HORACE M. KALLEN
AND THE AMERICANIZATION OF ZIONISM

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Title of Thesis: Horace M. Kallen and the Americanization of Zionism

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ABSTRACT

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Sarah L. Schmidt, Doctor of Philosophy, 1973

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Until the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, the years 1914-1921 constituted the high point of Zionism in America. Two factors were responsible: the outbreak of World War I which shifted major Zionist responsibility to the United States, and the assumption of the leadership of the American Zionist movement by Progressive reformer Louis D. Brandeis.

Under Brandeis' Chairmanship the American Zionist organization changed, developing emphases and goals different from the Zionists in Europe. Responding to intellectual formulations rather than to the pressures of felt anti-Semitism, Brandeis-led Zionism rejected the traditional Zionist definition of Palestine as an asylum for the oppressed and adopted, instead, the goal of a Jewish nation that would serve as a model social democracy. In tune with the prevailing Progressive emphasis on efficiency and on scientific management, but in contrast to the relaxed and informal operations of the European Zionists, Brandeis stressed organizational discipline and order. Unlike the
Europeans, who formed distinct groups of "practical" or "spiritual" Zionists, the American Zionists combined the two; they were "Messianic pragmatists" who defined a Utopian vision for the Jewish people, and then set out, by the most practical means possible, to achieve it.

Much of the American definition of Zionism during this period came from an almost anonymous individual, social philosopher Horace M. Kallen, who acted behind the scenes in many capacities. From 1914 until 1921, when a major dispute between the American Zionist leaders and their European counterparts over their differing conceptions of Zionism forced Brandeis and Kallen to leave the Zionist movement, Brandeis relied on Kallen in many ways. Kallen, a fellow Progressive, helped to formulate and to implement plans for efficient reform of the organization; he originated many of the ideas that Brandeis and others used as a basis for action in the Jewish community; he became a "missionary" trying to convert both Jews and non-Jews to the Zionist cause; he was, for quite some time, the sole American link with important Zionist activity in Great Britain; he prepared the outlines which American Zionists viewed as basic to the reconstruction of Palestine. Because Kallen did so much for American Zionism during this period, and because his approach to Zionism was influenced both by the philosophy of Pragmatism and the values of Progressivism, a presentation and analysis of his correspondence and records of those years does more than delineate the roles Kallen played as a Zionist activist.
It presents, also, a picture of the Zionist movement in America during a crucial decade, showing the way the organization took on an American cast, and relating the development of this Americanized Zionist organization to the mood and values of the dominant American culture of the period.
In 1973, the year in which the State of Israel celebrates its twenty fifth anniversary, the Zionist concept that the Jewish people constitute a national community is a fact of life. Though Americans may debate, for instance, the American foreign policy in the Middle East, the policies of the State of Israel vis-a-vis the Arab States, or the relationship of the Israeli Government to Zionist groups in the Diaspora, at the same time we must acknowledge that Zionism has become a vital, possibly the most vital, force within the American Jewish community. Furthermore, there is but scant challenge to the idea that one can be, at the same time, a Zionist and a good American; the issue of dual loyalty has become moot.  

This was not always the case. In early twentieth century America the dominant leaders of the German Jewish community considered Zionism a form of "tribalism," and for rabbis and laymen alike any manifestation of Zionism was an offense to their Americanism and an obstacle to Jewish adjustment in a democratic environment. A prominent spokesman for Reform Judaism once referred to Zionism as a "momentary inebriation of morbid minds," and in 1904 the lay head of the Jewish community, banker Jacob Schiff, refused to meet Zionist leader Theodor Herzl, writing, "I am an American pure and simple and cannot possibly belong to two nations. . . ."  

Among the masses of immigrants who flocked to the United
States from Eastern Europe between 1880 and 1914, Zionism also had little support. Too busy trying to make a living in a strange new urban industrial environment for much organizational or intellectual activity, the new arrivals tended to gravitate towards groups of old-country friends, or towards various shades of socialism. A weak Federation of American Zionists during its strongest year, 1908, had only 12,000 members, mainly in scattered groups of Hebraists from Eastern Europe who resented the Federation's leaders, a handful of Americanized Jews of German background.\(^3\)

Only a few years later Zionism had become a major force within the Jewish community, its organization increased manyfold in members, financial resources, and influence. Until the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, the years from 1914 to 1921 constituted the high points of Zionist interest and activity in America. Two factors were responsible. In 1914 the outbreak of World War I in Europe dislocated the World Zionist headquarters in Berlin, and the Zionists in the United States, the only major neutral country, undertook the responsibility of maintaining the continuity of the Zionist movement during the war years by forming a Provisional Executive Committee for Zionist affairs. The man they persuaded to head that Committee, a new "convert" to Zionism, was the Progressive leader famous as "The People's Attorney," Louis D. Brandeis.

Under Brandeis' Chairmanship the American Zionist organization changed. It took on the values of its leader, values
that he brought with him as a prominent Progressive reformer. Instead of remaining one rather ineffective extension of the World Zionist organization, American Zionism developed emphases and goals of its own. Responding to intellectual formulations and to pressures of imagination rather than to the pressures of felt anti-Semitism, Brandeis-led Zionism rejected the traditional Zionist definition of Palestine as an asylum for the oppressed and adopted, instead, the goal of a Jewish nation that would serve as a model social democracy. In tune with the prevailing Progressive emphasis on efficiency and on scientific management, but in contrast to the relaxed and informal operations of the European Zionists, Brandeis stressed organizational discipline and order. Unlike the Europeans, who formed distinct groups of "practical" or "spiritual" Zionists, the American Zionists combined the two; they were "Messianic pragmatists" who defined a Utopian vision for the Jewish people, and then set out, by the most practical means possible, to achieve it.

As this study will show, much of the American definition of Zionism during this period came from an almost anonymous individual acting behind the scenes in many capacities, intellectual and practical. This man was social philosopher Horace M. Kallen, best known in American intellectual history for his theory of cultural pluralism, a 1915 response to the then-prevailing pressures for conformity through "Americanization." Kallen had adopted Zionism in 1903 as a secular mode of retaining Jewish identity, an alternative to the Jewish religious
tradition which seemed to him to be incompatible with twentieth-century America. He had come to Zionism primarily through the influence of two of his Harvard professors, literary historian Barrett Wendell, who interpreted the Hebraic spirit of prophetic social justice as the inspiration for the American founding fathers, and William James, whose philosophy of Pragmatism emphasized the reality of manyness. Kallen extended Wendell's identification of Hebraic tradition with American idealism; he defined Zionism, the movement to renationalize the Jewish people, as an opportunity to found a model democracy based on the same concepts of liberty and equality which, for him, symbolized America. At the same time he applied James's concept of pluralism to the ethnic groups, among them the Jews, who were beginning to become prominent in the United States, and argued that preservation of differences constituted the true measure of equality the Declaration of Independence had set forth. Zionism, thus, was able to fulfill two functions for Kallen—it allowed him to retain his Jewish identity and to become, thereby, a better American.

In 1911 Kallen became an instructor of philosophy and psychology at the University of Wisconsin. When he moved to the Middle West he left his familiar environment. Lonely, and somewhat out of place in Madison, he felt the need to assert his Jewish identity more strongly and stepped up his pace of Zionist involvement. In 1913, after reading that Brandeis had expressed some interest in an economic project
for Palestine, Kallen wrote to him of his own Zionist ideas. A few months later, just prior to the time that Brandeis assumed the Chairmanship of the Provisional Emergency Committee for Zionist affairs in August 1914, Kallen submitted to him a memorandum, outlining in practical terms his more developed vision of a Jewish State as an extension of American ideals of freedom and justice for all. Brandeis' subsequent statements show that Kallen's presentations must have impressed him; after Brandeis became a Zionist leader he took over Kallen's ideas as his own and used them as the basis for the new, American, emphases he gave to Zionism.

From 1914 until 1921, when a major dispute between the American Zionist leaders and their European counterparts over their definitions of Zionism forced Brandeis and Kallen to leave the Zionist movement, Brandeis relied on Kallen in many ways. Kallen, a fellow Progressive, helped to formulate and to implement plans for efficient reform of the organization; he originated many of the ideas that Brandeis and others used as a basis for action in the Jewish community; he became a "missionary," using his own rationale for Zionism and his theory of cultural pluralism to convert both Jews and non-Jews to the Zionist cause; he was, for quite some time, the sole American link with important Zionist activity in Great Britain; he prepared the outlines for the Utopian society which American Zionists viewed as basic to the reconstruction of Palestine. Because Kallen did so much for American Zionism during this period, and because his Zionism was an extension
of his own beliefs as a Pragmatist and as a Progressive, a presentation and analysis of the correspondence and records of those years, which he preserved with great care, does more than delineate the roles Kallen played as a Zionist activist. It presents, also, a picture of the way the Zionist movement in America took on its own, American, cast, and relates the development of this Americanized Zionist organization to the mood and values of the dominant American culture of the period.

My method in presenting this story differs from traditional dissertation presentations. In mixing the narrative of Zionist history with letters to and from Kallen I have attempted to create a sense of the experience that Kallen had as he tried to influence the definition and direction of American Zionism. Little by little the reader will confront conditions within the Zionist movement much as Kallen did. Hopefully, his interaction with Kallen's correspondence will help him to sense the Zionist history of this period as it unfolded, to participate in "the happening" as it was taking place. To add perspective to the account, I have included, also, Kallen's retrospective recollections of the Zionist organization of this period, and of his involvement with it, as he has revealed them to me in three lengthy interviews and an ongoing correspondence.

"American Zionism is very much in need of a historian," wrote Eric Goldman in 1952. The same is true in 1973. This study is a beginning step into an area that sorely needs to
go beyond the propaganda and defensive-oriented tracts that comprise the current available literature on American Zionism. Through all these years Horace Kallen's files have lain dormant; so has any knowledge of the major contribution he made to the American Zionist movement. I am grateful that he has allowed me to work with his papers and that he has been so helpful in answering all my questions. And I am pleased that I have been able to complete this portrait of him while he still is able to read and to enjoy it.
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PART I
THE BACKGROUND

CHAPTER I
THE SETTING
I.

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless tempest-tos'd to
me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door! 1

The Jews of the United States were among the millions of exiles who flocked to the New World. As refugees, tired and poor, rejected and homeless, they came seeking fulfillment of the promise of new beginnings. At first they arrived in ones and twos, struggling individuals, unnoticed and unmeasured. But during the forty years between 1881 and 1920 a whole people, numbering close to two million, found a homeland in the United States. 2

Twenty-three fugitives from the outreaches of the Spanish Inquisition founded the first American Jewish community in 1654. Despite early intolerance and barriers to complete religious freedom, other small Jewish groups followed. These were almost entirely of Spanish-Portuguese origin, and filtered chiefly into Jewish communities concentrated in a half dozen seaboard centers; at the time of the founding of the Republic, the
Jewish population numbered only between 2,000 and 3,000, less than one-tenth of 1 per cent of the total colonial population. These early settlers were successful merchants, with valuable trade connections in England, Holland and the West Indies. They plied their trade in the seaboard towns, and were part of the mercantile aristocracy of the time. By 1840 immigration and natural increase had raised the Jewish population to about 15,000 in a total of 17,000,000. Historians generally refer to this period of American-Jewish history, 1654-1840, as the Spanish period, for despite the presence of a considerable number of German Jews, the majority of American Jews at this time traced descent from Spanish or Portuguese exiles, whose wealthy leaders set the tone of Jewish life by adhering to Spanish religious and communal tradition.

During the generation following 1840, the United States experienced a major period of expansion. Population increased rapidly, with large groups of immigrants coming from Ireland, Scandinavia and Germany. Among the Germans who settled in the United States during this period were close to 200,000 Jews. Though some of the German Jews settled on the Atlantic Coast, many moved into the interior and founded Jewish communities in Chicago, Cincinnati, Memphis, St. Paul and Indianapolis. The German Jews, long accustomed to peddling and trading, took up the function of middlemen among their former countrymen. Beginning modestly, with packs on their backs or with horse and wagon, many itinerant peddlers soon were able to open
retail stores and quickly elevated themselves to the American middle class. Ultimately, many of the shopkeepers became merchants on a still larger scale, and the most successful became bankers and brokers. Within a generation a new Jewish aristocracy took form, wholly apart from the old Spanish enclaves. At the same time these German Jews quietly transformed the character of American Jewry. Less assimilated into mainstream America, more numerous and more spread out over the continent, the German Jews quickly absorbed the Spanish communities. During the forty years from 1840 to 1880, German Jews founded religious, philanthropic and fraternal organizations on the pattern they had known in Western Europe. Reform Judaism, a product of Germany, grew and flourished in the new, less conventional, environment; because, however, it dispensed with much of Jewish tradition and custom, Reform Judaism severed the thread of continuity with much of the Jewish past. Jewish living came to mean only the observance of a limited ritual combined with community stress on organized charity in the form of hospitals, orphan asylums, and various benevolent associations. 5

By 1880 the number of Jews in the United States was still a fraction of the population, 250,000 of about 50,000,000, one half of 1%. But the wave of immigration which swept over the shores of the North Atlantic between 1880 and 1920 included 2,000,000 Jews; in the single year 1906 over 150,000 arrived, more than had come in any decade before the Civil War. Masses of men and women from Eastern Europe poured into a few
eastern ports, notably New York, and by 1920 the Jews had grown to fourteen times their number in 1880, three and one-quarter percent of the total population. These were the years when machine industry was growing rapidly, and the bulk of the new immigrants, poor and unskilled, became an industrial proletariat. They earned their living as machine hands, chiefly in the needle trades, and saved their pennies to send to Europe to help rescue the relatives they had left behind. This wave of immigration, a direct reaction to active anti-Semitism and mass pogroms in Russia, reunited in the new country entire communities with continuity of culture and tradition. Landsmen, groups of old-country men, tended to stay together, and were reluctant to discard their Jewish heritage; they reacted to the alien pattern of German Jewish life by drawing in unto themselves and organizing their own study circles and social welfare agencies. Eastern European leaders and intellectuals continued with the literary and political activity they had known in Europe, building up, for instance, a large and influential Yiddish press and an active socialist-oriented trade movement. The Germans had little empathy for these penniless immigrants of the working class, whose socialism and ideas of trade unions threatened the foundations of their status as successful American capitalists. German Jews adopted a patronizing and condescending attitude towards the newcomers, excluding them from their social functions and social institutions, and insisting that they give up their culture and traditions as a prerequisite
to becoming good Americans. Turn of the century accounts show that tension between the two groups dominated the life of the Jewish community.  

Two distinct segments, then, formed the Jewish community during the Progressive Era; between them there was little interaction and considerable antagonism. Class differences between the two groups, the different dates of their migration, and the differences in their culture and traditions contributed to the gap. Stephen Wise, who was later to play an active role as leading spokesman for the American Jewish community, recalled in his autobiography that he had lived part of the early years of his life in the "ghetto of German born and German descended Jews of New York. . . . I barely knew or even touched the life of a much larger group of New York Jews who had come to America since 1881, the Eastern European Jews. . . ."  

The German Jews had an additional good reason for resentment of the newer immigrants. The mass influx of the latecomers, and their heavy concentration in a few cities, halted the process of assimilation of the older Jews into American society. When the dominant non-Jewish society began to develop the stereotype "Jew," based on the distinct language and cultural habits of the Eastern Europeans, the new anti-Semitism did not discriminate between the two communities. The first wave of major anti-Semitism in the U.S. in the 1880's and 1890's forced the Germans to rethink their assumed acceptance as complete and loyal Americans, and, as anti-Semitism
increased, a rapprochement between the two Jewish groups slowly began.  

During the twentieth century the American Jewish community has gradually achieved union, if not unity. The reasons are many, but two stand out. Like most of America's subcultures, the majority of this country's Jews generally have accommodated themselves to demands made by American standards of life and culture, not entirely relinquishing Jewish tradition, but finding some "middle way" comfortable to all. Even more important, perhaps, is that the overwhelming proportion of the Jewish community, to a greater or lesser degree, has come to identify with and support the State of Israel—the end product of a half century of struggle on the part of the Zionist movement. This American Jewish support for Israel is an especially surprising development, since the appearance of Zionism on the American scene at the turn of this century evoked such hostility on the part of the Jewish Establishment that its leaders referred to it jeeringly as "the momentary inebriation of morbid minds."  

II.  
The modern social and political movement called Zionism began with the convening of the first Zionist Congress in 1897 by Theodor Herzl, a highly Westernized, nearly assimilated, Viennese-Jewish journalist. One year earlier Herzl had written a book, The Jewish State, which was to transform the Jewish world. Herzl's thesis involved several assumptions:
(1) The Jews constitute a nation in the psychic and cultural sense, but they lack the attributes of political nationality; (2) anti-Semitism and Jewish suffering are the inevitable consequences of the Jews' statelessness; (3) Judaism as a civilization or culture is in danger of extinction unless the Jews are enabled to defend themselves physically and to express their unique spiritual nature; (4) a national state is the only institution which can guarantee such self-defense and self-expression; (5) Jewish survival and continued Jewish contribution to the mainstream of world culture can be ensured only if the Jews obtain an independent national state.

Though Zionist groups had been active in Eastern Europe for some time, propagandizing the national idea and urging immigration to the ancient homeland in Palestine, and though a purely cultural movement dedicated to the revival of Jewish literature and the Hebrew language had preceded this limited political activity, it was Herzl's enunciation of the "Jewish Question," and his dynamic leadership, that transformed an ethereal vision of a "Return to Zion" into a political movement. The First Zionist Congress enunciated the so-called Basle Platform which was to become the keystone of the world Zionist movement. Zionism, as the Basle Platform defined it, "seeks to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law." In the early years of this century the leaders of this "political Zionism" emphasized the diplomatic activities of the movement, trying to pressure various European governments into helping grant Jews a political
charter allotting them a piece of land on which to build an independent state. After 1903, when the Zionist Congress rejected Great Britain's offer of Uganda for the Jewish nation, the political Zionist movement added the proviso that only Palestine, because of its unique associations with Jewish historical development, could provide the territory for the future Jewish State.11

Zionist leaders then began to direct their efforts towards the Turkish Government, which had title to Palestine as part of the Ottoman Empire. Results were negligible, however, particularly after the nationalist oriented 1908 revolt of the Young Turks, and Zionism, as an effective political movement, appeared moribund. World War I brought a sudden new opportunity. Turkey joined with the Central powers, and Chaim Weizmann, an active Zionist since the early days of the movement, led a small group of English Zionists in revived diplomatic efforts, working through the British Cabinet as representative of the Allied Powers. In November 1917, when Great Britain conquered Palestine, the British Cabinet issued a promise to the Jewish community that came to be known as the "Balfour Declaration." The key phrase of the "Balfour Declaration" read: "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine,
or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." On the basis of this statement of official British policy, the Allied Powers granted Great Britain the Mandate for Palestine at the San Remo Conference in April 1920, with the "responsibility for placing the country under such . . . conditions as will secure the establishment of a Jewish national home." Many Zionists at that time, particularly the leaders of the movement in America, considered this commitment the fulfillment of the goals Herzl had set for the Zionist movement. 12

At the same time, however, that Herzl and his followers were pursuing diplomatic activities, most Eastern Europeans and some Westerners represented a so-called "practical school" of Zionism. They wanted the Zionist movement to concentrate primarily on awakening the national consciousness of the Jewish masses, believing that once the masses became nationally conscious they would themselves motivate their energies for the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine. These Zionists worked for constant colonization of Palestine and the strengthening of the internal Zionist organization. Particularly after the failure of attempts at diplomatic negotiation with the Turks, the Zionist movement began to emphasize the programs of the practical Zionists; by 1913 the Executive of the World Zionist Congress contained not one political Zionist. The negotiations that led to the issuance of the "Balfour Declaration" were done apart from, and almost without the knowledge of, the official World
All during this early period there was also a group known as spiritual or cultural Zionists. Their leader was a Hebrew essayist who wrote under the name Achad Ha'am—in Hebrew, "one of the people." Cultural Zionists believed in the restoration of Palestine as a center for the preservation of the eternal values of Judaism, a spiritual generator that would preserve the Jewish communities throughout the world. Not Jewry, but Judaism, they held, was in peril, and Palestine must look beyond a role as asylum for the oppressed. Colonization must be slow and sound; hurried large scale growth would endanger the quality of the new Jewish homeland and lessen its impact on the Diaspora Jewish communities. Cultural Zionists were always a minority within the Zionist movement, but they were articulate and their ideas carried weight beyond their numbers.

Though differences between political and practical Zionists caused much controversy in the early years of the Zionist movement, creating bitter factionalism between its Western and Eastern European branches, actually both were concerned with differing means to a similar end. Zionism's ultimate goal always was to be a Jewish State secured by law, a state that would provide the solution to the political, social and cultural problems of the Jewish people by permitting them to develop a free national life. Conflict within the movement itself as to the role of religion, Hebraic culture, capitalism and socialism in the homeland-to-be forms much of the Zionist
history of the twentieth century. Indeed, differing priorities inherent in the different perspective of some American Zionist leaders led to a serious break and a separatist path for them after World War I. Nevertheless, when Louis D. Brandeis, the leader of the American Zionists, issued his own definition of Zionism he adhered closely to the 1896 Basle Platform. "Zionism seeks to establish in Palestine, for such Jews as choose to go and remain there . . . a legally secured home, where they may live together and lead a Jewish life," he said in 1915, and it is this concept of Zionist aims to which this study refers. 15

III.

American activity on behalf of the colonization of Palestine--practical Zionism--began in 1884, with the establishment of a branch of the Eastern European "Lovers of Zion" (Hoveve Zion) Society in New York. Political Zionism began in 1898, with the formation of a Federation of American Zionists, a loosely organized federation of groups interested in Zionism. Yet there had been isolated forerunners.

The first American Jewish exponent of Zionism was Mordecai Emanuel Noah, self-styled "Citizen of the United States of America, late consul of the said States to the City and Kingdom of Tunis, High Sheriff of New York . . . ." Influenced by the unhappy plight of the Jews he had seen in his travels through Europe and Africa, and smarting from the insult of his mysterious removal as Consul to Tunis--an action
which he attributed to anti-Semitism in the State Department—Noah conceived of a plan to establish a Zion in the New World. In 1825 he proclaimed himself governor and judge over Israel, and persuaded a Christian friend to buy land for a Jewish republic on Grand Island, in the Niagara River in upstate New York. Noah named his colony Ararat, and conceived of it as an asylum "where our people may so familiarize themselves with the science of government . . . as may qualify them for that great and final restoration to their ancient heritage, which the times so powerfully indicate." No one, however, accepted Noah's plan to colonize at Ararat, and in his late years he returned to his original dream of a Jewish State in Palestine. 16

Six years later, Rabbi Isaac Leeser, an influential German-born Rabbi of a Spanish-Jewish congregation in Philadelphia, called "for a time when the land of Israel is again to be ours." Though he did not suggest that American Jews settle there, Leeser saw Palestine as a place of refuge for the oppressed Jews of Russia, Germany and Hungary. Close to the modern American attitude towards Zionism, he felt that the role of American Jews would be to provide financial support for agricultural colonies in "the land which is the Israelite's home and [in which] he should always regard himself as having an interest in its soil." 17

The first wave of Russian Jewish immigration, the aftermath of the Russian pogroms of 1881, aroused the conscience of poet Emma Lazarus, member of a wealthy Portuguese Jewish family
long assimilated in America and far removed from all Jewish associations. Her later poems are a rallying cry for the dispersed of Israel, full of a vision of the Jewish people restored to its land. The re-establishment in Palestine of "an independent Jewish nationality" was the only remedy which was not a "temporary palliative." She was not afraid that "the establishment of a free Jewish state [would have] the remotest bearing upon the position of the American Jews"; it was clearly the responsibility of American Jews, in their prosperity, to help establish "a home for the homeless, ... a nation for the denationalized."\(^{18}\)

These early American manifestations of Zionism had about them a touch of the romantic--Jews, far removed from actual suffering or persecution, seeking to minister to their brethren through an asylum in Palestine. Herzl's call for a Jewish homeland had about it much of the same tone. Both Herzl and Emma Lazarus, for instance, had none of the Eastern Europe Zionist experience which defined the need for colonization in a practical way--a mode of release both from Czarist oppression and from Orthodox Jewish repression. American philanthropic interest in Palestine differed from Herzl, though, in a very crucial way. Comfortably assimilated in the open society of nineteenth century America, Lazarus and the other early Zionists would not have assented to Herzl's assumption that only by creating a home for the Jewish people in Palestine could the Jews purge themselves of their Diaspora inhibitions and face the world on free and equal terms. They
already had found their "Promised Land," and merely wished to provide another one for those whom America could not accommodate. Thus, even before formal Zionist activity in America had begun, there were already the seeds of an emphasis on Zionism as a charitable social work enterprise—a function Zionist organizations have retained in the American Jewish community to this day.  

IV.

Between the years 1884-1914, American Zionism, reflecting the American Jewish community as a whole, consisted of two distinct segments. Zionist activity started with Eastern European Yiddish-speaking transplants, who founded several little "Lovers of Zion" societies in the 1880's and 1890's in New York, Boston, Chicago and Baltimore. These newcomers, though content to live out their lives in the United States, found satisfaction in continuing their practical Zionist activity to help establish colonies in Palestine. The existence of these groups was understandably haphazard in a country populated by relatively few Jews, most of whom were of alien German extraction, far removed from interest in traditional Jewish values. The "Lovers of Zion" were weak in membership, in finances, in clear cut goals, and in leadership. By 1897 the fledgling Zionist movement in America was nearly dead. 

It came to life again under the aegis of German-born Dr. Richard Gottheil, a distinguished orientalist and professor
of Semitic languages at Columbia University. Gottheil's father, despite the fact that he served as rabbi of the most influential anti-Zionist Reform congregation in the country, had a deep emotional interest in Palestine, an interest which he had passed on to his son. In 1897 Richard Gottheil attended the first Zionist Congress in Basle, and returned to this country inspired by Herzl and determined to organize a Zionist movement in America. The following year Gottheil called for a national conference of Zionist societies; nearly one hundred Hebrew speaking clubs, Jewish educational societies, synagogue organizations and fraternal lodges responded. They formed a loosely organized Federation of American Zionist Societies, in which the unit was the society, not the individual member, and which included many Jewish groups that had little, if any, Zionist knowledge or orientation. Though the leadership came from the German Jewish community, the members of most of the societies were recent Eastern European arrivals. Like the "Lovers of Zion," many of these groups were short-lived, and the strength they contributed to the central body, including the essential item of financial aid, was meager and precarious. 21

Louis Lipsky, one of the most active of the early Zionists, and editor of its English language journal The Maccabean, recalled that these early years of American Zionism were "provincial. . . . Our system of taxation was ineffective, and discipline was quite unknown." Professor Gottheil, the organization's unchallenged perennial president,
used to take his annual vacation in Europe during the summer, consistently missing the Federation convention in the Catskill Mountains of New York. At these conventions the few young active workers, mainly Eastern Europeans who had come to America as adolescents, received some information about the worldwide Zionist movement and its goals. For the rest of the year, however, Zionist activity consisted of collecting for the Jewish National Fund, selling shares of the Jewish Colonial Trust, and singing Hatikvah, "The Hope," the Zionist anthem. Because the national leaders of the Federation of American Zionists were upper class Westernized Jews, and the rank and file were part of the lower class immigrant community, there was a communications gap and little hope of effective organization or action. Stephen Wise, a student of Gottheil's at Columbia, served as the Federation's first secretary. Years later Wise remembered that "there was little or no contact between Eastside and Westside Zionists" beyond the fact that he and Gottheil felt obliged to attend the "long" and "drawn out" meetings of some constituent groups. Bernard Richards, an active member of one of these groups, pictured Gottheil as "aloof, solemn, and fearfully formal." Yet Gottheil always was re-elected, for there were no other candidates with his stature in the American Jewish community who had the time and resources to devote to an abstract cause. 22

In 1902 Herzl, recognizing the weakness of the Federation of American Zionists, sent his own English secretary, Jacob deHaas, to the United States, with instructions to provide
some professional guidance and inspiration for the fledgling movement. deHaas, a London journalist and one of Herzl's first adherents in England, became the paid secretary of the Federation and the editor of its English-language monthly, The Maccabean. But within two years deHaas had to resign from both posts; there was not enough money in the Federation's coffers to pay him an adequate salary.23

The 1903 Kishineff pogrom in Russia gave American Zionists the first tangible opportunity to use their organized strength in action. Kishineff was a direct intrusion of the Jewish need implicit in the condition of the European Jews; the unprovoked anti-Semitic massacre was just the proof Zionist speakers needed to show that the Jews desperately needed a land of their own. Zionists were leaders in organizing meetings and demonstrations, including a protest parade down New York's Fifth Avenue. Judah Magnes, a Rabbi who the German Reform establishment had cast from their ranks for his pro-Zionist ideas, emerged as a new Zionist leader. He quickly organized a group which collected $15,000 to aid Jewish self defense in Russia, and won over many new converts to Zionism by his smooth "Western" appearance and language. Lipsky described this time as "thrilling," with "scenes at mass meetings transcend[ing] description."24

Though Zionist enthusiasts expected a large influx of new converts into the fold after Kishineff, when the shock and indignation subsided so did the interest in Zionism. For the next decade, until the outbreak of World War I, Zionism
in America continued to be a small and feeble enterprise, providing an outlet for a few devotees whose spokesmen often sounded trite and apologetic. Zionist societies came and went, with a yearly turnover sometimes approaching fifty percent. There were a few stable components to the Federation—a Zionist fraternal order, Order Sons of Zion; Hadassah, a women’s organization founded in 1912; the Intercollegiate Zionist Organization and its counterpart for adolescents, Young Judea; a weekly Yiddish newspaper and a monthly English magazine. There were also two large and active semi-autonomous groups, the Socialist oriented Labor Zionists, and Mizrachi, the Orthodox religious Zionists. Yet at the Federation’s pre-war convention in 1914, the organization reported a total membership of 15,000 and adopted a yearly budget of only $12,150. Clearly its influence and its resources fell short of its potential in the American Jewish community, which already numbered more than 3,000,000. The American milieu seemed to discourage the Zionist efforts; one careful study of the Zionist journal The Maccabebean has concluded that until 1914 American Zionism had "exerted no positive leadership in moulding Jewish communal institutions ... nor did it become a decisive force in determining the ideological patterns of American born Jews."  

V.

Why was the transplantation of the Zionist idea onto American soil so difficult? There are many reasons, some
deriving from conditions in America generally at that time, some particular to the structure and minority position of the Jewish community.

In a very basic sense, compelling economic factors were at work during these years of mass immigration that made affiliation with, and activity for, Zionism difficult. The newcomers often arrived literally penniless; at the turn of the century Jewish immigrants brought with them "an average of only eight dollars a head and faced the stark necessity of finding work to keep alive." The Eastern Europeans who would be needed to make up any large scale organization, unlike the Germans in earlier years, tended to remain in their port of entry, where they found work in the most poorly paid industrial trades. They lived meagerly, working overtime and saving money to help bring over more quickly the relatives and friends they had left behind. Not only was there no extra money for what appeared to be an abstract cause, there was neither time nor energy for ideological "hobbies." Eastern Europeans active in the Zionist movement, like Lipsky, had come to the United States at the very beginning of the years of mass immigration, and had had time to gain something of an economic footing by the early twentieth century. 26

It was only natural that under such financial hardships, and amid the degrading conditions of the sweatshop system, that the labor movement should attract the Jewish workers. The unions not only fought to improve the working conditions
of the laborers; they represented, also, a means through which the newcomers could adjust to the new society. It is quite understandable, therefore, that the activities of the unions and the propaganda of the Socialist organizations seemed far more important to the immigrants than the fortunes of the Zionist movement, which in no immediate way affected or improved their own complicated existence. 

A second factor was the lack of dynamic leadership necessary for successful organizational activity. Leaders of the Federation of American Zionists like Gottheil were far removed from the rank and file and quite ignorant of their needs, problems, and modes of expression. Early Labor Zionists recalled, "The Zionist office had little contact with the Jewish masses. When Zionism occasionally descended upon the Jewish ghetto, it appeared like a ghost wearing a silk topper." By contrast, the leaders of the trade unions and the Socialist organizations were the aggressive intellectuals of the immigrant communities, schooled in the art of leadership. The speed with which Zionist groups formed and disbanded, the existence of so many groups each with small membership, the petty rivalries among groups and the lack of confidence of the constituency in the Zionist leadership, all contributed to the instability of the Zionist movement during this period. 

Another problem was the distance of Palestine, both physically and ideologically, from the lives and concerns of the American Jewish population. Palestine was far away, and,
except for rare occasions when visitors came and told colorful tales, it was difficult to conceive of a Jewish state as a vivid reality. Zionist activities at the time consisted mainly of "propaganda and polemics," according to Abraham Goldberg, an early Labor Zionist; to workers grappling with the problems of life on New York's East Side, the idealism of the Socialists seemed more pertinent and closer to home than the idealism of the Zionists.29

Most of the Eastern European newcomers came from communities that adhered to the Orthodox practice of Judaism. There was a small Orthodox Zionist group; the traditional Orthodox position, however, was that the dispersion of the Jews from their homeland was a sign of God's displeasure, and that the Diaspora would end only with the coming of a Messiah, certainly not through the intervention of human measures. Orthodox Rabbis equated Zionism with assimilation, and considered it the blasphemous destroyer of the traditional faith. Though the majority of immigrants dropped their Orthodox practices and beliefs once they came to America, this was not an immediate process, and initially the diatribes of Orthodox spokesmen against Zionism carried great weight.30

But the strongest pressure mitigating against Zionist activity was the pressure for Americanization, the attempt to divest the immigrant of his former cultural habits and customs, and to make him adhere solely to the American way of life as set by the Anglo-Saxon stock. As soon as the immigrants arrived in the United States, they encountered
strong forces drawing them away from their own cultural forms, which may have included Zionism, towards "The American Way."
The humanitarian urge to improve the lot of the immigrants, implicit in the message of the Social Gospel, often took the form of settlement house indoctrination; in some instances, young social workers came to live among the foreigners to "show them by direct contact how to live as true Americans."
Despite their best intentions, the activities of the settlement house workers implied to the sensitive newcomers that the old ways were not truly American, and ought, therefore, to be discarded. 31

One of the most influential settlement houses on the East Side of New York was the Educational Alliance. Its first director, David Blaustein, noted in his memoirs, "Special effort [was] made to impress the children with the idea of patriotism and acquaint them with American customs and usages." This stress after school and on weekends emphasized the message of the public schools, which, during this period especially, had a far-reaching influence in molding ideas to fit the standards expected by Anglo-Saxon Americans. Mary Antin's The Promised Land is but one instance of the school's role in the dramatic transformation of immigrant Jew into aspiring American. 32

The pressure to Americanize, with its corollary to forget the Jewish national aspiration, came to the Eastern European newcomers not only from the American non-Jewish community. Perhaps even stronger and more influential was
the active hostility towards Zionism of the established Jewish community, whose leaders, after having worked hard to establish themselves as loyal Americans, feared for their precariously balanced status. "We have fought our way through to liberty, equality and fraternity; none shall rob us of these gains. . . . I refuse to allow myself to be called a Zionist, I am an American," proclaimed Henry Morgenthau, Sr. 33

At the beginning of the twentieth century, a distinct pictorial stereotype of the Jew began to emerge in newspapers and on the stage. This pattern of physical features and form of expression based itself on the Jewish immigrants, and the German Jews rightfully feared that the emerging anti-Semitism would engulf them as well. Because of their belief that safety both for themselves as well as for the immigrant masses lay in an adjustment of the Jewish way of life to the common American pattern, the German Jewish communal leaders worked hard to hasten the acculturation of the newer immigrants. Fraternal orders and women's groups devoted themselves to the uplift of the sweatshop workers, providing them with free medical care, food and clothing, as well as lectures on American culture and lessons in the English language, doling out philanthropy in an impersonal and patronizing manner that quite antagonized its recipients. 34

To the Reform Jews Zionism was a philosophy of foreign origin, not suitable for true Americans. "I am an American pure and simple, and cannot possibly belong to two nations,"
wrote Jacob Schiff, a lavish philanthropist and acknowledged lay leader of the established Jewish community. Rabbi David Phillipson represented the sentiments of the Reform leadership in expressing their almost religious devotion to America as the Promised Land, when, in 1895, he pronounced "The United States is our Palestine and Washington our Jerusalem." The American Israelite, organ of the Reform Jews, made their position clear that "the whole noise [of Zionism] is made by some persons of recent immigration, with whom we American Jews have absolutely nothing to do."35

What troubled Zionists most were the charges of double patriotism the Westernized Jews, out of their own insecurity, continued to level against them. Louis Lipsky recalled that "Jacob H. Schiff, speaking with a delightful German accent, used to elaborate upon its [dual loyalties'] dangers. His words carried in the press [and] we had to spend weeks to catch up with them." In 1907 Schiff publicly dissociated himself from Zionism. "Speaking as an American," he said, "I cannot for a moment conceive that one can be at the same time a true American and an honest adherent of the Zionist movement." At the time, Schiff's statement was extremely influential; in reply, the struggling Zionists could only protest and hold meetings. With pressure from both outside and from within their community, the masses of new Jewish immigrants quickly chose to become Americans--and just as quickly lost their interest in the Zionist movement.36
VI

The America that the new immigrants were so eager to become absorbed into was the American society of the early twentieth century, the America of the period which historians have come to call the Progressive Era. These years, between the Spanish-American War and World War I, were a time when the heretofore agrarian and commercial economy of the United States was shifting to become an urban and industrial one. The Jeffersonian image of the self-sufficient yeoman, and the individualistic American ethic shaped in the rural past, suddenly seemed obsolete and irrelevant in the new technological and industrial age. Many Americans expressed concern about the position of the individual within the country's increasingly industrial society, and argued that some changes would have to be made if the United States was to survive with its values intact. 37

Between 1896 and 1914, therefore, there arose various attempts at reform, operating at the local, state and national levels of government. Though these efforts were uncoordinated, diffuse rather than united, taken together they constituted a broad movement which, at the time, appeared to be "progressive," i.e., advancing towards a more perfect condition of society. Reformers, mainly independent professionals and small businessmen, sought different goals: political reforms, to destroy the urban political machines and their attendant corruption; economic reforms, to regulate public utilities and to curtail corporate power; and social
reforms, to ameliorate the lot of the innocent victims of the new industrial order, like women, children and the poor of the cities' slums. The solutions they presented were complex, confused, and often contradictory; they were trying to preserve the competitive and individualistic American tradition, but, at the same time, they did not want to sacrifice the affluence and modernity associated with technological progress. Economically secure and optimistic in their social views, yet anxious about their own status in society, the middle-class progressives enacted only mild measures that never really threatened existing power relationships. 38

Though historians have come to judge both the intent and the results of the progressive reformers rather severely, during the early twentieth century there was an energizing sense of optimism among intellectuals and critics of American life. Progressives felt that they were leading a popular rebellion against the unfettered power of large corporations and against the political machines that corrupted public institutions and negated democracy. Their goals, as the Progressives saw them, were clear and simple—to bring government back to the people, to abolish special privilege, and to enact a series of laws embodying principles of social justice and equal opportunity for all. Their underlying motive, said the Progressives, was to restore to America the values on which it had been founded, the ideal of a democratic and humane society based on egalitarianism and on social compassion. Though the progressive leaders usually
came from an urban middle class elite, they considered themselves to be allied with the masses against the forces of wealth, self-interest and special privilege. Historians writing within the Progressive tradition, for instance, believed that the progressive reformers, regardless of their specific goals, were part of the same movement because they invariably supported "the people" against their enemies.

One group of "the people" who the progressive leaders did not support, however, were the recent immigrants to the United States, especially those from Eastern and from Southern Europe whose traditions and habits appeared alien to the predominantly Anglo-Saxon reformers. The progressives were tolerant, but they viewed the immigrant as a passive entity to be molded under the influences of American society. Progressives were in the forefront of groups working to "Americanize" the immigrant, which meant encouraging him to replace his old-world traditions with both loyalty to the American government and adherence to American, i.e., Anglo-Saxon, culture. Though, as in the settlement houses, progressives often carried out Americanization programs with sympathy and with understanding of the immigrants' backgrounds, their goal, nevertheless, was to hasten the assimilation of all immigrant groups into one vast American "melting pot." It is no surprise, therefore, that foreign ideologies like Zionism made little headway in the United States during the Progressive period. For the reform leaders who, through schools or through settlement houses, were most likely to come into
contact with the new immigrants, were precisely those who had a commitment, albeit an often subtle one, to helping change the immigrant into a complete, a 100%, American, a loyal citizen with no dual allegiances to interfere in his adjustment to his new country. 39

VII.

During this pre-World War I period there was one significant attempt to reconcile the Zionist idea with the reality of conditions for the Jewish newcomers to America. In 1902 leaders of the Conservative Jewish Theological Seminary in New York chose Dr. Solomon Schechter, a renowned English Biblical scholar, to head their nascent school. Schechter had discovered and had explicated valuable Jewish manuscripts, and his attainments in the field of Jewish scholarship were imposing, but, with all his devotion to so-called "Jewish science," Schechter remained a religious mystic. In Zionism he saw the salvation of Judaism, and he set out to champion its cause against the Reform and secularist Jews on one hand, and the Orthodox traditionalists on the other. 40

Schechter agreed with classic Zionist theory that the gentile society in Europe, because of longstanding and deep-seated anti-Semitism, would inevitably drive the Jews out. But he felt that this analysis did not apply to America. America was the New World, and American Jews would be free to make their way as they wished in this open and
unprejudiced society. In essence, said Schechter, America was different, and so would be the experience of its Jews. 41

The role of Zionism also would be different. Though American Jews would not need to go to Palestine because of oppression or persecution, nevertheless it would be in their best interests to support the building of a Jewish state. For Palestine would be a special community, providing an emotional, spiritual and cultural homeland even for Jews who preferred to remain outside it. Jewish self-respect demanded Zionism, not as a form of charity, but as a way to preserve Jewish identity in a society where all forces encouraged assimilation. 42

Schechter's Zionist formulation was valuable because it responded to the fears of the new immigrants by helping them to harmonize their desire to become part of America with their desire to retain their deep Jewish sentiments and relationship with Jewish culture. Actually, however, Schechter's two-sided definition of Zionism came close to a re-statement of the Basle Platform of 1897. "It is not only desirable," he said, "but absolutely necessary, that Palestine, the land of our fathers, should be recovered with the purpose of forming a home for at least a portion of the Jews, who would there lead an independent Jewish life." But in addition, according to Schechter, Zionism would serve as "the great bulwark against assimilation" for those who would live outside the homeland. 43

The key to the usefulness of Schechter's concept of Zionism in America lay in his careful distinction between
assimilation and Americanization. Americanization—"that every Jew should do his best to acquire the English language [and] . . . should study American history . . ., thoroughly appreciating the privilege of being a member of this great commonwealth"—was good. But assimilation—"loss of identity"—would deprive both the Jews and the rest of the world of a valuable heritage. Zionism, "through the awakening of the national Jewish consciousness," would provide "a most wholesome check" to Jewish absorption. Further, the Jewish people must "first effect its own redemption and live again its own life, and in Israel again, to accomplish its universal mission." Political Zionism, then, would be the handmaiden of an ultimate spiritual purpose, as well as the indispensable tool for saving Jews in need in Eastern Europe.

In 1906, at the time Schechter wrote this statement, his words made little impression amongst the masses. Though they needed some rationale to preserve their identity as Jews in this strange new land, the influence of articulate Reform leaders, and wealthy American Jews like Jacob Schiff, that one could not be both a Zionist and a good American was still too strong and too convincing. Yet Schechter impressed his students, the rabbis-to-be of the next generation, and many Jewish intellectuals, who found his ideas congenial with their own search for secure roots as Jews. Though he died in 1915, just as American Zionism was beginning to come into its own, Schechter had laid the foundation for later and more complete expressions of an American rationale for Zionism.
Horace M. Kallen is a philosopher, an educator, a "scientific humanist," an "aesthetic pragmatist"—a nonagenarian who in 1973 is still active lecturing, writing, and publishing. His career has been long and varied, stretching back to the turn of this century when he first attracted the attention of his Harvard professors, who perceived unusual qualities of intelligence and sensitivity in this young Jewish immigrant. These teachers—William James, George Santayana, Barrett Wendell, Josiah Royce—were also leaders of their time in American philosophy and literary criticism. The influence they had on young Kallen, combined with his own receptivity and perceptive empathy, gave him the start towards an unusually creative lifetime, combining contemplation and action in equal measure.

Since the early years of this century, Kallen has been addressing himself towards a wide range of problems of contemporary concern, frequently recognizing and confronting issues decades before they came into national prominence. Thus, Kallen's interest in minority cultures goes back seventy years to the pre-World War I era when he first began to think about "the right to be different" that
became "cultural pluralism"; his interest in the environment and problems of human survival goes back sixty years to contacts he made during World War I; his interest in man as consumer goes back fifty years, to experiences he had with the labor movement during the twenties. "It takes about fifty years for an idea to break through and become vogue," says Kallen; he is fortunate to have lived long enough to see his early concerns validated by the course of time, and to know that scholars are using his contributions of years ago for their continuing interest and stimulation.  

There is another, special, side to Dr. Kallen's life, reflecting his position as a Jew living in America. "I have always regarded you as the foremost creative American Jewish thinker who demonstrates by actual example that it is possible to live with distinction synchronously in two civilizations," wrote Jewish philosopher Rabbi Mordecai M. Kaplan to Kallen in 1952, on the occasion of Kallen's seventieth birthday. Kaplan's appraisal is correct. For Kallen has succeeded in defining and living his life both as an American and as a Jew from his single philosophical perspective of Hebraism, the source, according to Kallen, of both cultures. Hebraism, "individualism . . .; the right to be oneself, the right to be different," allows Kallen to perceive his "Jewish difference [to] be no less real, worthy and honorable than any other" and Kallen has learned to overcome his "dumb anxiety over [his] Jewish identity" by "living and orchestrating it" with the principles of the American Idea, principles of
individual liberty and freedom that he has spent a lifetime explaining and teaching.3

II.

Kallen, born in Germany in 1882, came to America as a young child when, in 1887, his entire family emigrated to Boston. Kallen's father was an Orthodox Jewish rabbi, and as Kallen recalls,

The doctrine and discipline of my earliest years were the Jewish doctrine and discipline, the Hebrew Bible with its Judaist commentaries and the difficult and heroic economy of the Orthodox Jewish home. It is upon the foundation and against the background of my Jewish cultural milieu that my vision of America was grown.4

Like other immigrant children of his generation, Kallen's first confrontation with America, its history and values, was through the medium of the public schools. Particularly influential was

an old agnostic Yankee teacher in the Eliot Grammar School [named] Webster ... who had fought in the Civil War [and] was fond of reading us poetry and bits of Emerson.... He knew, of course, who my father was, and it used to amuse him to stop me in the corridors ... and ... talk religion and theology to me .... I used to resent being stopped, but the conversations left their mark.

Kallen's teachers perceived American history "with the simplicity and clarity, even the beauty," of its depiction in the history textbooks of the 1890's; under their influence he soon came to agree. He has recalled his youth,

I saw a pious and heroic generation of Puritans making their righteous and providential way .... against devilish blood-thirsty redskins .... I saw their descendants, a heroic and embattled handful of lovers of liberty .... I used to go down
to the Tea Wharf to see where the tea had been poured, and up to Bunker Hill to fight that battle for myself. ... [This was] the true part of my life, the most personal part of my existence.5

Bit by bit in Kallen's mind "the drama of persons" in the American story receded before "the ecstasy of ideas."

In our household the suffering and slavery of Israel were commonplaces of conversation; from Passover to Passover, freedom was an ideal ceremonially revered, religiously aspired to. The textbook story of the Declaration of Independence came upon me, nurtured upon the deliverance from Egypt and the bondage in exile, like the clangor of trumpets, like a sudden light. What a resounding battle cry of freedom! And then, what an invincible march of Democracy to triumph over every enemy--over the English king, over the American Indian, over the uncivilized Mexican, over the American champions of slavery betraying American freedom, over everything, to the very day of the history lesson!6

It is not surprising that Kallen preferred to immerse himself in "the heroic America of the textbook legends"; his alternative was to live in "the sordid realities of the daily struggle for bread which I shared with my God-fearing proud father and his long-suffering household." Kallen was the oldest of eight children, and until the birth of the eighth, the only son. "My father was a strict man; I didn't like him," Kallen recalls. He found his father's expectations that he continue in the Orthodox Jewish tradition onerous, and particularly resented his role as Rabbi's son.

It was a poor household and the rules were such that orchim [guests] were always more important than the members of the family. At the Sabbath meal father would have in guest visitors; then it was FHB--family hold back.7

Paralleling the experience of many immigrant sons, Kallen found his new world alien from that of his father and, even
as a young boy, ran away from home several times. "I never could make my devout and learned and very snobbish father . . . too powerful, too demanding, to be idealized, to be anything but feared and dodged and hated--understand the why of these truancies," remembers Kallen. "My father's ways were authoritarian. Alternatives to them provided channels of liberation. 'Alienation' . . . was a process of liberation." Only in 1917, during the last two weeks of the elder Kallen's life, were the two reconciled and some sense of understanding established between them. Kallen wrote then to his friend and philosophy colleague, Wendell T. Bush,

He is among the last of the old school of Jews, who would make absolutely no concession to their environment, but made their environment wherever they went. . . . He insisted that the ritual ordinations were to be followed to the letter, because in them the life and soul of a community consists. . . . When his generation is all gone, I think that the Hebraic spirit will undergo disintegration outside of Palestine.8

When Kallen rebelled against his father he rejected more than the seemingly tyrannical personality who wished his son both to subordinate his new found freedom to family demands, and to deny his interest in secular learning in favor of the duties of Jewish scholarship. Kallen rejected, in one grand sweep, all the tradition which his father represented. "In the Oversoul of Emerson . . . and in the God of Spinoza . . . I found weapons with which to confound the Jehovah of my father and his rule," Kallen wrote in 1933. By the time he was an adolescent, Kallen had denied for himself any validity
in the Jewish doctrine; he was "extremely repellent about Judaism," discarding both its theological and ritual content. Kallen, who to this day refers to himself as an "atheistic humanist," came, at that time, very close to casting aside his Jewish identity entirely. But at the age of eighteen, just as the century turned, he was able to leave home permanently and to begin his studies at Harvard College "where a Yankee, named Barrett Wendell, re-Judaized me." 9

III.

As an undergraduate Kallen never perceived of himself as a true "Harvard student," but rather as a student at Harvard. In 1950, in response to a request for a short memoir of his days at Harvard, Kallen admitted, "I was a ragged fellow from the other side of the track working his way through." During part of this period he was a resident counselor at Civic Service House, a settlement house for new immigrants in Boston's North End. There he first became acquainted with Socialists and Anarchists, groups that challenged his ideal vision of America, groups that found "in their social gospels the same compensating dream of consolation and hope that had come to me [Kallen] through the textbooks of American history." Yet Kallen maintained his own "invincible dream of America," a dream he tried to convey to the young boys whose groups he advised, a dream he continued to hold despite direct confrontations with the realities of Boston's political bossism and school corruption. 10
What impelled Kallen to keep to his dream? He explained recently,

Perhaps because of my bringing up, principles were more real and important than persons, righteousness than wickedness; they were there to be followed or violated, and the violatees somehow defeated themselves while the principles endured as the shaping forces in the lives of the perishing violators themselves. ... Disillusions simply challenged variation of ways toward its realization. ... This, incidentally, is the inwardness of the pragmatic philosophy with its meliorism as against both the optimisms and pessimisms of the philosophic tradition. I could never take the American Idea as a description of the human condition, any more than I could take the Ten Commandments as such. Both are working hypotheses, programs for changing the human condition.

The major influences on Kallen during his undergraduate years were three teachers, giants in American thought, with whom he was lucky enough to establish direct and personal relationships.

The dominant influence of my freshman year was George Santayana: I recover the slight, neat figure, the face of a Murillo madonna with a moustache. ... Once at the end of the hour, I simply had to raise a question, and the answer took us out across the Yard, and down Massachusetts Avenue. The event was an initiation. Over the years there were many such walks ...

The next year I found Barrett Wendell. The one occasion I had to enter a dormitory was to go to his office in Grays 18 for permission to enroll in his English 12. By the continuing argument which we then and there started, he freed my surprised mind for ways of perceiving the American Idea and for the art of saying anything that I saw which gave a new turn to my appraisal of myself as a free man among other men ...

In my last year I found William James. Darkly there appears again the slight frame ... The attitude of seeking rather than showing, and the feel of welling kindliness and openness of spirit. ... Hearing him then and there initiated a
philosophic as well as a personal allegiance which endures.\textsuperscript{12}

Kallen credits professor of English literature Barrett Wendell, "a Tory Yankee with Puritan heritage," with bringing him back to an identification with the Jewish people, though Wendell probably served only as the intermediary for Kallen's need to rethink his roots and the community from which he had come, a need which became more pressing with Kallen's sense of difference and of isolation at Harvard. Kallen recalls,

I had this work with Barrett Wendell involving the literary history of America. . . . He emphasized in that course the role of the Old Testament as a certain perspective, a certain way of life. He showed how the Old Testament had affected the Puritan mind, traced the role of the Hebraic tradition in the development of the American character. I wrote a paper challenging that entire position. I thought I did a very good paper indicating that the Old Testament was narrow, bigoted. . . . [S]o he had me up in his office, . . . and he went over that essay with me, paragraph by paragraph, and somehow I began to see the whole thing in a different perspective and everything that I had been shutting out . . . turned back. . . . And so I developed the interest in what you might call the Hebraic, the secular, the non-Judaistic component of the entire heritage and that naturally linked with what I knew about Zionism, the Herzl movement.\textsuperscript{13}

When, in 1902, Kallen "returned" to "Jewishness" he recalls that his father was "very pleased." But it was a different Jewishness from that of his father and of his father's tradition. Kallen continued to reject what he calls the Judaist component of Jewish tradition—the theology, the rituals, the laws and regulations of Jewish observance. Instead he identified with what he calls the Hebraic past of the Jewish people, a Hebrew-Jewish way of
thought that constitutes a culture and binds a people together. Zionism, a secular Hebraic ideal, became for Kallen the means through which he could remain within the Jewish community, his link with Jewish association, his way to affirm the past he had nearly discarded, by giving it a new definition. The "Jewish Idea," as it had come to him, had seemed the antithesis of the freedom and democracy implicit in the "American Idea." After 1902 Kallen began to interpret the Old Testament as the source of the American Idea, the basis of the Declaration of Independence and of the Bill of Rights, the foundation of his idealized version of America. The Old Testament, instead of being the embodiment of the rotes and rituals of Jewish theology, became the catalyst that encouraged the formation of a free society with notions of equal liberty to all individuals and to all groups no matter how different, i.e., a pluralistic society. Zionism, the means to re-create another state dedicated to these same ideals of freedom and equality, was, therefore, highly compatible with the American Idea. To be a Zionist was to be a good American; especially was this true for Jewish Americans, with their special attachment to the Old Testament and their longstanding tradition of liberty and justice for all.

Kallen's decision to become a Zionist was entirely a personal, abstract, one, not influenced by the Jewish community or by the fledgling American Zionist movement. In fact, Kallen does not recall knowing about any Zionist
organization in 1902; his awareness of Herzl went back to conversations at his father's home and in the synagogue when he was a young child. Kallen's Zionist position was unique.

I was an alienated intellectual being suddenly challenged in his alienation. . . . And the challenge turned not on anything in the Hebraic tradition at all [but] . . . on what Americanism came to mean to me . . . in terms of the philosophical pluralism with which [William] James was identified and . . . in terms of the interpretation of the American tradition and the literary tradition of America by Barrett Wendell. . . . The [Zionist] meanings came to me rather in terms of the American Idea than in terms of what I had learned of Torah [Jewish law] at home or in Cheder [Hebrew school].

James's philosophical pluralism was important for it had emphasized

the reality of manyness, the refusal to accept the proposition that the many are appearance and only the one is reality. When I accepted this idea I didn't have to abolish the past in thought and image. . . . I didn't have to think of it as an image that could be dissipated. I could think of it as a present perduring reality which, in my personal history, all my experiences joined and with which they orchestrated and made the me that I was becoming. . . .

What it [James's pluralism] released me from was an attitude which shut out operational working of my past. It opened opportunities. Zionism became a replacement and reevaluation of Judaism which enabled me to respect it . . . which allowed me to see an ongoing pattern, a group personality, called Jew.

Thus, when Kallen later became active in the Zionist movement, his approach and stance were rather different from those whose Zionist motivation emerged from any of the several European Zionist traditions. Significantly, his formulation of Zionism was to appeal most to other American intellectuals.
who had become alienated from Jewish tradition, and who were searching for some other means to regain ties with the Jewish community.\footnote{15}

IV.

Kallen was graduated from Harvard \textit{Magna Cum Laude} in 1903. At the recommendation of James, Santayana, and Unitarian clergyman Edward Everett Hale, he left for two years at Princeton, where he was an instructor in English and continued his own graduate studies. Kallen at that time planned to be a novelist and a poet, but his years at Princeton were not happy. As early as November 1903 he needed Barrett Wendell's reassurance that his time at Princeton would not be wasted. "A man of letters should understand how life presents itself to those who observe it from angles other than his own," wrote Wendell. Unfortunately, however, Wendell could not help much with Kallen's request for help in teaching methods. "For my own part," Wendell confided, "I have never arrived--in twenty-three years--at any conclusion which comes near satisfying me."\footnote{16}

Kallen soon learned how the merest commonplace of Massachusetts Harvard could be the violent heresies of New Jersey Princeton. . . . After two years the God-fearing authorities refused any longer to harbor me and my Jewish heresies, which they said were debauching the youth . . . and they dropped me, much to my relief.

James and Santayana had not mentioned in their letters of recommendation that Kallen was Jewish. Kallen recalls that
when the Princeton authorities fired him, a member of the English department who favored keeping Kallen told him bluntly, "If they had known I [Kallen] was a Jew they would not have hired me."17

By 1903, when Kallen left for Princeton, he had already "returned" to Judaism through his acceptance of a secular Zionist position. In 1904, two poems of his, attempting to distinguish the Hebraic tradition from its Judaist component, appeared in The Maccabean. Kallen, upon rereading these poems recently, commented,

What a callow intolerant lyricist my adoption of Zionism made me! There's something in both poem and essay [of 1906] which may be identifying my aggression toward the opposition with my feeling toward my father.

Though The Maccabean published Kallen's work, he was still removed from any official American Zionist activity. The poems indicated, however, knowledge of the European Zionist movement. "The False Hope," title of one of the poems, referred to a statement of Herzl's close associate, Max Nordau, "Zionism's only hope is in the Jews of America."18

Kallen returned to Harvard in 1905
to sit at the feet of William James, and Santayana, and Royce, and Munsterberg. . . . Them was [sic] happy days. Philosophy went so excellent with political and social "reform" in Boston, and a wee bit teaching in Cambridge!

At his alma mater Kallen was not only a student, but also a friend and teaching assistant to James, Santayana, Royce and Munsterberg. Kallen especially became a protege of James, who directed Kallen's Ph.D. dissertation, "Notes on the Nature of Truth," and who specified that his own unfinished book,
Some Problems in Philosophy, be left for Kallen to complete and to edit. James wrote,

It [the dissertation] is a big effort. . . . When you come to your own dogmatic statement . . . I think the thesis splendid, prophetic in tone and very felicitous often in expression. . . . My total impression is that the critter Kallen has a really magnificent vision of the lay of the land in philosophy--of the land of bondage as well as that of promise.19

Kallen's experiences at Princeton had been disillusioning. Despite his competence as a scholar, he had been subject to discrimination as a Jew, and had experienced the gap between the American Idea and its practice. Three decades later, he recalled,

I returned to Harvard to complete my studies with my dream America completely distorted. I was aware at last that the real America was by no means the simple and lucid and beautiful drama of progress in liberty and well-being which the textbooks purveyed. I had seen how the very Americans themselves, the "true" Americans for whom the tradition of liberty was an inheritance and not a choice, were occupied in confuting principles by practices, falsifying ideals by facts, and cheating and defeating the promises of the schools by the performances of the market-place, the altar, and the forum.

Kallen was restless in Cambridge and by 1907 happily accepted a fellowship in philosophy that enabled him to go abroad to study with F. C. S. Schiller at Oxford, and to attend the lectures of Henri Bergson in Paris. When he returned a year later Kallen had become more settled; in the doctoral dissertation he had completed he had laid the foundation for the pragmatist-humanist outlook which he has spent a lifetime developing.20

Two important experiences during 1905-1908, his years
at graduate school, helped Kallen to begin formulating his ideas on the topics that were to be his major interest for the next several years--Zionism and the cultures of minorities. In 1906 Kallen came to the attention of the leaders of the Federation of American Zionists, who had seen the poems he had published in The Maccabean. They invited him to give a paper at their annual convention in the Catskill Mountains, and Kallen composed an essay, "The Ethics of Zionism," an interpretation of the Zionist idea based on Aristotle's Politics and Ethics. The preparation of this paper caused Kallen to clarify his own nascent views on Zionism, and in it he began to develop an ordered cohesive expression of his Zionist rationale.  

He began by rejecting two traditional Zionist positions—that Zionism is a charity to help free the masses from anti-Semitic persecution, and that Zionism is the fulfillment of an age-old religious instinct. "A philanthropic or religious Zionism, based as they are on sentiment and opinion rather than fact; on passion, rather than on law, are both inadequate for the ideal of Zion," he proclaimed. Zionism needed a new rationale, one based on reason and on science, one that could show that the Jews deserved to live as a separate people in a country of their own. The Jew would have to prove his right to survive "by the vigor of his achievement and the effectiveness of his ideals, by his gifts to the world and his power for good in the world."
In a rather elaborate exposition, Kallen then extended the Darwinian principle of survival of the fittest from the individual to the social group, and applied this principle to the history of the Jewish people. Longer than any other people of recorded history the Jews have survived, remaining "masterful and ever assertive, ... molding the Western soul and setting before him definite controlling ideas." The Jewish race has been "the light-bearer of the world." The message of Hebraic prophets like Isaiah continues to be valid, therefore, "as a moral principle universal in its application that to each man in the human family is the right to live and to give his life ideal expression." Indeed, noted Kallen, this same message had recently been stated "in modern terms and scientifically brought to the world again" by a "Genius" of "thoroughly Jewish character," Karl Marx.²³

For these reasons, according to Kallen, the Jewish race had ethically asserted its right to maintain its self-hood. But to do so, it, like the other nations of the world, needed to have "permanent occupation of a definite territory." "People's individuality cannot receive its highest and most adequate expression where individuality is a danger and a threat, as it must be under an alien environment," Kallen asserted. National self-expression would be possible only with a distinctive national life "under customs and law spiritually native."²⁴

In these arguments Kallen had addressed himself to the obligation of the gentiles to support the re-nationalization
of the Jewish people. He then turned to the role of the Jews, particularly those in America.

In America our duty to Zion is our duty to our children... [O]rganized training in self-knowledge must be our work. For of all things, the realization of the race—self is the central thing.25

Kallen used "The Ethics of Zionism" for more than simple analysis. In this 1906 speech he displayed, also, a "radical" stance, by demanding that the Jews be willing to fight for the justice of their cause.

Our duty is frank and open combat; our duty is to Judaize the Jew and to open his eyes to the potent facts of existence. We have to crush out the Marano [secret Jew], chameleon [assimilationists], and spiritual mongrel [Jews who imitated non-Jewish rituals]; we have to assert the Israelite.26

In "The Ethics of Zionism" Kallen had begun to speak of themes he was to develop further in later years—his emphasis on rationale rather than on sentiment in explaining the need for a Jewish state; his concern with the survival of the complex of culture he called Hebraism; his "pluralistic" conception that "each man in the human family [has] the right to live and to give his life ideal expression"; his stress on the need for self-respect on the part of American Jews, a need that involvement with the Zionist cause would help to promote; his acknowledgement of the requirement for self-assertion. By chance, Solomon Schechter was summering in the Catskills, and happened to hear Kallen read his paper. In 1972 Kallen recalled,

In that paper I automatically applied what I had learned in my courses... and while most of the auditors either couldn't make out what I was
driving at or were opposed anyhow—it was foreign to them in many ways and it was militant—Schechter liked it.

The American Hebrew of July 6, 1906, in its report of the convention, notes that

Horace M. Kallen, of Harvard University, read a paper on "The Ethics of Zionism"... A motion of thanks to the speaker was seconded by Dr. Schechter.27

Kallen and Schechter became good friends—"We got to talking, we sat and talked about things"—and, after that, whenever Schechter came to Cambridge he would stay with Kallen. Schechter also began sending Kallen his books and articles, and Kallen credits Schechter with making "come alive for me things that my father had killed." In an autobiographical statement prefacing an article "Philosophy Today and Tomorrow" that Kallen wrote in 1935, he credited six people with being paramount influences on the development of his attitude, point of view, and method. Of the six, Schechter is the only Jew. Obviously, part of Schechter's influence must have been his perception of the Zionist idea as a means that could help American Jews to preserve their identity in a society supposed to encourage quick assimilation into a common American "melting pot."28

Once Kallen became acquainted with the Zionist organization he began activity within it. He returned to Boston and became chairman of its Zionist Council, arranging a meeting for Russian Zionist leader Shemaryahu Levin at which he persuaded William James to sit on the platform and to
stand up for a bow. The American Hebrew reported the incident and noted that Levin "was accorded a reception such has been but seldom given a Jew by a non-Jewish audience." Kallen also must have communicated his new-found Zionist activism to other Harvard teachers besides James. In 1907, for instance, Hugo Munsterberg wrote Kallen suggesting "that a paper on Zionism would attract at present any magazine," and urging Kallen to write on Zionism as "the most fitting and safest way . . . to earn extra money." 29

In a sense Kallen returned from the Zionist convention with the enthusiasm of a new convert; he was anxious to communicate to as wide an audience as possible his personally realized conception of the relation of Hebraism to the American Idea. In 1906 Kallen joined with a fellow Harvard student, Henry Hurwitz, and organized a group called the Menorah Society. The purpose of the Menorah Society was to bring together all people of Jewish and non-Jewish derivation who were concerned with the study and advancement of Hebraic culture and ideals, which meant essentially Old Testament tradition as against New. The university setting of this group impressed the non-Zionist leaders of the American Jewish community and many non-Jewish intellectuals, who spoke at its meetings, contributed funds, and helped its Journal to become a sounding board for writers representing an entire spectrum of opinion on subjects of Jewish interest. Until after World War I the Menorah movement "had a great splurge" and Kallen worked hard for it, using the Menorah groups and The Menorah Journal as vehicles for promoting his ideas about Zionism. 30
Kallen's new awareness of himself as a Jew gave him a heightened sensitivity to the problem of all minorities; he was especially concerned with how they might survive and remain true to themselves within a dominant majority culture. But it was an incident with a black student and friend, Alain Locke, that first provoked Kallen to clarify his concept of cultural pluralism, his interpretation of civilization as a cooperative union of the different. Kallen recalls,

"It was in 1905 that I began to formulate the notion of cultural pluralism and I had to do that in connection with my teaching. I was assisting both Mr. James and Mr. Santayana at the time and I had a Negro student named Alain Locke, a very remarkable young man—very sensitive, very easily hurt—who insisted that he was a human being and that his color ought not to make any difference. And, of course, it was a mistaken insistence. It had to make a difference and it had to be accepted and respected and enjoyed for what it was.

Two years later when I went to Oxford on a fellowship he was there as a Rhodes scholar, and we had a race problem because the Rhodes scholars from the South were bastards. So they had a Thanksgiving dinner which I refused to attend because they refused to have Locke.

And he said, "I am a human being," just as I had said it earlier. What difference does the difference make? We are all alike Americans. And we had to argue out the question of how the differences made differences, and in arguing out those questions the formulae, then phrases, developed—"cultural pluralism," "the right to be different."[31]

Kallen's empathy with Locke, and his decision to support the difference of a fellow human being, were, to a large extent, the products of his awareness of his own difference as a Jew. Barrett Wendell, for instance, though sympathetic to Locke's plight, did not agree with Kallen's decision "to make a 'cause' of the matter." Wendell wrote to Kallen at Oxford,
My own sentiments concerning negroes [sic] are such that I have always declined to meet the best of them—Booker Washington, a man whom I thoroughly respect,—at table. . . . It would be disastrous to them, if they are gentlemen at heart, to expose them . . . to such sentiments of repugnance as mine, if we were brought into anything resembling personal relations. . . . It is sad, I admit—not least so to me for the reason that I am passing, perhaps of the past altogether.32

Kallen, however, ignored Wendell's advice on the Thanksgiving dinner; instead he appeared to pay better attention to the next letter Wendell wrote.

As I look back on our friendship, nothing marks it more than your growth out of personal limitation of view into that broadening sympathy with other kinds of men which is essential to true scope, and which, to keep vital, must persist. . . . The problem . . . is at once to preserve your own individuality and not . . . let this shut out understanding of different ones, a toleration of them.

Seven years later, in his seminal essay "Democracy versus the Melting Pot," Kallen elaborated on this idea, formulating the concept of "the equality of the different," and extending it from individuals to social groups or cultures, each of which has an equal "right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" in its own way. Kallen called his idea "cultural pluralism"; it is the phrase with which many still identify him.33

Kallen continued to live in Cambridge after he received his Ph.D. degree in 1908, serving as a lecturer in philosophy and continuing as a teaching assistant to James, Santayana and Royce. For one semester he was an instructor in logic at Clark College in Worcester, Mass., where he met Sigmund Freud, whose ideas he had already worked with at Harvard.
Correspondence of this period, 1908-1911, mainly with his Harvard professors, shows that Kallen was unsettled, looking for some suitable niche, not quite sure whether he wanted to write or to teach, meanwhile scratching out dollars any way he could in order to support himself and to contribute to his family. Finally, in 1911, he received an offer to teach philosophy and psychology at the University of Wisconsin, a school that attracted Kallen, despite its distance from Cambridge, because of its reputation as a "Middle Western centre of progress, democracy and efficiency." Santayana urged him to take the job, for the University had

a great deal of character. ... The great idea there is that of civic progress. They don't care how heterodox one's ideal may be: but they want one's heart to be set on the life and necessities of the community.34

Wendell congratulated him, and also praised Wisconsin. "Here you have, I think," wrote Wendell, "a fine chance to make yourself a place at what I have come to believe the best of all our Western universities; and this means in the very heart of hearts of America. ... [T]he clouds have broken for you; it is your part quietly to keep aware of the sunshine, and not to mistake drifts for storms."35

But Santayana's and Wendell's predictions turned out to be not quite accurate. Kallen stayed in Wisconsin, "not easily, not quietly," until 1918, when he resigned "before getting kicked out" over questions of "academic freedom and academic sincerity." Kallen felt isolated during these seven years, and missed Harvard and its intellectual excitement.
Santayana reassured him,

Your tone is not that of a person who has found Paradise at last. I make allowances, however, for the pessimistic vocabulary natural to an idealist (in the good sense of the word) and I hope to see you soon, like the dyer's hand, subdued to what it works in, and bright cardinal in colour.

Wendell commented, "As to the isolation, I suspect it is partly temperamental. In this epoch of ours we are all alien, unless we are too dense to feel the utter strangeness of the incessantly moving years."36

These years at Wisconsin, however, were a highly creative period for Kallen. He recalls, "It was during the time in Wisconsin that those thoughts to which I gave expression in Culture and Democracy in the United States [the first definitive statements on cultural pluralism] came to their maturity."

This was also the time that he published William James and Henri Bergson, an analysis of two differing strands of pragmatism; The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy, Kallen's exposition of his Hebraic philosophy of life and his "most cherished" book because it most succinctly expresses the values by which he has tried to live; The Structure of Lasting Peace, a diagnosis of nationalism and the concomitant need for an international peace-security organization; and many magazine articles.37

The Midwest and Kallen's "discovery of the United States" appear to have given him new energy and new stimulation in his Zionist activity also. Perhaps, alone in Madison, he felt the need to reassert his Jewish self-hood more strongly; perhaps,
away from his friends in the East, he had more desire to 
explore the rest of the country. His extensive correspon-
dence of this period shows that Kallen was devoting almost 
as much time to "advancing Hebraic culture and ideals" and 
to "secularizing the Bible"--Kallen's phrases for his inter-
pretation of Zionism--as to his teaching and writing. Not 
only was he sending a constant stream of letters and memo-
randa to Zionist officials all over the country, he seems 
also to have spent every spare minute during vacations and 
weekends travelling and speaking for the Zionist cause. 
"The Zionism was a channel in which I became again a whole 
person," Kallen recalled recently. "This identification was 
a restoration or an ablution of a wound, a break, a cut." 38

Kallen never really adjusted to Wisconsin, though, and 
within a short time was trying to find another job. Early 
in 1915 Munsterberg wrote him, "[O]ur ... chairman tells 
me that even in Wisconsin a certain restlessness has come 
over your migratory temper and that you are looking for 
another place." When America's entrance into World War I 
touched off the same hysteria of crisis in Wisconsin as in 
the rest of the country, Kallen began to feel even more un-
comfortable. Finally matters came to a head.

I do not know whether I have written you [wrote 
Kallen to a British friend, Alfred Zimmern] that I 
am leaving Wisconsin because of embroilments with 
the Administration in matters involving academic 
freedom. I had no particular personal interest in 
the issues except in the case of my house guest 
[pacifist] Norman Angell who was denied the halls 
of the University, ... The other matters turned 
on the condemnation of Senator LaFollette. As you
know, I have not the slightest use for his views toward the war, ... but it became apparent that the University was being used by his old political enemies as a weapon against him, and the methods by which this use was obtained were distinctly reprehensible. So I denounced the whole business and protested against the proceeding with disagreeable conclusions and consequences all around.39

What Kallen had reacted to was the desire of the faculty to obtain unanimous support for their censure of LaFollette. Kallen refused, and minced no words in his letter of resignation to the University of Wisconsin Chancellor. He wrote, "[T]he University has been pervaded by an atmosphere of intolerance and passion that has made effective work trying. ... I find myself less and less in sympathy ... with the attitude of the faculty ... toward fundamental questions of academic freedom."40

Kallen, however, was somewhat relieved to have had the issue forced and to be able to return to Boston, where he felt the atmosphere to be more congenial. His friend Zimmer confirmed Kallen's feeling: "I expect it was a good thing you gave it [teaching at Wisconsin] up anyhow, as I never understood how you were able to combine it with all your other [Zionist] activities."41

"The period 1918-1921 was one of considerable change in my life—academic freedom issues in Wisconsin and resignation, war work, beginning with the New School," wrote Kallen recently. From the time Kallen left Wisconsin until the end of the War, he was a member of the Committee on Labor under the chairmanship of Samuel Gompers, and of The Inquiry into
Terms of Peace, headed by Colonel House, "whose work failed to influence the peace-making in Paris." When, in 1919, Herbert Croly proposed a "New School" that would "bring together academic scholarship with the practical problems of human relations" Kallen accepted his invitation to become a member of the faculty. He did so reluctantly, for he had hoped after leaving Wisconsin to make a living as a writer, but the New School promised him the freedom that he felt he needed, and its approach to higher education as a desegregation of vocation and culture appealed to his activist temperament. Among Kallen's original colleagues were Charles Beard, John Dewey, James Harvey Robinson, Thorstein Veblen and Alvin Johnson; in 1973 he is the only one of the original staff living.  

The New School started slowly, for it was a radically new innovation in higher education, issuing no credits and offering no degrees, and Kallen gave his first seminar, "The International Mind," to only seven students. But over the years the New School provided Kallen with a "snug harbor"; from 1919 until 1970, when he retired officially from the School, Kallen taught philosophy and social psychology to thousands of students there, as well as at many other universities, and has influenced countless others through his steady stream of books and articles on a seemingly limitless range of subjects.
In 1935 Kallen set forth the principles which have guided him in his profession and in his life.

Although I feel philosophy as a calling and enjoy teaching it, I have not been able to devote myself exclusively to what is euphemistically known as "scholarship" and the sheer academic life. My earliest interests were as literary as philosophical and were soon crossed by direct participation in political and economic movements of the land, especially those aiming at the protection and growth of freedom, including the labor movement, the civil liberties union and the consumer's cooperative movement. Hence I have never attained that fullness of pedagogical withdrawal which custom and prejudice ordain for the practice of philosophy in America. . .

Although my first and most enduring interest remains aesthetics, . . . need and inclination have led me into all of the ramifications of social science, from its logic and method to its most peripheral subject matter, as my published works show: each is an attack upon a specific problem in a special field from a standpoint which might be called aesthetic pragmatism.44

Kallen's body of work, therefore, is not primarily theoretical or metaphysical; it is moral, practical, and often embodies political implications. "His central theme has been the freedom of man and his many books are original studies of what freedom is . . . and how it grows spiritually and materially in the different institutions of society amid the manifold hazards of the human enterprise," wrote his friend, I. B. Lipson, in 1945, in a letter to the Nobel Foundation nominating Kallen for the Nobel Prize in the field of literature. Kallen set forth the "first principles" of this philosophy of freedom early in his *William James and Henri Bergson* (1914); since then he has published over forty
books and more than four hundred articles, each an extension of his concept of freedom to culture, education, religion, and the arts.\textsuperscript{45}

Kallen initially gained a national reputation in 1924, with the publication of \textit{Culture and Democracy in the United States}, a collection of essays he had written during the previous ten years. His formulation of the concept of cultural pluralism—likening the United States to an orchestra where each racial group contributes its special different tone to the rich ensemble of the whole—was a sharp critique of the assumptions of the melting pot theory and of the 100\% Americanizers. "His arraignment of certain hysterical \ldots phenomena connected with the post-War Americanization movement is trenchant and must be welcomed as an antidote to some of the twaddle produced on the other side of the controversy," wrote one reviewer who applauded especially Kallen's attack on organizations like the Ku Klux Klan. But Kallen's challenge to the old WASP traditions provoked protest as well. "As he is not American by birth, Mr. Kallen is a little lacking in that native sympathy which makes it easy for native Americans to understand one another," suggested another critic.\textsuperscript{46}

Two previous volumes, \textit{The Structure of Lasting Peace} (1918) and \textit{The League of Nations Today and Tomorrow} (1919) had gone almost unnoticed; in them, however, Kallen had developed the same ideal of the right to be different and had urged a new political and social order with free cooperation
of the different. Zionism and World Politics (1921), Frontiers of Hope (1929), Judaism at Bay (1932), Of They Which Say They are Jews (1954) and Utopians at Bay (1958) are specific studies of the Jewish people from the perspective of cultural pluralism, both as an ideal and as a practical program. The Book of Job as a Greek Tragedy is Kallen’s demonstration of the "orchestration" of the Hebraic and Hellenistic modes, two ancient cultures traditionally considered to have been irreconcilable. Publication in 1954 of Cultural Pluralism and The American Idea, a series of lectures with critical responses and challenges, brought some of Kallen’s ideas on American culture up to date.

In the area of political economy Kallen's trilogy of the 1930's, Individualism, an American Way of Life, A Free Society, and The Decline and Rise of the Consumer, provide a conception of human nature and a program of social organization that are working alternatives to the generally accepted notion of life as labor and man as producer. Kallen argues that man is a consumer by nature and becomes a producer only through external necessity. Man's inner personal freedom best flourishes, therefore, to the degree that social-economic organizations become consumer organized and consumer governed. In the summer of 1973 Kallen published Consumerism, Cooperatism and the Idea of the Consumer, a revision of some of these ideas "in light of Naderism and the recent vogue of consumerism."47

During his entire life Kallen has been concerned with the role education plays in a democracy; his special interest has
been the education of adults, and for many years he participated actively in trade union education. *Education, The Machine* and *The Worker* (1925) grew out of the stimulation he received working with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America; more recent books in this area are *The Education of Free Men* (1949) and *Philosophical Issues in Adult Education* (1962).

Not surprisingly, considering his own rejection of traditional religion and his early contact with William James and the concept of religious experience, Kallen has devoted much thought to the nature of belief. *Why Religion* (1927), *Democracy's True Religion* (1951), *Secularism is The Will of God* (1954) all discuss Kallen's separation of the essential religious experience from conventional religious ideas and churchly organizations, an anti-clericalism which often has embroiled Kallen in controversy.

Kallen's initial interest in the arts has endured. He first discussed his principles of aesthetic pragmatism in a series of essays collected in 1930 as *Indecency and the Seven Arts*. His two-volume *Art and Freedom*, published in the 1940's, is a monumental interpretation of the relationship of the ideas of beauty, use, and freedom from the Greeks to the present day. As he has grown older Kallen has become concerned with the role of the comic tradition; he wrote both *Freedom, Tragedy and Comedy* (1962) and *Liberty, Laughter and Tears* (1969) after he was eighty years old.

Kallen's teaching and writing, however, constitute but
the tip of the iceberg of his long and creative life. The correspondence that he has preserved over the years demonstrates Kallen's courage, over and over again, in submitting his philosophy to the test of action. He has fought against the Establishment and entrenched power since 1902, when he challenged the corruption of the Boston School Board, and forced the issues to a trial in court. He has taken a firm stand against any type of prejudice, dating back to the 1907 Thanksgiving dinner at Oxford, which, as a gesture of support to his black friend, he declined to attend. He resigned from the University of Wisconsin rather than submit to a limitation on free speech, and caused the State of Massachusetts to indict him for blasphemy in 1927 when he defended the memory of Sacco and Vanzetti by comparing them to Jesus Christ. In the early 1930's he was one of the first to recognize the potential for Nazi destruction and terror, and supported New School President Alvin Johnson in establishing a "University in Exile" made up of the scholars he helped rescue from Europe. A few years later he concentrated his prodigious energy on defending Bertrand Russell's right to teach, regardless of Russell's "Unchristian" domestic arrangements. He continues to participate actively in organizations ranging from the American Jewish Congress and the American Association for Jewish Education to the American Civil Liberties Union, the Cooperative League of the U.S., the International League for Academic Freedom, and the Conference on Methods in Philosophy and Science. 48
If you start with the philosophical premise on which my . . . faith [is based],--a deep sense of the urgency and the striving which is at the core of each and every individual being--then you move out wherever a human problem of survival appears and you apply the operational techniques that you believe in in the hope that there will be results.

Kallen said recently. His commitments until this day bear witness to his 1932 credo that

a man of truly liberal spirit will scorn no activity because it is different, so long as it is sincere. . . . His spirit will be imbued with that tolerance which is the same as sympathetic understanding; his rule of conduct will be "live and let live," his aim the freedom and fellowship of the endless diversities of personality and association which make up the world.

This theoretical conviction Kallen has blended into social practice; he exemplifies in his daily activities the tradition of the philosopher as a rational activist in a perplexing world. Writers commenting on Kallen often call this position that of a "pragmatist-humanist"; Kallen himself calls it "Hebraism."
CHAPTER 3
THE IDEAS

I.

The three seminal phrases in Kallen's thinking and writing, phrases that came to him early in his career and have continued to dominate his work, are (1) The American Idea, (2) Cultural Pluralism, (3) Hebraism. Because Kallen's understanding and definition of these phrases led to his formulation of the Zionist idea, and because they underlie his reasons for committing himself as an activist within the Zionist movement, it is important here to clarify his use of them and to see how they interact to form his rationale for Zionism.

The American Idea is a phrase Kallen has taken from crusading transcendentalist minister, Theodore Parker, who used it first in 1850, while speaking before a mass meeting to denounce the fugitive slave law. Parker told his audience,

There is what I call the American Idea. I so name it because it seems to me to lie at the basis of all our truly original distinctive and American institutions. It itself is a complex idea, composed of three subordinate and more simple ideas, namely, the idea that all men have inalienable rights, that in respect thereof, all men are created equal, and that government is to be established and sustained, for the purpose of giving every man an opportunity for the enjoyment and development of all these inalienable rights. . . . For shortness sake I will call it the idea of freedom. 1
Kallen maintains that it is this American Idea which the first several propositions of the Declaration of Independence set forth, which constitutes the Preamble to the Constitution and the basis for the Bill of Rights, and which underlies "the succession of subsequent Amendments which confirm and protect the equal right of human beings who are different from each other and who are living together with each other, to life, liberty, and safety." He sees this American Idea as the national religion, an ideal to which all "bona fide Americans as citizens" are committed. America for him "signifies a new order of the ages which ... grounds certainty and security in the struggle for survival on equal liberty and equal opportunity; which institutes democracy as an organization of liberties, 'to secure these rights.'" Like other religions, the American Idea requires "faith of a commitment to an ideal. ... [I]t is a working, fighting, hypothesis" which aspires always to achievement, yet never quite is achieved. To remain a believer in the American Idea, says Kallen, takes both will and courage. Yet these are necessary if this country is to secure "more just administration of its laws, the diversification and enrichment of its culture."²

Though he did not identify "The American Idea" as such until his years at Harvard, Kallen recalls that the emphasis of his public school education early gave him a strong commitment to its principles. He developed then, and still maintains, a fervent sense of American patriotism, and when,
as at Princeton, he perceived the gap between rhetoric and reality implicit in the Idea, he transformed the "Idea" in his thinking, to an "ideal." Gradually, applying James's pluralism to experiences such as his settlement house work and his contact with Alain Locke, Kallen began to emphasize one part of the Idea, the part which states that "all men are created equal." What did the word equal imply? In order to be equal with one's neighbor did one have to be the same--or was a person's right to equality greater if he could express his unique individuality, i.e., an equality in difference? The American Idea, Kallen concluded, "takes for granted that they [men] are countless ... multitudes of human individuals, each somehow different from all others. ... It postulates that this difference, this singularity of the person, is the inalienable right..." Men could be equal only insofar as they would be free to be different; the greatness of the United States resided in the fact that its founders defined our system of government precisely to institute "an organization of liberties" dedicated to granting men the freedom to be different.3

II.

By 1914, when Kallen wrote "Democracy versus The Melting Pot," he had extended this principle of the freedom to be different from individuals to social groups. Not only each person, but each group--each religion, each ethnic community--is different. "The American people ... are a mosaic of
peoples, of different bloods and of different origins, engaged in rather different economic fields and varied in background and outlook as well as in blood," he stated. The United States is not merely a union of "geographical and administrative unities"; it is also a "cooperation of cultural diversities, . . . a commonwealth of national cultures." American democracy aims, "through Union, not at uniformity, but at variety, at a one out of many." Kallen concluded,

It [the United States] involves a give and take between radically different types, and a mutual respect and mutual cooperation based on mutual understanding. It is this ideal which to my mind seems most naturally the proper content of the interplay of the terms Liberty and Union and Democracy.4

Kallen called this concept "Cultural Pluralism," and acknowledged that "so old-fashioned a teaching is at the present time [1924] popular nowhere in the United States." He knew that "both American Tories and American intellectuals reject it" and attributed this rejection to many factors. Primarily, he said, they were reacting to the undermining of traditional American assumptions and securities that resulted from America's adventure into the "Great War." The support for the concept of America as a "melting pot," the commonly accepted alternative to cultural pluralism, came from the feeling that the traditional American values were in danger, that the masses of recent immigrants would overwhelm and ultimately engulf "the 'typical American,' puritan and pioneer, sentimental and ruthless, snob and democrat, cock of the roost with Fortunatus' cap on his head, sitting pretty
on the top of the world and whistling 'Yankee Doodle.'"\(^5\)

Culture and Democracy in the United States, a compilation of essays enlarging on cultural pluralism, was Kallen's polemic against the melting pot concept. His essays were all careful analyses of American history and American culture, as, through the prism of the American Idea, he defined them. Yet underlying each was a fighting tone—against those who preached "Americanism" in books, both scholarly and popular, or against those who tried to implement it in organizations like the Ku Klux Klan. Like a good debater, therefore, Kallen tried to simplify his message, and in "Democracy versus the Melting Pot" he used a metaphor to make cultural pluralism more understandable. He wrote,

"American Civilization" . . . [is] a multiplicity in a unity, an orchestration of mankind. As in an orchestra every type of instrument has its specific timbre and tonality, founded in its substance and form; as every type has its appropriate theme and melody in the whole symphony, so in society, each ethnic group may be the natural instrument, its temper and culture may be its theme and melody and the harmony and dissonances and discords of them all may make the symphony of civilization.\(^6\)

A crucial point in Kallen's thesis was the distinction he made between nationality and citizenship. Nationality, he wrote, is "altogether independent of citizenship."

There is no more necessary connection between nationality and citizenship than between religion and citizenship. A nationality is a very intimate form of historic and cultural creative association related to the group as personality is to the individual. . . . A state is a secondary form of association designed by those who participate in it. . . . A nationality is creative, a state, regulative. Citizenship, thus, is independent of nationality and a safeguard of it, as it is of religion, in every free land.
Politically, as citizens, we are all equal; yet the way in which each of us expresses ourselves, a way related to our "natio" or "nativity," is different. "All men are created equal" embodies the notion that America is a democracy safeguarding the right and opportunity of each individual and of each group to be different—and, in this union of differences, said Kallen, resides the enrichment and strength of America.  

III.

Kallen traced this concept of a "harmonious cooperation of nationalities" back to the prophets of Israel, "those champions and vindicators of social justice and international righteousness and peace . . . [whose] spirit . . . literally inspired the democracy of our America." These prophets enunciated what Kallen calls the Hebraic spirit, a "living spirit which demands righteousness, expressed in all the different interests in which Jews, as Jews, have a share—in art, science, philosophy, and social organization, and in religion." Kallen uses the term Hebraism to refer to "all that has happened in Jewish history, both religious and secular"; Judaism stands for only one special aspect of Hebraism, that "which comprises the sentiments, theories, doctrines and practices which relate to God."  

The concept of Hebraism, "the Jewish way of life become . . . secular, humanist, scientific" allowed Kallen to retain an identity within the community of Jews that fit
in with his "secular, humanist, scientific" American education. At the same time he could reject the religious tradition for which his father stood and which he had come to perceive as supernatural, i.e., not grounded in modern science or fact. It gave him, also, a way to define the essence of being Jewish as the awareness of belonging to "a well defined ethnic group." To be a Jew did not mean adherence to a set of accepted beliefs and rituals; rather, to be a Jew meant to live as part of the "organic unity of Hebraism," as part of "the Jewish community or group with all its social and spiritual qualities, institutions, history and ideals." In 1916 Kallen wrote,

The fact of being a Jew is a fact of being a member of a natural social group, of a brotherhood of unforgotten ancient origin, who because of their acknowledged social continuity, because of their likemindedness, develop ... a common culture.

This emphasis on social group, rather than on theology, is the basis for the American Jewish community today; consciously or not, many immigrant sons like Kallen were able to keep their Jewish identity by redefining it in Kallen's terms. As literary critic Alan Guttman has written, "In the philosophy of cultural pluralism secular Jews anxious to avoid assimilation discovered a rationale to justify their instincts."

If Hebraism is "the flower and fruit of the whole of Jewish life"--a culture, "a harmony of which peoples and nations are the producing instruments"--then its expression, according to Kallen, has always been rooted in "the ethnic
solidarity and a geographical concentration" of the Jewish people. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the majority of Jews, even in the diaspora, tended to live together as homogeneous communities, living "an organic social life" and expressing their culture in their own way. In response to the forces of emancipation, however, the cohesive Jewish groups began to break apart. Jews began to be "treated as living individual members of a dead nation, whose entity involved them like a ghost, insubstantial, yet real enough to awaken fear and dislike." Hebraism, the Jews' "unique achievement as a well defined ethnic group" and the source of Western civilization's democratic liberal tradition, began to die, unable to survive without an integrated community to sustain it. During the nineteenth century a "Jewish problem" arose, both for the non-Jews, who resented the stranger now free to live in their midst, and for the Jews, who were in danger of losing their individuality and their identity. 10

Kallen was sensitive to these problems, for without a living secular Hebraic culture he had no way to justify his own connection with the Jewish people. Further, he truly believed that the Hebraic culture, with its emphasis on individual freedom, had value for the rest of the world and should not be allowed to disappear without a struggle. In addition, he had come to agree with the democratic national philosophy of nineteenth century Italian leader Giuseppe Mazzini, whose words he often cited.
We believe [Mazzini declared] . . . in Nationality, which is the conscience of the peoples, which assigns to them their share of work in association, their office in Humanity, and hence constitutes their mission on earth, their individuality, for without Nationality neither liberty nor equality is possible . . .

The solution Kallen found for himself was Zionism, the movement for the renationalization of the Jewish people. If the Jews could live as a free people in their own land, he decided, "that unique note which is designated in Hebraism has a chance to assume a more sustained, a clearer and truer tone in the concert of human cultures, and may genuinely enrich the harmony of civilization."\(^{11}\)

IV.

Kallen had begun to formulate some of his rationale for Zionism in his "Ethics of Zionism" essay of 1906; he wrote the statement just quoted in 1910. Within the next few years he worked out for himself three major reasons for a commitment to Zionism, three arguments that answered both his own needs and the objections of both the Jewish and non-Jewish communities to the Zionist cause. While some of his reasoning shows a relationship to Zionist themes found elsewhere, one addition entirely his own—the definition of Zionism in terms of cultural pluralism—had an original emphasis that would help to allay the most significant fear of American Jews concerning Zionism, the charge it invited of dual loyalty.

Kallen first defined the need for a Jewish state in much the same humanitarian terminology as, for example, his
American predecessor Emma Lazarus.

Zionism seeks, in response to the pressure of anti-Semitism, in observation of the terrible and guiltless social maladjustment of Jewish individuals and groups, to relieve the pressure, to minimize the maladjustment, and to eliminate its cruelty and injustice, so far as possible, by a Jewish settlement in Palestine.

Kallen called this his remedial argument, but used it to go beyond a romantic or philanthropic impulse. He quoted Mazzini approvingly,

Soldiers without a banner, Israelites among the nations, ... Do not beguile yourselves with the hope of emancipation from unjust social conditions if you do not first conquer a Country for yourselves; where there is no Country there is no common agreement to which you can appeal. ... Do not be led away by the idea of improving your material conditions without first solving the national question. You cannot do it. ...

Financial aid, while capable of relieving immediate conditions, would never really remedy the position of the Jew at the mercy of the anti-Semite. In addition, dependence on philanthropy implied acceptance of a less than equal position, a "servile sufferance," and, therefore, a "surrender of individuality and destruction of self-reliance and self-respect." 12

Kallen argued, therefore, that to relieve the pressure of anti-Semitism the Jewish people had to become self-reliant, the Jewish ethnic group had to become a strong, self-supporting nation, his ideal for all ethnic groups. He wrote that the Jewish problem's "solution through Zionism by the concentration of a free and self-governing and creative commonwealth of Jews in the Palestinian homeland rests upon the fact that the existence of such a commonwealth will
abolish the ambiguity of the Jewish position..." Only from a position of equality could the Jews "fight back."\textsuperscript{13}

This argument was not original with Kallen; it derives from Herzl, whose Jewish conscience had been stired by the anti-Semitism involved in the Dreyfus Case in France, and who sought a Jewish State as the only means capable of relieving the threat of anti-Semitism. It appealed to the non-Jews, because the Zionists held out hope for the solution of the "Jewish problem," i.e., the presence of the unwanted Jew in Christian lands; it appealed to the Jews in Western countries because it gave them a means to help their less fortunate brethren in a gesture of noblesse oblige. Kallen, however, did not stress this rationale in his writing and speaking. He called it "negative... a reaction [to] the relation of the Jewish masses to other European groups." Instead he much preferred to emphasize what he considered the "affirmative" side of Zionism, "a program to actualize the impulse which the Jewish people feel, like the other peoples of the world, toward the realization of their characteristic potentialities in an autonomous group-life having its appropriate social and cultural forms."\textsuperscript{14}

Zionism, Kallen said, by encouraging a new national self-realization, would give to the Jewish people a chance to "lay in Palestine the foundations of a new and living Hebraism." Here Kallen was addressing himself to the problem of Jewish survival. He recognized, both from his own experience and from the observable condition of the American
Jewish community, that "under the stress of a secular and secularizing age Judaism disintegrates much more rapidly than Christianity." He criticized the reform "Modern Judaism" for being "so detached from Jewish life," and noted that traditional Orthodox belief depends on a "supernaturalism [which] cannot maintain itself against a practical intelligence which wrests her secrets from nature. . . ." Judaism, he felt strongly, if it were to survive, would have to become relevant to the actual living interests of Jewry, to the "social and spiritual complex of group qualities and customs" that have made the Jews into a community. Judaism, he wrote, must find an "animating ideal" to "strengthen, and if need be, replace [its] failing supernaturalism." 15

That "animating ideal" Kallen found in Zionism, the "integrating force" which would strengthen Judaism's "failing supernaturalism" and make "being Jewish" once again a way of expressing a living dynamic culture. In order to survive, Kallen stressed, Judaism "will have to be reintegrated with this [Hebraic] secular, cultural form of community." 16

Kallen was conscious of the cultural Zionist position that establishment in Palestine of a Hebraic center of culture would be adequate to restore a sense of self-hood and dynamism to the Jewish people. He rejected this argument, however, for he felt that "a free and living culture is not the source but the outcome of an organized and stable Jewish life; that consequently the alternative to political action . . . [is] not 'colonization' or 'cultural activity' but one
more Ghetto, this time in Palestine." Though political action to secure a Jewish national state would bring in its wake heightened cultural activity, a cultural center alone would not make for a free and equal people. 17

Kallen knew, also, that he challenged the traditional point of view with his emphasis on "Hebraic" nationality rather than on "Judaistic" religion as the means for Jewish survival. He tried hard to explain his position, as in this letter he wrote to Jacob Schiff in 1918, urging Schiff to affiliate formally with the Zionist movement.

I have always insisted that insofar as there is any hope for Judaism at all, it is in Zionism. ... The implications of this point seem to me to be as follows:

Social life like the life of the individual is an organic thing. ... It is essential in an organism that a part cannot exist unless all the other parts with which it belongs also exist. Of the institutions of society, this is also fundamentally true. Religion is one of these institutions. ... That Judaism is a religion intimately associated with a specific people from the beginning of its history, is of course, a truism. And it is also a truism that the failure of Reform has derived very largely from the fact that it has cut off Jewish religion from the total complex of Jewish life.

... Now, I think that on the whole religion has been overemphasized in the life of our people. It seems to me that for its own health, it is necessary that the other aspects of Jewish life shall receive commensurate development. In fact, if we were to follow the physiological analogy, the necessary building up of any system of organs depends not only on the cooperation but on the opposition of other systems of our organs. In social life the correlation between institutions is analogous. ...  

A genuine concern for religion, such as yours, would, it seems to me, absolutely demand the healthy coordination with it of the other aspects of national
life. For this reason, it seems to me that you are essentially a Zionist, making one emphasis just as others of us make others.

The revival of the entire complex of Hebraic culture through Zionism, therefore, would lead also to a revival of its Judaist component, i.e., the traditional religious customs and observances. Instead of allowing the "Judaistic" religion to disappear, Zionism would help it to thrive in a dynamic, living, way.18

Kallen saw the rebirth of Hebraism going beyond the question of mere survival, however.

To the Jews of the world it [is] . . . a programme of self-help and social justice within Jewry; giving the same rights and responsibilities to both sexes, and actually trying out experiments in economic organization to abolish the exploitation of one man by another without abolishing the impetus towards individual excellence.

To the nations of the world [Hebraism] . . . should carry into effect the social and spiritual ideals of the Hebrew prophets . . . , it [should] reassert the prophetic ideal of internationalism as a democratic and cooperative federation of nationalities . . . .19

This argument has about it the same Utopian overtones expressed earlier by someone like Mordecai Noah, who also saw a reestablished Jewish state in the Utopian terms not uncommon in ante-bellum America. But Kallen was reacting to something closer to his own experience, the cumulative impulse for reform in the United States known as the Progressive Movement. Kallen saw that the renationalization of the Jewish people would give them an opportunity to start afresh, to create a country based on "their ancient tradition
... of social justice and fundamental economic democracy." Their entire state could constitute a reform, which for Kallen meant primarily economic reform, embodying new concepts of land and resource ownership and control and of economic cooperation. At the same time that the "Hebraic spirit" would be renewed, thereby ensuring the survival of the Jewish people, so also would the traditional prophetic ideals have a new opportunity to flourish, making the Jewish state the living embodiment of a free and just social order.

Like his "remedial" argument, Kallen's "constructive" Zionist position had appeal both for non-Jews and Jews. To non-Jews, Kallen presented the possibility of a modern-day Utopia, a state in which the most modern economic and social reforms could be effected. To Jews, Kallen held out the promise that Zionism would instill a new life into the faltering Hebraic culture, thereby acting as the means to ensure the survival of the Jewish people. To already "Americanized" Jews both parts of this affirmative reasoning were attractive, for though reform in the Progressive mode was good, reform that, in addition, helped them to maintain their identity was even better.

In an article titled "America's Two Zionist Traditions" social historian Judd Teller notes that traditionally Zionism has expressed itself in one of two modes, the practical or the romantic. Practical Zionism flourished mainly in Eastern Europe, where the masses of Jews were subject to direct oppression and saw Zionism as the means that would free them
from persecution and restore their self-esteem. Romantic Zionism received expression among the Westernized Jews like Herzl, for whom Zionism was not only a means to rescue Jews from persecution, but also as a way to reestablish for the world a truly righteous state. According to Teller, the Zionist movement as it developed in America between 1914 and 1921 differed from European Zionism because it was able to bring together the practical and romantic into what Teller calls "Messianic pragmatism." Messianic pragmatism synthesized the concept of Palestine as asylum with that of Palestine as Utopia. American Zionists believed not only that Zionism would work to solve the "Jewish problem," but also that Zionism would provide the means for realization of an ideal state.21

Teller's terminology is useful for summing up two of Kallen's rationales for Zionism. In November 1915 Kallen wrote, "Zionism is the one practical answer to the Jewish question, in that it has provided the Jews of the world with a common instrument for its solution." A few months earlier he had written that the Jewish state would be "the flowering and fruitage of the Hebraic spirit, which, rooted in our historic past, planted on our national soil, shall realize, in modern terms, in social organization, in religion, in the arts and sciences, a national future that by its inward excellence will truly make Israel 'a light unto the nations.'" If, as this study will show, "Messianic Pragmatism" is the form American Zionism took from 1914 to 1921, then certainly
Kallen's words helped both to define it and to give it direction.22

V.

Kallen added another facet to his Zionism definition, however, tying it in with his concept of cultural pluralism. An early statement by Kallen of the pluralist idea appeared in an essay "Judaism, Hebraism, Zionism" published in 1910.

Culture thus constitutes a harmony, of which peoples and nations are the producing instruments, to which each contributes its unique tone, in which the whole human past is present as ... a background from which the present comes to light ...

If this is so, reasoned Kallen, then the Jewish people who have contributed "the Hebraic note [which] has given to the history of Europe an unquestionable coloring" deserve to have a land of their own where "this note may gain in strength and purity" and where the Jews "like that of any of the peoples of Europe may again be free to express itself characteristically in organized social life, in esthetic and intellectual activities."23

Implicit in this argument is the notion that Zionism does not mean the renationalization of all Jews in Palestine. An individual Jew in the United States, for instance, could choose to live in America and to make his contribution to the "American symphony." At the same time, however, the Jewish people, as a national group, should be given the same right as other nations to express its culture in a land of its own, contributing, thereby, to the "symphony of nations."
Kallen wrote,

The Zionists have said: "The Jews are a historic people among other peoples, neither better nor worse... They are entitled equally with any group to express their qualities freely and autonomously as a group, making such contribution to the cooperative enterprise of civilization as their qualities as a group promise." 24

Kallen knew from his own experience at Princeton, for instance, that American Jews, though not subject to overt pressures of anti-Semitism, were still not free to interact on truly equal terms with non-Jews. He had come to believe, therefore, that all peoples needed a national center with which to identify, and that until the establishment of a Jewish state the position of the individual Jew would remain ambiguous. American Jews would benefit from "the reestablishment of the Jewish homeland," he wrote, for it would remove their uncertain position, thus allowing for a more "harmonious adjustment of the Jew to American life." 25

Kallen took care to stress the values of American democracy. Because America, ideally, is both "liberal and liberating," it encourages "collective self-expression" of European-born groups "in their ancestral lands," he wrote. American Jews, therefore, could participate in the American liberal tradition if they supported the Zionist cause. Additionally, the inspiration that American Zionists would receive from the renewed Hebraic spirit would enable them to contribute more successfully to the dominant American cultural tradition. 26

This reasoning had a tone of defensiveness about it.
Written in 1919, it was a reaction to the post-World War I pressures for Americanization and for the clear assertion of one's American loyalty. It reflected also Kallen's support for the principles expressed in Wilson's 14 Points and embodied in the League of Nations, ideals which encouraged the rights of small national states. But Kallen felt that this argument was inherently correct. He truly believed that giving the Jewish people an equality among nations would give to each Jewish individual, even to free and respected American Jews, a heightened sense of self-awareness and self-respect. "Nationalism means self-assertion, contempt for servile sufferance, a higher cultural development. . . . [A]ssimilation involves surrender of individuality and destruction of self-reliance and self-respect," he quoted approvingly from a Labor Zionist friend. 27

Through this sense of self-respect, then, would come both pride to the American Jewish individual and a new morale to the American Jewish community. To Ruth Mack, a young would-be Zionist whose father later was to become president of the American Zionist movement, Kallen concluded:

It is not within the province of Zionism to gather all the Jewish people into one region. The movement is not philanthropic except incidentally. . . . Insofar as Zionism aims to make conditions free by insisting on the democracy and equality of nationalities it will improve the . . . condition of all the Jews in the world. 28

There were several points in Kallen's analysis of Zionism that made it especially attractive to well educated, almost assimilated, American Jews, many of whom had been
either indifferent or hostile to the Zionist cause. In the
first place, Kallen, by defining Zionism in a way that went
beyond philanthropy, and by putting in the accepted American
Social Gospel tradition of noblesse oblige, appealed to the
instincts of those who wished to help their brethren but who
denigrated charity as a means that perpetuated poverty and
low status. During this period of progressive reform, the
most American of Americans helped the new immigrants by
setting up settlement houses and courses of education whose
goal was to enable the immigrants to learn to help themselves.
Now, Kallen said, a national state could do the same thing
for the persecuted Jewish masses in Europe; the position of
the Jews in Palestine would be "natural," and they would
thrive, therefore, by their own efforts. Thus American
Jewish leaders, if they became Zionists, could fill the same
role for the immigrants to Palestine as their non-Zionist
counterparts were doing for the immigrants to America, in a
mode highly sanctioned by the majority American culture.29

In addition, Kallen's insistence that the new state
would grow on the base of a revitalized Hebraic spirit, in-
corporating the most just economic conditions and emphasizing
both democratic principles and individual excellence, encour-
gaged those who knew the need for reform in America but who
were already despairing of its implementation in a large and
complex country. Palestine was small, virgin territory for
experimentation in the form and substance of government, a
new chance to see if the school book ideal Jeffersonian
principles of democracy could be made to work in a world made different by modern technology. The Progressive impulse, already dying in America by the time of the first World War, could be brought back to life again with the success of the Zionist movement.

Most important, perhaps, was the blow Kallen's theory of cultural pluralism gave to the ubiquitous charges of dual loyalty. Accepting the assumptions of the pluralist theory meant accepting the implication that "hyphenated" Americans were better Americans. To maintain one's Jewishness meant the ability to contribute more to the "American symphony"; to support the renationalization of the Jewish people meant helping to restore the valuable "Hebraic note" to the "harmony of civilization." Advocacy of the Zionist position enabled Jews to regain their sense of self-respect; in so doing, it enabled them also to be stronger Americans. "Our duty to America, inspired by the Hebraic tradition--our service to the world...--both of these are conditioned, insofar as we are Jews, upon the conservation of Jewish nationality," wrote Kallen. Though the new immigrants may have found this formula too subtle to grasp, it had great appeal for those whose needs it met, those who were looking for some rationale that might help them to maintain a Jewish individuality compatible with a commitment to American ideals and culture. Kallen's argument for Zionism gave them, as it gave him, a means for becoming more American by becoming more Jewish. Instead of responding to the pressures for 100% Americanism by conforming
and by "melting," American Jews could now better express the "American Idea" by retaining their singularity in the "Hebraic" tradition. Instead of replying defensively to demands for assimilation, the Jews could provide an affirmative alternative that was both proof of their patriotism and preserving of their identity.30

Had Kallen merely formulated these ideas for himself, or written of them occasionally in Zionist periodicals, his influence within the Zionist movement would, no doubt, have been limited. But Kallen, one of William James's foremost disciples, applied the principles of his mentor's Pragmatism to the Zionist idea to which he had, in theory, become committed. Defining this Pragmatism recently, Kallen noted,

The Pragmatic method started with an idea, an image. Then you elaborated the image so that it became a proposition, a statement, a working hypothesis. It becomes a program of action, a plan to make an experiment to prove what you already believe.31

When, therefore, Kallen became convinced of the rightness of the Zionist position he felt it incumbent upon himself to use his skill and his energy to convince others. He felt, also, the necessity to try to make the Zionist movement into the most effective means for realizing the Zionist cause, a movement that would reflect his "Messianic-pragmatic" vision of Zionism and its connection with the ideals of both Hebraism and the American Idea. As Kallen has commented, in reaction to his delineation here as a "Messianic pragmatist,"

Is there any authentic Pragmatism that isn't [Messianic]? . . . The Messiah is a personality who sooner or later will do certain things which
are involved in his faith, which he makes actual. He turns beliefs into facts. This is the pragmatic process. It is the consequences in action of a belief.

Pragmatism means the working out of faith into action. . . . It is a way of recognizing that what we call awareness, the insight of the seeing of things and their relations, is empty until it is in motion, put to work. . . . The principles of pragmatism turn on the fact that a belief isn't a description of an existence but a program for changing it. . . .

What I was doing about Zionism [from 1911 to 1921] was the action that was involved in the positions taken. . . . Presenting hypotheses to work from—that was my business. I was doing it as a way of life. . . . It involved aspiration, ideal, desire. The quality of my life, that's what it was.32

For a crucial decade in the life of American Zionism, 1911-1921, he worked hard defining goals and the means to implement them, convincing some with his point of view, alienating others. For a few years it seemed that the Zionist movement might take the form he planned for it. Ultimately, however, Kallen's plans seemed to the majority of the American Zionist Organization too Messianic, not enough pragmatic, and he and his followers became isolated by projecting too much of the American progressive mode, too little of the European Zionist tradition. He and those whom he had influenced lost their power, and, thereby, their ability to shape the destiny of the Zionist state; in 1921 Kallen resigned from the Zionist movement, though he has never ceased to support the Zionist cause and to work for it in his own way. The story of these years, and of Kallen's part in it, reflects the way the Zionist movement,
for a short time, became energized as it took on an American emphasis. It is the story that, through Kallen's words and letters, the succeeding chapters will tell.
In 1911 Horace Kallen left Boston for his new teaching position at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. He went with the best wishes of his teachers, and with not a little excitement about the prospect of starting his career in a new milieu, and of making, at last, a name and reputation on his own. Kallen was far from confident, however, of how he would fare occupationally, and wrote of his uncertainty to his mentors at Cambridge. Hugo Munsterberg's reply was reassuring, for he had heard words of praise about Kallen which suggested that the Wisconsin authorities would try to renew his contract. "I have the impression that if you meet them half way you can build up something lasting or relatively lasting in Madison." Munsterberg added, "I think you can manage them sufficiently to have the opportunities for steady progress in the philosophical department. . . ."¹

Of one thing Kallen was certain; he had made a commitment to the Zionist idea, and he knew that, in some way, he would continue to work to further the Zionist cause. He had
left for Wisconsin shortly after the meeting of the Tenth International Congress of Zionists, a conference which had shown considerable diversity of opinion between the supporters of Herzl oriented political Zionism, and the supporters of the practical Zionist Hovevei Zion movement, with its emphasis on immediate colonization. This division disturbed him. "I thought that the segregation was stupid," he recalled recently. "Every culture is political. There is the quality of polis—that's Greek for city—of a community of people living together.... Judaism without an autonomous community could not hold the potential for cultural renaissance; and wherever you can set up an autonomous community you can sustain and develop a culture."  

Kallen and some of his university friends like Harvard Menorah Society president Henry Hurwitz felt the importance of establishing their position unequivocally on the side of the political Zionists. In "A Declaration from Political Zionists" that the Zionist journal, The Maccabean, published in September 1911, Kallen and four others expressed their fear that the Zionists, "in the ardor of immediate pursuits," might neglect, or even abandon, "the ultimate purposes of Zionism." They continued,

... [W]e emphatically reaffirm our allegiance to the total program of the first Basle Congress.

This we do in the profound conviction that the Jewish people, living a healthy and autonomous national life, can and will efficiously maintain for civilization Hebraic tradition and culture.
The Federation of American Zionists in 1911 was at a low ebb; its money was scant and its members were few. It lacked real leadership, only several "honorary" officers and an executive committee which hardly functioned. In a report to the Zionist Convention, the Zionist administration itself acknowledged that "leaders, in the sense of men with large personal followings, or capable of inspiring large masses, we had none." Their inability to make any headway for the Zionist cause frustrated the few active Federation workers, and they especially were sensitive to any hint of criticism or dissatisfaction with the Zionist administration.4

The Maccabean, official organ of the Federation, took note of the political Zionist statement and responded editorially by calling it "premature and uncalled for." Additionally, in an even stronger editorial, The Maccabean proceeded to attack what it called "Academic Zionists."

... [T]hey render us no service. ... [T]hey are content with the solution of the dilemma of their own lives. Their Zionism, it would seem, is essentially intellectual. ...

When will our university men cease being closet men? When will they come back to our people and lead them?5

Kallen reacted heatedly to the Zionist editorial. In strong words he wrote to The Maccabean, defending both the intent of the "Statement" and his position as an "academic Zionist." His letter, published in the November 1911 issue, defined rather well the role he conceived for himself as a Zionist activist.
Each [of the academic Zionists] has set himself consciously, and often at the hazard of his position and his academic future, the task of developing in the young Jews whom he can persuade to listen to him, the Hebraic spirit, and active devotion to Hebraic ideals. . . . They are fighting for the future of Zionism in the profoundest and most vital sense. For they have set themselves, at great risk, upon the firing-line, where the leaders of the generation to come are in the making, and they hazard, often, their all to make that generation Zionistic.6

The Maccabean, reflecting the insecure position of its editors, tried its best to be conciliatory in an editorial replying to Kallen's letter. Still defensive, it pointed out that the "manifesto" had been intended "to impression upon the public mind the fact that there were gentlemen of academic training who persisted in their allegiance to the Basle program, in spite of the equivocal position of the movement." Despite its sensitivity, however, The Maccabean conceded that the "manifesto" had, indeed, created new interest in, and allegiance to, Zionism's political ideals. "Dr. Kallen need not be downcast," the editorial concluded, for the discussion engendered by the statement had yielded much in "educational value."7

After the 1911 controversy Kallen retired for a while from any active critique of the Federation. A 1913 letter to Kallen in Wisconsin from Louis Lipsky, Chairman of the Federation Executive Committee and Editor of The Maccabean, shows them to have reached a cooperative working arrangement and, at least superficially, a cordiality of relations. Wrote Lipsky,
The Administrative Committee is grateful to you for your all too brief trip back to your "culture plant." The accounts that come in show that you were successful in making high-brow stuff understandable by the general run of humanity.

Your memorandum was circulated, read, and probably forgotten by most of the delegates [to the World Zionist Congress]. The Congress is no place for serious propaganda of ideas. There is too much confusion and most of the business is transacted on lines so irrational that no mind used to Anglo-Saxon procedure can understand it.

Please go ahead and do your best to make propaganda for the Jewish Colonial Trust, The National Fund, The Shekel [recruiting members] and let all else [i.e., ideas] go by the board.

Kallen responded promptly, offering his services to the Federation during the Christmas vacation. At the same time, however, quite apart from the official Zionist organization, and unbeknownst to it, Kallen was devoting his time and energy to working on his own vision of the Zionist ideal.

II.

On August 18, 1913 Kallen organized a secret Zionist society which he called The Parushim, the Hebrew word which means both "the Pharisees" and "separate." The Pharisees had flourished as a separate sect during the time of the second Jewish Temple, goading the Jewish Establishment into making the traditional "written law" more relevant to the times by adding to it the interpretations of the "oral law." Kallen saw much the same role for his group of Parushim, whose purpose he defined as "advancement by deed and word of the cause of autonomous Jewish nationality [Zionism] in the
interest of Hebraism." Recently he recalled,

Initially they [the Parushim] were mostly the same people who had figured in and organized the Menorah movement... and who felt that here was, shall I say, a Utopian opportunity... There developed a collection of young men and women like the Peace Corps... There was the quality of "Young Turks," and the same attitude, trying to transvalue the Jewish interest over here in the way that the Young Turks wanted to transvalue the Turkish interest.  

The Parushim was a very unusual Zionist group, organized both as a secret fraternity and as a reform movement. Unlike other social groups at the time, both men and women were eligible; "there was a certain definite interest on desegregation of the sexes," Kallen remembers. Enrollment was by an oath of initiation, and there was a probationary period for up to three years, during which time the initiate was to give "exclusive and specific service to the cause." Kallen invited no one to become a member until the candidate had given specific assurances regarding devotion and resolution to the Zionist cause, and each initiate had to undergo a rigorous analysis of his qualifications, loyalty, and willingness to take orders from the Order's Executive Council. The motto of the group was the response traditionally attributed to the Jewish people on receipt of the Ten Commandments --"Naaseh V'Nishmah"--"we will do and we will listen."  

A member swearing allegiance to the Parushim felt something of the spirit of commitment to a secret military fellowship. At the initiation ceremony the head of the Order informed him:
You will . . . be subject to an absolute duty whose call you will be impelled to heed at any time, in any place, and at any cost. . . . You will be a fellow of a brotherhood whose bond you will regard as greater than any other in your life--dearer than that of family, of school, of nation. By entering this brotherhood, you become a self-dedicated soldier in the army of Zion. Your obligation to Zion becomes your paramount obligation.

The initiate responded by swearing:

I hereby vow myself, my life, my fortune, and my honor to the restoration of the Jewish nation--to its restoration as a free and autonomous state, by its laws perfect in justice, by its life enriching and preserving the historic speech, the culture, and the ideals of the Jewish people. . . .

I pledge myself utterly to guard and to obey and to keep secret the laws and the labor of the fellowship, its existence and its aims.

It is clear both from the wording, which paralleled Kallen's published phrases on Zionism, and from the handwriting on the original copy of this Induction Ceremony, that Kallen was its author. Kallen's organization of the Parushim had many implications. Primarily it showed his overriding interest in working for the realization of the Zionist ideal, and his need to create, if necessary, an educated militant group that would join him in the cause. This secret order demonstrated, also, how dissatisfied Kallen had become with the slow progress of the official Zionist organization. His stress on obedience and on discipline emphasized Kallen's awareness that a vaguely functioning federation, lacking purpose and definite structure, could never be effective in helping to create an autonomous Jewish state. The Order's careful investigation of each candidate's background
and motivation underscored Kallen's need to work with an elite cadre, rather than with the mass-oriented Zionist Federation, whose members had difficulty understanding his speeches and memoranda.

The Parushim served an additional purpose for Kallen. Removed from the Eastern Seaboard, his "culture plant" for things both Jewish and non-Jewish, Kallen needed some sort of community with which he could feel comfortable, a group with like minds and like interests. The parushim were to serve for him as brothers and sisters, who, to quite some extent, he dominated, but who had sworn to accept that domination. In 1913, the year Kallen founded the Parushim, he was thirty-one years old, unmarried, estranged from his father, separated in distance and in thinking from his mother and younger siblings. Through the Parushim Kallen was able to create a substitute both for his family and for his Harvard fellowship of congenial minds. As Kallen admitted recently, "The Parushim project was an intimacy-seeking variant of the Menorah endeavor."12

The Parushim, however, met needs of others besides Kallen. The few people he invited to join the Order, all well educated, all Zionist leaders in their own communities, answered enthusiastically. I. J. Biskind, a doctor in Cleveland, who during World War I was to go to Palestine as a medical missionary, responded,

In behalf of Zion, in behalf of Hebraism I will accept a membership of the Parushim--if elected--unconditionally and for life. I want to
work, work, work and not sing "Hatikvah" [the Zionist anthem]. I want to be a soldier of the ranks and do actual work. We have been sleeping too long; we have been dreaming and golden opportunities have slipped by us.  

Henrietta Szold, founder of Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization, was another early member of the Parushim. She wrote Kallen, "If . . . I may state the difficulties we [Hadassah] are encountering in our educational work, and so secure instructive advice from the hidden source, it will cause an increase not only in the results but also in the strength and zeal of the workers." Her reference to "the hidden source" was, no doubt, tongue in cheek, for she continued, "If ever I emerge from under the . . . routine work in which I am now enveloped, I am going to devote myself to the reading you have prescribed for such as I am, and attempt to make myself more effective than I have been."  

In 1913 Kallen, aware of the moribund condition of the Zionist organization, felt that the way in which he and the Parushim would be most influential was through a program of education. His focus, Kallen recalls, was on "the play of ideas--it had to be more theoretical than practical, imagining a program or an action without doing it." Henrietta Szold, for instance, in acquiescing to his request that she provide literature for Zionist courses to be given in Temples and Sunday Schools, noted, "We of the Daughters of Zion are prepared to do literary work, if the well-informed will give us a synopsis and the literature to be consulted." Kallen's role, obviously, was that of the "well-informed."
Kallen went further with his Parushim scheme, however.

In April 1914 he wrote to Max Nordau, a political Zionist who had been Herzl's first and most loyal colleague and closest adviser, in Berlin,

... [I]t happens to be my turn to head the secret organization here in America, which is aiming to turn the Zionist movement in a political direction, from within.

Our order is called Parushim. It is the outcome of the prolonged association of a number of young men in "academic" life, who observing the general trend of events in the Zionist movement decided that the higher ideals would fail unless a check were set. ... Members must all be of distinguished character and trained minds. ... Our present purpose is one of quiet propaganda and education in the "political idea." We aim to make the masses consciously "political."

... It is our desire and plan to organize brotherhoods all over the world. ... We hope if all goes well in a few years quietly to turn the Zionist movement back into its proper channels. ... 16

There is no written record of Nordau's reply to Kallen, nor of his evaluation of a world-wide Zionist brotherhood, bent on secret activity and influence. Kallen recalls that Nordau "wouldn't cotton to it. He didn't think ... a vow would be of any use." The matter was shortly to become moot, however, for four months later war broke out in Europe, forcing the dislocation of the World Zionist headquarters from Berlin. From 1914 until 1920, European Zionists lost their influence as the center of Zionist activity shifted, first to the United States, then to England. Kallen's plan for a secret world-wide Zionist society became one of the war's casualties. But as the United States became more
prominent on the Zionist stage, Kallen and his vision of Jewish renationalization were to receive an opportunity for expression wider in scope and more vast in influence than anything he had ever imagined.17

III.

In December 1913, a few months after he had organized the Parushim, Kallen made an attempt to renew his acquaintance with the famous "People's Attorney" of the Progressive movement, Louis D. Brandeis. Kallen had met Brandeis in 1903, during his undergraduate years at Harvard while he was living as a counselor at Boston's Civic Service House. As Kallen remembers,

At that time a number of public schools were being ... reconstructed in Boston and the school committee was a lousy political organization. ... Now there was a political family. ... The principal of a new school ... was a brother of the family. ... It turned out that the administration of the school and the relation of the principal to students became very questionable and we had to challenge the man. And one of the boys in the [settlement house] group was sued for criminal libel for having described [the principal] as unfit to head a public school.

Mrs. Glendower Evans, a patron of the settlement house and a friend of the Brandeis family, got the Brandeis firm to take up the case, which they defended without fee. That was my first and earliest contact with Brandeis.18

After Kallen met Brandeis they had several talks together, though not about Brandeis' Jewish connection. In 1903, "it never occurred to me to raise it. It didn't seem to be relevant. And it [the Zionist conviction] wasn't set, it wasn't
there fixed as definitely as it became later, in my own mind," Kallen recalls. 19

Ten years later, however, Kallen heard of Brandeis' budding interest in the Zionist movement and sat down to write him something of his own Zionist philosophy.

To Louis D. Brandeis

Madison, Wisconsin
20 December 1913

My dear Mr. Brandeis,

... I venture to trouble you just now because I hear that the organization of the American Palestine company is completed and its program formulated. What the program may be the paper: do not say but whatever the special enterprise or enterprises, they will all involve the same problem. This is the general problem of avoiding economic injustice, of securing and maintaining the cooperative harmony of capital and labour, to the solution of which here you have yourself contributed so much.

In Palestine we aim at a new state and a happier social order. But a state which from its very beginnings has failed to profit by the difficulties of the past, which repeats ... the foreseeable and avoidable waste and misery throughout all the industrial forms and the injustice throughout all human relations, is hardly worth aiming at. There exists a labour problem in Jewish Palestine which is sometimes very acute. There are strikes in Jewish Palestine, and exploiting and exploited classes. None of these is necessary; all are avoidable by right beginnings.

I venture therefore to suggest that you take this matter into serious consideration in the development of the program of the American Palestine Company: but I want also to beg you, furthermore, not to limit your interest, if you are interested, to the A.P.C. [American Palestine Company], but to consider the general problems of agricultural and industrial organization as Zionism has to face them, and to formulate such a plan as will in your view, serve in each type of Jewish undertaking, social justice as well as economic gain. I want to beg you to urge the necessity of such a plan whenever and wherever the occasion offers itself.
I know that this is a great deal to ask of a man as engaged with weighty matters as you are. Your involvement in the Zionist movement has, however, renewed the courage of many of us who are deeply concerned in it, has given us the hope that its program and policy might be changed from the piddling charity and ghetto-building in the Orient into which it has fallen, back to the high level of statesmanship [a reference to Herzl] in which it had been begun. We feel that there is with us at last a statesman and a leader. I have taken the liberty of sending you under separate cover a paper written in the cause of controversy in which I have indicated what it is the hope of very many of us to be led to.

I shall be in Boston (enroute to the meeting of the American Philosophical Society . . .) [and] if you are interested in pursuing the matter I can be reached. . . . [in] Roxbury. 20

Brandeis' reply to Kallen was in the same crisp, efficient style that permeated all his correspondence.

From Louis D. Brandeis Boston, Massachusetts December 22, 1913

My dear Mr. Kallen:

I have yours of the 20th.

The statement that the organization of the American Palestine Company is complete and its program formulated, is entirely unfounded. Upon taking up the matter with my associates last summer I found that the necessary data to formulate any plan were not at hand. A preliminary report was made by Mr. Jacob H. DeHaas at the Executive Committee meeting in November, and further investigation of the subject was agreed upon. There is no chance of the final plan being formulated for some time.

I regret that I am leaving Boston again tomorrow, and so shall not be able to see you, but I hope that you will talk this matter over fully with Mr. DeHaas, and submit also a memorandum of your views in writing, so that they may be considered by all of the members of the Committee [of the American Palestine Company].

The urgent and engrossing matters which have taken me to Washington have prevented my giving as much time to the Zionist question as I had wished,
and hope later to do. I may say that I have great sympathy with your point of view.21

This 1913 exchange of letters, before Brandeis had made any public commitment to Zionism, set a pattern for the relationship between Kallen and Brandeis during the next several years. Kallen, in his letter, spoke of the possibility of a new social order in Palestine. He was hopeful of the chance to eliminate exploitation, and addressed himself to the problem of maintaining cooperative harmony between capital and labor. He defined his own goal for the Zionist movement, neither philanthropic nor cultural, but a "new state," arrived at through a "high level of statesmanship." Kallen emphasized ideas, often in the abstract, that would shape the ideal ends which he wished the Jewish state to fulfill.

Brandeis found himself, almost always, in sympathy with Kallen's point of view. In this letter he stated so specifically, more or less as an afterthought. Other letters simply assumed this harmony of ideas. But Brandeis was concerned also with facts, reports, memoranda. He was, after all, the attorney, representative of the Progressive movement, who had successfully won many cases by use of voluminous statistical data. After August 1914, when Brandeis became the leader of the American Zionist movement, he relied heavily on a steady stream of letters and memoranda from Kallen, on both the goals of the Zionist movement and the ways in which to achieve them. Brandeis' replies, however, always emphasized
the possibility of achievement, and insisted on the necessary conditions for obtaining results.22

IV.

Kallen did not get to see Brandeis in Boston in December 1913. He did, however, fulfill his promise to Lipsky to use part of his Christmas vacation for the Zionist cause, and took time to speak before the convention of the Boston Order Knights of Zion. His speech dealt with several of the Zionist themes he had been developing—for example, the role of the Jewish state in promoting "an enriched Hebraic strain" and in serving as a model for "the spirit of democracy and social justice." It contained, also, a forthright statement explaining why Kallen felt American Jews should support the Zionist renationalization.

... From now on the new constructive phase of Zionism begins.

Comrades of the Order, the burden of this construction falls of necessity upon the Jews of the Occident, particularly upon the Jews of America and of England. The Jews of these countries live under the aegis of democracy. They have learned the meaning of civil responsibility and social duty... They have learned not only that democracy means opportunity. They have learned that democracy means also individuality, and that the best contributions that they can make to the countries they live in are... contributions Jewish in origin, character and intent....

... As the individual Jew makes the best of himself as a citizen of the United States... only by developing and expressing what is best in his nature as Jew freely and autonomously, so the Jewish people can give their best to civilization... only by expressing the nature of the race freely and autonomously. We must seek, therefore, first and
foremost, this autonomy of the Jewish State among the states of the world. . . .

The "paper written in the cause of controversy" which Kallen sent to Brandeis in December 1913 was "Judaism, Hebraism, Zionism," published in 1910 in The American Hebrew in response to rabbinical attacks aimed at Kallen's rejection of Reform Judaism. In that paper Kallen had hinted at some of the cultural pluralist rationale made explicit in his speech to the Knights of Zion, using phrases like "culture ... constitutes a harmony ... to which each [nation] contributes its unique tone" and "what really destroys the Jews is what 'universalizes' them, what empties their life of distinctive particular content." In this 1913 speech, however, Kallen's ideas had matured enough for him to use the cultural pluralist theory to make a succinct, direct, argument for American Jewish support for a Jewish national state. This speech used phraseology Kallen was to employ many times later, and expressed ideas with which Brandeis was to have special affinity. Particularly did Kallen's stress on "civil responsibility" and on "social duty" appeal to a Progressive reform leader.

Kallen took seriously Brandeis' request for a memorandum of his views; he spent the next several months preparing one, hoping that it would help to convince Brandeis to take an active leadership role in the Zionist movement. Kallen wrote Richard Gottheil, former president of the Federation of American Zionists, and head of the Department of Semitic
Languages at Columbia University, of his plans. Gottheil responded,

I wish fervently that you could persuade Brandeis to take the leadership here. We are wanting very much in dignity. . . . By the way, if you can, you ought to get hold of [Reform Rabbi Stephen] Wise and try and bring him into the fold. . . . We ought to have Brandeis as President and Miss Szold [of Hadassah] as General Secretary. . . . This would be worth more to us than anything else we could do.25

But Kallen was in Wisconsin, and felt the difficulty inherent in communicating solely by correspondence. Not until August could he come East again--but by then the first World War had erupted in Europe, and the entire status of Zionism and of the American Zionist movement was about to change.
In 1914 the Federation of American Zionists had held its annual convention in June. The report of the Executive Committee was hardly encouraging; the Federation had mustered only 1,860 paying members among the 3,000,000 Jews in America, and its leaders were quite "disturbed" over the prospect of having to collect the $12,000 the annual Convention had adopted as the Federation's budget. Though the convention delegates rejoiced in evidences of the growing strength of the movement in Palestine, they felt that the fate of Zionism did not, to any great extent, rest with them. The Jews of America, the Zionists complained, "had forgotten the ancient hope of their people."

The highlight of the convention had been the appearance of Shemaryahu Levin, a member of the World Zionist Inner Actions Committee, the Zionist executive body then located in Berlin. Levin had come to America in an attempt to obtain funds for the Palestine Hebrew school system; only partially successful in this quest, he decided to return to Berlin and left in August, sailing on a German liner. The Allies declared war, however, while his ship was in mid-Ocean, and the
British fleet forced it, and Levin, to return to New York. At the same time, the declaration of war in Europe had split the Zionist Executive apart, its German members on one side, its members from the Allied countries on the other. In Palestine the fledgling settlement, still under Turkish rule, was threatened with destruction. Though Zionists in the United States differed as to which side they supported, they knew that inherent in the war situation, with its potential for a post-War realignment of nations, was the possibility of benefit for the Zionist cause. They realized, also, that America was the most powerful neutral country, and that, with the Berlin Central Zionist Executive unable to maintain contact with Zionists in Allied or neutral countries, it was up to the American Zionists to maintain continuity of Zionist efforts. Only American Jews were in a position to come to the aid of the war-torn Jewish communities in Europe; only American Zionists were available to preserve the World Organization and to defend Zionist interests; only American Zionists could help the threatened Palestine community.  

The administration of the Federation of American Zionists decided to make good use of Dr. Levin's forced return to this country. They suggested that, in his capacity as member of the World Executive, he call for an "Extraordinary Conference" of all Zionist groups in this country. With the help of Louis Lipsky, representing the Federation, Levin prepared an "Emergency Call."
The Zionist Central Bureau in Berlin, established upon an international basis, is utterly destroyed. The Organization in Europe is shattered. . . . It is our first and most holy duty to hold and maintain in this critical moment the Zionist Organization, and especially the positions we have won . . . in Palestine.\(^3\)

On August 30, 1914 the "Extraordinary Conference of representatives of American Zionists" met in New York. One hundred fifty delegates created a "Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs" which would represent every branch of the Zionist movement in America, and which would act for the World Zionist movement. At the first meeting, the Committee assumed responsibility for an Emergency Fund of $200,000, a sum quite in excess of the Federation's budget of $12,000, but an amount the delegates considered necessary to meet the immediate needs of the Palestine settlement. The Federation, having officially aided in the organization of the Conference, recognized its own weakness, and declared its willingness to surrender its authority to whomever would assume leadership of the new Committee. They did so knowing in advance of the most significant event planned for the August Conference, the request to Louis D. Brandeis, a new recruit to Zionism, that he assume the Chairmanship of the Provisional Executive Committee.\(^4\)

II.

Brandeis agreed to become the Committee's Chairman even though he did not feel qualified for his new task, he told the Conference.
But I hold it to be my duty and my privilege to aid, and . . . to join you in this great work. . . .

Throughout long years which represent my own life, I have been to a great extent separated from Jews. I am very ignorant of things Jewish. But recent experiences, public and professional, have taught me this: I find Jews possessed of those very qualities which we of the twentieth century seek to develop in our struggle for justice and democracy; a deep moral feeling which makes them capable of noble acts; a deep sense of the brotherhood of man; and a high intelligence, the fruit of three thousand years of civilization.

These experiences have made me feel that the Jewish people have something which should be saved for the world; that the Jewish people should be preserved; and that it is our duty to pursue that method of saving which most promises success.5

Indeed, when Brandeis assumed the Chairmanship of the Provisional Committee, he hardly was known as a Zionist, let alone as a Zionist leader. Brandeis came to Zionism at the height of his career as a successful lawyer and social reformer, and as a typical American assimilationist. His ancestral background included no formal religious observance, no Jewish nationalist leanings, no racial-cultural interests. "My early training was not Jewish in a religious sense," Brandeis said in 1910. "While naturally interested in their race, my people were not so narrow as to allow their religious belief to overshadow their interest in the broader aspects of humanity." Several of Brandeis' close relatives had intermarried with non-Jews. His family, except for one uncle, were freethinkers, and his brother-in-law, Felix Adler, had founded the quasi-religious Ethical Culture Society. The only throwback to tradition was the uncle after whom Brandeis
was named, Louis Naphtali Dembitz, a Jewish scholar and an early American Zionists. 6

Brandeis, though he had never disowned his Jewish background, clearly had no Jewish consciousness. He had never attended synagogue services nor had he participated in other Jewish religious observances. His law practice and social life in Boston had no special identification with any one sect or interest group. Though he had contributed to a number of Jewish charities, he gave even more generously to non-Jewish charities and to the various public service groups with which he affiliated. 7

For many years Brandeis had believed fervently in assimilation, and, in a 1905 speech on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the first settlement of Jews in the United States, anticipated Theodore Roosevelt's denunciation of the dual loyalties of so-called hyphenated Americans. After praising the contribution made to America by people of "Jewish blood," Brandeis continued,

There is room here [in America] for men of any race, of any creed, of any condition in life, but not for Protestant-Americans, or Catholic-Americans, or Jewish-Americans, nor for German-Americans, Irish-Americans, or Russian-Americans. This country demands that its sons and daughters whatever their race . . . be politically merely American citizens. Habits of living or of thought which tend to keep alive difference of origin or to classify men according to their religious beliefs are inconsistent with the American ideal of brotherhood, and are disloyal.

Brandeis used almost the same words five years later in reply to the question, posed by a Boston Jewish Advocate interviewer,
"What do you consider the true relationship of the Jewish newcomers to America?" His answer was titled "Jews As A Priest People," and noted also that the "so-called dreamers [Zionists] are entitled to . . . respect," but that "I believe that the opportunities for members of my race are greater here than in any other country."

Brandeis' biographers agree that his first contact with Jews as a group came in 1910, when he acted as mediator between garment manufacturers and the clothing workers' unions in a New York strike. Brandeis, until this experience, had only known the upper-class Jews of German origin; now, at age fifty-four, he met for the first time the working class immigrant masses from Eastern Europe. As he proceeded to help settle the strike, it seemed to him that he had come across an ethical attitude which was outside the range of his experience as a strike mediator. Compared to the paternalistic labor relations that characterized the New England mills, the garment industry was a living model of democracy. "What struck me most was that each side had a great capacity for placing themselves in the other fellow's shoes," Brandeis recalled later; "each side was willing to admit the reality of the other fellow's predicament." Noting their ability to cooperate, Brandeis came to feel that the Jews might have a genius for self-government; struck by their idealism, he wondered if the Jewish community might reflect the hopes and ideals which he held out for all men.

If this experience moved him emotionally, another, at
roughly the same time, piqued his intellectual curiosity. While soliciting support for his plan of savings-bank life insurance, Brandeis visited Jacob deHaas, then editor of the Boston Jewish Advocate. Casually, at the end of the interview, deHaas asked Brandeis if he had any relationship to the American Zionist Louis Dembitz. Brandeis readily acknowledged his Louisville uncle, and when deHaas replied, "Louis N. Dembitz was a noble Jew," Brandeis demanded an explanation. deHaas proceeded to tell Brandeis the story of Theodore Herzl, whose English secretary deHaas had been, and of the Zionist movement, in whose service deHaas had originally come to America. The goal of Zionism, according to deHaas, was the small state, rooted in political and economic democratic principles. Brandeis, an inveterate foe of bigness, and a proponent of the Jeffersonian ideal of society based on a small-unit economy, found in Zionism a new and interesting cause. Over the next several months the two men met frequently; according to deHaas, the story of Zionism, "told chapter by chapter . . . , coupled with the capacity for the ideal which he had found in the needle workers of New York, opened to Brandeis new vistas." 10

deHaas told this story in his 1929 biography of Brandeis, and almost every Zionist history has quoted it as fact. A later biographer of Brandeis, A. T. Mason, who interviewed Brandeis in 1940, quoted a somewhat different recollection by Brandeis, who attributed his beginning interest in Zionism to an August 1912 visit with deHaas. The discrepancy is
informative, for it shows the somewhat apocryphal nature of the story of Brandeis' "conversion." A further claim by deHaas, also widely quoted, is that Brandeis joined the Federation of American Zionists at its June 1912 Convention. This is in obvious disagreement with Mason's version, but the record contradicts deHaas's story as well. Proceedings of the Convention, as reported in The Maccabean, simply show that the delegates passed a resolution thanking Brandeis, among others, "for sympathy with our aims." There is no mention of Brandeis' joining the group, an affiliation which, no doubt, would have stirred wide comment and enthusiasm.11

III.

It appears that Brandeis' conversion to Zionism has been more a matter of conjecture than of fact. deHaas, for instance, noted that Brandeis' first public appearance on behalf of Zionism took place in March, 1913, when he presided at a meeting welcoming European Zionist Nahum Sokolow to Boston. At that meeting, according to deHaas's recollection, Brandeis said "he was present to evidence his personal affiliation with the Zionist movement." Brandeis' brief remarks at that occasion, however, made clear that he wished simply to express his sympathy with the "great vision" of "the Jewish people ... struggling for social rights." He used the occasion, also, to note his own philosophy that "the true happiness in life is not to donate but to serve," and suggested that "they," the Jews, could bring about the
Zionist ideal through service. Nothing in Brandeis' words even implied his own interest in 'serving.'

How, in fact, did Brandeis move from this somewhat lukewarm sympathy for the aspiration of a Jewish state to the point, a year later, of assuming active responsibility as the leader of the entire American Zionist movement? No one really knows. Historians writing on Zionism generally cite deHaas's claim that Brandeis, through deHaas's influence, "saw in Zionism a sincere and fruitful loyalty to the underlying principles of the Jewish people." This is vague in the extreme and does not even begin to confront the question of why Brandeis became such an active Zionist after fifty-eight years of total indifference to "the Jewish people." Mason related merely that "the bold idea" of becoming chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee "appealed to Brandeis," but did not suggest why.

In a 1965 article, "American Jews in Politics: The Case of Louis D. Brandeis," Israeli political scientist Yonathan Shapiro, unawed by the aura of hero worship accorded Brandeis in Zionist literature, made the first scholarly attempt to grapple with this question. He noted the suddenness of Brandeis' conversion, and attributed it to political opportunism and a hunger for political advancement. Shapiro suggested that Brandeis turned to Zionism only after his first "bid for power--when he was considered by President Wilson for a Cabinet post--failed, owing to strong opposition, which included that of powerful Jewish businessmen." According to
Shapiro, Brandeis cultivated Jewish leaders in order to have their support in his second bid, the Supreme Court nomination; Brandeis, Shapiro maintained, gained confirmation to the Court in 1916 due to the overwhelming active support of the Jewish community and the implications of this support for Democratic party politics.  

Historian Melvin Urofsky, editor of several volumes of Brandeis' letters, disputes Shapiro's thesis. He cites evidence to show that Wilson excluded Brandeis from his Cabinet in 1913 not because of Jewish opposition but because of opposition from Democratic Party chieftains, who Brandeis had antagonized and on whose goodwill Wilson depended. Urofsky feels that the Supreme Court nomination was Wilson's reward to Brandeis for various services he had rendered to the President; in addition, Wilson hoped to appeal to the various progressive alliances that had supported Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, and to whom Brandeis was a "Progressive of Progressives." Urofsky feels that Shapiro presented "a serious misreading of the nature of Brandeisian Zionism" in suggesting that Brandeis became a sudden devotee of ethnic politics for his own ends. Had this been so, given the 1914 climate of the American Jewish community, Brandeis would have become an active non-Zionist, not a leader of the Zionists, who were a distinct minority among the Jews. Brandeis did not change, says Urofsky, but merely found "a Zionism that allowed him to carry out his leadership in the best of progressive traditions."
Brandeis became a Zionist, then, according to various biographers and historians, for a number of reasons—the emotional appeal of the community of Jewish garment workers and his respect for their values of brotherhood and social justice; his newly discovered connection with Zionism through the uncle after whom he was named; some self-interest in appealing for political support from Jewish interests; a recognition that Palestine, an area of limited size, could be an effective laboratory for the Progressive credo of applying science to human affairs through social engineering. All of these suggestions are speculative, however, and there is no real "proof" for any of them. Surprisingly, however, no one has ever speculated as to what sort of intellectual justification a man of Brandeis' background and intelligence must have needed in order so suddenly to change his affiliations and his point of view. Brandeis, who had had little contact with Jews until he was fifty-four years old, who, in 1905 and 1910, had equated hyphenated Americans with disloyal Americans, whose devotion to America was above reproach, in 1914 became the spokesman for Jewish nationalism. Did he not need some way, intellectually, to rationalize this change, to answer the charge of dual loyalty he had raised in his earlier speeches? It seems inconceivable that Brandeis could have become an active Zionist without first finding some way to make Zionism compatible with his American patriotism.

As the December 1913 exchange of letters between Kallen and Brandeis shows, there had been a renewal of a relationship
between the two at the time when Brandeis was showing some interest in Zionism, but before he had undertaken any active role as a Zionist. Gottheil's letter to Kallen in early 1914, before the outbreak of war in Europe, indicates that Gottheil, representative of the long-time Zionist activists, was hopeful that Kallen could convince Brandeis to become the leader of the American Zionist movement. Kallen did, as a matter of fact, follow through on Gottheil's suggestion, but not until August, when he left Wisconsin and came East.

Kallen then sent Brandeis a letter suggesting that they meet and talk about the Zionist movement and the Zionist organization. "I know how numerous and how weighty are the demands on your time and energy," wrote Kallen cautiously. "It is only because the issues are so important and the present crisis so serious, and because so many of us 'academic' Zionists are looking to you for leading, that I venture to approach you at all."¹⁶

Brandeis was willing to meet with Kallen, but they had some difficulty arranging an appointment. Finally they were able to find time for a long, uninterrupted private discussion—a trip from Boston to New York by overnight boat that both were planning to take to the Extraordinary Conference of Zionists called by Shemaryahu Levin for August 30, 1914. In recalling this period recently, Kallen noted,

There was the question of who should head the Provisional Executive Committee. And at that time I wrote to Brandeis, who had become aware of my ways of thinking, urging him to take on the leadership of the Committee. . . .
We talked. I don't recall exactly, but there was so little dissent by him from my position.

The important thing for him was that the proclaimed antagonism between Americanism and Zionism was a false claim—it didn't have to be. Because to begin with he believed that he could not be an American and a Zionist completely. Then he came to believe that he could, and that he would, and he did. And he did it with a vigor and a force... and his stance and his vision were of a quality of a man convinced.

A good way to investigate Brandeis' perception of Zionism is to look closely at the Zionist speeches he made, particularly those of late 1914 and 1915, shortly after he assumed leadership of the Zionist movement. It soon becomes clear that Brandeis used several themes over and over again; his speeches contain standard phrases and paragraphs that he repeated with different emphases, depending on his audience. His initial theme, for instance, his conviction of the Jews' right to succeed in the struggle for national survival, appeared in almost every Zionist speech he made. As Brandeis accepted the Chairmanship of the Provisional Executive Committee he noted that he did so because of his recent conviction that the Jewish People, "the fruit of three thousand years of civilization," should be preserved. The purpose of the renationalization of the Jews was to promote this preservation; therefore, said Brandeis, "it is our duty to pursue that method of saving which most promises success."

Other themes began to emerge during a mammoth speaking tour Brandeis undertook in the fall and winter of 1914. The
titles of three major speeches, "A Call to the Educated Jew," delivered before a conference of the Intercollegiate Menorah Association and published in the first issue of the Menorah Journal (January, 1915); "The Jewish Problem--How to Solve It," delivered in June 1915 before the Conference of Eastern Council of Reform Rabbis; and "True Americanism" delivered in 1915 as the traditional July 4 oration at Faneuil Hall, Boston, give a good indication of the approaches Brandeis used and of the character of the groups he was addressing.

Brandeis' speeches almost always began with a standard opening.

During most of my life my contact with Jews and Judaism was slight. I gave little thought to their problems, save in asking myself, from time to time, whether we were showing by our lives due appreciation of the opportunities which this hospitable country affords.

My approach to Zionism was through Americanism. In time, practical experience and observation convinced me that Jews were by reason of their traditions and character peculiarly fitted for the attainment of American ideals. Gradually it became clear to me that to be good Americans, we must be better Jews, and to be better Jews, we must become Zionists.

What did Brandeis mean by American ideals? This was the basic topic of his Faneuil Hall address, a speech given before an audience composed mainly of non-Jews.

... [T]he founders of the Republic ... were ... convinced, as we are, that in America, under a free government, many peoples would make one nation. ...

America ... has always declared herself for equality of nationalities as well as for equality of individuals.
... America has believed that each race had something of peculiar value which it can contribute to the attainment of those high ideals for which it is striving. America has believed that we must not only give to the immigrant the best that we have, but must preserve for America the good that is in the immigrant and develop in him the best of which he is capable. America has believed that in differentiation, not in uniformity, lies the path of progress.21

In one form or another, Brandeis included his definition of "True Americanism" in all his addresses, even in the many abbreviated remarks he sent to organizations that requested a message from him. This definition was the backbone of his approach to Zionism; without it, his Zionist rationale made little sense. His Zionist argument usually centered on two points.

For us the Jewish problem means this: How can we secure for Jews, wherever they may live, the same rights and opportunities enjoyed by non-Jews? How can we secure for the world the full contribution which Jews can make, if unhampered by artificial limitations?

The problem has two aspects: That of the individual Jew, and that of Jews collectively. Obviously, no individual should be subjected anywhere ... to a denial of any common right or opportunity. ... But Jews collectively should likewise enjoy the same right and opportunity to live and develop as do other groups of people. ... For the individual is dependent for his development ... in large part upon the development of the group of which he forms a part. We can scarcely conceive of an individual German or Frenchman living and developing without some relation to the contemporary German or French life and culture. ... [T]he solution of the Jewish Problem necessarily involves the continued existence of the Jews as Jews.22

Jews, Brandeis was saying, in order to survive, needed to have the same equality or rights, both individually and collectively, as other people. Zionism, the movement to
renationalize the Jewish people, would give them this equality.

... [Zionism] is essentially a movement to give the Jew more ... freedom; it aims to enable the Jews to exercise the same right now exercised by practically every other people in the world: To live at their option either in the land of their fathers or in some other country; a right which members of small nations as well as of large ... may now exercise. ...  

What, according to Brandeis, constituted nationality? Had not the Jews lost their claim to their own nationality through two thousand years of dispersion among other nations? Brandeis always raised this issue, and then proceeded to distinguish carefully between "nation" and "nationality."

The difference between a nation and a nationality is clear; but it is not always observed. Likeness between members is the essence of nationality; but the members of a nation may be very different. A nation may be composed of many nationalities. ... [T]he essential ... is the recognition of equal rights of each nationality.

... [Nationality is] the conscious community of sentiments ... religion, tradition, customs [which bind] us together. ... The similarity of experiences [which tend] to produce similarity of qualities. ...  

According to this definition, then, the Jews were a distinct nationality. But why, after all the years in the Diaspora, did the Jews need a nation in order to express their nationality? Couldn't they do so equally well in a free country like the United States? Brandeis allowed himself to admit a possibly painful fact—-even America, the most liberal of countries, had "failed to eliminate the anti-Jewish prejudice." This was because, in its pressure
for conformity, America had failed "still to recognize the equality of whole peoples or nationalities." The Jewish people, in order to have complete liberty of expression, needed a country of their own.

Deeply imbedded in every people is the desire for full development--the longing, as Mazzini phrased it, "to elaborate and express their idea, to contribute their stone also to the pyramid of history." . . . [Zionism] is a manifestation in the struggle for existence by . . . a people whose three thousand years of civilization has produced a faith, culture, and individuality which will enable it to contribute largely in the future, as it has in the past, to the advance of civilization. . . . [Zionists] believe that only in Palestine can Jewish life be fully protected from the forces of disintegration; that there alone can the Jewish Spirit reach its full and national development. . . .

To Brandeis, then, Zionism became more than a movement to return the Jews to Palestine in order to ensure their survival as a people. As a matter of fact, he always took pains to reassure his audiences that Zionism "is not a movement to remove all of the Jews of the world . . . to Palestine." Its primary purpose for him lay in the effect which the return to Palestine would have on the lives of Jews who chose to live outside the national homeland, in the United States, for instance. Brandeis characterized the Zionist movement in two ways. "It is idealistic but it is also essentially practical," he said; "it seeks . . . to make the dream of a Jewish life in a Jewish land come true."

There is no doubt that his practical mind took pleasure in the facts of Palestine's material development, for they indicated the reality of the rebirth of the Jewish nation, and
the actuality of its existence as a potential state. The success in colonization was most important, however, for the "spiritual and social development" which accompanied it, "a development in education, in health and in social order" that Brandeis saw as exemplary for all the nations of the world.26

Zionism, Brandeis reiterated, "by securing for those Jews who wished to settle there the opportunity to do so," had meaning for all people, both the Jews and non-Jews; the reestablishment of "a legally secure home," where Jews "may live together and lead a Jewish life" would give "a center from which the Jewish spirit may radiate and give to the Jews scattered throughout the world that inspiration which springs from the memories of a great past and the hope of a great future." The restoration of Jewish spirit enunciated originally by the Jewish prophets and encompassing the "highest conception of morality" and "ideals of democracy and of social justice," was clearly demanded, he said, "in the interest of mankind, as well in justice to the Jews."27

In his speeches Brandeis went beyond the generalities of Zionist theory to confront the problem most pressing to American Jews, the issue of dual loyalty. Since, argued Brandeis, "the twentieth century ideals of America have been the ideal of the Jew for more than twenty centuries," and since Zionism was committed to the preservation and strengthening of these ideals, it followed that "loyalty to America demands that each American Jew become a Zionist."
Let no American imagine that Zionism is inconsistent with Patriotism. Multiple loyalties are objectionable only if they are inconsistent. . . . A man is a better citizen of the United States for being also a loyal citizen of his state, and of his city. . . . There is no inconsistency between loyalty to America and loyalty to Jewry. The Jewish spirit . . . is essentially modern and essentially American. . . . [T]he Jews in spirit and in ideals [are] fully in harmony with the noblest aspirations of the country. 26

Brandeis went even further with this argument. "The Jewish renaissance in Palestine," he said, would enable the Jews of the United States to perform more successfully their "plain duty to America." He emphasized that "by battling for the Zionist cause, the American ideal of democracy, of social justice and of liberty will be given wider expression."

A good Zionist, therefore, would become also, at one and the same time, a more patriotic, a more 100%, American. 29

A good Zionist was also a more self-respecting individual, said Brandeis. "Demoralization," he noted, "has to some extent already set in among American Jews." Brandeis attributed this to the foundering of the Jewish spirit, and the lack of "necessary moral and spiritual support" in the open society of "our land of liberty." Citing instances of Jewish crime, Brandeis deplored the waning of Jewish values, with the inherent loss of self-respect to Jews both individually and as a group. The sole bulwark against this demoralization, he said, was "to develop in each new generation of Jews in America the sense of noblesse oblige. . . . That spirit can best be developed by actively participating in some way in furthering
the ideals of the Jewish renaissance; and this can be done effectively only through furthering the Zionist movement. 30

These arguments that Brandeis, newly converted to Zionism, used to justify his conversion, are rather different from the Zionist theories of Europe. Unlike European Zionists, or recent Jewish immigrants to the United States, Brandeis’ Zionism did not stem from an emotional reaction to anti-Semitism, nor from a rejection of the concept of emancipation with its implication of the right of the Jews to live where they pleased. This is understandable, since the American Jewish experience with which Brandeis was familiar was a fundamentally different experience from that of European Jewry; he had, after all, achieved great success by taking his own emancipation for granted. The source of Brandeis’ Zionism lay in his concept of Americanism, a concept he defined differently after 1914 than before. In 1905 he had spoken out against “hyphenated Americans.” In 1910 he had stated, “[T]he recognition of the high ideals of the Jewish race its members found at last in America,” and had reiterated that “habits of living, of thought which tend to keep alive difference of origin . . . are inconsistent with the American idea . . . and are disloyal.” By 1915 he was saying that “the new nationalism adopted by America proclaims that each race or people, like each individual, has the right and duty to develop, and that only through such differentiated development will high civilization be attained.” Before 1914 Brandeis had championed a “melting pot” ideology; afterwards,
his concept of Americanism insisted that differing national groups be encouraged to retain their identity. Even more radical a change was his suggestion that the various ethnic groups could best contribute to America by preserving their respective traditions. 31

From this new, pluralistic, concept of America Brandeis was able to identify a kinship of spirit between Judaism and America. No longer "inconsistent" and "disloyal," the Jewish spirit had become "essentially modern and essentially American." Loyalty to America "demanded that each American Jew become a Zionist"; it was the Jews' "duty to preserve and to develop further the Jewish spirit." The Zionist movement had brought forth in Palestine the qualities of personal dedication and social responsibility which, to Brandeis, represented the highest expressions of American ideals. It was clear, Brandeis said in 1915, that the American Jews, "free from civil or political disabilities and ... relatively prosperous," should lead the struggle to found a Jewish nation which shared America's "fundamental law" of the brotherhood of man, and "America's insistent demand" for social justice. 32

IV.

This analysis of Brandeis' speeches makes obvious how much of his Zionist rationale bears an uncanny similarity to the Zionist statements of Horace Kallen. "True Americanism" reads like a re-statement of cultural pluralism; the "ennobling" Jewish spirit is a twin to Kallen's Hebraic
spirit; the identification of the Jewish spirit as the source of the American idea recalls Kallen's eye-opening experience with Barrett Wendell; the characterization of Zionism as both "idealistic" and "practical" is a re-statement of the themes implicit in Messianic pragmatism; Brandeis' preference for Zionism as a constructive force rather than as a form of charity resembles Kallen's "affirmative" argument; the charge to American Jews to regain their self respect by becoming Zionists, and to do their duty by assuming leadership of the Zionist cause, echoes Kallen's words. There had been a connection between the two. Kallen's ideas must have been the missing link, the impetus that provided Brandeis with an acceptable rationale for assuming leadership in the Zionist movement, the approach that gave Brandeis a way intellectually to accept a commitment to a cause which attracted him emotionally.

Some confirmation for Kallen's recollection of his August 1914 meeting with Brandeis appears in a pamphlet Kallen wrote in 1943 as a memorial to Brandeis. Without identifying his own role in formulating the theory of cultural pluralism, Kallen wrote

"... Between that date [1910] and the date of the Fourth of July address [1915] there had come to his [Brandeis'] attention inductive studies of the character and condition of American culture and an exposition of the cultural forces that gave the American mind its dynamic competency its flexibility and its richness ..., an interpretation which has come to be known as Cultural Pluralism.

One of these "inductive studies" was certainly Kallen's 1910
article, "Judaism, Hebraism, Zionism," which he had sent to Brandeis in December 1913. In Kallen's files is another, unpublished, study entitled "The International Aspects of Zionism." Kallen dated this memorandum August 11, 1914; a note on it, in Kallen's handwriting, adds "Copy submitted to Mr. Brandeis August 29, 1914." It is reasonable to assume that Kallen gave this analysis of Zionism to Brandeis, and discussed it with him, on their boat trip to New York, the day before the August 30 Zionist Extraordinary Conference. Brandeis, then, would have been familiar with its contents by the time he allowed his name to be put in nomination as Chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee.\(^{33}\)

The first section of Kallen's memorandum incorporated much of his Zionist thinking and reinforced his ideas of "Judaism, Hebraism, Zionism." In it he discussed his concept of "the equality of the different" and the importance, to free men, of maintaining these differences. He argued that a new Jewish nation would revive the Jewish culture, and defined and delineated Hebraism, "the mind ... of the Jewish people." He presented the viewpoints of both the practical and the political Zionists, concluding, "there can be no 'cultural centre' without a political centre." He rejected the idea of Zionism as philanthropy, stressing that Palestine must become free from dependence on charity in order for the Jews to be able to express their "ethnic nationality" freely and autonomously. He showed how the American Jewish community was in danger of dying without
a Jewish national homeland with which it could identify. 34

Kallen's thoughts were new to Brandeis, for most of them were not part of the standard European Zionist ideology with which deHaas, for example, would have been familiar. Their effect on Brandeis and their contribution to Brandeis' decision to assume active Zionist leadership can be only a matter of conjecture. But the fact that shortly thereafter Brandeis was to repeat almost verbatim many of these same points in a Zionist philosophy of his own demonstrates, with some certainty, that they made a significant impression on him. Historians have ignored completely the role that Kallen's concepts must have played in Brandeis' Zionist "conversion," but to do so is to imply that Brandeis never thought out his seemingly about-face change, a rather improbable assumption for someone with Brandeis' intellectual background and stature.

The influence of Kallen's ideas, through Brandeis' statements, went further, however. As Kallen admitted recently,

Now Brandeis took up the ideas ... and after he identified himself with the Zionist movement ... he presented in his own language the essential ideas. And in presenting those ideas, the conflicts he had imagined between Zionism and Americanism and that were emphasized so much by the [non-Zionist] American Jewish Committee of those days ... were simply nullified. Now that gave Zionism publicly a philosophical status in terms of what you might call the American faith, and gave it a public force that it couldn't possibly have had from me alone.

Kallen, through Brandeis, thus became the philosopher of an Americanized Zionism, the intellectual who worked behind the
scenes with a leader whose influence, he felt certain, would remake the Zionist movement in America. Kallen's perceptions were accurate. From 1914 until 1921, when their insistence on an "Americanized" Zionism forced Brandeis and Kallen to leave the Zionist movement, American Zionism came into its own, reaching a zenith of development not equalled again until the crises attending the founding of the State of Israel in 1947 and 1948. This development depended, however, on more than words; for Progressives like Kallen and Brandeis it depended, also, on the building of a new kind of Zionist movement, one stressing the organization and discipline necessary for the performance of "duty" and of "social responsibility."
CHAPTER 6
1914: THE EFFICIENT REFORMER

I.

If before 1914 Zionism had made small headway in the United States, during the years of the first World War Zionism leaped forward in a spectacular advance. Where there had been only 12,000 organized Zionists in America in 1914, by 1917 American Zionists numbered 150,000, and by 1920, 171,000. By May, 1915, the Emergency Fund had transmitted $350,000 to Palestine, a sum which would have seemed fantastic to the delegates who attended the Federation Convention less than a year before; by 1920, more than $1,500,000 had been remitted. "Palestine became the vital topic of the day," remembered Abraham Goldberg, an early Zionist worker; "fifteen years of American Zionist activity, which seemed most circumscribed and barren to the active workers themselves . . . burst forth [in response to] the war [which] supplied the needed stimulus." 1

The years 1914-1920 constituted the period in which American Zionism matured. The horrors of the war in Eastern Europe, where the greatest number of Jews still lived, and the pressure of economic necessity in vulnerable, isolated, Palestine, awakened a great response. As the conviction
grew that the war, through an international readjustment in the Near East, might bring in its wake a solution of the Jewish question, and perhaps even result in the establishment of a Jewish state, the Zionists gained the status of a mass movement. Louis Lipsky recalled,

The struggle to achieve results sharpened our wits, called forth our best talents. . . . Our prestige was at its highest in this period. We seemed to be capable of surmounting all obstacles. We appeared in the light of a victorious army. Coffee-house meetings, conferences, conventions, congresses, campaigns for funds, re-organization, polemics in the press and from the platform--day and night, without leave of absence, always at the front, prepared to engage in battle. . . .

The practical side of our efforts was reflected in the funds collected, the organization that grew up under our hands--vigorou, enthusiastic, self-sacrificing. . . .

The war conditions undoubtedly provided the opportunity for the growth and increased influence of American Zionism. Those who lived through this period, however, were in unanimous agreement that "the transformation of American Zionism . . . would remain an historical enigma without consideration of the extraordinary leadership . . . of Louis D. Brandeis, . . . who, by his superb leadership and immeasurable devotion, gave Zionism high prestige and a new direction." Brandeis seized the opportunity the Provisional Executive Committee gave him; under his direction "the Zionist forces were employed effectively whether the objective was diplomacy, organization or rigid accounting of American receipts and Palestinian expenditures." Lipsky, who in 1920, was to become the leader of an anti-Brandeis faction within the
American Zionist movement, remembered the period of

the early days of his [Brandeis] participation in
our affairs [as] a source of joy and comfort to
all who were involved in the Zionist responsi-
bility. . . . He plunged into the responsibili-
ties of Zionist action with such zeal and
insistence that his associates were overwhelmed.
. . . He would brook no delays; . . . he was
eager for information . . . making notes for
things to be done just as soon as his visitor
departed. . . . He believed that Zion would be
redeemed . . . and that he was helping in the
realization of that dream.3

Brandeis had come to Zionism at the height of his career
as a leader in, and spokesman for, the American Progressive
movement. In his Zionist activity he carried out his leader-
ship in the best of Progressive traditions. During the years
that he headed the American Zionists Brandeis acted just as
he had when he had championed wage and hours laws, defended
children, or promoted scientific management and conservation.

To Brandeis, Zionism was another reform, and he brought to
bear not only the Progressive outlook, but also the tactics
he had learned in previous battles. He studied the data,
decided on a goal that could be practicably achieved, and
organized his followers to do so. "Money, Members, Disci-
pline" was his motto, and his speeches concluded with the
demand to "organize, organize, organize."4

Definitions of American Progressivism are many and
varied; most, however, lay stress on the movement's belief in
scientific and efficient management as a basis for achieving
reform. Historian Robert Wiebe, for example, notes that
"the values of continuity and regularity, functionality and
rationality, administration and management set the form of problems and outlined their [the Progressives'] alternative solutions." And a study of the conservation movement of the early twentieth century concludes, "The broader significance of the conservation movement [to an interpretation of the Progressive movement] stemmed from the role it played in the transformation of a decentralized, nontechnical, loosely organized society, where waste and inefficiency ran rampant, into a highly organized, technical, and centrally planned and directed social organization which could meet a complex world with efficiency and purpose."  

deHaas reported that Brandeis did, indeed, devote a considerable portion of his energy to the problems of organization and administration.

The new leader imposed his spirit upon the organization. . . . His habitual punctuality forced a like response from everyone who sought to associate with him. . . . He believed in the written word. . . . [He wrote] carefully phrased letters, with their numbered paragraphs, followed at short intervals by demands for precise detailed statements. . . . [T]he whole procedure called for an orderliness and a systemization, a compactness and a precision. . . .

The installation of a time clock in the Zionist offices . . . implied an end to comfortable dishabille, the "slippered ease" with which Zionist affairs had been conducted. Some of the old "machine" rebelled against this introduction of mechanical methods. . . . [T]hey were . . . opposed to his ceaseless spurring, his demand for self-discipline, his insistence upon accuracy. . . .  

deHaas's descriptions make clear that Brandeis was a Pragmatist as well as a Progressive. As Kallen wrote recently, in agreement with the thesis that the American
Zionist movement of this period took on the character of a Progressive reform, "You might say our [Kallen's and Brandeis'] progressivism ... depended on the honesty of power in the use of principles taken as working hypotheses." Once Brandeis clarified the Zionist ideal in terms he could accept, he proceeded to implement a program of intensive efficiency for the translation of that ideal into action. His appetite for reports and memoranda was insatiable, and with his tersely worded directives to Benjamin Perlstein, the administrative secretary of the Provisional Executive Committee, he controlled every phase of the Zionist program. His "cold hard austere" regime saw Zionism in terms of a job that could be done. From 1914 to 1921, the Zionist movement in America took on a different complexion. "The American Zionist view tended to crystallize in a formulation of the Jewish position less partisan, more scientific, more historical and more sociological than formulations made at the seat of the Jewish problems-in-crises in central Europe, and the American Zionist tended toward an attitude less ardent, more contemplative and more businesslike than that of the European," wrote Horace Kallen in 1921. As Kallen commented recently, Oh, yes, the Zionist movement in America became American. It took on the insistence on democratic processes, the tendency to accent the practical realization of purposes and intention [implicit in the Pragmatic method], the substitution of action for talk. Before Brandeis, Zionism was so much talk, you know.
II.

In 1914 Brandeis recognized in Kallen a mind that had been formed by some of the same influences as his own. Each had derived his governing perception from influences outside the Jewish community; each had been part of the Harvard milieu of men and ideas. Brandeis was an active leader in the Progressive movement, and Kallen was the disciple and apostle of William James, whose emphasis on Pragmatism gave the philosophic rationale for much of Progressive reform. Both believed in science, modernity, efficiency, expertise. Both shared an American commitment to Zionism, and both saw in the Zionist movement the chance to effect, in Palestine, the Utopia of social justice which was somehow eluding the Progressives in the United States. Beginning in September 1914, when Brandeis took over the Zionist leadership, until July 1916, when Brandeis resigned his chairmanship after becoming a Supreme Court Justice, Brandeis and Kallen worked together closely to implement their goal of an "Americanized" Zionism.

The first indication of the Kallen-Brandeis cooperative effort came almost immediately after the formation of the Provisional Executive Committee. An undated letter from Benjamin Perlstein to Brandeis, enclosing a copy of an appeal, "To the Zionists of America," included this covering notation: "I am enclosing copy of the appeal which I understand was framed by Dr. Kallen and you. I understand that this is to
be the form of appeal to appear in newspapers and also to be sent to Zionist friends." The contents of the appeal referred to the decisions made at the Committee's formation meeting; its probable date, therefore, was early September, 1914.9

"To the Zionists of America" described the reasons for the formation of the new Zionist organization and then proceeded to define a role for American Zionists.

It [the Provisional Executive Committee] has inaugurated the work of administration. It has made plans for the maintenance of the institutions of Zionism in Palestine... It has entered into relations with other bodies of Jews, in the hope that a united American Jewish community may be ready to act at the opportune moment.

Fellow Zionists, the work of safeguarding the continuity of our movement is begun... It requires men, it requires money. You must furnish both. You must give of your devotion without reserve, of your means without stint.

... Zionists, the duty of the hour is supreme. Strain every nerve to obtain at once the One Hundred Thousand Dollar fund that is essential. ... Put the machinery of all your organizations into motion without delay... And who knows but that opportunity may yet be wrested from disaster! Who knows but that our tried people everywhere ... will strive, united with us, for permanent justice, peace, and liberty for the Jewish people in the Jewish land.10

Signed "Louis D. Brandeis," this appeal received wide circulation as Brandeis' first official Zionist statement. It foreshadowed many of the themes that Brandeis, through Kallen, was to stress later—the emphasis on the development of an administration capable of meeting its Zionist responsibilities, the appeal for men and money, the picture of Palestine as a potential land of "permanent justice, peace
and liberty," the mention of duty and self-sacrifice.

Kallen's role was anonymous, as was often to be the case, but a few days later Brandeis assigned to him some specific Zionist duties.

From Louis D. Brandeis
New York
September 13, 1914

Dear Dr. Kallen:--

... I trust that you are feeling better ..., and that ... you can take up the work vigorously now.

First: At yesterday's meeting of the Executive Committee, a vote was passed directing the Chairman to appoint a committee to consider the political problems, with the special view to the instruction of any delegate who might be appointed, should there be an opportunity of participating in peace negotiations. ...

I have appointed you, Professor Gottheil and Mr. Hurwitz as members of that committee, and I think it important that careful consideration of that matter should be undertaken at once, so that much work may be done on this before you start West. ...

Second: Another vote was passed ... requesting the Chairman to appoint a committee to undertake the propaganda work for Zionism, so that the public may acquire an understanding of the aims of the Zionists. ...

This matter, you will recall, was discussed by us at our informal conference ... on the evening of September 1st. I took the matter up with Mr. [Norman] Hapgood to have an editorial in "Harper's," in about a fortnight. The material for an article on Zionism in "Harper's," which I understood from your letter of September 4th you were preparing, has not reached us. ...

... [It] seems to be wise to offer to Dr. Stephen S. Wise the chairmanship of this committee, and I want to appoint you, Professor Gottheil, Mr. deHaas and Dr. Hurwitz as members. ... I trust ... that this work can also be effectively started before you go West. ...

Third: The minutes of the [Extraordinary] Conference have not been distributed, it being deemed advisable to make a careful examination of them before
this is done. . . . This matter . . . requires your immediate attention. Mr. Perlstein has the stenographic report of the proceedings of the Conference.11

In an eight-paged letter marked "Personal," Kallen responded to Brandeis' directives.

To Louis D. Brandeis Chicago
21 September 1914

Dear Mr. Brandeis,

1. I arrived in New York on Tuesday. The first committee to meet was that on the minutes of both the Extraordinary Conference and Provisional Committee. We discovered grave lacunae in the records of the conference, particularly with reference to the Provisional Committee power to coopt new members. The Committee, according to the Federation Secretary, has that power on the basis of a ruling by Mr. Lipsky. . . . None of this appears in the minutes of the Conference. . . .

2. The Committee on Propaganda met twice, Mr. de Haas being absent. We surveyed the field, and arranged for Messrs. Gottheil, Wise and myself to undertake publication of statements (1) on the relationship of Zionism to Turkey, (2) on the Zionist Program and the Present Situation, (3) on Zionism and Americanism. I have seen Mr. Fuller of The Nation. He has promised to encourage a discussion a propos of Gottheil's book [on Zionism], the discussion to culminate with an editorial in favor of the Movement, if he finds it "practical". I have also undertaken to write for him on the general problem of nationality. . . . I will write to [Norman] Hapgood to find out from him just what he would like by way of statement. An article by you in that weekly would be most advantageous. I called Mr. Samuel Strauss [publisher of The New York Globe] and Henry Bernstein together again, and we have finally succeeded in organizing a News Bureau. Mr. Perlstein is to get out a biweekly bulletin of all Zionist happenings, which these gentlemen are to use for the good of the cause. Whether they will keep their promises remains to be seen: They are both busy men and it will be necessary for the secretary to keep them informed of their responsibilities.

3. The political committee met with Dr. Magnes absent from both sessions. May I say, incidentally, that Mr. Magnes's membership on the committee may prove a hindrance to its work. I know him only by his record and connections, and I am impressed by
the instability of the first, and the multiplicity of the second. The latter, I think [may] make him seek to find compromises of all his causes with one another, so that he cannot serve any of them wholeheartedly. . . .

The conclusions of the political committee will be conveyed to you personally by Messrs. Gottheil and Wise. Otherwise, it has agreed to the same mode of procedure that we discussed in our meetings of some time ago. I believe in the wisdom of keeping its activities as detached as possible from those of the larger committee --or if it must be attached--of making its work nominal and of appointing another committee to do quietly the necessary work. Indeed, I was impressed, at the office, by the multiplicity of committees, and paucity of work. None of those that has been appointed at the earlier meetings seemed to have accomplished anything or even to have known their duties.

Mr. Samuel Strauss was particularly emphatic in this matter. He is of the opinion that if anything is actually to be accomplished it will best be done by attaching to yourself a few individuals, like Judges [Irving] Lehman and [Julian] Mack, and working with them. Our record justifies his belief and I have asked him to discuss the matter with you.

4. I am instructed by the Executive of the Parushim--the order of which I told you--to notify you of your election to honorary membership,--and to offer you a place on the executive committee. The Order, as you know, is particularly concerned with the political and socio-economic aspects of the Zionist program, with the view of the conservation and development of Hebraic culture and ideals. It aims to make of itself at one and the same time a disciplined and trained army and a school for leaders.

5. Here in Chicago, the Jews are sharply divided into two groups. From the point of view of our needs the best policy will be for you to meet these groups separately. Accordingly, the [wealthy] "South Side" Jews are asked to organize an independent reception for you and Dr. [Shemaryahu] Levin. It is hoped to give a dinner where you can meet perhaps two hundred Jews of wealth and position and state to them our cause. They are both ignorant and prejudiced, as well as wealthy, difficult, consequently, in the extreme. But our hope of getting much money for immediate purposes lies with them almost entirely. Later, when we proceed to build up the organization, we shall be able to deal with the larger masses freely. . . .
These letters show the sense of energy and activity that began to permeate the American Zionist movement once Brandeis assumed a leadership role. They indicate, also, the close working relationship between Brandeis and Kallen in late 1914. Kallen, in his letter, touched on several of the issues he was to emphasize in the next few years in his correspondence both to Brandeis and to other Zionist leaders. He made it obvious, for example, that he felt most comfortable working with compatible individuals or with small knowledgeable groups who would work quickly, quietly and efficiently to obtain results; he recommended this procedure to Brandeis also. Judges Irving Lehman and Julian Mack came from backgrounds similar to that of Brandeis, almost assimilated, removed from the Jewish community. Both had been active on the anti-Zionist American Jewish Committee, and had spoken against the Zionist movement, citing the charge of dual loyalty. Once Kallen had convinced Brandeis that "multiple loyalties are objectionable only if they are inconsistent," he urged Brandeis to do likewise with other "Americanized" Jews of stature. Kallen felt that men like Lehman and Mack, in order to have become so successful, must have demonstrated a sense of priorities and a discipline of self; certainly, an organization consisting of a multitude of disorganized committees, derelict even in the comprehension of their duties, needed leaders of this caliber if achievements were to be obtained.13

For Kallen was, as this letter succinctly reveals, a
harsh critic of the way in which the Zionist Organization had been functioning. He looked askance on the secretary who allowed omissions in the minutes, on committees which accomplished nothing, on people who needed to be reminded of their responsibilities. He was critical, also, of less than single-minded devotion to the Zionist cause. Dr. Magnes, a cultural Zionist, might prove to be disloyal, said Kallen, for Zionism meant wholehearted loyalty to the Basle Program. The "disciplined and trained army" of the Parushim defined what Kallen hoped the entire Zionist movement might be—loyal, tightly organized, efficient in the performance of duties and responsibilities, always with an eye on the greater goal of conserving and developing Hebraic culture and ideals. 14

This letter shows, also, the major liaison and public relations role Kallen was to play in the new Zionist movement, both with Jews and with non-Jews. Kallen's perception, for instance, defined who Brandeis was to meet in Chicago; other letters indicate that he performed the same function for Brandeis and others all over the mid-West, the South, and on the West Coast. In addition, as this letter makes clear, Kallen was a major anonymous influence on the non-Jewish media, suggesting to them topics and approaches, as well as providing entire articles that Hapgood and others used over their own signatures. Examination of magazines of the 1914-1915 period shows that Kallen was extraordinarily successful; beginning in September 1914, major journals began
featuring articles on Zionism, almost all of them in favor of the cause. ¹⁵

A letter of about the same time from Kallen to Felix Frankfurter confirms some of these observations. Kallen had first met Frankfurter in the 1905-1906 period, when Frankfurter was a senior at Harvard Law School. "I believe we already talked then about the Jewish interest in the context of ideas of justice under law," wrote Kallen recently. Brandeis' affiliation with Zionism greatly impressed Frankfurter, who, at Brandeis' request, became a member of the "advisory council" of the Provisional Executive Committee. There Kallen and Frankfurter became "incidental friends and ongoingly fellow workers." ¹⁶

During 1911 and 1912 Frankfurter had been Secretary of War Henry Stimson's assistant. He had lived in Washington in a house he shared with several young men, among them an Englishman, Lord Eustace Percy, at that time one of the Chief Assistants to the then British Ambassador Lord James Bryce. Kallen wrote to Frankfurter, therefore, for help in establishing another role Kallen was destined to play, that of liaison with a group of important Zionists in Great Britain. ¹⁷

To Felix Frankfurter

Sept. 17, 1914

Dear Felix:

... [M]ore matters are under discussion than in execution. I am not altogether certain about the usefulness of most of the committeemen for their suitability for the work which is being required of them. I found, when I took matters up, the usual confusion of mind and reproduction of act. Whether it will be possible to get any order into the work.
before I leave for the West [Wisconsin] I do not know. At least the publicity Committee has been established in organized form . . . Its function will need to be as much that of suppression as of dissemination of news. The Political Committee is still in session, and I will write you a summary of what it has achieved, or, rather, talked of, when sessions are over. In this connection, please send me again a memorandum of what communications you can establish for us with the British Government. You mentioned, as I remember, Lord [Eustace] Percy and perhaps there are others. I am particularly anxious to get hold of [British Ambassador Lord James] Bryce . . . He seems to be a friend of a large number of people, none of whom is, to my mind, desirable as a mediator between him and us.18

III.

At the same time, however, that Kallen was criticizing the lack of results on the part of the official Provisional Executive Committee organization, he was working actively to further the Zionist cause through his own organization, the Parushim. It was his hope that the Parushim would be the vanguard of the new Zionist movement, that it would lead the way in working with Brandeis to inculcate a new Zionist spirit and loyalty. When Kallen returned to Wisconsin in mid-September, 1914, he left the center of Zionist activity in New York. As Chairman of the Parushim's Executive Committee, though, he received regular detailed reports from all its members and sent them detailed assignments in return. Since the Parushim were also, as Kallen had envisioned, the leading activists of the new Zionist movement, this correspondence reveals much both of the Zionist history of the period, and of the roles Kallen was playing.
Several conclusions about the new American Zionism emerge from a close reading of these letters. Almost all the letters refer to the insecure status of the Provisional Executive Committee. The World Zionist Inner Actions Committee contested its right to exist and tried to restrict its responsibilities. The anti-Zionist American Jewish Committee resented a possible new competitor and made cooperation difficult. Even more disturbing, for Brandeis and for his followers, was the jealousy the Federation of American Zionists showed once the crisis attending the outbreak of war receded. The Federation, by its inertia and inefficiency, thwarted Brandeis' more strenuous efforts; it would, no doubt, have been quite content to return to the more relaxed status quo of the pre-Brandeis days. Intra-organization rivalries began almost the day after Brandeis assumed office, and though initial enthusiasm managed to mute outright rebellion, the pot had begun to boil with factionalism and with clique-dominated politics.

Many comments in these letters make clear that the primary function of the Provisional Executive Committee was that of fund raising. Though Brandeis had hopes for political influence, his first concern, and that of his active workers, was to raise the Emergency Fund as quickly and as expeditiously as possible. Previous to Brandeis, the Federation of American Zionists could hardly collect the money to keep its own organization functioning. deHaas, who, at Herzl's suggestion, had come to the United States in 1902 to
"administer" the Zionist organization soon left it to become a journalist; the American Zionists could not support even one paid worker. Within a few years after Brandeis assumed his leadership the fund-raising efforts these letters speak of brought unprecedented success, and the Zionists were able to raise huge sums of money. Brandeis had given American Zionism a new, unique role, one perpetuated to this day—American Zionists became the financiers to the World Zionist movement.

Various of the letter writers reveal the poor condition of the American Zionist movement in 1914, and the tremendous effort required on the part of a few dedicated workers to establish even the word "Zionism" as a positive fact among the Jewish masses. Ignorance and distrust of the Zionists came from both the "uptown" Jews of whom Biskind writes, and the middle class Jews who Szold describes. Zionism was an obscure concept when the Provisional Executive Committee began its work in the American Jewish community; hope for its future seemed to lie in the work with the next generation, with college students and with Menorah groups.

The letters show, also, the importance of World War I as a factor in guiding the activity of the Provisional Executive Committee. In 1914 the United States was a neutral country and the Provisional Executive Committee felt obliged to adhere to the principles of neutrality. It did so not only from patriotic sentiments, but also because open identification with one group of belligerents might undermine
the already precarious unity of the Zionist movement in Europe, and might endanger the Jewish colonists in Palestine, still under the rule of Turkey, one of the Central Powers. Yet Kallen and Brandeis, close to the American intellectual community which supported the Allies, wanted the Zionists to do likewise. They sought round-about methods, therefore, for influencing Jewish public opinion, which was preponderantly anti-Russian, and thus, by implication, pro-German.

A factor that helped to make Zionism more acceptable was the tremendous personal impression Brandeis made. It appears that without Brandeis' presence the opportunity accorded the Zionists by the outbreak of the war would have been lost. The Zionists needed him to stand with them against the Jewish community "powers"; the Zionists needed him to speak up for them in the non-Jewish councils of state. The Zionists themselves were confused about what the effect of the war might be. Brandeis' reassurances helped them go against prevailing mass Jewish sentiment in declaring their allegiance with the Allies. Brandeis, merely by his "being," was able to inspire both the Jewish community leaders and a new mass Zionist following, who looked to him as a prophet on a level with the fabled Herzl.

The Parushim were, perhaps, the most avid welcomers of Brandeis to the Zionist movement. But the letters show that they valued him, in part, because they hoped to lead and to influence him according to their own Zionist vision. An almost conspiratorial tone clings to some of the comments
the Parushim made about Brandeis. Only if we show Brandeis the proper way, they seem to be saying, can the Zionist movement progress in the "correct" direction.

Finally, these letters reveal an interesting paradox. Though Brandeis epitomized the elite leader, and though initially much of his work was through the chosen, "separate," Parushim, nevertheless the Zionists saw themselves aligned firmly on the side of the masses as against the Establishment community leaders. American Zionism, after it got on its feet, was, in the eyes of its leaders, to be a democratic movement. First the leaders would arouse the various segments of the Jewish community and educate them; thereafter, the masses would constitute the strength of the American Zionist movement. Zionism was to become a reflection of American democratic ideals; unlike the American Jewish Committee, Zionism's leaders were to govern by consent, not by self-constituted authority. This wish for a democratic Zionist movement was to come true, with different consequences, however, from those Brandeis and his followers foresaw in 1914. For only seven years later, by majority vote, the delegates to a convention of the Zionist Organization of America saw fit to reject Brandeis' policies, forcing him, Kallen, and most of the group represented in these letters, to resign from the Zionist movement. 20
To Stephen S. Wise, Prominent Reform Rabbi and leader in the Jewish community

Madison, Wisconsin
September 25, 1914

Dear Dr. Wise,

... I hope you will bear in mind what I told you about the Order [the Parushim]. We want most of all disciplined and well-trained young men and young women who have vision as well as executive ability, and spirituality, as well as force. In New York there are a good many who might be trained for leadership under proper direction, and I feel that you could play a very powerful and ideal part in the making of such leaders.

... As for your feeling about the secrecy of the work, it is, after all, no more secret than any important work has to be. ... [A]n organization which has the aims which we have must be anonymous, must work silently, and through education and infection rather than through force and noise, and can gain results only insofar as its standards are made to live in the lives of the people to whom they are brought. But no thing could be more suicidal than the announcement of such an object, so that the secrecy is inevitable. I hope that you will join with us and take your place in our executive committee together with Mr. Brandeis.21

From Henry Hurwitz, President of the Intercollegiate Menorah Association

Dorchester, Mass.
October 5, 1914

Dear Harry [Kallen's favorite nickname for "Horace"],

I got your letter the other day while I was in New York. I went chiefly to attend a meeting of the Provisional Committee. The meeting was rather routine. Chiefly on how to raise the fund. Coming very slow. Brandeis anxious to have done with it in order to have energies free for the bigger problems—also before general appeal for relief floods us. Brandeis put it up to [Judah] Magnes and [Stephen] Wise to raise money among their people [rich congregants].

So far, the mass meetings seem to be little successful, except the Boston meeting... That was
really an extraordinary night for Boston Jews. Surging mob at Symphony Hall when doors opened at 7. At 7:10 necessary to open Jordan Hall for overflow meeting. Still a couple of thousand turned away from both halls. . . . Brookline [established well-to-do Jewish immigrant communities], to hear and to join. Brandeis spoke over an hour, simply but with suppressed emotion; seemed to hook the subject and reluctant to leave it. Got great ovation both before and after speech. Tremendously different attitude towards Zionism in Boston now among all classes.

That meeting of national [Jewish] organizations [to plan for relief aid to Jews in Eastern Europe and Palestine] will be called . . . by the [anti-Zionist American] Jewish Committee alone. Decided our [Provisional Executive] Committee to keep out. . . . Brandeis wants free hand. But Federation of Zionists will be represented. . . . Wise is very keen to have you as one of our representatives. . . . He believes you to be necessary to command not only respect but support for whatever we may want from the conference. . . .

The chief question now is, whether to send an American representative to the meeting of the [World Zionist] Greater Actions Committee in Stockholm. . . . Seems they regard us merely as money-raising committee. Conditions predicated by [Shamaryahu] Levin as basis for our organization [inability of World Zionist Executive to function] seems now to be wrong. . . . (Levin sees the organization is already gone out of his hand; is trying, it would seem, to organize a kind of opposition to us politicals. . . .) . . . DeHaas off on trip to South to raise money; but . . . I believe with Wise that deHaas should go to [Stockholm to] impress the true situation upon the people in Europe—especially since Brandeis to be head of Zionist movement. (This Wise takes for granted, too.) Otherwise, we may have very embarrassing difficulties with the organization, however crippled, in Europe. . . .

I saw Oscar Straus [a member of the American Jewish Committee Establishment; former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey] . . . on a Menorah matter. Incidentally, we talked Zionism. He declared himself strongly in favor of Jewish colonization in Palestine . . . but only under political guarantees of one or more Powers. . . . He is greatly impressed with Brandeis as leader; expressed a desire to meet him and talk over the problems of Zionism with him. . . . Wise will arrange a meeting between them. . . .
To Richard Gottheil, former President of the Federation of American Zionists.

Madison, Wisconsin
Oct. 14, 1914

Dear Prof. Gottheil:

... My reports from New York are disquieting. I hear of a good deal of restlessness on the part of Federation [of American Zionist] officials, who think they are being displaced. ... I hope that, insofar as possible, [Louis] Lipsky, [Shemaryahu] Levin and Co. will be given as much kavod [honor] as possible. I am told that they feel "snuffed out"; and I fear very much that they may develop obstructionist tactics which will disgust Mr. Brandeis, and perhaps lead him to cut himself off from the organization. I am particularly concerned about the movement of the I.A.C. [World Zionist Inner Actions Committee] toward the re-opening of offices in Berlin, and the meeting in Stockholm. The situation seems to me to be very delicate, and I hope that you, Wise, Miss Szold, Brandeis and Hurwitz can find some way of suppressing what I feel will be--knowing the character of the Federation [of American Zionists] as I do--very unwise action.

Finally, there is this matter which seems to me now to be of prime importance. I do not find in any of the foreign periodicals any recognition of the significance of Brandeis' leadership. I think that it is necessary to make this very clear by a statement of Brandeis' position and importance in this country, written by a number of people, e.g., you, Wise, Oscar Straus, ... and sent to such papers as the Jewish Chronicle of London, the Zionist, etc. The Chronicle is ominously silent about the activities in America, and I regard that as a dangerous thing. Will you kindly put this matter also to our group [Parushim]? We shall have to depend upon ourselves, I foresee almost exclusively, if we are to save Brandeis for the great work of the movement, without being involved in much unnecessary quarreling and personalities.23
From I. J. Biskind, a Cleveland Surgeon.

[The Hebrew letter for "P" often used as a heading on the reports of Parushim members.]

Oct. 19, 1914.

Dear Dr. Kallen,

Your letter received. . . .

. . . We have done all in our power to make the Brandeis meeting a success. Mr. Brandeis arrived here [Cleveland] at about noon. Several of our people and one of the Uptown Jews (as you call them) met him at the station. After a few introductions we turned him over to the Germans ["uptown" German Jews] who had a luncheon waiting for him. He spoke at the luncheon and made a very good impression. None of our people was present, as our uptown Jews did not want to have a Zionist luncheon. . . . Towards evening 30-40 of our people had Mr. Brandeis to a luncheon of our own, where he gave us a nice talk.

The meeting in the evening was a great success morally, but not financially. . . . The armory where the meeting took place has a capacity of about 3000 and was filled. We collected all told about 500 dollars at the meeting, and it was the fault of the federation in New York. We expected Dr. [Shemaryahu] Levin should make the appeal for money, but he did not come and instead of him they sent Mr. Mosliansky who was not understood by 90% of the people. . . .

. . . We are still negotiating with the uptown Jews about donations. They have not given anything yet, all we have collected so far was from our own people.

I have had a little conversation with Mr. Brandeis and have told him something about my little scheme. He seemed to be interested and asked me to let him see the report. . . .

. . . I think, that now is the time for us to start to mould public opinion and influence it in our favor. People like Mr. Brandeis, yourself and Dr. Gottheil should come out openly in the big newspapers and magazines and tell the world what we want and demand. . . .

Is there anything else being done here outside of collecting the money for the fund?24
From Henrietta Szold, President of the Hadassah
Women’s Organization

New York
October 18, 1914

Dear Dr. Kallen:

... The hundred thousand dollar fund is a terrible incubus. I am sure Mr. Brandeis himself feels it as such. The collections are proceeding slowly everywhere. Here in New York and within Hadassah circles our best strength has been absorbed in the intensive canvass we are making in a restricted section of the city. We have taken unto ourselves thirty city blocks in the Harlem district [at that time a middle-class Jewish neighborhood]. We are making a house-to-house canvass, the beginning of which was a mass meeting of organized Zionist women, of whom a thousand had been addressed. Only two hundred and fifty appeared, but the spirit of the meeting was admirable...

What the financial result will be it is impossible to foretell. So far the reports from the collectors have not been encouraging. It must be admitted, too, that the times are hard. There is an enormous amount of suffering in the city, and, naturally, the Jews feel it most. But on the other hand it must be admitted, too, that there is a tremendous amount of materialism abroad... [We have] organized squads who go through the Jewish neighborhoods and accost groups of girls. One lesson that has been learned is that even the word Zionism is unknown to fifty percent of the persons interrogated in this casual way. Next week for three nights we shall have some soap box speaking in one of the most populous Jewish neighborhoods uptown...

The other work of the Provisional Executive Committee from the point of view of organization and education, etc., also proceeds very slowly. Our spirit has been flagging, I fear. As I suspected from the first, you will remember, our status is not secure, and at every turn we ask ourselves, cui bene?... It appears from the very meager communications that have been trickling through to us that the Inner Actions Committee is far from disabled, as Doctor Lewin [Levin] supposed. We--our Provisional Executive Committee--has been greeted by them as Hilfscomite (Auxiliary Committee). Up to the present we have received authority only to deal independently in Palestinian matters, which, of course, means the collection and transmission of moneys. We have addressed a
communication to the Stockholm conference which ought to determine finally what our status is.

Next Sunday the conference of American Jewish bodies is to take place under the auspices of the American Jewish Committee. I have not yet heard who our delegates are to be; that is to say, the delegates of the Federation of American Zionists. Our Provisional Executive Committee, being an international body, is not to have representation. If our fund is not collected by the time this body issues its appeal for general relief, I am afraid we shall be submerged.

To Henrietta Szold

Madison, Wisconsin

October 28, 1914

My dear Miss Szold:

I am glad to hear from you at last. I have been wondering what turn matters were taking in New York.

... I have been in communication with Maurice Browne of The Little Theater of Chicago. He has enthusiastically agreed to organize a company of Jewish players who will present nationalistic plays all over the country. ... I have undertaken the writing of one play, but we need two more, one of which must be a comedy. ... If you know of any mss. already in existence or of any persons who have real dramatic power, will you kindly put them into immediate communication with me.

We are all feeling the pressure of the $100,000 fund. I have seen nothing more slow. The Hadassah plan seems to be the most practical and admirable one thus far promulgated. I am sorry to say that most of the Brandeis-Lewin [Levin] meetings have been distinctly failures. ... I hear from [Cleveland] that Mr. Brandeis made a great impression. ... Elsewhere the collections go on slowly, but I hope that we will have completed the fund before the beginning of March.

... As for the status of the Provisional Committee, I do not despair. The chief good of its organization lies not in whether its authority is forthcoming from the [World Zionist] Central Actions Committee or not, but in the fact that it has placed Brandeis definitely at the head of the movement in this country and as a member of the movement, and that has brought out the enthusiasm and practical cooperation of the student bodies everywhere—-in short, that it has injected into the movement a new spirit and a
new personnel, and promises, I hope, to put an end forever to Ghetto methods and petty Ghetto ideas and personalities that has marked the history of the Federation.

What I hear of the business in New York is distinctly discouraging. It seems that DeHaas has been sent without preparation on an unnecessary and expensive trip through the Middle West, and that personalities are marking the relations between Lewin [Levin], [Richard] Gottheil and the Federation. I hope that it will be possible to keep the peace between these parties. When will our so-called leaders learn that it is war-time in fact, and that the least dissension in our own ranks is treachery to the cause? Undisciplined, self-regarding, and full of brag, the whole organization has suffered mostly from its lack of organization. Now, once and for all, we must put an end to the matter, and be content to do what is given to us to do without question and without cavil. I feel very bitter over the reports from New York, for I seem to see that the old rock on which we have been breaking has not lost any of its harshness because of the crisis. I am more than ever convinced that sooner or later we shall need to have a complete house-cleaning, and to substitute for the present organization another one trained to higher ideals of order, loyalty, and efficiency.

To Benjamin Perlstein, Administrative Secretary of the Provisional Executive Committee

Madison, Wisconsin
Oct. 28, 1914

Dear Ben:

... My advices from New York are not satisfactory, and I wish you would send me a personal note on the situation as you see it in the office. I have been told that personalities have been entering into the problems of administration, and are becoming a serious menace to the unity of the work. Nothing could be more terrible—a disloyalty; and I am anxious, as soon as possible to have the whole truth of the matter,... so please write me frankly and in detail what the status of [Louis] Lipsky, [Shemaryahu Levin] Lewin, [Richard] Gottheil et al. is, and how effectively they are cooperating with each other and particularly with Brandeis.

... What we really need to do is to revise our
personnel, and to put the organization on its feet as an organization.

You understand, of course, that this note is purely personal.27

To Stephen Wise

Indianapolis

25 Oct. 1914

Dear Dr. Wise:

I am writing from Indianapolis. Last night I spoke in the local reformed synagogue here—naturally on Zionism. Today I am to meet a number of members of the congregation and to urge upon them a practical allegiance to the cause. I am told that you are to occupy the same pulpit next Friday, and I am venturing to suggest that it would be very advantageous to the cause here if you also spoke on Zionism and urged practical allegiance. The community here, impresses me all in all as being unconscious Jews and rather materialistic, but they have their possibilities and if awakened, may become potent for much good...

I receive discouraging reports from New York. The Brandeis tour seems to be financially a failure; [Richard] Gottheil has quarreled with the Federation office or they with him, and the collections are slow. The student bodies on the other hand, promise to become intelligently active and our hope lies in them...

From Stephen Wise

New York, N.Y.

Oct. 27, 1914

My dear Dr. Kallen:

... I am dictating this line just before leaving for Indiana...

... What you write of [Progressive economist] Professor [Edward A.] Ross is deeply interesting... [I]f he really wills to help, as you rightly say, he has a considerable following, and his cooperation might prove of great value. But of course he must not think of Zionism as a remedy for what he would call the Jewish immigration evil.

I note your suggestion with regard to Indianapolis, and shall act upon it if circumstances permit...
You will be interested that [European Zionist Max] Nordau and Prof. Jehuda of Madrid University, have written to Oscar Straus, begging him to intervene on behalf of the [Palestinian] colonies in the event of war between Turkey and Russia. They seem to think that the Turkish Government might permit the Arabs in Syria to fall upon the colonists on the ground that they are Russian citizens. . . . Mr. Straus has taken the matter up with just the right men in Washington and I am taking up the question with Administration circles, for the sake of additional safeguards.

Sunday's meeting [called by the American Jewish Committee] was not altogether satisfactory. Brandeis was present but because of his native modesty did not take that part in the deliberations which would have redounded so greatly to the advantage of the meeting. Magnes joined us in opposing the utterly antidemocratic proposals of [Jacob] Schiff . . . and we won in the despite of them. Brandeis seems to think that it is hopeless to work with that group. He feels, however, that the best thing about the meeting was that those assembled deliberately set out to limit their activities to money-getting, which I need not say leaves us free on the side of political negotiation. I still feel that perhaps the biggest thing that can be done for the cause is the carrying out of the plan [for Brandeis to visit Europe] we discussed in Professor Gottheil's study. I think, however, in order to bring that to a head, it will be necessary before very long for you, deH. [deHaas], G. [Gottheil] and me to press it to a conclusion with B. [Brandeis].

Friday Morning,--Indianapolis

Alas, the Turks seem to have chosen war, or Germany has dragged them in. I am very fearful of the outcome. If Turkey is driven into Asia, will she tolerate a Jewish settlement in her last stronghold? If only [Jacob] Schiff and others [lay leaders of the American Jewish community] were statesmen, they could assure better things for Palestine no matter who wins. But our "great" think in terms of the Red Cross. . . . [I have heard] of the profound impression you made here on the now almost Zionistic. Admira bile dictu, you have almost wrenched them free from the fetters of the Anti-Zionistic [Reform leader] Kohler regime. . .29
From Henry Hurwitz

New York, New York

November 1, 1914

Dear Harry,

At the Vorconferenz that we had ... before the meeting called by the American Jewish Committee, Brandeis made two very definite statements of Zionist policy: (1) With regard to a suggestion that, if the [non-Zionist] American Jewish Committee underwrite our $100,000, we might throw all our energies into the general collection, Brandeis stated with the utmost vigor that that would be the greatest misfortune for us; it would mean the virtual cessation of Zionist propaganda...; (2) in political and diplomatic action, we must have our hands perfectly free; we cannot be bound by any decision ... on the part of any conference of national organizations.

These principles were easily maintained...

The Conference was terribly cut-and-dried (a contrast of day and night to our own [August 30 Extraordinary Conference] at the Marseilles), without animation or vision on the part of the leaders. It was designed merely to take the dirty work of fund-collecting off the hands of the American Jewish Committee. Not a word or suggestion of Jewish policy in the face of the crisis was permitted. ... The Zionists were paid marked respect--unprecedented--by the powers [Jewish Establishment leaders], on account of Brandeis. He was pulled into a front seat between [Jacob] Schiff and Oscar Straus, which he deserted at the earliest opportunity. ... The question arose as to the method of appointing the Committee ... that are to collect the funds. Schiff moved that ... the ... committee ... be chosen by a committee ... appointed by the chair. Magnes ... moved that the organizations should appoint their own representatives. ... It was a clear conflict between the plutocratic and democratic principles. Upon a standing vote, the democratic principle was seen to prevail (Zionists were there in force), and it was most dramatic and significant--something that could not fail to strike every one at the meeting and especially the powers--that Brandeis stood up from his seat with the majority, alone among the plutocrats and their minions who surrounded him. Some one behind me whispered loudly: "The king [Schiff] is dead, long live the king [Brandeis]!" But the old king wouldn't die so easily. Something most extraordinary occurred. In the midst of the vote, when those standing for Magnes's motion were seen to be in the clear majority,
Schiff arose and started haranguing excitedly: he was not called to order by the Chairman ([Louis] Marshall); and, what was most scandalous, the chairman refused to recognize or to continue to vote! There followed excited and disorderly discussion, during which Schiff left the meeting ... but, in the end, the powers were beaten even worse. The unparliamentary and inept way in which Marshall conducted the meeting was to me, at least, astonishing.

... At our Vorconferenz, Brandeis made the further statement that he had it from persons in Washington close to affairs that the war would last at least two years. Thus, he said, we need not be precipitate in our political thought and action; above all else let us keep our freedom of action.

... G. [Gottheil] seems to be making a mess of things. ... I hear that G's demand upon the Actions-Comite for all papers relating to diplomatic activity has given an unfortunate impression in Europe. When I saw him Friday, he pulled out of his breast pocket a letter from [European Zionist, Max] Nordau which, he said in a most portentous manner, contained certain information regarding the diplomatic activity of the Actions-Comite, but he did not proceed further to specify or to show me. ...

Wise has told deHaas of the plans for B. [Brandeis] going to Europe. I took it from deHaas as a piece of news, and suggested the advisability of keeping it to ourselves.

... And now Turkey is in it [the War]: It must mean almost everything to us--our making or breaking [since Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire].

To Henry Hurwitz

Madison, Wisconsin
Nov. 7, 1914

Dear Henry:

... I am delighted to have your full and clear statement of the meeting of the Vorconferenz, and that meeting that followed it on Oct. 24. The situation seems to have been historic and is well worth a place in the archives, but there is hardly any time to dwell on that. We have now the difficult problem of suggesting that the Jews as a whole are rather pro-Allies, but that there is a distinct anti-Russian feeling among them that must not be confused with a pro-German sentiment. The Yiddish papers [reflecting the anti-Russian
views of the immigrant masses] must have created a feeling in diplomatic circles that the Jews as a whole are pro-German. It becomes necessary, therefore, to write letters to the daily and weekly press stating why and how it is natural for the Jews to be anti-Russian and still for the Allies. I have asked [Marvin] Lowenthal and [Alexander] Sachs [two members of the Parushim] to write to the Nation. Will you . . . get a couple of your men to write to the Times and the Sun, and write yourself, if possible.

Now that Turkey is in, it is very necessary--no matter how long or how short the war may be--to consider the possible alternatives before us. . . . It is absolutely necessary that we should have a dossier containing plans for meeting each of [the] . . . possible emergencies, and that practical steps be taken to safeguard our own interests as nearly as possible from all sides at once. We have been, I feel, rather thoughtless of contingencies, so that when Turkey did go in, we were unprepared to meet the demand for a statement. Gottheil reports that he has made one, and that he had no opportunity to consult anybody but Miss Szold and [Stephen] Wise. He claims to have made it entirely as a private individual; even if he has, the organization may have to pay if anything goes wrong. From what he says of it, it seems to me a very sound statement to have made; but here again, we should have had such a statement ready from the start, and now we must think out all possible eventualities and be ready to meet them without delay. For this reason, I am going to urge you to come out here [Wisconsin] as soon as possible. If possible the best time would be . . . when Brandeis will be in Chicago. . . . We could then have an executive meeting of "J" [Parushim] and consider the problem of national organization in this country and many other things. Brandeis writes that he feels this to be most important, and I am feeling pleased as Punch that he has realized its importance so soon.

I am going to Chicago to help organize the Menorah there. I have been asked to Missouri, and I want to be asked to Cleveland, where I must establish contacts with a variety of people, both from the Menorah and Zionist standpoint. . . . [Concerning] California I . . . shall make my arrangements as soon as I hear from them. . . .
To Alexander Sachs, a graduate student in economics at Columbia University.

Madison, Wisconsin
Nov. 7, 1914

Dear Sachs:

I have yours of the 3rd inst. You will take note of these two things.

1. Let me know as fully as possible just what the situation is in the P.C. [Provisional Committee] office.

2. Please report on the progress you have made with the list of candidates for "[Parushim]" which you had sent for approval to the Executive Committee.

3. In order to show that the Jews are not unanimously against the allies, it has become necessary to publish letters stating the Jewish position from the Zionist point of view. This letter should cover the following points:

   (a) That the Jews are engaged equally on all sides
   (b) That in the order of their treatment, their sympathies are as follows: England, France, Austria, Germany, Russia
   (c) That they have suffered terribly at the hands of Russia, and that they are naturally anti-Russian rather than pro-German
   (d) That their stake in the war is perhaps as great as that of Belgium, and that...
   (e) That the great mass of them are suffering just as much
   (f) That the way out would lie in nationalization...
   (g) That the attitude and feeling of the Jews is dependent entirely on the kind of treatment that...

You are directed to write such a letter and to submit it through me to the [Parushim] Council before offering it for publication.

Many thanks for your personal appreciation, and please regard it as reciprocated.
From Stephen Wise  
New York, New York  
Nov. 17, 1914

My dear Dr. Kallen:

Just this hurried word because G. [Gottheil] and I know that you will see B. [Brandeis] in Chicago after a few days. We are deeply disturbed . . . by the reports which reach us . . . with respect to Jewish massacres, which are being carried on by the Poles. . . . It seems to me that nothing we could do would be more important than to make the English and French governments feel that they cannot suffer this thing now, and that Russia must speedily make some pronouncement on the Jewish question. Do you not really think that the time has come for B. [Brandeis] to undertake this quest? I would go to Washington and see W.W. [Woodrow Wilson] for I know that he would not be indifferent to the matter. . . . You know B. [Brandeis] well and therefore you have a better right to ask him to undertake this mission. . . . After you have seen him, will you write to me so that G. [Gottheil] and I here may know what is to be done.33

To Stephen Wise  
Madison, Wisconsin  
November 18, 1914

Dear Wise:

. . . I have been wondering since Turkey has gone into the war whether we could not through Mr. Crane [former U.S. Senator, interested in the rights of small nations] and other Americans and Gentiles get options, or perhaps buy outright, all the . . . government land in Palestine. In this respect, Turkey's need is distinctly our opportunity, and action at this moment may save us a great deal of embarrassment and difficulty later on. The thing, if it is done at all, will of course have to be done through Gentiles, and would involve a double transfer, as I am quite sure the Turks would not be willing to sell to the Jews. There are many other things that ought to be talked through; and I imagine that sooner or later our particular group [the Parushim] will need to meet and canvass the whole actual situation with its possibilities, and form plans to meet them all.

19th

Your letter of the 17th just came. I shall speak very explicitly with B. [Brandeis] re the visit abroad.
There is [sic] a number of other matters on which we must get together. I feel more and more that we are working blindly. . . . 34

To Mrs. Maurice Leon, Richard Gottheil's daughter.

Madison, Wisconsin
Oct. 28, 1914

Dear Miss [sic] Leon:

I have to acknowledge the receipt of the additional documents . . . I shall have abstracts made of them and filed. . . .

. . . Do not despair. We have been badly off many times before, but we have always managed to come clear. What we need most is loyalty and discipline; and so long as we work together like the soldiers, I have no fear for the result—no matter what may stand in the way. . . . 35

IV.

What role was Kallen playing in this post-August 1914 Zionist movement? To what extent did he define its new direction, and help to lead the way? As the evidence of these letters makes clear, Kallen, though half a continent removed from New York, was truly at the center of all Zionist activity. His Parushim wrote him faithfully of all that was going on; sometimes several people wrote him of the same event, giving him a unique multi-faceted perspective. Kallen's Wisconsin address was the terminal of a wide-spread communications system and, as the leader of an intimate inner circle, he sifted, channelled, and commented on his information in ways that he felt would produce the most effective results.
The image that emerges of Kallen is that of a general of a secret underground guerilla force, determined to influence the course of events, but in a quiet, anonymous way. Indeed, the repetition of military terminology in these letters is striking. "We [must] work together like true soldiers," he wrote Mrs. Leon, and he deployed his Parushim like members of an army. Like any underground leader he demanded of his followers discipline, obedience, and whole-hearted devotion to the cause; the inefficient and slipshod Federation received only his scorn and approbation. Surprisingly, perhaps, the members of the Parushim, each of whom was a leader of the highest caliber in his own right, consented to Kallen's demands. No doubt, the secret organization dramatized the potential for effective Zionist actions. Additionally, Kallen provided constant encouragement to flagging spirits, and held out the promise, through concrete action, of tangible Zionist accomplishment.

Kallen's constant use of military terminology was no accident. Seeking, in the words of his mentor, William James, "a moral equivalent for war," Kallen had found one in the possibilities for action within the Zionist movement, possibilities that had become viable by Brandeis' assumption of leadership. As leader of the Parushim, Kallen was commanding his army in the ways he felt would do the most good. A good Pragmatist, he was putting his insights about Zionism to the test of experience.

Almost every one of Kallen's letters criticized the
Federation for its structural looseness; he would have liked to install a different sort of organization, efficient, well-run, not dominated by personal pettiness and rivalry. Here Kallen was demonstrating the influence of the ideals of the Progressives, many of whom equated reform with efficient organization. Though Kallen and Brandeis were in complete agreement on this point, they constituted a distinct minority among the more traditional Federation members, who had received their Zionist orientation from Europe, where casualness of method was the accepted mode. Though Kallen and Brandeis were to work hard over the next few years to bring a sense of rigorous discipline to the American Zionist movement, they never quite succeeded. In 1921 Brandeis' insistence on organizational standards became a major issue in the split that took place between him and his followers and the European Zionists.

The commitment to, and insistence on, a well-run organization colored all of Kallen's directives to the Parushim. Even more important, however, were the plans he suggested and the actions he initiated. Letter writing campaigns, both here and abroad, a Zionist Theatre group, plans for purchase of land in Palestine, the insistence on political action contingency plans, schemes for influence of foreign diplomats--Kallen was overflowing with ideas to hasten the achievement of the Zionist goal. These were not the schemes of a dreamer, however; always practical, Kallen outlined each plan in all its details, and assigned it to the most suitable person.
As leader of the Parushim Kallen was the very model of the "Messianic pragmatist"; first he defined a goal in theory, and then he proceeded to suggest its means of implementation. His followers did carry out his directions—Henrietta Szold, for instance, procured the manuscripts he requested—and the Zionist organization began to function more efficiently, to receive attention, and to attract more wide-spread support. In turn the members of the Parushim began to experience a sense of behind-the-scenes power and influence.

Kallen's correspondents, it is clear, ascribed to him a special relationship with, and influence on, Brandeis. He had more intimate access to the new Chairman than they and, therefore, the opportunity for recognition as one of Brandeis' principal advisors. Kallen, however, apparently did not wish to advance his own personal interests or career through Brandeis. The letters show his concern with protecting Brandeis and with providing for him an optimal climate in which to become a successful leader. Certainly Kallen wished to "instruct" Brandeis; perhaps, covertly, even to manipulate him. But Kallen's preference was for the role of anonymous string-puller. He knew that Brandeis could accomplish for the Zionist cause things of which he and the Parushim only dreamed, and was content to channel all his insights and energies through Brandeis. 36

Commenting recently on this period, Kallen noted, "Brandeis was a 'Jones' that so many Jews would want to keep up with. The image of him, the public image of the public
defender, was such that here was a national, an authentic American hero." As Kallen looked back, he described his own role as "chief cook and bottle washer." When challenged by the fact that his letters show him to have been more influential than kitchen help, Kallen replied, "Say that I tried to keep the poison out of the diet."
As "chief cook and bottle washer," Kallen worked closely with Brandeis while the tempo of Zionist activity increased. On November 22, 1914 he met with Brandeis to discuss four items he considered most important to bring to Brandeis' attention--collections, propaganda to Gentiles, organization, and "missions." Kallen was concerned that fund raising activity was absorbing too much of Brandeis' time, and Brandeis concurred. Analyzing the situation, they noted that $28,000 of the $43,000 raised for the Emergency Fund to date had come from one large contributor, Nathan Straus, a major Jewish philanthropist and recent convert to Zionism, who earlier had concentrated his funds on securing pasteurized milk for the children of New York's East Side Ghetto community. Obviously the reports from the Parushim had been correct--raising money for Palestine among the masses of Jews was going to be a tedious job, dependent on much difficult educational spade work.¹

Kallen and Brandeis agreed, also, on the need for intensive work in propagandizing the Zionist idea to the non-Jewish community. Though they specified that ultimately the
"Jews must emancipate themselves," they felt that Gentile support was essential, especially to influence non-Zionist Jews to affiliate with the Zionists.

Kallen complained about the Zionist organization. It was "weak and wobbly" with "no cohesion." He suggested that the Parushim "might be applied to developing the situation into an effective working body" and urged that the Zionist organization take an active, "offensive" stance in its relationships with non-Zionists, particularly with the influential and powerful Reformed Jewish community. Brandeis agreed that the organization was weak; the committees he had appointed, for example, had done no work. He endorsed Kallen's plans for the Parushim, since he had discovered that the Zionist movement was suffering from a lack of competent leaders, and Brandeis wished to continue also with his "other work [as advisor to Wilson] because it helps Zionism."

"Missions" referred to the international situation. Though Kallen wanted Brandeis to go to England to establish a relationship with Chaim Weizmann and the British Zionists, Brandeis demurred. He felt that the American Zionist organization had most to gain by working to increase its own membership and financial base; only then would it be ready to involve itself in international politics.

These concerns remained for a while central to Kallen's Zionist activity. During 1915 and the first half of 1916, until Brandeis became a Supreme Court Justice and resigned
as Chairman of the Provisional Committee, the exchange of letters between Kallen and Brandeis focused on the four themes they had discussed at their November meeting. As this sampling of their correspondence reveals, they began these years in almost total agreement with one another; gradually, however, Kallen's more ideal and more radical stance began to diverge from Brandeis' desire to concentrate on what could be achieved reasonably without animosity or controversy.

To Louis D. Brandeis

Dear Mr. Brandeis:

Last week I was in Cincinnati for the convention of the Intercollegiate Menorah Society. I naturally gave as much time as possible to the Zionist situation, and this is the outcome of my observations and negotiations:

1. The rumor is widespread throughout Cincinnati that [anti-Zionist Reform Rabbi] Mr. Phillipson and his group boast that your refusal to speak there after you had arrived was due to the political influence of that group and that you heeded them because they had succeeded in influencing Mr. Wilson when your appointment to the Attorney-Generalship was up: that your activity in Zionism was so motivated, etc. etc.

... I write [this] to you for the reason that it is needful that you should know with what weapons the enemies of our movement have been fighting and are fighting and that when you act this knowledge should be a factor.

2. The possibility of action has been provided for. I had considerable talk with [two men] ... the one a professor of law in Cincinnati University, the other a shoe manufacturer and Harvard '06. I pointed out to them that Cincinnati had never, because of [Reform] theological influence, given our movement a fair hearing, and that it was the duty of the lay community, acting of its own volition, to provide for such
a hearing... [They have] agreed to organize a lay committee... who will invite you together with Stephen Wise or me to address a meeting that they will arrange on "Zionism" and to perfect some sort of organization among American Jews of Cincinnati which will stand for the Movement permanently.

In the same connection I went to Indianapolis. There a committee has been formed which will... ask you down etc...

...I have been doing my best to keep your plans in mind and to prepare our local [Parushim] groups for actively carrying them out. But the very concept of organization in any effective sense of the term is foreign to our people, and they are like to need an infinite deal of patience and teaching.

...I want to assure you again, in a sort of renewal of allegiance, that we who have been concerned about the destiny of the spirit of our people are ready to follow wherever you may lead.

One of the student organizations at Cincinnati's Hebrew Union College, the Seminary for training Reform Rabbis, invited Kallen to speak on "The Meaning of Hebraism." The College authorities, Rabbis Phillipson and Kohler, demanded that the lecture be cancelled because of Kallen's Zionist affiliation. Brandeis suggested that the Zionists retreat for a time from Cincinnati and concentrate their energies where they were more welcome. Kallen's reply shows the offensive position he felt the Zionists needed to assume.

To Louis D. Brandeis Madison, Wisconsin
February 21, 1915

Dear Mr. Brandeis,

...To talk of avoiding controversy about Zionism is like talking of avoiding war when war is on. From the beginning, controversy has been thrust upon us. We not only did not seek it, we sought alliances with our bitterest enemies and were loth to strike back when attacked. We have paid in this
country ... a heavy price for our conciliatory attitude. I do not believe that we should go about with a chip on our shoulders seeking opponents. I do believe that an attack on Zionism should not be passed over without reply. Indifferents are not turned into adherents in that way—and as long as Phillipson etc.—speaking for "liberal Judaism" persist in attacking us, we shall need to reply, for the sake of maintaining a status with these very indifferents whom we are to gain.

In the present instance the situation in Cincinnati involves no controversy. A number of laymen, interested for whatever reasons, in our position want us to tell them more about it. We go to them ... with our gospel of Hebraism and "constructive Jewishness" for them to take or to leave. They are these very indifferents, and to some extent, the best of them, whom you wish to win. We simply owe it to the cause and to them to answer the call if it comes.

I knew from the start how you would measure the situation of our movement once you became familiar with it. I put into your hands at the outset a document which summarized both our view—I mean the view of "I" [Parushim]—and our program. May I refer you to this document again. I am a little afraid that you have been overwhelmed with the problems of organization and propaganda alone. We believe that there are these other matters which are just as important, and that the time is at hand when each must receive expert attention. ... I have organized a students' society here [Wisconsin] and on the 27th we will be organized in Berkeley. The group here has been for some time working on the problems I have mentioned. ...

I do not know that I shall get east before June—it may be that I can come in April. But I still hope to see you in Cincinnati ... before then.4

From Louis D. Brandeis
Boston, Mass.
February 23, 1915

My dear Kallen:

Replying to yours of the 21st:

First: I am extremely sorry that I cannot agree with you, or that you do not agree with me in regard to the course to be taken in Cincinnati. ...

[Reform leader Rabbi] Phillipson is at present in control of his congregation, and through it of the
We have far more field to cover than it is possible for us even to scratch with our present forces. Your strong conviction necessarily makes me review carefully the ground upon which I reached the conclusion announced. But as I said to you before, if we leave Cincinnati alone in its isolation, its opposition will shrivel up. The situation is the reverse of what it was twenty years ago. Then Zionism needed controversy. Today controversy alone can serve the opposition.

Second: The other questions have not been out of my mind; but our problem to my mind cannot be satisfactorily settled unless we have forces behind us. In my opinion Zionism can accomplish nothing except through relatively large forces of men who are thoroughly disciplined, and who are willing to make sacrifices.

Shortly thereafter Brandeis began to address himself to the problem of training "large forces of men" to be Zionist leaders.

From Louis D. Brandeis
Boston, Mass.
March 4, 1915

My dear Kallen:

We need preeminently in America the intellectuals and men of leadership in the community. The men whom we wish to reach do not naturally associate with most of those who are now members of existing local Zionist organizations affiliated with the Federation, and in large part cannot be led to join such local societies.

Could we not develop college Zionist societies?

I have not formulated any plan and am submitting the idea for your consideration.

To Louis D. Brandeis
Madison, Wisconsin
March 11, 1915

Dear Mr. Brandeis:

As for the development of undergraduate groups, they have been on the agenda of the Order
[Parushim] from the start... We... have been working as quietly as might be through other channels--especially the Menorah [Society]. Now the time has come for overt Zionist action, and I have accordingly organized in California, Missouri and Wisconsin select groups of students who undertake their Zionist obligations as a vow, and who enroll themselves in the society with the understanding that they are to do organic, practical work. Little by little, we shall enlarge the scope of their activity, until we shall have in every academy what will be tantamount to a Jewish honor society devoted to the services of the Jewish national cause...

I am relieved to hear that you have been thinking of the other questions. I am always timid lest we fail to develop in terms of an organized program. It seems to me fundamental that all problems should be kept before the minds of the active members of our group as a unit... [but] it is clear that the articulation of our program has to be a part both of the propaganda and disciplinary work.

Kallen did come East in April, at which time he organized a chapter of his University Zionist Society in New York. For the first time he found reason to be pleased with what he saw of the Zionist organization, and in the second part of his letter proceeded to some of the "other" subjects which he had previously accused Brandeis of neglecting.

To Louis D. Brandeis
Madison, Wisconsin
April 10, 1915

Dear Mr. Brandeis:

The impression that most definitely remains of my brief visit to the East is that of togetherness. Nothing could be more opposite than the meetings of [last week] with those at the beginning of the P.C.'s [Provisional Committee's] work. There are signs of a genuine esprit de corps. We are, I am afraid, very far from more than signs, but never since my knowledge of the Zionist organization began have we seemed nearer to more. Converting our mob into an army is an overwhelming task, and there is no one else among all us Jews today who could have done so much in so short a time.... I do not cease to admire your long-suffering patience in
committee. I should myself have flown off the handle half a dozen times.

We are far from having had our talk out. There are still many points that I never even got a chance to mention. These deal not so much with the immediate problems of organization as with the specification of the imaginative vision for the sake of which our organization must exist and in the light of which it and the work gets meaning for the workers. I mean, in short, the planning, on the basis of the best experience of the past, of a "government" which may be preached, and to one or the other phases of which an individual may attach himself, as he does to party platform. In Cambridge I again took up with [Felix] Frankfurter the matter of a sort of "ministry of the interior," a plan for economic organization and advancement of the land should we get it. He seemed more willing than before, but he needs jogging. The issue is not yet alive and momentous to him. . . . 8

In a letter Kallen had written to Brandeis the previous day, he had been even more specific about his plans for elaborating a complete organization of a provisional government for the Jewish State to be. Kallen had suggested a tentative constitution involving, at first, a trusteeship for Palestine, plans for public and private development of the resources of the country, and "ministries" of public education, public help, art, foreign affairs and public safety. "I have the feeling," he wrote, "that all these things must seem flighty and remote to you, yet it seems to me exactly the consideration of these things which true readiness involves. And I feel more and more certain, as I talk with young men, that so long as they can keep in mind these things, we may be assured of their practical activity in the organization here." 9

The initial Progressive impulse had been one of reform. The early twentieth century Progressives encountered conditions of poverty or exploitation or corruption. With the optimism
characteristic of the period, they turned to the concepts of efficiency and order, trusting that objective and smoothly run organizations would solve the problems from which they felt America was suffering. So, too, with Kallen. All of his early statements on Zionism stressed the "constructive" potential of the Jewish state for reviving the Hebraic traditions of democracy and social and economic justice. When Kallen became a Zionist he did not even know of the Zionist organization. Confronted with it, however, and sorely disappointed by its lack of efficiency and paucity of results, Kallen set for himself the task of restructuring the organization to make it an effective working unit. Once he saw signs of an "esprit de corps," he was quick to return to his original concern, the planning for a Jewish state that might become a modern day example of "liberty and justice for all."

Though Kallen never ceased to deal with problems of organization and of propaganda, the following letter to Frankfurter, clarifying Kallen's remarks in his letter to Brandeis of April 10, and the note to his English friend Zimmern, were forerunners of what, in 1917 and 1918, were to become Kallen's major preoccupations. 10

To Felix Frankfurter Madison, Wisconsin
April 9, 1915

My dear Felix,

I meant what I said when I talked to you about considering a job as a director of a "Ministry of the Interior." What we need to keep men and women going in the dirty work of organization and financing is imaginative vision of that for the sake of which they work. A vague Zion and a sentimental Jerusalem contrasts too violently with actual facts, and what we
want to be must of necessity be made specific. The chances of realization were never so good, and there is no knowing at what moment our hopes may become a fact.

It seems to me that your particular job ought to be the consideration of the following things: (1) What are the economic and commercial assets of Palestine? (2) What is being done ... to develop them? (3) How shall the work of development be organized so as to secure social justice and the ends of public happiness and safety? (4) How shall this be done so as to give all our young people at one and the same time training in defense of their country against enemies and positive services to the country for its development, i.e., can we really establish a "moral equivalent" for war?

In terms of existing conditions, natural and social, there are answers to all these questions which may constitute a specific program for further action. It is up to you to find the answers.11

To Alfred Zimmern    Madison, Wisconsin
October 30, 1915

Dear Alfred:--

... I am trying to write for the New Republic an article on Zionism which will take the question up once more in a rather more elementary and logical version. ... I am more than ever convinced that we must conduct a persistent and unrelenting campaign of democratic and social ideas to meet the situations that are bound to arise at the end of the war no matter who wins. ... I wish that we could establish some sort of plan for cooperative and unified action. ... What we want to do is to democratize the movement as completely as possible, and to substitute intelligence for bureaucracy wherever we can. ... 12

This issue of the democratization of the Zionist movement underlay the first eruption of the latent tensions within the Brandeis-led American Zionist organization. In the summer of 1915, a year after the formation of the Provisional Executive Committee, one of its members, cultural Zionist Judah Magnes, resigned in objection to the increasing
political activity of the Brandeis Zionists. As Kallen had demonstrated in 1911, he and his followers in the Parushim took the Basle Platform seriously, and assumed that all their efforts would result in the eventual attainment of Palestine as a "secure homeland" for the Jewish people. Even more disturbing to Magnes, an active member of the American Jewish Committee, was Zionist support for convening an American Jewish Congress, a Congress whose delegates were to be elected democratically from all segments of the American Jewish community, and whose purpose would be to represent the interests of American Jewry at any post-War conference that had the Jewish question on its agenda.13

Brandeis and the Provisional Executive Committee felt that the Congress would be important for many reasons

... By creating spokesmen for American Israel who are representative, [the Congress] will provide a body through which the Jews of America, as the only great neutral group of Jews, may not only authoritatively address other Governments, but may so be addressed by other Governments desirous of dealing with representatives of the whole Jewish people.

... The Congress will ... work out ... basic ideas according to ... democratic principles. ...

... The Congress will have the further effect of creating unity in American Jewry, without which achievement abroad is impossible. Unity will develop because the minority will cooperate with the majority to attain the common end when the judgment and will of the majority has been democratically ascertained. That is in accordance with American methods and the demands of loyalty.

In addition, though not acknowledged so explicitly, the creation of an American Jewish Congress would challenge
the hegemony of the American Jewish Committee, which was extremely defensive on the dual loyalty issue, and tended, therefore, to obstruct all Zionist activity.¹⁴

When Magnes resigned from the Provisional Executive Committee its leaders feared he might provoke either a public debate or an intra-Zionist organization controversy over his position. They sent Magnes' letter of resignation to Kallen with the request that he prepare a rebuttal. Kallen, who perceived the Congress issue as "a struggle between Americanism and medievalism, between a democratic Jewry and a traditional Jewish oligarchy," and who felt that the proponents of the Congress represented a "self-conscious mass movement, with democratic postulates and programmes" replied several times to Magnes' challenge. Selections from two of his letters show how steadfast Kallen was in defining both the Jewish State and the Jewish Congress as expressions of the democratic principle.¹⁵

To Louis D. Brandeis
Madison, Wisconsin
Sept. 24, 1915

Dear Mr. Brandeis:--

... [Dr. Magnes] is aware that our one great instrument of colonization and development in Palestine, the national fund, is maintained and operated to secure the Jewish land as the inalienable possession of the Jewish people.

... [T]he notion that the problem of organization and the problem of development and realization of the Zionist purpose are distinct is a purely manufactured one. From the outset, our fundamental problem was one of organization. We cannot win to our goal without organization. One thing is a function of the other.
... [O]ur fundamental principle is the democracy of individuals and of groups... Our intention... is the neither merely philanthropic nor merely cultural. It is democratic and international. Under the Basle program we aim to establish in Palestine a legally assured and publicly secured home for the Jewish people...

Under this program, it has been necessary for us... to bring about the democratic, cooperative and open unification of the Jewish people, particularly in the United States...

... We stand on democracy, nationality, and... a free Jewish life in Palestine.16

To Louis D. Brandeis Madison, Wisconsin

November 6, 1915

Dear Mr. Brandeis:--

... Rumors have been coming here... that it is planned to postpone the holding of the Congress to the end of the war, etc., etc. I want to register immediately my strong dissent from any such plan. The Congress can serve only one purpose, that is, to place definitely the mass of Jewry behind a representative and selected group, which shall deal with the issues in a practical way as they arise when the war is over. I believe that prolongation of the discussion concerning the Congress and the issues involved can only serve to cool interest, and, ultimately, to replace the power in the hands of the American Jewish Committee by default. If it [the Congress] is held this year, we shall be in a position to develop fresh interests in terms of organization activities and organization problems, which will keep the sense of solidarity active among our people, and maintain a distributed responsibility in the body of Jewry.17

II.

By the time Kallen wrote the above letter, Brandeis had been leading the new American Zionists for over a year. He had begun to build up the organization and to make contacts and judgments of his own. Kallen, his experience, criticism
and advice, were no longer so important to Brandeis. It was apparent, also, that the Parushim were not working out as Kallen had hoped. Though Kallen continued to receive reports, they became less frequent and less detailed as the Zionist workers became involved in projects of their own and scattered to other commitments. Henrietta Szold, for example, was the moving force, through the Hadassah women's organization which she had founded, behind a plan to send to Palestine a completely equipped medical ship and to recruit doctors and nurses for work in Palestine. Stephen Wise concentrated on developing his own "Free Synagogue," and on cultivating a role as Jewish liaison with the Wilson administration.18

Kallen's leadership, particularly his neglect of Jewish tradition, irritated some members of the Parushim; they resented, for instance, his calling meetings for the Jewish Sabbath. In addition, there developed a conflict between Brandeis' moderate position in approaching non-Zionists and Kallen's more radical stance. Kallen, despite Brandeis' disapproval, continued to define the policy of the Parushim as "militant and aggressive": "we must constantly, with pen and tongue, attack that part of Reform Judaism which . . . attacks Zionism and the leaders of Zionism," he directed new recruits.19

When Kallen instructed economist Alexander Sachs, one of the original Parushim, to "counter-attack" speeches of two prominent Reform Rabbis, Sachs consulted Brandeis, who advised
against it. Sachs wrote to Henry Hurwitz, Kallen's chief link with the Parushim in New York, and this letter, which Hurwitz then sent to Kallen, makes clear the difficulties some of the Parushim were finding with their avowed commitment to their leader.

From Alexander Sachs to Henry Hurwitz

Cambridge, Mass.
December 30, 1915

Dear Henry:--

Dr. Kallen asked me to write a report of my activities as a Parush (I use the Hebrew because its English equivalents "Ascetic" "Recluse" certainly sound queer). Of work delegated by the Parush I have, as the Executive Committee will report, done none. I was assigned the task of entering into a polemic with [Reform Rabbis] Drs. Phillipson and Schulman. I consulted first with Mr. deHaas, and later with Mr. Brandeis and both advised against it. My conduct in the matter elicited a fine from the Executive [Kallen], and the Executive's conduct made me wonder at the doubtful wisdom of such a separatist secret organization. . . . Both in the early assignment and in the recent assignment I feel that the action of the Executive factually (not theoretically) questions the sovereignty of Mr. Brandeis. I am informed that in the matter of the recent attack of Dr. Phillipson on Zionism as anti-American and anti-religious Mr. Brandeis' plan of campaign is different from that of the Executive. Personally I believe that a thoroughly thought-through Zionism must stamp a policy of plural nationality as both anti-American and anti-Zionist. Aside from considerations showing that Dr. Kallen's attitude in Democracy vs Melting Pot [sic] would make Zionism superfluous it strikes me as extremely poor tactics to advocate hyphenism now. . . .

. . . I fail to see the wisdom of the Executive's view and since I am informed . . . that Mr. Brandeis does not think such polemics advisable, I regretfully decline to do the task assigned.

This can't be taken to indicate that I am a delinquent Zionist because I have in fact done a good deal of Zionist work under the direction of the [New
England Zionist Bureau and have just finished a report about an important matter assigned to me by Mr. Brandeis, the precise nature of which I am not at liberty to disclose to the [Parushim] Executive [Kallen]. \(^{20}\)

Brandeis confirmed his difficulty in working through the Parushim. In November 1915 he wrote Kallen,

"I understand that [Louis] Lipsky and some others call the Group \(\mathfrak{f} \mathfrak{u} \mathfrak{u} \mathfrak{w} \mathfrak{z} \) [Parushim] thinking that it is a term of opprobrium, in the sense of snobs, separatists or highbrows," reported one of the Parushim, Alexander Dushkin, to Kallen. \(^{21}\)

Elisha Friedman, President of the Collegiate Zionist League, though loyal to Kallen's leadership, was another member of the Parushim who began to question the group's validity.

From Elisha Friedman

New York, N.Y.

Mar. 1, 1916

My dear Dr. Kallen:--

Reporting on the activities of the pledged group, I wish to say that we had two meetings . . . with six present in each case.

. . . Dushkin is studying educational conditions in Palestine, Feinberg is looking up industrial possibilities of Palestine, Cohen is attempting to get local economists—statisticians to cooperate on Palestinian work. . . . I have gotten together some government publications on the cotton and textile industry in the East. . . .
Now, Dr. Kallen, don't you think that since the University Zionist Society is doing just the work of this group that we ought to consolidate and work with their aid. For six men as an independent group look rather puny. . . . I recommend the merging of the group under present conditions. . . .

Despite these signs of unrest Kallen stood firm. He replied to Friedman,

The bond which unites its [Parushim] members is . . . of a delicate and psychological sort, very different from the kind of formal organization involved in the University Zionist Society. . . . The society naturally does not bind itself by a sort of pledge to an unquestioning leadership as the group does. In point of fact, it might become the task of the group . . . to join the society and to direct its activities. But some form of separateness it must maintain.

And he reassured Dushkin, "I am delighted that Lipsky and others call the group 'Parushim' in scorn. The thing for us to do now is to turn that scorn into astonished admiration by the highest degree possible of effectiveness." 23

The correspondence with the Parushim dropped off sharply after early 1916, though there are some letters dated 1917 and 1918, suggesting that the group still existed at that time, and Kallen credits the group with developing the principles of the 1918 Pittsburgh Program. Despite the fact that Kallen felt that the need for a close-knit "community" like the Parushim had not diminished, the difficulty inherent in sustaining, long-distance, the loyalty and discipline of a group of intelligent individuals with minds and leadership qualities of their own, became too great an obstacle. As Kallen commented recently,

It [the Parushim] never became as practical as perhaps it could have been and as I thought it might
be. . . . I was troubled by so much of the luftmenschlichkeit, the rhetoricism among Zionists . . . and I thought that a group organized as a "guided" democracy . . . might turn interest and action toward vital change. The expressions of this notion that I drafted were to be points of departure for rules of teaming up. . . .

But the "teaming" became impossible with a leader so geographically removed from the center of power, a leader so dependent upon the cooperation of his followers, both for news and for self-sustained activity. 24

Perhaps it was unrealistic from the start to expect a small group devoted to anonymous activity to exert much influence on a disorganized movement of many parts, a movement growing rapidly, with new leaders and new problems. Certainly Kallen's demand for separatism did not make it easy to be a member of the Parushim, once the initial drama wore off. As Kallen recalled in 1964, "The thing didn't function very well. . . . What you could do with young Italy [in the days of Mazzini] you couldn't do with young Jewry, or old. . . ." 25

Though Kallen, no doubt, felt disappointed that his dream of a vanguard army for Zionism was not to be, in his "melioristic" way he seemed never to lose hope. Recently Kallen commented on this philosophy which has guided him throughout his life.

Extremes in the struggle for survival are self-defeating. Philosophically you call them, "Optimism," and "Pessimism." The optimist says, "This is the best of all possible worlds. Whatever you do, you can't make it better. . . ." The pessimist says, "This is the worst of all possible worlds. Whatever you do, you can neither make it better nor make it worse. . . ."
So what shall you or I do? There is a third point of view which is "Meliorism," meaning "Betterism," which is actually what we do and what the pessimist and the optimist do. Day to day we make changes to improve the conditions that we don't like and to advance the condition that we do like. . . . We use this doctrine in such a way that we can go on living a little better. 26

Kallen has written of this "meliorism," an aspect of James's pragmatism,

Things improve or deteriorate piecemeal, here a little, there a little. With free initiative, faith and due attention and effort, excellences can be and are made to accumulate, evils to wear down; life can be given direction and can be habituated therein. By our taking consciously with open eyes and firm heart that risk which is the true inwardness of our being, the risk involving "courage weighted with responsibility. . . ." Nature does get humanized and we do build a home for ourselves in this heedless and antagonistic world.

In 1915, he took "that risk," and went on "living a little better," by turning his Zionist energies away from the Parushim, and by beginning to concentrate, with somewhat greater success, on a role he had been playing all along—that of teacher and preacher of Zionism to the non-enlightened and non-committed. 27
CHAPTER 8
1915-1916: THE ZIONIST MISSIONARY

I.

Before 1914 Richard Gotthiel had been the only Jew of some stature in the American community who was willing to be a leader of the Zionist movement. From the time that Brandeis took an active leadership role as a Zionist, however, Kallen hoped that other non-Zionist Jews of similar status in the American community might be convinced to do likewise. Several were. Following Brandeis' example, and influenced by his argument that there need not be a disharmony of loyalties between Americanism and Zionism, many of his fellow Progressive reformers became Zionists. People like Eugene Meyer, a financier who later became publisher of the Washington Post; Mary Fels, the Progressive philanthropist active in the struggle for women's rights; Judge Irving Lehman, New York State Supreme Court Judge; Louis Kirstein, department store executive and President of the Boston Public Library and the Boston Port Authority; Mary Antin, apostle of "Americanization";—all began to contribute both money and time to the Zionist cause.¹

One of the most impressive new converts after Brandeis was Judge Julian Mack, a professor of law at Northwestern
University and the University of Chicago, a judge, first of the Chicago Juvenile Court, later of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, one of the founders and an active supporter, until 1915, of the anti-Zionist American Jewish Committee, President of the Zionist Organization of America from 1918 until 1921. Kallen first met Mack in 1911; when Kallen needed a respite from his loneliness in Madison he used to visit Chicago, and there got to know Mack’s daughter. Kallen recalls that Mack often challenged his concept of cultural pluralism, and that they had many conversations on the subject in which Kallen tried to convince Mack that American patriotism and a commitment to Zionism were not necessarily incompatible. In 1943 Kallen wrote of Mack,

> As with the case of Louis Brandeis, it was no more Julian Mack’s sympathy for the Jews as pitiful victims of injustice than his revision of the idea of democracy that made a Zionist out of him. . . . When Julian Mack felt persuaded that instead of a "melting pot" democracy consists in the cooperative union of the different on equal terms . . . he gave himself to Zionism. 2

It is very difficult to find support for this claim, for Mack’s daughter destroyed all his papers after his death, and there are only a few random letters remaining. One, however, written by Kallen to Mack in early 1915, before Mack became a publicly avowed Zionist, does suggest strongly that Mack was using Kallen, at the least, as his "spiritual advisor."
To Judge Julian Mack  
Madison, Wisconsin  
January 19, 1915.

Dear Judge Mack:

... As to your enclosure--I both assent and dissent that the Jews have contributed monotheism to the world is a legend, not a fact. ... It is rather an ethical attitude to which an incidental monotheism was accessory that the Jews have contributed to the world. ...

Religion is less than life, and as life becomes more and more secularized, the religion of the Jews becomes less and less of the life of the Jews. I use the word Hebraism, consequently, to designate the whole of that life, of which Judaism is a part. ... This is justified by history also—for Judaism appears toward the end of the history of the ancient Jews; it is post-prophetic, and it goes in from the time of its appearance with other secular expressions of the spirit of the Jewish nation. ...

... I think it doubtful, whether through study of the Hebraic tradition Jews will become more religious. I think it is certain that they will become more Jewish, cognizant of their spiritual inheritance of its social import, and of the noblesse oblige that it puts upon them. They will naturally not scoff, because it is ignoble to scoff. But their judgments of religion ... will be made in terms of its role in human life.... They may completely disapprove of religion and still be good Jews. It is to be remembered that the prophets were the atheists of their own times. I suspect that ... the term [religion] had better give way to the expressions loyalty to ideals, conduct of life, noblesse oblige, which with us are implicated, though not undetachable from, specifically Jewish concepts. ... 3

After his own 1902 "epiphany," Kallen felt strongly that a Jew who became a Zionist liberated himself from the tension of having to discard one loyalty in order to maintain another. Recently, referring to people like Mack, and like himself, Kallen commented,

Actually people are very much controlled by the unconscious. Whatever they have of their Jewish heritage, however it has come to them, it's there,
maybe suppressed and denied, but it worries them. They know what their commitments are, consciously, and they have a bad conscience about a kind of commitment which dates to infancy, say, of which they have no awareness but which bothers.

And they come upon some formula that reconciles the two—so that the inner conflict is resolved, more or less. Now the chances are, in terms of courage, psychological judgments, that that's what happened to so many people, and that they found in my formulations the kind of reconciliation that freed them. Because the turn to Zionism, the turn to Jewishness without any theological commitment, is a liberation. It makes life easier... It enables them to accept their roots, and it frees their relation to themselves, to other Jews; it saves them from a constant practice of watchfulness, maybe this fellow thinks I'm a Jew, and so on. ... And a faith which frees a personality from that kind of tension and conflict is a saving faith.

He "talked" Zionism, therefore, whenever and to whomever he could, both to individuals and to groups, Zionist and non-Zionist. 4

Kallen's correspondence of the period 1915-1916 makes clear that he saw himself as a teacher-preacher, a Zionist missionary, whose work was to speak as convincingly as possible to his fellow Jews of the "saving" power of Zionism. As early as 1914 he had written to the editor of a new Yiddish newspaper, "The Day,"

The American people stand at the parting of the ways. The old traditions of New England are gone. Those were the traditions out of which sprang that vision of democracy for which America has long been a symbol. No new ones have as yet been formed. No new order of the mind or the spirit has as yet established itself as the unitary expression of the whole national life. Perhaps it is doubtful whether such an order can establish itself again. But whether it can or not, it remains for the Jews in America to carry on the burden of the Hebraic tradition which lies at the bottom of our national vision, and to
continue its potency in the life of the nation. It is impossible for any Jew to be a loyal American without being, first of all, a completely loyal Jew. "The Day" I know will help in the expression and maintenance of this loyalty.  

Kallen's fellow Zionists recognized him as a valuable instructor and propagandist for their cause. Often he drafted the letters sent to anti-Zionist rabbis or to non-Zionist philanthropists over other signatures. Brandeis sent Kallen frequently as his personal emissary in private meetings with representatives of non-Zionist organizations. Other members of the Provisional Committee used him as a quick, convenient source of ideas; they published articles, for example, not attributed to Kallen, but based on an outline he suggested. Each of the following letters exemplifies one of these hidden roles Kallen played; many others in his files show that he appeared in this anonymous guise often.

From Stephen S. Wise
New York, New York
November 4, 1915

My dear Kallen:

... I am at present engaged in the securing of a large sum of money. ... You forget one thing which unhappily is true—namely that I have hardly any access to the men of large fortune. ... [Jacob] Schiff and I have no relations whatever and as a result of that I cannot touch any of the really rich men. ... 

... When I was in Pittsburgh lately I took up ... the possibility of getting the Temple for a Zionist meeting. ... The Zionists there seemed to be delighted about it and they first thought of asking Judge Mack. I do not know ... whether he will consent to speak. ... Why not write a line and tell him ... [to be] ready to be of service?

... I should be perfectly willing ... to address a letter to [philanthropist] Mr. [Julius] Rosenwald and lay the law down to him, pointing out
his obligation to his people and to the supreme interest of Israel at this time. Suppose you draft the letter ... and I send it to him.6

To Louis D. Brandeis
Madison, Wisconsin
January 5, 1916

Dear Mr. Brandeis:

I send you herewith a memorandum ... of a conversation between [Judge and anti-Zionist Jewish communal leader] Mr. Cyrus Sulzberger, ... and myself on ... December 31st, in the Pennsylvania Railroad train going from Philadelphia to New York.

The topic of the conversation was the [American Jewish] Congress issue, and the problems arising out of it ... As the discussion subsequently developed, Mr. Sulzberger substantially agreed to the following points, namely that the war had precipitated the masses and the classes, the origins of which lie

(a) in the difference between the old and the new migrations to this country;  
(b) in the influence of American institutions on the new migration;  
(c) in the general progressive development of the country from 1898 to 1908. In substance the argument ran as follows:

The so-called "Americanized" or "American" Jews are the descendants chiefly of Jews who came from Germany, had had the benefits of western culture, and had succeeded in various ways in adapting themselves to American environment and attaining a competence in this environment. They formed the mediators between the new migration and the larger American communities. They provided for it the charitable institutions, the tools of Americanization ... and acted as mediators, controlling its affairs, speaking for it, and so on without consulting it. They reproduced practically on a wider scale the medieval situation of the Hofjude [Court Jew].

In the meantime the great masses of Jews from eastern Europe got Americanized, acquired a certain political sense and political facility through the responsibilities of American citizenship, began to contribute to the charities, and began to clamor for a voice in the control of money and other matters. Little by little a fissure appeared in charitable work and in organization. The "Associated Charities" found themselves confronted by rival and sometimes re-duplicating bodies which were called "The Orthodox
Charities." The fraternal orders like the B'nai B'rith found themselves confronted by proletarian orders . . .; the [Reform] Union of American Hebrew Congregations by the Union of Orthodox Congregations, and each one claimed that the other was without right, one because it paid nothing to the maintenance of Jewish institutions, the other because it was unrepresentative of the opinion of the great masses. Both were right, but the representatives of the classes were constantly receiving financial aid and urging financial responsibility upon the masses, and the masses were sufficiently responsive only to find their representatives frozen out in gatherings of all sorts to which they had been invited.

... This was the situation when the war broke out. With the war there came an enormous wave of emotion which could be directed and guided, but could not be fought off or repressed. . . . The emotion had defined itself in the demand for a [democratically elected American Jewish] Congress, and the [plutocratic American Jewish] Committee should have acceded to that demand at once. That it did not do so was a grave error which Mr. Sulzberger concedes. He declared . . . that it [the American Jewish Committee] is genuinely anxious to get together with the rest of us, aiming only to safeguard the interests of our brethren in Europe. . . . He agreed . . . that it might possibly solve the problem if it were agreed on both sides that the Congress should be called before the cessation of hostilities. . . . He further suggested that I discover how you would feel on the matter, and to let him know, while he himself would feel out the opinions of his conferers on the American Jewish Committee.7

To Louis D. Brandeis
Madison, Wisconsin
June 3, 1916

Dear Mr. Brandeis:--

I saw Mr. Krause [president of the large Jewish fraternal order, B'nai B'rith] Tuesday at noon. He gave me a full and substantial account of his activities and of his correspondence with you. He listened courteously to what I had to say, but it was very evident that he was not in any way to be moved from the middle-of-the-road policy [towards recommending B'nai B'rith support for the American Jewish Congress] which he had adopted. I pointed out to him that the alignment in the [American Jewish] Congress issue was essentially a class struggle in which the intellectuals and idealists were aligned with the masses as against the capitalistic paternalism of the American Jewish
Committee, and that the position of the B'nai B'rith was that of the Middle Class defeated by the capitalists and unable to join hands with them because of the [class] warfare and unwillingness to ground their leadership on democratic and representative principles governing the Congress movement. I pointed out that in the future the membership of the B'nai B'rith would have to be recruited from the Russian Jews, and that if there once arose an organization in which the young men and women of promise of the Jewish majority could work freely with the majority, the B'nai B'rith was doomed; so that it could not afford, if it wanted to maintain itself through the generations, to stand aside in this struggle. Mr. Krause seemed impressed with the statement although I don't think he took it under consideration. He is too old to learn, and although without illusions concerning the social character of his constituency, he is too habituated in the Hofjude [authoritarian] mode of procedure to be willing or able to change. It is clear that we shall have the sympathy and cooperation of the B'nai B'rith so far as Krause's own influence extends but that is all.

From Henry Hurwitz
July 26, 1916

Dear Harry:--

I have seen Felix Frankfurter and asked him to write an article for the [Menorah] Journal in the nature of a call to the graduates to become interested in the Menorah movement and to co-operate. Such an article might be reprinted and sent ... to graduates throughout the country, with whom Felix's name and position will carry a great deal of weight. Felix says he cannot do anything apart from his work this summer ... but if we furnish him with material and suggestions, he will try to do what we want. I should be obliged if you would jot down and send me your suggestions for an article of that kind.

To Henry Hurwitz
Roxbury, Mass.
July 26, 1916

Dear Henry,

Felix should touch upon the following points:

1. The democratic necessity of self-respect and frank Jewishness on the part of Jews in academies. ...
2. The fact that most of academic anti-Semitism in the student body anywhere is based on the ignorance of what the Jew is and has stood for.

3. The influence of the Menorah in bringing the separate Jewish classes together in terms of a common ideal and the consequent definition of "noblesse oblige."

4. The endorsement of the movement by such men as Brandeis, Mack, the various artists, writers, college presidents.

5. The revitalization of Jewish idealism among Jews who are to be the leaders of the next generation.

Possibly the greatest challenge that Kallen undertook as a Zionist missionary was his attempt to make Jacob Schiff, founder of the American Jewish Committee and the most influential leader of the anti-Zionist forces, a member of the Zionist organization. Schiff strongly opposed the Zionist movement, rejecting it as a secular nationalistic perversion of the Jewish faith, incompatible with American citizenship. Though Schiff gave money to agricultural and educational projects in Palestine, he was careful to specify that he did so to prevent Jews from starving, and despite his disapproval of the concept of a Jewish nation.

Kallen decided to challenge Schiff by appealing first to his American patriotic sentiments. When war broke out in 1914 Kallen had been quick to announce his support of the Allies; as the letter below shows, he also had urged the Zionist organization, though officially neutral, to propagate anonymously for the Allies, particularly among the recent Jewish immigrants, who tended to support Germany out of an anti-Russian sentiment.
To Alex Aaronsohn, Administrative Secretary of the Zionist Bureau in Chicago

Madison, Wisconsin
October 22, 1915

Dear Alex:

It is necessary to point out to our friends in Washington that the Yiddish press is a press which is not self-supporting, but which has to depend on advertisement and a great many other sources for maintenance. It is not and never has been either on political matters or on social matters representative of the public opinion of the Jewish people. The Jewish people in New York city particularly are undoubtedly anti-Russian, and their justifiable hatred of Russia has influenced their attitude towards France and England, two countries for which they have a great deal of loyalty and admiration. Through the Yiddish press, however, the German government, through paid agents, has conducted a campaign of misrepresentation which tended to change the attitude of the Jewish people from anti-Russian to pro-German. This campaign has gone on unhindered by either the French or the English authorities... It is recommended, therefore, that the French and English ambassadors provide themselves with agencies to counteract the machinations of the German agents, and to correct the false words and misrepresentations perpetrated by them. On the whole, the sentiment of the Jewish people is neutral, and the impression which the Yiddish press gives is a purely manufactured one.... The sympathy of the Jewish masses is first of all with their brethren in Russia; then with the democratic powers, England, France, and Italy. The Jewish Yiddish newspapers can be made to express that sympathy by the right means, and the ambassadors are strongly advised not to let the situation in the Ghetto go by default. If the powers involved could express themselves concretely concerning the solution of the Jewish question, there is no doubt that the whole of Jewry would swing completely in the direction of the allies. The fiscal and social consequence would be inestimable.

You will transmit these sentiments in this form to the persons indicated...12

In contrast, Schiff had begun by supporting the Germans. In this, he was close to the attitude of the Eastern European immigrant masses, who saw Czarist Russia as their enemy and
who prayed for the war to end with the defeat of their former oppressors by the German armies. In 1917, however, after the United States joined the War on the side of the Allies, Schiff, as a manifestation of his American patriotism, shifted his position. It then became incumbent upon him to convince others to do likewise, to turn around a sentiment he had helped to create. Kallen recognized Schiff's predicament, and approached him by offering the services of the Zionist organization. At the same time, he began to instruct Schiff on Zionism. This exchange of letters shows how close Kallen came to converting Schiff: Ultimately, however, Schiff's long-held anti-Zionist convictions were too deeply rooted to allow him to reverse his position and to affiliate with the Zionist organization, no matter how convincingly Kallen tried to make his case.

To Jacob Schiff

New York, New York

July 24, 1917

Dear Mr. Schiff,

... I have been getting specific data on the [American Jewish] Ghetto attitude toward the war and I am afraid the situation is even more serious than you thought. I have come to the conclusion that something definite ought to be done—a patriotic propaganda, perhaps, from press and platform and pulpit, and an active campaign of instruction on the dangers of the present attitude.

... In principle I am inclined to deplore over-emphasis on any social institution—religious or economic, etc. Judaism is a national religion and if the Jewish nationality is healthy and flourishing it will be also, and conversely. ... The present weakness of Judaism seems to me a function of the social disintegration of Jewry. Reintegrate Jewry and Judaism will reassert its normal significance in
Jewish life. Zionism alone--just the Basle program--seems to me adequate to reintegrate Jewry. That is the foundation, the rest will grow . . . naturally out of that.\textsuperscript{14}

From Jacob Schiff
New York, New York
July 25, 1917
Dear Dr. Kallen:

I, too, have given considerable thought as to what could be done to influence and improve the "Ghetto attitude" towards the war, which . . . you believe is even more serious than I painted it to you when we recently met.

I fear, however, there is no way of getting at these people except through the Yiddish press, which in turn, I am told, is always having its ear to the ground, rather writing what it thinks will please its readers, instead of endeavoring to lead them on to patriotic paths.

Would it not be possible for the Zionist organization--for the people in question are almost all Zionists--to come out and strongly and continuously urge its followers that in the present crisis there is an opportunity to show that Zionism and Americanism cannot conflict, and that for the time being, good Zionists must show first, that the weal of the country, of which they happen to be citizens, must be their main concern.

I am sure, if the larger Zionist organizations would take such an attitude, Zionism itself would be greatly helped, and one of the strong objections that has always been made to it, would fall to the ground.\textsuperscript{15}

To Jacob Schiff
New York, New York
July 27, 1917
Dear Mr. Schiff--

The Zionist Organization will do what it can to develop a patriotic sentiment in the Ghetto. You are, however, mistaken in the opinion that the anti-conscription agitation is conducted by Zionists. It is conducted by socialists . . . among whom there are one or two Poale [Labor] Zionists--against the wishes of their leaders . . . Intimately connected with them . . . is [pacificist] Rabbi J. [Judah] L. Magnes whose influence would be of greatest weight. . . .
An active opposition on his part would do more than oceans of declarations by the real Zionist organizations. . . .

To Jacob Schiff
Roxbury, Mass.
January 4, 1918

Dear Mr. Schiff,

I did not discover until too late that I could hear you best behind the screen at the Menorah dinner; consequently I missed part of your address. What I did hear interested me very much partly because it made clear to me that there is between us an essential agreement. What differences there are are differences of emphasis incidental to any great organic movement involving a large cross-section of life. . . .

As a Zionist I am personally committed to the liberation and perfection of [the religious aspects of] Judaism as a part of the total content of Jewish life. . . . I am committed to it because I realize more deeply than I can say the organic character of group life and I accept it. . . . So Zionism has made me hospitable to and sympathetic with Judaism. . . . If I judge your paper [read at the Menorah dinner] correctly you are aligning yourself with Zionism of the [religious] right wing; but that you are fully in spirit and in outlook a Zionist seems to me indisputable. To become so absolutely you would need merely to declare yourself a member of the Zionist organization. Membership in our organization involves merely a minimum of Zionism—the belief in the establishment for our people of a national homeland in Palestine and cooperation with our comrades to secure this minimal end, without which none of the more spiritual ends can be realized.

May I not present your name for membership at large in the organization? After all it is the overt alignment of men that utters their principle and vision. You are with us in spirit—may we not count you among us in body?17

To Jacob Schiff
Roxbury, Mass.
January 11, 1918

Dear Mr. Schiff:

I am venturing to send you herewith my Nation article of November 29 ["Issues of War and the Jewish Position"]. . . .
You are right in the assumption that official Zionism does not emphasize religion. Neither does it deny religion. Its program is simply to renew the totality of Jewish culture by restoring its indispensable political base. Whether religion is central or not depends upon factors over which we have no control. They are international factors from which as you will see from this essay in the Nation, our own liberation and the liberation of Judaism have derived. Should there be a general historic and social movement in the direction of religious emphasis, inevitably the Jewish people will have a part in it. Should the movement take another direction, just as inevitably we shall be affected by the international situation.

I do think that [your] emphasis on the continuity of your attitude toward Zionism and the Jewish question is most desirable. [But] after all our opinions march with events just as our lives do. It is absurd to speak of inconsistency of opinion, as I view it, as it is to speak of inconsistency between two periods of the same life. The past lives in the present—the present can mean nothing without it.

So I think that [there is] some ground for suggesting changes. [and] I am fairly certain that they would be such as to throw into the foreground the living continuity of your outlook and into the background the merely verbal contradictions on which rabbis of the Reform Synagogue particularly would, I am certain, if they had the courage, pounce.

I do hope that by this time you are already enrolled in the Zionist organization. I hope I may be able to interpret their position so far as it is the representative fundamental Zionist position to you.

From Jacob Schiff

New York, New York
June 24, 1918

Dear Dr. Kallen:

I wish I could see my way to join you but I believe you understand, after all I have told you, partly at least the reasons why I cannot come forward, in the way you think I should, without the feeling on my part that I am sacrificing self-respect and this, I am sure, you would not wish me to do even for the cause of Zionism.
From Jacob Schiff  
New York, New York  
June 28, 1918

Dear Dr. Kallen:

... For reasons which I hoped you would understand, after the various talks we had, not only last Friday, but also at other times, ... I can still not see my way to become a member of the Zionist Organization, though I have already assured you and others, I am very willing to cooperate in any reasonable manner in any Zionist matters that may commend themselves to me.20

To Jacob Schiff  
New York, New York  
July 7, 1918

Dear Mr. Schiff,

... I wish I could make clear how disappointed I am that you return the Shekel blank [Zionist membership blank] unfilled. I know what you have undergone [in trying to make a decision] and need not say, do I, how inevitable and magnanimous your attitude has been and is. And I realize, too, that your service to the Zionist movement outside the organization is sure to be great and significant, yet—it seems to me that the same reasons which made your participation in person, as a member of the American Jewish Congress indispensable, if the Congress had been held, apply even more coercively with respect to the Zionist Organization.

... [Your position as a leader] deprives you, as it does every great man of private right and private feeling. It imposes public obligations. ... That is the penalty of leadership. I am hoping that the magnanimity that led you to give yourself finally to the Jewish Congress will lead you, in a matter so much more fundamental and difficult, I realize, to sign the Shekel blank which signifies formally your allegiance ... to the Zionist programme. In brief, noblesse oblige.

Please forgive me for venturing these remarks. If I didn't care a great deal, I should not have had the boldness; but I like to think of you as greatly magnanimous.21

Schiff died in 1920, without having become a formal Zionist, though in 1917 he did announce his support of Palestine as a cultural homeland for the Jewish people.
What he could not do, however, despite Kallen's arguments, urging, and flattery, was to allow himself to support a national state for the Jews, a state which, in his eyes, might bring his countrymen into conflict with their responsibilities, as he saw them, as Jewish-Americans.

II.

Curiously enough, though Kaller never could persuade Schiff, and many other Jewish Establishment leaders, of his pluralist argument that Americanism and Zionism could be complementary, he had greater success with several prominent non-Jews who he approached. He always had felt that Zionism was as attractive a theory to the Gentiles as to the Jews; some of his arguments in the 1906 "Ethics of Zionism" were addressed specifically to non-Jews. In October 1914 he wrote Stephen Wise,

Within my experience, the hope of effective propaganda has always lain in the teaching of Zionism as the outcome of a lebensauschauung, and whatever effect I have had had depended on that, I am sure. As a lebensauschauung it can be and ought to be preached to Gentiles as well as Jews, and Gentile support for it ought to be asked and publicly used. For if Zionism is anything it is a solution of a world question, and it concerns everybody else, no less than the Jews.22

Brandeis used Kallen consistently as his link with the non-Jewish media. Only three months after the formation of the Provisional Executive Committee, Kallen was reporting,

My own contacts with the Nation have involved some delays, but the editor assures me that a number of both letters and articles dealing with Zionism will be published during the year... I have established connections with the New Republic and
the Atlantic. To both I am to submit Zionist articles either my own or another's. 23

Kallen felt that there was a great readiness on the part of Christians to listen to his Zionist arguments. One of the Christians with whom Kallen was most influential was Norman Hapgood, a Progressive crusading journalist, and, in 1914, editor of Harper's Weekly. After meeting Kallen, Hapgood wrote several major articles on Zionism, and his words are so close to Kallen's phrasing that a connection between the two is inescapable. Like Brandeis, Hapgood began by confessing his former belief in the melting pot theory. But, he then acknowledged, he had changed.

My change was due to a changing view of democracy. . . . Democracy will be more productive if it has the tendency to encourage differences. Our dream of the United States ought not to be a dream of monotony. . . . Monotonous unity is not patriotism of the most interesting kind. It would be far better for the richness and value of existence if in diverse ways we all could have devotion to certain rich specific ideals of our own. . . .

The Zionist movement means that the Jews have something to contribute to human nature. . . . Self-respect and a home will strengthen and purify the Jews, everywhere. . . . 24

Kallen kept in touch with his former teachers. A letter to Wise, for example, noted that "Barrett Wendell, who made a Zionist of me, has made a small contribution to the emergency fund. . . . His name will help us much." Kallen wrote at some length to Henri Bergson, sending him articles on both Zionism and cultural pluralism, and asking for his support of Zionism.
To Henri Bergson

Madison, Wisconsin
July 24, 1915

Dear Prof. Bergson,—

.. . Abstractly the Zionist movement asks for the Jews the same opportunities for freedom for national life and cultural development that all European nationalities claim for themselves. But concretely it offers what those of us who have studied the question for many years have been forced to conclude is the only way out of an impossible situation for the great mass of Jewish people in Russia. .. .

Will you not raise your own voice in behalf of this ill fated people and do what you can to help relieve the most intolerable tragedy which the war has yet brought into being? The cause of the Jews is, in fact, the essential example of the principle of Democracy in Nationality and Nationality in Democracy which you have so well defined. .. . A statement from you to the world and your intervention .. . would have unbounded good results.25

He sent Santayana some articles, as well as his 1921 book, Zionism and World Politics. Santayana's reply, unwittingly, took the position of the cultural Zionists.

From George Santayana

Rome
November 21, 1921

Dear Kallen,

.. . Your book has left some doubt in my mind whether the Jewish Palestine which you desire is possible, and whether it would be very pleasing. I can't imagine Israel industrialized or Palestine (which seemed to me a miserable country when I was there) any thing but a place of pilgrimage or penance, like Sinai. And would an artificial industry, if it could become self-supporting in that climate, prove compatible with the spiritual function which the seat of Judaism should have? I could more easily conceive a Zion .. . like the Vatican .. . simply a religious centre and nursery for the Diaspora. But we shall see.26
Kallen wrote, also, to his university colleagues, usually referring them to "Democracy Versus the Melting Pot," and implying that its rationale should lead to some public support for Zionism on the part of his correspondent. John Dewey's reply suggests his reservations concerning the practicality of the pluralist idea and his somewhat hesitant sympathy for Jewish nationalism in the guise of Jewish relief.

From John Dewey

New York, New York
March 31, 1915

My dear Kallen--

... I was much interested in the Nation articles of yours and have a number of queries I would like to put to you if we have a chance for a talk. Chiefly I am inclined to ask whether you do underestimate the reminiscent and literary qualities of these culture revivals. To put it personally: My forebears on both sides are Americans for over two hundred fifty years. ... And I cannot remember when I had any interest in the Anglo-Saxon talk. I want to see this country American and that means the English tradition reduced to a strain along with others. It is convenient for "Americans" to put the blame of things they don't like on the "foreigners," but I don't believe that goes very deep; it is mostly irritation at some things they don't like and an unwillingness to go below the surface. I quite agree with your orchestra idea, but upon condition we really get a symphony and not a lot of different instruments playing simultaneously. I never did care for the melting pot metaphor, but genuine assimilation to one another—not to Anglo-saxondom—seems to be essential to an America. That each cultural section should maintain its distinctive literary and artistic traditions seems to me most desirable, but in order that it might have the more to contribute to the others. I am not sure you mean more than this, but there seems to be an implication of segregation. ... That we should recognize the segregation that undoubtedly exists is requisite, but in order that it may not be fastened upon us.

... I should be glad to do anything I can in
behalf of the relief of the Jews. . . . Possibly
[you] . . . might suggest something practicable
which I could try to do.27

Kallen's plea to British Socialist economist Sidney Webb,
besides indicating how far afield he went in his missionary
activity, shows, too, Kallen's preoccupation with building
the new Zion as an "economic democracy."

To Sidney Webb  Madison, Wisconsin
January 22, 1918

My dear Mr. Webb:

You are hardly likely to recall the young American
student at Oxford who spoke with you something like ten
years ago about the Zionist solution of the Jewish
question. If I venture to recall myself to your atten-
tion, it is because I have known and have followed with
deep appreciation and gratitude your own concern in the
Zionist movement, and your influence with the labor
party in England in its behalf. I should like now to
bespeak your further good offices in the matter in
helping to define the economic and fiscal programs of
the Zionists.

As you may know, the Zionists are, broadly speak-
ing, divided into three classes. There are the intel-
lectuals, more or less radical, but on the whole a
small handful and not to be characterized by their
economic predilections. There are the workingmen
Zionists who constitute a "labor party" in the Zionist
movement, but who are still in the minority, and who,
besides, have all the confusion and impracticality
which the protesting Jewish proletariat seems every-
where to manifest. Finally there is the great bulk of
the Zionists. These have religious predilections.
They are mostly members of the middle class, small
traders and such and have never faced the economic
problem in any but a personal way. Their Zionism is
instinctive and sentimental and only a secularized form
of their primary religious sentiment. None the less
they have been willing and ready to accept the fiscal
machinery of the Zionist organization—the Jewish
Colonial Trust and the National Fund. And they are
not likely to offer any resistance to the application
of social intelligence to the economic problem. But
they need urging and they need particularly the pre-
sure of gentile liberal opinion in England and
elsewhere to turn their willingness into a definite position.

Already we are gathering in this country [the United States] large sums of money for a restoration fund, and I have no doubt that the same thing is being done in England and in Russia. What I hope you will see your way clear to doing is this: get the public attention of Zionists to the opportunity of beginning anew, for establishing a real economic, as well as political, democracy in Palestine. Urge it upon them as their best hold on the good will and cooperation of liberal opinion, and if possible, have the labor groups adopt resolutions to the effect that a genuine economic democracy is desired in Palestine. You see, Zionism is actually an admirable opportunity for a constructive social experiment. There is very little to tear down in Palestine. The building may be begun from the ground up and can be done on a scale small enough to ensure control and easy correction of errors. Everything depends now on the way in which the mass of Europe gets set and the pressure of public opinion. Zionism has, if I am not mistaken, the endorsement of liberals and laborites all over the world. But with the economic background and function of the Jew, the economic line of least resistance, as you may well see, would tend to be determined by the inertia of the older order. Heavy public pressure in the new direction, would, it seems to me, be a genuine service to both the Jews and to the rest of mankind.

Please forgive me for troubling you at such great length. It is your well-known practice with problems of this order and your record of great service to economic democracy which moves me to do so.28

Webb's reply, though sympathetic, was not too helpful.

From Sidney Webb London
March 3, 1918

Dear Mr. Kallen,

... We upheld the paragraph on the Jews and Palestine [the Balfour Declaration of November 1917], but beyond this it was for the moment inexpedient to go. What you say as to the importance of seizing the opportunity to build a Zionist state on the newest and best principles is of the greatest importance.

However, I am unfortunately not in Zionist circles, and should have no influence there. Unfortunately,
too, some part, at least, of the Jewish Socialist movement, in some countries at any rate, seems to have opposed the Zionists, partly because Zionism appeared to run counter to the demands for Jewish equality of citizenship in such countries and partly because it seemed to be a middleclass and intellectualist movement, in contrast with proletarian socialism. This antagonism may, it is to be hoped, now subside.

We have, in England, very little Jewish socialism or even trade unionism, and I fear that our Zionist movement is quite unconverted to collectivist views.

Yours truly,

Sidney Webb

Do you see the New Statesman, with which I am connected? Perhaps something might be done through it. Would you write a letter to the Editor?29

One non-Jewish intellectual of the period who not only accepted Kallen's reasoning completely, but even tried to propagate it further, in a guise of his own, to circles both Jewish and non-Jewish, was Randolph Bourne. Bourne and Kallen knew each other well; there is an exchange of several letters between them dating from 1915 to 1917, mentioning weekends spent together as well as other meetings. Though this correspondence does not touch upon cultural pluralism or Zionism, it is fair to assume that they discussed these matters, which, at this time, were Kallen's primary concern. In a 1916 speech to the Menorah Society of Harvard, printed as "The Jew and Trans-National America," Bourne specified explicitly that his "own mind was set working on the whole idea of American national ideals by the remarkable articles [Democracy Versus the Melting Pot] of Dr. Kallen in The
Nation last year." And Kallen confirmed recently that they had several conversations on these themes which antedated Bourne's Menorah Society appearance. 30

In common with Brandeis' speeches and Hapgood's articles, this essay and a similar one, "Trans-National America," sounded like paraphrases of Kallen.

It is to ask ourselves . . . whether perhaps the time has come to assert a higher ideal than the "melting pot" . . . .

The foreign cultures have not been melted down or run together, made into some homogeneous Americanism, but have remained distinct but cooperating to the greater glory and benefit, not only of themselves but of all the native "Americanism" around them. . . .

The failure of the melting pot, far from closing the great American experiment, means that it has only just begun. . . . What we have achieved has been rather a cosmopolitan federation . . . of foreign cultures. . . . Meeting now with . . . common American background, all of them may yet retain . . . [their] distinctiveness. . . . They are more valuable and interesting to each other for being different. . . . America is coming to be not a nationality but a trans-nationality, a weaving back and forth, with other lands, of many threads of all sizes and colors. 31

At Harvard Bourne addressed himself specifically to Zionism.

. . . I believe we shall find in the current Jewish ideal of Zionism the purest pattern and the most inspiring conceptions of trans-nationalism. I used to think, as many Americans still do, that Zionism was incompatible with Americanism, that if your enthusiasm and energy went into creating a Jewish nation in the Orient, you could not give yourself to building up the State in which you lived. I have since learned that however flawless such a logical antithesis would be, nothing could be falser than this idea. . . .

. . . [The] distinction between State and
nationality is a very modern conception. It is becoming more and more difficult to identify State and nationality. The Zionist philosophy, I take it, assumes that with a national center for the Jewish race in Palestine to which the oppressed might flee, and to which, as the place where the type of life corresponding to the character and ideals of the Jewish people, the eyes of all Jews might turn, cultural allegiance and political allegiance might automatically strike a balance.

The Jew in America is proving every day the possibility of this dual life. [W]hat say we of the younger generation of Jewish intelligents such men as Felix Frankfurter, Horace M. Kallen. [Their] Jewish idealism has not in the least vitiated their peculiarly intimate insight into American problems, their gift of picking a way through the tangled social and economic maze. [T]hey suggest that an ardent Zionism involves the responsibility for an equally ardent effort for that progressive democratic reconstruction in America which is the ideal of all true Americans.

What were the factors that made it so difficult for Kallen to influence Jews like Jacob Schiff, yet allowed non-Jews like Hapgood and Bourne to accept his ideas wholeheartedly and to use them as their own? While the Jewish Establishment felt that Zionism threatened their status and their respectability in the community, the non-Jewish intellectuals were secure enough not to feel endangered by a minority, unfashionable opinion. Bourne, for example, was a critic of American society at its deepest levels. So, too, was Kallen with his rejection of the concept of 100% Americanism. They shared something very fundamental, their desire, as intellectuals, as Progressives, to help their country by defining and describing its shortcomings. Like Bourne, Kallen equated "intellectual" with "radical," "a restless, controversial criticism of current ideas and a
hammering out of some clear-sighted philosophy." Schiff, on the other hand, was not part of the American cultural climate of ideas. He was a good-hearted man, whose wealth he attributed to the opportunities America had provided him, and who could not, in the final analysis, bring himself to affiliate with any group that might question the Reform doctrine, "Washington is our Jerusalem and the United States our Zion."33

Kallen, whose heart was in the Jewish community, often found, to his dismay, that his head, his ideas, seemed alien to the Jews he most wished to help. Within the Zionist organization, for example, he had difficulty making his values clear to those unused to thinking in analytic terms. In spirit he was closer to a Bourne than to a Schiff, for his approach and stance were constructively critical, whether of the United States or of the Zionist movement. Ultimately this was to cause him loss of power and influence within the American Zionist movement--but not before he performed one more vital task for it, that of link with the newly significant Zionist forces of Great Britain.34
In the United States the outbreak of World War I had provided opportunities that ushered in a new leadership, and produced a fresh stream of creative energy for the American Zionist organization. It was in Great Britain, however, that the most significant political activity for the Zionist movement as a whole took place. There the Charter for Palestine, which Herzl had considered the *sine qua non* of Zionism, was finally attained. It consisted of a brief statement of policy by His Majesty's Government, known as the Balfour Declaration, which served as the basis under which Great Britain held dominion over Palestine for nearly thirty years.¹

The Balfour Declaration was the consummation of three years of diplomatic negotiation. The chief negotiator for the Zionists was Chaim Weizmann, a Russian-born follower of cultural Zionist Achad Ha'am. Weizmann had come to England in 1903 to teach chemistry at the University of Manchester, and in the years before the war had devoted his Zionist energies primarily to a project for establishing a Hebrew University in Palestine. The global conflict, which held promise for the Zionists of a postwar realignment of countries and territories, gave Weizmann his opportunity to gain
influence with the British leaders who, in 1917, were to grant the Balfour Declaration. Early in the war he devised a process for the large-scale production of acetone, a substance essential in the manufacture of explosives. According to the recollection of British statesman Lloyd George, who had been the chairman of the War Munitions Committee in 1914, Weizmann, when asked what recognition he desired for his new invention, had replied, "I would like you to do something for my people," and went on to plead for British aid in fulfilling the Zionist hope.2

Weizmann proceeded, with a small group of Zionist followers in Manchester, to work towards obtaining support in government circles and in British public opinion for the idea of a Jewish state. He was not a member of the World Zionist administration, and, from 1914 until 1917, labored on his own, restricting knowledge of his plans and activities to his Manchester Zionist "coterie." Weizmann was not connected even with the official English Federation of Zionists; a newcomer to Great Britain, he was uncomfortable with the Establishment British Zionist organization, and preferred to work not encumbered by uncongenial company. His efforts that led to the major Zionist diplomatic coup of the period, therefore, were in the nature of underground activity. Almost no one of the official Zionist organization, in America or elsewhere, knew of Weizmann's activities until the spring of 1917, when the Russian revolution and America's entry into the war produced changed world conditions that led Weizmann to convert his
secret negotiations to open diplomatic activity.3

Due to war conditions, the American Provisional Executive Committee had little contact with its European counterparts. Indeed, it had been the scattering of European Zionist leaders among all the belligerent nations that had been one of the reasons for the Committee's formation. Moreover, because of Weizmann's penchant for working alone and in secrecy, Brandeis and his followers had no idea of what Weizmann was doing; exchanges of information between what had become the two centers of Zionist activity almost were non-existent. As Brandeis complained to Kallen in October 1915, "The Provisional Committee has never received any communication whatsoever from him [Weizmann]."4

In 1912 Alfred Zimmern, a British classicist, political scientist, and authority on international relations, came to the United States on a lecture tour. While he was at Madison, Zimmern met Kallen; in short order the two became close friends. Kallen recalled recently,

He [Zimmern] had no Jewish relations, although "of Jewish parentage," and was as Oxonian English as anybody could enticingly be—a gentle man, with an open mind and a sensitive heart. . . . He learned [from me] of the Zionist aspiration in due course, and without joining anything did what he could to help.5

When Zimmern returned to England after his 1912 tour he and Kallen began a lengthy and intimate correspondence. Their letters touched on many subjects, but almost always there was some reference to the Zionist activity that was so important to Kallen, and in which, at Kallen's urging,
Zimmern began to become involved. By chance, one of Zimmern's friends was Harry Sacher, an English journalist and an active Zionist, one of the intimate circle of young men who became attached to Chaim Weizmann. Sacher was a member of the editorial board of The Manchester Guardian, a newspaper owned and edited by C. P. Scott, an influential and highly respected figure in British public life, and a close political and personal friend of Lloyd George. Through Sacher, Weizmann met Scott; their meeting laid the groundwork for the complicated maneuvering that led to the Balfour Declaration.

Realizing the importance of knowing what was taking place among the Zionists abroad, Kallen undertook, through his friend Zimmern, to become the link in international communication between the Americans and the British. From mid-1915 until early 1917, when Brandeis and Weizmann began correspondence of their own, Kallen was their go-between, using Zimmern and others to transmit information on attitudes and activities of the two Zionist groups. These letters encompass two dimensions. The letters from Kallen demonstrate his role as the liaison on whom Brandeis relied for knowledge of the English, and on whom the English relied for similar intelligence of the Americans. The letters to Kallen, like the chronicles of foreign travelers to our shores, give a different perspective of Zionist affairs in America, and sharpen the focus on how "American" the British Zionists felt the movement here was becoming. Not only, therefore, do the letters tell a story; they provide, also, a critique, from
the British point of view, of American Zionism and of the
direction it was taking.7

Even before the war and Kallen's work for the Provisional
Committee, he and Zimmern had touched on questions of Zionism.
In May 1913, Zimmern wrote,

... I spent an afternoon with my Zionist
friend H.[Harry] Sacher lately. The movement in
England progresses very slowly and does not make
young converts.... Sacher is a lead writer
on a good half penny daily and right in the middle
of things here.... How is the American move-
ment progressing?

But Kallen's first major activity as an international link
began in April 1915, when he sought from Zimmern some indi-
cation of British Zionist activity. Zimmern's reply gave
Kallen a good picture of the Zionist climate in England two
and one-half years before the issuance of the Balfour
Declaration.8

From Alfred Z immern

London
April 27, 1915

Dear Horace:

Your letter has just come. Before making up my
mind what action to take I will sit down and write
you what I know of the situation.

I happen to have had two sources of information
in the last few days. A cousin of ours ... lives
in Manchester and is intimate with C. P. Scott, who
runs and owns The Manchester Guardian--and is perhaps
... the most influential Liberal outside the Minis-
try. She said that Scott was greatly under the influ-
ence of Dr. Weizmann of Manchester University, an
enthusiastic political Zionist, and spoke to her
 vagely but enthusiastically) about Jewish projects
in Palestine. This is confirmed by the fact that
Scott gave prominence a month or two ago to a strong
Zionist article on Palestine, dealing with the [Jewish
agricultural] colonies. Similar articles have twice
appeared in the New Statesman. . . . I [do not] know Weizmann . . . but could probably get at him if necessary.

My other source is more interesting. On Friday last Sacher asked me to lunch to meet a Jew (Polish-born, I think) called Jablonowski (or similar name) [Jabotinsky]. He turned out to be a journalist, some 40 years of age, very able and well-informed, who had lived in Petrograd, Rome and Alexandria [Egypt] as well as in Poland. He had now come almost straight from Alexandria, and was acting on behalf of a small committee there . . . (I would have got all this in writing had I known you would be wanting reports: but I was asked in as a personna muta, a non-Jew, to express an opinion of the project discussed, and my presence was really due to the accident of my having rung Sacher up on the phone an hour before).

. . . He [Jabotinsky] said that, as a Zionist he had racked his brain to discover some way of stirring the public opinion of the civilized world on the Jewish question, and that he was convinced, after much thought, that nothing else would stir the imagination of the nations or make them realize the strength of Jewish national feeling as the knowledge of the existence of [a] . . . Jewish contingent [to fight, as part of the British army, to win Palestine from the Turks]. He said that wherever he had been (Rome, Paris, etc.) except in London the Jewish national question was regarded as an amiable fad, on a line with Esperanto and Vegetarianism: and that professions of sympathy from statesmen were of no value whatever. If nothing was done now except interviewing statesmen and pulling wires, the Jews would almost certainly be dropped at the Peace Conference—they would be the first to be sacrificed to lighten the diplomatic cargo. . . . He added however that in London things were quite different: That Lloyd George, [Herbert] Samuel and Lord Reading (Rufus Isaacs) were deeply interested in the Jewish national question, and that he had heard of the word Judenstaat ["The Jewish State"—title of Herzl's first volume on Zionism] which Jews themselves since Herzl's death have been afraid to utter, being used by a serious British statesman. He concluded therefore that Britain was the Jews' best hope: That a British Protectorate was the ideal solution and one which Jewish public opinion should advocate. . . .

. . . My strong impression is that J. [Jabotinsky] is right and that the ground has been as much prepared in high places as it is possible to prepare it. . . .
Everybody is disposed, when the question is squarely put to them, to admit the claims of Jewish nationality.

As to your specific questions I will consult others and write again. I am doubtful about the value of a journalistic campaign, especially by non-Jews, who don't know the subject. The 2 things needed, I feel, are (1) Events: eg., occupation of Palestine, making it a burning question (2) The putting forward of a demand by a representative body of Jews. There the American Jews can greatly help. English Jews are numerically weak and seem to me to be either overcritical or snobbish and timid.

... I have consulted Lord Eustace Percy [in the Foreign Office]. I sounded him and finding him sympathetic told him of your perplexities and what you wanted me to do. ... I have also heard that [Arthur] Balfour is favourable: he suggested playfully to [Herbert] Croly that the U.S. should declare a Protectorate over Palestine.

Kallen passed the information in this letter of Zimmern's, and in the numerous others that followed, on to Brandeis; his emphases and suggestions, however, indicated his own priorities for Zionist activity.

To Louis D. Brandeis
Madison, Wisconsin
May 14, 1915

Dear Mr. Brandeis,

... Zimmern's report has just come. It confirms what you knew through the press of the Jablonowski [sic] episode, but adds things that you must know. Please use your judgment about passing the matter on to the rest of the committee at this time. I would myself say nothing.

Zimmern advises ... that he approves the enterprise. He says that unless there is a "fait accompli" to compel attention the Jews will have no bearing at the peace conference. He therefore urges (1) occupation--and if possible--immediate investments to establish a large funded interest, and (2) a specific and well-formulated demand by a representative body of Jews.
The two points of greatest importance are the fait accompli and the organized demand. If the immediate economic penetration of Palestine can be in any way begun, it ought to be. The military activity should be quietly encouraged, but of course, publicly discouraged. The organized demand raises the question of the Jewish Congress again. In England there are outstanding individuals of influence who hinder—just as there are here. Only a weighty mass demand is likely to have influence against them, and that, too, must be well led.

Under the circumstances, it seems to be of importance that we should have an agent in England who shall bring the P.C. [Provisional Committee] into direct contact with the forces Zimmern has prepared for us...

To Louis D. Brandeis

Madison, Wisconsin

May 27, 1915

Dear Mr. Brandeis:

Zimmern's second report came this morning. He writes as follows:

"I have had a long talk with [Lord Eustace] Percy about Palestine. . . . The upshot of our talk can be put in three propositions: (1) that the Jews can count on sympathy and understanding for their national ideal from the directors of British policy. . . . (2) that the initiative in the matter lies with the Jews themselves and particularly with the American Jews. If it is to be a practicable matter it must be the Jews who must prepare the ways and means. For instance, a Jewish occupation of Palestine would necessitate the defense of Palestine. How far would the Jews be prepared to defend themselves? Percy showed that he feels on the present evidence that the Jews seem likely to be more effective at persuading other people to do things for them than to do them for themselves. There is a want of self-respect about that attitude. He is a little afraid that the American Jews may, like Americans generally, be taking the elemental prerequisites of civil and social life for granted instead of providing the means for securing them. We all feel just now that you across the Atlantic . . . have been living in a Fools Paradise building dreams of a perfect society without facing the ultimate facts—the need for protection and the effective enforcement of law on which all society rests. . . . (3) A British protectorate over Palestine
is, it seems, highly improbable. It would create a very bad strategic frontier and would involve us in serious expenditures to defend. . . . Percy further said that as a Foreign Office official, nothing would suit him better than to secure the support of American and neutral Jews by a vague Zionist declaration, but that it would not be honest in the face of the difficulties and uncertainties of the situation. . . ."

You will please note that this statement comes in answer to a series of questions I sent to Zimmern to which I asked him to get specific replies from the Foreign Office. You will gather from what he has obtained from Percy that the matter so far as action is concerned rests entirely with us . . . the necessity of a fait accompli seems fundamental. . . .

The only member of the Provisional Committee who had had any direct contact with Weizmann was Judah Magnes. Magnes, like Weizmann, a follower of Achad Ha'am, treated their correspondence as personal, however, and would not share its contents with the Zionist organization. In August 1915, when Magnes resigned from the Provisional Committee, even this tenuous link with the British was gone. Kallen, therefore, took it upon himself to write to Weizmann, with whom Zimmern had made contact, and to plead with him for the establishment of some permanent Anglo-American relationship. War conditions made this difficult; for almost two years Kallen's letters were to provide the only real connection between the two Zionist groups.

To Chaim Weizmann

New York, N.Y.

August 6, 1915

My dear Sir:

About ten days ago, I received from Mr. Alfred Zimmern an account of his interview with you. He cites you as saying that we are here in possession of an account of your activities in England,
communication having been made through Dr. J. [Judah] L. Magnes. Dr. Magnes considers this exchange of correspondence as being personal, and is therefore reluctant to furnish our Committee . . . copies unless it meets with your approval.

This is how the matter stands at present. You will, by this time, have received a visit from one of our representatives who, I hope, will be able to make it possible for us to incorporate into our records what has been done on your side. The work here, insofar as it has other than organization bearing, is very much handicapped by our ignorance of what our comrades elsewhere are doing, or not doing. We, consequently, lose opportunities and are compelled to work in the dark. It would be for the good of the cause if a more direct connection and a franker exchange between us could be established. I trust that you will give the matter immediate attention, and let me hear from you as soon as possible.12

To Alfred Zimmern

New York
August 6, 1915

Dear Alfred:

The enclosed note . . . to Weizmann, is self-explanatory. The situation in England appears to be as we suspected. In point of fact, the organization is so loose over there and individuals are acting so much on their own, that anything like concerted effort and organized endeavor for the single point has been made very difficult for us. The disorder in Jewish life, is, like all things Jewish, to some degree an exaggeration of the disorder in the life of their neighbors. Now, what I hope you can do . . . is this: Get the English Zionists, and particularly Weizmann to realize the need of organized and cooperative work. We, on this side, are bearing all the effective burden of the Movement, and if it were not for you, we should still be acting in the dark on all matters other than those of organization. The latter are making magnificent progress. You will hear very soon of the development of the Congress Movement which, we hope, will completely drive the money-lenders [the Establishment American Jewish Committee] out of the temple. There are other developments of which I cannot now write, but in line with E. P.'s [Eustace Percy's] suggestions and Jabertinsky's [sic] endeavor.13
The small group of Zionists which surrounded Weizmann included Leon Simon, a young English member of the Civil Service, a distinguished Hebraist and the translator of Achad Ha'am's works from Hebrew into English. Simon was close both to Achad Ha'am and to Weizmann. In common with Kallen, Simon was interested in ideas; he fulfilled for the Weizmann Zionists something of the intellectual role Kallen fulfilled for the Brandeis Zionists. Beginning in 1915 a correspondence developed between the two; their letters were often so long and so detailed that they might have been published as complete articles. From the beginning Kallen and Simon had their disagreements, which became sharper as time went on; eventually, their personal differences of opinion became the differences of the two Zionist movements they represented.  

From Leon Simon  
London  
September 16, 1915

Dear Kallen,

I was very glad to get your letter and pamphlet. . . . I read the pamphlet, as I read everything of yours that I see, with enormous interest and admiration. We have evidently been moving along the same lines: you will find the same general idea in Sacher's recent pamphlet on "Zionism and The State." But I cordially disapprove of some things in your pamphlet--things which I can only designate as remnants of Herzlian "bluff". . . . You have much too deep an understanding of Jewish nationalism and too clear a view of facts to imagine that Zionism is only meant for those who are denied the right to assimilate, or that it will appreciably relieve the economic and political grievances of Jews in Europe. . . .

Zionism is not in fact "completely democratic"; the machinery of European democracy applied to a scattered and multi-lingual horde with no concrete political interests in common and no political
training could only result in a farce. You may impress the goyim [non-Jews] by talking about a great democratic movement of the Jewish masses: but it is a bluff. What we have is the living Jewish idea, expressing itself fitfully and feebly in an organization which has to contend against enormous difficulties within and without, and has therefore, as organization, very little strength.

This brings me to a practical matter. As one instance of the lack of organization, take Jabotinsky. He is pushing his wild-cat scheme of a "Jewish army"—a scheme quite impossible of realization, and fraught with great danger to our people—in the teeth of the express condemnation of the [Zionist] Actions Committee. . . . I wish you could get some influential American Jews to cable . . . their emphatic disapproval. That might have some effect.

And one other thing of importance. We want very much that American Zionists know what has been happening here; but it can't be done adequately in correspondence. Cannot you manage to come over? It is really essential that somebody should, and we think of you as the best. . . .

To Leon Simon
Madison, Wisconsin
Oct. 1, 1915

Dear Simon:

Yours of the 16th reached me in practically record time. . . .

I am interested to note the items you disapprove of in my pamphlet. In reply to point one, I can only say this—that when you are trying to win a lot of opponents you say the minimum and not the maximum. Jews in particular have to learn Zionism as children learn mathematics. And while we who are deeply concerned may calculate all effects, what is relevant to most people are those few effects which they absolutely need to know. I do not agree with you concerning the political effect of Zionism on European Jewry; I do agree concerning the economical effect.

As for your second point, "completely" is a relative term. Certainly you will grant that the Zionist movement is the most democratic and integrative movement in Jewry, which has Jewish ends in view. In this country [the United States], anyhow, it is aligned with a fundamental democratism, a democratism personified in our leader, Louis Brandeis. I have been wondering if
you know this man and what you know about him over there in England. He is an infinitely greater man than Herzl, in fact the greatest man I know. I have known a good many important men in my time on both sides of the water, but I have known only two extremely great ones, and the other was William James. Here in America most of us—academicians, the Jewish radicals whom Brandeis has won over, the rabbis who are in the movement—have all grown to feel that in this man we have found our Moses. And he is leading in this country a great democratic movement of the Jewish masses with the Zionist issue in the foreground [the fight to convene the American Jewish Congress]. He has changed a weak and useless "organization" into a daily more effective fighting machine; and he will change, if ever he gets the chance to do so, the whole international organization into an organism which will realize the living Jewish idea in democratic terms. . . . Upon our side of the water, anyhow, Zionism has been and remains coincident with democracy in Jewish life.

I have called Mr. Brandeis' attention to what you say about the Javotinsky [sic] affair, and I suppose that you will hear in a short time as to what could be done.

As for the other matter, my own coming over at the present moment is out of the question. I think that it would create suspicion for a member of the Provisional Committee suddenly to leave his work and to go to England in mid-term. And you have no idea how our actions are under surveillance. . . . [I]t would be far better if you or Weizmann or Sacher would come over here. We need closer relations anyhow, particularly now, as a certain amount of dissension and difficulty has arisen within our own camp over the democratic issue. Magnes, who never to my mind was more than a Palestinian culturist, a philanthropic ghetto-builder, has resigned from the Provisional Committee. He is the only man who has been in communication with Weizmann. His sentiments are greatly pro-German, and he has sought to inject them into the neutral policy of the organization. Weizmann ought to know. I have written to him some time ago but have received no answer from him, nor has our office, which has been trying to get him to reply to certain questions for almost nine months. . . . 16
From Leon Simon  
London  
Oct. 17, 1915

Dear Kallen,

... I don't know if it's worth while pursuing the discussion. ... I am not clear what you understand by "democratism" as applied to Jewish affairs, but I think that your faith in it implies a higher estimate of the masses as a factor in the revival than I can accept. The really "democratic" movement in Jewry, to my mind, is the "Yiddishist" movement, which is fundamentally one of the worst enemies of Zionism, seeing that it accepts the galuth [Diaspora] ... I am much interested in what you say about Brandeis. We here know nothing about him at first hand and we have had no reason to suspect him of the great qualities with which you credit him. I confess to being a bit skeptical.

I showed the last part of your letter to Weizmann yesterday. He admits that he has been slack in answering letters. The reason is partly pressure of work, but more particularly a feeling that there isn't anything to write. He doesn't know what is going on in the minds of the American Committee and it's impossible to discuss in writing his own and our ideas and plans and hopes. At the present time especially, when the outlook is obscure, and any day may bring tremendous changes [due to the war], it seems useless to attempt to write anything. ...

I know Zimmern quite well and like and admire him tremendously. He is one of the best men we have. ...

... Please write and tell me how you view things from over there and what you think is the bearing of the most recent events [of the war] on our particular problem. Your vision should be less biased [sic] than ours.17

In August 1915 Kallen had sent law professor I. L. Kandel, a member of the Parushim who was to be in England for the summer, to speak with Weizmann and to discover what English Zionists were thinking and doing. Kandel's meeting with Weizmann was the first personal contact with him that the American Zionists established. His reports confirmed Zimmern's
observations, and showed that Kallen had an accurate picture of the activities of the English Zionists through the letters he had been receiving.\textsuperscript{18}

From I. L. Kandel  
New York, New York  
November 19, 1915

Dear Kallen,

... I had a long talk with Weizmann, Sacher and Zimmern. I was pledged to secrecy by the first only to find that everything he had told me was already in the hands of the [Parushim] Executive Committee. 

You probably know that nothing of a tangible nature has been done in England. From the account that I received Weizmann shouldered the whole burden of developing a sentiment for Zionism among the leaders of British politics. Through Mr. C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian he won the ear of Lloyd George, was then passed on to Herbert Samuel who gave him a favourable hearing. Mr. Balfour was next reached and was impressed.

All of these are in favour of supporting the Jewish claim to Palestine and of establishing a Jewish state under the English flag. ... Lord Percy (I think) turns out to be a Zionist but will not hasten Providence.

... [Weizmann, Simon and Sacher] were chagrined at (1) the inactivity of the American Zionists; (2) the pro-German attitude of the American Zionists; (3) the lack of cooperation with and understanding of the English aspiration by American Zionists. ...\textsuperscript{19}

From I. L. Kandel  
New York, New York  
November 26, 1915

Dear Kallen,

... The pro-German attitude of the American Zionists is deduced abroad first from the Yiddish and Jewish press, and seemingly from the actual known sympathies of some of the Zionist leaders who represent the East Side of New York perhaps more than the rest of the country.
My own feeling in the matter is that there will and can be no assured understanding of the whole situation unless Brandeis or you (I can think of no one else whom it would be worth while to send) go over personally. . . . As you are in touch with Simon perhaps you would prefer to continue writing to him. He stands between Achad Ha'am and Weizmann. It would be better not to approach the latter directly.20

By the time Kallen received Kandel's reports he still had not heard from Weizmann. Impatient, he pressed Weizmann for an answer to his letter of August, using Leon Simon as his courier. Kallen's letter drew from Weizmann, in Simon's estimate, a "rather spirited reply"; Kallen, in turn, wrote back in conciliatory fashion.21

From I. M. [Chaim] Weizmann London
November 24, 1915

Dear Dr. Kallen,

Mr. Leon Simon has shown me your letter to him and I regret deeply that you should find it [necessary to] . . . write in that tone. There is no slightest justification for it for the following reasons.

1. A year ago I was in very active correspondence with the Provisional Committee—viz. with Dr. [Shemaryahu] Levin and Dr. [Judah] Magnes. Dr. Levin never answered a single letter of mine. Dr. Magnes corresponded regularly, but for the last eight months I did not write anything to him because his attitude appeared so very doubtful. In fact, in one of your letters to Zimmern, you asked him to explain to me Magnes' attitude. He did so and I thoroughly agree.

2. The general attitude of the P. C. [Provisional Committee] as a body is not clear to me and I therefore must abstain from corresponding with them about Zionist matters, especially those which concern us as English Zionists.

3. Although I know yours and Brandeis' personal attitude and would be very glad to cooperate with you on Jewish matters, it seems to me, that your views are not the predominant views in the committee.
4. I explained it all repeatedly to Kandel ... and asked him to explain it to all of you. There is all I could do under the circumstances.

7. I have asked Zimmern various times that he should tell you that the only satisfactory way would be if you or Brandeis would come here. It's absurd that at a time like this one should be at sixes and sevens because one does not try to get into personal touch. You must live here ... and then you would perhaps appreciate why I refuse to write to American fellow Zionists as long as I don't know exactly what their attitude is.

... I hope this short note will clear up the "suspicions" and shall certainly be happy to be in correspondence with you. I read most of your ... [letters] with great interest. Please accept my best regards and present them to Mr. Brandeis and other friends.22


Dear Dr. Weizmann--

Mr. Simon has sent me your letter ... .

... As for the general attitude of the Provisional Committee, you may put it down this way: It is absolutely and completely pro-Jewish. You may have noticed from the report of our convention ... that we were at great pains to declare the neutrality of the Zionist organization in the war, but you may have noticed also that the statement concerning the Zionist position indicates acquiescence to the democratic principles, without which our cause could have no status. If you will examine the personnel of the Committee, both the regular members and the associate members, you will notice that there is not a single one whose personal sympathies are not definitely with the forces of democracy. It could not be otherwise in America or among American Jews. It is true that an agitation has gone on in this country at the hands of foreign agents in behalf of the Teutonic allies, but that agitation was based partly on a natural hatred for Russia which the Jewish immigrants from Russia have, and partly on the mercenary character of the Yiddish press. It has nothing, however, to do with the attitude of the Provisional Committee. Concerning
that you may feel secure. The only thing we ask is not necessarily that the whole Committee shall know what is happening and what to look forward to, but that the leader in the work and the particular committee interested with similar work shall be in a position to go on in less than complete darkness.

... I am sending a copy of this letter together with yours to Mr. Brandeis. 23

Kallen used Zimmern as his contact with others besides Weizmann. Lord Eustace Percy, the house-mate and friend of Felix Frankfurter, was also a friend of Alfred Zimmern. After 1914, when Percy returned to England to serve as right-hand man to the British Foreign Secretary, Kallen, through Zimmern, had a direct tap line to the British Foreign Office. 24

Kallen knew, through Frankfurter, that Percy was sympathetic to the Zionist cause. He felt, therefore, that the Zionists might enlist his aid in a rather clandestine scheme. Percy could help to secure the funds to pay agents to "buy," for the Allies, the sympathies of the pro-German Yiddish newspapers; these would then use pro-British articles which Kallen and his friends would supply. Percy was reluctant to participate in such an underhanded scheme, though he was aware that "the attitude of the Jewish press in the United States is doing us [the British] harm and doing the cause of the Jews throughout the world even more harm." He ended up by trying to straddle both sides of the fence—he would cooperate in the plan if Kallen would supply the concrete details and suggest specific names as "agents." 25

Kallen realized the dangers of his plan, and tried to keep it from Brandeis. "You must remember," he wrote Stephen
Wise, "that I did not in this matter act in any official capacity, but wrote privately to Z. [Zimmern] making purely personal suggestions. . . . For this reason I would urge you not to talk with L.D.B. [Louis D. Brandeis] about the matter, nor even with G. [Gottheil, then Chairman of the Political Committee]." 26

Despite his recognition of the "radical" nature of his plan, Kallen persisted with it; he was, apparently, interested in results, and would go to some length to attain them.

To Alfred Zimmern

Madison, Wisconsin
January 14, 1916

Dear Alfred:--

Your note with the enclosure from E. P. [Eustace Percy] came yesterday. E. P. [Percy] seems to blow both hot and cold, and I am uncertain as to what he really wants done. On the one side he denounces me roundly for suggesting a procedure that is undertaken in every political campaign, and in all matters concerning party interests, both in England and here; on the other side, he wants me to propose a concrete basis for carrying out such a plan. . . . I am altogether disposed to satisfy his wish if it can be managed, and will let you know as soon as I can discover whether it can be managed.

Since my last letter I have heard from Weizmann, and I think that we are going to understand each other. Mr. Brandeis is distinctly skeptical of the present advantage of either of us going over. He feels that all of our time ought to be devoted as fully as possible to the strengthening of the organization here, and to the necessary propaganda of our principles. . . .

E. P. [Percy] had better get off his high horse [in denouncing the plan to influence public opinion]. . . . It is a law of psychology that only continual repetition makes a final impression, and at the present time when there are so many voices as to make a babble, repetition is all the more necessary. . . . To sum it all up, I believe that if you really have a light, it is of fundamental importance not to hide it under a
bushel—in fact, to use reflections as much as possible. Otherwise you will only imagine that you are illuminating the world.

There has been no change in the situation here. We have won a victory with respect to the Congress matter [the formation of a Congress Organization Committee, with Brandeis as honorary Chairman], and I think you are really to hear the definition of the real attitude of the Jews of America when the Congress is called. We have, however, neither money nor men, and the great problem before us is to develop the right kind of leadership—the leadership which feels the momentousness of democracy at the present time, and has the practical intelligence so as to en-channel emotion as to make it effective in democratic organization. Brandeis, of course, is a host in himself. There is no one like him. But we need subordinates, and God only knows when we shall attain to them. . . .

Felix Frankfurter has described Percy as "a dreamer and a mystic"; to some extent he shared these qualities with Kallen. The two were able to maintain a rapport for several years that often eluded Kallen in his contacts with less idealistic Zionist workers. "If in any way," Percy wrote to Zimmern, "I have appeared unappreciative of the work K. [Kallen] is doing for the cause in which we all believe, I hope he will forgive me. . . . K. [Kallen] and I, I hope, are essentially at one in looking for the time, and working for it, 'when the Lord shall build up Zion and when his glory shall appear.'"

But Kallen and Leon Simon were finding that they had no such accord. "I suppose that we must agree to differ," wrote Simon to Kallen. "It seems to me . . . that American Zionism . . . is going on lines which will sunder it from European Zionism. I fancy that when the opportunity comes we here will be asking for one thing, and you for another. . . ."

This disagreement, however, did not prevent them from
continuing their correspondence. The letters that follow give some picture of the relationship of the American Zionist organization to other American Jewish groups, particularly during the period after July 1916, when Brandeis resigned as active leader of the Provisional Executive Committee, having been forced out by leaders of the American Jewish Committee, who were jealous of his threat to their own leadership of the American Jewish community. 30

To Leon Simon

Roxbury, Mass.
June 29, 1916

Dear Simon,

I had a brief chat with [Harry] Sacher [who was visiting the United States] and brought him together with Brandeis. . . . I got through him a much more articulate conception of the attitude and outlook of your group than it was possible to obtain from your letters, and I am impressed most of all by the tremendous influence that local situations and problems do exercise on men's outlook and conceptions. We are much closer together and also much farther apart than you think. . . .

. . . Latterly the American Jewish Committee and its creatures have held a conference in which a conspiracy was carried out to eliminate Brandeis from participation in the conduct of Jewish affairs. [Judah] Magnes and Judge Mayer Sulzberger insulted him in successive order and thus sullied the dignity of the Supreme Court of the United States. Then Ochs, owner and publisher of the New York Times, an amateur Gentile, hand and glove with the American Jewish Committee, ordered an editorial demanding the chief's [Brandeis'] withdrawal from Jewish affairs for the dignity of the judicial cloth. The editorial spread like wildfire through the country. But these people counted without their host. The chief resigned from the various relief committees and the Congress organization committee. The resignation clears him of official connection and his participation in these enterprises is now to be voluntary and unofficial. From the Zionist organization he does not budge, and his hand remains on all things connected with Jewish affairs in this country. . . . 31
From Leon Simon
London
November 16, 1916

Dear Kallen,

... You accused me, I believe, of being woefully misinformed about the state of things in American Jewry. Well, I may be... On the basis of the facts that I know, my conviction grows stronger that the [American Jewish] Congress will either be a Congress of nationalists only, and pass resolutions of a Zionism-cum Territorialist character, or, if it does manage to combine nationalists and assimilationists, it will become merely a [demand for Jewish] "Rights" Congress with no national value at all. It becomes more and more clear to me that you cannot "work together" with would-be thoroughbred Anglo-Saxons. So long as they are persuaded that what you are after is something "cultural" or "religious," they will be awfully nice to you; but as soon as you make it clear that you contemplate the creation of a full-blown nation, they show their teeth. And then they stop at no meanness, no falsehood in their efforts to thwart you... 32

From Leon Simon
London
May 26, 1917

My dear Kallen,

... Two days ago I should have welcomed Schiff's public adoption of Achad Ha-Amism without reserve. The anti-Zionist manifesto of the [English Jewish Establishment] Cojoint Committee, issued on Thursday last, has
made me more cautious. The line these fellows now take is this:--"We would like to see a spiritual centre in Palestine, and you may even have a Jewish nationality there if political conditions shape that way. But we object strongly to the Zionist theory that the Jews of the whole world form a homeless nationality." Now you and I know that in Achad Ha'amism the idea of a spiritual centre is the correlative of the idea of a homeless nationality: it is because we are the latter that we need the former. But the goy [non-Jew] doesn't necessarily realize that; and what these fellows are doing is to use a distorted Achad Ha'amism as a stick to beat Zionism with. Your letter, coming just when the air here is full of this affair, raises to my mind the question whether Schiff--deliberately or unconsciously--is playing the same game... The issue is whether one wants Palestine because one is a member of the Jewish nationality... or as a quasi-philanthropic measure. You ought, I think, to get this distinction clearly realised in America, and to get it clearly stated whether Schiff and people like him mean what we mean... 

What applies to individuals like Schiff applies still more strongly to Palestinophile organizations, such as (e.g.) the B'nai B'rih... And in the [American Jewish] Congress it will be necessary not merely to voice the demand for Palestine, but to demand Palestine for the Jewish nation. Any temporizing will be dangerous.34

From Leon Simon

London
August 5, 1917

Dear Kallen,

I received your letter... some days ago, but delayed answering until I could see Weizmann...

As you know, I never was a great believer in "organization," but I am free to confess that just now concentration on that side of the work is more readily justifiable than in more normal times and if you can get your 200,000 members, so much the better... And certainly, as you suggest, the time has come when the "sympathizers" must be called on to show the reality of his sympathy by joining up. Otherwise he is simply playing the game of the pseudo-"culturals" with their humbug about a "centre" with no circumference.

But what I am asking myself is--what is it all
for? Given organizations increased twofold or tenfold, what are we trying to obtain by their aid? That the Congress is likely to vote more or less solid for the Basle Programme is very satisfactory. But the B.P. [Basle Program] is merely a general framework. What are our actual demands for after the war? We are much handicapped here by not knowing the American answer to this question....

What our policy is I think you know.... I wish you could tell me something of how American Zionists see (1) the most desirable and (2) the most likely post-war situation.

A full-blown exchange between Kallen and Simon on their respective formulations for the development of Palestine was not to come until 1918. Then, however, their plans would take on much more meaning, for on November 7, 1917 "His Majesty's Government" issued the statement which later became known as the Balfour Declaration, the statement viewing "with favour the Establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people."

To Jacob deHaas
Madison, Wisconsin
November 8, 1917

Dear Jack:

I need not say how much pleasure your telegram [announcing the Balfour Declaration] gave me. From correspondence with both Zimmern and Simon, I knew that the event was not far off, and I flatter myself in having had some small share in hastening it. However, I am very anxious to get the details inasmuch as I do a good deal of speaking on the issues of the war, and I should like to be in a position, if the matter can be made public at all, to make statements about the character of our cause.

To Leon Simon
Madison, Wisconsin
November 20, 1917

Dear Simon:

Your letter was followed by Balfour's public
announcement, and I think that announcement squashes finally and completely the activities of the anti-Zionists, and shows also what degree of cooperation does in fact exist between the American and English Zionists. . . . You cannot imagine the tremendous effect of the declaration here. It has changed the status of the Jewish people overnight. . . .

In November 1917 Kallen really did feel that a British declaration expressing its approval of Palestine as a Jewish homeland would give to the Jewish people a new status. The "charter" had been secured; now would be the time for outlining concrete plans to make the dream into a reality. Much of Kallen's time in 1918 would be devoted to working out proposals to effect the practical achievement of a Jewish state, and, in a change from the 1914-1916 period, much of his work would be done alone. For by 1918 Kallen's training and temperament had isolated him from all but a few of the American Zionist leaders who shared his background and approach to Zionism. Not only was his "Americanized" Zionism pulling apart from the European tradition; it was serving, also, to alienate Kallen from the masses who, during the war, had joined the Zionist Organization in America.
By November 1917, the date of the Balfour Declaration, Kallen was no longer the forceful active member of the inner circle of Zionist affairs that he had been in 1914 and 1915. November 1917 was almost three and one-half years after the formation of the Provisional Executive Committee; Kallen, in Wisconsin, had been away from the center of things for a long time. Hints of the toll this isolation would take on Kallen’s leadership role began to appear in letters as early as April 1915, when Kallen wrote to Stephen Wise.

A letter from [Provisional Executive Committee Administrative Secretary Benjamin] Perlstein points out that to send me all documents would overburden the office of the Prov. Comm. [Provisional Committee]. He wishes to know the purpose for which I want the documents, and what documents I need. I shall write to him, but I hope you will also instruct him specifically, since I am not at this distance in the position to know what will be relevant and what irrelevant to the work of our Committee, and such general interests in other details.

Though Wise tried to cooperate with Kallen, checking to see that the office supplied him with all pertinent memoranda, it was clearly an impossible task to duplicate all the Provisional Committee office business for Kallen’s information. By March 1916 Kallen was complaining to Henry Hurwitz, "I am
entirely in the dark concerning the developments in the P. C. [Provisional Committee]"; a few months later he wrote directly to Brandeis that he received reports of the Provisional Committee only "very long after the meetings are held." 2

The distance from Madison to New York had other drawbacks. Travel halfway across the American continent was not an easy journey in 1915. Kallen came East only rarely and much important business had to be transacted without his presence. Provisional Executive Committee members missed him: "I wish you might be present so that we could have the benefit of your counsel [at a series of meetings with Brandeis]," wrote Stephen Wise in September 1915. Sometimes, in response to their urging, Kallen did manage to attend crucial conventions or meetings; more often, he simply couldn't get away from the pressures of his teaching position. Many letters from Wise struck the same note as this comment of October 1917: "I wish some German brewer in Wisconsin could endow you for the next year or two until we approached within hailing distance of the solution of our problems so that we might have your help and counsel at hand all the time." Many of Kallen's letters echoed his November 1917 reply: "I wish too, that I could be around. . . . [U]nless some New York banker, rather than a Milwaukee brewer, endows a chair for me, there is no chance to speak of, of my going east. I get no word at all from the Provisional Committee office aside from my personal correspondence, so I am in the dark as to
Kallen's relations with the Provisional Executive Committee changed considerably after Brandeis was nominated as a Justice to the Supreme Court in March 1916. At first Kallen felt he might want to devote his entire energies to the Zionist cause. "Mr. Brandeis' going into the Supreme Court is likely to alter the balance of responsibility, and it may be necessary for me to give up my [teaching and writing of] philosophy and devote all my time prior to the cessation of hostility [of World War I] to the Zionist work," he wrote to Alfred Zimmern. But soon he decided that "the only difference that it is likely to me [to make] in the Zionist movement will be the removal of the office from New York to Washington—all in all, not an unadvantageous thing."4

Kallen was wrong. In July 1916, when Brandeis resigned as Chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee and became, instead, Honorary Chairman and a "silent leader," Stephen Wise assumed the post as Chairman. Wise's position was something of a formality, however; as he acknowledged in a confidential note to Kallen,

The truth is that [Jacob] deHaas is practically the Chairman of the Committee. Things are in his hands. He more than anyone else has access to the Chief [Brandeis] and is most trusted by him, so that practically any man can serve as Chairman, even though he be little more than a figurehead.5

deHaas jealously guarded his role as advisor and protector of Brandeis. In the process he made many enemies, for members of the Provisional Executive Committee resented having
their ideas channeled through him. Kallen suffered particularly. Since August 1914 he had had direct access to Brandeis with his ideas and memoranda; after mid-1916 the Kallen-Brandeis correspondence dropped off sharply, and the note of confidential cooperation was gone almost completely.\footnote{6}

dehaas was no substitute, in Kallen's eyes, for Brandeis.

Critically, Kallen wrote to Wise,

\begin{quote}
Did deHaas bring before the P.C. [Provisional Committee] the matters on which I wrote him formally --concerning the campaign in the Middle West, etc.? He writes very unpromptly and scantily. I see a great deal that can be remedied at his end of the work. He is so fertile of schemes and so impatient of facts and details.
\end{quote}

But deHaas didn't care much for Kallen's ways, or ideas, either.

By early 1917 deHaas was writing to Kallen, in a tone of impatience and admonishment,

\begin{quote}
It was reported to the Office Committee that an address of yours in Boston, and one in New York, had, so to say, gone over the line in the matter of opposition, or criticism of the religious phase of Jewish life, or the tenets of Judaism, or phrase it however you will. It was felt here that you should be advised that in view of the fact that we have already two or three fights on our hands, that it was not absolutely necessary to provoke a fourth one. . . . Further, it was reported to us, in an attempt made to develop one or two points of contact with the non-Jewish world . . . that a good deal of fuss was being made over what someone described as your attempt to create an "Austrian Empire of the United States." There is not any attempt in this to call you to account. You are thoroughly entitled to your own opinions; but facing, as we are, so many difficulties, is it necessary to alarm non-Jewish intellectuals by in any way suggesting that you want to establish--and this is not part of the Zionist program--national culture states in America, representative of each of the different elements?

. . . Now the responsibility is thrust upon you, and you may be in a position to repudiate the whole
business; but if not, why not set your doctrine on one side during this critical time, when you and all of us have so much to do for the issue that makes for us a common Cause?

Brandeis' removal to the Supreme Court left a gap in communications from Kallen to the Provisional Committee that never quite was repaired. Uncomfortable with de facto Chairman deHaas, Kallen turned more and more, with his criticisms and ideas, towards Stephen Wise. These letters between the two date from roughly the same time that the final negotiations for the Balfour Declaration were taking place. They show clearly, and rather poignantly, how removed Kallen had become from the thinking and activities of the Zionist inner-circle.

To Stephen Wise

Madison, Wisconsin
Sept. 22, 1917

Dear Wise:

Word comes to me from authoritative sources that there is a movement on foot once more to postpone the [American Jewish] Congress. Such a postponement would be disastrous. It would mean that the Congress would not be held. It would make us the laughing stock of both the Jewish and the Gentile world, and it would be gross treachery to the Jewish masses who have troubled us so much with the problems involved in the Congress. A movement should be started at once to compel the holding of the Congress on the assigned date, no matter if the place [Washington, D.C.] is changed. After all, all that it need do is to create an executive committee that should charge itself with the problem of Jewish readjustment after the war and which should be responsible to the Congress, and the sooner this is done, the better. Please let me hear from you on this point without delay.

... [Re] the Provisional Committee. I note that the federated Zionist societies of the Middle West have received an allotment [to the Provisional Committee] of only two delegates... That rules a number of Middle Westerners out, among them, myself. I am frank to say: That I do not like the situation because my relations
with the committee have been altogether irregular in the past and my responsibilities entirely out of proportion to my official standing. Such standing is particularly necessary around here in view of the organization problem that the Chief [Brandeis] wants carried out. I have found it very difficult sailing, acting on the half authority that my membership on the associate group gave me [Kallen was never an officer of the Provisional Executive Committee, but served as an "associate member"], but I should find myself hampered in all directions to be without any authority at all. I put the situation to you frankly because I do not think that the present juncture is any occasion for false modesty or a deprecatory attitude. I can be of value in organization work only under the conditions indicated, and that ought to be clear.8

Wise’s reply shows Brandeis’ sensitivity to the possibility of an outbreak of anti-Semitic feeling if the public were to associate the Jewish Congress movement with the activity of anti-War pacifists like Magnes.

From Stephen Wise New York, N.Y. September 24, 1917

Dear Kallen:

... There is a movement afoot to postpone the Congress. I believe that movement necessary. I think the Jewish masses can be made to see certain things that make it less than menacing to hold the Congress now. ... The Chief [Brandeis], Mack and Frankfurter feel very deeply that there is danger of the Congress being captured by the pacifists under the leadership of Magnes, and, if not captured by them, of having such an uproar made on behalf of pacifism that infinite damage will be done to the Jewish cause. ... The rest of us, including Mrs. [Mary] Fels, are strongly of the opinion that we must not go on. As for having the Congress outside of Washington, what I called yesterday at our Provisional meeting "an attenuated, minimized Congress," that would be flagrantly dishonest. The Chief [Brandeis] referred to such a procedure when proposed by Lipsky yesterday as essentially unconstitutional.

With regard to the ... representation allotted to the Middle West,—let me take that matter up with the Provisional Committee. We certainly want you to
serve on the [Provisional Executive] Committee, and something must be done to bring that about. 9

Wise arranged for Kallen to remain on the Executive Committee, but had less success in his efforts to bring Kallen East for more active participation in its meetings.

From Stephen Wise 
New York, New York  
December 7, 1917

My dear Kallen:

It seems a shame that we have not seen each other nor talked together for so long a time. . . .

I write this letter particularly in order to say to you that you must come to [a Conference of the Provisional Committee in] Baltimore. I want you to come; I hope you are making every plan to come; it is necessary that you be there. Certain very grave questions covering policy for many years are to be considered, and you ought to be present. I have not discussed the matter with my associates of the Committee, but I feel very deeply that you ought to be associated with one or another of the Commissions we are planning to send abroad [to the Post-War Peace Conferences]. The personnel of the Commissions has not yet been made up and will not be made up until after the Conference at Baltimore shall have taken place. But I do know that your services would be valuable and I hope that all my associates of the Provisional [Committee] will feel about it as I do. So come to Baltimore and have in your mind the possibility of an early departure [to Europe]. . . .10

To Stephen Wise  
Madison, Wisconsin  
December 13, 1917

Dear Wise:

May I extend to you my sympathy at the death of your mother? I have just lost my father, and I have some sense of what a wrench such an event is. My father had been ill a long time, and I was called to his bedside two weeks ago. . . . [M]y long absence makes it impossible for me to get away for Sunday's meeting [in Baltimore]. I need not tell you that I am very eager to be there, and would give anything to be able to make it. But my relations with the University administration are not too cordial at best, and
... I may not so immediately ask for any leave of absence, even if it were possible for me to obtain leave, which it is not.

I wrote deHaas some time ago, explaining why I would not be at the conference in Baltimore and asked that he send me an outline of the matters to be discussed that I might think them over and make my contribution in writing. I have not heard from him, and it is now, of course, too late.

I appreciate very much what you say about my possible relations to the Commissions that are to be created, and I need not add that I am ready to serve as I can. But I do not think that it is likely that I shall be wanted.11

From: Stephen Wise
New York, New York
December 17, 1917

My dear Kallen:

... I am sorry that you did not have some understanding of what we were to do at the conference. DeHaas should have told you, but we must be fair to him for he has been overwhelmed with work. ... What we really need in the office is a high-grade executive director with competent secretarial service at his command. DeHaas is doing the work of three or four people and doing remarkably well; but the work is now growing so big as to require the most careful direction.

The meeting [in Baltimore] yesterday was not particularly important; we have to have such meetings in order to take counsel with our friends from all over the country. I feel more and more that we have no right to impose our judgment upon them. We must invite them for consultation with us. ...

Not very much was said about the Commissions, excepting that the Chief [Brandeis] assumes Mack and I are to be among the members. I want to go, and perhaps I ought to go. ... I think a place ought to be found for you in the work. For one thing, I do not feel that you are happy where you are, and I think a place of real service can and ought to be found for you here [New York]. When can you come to New York? Can't we have a heart-to-heart talk about it. You, deHaas and I ought to talk it out very frankly. There is a little feeling in the office about your being standoffish and "hifalutin," but I suppose that is the
penalty which educated people must pay in the presence of certain folk. I write this frankly to you because I am sorry to note something of disinclination to accept you as one of the all-round workers for the cause. This is brutally direct, but it is written to you, as you know, by a friend, who has the highest possible regard for the service you have rendered and the greater service which you can render to the cause.12

Kallen had always been something of a separatist and a critic of the Zionist organization. The Parushim, after all, embodied even in its name the concept of separation. As early as August 1915 Parushim member I. L. Kandel had reported to Alfred Zimmern that Kallen was "full of fight but working single-handed," and Kallen vigorously defended the need for separation to followers like Alexander Duskin and Elisha Friedman.13

The truth of the matter seems to have been that Kallen was more comfortable working with ideas than with people. Though he professed democracy wherever and whenever he could, the underlying tone of his letters was rather elitist and "standoffish." Guerilla generals, missionaries and international liaisons work alone; they stand apart from, not among, those who they would influence. Kallen's language was not that of the masses. His most extended correspondence in the United States was with people like Brandeis, Wise and Schiff, men on the very highest rungs of American Jewish leadership. His letters abroad went to Alfred Zimmern, a Greek classicist, to Leon Simon, an outstanding Hebraic scholar, and to Chaim Weizmann, leader of the Zionist movement. The people to whom Kallen wrote were men of stature
and of achievement. There was no "plain-folks" touch even in his letters to the Parushim. 14

Kallen's background, though appealing to the new "American" leaders of the Zionist movement, was intimidating to the recent European immigrants who heeded Brandeis' call to join the organization. Harvard educated, an instructor in philosophy, a writer for some of the foremost American journals of opinion, Kallen had little in common with the Yiddish-speaking, East Side Ghetto masses. Indeed, even his use of the word "ghetto" in his letters smacked of distaste; that community clearly was not his community.

Kallen's position was similar to that of other intellectuals of the Progressive Era who had high hopes of leading the American people to new and better visions, but who failed to sense accurately the mood and temperament of those they wished to lead. He persisted often with ideal standards where others saw room for compromise. Once convinced of the correctness of a position, he found it difficult to yield. Compare, for example, his stance on the 1915 Hebrew Union College controversy with that of Brandeis, or his unwillingness to give way on the 1917 American Jewish Congress postponements with Wise's flexibility. It is obvious that many of his associates found Kallen's persistence irritating, and resented his continuous advice and "preaching." They took his high-mindedness for rigidity, and came finally, close to ignoring him.

There is no doubt, also, that Kallen's ideas on
organization and efficiency went against the instincts of those more accustomed to the looser procedures of the European Zionists. Kallen wanted discipline and order; Zionist functionaries like deHaas preferred a more casual, and more comfortable, approach. Kallen threatened them and their jobs. "I was like an old-fashioned athletic coach," he commented recently. "I wanted better and I knew that they could do better. My disillusion wasn't of their ability, but of their will and their commitment." As late as November 1918 Kallen wrote to Julian Mack, then President of the newly reorganized Zionist Organization of America, in words and tone that echoed his letters to Brandeis of September 1914.

To Judge Julian Mack
Roxbury, Mass.
November 27, 1918

Dear Julian:

The whole trend of events of the [Zionist Organization of America] executive committee makes it clear to me that there is something radically wrong with the administrative system, for there seems to be a great confusion of multiplicity and a great deal of irresponsibility. When one thinks of the development within a year of government departments, involving far more complicated issues, one realizes that the Zionist organization is still suffering from its ghetto legacies. Now I want to suggest to you once more that we secure an efficiency expert who shall overhaul the plant and install an administrative system for us that will eliminate all this overwork and confusion that DeHaas and others complain of. Miss Szold's department [of education] should be excluded, of course. It seems to be the only department in which intelligence and foresight have been applied to problems of administrative organization.

I do not, of course, want to make a public issue of this proposal. It is a suggestion to you as president, to do what you think best. But I am convinced we must come to it very soon or we shall suffer from
a breakdown of the administrative machinery. The question is, to my mind, not particularly one of mind but of methods. 15

It is not surprising, therefore, that the rank and file workers of the Zionist organization took advantage of Kallen's isolation in Wisconsin to slowly, but surely, freeze him out of their intimate group. What is surprising, perhaps, is that Kallen never lost hope. Though he knew, as he wrote to Wise, that he should not be wanted, he continued with a characteristic "meliorism" to turn to other, perhaps more suitable, ventures as an expression of his Zionist activism.

Thinking back retrospectively Kallen is aware of what happened between him and the Zionist organization. "It's true," he wrote recently, "that I heard less and less from professional Zionists, those for whom Zionism was a livelihood." But Kallen had never considered himself a leader of the Zionist organization as such. "I said and did what occurred to me needed to be done, addressing those friends and public figures I believed could do it. But I refused to become a professional Zionist or other ist. . . . If 'elitism' is applicable, it would be to my aversion to professionals who . . . tend to acquire the drill-sergeant corruption by power that accrues to any bureaucracy," Kallen recalls. 16

Kallen remembers, also, that he was outside of the autumn 1917 American last minute negotiations with the British about the wording of the Balfour Declaration. In 1972, in reply to the question, "To what extent was the American Zionist group
involved in the negotiations that led to the Balfour Declara-
tion?" Kallen answered,

I really don't know because by then I wasn't in contact. I disagreed with the proposed position—the use of the word homeland. That was a promissory note, which nobody could keep. ... I thought that if it was to be a British mandate it would be better to use the word "commonwealth." A commonwealth implies a certain internal pattern and structure, involving common welfare and other ideas. It postulates a pluralistic society.

My position was an isolated one because nobody quite dared to think as radically as that in terms of fundamental questions. You see, if you had a commonwealth you could immediately establish relations with the Arabs and get a certain cooperation.

Brandeis was too timid. He agreed to "homeland" because he wanted to be sure that there would be an opportunity to act, and I suspect that he had more faith in the phrasing and implications than I did. He was a transformer but not a revolutionary. I was called that [a revolutionary], though I didn't feel that way.

... Though some people wanted me to go [to the 1919 post-war Peace conference] I didn't want to go. It would have been a waste of my time. There would have been nobody to talk to. As it worked out—Zionist terms—I had certain ideas which were not very welcome at the time, anywhere.17

The statement above, from the evidence in Kallen's letters of that time, seems to be true. It is, also, regrettable. For in 1918 Kallen emerged finally in the capacity for which he was by nature and by training the best suited, the role at the center of all his other Zionist activity, his position as the quintessential Messianic pragmatist of the American Zionist movement. And Kallen's ideas for a Zionist commonwealth, ideas which he had been working on since 1914, but which culminated in the propositions he put forth in
articles and memoranda in 1918, constitute what might have been his greatest contribution to the Zionist movement.

II.

In August 1914, in "The International Aspects of Zionism," the memorandum which Kallen had submitted to Brandeis on their way to the formation meeting of the Provisional Executive Committee, Kallen had included an outline of the Utopia he foresaw for Zion. The aim of the Zionist organization, as he saw it then, was to establish a state in which the government would facilitate the expression of the ethnic nationality of the Jewish people— their language, literature, religion, philosophy, art. He suggested, therefore, a centralized international organization to work out "a carefully reasoned plan for the central control of all practical activity in Palestine." This organization would have five divisions: (1) a ministry of public affairs to be in charge of "the consistent development of the settlement, the establishment of industries, etc."; (2) a ministry which would apply uniform laws, "so as to maintain the practice of democracy and to avoid economic and social injustice"; (3) a ministry to develop a system of national education from grade school to university; (4) a ministry of public health and (5) a ministry to establish a Bureau of National Art.

For some time the working out of the implications of this scheme occupied Kallen's mind. He wrote of it to Brandeis and to Frankfurter in 1915, and his concern with developing
practical plans for the Jewish nation-to-be underlaid much of his efforts for the Zionist organization. In 1917 the entrance of the United States into World War I seemed to precipitate a renewed lease on life for progressive ideas. Starting in late 1917, and continuing into 1918, the Wilson administration proposed several schemes for economic planning; the *New Republic* described the morale of the country as that "of a cooperative commonwealth." Kallen was not untouched by these developments. In addition, he took seriously what he construed to be the British promise in the Balfour Declaration. It seemed especially appropriate, therefore, to begin to formulate specific programs, along progressive reform lines, to ensure the economic and socially just development of Palestine.¹⁹

Kallen began 1918 by writing to the leaders of the Zionist movement in both the United States and England, to remind them of their obligations to look beyond the victory of the moment towards the problems of the future.

To Alfred Zimmern  
Madison, Wisconsin  
January 11, 1918

Dear Alfred,

... I take it that out of the war have come three real significant episodes that have a genuinely constructive tendency. The first of these is the Russian Revolution... The second is the formation of your [British] Labor Party. And the third is the Balfour Declaration about the status of the Jewish people. I am sending you under separate cover a paper of mine in the New York Nation ["Issues of War and the Jewish Position"] on that matter. It has naturally filled my attention to a very large degree and has brought us definitely face to face with the specific
problems of the organization of the new polity when that is to come about.

I wonder if you could find out for me how Weismann [sic] and the other English leaders are thinking on this problem. We have had no exchanges on the matter at all. It seems to me, does it not to you, that we cannot begin too early, to think of the form of our state and the processes of its largest development. I am very much afraid of the small shopkeeper habit of mind which is characteristic of so many of the Jewish leaders when they deal with economic problems. And I am sure that an experiment in social justice in Palestine, because of the limitation of area, the concreteness of its problems, is much more likely to be significant and illuminating than anything that can happen in Russia for generations. Russia is too big, too overwhelming, too easily managed. In Palestine things are different and within the limits of control. . . .

To Justice Louis D. Brandeis Madison, Wisconsin
January 17, 1918

Dear Mr. Brandeis:

The possible uses of the Palestinian Restoration Fund have occupied my mind a good deal in the last fortnight or so. I understand that sums of it are to go as loans to the colonists in order to repair the damage done by the war. There will be other aims, of course, to be devoted to similar purposes and to the laying of the economic foundations of the new settlements. I am frank to say that I am disturbed by the possibility that the [Palestinian] colonies may be restored and new undertakings begun without regard to the fundamentals of economic organization that would insure a real democracy. It seems to me that the loan now made to the colonists ought to involve such conditions as will secure the mechanism of both economic and political organization with the lapse of an equitable period of time.

I take it the two fundamental initiatory enterprises will be those that involve irrigation and transportation, and I hope that we may have a frank consideration by the leadership of what is involved, and the definition of a progressively democratic economic program. Unless we do this, we shall saddle ourselves at once with a labor problem and a workman's party, which will shame us, and rightly.
Could there not be an exchange of opinion on these matters between ourselves and our colleagues abroad. As a good deal of the money is to come from here, it would not be superrogatory for us to take the initiative in making certain economic proposals. But whether we do or not, I feel deeply that we ought to be prepared, and I hope that the necessary preparation will be initiated at once.21

To Stephen S. Wise
Madison, Wisconsin
January 18, 1918

Dear Wise:

I enclose herewith copy of letter I have just sent to Mr. Brandeis. The matter is troubling me more than I have said in that letter. . . .. I want to tell you that if the leadership does not take the initiative in this matter, I shall feel compelled to do it myself both in public and otherwise. . . . We have been caught by events so often and so unready that in this most essential matter, I am not willing under any circumstances to take the risk or to stand unrecorded.22

To Chaim Weizmann
Madison, Wisconsin
January 17, 1918

Dear Professor Weizmann:

I have been tempted to write to you many times in the course of the last three years, and found it very difficult to resist since the publication of Balfour's statement. I know, however, that you are a busy man and as concerned as the rest of us, and more so, about many issues besides the one that we have in common. But that one is now presenting aspects which cause me a great deal of uncertainty and reflection.

Within the next two or three years, we have to prepare for the actual settlement and peopling of Palestine. Already we are raising in this country an initial sum of one million dollars, a portion of which is to go to the colonists as loans for the rebuilding of their war-devastated habitations. But a loan also is to be extended to the Anglo-Palestine Bank. We have, however, so far not considered the relations of these respective activities to the economic and fiscal policy of the movement as a whole, and too, with whatever comprehensive program we may define with respect to the new Jewish state. In this matter, the earliest
possible discussion on the economic matter between your group, [and] ours in America ... seems to me indispensable.

... We shall need, if our hopes are realized, to initiate two fundamental enterprises of irrigation and transport. And we shall be faced with possibilities of land speculation and other conditions which the National Fund will be in a position very little to obviate.

I think it would be disastrous if we did not undertake at once a series of discussions at home, and exchange of opinion with our comrades abroad on methods which will establish fundamental economic, as well as political, democracy in our new home land. That is primarily within the original tradition of our people and its reformation in contemporary terms will not break but help the continuity of our history.

I do not want to begin anything in this discussion without fully advising with you and the other English leaders, and through you, I trust, with the Russian leaders. But as I see it now, outside of our "foreign relations" [negotiations with Britain, France, etc.] the most pressing and immediate problem lies there. We must have an economic, political and an educative program ready as against the peace conference and as against the party alignment in the movement itself.

Therefore, I am venturing to ask you to send me your opinion on this matter at your earliest convenience.

My friend, Alfred Zimmern, has, I know, a very deep and abiding interest in it all and might to advantage be called into any discussion you might want to develop.23

To Alfred Zimmern

Madison, Wisconsin

January 18, 1918

Dear Alfred:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of my letter to Weizmann. I have asked him to speak with you about the matter if he thought he could undertake it, and I hope that if you see him, you will yourself give him a phillip on it. I am growing anxious. This part, is, as you know, the one thing that makes Zionism worthwhile to me. I find everywhere a certain scrappy and middle-class attitude toward the problems involved and I feel that we are in need of
To Alfred Zimmern

Madison, Wisconsin
March 12, 1918

Dear Alfred:

I return herewith Weizmann's letter. I think he takes the matter too lightly and I cannot get over my feeling that pressure ought to be brought to bear on English Zionists from the Gentile side. You will, of course, . . . see that our basic American ideas get full consideration.

Shortly, I shall send you some remarks via the Maccabean [the journal of the American Zionists] on the Constitutional Foundations of the New Zion. If you can get it discussed so much the better.

. . . I have promised [publishers in Boston] . . . a book on Zionism. In that book I want to touch particularly upon the racial problems of Palestine—the Arabs and others in Palestine proper and as neighbors in Asia Minor. . . . I want as nearly as possible to think out a modus vivendi which will lead to an ultimate United States of Asia Minor, involving the Jews, Arabs, Armenians, etc., under international or British guarantee.

. . . You say "come over" [to England]. I have been anxious to get over for the last eighteen months, but I do not seem to succeed in finding a way. I have tried to establish connections with the Red Cross and with the Y.M.C.A. but my [German] extraction makes a final difference with these organizations. The only possibility would be my going over in the service of the American propaganda abroad, but even to do that, one needs a good deal of influence. . . . It happens that my very intimate connection with William James would give me a certain authoritativeness for both the philosophy of Americanism and American participation in the war that other men might not have. See what you can do in that regard if you will.25

Kallen had been hard at work setting forth his own "definition of this issue." In the spring of 1918 The Maccabean published his "Constitutional Foundations of the New Zion," a description of the structure of the new
"commonwealth" as Kallen envisioned it. Though Kallen had referred to Marx's ideas with approval as early as 1906, the socialist cast of his own 1918 plans for the Jewish State derived from pre-Marxian varieties of socialism. In particular, Kallen had been influenced by his reading of Robert Owen, a British socialist of the early nineteenth century, who held that the key to human progress was in economic, not political, reform. Owen wished to make the existence of the private landowner and capitalist impossible; his socialism comprised a reorganization of society on the basis of public property, i.e., common ownership of the land and of the machinery of wealth production, communal supervision of the production and distribution of all necessary material goods, and an equitable distribution of wealth. To educate for such a society, in which a sense of trust would replace the spirit of competition, Owen devised a form of child-centered education similar to that of later "progressive" educators; a secularist, he stressed that the future of the race rested not in the hands of the Lord, but with the planning of educational authorities.26

Kallen felt that in Palestine, a land with "no complicated or immemorial social structures," an area "fully within the limits of control," plans such as Owen's could be put into effect; the Jews would have a great advantage in building a "genuine, creative democracy." By democracy Kallen had come to mean the "liberation, encouragement and perfection of differences among men, the increase of human individuality
and spontaneity, and hence of human cooperation." The "consti-
tutional foundations" he proposed were designed to achieve
this democracy, as he defined it. 27

In something of a change from his 1914 "International
Aspects of Zionism" Kallen, in 1918, compared the function
of the state to that of a traffic policeman: "it is to keep
the ways of life open to the free movement toward the expres-
sion and fulfillment of their natural capacities by individ-
uals and groups." Since "private ownership in community
values" and "privilege of any sort" had been the greatest
historic causes "of the arrest of the vital movement of the
masses of men," the most important function of the state would
be to abolish these where they might already exist, and, even
more important, to prevent them from arising. 28

Kallen made several concrete suggestions towards this
end. He felt that there should be public ownership of "the
whole Jewish land," as well as of all natural resources,
means of transportation and communication. All of these
would be "the inalienable possession of the Jewish people."
Individuals or associations undertaking any operation using
the land or its resources, including industrial enterprises,
would become the tenants and leaseholders of the state.
Leases would terminate, as in ancient Israel's "Year of the
Jubilee," every 50 years. No tax system would be needed,
for the public treasury would accrue enough funds from these
leases to finance the needs of the state. Every industrial
or agrarian organization would have to be an autonomous, free,
cooperative company, in which all its members would share alike up to a certain minimum, and then beyond this minimum according to their "powers and capacities." Each cooperative unit would join with others of its kind to form a national association of the industry or profession, charged with care for its welfare and progress.  

Kallen saw only two fundamental functions for the state, public defense and education. He defined medicine as "public defense against disease," and proposed that all doctors, hospitals, and schools of medicine, be socialized to make the defense against disease "both democratic and effective." The other line of public defense would be that against crime and war. Here Kallen suggested the creation of a state's militia, to consist of "young men and young women of whose education this work will be a part." In this way everybody would at one time or another have been a policeman and a soldier, and "the menace of a professional police and a military class will have been eliminated." 

Of all the institutions of society helping "to make or mar the lives of men, to liberate them or to enslave them" Kallen, like fellow progressives John Dewey and Randolph Bourne, considered education the most vital. He proposed, therefore, universal schooling to be financed by the state through college, except for those with "conspicuous incapacity." The "school world" would encourage "the freest possible play of the child's individuality"; it would require, also, some period of each school year to be devoted
to police and military training, and to service on public works. "Every citizen should share . . . in building the nation's roads, digging the nation's irrigation ditches, shoveling the nation's coal," Kallen wrote. School would mean "participation in the indispensable basic activities of the Commonwealth"; only after school's completion would each student choose for himself "whatever enterprise or profession is desirable or fit." 31

Kallen provided, also, the plans for the "social control" of the government in his commonwealth. There was to be a President, a parliamentary system on the British model, use of public referendums, and administration of various professions and groups by associations of their own members. What was to be most important for social control, however, would be "absolute publicity with respect to all the Commonwealth's affairs"; without it the citizens would be "blind and injustice . . . inevitable." 32

These proposals do not seem particularly shocking today. As a matter of fact, the State of Israel has incorporated several of them. But the English Zionists found the assumptions underlying Kallen's suggestions disturbing; they feared Kallen's leap in accepting the premise of a State, and were content to plan for what they considered more realistic possibilities. In the context of post-World War I Zionist thought, Kallen was, indeed, a "revolutionary."
From Leon Simon  
London  
July 24, 1918

My dear Kallen,

Since returning from Palestine, I have looked again at your letter to Dr. Weizmann of the 17th January, of which you sent me a copy. It seems to me that discussion of the questions which you raise is likely to be futile, unless we agreed about what it is that we are aiming at in Palestine, and on this fundamental point I think that there is some difference of view between us here and you in America, and that your letter reflects rather the American than the English view. What I mean is that you seem to me to presuppose the early establishment of a Jewish Government in Palestine—that is, a Government which would be responsible for the whole country and its inhabitants—and that the programme which you desire to formulate is a programme for a government of that sort, and is not merely one for the less ambitious affair which we contemplate, namely, an organization which should be charged simply with the management, development and extension of the Yishub [Jewish settlement] on lines of internal national autonomy. You demand "an economic, political and educational programme," but clearly the character of such a programme must depend on which of the two views outlined above is adopted.

We have, I think, the outline of a programme in conformity with what I have called the English view, though it is not worked out in full details. Here is a brief outline of our programme as I understand it:

(1) Economic. What we want is to obtain in the first place . . . waste and unoccupied lands, and to bring them under cultivation on national lines. . . . The purchase of privately owned land must be left, I think, for the most part to private individuals. . . . Private enterprise will develop business and industries of various kinds. . . .

(2) Political. On the political side, as I have indicated above, we do not contemplate a full-blown Jewish government in Palestine. We want the country to be placed under a single strong Government, which will allow the fullest possible facilities for Jewish National development. . . .

(3) Educational. . . . When I was in Palestine I saw a scheme which had been worked out . . . embracing kindergarten and elementary and secondary
schools... I think that it indicates lines on which a good educational system can be worked out. ...33

From Harry Sacher London
August 6, 1918

Dear Kallen:

A copy of your paper on the Constitution of the New Zion came to me... It's good stuff, and if I criticize it is that there is too much contemporary, perhaps ephemeral, English politics and sociology about it, and too little Jewish. I believe that there is such a thing as a Jewish politics and a Jewish sociology, but nobody has ever taken the trouble to work them out. Yet that's the end we should start from for the New Zion, rather than the other end. ...34

To Leon Simon Roxbury, Mass.
Sept. 7, 1918

My dear Simon,--

We do not presuppose the early establishment of a Jewish government in Palestine which would be responsible for the whole country and inhabitants. We do presuppose precisely what you do--"An organization which should be charged simply with the management, development, and extension of the Yishub [Jewish settlement] on lines of internal national autonomy." You will gather from the Pittsburgh resolutions on Palestinian policy, for which I have had some responsibility, that what we are concerned with as the initial step is a clear and unmistakable definition of the principle on which any kind of activity--whether minimal or maximal in its political implications--must develop. The character of our program is independent of the views we take concerning immediate action. But our views of immediate action are dependent on the principles which we desire to realize in Palestine. Your views as to the economic development meet ours. So do those of political development. ... I am personally inclined to believe that the conversion of Palestine into an English crown colony, in which the organization will have certain charter rights not unlike those of the British East India Company with respect to all Jewish settlements and enterprises is the most hopeful eventuality that we can look forward to. As for the educational plan
--our own feeling is that it should look forward to a development of the kind I indicated in "The Constitutional Foundation of a New Zion. . . ."

I wish, however, that you would detail for us, as fully as you can, the proposals that your letter outlines. We want, of course, the maximum of coordination in our work and an absolute unity of aim; otherwise we shall get smashed.35

To Harry Sacher
Roxbury, Mass.
September 7, 1918

Dear Sacher--

Yours of August 6th reached me 2 days ago. Thanks for your word about the "Constitution of the New Zion. . . ." What I was after in this paper was to lay down in broad outlines certain fundamentals. I am now at work studying the possibilities of organization from the point of view of the political relationships between the protecting powers, the Jews, and the Arabs. I will send you the material as it develops.

We don't any of us know enough about the "Jewish sociology" and "Jewish politics" to commit ourselves to economic peculiarities arising out of internal and social conditions which will not be repeated in the New Zion [i.e., the "New Zion" would not be another Jewish "ghetto"]. As you may have gathered from my paper, we realize the import of the [Jewish] tradition, and we are planning to carry out as soon as possible . . . [a] proposal to organize a society for the study of Jewish law with the view of incorporating as much as we can into a Jewish communal organization in Zion. . . .

If you can see your way to write me of developments on your side every week, I'll try to do the same for you on this end. It is certain that a good deal more coordination is necessary than we have actually established.36

Kallen's letters to the American Zionist leaders concerning his views on the new state were somewhat more frank than the letters to Simon and to Sacher above.
To Jacob deHaas
Roxbury, Mass.
Sept. 22, 1918

Dear Jack,

I have yours of September 10. I do not think we ought to bother about "Jewish point of view and Jewish policies." Jews working together will have these automatically and the only thing they can mean, considered without the principles of justice, is an emphasis on rabbinic practice, in which every minhag [custom] is a mitzvah [commandment].

My reply to Simon you will notice was rather more diplomatic than my feeling. The more I think about the matter the clearer it becomes to me that we must think and operate in terms of the idea of a State. If we do not we shall be building merely a ghetto. Here again the getting a clear understanding with our comrades elsewhere is rather pressing.37

To Stephen S. Wise
Roxbury, Mass.
October 20, 1918

My dear Wise,—

... As to a more substantial connection with England—it ought to be established. ... Misunderstandings now will cost tremendously later on. There ought to be periodic meetings of fully accredited persons or groups if we are going to get results later on.

... As to the program—as I indicated to both Simon and Sacher we must accept immediately what is wise. But we must plan with our minds on ultimacies. There is a presumption in the public mind that Zion is to be a state. This presumption can be capitalized into a fact when the time is ripe. If we destroy it we shall have killed the ideal itself and have deduct the settlement in Palestine to a new ghetto which will differ in no way from the old ones. For this reason honesty and tactics both require us to stand publicly by the "great program." The English want too little and it is much more dangerous in the present political circumstances to ask too little than to ask too much.38
III.

On June 17, 1918 Kallen had written to Alfred Zimmern,

During the last week, I have been engaged on a declaration on our economic and political principles. This declaration will be taken up in committee this afternoon, and will be presented to the Convention in Pittsburgh the 23rd of the current month. I am enclosing a copy, and shall be glad to have your comments and advice.\textsuperscript{39}

A copy of this declaration, in Kallen's handwriting, signed by him, and noted as "1st corrected draft--17/6/18" is in Kallen's files as "A Memorandum on the Principles of Organization of the Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine." The form and language of this memorandum make it quite clear that Kallen had the primary role in framing what has come to be known as the "Pittsburgh Program."\textsuperscript{40}

The Pittsburgh Program was a series of seven principles that the delegates to the 1918 convention of the newly formed Zionist Organization of America (a fusion of the Provisional Executive Committee and the Federation of American Zionists) adopted as their credo. It represented the crowning achievement by Kallen and the American Progressive oriented Zionists like Brandeis and Mack to express their faith and vision in reordering Palestine as a model democratic Jewish nationality. Like other of Kallen's ideas, however, the masses never really understood it; the American Yiddish press of the period, for example, ignored it.\textsuperscript{41}

With one exception, every source on Zionism that deals with this period attributes authorship of the Pittsburgh Program to Brandeis. The exception is Kallen, who knew
better, and who wrote in 1921,

An attempt has been made to keep the development of Palestine on the plains of commonsense. This attempt is the Pittsburgh Programme. Its origin is to be sought in a series of discussions which began between some of the members of a small group of American Zionists calling themselves "Parushim," shortly after the publication of Mr. Balfour's letter to Lord Rothschild [the Balfour Declaration]. The eight or nine men and women who participated in the discussion were of all shades of opinion and of all schools in economic thought. By common consent they determined to leave doctrine as nearly as possible to the doctrinaires and to face the problem of the economy of Palestine developing into a free Jewish commonwealth in terms of the conditions which such a development must meet and must overcome.... The formulation of these resolutions was the work of one member of the group. The modifications were due to the criticisms of the best minds of the organization, including Mr. Brandeis. 42

The form of the Pittsburgh Program followed along the lines of Kallen's "Memorandum" and its contents summarized several of his ideas from "The Constitutional Foundations of the New Zion." It read:

In 1897 the first Zionist Congress at Basle defined the object of Zionism to be "the establishment of a publicly recognized and legally secured homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine." The recent Declarations of Great Britain, France, Italy, and others of the allied democratic states have established this public recognition of a Jewish national home as an international fact.

Therefore we desire to affirm anew the principles which have guided the Zionist Movement since its inception, and which were the foundations laid down by our lawgivers and prophets for the ancient Jewish state, and were the inspiration of the living Jewish law embodied in the traditions of two thousand years of exile.

1. Political and civil equality irrespective of race, sex or faith, for all inhabitants of the land.

2. To insure in the Jewish national home in Palestine equality of opportunity, we favor a policy
which with due regard to existing rights shall tend to establish the ownership and control of the land and of all natural resources, and of all public utilities by the whole people.

3. All land should be owned or controlled on such conditions as will insure the fullest opportunity for development and continuity of possession.

4. The cooperative principle should be applied as far as possible in the organization of all agricultural, industrial, commercial and financial undertakings.

5. The fiscal policy shall be framed so as to protect the people from the evils of land speculation and from every other form of financial oppression.

6. The system of free public instruction which is to be established should embrace all grades and departments of education.

7. The medium of public instruction shall be Hebrew, the national language of the Jewish people.

The application of these principles to the Jewish community in Palestine became the cornerstone of the official program of the Zionist Organization of America only from 1918 until 1921. But Kallen's scheme for a Utopia, his most "Messianic" contribution to the Zionist movement, remains, to this day, his ideal of what the Jewish nation might have become.

The Pittsburgh Program was the visionary statement of one who measured the worth of Zionism in its extension of the principles of the American Idea to the new Jewish nation—principles, as he saw them, of social and economic liberty and equality for all. Kallen's Zionism, however, was by no means representative of the Zionist masses. The very fact that Kallen and the people he influenced came to Zionism
through Americanism distinguished them both from their Zionist colleagues abroad and from the recent European immigrants to America. The Europeans had a different Zionist experience and tradition; most of them had suffered from overt anti-Semitism and were, therefore, more cautious and less idealistic in pressing their claim for a Jewish state. The World Zionist Organization never accepted the Pittsburgh Program, and the American Zionists of European background who forced Brandeis to resign in 1921 repudiated it by implication. Speaking recently, Kallen recalled,

*I was a radical, in the sense that I wanted action. I wasn't prudent—a radical in that sense, and in that sense perhaps also impractical, because the commonwealth notion was regarded, and perhaps rightly, as an impractical notion. Although I say, perhaps rightly, I feel, actually wrongly. I think if we had started with it [the Pittsburgh Program] the whole history of the movement and its achievement might have been very different. But then, you know, "what might have been... ."

Leon Simon's letters below show that Kallen's memory about his role in the Zionist movement was quite correct.44

From Leon Simon

London
June 8, 1919

My dear Kallen,

... Why do I never hear from you these days? Our discussion on the future administrative system of Palestine seems to have died an unnatural death. I haven't seen any reason to change the views that I expressed. I become more and more convinced that we are absolutely not in a position to take over the administration of the country [Palestine], and that our only hope lies in an efficient and sympathetic British administration, which will allow us to concentrate on the tasks of administration, colonisation and education—in themselves sufficiently
stupendous in relation to the resources and the human material that we have. . . .45

From Leon Simon
London
August 3, 1919

Dear Kallen,

... There is, if you don't mind my saying so, something refreshingly "far off" in the American way of looking at things. . . . There is the . . . sort of "far-offness" about your "Pittsburgh Program." I won't criticize its history, except to say that it is sheer bunkum to assert that "political and civil equality irrespective of race, sex or faith was one of the principles . . . which were the foundations laid down by our lawgivers and prophets for the ancient Jewish state." Whatever ideas our lawgivers and prophets had, they were not 20th century American democrats. But in relation to the present and the future the Program simply doesn't face facts. Take the second principle: "ownership and control of the land, etc., by the whole Jewish people." Who the devil is "the whole people?" If it means all existing inhabitants of Palestine, it is just what we don't want. If it means the whole Jewish people, then in the first place the expression is too vague, and secondly you have got to square the proposal with your general democratic principles. No. 7 again: "The medium of public instruction shall be Hebrew." Do you mean for Arabs, Greeks, Armenians, Copts, etc. in Palestine, or only for Jews? The thing almost makes me weep by its remoteness from reality. And you have to remember that even among ourselves [the Jews] there is and will be considerable opposition to restriction of private ownership and control . . . .; that the driving force of our nationalisers comes largely from people for whom Palestine as Palestine is naught, and the socialistic principle is all that matters; that for the Zionist who is first and foremost a Zionist the essential thing is that we get the biggest possible run for our money in Palestine; and that in order to have the money wherewith to use our run we shall inevitably be compelled to avoid pushing doctrines to extremes and to build up the best social order we can get in a field enormously complicated by the existence of an overwhelming non-Jewish and semi-civilized [Arab] majority at the outset.

Don't let my personal position be misunderstood. I am personally at one in essentials with the ideas which lie behind your programme. Public ownership
and control of all natural resources, limitation of private profit, advanced social legislation, equal rights for women—all these are articles of faith with me no less than with you. But I am first and foremost a Zionist, and while I hope and believe that the socialistic ideas which I share with many other Zionists will have a better chance in Palestine than they can have in England or America, I never let myself imagine that by some miracle all the people whom we need in and for Palestine are going to knuckle under to socialism. We shall have a hard fight (a fight rendered no less hard by the impossible intransigence of those who call more for socialism than for Palestine), and the scene of the fight will be Palestine, not Pittsburgh.

... Achad Ha-am I haven't seen for many weeks. ... Of course he isn't carried off his feet—or his head—by grandiose ideas. ... He fears a debacle in Palestine if immigration is too rapid. ... He has long thought that what we most want at present is a clear recognition by the Powers of our "historic title," because he is shrewd enough to see that we may quite well fail to pull off any big development scheme this time, and an unequivocal recognition of title will give us in that event a starting-off point for the next attempt. After that he wants a British mandate and a sympathetic administration. Given these things, he would hope for ordered and continuous progress towards a Hebraic majority. A very un-heroic attitude—but the life breath of reality is in it.46

Leon Simon's accusations were quite to the point. In 1918 the promise of a Jewish state was just that, and Kallen's assumptions did seem "far off" and removed from the "life breath of reality." But Kallen embodied within himself the uniqueness of the "Americanized" Zionist movement; he was both Messianic and pragmatic at one and the same time.

Kallen has another phrase for "Messianic pragmatism," a phrase that appears, also, in Brandeis' speeches. As Kallen commented recently,

The Brandeis program wanted to develop Palestine in an organized way by established methods which nevertheless would conform to the principles of the
Pittsburgh Program. . . . The Americans [like Brandeis] had a more realistic perspective of potentials [than the Europeans]. . . . Call them practical idealists. . . . Whatever they did, day by day, and year by year, was a function of their image of a social setup, designed to turn it from an image into a fact.

Kallen equates this "Messianic pragmatism" or "practical idealism" with the teachings of his mentor, William James. "In America, the mind and hand are orchestrated and the consequences are what the hand produces of what the mind sees or foresees. This is Pragmatism, the American philosophy," he explains. 47

The fact that Brandeis shared Kallen's image of Zion as a potential Utopia, and remained committed to the Pittsburgh Program, was to become of primary importance in 1919-1921. For the confrontation that was to come between Brandeis and Weizmann during those years went beyond the differences of opinion in the correspondence between two intellectuals. It became, instead, the clash of views between the two major leaders of the Zionist world.
CHAPTER 11

1919-1921: THE DISILLUSIONED ZIONIST

I.

The position of Zionism at the end of World War I was incomparably higher than it had been at its beginning. Herzl's fantasy, closer to a dream than to a statement of realistic potentials, by 1918 had become a factor in the reconstruction program of the world's most powerful countries. In the United States, Brandeis and his followers considered the Balfour Declaration an open sesame to a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, and began to turn their energies from organization in America to economic projects in the Middle East.

Despite the fact that Kallen, Brandeis, and the other American Zionist leaders were convinced that the only task left was the practical one of building the Jewish state, events were soon to prove that the skills of the political Zionists were still necessary. The Zionists had to win the approval of the Balfour Declaration at the Versailles Peace Conference, they had to secure the appointment of a favorable mandatory power for Palestine, and they had to safeguard the interests of the Jewish National Home within the textual structure of the Mandate. Attainment of these objectives
came only after a difficult eighteen months' struggle; not until April 1920 did the Supreme Council of European Powers, meeting in San Remo, vote to declare Palestine a mandated territory, to award the Mandate to Great Britain, and to order the British to administer its trust under the terms of the Balfour Declaration. On July 1, 1920 Sir Herbert Samuel, an Anglo-Jewish statesman sympathetic to Zionism, assumed the position of High Commissioner of Palestine. The Jewish National Home finally had become a formal part of the new world alignment.¹

During this post-war period the Zionists were busy presenting their case before the various peace commissions. They were far from agreement among themselves, however, as to how they wanted to develop Palestine, once the land would become theirs. In June 1919 Brandeis and a group of American Zionists made a brief visit to Palestine. On the way back they stopped in London, where Brandeis and Weizmann met for the first time. In a series of conferences between the Americans and the Europeans, sharp differences developed; there was agreement neither on the future organization of the Zionist movement nor on the policies to be pursued in Palestine.²

The European Zionists favored a continuation of the pre-War international organization, a centralized body whose decisions all the national Zionist associations would be required to follow. As Louis Lipsky recalled,
All the experience we [the American Zionists] had gathered, the plans we had mulled over—how Palestine was to be rebuilt, the manner and the method; the impression we were under that we were to be in the forefront of the rebuilding—all this suffered a serious jolt when we discovered that the old Zionist world, battered and broken, impoverished, shaken and shifted, still had a voice and a will, and insisted that the old international councils be resumed, with their old traditions and precedents.

Around him [Weizmann], at the first free moment, the pioneers of Zionism rallied, and all were intent onwedding together once more the scattered fragments of the Zionist Organization and resuming the old Zionist traditions. The past had not been effaced.

In addition, the Europeans insisted that their newly organized Zionist Commission should take charge of the Jewish community in Palestine and all its activities: control the schools, organize the community socially and politically, direct colonization and land reclamation and regulate immigration. The Americans, however, wanted the Palestinian Jewish settlement to retain a democratic control over its own affairs; they felt that Diaspora Zionists should not interfere with internal concerns of the colonists. Zionists were to help to prepare the country so that it could maintain itself and become economically self-sufficient as soon as possible; projects like malaria eradication and improvement of sanitary conditions, for example, took high priority in Brandeis' plans. Brandeis, moreover, was unimpressed by the European Zionists and their methods. "Their long discussions, their devious arguments leading to vague decisions" disturbed him. To make matters even worse, the conferences were carried on
in "a babel of tongues," and meetings often proceeded without heeding the customary conventions of parliamentary procedure. When Brandeis returned to the United States, Lipsky and others noted a "visible change in his demeanor." Though Brandeis had "seemed to be prepared for the ideal Adventure of a Chosen People," his first face-to-face confrontation with the European Zionists and with the traditional methods of the movement had given him cause to rethink and to reconsider his potential role as a leader of international Zionism.4

The consequences of this first dissension in London became apparent at the September 1919 convention of the Zionist Organization of America. A report of the Zionist negotiations at the Peace Conference that favorably impressed the delegates was not enough to prevent the appearance of the signs of a factional struggle that had begun in London. A lengthy debate developed between those who wanted to support, without question, the decisions of the World Zionist Organization, and those who sought a high degree of autonomy for the American Zionist Organization. At a crucial point in the proceedings, though, Brandeis' followers were able to sidetrack the debate by reading a description of his recent trip to Palestine, and by voicing his plea that development of the homeland could proceed only if "all present differences of opinion within the movement and concerning the movement" would be forgotten.5

A year later, however, underlying differences between
Brandeis and the European Zionists came to the surface again at the July 1920 London Conference, the first international Zionist meeting since the last pre-War Zionist Congress of 1913. Brandeis headed a delegation of forty Americans, who hoped to press upon the world organization a program of economic rehabilitation in the spirit of the Pittsburgh Program. His address at the opening session of the Conference was a good description of the American Zionist position.

A great opportunity has come to the Jewish people. We, its representatives, are gathered here to consider and to determine how best we may avail ourselves of that opportunity. The work of the great Herzl was completed at San Remo. The effort to acquire the public recognition of the Jewish Homeland in Palestine... has been crowned with success.... The rest lies with us. The task before us is the Jewish settlement of Palestine. It is the task of reconstruction. We must approve the plans on which the reconstruction shall proceed. We must create the executive and administrative machinery.... We must select men of the training, the experience and the character fitted to conduct the work. And finally we must devise ways and means to raise the huge sums which the undertaking demands....

Now is the time for action, for service, and for sacrifice.... Let us proceed, for the time is urgent.6

The Brandeis program made three demands: (1) all Zionist effort should be directed toward the development of Palestine as the Jewish National Home; (2) the World Zionist Organization should be administered with the highest standards of efficiency and fiscal responsibility so as to produce the maximum effort and support for the Jewish National Home; (3) the economic development of Palestine should be conducted by a group of men, not necessarily Zionists, of the highest
financial standing, who would be in control of all Zionist economic enterprise.  

This plan went against long standing Zionist tradition. It ignored the customary role of the Zionist organization in propagating educational and cultural activities in the Diaspora to foster Jewish nationalism; it admitted non-Zionists to positions of responsibility and control. Nevertheless, the European Zionists were anxious to please Brandeis. They suggested that they would accept the Brandeis plan if he became one of a cabinet of three men which would be the supreme policy making body of the World Zionist Organization. Brandeis, however, refused; his position on the Supreme Court and in American life, he declared, made it impossible for him to become a leader of the international Zionist body.

Weizmann and his followers, therefore, felt free to reject Brandeis' plans for Palestine, proposals with which they had disagreed from the beginning. Instead, they adopted a program to organize a Palestine Foundation Fund, called the Keren Hayesod, which would assume all the obligations of Zionist fund raising throughout the world in accordance with guidelines and directions which a central body would determine. The Fund, through both gifts and investments, would finance the entire program for building the National Home; it would encompass, also, education and propaganda efforts outside of Palestine.

Brandeis would not accept this decision. He was uncompromising in his insistence that the San Remo agreement
had introduced a new phase of Zionist activity. The object of Zionism, he reaffirmed in a memorandum he wrote on the S. S. Zeeland after he left the London Conference, is "to populate Palestine within a comparatively short time with a preponderating body of many self-supporting Jews who will develop into a homogeneous Jewish people with high Jewish ideals; who will develop and apply these Jewish spiritual and intellectual ideals; and who will ultimately become a self-governing commonwealth." He felt that the Fund, by co-mingling gifts and investments, would be financially irresponsible, and he wished to have the autonomy to chart the course of American Zionism as he thought proper. In deference to Brandeis' wishes, the American delegation left no representative of American Zionism in the new world Zionist administration in London. The future relation of the Zionist movement in America to the international Zionist organization had become, on both sides of the ocean, a grave and anxious question. 10

Louis Lipsky, a member of the American delegation who, out of loyalty, supported Brandeis' decisions at the London Conference, recalled later his own feelings in the summer of 1920.

In a certain sense we Americans returned defeated from London. We had not played an effective part in international policy. We had not entered into international responsibility. We had made no lasting favorable impression upon our co-workers of other lands, except that arising out of our financial possibilities. They looked to us for support of the Zionist work in Palestine; all other lands were in a state of collapse. The Keren Hayesod could financially
be successful only in America. But we were not in harmony with the trend of Zionist events. We felt ourselves strangers to it.

It was inevitable that Mr. Brandeis' leadership should suffer a reverse. He had deliberately made the Great Denial. Many of us felt that it was incumbent upon us, who believed in united action on the part of all Zionists, that we achieve our purpose not by segregation, but by going forward into the councils of the international organization. . . . But Mr. Brandeis' refusal to participate in world leadership made that task difficult. . . .11

A year later, at the June 1921 convention of the Zionist Organization of America, the tensions that Lipsky and his colleagues had felt reached their climax. The major decision before the delegates centered on the Palestine Foundation Fund — should the Zionists of America commit themselves to support the new World Zionist Organization or not? Judge Mack, the president of the Zionist Organization, made it clear that Brandeis and his supporters found the all-inclusive Fund unacceptable, and that in due time they would provide plans for a fund of their own. The majority of the delegates, however, led by Louis Lipsky and influenced by Weizmann, who had come to the United States to plead for their support for the Keren Hayesod, failed to return a vote of confidence in the administration. Thereupon, Mack announced his resignation as president of the Organization, as well as that of the majority of the Executive Committee (including Kallen); he read, also, a letter of resignation from Brandeis as honorary president. On June 7, 1921, the Brandeis era in American Zionism was over.12
II.

In 1919 and 1920, before the decision of the San Remo Conference that confirmed the Jewish Homeland, Zionist activity on both sides of the ocean focused on preparing Zionist position statements for consideration by committees of the various post-War conferences. The American Zionists knew that their attitude towards Palestine differed from that of the Europeans. They were, therefore, anxious to get their viewpoint on record. Their special project was an attempt to get the Mandatory Agreement to include the principles of the Pittsburgh Program.¹³

Kallen had resigned from the University of Wisconsin in the spring of 1918. Back East in Boston, he was trying to make his living as a writer and, at the same time, serving as a member of Colonel House's Inquiry into the Terms of Peace. Compared to the material in Kallen's papers from his years at Wisconsin, there are far fewer letters from the 1919-1921 period. He was closer to the center of things and could establish personal contact when he wished; the need for correspondence, therefore, diminished considerably.¹⁴

In March 1919, however, illness prevented Kallen from coming to New York to attend a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America. Instead, he wrote the committee a letter describing his views, a letter that made perfectly clear his attitude at that time towards Zionism and towards the Zionist movement, both here and abroad.
To the Executive Committee,
Zionist Organization of America

... In my judgment, the failure or success of the Zionist cause will depend not so much on the degree of political independence it asks or gains for the Jewish people in Palestine, as on the economic principles under which that independence may, either immediately or in the course of time, be achieved. I wish to go formally on record at this time, that Zionism has very little meaning for me apart from the principles of social justice, which are, to my mind, the essentials of the Jewish tradition and which the American Organization has tried to embody as the guiding principles for social construction in Palestine in the Pittsburgh program. I urge that the committee do everything in its power to see that this program, if it is not already incorporated, shall be incorporated verbatim in the final form of the memorandum [to the Peace Conference]. I urge that it do everything in its power to see that the protocol by which the Peace Conference will give to the Jewish people the right of free development of its homeland in Palestine, shall embody this program and shall designate the specific instrumentalities of its realization. Failure to do this would be to condemn the Palestinian homeland to the status of another ghetto and Zionism to essential defeat in spirit. It would condemn a great many Zionists to withdraw from the national organization to some other branch of the movement which aims more truly and fundamentally at a genuine Jewish Commonwealth [a reference to the Socialist Labor Zionist movement]. The time for political maneuvering is over. The time for a straightforward and clean cut stand on fundamental principles is at hand. If it must be American Zionism against the world then let it be so. But I do not believe that it must, and I know that both the people and the government of Great Britain are much more sympathetic to the American program for Palestine than the state-blind and economically uneducated gentlemen who are guiding British Zionism.15

As this letter shows, by 1919 Kallen had become severely disenchanted with the position of the English Zionists. That position, as Leon Simon and others had explained it to him, seemed to demand too little. Taking the Balfour Declaration
only at its promissory face value, the British were content to move slowly towards securing a Jewish State. Weizmann, moreover, was emerging as a compromiser, a man of moderation who preferred to take one cautious step at a time. The British were willing to defer the formulation of specific proposals to develop Palestine; they would wait to see what time and events might dictate. This attitude incensed Kallen, who wanted to insist that national sovereignty be demanded at once for the Jewish commonwealth, followed by an immediate program of economic reconstruction. Through his friend Alfred Zimmern he vented some of his anger, and stressed, once again, the need for planning and for proper personnel.

To Alfred Zimmern

Roxbury, Mass.

April 15, 1919

Dear Alfred,

Since I last wrote you we have received here two separate versions of the statement of the Jewish position to the Peace Conference. The second version was written after the Americans had arrived on the scene [in Paris and] comes very much closer to meeting the indispensable conditions for a successful social endeavor in Palestine. The Organization Committee, which had been bound to take action with respect to my letter [of March 11, 1919], met all its stipulations, and the breach [between Kallen and the Committee] which I feared would be bound to come has been practically prevented. At this moment, infinitely more depends on personnel than on anything else. As I have had occasion to write you before, our friends in England, Weizmann and company, particularly, are either altogether without any economic sense or are reactionary and literary. Large sections of the Zionist community, who have the leisure and the will and the sense, are without training, so that the right selection of proper administrative agents [for Palestine] becomes exceedingly difficult. This difficulty can, I think, be eradicated only in one way; namely, by making sure that the administrative agents of the
mandatory meet our views as nearly as possible. . . .
Two factors seem to me, to come in for an indispensable initial control. The first of these is education; the second, the basic organization of all economic enterprises. As you know from my "Constitutional Foundations of the New Zion," . . . I am certain that there is a definite line to follow in both these matters. My hope is that with the right kind of administrators, it will be possible to give the enterprise in Palestine the initial set for growth in the right direction.

My application for a passport has been in this week. . . . I am going [to Europe] in the capacity of a correspondent for the New Republic and as Professor of Philosophy in The New School of Social Research. It seems settled that I shall teach there next year. . . . 16

Zimmern and Kallen were close enough in rapport so that Zimmern probably did not feel uncomfortable with the cocksure tone of Kallen's letter. Others like deHaas, however, no doubt resented the incessant demands and criticisms that Kallen made. Yet Kallen retained his status as a valuable source of ideas for the American Zionists, and deHaas took pains to secure his advice.

To Jacob deHaas

Roxbury, Mass.

May 10, 1919

Dear Jack:

The principle on which you describe the selection of a committee [on economic development in Palestine] in yours of the 7th seems to me to be alright as far as it affects the organization. The only thing I should question is the choice of A. Lipsky as research worker. The impression I have of his work is not one that inspires me with confidence and he is not a specialist, versed in problems of technology of economic investigation. . . . The number of workers on the committee seems to me to be ridiculously small. Certainly, Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Garment Workers should be added if he is willing to serve.
Have you drawn up a memoranda which the Committee can use for a program? It is necessary for them to know that the action of all undertakers [of projects] in Palestine must take place within a framework that is partly determined by the stipulation of our general charter and our agreement with the mandatory power and partly determined by a general program which they must draw up themselves. . . . The Pittsburgh program is, in fact, only a collection of permissive principles. Whether we shall get a genuine social commonwealth, by means of it, or a highgrade, middle class democracy, will be determined by the definition of objective. I have tried to define what seems to me . . . a proper objective in "The Constitutional Foundations of the New Zion". . . . As for sporadic experiments [in industrial organization] which should be studied, there are a good many of them, particularly in France. . . . And in agriculture, the number is legion, although the failures are as numerous. I must repeat the two real problems in cooperation, if the historical record is any guide, are the problems of education and management. . . .17

In 1918 Great Britain had authorized the formation of a Zionist Commission which would advise the British military administration in Palestine "in all matters relating to Jews, or which may effect the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish People." Weizmann was the Chairman of the Commission, which was to include Zionist representatives from England, France, Italy and the United States. Though Kallen was anxious to join the Commission, Brandeis was reluctant to let him do so. "I can well understand that Brandeis and others might regard my position on economic and international questions a menace, etc.," a disappointed Kallen wrote to Mack. Kallen's inability to secure a passport decided matters, and the Zionist Commission left for Palestine without him.18

Kallen reconciled himself to relying on Alfred Zimmern, who Weizmann took along as one of a group of "technical
experts," for first-hand information on conditions in Palestine. Zimmern's report to Kallen implied the difficulty in making Utopian plans for a country that, in fact, already existed, a land with its own special character and needs. But Zimmern's impressions did lend support to the American desire to keep the Zionist organization out of the internal affairs of Palestine.

From Alfred Zimmern  
London  
August 28, 1919

Dear Horace,

I have been meaning to write you ever since I got back from Palestine. . . . So far as liberalism as regards Palestine is concerned, you will not need me. L. D. B. [Brandeis] . . . will be quite adequate. As he will tell you, the problem looks a great deal different at close quarters from what it does on paper. . . . Land in Palestine is in fact a wholly different commodity from land in Henry George's California: it is a raw material which has to be shaped by infinite industry and much capital into an article of reproductive value. . . .

Personally I found the main problem in Palestine to be not material at all but spiritual. It is going to be very hard indeed to make the Jewish community in Palestine really unhyphenably Jewish. There is at present a cross current of assimilations there—Russian-Jewry, Sephardic Jewry [of Spanish origin], Yemenite Jewry, American Jewry are unconsciously fighting for survival and even for mastery. There are too few unifying factors; and Hebrew by itself being after all only a medium of intercourse, not a common thought, is relatively weak. Most of the issues that are being fought out, though they look like conflicts of interest (e.g. the Labour question) are really conflicts between various Ghetto nationalisms. Bolshevism and Marxianism are as out of place in Palestine as the Virginian planter outlook of the Judaean colonists. I therefore think that education is the most important problem. . . . In the [agricultural] colonies, especially the Galilean colonies, one meets men and women who are perfect Palestinians—who have adapted themselves completely to their
new-old surroundings; but they can't communicate
their ethos easily. . . . The Jewish Dominions
[Jews in the Diaspora] are in danger of smothering
the Motherland [Palestine] with their Colonialism.
This, in a sentence, is to me the greatest problem
in Palestine. . . .

I hope you can really get over in December.
. . . DeHaas . . . told me of your difficulties.
I think you would be happier in England than in
America, pending going to Palestine. . . . I wish
I could waft you over a breath of health and happi­
ness. I feel you are strained and straining, Your
your tree is not planted in the right soil. . . .

Kallen's passport difficulties prevented him, also, from
becoming part of the delegation that represented the American
Zionists at the 1920 World Zionist London Conference. When
the delegates returned, however, Kallen quickly took his place
within the group working to defend Brandeis' position against
Lipsky's sizeable, forceful opposition. Norvin Lindheim, a
prominent Wall Street lawyer who had become a Zionist through
the influence of Stephen Wise, used Kallen in much the same
way Wise and others had done earlier--for advice in defining
positions that others would more openly express. But by 1920
Kallen was fighting for his ideas within the Zionist organi­
zation, rather than with the non-Zionists outside it.

From Norvin Lindheim

New York, New York
Sept. 18, 1920

Dear Harry:

. . . The situation is growing daily more serious,
and I believe that unless something be done, the Execu­
tive Committee [of the Zionist Organization of America]
will take an attitude opposed to L. D. B.'s [Brandeis']
policy. I consequently determined to see what I could
do in the situation . . . and wrote to L.D.B. [Brandeis],
a copy of which letter I am enclosing. Please treat the
same as confidential, as nobody else has seen it.
... It is most advisable to have a conference with some of the leading lights of the opposition. The conference is set for next Thursday evening. I think it important for you to be here if you can so arrange your affairs...

... Will you also consider the question whether it will be advisable to send an American representative to Palestine and to London. This, I think, is in line with L.D.B.'s plan [to remain autonomous of the World Zionist Organization], as otherwise we cannot supervise our work and make the necessary agreement with the London executive. This may be a way out satisfying the opposition,—to send a representative to London and Palestine, and at the same time be in line with L.D.B.'s policy of not having any participation in the executive of the International organization.

... I am not alarmed about the situation, but it is critical, and you and I and a few others have to straighten this out. DeHaas is unquestionably being made the target of the wrath of the "opposition" [because of his position as Brandeis' intermediary]. This is very clear, and he must not take a prominent part in the discussions.

To Norvin R. Lindheim
Roxbury, Mass.
Sept. 20, 1920

Dear Norvin:

Yours of September 18 arrived this morning. ... I don't believe that any real compromise in the situation is possible. The issue turns entirely on whether L.D.B. [Brandeis] can be persuaded to assume the responsibility [for World Zionist decisions] without the power [participation on the World Zionist Executive]. And that is absurd on the face of it. I don't see that it is possible for him without resigning from the bench to do anything but stick to the position that he has been forced to adopt [Brandeis' conviction not to accept office in the World Zionist Organization]. And the whole domestic and international situation is such that his resignation from the bench would be a worldwide calamity for the Jews. Consequently, the issue reduces itself to our [the American Zionists] going on with Brandeis or without him. There is every reason to believe that without him we should be knocked into a cocked hat by the various anti-Zionist interests in both the Jewish and non-Jewish world. ... The problem is to get the "opposition" to feel less and to think more. The fact remains that the [American]
delegation voted in line with the Brandeis policy in London. I think that to repudiate that action would be exceedingly dangerous to Zionist morale.

Therefore, we must distinguish three issues very sharply and prevent them from being confused with each other.

(1) The first is the approval of the action of the delegation in Brandeis leadership.

(2) The second is the emotional differences between L.D.B. [Brandeis] and members of the delegation.

(3) The third is the program of adjustment and action for the future. The plan to send American representatives both to London and Palestine may be the best one, but I am not yet prepared to commit myself to anything. We will talk the matter over when we meet. ... 22

Lindheim was able to arrange a meeting with the "leading lights of the opposition." At the September 29, 1920 meeting of the National Executive Committee Kallen presented a resolution expressing support for Brandeis' conduct at London. In the ensuing discussion, Louis Lipsky criticized Brandeis' refusal to allow any American to serve on the World Zionist Executive and declared that he had supported Brandeis at London despite his own better judgment. As a result of Lipsky's criticism the Committee sidetracked Kallen's resolution, adopting, instead, a conciliatory proposal requesting the Executive to appoint a committee which would "try to allay doubt and unrest now existing in Zionist circles." 23

Kallen had good reason to support Brandeis' conduct at the 1920 London Conference. In seeking to keep the American Zionists autonomous and free to reject the dictates of the World Zionist Organization, Brandeis was following the same
position Kallen had outlined to the American Executive Committee early in 1919. But Kallen's rapport did not extend much beyond Brandeis, Mack, and a few other highly Americanized Zionists like Lindheim. deHaas and the Zionist organization continued to be targets of his criticism, often in blunt and scathing terms.

The 1918 Zionist Convention which had ratified the Pittsburgh Program had adopted, also, a far-ranging reorganization program. The Provisional Executive Committee had merged with the Federation of American Zionists to form the Zionist Organization of America. Instead of a federation of societies the new organization was to base its standard of membership on the individual. Though there would be one central office, members would be part of geographical districts with considerable leeway for independence. Jesse Sampeter, an early member of the Parushim, expressed well the viewpoint of Kallen and his circle when she wrote,

A Federation of Societies was too immature and unpolitical a form for a movement which was coming to be the vital, progressive force in American Jewry. It was also out of harmony both with American and Zionist political ideals which made the individual, and not the group, the unit of organization.24

There had been great resistance to the reorganization plan in 1918, particularly among the Yiddish-speaking newcomers to America who felt that they would have little in common with the more Americanized members of a centralized organization. This resistance persisted, and in 1920 deHaas was inclined to institute further changes in the Constitution. Kallen's reply
to deHaas' request for ideas on proposed revisions was frank and to the point.  

To Jacob deHaas

Roxbury, Mass.

Sept. 23, 1920

My dear Mr. deHaas:

In reply to your letter of Sept. 20:

(1) I do not regard it possible to raise the dues to a point which will obviate the necessity for raising additional funds for work in America alone, to say nothing of work abroad.

(2) I do not think that much money can be raised as voluntary contributions for land purchases.

(3) I do not think that a series of companies endorsed by the Zionist Organization and explicitly committed to carry out the Pittsburgh program as a demonstration that it is not profits but the Jewish development of Palestine which is desired can be successfully financed among the rank and file of American Jewry.

As to the reorganization of Z.O.A. [Zionist Organization of America]:

(1) I believe any further change in the constitution to be unwise. The constitution has been in force--actually--little more than a year. Its enforcement has demanded a change in the psychology of the individual Zionist which has not yet been completed. The new psychology has been that of loyalty to the Zionist Organization as a whole as contrasted with the too intense local loyalty which existed prior to the establishment of the district plan. The district plan can not be regarded as having failed because it can not be regarded as having been efficiently applied. In my judgment, the Department of Organization [of the Zionist Organization of America, headed by deHaas] is entirely responsible for such failure as obtains. It has functioned as an order-giving autocracy from the top when it ought to have functioned as a loyalty creating agency within the districts themselves. The proper procedure is to decentralize the organization. The districts should receive a great deal of local autonomy, should be empowered to raise as much money as they find necessary for their local needs, and should
be encouraged to penetrate all Jewish activities within the area of their jurisdiction. They should be particularly encouraged to create local bodies with special interests in Palestinian development and to raise money for such special interests. The central organization should serve only as an advisory and coordinating agency.

I am of the opinion that any form of organization would work if the duly chosen officials, particularly the unpaid ones, were workers. The problem is entirely one of execution of function not of the alteration of form.

Although these opinions are personal to me, I have reason to believe that they are shared by that group of the Zionist Organization of America Zeiri Zion [a Labor Zionist group, "the young men of Zion"], with which I am identified.

But Kallen had erred in suggesting that his own sentiments represented the sentiments of his group. As 1920 ended Kallen was finding fewer and fewer Zionists whose views matched his own. In keeping with his principles he preferred to speak out, alone if necessary, rather than to submit to direction in the presentation of his opinions.

To Abraham Savitzsky, Secretary
Zeiri Zion [Young Men of Zion]

December 21, 1920

My dear Sir:

I have your letter of December 20, on behalf of the Executive Committee of Zeiri Zion, declaring that my position is not in harmony with the views of Zeiri Zion, and requiring me in the future to take account of the opinions and views of that organization in such transactions as I participate in.

The request is unique in my experience for unparliamentary presumption. Customarily, members of any organization are bound by the principles laid down in its Constitution, and by the resolutions adopted by its national body. Beyond that, they are regarded, and should be regarded, as free to
use their best judgment as to what will benefit their organization or advance the cause which their organization was created to serve. That has been my own position with respect to Zeiri Zion, and with respect to any other organization of which I have been a member. That has been the practice of all American organizations that I know anything about. The disposition toward coercion exhibited by the Executive Committee is patently contrary to all the principles governing parliamentary bodies. It may be a practice in Poland, but it is altogether foreign to America [crossed out like this in the original] western countries. I can not yield to it, nor could any self-respecting Zionist.

However, I do not wish to embarrass the Executive Committee [of Zeiri Zion]. I have long observed that I should be unable to agree with it in its disregard for facts, its dogmatism, its propensities for endless debate, its idea that it can solve specific and practical problems by passing general and theoretical resolutions. Its present action destroys any hope that I entertained that it might learn competency through experience, and change from a doctrinaire debating society into an effective agency for advancing the cause of social justice in Palestine and for building up the Jewish masses into a democratic Zionist Organization in America. I am now reluctantly compelled to believe that it will continue to talk about these things while others will do the real work. Accordingly, I herewith tender my resignation, to take effect at once.27

III.

The year 1921 saw the publication of a book on which Kallen had been working since 1915. *Zionism and World Politics: A Study in History and Social Psychology* presented Kallen's opinions liberally mixed in with a wealth of detail on the history of Zionism, past and contemporary. It was, and remains, a storehouse of information about the international movement for Jewish nationalism from its origins in the Middle Ages right up to July 1921, the date Kallen gave for writing
his last chapter. Roughly half the book dealt with the years after World War I. These chapters described, with the intimacy of a close witness, the behind-the-scenes negotiations at the Versailles Peace Conference, the jockeying among the major powers for influence in the Middle East, the politics involved in awarding the Mandate to Great Britain. The next to the last chapter, explicit in its expression of Kallen's own point of view, bore the title "San Remo: The End of An Epoch." 28

Kallen called his final chapter "Vita Nuova?," "A New Life?" To him, in 1921, this was what the promise of Zionism held out. The question mark was significant, however, for Kallen felt that few others recognized the opportunities that had opened up, almost overnight, in Palestine. Since, by this time, Kallen had become disillusioned in his attempts to influence the Zionist organization from within, "Vita Nuova?" was, in part, a public polemic to try to convince Zionists to assume new ways of thinking and of acting. 29

To some extent "Vita Nuova?" represented the swan song of Kallen's work as a Zionist publicist. The strong words he used expressed his despair rather accurately.

By public law and international guarantees the hope of Zion, which was an age-old sentiment and a compensatory fantasy, has been turned into the hope of Zion which is the hard, barren sordid geographical and ethnographic rehabilitation and cultural development, its political complications and religious cross-currents, its problems of public health and social justice. . . . The fact is that the validation of the Balfour Declaration by public law [San Remo Treaty] finds the Jews--both the masses of the people and the organized Zionists--unprepared. . . . Here at last is the salutation which has been the sustaining hope
of the heart of Jewry through the bitter ages, challenging them to new life. Yet the manner in which they respond to it leaves room to doubt whether the attainment of this new life shall not become a process painful, lingering, and--disillusioning.30

Disillusioned—that is what Kallen had become. "Nowhere except among the handful of American leaders does there appear to be any adequate realization that Palestine ... is at last a present solid and coercive fact, whose saving power can be brought into operation only by swift and extensive readjustments of temper and attitude," he wrote. Kallen, who had set out in 1914 with high hopes of remaking the Zionist organization into an instrument capable of creating a Jewish nation that would be a model of social and economic justice, by 1921 saw his convictions accepted by only "a handful." All the excitement, energy, and activity seemingly had been for naught--his vision of Palestine was not the same as that of most of his colleagues both here and abroad, men who defined Zionism from different backgrounds and with different perceptions. One man, however, who Kallen continued to influence, was Louis Brandeis.31

From Louis D. Brandeis
Washington, D.C.
Nov. 11, 1920

My dear Kallen:

My thanks for your "Zionism and World Politics." It is good to have the story and the essentials told and told so well. I wish we could make sure that it will be read--and not read only with the eyes, but understood.

I have been thinking much of the "Vita Nuova?" for which we long. For its attainment, the first step
must be to appreciate what is really worthwhile in life:--the next to realize that the sanctity of means is imperative. And as I think over these essentials, I become more and more convinced that we can accomplish in Palestine something significant only by having there a group who feel as we do and feel so deeply and convincingly. This is why . . . I think that our few worthy representatives there should be supported by newcomers who will help to keep the light burning and spread its rays.

These years . . . after the Great War should make men and women realize how false have been, in large measure, the tests of achievement recently applied and how mistaken the avenues pursued in search of happiness.32

To Louis D. Brandeis

New York, New York

Jan. 3, 1921

Dear Mr. Brandeis,

I had hoped to thank you for your word about "Zionism and World Politics" long before this. Various things have prevented--I wanted to have a good look at the efforts of our own [Zionist] group here, and I wanted to be clearer about my own personal relations to Palestine. I have done as much as I need in the former. We are very badly in need of new blood that can act in the new way required by the new program. Neither DeHaas nor the rest of us succeed in throwing off the old habits of the Z.O.A. [Zionist Organization of America] . . . so that DeH [deHaas] is mostly at a loss, and the rest of us make him the goat of our own inertia and failure. The great non-Zionist reservoirs of cooperation remain untapped; we are losing our old adherents . . . because of our inaction and we are gaining no new ones . . . I have talked about these things with J. W. M. [Julian W. Mack, president of the Zionist Organization of America] and [Stephen] Wise and written F. F. [Felix Frankfurter]. They agree, but remain optimistic . . . and then do business as usual. As I see it, the demand for another type of executive secretary [to replace deHaas] is justified, but the justification is quite different from that offered by those who make it most loudly. They do it to cover their own inaction, but it also seems to me that deH [deHaas] has not been equal to the situation. This is his and our misfortune, not his fault, but we must not allow it to become our undoing.
As to my personal relation to Palestine, I am by no means clear. I so completely agree with you as to the necessity of our going and settling there that I feel the constant pull to do so, even in the face of many weighty considerations of family necessity which should keep me here. But I fear also that I should prove a liability and not an asset to the land, for the sort of thing I can do at all is a social luxury, not a necessity, and I am too old [Kallen was at this time 39 years old] to acquire successfully any skill with my hands that might be available for Palestine. I have thought of the consular appointment to one of the Palestinian cities, but the possibility of that, in view of my opinions and record, seems negligible. I see nothing before me but to drift and hope for a lucky accident in this connection.33

Though "Vita Nuova?" began on a note of disillusionment, Kallen by no means had given up his hope for a New Zion. Much of the chapter dealt with Kallen's economic theories, stressing the primacy of the consumer as against the producer, and the need for development of both consumers' and producers' cooperatives. Extending the outline of "Constitutional Foundations of the New Zion," Kallen supplied concrete details for making Palestine the equitable society which he had wanted the Zionist movement to create. Convinced, however, that he could no longer work within the Zionist movement, he set out to form another group, the New Palestine Society, with whom he could feel more compatible, and which might share his vision of Zion.34

To Hyman Morrison, Boston Federation of Jewish Charities

Jan. 5, 1921

Dear Mr. Morrison:

Enclosed you will find a statement regarding the organization and plans of the New Palestine
Society. This society is composed of persons who are concerned about the development of Jewish Palestine as a free, just and happy commonwealth. It takes its general stand on the Pittsburgh Program adopted unanimously by the Zionist Organization of America at its 21st annual convention in June 1918, and reaffirmed at subsequent conventions. Its specific aim is to function like the Fabian Society in England, as a fact-finding, policy-analyzing body, seeking by scientific research and constructive proposals to influence the programs and agencies of the various interests active in Palestine in a direction in harmony with the ideals of national righteousness and international justice which are the vitalizing origins of the Jewish tradition.

We have the honor to notify you that you have been nominated for membership in the Society by Dr. H. M. Kallen. . . . We shall be happy to have you accept the nomination and to enroll you among our members.35

The co-signee, with Kallen, of this letter was Professor Julius Drachsler of the Department of Economics and Sociology at Smith College, a good clue to the kind of members Kallen wanted for his new Society. It seemed as if Kallen was trying to organize another version of the Parushim, another group that could serve for him as a compatible community, stripped, this time, of the obligation for secrecy and separation. In "A Brief Statement of Aims and Organization" Kallen outlined the problems in Palestine which needed "the best attention of humane men and women who have the fate of the Jewish people at heart and who see in the new Palestine . . . a promise for a better, juster order in the future." He proposed Committees on Labor, Education, and Political Affairs to deal with basic aspects of Palestinian life. There was to be a liaison group with the Zionist Organization of America, as well as several "foreign correspondents . . . stationed at strategic points
where facts of importance can be gathered and where public opinion needs to be influenced. . . "36

In formulating "upon the basis of carefully sifted and intelligently ordered data, the basic problems of the developing life in the New Palestine," the New Palestine Society was to rely mainly on the results of studies "that will be based largely upon the judgment of experts." Indeed, this was the same role that the founders of the New School of Social Research had assigned to it in relation to the problems of American society. In quite some detail Kallen outlined, also, the duties of an "Office and Research Secretary"; he or she would be well supervised, for the office of the Central Organization was to be located at the New School for Social Research, the very same location as Kallen's office.37

One of the contributions of this new group was a "Memorandum on the Necessary Contents of the Charter of the (proposed) Palestine Cooperative Trading and Credit Company." This memorandum defined the principles and activities of the Palestine Development Council through which the Brandeis-Mack group fostered economic undertakings in Palestine after their resignation from the Zionist Organization of America. Undated, in Kallen's handwriting, the memorandum reiterated much of Kallen's 1921 thinking as he had expressed it in "The Constitutional Foundations of the New Zion" and in "Vita Nuova?". It stressed the same objective for Zionism that Brandeis had described in his 1920 Zeeland Memorandum: to develop in Palestine as many self-supporting Jewish settlements as
possible with a view towards establishing "an autonomous Jewish Commonwealth."

The company Kallen proposed would undertake to supply Palestine with needed commodities; it would encourage, also, "the association of the actual and incoming Jewish population in Palestine into cooperative groups both as buyers, and sellers, and as producers." Following the principles suggested in the Pittsburgh Program, all employees in any of the company's undertakings would have "progressive participation in the management, a share in the profits and a share in the ownership."

Kallen hoped that shares in the corporation would be cheap enough to secure the largest possible number of investors; he still spoke in terms of a "rank and file" base for what he considered the proper development of Zionist ideology. But, in 1921, Kallen's thinking had diverged from that of the masses; instead, his plans appealed either to idealists like himself, or to the wealthy American philanthropists who could afford to support economic undertakings and who were unconcerned with Zionism as a cultural or social force. On July 13, 1921, a week after Brandeis and his supporters resigned from the Zionist organization, they held a meeting in the offices of New York State Senator Nathan Straus, Jr. to consider their plans for the future. Straus's description of the meeting indicated plainly the gap that had developed between Brandeis, who relied on ideas Progressive-oriented ideas like Kallen's, and the majority of Zionists
in America and elsewhere.

From Nathan Straus, Jr. New York, New York
June 13, 1921

My dear Dr. Kallen:

Although I had no opportunity of discussing your views with any of the other gentlemen before the meeting last Friday, still I believe you would be in general accord with what was decided upon . . .

Justice Brandeis gave the meeting its slogan by suggesting that we should devote ourselves to raising money and spending it in Palestine for productive purposes. Dr. [Stephen] Wise put it tersely as "Silence here, service in Palestine" [i.e., no Diaspora education or propaganda work].

Developing this idea, Justice Brandeis proposed a policy as regards the officers of the Zionist Organization of what he termed "non-intercourse." He said he believed that we should not aid them in the errors which they are bound to make, but allow them to work out their own course and thus prove themselves wrong.

Our attitude toward the world in general and specifically toward the problem in Palestine should be made, he believed, as follows. Establish a trust company to be known as the Palestine Associates, Inc., or the Palestine Development Trust, which should undertake one task at a time in Palestine. Justice Brandeis emphasized that he believed the task should be selected with regard to its feasibility, immediate necessity and with consideration of the amount of funds which we can obtain. He advised a progression by which one task would be entered upon and disposed of before the next was undertaken. This stepping stone system of proceeding from one definite task completed to another definite task undertaken should be accompanied, he believed, by neither boasts as to achievements in the past, nor vague and grandiloquent promises for the future.

As a first undertaking it was suggested that a cooperative buying organization might well be organized for the furnishing of supplies to the Chalutzim ["Pioneers" in Palestinian settlements]. This was estimated to cost about two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00).
Justice Brandeis further said later, in answer to a question, that he believed that one way to achieve unity in any organization was to reduce to a minimum the matters on which there must be agreement, what he termed the "irreducible minimum of essentials." These essentials would be the task of the World Zionist Organization. Such a task would be, for instance, the contact of the Zionists with the mandatory [power, Great Britain], the contact of the organization with the other [world] powers and with the Arabs, etc. These duties must properly be carried out by the World Zionist Organization. However he believed that only duties of this type were the proper sphere of the World Organization.

He said that the World Zionist Organization through its spokesmen today [Weizmann, et al.] is pleading for the type of organization exemplified by Czarist Russia. We stand for the type exemplified by the British Empire with its practically autonomous colonies. 40

Straus's letter provides a good picture of the group of "Messianic pragmatists" whom Kallen had helped first to convert to Zionism, then to lead in the direction he defined for Zionism. Working quietly, one task at a time, assessing potentials realistically and then proceeding efficiently to gain maximum results—all this would lead to the ideal goal of the economically and socially just autonomous Jewish State. But, as Lipsky had noted to Kallen as early as 1913, Kallen's ideas had been "circulated, read and probably forgotten" by most of the Americans exposed to them. Kallen's thinking was in tune with that of Brandeis; by 1921 both were very much out of touch with the opinions and needs of the less educated, less American-acculturated, majority of Zionists.

One of the most poignant ironies of Kallen's rejection by the American Zionist movement was that the cultural pluralist
argument he had formulated had been the theoretical underpinning which gave the Jewish immigrants to America the freedom to join the Zionist organization without worrying about being accused of dual loyalties. Most American Jews, recent immigrants similar to the majority of the delegates to the 1921 convention, had been reluctant to identify themselves as Zionists before 1914, when Brandeis became the Zionist Chairman; it had seemed, then, un-American and un-patriotic. The Americanized Zionism of Kallen and of Brandeis had made membership in the Zionist organization respectable. Cultural pluralism implied that being a hyphenated American was better than being an assimilated, or "melted," one. Yet it was these new members of the Zionist organization, men and women of European background who Kallen felt certain could be educated to his vision of Zionism as the real possibility for a better world through the application of intelligent planning, who found Kallen's approach to Zionism too American and, therefore, foreign. Kallen and Brandeis, who had championed majority rule, now found themselves victims of it; the democratic "masses" simply could not follow these strange leaders whose paternalism they had come to resent.

The tension which Kallen embodied within himself—on the one hand, his conviction, as knowledgeable intellectual, to proceed with the most efficient methods to accomplish his well thought-out goals, and, on the other hand, his commitment, as democrat, to be governed by the will of the
majority—had become, by 1921, the tension within the Americanized Zionist movement. As Straus reported to Kallen, Brandeis "believed that we should not aid them [the majority of the Zionists] in the errors which they are bound to make, but allow them to work out their own course and thus prove themselves wrong." In this Kallen and Brandeis were not unlike other leaders of Progressive reform, "a responsible elite, which was to take charge of the popular impulse to change and direct it into moderate and ... 'constructive' channels. ..." And, like others of their kind, their optimism and sense of righteousness prevented them from appraising the true mood of their constituencies. 41

In late 1921 Kallen's friend Zimmern returned to the United States on another lecture tour, and spoke, among other places, at the Banquet of the Harvard Menorah Society. Kallen introduced Zimmern; the words he used were the same he might have applied to himself.

Mr. Zimmern represents the sort of thing that one hopes for in educated men, the combination of profound scholarship and the mastery of the special field with a wide range of learning in all other fields. ... He has served ... in behalf of an ideal in Humanity and Freedom, and Justice, which got a good deal of advertisement but no buyers. ...

He belongs to the glorious defeated, but the kind of defeat ... [that] has the implications of the victors, because the sort of thing the Liberal stood for, the sort of thing the men who were watching the living trend in the history of the whole world, that sort of thing can be delayed by hypocrisy and inertia, and stupidity; it can be postponed, but its consummation cannot be prevented.

Professor Zimmern is one of the little group of men who had faith in the flexibility and the goodness
of human nature to believe that a better world could actually be made instead of grown; he believed in the power of intelligence, and in the value of foresight. . . .42

Like Zimmern, Kallen was one of the "glorious defeated"; like Zimmern, he remained a good "Liberal," optimistic, with faith in progress and a commitment to social change. "Disillusion has to go with learning," he commented recently. "Learning means finding alternatives to that which has failed." In the years after 1921 Kallen remained a Zionist, continuing to work for the creation of a Jewish nation in the way that he thought best. Most of his energy, however, he turned in different directions, away from the Zionist Organization towards groups where he could more effectively express his concern with freedom and with social justice. "The Zionist situation didn't seem to me to offer any opportunities for usefulness," he recalls. "I would have been blocked doing my own thing and I'm not the kind of person who would do another person's thing."43

The resignation of the Brandeis group from the Zionist Organization of America in 1921 strengthened the image of the organization as the American branch of a world nationalist movement. The Weizmann-influenced emphases of Louis Lipsky, the new Zionist organization president, kept many American sympathizers of a Jewish Palestine from joining the Zionist movement, and after the Immigration Act of 1924 no new immigrants came to swell the European oriented ranks. In 1922 the membership and the resources of the Zionist Organization
of America declined almost to their pre-1914 levels and remained that way until 1947, when the renewed prospects for an autonomous Jewish State engendered a fresh interest in the Zionist movement.  

During the 1920's Brandeis and his followers continued to work independently for the financing of economic projects in Palestine along the lines suggested by Kallen in his memorandum for the creation of a Palestine Development Council. They had little success in raising the huge sums of money these plans required, for they were isolated from the masses and, in defeat, had lost their influence with important Jewish groups like the American Jewish Committee and the B'nai B'rith. By 1929 conditions within both the Lipsky and the Brandeis camps had become so moribund that they agreed to join forces once again in order to maintain even a minimum of Zionist interest and activity in the United States. Kallen recalls that the Zionist movement in America after 1921 began to become recessive. ... Factional differences, organizational politics, replaced very much the overall concern with the major cause [the building of a Jewish State in Palestine]. The major cause was served incidentally, and the interest in it was secondary. Zionism became an aspect of a "Diaspora Nationalism" limited to the Zionist organization.  

The decade Kallen had spent in the service of the Zionist movement, however, had been an important one. For a few bright years the Zionist organization had pulsated with energy and with hope, in no small measure due to Kallen's quiet influence in the places he felt it would do the most
good. His ideas helped to change the American Zionist movement from a small, rather inefficiently managed group to one that grew rapidly in numbers, financial resources, and influence. His approach to Zionism gave it a uniquely American cast that led first to its rise, then to its fall. That Kallen's role has gone unrecognized for so long is a tribute to his modesty. But it is well that some instinct impelled him to preserve carefully his papers for over fifty years, so that, one day, the truth might come out.
PART III
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 12
THE AMERICANIZATION OF ZIONISM

The issues that underlay Brandeis' 1920 break with Weizmann, and the subsequent rejection of Brandeis' views by the delegates at the 1921 Convention of the Zionist Organization of America, were complex. Basically, however, they centered around the direction American Zionism had taken, particularly after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in November 1917. Brandeis and his followers believed that with the Balfour Declaration, or at the very latest with Herbert Samuel's appointment as High Commissioner to Palestine, the Zionist organization had accomplished its main political tasks. Zionists, in their opinion, needed to turn all their energies towards the upbuilding of the Jewish homeland in Palestine. The American Zionists wished, therefore, to disband the old Zionist apparatus, to move all administrative functions to Palestine, and to emphasize practical accomplishments rather than the accustomed Zionist intra-organization political maneuvering. They opposed all Zionist work, aside from fundraising, in the Diaspora; as well-established and secure Americans, they saw no need for Zionism as a cultural or social communal force. In Brandeis' view, the model of economic democracy and social justice that Palestine would become would do more to inspire Diaspora Jews.
and non-Jews than even the most effective education or public relations activity.¹

Further, Brandeis and his followers wanted to bring to the World Zionist organization the same emphasis on administrative expertise and modern organization methods that they had stressed in their leadership of the American Zionist organization. Brandeis criticized the lack of order and definite purpose he had perceived among the European Zionists; disapprovingly, he called the 1920 London Conference a "talk-fest." He proposed, instead, that the best possible executives be recruited to manage the development of Palestine, whether they had been Zionists or not; practical work required capable men.²

The Europeans resented this. As Weizmann wrote later in his autobiography,

The World Zionist Organization, the Congresses, were not just ad hoc instruments; they were the expressions of the unity of the Jewish people. The propositions of the Brandeis group, dealing ostensibly with merely formal matters, with organizational instrumental rearrangements, actually reflected a denial of Jewish nationalism; they made of Zionism simply a sociological plan . . . instead of the folk renaissance that it was.³

To the Europeans criteria of efficiency and expertise were out of place in a movement based on traditional Jewish dreams and longings. Weizmann and his followers judged the Brandeis group in much the same way that Harry Sacher had accused Kallen of neglecting "Jewish politics" and "Jewish sociology." Brandeis' policy, said the Europeans, was a "Zionism without Zion." The American Zionist leaders lacked
a "Jewish heart"; their Zionism was an "ersatz Zionism," superficial, and ignorant of Jewish tradition. Citing Brandeis' 1920 refusal to leave the Supreme Court to become a leader of the World Zionist organization, they accused him of lacking a total Jewish commitment, stemming from an unfamiliarity with Jewish ways of living and of thinking. "I do not agree with the philosophy of your Zionism," Weizmann told Brandeis and his followers in 1921. "We are different, absolutely different. There is no bridge between Washington and Pinsk [a small town in Poland]." Another Zionist leader, Menahum Ussishkin, put this position even more frankly when he remarked to the American Zionists, "You have a goyish [non-Jewish] head, but we have the Jewish heart."

The instincts of Weizmann and of Ussishkin essentially were correct. Brandeis had taken over "a handful ... [of] journalists, intellectuals, shopkeepers, and more or less skilled workmen" and, through the application of an efficient management approach, had utilized the opportunity the War had provided to transform the American Zionist organization into a movement that grew immeasurably in size, activity, and prestige. But he had done all this from the perspective of an American Progressive reform leader, seeking a new way to apply Jeffersonian-like principles and practices of social democracy, exploiting a new chance to build an ideal "City Upon A Hill." Using the rationale which cultural pluralism provided, Brandeis and others like him became Zionists as Americans, rather than as Jews. Inevitably their perspective
differed from those whose Zionism was a response to Jewish tradition and an expression of Jewish culture.⁵

This differing approach to Zionism lay at the heart of the 1919-1921 Brandeis-Weizmann dispute over the role of the Zionist organization. Brandeis' priority was to build the Jewish state quickly and efficiently into an exemplary "cooperative commonwealth." Weizmann, whose roots were deep into the Jewish community, was less concerned with making Palestine a model state and more interested in organizing Jewish nationalist sentiment among the Diaspora masses. Brandeis' Zionism struck Weizmann as that of an American "Puritan: upright, austere, of a scrupulous honesty and implacable logic... [with] elaborate plans for the upbuilding of Palestine." Brandeis saw Zionism intellectually, coolly, in terms of a job that could be done. For Weizmann and his followers, however, the Palestinian homeland was to be more than another nation-state; it was to represent the heart of Judaism. They spoke of Zionism, therefore, with emotion and with fervor, as those dedicated to a sacred mission. According to the recollection of Felix Frankfurter, who, as the representative of the American Zionists to the Versailles Conference, worked closely with Weizmann, Weizmann, in a "passionate, romantic" way, dismissed Brandeis' economic plans with the attitude that "God will provide,... the messianic grant given by Providence to the Jews will somehow or other answer the difficulties."⁶

In 1921 Kallen was one of Brandeis' most loyal supporters,
one of the group who resigned from the Zionist Organization with Brandeis, one who felt so strongly about the issues involved that, though he remained committed to the ideal of building a Jewish State, he never again joined any Zionist organization. His recent comment concerning the 1921 convention dispute provides a good explanation of why Brandeis, despite his stature as a Supreme Court Justice, at the highest levels of American achievement and influence, failed to receive a vote of confidence from the majority of the convention delegates.

The delegates [to the 1921 Convention] chose Weizmann because he belonged. Brandeis did not belong; Brandeis was of another dimension. Weizmann belonged because of his essentially shtetl [European small town] quality, he never stopped being a shtetl personage... .

The [native] Americans followed Brandeis. All of those, say, who were Bar Mitzvah [aged 13] by the time they reached this country followed Weizmann. The split almost went down the line—a cleavage between our American group and the recent immigrant majority. Later, of course, this distinction became blurred and there were continuous modifications in which there was rapprochement where all those of our group, with practically no exceptions that I can add to myself, accepted membership in the Zionist movement, and the Zionist organization. But in 1921 when Weizmann came to the Cleveland Convention, it was the masses who chose Weizmann. He was one of them; he was their man.7

Kallen here touched on a key issue. To the European Zionists, and to the recent Jewish immigrants to the United States, still more European than American, plans for a Utopian economic democracy to be implemented by efficient management methods, plans which seemingly ignored the issues
of Jewish nationalism and which made the question of Jewishness almost irrelevant, plans derived from the ethos of American Progressive reformers, seemed alien. Brandeis and the values he represented were "of another dimension." Yet these plans embodied the very ideas that made Zionism a worthwhile cause to people like Kallen and Brandeis. The building of Palestine was an extension of their education and identification as Americans, not as Jews. As Kallen explained recently, he had formulated his Zionist rationale "in terms of the philosophical pluralism with which [William] James was identified and in terms of the interpretation of the American tradition . . . by Barrett Wendell" rather than in terms of what he "had learned of Torah [Jewish law] at home or in Cheder [Hebrew School]." Thus, the Americanized Zionism of Kallen, and of the people he influenced, stressed ideas different from those of the European tradition with which most of the American Jews in 1921 were familiar. And the majority of delegates to the Zionist Organization of America, an organization deliberately built on democratic principles, repudiated it.

What was American about Americanized Zionism? Kallen, who in large measure gave Americanized Zionism both its definition and its direction, addressed himself to this question recently in reaction to some of the earlier chapters of this study. He wrote,

I think you're right re the role of my experience with "Progressives" in theory and practice.

... [Also] the essentials of pragmatism had as
much to do with my perspectives as the practice of people like old Bob LaFollette, etc. . . . The reorganization of Zionism [was] in "progressive" --i.e. honestly pragmatic terms.

When asked to elaborate on this statement, Kallen commented,

Americanized Zionism was based on the American Idea, which implied the same right to be different as is implied by [the pluralism of] Pragmatism. This is the same principle as in the Declaration of Independence, the principle of liberty and justice for all . . .

Our program was based on certain beliefs. Our Zionism was the working out of that faith in action. . . . Palestine was an old, destroyed frontier to be renewed. We went in for the replacement of Halukah [charity] with self-help. That was American . . . like the Social Gospel movement, etc.

With these statements Kallen was characterizing the two ways in which his Zionism was peculiarly American: it reflected both the pragmatic philosophy of his teacher, William James, and the Progressive movement in America with whose values and goals Kallen identified. Historian Henry Commager has defined Pragmatism as "practical, democratic, individualistic, opportunistic, spontaneous, hopeful," and has observed that "pragmatism's willingness to break with the past, reject traditional habits, try new methods, put beliefs to a vote, make a future to order" exactly expressed the American temperament of the early twentieth century. Another well known historian, Eric Goldman, has described "progressivism" as a movement that "prized cultivation, manner, and efficiency; . . . [it had] a gusty, down-world confidence. . . ." Though both these statements are highly simplified abstractions of complex movements, they are useful here in evaluating the
American-ness of the Brandeis-led Zionist movement. For, as this study has shown, the characteristics that Commager and Goldman attributed to Pragmatism and to Progressivism were precisely those which Kallen and Brandeis tried to apply to the Zionist movement in America. 10

What were the characteristics of Americanized Zionism as distinct from European Zionism? In 1921, in *Zionism and World Politics*, Kallen gave this answer.

[The American Zionists] tended to assimilate the Jewish question into the general complexes of the nationalistic and libertarian strivings of nineteenth century Europe. . . .

The American Zionist view tended, in a word, to crystallize in a formulation of the Jewish position less partisan, more scientific, more historical and sociological than formulations made at the seat of the Jewish problem in crisis in central Europe, and the American Zionist tended toward an attitude less ardent, more contemplative and more business-like than that of the European.11

To the Americanized Zionists who followed Kallen, Zionism was an application of the cultural pluralist rationale that Jews needed a national life in their own land in order to realize more fully their "equality in difference." Though these Zionists felt that, incidentally, a Jewish state would alleviate the age-old "Jewish problem" of anti-Semitism, they had not themselves experienced any serious difficulties as Jews. Their Zionist formulation, therefore, was primarily an intellectual one, an ideal that allowed them to preserve their American identity on equal terms with others in a pluralistic society at the same time that they advocated a broader extension of the precepts of liberty and equality which they
attributed to the American Idea. Americanized Zionism was an abstraction, a notion that constituted a "saving faith" in psychological, not immediate physical, terms. This placed it at odds with European Zionism which was a deeply felt reaction to the real suffering which Jews had experienced. To the masses in Eastern Europe, Zionism was not an option, a way to maintain a Jewish identity. Like it or not, they lived by their Jewish identity; Zionism, to them, represented a hope for survival, a concrete alternative which promised the opportunity for establishing a less threatening way of life in a land they could call their own.

The Europeans sensed rightly that Americanized Zionism was, from the conventional point of view, "un-Jewish." Kallen had rejected the Jewish religious tradition. His Zionism was entirely secular in definition and his only references from the Bible were those that had become part of the Judeo-Christian humanistic tradition. Zionism for Kallen, and for those influenced by him, owed more to American intellectual direction than to the Old Testament. Kallen, as one of William James's disciples, had sought a "moral equivalent of war," and had found it in Zionism. Brandeis and others followed suit. This statement, from a 1923 speech by Brandeis before the Palestine Land Development Council, is a good example of the secular way in which the Americanized Zionists saw Palestine.

The Land [Palestine] is an inspiration to effort. . . . We must be willing to enter upon a great adventure; must conceive of the life worthwhile as something
other than the humdrum everyday existence to which so many of us are condemned, or rather, condemn
ourselves. If, in our lives, we want something
beside the commonplace, if we want adventure, if
we want romance, if we want the elevation which
attends intellectual and spiritual striving, if
we want the deeper satisfaction of having aided
in making this world and our own people better and
happier, we must put our minds on what we can aid
in doing there [Palestine]. . . . If circumstances
are such that we cannot go to the battle front, let
us make sure that someone else goes, in whose work
we will interest ourselves, and in whose trials and
ultimate successes we have some part.

As the Europeans perceived, there was not even a hint here
of the uniquely Jewish role that Zionism traditionally had
expressed. This, indeed, was a "Zionism without Zion."

Americanized Zionism had meaning for people like Kallen
and Brandeis because they saw it as a way to strengthen
American values. They were Zionists not because they were
good Jews, but because they were good Americans. In America,
a country which prided itself on its toleration of religious
minorities, and which ideally encouraged equal opportunity
for all, this position had some logic. To the European Zionists,
however, this formulation was absurd. Jews abroad,
especially those in Eastern Europe, where Jews were subject
to constant pressures from their national states, identified
themselves, and were identified by others, primarily as Jews.
Their national allegiance was always subordinate to their
Jewish identity. When Weizmann had the opportunity to head
the Zionist Commission in 1919, for example, he resigned his
position at the University of Manchester and on various
British scientific research groups; he was a man from Pinsk,
a Zionist first, a British chemist second. Brandeis, a year later, refused to leave the Supreme Court to become a leader of the World Zionist Organization; he was a man from Washington, an American Justice first, a Zionist second.

Where the Europeans saw Zionism, therefore, as the defining core of their life style, the Americanized Zionists limited it to something apart from their innermost selves. Zionism was on a par with other reforms they sought in American life, except in this instance the reform would take place in a different locale as a model of what efficient planning and scientific management could do. Their Zionism was a function of their progressivism, of their faith that in a just society men should be free to live where they wished, exempt from irrational prejudices. The land of Palestine was important less for its historic role as the Biblical homeland than for its small size, its scattered population, and its potential for experiment.

This explains the impatience of the Americanized Zionists with Zionist "talk." Zionism, to the Americans, represented a deed to be done. Unlike Europe, where Zionist organizations traditionally fostered factions which gloried in never-ending "general debates" on plans and procedures, Americanized Zionism wanted action. It stressed, therefore, the virtues of a tautly run organization, and emphasized facts, reports, discipline, efficiency. It believed in the advice of experts, Zionists or not. It was "businesslike"; it was interested in results.
Americanized Zionists reflected the position of status its leaders had achieved in American life. Kallen's 1921 statement in *Zionism and World Politics* went on to note that "the American formulation of the Zionist position won in America the respectful attention and ... the sympathy and then the adherence ... of the more distinguished Americans both of Jewish and non-Jewish extraction." Despite all the talk of democracy and of appeal to the masses, Kallen's and Brandeis' Zionism was a Zionism for the elite. Both were Harvard graduates of the highest standing with access to the best minds of their generation, and their ideas tended to appeal to others of similar temperament and background. Americanized Zionism needed followers who could understand and carry out complex demands and directions. It presupposed education and sophistication; it assumed enough economic security to allow its adherents to take the time needed for "service." Recall the kind of men and women whom Kallen invited to join the Parushim. There was not an "average" person in the lot; each and every one eventually became a leader of some repute in either the Jewish or the non-Jewish community.13

This security and status was what made Kallen and Brandeis comfortable as Americans first, Jews second. It is also what impelled them to reject the World Zionist Organization commitment to Diaspora Nationalism, a doctrine which would have concentrated the efforts of the Zionist movement on educational and propaganda efforts to rouse the national
consciousness of the Jewish masses in countries outside of Palestine. Highly acculturated Americans, they did not wish Zionism to become a tool to reinforce the "ghettos" of the rapidly expanding immigrant communities. As cultural pluralists they hoped that Zionist activity would provide a way for Jews to express, within mainstream American society, their "equality in difference." But they definitely did not want the Zionist organization to encourage Jews to become self-segregating, a development they feared if Zionist membership became equated solely with the development of the Jewish national consciousness.14

This tension between the acculturated leadership and the immigrant majority underlay the downfall of Americanized Zionism. Defined by an intellectual who had been influenced by the insights of Harvard sages in preference to the traditional Talmudic sources, put into practice by a demanding reform leader who liked to compare the Zionists with "the Pilgrim Fathers," it could hardly be expected to appeal for very long to the masses of Eastern European Jewish immigrants who had joined the American Zionist Organization during World War I.15

Louis Lipsky recalled that when Weizmann came to the 1921 Zionist Organization of America convention the majority of the delegates there comprised the relatives of the Jews of Vilna, of Warsaw, of Bucharest, of Krakow and of Vienna. . . . They were thirsting for his [Weizmann's] words. . . . They were kinsmen who had wandered from home and who had found freedom in a new land, but they remembered their origins.
Certainly, thought Lipsky, these people would respond more readily to the Zionist formulations of this man who shared their background than to a "leadership that could not speak to them in the language they understood, that persisted in going its own way without considering their feelings, prejudices and ideals. . ."16

What these recent immigrant masses wanted from the Zionist organization was the same thing they sought in the groups of landsmen, old country men, that they formed in great numbers—a way of escaping from the harshness of contact with strangers in finding security through affiliation with a comfortable ethnic group. Social and cultural groups in New York or Chicago, whose agenda centered on Palestine, would have fulfilled that need. But Brandeis had rejected this role for the Zionist organization, and his replacement, his businesslike emphasis geared towards the swift building of a state in Palestine, had little appeal to these people, themselves busily engaged in establishing new lives in an unfamiliar land.

As long as the crisis of the war persisted, and America was isolated from Europe, Americanized Zionism was able to develop with little opposition. Brandeis' status within the American community was so great that no ordinary person or group could dare to challenge his leadership. With the resumption of normal Zionist activity after the war, however, an alternative to Americanized Zionism presented itself. The lack of mass appeal of its priorities and methods, coupled
with Brandeis' rejection of responsibility on the world stage, crystallized the European-oriented opposition that all along had felt uncomfortable with the articulation and direction of Americanized Zionism. Brandeis and his group, convinced that they were right, hesitated to fight back; defeat was inevitable.

Americanized Zionism was ultimately to make several contributions to the American Jewish community. It offered to Westernized Jews for whom religious tradition seemed outmoded or sterile an alternative, secular, way to keep their Jewish identity. As Kallen suggested in his cultural pluralism arguments, it gave American Jews an outlet for their ethnic sentiment, allowing them to participate on equal terms with other ethnic groups of the American pluralistic society. It became a major factor in continuing the traditional concept of a unity of the Jewish people, and helped, therefore, to slow down the rate of assimilation in an open society which encouraged it. But as its failure in 1921 showed, the majority of the Jews in the United States fifty years ago were not yet ready to accept a perspective on Zionism which contradicted much of the Zionist tradition with which they had grown up. It was to take the tragic events of the 1930's and 1940's in Europe, and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, coupled with a new generation of acculturated, better established, and, therefore, more secure American Jews, before American Zionism became "Americanized" again. Ironically it was the role that Brandeis outlined in 1921, the
role of fund-raisers for the upbuilding of the Palestine community, that was to become the role that, since 1948, the American Zionists have adopted as their own.

Ironically, also, it was Kallen's fate to live long enough to see the creation of the Jewish Commonwealth, only to analyze it in 1958, with some disappointment, as Utopians at Bay. Happily, he remains a "meliorist," whose hope springs eternal; his current membership on the Council of the Kibbutz [Israeli collective settlement] Management and Research Center of the American Council for the Behavioral Sciences is a good indication of the role in the Zionist movement he finds compatible with his ideal of Zionism today. Recently, in reply to a question on Israel's impact on American Jewry, Kallen wrote,

... [There are those] who think [of] Israel as the present phase of an ongoing struggle to embody a historic faith in present fact, [who] regard Israel as an ideal bet on a future of equal liberty and equal safety under law; but a bet which cannot be a sure thing and nevertheless must have the generous support of American Jews as Americans and also as Jews. This was how Mr. Justice Brandeis believed such a secularized image of a Jewish state should affect American Jewry. This is how, on the record, with increasing consensus and vigor, the image now known as the fact of Israel has since World I affected the majority of American Jews.

This is Horace Kallen's 1973 evaluation of the Americanization of Zionism. It is fitting, I think, that he should have the concluding word.17
APPENDIX A

A MEMORANDUM ON THE PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION OF THE JEWISH COMMONWEALTH IN PALESTINE

Whatever may have been the causes of the war, its purpose is, for the democratic peoples of the world, definite and simple. Its purpose is, to establish that condition of secure and lasting peace under which alone each and every group in the family of nations can sustain and perfect its qualities and powers in the making of its own freedom and happiness and in the service of mankind. If the war has brought to the civilized world terror and destruction, it has also brought a new vision and fresh hope. Only for the sake of realizing this vision, only for the sake of turning this hope into a programme and the programme into a fact, are the free peoples of the world undertaking and accepting the horror and inhumanity of the battlefield, the sorrow and loneliness of the hearth.

"Every sign of these terrible days of war and revolutionary change," writes President Wilson in a letter to the New Jersey Democrats, March 20, 1918, "when economic and social forces are being released upon the world, whose effect no political seer dare venture to conjecture, bids us search our hearts through and through and make them ready for the birth of a new day—a day, we hope and believe, of greater
opportunity and greater prosperity for the average mass of struggling men and women, and of greater safety and opportunity for children."

In this utterance of the President of the United States are affirmed the will and aspiration of the American League for Labor and Democracy which has declared the Zionist aim to be one of its own war aims, and of the British Labor Party, which also has declared for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine as one of the aims of the war. The Memorandum on War Aims of the Interallied Labor Conference, held in London in February 1918 affirms this will and aspiration for the great majority of the free peoples in Europe. This memorandum declares its opinion that one of the terms of settlement must be that "Palestine should be set free from the hard and oppressive government of the Turk, in order that this country may form a Free State, under international guarantee, to which such of the Jewish people as desire to do so may return and may work out their own salvation free from interference by those of alien race or religion." And toward the solution of the problems of reconstruction after the war it urges "the importance not merely of conservation, but also of the utmost possible development, by appropriate government action, of the resources of every country for the benefit not merely of its own people, but also of the world."

"In these declarations of the President of the United States and of the representatives of the masses of the people of the free countries of Europe and America, we the Zionists
of America in solemn convention assembled, unanimously concur. With the governments of the great democratic States, who, led by Great Britain, have endorsed and adopted our aims as theirs, with the great peoples of these states whose assembled representatives have extended to us acknowledgement, cooperation and friendship, we undertake, so far as in our power lies, the responsibility of making sure that the destruction which this war has brought shall be a destruction of all that has been inimical to the liberty and happiness of mankind; of making sure that the opportunities the war has opened shall be used for the creation of a more secure, a happier, and a freer society. To this creation, particularly, we Zionists have been dedicated. The Zionist movement has indeed been from its very inception not merely a movement to establish in Palestine for the Jewish people a legally secure homeland under the warrant of public law, the Zionist movement has been from its inception a movement to establish such a homeland on the principles of a social justice that will actually secure to each man his life, his liberty, and his happiness. The prophetic, Talmudical and legal traditions of the Jewish people rest on these principles: economic and social democracy, to be achieved through the proper control of natural resources and universal education, are the chief concern of the prophets; are the objective of the legislation of Deuteronomy and Leviticus and the intent of the living law of the people as recorded in the Talmud. The fiscal agencies of the Zionist Organization, particularly, the National Fund,
are designed in order to establish these principles: the Organization's policy in the development of agricultural and educational institutions in Palestine has been governed by them.

In 1897, the Programme of the 2d International Zionist Congress at Basle defined the object of Zionism as "the creation of a publicly-recognized and legally secured homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine." Now the declarations of Great Britain, France, Italy and the other members of the allied democratic states of the world have established as an international fact this public recognition of the Jewish homeland, and in consequence of this recognition there is at work in Palestine today the Zionist Administrative Commission. These events have rendered immediate the practical problems of the restoration of land, and in view of this immediacy we desire here to affirm anew the principles above designated with the view of applying them to the tasks that confront us in the development of the land to best advantage, the establishment of civil freedom and security for its inhabitants and the education of its children.

I. The National Ownership of Land and Public Utilities

(a) To insure to all the citizens of the homeland in Palestine the completest possible equality of opportunity and responsibility, we declare for the national ownership and control of the land and all its resources, and of all public utilities.
(b) We hold, however, that the most effective development and use of both the natural resources of the land and of public utilities is to be attained by the initiative of private cooperative enterprise under such leases as will secure the continuity of the undertakings.

(c) In so far as there remain lands privately owned we urge

II. Democracy: Economic and Political

(a) Economic Democracy: We declare that the continuity of the great tradition of the Jewish people can be best maintained and the needs and conditions of modern enterprise met by the organization of all industrial, agricultural, commercial and financial enterprises on a cooperative basis.

(b) Political Democracy--(1) We declare for the political and civil equality, irrespective of race, sex, or faith, of all peoples inhabiting the land

(2) We require the integrity and the security of the traditional "constitutional rights" of mankind: the right to life, liberty, and property, to freedom of association, of speech, of press, of movement, of conscience and worship.

III. Education

(a) We declare for the creation, in the Jewish homeland, of a system of compulsory, free, and democratic education.

(b) We declare for Hebrew as the medium of Jewish national instruction.

IV. Recommendation to the Zionist Administrative Commission

(a) We urge upon the Commission now engaged in the
preliminary work of the restoration of the Jewish homeland to govern all its undertakings by these principles.

(b) As immediate steps we request:

1. The prevention of all speculation in land and land values.

2. Control in the public interest as herein defined of all business undertakings.

3. The support and development of all technical and religious schools, private or public, using Hebrew as a medium of instruction.

V. Recommendation to other Zionist Federations

(a) We urge upon all other bodies of Zionists whose existence is established by a statute of an International Zionist Congress to endorse the principles herein declared.
NOTES

Preface


3 These facts are discussed in greater detail in Ch. 1.

Chapter 1


3 These statistics, from Janowsky, are only rough estimates, because the census makes no inquiries about religion and looks upon Jews as a religious group.

4 See Stephen Birmingham's *The Grandees* (New York, 1971) for a recent account of this distinctive community, whose members continue to hold themselves apart from the general Jewish community.


Notes--Chapter 1


9 Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew (New York, 1955); the quote is from Laqueur, A History, p. 402.


12 Rufus Learsi [Israel Goldberg], Fulfilment (Cleveland, 1951), Ch. XVIII, passim. Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (New York, 1961) is a storehouse of information on this subject.

13 Shapiro, Leadership, p. 20.

14 Learsi, Fulfilment, p. 49; Laqueur, A History, pp. 162-166.


17 Silverberg, If I Forget Thee, p. 55; Feinstein, American Zionism, p. 12.
Notes--Chapter 1


23 Learsi, Fulfilment, p. 247.

24 Learsi, Fulfilment, p. 148; Feinstein, American Zionism, p. 244; Lipsky, "Early Days," 455; Haber, Odyssey, pp. 33, 47.


26 Handlin, "A Century of Jewish Immigration," 17, 49.

27 Feinstein, American Zionism, p. 281.


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32 David Blaustein, The Memoirs of David Blaustein (New York, 1913), p. 35. Before Blaustein moved to New York in 1889 he was Horace Kallen's Hebrew teacher in Boston. The first sentence of Mary Antin's Promised Land (Boston, 1912), "I was born, I have lived and I have been made over," has long served as a tribute to the "merits" of Americanization.


36 Handlin, Adventure, p. 184; Lipsky, "Early Days," 452; Learsi, Fulfillment, p. 149.

37 The first three paragraphs of this simplified survey of the Progressive movement, designed merely to place in some context references that appear later in this study, rely on the summations of Gerald Grob and George Billias, ed. Interpretations of American History, Vol. II (New York, 1967), pp. 141-149, and Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, ed. Twentieth Century America: Recent Interpretations (New York, 1969), pp. 1-2. See also my Bibliography, pp. 370-373, for works pertinent to the general conclusions of this section.


Notes--Chapter 1

43Ibid., pp. 505-506.
44Ibid., pp. 506-507, 510, 512.

Chapter 2

2Much of the material in this Chapter comes from three lengthy interviews Dr. Kallen accorded to me on June 7 and July 9, 1972, and on August 9, 1973, and from another recorded interview he made with two close friends, Milton Konvitz and Dorothy Oko, in 1964. Dr. Kallen is more concerned with the work he is doing today than with re-creating the record of years ago; he has eschewed, therefore, any published attempts at autobiography, and except for an introduction to Individualism: An American Way of Life (New York, 1933) rarely has referred in print to details of his life. I am fortunate, also, in having had Dr. Kallen's comments on the draft of this dissertation, Chapter by Chapter. He has, for example, added many facts to the first draft of this Chapter, making it both more accurate and more detailed than otherwise it would have been. My use of the word "recently" indicates material derived from an interview or from a letter from Kallen to me since June 1972, when I first met him.

The Horace M. Kallen Collection in the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio (hereafter referred to as KC-AJA) contains dozens of letters from current scholars who have "rediscovered" his early books. A good example is a letter from Nathan Glazer, co-author of Beyond the Melting Pot, to Kallen, October 25, 1956: "May I say ... that I have found your book [Culture and Democracy in the United States] enormously stimulating, and by far the best that exists on the impact of immigrant groups on American culture. Returning to it ... after sometime I was amazed to discover how much that I and others had thought and written about this matter had been written by you a long time ago."

Notes--Chapter 2


9. Kallen, Individualism, p. 8; Interview with Milton Konvitz and Dorothy Oko, 1964 (hereafter referred to as 1964 Interview); Interview with Schmidt, June 1972.

10. Kallen to Brooks Atkinson, April 20, 1957, KC-AJA, 1957; 1964 Interview; Kallen, Individualism, p. 9. Kallen has recalled, for instance, that he refused to join the political club of Boston Boss Martin Lomasny (in whom Lincoln Steffens saw so much hope) and had to fight a "comic little fight" to assert his independence. See also Chapter 4, p. 96.


16. Barrett Wendell to H. M. Kallen, November 3, 1903, November 19, 1903, KC-AJA.


Notes—Chapter 2

19 Harvard Class of 1903, Tenth Annual Report (1913), p. 274; Alice (Mrs. William) James to H. M. Kallen, September 3, 1910, KC-AJA; William James to H. M. Kallen, August 15, 1908, KC-AJA.


22 Ibid., p. 61.

23 Ibid., pp. 62, 67.

24 Ibid., p. 70.

25 Ibid., p. 71.

26 Ibid.

27 1964 Interview; Interview with Schmidt, July 1972; The American Hebrew, LXXIX, No. 5 (July 6, 1906), 121.

28 Interview with Schmidt, July 1972; Horace M. Kallen, Philosophy Today and Tomorrow (New York, 1935), p. 251. The other five names Kallen mentioned as influences were Santayana, James, Wendell, psychologist Edwin Holt, and Canning Schiller, his tutor at Oxford.

29 The American Hebrew, LXXX, No. 12 (June 25, 1907), 307; Munsterberg to Kallen, August 22, 1907, KC-AJA.

30 Interview with Schmidt, July 1972.

31 Ibid. A brief reference to this incident is included also in Kallen, "Alain Locke and Cultural Pluralism," in What I Believe, p. 132.

32 Wendell to Kallen, November 3, 1907, KC-AJA.


34 Kallen Individualism, p. 11; Kallen to Schmidt, May 30, 1973; Santayana to Kallen, July 1, 1911, KC-AJA.

35 Wendell to Kallen, August 14, 1911, KC-AJA.
Notes--Chapter 2

36 Harvard Class of 1903, Fourth Report (1919), p. 162; Santayana to Kallen, November 19, 1911, KC-AJA; Wendell to Kallen, December 26, 1911, KC-AJA.


38 Documentation of this paragraph forms the bulk of this dissertation, Ch. 4-11; Interview with Schmidt, August 1973.

39 Munsterberg to Kallen, March 24, 1915, KC-AJA; Kallen to Zimmern, April 16, 1918, KC-AJA.

40 Kallen to Schmidt, May 30, 1973; H. M. Kallen, Draft Letter of Resignation from the University of Wisconsin, KC-AJA.

41 Zimmern to Kallen, May 11, 1918, KC-AJA.


47 Interview with Schmidt, July 1972.


49 Interview with Schmidt, June 1972; Introduction to Judaism At Bay (unpublished draft), KC-AJA. The phrase "pragmatic humanist" appears repeatedly in, for example, introductions to Kallen's work, or in short summaries of his position accompanying articles in journals; Kallen never uses it. For a discussion of "Hebraism," see Ch. 3.
Chapter 3


5H. M. Kallen, "Culture and The Klan," ibid, pp. 11-12, 21.


9H. M. Kallen, "Foreword," Judaism At Bay, p. 5; Kallen, "The Distinction between Hebraism and Judaism," 86; H. M. Kallen, "Jewish Quarrels and Jewish Unity," Judaism At Bay, pp. 81-82; Alan Guttman, The Jewish Writer in America (New York, 1971), p. 93. Note also Oscar Handlen's comment in Adventure in Freedom (New York, 1954), p. 243: "The most attractive effort to contrive a philosophy of Jewish living in terms of Jewish experience [in America] was Horace M. Kallen's incisive questioning of the melting pot theory. . . . This image [of America as a great orchestra] . . . supplied reassurance to many who sought a firm basis for belonging to both Judaism and Americanism."

Notes—Chapter 3


14 "Dr. Kallen on Zionism," The Maccabean, XXV (November-December 1914), 188.


16 "Foreword," Judaism At Bay, p. 5.

17 Kallen, Zionism, p. 78.

18 Kallen to Jacob Schiff, January 11, 1918, Jacob A. Schiff Collection, AJA.


20 Kallen, "In The Hope of The New Zion," pp. 455-456; Kallen, "Constitutional Foundations," 98. Kallen's ideas for economic reform are discussed in Ch. 10 and 11, for they were an important part of the complex of issues that led to the 1921 split between the American and European Zionists.

21 Judd Teller, "America's Two Zionist Traditions," Commentary (October 1955), 343-352. For Herzl's picture of the Jewish State as Utopia, see Altneuland (Vienna, 1897), where he set out a complete description of the structure and organization of the new state.


25 Ibid., p. 119.
Notes--Chapter 3

26 Ibid.
27 Kallen, Zionism and World Politics, p. 90.
28 H. M. Kallen to Ruth Mack, August 4, 1915, KC-AJA.
29 On the noblesse oblige role of American philanthropists, see Robert Bremner, From the Depths: The Discovery of Poverty in the United States (New York, 1956), and Jane Addams, My Years at Hull House (New York, 1910). A good early (1910) Kallen exposition of this point is in "Judaism, Hebraism and Zionism."
31 Interview with Schmidt, August 1973.
32 Ibid.

Chapter 4

1 Hugo Munsterberg to Kallen, November 10, 1911, KC-AJA.
3 The Maccabean (September 1911), 75.
5 The Maccabean (September 1911), 70-71.
6 Ibid. (November 1911), 140.
7 Ibid., 138-139. Note deHaas's comment in Brandeis, p. 30: "Seven stalwarts fought off attacks on the principles of the movement and it was their struggle which kept the moribund American organization from breaking up."
8 Louis Lipsky to Kallen, October 16, 1913, KC-AJA.
9 Memorandum, in Kallen's handwriting, concerning the organization of the Barushim, KC-AJA; Interview with Schmidt, July 1972.
10 Memorandum and Interview, ibid.
Notes--Chapter 4

11."Induction Ceremony Into The Order of the Parushim," with corrections and annotations in Kallen's handwriting, and marked by him "Strictly Confidential," KC-AJA.

12Kallen to Ben Halpern, November 4, 1971. Dr. Halpern, Chairman of the Department of Near East Studies, Brandeis University, cordially sent me a copy of this letter.

13I. J. Biskind to Kallen, October 4, 1913, KC-AJA.

14Henrietta Szold to Kallen, November 9, 1913, KC-AJA.

15Interview with Schmidt, July 1972; Szold to Kallen, January 28, 1914, KC-AJA.

16Kallen to Max Nordau, April 7, 1914, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, File A119/50/8/8.


18Interview with Schmidt, July 1972.

19Ibid.

20Kallen to Louis D. Brandeis, December 20, 1913. Louis D. Brandeis Collection, Zionist Archives, New York. A draft of this letter, differing in some minor wording, is in the Kallen Collection, AJA. The American Palestine Corporation was a project for an industrial corporation for Palestine development that European Zionist leader Nahum Sokolow suggested to Brandeis. It never went beyond the preliminary discussion stage.

21Louis D. Brandeis to Kallen, December 22, 1913, KC-AJA.

22For Brandeis' emphasis on data in his career as a lawyer, see A. T. Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life (New York, 1942), and Melvin Urofsky, A Mind of One Piece (New York, 1971). Jacob deHaas, Brandeis, discusses at length Brandeis' stress on facts and reports, and emphasizes how this characteristic upset the old-time workers in the Zionist movement. See also Ch. 6 and 7.

23Unpublished Address marked "To The Convention Order Knights of Zion," December 26, 1913, KC-AJA.

24H. M. Kallen, "Judaism, Hebraism, Zionism," in Judaism At Bay, pp. 37, 39. Kallen referred Brandeis back to this article in the major memorandum he submitted to
Notes--Chapter 4

Brandeis in August 1914, in response to the Brandeis letter of December 22, 1913. The implications of the last two sentences in this paragraph, as well as Kallen's memorandum, are discussed at length in Ch. 5.

Richard Gottheil to Kallen, March 6, 1914, KC-AJA.

Chapter 5


3 Lipsky, "Early Days," 461; Learsi, Fulfilment, p. 182.


7 deHaas, Brandeis, p. 50; Urofsky, A Mind, p. 98.

8 Mason, Brandeis, p. 442; deHaas, Brandeis, pp. 151-152. The 1905 speech is titled "What Loyalty Demands."

9 Mason, Brandeis, p. 442; deHaas, Brandeis, p. 51.

10 deHaas, Brandeis, p. 52.

11 Mason, Brandeis, p. 443; The Maccabean (July 1912) 5.

12 deHaas, Brandeis, pp. 53, 154-155.

13 Ibid., p. 57; Mason, Brandeis, p. 444.

Notes--Chapter 5

15 Urofsky, A Mind, pp. 101-103.

16 Kallen to Brandeis, August 22, 1914, Brandeis Collection, Zionist Archives, New York.

17 Ibid., August 27, 1914; Interview with Schmidt, July 1972.

18 deHaas, Brandeis, p. 162.

19 These speeches are contained in Louis D. Brandeis, Brandeis on Zionism (New York, 1942), ed. by Solomon Goldman, for the Zionist Organization of America as a memorial to Brandeis. deHaas includes some of the same speeches, with slightly different titles in his biography of Brandeis. Often entire paragraphs appear in different places in the two versions, but the wording is the same. In 1915 the Federation of American Zionists reprinted "True Americanism" in pamphlet form as "Zionism and Patriotism," an indication of the organization's defensiveness on the dual loyalty issue. Handwritten manuscripts in the Brandeis Papers show that Brandeis wrote his speeches himself, i.e., they were not written by deHaas or other Zionist advisors; they, therefore, represent good expressions of his own point of view on Zionism.

20 deHaas, Brandeis, p. 163.

21 Brandeis, Brandeis on Zionism, pp. 3-10, passim.

22 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

23 Ibid., p. 24.

24 Ibid., p. 19.

25 Ibid., pp. 17, 25. Note the reference to Mazzini, the Italian Nationalist leader who Kallen often quoted.

26 Ibid., pp. 26-27.

27 Ibid., pp. 24, 34, 59-68, passim.

28 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

29 Ibid., pp. 54, 72.


31 deHaas, Brandeis, pp. 152-154; Brandeis, Brandeis on Zionism, p. 11.
Notes--Chapter 5


35 Interview with Schmidt, July 1972.

Chapter 6


Notes--Chapter 6


8 Eric Goldman, Rendezvous, p. 171, characterizes Kallen as the "able young Progressive"; Ernest Becker, in Beyond Alienation (New York, 1967), p. 36, calls him "one of the hardy early pragmatists." Kallen was an early supporter of La Follette in Wisconsin, and certainly perceived of himself as in the Progressive mode—e.g., his insistence on equal rights for women when he formed the Parushim. He considers his Zionist activity of this period as a function both of his Pragmatism and Progressivism (Kallen to Schmidt, June 8, 1973).

9 Benjamin Perlstein to Louis D. Brandeis (N.D.), Brandeis Papers, Zionist Archives, New York.

10 "To the Zionists of America," KC-AJA. This appeal is included also in Brandeis, Brandeis on Zionism, pp. 46-48, attributed, of course, to Brandeis.

11 L. D. Brandeis to Kallen, September 13, 1914, KC-AJA.

12 Kallen to Brandeis, September 21, 1914, Brandeis Papers, Zionist Archives, New York.


14 In the case of Magnes, Kallen proved to be prescient; less than a year later Magnes resigned from the Provisional Executive Committee, publicly attacking it and its leadership. In 1916, after Brandeis had become a Supreme Court Justice, another attack by Magnes led Brandeis to resign as Chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee.


Notes--Chapter 6


18 Kallen to Felix Frankfurter, September 17, 1914, KC-AJA.

19 Cf. deHaas's statement in Brandeis, p. 63: "[T]he old machine rebelled... They were wholeheartedly willing to fight under the shadow of Brandeis' name, but they were equally opposed to his ceaseless spurring, his demand for self-discipline, his insistence upon accuracy, and his stern opposition to compromise."

20 deHaas, Brandeis, p. 66: "Whilst from the moment he [Brandeis] became prominent in Zionism a group of extremely diverse personalities surrounded him and carried through many of the tasks which made the Brandeis regime successful, his whole striving was toward the creation of a thoroughly democratic movement, an organization which should rely for its political power as well as for its financial strength upon mass support." See Ch. 11 for a more complete discussion on the downfall of Americanized Zionism.

21 Kallen to Stephen S. Wise, September 25, 1914, Stephen S. Wise Collection, AJA. There has been nothing published on the Parushim anywhere, in part due to Kallen's passion for secrecy.

22 Henry Hurwitz to Kallen, October 5, 1914, KC-AJA. The difficulties with the Europeans, of which Hurwitz speaks, did come to fruition after the war, in 1919. See Ch. 11.

23 Kallen to Richard Gottheil, October 14, 1914, KC-AJA.

24 I. J. Biskind to Kallen, October 19, 1914, KC-AJA. Biskind's "scheme" was to secure options to buy land in Palestine. Brandeis deferred Biskind's suggestion, writing, on December 4, 1914, to Kallen, "When we have secured large contributions from many people, a study can be made of the lists of persons who contributed, to find out who are conceivably interested to go further and make investments there for the common cause." (KC-AJA).

25 Henrietta Szold to Kallen, October 18, 1914, KC-AJA.

26 Kallen to Szold, October 28, 1914, KC-AJA. Kallen later wrote to Szold, acknowledging receipt of her plays, but there is no indication that he ever used them. Kallen to Szold, December 12, 1914, World Zionist Archives, Jerusalem.
Notes--Chapter 6

27 Kallen to Benjamin Perlstein, October 28, 1914, KC-AJA.

28 Kallen to Wise, October 25, 1914, Stephen S. Wise Collection, AJA.

29 Wise to Kallen, October 27, 1914, KC-AJA. Cf. Wise's description of the meeting with the American Jewish Committee with Hurwitz's account in the next letter. Kallen wrote "Democracy vs. the Melting Pot" about this time as an attack on Ross's The Old in The New.

30 Hurwitz to Kallen, November 1, 1914, KC-AJA.

31 Kallen to Hurwitz, November 7, 1914, KC-AJA.

32 Kallen to Alexander Sachs, November 7, 1914, KC-AJA.

33 Wise to Kallen, November 17, 1914, KC-AJA.

34 Kallen to Wise, November 18, 1914, Stephen S. Wise Collection, AJA.

35 Kallen to Mrs. Maurice Leon, October 28, 1914, KC-AJA.

36 When Brandeis first assumed his position as Chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee, he offered Kallen the job of Administrative Secretary. Kallen, to whom being the paid functionary of any cause is anathema, refused it. Interview with Schmidt, July 1972; Kallen to Schmidt, July 22, 1973. A letter to Kallen, December 8, 1914, from Benjamin Perlstein, who accepted the job, confirms Kallen's recollection, KC-AJA.

37 Interview with Schmidt, July 1972.

Chapter 7

1 The information in this and the next three paragraphs comes from a memorandum to himself that Kallen made of this meeting with Brandeis, KC-AJA. This was not an unusual practice with Kallen, who had the instincts of a good organization man in preserving records of such meetings.

Notes--Chapter 7


4Kallen to Brandeis, February 23, 1915, Brandeis Papers, Zionist Archives, New York. The "document" to which Kallen referred was probably "The International Aspects of Zionism," the first part of which was discussed in Ch. 5, pp. 125-126. The second part deals with an analysis of the Utopian possibilities of the new Zionist state. See Ch. 10, p. 247.

5Brandeis to Kallen, February 23, 1915, KC-AJA.

6Brandeis to Kallen, March 4, 1915, KC-AJA.

7Kallen to Brandeis, March 11, 1915, Brandeis Papers, Zionist Archives, New York.

8"Memorandum of Organization Meeting of the University Zionist Society," April 4, 1915, KC-AJA; this Memorandum notes also that Kallen was to form a University Zionist Society in Chicago. Kallen to Brandeis, April 10, 1915, Brandeis Papers, Zionist Archives, New York. See letter to Frankfurter, this chapter, p. 173.

9Kallen to Brandeis, April 9, 1915, KC-AJA.

10Though the optimism characteristic of the Progressive period seemed often to color Kallen's hopes for the Zionist movement, he considers himself a "meliorist." See this chapter, p. 182; also Ch. 2, p. 37.

11Kallen to Felix Frankfurter, April 9, 1915, KC-AJA. The reference in the last sentence to "a moral equivalent for war" shows the continuing influence on Kallen's thinking of his teacher, William James.

12Kallen to Alfred Zimmern, October 30, 1915, KC-AJA. See also Kallen's letter to Sidney Webb, Ch. 8, p. 203.


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16 Kallen to Louis D. Brandeis, September 24, 1915, KC-AJA.

17 Kallen to Brandeis, November 6, 1915, Brandeis Papers, Zionist Archives, New York. The Congress did not meet until December 15, 1918, after several postponements and delays. See also Ch. 8, pp. 189-191 for more on Kallen's attitude towards, and activity for, the Congress.

18 Rufus Learsi [Israel Goldberg], Fulfilment (Cleveland, 1951), p. 185; Shapiro, Leadership, p. 136.

19 Jesse Sampter to Kallen, December 26, 1915, "Since I understand that ours is not a separatist Order in the sense that it does not exclude any Jew who has proved his complete devotion to the Zionist cause, it would be unkind, unfair and unjust to call a meeting at this particular time [Friday evening, the Jewish Sabbath]..." (KC-AJA); Report of meeting of Parushim, December 31, 1915, KC-AJA.

20 Kallen to Brandeis, November 10, 1915, contains a plea by Kallen to Brandeis to uphold the "discipline" of the Parushim, KC-AJA; Alexander Sachs to Henry Hurwitz, December 30, 1915, KC-AJA.

21 Brandeis to Kallen, November 29, 1915, KC-AJA; Alexander Dushkin to Kallen, February 8, 1916, KC-AJA.

22 Elisha Friedman to Kallen, March 1, 1916, KC-AJA.

23 Kallen to Friedman, March 6, 1916, KC-AJA; Kallen to Dushkin, February 15, 1916, KC-AJA.

24 Kallen to Schmidt, June 8, 1973, commenting on the first draft of Ch. 5. For the role of the Parushim in developing the Pittsburgh Program, see Ch. 10, p. 262.

25 1964 Interview.

26 Interview with Schmidt, June 1972. The exposition of this point is one of the major themes of Kallen's most recent book, Creativity, Imagination, Logic: Meditations for the Eleventh Hour (in press, for publication in London in late 1973).

Chapter 8

1 Rufus Learsi [Israel Goldberg], Fulfilment (Cleveland, 1951), p. 183; Interview with Schmidt, July 1972. Mary Antin wrote to Kallen, November 6, 1916, "We still have one great cause in common, namely Zionism," KC-AJA.

2 Interview with Schmidt, July 1972; H. M. Kallen, "Julian William Mack," in Of Them That Say They Are Jews (New York, 1954), p. 126. Though Kallen has always been hesitant about taking credit for Brandeis' conversion, in both my 1972 interview with him, and his 1964 interview with Konvitz and Oko, he stated positively that Mack became an active Zionist almost entirely due to his influence. My own feeling is that Kallen, who, if anything, is excessively humble and reluctant to talk about his achievements, would not claim this credit if he did not feel 100% certain about it. A recent, well-researched, unpublished biography of Mack by Harry Barnard substantiates Kallen's claim. In dramatic fashion, Barnard suggests that Kallen "won Mack's soul" over the arguments of Reform leader, anti-Zionist, Rabbi Emil Hirsch.


4 Interview with Schmidt, July 1972. Others recognized the role Zionism played as a "saving faith" for Kallen. Philadelphia art-patron Albert Barnes wrote him on January 11, 1919, "I've seen your complexes diminish in intensity--while the change when you identified yourself with Zionism fairly hit me in the face. It was obvious that you had withdrawn from your fantasy world into a sympathetic gregarious atmosphere" (KC-AJA).

5 Kallen to Mr. Bernstein, October 28, 1914, KC-AJA. Kallen's sentiments, as he expressed them in this letter, were similar to those of other intellectuals of the period, e.g., Van Wyck Brooks. There is no evidence that Kallen knew Brooks at this time, though there was some correspondence between the two during the 1920's.

6 Stephen S. Wise to Kallen, November 4, 1915, KC-AJA.

7 Kallen to Brandeis, January 5, 1916, KC-AJA. Though Sulzberger, first president of the American Jewish Committee and a highly learned layman in the field of Hebrew jurisprudence, did believe in making Palestine a place of refuge for
Notes--Chapter 8

the Jews of Europe, he was unalterably opposed to the idea of a Jewish State. Much compromise and jockeying for position between the Zionists and the American Jewish Committee took place before the Congress finally met, a year after the end of World War I. A detailed study of the fight for the Congress is included in Yonathan Shapiro, Leadership of the American Zionist Organization (Urbana, Ill., 1971), Ch. IV; see, also, Kallen, Zionism and World Politics (New York, 1921), pp. 143-149.

8. Kallen to Brandeis, June 3, 1916, KC-AJA.

9. Henry Hurwitz to Kallen, July 26, 1916, KC-AJA.

10. Kallen to Hurwitz, July 26, 1916, KC-AJA. Hurwitz later wrote Kallen, "I very much doubt whether we can get Felix to write that article we want of him. . . . I therefore beg of you to write something yourself embodying the points you make in your letter . . . of July 26. It can be anonymous, if you like, impersonal and official. . . ." (Henry Hurwitz to Kallen, September 6, 1916, KC-AJA).


12. Kallen to Alex Aaronsohn, October 22, 1915, KC-AJA. See, also, Kallen's letters to Hurwitz and Alexander Sachs, Ch. 6, pp. 156 and 158, and Kallen's letters on this plan to Eustace Percy, Ch. 9, p. 226.

13. Recall Schiff's 1907 statements, Ch. 1, pp. 23, 24. Schiff had refused to meet Herzl in 1904, writing to Stephen Wise, "I am an American pure and simple and cannot possibly belong to two nations. . . ." (Stephen Wise, Challenging Years [New York, 1949], p. 33).

14. Kallen to Jacob Schiff, July 24, 1917, Jacob H. Schiff Collection, AJA. See, also, Kallen's letter to Schiff, Ch. 3, p. 74. Kallen was teaching philosophy at the Columbia University Summer School, a position John Dewey had arranged for him; therefore, his New York address.

15. Schiff to Kallen, July 25, 1917, KC-AJA.

16. Kallen to Schiff, July 27, 1917, Jacob M. Schiff Collection, AJA.

17. Kallen to Schiff, January 4, 1918, KC-AJA.

18. Kallen to Schiff, January 11, 1918, Jacob M. Schiff Collection, AJA. Kallen was addressing himself here to
Notes—Chapter 8

Schiff's very understandable fear that he would be accused of inconsistency if he reversed his previous position and joined the Zionist organization.

19 Schiff to Kallen, June 24, 1918, KC-AJA.
20 Schiff to Kallen, June 28, 1918, KC-AJA.
21 Kallen to Schiff, July 7, 1918, KC-AJA.
22 Kallen to Wise, October 6, 1914, Stephen S. Wise Collection, AJA.
23 Kallen to Wise, December 26, 1914, Stephen S. Wise Collection, AJA. See Note 14, Ch. 6, p. 340.
25 Kallen to Wise, December 24, 1914, Stephen S. Wise Collection, AJA; Draft letter, Kallen to Henri Bergson, July 24, 1915, KC-AJA.
26 George Santayana to Kallen, November 21, 1921, KC-AJA.
27 John Dewey to Kallen, March 31, 1915, KC-AJA.
28 Kallen to Sidney Webb, January 22, 1918, KC-AJA. A complete discussion of Kallen's economic ideas for Palestine is in Ch. 10.
29 Webb to Kallen, March 3, 1918, KC-AJA.
31 Bourne, "Trans-National America," in War, pp. 107-123, passim. Bourne replaced Kallen's metaphor of the orchestra with one of his own, a multi-colored woven piece of cloth. Cf. Alfred Zimmern to Kallen, January 20, 1917, "I was especially interested in Bourne's article in the last number [of The Menorah Journal]. Poor Bourne, whom I met when he was over here [England], is a very good expounder of other
people's ideas and I could see that yours must have made big headway by his whole manner of treatment."

32 Ibid., pp. 128-133, passim.


34 Kallen's declining relationship with the American Zionist Organization is discussed in Ch. 10.

Chapter 9

1 Rufus Learsi [Israel Goldberg], Fulfilment (Cleveland, 1951), p. 187. For the complete phrasing of the Balfour Declaration, see Ch. 1, p. 8.

2 Ibid., p. 188. The most authoritative source on the history of the Balfour Declaration, an extremely well-researched volume, is Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (New York, 1961). Stein refers in some detail to this story, pp. 119-120.

3 Stein, Balfour Declaration, pp. 121-125, passim.

4 Louis D. Brandeis to Kallen, October 6, 1915, KC-AJA. Also, note Benjamin Perlstein's comment to Kallen, May 25, 1915, "The activities of the members of the Actions Committee who are now in Europe are as a hidden page to us. We are absolutely in the dark as to what they are doing. ... [T]hey are giving our views ... very little consideration, as they have never asked for them" (KC-AJA).

5 Kallen to Schmidt, December 22, 1972. "Of Jewish Parentage" refers to some Jewish background on his father's side. Zimmern's mother was not Jewish, however, and out of deference to her, Zimmern never joined any official Zionist organization (Alfred Zimmern to Kallen, July 15, 1918, KC-AJA).

6 Stein, Balfour Declaration, pp. 124, 131.

7 Ibid., p. 423.

8 Zimmern to Kallen, May 21, 1913, KC-AJA.

9 Zimmern to Kallen, April 27, 1915, KC-AJA.
Notes--Chapter 9

Lloyd George at this time was Chairman of the British War Munitions Committee; in 1917 he became Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Herbert Samuel, a prominent Anglo-Jewish statesman, became Secretary of State for Home Affairs in 1916; from 1920-1925 he was the first High Commissioner for Palestine.

Balfour held many positions at the highest levels of British government; in 1917 he became Foreign Secretary and, therefore, the official signatory of the Zionist declaration which came to be called after him.

Lord Reading was a member of the Anglo-Jewish Establishment; after a multi-faceted career he became, in 1918, the British Ambassador to the United States.

Eustace Percy held several high-level positions in the British Foreign Office both in America and in England; the Foreign Office considered him an expert on American society.

Jabotinsky, a prominent Russian Zionist, who played a major role in Palestine in the 1920's and 1930's, eventually did found a "Jewish Legion" which joined with the British in fighting against the Turks in Palestine.

These biographical details, taken from Stein, Balfour Declaration, are substantiated by entries in the Encyclopedia Judaica (Jerusalem, 1972).

10 Kallen to L. D. Brandeis, May 14, 1915, Brandeis Papers, Zionist Archives, New York. This letter coincided with the period in which the idea of an American Jewish Congress was first brought up.

11 Kallen to Brandeis, May 27, 1915, Brandeis Papers, Zionist Archives, New York. The "vague Zionist declaration" to which Percy referred is a good description of the rather ambiguous character of the Balfour Declaration.

12 Kallen to Chaim Weizmann, August 6, 1915, KC-AJA. For a report of the "representative," I. L. Kandel, see below, p. 223.

13 Kallen to Zimmern, August 6, 1915. Letters that follow make clear Kallen's reference to Percy and to Jabotinsky in the last sentence.

14 Stein, Balfour Declaration, p. 124.

15 Leon Simon to Kallen, September 16, 1915, KC-AJA. As several of Kallen's letters to his other correspondents show, he approved of Jabotinsky's "wild-cat scheme" in order to present the British, and the world, with a "fait accompli"; e.g., Kallen to Zimmern, November 1, 1915, "I think that
Jabotinsky should go on with the work, but that he should act independently and not drag in the Zionist organization..." (KC-AJA).

16 Kallen to Simon, October 1, 1915, KC-AJA. Kallen's mention of William James and Brandeis suggests the two important emphases in his life at that time--the development of his ideas on pluralism and his work for Zionism. His comment that Zionism "will realize the living Jewish idea in democratic terms" states his Zionist rationale in a nutshell.

17 Simon to Kallen, October 17, 1915, KC-AJA.


19 Kandel to Kallen, November 19, 1915, KC-AJA.

20 Kandel to Kallen, November 26, 1915, KC-AJA. Recall the letter to Alex Aaronsohn on the matter of Jewish pro-German sympathies, Ch. 8, p. 193, and the paragraph that follows.

21 Simon to Kallen, November 28, 1915, KC-AJA.

22 Weizmann to Kallen, November 24, 1915, KC-AJA.

23 Kallen to Weizmann, December 6, 1915, KC-AJA. "Forces of democracy" is Kallen's euphemism for support of the Allies in the war.

24 Harlan Phillips, ed. Felix Frankfurter Reminiscences (New York, 1960), pp. 105-106. See also Ch. 6, p. 140 for the origin of the Kallen-Percy link.

25 Eustace Percy to Alfred Zimmern, December 5, 1915, KC-AJA.

26 Kallen to Stephen Wise, January 21, 1916, KC-AJA.

27 Kallen to Zimmern, January 14, 1916, KC-AJA. Note Kallen's characterization of the "right kind of leadership"; this is how he had wanted to act as leader of the Parushim. See H. M. Kallen, Zionism and World Politics (New York, 1921), pp. 145-146, for his complete description of the politics involved in forming the Congress Organization Committee. There is no indication either in Kallen's correspondence or in sources on Zionist history whether Kallen's plan was ever carried out. His letters to Schiff of July 1917 (Ch. 8, pp. 194-195) would indicate that by the time America entered the war the problem still had not been solved.
28 Phillips, Frankfurter, p. 105; Percy to Zimmern, February 13, 1916, KC-AJA.

29 Simon to Kallen, March 5, 1916, KC-AJA. Simon felt that the Americans were veering towards Territorialism—the acceptance of any suitable territory, not necessarily Palestine, as the Jewish homeland. Kallen vigorously denied this assertion (Kallen to Simon, March 22, 1916, KC-AJA).

30 Yonathan Shapiro, Leadership of the American Zionist Organization (Urbana, Ill., 1971), pp. 94-95.

31 Kallen to Simon, July 29, 1916, KC-AJA. Note that, despite Kallen's assurances to the contrary, Brandeis did resign as Chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee as a result of the incident mentioned in this letter, becoming, instead, Honorary Chairman, and an anonymous, and weaker, influence. "Amateur Gentile" is Kallen's phrase for assimilationist Jews.

32 Simon to Kallen, November 16, 1916, KC-AJA.

33 Kallen to Simon, May 4, 1917, KC-AJA.

34 Simon to Kallen, May 26, 1917, KC-AJA. Recall that Simon was the leading British expert on Achad Ha'am.

35 Simon to Kallen, August 5, 1917, KC-AJA.

36 Kallen to Jacob deHaas, November 8, 1917, KC-AJA.

37 Kallen to Simon, November 20, 1917, KC-AJA.

Chapter 10

1 Kallen to Stephen Wise, April 15, 1915, KC-AJA.


3 Wise to Kallen, September 13, 1915; Wise to Kallen, October 31, 1917; Kallen to Wise, November 2, 1917, KC-AJA. From 1915 on, a sentence or two repeating these themes, either entreatimg people to come to Madison for "full and complete" discussions, or regretting, often apologetically, the fact that he could not leave the mid-West, appeared in nearly all of Kallen's letters.
Notes--Chapter 10

4 Kallen to Alfred Zimmern, February 17, March 11, 1916, KC-AJA.

5 Ezekiel Rabinowitz, Justice Louis D. Brandeis (New York, 1968), Ch. IV, refers to Brandeis' Zionist leadership, after he resigned as Chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee, as that of a "silent leader." Wise to Kallen, June 11, 1917, KC-AJA.


7 Kallen to Wise, September 22, 1917; Jacob deHaas to Kallen, January 22, 1917, KC-AJA. deHaas, in his reference to "national culture states in America," was presenting a not uncommon misinterpretation of Kallen's theory of cultural pluralism.

8 Kallen to Wise, September 22, 1917, KC-AJA. Aside, perhaps, from Kallen's note to deHaas of November 8, 1917 (Ch. 9, p. 232), this is the only overt statement by Kallen in all of his correspondence that indicates his awareness of the importance of his work. That he was forced to make such a statement indicates how pressured he felt to justify his position, both to himself and to others. Compare the tone of this letter with those of late 1914 (Ch. 6, pp. 146-160) when he was clearly in command of things.

9 Wise to Kallen, September 24, 1917, KC-AJA. Wise did not convince Kallen on the Congress issue, and gave up trying: "I am not going to write about the Congress, for I am afraid that nothing can be done with you. If you knew the New York situation and knew all that threatens and all that is, I am sure you would come around to my way of thinking. But I promised not to discuss the matter, and I won't" (Wise to Kallen, October 8, 1917, KC-AJA).

10 Wise to Kallen, December 7, 1917, KC-AJA. The Commissions to which Wise referred were to aid in expressing the American Zionist position at the various European post-war conferences.

11 Kallen to Wise, December 13, 1917, KC-AJA.

12 Wise to Kallen, December 17, 1917, KC-AJA. At about this same time Kallen also was "frozen out" of Menorah Society activity. The letters cited in Notes 10-12 deal with this issue, as does a later exchange between Kallen and Hurwitz, November 29, December 2 and December 3, 1918, KC-AJA.
Notes--Chapter 10

13 Zimmer to Kallen, August 8, 1915, KC-AJA.

14 Kallen admitted to me recently that he had actually " despised" organization functionaries like deHaas (Interview with Schmidt, August 1973). Note, also, that at this time Kallen was writing regularly to people like Barrett Wendell, George Donlin (editor of the Dial, to which Kallen was a contributing editor) and Randolph Bourne; these letters, however, rarely touched on Zionist issues.

15 Interview with Schmidt, August 1973; Kallen to Julian Mack, November 27, 1918, KC-AJA. This letter confirms several of the observations about Kallen suggested in the previous paragraphs; notice, for example, the "preachy" tone. The "Dear Julian" contrasts with Kallen's more formal mode of address to Brandeis, Wise, and others; it lends some credence to Kallen's claim of a personal relationship with Mack.


17 Interview with Schmidt, July 1972. I have taken some liberty in editing out my questions in order to condense Dr. Kallen's responses.

Despite claims that the Americans had contributed some of the wording of the Balfour Declaration, recent scholarship has shown this to be untrue. See Herbert Parzen, "Brandeis and the Balfour Declaration," in Herzl Year Book V (New York 1963) and Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (New York, 1961), pp. 531-532.

18 Kallen, "International Aspects of Zionism," pp. 8-9, KC-AJA.

19 Kallen's letters to Brandeis and to Frankfurter are in Ch. 7, pp. 171 and 173. Note that his letter to Sidney Webb in Ch. 8, paralleling some of those in this chapter, was a product of his 1918 preoccupation with "Utopia." See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (Boston, 1957), pp. 37-39, for a discussion of 1917-1918 progressive legislation, and the use of the phrase "cooperative commonwealth."

20 Kallen to Zimmern, January 11, 1918, KC-AJA.

21 Kallen to Brandeis, January 17, 1918, KC-AJA. This letter is very close in tone to Kallen's first Zionist letter to Brandeis of December 1913 (Ch. 4, p. 97).
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22 Kallen to Wise, January 18, 1918. As this letter makes clear, Kallen recognized his isolated position by this time.

23 Kallen to Chaim Weizmann, January 17, 1918, KC-AJA. The brief entry for Alfred Zimmern in the Encyclopedia Judaica (Jerusalem, 1972) notes that "Weizmann consulted him [Zimmern] on political questions."

24 Kallen to Zimmern, January 18, 1918, KC-AJA. Since Kallen returned to Zimmern the letter from Weizmann there is no copy of it in his files. Its contents, and Kallen's reaction, can be deduced from the letters that follow.

25 Kallen to Zimmern, March 12, 1918, KC-AJA. Kallen was unsuccessful in several tries to "get over"; he did not visit Europe until 1927.


28 Ibid., 100.

29 Ibid., 127.

30 Ibid., 127-128.

31 Ibid., 128-129.

32 Ibid., 133.

33 Leon Simon to Kallen, July 24, 1918, KC-AJA. In a later letter on this subject (October 22, 1918) Simon specified a "development company" separate from the government, which would carry out public works and buy land on a grand scale to lease to settlers. He also expressed his preference for a form of administration "on the lines of British Crown Colony Government." Despite Kallen's conciliatory phrasing in his letter below of September 7, 1918, Simon's and Kallen's views were obviously not along the same lines. See also Kallen's letters to deHaas and Wise, p. 260.

34 Harry Sacher to Kallen, August 6, 1918, KC-AJA.
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35 Kallen to Simon, September 7, 1918, KC-AJA. For more on the "Pittsburgh resolutions on Palestinian policy," see pp.

36 Kallen to Harry Sacher, September 7, 1918, KC-AJA.

37 Kallen to Jacob deHaas, September 22, 1918, KC-AJA.

38 Kallen to Wise, October 20, 1918, KC-AJA.

39 Kallen to Zimmern, June 17, 1918, KC-AJA.

40 See Appendix A for the text of this memorandum. I have included it in its complete form in an attempt to correct the record, for, in Zionist accounts of this period, historians seem to be totally unaware of Kallen's role in formulating the Pittsburgh Program.


43 Almost every Zionist source dealing with this period quotes the Pittsburgh Program in full. In deference to its author, I cite Kallen, Zionism, pp. 301-302. Interview with Schmidt, July 1972.

44 Interview with Schmidt, July 1972.

45 Simon to Kallen, June 8, 1919, KC-AJA. Dr. Kallen wrote to me February 2, 1973: "I think the time came when we [Leon Simon and Kallen] had little to write about to each other. Our interests diverged to a distance letters couldn't bridge... ."

46 Simon to Kallen, August 3, 1919, KC-AJA.

Chapter 11

1 Rufus Learsi [Israel Goldberg], Fulfilment (Cleveland, 1951), p. 221.

2 Ibid., p. 219.


6 Louis Brandeis, Brandeis on Zionism (New York, 1942), pp. 113-115. The most completely researched description of the London Conference, with many details I have summarized only briefly, is in an article by George Berlin, "The Brandeis-Weizmann Dispute," in American Jewish Historical Quarterly (September 1970), 37-68.


8 Learsi, Fulfilment, p. 224.

9 Ibid., p. 225.


12 Learsi, Fulfilment, pp. 226-227. For Lipsky's feelings on the 1921 Convention, see "Early Days," 483-484; for Kallen's view, see Zionism, p. 284.

13 Schwartz, "Zionism," pp. 59-60. The Americans were unsuccessful in their attempts to influence the wording of the Mandatory Agreement.

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15 Kallen to the Executive Committee, Zionist Organization of America, March 11, 1919, KC-AJA.

16 Kallen to Alfred Zimmern, April 15, 1919, KC-AJA. After several attempts and much wire-pulling, Kallen's passport application was denied "for practical reasons." Kallen to E. Mohl, March 10, 1920, KC-AJA.

17 Kallen to Jacob de Haas, May 10, 1919, KC-AJA.

18 Learsi, Fulfilment, p. 213; Kallen to Julian Mack, February 28, 1919, KC-AJA.

Several letters written at this time indicated both Kallen's disappointment and the reasons he wanted to go, e.g., Kallen to Herbert Croly, April 23, 1919: "A division has arisen in the application of the [Pittsburgh] Program and the liberals [on the Commission] need strengthening" (KC-AJA).

19 Zimmern to Kallen, August 28, 1919, KC-AJA. The underscoring appears in the original, in different pen marks from that of Zimmern; apparently it had been done by Kallen to guide him in framing a reply.


21 Norvin Lindheim to Kallen, September 18, 1920, KC-AJA.

22 Kallen to Lindheim, September 20, 1920, KC-AJA.


25 Shapiro, Leadership, p. 120.

26 Kallen to de Haas, September 23, 1920, KC-AJA. de Haas had concluded his letter to Kallen, "To simplify the immediate task I should be glad to have your conclusions without any statement of reasons. . . ." This clearly was impossible for Kallen.

27 Kallen to Abraham Savitsky, December 21, 1920, KC-AJA. Kallen's objections to the Zeiri Zion were similar to Brandeis' objections to the meetings of the European Zionists in London in 1919 and 1920. Cf. Kallen's letter to me of June 1, 1973, discussing his reasons for forming the Parushim: "It was . . . perhaps as an antithesis to the prevailing
organizational looseness and combinations of verbal intensity and minimal action [of the Federation of American Zionists]."

28Kallen, Zionism, pp. viii, 277; Ch. 13-18, passim. Several secondary sources on Zionism have used Kallen's information, often paragraphs at a time, rarely with attribution. The ideas in Zionism represent a distillation of Kallen's Zionist formulations, as discussed in Ch. 3.

29"Vita Nuova?" was published, in an abridged version, as "Facing the Facts of Palestine" in The Menorah Journal (August, September 1921).


31Ibid., pp. 277-278. See Ch. 12 for a more complete discussion of some of the implications of this paragraph.

32L. D. Brandeis to Kallen, November 11, 1920, KC-AJA.

33Kallen to Brandeis, January 3, 1921, Brandeis Papers, Zionist Archives, New York. At this time Kallen had begun to teach at the New School for Social Research; therefore, the New York address.

Kallen wrote to me on February 2, 1973 about this letter: "I needed to decide, in the context of an illness and the imminence of middle age, where and how I could do best and most to help the Zionist dream come true. And it was clear enough that it couldn't be in Palestine, whether as a Halutz [pioneer] or a Zionist official. Looking back, I believe my decision was right, the more so because . . . the urgent need for a realistic program of building a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine was made a tail to Weizmann's [Zionist] diaspora program. . . ."

34Kallen later developed the economic theories in "Vita Nuova?" more completely, and in 1936 published them as The Decline and Rise of the Consumer. See also Ch. 2, p. 58.

35Kallen to Hyman Morrison, January 5, 1921, KC-AJA.

36The New Palestine Society: A Brief Statement of Aims and Organization, KC-AJA.

Notes--Chapter 11

38 Schwartz, "Zionism," p. 61; "Memorandum on the Necessary Contents of the Charter of the (proposed) Palestine Cooperative Trading and Credit Company" (4 pp.), KC-AJA.

39 Ibid.

40 Nathan Straus, Jr. to Kallen, June 13, 1921, KC-AJA.


42 H. M. Kallen, Unpublished Address before the Harvard Menorah Banquet, December 12, 1921, KC-AJA.

43 Interview with Schmidt, August 1973.

44 Shapiro, Leadership, pp. 180-181.


Chapter 12

1 Walter Laqueur's A History of Zionism (New York, 1972) provides excellent documentation for the assertion that a major proportion of Zionist energies went into intra-organization feuds and maneuvering for power.


7 Interview with Schmidt, July 1972.
Notes--Chapter 12

8 Interview with Schmidt, July 1972. Quoted in more complete context in Ch. 2, p. 40.

9 Kallen to Schmidt, June 8, 1973; Interview with Schmidt, August 1973.


11 Kallen, Zionism, p. 133. In a letter to me, June 8, 1973, Kallen noted that the word "scientific" in this quote would have had for him, and, he thought, for Brandeis also, the connotation of "progressive"--i.e. honestly pragmatic.


13 Kallen, Zionism, p. 133.

14 For a more complete discussion of Diaspora Nationalism, see Shapiro, Leadership, pp. 20-23. Kallen's theory of cultural pluralism often was misunderstood to imply the acceptance of Diaspora Nationalism (recall deHaas' letter, Ch. 10, p. 237). But the concept of complete separation was, and is, anathema to Kallen. His thesis insists that each nationality, each "instrument," must join with others to contribute towards a more beautiful "symphony."

15 Brandeis, Brandeis on Zionism, p. 126.


Appendix

1 The original of this bears the note, in Kallen's handwriting, "1st corrected draft--12/6/18--H. M. Kallen." Kallen regularly places the day of the month before the month, i.e., this was completed June 12, 1918, to be submitted to the 1918 Convention of the Zionist Organization in America, meeting in Pittsburgh.
2Kallen left this incomplete in the original. On February 2, 1973, Kallen wrote to me,

The incompleteness of I(c) was due, I merely feel, I don't know, to dissatisfaction with provisions that should respect what I hold to be the animal instinct for ownership, which most animals manifest, without justifying and protecting property. . . . This involves the relation of labor . . . to sense of ownership, the role of teamwork and consumer cooperation. I still seek a satisfactory phrasing.
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