ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: WAR AND RESISTANCE: THE PHILIPPINES, 1942-1944

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What happened in the Philippine Islands between the surrender of Allied forces in May 1942 and MacArthur’s return in October 1944? Existing historiography is fragmentary and incomplete. Memoirs suffer from limited points of view and personal biases. No academic study has examined the Filipino resistance with a critical and interdisciplinary approach. No comprehensive narrative has yet captured the fighting by 260,000 guerrillas in 277 units across the archipelago. This dissertation begins with the political, economic, social and cultural history of Philippine guerrilla warfare. The diverse Islands connected only through kinship networks. The Americans reluctantly held the Islands against rising Japanese imperial interests and Filipino desires for independence and social justice. World War II revealed the inadequacy of MacArthur’s plans to defend the Islands. The General tepidly prepared for guerrilla operations while Filipinos spontaneously rose in armed resistance. After his departure, the chaotic mix of guerrilla groups were left on their own to battle the Japanese and each other. While guerrilla leaders vied for local power, several obtained radios to contact MacArthur and his headquarters sent submarine-delivered agents with supplies and radios that tie these groups into
a united framework. MacArthur’s promise to return kept the resistance alive and dependent on the United States. The repercussions for social revolution would be fatal but the Filipinos’ shared sacrifice revitalized national consciousness and created a sense of deserved nationhood. The guerrillas played a key role in enabling MacArthur’s return. Their legacy shaped Philippine national identity and the political contest between exiled officials, collaborationists, and the members of resistance. The research presented in this dissertation crosses military, cultural, social, political, economic and diplomatic fields. It gives voice to the Filipino, Japanese, and American actors and shows how their actions and stories are not only interrelated but interdependent. In this way it hopes to reach several audiences at once. For the military student, this case study reveals the multiple and particular roots of guerrilla warfare. For others, it reveals the fundamental role of military action in important social and cultural developments. Finally, and most essentially, it tells a fascinating story that has been long ignored.
War and Resistance: The Philippines 1942-1944

by

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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Forward

What happened in the Philippine Islands between the surrender of the Allied forces in May 1942 and MacArthur’s return in October 1944? During the two-and-a-half years between the worst defeat in the history of the United States Army and the greatest single loss of soldiers in the Japanese Army’s history, at least 260,000 guerrillas in 277 units resisted the Japanese across the archipelago but the existing historiography about their struggle is fragmentary and incomplete.¹ Works by former political figures, noncombatants and guerrilla leaders offer points of view constrained by the limits of personal experiences and biases. No historian has yet provided a comprehensive examination of the Philippine resistance with the interdisciplinary approach the subject demands. The result has produced a glaring gap in history.

The seventy-eight volume official history of the United States Army in World War II includes four books addressing the Philippines. *The Fall of the Philippines* (1953) concluded with Lieutenant General Jonathan Wainwright’s surrender on 6 May 1942 which it labeled “The End of Resistance.”² The author, Louis Morton, left a misleading impression when he wrote: “…by 9 June all forces in the Philippines, with the exception of certain small detachments in isolated areas, had surrendered… The six-month-long

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¹ See Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling, *Lapham’s Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines 1942-1945* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press: 1996), 225. Lapham argues that many of this Filipino numbers were “spurious” claims while 100,000 true guerrillas were rejected.

struggle for control of the Philippine Archipelago was over.” Following a volume describing the Allied advance towards the Islands, the series resumed with MacArthur’s reappearance on 20 October 1944 in Leyte: The Return to the Philippines (1954). This book contained only a brief acknowledgement of guerrilla operations preceding the American invasion. What happened in the Philippines between those events apparently did not merit mention.

These U.S. Army histories are a singular but by no means isolated example of the conspicuous absence of the Philippine resistance from the historiography of World War II. Tens of thousands of pages in the hundred books recently recommended by the West Point history department contain only two references to the guerrillas: Robert B. Aspery’s two-volume, 1,391-page, War in the Shadows: the Guerilla in History devotes fifteen pages to their story while Ronald H. Spector’s Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan contributes two of 561 pages to these guerrillas. Even more recent seminal works such as Edward J. Drea’s Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945 and John Costello’s The Pacific War 1941-1945 make little or no mention the Philippine guerrillas.

Academic studies on this subject are few and narrow. Notably, Bernard Norling, former professor emeritus at the University of Notre Dame, wrote of the American guerrillas in Northern Luzon up to 1943. Matthew Andres published a 144-page study of

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3 Ibid., 582.
the Filipino guerrillas in Luzon. U.S. Army Major Peter T. Sinclair II wrote a Command and General Staff College masters thesis, “Men of Destiny: The American and Filipino Guerrillas During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines,” that became a short book of the same name. Unfortunately, these works are too limited in time, space, and subject to provide comprehensive understanding of the events in the Islands.

Histories of irregular warfare prove no better on this subject. A prominent U.S. Army study on irregular warfare by Kalev Sepp identified forty-eight insurgencies in the twentieth century including three in the Philippines: the fight against the Americans in 1899-1902; the Hukbalahap Rebellion in 1946-1954; and, the New People’s Army and Moro Liberations Front revolts that began in 1970. David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964), Francois Sully’s Age of the Guerrilla (1968), and Robert Taber’s The War of the Flea (1970) focused on Vietnam and the Cold War. They led a new wave of interest in guerrilla warfare but one with limited perspective as reflected by U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine: “the modern era of insurgencies and internal wars began after World War II” as “national and transnational revolutionary movements.” These works thus both ignore the Philippine resistance in World War II and frame all guerrilla warfare within the constructs of Maoist revolutionary war theory. Accordingly, all guerrilla warfare is seen as part of phased revolutionary war

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6 Matthew Andres, Pinoy at War (Chicago: Andres Historical Solutions, LLC., 20 January 2013).
8 One author of current US Army counterinsurgency doctrine, John Nagl, noted that of all its source material, “perhaps none was as important as David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.” United States Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-34, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 2007), 7
10 Galula opened his book with a quote from Mao Tse-Tung and throughout equated insurgency and guerrilla warfare with Mao’s concept of protracted revolutionary war. Galula, xi, 1-3.
aimed at social change and culminating in the creation of conventional forces to conduct decisive military operations. The Philippine resistance did not fit this model.


Any search for evidence to fill this blank space in historiography faces daunting challenges. The memoirs of isolated guerrilla leaders and other actors tend to be myopic, cryptic and prone to exaggeration.\(^{12}\) Rumors and Japanese propaganda distorted their perceptions.\(^{13}\) The traces of their experiences captured in the documents and records collected by MacArthur’s headquarters lacked context and were further compromised by

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\(^{12}\) For example, as the U.S. forces made their way across Luzon and Leyte, Fertig entered into his diary, “My own opinion is that the land fighting, at no time, has been as serious as communiqués would make you believe.” Wendell Fertig, *Fertig Diary*, October 27 1944, Wendell W. Fertig Papers, Diary, 1943-1945, Message Traffic intelligence Summaries Later Conference, Box 1 of 2, The United States Army Heritage and Education Center Archives, Ridgeway Hall, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

\(^{13}\) See Russell W. Volckmann, *We Remained: Three Years Behind Enemy Lines in the Philippines* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1954), 105-105. Sometimes the unfulfilled rumors of impending Allied invasion were worse on popular morale than any Japanese propaganda.
requirements for military secrecy. Censorship regulations forbade soldiers from reporting locations of operations, escapes from enemy custody, Japanese propaganda, mistreatment of POWs, and even malarial control efforts. Commanders barred the publication of any photographs that could reveal the effects of operations, disparage U.S. and Allied forces, or “be distorted by the enemy and used as propaganda.”

Language barriers present additional difficulties: I do not speak Japanese or many of the languages spoken in the Philippines. Fortunately, the pertinent Philippine sources are available in English. Unfortunately, the 102-volume Japanese War History known as the Senshi Sōsho is just now being translated. The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR), with associated organizations such as the Corts Foundation and the Australia-Japan Research Project, has only recently translated the first volume of the vital work. Even so, enough postwar U.S. military intelligence translations of Japanese documents and interrogations – and Japanese academic works published in English – is available to gain the degree of knowledge of the Japanese perspective this effort requires.

14 AIB deputy Colonel Allison Ind got “an exclusive channel” for the AIB to be kept secret even from the guerrilla leaders. See “Radio Communications–Philippines,” Ind to Merle-Smith, 14 January 1943, in “Papers of Courtney Whitney,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, Box No. 63, Records Group 16.
15 See Appendix 6, USAFFE Regulations No. 1-25, “Censorship Regulations Regulating Private Correspondence,” 8 December 1943. Charles A. Willoughby Papers, Intelligence Series: Operations of Military Civilian Censorship, Box 9 of 13, The United States Army Heritage and Education Center Archives, Ridgeway Hall, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
16 See Appendix 4, USAFFE Regulation No. 1-25, “Processing and Censoring of Film,” 16 November 1943, Charles A. Willoughby Papers, Intelligence Series: Operations of Military Civilian Censorship, Box 9 of 13, The United States Army Heritage and Education Center Archives, Ridgeway Hall, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
17 The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR) and associated organizations such as the Corts Foundation and the Australia-Japan Research Project have made available in English the first volume regarding the Dutch East Indies.
The particular influences operating upon archives present barriers of their own.18 Two of the three major collections of Philippine guerillas records are U.S. government controlled: the National Archives at College Park, Maryland, and the United States Army Heritage and Education Center Archives in Ridgway Hall in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The third is the MacArthur Memorial Archives in Norfolk, Virginia. While the archivists I have worked at these locations with have been unfailingly professional and helpful, the government does not always make materials available. Alfred W. McCoy noted how for 35 years the U.S. government withheld as classified vital records relating to Ferdinand Marcos’ war service.19 During the research for this work, the U.S. Army withdrew from public access all records of former Philippine guerillas Russell Volckmann, Donald Blackburn and Wendell Fertig related to their drafting of U.S. Army Special Forces doctrine.20 Additionally, these archives draw almost exclusively from, or through, U.S. military sources. Filipino voices are largely absent.

Postwar politics raised even more barriers. In 1945, Ferdinand Marcos petitioned the U.S. Army for recognition as the wartime leader of the Ang Mga Maharlika guerrilla group in Luzon.21 He claimed to have formed this unit on 1 December 1942, and later expanded it to 131 officers and over 8,000 men.22 Marcos asserted that he had led these men in constant battle against the Japanese and later even claimed the title of ‘most

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20 I discovered this at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and the U.S Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, N.C. in the spring of 2015.
21 See Marcos’ petition online at UP Third World Studies Center site at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3IczjzkKCDkJV2FqMDIOemZYnVk/view
decorated Filipino veteran’ with thirty-two medals for heroism, two from the United States Army.\textsuperscript{23} Into the 1980s, Filipino writers were still “discovering” documents revealing his “super exploits” during the war.\textsuperscript{24} As Jeff Gerth of the \textit{New York Times} reported, Marcos’ guerrilla history was “central to his political appeal.”\textsuperscript{25} The intricate politics of the Marcos regime complicated the historiography of the resistance. Philippine President Manuel Quezon once noted: “Under our Constitution what is paramount is ‘not individuals’; it is the good of the State, not the good of the individual which must prevail.”\textsuperscript{26} The good of the state often became entangled with the interests of the person in power. As Ellen Schrecker noted, this turned “dissent into disloyalty.”\textsuperscript{27} History that contradicted Marcos’ legend could be seen as treasonous.

The evidentiary record actually offers some support for Marcos’ claims. On 31 March 1945, MacArthur’s General Headquarters identified Colonel Ferdinand E. Marcos, “ex-Manila lawyer” and an intelligence First Lieutenant on Bataan, as the commander of 13 staff officers and 8,200 troops of the “ANG MANGA MAHALIKI (The Noble Ones)” guerrillas.\textsuperscript{28} The report added however, “Many of the personnel belonging to the MAHALIKI seem to belong to [American guerrilla leader Russell] VOLCKMANN’s organization.”\textsuperscript{29} As Marcos inflated his record in the decades after the war, anyone purporting to tell the history of the resistance was expected to support his story. In 1982,

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Baclagon, \textit{Filipino Heroes} and Ariate and Reyes, Gerth and Brinkley.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Harold M. Vinacke, “Post-War Government and Politics of the Philippines,” \textit{The Journal of Politics}, Vol. 9 No. 4, November 1947, 717.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ellen Schrecker, \textit{Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America} (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), xxiii. See also Colleen Woods, 53.
\item \textsuperscript{28} General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, “Guerrilla Resistance Movements in the Philippine,” 31 March 1945, 22, 45. Box 255, RG 407, Philippines Archive Collection, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 45.
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even the truly heroic Jesus Villamor included in his memoirs distinct recollections of Marcos as an unparalleled warrior on Bataan, a fearless guerrilla leader, and a source of vital intelligence from Luzon and Manila.\textsuperscript{30}

Despite this pressure to conform, some other Luzon guerrilla leaders challenged Marcos’ memories. Robert Lapham wrote, “It seems to me that the critics have the stronger case, that much of Marcos’s wartime heroism was imaginary or at least exaggerated; nevertheless, the whole question has been grievously muddled by postwar American and Philippines politics.”\textsuperscript{31} Finally, in 1985, historian Alfred W. McCoy discovered documents confirming long-held suspicions that Marcos’ claims were “distorted, exaggerated, fraudulent, contradictory and absurd.”\textsuperscript{32}

By then the influence of the Cold War and Marcos’s politics had discolored the history of the resistance. One example was the obscuration of the wartime history of the Socialists, Communists and Sakdal party members. These movements coalesced first into an anti-Japanese United Front and then as the Hukbalahap guerrilla movement. When the prewar Filipino elites returned to power, the Hukbalahaps became a threat to the “good of the state” and Cold War order. As Colleen Woods explained, “by branding dissent as subversion, Filipino and American anti-communists contended that the state was not required to allow those deemed as communists the freedoms a liberal state promised its citizens.”\textsuperscript{33} The state’s subsequent victory in its ten-year conflict with the Huks threw a shadow over the substantial role the social revolutionaries had played in the resistance

\textsuperscript{32} Gerth and Brinkley.
against Japan. Even many Huks sought to forget much about their wartime record. In a
188-page autobiography written in prison, Huk leader Luis Taruc dedicated barely two
pages to the war tersely noting “that errors were made and that innocent people died.”

Finally, racism – conscious or unconscious – raises concerns for researchers. Memoirs and records show flashes of conscious feelings of racial superiority or victimhood. These feelings filtered recollections. Worse, they colored popular memory of
the guerrilla resistance in the Philippines during the war.

If historical literature on the Philippine resistance is inadequate, the representation
of the event in popular film has been almost wholly imaginary. Wartime American
propagandists quickly seized upon the resistance to rally public morale. The September
1942 movie Manila Calling featured Cornel Wilde and Lloyd Nolan as Americans who
organized and led Filipino guerrillas against the Japanese. A parade of similar films
followed in 1943: Wallace Beert’s Salute to the Marines, Otto Kruger’s Corregidor,
Claudette Colbert’s So Proudly We Hailed!, and Bataan with Robert Taylor. John
Wayne’s Back to Bataan (1945) rushed to include scenes of the return of U.S. forces that
occurred during filming. These movies uniformly reinforced an image of Filipino
insurgents as American-led adjuncts to MacArthur’s operations.

The passage of time has done little to correct this perception. After a five year
delay, in 1950 Twentieth Century Fox released a Fritz Lang movie starring Tyrone
Power, American Guerrilla in the Philippines, based on the novel by Pulitzer Prize

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34 Luis Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger Publishers, 1967), 23
Lloyd Nolan and Carole Landis Opens at Globe—Counter-Espionage Featured at Rialto,” New York
accessed 20 April 2015.

In all these movies Americans lead the fight and Filipinos serve as brave supporting characters. Hollywood no doubt felt compelled to depict heroic Americans in lead roles to satisfy audiences and generate box office receipts. Some of the early movies were reportedly even banned in parts of the American South for depicting integrated Fil-Am fighting units.\textsuperscript{37} Cold War viewers could find solace in depictions of successful American leaders and loyal allies. Against the backdrop of the gap in historiography, these movies compounded the problems of politics to help corrupt popular memory of the Philippine resistance during World War II.

The chapters that follow set out to overcome these barriers and correct this record by investigating sources across a wide range of disciplines to present a comprehensive investigation of the actors and events of the Philippine resistance. Where practicable, it places this narrative in the context of guerrilla warfare theory to add to our understanding of the conduct of resistance. It also listens to the voices of Filipino, Japanese, and


American actors to gain their perspectives and grasp their motivations. Only through the synthesis of all their experiences can we capture the interconnected and interdependent nature of their struggle. In the end, this work provides the first comprehensive history of the Philippine resistance across the Islands throughout the period of MacArthur’s absence.

This work is organized chronologically, in three parts, to demonstrate the synthesis of events. Part one is a historical review in two chapters to set the context of Philippine history highlighting the fragmented character of the country and its people, their tradition of armed revolt against foreign occupation, the evolution of popular social and economic divisions, and the Philippines’ changing relations with Japan and the United States. The second chapter explores the convergence of pending independence from the United States, an emerging social revolution within the Philippines, and the initiation of war by Japan.

The body of this work is in the eleven chapters of the second section. These form the narrative of the Philippines resistance and include only the briefest mention of the conventional military operations involved in the fall of the Philippines or the wider war at large. It includes analysis of previously unacknowledged factors that had major affect on the resistance: food, radios, submarines, disease, etc. It also explores integral issues such as the cultural consequences of Japanese occupation policies and the experience of women.

38 This work incorporates 49 primary and secondary sources on the Filipino experience, 38 on the Japanese, and 32 on the Americans. It draws from an additional 125 works on general military, economic, cultural, and diplomatic history related to my subject – including 21 prominent works on insurgency and counterinsurgency theory.
The final section of the dissertation consists of two chapters. The first describes MacArthur’s return and its relation to the resistance. The last is a conclusion that examines trends, provides observations, and briefly looks beyond the war to put the resistance into a historical perspective.

The American Battle Monuments Commission built only two monuments to the Philippine guerrillas of World War II: one is a commemoration of Cabanatuan raid with a minor reference to the guerrillas, and the other a memorial at the 152-acre Manila American Cemetery at old Fort McKinley.\footnote{\textit{The erection of monuments by the troops “was expressly forbidden by the military services.” Elizabeth Nishiura, American Battle Monuments” A Guide to Military cemeteries and Monuments Maintained by the American Battle Monuments Commission} (Detroit, Michigan: Omnimgraphics, Inc., 1989), 8.} There, the Southwest Room of the Chapel features an inscription that reads: “For over three years the Philippine Islands suffered under enemy occupation while the United States forces fought their way back. During these long years the courageous guerrillas fought unceasingly to keep alive the flame of hope in the oppressed but loyal civilian population.”\footnote{Ibid., 342.} This is that story.
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1. Three Roads to War

For hundreds of years the diverse people on the islands called the Philippines conducted isolated and sporadic resistance against the Spanish. The American determination to leave the Islands opened the door for rising Japanese imperial interests.

On the eve of World War II, the Philippines were still very much “a socially and geographically fragmented nation.”41 Grouped and named in 1542 for the Spanish king by adventurer Ruy López de Villalobos, the Philippines existed as a little more than a geographical expression. It consisted of more than 7,100 islands stretching 1,150 miles, the distance from Washington, D. C., to Denver, with a total land area only the size of Arizona (Maps 1). These islands contained twelve major ethno-linguistic groups separated by waterways, jungles and mountains into more than a hundred identifiable tribes speaking seventy dialects (Map 2). Even before the arrival of the Spanish, itinerate Arab, Chinese and Malayan migrant populations added to the Islands’ diverse coastal communities.42

Journalist and U.S. Army intelligence agent Yay Panlilio catalogued the diverse mixture of natives and migrants by describing a range of facial types: “Chinese blood gives a fair, fine-textured skin. Spanish heightens the bone structure and, like Portuguese and Italian, makes for beautiful eyes; only the Hindu, called ‘Bombay,’ bequeaths a larger, deeper, more lustrous eye. German and Swiss blood is weak and usually loses to

Map 1: The Philippine Islands
Map 2: Locations of Major Ethnic Groups in the Philippines.

the Malay, but English and American half-breeds are strikingly Occidentalized, so much so that they sometimes lack the piquant, petite charm of the oriental.”"^{43} By 1941, these Filipinos identified themselves not by nationality but by family ties.

Political scientists like Jean Grossholtz have identified the Philippine family as “the strongest unit of society, demanding the deepest loyalties of the individual and coloring all social activity with its own set of demands” and noted that “the communal values of the family are often in conflict with the impersonal values of the institutions of the larger society.”"^{44} As Alfred W. McCoy explained, family meant more than the political term household or the ethnographers’ idea of kinship: “Seeking a term that describes the political role of family, we might use kinship network, that is, a working coalition drawn from a larger group related by blood, marriage and ritual.”"^{45} Assuming six children per family, each Filipino could count 825 family members in a kinship network that included both paternal and maternal lines."^{46} Marriage doubled that number. The networks then increased through personal and ritual relationships and often surpassed “linguistic boundaries.”"^{47} For colonial powers, the primacy of family ties limited the value of national institutions as a means of population control.

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^{46} “If we make a reasonable assumption that each couple in the Philippines has an average of 6 children, then it follows that and average individual has some 5 siblings, 6 children, 30 nieces and nephews, 10 uncles and aunts, 60 first cousins, 120 first cousins of his parents, and 720 second cousins. If all these are married, they link the individual into the similar families of each of their spouses.” Brian Fegan, “Entrepreneurs in Votes and Violence,” *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 51.

The Spaniards learned to leverage native kinship networks. Borrowing a Malaysian title, they officially recognized local clan leaders as *datus* – chieftains under the Spanish suzerain. They chose not to teach Spanish as a common language in the Philippines so as to keep natives from uniting in opposition to their rule. They did however support the Catholic Church in efforts to convert the Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims and practitioners of native faiths. Tribal chiefs, rajas, and datus uneasily received new priests, captains and governors and reached accommodation with the Spanish bureaucracy and church, turning “barangays” into “pueblos and barrios.”

Except for the southern Muslim areas, Catholicism provided the basis for a first common Philippine identity. Filipinos embraced the Gospel concepts of redemption yet, as Communist guerrilla leader Luis Taruc observed, “it would be misleading for North Americans and Europeans to equate the highly organized Catholic life they know, which revolves around the Church and clergy, with Catholic life in the Philippines.” During the 400 years of Spanish rule, most Filipinos lived too far from churches to attend mass regularly; priests came to them on days of fiestas. None but the urban wealthy and well-connected citizens could enjoy association through elaborate rituals in big churches.

The involvement of the Church justified the Spanish empire and helped pacify its subjects. The crown granted the armies of Augustinian, Dominican, and Recollect missionaries large tracts of land to administer. The Church managed *encomiendas*, estates with vassal labor or *haciendas* renting to tenant farmers. The Church also provided a rare institutional space for Filipinos through native education and ordinations that helped bond the people with the Spanish crown. Baptisms, confirmations and weddings

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49 Matsuda, 60.
expanded kinship networks. In this way the Church aided government efforts to connect local clan leaders into a web of elites spanning the Islands.\textsuperscript{52}

Seven hundred years of Islamic dominance in Spanish history shaped the character of the colonial bureaucracy in the Philippines. As Patricia Seed noted, Islamic concepts of tribute-collecting (jizya), census-taking, and ethnically segregated townships (ahl al-dhimma) reemerged in the sixteenth century Spanish colonial practices.\textsuperscript{53} The Umayyad Caliphate had placed Spain under requerimiento, an edict required subjugated people to convert voluntarily or face harsh punishment.\textsuperscript{54} The Spanish imposed religious uniformity in a similar manner across their empire. Yet Spain’s colonialism “was first of all a military conquest.”\textsuperscript{55} The administration enforced its policies with little tolerance of native dissent leading to outbreaks of violence, especially around the large populations in Manila and the Pampango language areas.\textsuperscript{56}

Periodic and localized revolt characterized Philippine colonial history. In 1574 the pirate Limahong led a Chinese settlement on Luzon against the Spanish.\textsuperscript{57} The imperial administration responded by incorporating Chinese community, clan, and business societies into the Gremios de Chinos captain system, similar to the datu system, as a means of enforcing order. Japan’s new ruler Toyotomi Hideyoshi sought to exploit the revolts and demanded the surrender of the Philippines. Diplomacy placated the Japanese but the Chinese community in Manila again rebelled in 1603. Three thousand Japanese

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{52} “The country is most unified in its elites,” Kessler, 5. \\
\textsuperscript{53} Seed, 78-88. \\
\textsuperscript{54} Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 69. \\
\textsuperscript{55} Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, Latin American Politics and Development (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, In., 1996), 15. \\
\textsuperscript{56} Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling, Lapham’s Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines 1942-1945 (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 126. \\
\textsuperscript{57} Matsuda, 61.}
residents in the city rose up against the Spanish three years later. Violent rebellions in the Islands would occur about every twenty years thereafter.

Spain found Muslim populations in the southern islands impossible to control. In 1639 Augustinian friars established fortified bases around Lake Lanao in their effort to convert the “stronghold of heathenism” in Mindanao. Typhoons, volcanoes, Dutch interventions, and thousands of Moro troops under Sultan Kudarat drove the Spaniards out of the area. They would not return until the nineteenth century. Islam proved an impermeable barrier to colonization in other unexpected ways. Because Muslims would not accept baptism, there could be no intermarriage with Spaniards and no ties to Spain through kinship networks.

As later explained to American administrators, intermarriage provided a key means for Spanish development of native cooperation: “The Spanish masters bred sons and daughters who frequently were only part Spanish, the other half being Tagalog or some other indigenous tribe, and the class of mestizos multiplied. The social structure of Spanish society was modified to find a place for the mestizos halfway between the Spanish and the Tagalogs, who occupied the lower stratum.” The mestizo children of the elites became a critical link between the colonialists and the colonized peoples.

The elite family-run plantations connected with Spain through the galleon trade known as the situado. Manila collected goods from across the Islands for shipment through Mexico to the rest of the Empire. In return the bureaucrats in Manila distributed “wages for military personnel, compensation for clerks and officials, donations to hospitals, widow’s pensions, and other administrative costs. Tributes and taxes were

58 Ibid.
levied and regularly increased in the islands but were never nearly enough.” 60 Government efforts to make up for revenue shortfalls with mandatory labor routinely met resistance. In 1649 peasants in Samar revolted against efforts to force them to build shipyards in Cavite on Luzon. In 1745, Cavite workers rose up against the imposition of corvée labor and the government seizure of land for Dominican estates. In 1762 Cagayan peasants rebelled against landowner imposed beatings and slave labor.

The inchoate economic development of the Philippines caught the attention of other powers. During the Seven Years War, Great Britain seized and held Manila for two years. Spain’s grip on the Islands slipped further in 1785 when the Royal Philippines Company replaced the galleon merchant monopoly. 61 Foreign competition, rigid bureaucracy and other factors led to its eventual ruin. “Again,” William Lytle Schurz observed, “the voluntary labor of the native Filipinos was not adequate to the gigantic task of developing the resources of the islands, which was an important phase of the company’s program.” 62 British and American companies began to dominate Philippine trade of cash crops produced mostly by wealthy Chinese mestizo families employing tenant labor.

A revolt in 1841 added a new dimension to the tradition of discontent in the Philippines. In 1829 Manila church officials rejected Apoliniario Cruz’s application for the priesthood because he was not Spanish. After joining an order of monks serving a local hospital, Cruz formed the Brotherhood of Saint Joseph (Cofradía de San José) in Tayabas. He banned Spanish and mestizos from the order and began teaching a mix of

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60 Note: The Bull of Demarcation closed the Straights of Good Hope to Spain. Matsuda, 121.
61 Matsuda, 125.
gospel mixed with local beliefs and talismans (*ating-ating*). By 1840 Cruz had over 4,000 followers and decided to seek official recognition from the Church and colonial government. Rejection led to protests, arrests, violence and suppression. During the last week of October 1841, the Brotherhood fought a major battle with government forces in Isabang, Tayabas. The Spanish captured, tried, executed and dismembered Cruz (also known as Hermano Pule). Yet Cruz had introduced a new and volatile combination of Christian faith and armed social revolt in pursuit of salvation. As Kessler noted, growing ideals of Filipino nationalism and independence “found expression in religious forms that peasants easily understood and accepted.”

By the mid-nineteenth century, unrest in the Luzon threatened colonial control. As Paul Rodgers noted: “young mestizos, educated in Europe, came home with the ideas of the French Revolution and began to organize the Filipino people, for whom they acted as leaders and organizers, in a struggle against the few thousand Spaniards who held the power of society.” In *A Report on the Status of the Philippines 1842*, ambassador Sinalbaldo de Mas warned Spain to liberalize policies regarding the “rights of Filipinos” or lose the Philippines.

The Catholic Church was caught between the interests of the Filipinos and Spain. It “trained an increasingly well-educated population of native disciples and teachers” and protected Filipinos from imperial abuses but at the same time it kept native priests in subordinate positions and excluded them from religious orders and influential

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63 Kessler, 9.
64 Rodgers, 20.
assignments. In 1872, the Church withdrew support from the indigenous organization known as Mary’s Honor Guard (Guardia de Honor Maria) and supported the execution of three native priests “for raising grievances that the government condemned as anti-Spanish.” Rejecting traditional protest and revolt, thousands of the organization’s members went into the hills to fight as guerrillas. They formed a commune in Cabaruan, Pangasinan, which lasted until dispersed by the Americans in 1901.

The merger of political and religious revolt also found expression in the example of Dionisio Sigobela. During the 1890s, he lost his farm to hacenderos on Negros, declared himself ‘Pope Isio,’ and led an armed movement in the hills against the rich while preaching independence as a step towards building a “communistic paradise.” The Americans forced him to surrender in 1907 before granting him clemency.

Against this episodic social unrest, the Spanish authorities found allies in the emerging class of native elites who benefited from colonial trade. Over the last century they had thrived in enterprises related to the increased productivity resulting from the replacement of traditional small plot tenure agriculture by large plantation haciendas. As the decreasing availability of land fueled peasant discontent, this rising native middle class gave its support to Spanish rule out of “fear that political revolution would lead to social revolution.” In 1868 they manned the Guardia Civil from local levies to enforce Spanish control. Philippine society stratified into a power hierarchy of “the hacenderos (landowners), non-cultivating tenants, and sharecroppers.”

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66 Matsuda, 252.
67 Ibid.
68 Kessler, 9.
69 Ibid., 7.
71 Kessler, 7.
Despite dependence on the Spanish for their economic and social status, many elite Filipinos had begun embracing thoughts of political independence. Nationalist writers such as Marcelo H. del Pilar and Lopez Jaena popularized calls for political reform in the Propaganda Movement. Jose Rizal published his novels *Touch Me Not* (*Noli Me Tángere*) in 1887 and *The Subversive* (*El Filibusterismo*) in 1891, protesting abuses by Church friars, tax collectors, and colonial administrators. His protagonist, Juan Crisostomo Magsalin Ibarra, fought colonial authorities. Despite official censorship, Filipinos read and shared the stories and their arguments for rights, democratization, education reform, and liberation from Spain. To Spanish ears, the calls for reform sounded like rebellion. The “inability to distinguish between the two” led to Rizal’s arrest. The Spanish executed him by firing squad in 1896.

The decades following 1890 were “disastrous for the peasantry because of epidemics of man and beast, locusts, wars, changes of regime, banditry, collapse of foreign sugar markets, and general economic depression. The landowners reacted to all these threats to their economic interests by squeezing tenants harder.” The hardships led clerk Andres Bonifacio to organize in 1892 three hundred independence supporters into a secret society, the Highest and Most Respectable Society of the Sons of the People (*Kataastaasang Katipunan nang manga Anak Bayan*), better known as the Katipunan. Within a year the organization claimed 10,000 members. The Spanish authorities moved against it, provoking general revolt. “The Katipunan movement, however, was a historic watershed in the linking of nationalism with peasant unrest,” Kessler observed, “bringing together peasant aspirations for religious salvation and bourgeois yearning for national

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72 Kessler, 30.
73 Matsuda, 252.
74 Daniel Doeppers cited by Kessler, 8.
In May 1896, Katipunan leaders José A. Ramos and Doroteo Cortes employed the captain of a Japanese vessel, the Kongo, to carry a message to Oi Kentaro asking for aid, “as France had once aided the American revolutionaries.” Bonifacio then sent a delegation to Tokyo seeking the Emperor’s acceptance of the Philippines as a Japanese protectorate. Additionally, Katipunan secretary Emilio Jacinto negotiated with Admiral Kanimura Hikonojō for help against the Spaniards.

The contacts reflected Japan’s rising stature in international affairs. Twenty-five years after United States ships ‘opened’ Tokyo in 1853, Japan forced previously closed Korea to accept unequal trade relations. In 1893 the Meiji government’s new Overseas Development Society (Shokumin Kyōkai) characterized Japan’s interest in Asia’s resources: “Men in the north, materials in the south.” In the north, Japan went to war with China in 1894. In the south, the Society noted three trends in the Philippines. First, the Spanish were losing their hold over the Islands. Second, the Philippines possessed undeveloped resources and profits. Third, the Spanish were not likely to develop those resources. Japan immediately offered to buy the Philippines from Spain for $200 million. Within the year Japan wrested from China its claim on Korea and possessions including Taiwan, reducing the distance between the Japanese Empire and the Philippines from 1,500 to roughly 200 miles.

Bonifacio began a revolt in Manila in August 1896. Mariano Alvarez, Emilio Aguinaldo and others spread the fight into the provinces. Despite failure in battle, the

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75 Kessler, 10.  
76 Tarling, 4.  
77 Raposas.  
Katipunans declared a national government and elected Aguinaldo president of the new Republic of the Philippines in November 1897. Their war however became increasingly brutal, with Filipinos attacking Filipinos. Aguinaldo arrested Bonifacio for burning a village and had him executed by Katipunan firing squad in 1897. Then, in December, Aguinaldo surrendered to the Spanish “for 800,000 pesos and exile in Hong Kong.”

Fortunes in the Philippine changed dramatically with the United States war against Spain in 1898. U.S. Navy Commodore George Dewey sailed from Hong Kong to Manila Bay and destroyed the Spanish fleet on 1 May. Dewey had won the Philippines, but lacked any troops with which to claim his prize. He sent dispatches of his victory to Hong Kong aboard the USS McCulloch with instructions to bring back Aguinaldo and about forty of his subordinates to take command of rebel Filipino forces. Upon his return Aguinaldo proclaimed: “The great North American nation, a lover of true liberty, and therefore desirous of liberating our country from the tyranny and despotism to which it has been subjected by its rulers, has decided to give us disinterested protection, considering us sufficiently able and civilized to govern ourselves.”

Meanwhile seven German warships under Vice-Admiral Von Diederichs arrived in Manila Bay “for the purpose benefiting the trade relations between Manila and his own country.” The combination of Spanish troops still in Manila and German warships now in the bay worried Dewey. By the time General Wesley Merritt arrived with the first American troops at the end of June, Aguinaldo had already declared the Philippines an independent nation under his administration. President William McKinley feared that

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80 Kessler, 10.
81 Stickney, 74.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 88.
withdrawing from the Philippines would invite foreign powers to take it but at the same
time an American occupation would “engender jealousy and hatred on the part of the
natives which could not be overcome for many years.” As the President wondered what
to do, Merritt’s undermanned force operated under vague and shifting orders.

The Spanish commander in Manila secured Dewey’s promise to keep the rebels
out of the capitol until ships arrived to take his forces back to Spain. Aguinaldo felt
betrayed. “Trusting in the honesty of the Americans and recognizing that our easy
triumph was partly due to their destruction of the Spanish fleet,” he complained, “I have
obtained the friendship of those representatives by assuring them that the Filipinos
preferred an alliance with America to any other nation. Unfortunately my efforts
encountered their pretension, which was as inconceivable as it as firm, that I should be
subservient to their orders.”

By the Treaty of Paris, America paid Spain $20 million dollars for possession of
the Philippines. The next month Aguinaldo declared the First Philippine Republic under
the Malolos Constitution, although his authority hardly reached beyond Luzon’s Bulacan Province. General Merritt assumed duties as the first United States Military Governor of
the Islands and incrementally replaced Spanish rule with American authority. In
February, war broke out between Aguinaldo’s forces and the U.S. Army.

The victory over Spain had left President McKinley with an empire but he was
still not sure what to do with it. He sent a five-man First Philippine Commission under
Cornell University President Jacob Schurman to recommend a policy for the Islands. The
commission toured the Philippines and delivered its report on 3 January 1900. They

84 Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 2000), 5.
85 Stickney, 409-411.
concluded that the Islands were not ready for self-government and were a likely target for occupation by some other power should the United States depart.

Indeed, disciples of Alfred Thayer Mahan in many countries coveted sea bases in the Philippines. 86 Japan’s Foreign Minister, Okuma Shigenbou, instructed his representative in Washington that if the U.S. hesitated to claim the Philippines, Japan was willing to do so jointly or alone “to form, subject to proper conditions, suitable government for the territory.” 87 This was one part of a robust foreign policy manifested by Japan’s contribution of the largest contingent of troops to the nine-nation intervention against the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900. 88 McKinley hesitated but finally decided that America had no choice but to keep the Philippines as a U.S. protectorate until such time as when the Islands were prepared for independence. However, as Walter LeFeber noted, to maintain this new frontier the U.S. would need Japanese cooperation. 89

McKinley’s decision, of course, depended on securing the Philippines. Until his capture in March 1901, Aguinaldo moved from desultory conventional combat to full blown guerrilla warfare against the Americans and their Filipino allies. U.S. generals including Arthur MacArthur responded with violent campaigns against the insurgents, while Governor Generals such as William Howard Taft oversaw programs to benefit friendly Filipinos. The vicious fighting was marked by “shootings of surrendering combatants, torching of villages, and bayonetting of villagers.” 90 Yet it was the failure of American anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan’s presidential bid in 1900 followed by

86 Mahan warned that “the most active days of colonizing” were associated with contests and conflict over coastal bases needed for sea power. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1987), 28-31.
87 Tarling, 5.
89 Ibid.
90 Matsuda, 254-255.
Aguinaldo’s capture the next year that doomed rebel hopes in the Islands. By 1902 at which time President Theodore Roosevelt declared an end to Philippine Insurrection, 126,468 American troops had fought there and lost 4,234 dead and 2,818 wounded; by some accounts 200,000 Filipinos had died, the vast majority from diseases and starvation.  

A significant number of Filipinos allied with the Americans during the war and fell victim to the Katipunan attacks. U.S. Army Lieutenant Matthew Batson converted a remnant Filipino scout unit employed by the Spanish in Macabebe, Pampanga, into the Macabebe Scouts and by 1901 the unit had grown to 15,000 native men in over 50 companies in support of the U.S. Army. In retaliation, insurgents under General Antonio Luna massacred Macabebe’s population and burned its buildings. The Macabebe Scouts would become the Philippine Scouts, a critical part of the Islands’ defense force.

One of the surrendering guerrillas was a young, malaria-ridden lieutenant named Manuel Quezon. He had been moved when Americans returned the body of the brother of his mentor, General Mascardo, along with his belongings and a letter of condolence. Quezon wrote: “What a different picture it gave us of the kind of men the Americans were from that depicted by the Spaniards in the early days after the declaration of war by the United States against Spain.” Quezon’s had also been impressed by two Japanese observers attached to his command, Captain Hara and Lieutenant Nakamori. Most memorable to him, however, was a visit he paid to the captured Aguinaldo: “I felt that the

93 Quezon, 55.
whole world had crumbled; that all my hopes and all my dreams for my country were
gone forever!”

Starved, penniless and sick, Quezon suffered a nervous breakdown.

The Americans compelled the surrendered guerrillas to take an oath of allegiance
to the United States. General Artemio Ricarte refused to comply and instead accepted
exile to Hong Kong. He returned to Manila at the end of 1903 in hopes of renewing the
revolution but was arrested and sentenced to eleven years in Bilibid Prison. In 1910,
Governor William Cameron Forbes released Ricarte but, still refusing the oath of
allegiance, he was again exiled to Hong Kong. In 1915, fearing arrest for revolts in
Manila, Ricarte fled to Yokohama, Japan, where he ran a coffee shop.

Theodore Roosevelt issued Field Orders No. 3 on 28 March 1903 instructing
soldiers to “pay careful attention to local customs and sensibilities and expressly
prohibited indiscriminate arrests, property destruction, or looting.”

Meanwhile the colonial administration pursued and ‘attraction policy’ through improvements in
administration, schools, hospitals, sanitation and other quality of life areas.

Leonard Davis described these reforms as “sophisticated methods of subduing the spirit and
seducing the mind of the Filipino. The recreation of Philippine society in the image of its
conqueror, the conversion of the elite in adjuncts of colonial rule, and the cultural
Americanization of the population became integral parts of the process of colonization.”

Certainly, like the Spaniards, the Americans sought to develop a cooperative alliance

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94 Ibid., 78.
95 Tarling, 161.
96 Campaigns against the southern Moros continued until 1913. Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of
Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1997), 46. Moros had not joined the resistance against the Americans and the US signed a
treaty with the sultan of Sulu in 1899. “In 1904 it abrogated the treaty, but the attempt to establish its
authority met violent resistance, subdued only after the massacres at Bud Dajo in 1906 and Bud Bagsak in
1913.” Tarling, 31.
97 Boot, 115.
with the Filipino elites. As a measure of their success in this effort, from July 1899 to
July 1900 the Filipino-run Manila Native Police made 7,442 arrests for the new
administration.\textsuperscript{99}

While many elite \textit{provincianos} demonstrated support for the Americans, many
peasant \textit{taos} aligned with “those independence fighters and religious Robin Hoods
seeking an ‘ill-defined utopia,’ such as the Babilanes in Negros, the Pulajanes in Samar,
and the Santa Iglesia of Central Luzon.”\textsuperscript{100} Still, the end of Spanish rule saw a growth of
elite mestizo and Filipino haciendero wealth and power by “first creating multiple
tenancies and then converting leasehold tenants into sharecroppers by imposing higher
rents.”\textsuperscript{101} American laws designed to break up the large Spanish and Church estates
unintentionally transferred the land to native hacienderos who divided plots, sacrificing
productivity in order to increase tenant dependency on landlord grants of credit. What
hacienderos lost in profits they gained in influence and power. Through kinship networks
they also controlled the new 6,000-man Philippine Constabulary (PC) created in July
1901 “to supervise local police forces and suppress guerrilla activity.”\textsuperscript{102}

 Freedoms granted by the Americans brought new opportunities various
populations in the Islands to compete for political power.\textsuperscript{103} The largest of the immigrant
communities, the Chinese, comprised less than one-half of one percent of the overall
population.\textsuperscript{104} More than eighty percent were men who came to make their fortunes and

\textsuperscript{99} Linn, \textit{The Philippine War, 1899-1902}, 128.
\textsuperscript{100} Kessler, 111.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Americans and a few other Westerners served as the only officers in the PC until 1907. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} The 1918 census recorded 10,314,310 people in the Philippines of which 43,802 were Chinese; 7,806,
Japanese; 5,774 Americans; 3,945 Spaniards; and 2,710 of “other races.” Malcolm, 350.
\textsuperscript{104} “…from 1908 to 1938, there were 457,790 Chinese entering the Philippines, while 381,865 left, giving
a net increase of 75,925.” Yung Li Yuk-Wai, \textit{The Huaqiao Warriors, Chinese Resistance Movement in the
Philippines 1942-45} (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995), 9, 15.
go home again and those who stayed were legally barred from Filipino citizenship. As Yung Li Yuk-Wai observed, however, “it was highly doubtful if most of them would have applied had this been available to them. Culturally, real assimilation did not take place.” Most of the small permanent Chinese community worked as merchants and controlled an astounding eighty to ninety percent of all retail trade in the Philippines. Under the Americans they tentatively moved to convert their economic power into political influence. In 1904, at Taft’s invitation, they formed the Manila Chinese Commercial Council that protected the Chinese monopoly on retail commerce, supported Chinese mainland interests, and increasingly challenged Japan on both counts.

The American policies, no doubt reinforced by general exhaustion from war, reduced rebellious impulses among Filipinos. Nationalists found it hard to rally people to fight for independence. As Quezon later explained, “Damn the Americans! Why don’t they tyrannize us more?” The apparent complacency was easily misinterpreted. In 1904, a U.S. War Department commission in the Philippines reported: “The common people are not a warlike people, but are submissive and easily – indeed much too easily – controlled by the educated among them, and the power of an educated Filipino politically ambitious, willing to plot and use all the arts of a demagogue in rousing the people, is quite dangerous.” Yet the soldiers respected the Filipinos’ fighting skills. Captain William E. Birkhimer recounted, “I owe it to our rebel enemy to say that, from their

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106 Ibid., 15.
107 Ibid., 51.
108 Boot, 125.
109 Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, Reports of the Philippine Commission, the Civil Governor, and the Heads of the Executive Departments of the Civil Government of the Philippine Islands (1900-1903), (Washington D.C.: Washington Printing Office, 1904), 144.
standpoint, I regard their scheme of warfare nearly perfect.” Filipinos had proven adept at waging guerrilla raids and ambushes. They had endured jungle hardships and seemed impervious to the tropical illnesses that ravaged the Westerners. They even developed effective intelligence networks that tracked American military movements. They seemed to vanish when confronted with overwhelming forces and blended into the general population as friendly natives when caught by their pursuers – a tactic the frustrated Americans called the “insurrecto-amigo game.”

The Americans’ expressed desire to eventually grant independence further sapped Filipino resistance. As Theodore Roosevelt said, “If we act so that the natives understand us to have made a definite promise, then we should live up to that promise.” Seeing prominent Filipinos of the Federal Party (Benito Legarda, Trinidad Pardo de Tavera and Jose R. Luzurriga) included in the Philippine Commission under Governor-General William Howard Taft, Quezon wrote: “I wondered, in my own mind, if the freedom which we lost by fighting America could not be won by co-operating with her. The idea flashed through my head that I might renew the same fight by peaceful means, by taking active part in the political field.” In 1907 the Philippines would become the first Asian colony to establish a national assembly.

Meanwhile, many worried about Japan’s territorial ambitions. In 1905, Tokutomi Sohō wrote a widely read essay “The Yellow Man’s Burden” that stated, “It is not something we sought, but all the yellow races – one of the two great racial groups in the

110 Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902, 190.
111 Malcolm, 70.
112 Quezon, 88.
113 Boot, 125.
At Yale University, legal historian Asakawa Kan’ichi reported that in the United States, “Many people believe that Japan in the future is sure to annex Korea, swallow up southern Manchuria, control the destiny of the China dynasty, extend her armed reach to sway in India, and threaten the Philippines and Australia, thus conquering the whole of Asia.” That September, the Overseas Development Society began publishing Greater Asianism (Dai Ajia shugi). This term, which grew in popularity in the 1920s and 1930s, differed from pan-Asianism (Han Ajia shugi) or even Asianism (Ajia shugi) in that it advocated not just leadership in Asia but “a tendency towards expansionism and imperialism.”

Racial attitudes also colored relations in the Philippines. The Americans adopted Spanish policies segregating occupiers and subalterns. Military and government personnel enjoyed separate quarters, stores, clubs, theaters and golf courses. American Major John C. H. Lee argued that commanders should not publicly order white soldiers to perform menial tasks lest they lower their status in native eyes. Despite a lack of anti-miscegenation laws, American women marked “the bodily and cultural separation of the colonized and colonizers, most consciously in domestic spaces.” Wives enforced this divide. A reporter noted: “The American who marries a Filipina is promptly ostracized. She may be a graduate of Bryn Mawr or Vasser or Wellesley, she may be beautiful and cultured and charming, but no matter – she is not white.”

114 Goto, 13.
115 Ibid., 12.
117 Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940, 124.
Many of the Americans administrators agreed with Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s views that “superior races could improve the characteristics of the inferior.” \[120\] Correspondent E. Alexander Powell reflected their thinking in 1922: “The dominance of the mestizos in insular affairs is undoubtedly due in part to the advantages of education and travel which they owe to the wealth and influence of their fathers, but I am convinced that an even greater factor in gaining their present ascendancy is in the alien blood – particularly the European blood – which courses through their veins.”\[121\] Such attitudes reinforced local superstitions and inferiorities: one American recalled that pregnant peasant Filipinas would shyly request to touch him and other Americans in the hopes they would then give birth to a ‘whiter’ baby.\[122\] Powell contended that the ablest Filipinos had at least half Spanish or one-third Chinese blood.

Even one as admiring of Filipinos as William Howard Taft paternally referred to them as “our little brown brothers.”\[123\] Many soldiers, on the other hand, remained frankly hostile towards the natives. A song famous among them included the line: “He may be a brother of William H. Taft, but he ain’t no brother of mine.”\[124\] On Samar, U.S. Marine Pete Ellis described the local children in a letter to his father: “I wish that you could be with me so that you might meet your little brown brothers and sisters… they remind me of a lot of little brown rats and they are just as plentiful too.”\[125\] Quezon would later wonder about Taft’s critics: “Many of them doubtless remembered how Southerners were

\[120\] LaFeber, 79.
\[121\] Powell, 287.
\[122\] Lapham and Norling, 90.
dealt with after the Civil War and, therefore, felt no better treatment should be given to the ‘brown brothers.’ Still others were told by English and Dutch subjects how foolish it was – and how dangerous – to attempt the experiment of ‘shooting’ democracy into the fabric of ‘Oriental’ minds.”

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Prejudices aside, the American still hoped to grant independence to the Islands. Perhaps the strongest argument for such a policy was the Islands’ inherent vulnerability to foreign invasion. In 1904 officers at the U.S. Army War College began drafting Plan Orange for a potential war against Japan. Completed two years later, Orange posited the practicability of a successful defense of Hawaii and Guam, but not the Philippines.127 Theodore Roosevelt publicly mused, “The Philippines from a military standpoint are a source of weakness to us. …These being the circumstances, the Islands should be given at an early moment their independence without any guaranty whatever by us and without our retaining any foothold in them.”

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The most likely threat to the Philippines remained Japan. Progressively ambitious military leaders there contested government officials over international policy. Vice President Takahashi Korekiyo led opposition to increased military expenditure in favor of civilian investment.129 In 1904-1905, Japan fought a war with Imperial Russia and won a decisive naval victory at Tsushima, leading to greater political influence in Tokyo for the military. When the American President negotiated an end to that war, Russian diplomats warned him that after the Japanese secured Korea, they would go after the Philippines.130

126 Quezon, 113.
127 LaFeber, 90.
128 Malcolm, 70
130 LaFeber, 81.
U.S. Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, J.A.T. Hull, told the
Washington Post the Japanese coveted the Philippines. Japanese Japan’s Foreign Minister
Kogoro Takahira replied: “Just now [Japan] is engaged in a life-and-death struggle for
existence in Manchuria. She will sacrifice life and treasure to carry out that end but she is
not intent upon gaining the possession of the U.S. in the Philippines.”

For all intents and purposes, the Japanese seemed happy with America’s efforts to
colonize the Philippines. In an effort to build the Islands’ economy, the U.S.
administration had opened the door to Japanese immigration. In 1903, the administration
hired 250 Japanese workers for a two-year construction project to build the twenty-two
mile long Kennon Road in Benguet. When finished, some workers went home, some
became farmers in Benguet, and 180 went to Davao, Mindanao. Others joined them
hoping to make their fortunes. Twenty-six-year-old Ota Kyosaburo came to Manila in
1901 and established a shop selling Japanese goods for the workers on the Kennon
Road. Afterward, he served as an agent for laborers moving to Davao to work in hemp
cultivation. The Japanese immigrant population in the Philippines grew at 0.5 percent in
1886, and expanded to a rate of 2.87 percent by 1903, an increase of 574 percent.

Minister Takahira reported to Tokyo, “The possession of the Islands by [the
United States] is beneficial to Japan and its people. The United States has given an object
lesson to the Orient of a more efficient way of life. We are trying to do our best to teach
the Koreans, as well as the Chinese, and we are aided by what has been done by the

131 Yu-Jose, 16-17.
132 Ibid., 14-15.
133 Ibid.
134 National Statistical Coordination Board, “Population of the Philippines, 1799 to 2010,” at
August 2017.
United States in proving the benefits of the principle of progress.” The Japanese colonial government in Taiwan even made “intensive studies” of the American occupation of the Philippines to monitor the situation there and to look for lessons on how to more effectively manage their colony. The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce sent Genji Hatano in 1901, Kazue Kato in 1902, and Iekichi Ihara in 1906 to the Philippines “to observe industrial and commercial practices in the country and encourage the Japanese to participate in the country's business and commerce.”

In 1905, U.S. Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Japan’s Prime Minister Katsura Taro exchanged notes promising to respect claims on the Philippines and Korea. Three years later Secretary of State Elihu Root and Foreign Minister Takahira agreed to honor the territorial integrity and free trade of China, and Japan renewed assurances that it had no ambitions towards Hawaii or the Philippines. In 1906, however, when the San Francisco school board segregated ‘Asiatic’ children, Giichi Tanaka drew up the first draft of the Imperial National Defense Policy that included plans for war against the United States in the Philippines.

That same year Japan’s Agriculture Ministry argued that the country needed to better understand Filipinos in order to break the West’s monopoly of trade with the Islands. When in 1910, Jokichi Iwatani ended his second term as Japan’s Vice Consul in Manila, he issued a report describing Filipino natives (dojin) as lovers of gambling, with no sense of right and wrong, who told lies and committed robberies. “He saw

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135 Yu-Jose, 16-17.  
137 Yu-Jose, 17.  
139 Yashikawa, 176.
Philippine history as one of battles, civil wars, and secret revolutionary organizations,” noted Lydia N. Yu-Jose.\textsuperscript{140} Iwatani also believed non-Christian Filipinos would welcome the Japanese into the Islands.

The Japanese were by then increasing their population in the Philippines. By 1901 there were nearly 1,000 Japanese, mostly in Manila, and almost all from lower social classes -- twenty-eight percent worked as prostitutes.\textsuperscript{141} To improve this community, the Japanese Consul organized the Japanese Mutual Aid Association with support from Tokyo for the stated purpose of increasing trade. By 1912 the Japanese population in the Philippines had risen to 3,654, with 1,318 living in Manila. Seven years later the overall population reached 9,874, with 2,068 in Manila and 5,621 in Davao. Increased immigration corresponded with a growth in trade: in 1903 nine ships carried goods to Japan, by 1918 that number rose to three hundred and seventy-five ships.

Coincident with Japan’s growing interest in the Islands, the U.S. Congress took steps to defend Filipinos from exploitation by monopolistic enterprises.\textsuperscript{142} In 1910, Colorado Congressman John Andrew Martin led lawmakers in limiting to 1,024 acres the amount of public land that the government could sell to corporations or individuals.\textsuperscript{143} American sugar corporations got around this law with help of government officials who saw the industry as a key to expanding the Philippine economy. The sugar industry that had collapsed during the Katipunan revolution from over 250,000 tons of export in 1892

\textsuperscript{140} Iwatani also “believed it would be better for the Filipinos to give up the fight for independence and remain under the United States. This would be the beginning of the development of the islands.” Yu-Jose, 23.
\textsuperscript{141} Yashikawa, 177.
\textsuperscript{142} Quezon, 117.
\textsuperscript{143} The fight in Congress over “friar lands and the sugar trust” provides a wonderful case study of conflicts in American moral and financial colonial interests. See the Committee of Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives, 915-925.
to about 50,000 tons in 1900, would increase six-fold before World War I.\textsuperscript{144} Yet as a resident commissioner to the U.S. House of Representatives from 1909 to 1916, Quezon expressed fears that such “large investments of American capital in the Philippines will inevitably result in the permanent retention of the Philippines by the United States.”\textsuperscript{145}

The expanding Philippine economy hastened social changes. As Manila and other cities prospered and modernized, elite landowners shifted residence from rural areas to urban centers. Supervision of lands was delegated to overseers who replaced the old paternal patron-client relationship between landlord and peasant with exploitive profit taking. Increasingly dependent tenants lacked protection from landlords who expropriated greater amounts “of the fruit of others’ labor.”\textsuperscript{146} Peasants, especially tenants on sugar plantations, lived as impoverished slaves. Kessler observed, “Workers were regularly whipped, and the police patrolled the highways at night to prevent workers from escaping.”\textsuperscript{147}

With Americans guaranteeing freedom of association, exploited peasants created tenant unions such as the Brotherhood of Farmers (\textit{Kapatiran Magsasaka}). The Brotherhood preached “syncretic folk-Marxist ideas, adapted through the earlier idiom of folk-catholic ideas.”\textsuperscript{148} Manila printers formed the Islands’ first workers’ union in 1902 and four years later voted Crisanto Evangelista as its secretary.\textsuperscript{149} Seven years later Evagelista founded the Philippine Labor Congress (\textit{Congress Obrero de Filipinas}, or COF). Like the nationalists, social revolutionaries turned to politics to effect change.

\textsuperscript{144} See Figure 1, Philippine Sugar Exports, 1836-1920, John A. Larkin, \textit{Sugar and the Origins of the Modern Philippine Society}, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1993), 47.
\textsuperscript{145} Quezon, 118.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} Kessler, 12.
\textsuperscript{148} McCoy cited by Kessler, 14.
As the Philippines moved towards social upheaval, Japanese merchant Tomio Matsuoka returned to Japan and published ten years’ worth of observations of economic conditions in the Islands. With an introduction by Kyoto University professor Inazo Nitobe, Matsuoka cited Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce figures to show that Philippine natural resources were underexploited due to the Islands’ small population. He said Filipinos were naturally lazy and that they had not embraced modern agricultural technology. Matsuoka added that the Chinese “were more interested in trade and commerce than agriculture” and the Americans “were not keen on investing in the country” because “they believed that their government would sooner or later withdraw.” Under these conditions, development would depend on the Japanese.

In Tokyo by 1914, military ambitions and government restraint had reached equilibrium. The government refused to raise two army divisions for operations in Asia but agreed to nationalize the Japan’s railroads. The outbreak of World War I tilted the balance. Japan secured Britain’s approval to grab German possessions in the Pacific, declared war on Germany, and captured the German settlement in Tsingtao in China. The Imperial Navy, acting on its own authority, quickly seized German territories in the Marianas, Caroline and Marshall islands and conducted unprecedented aerial attacks on German and Hungarian ships. The “fleet faction” in government resisted international pressure to withdraw and pushed for expansion to the south.

Japan completed diplomatic negotiations with Russia, sent naval vessels to aid the British in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and joined the United States in sending troops

150 Yu-Jose, 27.
151 Ibid.
152 Smethurst, 6.
153 Goto, 19.
into Siberia. Tokyo presented Twenty-One Demands to China, insisting on greater control over Manchuria and the Chinese economy. At war’s end Japan held a prominent position in the Paris Peace Conference and a permanent seat in the Council of the League of Nations, yet the Western powers at Versailles rejected the Japanese-Chinese proposed racial equality clause to the final peace treaty. From America’s view, as A. Whitney Griswold observed, “With Japan ensconced in the Marshalls and Carolines, the Philippines were now more than ever hostage to fortune.”154

In 1915 several prominent Tokyo businessmen formed the South Seas Association (Nan’yo Kyokai) to investigate, advertise and develop opportunities for Japan in the vast South Seas area. 155 The association published a journal, *Reports of the South Seas Association* (Nan’yo Kyokai kai ho), later renamed the *Bulletin of the South Seas Association* (Nan’yo Kyokai zassho). An article by Miyama Kichisaburo, renewed claims that Filipinos were lazy people but welcoming to the Japanese. He added that the Chinese grip on Philippine commerce blocked opportunities for the Japanese, but noted that Japanese communities made hemp, coconut, and pearl industries ripe for exploitation.

The next year Inazo Nitobe joined a South Seas observation tour in the Philippines. In later essays and lectures he argued that Philippine population was too small to develop the Islands, suffered poor nutrition and disease, and needed the immigration of Japanese laborers. This past champion of indigenous self-representation wrote that Japanese “patriotism is confined too narrowly within the home land and feeds itself upon the insular spirit, which does not see that there are regions untouched by man where, if they but work, our people will be welcome. Just as nature abhors a vacuum,

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155 Yu-Jose, 42.
social economy abhors a dearth of labor when land and capital can be had in abundance.”

Yusuke Tsurumi, a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Railroads, toured Manila and praised American colonial improvements in public works, national literacy, and health. He reported “that the Philippines was neither under-developed, nor were the Filipinos suffering under an oppressive colonial regime.” He added that the Christian, westernized Filipinos were arrogant for thinking they were on par with the Japanese. Tsurumi suggested a new direction for Japan in the Philippines by using a law that permitted corporations to own land denied to foreigner individuals. “Japanese investors,” he advised, “should establish corporations and this in a way, would contribute to the realization of Japan’s southward expansion.”

The Japanese businessmen note rising American economic enterprise in the Islands. In 1900, U.S. goods amounted to nine percent of Philippine imports and eleven percent of the value of all Philippine imports. Nine years later the U.S. passed the Payne-Alrich Act allowing unlimited duty free American imports into the Philippines. The next year, U.S. goods made up forty-one percent of the value of Philippine imports. By 1933 U.S. goods would comprise eighty-three percent of Philippine imports and about seventy-five percent of the value of all Philippine imports.

More worrisome to the Japanese, in the midst of World War I the United States passed the Jones Act that created both a new Filipino constitution and a path towards independence. The Act promised, “it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people

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156 Ibid., 32.
157 Ibid., 33.
158 Ibid., 36.
159 Davis, 35.
of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein.”¹⁶⁰ The implications for Japan’s colonies were ominous. “By this time,” wrote Quezon, “even the most intransigent Filipinos, with the exception of General Ricarte, who had exiled himself form the country, had become sincere friends and loyal supporters of the United States.”¹⁶¹ Still, many Filipinos saw no reason to delay independence and viewed American power as an obstacle to needed reforms.

As Richard Kessler noted, many Filipino elites “sought to free themselves of American bondage partially because they thought independence would make it possible to define what it meant to be Filipino – in much the same way that millenarian movements promised a new definition or self in a spiritual rebirth.”¹⁶² Whether identity preceded or followed independence was a matter of debate. Filipino writer Maximo M. Kalaw, who earned law degrees at Georgetown and the University of Michigan, argued, “The Filipinos are a people, like the Cubans or the Irish or the French – a distinct political entity with a consciousness of kind and with national feelings and aspirations.”¹⁶³ Others like American war correspondent E. Alexander Powell contended, “Although, as the result of four centuries of white man’s rule, they have gradually come to resemble one another more and more and to have more and more in common, they are still as distant in their genealogies as the Chinooks, the Zunis, the Iroquois, and the Sioux.”¹⁶⁴

In fact, Quezon argued that Filipinos shared unique commonalities: “The Filipino is, psychologically speaking, a Westerner. His concept of honor is, by heredity, Spanish:

¹⁶⁰ Malcolm, 68.
¹⁶¹ Quezon, 132-133.
¹⁶² Kessler, 11.
¹⁶³ Powell, 280.
¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 281.
gallant, although generally humble and not presumptuous, he reacts violently against the least act of contempt.”\textsuperscript{165} This uniqueness produced the only Christian country in the Far East, one he thought ready for independence from West and East. Others suspected that elites like Quezon only sought independence “as a means of enlarging their power base. For them, independence promised a paradise of riches. Even under American rule, members of the elite were able to amass more wealth and power as the Spanish were displaced.” \textsuperscript{166} Whatever the motivation, the desire for independence was real and growing.

The Jones Act spurred Japanese efforts to increase migration to the Philippines before a future independent government could close the door.\textsuperscript{167} The 1920s saw Japan’s population rise from about 56 million people to over 64 million, a fourteen percent increase. The Philippines, roughly the same size as Japan, had less than 14 million people. Officials in Tokyo worried their population would outgrow the resource capacity of their national territory. One solution was to stimulate migration and by 1930, government programs had encouraged 510,000 Japanese to live in foreign countries.\textsuperscript{168} An article by Kamiya Tadao noted favorable conditions for migration to Davao, Mindanao, where Japanese companies owned more than 147 square miles of land.\textsuperscript{169} He suggested sending 7,000 to 8,000 immigrants to Davao each year, a number thought low enough to avoid complaint from the American government. Indeed, from 1918 to the mid-1930s the Japanese population in the Philippines grew from 8,000 to 20,000, mostly

\textsuperscript{165} Quezon, 294-295.
\textsuperscript{166} Kessler, 11.
\textsuperscript{167} The Lansing-Ishii Agreement on 1917 also spurred Japanese migration policy. Grant K. Goodman, ““A Flood of Migration”: Japanese Immigration to the Philippines,” (Lawrence, Kansas: Center for Digital Scholarship, University of Kansas, 2011), 3.
\textsuperscript{169} Yu-Jose, 44.
in Davao.\textsuperscript{170} In 1918, forty-five percent of all overseas Japanese in Southeast Asia were in Philippines; that increased to sixty percent by 1929.\textsuperscript{171}

The Japanese arrivals to the Philippines did not seek to assimilate. The Davao community was particularly exclusive due to the insular nature of the hemp estates. During the 1920s Japanese immigrants arrived on Japanese ships, stayed in Japanese hotels, registered at the Japanese consulate, joined Japanese clubs, and got hired at one of the Japanese corporations.\textsuperscript{172} When they needed wives, they went back to Japan.

The rising numbers of Japanese immigrants encountered resistance. In 1919 and 1920, editions of \textit{Nan’yo Kyokai Zasshi}, Kakuro Itakura noted increasing Moro attacks on Japanese, new laws restricting ownership of public lands to Filipinos, a proposed survey of land in Davao, and a restriction on Japanese doctors.\textsuperscript{173} This evidence of rising anti-Japanese sentiment appeared to be as part of an ongoing American policy. Theodore Roosevelt had negotiated a “Gentleman’s Agreement” in 1908 by which Japan limited emigration to America. The United States then passed the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924 to close the door to Japanese (and Chinese) immigrants. President Coolidge passed an Immigration Exclusion Act that not only barred Japanese immigration to the United States and Canada, but also prohibited Japanese from naturalizing as U.S. citizens.

The Japanese who migrated to the Philippines reported finding opportunity. Six-foot tall Matsuzo (Santiago) Kitaguchi arrived in Naga, Luzon, in the 1920s and married a Japanese mestizo, Presentacion (Tancing) Yamaguchi. He partnered with another

\textsuperscript{170} Malcolm, 357.
\textsuperscript{171} Yu-Jose, 68.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 71.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 45-46.
Japanese named Mori in the popular corn with ice (maíz con hielo) and mango con hielo refreshment parlor they called Ki Mori in downtown Naga.\textsuperscript{174} He died young and his widow married Hisato Kubato, a regular on the Naga tennis courts, who partnered with Mori in the Naga Bazaar and engaged in commodity trading of husked rice. His close associate, the well-liked Takeru Suga, owned the popular Lion Bazaar in Naga. Their community was a far cry from the Japanese in the Philippines twenty-years earlier. They were members of associations connected to Japan through the Consul General in Manila. And, they would later play a role in the Japanese invasion of Bicol.

Gradually, the Japanese found themselves competing with Chinese interests in the Philippines. As Yung Li Yuk-Wai observed, “The Philippine Chinese enjoyed the freedom and security under the American rule that they had never experienced in the Spanish period.”\textsuperscript{175} A Chinese consulate opened in Manila in 1899, but there the community was mostly from Fukien and resisted its influence. That same year thirty Cantonese came from the United States and established the Hong Shun Tang, once a secret organization to overthrow Qing. It became a Chinese Benevolent Society, multiplied into numerous lodges, and in 1935 formed the anti-Japanese Philippine Chinese Hungmen Federation (Feilubin zhongguu hangmen lianhe zhonghui).\textsuperscript{176} By this time the community had its own newspapers (The Chinese Commercial News and Fookien Times), an arbitration committee to settle community disputes, and fifty-eight schools “to maintain Chinese tradition” and “orient the Chinese population only toward

\textsuperscript{174} Jose V. Barrameda, Jr., \textit{In the Crucible of an Asymmetrical War in Camarines Sur 1942-1945 (The Story of the Tangcong Vaca Guerilla Unit)} (Manila: National Historical Institute, 2007), 6.
\textsuperscript{175} Yuk-Wai, 19-20.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 40.
Chinese politics.”\(^{177}\) The Chinese community formed a shadow nation run by strongly anti-Communist business interests.

In the late 1920s, Philippine Labor Congress leader Crisanto Evangelista bucked opposition to bring leftist Chinese into Philippine labor groups. Philippine and Chinese antipathy had led most Chinese communists to go underground and blend into a larger leftist population. The Overseas Chinese Labor Party (Huaqiao gongdang) ended publication of the Common People’s Daily newspaper in 1922.\(^ {178}\) The leftist Chinese then formed the Worker’s Association (Gongren xiehui) to foster trade unions. It became the Philippine Chinese Laborer’s Union (Feilubin huaqiao zhonggonghui) in 1928. Filipino laborers however increasingly resented Chinese workers who accepted lower pay and harsher work conditions. Resentment broke out in anti-Chinese riots in Manila in October 1924 and in San Pablo in 1931.\(^ {179}\) The issue eventually contributed to a split over the direction of the COF, with the Chinese joining the COF-Proletariat (Congress Proletario di Filipinas) led by Evangelista and Jacinto Manahan and supported by the Secretariat.

Under free trade in the 1920s “the Philippines became prosperous, but at the same time largely dependent upon the profitable market of the United States.”\(^ {180}\) The social revolutionaries continued to organize workers. In 1922 the Central Luzon peasants led by Manahan joined in the Philippine Confederation of Tenants and Agricultural Workers (Confederación de Aparaceros y Obreros Agrícolas de Filipinas).

In 1924, a leader in the Communist Party of the United States of America, William Janequette (alias Harrison George), arrived in Manila “to observe labor

\(^ {177}\) Ibid., 48-49 and 57.
\(^ {178}\) Ibid., 60.
\(^ {179}\) Ibid., 16.
\(^ {180}\) Quezon, 142.
conditions in the Philippines.”

Introduced to the labor leaders including Evangelista, Janequette invited the Manila unions to send representatives to the First Congress of the Oriental Transportation Workers in Canton, China. Five delegates led by Domingo Ponce attended the Communist-organized congress. Ponce returned to Manila to organize a secretariat “under the direction of the Third International of Moscow.”

Jacinto Manahan returned to transform the National Federation of Tenants and Agricultural Workers of the Philippines (Confederacion Nacional de Aparceros y Obreros Agricolas de Filipinas) into the National Society of Peasants in the Philippines (Kalipunan Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas), better known by its initials KPMP.

According to Alvin H. Scaff, “It was this union which became the basis for the Communist activity among the peasants, especially in the central provinces of Bulacan and Nueva Ecija.”

Alongside the Philippine Labor Congress, they championed agricultural and labor reforms.

Coincidentally, millenarian movements arose in the Islands. Called colorums (after the liturgical expression ‘per omnia secula seculorum’ or ‘world without end’), they followed the path of groups like the Brotherhood of Saint Joseph and Mary’s Honor Guard in uniting spiritual determinism with social revolt. In 1923, Pedro Kabola established the Association of the Worthy Kabola (Kapisanan Makabola Makasinag) that two years conducted a religious uprising in which Kabola was killed.

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184 Scaff, 10.
In the midst of this social upwell, rumors from the Philippines rippled through Japan that the United States was planning war. On 30 June 1921, Nagasaki governor Akaboshi Tentai relayed to Minister of Home Affairs Tokonami Takejirō and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ichida Kosai a report from Kadowaki Shin of Mitsui Bussan’s Manila branch on rumors of an impending war between the United States and Japan. He wrote that Philippine newspapers were reporting that the Japanese military was recruiting men between 18 and 35 years old residing in the Philippines. Shin added that he believed lower-class Filipinos would embrace the Japanese against the Americans, but the elites favored staying with the Americans to further prepare for eventual independence.

These fears of war contributed to, and were exacerbated by, the Washington Naval Conference in 1922. The world powers agreed to restrict naval construction and Japan felt compelled to sign the treaty which limited it to three-fifths of the tonnage of capital ships allowed to the British and Americans who maintained fleets in two or three oceans. The treaty also required Japan to turn over its base in Tsingtao, China, to the Americans, to build no defenses on its newly gained Pacific islands, and to respect the territorial integrity of China. In return the U.S. promised it would not build a modern naval base in the Philippines nor fortify the Islands.

Before the Naval conference, new Philippine Governor General Leonard Wood visited Japan. War Minister – later Prime Minister – General Giichi Tanaka indicated his desire to visit the Philippines. After touring areas in north and central Luzon, “Tanaka accurately judged the military defense of the Philippines as small-scale, weak, and unable

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185 Yu-Jose, 72-73.
186 Smethurst, 7.
187 Tarling, 37.
to hold off a prolonged enemy attack.” He saw that Filipino soldiers trained only once a year but thought they could be good in small-scale warfare on familiar terrain. He believed the greatest threat to any invading army would be the harsh environment and the lack of infrastructure. Tanaka argued that Japan should expand into the Philippines and utilize its resources. However, added to the naval restrictions, Japan suffered internal budgetary concerns. Throughout the 1920’s Japan’s economy was about one-seventh the size of the American economy but, even after the Naval Conference, it spent four times more per capita than the Americans to maintain a navy. The Kato government then cut military budgets in 1925.

Filipinos remained focused on independence and social reform. In 1924, after failing to win Nacionalista party support for a congressional run, Evangelista founded the Labor Party of the Philippines (Partido Obrero de Filipinas). The next year, his COF received an invitation to attend the Red International Labor Union (RILU) meetings in Canton. In 1927, the COF voted to affiliate with the RILU and organize a political party, the Workers’ Party (Partido Obrero), formed under Evangelista the following year.

The COF affiliated with the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat in 1927. Late in 1928, Evangelista and Crisanto Bognot attended meetings in Shanghai where they conferred with American Communist leader Earl Browder and Mao’s deputy Chou En-Lai. Evangelista and Bognot then went to Moscow for training, and were joined there by Manahan. In 1929 the COF split over Marxist doctrine. Evangelista walked out to form the Association of Toilers (Katipunan ng maga Anak Pawis ng Pilipinas,) or KAP, which

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188 Yu-Jose, 75.
189 Smethurst, 9.
190 Scaff, 9.
191 Ibid.
he dedicated to implementing a “Soviet system in the Philippines.” Ruperto S. Cristobal and Antonio Paguia stayed with the COF. In 1930 Manahan founded the Communist Party (Partido Comunista) dedicated to the end of American sovereignty and the overthrow of the Philippine government.

Meanwhile in 1927, Patricio Dionisio founded a ninety-seven-member secret National Association (Katipunan ng Bayan) that in 1930 became the Association for an Offensive for Our Future Freedom (Kapatiran Tangulang Malayang Mamamayan) calling for immediate independence. Rampant rumors that Japan was providing military supplies to the association brought a government crackdown. The administration acted in piecemeal fashion, “identifying and destroying their leaders, the government broke them down and isolated them from their mass base. Leaders were played off against one another; bribery, deceit, and treachery were commonly used tactics. After a period of tumult, the government suppressed the rebellion, and the rebels merged back into the fabric of rural society.”

In 1930 wealthy landlord and Pampanga lawyer Pedro Abad Santos, once imprisoned by the Americans, founded the Socialist Party but it remained very small for several years. Born into an elite family in 1876, Abad Santos had represented Pampanga in the Philippine National Assembly for two terms and was a member of the Philippine Independence mission to the United States in 1922 under Sergio Osmeña. In the late 1920s he accepted an invitation to study at the Lenin Institute in Moscow, and returned to spread Marxist ideology. Close associate Luis Taruc wrote, “He was a Marxist, but not a

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192 Kessler, 30. For the interpretation of the title of the KAP, see Kerkvliet, 98.
193 Kessler, 15.
Bolshevik. He was truly a socialist.” Taruc explained that Abad Santos sought change from within the existing political structure. Abad Santos established the General Workers’ Union (Aguman ding Malding Talapagobra), better known as the AMT, with Taruc as both Socialist Party general secretary and AMT political director.

An American guerrilla later wrote, “Luis Taruc was a relatively unsophisticated man and a believing Christian. Whether he ever became a ‘real’ Communist in the sense of wholeheartedly believing Marxist metaphysics is uncertain.” Years after the war, Taruc answered the question: “Yes, I have been a Communist – and yet originally not a Communist but a Socialist. …I, for one, was never completely won over to toeing the Stalinist line. I was never ‘Bolshevised,’ and I never accepted completely the atheism that is fundamental to Communist belief.” Taruc believed Communists and Socialists wished to overturn the existing social order but disagreed on the necessity of revolt.

Into this age of social unrest, the Great Depression strained relations on both sides of the Pacific. After ten years of increasing Filipino emigration to the United States, in January 1930 in Watsonville, California, rioters attacked Filipino migrant workers when a local dancehall allowed them to dance with white dime-a-dance girls. One Filipino was killed. Two months later in Manila, high school teacher Mabel Brummitt’s efforts to discipline Filipino students sparked large anti-American rallies. Some 10,000 high school students in the city went on strike and threatened to lynch education department officials Alejandro Albert and Luther B. Bewley. Benigno Ramos, a Senate staffer, used

194 Taruc, 13.
195 Kerkvliet, 37.
196 Lapham and Norling, 128.
197 Taruc, 5-6.
the event to launch a weekly newspaper *Sakdal* (Tagalog for ‘accuse’ or ‘absolute’) to protest against both the U.S. and the Philippine governments. *Sakdal* circulation grew from nearly 20,000 after one year to nearly 300,000 as the paper gave voice to advocacy groups calling for reforms in land ownership and political power.

In 1932 the elites struck back. The Philippine Supreme Court outlawed the Communist Party. Many party leaders went to jail, the rest went underground. Abad Santos’ Socialist Party absorbed idealist elites and peasant masses in Central Luzon. In October 1933 after spending ten months in the United States, Benigno Ramos turned hundreds of thousands of *Sakdal* subscribers into the Sakdal political party. Millenarian peasants flocked to the Sakadal movement and its promise of political participation in the democratic structures. They called for immediate, complete and total independence from the U.S. (“*kagyat, ganap at lubos na kasarinlan*”). American Governor-General Frank Murphy welcomed the new party saying, “Finally, an opposition party in the real sense of the word has been born in Philippine politics.”

In China by this time, a three-year campaign by Kuomintang nationalists against warlords encroached upon Japanese claims in Manchuria and led militarists to pressure Tokyo for action. In 1928, Japan had sent troops to Shantung Province to isolate Manchuria where support for the Kuomintang was growing and endangered Japanese control. Native Manchurian efforts to develop railroads already threatened the Japanese South Manchurian Railway monopoly. When Japanese troops assassinated a Manchurian warlord, the Imperial Army General Staff protected the culprits and caused the

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199 Tarling, 162.
resignation of the Tanaka government in July 1929. Yet, with the financial constraints caused by the onset of the Great Depression, Japan joined other governments at the London Naval Conference the following year to extend limits on naval construction for another six years.

The Japanese aggression in far away Manchuria worried several audiences in the Philippines. The Chinese community, already concerned about growing Japanese challenges to their economic interests in the Islands, began to rally in opposition. American authorities, facing growing Filipino demands for political independence, continued to seek a way to leave the Islands without losing the colonial economic advantages or exposing the Philippines to foreign aggression. Filipinos seeking independence feared the Japanese demonstrated imperialism. Filipino revolutionaries organizing to force social change in the Islands began to feel the tug of internationalist concerns pushing for united fronts against fascist powers. Each audience followed the course to war from their own perspective, unaware of their similar destination.
2. Failure to Plan

Events leading to war outpaced the expectations of military planners in the United States and Japan. As a result, all sides went to war guided by faulty assumptions that left them unprepared for the conflict that arose in the Philippines.

In 1930, Japanese militarists assassinated Prime Minister Osachi Hamaguchi. Imperialists ascended. Headlines in Osaka the next year asked: “Why is the American annexation of the Philippines justified, while the Japanese seizure of Formosa is not? Why is it just for Great Britain to control India, but not for Japan to control Korea?” In September, the army in Manchuria provoked an incident to justify invading Mukden, Manchuria. The Kwantung Army then seized all of Manchuria to “thunderous public applause at home.” In May 1932 naval officers assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and other officials who had tried to reign in the military. Four months later the Kwantung Army established the Manchurian puppet state of Manchukuo. International condemnation led Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. Japan invaded northern China and forced a truce by which it gained Jehol province for Manchukuo.

These events galvanized the Chinese community in the Philippines. In November 1931, the Federation of Philippine Chinese National Salvation Association (Feilubin huaqiao jiuguo lianhehui) formed of 303 local associations, all of them in support of China against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist Kuomintang Party attempted to gain

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202 Smethurst, 9-10.
control of the Philippine Chinese, but their business leaders resisted calls for economic boycotts against the Japanese. The Kuomintang did however gain considerable influence over the Chinese schools in the Philippines.  

Mao also sought influence in the Philippines, with help from international communist organizations supported by the Soviet Union. Encountering resistance, his agents turned to the anti-Japanese Philippine Chinese Hungmen Federation as a gateway into the “lower strata of the Chinese community.” At the same time the Chinese Chamber of Commerce reorganized into the Philippine Manila Chinese General Chamber of Commerce (Feilubin Manila zhonghua shanghui), indicating “the adjustment of the body to secure recognition and influence in both the Chinese and Philippine governments, and to widen its scope from Manila to the whole of the Philippines.”

In 1931 former Philippine Senate President Sergio Osmeña and Speaker of the House Manuel Roxas, both of the ruling Nacionalista Party, led a delegation to Washington seeking independence. In January 1933, the U.S. Congress passed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act over President Hoover’s veto. The act promised independence to the Philippines after a ten-year period, but allowed the United States to retain military bases and tariffs on trade. As Alfred W. McCoy wrote, “Realizing that the glory of having negotiated independence in Washington would prove a major advantage in the subsequent campaign for the Commonwealth presidency, the country’s leading politicians – Senate president Quezon, Senator Osmeña, Congressman Manuel Roxas,

\[203\] This control influenced a large number of the students to join Kuomintang resistance when the Japanese invaded the Philippines. Yuk-Wai, 57.
\[204\] Paine, 80. See also Yuk-Wai, 65.
\[205\] Yuk-Wai, 61.
\[206\] Ibid., 45.
and Senate minority leader Ruperto Montinola – split over specifics.” Osmeña and Roxas embraced the bill but Quezon surprisingly opposed it saying, “I did not object to the provision regarding the retention of naval stations so long as this was made dependent upon the consent of the Philippine Republic; but I did strenuously and definitely oppose the retention of military establishments otherwise, for it destroyed the very essence of independence for the Philippines.” Quezon won the debate and the Philippine legislature vetoed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act.

Japan moved quickly to gain influence in the potentially independent Islands. Tokyo established the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Manila to challenge the Chinese retail monopoly but the 775 Japanese small retail stores in the Philippines could not compete with their 13,818 Chinese competitors. Six Japanese department stores operated in Manila in the 1920s with an average of ten employees each. After ten years the new Chamber of Commerce only increased that number to twelve stores with twenty employees each. Only when Chinese stores finally agreed to boycott Japanese goods did consumers turn to the Japanese stores and increase their retail market share.

When Japan left the League of Nations in February 1933, influential journalist Shiminaka Yasaburō organized the Greater Asian Society with politician Knoe Fuminmaro, General Matsui Iwane, Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa, and journalist Tokutomi Sohō. The Society pushed for an aggressive foreign policy, especially

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208 Quezon, 149.
209 Yu-Jose, 68.
210 Ibid., 68.
211 Ibid.
212 Goto, 19.
towards Southeast Asia. That June, Tokyo sent a ‘South Seas Fact-Finding Tour’ of twelve influential citizens, including members of the House of Peers, to the Philippines.

Japan was uneasy over the American offer of self-government to the Filipinos. “It was not only, nor even primarily, that by offering the Filipinos self-government, if not independence, the Americans might be setting a course which would stimulate their own subjects to seek the same,” historian Nicholas Tarling explained, “It might also indicate that the United States, having become a colonial power amid controversy, might cease to be one.”

During the 1930s, Japan established forty-three agricultural corporations in Davao with a total investment of twenty million pesos, managed 2,000 independent tenants with a total capital of ten million pesos, ran 200 commercial and industrial enterprises worth five million pesos, and increased investments in lumber and fishing. A U.S. withdrawal endangered returns on these investments.

Quezon led a commission to the Washington to discuss with President Franklin Roosevelt possible improvements to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act and Philippine security. Roosevelt pessimistically responded, “After all, the American military force in the Islands is too small to protect the Philippines against foreign invasion, and after we have been in the Islands all these many years, it will be impossible to induce Congress to appropriate the necessary funds for the military defense of the Islands and the maintenance of an army of sufficient size to keep any enemy at bay.” Quezon told the newspaper magnate Roy J. Howard that the Americans should either fortify the Philippines and build a navy, or ‘leave bag and baggage,’ or make an ‘alliance, or

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213 Tarling, 32.
214 Yu-Jose, 69.
215 Quezon, 151-152.
…partnership in commerce and defense.” He went to the War Department and asked Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur if he thought the Islands could be defended. “I don’t think so,” the general replied, “I know of course that the Islands can be protected, provided, of course, that you have the money which will be required.”

MacArthur estimated the Philippine Constabulary budget as P6,000,000 ($3,000,000) per year and thought it would take an additional P10,000,000 ($5,000,000) per year to build an adequate military. A large, professional army would be too expensive. “You would have to create a citizen army on the basis of universal compulsory service,” he advised Quezon, “If you have a small regular force as a nucleus to be expanded by employing the citizen army in time of peril, no nation will care to attack you, for the cost of conquest will be more than the expected profits.”

The Tydings-McDuffie Act of March 1934 promised Philippine independence. The Act opened negotiations on bases and tariffs and authorized the Philippine government to write a new constitution. Once ratified, the constitution would make the Islands an American Commonwealth for a ten-year period leading up to independence that would provide time for the Philippines to practice self-government and build an adequate national defense force. The new constitution also included a clause binding it to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, renouncing the use of war as a means of international politics.

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216 Tarling, 160.
217 Quezon, 153.
218 Ibid., 154.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid., 156-157.
The new Commonwealth worried Japan. The United States became the first modern imperial power to willingly withdraw from a colony.\textsuperscript{221} This shifted an existing paradigm by proving that Asian colonies could gain independence and that imperial powers could give up their colonies. The contrast with Japanese policy was stark.

In 1935, Consul General Kiyoshi Uchiyama sent Foreign Minister Koki Hirota suggestions for dealing with the ‘Philippine Problem.’ A possible course of action was to take “decisive” action as in China. He added an alternative: “We can… publish a pro-Japanese newspaper, manipulate the members of Congress, join hands with the opposition, stir up anti-American sentiment, arouse public opinion in Japan, and… adopt other behind the scene measures. We should educate the people of this country… that we have no territorial ambitions and we only desire to expand our economic interests.”\textsuperscript{222}

Quietly, the Japanese consulate lobbied against perceived anti-Japanese legislation on immigration and land ownership and recruited allies in the National Assembly, including Manuel Roxas, Benigno Aquino, Camilo Osias, Quintin Paredes, and Pedro Sabido.\textsuperscript{223} The consulate contracted promising Jose P. Laurel as a legal adviser and hired Claro Recto for Ishihara Industries Company seeking Philippine mining concessions.

Tokyo saw in the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in December 1935 the creation of a power vacuum that spelled opportunity.\textsuperscript{224} The Education Ministry and the Foreign Ministry together formed The Philippine Society of Japan (\textit{ Hiripin Kyokai }) to “promote the friendly Philippine-Japan relations through such means

\textsuperscript{221} Yu-Jose, 123.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 143.
\textsuperscript{223} The Japanese consulate reported these men “were on our side.” Nakano Satoshi, “Appeasement and Coercion,” \textit{ The Philippines Under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction }, ed. Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo Trota Jose (Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1999), 34.
\textsuperscript{224} Goto, 20.
as cultural exchange.”

Founding members included Society for International Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai) co-founder Prince Tokugawa Yorisada, Minister of Education and Culture Viscount Okabe Nagakage, League of Nations delegate Ishimaru Yuzo, Vice Foreign Minister Horiuchi Kensuke, prominent educator Oshima Masanori, Propaganda Division Chief Major General Kojo Tanehide. Business, trade, and banking officials interested in the economic exploitation of the Philippines filled many of its offices. The Society also received funds from the Army and Navy and in return frequently provided the military briefings. Beginning in December 1936, for eight years the Society issued a roughly 80-page monthly journal called Philippine Information Bulletin (Hiripin Joho) “to produce friendly relations between the two countries, to advance cultures and to strengthen economic links.”

A secret supplement to issue Number 21 carried a speech by the former Consul General in Manila, Kiyoshi Uchiyama, “On the U.S.-Philippine Relationship After Independence.”

American politicians recognized the Commonwealth as a potential diplomatic hostage. A. Whitney Griswold explained, “President Roosevelt’s willingness to waive the right to maintain military bases on the islands, his evasiveness with respect to a naval base, indeed his very approval of the Tydings-McDuffie Act were generally interpreted as a decision to fulfill the wish Theodore Roosevelt had expressed to Taft and Sternburg,


The other founding members were Yanagisawa Takeshi, Horii Genesaku, Colonel Kobayashi Jiro, Akama Nobuyoshi and Mori Denzo. See also Jon Thares Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy in U.S. Japanese Relations, 1919-1941 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 163.


Ibid., 122. Shinzo Hayase points out that both Goodman and Yu-Jose identify the purpose of the Society as the economic penetration of the Philippines.

Ibid., 136.
and rid the United States of its costly hostage. It was both praised and condemned as a withdrawal from active participation in Far Eastern politics and as a renunciation of potential American economic predominance in China.”

An Army War College planning group, chaired by Colonel Jonathan Wainwright, reviewed Plan Orange and concluded that the Philippines would be lost early in any war against Japan.

Chinese community opposition to Japan increased. In 1935 in Iloilo, Panay, -- home to more than 3,500 Chinese -- teachers Chen Qushui and Zheng Shimei of the Chinese Commercial Secondary School (Huashang Secondary School) organized the National Defense Drama Club to spread anti-Japanese sentiment and support a boycott of Japanese goods. The next year they founded the Chinese Salvation Association (Yilang huaqiao Jiuwang xiehui) which would later turn Chinese youth towards guerrilla warfare. Coincidentally, the leftist Philippine Chinese Laborers’ Association furniture workers led a strike that brought a backlash from the Philippine government with of a series of bills to curtail the economic power of the Philippine Chinese.

On 15 November 1935, Manuel Quezon became first president under the new constitution. He already faced guerrilla resistance. “Banditry in the mountains at the other end of Laguna de Bay was still active,” he recalled, “and the Sakdalistas in the nearby provinces were still restless. I seized both of these problems quickly and with great vigor and soon settled them to the general satisfaction and without further bloodshed.”

In the 1934 elections, the Sakdal party had won several seats in the new House of

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230 Griswold, 453.
232 Yuk-Wai, 101-102.
233 Ibid., 16.
234 Ibid., 166.
Representatives as “village true believers” challenged the Nacionalista Party with “rampant patriotism of the millennial variety.”\textsuperscript{235} Quezon’s election brought rumors that Sakdal leader Benigno Ramos would join General Ricarte with Japanese supplied arms and air support to lead an overthrow of the new Philippine government. In fact, inspired by the new multilingual \textit{Free Filipinos} newspaper, some 7,000 Sakdalistas revolted in May 1935 across several northern Luzon cities. Quezon suppressed the movement, leaving sixty dead and driving the Sakdals underground and Ramos into self-exile in Japan. “Yet the movement was a landmark event in the secularization of the spiritual themes of personal and national salvation,” Kessler wrote, “just as the Katipunan had been central to the popularization of nationalism.”\textsuperscript{236}

Based in Manila, dominated by the Nacionalistas, and adopting Tagalog as its official language, the new government was hardly a national one. Historic geographic, cultural and social divisions remained. Quezon sought to win over the peasants and wipe out “tribal particularism,” saying: “In frequent visits to the provinces, especially those far distant from Manila, I addressed large audiences and rallied them to the knowledge that we were all, first and foremost, Filipinos, and that at last they had their own government.”\textsuperscript{237} He saw himself as the “first Filipino politician with the power to integrate all levels of politics into a single system” and he used it to balance powerful provincial kinship networks against peasant organizations seeking a share of power. Under Quezon, the ‘Ins’ were never entirely secure and the ‘Outs’ were never completely excluded.\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{235} David R. Sturtevant cited by Kessler, 14.
\textsuperscript{236} Kessler, 14.
\textsuperscript{237} Quezon, 168.
\textsuperscript{238} Tarling, 161.
Quezon secured soon-to-retire MacArthur to serve as the Commonwealth’s Field Marshal and Military Advisor to the Government of the Philippines. The general had to do what the American military said was impossible. “My plan for building a defense for the Philippines was a simple one,” he wrote, “patterned after the citizen-soldier system of conscription effectively established in Switzerland.” He would use the Constabulary to build a small, professional standing army. MacArthur divided the islands into ten military districts and planned 128 training camps. Cadres of four officers and twelve enlisted men assigned to each camp would train the men from their nearby areas. Each district was to train 4,000 men annually. By Quezon’s direction, MacArthur confessed: “In addition to the purely military side of the camps, there was a broad effort to build up the health and economic well-being of the trainees, the great majority of whom were from backward rural homes and surroundings.” More ambitious plans included the establishment of a military academy modeled on West Point, a navy of fifty torpedo boats, and a two hundred and fifty plane air force. MacArthur expected to have forty divisions by 1946 with 400,000 men equipped with American surplus equipment and weapons. Congress promised him a budget of eight million dollars a year, then promptly cut to six million a year and reduced his quota of trainees by half.

Militarists in Tokyo had by now assassinated three of the past five Prime Ministers. On 26 February 1936 army officers assassinated two advisors to the Emperor and missed the Prime Minister when they killed his brother-in-law by mistake. Mutineers surrounded the Japanese Foreign Office and held much of Tokyo for three days in a failed coup. Militarists also killed finance ministers when they opposed higher military

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240 Ibid.
241 Ibid., 105.
budgets. That opposition ended with the murder of Finance Minister Takahashi. His successor doubled the military budget in his first year.\textsuperscript{242} The military set foreign policy: resist Russia, capture all of China, and move south to take British, Dutch and French colonies for resources. Japan announced its withdrawal from the international naval pacts. In August, the Five Ministers’ Conference agreed to a southward advance to coincide with the existing Standard National Policy of northward advance.\textsuperscript{243} Three months later, Japan entered the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany.

In February 1937, Quezon travelled to Tokyo with his military chief, MacArthur. On this and a subsequent visit the next year, he held informal talks with Foreign Ministers Arita Hachiro and Ugaki Kazushige and other officials.\textsuperscript{244} Arita warned Quezon, “many Americans believe that Japan will take the Philippines once you are free, these Americans, plus many others who are imperialists at heart, object, even now, to the independence of the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{245} “Mr. President,” the Japanese foreign minister continued, “you may tell your people – you may even assure President Roosevelt when you see him – that Japan will gladly be a signatory to a treaty that will recognize the Philippines as a neutral territory once it shall have become independent. …Japan has no aggressive intentions towards the Philippines. All we want is your trade – to buy your products and to sell you our goods.”\textsuperscript{246} Quezon promised to check growing anti-Japanese sentiments at home.

The visit was part of a world tour. Quezon arrived in the United States to a nineteen, not twenty-one-gun salute, reminding him that Americans did not yet consider

\textsuperscript{242} Smethurst, 10.
\textsuperscript{243} Goto, 19.
\textsuperscript{244} Satoshi, 34
\textsuperscript{245} Quezon, 177.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., 177-178.
him as a head of state. He told reporters he now wanted independence in 1938.\(^{247}\) Meanwhile MacArthur sought promised military support but reported, “My request for supplies and equipment went unheeded by the War Department.”\(^{248}\)

Consul General Kiyoshi Uchiyama alerted Tokyo to a growing “Philippine problem,” the anti-Japanese attitude of the Commonwealth government “as especially reflected in the proposed laws of the Congress of the Philippines.”\(^{249}\) Increasingly concerned about Japanese intentions, Filipinos worried about a colony in their midst they referred to as “Davaokuo.”\(^{250}\) New legislation restricted foreign land purchases in Davao. During the May 1936 question hour, Foreign Minister Arita told the lower house of the Diet in Tokyo that this law resulted from growing Filipino nationalism, not United States’ policies.\(^{251}\) Unsatisfied, a leader of the Japanese community in Davao, Matsumoto Katsushi, pressed for action warning that “the next set of problems would be about lumbering rights, immigration, taxation, and so forth.”\(^{252}\) More ominously, Matsumoto warned developments in the Philippines put at risk the “continental policy of the army” and the “southward advance policy of the navy” if the Japanese government did not take immediate action to support the Japanese population in Davao who were fighting “economic war in peacetime.”\(^{253}\)

Philippine economic nationalism interfered with Japan’s plans to develop and exploit the Islands’ resources. Fourteen years earlier the Kyoto Chamber of Commerce had sent Namikawa Eijiro to the Philippines to explore its mining potential. In 1935 the


\(^{249}\) Yu-Jose, 126.

\(^{250}\) Goto, 89.

\(^{251}\) Yu-Jose, 126.

\(^{252}\) Ibid., 128.

\(^{253}\) Ibid., 128.
Vice Minister of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nagai Ryutaro, sent Namikawa back to the islands to start the Pacific Mining Company, Ltd. (*Taiheiyo Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha*) and develop mines in Pilar and Panay. Consul General Uchiyama made certain that “Filipinos with political influence” were on the board of directors, “believing that Filipino government officials used their position to obtain economic favors for themselves and their friends.”²⁵⁴ In 1937 Japan opened four manufacturing businesses in the Philippines: the Balintawak Beer Brewery Company, the Seafood Corporation in Zamboanga, the Oriental Industrial Company, and the Mori Bicycle Company. Kanegae Seitaro also established the Filipinas Mining Company that sold chrome to the Toho Metal Company at roughly five percent the price they offered other companies.²⁵⁵ From 1934 to 1939 Japanese mines in the Philippines increased shipments of iron ore to Japan from 7,240 tons to over 1,000,000 tons.²⁵⁶

In July 1937, Japan used an exchange of gunfire near Beijing as an excuse for declaring war on China. From August to November, outnumbered but more advanced Japanese forces conquered Shanghai and inadvertently brought the influential Chinese community in the Philippines into the war. Their first response was financial. From 1937 through 1939, the Chinese in the Philippines contributed some P7,000,000 to P12,000,000 for the mainland defense.²⁵⁷ Militant members of the community organized the Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines (*Feilubin huaqiao yiyongjun*), the CVP, under one of three members of the Kuomintang Standing Committee in the Philippines, Central Military and Political Academy graduate Colonel Shi Yisheng (Shih I-sheng). The CVP

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 130.
²⁵⁵ Ibid., 131.
²⁵⁶ Ibid.
²⁵⁷ Yuk-Wai, 22.
became “a para-military extension of the Kuomintang Army in China.”258 Li Qingquan (Dee C. Chuen), President of the Chinese Chamber of Congress, organized CVP financial support from twenty-five of the wealthiest Chinese families in the Philippines.

Chinese leftists in the Islands also joined the war effort. Under conditions of the Second United Front, the Communists worked more openly in the Chinese community in the Philippines. The Philippine Chinese United Workers’ Union (Feilubin huaqiao ge laogong tuanti lianhehui or Lao lian hui) grew in numbers and broke with the Philippine Chinese Labor Association’s fight over workers’ concerns in order to concentrate on war propaganda and support. The Union raised money and manpower for the Communists in China, and in November 1937 sent twenty-eight members of the first Voluntary Team of Returned Philippine Chinese to join Mao’s army.259

On 24 November the popular Dutch East Indies newspaper Batavian Newspaper (Bataviaasch nieuwsblad) printed an editorial titled “Pacific Penetration” that warned: “It has recently been emphatically shown that no illusions may be cherished that Japan’s expansion on the mainland of Asia and the incidents which that involves are reducing interest in the development of the southward ‘life line.’”260 The essay drew attention to “Trojan horse” Japanese shops and communities and specifically mentioned Davao in the Philippines as a Japanese colony. Indeed, many buildings including schoolhouses in Davao flew the Japanese flag.261

A few weeks later the Japanese captured the Chinese Nationalist capital of Nanking and began a historic spree of massacre, rape and looting. Prodded by the

258 Ibid., 135.
259 Ibid., 63.
260 Goto, 19.
261 Panlilio, 11.
Kuomintang, the Chinese in the Philippines again considered a boycott of Japanese goods but businessmen were reluctant to lose profits. In February 1938, the newly formed Philippine Resist-the-Enemy Committee (Kangdi hui) drafted a boycott resolution, “Regulations Governing the Execution of Enemy Goods Boycott.”\footnote{262} The Philippine Chinese Chamber of Commerce endorsed the measure but it remained unenforced until October. It failed to harm Japan economically but alerted it to hostility in the Philippines.

Meanwhile, alarmed by how Hitler exploited the divide between Socialist and Communist parties in Germany, in 1935 Stalin used the Seventh Comintern in Moscow to direct all Communist parties to form United Fronts against Fascism with leftist and centrist parties. Within two years American Communist leader James Allen intervened with President Quezon to secure pardons for all members of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP). The PKP then moderated its propaganda to work more closely with Abad Santos’ Socialist Party. Chinese tactical advisers arrived to encourage an alliance between the Communists and Socialists and the two organizations merged their 15,000 members into the Popular Front in May 1937, formed the Collective Labor Movement, and elected PKP leader Guillermo Capadocia as Executive Secretary.

Wealthy brothers Vincente, Jose and Jesus Lava assumed key PKP leadership positions, but they chose Socialist Luis Taruc as their front man. Vincente Lava was an “urbane, sophisticated, a highly educated chemist from the Bureau of Science in Manila… from an aristocratic land-owning family in Bulacan Province and had completed a Ph.D. in chemistry some years before at an outstanding university in New York City.”\footnote{263} Taruc, on the other hand, was from a poor family in Pampanga and had

\footnote{262} Yuk-Wai, 51.  
\footnote{263} Scaff, 4.
dropped out of law school in Manila after two years for lack of money. Between them, as Kessler noted, “The question of who controlled who is still open to debate.”

In August, the Popular Front’s Central Committee issued a manifesto, “Mobilization of Filipinos Against Japanese Aggression.” They now proclaimed Japanese aggression as “the greatest threat to our national integrity and the achievement of our independence” and called for “unity with the democratic and progressive forces in the United States, not policies which will play into the hands of Fascists and lead Filipinos under the yoke of the Mikado.” Having absorbed the Socialist Party, PKP leaders sought to expand the United Front: “We are ready to cooperate with all parties, political groups, labor, peasant and fraternal organizations, no matter what our differences may be with regards to ultimate aims and programs, for the purpose of establishing a democratic front of the Filipino people which will be dedicated to the improvement of our living conditions, to the defense and extension of our democratic rights, to safeguarding our national autonomy, and furthering our cause of peace and security.”

The Filipino elites were not eager to join this popular front. Instead, Quezon went to Japan in 1938. He made a point of visiting Benigno Ramos to encourage him to return home. “The president was looking, as [G.K.] Goodman puts it, for ‘an almost mystical ‘national unity’ under his own aegis,’ and expected Ramos to lead his followers into the fold.” Ramos ended his three-year exile in August, and reformed his Sakdal Party as the Ganap Party though some of the old group refused to join him. The Philippine

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264 Kessler, 29.
266 Ibid., 226.
267 Tarling, 162. Professor Grant Kohn Goodman, a former co-director of the University of Kansas’s East Asian Center, was a prolific author on Japanese history and had served in the Philippines during World War II interrogating Japanese prisoners.
Supreme Court declared the Sakdal party subversive and ordered it disbanded. Moreover, inspired and supported by Franco’s Spanish *Falange* party, many in government urged action against the peasant opposition movements. Quezon tired of Ramos’ anti-American and pro-Japanese preaching and had him arrested. Instead of achieving national unity, Quezon’s outreach had furthered class division.

United Front cooperation between Chinese Nationalists and Communists led to the Philippine Chinese United Workers’ Union sending students to Mao’s base in Yenan to study at the Anti-Japanese Political and Military University or the Lu Xun Academy of Art.268 Graduates Wang Xixiong, Huang Jie, Cai Jianhua, and a few others returned to the Philippines before the Japanese invasion. The Kuomintang also recruited in the Islands: “In 1938, a group of eighty-three Philippine Chinese youths went to Nanping, Fujian, to receive military training in the Reserve Officers Training Camp No. 13 held by the War Department of the Chinese Nationalist government.”269

Quezon’s visits to Japan left him “convinced by the crushing strength of the Imperial war machine that it was futile for the Philippines to resist.”270 He saw his country’s best hope in diplomacy, not MacArthur’s plans for defense. Quezon “cut the arms budget, halved reserve training, and postponed mobilization,” wrote Meirion and Susie Harries, “As a result, many Filipino troops would go into action without ever previously having fired their rifles – obsolete Enfields and Springfields – and with such basic equipment as helmets and shoes missing.”271

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268 Yuk-Wai, 63.
269 Ibid., 117.
270 Meirion and Susie Harries, 314.
271 Ibid.
The Japanese continued with economic and migration policies in the Philippines. Tokyo established the Greater Japan Islam Association (Dai-Nippon Kaikyo Kyokai) to support Japanese foreign policy. There were 678,000 Muslim Moros in the Philippines, over four percent of the country’s population.\textsuperscript{272} The government also created the Overseas Mining Association to assist in China and Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{273}

Western corporations discovered promising mineral deposits in the Philippines. Unfortunately for Japan, Commonwealth laws declared: “all natural resources, including minerals, belong to the state.”\textsuperscript{274} As Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines George Malcolm interpreted the new Constitution, “Private agricultural land cannot be assigned to unqualified persons – that is, to aliens, that is, to the Japanese.”\textsuperscript{275} Sakamoto Tatsuoki, the head of the Taiwan foreign affairs division, proposed the recruitment of second generation Japanese-Americans who he believed could use their rights in the Philippines. “They could also opt for Philippine citizenship but they should not become like the lazy Filipinos,” he argued, “They should keep the Japanese spirit and be the vanguard of Japanese expansion.”\textsuperscript{276} The manager of the Taiwan branch of Mitsui Bussan, Ikeda Takuichi, suggested Japanese born in the Islands might apply for Philippine citizenship and act as agents for Japan. To ensure they did not lose their character, however, Japan would have to support Japanese schools in the Philippines so the children could be raised with proper values.

\textsuperscript{272} Midori, “99.
\textsuperscript{274} Malcolm, 147.
\textsuperscript{275} Ibid., 147-148.
\textsuperscript{276} Yu-Jose, 133.
In the February 1938 issue of *Nan’yo Kyokai zasshi*, the director of the Manila branch of the Nan’yo Kyokai, Hara Shigeharu, urged immediate Japanese migration before Philippine laws limiting immigration took effect. He wrote, “If through immigration we occupy territory in the Philippines now, we need not cry even if Japanese goods are taxed prohibitively, because the advance post of our southward advance will not be taken from us.”²⁷⁷ Twice in the next three years the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported migration by publishing volumes on Philippine history, politics, economic, people, and relations with Japan. A chapter on Philippine-Japan relations stated: “Japan sympathized with the Philippines’ desire for independence and that Japan had no intention of invading her. Japan simply did not want to be isolated and out of this consideration, it was Japan’s wish to see an independent Philippines that would be free to receive aid from her.”²⁷⁸ The volumes also denounced as “anti-Japanese” the Philippine immigration quotas, legal barriers to Japanese seeking Philippine citizenship, and laws barring foreign exploitation of Philippine resources.²⁷⁹

In April 1939, Japan’s Navy National Policy Research Committee considered the impact of the China Incident on the Administration of the Southern Area and drafted a set of objectives for the Philippines. Among them: the promotion of exports and friendship; the development of economic relations and “necessary and appropriate” industries including agriculture, forestry and fisheries; and the replacement of Chinese, British and U.S. influence in “regional commercial rights.”²⁸⁰ These were goals for diplomacy. The Navy report called for the “promotion and guidance for advancement and self-awareness

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 139.
²⁷⁸ Ibid., 124.
²⁷⁹ Ibid., 124.
of native peoples” and “a gesture towards giving sufficient support out of good will for Philippine independence (corrected to: taking an appropriate attitude out of good will for Philippine Independence).”281 This cultural approach included plans for using Catholics and placating Muslims in the Southern Area.

Despite Japanese protests, the Commonwealth government continued to pass legislation protecting national interests. In 1939 the Philippine government passed the Fisheries Act, the Public Land Act, the Mining Act, and the Forestry Act that limited foreign investments in these industries to forty percent. An Anti-Dummy Act prevented Filipinos from acting as shells for foreigners. An immigration law passed in 1940 also limited immigration from any country to 500 per year. These acts served to both create an independent national identity and to ensure the economic interests of the Filipino elite.

On top of these legislative acts, the Chinese community stepped up efforts to maintain its economic interests. From 1932 to 1937, Japanese imports increased twenty-five percent and Chinese share of rice retail and marketing fell to about sixty-five percent.282 In 1939 Japanese immigrants to the Islands exceeded Chinese arrivals for the first time.283 Prominent Japanese were quoted saying that if “China disobeyed Japan” she must be severely punished “by having her arms and legs cut off!”284 In May 1939, the Philippine Chinese Chamber of Commerce (PCCC) began enforcing “Regulations Governing the Purge and Registration of Enemy Goods” and expanded their boycott. Ironically, the boycott increased Japanese retail in the Philippines by leaving them as the only stores providing popular Japanese products. The PCCC Chairman announced: “The

281 Ibid., 65.
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid., 29.
Chinese must regain their primary mission [of being businessmen], and must not be excessively indulged in military and political affairs.” The PCCC remained strong. In July, Quezon’s government established the Emergency Control Committee to set prices but before the year was out, the PCCC twice negotiated higher prices.

Americans continued to worry about Japanese aggressiveness. U.S. High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt called for reconsideration of Philippine independence out of a fear that Japan would seize the Islands once the United States departed. Quezon roundly denounced McNutt’s position. Independence remained on schedule.

The 1938 and 1940 the U.S. Army War College reviewed and updated plans for defending the Philippines. Influenced by MacArthur’s optimistic forecasts, both plans assumed a successful defense of the Islands. Faculty member Major J. Lawton Collins wrote: “When we consider the actual situation in the Philippines today, it seems to me nothing short of a crime that the Army and Navy let themselves get into the hole we are in… we have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into the organization of the defense of Corregidor, and we all agree that we cannot hold it.” Officers in the Philippines questioned America’s commitment. General William E. Brougher said: “Who had the right to say that 20,000 Americans should be sentenced without their consent and for no fault of their own to an enterprise that would involve them in endless suffering, cruel handicaps, death or a hopeless future?”

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285 Yuk-Wai, 51.
286 Dower, 126.
287 Yu-Jose, 123.
288 Gole, 91, 105.
289 Ibid., 97.
290 Fleming, 18.
The Army Air Corps sold the idea that B-17 bombers in Manila could deter Japan from aggression because Japanese cities were especially vulnerable to incendiary bombs.\textsuperscript{291} By some unseen logic, the United States military agreed and disregarded Plan Orange that “had called for the abandonment of the islands as indefensible in a war with Japan.”\textsuperscript{292}

In September, Hitler invaded Poland. Colonial powers Britain and France were now at war, but America remained neutral. Japan remained focused on economic diplomacy in the Philippines. In May 1940, as Germany overran France and threatened Britain, Japan’s Overseas Mining Association set up a liaison office in Manila and the Ishihara Sangyo Company added an office for developing mines in the Philippines. To comply with Commonwealth laws that required at least sixty percent of stock in any mining companies and seventy-five percent in shipping companies owned by Philippine or U.S. citizens, Sangyo set up joint ventures with Insular Mine operations and Luzon Lighterage.\textsuperscript{293} They began developing iron ore mines in Paracale, Camarines Norte, and surveyed Hintatuan and Nonoc islands north of Mindanao.

Germany’s rapid defeat of France and the Netherlands encouraged militarists in Japan to seize those countries’ Southeast Asian colonies. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt renewed commitments to allies in the region. Japan had played a long game, confident that since the establishment of the Commonwealth, the United States would leave the Southwest Pacific. Now they reconsidered this assumption.\textsuperscript{294}

\textsuperscript{291} Meirion and Susie Harries, 291.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{293} Setsuho, 144.
\textsuperscript{294} Tarling, 73.
On 4 July 1940, Japan’s Imperial Army General Staff and its Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry submitted “The Principles to Cope with the Changing World’s Situation.” It expressed fear of a U.S. Navy build-up. The Japanese economy would suffer unless Japan “decided immediately to take the initiative in laying the groundwork in the south.”295 The navy agreed. Their planners wrote: “The use of armed forces in the southern area will be decided upon depending upon the domestic and foreign situation, but the target will be limited to Great Britain, insofar as possible.”296 Political pressure by army leaders compelled the cautious Yonai Cabinet to resign.297 A second Konoye Cabinet embraced the Tripartite Alliance with Germany and Italy, looked to expand southwards, and was hostile towards Britain and America. The Japanese general staff began to envision a rapid establishment of a “self-supply area” from Manchuria to Australia, from India into the Pacific Islands.298 The Philippines sat at its heart.

In the Islands, there was no appetite for war. The Americans, recognizing the weakness of their position, did not include MacArthur in their planning and communications.299 Filipino elites hoped to maintain “good and friendly terms with Japan.”300 The once burgeoning leftist opposition to Fascism ceased with Stalin’s pact with Hitler.301 In provinces like Pampaga the Socialists even used their old party identity in the 1940 elections.302 Class antagonism, however, continued to simmer. Luis Tarlac noted, “The menace of the invasion… caused much tension in the towns and barrios of

296 Ibid., 16.
297 Ibid., 13.
298 Goto, 21.
299 Manchester, 186.
300 Quezon, 180.
301 The Molotov-Ribentrop Pact of 23 August 1939.
302 Taruc, 19.
Central Luzon. It was not relieved by the reactionaries and landlords, who took the opportunity to accuse the AMT, the socialists, and the Communists of being a 5th column. Nacionalistas circulated false propaganda that our movement was connected with the Sakdals.”303

The Japanese military lacked plans for striking the Philippines. In fact, through March 1941, the Navy General Staff would have “only an extremely rough study of war strategy against the United States and Great Britain on a total war scale.”304 The Army General Staff First Section Research Group issued broad Proposals for the Governance of Occupied Territories in the Southern Area of Operations that described a limited mission in the Philippines for “destroying American strongholds” and noted the “extraction of Philippine natural resources should not be looked upon as urgent.”305 The document stressed, “In any and all cases, our military forces are not to become involved in the direct governance of the country, except for the purpose of attaining our military mission or providing assistance to the Philippine government for the establishment of a new domestic economy.” 306 Planners assumed cooperation from the Philippine government on measures to keep the Filipinos from siding with the Americans. Should the Philippine government stand with the Americans, the Army General Staff advised, “we should take measures for gradual disintegration of the government through intrigue and other such means.”307 They considered returning General Ricarte from exile in Yokahama to replace President Quezon. Finally, the Proposals presciently warned: “The Philippines, if obtained, has very little to offer us, while at the same time increases our

303 Agoncillo, 663.
304 Monograph 150, Japanese Monographs, 3.
305 Satoshi, 31-32.
306 Ibid., 33.
307 Ibid., 31-32.
Japan had higher priorities. On 17 April, the Imperial High Command issued a new *Outline of Policy Toward the South* that announced offensive operations would not begin unless absolutely necessary, and Navy mobilization would not be complete until November.\(^{309}\)

In May, in Manila’s Chang Kai-Shek High School for Chinese students, teacher Jiang Jieshi organized students from 14 to 25 years old into the Philippines Chinese Youth Wartime Special Services Corps (*Feilubin huaqiao qingnian zhanshi tebie gongzhuo zongdui*) (PCYWSSC) as part of the Youth Corps (*Sanmin zhuyi*).\(^{310}\) The PCYWSSC started with about eighty members. The organization remained selective in recruiting and retention, taking only Chinese Nationalists of good character and physical ability. It grew to about 500 members. Its youth and inexperience bred exuberance that would lead to the destruction of its headquarters on two occasions. Though it was to report losing only thirty-six members during the war, thirty-three were organization leaders.\(^{311}\)

In early 1941 the Japanese High Command established a new General Staff department, the War Guidance Office.\(^{312}\) The government began implementing financial maneuvers to both preemptively neutralize American sanctions and to influence the Philippine government. On 14 June, Japan began withdrawing tens of millions of dollars of deposits from the Yokohama Specie Bank in New York.\(^{313}\) The money went to pay debts to Western nations, with about ten million dollars sent to balance a trade debt with

\[^{308}\text{Ibid., 31-32.}\]
\[^{309}\text{Meirion and Susie Harries, 285.}\]
\[^{310}\text{Yuk-Wai, 129.}\]
\[^{311}\text{Ibid., 131.}\]
\[^{312}\text{Meirion and Susie Harries, 283.}\]
the Philippines.\textsuperscript{314} A week after the withdrawal, Hitler upset all geopolitical calculations with his invasion of Russia.

Forty-eight hours after the Germans crossed the Russian border, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe’s cabinet met to reconsider their southern advance policy. With the Pacific colonial powers Britain, France and the Netherlands reeling, and the Soviet Union neutralized for the time being, the moment seemed opportune. The Japanese leaders decided to force an unequal military alliance on Vichy French Indochina to further isolate China. From 28 June to 2 July, a Liaison Conference between representatives of the government and the Imperial General Headquarters met and produced the \textit{Outline of the Empire’s National Policy to Cope with the Changing World Situation} which called for southward and eastward expansion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, an evolving concept of economically a self-sufficient Asian bloc free from Western influence.\textsuperscript{315} The “Main Principles,” however, included two faulty assumptions: first, Britain would fall and, second, Japan was not going to attack the Philippines.\textsuperscript{316}

On 24 July, President Roosevelt sought to block Japan by offering to recognize French Indochina as a neutral country.\textsuperscript{317} Japanese troops disembarked at Cam Rahn Bay that same day. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull publicly stated that everything was now going “hellward” and the path to war seemed clear.\textsuperscript{318} Twenty-four hours later, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8832, freezing Japanese assets in the United States (including the Philippines). Additionally, the administration increased lend-lease

\textsuperscript{314} The Alien Property Custodian staff calculated that by December 1941 the Japanese government withdrew $27 million from this account, most before 26 July. Ibid., 180.
\textsuperscript{315} “(Japanese) Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, Part III,” Monograph 147, Japanese Monographs, 28.
\textsuperscript{316} Meirion and Susie Harries, 281-284.
\textsuperscript{317} Tarling, 74.
\textsuperscript{318} LaFeber, \textit{Clash}, 201.
shipments to China, with more planes to the Flying Tiger volunteer airmen, and recalled
Douglas MacArthur to active duty to command United States Army forces in the
Philippines. Manila was already home to an American infantry division under Major
General Jonathan Wainwright. Roosevelt authorized the immediate incorporation of the
Philippine Army’s nine reserve divisions into a new command, the United States Forces,
Far East (USAFFE). Unfortunately for MacArthur, the annual six-million-dollar military
budget meant the new divisions existed only on paper. In comparison, that same month
the United States sent $240 million in military aid to China.\(^{319}\) MacArthur expected a
similar large investment in his force soon and began to plan accordingly.

Faced with an increasingly hostile United States, Japan adjusted its policies. After
another Liaison Conference, the Konoe administration announced a French-Japanese
Joint Defense Pact on 29 July. With this flank secured, Japan then looked to seize the
Pacific colonies of the European countries. Teiichi Suzuki, President of the Prime
Minister’s Planning Board, submitted to the Government and the Imperial General
Headquarters a report outlining resources needed for expanding hostilities. Suzuki
believed Japan possessed reserves of two months of nickel, four months of manganese,
and one month of Manila hemp – all products available in the Philippines.\(^{320}\) He urged
that any war must aim for “the acquisition of resources in line with these demands.”\(^{321}\)
Southern Area resources had not yet been part of any plans.

\(^{319}\) In July 1941 the U.S. provided the Chinese Nationalists with $240 million in military aid. It sent $500
million more in 1942. From 8 February 1939 to 21 March 1942, the U.S. promised six aid packages,
totaling $620 million and sent $606 million. Paine, 182.
\(^{320}\) Monograph 150, Japanese Monographs, 73-74.
\(^{321}\) Prime Minister Konoe established the Planning Board in 1937 to identify issues of national importance
and organize appropriate responses. Ibid., 51.
While the army and navy argued over whether to attack the Philippines first or last, German advisors suggested that the United States might stay out of the war altogether if Japan simply bypassed the Islands. Yet every day the United States seemed to get stronger in the Pacific. The government approved as national policy the Imperial Staff’s *General Principles to Cope with the World’s Changing Situation* that recognized “the inevitable and natural deterioration of relations with the United States” and vaguely stated that Japan would “solve the southern area problem by taking advantage of opportunities.” Suzuki proposed four options for seizing the Philippines, all of which necessitated the destruction of American forces. The government and military officials agreed on a “swift advance of our forces along the two lines of operations to the oil fields in simultaneous operations in the Philippines and Malaya. Insofar as strength permitted.”

The Navy Central Authorities objected to the ambitious strategy: “The southward expansion policy was originally advocated by the Navy but it emphasized that the goal must be achieved by peaceful means, if at all possible, and the use of military force must be determined with great prudence.” An American embargo of oil would justify the use of military force in the south, but the navy felt unprepared for a long war with the United States. Even so, the navy began “thorough preparations for the commencement of hostilities against the United States” after deciding, “it may prove impossible to avoid

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322 Ibid., 11.
324 Monograph 150, Japanese Monographs, 10.
325 Ibid., 12.
326 Monograph 146, Japanese Monographs, 18.
war with that country.”

War strategy would depend on a quick victory in decisive battle so as to deter America from mobilizing its vast latent strengths.

Planning became more urgent on 1 August when President Roosevelt declared an embargo of all oil to Japan. Without another source of oil, Japan either had to placate Roosevelt by sacrificing its imperial ambitions or risk war to secure further resources. Internal estimates indicated that Japan held “reserves of 9.4 million kilotons and consumed 450,000 kilotons per month, giving it about a one-and-a-half year supply at stable consumption rates.”

War, of course, would increase consumption rates. Faced with these projections, the war ministry accelerated planning for war.

On 6 August, Roosevelt offered to suspend military measures (and get the British and Dutch to follow), if Japan withdrew from Indochina, promised not to deploy additional troops in the Southwest Pacific, and recognized Philippine neutrality. Japan did not respond.

On 10 August the Japanese Army Headquarters summoned the Catholic Archbishop of Tokyo, Tatsu Doi, and the Bishop of Osaka, Yoshigoro Taguchi. Bishop Taguchi arrived the next day accompanied by Tatsu’s representative, Father Tatsuya Shimura. The Army representatives informed the clerics that the war would start soon and that Japan would occupy the Philippines. They would need fifty Catholic clergy and one hundred and fifty laity to serve as religious propaganda workers in the Islands. There were only about 150 Japanese among the 596 priests who served the 119,224

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327 Ibid., 45.
328 Paine, 182.
329 Tarling, 74.
Catholics in Japan and the 192,209 Catholics in its colonies – a ratio of one Japanese priest for every 2,000 Catholics. There were over 12,000,000 Catholics in the Philippines. The military plans seemed to expect one Japanese priest to serve 240,000 Filipinos.

Bishop Taguchi arranged a meeting with the leading Catholic clerics in Tokyo and the apostolic representative to Japan, Paolo Marella. They agreed to cooperate with the army but were determined not to get involved in a war. Father Shimura gave Major Yokoyama of the General Staff the names of three priests, five seminarians and eight laity who would report in November as civilian employees of the 14th Army’s Religious Pacification Operations Section. Lieutenant Tomoji Narusawa assumed command of the Religious Section aided by his Second Lieutenants, Hiroshi Iijima and Sakae Mihara. Narusawa was not a Catholic but his wife was and so were his lieutenants.

In Manila on 19 August, President Quezon announced: “We owe our loyalty to America, and we are bound to her by bonds of everlasting gratitude. Should the United States enter the war, the Philippines will follow her and fight by her side, placing at her disposal all our manpower and material resources to help her achieve victory, and for this reason America’s fight is our own fight.” 331 MacArthur, however, lacked the infrastructure and logistics to mobilize the nine Philippine reserve divisions. Even his one standing division, the scattered American-manned Philippine Division, had only three of its four authorized brigades and was without much of its equipment. 332 Still, he decided to use this division to organize, equip and train the reserve divisions during their mobilization. In August they would build camps, send American officers and non-commissioned officers to form a training cadre, and loan the division’s equipment to the

331 Goto, 90.
Filipino reservists and recruits. MacArthur scheduled a gradual call up of his 120,000 Philippine Army reservists to begin on 1 September and end on 15 December.

In Tokyo, another Liaison Conference met from 3 to 5 September to refine the Outline of the Empire’s National Policy to Cope with the Changing World Situation. The Diet ratified the revision on 6 September stating: “The Empire, determined to face a war against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands for the sake of self-existence and self-defense, will complete preparations for war with early October as the approximate deadline.” Until then, Japan would pursue negotiation. One official later recalled, “This decision, however, did not mean that the Government was determined to wage war. It would be closer to the truth to state that greater expectations were placed on diplomatic negotiations.” Negotiators demanded that U.S. “military facilities in the Far East will not be strengthened further than the status quo.” Ambassador Nomura delivered to U.S. Secretary of State Hull a demand for the U.S. to stand down in the Philippines.

An air of fatalism hovered over Japan’s decision makers. “The government has decided,” said Chief of the Naval Staff Osami Nagano, “that if there is no war, the fate of the nation is sealed. Even if there is war, the country may be ruined. Nevertheless, a nation which does not fight in this plight has lost its spirit and is already a doomed country.” From 10 to 13 September, the Imperial Navy’s Combined Fleet assembled “all commanding officers and staff officers of the Fleet” at the Naval Staff College in Tokyo to wargame maneuvers for seizing the Southern Area and attacking Hawaii.
Commander in Chief Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto served as chief referee. To clear up ambiguities found in the exercise, on 24 September the Supreme Command, supported by the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staff, requested that the government “changeover from political to military strategy” by 15 October, “at the latest.”

While MacArthur and the Japanese military remained focused on potential conventional operations, other began to think differently. With German columns closing on Moscow, Communist-led Popular Fronts mobilized around the world. In October, the leaders of the AMT party in Manila issued orders for “all cell groups to prepare for guerrilla warfare” against possible Japanese invasion. They issued a circular suggesting the formation of twelve-man squads as the basis for combat.

Quezon had been a guerrilla from 1899 to 1901. He well understood the Philippines’ historic tradition of irregular warfare. Yet he never seriously considered preparing his country for guerrilla resistance against a potential Japanese invasion. Douglas MacArthur had fought Philippine guerrillas as a young officer in 1903. He knew his citizen soldiers lacked the equipment, training, and cohesion to fight conventional battles. He also never seemed to consider preparing his reservists to fight a guerrilla war.

MacArthur drafted conventional plans for defending the Philippines with units he did not have. He expected to muster the 120,000 Filipino soldiers, augmented by the 30,000 Americans and Philippine Scouts, to face probably 50,000 invaders sometime in 1942. Accordingly, he organized his paper command into three infantry divisions in northern Luzon, four in southern Luzon, three in Visayan-Mindanao areas, and two more in reserve. Meanwhile, the men of the first of three regiments in each Philippine reserve

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339 Ibid., 16.
340 Scaff, 22. See also Agoncillo, 663.
Map 3: MacArthur’s Defense Plan, December 1941
division reported for training on 1 September, followed by the second three regiments towards the end of October, and the third towards the end of December.\textsuperscript{341} Equipment shortages, obsolete weapons, untried leaders, and a pervasive lack of discipline marked their training. There was not enough time or material to make these divisions ready.

In September, the U.S. Army advertised for officer volunteers for the Philippines. Signal Corps Lieutenant Donald Blackburn volunteered out of his basic officer’s course. After the twenty-three-day voyage from San Francisco, he arrived in Manila in October. He became one of many ‘casuals,’ someone to strip from his regular unit and assign to a new Filipino unit.\textsuperscript{342} Blackburn reported to the Headquarters of the new 12\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment filled with Igorot reservists who did not speak English. Second Lieutenant Charlie Youngblood asked Blackburn, “How do we train these people?” Blackburn answered, “We’re just going to have to draw pictures, I guess.”\textsuperscript{343}

Captain Russell Volckmann, a young infantry officer who had arrived in Manila in 1940, became a senior instructor and executive officer for the new 11\textsuperscript{th} Philippine Infantry Regiment near Baguio. He found his soldiers, despite having a five and a half-month call up in 1937, only trained in close order drill and saluting. Volckmann recalled, “Officers, non-coms, and privates all had practically no knowledge of basic military tactics and techniques. What little they did know was in most cases either wrong or

\textsuperscript{343} Ibid., 30.
Map 4: Japanese Invasion Objectives


Note: Japan planned to control 1,650,000 Filipinos out of a population of over 16,000,000.
On paper the regiment had 1,850 soldiers; in reality, it contained a smaller number of civilians in uniform. Moreover, Quezon still hoped to avoid war and wanted to use the call up to build new and better citizens. White House advisor Fred Howe toured MacArthur’s command and happily observed new soldiers training “in hygiene, in agriculture, in handicraft, and in making them ready to take up homesteads and establish themselves as self-respecting citizens.” They were not training for modern war.

The Japanese also failed to anticipate guerrilla war. Their plans focused on controlling cities: “Manila (the military, political, economic and cultural center of the entire Philippines with a good harbor and a population of 620,000); Cebu (with a good harbor and a population of 140,000), Davao (population 95,000; Japanese residents 18,000); Iloilo (on Panay Island. Population 90,000; Japanese residents 400); Batangas (population 50,000); Legaspi (the only port at the southern extremity of Luzon Island with a population of 40,000) and Cavite (U.S. Asian Fleet base with a population of 40,000).” Planners identified food as essential to controlling these populations: “Rice is the staple food of the Filipinos but its domestic production is insufficient to feed its population. However, substitute foodstuffs such as corn, sweet potatoes, coconuts and Chinese yams as well as cattle, fish and spices are abundant throughout the islands.” There were no plans on how to obtain the amount of food needed to feed the people.

The Imperial Army did consider environmental challenges. The Philippines had a dry season from November to early June and wet season July to October, with noticeable

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345 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 105.
347 Ibid.
differences in precipitation across the islands. Early plans also recognized the threats of dysentery and poor sanitation, malaria, dengue fever, cholera, typhoid, sunstroke and heat-stroke in the islands. The plans did not include remedies for these challenges.

Into October, hesitancy to go to war hampered Japanese military planning. On 7 October, Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano warned Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama: “The undue extension of the time limit for the purpose of continuing negotiations will deprive us of the opportunity of taking the initiative in war and, in consequence, will make the carrying out of future operations more difficult.” Mid-month found the Premier and the Foreign Minister at odds with the War Minister while the Navy Minister remained indecisive. “Accordingly,” an official later recalled, “Imperial General Headquarters pressed the Government to clarify its attitude on the issue of peace or war, but the Government was unable to give a definite answer. As a result, the Third Konoye Cabinet resigned en bloc on 16 October and the Tojo Cabinet was formed on the 18th.” From 23 to 30 October, Tojo convened another Liaison Conference under the presumption that war would begin in March 1942. The attendees prioritized logistical preparations for war and options for breaking the stalemated negotiations with the United States by diplomatic means.

On 29 October, navy planners submitted a draft plan to the Combined Fleet Headquarters. As the Liaison Conference wound down, the President of the Planning Board explained that war in early December would require Japan to occupy the oil fields

348 Ibid., 6.
349 Ibid., 5.
351 Monograph 147, Japanese Monographs, 51.
in the southern areas within four or five months if it was to continue fighting.\textsuperscript{352} Even then, he forecast a period of low oil supply and cautioned: “As time passes, the ratio of military strength between Japan and the United States will be more and more to Japan’s disadvantage. This will be especially true in regard to air strength.”\textsuperscript{353} He feared that the United States would strengthen Philippine defenses and draw closer to Great Britain, the Netherlands and China. The Americans had already scheduled construction of five new airfields for the Philippines for early 1942.

A Liaison Conference between the military and government convened on 5 November, this one in the Imperial Court Room in the presence of the Emperor.\textsuperscript{354} The Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Planning Board President, Finance Minister, and military Chiefs of Staff briefed the plan for war they had agreed to four days earlier. The attendees reviewed two plans (A and B) for continued negotiations, neither of which would contain enough concessions to satisfy the U.S. They therefore now planned to go to war in early December. Believing American strength in the Philippines increased by 4,000 men a month, the Japanese army planners concluded: “Despite foreseeing considerable difficulty in operations against the southern area in the initial phase, the Japanese Army is fully confident of success. Thereafter, with the maintenance of surface traffic by the Navy, the Army will be able to secure the areas required.”\textsuperscript{355} The Chief of the Army General Staff estimated the 14\textsuperscript{th} Army could conquer the Philippines within

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{352} Monograph 150, Japanese Monographs, 21.
\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., 89.
\textsuperscript{354} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., 78.
\end{footnotesize}
fifty days.\textsuperscript{356} Agreeing that war was inevitable, the Emperor formally endorsed the war operations plan.\textsuperscript{357}

At the conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff reported American strength in the Philippines as about 42,000 troops and 170 aircraft – up from 10,400 men and 115 planes 14 months earlier.\textsuperscript{358} To seize of the Islands, he tasked the Southern Army’s 14\textsuperscript{th} Army with the 16\textsuperscript{th} Division, 48\textsuperscript{th} Division, and two tank regiments.\textsuperscript{359} The 11\textsuperscript{th} Air Fleet would fly support. The rushed plan included preparatory air raids, amphibious assaults, carefully allocated air support, and vague “mopping-up operations.”\textsuperscript{360} There was still no consideration of guerrilla resistance. On 10 November, the 14\textsuperscript{th} Army Commander reported to the Imperial General Headquarters for informal instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, the War Minister and the Commander in Chief of the Southern Army. They were less than four weeks away from war.

Yet another Liaison Conference on 13 November approved a “Plan to Speedily Conclude Hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands and the Chiang Regime.” This plan stated: “The Japanese Empire will carry out swift armed warfare in order to destroy the bases of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands in the Far East as well as the southwest Pacific Area; establish strategically important positions; and, at the same time, secure areas containing necessary resources and principal communication lines in order to make Japan self-sufficient. Every possible measure will be taken to draw the main strength of the United States toward Japan Proper

\textsuperscript{356} Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{357} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{358} “Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, Part V, Monograph 152,” Japanese Monographs, 10.
\textsuperscript{359} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{360} Ibid., 58.
and to destroy it at an opportune moment.”\textsuperscript{361} The plans centered on decisive battles in which victory was assumed sufficient to secure resource areas.

After defeating its enemies, the Imperial Army planned military administration of the occupied areas to establish “public peace, assist in the rapid acquisition of national defense resources and to help maintain the forces engaged the operations.”\textsuperscript{362} Occupation forces would secure key roads, railroads, harbors, airfields, post services and communication centers to support military operations. This left uncrontolled areas that could be used to organize guerrilla bases.

The Imperial Army decreed: “In establishing a military administration, existing administrative structures were to be utilized as much as possible and racial customs were to be respected.”\textsuperscript{363} Military administrators were to maintain existing foreign trade, local currency, and civil order. At the same time, they were told, “The people of the occupied countries were to be warned that they would have to face some deprivation as it would be necessary for the occupation forces to acquire certain defense materials.”\textsuperscript{364} American, Dutch and British citizens in the occupied lands were subject to “such measures deemed as necessary.”\textsuperscript{365} Future Liaison Conferences would address any unforeseen issues caused by occupation. In summary, the Central Authorities and the Planning Board in Tokyo would oversee the exploitation of new territories, while local military officials maintained order through the existing governmental structures.\textsuperscript{366}

\textsuperscript{361} Monograph 150, Japanese Monographs, 46.
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid., 49.
\textsuperscript{363} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{364} Ibid., 50-51.
\textsuperscript{365} Ibid., 51.
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid., 52.
The Japanese based their plans on number of key assumptions. First, MacArthur’s defense would not last beyond fifty days. Second, the existing Philippine government would remain effective under the Japanese. Third, there would be no guerrilla resistance of significance. Fourth, the productivity of the existing economy could be maintained and thus prevent unbearable hardship on Filipinos. The Japanese did not prepare for the possibility that these assumptions proved invalid.

On 15 November, the Japanese army reassessed the defense forces in the Philippines. It believed that approximately 22,000 troops filled one U.S. division while the Philippine National Defense Army had 110,000 more men available in ten divisions.\textsuperscript{367} It expected another 15,000 men would enter army service by the end of 1941. The ‘patrol unit’ (the Constabulary) was thought to be under MacArthur’s command. The planners reported: “Although, the Americans are generally of excellent character, they tend to be physically and mentally lax and devoid of seriousness due to the tropical climate. The natives are well-educated and are especially satisfied with simple foods, but on the other hand they lack perseverance, and sense of responsibility. The military efficiency of native officers and men is greatly inferior to that of Americans.”\textsuperscript{368}

The commanders of 3\textsuperscript{rd} Fleet, 11\textsuperscript{th} Air Fleet, and 5\textsuperscript{th} Air Group met with the Southern Army on 14 and 15 November to prepare operations for the Philippines. They determined: “The operation objectives of the army are to defeat the enemy in the Philippines and to destroy its main bases… the army will seize the strategic points within

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\textsuperscript{367} Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 10.
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid., 12.
\end{footnotesize}
Advance detachments were to capture Batan Island, Vigan, Laoag, and Aparri quickly and construct airfields to support main operations. The 48th Division would land in the Lingayen Gulf, sweep central Luzon, and occupy half of Manila. The 16th Division would land in Lamon Bay, sweep southern Luzon, and occupy the rest of Manila. Finally, several detachments would take Legaspi, Davao, Jolo and secure naval bases in Subic Bay and Olongapo. Southern Army planners identified Manila as the place of the decisive battle and noted, “After seizing Manila City, the army will then occupy the fortress at Manila Bay and promptly open the Bay.” After fifty days the Army would reassemble a force around the 38th Division “for transfer to the Dutch East Indies area” and the main part of the 5th Air Group would transfer to “the Malay area.”

To command the 14th Army, the Imperial Headquarters selected General Masaharu Homma, a thirty-four-year army veteran considered to be one of the smartest army officers in Japan. He was an anomaly, known for his “taste for good paintings and furniture, a modest talent for verse, a flair for Western languages.” He had survived scandal while stationed in Britain in 1919 when his wife Toshiko, the daughter of a Meiji general, became an actress of stage and film. Her many romantic affairs led Homma to attempt to jump out a window of the Langham Hotel in London. He divorced and later married Westernized wealthy Fujiko.

The Imperial General Staff issued two planning directives. A Liaison Conference on 20 November approved the first, “Guidelines Governing the Administration of the

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369 Ibid., 15.
370 Ibid., 26.
371 Ibid., 19.
373 Ibid.
Southern Occupied Areas.” The Conference added an addendum, “Listing of Standards for Development/Acquisition of Important Resources According to Each Area of the South Seas,” that set targets of 50,000 tons manganese, 50,000 tons chrome, 100,000 tons copper, 300,000 tons of iron to be acquired in the Philippines in the first year. The Imperial General Headquarters Army Section adopted the second planning directive, “Plan for Governing Areas in the Territories Occupied During Southern Area Operations,” on 25 November and sent it to the commander of Southern Army. It prioritized the “restoration of law and order, immediate extraction of defense-related resources, and Occupation Force self-sufficiency, as the three cardinal rules of occupation.” The policy called for using “existing governmental institutions, protecting and respecting existing religious institutions, and the inevitability of burdening the livelihood of citizens in order to obtain defense resources and achieve self-sufficiency for the Occupation force.”

Less than two weeks before the invasion, the Imperial General Staff finally provided the Army with guidance for the occupation of the Philippines. In “The Proposed Plan for an Early Termination of the War Against the United States, Great Britain, and Netherlands,” the military leaders announced, “the present regime in the Philippines shall be allowed to continue for the time being and be guided towards contributing to accelerating the termination of the war.” There was no thought that the ‘present regime’ may not want to continue under occupation. The 14th Army was to establish military administration to “restore law and order, quickly acquire resources vital for

374 Setsuho, 129.
375 Ibid., 130.
376 Satoshi, 30-31
377 Ibid., 30-31.
378 Ibid., 35.
national defense, and realize self-sufficiency of the Occupation troops.”

The army would coordinate private enterprise with central administration to exploit the needed resources. The head of the Department of Industries, Michizo Yamagoshi, produced a top-secret report for the 14th Army Military Administration entitled “Transformation of the Philippine Economy under Military Administration” with priority assignments for Japanese industries: three copper mines at Mankayan, Hixbar (Rapurapa) and Antique; the chrome mine at Zambalese (Masinloc); two manganese mines at Bohol (Gundorman) and Busuanga; and, the iron mine at Kalambayangan.

The Southern Army Group and 14th Army completed their plans under the assumption that they would attack after the New Year. They estimated a thirty-four-day campaign to clear and seize Luzon, followed by one brigade “mopping up the enemy remnants.”

The planners again emphasized, “With the expiration of the period slated for the Luzon operation, about a half of the army (one division, specialist units under direct army command, and almost the entire strength of the army and navy air units) will embark on vessels after making preparations near Manila….”

Based on these plans, the high command would quickly strip quality troops from the Philippines.

On 26 November, American Secretary of State Hull met with the Japanese representatives and again demanded that Japan withdraw from China and Manchuria. The next day Tojo convened another Liaison Conference. On 29 November, the senior Japanese leaders met again with the Emperor to confirm their belief that war was now inevitable. Tojo later testified: “No one attended from the Imperial General

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379 Setsuho, 129.
380 Ibid., 130-131.
382 Ibid., 26.
He announced: “Japan desired an early decisive battle, but in war there was always the other side so there would always be times when the situation would not develop as expected or desired. Therefore, we must be prepared for a prolonged war.”\textsuperscript{384} Tojo was thinking in terms of the larger war, not prolonged resistance in the Philippines. He addressed concerns about “unrest of the people at large,” but only in reference to Japanese citizens, not occupied populations.\textsuperscript{385} He also admitted “there was no definite plan as to the means by which the war would be terminated.”\textsuperscript{386} The next day at 1500 hours, Tojo reported to the Emperor who noted that the navy was against going to war. The Prime Minister argued they had no choice. The Emperor authorized an Imperial Conference. On 1 December, the leaders reconvened with the all the government ministers to announce negotiations had failed and the nation was going to war.

In Manila, Quezon recalled: “For several months, I had been almost certain that war with Japan was inevitable in view of the positive stand taken by the United States vis-à-vis the so-called ‘China Incident’ and the announced Greater East Asia policy of Japan.”\textsuperscript{387} Despite his feeling, his country remained unprepared for war.

In early December the Japanese 9th Submarine Division (with two submarines, the \textit{I-123} and \textit{I-124}) of the 6th Submarine Squadron assigned as the Philippine Submarine Group, left Samah on Hainan Island for the Philippines. The \textit{I-123} proceeded to Balabac Strait and the \textit{I-124} to Manila Bay and per prearranged schedule, on 8 December the two submarines secretly laid about 40 mines at the western entrance of the Balabac Strait and

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{383} Monograph 150, Japanese Monographs, 97.
\item\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 99.
\item\textsuperscript{385} Ibid., 100.
\item\textsuperscript{386} Ibid., 101.
\item\textsuperscript{387} Quezon, 183.
\end{itemize}
at the mouth of the Manila Bay.”³⁸⁸ Later in the month the 13 Submarine Division (I-121 and I-122) joined the two subs.

The Japanese government prepared a statement to issue in conjunction with the attack on Pearl Harbor, “An Outline of Information and Propaganda Policies for the War between Japan and the Anglo-American Powers.” While emphatically denying that their war was one against white people (so as not to offend their Axis allies), the document made it clear that Japan’s cause was a moral one for a “new world order” which “enabled all nations and races to assume their proper place in the world, and all peoples to be at peace in their own sphere.”³⁸⁹ This aim derived from the worldview of the legendary Emperor Jimmu who 2,600 years earlier projected Japan as an enlightened center of a world at peace. As John Dower explained, “What makes this bureaucratic guide to propaganda policy so useful, however, is that it embraces in a brief format many of the other emotional elements that were intimately wrapped up with the concept of proper place and integral to the Japanese designation of themselves as the ‘leading race.’ We have here moral righteousness, mythical legitimization, global vision, and the evocation of a ‘shining history’ – an image of brightness that will be found recurring in many forms.”³⁹⁰ Dower concluded: “It was the intention of the Japanese to establish permanent domination over all other races and peoples in Asia – in accordance with their needs, and as befitted their destiny as a superior race.”³⁹¹

The Japanese adapted their mythology to support a racist vilification of their enemy. “There were certainly no great impediments to hating or denigrating the

³⁸⁹ Dower, 205.
³⁹⁰ Ibid., 206.
³⁹¹ Ibid., 264.
Westerners,” noted Dower, “but the idioms had to fit: strong and threatening, beneficent and evil. They settled on demons, albeit demons with a human face.”392 By this philosophy, Filipinos, like other Asians, were not evil but they had natural positions to fill subordinate to the Japanese. The Japanese plans framed their appreciation of the political, economic and military weaknesses of the Philippines in this worldview. To control and develop the Islands, they would drive out the Americans and seize and subordinate the larger cities that linked the Philippines through administration and commerce. They assumed that the inhabitants of the vast spaces outside those nodes would then accept subaltern status. The plan of attack was part and parcel of the overall decision to go to war that Eri Hotta aptly termed “a huge national gamble.”393 Events, however, invalidated the planners’ assumptions.

392 Ibid., 179.
3. A Time to Die
8 December 1941 – 10 March 1942

_The Japanese invaded the Philippines to drive the Americans out of that strategically vital region. By the time MacArthur realized that he lacked the forces and support needed to carry out his conventional defensive plans, he was too late to organize a viable guerrilla resistance. The Filipinos however, caught between the Japanese and Americans, had already begun armed resistance against their new occupiers._

Manila, D1/R-1,048

_(Day 1 of Japanese occupation/ 1,048 Days until MacArthur’s return)_

It was 8 December in the Philippines when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Nine-year old Isabel ‘Lita’ Yumol, the daughter of a Manila attorney, learned the news from a neighbor who heard it on his short-wave radio. Lita’s father sent her to tell neighbors to stock up on supplies. News of attacks on Malaya, Thailand, Singapore, Guam, Hong Kong, and Wake Island, followed. That night Lita asked her father if the Japanese would attack them. He explained, “The Philippines is a Commonwealth of the United States and we’re friends, and so the Japanese will think of us as enemies.”

The Japanese now controlled the 4,000 miles of sea between the Philippines and the nearest American base at Midway Island. Their troops seized the little island of Batan, a hundred and fifty miles north of Luzon, and began building an airfield. Ten hours after the attack on Hawaii, Japanese aircraft struck Clark Field north of Manila and

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crippled MacArthur’s Far East Air Force. That evening, the bulk of the U.S. Navy in the Philippines, Asiatic Fleet Task Force 5, left the Islands for Australia.

Four days earlier, MacArthur reorganized his army and placed the four divisions and one cavalry regiment in Luzon under Major General Jonathan Wainwright with orders to defend the Lingayen Gulf, the Zambales coast, and the Bataan Peninsula. He told Wainwright there would be “no withdrawal from the beach positions” and to hold them “at all costs.” On the beaches, however, local commanders found that inadequate training, lack of equipment, and sparse communications undermined such plans.

MacArthur had sent his officers on B-17 bombers over Luzon to see how two volcanoes in Bataan and the Zambales Mountains would constrict enemy movements. Impassable mountain ranges in the north would funnel invaders into the lowlands of Manila. “The logic of an invasion was obvious,” wrote one officer, “as MacArthur understood: land at Lingayen, drive down the plain to Manila, and seize the bay from within.” MacArthur planned conventional defenses to block these routes.

Early on 9 December, Japanese aircraft struck Nichols Field south of Manila. In the evening planes appeared over Manila. Adalia Marquez, wife of Philippine Civil Liberties Union leader Antonio Bautista, recalled, “At first we didn’t think much about them. We hoped they were American planes flying up there to assure the Filipinos that Uncle Sam was on the job – that he would soon chase the enemy out over the ocean and they would never come back. But then the sirens lifted up their mournful voices.”

395 “Thus after one day of war, with its strength cut in half, the Far East Air Force had been eliminated as an effective fighting force.” Morton, 88.
396 Morton, 69.
398 Marquez, 3.
swept the capital as the Japanese bombs fell. “Utter confusion seized our whole neighborhood,” Marquez remembered. 399

Helen Lawson Cutting, in the advertising staff at the Herald, asked editor Carlos Romulo, “Why aren’t we fighting them? Where are our planes?” 400 He had no answer. Romulo would soon to return to active duty as an aide to General MacArthur. Reporter Yay Panlilio, single mother of three, covered the bombing and then joined others from the paper that volunteered to serve USAFFE. The Assistant Chief of Intelligence at Fort Santiago, Captain Ralph Keeler, swore her in as a U.S. intelligence agent with badge number 67 with instructions to report anything of value.

Japanese air attacks early on 10 December destroyed the U.S. Navy facilities at Cavite. The Naval Yard normally employed 1,500 to 2,000 civilian workers but recently had given work to about 5,000 Filipinos. 401 Attacks like these destroyed jobs and infrastructure and created a resentful and idle pool of manpower.

That morning the Japanese Tanaka Detachment landed on Luzon’s north coast at Aparri while the Kano Detachment came ashore on the northwest coast at Vigan. These were part of six small advanced landings to gain footholds on the island for airfields. 402 MacArthur saw the landings as diversions and refused to engage them in force. 403

Filipinos grew worried. “They were poor people who had nothing to do with this new war and little knowledge of the events that brought it upon them,” American Lieutenant Ed Ramsey remembered, “They had no weapons and only the frail shelter of

399 Ibid.
400 Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc. 1943), 22.
402 Morton, 98.
403 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 123.
Map 5: Japanese Invasion Landings in the Philippines, December 1941
bamboo built on stilts, and we urged them to evacuate while there was still time. Few did, even the women and children choosing to remain in the home to tend to their copra groves and rice paddies.” Filipinas began cutting their prized long hair and dressing like men in hopes of avoiding Japanese attention. As Adalia Marquez recalled, “We had heard about the sex atrocities the Japanese had committed in China.”

Against the Japanese landings, initial USAFFE defenses melted away. An American commander recalled, “…when the Japs fired on the Filipinos, the noise would scare these guys more than anything else, and that they would often break and run. They perceived the Japanese as ‘being ten feet tall,’ but they didn’t know what their guns could do. They just didn’t have any confidence.” MacArthur shifted forces and equipment across Manila Bay to the Bataan Peninsula and the island citadel of Corregidor. Recently recalled U.S. Navy Lieutenant, Junior Grade, Chick Parsons supervised the fueling and supply of ships in the Manila port.

Short and dark complexioned, the thirty-nine-year-old Parsons had learned Spanish and stenography in his Tennessee high school. Upon graduation, he hopped a freighter to the Philippines where two uncles had remained after the Spanish American War. In 1921 he found work as a secretary with a commission under retired General Leonard Wood and W. Cameron Forbes as they investigated the readiness of the Philippines for independence. For three years Parsons traveled the Islands on the yacht Apo, learning firsthand local topography, cultures, and dialects. After postgraduate study in commerce at the University of the Philippines, he worked for the Telephone and

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404 Ramsey and Rivele, 46.
405 Marquez, 4.
406 Blackburn Interview, 36.
Telegraph Company, became a senior purchaser of lumber on Mindanao for the Meyer Muzzall Company and a manager of the North American Trading and Importing Company. Parsons found time to accept a commission in the United States Naval Reserve with the Pacific Fleet in Manila. When he turned thirty, he married fifteen-year-old Katraushka Jurika, daughter of a Czechoslovakian veteran of Spanish-American War, and settled into a comfortable life managing the Spanish owned La Insular Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Zamboanga. The couple moved to Manila where Parsons managed the Luzon Stevedoring Company’s tugboats along with local chrome and magnesium mines. He prospered enough to retire young and enjoy life with his wife and three young boys. When Katsy’s father died, her mother Blanche moved in to help care for the boys. Parsons even organized the Los Tamaaos Polo Club. With roots established in the Philippines, Parsons decided to remain with his family in Manila.

Fate now asked more of Chick Parsons. To escape confiscation by the Japanese, several Danish ships stranded in Manila harbor applied for Panamanian registration. Caught without a diplomat in Manila, the Panama sought a local ‘honorary consul’ to carry out the transfer. Authorities reached out to Parsons who accepted and received Panamanian passports for his family, official papers and seals, and a Panamanian flag. These accouterments would play large in Parsons’ future.

On 12 December, MacArthur confided to reporters that he could not defend all likely invasion points. “The basic principle of handling my troops is to hold them intact until the enemy commits himself in force,” he explained, “These small landings are being

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408 Ibid 35.
made to tempt me to spread out and weaken our defenses.”

Had he organized guerrilla forces, this would have been the time to deploy them.

MacArthur’s aide-de-camp, Colonel Sidney Huff, went to Quezon’s house in Mariquina to discuss movement to Corregidor. At 2000 hours that night, Quezon met with MacArthur in the Manila Hotel. “The military defense of the Philippines is primarily America’s responsibility and not mine,” the President said, “I have already placed every Filipino soldier under your command. My own first duty is to take care of the civilian population and to maintain public order while you are fighting the enemy.” MacArthur told Quezon it was his duty to keep him from falling into enemy hands. “He was also of the opinion that as long as I was free,” said Quezon, “the occupation of Manila, or even of the Philippines, by the Japanese Army would not have the same significance under international law as if the Government had been captured or surrendered.”

Southern Luzon, D5/R-1044

The Philippine 11th Division faced the Japanese in north Luzon when the Kimura Detachment’s 2,500 men landed two hundred miles southeast at Lagaspi. Major General George M. Parker, Jr.’s South Luzon Force covered two hundred and fifty miles of front with Brigadier General Vincent Lim’s 41st Division and Brigadier General Albert Jones’ 51st Division. They were spread too thin to stop the landing. The Philippine soldiers had too few machine guns and the guns jammed in the sand. “Well, with this,”

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409 Romulo, 55.
410 Quezon, 194.
411 Ibid., 196.
412 Ibid., 198.
413 Morton, 109.
Blackburn, “the Filipinos started taking off. There was no stopping them.” Blackburn added, “there was no unity. There was no feeling of pride…. when the Japs hit the beach and started shooting, the Filipinos just ran.”

Blackburn recognized that the Filipino soldiers were simply unprepared to fight as conventional units. English and Tagalog speaking officers could not rally the division’s enlisted men who spoke only in the Bicolanian dialect. Unable to return fire, they left their weapons and fell back. The soldiers had never developed unit teamwork, especially in combined arms. Parker instructed his forces to fall back north and destroy all roads, bridges and rails along the way.

Manila, D6/R-1043

Manila received reports of looting in Camarines Sur near the Kimura Detachment’s advance, “first, of the Japanese-owned stores, then of those owned by the Chinese.” Officials ordered Provincial Inspector of the Sorgoson Philippine Constabulary, Major Licerio P. Lapus, to evacuate Legaspi’s 40,000 citizens into the nearby hills. Lapus spread word to “go to the mountains and wait for aid.” To buy time, he led his Constabulary in small hit-and-run attacks against the invaders. Skilled men like Medical Inspector First Lieutenant Burgow T. Sayoc arrived and transformed Lapus’ band into a guerrilla unit. The Japanese continued north towards Manila.

At 1100 hours on 13 December, Quezon convened his Council of State. Vice President Sergio Osmeña, Speaker of the National Assembly Jose Yulo, Chief Justice

414 Blackburn Interview, 45.
415 Ibid, 47-48
416 Morto, 109.
417 Barrameda, 6.
418 “History of the Province,” 4.
Jose Abad Santos, and Majority Floor Leader Quintin Paredes attended along with staff secretaries Serafin Marabut (Finance), Jose P. Laurel (Justice), Rafael Alunan (Agriculture and Natural Resources), Sotero Baluyot (Commerce and Communication), Jorge Bocobo (Public Instruction), Leon Guinto (Labor) and Jose Fabella (Health). Quezon’s protégé Secretary to the President Jorge B. Vargas served as acting Secretary of Defense. Teofilo Sison served as the Head of the Civilian Emergency Administration. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army General Basilio Valdes and Chief of the Philippine Constabulary General Guillermo Francisco represented the military and the police forces. Finally, Senator Manuel Roxas, wore his U.S. Army major’s uniform as liaison to MacArthur. Quezon later wrote that Roxas was “one of our most able.”

The Council of State reviewed defense plans. Valdes reviewed the call up of 80,000 men in seven divisions for Luzon, two for the Visayas, one for Mindanao, along with the 10,000 Americans soldiers and 10,000 Philippines scouts. Francisco reported his 6,000 Philippine Constabulary had “orders to round up all the Japanese and to take them to internment camps.” Quezon, “well trained by actual experience to stand the hardships of war,” still did not consider guerrilla resistance.

Southern Luzon, D7/R-1042

In southern Camarines Sur, Assemblyman Mariano E. Villafuerte appealed to Governor Ramon Imperial to return from hiding to restore order in the provincial capital Naga. Villafuerte, whose prominent family ran the lumber mill in Sipocot and who

419 Quezon, 201.
420 Ibid., 202.
421 Ibid., 214.
422 Barrameda, 7.
had introduced the Boys Scouts to the Philippines, fretted about Naga’s citizens. The governor declined to return and instead authorized Villafuerte to act in his place. Villafuerte rallied the Naga police and got the government operating to reassure both the people of the province and the Commonwealth Government.

At 0800 hours on 14 December, the Japanese entered Naga. Locals had to decide to fight, flee, or cooperate. Villafuerte left for Sipocot leaving the governor’s brother Senator Domingo Imperial to meet the invaders. Using local Japanese resident Kubota as interpreter, Commander Denzo Kuriyama asked for the governor, the former governor, assemblyman Ramon Felipe, and Villafuerte. “That early,” Jose V. Barrameda, Jr., wrote, “their policy apparently was to get the political big guns to serve in the government forming under the control of the Japanese military.”

Kuriyama spent two days meeting with Villafuerte, both Imperial brothers, Bishop Pedro P. Santos, and Naga resident American judge Robert E Manley who lost his mansion to the Japanese military police as their headquarters. It fell to Villafuerte to organize the thirty-two provincial municipalities for occupation. Several times he would try to give up his post. The province had P600,000 frozen in the Philippine National Bank. Villafuerte sought a loan of P500,000 using the bank account as collateral. The government was so absent of funds that on 16 December, Kuriyama released P3,000 to its coffers.

Elsewhere in Bicol, recently elected congressman and Philippine Army reserve lieutenant Wenceslao Q. Vinzons of Camarines Norte opted to fight. By 18 December, assisted by Francisco “Turko” Boayes, he had several hundred men organized as

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423 Ibid., 8.
424 Ibid., 13.
Vinzons’ Traveling Guerrillas (VTG). They quickly impounded Chinese merchant Dy Hian Sian’s mill and stockpiles of rice, storing it in mines and villages. Vinzons then removed his provincial government from Legaspi to the remote town of Tuláy na Lupà. Short, dark Negritos from Labo came to complain of Japanese pillaging and raping. Vinzons advised them to fight with their bows and poison arrows. Days later he received hard-to-believe reports that sixty Negritos destroyed a column of two thousand Japanese on the Manila South Road.

Prejudice colored opinions of the Negritos but American Henry Clay Conner lived among them and knew them well. “Not only were they enthusiastic fighters who hated the Japanese, but it was impossible to put spies among them because no other people looked like them,” Lapham knew Connor and said, “He thought they had much more intelligence than others gave them credit for, and said they were remarkably loyal to him once he learned their language and treated them as equals.” Connor even married the sister of Negrito tribal chief Kodario Laxaman and had a child by her. Once the Philippines were liberated, however, he left his new wife and son to return to the States, fifteen years later arranging to provide them financial support.

Another Luzon tribe subject to prejudice were the “pygmy-sized, bushy-haired, extremely dark skinned” Igorots dressed in loincloths and armed only with bolo knives and bows and arrows. Bob Stahl witnessed their lethality against a target one-hundred-feet distant: “Immediately the Igorot whipped out an arrow and zinged it into the tree.

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426 Ibid., 702.
427 Lapham and Norling, 95.
428 Ibid., 102.
And again, and again. Three arrows in not more than ten seconds, all without the attention-gathering noise of rifle fire, and if there had been a six-inch-diameter bull’s eye on that tree, all three arrows would have been in it! I could do no better with a carbine.”

The Igorots were naturals for guerrilla hit-and-run tactics.

According to Barrameda, “During the first days, the invaders treated the civilians generally with almost exemplary courtesy, partly because most of the Japanese troops were being thrown northwards in a savage drive to bring MacArthur and his stubbornly heroic Filipino-American soldiers to their knees according to a timetable. The Japanese did not want an actively resistant population against their initially skeleton-force garrisons behind the war front.”

Even so, at 0430 hours on 18 December, Vinzons and Turko led an attack on Japanese troops at Laniton Bridge in Basud, Camarines Norte, killing five soldiers. About six hours later one hundred and twenty Japanese soldiers arrived at Daet. Vinzons fled to hide in Barrio Tulaynalupa.

Before the end of December, Philippine Constabulary Sergeant Faustino Flor and municipal counselor Teofilo Padua organized the Camp Isarog Guerrillas near Irigacalled. Because Flor brought more weapons, the group named him captain and commander while Padua became First Lieutenant and executive officer.

The emergent resistance groups had more volunteers than weapons. Almost all Filipinos carried knives with blades that varied by tribe: wavy *kris*, thick elliptical *barong*, curved *campilan*, angled *kukri*, etc. Guns were harder to find. Some gathered old Springfield and Enfield rifles from abandoned USAFFE training areas or old battlefields.

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430 Ibid.
431 Barrameda., 10.
432 Ibid., 11.
433 Ibid., 24.
Others created their own weapons. Many crafted a crude shotgun known as the *baltik* from a three-quarter inch pipe using 2-guage shotgun shells. Don Willis recalled: “The pipe was fitted into a larger pipe so it would slide back and forth. A wooden stock was put on the opposite end of the large pipe with a short length of nail sticking up in the center of the larger pipe. A hole was cut in the side of the larger pipe. The small pipe was slid forward, a shell loaded into it, the gun was pointed at the target, and then the small barrel is jerked sharply back. The nail hits the primer of the 12-guage shell, and the shot is on the way.”\(^{434}\) It was definitely not a long-range weapon. “Nor was the baltik accurate,” Bob Stalh reported, “for without a rifle’s bore to send it point first on a direct course, the slug, if it hit its target, often hit broadside, with very effective results. Crude as it was, the baltik had killing power, and that was what mattered.”\(^{435}\)

Central Luzon, D11/R-1038

The Philippine government called up the untrained militia to support the conventional defense. One U.S. officer noted, “Most had never seen a rifle and few possessed even uniforms.”\(^{436}\) All senior and junior ROTC cadets also received orders to report to army camps and join USAFFE units. Instructors sent freshman and sophomore cadets home, but many chose not to stay there.

USAFFE hastily shuffled units to the front. Lieutenant Ed Ramsey had joined the 26\(^{th}\) U.S. Cavalry at Fort Stotsenberg in June only to spend “every spare minute” preparing for a match against the Manila Polo Club. Meanwhile, he remembered, “reports

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\(^{435}\) Stahl, 6.
\(^{436}\) Ramsey and Rivele, 37.
of Japanese over-flights became so frequent that we scarcely took notice of them.”437 Suddenly he received orders to take a staff car with a radio, two machine guns, twenty-seven Filipino cavalrymen on horseback, and local constabulary troops to central Luzon and defend the east coast from Dingalen to Baler. Traveling that area by car from one end to the other took more than three hours. “It was a forlorn hope,” Ramsey recalled, “I knew it as I set out.”438 MacArthur counted on many such forlorn deployments to slow the Japanese until he could counterattack.439 Yet the thinly spread units could only report and fall back, assuming they could communicate at all.

Davao, Mindanao, D13/R-1036

Attacks on Japanese residents in Luzon caused the Japanese high command to worry about the security of the large Japanese population in Davao, Mindanao. Homma sent a small battle group from Palau to secure Davao late on 20 December. Lieutenant Colonel Toshio Miura’s force consisted of the 56th Brigade of the newly raised 56th Division augmented by the 1st Battalion of the 33rd Infantry Regiment.440 The next morning, USAFFE Chief of Staff Sutherland dictated a message to Washington: “Enemy attacking Davao with land forces from four transports. Engaged by advance elements of the 101st Division. If more than predatory effort I plan to launch guerrilla warfare throughout Mindanao with Mohammedan population.”441 He prepared no such plans.

After securing Davao, the Miura Detachment lost the 56th Brigade to Jolo Island and the Netherlands Indies. Miura augmented his remaining battalion with local constabulary forces before attempting to extend his control on Mindanao into Digos, Augusan, and Zamboango. A few skirmishes

437 Ibid., 42.
438 Ibid., 45.
439 Morton, 69.
440 Ibid., 507-508.
441 Rodgers, 106.
later, he decided to remain around Davao. American commander, General William F. Sharp, thought it best not to attack Miura’s position.

Central Luzon, D15/R-1034

Late on 22 December eighty Japanese ships dodged sporadic 155mm artillery fire and entered the Lingayen Gulf north of Manila. The next morning, they landed six regiments of the 48th Division and threatened to cut off the 11th Philippine Regiment at the southern tip of the bay. Major Russell Volckmann had just recently assumed command of the regiment.

The thirty-year old Iowan and West Pointer Volckmann had arrived in country with his wife and son only eighteen months earlier. He became the executive officer of the Filipino regiment when it stood up in July. The next month he waved goodbye to his family as they joined the exodus back to the States. His family was now his unit’s mountain Igorots and lowland Ilocanos and Cagayanos who spoke eleven dialects. He noted, “The officers, being mainly political appointees, had less training than the men they were to lead.” At Daguban they scavenged shovels and other equipment to prepare defensive positions. They retreated without ever having seen the enemy.

Units rushed from the Lingayen Gulf to Baguio where the commander of Camp John Hay, Lieutenant Colonel John P. Horan, tried to get them organized. Regimental commanders Colonel Donald Bonnett, Major Max Ganahl, Lieutenant Colonel Martin Moses, and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Noble met with Horan and discussed the possibility of dispersing to wage guerrillas operations. “It was known at the time that

442 Morton, 508.
443 Ibid.
444 Volckmann, 6.
445 Ibid.
there were food stocks and weapons in the many mines around the area,” Blackburn recalled, “Most of the mines, as the story went, had about six months to a year’s supply of food, and quantities of weapons, and a lot of the miners were [in the] Reserves.”

Horan decided to use his radio to coordinate with MacArthur’s headquarters one hundred and thirty miles to the south. Many of the units around Camp John Hay, however, had no means of communication. The 11th Infantry Regiment arrived with “neither wire nor radio communications between the battalions and the regimental command post.” The 12th Infantry Regiment came with “no vehicles, no radios, no mortars, and only one rifle company.” USAFFE ordered all the units to fall back to Bataan.

With the Japanese cutting between Baguio and Manila, MacArthur authorized Horan to take whatever steps he thought necessary to save the units. Horan gathered his forces and retreated to Caranglan before turning back to Kiangan. The Japanese reached Balete Pass and cut off his position. On Christmas Eve, Horan radioed: “My right hand is in a vise, my nose in an inverted funnel, constipated my bowels. Open my south paw…” USAFFE headquarters replied, “Save your command.” Horan destroyed vehicles and equipment, dissolved his force, and authorized his men to head for Bataan, surrender, or fight on as guerillas. He gave Filipino soldiers permission to go home.

Horan’s destruction of his radios would prove costly, but the SCR-177’s radio, receiver and generator were a bulky forty-five pounds and his soldiers needed to move

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446 Blackburn Interview, 49.
447 Volckmann, 19.
450 Morton, 135-136.
quickly. As for himself, Horan opted to fight on as a guerrilla. Volckmann wrote: “As a result of this order, sparks of resistance spread to every corner of North Luzon, and from these sparks a flame sprang that burned throughout the dark days of the Japanese occupation.” He was unaware that Lapus, Vinzons, and others were already fighting.

Southern Luzon, D16, R-1033

MacArthur’s withdrawal had left Bicol undefended, creating a power vacuum filled by Filipinos. Citizens and remnant USAFFE troops gravitated to Vinzons, Lapus, Lieutenant Colonel Montano Zabat of Albay, Sorsogon Province Governor Salvador C. Escudero, and Gregorio Espinas in Sorsogon City. Zabat – “a self-styled colonel who had been a traffic officer in Albay and Sorsogon with the pre-war rank of first lieutenant” – led the strongest group with three to four hundred armed men in Camarines Norte. Lapus established his base in the Inang Maharang mountain forests near Manito in Albay, with training facilities on the remote Bulusan volcano slopes. Escudero’s family connections and political alliances gave him power in Sorsogon province but inspired challenges from other guerillas, especially Lapus. These leaders had to compete for scarce support. A later U.S. Army report said: “Fighting between units over matters of area command almost exceeds any fighting against the Japanese. The leaders have frequently asked for an appointed outside commander, knowing their own shortcomings and desiring to

453 Volckmann, 15-16.
454 Barrameda, 134.
contribute something more concrete to their country, but no action has been taken to coordinate these units.”

Bicol remained a Filipino field of battle.

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455 General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, “Guerrilla Resistance Movements in the Philippine,” 31 March 1945, Box 255, RG 407, Philippines Archive Collection, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland, 23. (Hereafter “Guerrilla Resistance Movements.”)
Map 6: Major Guerrilla Groups in Bicol (southern Luzon), December 1941

A 1937 Philippine Constabulary Academy graduate, Lieutenant Ernesto S. Mata, led an independent group of seventy-five to one hundred armed men along the coast of
Zabat’s area in Camarines Norte. Padua, with Flor, had three hundred and fifty armed men (but claimed 2,000 members) in the reorganized Camp Isarog Guerrilla Unit (CIGU) in the San Miguel Bay area of Camarines Sur. He would join Zabat’s force. Philippine Army finance sergeant Juan Q. Miranda promoted himself to captain and organized the Tangkong Vaga Guerrillas (TVGU) near Libmanan, Camarines Sur. Damaso O. Dianela, who claimed to be a captain in the U.S. Army, raised a band in Camaroan that became known as the Camp Tingawagan Guerrillas. Major Francisco Sandico, the Provincial Inspector of Albay and Senior Constabulary in Bicol, and Lieutenant Julio Llanrezas led active, independent groups in Albay Province, and twenty-one-year-old Lieutenant Salvador Rudolfo commanded guerrillas on the island of Cantanduanes. Later, Captain Eustacio D. Orobia, a Philippine Division air officer taken prisoner on Bataan and paroled, assumed the title of “General” and organized 200 men of the Bagong Katipunan guerrillas around Jovellar on the west coast opposite Legaspi. Meanwhile a Major Aguilar reportedly formed another band around Tiwi on east coast. Zabat, Lapus and Padua competed to recruit a small group under a Captain Tacerua on Burias Island off the west coast of Bicol.

North and Central Luzon, D17, R-1032

In Pangasinan Province, Jose de Guzman led guerrilla attacks in Umingan, San Nicolas, Asingan, San Quentin and Tying. Closer to Manilla, in Bulacan Province, Pacifico Cabreras led forty men in operations near Baliuag. On the northeast corner of Luzon, Cayagan Province Governor Marcelo Adduru withdrew his government from

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456 “History of the Province,” iGovPhil (.gov) 4.
457 See Orobia’s role in Bataan in William D. Chalek, Guest of the Emperor: 1941 to 1945 in the Philippines Surviving the War, and as a POW, Bataan Death March, Cabanatuan, Davao Penal Colony, The ‘Hell Ships’ (Lincoln, Nebraska: Writers Club Press, 2002). 40-60.
458 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 23.
Tuguegarao to the inland town of Tuao on the Chico River. A reserve major in the Philippine Army, Adduru had since August prepared contingencies and trained his constabulary in guerrilla tactics. He reorganized two Constabulary companies, augmented by USAFFE stragglers and local volunteers, into the Cayagan Guerrilla force.

With Adduru was American Captain Ralph Praeger. After the Japanese landed at Aparri, Praeger’s Troop C of the 26th Cavalry attempted to delay the invaders in the Cagayan Valley. The landing in the Lingayen Gulf cut them off from the main USAFFE forces. Praeger withdrew through Tuguegarao towards Vigan in Ilocos Sur and received orders to disperse his isolated force. He turned what remained of C Troop back northwest into the Cagayan Valley. There he picked up a number of Filipino soldiers from disbanded units. Praeger arrived at Adduru’s headquarters with Lieutenant Francis Camp and three other American officers from Horan’s dissolved command.

The USAFFE forces were without sufficient food, communications, sleep or guidance, and became increasingly frustrated. Supplied only with commercial maps, Captain John Wheeler of the 26th Cavalry complained, “Jesus Christ, these maps aren’t worth a damn. I now know where to buy Goodyear tires and Camel cigarettes everywhere

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459 Norling, 16.
460 Volckmann, 34-35.
Map 7: Major Guerrilla Units in North and Central Luzon, December 1941
between here and Subic Bay, but I’m damned if I can tell where a trail ends or a river or a bridge is anywhere.”461 The men stumbled past the limits of endurance. Seeing his friend Cliff Hardwick shot through the head, Ramsey recalled, “I brooded over it all day until I felt I might be going mad.”462 Only faith in reinforcement from America kept the men in the field going. Leaders in Washington, however, knew the otherwise. In late December, Roosevelt told Churchill the Philippines were a lost cause while Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson added: “There are times when men have to die.”463

Early on Christmas Eve the Japanese 16th Division landed at Lamon Bay at the waist of Luzon. At 0900 hours, MacArthur’s aide Colonel Sidney Huff went to Malacañang Palace to inform President Quezon that it was time to move the seat of government to Corregidor. At 1500 that afternoon, after a delay caused by Japanese bombing, Quezon and his family, his senior aide Colonel Manuel Nieto, Vice President Osmeña, Chief Justice Abad Santos, Major General Valdes, and the President’s staff headed out in two launches for the S.S. Mayon anchored about a mile out in the bay.464 United States High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis Bowes Sayre and his family and staff joined them.465 Four hours later MacArthur and his staff followed them to the island fortress on Corregidor known as “the Rock.” Chief of the Philippine Constabulary Major General Francisco stayed behind to maintain law and order. MacArthur also left his Deputy Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Richard J. Marshall, behind to run the rear

461 Ramsey and Rivele, 63.
462 Ibid., 70.
463 See Manchester, 241.
464 Two months later Mayon’s captain would go down with his vessel, sunk by Japanese bombers. Quezon, 212.
465 Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, 60-61.
guard. Quezon left Secretary of Justice Laurel and Presidential Executive Secretary Vargas with instructions, “You two will… deal with the Japanese.”

On Christmas day as part of the force from Davao seized Jolo, Homma neared his main objective, Manila. USAFFE’s series of defensive lines had pushed Homma behind schedule. Then on 26 December, MacArthur declared Manila an open city. There would be no final stand in the capital. MacArthur urged the 684,000 citizens of Manila to evacuate, and 400,000 would indeed leave. The Yumol family joined the harried exodus in an over-loaded Packard and headed for their matriarchal grandmother’s home in Mabatang, Bataan. Some relatives remained in Manila saying, “This is our home – we were born and grew up here; we built up this town. We would never abandon it; we need to keep it going. And if we would die here, so be it.”

MacArthur completed his withdrawal across Manila Bay to the Bataan Peninsula. Homma followed. Retreating soldiers advised the Filipinos along their route to leave before the Japanese arrived. On 27 December, near Bayambang, Volckmann received orders to move the remnants of his 11th Regiment another fifty miles south and join the forces in north Bataan. They commandeered all the vehicles they could find and headed south. Bado Dangwa, who ran a transportation company in the Mountain Province, turned over one hundred and thirty buses and other vehicles to USAFFE. When the Japanese arrived at Baguio, he headed into the hills to organize a resistance group.

One of those left behind was twenty-five-year-old Japanese mestizo Cecile Okubo Afable, an editor and writer for the Baguio Midland Courier. Japanese soldiers entered her home, executed her pacifist Japanese father, and seized their house – apparently

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466 Starling, 163.
468 Jennings, 5
because it had a grand piano – for use as a brothel.\textsuperscript{469} Cecile recalled about a hundred women brought to the house as sex slaves for the Japanese soldiers. A number were later killed for trying to escape or to prevent them from testifying after the war.

On 28 December, President Roosevelt delivered a radio address: “I give to the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected. The entire resources, in men and material, of the United States stand behind that pledge. It is not for me or for the people of this country to tell you where your duty lies. We are engaged in a great and common cause. I count on every Philippine man, woman, and child to do his duty. We will do ours.”\textsuperscript{470} Quezon later said, “On reading the message I was instantly electrified and thrilled.”\textsuperscript{471} Hernando J. Abaya recalled thinking, “Our freedom would be redeemed! This meant the battle of the Philippines was already lost.”\textsuperscript{472} Captain Jesus Villamor, a hero pilot now serving as an aid to Quezon realized, “Clearly no American warships were on the way. There would be no victory dinner at the Manila Hotel on New Year’s Day.”\textsuperscript{473}

Quezon had won reelection as president on 11 November. To demonstrate the functioning of his government, he insisted on carrying out an inauguration ceremony on Corregidor on 30 December. First his staff had to find a radio to “communicate with the outside world …with the occupied areas.”\textsuperscript{474} The headquarters contacted Brigadier General Marshall in Manila who sent Major Teague and Lieutenant Ince scrambling to find a radio strong enough to broadcast from the Rock. For the ceremony, U.S. High

\textsuperscript{469} George Hicks, \textit{The Comfort Women, Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War II} (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), 126-127.
\textsuperscript{470} Hernando J. Abaya, \textit{Betrayal in the Philippines} (New York: A.A. Wyn, Inc.; 1946) 22.
\textsuperscript{471} Quezon, 226.
\textsuperscript{472} Abaya, 22.
\textsuperscript{473} Villamor, 46.
\textsuperscript{474} Romulo, \textit{I Saw the Fall of the Philippines}, 99.
Commissioner Sayre and MacArthur flanked Quezon. Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos gave the oath. Quezon then spoke: “At the present time we have but one task – to fight with America for America and the Philippines… Ours is a great cause. We are fighting for human liberty and justice, for those principles of individual freedom which we all cherish and without which life would not be worth living.”  

In the weeks ahead, however, Quezon began to doubt Roosevelt and said, “It seems that Washington does not fully realize our situation nor the feelings which the apparent neglect of our safety and welfare have engendered in the hearts of the people here.” He began to consider possible ways to pursue immediate independence and neutral status in the war.

In Manila the leftist members of the Philippine Civil Liberties Union, who had long fought for democratic reforms, feared the Japanese arrival. Antonio Bautista hosted a secret Union meeting to organize an underground resistance he called ‘the group.’ Founding members included Ramon de Santos, Lorenzo Tanada, Francisco Lava, Anselmo Claudio, R. Mamino Corpus, Cirpriano Cid of the Manila Bulletin, columnist Amando L. Dayrit, Jesus Roces, Rafael R. Roces, Jose B.L. Reyes, Jesus Barrera, and Bautista. Eventually ‘the group’ became better known as The Free Philippines and managed to place agents inside the collaborationist government and the Japanese hierarchy. They sent communist leader Vincente Lava “out to the province to help set up an underground movement.” The Japanese were on the lookout for these men. They eventually captured and executed de Santos, Rafael Roces, and Apacible.

475 Jesus Villamor, (as told to Gerald S. Snyder), *They Never Surrendered: A True Story of Resistance in World War II* (Quezon City, Philippines: Vera-Reyes, Inc., 1982), 46.

476 Manchester, 245.

477 Marquez, 7.

478 Ibid., 7-8.

479 Ibid., 8.

480 This became the ‘Hukbalahap,’ which was soon to give the Japanese forces plenty of trouble.” Ibid., 7.
Bautista was captured, reportedly escaped, but was never seen again. Dayrit died in the hospital in 1944.

South Central Luzon, D21/R-1028

“At this time,” a later U.S. Army assessment noted, “popular sentiment in the Philippines was agitated due to enemy propaganda and the strategies of some vicious inhabitants including Chinese residents and members of the Communist Party.”481 Chinese Workers’ Union, the Dramatic Clubs, the Chinese Cultural Association and the Salvation Association combined to form the Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force (Feilubin huaqiao kangri zhidui also known as the Hau Zhi, Wha Chi or Wah Chi) in Bataan with cells in Laguna, Tayabas, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Bulacan, Rizal, and Batangas. The group established communications and assisted people in escaping the Japanese while spreading anti-Japanese propaganda and encouraging loyalty to the United States, the Philippines and the Chinese Nationalists. Yung Li Yuk-Wai noted, “Unlike the Chinese leftists, the Chinese resistance forces on the rightist side were characterized by diversity and disunity.”482

The eighty members of the Philippines Chinese Youth Wartime Special Services Corps provided aid to bombing victims in Manila but dissolved when the Japanese were about to enter the city. One of the three members of the Kuomintang’s Standing Committee in the Philippines, Shi Yisheng, received authority from the Chinese Military Council to convert the Chinese Volunteers of the Philippines (CVP) into a guerrilla force. They became the genesis of two groups, the US-CVP in the Baguio-La Union area under

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481 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 309.
482 Yuk-Wai, 115.
Li Bocai (Lee Pak-chay aka Vincente Lopez) linked to USAFFE, and the CVP under Shi Yisheng in the Calabugao Mountains in La Union.\textsuperscript{483} Unsubstantiated sources reported that on 18 December, USAFFE supplied the US-CVP with 600 Springfield rifles.\textsuperscript{484}

The Philippine Chinese United Workers Union joined other Chinese leftists to form the Anti-Japanese and Chinese-protection Committee (AJCPC) and a militia of Wartime Service Corps (WSC) and petitioned Quezon and MacArthur to join USAFFE.\textsuperscript{485} On 25 December, Wang Xixiong of the AJCPC led 400 Chinese women, children, and elderly out of Manila to Paete, Laguna. Xu Jingcheng and Chen Cunsheng led others to Bulacan. Huang Jie and Cai Jianhua took the WSC to San Fernando, Pampanga, to train. After leaving Manila, the AJCPC reformed as the Emergency Action Committee (\textit{Feichang shiqi xingdong weiyuanhui}).

A group under Xu Zhimeng included leftist and nationalists, the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps (\textit{Feilubin huqiao kangri chujian yiyongdui}) or Kang Chu or PCAJVC.\textsuperscript{486} With up to 300 members the PCAJVC conducted nonmilitary operations such as gathering food and publishing the \textit{Chinese Commercial Bulletin} (Qiaoshang gong bao).

The appearance of such guerrilla units annoyed Homma. Unwilling to divert his hard-pressed combat units, he ordered his Luzon Line of Communication Department to apprehend these “insidious elements” of USAFFE in the north central areas around Bontoc, Bayombong, and Zambales with support from the Army Air Unit.\textsuperscript{487} To the

\textsuperscript{483} Ibid., 135-137.
\textsuperscript{484} Ibid., 135 and fn82. The report is cited from U.S. Baclagon, \textit{The Philippine Resistance Movement Against Japan, 10.12.1941-14.6.1945} (Quezon City: Munoz Press, 1965) 301. The supply of rifles is not mentioned in the “Affidavit of Shih I-sheng” in NARA, PAC, 407/323/106-1.
\textsuperscript{485} Ibid., 79.
\textsuperscript{486} Ibid., 94.
\textsuperscript{487} Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 309.
Japanese military, ambush and sabotage were the work of lawless ‘bandits,’ not organized enemy resistance. As such, they were the responsibility of the local government, not the Imperial Army. Homma instructed Filipino political leaders including Manila mayor of Jorge Vargas to establish “a central administrative organ” to execute governmental affairs and a “provisional consultative committee” to ensure strict accord with the Japanese military.\textsuperscript{488} While he still hoped Quezon and his government would return and cooperate, Homma needed a national authority to keep law and order.

Stories of the Japanese committing random rapes, beatings and killings spread like wildfire. When Japanese soldiers shot and killed a teacher in Vigan, Buenaventura J. Bello, for refusing to lower his school’s American flag, his name became famous throughout the Islands.\textsuperscript{489} Yet in many personal encounters, Filipinos found Japanese troops less than terrifying. Isabel Yumol remembered her father’s first encounter. In heavily accented English the older of two soldiers identified himself as a colonel who taught at the University of Tokyo. His compatriot was a lieutenant who was once one of his students. They were lost and needed directions. The younger soldier used a translation dictionary to call Isabel “little sister” and shared a picture of a girl he called, “my sister, same you, miss her.”\textsuperscript{490} The soldiers moved on, leaving behind a relieved Yumol family.

Marcos V. Augustín had a much different experience. The son of a lawyer and mayor, Augustin had run away from home at a young age and earned his living as a boxer and cab driver.\textsuperscript{491} He entered the army as a truck driver. As a part of demolition platoon under Lieutenant Colonel Narcisco L. Manzano, he became trapped behind enemy lines

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\textsuperscript{488} Ibid., 308-309.
\textsuperscript{489} Romulo, \textit{I Saw the Fall of the Philippines}, 46.
\textsuperscript{490} Jennings, 8.
\textsuperscript{491} Panlilio, 89.
when the USAFFE engineers blew the Kalumpit Bridges early on New Year’s Day.\footnote{For details on the destruction of the bridges see Morton, 209.} They destroyed their equipment, dropped 130 rifles and cases of ammo into the Pasig River, and headed south. Augustin traveled with Lieutenant Vidan through Pampanga and witnessed a Japanese patrol kill an old man who tried to stop them from beating his wife and raping his granddaughter.\footnote{Panlilio, 96.} They shot Vidan through the head and captured Augustin. Discovering he had a tattoo of an American eagle with the Stars and Stripes and the words “Love unto Death,” the Japanese beat Augustin harshly.\footnote{Agoncillo, Vol. II, 692.} Though bound and tied, he managed to knock down a guard and jump from a truck into a river. Augustin escaped into the hills near Antipolo and gathered around him a band of resistance fighters. He assumed a nom de guerre, Marking.

Many Filipinas suffered worst. On a street in Angels City, Pampanga, two Japanese soldiers grabbed fourteen-year-old Maria Rosa Luna Henson while she was gathering firewood. She screamed and an officer arrived to berate the two men. The officer then grabbed Maria from behind and raped her on the street before passing her to the others to share. In all, twenty-four soldiers raped her that day.\footnote{In 1992 Maria Rosa Luna Henderson became the first Filipina comfort women to tell her story. Wallace Edwards, \textit{Comfort Women: A History of Japanese Forced Prostitution During the Second World War} (North Charleston, South Carolina: Absolute Crime Books, 2013), 78.} The Japanese took Maria with six other women to a rice mill near a local army headquarters. Ten to twenty Japanese soldiers raped the women and young girls every day for several months.\footnote{George Hicks, \textit{The Comfort Women, Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War II} (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), 126.} In August the soldiers moved their captives to a larger facility.\footnote{In January 1944 a Hukbalahap raid rescued the women. Maria Rosa Henson, \textit{Comfort Woman: A Filipina’s Story of Prostitution and Slavery under the Japanese Military} (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 23-26.}
The Filipinas suffered from a combination of Japanese cultural attitudes towards both subjected people and women. A British observer noted in 1912: “It has been conclusively shown that at present the social structure of Japan rests upon loose foundations; that woman, though not subjected to physical ill-treatment, is precluded from exercising a will of her own; and that the prince no less than the peasant is not slow to take advantage of a system that gives rein to the passions.”498 The writer, Lancelot Lawrence, added: “It is not realized that in the midst of a country which perhaps more than any other part of the world has been endowed with the glorious beauties of nature, thousands of women, and even little girls, are enslaved in a condition of moral degradation that has no parallel in lands where the teachings of Christianity are accepted.”499

Jesus Villamor recalled hearing: “The Japanese raped all Filipino women they got hold of, some of the men believed, and I was inclined to think this true, so many were the stories of horrors carried by the [bamboo] telegraph.”500 Thirty-two Japanese soldiers in Cebu reportedly took turns raping the fourteen and sixteen-year-old daughters of a man found with suspicious slips of paper.501 A guerrilla said, “The degree to which they raped and otherwise brutalized legions of women led to the frequent remark that the Spaniards had built churches in the Philippines, the Americans had built schools, and the Japanese had built brothels.”502

499 Ibid., 724
500 Villamor, 120.
501 Ibid.
502 Lapham and Norling, 106.
South Luzon, D25/R-1024

In Bicol, the Japanese hunted Vinzons for fear that he served as a potential center of resistance. Indeed, by New Year’s Day, Philippine soldiers from units disbanded near Gumaca, Tayabas, were streaming into Vinzon’s new headquarters in Camarines Sur. The Japanese stepped up propaganda efforts to compel Vinzons’ surrender, including torturing members of his Young Philippines political party and burning down barrios.  

Central Luzon, D25/R-1024

On 1 January 1942, Homma’s reconnaissance reported large fires in Manila. He acted quickly to save targeted areas from destruction and to rescue the city’s Japanese citizens. At 2000 hours he ordered his 48th Division to occupy and hold the capital.

At the same moment MacArthur met with Quezon on Corregidor. “General MacArthur read aloud to those present a telegram which he had received from Washington to the effect that if my evacuation could possibly be accomplished,” Quezon wrote, “I should be taken to Washington and function there as the head of the Commonwealth Government in exile and as the symbol of the redemption of the Philippines.” The asthmatic Quezon suffered terrible coughing fits in Corregidor’s damp tunnels, but preferred to stay on the Rock. He passed the decision to his Cabinet and they determined he “should refuse to make the trip” under the assumption that “before Bataan and Corregidor were forced to surrender, sufficient help would come from the American and Filipino forces to take the offensive and drive the enemy out of

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504 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 88.
505 Quezon, 236.
Quezon later confessed that at the time he knew his “evacuation to America could be made in comparative safety” and he “was doubtful if help could come in time.” He remained.

On Luzon, Horan lost all hope. He disbanded his remaining units near Cararanglan, Neuva Ecija. Major Calvert Parker of the 43rd Infantry left with Captain Arthur Murphy and Private Grafton “Budd” Spencer to find the units in Bataan. They made it as far as Montalban in Rizal before Japanese forces forced them back north. Meanwhile Major Everett Warner and Captain Manuel P. Enriquez organized guerrillas around Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya, into the ‘1st Provisional Guerrilla Regiment.’ Captain Guillermo Nakar joined them with remnants of the 71st Infantry Regiment. With scavenged equipment, Nakar established radio contact with Corregidor in mid-January.

On 2 January, the society page of the Manila Tribune reported the wedding of Jose Laurel III, son of the prominent Secretary of Justice. Jose III had studied at a Japanese military academy before becoming a captain in the USAFFE. He had commanded troops at Mauban until his capture. His timely release signified the Japanese interest in placating Filipino politicians like the Secretary of Justice.

At 1745 hours that evening, the Japanese 48th division entered Manila with three infantry battalions. Fifteen minutes later another infantry battalion and reconnaissance units from the 16th Division joined them. Japanese residents welcomed them enthusiastically. Homma garrisoned the city with two infantry battalions of the 48th

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506 Ibid., 239.
507 Ibid., 239-240.
509 Abaya, 31.
510 Years later Kanegae Seitaro of the Filipinas Mining Company recalled, “I will never forget the excitement I felt when… the Japanese army entered Manila.” Yu-Jose, 157.
Division later joined by four infantry battalions of the 16 Division.\textsuperscript{511} All schools closed, leaving 2,000,000 students across the Philippines on the streets.\textsuperscript{512} Still, the lack of a decisive battle upset Japanese campaign plan. Homma turned to the Bataan Peninsula, an area he knew only from a few 1:200,000 scale maps.\textsuperscript{513}

Quezon later wrote that not until 2 January did he notice Roosevelt had said Philippine independence would be \textit{redeemed}. He asked MacArthur if that word indicated Roosevelt thought the Islands to be irredeemably lost. “The General,” wrote Quezon, “while not expressing a positive opinion, suggested the possibility that the transmission of the presidential message might have been garbled.”\textsuperscript{514} Quezon had the word changed to “preserved” before relaying Roosevelt’s message to the men on Bataan.\textsuperscript{515}

The next morning Chick Parsons awoke to discover Japanese sentries in front of his house in Manila. A sign on the front gate declared the home as “Property of the Imperial Japanese Government.”\textsuperscript{516} Parsons and his family faced internment. Thinking quickly, he ran a Panamanian flag up his flagpole and informed the guards he had diplomatic immunity. After verifying his status with the Philippine government, Japanese officials arrived to inspect Parson’s credentials. They suspiciously approved his neutral status. Parsons then spent days exploring the city to witness Japanese actions and Filipino reactions. He turned his curiosity into intelligence collection and, with Katsy’s help, filed reports he thought might be useful one day. Catholic priests supplied names of people

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{511} Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 104.
\item \textsuperscript{512} Agoncillo, Vol. I, 424.
\item \textsuperscript{513} Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 120.
\item \textsuperscript{514} Quezon, 241.
\item \textsuperscript{515} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{516} Ingham, 34.
\end{itemize}
held by the Japanese. Disguised as a peasant, Parsons went into the jungles to find guerrillas. Only once did police detain him in Santo Tomás for a couple hours.\(^{517}\)

On 3 January, the Japanese announced martial law in all occupied districts. In Naga they painted the outline of two feet in the front of the capitol building. “All Filipinos passing by the building had to stand with their feet inside the outlines and bow to the Japanese sentries,” a witness recalled, “A wrong bow brought a blow on the Filipino, so people practiced bowing.”\(^{518}\) These measures supported population control. Leon Parong of Tibgao executed a perfect bow, but still suffered instant arrest followed by a month of forced labor on a gang at the Pili airport.\(^{519}\)

In the afternoon three hundred men, women and children reported as ordered to the University of Santo Tomas in Manila.\(^{520}\) Only that morning Japanese officials selected the fifty-acre campus as an internment camp for foreign nationals. Four hundred more arrived the next day, another five hundred on Tuesday, and hundreds more through the rest of the week. Luis de Alcuaz, Secretary to the Father Rector, opened more space to the new arrivals, but the conditions were harsh. “Within 10 days, there were over 3,000 people in the camp, some 2,000 of whom were lodged in the main building, 700 in the gymnasium, and 400 in the annex,” intern A.V.H. Hartendorf reported, “From 30 to 50 people were jammed into each of the rooms in the main building and annex, and the average floor space per person was only about 22 square feet; in some rooms it was at

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\(^{518}\) Barrameda, 12.

\(^{519}\) Ibid., 13.

\(^{520}\) Hartendorp, Vol I, 8.
one time as low as 16 square feet.”

Seventy percent of the interns were Americans, twenty-five percent were British, the rest from many countries.

From that first day, Filipino fiends and neighbors arrived outside the camp bringing food and other necessities. Soon the routine crowds established exchange points with the internees through “The Gate,” “The Fence,” and “The Package Line.” “The Japanese were astounded and irked at the loyalty and affection shown by the Filipinos for their ‘oppressors,’” Hartendorf wrote, “and at first attempted to drive the crowds off with blows, but they kept coming back.” After three weeks, the commandant banned internees from the front grounds and ordered all Filipinos not to approach the fence. Packages still went in and out, many with notes of communication. Always lacking adequate sanitation facilities, food, or water, internees organized committees, hospital wards, and even a school for the children. The occupiers adopted harsher measures to reform the population.

On 4 January, Horan reorganized his remaining forces into the 43rd Infantry, Philippine Scouts, and withdrew to Kiangan, Ilfugao. A week later, he secured an Army radio in Bontoc and sent it to Aritao where Warner, Enriquez and Nakar had formed the 1st Provisional Guerrilla Regiment. Horan had Technical Sergeant William Bowen and Private Earl Brazelton of Camp John Hay’s 228th Signal Company build another radio out of old radios and spare parts. He contacted USAFFE and was told to carry on as guerrillas under the designation of the 121st Regiment.

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522 Horan’s accounts are from “Dairy [sic] of Col Horan,” National Archives, Philippine Archives Collection, RG 407 Box 258. The radio was probably the Bureau of Post radio at Suyoc. See also Geography of Luzon, June 1942, “Papers of Courtney Whitney,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, Box No. 68, Records Group 16.
523 Norling, 50.
Twenty miles east of Warner, Major Calvert commanded the remnants of the 43rd Infantry Regiment, the bulk of it being the A and B companies of Ifugao tribesmen from Bontoc in the Mountain Province and Philippine Scouts from nearby Bontoc. These men transformed themselves into the Calvert Guerrillas, determined to protect their homes. They moved west to link up with Warner, but they would never made the rendezvous.

Horan reached out to claim command of guerrillas from Abra Province to La Union Province. At the war’s outbreak, American engineer Walter Cushing demolished his mine in Kalinga and ventured into Abra where a number of disorganized soldiers guarded armories for deployed Philippine Constabulary units. Cushing took charge of a training unit in Bangued and commandeered their weapons. He moved his small band sixty miles inland to a mine in Batong that had a radio he knew could contact USAFFE headquarters. Taking the radio, he returned to Abra with 200 men including thirty American soldiers from an air warning unit in Cape Bojeador under 1st Lieutenant Robert H. Arnold. These men had been cut off and set out to join Cushing and his guerrillas. Cushing and his men were motivated but untrained and unorganized; Arnold and his men provided needed military expertise and leadership.

After some training and intelligence collection, Cushing planned a New Year’s Day ambush against a Japanese truck convoy on Highway 2 near Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. Arnold led the successful operation, but across northern Luzon Cushing got the credit. Horan designated Cushing’s force as the 121st Infantry Regiment (after the largest USAFFE remnant in Cushing’s command). Arnold became irritated “over the way

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524 Volckmann, 30.
Cushing was monopolizing the honor of founding and leading the guerrilla organization that was then attracting the attention of the people of Ilocos.”\textsuperscript{525}

Other guerrillas remained beyond Horan’s grasp. Somewhere on the northwest corner of Luzon in Ilocos Norte, Governor Roques Alban led his hundred armed men in the border area of the Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur and Abra provinces. In Nueva Vicaya, Philippine Army sergeant Benidicto Erasmus reportedly promoted himself to Lieutenant and led a guerrilla band. Rumors spread of an independent guerrilla group under a major Gaular or Ganlan in Ilocos, but no record of this unit exists.

On 5 January on Corregidor, Carlos Romulo began “Voice of Freedom” radio broadcasts announcing, “People of the Philippines! You are listening to the Voice of Freedom – from the battle front of Bataan!”\textsuperscript{526} The Japanese countered with daily propaganda over radio KZRH questioning why Filipinos should fight, suffer and die for America. Romulo responded for Quezon with a message ‘from a typical Filipino soldier in Bataan,’ walking a line between encouraging resistance and protecting the people:

“Be courageous and prudent. Do not offer futile resistance. Yield as far as you honor will allow, but no farther. Remember that if you cooperate with the Japanese you are fighting against me – against all of us. The rice that is harvested from your fields, the scrap iron collected in your streets and yards, is used to feed the inhuman war machine that has separated us and desolated our country. The ammunition that is being made in Manila is being used against us;

\textsuperscript{525} Agoncillo, Vol. II, 656.
\textsuperscript{526} Romulo, \textit{I Saw the Fall of the Philippines}, 106
those very same bullets may kill your son, your husband. You can see why it is important you refrain from helping the enemy.”

Northern Luzon, D37/R-1012

On 13 January, Praeger led an attack ordered by Cagayan Governor Adduru that surprised and damaged the Japanese airfield at Tuguegarao. He followed up forty-eight hours later with an attack on the Aparri airfield and the bridges and culverts between the two fields. A Japanese counterattack drove his guerillas from Tuao deeper into the mountains of Rizal near Apayao.

Manila, D39/R-1010

In Ermita, Manila, the Civil Liberties Union members of the underground Free Philippines began gathering intelligence from capitol and disseminating it to the guerrillas in the mountains. They recruited intellectuals like Hernando J. Abaya, Teodoro M. Locsín, Rafael Ledesma, José Apacible and Arsenio Lacson. Manzano, who avoided capture with Augustin, joined and used his experience as an intelligence officer to evaluate the information collected by agents. He also mimeographed a newsletter for the people to counter Japanese propaganda and expose collaborators.

In the San Juan Catholic Church just outside Manila on 15 January, two underclass Philippine Military Academy cadets, Miguel Ver and Eleuterio “Terry” Adevoso, began gathering the dispersed sophomore and freshmen ROTC cadets in and

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527 Romulo, 111.
528 Ibid., 652.
530 Marquez, 192.
around Manila into a motivated but inexperienced and ill-equipped unit.⁵³¹ These ‘ROTC Guerrillas’ pledged to collect intelligence for MacArthur, to bolster morale and protect civilians, and to fight behind enemy lines for USAFFE.⁵³² When a San Juan priest reported the youngsters to the Japanese, the group moved into the hills around Talbak. From a base in Banabá they tracked enemy movements, harassed the occupiers, and began eliminating collaborators.

Life on Luzon became difficult. American and Japanese troops confiscated all transportation. Strafing Japanese aircraft endangered anyone traveling on main roads while bands of armed men roamed the jungles. With bridges destroyed and communications cut, people became isolated and subject to rumor. An editor at the Herald recalled, “Nervous provincial correspondents were reporting Japanese landings in the most impossible places. The radio stations began broadcasting hectic warnings that paratroops were landing. There were rumors that the water supply had been poisoned; of uprisings among the large Japanese population at Davao.”⁵³³ An important role for would-be guerrillas was to learn what was really happening across Luzon and pass word to the people. Energetic young men like Terry’s ROTC filled that role.

In other unforeseen ways the Japanese invasion disrupted life. Although Camarines Sur harvested a million sacks above annual consumption, Commander Denzo Kuriyama, Lieutenant Colonel Tokiaki Nyhro, and Captain Hiroshi Ohtami prohibited its export out of the province.⁵³⁴ The Japanese army seized the husked rice, abaca and copra, barely paying for 100,00 sacks of rice, and sent it to warehouses in Iriga, Tigaon

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⁵³³ Romulo, 38.
⁵³⁴ Barrameda, 13.
and Libmanan under police guard.\textsuperscript{535} Meanwhile, shoppers in the markets across the islands began to go hungry.

Without pay, farmers could not afford items needed for the next planting season. Food, gas and other confiscated commodities skyrocketed in price. In Naga, acting governor Villafuerte tried to cap prices at or below a fifty percent markup from prewar levels. With the Chinese stores sequestered by the Japanese, he tried to get the occupation military authorities to get the Japanese stores to lead the way in price controls but the Japanese Association saw profits to be made. “That early,” Barrameda wrote, “the civilian population had begun to taste the bitter fruit of the Japanese invasion.”\textsuperscript{536}

At Homma’s side when he entered Manila was Hideico Kihara who had served many years as Vice-Consul in Manila and Consul General in Davao.\textsuperscript{537} Kihara was to advise Homma on the formation of a new Philippine Government. Prominent Filipinos left in Manila by Quezon formed a commission to maintain order and deal with the Japanese: Mayor Jorge Vargas, Benigno Aquino, Jorge Bocobom, Antonio de las Alas, Jose P. Laurel, Rafael Alunan, Claro Recto, Quintin Paredes, and Jose Yulo.\textsuperscript{538} Quezon advised them that “if they should be given an opportunity to co-operate in the administration of a civil government, they should accept it in order that the interests of the people and public order and respect for property should be safeguarded.”\textsuperscript{539} If they refused to join the Japanese, Quezon said Homma would find “Filipinos who were more sensible and cooperative, that is to say, pro-Japanese or more pliable Filipinos.”\textsuperscript{540}

\textsuperscript{535} Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{536} Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{537} Quezon, 290.
\textsuperscript{539} Quezon, 291.
\textsuperscript{540} Ibid., 291.
Homma’s Chief of Staff Masami Maeda reached out to the commission to establish a cooperative administration. They met at Yulo’s house as the Japanese entered Manila. Through Vargas, Maeda would convene another meeting on 23 January with leaders including Aquino, Paredes, Laurel, Yulo, Osia and Recto, but not Ricarte or Ramos. They decided to ask Japan for a republic, not a commonwealth. For head of government they proposed Vargas “who only held an appointive position” rather than an elected official “in order that none of their acts might be interpreted as bearing popular sanction or the endorsement of the public.”

Most commission members were determined to prevent radicals like Benigno Ramos and General Ricarte from heading the government. They believed that the Japanese “as in Burma, preferred more generally accepted figures.” As historian Nicholas Tarling observed, “One reason for installing Vargas was that he was more politically ‘neutral’ than Aquino or Laurel, and ‘would also be, at least temporarily, a stand-in for Manuel Quezon. For there is no question that from the outset the Japanese believed that Quezon himself would be the ideal figure to lead a regime under their aegis.” Vargas was also a guardian of the pre-war elites. Ramos, Ricarte or another radical might have opened the door to social revolution. At a press conference on 17 January, Vargas said, “Let independence come in any form! We will co-operate!” Cooperation would be the policy of the new government and the duty of loyal Filipinos. Those who would not cooperate stood outside the law.

541 Starling, 164.  
542 Quezon, 292.  
543 Starling, 162.  
544 Ibid., 167.  
545 Abaya, 26.
On 24 January, the Japanese Military Administration issued Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Executive Committee (PEC) with Vargas as Chairman. Thirty-four prominent Filipinos formed the advisory Council of State (later 35 members, then 24); any twelve could form a quorum. “Six governmental departments and a number of bureaus were also established, but for all the names of appointees published in the newspapers, these existed chiefly on paper,” wrote Hartendorf.546 In the next week, more than fifty Commonwealth offices closed with their officials and employees ‘retired.’

Vargas and the PEC focused on issues they knew would please the Japanese and prepare for independence, those steps that would “eliminate the blind dependence upon Anglo-American culture and civilization” and promote among the Filipinos the “consciousness that they are Orientals.”547 Among their first steps was a Japanese program to revise Philippine schoolbooks, eliminate western influence and promote Japanese ideas of proper place and spirit.548 The PEC pushed a proposal to eliminate English and replace it with Tagalog, already deemed the national language.

Northern Luzon, D42/R-1007

Meanwhile Walter Cushing struck again, ambushing a column of sixty Japanese soldiers and ten trucks passing through Candon, Ilocos Sur on 18 January. He then destroyed three cars carrying a Japanese General and his party and recovered captured maps of the American fire control plans for Bataan and Corregidor. Accepting a commission from Horan as a captain, and later major, Cushing continued his guerrilla

547 Quezon, 294.
548 Ibid. 293.
campaign throughout northern Luzon under the 121st Regiment. Lieutenant Colonels Moses and Noble also appeared at Horan’s growing headquarters.

These American soldiers turned guerrilla leaders had to learn on the job. As Robert Lapham wrote, “As for the other schemes to wage guerrilla warfare, whether they were already under way or merely gleams in somebody’s imagination, all I can say is that in January 1942 I had never heard of any of them.” MacArthur rather quickly embraced the idea of guerrilla resistance. He modified the mission of Sharp’s Visayan-Mindanao Force: “When organized resistance was no longer practicable, he was to split his force into small groups and conduct guerilla warfare from hidden bases in the interior of each island. Food, ammunition, fuel, and equipment, were to be moved inland, out of reach of the enemy, in preparation for such a contingency. Those supplies that could not be moved were to be destroyed.”

Central Luzon, D43/R-1006

With Wainwright in Bataan was Major Claude A. Thorp, a veteran of the Mexico Expedition and World War I, who until recently served as the Fort Stotsenburg Provost Marshal. After the first week of January, Thorp drafted a plan for organizing guerrillas behind Japanese lines. He took his plan to Wainwright who rejected it.

It was not that SWPA refused to consider irregular warfare. MacArthur had already began quietly constructing “an extensive network of prominent businessmen,

550 Lapham and Norling, 13.
551 Morton, 500.
552 See Herminia S. Dizon, “Complete Data Covering the Guerrilla Activities of the Late Colonel Clade A Thorp,” RG 407, Box 258 Philippine Archive Collection, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
553 Lapham and Norling, 13.
plantation owners, miners, and newspaper people” to collect intelligence on the Japanese and their operations as his forces withdrew to Bataan.\footnote{Lapham and Norling, 11.} In July 1941, G-4 Colonel Charles Willoughby G-4 and deputy G-2 Colonel Joseph K. Evans had begun organizing the Postal and Telegraph Service, the Philippine Long Distance and Telephone Company, the Postmasters, the Philippines Civil Service and more into a network for air-raid warning and other intelligence gather. MacArthur’s G-2 later reported: “Many American businessmen, miners, and plantation owners were enrolled secretly, with a view to forming a nucleus of information and a potential ‘underground,’ in case the Japanese were successful in over-running the Islands, a pessimistic possibility no publicly admitted.”\footnote{Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, United States Armed Forces Pacific, 
*Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation (Volume II, intelligence Series)*
(Tokyo, Japan: 10 June 1948), 1, Russell W. Volckmann Papers, Box 1, Center for Military History, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. (hereafter “Intelligence Activities.”)} Willoughby worked with Captain Joseph McMickling “on a plan for certain communication workers to go underground and form nets should the Japanese attack.”\footnote{Allison W. Ind, *Secret War Against Japan: The Allied Intelligence Bureau in World War II*, (Independently Published in United States; 2014), 104.} Senator Manuel Roxas, journalist Yay Panlilio and many other Filipinos joined this network.

Thorp went to Colonel Hugh Casey, MacArthur’s adjutant, who arranged for him to see the boss. Unfortunately, Thorp was shot in the left thigh while probing the front lines on 17 January. Even so, two days later MacArthur approved his plan. Shortly thereafter Thorp departed Bataan with nineteen men and two women. With him was Lieutenant Robert Lapham, Lieutenant Charles Cushing, Captain Ralph McGuire, Sergeant Alfred Bruce, Sergeant Fred Sladky, Sergeant Everett Brooks, Sergeant Malacoli, Corporal Daniel Cahill, Corporal George McCarthy, and Corporal Young (a
Moro). The married Thorp also brought along his secretary and mistress, Herminia “Minang” Dizon. Lapham recalled, “This would have been a purely personal matter had not some of the men made jokes about it, thereby visibly reducing the respect some of them had for Thorp.” The group slipped through the Japanese lines and began an arduous forty-day journey towards an arms cache at Camp Sanchez deep in the Zambales Mountains. Reflecting their inexperience, Thorp’s party brought with them only a radio receiver: they could monitor broadcasts from USAFFE but could not talk back. Thorp chose the mountains around Timbu as his base and the area became something of a collection point for stragglers.

Meanwhile USAFFE G-2 Brigadier General Simeon de Jesus organized sixty agents, mostly from the Philippine Constabulary, into the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) for clandestine intelligence operations on Luzon. As G-2 reported, “Mission of the MIS was to collect, evaluate, and disseminate military information obtained in Bataan, Zambales and Pampangas and other occupied areas, operating principally behind enemy lines.” Plagued by poor communications and the time it took to get agents into targeted areas, the MIS had produced limited results but stayed in operation until after the fall of Bataan.

MacArthur also authorized retired officer and Spanish-American War veteran Colonel Hugh Straughn to organize a guerrilla force. Straughn was already behind the Japanese lines in Bataan in the mountains around Antipolo in Rizal. Yay Panlilio recalled Hugh Straughn as a “U.S. Army colonel whom some of Marking’s men coaxed out of a cave with three old women, a middle aged one and a boy, thereafter organized the Fil-

557 Lapham and Norling, 14.
558 Ibid., 18-19.
559 Intelligence Activities. 2.
American Irregular Troops (FAIT)” in Central and Southern Luzon provinces.”

Straughn asked Sorsogon Governor Salvador Escudero to join the FAIT as a colonel, and in March, drew Major Francisco Sandico out of hiding to join his force.

Tokyo, D44/R-1005

On 20 January, Premier Tojo addressed the Japanese House of Peers in the 79th Diet, echoing the Hakko Ichi-U ideal of divinely ordained imperial rule over the eight directions that united the entire world. He said Japan wanted each country and its people “to have its proper place and demonstrate its real character, thereby securing an order of co-existence and co-prosperity based on ethical principles with Japan serving as its nucleus.”

The Board of Information further explained: “The people of Greater Asia are now confronted with the greatest opportunity in their history to build their common name according to the proud social conception of the world as a single family, each member thereof performing his functions according to his talent and ability for the good of the whole. We in Japan, speak of this conception as based upon the ideas of Hakko Ichi-U, the tradition of the nation as a family which has held our country and people intact and united for twenty-six centuries.”

The prospect of permanent hardship, brutality and rapes made Filipinos increasingly desire the return of the United States and its promise of independence.

Tojo described Hong Kong and Malaya as ‘absolutely essential’ for Japan’s defense. “As regards the Philippines,” he said, “if the peoples of those islands will hereafter understand the real intentions of Japan and offer to cooperate with us as one of

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560 Barrameda, 104.
561 Starling, 132.
562 Barrameda, Jr., 14-15.
the partners for the establishment of the Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere, Japan will gladly enable them to enjoy the honor of independence.” On 21 January, The Japan Times and Advertiser printed Tojo’s speech. If the promise of independence did not win over the guerrillas, it might convince the ruling elites to police the countryside.

The Japanese understood that the Philippines posed an awkward problem. Studies in Tokyo identified Filipinos as “Asians but not Asians, Westerners but not Westerners.” After more than a month among the Filipinos the Southern Army added its own assessment: “They are self-indulgent, idle, fickle and frivolous. They adore the United States and make light of us. There is not much public peace. We must maintain strict military authority and try to have them heartily cooperate with our policies by abandoning their attachment to the United States.” The army appeared not to appreciate the link between their harsh policies and growing Philippine resistance.

Tojo warned of a long war. “The United States and the British Empire are, however, the countries which boast of their wealth and power as the greatest in the world, having for many years consolidated the foundation for their domination of the world,” he said, “Even though they have suffered overwhelmingly from defeat in the opening stage of the war, it is not difficult to imagine that they will stubbornly resist us and try to turn the tide of the war. We must, therefore be prepared for difficulties of various sorts which may become a protracted one.” He was not talking about popular resistance in occupied lands.

563 Wilson, 80.
564 Goto, 66.
565 Ibid., 6.
566 Wilson, 79.
Applying lessons from Manchuria and China, the Japanese high command began utilizing propaganda units in the Philippines to influence the natives and reassure Japan’s citizens and military. Most of this propaganda corps remained in Manila coordinating the mass media. Smaller detachments went into the field to support the combat troops and constabulary forces. One unit was the Hitomi Propaganda Platoon (*Hitomi Senden Tai*), named after its commander, twenty-five-year-old Lieutenant Junsuke Hitomi. Commissioned in 1938, he had spent three years with the 12th Battalion of the Manchurian Independent Defense Force against the Chinese communist guerrillas of the Unified Anti-Japanese Resistance Army of the Northeast.”

He now went with his platoon on “goodwill missions” to convince Filipinos hiding in the hinterlands to return to their homes and farms and go back to work.

The focus of Japanese propaganda was to remind Filipinos of their racial brotherhood. “They were heavy-handed conquerors, appealing at once to visions of wealth as well as to racism and fear,” noted Ramsey, “In return for cooperation the Japanese promised fabulous prosperity within the pan-Pacific commonwealth of Asian peoples. This theme formed the centerpiece of their propaganda, and in the face of shortages and rationing the racial aspect was stressed.” As Kempeitai Colonel Akiro Nagahama said to Adalia Marquez: “You are Filipino. You are brown-skinned and you will always be brown, no matter how much American make-up you apply. We Japanese and you Filipinos are of the same color and it is only right and natural that our two people

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568 Ramsey and Rivele, 147.
should be brothers. The American is of another color. He will never be your friend.”\footnote{Marquez, 19.}

Racial brotherhood, however, failed to motivate Filipinos. Willard H. Elshrec noted: “Even if there was a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the white man’s reform, scarcely a hand was lifted in support of the Japanese. They clearly had failed to identify the interests of South-East Asians with their own.”\footnote{Willard H. Elshrec, \textit{Japan’s Role in South-East Asia Nationalist Movements} (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953), 160.}

Central Luzon, D48/R-1001

On 24 January, Hitomi began thirteen days of platoon propaganda operations in Batangas preaching cooperation to peasant communities. Just the day before, as the Japanese prepared to invade the Solomon Islands, MacArthur cabled Washington that he was nearly out of maneuver room and announced, “I intend to fight it out to complete destruction.”\footnote{Ed Cray, \textit{General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman} (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1990), 284.} Despite USAFFE’s dire situation Hitomi found, “the people were completely opposed to us… the objectives of propaganda activities based on respect and courtesy have not been achieved here.”\footnote{Nakano 47.} Then he had an epiphany.

One day a ranking officer of propaganda corps, Shingeobu Mochizuki, arrived to give a speech on Kunmi Watanabe’s imperialist ideology and racial brotherhood. A local citizen who had studied in Japan, Julio Luz, translated. The quiet crowd slowly warmed to the speech and applauded loudly at the end. Isamu Wad, a local Japanese in attendance who spoke fluent Tagalog, explained to Hitomi what had happened. Mochizuki’s speech confused the peasants so halfway through his interpreter simply began telling a story of

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\footnote{Marquez, 19.}
\footnote{Willard H. Elshrec, \textit{Japan’s Role in South-East Asia Nationalist Movements} (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953), 160.}
\footnote{Ed Cray, \textit{General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman} (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1990), 284.}
\footnote{Nakano 47.}
how he once witnessed a Japanese man in a Nagoya shopping center go through great lengths to return a lost item to its proper owner. The Japanese, Luz said, were basically honest so everyone should give them a chance. The crowd loved that story.\textsuperscript{573}

The lesson for Hitomi was clear. Forget preaching the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and other things that didn’t matter to these people. Instead, use a simple, comprehensible and relatable argument: you Filipinos are caught in the middle of a war between Japan and the United States; the Japanese want to fight the Americans, not you Filipinos; if you ‘sit-it-out’ and don’t support the guerrillas, the Japanese will leave you alone. Hitomi augmented his platoon with “local Japanese residents, news reporters, photographers, and novelists in addition to Filipino entertainers, motion picture projectionists, public speakers and physicians” to bring out the crowds.\textsuperscript{574}

From the end of February through the first week of March, the Hitomi Propaganda Platoon took its show to Bicol in southern Luzon and saw that drawing crowds and delivering a message tailored to their concerns produced results.\textsuperscript{575} Hitomi also deployed “special tactical forces” which he had used in Manchuria: “sneak attacks on guerrilla hideouts, using the prisoners rounded up for counterespionage, or taking the family members of the guerrillas hostage.”\textsuperscript{576} The combination proved very effective.

Northern Luzon, D51/R-998

Having moved his government out of Laoag and into the mountains of Apayao ahead of the Japanese, Governor Ablan spent weeks with Lieutenant Feliciano Madamba

\begin{footnotes}
\item[573] Ibid., 6.
\item[574] Ibid., 4.
\item[575] Ibid., 7.
\item[576] Ibid., 7.
\end{footnotes}
organizing guerrillas. On 27 January, Alban and Madamba led a detachment to Solsona and recovered three hundred rifles, eighteen machine guns and several crates of ammunition. The next day they ambushed and slaughtered a column of fifty Japanese soldiers entering Ilocos Norte. Excited local citizens rallied to Alban. A week later the Japanese sent in a larger column under Major Kumatsu only to see them succumb to a similar ambush. “This time,” a guerrilla reported, “the Japs retaliated by bombing several of the inland villages and executing some twenty civilians at Banna, Ilocos Norte.” After continued attacks by Alban, the Japanese executed further reprisals in Neuva Era.

Central Luzon, D52/R-997

On 28 January, Tokyo announced the new government in Manila. High Commissioner Sayre pressed Quezon to publicly denounce the collaborators. Quezon refused saying, “any evidence of my faith in their loyalty would in itself serve to fortify their determination not to betray me; whereas, any indication that I considered them lost to the cause and practically traitors, would perhaps force them to go over to the Japanese.” By this time, Quezon needed morphine shots to calm his asthma attacks.

The Japanese bombed Port Moresby in New Guinea on 3 February, worrying the fragile American-British-Dutch-Australian joint command in the Pacific. The next day U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George C Marshall sent a request to MacArthur for plans on how he intended to evacuate his wife, his almost four-year old son, and other

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578 Volckmann, 37.
579 Quezon, 256.
officials, adding that if he withdrew from Bataan perhaps MacArthur should go to Mindanao or Australia.\(^{580}\) MacArthur did not reply.

That day the submarine SS-202 *Trout* arrived at Corregidor. Before departing with the Philippine Treasury’s gold, intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Warren J. Clear revealed to MacArthur that the recent Arcadia Conference in Washington between British and American chiefs of staff ended with an agreement to prioritize operations against Germany. War Department planners had concluded that reinforcing the Philippines was impractical. It would take five to seven aircraft carriers, seven to nine battleships, fifty destroyers, sixty submarines and auxiliaries, and 1,500 aircraft to breakthrough to the Philippines – “an entirely unjustifiable diversion of forces from the principal theater - the Atlantic.”\(^{581}\) USAFFE stood alone.

Meanwhile the Kempetai continued to hunt down Philippine leftists. A raid on a house in Manila on 24 January resulted in the capture of Communist Party Chairman Crisanto Evangelista, Party Vice-Chairman Pedro Abad Santos, and Communist mayor of Angeles, Agapito del Rosario. The Japanese executed Evangelista and Rosario. Abad Santos became gravely ill during his two years in prison and died shortly afterward. Perhaps influenced by their alliance with Hitler, the Japanese forfeited any chance to use the social revolutionaries against the pro-American elites. Instead, they drove leftists to further resistance.

Early February, remaining Communist leaders Luis Taruc, Mateo del Castillo, Juan Feleo, Casto Alejandrino, Fernancio Sampang, Jose de Leon, Eusebio Aquino, Mariano Franco, and Lino Dizon gathered in Bakwit in Kabyaw in Nueva Ecija. They

\(^{580}\) Morton, 353-354.

declared an end to the AMT and Socialist parties, leaving only the Communists to represent the people. With Quezon out and the PEC under the Japanese thumb, the Communists considered declaring a new republic. Taruc recalled: “Our Politiburo leaders emphasized in conversations with me that it was opportunism to put nationalism before Communism at that moment. They said we must merge the two in our minds.”

It was a key moment for Filipino social revolutionaries. The fight against the Japanese presented an opportunity to erase the old order. Yet the best chance to defeat the Japanese was to join with the Americans who stood with Quezon. Taruc considered the situation. “Ours was not a fight for America,” he believed, “except in the sense that we were allies, but a fight for Filipinos. I saw our resistance movement as being revolutionary, from which we would emerge free men in every sense of the word.”

The group opted to continue the policy of a ‘united front’ so as not to alienate potential allies among “moderate landlords” and “middle-class groups.” Trotsky had argued in 1922 that when the party was in the minority, and the majority failed to understand its mission, the “party must assume the initiative in securing unity in these struggles,” as long as it remained independent and led the movement as the “vanguard of the proletariat.” Hard liners accepted Taruc’s ‘petty-bourgeois nationalism’ to fight and discredit the Japanese and obstruct their economic exploitation the Philippines. From a prison cell years after his association with the Huks, Taruc would write, “I know now from experience that the nationalism of the Communists is indeed opportunism, and that

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582 Taruc, 21.
they use it for their own ends. Any nationalist who makes an ally of the Communists is going on a ride on a tiger.”

Philippines, D59/R-990

Cornered on Luzon, with no hope for reinforcement, MacArthur looked at defending Mindanao, Cebu, Panay, Negros, Leyte, and Samar. At 36,000 square miles, Mindanao was second largest – and closest to Australia – of all the islands. Cebu’s capital Cebu City was the second largest urban center in the Philippines. In early January, MacArthur organized the Visayan-Mindanao Force of five Philippine Army units under Brigadier General William F. Sharp headquartered in Cebu City. On 4 February, he reorganized USAFFE into four independent groups. The Luzon force under Wainwright defended Bataan. A separate Harbor Defense Command held Corregidor. Sharp lost the 71st and 91st Divisions to Luzon, leaving the Philippine Army’s 61st, 81st, and 101st Divisions augmented by two recently mobilized regiments from the 71st and 91st divisions with some provisional and Constabulary units.

Master Sergeant Paul Rogers was the chief stenographer at USAFFE headquarters for both MacArthur and his chief of staff Lieutenant Colonel Richard K. Sutherland. He captured his commander’s thoughts: “MacArthur was hedging against the day when, in spite of Roosevelt’s orders to him, and his orders to Wainwright, the command must collapse and surrender. With the four forces operating independently under his command, surrender of one would not tumble down the others.” If Bataan fell, MacArthur planned to direct the separate commands from Australia in continue resistance until he counterattack. As explained by Rodgers: “When Corregidor surrendered, as it must in spite of the orders from the White House, two forces would still be free in the Southern

585 Taruc, 21.
586 Ibid., 500.
587 Rodgers, 212-214.
588 Ibid., 213.
Islands to fight on as guerrillas.”

“Marshall, however,” William Manchester noted, “had decided to give Wainwright a third star and command of all the Philippine forces. That meant that Wainwright had the power to surrender all fighting in the islands and that the Japanese, aware of it, could threaten to execute everyone on Bataan and Corregidor unless he exercised it – which is exactly what happened.”

Each night the residents on Corregidor listened to KZRH from Manila play a tune called “Waiting For Ships That Never Come.” On 6 February, the radio broadcast a call from the venerable Aguinaldo asking MacArthur to surrender for the best interests of the people, just as he had done in 1901. The message moved the physically exhausted Quezon who also feared the effect of Tojo’s promise of independence on “the less educated classes.” One night the exasperated President complained to Romulo, “The fight between the United States and Japan is not our fight. I want to go back… and try to protect our people, Romulo, not America.” Quezon informed MacArthur he was considering “placing myself in the hands of the Japanese.” MacArthur talked him out of such a drastic action, arguing that the Japanese would isolate him and issue bogus statements in his name. Quezon considered asking Roosevelt and the Japanese to accept Philippine neutrality as a way to save his nation from further sacrifice. Over Osmeña’s and Roxas’ objections, the Cabinet agreed to let him send the request to Roosevelt.

Not everyone at the KZRH radio station was under Japanese control. When their agents carted off broadcaster Johnny Harris to Fort Santiago prison for being found with

589 Ibid.
590 Manchester, 256
591 Villamor, 55.
592 Quezon, 266.
593 Starling, 166.
594 Quezon, 267.
595 Ibid., 269.
a U.S. Army G-2 calling card, Jorge Vargas happening to be visiting the station. He cautioned broadcaster Yay Panlilio, “Watch your health, Yay. The weather is undependable. There is much influenza, and it is catching.”

Central Luzon, D67/R-982

Horan had spent weeks trying to establish radio contact with MacArthur’s headquarters. On 12 February, he finally got through and received authorization to reorganize his forces into the 14th Infantry Regiment. The designation indicated an intention to turn the guerrillas into a conventional army unit. Horan also received official appointment as commander of all USAFFE and Constabulary forces in North Luzon. Unfortunately, he again lost communication with USAFFE until 19 March.

Since the end of January, Huang Jie and Cai Jianhua oversaw Emergency Action Committee agents in training cadres from the Wartime Service Corps in San Fernando, Pampanga. The first three parts of the Cadre Training Course occurred in Mandili under veterans from Mao’s army. Luo Lishi and Guo Jian began with instruction on team organization. Xu Jingcheng followed with lessons on United Front policy. Guo Jian then taught classes on the political work of the army. Then Huang Jie taught guerrilla tactics in the field on Mount Arayat.

On the day Japanese capture Singapore, 15 February, Xu Jingcheng convened the leftist Chinese leaders for a conference on strategy. They agreed on three objectives: assist Filipino peasants and workers in organizing an anti-Japanese force; organize

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596 Hearing this story six months later, Marking removed Vargas from his list of targets for assassination. Panlilio, 176.
597 Volckmann, 138-139.
598 Yuk-Wai, 80.
underground activities in Manila and central and southern Luzon, Iloilo, Cebu, Samar and Cotabato; and, return the bulk of the 400 evacuated Chinese back to Manila. To accomplish these objectives they divided the Cadre Training Course graduates into three groups. The first remained in central Luzon. The second became the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets League and organized an underground in Manila southern Luzon. The third organized Chinese leftist communities in Cebu, Iloilo and Cotabatao over the next several months. “Meanwhile, the leaders brushed up on guerrilla tactics,” Agoncillo wrote, “In particular, they read American reporter Edgar Snow’s *Red Star Over China* which described the guerrilla tactics of the Chinese communists under Chu Teh.”

With Mao’s army, P’eng Teh-huai explained to Snow the Chinese Communist revolutionary theory of guerrilla war. “Imperialism, landlordism, and militaristic wars have combined to destroy the basis of rural economy, and it cannot be restored without eliminating its chief enemies,” he said, “Enormous taxes, together with Japanese invasion, both military and economic, have accelerated the rate of this peasant bankruptcy, aided by the landlords. The gentry’s exploitation of power in the villages is widespread unemployment in the villages. There is a readiness among poor classes to fight for a change.” These were similar to the conditions the Philippine Communists saw in their country.

P’eng outlined steps for revolutionaries under such conditions:

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599 Ibid., 80-81.
602 Ibid., 282-287.
1. Use economic hardship tied to exploitative landlords and war to create the conditions for peasant willingness to support revolution.

2. Exploit rural lack of communications and transportation networks to “make it possible for the people to arm and organize.”

3. Occupy the gaps between the areas of imperialist control where “partisan warfare can develop quickly.”

4. Arouse peasant resentment of “intolerable social and economic conditions” while providing “leadership, form and objectives.”

5. More than warriors, be “political propagandists and organizers” to convince peasants that only by revolution can they meet their needs.

6. Ensure that only the Communist Party leads a revolution because only it understands the “political and organizational work” needed.

7. Ensure “field leadership” is “determined, fearless and courageous.”

8. As the first step in meeting the peasants most urgent needs, promptly disarm the “exploiting class.”

9. Never remain stationary; continually expand.

10. Include in every phase of operations “political training” and local leader development.

11. Do not fight any “losing battles.”

12. Use surprise as the fundamental tactic of partisan operations.

13. Work out detailed plans, including lines of retreat, for every operation.
14. Defeat the landlords and gentry militarily and win them over if possible.

15. When outnumbered, use speed, surprise and concentration to attack single enemy locations.

16. Always be prepared to give ground and retreat.

17. Master the tactics of “distraction, decoy, diversion, ambush, feint and irritation.”

18. Avoid attacking enemy strengths and concentrate on enemy weakness.

19. Take every precaution “to prevent the enemy from locating the partisan main forces.”

20. Use connection with the people to develop and use advantages in intelligence collection.

Tactically, the guerrillas had to display “fearlessness, swiftness, intelligent planning, mobility, secrecy, and suddenness and determination in action.” Most importantly, they had to remain philosophically focused on class politics to motivate and unify the masses. This required an emphasis on educating the people and eliminating competing ideas and the people who held them. “If there is no movement of the armed peasantry, there is in fact no partisan base, and the army cannot exist,” P’eng told Snow, “Only by implanting itself deeply in the hearts of the people, only by fulfilling the demands of the masses, only by consolidating a base in the peasant soviets, and only by sheltering in the shadow of the masses, can partisan warfare bring revolutionary

603 Ibid., 287.
victory.” P’eng concluded: “Tactics are important, but we could not exist if the majority of the people did not support us. We are nothing but the fist of the people beating their oppressors!”

Tokyo, D71/R-978

Meanwhile in Tokyo, officials became frustrated with the duration of the Philippine campaign. They had already exceeded the Southern Army Group’s estimate of a thirty-four day campaign to conquer Luzon. The 14th Army had anticipated that Mindanao and the Visayas would fall quickly after Manila. Homma, however, appeared stalemated in Bataan with no end in sight. The Imperial General Headquarters urged him to finish off USAFFE. When he pushed back, in early March the headquarters promised to send reinforcements for advance into the southern Philippines.

In another speech before the Diet in Tokyo on 16 February, Tojo repeated his promise of independence in return for cooperation with Japan. The next day the Imperial Japanese Army issued Order No. 2 dictating six principles to guide the education of children when the Philippine schools reopened. Teachers were to construct lessons that would: 1) promote relations between the Philippines and Japan in the New Order of the Co-Prosperity Sphere; 2) erase Western influences; 3) elevate morals over materialism; 4) promote Japanese language and eliminate English; 5) promote vocational education; and 6) inspire in the people a love of labor.

604 Ibid.
605 Ibid., 288.
607 Morton, 501.
608 Ibid.
609 Goto, 54.
610 Agoncillo, 426.
At the same time, the army continued with the war. Unmolested Japanese aircraft dropped leaflets on Bataan: “Dear Filipino Soldiers! There are [sic] still one way left for you. That is to give up all your weapons at once and surrender to the Japanese force before it is too late, then we shall fully protect you. We repeat for the last! Surrender at once and build your new Philippines for and by Filipinos.”

In late February, Filipinos listened on the radio to Roosevelt as he promised to soon send thousands of planes -- to Europe. Quezon exploded at MacArthur’s Chief of Intelligence, Colonel Willoughby, who was fluent in Spanish: “For thirty years I have worked and hoped for my people. Now they burn and die for a flag that could not protect them. Por Dios y todos los santos! I cannot stand this constant reference to England, to Europe. I am here and my people are here under the heels of a conqueror. Where are the planes this sinverguenza is boasting of? How American to writhe in anguish at the fate of a distant cousin while a daughter is being raped in the back room!”

MacArthur decided it was time to get Quezon off Corregidor. The position was tenuous and the president’s health was failing. Residing in the damp, unventilated Malinta tunnel, Quezon had developed a chronic cough and his temperature spiked at times to 105 degrees. With great secrecy MacArthur’s staff put Quezon and his party aboard the submarine SS-193 Swordfish at 2300 hours on 18 February. As proof of his intentions, the submarine also carried a box containing MacArthur’s papers, medals and

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611 Villamor, 55.
612 Ibid., 56.
613 Romulo, 178.
last will and testament.\textsuperscript{614} At the War Plans Division in Washington, Brigadier General Dwight Eisenhower wrote in his diary: “Looks like MacArthur is losing his nerve. I’m hoping his yelps are just his way of spurring us on, but he is always an uncertain factor.”\textsuperscript{615} Before departing, Quezon handed a letter to Roxas “to act in my name in all matters not related to changes in policy” \textsuperscript{616} After three days, \textit{Swordfish} commander Lieutenant Chester C. Smith disembarked his passengers on San Jose de Buenavista, Antique Province, in Panay. From there the party traveled to Iloilo by car and then aboard a steamer to Bacolod, Negros, before U.S. Navy PT boats, under the ubiquitous Commander John D. Bulkeley, moved them to Del Monte in Mindanao.\textsuperscript{617} When the Japanese moved into the Visayas, the presidential party went by B-17 bomber to Australia to set up a government in exile.

The day after Quezon left Corregidor, Japanese aircraft bombed Darwin, Australia. The next day Japanese troops invaded Bali and Timor. A worried Australian Prime Minister John Curtin pressed Churchill to return his country’s three divisions from North Africa. Churchill demurred. On Saturday, 21 February, Curtin convened his cabinet and gained their agreement to trade their divisions for a United States’ general to command the Australian theater of war with reinforcements as soon as possible. New Zealand concurred. Churchill quickly relayed the Australian request to the American President. At 1123 hours on 23 February, MacArthur received orders from President Roosevelt to leave Corregidor, go to Mindanao and then on to Australia to take command.

\textsuperscript{614} John Costello, \textit{The Pacific War 1941-1945} (New York: Quill, 1982), 212.
\textsuperscript{615} Merle Miller, \textit{Ike the Soldier: As They Knew Him} (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1987), 341.
\textsuperscript{616} Quezon, 281.
of the newly designated Southwest Pacific Area command. MacArthur did not reply, feeling his duty was to remain with his men.

On 25 February, Benigno Aquino volunteered to campaign across the Islands for co-operation with the Japanese. Sakdalista and Ganap leader Benigno Ramos had already employed his followers in aiding the Japanese “by cutting communications in Luzon behind Allied lines.” On the last day of the month PEC leaders in Manilla issued a telegram for Quezon signed by Vargas, Laurel, Aquino, Yulo, Sison, Recto, de las Alas, Parades and Alunan. The message read:

“In view of the enormous toll in lives and property now exacted of our people and because of the imminence of further untold suffering among the entire population and as it is evident that further resistance in the Philippines will be futile because of the present supremacy of Japan in the Far East, we believe that the time has come for you to consider the advisability of taking the necessary steps to bring about the immediate cessation of hostilities in the Philippines. In view thereof we are sending the following telegram to President Roosevelt:

‘We the undersigned leading officials of the newly established civil administration of the Philippines beg leave to express our desire for the re-establishment of peace in the country and

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619 Travelling on a Japanese provided aircraft, Aquino started in Legaspi calling for collaboration. Abaya, 43.

620 Lapham and Norling, 98.
earnestly request you to consider the advisability of ordering the immediate cessation of hostilities in the Philippines. We believe that in view of the trend of events further resistance in the Philippines will mean more destruction of lives not only of soldiers but also of civilian non-combatants living in and around the fields of battle. We are co-operating with the Japanese forces in the re-establishment of civil government on the promise of the Japanese government to grant the Filipino people their independence with honor. We have taken this step with the aim in view of insuring and realizing our aspiration for our early independence.”

The signatories saw only hardship for the people of the Philippines in further resistance. Others saw only hardship in accepting Japanese suzerainty. On 28 February, Quezon broadcast his response: “I urge every Filipino to be of good cheer, to have faith in the patriotism and valor of our soldiers in the field. But above all, to trust America and our great and beloved leader – President Roosevelt! The United Nations will win this war. America is too great and too powerful to be vanquished in this conflict. I know she will not fail us!”

For most Filipinos, the decision as to whether to collaborate or resist came down to kinship network concerns. Guadencia Vera was just a private in the Philippine Scouts but an influential citizen of Tayabas. He returned to his home in early 1942 to lead about one hundred men, women and children of his extended kin into the mountainous forests to escape the Japanese. Badly prepared and poorly organized, this group turned to

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621 Abaya, 25
622 Romulo, 191.
623 Stahl, 92
ruthless banditry to survive. Nearby, Vicente Umali, former Mayor of Tiang, Tayabas, organized a local group that would become known as President Quezon’s Own Guerrillas in central Laguna, Batangas and western central Tayabas that would later claim 10,000 members in 11 regiments.

Hopes in the Philippines dwindled. While the United States began the internment of Japanese citizens on its west coast, Aquino began his campaign for collaboration. In the week beginning 27 February, the Japanese navy defeated a combined Allied fleet in the Battle of the Java Sea, invaded Java, bombed Broome, Australia, and captured Batavia, capital of Dutch East Indies. On Bataan, Ed Ramsey, recalled, “We had been promised relief but none was coming, and all of us in Bataan shared a sense of betrayal.”

Exhaustion and lack of medicine left thousands ill. Ramsey went to General Hospital #2: “I could hear and smell the place long before I saw it. There were rows of men on metal bedsteads hung with mosquito nets, suffering from every kind of sickness and wound. Their screams were terrible, and the stench hung thick upon the air, almost visible in the morning light.”

Central Luzon, D92/R957

In the first week of March collaborationist police in Candaba, Pampanga, forty miles north of Manilla, surprised a Communist guerrilla band gathering rice and captured eight men. The guerrillas were under the command of a woman, Felipa Culala, alias Dayang-Dayang (“Moselm Princess”), who had been a pre-war peasant activist in nearby

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624 Ramsey and Rivele, 70.
625 Ibid., 71.
Mandili. She had enlisted thirty-five men at the start of the war into a guerrilla unit.\textsuperscript{626} Described as “a huge woman, manly, rough, and with a commanding personality that made her men tremble with fear,” she did not take her men’s loss lightly.\textsuperscript{627}

On 8 March, Dayang-Dayang led a raid on the makeshift prison in the municipal building in Candaba and freed her men before retreating home to Madili. Word of her success brought volunteers that swelled her unit’s ranks to 130 members. Japanese patrols retaliated by brutalizing local civilians. Dayang-Dayang ambushed one enemy patrol, reportedly killing nearly forty Japanese soldiers, eight police officers, and sixty collaborationist constabularies while capturing thirty-eight of their weapons and some equipment.\textsuperscript{628} These engagements marked a turning point for the communists, “proving that the guerrilla movement could defeat a powerful enemy and pose a serious threat to the Japanese.”\textsuperscript{629} In Luis Taruc’s opinion, Dayang-Dayang inspired the formation of guerrilla bands across Luzon.

Visayas, D92/R-957

MacArthur again reorganized, this time with his eye apparently on potential guerrilla resistance. He reduced Sharp's command to just the Mindanao Force and placed the five central island garrisons in a Visayan Force under Brigadier General Bradford G. Chynoweth headquartered on Panay. The Visayan Force consisted of: Colonel Albert F. Christie's 7,000-man Panay Force with the 61st Division (PA); Colonel Irvine C. Scudder’s 6,500 troops on Cebu; Colonel Roger B. Hilsman’s assorted 3,000 troops on

\textsuperscript{626} Vina A. Lanzona, \textit{Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex and Revolution in the Philippines} (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 121.
\textsuperscript{627} Agoncillo, Vol. II, 668.
\textsuperscript{628} Numbers vary. Taruc claimed Dayang-Dayang killed 38 soldiers and captured 30 guns. Hernandez claimed she killed 37 soldiers. Davis, 63n. Interestingly, the Chinese records surveyed by On 2 March, the Wartime Service Corps fought Japanese troops near Mandili, Candaba, Pampanga, killing 62 Japanese sources surveyed by Yuk-Wai (80) indicate the Wartime Service Corps claimed to have fought Japanese troops near Mandili, Candaba, Pampanga, killing 62 Japanese on 2 March, clearly Dayang-Dayang’s fight, indicating her men were likely Chinese communists and possibly veterans from the main land.
\textsuperscript{629} Lanzona, 121-122.
Negros; Colonel Theodore M. Cornell’s “hastily improvised force” of 2,500 men defending Leyte and Samar; and, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur J. Grimes lightly armed 1,000 men on Bohol. USAFFE oversaw the Panay and Mindoro garrisons.

Chynoweth expanded and refined the planned transition to guerrilla operations in what he called Operation *Baus Au* (Visayan for "Get it Back"). He oversaw “the large-scale movement of goods, supplies, and weapons into the interior for use later in guerrilla warfare” with hidden caches in the jungles and mountains. Great strides in Panay’s preparations resulted from the *cargador* work of the 63d Infantry Regiment, which adopted its insignia of a carabao sled carrying a sack of rice with words *Baus Au*. On the other hand, the preparations shook civilian confidence. “They took great pride in their Army,” noted Colonel Tarkington, “and having been indoctrinated for years with the idea of American invincibility, were all for falling on the enemy tooth and nail and hurling him back into the sea.”

On 8 March, Japan invaded New Guinea. The next day their army marched into Rangoon, Burma. Two days later they landed in Mindanao.

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630 Morton, 502.
631 Ibid., 501.
632 Ibid., 502.
633 Ibid., 503.
634 Ibid.
4. MacArthur’s Departure

11 March - 6 May 1942

MacArthur’s departure to Australia coincided with General Marshall making changes that undermined his plans for sustained guerrilla war outside Luzon. Meanwhile, the Fil-Am troops heroic resistance delayed the Japanese in subjugating the islands and created time for Filipinos and expatriate Americans to form ad hoc guerrilla groups. Filipino elites meanwhile chose between resistance, collaboration, and revolt.

Corregidor, D94, R-955

At 2000 hours on 11 March, two hours after sunset, U.S. Navy Lieutenant John Bulkeley steered his seventy-seven-foot boat PT-41 from the North Dock of Corregidor Island. Off shore in Manila Bay the three other PT boats from Torpedo Boat Squadron Three fell into formation as they headed into the open sea. Overhead the last three P-40 fighter planes in the Philippines flew air cover. A network of coast watchers reported increased Japanese naval activity and an enemy destroyer squadron heading towards Manila. Indeed, after becoming separated from the escorts in squall-whipped seas that night, PT-41 narrowly dodged several Japanese warships. With his boat’s worn-out 4,050-horsepower engines only mustering half their normal fifty miles per hour speed, Bulkeley needed thirty-five hours to cut through 560 miles of 15-foot waves to reach the Del Monte pineapple plantation on Manchester, 254-263.
the big island of Mindanao. His was a heroic but sensitive mission: the escape of Douglas MacArthur.

After MacArthur ignored two messages from Washington in February calling for him to relocate to Australia, two urgent cables on 6 and 9 March finally compelled him to relent and make his retreat. Some thoughtful historians have concluded that by that time, MacArthur deserved to be relieved of his command. Ronald Spector wrote, “His ill-conceived and grandiose plan to defend the entire archipelago had resulted in confusion and near disaster; it helped to produce the acute supply shortage which was sapping the strength of the Bataan forces. His grandiloquent pronouncements, together with his strange refusal to visit the front, hurt morale and shook the confidence of his men.”  

To the American people, however, MacArthur had become an early hero of the new war. He was leading America’s boys in a intrepid fight against a dastardly enemy, desperately trying to hang on until promised reinforcements arrived. MacArthur did his best to stoke this popularity: “Of 142 communiqués released by his headquarters between December and March, 109 mentioned only one individual: MacArthur. ‘When an action was described, it was ‘MacArthur’s right flanks on Bataan’ or ‘MacArthur’s men.’ The communiqués... omitted the names of combat units, commanders and individuals who had performed exceptional exploits.”

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637 Ibid., 118.
Politicians tripped over each other to praise MacArthur and President Roosevelt gladly used him “to perk up civilian morale” in the dark months after Pearl Harbor. To lose this general to the enemy would be too damaging to national confidence to even contemplate. While in Washington, the President brought Churchill into a discussion on MacArthur’s fate with Secretary of War Henry Stimson. The Prime Minister shared his telegram ordering General Lord Gort to relinquish his command at Dunkirk and return to England so as to prevent his capture and deny the Germans a propaganda coup. The President read the telegram with great interest and Stimson asked to borrow it. “It may be (for I do not know),” wrote Churchill, “that this influenced them in the right decision which they took in ordering General MacArthur to hand over his command to one of his subordinate generals, and thus saved for all his future glorious service the great Commander who would otherwise have perished or passed the war as a Japanese captive. I should like to think so.” Roosevelt added a Congressional Medal of Honor and public announcement of MacArthur’s new command of Australia’s defense to both entice MacArthur and reaffirm his high standing in the minds of the American people.

The promise of aid must have also motivated the President. MacArthur appeared ready to sacrifice himself – with his wife and young son – to demonstrate his faith in the promise that Roosevelt knew to be false. Unexpectedly questioned at

638 Cray, 297.
639 As John Costello observed, “Reports of MacArthur’s gallant struggle fed the mounting anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States.” Costello, 211. On 19 February, the day before ordering MacArthur’s evacuation, FDR signed Executive Order 9066 authorizing the internment of Japanese Americans in designated ‘military exclusion zones.’
a press conference on the yet-to-arrive aid, Roosevelt aberrantly stammered: “I wouldn’t do any --- well, I wouldn’t --- I am trying to take a leaf out of my notebook. I think it would be well for others to do it. I --- not knowing enough about it --- I try not to speculate myself.”641 For ten years Roosevelt had not mustered the political will to either prepare Philippine defenses or to build the navy needed to break through during a war with Japan. “So the neglect of the Philippine defenses,” explained George C. Marshall, “was the matter of the fact that our country had never appropriated the money for the equipment and the material that was needed, because it takes at least almost a year to get most of these things, and a year and a half or two years to get the others after the act is once passed.”642 The capture of MacArthur would have triggered questions Roosevelt would not want to answer.

Corregidor broadcasted to the soldiers on Bataan and the Philippine people explanations for MacArthur’s move to Australia. As a U.S. Army history noted, “A large part of the faith in the timely arrival of reinforcements had been based on the presence of General MacArthur.”643 Ramsey noted the profound effect of MacArthur’s departure: “Some hailed it as a prelude to a counterinvasion, clinging to the old stories about the hundred-mile-long convoy. But others, worn out from weeks of fighting, hunger, and sickness, saw it as abandonment. MacArthur had saved himself, they grumbled, and left them behind to die.”644

On 14 March, MacArthur and his party arrived at Del Monte’s airfield in Bukidnon Province on Mindanao. Villamor observed, “He must have lost 25 pounds,
living on the same diet as the soldiers on the Rock, and looked gaunt and ghastly.”

He seemed surprised there were no planes ready to carry him to Australia. Four planes had been sent, one crashed, one turned back, and two never made their destination. Finally, at 2000 hours on 16 March, two B-17 bombers piloted by Lieutenant Frank Bostrom and Captain Bill Lewis arrived from Darwin to pick up MacArthur and fly him south.

MacArthur left a letter for Quezon: “The United States is moving its forces into the southern Pacific area in what is destined to be a great offensive against Japan. The troops are being concentrated in Australia, which will be used as the base for the offensive drive to the Philippines. President Roosevelt has designated me to command this offensive and has directed me to proceed to Australia for that purpose.” He asked Quezon and his family to join him there. Three days later Bulkeley and his PT boats picked up Quezon and his entourage at Zamboanguita Beach on southern Negros.

On Corregidor, as USAFFE placed all troops on quarter rations – about 1,000 calories per day – Romulo reported: “On March 17th we learned MacArthur had entered Melbourne as a hero.” Twenty-four hours later, while riding a train to the continent’s south coast, the general accepted command of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). Later, on 24 March in Washington, the Combined Chiefs of Staff designated the entire Pacific theatre as an area of American strategic responsibility. At the end of the month the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff organized the theatre into the

645 Villamor, 58.
646 Quezon, 298-299.
647 Romulo, 230
Southeast Pacific Area, the Pacific Ocean under Admiral Chester Nimitz, and SWPA under MacArthur.

Switching trains in Adelaide Station on 20 March, MacArthur gave a short speech to the press: “The President of the United States ordered me to break through the Japanese lines and proceed from Corregidor to Australia for the purpose, as I understand it, of organizing the American offensive against Japan, a preliminary object of which is the relief of the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{648} In other words, he had not abandoned his troops; he had done his duty and obeyed direct orders from the Commander-in-Chief. He did not run away, he ‘broke through’ enemy lines – in a way, he had advanced. Most importantly, he was going back. MacArthur concluded: “I came through and I shall return.”\textsuperscript{649} That day the Japanese bombed Port Moresby in New Guinea, and Roosevelt promoted Wainwright to Lieutenant General and command of all the forces in the Philippines.

MacArthur’s memorable line was more than an act of self-aggrandizement. It was a calculated attempt to stave off defeat in the Philippines by influencing several audiences simultaneously. First, of course, he wanted his soldiers in the Islands not to think badly of him and to fight on in some desperate hope their situation could be reversed. Secondly, he wanted to openly defy the Japanese and show that at least they could not defeat \textit{him}, and in fact should fear his return. Third, and most importantly, he wanted to publicly commit the United States to return to the Philippines. Lastly, he wanted to assure the people of the Philippines that their struggle against the invaders was not over. In his memoirs, MacArthur explained he

\textsuperscript{648} MacArthur, \textit{Reminiscences}, 145.
\textsuperscript{649} Ibid.
believed the phrase ‘I shall return’ worked magic on the Filipinos: “It lit a flame that became a symbol which focused the nation’s indomitable will and at whose shrine it finally attained victory and, once again, found freedom.”

Time must have polished his memory however for as Ramsey described the mood in Bataan: “America had failed to defend the Philippines, and the promised relief had never appeared. A trust had been violated, a confidence betrayed.”

Tokyo, D96. R-953

The day after MacArthur’s departure – a move not made public for another week – Tojo again spoke of independence for the Philippines. Though records indicate he was preoccupied with Thailand, he prepared a schedule for Philippine ‘independence’ in November 1943. Tojo believed America’s earlier public promise of independence had set high Philippine expectations that prevented the country from embracing “the Japanese side.” Therefore, on 13 March he set out on a two-week tour of the occupied lands in Southeast Asia with stops planned for Manila and Davao. The next day he gave a speech: “The Philippines and Burma would have independence ‘after they have evidenced their cooperation with the empire,’ but ‘military affairs, foreign affairs, economics, and other affairs shall be placed under the firm control of the empire.”

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650 Ibid.
651 Ramsey and Rivele, 77.
652 Goto, 40.
653 Ibid., 66.
654 Ibid., 55.
655 Tarling, 133.
In March, the War Ministry (Rikugun Sho) tasked the Kempeitai to establish sections to process and hold the hundreds of thousands of Allied POWs in Japanese hands. Section One would run camps in Japan, China, Korea, Manchukuo, Formosa, and the Philippines. The War Ministry issued administrative regulations but left camp commanders free to determine how to run their camps. Inadequate resources and imperially sanctioned punitive attitudes towards surrendered soldiers pushed many camp commandants to violations of the Geneva Convention.

Central Luzon, D97, R-952

In Manila, the Kempeitai established its headquarters in the Jai-Alai Club, before moving to Villamor Hall at the University of the Philippines, and finally to Fort Santiago on the Pasig River. Observant Filipinos noticed two types of Kempeitai. Elite officers worked as special agents in field cases, often in civilian clothes, closely associated with the Special Service Agency or Military Intelligence (Tokumu Kaikan). The regular, uniformed Kempeitai worked as guards or enforced military law. The Japanese executed two types of trials: military court (gumpo kaigi) and civilian court (gunritsu kaigi). As the war turned against them, they began special courts martial (tokubetsu gumpo kaigi) that permitted no legal representation for the defendants.

A day before Tojo began his trip, on Luzon, Xu Jingcheng established the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets League, or Kang Fan, with

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657 Ibid., 75.
658 Brown, 126.
himself as chairman. He created cadres for separate Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets
Alliances among Workers, Store Employees, Youths, Women, and Cantonese. The
groups spread south to Bicol, then to the Visayas and Mindanao. Their mission was
to “keep up the spirit of the Chinese through propaganda” and after about a month
they began printing a secret newspaper *The Chinese Guide (Huaqiao dao bao)*. Under
editors Zhang Siming and Huang Nanjun, the paper grew from 350 issues in Manila
to over 3,000 copies across Luzon. The Kang Fan also supplied money, medicine,
materials and manpower to the Hua Zhi. It passed intelligence to its Manila Unit
including targets for assassination to deter Chinese from collaborating with the
enemy. The Hua Zhi killed Tang Yunde and Liu Yuheng of the Japanese-created
Chinese Association (*Huaqiao xiehui*). An attack on association president Zeng
Tingquan (Justo Cabo Chan) on 4 December 1944 failed but killed many people
around him.

Secret organizations for and against the Japanese made Manila a very
dangerous place. Yay Panlilio recalled: “Friends of other days now could be divided
into three classes: those who had fallen away and could no longer be depended on;
those who held aloof and would keep for the day when all could be explained; and
those who fell in step, knowing the score, ready to pay the price – but not stupidly.”
In March, while the Japanese searched for Romulo, Yay left the KZRH radio
station and kept walking. After four days she made her way out of Manila into the
hills past Rizal, to the hut of a farmer named Igi, and into the grip of malaria.

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659 Yuk-Wai, 99.
660 Ibid., 100.
661 Panlilio, 12.
Southern Luzon, D98, R-951

With his army concentrated in Bataan, Homma could only send small patrols to deal with insurgents elsewhere. In Bicol, they identified Barangay San Nicolas in Canaman, Camarines Sur, as ‘gerilyado’ (guerrilla area). Soldiers and Ganaps searched the town looking for guerrilla leaders. Late on 15 March, the Japanese attacked a gathering of San Nicolas citizens attending the wedding of Venancio Borlagdan and Blandina Obstaculo. A sudden flare preceded a barrage of machinegun fire. The attack lasted for three hours before the soldiers ransacked and burnt the town. Antonio P. Estrada, then sixteen-years-old, later described “the exodus of barrio folks from San Nicolas to the town center of Canaman,” the men, women, children old and young, moving in single file with their personal belongings salvaged from burnt homes. “We stayed in the school and houses of relatives,” Estrada remembered.

There were guerrillas in the area, motivated by basic concerns. In Libmanan, Camarines Sur, a long-time Japanese immigrant named Miyahira Berto owned a sari-sari store. When he fell behind on his electric bill, the electric company owner, Patricio Genova, cut off his power. When the Japanese troops arrived, Berto got them to imprison Genova. Berto failed to appreciate that Genova’s granddaughter, Matea Abante, was the wife of thirty-three year-old Elias Madrid, “a rich man in his own right, and heir to one of the biggest land-based local fortunes.” He witnessed

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663 Barrameda, 15.
664 Ibid., 11.
the poor treatment of his father-in-law in prison and secured his release with a cash fine – or bribe – of P800 along with a sack of rice and some gasoline.

Elias Madrid, a close friend of guerrilla leader Leon S.A. Aureus from nearby Libmanan, began coordinating with Dr. Sancho Manubay, Felix Malapo, Luis Los Baños, and Canaman Mayor Damaso R. Requejo. By the end of February, they decided to form a guerrillas unit and recruit someone with military experience to lead them. Madrid chose his nephew, Philippine Army Finance Sergeant Juan Q. Miranda. At Madrid’s house in San Nicolas, Canaman, on 2 March, they finalized their plans. Six days later, Elias, his brothers Modesto and Policarpo, Raymundo Martinez and Leon San Aureus met with Miranda in San Nicolas. Miranda agreed to lead the group. San Aureus, a reporter, became group executive officer and chief of propaganda. Elias Madrid became finance officer, using his own money. The group chose for its name the Tangcong Vaca Guerrilla Unit (TVGU), and became the first armed resistance unit in Camarines Sur. In two days they recruited over two-dozen new members. San Nicholas Mayor Damaso Requejo became an associate while simultaneously mediating with the Japanese on his citizens’ behalf whenever they were in danger. On 13 March, the TVGU conducted their first operation, a demolition of the Tucbasan Bridge connecting Libmanan and Naga. Unsuccessful attempts to blow nearby railroad bridges followed. These actions brought on the Japanese attack on the wedding in San Nicholas.

On 20 March, the TVGU retaliated by ambushing two buses carrying Japanese soldiers, losing two guerrillas to shrapnel from grenades. The Japanese increased patrols on the Naga-Pascacao road, but locals joined the TVGU in greater numbers.
At 0500 hours on 28 March, they ambushed a train in Manalas on the Naga-Sipocot line, killing six Japanese soldiers and taking their weapons and arresting a suspected informer named Delfin Nepomuceno. Japanese reinforcements arrived firing wildly and killing three civilians who were gathering metal from the destroyed train. One of those killed was prominent citizen Jacinto Ursua, turning his kinship network against the Japanese. The following month the TVGU liberated 27,000 to 35,000 sacks of rice stored in a Japanese warehouse in San Juan and distributed much of it to the people. They then sent patrols under Lieutenant Simeon Ayala and Sergeant Tomas Servidad to drive out Ganaps harassing citizens in remote barrios in Libmanan. Two days later a patrol led by Lieutenant Wilfredo San Sebation killed eighteen Ganaps in Cabinitan, Ragay. That day, the TVGU began issuing a mimeographed newspaper, *The Voice of Freedom*, edited by Aureus under his pen name, Rosau Eulanes.

Northern Luzon, D102, R-947

Ilocos Norte Province Governor Ablan traveled to the neighboring Apayao Province to use Praeger’s radio to contact Quezon whom he thought was still on Corregidor. On 19 March, he sent a message asking for P100,000 for his government workers who had not been paid since December. Upon receiving this message, and unable to fulfill the request, Quezon authorized Ablan to “issue emergency notes as previously authorized by your provincial treasurer and district or fiscal auditor

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665 Barrameda, Jr., 19.
666 Ibid., 20-21.
667 Norling, 15.
for payment authorized expenditures."  

Teodoro Agoncillo noted, “The significance of this development lies in the fact that not only did Alban’s outfit grow into a full-blown resistance group, but more importantly it led to the imposition of discipline upon those who, as independent guerrillas, had committed acts of brigandage, rape, and murder against their pawn people.” Indeed, Ablan prepared orders for his deputy, Lieutenant Feliciano Madamba, to reorganize his growing force into three geographical sectors, each with one leader for direction and several towns for support.

Ablan requested immediate supply of quinine and medicine to fight cholera and dysentery. He claimed his guerrillas had so far killed 600 Japanese soldiers in Ilocos Norte and boasted that despite the Japanese occupation of Laoag and San Nicholas, his free government still functioned in the hills. He noted that the Japanese had sent General Ricarte to visit Bitac, a town badly damaged for its resistance. Ablan reported: “Every day the hatred of our people against the Japs becomes more intense as they rob our homes, destroy property, kill civilians, and rape our women.”

The acts of rape especially incensed Filipinos across the Islands. It seemed that almost everyone knew of a woman like twenty-four-year-old Manileño Gertrude Balisalisa. When the Japanese forcibly drafted her husband, an engineer, to work on bridges, she was sent to the local commander’s quarters to work as a housemaid. Japanese officers raped Balisalisa and a number of other women in

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668 Agoncillo, 650.
669 Ibid.
670 Volckmann, 37.
671 Hicks, 126.
house several times every day. The officers forbade the women from speaking to each other and punished them with physical beatings. At least one was shot trying to escape. After the war, Gertrude’s husband disowned her, and took her two children away. 672

By this time Japanese soldiers were habituated to the exploitation of conquered women. Since the 1920s in Korea, the Japanese had sexually enslaved tens of thousands of mostly non-Japanese women. 673 In 1932, the Japanese military in China recruited and compelled women to serve as sex workers they called ‘comfort women’ (juugun ianfu). 674 The program failed to prevent widespread rape of local women. In December 1937 in Nanking, Japanese soldiers raped between 20,000 and 80,000 women and girls (while massacring 250,000 to 300,000 people) as part of their subjugation campaign. 675 Within two years the War Ministry worked to provide a least one comfort woman for every 100 soldiers. 676 In July 1941, the army requested 20,000 comfort women for 700,000 troops in China and Southeast Asia – a ratio of one woman or girl for every 35 men. 677

In the Philippines, at first, most comfort women were not recruited but forcibly abducted from their homes or off the streets and kept in army run stations and garrisons. 678 Records indicate that each company-sized Japanese unit detained about ten young women or girls during the occupation, and soldiers raped each girl

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673 Fujitani, 371.
674 Edwards, 7.
675 Ibid., 20.
676 Ibid., 25.
678 Edwards, 77.
five to ten times a day. The unpaid women also had to clean, wash clothes, and cook. With an average age under 18 years old, the Filipinas were younger than the women taken by the Japanese in other occupied countries.

In cities, the Japanese military exploited areas when “indigenous prostitution seems always to have flourished.” As Theresa Kaminski noted, “Prostitution and gambling, both run from cabarets, continued with the cooperation of the police and other city officials.” Hartendorp added: “Cabarets and houses of prostitution sprang up all over Manila. The principal American residence districts, Ermita and Malate, were crowded with these establishments.” Every day the Manila Tribune advertised: “Wanted: waitresses, hostesses, dancers; good-looking and up-to-date girls preferred,” “Wanted: mestiza waitresses with pleasing personality,” “Wanted: complaisant hostesses, apply personally,” “Secretaries, girls for Japanese Navy Club, Tokyo Saloon,” “masseuse (specializing in prostate massage),” “young and single barbers,” and “massagist [sic].” Many Filipinas took these jobs to prevent their families from starving.

The Japanese army, “always wary of the danger of espionage, especially when there was an active guerrilla resistance,” imported girls from Japan, Korea, China, Spain, Russia, Indonesia and Westerners caught in conquered territories.

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679 Henson, xvi.
680 Ibid., xvi.
681 Hicks, 124.
684 Ibid.
685 Hicks, 124-127. The guerrillas in fact closely watched the cubicles of the Japanese army brothel in Naga, and noted how a bayonet hung on the door indicated an enlisted man present, while a sword meant it was an officer. Barrameda, 72
Hicks reported prices charged in Manila as ¥3.50 per night for Koreans, ¥5.50 for Japanese, ¥11 for Hispanics, and ¥13 for Americans.\textsuperscript{686} One observer noted: “The Japanese were always stressing in their propaganda that the Filipinos were Orientals and should consider themselves fellow-Orientals with the Japanese; but they did like \textit{mestizas}.”\textsuperscript{687}

Sometimes, the Japanese simply used the forcible enslavement of women and seizure of property for use as brothels as a means for exerting their power. Through the first year of occupation Auxiliary Bishop Monseigneur William Finnemann openly opposed Japanese ‘comfort women’ practices.\textsuperscript{688} In early October 1942, a Japanese commission went to him and announced that they intended to turn the convent of Holy Spirit Sisters in Mindoro into a brothel. As Fertig related: “The Japs approached Monsay. Finnemann, Bishop of Minchoro [sic], with the proposition that he turn his girls college with all the girls over to them as a red-light house. He refused. Later invited on board the transport he was brutally murdered. Story given by Fr Reith with request it be made public at home.”\textsuperscript{689} On 19 October, the Japanese arrested Father Finnemann. After seven days of beatings and starvation he still refused to sign over the convent. The Japanese finally threw him into the seas off Verde Island near Batangas, and reported that the bishop had committed suicide.

To the common Japanese soldier, however, the use of comfort woman was not seen as an evil act. Just as they were prepared to sacrifice their lives for their

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[686] Ibid.
\item[689] “Diary, 1943-1945, Message Traffic Intelligence Summaries Later Conference,” 6 January 1943, Wendell W. Fertig Papers, Box 1 of 2, Center for Military History, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. (hereafter “Fertig Diary.”)
\end{itemize}
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Emperor, they expected women also had a duty to sacrifice. Their attitudes are revealed in their recollections long after the war. Kaneko Yoichi, a prefecture in Yamaguchi, recalled how Korean women followed his unit in Yichang, China, balancing their suitcases on their heads. During lulls in the fighting engineers hastily constructed “rush huts” patrolled by sentries with fixed bayonets. Soldiers would line up to take turns with the women until an alarm signaled another Chinese attack. He recalled how with “trousers still lowered, soldiers would run helter-skelter,” while the women rolled over and covered themselves with their suitcases in desperate hope of protection from incoming rounds. With almost fond melancholy, Yoichi recalled: “The soldiers put a bit of their dreams in their brief interludes with the comfort women between battles.”

In a sign that they were aware that Filipinos did not share their cultural values, the Japanese Propaganda Corps organized a unit of writers, “the Pen Corps” (pen butai). The unit sent Miki Kiyoshi to the Philippines in March 1942. A philosopher of Buddhist and German ideas trained in Kyoto and Europe, Miki spent the rest of the year observing Philippine culture. He wrote that Filipinos exhibited a resignation resembling the Japanese concept of subjective nothingness, but without depth. They exhibited politeness without philosophical context. He felt that the Spaniards and Americans had given Filipinos an inferiority complex that they compensated for with empty habits of making speeches and wearing expensive clothes. These observations reinforced those of other published authors. Advisor to

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690 Carry, 80.
691 Ibid., 81.
692 The Pen Corps first appeared after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Yu-Jose, 166.
693 Ibid., 166-167.
the Fourth Philippine-Japan Student Conference Matsushita Masatoshi, for example, declared Filipinos were “an abundant source of human resources that could be harnessed for the benefit of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”

Central Luzon, D103, R-946

By now Luzon crawled with USAFFE stragglers, some trying to reach Bataan, others attempting to escape that peninsula. Many – except Philippine Scouts – fell in with any guerrilla outfit they found. Only Horan’s and Thorp’s guerrillas, however, could claim official status conferred by USAFFE and MacArthur. These two groups began competing for recruits and prestige. Their growth was haphazard. In Neuva Vizcaya, for example, Major Parker Calvert, Lieutenant Arthur Murphy and Private Grafton Spencer arrived at Lusod Sawmill southwest of Baguio after failing to get through to Bataan. They found Filipino soldiers who asked to join Calvert. After organizing an ad hoc outfit, Calvert ventured north to Bontoc and reported to Horan. He had been unaware Thorp’s group was nearby.

Thorp’s position improved tremendously on 20 March when a USAFFE team under Major Llewellyn Barbour completed a daring trip by PT boat and cross-country guides to deliver a two-way radio. With the radio came Technical Sergeant Bill Brooks to operate it, demolition specialist Sergeant Albert A. Short, and two Philippine Scouts all of whom opted to stay with the guerrilla leader.

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694 Ibid., 167.
695 “It is not without interest that Philippine Scouts, who had been trained by regular army officers, seldom joined the scores of thousands of their countrymen who became guerrillas.” Lapham and Norling, 19.
696 Ibid, 18-19. Lapham recalls the radio arriving on 20 March but Dizon sets the date in May.
697 Ibid., 19.
Meanwhile on 21 March, MacArthur’s train reached Kooringa in far south Australia and he finally learned there was no army waiting for him. Shocked and disappointed, he arrived at his new headquarters in Melbourne the next day to find he commanded three hundred and sixty U.S. Army personnel. He monitored reports of four days of heavy Japanese bombing on Bataan and Corregidor that put out of commission freezers holding 24,000 ponds of caribou meat, endangering USAFFE’s food supply.

Severe shortages forced the Mayor of Manila to order price controls on a variety of commodities with harsh penalties for violations. It would be months before the PEC sent special Department of Agriculture and Commerce agents to enforce the price controls before finally establishing the Economic Police Division from the Bureau of the Constabulary in May 1943. In the meantime the mayor’s action unleashed growth in black markets. The population that had previously only worked around Japanese authority now began resisting Philippine government edicts. The legitimacy of the administration collapsed.

The food shortages revealed Japanese miscalculation. Their armies had gained control over Southeast Asian territory that produced sixty-seven percent of the world’s rice. Tokyo's new colonies alone provided seventy-five percent of Japan’s rice, before American submarines interdicted supply lines. Yet early on Luzon faced a critical and increasing shortage in rice that compromised government

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control and legitimacy. Few things were more important to the people than rice. As one observer noted, "It is the staple food of the Filipino. It is the thing that occupies his attention more than any other. Rice planting in the lowlands is an occasion for song, for love, and for neighborliness."\textsuperscript{700}

In March, the Japanese Military Administration (JMA) announced a program to introduce to the Philippines quick-growing Taiwanese rice called horai, and forecasted a three hundred percent increase in national rice production.\textsuperscript{701} Over the next eight months the Japanese controlled media published glowing reports of tests that proved how easily the rice grew in the Islands. In August, for example, the \textit{Manila Tribune} reported on a 4,000 acre model farm under Ota Development Company: “From this model farm at least two crops are expected annually and the production will be used for meeting military requirements in the Philippines. It was disclosed that the rice crop from this model farm is expected to reach 100,000 bushels in 1942 and 750,000 bushels in 1944.”\textsuperscript{702} The JMA publicized planting of horai across the Islands to make the country self-sufficient in 1943. Until then, Japan would ship in rice from Vietnam to make up for shortages.

Rice was only one of the JMA’s concerns. Between 27 March and 7 April, it announced the “military-commissioned management of the Japanese developed mines.”\textsuperscript{703} The JMA established the Philippine Mining Association to enable the

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\textsuperscript{700} Malcolm, 254.  
\textsuperscript{701} Jose, “The Rice Shortage and Countermeasures During the Occupation,” 201.  
\textsuperscript{702} Hartendorp, Vol. I, 193.  
\end{flushright}
Japanese military to reorganize, rebuild and operate local mines.\textsuperscript{704} This association oversaw legal changes to allow the Japanese to seize “enemy-held assets” defined as property owned by enemy countries or citizens, property used by the U.S.-Philippine forces, and all public or semipublic property of the Philippine government under the management of the military. Following the pacification of Panay, Ishihara Sangyo engineers entered the copper mines in Antique only to find facilities wrecked by “the enemy.”\textsuperscript{705} The Philippine Mining Association would have to hire 2,000 local workers under Japanese supervision to rebuild the works.

The Japanese navy put the Ota Development Corporation in charge of rubber plantations in Cotabato, vegetable farms in Calamba, and confiscated lands for a slaughterhouse to provide the military with beef. Ota also ran rice plantations in Mandaluyong and Pangasinan for the horai experiments. It partnered with the Furukawa Plantation Company to run copra farms in Mindanao, and with Daido Boeki to produce salt in Manila. The Furukawa Plantation received the 2,300-hectare International Harvester abaca plantation along with lumber companies and cotton plantations.\textsuperscript{706}

The JMA also created the Philippine Research Commission (\textit{Hito Chosa linkai}) to recommend policies on economy, politics, ideology, education, religion and race.\textsuperscript{707} The Commission examined the racial division of power – Spanish mestizos dominated the government, Chinese merchants dominated commerce – that marginalized Filipinos. To bring the Filipinos into their proper place in the new

\textsuperscript{704} Ibid., 137.
\textsuperscript{705} Ibid., 147-148.
\textsuperscript{706} Yu-Jose, 158.
\textsuperscript{707} Ibid., 159.
order, the commission recommended replacement of the concepts and practices of democracy and individualism with new concepts of morality (dotoku), justice (seigi) and moral justice (dogi) to harmonize senses of duty and freedom.\(^708\) The commission also recommended building upon the Filipino sense of kinship to create a form of Japanese polity (kokutai) with propaganda casting the head of state as a father caring for the national family.\(^709\) In this way they hoped to foster feelings of duty and sacrifice in the Filipinos.

The Japanese Army’s Religious Section brought Catholic Bishop Taguchi from Tokyo to meet with Manila Archbishop Michael J. O’Doherty. Although Religious Section publicized the meeting in a positive light, “the archbishop showed very little willingness to cooperate with the Japanese, and was in effect confined to his quarters in the archdiocese headquarters for the duration of the war.”\(^710\) Quezon later explained O’Doherty refused cooperation “on the ground that he had had no opportunity to consult with his parish priests, and as they were all Filipinos and he was an American of Irish birth, he did not know how they would take it from him.”\(^711\) The Japanese found the archbishop’s two Filipino deputies, Auxillary Bishop Guerrero and Father Rufino C. Santos, more receptive. O’Doherty had in fact instructed Guerrero “to deal directly with the enemy and to do everything to protect the Church from harassment.”\(^712\) Yet as historian Terada Takefumi noted, Guerrero’s collaboration would exceed O’Doherty’s wishes and he was relieved of his Church

\(^{708}\) Ibid., 162.
\(^{709}\) Ibid.
\(^{711}\) Quezon, 296.
\(^{712}\) Takefumi, 241.
duties when the Americans returned. Father Santos learned to avoid the Japanese but the Kempeitai later arrested him and he was only saved from execution by the timely return of U.S. forces.

Relations with the Catholic Church would remain problematic for the Japanese. Already, as Romulo noted, “It was a common sight to see our priests praying over the ashes of the churches.” The day after MacArthur declared Manila an open city, the Japanese bombed the capital and apparently deliberately targeted the Catholic Santo Rosa and Santa Catalina colleges and a number of churches. Kempeitai swept Nuns and priests into prisons and camps. The decision to turn the Santo Tomas campus into a prison camp also insulted Catholics. As one Manila resident later noted, “Every Catholic student in every Catholic school knows that the University of Santo Tomas is the largest and oldest university in Asia and in the Philippines.”

Central Luzon, D112, R-937

On 29 March, in the forests between Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Tarlak, a number of prominent Philippine Communists leaders with about two hundred of their followers “armed with paltik, balisong [homemade knives], bolos, and few rifles” met to organize a new guerrilla force. Among the leaders in attendance were Dayang-Dayang, Bernardo Poblete (aka Banal), Lope de la Rosa, Eusebio

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713 Romulo, 81.
714 Jennings, 26.
Aquinbo, Mariano Franco, Casto Alejandrino, and Luis Taruc.\(^{716}\) They voted to create a new “People’s Army to Fight the Japs,” in Tagalog *Hukbong ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon* that became known by the acronym Hukbalaháp, or Huks for short.\(^{717}\)

Following a Leninist model, they elected Alejandrino, Dayang-Dayang, Poblete and Taruc to the Military Committee with Taruc as chairman and Alejandrino as deputy.\(^{718}\) Vincente Lava, from the Philippine Civil Liberties Union’s underground Free Philippines group, officially took over for Taruc as chief executive of the Communist party. Mateo del Castillo, later the political commissar, defined for the Huks the war as the military phase of the United Party Front effort to overcome the Japanese, Americans, and Philippine government and create an new independent communist state. Influenced by the Chinese communists, they would accept short-term cooperation with opponents when it suited them, and indeed they even worked with the Japanese at times, but their ultimate objectives were never to change. A U.S. Army assessment noted, the Huks “will probably remain a difficult problem during reoccupation and possibly afterwards.”\(^{719}\)

The Huk leaders issue two guiding documents, *The Fundamental Spirit of the Hukbalaháp* and *The Iron Discipline*. The first called for mutual equality and love between the Huks and the people. The second demanded that Huks follow orders. It was an unbreakable code that made the Huks respected and feared. As one history noted, “While the Japanese apparently ruled, the Huk actually governed.”\(^{720}\)

\(^{716}\) Agoncillo, Vol. II, 6669.
\(^{717}\) Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 12.
\(^{718}\) See Lanzona, 122.
\(^{719}\) Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 12.
\(^{720}\) Agoncillo, Vol. II, 672.
According to neighboring guerrillas, however, many under Huk command—
“including Taruc himself”—chafed under the exacting Communist regulations.\(^\text{721}\) Taruc wrote, “I tried to avoid anything in myself that might divide our ranks and weaken the leadership of our people’s army. I tried to become a better Communist. I adjusted myself to Party discipline, irksome though it was, and tried to share the mind and outlook of my comrades of the Politburo and the High Command.”\(^\text{722}\)

Even so, the Huks effectively controlled their territory. The AMT and KPMP assisted by uniting to form the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC). “The Huk organization had a wide mass base and a political sophistication that other resistance groups had never had. Its leaders, who came from the lowest stratum of society, were zealous fanatics who understood the needs, customs, and aspirations of the people,” Leonard Davis explained, “The method of indoctrination into the aims and purposes of the Huk was so thorough—ranging from lectures to writing textbooks and preparing historical pageants—that the people under the Huk sovereignty grasped the simple message, and could not help believing that a new vista had been opened up in which they, and not the landlords, were in control.”\(^\text{723}\)

Agoncillo offered reasons for the Huks’ success.\(^\text{724}\) First, coming from the oppressed strata of society, the Huk leaders understood their people and what motivated them. Second, as ideologues, they were highly motivated in their work and willing to enforce the fanatical discipline. “Oftentimes,” he wrote, “it was

\(^{721}\) “Many, including Taruc himself, resented harsh Communist discipline,” Robert Lapham noted, “Too many ‘enemies’ had formal sins in the Marxist church, had severely undermined the spirit of comradeship that existed among the Hucks early in the war. Leaders had grown selfish, used faithful followers to exalt themselves, and often acted impulsively.” Lapham and Norling, 139
\(^{722}\) Taruc, 23.
\(^{723}\) Davis, 37.
\(^{724}\) Agoncillo, Vol. II 676-677.
necessary for them, in what they considered to be the interests of the movement, to 
liquidate those suspected, rightly or wrongly, of posing a danger to the 
organization.” 725 When it suited, however, they would ally with well-to-do 
capitalists like Vincente Bernia of Manila, said Blackburn, “because they could be 
used since the Japs wouldn’t suspect that these people with money and position 
were playing footsie with the Huks. They were bringing arms out of Bataan into 
Arayat, and in large quantities.” 726 Intense propaganda, indoctrination and ruthless 
methods helped convince the population to support the Huk program of 
“requisitioning and pressure as a way of systematically ruining the wealthy.” 727 This 
was seen as a step towards revolution.

The ‘popular front’ policy attracted a large following. “Its growth was 
spontaneous,” Taruc reported, “Whole squadrons [see below] came overnight from 
towns and barrios.” 728 Competing guerrillas observed: “Some of its leaders were real 
zealots, and some of their followers were truly inspired by the Marxists ideal, but 
most ordinary Filipinos who became Huks did so for reasons that had little to do 
with Marxist metaphysics.” 729 The starving came for food, the vulnerable for 
protection, victims came for revenge, and even some criminals for looting. Food was 
the strongest incentive. In their area, Lizzie Collingham noted, “Good weather 
ensured a rice bumper crop and many recall the period of 1942 to 1947 as the 
period in their lives when food was most plentiful.” 730

725 Ibid.
726 Blackburn Interview, 88-89.
727 Lapham and Norling, 83-84.
728 Taruc, 22.
729 Lapham and Norling, 132.
730 Collingham, 243.
As Taruc explained, “The Huk was organized on the basis of squadrons, composed of approximately 100 men each. The squadron was subdivided into platoons and squads. Two squadrons made a battalion, and two battalions a regiment.” Notable among the Huk guerrilla organization was a unit called Squadron 48, also referred to as the *Wa Chi*, a Chinese outfit. Among the merchants, teachers and newsmen who filled its ranks were veteran guerrillas from Canton. The number 48 came from two Communist armies in China, the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army. The unit provided training for all Huks both militarily and politically.

The reputation of the Huks remained a politically sensitive subject even long after the war. William J. Pomeroy wrote ideologically of them. Other guerrillas entertained a different opinion. Lapham wrote: “The vaunted idealism of the Huks existed mainly in the imaginations of those Western ‘progressives’ who see a reincarnated George Washington whenever some bloodstained bandit comes out of the jungle, rifle in hand, and starts talking about ‘freedom’ and ‘social justice.’” Taruc admitted, “errors were made and that innocent people died.”

According to some estimates the Huks killed 5,000 Japanese – and 20,000 Filipinos. Many of their members accepted this as the price of social justice. “Others were like Carlos Nocum,” wrote Lapham, “who joined in order to fight the Japanese but who disliked

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731 Taruc, 22.
733 Lapham and Norling, 132.
734 Taruc, 23.
735 Willis and Myers, 164.
Marxist dogmatism and discipline so much that he and his men switched over to my LGAF forces in 1942.”

As one of its first acts, the Huks sent Alejandrino, Sampang and Benedicto Sayco to Bataan to meet and coordinate with MacArthur not knowing he had already left the Islands. Li Yongxiao claimed to have been with the Huk delegation and reported that they met Major Claude Thorp’s executive officer, Captain Mackenzie, who took them to see Thorp on Mount Arayat. There, Lapham recalled seeing four or five particularly hard looking Huks arrive and believed one of them was Luis Tarlac, though others thought it was Casto Alejandrino. “They asked Thorp if he would be their military advisor,” Blackburn learned, “they would run the political side of things. Thorp said that he wouldn’t be the military advisor, but that he’d run the whole damn show. This didn’t sit well at all, and it resulted in quite a bit of friction between Thorp and the Huks.”

Thorp was building his own team. The mayor of Prac brought Colonel Mario Pamintuan to him, quickly followed by Tomas Lumanlan and Francisco Ocampo. From Timbo came Eugenio Soliman. Thorp moved his group to a plateau on Mount Pinatubo and established camp, known as Camp Four or Camp Sanchez, in sight of Clark Field.

Japan ended the month by bombing the clearly marked American field hospital No. 1 at Bataan, killing fifteen patients and administrators. The deliberate

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736 LGAF is the Luzon Guerrilla Armed Force, Lapham and Norling, 132.
737 Yuk-Wai, 90.
738 Lapham and Norling, 21.
739 Blackburn Interview, 89.
740 Ibid., 18.
act so enraged Filipinos that in the evening Japanese army officials broadcast an unprece
dernted apology on Philippine radio. Quezon then broadcast from Melbourne that he had left the country so as to work with MacArthur: “I call upon every Filipino to keep his courage and fortitude and have faith in the ultimate victory of our cause.”

On April Fool’s Day, the first reinforcements promised to Homma arrived in Luzon. Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi and his 35th Brigade of the 18th Division, augmented by the 124th Infantry Regiment, came from Borneo. Homma added service troops from the 14th Army to form the Kawaguchi Detachment. Four days later the 5th Division’s 9th Infantry Brigade and the 41st Infantry regiment under Major General Saburo Kawamura arrived from Malaya. Again, Homma bolstered this group with supporting units to form the Kawamura Detachment. He planned to use these new detachments to conquer the southern Philippines.

On 2 April, as Japanese troops invaded Hollandia in New Guinea, SWPA sent the submarine SS-196 Searaven with ammunition to Corregidor, but it would arrive too late. The next day the forces defending Bataan endured six hours of heavy shelling. Ramsey recalled, “I was horrified and shaken by shellshock; it seemed that it would go on forever, this brutish killing and maiming, and that there was nothing I or anyone could do to stop it.” A determined Japanese assault breached the lines of the Philippine 41st Infantry Division. In the evening, Homma sent representatives to deliver a message: “follow the example of Singapore and Hong Kong and accept

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741 Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, 231.
742 Morton, 501.
743 Ibid., 502.
744 Ramsey and Rivele, 80.
an honorable defeat." Wainwright refused. Homma advanced towards the key terrain in Bataan, Mount Samat.

Southern Luzon, D116, R-933

At midnight in Bicol, the TVGU moved to destroy a large rice mill owned by Dona Flaviana Aspe de Ocampo and used by the Japanese Association to provide rice to the Japanese Army. Thirteen guerrillas ordered the police guards at the mill to hand over their weapons, shooting and killing one who refused. The raiders then killed Doña Babeng and her daughter Rebecca Ocampo because “their tongues were not too friendly to the guerrillas.” The ruthless act scared the Filipino elite. “In an area where people were nearly universally pro-American,” wrote Barrameda, “the killings, nevertheless, sent shock waves, primarily because of the prominence of some of the victims. The killings did tend to reinforce the upper-class notion about all guerrillas being power-mad and gun crazy.” The line between resistance and revolution became unclear.

Bataan, D118, R-931

Two days later, the defense of Bataan began to crack. MacArthur radioed Wainwright, “If food fails you will prepare and execute an attack upon the enemy.” He wanted I Corps on the west to deliver a diversionary artillery barrage while II Corps assaulted forward to Olongapo Road and turned towards Subic Bay. If the

745 Ibid., 78.
746 Barrameda, 11.
747 Ibid., 20-21.
748 Rodgers, 214.
attack failed to break through, some men could still pass through the Japanese lines into the Zambales Mountains to fight on as guerrillas. Stenographer Rodgers later asked: “Who can say that the troops would have suffered more than they did in prison camps?”

On 5 April, the Japanese took Mount Samat from the Philippine 21st Division. USAFFE forces were spread thin, starving, and ravaged by disease. Homma completed the organization of the Kawaguchi and Kawasura Detachments for use on other islands. The barely trained Philippine 61st Division (two infantry regiments and one artillery regiment) held Panay, three regiments were on Negros, a provisional brigade and regiment on Cebu, and one regiment each on Leyte and Samar. No reinforcements could reach these units. That evening the submarine SS-185 Snapper delivered 20 tons of food to Corregidor and evacuated 27 intelligence and communication personnel. Wainwright doubled rations for troops so the Japanese would not capture the food.

Early on 7 April, a Japanese bomber hit an ammunition truck parked by field hospital No. 1 at Bataan. Other aircraft returned to bomb and strafe the hospital clearly marked by red crosses and killed eighty-nine soldiers and nurses and wounded another hundred-and-one. Along the front, Homma’s troops attacked and forced Wainwright’s II Corps back along the San Vicente River. Twenty-four hours later the USAFFE troops made a temporary stand along the Alangan River until Japanese tanks forced them back again. Realizing the end was near, troops in Bataan destroyed their ammunition and supplies. A number of soldiers risked the shark-

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749 Ibid.
750 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 275.
infested waters and tried to swim to Corregidor. American sailors scuttled the
submarine tender Canopus, tug Napa, and floating drydock Dewey on the Bataan side
of the bay. The sub Seadragon delivered 20 tons of food and removed the last
twenty-one radio intelligence personnel.

USAFFE medical supplies, particularly malaria treatments, ran low. At the
war’s start, the Philippine Department Medical Supply Depot held 4,500,000 five-
grain (.325 gram) quinine sulfate tablets in stock, a 30-day supply.751 USAFFE
authorized a quinine prophylaxis regimen of two tablets daily for the Philippine
Scouts in Bataan and certain rear area units, but supplies were deemed insufficient
to cover Philippine Army divisions. During the retreat to Bataan, forces abandoned
or destroyed stocks of quinine and other medical supplies in Manila.752 In February,
“sickness rates began to rise abruptly.”753 By the end of March, the Chief Surgeon,
Luzon Force, reported 1,000 cases per day of malaria, each requiring three to four
days of intravenous treatment with quinine.754 In addition, some sixty percent of the
medical personnel at the hospitals became incapacitated with malaria.755
Conservative estimates are that 24,000 soldiers (twenty-five percent of the total
force on Luzon) suffered malaria by April, sixty percent with P. vivax, thirty-five
percent with P. falciparum, and five percent with both strains.756

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751 Coates, ed. Medical Department, United States Army, Preventive Medicine in World War II, Vol IV, Communicable Diseases: Malaria, (Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, 1963), 505.
752 See Warsaw, 245.
753 Coates, 505.
754 Ibid., 506-507. 
756 Coates, 503-504
Lapham believed, “Bataan was more a medical disaster than a battlefield defeat.” Donald Willis recalled, “Many a man’s hands were black, swollen and cracked from pellagra,” others could hardly eat because of sore mouths from scurvy. I saw many men with their legs swollen to twice their normal size from beriberi.” Army doctors urged prolonged bedrest for victims of beriberi and special dietary and vitamin regimens. Conditions made this impossible. The Army recommended treating malarial dysentery with immediate intra-muscle injections of 10 grains of quinine dihydrochloride to be followed by a regimen of quinine or atebrin [a synthetic substitute for quinine also known as mepacrine dihydrochloride] with an additional orally ingested two percent sodium bicarbonate for diarrhea. MacArthur’s forces ran out of the needed medicine. A regimental surgeon reported: “almost every man in Bataan was suffering, not only from the effects of prolonged starvation, but also from one or both of the acute infections that plagued us throughout the campaign, viz, dysentery and malaria. I have seen men brought into the battalion aid stations and die of an overwhelming infection of dysentery or cerebral malaria before they could be tagged and classified for evacuation.”

Disease favored no side in this war. The Japanese suffered from unsophisticated medical support. Their medical officers failed to recognize ‘scrub typhus’ and misdiagnosed it as Wewak fever, Hansa fever or malaria. Headquarters established no standard treatment for tropical diseases and soldier support

757 Lapham and Norling, 43.
758 Willis and Myers, 27.
760 See Strong, Volume I., 444-454.
761 Coates, 507.
depended “a good deal on the whim of the individual medical officer.” They did not use intravenous quinine for cerebral malaria, had no mepacrine, no prophylactic injection against tetanus, no sulfaguanidine for dysentery, and no penicillin. Malnutrition aggravated disease. As in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, “Vast quantities of vitamin tablets and injections were used, but it seems they proved of very little use; beriberi, night blindness, and other signs of deficiency were common.”

Homma pushed forward. Lacking food, medicine, ammunition, and space, the defenders were finally out of time. On the morning of 9 April, USAFFE’s II Corps commander, General Edward P. King, sent a truce bearer to the Japanese lines in Bataan. The Nagano Detachment commander demanded that King appear personally with his staff officers. From Australia, MacArthur radioed Wainwright that “under no conditions should Bataan be surrendered; any action is preferable to capitulation.” At 1230 hours King defied MacArthur and Wainwright and gave up his 75,000 American and Filipino soldiers – the greatest number of men surrendered in U.S. history. “Thus,” reported the Japanese, “the enemy’s forces on Bataan Peninsula lost the heart of their command system.” Wainwright was left with 10,000 men in Corregidor to fight on.

A number of soldiers in Bataan, however, refused surrender. They chose instead to take their chances escaping through the enemy lines to continue fighting.

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762 Meirion and Susie Harries, 374.
763 Ibid.
764 Ibid.
766 Blackburn Papers, 227.
as guerrillas. In what remained of the 26th Cavalry Regiment, Captain Joe Barker told Lieutenant Ed Ramsey, “Don’t suppose I’d last long in prison camp.” Together they worked their way down rivers and up to the ridge of Mount Mariveles carrying only a few rations and .45 caliber automatic pistols. Ramsey recalled, “Everyone’s lungs ached, everyone’s stomach was empty. The effort to climb was more than we could bear, yet we had no purpose now except to reach the ridge line.” They picked up a lost American private, dodged Japanese patrols straddling their path, and worked northward from Bataan to the vicinity of Fort Stotsenberg.

Robert Lapham with the Philippine Scouts struck out north from Bataan with soldiers Albert Short and Estaban Lumyeb stealthily through the Zambales foothills. They passed close by Camp O’Donnell and saw it was now a prison camp. In a nearby barrio Filipino civilians mobbed the three men. “The experience forced us to face facts at last,” said Lapham, “it was impossible to hide from Filipino civilians; we had to trust them.” In Lupao, Nueva Ecija, the small group met Sergeant Estipona and four or five other soldiers of the 26th Cavalry. Exhausted, Short and Estipona remained in Lupao while Lapham and Lumyeb searched for another base farther north.

At the 11th Division headquarters Major Robert Volckmann and signal officer Captain Donald Blackburn agreed to escape north to the high country. They went with Lieutenant Colonels Moses and Noble to General Brougher to ask permission to leave his unit. The general did not give his overt authorization but said, “If I was a

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767 Ramsey and Rivele, 84.
768 Ibid.
769 Lapham and Norling, 24.
770 Blackburn Interview, 71.
younger man, I’d entertain the same thought.”771 Thinking smaller groups made smaller targets, Volckmann and Blackburn went together, Moses and Noble traveled separately.

Volckmann found that his orderly had mistakenly emptied his musette bag of iodine, quinine, and first aid supplies, leaving only a change of underwear, a pair of socks, toilet articles, a towel, lighter flints, a small bottle of lighter fluid, gun oil, cleaning patches, and a sketch map.772 Blackburn recalled, “I really hadn't thought about quinine, or malaria, or dysentery, or beriberi, or any of those things. As a result, when we left our division, we were very ill prepared. We didn't have any medicines to speak of. It was just an oversight on our part. We had some quinine, but we didn’t have very much.”773

Amid near confrontations with Japanese patrols and difficulties in hacking through mountainous jungle, one particular hardship haunted the men.774 “For anyone who has never gone hungry for a long time,” recalled Volckmann, “I’m sure it is hard to understand this continual thinking about food. To us, however, regardless of Japs and all other dangers, food meant life or death.”775 Filipinos provided food and shelter on their route. Americans Corporal Alfred Bruce of the 31st Infantry and three lieutenants Volckmann remembered as Whiteman, Petit, and Anderson, along with a number of Filipino soldiers joined them. A Filipino Scout, Jose Maddul from Ifugao, Mountain Province, whom they called Bruno, became an exceptionally

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771 Ibid., 67.
773 Blackburn Interview, 71.
775 Volckmann, 53.
valuable member of the team. Whiteman and Bruce made it as far as Banban near
the Dinalupihan-Olongapo road where they became too sick to continue. They were
never seen again.

Lieutenant Russell D. Barros of the 91st Infantry Division and some other
stranded American officers arrived in the Sierra Mountains near Rizal and joined
Marking’s guerrillas. Marking and his deputies Leon Cabalhín, Anacelto San Juan,
Teófilo Salvador led a group spread across central Luzon in Laguna-Rizal, Batangas,
Cavite, and Bulacan. They swore their followers to the U.S. Army’s oath of
enlistment. They found Barros as one “whose legs were raw from ankle to knee
with tropical ulcers, and who had the best of intentions and forever said and did the
wrong thing and somehow muddled through without getting killed.”

Marking wrote a statement of purpose: “We, ’Marking’s Guerrillas,’ believe it
is the right of every Filipino to walk in dignity, unslapped, unsearched, untied; to
speak freely of honor and injustice alike; to assemble freely’ to mold our destiny as a
people. We believe that we owe our allegiance to America, and that the only flags to
fly in this sweet air are the Stars and Strips and the Philippine flag until such time as
the Philippine flag flies alone.” He based his guerrillas in Kanumay and began
sabotaging the facilities in the Cavite Navy Yard. He also sent Chinese mestizo
Marcelino Abuyog (Li Junliang) to Manila with orders for all Chinese guerrillas to
join his force. In March, Liu Binwu (Lao Pin-heh or Roman S. Hao) joined Marking

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776 Blackburn Interview, 69.
777 Panlilio, 42.
778 Ibid., 158.
779 Panlilio, 3.
780 Yuk-Wai, 138.
and trained at Antipolo before he received a CVP team in Manila to lead in demolitions and ambushes.

The soldiers transitioning into the jungle gained new appreciation for its dangers. They embraced the cover of “lush forests in which we had hid and carried on our coast watching.” Yet they found its incessant dampness played havoc with their equipment. Stahl wrote, “The constant high humidity and moisture got into the bowels of our radio and shorted out critical parts.” Intense humidity ate away clothes and shoes and caused rashes. Rattan thorns stuck the hands and feet and broke, leaving part under the skin. “They would invariably become infected and cause an ulcer,” Willis remembered, “In the tropics most small cuts or scratches will turn into an ulcer if not constantly tended to. For lack of better medicine, we kept the scratches open with several applications of hot coconut oil every day. The scratches and leech bite then healed quickly.”

The jungle held millions of small, biting creatures whose constant noises could make men go mad during the pitch-black nights. Others learned to find comfort in the cacophony of insects and dread in any abrupt quiet. “I knew,” said Ramsey, “that the sudden silence meant Japanese foot patrols.” Leeches presented a relentless nuisance. “Squeezing through small crevices – shoe and legging eyelets – they buried their heads in the flesh and began to suck blood,” Steve Mellnick remembered, “They apparently anesthetized the skin because we rarely

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781 Stahl, 64.
782 Ibid., 76-77.
783 Willis and Myers, 80-81.
784 Ramsey and Rivele, 252.
felt their presence.”785 Willis added, “They were so numerous along the trail that you could see them on the leaves of the trees and on the blades of the cogon grass, waving their thin bodies in the air, trying to find a passing victim to latch onto.”786

As Fertig described life in the jungle:

“In this green, wet mildewed snarl of a world, the little wounds the leeches make do not heal. Scratches do not heal. There is no way to keep the wounds dry; there is no sun to help the healing. The little wounds therefore grow larger, and rotten. They become tropical ulcers and the flesh in time rots away to expose the shiny-white bone which quickly yellows with lymph and blood and ooze. It is easy to die in the world of the jungle, although death is apt to come slowly, beginning with the first fevers of any of a considerable number of diseases.”787

Sickness afflicted the men quickly. After three days on the Dinalupihan-Olongapo road Volckmann got “violently sick” and said, “I became so weak that I finally begged the rest of the party to go on without me, but they would not listen.”788 Blackburn recalled: “During the second week dysentery and malaria hit us, and this was just after we had gotten out of the Bataan Peninsula.”789 They found

786 Willis and Myers, 80.
787 Keats, 28.
788 Volckmann, 57.
789 Blackburn Interview, 71.
sojourn with the Guerrero family outside Dinalupihan where the head of the household brought a doctor friend with liquid quinine uria. The doctor treated Volckman and Blackburn for malaria, yellow jaundice and beriberi. Blackburn later reported, “I guess we got down to well under 100 pounds. We were like skeletons, and the food wasn’t that appetizing.” Mao Tse-Tung likened the relation of guerrillas to the people to that of fish and the sea. Lose the support of the people, and the guerrilla, “like the fish out of its native element, cannot live.” This was certainly true for the Philippine guerrillas. The Guerreros were just one of countless Filipino families who offered them indispensable life-sustaining aid.

When lacking modern medicine, the natives offered traditional remedies. Fertig recalled: “The Filipinos say that you never get malaria unless you’re hungry. You have it all the time, but it doesn’t hit you until you miss a couple of meals and get run down.” That did not hold for the Americans. At Haliap, on Luzon, people who fell ill were thought to have displeased their ancestors. For a minor illness, a shaman attempted to placate the deceased through a bacci ritual in which he offered tapoy, betel nut and other foods spread on a blanket. “On several occasions,” recalled Volckmann, “while visiting some of our camps, I became ill. Without asking me the pagan priest came in to play bacci for me. I recovered, so I never questioned their beliefs and customs.” More severe illnesses required the forced feeding, ritual killing, roasting and eating of a dog. Some dismissed such practices as

790 Ibid., 79.
791 Ibid.
794 Volckmann, 114-115.
primitive superstition but Blackburn thought they had psychological merit “because the ritual distracted the sick man from his troubles and showed him ‘that even strangers sincerely wanted him to get well.’”\textsuperscript{795} He also found that respecting the native practices helped connect the guerrillas with the people.

Not that many guerrillas were any better trained in medicine. Faced with his first bout of the alternating malarial fever and chills, Ramsey took thirteen quinine pills. “The dose nearly killed me, and by morning I was delirious,” he wrote.\textsuperscript{796} Confused and stumbling in “horrible isolation and fever,” he believed he was about to be captured. “I took my pistol from the holster,” he remembered, “slipped off the safety catch, and pressed the muzzle to my temple. My finger was on the trigger, and I began to squeeze. But my mind would not let me.”\textsuperscript{797} At the last minute he turned his despair into anger against the Japanese and vowed to continue. Many others similarly exhausted, sick, starving, and facing dreaded uncertainty, must have perished.

The guerrillas noticed other significant cultural practices among the tribes. Betel nut, for example, played a part in many customs. “It releases a mild narcotic that deadens pain and fatigue, and it’s a symbol of social acceptance,” a native explained to Mellnick, “Chewing betel to an Ata [natives near Davao] has the same significance as breaking bread to an Arab: it implies friendship. If an Ata female offers her betel nut bag to a man, she is implying that his attentions are welcome.”

\textsuperscript{795} Mary Ellen Condon-Hall and Albert E. Cowdrey, \textit{The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against Japan} (United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services) (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 1998), 360.
\textsuperscript{796} Ramsey and Rivele, 103.
\textsuperscript{797} Ibid., 104.
Partaking in betel nut routines often help cement bonds between guerrillas and the tribes.

Travelling through this jungle world, Corporal John Boone of the 31st Infantry Regiment came across Barker and Ramsey near Dinalupihan. He told them that, under MacArthur’s orders, Thorp had gone into the hills north of Fort Stotsenberg to “enlist any Filipinos and Americans who want to join into a guerrilla force that’ll carry on the war behind Jap lines.” Noticing that Private Gene Stickland was too sick to continue, Boone also told of a camp near Thorp where he could receive medical care.

The brothers Bill and Martin Fassoth had offered their large sugar plantation deep in the Zambales Mountains near Clark Field as a safe oasis for the escapees from Bataan. Their Spanish-Filipino neighbor Vicente Bernia brought supplies, money, and medicine through his contacts with the Catholic Church in Manila. Barker, Ramsey and Strickland made it to the camp and stayed long enough to recover from their various illnesses. There they learned of the horror of the Bataan Death March.

On 9 April, the Japanese marshalled the USAFFE prisoners taken in Bataan for a movement to prison camps. The Japanese had expected 25,000 POWs but found 75,000 starving, sick and exhausted prisoners. Instead of marching fourteen miles to small camps, they decided to march the men sixty-five miles to larger

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798 Mellnik, 249.
799 Ibid., 94.
800 Blackburn Interview, 77. Note: Some guerrilla memoirs, like Volckmann’s, refer to the Fassoth as Faussetts.
801 Guardia, American Guerilla, 78.
camps and the rail station in Balanga for further movement. To house the prisoners, the Japanese hurried construction of camps at Santo Tomas and Fort Santiago in Manila, Camp O’Donnell near Capas in Tarlac, Camp Cabanatuan in Nueva Ecija, Los Baños Internment Camp on southern end of Laguna Bay, Casissang and Davao Penal Colony in Mindanao, Puerto Princesa in Palawan, and Corregidor.\textsuperscript{802}

Many of the starved and ill soldiers faltered on the march only to be beaten or killed by guards. “One elderly captain begged a guard to put him out of his misery with a single shot,” survivors recalled, “a young American soldier was taken from the line and forced at gun point to beat the captain and bury him alive. The young soldier later committed suicide.”\textsuperscript{803} Up to 18,000 prisoners may have perished on the Bataan Death March. A number managed to slip away, often sheltered by Filipinos, to join the resistance. Blackburn remembered the Filipinos “people were horrified at what they observed, and were terrified of the Japs. They just despised them.”\textsuperscript{804}

Cebu, D123, R-926

With Bataan captured, Homma confidently launched his assault on the southern Islands. He planned to send the Kawaguchi Detachment to take Cebu and the Kawamura Detachment to seize Panay. Then, the two detachments would join the Miura Detachment already in Davao to conquer Mindanao.\textsuperscript{805}

The evening of 9 April, coast watchers on Cebu spotted three Japanese cruisers and eleven transports off shore. The ship carried 4,852 well-trained and battle-tested troops of the Kawaguchi

\textsuperscript{803} Meirion and Susie Harries, 315-316.
\textsuperscript{804} Blackburn Interview, 75-76.
\textsuperscript{805} Morton, 503.
The convoy split during the night and at dawn the larger portion landed close to the island capital, Cebu City. Several B-17s from Australia ineffectually challenged the landing. USAFFE’s 6,500 poorly trained and equipped soldiers were too thinly spread to defend any one beach on Cebu. “I had no idea of being able to stop the Japs,” explained Brigadier General Bradford Chynoweth, “but I thought we could spend two or three days in withdrawal.” Then he would transition to preplanned guerrilla warfare.

Lieutenant Colonel Howard J. Edmands commanded about 1,100 members of the Cebu Military Police Regiment defending Cebu City’s 150,000 residents. Their mission was to hold long enough to allow the demolition teams to complete their work and then fall back into the hills. A pattern repeated: the Japanese advanced, the defenders withdrew. The Kawaguchi detachment reported defeating “several thousands of enemy” and “the subjugation of strategic positions on the island by the nineteenth.” Yet Cebu’s defenders remained intact with their arms, ammunition and supplies. On 19 April, Homma sent the 31st Independent Infantry Battalion to relieve the Kawaguchi Detachment to prepare for operations on Mindanao. Wainwright had conceded Cebu three days earlier and ordered Major General William Sharp to re-establish the Visayan-Mindanao Force.

On Cebu, thirty-three year-old American Harry Fenton, born Aaron Feinstein, was a popular radio announcer on KZRC in Cebu City, well known for his anti-Japanese broadcasts. He had served as an enlisted man at Sternberg Hospital before leaving the Army to marry a Filipina. When the war began, Fenton claimed a commission from Chynoweth and went into the hills and used his celebrity to unite several small bands of guerrillas in north Cebu. Reports indicated that Fenton “trusted no one... Except for those nearest him, no one seemed to like him.” Another guerrilla said, “He’s a madman. He’s insane with hatred of the Japs. Anyone found with a single Yen in his pocket he immediately condemns to death. The

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806 Ibid.
807 Ibid., 505.
808 Ibid., 503-505.
809 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 276.
810 Morton, 506.
811 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 34.
same for anyone found living in occupied or controlled territory. And anyone who
refused to submit to him he calls an enemy collaborator, and has him shot. He
doesn’t believe in issuing money. But troops are not paid. His goods are not paid for.
He rules by martial law.”

In southern Cebu, a thirty-seven year-old Mexican-American mestizo and
mining engineer James Cushing – who’s brother Walter was a guerrilla in northern
Luzon – claimed a commission as a captain from Chynoweth. He raised a guerrilla
force around a core of trained USAFFE personnel and built a reputation for
protecting civilians and fighting alongside his men. He was liked and respected. In
September, Cushing would lead 1,000 guerrillas – the “Cebu Patriots” – with mortars
against a Japanese garrison in Toledo. Considering Fenton and Cushing, Salvador
Abcede reported: “They are not compatible. Cushing is sound and able. He has the
good will of everyone around him. Fenton has none. Cushing and Fenton have
nothing in common except both are American nationals.”

Luzon, D124, R-925

The guerrilla 14th Infantry Regiment (two battalions) operated in the upper
Cagayan River region. To their west, Wainwright had promoted Horan to full colonel
on 7 April and reflagged his organization as the 121st Infantry. “Taking advantage of
the weakness of our garrison force,” the Japanese observed, “these units were
engaged in disturbing public peace.” Homma’s headquarters tracked “several

812 Villamor, 89.
813 Ibid.
814 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 281.
hundred defeated enemy troops” in the mountains of central Luzon east of the upper Cagayan River and about 3,000 more in the Zambales Area north of Bataan.815 To the south in Bicol, “several hundred defeated enemy troops and malcontents had changed into guerrilla units and were disturbing the peace” around Legaspi, Mount Isarog, and Daet.816 Around Luguna Bay southeast of Manila, guerrillas reportedly operated in increasing numbers.

On 10 April, Homma sent his 16th Division, the Nagano Detachment, and the 4th Division to mop-up the USAFFE remnants.817 The next day the 16th Division on the west coast received the Ikuta Detachment and the 20th Infantry Regiment to clean up around Bagac, Canas Point and Quinan Point. The Nagano Detachment swept near Mariveles along the Sisiman Bay, while the 4th Division cleared west of Cabcaben and prepared for the capture of the fortress of Corregidor. Simultaneously, the 65th Brigade concentrated to mop up west of Mount Samat. Homma’s units cleared southern Bataan in seventy-two hours. The 4th Division and the Army Artillery Unit then joined the Army Air Unit for an assault on Corregidor. On 13 April, the 65th Brigade went to east-central Luzon, the Nagano Detachment to west-central Luzon, and the 16th Division south of Manila.818

815 Ibid.
816 Ibid.
817 Ibid., 229-230.
818 Ibid., 230.
Map 8: Japanese Dispositions and Invasion Landings in the Philippines, early 1942
The next day, as ten B-25 and three B-17 bombers moved from Australia to Mindanao and 350 Filipino POWs died on the march from Bataan, officials in Washington debated what to do with Quezon and his government. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles sent a memorandum to Presidential Political Advisor Stanley Hornbeck. “The President has informed me that he thinks it highly desirable for President Quezon under present conditions to remain in Australia with his Government,” wrote Welles, “He feels that in Australia the Philippine Government in exile will be able to undertake effectively the kind of propaganda and intelligence work which the Governments of Norway and the Netherlands, et cetera, are able to undertake in London because of geographical proximity.”

Three days later Hornbeck countered, “Australia appears less suited for the engaging in the type of propaganda which would be of help to our side in relations with the Philippines than is the United States. More than 1,000 miles from the Philippines, Australia has no system of communications with the Philippines, has no American press or Philippine press, and has more limited broadcasting facilities than this country.”

Besides, the coming winter in Australia would likely aggravate Quezon’s tubercular condition. Roosevelt would have to reconsider.

Meanwhile on Luzon, escapees from Bataan increasing made contact with guerrillas. “Most Americans have merely assumed that guerrilla activity in the wartime Philippines must have been initiated by U.S. escapees like me,” Lapham wrote, “and that we then coaxed or bullied Filipinos into supporting us. This was not

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the case at all.” Most American soldiers escaping Bataan looked to either join U.S. groups or to escape to Australia or China. “Overwhelmingly,” Lapham wrote, “Filipinos came to us and begged us to lead them and help them fight their oppressors.” When Lapham reached Umingan, retired Philippine Constabulary sergeant Juan Desear, farmers Juan Marcos and Emilio Casayuran, and grocer Filadelfo Macaranas asked him to lead them in guerrilla warfare. “Training or no,” Lapham said, “they were all willing, even eager, to risk their lives to badger the Japanese invaders, and they assured me that they knew at least ten or fifteen others who would join us and bring rifles with them.” He accepted their pleas to be their leader.

Across the Islands many Filipinos chose – or did not choose – to invite Americans to lead them. These Filipinos generally saw the American soldiers as men with expertise in military tactics, organization, and leadership. Others thought that having an American in charge meant a chance to receive recognition and material support from MacArthur. With faith in his promise to return, these Filipinos suspected that alliance with Americans would be beneficial in the long run. Still others had a more immediate reason for wanting an American in charge: pre-war politics, culture and class divided many native guerrilla groups. While these divides often made cooperation difficult between Filipinos, all could agree to follow an American outsider.

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821 Lapham and Norling, 26.
822 Ibid.
823 Lapham and Norling, 26-27.
For the chosen guerrilla leaders, the burden was heavy. They needed to be one with the Filipinos. “The guerrillas were fighting for not only for family but also for a larger cause – the life of their nation... I, an American, was heading their crusade for liberty and the life of their nation, and it was a heavy responsibility,” Ramsey explained, “Yet ultimately I was nothing but a symbol. A Paraclete reminding them of the promise of salvation. That promise had been made by the man whom they trusted more than any other and in whose distant shadow I stood: MacArthur.” As numerous memoirs attest, each American came to feel the weight of wearing the mask of MacArthur’s agent.

Lapham embraced the role. He made Umingan his base and sought out local influential Filipinos. He met the chief of police, several businessmen and plantation owners and learned that the mayor was pro-Japanese. “Two concerns were of vital importance to them: first, we should not fight with the Japanese near Umingan, for they might take reprisals against civilians; second, something decisive had to be done about roving bands of former soldiers and outlaws who were terrorizing local civilians.” The link between action and reprisal would become clear to guerrilla leaders in due course.

Cebu, D125/R-924

On Cebu on 11 April, a Japanese patrol stopped a car carrying Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos, his son and two soldiers. Quezon had left Abad Santos with written authorization to act as his representative. The Japanese took him and his son to a prison camp near Cebu City. Before the end of the month, Major

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824 Ramsey and Rivele, 160.
825 Lapham and Norling, 27.
General Kiyotake Kawaguchi arrived to escort the two by ship to Lanao on Luzon. Abad Santos repeatedly refused orders to collaborate with the Japanese.

The day after Abad Santos’ arrest, Cebu guerrillas destroyed their last boat, PT-35. On Mindanao, the crew of PT-4 also scuttled their boat while overhead, a U.S. 17th Pursuit Squadron P-40 flown by Lieutenant John Brownwell scored the last shoot down of a Japanese aircraft in defense of the Philippines. Meanwhile the Death March on Luzon left Balanga on 13 April and reached Orani the next day, overwhelming the available facilities. The Japanese took one large group further north to a warehouse in Lubao. More would be sent to San Fernando. Behind them the constant bombardment of Corregidor took its toll. Seventy defenders died when the tunnel they hid in between the James and Morrison coastal artillery batteries collapsed.

Panay, D130/R-919

At dawn on 16 April, the 4,160-man Kawamura Detachment landed near Iloilo on southeast Panay. A smaller force landed to the north at Capiz. A final landing force came ashore forty-eight hours later near San Jose on the southwest coast. The landings went unopposed. Across the island Colonel Albert Christie’s 7,000 defenders executed their pre-planned sequential withdrawals until they reached the mountains where, in accordance with Operation Baus Au, they were to wage guerrilla warfare.826 The Japanese reported “very little enemy resistance” and completed the occupation of all designated strategic points in four days.827 Their two converging columns seized Capiz and the copper mines around San Jose intact. However, they found USAFFE forces had reduced Iloilo City to ruins. Still, by 20 April, Kawamura

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826 Morton, 507.
827 This sentence was pencil-changed to read: “Without large enemy resistance, they completed the occupation of key areas on the island by the twentieth.” Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 276.
considered the campaign over.\footnote{Morton, 507.} Homma sent a hastily assembled 1st Independent Infantry Battalion of the Independent 33rd Battalion to relieve the Kawamura Detachment to prepare for Mindanao.

For Christie, well organized in the mountains, the campaign was yet to begin. He had abundant arms, ammunition, and fresh water along with 500 head of cattle, 15,000 bags of rice, hundreds of cases of canned goods, and adequate fuel.\footnote{Ibid.} He began hit-and-run raids that brought a Japanese punitive expedition to San Jose. When a Filipino reported Japanese troops approaching, Christie organized a company ambush armed with bolos, spears, bows and arrows that killed a large part of the enemy force and caused the rest to retreat to San Jose.\footnote{Morton, 507.} Despite this skirmish, Homma reported Panay conquered and turned his attention elsewhere.

Washington, D131/R-918

In Washington, Roosevelt revisited the situation with Quezon. He floated an idea of inviting the Philippine Government in exile to sign the United Nations Pact. State Department representatives cautioned that such a move would “be equivalent to formal recognition by us at this time of the independent status of the Philippines.”\footnote{U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Historical Documents Foreign relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, General; British Commonwealth; the Far East, Volume 1, Document 790. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v01/d791} The United States would forfeit leverage in gaining Philippine cooperation in the war and could, in fact, lose Quezon to some kind of settlement with Japan. Welles suggested it would be wiser to wait until they could set a policy for the independence of all countries occupied by the Japanese. But, he allowed, if the President thought the move necessary for the Filipino morale, then he should go forward. Five days later Roosevelt announced he would not push for the Philippine’s immediate independence. “I am, of course, a firm believer in carrying through our

\footnote{Morton, 507.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Morton, 507.}
\footnote{U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Historical Documents Foreign relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, General; British Commonwealth; the Far East, Volume 1, Document 790. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v01/d791}
promise of independence to the Philippines,” he wrote, “but I do not think we should modify the present law by a step which might be considered to hold out a promise to them for immediate independence if, for example, the war were to terminate early in 1943. There might be a period of repair and adjustment for two or three years for which the United States should be responsible.”

Australia, D132/R-917

On 18 April, MacArthur formally accepted appointment as the Commander in Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area. Even before leaving Corregidor, he had sent staff members to Australia to coordinate with the Allied command. G-2 Staff Executive Officer Colonel Van Santvoord Merle-Smith worked with Royal Australian Navy Captain R.B.M. Long to transform their highly effective Naval Coastwatch Service into MacArthur’s vision of an inter-service intelligence, propaganda and special operations activity. Princeton grad Merle-Smith, a well-connected New Yorker from an Oyster Bay patrician family and former Third Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson, was an exceptional choice for an effort “severally handicapped by jealousies” between services, departments and nationalities. MacArthur supported him in turf fights against bureaucratic inertia. Merle-Smith began work on an outline for an allied organization to be known as the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB). Australia promised £45,000, and the Allies worked out command

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832 Ibid., Document 793. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v01/d793
833 See Memorandum, “Summary History of Organization of A.I.B.,” 25 January 1943, Box 469 RG 496, Philippine Archives, NARA II.
834 Ibid.
arrangements. Even so, AIB requests to Allied military authorities for “technical radio personnel” were met with the reply “none available.”

Manila, D132/R-917

That afternoon the Japanese army and Kempeitai in Manila suddenly rounded up all consular officials of neutral countries and hauled them off to prisons. Any white person on the streets of Manila received curses, slaps and kicks. Slowly, rumor spread of a remarkable event. Early in the day Brigadier General Jimmy Doolittle had led sixteen U.S. Army Air Force B-25 bombers in a thought-to-be-impossible launch from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet and bombed Tokyo, Yokohama, Yokosuka, Kobe, Osaka, Nagoya and other cities before escaping to China and Russia.

As people in Manila learned of the Doolittle Raid, they understood the Japanese fury. Hundreds were arrested. Chick Parsons was taken from his consular office to the dungeons of Fort Santiago. After some time, he got word out to Helge Jansen, the American ‘honorary consul’ of Sweden whose wife was the actual Swedish consul. Jansen notified Panama of Parson’s predicament. Officials protested to Japan about the treatment of their consul. The Japanese transferred Parsons to the prison at Santo Tomás. At the end of May, a friendly doctor persuaded Japanese officials to let Parsons rest at home for one week. Parsons

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835 Ibid. Correspondence between the Commander E.A. Feldt, Navy Office, Commonwealth of Australia, and Ind through April 1942 indicate how desperately the AIB searched for fields radios unavailable in country. See Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG16, Box 68, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia.
836 Ingham, 38.
837 Ind, 145.
would never speak of what happened to him during his month in prison, but he had emerged missing several fingernails on his right hand.838

The day after Doolittle’s attack, President Quezon and his party left Australia aboard the steamer SS President Coolidge bound for the United States. He notified Washington he accepted Commissioner Sayre’s and Secretary of War Stimson’s offer of 31 December 1941. Villamor met the wheelchair-bound Quezon before his departure. Quezon told him: “Jess, there is nothing I can do in Australia but vegetate. You know I am not made for that. My place is in the United States. I must urge them to continue the struggle. They owe us a debt which must be paid. The Philippines must be reconquered.”839 Villamor asked what he could do to help. Quezon responded: “Go to the United States, and tell los animáls – those animals – in Washington how badly help is needed in the Philippines.”840

MacArthur radioed to Washington regarding Quezon’s voyage: “Due to his presence aboard, the ship is being convoyed to limit of jurisdiction of this area. Request that necessary orders be issued to insure convoy for remainder of voyage. This is considered essential not only for his actual protection but because of the political repercussions which might follow if every safety precaution were not taken.”841

Southern Luzon, D133/R-916

838 Wise, 51.
839 Villamor, 62.
840 Ibid.
841 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Historical Documents Foreign relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942, General; British Commonwealth; the Far East, Volume 1, Document 792

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On 19 April in Bicol, Faustino Flor led his Camp Isarog Guerrillas in an attack on Iriga and drove that town’s mayor, Manuel Crescini, to seek refuge in Naga. With intelligence supplied by a group under the Oligquino brothers and Adolfo Caro, Flor decided to push his attack against the Japanese platoon garrison in Naga. Miranda agreed to assist. Reports described the garrison as “trained professionals with superior weapons and greater firepower” who manned prepared defensive positions at the Mabolo, Puente de Naga, and Cogante bridges, and in the railroad station.842

Coincidentally, Vinzons attacked the forty-man Japanese garrison at Daet on 29 April, with 100 men of the VTG, including six American miners who wore lieutenants’ bars, aided by 150 other guerrillas.843 Hartendorp reported, “The attack at Daet was reportedly provoked by Japanese brutality in that area, where they shot down men, women, and children, just for being on the road or to see them jump, and by the abuses of Japanese-appointed Filipino officials.”844 Vinzons’ attack effectively distracted the Japanese from taking action against Flor.

The next morning, Flor opened his assault. Miranda and the TVGU arrived in the afternoon. On the second day, 65 men of Captain Damaso Dianela’s Camp Tinawagen Guerrillas joined the fight. Lieutenant Jose Hernandez, son of a former Camarines Norte governor, arrived with a small band from Cabusao. The Buenaventura Plantado group came. Felix (Baro) Espiritu led men from Camaligan, and Ricardo Gordenker brought a band from Mount Isarog. Isabelo Payte led Isarog

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842 Barrameda, 26-27.
844 Ibid.
tribal bowmen firing flaming arrows across the Naga River into buildings occupied by the Japanese. Of the 1,000 guerrillas in the attack, only about 200 carried rifles, shotguns, paltiks, or other firearms. Many of the smaller units would remain as parts of the larger ones from this point on.

The guerrillas fought to the center of Naga and freed foreign nationals held in the provincial prison. They also liberated the inmates’ forty-two wives and children held in Manley’s house near Puente Colgante. The Japanese moved acting governor Villafuerte, his seven children, and his pregnant wife from the governor’s house to the capitol building. Japanese resident Sasaski burned to death in a warehouse set afire in Tabuco.

On 2 May, Vinzons’ deputy Turko stood ready to capture Daet. That evening in Naga, as his wife began hemorrhaging, Villafuerte sent a letter to the Japanese commander asking that they be released to the guerrillas. Japanese soldiers with them managed to kill and cook a stray dog to feed the Villafuertes. The guerrillas tighten their grip on Naga and cut the water supply to the capitol building. Before dawn on 3 May, the squad of Japanese soldiers in the capitol building broke out, taking the Villafuerte family with them. At sunrise, the guerrillas claimed victory in Naga.

The guerrillas arrested six Japanese-Filipino families in Naga and sent them to a camp in Curry, Pili. Japanese resident Tancing Kitaguchi and her five daughters were not arrested but they had their house and belongings burned to the

846 Barrameda, 26-27.
847 Ibid., 32.
ground. Guerrillas took Ancieta Pinon, Tancing’s mother and Kubato’s wife, to a TVGU camp to serve as a cook and washerwoman.

The escaping Japanese commandeered a fishing boat to take Villafuerte, his wife, and oldest son Peping to Legaspi. At sea, Mrs. Villafuerte again began hemorrhaging and her husband convinced the Japanese to go ashore at Vito, Siruma. He did not know guerrilla Elias Madrid’s wife and family were there. The party landed at 1900 hours on 4 May, into the middle of a santacruzan ritual. The Japanese soldiers fired into the air, perhaps to disperse the crowd. Guerrillas fired back. The Japanese retreated to the jungle’s edge and a nightlong firefight ensued. At 2200 hours Elias Madrid gathered a squad of guerrillas and headed to Vito in a pumpboat. Upon arriving near midnight, he rushed to his wife’s house, and the Japanese stole his pumpboat and got away. The victorious guerrillas executed Villafuerte, his wife, his son, and their companions – beheading the corpses of Villafuerte and Crescini afterwards.848

Central Luzon, D135/R-914

Barker and Ramsey tired of the Fassoth Camp and its refugees’ defeatism and insubordination. They were determined to find Thorp and join his organization. Though still seriously ill, Private Strickland made them promise to take him along. The three departed with Negrito guides who agreed to take them to Thorp’s camp near the remote Timbo barrio near Mount Pinatubo. The small party arrived at their destination on 21 April and the shivering Strickland told the officers, “I told you I’d make it.”849 On their

848 Barremda does much to cut through misleading stories about these events that found their way into the SWPA records. Barrameda, 32-36.
849 Ramsey and Rivele, 98.
second day in camp, twenty-one year-old Gene Strickland died, simply worn out by malnutrition, illness, and fatigue.

The fall of Bataan had shaken Thorp. Lapham wrote, “It has been alleged that at this juncture Colonel Thorp simply gave up. That is not what happened. We had general discussion about various possible actions, and at length Thorp brought it to an end by announcing that we could all do as we liked: surrender to the Japanese, stay with him, or strike out on our own.”\textsuperscript{850} Thorp would fight on, for now. Eager arrivals like Baker and Ramsey helped keep Thorp going.

Volckmann and Blackburn, overcome by illness, returned to the Guerro family home to recover. “They knew that if they hid us and shared their scanty means with us,” recalled Volckmann, “the Japs would surely torture and kill them if they found out. Not an easy decision to make, particularly for a man with a family to care for.”\textsuperscript{851} On 23 April, Guerro contacted his prewar employer, a Mr. Demson, who moved the refugee soldiers deeper into the mountains to a camp away from all main trails he ran with well-made buildings of bamboo frames and woven split-bamboo walls. The two Americans settled in for a fortnight to recover their health. Meanwhile ‘bandits’ raided Demson’s newest camp, killing his wife, wounding his son, and stealing their belongings.

The incident attracted Japanese patrols searching for the culprits. Volckmann and Blackburn spent days hiding in a nearby creek bed. Guerrero related his observations on how the Japanese conducted their search: “They moved down those trails that they could find, and each time they passed a house or an evacuation camp they sprayed it with bullets and kept on going.”\textsuperscript{852} “I thought Guerrero had a lot of

\textsuperscript{850} Lapham and Norling, 22.
\textsuperscript{851} Volckmann, 57.
\textsuperscript{852} Ibid., 60.
guts,” Blackburn remarked. Before month’s end, the Guerrero family departed, leaving Volckmann – now also suffering beriberi – and Blackburn to recuperate at Demson’s camp. Then on 5 May, Demson and his son ceased sending supplies and vanished.

For five days, the Japanese shelled Corregidor with a huge 240mm Type 96 howitzer they had brought to Bataan. On 25 April, as Japanese bombers hit the port at Darwin in Australia, they added nightly artillery bombardments to the daily shelling against Corregidor. Fifteen of Wainwright’s men died when two shells from the Type 96 howitzers destroyed the entrance to a command tunnel.

The Japanese 65th Brigade’s Lieutenant General Akira Nara requested Lieutenant Hitomi’s propaganda unit “for the purpose of getting the Philippine-American guerrilla forces in northern Luzon to surrender as well as persuading the local people to cooperate with the Japanese Army to restore law and order.” With help from some surrendered U.S. Army officers, the propaganda unit enjoyed success in the Mountain Province and Ilocos area through 18 August. To counter them, Governor Ablan established an intelligence network under former Office of Publicity and Propaganda officer Pedro F. Alviat to collect information and print a newssheet to distribute in the region.

Events in Luzon affected Japanese propaganda activities even in Tokyo. Akiyama Kunio worked in the War Ministry press section and the Cabinet’s public information center. A reporter told him that a Viscountess in Shinagawa watching a

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853 Blackburn Interview, 76.
854 Guardia, American Guerilla, 55.
855 Nakano, 4.
line of POWs commented, “The poor things. How sad to treat the Americans this way.”\textsuperscript{856} Tasked to raise Japanese civilians’ “fighting spirit,” Kunio seized upon the comment as evidence that too many of his countrymen still felt the “Americans and the British were superior.”\textsuperscript{857} He later explained: “I felt that I fully understood the kind of feelings of compassion of the Japanese lady who had commented, ‘the poor things.’ But something happened in the Bataan Peninsula in the Philippines. The Americans were very familiar with the terrain, as they had used that area as a training ground. Japanese forces faced difficulties in capturing it. Two infantry battalions in landing craft landed on the right flank of the enemy, but they were cut off and come under heavy attack. One of our scouts saw American soldiers killing our wounded soldiers by rolling over them with a bulldozer.”\textsuperscript{858} True or not, such tales from the Philippines fed the War Ministry’s media.

Meanwhile Homma continued to bombard Corregidor. In the early evening of 2 May, 1,600 sixty-two pound bags of gunpowder in the Geary gun battery magazine exploded, killing fifty-six soldiers and wounding hundreds more. The next day the submarine SS-190 \textit{Spearfish} removed twenty-seven soldiers, nurses and civilians from the beleaguered island as 2,000 Japanese soldiers prepared to board fifteen barges across the bay in Bataan.

Mindanao, D142/R-907

\textsuperscript{857} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{858} Ibid.
Homma turned to Mindanao. He planned a multi-pronged attack: the Miura Detachment would drive from from Davao and Digo; the Kawaguchi Detachment would land at Cotabato and Parang and move east and north; and the Kawamura Detachment would land in the north near Macajalar Bay and strike west to meet Kawaguchi and south through central Mindanao. Ultimately, the three detachments would link up near the center of Mindanao along the Digos-Cotabato stretch of Route 1.

By 28 April, Lieutenant Colonel Reed Graves of the 101st Division (PA) expected the Miura Detachment in the Cotabato-Davao Sector to attack. A battalion of the 10th Independent Garrison Regiment had arrived to relieve the Miura Detachment. Graves could not feel comfortable. An American reported, “Most of the men who fought on Mindanao never fired a live round before they went into battle.” There had not been enough ammunition to train. When the Miura Detachment attacked, however, Graves managed to hold them until the evening of 2 May when his commander, Brigadier General Joseph P. Vachon, ordered his withdrawal.

Early on the morning of 29 April, the Emperor's birthday, the Kawaguchi Detachment put 4,852 men ashore near Cotabato and Parang ninety miles west of Davao. Units of the 101st Division (PA) under Lieutenant Colonel Russell J. Nelson augmented by Constabulary troops put up a surprisingly robust defense until Japanese aircraft forced them to fall back. Kawaguchi marched east toward Pikit, threatened Graves troops holding the Miura Detachment and forced their withdrawal. For five days Kawaguchi and Miura pushed their better-armed and supported troops against and around the USAFFE positions and gained control of southern and western Mindanao.

On the morning of 3 May, the day Stillwell began his epic retreat in Burma, the Kawamura Detachment landed on Macajalar Bay in north central Mindanao, one hundred and twenty-five miles northwest of Davao. For six days the Japanese

859 Morton, 510.
860 Ibid.
861 Ibid., 508
862 Ibid., 512.
863 Ibid., 510.
864 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 277.
865 Morton, 515-516.
advantages in artillery and aircraft undermined Fil-Am attempts to hold defensive lines or counterattack.

Manila, D149/R-900

On 5 May, Tojo arrived in Manila. Collaborationists in government orchestrated a warm reception covered by a supportive press. Nearly 400,000 people, many waving Japanese flags, greeted the Prime Minister. Bands played along his route. Tojo told the crowd at the Luneta: “I am glad to state that upon my arrival in this country, I see everywhere tangible evidence of your growing desire to cooperate more closely with the Imperial Japanese Government. I note with great satisfaction that you are actively forging ahead in your tasks of creating the New Philippines and under the circumstances, I am convinced more than ever of the propriety of your early independence.”866 Commissioner of Justice Jose Laurel led cheers of ‘banzai!’.

During his meeting with Tojo, Presiding Officer of the PEC Jorge Vargas expressed how happy he was that Filipinos and Japanese were working together to create a new Philippines. He explained, “We have been an orphan in Asia, a spoiled child among the Asian peoples. Living in an alien culture, we have forgotten our innate culture, but Japan has pulled us up to the level of a member of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.”867 He added, “Japan’s victory means liberation of the Philippines. Only then will we attain our objective as an independent nation.

867 Goto, 68.
under Japanese leadership.”\textsuperscript{868} After three days, Tojo returned to Japan without visiting Davao, while newspapers advertised the second shipment of rice from Saigon to Manila.

Tojo likely received a briefing on the ongoing effort to convert the Araullo High School in Intramuros into a new Constabulary Training Academy. Selected cadets underwent a three-month course, under Japanese supervision, to become effective and willing members of the law and order force. “From the Filipino point of view,” Agnocillo noted, “the creation of the Academy was a preparation for retaliatory measures to be taken by the Academy graduates, upon the insistence of the Japanese, against the guerrillas or, as the Japanese called them, bandits.”\textsuperscript{869} To oversee the new constabulary forces, the Military Administration under Director-General General Yoshihide Hayashi created the Department of Peace and Order.

To help guide occupation policy, the JMA established the Philippine Research Commission (\textit{Hito Chosa linkai}). It acknowledged American achievements in individual rights, local government, and general secular education but found faults with each.\textsuperscript{870} Education, for example, centered on liberal ideals, law and literature, and led Filipinos away from the manual labor the Japanese felt suited them. Filipinos lacked any sense of self sacrifice and duty to the state. The JMA had to eradicate the Western influences perverting Filipinos and re-educate them in attitudes appropriate to their proper place in the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.

\textsuperscript{868} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{869} Agoncillo, Vol. I, 351-352.
\textsuperscript{870} Yu-Jose, 160-161.
To meet these objectives, the JMA created the Government Training Institute to inculcate administrators in “moral, intellectual, and physical” ideals that would “make them better fit to perform their duties under the New Order.” They were to teach a new Japanese influenced language called ‘Nippongo’ in all schools, and exorcise all non-Japanese ideas from textbooks. Commissioner of Education Claro Recto received orders to reopen schools under the supervision of a Japanese-Filipino committee. He targeted the first day of June for the start of the new school year but a lack of teachers and an unwillingness of parents to send their kids to the schools undermined his efforts. As late March 1943 only 1,227 of 8,724 elementary schools had reopened and only 267,977 of prewar 1,324,335 students had enrolled.

Corregidor, D149/R-900

Following a bombardment of 16,000 shells, just before midnight on 5 May Homma hit the east side of Corregidor with 2,000 infantrymen. Intense defensive fire killed or wounded 1,200 of the assaulting force. Yet by 0930 the next morning, 6 May, the Japanese achieved a solid toehold on the island fortress. Counterattacks by U.S. Marines failed to dislodge the invaders who were now reinforced with tanks.

At 1230 hours, a representative from Wainwright under a flag of truce crossed the Japanese lines near Cavalry Point to arrange a meeting to discuss the surrender of Corregidor and all the forces defending it. An hour later Wainwright

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872 Villamor .75.
arrived at the left flank of the Japanese 4th Division to surrender. He sent a message in code to General Sharp granting him command of all USAFFE forces outside Corregidor. The Japanese escorted Wainwright to Cabacab but because he only offered to surrender Corregidor, they sent him back and continued to attack.\textsuperscript{874} Later that day General Short radioed MacArthur from Mindanao: "North front in full retreat. Enemy comes through right flank. Nothing further can be done. May sign off any time now.\textsuperscript{875}

Wainwright informed Homma that he only commanded Corregidor and had no authority to instruct the other forces to surrender. Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, however, had promoted Wainwright to command all forces in the Philippines and Homma had seen the general order issued by Wainwright announcing his assumption of USAFFE command.\textsuperscript{876} Homma demanded Wainwright surrender all forces or face continued attack. The American general honestly claimed he had no way to communicate such an order; deputy senior signal officer, Colonel Theodore T. Teague and his fifty signal officers and 662 enlisted men had destroyed all their radio equipment.

Finally, Wainwright agreed to coordinate the unconditional surrender of all USAFFE forces in the Philippines. At 2345 hours, a white flag flew over the headquarters on Corregidor. Five minutes later, over the Philippines Broadcasting Network from Manila, Wainwright instructed all American commanders in the Islands to lay down their arms.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnoteref{874} Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 270.
\footnoteref{875} Morton, 518.
\footnoteref{876} Rodgers, 214.
\end{footnotes}
5. Alone
7 May – 9 July 1942

With Wainwright’s surrender, MacArthur lost all awareness of developments in the Philippines. There, refugee soldiers who refused to surrender wandered the jungles fighting disease and starvation. Meanwhile Japanese occupation practices insulted Philippine cultural sensitivities and incited resistance.

Manila, D151, R-898

Homma provided airplanes to send Wainwright’s staff to coordinate the surrender of subordinate USAFFE units across the Islands. Teams of Japanese and American officers reached Cebu on 14 May, Panay on 19 May (where they also discussed surrender of Negros), Leyte on 22 May, Negros and Samar on 25 May. Japanese garrison units followed the negotiators.

The day after Wainwright’s surrender, the Japanese unloaded 6,000 American and Filipino prisoners from barges at the yacht club on Dewey Avenue in Manila. They planned a march through town to the rail yard to impress the local population. “When the Australian and British prisoners had walked through Singapore they had been jeered at: so had the Dutch in Batavia,” one historian noted before adding, “The Manileños did jeer at those ragged troops, but their very raggedness seemed to symbolize something more profound the fraying of American

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877 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 272.
878 Ibid., 279.
confidence, of Manila’s confidence in America. Many Manileños ran behind Japanese
guards and offered the prisoners cigarettes and food – it was like a sentimental
gesture to an old friend leaving, perhaps never to return.”

Panay, D152/R-897

Within days of Wainwright’s surrender Brigadier General Christie agreed to
follow orders and surrender the Americans of his 61st Division (PA), but before the
Japanese arrived on 19 May he granted his Filipino soldiers permission to head into
the hills. Few followed his order. Christie had Division G-3 Captain Macario Peralta,
Division Engineer Captain Leopoldo Relunia, and 3rd Battalion, 63rd Regiment
Commander Captain Julian Chaves promised not to organize guerrilla resistance for
two months after he surrendered so as not to provoke retribution upon prisoners.
Peralta led his soldiers into northeast Panay, Relunia moved to eastern Panay, and
Chaves went to central Panay. Two other Filipino officers led more men to other
areas: Braulic Villasis to Capiz and Cririlo Garcia to the northwest. Disorganized
independent bands roamed freely. Over four months, however, Peralta gradually
brought the far-flung units under his command, under the banner of the 61st
Division, and managed to contain the small Japanese garrisons in San Jose (Antique),
Capiz, and Iloilo City.

Peralta was a thirty year-old regular army officer and a 1935 graduate of the
University of the Philippines with majors in law and ROTC. “People who have known
him report that he is a strong character, a good organizer, aggressive, sure of himself.

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to the point of being cocky, and a strong nationalist,” SWPA noted, “He tends to be
impetuous, lacks experience, is on occasion arbitrary and sometimes lacks follow-up
on his ideas. He wants the Panay guerrilla organization to be a purely Filipino
accomplishment.” Indeed, Peralta tolerated Americans who came to his island but
excluded them from his organization. SWPA remained suspicious of his nationalism
and accused him of pursuing “self-aggrandizement at all costs and under any
conditions.”

Iloilo province’s Governor Tomas Confesor had escaped detention in Manila
weeks earlier and returned to southern Panay. The other two provincial governors
in Antique and Capiz surrendered, but Confesor moved his government into the hills
to organize resistance. “He is impetuous,” U.S. Army intelligence reported, “and was
known as the ‘stormy petrel’ of Philippine politics because of this trait alone.”
Confesor established a police force known as the Provincial Guards and a messenger
organization that rivaled the remnant 61st Division guerrillas. He remained in his
province to reconstruct civil government beyond Japanese control and even
conducted radio broadcasts of news to the citizens.

The people of Panay gravitated to Confesor. In contrast, Peralta, Relunia,
Cirilo Garcia, Jurado, Guarinia, and the other 61st Division officers were Tagalogs
from central Luzon and thus outsiders. They shared neither kinship nor sympathy
with local people. When Peralta declared martial law on Panay, he entered into a
prolonged contest of authority with Confesor.

880 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 48.
881 Ibid., 49.
882 Ibid., 6.
Also in Iloilo, Juanito Ceballos raised fifty armed, demobilized soldiers. He led them to rural Zarraga in search of Judge Vincente Mapa who had once sentenced Ceballos to prison for theft. They found the judge and executed him. The band killed the abusive hacendiero Sabas Gustilo. Such actions drove the local elite into the arms of the Japanese for protection. Ceballos then turned across the Iloilo Plain to hunt down the politically powerful Lopez brothers but ran into an ambush on 16 July and was captured and executed.

Iloilo was home to more than 3,500 Chinese, the second largest Chinese community in the Philippines. Teachers Chen Qushui and Zheng Shimei of the Chinese Commercial Secondary School (Huashang Secondary School) had organized the National Defense Drama Club in 1935 to spread anti-Japanese sentiment and support the boycott of Japanese goods. The next year they founded the Chinese Salvation Association (Yilang huaqiao jiuwang xiehui). Now the Association turned Chinese youth towards guerrilla warfare. Leftists Zhang Jisheng and his brother Zhang Guamian established a bookstore and reading club which Wu Zhaisheng (Wu Yuan), Gong Taoyi and Wu Jinshui (Chen Qinghai) turned into the National Salvation Society in 1938 to mobilize students and shopkeepers. The Japanese invasion either drove the Society’s fifty members underground or to other islands. Before the Japanese invaded Panay, a Kang Fan delegation arrived in Iloilo with Cai Zhensheng, Guo Jian and Ji Rongfang “to organize the underground activities in the

883 McCoy, “Rent Seeking Families,” 472.
885 Ibid., 103.
After Chen Qushui and Zheng Shimie left for other islands, the Kang Fan established the Southern Island Branch of the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets League on 7 July and began publishing the underground *Southern Island Guide (Nandao dao bao)* newspaper.

Visayan-Mindanao commander Major General Sharp hesitated to surrender his command to the Kawamura Detachment. He felt well positioned to wage an irregular warfare. He drew hope from Quezon’s broadcast from radio station KGEI in San Francisco on 9 May: “Our nation will not for long remain in bondage. The American forces will redeem their pledge. Led by their able general, they will rescue the Philippines. Stand firm for your freedom is not lost. The United States through its great President. Franklin D. Roosevelt, has pledged not only her armed might but also the total redemption of our land. I am here to work for the fulfillment of that pledge within the earliest possible time.” His hope proved to be misplaced.

Early in the year, 81st Division Commander Brigadier General Guy O. Fort tried to bolster his forces in Lanao, Mindanao, by organizing thousands of Moros in defensive positions along highways in the south. Motivated young Muslim men under their own leaders formed the Moro Bolo Battalion paid by USAFFE. When the Japanese landed at Davao, the untrained Moro forces quickly dissolved. Remnants, however, became active guerrillas in Lanao and Cotabato.

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886 Ibid., 102.
887 Abaya, 24.
Before Corregidor fell a young, Moro lawyer named Salapida Pendatun along with his brother-in-law Datu Matalam Udtog organized an untrained Bolo Battalion in the vicinity of Catabato. Pendatun was a classmate of Peralta at the University of the Philippines and became a First Lieutenant in USAFFE. His unit included Datu Aliman and his brothers-in-law Datu Mantil Dilanglan and Gumbay Piang. Armed with knives, the battalion set out to block the Digos-Kabacan Road but crumbled before the enemy advance.\(^{888}\)

In Pikit, Japanese sentinels publicly bayonetted to death two American priests after seeing a few Filipinas by custom kissing the priests’ hands. The Japanese put their bodies in sacks, tossed them in a river, and continued plundering, raping and killing civilians.\(^{889}\) Similar atrocities committed in Midsayap and Kabacan in Cotabato province – events known as the Judgement of Knives (\textit{Juez de cochilio}) – terrorized the population and spurred the Bolo Battalion’s men to reform as guerrilla bands in July and August.

Pendatun selected as his executive officer Major Edwin D. Andrews, a thirty-seven year-old American mestizo. A graduate from the Philippine Constabulary Academy, Lieutenant Andrews commanded the Zablan Airfield when the war started and had known Villamor. With Pendatun, Andrews received 200 rifles from Assemblyman Manuel Fortich and helped defeat Japanese garrisons at Kibawe, Maramag, Valencia, Mailag and Malaybalay.\(^{890}\) By the end of 1942, they would have 2,400 men in Bukidnon province and more in the surrounding areas. Andrews

\(^{888}\) Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 97.
\(^{889}\) Villamor, 144.
\(^{890}\) Ibid.
would brag: “We had a police headquarters with its G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4. We had the necessary services such as quartermaster, medical, transportation, ordinance and finance. We had a regular hospital running with six doctors and twenty nurses, in short a regular force functioning under the leadership of this young Muslim lawyer.”

With this support, Sharp remained reluctant to surrender Mindanao. On 11 May he received word from MacArthur: “Orders emanating from General WAINWRIGHT have no validity. If possible separate your forces into small elements and initiate guerrilla operations.” When Wainwright informed Sharp that Homma would not accept his surrender unless all U.S. forces in the Philippines capitulated, Sharp radioed to MacArthur that he would surrender. SWPA coincidentally lost contact with Praeger’s radio on Luzon. As an officer on the SWPA staff noted, “One by one the thin, uncertain lines of communication between General MacArthurs reconstituted headquarters in Melbourne and the tortured Philippines three thousand miles to the north were fading into silence.”

Even after Sharp’s surrender, according to U.S. Army, estimates, “ninety-five percent of [Mindanao] was free of enemy occupation or patrols.” Many Americans with military and civilian expertise still remained at liberty on the islands. The geographically vast island held numerous food centers. The small Japanese garrisons in the coastal cities of Davao, Cotabato, Zamboanga, Cagayan and

891 Ibid.
893 Volckmann, 90.
894 Ind, 3.
895 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 83.
Surigao had only a few roads available to the interior. In Dansalan, Short held the Japanese at bay through 27 May. His decision to surrender, Keats wrote, “was so complete and sudden that civilians and army remnants were stunned and demoralized.”

Many men refused to follow Sharp into captivity. Mining stock millionaire speculator Samuel J. Wilson, owner of Wilson Building in Manila, was a recalled Navy lieutenant in Lanao when he learned that the Japanese had interned his wife and his kids in Santo Tomas prison. He set out to join the resistance. Jordan Hamner, Charles M. Smith, and Athol Y. “Chick” Smith were mining engineers on Masbate Island. They obtained a sail boat and escaped to Panay. When Cebu fell they moved to Mindanao and accepted commissions in Sharp’s army to build roads. When Sharp surrendered they made their way to a camp on a plantation owned by a Mr. Deishcer near Rgounggan or Momungan where stray Americans gathered.

Some who followed orders to surrender had second thoughts. Private Robert Ball and Sergeant Knortz surrendered at Malaybay but later escaped to join the guerrillas. To help encourage whites to surrender, the Japanese released from Davao prison camp a German citizen, Waldo Neveling. He opted to head into the jungle to join whatever guerrillas would have him.

Lieutenant Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, an American mining engineer and Army reservist on Luzon recalled to active duty in early 1941, was constructing an airfield on at Kolambagan, Lanao, in Mindanao when he heard Sharp had surrendered. Fertig joined Navy Chief Petty Officer Elwood Offret and Army Captain

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896 Ibid., 88.
897 Keats, 6-10.
Charles Hedges and headed to the Mirayon province near Alanib. The three men sought to link up with 81st Division commander Brigadier General Guy Fort. When they reached the house of Salvador Lluch, a trader between the lowland Christians and mountain Moros, they were told Fort had also surrendered. The men learned of Driescher’s Camp and headed that way.

Central Luzon, D160/R-889

Homma sent the 32nd and 35th Independent Infantry Battalions of the 10th Independent Garrison Unit and the Miura Detachment to mop up enemy remnants on Mindanao while the Kawaguchi and Kawamura Detachments prepared to depart the Philippines for other theaters. The Nagano Detachment (62nd Infantry Regiment, 21st Infantry Regiment) moved to Negros, Bohol, Leyte and Samar. The 2nd Independent Infantry Battalion joined the Nagano Detachment to garrison Cebu and Panay. Four days earlier a detachment of the 65th Brigade, 3rd Battalion 51st Mountain Artillery Regiment, and the 3rd Trench Mortar Battalion, reported the completion of mop up activities in west-central Luzon. At midmonth a detachment from Olongapo with officers from Sharp’s staff arrived to subjugate the Visayas and Mindanao. Meanwhile, reconnaissance elements from the 16th Division went to Mindoro and Marinduque.

“By the time the island fortress of Corregidor finally surrendered on May 6, 1942,” wrote Meirion and Susie Harries, “the besiegers, outnumbered three to one,

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898 Ibid., 6.
899 Ibid., 6.
900 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 278.
were almost as short of ammunition as the besieged. The campaign had also put some of the weakness of the [Japanese] High Command on show – most conspicuously the clashes of personality, differing priorities, and individual ambitions." 901 If concerned, Homma tried not to show it. He saw his mission now as mopping up defeated and isolated USAFFE units. Guerrillas were still a matter of law and order for the Philippine government and constabulary. Homma expected USAFFE units stranded behind the lines and acting as guerrillas to follow Wainwright's orders and surrender, once informed of those orders. Indeed, after receiving a personal letter delivered by messenger from Wainwright, Horan obeyed and surrendered. 902 “After his surrender,” remarked Blackburn, “he came out into the villages and campaigned for the surrender of the Americans. Big help! He was responsible for coining the phrase, ‘misguided elements.’” 903 Many men respected Horan's authority and laid down their arms; many more, Filipino and American, opted to fight on.

Horan's operations officer, Walter Cushing, chose to remain. He took command of the 121st Regiment and dispersed it into small groups. Captain William Peryam took over a large part of the unit. 904 Cushing used his radio from the Batong Mine to monitor news which he then distributed in a newssheet he called The Echo of the Free North. 905

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901 Meirion and Susie Harries, 313.
903 Blackburn Interview, 127.
904 Mike Guardia, American Guerilla, 101.
905 Volckmann, 32.
In Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya, Colonel Warner also received a message from Wainwright and agreed to surrender his reconstituted 14th Infantry Regiment. Filipino Major Nakar assumed command of the troops who refused to surrender and established a new base in Isabela. Pursued by Japanese patrols that harassed and punished nearby civilians, Nakar dispersed his men among the population to obtain food and shelter and avoid the destruction. Meanwhile, he moved his headquarters to Madela, Nueva Vizcaya, and concentrated on getting a radio.

Captain Parker Calvert and Lieutenant Arthur Murphy had only recently gathered remnants of the 43rd Infantry Regiment in Begnuet from Philippine Scout A and B Companies manned by Igorots from the Bontoc and Ifugao. Japanese patrols kept them from linking up with Warner near Nueva Vizcaya. Calvert decided to move north to Bontoc to join Horan, only to find that he had surrendered. Horan, however, left orders for Calvert and Murphy to also cease resistance. After much debate, they ignored his orders. Parker opted to seek out colonels Moses and Noble who were rumored to be back in the area after failing to get through to Bataan.

Other scattered guerrilla bands appeared in La Union, Abra and Ilocos Sur. Japanese troops from Corregidor arrived at Ilocos Norte searching for Alban. They brought old General Ricarte and several American officers to deliver speeches urging the guerrillas to capitulate.

Visayas, D161/R-888

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The Japanese met resistance almost everywhere. On Dumaran Island off Palawan, American mestizo brothers Alfred and Paul Cobb ran a cattle ranch. About the time Wainwright surrendered, the brothers organized a guerrilla Home Guard to provide law and order on Dumaran Island and in northeast Palawan. The Cobb Group headquartered in Danlig.

The Japanese invaded Dumaran, seized the capital of Puerto Princesa, and set to work building an airstrip using American POWs from Manila. The island government collapsed and brigands roamed the countryside. Occasionally the Japanese sent out patrols on foot and by boat and made efforts to seize the rice harvest. Guerrillas occasionally ambushed the patrols but focused more on keeping order, protecting civilians, and supporting the extra-legal government.

On Mindoro, twenty-six-year-old Senior Inspector of the Romblon-Mindoro District Constabulary Major Jose M. Ruffy commanded sixty constabulary troops near Pinamalayan when the Japanese arrived. Civilian volunteers increased his group to about 250, half armed. Ruffy organized four companies into a Bolo Battalion headquartered near Naujan.

Japanese troops entered Bohol's capital of Tagbilaran and seized manganese mines on nearby Panglao and Guindulman islands. Captain Victoriano Blancas surrendered his USAFFE garrison, leaving Bohol Governor Agapito Hontanosas to the Japanese. Blancas' Executive Officer and Adjutant, First Lieutenant José M. Maneja, refused to surrender a led followers into the mountains to a base he called “Camp Liberty.” The Volunteer Guard, formed prior to the war by Quezon’s order,
joined them to form a Bolo Battalion. Armed with the signature curved knives, they acted mostly as couriers, cargadores, and sentries.

The cargadores, native bearers who transported supplies across the jungles, became unsung heroes of the resistance. “Wearing brief loincloths and amulets, they ate with their fingers and indicated the time of day by pointing to the sun,” Steve Mellnick later remembered, “They described longer periods of time in terms of suns and full moons. They had no concept of seasons – only wet and dry spells. Surprisingly, they had a word for every digit between one and twenty. They possessed remarkable strength. A four foot, ninety pound [Mindanao native] Ata would carry a seventy-five pound load all day without complaint.” 907 They seemed to always be present and ready to assist guerrillas. At least one guerrilla would admit, however, that advance parties of armed guerrillas providing security during movements “would also recruit laborers, sometimes, I fear, with a bit of ‘persuasion.’” 908

Without telephones or radios, the guerrillas heavily relied on couriers or runners to carry messages, often over very long distances. Even short distances on maps translated into long travel times when complicated by steep hills, dense jungles, or treacherous rivers. Messengers had to be physically tough, familiar with the territory and the people, able avoid both the Japanese and the dangers of the jungles, and trustworthy. Incredibly, as with cargadores, sufficient numbers of volunteers applied. Most had wanted to fight but lacked proper arms. “The runners’ main importance was quite different anyway,” Lapham reasoned, “since I always

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907 Mellnik, 248.
908 Stahl, 63.
had more volunteers than I knew what to do with, making runners of a considerable number gave them a chance to do, and feel they were doing something useful.”

Without the hand delivered messages guerrillas remained isolated, even from neighboring insurgents. Ramsey once wrote of his closest fellow guerrillas: “I had been out of touch with Putnam and Lapham for months and did not even know whether they were still alive.” By habitually exchanging the latest information with people along their paths, the messengers established a network – the “jungle telegraph” – that rapidly spread news among the people.

As Volckmann recalled, communication networks could be complicated: “Three east-west and three north-south message routes were established, linking the district commands with GHQ, USAFIP, N.L. Message centers or relay stations, manned by a non-commissioned officer with four to six men, were located ever four to six hours hiking distance along each of these routes.” They called the runner system the Land Communication Company. Blackburn added, “We had way stations, or message centers, set up every four to six hiking hours, depending on terrain. And, we kept nine men and a noncom in each of these message centers.” Using miners’ helmets with carbide lamps they moved at night. Messages marked ‘rush’ went out day or night. A message from Iloucas coast reached Kalinga, about 225 miles distant, in two days. A message traveling over seventy miles from Kiangan to La Union – seven days hard march over mountains – took two days. Centers copied the

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909 Lapham and Norling, 74.
910 Ramsey and Rivele, 234.
911 GHQ, USAFIP, N.L. was the General Headquarters of Volckmann’s guerrilla command, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, Northern Luzon Volckmann, 129.
912 Blackburn Interview, 165-166.
information in each message so that Volckmann could identify and adjust to any messages that fell into enemy hands.

Messengers pulled extra duty as scavengers, sentries and spies. “Our couriers are real heroes!” wrote Mellnick, “They enter Davao City, call on friendly officials, borrow money, and buy clothing, medicines, and salt. Then comes the dangerous part – smuggling the stuff out of the city! They can usually hide the medicines among vegetables, but they have trouble smuggling three tons of salt each week! The Japs are aware of our salt problem and inspect all vehicles leaving the city.”13 Like the cargadores, the messengers were all natives.

Central Luzon, D168/R-881

North of Bataan, Colonel Thorp conducted patrols with his Luzon Guerrilla Force (LGF) from his base on the slopes of Mount Pinatubo. Four days after Japan completed its conquest of Burma, 24 May, Thorpe returned to Timbo with a large entourage of staff and companions that included a number of women. Two weeks earlier Joe Barker and Ed Ramsey, who limped with an infected jungle ulcer on his foot, had had arrived in the camp to wait for the colonel’s return. Colonels Moses and Noble arrived shortly after them with ideas for a guerrilla force.

Barker and Ramsey spent their days putting together a guerrilla band to be part of Thorp’s force. Ramsey recalled, “In every village we sought out men with military or police training, and these we commissioned as officers. There were few of them, however, and often we substituted with local government officials or

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913 Mellnik, 244.
people who had had some higher education.”\textsuperscript{914} In nearby Timbo refugees built a
ew base a mile and a half up river from Thorp. Baker and Ramsey made an eager young Filipino volunteer named Processo Cadizo a sergeant in their organization. News reporter Alejandro Santos and policeman Fausto Alberto came in from Manila. Philippine scout Claro Camacho also became a key aide and ran the headquarters.

At Thorp’s base Ramsey observed how much the guerrillas were a Filipino outfit. “While we waited, the people of Timbo were wonderfully kind to us,” he recalled, “There were over a hundred of them, Filipino soldiers and their families who had fled from Fort Stotsenberg to the safety of the mountains.”\textsuperscript{915} The refugees fed the Americans, provided medical aid, and offered companionship and entertainment. Through bonds of pity and kindness, they drew the Americans into their community and common cause. Ramsey wrote, “Up until this time I had thought of the Philippines only as a post; now I began to see it as a place, and a people. We had failed in our defense of them, leaving them in the hands of their enemies. They ought to have owed us nothing; instead they were sharing what little they had with us and risking their lives to help us.”\textsuperscript{916} Baker and Ramsey rededicated themselves to carry on as guerrillas.

Ramsey went to Thorp to report his nearly completed new camp. The colonel no longer resembled the stout man Ramsey remembered at Fort Stotsenberg. “Now he was thin and rather frail, worn out from months in the jungle. His hair had gone

\textsuperscript{914} Ramsey and Rivele, 114.
\textsuperscript{915} Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{916} Ibid., 100.
completely white, and his manner was merely gruff.”

Thorp then received a report that the Japanese were coming. Filipino refugees scattered from the camp. Thorp sent his Americans out among friendly native families. A local Negrito named Pandora and his wife and two children housed Ramsey. They were small people who lived in a riverside hut and wore only loincloths. Pandora spoke very little Tagalog and Ramsey understood none of his native dialect. The family went about their daily lives, making arrows and tending to the children. “I felt an isolation more intense than I had ever known,” wrote Ramsey. He began to drift into dark thoughts. “I was going to be a guerilla, and I did not even know what that meant,” Ramsey recalled, “Fighting behind Japanese lines, no weapons, no organization, no army – it was madness. I would be captured and shot, or worse, and I had no one to blame but myself.”

Many guerrillas entertained such thoughts.

Meanwhile in the mountains northeast of Manila many of the young ROTC guerrillas were also hungry and disillusioned and began returning to their homes. With the fall of Corregidor, cadet leaders Eluterio Adevoso and Miguel Ver knew they had to rally their troops. They moved their headquarters into the Sumulong Rest House and renamed their group, “The Hunters.” Adevoso assumed the nom de guerre ‘Terry Magtanggol.’ He organized a raid on a building in the Union College of Manila used by the Japanese as an armory. Disguising themselves as Japanese soldiers, the Hunters duped a janitor into letting them into the building, slipped past

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917 Ibid., 110.
918 Ibid., 102.
919 Ibid., 102-103.
the guards, and got away with all 136 rifles. They then moved their newly armed force to a new camp at Malabanca.

Months later the Hunters would try to repeat their tactics at the Mapua Institute of Technology but the Japanese captured two of their members. Under torture, the boys broke. A Hunters’ sergeant spotted the two boys leading a Japanese patrol towards their base camp in Antipolo and warned Ver who disregarded the report. On the morning of 4 July, the Japanese attacked. Although the Hunters killed twenty-five Japanese soldiers, Ver also fell dead. The Hunters lost sixty rifles, two machine guns, a Browning automatic rifle, and much enthusiasm.920

Leyte, D168/R-881

The Japanese landed unopposed on Leyte on 24 May and took over the island within 24 hours. Colonel Thomas Cornell, the Leyte-Samar commander, surrendered his Provisional Regiment of the 91st Division. A Sergeant Terraz escaped surrender, formed a guerrilla band, and led it until the Japanese killed him. Sergeant Antonio Juan took over the guerrillas but was also killed in battle. The unit then split between Circiaco Centino and Filemon Pabilona. Second Lieutenant Alejandro Balderian promoted himself to lieutenant colonel, took supplies from camp at Jaro and organized a guerrilla unit in Northern Leyte. Isabelo Centino, who had fought under Balderian, joined his father, Circiaco Centino, and both civilians claimed the rank of major. The Centino guerrillas in Jaro, Pastrana and Palo in northeast Leyte became part of Balderian’s group. First Sergeant Pabilona promoted himself to

920 Agoncillo, 691.
lieutenant colonel and expanded his guerrillas to control the area near San Miguel, Babatngon, Alangalang and unoccupied Tacloban.

Off southern Leyte, U.S. Navy Yeoman Lieutenant Gordon A. Lang, Major Porfirio E. Jain and Lieutenant Jose Nazareno formed a guerrilla group on Panaon Island. Jain took over Lang's group. Lieutenant Blas Miranda (alias Colonel Briguez) started another guerrilla group in the area from Palompon to Baybay. Technical Sergeant Felic Pamanian assumed the rank of lieutenant colonel and established a band of guerrillas in the Mount Capoocan area of Northern Leyte, joined soon after by another band under USAFFE Captain C. Corpin from Biliran.

Southern Luzon, D168/R-881

Before Cornell surrendered, he triggered a competition among guerrillas in southern Luzon by appointing Lapus as commander in Bicol, pending contact with the more senior officer Sandico.921 By the time Sandico appeared in late May, Lapus’ Guerrillas were a robust outfit of several hundred men based in Carachayon that attracted aggressive Japanese patrols. Lapus moved his group to Dolos, assigned seventeen men to protect Governor Escudero, and temporarily disbanded his unit. Lapus’ weakened state convinced his deputy, Sayoc, to secretly cooperate with Escudero to overthrow him. When he found out, Lapus fired Sayoc.

Manila, D168/R-881

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While Homma conducted his mop up operations across Luzon, members of the collaborationist government worried about the persistence of the resistance. On 20 May, Assemblyman Benigno Aquino had written Vargas to insist that he call Japanese attention to the dangers of the “bad elements, otherwise known as the USAFFE’ in Central Luzon. Many Filipinos however wanted the administration to address the problem of Japanese abuses. Four days after Aquino’s letter, ten-year-old Lita Yumol walked to school with her little brother past a Japanese sentry point. She had learned not to smile, to bow deeply and formally to the soldiers, and to make certain her brother did the same. “There have been cases when people, even children, who fail to do this are stopped or called back and slapped on both cheeks; then told to bow low,” Lita noted, “And father has warned us of this.”

Slaps in the face were a particular point of cultural contention. “In their penchant for slapping non-Japanese Asians about,” Dower wrote, “Japanese soldiers, especially enlisted men, were treating others in the same way their superiors treated them. Racial arrogance came together here with the all-too-human transfer of oppression; and although such practices made the Japanese hated, these were crude rather than atrocious acts.” Yet from the Filipinos’ perspective such behavior permanently alienated them from the Japanese. Numerous such acts gave weight to rumors of atrocities that further infuriated Filipinos and increased their resistance.

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922 Abaya, 44.
923 Jennings, 33.
Witnesses like Lapham testified that the Japanese “arrested, maimed, and murdered Filipinos by the tens of thousands and did so in myriad horrible ways: whipping them, starving them, setting fire to the hair in their armpits, pulling out their fingernails, giving them showers of boiling water, abusing and killing their children in front of them, and chaining them to slabs of iron in the burning midday sun so that they slowly fried to death.”

Villamor detailed several specific incidents: a young Filipina who slapped back at a Japanese soldier on Rizal Avenue in Manila was stripped and left tied to a pole in the city square; a boy in Negros was tied up in a house that was then set afire and he was burned alive; a guerrilla caught on Panay was skinned. Suspected guerrillas across the islands had lips or ears cut off, hands soaked in gasoline and set fire, soles of feet cut open and before being forced to walk in sand. “There was the ‘cutting’ torture,” Panlilio added, “The Jap would rush the victim with bayonet or saber, as if to dispatch him permanently, then would deflect or pull the thrust to inflict a lesser wound or slice off only a nick of flesh. A slip meant death, but what of it?”

In other ways, Japanese indifference reinforced the perception that they disdained Filipinos. During their invasion the Japanese destroyed the Misamis water and power station and never repaired it. It remained a powerful symbol. “With all their promises to the Filipino people about the ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere,’ they made no attempt to help rebuild any of the damaged property,” Willis recalled, “As a matter

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925 Lapham and Norling, 106-107.
926 Villamor, 120.
927 Panlilio, 166.
of fact, they usually pulled out any plumbing, wiring, pipes or machinery and shipped it off to Japan. I noticed that was true all over the Philippines.”

News of each insult, slap, atrocity and destruction inflicted on any Filipino radiated across kinship networks and brought entire clans against the occupiers. Families across the Islands united in resistance. Over months and years this fostered a new identity. Families and clans or town, though carrying the separate banners of the Huks, Chinese, USAFFE groups, or local guerrillas, shared the experience of being targets of Japanese hostility because they were Filipinos.

Negros, D170/R-879

On 26 May the Japanese landed at Dumaguete, capital of Negros Oriental, the last unoccupied province. When Davao fell Colonel Roger Hilsman, Sr., commander of the 101st Division in Mindanao, went to Negros to organize a provisional force. He had planned a “little Bataan” defense of Mount Kanlaon, but fell ill in March and was sent to Cebu. Hilsman’s operations officer, Major Salvadore Abcede, and other staff officers had thought the “little Bataan” defense a bad idea. When cavalry Colonel Robert MacLenan arrived to take command the staff convinced him to divide Negros into five sections for guerrilla warfare. To prevent having to surrender his command with Wainwright, MacLenan relieved all his subordinate American commanders and replaced them with Filipino officers. Abcede received the 2nd Battalion, 74th Infantry, southwest from Isabela, and the rest went to majors Ernesto Mata, Pullong Arpa, Francisco Gomez, and Fortunato Roque.

928 Willis and Myers, 109.
When the Japanese landed on Negros in April, Hilsman made a surprising return and reclaimed command just as Wainwright surrendered. Eight days after Corregidor fell, Hilsman surrendered and ordered his units to do the same. Arpa and most of his men, Gomez with a token force, and Roque with a larger force obeyed Hilsman’s orders. Mata and Abcede refused and led their men into the mountains of Marapara and Kanlaon. Abcede said Mata “refused to surrender. But he was goaded by the Americans into giving his men the choice between surrender and resistance. Most of the officers gave themselves up but the enlisted men fled.” 929

By 20 May the Japanese reached Bacolod on the north coast of Negros where the 1,000 men left from the original 4,500-man Negros Force waited. The guerrillas burned Banago Wharf, the Diza Electric oil deposit, the Socony gasoline tank at Santo Niño, and the alcohol tank near the Bacolod-Murcia Central railroad yard. Facing superior Japanese force, Abcede disbanded most of his troops with orders to be ready to regroup when called. Meanwhile what he termed ‘wild units’ used resistance as a “pretext for plunder.” 930 Abcede regrouped his troops and ‘liquidated’ the bandits.

In Dumaguete, the students and faculty of Silliman University were widely known as champions of the free government movement. They now felt threatened by arrival of the Japanese. American Henry Roy Bell, a popular physics professor and former athletic director on the staff since 1921, organized the evacuation of university equipment and personnel to Malabo and Lake Balinsasayao. Upon first meeting Bell, Villamor said, “I had expected the cartoonist’s concept of a professor:

929 Villamor, 85.
930 Ibid..
slim, stooped, eyeglasses perched precariously on the bridge of his nose, an absent-minded look on his face, but the man who stood before me, sipping cool juice from a coconut he held in his hand, was robust and vigorous, looking more like a professor of physical education than of physics.” 931

Bell was indeed active. He assisted the creation of a free provisional government in south Negros to support resistance. He set up a camp at Malabo west of Dumaguete and helped organize a number of Silliman students and alumni there into several Bolo Battalions. A former student and later ROTC instructor at Silliman, Major B.N. Viloria led one battalion and an USAFFE lieutenant who escaped from Mindanao led another. High school teacher Felix Estrada and Leon Flores were each appointed as captains and given command of battalions closer to Dumaguete. Victor Jornales and Sergeant David Cirilo assumed command of two more. All were under Bell’s guidance.

The Japanese occupied the outer fertile horseshoe plain of Negros and drove guerrilla bands into the central rough interior and south coastal mountains in the north, central (east and west slopes), and south. Poor logistics and communications plagued the guerrillas. “Thus, limited and immobile,” SWPA reported, “the guerrillas suffered proportionately more from Japanese terror raids and destructive attacks then they did on Panay, Mindanao, Samar, or even Luzon.” 932

Bell prioritized efforts to establish radio contact with any U.S. forces. Before the arrival of the Japanese, he moved all the parts needed to build a radio set from the university and buried them in the mountains near Dumaguete. With the help of

931 Ibid., 99.
932 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 69.
experienced USAFFE radioman Lieutenant Louis Vail, an American mestizo from northern Negros who escaped prison in Fabrica, he recovered the parts, assembled a radio, and tried to contact the outside world.\footnote{Bell, assisted by LT Louis Vail, former USAFFE radio technician, reassembled their radio and tried to make contact in September 1942 but did not succeed until February 1943. KZCB finally contacted SWPA in mid-March 1943 and became part of Negros net in April. \textit{Intelligence Activities}, 13.} According SWPA G-2, not until 28 February would the War Department report efforts to establish coded communication with an unknown radio operator on Negros who turned out to be Bell.\footnote{Ibid., 74.} Meanwhile, the professor's guerrillas kept the small Japanese garrisons largely confined to Dumaguete, Bais, and Tanjay.

Mindanao, D175. R-874

On Mindanao, a Japanese infantry battalion entered Lanao province and established a garrison at the old American base Camp Keithley. A Kempeitai squad and a JMA liaison office from the Davao Branch along with a telecommunications unit settled in Dansalan. Lieutenant Yusuke Goto commanded the liaison office and took charge of administration and business matters while civilian Seiji Kogo of the JMA ran special operations and assignments.

A large part of the Japanese plan to subjugate Mindanao rested with the island's Muslim Moro population. Kogo established and maintained direct contacts with the influential Moro leaders in central Mindanao.\footnote{Kawashima Midori, “Japanese Administrative Policy Towards the Moros in Lanao,” \textit{The Philippines Under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction}, ed. Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo Trota Jose (Manila, Philippines: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 1999), 111.} Goto arranged to bring a garrison battalion to Parang, Catabato. He also brought the second son of influential Lanao Muslim Domocao Alonto, Madiki Alonto out of the University of the
Philippines, and a leading Cotabato Muslim politician, Ugalingan Piang. Seeing his son in Japanese hands, Alonto surrendered and offered passive cooperation. Piang convinced many Moros near Goto’s headquarters to lay down their arms.

Cotabato was also home to a community of 1,500 Chinese, largely Kuomintang loyalists. In 1939 leftists Wu Wenguo, Lin Zhengren and Huang Ruihua created the Cotabato Chinese Mutual Aid Society (Cudao huaqiao huzhushe) to boycott Japanese goods, collect money for China, and push Kuomintang-Communist cooperation.\(^{936}\) When the Japanese invaded, the Society evacuated its seventy members and families inland to Pilayan. They formed three small resistance units and tried to avoid the Japanese and malaria. On 6 June 1944, the Japanese would surround and capture the force, and execute twenty-nine members the following day. A remaining part of the society in Lebak tried without success to join local guerrillas.

North Central Luzon, D178/R-871

When Horan surrendered, Walter Cushing set out across Luzon in search of other guerrillas. In Tarlac province, he received help from a Spanish manager of a sugar processing operation who produced alcohol for the Japanese. In Manila, he discovered several Philippine officials still loyal to the exiled government who provided Cushing with false documents identifying him as a priest, a Spanish mestizo, and an Italian mestizo. Through bluff and luck, he narrowly avoided

\(^{936}\) Yuk-Wai, 104.
Japanese troops on several occasions. The next month Cushing managed to contact guerrillas in La Union and Ilocos Sur before making his way back to Abra.

By this time Russell Volckmann had been desperately ill for weeks. On the last day of May he wrote in his diary: “For the first time in my life, I realize the value of health. To my disgust, many of the nights I have almost hoped not to wake up in the morning.” He vowed to get beyond the malarial ridden lowlands and into the mountains to regain his health. In early June, after more than a month recuperating and hiding in the Guerrero’s jungle shack, Volckmann and Blackburn went with their host to his family home. A local doctor came to examine both men and injected them with shots. After three more days, they felt better and had just begun eating again when word came that the Japanese were returning. Volunteers carried the two officers back to the Guerro evacuation camp.

By mid-June Volckmann was finally able to stand and soon began walking a little more each day. Petit and Anderson came and told him of Bill and Martin Fassoth’s camp in the Zambales Mountains. By then the brothers, along with Bill’s wife Catalina, had saved 104 of the roughly 400 Americans known to have escaped the Bataan Death March. They even brought in a doctor and medical supplies to care for the sick and injured soldiers. Volckmann thought, “It sounded too good to

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938 In his memoirs, Volkmann spells the brothers’ name as ‘Fausset.’ Mike Guardia correctly spells it ‘Fassoth.’ After the war, the Army denied reimbursements to Bill: “You were not authorized to incur expenses for which you seek reimbursement; it was a voluntary act on your part which does not create any obligation, legal or implied, on the part of the United States to reimburse you.” Malcom Decker, *From Bataan to Safety: The Rescue of 104 American Soldiers in the Philippines* (Jefferson, North: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2008), 1. Martin Fassoth was captured by the Japanese in 1943 and served out the war as a POW.
939 Ibid., 1.
On 22 June, despite pleas from the Guerrero family, the two Americans headed for the Fassoth camp. The sick men stumbled into the camp after a long day’s march and found a large main building surrounded by several smaller ones. “When we got there – we had a hell of a time getting there because both Volckmann and I, during the stay at Guerrero’s, came down with malaria, yellow jaundice, and beriberi,” Blackburn recalled, “The illness hit Volckmann real bad. What do you call it, dysentery and hole [sic] nine yards, so we lost weight. I guess we got down to well under 100 pounds. We were like skeletons, and the food wasn’t that appetizing.”

Between fifty and eighty Americans lounged about the camp on bamboo cots listening to a radio tuned to KGEI out of San Francisco. The neighbor Bernia continually risked his life to purchase abundant supplies for the camp, often on credit from patriotic merchants. Blackburn thought the soldiers in camp treated the Fassoth brothers badly and were “very derogatory of Bernia.” The refugee soldiers ate rice and salt twice a day. The lack of vitamin B in the diet did nothing for Volckmann’s beriberi and, he said, “my ankles and my feet became so swollen that I could hardly walk, and I couldn’t even get my shoes on.” After breakfast on their first morning in camp, a big red headed sergeant, Red Floyd, walked up to Volckmann and Blackburn and said, “Now, look, let’s get the name of the game straight, if you guys want to stay here I want you to recognize that there is no such

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940 Volckmann, 62.
941 Blackburn Interview, 79.
942 Guardia, American Guerilla, 57-58.
943 Blackburn Interview, 83.
944 Volckmann, 65.
thing as rank. The war is over." Blackburn and Volckmann thought better of engaging in an argument.

By June, Homma had established the Manila Defense Force with a relatively small number of permanently assigned active duty troops: one infantry battalion of the 37th Infantry Regiment (relieved first by the 35th Independent Regiment and then by the 141st Infantry Regiment) and the 4th Cavalry Regiment. The regular units of the Japanese army were needed elsewhere. The violence then existing in the Philippines were a matter for the police. In subjugating the Visayan Islands and Mindanao from April through early June, the Japanese reported losses of only 114 men killed (including four officers) and 321 wounded (six officers) in return for capturing 9,278 prisoners along with 3 planes, 58 aircraft cannons and guns, 52 machine guns, 4 light machine guns, 4,600 rifles, 374 trucks, and 16 automobiles. By the end of May the 47th Infantry Battalion (minus one company) sailed from the Manila Defense Force to Davao to join the 17th Army. In the months ahead three other companies of the 40th Infantry Battalion would leave Manila for Sumatra.

The Japanese garrisons occupied strategic cities and towns, subjugated the residents, established control of transportation and communications, and began exploiting resources. The garrisons were too strong for guerrilla forces but their lines of supply appeared vulnerable. The Japanese 63rd Lines of Communication Sector Units therefore reorganized their installations around Manila. They aimed

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945 Blackburn Interview, 80.
946 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 284.
947 Ibid., 315.
948 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 308.
949 Ibid., 289.
to increase local production of war materials, repair infrastructure sabotaged by the retreating Americans, and gather and maintain stocks of supplies. Short on manpower, in early 1942 the Japanese imported 2,000 aborigines from Formosa, the so-called Takasago Volunteer Corps, and organized them into the Formosan Labor Service Corps for work in the supply depots and the air sector units in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{950} The Imperial Army also supported the supply system by repairing roads and railways with the ad hoc Army Road Unit (the 38\textsuperscript{th} and 39\textsuperscript{th} Field Railway Units) and the Army Railway Battalion (3\textsuperscript{rd} Battalion of the 6\textsuperscript{th} Railway Regiment) that had begun by reopening the Damoritis and Tarlac line on 16 January. In return, line of communication units provided personnel, field hospitals and “local coolies” to combat and line units – especially after March.\textsuperscript{951} Still, the Japanese lacked numbers to defend all their infrastructure all the time, and the guerrillas knew it.

To foster better relations with the populace, the Japanese granted amnesty to tens of thousands of Filipino POWs. The mass release served several purposes: it advertised good intentions, possibly pacified native families, bolstered the available work force, and signaled to Filipino guerrillas that they too could lay down their arms and return to their normal lives. For Japan, however, the war was taking a dramatic turn. Four thousand miles away, the U.S. Navy would destroy the heart of the Japanese carrier force at the Battle of Midway from 4 to 6 June.

On 5 June, Chick Parsons was one of those unexpectedly paroled and sent home under armed guard from the Santo Tomás prison. The Japanese authorities ordered him to gather his family with one trunk and one suitcase for shipment

\textsuperscript{950} Ibid., 292.
\textsuperscript{951} Ibid., 297.
‘home’ to Panama as part of an exchange of citizens with neutral Latin American countries. Parsons knew there would be a customs inspection before departure. The discovery of any printed material could get him and his family shot. Unbeknownst to him, however, his wife packed his intelligence file in their suitcase. Adding to his difficulties, Katsy’s mother Blanche refused to go. Her son Tommy Jurika was a POW on Cebu and she refused to leave the country without him.

The Parsons family sailed with eight other civilians under constant armed guard on a Japanese military hospital ship to Formosa. There they underwent inspection. Only by having his smallest child sit innocently on their suitcase did they avoid having soldiers find his intelligence file. Distracted inspectors let the Parsons get on a captured American aircraft flying to Shanghai. There they embarked on the Conte Verde bound for Singapore and Lourenço Marques in Portuguese East Africa where officials completed the citizen exchange. The Parsons finally boarded a U.S. chartered repatriation ship, the Swedish MS Gripsholm, bound for Rio.

Visayas, D182/R-867

On Negros, fifty-year-old Assistant Inspector General of the Philippine Army Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Gador had become the 7th District Commander (Negros and Siquijor) when war began. However General Sharp fired him because Gador could not get along with his junior commanders. Sharp transferred Gador’s staff to Mindanao. In June, Gador returned to Negros claiming Sharp had sent him back to organize guerrilla resistance. He then went into the hills and appeared inactive.

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952 Ingham, 38.
Meanwhile thirty year-old Major Hermenegildo Mercado, one of Peralta’s classmates at the Infantry School, organized guerrillas around Guilhulngan and north into Negros Oriental. He would join Gador in September but break away the next month after an apparently serious argument. The two men remained hostile thereafter.

On nearby Bohol, Philippine Army Third Lieutenant Ismael P. Ingeniero organized what would become that island’s largest resistance group, the “Behind the Clouds” guerrillas. Ingeniero had once served under Gador. U.S. Army intelligence reported: “Ingenerio is described as a weak character, and inclined to take orders from Gador, whom he alone recognized as commander of Negros Oriental.”

Reports indicated he had been happily absent during the Japanese invasion while visiting his wife in Panay and added: “It is said that Ingeniero obtained command by a quasi-political deal and through the support of Senator Carlos Garcia.”

Others noted that Ingeniero “was somehow getting things done.” He communicated with Cebu and, aided by Governor Conrado Marapo and Senator Carlos Garcia, rallied the people on Negros. Villamor later reported that under Ingeniero: “All able-bodied men aged 16 to 60 drilled daily and stood guard, without arms but with sharp bolos hanging from scabbards tied around their waists, at guard houses one to two kilometers apart. Some women as well, those up to 30 years of age, also drilled, and, to feed the soldiers each Boholano family was giving each month: one *ganta* of rice, one chicken, two eggs, and ten centavos.”

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953 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 81.
954 *Intelligence Activities*, 19.
955 Villamor. 128.
956 Ibid.
1943, Ingeniero had 4,000 guerrillas under 194 officers and blocked the enemy garrisons at Tagbilaran and the Guindulman manganese mines.

On Mindoro, a mysterious group led by a resident of Tamarraw named Romerius, thought to be a former chief of police of San Jose, arose in mid-1942. The Romerius Group reportedly did considerable damage to the Japanese supply around southwest Mindoro.

Central Luzon, D186/R-863

Outside Manila, Marking heard stories of increasingly harsh treatment by the Japanese of 115 American prisoners, mostly pilots and engineers, held in the Cine Lumban movie theater, a makeshift prison in Laguna. He decided to liberate those prisoners and secured the cooperation of the Lumbang mayor who agreed to turn off the town's lights and prevent all local dogs from barking on the night of the attack. (As one guerrilla said, “If there was one constant in the Philippines, it was that any given time and place one to a dozen dogs would be barking. Most Filipinos like dogs, and rural families usually had one or two, but why they howled so relentlessly I never knew.”) On the moonless night of 11 June, Marking led forty-five guerrillas in boats across the Laguna de Bay, tied up the mayor for appearances, and took up positions around the prison. “Marking shot a sentry, signal for a tensely aimed volley,” Agoncillo reported, “and guerrillas sprang into the clearing to shoot and bludgeon the remaining guards and grab their guns.” However, only one

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957 Kaminski, 241.
958 Lapham and Norling, 66.
American POW, George Lightman, answered Markings call to freedom. A U.S. Army captain among the prisoners ordered the rest to remain where they were. Marking left with Lightman and some captured weapons. In the following days, the Japanese executed ten of the remaining POWs as punishment for the one who escaped.

Meanwhile, hunted and aware of Chief Justice Santos’ fate, in mid-June, Manuel Roxas surrendered to Japanese authorities in Davao. As Quezon’s former Secretary of Finance and an eleven-year Speaker of the House of Representatives, there were few more prominent men in the Philippines. A colonel named Jimpo rushed Roxas to Manila. Knowing Roxas served as a liaison between Quezon and MacArthur, Kempeitai chief Colonel Akira Nagahama decided to execute him for suspicion of leading Mindanao resistance and intent to lead guerrillas in Luzon. A political tug of war erupted. Old friend Commissioner of Justice Jose Laurel demanded the Japanese release Roxas saying he was too valuable to execute. Laurel’s protests delayed a decision on Roxas’ fate into August. By then new 14th Army chief of staff Colonel Takaji Wachi ordered an English-speaking priest, Father Gen Kawahara, to investigate Roxas. Kawahara reported: “Roxas’ influence turned out to be far greater than we had originally imagined” and concluded that he should be spared so the Japanese could “win him over to our side.”

Northwest of Manila, Thorp convinced Barker to join his Luzon Guerilla Force at Camp Sanchez. By the end of May, he had two new organizations, Squadron 111 in Umingan and Squadron 300 in Lupao. Thorp issued General Order Number 1 making Captain Wilber Lage his adjutant and Sergeant Bill Brooks his official

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radioman. He reorganized the LGF into four geographical sectors: northern Luzon under Captain Ralph Praeger; west central Luzon under Captain Ralph McGuire; southern Luzon under Captain Jack Spies; and, now, the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Area (ECLGA) under Captain Joe Barker.\textsuperscript{961} Ed Ramsey would be Barker’s adjutant and Bernard Anderson his Chief of Staff. Lapham, commanding guerrilla companies to the north, became Thorp’s inspector general. With these arrangements, as the senior U.S. Army commander, Thorp felt ready to find and bring all other groups on Luzon under his umbrella.

Praeger was well positioned to scavenge guns and ammunition from the fields around Bataan. “He also liquidated spies and collaborators energetically and undertook some sabotage,” recalled Lapham.\textsuperscript{962} Stretching his authority, on 4 July, Praeger would commission Apayao Governor Marcelo Adduru as a major in the U.S. Army and make him executive officer in their combined Cagayan-Apayao Guerrilla force.

By the end of May the veteran Chinese communists had assisted the Huks in establishing a Political and Military Training School on Mount Arayat in Central Luzon.\textsuperscript{963} They used Mao’s and Chu-teh’s \textit{Fundamental Spirit of Guerrilla Tactics} and Snow’s \textit{Red Star Over China} as manuals. The Chinese were vital to the Huks.\textsuperscript{964} The Huks signed an agreement allowing the Hua Zhi freedom of action in return for food,

\textsuperscript{961} Ibid., 111.
\textsuperscript{962} Lapham and Norling, 36.
\textsuperscript{963} Davis, 38.
\textsuperscript{964} An American guerrilla noted: “In fact their most effective combat squadron was not Filipino at all but in fact composed of Chinese Communist veterans of campaigns in mainland China in the 1930s.” Lapham and Norling, 133.
intelligence, guides and a promise to coordinate with the Huks and help train them in guerrilla tactics.965

The Hua Zhi moved to Bataan in June to gather weapons. In July it regrouped on Mount Pasbul on the Bataan-Pampanga border for training in tactics and political indoctrination using Mao’s *The Guerrilla War* and *The Strategic Problem in Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War*. In early September the unit would return to Mount Arayat with seventy-eight armed men. Their record of combat actions would be surprisingly sparse: an ambush and capture thirty-two Japanese in San Isidro on 8 December; killing thirty-seven Japanese at the cost of five killed and three wounded at Kanunpa in January 1943; ten more engagements, killing 286 Japanese and capturing twenty-four while suffering nineteen killed, eighteen wounded, and six missing in February, March and April.966 Even more surprising, Bernard Anderson reported to SWPA that the Hua Zhi was “100 percent pro-American, pro-Filipino and pro-Chinese Chungking [Nationalist] regime.”967

In late June, Thorp sent Barker, Anderson, and Pettit to liaison with the Huks. The delegation arrived on 7 July. Barker presented letters from Thorp offering USAFFE recognition and promising support if they joined his command.968 The West Pointer tried to impress the Huks with his command presence and promises of salaries and support once they established lines of communication with Australia. Taruc perceived Barker to be an irritating elitist who was trying to coerce the Huks into subordination. At the time the Huks claimed about 10,000 members in Bulacan

965 Yuk-Wai, 91-92.
966 Ibid. Table 8, 84.
967 Ibid., 93.
and Pampanga, far outnumbering Thorp’s small headquarters.\textsuperscript{969} “We told them that we would follow them militarily, but that we must be free to have our own political program which had as its objective democracy and independence,” Taruc reported, “We told them we would not put Filipino patriotism on sale for back-pay promises.”\textsuperscript{970}

The Huks were fighting a different war. The Americans wanted to defeat the Japanese and restore the pre-war Philippine government; the Huks remained intent on preventing the return of the colonial government and in effect overturning the pre-war government. They were able to base their positions in the recent Atlantic Charter issued by Roosevelt and Churchill that promised the right of self-determination to all people. Still, only Anderson’s diplomatic mediation enabled the two sides in Luzon to agree on a loose collaboration. “Given these fundamental disagreements,” Lapham wrote, “the best the conferees could manage was a paper promise to ‘cooperate’ and share equipment and supplies, while allowing the Huks ‘independent action’ on ‘organizational and political matters.’”\textsuperscript{971}

After this meeting, letters signed by Thorp, Barker and Ramsey circulated across northern Luzon announcing Huk-USAFFE cooperation and demanding all local citizens surrender their weapons to the Huks. “Barker and I were reluctant to believe the reports of this deception,” Ramsey wrote, “until we saw the letters ourselves bearing bad forgeries of our signatures.”\textsuperscript{972} Friction rose. Lapham

\textsuperscript{969} By 1944 the Huks would count 100,000 members who controlled large parts of by southern Tarlac, eastern Zambales, northern Bataan, southern Nueva Ecija, and parts of Pangasinan, Rizal, Manila and Laguna.

\textsuperscript{970} Agoncillo, Vol. II, 674.

\textsuperscript{971} Lapham and Norling, 129.

\textsuperscript{972} Ramsey and Rivele, 115.
recalled: “Early in the war a small Huk unit and a small unit of my own met, talked in a friendly fashion, ate supper together, and all went to bed. When my men awoke the next morning the Huks were gone, and so were our guns and supplies.” He added: “Early in the war we spent as much time fighting the Huks and various pro-Japanese individuals and groups as we did combattin the Japanese themselves.” Lapham concluded, “In my experience with them, the Huks were shrewd, formidable, and above all, treacherous adversaries.”

North of Camp Sanchez near Umingan, between severe bouts of malaria and dysentery Lapham established a second base he called Camp Manchuria in honor of its remoteness. This base operated in parallel with his first camp in Lupao, Nieva Ecija. Lapham had left Thorp two months earlier with one hundred men, and now commanded nearly double that number organized in two companies in the separate camps. He promoted himself to major; Ramsey followed suit. Filipinos filled his ranks. Federico Doliente came to Camp Manchuria with ten men. “If Johnny Marcos was our best recruiter and trainer in 1942, Doliente proved to be the best fighter” Lapham remembered, “Soon he became my most trusted companion on patrols.”


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973 Lapham and Norling, 134.
974 Ibid., 98.
975 Ibid., 133.
976 Ibid., 33.
977 Ibid., 38.
Lapham soon learned that Umingan’s collaborationist mayor was threatening his citizens for information on the guerrillas. Sergeant Doliente volunteered to handle the matter and set out with a patrol one night. A few days later at sunrise he returned to Camp Manchuria with the a gunnysack as a present for Lapham. Inside was the mayor’s severed head. “I am not especially squeamish,” Lapham confided, “but that experience was a shock.”

Just when it seemed Thorp was getting command of the northern Luzon guerrillas, he faced a challenge. One of the highest-ranking men to escape the Bataan Death March was Colonel Gyles Merrill of the 26th Cavalry Regiment. He had collapsed but natives dragged him into the bush before the Japanese noticed. Locals hid him and nursed him back to health over several weeks and Merrill made it to the Fassoth’s camp to recuperate. Like Anderson and Spies, he tried to persuade the Fassoth brothers to convert their camp into a guerrilla base under his command, but Bill and Martin refused. Merrill believed himself to be the senior U.S. Army officer left in the Philippines. Later in the summer he struck out to establish a base north of Manila Bay from which he could eventually command all guerrillas in the Islands. With him went Colonel Peter Cayler, Captain Crane, Captain Kadel and Private Leon Beck. They would form the Zambales Guerrillas and recruit into their ranks a local college-educated farm boy, Ramon Magsaysay, who would later become President of the Philippines.

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978 Ibid., 34.
979 Ibid., 35.
Meanwhile hardships mounted for Filipinos. In June, the Japanese-run National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) began rationing rice. Initially about 2.5 pounds per person per day, by October the ration would fall to a little more than half a pound per person per day and later drop further still.\footnote{Jose, “The Rice Shortage,” 203. The initial ration was 1\textit{ganta} or 1,200 grams per day.}

In Melbourne, MacArthur craved information from the Philippines. He heard nothing. Then the AIB received reports that allied coast watchers heard transmissions from someone named Bell on Negros.\footnote{Ibid, 120.} In late June the Federal Communications Commission station KFS at San Leandro, California, near San Francisco, received a radio message addressed to MacArthur from a station calling itself VCJC.\footnote{Hanyok, Robert J., “The Necessary Invention: The Cryptologic Effort by the Philippine Guerrilla Army, 1944-1945,” Cryptologic Almanac, (DOCID: 3719065) Center for Cryptologic History, at https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/files/crypto_almanac_50th/The_Necessary_Invention.pdf, 13 Sept 2014} Suspicious of a Japanese trick, the San Francisco station ignored the traffic before finally forwarding the repeated calls to the Army Signals Intelligence Service who then passed it to the War Department for a lengthy authentication process. By coincidence, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph K. Evans served as the G-2’s Chief of Southeast Asia section at the War Department after leaving the Deputy G-2 position at Fort Santiago in Manila. He had helped Willoughby establish a secret intelligence network of Americans and Filipinos with a crude cypher code to report from behind enemy lines after an invasion.\footnote{See Ind, page 119.} As the G-2 later noted: “Under the impact of the Japanese occupation, the American network disintegrated; the men were either killed or interned. Many Filipino agents, however,
managed to survive and formed a nuclei of resistance and a skeleton for the ‘underground.’”\textsuperscript{985} Evans verified the authenticity of the source of the message: it was from Peralta on Panay.\textsuperscript{986} Unfortunately the sender’s weak radio could only communicate when atmospheric conditions were just right, meaning it sometimes took weeks to exchange messages.

Coincidentally SWPA Assistant G-2 Colonel Merle-Smith had submitted his plan for the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) on 8 June in a memorandum to the Commander in Chief Australian Military Forces, General Thomas Blamey with MacArthur’s enthusiastic endorsement. At Blamey’s suggestion the Allied command appointed Colonel G.C. Roberts, the director of Australian Army intelligence, to lead the AIB, but MacArthur ensured his control over operations by placing U.S. Army intelligence officer Major Allison Ind as Robert’s deputy.

On 2 July, Merle-Smith tasked Ind to draft a directive organizing the AIB and four days later Roberts signed and issued it.\textsuperscript{987} Ind spelled out the new organization’s mission: “Obtain and report information on the enemy in the Southwest Pacific Area, and in addition, where practicable… weaken the enemy by sabotage and destruction of morale, and … render aid and assistance to local efforts in the same and in enemy-occupied territories.”\textsuperscript{988} First, the AIB would have to gain an accurate awareness of the state of the resistance in the Philippines.

Ind organized the AIB in four sections with Section C, under Captain Commander Eric Feldt of the Royal Australian Navy Volunteer Reserve, handling

\textsuperscript{985} Intelligence Activities, 2.
\textsuperscript{986} Guerrilla Resistance Movements,” 46-50.
\textsuperscript{987} Ind, page 37.
\textsuperscript{988} Ibid.
field intelligence. He further divided Section C into three regional sub-sections: Northeast Area, the Philippines (PRS), and the Netherland East Indies. On 20 July SWPA moved from Melbourne to Brisbane where the AIB occupied several floors in the Heindorf House office building. Guards on the ground floor limited access to the AIB; guards on the PRS floor kept out the rest of the AIB. The PRS communications team worked in shifts of one officer and two or three enlisted men. According to Radioman Technical Sergeant 4 Bob Stahl, a teletype connected the desks in the code room to “some mysterious location where a radio station transmitted and received our messages.”

“The guerrilla movement was just beginning and radio traffic was sporadic,” recalled Stahl, “This made my job very boring, with nothing to do but read books, work crossword puzzles, or sleep.” Ind took charge of the PRS and started to sort out the reported radio contacts.

Southern Luzon, D213/R-836

As June came to a close, Cararines Sur guerrilla leader Lieutenant José Hernandez delivered to Vinzons from Wainwright’s personal secretary, Lieutenant Robert Silhavy, a request for a meeting. Vinzons agreed to meet in Barcelonita, Camarines Sur, on 8 July. He granted his troops a fifteen-day furlough before heading to the meeting accompanied by his father and provincial governor Basilio Bautista. A former guerrilla named Villaluz betrayed Vinzons enabling the Japanese to capture him. They paraded him before a crowd in Labo before putting him in the

989 Stahl, 18-19.
990 Ibid.
991 See Memorandum, “A.I.B., ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS” 16 April, 1943, Box 473 RG 496, Philippine Archives, NARA II
A week later the Japanese arrested Vinzons’ wife, Liwayway, and children, Alex and Aurora. Vinzons still refused to collaborate. He smuggled out a single written message: “Tell Rafael Quiñones, fight and continue.” Qiñones was first Vinzons’ protégé in the Young Philippine Party in Basud. For another week, they tried to get him to turn collaborator but he still refused. Finally, on the night of 15 July garrison commander Major Tsuneoka Noburo confronted Vinzons with a paper signed by fifty natives identifying him as dorobo – bandit – and threatened him with death. Vinzons replied, “Nothing can make me happier than to die for my country, Major. You will too…” He was interrupted by the thrusts of Noburo’s bayonet. Vinzons died that night. His family was never seen again.

Vinzons’ deputy, Sergeant turned Major Francisco Boayes rallied the scattered Vinzons’ Travelling Guerrillas (VTG). The dark Syrian-descended Boayes nicknamed ‘Turko,’ was a five-foot-five grade school educated former boxer who had served as Vinzons’ driver and bodyguard. Another band of guerrillas from Libmanan, Camarines Sur, under Juan Q. Miranda joined Turko. Miranda had already absorbed the small guerrilla band under Lieutenant Leon Sa Aureus and his brother. Turko intended to continue uniting the guerrillas in Bicol.

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992 Barrameda, 142.
993 Ibid., 143.
994 Agoncillo, 709.
6. Contact

10 July – 5 October 1943

Slowly, leaders of several guerrilla groups established radio contact with MacArthur’s new Allied Intelligence Bureau that faced the daunting task of verifying these contacts. At the same time the Japanese efforts to exploit the Islands had caused economic depression and famine. The increased hardship further alienated the population and government from the Japanese administration and led many Filipinos to recruit Americans into the resistance.

Northern Luzon, D215/R-834

Before Lieutenant Colonel Everett Warner surrendered on Luzon, he passed his radio set to Captain Guillermo Nakar of the 14th Infantry Regiment. Through June, Nakar used the radio repeatedly trying to contact SWPA. On 10 July, a coast watcher in Java had picked up a faint Morse code signal that he passed up the chain of command. Ten days later MacArthur’s G-2 read the message. Nakar sent to MacArthur: “Detachment of Fil-American forces – we have not surrendered and are actively raiding northeast towns of Pangasinan, including Dagupan.”

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995 Major General Courtney Whitney, “MacArthur’s Rendezvous with History,” LIFE, 15 August 1955, 49. Breuer noted the Java stationed picked up the message on 10 July; Whitney recalled receiving the message 20 July.

996 William B. Breuer, MacArthur’s Undercover War: Spies, Saboteurs, Guerrillas, and Secret Missions, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.; 1995), 46. Nakar reported radio censorship by Japanese denied Filipinos true accounts of the war and that his men were disseminating information through a pamphlet,
A senior SWPA officer later described Nakar’s report: “His message was the first clear proof that loyal Filipinos, led by MacArthur’s soldiers who had escaped capture, still fought on. It dramatically confirmed MacArthur’s faith that they would and he determined to do all in his power not only to support it but in time to exploit it as a powerful adjunct to Allied arms.”\(^{997}\) It was a critical moment for the SWPA commander. “I had acquired a force behind the Japanese lines that would have a far-reaching effect on the war in the days to come,” MacArthur noted in his characteristically grandiose manner, “Let no man misunderstand the meaning of that message from the Philippines. Here was a people in one of the most tragic hours of human history, bereft of all reason for hope and without material support, endeavoring, despite the stern realities confronting them, to hold aloft the flaming torch of liberty. I recognized the spontaneous movement of free people to resist the physical shackles with which the enemy sought to bind them. It was a poignant moment.”\(^{998}\)

Finally Nakar received a response: “The courageous and splendid resistance maintained by you and your command fills with pride and satisfaction. It will be my privilege to see that you and your officers and men are properly rewarded at the appropriate time. – MacArthur.”\(^{999}\) The SWPA commander promoted Nakar to Lieutenant Colonel. The AIB had a new mission: arrange and coordinate support for Nakar and any other loyal guerrillas on the Islands.

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\(^{997}\) Whitney, “MacArthur’s Rendezvous,” 49.

\(^{998}\) MacArthur, Reminiscences, 202-203.

\(^{999}\) Volckmann, 139. Note Volckmann said Nakar received MacArthur’s response on 29 June.
PRS leader Allison Ind began piecing together other sporadic messages from the Philippines. On 7 August, he received a worrisome report from Nakar: “Intelligence report reveals that enemy has detected the existence of our radio station, possibly by geometric process, and detailed a large force to look for us.” After a message on 22 August, Nakar went silent.

By now the JMA plans for the Philippine economy were failing. They now understood the impact of losing the eighty-four percent of Philippine pre-war exports that went to the United States. They had also forfeited eighty-percent of the country’s taxes paid by the imprisoned Americans and other Westerners who had made up only one percent of the pre-war population. Those were the people who had carried key business and government administration burdens. Instead of compensating for the collapse of these government revenues, Japan remained determined to exploit the country economically.

“While the Japanese government presided over an ever-worsening food situation at home,” Lizzie Collingham noted, “as the occupying power in south-east Asia it succeeded, in an astonishingly short space of time, in running down the entire region, pushing back the progress which had been made towards modernity and re-establishing its pre-colonial isolation, undoing the process of urbanization and driving the hungry population back into the countryside to undertake

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1001 Breuer, 47.
1002 *Intelligence Activities*, 5.
1003 Jose, “The Rice Shortage,” 203.
1005 Ibid., 251.
subsistence farming.” Most Filipinos now lived below subsistence levels. They had too few jobs and too little wages to support economic growth. “The jobs still open to them had been scaled down, salary-wise, to the point of ludicrousness,” Villamor reported, “A telephone operator in Manila receiving 120 pesos before the war was now getting 15 pesos for the same work. Public officials used to monthly salaries of 300 pesos were lucky to now get 40 to 50 pesos.”

Japanese monopolized commerce by paying front men worthless occupation scrip.

A new Federation of Filipino Retailer Associations received power to control retail prices but this failed to correct problems with supply. “In terms of managing the food supply,” wrote Collingham, “the occupying administration’s greatest mistake was to allow the rice industry to disintegrate.” The JMA assigned retailers to the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) to set rice production and distribution. A new Federation of Rice Growers Cooperative supported their efforts. A new Food Control Association did the same for other foods. Other cooperatives controlled livestock and fish. Non-food commodities fell under the control of the Philippine Prime Commodities Distribution Control Association. As one Philippine historian said, “Most of the associations were headed by Japanese, with Filipinos as token members of the various boards.” None of the organizations allowed free market practices.

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1006 Collingham, 235.
1007 Villamor, 187.
1008 Ibid., 75.
1009 Collingham, 235.
1010 Jose, “The Rice Shortage,” 203.
On 19 July, a mission of cotton specialists arrived in Manila from Japan. They followed a mission sent in May that sank aboard the *Taiyo Maru* before it reached the Philippines. The next day the JMA endorsed several policy plans: “Outline for Implementing Projects for Increasing Cotton Production in the Philippines,” “Outline for Implementing Projects for Cotton Cultivation in the Philippines for the Year 1942,” and “Outline for Projects to Increase Cotton Production in the Philippines.” They sent the Outlines to the Executive Commission who approved five-year targets for producing 100,700 U.S. tons of cotton per year by cultivating 1,124,330 acres of farmland. Their goal was not to satisfy Filipinos but to support the Japanese war effort. Calculating the domestic demand of cotton in the Philippines at 16,670 tons, the Japanese believed the Islands could produce 83,340 surplus tons of cotton for use elsewhere in the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. To accomplish this they would reclaim idle land and convert fields used for forests, rice and sugarcane, no matter what the impact on the Philippine economy. The JMA assigned cultivation districts to nine cotton companies. As Yoshiko Nagano noted, the goals were impossible to reach.

Northern Luzon, D220/R-829

Meanwhile, the Hitomi Propaganda Platoon travelled through the Mountain and Ilocos provinces with American officers calling to the guerrillas to

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1012 The plan set targets as 1,510,000 piculs. A picul is an Asian weight roughly equivalent of what one man can carry on a shoulder, about 133 lbs. The plan also set a target for planting 455,00 hectares. Each hectare is about 2.47 acres.

1013 Yoshiko, 181.
surrender.\textsuperscript{1014} By mid-summer the Hitomi embraced a mix of punitive tactics – conducting raids, making arrests, taking hostages, and demonstrating firepower – while still spreading propaganda.\textsuperscript{1015} This ‘hostile propaganda’ strategy persuaded 117 guerrillas to surrender, led to the arrests of another sixteen, and captured two machine guns, 116 rifles, 39 pistols, and 21 hunting rifles.\textsuperscript{1016}

In July, Hitomi had moved his unit into Ilocos Norte. There he was shocked to see guerrillas shoot and kill an American officer he brought to convince them to surrender. Prewar provincial governor Roque Alban still commanded guerrillas with his lieutenants, schoolteachers Feliciano Madamba and Isabelo Monje. Local assemblyman Edwin T. Medina, who had been defeated in elections twice by Alban, supported the Japanese and accepted their appointment as governor. Medina’s followers also cooperated and took leading positions in the constabulary.

Hitomi now used all his weapons: the circus techniques, hardline activities, visits by General Ricarte, and freed Philippine Army doctors to provide medical support to locals. In August, Monje surrendered. One hundred and twenty-five guerrillas followed, twenty-three pledging to cooperate with the Japanese.\textsuperscript{1017} Hitomi arrested fourteen more and reported capturing 86 pistols, 51 rifles, and 2 pieces of heavy artillery. Local Constabulary forces joined the Furuki Battalion in sweeping the guerrillas. The Japanese declared Ilocos Norte cleared on 12 August.

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1014} Nakano, “Captain Hitomi,” 4.
\item \textsuperscript{1015} The platoon turned to harsher tactics after 10 June. Blackburn identified a Colonel Callakus who went about preaching Wainwright’s order to surrender “and no ifs, ands, or buts about it.” Blackburn Interview, 101.
\item \textsuperscript{1016} Nakano, “Appeasement and Coercion,” 47.
\item \textsuperscript{1017} Ibid., 48.
\end{itemize}
During July the Japanese Fourteenth Army reported increasing lawlessness on Mindanao.\textsuperscript{1018} As SWPA knew, “The Moro problems on Mindanao have long been a source of discontent and unrest.”\textsuperscript{1019} The long fraught relations between Lanao’s hill-dwelling Muslim Moros and coastal Christians were unraveling. The mountain people considered lowlanders soft and fearful; lowlanders thought of mountain people as ignorant barbarians. For centuries they exchanged raids for food, goods and women. For the last four decades, the Philippine Constabulary had managed to keep peace. According to Fertig, “During the period of American rule in the Islands, the number of lowland women carried off to Lanao’s mountains was more or less minimal, but the sudden intrusion of the Japanese resulted in a kind of legal vacuum which was immediately filled by ancient custom, and the paying-off of old scores.”\textsuperscript{1020}

The U.S. Army had long noted differences between Moro tribes: “The Maranao (Lanao) Moros are perhaps the bravest, proudest and most intelligent of the Philippine Moro groups: Maranao (Lanao), Maguindanao (Cotabato) and the Tao-Sugs and Samals (Zamboanga and Sulu). Intelligence, courage and pride, however, do not make the Lanao Moro either a valuable ally or a dangerous enemy.

\textsuperscript{1018} Midori, 112.
\textsuperscript{1019} Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 90.
\textsuperscript{1020} Keats, 21.
His intelligence is more nearly sly cunning, going hand in hand with treachery. The Moro has little respect for the Christian Filipino and may always be antagonistic towards him.”

Their small villages built around farms held kinship networks loyal to their leaders. Interrelated communities elected a Datu. Knowing these differences helped in identifying possible allies.

The Japanese suspected Americans were behind the Moro unrest. Indeed, many of the more troublesome natives were pro-Americans on the eastern portion of the Island where chief Datu Tambuyong headed a large kinship network in Taglibi area (eastern Jolo). Family leader in the Luuk-Talipas Sector in western Jolo, Captain Arolas Tulawie, also became pro-American.

The JMA brought former Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu Teofista Guingona and his assistant Cricaco Raval to Davao. They appointed Raval – a Christian – provincial governor. The Imperial Army promised to “wipe out the malignant Moro elements” and “win the hearts of powerful chiefs.”

Negative views of Moros were not unique to the Japanese. American guerrilla Charles Hedges reported: “These hills Moros live according to the Koran as interpreted by some illiterate, flea-bitten imam who heard from some crooked hadji what was supposed to be in the Holy Book. What they get out of it boils down to polygamy, slavery and brutality.”

The garrison battalion in Dansalan began a subjugation campaign by attacking Wato on the western edge of Lake Lanao, killing twenty-four villagers and

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1021 Ibid.
1022 Midori, 112.
1023 Keats, 59.
burning eight homes despite no evidence of any local involvement with the guerrilla movement. This and following operations turned the people against the Japanese. Reprisals and heavy-handed actions to terrorize the population in Cotabato persuaded many former Bolo Battalion members to form guerrilla bands. Datu Aliman gathered 600 men between Kidapawan, Cotabato, and Mount Apo, Davao province. Datu Mantil Dilangalan, with his two brothers, raised 1,000 men (half armed) in the Midsayap-Dulawan-Pikit area. From Midsayap to Lebak, twelve year U.S. Navy veteran Major Matas led 500-man Christians in ‘Matas Militia’ force. He became known as “the God of Midsayap,” and “was reported to be brave determined but reckless and defiant.”

In August, Datu Salipada Pendatun led the first attack on the Japanese garrison at Pikit, Cotabato. Success brought many new men to join his group. With a larger force Pendatun attacked Kabacan and secured the Digos-Kabacan Road by September. Gradually Aliman, Dilangalan, and others united under Pendatun’s command. Most went with him to Bukidon. Others opposed Pendatun, describing him as an anti-American lawyer and self-promoted brigadier general “deeply involved in Moro politics and protected by a princely family.” His chief of staff Ed Andrews had once been a student at the FBI school in the United States and had served in the Constabulary intelligence section before the war. When the Japanese invaded he took to the hills before finding his old friend and joining the guerrillas. He was known for his fierce hatred of Americans. “Perhaps,” John Keats

\[1024\] Ibid., 97.
\[1025\] Keats, 131.
\[1026\] Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 98.
wrote, "the mestizo had never got over a racial insult suffered during his training
days at flying fields in the southern United States."1027

Elsewhere on the Mindanao, Wendell Fertig, Elwood Offret and Charles
Hedges reached a Moro village ruled by Datu Soong. Young men in the village
wanted to kill the Americans, but the Datu brought out letters of commendation he
had once received from Lieutenant John J. Pershing and General Arthur
MacArthur.1028 He provided guides to lead the party on to Deisher's Camp where
they found about thirty American soldiers and sailors who had given up on the war.
The camp was an unhealthy, muddy mess lacking proper sanitation but the men
intended to hide there for the duration. Fertig remembered, "They resented officers,
would not take orders, and would do nothing but sit there, rotting in the jungle,
living off the store of Army rations which Deisher, an old prospector and boar
hunter, had somehow acquired."1029 Fertig and his group, now including Jordan
Hamner and Charles Smith, moved on and stumbled into the home of Mrs.
MacMichel, an old Moro widow of an American Spanish American War vet. Her
open, sunny home seemed to keep Hedges' malaria in remission.

On the Fourth of July, Fertig sat on a high hill near Dansalan looking down on
the National Road. Below him the Japanese paraded a long line of ragtag and malaria
ridden POWs, in hopes of impressing the citizens of Mindanao. At the head of the
column they placed Brigadier General Short in an open truck. The POWs shambled
forward tied together foot and hand with telephone wire. Whenever they lagged,

1027 Keats, 131.
1028 Ibid., 62.
1029 Ibid., 81.
Japanese guards beat them or jabbed them with bayonets fixed on their long rifles. When they fell they were stabbed.\textsuperscript{1030} Watching from above, Fertig decided he would never surrender. He would fight.

U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Ernest McClish had arrived in Misamis Oriental in November 1941 to command a regiment but the unit’s supplies were sunk in Manila Bay. When Wainwright demanded surrender, Governor Pelaez told McClish his unit was the only thing maintaining law and order. McClish recalled, “I couldn’t surrender and let the province fall apart!”\textsuperscript{1031} He organized guerrillas in Imbatug, Bukidnon. Americans Lieutenant Robert Ball, Lieutenant Anton Haratik, and Captain William Knortz joined him to organize more units in Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. The guerrillas ambushed a Japanese patrol near Medina, but returned the captured soldiers to the Japanese with a proposal: “Keep your men out of my territory and I’ll keep mine out of yours!”\textsuperscript{1032} Both sides kept the informal truce. The free government ran schools, courts, tax collections, trade and began printing money. McClish reached out to find other guerrillas and found Fertig.

Negros, D229/R-820

By July, Salvador Abcede’s guerrillas centered around Kabankalan with much of their prewar supplies and at least 600 rifles, making them one of the best armed guerrilla units in the Philippines. With many of their officers born and raised on nearby plantations, they were able to maintain supply sources. Former Bacolod

\textsuperscript{1030} Keats, 82-83.
\textsuperscript{1031} Mellnik, 254.
\textsuperscript{1032} Ibid., 255.
mayor Alfredo Montelibano acted as Governor of Free Negros. “Under his management the civil government of resistance had grown into a stability that was amazing in time of war,” said Abcede, “Free Negros not only had treasurers and auditors, it had officials in the municipal level, including policemen and clerks, fiscals, and judges.”

Locals sent about twenty percent of all food gathered in the area to the guerrillas.

One person who met him described the twenty-nine-year-old Abcede as having “a rather shy self-effacing look. Yet he had about him the air of quiet confidence. He looked like a leader.” Abcede had graduated from the University of the Philippines in 1936 with a reserve army commission, entered active duty in the Philippine Army in 1939, and quickly became the ROTC commandant at Silliman University on Negros. Promoted to lieutenant colonel at the start of the war, he received a battalion command. A U.S. Army estimate said: “He organized his [guerrilla] force early after surrender and has always led his men into the attack. He is aggressive and often given to snappy judgments but is never afraid to admit mistakes. He is hearty and frank and well liked throughout Negros...”

Captain Enrique Torres, now major, formed a unit under Abcede near Sinalbagan. Major Hermenegildo Mercada, a thirty-year-old classmate of Peralta at the Infantry School, organized anther group of guerrillas that extended from Guilhulngan north to Negros Oriental during May and June. When these units retreated into the mountains, many families went with them.

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1033 Villamor, 86.
1034 Ibid., 82.
1035 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 70.
A man known as Puring, thought to be Philippine Army Private First Class Casiong Gemillan, led a lawless band with about fifty USAFFE weapons in the hills west of Valiohermoso, Negros Oriental, and San Carlos, Negros Occidental.\textsuperscript{1036} His deputy was his brother, illiterate ex-convict Margarito Gemillan. SWPA reported: “They have attacked the Japanese and have also interfered with the nearby guerrilla activity and molested civilians in the vicinity.”\textsuperscript{1037} Reportedly, Puring died fighting Abcede’s guerrillas and his brother took over the organization. The Puring guerrillas would melt away during the fall of 1944.

Killing Puring was just one example of how guerrillas had to provide law and order by assuming the duties of police, judges and juries. “This was no easy task,” wrote Lapham, “No code of law anywhere governs the activities of guerrillas, and where we were, there were no effective courts or judges either.”\textsuperscript{1038} Even so, the job of providing security was vital in winning popular support. Lieutenant Colonel Claro Lauretta of the Constabulary commanded the battalion in Davao City. “Do you know what happens when no one will enforce law and order?” he observed, “The strong take from the weak: food, belongings, wife, and even life! We shot half a dozen such ‘bandits’ before the men began to behave! We then faced urgent survival problems: shortages of food, salt, clothing, and medicines. As we solved those, new ones cropped up. When people asked me to legalize births, deaths, and marriages, I

\textsuperscript{1036} Ibid., 71.
\textsuperscript{1037} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1038} Lapham and Norling, 79.
established a civil government. It’s now set for the long pull.”

People tended to follow whoever provided for their safety.

Providing law and order led to hard decisions. “We had no jails; we could not afford to waste time, men, food, and money paying jailers to look after prisoners; and nobody ever joined a guerrilla band because he wanted to guard prisoners anyway,” Lapham wrote, “Consequently, punishments for misdeeds had to assume forms other than confinement. For some minor offenses, a man might be punished by being put on KP or assigned to look after the horses, but for something serious there was usually little real choice between setting an accused free (with perhaps a stern lecture) and executing him.”

Lapham decided on three offenses that earned a death sentence: “looting, rape, and giving aid and comfort to the enemy.” He later admitted, “I never kept records of the uglier cases we had to deal with.”

All guerrilla leaders had to make similar decisions. In the Filipino TVGU, Barrameda observed, “Deemed capital crimes were treachery or treason (to TVGU, by working against its interests) and crimes against chastity (as rape was then classified; such crimes normally carried with them the death penalty).” A TVGU commander said, “In the Third Battalion under Captain Leon Aureus if one is found wanting he was immediately separated from the group by firing squad.” While the guerrillas found such measures necessary to their success, they would make incorporation into MacArthur’s U.S. Army command impossible.

1039 Mellnik, 244.
1040 Lapham and Norling, 80.
1041 Ibid., 80.
1042 Ibid., 81.
1043 Barrameda, 65.
1044 Ibid.
Colonel Hugh Straughn refused to surrender his Fil-American Irregular Troops (FAIT) guerrillas around Antipolo. He gained support from local civilians and soldiers escaping Bataan. Expanding south and east of Manila, Straughn brought other guerrilla groups under the FAIT umbrella including the President Quezon’s Own Guerrillas (PQOG) and the Hunter’s. He began negotiations to recruit Marking’s Guerrillas.

Outside Manila, Yay Panlilio had arrived at Marking’s camp in July. She recalled her first sight of him: “Tall, well-muscled, but lean, Major Marcos V. Augustin, alias Marking, stood with his fists on his hips, his feet planted wide, and his head high and a little back.” The twenty-nine year-old Irish American-Filipina immediately caught his eye. She had skills Marking was lacking. “And I was a woman,” she noted, “not a juicy morsel, but there are times when any old horse looks like fresh meat.” Panlilio continued, “Hotly we looked at each other. I saw a fighting man. He saw a defiant woman. We burst into laughter, having found each other.” Soon, they were lovers. Marking promoted them both to colonel and appointed her co-commander of his Guerrillas.

Panlilio wrote, “I had tried, since the Japs had landed on the Islands, to fight them in my own way, on my own. It had been impossible. Now, like thousands of

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1045 Panlilio, 18.
1046 Ibid., 15.
1047 Ibid., 18.
others before and after me, I took the only course open: I became a guerrilla.”

Panlilio and Marking made for a volatile mixture. “No better combination could have come out of a desperate situation: Marking with his brawn and bravado, and Yay with her intellect and woman’s intuition,” explained Agnocillo, “Where Marking was raw, Yay was polished. Marking, brusque and uncouth, was a man of action who seldom, if ever, thought of consequences. Yay, a civilized woman, was calculating and sophisticated. Yay furnished the necessary rein to Marking’s extravagant enthusiasm.”

A U.S. Army report observed: “The leader of the group is Marcos Villa Agustin [Marking], but the backbone of the organization is a woman known as Yay Panlilio.”

Under her influence Marking accepted an offer to join Straughn with an appointment as commander of the FAIT 1st Brigade. The organization had grown from seventeen original members to over one hundred and fifty. The raid on Lumban prison in Laguna had increased their stock of firearms from seventeen to sixty thirty-caliber rifles. Now they dreamed of bigger things.

After Miguel Ver’s death, Terry Adevoso reassembled the Hunters guerrillas. Many of the former ROTC cadets rallied to revenge their fallen leader. In August, Adevoso led an ambush of 200 Japanese soldiers along the road from Rizal and Laguna. When the firing was over they reported counting 127 dead enemy soldiers. The victory kept the Hunters in the field and won renewed popular support. Arms, supplies and recruits increased. In the next few months Adevoso sent groups out to expand the organization. Each group took a new name into their new

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1048 Ibid., 7.
1050 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 19.
1051 Agoncillo, Vol. II, 691.
areas: Birds of Preys (Limbás), Cobra (Cobra), Eagles (Aguila), Hawk (Lawin), Hornets (Putakí), Shark (Patíng), Vipers (Ulupóng), Wild Cats (Musang), Wild Buffaloes (Támaraw) and Lapu-Lapu, (after the Visayan who killed Magellan in 1521). The Hunters spread from Rizal to Laguna, Cavite, Batangas, and Tayabas.

Lieutenant Juan Pajota, a 91st Infantry Division (PA) veteran, escaped from Bataan to return home to Nueva Ecija. He was small in stature but steady, tough, an unassuming. He was also not ready to stop fighting the Japanese. Pajota sought out the guerrillas operating in his home province under Lapham. The American commander saw in Pajota “a very unflamboyant guy with a natural bent for leadership. He was resourceful, organized and extremely imaginative.”1052 Author Hampton Sides added: “He knew all the mayors of all the barrios. He was familiar with the realities on the ground, every quirk of the water buffalo paths, every river bend. Whatever men or arms might need to be mustered, Pajota had the political wherewithal to make it happen.”1053 Lapham commissioned Pajota to raise several squadrons in central Nueva Ecija. Soon, he had “eyes” and “hands” in every village. Every successful American guerrilla commander had at least one man like Pajota.

Manila, D237/R-812

The Japanese Imperial Headquarters, irritated with the difficulties in managing the Philippines, held Homma accountable for the failure to take the Islands on schedule and removed him from command. On 1 August, Lieutenant General Shizuichi Tanaka arrived in Manila to take charge of the 14th Army. A

1052 Sides, 128.
1053 Ibid.
Shakespeare scholar at Oxford for three years, he had served as a military attaché in the United States and Mexico and had led the Japanese delegation in the victory parade in London after World War I. He had even met Douglas MacArthur. He also had served as a Kempeitai commander during tours in China.

Manila that August appeared tranquil. One of its residents reported, “it is an uneasy kind of peace; tension and fear are still ever present because the Japanese go on midnight or early morning raids of neighborhoods looking for guerrillas that they had been informed reside or are hiding in that neighborhood.”1054 The Japanese sought to separate the people from the guerrillas. They would routinely bring an anonymous Filipino with a bag over his head to a line-up of local men. Anyone pointed out by the masked person was quickly carried off to Fort Santiago. “If the young man resists and fights, he is tackled and bayonetted,” Isabel Yumol remembered, “And if his family comes to his aid, they, too, are bayonetted. But sometimes the Japanese do not need any reason. They just come and choose a house at random to raid and harass or take away the household head and massacre the whole family when there is resistance.”1055

The Japanese use of rewards and punishments often led guerrillas to both suspect the people and fear bringing retribution upon them. Relations became trickier in September when the Philippine Executive Commission issued Executive Order Number 77 ordering the establishment of JMA-directed ‘neighborhood

1054 Jennings, 37.
1055 Ibid.
associations’ to police resistance to occupation policies.\textsuperscript{1056} Over the next nine months, the JMA created 13,192 neighborhood associations in and around Manila alone containing 900,000 members.\textsuperscript{1057} A guerrilla noted, “If a person wanted to go from one town to another, before he could leave the barrio, he had to have a pass stamped by the barrio lieutenant, then take it to the municipality and the Japs would pass on it; then he could go to the next town where the Japs would again stamp it.”\textsuperscript{1058} The guerrillas realized they could trust very few people in the cities; they had to look to themselves for support.

Australia, D243/R-806

MacArthur’s G-2, Charles Willoughby, pressed the AIB to strengthen the weak line of communications with the Philippines that frustrated both MacArthur and left the guerrillas isolated. Ind recalled, “G2 left little doubt in our minds: the obvious precariousness of the equipment in the Islands, the lack of secure ciphers and, above all, the contradictory nature of the information that was beginning to come out underscored the need for an observer placed there and controlled by GHQ.”\textsuperscript{1059} The first question was who to send.

At Amberly Field near Brisbane, Major Joseph McMicking, Jr. introduced his friend Jesus Villamor to Ind. Villamor had said he wanted to go back to the Philippines. Convinced he was serious, Ind arranged Villamor’s immediate transfer

\textsuperscript{1057} Hartendorp, 453.
\textsuperscript{1058} Blackburn Interview, 141.
\textsuperscript{1059} Ind, 101.
to the 81st Air Depot Group. A few days later Villamor was at his new desk when AIB Controller Colonel Roberts handed him a directive initialed “O.K. MacA”:

“1. Establish a net for military intelligence and secret services throughout the Islands.
2. Establish a chain of communication, both local and to Australia.
3. Establish an eventual escape route to accommodate evacuation of selected individuals in the interest of future planning.
4. Develop an organization for covert subversive activities and propaganda for use at the appropriate time. This same organization will also be used for passive resistance and simple sabotage.
5. Locate and contact individuals known to be loyal.
6. Establish the rudiments of the net, to be formulated upon the ‘cell’ system for mutual protection.
7. Establish a radio transmitter for contacting Darwin on matters of transportation rendezvous only.
8. Conduct an intelligence survey of a general nature to obtain information on:
   a. Japanese political intentions
   b. Japanese military intentions
   c. Japanese civil intentions
   d. Japanese military, naval, air strengths; dispositions, equipment, quality, morale, training etc.
e. Japanese operatures [sic] of future significance.”

It was a tall order; Villamor accepted the mission. He wanted to enlist friends then in the United States. SWPA denied him the sons of General Vincente Lim, MIT graduate Luis Lim and Annapolis-trained Roberto Lim. They also denied requests for West Pointers Colonel Jaime Velasquez and Colonel Tirso Fajardo. For six days Villamor traveled around Australia evaluating hundreds of Filipinos and selected eight for special training at Brisbane’s Victoria Barracks under Australian Army Captain Allan Davidson: Rodolfo Ignacio, Delfin YuHico, Patricio Jorge, Dominador Malic, Emilio Quinto, Susano Amodia, Virgilio Felix and Pedro Cariago.

Northern Luzon, D246/R-803

Guerrillas who had not been in Bataan, like Walter Cushing, Ralph Praeger, and Guillermo Nakar, had conducted an flurry of attacks following Wainwright’s surrender. The Bataan escapees, on the other hand, were largely inactive. As Lapham explained: “For me, the first eight or nine months of the war were by far the hardest because I was sick so much of the time. Like many others, I was already beset with malaria and dysentery when I came out of Bataan in February.” Just the sight of capable men ravaged by illness could discourage action. In August, American miner Patrick O’Day reported to Volckmann for duty. Blackburn noted, “He was a civilian engineer and an unsavory character.” Volckmann recalled, “He stood over six feet tall and normally weighed well over two hundred pounds, but

1060 Villamor, 66-67.
1061 Ibid.
1062 Blackburn Interview, 123.
fever, dysentery, and hard traveling had taken so much out of him that he now looked like a walking skeleton. I'm sure that when we met him he didn't weigh over a hundred and forty pounds, and he looked so weak and thin that it didn't seem he could stand up against a stiff breeze."\textsuperscript{1063} Such men needed to recuperate with Filipino families or at bases like the Fassoth camp before entering the fight.

Years later Che Guevara would observe: “The doctor's role in guerrilla warfare is a highly important one. Not only does he save lives, but he strengthens the morale of the sick and wounded.”\textsuperscript{1064} The U.S. Army already understood how notorious tropical diseases of the Philippines could cripple military operations. In 1899 ten percent of the U.S. troops fell ill with fever and diarrhea within three days of arriving in the country, and a third were ill by the end of a week.\textsuperscript{1065} By the time Arthur MacArthur's 2\textsuperscript{nd} Division had completed twenty-one days on campaign, despite several rest periods, 2,600 of his 4,800 soldiers were sick with “sore or rotting feet, low-grade fever, diarrhea, parasites, headaches, chills, fainting, chronic fatigue, skin diseases, tropical ulcers, and psychological depression.”\textsuperscript{1066} It was not unusual to see fifty to seventy-five percent of field unit personnel on sick reports.\textsuperscript{1067} General Samuel Sumner, 1\textsuperscript{st} Brigade, Cavalry Division, V Corps, reported that every time his troops took to the field for more than a few days, “sick reports go up alarmingly, averaging over fifty percent, and a considerable proportion of this number are permanently incapacitated from further duty. I am forced to keep this

\textsuperscript{1063} Volckmann, 79-80.
\textsuperscript{1065} See the story of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Oregon Regiment in Linn, \textit{The Philippine War}, 14-15.
\textsuperscript{1066} Ibid., 90.
\textsuperscript{1067} Ibid., 148, 286 and 298.

289
fact prominent in all my operations in this section.”

Even after the fighting ended, doctors noted that American soldiers succumbed to a tropical malaise they termed melancholy or nostalgia. The Army Surgeon General reported: “Residence in the tropic regions at or near the sea level is unfavorable to the health of Northern races. ...In my opinion, nobody – no white man – lives in the tropics over a long period who does not deteriorate in practically every way.” Concern became so great that in 1934 Congress restricted soldiers’ tours in the Philippines to not more than two years.

Peace or war, the most dangerous malady in the Islands was malaria. Though generally limited to between the 45° south and 45° north latitudes, malaria, killed more people worldwide than any other disease. The term covered illnesses produced by four different microscopic parasites introduced into the blood by several species of mosquitoes. The Philippines were home to *anopheles flavirostris*, *maculatus*, *balabacensis* and *mangyanus* mosquitoes that breed in various types of water, live in and near forests, and attack their victims between 2000 and 0100 hours, the time period closely associated with guerrilla operations. Another indigenous breed, *anopheles litoralis*, uniquely breeds in coastal areas in salty or brackish water. Normally these malarial mosquitoes live only below 600 meters elevation (2,000 feet) where most of the Islands’ population centers and military

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1068 Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 16.
1069 Malcolm, 385.
1070 Numbers for the 1940s. Warsaw, 3.
installations reside. The anopheles mosquitoes are especially hard to combat due to their lack of buzzing noise and their ability to bite without causing pain that would attract the immediate attention of their victims. Many variables can cause the incubation period between initial bite and onset of malaria symptoms to range from a typical period of six to ten days to as long as several months. Even then “full-blown attacks” would “probably continue from one to three years, for it was known that suppression even for as long as two and a half years does not influence the ultimate course of the disease.”

While the quickness, severity and duration of the symptoms can vary, malaria is almost always harshly debilitating to physical effort. Typically, victims first suffer a period of chills that left untreated become 'paralyzing shivering,' followed by a burning fever with headaches and great thirst, and finally ‘drenching sweats’ as the fever breaks. The fever can be quotidian, or daily, or tertian, that is appearing every other day. As the parasite multiplies and destroys red blood cells, the spleen becomes enlarged and tender. The anopheles mosquitoes in the Philippines carry two of the four particular malarial parasites – *Plasmodium falciparum* and *Plasmodium vivax*. *P. vivax* exists in thirty percent of the archipelago and causes a fairly benign tertian fever, with normally eight to ten relapses. The *P. falciparum* strain, covering eighty percent of the Philippines, causes

1073 See Warsaw, 13.
1076 See Ibid., 10-14.
a severe tertian fever and is commonly associated with malignant cerebral malaria
that can cause a sudden, fatal collapse. As one medical researcher explained: “In the
Philippines, where such deaths are not uncommon, the man who falls unconscious
in the field is said to be a victim of ‘Mindoro lightning.’”\textsuperscript{1077}

Another common mosquito in the Philippines, the \textit{aedes aegypti}, carries both
yellow fever and dengue fever. After an incubation period of three to six days,
yellow fever produces a roughly four-day period of moderate to severe fever,
headaches, muscle pains, nausea, vomiting and possible hepatitis and hemorrhagic
fever. Even today epidemics of dengue fever break out across the Philippines about
every three to four years.\textsuperscript{1078} Victims suffer “an initial three or four-day febrile
paroxysm [feverish convulsions] of very sudden onset, a remission, which comes on
or about the fourth day, and a terminal rise of temperature for two or three days –
“the saddle-back temperature course.”\textsuperscript{1079} Aches and pains concentrated in
attachments of muscles at the joints, soreness behind the eyes, inability to
concentrate, insomnia, extreme fatigue and loss of appetite are common symptoms.
As a result, Army physicians noted, “The malaise and depression are generally so
great that the patient keeps his bed voluntary.”\textsuperscript{1080}

Before World War II the U.S. Army had some experience – and some success
– in fighting conditions that caused tropical diseases. It spearheaded improved
sanitation, vector control and improved treatment in Panama and Hawaii after the

\textsuperscript{1077} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{1078} Taken from World Health Organization as reported in Denguematters, “Issue 7 – Dengue in the
Philippines,” \url{http://www.denguematters.info/content/issue-7-dengue-philippines} accessed 6 November
2015.
\textsuperscript{1079} Strong, Volume II, 905.
\textsuperscript{1080} Ibid., 916.
Spanish American War. In Panama City between 1904 and 1935 the Army’s efforts reduced the percentage of population morality resulting from malaria from a yearly average of 12.3 percent to 0.5 percent.\textsuperscript{1081} While the Army had similar success in Manila, the Medical Corps reported that “malaria control measures in Bataan had not been impressive” before 1941.\textsuperscript{1082} Unfortunately, when prewar plans to defend Manila quickly collapsed, the soldiers found themselves exposed to disease in Bataan.

Dysentery often amplified the symptoms of malaria and dengue fever. This illness has many forms, all characterized by infection of the intestines causing “mucus in bloody discharges from the intestine.”\textsuperscript{1083} The Philippine guerrillas commonly experienced \textit{malarial}, \textit{bacillary}, and \textit{amoebic} forms of dysentery from parasites ingested while drinking unclean water, eating contaminated food, or touching unclean hands to the mouth. \textit{Protozoal dysentery}, first pathologically described in the Philippines in 1900, produced chronic diarrhea, “colicky pain, a distended and painful abdomen, with furred tongue and loss of appetite.”\textsuperscript{1084} \textit{Leishmanian dysentery}, also found across the archipelago, produced in its victim “persistent fever, anemia, and cachexial [a wasting loss of weight] condition with the ultimate enlargement of the spleen and liver.”\textsuperscript{1085} Signs of infection usually appear about three days after contamination and last for ten days. Of particular concern, the victim of dysentery suffered the risk of severe dehydration due to the volume of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1081} See Table 4 “Malaria in Panama,” in James Stevens Simmons, et al., \textit{Malaria in Panama} (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1939), 28.
\item \textsuperscript{1082} Coates, 497.
\item \textsuperscript{1083} Strong, Volume I, 444-454.
\item \textsuperscript{1084} Strong, Vol. I, 447.
\item \textsuperscript{1085} Ibid., 454.
\end{itemize}
fluid passed by diarrhea, vomiting and sweats.

Americans were not the only ones vulnerable to mosquito-borne illnesses: natives felt the affects too. After the Japanese established control they began forcing captured Filipino soldiers to take an oath of loyalty and assigned them to three constabulary companies in Langnan, Bontoc and Lubuagan. These locations compelled the Ladies Club in Baguio to complain to provincial Governor Hillary P. Clapp: “Our soldiers from the mountains are not used to the lowlands, and the mosquitoes. They are dying. Won’t you do something to get them out of the lowlands?”

Despite some local immunity, people from one area of the Philippines remained vulnerable to diseases in other areas.

Even without disease, the guerrillas faced maladies brought on by their inadequate quantity and quality of diet. Beriberi was common and described by the Army as: “A disease of nutrition which is attributed to inadequate ingestious [sic] absorption or utilization of the heat labile portion of the vitamin B complex which is usually designated B-1 or Thiamin.” Lack of this vitamin – abundant in beans and peas – affected nerves, brought on weakness, and could cause paralysis and congestive heart failure. The chronic malnutrition suffered by the guerrillas greatly increased their susceptibility to infections and parasitic disease.

The little medical training provided to the soldiers who became guerrillas made diagnosis and treatment of their illnesses difficult. Yet even professional medical personnel would find it challenging to identify correctly the ailments plaguing these troops. Because the malarial parasite is in the blood, for example, it

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1086 Blackburn Interview, 135-136.
1087 See Strong, Volume II, 1,038.
can harm any and all bodily organs and produce symptoms that mimic a host of other diseases.\textsuperscript{1088} In addition the Philippine guerrillas could be, and often were, infected by both \textit{P. vivax} and \textit{P. falciparum} along with many of the other tropical illnesses in the islands. A successfully diagnosis and treatment of one illness would often just replace one causative parasite with a second or third.

Beyond physical infirmities lurked a more treacherous malady. By the time Ramsey arrived at the Fassoth camp it had better sanitation, plenty of food, a doctor and a nurse, but even these were not enough for some. He watched camp personnel try to nurse one lieutenant back to health. “Instead,” Ramsey noted, “he was obsessed with the idea that his government had deserted him and left him helpless before his enemies. And so, while everyone around him was regaining weight and health, he continued to decline until finally, for no reason the doctor could identify, he died.”\textsuperscript{1089} Blackburn identified the lieutenant as Bell, an engineer from the University of Colorado.\textsuperscript{1090} Whether this “strange malaise” resulted from a combination of illnesses, Ramsey noted, “It drove home to me once again the truth of which I was already aware, that mind and attitude together shape will, and the when the will is lost, defeat follows.”\textsuperscript{1091}

The escaping from Bataan needed time to recover mind and body. In the meantime first guerrillas would soon reach their own limits of endurance.

Visayas, D244/R-805

\textsuperscript{1088} Warsaw, 9.
\textsuperscript{1089} Note that Price referred to the Fassetts by the name Fassoth. See Ramsey and Rivele, 138.
\textsuperscript{1090} Blackburn Interview, 82.
\textsuperscript{1091} Ramsey and Rivele, 138.
Between 8 and 26 August, as Americans and Japanese battled from the Aleutians to New Guinea, a succession of uprisings that began in Negros spread across the Philippines. In response, the Japanese prepared an autumn campaign of subjugation to pacify all the islands by the end of the year.\footnote{1092} A major part of the plan was the sudden round up and re-imprisonment of the Filipino POWs previously granted amnesty. That effort was designed to acquire labor began on Panay in August and angered the Filipinos. Japan simply could not spare any more military manpower for the Philippines and faced a growing labor deficit at home. Haseba Sueto of the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipbuilding Works recalled, “By 1943 the shortage of labor had become the most pressing problem at war plants.”\footnote{1093} When he forcibly brought 820 laborers from China, he was met by “representative from 32 war plants all over Japan” asking for workers.\footnote{1094} The Japanese would also send over 30,000 Allied POWs to Japan “to work in coal mines, factories and other locations”; 3,526 of them would die before in the end of the war.\footnote{1095}

Guerrillas contributed to the JMA’s demand for more workers in the Islands. For nearly a year they had delayed the opening of copper mines in Chobutan, Pilar-Cadiz, and Sipalay that the JMA had allotted to Mitsubishi Kogyo and Ishihara Sangyo. Attacks led by Carlos Amores severely curtailed output from the important Nihon Kogyo manganese mines in Busuanga. While working as a security guard at the mines, Amores secretly organized hundreds of guerrillas armed with pistols,

\footnote{1092}{“Record of Operations in the Philippines, Part II,” Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 5.}
\footnote{1093}{Carry, 104.}
\footnote{1094}{Ibid.}
knives and clubs. They attacked and killed all twenty or so of the Japanese employees at the mine and most of the Japanese residents in town.\textsuperscript{1096} The guerrillas then sealed the mine with dynamite and destroyed stocks of ore before being driven into the hills.

Despite such problems, on 22 August, Ishihara Sangyo delivered its first shipment of iron ore from the Larap Mine (Kalambayangan mine). Over the previous six months they had accomplished a great deal with the assistance of a man named Pastrana who had managed the mines before the war for the Lepantao Company. They stripped from mines at Paracale equipment including two diesel train engines with track, eight barges, two towing launches, power-generators, power lines, and building items to get Larap operating.\textsuperscript{1097} They scavenge other equipment including two 600-hp diesel generators from local gold mines. The objective exploitation of Philippine resources had begun, but guerrillas aimed to stop it.

Under army protection, Mitsui Kozan began extracting copper ore from the Mankayan Copper Mine in northern Luzon.\textsuperscript{1098} To get the mines working, the JMA and Fourteenth Army Headquarters stripped ten idle gold mines around Baguio of materials formerly imported from the United States. They hired a Japanese resident of Manila who worked as a machinist at the Balatoc mine to oversee the transfer of power generators from mines at Suyoc and Balatoc.

With the mines heavily guarded, guerrillas attacked the transport of ore along the Naguilian Road through Baguio towards Poro. “As a result,” one historian

\textsuperscript{1096} Setsuho, 159.  
\textsuperscript{1097} Setsuho, 146.  
\textsuperscript{1098} Ibid., 140-141.
wrote, “not only was the transport of materials, equipment, and extracted ore, slowed down, but the availability of truck drivers and general workers was also seriously affected.”

In Bohol, guerrillas abducted and killed Japanese employees at the Nihon Kogyo manganese mine. Surviving workers fled. Production halted. Only after Japanese soldiers arrived to increase security and coerce workers did limited production begin again. The guerrillas had, however, disrupted Japanese exploitation of resources, interrupted employment necessary to the occupation economy, and diverted the Japanese military from preparations to defend the Islands from MacArthur’s return.

The Tai Kogyo Company won the contract to operate the Toledo copper mine on Cebu but guerrilla activity delayed operations there for eight months. In mid-1942, Cushing and Fenton decided to combine forces and established dual command on the island. Fenton assumed administrative command with headquarters in Maslog. Seven miles away Cushing took charge of the combat guerrillas from a base at Mangalon Heights. They organized their units into battalions and staff sections along U.S. Army lines. “The Cebu area long enjoyed the reputation for having killed more Japanese than any other area,” SWPA would note, “In their efforts to stamp out Japanese and Japanese sympathizers, the men, reportedly under Fenton, went to extremes and many wanton killings of innocent citizens were reported.”

Suspecting local power politics coloring such reports, MacArthur’s staff commented:

1099 Ibid., 141.
1100 Ibid., 159.
1101 Ibid. 157.
1102 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 35.
“Although there was a certain amount of killing and destruction, it appears possible that this feature was exaggerated by Kangleon, Fertig, Parsons, and Ingeniero, who had ambitions regarding Cebu.”

Guerrillas on Panay conducted similar acts of intimidation. When the Ishihara Sangyo Company tried to recruit 2,000 workers to reopen the vital copper mine in Antique, few came forward. From 23 to 27 September, guerrillas attacked the mine killing between twelve to sixteen Japanese employees. Only efforts of the Japanese air force broke the guerrilla siege. By the end of the year the Japanese army had to garrison the area around the mines and guard 385 POWs who were brought from Manila to get the mines operating again.

Representatives of Taiwan Takushoku, Kurha Boseki, Toyo Menka, and Toyo Boseki companies arrived in Negros to develop cotton fields. Here too, guerrilla activity foiled plans and eventually forced a retreat to Luzon. The JMA adjusted by redrawing districts so as to assign all nine cotton companies working in the Philippines land on Luzon for their operations. Still, at the height of the planting season in October, only 1,688 acres had been planted.

On 20 August, the Negros guerrillas elected Professor Bell to organize their forces. He recruited local Chinese merchant Manuel Sy Cip to obtain supplies. After getting his organization up and running, Bell sought an experienced officer to take charge. He asked Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Gador, then hiding in Negros’ central

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1103 Intelligence Activities, 18.
1104 Setsuho, 147.
1105 Yoshiko, 182.
mountains, but he declined. Bell then found Constabulary Major Placido Ausejo, a fifty-one-year-old Silliman University graduate, to assume command. “He is disciplined, mature in judgment and a good organizer,” noted U.S. Army intelligence, “all excellent assets in establishing a guerrilla movement about to go wild.” In October, Ausejo named his 1,000-man guerrilla force the 75th Regiment and placed his headquarters in Malabo. It became a well-disciplined and popularly supported unit.

On nearby Negros Siquitor, a retired Philippine Scout, Major Benito Cunanan, had organized two battalions of guerrillas and in August, drove off the first of several attempted Japanese landings. Greater challenges for Cunanan would come from Gador.

A contretemps raged on Panay where Peralta competed with Confesor for leadership. The two sides fought over personnel, supplies, money, citizens’ rights, and control of the Provincial Guards. Peralta had the more powerful force. He had started with about 2,000 soldiers and grew his organization into the 8,000-man Free Panay Guerrilla Forces (FPFG). Confesor’s long-time political foe, assemblyman Jose Zulueta, joined Peralta. Confesor retained authority derived from the people’s loyalty and stood guard for their rights against guerrilla transgressions. The contest devolved to an uneasy balance: Peralta would try not to interfere with government rule and Confesor’s Provincial Guards as long as Confesor saw that seventy-five per

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1106 Scott A. Mills, *Stranded in the Philippines: Professor Bell’s Private War Against the Japanese* (Annapolis, Maryland: the Naval Institute Press, 2009), Chapter 9.
1107 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 74. Interestingly, in 1948 Willoughby noted: “Recent evidence appears to substantiate earlier impressions that Ausejo was made to seem a more skillful commander than was apparently justified.” *Intelligence Activities*, 19.
1108 Ibid., 57
cent of taxes collected on Panay went to Peralta. With this, nearly 15,000 united guerrillas held at bay more than 5,000 Japanese troops on Panay.

Central Luzon, D254/R-795

Outside Manila in August, Harry McKenzie, an American miner married to Filipina named Mary with a six-year-old son, arrived to join Lapham. “Harry was a proverbial diamond in the rough: he had little formal education but was faithful and dependable,” Volckmann recalled, “I soon made him district commander of Nueva Ecija as well as my executive officer – in effect, my right-hand man.” Mary’s cousin, Manuel Bahia, became Harry’s adjutant.

Volckmann and Blackburn had by now spent two months recuperating in the Fassoth camp and wanted out. The camp wallowed in despair. “I mean, most of the talk that you would hear was, ‘They’re not ever coming back. How are we going to survive?’” Blackburn recalled, “and, ‘People don’t give a damn.’ They were trying to survive and had their doubts about that. They didn’t have a spark to start thinking about anything like resistance or guerrilla warfare.” The refugee soldiers rejected military rank, order and discipline and were outright belligerent. Sanitation literally went out the window. Through leadership by example, the two officers gradually reasserted rank and structure and instituted a program of slit trench latrines.

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1109 Lapham and Norling, 39.
1110 Blackburn Interview, 86.
Bernia told the two Americans that an increasing number of armed bandit gangs calling themselves guerrillas, some with Americans, were abusing people in the area. “He felt the need to get something organized to control all of this,” Blackburn wrote, “He pointed out this group with Merrill and Cayler, and asked Russ and me to accompany him to visit them to discuss these problems.”\textsuperscript{1112} Volckmann and Blackburn were eager. They started north on 18 August. Again, locals along the route fed and sheltered them and at times provided carabao carts for travel.

Bernia took the Americans to Natividad where they met Colonel Gyles Merrill. “They had recently moved him to the Natividad area,” wrote Volckmann, “but it was obvious to us that the colonel was still in bad shape.”\textsuperscript{1113} Blackburn and Volckmann ran into prewar acquaintances Colonel Pete Cayler and Captain George Crane who were staying with some other Americans as guests of a Chinese mestizo family named Jinco. After three days the two officers decided to find Thorp and Merrill drafted a message to give him. When it was time to move the two men were reluctant. “I hadn’t tasted food like that even before the war,” said Blackburn, “The Jinco daughters prided themselves on their cooking, and I’m telling you, those Chinese gals could really put it on. They were beautiful girls.”\textsuperscript{1114} Fine food, fresh linen, and comfortable beds tempted them to stay, but Volckmann and Blackburn again headed north.

On 20 August, the party came across Wainwright’s former cook who swore he had recently seen the general on a train headed for Manila where he was to be

\textsuperscript{1112} Blackburn Interview, 85.
\textsuperscript{1113} Volckmann, 67.
\textsuperscript{1114} Blackburn Interview, 86-87.
shipped to Formosa. That evening Volckmann and Blackburn arrived at Thorp’s camp near Timbu, west of Fort Stotsenburg. The colonel struck his visitors as being willfully uninterested in the war and irritated by the arrival of anyone determined to fight.\footnote{Guardia, \textit{American Guerilla}, 63.} Volckmann and Blackburn delivered Merrill’s message. Volckmann recalled, “Thorp burst into a rage because the letter seemed to assume that Merrill was the supreme commander of guerrillas on Luzon.”\footnote{Lapham and Norling, 37.} “He believed that he was the only legitimate one authorized to do this,” observed Blackburn, “He assumed a very arrogant attitude about it.”\footnote{Blackburn Interview, 86.} Whether Merrill realized it or not, Thorp had received his authority directly from MacArthur. In a series of messages and diplomatic exchanges, Merrill accepted recognition from Thorp as subordinate commander in Zambalese.

At Thorp’s camp Volckmann took note of a group of men around him. “Many became extremely pessimistic, firmly convinced that we had no chance to survive – to them it was only a question of time and events.”\footnote{Volckmann, 69-70.} Illness easily tipped these men into despair. Yet Volckmann spotted a second group who seemed more ‘determined and optimistic’ per day, defying desperation. Finally, Volckmann identified a third group: “Some individuals’ minds became so confused and distorted that it was hard to imagine they had once been normal Americans. They sank to the level of beasts, and became so self-centered in their fight for existence that they would stop to anything, regardless of the effect on others. Stealing, cheating, lying or
even murder cam easy to them if to their distorted minds it seemed to be to their advantage."\textsuperscript{1119}

After two days, Volckmann and Blackburn concluded: “Thorp had no brains.”\textsuperscript{1120} Upon learning that Moses and Noble and earlier passed through and headed north, they decided to find them ask for a guide to lead them through the central plains. Thorp agreed to have them escorted as far as Hukbalahap territory. Volckmann and Blackburn spent another day with Thorp and witnessed a Japanese attack. On 24 August, they departed with their Filipino guide, nicknamed Kid Muscles. They skirted around the internment camp at Camp O’Donnell before reaching the camp of sixty year-old Huk leader Esuebio Aquino who had felt slighted by Thorp.\textsuperscript{1121} After Volckmann declined Aquino’s offer to become his military advisor, the Huk offered quarters and food for the night and a guide to take them farther north in the morning.

Washington, D265/R-784.

Chick Parsons arrived with his family in New York City on 29 August. He reported to the Navy and learned he had officially been missing in action. Parsons settled his wife and children with family in North Carolina and reported to duty in Washington, D.C. where he delivered the intelligence file he had assembled in Manila to Colonel Joseph Evans in Army G-2.\textsuperscript{1122} Parson got word to old friends like Peter Grim, his boss from the Luzon Stevedoring Company, of his return to the living.

\textsuperscript{1119} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{1120} Blackburn Interview, 90.
\textsuperscript{1121} Guardia, \textit{American Guerilla}, 64.
\textsuperscript{1122} Ingham, 48-49.
Grim, now a U.S. Army Transportation Corps colonel in Brisbane, brought Parson's story to the attention of the Allied Intelligence Bureau. At the time the Army headquarters in Washington focused on the pending landings in North Africa. Given the lack of Army units in the Pacific, the burden of collecting and analyzing signal radio intelligence fell to MacArthur's Central Bureau Brisbane. They needed help. Before the end of the year, SWPA sent a message to Washington: “SEND PARSONS IMMEDIATELY – MACARTHUR.”

Northern Luzon, D268/R-781

Thorpe by now led the most wide-ranging guerrilla unit on Luzon. Headquartered at Camp Chavez on Mount Pinatubo at Timbo, Pampanga, the Central Luzon Guerrilla Force (CLGF) had become well organized and staffed. He scheduled a conference of his district commanders for 29 August at his headquarters. A Tagalog runner named Rodriguez betrayed the meeting to the Japanese, but he got the date wrong. The Japanese raided the site twenty-four hours too early. Thorp escaped with his headquarters to Santa Juliana in Tarlac province where former mayor Marcos Laxamana, the uncle of Thorp's secretary and mistress Minang, greeted them.

Near La Paz, Tarlac, Volckmann and Blackburn met guerrillas who brought them to Robert Lapham’s headquarters on 1 September. They found him confined to

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1123 Ind, 145.
1125 Ingham, 48-49.
1126 Lapham and Norling, 49.
bed with fever and tended to by an African-American veteran of the Spanish American War, Mr. Brunch, who “carried a lot of influence in the area. He was a big help to Lapham with food and other things.”

Volckmann and Blackburn learned that Moses and Noble had established a base farther north. Lapham provided guides and, on 4 September, they continued to march north.

A timely warning from a native enabled Volckmann’s party to escape a Japanese ambush along their path before he and Blackburn reached a camp near San Nicolas established by Walter Cushing’s brother, Charlie – a “very placid, pleasant sort of fellow.” They found among the sick guerrillas recovering in the camp malaria-ridden Lieutenant Rufino Baldwin who had been with the 11th Infantry Regiment on Bataan. After recovering Baldwin moved on to the Itogon mining area to raise his own guerrilla force. Volckmann and Blackburn also met two American miners, John French and Herb Swick. When Cushing said Noble and Moses were near Bokod in Benguet, Swick agreed to lead the way there.

As Volckmann and Blackburn journeyed through the mountains near Benguet, they felt invigorated by the crisp, clean air. It was an area as yet untouched by the Japanese. They came across veteran Irish miner American Patrick O’Day who shared a house with a Belgian priest. Malaria and dysentery had reduced O’Day to “a walking skeleton.” A native arrived with a message for Volckmann and

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1127 Blackburn Interview, 95.
1128 Ibid., 98.
1129 Volckmann, 80.
Blackburn from Moses and Noble asking to meet at Barrio Benning where Benguets, the southernmost of the Igorot peoples, lived in grass houses raised on stilts.\textsuperscript{1130}

On 9 September, Blackburn and Volckmann finally met Moses and Noble who brought along Captain Parker Calvert and Lieutenant Arthur Murphy. The two colonels briefed their visitors on the situation in northern Luzon. In nearby hills Walter Cushing led the 121\textsuperscript{st} Regiment, Nakar commanded the 14\textsuperscript{th} Regiment, and Calvert had the 43\textsuperscript{rd} Regiment. Praeger led guerrillas in Cagayan province. They believed Ablan still had a force in Ilocos Norte. Philippine Army Captain Ali al Raschid led guerrillas in Kalinga province. Lieutenant Rufino Baldwin was building a command in Benguet. To the north more guerrillas followed Bado Dangwa, the former transportation executive. It sounded impressive but disorganized. Volckmann asked the obvious question: was Moses, the senior American officer, in command of all these guerrillas? “No,” he answered, “to date we have been surveying the situation and have been resting to get our health back. As yet we haven’t decided the question of taking over command.”\textsuperscript{1131} They thought Volckmann and Blackburn needed more rest too. The next day Herb Swick led Volckmann and Blackburn to a doctor near Barrio Uding. Moses and Noble headed back north.

Four families resided near the abandoned mines around Uding. The elderly Pearsons were Americans who had come from the Itogon Mine south of Baguio accompanied by their son, his wife and the Moule family. Also from Itogon came Filipino Dr. Biason, who had studied in Minnesota, and his wife, a nurse from Wisconsin. “After a few hours with them I felt that I had been lifted into a new

\textsuperscript{1130} Guardia, \textit{American Guerilla}, 73.  
\textsuperscript{1131} Volckmann, 84.
world,” Volckmann wrote, “and that I was father away from the war than at any time since it began.” Their crude houses, with running water from a nearby stream, used a water-powered automobile generator for a radio and lights. Each night a different family fed the visitors. Biason and his wife tended to the officers. Volckmann began to regain his health but Blackburn’s illness lingered.

Swick took Volckmann to the abandoned Bodok mines where a caretaker kept a house and mill in good order. Volckmann recovered material from some machine belts to repair his worn-out shoes. At the nearby mining camp at Barrio Equip he encountered the Belgian priest who shared his dwindling supply of canned goods and O’Day, Private Gattie and a miner named Harris. The 6,000-foot high camp had good air and an abundance of food. “In addition to mountain rice, we had cabbage, camotes, pork, chicken, beef, and once in a while a little coffee,” Volckmann recalled. Blackburn was soon well enough to join them at Camp Equip and brought with him a message from Noble and Moses calling for a meeting in 1 October. After two weeks at Equip, Volckmann and Blackburn set out to meet Thorp at Barrio Caraw.

Meanwhile, Walter Cushing left his 121st Infantry Regiment area around Abra and La Union Province and went to Kabugao, Apayao, to see Praeger and deliver intelligence reports. Praeger used the Buhay Mine radio to relay the reports to SWPA, including the first details of the Bataan Death March. Cushing then, ignoring Praeger’s warnings, set out to find guerrilla units causing hardships to

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1132 Ibid., 85.
1133 Ibid., 85.
civilians in the Isabela province. Near Jones, Cushing and three of his men accepted an invitation to dinner at a local farmer’s house. As they left the dinner, a Japanese patrol waiting outside the house shot and killed Cushing and his men. As told to Volckmann: “Cushing fell wounded, and though riddled with bullets, he managed to empty all but one round from his .45 revolver into the Japs. The remaining round he put through his head.”

The Japanese sent patrols into Abra that captured most of Cushing’s officers, including his successor, Captain William Arthur. Major George Barnett managed to avoid the Japanese and rallied the remnants of Cushing's guerrillas in the area northwest of San Fernando, La Union. Seizing the initiative, he dodged enemy patrols to harass their lines of communications.

Mindanao, D279/R-770

On Mindanao, a Muslim force under Manalo Mindalano attacked a Japanese garrison at Ganassi. In response, on 12 September, Lieutenant Sunao Yoshioka led an infantry attack against guerrillas reported near Tamparan on the west shore of Lake Lanao. The company ran into an ambush by bolo-wielding Moros and suffered nearly complete destruction. Months of fighting followed. The Japanese at Ganassi in Lanao opted to remain in their garrison and avoid antagonizing the local Moros.

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1134 Volckmann, 35.
1135 Volckmann, 36.
1136 Midori, 113.
Colonel Utsunomiya Naokata arrived in Manila to assume duties as the Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of the General Affairs Department in the JMA. He came intending to deal with the Philippine elite “as gentleman in order not to insult their character.” In accordance with this approach, on 20 September the Japanese Army Department of Information tried to demonstrate their country’s ancient ties to Christianity and the Philippines. It sponsored a Catholic mass at San Marcelino as a farewell to members of the Religious Section who were about to return to Japan. They dedicated the mass to medieval Japanese feudal lords Takayama Ukon and Naito Joan, Christians who escaped persecution in 1613 and settled in Manila. Five members of the Religious Section stayed in Manila at the University of San Tomas seminary.

By now the Japanese Army suspected that the Church supported the guerrillas. For four months Bishop Taguchi drafted four documents to guide Filipinos towards Japanese interests: “Trends in Religious Propaganda in the Philippines,” “Memorandum on the Necessity of Religious Instruction in the Philippines: The Issue of Public Schools,” “Proposed Agreement Between the Japanese Imperial Government and the Vatican,” and, “Concerning the Proposed Agreement with the Vatican Regarding the Catholic Church in the Philippines.” The military then demanded he remove all foreign priests from duties in the Islands. Foreign Caucasians comprised slightly more than half of the priests and nearly one out of ten of all administrators in the Church in the Philippines. Taguchi knew the

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1137 Satoshi, 28
1138 Takefumi, 226.
Vatican had promised in 1926 to place Philippine priests in the Church hierarchy, schools, and parishes. Removing the foreigners and appointing Filipino priests could satisfy the military, please the Island’s Catholics, and divide the Church from the guerrillas. Taguchi decided to risk irritating the Vatican and follow JMA orders.

There were other Church reforms that could potentially win Filipino support. Many Filipinos had long resented special tax exemptions enjoyed by the Church on its vast estates. For many also the legal mandate requiring all children to attend Catholic education in public schools was an irritation. Bishop Taguchi proposed legal changes to allow taxes on all Church property not used for religious activity and to make Catholic education optional in public schools. Contrary to the wishes of the Japanese military, however, he argued that the Church must be allowed to still operate Catholic schools. Taguchi also insisted that changes in Church policies had to be done with Vatican approval. He joined Toyoaki Ono of the Religious Section and Belgian priest Father Bromman of Manila along with Tokyo-appointed former Chancellor to France Ken Harada in a special emissary mission to the Vatican to push the reforms.

Outside Manila, Ramsey had fallen so ill that Barker carried him back to the Fassoth camp. There, Captain Warshal, an escaped Army doctor, tended to Ramsey while Barker assessed the camp. The Fassoths were now hosting more than one hundred American refugee soldiers. None seemed anxious to leave. As Ramsey recovered he tried to recruit the idle soldiers. Several bluntly told Ramsey: “We’re not guerrillas. If we’re captured we will be treated as prisoners of war. But if they
take us with you, we might all be killed.”1139 Not one soldier volunteered to go with Ramsey; some told him to leave and not come back.

Ramsey began to consider trying to lead guerrillas and asked Barker what he knew about guerrilla warfare. Barker admitted, “I guess I was absent the day they taught that at the Point.”1140 In fact, the U.S. Army did not teach irregular warfare. Ramsey surmised, “But we’re cavalrymen and we understand shock, surprise, and mobility, and I guess that’s what guerrilla fighting is all about.”1141 They would look for other sources of information.

Thorp learned from the Hukbalahaps. “Through contact with the Huks,” Ramsey recalled, “Barker and I managed to obtain a copy of Mao’s book on guerrilla warfare, and we passed it back and forth, studying it in our spare time and discussing its lessons over meals and on the march.”1142 Mao said, Ramsey noted, that guerrillas had to “stay on the defensive but assume the initiative, take advantage of the terrain and the fact that the Japs are fighting in a foreign country among a hostile population. We have to stay flexible but organized and avoid pitched battles. Most of all, we have to build our credibility and get the people on our side. We fight only when we have the advantage, but we don’t take on the enemy directly.”1143 Barker balked at the political purpose behind Mao’s operations. “Our job isn’t to start a revolution,” he noted, “it’s to prepare for MacArthur’s invasion. We’re military men, not politicians.”1144

1139 Ramsey and Rivele, 136.
1140 Ibid., 100.
1141 Ibid.
1142 Ibid., 112.
1143 Ibid.
1144 Ibid., 112-113.
Like other guerrilla leaders, Ramsey and Barker learned through trial and error. Volckmann explained: “We all had to learn the hard way. Every mistake, when the chips were down, cost plenty, and the cost in this game was lives and equipment. From the beginning of our overt operations against the Japs I had the opportunity to observe and analyze the many related factors as they affected guerrilla warfare and resistance movements in general. My conclusions at that time seemed sound, and today as I review them my convictions become even more firm.”¹¹⁴⁵

Travelling south of Porac, Ramsey suffered a malarial fit as he arrived in a barrio where terrified locals informed him that a Huk war party was in town. Assisted by Cadizon, he climbed into a hut to meet the Huk patrol leader. A dozen armed Huks grabbed him just before he passed out from illness. He awoke in a dark hut hearing Huks outside arguing in Pampango dialect. Cardizon said a Huk lieutenant was saying Tarluc had denounced Ramsey as a German spy and ordered his execution.¹¹⁴⁶ Cardizon then dragged Ramsey under the rear of the hut into the cane fields and jungle ahead of the pursuing Huks. Before they made it back to their base, the Japanese raided nearby Timbo, burned the village to the ground, and scattered the inhabitants.

In Porac, their new area of operations, Barker and Ramsey reached out to known anti-Japanese civilians. They recruited five local leaders. Barker cast his eyes on a bigger prize: Manila with its supplies, money and intelligence. Alejandro Santos and Fausto Alberto volunteered to go to their homes in Manila and establish guerrilla cadres. Japanese propaganda covered Manila in an attempt to deprive the

¹¹⁴⁵ Volckmann, 105.
¹¹⁴⁶ Ramsey and Rivele, 129.
guerrillas of support. “Garish, gigantic billboards now plastered the city, the guerrillas said, proclaiming ‘Asia for the Asiatics’ and ‘Drive out western imperialism,’ and setting forth, painfully, the rules and regulations under which the Filipinos were expected to live.”\textsuperscript{1147} Kempeitai Colonel Akira Nagahama had drawn up a list of specific targets for bounty hunters, headed by the names Thorp, Moses, Noble, Praeger, McGuire, Barker and Ramsey.\textsuperscript{1148}

Santos and Alberto found civilians in Manila already forming resistance groups. By the end of the month they were funneling vital information to Barker, who bundled it and sent it by messenger to the southern islands for relay to SWPA. Local volunteers – men and women – acted as couriers. “They went understanding full well that if they were caught they would be tortured for information and then executed. Many we never saw again.”\textsuperscript{1149} Determined to see for himself the situation in the capital, Joe Barker snuck into Manila at the end of October.

Dennis Molintas, a farm school principal and army reserve major who had not been activated, arrived at Bokod and reported to Moses who authorized him to raise a guerrilla company. Later in the year Moses would combine Dangwa’s force with Molinatas to form the 12\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment. Volckmann commented: “Dangwa was undoubtedly the most influential and respected native in the Mountain province and was admired and respected by the natives throughout North Luzon. He possessed an unusual understanding of his people; he was just, and his

\textsuperscript{1147} Villamor, 75.
\textsuperscript{1148} Ramsey and Rivele, 116-125.
\textsuperscript{1149} Ibid., 116.
word was as good as gold. To the majority of the natives, his word was law.”

Moses then formed the 66th Infantry Regiment in Baguio and other communities from the 43rd Infantry, the 11th Infantry, and the 12th Infantry regiments. Ever present danger tempered any satisfaction he might have felt with his growing guerrilla force. Before the end of the month, hostile patrols killed Captain Jack Spies while moving south to assume his designated command.

In Manila on 20 September, Begnino Aquino moved to get an armed Filipino force on the side of the Japanese and collaborationist government. He sent a seven-page memorandum to the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces outlining a plan to issue a P5,000,000 bond to buy arms and ammunition for the Constabulary. Once armed, Aquino wanted to use the native force “to diminish the activities of the lawless elements. The way we can combat this campaign is by informing the people of the true state of affairs and by specifically convincing them that in no way can America win this war.” The Japanese did not act on the plan, indicating their doubts that armed Filipinos would fight against the guerrillas.

In Pampanga, Major Emilio Hernandez brought in four guerrilla units to join Lapham’s organization. Captain Gemeniano de Leon became commander of Squadron 206. Lapham promoted Sergeant Albert Short to lieutenant and appointed him district commander for northeastern Nueva Ecija and southern Nueva Vizcaya provinces. Short recruited Captain Carlos Nocum and his small band of guerrillas. Lapham designated them Squadron 311. Soon after, Japanese patrols hit their area hard and pushed the guerrillas back twenty-five miles into Pantabangan. “Short was

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1150 Volckmann, 145.
1151 Abaya, 44.
shot in the arm during a skirmish with a rival band of Filipino guerrillas,” Lapaham recalled, “and while he was still weak from his wound the Japanese renewed their pursuit. In attempting to escape from them, he was shot and killed.”1152

One evening in Pantabangan, ill with malaria, Lapham sat on the edge of hill and gazed at the distant barrios. “Never in my life have I felt so alone, so misplaced, so utterly estranged from normal human existence.”1153 He saw his forces as hopelessly disorganized and scattered. As Lapham noted, “When the physical resources of troops have been sapped by chronic disease and protracted semi-starvation, their will to fight declines along with their ability to do so.”1154 Idle moments magnified fears and tested the guerrilla leaders. The remedy was to be active.

Truckloads of Japanese unloaded near Umingan and spread out into the jungle. Natives reported that the patrols were going to raid Camp Manchuria in revenge for the beheading of the collaborationist mayor of Umingan. Lapham’s men slung their ailing commander into a hammock and took turns carrying him away. Several times he ordered his men “to put me down beside the trail and let me die in peace.”1155 Esteban Lumyeb repeated: “Not now, sir. We can make it. You will see, sir.”1156 One night in a house just outside Umingan, the Japanese arrived just as Lapham and his bodyguard Lalugan escaped out the back door.

1152 Lapham and Norling, 40.
1153 Ibid., 41.
1154 Ibid., 43.
1155 Ibid., 44.
1156 Ibid., 45.
The Japanese had opened an intensive campaign in northern Luzon that drove a number of guerrillas to surrender. According to Agoncillo, “One of them, Lieutenant Leandro Rosario, actively collaborated with the enemy and pointed to Nakar’s hideout.”1157 On 29 September a Japanese patrol from Baguio conducted a raid near Jones, Isabela, and captured Nakar and his radio. It involved more than betrayal. Radio contact with MacArthur had elevated Nakar’s stature and increased his desire for communication. Without codes, however, he had to provide “long and detailed instructions for codes and deceptive timing to mislead the Japanese.”1158 The long transmissions enabled Japanese direction-finding equipment on ships off shore to accurately plot the source of Nakar’s signals. After that, it was relatively easy to find the major.

The Japanese hoped to gain Nakar’s cooperation but he refused. Even after months of torture he still held out. Finally, in October 1943, they beheaded Nakar in the North Cemetery in Manila.1159 Without their leader, most of his 5,000 men surrendered; the rest dispersed into the mountains.1160 What was left of the 14th Infantry passed to Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Enriquez, commander of the 2nd Battalion. Enriquez concentrated on intelligence coordination with the 43rd, 121st and 14th Infantry Regiments. He daringly located his headquarters inside a Nacoco Store (a trading post authorized by the Japanese) in Baguio. It was a brilliant choice as agents posing as salesmen could easily come and go bringing intelligence.1161

1158 Breuer, 47.
1159 Volckmann, page 139.
1160 See Memorandum, “Summary History of Organization of A.I.B.,” 25 January 1943, Box 469 RG 496, Philippine Archives, NARA II
1161 Guerrilla Resistance Movements in the Philippine,” 41.
Visayas, D291/R-758

Across the Islands, guerrilla groups allied and adjusted alliances. In Bicol, Turko merged his VTG with Miranda’s TVGU guerrillas around 24 September.\textsuperscript{1162} Under their strict policies against rape and other crimes, Turko “never once molested any civilian.”\textsuperscript{1163} He moved his troops from Camarines Norte to Camarines Sur in hopes of leaving their bad reputation behind. Turko tried to justify his men’s repute as part of guerrilla warfare. “But rape can never be an inevitable extreme measure or put more bluntly, a war policy,” Barrameda wrote, “Neither is the public humiliation and killing of non-combatants, collaborators as they may have reportedly been.”\textsuperscript{1164} After several months, however, Turko withdrew the VTG from the TVGU to again become an independent group.

On Negros, Lieutenant Colonel Gador’s habit of promoting relatives to senior positions irritated many of his officers. Mercado withdrew his force from Gador’s command. Meanwhile on nearby Negros Siquijor, Benito Cunanan’s men continued to drive off attempted Japanese landings and even assassinated the Japanese appointed governor. In October, Cunanan agreed to join his guerrillas to Ausejo’s 75\textsuperscript{th} Regiment as the 4\textsuperscript{th} Provisional Battalion.

In northeast Palawan, Alfred and Paul Cobb continued to expand their guerrilla Home Guard out of Danlig with a unit on Dumaran Island. Alfred made contact with American airmen from the 48\textsuperscript{th} Material Command hiding on Cuyo

\textsuperscript{1162} Boayes did not join Miranda in July as SWPA thought. Barrameda, 146.
\textsuperscript{1163} Ibid., 148.
\textsuperscript{1164} Ibid., 147.
Island. Some of these men agreed to join the force on Palawan, others would connect the group to Amores on Busanga. They collected food, arms, boats, and other supplies and drafted plans for attacking Puerto Princesa.

When Carlos Amores led the uprising against the Japanese occupied manganese mines in Busuanga-Coron on Palawan, he went to Danlig to ask to the Cobb Brothers for aid. He returned to Busuanga but Japanese counteraction, and a lack of food, forced him to leave with about a hundred men for Sibaltan in northern Palawan. There he joined with the Cobbs as C Company in the Palawan Special Battalion. This brought the Cobb Group to about 150 armed men. There would be no more guerrilla operations on Coron or Busuanga, only agents gathering intelligence.
7. Divisions

6 October 1942– 6 January 1943

As MacArthur’s headquarters prepared to send agents into the Philippines, the now numerous guerrilla groups experienced friction over territory, supplies, and authority. Conflict arose over many pre-war political and social divisions. With the hardships of occupation, no sign of MacArthur’s promised return, and impactful Japanese counterinsurgency operations, Filipino resistance entered a trying time.

Mindanao, D303/R-746

On 6 October, Japanese troops on the inter-island streamer Tular tried to dock at Misamis City harbor but were surprised and driven off by guerrillas firing from the town’s old Spanish fort under a suddenly-raised American flag.\textsuperscript{1165} Developments on the island caught them by surprise. Former USAFFE soldiers, Philippine Constabulary, Philippine Scouts, U.S. Navy, and civilians had formed numerous hometown barrio bands east of Misamis Oriental, north of Agusan and Surigao. “They were led by natural leaders,” SWPA later reported, “who assumed their responsibilities for various reasons – personal aggrandizement, banditry, desire to fight the Japs or establishment of law and order.”\textsuperscript{1166} Private First Class Clyde Abbott of the 14\textsuperscript{th} Bomb Squadron and Lieutenant Pedro Collado of the Philippine Constabulary had led Filipino guerrillas in a successful attack on a

\textsuperscript{1165} Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 123.
\textsuperscript{1166} Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 94.
Japanese patrol out to establish a puppet government in Balingasag.\textsuperscript{1167} Yet many of these groups, like those led by U.S. Army Air Corps veterans Master Sergeant James McIntyre at Claveria and Master Sergeant Alfredo Fernandez at Malitbog, refused to cooperate with each other.

The Japanese had remained focused on Moro bands like those around Lake Lanao under datu ‘Brigadier General’ Busran Kalaw. Though he was reportedly anti-American, he was actually just anti-anyone not Moro.\textsuperscript{1168} Weak bands under Manuel Fortich and Vincente Leuterio appeared in southern Bukidnon and reached out to Pendatun who was waging a successful campaign with 2,400 men to drive the Japanese out of Kibawe, Maramag, Valencia and Mailag before the end of the year. Meanwhile other groups formed in northeast Mindanao: Macario Diaz in Masgad, Major Garcia in central Surigao, and Captain Tomanning at Lianga. A U.S. Army assessment noted: “These small groups were loosely controlled and behaved as bandits in their areas. They inflicted damage against property, refused to submit to each other and gave the guerrillas a bad name generally. It appeared as though establishment of order in these areas would be difficult.”\textsuperscript{1169}

When the Japanese invaded, American mestizo Luis Morgan (also known as William Morgan and Morgan Morgan) was a lieutenant in the Philippine Constabulary on Mindanao. One guerrilla described him as “outgoing but demanding, almost arrogant. He had a swashbuckling air about him, with a tommy

\textsuperscript{1167} Ibid., 95.  
\textsuperscript{1168} Keats, 131.  
\textsuperscript{1169} Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 95-96.
gun strapped across his chest.”\textsuperscript{1170} Just before Sharp surrendered, Morgan received orders to take his troop from Kolambugan to Lake Lanano. Instead, he burned the sawmill at Kolambugan and headed for distant Baroy, picking up about four hundred Philippine soldiers along the way. At his destination, Morgan found the Christian town suffering from Moro raids. He reportedly gathered Baroy’s roughly thirty Moro men, women, and children into a warehouse and slaughtered them with machine gun fire.\textsuperscript{1171} He then set himself up as a warlord, demanding money and food for his men, and a new woman for his bed each night.

Bill Tait, son of an African-American Buffalo soldier and a Moro woman, arrived in Lanae. Tait had survived a troubled youth and now joined the puppet Bureau of Constabulary where he rose to the rank of lieutenant. Quickly tiring of the Japanese, however, he wandered out to join Morgan offering information on the disarray among the guerrillas across Mindanao.

In August, Morgan learned of Fertig nearby and sent Tait to him with a proposition. Morgan had gathered more men than any self-promoted captain leading some un-surrendered Filipino officers of higher rank to signal their desire to take over his operation. To keep his command, and perhaps expand it, he proposed to spread a rumor that MacArthur had sent a brigadier general to Mindanao to command the resistance. He asked Fertig to show up at Baroy and claim to be that general. Fertig would get to play the boss while Morgan ran the show as Fertig’s Chief of Staff. Tait asked Fertig to come see Morgan to discuss the plan.

\textsuperscript{1170} Virginia Hansen Holmes, \textit{Guerrilla Daughter} (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 2009), 73.
\textsuperscript{1171} Keats, 89.
Fertig, however, had ideas of his own. He had assumed that eventually one of the guerrilla bands would come to him seeking his leadership and experience. Only then, from a position of strength, would he join any group. Morgan was welcome to come see him, Fertig told Tait, while he considered the offer. Two weeks passed and civilians grew more resentful of Morgan’s heavy-handed acts while rivals clamored for his command. On 10 September, Morgan at last came to Fertig. Maintaining a voice and posture suited to his superior rank, the American officer grilled Morgan on why he had not followed orders and gone to Lake Lanao. He asked Morgan for plans and staff studies, tables of organization and equipment, and battle rosters. When a humbled Morgan returned three days later with the requested information, Fertig was wearing the silver stars of a brigadier general, fashioned by a Moro silversmith from local coins.

Fertig decided to accept command of Morgan’s guerrillas, but not as a figurehead. He designated Morgan’s force as the 106th Regiment. Headquartered at Misamis, Fertig set out to bring all guerrillas in Mindanao under his command. Captain Joaquin Dismal in nearby Misamis Occidental asked his help to attack a Japanese garrison. Fertig sent Morgan and Tate and they successfully cleared Misamis Occidental and the north coast of Zamboanga. Meanwhile fifty-one year-old Lieutenant Colonel Ciriaco Mortera brought his remnant constabulary force to join Fertig and became the 105th Division in Lanao and Misamis Occidental.

From his headquarters on 18 September, Fertig issued a proclamation addressed to “The United States Army Forces in the Philippines” from the “Office of

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1172 Ibid., 102-104.
the Commanding General in the Field of Mindanao and Sulu.” He announced Morgan had cleared and occupied Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga and raised the American and Filipino flags. He proclaimed the reestablishment of the Philippine Commonwealth Government authority in the liberated areas under Military Authorities. Where civil laws conflicted with military laws, military laws would prevail. Finally, Fertig signed the declaration as “W.W. Fertig, Brigadier General, USA, Commanding Mindanao & Sulu Force.”

Fertig suspected that Morgan resented his command and, given time, would work to replace him. In the meantime, he had to get Morgan away from the men. He decided to send him on a trip around Mindanao to find and recruit all the various guerrillas into his organization. If Morgan succeeded, it would prove his loyalty. If he failed, Morgan would look weak and incompetent. If something unfortunate happened on the trip, it would be a problem solved for Fertig. Over the next few months while Morgan was gone, Fertig would improve his units and gain their loyalty, organize a civil government, and get Charlie Hedges to organize Lanao province. When McClish and Ball arrived in Misamis, Fertig sent McClish to command the guerrillas in northeastern Mindanao with Childress along as his chief of staff. Ball remained at Fertig’s headquarters and later became district communication officer.

Fertig conducted a whirlwind inspection of Misamis Occidental. He found the motor pool Hedge’s had run before the surrender still in good order. His men got the province’s telephone system running again. Chief Petty Officer Offret, who knew a

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1173 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 89.
thing or two about engines, supervised the reopening of the coconut oil factory in Jimenez that had employed many local citizens. The oil would be vital to Fertig’s operations.\footnote{Keats, 123.}

Fertig’s command rapidly absorbed a number of guerrilla bands in Mindanao. On the central north coast near Cayagan between Talakag and Sumilao, the American Air Corps enlisted men who had formed small guerrilla groups now left to find their way to Australia.\footnote{Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 93.} U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Bowler recruited and combined their bands supplied with arms and equipment from prewar stocks. These became Fertig’s 111\textsuperscript{th} and 112\textsuperscript{th} Regiments of the 109\textsuperscript{th} Division. Major Manuel Jaldon organized guerrillas around Alubijid, Misamis Oriental, into the 109\textsuperscript{th} Regiment. Eventually the 111\textsuperscript{th}, 112\textsuperscript{th}, and 117\textsuperscript{th} Regiment formed in this area.

Bowler reported that western Mindanao was an ideal area for guerrillas with good terrain, supportive people, and few enemy troops. "My principal assets are anonymity, lack of roads, and friendly neighbors," he told Fertig, "The Japs know we operate in the hills, but they estimate our potential at five percent of what it is! If they ever suspected my true manpower, courier system, supply areas, and intelligence net, they wouldn’t rest until they had destroyed the organization!"\footnote{Mellnik, 259.} He determined to stay hidden as much as possible and only fight the Japanese when he had no other choice. "Communities provide us with shelter, information, and food, and we never involve them in operations," he said, "When the Japs sweep
through friendly barrios, my men fade into the hills; if necessary, they bury their arms and become farmers!”

When Steve Mellnik joined the unit, he observed: “Though Bowler’s personal qualities did much to stimulate guerrilla cohesion, it was local leadership – Americans who settled in Mindanao after the Spanish-American War – that enabled Bowler to expand the organization. Following USAFFE’s surrender, those veterans left their ranches and businesses and established ‘free’ communities in the mountains. When remnants of USAFFE units coalesced into guerrilla groups, the old-timers volunteered for active duty. Some served in command capacities, others performed supply, administrative, and intelligence functions.”

Fertig instituted a training program focused on tactics and individual soldier skills. For the staff, he prioritized basic administrative procedures, “careful to record service information so that someday his men could collect back pay.” Civilian volunteers used crudely fashioned molds to shape curtain rods into .30 caliber bullets. In a shed in Dipolog, Lieutenant Sol Samonte worked feverishly to find the right mixture of quicksilver from thermometers and other chemicals to make fulminate of mercury for percussion caps. Until he succeeded, they used match heads. They used an old ordnance factory in Jimenez to produce new ejectors for Enfield rifles from old springs. In a rice mill near Oroquieta, a handpicked crew carved hardwood in plates for printing money for the Government of the Free Philippines – notes that (without authority) promised redemption at face value after

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1177 Ibid.
1178 Ibid., 261.
1179 Keats, 160.
1179 Keats, 160.
1180 Ibid., 159.
the war. Outside Bonifacio on Panguil Bay, high school student and International Correspondence School of Scranton Pennsylvania graduate, Geraldo Almendres, filled the floors of a Nipa hut with scavenged parts from radios and a movie sound projector in an attempt to create a long-range transmitter and receiver. Finally, Fertig had his men try to manufacture soap, an item in great demand across the island, to trade on Negros for sugar needed to produce fuel.

In response the 6 October ambush of the streamer *Tular* at the Misamis City docks, the Japanese sent the 10th Independent Garrison’s five battalions to the Mindanao District and the 11th Independent Garrison’s four battalions to the Visayan District. The 16th Division still garrisoned Southern Luzon and the 2nd Regiment and 4th Battalion of the 65th Brigade occupied Northern Luzon. Colonel Yashinari Tanaka commanded western Mindanao under General Morimoto. They all believed ‘General Fertig’ held Misamis with 7,000 guerrilla troops.

Meanwhile, Fertig was finding it difficult to govern people who had routinely relied on direction from their leaders before acting on even mundane problems. War magnified his dilemma. When Morgan confiscated boats, fishermen objected, and the local economy and diets suffered. Fertig decided he had to create a new civilian government to deal with these problems and recruited the highly respected judge Florentino Saguin to become chief of state. Others stepped forward to fill administrative positions. Fertig sought an alliance with the local Catholic Church but Irish Jesuit Father Calanan could offer only his sympathy while insisting the Church

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1181 Ibid., 39.
1182 Keats, 127.
1183 Ibid., 139.
maintain outward neutrality. Unofficially, many priests and nuns became vital agents for Fertig.\textsuperscript{1184} To encourage cooperation, he ordered his headquarters personnel to attend weekly mass. Wisely, he also actively courted the support of the Doña Carmen Ozámiz and her family, the highborn Spanish mestizo kinship network that long held sway in the province.

Men came out of the hills to join Fertig. Millionaire Sam Wilson arrived and took over the printing of money and kept meticulous books for the Treasury. Robert Ball arrived and was put to work with the radio development section. Kenneth Baylay, sick with malaria, escaped with thirteen other patients from a field hospital before it fell to the Japanese. He spent months wandering through Moro country, saw his best friend and fellow traveler John Grant speared to death by Magahats, and wound up with Pendatun. Sensing hostility from Andrews, Baylay left with American Leonard Merchant to join Fertig. He reported a very capable West Pointer and World War I veteran named Colonel Frank McGhee was working on Pendantun's staff.

Seeking food and money, Roy Bell arrived unexpectedly from Negros. Fertig agreed to send food, military supplies and Mindanao Emergency Currency to Negros. In return, Ausejo's 75\textsuperscript{th} Regiment pledged itself to Fertig's command. Bell helped Almendres and Ball construct a radio. When the transmitter started working, Ball used a code cylinder Fertig carried to tap out a Morse code message to the world: "WE HAVE THE HOT DOPE ON THE HOT YANKS IN THE HOT

\textsuperscript{1184} Ibid.
PHILIPPINES.” They failed to realize that without a crystal, their transmitter slid across a broad band of frequencies. Even so, Fertig’s message was heard – at the radio station KFS in San Francisco. When operators heard the message full of slang in obsolete code broadcast on multi-frequencies, they dismissed it as some Japanese effort to jam Allied radio traffic. Any response would let the enemy know the transmission was working so they ignored Fertig’s desperate call.

The notion that the Japanese would dupe the Allied high command by false radio communication was not a product of feverish imaginations. In September 1943, the Japanese captured a thirty-four-man Portuguese-Australian intelligence team in Timor and used their radio to feed false information to the oblivious Allied higher headquarters for the rest of the war.1186

Central Luzon, D304, R-745

A prisoner tortured by the Japanese in Luzon, broke during the first week of October. He confessed to serving as a runner for the Fasoth camp and gave away its location. Fortunately, he got word to the Fasoths before the Japanese arrived. The camp disbanded. A local Negrito with three young wives took Ramsey, Doctor Warshall and Martin Fasoth to a hut in the higher hills. When the men returned, they found only burnt remains of the camp and the throat-slit bodies of a number of guards. They met up with Bill Fasoth and learned that after the expected Japanese raid many men returned to the camp. The Japanese then returned to finish the job,

1185 Ibid., 180.
1186 Spector, 466.
Bill decided to surrender to the Japanese for fear of what they might do to his family. Ramsey said his goodbyes and headed for John Boone’s camp.

By now the dangers posed by the Japanese was well known. “They would take into custody and hold as hostages the immediate members of the families of the known or suspected guerrillas,” recalled Volckmann, “publicly announcing that unless the banditos surrendered, their loved ones would be tortured and all their property confiscated. A means more penetrating and effective could not possibly have been conceived, for while the average Filipino has very little national or state feeling, his family ties are strong and sacred to him.”

On 23 October, as the Americans began to battle the Japanese for Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, word arrived at Thorp’s camp that Minang’s uncle, ex-mayor Laxamana who had welcomed them to Umindang, had been captured. Before his guerrillas could move, however, a Japanese attack captured Thorp and his headquarters on 29 October. The guerrillas believed Laxamana had betrayed Thorp for money. “The guide he had chosen for Thorp, Andres de la Cruz, was released at once by his captors and given back his gun, though the others remained ‘hog tied,’” Lapham noted, “Laxamana received a handsome reward for his treachery. Afterward, he was protected by the Japanese and helped to invest in real estate from which he made a great deal more money, though he may have eventually ended his inglorious career buried alive by guerrillas.”

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1187 Ramsey and Rivele, 141.
1188 Volckmann, 133.
1189 Lapham and Norling, 49.
eventually became guerrilla Ray Hunt’s lover and companion. Lapham said, “Understandably, he esteemed her highly.”

Lapham, Anderson and Ramsey took over Thorp’s organization.

Thorp’s capture erased his arrangement with the Huks, though they still escorted Anderson south to organize guerrillas. The Huks would fight some Americans and maintain decent relations with others. Merrill routinely made deals with them “because he admired their pugnacity.”

Blair Robinett, Joe Barker, and William J. Gardiner also worked with the Huks. Blackburn, Volckmann, Crane, Anderson, Ramsey and James Boyd remained wary.

Clay Conner served in Anderson’s new Squadron 155 in Luzon, commanding a band of several hundred Negritos. He openly admired the Huks’ organization, arms and leaders. “Yet he soon began to notice that he was almost always raided by the Japanese within a day or two after Huk contact,” recalled Lapham, “Then he saw Huks go into small barrios and take guns away from USAFFE guerrillas there. Finally, when he was saved from a Huk ambush only by the loyalty and quick wits of some of his Negrito followers, the last of his illusions about these smart, brave, ‘progressive,’ anti-Fascist warriors evaporated.”

It is interesting to note how the Negritoes who averaged less than five feet tall were considered unusually short. Yet, as Parsons noted the average Philippine guerrilla stood only five feet and two to six inches tall, weighed about a 110 to a

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1190 Ibid., 50.
1191 Ibid., 130.
1192 Ibid., 131.
120-pounds, and was between seventeen and twenty-three years old.\textsuperscript{1193} They often wore uniforms taken from the fallen Japanese and from a distance were almost indistinguishable. Parsons learned one quick method of identification – Japanese never went barefoot and Filipinos seldom wore shoes. In theory, they earned the same pay as American soldiers, but they received maybe ten to fifty pesos of script each month, which they called \textit{tinghoy} – worthless – because there was nothing to buy.\textsuperscript{1194}

Carlos Romulo studied the Japanese soldiers taken prisoner early in the war. He reported: “His weight is from 95 to 125 pounds; his height is five foot-three inches; his age is twenty-three; his length of military service is one and a half years. He comes, as a rule, from the farm.”\textsuperscript{1195} Villamor noted differences between Japanese troops. “The [regular army] Japanese soldiers in Luzon were well-built, of better than average height, and looked well-fed and well-groomed,” he noted, “They were in much better physical appearance than the transient casuals coming from Japan and proceeding to the front, who were younger, weaker, and smaller. One agent reported seeing a whole battalion of these soldiers, and not one of them was over five feet in height.”\textsuperscript{1196}

The Japanese field units enjoyed advantages in firepower, training, experience, and unit cohesion over the guerrillas. In addition to naval gunfire, aircraft, and sometimes tanks, the Japanese were routinely armed with .30 caliber water-cooled machineguns, so-called “knee mortars,” automatic rifles, rifles, and

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\textsuperscript{1193} Ingham, 108. \\
\textsuperscript{1194} Ibid., 169. \\
\textsuperscript{1195} Romulo, 203. \\
\textsuperscript{1196} Villamor, 185.
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According to a U.S. military intelligence officer, the Japanese arms “were of first-rate design and construction” with firearms as effective as Allied weapons but simpler to use.1198 “And the Japanese soldier had the advantage over the American and Filipino,” observed Romulo, “because he is used to living on almost nothing. We were willing to strip comfort to the minimum. But to him that minimum was a luxury.”1199

The regular troops were noted for their prowess in battle. B. David Mann fought in Bataan in 1945 and later wrote, “Japan’s leaders blundered many times during the war, but no one can dispute that the individual Japanese infantryman was among the best the world has ever seen. For tenacity, determination, bravery, and devotion to cause, he has few if any peers.”1200 As Yuki Tanaka explained: “The new military ideology – which placed so much weight on the concepts of no surrender, loyalty through blind obedience, and honor in dying for the emperor – spread throughout the Japanese armed forces with little apparent resistance.”1201 One soldier, Yutaka Yokota, explained: “There’s an old expression, ‘Bushido is the search for a place to die.’ Well, that was our fervent desire, our long-cherished dream. A place to die for my country. I was happy to have been born a man. A man of Japan. I

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1197 Willis and Myers, 106.
1199 Romulo, 198.
1201 Tanaka, 208.
don’t care if it makes me sound egotistical, but that’s how I felt. The country was in my hands.”

In their study of the Japanese soldier, Meirion and Susie Harries, saw in such blind courage a paradoxical weakness. “The utter disregard for danger was rooted not in hope but in resignation to the inevitability of defeat,” they wrote, “‘Dash forward bravely and with joy when meeting difficult situations,’ urged one of the most famous Bushido texts. ‘Common sense will not accomplish great things. Simply become desperate and crazy to die.’” Veteran Suzuki Murio later admitted, “Soldiers like me had no idea why we were fighting this war. We were treated as nothing more than consumable goods.”

As quickly as possible the Imperial Headquarters stripped away top line units from the Philippines for use on other fronts. Newer, greener, Japanese conscripts and reservists arrived to take over occupation duties. In 1940 regular army professionals outnumbered reservists in the Japanese army by a ratio of 2.4 to 1; by 1943 the army contained 1.5 reservists for each regular army soldier. One guerrilla recalled: “The Japanese occupation army was made up of conscripts, not regular army troops, and they were not the bravest of soldiers. A few bursts of rifle and submachine gunfire from a concealed position would disperse them quickly. On

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1203 Harries, 428.
1205 Panlilio, 33.
1206 In 1940 the Japanese army had 910,000 regular troops and 380,000 reservists; in 1943 they had 1,502,000 regular soldiers and 2,295,000 reservists. See Table 11.2 Regular Army and Reserve Troop Numbers, 1937-1945. Edward J. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 2009), 235.
one occasion, however, they came after us in force and routed us completely.”\textsuperscript{1207} Lapham watched his enemy closely and concluded, “Their maneuvers were broad, general sweeps, often appearing to be field exercises for green troops fresh from Japan.”\textsuperscript{1208} As in training exercises, the Japanese operated on exact and predictable timetables. Field officers told Quezon, “Everything with them is like a railroad time schedule.”\textsuperscript{1209}

Typical of Japanese tactics was their raid on Claver, Mindanao, on 30 November 1943. One witness described it: “A Japanese cruiser and several small craft shelled the town and the surrounding hills. They sent landing craft with assault troops ashore and moved inland to a distance of about three miles. Only two of our men were killed but the administrative personnel had to move quickly in order to get back into the hills before getting cut off.”\textsuperscript{1210} The Japanese soldiers appeared reluctant to either venture beyond the range of their naval gunfire support or to stay long in guerrilla controlled territory.

The green troops were less than imposing. Lapham noted, “The Japanese disliked going into the jungle at night so nocturnal ambushes were rare.”\textsuperscript{1211} Ramsey was confident that Japanese patrols “must have hated” operating in his base region “for the Balagbag jungles were alive with snakes and leeches and the rains had swollen the streams to torrents.”\textsuperscript{1212} Others recalled Japanese patrols as “chronically noisy” and said, “We could often hear their conversations and their

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1207] Stahl, 122.
\item[1208] Lapham and Norling, 89.
\item[1209] Quezon, 284.
\item[1210] Holmes, 115.
\item[1211] Lapham and Norling, 89.
\item[1212] Ramsey and Rivele, 252.
\end{footnotes}
clanging equipment long before we encountered them.” Many guerrillas assumed their enemy tried to avoid contact. An enlisted soldier of the 32nd Regiment from Osaka gave credence to this impression. He said, “Why die when you’ve already lost? I guess if you’ve been long on the battlefield, you know instantly whether the enemy’s going to shoot or not. Anyway, that was my philosophy: As long as I don’t fight, I’ll make it home. I believed in that.”

Many of these soldiers were not only green; they were almost children. In a poignant interview, Hanada Miki, six-year Red Cross nurse, recalled the soldiers sailing on her hospital ship for the Islands, in violation of the Geneva accords, because the U.S. Navy sank so many troop ships. “We transported many student soldiers to the Philippines,” she recalled, “Since they were told, ‘Books are unnecessary,’ they left many of their favorite books on board. Giving up works by Ishikawa Takuboku and Herman Hesse must have felt as if they were bidding farewell to their youth. The books were heavily underlined. Images of their faces as they gallantly saluted upon disembarking are burned into my memory.”

To compensate for these weaknesses, the Fourteenth Army relied on numbers. In September 1943, for example, they sent 1,500 soldiers on a three-pronged attack in Iloilo province in Panay, at Sara and San Dionisio, Nueva Invencion, and Barotac Viejo. The troops would surround their targeted area, “then the patrols cut through, over and over again, like cutting pie.”

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1213 Lapham and Norling, 90.
1214 Murio, 134.
1215 Carry, 143.
1216 Barrameda, 162.
1217 Panlilio, 111.
guerrillas could not withstand such numbers, especially when backed by airpower. The Japanese would target unprotected villages that supported the guerrillas. “Fifty Japs could surround a town,” Yay Panlilio wrote, “one town after another or several towns at the same time – surprise it, pouncing by truckloads, dumping men there at dawn, or creeping into sentry position before day broke. Anybody could come in. Nobody could go out.”

To maintain their numbers, the Japanese forced many Filipinos into Volunteer Guard organizations. Often guerrilla reports of high Japanese casualties masked the number of Constabulary, ronda, or ‘yuin’ Filipino auxiliaries included. In fact, the Japanese would often remove or destroy their dead to prevent them from falling into guerrilla hands. One guerrilla reported that the Japanese habitually threw their dead into native huts and set them on fire. “One such occasion,” Panlilio recalled, “a farmer passed by after the Japanese had left and among the half-charred bodies, one still moved, still groaned.”

Lacking the ability to completely destroy the resistance, the Japanese tried to achieve psychological domination. “The new masters were brutal and arrogant,” wrote Villamor, “They slapped people around at the slightest provocation. They bathed in the nude in the public plazas, shocking the Filipinos. They plundered, commandeering stocks of palay and corn, destroyed and dismantled private homes for firewood.” Rapes, tortures, and executions were means of cultural domination. When they rebuilt the Forbes Bridge in Iloilo City on Panay, for

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1218 Ibid., 130.
1219 Barrameda, 57.
1220 Panlilio, 73.
1221 Villamor 88-89.
example, the Japanese forced anyone passing over the bridge “to bow from the waist down before the sentinels representing the Emperor of Japan.”

Yuki Tanaka of Hiroshima University has argued: “in literal terms, Japanese soldiers were obviously the physical perpetrators of such atrocities. In psychological and ideological terms, they were also the victims of an emperor system that legitimized such atrocities in the name of the emperor.” Within Japan enlisted soldiers were considered a low social class, but in the colonies they represented the emperor, the highest possible position in society. Tanaka explained, “This led in many cases to unbalanced psychological states: extremes of self-abnegation in relation to the Japanese domestic hierarchy alternating with excessive self-regard in relation to colonial non-Japanese. The repressed resentment of the former was often expressed in violence toward the latter.” Violence towards the subjected people also helped reinforce a martial self-image among green troops. Before joining the guerrillas, Panlilio recalled talking to a Japanese officer who was angry at seeing one of his sentries sharing photos with Filipinos on the street. “Look what your country is doing to our army,” he said. “You mean you have to keep them away from the people?” she asked. He nodded and said, “Otherwise they go soft.”

Australia, D308/R-741

1222 Ibid.
1223 Tanaka, 204.
1224 Japanese historian Saburo Ienaga wrote that Japanese military culture after the Meiji Restoration “stifled creative research” and led to “impoverished strategic thinking and military doctrine,” in a system where officers were akin to “feudal lords” over privates who “had no human rights.” Hardesty, 6.
1225 Tanaka, 204.
1226 Panlilio, 33.
On 11 October Captain William L. Osborne and Captain Damon J. “Rocky” Gause, completed a 159-day journey of over 3,200 miles from the Philippines to northern Australia via Palawan, North Borneo, Tawi Tawi, and Makassar Strait. Dodging violent storms and the Japanese navy, the two officers escaped Corregidor and Bataan on a 20-foot sailboat rather than accept surrender. Delivered to Brisbane eleven days later, the barefoot and tattered escapees reported to MacArthur who exclaimed, “Well, I’ll be damned.” It was the “first direct personal information from the Philippines” brought to SPWA.

On 21 October, the AIB created a special Philippine Sub-Section under Major Ind to supply, fund, and communicate with the guerrillas Since July Ind and McMickling had worked on a plan to insert a team of agents into Mindanao. Now, the new sub-section reworked the plans for “a) re-establishment of radio communications with the Islands; b) intelligence collection by means of clandestine agents or parties; c) establishment of escape routes for PW; and d) establishment of lists of emergency supplies to be run into the Islands by air or submarine.” One of the first plans considered by AIB, drafted by Lieutenant C.V. Hurley, U.S. Navy Reserve, was to “organize, train, and equip a commando force of one thousand Moros officered by about a dozen naval or marine officers and NCOs” to harass

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1227 Military intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, United States Armed Forces Pacific, *Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation (Volume II, intelligence Series)* (Tokyo, Japan: 10 June 1948), 5.
1228 Ibid.
1230 *Intelligence Activities*, 8-9.
Japanese garrisons in Mindanao.” With input from Villamor, AIB decided to try something else.

The AIB drew up plans for inserting a team into the Islands code named Operation PLANET to be led by newly promoted Major Villamor. SWPA reported: “Although he was young and lacked experience, MAJ Villamor was capable and moved by intensely patriotic motives.” He sent the AIB the names of five soldiers he wanted on his team: Patricio Jorge, Emilio Quinto, Defin YuHico, Dominador Malic, Rodolfo Ignacio. Their mission was to establish “a net for military intelligence and secret services throughout the islands: organize a chain of radio communications, both within the Philippines and to Darwin in northern Australia; locate and contact influential persons known to be loyal; and develop an organization for covert subversive actions and sabotage.”

Captain Davidson prepared the team in mornings of physical training, infiltration techniques, navigation and sabotage courses, and afternoons and evenings learning Morse code, cypher systems and radio communications.

The AIB realized that radios were critical for coordinating the guerrilla resistance and operator skill was a very large part of long distance communication. While the distance a signal can travel depends on the power of

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1232 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 75.
1233 See “Commando Unit for Operation on the Island of Mindanao,” Villamor to Ind, 19 November 1942 in “Papers of Courtney Whitney,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, Box No. 63, Records Group 16.
1234 Breuer, 49.
1235 Ind, 106.
1236 The author thanks Ian O’Toole, curator of the Kurrajong Radio Museum (at yk2zio@yahoo.com) for his expertise on the operation of war time radios, especially the 3BZ and ATR-4.
the transmitter, many other factors also come into play. The guerrillas’ radios used short wave frequencies (1.6 to 30MHz) that travel by one of two possible paths, ground wave or skywave. Ground wave required low power and was useable twenty-four hours a day with minimum interference at night but it was generally limited to five to ten miles in range. Skywave, also called skip propagation, bounced the signal off the ionosphere – a layer of atmosphere thick with charged particles fifty miles above the earth – to receivers beyond the horizon for ranges up to thousands of miles. To effectively employ skywave, however, operators had to calculate the right choice of frequencies, the intended signal path, interference from solar radiation, and the right choice of antennae. To utilize ground wave, they usually employed a vertical rod antenna; skywave required a wire antenna, usually a half-wave dipole perpendicular to the target station. The better skilled the operator, the better the chance of successful long-range communication. Most guerrillas started with no skills in this area.

Instead of military radios, the AIB equipped the PLANET team with civilian models used by the Australian coast watchers: the Australian 3BZ and ATR4.\textsuperscript{1237} Perhaps this choice resulted from ongoing shortages of military radios or perhaps it was payback for Australian funding of the AIB. In any case, the radios were well suited to guerrilla requirements. The 3BZ, manufactured by Amalgamated Wireless, was a new design of the reliable “teleradio” first fielded in 1935 and used by more than 200 coast watcher stations.\textsuperscript{1238} Improved with changes suggested by field operators, the 3BZ had a

\textsuperscript{1237} Ind, 121.
transmitter with six crystal channels, a two-crystal channel CW (Morse code) and AM (voice) transmitter at 10 to 2.5 MHz. The receiver had five tunable frequency bands (or four bands plus one crystal channel) allowing general coverage from 200 Khz to 30 Mhz. The crystals enabled precise frequency usage. The 3BZ could use 6- or 12-volt batteries, AC or DC power, or a pedal generator based on a bicycle frame. The three 16-inch by 10-inch by 10-inch steel boxes for the transmitter, receiver and power unit together weighed less than 200 pounds and fit through a submarine hatch. Most importantly, the 3BZ was mildew, rot and fungus resistant. It was an excellent tool for the guerrillas, if the AIB could get them to the Philippines.

The Radio Corporation of Melbourne supplied, when available, the ATR4 – the Australian Transmitter/Receiver Model 4 portable radio. It included a battery-powered single-channel crystal transceiver operating between 5.5 and 7.5 Mc/s providing both CW and AM transmission. The transceiver and radio, originally designed for the Royal Australian Air Force, weighed a combined twenty-three pounds and fit into a backpack. The model ATR4B was “tropic proofed” like the 3BZ.

Power limitations in the 15-watt 3BZs, however, normally restricted range to about 400 miles. The range of the 1.5-watt ATR4s was even shorter even though initial AIB parties reported, “surprising results of over several hundred miles are being obtained by some of our parties.”

1239 Note from Ind to LTCDR Quere, undated, “Papers of Courtney Whitney,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, Box No. 68, Records Group 16.
1241 Steven Shapiro and Tina Forrester, Hoodwinked: Outwitting the Enemy (Buffalo, New York: (Annik Press, 2004), 64.
To span the roughly 3,600 miles separating the Philippine guerrillas and SWPA in Australia, PLANET included an 80-watt transmitter specially built by the U.S. Army Signal Corps.1243 Emillo Quinto, the highly skilled former communication officer on the Don Isidro and chief operator of the General Headquarters floating wireless station on the Arcturus, would operate it. Villamor described Quinto’s set as a specially modified ATR4 transmitter combined with a Dutch built NEI receiver.1244 The PLANET manifest listed two “Transmitters, 80-watt complete with spare parts and spare tubes.”1245 Later teams would carry the commercially available HT-9 transmitters built by Hallicrafters of Chicago, Illinois. These 13-inch by 30-inch by 13-inch 165-pound sets boasted a five-frequency 75-watt AM voice and one 100-watt frequency CW Morse code transmission capability.1246 Agents were to use the HT-9s, Dutch built 30-watt NEI-II/IIIs, or specially built radios for establishing relay base stations to communicate directly with SWPA and use the 3BZs and ATR4s for local guerrilla stations, intelligence operatives, coast and air watchers.

Submarines proved harder to get. Adjustments to worldwide requirements had left the Southwest Pacific Force (SoWes-Pac Force) based in Australia with just 20 submarines, 12 in Brisbane.1247 MacArthur’s staff had to barter with the Navy for their hard-pressed boats. “In return for submarine assistance, it was agreed to obtain for the Navy specific naval information and to establish coast-watch stations at points

1243 Ind, 110, 122. Ind claims the transmitter was 50-watt but the manifest claims 80-watt.
1244 Villamor, 70. The manifest for PLANET suggested the transmitter was 80 watts.
1247 Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1049). 266.
specified by Navy to provide information on shipping lanes and traffic densities, and later to provide targets for submarines."\textsuperscript{1248}

In Washington, a valuable help to AIB plans was lost due to racial politics. Director of the Office of War Information (OWI) Elmer Davis asked President Roosevelt to allow Japanese-Americans to enlist in the military to counter Japanese propaganda that framed the war as a racial conflict in "the Philippines, Burma, and elsewhere."\textsuperscript{1249} Powerful people in the administration resisted sending Japanese American soldiers into the Pacific Theater and limited them to support and intelligence roles.\textsuperscript{1250} The potential for such recruits to serve on insertion teams remained unexplored.

The AIB completed its plans for obtaining supplies, communications, personnel, training and transportation for the insertion of a team of agents back into the Philippines. Because of "the somewhat uncertain military capacity of Philippine guerrillas at this time," it worked with the Army Signal Corps to prepare separate radio networks for the AIB insertion teams, coast-watchers, and guerrillas.\textsuperscript{1251} From the start, therefore, SWPA intended to run its intelligence collection effort as separate from the guerrilla resistance as possible.

Central Luzon, D308/R-741

\textsuperscript{1248} Intelligence Activities, 19.
\textsuperscript{1249} Fujitani, 97.
\textsuperscript{1251} The desire for separate networks would also color the 1943 insertion operations. \textit{Intelligence Activities}, 19-20.
For a month Volckmann and Blackburn pressed Moses and Noble to take charge of the guerrilla effort, but Moses demurred. On 1 October, however, the colonel had changed his mind and declared he was assuming command of all guerrillas in north Luzon as the United States Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAIFP-NL). He paired leaders and units: Governor Ablan and Praeger in Apayao; Enriquez’s 14th Infantry in Nueva Vizcaya; George Barnett in La Union; Robert Lapham and Charles Cushing (brother to Walter and James) in Pangasinan and Neua Ecija; and Dennis Molintas in Benguet. Moses sent Volckmann, with Blackburn as his executive officer, to command three groups around Benguet. He also ordered all units to begin coordinated attacks against the Japanese at 0100 hours on 15 October.

On 11 October, Volckmann arrived at Barrio Tocod to coordinate with Baldwin. Blackburn, after detouring to Uding for more shots from Dr. Biason, joined them on 14 October. At midnight the next day, in accordance with Moses’ orders, Baldwin successfully attacked and destroyed Japanese garrisons at Sanhiglo and Balatoc that guarded the Itogon mines. “There were certain utilities and other installations between Itogon and Baguio which were also designated as targets for sabotage or destruction. The 15th was when everything was to go up in smoke.” Volckmann wrote: “I had now only to wait for reports from the other areas and hope that our plans had been carried out there with equal success.” He then sent

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1252 Blackburn Interview, 104.
1254 Volckmann, 88.
1255 Blackburn Interview, 107.
1256 Volckmann, 89.
Blackburn to coordinate another meeting with Moses and Noble and to pick out a new base for their headquarters. After the colonels met, and Volckmann received reports on the results of his attacks, he departed for Praeger’s base to use his radio and relay reports to Australia.

Arthur Furagganan, a Filipino who had studied sound engineering in California, had joined Praeger’s headquarters the previous March. Praeger had his men scour northern Luzon for radio parts and after five months Furagganan converted a set from the Kabugao post office into a long-range transmitter. A radio operator from Brazelton and Globe Wireless, Domi Caluen, spent September unsuccessfully trying to contact SWPA. Furagganan then stripped down the set and rebuilt the transmitter. Finally on 20 October, Brazelton and Caluen made contact with KFS, an event that surprised the guerrilla radiomen more than it did the War Department.

Praeger now reported that his Cagayan-Apayao Force (CAF) guerrillas had contained the Japanese and were protecting local governments in Cagayan and Apayao. He added: “I can organize 5,000 able-bodied trainees, R.O.T.C.s and intelligence men provided we would be furnished arms and ammunition.” He also passed word to MacArthur that Lieutenant Colonels Martin Moses and Arthur Noble had escaped capture on Bataan and had organized 6,000 guerillas north of Manila. The AIB quickly moved

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1257 Norling, 148.
1258 Ibid, 170. Norling points out Willoughby’s recollection of 4 November as the date of contact was in error. That date was SWPA G-2 records that indicated Praeger’s “First Message on File: 4 nov 1942.” See Intelligence Activities, 6.
1259 Whitney, 49.
1260 Breuer, 48.
to exploit this development by working out a code with Praeger and sending him a long list of intelligence priority requirements.

Two days after Praeger’s contact, Noble and Moses visited Volckmann on their way to Praeger and his new transmitter. The next day Volckmann went to see Blackburn at Uding where American refugees held a surprise birthday party for him. That night, however, Volckmann assessed his situation and became troubled. He wrote: “To my mind it was just a question of time and how much the Japs would take before they came boiling out into the mountains to try to wipe out the guerrilla menace.” When Blackburn considered the attacks of 15 October, he said, “In fact, what happened throughout the entire operational area was insignificant. But, what was significant, is that it alerted the Japs to presence of the guerrillas.”

The implications for the families in Uding were clear. Traveling to the Bodok Mines, Volckmann noticed many deserted homes – a sign the Japanese were about. His party then found the Lusod sawmill badly damaged and looted. He decided this would be his new base. Over the next week Blackburn put their camp in order and restored the local phone lines. Volckmann, Blackburn, and their bodyguards Bruno and Emilio, welcomed a mine mechanic named Deleon, an elderly native woman who served as their cook, and a young man who volunteered as a guide. Volckmann instructed local barrio leaders to provide men and supplies for his nascent guerrilla network and issued script that promised reimbursement from the United States government. Across northern Luzon, guerrilla actions picked up.

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1261 Guardia, American Guerilla, 80.
1262 Volckmann, 90.
1263 Blackburn Interview, 107-108.
1264 Guardia, American Guerilla, 79.
To the south, by October, Marking’s Guerrillas were also growing into a large outfit of “full-time fighters in the hills; part-time saboteurs, working for the enemy and undoing all they had done; propagandists writing, printing, passing their down-in-black-and-white defiance; men and women training themselves as intelligence agents, learning to observe and retain and evaluate what they saw and to convey the information accurately and quickly; a countryside, bending its back to a double load: the Jap army that took by force, and their own patriotic army that begged, begged, begged.” 1265

Moses did indeed bring a Japanese counterattack. In the first week of November, Japanese patrols forced Baldwin’s guerrillas out of the gold mining area south of Baguio. The patrols then entered Bodok moving south. More Japanese troops were on west bank of Agno River. The Japanese moved in force against Volckmann at his headquarters in Lusod. Shells hit the camp. “This convinced me,” he noted, “that they had definite information about our presence and the location of our headquarters.” 1266 From 10 to 15 November, as the Japanese came closer, Volckmann moved his headquarters farther up the mountains. From his new vantage point he watched the enemy move all about his previous location. They questioned natives about Volckmann and Blackburn by name. Their soldiers combed the area for five days. “Well, they were constant,” remarked Blackburn, “And, boy, they were everywhere. We could find hobnail boot prints everywhere.” 1267 At one point a patrol of fifty troops passed them within a stone’s

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1265 Panlilio, 58.
1266 Volckmann, 92.
1267 Blackburn Interview, 109.
throw. On the sixth day, the Japanese – Volckmann counted 350 soldiers – departed. The Americans headed for Uding, which they found thoroughly ransacked and burnt.

Volckmann headed north. “The Japanese were still in the area,” he reported, “and as we went along we could see numerous native villages going up in smoke.”\(^{1268}\) He pushed on towards the town of Equip in hopes of linking up with Moses and Noble but found it empty and smoldering. Volckmann then retreated south towards Ifugao, but took care to spread the word that he was heading north. “Through bitter experience we had learned never to disclose our true route to the natives,” he wrote, “Though the majority of them were quite loyal, Japanese torture had a way of making them talk. Then too, with the price the Japanese had placed on our heads there was always the risk that the temptation would soon be too great for some individuals.”\(^{1269}\)

Panay, D329/R-720

The Japanese Fourteenth Army transferred the Hitomi Propaganda Platoon to Panay to support the 170\(^{th}\) Independent Infantry Battalion at Iloilo, Capiz and San Jose. The task was formidable: separate the people from what were increasingly strong guerrilla units. Unlike Luzon, where diverse native ethnic groups had long adapted to living among a strong foreign governing sect, on an island like Panay the people were more homogenous and independent. Convinced that his higher headquarters would not appreciate his “wait and see” arguments designed to

\(^{1268}\) Volckmann, 96.

\(^{1269}\) Ibid., 97.
convince the Filipinos to sit out the war, Hitomi hid them. When the Imperial Headquarters sent two female reporters, Kikuko Kawakami and Tsuyako Abe, to visit and report on propaganda efforts in the field, Hitomi arranged a charade in which he gave locals an impassioned speech in Japanese about the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere while his interpreter delivered his ‘wait and see speech’ in the native language. The reporters left unaware of the deception. Hitomi received credit for the surrender of thirty American officers and 1,000 men of the 61st Division.

The Japanese army’s daily treatment of Filipinos undermined all efforts by propagandists to build ties with the people. As Blackburn noted, “When the Japs came they mistreated the hell out of the people in those barrios where Americans had been, and the natives who had fed them, or in any way had indicated that they were sympathetic to the guerrillas.” In Iloilo, Panay, thirteen-year old Tomasa Solingnog was asleep at home when Japanese soldiers arrived to drag her off. Her father jumped to her defense. “My father was struck with a sword by Captain Hiruka,” she recalled, “I ran to where he lay and embraced him only to find out that his head was already severed from his body. I cried hysterically, but the Japanese mercilessly dragged me out of our house.” They took her to a two-story house with many women and a bathroom in every room. At least four men raped her each day and also forced her to do laundry. “I cannot remember for how long I was inside the mess house,” she later testified, “because I felt that I was already losing my mind.

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1271 Ibid.
1272 Blackburn Interview, 109.
1273 Hicks, 125.
I’d always remember my father and then I’d cry.”\textsuperscript{1274} She eventually escaped only to be found by a Japanese officer who made her his mistress and servant.\textsuperscript{1275}

The Kempeitai established two comfort stations in Iloilo: No. 1 Comfort Station which charged ¥3 an hour for officers and ¥1.50 for a maximum 30 minutes to non-coms and paramilitary, and the upmarket Asia Hall that charged ¥6 each hour for officers and ¥2.50 per 30 minutes for NCOs.\textsuperscript{1276} Residents remembered “truckloads of women” brought in, including a number from Korea and Formosa.\textsuperscript{1277} The Iloilo Sanatorium inspected the women and girls for health. “Unlike the Koreans and Chinese, these women had not been given Japanese names, because the Japanese found Hispanic or indigenous names easy to pronounce and remember.”\textsuperscript{1278}

In the face of such events, Peralta determined to reinforce his position by establishing reliable direct communications with SWPA. He had Mariano Tolentino, head of the Bureau of Posts radio station in Iloilo, move a transmitter, three receivers and spare parts to his headquarters in Sara.\textsuperscript{1279} When these sets proved incapable of reaching Australia, Tolentino secured a more powerful transmitter from an abandoned British freighter in the port at Iloilo. On 30 October, Tolentino’s men broadcast un-coded messages for MacArthur and Quezon that were picked up,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1274] Ibid.
\item[1275] Ibid., 126.
\item[1276] Ibid., 124-125.
\item[1277] Ibid., 125.
\item[1278] Ibid.
\item[1279] Scott Walker, \textit{The Edge of Terror: The Heroic Story of American Families Trapped in the Japanese-Occupied Philippines}, (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009), Chapter 9. G-2 wrote of KAZ: “Since it was the only station suitably located to handle Philippine radio traffic, it was used by GHQ until a special station was established in Darwin in January 1944.” \textit{Intelligence Activities}, 12.
\end{footnotes}
again, by KFS in San Francisco, which responded in the clear the next night and relayed to Royal Australian Air Force station KAZ in Darwin.\footnote{Whitney, 49. See also \textit{Intelligence Activities}, 12.}

Peralta claimed command of 8,000 guerrillas and announced: “[We] control all Panay interior and west coast. Civilians and officials ninety-nine percent loyal. Supplies could be dropped [by aircraft] away from towns, and subs could make coast anywhere more than twenty miles distant from [larger towns].”\footnote{Breuer, 47.} This announcement of a large, organized and effective loyal resistance seemed too good to be true.

In Brisbane, Merle-Smith told MacArthur the message was “probably bona fide, but mixed with exaggeration.”\footnote{Villamor, 69.} In Washington, Colonel Evans of Army intelligence asked Chick Parson for his opinion on the validity message received by the Mackay Radio Monitoring Station at San Francisco claiming to be from Macario Peralta in Panay. Did he think it authentic or a Japanese trick? Parsons thought it probably real but believed the only way to be certain was to send someone with extensive knowledge of the Islands, culture, and languages into the Philippines to verify the situation on the ground. In other words, they needed to send someone like Parsons. Evans asked if Parson’s was volunteering, and Parsons answered that he probably was.\footnote{Ingham, 50.} He began working on a proposed plan to reach Peralta. On 17 December the Navy would notify SWPA they were willing to send Parsons.\footnote{\textit{Intelligence Activities}, 54.}

Still suspicious of a Japanese ruse, KAZ did not respond until 5 November when the station informed Peralta that his message had been received and passed to MacArthur. Knowing Peralta was without a cypher, SWPA hesitated to communicate further. Peralta
signaled: “All codes destroyed before surrender but we have cipher device M-94. We have sweated blood to contact you and tell you our needs. Are you going to let us down now [?] Query LT COL Velasquez, now reported to be with President Quezon, and I were classmates at the division staff school at Baguio. He may suggest names or places we encountered there for use as key phrase for cipher device M-94. Pending such do you object to enemy information in the clear[?] Query LT COL Macario Peralta Jr. 1527 Commanding Visay(V).” 1285

The War Department notified SWPA of their efforts in “developing possibility of cryptographic system with both Peralta and Praeger.” 1286 After a few more weeks KFS forwarded to Peralta a message from the War Department: “Break the coded message using as key word in combination cipher device M-94 followed by double transposition in the name of place where President Quezon and Governor Confesor last dined together?” 1287 After several weeks Peralta’s headquarters was able to solve the riddle and construct a code to begin secure communications with SWPA.

Peralta immediately sought SWPA’s approval to unite Philippine guerrillas in a Fourth Philippine Corps under his command. 1288 He had already begun reaching out to Ausejo on Negros (who chose to stay with Fertig), Miranda on Leyte, Merritt on Samar, and Abcede on Negros. He placed the 61st Division under Relunia and – he thought – cut an agreement with Fertig that Panay, Palawan, and the Visayas minus Samar and Leyte would be under his Corps. Peralta’s claim of a Corps built around

1285 Villamor, 69.
1286 Intelligence Activities, 12.
1287 Walker, Chapter 9.
1288 SPWA noted: “During this period, the various guerrilla leaders adopted a somewhat exaggerated classification of their improvised units, viz., Corps, Divisions, Brigades, etc. GHQ attempted to discreetly ‘lower these estimates’ without embarrassing the ambitious commanders.” Intelligence Activities, 17.
the 61st Division with 8,000 men impressed MacArthur. Those numbers dwarfed the 800 Japanese troops on Panay based around the capital. Peralta claimed to control the interior and west coast where SWPA could deliver supplies by ship or submarine. He also reported capturing, trying, and sentencing to death Panay's puppet governor, 'Hernandez of Capiz,' and awaited MacArthur's okay to carry out the execution. In the meantime, he said he had installed Confessor as governor. Finally, Peralta informed SWPA that he had declared martial law on Panay and requested authority to print money. This posed a problem for SWPA as Peralta was clearly exceeding military authority. The responded: "As regards your military forces your authority is defined by military laws and regulations with which you are acquainted. As regards civilian communities and populations you have no authority except that which permits you to take action to preserve the safety of your forces."  

Peralta's communications also indicated something interesting to SWPA – he had no Americans in his organization. Indeed, he deliberately left them out because he wanted this fight to better position the Filipinos for independence after the war. The apparent braggadocio, extra-legal acts, and hyper-nationalism concerned SWPA. The impression led Ind, for example, to urge

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1289 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 203-204.
1290 Message of 17 December 1942. Military intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, United States Armed Forces Pacific, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation (Volume II, intelligence Series) (Tokyo, Japan: 10 June 1948), 16.
Map 10: Major Guerrilla Units Tracked by SWPA G-2, 1943-1944
that any parties inserted into the Philippines to avoid “contacts and possible entanglements with the undoubtedly energetic and ambitious Peralta.”

SWPA G-2 would later report: “In the exchange of messages with GHQ during November, December, and January, Peralta apparently assumed that GHQ had no radio contact with or knowledge of Fertig.” It was soon evident that Peralta was attempting to assume command across the Islands. No matter how unlikely, this raised the possibility that if any one Filipino leader successfully united all guerrillas under their command, they might reach accommodation with the collaborationist government and the Japanese. A united nationalist command, therefore, could take the Philippines out of the war. A single Filipino leader could also pose postwar problems for U.S. relations with the Philippines. These fears made for uneasy relations between SWPA and Peralta.

Visayas, D335/R-714

Peralta eyed Mindoro to the north. USAFFE had no garrison there before the war and the Japanese easily chased its small constabulary into the hills. By late 1942 the scattered constabulary coalesced into a guerrilla band. “Many reports on guerrilla activities in Mindoro are unclear or ambiguous, but it is clear the conflicting ambitions of guerrilla leaders have led to increasing friction between groups and have prevented effective unification of command,” U.S. Army intelligence

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1291 Memorandum, Ind to Merle-Smith, 19 November 1942, “Papers of Courtney Whitney,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, Box No. 63, Records Group 16.
1292 Intelligence Activities, 16.
1293 “Local representatives of GHQ have also had limited effect on the development of guerrilla organizations on the island.” Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 60.
noted, “In an effort to extend their powers, guerrilla leaders have inducted civilians to a point where they have been unable to arm, feed or pay them. As a result the civilian population has carried a heavy burden; in some areas willingly, in others under compulsion.”1294

One of the largest guerrilla groups on Mindoro was under Constabulary force commander, Major Ramon Ruffy, who as a Batangueño from Luzon was seen as an outsider. The other large group was under Captain Estaban Beloncio who was an army reservist and school principal in Oriental, Mindoro, called to active duty with the Philippine Army. Ruffy had the loyalty of the trained constabulary soldiers; Beloncio had the people. The two grew hostile towards each other. In September, an American army radio technician Sergeant Charles H. Hickok had arrived and organized about thirty loyal Filipinos. The larger guerrilla organizations undermined his position. In November, Hickock reached out to Panay for backing and Peralta authorized him to take charge on Mindoro as part of the Fourth Philippine Corps and to restrict operations to gathering intelligence. Peralta then replaced Hickok with a Filipino.

On Negros south of Panay, Abcede continued to build his guerrilla forces in the mountains around Tanjay. He reached out to Bell’s ROTC guerrilla force from Silliman University near Dumaguete. Philippine Army Captain Enrique Torres – promoted to major with the guerrillas – formed a unit for Abcede near Sinalbagan and began battle with the Japanese near Buenavista. By November, Abcede claimed 7,000 people in his organization, though many were families who joined them in the

1294 Ibid., 60
hills. He accepted his old classmate Peralta’s offer of a promotion to lieutenant colonel and inclusion in the Fourth Philippines Corps. With Peralta’s urging, Abcede tried to recruit guerrillas under Lieutenant Colonel Ernesto Mata in the north and Ausejo in the south. A SWPA assessment of the twenty-nine-year-old Mata noted: “He is believed to be a good officer, is young, brave and believed to be well liked. He is reported to be a good organizer, but has been hampered by want of competent junior officers and the efficiency of the organization was never excellent as a result.”

To the east of Panay on the island of Romblon, Philippine Merchant Marine Captain Constantine C. Raval, had begun working for the 61st Division as early as March. In November, he began organizing a small band of guerrillas on the island. Though it was a fragile organization with little to do, it was valuable to Peralta. Romblon served as a strategic stepping-stone for reaching Luzon. Peralta gladly absorbed Raval into the Fourth Philippine Corps.

Only Marinduque, north of Panay and east of Mindoro, eluded Peralta. Japanese troops had landed on the island on 7 July and easily drove off the small Philippine Constabulary garrison under Lieutenant Sofronio T. Untalan. The garrison surrendered on 20 July. Peralta would need to insert agents if he was going to raise any guerrillas on Marinduque.

During the summer, lawyer and congressional representative Cecilio A. Maneja returned from Leyte to his home island of Bohol. He gathered guerrillas in the east and south into the East Bohol Battalion. When he realized how divided and

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1295 Mata had also been a classmate of Abcede in the Philippine Military Academy. Hartendorp, 110.
1296 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 71.
mutually suspicious the island’s other guerrilla groups were, he arranged a meeting of all leaders at Batuan in November. The conference produced an agreement for all Bohol guerrillas to unite under Philippine Army Major Ismael Ingeniero. They also agreed to form a free government on the island.

Luzon, D329/R-720

On 1 November, the Japanese in northern Luzon launched a tenacious campaign in retaliation for Moses’ guerrilla attacks two weeks earlier. “They were often led by Filipinos who knew the trails throughout the area where we were operating,” Blackburn recalled, “And from November 1942 to August 1943, the Japs were constantly mopping up the mountains and coastal areas.”1297 The campaign disrupted and isolated the northern Luzon guerrillas.

Closer to Manila, Ramsey recruited Second Lieutenant John P. Boone from the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Force (ECLGF) and promoted the former corporal to captain, claiming the authority from Thorp. Boone had been with the 31st Infantry Regiment when it surrendered in Bataan, but escaped from Cabanatuan prison camp to join the guerrillas. Leading a small band, the good-natured Boone fell in love with a woman he held prisoner after his men executed her husband for collaboration.1298 Ramsey performed their wedding ceremony.

Nearby, Lapham now had squadrons numbered by location: Pangasinan 100s, western Nueva Ecija 200s, eastern Nueva Ecija 300s, Tarlac 400s, and so on. Growth was haphazard. One day a man claiming to be Captain Edades walked into Lapham’s headquarters. Several Filipino guerrillas recognized Edades as a

1297 Blackburn Interview, 108.
1298 Ramsey and Rivele, 142.
Philippine Army officer who had attended West Point. He looked and talked the part. Lapham gave Edades a command north of Umingan and the captain soon eliminated collaborationist Ganaps. Pleased, Lapham sent Doliente with his guerrillas to assist Edades in ambushing the Japanese. Edades instead ordered Doliente to attack a fellow guerrilla, the young Telesforo Palaruan. “Fortunately,” Lapham recalled, “Doliente knew his own countrymen better than I did.”

Doliente hesitated and informed Lapham who went to see Palaruan. Now suspicious, Lapham took Doliente to confront Edades. “It was so evident that he was not the real Captain Edades at all but a mere con man.” Lapham ran ‘Edades’ out of his command only to find he moved a short distance to continue his act and rob from local citizens. “This time we brought his career to a sudden end, which so outraged his wife that she threatened to take the whole story to the Japanese,” Lapham reported, “Whether she would have done so, nobody knows, for she abruptly disappeared and was never seen again.”

Ramsey received a note to meet a colonel who had formerly been part of Wainwright’s staff and was now in hiding. Weakened by malaria and dysentery and down from 160 to 120 pounds, Ramsey rode a carabao sled to see the colonel. He found the man residing in the nice home of wealthy Filipino planters who played host to a half a dozen other American officers. The men, wearing repaired and pressed khaki uniforms, were in far better shape than their visitor. Ramsey explained Thorp’s organization and offered to transport them back with him to join

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1299 Ibid., 52.
1300 Lapham and Norling, 53.
1301 Ibid., 53.
the guerrillas. After a pause the colonel said, “I knew Thorp before the war. Good man. Do give him my regards when you see him.” Feeling worse than before, Ramey made the long ride back to his camp nursing a silent resentment for men who chose comfort over duty.

Mindanao, D334/R-715

On Mindanao, Fertig renamed his command to fit MacArthur’s pre-invasion designation of the island as the 10th Military Independent District (10th MID). His situation was good. Schools had not yet reopened, but that aided recruitment. Food was plentiful: pineapples from Del Monte plantations near Cagayan de Misamis; potatoes and temperate climate vegetables from the Bukidnon hills near Talakag and Claveris, Misamis Oriental; coffee and rice from the Panguil Bay area and east coast of Surigao. The 10th MID needed to develop trails and water transportation to connect the areas free of Japanese, to supply and bolster the civilian economy and win over the population. They started clearing carabao trails from Misamis Oriental and Balingasag into central Bukidnon to transport salt and chinchona bark needed to combat malaria. Additional trails from Talakag would carry food to troops in Misamis Oriental and Bukidnon.

Fertig went with Morgan to Vatali and recruited a loose guerrilla organization into the 121st Separate Regiment (Zamboanga City-Basilan Island) of the 10th MID. Morgan went on to Zamboanga and sent Lieutenant Abdulrahim Imao, a Moro from Jolo, to organize guerrillas on Sulu. Imao went with Sergeant Ursula

Ramsey and Rivele, 127.
Simpek and arrived on Siasi in December. They organized a small number of guerrillas with a few arms and on Christmas Day attacked a weak Japanese garrison in town and captured thirty rifles and some ammunition. Although the Japanese conducted aggressive counterattacks, the unit survived.

Southern Luzon, D336/R-713

In Bicol, Dinasco O. Dianela organized a guerrilla band on the east coast near Caramoan. He claimed to have been a U.S. Army captain and was known to have led sixty-five men in the assault on Naga in May. When the Japanese came in June to eliminate the guerrillas, Dianela reached a truce with the occupiers. He agreed not to bother a Japanese platoon left to garrison Caramoan, and in return the Japanese ceased their efforts against him. The truce held until November when the Japanese began arrests and harassment of civilians including guerrillas. From his base in Camp Tingawagan, Dianela prepared to go back on the warpath.

On 8 November, Miranda led sixty-seven men of several TVGU squads in a two-and-a-half hour ambush of a convoy in Taguild, Pamplona. They killed Colonel Susumo Takechi (the Japanese commander in Naga), two captains, two lieutenants and between 168 and 200 enlisted men. Five days later, the Japanese commander in Libmanan, Colonel Inuye, sent a letter: “Capt. MIRANDA BANDIT CAPTAIN, Libmanan, Camarines Sur: You are making the people in the mountains believe that you are helping the American people and that you will be the one to give them freedom. You forget that you are Filipino, an Oriental. You want to serve the

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1303 Barrameda, 43-44.
white people who had escaped already from the Orient. Bear in mind that we are
determined to have peace and order in the place at all costs, even to the extent of
sacrificing worthless lives.”

That day, the Japanese in Camarines Sur ordered all residents of Libmanan,
Pamplona, Sipocot, Lupi, Ragay, Del Gallego, Gainza, Camaligan, Cabuso, San
Fernando, Milaor, Minalabac, and Bula “to concentrate themselves in their
respective town centers within 72 hours.” After three days, guided by paid
informers, large formations of Japanese soldiers, Ganaps, and collaborationist
Bureau of the Constabulary troops began a two-week sweep of the mountains in
search of guerrilla bases. “They killed unknowing men, women and children of all
ages whom they chanced upon,” Barremda reported, “torched even the lowliest hut
and shack; slaughtered farm animals; and destroyed crops and other food sources.”

In Manila on 30 November, the head of the JMA Department of General
Affairs, Colonel Naokata Utsunomiya, met with JMA branch chiefs. They discussed
the small groups under former USAFFE officers who had been disrupting peace
since August and now seemed to be coordinating their activities. These bandits
were upsetting Japanese efforts in the Philippines. The JMA had to refocus on its
goals. Utsunomiya prioritized the extraction of copper and said: “The conditions

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1304 Ibid., 23.
1305 Barrameda, 47-48.
1306 Ibid., 48.
1307 Setsuho, 158.
under which such developed mineral resources are being transported to Japan cannot be termed favorable, and I see no room for optimism in the future.”

The Japanese sought to balance conditions with networks of informers. Volckmann described their methodology. First, they gained the support of a prominent citizen, usually with money or favors. That prominent citizen would then recruit others he thought could be persuaded or bought with lesser sums of money or favors. “This system became so effective in some areas,” Volckmann noted, “that civilians could not cooperate with the guerrillas without being reported to the Japs.”

In Luzon, these collaborators often came from the social revolutionary Ganaps.

By this time the Ganap political movement, the social movement once praised by American Governor-General Frank Murphy, had adopted a new identity. Yay Panlilio described them as a Japanese-trained Sakdal “Philippine Fifth Column” given free range to loot their countrymen. “At one time the Sakdals, or Ganaps as they were sometimes called, had been nothing more than discontented farmers,” she explained, “There had been a reason for their discontent. Under the cacique system – an absentee landlord system – they had labored in an economic slavery that had kept them in debt years ahead of their hours.” The peasants suffered severe exploitation: “Their food had been measured by the handful; their wives had but one good dress, none too good; their children were rickety, and pale and potbellied from

1308 Ibid.
1309 Volckmann, 125.
1310 Starling, 162.
1311 Panlilio, 46.
hookworms and roundworms. They bathed wounds with the liquid from boiled guava leaves because they could not afford pennies for mercurochrome. What little the landlords left them, the usurers took. Usually landlord and usurer were one and the same person.”  

When Benigno Ramos turned Sakdal and Ganap membership rosters over to the Japanese, “few could escape collaboration even if they would, the majority believed that their day had come.”

On the first anniversary of the war the Japanese staged a big parade in Manila with the mandated participation of all government employees. They ordered free streetcar rides and held free showings at the Lyric Movie Theater of a documentary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Attendees reported, “When President Roosevelt’s picture was shown, the audience clapped and cheered but when Hirohito’s picture was flashed, no applause. The Japanese officers pounded the floor with their sabers until the lights came on and the audience driven out of the show.”

The veneer of goodwill failed to cover the depth of affronts. According to Villamor, “One year after the Japanese entry into the city, murder, rape, and attacks on small children were still commonplace.” Furthermore, as one historian noted, “With the press completely in their hands, the Japanese began to exercise thought control.” Their military moved from censoring the press, to putting all newspapers under the Manila Simbun-sya run by the Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi. “The new company,” the Japanese announced, “has been established for

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1312 Ibid.  
1313 Ibid.  
1314 Fertig Diary, 6 January 1943.  
1315 Villamor, 75.  
1316 Agoncillo, 364.
the purpose of further clarifying the invulnerable position of the Nippon Empire, now in the midst of the creation of the New Order in Greater East Asia, of making more thoroughly understood the purpose of the Military Administration in the Philippines, and of propelling with greater force the materialization of the New Philippines.”

Nearly simultaneously, the occupying administration outlawed the existing Philippine political parties. In their place, the PEC’s Executive Order No. 109 created a new group called “the Association for Service to the New Philippines” (Kapisanan ng Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas), better known by the acronym KALIBAPI. Two days later the administration announced the purpose of the new organization was “to assist the Filipino in fully comprehending the significance of, and in strengthening his adherence to, the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia by subordinating himself and his interests to those of the Philippines.” Article 5 explained the order was designed: “To adhere strictly to the policies of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines in their administration and to render service in the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Benigno Aquino, current Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, became Director-General of the KALIBAPI. “In the LGAF we quickly reached ‘understandings’ with the KALIBAPI,” wrote Lapham, “just as we did with the Philippine Constabulary, and they often became quite useful to us.”

1317 Ibid., 364.
1318 Starling, 167.
1319 Agoncillo, 365.
1320 Lapham and Norling, 99.
Northern Luzon, D366/R-683

On 8 December, Volckmann and Blackburn, suffering a severe malaria attack, set up a new camp near Kiangan where they occupied a thatch hut. Near their camp were three American women, United Evangelical Church missionaries Miss Myrtle Metzger and Miss Lottie Spessard, and wife of a missing American lumberman, Mrs. Kluge. Miss Spessard, a nurse, looked after Blackburn. Their indispensable aide Bruno, now in his hometown area, secured supplies on credit through a local man, Mr. Herrin, who brought sugar, beans, cooking grease, coffee, tobacco and soap. Bruno also acquired a supply of native rice wine known as tapoy. Natives boiled rice, drained it under banana leaves into an earthen jar, covered it with a locally concocted powder, and fermented it for several days. Through trial and error, Volckmann happily discovered that a bar of the resulting powder was good for making ersatz hotcakes.

Bruno travelled in and out Ifugao where his father had been a tribal chief and his kinship network was strong. Spessard, Metzenger and Klug, informed Volckmann and Blackburn of a merchant named Formuka in Kiangnan they could trust. Through Formuka they found a man named Lanag who ran the city dispensary and could get medicine. The two men also relayed information about everyone in town. “There were a lot of Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary in the area who had their weapons,” Blackburn noted, “They were apprehensive as to what the Japanese were going to do. They wanted to get out of their homes, but they didn’t know where to go, or what to do. We began getting a flood of these people

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1321 Volckmann, 102.
1322 Blackburn Interview, 134.
coming to us.”\textsuperscript{1323} About thirty of the well-trained and loyal troopers filled Volckmann’s ranks.

Local Chief Timicpao of Kiangan was a relative of Bruno. “He wore a G-string, had all kinds of gold nuggets draped around his neck, as was extremely alert and astute,” wrote Blackburn, “I would say if he was not in his 90s, he was pretty close to it, but just as sharp as any guy you’ve ever seen.”\textsuperscript{1324} Timicpao offered full support to the Americans and helped build their camp. He also warned of a fiercely belligerent Chief Kimayong in nearby Haliap. Volckmann and Blackburn decided to visit this chief but found him to be a “little, short, meek, mild tempered fellow” in his 30s.\textsuperscript{1325} The chief assured them, “You’re not secure where you are. I want you to come and live at my place. You don’t want to live in this camp. I can guarantee your safety better than Timicpao, because I have more control of my people. I don’t have anything against Timicpao, and if I did, this is no time to get all excited.”\textsuperscript{1326} The Americans negotiated a long-lasting truce between the two chiefs and enjoyed support from both.

Bruno brought news from Luzon and overseas. He reported that the Japanese were conducting a strong propaganda campaign, broadcasting a parade of military victories and calling on Filipinos to join in the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere. Their theme: “The Americans will never be able to return to the Philippines – they have been defeated at the hands of the Japanese Imperial Forces.”\textsuperscript{1327} This was

\textsuperscript{1323} Ibid., 114.
\textsuperscript{1324} Ibid., 115.
\textsuperscript{1325} Ibid., 118.
\textsuperscript{1326} Ibid., 117.
\textsuperscript{1327} Volckmann, 105.
background to a renewed offer of amnesty to Filipinos who surrendered, turned in the arms, and handed over the Americans.

The Japanese also put three companies of the Bureau of Constabulary in Blackburn’s district at Bontoc, Lubuagan, and Kiangnan. Filipino POWs, promised freedom if they would join the Constabulary, manned the units. “They were the sons, uncles, grandfathers, fathers, or whatever, of the people that we had, and they knew this interior better than we did,” observed Blackburn, “So, I said, ‘I’ve got a problem. I’ve got to get control of that Constabulary.’” He found that the Constabulary commander in Kiangnan, Captain Emiliano Dunuan, and his Sergeant Pedro Dunuan were fellow veterans of the 11th Infantry of the 11th Division. Blackburn sent word to them to patrol in his area and they would meet. He told them, “This is kind of silly, you’re looking for us. Why don’t we help each other and when the time comes, I'll induct you into the Army and you'll be one of my battalions or companies?” They agreed.

Vasayyas, D370/R-679

On Leyte, Blas Miranda worked to unite the resistance groups in four municipalities around Ormoc: Albuera, Merida, Palompon and Baybay. He called a conference of the neighboring guerrilla leaders to expand his organization and dissuade banditry and collaboration. The attendees, including senior officers Major Marcos Soliman and Captain Aristoteles Olaybar, agreed to work together as the

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1328 Blackburn Interview, 136.
1329 Ibid., 137.
Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces (WLGWF) under Miranda’s command. The WLGWF organized six regiments under colonels, one per town with two in Ormoc, with Miranda assuming the rank of general. They recruited the justices of the peace from each town to serve as regimental judge advocates. Miranda also secured the cooperation of collaborationist Mayor of Ormoc, Catalino Hermosilla. Rafael Omega later testified in an affidavit that Miranda’s guerrillas killed all the “enemies” of Hermosilla.

Meanwhile on Negros, Bell and Abcede again asked Gador to assume command of all guerrillas. Gador declined, saying he first needed SWPA to officially offer the appointment because he did not want to be held responsible for existing conflicts between the guerrillas. Former First Lieutenant Ernesto Mata accompanied Abcede to Panay to see Peralta. After a strong pitch, they decided to join the Fourth Philippine Corps, bringing Negros into Peralta’s orbit. Peralta appointed Abcede as commander of the 72nd Division (Negros) with Mata as both his chief of staff and regimental commander. Gador was out in the cold. Later Abcede reorganized his force as the 73rd Provisional Division in Negros Oriental and Mata became the Chief of Staff in the District Headquarters while also serving as the commander of the 72nd Division until a replacement could be found. Gador belatedly responded on 11 December with a memorandum claiming his command over all forces on Negros based on what he said was an appointment he had received from General Sharp.

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1330 Lear, 75.
1331 Ibid.
1332 Ara, 48.
On 12 December KAZ in Darwin was able to exchange coded messages with Panay. Peralta received instructions from SWPA: “as our intelligence unit covering the maximum territory you can perform great service.” He began to spread his network through the Visayas into Luzon. Two areas on Luzon seemed promising: Bicol in the south or Batangas on the northwest coast. The first required securing Masbate Island, then in turmoil due to disputes among guerrillas. The second required Tablas Island and Mindoro or Marindduque.

In Bicol, Lapus received an emissary from Peralta, the Fourth Philippine Corps Chief of Staff Colonel Leopoldo Relunia, who was also a Bicolano. Relunia explained that, in accordance with MacArthur’s wishes, Peralta needed an intelligence net on Luzon. He wanted Lapus to anchor this net and offered to make his guerrillas the 3rd Battalion, 67th Infantry Regiment, 61st Division 67th Infantry Regiment, Fourth Philippine Corps and promote Lapus to major. Lapus accepted and began forwarding all his reports to Panay.

Governor Escudero had provided Lapus with extra-legal provincial government and supplied him with P20,000 from provincial funds. Now, however, Escudero accused Lapus of “embezzlement and banditry” and broke with the guerrilla leader. Escudero then accepted an offer delivered by Crisoldo de la Paz from Colonel Straughn to serve as a colonel in the FAIT. Taking with him the seventeen-man bodyguard provided by Lapus, Escudero built the most powerful

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1333 Intelligence Activities, 12.
1334 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 65.
1335 Barrameda., 103.
guerilla force in Sorsogon province, peaking at 1,500 men. Eventually, Escudero’s men would fight pitched battles with the Lapus group.

MacArthur later wrote: “Four months after the message from Colonel Nakar, in November, Major Macario Peralta, Jr., formerly of the 61st Philippine Division, radioed us that he was taking command of the fighters in the Visayas.” On 17 December, MacArthur radioed Peralta:

“Your action in reorganizing Philippine army units is deserving of the highest commendation and has aroused high enthusiasm among all of us here. You will continue to exercise command. Primary mission is to maintain your organization and secure maximum amount of information. [Combat] activities should be postponed until ordered from here. Premature action of this kind will only bring heavy retaliation upon innocent people.”

This order contradicted guerrilla orthodoxy. As Mao argued, attacks were crucial to maintain the initiative, and the loss of initiative lead to “the danger of defeat and destruction.”

Lapham also agreed with the need for aggressive guerrilla action. “We could give peasants a reason to be grateful to us,” he said and added, “we could stimulate their loyalty to their own government and to the United States, and we could cause them to fear us more than our foes.” As Hitomi learned with the Japanese propaganda outfit, the people needed to see someone address their concerns.

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1336 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 203.
1337 Breuer, 47.
1338 Mao, 98.
1339 Lapham and Norling, 30-31.
Lapham concluded, “In crises, notoriously, people everywhere look not for more discussion but for leaders who will reassure them and then act.”\footnote{Ibid, 31.}

SWPA gave priority to intelligence gathering that supported its operations. The guerrillas, on the other hand, needed the support of the population for sustenance and protection. To win over the population, guerrillas needed to demonstrate potency that only came from attacking the enemy. As Fertig put it: “The [Filipino] population wants to see dead Japs. Without public support, no guerrillas.”\footnote{Keats, 209.} Establishing radio communications had brought the guerrillas authority but also placed them within the chain of command, subjecting them to higher headquarters priorities at the risk of their own.

MacArthur’s message further restricted Peralta:

“You cannot – repeat cannot – operate under provisions of martial law in the Philippines occupied as they are by the enemy. It is not – repeat not – practicable to issue money. You should issue to your men certificates showing that the United States owes them pay as accrued. Similar certificates can be used as required showing purpose. The United States will honor them in due course of time. The enemy is now under heavy pressure and victory will come. We cannot predict date of our return to the Philippines but we are coming. Will cover other matters in subsequent messages.”\footnote{Villamor, 70. Note that MacArthur (Reminiscences, 204) ends the message with ”I am coming.”}
These instructions unknowingly favored Confesor against Peralta and the restrictions on printing money would be problematic for all guerrilla leaders. Three days later, SWPA received a response: “Field Marshal MacArthur from Lieutenant Colonel Peralta. Missions assigned us will be accomplished. Humblest soldier had blind faith in you and America.”\textsuperscript{1343} ‘Field Marshal’ was the rank MacArthur wore when he was out of the U.S. Army and worked only for Quezon.

SWPA soon passed another message to Peralta: “General delegation of authority to Combat Team Leaders to execute spies by ‘drum-head Court Martial’ is not authorized by our Rules of Land Warfare. For the protection of the forces under your command and the civilians in territory under your control and to avoid excuse for barbaric reprisal by the enemy, it is essential that your activities conform with orderly military procedure, with treaty obligations of the United States and with the rules of Land Warfare which govern actions of officers of the United States Army.”\textsuperscript{1344} Villamor recalled that Willoughby privately said: “Probably ample to make some of our departed Judge Advocates General stir restlessly in the graves.”\textsuperscript{1345} The refinements of established military rules of engagement clashed with the ugly reality of guerrilla war.

Lapham described his world of irregular combat: “It is a mean, dirty, brutal struggle to the death, devoid of any principle or sentiment save to survive and win.”\textsuperscript{1346} It took too much food and too much manpower to keep prisoners. Their ability to move quickly and quietly was compromised by having any captives in tow.

\textsuperscript{1343} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{1344} Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{1345} Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{1346} Lapham and Norling, 77.
Yet releasing prisoners meant endangering guerrillas, their bases, and their families. Ramsey noted: “Each unit was dealing with the issue on its own, which meant that some prisoners were being executed while others were being released. In the latter case the result was almost always raids, which meant the capture, torture, and killing of our own people.” He issued instructions: “It is the policy of the guerrilla forces to execute prisoners who threaten us. There is nothing else we can do.” He explained, “Consequently, whenever one of our units captured a Japanese or a Filipino collaborator or spy, he was interrogated briefly and then killed.”

The guerrillas also dealt harshly with spies, collaborators and betrayers. Ramon Magsaysay recalled receiving orders from Captain Ralph Maguire to liquidate any captured collaborators. “Those who were spying for the Japs were apprehended and eliminated; every effort was made to find the kingpins in every spy net that was uncovered,” Volckmann recalled, “After six months of such intensive effort the majority of the informers or spies had fled and were seeking cover within localities strongly garrisoned by the Japs.” Killing a Filipino could also bring retribution from members of his kinship network. Magsaysay warned McGuire: “Liquidate on member of a family, and his entire tribe will turn against us and our cause. I warn you at the end of this war you will have another war on your hands if this order goes through.”

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1347 Ibid., 178.
1348 Ibid., 179.
1349 Ramsey and Rivele, 264.
1350 Romulo and Gray, 48.
1351 Volckmann, 126.
1352 Romulo and Gray, 49.
SWPA, of course, could not authorize such action. The officers making the decisions risked severe punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. “I knew the Japanese would almost certainly execute me if they ever caught me,” wrote Lapham, “but that my own country might punish me after the war for fighting the enemy I simply could not imagine. I thought about a lot of things from 1942 to 1945 – survival, my possible contribution to eventual victory, day-to-day practical problems – but never about my hypothetical legal status. It could not have worried Filipino guerrillas much either; otherwise, there would not have been scores of thousands of them.”

By not formally bringing the guerrillas into his army – and not establishing a system of pay and allowances for them – MacArthur actually helped protect the guerrillas from legal punishment for their actions.

In many ways, engaging in the blood sport of guerrilla warfare provided its own forms of punishment. Traveling the Islands, Ramsey witnessed an execution in Colonel Manahan’s Mountain Corps Regiment. The executioner declined to use a rifle, opting for a bayonet instead. He forced the prisoner to kneel, stood behind him, and thrust the bayonet downward behind the left collarbone and into the heart. “The man died almost instantly,” Ramsey observed. Silently, the executioner wiped the blood off his bayonet on a palm leaf and went back to his daily duties. Ramsey later saw that the executioner was an undersized, fifteen-year-old boy. The men feared the boy and the thought of him haunted Ramsey. “He was the executioner,” he thought, “but it was I who had created the policy. He was merely

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1353 Volckmann, 72.
1354 Ramsey and Rivele, 264.
the instrument of my own decision, one that involved a violence more intimate and personal than anything else I had experienced in the course of the war.”

Unlike regular army commanders, guerrilla leaders could not pass their problems to courts or a higher command. Blackburn recalled a captain in the Cagayan Valley accused of raping a girl. “I had the evidence, the torn underwear, and an abundance of testimony. He used the excuse that the parents were collaborators, which they weren’t, and that that gave him the right. So, we formed a company in the town and executed the captain in front of all the people. By God, if you’re not letting your people get away with these things, then this gets around.”

Luzon, D378/R-671

In Bicol, TVGU leader Miranda sent Lieutenant Vicente Villa to San Narciso, Tayabas, to seek out Captain Epifano Vera in hopes of securing weapons. They discovered the captain had been captured and executed by the Japanese. Gaudencio V. Vera, a former cook with the Philippine Scouts who escaped home to Lucena when the Japanese destroyed his unit, now ran the Tayabas guerrillas with the assumed title of general. When Villa addressed the new leader without reference to his rank, Vera had him arrested and executed. “How Sergeant Vera managed to assume Captain Vera’s position taxes the imagination,” wrote Barrameda, “But to make the seemingly improbable truly outlandish, the guerrilla noncom soon even gave himself the rank of ‘General.’”

1355 Ibid.
1356 Blackburn Interview, 153.
1357 Barrameda, 87.
In late December, Captain Lorenzo Padua of the Camp Isarog Guerrillas invited TVGU leader Juan Miranda to Camp Isarog II to arrange a merger of their two groups. With Lieutenant Leon Aureus assuming temporary command in his absence, Miranda left on 20 December with an armed escort for Padua's camp. He arrived midday on Christmas. The next day the leaders agreed to bring Padua's Isarog guerrillas into the TVGU with Miranda as overall commander and Padua as his deputy. Barrameda reported: “The protocol was prepared on sheets of ruled pad paper by a strikingly beautiful intelligence officer in Padua’s camp, Lieutenant Constancia Estrada from the town of Baao, Camarines Sur.” The teenage Estrada, a veteran of several guerrilla bands, had been twice captured and saw her brother killed while helping her escape. She was in Japanese hands on 8 December when Padua freed her while capturing Denzu Kuriyama, then acting as a Japanese interpreter. Padua executed Kuriyama. Miranda fell in love with Estrada at first sight and decided to remain awhile at Padua’s camp.

Australia, D378/R-671

On 20 December, after a five-month voyage ‘special messenger’ Lieutenant Franklyn H. Young, Jr., and Mr. Albert Klestadt made it to Australia with three Moro crewmen along with Young's wife and child, and another woman aboard a 45-foot Moro boat. Young was an American mestizo in the Philippine Army who had spent time with Thorp and had escaped Bicol in July, travelled through Samar, Leyte, Cebu, Negro, and Panay where he linked up with German born Klestadt, an

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1358 Ibid., 52.
experienced yachtsman wanted by the Japanese for his work for the British Ministry of Information in the Manila embassy. Together they headed on to Zamboanga and Australia. He brought with him a report for MacArthur from Thorp in Pampanga detailing “large guerrilla groups existing in central Luzon” and added “important and lucid information of enemy and guerrilla activity in the areas through which they passed.” Taken to Melbourne, they briefed the G-2 personnel. Villamor wrote: “During hours of interrogation, I learned from Young and Klestadt that the guerrillas they had seen were disorganized, ragged and hungry, moving about in small arguing groups, and desperate for some sign of recognition.”

In Brisbane on 27 December, Jesus Villamor led his five-man team disguised as sailors handling cargo aboard the submarine SS-211 Gudgeon under. Before departing, Villamor had an audience with MacArthur who told him, “I shall see you when you come back. Better yet, I shall see you upon my return to the Philippines.” Lieutenant Commander William Shirley Stovall directed the Gar class submarine on its fifth war patrol towards the waters off Davao, Ambon Island, and Timor Island.

Luzon, D389/R-660

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1359 They also survived several near mutinies from the native crewman who apparently did not understand the difficult journey they were undertaking. Alan J. Levine, Captivity, Flight, and Survival in World War II (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger; 2000), 68-71.
1360 Intelligence Activities, 5-6.
1361 Villamor, 70.
1363 Villamor, 72.
Ensconced in Manila, Barker sent word to his ECGLF deputy Ramsey that all was well and he was swearing in new guerrillas recruited by Santos and Alberto. He also reported Thorp’s capture and that Barker was assuming command of the Luzon Guerrilla Force. Ramsey was to replace Barker in command of the ECLGF. “I ought to congratulate you,” Barker wrote to Ramsey, “since, according to our agents in Manila, you are now number two, behind me, on the Kempeitai’s death list.”

Ramsey also learned that west central Luzon guerrilla leader Captain Ralph McGuire was dead. “One of his own men had cut his head off and taken it to the Japanese.”

“We were not, as Mao had suggested, fish in the sea,” thought Ramsey, “we were minnows in an ocean infested with sharks.”

Ramsey wanted to go to Manila but it was too dangerous. Under new Chief of Intelligence General Baba, Kempeitai chief Nagahama had stepped up a counterinsurgency program of “informants, raids, rewards and torture.” Baba ordered Nagahama to use the Sakdalistas to create a network of secret informants called the Makapili – “out-and-out individual collaborators with the Japanese” – reporting directly to Baba’s headquarters. Laurel and others protested the creation of this “volunteer militia of opportunists and Japanophiles” that Nicholas Tarling described as “the kind of people the elite had feared when they offered their collaboration in 1942.” Nevertheless, within two months Baba had a composite sketch of Ramsey on his desk with a P250,000 bounty on the guerrilla’s head. After

1364 Ramsey and Rivele, 145.
1365 Ibid., 146.
1366 Ibid.
1367 Ibid., 148.
1368 Lapham and Norling, 99.
1369 Tarling, 170.
organizing ECLGF units in Bataan, Ramsey headed north where he believed Lapham
and Charles Putnam operated. Putnam was an American mining engineer who did
double duty as an artillery captain in the Army reserve. He had spent most of his
forty-odd years in the Philippines and was well liked and respected in his area.

Mindanao, D389/R-660

On Mindanao, Jordan Hamner and Charles Smith reunited with A.Y. Smith
who they found working for Morgan. For two months, the three pestered Fertig with
a plan to sail to Australia when the monsoons began. Though he thought their
scheme foolhardy, Fertig eventually gave his okay. Their first attempt failed after
two days but they returned to make better preparations and find a better boat.1370

Morgan took Hamner to Naga to fetch a twenty-one foot batel sailboat. Locals
supplied an eight-horsepower kerosene engine that would burn gasoline or fuel oil.
Hamner and the Smiths reinforced the boat and installed the engine for use when
the winds slackened. Two Filipino volunteers rounded out the crew: a Moro named
Lakibul Nastail and a Christian named Eugenio S. Catalina. On 4 December, they said
goodbye to Fertig and set sail from Labangan in southwest Mindanao for Australia in
the boat they renamed Or Else. Before they cast off, Fertig gave Charlie Smith a radio
call sign only the two of them would know. If Smith made it to Australia, he was to
radio Mindanao using the call sign “MSF” for “Mindanao-Smith-Fertig.”1371

1370 Levine, 72.
1371 Keats, 185.
Against all odds, the *Or Else* arrived off the coast of Australia on 31 December.\footnote{See Hamner’s tale in Bob Stahl, *Fugitives: Escaping and Evading the Japanese* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University of Kentucky Press, 2001), 99-125.} They had sailed through the Celebes Seas and the Morotai Straights, stopped for food and water in New Guinea and the island of Kai, and then straight south to Australia’s Cobourg Peninsula. They stayed one step ahead of the Japanese, dehydration, starvation, and some hostile natives along the way. After going ashore for water they headed west, came to the Cape Don lighthouse, and contacted coast watchers at 0300 hours on New Year’s Day. An Australian patrol boat called by the lighthouse delivered them to Darwin three days later.\footnote{Levine, 72.} At SWPA, Hammer and Charles Smith told of the existence of Fertig’s Mindanao guerrillas. MacArthur’s G-2 reported: “This development was an important link in the future plans of intelligence coverage. Hamner and Smith were interviewed on 12 January, and it was discovered that Fertig had a radio and was attempting to contact Australia. He did not succeed until about 20 February.”\footnote{Intelligence Activities, 12.}

By then Morgan had completed his recruitment tour of Mindanao and returned to Misamis. Fertig sent him out again on 12 January with eighty men of the General Headquarters Expeditionary Force to recruit bands in Leyte and Negros. He tasked Morgan to spread the word that only guerrilla leaders with Fertig’s USFIP would be designated ‘authorized’ commanders.

In Cotabato Province, Pendatun remained beyond Fertig’s command. He had grown his original Bolo Battalion of Moros into a diverse Muslim-Christian guerrilla movement known as the Bukidnon-Cotabato Force that controlled the Cotabato
Valley and southern Bukidnon. He maintained his friend Andrews as Chief of Staff. In mid-January, Pendatun attacked a Japanese garrison in Malaybalay from the south but promised support from guerrillas in the north under Lieutenant Colonel Robert V. Bowler never came and the attack failed.

Fertig promoted Clyde C. Childress, the 61st Division veteran, to lieutenant colonel and appointed him as the Chief of Staff of the 110th Division in Zamboanga. Childress managed much of Fertig’s supply operations: fuel for radios and rice from Surigao carried up the Cadabaran road or sailed on bancas to northern Mindanao. Fertig also created the ‘USFIP Navy’ with a large two-mast motor banca named Athena as its flagship under Captain Vincente Zapanta. The guerrillas first armed Athena with a homemade smoothbore cannon but later used a 20mm cannon and .50 caliber machine guns. After several successful encounters with the Japanese, the crew would burn the Athena in mid-1944 to prevent her capture. Other boats in Fertig’s Navy included the inter-island passenger launch Treasure Island with a high superstructure and 75-horsepower diesel engine; the light tug Rosalia with a 50-horsepower engine; the motor banca So What; the Nara; the CAPT Knortz; and the Narwhal.

Major Frank McCarthy, Jr. organized guerrillas in the Malangas area of southern Mindanao and quickly extended his command to the Kabasalan area rich in rubber plantations. McCarthy’s men actively collected latex to use in trade. By 1944, Fertig would incorporate the group into his command as the 115th Regiment, under Major Angel Medina.

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1375 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 96-97.
On 6 January 1943, Fertig summarized reports from across the Philippines in his diary: U.S. submarines patrolled the waters forcing Japanese ships to sail in the shallows to avoid them; ships sat idle in Manila with seventeen transports in the harbor for repair at one time in November; the Japanese collected all scrap metal for shipment to Japan; a large, unexplained explosion occurred at Fort McKinley that reportedly killed “seven truck-loads of Japs”; Filipinos paid a thirty-five percent luxury tax on everything; the boulevards in Manila were empty; American civilians remained interred in Santa Tomas College.\textsuperscript{1376} He also recorded a Japanese engineer’s discussion with a Filipino doctor: “Japan is now preparing for a long war, perhaps ten years. Manila is the paradise. In Japan everyone wears short pants with plenty of patches and no socks. Government ask more money but people cannot give for they do not have. Japan lacks raw material. No cotton, no iron. Dr. questions ‘But Japan is winning war?’ Oh, yes, but Americans very stubborn, will not hands up as Japan thought… We sink one American ship, Americans building three more in few days. In Japan take long time to build one ship.”\textsuperscript{1377}

\textsuperscript{1376} Fertig Diary, 6 January 1943.
\textsuperscript{1377} Ibid.
The insertion of the first team of agents under Jesus Villamor brought hope to the resistance and MacArthur alike. Yet Villamor’s reported that the guerrillas were divided, unorganized and critically short of supplies. Moreover, the guerrillas’ methods and objectives were unacceptable to MacArthur, yet he needed their help.

By the first week of January 1943, the Japanese campaign against the guerrillas in Luzon seemed a success. In Abra Province on 4 January, their patrols captured the new commander of the 121st Infantry Regiment, Captain William G. Peryman. He joined Thorp, Nakar and others already in prison. Walter Cushing and Speis were dead. Negrito tribesmen had beheaded McGuire. The Fassoth camp was in ashes, its proprietors in custody. Barker was on the run in Manila. Colonel Merrill was hiding in the Zambales Mountains. Colonels Moses and Noble moved in fits and starts. Volckmann and Blackburn seemed ready to fill the leadership vacuum but Ramsey and Lapham were not keen to be their followers. Lapham received reassurance from Thorp’s adjutant, Wilbur Lage, that he was not under Volckmann’s command, but still a part of Thorp’s organization.1378

1378 Lapham and Norling, 53.
In Bicol, Japanese units operated against Dianela’s Camp Tinawagan guerrillas south of Tabgan in Caramoan. On 7 January, Captain Kaji raided Padua’s camp in Balayan where Miranda had stayed with his new love Estrada. The guerrillas killed Kaji but Miranda was shot in the left leg and Estrada helped get him to Camp Isarog to recuperate. They would spend the year together at various camps while the TVGU remained under Aureus.

Near Manila, Ramsey had travelled with Boone to the west coast of Bataan to raise more guerrillas. Villagers celebrated their arrival and many local men joined the ECLGF. Upon return to Dinalupihan, however, they received bad news. On 8 January, the Japanese captured Barker’s bodyguard. After three days of torture, he told them where to find Santos and most of his staff in Manila. The next morning, they caught Barker and sent him to Fort Santiago. Shocked by the size of the ECLGF in and around Manila, General Baba accelerated his hunt for guerrillas in Luzon. “Thousands of people were being arrested,” Ramsey noted, “including hundreds of our operatives and senior officers. The Manila network had been dealt a heavy blow.”

Ramsey issued General Order Number 1 announcing his assumption of command of the ECLGF as of 13 January and the appointment of Fausto Alberto as head of the ECLGF Manila section. He restricted ECLGF raids and ambushes. “Our cadres were sternly discouraged from undertaking operations that would expose either them or the wider population to Japanese retaliation, though arbitrary reprisals aimed at intimidating the people occurred nonetheless.”

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1379 Ramsey and Rivele, 152.
1380 Ibid., 148.
Moses still thought he could unite the guerrillas under his command. He went with Noble to Adduru's headquarters in Magabubong to bring the Cagayan-Apayao Guerrilla Force into the USFIP-NL. He then reorganized his staff: Thomas Jones G-1 (personnel and administration), Praeger G-2 (intelligence), Noble as G-3 (plans and operations), and Adduru G-4 (logistics).\footnote{Agoncillo, Vol. II, 653.}

One of Moses's most reliable subordinates was Captain Ralph Praeger who led a growing outfit in the Cagayan Valley. Praeger radioed to SWPA: "Am conducting government with utmost care legally and morally devoid of politics and personal considerations. Military and civil authorities in perfect accord helping one another. I have provided all needs of the army composed of scouts, constabulary, and the Philippines Army in the Cagayan and Aparri. If I may be permitted I can organize five thousand additional men."\footnote{MacArthur, Reminiscences, 204.} Moses and Noble used Praeger's radio to inform MacArthur that they had "unified command, and control six thousand guerrilla troops in provinces north of Manila."\footnote{Ibid.}

Panay, D396/R-653

In December, the Japanese Army had demoted and removed Lieutenant Colonel Senô from command of the garrison battalion in Antique, Panay, and replaced him with a veteran of Manchuria and China, Lieutenant Colonel Ryoichi Tozuka.\footnote{Toshimi Kumai, "The Blood and Mud in the Philippines: Anti-Guerrilla Warfare on Panay Island," The News Today (Iloilo City), 26 November 2010. Yukako Ibuki, trans., Ma. Luisa Mabunay and Ricardo T. Jose, eds.} Reinforced with more troops and tanks, he continued mopping-up operations (sôtô) and punitive expeditions (tôbatsu) while preparing a major

\footnote{Agoncillo, Vol. II, 653.}
\footnote{MacArthur, Reminiscences, 204.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
assault against the heart of Peralta’s Fourth Corps. In early January, Tozuka launched his surprise attack (kantei sakusen) on guerrilla bases near Mount Dila-Dila and Mount Baloy. He sought to capture 61st Division Commander Relunia as well his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Chaves, who also commanded the guerrilla 63rd Infantry Regiment. Captain Toshimi Kumai, the adjutant of the Panay garrison, reported: “Even though the main forces had tanks deployed in the area, the results were not great. The troops only captured a guerrilla NCO and the mother of Lieutenant Colonel Chavez.”

A campaign of burning, looting and killing ensued. Even so, the Japanese failed to prevent Chaves and his troops from withdrawing into the hills in good order. Captain Kumai described a typical experience of a Japanese patrol on this campaign. He was scouting along the Suage River with a twelve-man patrol when they had to cross a road in an open area surrounded by a banana grove. Lance Corporal Taniyama was on point followed by several soldiers from the radio section seventy yards ahead of the rest of the patrol. Suddenly a young woman appeared to their front, waved happily at the men, and disappeared quickly as they approached. “Instantly, there was a volley of shots from the surrounding trees. Lead shots hit Taniyama directly and killed him on the spot,” recalled Kumai. After a lengthy exchange of fire with what appeared to be about sixty guerrillas on the edge of the jungle, reinforcements arrived and the guerrillas vanished. “In the dark chilly night, we found Taniyama’s beheaded body that had been thrown into a ditch,” Kumai continued, “We all searched for his head with our hands but finally had to return

1385 Ibid.
1386 Ibid.
with only his headless corpse. As we stood around the remains of Lance Corporal Taniyama, we were seething with strong feelings for retaliation.”

Sent to assist the operations in Panay, propaganda Lieutenant Hitomi was trying to turn policy into reality. He sent a “Report on the Civil Affairs of Antique Province” that noted that local law and order had begun to deteriorate when some 300 surrendered Filipino soldiers who had been allowed to return home were reincarcerated as POWs in June 1942. The people of Panay also resented the Ishihara Industries forcible recruitment of labor for their mines and harsh treatment by ‘low level Japanese.’ Guerrilla actions and propaganda aggravated the situation.

Negros, D403/R-646

On 13 January, Wendell Fertig noted, “Believe there has been a very strong typhoon some place as the weather here is bad.” The next evening, Skipper Stovall drew the submarine Gudgeon close ashore along the southern tip of Negros. There at Catmon Point, he landed the men of Villamor’s PLANET team and their equipment. Stovall then departed to reconnoiter the local islands, suffered a depth charge attack, and headed home to Brisbane. The first Allied Intelligence Bureau insertion into the Philippines was underway.

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1387 Ibid.
1388 Satoshi, 52-53.
1389 Fertig Diary, 13 January 1943.
PLANET’s mission was to establish a guerrilla radio communications network centered in Negros. They were also to bring needed medical supplies and other items.\textsuperscript{1390} As AIB had observed, “Medicine of all kinds is very scarce and costly.”\textsuperscript{1391} Losing one raft during his team’s insertion, however, Villamor opted to leave behind medical supplies and propaganda material so as to make room for his higher priority radios, codes and cypher equipment.\textsuperscript{1392} He carried his radios disassembled in four metal boxes, each twenty-three inches diagonally across so as to fit through submarine hatches. The individual boxes contained a battery, a transmitter; a receiver; and a collapsible 40-foot antenna, wire, and accessories. PLANET carried enough spare parts to operate for at least twelve months.\textsuperscript{1393}

After an eventful trek on foot towards Tolong, PLANET set its base near Sipalay on Catmon Point in a nipa hut looking southwest out on the Sulu Sea. With help from the ubiquitous Professor Bell, Emilio Quinto established radio station 4E7 with his 80-watt transmitter. During the night of 26 January, Quinto tapped out calls to ‘KAZ’ (RAAF Darwin) over 1,600 miles away.\textsuperscript{1394} After repeated attempts, KAZ responded and passed word to SWPA.\textsuperscript{1395} Elated to finally have a SWPA radio station in the Philippines, Ind reported to MacArthur’s chief of staff who replied, “The first to go in, but not the last. We’re on our way!”\textsuperscript{1396}

Almost immediately the ‘jungle telegraph’ spread the word, “is here! A party of Filipinos has landed. The general has sent Villamor to lead the resistance. Help

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1390} \textit{Reports of General MacArthur}, Plate 86, 306.
\textsuperscript{1391} “Report by Mr. J.A. Hammer” to Major Allison W. Ind, January 18, 1943, “Papers of Courtney Whitney,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, Box No. 68, Records Group 16.
\textsuperscript{1392} Breuer, 51.
\textsuperscript{1393} Barrameda, 164.
\textsuperscript{1394} \textit{Reports of General MacArthur}, 300.
\textsuperscript{1395} \textit{Intelligence Activities}, 13.
\textsuperscript{1396} Ind, 122.
\end{footnotesize}
has come, at last. The re-invasion It is coming. American troops are on the way.”¹³⁹⁷ Negros guerrilla Higinio de Uriarte recalled, “The general rejoicing and enthusiasm caused by Villamor’s arrival were indescribable and impossible to control. Those who were in the know passed the news to their friends: these friends passed it on to more friends until practically all the mountains rang with the glad tidings.”¹³⁹⁸ Villamor represented the Aid, the beginning of the end of the war.

Villamor was under SWPA orders to stay away from guerrilla politics and report objectively on personalities and organizations. The AIB later noted: “He arrived at the time the organizations of Abcede, Ausejo and Gador were full blown and Peralta and Fertig were attempting to gain control of Negros guerrilla affairs.”¹³⁹⁹ Abcede arrived to meet Villamor. “I wondered if America was ever going to know that we were still fighting, that we had not surrendered,” the he said, “I control about seven thousand men, and every one of them has been waiting for an eternity to hear just one word – Recognition!”¹⁴⁰⁰ Abcede had organized his troops in groups of thirty men with ten Enfield rifles and assorted other arms, to employ hit and run tactics and daily reconnaissance. He tasked snipers to fire at the enemy and kill at least one Japanese each day. Like other Visayan guerrillas, he often employed ‘reverse ambushes,’ firing shots and retreating to lure the pursuing Japanese into traps.¹⁴⁰¹

¹³⁹⁷ Villamor, 79.
¹³⁹⁸ Ibid., 79fn.
¹³⁹⁹ Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 75.
¹⁴⁰⁰ Villamor, 85.
¹⁴⁰¹ Lapham and Norling, 93.
Abcede shared what he knew about the guerrillas across the Islands: Americans Ralph Praeger were in Cagayan Valley, engineer Walter Cushing was in North Luzon, Fenton and James Cushing ran things in Cebu, and Wendell Fertig operated in Mindanao; Filipinos guerrillas included Governor Ablan, Peralta, Manuel Enriquez, Nakar and his XO Lieutenant Edmundo Navarro, Abcede, Mata, Ausejo, Kangleon, Magsaysay and Gador. Abcede complained, “Corporals are promoting themselves to sergeants, sergeants are becoming lieutenants, lieutenants are fancying themselves as captains. Overnight, some officers are turning into generals.”

Ausejo arrived and confirmed much of Abcede’s reports. Villamor passed the reports to SWPA with “recommendations on the solution of local problems, particularly on the command situations, on supplies being sent the guerrillas, on his being given some authority to deal with some problems, and on dealing with Gador firmly.” He was getting drawn into power struggles and SWPA hesitated to act on his recommendations. When SWPA refused to grant Villamor authority to settle the guerrilla disputes, Gador sensed an opportunity.

Gador and Ausejo had remained beyond Abcede’s control. When Gador heard Fertig wore brigadier general’s stars, he proclaimed himself a major general. “Gador has assumed control of all the Philippines and is heading for trouble,” wrote Fertig. “He controls an area between Concepcion and Libertad in Negros

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1402 Note: Villamor also claimed Abcede reported Ferdinand Marcos’ Ang Manga Mharlika (the Noble Ones). Ibid., 76.
1403 Ibid., 86.
1404 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 75.
1405 Fertig Diary, 19 February 1943.
Oriental,” complained Abcede, “and yet he wants to command all Negros. He wants the entire Philippines. A rumor has it that he threatens to liquidate anyone who defies his authority.”¹⁴⁰⁶ As for Ausejo, Abcede reported: “He is diplomatic. He is mature. He has the loyalty not only of his soldiers but of the civilians, whose cooperation the guerrillas desperately need.”¹⁴⁰⁷ Yet Ausejo had pledged to Fertig. It took twenty days for a courier from Ausejo to reach Abcede and only four to reach Fertig. Villamor recalled, “When he thought of Fertig, Abcede became furious.”¹⁴⁰⁸ Abcede ranted: “Does he think that the Filipinos cannot fight or stay together unless they have an American leading them? How does Ausejo know Fertig is a bona fide representative of MacArthur?”¹⁴⁰⁹ Abcede had Peralta contact SWPA. On 10 January, SWPA replied to Peralta: “Will investigate identity and activities of Brigadier General Fertig and will advise you as soon as possible.”¹⁴¹⁰ MacArthur added: “You will continue to exercise the command, relay this [to] Gador, Ausejo, Fertig, and Cebu.”¹⁴¹¹

By now Peralta had drawn Bernard Anderson, the Free Philippines, the Hunters and some other guerrilla groups on Luzon into his communication net.¹⁴¹² PLANET had landed on Negros instead of Panay in part to avoid Peralta, but Villamor had to branch out to establish his radio network. Ind had instructed Villamor to keep his presence secret and send a “highly trained, thoroughly astute individual” to meet Peralta but avoid any of his attempts to take control of the

¹⁴⁰⁶ Villamor, 86-87.
¹⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., 87.
¹⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.
¹⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.
¹⁴¹⁰ SWPA would not have radio contact with Fertig until February. Intelligence Activities, 17.
¹⁴¹¹ Villamor, 88.
¹⁴¹² Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 68.
Villamor sent Delfin YuHico, with a miniaturized cypher system sewn into his shoes, to Panay. In mid-January, he sent Bell with Bill Lowry to see Fertig on Mindanao. Upon his return, Villamor sent Bell with new codes to Cebu where Fenton and Cushing were reportedly attempting to repair a transmitter from radio station RCA. Villamor intended to go with Patricio Jorge through western Negros, to Mindoro, on to Luzon and then Manila. Quinto, Dominador Malic, Rodolfo Ignacio would maintain the net control station in Negros for all the Islands.

Villamor felt he had to resolve the contest between Abcede and Fertig over Ausejo. Abcede forced the issue in a message to Fertig: "Am informing you that our whole set-up in the Visayas has long been reported to War Department in Washington. Our instructions are coming from General MacArthur... Your laying claims to control Oriental Negros without controlling the whole island has (resulted in) unpleasant incidents. I can hardly blame Major Ausejo for hesitating to come under the control of this Headquarters. As an experienced officer, am sure you understand (the) importance of tactical unity." Fertig appeared to ignore the message.

Mindanao, D403/R-646

Fertig was preoccupied with the Moros in his area who had collected many weapons to go along with their increasing numbers. The 10th MD commander sent

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1413 Memorandum, Ind to Merle-Smith, 19 November 1942, “Papers of Courtney Whitney,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, Box No. 63, Records Group 16.
1414 Villamor, 123.
1415 Fertig Diary, 15 January 1943.
1416 Breuer, 54.
1417 Villamor, 88.
forty-eight year-old American Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Hedges to deal with them. A pre-war captain in the reserve, Hedges had spent years working among the Moros in the Kolambugan Lumber Mills on the north coast of Lanao. He came back to active duty to command the Motor Transport Company in Dansalan. Fertig noted, “his experience before the war made him familiar with the local people. He has since shown his ability to get along with the Christians and to maintain the favor and support of the Moros.”

American educator Mr. Kuder volunteered to assist Hedges with the Moros. Through January, Hedges organized a number of Moros from the Bolo Battalion under Manalao Mindalano and the Marano Militia Force to create Fertig’s 108th Division.

A number of prominent Moro leaders only slowly embraced Fertig. Busran Kalaw of Momungan, Datu Laguindab of Ganassi, Joseph Sanguilla of Mumay and Madakus, and Datu Buntalis of Masiu valued their independence. Kalaw was the prewar mayor of Mumugan, a former treasurer for Lanao Province, and an associate of Morgan. He eventually accepted command of Hedges’ 126th Regiment. Mindalano was a former school inspector known to be smart, brave and hot tempered and “was the first to fight the Japanese after the USAFFE surrender.” He and his men became the 127th Regiment at Malabang. Captain Macaurog Arumpac was the mayor of Lumbatan, a “clever, a little politico, a good manager” and a Mason. He became commander of the 124th Regiment in Rupagon, Lanao. Major Anonngo Baguindaali was a popular leader and one of the first Moro guerrilla leaders and

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1418 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 92.
1419 Ibid., 91.
1420 Ibid.
took charge of Hedges’ 128th Regiment at Malabang. Fertig’s USFIP also formed the 129th Regiment at Taraka, Lanao, and two Provisional Regiments with four separate battalions and five separate companies. Chinese-Moro mestizo Lieutenant Naguib Guandy, the prewar mayor of Malabang, organized and led Moro resistance south of there. He protected Christians along the Lanao coast and maintained good relations with the Japanese to protect his sources of supply.

A U.S. Army assessment noted: “The efforts of Busran, Kalaw, Mindalano, the Sultan of Ganassi and many other to bring the Moros into line is a monumental tribute to their respect for the American people. They were supported in their efforts by very small allotments of arms and supplies from the guerrilla headquarters.”1421 Their units became Hedges’ 108th Division in Lanao Province. The Maranao Militia Force, the best-armed single group of guerrillas in Mindanao, remained a separate part of the 108th Division for political reasons. Christians dominated the 108th Division staff and commanded the 105th Regiment at Baroy under a Captain Barro. The 108th Regiment at Kauswagam under Major Felipe P. Quejada, and the 120th Regiment at Dalipuga under Captain Pedro Andres brought the division to 597 officers and 8,841 men.

Major Rex Blow had been an artillery officer with the Australian Imperial Force when it surrendered in Singapore. He escaped with a group of prisoners from the Japanese prison camp at Sandakan, British North Borneo. Natives took Blow and the other escapees to Tawi Tawi in the Philippines. There they assisted Colonel Suarez commanding the Sulu Area until they were transported to Mindanao. Several

1421 Ibid.
men from the party were sent to Australia in early 1944 but Blow stayed behind to continue serving with Fertig’s guerrillas. The Japanese attacked Tawi Tawi opposed only by Constabulary troops under First Lieutenant Alejandro Trespeces. When their stocks of food and other supplies ran out, he moved his remaining thirty men to Bato Bato.

Meanwhile in Brisbane, Hamner and the two Smiths had arrived at SWPA headquarters and reported the work of Fertig on Mindanao. They convinced Army Intelligence to have KFS answer the incessant ‘hot Yanks’ in the ‘hot Philippines’ radio broadcasts. Subsequently during a morning brief Fertig’s radio operators told him they had heard “KFS calling MSF.” A shocked Fertig instantly knew Charlie Smith had gotten through and was calling him from friendly lines. He acknowledged the message and KFS responded: “if you know double transposition use as key first name of second next of kin and city of residence second next of kin and encode the following information.” When Fertig used the name of his oldest daughter Patricia and their hometown of Golden, the code worked. Fertig could talk to SWPA, just like Peralta.

Fertig reported to SWPA: “Have strong force in being with complete civilian support... Large number of enemy motor vehicles and bridges have been destroyed. Many telephone poles have been cut down, food dumps burned, and considerable enemy arms and ammunition captured. Thousands young Filipinos eager to join

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1423 Keats, 189-192.
1424 Ibid., 191.
when arms available. Ready and eager to engage the enemy on your orders." KFS instructed Fertig to sit tight.

About this time, the Japanese made a surprising radio broadcast in which they announced to the world that their aircraft had destroyed the guerrilla headquarters in Mindanao, killing General Fertig, and driving his forces into the hinterland. Military intelligence officials in Washington took notice and began to doubt the source of the radio contacts from Mindanao. Federal investigators visited Fertig's wife and daughters in Golden, Colorado, to gather information with which they could confirm their contact's identity using the last letter he had sent to her from Mindanao. Until then, Fertig heard nothing from SWPA.

Manila, D403, R-646

The Japanese high command reassessed its plans for the Philippines. Their first concern was Allied submarine missions into the Islands. The army and navy came to a new cooperative agreement by which the Imperial Navy agreed to “close or put under strict control, the straits wherever the conditions require,” while consulting with nearby army unit within its area of operations. Their second concern was the still lagging cooperation of Filipinos who seemed uninterested in joining the Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. To address this, Fourteenth Army Chief of Staff and director of the Japanese Military Administration, Lieutenant General Wachi Takaji, issued a statement: “in order to quicken national

1425 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 204.
1426 Keats, 183.
1427 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 6.
independence ...sixteen million citizens of the Philippines should liquidate their past focus on the reorganization of the economy and return as quickly as possible to their true East Asian indemnity both spiritually and intellectually.”

General Baba, chief of the Japanese counterintelligence corps who shared a headquarters with Nagahama’s Kempeitai in Manila, laid out a plan for defeating the guerrillas. While army units conducted raids and patrols, the Makapili informants would spread out to spy on their fellow citizens. “Although very small in number,” Ramsey recalled, “the Makapili were insidious, for they were extremely secretive, wore no uniforms, and were indistinguishable from their countrymen in towns and villages.” Baba stepped up raids on villages, increased the use of torture, and promised to pay for the severed heads of any guerrilla leader brought to his men.

Carlos Romulo recalled that in their effort to convince guerrillas to surrender, “The Japanese had two overwhelming arguments: corps of trained bloodhounds, and food. The Japanese dogs could track the guerrilla down in any hiding place.” Just hearing the baying hounds approaching was enough to convince many guerrillas that escape was futile. Romulo added: “The power of rice was even more sinister, Rice had become more valuable than gold.”

On 14 January, an Imperial Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference in Tokyo endorsed a document titled “Proposals Concerning Titles to Occupied Territories.” The policy draft recommended incorporation of “areas suitable as

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1428 Satoshi, 23.
1429 Ramsey and Rivele, 148.
1430 Romulo and Gray, 57.
1431 Ibid.
Imperial territory, areas of strategic importance” into the Empire. However, it
argued, Japan should grant independence “upon areas as qualify for it in the light of
their past political development, if this is deemed advantageous to the prosecution
of the Greater East Asia war and the establishment of Greater East Asia.” The
proposal called for granting Philippine independence as a way of decreasing strains
on the military. The officials believed a free Philippines would willingly police
themselves and still provide support to Japan. Yet five months later, the Navy still
argued against granting the Islands independence too quickly “for it will take time
just to change the present leadership” and their pro-American views.

In the meantime, the army placed three second-tier battalions in the new 17th
Independent Garrison in Luzon’s Mountain Province and started organizing the 22nd
Infantry Battalion in Baguio. To address growing unemployment, the Philippine
Executive Commission established a Bureau of Employment. As a first act the
Bureau established a policy that one person could only work fifteen days at a time
so as to allow others opportunities at employment. It was another clumsy effort
to centrally administer the economy. Major Matsunobu Mikio, an intelligence staffer
in the Fourteenth Army, received orders to organize and train native Ganap party
members at Fort McKinley into a labor battalion to support the military. This
organization became known as the Yoin or Yuin, from the Filipino term from the initials for the “United Nippon.” Some Yoin even received arms and uniforms.

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1432 Tarling, 135.
1433 Ibid.
1434 Satoshi, 37.
1435 Motoe, 71.
On Luzon, Xu Zhimeng and some other members of the rightist Chinese Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia (COWHM) and cadres from the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets League (PCAAPL) formed the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps (PCAJVC) from the Hungmen Restoration Committee at the end of 1942 or early 1943.\(^{1436}\) Wang Hounan, Chen Zhangtan and Zhuang Guodun came from the Anti-Puppets League. Wang Xixiong reported that a number of members came from the Hua Zhi. With 300 members, the PCAJVC concentrated on propaganda with the *Chinese Commercial Bulletin* (*Qiaoshang gong bao*), gathering food and other support for the Huks.\(^{1437}\)

By early 1943 the Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines (CVP) claimed to have 761 men in Manila and its surrounding area, 89 more fully armed men in Bicol, and 260 in Iloilo on Panay.\(^{1438}\) The Luzon force remained in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya until December then moved south towards Rizal and Pampanga before joining Marking in late 1944.

Also near Manila, Marking was down with malaria and Panlilio incapacitated with five abscessed molars. She saw the burden of command taking a toll on Marking. “I found early that it was hard for him to bear the shackles of leadership,” she wrote, “as it would have been for anyone. And I made him hate me because I insisted on it.”\(^{1439}\) She refused to allow him to risk himself in combat. Moreover, she

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\(^{1436}\) Yuk-Wai notes Lieutenant Max L. Brabson’s report that the PCAJVC formed on 29 December 1941. Yuk-Wai, 94.

\(^{1437}\) Ibid., 95.

\(^{1438}\) Ibid., 138.

\(^{1439}\) Panlilio, 21.
insisted he control his men. She wrote: "Not every man knows the difference between commandeering and banditry. You can recruit and train the thousands to fire guns, but who among them can you trust to remain strictly honorable? A rifle should be a trust; actually, it is a power over the life and death."\textsuperscript{1440} Panlilio used many tools of persuasion. As he recovered from malaria, one night Marking amorously said to her “I love you.” Panlilio responded, "Man, man, get away from me. We have work to do. We need sleep."\textsuperscript{1441}

Palawan, D404/R-645

On Palawan, the Cobb guerrillas merged with a group under former governor and reserve Philippine Army Medical Reserve captain, Higinio Mendoza, to form the Mendoza-Cobb Group. Mendoza had organized guerrillas just inland on the north coast. The cohesion of his group, however, was severely tested by dwindling men and food. In January, this new organization placed its headquarters in Tinitian and took on collaborationists in the Bureau of the Constabulary increased.

Negros, D416/R-633

Gador received a letter from Fertig announcing his claim to the command of all Mindanao and Visayan guerrillas. Fertig summoned Gador to Mindanao to discuss his place in Fertig’s organization. Instead, Gador asserted his seniority as a major general and announced his command of the Philippines. Fertig ignored both Gador’s proclamation and promotion.

\textsuperscript{1440} Ibid., 24.  
\textsuperscript{1441} Ibid., 26.
On 27 January, after three days of failed attempts to communicate with Australia, Quinto finally got through to SWPA. He sent Villamor's first message:

“So far so good though have had several hair-raising experiences. Conditions pretty bad and very serious for our forces though not generally realized. Understand Peralta has placed Fourth Corps under Fertig in Mindanao but there’s still a lot of confusion. Suggest you renew order to minimize fighting for their and civilian’s sakes. Am in [Negros] but travel is very dangerous and at times almost impossible due to severe restrictions imposed by our forces and increased patrol activity of Japs. Besides am having personal difficulty due to my picture being in many homes however will still try to make [Manila]. Contact me thirteen GMT as soon as possible and give me latest dope.”

The next day SWPA responded in three parts, the first reading:

“Warmest congratulations from CINC. In view of present confused Luzon situation indicated in information summary, desire you remain [in Negros]. Concentrate on supplying information [and] advice on areas of responsibility and trust-worthiness main guerrilla leaders in Visayas and Mindanao, and advice [on] relationships with this headquarters and each other. Should Peralta and Fertig each be independent and report direct GHQ or one be recognized general coordinator[?] In view of uncertain outlook [in]
Luzon [and] Visayas, would you advice [sic] concentration Mindanao meager supplies we can send[?]”1443

Parts 2 and 3 informed Villamor of Nakar’s and Thorp’s captures, Praeger’s radio contact, the possible loyalty of Luzon Constabulary chief Augustino Gabriel, Fertig’s control of Mindanao without a radio, and broken communication with Peralta. The message also granted SWPA permission to print scrip but prohibited guerrillas from imposing martial law. Both Villamor’s and SWPA’s communication reflected a lack of accurate situational awareness.

At Catagena, Villamor asked Abcede for men to build his communications network and received fourteen volunteers. He decided to form three-man communications teams saying, “The reports of agents in other areas of SWPA showed it never advisable to leave only two in a radio station; they almost always got into arguments. I wanted two men for the radio station I planned to establish, and the odd man as the ‘pacifier.’”1444 Before they went out, Villamor established a training program to pass along the skills his agents had learned at the Victoria Barracks. Lieutenants Modesto Castañeda, Enrique Abila, Roberto Luzuriaga, William Zayco, Arthur Zaycom, and Raymundo Teruel were the first to graduate from the program and deploy. They went to the Philippine capital and reported back to Villamor: “Manila was infested with spies and puppet police. Throughout all of Luzon morale was low, and elsewhere it was not a great deal better.1445 The

1443 Ibid., 93.
1444 Ibid., 67.
1445 Ibid, 96.
Manila Tribune ran a large front-page story that all resistance had ceased. According to Blackburn, Villamor saw this article and “accepted it at face value.”

Villamor began to appreciate differences between guerrillas and regular soldiers. Many derived from a difference in purpose. As S.C.M. Paine noted, “Conventional warfare usually relies on a deliver-victory strategy, while insurgencies often pursue a prevent-defeat strategy – the operative concept of the latter being to survive to fight another day so that the impoverished long-distance runner can defeat the rich sprinter.”

Washington. Lee and other great generals were familiar with this Fabian strategy. Because their men did not have to hold the line in battle, guerrilla leaders relied less on discipline. They could embrace more flexible attitudes to keep men in camp. When, for example, U.S. Army Lieutenant Russell Barros advised Marking and Panlilio to “keep the orders going” to subordinates so that they wouldn’t “break up or slow down,” the guerrilla leaders refused. “If they want to fight on,” Marking explained, “they find us first, tell us what they want to do; then we advise them on how it should be done, and finally we give them orders to go ahead and do it.” That was the guerrilla way.

The guerrilla units routinely disbanded and sent men home to both avoid the Japanese and to lower logistical burdens. They also proved extremely flexible in dealing with the enemy. While fighting in Butuan, Mindanao, guerrillas under McClish and Childress fought the Japanese until both sides ran low on ammunition.

1446 Blackburn Interview, 161.
1447 Paine, 125.
1448 Panlilio, 161.
Then they negotiated a truce dividing the town, with both sides agreeing to share access to the single midtown store. 1449

Finally, guerrillas had to always consider their relation to the people. “First off, to be successful a guerrilla leader must become, in one way or another, the de facto ruler of the territory in which he operates,” explained Lapham, “Failure to achieve authority will defeat all his plans and hopes.” 1450 That meant more than meeting the needs of the people in terms of law and order. To gain the loyalty of local officials and citizens required “that spies, collaborators with enemies, and anyone else who breaks down trust between himself and the local population must be eliminated or neutralized without pity.” 1451

Manila, D418/R-631

On 28 January, Prime Minister Tojo spoke before the Diet in Tokyo. The next day papers in Manila published his speech. “Substantial progress is being made in the degree of cooperation rendered to the Japanese Empire by the people of the Philippines as well as in the restoration of internal peace and security,” Tojo announced, “Under these circumstances and on condition that further tangible evidences of cooperation are actively demonstrated, it is contemplated to put into effect the statement made previously in the question of Philippine independence in the shortest possible time.” 1452 In celebration, the KALIBAPI declared a public holiday and scheduled pro-Japanese demonstrations for 8 February. Benigno Ramos

1449 Stahl, 33.
1450 Lapham and Norling, 76.
1451 Ibid.
led Ganap Party representatives in public rallies across the Islands that “harangued the people with purple prose describing the nobility of the Japanese aims and the magnanimity in promising independence to the Philippines.” On Mindanao, Fertig noted how on 11 February, “Both Tokyo and Manila have spent considerable time in their radio news broadcast telling about peaceful conditions in the Philippines; how the Filipinos are helping in the co-prosperity field while actually the Filipinos call it Prosperity-Ce-Tagalog, slang meaning ‘Your Prosperity.’”

The combination of successful Japanese counterguerrilla operations and MacArthur’s orders to ‘lay low’ had created a sense of calm in many parts of the Islands the encouraged the Japanese and their allies. On 28 February, the Manila Tribune quoted Bengino Aquino as saying: “It is possible that some would say that since the war has not been ended, our attitude would constitute treason to America. If such be the philosophy advanced by some people, I would not hesitate to say that I do not care if I were called a traitor to America.”

By 30 January, the Japanese in the Philippines were more concerned with farm fields than battlefields. Friction had developed between the cotton growers and the JMA over policy and security. In February, they created the Philippines Cotton Growers Association with Shozo Murata as chairman to replace the Japan Cotton Growers as the primary advisors to the JMA. The JMA reported 23,150 acres of cotton planted – an increase of almost 1,400% since October, but still less than three percent of their goal. Eighty percent of the cotton grew on Luzon, seven

1453 Ibid., 370.
1454 Fertig Diary, 11 February 1943.
1455 Abaya, 44.
1456 Yoshiko, 182.
percent in Negros. Traveling reporter Koichi Kayahara noted that the Japanese routinely failed to advance contracted farmers enough money for the costs of equipment, irrigation, planting, fertilizer, and insecticide – although they did pay a wage for irrigating and spraying insecticide. As a result, ginned cotton would only reach twenty percent of the JMA’s 2,470-ton goal.

On 20 February, the JMA approved the “Agenda for Implementing Cotton Cultivation Projects in the Philippines for the Year 1943,” and the “Agenda for the Determination of Cotton Cultivation Areas in the Philippines.” The plans built upon policies adopted toward the sugar industry the previous July and August. Of 643,000 acres dedicate to sugarcane, the JMA converted forty-six percent to cotton. Already, however, the forced conversion of farmland to cotton production had contributed to a severe and growing rice shortage accelerated by a monsoon in November 1943. In Manila, the cost of a sack of rice skyrocketed from 30 to 200 pesos. Only the Japanese, with their ability to print money at will, could afford bulk purchases of rice, and their purchases cut available supplies and drove up prices further. Meanwhile, hunger had driven people to Manila, nearly doubling its prewar population. The discontent resulting from such hardships increased popular support for the guerrilla movement.

Meanwhile, the Imperial Army renewed attacks across northern Luzon. February began with the Japanese raiding Ablan’s headquarters deep in the mountains and although they failed to capture him, he was never seen again. Other patrols scattered Thorp’s First District under Parker Calvert. He appointed Arthur

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1457 Ibid., 184.
1458 Ibid., 186-187.
Murphy as his adjutant and moved his headquarters to Kapangan in Benguet to reorganize around his remaining Philippine Scouts of the 43rd Infantry.

Mindanao, D425/R-624

On 5 February, Fertig received more questions from KFS seeking to confirm his identity. His frustration mounted the next day when Bell informed him that Peralta had gotten an Army radio working and was in contact with Australia. “He had radioed MacArthur’s headquarters, Fertig noted, “that certain officers, including one Wendell Fertig, were trying to usurp his command.”1459 Peralta had asked SWPA to recognize him as the commander of all guerrilla forces in the Philippines. Peralta had a robust guerrilla command in Fourth Philippine Corps and a free government partner in Confesor centrally located in the archipelago. He demonstrated the vitality of his command on 14 February when Fourteenth Army Commander Lieutenant General Shizuichi Tanaka narrowly avoided one of Peralta’s ambushes near Iloilo. To Fertig, developing his own large organization on the second largest island and the one closest to Australia, Peralta was simply an ambitious rival trying to take his place.

Peralta sent staff officers to aid Fertig, which Fertig somehow interpreted as Peralta placing his Fourth Philippine Corps under Fertig’s command. Villamor heard this and wrote: “They were behaving like kids in a dispute for the leadership of a neighborhood gang. And all through the officer ranks there spread the fever of

1459 Keats, 193.
competition. Brevet promotions were being handed out right and left, to too many people without even the approval of Fertig or Peralta. It is getting to be a farce, I thought.”

On 10 February MacArthur sent orders to “All Guerrilla Leaders”: to limit hostile contact with the enemy to minimum; to concentrate on developing intelligence nets; and to report “promptly names of superior officers, and other items of military intelligence.” MacArthur sent Peralta and Fertig three directives: one banning the printing of money, the second keeping guerillas under their current commanders, and the third designating Peralta as “military guerrilla chief of temporarily occupied enemy territory.” Confused and irate, Fertig fired off a capitalized message addressed to KFS with instruction to relay to the War Department: “As senior American officer in the Philippine Islands I have assumed command of Mindanao and Visayas with rank of brigadier general xxx As the leader of the guerrillas forces we have reactivated the USFIP and established civil government in the hands of duly elected commonwealth officials xxx Money is being printed by them and loaned to USFIP xxx Fertig.”

The message spurred MacArthur to get his arms around Fertig. On 11 February KFS in San Francisco informed Fertig his call sign was no longer MSF but now WYZB. Three days later KFS officially passed WYZB off to KAZ, the call sign for MacArthur’s SWPA headquarters in Brisbane. Irritated, Fertig resent his long

1460 Villamor, 96.
1461 “Orders from MacArthur,” Headquarters U.S.F. North Luzon in the Field, 10 February 1945, RG 407, Philippines Archive Collection, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland
1462 Keats, 193.
1463 Ibid., 195.
message to KAZ. MacArthur’s headquarters responded: “KEEP YOUR SHIRT ON YOU ARE NOT FORGOTTEN.”

The AIB realized it had to weigh in on the establishment of a chain of command in the Islands. As SWPA’s staff noted, “The problem of finding commander suitable for the overall situation was a difficult one and would take time and trouble. Recognition of individual local commanders appeared to be the most satisfactory solution and G-2 unhesitatingly recommended the establishment of island commands on the basis of pre-war Military Districts.” MacArthur decided that no one other than himself would command all forces in the Philippines.

He reactivated the pre-war military districts with the intention of assigning a guerrilla commander to command each one. On 13 February, SWPA broadcast to the guerrilla commands: “Command areas will be progressively established based on existing military districts.” They also prepared a letter to this effect for future agents to carry to Mindanao. MacArthur approved Fertig as commander of the 10th Military District that included Mindanao and, for the time being, Sulu. He ordered Fertig to perfect an intelligence net in the 9th Military District of Samar and Leyte until a qualified officer was found there to take command. MacArthur named Peralta as commander of the 6th Military District of Panay with the responsibility for establishing

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1464 Ibid., 196.
1465 Intelligence Activities, 15.
1466 Willoughby concluded: “Neither Fertig nor Peralta was really prepared for a Military District arrangement; both appeared dismayed and thought that GHQ had no faith in their abilities.” Ibid., 18.
Map 11: Military Districts and SWPA appointed commanders, 13 February 1943
intelligence in the 7th and 8th Districts. The order effectively recognized Fertig’s existing organization while terminating Peralta’s pan-Philippine Fourth Philippine Corps. SWPA specifically identified both guerrillas as lieutenant colonels and reminded them that no guerrillas were to assume the rank of general officer.

The order made Fertig suspicious of more senior officers in his region. One was Colonel Alejandro Suarez, a 47-year-old Spanish Moro mestizo who had served in the Constabulary in Cotabato and the Sulus since 1914. Educated in the States, he had rose to command the constabulary in Cagayan Province before the war, transferred to Sulu and became governor there in 1941. He suffered wounds in battle fighting General Sakaguchi’s Jolo Force when it landed at Taglibi, Jolo. He escaped to Mindanao, joined General Fort's troops, and surrendered with Fort. The Japanese took him to Cotabato to command the Bureau of Constabulary forces in that province. In January, he escaped to Tawi Tawi before reaching Bato Bato on Sulu. U.S. Army intelligence reported: “He is reliable, capable, knows the Moros well, is respected and has many friends among them.”

At Bato Bato, First Lieutenant Trespeces commanded thirty constabulary men. Suarez began integrating these men as guerrillas with those on Tawi Tawi to form one unit. About thirty miles to the south, Morgan had sent a Jolo Moro, Lieutenant Imao, with about twenty men to Siasi island. These "Fighting 21" attacked the Japanese garrison there on Christmas, captured thirty rifles, and

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1467 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 103.
withstood counterattacks in early 1943. Suarez incorporated Imao’s units. Recruitment brought the First Battalion at Siasi to 200 men, the Second Battalion at Jolo to 250, and the Third Battalion on Tawi Tawi to 350 men. After contacting Fertig, Suarez’s men became the 125th Regiment of the Mindanao Command with headquarters on the Malum River near Bato Bato. A separate guerrilla unit on Tawi Tawi under “Colonel” Tome Bitend eluded Suarez and seemed dedicated to profiteering by shipping rice to North Borneo. Eventually, SWPA would reestablish Sulu as a separate military district from Fertig, with Suarez as commander.

When Abcede was appointed 7th Military District commander, Ausejo accepted it without complaint and became Abcede’s G-3. Viloria became Ausejo’s executive officer and Bell served as his senior civil administrator. Dr. Jose Garcia joined the guerrillas as the Regimental Medical Officer and organized medical support.

Luzon, D426/R-623

The AIB delivered radios raised a problem of purpose. The AIB intended them for intelligence communications but the guerrillas needed them for control of their operations. The SWPA staff clearly saw the first function as a G-2 responsibility and the second as a function of the G-3. Yet the AIB wished to remain invisible to the other staff, reporting only to MacArthur. Ind set to work to also get “an exclusive channel” for

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1469 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 104.
communications to his agents in the Islands, denied to everyone including guerrilla leaders with radio receivers.\textsuperscript{1470} If they read his mail, he reasoned, they might attempt to influence his agents’ reports. Ind wanted unbiased communication with his agents, immune from guerrilla observation and influence. He also wanted to be free from the “undesirable security angle” of the RAAF station KAZ in Darwin that received and transmitted all Philippine traffic. The AIB could not be certain that the KAZ portal was not open to other eyes seeking to utilize the guerrilla forces. Ind drafted a memorandum for the G-2 explaining, “This is understood by me to be a temporary situation which will obtain only so long as no major military effort toward the Philippines is in effect.”\textsuperscript{1471}

While Villamor provided the AIB with visibility and control in the central Visayan Islands, the situation on Luzon remained murky. On 6 February, Moses and Noble arrived at Praeger’s headquarters and spent the next two weeks using his radio to communicate with SWPA.\textsuperscript{1472} They confirmed that they had directed all U.S. forces in the Philippines to “limit hostilities” in favor of collecting intelligence in accordance with MacArthur’s wishes.\textsuperscript{1473} Yet they seemed to contradict themselves, often in one message, in regards to popular morale, guerrilla status, and their

\textsuperscript{1470} “Radio Communications - Philippines,” Ind to Merle-Smith, 14 January 1943, in “Papers of Courtney Whitney,” MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, Box No. 63, Records Group 16.
\textsuperscript{1471} Emphasis in original. Memorandum, “Philippine – Radio Communications – Intelligence,” AIB to G-2, 16 February 1943, Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG 16 Box 63, Norfolk, Virginia.
\textsuperscript{1472} Norling, 191.
\textsuperscript{1473} On 10 February they ordered: “General policy of USFIPS in PI is to limit hostilities and contact with enemy to minimum amount necessary for safety. Concentration of perfecting organization and on development of intelligence net, reporting promptly names of superior officers, and other items of military of military [sic] intelligence. Offensive activities are premature and only result in increased enemy pressure and probable retaliation against innocent people. Therefore, until ammunition and supplies can be sent, which will take some months your missions as intelligence units can be currently of the utmost value.” Message to “All Guerrilla Leaders” in USFIPS from Colonel Martin Moses, 10 February 1943, Box, 248, RG Philippine Archives Collection, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
intended operations.\textsuperscript{1474} They appeared to be in less than complete control. Then, by the end of the month, over 1,000 Japanese troops began converging on Kabugao towards Praeger’ radio.

Not everyone was avoiding combat. Cabalhin of Marking’s guerrillas set an ambush on the Koyambay-Tanay trail augmented with an air-cooled .30 caliber machine gun recovered from an airplane.\textsuperscript{1475} His roughly seventy men encountered a patrol of 150 closely packed Japanese and killed 93, later discovered to be engineers headed for the Angelo mine.

Meanwhile the Huks had increased to a point that required reorganization. They divided central Luzon into five districts: First in Pampanga under Banal (Poblete); Second in Baliwag, Apalit, San Ildefonso, San Simon, San Luis, Candaba, Santa Ana, and part of Arayat under Dayang-Dayang; Third north of Mount Arayat under Aquino; Fourth in Nueva Ecija under de Leon; and Fifth from Mexico to Bacolor to Lubao and Floridablanca under Abelardo Dabu.\textsuperscript{1476} They bought or stole arms and ammunition.

The Huks invited USAFEE guerrillas to meetings. “In February 1943 my executive officer, Harry McKenzie, received such an invitation to try to negotiate some kind of working agreement with the hosts. En route to the appointed meeting place he was ambushed and shot in the chest.”\textsuperscript{1477} Harry’s men fled but his wife Mary and his adjutant, Manuel Bahia, stayed by his side as the Huks took them

\textsuperscript{1474} Norling, 190.
\textsuperscript{1475} Panlilio, 80-82.
\textsuperscript{1476} Agoncillo, Vol. II, 676.
\textsuperscript{1477} Lapham and Norling, 127.
prisoner. When a Japanese patrol raided the Huk camp, Mary and Manuel pulled Harry into the jungle and escaped to a doctor and then back to the LGAF.

Mindanao, D438/R-611

Based on Villamor’s and Hamner’s reports, SWPA decided to send their next submarine to contact Fertig. Chick Parsons arrived in Brisbane on 18 January and went to the AIB with his plan for a mission to the Philippines that was quickly approved by MacArthur. Taking over coordination with the Navy and Army for the mission, Parsons delivered lists of supply priorities for signal equipment, medical supplies, arms and ammunition, food, clothing, and “morale builders’ like cigarettes, chocolate, gum and magazines, and a fifty pound can of wheat flour “for Communion wafers” in the Catholic land. He prioritized medical supplies second only to radio equipment, “especially a quantity of atabrine for use against malaria.” He also brought cathartic pills to combat dysentery and sulfathiazole to treat pneumonia and staphylococcal infections.

SWPA G-2 noted: “Prior to this time, the C-in-C [MacArthur] had ruled that no American personnel would be permitted on penetration missions, but Parsons secured special permission at the last moment and was allowed to go on the first supply run to Mindanao and to remain on Mindanao as an observer of the guerrilla

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1478 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 84.
1479 Ingham, 48-49.
1480 Wise, 77.
organization there.” Parsons recruited newly promoted Army Major Charles Smith, fresh from his arduous trek on the Or Else, and two Moros for their knowledge of Mindanao and its people. When Fertig received the message from SWPA that Charlie Smith had arrived safely, he wrote, “That is wonderful for it gives me a friend at court. He can explain the reason for many things that have been done.”

On 18 February, the submarine SS-198 Tambor under Lieutenant Commander S.H. Armbruster departed Fremantle, Australia, on its sixth war patrol carrying Parson’s FIFTY team. On midnight 5 March they went ashore at Laganan near Tukuran in Zamboanga, Mindanao. Parsons sent a message to Fertig: “Urgent have four tons supplies for you from down under signed Lt. Comdr. Parsons and Smith.” Parsons had gone ashore without either a disguise or a weapon. Incredibly, among the natives who met him was his former washerwoman. A local guerrilla leader provided him a sixty-foot diesel-powered open lighter captured from the Japanese. Parsons used the boat, daringly flying an American flag, to shuttle the tons of supplies from the submarine. As Japanese patrols responded to exaggerated reports of six submarines unloading hundreds of men, guerrillas carried Parsons and his cargo into the jungle north of Oroquieta.

Fertig thought the four tons of supplies incredible. He calculated that it came to 1.3 pounds per guerrilla but found it did not break down that easily.

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1482 Intelligence Activities, 54.
1483 Fertig Diary, 21 February 1943.
1485 Fertig Diary, 5 March 1943.
1486 Keats, 200-202.
Assuming an adequate distribution, four tons could be carried by 160 men or 25 carabao carts. As they managed the shipment, Parsons explained to Fertig that only MacArthur’s personal interest produced any of these supplies. Fertig owed MacArthur his loyalty. Parson also presented instructions from SWPA for Fertig on how he should develop a radio net, establish coast watchers, and the construct secret airfields. Fertig was now firmly wrapped in the chain of command.

Fertig shared his fears that his organization could dissolve at any time. Indeed, while Parsons was still at sea, Major Angeles Limena’s 109th Regiment attacked the headquarters of Major Manuel Jaldon. “Finally,” Fertig wrote, “mutiny has broken out and threatens this whole crazy structure.”1487 Limena’s attack lasted four months. Fertig found it hard to fight the Japanese when his units were fighting each other.

Parsons reminded Fertig that MacArthur wanted intelligence, not action. “Those radios we brought you are for information,” he said, “You are to establish a flash line [immediate priority communication] of watcher stations along the coasts, and pass the word to us of Jap ship movements.”1488 Fertig disagreed. His priority was fighting. He told Parsons: “Now as far as the Japanese are concerned, the overall strategic objective is very simple. It is, Kill the bastards.”1489 No go, said Parsons. If he wanted SWPA support, Fertig would have to comply.

1487 Fertig Diary, 19 February 1943.
1488 Keats, 208.
1489 Ibid, 205.
Map 12: AIB missions to the Philippines, December 1942-July 1943.
Morgan began the month with a ten-day attack supported by McClish’s 110th Division against the Japanese at Butua. The attack failed and created a loss of face for Morgan – fortunately for Fertig. McClish moved to the Clacveria-Malitbog area and convinced independent guerrillas to join the USFIP under James E. McIntire and U.S. Army Air Corps’ Lieutenant Alfred Fernandez. He contacted other guerrillas under the leadership of Rosaurio Dongallo in the vicinity of Gingoog Bay. These units became the 110th Regiment of McClish’s 110th Division. MacArthur’s recognition – manifested by the delivery of supplies – improved Fertig’s position and made recruiting much easier. ‘The Aid’ proved his authority.\footnote{1490}

Fertig now refined his command. He arrested Sam Goode and replaced him as commander of the guerrillas in the Tago area with Second Lieutenant Joe McCarthy, then commanding a detachment in Tandag. He sent Lieutenant Alarcon from Zamboanga to Basilan Island to organize remnants of the Philippine Constabulary into an effective guerrilla force. Alarcon found former USAFFE staffer First Lieutenant Benjamin Santilan had already turned the guerrillas into an effective unit and recruited them whole into the Zamboanga City area command. Fertig also placed Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bowler in command of the newly organized 109th Division although, for the time being, its area remained unsettled until Fertig settled a dispute with Pendatun.

On 23 February, Fertig learned of his assignment as the 10th Military District commander.\footnote{1491} He apparently felt secure enough to reveal to Parsons a strategy he used to coerce support from local populations. Except for one specific area on the

\footnote{1490} Ibid.  
\footnote{1491} Fertig Diary, 23 February 1943.
east coast, the Japanese had treated the people of Mindanao so roughly that they drove most of them to the side of the guerrillas. Fertig worked to get the Japanese to drive the rest of the population to him. His guerrillas deliberately harassed the Japanese in ways designed to bring about retaliations against or hostile neutral population centers. Fertig explained to Parsons: “we practice sabotage and assassinate Japanese in that area, to provoke the Japanese into making the kind of reprisals that will put the people on our side.”1492 It was a cruel but effective policy.

Parsons and Smith were further surprised when Fertig told them that former Philippine Brigadier General Manuel Roxas was a key source of his intelligence.1493 “Briefly reports from Manila indicate that the politicians are trying to play the game,” Fertig wrote, “Except for Aquino [Aguino] the others are still with us. Even Laurel is at heart OK. The common people are definitely pro-Americans with the cocheros extremely so. Morale his high and they are just waiting.”1494 AIB had wondered where Roxas’ loyalties had settled. After all, when Quezon invited him to go with him to Australia, Roxas had demurred saying his duty was to remain in the Islands. As William Manchester noted, “Whether or not he stayed on MacArthur’s instructions is unclear. The General later said so, but contemporary documents are confusing.”1495 The Japanese had since released Roxas from prison in accord with Laurel’s wishes. MacArthur gladly received the revelation from Fertig.

1492 Keats, 207.
1493 Ibid., 219. G-2 would report: “Important intelligence was obtained from this source and forwarded through guerrilla channels to GHQ. Many prominent Manila residents and government officials were eager and willing to assist the guerrillas secretly. Because of his unique position, General Roxas became the funnel through which money and other material aid were delivered to the guerrillas.” Intelligence Activities, 90.
1494 Diary, 16 May 1943.
1495 Manchester, 379.
Fertig also shared interesting insights on the running of a successful guerrilla organization. To raise much needed funds, his men gathered up all the hair curlers in Misamis Occidental and established a monopoly on styling women’s hair. President Quezon greatly alleviated Fertig's money problems early 1943 by approving the creation of the guerrilla-staffed Mindanao Currency Board and authorizing it to print emergency currency.

Guerrilla operations took many forms. Fertig learned Japanese soldiers confiscated sweet potato like *camotes* from a tribe of Negritos, only to find the tubers were actually *camoteng cahoy*. Though similar in appearance, if not peeled, diced and soaked for three days in a fast running stream the *camoteng cahoy* ripens with cyanide. The feasting confiscators quickly turned blue and died. Fertig then made it a rule for his guerrillas to obtain as much *camoteng cahoy* as they could find and mix into baskets of *camotes* the Japanese purchased in local markets. The surviving Japanese soldiers remained extremely wary of local merchants.

With his new connection to the AIB, Fertig seemed a promising choice to serves as a central base for intelligence and sabotage operations across the Philippines as part of MacArthur’s return. Options elsewhere were clearly less appealing. In northern Luzon, Noble and Moses were trying but lacked control. On February 15, Merrill’s executive officer Cayler sent a message reminding them that Merrill was the senior American on Luzon and “therefore commander of all USAFFE guerrillas there.” No one was listening to Merrill. Bicol saw a tug-of-war between

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1496 Keats, 214.
1497 Ibid., 215.
1498 Lapham and Norling, 115.
several leaders. In the Vasayas, Peralta played for power. On Negros, new 7th MD commander Abcede was under pressure from the Japanese around Kabakalan-Binalbagan. Peralta supported Abcede on Negros and Cudilla on Marinduque. On Romblon he removed Captain Constantine Raval for incompetence and replaced him with Major Enrique Jurado.

Panay, D440/R-609

Apparently Peralta sent Raval to spy in Manila but he was shot at the Malacañang Palace in mid-1944. Jurado’s executive officer was Captain Mario Guarnia, a former attorney from Guimbal. SWPA concluded, “The organization is reported to have been weak and inefficient: the officers were lazy, there was considerable commandeering of goods from civilians, and loose control of officers and men from the top. Guarnia is reported to be a politician closely aligned with LTC Garcia in northern Panay and concerned mostly with his own personal power and profit; he did not work together well with Jurado.”

On Panay, the uneasy alliance between Peralta’s guerrilla organization and Governor Confesor’s free government continued to frustrate the Japanese. Failing to defeat Peralta, the Japanese targeted Confesor. The puppet provincial governor of Iliolo Fermin Caram wrote a letter to Confesor pleading with him to surrender to local commander Colonel Furukawa and bring “peace and tranquility to the suffering people of Panay.” Confesor was a thoughtful man, with degrees from the University of

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1499 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 60.
California and the University of Chicago. He recognized Caram’s plea as a totem for larger questions on war and resistance. Why risk lives to resist the Japanese? Was the effort worth it? What were they fighting for? Confesor’s reply of 20 February became a rare historical document, an explanation of large motives and an inspiration to a nation.

Confesor began by declining to surrender, saying peace and tranquility were beyond the power of Filipinos as long as Japan and America were at war. “This is a total war in which the issues between the warring parties are less concerned with the territorial questions but more with forms of government, ways of life, and those that affect even the very thoughts, feeling, and sentiments of every man,” he wrote, “In other words, the questions at stake with respect to the Philippines is not whether Japan or the United States should possess it; but more fundamentally it is: what system of government should stand here and what ways of life, systems of social organizations and code of morals should govern our existence.” ¹⁵⁰¹ He recognized that through the act of resistance, the islands of the Philippines had the chance to become one nation.

If Japan truly had the Filipinos best interests at heart, Confesor argued, they would withdraw and proclaim the Islands as neutral territory. If not, then the conditions set for independence were false and unachievable. “I agree with you when you say that our people are ‘experiencing unspeakable hardships and sufferings because of these hostilities,’ but you should realize that our people are bearing these burdens cheerfully because they know that they are doing it for a good and noble cause,” he wrote.¹⁵⁰² Japan forced an unacceptable way of life and system of government upon Filipinos. Fighting

¹⁵⁰¹ Ibid.
¹⁵⁰² Ibid.
them was an opportunity for Filipinos to prove themselves worthy of choosing a better way of life and system of government. Confesor wrote:

“In other words, this war placed us in the crucible to assay the metal in our being. For as a people, we have been living during the last forty years under a regime of justice and liberty regulated only by universally accepted principles of constitutional government. We have come to enjoy personal privileges and civil liberties without much struggle, without undergoing any pain to attain them. They were practically a gift from a generous and magnanimous people – the people of the United States of America. Now, that Japan is attempting to destroy these liberties, should we not exert any effort to defend them? Should we not be willing to suffer for their defense? If our people are undergoing hardship now, and are doing it gladly, it is because we are willing to pay the price for these constitutional liberties and privileges.” 1503

Confesor believed America represented democracy and freedom and was fighting for the Philippines not to keep them, but to protect them and would honor the promise to grant them independence. He noted that Japanese authorities, on the other hand, routinely condemned democracy and the principles of liberty. Filipinos like Caram had to make a choice between the two, a choice that would decide ‘national principles.’ To surrender for peace and tranquility was to forfeit the worthwhile ideals and principles upon which to build a new nation. As an exemplar,

1503 Ibid.
Confesor pointed to Lincoln and his determination to suffer civil war as the price for higher principles. He closed with a quote: “suffering afford for the practice of many virtues – virtues which develop greatness and nobility of soul.” The letter spread across the Islands, reprinted countless times and posted everywhere. The Japanese attempt to win over Confesor instead provided an opportunity to rally Filipinos to support the resistance and America’s return.

Villamor was becoming convinced of a need for one overall commander for guerrillas in the Islands. Peralta seemed a likely candidate. On 20 February, however, SWPA reminded Villamor: "As you know Peralta named commander of Panay district only. He has been specifically ordered December seventeenth to carry on no offensive activity unless by order [of] this headquarters and on February twelfth [to] cancel proposed armed demonstrations [on] Negros. – MacArthur.”

The next day SWPA sent a reminder to Peralta: “Command areas will be progressively established based on existing military districts. Commander of districts will operate under control [of] this headquarters and assignments will be subject to review on basis of performance. LT. COL. W.W. Fertig (CE) INF. is designated to command the Tenth MIL District (Islands of Mindanao and Sulu). He will perfect intelligence net covering Ninth MIL District (Samar-Leyte). No officer of rank of general will be designated at present. LT. COL. Peralta will command Sixth MIL District (Panay) and is responsible for organization of intelligence net covering Seventh and Eighth MIL Districts. – MacArthur” On 19 May, Fertig would enter

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1504 Ibid.
1505 Villamor, 97.
1506 Ibid.
into his diary: “KAZ has named Villamor as C.O. 7th Mil. Dist. To try and bring into line the groups that are fighting. God help him. I would not like the job.”\(^\text{1507}\)

On 2 March, propaganda platoon leader Lieutenant Hitomi reported from Panay: “the enemy has gained the upper hand in applying pressure on the citizenry ... propaganda speeches without a show of force are of no value at all.”\(^\text{1508}\) He asked for troops to assist him. Lieutenant Colonel Ryoichi Totsuka, the commander of the 107th Independent Infantry Battalion, also known as the Panay Defense Force, developed a “collective barrio operation” plan to forcibly relocate rural islanders into heavily populated urban areas so as to separate them from the guerrillas.\(^\text{1509}\) He tasked Hitomi to persuade the peasants to cooperate in the move. After reporting this to the Propaganda Corps headquarters in May, however, a plane from Manila arrived to pick up Hitomi and deliver him to Fourteenth Army Vice Chief of Staff Colonel Naokata Utsunomiya, who also served as the Chief of General Affairs of the Japanese Military Administration.

“Collective barrios have already failed on the China mainland,” Utsunomiya scolded Hitomi, “The only effect that they have is evoking the wrath of the people.”\(^\text{1510}\) He added: “I can’t believe that there is some fool now trying to implement the same plan out on Panay.”\(^\text{1511}\) Utsunomiya relieved Hitomi of his platoon and reassigned him to a desk in the Department of Information (Hodobu) in

\(^{1507}\) Fertig Diary, 19 May 1943.

\(^{1508}\) Satoshi, 54.

\(^{1509}\) Sophia Papers, 8.

\(^{1510}\) Satoshi, 54.

\(^{1511}\) Sophia Papers, 9.
Manila.\textsuperscript{1512} Hitomi believed that Governor Caram, had pressed the JMA to end the relocation plan.\textsuperscript{1513} With Hitomi gone, propaganda tailored to the people ended.

The Japanese also renewed efforts to leverage the Catholic Church. On 6 March, the Philippine Executive Committee, through Laurel’s Interior Department, ordered the Church to: “inculcate in the minds of their faithful or flock, loyalty to the constituted authorities and the absolute necessity on the part of all Filipinos to cooperate whole heartedly with the present administration in the establishment of peace and order in every nook and corner of the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{1514} Laurel issued a circular that stated: “Far from being political, the collaboration of all Churches is, in the ultimate analysis, a religious enterprise demanded by conscience.”\textsuperscript{1515}

Southern Luzon, D450/R-599

In Bohol, Turko had built a new VTG a camp in Caramoan in the third week of February. “Soon reports of rapes and other crimes against civilians in Caramoan surfaced,” Barrameda wrote, “Pitched battles ensued between the VTG and Camp Tinagawan men, some of whose relatives were said to have been violated and maltreated by Turko’s men.”\textsuperscript{1516} Reportedly, some of Dianela’s family were VTG victims but Turko’s men emerged as victors. Dianela took refuge in with Padua’s camp. When Turko followed, only the intervention of Lieutenant Adolfo Caro, Padua’s executive officer, saved Dianela from execution.\textsuperscript{1517}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1512} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{1513} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{1514} Villamor, 189.
\textsuperscript{1515} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1516} Barrameda, 153.
\textsuperscript{1517} Ibid., 141-142.
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Still on the run, TVGU commander Miranda limped on crutches with twelve men from Tangcong to Siruma and to Bahi (no Japanese there) arriving on 2 March. Former Bahi resident Jose Benvenuto (Benut) commanded a group of Turko’s VTG in the town. Six days later Miranda married recently promoted Lieutenant Estrada. The townspeople complained to Miranda of abuses by Benvenuto’s men, including extortion and rape. He ordered the VTG men to stop; they ignored him. Resident Ramon Piano went to Turko who sent Sergeant Floresta to investigate. “Apparently the sergeant saw Miranda’s young wife and liked what he saw,” noted Barrameda.1518 Floresta left town to report to Turko. On 14 March men from the VTG, apparently with Turko’s approval, plotted to poison both Miranda and Elias Madrid at a dance, but the targets failed to attend. Floresta returned to Bahi a few days later as part of a large force led by Turko and Dianela and announced that he claimed Miranda’s wife as balato – something of a gratuity due for service – apparently with the intention of giving her to Turko. Cooler heads prevailed, assisted by the arrival of Judge Bajandi, and Turko departed.

Madrid then discovered that Turko and Dianela planned to arrest Miranda for banditry and usurpation.1519 The plotters ordered to Miranda to report to Camp Tinawagan, but he fled Bahi. By now acting TVGU commander Aureus had been out of contact with Miranda for more than three months. After a shootout with Turko’s men in Bahi, Miranda and his wife left on 21 March with eleven men for the remote town of Viga, far from Turko’s influence. There he spent three more months recuperating.

1518 Barrameda, 156.
1519 Ibid.
Although Turko’s VTG and Padua’s Camp Isarog guerrillas were partners, of the forty-six actions logged by the Padua’s forces between 27 January 1943 and 26 December 1944, the VTG fought in only four. Yet, Turko carried disproportionate influence. In May, he met Dianelo in Padua’s camp in Goa, forced his capitulation, and absorbed the Camp Tinawagan guerrillas into the VTG. Turko immediately ordered the combined force to find and kill Miranda. He also married Caramoan Emilia Teoxon, expanding his kinship network with her powerful family, and made her brother his adjutant.

The tale grew more complicated. Lapus had recognized Miranda as the commander of the TVGU, but Zabat recognized Aureus in hopes of assuming his unit. Meanwhile the tug of war between Governor Escudero and Lapus took a turn in March when Escudero fell ill and went to Samar to recuperate. Lapus exploited his absence by convincing Merritt to drive Escudero off Samar. In May, both Lapus and Escudero sent delegations to Panay searching for Peralta’s support. The next month Lapus and Zabat met on Ticao Island, Masbate.

Negros, D464/R-585

Villamor had to learn through the jungle telegraph that a SWPA team under ‘Commander X’ (Parsons) with Captain Charles Smith and three others had landed on Mindanao in early March. “This mysterious commander was working to bring the independent groups on the huge island into line under Fertig,” he recalled, “There was no exchange of traffic between the Commander and me, and since Fertig were

\[^{1520}\text{Ibid., 154.}\]
getting along well – he had brought a set of silver eagles from Australia and had personally pinned them on Fertig – I decided to stay away from any involvement in Mindanao and turn my full attention to the other islands in the Visayas group.”

Mellnik would add, “Though outwardly frank, Chick [Parsons] was most mysterious about his origin and mission.” There was also a mysterious dynamic within the FIFTY team. Fertig noted on 16 March that Smith “encoded a telegram for the South. He would not let Parsons read it so he left in huff... Parsons considers himself as C.O. of the party while I consider them both as independent intelligence agents.”

Villamor had sent YuHico to Panay to Peralta, Jorge to Inginiero on Bohol, and Lieutenant Bartolome to Cabangban on Mindanao to reach Fertig. Villamor himself intended to go to Leyte. Finally, he sent Bell to Cebu in late March to meet Fenton. Villamor had considered going himself, but Bell convinced him that it would be better to send an American to see the erratic Fenton. Parsons discussed Fenton with Fertig and reported to SWPA: “In guerrilla areas today feelings are tense, pressure is great at times, and life does not have the high value of peacetimes.”

Villamor’s position abruptly became precarious on 28 March when the Japanese sent troops into south Negros. Quinto reported to SWPA: “Japanese land, sea and air activities started very suddenly. Locations menaced. Expecting word from leader. All’s well my side presently.” Fighting lasted four days and dispersed the PLANET team.

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1521 Villamor, 126.
1522 Mellnik, 259.
1523 Fertig Diary, 16 March 1943.
1524 Ingham, 161.
1525 Villamor, 99.
From Panay YuHico reported a positive impression of Peralta: “He has ten thousand men, half of them armed, with sub-machine guns and assorted firearms. He rules with an iron hand, under martial law, threatening to execute spies by drum head courts martial. His agents are everywhere. He fills the airwaves with messages to MacArthur.”

Peralta despised Vargas and wanted Quezon to publicly denounce him. YuHico told Villamor, “He doesn’t have much faith in you. He says your identity and mission are all over Negros and other islands. He claims your face has given you away. The people have deduced your mission.” Peralta clearly thought Villamor not a suitable choice to lead the Philippine guerrilla movement.

Villamor went against Peralta and radioed MacArthur recommending Quezon refrain from denouncing Vargas or any other apparent collaborators. “A denouncement by Quezon even or Vargas alone will include in the minds of the people all others,” he argued, “and it will undoubtedly encourage the shoot on sight policy of our soldiers which has already caused so many unjustified killings and which has actually boomeranged against us in that it has forced loyal people to seek Japanese protection.” It may have been that Villamor’s family attachments to the Philippine elite made him more understanding of their relations with the occupation forces.

Collaboration was indeed colored in shades of gray. Lapham, like most guerrilla leaders, sensed that, “Probably 90 percent of ordinary Filipinos, both farmers and local officials, in their hearts preferred Americans and American ideas

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1526 Ibid., 100.
1527 Ibid., 101.
1528 Ibid., 104.
to their Japanese counterparts.”

Yet as months went by without any sign of America’s return, many acclimated themselves to Japanese suzerainty. According to Adalai Marquez: “By this time, after more than eighteen months of occupation, some of the men and women residents of Manila had begun to ‘play ball’ with the enemy.”

Asunción A “Lola” Pérez explained, “It is not nationality. It is human nature. It could happen in America. It was happening in Europe before the war came here. It will happen wherever there is tyranny, oppression, and a price for betrayal.”

Some collaboration resulted from an earnest attempt to gain respect from the occupiers. Isabela Yumol won second prize in a contest among Filipino students reciting Japanese, with several Japanese generals applauding, and a neighbor commented: “you know, our little personal triumphs, like this, permitted and appreciated, make us feel less oppressed and subjugated.”

Others were clearly coerced into cooperation. As Villamor explained, “To some extent the whole country was a prison camp.”

“No civilian, even though loyal and sympathetic to the cause, could be expected to render support if he were sure to be reported to the Japs and shortly thereafter to lose his head to a Samurai sword,” wrote Volckmann, “It was obvious that the spies, informers, and collaborators had to be eliminated; the ‘eyes and ears of the Japanese’ had to be destroyed.”

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1529 Lapham and Norling, 77.
1530 Marquez, 17.
1531 Panlilio, 177.
1532 Jennings, 45.
1533 Villamor, 102.
1534 Ibid., 125.
In one example of the pressure felt by Filipinos, a Mr. Gongong from Kiangan, who had been raised by American missionaries and graduated and taught at Silliman University, applied to Volckmann as a volunteer spy. After being given a week to reconsider, he took the oath of service from Volckmann and went on his first assignment which he performed well. On his third mission, however, the Japanese stopped him and found his Army pass. They sent Gongong, who had a family, to a reeducation school in Manila, and after a few months he emerged as a constabulary officer working for the Japanese. “Our agents next reported that he was making public speeches denouncing the United States and asking the people to cooperate with the Japanese,” Volckmann wrote.\textsuperscript{1535} He then moved to Lubuagan in Kalinga province to command a constabulary company. The guerrillas found and killed Mr. Gongong. Volckmann wondered how the Japanese could have turned him. “Perhaps,” he concluded, “with certain individuals too much education is as bad as too little.”\textsuperscript{1536}

Still other collaborators were simply duped. One day Miss Magdalona Leones walked into the 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion, 121\textsuperscript{st} Infantry Regiment, USFIP-NL, in La Union and reported that a Filipino agent from SWPA had arrived in Manila and sent her to fetch the rosters of all guerrilla units in the local area. She said the SWPA agent had shown her official looking orders and U.S. Treasury checks proving his identity. In accordance with counter-espionage procedures, the guerrillas detained Miss Leones and sent her to Volckmann. A background check verified that she had been raised in the church by American missionaries and was a deaconess. She had been an friend

\textsuperscript{1535} Volckmann, 116.  
\textsuperscript{1536} Ibid., 117.
of Volckmann’s close associates Miss Metzger and Miss Spessard in Ifugao. Volckmann decided to hold Miss Leones until he could check out the agent in Manila. Two weeks later he received a report: he was a Japanese agent named Reyes. Volkmann’s investigation, however, triggered the Japanese to round up American missionaries used by Reyes in Manila. “I explained to Maggie, as we now called her, what had been uncovered,” Volckmann wrote, “She was very distressed to learn of the fate of her missionary friends.”

He invited Leones to work with the guerrillas and she readily accepted. She moved fearlessly about Manila, collecting information through her church contacts, and despite being arrested three times with incriminating evidence, she managed to escape back to the guerrillas each time to carry on her work. “Maggie was eventually formally enlisted into the Philippine Army and inducted in to USAFIP, NL,” Volckmann noted, “After the war she was awarded the Silver Star, the only woman in USAFIP, NL to receive such a high award.”

1537 Ibid., 135.
1538 Ibid., 136.
9. Networks

15 March – 31 May 1943

With the arrival of more agents and supplies, MacArthur began to construct an intelligence network parallel to the guerrilla organization. Meanwhile a new wave of local guerrilla leaders, assisted by submarine delivered aid, replaced those who had fallen and continued to organize and expand their operations. As the war turned, however, Japan became more desperate to control the Filipinos.

Mindanao to Leyte, D463/R-586

On Mindanao, Fertig gave Chick Parsons another boat, the sixty-foot diesel Mitsui launch called the *Nara Maru*. Parsons started along the coast northward to establish a radio station watching over the strategic Surigao Strait between the northwestern tip of Mindanao and the southeastern edge of Leyte. Almost anything transiting east and west through the Philippines got funneled through this easily observable and heavily trafficked waterway. Parsons wanted a team on northeastern Mindanao under Fertig’s control and support. A second team on southeast Davao would ensure coverage of the waterway.¹⁵³⁹

Parsons went ashore at Medina in McClish’s area of operations. He was surprised to find McClish’s ‘service company’ replenishing the *Nara Maru* with fuel distilled from coconuts – oil that provided fewer BTUs than diesel fuel but still

¹⁵³⁹ Ind, 147.
burned clean and true. McClish also provided Parsons with personnel for a coast-
watching station and a .50-caliber machine gun for his boat. When Parsons neared
the tip of Surigao City, the most desirable site for a coast watcher team, he found the
Japanese were already there and searching for him. He headed north across the
strait for Panaon Island that extended like a finger to the south off Leyte.

When they arrived the next morning, a team of yellow covered guerrillas
greeted the *Nara Maru*. The guerrillas had opened a wayward sea mine in hopes of
using its picric acid to treat jungle sores and got coated with its dust. On the
southeast edge of Panaon Island, Parsons emplaced Lieutenant Truman Hemingway
and a team from McClish’s command with a radio to report ship traffic in the strait.
He then turned north to Leyte.

Soon the Davo coast watching station reported seeing a ship sink off shore.
That one report turned the U.S. Navy into an enthusiastic supporter of the Philippine
guerrillas. Until that moment, the battle damage from many Navy attacks had
remained unconfirmed with no credit given for ships they sunk. Coast watchers
could now confirm the ships sunk and provide the credit. The Navy was ready to
provide submarines, coast watchers and net control stations to support spotters in
flashing traffic to Naval Intelligence in Perth. SWPA G-2 reported: “It was eventually
decided (20 August 1943) to establish a large radio station in Mindanao through
which all special Navy traffic would be passed directly to the Navy control station in
Australia.”

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1540 Ingham, 63-64.
1541 Ibid, 160.
1542 *Intelligence Activities*, 35.
Map 13: Coast Watcher Stations and Destruction of Japanese Shipping
Getting guerrilla commanders to be enthusiastic about coast watchers was another matter. Parsons explained to Fertig: “One torpedo in half a second can blow up more ammunition than the Japs can shoot at you in a year. Another can kill more Japs on a troop transport than all the guerrillas in the Islands could ever kill.”

Leaders like Fertig reluctantly diverted their resources to support the coast watcher network, and big results followed. In April 1944, coast watchers’ observations would give the U.S Navy the initiative in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Their observations led to more rapid cycles for attacks. Some 214 ship sightings reported in June 1944 grew to 405 in October, despite fewer Japanese vessels.

Before passing through the hundred-foot wide Panaon Straits, Parsons tried to coordinate with the guerrillas under Lieutenant Jose Nazareno defending the channel. He sent word ahead by relay runners but still took friendly fire with damage to external fuel tanks. Instead of being warned not to fire on the Nara Maru, the guerrillas had only received a warning: “Look out for a launch arriving this afternoon.” Parsons entered into his journal: “I have been fired upon by friends many more times than by the enemy.”

Before the end of March, Parsons reached Maasin in southwest Leyte. He learned that two guerrilla groups there were at war with each other and had just fought a battle leaving forty-five dead. "Captain" Gordon Lang, a former yeoman in

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1543 Keats, 208.
1544 Ind, page 173.
1546 Ingham, 68.
1547 Wise, 95.
the Sixteenth Naval District at Cavite led one band of guerrillas. American mining engineer “Major X” Chester Peters and his wife Filipina Julia Manapasi, also known as ‘Joan of Arc,’ led a group near Inopacan after being driven out of Ormoc. Parsons visited both and thought them incompatible and unreliable.

Parsons then went to see old friends Miguel and Mariano Jesus Cuenco of a powerful Cebu family who lived on Leyte. They advised him that the only person with enough status to unite all the Leyte guerrillas was Colonel Ruperto K. of San Roque at the southern tip of the island. A former constabulary commander on Cebu and Bohol, he had commanded the 81st Infantry Division and was captured while fighting near Davao. He claimed McClish’s men freed him from his imprisonment at Butuan. Indeed, after apparently losing Ausejo’s unit on Negros, Fertig had sent McClish to make contact with Kangleon on Samar and Leyte. SPWA would later report, “Kangleon acted forcibly under GHQ-Fertig instructions and encountered Peralta’s men on Leyte, Samar, etc.”

The fifty-one year-old senior Philippine officer on Leyte told Parsons he was too old and too tired to play another role in the war. Convinced by Parsons’ promise of recognition and support from MacArthur, and the faith of the Cuenco brothers, Kangleon finally said, “Apparently it is not the time for a soldier to rest. You have made my duty clear, Commander Parsons. I have no choice. You may tell General

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1548 Note Travis Ingham identifies the Lang and Peters guerrillas a based at Ormoc and Tacloban. Ingham, 70-71. These sites were actually occupied by Miranda and Balderian, respectively. Justibaste,

1549 According to Emil B. Justibaste, MacLeish’s men did not conduct any raids that might have freed Kangleon. Justibaste noted that others freed from Butuan became so by accepting deals with the Japanese, the implication that Kangleon may have done the same. Justibaste.

1550 The timing is suspicious: Ausejo pledged to Fertig in October 1942. Peralta tried to recruit Ausejo in November. Kangleon escaped prison in December, the same month Fertig assigned McClish a division command. Intelligence Activities, 18.
MacArthur that I am at his disposition.” Satisfied, Parsons headed to Malitbog in southern Leyte on his way back to Mindanao.

Parsons seemingly failed to consider other guerrillas in Leyte. Alejandro Balderian, Cirisco and Isabelo Centrino, Antonio Cinco, Blas Miranda, Felimon Pabilona, and Felix Pamanian, among others, operated separate successful guerrilla units across center and north of the island. Willoughby would later especially note, “Miranda may have had possibilities not evident at the time but was frozen out by Kangleon-Fertig-Parsons.” “Rumors circulated among them that Kangleon was compromised, that he had somehow collaborated to win release from imprisonment. Balderian, for one, would never accept the colonel as his commander.

In his study of the Leyte guerrillas, however, Elmer Lear suggested another reason for Parson’s appointment of Kangleon: he was the most palatable choice for command to MacArthur and the Philippines elites. Some accused Blas Miranda and his WLGWF of economic policies indicating “radical tendencies hostile to property interests.” Peralta’s endorsement could be dismissed given the lack of alternatives at the time. The hacienadores of western Leyte, including the Mejia and Tan families, long feared tenant revolt and saw ill intent behind Miranda’s practical decisions to divert harvests from markets, to protect delinquent tenants, and to confiscate lands for communal farming. Whatever his motivation, Miranda and men like him created expectations that threatened to alter post-war social power

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1551 Ingham, 75.
1552 Intelligence Activities, 18.
1553 Lear, 76-78.
dynamics. “To be sure,” Lear argued, “one might argue that from such beginnings
collective farms in the Marxist sense might emerge. Hypothetically, this eventuality
cannot be dismissed. Nonetheless, when one reminds himself that Leyte had no past
history of agrarian radicalism and that neither Miranda nor any of his staff were
socialists (much less Communists), it seems rather remote to think of the WLGWF as
an instrument of deliberate left-wing social change.” Even so, the wishes of the
hacienderos had to carry weight with those eyeing post war politics in the
Philippines.

The mayor of Malitbog led the town’s entire population in greeting Parsons
with all the pomp and enthusiasm they would have mustered for MacArthur himself.
Under the crush of the reception committee, the mayor fell through the dilapidated
dock. Even that could not break the town’s fervor for Parsons who stayed only a
couple of hours before heading to Mindanao.

Northern Luzon, D456/R-593

To avoid capture as Japanese patrols pushed into Apayo Province, on 8
March, Praeger disassembled his homemade radio and had his men laboriously
move it one mile from Kabugao to Bulu. The set included heavy diesel engines
and equipment, with parts weighing as much as 200 pounds. Foiled, the Japanese
threatened and bribed natives to find the guerrillas’ new headquarters. With the
radio reassembled at Camp X, thirty-minutes outside of Dampalan, Captain John

1554 Ibid., 83.
1555 See Norling, page 181.
1556 Ibid, page 199.
Simmons fought through recurrent bouts of malaria to keep faulty engines working and maintain Praeger’s communication with the outside world.\textsuperscript{1557}

Praeger’s decision to move his radio merits examination. While pacifying the Philippines forty-years earlier, the U.S. Army pursued a “wearing-out policy” to make the people weary of guerrilla “impotent military efforts” and thus “withdraw their material and moral support for them.”\textsuperscript{1558} In this new war, guerrilla leaders learned once again the link between action and popular support. As Fertig said, “I am trying to make clear that any guerrilla has to keep the pressure on, everywhere and all the time, killing Japs. Otherwise, no public support.”\textsuperscript{1559} If Praeger left Kabugao without a fight, the locals might perceive his force as impotent. Bernard Norling explained, “the people in and around Apayao would never feel the same pride about the radio message they would have felt had a couple of CAF patrols knocked off a Japanese company in their immediate locality.”\textsuperscript{1560} Yet with its batteries, generators, fuel, spare parts, etc., Praeger’s radio set took forty porters to move, demanding an early decision whether to fight or flee. If he stayed too long to fight, he risked losing the cumbersome radio. If he left in time to move the radio, he could look weak. Philosophical debates about ‘winning the people’ came down in practice to command decisions such as when to move a radio. Praeger chose to move quickly.

\textsuperscript{1557} Willis and Myers, 94. Note SWPAG-2 reported Prager went off the air in February and did not return until June. \textit{Intelligence Activities}, 13.
\textsuperscript{1558} Birtle, 113-114.
\textsuperscript{1559} Keats, 208-209.
\textsuperscript{1560} Norling, 181-184.
Running from the enemy meant Praeger went off the air. Moses and Noble, who by now claimed 6,000 guerrillas drawn from the remnants of the 14th, 121st and 43rd Infantry, sent out a message by runners on 20 March to “All Guerrilla Leaders”:

“Send your men out to all barrios in your territory and search for a ‘ham’ or amateur radio operator who is capable of constructing a transmitter that will carry 300 + 400 miles. Try to get him all the spare parts you can to construct the transmitter as well as the power unit and generator. Induct him into the U.S. Army. Place set on highest mountain in your vicinity. You are authorized to sign vouchers for all materials necessary to build this set. Also procure on regular commercial battery radio set in order to receive short wave messages. Make every effort to get this in operation by May 1st. A special secret messenger will arrive at your Headquarters prior to May 1st giving you the proper call letters, frequency and hours of daily contact.”¹⁵⁶¹

The AIB instructed Villamor to smuggle a radio into Manila. He had a Panay radioman, Jose Casteñada, memorize the construction of a radio, disassemble it, and pack the parts in a load of fruit. With two other PLANET members, Casteñada sailed a small boat to Luzon and brazenly walked through Japanese checkpoints all the way to Manila, telling any soldiers who stopped them that the fruit was meant for a Japanese officers’ mess table.¹⁵⁶² Casteñada arrived at the house of AIB agent Frank Jones, reassembled the

¹⁵⁶¹ Message to “All Guerrilla Leaders” in USFIPS from Colonel Martin Moses and Colonel Arthur Noble, 20 March 1943, Box, 248, Records Group Philippine Archives Collection, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland
¹⁵⁶² Breuer, 52-54.
radio, and brought the Manila guerrillas onto the Villamor net. Villmor then sent Rodolfo Ignacio to smuggle the forwarding radio to Major Ricardo L. Benedicto on Mindoro.\textsuperscript{1563}

Without radios, guerrilla leaders had to travel to make important communications. In March, Ramsey took a long, dangerous journey north through the area occupied by 10,000 Japanese troops near Fort Stotsenberg. At Tarlac he met with Captain Manuel Reyes who guided him through Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan provinces. Ramsey organized guerrillas in Bayambong, Claro Camacho’s home village. Anderson, who now ran his own guerrillas in Bulacan and Tayabas, went with Ramsey to organize east central Luzon. While they travelled, a ‘pro-Japanese Filipino agent’ obtained Anderson’s organization roster and sparked a purge that hurt the ECLGF. “Andy had good men,” noted Yay Panlilio, “for the good are magnets for those of the same metal.”\textsuperscript{1564}

On 17 March, the Philippine Executive Committee again endorsed the Japanese Military Administration practice from Manila the previous August and issued Executive Order 137 ordering the formation of Neighborhood Associations “as a tool to keep them informed on the presence of guerrillas, especially wanted one.”\textsuperscript{1565} They hoped to separate the people from the guerrillas. Association members were known as rondas (not to be confused with a similarly named group of collaborationist bandits in Sipocot). Males from eleven acted as sentries with bamboo drums to warn of a stranger’s appearance in towns. By April there were reportedly 13,192 neighborhood associations with over 900,000 members in and

\textsuperscript{1563} Ind, 127. \\
\textsuperscript{1564} Panlilio, 157. \\
\textsuperscript{1565} Barrameda, 71.
around Manila alone. More and more, the guerrillas had to rely on a thin reed of trusted civilian support. This environment especially hampered their acquisition of medical support.

The JMA was by now very concerned about Filipino reaction to the hardships of occupation, especially hunger. The commander of the forces occupying Leyte since October, 36th Independent Infantry Garrison Battalion Colonel Yoshitsugu Omuri, issued a proclamation:

"With respect to the food problem, I say that all of us have to make some personal sacrifices. This is the consequence of war. It is not only you who suffer from want of food. Everybody including America, England, Japan, China and all other nations engaged in war suffers from food shortage. Germany lost in the last war because of food shortage. Germany is winning today because she has learned a lesson about making herself a self-sufficient nation. Let us not depend upon Gandara [a rice-producing municipality in Samar] for rice. Even when the Japanese go there, they are not sure whether or not there is rice. Nobody knows when this war will end. Let us plant our own rice. This constitutes one of our moral disciplines. Sky-high price [sic] of commodities is an American philosophy. Price [sic] should be controlled by the government. But the government cannot do this work alone. All of us have to work

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1566 Hartendorp, 453.
together. As long as the war lasts, there will be problem of food.”\textsuperscript{1567}

The Neighborhood Association failed to alleviate such problems. Any success in controlling local populations with identification cards, checkpoints on travel, or the allocation of food and medicine, faced counterbalancing moral opposition. Brian Hardesty believed this was the cost of not deploying more local garrisons to live among the people so as to convince the population that the occupiers were “there to stay.”\textsuperscript{1568} Yet, without sufficient numbers of troops and operating within cultural attitudes dictating superiority over subjugated people, the Japanese fell back on customs practiced in Japan and its earlier conquests.

News suddenly rocked the northern Luzon guerrillas: Charles Cushing had surrendered. “Charles was a nervous man and, unlike his brothers Walter and James, had never seemed to me to be cut out for guerrilla life,” Lapham rationalized.\textsuperscript{1569} The Japanese had captured and imprisoned Cushing’s wife in Santo Tomas. After interrogation, they released her under the promise that if she would convince her husband to surrender to see his wife and children and know that they would be well treated. Cushing’s guerrillas, under Telesforo Palaruan and Feliciano Nobres, joined Lapham’s LGAF.

Cushing’s capture was apart of a broader campaign in the region. In the Markings area, Panlilio recalled, “The Japs patrolled oftener and oftener, in groups ranging from 30 to 150. We moved back. We moved forward. We side-stepped. We

\textsuperscript{1567} Ara, 67.
\textsuperscript{1568} In this Hardesty was in accordance with David Galula’s theories. Hardesty, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{1569} Lapham and Norling, 55.
sat tight.”\textsuperscript{1570} From August through April Markings Guerrillas dodged the Japanese patrols in and around Kalinawan, Rawang, Makantog, Sulok, Mayton and Kanumay. “Those who failed to move got run over,” said Panlilio.\textsuperscript{1571}

The Japanese captured Governor Marcelo Adduru on 1 April, dealing a severe blow to the Cagayan-Apayao Guerrilla Force.\textsuperscript{1572} Shortly thereafter, the hundred men of Alban’s Guerrillas went inactive in the hills near Carazi, Ilocos Norte. Then on 13 April, Captain Manuel Enriquez surrendered. Volckmann reported, “The Japs had taken Enriquez’s wife and children into custody as hostages, and at his wife’s pleading Enriquez surrendered. After his surrender he attempted to keep in contact and work with the guerillas.”\textsuperscript{1573} The Japanese imprisoned Enriquez in Fort Santiago. The remaining 1,000 armed men of 14\textsuperscript{th} infantry passed to Major Romulo Manriquez.\textsuperscript{1574} The Japanese tactics of capturing guerrilla family members was paying dividends. Still, when one guerrilla surrendered, it seemed two more volunteers arrived to take their place.

Negros, D486/R-563

On 7 April, SWPA sent a message to Villamor: “Information that serious friction exists between allied military groups in Negros is profoundly disturbing particularly in present dangerous circumstances. I am directing all leaders faithfully to cooperate against the common enemy.”\textsuperscript{1575} MacArthur promised to designate a

\textsuperscript{1570} Panlilio, 29.
\textsuperscript{1571} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1572} Agoncillo, Vol. II, 653.
\textsuperscript{1573} Volckmann, 139.
\textsuperscript{1574} Blackburn Interview, 133.
\textsuperscript{1575} Villamor, 106.
new 7th Military District commander soon, but until then he would hold all commanders responsible for their units. Villamor issued a call for local guerrillas to cooperate. Gador refused and reminded Villamor that he was the one true commander by virtue of his higher rank. In doing so, Gador further irritated his fellow guerrillas and several of his own officers who desired to be part of the SWPA. Meanwhile Peralta continued to support Mata as commander in Negros while Fertig endorsed Ausejo. Villamor had come to the conclusion that Abcede was the best choice for Negros commander.

The next day Villamor radioed SWPA a report on Peralta: “He is very strong against released prisoners and has verbally established the policy of having all released prisoners arrested and placed in confinement. His desire to have absolute control over other units is confirmed by his remark to [YuHico] that he had planned to furnish these with transmitters purposely constructed to be incapable of transmitting to you...” Still, Villamor admired the commander on Panay. He explained, “Peralta was a good soldier. But he was fuming with exasperation. His bitterness was a maddening waste. He was not conveying to MacArthur the real situation; he made no mention of his arguments with Fertig or Fenton, nor of Ausejo’s refusal to recognize him. And he said nothing about the rivalries existing in Negros. Nor had he made mention of the many other organizational problems.”

On 12 April, Fertig reported, “Radio from Peralta or rather Abcede suggests that

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1576 Ibid., 104.
1577 Ibid., 105.
they might be considering an armistice which will make it that much tougher on us.”

Villamor began to feel that he could not bring unity to the Philippine guerrillas. He sent word to MacArthur: “There are many problems now whose solutions can only come from you or Quezon. Example questions re taxes, courts and their jurisdictions, money, status of men taken into the services since the fall, etc. I feel that unless policies are established soon there is a danger that the Army will eventually lose the full backing of the civilians without which the Army will not long exist.” SWPA understood. G-2 noted: “The commanders have always been somewhat distrustful of one another. Cushing has complained that Ingeniero’s agents were operating in Cebu. Fertig allows no traffic to and from Negros, etc.” The guerrilla leaders even known to shut down each other’s radios in their areas for fear they might be ‘spying.’ In his heart Villamor believed the commander should be a Filipino.

Luzon, D488/R-561

Near Manila, Lapham collected more guerrillas. One was Captain Charles Putnam, an American mining engineer commissioned into the Army during the fighting on Bataan. He was a hard drinking, loud man who organized his own guerrillas in the Lingayen Gulf region. “He had lived among the Filipinos, obviously

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1578 Fertig Diary, 12 April 1943.
1579 Villamor, 105.
1580 *Intelligence Activities*, 70.
liked them, and understood them well,” Lapham noted, “He behaved toward them like an amiable despot and was extremely popular with his ‘subjects.’”

Lapham received money and information from the Escoda Group, prominent Manila citizens organized in part by New York Herald Tribune reporter Tony Escoda and his wife Josefa. The Escoda Group consisted of primarily young female socialites. Many members of the group, including the Escodas, were eventually caught, imprisoned and beheaded in Manila’s old Chinese cemetery. One member, Ramona ‘Mona’ Snyder, was with relatives in the country, one of who was a Lapham lieutenant, when she learned that the guerrilla leader was nearby and severely ill. “Though she had never seen me before,” recalled Lapham, “she showed up one day well supplied with money, medicine, and provisions and began to try to nurse me back to health.” Later introduced to Ramsey, Mona fell in love. According to Lapham, “In rapid succession she became his girlfriend, then an intermediary between him and Manuel Roxas.”

The time of occupation was especially dangerous for women. They lived under constant threat of sexual assault and rape by the Japanese or armed bands. President Quezon noted, “Many of the girls died from this brutal treatment and nothing could have been more certain to leave a permanent scar of deep hatred among the Filipinos against the conquerors than these awful crimes.” Describing attacks by indigenous bandits, Barrameda wrote, “It was horrible enough to be

\[1581\] Lapham and Norling, 57.
\[1582\] Ramsey and Rivele, 170.
\[1583\] Lapham and Norling, 58.
\[1584\] Ibid.
\[1585\] Quezon, 292.
molested and violated by the armed ghouls of San Jose and Rey. But the sons of Nippon were infinitely worse. They not only raped women; they soiled Filipino womanhood by carting off their victims to army-run brothels to serve the libidinous drive of their soldiers.” ¹⁵⁸⁶

This sense of insult to ‘Filipino womanhood’ motivated fierce resistance. Early on Quezon sent General Francisco and General De Jesus to inspect the troops fighting on Bataan. They reported on the desperate conditions facing the men. “They also told me,” recalled Quezon, “of the increasingly grim determination on the part of our men to fight as they learned of the abuses and atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers, especially the raping of Filipino women.” ¹⁵⁸⁷ Previous divisions of class and clan fell away; the victims were Filipina.

Many women had to make hard choices against such dangers. Almost every town saw morally good women and girls turn to prostitution to feed their families. Others turned to acts of collaboration. Adalia Marquez recalled, “I knew one such woman well. She was truly beautiful. I shall refer to her only as Linda. Her friend was Colonel Nagahama, Chief of the Japanese Military Police [Kempeitai] in the Philippines. She really had him ‘wrapped around her finger.’” ¹⁵⁸⁸ Beauty was an exceptionally vulnerable condition. Collaborators such as Linda served a vital social function however. On many occasions, they acted as gateways for Filipinos to access Japanese authorities while seeking justice for some wrong. Adalia used Linda to reach her husband Tony in prison.

¹⁵⁸⁶ Barrameda, 72.
¹⁵⁸⁷ Quezon, 250.
¹⁵⁸⁸ Marquez, 17.
A legion of other women joined the resistance and provided support for many guerrillas. Larger organizations frequently included Women’s Auxiliary Service (WAS) units making clothes, acting as nurses, or providing entertainment. Women served as vital intelligence assets and couriers. The Escoda Group socialites raised money and supplies and suffered for it.\(^ {1589}\) In Bicol, the Daughters of Tandang Sora and the Daughters of Liberty provided intelligence, field first aid, and acted as camp orderlies. Young female couriers tucked messages into their braided hair.\(^ {1590}\) The Daughters selected Paz Caguia as their president and their officers included Esperanza Dañgalan, Modesta Pancho, Rosario Sicad Peña, Maria Lareza Uy Abitria and Soledad Uy-Boco. They organized a food sales cooperative to raise money for local guerrillas. To deliver the monies, the women braved not only Japanese lines but also the infighting between the Bicol guerrilla groups.\(^ {1591}\)

Other women made their marks as individuals. Claire Phillips gathered intelligence while working as a hostess in a cabaret for Japanese officers and earned the nickname ‘High Pockets’ for carrying valuable information in her bra.\(^ {1592}\) American Dorothy de la Fuente posed as a Filipina and ran the Tsubahi, a bar reserved by the Japanese military where she collected intelligence and cash for the guerrillas. She was arrested and disappeared into Fort Santiago prison.\(^ {1593}\) Five-foot-tall nurse Lieutenant Estella Remito in Bucanasi amazed Don Willis with her ability to lead marches across jungle mountains at a pace of twenty miles per

\(^{1589}\) Ramsey and Rivele, 170.

\(^{1590}\) Barrameda, 73.

\(^{1591}\) Bárcélón.


\(^{1593}\) Villamor, 187.
Miss Trinidad Díaz, a cashier in the Binangonan cement factory, “a tomboy, but so gracious of heart she gave no offense nowhere,” served as a lieutenant in Marking’s Guerrillas, “policing the district with her own men, liquidating a spy, laying an intelligence network to catch more.” She led ambushes and killed Japanese soldiers. The Japanese finally captured her and tortured her for thirty-two days before she died.

Then, of course, there was Yay Panlilio. A well-known newspaper reporter and radio broadcaster before the war, she left her children to join Marking’s guerrillas. She quickly became his lover and co-commander, explaining “War was our marriage, the guerrillas our sons.” She faced resentment from the men around Marking and eventually had to confront his bodyguard, Cabalhin. “He said something, I said something,” Panlilio remembered, “he placed his hand on his sidearm, I challenged him to pull it and reached for my own.” Marking intervened with gun drawn on his bodyguard who left in tears. Panlilio’s relationship with Marking was not easy. “A week before, in a jealous fit,” she wrote, “he had thrown me on the ground, leaped over me to grab me up by my shirt front, slung me up over his shoulder after a couple of slaps, and carried me to the creek to hold me under water, thrashing and kicking and helpless in his big paws. ...Before that he had fired his .45 twice past my left ear at two feet, trying to put the fear of the Lord in me, and it did, it did.” Panlilio described Marking’s attitude towards

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1594 Willis and Myers, 101.
1595 Panlilio, 30.
1596 Ibid., 26.
1597 Ibid., 104.
1598 Ibid., 153.
her: “‘Don’t forget you belong to me. I catch you making eyes, I’ll black them both.’
And my unspoken retort, ‘If I weighed 135 and you weighed 90, it’d be the other way around, buddy boy.’”

Some guerrilla leaders tried to avoid romantic entanglements. Ramsey said he and Barker agreed to remain celibate. “We had heard reports of guerrilla officers compromised by their relations with local women,” Ramsey explained, “either directly through treachery or because of a jealous boyfriend or husband.” Lapham concurred, “Romantic attachments sometimes caused trouble: leaders and whole units were betrayed to rival units or to the Japanese by ‘other women,’ outraged wives, vengeful husbands, or disgruntled boyfriends.”

Units routinely established codes of conduct to prevent liaisons between male and female guerrillas that bred corrosive jealousies and undermined discipline. “Code violators were summarily dismissed to prevent bad blood and demoralization in the organization.”

Intentions aside, human nature inevitably came into play. Ramsey became involved with his agent Ramona Snyder and guerrilla Doyle Decker even reported that the Huks wanted Ramsey apprehended “for making improper advances to Filipino women.”

Guerrilla memoirs are chocked full of their observations of Filipinas: “rich wavy black hair, a nice figure, and a really great personality,” “good female companionship,” and “beautifully proportioned, fully developed figure.”

1599 Ibid., 154.
1600 Ramsey and Rivele, 125.
1601 Lapham and Norling, 105-106.
1602 Barrameda, 75.
1603 Lapham and Norling, 139 and 58
1604 Willis and Myers, 101.
participated in customs of courtship that ranged from politicking with parents, to accepting betel nut bags or rolled cigarettes, to meeting under the trees outside dance halls, to ritual abductions of young women from their homes.\textsuperscript{1605} Willis once turned down a concubine sent to him as a gift from a wealthy benefactor but noted, “Actually the practice wasn’t that unusual in the Philippines, as many businessmen had girlfriends living in apartments or houses conveniently located to their places of business.”\textsuperscript{1606} On Samar “almost all of the Americans had their own huts, equipped with native housekeepers of the female variety.”\textsuperscript{1607} Fertig’s men were happy to be stationed in Lanao where, as John Keats explained, “It was not that the Moro girls were immodest; they were merely helpful. They sincerely believed that men sicken if they do not enjoy regular sexual intercourse, and it seemed that none of them wished the Americans to become ill.”\textsuperscript{1608}

Thorp went into the jungle with his secretary and mistress Herminia Dizon. A woman named Maria nursed a desperately ill Villamor back to health in June 1943; he married her, and then divorced her when the war ended.\textsuperscript{1609} Henry Clay O’Connor married a Negrito daughter of a chief, had children with her, and left her when MacArthur returned.\textsuperscript{1610} Bob Stahl wistfully recalled a platonic relationship with a beautiful young daughter of Mayor Jesus Medenilla of San Narciso. He accepted a silver ring from her, not knowing that by this local custom a girl gave her

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1605} The Subanos have an interesting custom regarding the chewing of betelnut: if you are in love with a girl and want to let her know your feelings, you ask her to prepare a chew for you. If she consents, that means she will accept your attentions, or as the Filipino says, ‘She is negotiable.’ Ib\textit{id.}, 97.
\bibitem{1606} Ib\textit{id.}, 151.
\bibitem{1607} Stahl, 43.
\bibitem{1608} Keats, 285.
\bibitem{1609} Villamor, 125.
\bibitem{1610} Ib\textit{id.}, 102.
\end{thebibliography}
intended the ring to slip on her finger at their wedding. After he returned to the
states, he received a letter from one of the disheartened girl's cousins asking for the
ring back.1611

For the Japanese, relations with Philippine women were problematic. In
Korea, the Japanese encouraged miscegenation as a method of colonial
incorporation, but this had a double edge. "While this policy celebrated the
essential sameness of Korean and Japanese and made it possible to praise mixed
couples as conjugal models for the empire, such gestures of inclusion preserved the
possibility of extreme violence against those judged incapable of living up to
expectations of cultural Japaneseness," T. Fujitani explained, "In other words, it was
precisely the assumption that Koreans and Japanese had the opportunity to be
equals that legitimated abuse against those deemed (in)different."1612 Filipinas
suffered doubly in that they did not share an “essential sameness” with the
Japanese, and in that they were women.

A British observer wrote in 1912: “It has been conclusively shown that at
present the social structure of Japan rests upon loose foundations; that woman,
though not subjected to physical ill-treatment, is precluded from exercising a will of
her own; and that the prince no less than the peasant is not slow to take advantage
of a system that gives rein to the passions.”1613 Lawrence Lawton, future member of
the House of Commons, also noted, “It is not realized that in the midst of a country
which perhaps more than any other part of the world has been endowed with the

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1611 Stahl, 138.
1612 Fujitani, 372.
1613 Lawton, 722.
glorious beauties of nature, thousands of women, and even little girls, are enslaved in a condition of moral degradation that has no parallel in lands where the teachings of Christianity are accepted.”\textsuperscript{1614} The Japanese carried these attitudes with them to the Philippines.

The JMA’s Philippine Research Commission (\textit{Hito Chosa inkai}) recommended that Filipino women confine themselves to the affairs of the home and be re-educated to accept that they “are not in themselves... needed in passing judgment upon questions of public policy or taking proper measures regarding them.”\textsuperscript{1615} Filipino women needed to accept female Japanese values and “work quietly and unobtrusively in the family and for the neighborhood associations, enabling their husbands to work outside, completely freed from the cares of their families, thus drawing to themselves the unbound gratitude and respect of their men.”\textsuperscript{1616} To instill these values, the commission recommended separate schools and curriculum for girls.

Central Luzon, D487/R-562

Meanwhile, Marking’s Guerrillas conducted a string of assassination of Japanese Military Police in Manila.\textsuperscript{1617} On 8 April, the Chief of the Central Luzon Military Police, Captain Ikeda, sent a letter to Augustin (Marking) and Panlilio by name offering them a chance to surrender within ten days or face attack. “I hope you will understand this present situation, and be a historic man for the establishment

\textsuperscript{1614} Ibid., 724
\textsuperscript{1615} Yu-Jose, 161-162.
\textsuperscript{1616} Ibid., 161-162.
\textsuperscript{1617} Panlilio, 163.
of the New Philippines so that you will be consider [sic] second to Rizal,” Ikeda wrote.\textsuperscript{1618} The letter continued: “I am sure that the day may come that you will repaint [sic] if you continue the nothing dispute against the New Government or the Japanese Imperial Force. I am going to serve you as a man of real Philippines if you come to me and surrender, I will do the most possible was for your security and protection, as I, Chief of Central Luzon Military Police.”\textsuperscript{1619} At Panlilio’s urging, Marking reluctantly dispersed his men and ordered them to lay low. At the deadline, the Japanese launched a massive three-week campaign and detained, tortured and executed civilians.

During a full moon on 18 April, Japanese patrols arrived at Marking’s base on Mount Kanumay. For a full day, they drove off the guerrillas, killed those they encountered, burned the local crops, and left. Then they surprisingly returned, found proof that guerrillas were still in the area, and began hunting again in earnest. For four days Marking and forty-nine of his followers evaded the Japanese, always staying just one step ahead of their pursuers.\textsuperscript{1620} Finally, they slipped through the enemy net to safety.

Many guerrilla leaders lived in paranoid fear of betrayal, and Marking was no exception. He realized that peasant men like him, even more than Americans, threatened elites like Villamor and Peralta. Across the Islands former members of the lower classes had gained power from conditions caused by the Japanese invasion. As Brian Fegan observed: “The Pacific War opened new opportunities for

\textsuperscript{1618} Agoncillo, Vol. II, 699.
\textsuperscript{1619} Panlilio, 107.
\textsuperscript{1620} Ibid., 111.
political strong men drawn from classes below the old landed elite.” Marking was one such man.

Ricardo ‘Kardeng’ de Guzman, from a family of rice cultivators in Barrio Buga near San Miguel, was another. His older brothers, Amando and Bienvenido left home to manage estates for the wealthy and well-connected Doña Narcisa Buencamino-de Leon, “Doña Sisang,” who represented the absentee landlord de Leon family. Kardeng took over the family farm and in 1928 became a leader of the village peasant union Kapatirang Magsasaka (KM), where he protected villagers from rustlers sent by landlords to intimidate tenants by stealing their water buffalo and threatening their property. Kardeng gained a good reputation that he then used to deliver votes from Buga-Pinambaran to patron landowners who in turn provided political protection for him as a union leader.

The war brought Kardeng power. With hundreds of rifles and stores of ammunition from a nearby abandoned army camp, he formed an armed band of followers loosely affiliated with the USAFFE. Kardeng’s son Rubing joined Bernard Anderson’s guerrillas as a scout. The Japanese installed one of his cousins as town mayor. Amando used Kardeng’s band to enrich himself in estate management and politics but Bienvendio died at the hands of bandits in 1943. Of his younger brothers, Andron joined the KMPM and the Huks while Doña Sisang hired Graciano (Grasing) to manage her estates. All these connections increased opportunities for more power. “The war justified robbing ‘collaborator’ merchants moving valuable cargoes along the highway,” Fegan wrote, “Kardeng distributed part of the proceeds

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1621 Fegan, 60.
1622 Ibid., 58.
to the USAFFE and Huk guerrillas, in a style that was at once supportive of the patriots fighting a national enemy and payment of a kind of tribute by an independent political entrepreneur in recognition of superior force.” 1623

Old enemies in the Ganaps and Sakdals, including an in-law, betrayed Kardeng. Japanese soldiers and Constabulary troops raided his house, arrested Kardeng, threw him into Fort Santiago and tortured him. Rubing took over his group and allied them with Anderson. When the Americans arrived and Kardeng returned from prison, the family and their men ‘obtained’ U.S. army vehicles “for a few bottles of rum, some fresh food, or a few minutes with a woman,” and hauled lumber and supplies into rebuilding Manila. 1624 Andron returned to farming, Grasing and Kardeng grew rich in the service of Doña Sisang. Kardeng, and men like him, became important members of a new social order.

Northern Luzon, D495/R-554

By mid-March Blackburn was finally well enough to leave Volckmann’s camp in Ifugao and search for any guerrillas remaining in Benguet. “We just didn’t have any information. We had been cut off from everything,” he said, “My objective was to find out who was still around after the intense Jap patrol activity, and what the attitude of the native population was after such an ordeal.” 1625 After two weeks, he returned with an American, Mr. Fish, who reported that the Japanese had been campaigning since the October attacks ordered by Moses. “I learned that large

1623 Ibid., 61.
1624 Ibid., 71.
1625 Blackburn Interview, 120.
quantities of weapons had been captured when the Japs moved out,” Blackburn reported, “and that a lot of guerrillas had been captured. People had been scattered to the four winds.”

The Japanese captured Herb Swick in Uding, and shot Dr. Biason’s wife Daisy. Fish agreed to go back to Benguet and find guerrillas. After he left, Blackburn and Volckmann found that the Japanese knew they were in Antipolo and were heading their way. The two Americans escaped by night to Haliap. Volckmann continued to try to reorganize his guerrilla force and extend his intelligence network. “To supplement our fixed agents, we employed special agents who traveled widely under various guises as merchants or peddlers,” he recalled.

Not until 16 April would a search party sent by Volckmann into Benguet find a radio receiver for his headquarters. “This was the start of the beginning,” said Blackburn.

Visayas, D497/R-552

On 18 April, Vargas visited Negros and Panay with Jose Tulo as part of a pacification tour. The Japanese apparently felt satisfied with the military situation in the Philippines that by month’s end they would transfer the 2nd Infantry Division to the South-Eastern Area. Recruiting enough manpower to support industry, however, remained a problem and led an increasingly reliance on Filipinos.

In April, the Southern General Army issued “Details in Implementing Military Auxiliary Regulations” which authorized the formation of a military auxiliary (Heiho

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1626 Ibid., 121.
1627 Guardia, American Guerilla, 96.
1628 Blackburn Interview, 121.
Kitei) defined as “locally recruited non-Japanese soldiers attached to the Japanese military in order to supplement military action.” Auxiliar y units in the Philippines included “the Navy Free Unit” (Kaigun Jiyutai) in Zamboanga, the Pro-Japanese Unit (Shin’ichi Tai) in Nueva Ecija, the Standing Army in Negros Occidental, and the National Unity of the Children of Rizal (Pambansang Pagkakaisang mga Anak ni Rizal – PAMPAR) in Laguna and Rizal provinces.

Several weeks earlier the JMA Department of Industries had inspected the Antique copper mine in Panay and reported operations there had not yet reached the ore extraction phase. In April the Fourteenth Army fired mine manager Mineo Mori and would replace him with Hideo Yamazaki in July. Not for another twelve months would Antique reach its target of 19,000 tons of copper ore, but increasing guerrilla activity and a lack of transportation would close the mine in November 1944.

Vargas saw the turmoil Peralta’s men caused on Panay. He reported to the JMA, “Capiz [on Panay] is totally hopeless. Not a single official was in office. Provincial and municipal officials have been taken by guerrillas.” Asked about Tomas Confesor, Vargas answered, “He is hopeless. Nobody can make him give up. We will go get him!” Vargas suggested to Fourteenth Army Chief of Staff, General Takaji Wachi, that the Japanese arm the Iloilo constabulary so they could get Confessor and ‘clean up’ the province.

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1629 Motoe, 73. “It is said that this was practiced only in Malaya, Sumatra, Burma, Java, and Borneo, but the United Nippon (UN) soldiers in the Philippines were definitely heicho or military auxiliaries.”
1630 Setsuho, 148.
1631 Abaya, 32.
1632 Ibid.
Meanwhile Bell returned to Villamor on Negros seven weeks after leaving for Cebu. He reported that he had landed in southern Cebu and was ‘escorted’ to Fenton’s headquarters in Balanbar. In a fit of rage Fenton told Bell: “Tell Villamor we don’t want him or anyone else to butt into our affairs.” Bell found two delegations he had sent earlier to Cebu held in Fenton’s prison. He also saw that Fenton and Cushing had a well-organized, well-armed force and had killed more Japanese than any other group in the Visayas. They had ‘finished’ most of the mayors and surrounded the Japanese in Toledo, Carcar, and Cebu City leading to recent Japanese reinforcement.

When Bell offered recognition and aid from SWPA, Fenton replied, “To hell with that stuff. We don’t want ‘recognition’ or anything like that from MacArthur or anybody else until the American flag is flying over here again.” Fenton had Bell and his men escorted from the island with a warning: “Tell Villamor next time not to expect the return of anyone he decides to send – if he is crazy enough to do so.” Cushing took Bell to his boat and said he hoped his report would not be all bad, then added, “But I cannot go on like this much longer.”

Blackburn had learned that the power enjoyed by guerrillas “represented a beautiful way for the people to get even with their enemies.” Indeed, there was a political side to Fenton’s campaign of executions. Studies show that among the more than sixty executions Fenton ordered between July and December 1942, his Filipino

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1633 Villamor, 107.
1634 Ibid.
1635 Ibid., 108.
1636 Ibid.
1637 Blackburn Interview, 145.
aides had selected a number of politically prominent Cebuanos.\textsuperscript{1638} The most prominent aide was Ramon Durano, later known the “Caesar of Cebu,” who before the war had lost the First District Congressional seat to Osmeña ally Celestino Rodriguez. Durano joined Fenton as a captain and worked as a supply and intelligence officer. In these roles he provided the guerrilla leader with money, supplies and “young women.”\textsuperscript{1639} “Under Fenton’s authority,” Michael Cullinane explained, “Durano is said to have used his position in the guerrillas to arrest, try, and summarily execute prewar political figures in the First District suspected of collaborating with the Japanese. After the war, it was alleged that many of these executions were part of a systematic elimination of the political allies of Celestino Rodriguez.”\textsuperscript{1640} To prevent similar malfeasance, Blackburn explained that in Volckmann’s area, “We felt that we should make the judgment [on executions], even though it sounds dictatorial, because we didn’t have any axe to grind other than the accomplishment of our mission, whereas, many of these people had a hell of a lot of axes to grind.”\textsuperscript{1641}

On his own Fenton, the former radio announcer, had managed to broadcast on a radio station identified as WJE. According to MacArthur’s G-2, “The Cebu radio station was one of the more unfortunate incidents in the history of radio contacts in the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{1642} On 14 February 1943 the War Department notified SWPA that this station broadcasting “in the clear, information of value to the enemy and would


\textsuperscript{1639} Ibid., 169.

\textsuperscript{1640} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1641} Blackburn Interview, 145.

\textsuperscript{1642} \textit{Intelligence Activities}, 12-13.
not cease despite War Department orders.” SWPA futilely tried through Villamor and Peralta to get Fenton to stop. After about thirty days the station went silent and soon thereafter fell into Japanese hands. The Cebu guerrillas would remain without a radio until Villamor provided them with one in late 1943.

On Marinduque, Peralta’s hand-picked commander, 1934 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Lieutenant Colonel Enrique L. Jurado, brought back his predecessor, American Charles Hickok, from assignment on Tablas Island. Peralta had tasked Jurado to plan and execute penetration into Luzon. With this in mind, Jurado ordered Hickok to organize a guerrilla team to secure stopovers for agents moving between Panay and Luzon.

Fertig’s agents on Mindanao made contact with a band of three hundred Chinese guerrillas under Albert I.N. Kwok east of Jesselton in North Borneo. Through Lieutenant Jose Valera, the 10th MD raised money and arms from anti-Japanese civilians on the Borneo coast. Kwok claimed to have been a Chinese Army doctor assigned to intelligence in Malaya and Sarawak in 1937. When Moro traders informed him of guerrillas under Colonel Suarez in Tawi Tawi, Kwok persuaded them to take him there in May. He made a second trip to Tawi Tawi in June and brought money and medical supplies for the guerrillas. As a reward, Fertig commissioned Kwok as Third Lieutenant.

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1643 Ibid.
1644 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 104.
Fertig decided to send the disgruntled Morgan on another round of travels, this time to other islands. Morgan went first from Surigao to Leyte hoping to unite the contested 9th MD an (Leyte and Samar) under Colonel Kangleon who, after contact by Parsons, had reached out to Fertig for support. Unsuccessful, Morgan moved on to Siquijor and recruited guerrilla leader Major Benito Cunanan to command Cebu. Cunanan believed Morgan was an agent of SWPA, but the guerrillas on Cebu were unconvincing. The resulting contest among Cebu guerrillas led to hard feelings between Cunanan and the 10th MD. Morgan went on to Negros where he tried to recruit Lieutenant Colonel Gador to lead the 7th MD.

On Negros, Morgan met Villamor and brought him arms, ammunition, and other supplies. He told Villamor how he had made Fertig a general by “taking a lesson from Mein Kampf that a lie will be believed if it is big enough.” Morgan claimed it was his plan that had brought men out of hiding and turned them into a guerrilla organization across Mindanao. Villamor saw Morgan as a “proud and brave man,” a “restless man, frustrated by orders that came later to only ‘annoy’ the enemy,” who fought many battles and shared credit. Villamor later recalled, “I wondered if Morgan was aware that Fertig not only had pushed him up [promoting him from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel] but had in effect thrown him out of the command. I had intelligence reports to this effect. Fertig wanted Morgan out of the way.”

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1645 Villamor, 139.
1646 Ibid., 138-140.
1647 Ibid., 139.
Villamor thought that Morgan seemed unaware that he had been sent on a fruitless recruitment mission. Villamor recalled, “He seemed not to understand the reason for his failure. What he couldn’t grasp was that as a mestizo he was part American and part Filipino loyal to the Americans, but in another way his dual nationality worked against him. To many Filipinos he was not a Filipino... He had been spreading Fertig’s name everywhere, throughout the Islands, without really realizing that the Filipinos felt this was their cause, and they weren’t about to step in line behind some unknown American.” Villamor had come to see Fertig as something of a remnant of colonial exploitation and Morgan as his victim. “It’s best that you stop your tour,” Villamor told Morgan, “You’re just adding to the confusion.”

According to Villamor: “Fertig was playing favorites with Americans. He was giving them the best accommodations and arms, the best clothing and best assignments. Fertig was a nobody when he came to Morgan’s district for protection. Morgan had helped him, had made him a general. It had been his movement, and now he lost control.” How much Morgan may have influenced Villamor in forming these opinions is a matter for speculation.

The AIB continued to reach into the Islands. On 25 April the SS-211 Gudgeon under Lieutenant Commander W.S. Post, Jr. was ten days into its eighth war patrol out of Fremantle, Australia, when it attacked an enemy ship and escaped a counterattack. After three more days, Gudgeon torpedoed and sank the Japanese

1648 Ibid., 140.
1649 Ibid.
1650 Ibid.
fleet tanker the *Toho Maru*, the troop transport *Kamakura Maru*, and damaged tanker the *Kyoel Maru* in the Makassar Strait. Finally, on 30 April, Post executed his primary mission, delivering six men (including three Filipino enlisted men) of team PLEVEN under Second Lieutenant Toribio Crespo with three tons of equipment including two 3BZs and one ATR4 radios near Pucio Point, Panay.\(^{1651}\) *Gudgeon* then moved to Tawi Tawi and Mindanao to deliver four more tons of supplies before spending eight days sinking Japanese light vessels with its deck guns and heading for Pearl Harbor.

On Mindanao, Parsons had arrived in Bukidnon to settle the dispute between Fertig and Salipada Pendatun. He met “General” Pendatun in the Del Monte section in the southern Cagayan Valley. With his well-situated and large Moro force, Pendatun saw no reason for him to work under Fertig’s command. He had a large and effective staff with many Americans like Major Frank Magee, a former chief of staff to the commander of the Philippine Air Corps.\(^{1652}\) His organization was self-sufficient with livestock and farms and maintained their own powerful radio station. Not until Pendatun staged a demonstration of his power in an attack against Japanese troops barricaded in a school building in Malaybay did Parsons gain leverage in his recruitment effort.

After failing to dislodge the enemy with machine guns and homemade bombs, Pendatun sent in a carabao buffalo strapped with aerial bombs modified with dynamite fuses to finish the job. Parsons casually mentioned that with the kind

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\(^{1652}\) Ingham, 82.
of mortars and bazookas he would send to Fertig, Pendatun’s force would be more powerful. Mention of ‘the Aid’ proved effective. “He persuaded Pendatun to return to Cotabato with the Moro guerrillas who had come into Bukidnon by this time in great numbers,” SWPA noted. Pendatun contacted Fertig by radio and accepted a standing offer to join Fertig’s 10th MD as the 117th Regiment with a rank of major.

Bowler and a priest named Father Haggerty also joined Fertig’s organization but friction rose between them and Pendatun. On 3 May, Bowler informed Fertig that Andrews, “is violently anti-American, is largely responsible for Pendatun’s attitude.” Fertig called two of Pendatun’s officers, Andrews and former Lanao assemblyman Tomas Cabili, to his headquarters. He asked them to explain Pendatun’s issues. Fertig then sent Andrews to Villamor in Negros and kept Cabili with the guerrillas at Lanao.

In February, Fertig had recruited James Grinstead, a retired Army officer in his early fifties with many years of service among the Moros, to organize guerrillas. He later appointed Grinstead to command the 109th Regiment and later still as chief of staff of the 109th Division and he proved to be “a stable and careful commander in a difficult area.” With help from Parsons and Dr. Kuder, new bands sprang up in Nasipit, Buenavista, Cabadbaran and the lower Agusan River and united to become the 113th Regiment under the command of a Syrian mining engineer named Khalil.

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1653 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 93.
1654 Wise 104.
1655 Fertig Diary, 3 May 1943.
1656 Ibid.
1657 Ibid., 94.
Khodr who was described as “a highly intelligent, brave, forceful leader.”\textsuperscript{1658}

Somehow Khodr obtained 900 arms for the men of his new outfit.

Fertig’s embrace of the Moros irritated Morgan who detested the tribal Muslims. The arrival of Americans on submarines had already strained his uneasy relationship with Fertig. Already supported in his suspicions by Villamor, Morgan’s constant female companion, the guerrilla Sinang, convinced him that Fertig and his countrymen were out to get him.\textsuperscript{1659} The promotion of Pendatun to major, and as such superior to Morgan, further divided the two men.\textsuperscript{1660}

Upon returning to Fertig’s headquarters, Parsons went out on an ambush to observe guerrilla tactics. Outposts reported that the Japanese moved troops in big trucks reinforced with boilerplate on a routine schedule.\textsuperscript{1661} The guerrillas chose a narrow stretch of road in a mountain forest and set up an L-shaped ambush. At one end, a few men with tommy guns were told to shoot the windshields, tires and engines. A lieutenant told Parsons the Japanese would come to a stop about fifty feet from where the guerrillas opened fire – because they always came to a stop at that distance. At that exact point the guerrillas dug and camouflaged a trench on the side opposite of the firing line to catch the Japanese as they exited the trucks – because they always exited the trucks under fire and ran to that side of the road. Once set, the guerrillas waited. The trucks arrived on schedule; came to a stop fifty feet from the initial engagement; the troops ran out and fell into the pit; and were executed by the guerrillas. Parsons left the ambush convinced of the potential of the guerrillas.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1658} Ibid., 95.
\item \textsuperscript{1659} Keats, 223.
\item \textsuperscript{1660} Ibid., 225.
\item \textsuperscript{1661} Ingham, 94-97.
\end{itemize}
He wrote, “I am definitely a guerrilla. I see no sense in risking annihilation in open combat when you can fight, kill, run – and, later, fight again.”1662

Fertig’s 110th and 113th Regiments attacked Butuan, Agusan, from all sides under the Lieutenant Colonel Clyde Childress, Lieutenant Willard Money, Lieutenant Thomas Baxter, Captain Rosaurio Dongallo, Captain William Knortz and Major Khalil Khodr. The Japanese took refuge in a concrete schoolhouse and waited out a nine-day siege until Japanese aircraft and reinforcements. The intensity of the attack created a shortage of rifle ammunition for the guerrillas, but they noticed that the people saw the action as proof of their power.1663

Organization and reorganization was a way of life. Fertig placed his 3rd Battalion, 115th Regiment, under Major Manuel D. Jaldon who reorganized them into the 121st Regiment. The next month Fertig learned that Jaldon’s brothers persuaded him to meet with the Japanese in Zamboanga and sign a peace agreement. The 10th MD commander immediately suspended Jaldon and his regiment. No supplies would reach the unit until December when Major Felipe Fetalvero arrived from Lanao to take charge. He disbanded the 121st Regiment and declared a new 1st Separate Battalion with former American enlisted man Lieutenant Donald Lecouvre in command. Lecouvre began establishing valuable intelligence agents in Zamboanga City. As the battalion established detachments at Sirawai and Siocon on the west coast, it once again became the 121st Regiment but now directly under “A” Corps and not the 105th Division.

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1662 Ingham, 97.
1663 Ibid., 95.
A month earlier Parsons had used guerrilla contacts to reach out to Philippine Senator Jose Ozámiz in “in connection with the establishment of an Intelligence Net in Manila.” On 25 May, Ozámiz arrived from Manila by boat with Jose Maria and Pelong Campos to meet with Parsons and Fertig. He had pretended to travel on business only to be “caught and held under arrest by the guerrillas” until he was released to return to Manila. The senator was the son of prominent Spanish copra planters in a Mindanao province that bore their name in Misamis Occidental. He had earned a law degree at Columbia University in New York in 1929. During the occupation he served in the government with the approval of the guerrillas and provided them valuable intelligence.

The senator was one of a number of prominent agents in contact with Parsons. Juan Elizalde was a wealthy polo playing from a Manila family invested in sugar, shipping and insurance companies. With his brother Manuel, another Parsons’ contact, he organized the underground well-placed “28 Men of Fort Santiago” who gathered information from Japanese business and political contacts. He communicated with industrialist and statesman Salvador Araneta, Women’s Society of Christian Service Manila District President Mrs. Asuncion Perez, Mabini Academy founder Dr. Jose Katigbak, Hans Mensi [sic] and Company founder

1665 Wise, 140.
1666 Intelligence Activities, 55.
1668 Kaminski, 219-220.
and CEO Hans Menzi. President of the Sanitary Division in Lanao, and reserve
Captain in the Philippine Army, Dr. Antonio Montalva visited Parsons in Mindanao.
Others SWPA G-2 listed as contacts with Parsons included A.F. Gonzales, Antonio
Pertierra, Enrique Priovano, Prasedes Verona, Mary B Stagg and his mother-in-law
Blanche Jurika.\footnote{Intelligence Activities, 52-53, fn 28. Blanche Jurika and Mary Stagg along with Dr. Hawthorne Darby, Helen Wilke, and Sylvia Carrero were taken from Fort Santiago Prison sometime around May 1943 and taken to an undisclosed location "for further punishment." Hartendorp, II, 242.} Primitivo San Agustin and Mario Rama of President Quezon's
Own Guerrillas would also travel to Fertig's headquarters to establish liaison.

Ozámiz reported that some people in Luzon supported the Japanese and
were well rewarded.\footnote{Ingham, 162.} Most of the common people, however, simply endured in
increasing poverty and fear. To get access to food and other rationed necessities,
they had to belong to the Neighborhood Associations that he believed were tools of
the Japanese controlled KALIBAPI party. Ozámiz reported, “It is difficult to persuade
those, who otherwise would be helpful, that they have a higher duty to their country
than to the families.”\footnote{Ibid., 164.} Membership in the Neighborhood Associations brought rice
allocations but also required spying and reporting on friends and neighbors.
Parsons commissioned Ozámiz as a lieutenant colonel on active duty in the
members of his kinship network in Tayabas to and develop intelligence contacts in
Manila.\footnote{Intelligence Activities, 55.}
On 5 May, KZRH radio broadcasted news of Tojo’s visit across the Islands. The Prime Minister returned to the Philippines to cheering crowds orchestrated by Vargas as instructed by Consul Kihara. Twenty-four hours later at a “day of gratitude” ceremony in Manila’s Luneta Park, Tojo announced: “you Filipinos today are going to wipe away your mistaken Americanism... and return to your true character as a nation of great East Asian origin... we urge you all to cooperate in winning the Greater East Asian War more actively ... and be invested with the crown of national independence as quickly as possible.”\(^\text{1674}\) On 9 May, the first anniversary of Corregidor’s surrender, Vargas publicly called on “misguided remnants of USAFFE” to surrender.\(^\text{1675}\) Fertig reported, “KGEI commented ‘Tozyo [Tojo] visit to the Islands will be restricted by the activities of the Filipino-American troops.’ This is one of the first official admissions of our activities.”\(^\text{1676}\)

Negros, D523/R-526

On 14 May, under pressure from SWPA to end the divisions on Negros, Villamor suggested that he be made commander of 7\(^{th}\) Military District. SWPA responded the same day: “You will exercise your authority under direct command of General MacArthur. You will require all leaders of allied groups in your district faithfully to cooperate against the common enemy under your direction. Any failure on the part of allied group leaders to carry out these instructions will be reported to this headquarters for appropriate disciplinary action when circumstances permit.

\(^\text{1674}\) Satoshi, 23.
\(^\text{1675}\) Tarling, 168.
\(^\text{1676}\) Fertig Diary, 7 May 1943.
You will report to these headquarters when designation of permanent commander
Seventh Military District seems to you expedient and recommend designee.”

Villamor put Abcede in charge of the field troops and named Colonel Gabriel
Gador as Chief of Staff. He appointed Lieutenant Abenir Bornales as G-1 Adjutant,
Lieutenant Roberto Benedicto as G-2 Intelligence officer, Major Placido Ausejo as G-
3 planning and Training officer, and Lieutenant Benjamin Hollero as his G-4
Quartermaster. He named Major Romeo Intengan as his Finance Service officer and
Lieutenant Modesto Castañeda as a Signal Officer. Villamor commissioned Bell as a
major and appointed him as Negros Civil Administrator and as Chairman of a new
7th MD Research Board. Villamor also established a free civil government under
Negros Occidental pre-war governor Alfredo Montelibano, a thirty-six-year-old
wealthy planter in north Negros who had gathered money and food with Mata for
local guerrillas. “Montelibano is reported to be aggressive, a tireless worker,” SWPA
noted, “and exacting in his demands for work done. He apparently has the popular
support of the populace on Negros and is a program socialist fighting for the welfare
of the poorer class.” The organization intended to unite all the competing groups
on Negros into one ‘kinship network.’

On 28 May, Villamor held a conference to sell his plan. Abcede, Ausejo,
Montelibano, Bell, Intengan and dozens of others came to the meeting with their
deputies Rito Dominado, Uldarico Baclagon, Lorenzo Teves and Roberto S.
Benedicto. Gador arrived late. All the attendees wanted recognition, medicine,
money, radios, arms and ammunition. Villamor demanded cooperation from all the

1677 Villamor, 112-113.
1678 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 76.
guerrillas and threatened, “I will shoot any son of bitch who doesn’t get the message.” He announced the staff assignments and added, “My command is temporary, and when I see fit, when one of you shows me that you can command the respect and cooperation from all others, I’ll make him the permanent District Commander.” That seemed to get the men aboard. Villamor told them they would all wear their prewar rank, to which Gador violently objected. Villamor radioed SWPA that Gador was “a better politician than soldier” and “he does not believe in uniting Negros.”

Villamor called another conference of all guerrilla leaders on Negros for the third week of June. Mata, Abcede and Ausejo came to the conference and offered him their support. Gador arrived with much fanfare at the head of a large delegation of staff officers and armed guards. Coincidentally, the Japanese landed a patrol nearby in search of the guerrillas. One patrol managed to find and burn Bell’s camp. “Gador and most of his men fled without assisting in the local defenses though he had a position assigned,” Villamor reported to SWPA, “At the conference Gador accepted the post of Executive Officer in the 6th MD headquarters but resigned when he fled, and resumed his opposition activities.” Although a number of Gador’s officers joined Villamor’s command, and despite the pledges of loyalty from the conference attendees, Villamor received little support to remain as 7th MD commander.

Luzon D532/R-517

1679 Villamor, 117.
1680 Ibid., 119.
1681 Ibid., 123.
1682 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 72.
On Luzon, the Japanese campaign of early 1943 began to ease. Remnants of Thorp’s organization reformed to create the United States Philippine Island Force in the Botolan-Olangapo area. Colonel Gyles Merrill announced the reformation of the original Western Luzon Guerrilla Force in the mountains northeast of San Marcelino in Zambales. Another 1,000 men rallied under Antonio Francisco around Castillejos and San Marcelino.

Recently promoted to major by Moses, Ramsey and Lapham traveled together to see Putnam in the Lingayen Gulf. Ramsey would later claim Lapham had agreed to serve under him as deputy of the ECLGF and place his guerrilla force within Ramsey’s organization, something Lapham denied.1683 Everywhere they went Filipinos seemed to ask the guerrillas one question: when would MacArthur return? “His name was like an invocation to them, a holy word that had special power and meaning,” Ramsey remembered, “None of them doubted his promise to return, but they were anxious to learn when the invasion would come.”1684

Putnam agreed to command the Pangasinan province for Ramsey as part of Lapham’s force. Waving an arm over the land, Putnam told Ramsey, “We control these people. We hold their lives in our hands. Being a guerrilla leader is like being a king, Ramsey, you have absolute power over people.”1685 He told him the Igorots and Ilongots were headhunters and, sometimes, cannibals who invited Japanese raids as

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1683 Ramsey and Rivele, 161.
1684 Ibid.
1685 Ibid., 152.
an opportunity for spoil. "That's guerilla warfare, and as far as they're concerned I'm no captain, I'm the king."\textsuperscript{1686}

Volckmann had become well established in Ifugao with lines of communication to nearby guerrillas. Moses and Noble sent him word that the Japanese were becoming more active in Apayao and he expected Praeger's radio soon to be forced off air again. A week later a large Japanese force pressured Manalo. Then the Japanese captured Captain Rufino Baldwin, commanding 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion under Parker Calvert, south of Baguio. Baldwin had been, in Volckmann's words "terrorizing the Japanese in the area south of Baguio for many months."\textsuperscript{1687}

One night he had received a message from his fiancé asking him to come to her house. When he arrived, Japanese troops took him prisoner. Calvert commissioned Private Grafton Spencer to First Lieutenant and gave him the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion. Spencer took the battalion to Dalupiripin in the Itogon mining district southeast of Baguio.

Towards the end of the month Volckmann learned that a Japanese force was bearing down on him at Haliap. He asked chief Kamayong for help in evacuating his headquarters but Kamayong only sent four native holy men to hold a ceremony called a \textit{bacci}. As Volckmann and Blackburn watched in agitation, the four men spread out tobacco, rice and other items on a blanket, chanted, and slaughtered four small chickens to examine their entrails. They concluded that the signs indicated the Americans were safe where they were for they would bury the chicken legs on the approaching trails to stop the Japanese patrols. Volckmann protested to no avail. "The Jap patrol did come to the very foot of the hill upon which our camp was

\textsuperscript{1686} Ibid., 163.
\textsuperscript{1687} Volckmann, 145.
located,” he recalled, “but upon arriving at the spot where the chicken legs were buried they changed their direction and went on down the river valley!”

Manila, D537/R-512

On 28 May fifty-five year-old Lieutenant General Shigenori Kuroda arrived as the new military government to replace Homma. His thirty-three years with the army included tours as military attaché in England and India. He made it a priority to socialize, especially in playing golf, with the leading Filipinos. Kuroda’s philosophy was “in politics there should be no room for excessiveness or bullying.”

Barrameda wrote, “In Manila, Kuroda spent much of his time on golf, geishas and goofing off – and because discipline became lax, he was soon on bad terms with many of his senior officers.” Kuroda made few preparations to defend the Philippines against MacArthur’s return as he considered the Islands “obviously indefensible.” However, to rally the Filipinos, he appeared to be the right man for a new approach in the Islands.

A week earlier the year-old Greater East Asia Establishment Council issued a report calling for cultural programs to unite the occupied lands into a war alliance with Japan. The report stated: “The principal emphasis in education and all cultural-education policies should be on having those people discard all the remnants of Anglo-American ideas and having them achieve a full appreciation of being peoples of East Asia so that they will recognize and understand that the Greater East Asia

1688 Ibid., 118.
1689 Satoshi, 30.
1690 Barrameda, 90.
1691 Harries, 434.
War is a holy war for the liberation of East Asia and also for the noble idea of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”\textsuperscript{1692}

A priority program in the new approach was the Special Overseas Students from the Southern Regions (\textit{Nanpō Tokubetsu Ryūgakusei}, abbreviated as \textit{Nantoku}) to bring students identified as future leaders to Japan for education and culturalization. In the fall of 1943, one hundred and sixteen students from across the occupied territories were sent to Japan – twenty-seven from the Philippines. Another twenty-four young Filipinos went the next year making one out of every four students in the program a Filipino. In part, the program taught them to reject the ‘lazy’ Western humanist attitudes and adopt rigorous, disciplined Japanese methods. Among all the students, only those from the Philippines registered complaints about this effort.\textsuperscript{1693}

In holding out a carrot, the Japanese were not forgetting the stick. The day after Kuroda’s arrival, sixty-three Japanese transports arrived in Manila with 150,000 troops, of which 50,000 – many “Indo-Chinese and Burmese recruits” – would take up stations in and around Manila.\textsuperscript{1694} The Japanese military also scheduled construction of munition storage sites for Manila, Corregidor, Laoag, Kalaklan, Tabaco, Cebu, Iloilo, Davao and Cagayan to begin in October.\textsuperscript{1695}

Villamor passed these details to SWPA. “My agents spread out and they fed me with a constant stream of information,” he said, “By mid-June 1943 I had full

\textsuperscript{1692} Goto, 151.
\textsuperscript{1693} Ibid., 162.
\textsuperscript{1694} Villamor, 125.
knowledge of all enemy movements in the Visayas and Luzon, and I was sending daily reconnaissance reports to Australia...”¹⁶⁹⁶ Then Villamor fell sick in early June. A local woman named Maria nursed him back to health. He proposed and she accepted.

¹⁶⁹⁶ Villamor, 125.
MacArthur set up the more robust Philippine Regional Section to coordinate an increased delivery of agents and supplies into the Islands. Their judicious allocations secured guerrilla cooperation and limited the power of those deemed to be outside MacArthur’s network. Only northern Luzon remained beyond their reach. Meanwhile increased famine and inflation continued to challenge Japanese efforts to fully control the population.

Brisbane, D541/R-508

At SWPA headquarters in Brisbane, first thing each morning MacArthur would turn to the reports from the AIB radio operators in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{1697} By now, they had liaisons and radios on Mindanao, Negros, Tawi Tawi, Cebu, and Panay – and agents in Manila. As the submarine insertion teams confirmed the capabilities of the guerrilla leaders and their men, MacArthur became more determined to provide “direction and to weld the scattered groups into unified and responsible forces through the designation and support of responsible local commanders.”\textsuperscript{1698} As the SWPA G-2 noted, it was “the approximate end of the preliminary or pathfinding phase of intelligence development.”\textsuperscript{1699} It was time to move from the exploration of the guerrilla movement by

\textsuperscript{1697} Breuer, 114.
\textsuperscript{1698} Reports of General MacArthur, 298-302.
\textsuperscript{1699} Intelligence Activities, 29.
the AIB to the development of the guerrillas by another, more robust, staff in preparation for MacArthur’s future return to the islands.

SWPA drafted a plan to transform the isolated AIB Philippine sub-section staff into a larger Philippine Regional Section (PRS) under G-2 that would be more interconnected with the rest of the staff. With greater access to more supplies, submarines and personnel, PRS priorities were to 1) establish bases in Mindoro and Samar, 2) conduct intelligence penetration of Luzon, and 3) close gaps in the existing intelligence nets south from Luzon. MacArthur approved the PRS and recalled from Washington old Philippine hand Colonel Courtney Whitney, Jr. to lead it. “He was ideal for such an assignment,” wrote MacArthur, “A prominent Manila lawyer, his thirteen years there had made him thoroughly familiar with Philippine conditions and personnel. Rugged and aggressive, fearless and experienced in military affairs, his driving force found full play in charge of a guerrilla army.”

Notified of his new assignment, even before departing the States, Whitney looked for radios better suited to guerrilla operations but decided to stay with the Australian portable transmitters already in use. He arranged to have the Signal Corps organize the 978th Signal Service Company to support infiltration missions and cooperate with the guerrillas. Despite AIB plans for 100 volunteer soldiers from the 1st and 2nd Filipino Regiments training in the U.S. to be “sent in increments over a two year period,” on his way to Australia, Whitney inspected the regiments and chose 400 men for PRS

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1700 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 205.
1701 Breuer, 114.
1702 The 978th Signal Service Company became active on 1 July 1943. Raines, 290.
missions. The PRS got the volunteers approved and organized into the 3217 Reconnaissance Battalion.

On 23 May, Whitney arrived at SWPA. Six days later at 1345 hours he attended a conference in Sutherland’s office to clarify “the relationship of G-2 to the AIB and, more particularly, the Philippine Regional Section, AIB, as well as the responsibilities for both.” As MacArthur explained Whitney’s mission in the PRS:

“His objectives were the formation of a battle detachment in every important Filipino area, alerted to strike against the enemy’s rear as our battle-lines advanced; to secure fields adjacent to military objectives into which our airmen might drop with assurances of immediate rescue and protection; to arouse the militant loyalty of a whole people by forming resolute armed centers of resistance around which they could rally; to establish a vast network of agents numbering into the thousands to provide precise, accurate, and detailed information on major enemy moves and installations; to create a vast network of radio positions extending into every center of enemy activity and concentration through the islands; to build on every major island of the Philippines a completely equipped and staffed weather observatory to flash to my headquarters full weather data morning, afternoon, and night of every day; to implement an air-warning system affording visual observation of the air over every square foot of Philippine soil to

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1703 Intelligence Activities, 34.
1704 Reports of General MacArthur, 298-302.
1705 Memorandum for Record, Chief of PRS to Controller AIB, 29 May 1943. Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG16, Box 63, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia.
Map 14: Philippine Regional Section (PRS) Missions, October 1943-October 1944.

SOURCE: Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, United States Armed Forces Pacific, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation (Volume ii, intelligence Series) (Tokyo, Japan: 10 June 1948), Plate 4.
give immediate warning of enemy aircraft or naval movement to our submarines on patrol in Philippine waters; to apply close interior vigilance so as to secure for our military use enemy documents of value; and to exploit any other aids to our military operations that might arise.”

Despite the carryover of AIB personnel, like Major Allison Ind, the transition to the PRS and Whitney help open a gap between ongoing guerrilla intelligence collection and new SWPA missions. The PRS sidestepped the predominantly Filipino guerrillas for U.S. Army mission that were predominantly white Americans. Five years later MacArthur’s G-2 concluded: “In this project, however, several previously established channels were ignored or not fully exploited, especially the Villamor net. These channels were Filipino manned and guided. The new channels developed were all under American leadership and were based mainly on personnel from Australian bases.” The result contributed to a sense of racial discrimination among the Filipinos involved.

The PRS continued to use AIB facilities at Camp Tabragalbra and Frazer Island near Brisbane to prepare agents for the penetration missions. “All persons were given basic training and then groups were segregated for general areas in the P.I. On about a two-week notice, parties were organized for specific areas.” Army Signal Corps Lieutenant Louis Brown trained American and Hawaiian born Filipino volunteers as

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1706 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 205.
1707 Intelligence Activities, 30.
1708 Intelligence Activities, 30.
guerrillas, coast watchers, aircraft spotters, or weather observers. As of August, the camps held 125 officers and men, but planned to increase to about 800.1709

At any one time five groups of 25 volunteers entered Phase I of training without being told “the reason for this training or their possible destinations.”1710 The groups rotated through classes: 3.5 hours on judging distances; 8.5 hours each on map and compass reading; 10 hours on first aid; 21 hours weapons training; 29.5 hours ship and aircraft recognition; 30.75 hours on signals and Morse code; and 47.25 hours on physical training, unarmed combat, “Ranger type training and School of the Soldier.”1711 The AIB would interview qualified graduates for selection for fifty-six days of Advanced Training that included additional instruction on guerrilla operations, Japanese and local habits, and cryptography.

Navy commander Parsons ran a PRS supply dump in Darwin. Parsons and Whitney coordinated for submarines with the 7th Fleet Staff. Whitney oversaw all liaison with guerrillas including radio messages, guerrilla mail, and interrogation of returning personnel.

The PRS accelerated submarine missions into the Philippines. On 27 May, the submarine SS-202 Trout under skipper Lieutenant Commander Albert H. Clark, left Fremantle, Australia, on its ninth war patrol.1712 On 12 June, the Tambor class sub landed the five-man TENWEST team under CPT Jordan Hamner with two tons of supplies,

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1710 Letter of Transmittal - Philippine Section Personnel Training, LTC Allison W. Ind, 5 May 1943. Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG16, Box 68, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia. Evidence suggests the camp population never went much beyond 600 trainees.
1711 Ibid.
including 6,000 rounds of .30-cal and 2,000 rounds of .45-cal ammunition, for Fertig near Labangan, Mindanao. Though impressive, the amounts fell well short of 50,000,000 .30-cal rounds and 20,000,000 .45-cal rounds Fertig had requested in March.

Hamner brought with him Lieutenant Franklyn Young, Jr, returning to the Islands after his escape with Albert Klestadt. Together they established a radio station near Zamboanga City -- then “after a short review with Col. Fertig,” were off to Tawi Tawi to provide radio to Colonel Suarez.

On 1 July in the Makassar Straits off the northwest coast of Celebes, the SS-200 Thresher under Lieutenant Commander Harry Hull was on its ninth war patrol when it torpedoed the Japanese destroyer Hokaze, leaving it damaged and run aground in Subaya harbor, and sank the troop transport Yoneyama Maru about forty nautical miles from Balikpapan. The boat then stopped in Tawi Tawi where Captain Jordan Hamner and his team of agents set up a radio station to tie in intelligence on the Sibitu Passage in the Sulu Archipelago to SWPA. On 9 July, the sub delivered 500 pounds of supplies, 40,000 rounds of ammunition, and Hamner with the remaining five members of his team near Catmon Point, Negros, before heading to Pearl Harbor for an overhaul.

Interestingly, SWPA G-2 reported that in November the AIB sent a British team of agents to North Borneo with supplies for Hamner. SWPA instructed both teams to establish radio contact with each other. The teams failed to comply. G-2 remarked: “Neither party had much interest in inter-communications and their failure to take any

1713 Note that Roscoe also claims the Trout landed on 26 May at Basilan Island, southwest of Mindanao, with $10,000 and two tons of equipment. Roscoe, 272.
1714 Memorandum to Colonel Merrill-Smith, AIB, 28 March 1943, 1, Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG16, Box 68, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia.
1715 “First message from Maj. Hamner is dated 24 June 1943.” Intelligence Activities, 5.
1716 Ibid.
1717 Intelligence Activities, 28.
1718 20,000 rounds of .45-cal and 20,000 rounds of .30-cal. Roscoe, 272.
such action in this connection was received with a certain amount of prejudice against Hamner.”\textsuperscript{1719} SWPA suddenly noted his problems with malaria, his teeth and an ear growth. When Hamner returned to Australia on 15 March 1944, SWPA’s Philippine Regional Section (PRS) wrote to Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland: “Recommend that no action be taken toward the recognition of Maj. Jordan A. Hamner’s services as was done in the case of Comdr. Parsons and Maj, Smith upon their return from the Philippines, without consideration of the prior comment of PRS.”\textsuperscript{1720}

Agents reported that despite support from SWPA, the guerrillas found their toughest foes continued to be malnutrition and illness. As Blackburn stated, “About the time you’d think you got over with an illness, bam! You were hit with something else.”\textsuperscript{1721} Just moving through jungles caused casualties. Arthur Noble lost an eye from walking into a tree branch.\textsuperscript{1722} Lapham fell into a hole one night, broke his shoulder, and suffered from poorly constructed cast from an ill-trained medic. “His replacement,” recalled Lapham, “seeing at once that the cast was unsuitable, cut it off and discovered that what had originally been a simple break had been made a good deal worse by the misplaced efforts of his predecessor: muscle pressure and the cast had pulled the break apart.”\textsuperscript{1723} Lapham underwent rudimentary surgery and a new cumbersome, larger cast.

Illness and poor nutrition eroded willpower. Volckmann noted how the relentless pace of events, hardships and constant tension amplified any moral defects in a guerrilla’s character. He wrote, “Each day they became more depressed and listless, and with few exceptions these men readily gave up when forced into a tight spot. If overtaken by fever

\textsuperscript{1719} Intelligence Activities, 28.
\textsuperscript{1720} Ibid., 28-29.
\textsuperscript{1721} Blackburn Interview, 79.
\textsuperscript{1722} Ibid., 90.
\textsuperscript{1723} Lapham and Norling, 190.
or some other tropical illness, they often displayed no determination to fight back and as a result usually died within a few days.”

Volckmann and the other guerrilla leaders countered these dangers through sound organization, coherent operational direction, and firm military discipline. The bands of guerrillas that failed to do so, did not survive.

In June, famine and shortages threatened guerrilla and civilian alike. “Locusts had stripped the coconut palms of their leaves, making branches stick out like the ribs of umbrellas. A bar of soap was like a precious jewel,” Villamor recalled, “People moved about in clothing they had worn for months, men and women walked barefoot or in shoes with soles made from bits of old automobile tires. Cases of malaria were treated not with quinine but with the bark of the cinchona trees. And everywhere there was the nagging, persistent question: When would aid come?”

The malnourished population proved increasingly susceptible to tuberculosis, pneumonia and other respiratory diseases – often spread by released POWs and furloughed guerrillas returning to their homes.

As indicated by his ‘lay low’ order, MacArthur worried about the effect of guerrilla actions on the general population. “We guerrillas considered that we had a right to civilian support,” Lapham added, “since we were risking our lives against common enemies and of course could not operate without food and equipment. Yet civilians only had so much to give anyone; if pressed too hard they might starve.”

Guerrillas developed several methods of obtaining supplies from the people. Some ‘taxed’ the locals either through a free local government or by direct requisition. Most guerrillas tried to

1724 Volckmann, 69-70.
1725 Villamor, 130.
1727 Lapham and Norling, 83.
limit the demands they placed on the population closest to them for fear of losing both popular support and the loyalty of guerrillas with family ties in their area.\textsuperscript{1728}

In Volckmann’s organization, Blackburn recalled, “We got control of the towns, and the mayors were directed to appoint Food Administrators who would work with my Food Administrator. We would tax the mayor for so much rice and other food stuffs, and his Food Administrator would gather it up. Then, we would sign receipts for so many bundles of rice, so many pigs, so many chickens, and so many eggs, or what have you, the logistics people, would pick it up and distribute it to the camps in that geographic area.”\textsuperscript{1729} Local chiefs allied with the USAFIP-NL arranged support, issuing U.S. army receipts to their people in Volckmann’s name.

Some villages paid taxes in money, but most through food or other goods. Guerrillas purchased the goods with money, script they printed, or IOUs. Most tried to keep records of payments. Balance sheets however failed to reflect the tense debates among guerrillas over how to best allocate their scarce financial resources. “How many quarrels we had had over finances!” recalled Panlilio of her dealings with Marking.\textsuperscript{1730}

Some guerrillas were lucky enough to receive deliveries of cash from SWPA, but strict rules of accountability governed expenditures.\textsuperscript{1731} Issues over the collection, expenditure and safe keeping of money could rip apart organizations. Lapham actually declined $50,000 in genuine Philippine pesos when Chick Parsons told him he would have to account for it.\textsuperscript{1732} In September 1944 Anderson took that money, but later could

\textsuperscript{1728} Ibid., 86.
\textsuperscript{1729} Blackburn Interview, 159.
\textsuperscript{1730} Panlilio, 193.
\textsuperscript{1731} For administrative policies regarding this money, see Walter Rundell, Jr., \textit{Military Money: A Fiscal History of the U.S. Army Overseas in World War II} (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1980).
\textsuperscript{1732} Lapham and Norling, 153.
not account for $20,000 he gave to Alejo Santos. “I did not keep formal records of such ‘sales,’ or of contributions either,” confessed Lapham, “because I thought it dangerous to write of benefactors in record books that might be seized by the enemy.”

Guerrillas obtained supplies from a variety of local sources. Medicine came from large cities like Manila, often through the black market. They gathered weapons from raids and ambushes, old battlefields, or black markets. The LGAF gathered between 1,500 and 3,000 rifles for their 13,000 guerrillas from the fields of Bataan. Fuel for generators and engines came from the triple distillation of coconut oil. For other items, as Willis noted, “I was beginning to realize that if you ever want anything and can’t find it, all you have to do is go to a Chinese merchant in town, and he probably will have it or can locate it.”

Finding food became the predominant logistical problem for the guerrillas. Lapham recalled, “The production, acquisition, and distribution of food and supplies was always more complex than might appear on the surface.” Even the most loyal of citizens were struggling to feed themselves could only give little to guerrillas. As one said of Ernesto Felix, a volunteer Home Guard battalion commander in Cardona, Morong, Binangonan, and Taay: “He fed his children with one finger; and devoted the other nine to the fighters.” The Japanese captured Felix and tortured him to death.

American guerrillas lost on average about forty percent of their body. They survived on concoctions like ginamoose, which Stahl described as “a slurry of boiled

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1733 Ibid., 84-85.
1734 Ibid., 82-83.
1735 Willis and Myers, 64.
1736 Ibid., 83.
1737 Lapham and Norling, 83.
1738 Panlilio, 57.
baby shrimp, small enough to qualify as maggots. I’ve never eaten maggots, but they
couldn’t have tasted worse than ginamoose.” 1739 They ate carabao blood: “We would set
the cup by the fire and let the blood congeal. Then we dumped out the lump of blood,
sliced it, and put it on our rice or fried it and ate it with our rice.” 1740

Some foodstuffs served multi-purposes. One of the most useful was the tree fruit
tuba. Gatherers scaled palm trees daily, cut a slice from tuba buds, and hung a little
bamboo bucket under it to collect the dripping juice. 1741 A day later they collected the
juice into a larger bucket, and then repeated the process. After one day, the juice tasted
like beer; each day thereafter its became more potent. After five days, it served as the
base for a kind of pepper vinegar. After ten days, it could be triple distilled and used as
gasoline. Stahl noticed a problem: “It was not unusual for [drivers] to siphon the fuel
from the tank along the way to mix a few highballs. Then an SOS would be sent to the
nearest distillery for more fuel.” 1742

Another remarkably versatile food was the coconut. The tree palms became
thatched roofs, baskets, hats; the husks used for firewood and the ashes made lye. A
guerrilla recalled, “The un-matured meat inside is a jelly-like consistency but very
pleasant to eat.” 1743 A ripe coconut would have one-quarter to one-half inch thick
coco nut meat that was high in oil (sixty-eight percent). Mixed with water it made milk to
pour on toasted rice with sugar for cereal. Willis remembered native women shaving
coco nut meat and boiling the slivers in a fifty-five-gallon drum of water until the oil
settled on top. “Then they had a nice clear oil for cooking, for lamps, or for anything else

1739 Stahl, 43.
1740 Willis and Myers, 28.
1741 Stahl, 43-44.
1742 Ibid.
1743 Willis and Myers, 63.
which oil could be used for,” he wrote, “The meal from the coconut meat after the oil is extracted is around 8 or 9 percent protein and was fed to carabao or cows.”\textsuperscript{1744} Guerrillas learned to strip the husk off a mature coconut, punch holes through the points were the shell connected to the tree, blow air into the holes and pour in a tablespoonful of sugar, plug the holes and bury the coconut six inches below warm sands. “Wait at least a week before removing it from its ‘oven.’ Remove the plugs and pour,” recalled Stahl, “Or, if you are in a hurry, drink directly from the container. Voila! You have a cupful of sweet-tasting alcohol not unlike Southern Comfort (if you have enough imagination).”\textsuperscript{1745}

Though usually starving, guerrillas often demonstrated a remarkable ability to regain health under favorable conditions. When Willis escaped from a prison ship and was fed by natives on Mindanao, he reported, “I stayed in Siokon for three weeks, and during that time I gained fifteen pounds. I would have gained more because the food was certainly very good after prison fare, but I had two attacks of malaria and the quinine I was taking killed my appetite somewhat.”\textsuperscript{1746}

Northern Luzon, D543/R-506

Increased Japanese patrols pushed the famished guerrillas to the breaking point. After the campaign in the first half of 1943, Blackburn recalled, “Things were tough all over. The people were afraid to support guerrilla units… And, there was no protection from all the spies and informers who were beginning to spring up. The morale of personnel and the units hit a new low, if you could call them ‘units.’”\textsuperscript{1747} Operations

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\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{1744} Ibid., 63-64.
\item \textsuperscript{1745} Stahl, 124-125.
\item \textsuperscript{1746} Willis and Myers, 62.
\item \textsuperscript{1747} Blackburn Interview, 127-128.
\end{enumerate}
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suffered accordingly. Once while trying to impress the hostile Huks, Ramsey collapsed with what he later believed was a “mild stroke” that brought on “fits of paralysis and unconsciousness.”\textsuperscript{1748} By October, Blackburn would have to abort plans while he “detoured to go to Uding to receive another series of shots for his fever.”\textsuperscript{1749} Operational considerations had to be sacrificed in the interests of situating bases above the mosquito plains. Volckmann moved his forces into the Zambalese Mountains and reported: “The clean pine odor and the cool refreshing air of this beautiful country made me feel like a different person. Already I felt that by the grace of God I would again get a strong and well. I was sure that in this country we had at least half a chance.”\textsuperscript{1750} He traded access to the enemy for healthy living conditions.

Captain John Boone, a former corporal of the 31\textsuperscript{st} Infantry, had five regiments of men in the Japanese occupied Bataan-Zambales province. He kept them dispersed, living in their homes, to be reassembled in secret. They were loosely connected with Merrill and spent a good deal of time combating the Hukbalahaps.

Volckmann’s efforts to expand area of his authority irritated his neighbors. He made contact, recalled Lapham, “Then he tried to absorb my command into his by invoking what he called the ‘understanding’ I had reached with Moses and Noble. I simply ignored his blandishments as I had those of his predecessors. Nothing happened.”\textsuperscript{1751} Blackburn remembered Volckmann’s frustration. He said, “You could never get a handle on what Lapham had done.”\textsuperscript{1752} Blackburn added, “We never heard

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\item[1748] Ramsey and Rivele, 130.
\item[1749] Volckmann, 88.
\item[1750] Ibid., 79-80.
\item[1751] Lapham and Norling, 113.
\item[1752] Blackburn Interview, 96.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
from him, but Volckmann wasn’t pushing anything on it since that wasn’t going to accomplish anything.”\(^{1753}\)

Building his organization seemed to invigorate Volckmann. Failure to do so had an opposite effect. At a low moment Volckmann complained to Blackburn, “Any chance of continuing resistance in the area can practically cease to be considered anymore.”\(^{1754}\) Blackburn replied, “You remember, we always agreed, you and I, that the first one who took on a negative attitude, then the other was going to kick him right in the ass. Turn around.” Volckmann admitted, “I remember, so let’s stop that.”\(^{1755}\)

For Filipinos civilians, efforts to organize resistance presented dangers of a different kind. In Manila late on 3 June, lawyer Antonio Bautista, a founding member of the Free Philippines, sent his children and household staff to the movies. While they were gone he and his wife Adalia held a private dinner for five guests in their new house at Number 9 Third Street. In attendance were U.S. Army Colonel Narcio Manzano, Dr. Jose B.L. Reyes, Rafael R. ‘Liling’ Roces, Jr., and Lorenzo Tanada. From 1600 to 2100 hours, they discussed their plans for opposing the Japanese. “That was the beginning of the end of peaceful period I may have hoped for,” recalled Adalia.\(^{1756}\) Having spoken openly in the meeting, each attendee was now hostage to the loyalty of the others. At any moment something could happen that might result in the arrest and interrogation of one that could easily lead to the capture and execution of the others. For the several attendees close to PEC Commissioner of the Interior Jose Laurel, one such event came quickly.

\(^{1753}\) Ibid.
\(^{1754}\) Ibid., 128.
\(^{1755}\) Ibid.
\(^{1756}\) Marquez, 14.
Two days later at 0600 hours, Laurel was playing a round at the Wack Wack Golf and Country Club in Mandaluyong with Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, Dr. Leoncio B. Monzon, Dr. Nicanor Reyes, Sr., Aurelio Montinola, Sr., and ‘Liling’ Roces. On the seventh tee, a gunman shot Laurel twice in the back with a .45 caliber handgun. His doctor golf partners hurried Laurel to the Philippine General Hospital where the best available medical personnel, joined by Chief Surgeon of the Japanese Military Administration Colonel Ishii, saved his life. The Kempeitai immediately launched a massive search for the gunman, rumored at first to be a member of the Markings guerrillas known as “Little Joe.” Laurel, however, reportedly urged compassion for his attacker. He later wrote, “I condemn cowardice and treachery but I must respect the political ideology of people plunged into desperation in a situation in which I played an important role.”

According to Agoncillo, the Kempeitai apprehended and executed Captain Palma Martin, a member of Colonel Enrique Arce’s unit in the Hunters Guerrillas, but Laurel later identified his attacker as former boxer Feliciano Lizardo.

On 9 June, Volckmann received bad news. Hiding in cave near Lubuagan, Kalinga, Moses and Noble had sent a runner to a nearby town for supplies. “According to the story that we heard,” said Blackburn, “they had native boys they’d send out in front of them, supposedly to scout the trail, but the scouts carelessly let it be known that ‘the colonels are coming, the colonels are coming.’” The Japanese caught the runner and, under torture, he revealed the location of the two American officers. “The captured colonels were rushed to Bontoc, the capital of the Mountain province, where the Japanese commander forged an order by the colonels directing all guerrillas to surrender,”

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1758 Ibid.  
1759 Blackburn Interview, 123.
Volckmann recalled, “We wouldn’t have paid any attention to such an order if it had really been signed by the colonels, but the order published by the Japs was obviously a fake.” Volckmann explained, “Morale in general, both troop and civilian, was at a new low.” Blackburn added: “The morale of personnel and the units hit a new low, if you could call them ‘units.’ The men suffered from the lack of food and medical supplies. We just didn’t have anything.”

Volckmann was now the senior American officer with the fragmented guerrillas in Luzon. With Praeger’s radio offline, he had no means for communicating with SWPA. “Anti-resistance feeling mounted so high in some areas that it was impossible to send even a native runner through those areas without having him apprehended, tied on a pole like a pig, and carried to the Japs,” Volckmann note, “Arms and ammunition were becoming scarce; medical supplies ceased to exist. The guerrilla forces in North Luzon had been reduced to less than two thousand men dispersed in small bands. All this added up to a very gloomy picture.” On 20 June, Japanese troops arrived near his camp in Haliap. That night Volckmann wrote: “Hid our surplus things and went to our hide out. Made the last part of the trip in the dark, very hard walking.” For the next few weeks, local residents reported Japanese soldiers asking about Volckmann and Blackburn by name. The two guerrillas left Ifugao.

Mindanao, D552/R-497

1760 Volckmann, 119.
1761 Ibid., 120.
1762 Blackburn Interview, 128.
1763 Ibid.
1764 Guardia, 100.
On 12 June, the submarine *Trout* landed the TENWEST team under Jordan Hamner with two tons of radios and supplies for Fertig near Labangan, Mindanao. Farther south in Liangan, bed ridden with intestinal illness, Fertig wrote, “The casa is the one place in the whole world in which it is almost a pleasure to be sick. The war seems so far away and yet it is just across the bay… Unless the offensive starts very soon, we are lost, for we can’t meet the full force of the enemy.”\(^{1765}\) Meanwhile, Villamor had dissuaded Morgan from interfering with the Negros guerrillas and sent him back to Lanae. From Villamor’s reports, SWPA suspected that Morgan’s visit had been a ploy by Fertig to keep Villamor out of Mindanao.\(^{1766}\)

A Japanese force landed in nearby Misamis but Morgan did nothing to resist them, later claiming he was following MacArthur’s order not to provoke retaliation. When Morgan finally sent guerrillas into Misamis, contrary to Fertig’s orders, it was only to seize arms from those guerrillas who had fled before the Japanese.\(^{1767}\) Coincidentally, Fertig received word that “Andrews is continuing his anti-American conversations. He had a long talk with Morgan and after a few drinks, the latter admitted that he was responsible for all this; I simply acted as his front man. Andrews desires to go to Villamor. Well and good.”\(^{1768}\)

At his headquarters in Liangan, Lanao, Fertig named Lieutenant Colonel Robert V Bowler as 10\(^{th}\) MD Chief of Staff and to succeed him if he was captured or killed. This was a severe rebuke to Morgan, nominally Fertig’s second in command. Fertig converted the Cotabato-Bukindon guerrillas into the 106\(^{th}\) Division under Lieutenant Colonel Frank

\(^{1765}\) Fertig Diary, 7 June 1943.  
\(^{1766}\) Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 90.  
\(^{1767}\) Ibid.  
\(^{1768}\) Fertig Diary, 25 June 1943.
McGee. The guerrillas south and southwest of Cotabato became the 116th Regiment under Major Herbert Page, a retired officer with many years in the Philippines. Planter Fred Johnson assisted Page. Villamor, Captain Macario Guballa, and Major Matas also lent support to Johnson.

Second only to the many Americans added to Fertig’s organization was the increase in the number of Moros. Pendatun’s 118th Regiment included commanders Lieutenant Colonel Soriano, Major Gabutina, Datu Aliman and Datu Udtog. “Utog’s leadership and influence and Pendatun’s education have forged a powerful unit in this area,” SWPA reported, “The regiment kept the Kigos-Kabacan Road closed to enemy traffic until early 1944 when shortages of equipment and supplies forced the guerrillas to yield control.”¹⁷⁶⁹ In June, however, Fertig faced an apparent Moro spy ring from Bohol centered around an agent named Quizon. “Looks most suspicious,” he wrote, “as tho [sic] he were reporting my movements and indicating the possibility of an early attack.”¹⁷⁷⁰

Fertig set out to ‘consolidate or eliminate’ dissenting guerrillas on Mindanao. He sent Captain William Knortz to Surigao, Major Garcia into central Surigao, and Captain Tomanning to Lianga. Knortz, a former U.S. Air Corps corporal, had hid in the hills after the invasion. As the 10th MD liaison officer, Knortz proved trustworthy, efficient and daring. According to Fertig: “He was a fearless fighter when meeting the Japanese and square, firm dealer in organizing recalcitrant guerrilla groups.”¹⁷⁷¹ Knortz organized the guerrillas in the 114th Regiment and promoted former Private First Class Paul H. Marshall to Captain to command the regiment. Sergeant and now Lieutenant Robert Spielman, a fellow escapee from the Davao Penal Colony in April, assisted Knortz.

¹⁷⁶⁹ Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 98.
¹⁷⁷⁰ Fertig Diary, 13 June 1943.
¹⁷⁷¹ Ibid., 96
Tragically, while carrying supplies from Lanao to Agusan in September, the boat carrying Knortz would capsize and he drowned. This followed Bill Lowry’s suicide in June. “He was living and working too hard,” Fertig concluded, “and 18 months of war took their toll.”

As June came to a close, Parsons stayed with the Ozámiz family in Jimenez on Mindanao’s Iligan Bay. He was drafting a report when guards on the beach sounded an alarm. While the Ozámiz family hastily departed to hiding sites in the jungle, Parsons decided he had time for a nap. He awoke suddenly to find Japanese soldiers breaking down his front door. Parsons barely escaped out the back with his papers. In the hills he linked up with a group of locals led by Father Calanan heading to the Jimenez church to recover a can of wheat flour for communion wafers before it fell to the enemy. Realizing the size of the Japanese force, Parsons began a long roundabout journey to rejoin Fertig.

Manila, D556/R-493

News from Tokyo on 16 June reported Prime Minister Tojo’s announcement that Japan would grant the “honor of national independence” to the Philippines within a year. The PEC in Manila declared the creation of the Preparatory Committee for Philippine Independence (PCPI). On 19 June, a KALIBAPI convention selected members for the PCPI: Aguinaldo, Aquino, Osias, Paredes, Recto, Vargas, Yulo, and Roxas (who declined and recommended Aquino, then Laurel). The next day Kuroda approved the names and

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1772 Ibid., 20 June 1943.
1773 Ingham, 98-102.
appointed Jose Laurel as chairman. The delegation headed to Tokyo to coordinate the steps towards independence.\textsuperscript{1774}

Ironically, the announcement of pending independence slowed down JMA efforts to improve economic conditions in the Philippines. There was less incentive for Filipinos to work with the Japanese, and less incentive for the Japanese administrators to pursue long-range plans. As one arrival in the JMA Department of Industries reported, there was now little to do and little need for new men.\textsuperscript{1775}

The announcement fit with Japanese adjustments to unexpected difficulties resulting from their initial war objectives.\textsuperscript{1776} Isolating Asia from the West had caused a loss of vital imports, jobs and investments. Japanese control led to a weakening of self-policing and a rise of nationalism and resistance. Having occupation forces ‘live off the land’ increased competition for food and goods giving rise to shortages, inflation, and starvation. Economically exploiting the occupied countries for their natural resources exacerbated shortages and led to forced labor that in turn bred resistance. Occupation had politically, socially, and economically destabilized the occupied territories.

The selection of Laurel to chair the PCPI indicated a change of fortune for Chairman of the Philippine Executive Committee Vargas. Fourteenth Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Wachi observed: “No one had been so much taken advantage of and so abruptly rejected by Japan as Jorge B. Vargas, administrative chief under Japanese rule… he had been treated as a puppet not only by the Japanese, but also by the

\textsuperscript{1774} Tarling, 168-169.
\textsuperscript{1775} Jose, “The Rice Shortage,” 204.
prominent Filipinos.” Since January 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army had controlled the PEC and used Vargas as it saw fit. At first the Japanese hoped he would entice Quezon to join the occupation government. Now with Quezon in Washington, Vargas was no longer needed. On 15 July, the JMA ordered Alejandro Roces’ TVT newspapers to “play down Vargas” and “play up Laurel.” The papers quickly printed a statement from Laurel: “Vargas cannot handle the situation: If I were given the chance to head the government, I would place all who opposed me under the machine gun.”

The Japanese put Fourteenth Army Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Naonori Utsunomiya in position to oversee the drafting of the Philippine constitution. When Roxas begged off claiming to be ill, occupation authorities sent him to see Tojo who convinced him to join the constitutional assembly. Roxas later received credit for changing the document so as to avoid any declaration of joining the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Roxas’s position remained precarious: “He was living on Lepanto Street, in a house always guarded by the Japanese and whenever he left he was accompanied by a personal Japanese guard.”

Lieutenant Colonel Narciso Manzano ran an intelligence cell in Manila for the Free Philippines, with his deputy (and Villamor agent) Lieutenant Osmundo Mondoñedo. Among his network was Juan Elizalde who ran an underground team, “28 Men of Fort Santiago,” who circulated among social circles and business communities gathering intelligence. He also coordinate intelligence gathering activities for Parsons by

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1778 Abaya, 31.
1779 Ibid., 32.
1780 Tarling, 169.
1781 Villamor, 191.
1782 Kaminiski, 220.
politically prominent men such as Senator Jose Ozámiz, Rafael ‘Liling’ Roces, Jr., Enrique Pirovano. The Japanese kept a number of Manzano’s spies under watch: Hans Menzi, Manuel Elizalde, and Mrs. Asuncion Perez. Villamor said of his agents: “Many belonged to the best families in Negros and our roster of officers began to read like the Social Register: Montelbano, Alvarez, Torres, Benedicto, Locsin, Yulo, and others.” The intelligence net continued to spread across the Islands.

Villamor now had a fairly robust radio network. In Colipapa, Negros, Andrews operated station YAF with a 3BZ set in contact with SWPA in Australia with NEI as a reserve. With a Signal Corps set, he also oversaw the guerrilla contact station WPI. Benedicto operated the separate AIB intelligence net with another 3BZ transmitter and receiver. Villamor was providing an ATR-4 to Ingeniero in Bohol. He sent a handmade set to Arthur Zayco for the guerrillas in Albay or Sorgoson but heard nothing from them. Cebu station PNM was in contact with Andrews. Villamor however asked SWPA for ATR-4s for his agents in Panay, Leyte, and Cebu, saying, “I do not want to depend on guerrillas.”

With networks of couriers, the radios connected Bicol, Laguna, the Cagayan Valley and Manila in Luzon, along with Samar, Leyte, Cebu, Mindoro. Through them men like Captain Buenaventura Villanueva (Benny Newcastle) in Nagcarlan, Laguna, coordinated networks of spies that included Manila former Speaker of the National Assembly Jose Yulo, newsman Arsenio Lacson, University of Santo Tomas professor Manuel Colayco, Lieutenants Felizardo Tanabe and Emilio Zerudo, Lawyer Emilio

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1783 Villamor, 187-188.
1784 Ibid., 135.
1785 Intelligence Activities, 23-24.
1786 Ibid., 24
Severino, and Manila Policeman Ramon Bagatsing. Catholic priest Father Francisco Avendaño of Manila used a radio transmitter in his church to send information through Laguna to Negros to Australia.  

Villamor counted as agents the Free Philippines members Lorenzo Tanada, Antonio Bautista, Anselmo Claudio, Jose Barrera, Roberto Concepcion, Jose Reyes, and Rafael Roces, Jr. Manuel Roxas passed information from the heart of the government. One of Jorge Vargas’ press relations officers in Malacañang Palace, Vincente Alvarez, broadcast on KZRH containing coded information for the guerrillas that was passed from Villamor to SWPA.

Southern Luzon, D557/R-492

In Bicol, Turko sent his VTG guerrillas to hunt the TVGU leader Miranda. In the second week of June, 24 to 39 of his men under Lieutenant Rafael Quiñones and Lieutenant Jesus del Valle arrived in Viga. They looted the local church, Our Lady of the Assumption, and used the convent as their headquarters to harass citizens. Turko arrived on 17 June met with Miranda in the nearby barrio Rizal. In a heated exchange, Miranda called the VTG deserters. “At this point Quiñones went for his gun, not knowing that Miranda was a fast draw and a dead shot,” Barrameda wrote, “Quiñones was dead, a .45 caliber bullet in his forehead, before he even hit the ground.” Another VTG man went to shoot, Miranda killed him too. Miranda’s party relieved Turko and his men of all their bullets and then split up and escaped.

1787 Villamor, 136.
1788 Intelligence Activities, 27.
1789 Ibid.
1790 Ibid., 155.
1791 Ibid., 158.
1792 Ibid., 159.
Turko returned to his base to Caramoan to gather a larger posse to chase after Miranda. In Bato, they caught and killed TVGU Sergeant Manuel San Juan. They then spent July fruitlessly searching Catanduanes. On 2 July, Miranda and a small group had left Virac in Catanduanes for Batan Island, Albay, where he rendezvoused with Faustino Flor. The two leaders decided to join with Lapus in Bicol. Miranda continued on to Masbate then reached Panay in mid-August. Over the next month he conferenced at least twice with Peralta’s chief of staff Relunia – a fellow Bicoloan – seeking recognition and support. He also learned of his promotion to major, on Lapus’ recommendation. In mid-September, he left Panay for Iloilo.

Meanwhile, Leon Aureus broke his portion of the TVGU from Miranda’s to join Zabat. In July Aureus and Padua came to a new understanding. They divided Camarines Sur into five districts, Padua in charge of districts two and five, Aureus’s TVGU in charge of the rest. This agreement upended the Miranda-Padua accord that placed Padua under Miranda. Zabat used the new agreement as an opportunity. In August, he mediated remaining differences he had with Aureus and Padua and brought them into his organization as the 53rd Regiment with Padua in command. He then convinced Turko to also join him with promise of regimental command, the 54th Regiment (not to be confused with Lapus’ similarly named regiment).

Negros, D562/R-487

Despite his intelligence network success, criticism of Villamor found its way back to SWPA. On 22 June, Fertig wrote, “Unification of Negros is doubtful as Villamor is

\[\text{1793} \text{ Barrameda, 140.}\]
young, He is using unlimited promotion as a club to buy opposing leaders.” Four days later Villamor received word that he would be withdrawn from the Philippines by submarine. It was time to pick a successor as 7th Military District commander. “Although the youngest and most junior of all possible commanders,” he decided, “Abcede was, in my opinion, the most active and aggressive, the best suited for the task.” Then, at month’s end, 400 Japanese landed at Tolong on Negros. A reported fifty ships bombarded on Dumagete on their way into the Mindanao Sea. About the same time, SWPA instructed Villamor rendezvous with a submarine bringing an agent from Quezon around 8 July at the place he had arrived on Negros, near Catmon Point.

Villamor delayed his departure while trying to leave his house in order. He asked SWPA to appoint Abcede commander, allow Ausejo to go work for Fertig, and to place Gador on inactive status “for the sake of unity in Negros.” “Gador had a history of antagonizing guerrilla leaders,” Villamor reported, “He had interfered with and obstructed the operations of other organizations. He took advantage of disagreements in other organizations by offering their officers appointments in his own organization. Sometimes, because of his meddling, open conflicts between rival organizations erupted into open fighting.” SWPA left Gador alone.

Visayas, D571/R-478

On Panay, Peralta continued to build a formidable organization. His G-2, 26-year old Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Serran (a former 1st Lieutenant in the Intelligence Section

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1794 Fertig Diary, 22 June 1943.  
1795 Villamor, 141.  
1796 Ibid.  
1797 Ibid.
of the 61st Division) created and ran a robust intelligence network. SWPA observed: “There is good indication that his reports are reliable but that his sources are loosely organized and developed, and that little effort is being made to keep the financial accounts of the intelligence sector.”

Finances were indeed a problem for Peralta. He was spending a half-a-million pesos each month on his intelligence network. On 27 May he wired SWPA: “Problem of money this district acute. Released on million pesos printed last month and all gone. To combat Jap attraction policy, we have been paying partial salaries of soldiers and buying food. Otherwise soldiers’ families starve. Civil government in same hole.”

At the PRS, Whitney received Peralta’s urgent request for money and commented: “Soon such a requirement may be expected to be doubled or trebled. How much of these funds are actually distributed for legitimate purposes and how much are dedicated to the creation of an overlordship that may later prove a harassing thorn in our side, is a matter for pure conjecture but, as Peralta himself points out in this radio, ‘money talks.’ I know of no place in which it talks louder than in the Philippines.”

SWPA also noted that Peralta’s forces were both known for their frequent combat and their adoption of a Fabian strategy to avoid decisive battles: “This has not helped relations with the civilians but has retained the army almost intact.” SWPA believed the guerrillas’ habitual confiscation of local supplies irritated these relations.

1798 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 49.
1799 Memorandum, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area Allied Intelligence Bureau, Subject: Philippine Operations, 27 May 1943, 1. Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG16, Box 65, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia.
1800 Ibid., 3.
1801 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 50.
Peralta divided his 6th Military District Headquarters into two echelons. He remained with the East Central Antique Headquarters (First Echelon) with his executive officer, chief of staff, adjutant, intelligence officer, and signal officer. The Second Echelon, Eastern Panay Headquarters under Relunia included his executive officer, assistant executive officer and district quartermaster. SWPA agents reported, “From the beginning Peralta has exhibited a strong desire to bring a larger area under his command, to extend his influence as widely as possible, and to set up an intelligence system that would give him complete detailed coverage.”\(^{1802}\) Peralta sent agents to Luzon in two sections: one under Captain Alejandro P. Hontiveros southeast with 2nd Combat Team through Masbate; and, another under Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Jurado (former Chief of the Offshore Patrol, Philippine Army) southwest with 1st Combat Team through Mindoro. Hontiveros, a 25-year old graduate of Ateneo de Manila College, edited agents’ reports and forwarded them through Peralta’s 6th Military District headquarters to SWPA.

By July 1943 Peralta had extended his radio net into Luzon “to establish contacts ‘among friends’ for collection of intelligence on ‘harbor defenses, troop arrivals, etc.; airfields; troop dispositions’ in the area extending from Batangas to Pangasinan.”\(^{1803}\) Captain Teodorico Haresco reported from Batangas; Lieutenant Porfirio Bretana from Fort Wint on Manila Harbor; Lieutenant Ludovico Publico from Manila and its suburbs; Lieutenant Maximo Basco from Tarlac and Pampanga; Sergeant Elesco Pugne from Bataan and Corregidor; Sergeant B. Martinez from Lingayen and Pangasinan; and Sergeants Aurelio Parrenas and Enrique Magalona from Cavite. According to SWPA, however, “Reports were infrequent and often considerably delayed…. Reports from

\(^{1802}\) Ibid., 48.
\(^{1803}\) Intelligence Activities, 54.
central Luzon and Manila were exaggerated and sometimes were treated with reserve unless verified from other sources. Contacts were mainly mechanics, bar-tenders, small businessmen, and government clerks.” \(^{1804}\)

SWPA’s decision to reinstate the pre-war military districts had upended Peralta’s plans for expansion as the Fourth Corps, but he maintained his contacts he had built with guerrilla leaders in Negros, Leyte and Samar. He met no resistance in expanding his influence in Masbate, Marinuque, Mindoro or Palawn. Peralta continued to support Abcede on Negros in the 7\(^{th}\) Military District and Blas Miranda on Leyte in the 9\(^{th}\) Military District, often causing conflict with other regional commanders and SWPA. He flooded other areas with agents who infiltrated the puppet government, Japanese installations, and city street corners.\(^{1805}\) Only Fenton on Cebu and Fertig on Mindanao defied Peralta.

SWPA had trouble assessing the leaders in the Visayas. PRS agents reported: “Shifting support, failure to thoroughly examine the facts in disputes and the resultant hasty decisions, often cited by junior and inexperienced officers, have aggravated the local political situation on those islands.”\(^{1806}\) The native kinship network system often compromised shipments of supplies by submarine meant to bolster guerrillas. Agents reported: “Supplies sent from SWPA are reported to have appeared in quantity on the black market and seldom reach the needy or those for whom the supplies were intended.”\(^{1807}\) The assessment continued: “Besides graft and sometimes strained relations with the civilians, the compadre [extended kinship network] system by increasing

\(^{1804}\) Ibid.
\(^{1805}\) Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 66.
\(^{1806}\) Ibid., 48.
\(^{1807}\) Ibid., 49.
overhead personnel and depleting supplies seriously has further reduced the effectiveness of the organization, destroyed discipline almost entirely and at times immobilized the army." Even so, the PRS succeeded in arming the resistance: in early 1943 about sixty percent of guerrillas were armed; by mid-1944 that number rose to nearly one hundred percent.

On Palawan, the Provincial Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary at Puerto Princesa, Major Guillermo Maramba, had led his family and others into the hills when the Japanese invaded. He refused, however, to associate with any of the island’s emerging guerrilla groups. In June, one of the Cobb brothers met with Maramba in Danlig. The two men got into a heated argument and Cobb shot and killed Maramba. (A family history, however, states that Maramba “was ambushed, shot and killed by an American collaborator with the Japanese.” It further claimed that went on to claim that his adopted daughter Lola Luz, an active guerrilla, chased down and killed the gunman with her pistol.) The Cobbs tried to recruit the seventy-five armed Philippine Constabulary members assigned to Maramba’s executive officer, Captain Pedro Manigque. U.S. Army intelligence reported: “Manigque is reported to be a weak character, congenial but not intelligent, and not respected by his men; he printed money in an effort to hold the loyalty of his men, but was not able to check their abuse of civilian rights and commandeering of civilian goods.” Manigque resisted incorporation by the Cobbs brothers.

Second Lieutenant Baldmero R. Garcia, a cousin of Lieutenant Colonel Garcia of Peralta’s command, had hid on the west coast of Palawan until February 1943 when he

1808 Ibid., 50.
1809 Willis and Myers, 92.
1811 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 64.
went to Caramay and joined Manigque as his executive officer. When Peralta officially recognized Manigque as commander in Palawan in early June, the more aspiring Garcia assembled their men and won their vote to take command. Garcia then charged Manigque with misuse of funds. In July he promoted himself to First Lieutenant in command of Palawan and went to Panay to seek Peralta’s blessing. Manigque held on to his command until Peralta formed the Special Battalion in October with Garcia as its executive officer. Manigque refused to work with Garcia or acknowledge the legitimacy of the new battalion and fought against it. Garcia’s assumed command, captured Manigque in January 1944, and imprisoned him until the end of the war.

Peralta’s interference extended to southern Luzon. Governor Escudero, who had built the most powerful guerrilla force in Sorsogon province after separating from Lapus, had considered joining Straughn’s FAIT as a colonel but fell ill in March and moved to Samar to recover. Lapus then got Merritt to drive Escudero off Samar. In June, Escudero sent his son Antonio with three hundred armed men to Panay to see Peralta. They asked for permission to organize all of Bicol. Here was an opportunity sought by Peralta. He offered to recognize anyone who could unite the 5th Military District of southern Luzon. Failing to get immediate recognition from Peralta, Escudero played his own hand. In July, he announced his promotion to colonel and appointment as commander in Bicol by authority of Straughn and warned all others – i.e. Peralta – that he would not tolerate interference in his area of operations.

On Negros Siquijor, Major Benito Cunanan with his two battalions of guerrillas confronted the last of several attempted Japanese landings in June. The transports tried to land at Larena, but a captured mine placed in the channel by Cunanan sank one of the
vessels, drowning a number of enemy soldiers. Other troops, however, finally got ashore and dispersed the guerrillas. That was when Captain Luis Morgan arrived from Mindanao to upset Cunanan’s status as commander of the 4th Provisional Battalion under Ausejo’s 75th Regiment. Unaware that Morgan lacked authority, Cunanan accepted his offer to take command of the 8th Military District of Cebu and Bohol. Cunanan left Second Lieutenant Eduardo Cornella in command of what became M Company, 75th Regiment, 73rd Division, and went to Cebu to assume command. After much confusion, Cunanan left Cebu in July to assume duties as the headquarters commandant for SWPA’s newly established the 7th Military District under Abcede.

The situation on Cebu had been confusing enough without Cunanan. Harry Fenton and James Cushing had built a well-organized force of about 9,000 men, half of them armed, with plentiful supplies supported by another 3,000 civilian volunteers. Citizens even produced ammunition in local towns. The guerrillas had access to ship full of food meant for Corregidor that had been kept at Cebu to avoid the Japanese blockade. Yet 1943 had been rough for the Cebu guerrillas.

Cushing was suffering severe malaria when the Japanese launched a campaign in Cebu in March. Fenton, exhausted by nervous strain, suspended all guerrilla operations. The local population became uneasy with Fenton’s decisions and his growing reputation for executions. When other guerrilla leaders visited, Fenton refused to meet with them and broke off further contact. Moreover, he absolutely refused to print money and pay his men. By June, food had become scarce throughout Cebu, aggravated by currency shortages. Guerrillas left the field to head back to their homes. While Cushing left for

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1812 On 23 June, Fertig wrote in his diary, “Little discourse with Morgan concerning his use of the rank of Colonel and issuance of orders to Cunanan of Siquijor.” Fertig Diary, 23 June 1943.
Negros to recuperate, Fenton chased off Roy Bell. Cushing opposed Fenton’s monetary policy, his enforced isolation from other guerrillas, and his overt distrust of popular Governor Hilario Abellana who escaped Japanese imprisonment in July to carry on free government against puppet governor Jose Delgado. A SWPA study later noted: “Fenton was becoming more eccentric, his killings became more wanton, the lack of pay for his men and the constant Japanese raids caused further disaffection, and many men began to leave for other islands.”

Fenton and Cushing were on a collision course.

On Jolo, the Japanese suddenly reinforced their small Japanese garrison that had been confined to Jolo Town by the island’s guerrillas. The larger force charged out to attack the guerrillas with air and seas support and “literally destroyed organized guerrillas activity on Jolo.”

Luzon, D572/R-477

After mopping up Luzon Island with the 16th Division, the 65th Brigade and the Nagano Detachment, the Japanese Fourteenth Army continued pacification operations against guerrillas with combat support units. Peace and security remained elusive. At the end of July, the Japanese high command issued a new directive: “The Outline of the Plan for Subjugative [sic] Operations in the Philippines.” Maneuvers to end the resistance would begin in the Visayan Area, termed by the high command as “the worst in the maintenance of peace and order.” The plan aimed to secure all political centers,

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1813 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 36.
1814 Ibid., 102.
1815 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 309.
1816 Ibid., 8.
resources areas, and areas of strategic and tactical importance by the end of 1943.\(^{1817}\) It identified the means as: “1) Direct subjugative operations by the Army; 2) Advance in stability through the spreading of policies of the military administrative organs; 3) Pacification work through propaganda and information; 4) Work through the Philippine government organs.”\(^{1818}\) The order called for “The breaking up of guerrillas bases, the destruction of enemy radio apparatus and extermination of enemy submarine bases will be carried out in the subjective operation.”\(^{1819}\) Finally, the order noted, “Special attention will be given to win the heart and mind of the people.”\(^{1820}\) The timing seemed ripe.

With no signs of MacArthur’s return, anti-Japanese spirit began to weaken. Through the summer Ramsey toured the northern edge of his area and noticed, “a waning in the popular will to resist.”\(^{1821}\) He thought people were beginning to believe the Japanese occupation was becoming “irrevocable” and were demoralized by the damages wreaked on the economy. Ramsey and Lapham agreed something had to be done. “Our Maoist model of organization was proving inadequate,” Ramsey observed, “The Huks reinforced theirs with deceit, intimidation, and terror, thus keeping it vital through fear, but to us such tactics were alien and abhorrent.”\(^{1822}\)

Fourteenth Army’s “The Outline of the Plan for Subjugative Operations in the Philippines” identified specific reasons for Filipino resistance: “The population gradually turned against the Army, because of the shortage of goods, the inflation of money, and above all, the stringency of food, clothing and housing facilities. Hence, the hold on

\(^{1817}\) Ibid.
\(^{1818}\) Ibid., 9.
\(^{1819}\) Ibid.
\(^{1820}\) Ibid., 8.
\(^{1821}\) Ramsey and Rivele, 174.
\(^{1822}\) Ibid.
public opinion, which had been most carefully guided by the Army, was not easy to maintain.”

This assessment was true as far as it went, but it did not go far enough. It failed to recognize Japanese policies and actions that caused these problems and the tactics of occupation that exacerbated resentment. The report ranked the worst places in the Islands in terms of peace and order: Panay, Cebu, Bohol, and Negros. “There were enemy radios in several localities,” it noted, “but the radio on Samar Island was the most active of all.”

More damaging to law and order than the radios and submarine activities on Mindanao, it said, were the “constant rampancy” of the Moros.

No matter the causes of resistance, guerrilla action proved most damaging to Japanese interests. By 2 July, the Taiheiyo Kogyo Company was producing 6,000 tons of high-grade manganese at the mines in Bani, Camarines Sur in southern Luzon, but guerrilla intimidation prevented the recruitment of enough longshoreman to move the ore.

Elsewhere, the Japanese army still held about 40,000 Filipino POWs. The solution seemed obvious. The head of Taiheiyo in the Philippines, Namikawa Eijiro, petitioned the JMA for the use of the Filipino POWs captured at Bataan. The next day the JMA decreed that Filipino POWs could request work at a mine in Bohol managed by Nihon Kogyo. The JMA also allowed Taiheiyo engineer Ikeda Yoichiro to take one hundred and fifty POWs from the camp at Cabanatuan in Neuva Ecija. The POWs would finish loading the ore in Bani on 29 August and would then be released to their homes in Samar, Leyte, Bohol and Manila. The JMA asked the military to grant a P4,000 payment to the POWs who satisfactorily completed their work at the Bohol mine.

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1823 Monograph No. 1, Japanese Monographs, 10.
1824 Ibid., 11.
1825 Setsuho, 153.
In Northern Luzon in the Benguet province, the Mitsui Mining Company had managed to increase production of copper ore at the Mankayan Copper Mine from roughly 800 tons per day in January to a peak of 1,500 tons per day in June.\textsuperscript{1826} By August the mine would have between 4,600 and 5,500 workers and a company town population of 10,000.\textsuperscript{1827} The successful recruitment reflected management’s use of financial and material incentives, the dedicated support of military and Kempeitai security forces, and a coercive retention policy. By September however, a growing shortage of transportation – only 52 of the mine’s 402 vehicles were operating – created a backlog of 3,400 tons. The JMA ordered fifty vehicles from their motor pool and fifty from the military sent to transport the stockpile. It also directed spare parts from the military and Toyota Motor Industries sent there, authorized the use of lower grade lubricating oil, and directed that “Filipino employees will be trained in the use of the vehicles more carefully and efficiently.”\textsuperscript{1828} However, Lieutenant Bado Dangwa led a more intense and active guerrilla campaign to counter operations at the mine.

The Japanese still hoped religion could pacify the Filipinos. Sometime between May and October the JMA finalized “Policy Towards Philippine Roman Catholicism,” a forty-six-page policy statement. It set out a six-point strategy: (1) replace Archbishop O’Doherty with either Bishop Guerrero of Manila or Archbishop Reyes of Cebu; (2) replace all Caucasian priests with Filipinos; (3) obtain sales or leases of Church property for government interests of tenant farmers; (4) gain government control of all private school curriculum; (5) use an ongoing tenant uprising at the Church-owned Buena Vista estate as leverage to obtain goals; and (6), take all clergy and missionaries from enemy

\textsuperscript{1826} Ibid., 141-143.
\textsuperscript{1827} Ibid., 150.
\textsuperscript{1828} Ibid., 142.
foreign countries to Japan for incarceration as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{1829} Bishop Taguchi opposed any government interference with religious education, and the JMA prepared to compromise on this one issue if the Vatican would approve the removal of O’Doherty and the Caucasian priests. Still, it took until 6 January 1944 for the JMA to finalize a communiqué to send to the Vatican concerning O’Doherty. Two days later Laurel sent a letter to Pope Pius XII requesting the appointment of Filipinos to the hierarchy of the Church in the Philippines. The subsequent sensitive negotiations proved too time consuming to aid the Japanese pacification program, but they would have real and lasting results on reforming the Church in the Philippines after the war.

A plan for reorganizing the Philippine textile industry formed another promising but futile JMA project.\textsuperscript{1830} The Japanese put forth a proposal to import 120,000 spindles and 4,800 looms to add to the 20,000 spindles already in use in the National Development Corporation Textile Mills. As their name suggested, the textile mills were the product of a number of state agencies led by the Central Bank of the Philippines – and they were deeply entangled in corruption and favoritism.\textsuperscript{1831} The JMA had some 50,000 spindles and 1,800 looms sent from Japan and installed as part of a planned venture with Daiwa Boseki Company. Yet the Filipino elites in government resisted any interference in their businesses and used shortages in fuel, transformers, available space, and building materials to preclude any further expansion of the mills. When the JMA ended in October, so did the mills expansion enterprise.

\textsuperscript{1829} Takefumi, 235.
\textsuperscript{1830} Yoshiko, 188-191.
\textsuperscript{1831} Corruption and favoritism would remain part of the NDC Textile Mills operations long after the war. See Cheng-Tian Kou, \textit{Global Competitiveness and Industrial Growth in Taiwan and the Philippines} (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 115-116.
By this time rises in commodities prices threatened to undermine all other JMA efforts to win support from the Filipinos. On 15 July, it responded by issuing Military Ordinance No. 15 to control prices of prime commodities including cotton and cloth, matches, salt, tobacco, lard, soap, and paper. The JMA followed with Administrative Ordinance No. 10 that created the Philippine Prime Commodities Distribution Control Association (PRIMCO), which rationed commodities to prevent hoarding and sales on the black market. Each person registered with a neighborhood association received a yearly ration ticket with points for prime commodities. The Japanese military received half the total amount of textile commodities allocated to the private sector and corporations, even though there were twenty-five Filipinos for each Japanese soldier in the Islands (16 million Filipinos to 630,000 Japanese troops).

Even after nineteen months of occupation, the Japanese government still hoped that appeals to Asian identity could overcome resentment caused by hardships associated with the war. In July, it sponsored the Greater East Asian War Inquiry Commission filled by diplomats, businessmen, politicians and academics. The Commission issued a report (in English) “to expose the outrageous words and actions of the enemy nations, words and actions which violate all the principles of justice and humanity.” The report cast the war as a “counteroffensive of the Oriental races against Occidental aggression” marked the nefarious plans of the United Kingdom and the United States to deny Japanese power. The JMA disseminated the report across the Philippines.

The Fourteenth Army also renewed anti-guerrilla campaigns across the Islands, but believed it lacked the numbers required to do the job successfully. Army planners

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1832 Yoshiko, 192-194.
1833 Ibid., 193.
1834 Dower, 59.
later determined that the “subjugative operations” from July onward failed to offset the impact of constantly falling standard of living that turned public sentiment against them. “Therefore,” they reported, “due to the lack of military strength, suppressive activities were unsuccessful.”

Meanwhile, the guerrillas continued to operate. As Volckmann and Blackburn began to pick up the pieces of their scattered command, they traveled at night on foot, in shorts, straw hat, and shoes, to contact the guerrilla units across north Luzon. “After a few minutes on the trail one became soaking wet, either from the rain or perspiration. The bloodsucking leaches in the Ifugao area were very thick, and at every rest stop we shaved them from our legs with our bolos. On arriving at our destination, we bathed in cold water, being careful to remove all the leaches we had picked up, and then put on dry clothes,” Volckmann recalled, “From sad experience in the past, we were now always careful to suspend our shoes from a rafter to dry. Once I forgot to do this, but remembered them just as I was about to drop off to sleep. I startled everyone in the camp by jumping up and yelling, “My shoes!” I was too late; the rats had already eaten holes in the leather, leaving me a half-day repair job!”

To their south the leaders of Marking’s Guerrillas suffered as Japanese troops pursued them through Rizal, to Laguna, and to Mount Banashaw. Panlilio endured chest and stomach pains. “There was so much pain in me that I no longer felt hunger pains. …I was ready to die.” Finally she collapsed and had to be carried on a sling between bamboo poles as their band marched on, one step ahead of their pursuers.

1835 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 11.
1836 Volckmann, 121-122.
1837 Panlilio, 116.
Major Ralph Praeger, who was among the first to fight the Japanese with his Troop C of the 26th Cavalry, continued to fight at the head of his guerrilla unit in the in Ilocos Sur area. His close compatriot was former Cagayan Province governor Marcello Adduru. In June 1943 Adduru turned himself over to the Japanese as part of a spy plot. Appearing to turn collaborator, Adduru obtained a position with the Japanese in Manila from which he sent intelligence back to the guerrillas. Lieutenant Bonito Bulan took over Adduru’s guerrilla band and moved it to Isabela.

Luzon continued to tempt Peralta. He identified Masbate as the key to get to the big island. In July, he sent Major Vincente A. Tansiongo to take command in Masbate. Two months later Peralta sent a composite company of one hundred and thirty men under Captain Leon Gamboa to southwest Masbate. Through November, Tansiongo would reorganize the native Masbate guerrillas and used them to grow Gamboa’s unit into a battalion of three companies.

In Manila in August an incident occurred that reminded the Japanese of work to do. Movie director Abe Yutaka was shooting a bi-budget picture, *The Dawn of Freedom*, using the ‘liberation’ of the Philippines to rally support for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. General Kuroda, who was having an affair with an actress in the movie, supported the production and arranged for “thousands of American POWs to be trucked into Manila so they could suffer the humiliation of reenacting for the cameras their defeat of 18 months earlier.”

Even more thousands of Manileños staged an impromptu celebration at the sight of the Americans, screaming and rushing to touch the POWs, leading to many arrests and beatings.

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1838 Connaughton, et al., 60.
In July, the Japanese reoccupied Misamis Occidental and the Zamboanga north coast and put Fertig and his headquarters on the run. “My soldiers run off with the greatest of ease,” he wrote, “May they resist when necessary.” Captain Jose Naranjo heroically made a rearguard stand and helped to keep the scattered force from disintegrating. Fertig reestablished his base at Lanao. Thinking the Japanese were concentrating against him he complained of “brutal headaches” and rationalized, “It is only natural, I suppose, to place yourself in the position that you are No. 1 in the eyes of the enemy, and that their sole interest is to trap the leader.”

Chick Parsons had arrived at Fertig’s headquarters on 30 May with three officers who had survived the Bataan Death March and escaped the Davao Penal Colony: Navy Lieutenant Commander Melvin McCoy, Army intelligence officer Major Stephen Mellnik, and former MacArthur staffer Army Lieutenant Colonel William. “They are a bit stir crazy,” observed the 10th MD commander, “and apparently determined to continue on south.” Fertig then surprised Parsons by presenting Chick’s brother-in-law, Captain Tommy Jurika who had escaped a Japanese prison.

The Davao escapees informed Fertig of the fate of his friend Roy Gilbert. He had failed in an attempt to escape from Cabanatuan. “He was tied up to post at the entrance to camp and brutally beaten for three days then shot,” Fertig recalled, “The Japanese treatment is designed to eliminate all prisoners. Food is kept scarce and prisoners are

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1839 Fertig Diary, 3 July 1943.
1840 Ibid.
1842 Fertig Diary, 30 May 1943.
beaten if they steal of try to smuggle it into camp. At Cabanatuan diphtheria broke out in camp. There was ample antitoxins in the hospital but an American could not get permission to go to hospital." On top of exhaustion, sickness, and malnutrition, the weight of such events had to take a toll on the guerrillas.

Mellnik and McCoy met with Fertig and asked for transportation for ten to Australia. Fertig tepidly said he would ask to SWPA and await instructions. McCoy remembered, “I didn’t expect him to fall over us, but he was downright hostile! Is he afraid we’ll debunk his phony rank? Why the brush-off on our request to wire MacArthur? Fear that GHQ might learn about people like McClish and Bowler? Maybe the poor guy has more than he can handle! He didn’t sound convincing when he said he’ll tell GHQ about us; We’d be wise to check on him.” Joined by Ed Dyess, ten days later the three again confronted Fertig who told them his transmitter had been down. On 18 June, they got SWPA’s reply: a submarine scheduled to arrive between 15 and 25 July to pick up Parsons would also take McCoy, Mellnik and Dyess. G-2 noted: “They were brought out at the specific direction of General MacArthur to obtain information on the treatment of American prisoners of war in Japanese hands.” After a harrowing hike, the haggard men barely dodged a pursuing Japanese patrol before linking up with the SS-202 Trout southeast of Olutanga Island for the trip to Brisbane.

On 8 July, SWPA relieved Villamor of his temporary command in Negros and appointed Abcede as commander of 7th Military District. He called a conference for

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1843 Mellnik, 263.
1844 Ibid.
1845 Intelligence Activities, 93.
September to get agreement on organization, operations, and command. Gador not only refused to attend but also threatened to disrupt Ausejo’s organization, intelligence collection and communications with Cebu. Gador eventually left for Bohol and reported to a guerrilla unit commanded by his former subordinate, Major Isamael P. Inginiero. In October, he received a letter from SWPA directing him to relay reports through Abecede’s 7th Military District radio. This implied subordination. Gador chose instead to send his reports directly to SPWA and explained that “he had come to Bohol after receiving a SWPA letter on Negros and that he was awaiting further instructions.” SWPA sent no reply. Gador would virtually disappear after a powerful Japanese landing on Bohol in June 1944.

On Negros, the Japanese stepped up raids on the south coast from Dumaguete to Sipalay, attacked food production areas of central Negros Occidental and Oriental, and conducted a terror campaign in the north. The combination nearly collapsed the guerrillas. SWPA noted: “[Abcede] has been well aware of the limitations of his own organization, and has admitted realistically that the Japanese can do anything they want to on Negros. He has therefore conserved his forces and has sought to maintain the proper balance between a sufficient amount of action to keep up morale of officers, men and loyal civilians, and over-aggressiveness which might invite strong retaliatory measures.” Abcede dispersed his men and supplies, established early warning systems, and practiced higher levels of secrecy. He developed highly productive intelligence networks and managed to recover a number of downed pilots. An evacuation of American civilians left Negros with an entirely Philippine guerrilla organization.

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1846 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 72.
1847 Ibid., 77.
Reports from Negros indicated: “Politics are rife and many of the officers are not above appropriation of army supplies for their own purchase and aggrandizement of their positions for after the war.”\textsuperscript{1848}

The attacks on Negros were part of larger Japanese campaign across the Vasayans. The Japanese also suddenly advanced into central Panay from southern Iloilo. This drive reached the guerrilla district headquarters Sara in the northwest by September, capturing and destroying significant vital stocks of guerrilla supplies.

On its ninth war patrol, SS-202 \textit{Thresher} under Lieutenant Commander Harry Hull sank a tanker and scored hits on a transport in the Makassar Strait on the night of 30 June, and then engaged another tanker of Celebes five days later. On the night of 9 July \textit{Thresher} delivered 500 pounds of supplies and 50,000 rounds of .30 and .45 caliber ammunition at Catamon Point on Negros, before departing for Pearl Harbor. Hull also delivered the promised representative from Quezon, Agent “Gatbiala” wearing a uniform and major’s rank. Villamor recognized him as surgeon Dr. Emigdio Cruz, the President’s personal physician. The good doctor had accepted the incredible mission of going to Manila and somehow meet with Roxas, Rafael Alunan, Jose Yulo, Sr and any others he could find. Quezon had told him, “Cruz, this is a very tough job. Personally, I believe you have no chance to get through. With your connection to President Quezon, you have become very well known.”\textsuperscript{1849} The AIB had nothing to do with planning this mission, but Whitney and MacArthur approved it. Cruz assumed a new alias, Major Suylan. Though Villamor strenuously objected to the mission, Quezon insisted. Villamor dutifully arranged agents to get Cruz to his destination.

“Once in Manila he would try to determine if Vargas and his associates had really been won over [by] the Japanese,” Villamor recalled, “Had they lost hope that America would ever redeem them? Did they believe that Japan would win? Had the people

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{1848} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{1849} Villamor, 149.
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become pro-Japanese?” Cruz would also try to explain to his targets Quezon’s departure and the delay in America’s return. “Tell Vargas,” Quezon had told him in Washington, “and tell all those whom you can safely see and talk to, that I give them my word Japan will lose this war. I know it. I have seen the almost infinite resources of America, and its enormous war production. The whole thing staggers the imagination. It is only a matter of time. Tell them to keep faith with America. Tell them that General MacArthur has sworn to return to Manila in triumph.”

On 12 July, the Japanese launched another large attack across southern Negros behind a bombardment that lasted for five days. Fertig tried to find out what was happening on the island and complained: “Villamor gave WSK orders to send us no information except naval movements, and to relay our stuff south. Result we know nothing about changes in enemy status in Negros.”

Manila, D580/R-469

From 30 June to 12 July, Tojo made a second tour of Japan’s southeast conquests. On 10 July, he returned to Manila with the chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs Satō Kenryō, the vice minister in the Ministry of Greater East Asian Affairs, and chief of the Bureau of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yamamoto Kumaichi. The orchestrated throngs that greeted him a year earlier failed to materialize. “What is this?” he asked his official reception committee, “This is quite a change from the last time I was here.” Fourteenth Army Chief of Staff General Wachi answered: “Perhaps it is

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1850 Ibid., 154.
1851 Villamor, 155.
1852 Fertig Diary, 12 July 1943.
because it is too warm.” The Japanese Prime Minister met with Laurel and the Philippine Independence Preparatory Committee in the Manila Hotel. After expressing his hopes for Philippine independence and cooperation, Tojo suggested that the Philippines enter a military alliance with Japan to wage war against the United States. The Filipinos appeared cool to the suggestion.

Visayas, D597/R-452

In late July, the SS-209 Grayling under Lieutenant Commander Robert M. Brinker, began its eighth war patrol. On the last day of the month the boat delivered a team of agents under Lieutenant Ireneo Ames with equipment and supplies for Peralta at Pucio Point, Panay. SWPA G-2 explained, “This shipment was intended mainly as a token of material support for the Panay guerrillas.” On 23 August, under Skipper Lieutenant Commander E. Olsen, Grayling would deliver two more tons of supplies to guerrillas at Pandan Bay, Panay. Four days later, the submarine would torpedo and sink a Japanese transport, Meizan Maru, west of Mindoro. Grayling, however, would never return from this mission.

The situation between Fertig and Morgan was getting worse. On 27 July, Fertig wrote: “Morgan apparently thought that I would be going to Australia and had left Bowler in command. He would then take over. His latent anti-American jealousy came to the surface in his drunken speeches. I think it is a bluff as long as I am here but you never

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1854 Ibid., 384.
1856 Intelligence Activities, 21.
know.” The next day he intercepted a telegram from Morgan to Captain Sanguila reading: “I sent my resignation as chief today, advise Maj Busran – Morgan,” leading Fertig to comment, “I did not consider him that dumb.” The next day Morgan officially resigned from Fertig’s command. Morgan began issuing orders signed “General of the Fighting Guerrilla,” “C.O. of the Guerrillas,” and as Fertig’s Chief of Staff. Fertig sent a letter accepting Morgan’s resignation on 30 July. Finally, on 4 August, Fertig received a courier from Misamis Occidental announcing that Morgan was going to assume command of Mindanao and Sulu. Fertig wrote, “Personal opinion is that it is a trial ballon [sic] to test my reaction.”

On 3 August, Villamor sent a situation report to MacArthur: “Morale effectively undermined by threats, force propaganda, misunderstanding between friendly units and between army and civilians, sickness, activities of some puppets and the supposed kindness of Nips to ‘misguided element.’ If not immediately and effectively counteracted all semblance of resistance here will soon disappear.”

As he neared departure, Villamor more openly expressed his frustrations. Feeling ignored by MacArthur, he dreamt of liberating his homeland. He sent SWPA a proposal to gather six of his old Filipino pilots, return to Australia, and lead a bombing raid on Tokyo. The request went nowhere. On 15 August Villamor wrote Quezon:

“Now, more than ever, the people are in dire need of your guidance and counsel. I assure you that they have not forgotten you. Nor have they

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1858 Fertig Diary, 27 July 1943.
1859 Ibid., 28 July 1943.
1860 Ibid., 31 July 1943.
1861 Ibid., 4 August 1943.
1862 Villamor, 178.
1863 Villamor, 179.
lost faith in you or our General MacArthur. Neither have they lost faith in America or that victory shall ultimately be ours. However during these most trying times when as you say we are before the bar of public opinion to test our capacity as a race for self-government and the issue definitely rests in the mind and heart and soul of each individual among us, we find ourselves so besieged by the enemy that even this very air we breathe carries with it along with the enemy’s perfidious lies the stench of bodies torn and mutilated for their unflinching belief in the cause so many others have already died for. If you only see us now you will see that our hearts are broken, our souls torn between love of liberty and love of dear ones who are dying for lack of medicines, food and shelter, and our minds confused by enemy propaganda and the enormous uncertainties of our daily lives. But with all that we aim to carry on till no human can do any more. Please tell America that over here we do not pray for victory, for victory is sure to come. Rather we pray that God may speed the day of their coming which shall also be our day of liberation from the tyrannical heels of the warlords of Japan.”

Luzon, D606/R-443

Two days later the Manila Tribune printed Laurel’s first interview as Chairman of the Preparatory Committee on Philippine Independence. He told Japanese and Filipino newsmen of his plans to deal with the guerrillas: “The constabulary will be reorganized

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1864 Ibid., 180-181.
and strengthened to compel obedience of unruly elements. The force will be increased as needed to maintain order. If necessary, the Nippon forces will be requested to extend assistance during the transition period.\textsuperscript{1865} The Japanese spent August conducting zoning operations in and around Manila.

In central Luzon, Colonel Hugh Straughn had built his Fil-American Irregular Troops (FAIT) into a robust if loose guerrilla command. He had four brigades under Colonels Marcos Agustin (Marking), Emilio Acosta, Manuel T. Dikit, and Dionisio Banting, Jr. in the Bulacan-Rizal-Manila area, Batangas, Tayabas and Bicol respectively. Near Christmas of 1942, Marking left the organization. On 5 August, the jungle telegraph reported that the Japanese captured Straughn. Villamor saw Straughn’s picture in the \textit{Rabuang Arudela} and heard him on the radio denouncing the guerrillas as “trouble-makers and racketeers.”\textsuperscript{1866} Fertig reported: “Tokyo radio is playing up the capture as that of the guerrilla leader of the Philippines. Jap like he was quoted ‘I wish I could advise all my followers now hiding in the mountains to surrender.’”\textsuperscript{1867}

One month later the Visayan newspaper Shimbung printed an article, “Guerrilla Activities in P.I Futile,” that quoted Straughn: “I organized a guerrilla band known as the Filipino American Irregular Troops which was nothing but a make believe organization and materially composed of bandits, outlaws and other dissatisfied elements without effective arms or weapons.”\textsuperscript{1868} Straughn continued: “The ‘Marking Guerrilla’ was either annihilated by the Japanese punitive expeditions or dissolved through voluntary desertions. The group became so small since March 1943 that it had to be

\textsuperscript{1865} Abaya, 35.
\textsuperscript{1866} Villamor, 181-182. Villamor is also the only source to identify 5 August as the date of Straughn’s capture.
\textsuperscript{1867} Fertig Diary, 7 August 1943.
\textsuperscript{1868} Mateo, 80-81.
formally disbanded on May 1943.”\textsuperscript{1869} It is possible Straughn chose his words in hopes of saving his former guerrillas from attack.

Rumors circulated that Straughn was a victim of betrayal by Marking’s Guerrillas. Yay Panlilio countered that when Marking heard of Straughn’s capture he wept openly and said, “I told him that peninsula was a pocket! I told him to come with us. I told him to get farther back. I told all of them. Why didn’t they listen?”\textsuperscript{1870} Panlilio admitted that she did not like Straughn.

Most of Straughn’s units went their own way under their leaders. About four hundred poorly armed FAIT men in the mountains near Antipolo, Rizal, remained under “Col. Elliot P. Ellsworth” (reportedly General Vincente Lim) in Manila, until the Japanese captured Lim. The Japanese later executed both ’Straughn and Lim. Nearby the Hunters in Cavite ignored the orders to concentrate on intelligence and instead continued to fight within itself and with rivals like Marking’s guerrillas, “but especially against the Japanese.”\textsuperscript{1871} The President Quezon’s Own Guerrillas (PQOG) became an independent group in Batangas. By May 1944, Hunters and Marking’s absorbed the remaining FAIT who had been under Ellsworth.

The Japanese success against the guerrillas caused Filipino political leaders to recalculate their positions. On 11 August, Laurel told a group of women from the KALIBAPI: “It will take two more years to put down Germany; it will take another three years to beat Japan, that is five years. In the meantime, we must keep peace and order to forestall pestilence and famine. We must liquidate all guerillas.”\textsuperscript{1872} Whether he truly

\textsuperscript{1869} Ibid..  
\textsuperscript{1870} Panlilio, 133.  
\textsuperscript{1871} Lapham and Norling, 92.  
\textsuperscript{1872} Abaya, 37.
believed this or was telling the pro-Japanese audience what it wanted to hear remains an open question.

Worried about Mindanao, the JMA organized intense media coverage of a tour of Manila by twenty-six Lanao Moros led by Domocao Alonto. On a stop at JMA headquarters, newsmen reported that the group agreed to cooperate with the Japanese.\footnote{1873 Midori, 113.} After the tour, the administration in Manila sent Alonto to replace Rival as governor of Lanao Province.

For the administration, food was becoming a critical concern. Japanese policies across the their occupied territories had deleterious effects on agricultural supplies. “Burma, Malaya, and indo-China together represented the world’s largest rice-exporting area, but mismanagement of the rice trade led to a dramatic decline in production which combined with ruthless requisitioning of supplies to create a widespread hunger and, in Burma and Indo-China, famine,” Lizzie Collingham wrote, “As the Malayan schoolteacher Chin Kee Onn commented, ‘the much-publicized and rosily-painted ‘New Order’ turned out to be the ‘New Disorder’ and what was proclaimed to be the ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ was actually the ‘Co-poverty Fear.’”\footnote{1874 Collingham, 230.} With Filipinos making similar derogatory observations, food shortages endangered Japanese control.

By August, NARIC held only enough rice to feed Manila for one month.\footnote{1875 Jose, “The Rice Shortage,” 207.} With a new planting season at hand, Japanese plans for the agricultural economy were clearly in trouble.\footnote{1876 Ibid., 197.} Unfavorable weather, poor soil conditions and pests combined to devastate \textit{Hortai} rice and cotton cultivation. Price controls on foodstuffs failed; market prices rose
Despite government enforcement efforts, the cost of rice remained somewhat stable only around Manila and the price of meat spiked everywhere. Attempts to compensate for shortages by increasing the slaughter of animals reduced the number available for agricultural work.

The Japanese military’s tight control of transportation and fuel hampered all other sectors of the economy. The wider war exacerbated the Japan’s problems in the Philippines. Fourteenth Army lost the 122nd Regiment (two battalions of the former 65th Brigade) to the Central Pacific. It still maintained 22 to 23 infantry battalions throughout 1943 only by creating garrison units from second and third tier troops.\(^{1877}\) Late in the year Independent Garrisons reorganized to create three Independent Mixed Brigades, including the 30th Mixed Brigade in Mindanao and the 31st in the Visayas, built around a nucleus of six infantry battalions. Reinforcements from levies brought the total number of Independent Mixed Brigades to four in early 1944.\(^{1878}\)

In August, Mona Snyder met with Manuel Roxas in his Manila home. Learning of her guerrilla contacts, he asked her to serve as a liaison between him and Ramsey.\(^{1879}\) She passed a report from Roxas indicating that Luzon had become the main reserve area for Japan’s Southwest Pacific Army and contained 50,000 soldiers. The next month Mona informed Ramsey that the new Republic would declare war on the United States. Ramsey dispatched runners south to both Peralta and Fertig to get this important news to MacArthur.

Ramsey met with Lapham and transferred to him Captain Al Hendrickson, a tough Montanan and prewar private in the Signal Corps. “He was brusque, short-

\(^{1877}\) Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 39.

\(^{1878}\) Ibid.

\(^{1879}\) Ramsey and Rivele, 176.
tempered, and not one to refuse a drink or three,” noted Lapham.\textsuperscript{1880} Hendrickson inherited Captain Criscenzio Hipolito as his intelligence officer, Captain Ramos in command of Squadron 401 in western Tarlac, and Captain Diosdado Aganon commanded the Squadron 403. Hendrickson’s new commander sent him to the Tarlac Military Area as district commander. Tarlac was Huk territory.

Meanwhile Bernard Anderson sent two envoys, an American named Schaffer and Bim Manzano, to Marking to arrange a meeting. Panlilio described the pairing of Marking and Anderson as “gunpowder and matchstick.”\textsuperscript{1881} Anderson wanted cooperation. Marking suspected that now that he claimed 200,000 organized men and women, the American army officer wanted to take his command. Anderson offered recognition. “Bullshit, recognition!” Marking told him, “I don’t need to be authorized to fight for my country, I guess! Are my fighters paid heroes that they can’t fight just for nothing? I guess even MacArthur won’t tell me I’m doing the wrong thing! I guess even a bus driver can fight for his country – get the idea? And I was the best driver on the line too. I guess I can run my outfit right! Nobody has to give me permission to fight. I’d like to see anybody stop me!”\textsuperscript{1882} Anderson answered, “Recognition means bullets.”\textsuperscript{1883} Influenced by Panlilio, Marking finally agreed to take orders from MacArthur, but only MacArthur. Anderson taught Panlilio Army procedures for accounting, communication, policies, etc.

Anderson wanted to rally all the USAFFE soldiers in hiding. Panlilio recalled, “Marking and I agreed that it would take an American to pull the local Americans out of

\textsuperscript{1880} Lapham and Norling, 62.
\textsuperscript{1881} Panlilio, 153.
\textsuperscript{1882} Ibid., 155.
\textsuperscript{1883} Ibid., 156.
the rut – one who knew his own people, and one from whom they could take orders without loss of pride. Andy was it, we said.”

Anderson and his officers began canvassing Marking’s area. Very quickly many Americans secreted in kaingin hideouts across the countryside started working as couriers for Anderson. “They were Americans again, doing important work,” Panlilio wrote, “where in humiliation they had been mean, surly, ugly, all of a sudden in restored importance there was humility and friendliness – and gratitude. The only difference between them and Andy his men was that they were restored, and his men had to be.”

Anderson sent Lieutenant Russell Barros to deliver a message to Lapus in Bicol.

Southern Luzon, D606, R-443

In southern Luzon near Sorgoson, Major Licerio Lapus had survived combat with the Japanese, conflict with Escudero, and defections among subordinates. With backing from Peralta, he yielded to pressure and united his 54th Regiment with Sandico’s guerrillas to form the 56th Regiment. Sandico reported to SWPA that he had been offered the military governorship but refused because Escudero was still governor. Escudero charged Lapus with the unlawful declaration of martial law. This ongoing conflict turned Lapus even more to the 6th MD for help. Peralta, seeking influence on Luzon, alternately encouraged Lapus, Zabat and Escudero to lead unification effort in Bicol’s 5th MD. When any of the three Bicol guerrilla leaders appealed to the 6th MD, said Willoughby,

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1884 Ibid., 159.
1885 Ibid., 160.
Peralta would respond with “attendant double talk (and) would aver it had no right to meddle in the internal affairs of the 5th MD.”

Before the end of August, however, each of the three guerrilla leaders possessed a letter from Peralta acknowledging the bearer as 5th Military District commander. In this way Peralta increased the volume of intelligence flowing through his 6th MD headquarters, but he also escalated the bloody competition among guerrillas. Finally, Anderson intervened by sending Barros to Lapus in mid-August. He found Lapus “anxious for a settlement of the causes for the conflict” but Ecudero still refused all suggestions of settlement.

The competition for Bicol undermined unity. “True, Bicol-based rivals had themselves to blame as well, for letting the siren song of Panay drive them to the rocks of disunity as their quickened personal ambition obfuscated the paramount military goal of consolidating forces,” wrote Barrameda, “But individually, Escudero, Lapus, Zabat and Sandico were no less patriotic Filipinos, no less America-loving Filipinos, no less Nippon-hating Filipinos than any Filipino in the 6th Military District. Had circumstances allowed those men a local-based radio early on like Peralta, to transmit directly to GHQ, SWPA, in Brisbane, their reports would not have been exposed to the temptation of filtering and editing by a third party with an agenda of its own.”

Mindanao, D607/R-442

On 6 August, Fertig received a proposal from Morgan, now self-proclaimed commander of Mindanao-Sulu Force, to meet at Kolambogan. Fertig thought him “nuts”

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1886 Barrameda, 137.
1887 Ibid., 122.
1888 Ibid., 129.
and sent word that any “conference would be held at my order.”

Three days later Fertig received another letter, this one “setting forth [Morgan’s] grievances which are those of a spoiled child. He was not given the same treatment as others, etc.”

“Morgan aired his grievances to the assembled Provincial officials in Kolambagan and apparently consist largely of anti-Americanism and petty personal insults,” Fertig noted, “It boils down to his regret that he named me to command instead of assuming it himself. The conversation with Villamor and Andrews did not help the situation for they are both against me.”

The two men met on 11 August in Liangan. Morgan proposed to leave Fertig in charge of the 10th MD if Fertig acknowledged him as commander of the field forces. “I did tell him exactly what I thought of his actions,” Fertig wrote, “He has authorized the burning of all houses occupied by the Japs (of course after the Japs have departed). A tragi-comedy opera war.” Morgan left the next morning without waiting for Fertig’s response to his proposal.

Fertig approved the appointment of former U.S. Army 31st Infantry Sergeant William MacLaughlin as captain and commander of the 112th Regiment based near Sumilao. He similarly promoted a former 102nd Division quartermaster to captain in command of 111th Regiment centered near Mambuaya. Both units fell under the 109th Division. He dispersed the third battalion of the 125th Regiment on Jolo and sent many of its men to the second battalion on Siasi. A heavy Japanese assault on Siasi drove the

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1889 Fertig Diary, 6 August 1943.
1890 Ibid., 9 August 1943.
1891 Ibid., 10 August 1943.
1892 Ibid., 11 August 1943.
guerrillas to the first battalion on Tawi Tawi. Before the year’s end, more Japanese attacks pressed the first battalion near the breaking point.

On 22 August, an exhausted Fertig wrote in his diary: “Queer this war. Monday morning 8:30 P.I. time in my nip shack on a Lanao hillside looking toward Mt. Melindong across the smooth blue bay. The American program from Chungking with Diana Shore [sic] singing ‘The One I Left Behind.’ Love and happiness seem far away so does War with the pleasant air of the hillside.”  

1893 The troublesome Morgan had quit Fertig’s 10th Military District and set up his own command in Misamis Occidental, hence Villamor’s account that Morgan resigned his place with Fertig and took thirty loyal men into the jungle to fight on as loyal independent guerrillas.  

1894 To Fertig, “Morgan violated his agreement by notifying men on the other side to follow his orders until friction with me was settled. The man is crazy ‘insane’ and will make trouble eventually I fear.”  

1895 SWPA noted: “The situation threatened to become serious due to Morgan’s violent attempt at mutiny.”  

Visayas, D620/R-420

On Mindoro, Captain Esteban P. Beloncio merged his two hundred and fifty guerrillas around Lake Naujan with Ruffys Bolo Battalion and agreed to serve as Ruffy’s executive officer. As SWPA evaluated Beloncio it noted: “Some sources report that he was not well liked.”  

1897 Peralta, however, had no influence with Ruffy. Working through Jurado, Peralta would convince Beloncio to break loose from Ruffy at the end of March

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1893 Fertig Diary, 22 August 1943.  
1894 Villamor, 140.  
1895 Fertig Diary, 22 August 1943.  
1896 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 90.  
1897 Ibid., 62.
1944. The following November, Beloncio died in a fight with local guerrillas on Mindoro.

Elsewhere on the island, Alfonso Sotelo organized about 300 men on Mindoro into the Sotelo Group. The first time SWPA heard of the group was when they learned of their surrender in September 1943. In Mercado on Negros, Major Hermenegildo Mercada, an Infantry School classmate of Peralta who had joined and broken from Gador, joined the 7th Military District as commander of the 72nd Regiment (East Negros sector), 72 Division.

On Cebu, Harry Fenton faced a difficult decision. In July the Japanese had captured his wife and children and tried to use them to coerce his and Cushing’s surrender. Fenton and Cushing refused. By now, however, the two men agreed on little else. Fenton obstinately refused to pay his men, to work with other guerrillas, or to reconsider his determination to execute anyone he deemed guilty of crimes against the guerrilla cause. Cushing went to Negros in August to meet Villamor, leaving orders with his executive officer, Lieutenant Richard Estrella, to arrest Fenton.

On 19 August, Estrella convened a conference of his commanders to convince them of the need to arrest Fenton along with his loyal officers. The conference attendees agreed Fenton had crossed a line when he arrested and executed a missionary priest, Father Patrick Drumm.

James Cushing met with Villamor on Negros on 2 September. Cushing brought with him his regimental commanders: Lieutenant Colonel Olegario Baura, Captain Abel Trazo, and Captain Rogaciano Espiritu. Villamor found Cushing to be a “sacerdotal
figure” and a “mild figure of a man.”1898 He notified MacArthur: “Cushing just arrived. States that their present situation requires immediate solution else total collapse Cebu forces inevitable. Claims that majority of forces will no longer obey Fenton whose life is in danger. Believes that immediate financial aid will be of incalculable value in maintaining unity and is even more vital than command questions.” 1899 Villamor explained to Cushing SWPA’s policies but Cushing wanted authority to issue money and impose civil government.

Back in Australia, Parsons had convinced SWPA that Fenton and Cushing were out of control and refusing MacArthur’s authority Villamor sent another request to MacArthur on 17 September. “In this connection,” he explained, “it is felt that the situation is such that the SWPA cannot afford to recognize the district under the leadership of Fenton and Cushing nor give recognition to the guerrilla units until a new leadership can be arranged.”1900

Matters came to a head on 15 September when Estrella arrested Harry Fenton. While Cushing would later claim he only expected Estrella to detain Fenton, Estella immediately held a court martial that found Fenton guilty of all charges against him. He then had Fenton and several of his aides executed. Estrella then reorganized Fenton’s remaining 3,500 men.

Luzon, D622/R-427

Others also thought in terms of coups. In September, Major General Sosaku Suzuki arrived as the new commander of the Army Shipping Headquarters in Manila. He

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1898 Villamor, 196.
1899 Ibid., 196-197.
1900 Ibid., 198.
became convinced that the JMA needed to be more aggressive in purging pro-American officials from the Philippine government and advocated greater use of anti-American Moros and Ganaps. Suzuki went to the 31st Garrison Unit, commanded by the Great Asian Society board member Colonel Koreshige Inuzuka, to propose a coup. Inuzuka chafed under the Fourteenth Army policies and hired a writer named Hayase to research and advertise the Ganaps. Together they would produce a pamphlet in April 1944 lauding the Ganaps and Ramos.\textsuperscript{1901} Shortly thereafter, the Japanese high command sent Suzuki out of the country.

During this time Volckmann felt he had enough control over Thorp’s old USAFIP-NL guerrillas to begin reorganization in northern Luzon. He communicated with Romulo Enriquez in Nueva Vizacaya province, Robert Lapham in Pangasinan, Dennis Molintas northeast of Baguio, Parker Calvert northeast of Baguio, and George Barnett on the Ilocos coast. “We were still having trouble,” he wrote, “contacting any unit north of us, and contact with Praeger had been completely lost.”\textsuperscript{1902} Volckmann issued what he termed his “Lay Low Order,” directing the units to emphasize intelligence collection efforts and avoid confrontations with the Japanese. “By ordering that any member of his command who surrendered or permitted himself to be captured would be shot on sight,” Villamor noted, “Volckmann held his command intact.”\textsuperscript{1903}

Volckmann drew up a “Reorganization Plan of 1943” establishing seven geographical districts in North Luzon, one for each major subordinate commander in the USAFIP-NL. “Each district commander,” he wrote, “was directed to organize a combat regiment generally along the lines of a Philippine Army regiment, except that the three

\textsuperscript{1901} Motoe, 75-76.  
\textsuperscript{1902} Volckmann, 122.  
\textsuperscript{1903} Villamor, 183.
rifle battalions consisted of four rifle companies instead of the usual three.” He then tasked Blackburn to find and establish contact with any guerrilla units from Praeger’s outfit remaining in Benguet.

“Well, every time I would send someone north,” Blackburn commented, “the collaborators would cause their capture. They would take our man out and put him on a bamboo pole, tie his hands and feet like a pig, and take him to the town where he was ultimately executed.” In September, Blackburn sent former Philippine Scout Quiocho and Greg Swick with a company of armed men to open the line of communication to Apayao and Cagayan. They hid while traveling during the nights until, in a surprise attack, they seized “every public official, every policeman, and all of the public files” in both Kabugao and Ripang. They found letters from the Mayor of Ripang to Mountain Province Governor Hillary P. Clapp describing how they captured guerrillas including Praeger and with lists of local individuals “instrumental in this capture.” The guerrillas allowed those named to confess to Father David, a Belgian Priest, and then executed them in the city square. Later, Blackburn asked Father David if they had made any mistakes among those executed. He answered, “I won’t say that you made any mistakes, but, my son, I don’t approve of your method.” “Good enough,” replied Blackburn.

Volckmann assigned his new command areas. First District commander Parker organized his guerrillas into the 66th Infantry Regiment in Benguet. Second District went to Barnett with the 121st Infantry Regiment in the southern half of Ilocos Sur, La Union.

1904 Volckmann, 124.
1905 Blackburn Interview, 149.
1906 Ibid., 150.
1907 Ibid., 151.
1908 Ibid.
and northwest Pangasinan. Arnold took command of the 3rd District with the 15th Infantry Regiment in the northern half of Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, and Abra. The Fourth District and its 11th Infantry Regiment went to Blackburn in Cagayan and the sub-provinces of Ifugao, Bontoc, Kalinga and Apayao. The Fifth District with Nakar’s old 14th Infantry Regiment went to Major Romulo Manriquez in Neuva Vizcaya, Isbela, and northeastern Pangasinan.

“The new objectives were to get the guerrillas into camps,” recalled Blackburn, “and get them organized with the ultimate objective being to be in a position to render the maximum effectiveness in support of the Americans when they returned to the islands.”1909 Companies in the regiments included special weapons platoons to handle machine guns, mortars and any other available special weapons. Volckmann ordered all units into camps, no larger than company-sized, far from civilian populations. “This policy improved morale of both civilians and the military units, and also improved the discipline of the troops,” Volckmann observed.1910 Each district in turn was subdivided into areas required to provide guerrillas with material support like clothing, administrative supplies and money.1911

Tired of part-time guerrillas, Volckmann wanted a full-time outfit. Blackburn noted, “His philosophy was to stop being guerrillas by night and farmers by day. All that did was stir up the Japanese.”1912 The USFIP-NL guerrillas required town leaders to raise food contributions from local families. Volckmann also required his regiments to establish field hospitals of six doctors with six to fourteen nurses, a dentist, and seventy

1909 Ibid, 129.
1910 Volckmann, 124.
1911 Ibid. 127.
1912 Blackburn Interview, 129.
enlisted personnel, augmented with civilians as necessary. They had to purchase nearly all their medical supplies from Manila.

Volckmann set up his General Headquarters, USAFIP-NL with general and special staff sections along Army doctrinal lines with special emphasis on the G-5, Civilian Affairs section, with sections in every district, regiment and battalion. He required each district to gain and maintain popular support in their area. “The greatest menace to this program was not the Japanese but rather the spies, informers, and collaborators operating for them,” he wrote. Eventually he began to issue two newsletters with any good news gleaned from KGEI radio out of San Francisco. They tailored one newsletter to the needs of the guerrillas, the other to boost the morale and support of the people. Eventually Blackburn put in about 100 miles of telephone lines, powered by old hand-cranked commercial receivers retrieved from municipal buildings, solidifying Volckmann’s area command.

Once organized, Volckmann set out on a four-step campaign: “One, take stern measures against spies and informers i.e., their elimination; two, control the puppet officials; three, destroy the Japanese Bureau of Constabulary that was being put into the area; and four, gain the confidence of the people and restore their morale.”

Manila, D628/R-420

During the summer, Vargas carried P7,000,000 in Philippine occupation currency around the Islands to exchange for the emergency script authorized by Quezon and

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1913 Volckmann, 124.
1914 Ibid., 125.
1915 Guardia, American Guerilla, 110.
1916 Blackburn Interview, 167.
1917 Ibid., 129.
printed by guerrillas. He explained to Tanaka, “The possession of these [guerrilla] notes has a very great psychological effect on their holders and induces them to wish that the Government that authorized their issue should come back.” Vargas also requested that the JMA revoke the prohibition against displays of the Filipino flag. “The restoration of this flag would enhance the faith of the Filipino people in Japan and the Imperial Japanese forces and will no doubt make them eternally grateful,” said Vargas, “The very sight of this flag alone would inspire them with greater determination, not only to cooperate in the maintenance of peace and order in this country, but also to fight side by side with the Imperial Japanese Forces in the sacred mission of eradicating all Western influences from the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, including those in India and Australia.” Vargas also asked the JMA to outlaw the Sakdal or Ganap party as part of the Japanese ban on political groups other than the KALIBAPI. Laurel however challenged Vargas on this point. He sought to continue using the Sakdal, as an informer militia.

On 6 September, the KALIBAPI assembly completed and approved a draft Constitution for an ‘independent’ Philippines. The Japanese government General Affairs Bureau (Sōmukyoku) worried that following Philippine independence, all territories including India and Korea would push for independence. The grant of independence had to be managed carefully to protect Japan’s interests. Japan had compelled Burma’s leaders to declare war against the United States and Britain as a price for their independence. They sought a similar pact with the new independent Philippines. The new

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1918 Abaya, 33.
1919 Ibid., 33-34.
1920 Ibid., 35-36.
1921 Fujitani, 61.
constitution, however, included no such pact. “To that,” explained Tarling, “the activities of the guerrillas contributed, the Huks, the left-wing Chinese Hua Zhi, and above all those affiliated to the USAFFE.”  

As for an alliance against the Americans, Laurel argued, “It is not that we would refuse to sign the treaty if the Japanese forces insist on their phrases, but such a wording would hamper our policy to lead the people toward entry into the war, to which they are opposed, and it might hurt the position of the new government, and there would be danger of a split in the nation.”  

Instead he asked for a declaration of war “if feasible, as soon as possible.” When pressed by Tojo, Laurel explained “that Quezon, Osmeña and Roxas were the popular leaders in the Philippines, and not himself; that he could not carry the people, or even maintain a following, with such an unpopular measure; and it would not be ‘decent’ for the Filipinos to declare war against a benefactor.”  

By now the Japanese administration had run the Philippines for more than a year and a half. Filipinos who had once tried to ignore or coexist with the administration found their patience tried in countless ways. Most kinship networks suffered the imprisonment of at least one family member or friend. Uncertainty and fear, aggravated by the obnoxious behavior of the Japanese bureaucracy, made Filipinos angry with the occupiers and sympathetic with the resistance. The case of Adaia Marquez was one of thousands in Manila.  

On 27 August, the Japanese had arrested her husband, Philippine Civil Liberties Union leader Antonio Bautista at his law office. He had been a principal organizer of the

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1922 Tarling, 170.
1923 Goto, 91.
1924 Ibid., 90.
1925 Tarling, 170.
1926 Marquez, 22.
underground intelligence network of young urban professional Filipinos known as “the Free Philippines.” The Japanese had strong suspicions about Bautista’s activities, but no certain proof.

Adalia Marquez tried every avenue available to her to get to see her husband including pleading to a Filipina acquaintance named Linda who was living with a Kempeitai colonel as his mistress. On the evening of 3 September, Adalia unexpectedly received instructions to report to the Fort Santiago prison at 0700 hours the next morning. She did not realize that the Japanese hoped to use her to break her husband’s will. Adalia made arrangements with a neighbor to watch her children and arrived early to the prison. She was left waiting outside until 0800 when guards escorted her to a room with one table and one chair. They left her standing in the room.

After an indeterminate amount of time two men entered and identified themselves as Lieutenant Namiki and interpreter Fujiwara. They did not bring Bautista. Namiki sat in the chair at the desk and began questioning Adalia about her husband’s rank and role in the guerrillas. She claimed to no nothing, and in fact her husband had made certain that she knew very little of these things. Around noon the two interrogators left Adalia standing alone in the room.

At about 1300 hours (Adalai could not be certain for there was no clock in the room), the two men returned. They presented her with a poorly written letter supposedly composed by her highly educated husband. The letter read: “If you love our children, you must tell the truth, as I have already CONFESSIONED. Please, for the sake of our HOUSE, you must tell the truth because the Japanese Military POLISE is very
magnanimous and they will let you go home after you are telling the truth.”\textsuperscript{1927} Adalia recognized the letter as a forgery and assumed her husband had not confessed and that the interrogators were desperately fishing for information.

When Adalia continued to plead ignorance of any guerrilla activities, Namiki began beating her with a heavy ruler. Panlilio described such beatings: “It began in the application of a ruler edgewise to the face and hands, aimed at the bone protrusions such as eyebrows, bridge of the nose, knuckles. It ended in simply pounding the victim to a jelly with a baseball bat or rifle butts.”\textsuperscript{1928} Namiki screamed at Adalia, “This is the kind of treatment you deserve! You want to be like American girl – you want to wear pants, eh? Why do you wear pants!”\textsuperscript{1929} The questioning and harsh treatment continued with few breaks well into the night. Finally, the two men left and Adalia curled up on the floor to sleep. Around 0400 hours on 5 September, she awoke to the call of a rooster in the distance. She was alone.

Not until 2100 hours on 6 September did another person enter the room. Adalia recalled, “Then a white clad figure appeared at my door. A bowl of thin rice gruel was thrust towards me. ‘Lugau, eat it quickly,’ Fujiwara whispered.”\textsuperscript{1930} Now worried about her husband, her children and herself, Adalia came up with a new plan of action.

In the afternoon of 7 September, Namiki and Fujiwara re-entered the room and renewed the interrogation. A clearly exhausted Adalia answered their questions with lies laced with exaggerated gossip in hopes of pacifying them. They asked about her brother in the United States, indicating that they had done some homework on her family. They

\textsuperscript{1927} Marquez, 22.
\textsuperscript{1928} Panlilio, 165.
\textsuperscript{1929} Marquez, 23.
\textsuperscript{1930} Ibid., 25.
seemed especially receptive to any gossip relating to Japanese officers and their interactions with Filipinos, particularly with women. After a while Adalia was left alone again.

Sometime on 8 September a Filipino boy brought Adalia a bowl of lugao. That night Fujiwara brought her a few rice cakes to share as she told him about Linda and the Japanese Kempeitai officer. After her days of forced solitary contemplation, Adalia had become convinced that it was Linda who had betrayed her husband.

Before sunrise, Namiki and Fujiwara returned carrying flashlights to wake her and hear more about Linda. “I adlibbed enough material to fill a Sunday supplement scandal sheet,” recalled Adalia, “I began to suspect what I later found out to be actually the case. There were two cliques among the Japanese Military Police and they were terribly jealous of each other, one clique would do anything to discredit the other.”

Finally, on 9 September at 0200 in the morning, Namiki released Adalia with orders to return at 0730 with a written report of all she knew about the guerrillas. She returned at the appointed time and was left waiting and until 1200 when she was taken to a cell. Late that day she was released with orders to return the next day at 0900 hours. When she returned to Fort Santiago she was shown photos of suspected guerrillas to identify. She was released at noon. Four hours later she received a call telling her to expect a visit from Fujiwara at 1900 hours.

At the appointed hour, the interpreter arrived at Adalia’s home and demanded P10,000. He was almost crying as he explained that he had a wife and three children in Japan and they desperately needed money. Fujiwara told Adalia, “You understand, of

1931 Ibid., 28.
course, why Lieutenant Namiki admires you so much – why he treats you the way he
does? It is because of the way I interpret for you.”1932 The implication was clear.

On 11 September at 0700 hours, Adalia met Fujiwara on a bridge and handed him
P5,000 – all she could beg and borrow. An hour before midnight on 12 September, she
received another phone call telling her to meet Fujiwara in a hotel bar at 0300. At that
meeting Fujiwara informed Adalia that she would begin work as an informer for the
Japanese Military Police. She never got to see her husband who was later reported to
have escaped and disappeared.

Northern Luzon, D631/R-418

Praeger continued to lead guerrillas in the Ilocos Sur area while Adduru imbedded
himself with the Japanese as an apparent collaborator in order to access intelligence.1933
Adduru’s Cagayan and Apayao Force (CAF) had already placed Apayao Company’s
Captain Silvino P. Garcia and headquarters commandant Lieutenant Joaquin B. Flores in
similar missions after apparent surrenders.1934 Lieutenant Bonito Bulan took over the
CAF and moved it to Isabela.

Meanwhile, the Japanese in Cagayan threatened and bribed locals in an effort to
find Praeger’s new headquarters.1935 Finally on 30 August, they captured Praeger along
with Furaggganan and Brazelton.1936 The details of Praeger’s capture remain clouded. The
Japanese had been intercepting Praeger’s radio messages for several weeks, deciphered

1932 Ibid., 33.
1933 SWPA reported Adduru’s capture as June, Norling in Intrepid Guerrillas, says SWPA reported 1 April
but it actually occurred in June. (fn 25 Cpt 12)
1934 Norling, 213.
1935 Ibid, 199.
1936 West Point Association of Graduates, Cullum No. 11167, at
http://apps.westpointaog.org/Memorials/Article/11167/ 15 September 2014
with a broken code. Some guerrillas thought he had been betrayed. Others suggest that the physically fatigued officer was ready to surrender. Blackburn heard from a priest: “Praeger had captured these Japanese. He was treating them according to the rules of land warfare. But, he was running out of food and medicine, so he decided that he couldn’t adhere to those rules. So, he asked Father David to take the Japanese back to the commander in the town of Tuguegarao, down in the Cagayan Valley, which he did. The Japanese turned around and captured Praeger.” Later Ramsey noted: “Praeger had been seen by one of our guerrillas in Japanese custody at Cabanatuan, and there were reports that he was being tortured and put on display. This was becoming more common: Guerilla leaders were being paraded before the public after having been tortured beyond endurance and forced to make speeches denouncing the resistance and urging Filipinos to betray us.” The Japanese executed Praeger in November.

Australia, D633/R-416

Since June, the PRS had been working on plans “envisaging intelligence penetration separate from guerrilla consideration or support.” Through the summer, however, they began to appreciate the intelligence sources made and maintained by the guerrillas. Before the end of August, the PRS proposed a finalized plan “to develop intelligence procurement through guerrilla sources south of 12°00’ N” – the line dividing Mindoro and Luzon from the rest of the Philippines.

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1937 Norling, 227.
1938 During this same time, Volckmann fell so ill that Blackburn took over his command. Blackburn Interview, 170-171.
1939 Ramsey and Rivele, 173.
1940 Intelligence Activities, 34.
1941 Ibid., 35.
Back in Australia, Parsons reported to MacArthur and Whitney. The former lawyer eagerly took up Parsons’ case for establishing SPYRON - an amalgamation of ‘Spy Squadron’ - to shuttle supplies, communications, and agents into the Islands.\textsuperscript{1942} Parsons hired his brother-in-law, Captain Tommy Jurika. Captain George Kinsler took charge of procuring equipment for the guerrillas from civilian sources. Navy Ensign William Hagans – born and raised in the Philippines – arranged forward bases for submarine resupply. Navy Lieutenant Lee Strickland did the same for semi-forward bases. The Navy’s Seventh Fleet assigned Captain A.H. McCollum to coordinate support. Commodore Jack Haines of Task Force 72 also worked closely with Parsons. “It was a novel arrangement to have Army officers working at Navy bases and vice-versa, and we were looked upon as mystery men,” recalled Parsons, “The hush-hush nature of our business, prior to invasion, made it necessary to order supplies without indicating purpose or destination.”\textsuperscript{1943}

With MacArthur’s support, Whitney also sought new and better equipment for radio communication and fuel extraction from coconuts and other organic sources, along with lightweight carbines for jungle fighters. He prioritized and quantified orders for desperately needed supplies ranging from atabrine to shotgun shells. Finally, he sorted through requests from particular guerrilla leaders for special items. What might seem unimportant to a general supply officer might be critical to a particular guerrilla; Parsons understood why Fertig needed soap, Pendantun needed polish, and Kangleon needed dentures.\textsuperscript{1944}

Meanwhile the AIB kept up the submarine insertions. On its last run in August,
the SS-209 *Grayling* delivered to Panay supplies that included prized PRS radios. Villamor’s station HT-9 on Negros was now relaying traffic from numerous short-range B3Z and ATR-4 radios from central Luzon, southern Negros, western Panay and eastern Sorsogon, including traffic from Anderson, Merrill and Ramsey.1945 Each night, when solar radiation abated, the bases sent their updates directly through to SWPA.

About this time, Wolfgang Kleinecke of the Nazi Transocean news organization broadcast from Berlin a message that would take time to reach Parsons:

“The headquarters of a North American espionage ring in the Philippines, led by a 63-year old Catholic American woman missionary, were eliminated in January of this year by the arrest of the ringleaders, it became known only now from Manila. The ring numbered more than 100 North American, British, Chinese and Indian agents. Investigations have revealed that one Col. Evans before the outbreak of the G.E.A [Greater East Asia] War was head of the U.S. Secret Service in the Philippines, and had sent a man by the name of Charles Parson [sic] as his secret envoy to the Philippines to establish connections with 63-year old Blanche Jurika, who ostensibly was a Catholic missionary in Manila, but who in fact led a corps of guerrillas. By the way, Jurika is the mother-in-law of Parson. Parson, himself, was charged with rigging up a far-flung espionage apparatus and with organizing guerrillas. Parson collected anti-Japanese elements and on Mindoro Island overlooking Manila Bay established a

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1945 Ind,199.
secret wireless station which kept in constant touch with Australia and America. Blanche Jurika was the ring leader of the organization. She was already before the war an active member of the U.S. spy service in the Philippines, while her elder son, Stephan Jurika, prior to the outbreak of the war was military attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. It is reported that Stephan Jurika was directly in the lead of the air raid on Tokyo in 1942, and was aboard the U.S. aircraft carrier commanded by Doolittle. Also, Blanche Jurika’s second son, Thomas, was discovered to be a spy."

Of course there were much inaccuracy in this report: there was no international ring of 100 spies in Manila; Blanche Jurika was not spy; and Stephan Jurika was a naval intelligence officer aboard the *USS Hornet* who briefed Doolittle’s pilots but was not one of the fliers. Yet the report also indicated two interesting things: the Japanese knew of Chick Parsons and they were concerned about him.

Mindanao, D645/R-404

Despite the complaints of officers like Major General Sosaku Suzuki and Colonel Koreshige Inuzuka, the Fourteenth Army leaders believed they *were* adopting a more aggressive approach, at least towards the Moros in Mindanao and Sulu. They sent a covert operations specialist, First Lieutenant Baba Masataka of the Defense Intelligence Section, to Mindanao.

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1946 *Intelligence*, 52-53.
On 13 September, Fertig wrote: “Morgan is whipped… Tate pulled away and left him out on a limb. The mutiny is done…Things are clicking so well that I almost expectant [sic] for trouble.”[^1948] He noted, “Tate is Oc. Misamis doing some harassing and trying to clear up the mess made under Morgan’s orders.”[^1949] Fertig sent Cabili to Morgan in Misamis Occidental “with a proposal that will solve everything if accepted.”[^1950]

“Fertig got on badly with two of his other lieutenants as well, Captains Ernest McClish and Clyde Childress,” wrote Lapham, “They thought him paranoid and consumed with personal ambition, not to speak of ungrateful and discourteous to them after they had made it possible for him to move his headquarters to a safe location on the eastern part of the island.”[^1951] Believing Morgan dreamed of “a general amnesty,” Fertig cooked up a plan to convince Morgan that MacArthur needed to see him in Australia for vital coordination.[^1952]

A month earlier SS-287 Bowfin had begun its first war patrol from Brisbane, Australia, into the South China Sea.[^1953] The new Balao-class submarine had been commissioned in May and placed under veteran skipper Lieutenant Commander Joseph H. Willingham. Before dawn on 29 September, the boat delivered seven tons of supplies to Binui Point, Mindanao. Fertig sailed out to meet the sub aboard the Rubin IV. “Beautiful deadly sight, silhouetted against the driving rain squalls that slithered down Malindang. Comdr. Wallingham [sic] met me on the bridge and we went below to clean

[^1948]: Fertig Diary, 13 September 1943.
[^1949]: Ibid., 1-10 September 1943.
[^1950]: Ibid.
[^1951]: Lapham and Norling, 110.
[^1952]: Fertig Diary, 17 September 1943.
linen, drip-o-later coffee, sandwiches and cookies. We got everything possible off the ship, some few items, but they were on the edge for rations.”  

A separate launch came alongside with evacuees: Tucker, Minter, Napolilio, Glover, Owens, Offret, Graschio, Mr. Kuder – and Morgan. According to Lapham, Fertig used Davao prison camp escapee and American pilot Lieutenant Samuel Grashio to get Morgan on the submarine. 

On his way to the sub, Fertig received a radio message from SWPA “saying that Morgan, Tucker and Minter were to be held here. It was too late for the easiest solution of Morgan was to send him out.” The 10th MD guerrillas delivered more than a ton of fresh fruit to the sub. “At

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1954 Ibid., 29 September 1943.
1955 Lapham, 110.
1956 Fertig Diary, 29 September 1943.
Map 15: Mindanao Dispositions, September 1943-February 1944

8:30 we cast off and there in that thin steel shell are some of my biggest problems,” commented Fertig, “some friends, and my letters to my loved ones. For another few
weeks we shall be tied to the rest of the world. Only by the thin song of the radio transmitter bon voyage.”

On his way home, on 25 September, Willingham came across and sank the Japanese tanker *Kirishima Maru* in the South China Sea. Five days later *Bowfin* delivered more supplies and evacuated nine people from Siquitor Island. Departing the area Willingham engaged with gunfire and sank a small Japanese cargo ship, the *Mitake Maru*, in the Sulu Sea and a Japanese sampan in the Makassar Strait before returning to Fremantle on 10 October.

In Misamis Oriental, Fertig organized the guerrillas north of Agusan and Surigao into the 110th, 113th, and 114th Regiments. Battle tested guerrillas who a year earlier drove the Japanese out of Balingasag under the leadership of Clyde Abbott and Pedro Collado formed the 110th Regiment. Later, Fertig had Collado arrested for conspiracy of mutiny and replaced by Captain Luz. The three regiments faced light Japanese garrisons in Cagayan and Bugo with an outpost in Libertad. The Japanese launched periodic patrols with hundreds of men from Cagayan to Balingasag and from Butuan to Buenavista.

Negros, D652/R-397

On 20 September, Captain Sofio Bayron sent intelligence to Villamor which he then passed to SWPA: “My man in Bohol reports Santander in Cebu now occupied with indications whole island will be overrun. Governor Abelana of Cebu now in Bohol with

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1957 Ibid.
1958 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 95.
1959 Ibid.
eight officers. Fenton reportedly held by own men.”1960 At Villamor’s side, Cushing remained highly agitated, threw up at least once, and appeared ready to use his .45-caliber pistol. The PRS informed Villamor that the 8th Military District would go to Fertig who was to deputize Cushing to organize Cebu. SWPA denied Cushing the authority to print money. Fertig or Gador, or perhaps both, were to provide funds to Cushing. Villamor recalled the impact of this message: “Cushing was crushed. He began to tremble with anger.”1961 Villamor again sent to SWPA a request to allow Cushing to print money, and SWPA instructed Cushing to visit Fertig for a solution.

About this time Villamor experienced a distraction. Mauricio Guidote arrived in his camp claiming to be an agent sent by Roxas. His interest in the guerrillas’ radio, his praise of the Japanese, a sudden appearance of Japanese planes, and his demands that they contact Governor Montelibano raised suspicions as to whether or not Guidote was a spy. Unable to contact Roxas to verify the man’s bona fides, Villamor convened a board of senior officers to interrogate Guidote. After several hours, they believed the man’s story “appeared more and more phony.” 1962 The board unanimously ordered Guidote shot. A firing squad carried out the sentence.

Manila, D667, R-382

On 5 October, Fourteenth Army Commander General Tanaka visited the presidential palace in Malacañang. Vargas told him there were considerable USAFFE remnants still refusing to accept JMA offers of amnesty and causing problems. “This problem can be solved by the military authorities in two ways,” he said, “either by

1960 Villamor, 199.
1961 Ibid., 200.
1962 Ibid., 205.
sending sufficient troops to control the situation in the troubled provinces, or by
authorizing the Executive Commission to organize, fully equip, and utilize the
Constabulary for this purpose.” He recommended Commissioner of the Interior
Benigno Aquino to command an armed constabulary against the guerrillas.

A much different exchange between the two men occurred at 0933 hours on 14
October. Vargas repeated the words of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Army
and declared: “Effective October 14th, 18th year of Syowa, Military Administration
throughout the occupied territory of the Philippines is terminated.” With those words
Jose P. Laurel became President of the Second Philippine Republic as elected by the
National Assembly. Chief Justice Jose Yulo administered the presidential oath of office
while national heroes of forty years earlier, General Emilio Aguinaldo and General
Artemio Ricarte, raised the Philippine flag as the Philippine National Anthem played in
public for the first time since the invasion. At 1730 hours, the new president signed an
alliance between the Philippines and Japan promising close “political, economic, and
military” cooperation.

The Japanese Military Administration officially disbanded. Colonel Utsunomiya,
the Fourteenth Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff and the JMA’s Director of the General
Affairs Department, became the consular attaché to the new Philippine government.
Chairman of the Philippines Cotton Growers Association Shozo Murata, the highest-
ranking civilian and supreme advisor to JMA, became Ambassador Plenipotentiary.
Harvard educated former General Motors executive in Japan, Hamamoto Masakatsu,
became special advisor to Laurel. Hamamoto worriedly reported that there was not “even

1963 Abaya, 34.
one pro-Japanese” in the highest levels of the new Philippine government.\textsuperscript{1965} The JMA reassigned liaisons in the provinces. Lieutenant Goto in Dansalan, Mindanao, for example, transferred to Manila.

In his inaugural address Laurel stated his belief that “every living Filipino, including those in the mountains who still had some doubts,’ would ‘come down to help us.”\textsuperscript{1966} That evening Laurel departed for Tokyo with Vargas and Benigno S. Aquino. President Roosevelt broadcast his denouncement of the “puppet government” established under Laurel as born in “fraud and deceit” and added, “I wish to make it clear that neither the former collaborationist ‘Philippine Executive Commission’ nor the present ‘Philippine Republic’ has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United States. No act of either body is now or ever will be considered lawful or binding by this government.”\textsuperscript{1967}

Four days into independence, Laurel called a special session of the Assembly to address the country’s economic crisis. As a major in the JMA noted: “…whereas the Americans brought to the Philippines more than they took away, the Japanese, instead of bringing in goods needed here, have been taking away iron, ore, copper, and other resources of the archipelago. As a result, Filipino living standards have been continuously depressed since the Japanese arrival.”\textsuperscript{1968} Under the new constitution, Japanese companies retained their exploitation rights. The Japanese also kept control of fuel, transportation, media and the issue of money. Only the guerrillas interfered with their control. In Luzon, for example, the Hukbalahap and other guerrillas viewed the new

\textsuperscript{1965} Satoshi, 29.  
\textsuperscript{1966} Tarling, 169.  
\textsuperscript{1967} Abaya, 47-48.  
\textsuperscript{1968} Yu-Jose, 163.
government as Japanese puppets and deliberately attacked rice production and distribution.\textsuperscript{1969}

Laurel took the opportunity to offer a new amnesty to people “who may be responsible for crimes and offenses of sedition, illicit association, engaging in guerillas activities or aiding and abetting those so engaged or spreading false rumors and for all crimes and offenses political in nature committed heretofore against the laws of the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{1970} The Assembly unanimously approved the amnesty and ratified the alliance with Japan.

The new Philippine government had little choice but to comply with policies dictated by the Japanese. This was especially true in the area of law and order. “At the time the Philippines declare their independence,” the Japanese military stated, “guerrillas will be looked on as traitors who continue to disturb the peace in the Philippines, but the ones who repent their misdeeds and renew their allegiance to the Japanese Forces will not be punished.”\textsuperscript{1971} The guerrillas did not comply with the amnesty. “The reason, that the state of order could not be improved easily was due mainly to the industrial policies of the Philippines. Unsuitable employments resulted in a marked increase in numbers of the poor.”\textsuperscript{1972}

\textsuperscript{1969} Jose, “The Rice Shortage,” 206.
\textsuperscript{1971} Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 12.
\textsuperscript{1972} Ibid.
The Japanese grant of nominal independence to the Philippines failed to create the fruitful alliance they desired. The active and growing guerrilla resistance empowered the Filipinos in government to defy Japanese demands for more active partnership against the United States for fear of causing a civil war in the Islands. In some areas, however, the privations of occupation strained popular morale to the breaking point.

Mindanao, D682/R-367

As Saburo Ienaga wrote, “Granting independence to the puppet administration in 1943 did not reduce anti-Japanese feeling... Many Filipino men joined organized guerrilla units, but the whole populace – old and young, men and women – cooperated with the resistance. Japan had ‘liberated’ the islands from Yankee imperialism and given the Filipinos their ‘independence.’ Nevertheless, ‘The whole island chain became hostile territory.’” Only slowly, however, were guerrilla leaders able to connect regional resistance into a nation wide effort.

On Mindanao that October, Fertig formed the 106th Division under Lieutenant Colonel Frank McGee from the 116th, 118th and 119th Regiments plus the 116th Separate Battalion. Formerly retired American officer of the Philippine Constabulary, Major Herbert Page commanded the 116th in south and southwest Cabatao. The 119th was under Gumbay Piang, who had only joined Fertig in September. The Japanese had captured

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Piang but released him to house arrest in Cotabatos to appease the Moros. He lost no time in rejoining the guerrillas. When Japanese inspectors arrived to check on him, he pointed to the “Gumbay Piang, Prisoner of War” sign posted over his door and insisted he was out of the war. Once the Japanese revealed they had evidence he was still a guerrilla, Piang fled to the jungle to join his men full time.

Pendatun commanded the 118th assisted by Lieutenant Soriano, Major Gabutina, Datu Aliman and Udtog and kept the road from Kigos to Kabacan closed to the Japanese until early 1944. The suspicious Fertig still had issues with his 118th Regiment commander and wrote: “Pendatun continued to make trouble by underhand tactics. The Bukidnon civilians finally petitioned Bowler to get Pendatun out of the province. This justifies my previous contention.”

U.S. Army Air Corps Lieutenant Owen P. Wilson wandered out of the jungle near Caraga, Davao. Fertig sent him to take charge of a year-old battalion on the west coast of Davao Province. First Sergeant Javito Pedraya had killed the battalion’s former commander, Captain Asis, in June for attempting to surrender the unit. Pedraya then held the command together while waiting for Fertig to name a new commander. When Wilson arrived, Pedraya became battalion executive officer. Fertig supplied Wilson with a radio and sent the battalion to Caraga to collect intelligence on the southeast coast as the 111th Provisional Battalion of the 106th Division.

Lieutenant Villarin raised the 10th Military District’s 112th Provisional Battalion in the Augusan Valley and southern Surigao at Cateel and Lingig. Then Fertig sent

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1974 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 98.
1975 Fertig Diary, 6-7 October.
American Lieutenant Anton Haratik to assume command of the unit. The battalion saw very little action.

Also in October, Kwok’s guerrillas attacked the Japanese in Borneo, drove them out of Jesselton, and held the town for 48 hours. A large Japanese counterattack dispersed the guerrillas into the hills. Guerrilla Lim King Fatt was able to later reestablish contact with the 10th MD but the Japanese reportedly killed 3LT Kwok in January 1944.1976

Negros, D682/R-367

On 20 October, the submarine SS-288 Cabrilla on its first war patrol was hunting Japanese ships when its skipper, Commander Douglas T. Hammond, received a change in mission order.1977 In thirty-eight days at sea the boat had only engaged one ship, but it was memorable. One 24 September, Cabrilla had torpedoed and damaged the Japanese escort carrier Talyo northwest of Chichi Jima. Now they changed course to pick up four people from Doog Point, Negros – Major Jesus Villamor and three others. Thirty-six year-old British submarine liaison officer Commander Anthony Miers reported to Britain’s chief of submarines, Rear Admiral Claude Barry, that Hammond was too cautious and had refused to engage a schooner and two unarmed trawlers in the San Bernardino Strait.1978 Hammond did not bother to explain his overriding need to preserve secrecy while executing his special mission to recover Villamor.

Villamor left on Negros thirty-nine year-old Edwin Andrews, a target of Fertig’s ire, as SWPA’s forward agent for 7th Military District intelligence. A former student with

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1978 Michael Sturma, Fremantle’s Submarines: How the Allied Submarines and Western Australia Helped to Win the War in the Pacific (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval institute Press, 2015), 73.
the FBI in Washington in 1929, he had studied U.S. Treasury Department’s investigative
techniques. He later worked in the Intelligence Section of the Philippine Constabulary.
Later he earned his wings and commanded the Zablan airfield at Bukidnon but took to the
hills when USAFFE surrendered. With Morgan, he became the Chief of Staff of the
Bukidnon-Cotabato Force. Fertig sent him to Misamis and then to Negros to join
Villamor as a camp commandant. “Andrews has been well trained and has had
experience,” SWPA noted, “He has been close to American influence and is appreciative
of the treatment he received while in the United States. He is sensitive to his mixed blood
and when things are not going to his personal tastes, often jumps to the conclusion that he
is being discriminated against of this.”

G-2 acknowledged the handicaps under which Andrews operated. “The 7th MD
had little enough supplies, and the net had to subsist on a small allowance of Negros
Emergency Currency and contributions from friends in various parts of the Philippines.
Agents were withdrawn from the Visayan Islands but radio contact was maintained with
Bohol, Cebu, and 7th MD headquarters for use of net agents coming from Luzon.”

Leyte, D683/R-366

On 21 October, SWPA approved Parsons’ designate Colonel Rupert K. Kangleon
– the “strongest guerrilla leader on Leyte” – to command that island’s guerrillas. Fertig
sent him Navy Lieutenant, Junior Grade, I.D. Richardson as a liaison officer along with
Lieutenant St. John and Lieutenant Truman Hemingway to establish radio

1979 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 76.
1980 Intelligence Activities, 79.
communication to bring Kangleon into the 10th Military District net. Kangleon then set out to consolidate the guerrillas in his district.

Using supplies stored at a camp in Jaro, former Second Lieutenant Alejandro Balderian, had organized a guerrilla division in Northern Leyte. They fought well as an independent force and Balderian assumed the rank of lieutenant colonel. He joined Kangleon’s organization in mid-1943 to form 95th Regiment of the Leyte guerrillas.

Civilians Circiaco Centino and his son Isabelo Centino had become guerrillas under Philippine Army sergeants Terraza and Antonio Juan until both soldiers died in combat. The Circiacos each assumed the rank of major and the elder took charge. Isabelo fought under Balderian until given his own sector to command and helped bring the Centino groups in the northeast Leyte’s towns of Jaro, Pastrana and Palo in to join Balderian.

Colonel Antonio C. Cinco, leader of a guerrilla group that spanned Tanauan, Dagami, Tolosa, Burauen, Dulag, and La Paz, had an interesting past. After Corregidor’s surrender, he reportedly served as a Japanese informer until they discovered that he had been a USAFFE soldier. The Japanese threatened him with execution but he escaped to rally his guerrillas. He joined Kangleon and became his 1st Battalion, 85th Regiment.

American Navy Yeoman Gordon A. Lang assumed the rank of lieutenant and organized guerrillas in southern Leyte. He merged with another group formed by Philippine Army officers, Major Porfirio E. Jain and Lieutenant Jose Nazareno, on Panaon Island. The senior ranking Jain took over what became known as the Lang-Jain group and joined Kangleon as the 94th Regiment.
One of USAFFE Colonel Cornell’s pre-war Leyte Provisional Regiment’s First Sergeants, Filemon Pabilona, also served with the guerrillas under Terraza and Juan. Rising to command his own section under Centino, Pabilona grew his group until it eventually separated into its own command centered around San Miguel, Babatngon, Alangalang and unoccupied Tacloban. Eventually, Pabilona joined Kangleon as a Lieutenant Colonel in command of the Second Battalion, 95th Regiment.

Technical Sergeant Felic Pamanian refused to surrender with the Leyte Provisional Regiment and instead organized guerrillas near Mount Capoocan in northern Leyte. His growing band subsumed a guerrilla formation under USAFFE Captain C. Corpin from Biliran. Kangleon recruited the Pamanian Group as the 3rd Battalion, 95th Regiment with its leader promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and Corpin as Kangleon’s Assistant G-3.

Not all the guerrillas on Leyte were willing to fall in with Kangleon, however. Brigadier General Blas Miranda remained bitterly opposed to collaborators, and that included anyone like Kangleon who had once surrendered. A U.S. Army history stated: “He killed many former prisoners, whom the Japanese had released, on the pretext that they were spies.” Miranda formed the formidable Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Force (WLGWF) that ranged from Palompon to Baybay on northwestern Leyte and became known to Peralta who sent emissaries offering Miranda recognition as the commander of Leyte and Samar. Peralta was at the time unaware that Parsons (and Fertig) had tapped Kangleon for that role.

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Miranda absolutely refused to place his WLGWF under Kangleon, whom he believed had collaborated with the Japanese to earn his release from prison. Some reported that Miranda’s “inconsistent response to the Japanese” enraged Kangleon.\footnote{Ara, 41.} Now with SWPA’s authority as commander of the Leyte-Samar district, Kangleon ordered Miranda to subordinate his command in the name of MacArthur. If Miranda failed to do so, Kangleon promised that his 92\textsuperscript{nd} Division “would force… Miranda to join us.”\footnote{Cannon, 17.} Miranda would not budge and in August, Kangleon launched attacks into western Leyte against the WLGWF. In November, Kangleon would order all WGLWF officers to report to his 92\textsuperscript{nd} Division headquarters, but none came.

In December, during a typhoon, reinforced Japanese forces attacked the WLGWF main headquarters with great precision along with the headquarters of Miranda's regiments in Albuera, Palompa, Merida and Baybay. Miranda dispersed his remaining forces and ordered them to lay low. His chief of staff, Marcos Soliman, appealed to Peralta for help. Pedro Merritt on Samar had already pledged loyalty to Peralta who now considered appointing Soliman, as commander of a unified Leyte-Samar.\footnote{Lear, 89-90.} Before then, Kangleon’s attacks proved too much for the remaining WLGFW. The 92\textsuperscript{nd} Division welcomed the surviving members of Miranda’s guerrillas as the new 96\textsuperscript{th} Regiment. By the time of MacArthur’s return to Leyte, Kangleon would report 209 officers and 3,190 men organized as the 92\textsuperscript{nd} Division, Philippine Army.

Northern Luzon, D685/R-364

\footnote{Ara, 41.}
\footnote{Cannon, 17.}
\footnote{Lear, 89-90.}
There was, however, no unity in the resistance. As Blackburn recalled, “Throughout the north there were independent bands which were going to do their own thing, including out-and-out banditry. If we were going to do the things that Volckmann wanted to do, we had to ‘command’ and keep these scalawags from stirring things up.” They began sending emissaries to round up the stray groups. During October, Dennis Molintas and Bando Dagwa rejoined the USAFIP-NL under Volckmann. Then, Parker formed the 66th Infantry Regiment by combining the 1st Battalion of 43rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment, and the 3rd Battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment (43+11+12=66).

Volckmann collected all available radios and related parts and searched for someone who could turn them into a working transmitter and receiver. They collected the parts at his headquarters where a 300-foot waterfall provided power for a captured 220-volt generator. Unfortunately, Volckmann remarked, “A search through North Luzon failed to turn up a single individual with the required skill.” Finally agents in Manila located Timoteo Sinay and Crespo Hernandez, technicians who reportedly could build a working radio. On 23 October, the USAFIP-NL commander celebrated his 32nd birthday in Halaip, Ifugao, with a team working on his radio to support his existing intelligence network. “We cultivated a system of SS agents, secret service agents,” Blackburn added, “who were planted in the barrios and towns. They were kept undercover. They would surreptitiously get word out to us about what was going on.”

Frustration in dealing with informers led to some unorthodox strategies. Blackburn found that every detail of guerrilla activities in Tuao quickly found its way to

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1985 Blackburn Interview, 132.
1986 Volckmann, 156.
1987 Blackburn Interview, 133.
the Japanese. He responded by arresting the leaders of the three most prominent families, Sanchez, Casabang and Rodriguez. The families had been feuding and at least one was likely bargaining for Japanese support. Blackburn promised his detainees he would kill them if the Japanese returned. “It stopped, just like that,” he noted, “bang, we had no problems.”

Visayas, D689/R-360

Between April 1943 and January 1945, MacArthur’s command conducted forty-one submarine missions and more than fifty landings in the Philippines that delivered over 12,080 tons of supplies to the guerrillas. In the first twelve months of its operations, the PRS oversaw thirteen submarine missions and twenty-seven insertions into the Philippines to extend SWPA control in the islands. These included nine missions to Mindanao, five to Luzon, two each to Mindoro, Panay, Negros, Tawi Tawi and Palawan, and one each to Samar, Bohol, Leyte and Bicol. By 27 October 1944 the AIB and PRS would have 134 radio stations: 46 on Mindanao, 23 in Panay, 21 in Luzon, 13 on Negros, 11 on Leyte, 6 on Mindoro, 5 on Palawan, 3 each on Cebu and Samar, and one each on Bohol, Masbate, and Tawi Tawi. This infrastructure enabled MacArthur to use the guerrillas in support of his preparations for invasion.

With MacArthur’s personal support, the PRS obtained from the Navy one of its new large submarines. After fifteen days in Brisbane and a refit by Submarine Division Eighty-One the submarine SS-167 Narwhal under Commander F.D. Latta departed on 23 October for the Philippines on its seventh war patrol. She carried ninety-two tons of

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1988 Blackburn Interview, 176-177.
1989 See “Guerilla Submarines” at West-Point.org at http://www.west-point.org/family/japanese-pow/Guerrillas/Guer-Subs.htm and Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center, “Submarine Activities Connected with Guerrilla Organizations,” from Type Commands 1945, World War II Command File, Record Group 38, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD at http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/pi_subs_guerrillas.htm
supplies stored in both torpedo rooms and eleven Filipino-American graduates of the Tabragalba school organized into two teams.\textsuperscript{1992} Parsons led one team of four officers and six enlisted men of the 978\textsuperscript{th} Signal Services Company.\textsuperscript{1993} By now submarine deliveries of medical materials had changed the guerrillas’ supply priorities. For example, F.D. McGee in northern Luzon sent a request in October indicating a reduced need for antimalarial medication: “The principle medicine needed is for amoebic dysentery. Next is local anaesthetic [sic], calcium, sulfa drugs etc.”\textsuperscript{1994} On its first run, \textit{Narwhal} carried 1.2 million atabrine tablets and 800,000 quinine pills to Mindanao.\textsuperscript{1995}

Lieutenant Garcia returned from Panay to Palawan in October with Major Pablo Muyco of Peralta’s G-3 section. The two men had traveled the island and obtained agreement from all the local guerrilla leaders, except Manigque, to merge their forces into the Palawan Special Battalion of the 6\textsuperscript{th} Military District. Muyco would command the unit with Garcia as his executive officer. They organized the battalion into four companies: A Company under Captain Higino Mendoza at Malcampo, B Company under Third Lieutenant Felipe Batul at Danlig, C Company under Captain Carlos Amores at Taytay, and D Company under Captain Narizidad Mayor at Brooke’s Point. Within a few months the battalion had 57 officers and 954 men with about 300 arms. It covered all of Palawan and some areas on the smaller nearby islands of Balabac, Cuyo and Agutaya, Cagayancillo, Busuango, Culion and Coron. They also managed to cover Dumaran Island.

\textsuperscript{1993} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1994} LTC F.D. McGee Headquarters, 109\textsuperscript{th} Division, Cotabato Sector, to C.O. 109\textsuperscript{th} Division, 20 October 1943. 3. National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
\textsuperscript{1995} Condon-Hall and Cowdrey, 357.
with at two or more agents in every town. Within a year the Palawan guerrillas were well integrated into SWPA’s coast watcher network and provided valuable intelligence on ships passing through the narrow straights through the Islands.

Later in the month, Cushing returned to Cebu after having received no help from Villamor or SWPA on his trip to Negros. He found Estrella commanding after the hasty execution of Fenton. Some P150,000 from Fenton’s treasury had disappeared. Furthermore, officers gave evidence that Estrella had accepted P60,000 from the Japanese to deliver Cushing over to them. Alarmed, Cushing declined an invitation from Fertig to go to Mindanao to discuss the Cebu. He instead he sent Abellana to Fertig with hopes of bringing back some money.

On 2 November, the submarine SS- Rey delivered 2 tons of supplies to Rowe on Mindoro along with one intelligence officer and two weathermen.

Manila, D696/R-353

Just after sunset on 3 November the SS-225 Cero successfully rendezvoused with Bernard Anderson north of Manila on Luzon. The boat unloaded 20 tons of supplies, 2 intelligence officers, 6 radio operators, a two-man weather team, and two officers and 4 enlisted men of a demolition team.

As president, Laurel secretly established a radio in the Malacañang Palace to monitor foreign broadcasts. He had Chief of the Constabulary General Guillermo B. Francisco bring in radio expert Captain Angelo P.B. Frago from the Japanese controlled...

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1997 General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, Check Sheet, 4 November 1944. Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG16, Box 65, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia.
1998 Ibid.
PIAM station (the pre-war KZRH) to set up and monitor a listening post. Frago listened every night to the international broadcasts and used Lieutenant Circiaco Quinto as a stenographer to prepare synopsizes for delivery to Laurel each morning. The radio was kept a closely held secret to prevent the Japanese from knowing what Laurel knew. The Kempeitai, tracing a lead from captured guerrillas, would arrest Frago but fail to break him in Santiago Prison before Laurel secured his release.

On 5 and 6 November, Tokyo hosted leaders across Southeast Asia in a Greater East Asia Conference. Chang Ching-hui from Manchukuo, Prince Wanwaithayakon from Thailand, Wang Ching-wei from China, Ba Maw from Burma, and Jose Laurel from the Philippines attended. The conference was to be “an inspiring symbol of Pan-Asian idealism and the demise of white colonial rule in Asia,” and to stoke both pan-Asian dreams and Western worries about racial politics. Before the conference, Laurel met with Tojo and confessed that he believed freedom in the Philippines – and all Asia – depended on Japan’s success in the war. He added, “if the Asian people become aware of this fact, they will naturally cooperate with Japan in her task of liberating her East Asian brothers. They must be informed that Japan’s victory is absolutely necessary for their own sake.”

The Japanese hoped their conference would produce an Absolute Defense Sphere (zettai kokubō) uniting all the countries against the United States.

Laurel, like the other delegates, agreed to make a speech. He alone declined to submit his speech in advance for review. In his speech he said, “one billion Asians will never again become victims of Western exploitation… Although the Philippines is a

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2000 Dower, 6.
2001 Goto, 92.
newly born, small, and feeble country, we are prepared to devote all the spiritual and material elements of the country to victory in the Greater East Asia War."

After the conference, the Japanese suggested they might send two hundred and twenty ‘advisors’ to assist Laurel and his new government. The new President rebuffed the offer reasoning that “if such a large group of Japanese are to stay in our country, we are afraid it would give the impression that the Philippine government is a puppet regime.” Tojo decided not send the advisors. Japan assessed Laurel as ‘useful’ but not ‘cooperative.’

Across Luzon, poor management and bad environmental conditions led to a failed rice harvest that brought the people close to starvation. This famine affected guerrillas in a number of ways. The Japanese and their collaborationist allies were often able to recruit spies and turncoats “for twelve pesos and six liters of rice.” For guerrillas with starving families the inducements were especially hard to resist. Magsaysay recalled, “My men did not surrender as a result of the rice offers. But I knew that the offers had a demoralizing effect among them.”

Groups like the TVGU in Bicol had to send “guerrilla reservists” to live at home, though ready to mobilize when needed, because they could not feed them. Mobilization meant “that both regulars and reservists underwent combined drills and lectures on military matters for a full day or more.” Offensive action was left to small, specially trained units like the Bagong Sirang Society assassination squad. The guerrillas had to

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2002 Ibid., 91.
2003 Goto, 68.
2004 See Table 4-1 “Relationships of Four Southeast Asian Leaders with Japan” in Goto, 99.
2005 Barrameda, 82.
2006 Romulo and Gray, 58.
2007 Barrameda, 77.
2008 Ibid.
employ greater numbers of women to split rattan, make bakya wooden sandals, soap and other products, for sale in local markets to raise money for food. Some organizations, like the Hua Zhi and the Hunters, signed mutual aid agreements to get through the tough times.

Australia, D600/R-350

On 6 November, Villamor arrived back in Freemantle to debrief a panel of six officers headed by Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers. Villamor reported: “The morale of the troops and the people appears on the surface to be high. Actually, it is built on a very shaky foundation which crumbles every time the Japs start a campaign in a particular area. ...they are fairly well informed [of the U.S. advance across the Pacific] and they regard all of this understandingly, but this understanding often gives way to disappointment, then impatience, and finally despair whenever they are hard pressed by the enemy.”

The panel wanted to know if the order to refrain from attacks against the Japanese to concentrate on intelligence hurt the guerrillas. “Tell me this,” asked Major C.A. ‘Archie’ McVittie, “do these ambushes help the morale of the guerrilla forces? In other words, if they were not permitted to pull these ambushes, do you believe that they would be able to hold them together as a unit?” Villamor said he thought the units could hold together and that a strong order from MacArthur could stop the aggressive actions that only brought retaliation.

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2009 Ibid., 81.
2010 Yuk-Wai, 92.
2011 Villamor, 225.
2012 Ibid., 214.
Reports from Negros indicated that for the first time since June, Japanese patrols burned Bell’s camps. The professor and his family barely escaped capture. This time he had enough. Bell called SWPA and asked for a submarine to remove a number of civilians from Negros, including his family and him.

Restless, Villamor asked to return to Negros and resume command of his net. He had left Andrews as the nominal head of his station while Benedicto secretly operated the PLANET net. The net remained invisible to the guerrillas, free from their influences, to provide a direct connection with SWPA. Whitney, however, received reports that caused him to second guess the selection of Andrews. On 6 December, he weighed in on Villamor’s request to return with a message to MacArthur: “There is convincing evidence before us (Parsons – Meider) to the effect that Villamor, upon his return to Negros, became politically ambitious – Meider says that he now envisions himself as Quezon’s successor as President of the Philippines – and under such circumstances it would be difficult for him to confine employment of such a net to military rather than political purposes.” Whitney wanted to turn the Negros net over to Abcede.

Visayas, D706/R-343

The Japanese resumed attacks along the east coast of Panay in November and December. In late November, their campaign from Panay reached Tablas Island. A week later, patrols appeared on Sibuyan Island. They attacked into the Romblon Islands in December and the Aklan area in the northwest Panay into January and February 1944. “This was the most thorough-going and ruthlessly destructive campaign of all,”

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2013 Villamor, 246.
2014 Major H. L. Meider reported, “He is a personable young man but violently anti-American.” Ibid., 242.
2015 Villamor, 243-44.
MacArthur’s headquarters noted, “Loss of life and civilian property was exceptionally heavy but this only further embittered the people against the Japanese.”

Many guerrillas in the Romblon Islands surrendered. At first Guarinia remained to reassemble the guerrillas as part of Lieutenant Garcia’s 1st Combat Team but then reportedly he surrendered to the puppet government officials on Sibuyan. The Japanese moved Guarinia to Manila, creating a vacuum in Romblons that Untalan tried to fill. Jurado managed to escape ahead of the Japanese to Mindoro, taking his intelligence center with him, and would be made commander there in March 1944. Later, captured documents clearly showed how the Japanese had “carefully observed guerrilla activity and radio traffic, even breaking some coded and ciphered messages.”

In the wake of this campaign Relunia, Peralta’s chief of staff, decided to streamline his organization. By spring, he had seven Combat Teams in semi-autonomous areas that relied on his division headquarters only for supply and administration. He attached special units to the combat teams but placed the Combat Commands’ intelligence under S-2 liaisons that reported directly to the district command. SWPA noticed the result: “The products of Peralta’s intelligence network has been vastly detailed and exceptionally voluminous.”

The network’s runners delivered reports on schedule to feed a monthly district report that included “enemy strengths and movement of even individual Japanese soldiers, enemy installations, supply areas, communications, etc.,” leading SWPA to conclude, “The ability of the agents to secure information is

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2016 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 47.
2017 Intelligence Activities, 30.
2018 Guerrilla Resistance Movements 49.
unlimited and their patience in preparing reports on these details seems bottomless.\textsuperscript{2019}

Unfortunately, the agents did not understand what intelligence SWPA needed.

On 13 November, twenty-four hours after spending two days attacking Japanese ships and evading destroyers, the submarine \textit{Narwhal} slid silently on her electric motors through the moonlit night to within 1,600 yards of the western beach of Butuan Bay on Mindoro.\textsuperscript{2020} At its closest point Mindoro lay eight miles from Luzon across the Verde Island Passage. It was this passage that Parsons wanted under observation. He went ashore in a rubber raft escorted by a Filipino soldier. Spotting a \textit{batel} anchored off shore, Parsons made a snap decision to board it and requisition the craft to ferry supplies from the sub. He climbed aboard only to awaken Japanese army sentries on deck. Parsons took a bayonet to the chin while making a narrow escape as gunfire erupted behind him.\textsuperscript{2021} Once ashore, he linked up with local guerrillas and got his chin bandaged until he could get it stitched properly back aboard the \textit{Narwhal}.

The next day the Japanese \textit{batel} left the area. At 1815 hours, Lieutenant Commander Latta moored on the starboard side of the guerrilla schooner \textit{Dona Juana Maru} and unloaded forty-six tons of supplies. Parson’s sent ashore a coast watcher team under Major Lawrence H. Phillips with a radio. The team members were Captain Ricardo C. Galang, First Lieutenant R.F. Songco, Warrant Officer Braynard L. Wise, Master Sergeant Alfredo A. Alberto, Technical Sergeant Arcangel Baniarees, and Sergeants

\textsuperscript{2019} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2021} Ingham, 146.
Vincente Pinuela, Benjamin Harder, Ramon Vitorio and Lino Banares. Theirs mission: to “a) watch Verde island Passage and Apo East Pass and b) correlate the development of information from Manila and Central Luzon.” Parsons was supposed to put the Phillips party ashore on an isolated section of coast, but he chose to deliver them to Paluan where he had an associate. After they finished unloading, Narwhal departed.

Latta made a short dive for trim, and on 15 November rendezvoused with a launch flying a prearranged signal to pick up Colonel Fertig and ferry him to Naspit Harbor, Mindanao. “The expected sight brought us relief – the largest sub in the world,” wrote Fertig, “Enroute to the pier, we grounded but by blowing down the aft we floated clear and tied up at the pier. The only case in our history where one of the naval craft moored at a pier in enemy occupied area…. The job was done but the mental strain had been terrific.” A local band playing Anchors Aweigh greeted Latta and his boat. Fertig recalled, “Sandwiches and coffee in the ward room. Letter from home with pictures of Mary and the girls. Gee, I was homesick.”

The guerrillas off loaded 46 more tons of supplies along with Parsons and five agents from the PRS. At midnight Latta departed with thirty-two evacuees, including members of Buckley’s famous PT boat crew, eight women, two children and two-year-old Steven Cryster. “In the forward torpedo room, Steven solemnly bit into his first pieces of bread. ‘Cake mommy,’ he said.” Observing were two visiting guerrilla

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2022 Campbell adds it is possible US LT Leon Charles Tinnell was also put ashore. Phillips was later killed by the Japanese while Baniares and Vittorio were captured and tortured. Radioman Wiess died on a later mission.
2023 Intelligence Activities, 5.
2024 Ibid., 38.
2025 Fertig Diary, 15 November 1943.
2026 Ibid.
2027 Intelligence Activities, 94.
2028 Ibid.
leaders: “Kangleon and Ingeniero were much impressed by their visit to sub,” Fertig wrote, “Now to send them home with some supplies will complete their trip and cement their loyalty.” Narwhal departed for Darwin, arriving on 22 November.

The Narwhal’s return posed a problem: what to do with the civilian evacuees? Whitney conferred with representatives of the American Red Cross. Together, they decided to take control of the Stathalan hotel in Caloundra, about 70 miles north of Brisbane on the coast. As G-2 reported: “This housed 30 to 60 people at various times and was seldom empty for more than a few days at a time from early November 1943 until it was closed in August 1944. During this time Miss Alice Thompson, ARC, kept a hospitable recuperation center for evacuees, and the excellence of the food added many pounds to the hungry civilian in the month they stayed there before their return to the United States.”

The remote location helped preserve secrecy. Officers from SPWA G-2 interviewed the evacuees at the hotel before clearing them for return to their homes. “Approximately 250 persons were processed at Caloundra, and much valuable information was accumulated for use of occupation forces and for dealing with post-occupation problems such as guerrilla recognition (Luzon), emergency currency, recovered personnel, and claims.”

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2029 Ibid. 17 November 1943.
2030 The evacuees included: US Marines 1LT Reid C. Chamberlain, SSGT Michael Dobervich, CPT Austin Conner, 1LT Jack Hawkins; Army Air Corp members CPT Cyril A. Grohs, 1LT Albert Roy Kirby; US Army soldiers COL (Chaplain) Frank W. Duff, MAJ Leo O’Connor, MAJ Halbert E. Woodruff, CPT Oscar F. Smith, CPT and Mrs. John Martin, SGT Frank Harayda, PFC Aldo F. Maccagli; US Navy sailors TMC1 John L. Houlihan, Jr., QMC1 Otis F. Noel, MMC1 George W. Winget; and civilians Donald C. McKay with his wife Harriet and daughter Mary, Mrs. Evelyn Birchfield and her son James, Mrs. Glenda Cryster and her son Steven, Mrs. Helen H. Welbon, Mrs. Nellie Varney (whose husband remained with Fertig), Mrs. Thelma M. Briggs, Mrs. G.E. C. Mears (British), two Norwegian sailors rescued from a torpedoed ship, Mr. Fred Warner. Ind, 199. See also Campbell, 302-303.
2031 Intelligence Activities, 94.
2032 Ibid.
After three days of refit and reloading, *Narwhal* had returned to sea. At dusk on 2 December, Latta began unloading ninety tons of supplies, three Army officers and ten enlisted men in Butuan Bay on northeast coast of Mindanao at Cabadaran. One member of the team under Charlie Smith, radioman Bob Stahl, recalled two hundred natives with a small band playing ‘Anchors Aweigh’ greeted them at the dock. Japanese forces sat ten miles away in garrisons at Nasipit and Cabadaran. “They’re as scared of us as we are of them,” one of Fertig’s American guerrilla leaders told Stahl, “We whipped their asses lots of times, and they leave us alone.” Chick Parsons and seven evacuees, along with ten tons of bananas, departed aboard the sub before dawn the next morning. Parsons informed skipper Latta of their next destination.

Three days later the sub picked up another nine evacuees “with great haste” from Alubijid Bay about 120 miles to the west a Misamis Oriental. A Navy history reported, “Latta stepped up he four engines to 17 knots as the submarine left this bay – the place had an unhealthy look.” Over the next three days Narwhal picked up nine

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2033 Although other sources say two officers and eleven enlisted (see Roscoe, 274 for example) the team was: Major Charles Smith, Captain James Evans (medical officer), Lieutenant Robert Ball, First Sergeant Restituto J. Besid, First Sergeant Aniceto C. Manzano, Staff Sergeant Gerardo A Sanchez, Technical Sergeant Third Class Robert Stahl, Technical Sergeant Fourth Class David D. Cardenas, Technical Sergeant Fourth Class Crispolo C. Robles, Technical Sergeant Fifth Class Daniel B Sabado, Technical Sergeant Fifth Class George R Herrera, Private First Class Querobin B Bargo, and Private First Class Andres S. Savellano. *Intelligence Activities*, 39-40.

2034 Stahl, 31.

2035 “Evacuees consisted of 2 soldiers, 3 civilian men, one woman and an eight-year-old-girl.’ The two soldiers were Adriano S. Oliver, Jr., and Efron H. Rodillon. Both were Filipino soldiers who were captured by the Japanese and later escaped from Panay Island.” Campbell, 303.


2037 Roscoe, 274.
more people from Negros and Mindanao and sank the Japanese merchant *Himeno Maru* with gunfire off Camiquin Island before returning to Darwin on 11 December.

On 23 November, Phillips radioed SWPA from Mindoro about Japanese patrols in his area: “Increased activity against guerrillas in general. Expect meet with Majors Jurado, Ruffy, and Valencia to talk about guerrilla difficulties. Will then advise recognition status.” Two days later Phillips held a conference of the Mindoro guerrilla leaders that quickly drew Peralta’s attention. The previous May, Peralta had sent 1934 U.S. Naval Academy graduate Lieutenant Enrique L. Jurado of the Philippine Offshore Patrol to organize the guerrillas on Mindoro where former constabulary Major Ramon Ruffy and Captain Esteban Beloncio competed for leadership. According to MacArthur’s G-2: “Peralta had appointed Maj. Ruffy CO on Mindoro under the Panay Command.” On 26 November Phillips convened a meeting in Mamburao between the guerrilla leaders and came away with an understanding that Ruffy would command the Mindoro provisional guerrillas with Beloncio as his executive officer. Without authority from SWPA, Phillips then encouraged Ruffy to assume the role of “4th MD commander, independent from Peralta.

Not until 13 December did Phillips get a reply from SWPA: “Your mission is one of secret intelligence, and while it is desired that you extend friendly cooperation to local guerrillas and loyal residents, your participation in their affairs to any greater extent could tend to compromise the success of that mission and should be carefully avoided.” The Panay commander sent Jurado back to Mindoro ostensibly to establish observation posts on the Verde Island passage and create a base for penetration of Luzon. Peralta also sent

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2038 *Intelligence Activities*, 36.  
2039 Ibid.  
2040 Ibid., 36-37
a unit from 1st Combat Team to provide Jurado’s security and maintain presence on Mindoro. Relations between the guerrillas would deteriorate while the Japanese harassment of Phillips intensified.

Bohol, D719/R-330

Meanwhile between Cebu and southern Luzon, Ismael Ingeniero assumed the rank of major and claimed command of all guerrillas on the island of Bohol despite the presence of several senior officers. “This may have caused friction within the command,” noted SWPA agents, “and there are indications that Ingeniero maintained a close surveillance of these men lest they attempt to assume command.” Ingeniero named his united guerrillas ‘Boforce’ and established headquarters at Carmen near the center of Bohol. Reports indicated: “The organization was run in a military manner with some formality, and guards and sentry posts were frequently on highways. Discipline was reported as good.” Yet SWPA noted, “Despite this outward show the military efficiency of the organization was questionable. And little action was taken against the enemy other than occasional ambushes and the gathering of intelligence.” Ingeniero added a Women’s Auxiliary Service to sew clothing and make other equipment and raise money to sustain operations. Local attorney G. Lavilles volunteered to run a unit newspaper, *Bolos and Bullets*, that became popular on Bohol.

Ingenerio claimed command of the prewar 8th Military District that included Cebu and extended his intelligence to include Cebu City, irritating Cushing. In December, SWPA recognized Ingeniero as the Bohol Area Commander – but not Cebu. The PRS

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2041 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 81.
2042 Ibid., 80.
2043 Ibid., 81.
sent Ingeniero supplies in late 1943 including a radio, noting, “There have been difficulties in the distribution of supplies from SWPA through Bohol to Cebu, and fairly reliable indications that the Bohol regime is concerned less with fighting the enemy than with aggrandizement of their political power, renown and economic well-being, even at the expense of the civilian population.”

On 26 November, Ed Andrews reported from Negros that Doctor had returned from Manila. Quezon’s physician had successfully worked his way to the capital and managed to meet Roxas, Rafael Alunan, Jose Yulo, Pandac, Justice Ramon Avanceña, Taba, Nonoy, Bulotong Elpidio, and Quirino. MacArthur’s G-2 later wrote, “His mission is easily the single outstanding feat of the entire year.” He found all of them and all the generals loyal to Quezon and the constitution. General Lim even pretended to be chronically ill to avoid cooperation with the occupiers. Cruz reported Pio Duran, who had given his children Japanese names before the war, competed with Ricarte for Japanese favor but Quintin Parades “whose prewar business connections with the Japanese made him suspect” was still loyal. He cautioned however, that Vargas was “entirely helpless and in a mist” and Peping was “in a very thick mist.” Cruz added: “Independence is a joke. Ninety-eight percent of people and government employees are true and loyal. They are more interested in the return of American forces than anything else. Feeling of hatred against enemy is at a very high tension and a slight sign of American help will cause general uprising all over.”

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2044 Ibid.
2045 Intelligence Activities, 7.
2046 Panlilio, 177.
2047 Villamor, 260.
2048 Ibid.
Dr. Cruz felt the emotional sacrifice of war in Manila when he managed to drop in unannounced to see his wife. He recalled, “My wife was shocked, too, when she saw me, but after praying for a few minutes to the Image of our Holy Virgin, she became composed. She was speechless, keeping a tight hold on me and trying to convince herself that I was no a product of her imagination.”

On 20 December, Andrews sent a multi-part message to SWPA requesting recognition, promotion, and the authority to promote his people and to establish financial contacts across the Islands. Nine days later SWPA replied: “It is desired you report to commander Seventh Military District [Abcede] for duty.” Learning of this, Villamor became very upset.

More than a decade later Villamor searched archives to learn why PLANET was replaced. He concluded: “These channels were Filipino manned and guided. The new channels developed were all under American leadership.” He believed that Whitney was a racist and commented, “Andrews was no ‘bobo,’ no undesirable, although Whitney would have treated him like one.” Villamor confessed: “Once I had admired General MacArthur, held him in the highest esteem. But now I was disillusioned in him. This man capable of acts of rare courage, it seemed, was also capable of accepting bad advice from self-serving aides. It was a contradiction I found hard to comprehend.”

In 1948, Willoughby oversaw a study of Philippine guerrilla intelligence operations that included this observation: “Regarding Maj. Villamor’s mission to Negros

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2050 Villamor, 249.
2051 Ibid., 284.
2052 Ibid., 243.
2053 Ibid., 249-250.
to establish an intelligence net, it is now known that he assembled one of the most active and best connected of any intelligence group gathered in the Philippines. The potential was enormous but largely unrealized." 2054 G-2 had realized that Villamor’s extensive contacts, especially in Manila, were under the impression they were talking to SWPA. In practice, however, they were talking to Villamor and when he left, they were talking to no one. Except for those net members who found their own ways to pass information to other networks, SWPA had to start from scratch. This was the cost of the highly compartmentalized designs of the AIB. The G-2 study concluded: “This tendency to ignore experience and existing organizations is one of the less creditable characteristics or the otherwise brilliant intelligence enterprise in the Philippines. There was no need for a new broom; the Villamor net, properly supported, was chronologically a full year ahead of Maj. (then CPT) L.H. Phillips, Smith, and Lt Comdr. George Rowe.” 2055

Villamor’s conclusions also seem to ignore some pertinent factors. While there is little doubt that Whitney and others were more comfortable with professional U.S. Army officers manning key command and control nodes in the islands, the case of the Negros net control station does not support claims of racism in MacArthur’s headquarters. Whitney recommended that a Filipino – Abcede – take over the net. As previously noted, Abcede shared Villamor’s suspicion of American biases, having questioned Ausejo’s preference for working under Fertig saying: “Does he think that the Filipinos cannot fight or stay together unless they have an American leading them?” 2056 Villamor’s frustration was not unique, however. Americans like Fertig, Volckmann and Lapham also felt persecuted by SWPA.

2054 *Intelligence Activities*, 22-23.
2055 Ibid., 27.
2056 Ibid., 87.
In December, in the U.S. capital, Villamor read in the *Washington Post* that 2,000,000 items with “I shall return” were sent into Japanese occupied Philippines. He thought: “They needed medicine, arms, the full recognition of guerrilla leaders, some real sign that, indeed, was coming – like the sight of an American airplane, the sound from the guns of American ships. The thousands of Filipinos and Americans in Japanese internment camps, the hundreds in the dungeons of Fort Santiago, would never see these tokens, would never get the cigarettes, matches, chewing gum, candy bars, sewing kits and pencils now being sent by submarine in great quantities, each package bearing the crossed American and Philippine flags on one side and on the other the ‘I shall return’ pledge of MacArthur.”

Southern Luzon, D742/R-325

In November, Turko and Padua nominated Zabat for Lieutenant Colonel and command of all Bicol Free Forces. Weeks later Mayor Velasco of Libon communicated to Zabat an offer of amnesty from the Japanese if he would cease operations. Zabat conferenced with his commanders and used the offer to obtain loyalty pledges from lieutenants Sandico, Lelis, and Capayas. He then informed Peralta’s representative, Colonel Serran, of his new organization. Serran told Zabat that if he could get Miranda, Lapus, Escudero and Flor to join him, then the 6th Military District would support his claim as commander of the 5th Military District. Then Sandico renounced his ‘forced’ pledge but told Lelis and Capayas to stay with Zabat whose subsequent efforts in sending Turko to Lapus, Padua to Escudero, and Captain Garcia to Miranda failed to achieve unification.

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2057 Villamor, 241.
During the first week of December, Miranda met with Lapus and agreed to bring the TVGU into Lapus’s 54<sup>th</sup> Regiment in January. On 9 December, Miranda left Panay to go home to Bicol. About that time a two-week long Japanese zonification campaign was underway in Tancong Vaca area. “A sidelight to this,” wrote Barrameda, “was the rumor at the TVGU headquarters that at the height of the Japanese ‘bandit-zone’ operation, some VTG men tried to betray the location of Miranda’s camp to the Japanese. …Such was the paranoia of the times.”<sup>2058</sup> After being away from his TVGU guerrillas for more than a year, Miranda returned on Christmas Eve with fourteen soldiers and a shipment of weapons provided by Peralta.<sup>2059</sup>

Central Luzon, D743/R-306

Ramsey had received an invitation in late November from Brigadier General Vincent Lim, living in virtual house arrest in Manila, to come and discuss the unification of all Luzon guerillas. The invite meant travelling into the capital where Kempeitai chief Nagahama had raised the bounty on Ramsey’s head to a half million pesos. Nevertheless, he felt meeting Lim was worth the risk. Ramsey made the daring trip through Japanese lines in a railroad boxcar secured by Claro Camacho.

Swiss national Walter Roeder, technical director of the Manila Gas Company, posed as a collaborator with the Japanese while secretly supporting the guerrillas. Assisted by photographs taken by Major Jorge Joseph and logistics from eighteen-year old Pacifico Cabral, Roeder had false identification papers waiting for Ramsey when he arrived in Manila. Ramsey entered the city by sedan on 20 December, and spent the next

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<sup>2058</sup> Barrameda, 149.
<sup>2059</sup> Ibid., 162.
several days openly traveling and secretly coordinating with resistance leaders, usually with Ramona Snyder at his side.

On Christmas Day, Ramsey met a Czechoslovakian consul named Schmelkis who informed him that a Filipino claiming to be agent CIO-12 had arrived in Manila by submarine and wanted to meet.\textsuperscript{2060} The man’s bona fides seemed valid, Shmelkis said, but ‘Agent CIO-12’ had oddly said that he knew Ramsey had come to Manila to assassinate General Lim. Perplexed, Ramsey instructed Schmelkis to go back and tell the visitor that the Huks and ambushed some of the ECLGA and Ramsey had left to deal with the situation. Meanwhile, Roxas sent word through Ramona Snyder that Nagahama knew Ramsey was in Manila and was closing in. He also stated that Baba had learned the Huks had recently killed some of Ramsey’s guerrillas and Ramsey was moving to deal with them. Clearly, CIO-12 was a counterintelligence agent for Baba. Ramona took Ramsey to Roeder who hid him in a gas company compound guarded by more than 100 Japanese soldiers while the Kempeitai searched for him in Manila for nine days.

In December, the Japanese announced: “The amnesty under which Americans have been guaranteed safety and internment by the Imperial Japanese Government is about to expire. After 25 January 1944 any American found in the islands, whether unsurrendered soldier or civilian, will be executed without trial.”\textsuperscript{2061} Peralta reported to SWPA that on Panay the Japanese executed thirteen captured Americans, including women and children.

Meanwhile Marking’s guerrilla had returned to their old Sulok Camp for Christmas where they received a holiday visit from prominent Manila social worker

\textsuperscript{2060} Ramsey and Rivele, 199.
\textsuperscript{2061} Ingham, 182.
Asunción A “Lola” Pérez. For more than twenty-five years she had led the Associated Charities in the Philippines and served as the Director of the Bureau of Public Welfare.\textsuperscript{2062} She had conveyed Marking’s offer of refuge to Manuel Roxas who tearfully replied, “Tell General Agustin that it is not time yet for me to escape. Tell him that for some of us the fight against the enemy is in close. Tell him that we all of us fight, but in different ways. I am old and sick. I cannot carry arms. I would be a burden. Here in another way, I fight. I did not know anybody knew it but myself.”\textsuperscript{2063}

It is worth noting that Pérez relayed a specific message from Roxas to Marking: “Do not shoot Laurel again.”\textsuperscript{2064} Rather than deny involvement in the attempted assassination, Marking insisted on the appropriateness of such actions. Pérez explained that Roxas feared that killing Laurel or any other member of the government would just bring more radical collaborationists into office. She added reported, “Seriously, Laurel has changed. He was always a Filipino, a good Filipino. Before the war he was convinced that the political future of the Philippines lay in a Greater East Asia. Now he knows that will be just another Korea crushed by the same Japan. He may not love the Americans, but he does love his own people. History may show him a pitiable figure indeed, caught up by a culture of ideology, then forsaken by it. Right now, between Roxas and the Japanese, he is caught and crushed between two opposing forces.”\textsuperscript{2065} Lola said succinctly, “The way it is, the Japs use Laurel, and so do Roxas and the loyal men behind Roxas.”\textsuperscript{2066}

Pérez provided perhaps the strongest defense of Laurel:

\textsuperscript{2062} Panlilio, 171.
\textsuperscript{2063} Ibid., 173.
\textsuperscript{2064} Ibid., 174.
\textsuperscript{2065} Ibid., 175.
\textsuperscript{2066} Agoncillo, Vol. II, 697.
“Roxas could do no better than Laurel, who now delays, distracts, gives advice that Roxas gives to him to give. The Japanese will never understand the Philippine psychology. Roxas studies their plans very carefully and, with other loyal leaders, maps out a counter campaign against everything they plan to do. Then they advise Laurel. Laurel knows Philippine psychology, too; he knows the significance of Roxas’ advice; he knows that if he gives the advice cleverly or casually enough, the Japanese will swallow it and do exactly the thing that will warn the Filipino people that will make them balk, that will keep them alert. Take the Japanese plans to conscript Filipinos no longer as labor but as soldiers. Roxas advised Laurel to make a big speech openly stating that we Filipinos must fight the Americans. That jolted the Filipinos wide-awake. They knew then the real significance of being recruited and trained to keep peace and order. In the meantime, following Roxas’ advice, Laurel has been busy perfecting the plans for conscription. A headache delays him. He must go to the province on a tour of inspection. He is very ill. He recovers. He must consult with other officials. He must verify certain statistics. He is delayed by a storm. He is delayed with official matters. He is delayed by family matters. It is a dangerous game that Laurel is playing. In front of the Japanese, he and Roxas disagree just enough to invite the Japanese to take Laurel’s advice instead of Roxas’s, and it is really Roxas’s advice they take through Laurel. Laurel cannot move around too much. He is
forever surrounded by the Japanese. But Roxas has connection that keep him informed of the real state of affairs, and so he puts into Laurel’s mouth the words that will not only annul the endeavors of the enemy but also inform the people of the real intentions of the Japanese.”

Lolo reported that in Manila:

“There is tremendous greed and heartbreaking treachery everywhere. The enemy have a system of espionage that traps the patriots at every turn. They send out solicitors, and these catch the most victims. These solicitors speak words that the desperate heart aches to hear – that the Americans have landed in Mindanao, that aid is very near, that the guerrillas need only a little help to rid the country of the enemy. These solicitors claim direct contact with MacArthur. They claim to have transmitters, and to receive and send messages. Perhaps there are genuine contact men… But how do we know which is genuine and which is a Japanese agent? Home after home has been raided by the Japanese Military Police. From the supper table, with his children around him, a father has been taken. A son waves goodbye to his mother and is not heard from again until weeks later, when they return his clothes to her from Fort Santiago – if they return anything at all. In the markets, in the throngs on the street, in restaurants, in clubs, in

Ibid.
offices, even in schools – waking and sleeping, there are informers everywhere.”

Visayas, D746/R-303

On 23 December, Charles Smith led a team from Mindanao north to place coast watchers between the Leyte Gulf and Manila Bay. With Smith were Americans, Medical officer Captain James ‘Doc’ Evans and Corporal Bob Stahl. He also picked up Lieutenant Robert Ball, a former Signal Corps private, from Fertig’s organization. The bulk of the team was nine Filipino soldiers chosen from the First and Second Filipino Infantry Regiments in California. Smith moved north with his team while peeling off detachments to set up separate stations: First Sergeant Anicento C. Manzano and Technician Fourth Class Crispolo C. Robles headed to Bondoc Peninsula in Southern Luzon; First Sergeant Restituto J. Besid with Privates First Class Querubin B. Bargo and Andres S. Savellano went to Masbate Island; Staff Sergeant Gerardo A. Sanchez went to Cebu City; Ball and Technician Fifth Class Daniel B. Sabado trekked to northwest Samar; and Technician Fourth Class David D. Cardenas and Technician Fifth Class George R. Herrera went with Ball before heading for central Luzon and Manila.

As part of the trade for Ball’s services, Doc Evans replaced Captain Armato Arietta in Fertig’s headquarters to serve as 10th MD medical officer, and Pennsylvanian Lieutenant Elwood Royer -- who knew how to operate a .50-caliber machine gun – joined Smith’s band. “Also with us were five Filipinos who proved to be very important to our well-being,” wrote Stahl, “Each had his individual skills, which would be used repeatedly

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2068 Ibid., 176-177.
2069 Intelligence Activities, 39-40.
in the days ahead.” Sixteen-year old Rodriques had learned to cook from Major Smith’s wife, Kathryn, and served as a man Friday on Masbate Island. Smith’s bodyguard, Catalina, had been with him on the Or Else to Australia, returned as a coast watcher at Davao, fought the Japanese with Fertig, and rejoined Smith upon his return. Two other soldiers sent by Fertig, Ochigue and Madeja, were veteran guerillas known for their courage and loyalty. Teenager Frederico was a long-time aid-de-camp to Captain Ball and had become something of an adopted son to him.

Travelling together aboard the seventy-foot sailboat they called Malaria, Ball, Smith and Stahl arrived in Guiuan Bay on Samar on 27 December. Three days later Ball and Stahl set up radio station MACA at Guiuan. They chose their call sign for the abbreviated way MacArthur initialed papers and sent reports to Fertig’s station KUS for relay to station KAZ in Australia.

On Samar, Charlie Smith found that a Major Manuel Vallie controlled the south while Captain Pedro Merritt still controlled the north. Neither would cooperate with the other. Smith shuttled between them hoping to work out an alliance, while placing Sergeant Cardenas as a coast watcher on the west coast. Ball, Royer and Stahl left Sergeant Herreria operating a small radio at Pambujan Sur and on 3 January, headed farther north.

After Stahl got his radio working, Vallie arrived with several local politicians. “Success in the islands depended in large part on a good relationship with politicians,” Stahl recalled, “We tuned in a news broadcast from San Francisco – the first news they had heard since the islands had fallen, except for the constant Japanese propaganda...”

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2070 Stahl, 47-48.
2071 Ibid., 47-48.
broadcasts. Seeing us – real, live Americans who had come from Australia – and hearing the news of the Allied offensive in New Guinea and other islands in the south brought tears of joy to their eyes! They had been waiting for General MacArthur to send THE AID, and it had finally arrived.”

The natives held a party, and Vallei shared a stash of Coca-Cola mixed with several fifths of stateside whiskey.

The Americans’ heavy 50-watt radio required a 110-volt power source. They had several small, gasoline-powered generators to charge 6-volt batteries. They needed two of the small generators to produce 110-volts, but one had already broken down. At Borongan, Mrs. Emma McGuire, the Filipina wife of a recently deceased American mestizo mine operator, led the PRS team to a diesel engine and a ten-kilowatt, 110-volt generator.2073 The guerrillas disassembled the new generator as best they could but the largest piece still weighed over five hundred pounds and had to be carried by four cargadores suspended from two long poles. They recruited twenty native men each day to work in shifts to tote the generator, dubbed “McGuire’s Monster.” For several days Mrs. McGuire fed the party while doctor Arturo Victoria tended to their ailments.

Northern Luzon, D748/R-301

In November and December, Volckmann reported, “nothing exciting” happened in his area of operations.2074 Calvert Parker managed to get a radio receiver working in the USAFIP-NL First District, and heard from San Francisco that the U.S. had invaded Bougainville and the Gilbert Islands. Runners reported that Japanese had executed Thorp, Straughn and Barker in Fort Santiago. Volckmann went to Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya to

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2072 Stahl, 58.
2073 Ibid., 62-63.
2074 Guardia, American Guerilla, 113.
meet his 5th District Commander, Major Manriquez, and came away impressed with his organization. He returned with a decision to share with his deputy, Blackburn. “He was to remain in Ifugao for the time being as commander of the Seventh District and the 11th Infantry,” Volckmann recalled, “I planned to move west over into western Benguet or eastern La Union province to set up a new headquarters.” It would be a couple months before Volckmann was healthy enough for the move and he maintained strict secrecy about it. He held forlorn hopes to find Praeger.

Expansion meant friction. Robert Lapham, now wearing colonel’s rank, established guerrillas in north central Luzon across Nueva Ecija and Pangasinan. In spots his jurisdiction conflicted with Volckmann’s claimed territory and resulted in increasing conflict between the two. In December, Ray Hunt, a former aircraft mechanic with the 21st Pursuit Squadron who had served as an infantryman in Bataan, joined Lapham. Hunt had escaped from the Death March and the Fasoth camp. Since then he had wandered Luzon, gathering a handful of guerrilla followers as he went. Lapham sent him to become Captain Al Hendrickson’s executive officer until the two irritated each other so much that Lapham separated them in mid-1944. Hendrickson remained in western Tarlac while Ray Hunt assumed command in San Quentin, Pangasinan.

According to Lapham, having Americans to appoint to various positions alleviated a serious problem: jealousy among the Filipino officers. Lapham later remarked, “By December there were people at SWPA headquarters who had heard enough. CPT Bartolomeo Cabangbang issued a memo to all unit commanders on Luzon to stop our petty squabbling.” To ease

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2075 Volckmann, 140.
2076 Lapham and Norling, 68.
2077 Ibid., 70.
2078 Ibid., 117.
suspicions between competing guerrilla commanders, SWPA decided to change the way it sent communications. “Thereafter, SWPA directives were addressed to Anderson, Volckmann, and me [Lapham] en masse, as if it made no difference whether we were together or separate or some subordinated to others." 2079

By now, USAFIP-NL’s understanding with the former 11th Division members in the local Constabulary companies paid big dividends. Sergeant Pedro Dunuan had taken a job as a clerk for a Japanese garrison and passed to the guerrillas copies of enemy intelligence and plans. Captain Emiliano Dunuan arrested people targeted by the guerrillas. When they suspected someone worked for the Japanese, the guerrillas would provide ‘evidence’ that they really worked for the resistance, Dunuan arrested them and a sympathetic judge in Augarrine sent them to jail in Bontoc escorted by a Japanese patrol. “Now, if the guy was real bad,” explained Blackburn, “we’d ambush that patrol to Bontoc and get rid of him. If the Constabulary couldn’t handle it, we would do it quietly, and the Constabulary would cover it up.” 2080

By year’s end, Volckmann established Camp Seven on a mountainside overlooking the Taboy Valley. He noted cultural differences between the tribe he had just left, and the one he now lived among. “The Benguet beat is slow and the rhythm and movements of the dancers resemble graceful butterflies, while the Ifugao beat is much faster and the rhythm and movements mush sharper and more jerky, like a war dance,” Volckmann wrote, “The dances in general portray the differences in the characteristics of the two peoples. The Benguet in general is even-tempered, modest and peace loving,

2079 Ibid.
2080 Blackburn Interview, 139.
while the Ifugao is more impatient and is hot-tempered and a fierce individual fighter.”

Blackburn, who claimed to have cured an infected heel by walking on it until it got better, suffered another bout of malaria. In camp near Haliap, nurse Lottie Spessard brought him some blood medicine called salvisand she found in a burned out sawmill. “I felt that malaria was a blood weakener, at least that is my hypothesis,” said Blackburn, “and since we had the damn stuff, I said, ‘Why not try it?’ So, [Spessard] shot it everywhere but in the vein, and my damn arm swelled up and looked like a baseball bat. I never had so much pain. I couldn’t use that arm for two weeks.”

Things were tough all over. Farther south near Manila, Ramsey believed Filipino morale had grown dangerously low. Lapham, however, disagreed and later wrote, “Maybe I fooled myself,” he recalled, “maybe I saw mostly what I wanted to see. But I don’t think so.” After much consideration, Ramsey continued to jettison the Maoist cadre organization he had been using and restructure the ECLGF. He counted some 30,000 guerrillas in five regimental military districts around Manila, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga and Pangasinan-Tarlac. He renamed the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Force as the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Army (ECLGA).

Eugenio Lopez, from the wealthy Lopez family on Panay, decided to wait out the war in his summer home in Baguio on Luzon. “Working through close friends among the guerrillas, Lopez supplied them with ‘medicine, shoes, bond papers, laundry soaps, clocks and liquor.’ Simultaneously, however, he cultivated a warm social relationship

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2081 Ibid., 138.
2082 Condon-Hall and Cowdrey, 360.
2083 Blackburn Interview, 119-120.
2084 Lapham and Norling, 60.
2085 Ramsey and Rivele, 177.
with the local Japanese command, hosting frequent parties for the most senior
officers." In December, a man named Franco Vera Reyes arrived in Baguio posing as
Colonel Reyes, American intelligence officer sent by MacArthur. He had already used
this con to gain money from the Manila underground and eventually delivered to the
Kempeitai resistance agents Rafael R. “Liling” Roces, Jr., wealthy industrialist Juan
Miguel Elizade, and Del la Rama Shipping manager Enrico Pirovano. In Baguio,
Reyes enticed Congressman Ramon Mitra and Colonel Manuel Enriquez to arrange a
meeting with local resistance members at the Tropicana Restaurant. As he arrived that
night Reyes recognized the waiting Eugenio Lopez, the restaurant’s owner, and instantly
departed, heading for Manila. Lopez had also recognized Reyes as a con man he had
dealt with before the war. Fearing imminent arrest, Colonel Enriquez accepted Laurel’s
standing offer for amnesty and Congressman Mitra agreed to a Kempeitai request that he
serve as mayor of Baguio.

Mindanao, D753/R-296

In mid-December, Fertig wrote, “Radio contact has been made and maintained
direct with Australia. Plenty of good dope to them.” However, a new Japanese
campaign soon threatened Fertig’s headquarters on the north coast of Lanao. He moved
his command to the Augsan Valley and by January set up a subcommand called “A”
Corps under Bowler for communication and control. The corps consisted of the 105th,
108th, 109th and 106th Divisions. Bowler’s second in command, his adjutant, was

2086 Alfred W. McCoy, “Rent Seeking Families and the Philippine State,” 473.
2087 Ibid.
2088 Ibid., 474.
2089 Fertig Diary, 11-15 December 1943.
Lieutenant Colonel Ciriaco Mortera, a well-respected Philippine Constabulary officer who was relieved of command of the 105th Division. Fertig replaced Bowler as commander of the 109th Division with Lieutenant Colonel James Grinstead, a retired officer who lived on his plantation in Cotabato with many years of service in the Philippines, especially among the Moros in Mindanao.

On one hand the appointment of Grinstead fit with Fertig’s penchant for placing Americans in command positions. As American escapees appeared and joined the 10th MD, Fertig gladly commissioned them. Yet on another hand, the appointment was unusual. Fertig had gained a reputation for appointing young officers to command and staff positions. A daughter of one guerrilla, Virginia Hansen, recalled, “This infusion of young people into the organization clashed with the old-timers like my father and many other civilians who had operated businesses in the Philippines for years.”

Her father was fifty-three years-old Grinstead was also in his early fifties. When it came to accusations of bias among the Philippine guerrillas, there always seem to be exceptions.

The Japanese stepped up their attacks. A proclamation went across the island announcing that any American, or anyone helping an American, faced immediate execution. “True to their word,” recalled Virginia Hansen Holmes, “particularly when they found a guerrilla, American or Filipino, the Japanese forces immediately executed him, usually by beheading. Afterward, they put the head of the dead person on a stake in the town plaza to demonstrate to the people the consequences of resisting Japanese occupation or aiding their enemies. Albert McCarthy, killed by the Japanese in an ambush, was treated exactly this way.”

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2090 Holmes, 79.
2091 Ibid., 113.
Propaganda efforts sought to reinforce these acts to separate Filipinos from Americans. On 8 December, Jorge Vargas wrote for the Japanese News Agency in the Osaka Mainchi:

“Responsible as I was for the safety of the lives and property of the citizens of Manila, I faced the impending entrance of the Japanese Imperial Forces with uneasiness and trepidation because American propaganda had led us to expect abuses and excesses from the army of occupation, and we felt that the USAFFE had abandoned us to a cruel and bitter fate. I believe that my high esteem for the Japanese, which I entertained long before the war, was completely justified by the irreproachable conduct of the Imperial Japanese Forces which entered the city of Manila during the first days of January. My belief in Japanese nobility and honor has been further strengthened by the beginning policies which have been followed subsequently. As I have said time and again, the Imperial Japanese Forces came to us, not as enemies, but as a liberating army of fellow Orientals.”

Late in December, Parsons met again with Senator Jose Ozamiz who reported that the food situation in Manila was “very bad.” The Japanese 16th Division also reported that the deteriorating food crisis undermined peace and order: “Lack of rice and corn makes the people worry too much about the food situation. It becomes the main topic of

2092 Abaya, 28.
2093 Ibid., 164-165.
the day among the residents here.” The division cited NARIC’s failure in Leyte and called for the immediate improvement of provision and distribution of food for Filipinos.

According to Ozamiz, many of the Kempeitai had withdrawn from the occupied towns. Without the police around, the Chinese retail stores owners who ran the black market kept rice at about P1,000 per bag to both make profits and to discredit the Japanese in the eyes of the Filipinos. The Japanese responded by bringing in food from outside the districts and distributing it through the neighborhood associations. They paid laborers with a bag of rice and five pesos per day in occupation script, a five-fold increase of pre-war wages. Ozamis reported this extra ‘Mickey Mouse money’ was worthless: “A man may buy a woman for a night, he may gamble, hoping to treble his stake and so purchase something on the black market. Otherwise there is nothing to buy. Inflation is advancing rapidly.”

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2094 Ara, 70-71.
2095 Ingham, 163.
2096 Ibid., 164-165.
By this time, prewar Philippine currency was out of circulation. The Japanese had floated two million pesos of occupation script and were printing more every day. There was already more money than the value of goods in circulation. In accordance with MacArthur’s plans to increase the rate of inflation, Parsons brought P500,000 of artificially aged counterfeit Japanese issued Philippine currency and slipped it into circulation on the Islands. In unoccupied areas, President Quezon authorized guerrillas to print money in the name of the exiled government. Parsons also brought in real cash to

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Notes: Of the countries occupied by Japan “only the Philippines had a 40% or more monthly price rise.” Between November 1943 and January 1945, monthly Philippine inflation exceeded 50% on three occasions. Thailand, Indochina, and Burma maintained rice surpluses, the Philippines, Indonesia (and Burma after 1944) did not. “To try to preserve seigniorage, Japanese military administrators had to rely on high inflation taxes to try to offset strongly negative changes in real balances. In the Philippines, the inflation tax reached 651% in 1943 and 778.1% in 1944.” Huff and Majima, 17-24.

Note also: Villamor arrived with P4,000 in gems and P350 of Philippine commonwealth bills – all that was then available in Australia. Intelligence Activities, 21.
empower guerrilla leaders in their local communities. Guerrillas enforced harsh measures to control inflation in their areas. “Not only is there no inflation in the unoccupied sections,” Parsons reported, “but also there is no black market or profiteering. Ceiling prices are rigorously maintained and anyone endeavoring to profit by the situation is dealt with by the guerrilla chiefs.” 2099

The AIB would send Peralta $500,000 in US $100 bills in July. The next month they sent another P1,000,000 into the Islands. When Parsons returned he provided samples of the latest Japanese issued Philippine Invasion Currency (APA) and recommended counterfeiting as much of it as possible. By end of December 1943, some 10,000,000 artificially aged pesos arrived from Washington: ten thousand P50 notes, five hundred thousand P10, six hundred thousand, P5 notes, one and a half million single peso notes. While these amounts provided critical funding to guerrilla operations. “However,” s post war study noted, “P10,000,000 was only a ‘drop in the bucket’ compared to the tremendous amount of currency printed by the Japanese themselves; it would have made no appreciable difference to the economic system in the Philippines.” 2100

Ozamis informed Parsons that the Japanese had put a $50,000 bounty on his head, dead or alive. 2101 Parsons had one question: had he heard anything about his mother law, Blanche Jurika? Yes, he was told, she had been arrested and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison. 2102

2099 Ingham, 166.
2100 Intelligence Activities, 21-22 and fn35.
2101 Wise, 140.
2102 Ingham, 166.
Parsons sailed from Mindanao at night on one of Fertig’s inter-island supply craft. The wind fell, stranding them eight miles from their destination when day came. A Japanese patrol craft passed within a hundred yards as the Filipino crew pretended to mend a fishing net carefully placed to hide their radio and supplies while the well-tanned Parsons, in native costume, manned the tiller. Any attempt to move away from the enemy boat would have brought an instant fusillade. The Japanese apparently saw nothing of concern and continued on their way.

Fertig itched to attack and continued to grow and organize the 10th MD. When the Japanese invaded in June 1942, Captain Claro B. Laureta had led thirty of his men from Camp Victor in Davao into the hills to the north as a guerrilla unit. There, Laureta found around 4,000 civilian refugees along the Lubugon River and used his small force to provide them law and order. They flocked to his command. The 110th Division recruited Laureta’s outfit in early 1943 and he reported to Misamis Oriental in July as commander of the 130th Regiment of the 110th Division. By the beginning of 1944, Fertig found the 110th Division large enough to break part off and stand it up as a separate 107th Division under Laureta whom he promoted to major. When Lieutenant Colonel Clyde McClish, the commander of the 110th Division, fell ill, Fertig had him evacuated to Leyte and replaced by Captain Marshall on 21 January.

In command of the 105th Division, Lieutenant Colonel Ciriaco Morterea gained a reputation as a capable but not particularly aggressive or strong leader. Fertig reassigned him to administrative duty as Adjutant General of A Corps in January and replaced him in command with Lieutenant Colonel Hipolito Garma, a fifty-four-year-old Chief of

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2103 Ibid., 172.
2104 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 97.
Constabulary under Genera Sharp. Unwilling to surrender, he hid in the hills until appointed as the Adjutant General of the 109th Division in Bukidnon in 1943. SWPA noted, “It has been reported by one source that he lacks initiative and ‘fight.’”\textsuperscript{2105} In late 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Teano became Adjutant General of the 105th Division.

Luzon, D754/R-295

From 31 December to 3 January, Laurel reorganized his government. Claro Recto took over Foreign Affairs, Antonio de las Alas assumed the lead at Finance, Teofilo Sison moved to Justice, Rafael R. Alunan became the chief at Agriculture and Natural Resources, Quintin Paredes took charge at Public Works and Communications, Emiliano Tría Tirona received Health, Labor, and Public Welfare, and Laurel kept control of Home Affairs, Economic Affairs and Education.\textsuperscript{2106} Together they faced serious problems, notably the rise of hunger, and fall of morality.

On New Year’s Day 1944, the Haliaps near Volckmann’s headquarters reported a stranger lurking about the local trails. The guerrillas picked him up and under Blackburn’s interrogation the man confessed to being a spy for the Japanese. He was summarily executed.\textsuperscript{2107}

The next day, Laurel summoned all of Luzon’s absentee landowners to Malacana and told them, “We have to get rice. If necessary, we must compel planters to sell to [government agencies]. We will strengthen the constabulary to keep peace and order and if the constabulary can’t to it, I will ask the Japanese Army to help me.”\textsuperscript{2108} Four days

\textsuperscript{2105} Ibid., 88.
\textsuperscript{2106} Agoncillo, Vol. I, 404.
\textsuperscript{2107} Guardia, American Guerilla, 114.
\textsuperscript{2108} Abaya, 39.
later Laurel told his advisors: “If necessary, we have to sacrifice one third of our people in order to save the other two thirds.”

On 3 January, Laurel issued Proclamation Number 10, calling for all students, KALIBAPI, and religious groups to work for food production. He established the Food Administration under Jose Sanvictores to deal with the crisis. To curb the black market, the administration asserted NARIC’s monopoly on rice and banned citizens from brining the staple into Manila. NARIC however had become so poorly regarded that Laurel replaced it with the National Rice Granary (Bigasang Bayan) – BIBA – run by Filipinos under the Food Administration. BIBA rationed rice at only one-quarter pound per person per day, and that ration would soon be cut in half. Laurel set up an Economic Planning Board to address the crisis with long-range schemes for improvement. Short-term special enforcement courts, drafts of manpower for farms, and confiscation had little impact on the famine. The Philippine government needed someone to blame. After touring Laguna, Batangas and Tayabas, Recto announced, “The recent food shortage as well as the present hardships suffered by the people are due mainly to the activities of the guerrillas, who hinder food production.” The next month Laurel would have the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources forcibly draft manpower to support his food production campaign.

The Japanese were growing anxious about the Filipinos. They sent Ricarte back to Japan, after rumors indicated he was involved in a planned a coup against Laurel, but

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2109 Ibid., 40.
2111 Hartendorp, Volume II, 105.
2113 Abaya, 46.
2114 Ara, 71.
they would bring him back in April. The high command sent instructions to the 14th Army: “The attitude of the Filipinos must be watched closely to see whether any sign of enemy operation against the Philippines appears. The guerrilla bands will rise against our forces in full strength just before the enemy invades the Philippines, and attack railways, communication, bridges, airbases, harbors and munition camps. In this manner they will harass our rear positions and interfere, to their utmost with our operational activities.”

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2115 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 40-41.
12. Harvests

7 January – 4 June 1944

As the Americans marched across the Pacific, Japanese military leaders began to evaluate the readiness of Philippines defenses. Two years of relatively small garrison force operations had permitted the development of robust and well-organized guerrilla forces influenced by MacArthur that provided him with vital intelligence, over-watch of sea-lanes, and influence with local populations.

Visayas, D761/R-288

In early January, Ramsey received another report that a SWPA agent wanted to meet northeast of Manila. This one was a PRS agent who had arrived in Luzon by submarine and was waiting for him with instructions from MacArthur and a radio for the ECLGA. The news appeared incredibly exciting. “There was little more I could accomplish in Manila,” Ramsey noted, “and, given the surveillance, a meeting with General Lim was out of the question.”\textsuperscript{2116} On 7 January, he and Roeder left the city on bicycles to rendezvous with their visitors.

ECLGA Manila District chief of staff Colonel Patricio Gonzalez (aka Pat Gatson) waited in a house with Sergeant Ben Harder of the PRS who had arrived from Mindoro.\textsuperscript{2117} Harder informed Ramsey that Major Phillips, who was still with Ruffy, had the radio and Ramsey had to go to Mindoro to get it. Disappointed, Ramsey decided to

\textsuperscript{2116} Ramsey and Rivele, 204.
\textsuperscript{2117} Ibid., 205.
make the long trek across Manila Bay, down southern Luzon, over the inter-island waterways, and on see to Ruffy at Naujan, Mindoro.

With fifty-year-old Filipino Colonel Eduardo Manahan, commander of the ECLGA Mountain Corps Regiment, Ramsey scouted a new place for his headquarters in Balagbag before he headed off for Mindoro. ECLGA chief of staff Colonel Armado Bautista oversaw construction of the camp in the high mountain site. Then on 15 January, Ramsey left to find Phillips. Pat Gatson arranged his passage through the fractious guerrilla territories of southern Luzon. One particularly worrisome area was under a “General Ernie.” “Tishio Ernie had been a renegade for years,” Ramsey noted, “and neither the prewar government, nor the Japanese had been able to suppress him.” The old bandit warred with the Japanese and rival guerrillas, but he accepted a truce long enough to let Ramsey pass (with Gaston and four bodyguards). General Ernie, “certainly not my idea of an officer” Ramsey later wrote, staged for the ECGLA chief the beating and summary execution of several suspected spies.

The previous May, Peralta had sent 1934 U.S. Naval Academy graduate Lieutenant Enrique L. Jurado of the Philippine Offshore Patrol to organize guerrillas on Mindoro where Ruffy and Beloncio competed for leadership. Jurado was unsuccessful. In November, SWPA sent Phillips to Mindoro where the two guerrilla leaders asked him to settle their differences. Phillips convened a meeting in December between the two in Mamburao. After three days, the parties agreed that Ruffy would command the Mindoro provisional guerrillas and Beloncio would be his executive officer. Peralta then sent Jurado back to Mindoro to establish observation posts on the Verde Island passage and

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2118 Ramsey and Rivele, 214.
2119 Ibid., 217-218.
create a base for penetration of Luzon. Peralta also sent a unit from 1st Combat Team to provide Jurado’s security.

Meanwhile Sofronio Untalan suddenly reappeared on Marinduque. The lieutenant who had surrendered his command in July 1942, had recently jumped parole, returned to Peralta and received a captain’s commission with orders to go to Marinduque and assume command of Company M in Lieutenant Garcia’s 60th Infantry Regiment. American Sergeant Charles Hickok had been replaced by Peralta for Captain Cudilla and subsequently recalled to organize movement between Panay and Luzon. When Hickok learned of Untalan return, he was incredulous. Hickok found Untalan “not very intelligent and not reliable under pressure.” The two clashed and Hickok left. Untalan met the Constabulary chief on Marinduque, Lieutenant Rudolpho Tescon, and they agreed not to attack each other.

From Masbate, SWPA received reports that on 23 January Tansiongo, Gamboa and several other Masbate and Panay guerrilla leaders met with puppet government representatives and Japanese officials. A year earlier constabulary Captain Manuel Donato organized a guerrilla band opposed by the resistance group under Captain Juan Villaojada (Jesus Arazaga). The meeting attendees agreed that until Villaojada was captured or killed, the Japanese military and their Constabulary troops would have freedom of movement between their garrisons and in return the guerrillas would have freedom of movement in their areas. Once Villaojada was liquidated, they would meet again, and some reports even said Tansiongco promised he would then surrender to the Japanese. “This is an interesting sidelight on the enemy pacification program,”

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2120 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 59.
MacArthur’s staff noted, “It likewise shows the weakness of the Masbate guerrillas.”\textsuperscript{2121} In February, the Japanese would pin down the small band of guerrillas under Villaojada and his brothers in the northern peninsula. Juan fled to Luzon where the Japanese captured and killed him and his son Estaclito in Lucena, Tayabas. A little later the Japanese killed Villaojada’s brothers in Masbate. Tansiongco would drive the Villaojada group remnants the into the hills.

On 17 January, Japanese forces swept Samar and captured Pedro Arteche and his brother Melecio. They imprisoned both at Tacloban. Later, a military escort took Pedro to his neighbors assembled in a church in Catbalogan and instructed him to beg them to cooperate with the Japanese. Instead he urged them never to surrender. He was dragged away and never seen again.\textsuperscript{2122}

Southern Luzon, D769/R-280

In Camarines Sur, the recently returned Miranda resumed command of Aureus and his men. Lapus ended nearly three months of exile to persuade Miranda to drop his cooperation with Zabat and sign an agreement to join him in Peralta’s 6\textsuperscript{th} Military District. The TVGU agreed and became the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Battalion 54\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment under Lapus.

Guerrillas under Captain Natividad Mata group resurfaced in Bagotayog, Ragay, which was TVGU country. Mata however still claimed to be with Marking’s Fil-American Troops (MFAT). Unaware of Miranda’s return, he wrote to Aureus, requesting a conference in Tatlong Parang, Ragay. Miranda sent a delegation under Lieutenant

\textsuperscript{2121} Ibid., 58  
Sibulo. At Bagotayog, this party was redirected to Basiad Bay, at the border of Tayabas and Camarines Norte, to meet Mata. A second patrol under Lieutenant Leonardo Golpe followed. Neither found Mata.

Central Luzon, D780/R-269

Outside Manila, the ROTC lads in the Hunters had destroyed their radio in June and linked up with Colonel Ramirez’s 34th Division. When the Japanese captured Ramirez, the Hunters tried to coordinate first with the Huks, then Thorp, Peralta, Straughn, and even Marking. They sent Captain Leonardo Aquino to Bataan and Zambales in late 1943 to develop intelligence contacts. He managed to organize four hundred poorly armed and trained men into a branch outfit called the Cavite Hunters. By January, a number of survivors of Straughn’s FAIT had joined the Hunters. “They lost thousands of members in counter guerrilla operations launched by the Japanese,” noted Panlilio, “yet throughout 1943 they continued to expand, at one time cooperating with Marking’s Guerillas, then with Colonel Ramsey’s East Central Luzon Sector guerrillas, and later with the 6th Military District force of Peralta on Panay.”²¹²³ When in early 1944 they opened fighting with Marking’s guerrillas and the Huks, Anderson intervened.

Marking’s guerrillas also developed branch organizations like the Texans in Cavite and Dunging’s Mountain Corps in Montalban, Rizal. By January, Marking claimed 200,000 organized men and women. He sent Serense to Manila to form the Guerrilla Intelligence Division (GID) from 600 handpicked men and women from Marking’s seventeen Manila regiments.²¹²⁴ The GID ran mail, collected food and

²¹²³ Villamor, 184.
²¹²⁴ Panlilio, 194.
supplies, mapped enemy locations, moved people, and conducted surveillance and spying. The couriers took the name the Pony Express. The escape teams became the Underground Railroad.

Visayas, D782/R-267

The latest PRS radio stations began coming on line. Sergeants Crispolo Robles and Anciento Manzano got station MAA operational on 28 January on Bondoc Peninsula on Luzon. Sergeant Restituto Besid and Privates Querubin Bargo and Andres Savellano put station MAB on Masbate on line on 29 January to relay their reports of traffic out on the Sibuyan Sea. Soon thereafter, Sergeants Gerardo Sanchez and Daniel Sabado had station MAD operating on Cebu.

Meanwhile on 26 January, the submarine *Narwhal* departed Fremantle under Lieutenant Commander Latta on its ninth war patrol with 90 tons of ammunition and supplies – and Chick Parsons. On 5 February, they unloaded 45 tons at Libertad, Panay. Parsons finally met with Peralta and was surprised to learn the colonel commanded approximately 12,000 men. They seemed well organized and disciplined. Parsons also noted the influence of Governor Tomás Confessor. Peralta professed complete loyalty to MacArthur and SWPA and Parsons promised him recognition and aid. *Narwhal* picked up six evacuees and two days later sailed to unload 45 more tons at

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2127 Ingham, 155.
Balatong Point, Negros, where Latta received another twenty-eight men, women and children to take to Australia.\textsuperscript{2128}

Central Luzon, D786/R-263

In the Nacoco store in Baguio, the Japanese had earlier arrested Manuel Enriquez and sent him to a Manila concentration camp. He had gotten released in October as part of the general amnesty that came with Philippine independence. Enriquez reorganized guerrillas in the Mountain Province and obtained a transmitter from Manila. Captain Ali Al-Raschid, Chief of Police of Baguio and former Philippine Army officer, supervised communications from Baguio.

In late 1943 an agent arrived at Enriquez headquarters and announced that Villamor had sent him to obtain a 14\textsuperscript{th} Infantry roster. The agent got the roster but turned out to be the swindler Franco Vera Reyes – the same man who caused trouble for Eugenio Lopez – who now worked for the Japanese. Fearing security had been irreparably compromised Enriquez held a conference with his top lieutenants and got them to agree that some of them should surrender to the Japanese. Several others fled to other areas and islands to join or organize guerrillas. A Japanese raid on the Nacoco

\textsuperscript{2128}Campbell noted the evacuees picked up from Panay: engineer William LeLand Archer, Thomas J. LeBlanc, Ben C. Zimmerman, P. Holme, and Army Air Corp members MAJ Carl E. Comeaux and ILT Bill Dean. From Negros they picked the Silliman university refugees Henry Roy Bell with his wife Edna Mae Bell and sons Kenneth and Donald and family friend 16-year old Emma Maud Vail; Reverend James F. Mckinley Jr. with his wife Virginia and daughters Cherie, Jill and Kathy; Arthur L. Carson with his wife Edith and their daughter Jean and son Robert; Robert Benton Silliman and his wife Metta and sister-in-law Abby R. Jacobs; David Watkins his wife Neives Adella “Ebing” and daughters Anna and a newborn baby girl; and Mildred Rachel Edwards. Accompanying them were US sailors LTCDR Frederick L. Worcester and SS2 Jopaul Little, airmen SSGT James E. Halkyard and CPL Joseph F. Boyland, and soldiers PVT Ramon Corona and PVT Gavin White. See also Theodore Roscoe, \textit{United States Submarine Operations in World War II} (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1949), 369.
Store rounded up most of the remainder of Enriquez’s men. Enriquez was again captured in February.

For guerrillas, the perils of famine surpassed even those of the capture. “Suddenly there was little left to eat in the land,” recalled Panlilio, “With hunger came another pale horseman, disease – with them both came short tempers which almost undid us all.”\textsuperscript{2129} She added, “The guerrillas and civilians alike clawed for food, the starving from the starving.”\textsuperscript{2130} Marking’s agents reported the effort the Japanese took to look like they were addressing the problem: of twenty-one ships departing Manila loaded with rice, twenty went to Tokyo but one turned around at Olongapo and returned to Manila to appear as if it were delivering rice to the Islands.\textsuperscript{2131} The people, however, watched price tags. In the Philippines, the price of a 56-kilogram \textit{cavan} of rice rose from about P7 in 1941, to P30 in late 1942, to P70 in mid-1943, to P250 by mid-1944, to P3,000 to P5,000 by December 1944, and to P12,000 in 1945.\textsuperscript{2132} At the same time, the average wages rose from P1.3 per day to about P4. “Until the harvest was reaped, the fighters would have to be kept quiet,” Panlilio wrote, “otherwise there would be more fighting in the foothills than harvesting. The Japs were demanding almost more than the harvest, and most of the seasonal crops had already been gathered in, but there was still \textit{palay} [husked rice] in the fields and, left in peace, the people could sneak enough of their own on the side to live through a while longer.”\textsuperscript{2133}

Northern Luzon, D795/R-254

\textsuperscript{2129} Panlilio, 196
\textsuperscript{2130} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2132} Collingham, 243.
\textsuperscript{2133} Panlilio, 187.
Volckmann toured guerrilla units in northern Luzon. Gualberto Sia had drawn remnants of McGuire’s troops near Olongapa and Botolan in Zambales into the USPINF-NL and attached them to Anderson in Tayabas in early 1944. The combined force counted about 4,000 men. On 10 February, Volkmann left Ifugao for Benguet where Counselor Tammicapao waited. Upon arriving at Camp Seven on the eastern side of the Taboy Valley, Volekmann learned of the U.S. invasion of the Marshall Islands. By 21 February, he reached Parker’s First District camp in northwestern Benguet and decided to make it his new USAFIP-NL headquarters. Captain Alipio Cubas’ 1st Battalion of the 121st Infantry in the Second District most impressed him especially the camp hospital and dental office. All the company camps held reveille and taps each day with the American and Philippine flags. The Women’s Auxiliary Service organized plays, dances and social events. “No wonder the morale of this unit was so high,” he remarked, “soldiering in Ifugao had never been like this!”

The USAFIP-NL commander directed Barnett to move a unit of the 121st Infantry north through Abra into Ilocos Norte to discover if Ablan’s guerrillas were still around. The Japanese fiercely repelled earlier such attempts. Barnett sent John O’Day with K and M companies. And he made contact with a local guerrilla leader east of Laoag. Days later they suffered a strong Japanese attack. “O’Day determined that he was not going to be run out of the area,” Volckmann noted, “and, suspicious of this local leader, detailed agents to watch him closely.” O’Day called for a meeting with the local guerrilla leader and demanded he lay down his arms. When the local leader attempted to flee, O’Day shot him down along with several of his men. “It turned out that the Japs, in order

2134 Volckmann, 147.
2135 Ibid., 153.
to protect the Laoag area,” explained Volekmann, “which included the largest Japanese air base in the North Luzon, had cleverly organized and armed groups of natives who posed as guerrillas.” O’Day broke the sham operation and opened the area to the USAFIP-NL. RobertArnold went to Ilocos Norte to command the Third District.

Barnett’s 121st Regiment also identified a collaborator living next to a Japanese garrison in his area. His guerrillas snuck in at night and executed the man. “I don’t know how they did this under the noses of the Japanese,” Blackburn reported, “but they put him up on the flagpole right in front of the Japanese garrison. The next morning the Japs found him hanging there. Well, that town cleared up in short order.” Blackburn considered the effectiveness of such a bold but foolhardy act: “If you could eliminate spies almost in the presence of the Japs, then nobody is going to continue being a collaborator.”

Manila, D797/R-252

With the Americans marching west across the Pacific, Japanese military planners considered the Philippines as a future battlefield. Then the Dampier Straits in New Guinea fell on 12 February, bringing the Philippines into the front line. The Imperial Army headquarters declared, “The Philippine operation will be a decisive battle with the main American force.” Geography dictated they prepare for many separate battles in the Islands.

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2136 Volekmann, 153.
2137 Blackburn Interview, 144.
2138 Ibid.
With U.S. forces “advancing far faster than we had expected,” the Japanese in Manila “began intensive suppressive operations and enforced strict regulations in the important sectors so as to simplify defensive operations.”\textsuperscript{2140} Their plan: 1) blockade the main straights to prevent submarine transits; 2) build defenses of islands and harbors; 3) watch the coasts; 4) actions for “capturing enemy radios and the sectors in which the guerrillas are in operation”; and, 5) organize an anti-sub task force.\textsuperscript{2141} The army tasked the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Signal Regiment with employing the Radio Direction Finding Unit as needed to locate enemy radios.\textsuperscript{2142}

Senator Jose Ozámiz, recently commissioned by Parsons as a lieutenant colonel, served as Laurel’s chief of the Games Amusement Division. He suddenly resigned that position to become a fulltime guerrilla intelligence agent. On 11 February, Japanese police arrested him after discovering on him a letter addressed to Manuel Roxas from Parsons.\textsuperscript{2143} The Kempeitai rounded up twenty-nine other Filipinos in Manila believed to be associated with the guerrillas, all betrayed by a member of the Makapili.\textsuperscript{2144} According to a later G-2 report, the arrests were a result of information gleaned by the agent on Mindoro who had been observing Phillip’s contacts.\textsuperscript{2145}

Kempeitai chief Colonel Nagahama went with three truckloads of military police to see Laurel and demand Roxas’ arrest. Laurel’s son alerted the palace guards and tense situation developed. Laurel refused to allow Nagahama to arrest Roxas and said, “If you insist on arresting Roxas, you must get orders from the High Command. You are a mere

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\textsuperscript{2140} Ibid., 12.  \\
\textsuperscript{2141} Ibid., 13.  \\
\textsuperscript{2142} Ibid., 18.  \\
\textsuperscript{2143} Agoncillo, Vol. I, 411.  \\
\textsuperscript{2144} Cuezon.  \\
\textsuperscript{2145} Intelligence Activities, 56. 
\end{flushright}
subordinate and I refuse to deal with you.”2146 Nagahama departed but promised he would get Roxas. Laurel called on Ambassador Murata and Hamamoto Masakatsu to get Kuroda to move against Nagahama.

Mindanao, D800/R-249

Lieutenant Adolph Sternberg, Jr. of the U.S. Army Air Corps joined Fertig’s guerrillas after spending more than a year bedridden with a tropical skin disease with Laureta’s force along the Libuganon River in Davao province. Fertig sent him back to Davao as a liaison officer between the 130th Regiment and the 110th Division. Once there he was given eighty men to form a Special Intelligence Detachment near Matlivas, Davao. SWPA later reported, “LT Sternberg’s intelligence activities in the Davao area have been quite valuable.”2147

On 15 February, the submarine Narwhal arrived at Darwin and transferred its thirty-four passengers from the Philippines to an Army tug before docking. After a day of resupply and refit, Narwhal departed Darwin for a return to the Philippines with Lieutenant Colonel Ernest McClish and Major Clyde Childress along with Lieutenants William H. Kimbrough, M. M. Wheeler, and S.R. Silva, four Filipino soldiers (Staff Sergeants A.T. Sarmento, Conrado A. Gustilo, Louis Cotez and SGT Paterno A. Ortiz), and several enlisted U.S. Army soldiers. When guerrillas however failed to appear at a planned rendezvous at Mautabuan Island, Tawi-Tawi, to receive seven-man team under Lieutenant William H. Kimbrough and supplies, Skipper Latta sailed on to Mindanao.

On 2 March, the *Narwhal* entered the mouth of the Augusan River at Naspit ready to deliver McClish and Childress with 70 tons of supplies. Latta spotted a prearranged guerrilla signal on Cabadbaran Beach. At 1850 hours he sent forward a boat carrying Lieutenant Commander Wilson, McClish and Childress. They returned to inform the skipper that the river was too rough for the guerrillas’ barge, so Latta advanced in the moonless night into the channel to a point where he could conduct the transfer.\footnote{Office of Naval Records and History, Ships’ Histories Section, Navy Department, “History of USS Narwhal (SS 167),” 9. Microfilm Reel Job No, H108, AR-229-76, Naval District Washington Microfilm Section, available at https://www.scribd.com/doc/176290597/SS-167-Narwhal-Part1 accessed 29 July 2016.}

Ashore Warrant Officer Walter Wallace stood with twenty-nine service men and eight civilians awaiting evacuation. Wallace wrote: “never in my life had I seen men go so wild with enthusiasm as we did then. Hats were thrown into the air, we kissed and hugged each other, we shouted and cheered, and cheered and shouted, until no one had any breath left to shout and cheer longer.”\footnote{Campbell} By 0230 that night, despite the extremely difficult conditions, the 70 tons of supplies were in Fertig’s control. Twenty-eight evacuees (and Parsons) made it aboard the sub.\footnote{Campbell identified 20 evacuatees from Mindanao: sailors SM1 Bruce Gordon Elliot, TM1 Martin Henry DeVries, SC2 Henry C. Rooke, Steward Benjamin Licodo; Army airmen CPT Thomas Jurika, CPL William P. Williams, radioman Earl Chester Homan, Jr., mechanic Leonard Lee Merchant, mechanic Frank Divino, Wilbur E. Dallenbach, McVe J. Vigouroux, Robert E. Gentry, Earl A. Cook; Australians 1LT James Kennedy, Leslie Gillon, Raymond Steele; Norwegian Arne Hansen (or Ragnand Myhre); civilians Frank Forrest Hamlin, Charles S. Miller, Jr. and his wife. At Tawi Tawi he noted seven civilians, three “Python commandos,” and two ‘unauthorized passengers’ trapped on board by the sudden arrival of the Japanese ships, identified as LT J.V. Valera and possibly CPL Likabul. AIB’s MAJ William L. Jinkins was also picked up.}

The next day in the Sulu Sea, Latta engaged and damaged the 560-ton *Karatsu*, the river gunboat formerly known as the *USS Luzon*. On 5 March *Narwhal* returned to Tawi-Tawi, this time to Bohi Gansa, in difficult currents between the beach and reefs. Captain Hamner came out with two small boats to receive the remaining 20 tons of
supply. Latta inflated his four rubber boats and broke open all cases of carbines to assist in the transfer. Even with ten evacuees arriving aboard to assist, the delivery was incomplete when three Japanese destroyers arrived and forced *Narwhal* to escape. Departing with Hamner were British Army Captain Douglas Keith Broadhurst, Captain Paddy O’Keefe, Colonel John F. ‘Sugar’ Caine, Marine Corporal William Dewey Swift, airman John E. Spruill, and soldier Edward A. Chmielewski.\(^{2151}\)

As Latta exited the bay he passed several sailboats at no more than twenty-five yards, one of whose crew repeatedly bowed apparently assuming the submarine was Japanese before he broke into celebration at seeing the white face of the captain. The next day *Narwhal* attacked and sank a transport and suffered the most intense depth charge assault it would experience during the war. Latta reported, “Hatch wheels spun, lights went out, fuses blew, the port annunciator splintered in a symmetrical sunburst design as the escort crossed directly overhead between #2 and #3 charges. At 1855 Narwhal was at 220 feet as two more depth charges came down and the crew was wishing for a soundproof blanket to pull over their heads.”\(^{2152}\) Forty minutes later the last two charges detonated. At 2135 hours the sub surfaced to an empty sea. Latta completed his last war patrol with the *Narwhal* on 11 March on return to Port Darwin and transferred the passengers to the Australian Navy tug *Chinampa* and then headed to Fremantle for short refit and a change of commanders. *Narwhal* finally arrived on 20 March at Freemantle. Latta finished his tour as one of the unsung heroes of the Philippine resistance.

\(^{2151}\) Campbell

On the northeast corner Samar, Charles Smith found a new home for radio station MACA. Using the 50-watt radio with a hundred-foot antenna stretched between two trees on top of a 1,300-foot peak, Ball had them back on the air in the second week of February from a makeshift camp of huts in Palapag Mesa. Smith’s team established alternate radio sites with stores of fuel, equipment and money in case the Japanese arrived and they had to ‘bug out.’ As their satellite stations came up on the net, Ball and Stahl set up shifts from 0600 to 2200 hours daily to monitor the weak signals through heavy earphones. With only inexperienced Morse code operator for assistance, the two Americans found themselves having to monitor calls personally.\textsuperscript{2153} Stahl recalled, “So many stations – Army, Navy, and civilian – communicated on our assigned frequencies that the interference was, at times, horrendous.”\textsuperscript{2154} Only through experience did they learn how to wait until the interfering signal stopped, pick out the weaker MACA net communication, and vary the signal’s pitch to distinguish it from the other noise.

With the station in operation, Smith took Stahl to settle with the contemptuous Captain Merritt in Catubig. The impression was, Stahl recalled, that “Merritt would go with the side that did the most for him, and he hadn’t yet heard the Japanese offer.”\textsuperscript{2155} Merritt prepared a fiesta to greet his guests while Smith prepared for confrontation. Stahl said of Merritt, “He was much larger than any Filipino I had yet seen. His skin color and Negroid facial features belied any Filipino heritage. Filipinos are brown. He was black. In addition, he had the curly hair of an African Negro.”\textsuperscript{2156} During the evening party Stahl

\textsuperscript{2153} Stahl, 70.  
\textsuperscript{2154} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{2155} Ibid., 75.  
\textsuperscript{2156} Ibid.
observed from a distance that neither Merritt nor Smith drank any alcoholic beverages and their tense discussion grew increasingly bitter. “Finally, Smith stood up and slid his hand down to his pistol,” Stahl reported, “I stood up and cocked my tommy gun. ‘Listen to me, you black bastard!’ Smith shouted, ‘I’m in control of this island. If you do anything to try to stop me, or help the Japs stop me, I’ll cut your balls off and ship them back to Africa!’ Not one of Merritt’s men moved in the face of the tommy gun and the BARs held at the ready by Ochigue and Catalina. From that day forward Merritt gave Smith very little help, but he gave no trouble either.2157 The confrontation said as much about the racial biases the actors carried as did about the nature of intra-guerrilla power politics.

Charles Smith received a report from Lapus. He reported to SWPA that Lapus “had the foundation of a good intelligence net started and that he had given Lapus financial assistance.”2158 That support undoubtedly undermined Turko’s efforts that month to get Lapus to join Zabat in a unified Bicol force. With it went Zabat’s chance to win Peralta’s recognition as 5th MD commander. Zabat ordered Captain Garcia to bring Miranda to heel, but Garcia never tried.2159

By now Peralta had developed an extensive intelligence network in Manila organized as the 43rd Division under Captain Ricardo Perez. The division’s four regiments supported sabotage missions conducted by a unit under I. B. Fernandez with a reported 1,000 members.2160 In early 1944, however, Japanese agents uncovered the unit and captured most of its agents.

2157 ibid.
2158 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 31
2159 Barrameda, 162.
2160 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 67.
Meanwhile Ramsey continued his three-hundred-mile journey across the Islands to Mindoro in search of the radio sent to him by SWPA. On 21 February, Anderson notified Lapham that he had not heard from Ramsey since November (when he headed for Mindoro). Two weeks later Anderson distributed an order to all Ramsey’s ECLGA guerrillas signed “Bernard L. Anderson, Capt, Infantry, U.S. Army Commanding.”  He bequeathed Ramsey’s northern Neuva Ecija, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and northern Tayabas provinces to Lapham. (When Ramsey returned, Lapham recalled, “Ed raised no protest against this action; indeed he never made trouble of any kind for me.” The transfer did bother Volckmann however.)

On his trek, Ramsey hacked through dense jungle, sailed within fifty yards of a Japanese destroyer in an early morning mist, rode in horse carts escorted by unfamiliar guerrillas, and fought typhoon-whipped waves off the coast Mindoro. “Whenever I would find myself outcast in some barrio, or buried deep in the jungle,” he wrote, “I would answer the inevitable question of what was I doing here, how I had gotten here, with the simple, sobering assurance that it was my job. But the guerrilla movement had grown far beyond a job, and its goals and ideals had surpassed duty’s ability to explain them.”

Ramsey’s deep reflection on guerrilla warfare, and his place in it, was something most guerrilla leaders experienced. He later explained: “Guerrilla struggle, I began to realize, had altered not only my understanding of tactics but also my whole concept of the nature of war, from that of a conflict fought by the rules with conventional weapons to one fought by instinct, with faith and devotion above all. And, inescapably, it was

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2161 Lapham and Norling, 118.
2162 Ibid., 119.
2163 Ramsey and Rivele, 222-223.
altering my understanding of myself, not only as a soldier but also as a man.”

He became conscious of a truism of successful guerrillas few recognized. “I was no longer merely with the Filipino people, Ramsey realized, “I was of them… Their struggle had become my struggle, and their liberation, inevitably, would be mine as well.”

Traveling across the cultural landscape of the Islands, Ramsey began to appreciate the different values embraced by the different groups of native guerrillas. As Lapham explained, “Some such bands were led by Americans, but an overwhelming majority in all them were Filipinos whose motives were varied: hatred of the Japanese enemy, a desire to plunder, sheer fear, or some combination of these.”

The guerrilla leaders shared had one common interest with the people everywhere – MacArthur’s return. “MacArthur was reality,” Ramsey reported, “the long, unfailing cable that bound us to the outside world. He had promised to return and he would return, and when he did he would need our help.”

In March, Ramsey finally made it to Ruffy’s headquarters near Bongabong. “I was impressed with Ruffy’s camp,” he recalled, “It was large and well organized, with a kind of permanence I didn’t usually associate with guerrilla forces. Rows of well-built thatch-and-nipa barracks stood on streets edged in stone.”

Ruffy had with him twenty-three officers and 600 men with local governments and volunteer Home Guard formations established in the guerrilla-controlled areas. Phillips provided liaison to

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2164 Ibid., 223.
2165 Ibid.
2166 Lapham and Norling, 103.
2167 Ramsey and Rivele, 226-227.
SWPA and arranged support. Disappointingly, however, Ramsey learned that Phillips had already returned with his radio to his base on the opposite coast of Mindoro.

An unexpected visitor to Ruffy’s camp was waiting for Ramsey: Peralta’s representative Jurado. The ECLGA commander was unaware that Phillips had tried to recruit Ruffy as an independent commander for the PRS, but Ruffy had previously submitted to Peralta. In fact, on 9 January, Phillips had informed SWPA that after meeting with Ruffy and his executive officer Beloncio, he recommended appointing Ruffy as 4th MD commander. Ramsey had walked into a full-blown tug-of-war over Ruffy between Jurado and Phillip’s representative, his executive officer Captain R. Galang. Ramsey just wanted a radio.

“We have heard rumors that Phillips’ camp was raided,” Ruffy told him, “and since then I have had no radio contact with him. No one knows if he escaped or is even alive.”\footnote{Narwhal} tried to contact Phillips on 26 February spent two days looking for him with no success. Ramsey waited ten days. Finally, a half-naked and clearly exhausted Warrant Officer B.L Wise of Phillips’ group stumbled into Ruffy’s camp to report that the Japanese had indeed raided his position near Naujan and killed or drove off their team and captured their radio and equipment.\footnote{SWPA G-2 recorded the Warrant officer’s name as B.L. Wise (Intelligence Activities) but the West Point data base on American guerrillas in the Philippines identifies him as Second Lieutenant David Wise (http://www.west-point.org/family/japanese-pow/Guerrillas/Guerrillas-List.htm).} Phillips and Wise had wandered the jungle for week before they ran into a Japanese patrol that opened fire and killed Phillips. Wise had spent a month struggling to make it back to Ruffy.

Years later the U.S. would learn that when Parsons had decided to land Phillips team in the town of Paluan, he inadvertently delivered them to the Japanese. Captured

\footnote{Intelligence Activities, 37.}
\footnote{Ramsey and Rivele., 231.}
documents would reveal Japanese intelligence reports for the period of 17 February to 7 March 1944: “Maj. Phillips, WO Wise, and six Filipinos landed on Paluan, Mindoro with equipment. They brought small wireless sets to mountains north of Paluan Town on that island and reported details concerning ship movements to Maj Phillips until 15 February this year.” After apparently monitoring Phillips’s contacts, they sent a patrol into the Mount Calavite area and caught the American team off guard near the end of February.

Attacks like the one on Phillips hurt in many ways. A promising station was lost. Wise reported that Phillips had thrown some papers, codes and messages he carried into nearby bushes when the Japanese appeared. In March 1945 a Japanese prisoner at Hollandia testified that he knew Phillip’s code texts were recovered and decoded. The team scattered. Galang joined Harder and Staff Sergeant V.A. Pinnela in Manila. Wise, First Lieutenant R.P. Songo and Technician Fourth Grade A.A. Alberto escaped to join Jurado in his move to Panay. Wise and Songo would die before the war ended while Alberto disappeared. Staff Sergeant A. Banaires was believed captured and likely executed. Technician Fifth Class R.D. Vitorio was captured and “told what he knew to the Japanese. His diary confirmed information he reported.”

As Ramsey prepared to return to Luzon, Peralta sent word that he had arranged for a submarine delivering supplies to the southern tip of Mindoro to take Ramsey back to Australia. “It was tempting, it was tantalizing,” Ramsey recalled, “But I knew I could not leave.” Only after Ramsey declined the offer did Ruffy reluctantly show him a cable: “MacArthur to Ramsey: Request that you return to Luzon to command your

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2172 Intelligence Activities, 37.
2173 Ibid., 39.
2174 Ramsey and Rivele., 39.
2175 Ibid., 234.
resistance forces. [signed MacArthur].” Ramsey realized Peralta was aware of this order and still tried to get him to leave the Philippines. He gathered his entourage and left for Luzon immediately.

After cheating death, Wise returned to Australia but insisted on returning to the Philippines to re-establish Phillips’ coast watching station. He was lost aboard the submarine SS-197 Seawolf when it was sunk while carrying him back to Mindoro. Beloncio and Ruffy fell out soon afterwards and their Bolo Battalion collapsed. Beloncio, supported by Peralta, broke from Ruffy and took with him the A, C, and D companies to the 6th MID. Ruffy, left with B Company, fled to central Mindoro and soon rebuilt his force to about 300 to 400 men.

Manila, D823/R-226

On 9 March, Major General Shiyoku Kou (Hong Sa-ik) arrived in Manila from command of the 108th Infantry Brigade in China to assume command of all POW camps in the Islands. An ethnic Korean, he was a distinguished officer honored with promotion to lieutenant general in October. The atrocities committed in the camps under his name no doubt contributed to the creation of a well-known saying in the Philippines: “The Koreans committed more atrocities than the Japanese” (Mas malupit ang mga Koreano kaysa mga Hapon). As Lydia N. Yu Jose has noted, however, unlike in China, the Japanese used few Korean troops in the Philippines; the old saying was not true.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{2176}} \text{Ibid., 234.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2177}} \text{Lydia N. Yu-Jose, “The Koreans in Second World War Philippines: Rumor and History,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, June 2012, 324.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2178}} \text{Ibid.}\]
That month the U.S. Navy began raids on the Japanese forces on Palau. Senior Japanese officers later admitted, “In 1944, the enemy’s attack became more violent and progressed beyond our expectations.”

The Imperial General Headquarters reassessed the strategic situation. They saw the next likely phase of the war would center in the area between the Palau Islands, New Guinea and Philippines. Efforts to defend this area began at once.

The Japanese Imperial Headquarters sent an Expeditionary Group team under Lieutenant General Sosaku Suzuki to Formosa, the Philippines and Borneo to “improve Army equipment and head efforts being made to bring about cooperation in operations for the protection of the sea lanes.” The allied advances had increased the strategic importance of the Philippines. As one general staff officer noted: “The geographical position of the Philippines in the Southern Area is equivalent to the pivot on a fan and thus is an important rear line communication and took active part during entire operation.”

The Army Section of Imperial General Headquarters issued a report, “Recent Conditions in the Philippines,” which said in part: “in the Philippines, even after independence, pro-American ideas are still widespread and stubbornly upheld within every social strata and class, and cannot be extracted.” This condition bred resistance and undermined Japanese endeavors to hold the Islands. “The attitude of the inhabitants,” the army planners noted, “who are displeased with our rule in the past, is a matter of prime concern. It is impossible to fight the enemy and at the same time suppress the

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2179 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 48.
2180 Ibid., 25.
2181 Ibid.
2182 Satoshi, 27.
activities of the guerrillas.” The report went on to suggest that the persistent pro-American sentiment throughout the government – save Laurel and a few others – indicated that the JMA had been too complacent with the Filipino elites. Rumors of a coup against Laurel circulated in Manila, raising suspicions between Filipino and Japanese, especially the military among the 31st Garrison Unit’s Colonel Inuzuka, the Information Bureau’s Tomoji Kageyama, and their associates. Kageyama in particular had long favored the Sakdalistas and objected to the Japanese army treatment of Benigno Ramos and his followers.

The Imperial Army leaders feared that both the Filipinos and the Japanese army in the Philippines had become lax and “thus were apt to become careless in their work which attached importance to military administration.” Preoccupation with guerrillas led to neglect of defense plans “which needed revision to meet the changes in the conditions.” Insufficient transportation, manpower and equipment had hampered efforts to improve the defenses since June. Additionally, the army reported, “Enemy attacks increased in violence day after day and heavy damages were imposed on our transports by enemy submarines.”

The Japanese expected that any American return to the Philippines would begin in the southern-most island of Mindanao. In March, Major Yamajo Chotoku, Fourteenth Army Intelligence Section, Manila Branch, sent a request to the Imperial General Staff for agents – “preferably a Haji” – to coordinate ‘Moro operations’ against Americans in

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2183 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 41-42.
2184 Motoe, 78.
2186 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 19.
2187 Ibid.
2188 Ibid., 20.
the Philippines. The General Staff forwarded the request to the Greater Japan Islam Association (*Dai-Nippon Kaikyo Kyokai*). The Association offered a three-man survey team consisting of former Great Asia Society chairman Okamoto Jingo, Association member and Japanese Muslim Owada Masato, and young linguist and Association researcher Furukawa Harukaze.

The Imperial Army staff ordered the transfer of the Southern Army General Headquarters from Singapore to Manila. Further orders called for strengthening strategic points in the Islands by July. Revised plans foresaw a division in the Surigao-Cagayan, another in the Davao-Cotabato Area, and another for the Palawan and Sulu Islands. These plans announced “a minimum strength of approximately seven divisions will be required in the defense.”

The Japanese planners also had to calculate the forces needed against the guerrillas. They categorized two required types anti-guerrilla missions while the army opposed MacArthur: first, the protection of installations including “railway, roads, bridges, communication, harbor installations, airbases, mines, factories, and munition dumps”; second, the maintenance of “order in the districts.” From experience in Manchuria and China, they calculated “approximately 24 battalions is necessary for the said defense” and concluded, “the defense strength in the Philippines requires a minimum of seven field divisions and about 24 garrison battalions.” By these numbers, the situation in the Philippines looked grim. The army planners in Manila noted: “The

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2189 Midori, 109.
2190 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 45.
2191 Ibid., 48.
2192 Ibid., 43.
2193 Ibid.
2194 Ibid.
strength on hand added up to only a field division (the 16th Division) and four independent mixed brigades (the 30th through 33rd Brigades, a total of 24 battalions). It was concluded that six divisions must be dispatched immediately.\textsuperscript{2195} This request went to the Imperial Headquarters in March, and brought only plans for a gradual build up “due to the decrease of the transports.”\textsuperscript{2196}

Panay, D834/R-215

The submarine SS-240 \textit{Angler} under Lieutenant Commander Robert I. Olsen was about thirty days into its second war patrol in Philippine waters when suddenly Olsen received orders to head for northern Panay to evacuate ten Americans.\textsuperscript{2197} Before dawn on 20 March, the skipper reached a point eight miles south of the rendezvous point off Libertad and waited for dusk. “About 0900 a crowd of people was seen walking behind the tree line on the beach, and an hour later the prescribed signals were hoisted in the palms along the water’s edge,” Theodore Roscoe reported, “The submarine waited offshore, submerged. Then at sunset Angler surfaced, crew at battle stations, and with decks awash moved to within a 1,000 yards of the beach.”\textsuperscript{2198} A banca met the \textit{Angler} and Lieutenant Colonel Cerilo Garcia, Peralta’s First Combat Team commander, stepped across to inform Olsen there were 58 people including 16 women and children awaiting evacuation – a number almost equal to the total crew on the submarine.

On the twelve-day run back to Darwin, the boat’s entire crew berthed in a cramped after battery compartment, minus the torpedo watch-standers. “Concerning the

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\textsuperscript{2195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2196} Ibid., 44.
\textsuperscript{2198} Ibid.
passengers,” Olsen noted, “Men and boys lived in after torpedo room, women and children in forward torpedo room. CPO quarters were inhabited by one woman with a two months old baby, one pregnant woman (8 months), one seriously ill girl (worms – temperature 104 degrees) and two elderly women. Ship was immediately infested with cockroaches, body lice, and hair lice. A large percentage of the passengers had tropical ulcers plus an odor that was unique in its intensity.”2199 The half-starved passengers bore lacerated feet that required medical attention. One male evacuee suffered a complete mental breakdown and Olsen placed him under 24-hour guard.

The sailors noted how the passengers rapidly devoured all food passed their way. Without enough food for everyone on board, the captain put crew and passengers on rations of two meals per day with soup at midnight. Olsen added, “Habitability forward of the control room resembled the ‘Black Hole’ of Calcutta, a condition which resulted from children urinating and spitting on the deck, body odors, and 47 persons sleeping forward of the control room. In spite of the constant watch at the head it proved impossible to teach our passengers the proper use of this vehicle after two years in the hills…”2200 On 9 April, Angler arrived at Freemantle, Australia.

Southern Luzon, D839/R-210

After more than 800 days, most Filipinos had learned to live with the war. “Like Manila and other population centers,” Barrameda wrote, “Naga had since settled into a somnolently placid and economically squeezed acceptance of the bored enemy, the underground movement only momentarily and not often breaking through the tranquil

2199 Roscoe, 370.
2200 Ibid.
surface of mixed disquiet and grey despair.” 2201 In late February, the Japanese in Naga had sent a team of Filipinos led by Governor Andres Hernandez and Judge Gabriel Petro to negotiate with the TVGU. 2202 Miranda, Aureus and others met them in San Gabriel, Pamplona. Miranda sensed low morale in his enemy.

The negotiators presented Hitomi’s ‘sit-it-out’ argument: “The war was between Japan and America. There was no reason for the Filipinos and the Japanese to continue fighting each other. If the Americans came back to the Philippines, the Filipino people were free to renew their allegiance to the white men. But in the meantime, why should Filipinos make their lives miserable? The guerrillas could go home and they would not be bothered at all.” 2203 Miranda asked the Japanese to demonstrate sincerity and disarm the rondas under Rey and San Jose within the next two weeks.

Geronimo San Jose and Teodoro Rey led bands of anti-guerrilla ‘rondas’ (vigilantes) in Sipocot. “They professed no love for the guerrillas,” Barrameda wrote, “served the political interests of the Japanese invaders who tolerated their extralegal existence, robbed and abused civilians and claimed they were maintaining law and order.” 2204 When the Japanese failed to act, Miranda sent a detachment under Lieutenant Sibulo to Awayan to disarm Teodoro Rey’s smaller group. San Jose reacted violently, assaulting the towns of Sipocot and Malinao, wounding many civilians and sending many more to a detention pen in Tara. 2205 Sibulo turned his patrols against San Jose.

The Japanese responded by arresting Aureus’ sisters and other TVGU relatives and sending them to the Tara prison as hostages for the return of Rey’s weapons. They

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2201 Barrameda, 91.
2202 Ibid.
2203 Ibid., 94.
2204 Ibid., 23.
2205 Ibid., 95.
also sent twenty Japanese soldiers and forty Constabulary troops to burn down the TVGU barracks in Tila, Cambalidio, and an ordnance post in Malinao. On 25 March, Miranda ordered the sixteen rifles taken from Rey delivered to the Japanese in Quitang, Pasacao. When the authorities did not free Aureus’ sisters and the others as promised, Miranda went to the city hall, the Ateneo de Naga building, to meet with the Japanese. They released the sisters and arrested Miranda. With the assistance of Tom Kilates and other double agents, however, he escaped back to the TVGU just before the Japanese could complete his scheduled execution.

In the first week of April, San Jose led his rondas with support from the Japanese on a two-week campaign of brutal raids in the Libmanan-Sipocot area. By this time the Goa agreement uniting Padua and the TVGU had fallen apart. Some of Padua’s Camp Isarog II force joined the Turko command and moved into TVGU Lieutenant Sibulo’s area by order of Colonel Zabat, now arch rival to Lupus and Miranda. “Zabat’s order in January 1944 to the Boayes [Turko] men,” Barrameda wrote, “was to whip Miranda into line and make him accept Zabat’s leadership.” Warned about Turko and Padua, Sibulo kept his B Company intact and in an anxious coexistence through September. Then the Turko-Padua forces conducted ten attacks on the Japanese, apparently in an effort to win over the locals from the TVGU. The Japanese responded by torturing and beheading a number of area citizens through mid-October.

Visayas, D846/R-203

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2206 Ibid., 107.
2207 Barrameda, 108.
In the meantime, the Japanese continued military actions to neutralize the guerrillas. Raids in Mindoro in March captured the radio first set up by Jurado on Tablas. When the Japanese forced its movement the previous December, Jurado had taken it to Mindoro, then Marinduque, then back to the northwest tip of Mindoro. To reestablish this broken link, Peralta would send Jurado back to Mindoro in mid-1944 with orders to rebuild the station under the 1st Combat Team.

Following Fenton’s execution and a strong Japanese attack in January, James Cushing set on rebuilding the guerrillas on Cebu. Shortly afterward, SWPA recognized Cushing as the commander of the 8th MD in the Cebu area, sent him supplies, and established direct radio contact in March. By April, Cushing had organized 5,687 men with 2,700 mixed arms into the 85th, 86th, 87th, and 88th Regiments. He established an intelligence net and sent information directly to Australia. Cushing then requested Bohol added to his district. Fertig also claimed Bohol and sent supplies there. Fertig, Peralta and Abcede would each maintain agents on Bohol.

Cebu, D845/R-204

On 31 March 1944 began what MacArthur termed “One of the most dramatic incidents of the war.”  Just after sunset, two four-engine Kawanishi HSK2 flying boats left besieged Palau for Davao, Mindanao. Aboard one was Admiral Mineichi Koga, Yamamoto’s successor as commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet. His chief of staff, Rear Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, flew separately with fourteen staff officers. Fukudome brought with him a leather case sealed in a box containing Koga’s plans for decisive

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2208 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 205.
naval operations. The recently updated copies of Combined Fleet Secret Operations Order No. 73 and "A Study of the Main Features of Decisive Air Operations in the Central Pacific" were bound in a red cover marked with a ‘Z.’ Only a month earlier, the Imperial General Staff approved the ‘Z plan’ for defense against advancing U.S. forces.

A violent storm brought down Koga's plane and all its passengers. Fukudome’s plane diverted to Manila, but running low on fuel tried for Cebu and crashed into the Bohol Strait about two hours after midnight. By dawn thirteen survivors of the twenty-five passengers had swam the two and half miles to Cebu where James Cushing reportedly led 25,000 Filipino guerrillas. Spotting Cebu City about six miles to the north, the survivors decided to swim up the coast to link up with the Japanese garrison. At about 1100 hours, however, fishermen from Magtalisay captured Fukudome and ten others. Two other survivors managed to take one canoe and continue to Cebu City. The natives decided to take their captives to guerrillas near Basak. Before they got there, Japanese airplanes began circling overhead looking for them.

U.S. signals intelligence decoded an emergency message from the Japanese High Command in Tokyo alerting various commanders that Admiral Koga and important documents had gone missing. Cebu City garrison commander, Lieutenant Colonel Seiiti Ohnisi, sent out 2,000 soldiers on a ruthless search, leaving burnt villages and slaughtered inhabitants in their wake. They even released boxes at the crash site and found they floated to Magtalisay. Nearby, early on 3 April, villagers Pedro Gantuangoko and Rufo “Opoy” Wamer had found a box containing documents in the surf and hid it from

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2210 Guerrilla Resistance Movements in the Philippine, 38.
2211 Bradsher.
Japanese patrols before passing it to Corporal Norberto “Berting” Varga of the local guerrillas just before the Japanese burned their homes.\textsuperscript{2212}

On 8 April, Cushing reported the crash and survivors to SWPA. Cushing also passed along his concern about the intense Japanese search. The natives had killed one of the Japanese who had tried to escape. Whitney offered to have the captives moved to another island but Cushing knew it would be hard to move them to a link up spot. Three prisoners were badly hurt; Fukudome was litter bound and running a fever of nearly 104 degrees. His aide, Commander Yuji Yamamoto, spoke enough English to convince the guerrillas that Fukudome was General Twani Furomei, commander of forces in Macassar, Celebes. Cushing talked with the general, who spoke English well, and came away suspicious.

On 9 April, with Japanese patrols closing in, Cushing urged SWPA to remove the prisoners but his message did not reach SWPA for three days. Cushing evacuated his base and moved with twenty-five guerrillas and the captives towards Kamungayan where he learned that the Japanese had taken over 100 Filipinos as hostages to exchange for the prisoners. A Japanese patrol, supported by aircraft, intercepted Cushing’s group and killed two guerrillas and a nurse. Knowing more enemy were on the way, Cushing decided to negotiate.

Late that night, Cushing sent two guerrillas and two prisoners to Ohnisi with an offer to release his prisoners if the Japanese would end their violent campaign. Meanwhile he desperately sought guidance from SWPA. Ohnisi ended negotiations and demanded the immediate release of the prisoners. Near midnight Cushing radioed SWPA of his decision but two days would pass before SPWA got the message. At noon the next day, the two sides completed the exchange. Ohnisi told Cushing, “I expect to see you

again in the battle field some day.”\textsuperscript{2213} Too late, SWPA informed Cushing of a scheduled submarine rendezvous to pick up the prisoners. Fukodome was back in Tokyo by 29 April. Ohnisi’s troops were back on the warpath by 13 April – with orders to avoid attacks on civilians.

According to Villamor, Whitney had said: “Cushing is an unusual study in himself. Showing little strength in civil life, now badly crippled by arthritis and committed to the use of crutches most of the time, his fighting spirit has dominated Cebu resistance since the surrender and his leadership over a following badly harassed by consistently superior enemy forces is remarkable. I believe he and his followers merit all assistance reasonably possible.”\textsuperscript{2214} The decision to surrender the prisoners caused some of the senior SWPA officers to doubt Cushing’s nerve. On 13 April, however, Cushing sent word that he had received some important looking Japanese documents.

According to Cushing, the haul brought in by Gantuangoko and Opoy Wamer included Japanese operations maps “showing airbases, naval bases, wireless stations, emergency landing fields, triangulation points, heights, and other control symbols in the legend” for Palau, the Philippines, French Indo-China, Hainan Island, and South China.\textsuperscript{2215} After consulting with Whitney, on 15 April Cushing put the documents into five empty cartons designed for 81mm mortar shells and sent them with Captain Celso C. Enriquez and escaped German prisoner Herbert Ritter on a two week trek to Andrews in Culipapa, Negros.\textsuperscript{2216} Over the next two weeks two more batches of documents arrived at

\textsuperscript{2213} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2214} Villamor, 265.
\textsuperscript{2215} Barreveld, 161.
\textsuperscript{2216} Ibid., 164. Note: Bradsher identifies the couriers as Russ Snell and Jimmy Dyer.
Cushing’s headquarters; the first he sent to Andrews and the second to Fertig in an attempt to catch a submarine.

Reports that the Japanese on Cebu were offering P50,000 for documents lost in the crash raised eyebrows at SPWA. When on 4 May Andrews reported receiving the first documents, Chief of Staff Sutherland got the Navy to divert the SS-291 *Crevalle* under Lieutenant Commander Francis David Walker, Jr., from a patrol off Borneo late on May 7 to pick up twenty-five evacuees from Negros. Whitney coordinated with Abcède to oversee a secret transfer and pick up of the documents within thirty minutes. At dusk on 11 May, *Crevalle* arrived at Basay, Negros, and picked up forty American refugees. Abcède personally handed Walker a wood box to be delivered to MacArthur. *Crevalle* left after two hours, remaining surfaced as much as possible for faster travel to Australia. After two days, the commander of the U.S. Naval Base in Darwin, Commander X. M. Smith greeted the *Crevalle* to pick up the box. Six hours later the captured documents had travelled the 1,800 miles to SWPA at Brisbane.

By 21 May, Whitney and Willoughby had passed the documents to Colonel Sidney F. Mashbir of the Allied Translation and Interpreter Section (ATIS). Forty-eight hours later Mashbir began distributing mimeographed copies of the 22-page Translation No. 4 "Z Operation Orders," with the first two copies going to General George C. Marshall and MacArthur. Within five days Mashbir also issued the 29-page translation of "A Study of the Main Features of Decisive Air Operations in the Central Pacific" and ATIS Limited Distribution Translation No. 5 of the remaining documents.2217

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2217 "The number of Japanese documents captured by the Philippines guerrillas and sent to GHQ was so great that special provision had to be made to insure their translation. Accordingly, the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section established, on 6 June 1944, a separate section, the Philippine Islands Research Section, to hand this voluminous material." *Intelligence Activities*, 62 fn11b.
MacArthur tried to relay the information gained from the translation to Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Chester Nimitz by radio with little success. Seventh Fleet Director of Intelligence, Captain Arthur McCollum had the documents sent to Nimitz’s intelligence chief Captain Layton at the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area, at Pearl Harbor. His staff passed the intelligence quickly to Nimitz who ordered copies sent immediately to “all flag officers assembling in the Marshalls,” including Admirals Spruance and Mitscher as they prepared for operations in the Marianas. Thus informed, Spruance refused to chase a Japanese decoy fleet 600 miles west of Guam and remained in place for the ensuing Battle of the Philippines Sea west of the Marianas.

Meanwhile, on 22 May, Cushing radioed SWPA to report that the Japanese naval commander in Cebu, Takeshi Watanabe, spread leaflets addressed to Cushing demanding that all documents and items from the crash site turned over by noon 30 May to the mayor of San Fernando. Cushing wrote to Wanatabe denying any knowledge of documents from the crash but added that local fisherman reported seeing a banca take a satchel out of the water and head off towards Bohol. The Japanese sent a 3,000-man detachment to search Bohol. Without their demands met, at the deadline the Japanese stepped up attacks and took Cushing’s headquarters by surprise. Three days later Cushing radioed SWPA that Japanese patrols burning villages were chasing his battered band. Yet by that evening all remaining captured documents were in Andrews's hands and Whitney promised Sutherland a submarine would get them within of the 10 days.

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2219 Ibid.
2220 Barreveld, 177.
2221 Ibid., 176.
The second batch of documents consisted of two volumes of typewritten and penciled radio messages that had been received and decoded. The messages were between various naval units from the end of 1943 to March 29, 1944, with code symbols on the messages. The messages were primarily about the change of codes of Japanese fleet units and radio broadcasts and appeared to be of primary value to the Central Bureau, the Allies' code-breaking unit in SWPA.

By some accounts, MacArthur demoted Cushing to Private.\(^{2222}\) Whitney got him “reinstated” after the war and Cushing retired with his family within the Philippines.\(^{2223}\)

Luzon, D846/R-203

Japanese units also attacked Marking’s Guerrillas in Rizal province. “For four hours, the Japs had bombed and strafed, shelled and mortared and sniped, combed the grass and bayoneted,” Panlilio reported, “Against four hundred of us plus a score of prisoners and the weaponless, they had pitted eighteen hundred troops, a cavalry detachment, six planes, three mountain guns and, near the highway, a tank. They had encircled an area two miles long and half a mile wide, and closed in while the planes bombed and strafed and the mortars burst within an area growing smaller and smaller as they drew the net tight. They were in condition and heavily equipped; we were not.”\(^{2224}\) Marking’s troops escaped to Sampaloc, hungry, tired and fighting recurrent malaria. Still, the Japanese kept up the pressure. A Marking scout reported: “More and more Japs. The

\(^{2222}\) Sinclair, 50-51
\(^{2223}\) Toland, *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945* (New York: Random House, 1970), 480
\(^{2224}\) Panlilio, 205.
people say that some of them are coming backwards – that they are not from Japan but from New Guinea. They are very cruel.”

Farther north on 1 April, Volckmann completed his tour of Barnett’s Second District and returned to his new headquarters collocated with Parker’s headquarters. Seven days later American gold miner Captain ‘Herb’ Swick and Lieutenant Colonel Richard Green arrived, liberated by Parker from a prison at Camp Holmes near Baguio. Volckmann sent Swick to Blackburn and Green to Barnett.

Volckmann ordered Blackburn to reclaim the Fourth District area where Praeger and his executive officer Captain Thomas Jones had been captured the previous July. He recalled, “The task of expanding from Ifugao north through Kalinga and Apayao subprovinces and into Cagayan province was a slow, difficult assignment and one that took several months to accomplish.” Violent Japanese reprisals had turned much the population against the USAFIP-NL. “However,” explained Volckmann, “with the able help of Herb Swick and an outstanding Filipino officer, Major Joaquin Dunuan, and with great determination, Don gradually extended control north through Kalinga and Apayao.”

A Blackburn raid on Apayao captured papers from the governor’s office that told of collaborators working with the puppet governor. “With this evidence,” Volckmann noted, “the 11th Infantry quickly rounded up the traitors, and when news of this spread the entire area opened up.” “With the elimination of the spies and informers,” he added, “the ever-increasing support of the populace, and excellent intelligence, the resistance

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2225 Ibid., 217.
2226 Volckmann, 151.
2227 Ibid.
2228 Ibid., 152.
movement in North Luzon took on steadily growing strength."\textsuperscript{2229} By the end of April, some 2,000 dispersed guerrillas he inherited from Thorp had turned into a force of 8,000 organized guerrillas with 7,000 more in reserve. In addition, he could count on 5,000 in service support duties.

Bad news from the 66\textsuperscript{th} Infantry dampened the elation over the successful prison raid that freed Swick and Green. A fragmentary report from the field indicated that a Japanese raid on a Second Battalion camp had killed First Lieutenant Grafton Spencer who had survived serious illnesses, jungle hardships, and numerous encounters with the enemy to become a competent and popular guerrilla leader. The guerrillas learned that the Japanese had earlier captured two soldiers in Parker’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion, 66\textsuperscript{th} Infantry, who broke under torture and betrayed Spencer.\textsuperscript{2230} Although warned that an enemy patrol was approaching, Spencer overestimated the time it would take for them to reach his position and he remained with his cook to burn rosters and other documents. He was caught by surprise and sent several guerrillas scurrying with his papers while he and two others provided covering fire. Spencer was shot before he could flee and captured with two of his men. “The Japs tried to extract information from their prisoners, and Spencer underwent severe torture; but to each question he merely answered with a broad grin,” reported his men, “The Japs finally could stand no more, bayonetted him to death, and moved off with the two Filipino prisoners.”\textsuperscript{2231}

The Japanese also attacked and burned the Second District Field Hospital, though all personnel had left in advance with most of their equipment. They then detained and

\textsuperscript{2229} Ibid., 155.
\textsuperscript{2230} Minch.
\textsuperscript{2231} Volckmann, 149.
starved 200 civilians in Kapangan for ten days, trying to gain more information on the local guerrillas.

On 6 April, Lapham acted Bernard Anderson’s earlier declaration made in Ramsey’s absence and announced that he was assuming command of the Second Military District and all organizations within it. Anderson took over the Kalayaan Command in Tabayas Province. “More than four months passed; and then a strange letter come from Volckmann,” Lapham recalled, “…the letter went on to complain that I was intruding on his territory, a matter he hoped would be straightened out after his report reached Australia.” Volckmann claimed authority over the Second District per old orders from Moses and Noble. Lapham continued, “Three weeks later (now five months after my announcement that I had assumed command of the Second Military District), I received a letter saying that ‘this damn order has caused me too much trouble’ and charging that I had exceeded my authority because northern Nueva Vizcaya had never been in the Second Military District.”

Lapham enjoyed irking Volckmann over the Second District. He explained, “…I had laid claim to it, tongue in cheek, only because Anderson had told me it was within my domain and because I knew that doing so would irritate Volckmann.” Volckmann did not take this lightly. “He informed me,” Lapham remembered, “that though he disliked quarreling between units, if I continued to let my guerrillas kill his officers and men, he would have to move in a whole battalion and straighten things out.” According to Lapham, “Volckmann then threatened to have me court-martialed, and

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2232 Lapham and Norling, 120.
2233 Ibid.
2234 Ibid.
2235 Ibid.
appealed to SWPA to have me placed under his command. Presumably he wanted formal authorization for having already listed Harry McKenzie and me among ‘officers under his command.’ He added that my pretensions had been hampering his intelligence work, delaying his reports, and producing armed conflicts between his followers and mine. SWPA ignored him, and so did I.”

Ramsey finally returned to Luzon, coming ashore near a southern village he had passed through months earlier. Japanese troops chasing Ramsey had burnt the once cheerful collection of huts and interrogated and tortured their inhabitants. “What was more,” he wrote, “the raid had been led personally by General Baba.” All along Ramsey’s route, Baba followed and laid waste. The population was now afraid to help Ramsey.

Manila, D849/R-200

In April the Japanese Supreme Southern Army headquarters began its move to Manila while drafting a new operation order and overseeing the development of airfields in the Philippines. The Islands had changed from base depot to the front line of defense. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the Supreme Southern Army chiefs-of-staff did not complete the transition until September, delaying “preparation for the operations.” The Imperial General Headquarters determined: “We must destroy the enemy before they gain a foot-hold on land, if possible at sea with the air force which has great

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2236 Ibid., 120-121.
2237 Ramsey and Rivele, 237.
2238 “Record of the Philippine Operation, Preparations made by the 14th Army Gp. For the Military Operations in the Philippine Islands From July 1944 to the End of November 1944,” 1, Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 18, October 1946, Records Group 550, Box 7, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
2239 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 56.
To do this, they planned to transform the Islands into essentially a large airbase defended by the Fourteenth Army.

The Supreme Army HQ arrived and in July stood up the 14th Area Army Command in Manila to command Luzon and the 35th Army Command in Cebu to command the Visayans and Mindanao. The 30th Division also went to Mindanao. More than 10,000 men came from other fronts. Even when reinforcements made it to the Philippines, however, getting them to the right place proved difficult. “At the end of May a great number of replacements for the southern area arrived in Manila, and the majority of them were compelled to remain there due to the shortage of sea transportation.”

The Fourteenth Army was to build, defend and coordinate the air operations. They issued a new Operation Plan Number 11: “The Army must suppress the guerrillas with as small a group of men as possible and defend the Philippines with the greater part of its force.”

The headquarters made available four brigades and parts of two active divisions for maintaining peace and order. This limited provision of troops did not detract from counter-insurgent efforts. “The guerrillas,” the Fourteenth Army planners ordered, “must be suppressed to the utmost to maintain a state of order before the enemy invades.”

The army had to devote itself to the preparation of air bases, munition dumps, and defenses. In May the Imperial Headquarters dispatched a planning section under Major General Tsuchio Yamaguchi to the Fourteenth Army To oversee the effort. Yamaguchi

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2240 Ibid., 48.
2241 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 13.
2242 Ibid., 53.
2243 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 2.
2244 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 53.
planned to build seventy airfields, with top priority given to Manila, Clark, Lipa, Bacolod, Leyte, Davao and Malaybalay. An officer later recalled: “The reinforcement of the air bases was carried out according to the above mentioned plan, but fell short of our expectations because of difficulties encountered in employing coolies and getting bulldozers and trucks which were necessary to construct airfields. Furthermore, the progress of the works was impeded because of the rainy season.”

The U.S. Navy upset deliveries of needed fuel and equipment. Guerrillas disrupted everything else.

Japanese field officers recalled: “The guerrillas became more and more active and not a single day passed without the Army having to take some action against them by dividing many units to protect arms, ammunition, fuel and other supplies, railway and communication centers.” Their actions surpassed the response capability of the Constabulary who had to pick and choose where to fight. A planner recalled: “The Army devoted itself to the preparation for the Philippines defense operations and determined to maintain a state of order only in the districts which were important to carry out the defense operations, namely main cities, air bases and their vicinity, important harbors, sectors along the railways and the main roads.”

Field commanders saw resistance rise with rumors of MacArthur’s approach. “The guerrillas rose up against our forces everywhere,” an officer recalled, “and even attacked our garrisons due to the small number of men stationed there.” Guerrillas continued to target vulnerable Japanese lines of supply and communications. Japanese officers reported: “The shortages of the supplies tended to worsen the state of order. The

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2245 Ibid., 51-52.
2246 Ibid., 52.
2247 Ibid.
2248 Ibid., 56.
situation went from bad to worse when more and more of the inhabitants began to disobey our orders.”

To counter fears of an insurgency in support of an American invasion, the Kempeitai stepped up operations. On 25 February, Antonio Bautista had been arrested again after his earlier release as part of the independence amnesty. About ten days later he smuggled a message to his wife: “Get rid of everything in our house. Take all my law books to my brother, Deogracias. Pay my insurance. Send the horses and carretela to Bocawe and get out of Manila.” She stayed. On 4 April, Adalia received a call from Fujiwara instructing her to report once again to Major Nishimura at Fort Santiago. She went the next day as ordered. The interrogators tried to get her to convince her husband to sign a confession. He refused. An anonymous Japanese officer shouted at him: “You will not sign, ha? You would like to have your name go down in the annals of history as one who resisted the Japanese, one who refused to sign even at the point of death? Your name will be a great one. … All this you think, but it will never be so; no one will hear about this incident. No one will leave this room alive to tell about what happened. You will die the death of a common thief, a traitor to your countrymen whom you have tried to lead to slavery under the white man.” They then beat Bautista in front of his wife. The treatment of her husband nearly broke Adalia. “I began to doubt the truth of history,” she wrote, “Were there really heroes? Or were heroes just political figures inflated in the eyes of the world by having something idealistic attributed to them? Were the ones who really suffered unheard and unsung, as Tony would be after the Japs were through with

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2249 Ibid.
2250 Marquez, 46.
2251 Ibid., 56.
him? Oh, nothing, nothing could be worth all this sacrifice.”

Many Filipinos must have had similar traumas.

Agoncillo wrote, “For the Filipinos, the year was the most critical not only because of the thousands of arrests and executions perpetrated by the Japanese, but also because of the scarcity of food and medicine. There was a slackening in the buy and sell trade, and the law of supply and demand was taking its toll: hundreds of people were dying of hunger. Prices of commodities were shooting up daily and only a few could afford the black market.”

On 8 April, Manuel Roxas accepted the chairmanship of the new Economic Planning Board to curb the black market and reform the rationing system. Four days later he was playing golf with General Kuroda, Admiral Oka, and Ambassador Murata at Malacana Park.

The Laurel administration also established the Labor Recruitment Agency and sent it traveling the country to recruit workers for the Japanese. In a radio address on 16 April, Laurel offered the Japanese 40,000 Filipino laborers to build defenses against a U.S. invasion. Almost no one volunteered. In Davao, the governor had to order the Neighborhood Associations to draft five workers per district. Terami-Wada Motoe observed, “This phenomenon was due to growing dissatisfaction among the people with the Japanese occupation, bad working conditions, fear of guerrilla reprisals, and effective guerrilla propaganda.”

After Easter, 9 April, Bautista escaped from prison, never to be seen again. Five days later, the Japanese retaliated by detaining his wife Adalia and their children and

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2252 Ibid.
2254 Abaya, 40.
2255 Ibid., 40-41.
2256 Motoe, 71.
placing them in Fort Santiago as hostages. On 23 April, they were placed on house arrest as bait to attract Bautista. Adalia made a study of her Japanese guards. Police Chief Kaihachu and his deputy Kawata both claimed descent from nobility in Osaka. Corporal Imanisi was quiet and kept to duties like cooking for his section. Her guard Hasiguchi had been born in America and graduated from an eastern university. He had a wife and child in Tokyo but confessed to another love: “Yes, I had a romance with a Japanese girl in the United States, but I could not marry her, she would have been too expensive to keep. What my wife spends in a year would have been spent in only half a month by the girl I left behind in the States!” Shortly after the Emperor’s birthday on 29 April, Adalia and her children were taken back to Fort Santiago.

On 17 April, a Philippine delegation went on a ‘gratitude mission’ to Tokyo. On the mission were Speaker Benigno Aquino, Chief Justice Jose Yulo, Minister of Finance Antonio de las Alas, Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources Rafael R. Alunan, Director-General of the KALIBAPI Camilo Osias, and Secretary Andres V. Castillo. Laurel charged Alas and Osias with a secret task of seeking out Japanese officials to help with the desperate economic situation in the Islands. The Emperor decorated Aquino with the First Order of Merit with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun, his second award from the Japanese government.

A week into the visit, Aquino gave a speech in Tokyo in which he said: “Quezon is a puppet; final victory will be Japan’s.” The next day the Manila Tribune quoted

2257 Marquez, 104.
2259 Abaya, 44.
him as describing the U.S. as suffering from “spiritual anemia,” as being “rotten to the core,” and said it would find recovering the Philippines “an impossible enterprise.”\textsuperscript{2260}

Even this late in the war, cultural blinders seemed to prevent most Japanese from understanding how Filipinos viewed them. In May, wounded Japanese soldier Horiguchi Itsurō was recuperating in a Manila hospital and tended to by a Filipina named Nina. Her kindness attracted him and when she spoke, he recalled, “My heart leapt with joy, and I responded to her.”\textsuperscript{2261} Then one day when they were alone their conversation turned to life under the occupation. “Freedom taken away, the lack of goods, the poverty of life, the brutality of military police, hatred towards Japanese soldiers,” Horiguchi recalled her saying, “She concluded by asserting strongly, ‘MacArthur will certainly return and save us.’ But I was one of those hated Japanese soldiers. My blood ran backward, my lips trembled, and I glared at her. If it hadn’t been firmly forbidden, I would most likely had knocked her down.”\textsuperscript{2262}

Visayas, D875/R-174

Since the start of the AIB intelligence collection, SWPA considered the need for weather observation posts in the Philippines. On 31 March, the Allied Air Forces sent a request to establish three weather observation posts and a net control station on Mindanao.\textsuperscript{2263} G02 reported, “Plans were already on foot to establish weather posts near Balabac Island and within guerrilla nets when Lt. Col. Smith on Samar reported (3 April 1944) that he had several pre-war Philippine weather observers and enough equipment to

\textsuperscript{2260} Ibid., 45.
\textsuperscript{2261} Carry, 146-147.
\textsuperscript{2262} Ibid., 150-151.
\textsuperscript{2263} Intelligence Activities, 45.
furnish weather observations.” Smith began sending the first weather reports on 14 April. The next month the Allied Air Forces sent weather observation teams under Warrant Officer Lucien V. Campeau to Fertig for Lanao, the Agusan Valley, and Zamboanga City, and set up a special weather net control station in New Guinea. Weather teams to Mindoro in June and central Luzon in August would follow.

Smith also reported to SWPA that in March, Escudero evicted Lapus from Sorsogon province in Bicol in southern Luzon despite Lapus’ claim of popular support. Since then Escudero had gained support of wealthier citizens and established contact with Smith. Lapus left behind small bands in Pilar and Bulan and in April requested Smith contact SWPA to request for him P500,000 in cash or the authority to print his own money. He had sent a similar request through Peralta who chose not pass it on to SWPA. Smith forwarded the request to Brisbane but SWPA replied with disapproval. Lapus then contacted Andrews on Negros with a promise to send his intelligence through him and not Smith. At the end of the month, Smith arranged a conference between Lapus and Escudero to iron out their differences, but the meeting failed to achieve unity. G-2 noted: “The situation between the two was so antagonistic and confused that Smith felt he could not rely on either completely. So in early 1944 he sent an independent net station to Sorsogon which any guerrilla could use for reporting intelligence.”

In May, Anderson sent Captain Barros to Bicol to assess the situation. By July, Escudero rebuffed Barros. The Bicol guerrilla leaders continued fighting, killing, and mistreating each other and their civilians. Agents reported to SWPA: “Obstinate, and

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2264 Ibid., 46.
2265 Ibid.
2266 Ibid., 89.
under the influence of the embittered Sayoc, Governor Escudero has not shown himself an easy man to deal with.”

Meanwhile the submarine SS-291 *Crevalle* under a new captain, Lieutenant Commander Francis D. Walker, had spent most of the month in the South China Sea on its third war patrol. After torpedoing and sinking the Japanese fleet tanker *Kashiwa Maru* off Borneo and the Japanese army cargo ship *Nisshin Maru* west of Kalutan Island, Walker received orders to go to Negros. On 11 May, the *Crevalle* recovered twenty-eight women and children along with a number of sensitive documents from Tolong, Negros. Three days later the boat received damage from a depth charge attack north of Celebes. Walker changed course from Fremantle to Darwin and made port on 19 May to deliver his passengers and cargo and undergo repairs.

On 15 May, new skipper Lieutenant Commander Jack C. Titus took the *Narwhal* out of Darwin for a return to the Philippines. Six days later the sub engaged a Japanese convoy and suffered damage to one engine. On 24 May, Titus delivered 25 tons of supplies and 22 men to guerrillas at Alusan Bay, Samar. After a failed attempt to link up with guerrillas near Sanco Point, on 1 June *Narwhal* delivered 8 men and another 7 tons to Fertig at Tukuran, Mindanao and a second stop in central Mindanao to Bowler.

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2267 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 33.
2270 Bob Stahl recalled 22 men and fifty tons of supplies. Stahl, 79. See also General Headquarters Southwest pacific Check Sheet, 18 May 1944, Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG16, Box 68, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia.
with 8 more men and 45 tons.\footnote{2271 The men included one MIS-X officer, two weathermen, and five Filipino radio operators. General Headquarters Southwest pacific Check Sheet, 18 May 1944, Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG16, Box 68, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia.} On 9 June, the boat ended its patrol at Darwin. A day later, \textit{Narwhal} left on its twelfth war patrol. After shelling oil tanks in the Netherlands East Indies, on 20 June the Narwhal would deliver four men and 92 tons of supplies near Tucuran, Mindanao. On the return to Freemantle, Titus engaged and damaged the Japanese oil tanker \textit{Itsukushima Maru} in the Sulu Sea.

Among the men delivered to Samar were three U.S. Army Air Corps meteorologists: Sergeant William Richardson, Corporal William Becker III, and Private First Class Jerry Pascua. Richardson and Pascua set up a weather station on the east coast of Samar. Becker set up another station with Sergeant Raymundo Agcaoili and Private Isaac Aguila at Sorsogon on Luzon. Stahl recalled, “They had to move frequently, for making weather observations required that they release hydrogen-filled balloons into the air daily to determine wind currents. Obviously, this activity drew attention to their location and aroused Japanese interest.”\footnote{2272 Ibid.} Their data helped SWPA plan and execute current and future operations.

Nearly a year earlier Peralta had sent Major Vincente Tansiongo and Captain Leon Gamboa to get control of Masbate Island where Captain Manuel Donato led one of several known guerrilla groups. By March 1944, Peralta had organized the 59 officers and 943 enlisted Masbate guerrillas as 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion with Tansiongo in command and Donato his executive officer as part of Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Serran’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} Combat Team on northeast Panay. Reports to SWPA indicated that the Villaojada group had
promised Donato supplies and recognition as commander of Masbate.\footnote{2273} Donato was apparently irritated at being supplanted by Tansiongco and reached out to Zabat in Bicol. Now Gamboa returned to Panay with his original cohort of 130 guerrillas leaving Tansiongco commanding Masbate. Despite this intrigue, Tansiongco linked the weekly courier runs between Bicols, Samar, Leyte, Masbate and Panay. In mid-1944 he established strengthened this connection with radio links between the islands.

Lapus fled Sorsogon west to Ticao Island between southern Luzon and Masbate. In April, a Japanese patrol arrived and Lapus relocated with a coast watcher party to Masbate. The Japanese followed and Lapus escaped back to Sorsogon. Coastwatcher Armando Santiago was not so lucky. The team dispersed, losing some equipment to the Japanese, but Lieutenant Alban of the Masbate guerrillas rescued their radio for the his unit.

Luzon, D890/R-159

The pace of events seemed to accelerate on Luzon. In May, Ball delivered a radio from Fertig to Lapham. Ramsey reached Manila where the Japanese had arrested Gatson and dozens of other ECLGA agents in the previous months. “For the second time,” Ramsey lamented, “our Manila network had been stripped.”\footnote{2274} Colonel Sanchez, Hukbalahap 8th Regional Command, reported that Thorp, Noble, Moses, Praeger and Barker had all been forced to dig their own graves in the old Chinese cemetery and beheaded on a rainy day in the past December. None of them had betrayed the guerrillas. Barker’s death struck Ramsey hard. “He was only one of over twenty-five hundred
guerrilla fighters who had so far lost their lives,” he observed, “and though he was closer to me than the others, and his face was clearer in my mind, I allowed him to take his place among them in my memory.”

Ramsey oversaw the completion of a new headquarters at Balabag while simultaneously constructing a series of outposts in the lowlands. Then he collapsed from malaria, malnutrition, exhaustion and various accumulated illnesses. He spent more than a week in the home of a Catholic priest in San Mateo when, in answer to his prayers, Modesto Castandeda (aka Captain Casey) arrived by truck with a radio from the PRS delivered by submarine. Over the last four months Castandeda had travelled 1,000 miles from southern Negros with the radio. He cited Mao to Ramsey: “Communication is the lifeblood of guerrilla warfare. Every guerrilla unit must have radio equipment.” Ramsey noted, “For us it was the beginning of a new phase of the war. There would be no more runners risking their lives on the long journey to Panay, no more endless delays to receive replies, no more isolation. We were back in the wider war, in touch with the world.”

To guerrilla leaders, radios were life.

Staying alive required medicine. By summer, many of the guerrilla groups had developed medical support organizations. The USFIP-NL had two relatively well-staffed and supplied field hospitals. “As I recall,” Blackburn later said, “the table of organization called for six doctors and six nurses in each hospital company. Well, with the area being as large as it was, I had to take those hospitals and split them up. So I had four hospitals.” The largest field hospital, at Manauan, was “a structure with a thatched

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2275 Ibid., 241.
2276 Ibid.
2277 Ibid., 243.
2278 Blackburn Interview, 155-156.
roof and floors, containing an emergency room, operating room, and several wards” with sixty beds. Volckmann described his 2nd District hospital as “the best I had seen anywhere. They constructed patients’ beds that could serve as stretchers to carry the patients quickly. They added an extensive warning system to guard against surprise raids. The hospital even boasted a complete dental outfit, including a field chair and foot-powered dental drills.” The warning system proved its worth when a Japanese attacked in June and destroyed every trace of the hospital, but the guerrillas had safely fled with the patients, staff and supplies.

With adequate supply and supporting personnel, the guerrillas also provided critical medical assistance to local populations as a way to build their relationship. In the WLGWF, Blas Miranda’s Division Surgeon, Dr. Domingo C. Veloso, organized a hospital at San Jose open to guerillas and civilians alike that became “a health-giving oasis.” As Blackburn explained, “This was one of our jobs, in addition to the military activities. You had to take care of the people. They saw that we were doing this thing.” Modern U.S. doctrine has recognized the centrality of “civilian-military unity” in counter-insurgency operations. Providing medical aid to the population generated such unity. Blackburn noted, “Later on, when the people recognized that we were consolidating our area, they began trying to move out of the Jap areas and into ours. We set up places for them to live, gave them seed, and a piece of land that was designated for

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2279 Condon-Hall and Cowdrey, 360.
2280 Volckmann, 147.
2281 Lear, 76.
2282 Blackburn Interview, 155-156.
them by the mayor of the town. They were expected to grow their own crops and become productive. We had this civil affairs action going on as the organization progressed."\textsuperscript{2284}

Meanwhile, in Manila, Manuel Roxas sought better coordination of agents. In March he sent Colonel Narciso Manzano to Fertig with a request that SWPA appoint Manzano as “coordinator of intelligence of Luzon.”\textsuperscript{2285} In early 1942, Manzano had worked under Wainwright’s orders to “develop an internal intelligence net on Luzon after the surrender.”\textsuperscript{2286} He then collected and disseminated intelligence for the Free Philippines out of Manila and develop contacts with Peralta and Villamor. In late 1943 Roxas gave him P2,000 for operations and General Lim used him as an intelligence officer of his resistance group and he forwarded reports to Phillips on Mindoro and through Ozámiz to Mindanao.

On 20 March, SWPA instructed Fertig to keep Manzano in Mindanao. On 14 April they authorized Manzano to develop Luzon intelligence with Fertig’s support. At the end of May Fertig asked for a submarine to take Manzano back to Luzon. On 19 July SWPA instructed Manzano to return to Luzon and five days later arranged a submarine for transit. Two days later they cancelled the submarine. SWPA arranged and cancelled second submarine mission on 1 August. Finally on 1 September, the PRS permanently assigned Manzano to Fertig’s headquarters. “The case of Manzano,” wrote MacArthur’s G-2, “is a baffling parallel to that of Rosenquist, Villamor, and Andrews: a promising potential, with extraordinary background, unexploited due to the refusal to grant

\textsuperscript{2284} Blackburn Interview, 155-156.  
\textsuperscript{2285} Intelligence Activities, 67.  
\textsuperscript{2286} Ibid, 85.
centralized operational control in intelligence matters and a total and irritating division of authority in the critical years, June 1943 to June 1944.”

Visayas, D901/R-148

On Samar, Charlie Smith loaded two bancas with men and equipment delivered by the *Narwhal* on 24 May. He sent one team – Lieutenants Vincente Labrador and Carlos Ancheta, Staff Sergeant Cipriano Miguel, Sergeant Pete Luz, and Corporals Agrifino Duran and Rudolph Santos – with equipment to rendezvous with Ball on Baler Bay. A second group under Bob Stahl headed to the Bondoc Peninsula in southern Luzon to link up with Sergeant Crispolo Robles and establish a sub-net control station “to improve our operations in that area and to serve as an alternate NCS should MACA be lost to the enemy.” Stahl took along Staff Sergeant Gerado Nery, Sergeant Jack Montero, and Corporals Eddie Holgado and Julio Advincula, and two young civilians Ochigue and Madeja as bodyguards. To guide them through enemy patrolled seas to points on the rugged coastlines, the crews relied on a large scale 1933 *United States Coast and Geodetic Chart of the Philippines Islands* and a 1940 *Socony-Vacuum Oil Company Road Map*.

On 30 May, by sheer luck, Stahl completed his danger-filled cruise to Luzon and landed very close to Robles’s base in Bondoc. The next day he established radio station S3L three miles northeast of Patabog on Luzon and radioed Smith: “Chased en route but arrived ok. Anderson’s man here so will dispatch money and codes immediately. Will

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2287 Ibid., 67, fn4.
2288 Stahl, 79.
instruct him on rendezvous with other party.” Two hours later Smith replied: “Good going. Congrats. Send two radios to Andy. Nips are after us. Keep contact with Ball.”

Smith was building a robust communications network. From his net control station in north central Samar, he connected with four stations on that island, one in Cebu, one in Masbate, two in southern Luzon at Sorsogon and the Bondoc Peninsula, and two in central Luzon in Baler and Manila.

As fast as SWPA could emplace the radios, the Japanese responded. They virtually besieged Smith and the MACA station along with Fertig and KUS on Mindanao. Stahl recalled: “I had agents losing their radios – or worse, being captured. I had stations coming on the air, only to disappear and never be heard again. I had really important ship sightings that I could not get through to GHQ because the Japanese were jamming my signals. The Japanese were using direction-finding equipment to locate my station.”

Shortly after Stahl got settled in Bontoc, he was summoned to meet with a native general in a nearby schoolhouse. About twenty men clad in various ragged uniforms and armed with a mix of bolos and small arms provided a chilly reception. With a show of pomp, Colonel Figueras introduced ‘Lieutenant General’ Guadencio V. Vera, “Commander in Chief and Judge Advocate of the Tayabas Guerrilla Vera’s Party!”

Stahl remembered: “He was about five feet, two inches tall, exceedingly thin, gaunt, sunken cheeked, hollow eyed. His teeth were much too large for his mouth, giving him a constant snarl. His eyeballs were very large, adding to his proper appearance as the

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2289 Ibid., 89-90.
2290 Intelligence Activities, 41.
2291 Stahl, 90.
2292 Ibid., 92.
2293 Ibid., 90.
Stahl had no idea who this man was but he sensed danger from him and his men. Vera was the same man who had executed Lieutenant Vicente Villa from Miranda’s TVGU guerrillas for a perceived insult nearly two years earlier.

Vera said, “Welcome to Bondoc Peninsula, Lieutenant Stahl. My guerilla forces have kept this entire peninsula free of the Japanese. The United States Army and the Philippine Army may have surrendered, but we did not surrender! Bondoc Peninsula has not surrendered to the Japanese! We are still a free country!... And when my supreme commander, General Douglas A. MacArthur, sends me enough guns, Tayabas Guerilla Vera’s Party will drive all of the Japanese from the Philippines forever!” As proof of his power, Vera produced Americans George McGowan, Eldred Sattem and Chester Konka. The three had escaped from Japanese interment three months earlier, wondered into Vera’s ‘hospitality,’ and had not been allowed to leave. McGowan warned Stahl that Vera would kill them all if he didn’t do something.

Stahl, like other Americans, formed a low opinion of Vera and his hundred or so followers. They were dirty, poorly armed nomads noticeably lacking sanitary latrine practices. Despite the pretensions titles, there was little evidence of military organization. Vera proudly displayed his two wives and his pretty mistress, who he beat and humiliated and later tried to send to Stahl for his enjoyment. The group seemed little more than bandits and a menace to Stahl. Vera would later explain how his people had fled to the hills when the Japanese came, and added, “We would be a guerrilla army. But with no money we soon became bandits in order to survive.”

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2294 Ibid., 92.
2295 Ibid., 92-93.
2296 Ibid., 119.
“Imagine,” Stahl recalled, “more than one hundred men, women and children living in a jungle camp where every call of nature was handled as an animal would – drop it anywhere and don’t even cover it catlike! I now knew why they lived the nomadic life that Robles had described. The stench was unbearable.”2297 Yet, Stahl realized that he needed Vera’s cooperation if he was going to operate in the immediate area. Vera’s group could supply men and food, if they did not kill Stahl first. After hedging for time, Stahl forged a message from MacArthur to Vera, praising him as an important guerrilla leader and asking him to support Stahl and coast watchers and promising to send guns as soon as possible to the Tayabas Guerrillas. Stahl observed, “The scheme worked! Moral: When you’re dealing with a nut, think like a nut.”2298

After failing to make scheduled contact with guerrillas at Sanco Point on eastern Mindanao, *Narwhal* completed a rendezvous in Pagadian Bay near Tukuran on the coast of southern Mindanao, to land 25 tons of supply and 16 men on 1 June. Leaving at 2200 hours that evening, the boat ran aground but managed to get back to Darwin with no apparent damage.2299

Meanwhile, on 5 June, the submarine SS-168 *Nautilus*, now under Commander George A. Sharp, Jr., delivered 92 tons of supplies to Tucuran, Mindanao.2300 Nine days later in the Banda Sea, Sharp engaged and sank a Japanese sampan with gunfire. On 22 June, *Nautilus* delivered another 92 tons and four men to Balatong Point, Negros, and picked up seventeen evacuees. On 9 July, Sharp sailed into the Amsay River in Mindoro

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2297 Ibid., 104.
2298 Ibid., 95-96.
and delivered twenty-two men and twelve tons of supplies. After a supply run to Canayoan, Bohol, was cancelled, Sharp delivered two men and 30 tons of supplies to Lagoma, Luzon. Finally, on 16 July, Nautilus recovered a sensitive document, a box, and two packages from Balatong Point, Negros.

On 10 June, the *Narwhal* departed Darwin on her eleventh war patrol. Ten days later, after some secondary missions, skipper Titus rendezvoused with Peralta’s agents off Lipata Point, Panay, and delivered four men and 92 tons of supplies. With Japanese garrisons at Culasi three and a half miles to the south and Pandan thirteen miles north, the guerrillas came with enough boats to make unloading a quick chore but when they refused to load their boats to capacity, an irritated Titus put his men in the boats to take charge. After more conflict, Titus ordered the natives to swim fuel drums ashore, further infuriating the guerrilla officers and delaying unloading. At 0400 hours, Titus had had enough and jettisoned the last 15 tons of supplies and pushed overboard about 20 of Peralta’s men who had refused to leave the boat. With four men delivered ashore and fourteen evacuees on board, Narwhal departed the area. On 28 June the submarine delivered its evacuees at Darwin before heading to Fremantle.

Although the Supreme Southern Army forecast that the Americans would attack Luzon from the south or central Philippines, by June the Fourteenth Army Commander had come to believe the Americans would attack Luzon from the east. He wanted to place at least two brigades and one active division to meet the American there, but higher

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2301 Ibid.
2302 Campbell identified 15 evacuees: civilians Courtland Ashton, Kenneth Arnold Hanson, Ernest Harry Heise, Charles Holland Hickock; airmen John Edward Ruziecki, Franklin Trammell, William Marvin Hammons, Robert T. Johnson, Jr. and his seven months pregnant Filipina wife; soldiers Patrick Joseph Mellody, George H. Ossorio, Robert Sealey Kramer, Floyd C. “Frank” Reynolds.
2303 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 3.
command overruled his plan. The dispositions remained: two composite brigades in Luzon (one brigade of six independent infantry battalions, and one labor and engineer brigade), one brigade in the Visaya Islands, one brigade in Mindanao, one division (16th) in Leyte, and one division (30th) in Siargao (northeast of Mindanao). Units reported sixty percent of the air bases completed. Fourteenth Army distributed its Four IMBs: the 30th IMB with the 100th Division in Davao, the 31st IMB with the 102nd Division in Visaya, the 32nd IMB with the 103rd Division in Northern Luzon, and the 33rd IMB with the 105th Division in Southern Luzon.

The guerrillas still continued their attacks. A former collaborator on Mindanao, Ali Dimaporo, led a Moro attack on the Japanese garrison Malabang. A Muslim from Lanao in Dansalan drafted on 29 October 1941, Dimaporo accepted a commission as a third lieutenant in the local 10th Battalion of the 10th Infantry Division. After serving as General Fort’s aide, he organized a bolo battalion. He surrendered in May 1943 under Fort’s orders and entered prison at Camp Keithley. In July, he accepted a pardon after agreeing to help fight the Moro guerrillas and bring in Captain Mamarinta Lao and Major Manaloa Mindalano. The Japanese provided him with thirty rifles and two launches. With a small band of men, Dimaporo travelled Misamis Oriental delivering pro-Japanese speeches, collecting arms from the natives, and protecting pro-Japanese traders. Meanwhile, he later claimed, he coordinated with guerrillas and provided them “food, money, shelter and ammunition.”

Captain Ishima, the Japanese commander in Malabang, arrested and interrogated Dimaporo for suspicion of aiding the guerrillas, but released him again. On 24 June,

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Dimaporo led several of his family members and twenty-six men on a detail protecting workers on the Malabang-Parang road, while Ishima and twelve Japanese soldiers kept watch nearby. During his lunch break, Dimaporo led his armed men in slaughtering Ishima and his soldiers. From then on Dimaporo fought as a guerrilla. The attack, while not significant, represented a growing trend of collaborators turning sides and working against the Japanese as the war turned more decisively in U.S. favor.\footnote{Midori, 114.} The Japanese moved their battalion out of Dansalan to Iligan. Based on reports from Fertig, SPWA reported, “The guerrillas have only recently recovered from the pressure.”\footnote{Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 104.} They added, “The Mindanao guerrilla force is the largest organized unit in the Philippines and is now the best equipped.”\footnote{Ibid., 84.}

Balabac Island, 914/135

On 8 June, skipper Lieutenant Commander Marshall H. Austin sailed the submarine SS-272 Redfin on its third war patrol to Ramos Island near Palawan in the Balabac Strait to deliver six guerrillas and 25 tons of gear.\footnote{See “Redfin” at uboat.net at \url{http://uboat.net/index.html} accessed 25 July 2016.} The PRS had been planning this mission since February but had trouble scheduling a submarine until the Director of Intelligence for Allied Naval Forces Captain A.H. McCollum stepped in to provide the Redfin. An all-Filipino team of agents trained to conduct the mission: First Sergeant Amando S. Corpus, Sergeant Ramon F. Cortez, Sergeant Carlos S. Placido,
Sergeant James R. Renuos, Jr., Corporal Teodoro J. Rallojay, and Technician Fifth Class Richie D. Dacquel.\textsuperscript{2309}

On 23 June the team made its first radio contact with SWPA. At 2200 hours on 13 August, the coast watchers spotted a vessel transiting the Balabac Straight explode and sink.\textsuperscript{2310} Receiving their spot report, U.S. Navy Task Force 71 determined the vessel was the submarine SS-250 \textit{Flier}. Thirteen sailors made it off the quickly sinking boat, and eight made it ashore to Mantaguile Island.\textsuperscript{2311} Six days later natives found the survivors and led them to Corpus’ team who notified SWPA.

The Navy concluded that the \textit{Flier} had hit a floating mine. Palawan guerrillas under Dr. Higinio Acosta Mendoza, Sr., had already passed a report from three sailors held by the Japanese in the Puerta Princesa Prison Camp of the sinking on 26 July of their boat SS-273 \textit{Robalo} two miles west of Palawan by another mine.\textsuperscript{2312} This was too much. The Navy held Corpus’ team accountable and demanded better reporting on naval minefields. On 24 SWPA radio the agents: “Results thus far are disappointing and immediate improvement in your intelligence coverage and reports is desired and expected.”\textsuperscript{2313} Corpus took the reprimand hard. Two days later, Sergeant Placido notified SWPA that his team leader had shot himself through the heart.

On 31 August, \textit{Redfin} returned to Balibac Island to recover Flier’s surviving crew along with nine civilians. Before returning to Freemantle on 1 July, the boat sank the Japanese tanker \textit{Asanagi Maru} and the Japanese army cargo ship \textit{Aso Maru}.

\textsuperscript{2309} \textit{Intelligence Activities}, 42-43.
\textsuperscript{2310} Ibid., 43.
\textsuperscript{2312} Roscoe, 348.
\textsuperscript{2313} \textit{Intelligence}, 43.
After nearly three years of brutal occupation, Filipinos needed some sign MacArthur’s return. They did not know that MacArthur had to convince President Roosevelt to authorize him to liberate the Philippines – an argument the general won by citing the proof of Philippine resistance. The new government in Japan hoped to gain some measure of victory in the Philippines that would compel the Americans to negotiate an end to the war on favorable terms. As MacArthur began bombing the Islands, the guerrillas began work to deny the Japanese hopes.

Australia, D911/R-138

On 5 June, SWPA GHQ issued Staff Memorandum 18 that effectively ended the semi-independent status of the PRS. At the end of February the G-2 had published a special staff study arguing for more involvement from other staff sections in Philippines operations. It had become apparent, for example, that “the requirements of the Guerrilla activities of PRS Section would soon become too large for the present AIB supply organization.” SWPA produced a draft plan on 16 April for sharing operational responsibilities in the Islands, but only completed the necessary staff coordination in June. “The direction of guerrilla activities passed to G-3, with intelligence matters being

2314 Intelligence Activities, 58.
2315 Memorandum to Chief Supply Officer, Deputy Controller AIB, 22 April 1944, Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG16, Box 68, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia.
Map 16: Intelligence Coverage in the Philippines, Reported by SWPA G-2, 27 May 1944
more closely supervised by G-2 and supply becoming a responsibility of G-4. PRS continued as a coordinating staff (under G-3), completing a curious administrative course, from G-2 – AIB – PRS – G-3, when its characteristic missions and functions behind enemy lines were predominantly G-2; which already successfully conducted clandestine operations in every territory, from the Solomons to Singapore.**2316

Samar, D921/R-128

On 15 June the United States began a month-long campaign to conquer the island of Saipan in a pivotal battle of the Pacific war. The Americans lost almost 3,500 killed and another 10,000 wounded; the Japanese lost 24,000 in battle and over 5,000 more committed suicide.

Another 22,000 Japanese civilians on the island died, mostly from suicides to avoid falling into the hands of the Americans. Japanese government leaders used their example to inspire future sacrifice. “Newspapers across Japan, for instance, carried translations of a Time magazine article that described women and children committing suicide, and especially the extraordinary sight of young Japanese women choosing to plunge off cliffs rather than surrender to American soldiers,” noted Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook, “Such awe-filled ‘enemy’ reports were presented by Tokyo as clear-evidence of the glory of civilian sacrifices, and portrayed as proof of the ‘pride of the Japanese woman.’”2317 A Tokyo Imperial University professor told reporters in

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2316 Intelligence Activities, 58.
Yomuri, “our courage will be buoyed up by this one hundred times, one thousand times” in an example of the required “sacrifice before our great victory.”

Late in the afternoon of 15 June, Bob Stahl’s radio station S3L detected calls from Lieutenant Gerry Chapman on southern Luzon repeatedly trying to reach either Smith’s MACA station on Samar or Fertig’s KUS station on Mindanao – both known conduits to MacArthur in Australia. Chapman had been a part of Fertig’s network reporting from Samar but in his new location he was part of Charles Smith’s net. Stahl knew that Chapman’s position in enemy territory near Santa Magdalena provided good observation of ships transiting the San Bernardino Strait. The persistence of Chapman’s efforts indicated something important about his message.

Stahl recalled, “I had no idea of the content of his message, but I noticed the Japanese ‘jamming’ – sending out interfering noises to keep his message from being heard – was more intense than usual.” Piecing together Chapman’s coded dispatch from the repeated broken fragmentary transmissions sent on his 4-watt AT4 radio, Stahl decided to relay the message with his more powerful 12-watt “Dutch Set.” No response came from either MACA or KUS. Stahl took a chance in trying to contact KAZ in Australia directly but with no success.

Somebody received Stahl. “Suddenly, I heard someone calling my station. I couldn’t read the caller’s ident, but through the din I finally understood a request for me to change to another frequency. ‘QSY 10,800. QSY 10,800,’” the caller said. Whoever was calling obviously knew something about my equipment, for he was asking me to switch to 10,800 kilocycles. Only a station that knew what frequency crystals I had would

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2318 Ibid., 339.
2319 Stahl, 100-103.
2320 Ibid., 100.
request this, for it was a doubling of my 5,400-kicycle crystal, a frequency I rarely used, but a good one for long-distance communication.” The receiver turned out to be KFS. Once again, the Mackay Radio station in San Francisco had come to the guerrillas’ rescue. KFS offered to relay Stahl’s message to KAZ in Australia. After another relay by Fertig’s KUS, Chapman’s message travelled the 22,600 miles from the Philippines to California to Australia. With the message sent, Stahl decoded it: “GOING EAST TWO SMALL PATROL BOATS, TEN CRUISERS, THREE BATTLESHIPS, ELEVEN DESTROYERS AND NINE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.”

The Japanese Fleet was heading out to jump the Fifth U.S. Fleet under Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, at the moment distracted by its duties in assisting in the assault on Saipan in the Mariana Islands. It was a desperate gamble by the Japanese, but if successful, one that might stem the tide of war in the Pacific. Alerted by the guerrilla radio operators in the Philippine jungles, Spruance turned in time to surprise the Japanese in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. From 19 to 20 June, three Japanese fleet carriers were sunk. Overhead, in what became known in the U.S. Navy as the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot,” vastly superior American aircraft shot down roughly 600 enemy airplanes, virtually destroying Japanese naval air power.

Manila, D931/R-118

On 25 June, a group of Japanese officers in dress uniforms came to Fort Santiago to inspect the prison cells. “Something somber dominated the atmosphere,” Adalia

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2321 Ibid., 101.
2322 Others have reported that the submarines USS Flying Fish and USS Seahorse also reported the Japanese Fleets transiting the San Bernardino Straits. See for example E.B. Potter, Admiral Arleigh Burke, (Annapolis; The Naval Institute Press, 1990).
They pulled forty prisoners out of their cells and lined them up in two groups, chained together at the ankles and tied together at the wrists with ropes. The prisoners received picks and shovels and marched out of the Fort at 1430 hours in the afternoon. The first group contained Chinese prisoners. American aviator Captain George Harrison led the second group. Adalia recalled, “I had to look. Those noble men, with heads held high, marched on. It was no longer the chain I saw; I saw men whose kind make history. Never faltering, they marched out of the double gate – martyrs whose spirit will live forever in the hearts of the Filipino people.” Four and a half hours later the detail guards under Lieutenant Yamada marched back into the camp alone. Adalia asked Yamada if the stronger men had shot the weaker ones. “No,” he answered, “that is where I came in. You know, I am greatly honored by this. Those people who are gone were all first-class men. I had the honor to shoot them!” Adalia passed the word to the other prisoners, “I said that none of us should be too trusting now. As for myself, I started suspecting that the kindness the Japs were showing me were nothing but a prelude to my own grave-digging.”

All Japanese, Formosan and Korean prison camp guards had to memorize regulations in the *Imperial Code of Military Conduct (Gunjin Chokuron)* issued in 1882 and the *Japanese Service Code (Senjinkun)* of 1941. Both drew upon the code of *bushido* that emphasized self-discipline and tolerance, compassion and justice towards others. The 1941 Service Code specifically forbade the kind of atrocities committed in China in 1937. Yet the code also demanded they obey all superior officers as

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2323 Marquez, 132.
2324 Ibid.
2325 Ibid., 133.
2326 Ibid.
2327 Tanaka, 207.
representatives of the Emperor with the blind obedience of the new military ideology. As Yuki Tanaka explained: “The brutal treatment of POWs by the Japanese can be seen as a way this ideology was put into practice. To despise men who had surrendered rather than fight to the death became a first step toward justifying reckless violence against them.”

Guards used food as a weapon. In the Cabanatuan, Don Willis recalled, “Life in camp was a continual battle for survival. The men became walking skeletons on our food ration, about 10 ounces (a large sardine can scoop) of **lugow**, a watery rice, and **kangkong**, a plant which grew in the ditches around camp.” Prisoners waited hours for a turn at a dripping water hose, often to be shooed away by guards at the last minute. When George Harrison arrived to Fort Santiago in April 1944, the guards starved him for ten days, beat, fed, then starved him again. They hauled him before an interrogator with Adalia Marquez interpreting. The interrogator placed food before Harrison as an inducement to get him to talk. Harrison ate greedily then pretended not to remember anything. “The interrogator jumped up and sat on Harrison’s stomach, bouncing up and down while raining blows on Harrison’s head until Harrison began to vomit blood. Harrison was then taken off to his cell to endure two months of torture before being taken from the fort.”

Harrison had suffered a version of a torture commonly used by prison guards: “tie up a man, force his mouth open under a faucet, fill him full of water, then kick him and

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2328 Ibid., 208.
2329 Willis and Myers, 27.
2330 Marquez, 118-119.
beat him in the stomach!” They also used the ‘Sun Cure’: “The victim was tied to a stake in the full heat of the sun with a sentinel to prod him with a bayonet to keep his face up and his eyes opened full in the sun’s direct rays.” One day of the cure meant a day or two of blindness and possible permanent damage. Many guards liked to practice martial arts on the prisoners. Yay Panlilio reported, “The Japs, to amuse themselves, would tie the victim’s penis, scrotum, or both and lead him around like a dog on the leash, yanking it, laughing hilariously at the pain it provoked.” Others reported from Fort Santiago: “Suspected guerrillas had lighted matches thrust under their fingernails and white-hot irons applied to their genitals. Women came in for especially cruel treatment, including rape and mutilation.”

A few prisoners got to see the human side of their guards. Adalia noted random acts of kindness from several guards. One, Wada, she noted, “was not a strict guard. He swore at the prisoners like five drunkards all in one, but he was inclined to be kind, even allowing his charges to gossip and joke with him.” At Cabanatuan, Willis recalled Lieutenant Okubo who was transferred with him to the Davao Penal Colony. “He would always ask, ‘How awe you? , Lieutenant Weeus,” recalled Willis who added, “I intended to use him if I could as he seem to take a liking to me. He even asked me to make a sketch of him, which I did.”

SWPA considered plans for contacting and aiding the prisoners held by the Japanese. A month after departing Mindanao in July 1943, Davao Penal Colony escapee

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2331 Volekmann saw this form of torture used against the people of Kiangan, Guardia, *American Guerilla*, 111.
2332 Panlilio, 166.
2333 Ibid.
2334 Ramsey and Rivele, 137.
2335 Marquez, 118-119.
2336 Willis and Myers, 37.
Stephen Mellnik was on his way to Washington. There a secret organization dedicated to aiding U.S. prisoners in enemy hands, MIS-X, interrogated Mellnik for any information that might help future such operations in the Philippines. Mellnik returned to SWPA and on 11 December submitted a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 on a plan to develop contacts with allied prisoners in Davao and possibly in Cabanatuan.

Lieutenant Harold A. Rosenquist, an MIS-X officer trained in the latest escape and evasion techniques and serving with SWPA, agreed to go to Mindanao and attempt to contact the Davao prisoners. The Lieutenant had hoped to go in February, but Whitney stopped him. “Whitney’s influence was too strong,” Rosenquist recalled. The SWPA Chief of Staff finally approved the mission on 26 March 1944, over the objections of the PRS who thought it trespassed on 10th MD’s authority. On 26 April the PRS notified Fertig that Rosenquist “has been placed on temporary duty with your command for the purpose of acting as your advisor in the planning of assistance to prisoners of war in your military area.”

Meanwhile on 1 March, Fertig sent Lieutenant Robert Spielman, another Davao escapee, back to make contact with the prisoners and gather whatever intelligence he could. Sixteen days later Spielman made it to the camp and began his mission. After three more days he successfully linked up with prisoners in the lightly guarded, remote camp. In the process, Spielman passed some small supplies he carried to the prisoners. When on 27 March the Japanese discovered the newly arrived supplies, Captain Mark

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2337 Intelligence Activities, 59.
2339 Ibid., 60.
2340 Ibid., 60.
Wohlfeldt led ten other prisoners in an escape. Patrols managed to recapture four of the escapes for severe punishment.

On 1 June the SS-167 _Nautilus_, under Skipper Jack Titus, put Rosenquist ashore on the west coast of Turkuran, Zamboanga. The lieutenant made his way to Major Claro Laurenta’s guerrilla headquarters in Kampungagan. Laurenta then got him to Fertig at 10th MD’s base on 23 July. With a team of guerrillas, Rosenquist successfully reached the Davao Penal Colony in early August, and found it empty.

SWPA later learned that on 6 June the Japanese had gathered the 1,250 prisoners in camp and marched them blindfolded and tied together to Lasang Pier in Davao.\textsuperscript{2341} Six days later the prisoners crammed aboard the merchant freighter _Eire Maru_ to Zamboanga, where 750 prisoners were transferred to the _Shinyo Maru_ bound for Manila. U.S. submarines SS-256 _Hake_, SS-241 _Bashaw_, and SS-263 _Paddle_ were waiting off Mindanao to intercept a reported Japanese fleet gathering near Tawi Tawi and expected to strike the U.S. fleet near the Marianas.\textsuperscript{2342} Notified by Allied Naval Forces command of a troop ship in her area, _Paddle_ attacked on 7 September. Only 82 of the prisoners survived the sinking ship to make it ashore.\textsuperscript{2343} This was not an isolated incident: of the 126,000 Allied prisoners transported on 134 unmarked Japanese vessels in 156 voyages during the war, 21,000 would die from attacks by American planes and submarines.\textsuperscript{2344}

Later studying the failed mission to Davao, MacArthur’s G-2 commented: “The removal of practically all PW from the Penal Colony during the five month’s delay in

\textsuperscript{2341} Lukacs, 343.
\textsuperscript{2342} Roscoe, 366.
\textsuperscript{2343} SWPA G-2 reported 83 survivors of the Shinyo Maru. _Intelligence Activities_, 59-60. A careful study by Roger Mansell of records recovered from prison construction details in the National Archives sets the number at 82. See “Roster of Allied Prisoners of War believed about Shinyo Maru when torpedoed and sunk 7 September 1944. At http://www.west-point.org/family/japanese-pow/ShinyoMaruRosterJPW.html, accessed 1 February 2018.
\textsuperscript{2344} Lukacs, 343.
Rosenquist’s arrival meant that help which might have been given arrived too late. It is now known also that the guerrillas with a little assistance might have removed most of the PW safely had the project been organized while the opportunity presented itself.\textsuperscript{2345}

Bohol, D929/R-120

The unexpected arrival of Senator Carlos P. Garcia, “the backbone of the civil government on Bohol,” disrupted a plot by junior officers in Boforce to kill and overthrow Ingeniero.\textsuperscript{2346} The guerrilla leader reportedly fled to Panay. On 23 June, Japanese forces landed at several points on the island against little resistance. They seized the major cities and spread across the island in a few weeks. They killed, harassed, and destroyed all guerrillas they encountered. Agents reported to SWPA: “Secrecy discipline of the organization had been reported as bad, and it is known that the Japanese had obtained complete rosters of the Bohol guerrilla force before their invasion through Senior Inspector Muego of the puppet Constabulary. Shortly before their invasion many Japanese undercover agents from Cebu moved to Bohol, and at the same time BC’s (members of the puppet Bureau of Constabulary forces) surrendered and joined the guerrilla forces in Bohol.”\textsuperscript{2347}

The Japanese Army planners again reevaluated the guerrilla threat. “American and Philippine guerrillas were prevalent on the many islands of the Philippines group, and they were in contact with the U.S. forces by means of radio and submarines,” high command officers recalled after the war, “These guerrillas were very powerful and active,

\textsuperscript{2345} Intelligence Activities, 60.
\textsuperscript{2346} Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 81.
\textsuperscript{2347} Ibid.,
especially in the districts of Mindanao, Visayas and Luzon. Such being the case, each unit had to resort to punitive actions in order to maintain public peace and order.”

Central Luzon, D933/R-116

Ramsey arrived at his new headquarters camp in Balagbag. Six nipa huts housed the troops. Another larger hut served double duty as the mess hall and hospital. A small hut was Ramsey’s home. An escaped POW, Marine Corporal Jimmy Carrington, oversaw security with two .50 caliber machine guns salvaged from wrecked American fighter plane. On 27 June, Lieutenant Colonel Leopoldo Guillermo emplaced Ramsey’s new radio behind the camp on what he called ‘Signal Hill.’ With the new station, LRT, he contacted Major Andrews on Negros, net control station NAL. “During those first few heady weeks after our radio post went on the air,” Ramsey wrote, “I pieced together a brief history of the previous two years of the war, and I was both shocked and encouraged by what I learned.”

Messages identified as coming directly from MacArthur requested Ramsey provide details on the numbers of his forces, their arms, their locations, and their training and readiness.

The Constabulary, Kempeitai and Japanese military were cracking down on suspected guerrillas. The pressure led Ramona Snyder to leave her post in Manila and join Ramsey in the hills. She maintained her network of contacts through couriers. The ECLGA intelligence chief in Manila, twenty-nine-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Liberato “Obie” Bonoan, kept the information flowing out of the capital. Laurel’s administration

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2348 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 9.
2349 Ramsey and Rivele, 248.
seemed to be gaining control and had supplied 250,000 laborers to the Japanese.\footnote{Abaya, 39.} Ramsey began publishing a counterpropaganda newsletter, \textit{The Voice of the Misguided Elements}, and distributed copies to local towns. “They were in great demand as the only available source of outside information, and people read and reproduced them at the risk of their lives.”\footnote{Ramsey and Rivele, 254.}

Ramsey’s guerrillas did their best to keep pressure on the enemy. “Operatives would pour cane sugar into the gas tanks of planes and vehicles, set fire to depots, or attack military convoys in the countryside,” he reported, “Sabotage served a valuable morale-boosting purpose, but it had always remained subordinate to our main goals or organizing and intelligence gathering.”\footnote{Ibid., 255.} He wanted more substantial operations. “The Filipino people needed a sign – something to sustain them through this third year of occupation,” Ramsey wrote.\footnote{Ibid.} Late that month Roeder delivered a prototype explosive device consisting of two six inch lead cylinders welded together, match heads and black powder in one end and the other to be filled with sulfuric acid, with a space between separated by thin copper sheathing. “The sulfuric acid eats through the copper plate until it reaches the matches,” Roeder explained, “It ignites them, and they in turn explode the powder.”\footnote{Ibid., 256-257.} With these time-delayed detonators, Ramsey ordered his commanders to initiate a campaign of sabotage in mid-July.

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\footnote{Abaya, 39.}
\footnote{Ramsey and Rivele, 254.}
\footnote{Ibid., 255.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid., 256-257.}
Japan had relied on an island line of absolute national defense that ran from the Aleutians through the Solomon Islands, New Guinea, the Marshalls, the Gilberts, and the Caroline Islands. That line was collapsing faster than anticipated. On 10 July the United States bombed Tokyo. “Troops began to be moved from Manchuria in earnest now – another turning point for the Imperial Army as a whole, reflecting a reluctant but inevitable shift in priorities to the defense of the home islands,” wrote Meirion and Susie Harries, “There were four possible centers for the defense effort, the ‘Sho Go, or Victory Operation,’ as it was defiantly called: Formosa, the Philippines, the Kurile islands, and the home island of Honshu itself. The Americans aimed to provoke the Japanese forces into advancing on Formosa, thus weakening their resistance in the Philippines.”

To defend the Philippines against return of American forces, the Fourteenth Army again reorganized. By July, the Japanese had transferred some 10,000 wounded and other troops from New Guinea and the Southern Area into Manila. Military planners intended to use the Islands as a point of transit for these men but a lack of transportation led to a chaotic buildup of troops. The Southern Army Command established a new 1st Field Replacement Hospital to educate, train, supply, and house the men with an eye to using them in the Philippines.

Meanwhile reinforcements arrived as shipping allowed: the 26th Division in July and August, the 8th Division in August and September, the 2nd Tank Division and the 61st Independent Mixed Brigade (IMB) in September, and the 58th IMB in November. The army also formed several new divisions: the 103rd Division in North Luzon; 105th Division in Southern Luzon; the 102nd Division in Visayas; and the 100th Division in

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2355 Meirion and Susie Harries, 433.
2356 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 9.
On paper, each division consisted of two brigades, each brigade four independent infantry battalions and associated artillery, mortar, engineers and transportation units. The newly organized independent mixed brigades had three infantry battalions with engineers and artillery. The 54th IMB garrisoned the Sulu Archipelago in Zamboanga, the 55th IMB garrisoned central Luzon. The 58th IMB reached the Philippines in early July with three infantry battalions and artillery.

The Fourteenth Army continued to refine plans. Following the lessons of Saipan, where Japanese positions on the beaches fell to U.S. naval gunnery, they planned an inland defense in the Philippines. On Luzon, they assigned three battalions of infantry and engineers to Apparri; one infantry battalion in Lingayen Gulf; one infantry battalion in Dingalan and Baler Bay; one infantry battalion in Batangas; two infantry battalions on the coast of Lamon Bay; one infantry battalion in Olongapo; and two infantry battalions in Manila. Another three infantry battalions of the 105th Division were held at Lamon Bay in reserve. The Imperial Headquarters began sending two newly organized mixed brigades in July but they were unable to complete arrival until October. The lower quality troops of the newly formed 55th IMB and the 33rd Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion) of the 16th Division were placed in central Luzon to support Baler and Lingayen Bay. The Imperial Headquarters unofficially organized the Fourteenth Army Area and the 35th Army headquarters. These forces were too thinly spread.

2357 Ibid., 7.
2358 An infantry battalion was supposed to have 1,200 men. Ibid., 8.
2359 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 4.
2360 Ibid., 4-5.
Map 17: Radios in the Philippines, Reported by SWPA June 1944

SOURCE: Military intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, United States Armed Forces Pacific, Intelligence Activities in the Philippines During the Japanese Occupation (Volume II, Intelligence Series) (Tokyo, Japan: 10 June 1948), Plate 10.
By now the U.S. Navy was strangling Japan at sea while bombs rained from the sky. One Japanese merchant captain recalled, “When I was in Manila for repairs in the summer of 1944 and learned of the heavy submarine losses of ships crossing the Bashi Straits from Formosa to Luzon, I and my associates began to fear the war was beginning to be lost.”\textsuperscript{2361} The Japanese forces in the Philippines requested a shipment of 100,000 drums of fuel. By the end of September only 40,000 had arrived, and air raids promptly destroyed 37,000 of those.\textsuperscript{2362} Too little arrived to carry out the army’s plans. The Japanese confiscated 3,000 motorcars in the Islands, half of them in the Manila area, further hampering the general economy.\textsuperscript{2363} A thousand of the vehicles went to the units constructing airfields. The army’s ten infantry companies in Manila shared 300 cars, only half worked at any given time.\textsuperscript{2364}

The distribution of ill-equipped forces to address the invasion threat invited guerrilla action. In July, Matsui Kozan had to close the Mankayan Copper Mine because they could not transport the ore. In the mine’s general affairs office Yoshimichi Ozaki explained to officials the reasons: “impassable steep roads, decrepit vehicles and lack of replacement parts, uncooperative Filipino drivers, destruction of roads by torrential seasonal rain, and anti-Japanese guerrilla activities.”\textsuperscript{2365} Setsuho Ikehata found that through the first half of 1944, Matsui Kozan desperately advertised for 200 truck mechanics and 200 truck drivers – “a state of affairs not at all unrelated to guerrilla

\textsuperscript{2361} Roscoe, 360.
\textsuperscript{2362} Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 47.
\textsuperscript{2363} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{2364} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2365} Setsuho, 142.
Attacks by Vinzon’s Traveling Guerrillas on the Kalambayangan mine and the transportation carrying ore form the mine forced more closures.\textsuperscript{2367}

To neutralize guerrillas, the Japanese prioritized the elimination of radios. Locals began noticing boats off the coasts and in rivers carrying strange arrays of antennas and wires. When these “Chinese clotheslines” appeared in Mompog Passage and in Ragay Gulf bracketing his radio station on the Bondoc Peninsula. Stahl took notice. “I suspected that these were crude radio-direction-finding rigs seeking a fix on our station,” he recalled, “My concern was great enough that we ceased radio operations for several days until they moved away, shifting our radio relay network to one of the other net stations.”\textsuperscript{2368} Volckmann turned to couriers to deliver his reports to Lapham who was in Baler with Ball.

To subdue guerrillas in Mindanao, on 14 June the Greater Japan Islam Association survey team of Jingo Okamoto, Masato Owada, and Harukaze Furukawa arrived in Manila. They were too late; a Major Yamaji informed them that Fourteenth Army General Staff Defense Intelligence Section didn’t need them anymore.\textsuperscript{2369} The army already had a plan for dealing with the Moros. The survey team decided to go to Mindanao anyway. Before they found a plane to take them there, however, U.S. bombing of Davao forced Yamaji to order them to return to Japan. Colonel Inuzuka later indicated that the Fourteenth Army plans to introduce Muslim propagandists into Mindanao and build a mosque there failed for lack of suitable personnel.\textsuperscript{2370}

\textsuperscript{2366} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2367} Ibid., 160.
\textsuperscript{2368} Stahl, 101.
\textsuperscript{2369} Greater Japan Islam Association (\textit{Dai-Nippon Kaikyo Kyokai}). The Association offered a three-man survey team of former Great Asia Society chairman Okamoto Jingo, Association member and Japanese Muslim Owada Masato, and young linguist and Association researcher Furukawa Harukaze. 109.
\textsuperscript{2370} Ibid., 110.
Lieutenant Shigenobu Mochizuki of the Department of Information published a pamphlet *Practical Outline for an Education and Enlightenment Movement in the Philippines: Guidelines and Concrete Proposals.*\(^{2371}\) Mochizuki had graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University with a degree in Chinese philosophy, entered the army in 1939, and went to Manila in January 1942 as part of the Propaganda Unit (now renamed the Department of Information).\(^{2372}\) He emphasized the use of school curriculums to eradicate Western ideals and align popular thought with loyalty to Japan. Mochizuki built the New Philippines Cultural Institute in Tagaytay forty-five miles southeast of Manila. Known by the Japanese as the Tagaytay Educational Corps (*Tagaytay kyoiku tai*), the Institute intended to reshape the minds of promising future Filipino leaders. In the first six-month Mochizuki instilled in the class of sixty handpicked Filipino POWs the Japanese spirit of self-sacrifice and the evils of American democracy’s individualism and materialism. “Indeed,” Lydia Yu-Jose observed, “the memories that remained in the minds of the graduates of this institute were patriotism and the discipline he enforced.”\(^{2373}\) Before either the first class graduated or the publishing of his pamphlet, guerrillas killed Mochizuki in an ambush in May 1944 in Cavite. Without him, the Institute closed. The graduates, it turned out, had only absorbed a sense of duty to one’s nation, and in their minds that nation was the Philippines.\(^{2374}\)

Luzon, D943/R-106


\(^{2372}\) Yu-Jose, 164.

\(^{2373}\) Ibid., 165.

\(^{2374}\) Ibid.
Tensions rose as MacArthur approached the Philippines. On 7 July, President Laurel announced on radio: “No right-thinking Filipino should allow the re-conquest of the Philippines. We must bear in mind our commitments as an ally of Japan.”\textsuperscript{2375} Behind closed doors, however, he continued to tell Filipino and Japanese officials that he would rather quit as president then declare war on the U.S.\textsuperscript{2376} The Japanese began to seriously consider replacing Laurel with General Ricarte.

Tensions also rose between guerrillas. Lapham continued to irritate Volckmann. “Early in the war,” he wrote, “disputes within and between guerrilla groups had been mainly over what our duties were and what our policies should be, much complicated by our rivalry for access to food and arms, all exacerbated by personal grudges. By 1944 we were quarreling mostly over jurisdiction: who should rule whom.”\textsuperscript{2377} Some guerrilla leaders suspected their rivals of trying to better position themselves as heroes before MacArthur returned. Blackburn countered: “As we knew it, Lapham never did very much of anything. He just ran a little raid here and there, and didn’t have many organized camps. They were just guerrillas by night and farmers by day.”\textsuperscript{2378} Although he was certain Volckmann spoke ill of him to SWPA and wanted him court-martialed, Lapham chose to ignore his neighbor. He wrote, “Most American operators, like Volckmann and me, barked a lot and exchanged many paper admonitions and warnings but we seldom really fought one another.”\textsuperscript{2379}

In the ECLGA, Ramsey authorized the manufacture of as many of the pipe bombs as possible with Walter Roeder’s new explosive devices. Through 15 July his guerrillas

\textsuperscript{2375} Abaya, 41.  
\textsuperscript{2376} Abaya, 50.  
\textsuperscript{2377} Lapham and Norling, 121.  
\textsuperscript{2378} Blackburn Interview, 163.  
\textsuperscript{2379} Lapham and Norling, 121.
placed the explosives on targets throughout Manila. After long hours of anticipation, after 0100 hours that night explosions began to ring out across the city. The main Japanese fuel depot at Tanque burst into flames. Railroad tanker cars in the Manila yards exploded. Oil tanks in the Philippines Manufacture Company went up in flames. At dawn a 10,000-ton tanker in the harbor rippled with eruptions caused by a device dropped in a fifty-gallon oil drum loaded on board the previous day. A tanker burst into brilliant flames. The blast caused a chain reaction with other vessels anchored next to the ship. Ramsey and his men watched it all from afar before retreating to their base to await reports from the field. “The Japanese, taken completely by surprise,” he learned, “had dashed about the city trying to determine what had happened. Roeder’s unpredictable fuses had been an inadvertent asset, imposing a randomness on the explosions that made it impossible for the Japanese to coordinate a response.” The Japanese caught a handful of Ramsey’s agents placing explosives and they suffered dire consequences. Baba closed Manila, stepped up food confiscations, and began a wave of arrests and interrogations. The Huks quickly claimed credit for the bombings. Guerrillas in Manila struck again in mid-July, burning Piers 5 and 7 in the South Port, and on 25 July destroying a steamer in the Pasig River.

Conflicts between Huk and non-Huk guerrillas had become more common. “A typical fight with the Huks developed once in 1944 up in the Sierra Madre,” Lapham wrote, “when they ambushed one of our patrols that was protecting Filipino cargadores carrying supplies sent to us from Australia. A gun battle erupted and the Huks stole some

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2380 Connaughton, et al., 67.
2381 Ramsey and Rivele, 260.
2382 Connaughton, et al., 67.
of the supplies.”

This was one example of what appeared to be a suspicious campaign. “Conflict with other guerrilla groups were frequent,” SPWA noted, “and by mid-1944 the Huks were actively fighting all their guerrilla neighbors. ...Since early 1944 there has been a lessening of Hukbalajap attacks on Japanese installations, and it has been reported that the Japanese are arming the Hukbalajap, probably as a means of combating the guerillas.”

Anderson tried to intervene in the three-way war between the Hunters, Marking’s Guerrillas, and the Huks. His loose association with the Hunters weakened when he gave them their own radio. When Japanese entered the fight near Infanta, Marking wanted to fight but obeyed Anderson’s order to lie low. “And so we pulled out,” recalled Panlilio, “finding a new camp up the Kaliwa, and the people whose houses had been burned all along the lower river said, under their breath, ‘Cowards! Big talkers!’”

With support from SWPA, Anderson forwarded to Marking supplies and three radio operators. “We looked at the three New Guinea boys,” said Panlilio, “so called because they had been trained for Signal Corps work in New Guinea. To us, they were heroes. What if they had not yet seen action? Why would they leave America, if not to give their lives for the Philippines? It was enough.”

Lapham had also just begun to receive SWPA weapons and supplies. “I began to form new reserve squadrons at a more rapid rate,” he remembered, “I even added a Chinese unit of seventy men, following a request from the secretary of a Chinese military organization in Manila. The new troops were sent west to Tarlac, usually the most

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2383 Lapham and Norling, 135.
2384 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 14.
2385 Panlilio, 228.
2386 Ibid., 229.
troubled of my provinces.” Lapham’s organization reached its largest strength when Anderson agreed to give him Captain Dioscorro de Leon guerrillas in the southeastern Nueva Ecija sector. “This really changed nothing,” said Lapham, “since de Leon had been reporting to me as one of my own for many months; nonetheless the action was typical of Andy.”

Sixty miles to the south the Japanese had gained a reputation in Bulacan province for particular brutality, molesting women and confiscated harvests. There Captain Alejo Santos left the Bulakan Military Area (BMA) guerrillas. He had bolted from Bataan for his home in Bustos when King surrendered. Mayor Alfredo Cruz Eraña offered to support Santos if he would form a guerrilla unit to protect the people. Santos expanded the BMA to neighboring towns, picking up support from prominent citizens. He established a base in Victory Hills and by 1945 could claim eight regiments: M, Ponce, Republic, Mountain, Buenavista, Biyák-na-Bató, Kákarong, Valenzuela, and Batatè.

Southern Luzon, D957/R-92

In Bicol, Captain Faustino Flor was now cooperating with Lapus who had received P8,000 from Charles Smith. Their cooperation angered Colonel Zabat who claimed command of the 5th Military District. He accused Flor of being a Japanese spy and charged Lapus with trying to forcibly recruit one of his subordinate commanders, Molinas. Zabat retaliated on 21 July with a ninety-man attack against Lapus’ town of Monito, killing several of his men and mistreating the citizens. He sent other forces after Flor. About this time SWPA believed Flor commanded about fifty men between

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2387 Lapham and Norling, 157.
2388 Ibid., 70.
Camarines Sur and Albay. Although Zabat’s “methods of operation have aroused considerable animosity in other leaders of the district,” SWPA noted that he led Bicol’s most powerful group with 800 to 1,000 men in Albay. 2390

With his supply growing critically short on the Bondoc Peninsula of southern Luzon, Bob Stahl sought aid from General Vera and his guerrillas. Expecting the same rag-tag group of bandits he saw in May, Stahl was surprised by Vera’s new camp. “It was different,” he wrote, “There were no soldiers lolling about doing nothing, as had been the case in the previous camps I had seen. Everyone in sight seemed to be engaged in a chore of one sort or another. He had, as Mayor Medenilla had said, cleaned up his act.” 2391 The camp was well organized. They employed straddle trenches for latrines.

“Yes, this was a different camp – and this was a different man than I had met a month or so ago. No longer was he a braggart, a boor, a horses’ ass,” Stahl noted, “He appeared to be interested in preparing to fight a war rather than in killing his family’s political enemies and robbing civilians. Quite a large order!” 2392 Vera was typical of a number of Filipinos. Without training or preparation, he had set out with his people to avoid and resist the Japanese without realizing the enormity of the task. To professional American soldiers, he and his men appeared woefully inept. They were however tough, smart, and determined. Given time, they adapted.

Vera further surprised Stahl by saying, “I have thought a lot about our first meeting. I was going to wipe out your little group and take your guns. You did not fool me with your message to General MacArthur and his answer to me.” 2393 The Tayabas

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2390 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 28.
2391 Stahl, 118.
2392 Ibid.
2393 Ibid.
chief explained that the ‘message’ saved Stahl for Vera could not dismiss it without confirming that the Americans took him lightly. He wanted the Americans’ respect. “You also ended my career as a bandit,” Vera continued, “for no one would take me seriously any longer. I had to change my army into a real guerrilla army. That was good. I want to get back at the Japanese for what they have done. After all, I am a Philippine Scout! I will fight them.”

By the time MacArthur came back to Leyte, Vera had a “well-trained, well-disciplined guerrilla army” of about 1,000 men despite having received almost no supplies from SWPA. When the Americans asked Vera to destroy two Japanese radars near Boac Marinduque in support of impending landings, Stahl reported: “General Vera’s troops found both units and destroyed them – with no help and no thanks from the U.S. Army.”

SWPA took stock of the guerrillas. In Bicol on southern Luzon, Miranda had about 300 armed men in vicinity of Camp Tancing in Camarines Sur as the “53rd Regiment” in Lapus’ organization. Major T.B. Padua claimed 2,000 members but probably four companies of 350 men total with about 40 weapons in the San Miguel Bay organized as 53rd Regiment, 51st Division under Colonel Zabat. Other guerrillas seemed equally strong.

Visayas, D957/92

On 14 March the PRS had submitted a plan for replacing the lost Phillips team on Mindoro. By 21 June the SPWA staff had turned this plans into a mission to be led by the PRS executive officer, U.S. Navy Commander George F. Rowe. MacArthur’s G-2

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2394 Ibid., 119.
2395 Ibid., 158.
2396 Ibid., 159.
recalled, “Rowe, a Navy pilot, had been a sugar broker and operator in the P.I. from 1930 to 1941 and a partner in the firm Mitchel, Rowe & Co. He had flown extensively over the P.I. and had expert knowledge of the islands.”

The mission assigned to Rowe was to “develop communication nets forward into central Luzon and Manila, to cover Verde Island Passage, Apo East Pass, and Manila Bay area for naval movement, to obtain weather information, and to give air warning reports.”

On the night of 9/10 July, the SS-168 Nautilus on her eleventh war patrol under skipper Lieutenant Commander George Sharp, Jr., delivered Rowe and his 22 men and 12 tons of supplies at the mouth of the Amaay River in western Mindoro, before sailing on to deliver supplies to Kangleon on Leyte and Abcede on Negros. Rowe found support from local residents, and deliberately kept out of the ongoing dispute Ruffy and Jurado. Rowe’s men were “more thoroughly trained in the operation of technical equipment and were better equipped then any other party previously dispatched.” They set up radio, air warning, weather observation and radar detection stations. With new high-powered cameras, photo development and copy equipment, they established facilities for photographing shipping lanes, installations, and captured enemy documents. Rowe was in communication with SWPA eight days after landing.

Meanwhile on Masbate, Donato conferenced with his men and issued a declaration of separation from Peralta’s 6th MD and Tansiongo’s command. Many of Masbate’s Constabulary and reservists joined Donato’s command, against the Japanese garrison.

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2397 *Intelligence Activities*, 45.
2398 Ibid.
2399 Ibid., 45.
The Japanese withdrew all their forces except a small garrison from Bohol at the end of July. Ingeniero’s deputy, Captain Estaban Bernido, reassembled and reorganized the remaining Boforce guerrillas. Ingeniero returned in late August or early September and dispatched Boforce agents to Cebu, Negros and Leyte to request arms, ammunition and a radio transmitter. At the end of September, Ingeniero reported to SWPA that his force was active.

In southern Luzon, Lapus requested SWPA immediately recognize him as commander of the 5th Military District. He claimed his 54th Regiment had 2,600 armed men with a division in reserve, but probably had closer to 1,500 poorly armed men. Lapus set his headquarters in Albay province, and conducted operations on the west coast of Sorsogon and Ticao Island. Anderson’s agent Captain Barros found the Lapus troops “the ‘most military’ he had met in the Bicol.”

Hawaii, D962/R-87

The common faith among Filipinos that MacArthur would return was not shared in the halls of power in Washington. The United States faced a decision about the Philippines. The Chiefs of Staff believed that the best strategy was to bypass the Islands and head for Formosa to create a base for invading Japan. By all military considerations, they were correct. They realized, however, that MacArthur was intent on fulfilling his promise to return to the former American protectorate. Knowing this, General George C. Marshall warned MacArthur, “We must be careful not to allow our personal feelings and Philippine political considerations to override our great objective, which is the early

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2400 “Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 31.
MacArthur insisted on a chance to make his argument to the President.

On 21 July, President Roosevelt departed San Diego aboard the cruiser *USS Baltimore* bound for Hawaii. Five days later he docked in Honolulu. MacArthur had already arrived from his twenty-six-hour flight from Brisbane. The President immediately summoned the general for what turned out to be a photo opportunity for Roosevelt’s press entourage. MacArthur returned to his temporary quarters at Fort Shaffer and complained to his staff that the frail President had only wanted him in a picture to aid his reelection campaign.\(^\text{2402}\)

The next day, 27 July, the President and his commanders had dinner at the Holmes estate. Afterwards they discussed two possible approaches towards Japan. Nimitz, with staff and visual aids, spoke first and cogently argued for a direct approach to Formosa, skipping the Philippines all together. MacArthur then stood alone before a map, without a script or notes, and reviewed the American failure to defend the Philippines, his own embarrassment, and his promise to return. “Both approaches had,” wrote Tarling, “with the exception of northern Burma and part of the Philippines, attributed little importance to Southeast Asia, the original bone of contention. MacArthur had, however, been anxious, partly for political reasons, to regain, rather than bypass, the Philippines.”\(^\text{2403}\)

Nimitz won on points of geography, logistics, and other military considerations. MacArthur, however, warned that if the U.S. forces bypassed the Philippines: “We would

\(^{2401}\) Villamor, 258.
\(^{2403}\) Tarling, 120.
admit the truth of Japanese propaganda to the effect that we had abandoned the Filipinos and would not shed American blood to redeem them; we would undoubtedly incur the open hostility of that people; we would probably suffer such loss of prestige among all the peoples of the Far East that it would adversely affect the United States for many years. I feel also that a decision to eliminate the campaign for the relief of the Philippines, even under appreciable military considerations, would cause extremely adverse reactions among the citizens of the United States."2404

The President declared a recess and talked alone with MacArthur. “Seizing the initiative,” Alfred Castle wrote, “MacArthur used his political trump card. Reminding the president that this was a reelection year, he argued that abandoning 7,000 starving POWs and 17 million Filipino Christians would turn public opinion against him.”2405

The high command reconvened the next morning at 1030 hours. At about noon the President waved his hand and said he had heard enough. He would adopt MacArthur’s plan to retake the Philippines and instructed Nimitz to support him. The fact that Filipino guerrillas had been actively carrying on the fight undoubtedly influenced the President’s decision.

Palawan, 964/85

U.S. Navy submarines continued their forays into Philippine waters. On 28 July, the submarine SS-197 Seawolf under Lieutenant Commander Albert M. Bontier began its fourteenth war patrol out of Darwin with orders to Tawi Tawi.2406 On 7 August the boat landed a six-man coast watcher team and nine tons of supplies at Tongehatan Point, Tawi

2404 Villamor, 258.
2405 Castle, 172.
Tawi, before evacuating Captain Frank Young from his AIB coast watcher mission. Two
days later Bontier landed six more men and five tons of supplies at Dumaran Island,
Palawan.

Master Sergeant Eutiquio B. Cabais led the Palawan team. With him were:
Sergeants V.C. Goloyugo and J. Cuteran; Technicians Fourth Class T.E. Vergara and L.
Marquina; and Technician Fifth Class Daganda. After making contact with local
guerrillas, the PRS agents promoted themselves: Goloyugo to Lieutenant Colonel,
Cuteran to Major, and the rest to Captain.\footnote{Intelligence Activities, 44.}

Cabais made his first contact with SWPA on 27 August. He moved his net
control station from Dumaran Island to Batulan in north Palawan to obtain better
coverage on enemy movements. Cabais added a weather station and sub-stations in
Coron Bay, Bacuit Bay, and Cuyo Islands. Eventually, Peralta made contact with his
team. Before transferring operations to Eighth U.S. Army on 28 February 1945, Cabais
would recover, interrogate, and arrange evacuation for an escaped prisoner from Puerto
Princessa, thirteen downed fliers, and three captured Japanese soldiers.\footnote{Ibid, 45.}

\footnote{Abaya, 49.}

Luzon, D969/R-80

On 2 August, a flash news bulletin broadcast across the islands: “President
Quezon of the Philippines died this morning August 1 at Saranac Lake, New York.
Sergio Osmeña has succeeded to the presidency.”\footnote{Abaya, 49.} The effects of tuberculosis
compounded by the stress of war had proved fatal to the president. Quezon was

\footnote{2407 Intelligence Activities, 44.}
\footnote{2408 Ibid, 45.}
\footnote{2409 Abaya, 49.}
considered by many to be a symbol of resistance, for some, he was the Philippines. How his death might affect loyalties remained to be seen.

Mrs. Osmeña, still on Luzon, had moved her family away from Manila to Baguio. Now that her husband was president, she became worried that the Japanese would take her and her children hostage. She passed word to the USAFIP-NL that she wished to be evacuated into the mountains under guerrilla protection. For now, she would have to remain in place.

On 25 July, the SS-186 *Stingray* under Lieutenant Commander Samuel C. Loomis, Jr., began its twelfth war patrol out of Majuro in the Marshall Islands.\(^\text{2410}\) On 27 August, Stingray landed fifteen men and ten tons of supplies at Mayrajira Point, on the northeastern tip of Luzon. On 7 September, the submarine returned to Darwin for three days before heading out with orders to scout landing beaches at Majoe Island, Mindanao. On 15 September, Loomis delivered a four-man air warning team on the island. Four days later the boat returned to Darwin. On 21 September Stingray would be out to sea again, delivering 35 tons of supplies to Baculin Bay, Mindanao, on 27 September and landing a three-man team on Suluan Island, Samar, three days later.

In the Islands, the tempo of guerrilla activities picked up. Lapham wrote: “In the last half of 1944, while I was trying to arm new units, transmit intelligence to Australia with newly received radios, and distribute largess from submarines, I constantly received ‘orders’ and ‘suggestions’ from Anderson, Volckmann, Merrill, and the agents of several different Filipino guerrilla leaders. Since I had no intention of submitting to any of them, on August 8 I radioed SWPA to request clarification of my status.”\(^\text{2411}\) He confided, “I


\(^{2411}\) Lapham and Norling, 115.
felt sure, for instance, that Volckmann would have been delighted to have me court-martialed.”

Communications were still tenuous. Anderson was in east central Luzon with in Ball Baler, Tayabas, relaying his communication to Fertig. When Ball’s 3BZ radio died, his ATR4 proved too weak to relay. Stahl took up relay duty and Anderson in turn promised gasoline to Stahl, but it never arrived. Ball sent Lieutenant Carlos Ancheta and Sergeant Pete Luz to Volckmann with a radio set to tie the USAFIP-NL into the Ball-Smith-SWPA net. Volckmann wrote, “This was one of the most thrilling moments I experienced during my guerilla days in the Philippines. Radio contact with SWPA, lost since March 1943, was re-established! We again had hopes of receiving help from the outside world.” When the batteries died after forty-eight hours, Sinay and Hernandez quickly rigged a connection to the camp generator. They then improvised a 75-watt set to replace the smaller radio brought by Ancheta.

Volckmann contacted SWPA to ask for supplies and learned that an officer and fifteen men with 15 tons of supplies had recently landed at Bangui, Ilocos Norte, and were headed to his headquarters. Two weeks later USAFIP-NL scouts found the party led by Lieutenant Valera who had made a ‘blind landing’ prior to Volckmann having a radio. The sub’s skipper aborted the landing midway and departed when Japanese warships unexpectedly arrived on the scene.

Arranging and receiving supplies from SWPA was a time-consuming process. In May, Lapham had met with Ball in Tayabas and received a radio. Between 17 and 28 July, he had radioed back and forth with SWPA to coordinate his first delivery of

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2412 Ibid.
2413 Volckmann, 157.
supplies by submarine. They debated possible landing spots and decided on Dibut Bay, five miles of steep hills and dense jungle from the Japanese garrison at Baler.\footnote{2414} The PRS planned a mission for Parsons to resupply Lapham in July and approved the plan in early August. Lapham went to the rendezvous area seven weeks early to oversee the preparations of Lieutenant Aquino’s Squadron 103 as they built rafts for transferring supplies and rehearsed the signal plan for link up.\footnote{2415}

On 12 August, the Narwhal under Lieutenant Commander Titus departed Fremantle on its thirteenth war patrol with forty-five passengers for Dibut Bay on the east coast of Luzon.\footnote{2416} On 29 August, the scheduled day of the rendezvous, Lapham guerrillas anxiously watched the bay. “All day we watched fruitlessly for our long-awaited visitor,” he recalled, “Then, early in the evening, the sub suddenly rose right out of the sea like a gigantic whale – between me and the shore! I was simultaneously thrilled and dumbfounded. The thing looked like a battleship.”\footnote{2417} Chick Parsons and Private Courtney Whitney – the colonel’s son -- went ashore in a rubber raft. While the submarine spent the next day off shore reconnoitering the bay, Parsons met with the guerrillas. At 1600 hours, skipper Titus spotted the guerrillas signal and returned to unload twenty-three passengers and ten tons of supplies “by the expedient handling and direction of Commander Parsons” who used guerrilla constructed bamboo rafts to ferry the gear.\footnote{2418}

\footnote{2414} Note Lapham says the rendezvous was set for 31 August, but the Narwhal records indicate it landed at Dibut Bay on 31 August. Lapham and Norling, 150.
\footnote{2415} “Persistent stories that Parsons was in Manila some time after 1942 are probably traceable to his trip in August 1944, when he penetrated inland as far as Antipolo, near Manila.” Intelligence Activities, 58.
\footnote{2417} Lapham and Norling, 152.
They used ropes to guide the rafts to and from the sub while Lapham shared ham sandwiches and coffee with the captain in the boat’s mess. He remembered, “Days later I found that part of our cargo was a delicious new kind of army chow called K rations. I didn’t know that most GIs called their contents dog biscuits and other colorful, often vulgar, names. To me, after so many months of a guerrilla diet, even the Spam tasted like prime T-bone steak.” Lapham suddenly experienced a feeling common to other guerrillas resupplied by sub: “I still remember the thought struck me sharply: ‘What in the hell am I going to do with all this stuff?’” Along with the supplies, SWPA sent Lieutenant Enrique Torres to assist Lapham in intelligence matters. Parsons returned ashore as Titus departed before midnight.

At 1856 hours on 1 September, *Narwhal* arrived at the Magnac (reported as the Masanga) River farther south, recovered Parsons and Whitney, and unloaded another twenty men and ten tons of supplies. The sub also took aboard four evacuees: former tank sergeant Captain Rudolph O. Bolstad (LGAF), Captain Charles L. Naylor (LGAF), Private First Class Wilbur B. Jellison, and Lieutenant Wilbur J. Lage. Another soldier, John M. Kerrey of the 228th Signal Operations Company, fell into the water and drowned. After a stop in Cateel Bay the next day to pick up one man and mail, Titus headed south, making Darwin on 10 September.

On the Magnac River, Parsons delivered supplies to Anderson. West across Bicol, Major Richard Barros ran a station on Ragay Gulf with about sixty former Philippine Scouts working for Miranda. Anderson had promised to send him supplies from the next

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2419 Ibid., 153.
2420 Ibid.
2421 Campbell.
submarine, and sent a courier instructing Barros to have Miranda send men north to Basiad Bay to receive arms and supplies. Twenty men led by Captain Leonardo Golpe and Lieutenant Eulogio Castañeda left Miranda’s area on 25 September and returned on 13 October with 12 M-1 carbines, 3 submachine guns, 3 tommy guns, and assorted supplies in four metal boxes. What Lapham had requested in May had arrived in guerrilla hands five months later.

Anderson also sent Barros a radio, an unusual low-wattage set powered by a hand-cranked generator, for a coast watcher station to relay reports through Stahl. Barros sent an operator to Stahl to coordinate codes and procedures. When several days later Stahl had not heard from Barros’ station, he decided to sail across the bay and find out what was wrong. “Naturally, I had an ulterior motive,” Stahl explained, “He had supplies—food, I should hope. Perhaps even cigarettes!”

After a perilous sail across the bay, scaling a sheer cliff hundreds of yards high, and hiking a difficult jungle trail, Stahl and Eldred Sattem followed their guide Pablo Montalvo into Barros’ “Ohio Headquarters.” There they met American Ted Suttles, a former employee of the Camarines Norte mining company recently freed by guerrillas from the Japanese prison at Naga. Barros explained that his operators “might be good code clerks, but what’s the good of that if they can’t get the damned radio going?” Radioman Stahl thought, “It wasn’t their fault. They hadn’t been schooled in proper operation of the type of equipment they were using. In fact, they had never even seen this type of equipment in their training, nor had I ever seen a radio like this before. This was not an unusual situation, for the Army sent a lot of equipment to us that might be

2422 Barrameda, 164.
2423 Stahl, 128.
2424 Ibid., 130.
classified as junk – equipment long ago labeled unfit for combat use. Here was the perfect spot to dispose of these purchasing mistakes, for we were in no position to complain.”

From his experience with the bicycle powered “Dutch Set,” Stahl realized that both the transmitter and receiver would drift off frequency if the person cranking the generator did not maintain a steady pace. After a while they perfected the proper cranking rate to maintain contact with S3L.

Meanwhile on 29 August, Volckmann sent to SWPA a message with his new radio: “D-Day missions have been assigned within this command as follows: to destroy all enemy lines of communication; to harass, delay, and destroy all troop and supply movements; to destroy enemy supply dumps, truck parks, troop concentrations, and command posts: to prevent enemy from securing locally food supplies, construction materials, labor, means of transportation. Units of this command have been given detailed assignments and have assembled materials and trained men to accomplish above on orders from your HQ or lacking these on orders from this HQ. Request you inform the HQ of any changes desired. Volckmann.”

SWPA sent no reply to this message.

Volckmann also relayed a request from Mrs. Osmeña’s for the USAFIP-NL to take her and her family into the mountains. He wanted President Osmeña to authorize such a move. The new President desired that his family stay in place. Volckmann informed the Philippine’s first lady that he would obey her husband’s orders, despite her vehement protests.

From late August into September, guerrillas under John O’Day began a “reign of terror and atrocity” in Ilocos Norte in a desperate attempt to finally purge the area of a

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2425 Ibid.
2426 Ibid., 159.
“Japanese collaboration faction.” Lapham recalled, “His main interest seemed to be pursuit of a vendetta with another group headed by CPT Fermin Bueno. The feud was resolved only when O’Day raided Bueno’s camp, captured Beuno and some of his men, and had them flogged.”

By September, Volckmann had reorganized the USFIP-NL with three partially armed regiments of the 11th Division into a force totaling about 10,000 men. He was up and running with radio contact to SWPA and reporting all on traffic from 1st Military District in Northern Luzon. By now Volckmann carried on a robust program of intelligence gathering, sabotage, ambushes and training. Yet he remained frustrated by his inability to secure any supplies from directly from SWPA.

Manila, D992/R-57

By July, the direction of the war brought down Tojo’s cabinet. His replacement as Prime Minister, Kuniaki Koiso, was general of more than forty years service in the Imperial Japanese Army. The Emperor also approved the appointment of retired admiral Mitsumasa Yonai as Minister of the Navy, who had been replaced as Prime Minister before the war for his perceived pro-American and pro-British views. The new Koiso-Yonai cabinet entered office on 22 July with instructions from the Emperor “to carry on the war as effectively as possible and then at some point to prepare the groundwork for peace.” Koiso believed the window for negotiation with the Americans had opened with the hard-fought battle of Guadalcanal and closed with Japan’s defeat at Saipan. Now he reasoned that their only hope for a negotiated settlement rested on the upcoming

\[\text{References:}\]

2427 Satoshi, 51.
2428 Lapham and Norling, 109.
battle for the Philippines: “If Japan won even one engagement in the battle, it could then prepare for a truce arrangement.”\textsuperscript{2430} They had to make the Americans pay such a high price for the Philippines that they would not want to continue the war any longer.

The Japanese decided to make a fundamental change to their defensive plan for the Islands. “The Supreme Southern Army,” an officer later reported, “made clear its intention that the Philippines Operation would not be a defensive but a decisive operation.”\textsuperscript{2431} In other words, they were not out to further bleed the American forces marching toward Japan, but kill them. The Imperial Headquarters convened a planning conference. “Since an attack was imminent,” planners recalled, “the Army immediately decided to launch the attack before the enemy forces attempt a landing on any part of the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{2432} The Supreme Southern Army labeled the offensive plan for the Philippine Campaign the \textit{Sho Ichigo} (one opportunity). In mid-August, the Army began necessary preparations, but the time available proved too short.\textsuperscript{2433}

Shortages severely challenged the Japanese. By the end of August, less than one third of the weapons, ammunition, supplies and vehicles promised from Japan had arrived in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{2434} Troops rescued at sea (\textit{Kaibotsu Butai}) and recuperating in Manila hospitals were pressed into the line after a short training period and with captured weapons – “but after August, even these weapons were no longer obtainable.”\textsuperscript{2435}

A malaria epidemic broke out in Manila. At Fort Santiago prison, a guard named Fukuomoto explained to Adalia Marquez that the epidemic was brought to the capital by

\begin{footnotes}
\item[2430] Ibid, 178.
\item[2431] Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 12.
\item[2432] Ibid., 13.
\item[2433] Ibid., 2.
\item[2434] Ibid., 47.
\item[2435] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
people who had come down from the mountains. “From this,” Adalai recalled, “I gathered that there were many guerrillas who had surrendered as a result of the pacification campaign conducted by the Japanese-run Department of Justice. The guerrillas had been promised immunity from arrest if they surrendered, according to Fukuomoto, and it was planned to integrate them in the Philippine Constabulary under the Japanese.” Coincidentally, towards the end of August, Adalai and her children were released from Fort Santiago. Others were less fortunate.

U.S. Army Master Sergeant Richard Sakakida later testified that on about 25 August, while he was a prisoner of war in Manila, he was called to witness the executions of between 18 and 40 people who had been tried on charges of being involved with guerrilla activities. He distinctly recalled one of those summarily beheaded was an elderly woman named Mrs. Blanche W. Jurika – Parsons’ mother-in-law. Her remains were among the many interred in the Chinese Cemetery north of the capitol. Only after the war did Parsons learn of her fate.

Outside the capital on 6 September 2,000 Huks and 250 Hua Zhi assaulted the Japanese base on Mount Arayat. The Hua Zhi created two new squadrons, the Cantonese (Second Squadron) and Fukien (Third Squadron) of about 100 men each. It also recognized the Manila Squadron under Li Biaofu that coordinated with the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets League. In October, the Hua Zhi would form a squadron in Tikman, Camarines Sur, with only twenty-six men with two pistols, in time to meet the American invasion and more secure arms and supplies.

2436 Marquez, 85.
2437 Wise 155.
Rumors from the jungle telegraph circulated Manila. U.S. airplanes reportedly bombed the Islands. Indeed, night air attacks – reportedly B-24s – began against Davao in August, with the heaviest raid on 8 September.\textsuperscript{2438} On 10 September naval telegrams to the Fourteenth Army in Manila reported U.S. forces landing near Davao, but the report proved false.

Mindanao, D1,007/R-44

In August, Fertig had complained: “The food situation is extremely critical. If we are not run out of here, we have enough fuel for 80 days. There is only food for 10 days. Our only chance of survival will be for the Nips not to press us too hard. Again our future is in God’s hands. We have done all we can.”\textsuperscript{2439} To make matters worse, in early September the Japanese began moving troops around Mindanao.\textsuperscript{2440} They now had 25,000 troops in Surigao and 80,000 people in Davao, and they confiscated all the food they could find. “Food is a terrific problem,” Fertig emphasized, “as this area is on the verge of starvation.”\textsuperscript{2441}

The Japanese were consolidating their positions in Mindanao. Troops from Surigao journeyed through Agusan and Oriental Misamis to Cagayan before occupying a defensive area in South Bukidon. Another 5,000 Japanese soldiers, followed by women and children, marched from Naspit to Cagayan, despite harassment from Fertig’s 110\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment. The effort left only a 550-man garrison at Hinataun on eastern Mindanao, 700 in Surigao on the northern most tip of the island, and possibly 2,000 in

\textsuperscript{2438} Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 21.
\textsuperscript{2439} Fertig Diary, 5 August 1944.
\textsuperscript{2440} Ibid., 19 October 1944.
\textsuperscript{2441} “Ibid., 11 August 1944.
Agusan on the north coast. Then the Japanese completed a withdrawal across the Agusan River by mid-month. Troops in Davao withdrew leaving the city’s penal colony to the guerrillas.²⁴⁴² Fertig noted, “Japs have left the whole river and are believed to be about ready to leave Butuan. Many troops withdrawn from Surigao. East clear from Lianga to Manag. Only 200 troops at Tandag. 32 ships caught on 9 Sept. in Lianga and Hinatuan Bays, and everyone sunk. We are getting troops there but should be plenty of Salvage. It is believed this convoy had just completed loading most of Lianga garrison when our task force caught them.”²⁴⁴³ The remaining Japanese forces at Camp Keithley would secretly depart one night in early October, link up with the battalion at Iligan, and moved to Davao. They would evacuate Damaslan and Iligon on 11 October and concentrate 35,000 troops “between Digos, Pikit, and Velncia. Troops from Sambo arriving Davao by fast launch.”²⁴⁴⁴

Reviewing the war situation on 9 September, Fertig felt optimistic. “After nearly two weary years of battle,” he concluded, “the tide has turned. It should run to flood without serious opposition. I wanted to be home when the Aspens turn but impossible. Maybe by Christmas.”²⁴⁴⁵ U.S. carriers had just begun two days of bombing attacks on Davao, Surigao, Cagayan, Bukidon. On 13 and 14 September, they hit Cebu, Leyte, Panay, and Negros. On 20 and 21 September, they hit Legaspi. Fertig wrote, “Box score thru 20 Sept. is 701 planes destroyed 176 ships sunk or damaged. Jap airforce practically driven from Mindanao, Davao, Sarangani Bay and Zambo hit almost daily.”²⁴⁴⁶ The day of redemption seemed at hand. After the war Japanese generals would admit, “When the

²⁴⁴² Ibid.
²⁴⁴³ Ibid., 25 September 1944.
²⁴⁴⁴ Ibid., 19 October 1944.
²⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., 9 September 1944.
²⁴⁴⁶ Ibid, 25 September 1944.
enemy task force raided the central and northern parts of the Philippines from 13 to 16 September, our air corps and a part of the land units suffered severely.”

On 14 September, Narwhal again departed Australia on its fourteenth war patrol with forty-one passengers. After a mission in the Netherlands Indies, the submarine rendezvoused with guerrillas off Balingasag, Mindanao, on 27 September. Despite heavy rains the crew delivered three men and 20 tons of supplies and picked up guerrilla Captain Chandler Thomas who was to arrange the pickup of four stretcher-bound guerrillas down the coast. Two days later Skipper Titus found Thomas’ requested landing site in Siari Bay a poor one due to currents, shoals and exposure to enemy eyes but he still sent out two rubber boats captained by reliable petty officers to retrieve the four wounded men. To Titus’s surprise, eighty-two evacuees came out to board the Narwhal. Eighty were former POWs the Japanese had sent north from the Davao prison camp when the submarine SS-263 Paddle torpedoed their transport Shinyo Maru and enabled their escape. Indeed, only four of the men were litter cases.

2447 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 21.
In his diary Fertig explained that the Japanese had loaded 750 American POWs on two small ships in Davao on 21 August before transferring them to the large ship. On 7 September, the U.S. submarine torpedoed the unmarked vessel but some POWs survived. “They were machine gunned by planes and from a launch launched by enemy,” he wrote, “83 including 26 officers finally reached shore. Fred Gallager, Harry Fisher, and Chenowyth were among the survivors.”\(^{2450}\) Guerrillas led these survivors to Siari for submarine extraction to SWPA.

Leaving the area, *Narwhal* lost power on her rear planes and was stuck in diving posture to 170 feet before emergency procedures brought her to the surface just as a Japanese aircraft flew overhead. The boat survived the scare and made it to Mios Woendi, Dutch New Guinea on 5 October. SWPA supply deliveries lifted the guerrilla’s spirits. The *Narwhal* had delivered 35 men and 35 tons of supplies near Kiamba and three men and 20 tons at Balingasag.\(^{2451}\)

The results of photographic reconnaissance of “King Two,” Halsey’s carrier air raids of the Philippines in September, convinced the admiral that Japanese defenses in the central islands were weak.\(^{2452}\) The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed MacArthur “to occupy Leyte, by-passing Mindanao, with Nimitz’s forces, having taken Palau, joining in the attack.”\(^{2453}\) Of course, when they had met in July at Pearl Harbor and the President

Frederick J. Gallagher, PFC John J. Mackowski, 1LT Theodore L. Pflueger, PVT Harold W. Wilson; Army quartermaster PVT Buster Parkerm SGT John W. Booth, CPL Emery A. Motsinger; Army coastal artillery PFC William S. Horabin, SSGT Charles C. Johnstone, 2LT Francis E. LeClear, PFC Lewis A. Moore, PVT D.J. Olinger, PFC Michael Pulice, PFC Rose Denver, 1LT Morris L. Shoss, PVT Lawrence Tipton; British national commissioned into US Army 1LT James A. Gardner; survivor of *Eiyo Maru #2* (or *Yashu Maru*) 2LT John H. McGee.

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\(^{2450}\) *Diary, 1943-1945, Message Traffic Intelligence Summaries Later Conference,* 19 October 1944, Wendell W. Fertig Papers, Box 1 of 2, Center for Military History, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.


\(^{2452}\) Roscoe, 369.

\(^{2453}\) Tarling, 107.
asked, “Douglas, where do we go from here?,” MacArthur had replied, “Leyte, Mr. President, then Luzon!”

Panay, D1,029/R-20

On Panay, Peralta reorganized his robust force into six Combat Teams. The 1st Combat Team under Lieutenant Colonel Cirilo B. Garcia occupied northwest Panay with its headquarters in Libertad, Antique, and counted 132 officers and 2,166 enlisted men with 2,000 arms. G-2 Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Serran became the commander of the 2nd Combat Team and Major Frederico Salacedo replaced him as District Intelligence Officer. The 2nd Combat Team held San Dionisio, Iloilo, with its headquarters at Amayong, and had 148 officers and 2,035 men. Major P.B. Osman commanded 3rd Combat Team in west-central Iloilo Province with 73 officers and 1,340 men with 814 arms. The 63rd Combat Team under Lieutenant Colonel Julian C. Chaves had a force of 190 officers and 3,258 men with 1,400 arms in southern Iloilo Province headquartered at Mount Tigatay. Lieutenant Colonel Leopoldo Relunia ran the 64th Combat Team in east central Iloilo and Capiz Province and commanded 282 officers and 4,055 enlisted men. The 65th Combat Team under Lieutenant Colonel Braulio F. Villasis had a roster of 139 officers, 2,075 men and 1,000 arms in southern Antique Province and Palawan with its headquarters at Lanaon, Antique. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel V.W. Grasparil led the 66th Combat Team in northern and western Capiz Province with 192 officers and 3,321 men and 800 arms.

Peralta sought to flood targets ranging from Japanese installations to city street corners with agents recruited from within the puppet governments. By April, he had

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intelligence contacts in Northern Luzon (Cagayan, Ilocos, Isabela, Nueva Ecija, N. Taybayas, Neua Vizcya), Manila, Bataan, Corregidor, Cavite, and Southern Luzon (Laguna, S. Taybayas, Camarines Sur, Albay, Sorgoson, Camarines Norte).\footnote{Tarling., 66.} “The object,” the PRS noted, “has been to introduce an element of competition between agents and to cross check information received.”\footnote{Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 66.} Often this competition spilled into friction with local free government officials. As SWPA observed, “Shifting support, failure to thoroughly examine the facts in disputes and the resultant hasty decisions, often cited by junior and inexperienced officers, have aggravated the local political situation on those islands.”\footnote{Ibid., 48.}

Peralta reported spending P100,000 each month to maintain this intelligence network, P25,000 in Panay Emergency Currency and the rest in Japanese Military Currency. P10,000 of this went to Lapus, Merrit, Zabat and Miranda. He extended his influence into Luzon by sending out radios and agents to supplement his extensive network of couriers making weekly runs between Panay and Bohol, Samar-Leyte, southern Luzon, the intermediate islands and Masbate.

By October Peralta reported having as 22,600 guerrillas, including Masbate, with 8,000 arms of various types and about 160 rounds of ammo per weapon. Between mid-1942 and October 1944 SWPA delivered 350 tons of supplies to Panay including “carbines, assorted machine guns, tommy guns, a few mortars, etc.”\footnote{Ibid., 55.} Leadership below the top levels was weak, however, and failed to instill discipline. Agents reported: “There
are indications of rebellion against Peralta’s authority on Masbate.”

Peralta’s subordinate commander Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Jurado had Masbate’s radio working by September and served as an able but contentious agent to Luzon and other islands. Guerrillas in east central Mindoro killed Jurado on 14 October. Still, with morale kept up by success in the field and support from SWPA, Peralta’s men kept the Japanese confined to garrisons at San Jose (Antique), Santa Barbara, Iloilo City and Capiz town,

Manila, D1,005/R-46

Japanese reinforcements began arriving: the 1st Division from September through November, the 68th Brigade and the Manila Defense Command from October through December, and the 10th, 23rd, and 19th Division (minus) in November and December. The 8th Division had begun arriving in early September and moved to Los Banos. The 2nd Tank Division reached Manila and Northern San Fernando then sent its main body to the area from Cabanatuan to San Miguel, and the rest to eastern Lingayen Bay. It had lost one infantry battalion, three tank companies, three artillery battalions and three engineer companies to the U.S. Navy during transit to the Philippines. The 61st IMB arrived in Luzon in late September and sent to the islands in the Babuyan Channel.

The combination of guerrilla and U.S. Navy attacks virtually ended Japanese exploitation of Philippine resources. The Ishihara Sangyo Company reduced operations at the Larap mine to minimal production of ore for local pig iron foundries due to a lack of transport and omnipresent guerrillas. The entire mine would shut down on 18 December. On 7 September, Leon Guinto, wartime mayor of Manila, had announced:

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2459 Ibid., 50.
2460 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 23.
2461 Setsuho, 147.
“No hostile acts against the Republic and the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy will be tolerated. I weigh my words when I solemnly declare that the consequences of such hostile acts will be fatal!” Yet that month the Japanese abandoned the shipping lines from Davao to Halmahera and Manila to Saigon. By November, they dropped the lines from Miri to Manila, from Singapore and Soerabaja to Balikpapan and from Manila to Ormoc and Davao. The U.S. Navy’s success at sea made guerrilla attacks on mines irrelevant.

In and around the capital Ramsey now claimed 45,000 members (7,000 armed) in the ECLGA. His expansion brought him into increased combat with the Hukbalahaps. With his radio and operator, he established reliable communication to SWPA through stations on Mindanao, Samar and Negros. The guerrilla 4th Ordnance Detachment under Pedro Villaluz operating in Zambales, Tarlac, Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija also worked with Ramsey.

Ramsey boasted of greater unity with local civilians but found it stressed his limited food supplies. This problem plagued all guerrillas. Rice production in the Philippines during the war had fallen by seventy-three percent. In the latter half of 1944, Japanese commanders waged a deliberate campaign to confiscate all available food stocks on Luzon to deny rations to the guerrillas and their allies. Meanwhile, as Abaya reported, “Many landlords amassed fortunes selling rice to our Jap guests at fantastic prices…the poor went hungry… Rice at two thousand pesos a cavan and still shooting up!” Ramsey noted, “Through October and November we began eating monkey,

2462 Abaya, 51.  
2463 Roscoe, 360.  
2464 Davis, 40.  
2465 Abaya, 51.
birds, and the indigenous *kamoting kahoy*, a pasty wild tuber. We were all losing weight, and by mid-November I was dangerously thin and debilitated.”

Meanwhile, having lost their carriers and naval aircraft, the Japanese assembled most of their remaining air force in the Philippines. They also concentrated naval vessels from Singapore and the Inland Sea into the Islands’ waters. They hoped desperate naval sorties under a land-based air umbrella would destroy any invading American fleet. Commander of the Southern Expeditionary Army Group General Viscount Hisaichi Terauchi prioritized the defense of Luzon and brought in General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the conqueror of Malaya, from exile in Manchuria to command of the Fourteenth Area Army. The Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo, however, overruled Terauchi and ordered preparations to fight a decisive battle on Leyte, not Luzon.

Yamashita had a reputation as a highly effective commander who “inspired strong loyalty and affection in his men” by sharing their sufferings. Though deeply involved in the ‘February 26 Incident’ in 1936, his career survived. He now organized his 262,000-man army into three main groups: the Shobu Group under his command in north Luzon; the 80,000-man Shimbu Group under Lieutenant General Shizuo Yokoyama around Manila, and the 30,000-man Kembu Group under Major General Rikichi Tsukada near Bataan. The groups were to execute delaying actions against the invaders and withdraw into inland strongholds. At the right moment, Yamashita decided, he would declare Manila an open city.

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2466 Ramsey and Rivele, 290.
2467 Tarling, 107.
2468 Harries, 339-340.
2469 Ibid., 108.
The Japanese kept up counterguerrilla operations. On 11 October, Yamashita ordered the “subjugation” of “armed guerrillas.” Ramsey learned that they captured and beheaded Charles Putnam. After seven months of torture, Pat Gaston was executed in Fort Santiago, accused of attempting to free prisoners.

Ramsey had his own unexpected brush with death when he suffered appendicitis. His guerrillas used their rifles to bring him Dr. Teng Campa to conduct an operation. Campa secured a spinal anesthetic on the black market, but it proved to be a vial filled only with water and did nothing to curb the pain. Ramsey sedated himself with copious draws of Tanduay rum. After five days of moving in and out of delirium and comas, he heard Campa tell him, “Your hospital is a joke. You need a surgeon.” Campa volunteered to remain with Ramsey for the remainder of the war.

Other native medical professionals came out to join the newly formed guerrilla bands. Dr. Biason and his wife Daisy remained with Volckmann to run the medical station at the mine in Itogon and the facility at Uding. Elsewhere Blas Miranda on Leyte managed to keep his prewar division and regimental surgeons and boasted of “one of the best hospitals ever built in the Visayas by any guerrilla organization.”

Not all medical professionals volunteered, however. Asked where he got his doctors and nurses Blackburn responded, “They came in like the others, but we also went out and kidnapped them because they were afraid to come and join the guerrillas. We

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2470 A. Frank Reel, *The Case of General Yamashita* (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), 105-106. Reel would note: “The adjective [armed] is important, for, according to the very “Rules of Land Warfare:” for violation of which Yamashita was being tried, the Japanese had a right to execute armed guerrillas.” Reel, 106.
2471 Ramsey and Rivele, 269.
2472 Ibid., 271.
2473 Volckmann, 85.
2474 Condon-Hall and Cowdrey, 359.
would go into town, pick up the doctor and his whole family, and move them into the jungle. After they were out there for a while, we usually dropped the word that they had joined the guerrillas, and so, they weren’t about to go anywhere else.”

By such a means Blackburn ‘found’ excellent physicians Jacob Pena and Juan Asuncion and surgeon Gonzalo Cabaliqunito.

Whatever the method of recruitment, guerrillas like Volckmann organized relatively robust medical support. He even trained his Women’s Auxiliary Service (WAS) in first aid to supplement hospital personnel. In central Luzon, Marking formed a loose detachment of civilian physicians, Philippine Army medics, and a few nurses to form a hospital near the Pasig River.

Medical supplies however remained hard to acquire. The Japanese controlled sources in Manila. Volckmann remembered, “Anyone who suddenly purchased a large quantity of medical supplies in Manila would soon find himself before the Kempeitai, the Japanese military police. Unless a watertight explanation could be given he would land in Fort Santiago prison never to be heard from again.”

A trusted merchant in Kiangnan put the USAFIP-NL in touch with a man named Lanag who ran the local dispensary and became a reliable source for medical supplies, at considerable personal risk. Other guerrilla organizations tried to develop similar sources. A female agent in Manila posing as a relief worker procured “from all possible sources, including hospitals, all the supplies she could lay her hands on. Messenger agents would contact her from time to

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2475 Blackburn Interview, 155.
2476 Condon-Hall and Cowdrey, 359.
2477 Volckmann, 127.
2478 Condon-Hall and Cowdrey, 358.
2479 Volckmann, 128.
2480 Blackburn Interview, 134.
time and smuggle the supplies through the many Japanese inspection posts back to North Luzon.”  

Women like Peggy Utinsky, Naomi Flores, and Maria Martinez routinely risked their lives to support guerrillas while working as nurses in Manila. A good deal of guerrilla effort became invested in developing, maintaining and – when needed – evacuating these medical supply sources.

The black market was an available but highly unreliable source of medical logistics, as Dr. Campa’s experience demonstrated. When all else failed guerrillas frequently ordered supplies taken from local civilians, usually with an “honest effort” to pay or provide receipts for later reimbursement “at a fair and just rate to be determined after the cessation of hostilities.” Finally, when very desperate, the guerrillas targeted Japanese installations in raids specifically designed to capture medical provisions.

Supplies by submarine, however, were increasing. In the first six month of its submarine operations, the AIB and PRS directed eight submarine missions to the Philippines; in the six-month preceding MacArthur’s return they conducted thirty successful landings. On 19 September, the SS-225 Cero under Lieutenant Commander Edward F. Dissette sailed from Darwin on its sixth war patrol with orders to patrol off Mindanao. On 27 October Dissette forced the Japanese gunboat Kyeoi Maru No. 3 to run aground on Luzon. On 3 November Cero landed sixteen men under Vanderpool and 17 tons of supplies on the coast of Luzon before heading off to Pearl Harbor. In addition, SWPA aircraft began to reach the Islands.

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2481 Volckmann, 128.
2482 Kaminski, 234.
2483 Ibid., 127.
2484 “Once,” recalled Volckmann, “we were in desperate need of medical supplies and instruments we found it necessary to raid two Jap installations, which were successfully moved, lock stock and barrel, minus the Japs, out into the mountains.” Volckmann, 128.
Volckmann thought he had finally arranged for a direct delivery of supplies from SWPA for 19 October. The submarine he expected to deliver supplies at Darigayos, north of San Fernando, La Union, failed to appear. SWPA sent supplies to other guerrillas on Luzon: on 23 October the SS168 Nautilus dropped off 12 men and twenty tons of supplies at the Massanga River, followed by another twenty tons of supplies at Dibut Bay the next day. Meanwhile Volkmann’s guerrillas built a 4,000-foot airstrip at Tuao where aircraft landed to coordinate and drop off supplies. General Jarred V Crabb of 5th Bomber Command sent generators and equipment for the airfield. U.S. aircraft flying photographic missions over the island provided gridded photos to the guerrillas. Blackburn maintained a photo mosaic of his area to pass detailed locations of targets to SWPA. “I also had the best orchestra in the area,” said Blackburn, “and the men liked the girls in this safe area.” Many pilots would land and remain overnight.

On 21 September, from the window of her school at Saint Rita College, young Isabela Yomul, watched formations of airplanes approach Manila. “Then the air-raid siren started to blare out loudly,” she recalled, “and I see small white puffs of smoke in the sky. The two bodied airplanes move so fast none of the white puffs is hitting them.” The planes were twin-boomed P-38 Lightings of the U.S Army Air Corps and they introduced a very different American military to the Philippines. Robin Prising remembered watching from a rooftop in Santo Tomas prison: “Out of the massy surge of clouds, the American bombers came, tier upon tier of them, flying high, flying low, and earth shaking armada of aeroplanes, glistening silver-white in the sun as they rode the

2486 Blackburn Interview, 184.
2487 Ibid., 183.
2488 Ibid., 185.
2489 Jennings, 51.
air... As we began to count them, black bombs dropped from their bellies, smashing the harbor and airfields of Manila.”2490

The last American fighter that flew over the Islands, the P-40B Warhawk, could muster about 340 miles per hour and fly up to 31,000 feet, comparable to the Japanese Zero which could fly up to 346 miles per hour and up to 35,000 feet high.2491 The Zero was far more maneuverable which gave it a great edge in a dogfight. While the Japanese had made few improvements to the Zero, the new P-38L Lighting fighters appearing over Manila could fly 414 miles per hour and up to 40,000 feet.2492 The P-38s heralded the arrival of new American quantitative and qualitative advantages in bombers, aircraft carriers, naval gunnery, landing craft, submarines, artillery, and most other weapons and supply systems that shocked the Japanese and guerrillas alike.

“Manila and Clark were heavily bombed by powerful carrier-based planes from 21 September to 4 October,” the Japanese reported, “Our air bases and the ships which were in Manila Bay were heavily damaged.”2493 Based on guerrillas’ battle damage assessments, SWPA would note the raids on September 21 and 22 were “especially gratifying” causing 2,000 to 3,000 Japanese casualties, hitting ninety percent of Japanese military installations, sinking some forty to sixty ships, mostly inter-island vessels, in Manila harbor.2494 Outside Manila, Marking related to his men how he was moved by the display of American airpower. One of his deputies replied, “Today is not the wonder of

2490 Connaughton, et al., 67.
2492 Ibid., 581.
2493 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 21.
2494 Lapham and Norling, 166.
it. The wonder, Marking, is how you pulled through last year. The wonder is how you kept on fighting.”

Also on 21 September, the submarine SS-197 *Seawolf* put to sea under Lieutenant Commander Alfred Marion Bontier from Brisbane on its fifteenth war patrol to deliver personnel and supplies to the east coast of Samar. A prewar sub, *Seawolf* won 13 battle stars during the war. The boat reached Manus on 29 September and exchanged radar signals with *Narwhal* on 3 October before disappearing forever with all hands – possibly sunk by friendly fire.

Two days after *Seawolf* departed Australia, the submarine SS-271 *Ray* under Lieutenant Commander William T. Kinsella departed Fremantle on its sixth war patrol for the South China Sea. On 12 October, Kinsella sank the Japanese troop transport *Toko Maru No. 7* near Cape Cavalite, Mindoro. He then torpedoed and sank the Japanese tanker *Horai Maru No. 7* of the Mindoro west coast on 1 November. That same day the *Ray* landed three men and two tons of supplies at Mamburao, Mindoro. The boat would be involved in the sinking of another transport ship, *Kagu Maru*, and a corvette *Kaibokan 7*, before arriving at Pearl Harbor on 8 December.

On 27 September, Laurel finally announced a declaration of war against United States and Great Britain with the unanimous consent of his cabinet and Council of State. He also let loose the Ganaps and the Makapili on the resistance. “In San Pedro, Laguna, the price for each guerrilla caught and executed was one sack of rice,” Abaya noted, “In

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2495 Panlilio, 235.
Santa Cruz, Makapilis demanded passes for meat and other foodstuffs. No salary was provided for these ‘patriotic’ soldiers. Hence an open incentive for looting.”

The Makapili and other informers would find little reward for their collaboration. Adalia Marquez observed their positions. “No matter how faithfully they worked for the Japanese, when they outlived their usefulness they were done away with.” She noted the case of a boy named Hilario who stole a briefcase that turned out to belong to a Japanese general who was on his way to brief General Yamashita. Captain Eda of the Japanese Military Police rounded up sixty-four people. “They were condemned not for participation, not for guilt by association, but by accident of location,” Adalia explained, “Even those informers who had helped the Japs get their men were still behind bars. It was common to hear, ‘What is the use? Be on the Japs side, they imprison you. Go against them, they do the same. Might as well be against them!’”

New skipper Lieutenant Commander George H. Laird, Jr., steered SS-322 Blackfin submarine out of under Pearl Harbor on its first war patrol on 30 September. On 1 November Blackfin torpedoed and sank both the troop transport Unkai Maru No. 12 and the auxiliary vessel Caroline Maru of the west coast of Mindoro. On 18 November, Laird recovered documents and equipment from the guerrillas on the Camurong River in Mindoro.

Northern Luzon, D1,018/R-31

2498 Abaya, 57.
2499 Marquez, 111.
2500 Ibid., 142
In Baguio, a “hula hula dancer” at the Pines Hotel named Judy Geronimo went to see Eugenio Lopez and handed him a letter from local guerrillas. Lopez recognized Geronimo as a hostess who was “very close friends of the Japanese military police.” He declined the letter. After the war Geronimo testified that Lopez said the letter “would first have to be cleared by the Kempeitai.” Two weeks later, the Kempeitai arrested Geronimo and sent her to be tortured and interrogated. She recalled: “I was taken to Bining, Mountain Province on 16 October, by three Japanese soldiers, where I was shot and buried. The Japanese then left, and some Igorots took me to the hills and took care of me.”

In April 1945 Geronimo would lodge treason charges against Eugenio Lopez with the U.S. Counter Intelligence Corps. Throughout the war, his brother Fernando had maintained his string of casinos in Iliolo City under Japanese protection and he published the pro-Japanese daily paper *Panay Sho-Ho* in Iliolo. “Like most of the provincial political elite,” wrote Alfred McCoy, “who cultivated allies on both sides of the battle lines, the Lopez faction had maintained contact with pro-American guerrillas through USAFFE intelligence officers, among them Captain Patricio Miguel, a prewar Lopez supporter in the city police, and Captain Alfredo Gestoso, who helped Fernando escape from the city at the war’s end and later protected him from collaboration charges.” Despite the strong appearance of collaboration, elites like the Lopez brothers knew how to elude punishment.

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2502 Alfred W. McCoy, “Rent Seeking Families and the Philippine State,” 474.
2503 Ibid.
2504 Ibid.
2505 Ibid., 475.
Manila, D1,034/R-15

General Tomoyuki Yamashita arrived on 6 October as the new Commander in Chief of the Fourteenth Army Area. The ‘Tiger of Malaya’ conquered supposedly impregnable Singapore in seventy days, the greatest disaster in the history of the British Army. “The Japanese subordinate military authorities in the Philippines had complained to Imperial General Headquarters against General Kuroda’s complacency and fondness for good living,” Agoncillo wrote, “Hence Yamashita’s appointment to the Philippine post.” Yamashita had spent most of the war in semi-exile in Manchukuo and China but now was considered the right man to defend the Philippines. He had a lot to do without knowing just how little time he had to do it.

On his arrival in Manila, Yamashita declared: “Those who stand against the Japanese Army must be regarded as their enemies. In the Philippines today, the war has come to the situation of kill or be killed. No matter who the person is, a Filipino or not, if we hesitate we ourselves will be killed.” In the previous weeks, newly arrived Fourteenth Army staff officers proposed a plan to assassinate President Laurel and asked Benigno Ramos and General Ricarte for their support. Other Japanese officers brought into the plot reacted with alarm and older hands on the army staff stopped it. Ambassador Shozo Murata, President Laurel’s personal interpreter Masakatsu Hamamoto, and Colonel Utsunomiya maintained support for Laurel and fought the new hard liners and their attempts to destroy the Filipino elite.

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2507 Barrameda, 114.
2509 Sophia Papers, 10.
The day after his arrival Yamashita assumed command and the next day convened a meeting of his division commanders “where he elucidated the important elements of the operational plan. He also emphasized the traditional battle spirit and affirmed that the land units must fight the battle on Luzon with the utmost effort.” Yamashita anticipated a decisive battle on Luzon, prioritizing the defense of the naval bases and airfields. To do so he would have to address the guerrilla threat. He confessed to his chief of general affairs, Utsunomiya, “I had no idea how bad the peace and order situation is in the Philippines.” He blamed the staff and called Utsunomiya a ‘lazy official’ (dara-kan), accused him and Chief of Staff Major General Takaji Wachi of spoiling the Philippine elites, and pointedly asked Ambassador Murata, “How could you have spent nearly three years here and let this happen?”

To correct the situation Yamashita decided to take a risk and approved an idea advocated by Inzuzuka and Kageyama to arm Filipinos loyal to the Japanese. Collaborators like Ramos, Ricarte, and Pio Duran of the Makapili had of course long advocated such a measure. Since at least July they had been coordinating with the Kempeitai, Mainichi newspaper reporters in meetings at the New Philippines Cultural Institute recently moved to Manila. The Fourteenth Area Army Headquarters formed an eighty-one-man Special Construction Unit (Tokubetsu Kosaku Tai) under Major Sato. The unit was to organize, recruit and train a volunteer Filipino army to fight alongside the Japanese against guerrillas and any U.S. forces that might invade the

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2510 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 24.
2511 Satoshi, 41
2512 Ibid.
2514 Ibid.
Islands. As a secondary mission, the volunteer forces were to support propaganda operations to sway the Filipino population to resist an American invasion.

The Japanese also pressed the Laurel government for more manpower. The Philippine administration issued a report detailing reasons why Filipinos did not – and would not – answer calls from the Japanese military and businesses.\textsuperscript{2515} The primary reasons were: language barriers, poor wages, hard working conditions, forced relocations, separations from family, and the need to stay at home to fend off starvation. Many of these causes sprung from the action of the guerrillas. The Laurel report explained: “The anti-Japanese guerrilla efforts to prevent people from applying for work in Japanese projects, which this report does not mention, must have contributed to the difficulties in procuring labor encountered by military-commissioned mineral resource development projects.”\textsuperscript{2516}

The Japanese prepared to defend Luzon by rounding up anyone thought to be associated with the guerrillas. Adalia Marquez was one of those suspects. On 6 October one of her former guards, Kawata, secretly warned her to leave Manila quickly for she was about to be arrested again by order of Kempeitai Chief Colonel Nagahama and sent back to Fort Santiago. This time she would not return.\textsuperscript{2517} Adalia hurriedly gathered her children and headed to her extended family in Bucawe.

Hollandia, D1,032/R-17

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\textsuperscript{2515} Setsuho, 152. \\
\textsuperscript{2516} Ibid., 152. \\
\textsuperscript{2517} Marquez, 186.
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Parsons reported to the Sixth U.S. Army commander Lieutenant General Walter Krueger’s headquarters in Hollandia for a briefing. Krueger informed Parsons that Sixth Army would invade Leyte on or about 20 October. Like almost everyone else, Parsons had assumed MacArthur would strike Mindanao first. SWPA instead decided to have Fertig harass the Japanese on Mindanao while Charlie Smith assisted diversionary landings on Samar. Only in the last days of September had the Samar guerrillas, “acknowledging Smith’s integrity and ability,” met to nominate the American colonel for command of the Samar area. On 4 October, SPWA endorsed the appointment. Smith reported having approximately 8,500 men (two-thirds with prewar training) but without trained officers.

Krueger further informed Parsons that MacArthur and President Osmeña wanted to avoid collateral damage to the Philippine civilians. They wanted to evacuate villages near the invasion beaches but feared such a move might tip off the Japanese. They finally decided to have one trusted agent infiltrate the area prior to the attack and devise some way to move the locals without alerting the Japanese to the pending attack. That trusted agent had to be Chick Parsons.

MacArthur would also need Kangleon’s help on Leyte and Samar. He promoted Kangleon to colonel on 1 October but the area’s guerrillas remained fractious. On Samar, Pedro Merritt’s group became the 93rd Division (322 officers and 1,408 men in four regiments), but he still refused to work under Kangleon. Reportedly, Merritt’s men violently intimidated and exploited the local people and government. Because of this Major Manuel Valley refused to join Merritt and added his 1,200 men on Samar to

2518 Ingham, 161.
2519 Wise, 146.
2520 Intelligence Activities, 40.
Kangleon’s ranks. Colonel Juan Causing, the former commander USAFFE Leyte Provisional Regiment, also gave his guerrillas on Leyte to Kangleon, became his chief of staff, and went to Samar and in fact recruited Valley for Kangleon. Captain Luciano Abia joined constabulary troops to Valley.

Parsons knew he had to get to Kangleon’s headquarters which he believed to be somewhere near the Leyte capital of Tacloban. A submarine insertion, however, would take too long to arrange and execute and would likely draw too much attention. He would have to go in by air. With MacArthur’s authority, Parsons went to see Seventh Fleet commander Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid who reluctantly offered him a PBY Catalina Black Cat flying boat specially equipped for night operations. He then went to see the fleet commander of aircraft, Rear Admiral Frank D. Wagner, to schedule the aircraft and a special crew for a “destination to be designated by the above-named Parsons.”

Parsons returned to Hollandia for final coordination with MacArthur’s chief of staff, General Richard K. Sutherland, who informed him that Army intelligence had sent Lieutenant Colonel Frank Rawolle to accompany him on the mission. The Army was not going to rely on a naval officer to send the information they required.

As his advance elements neared the Philippines, MacArthur ordered all guerrillas to concentrate on acquiring “reliable - specific information on enemy defensive position with later commitments as required to harassing actions to the extent of existing capabilities.”

SWPA’s staff got involved in using the guerrilla radio nets to prepare for the invasion. “As a result,” Ramsey recalled, “his demands on us for intelligence

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2521 Ingham, 204.
2522 Letter Major H.C. Page to Colonel Frank D. McGee, 29 September 1943, Box, 248, Record Group Philippine Archives Collection, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland
became more insistent and pointed.” Lapham recalled how MacArthur sent several messages with “specific instructions to survey the whole area we controlled, make every possible advance preparation for combat, and plan in detail an extensive program of sabotage to be put into effect when orders came from Australia.” SWPA planners thought the guerrillas provided “a good picture of what they would meet after their landing.”

Lapham wrote:

“At various times we reported 2,000 to 3,000 Japanese troops accompanied by 200 Philippine Constabulary men and 2,000 drums of gasoline at various places on Luzon; 3,000 enemy troops at Urdaneta with four small tanks; 10,000 Japanese in the hills south of Paladapad; 15,000 more along the National Highway; 4,000 more near a certain barrio; 500 in one place; 800 in another, and 15,000 in a third along Dingalan Bay; a division and half along the Zambalese coast, three more division in Pampanga, and 1,500 PC nearby, though perhaps half of these were really pro-American; 3,000 ground troops aboard fourteen transports off Port San Fernando, and 200 Nip engineers at Mahoag,; fifty Japanese guarding the supply depot at Damortis in the railway warehouse north of the station, plus 100 who guarded an ammunition dump at Batac barrio school, 400 infantrymen at Rosario,

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2523 Ramsey, 285.
2524 Lapham, 163.
2525 See Reports of General MacArthur, 195.
900 troops and one mountain gun at Binalonan, 5,000 troops and some
guns in a nearby convent, and 2,000 more in Inbac.”

He added: “A recurring theme in dozens of such reports was that commodities were
stored in schools, convents, churches, bamboo groves, or thickets of large trees where the
Japanese seemed to think the goods would be concealed or the Allies would not expect
them to be hidden.”

SWPA also demanded information on the Huks. “We forwarded the names of
eight or ten of their leaders and the towns in which they were currently staying,” recalled
Lapham, “We emphasized that they were loyal to neither Japan nor America because they
were true Communists who would try to seize power at the end of the war; that they
probably had more troops in reserve; and that when they were not actively making
trouble for us, they devoted much effort to plundering civilians.”

SWPA over-saturated the Islands. In early October, Stahl learned of a new radio
station on his area on the Bondoc Peninsula. “The Army and Navy were flooding the area
with radio stations. Security needs kept us oldsters from knowing of the impending
landing. The station at the Point was a part of a new network based on Negros Island and
specifically a part of the Leyte landing operation. They weren’t anxious to tell me what
they were doing although they admitted they knew of the existence of station S3L and
had been told to relay through my station in an emergency.”

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2526 Lapham and Norling, 163-164.
2527 Ibid., 165.
2528 Ibid., 166.
2529 Stahl, 133.
On 11 October, the *Narwhal* departed Mios Woendi in Dutch New Guinea under new skipper Commander William G. Holman on its fifteenth and final war patrol.\textsuperscript{2530} Six days later it delivered ten tons of supplies to Tongehatan, Tawi-Tawi. On 19 October, *Narwhal* delivered thirty-seven men and fifty tons of supplies to Calipapa, Negros, before heading home to Brisbane, Australia, on 2 November. Within three months the boat that had been a lifeline for the Philippine guerrillas would be decommissioned in the Philadelphia Naval Yard.

Leyte, D1,040/R-9

After threading around Japanese spotting stations and radar sites in a moonless rain early on 12 October, Parsons’ flying boat sought out one of the three planned insertion points on Leyte. Low on fuel, they had to return to their base. He received a note from Whitney: “Kangleon on west coast. Does not believe he can get across for several days, due to heavy enemy interference. Recommend your trip be delayed as long as possible.”\textsuperscript{2531} Parsons decided to fly again that night. The first night’s pilot needed rest but opted to fly in the co-pilot seat for next attempt.

Flying just above the waves, they again ran the gauntlet between Homonhon and Dinagat Islands before landing on the water near Tacloban. Worried about Japanese planes at the city’s airfield and the enemy guns on the highlands above the beach, the flying boat kept its engines running while Parsons and Rawolle launched themselves and their rubber raft out a side window. In less than a minute they were paddling towards shore as the plane flew out of sight.


\textsuperscript{2531} Ingham, 210.
As their raft tangled on a reef off the beach, the two Americans saw a light approaching from shore. Rawolle grabbed his carbine but the habitually unarmed Parsons called out to whoever was approaching and ordered them to fetch a boat. A tense and dangerous moment ended when two native fishermen arrived with a canoe to ferry the Americans inland. A retired Navy mess attendant from Cavite hosted Parsons and Rawolle and soon half the town was celebrating their arrival. After eating heartily, the two officers slept soundly. On the morning of 14 October two guerrillas appeared with a boat to take the Americans to one of Kangleon’s radio stations where they sent a message to SWPA: “Party arrived safely – Parsons.”\footnote{Ibid., 216.} They sent the boat to get Kangleon who arrived that later that evening.

Parsons informed Kangleon that MacArthur knew the Japanese were reinforcing their garrisons in the Philippines in anticipation of his return. They now had 24,000 men on Leyte, expecting him to attack there after he took Mindanao. Therefore, in a few days, American airpower would conduct terrible strikes against the enemy’s garrisons across the Islands, including those in Kangleon’s domain. MacArthur’s plans included heavy naval and air bombardment of Tacloban, normally home to 30,000 citizens. Fearing for the safety of the Filipinos, the General wanted leaders like Kangleon to have the people leave their homes and head for the hills before 16 October and stay hidden for one week. Without hesitation, Kangleon said it would be done. The guerrilla leader also agreed to Parsons’ request to have all radios on standby every hour on the hour.\footnote{Ibid., 219-220.}
On 15 October, Kangleon reported to Parsons that the Japanese had abandoned Tacloban. He asked that the Americans spare Leyte’s capitol from bombing.\textsuperscript{2534} Parsons relayed the request but could not be certain SWPA approved or even received the message. Parsons knew the Japanese had imprisoned Kangleon’s children in Tacloban and suggested that they had time to send agents to liberate them. Kangleon refused to risk men and possibly tip off the Japanese to the impending invasion. The next day came word that the Japanese had left Panaon, leaving only civilians on this area still targeted for heavy bombing. Parsons again sent out a radio request to spare that location. The messages had been received but debated. “We had to decide whether the Japs were playing a game in withdrawing from Tacloban before the bombing started,” noted Whitney, “They might have returned after the barrage – and that would have been tragic for the American lads on the beach.”\textsuperscript{2535} Given the guidance from MacArthur and Osmeña, however, SWPA redrew the bomb lines at Tacloban and Panaon to limit collateral damage.

On 15 October, the U.S. began heavy air raids on Luzon at Naga and Sipocot. “Two days later,” wrote Barrameda, “another massive morning air raid, this time in Pili, fueled the anger of the Japanese in the garrison there, and they massacred no less than 50 men, women and children that afternoon in Barrio Agdangan in the town of Baao.”\textsuperscript{2536}

The next day, SWPA ordered all the guerrillas in the Philippines to conduct attacks in support of the impending invasion. Lapham recalled, “We blasted bridges, cut communication lines, knocked holes in highways, ambushed truck convoys, attacked

\textsuperscript{2534} Ibid., 223.
\textsuperscript{2535} Ibid., 227.
\textsuperscript{2536} Barrameda, 169.
enemy garrisons.\textsuperscript{2537} Fertig’s guerrillas attacked fortifications in Misamis City with 400 men armed with 200 Enfield rifles, submachine guns, automatic rifles, three 81mm mortars with 150 rounds.\textsuperscript{2538} On Bohol, Ingenerio reorganized Boforce into the 84\textsuperscript{th}, 85\textsuperscript{th}, and 86\textsuperscript{th} Regiments with a total of about 8,000 poorly armed men. On Negros, SWPA officially promoted Abecede to Lieutenant Colonel.

For several days the U.S. Navy swept for mines and surveyed beaches on Leyte. On 17 October teams from the 6\textsuperscript{th} Rangers seized several small islands off Tacloban. They could not be certain what reception they would receive on the main island. During the previous year, the Japanese garrisons had stepped up frequent and intense patrols that arrested, tortured and interrogated more civilians. By January the pressure had led several of General Miranda’s guerrilla officers to accept amnesty, including Major Marcos Soliman. Since then, the Japanese reported 561 engagements against guerrillas, killing 1,984 guerrillas, capturing 2,300 prisoners, accepting the surrender of 6 Americans and 23,077 Filipinos and seizing 7 vehicles, 7 generators, 37 radios and communication items, 1,556 firearms, and 55,348 rounds of ammunition, while losing 7 officers and 208 enlisted men killed, and 11 officers and 147 men wounded.\textsuperscript{2539}

On 19 October, SWPA issued a warning order of an impending landing by Sixth U.S. Army at Tacloban, Leyte. Fertig wrote in his diary: “Our time of trial and triumph is at hand.”\textsuperscript{2540}

The next day, the Battle of Leyte began.

\textsuperscript{2537} Lapham and Norling, 168.
\textsuperscript{2538} Willis and Myers, 104.
\textsuperscript{2539} Cannon, 18.
\textsuperscript{2540} Fertig Diary, 19 October 1944.
The guerrilla forces played a vital role in MacArthur’s return. They built and operated airfields, rescued down pilots, provided coastwatchers, passed intelligence and conducted pre-invasion demolitions. During the invasion, they coordinated with the population, scouted routes and enemy positions, interdicted enemy lines of communication and logistics, protected flanks and conducted deep operations, and acted as conventional forces at times. They also provided essential actions in liberating prisoners of war and saving them from execution.

On 20 October at 0600 hours, a U.S. Navy armada opened fire on the beaches in that area. At 1000 hours landing craft brought X Corps from Lieutenant General Walter Krueger’s Sixth U.S. Army ashore. XXIV Corps landed fifteen miles farther south. They pushed forward against light resistance. At 1330 hours, in X Corps’ sector, MacArthur waded back onto Philippine soil. To a waiting microphone, he said, “People of the Philippines, I have returned! By the grace of Almighty God, our forces stand again on Philippine soil.”

To guerrillas throughout the Islands, MacArthur radioed: “The campaign of reoccupation had commenced. Although your area is not at present within the immediate zone of operations, it is desired that your forces be committed to limited

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offensive action with the specific mission of harassing the movement of enemy reserves within your area and as far as possible contain him to his present positions. Intelligence coverage must be intensified in order that I be fully and promptly advised of all major changes in enemy dispositions or movement.\textsuperscript{2542}

The impending link up of MacArthur's command with the guerrillas posed a problem for SWPA. On 30 September, G-3 Major General Stephen J. Chamberlain sent a memorandum to Chief of Staff Sutherland warning: “Our guerrilla forces have never burdened themselves with keeping or protecting Japanese captives and have not infrequently submitted them to severe methods of torture. As we return and recognize these forces more officially and directly as elements of our Command, such practices, if known to the enemy, may, not without justification, become the pattern for his treatment of our prisoners in his hands including survivors of Bataan and Corregidor.”\textsuperscript{2543} Chamberlain recommended sending a warning from MacArthur in the clear a to all units and commands (including the Japanese) stating that SWPA always treated prisoners according to the customs and laws of war and it expected all others to do the same.

Sutherland responded the next day:

“1. Guerrilla forces in the Philippines have operated in wholly irregular fashion and under conditions of the utmost difficulty. The penalty imposed by the enemy for their activities has been immediate death through inhuman torture. As has been the case

\textsuperscript{2542} \textit{Intelligence Activities}, 92.
\textsuperscript{2543} General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area Check Sheet, G-3 to Chief of Staff thru G-2, 30 September 1944. Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG16, Box 65, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia.
in practically all guerrilla movements, they have probably been forced to adopt the principle of ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,’ not only for their own immediate protection through intimidation but also to secure the necessary cohesion among their own forces. Desperate men who fight outside the rules of land warfare cannot be expected to apply those rules unilaterally. I know of no case in history where it has been done. For these reasons I do not concur in the promulgation of the proposed directive.

2. Upon reoccupation of various localities in the Philippines, the guerrilla forces will come under the direct and immediate control of the regular armed forces of the United States. They will be recognized and regularized and from that time forward will, of course, be required to abide by the established rules of land warfare.”

MacArthur did not choose Leyte for the strength of its guerrillas. Although Kangleon’s 92d Division had three regiments with 209 officers and 2,981 enlisted men, it was a relatively recent formation that had received almost no support from SWPA. He had only established his intelligence network in March and it “was not as active as most of the others in the Philippines,” with monthly totals of messages

2544 General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area Check Sheet, Chief of Staff (U/S) to G-3, 1 October 1944. Papers of Courtney Whitney, RG16, Box 65, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia. Still men like Volckmann and Blackburn recalled getting into legal troubles after the war and had to defend former guerrillas on multiple charges of murder for “eliminating spies and saboteurs.” Guardia, Shadow Commander, 135.

2545 Cannon, 18.
received by SWPA of: 6 in March; 7 in April; 7 in May; 12 in June; 13 in July; 13 in August; 17 in September; and 26 in October.”

In choosing Leyte, SWPA had decided to bypass, for now, the more obvious invasion target, Mindanao. “MacArthur radioed that we should do everything to prevent Nips moving toward Surigao,” Fertig wrote, “We also began limited offensive action against all Nip garrisons.” All guerrillas took to the field.

An attorney later assigned to General Yamashita’s defense counsel, A. Frank Reel, explained that from the perspective of the Japanese soldiers:

“It is impossible to comprehend the speedy reconquest of the Philippines by the United States forces without an understanding of the part played behind the lines by the guerrillas. ... Bridges were destroyed, wires were cut, military vehicles were wrecked. Japanese night patrols would fail to return to their bases – the soldiers would eventually be found dead, their heads and other important organs removed by bolo knives. Ambush, demolition, assassination, occasionally open combat, became the nocturnal activity of over a hundred thousand men who had secreted themselves in the hills and mountain slopes and who were supplied with food and information by other more loosely organized groups of men, women and even children in the villages below.

2546 Ibid. 20.
2547 Fertig Diary, 20 October 1944.
It is little wonder that Japanese soldiers felt that practically the entire population of provincial areas had sprung to arms against them, that the placid Filipino ‘civilians,’ who smiled at them by day, were treacherously murdering them by night.”

To soldiers focused on a conventional fight, the guerrilla attacks appeared especially menacing. “Reports of atrocities flowed into Yamashita’s headquarters; guerrillas had hacked half-drowned sailors to pieces as they struggled shore on the southern coasts of Luzon after the Battle of Leyte Gulf while elsewhere guerrillas had murdered innocent Japanese civilian women and children.” Patrons discovered machine guns and grenades left by guerrillas on the perimeter of Yamashita’s headquarters in Fort McKinley and a bomb buried under the officers’ mess.

Hundreds of Filipinos claiming to be guerrillas ready to assist the Americans swamped the Sixth Army landing sites. An Army history noted, “These individuals caused endless confusion, since it was practically impossible for the Americans to distinguish between the genuine guerrilla and his opportunistic counterfeit. After the first few days, however, the Army made contact with guerrilla headquarters and established liaison with the bona fide guerrillas.”

As MacArthur’s forces arrived, they began absorbing, disbanding or reorganizing the guerrilla organizations they encountered. As a first step, SWPA assigned the guerrilla units to conventional force commanders. The 24th Division

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2548 Reel, 105-106.
2549 Connaughton, et al., 67.
2550 Ibid.
2551 Cannon, 204.
and 1st Cavalry Division absorbed the guerrillas on Leyte. General Krueger made the guerrillas a part of his armed forces, and they became a source of additional strength to the Sixth Army," wrote Cannon, "These men frequently operated and patrolled in enemy-held territory and brought the Americans valuable information on Japanese movements and dispositions; the unit commanders of Sixth Army, however, tended to discount reports from such sources with regard to the size of Japanese forces. The guerrillas also guarded supply dumps and depots, bridges, and other installations in the rear areas."

Parsons brought Kangleon through the line of incoming troops and hailed a boat out to Kreuger's flagship. Around them fell seemingly endless naval gunfire and air-dropped ordnance. MacArthur finally recognized Kangleon as the Leyte Area Commander and gave him written instructions: "I desire that you establish and maintain direct communication with this headquarters at your earliest opportunity and thereafter you keep me informed of major developments involving enemy movement, dispositions and other activity within your area and observation." Parsons and Kangleon established a communication center on the ship and provided guerrilla locations, codes and signals.

Sixth Army decided that southern Leyte was so lightly defended as to justify extreme economy of force. They would leave the Japanese garrisons at Malitbog and Maasin to the guerrillas. Parsons had boasted, "The guerrillas could do it themselves

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2552 See Reports of General MacArthur, 236.
2553 Cannon, 204.
2554 Ibid., 17.
if they had a couple of gunboats to knock down the walls of the garrisons.\textsuperscript{2555} He now got the chance to prove it.

Before dawn on 21 October, Parsons flew to Sogod Bay north of Malitbog where he linked up at with local guerrilla leader Captain Juan Escaño who had about 250 guerrillas at the ready. Offshore, the Navy supplied a pair of LCI gunboats (Landing Craft Infantry) specially armed with three forward mounted 40mm Bofors cannons along with several 20mm cannons farther aft. Parsons’ target was a two-story house on the beach in a thick-walled Japanese garrison compound reinforced with trenches. The night before Escaño’s men surrounded the compound. On Parsons’ order the gunboats began firing salvos near the water and then walked them towards the compound so as to avoid shelling the nearby town. When Parsons felt the position sufficiently bombarded, he ordered cease-fire and the guerrillas charged through the holes in the walls to finish off the garrison. Guerrillas in ambush killed all escaping Japanese. Inside the house the guerrillas found great quantities of food and supplies, and few bodies. The bulk of the Japanese force died trying to escape over the walls. There were no survivors.

Parsons’ second objective at Maasin was a Japanese garrison of about sixty men at a radio station in an adobe and stone schoolhouse surrounded by pillboxes and other defenses. A washerwoman provided the guerrillas with detailed sketches of enemy positions and said the Japanese expected reinforcement soon from Cebu.\textsuperscript{2556} Again the guerrillas took up positons and Parsons directed the naval gunfire. This time he used incendiary 20-mm rounds to set fire to the schoolhouse’s

\textsuperscript{2555} Ingham, 231.
\textsuperscript{2556} Ibid.
wood roof. Before he lifted fire, the guerrillas attacked with bolos and slaughtered the garrison. Parsons notified 7th Fleet and Kangleon that guerrillas had secured southern Leyte.

The operations on the southern Leyte typified the missions assigned to guerrillas during the liberation of the Philippines. Sixth Army instructed its field commanders that “guerrillas not be given missions beyond their capabilities,” which normally limited them to reconnaissance, outposts, and guides. Even so, in time many guerrilla units proved to have high combat capabilities. A study of Volckmann’s group noted, “The USAFIP-NL was the not only the largest and most effective guerilla organization in Luzon, it was also a combat division that successfully accomplished the tasks of a U.S. division in the Luzon campaign. The USAFIP-NL was a critical part of the Sixth Army campaign in northern Luzon in some of the most vicious and toughest fighting in the southwest Pacific theater. The Sixth Army would support Volckmann with the 308th Bomb Wing and Forward Air Controllers to provide air support.

Ramsey’ ECLGA had more than 10,000 personnel “organized into military districts of Pangasian, Tarlac, Pampanga, Bulacan, and Bataan.” They discovered and reported Yamashita’s movement of forces inland on Luzon to form a defensive

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2557 Cannon, 257 fn16.
2560 Jerry, 37.
line away from the central plains.\textsuperscript{2561} Ramsey then led ECLGA forces to clear out 600 Japanese soldiers from the fishpond region outside Manila and guided the U.S. 37th Infantry Division into the capital.\textsuperscript{2562}

On 23 October, the \textit{Nautilus} delivered 12 men and 20 tons of supplies to Masanga River on Luzon. Two days later the boat put ashore another 20 tons at Dibut Bay. On 26 October, \textit{Nautilus} delivered Americans Sergeant Rhys Wood and Sergeant Richard Ensor (who took the rank of Lieutenant) and Filipinos A. Luna and Sergeant Basud at ‘Hidden Bay’ (\textit{Tinagong Dagat} – code for Salanga Point).\textsuperscript{2563} Captain Golpe led them to Maragumdum, Dalupaon,Pasacao, (Radio City) where Barros operated a transmitter. Barrameda remarked, “The unit’s almost instant recognition [by SWPA] was more likely than not due to the fact that its CO was an American.”\textsuperscript{2564}

Between February 1943 and October 1944, SWPA had delivered nearly 500 tons of supplies by submarine to Mindanao.\textsuperscript{2565} The 10\textsuperscript{th} MD became a center for supply to other islands, especially Bohol, Leyte, and Luzon. Fertig’s men created airfields at Misamis, Labo, Dipolog, and Farm #2 in central Zamboanga. He recalled, “When these were completed, we began to receive supplies by C-47, C-46, and PBY planes.”\textsuperscript{2566} Willis remarked, “Some American planes had been dropping in to the airfield, thus we had some canned goods to work with. It was funny: the crews coming in wanted fresh stuff – onions, eggs, chickens, bananas, papayas, fish – while

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{2561} Ibid., 39.
\item \textsuperscript{2562} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{2563} Barrameda, 165.
\item \textsuperscript{2564} Ibid., 166.
\item \textsuperscript{2565} Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 84.
\item \textsuperscript{2566} Willis and Myers, 92.
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we wanted canned goods, Spam, corned beef, sardines, dry biscuits and stuff from home.”

On Leyte the 1st Cavalry Division secured Tacloban within 24 hours. On 23 October, MacArthur hosted a ceremony in front of the municipal building to restore civil government to Leyte. The 5th Cavalry Regiment provided thirty “dirty and tired but efficient-looking soldiers” as an honor guard to escort President Osmeña. A radio broadcasted the ceremony including speeches by MacArthur and Osmeña. Krueger decorated Colonel Kangleon with the Distinguished Service Cross and Osmeña appointed him governor of the island.

As fighting increased in intensity inland, offshore desperate Japanese forces unveiled a new tactic, kamikazes, to attack U.S. ships in suicide missions. The desperate attacks reflected the ‘Shō-Gō 1’ plan for naval operations around the Philippines issued by Combined Fleet Chief, Admiral Soemu Toyoda. He began with the assumption that a successful American invasion in the Islands would cut supplies lines and render his fleet in southern waters useless. He was therefore willing to expend his forces in battle.

Toyoda divided his remaining fleet into three task forces. Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s main “Center Force” (five battleships, ten heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and fifteen destroyers) was to pass through the San Bernardino Strait and turn south to attack MacArthur’s landing area. Meanwhile a “Southern Force” would advance through the Suriago Strait in two groups: the first under Vice Admiral Shoji

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2567 Ibid., 123.
2568 Cannon, 348.
2569 Fertig Diary, 27 October 1944.
Nishimura (two battleships, a heavy cruiser, and four destroyers) followed by and Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima (two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and four destroyers). The successful advance of these forces would depend on avoiding American airpower. To ensure this, Toyoda organized a Northern Force. The plan envisioned using Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa with several aircraft carriers to act as a decoy and draw the American carrier forces away from Leyte.

The U.S. Seventh Fleet under Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid provided MacArthur’s amphibious forces and close naval support. Its light carriers were equipped to support ground operations. Air cover for the operation came from the U.S. Third Fleet with its five fast carrier task groups under Admiral William F. Halsey, who reported to Nimitz. By 24 October, Halsey had sent two of his carrier groups back to the Ulithi naval base for resupply.

As Kurita’s Center Force entered the San Bernardino Straight early on 24 October, only planes from the carrier *USS Intrepid* were close enough to strike. At 1030 hours the Intrepid’s aircraft began what would be 259 sorties against Kurita’s task force. They hit three Japanese battleships and one heavy cruiser. The super battleship *Musashi* was eventually sunk. Kurita fell back and Halsey issued vague orders to his Third Fleet to be prepared to cover the strait with battleships and two carrier groups. Upon learning of Halsey’s order, Kinkaid believed the covering force was in place and protecting his lightly armed Seventh Fleet as it supported the invasion.

Shortly before dusk Halsey’s reconnaissance spotted the Northern Force decoy. Believing Kurita to be badly damaged in in retreat, Halsey decided to chase
the remaining Japanese carriers with everything he had. Just after dark Kurita reversed course with his still powerful battle group and headed for the unguarded San Bernardino Strait.

Fertig reported watching a Japanese Task Force move through the Surigao Straits. Around midnight, Nishimura’s Southern Force task force fought through more than three hours of attacks by American torpedo boats. Thirty miles behind him, Shima followed. At 0300 Nishimura ran into volleys of torpedoes from American destroyers from the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s Support Force. One Japanese battleship was damaged; the other was sunk along with a destroyer. An hour later a line of old American battleships, resurrected from the waters of Pearl Harbor, opened fire. Cruisers soon joined the battle. In the pitch-black night the Americans’ advantage in radar proved decisive. Nishimura’s fleet took a number of hits and began to scatter, running into Shima’s trailing force. The Battle of Surigao Strait would be the last gunfight between battleships in naval history.

As the Southern Task Force began its fight, Kurita emerged from the San Bernardino Strait with four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and eleven destroyers. By dawn the Center Force ran into Kinkaid’s lightly defended escort carriers under Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague. The American light carriers launched all planes and attempted to scatter behind a smoke screen and desperate attacks by the destroyers. As a guerrilla leader reported: “The whole Leyte expedition had been endangered.”

2570 Fertig Diary, 27 October 1944.
2571 Fertig Diary, 27 October 1944.
At roughly the same time Halsey launched a first wave of about 180 aircraft to attack the Northern Force. Ozawa simultaneously launched 75 planes to attack Halsey. Almost all of the Japanese planes were shot down and did no damage. Throughout the day over 500 American sorties sank three carriers and a destroyer and crippled another carrier and a cruiser. Yet, Halsey’s success was marred by desperate pleas for help from Kinkaid.

After some prodding from Nimitz, at 1115 hours Halsey ordered a task force south to protect Seventh Fleet. By the time they arrived, Kurita have broke off from the battle. Convinced that he had hit the center of Halsey’s fleet, and hit by swarms of American aircraft and seemingly every gun in the Seventh Fleet, Kurita had turned north before retreating through the San Bernardino Strait. Before turning south, Halsey dispatched four cruisers and nine destroyers under Rear Admiral Dubose to finish off the Northern Force. They caught and sank the damaged light carrier and a destroyer. When an American submarine sank one of Ozawa’s cruisers late that night, the Battle for Leyte Gulf was over. The Japanese had lost “thirteen capital ships, three light cruisers, eight destroyers, and six submarines without achieving their objectives.”

Exaggerated and mistaken reports led the Japanese high command to believe they had destroyed the U.S. Navy and cut off MacArthur on Leyte. Ignoring Yamashita’s advice to save troops for a decisive battle on Luzon, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the immediate reinforcement of Leyte “expecting

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2572 Drea, 243.
2573 Anderson, 19.
that they would formally accept MacArthur’s surrender.” They began transferring the 1st, 8th, 26th, 102nd, and 130th Divisions and the 68th Mixed Independent Brigade from the other Philippine Islands, Japan and China to Leyte.

Just before the Battle of Leyte Gulf began, Mrs. Osmeña sent another urgent message to Volckmann pleading for her family’s evacuation from Baguio within seventy-two hours. USAFIP-NL had already drawn up a contingency plan, now they set it into motion. Early on 30 October, the seven members of the Osmeña family moved by car from their house to a point two-and-a-half miles out of Baguio. Volckmann’s agents got a friendly constabulary to falsely report the Osmeñas as having passed through a checkpoint on the road to Manila. Members of the 66th Infantry escorted the family on foot up the mountain trails, carrying the First Lady and her pregnant daughter-in-law in chairs, and dumped their car over a cliff. “The entire plan worked out without a mishap,” Volckmann noted, “and Mrs. Osmeña and her four children were placed in a small camp near my headquarters.” A month later the President had a grandchild born in the 121st Infantry’s field hospital. In January 1945, the whole clan reunited at MacArthur’s headquarters at Dagupan.

By 2 November, the 24th Division had killed 3,000 Japanese troops in seven days of heavy fighting in Leyte Valley and entered Carigara on the north coast. Fertig wasn’t impressed: “My own opinion is that land fighting, at no time, has been a serious as communiques would make you believe.” Sixth Army units secured

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2574 Drea, 243.
2575 Volckmann, 161.
2576 Anderson, 14-15.
2577 Fertig Diary, 28 October 1944.
the airfield at Tacloban and scheduled drops of supplies to Luzon guerrillas. Kruger then began a two-corps pincer maneuver to clear the Ormoc Valley.

The events on Leyte unsettled both the Japanese and the collaborators on Luzon. Laurel issued Force Labor Service Order (Executive Order No. 100) requiring work in support of the government with punishment of ten years in prison and P10,000 fine for noncompliance. More importantly, he armed the Japanese-allied volunteer Filipino Makapili. Laurel served as honorary adviser to the new unit, but Benigno Ramos served as its executive general. Laurel worried that such a unit independent form the Philippine government was a possible threat. Suspicion of Ramos’s intentions added to his worries.

On 3 November, the Meiji Emperor’s birthday, Manila lawyer and ardent nationalist Aurelio Alvero founded the New Leaders Association (NLA) to organize young Filipinos to guard utilities and communication facilities so as to free up Japanese troops to fight the Americans. In the following months Alvero organized a larger armed force, the Bisig-Bakal-ng-Tagala, to maintain law and order in Manila. On 24 November, General Ricarte formed his own army, the Volunteer Army for Peace and Order of the Philippines (Kusangloob sa Kapayapaan at Kaayusan ng Pilipinas) better known as the Peace Army. With a mix of idealistic youth and old Ricarista veterans, the Peace Army totaled about 450 men under the command of Agapito Zialcita headquartered in Manila. Like Alvero, Ricarte desired a

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2578 Motoe, “The Filipino Volunteer Armies,” 71
2579 Ibid., 80.
force not under Ramos’s control. After Ricarte left Manila for Baguio, the growth of
his force faltered, then it merged with the Bisig Army.

Now that liberation was near, some guerrilla leaders quarreled anew over
authority and postured for leadership roles. Volckmann sent runners to Al
Hendrickson ordering him to provide a list of his troops. Hendrickson ignored the
order. Volckmann then threatened Ray Hunt with court-martial if he refused to
acknowledge his commands. Both Hendrickson and Hunt were under Lapham. “My
troubles with Volckmann were persistent and irritating,” wrote Lapham, “but they
were only paper exchanges, never anything like as serious as my hostile relations
with the Japanese or Huks.”

A week later Fertig complained, “Burned up this afternoon as Sidney Rodgers
of San Francisco reported that one Filipino Guerrilla leader from a neighboring
island reported that his 1000 men had killed 5000 Japs since he organized his unit.
This was done with bows and arrows since he has only 60 rifles. 8,000 Japs on
island have been whittled down to 3,000, who spend their days hiding in caves. Such
outright lies detract from the whole effort. This leader says his own bag is several
hundred Japs. I don’t know who he is but I know he is a damn liar.”

On 8 November, a typhoon struck the Islands and delivered several days of
rain. Increased resistance, difficult terrain, weather and logistical problem slowed
the advance. Within a day, bridges across Surigoa washed out. On 10 November,

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2581 Lapham and Norling, 121.
2582 Ibid., 121.
2583 Fertig Diary, 15 November 1944.
radio station KAZ went off the air. Fertig reported, “Fighting on Leyte continues slow and vicious.” On 13 and 14 November, American Navy aircraft struck Manila. Yamashita formulated a new defensive plan for Luzon. He decided to fight delaying actions against the Americans at three key mountain passes: east of Manila, west of Clark, and near Baguio. His soldiers prepared in utmost secrecy. After the war, a Japanese officer stated: “The guerrilla activities against our mobile transportation and the great deduction of military strength greatly influenced the Luzon campaign.”

Volckmann arranged a new submarine rendezvous in northern Luzon for USAFIP-NL for 21 November. He planned primary (Darigayos Cove) and alternate (San Estaban) landing sites, arranged recognition signals and contact procedures via coded radio messages, and personally took charge of the primary rendezvous point. He assigned the secondary site to Barnett. His guerrillas established surveillance of both points ten days prior to the scheduled landing. Two days prior, they set up outposts to monitor all movement into and out of the landing zones. The night before, a combat battalion of 3,500 cargadores moved with the greatest possible secrecy into positions near each rendezvous point and organized into carrying parties. “The tension that existed is hard to describe,” Volckmann wrote, “Every officer, enlisted man, and civilian connected with the operation fully realized the

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2584 Fertig Diary, 9 November 1944.
2585 Ibid., 14 November 1944.
2586 Monograph No. 4, Japanese Monographs, 31.
2587 Ibid., 21.
importance of accomplishing the mission successfully. We had been waiting three
long years for this day – help the outside world!”

Three days out SWPA had still not confirmed the recognition signals and
procedures. Volckmann departed on a pony in the typhoon for the primary landing
point, got washed over a cliff and stopped in his tracks by a swollen river. The next
day at base camp a carabao buffalo got washed over the cliff and smashed the
waterwheel knocking out power to his headquarters' radio. Volckmann wrote,
“What a helpless situation! I could not sleep that night for thinking about the
possibility of missing contact with second submarine.”

On the afternoon before the submarine arrival, the USAFIP-NL watched a
large number of planes pounce on a group of ships a few miles out to sea. "Suddenly
the air was filled with screaming planes diving on the ships, and a series of loud
explosions followed," Volckmann noted, “I could scarcely believe my eyes. I had a
ringside seat to a U.S. air strike!” Farther south planes struck the Japanese port at
San Fernando. Unfortunately, the strikes brought Japanese patrols boats into
Darigayos Cove putting the scheduled submarine landing at risk. When a Japanese
boat anchored on the morning of the scheduled link up, Volckmann sent word to
SWPA that the point was compromised and they should use the secondary spot. He
could not be certain the message got through in time. Much to his relief, when he got
back to his headquarters he learned Barnett had accomplished the rendezvous with
the Gar and 22 tons of supplies were on the way along with sixteen men led by

\[\text{References:}\]

\text{Volckmann, 162-163.}
\text{Ibid., 164.}
\text{Ibid., 166.}
Captain William Vaughn and Captain William Farrell. The equipment included radios, weapons, ammunition, demolition material, and medical supplies. The party included demolition experts Lieutenant Fred Behan and Lieutenant Donald Jamison, two enlisted weathermen, and ten Filipino radio operators and demolition men. They brought with them instructions for preparing for the pending American invasion. The news of the submarine spread quickly and boosted moral across northern Luzon. Volckmann’s relief was indescribable.

The submarine SS-256 *Hake* under Lieutenant Commander Frank E. Haylor on its seventh war patrol roamed the South China Sea. On 19 November, *Hake* torpedoed and damaged the Japanese light cruiser *Isuzu* fifty-five nautical miles west of Corregidor. On 5 December, Skipper Haylor delivered supplies to Libertad, Panay, and evacuated 29 recovered U.S. aviators and ten other refugees. The boat then delivered its passengers to Fremantle on 16 December. Meanwhile, the submarine SS-253 *Gunnel* under Lieutenant Commander G.E. O’Neil, Jr., on her seventh war patrol, torpedoed and sank two Japanese torpedo boats, the *Sagi* and the *Hiyodori*, and the merchant tanker *Shunten Maru*, in the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea. Suddenly orders diverted the boat to Flechas Point in Palawan to pick up eleven recovered U.S. aviators on 2 December. On 28 December, the boat ended its patrol at Pearl Harbor.

Fertig felt no relief. On 22 November, he wrote: “It appears Sixth Army has decided to let me continue the fight here with few supplies. Personally, I don’t like the news because I intend to get home before too many have passed. I stayed while

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the greatest need was here. Now that is past and I want to go home, and shall carry
the fight to MacArthur.” First, he faced an unexpected difficulty. The “Matas
Militia” in Midsayap mutinied against his authority and established the independent
command “Mindanao AUSFIP Philippine Army, Cobatato Sector.

Fertig then learned that on 23 November a PBY flying boat arrived in his area
at Casul Bay off Misamis Occidental with a Captain Thomas and two officers who
met with junior officers and local people to devise quicker procedures for rescuing
for downed pilots. SWPA had not told the 10th MD commander of such teams
entering his territory. Fertig let it be known that he “did not approve of other units
sending penetration parties into my area or have strangers gather info for they
talked only with civilians and Junior officers. We are competent to conduct rescue
and advise GHQ when evacuation should be made.” If SWPA saw Fertig only as
an irregular fighter operating in their area of command; he saw SWPA as an intruder
in his zone.

As MacArthur eyed a return to Luzon, he considered the collaborationist
government. These were men left behind by Quezon with instructions to work with
the Japanese while doing their best to protect the people. Which were guilty of
treason and which were not was a matter of debate. On 28 November, MacArthur
announced: “When our military forces have landed in Luzon, it shall be my firm
purpose to run to earth every disloyal Filipino who has debased his country’s cause
so as to impede the services of USAFFE officers or men who have continued to resist.

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2593 Fertig Diary, 22 November 1944.
2594 Guerrilla Resistance Movements, 97.
2595 Fertig Diary, 12 December 1944.
Such actions construe direct aid to the enemy in his war against the United States of America and the Philippine Commonwealth."\textsuperscript{2596} Whether or not a collaborator ‘impeded the services’ of USAFFE guerrillas, then, seemed to be the dividing line. Meanwhile numerous ‘fence sitters’ flocked to the Americans. The Japanese confirmed this drift with their actions. “They successively disarmed, then disbanded, the Constabulary – after which most of its members openly defected to the LGAF or other guerrilla organizations.”\textsuperscript{2597}

On 30 November, Major Romulo Manriquez men saw a plane crash in the Fifth District area near Nueva Vizcaya.\textsuperscript{2598} Getting to the spot, they discovered a Japanese transport carrying a number of high-ranking officers had crashed. Among the items recovered from the site, were papers from the new Japanese commander in the Philippines, General Tomiyuki Yamashita on his plans for the defense of the islands. The guerrillas quickly delivered the papers to MacArthur’s headquarters.

On 6 December, Fertig entered into his diary new worries: “A new group of radio and radar sent to Panay and to establish contact with E71. They are sending their messages thru us. GHQ seems to feel that we are too big for our pants but when they want results they call on our net.”\textsuperscript{2599}

Ambassador Murata had to threaten Laurel and his cabinet to get them to attend the ceremonial inauguration of the Makapili army on 8 December. Headquartered in Manila, the armed Makapili recruited heavily in Ganap regions such as Baliwag, Bulcana, Gapan, and Neuva Ecija. Local chapters ranged from 30 to

\textsuperscript{2596} Abaya, 59.  
\textsuperscript{2597} Lapham and Norling, 79.  
\textsuperscript{2598} Guardia, 124.  
\textsuperscript{2599} Fertig Diary, 6 December 1944.
300 men and at its maximum strength the armed force numbered close to 5,000 men. According to Motoe, “In Gapan, the Makapili chapter was visited by the members of the Hukbalahap, a Communist-led anti-Japanese guerrilla group, who offered to form a united front with them against the returning U.S. forces. However, the Makapili turned down the offer.” The Makapili would fight American forces at several points, even conducting suicide attacks, but U.S. forces drove them into the hills to face starvation or trial for treason.

Krueger entered Ormoc City on 10 December and crafted a new plan to tackle the Japanese: “the 77th Division was to break loose from its base and use Indian warfare or blockhouse tactics. At night each ‘fort’ was to establish an all-round defense from any Japanese night attacks. In the daytime, an armed convoy was to go ‘from fort to fort.’ The Filipino guerrillas were to guard the bridges and furnish intelligence.” In the final push, the 77th Division killed 1,506 Japanese soldiers while capturing only 7 prisoners, and lost 123 killed and wounded and 13 missing. Only the mountains west of the Ormoc Road remained in Japanese hands.

On 13 December, Yamashita began shifting forces from Luzon to Leyte. The Japanese moved more than 34,000 troops to Leyte with over 10,000 tons of materiel, most of it through the port of Ormoc on the west coast. They had to divert some units to suppress guerrillas in the Camotes Islands off the west coast of Leyte guarding the entrance to Ormoc Bay. The single infantry battalion (less two

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2601 Cannon, 314.
2602 Anderson, 28.
2603 Ibid., 20.
companies) of the Camotes Detachment came from the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade with an added artillery battery and an engineer platoon.\footnote{Cannon, 314.}

On 18 December, Fertig reported a Japanese radio broadcast listing their losses in the Philippines since 1 November as “78,041 Naval and 83,748 Army personnel or a total of 141,787” which he compared to MacArthur’s report of Japanese losses on Leyte as “39,136 counted dead, estimated 30,000 drowned in convoys and 21,000 believed killed but bodies taken away by the enemy.”\footnote{Fertig Diary, 18 December 1944.} Eight days later Fertig reported: “The battle of Leyte is reduced to mopping up campaigns. The 77th landed at Pomopolan to close the last part in Nip hands. Figures indicate that Jap defeat was extremely serious. Since 20 Oct. AF shot down 1015 planes while carrier planes accounted for 1233 – total of 2348. Japs lost 164,000 tons of shipping plus 27 warships in attempts to re-enforce Leyte. Casualties were 113,421 Japs of whom 54,349 were counted dead. Our losses 2,623 killed, 8,240 wounded and missing.”\footnote{Ibid., 26 December 1944.} The Japanese would continue organized resistance on Leyte until 31 December. After the war, the U.S. Army reported that Leyte cost the Americans 15,584 casualties with 3,504 killed; the Japanese suffered an estimated 49,000 killed.\footnote{Anderson, 30.}

MacArthur turned to Luzon. He placed the island’s guerrillas under Sixth Army.\footnote{Ramsey, 307.} To speed up reporting, SWPA authorized select guerrillas like Barros in
Anderson’s Luzon sub-stations, to transmit directly to the high command instead of clearing reports through net control.\textsuperscript{2609} On 12 December, Volckmann received a second submarine shipment. “Instead of arms and ammunition, and medical supplies that were so vital to Volckmann’s enterprise, they opened the crates to find nothing but propaganda items: cigarettes, rubber stamps, and candy bars bearing the words ‘I Shall Return.’”\textsuperscript{2610} Another submarine brought 25 tons of equipment and no propaganda items. Meanwhile, Volckmann scouted the best spot for an invasion force. He chose Lingayen Gulf and sent a message: “There will be no repeat no opposition on the beaches.”\textsuperscript{2611}

In late December, the jungle telegraph carried rumors of a Japanese massacre of POWs in a prison camp near Puerto Princesa in Palawan. According to reports, on 14 December the Japanese forced 150 prisoners into three air raid trenches, flooded the trenches with gasoline, and set the POWs on fire. They gunned down any who tried to flee the flames. Still, eleven managed to escape.

On 15 December, U.S. and Filipino forces landed on Mindoro to create a base closer to Luzon. The 1,000 Japanese troops on the island offered little resistance. “By the end of the first day, Army engineers were hard at work preparing airfields for the invasion of Luzon. The first was completed in five days; a second was ready in

\textsuperscript{2609} Barrameda, 168.
\textsuperscript{2610} Guardia, \textit{American Guerilla}, 124.
\textsuperscript{2611} Ibid., 125.
thirteen.” The airfields allowed greater direct support for operations on Luzon.

Four days after the Mindoro invasion, the Japanese command in Manila activated their Luzon Defense Plan. After three more days, the Laurel administration left Manila with the Japanese leadership for Baguio.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Strength</th>
<th>Prisoners Of War</th>
<th>Surrendered After 13 Aug 1945</th>
<th>Killed Or Died</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Luzon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shobu Area</td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>4,415</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shimbu Area</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>6,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kembu Area</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manila</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>5,670</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bataan</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Luzon</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicol Peninsula</td>
<td>3,515</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>275,685</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,050</strong></td>
<td><strong>61,100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central and Southern Philippines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindoro and the Visayan Passages</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palawan and offshore islets</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamboanga Peninsula</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>1,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulu Archipelago</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panay and Guimaras</td>
<td>2,835</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Negros</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>6,170</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cebu and Mactan</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>8,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohol Island</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Negros</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Mindanao</td>
<td>55,850</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>34,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>105,865</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,695</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,910</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>381,550</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,745</strong></td>
<td><strong>114,010</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 694.

Table 2: Japanese Casualties in the Philippines, 1945

Two hundred Japanese soldiers marched into Bucawe where Adalia Marquez and her children were hiding. The townspeople turned to two guerrillas, Glicerio

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Samulde (Big Boy) and Domingo Paulino, who listened to San Francisco on their radio. “What does MacArthur say in a case like this when there is a Japanese company in town?” they asked, “Does he advise us to leave?”

“But alas,” Adalia wrote, “MacArthur overlooked such little details, although they were very important to the residents of a small town like Bucawe.” After two hours, Adalia joined other local citizens and moved into the jungle near Batia where they established a camp.

In Manila, the Japanese military cracked down on all suspected guerrilla sympathizers. The pressure split the PCAJVC. Hu Guizhi led part to join the Hua Zhi’s Bicol Squadron, the remainder in Manila joined the Hua Zhi’s Manila Squadron.

SWPA tried to bring order to the Luzon guerrillas prior to MacArthur’s return. Captain George Miller brought representatives of the Hunters and Marking’s Guerrillas together in Boso-Boso, Antipolo (the Hunter’s 44th Division headquarters) to resolve their feud. Proposals to exchange overlapping units fell apart over arguments on the quality of the units to be gained or loss by each group. Then on 26 December, Lieutenant Colonel Tereso D. Pía, commander of the Hunter’s 44th Division, led a delegation to Marking’s camp to renew discussions. They agreed to reactivate the joint Rizal-Eastern Laguna Command (RELCO) with Miller as an advisor. “It was this new body,” Agoncillo wrote, “that directed the two guerilla groups in their demolition and sabotage work which paved the way for the liberation of Manila in early 1945.”

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2613 Marquez, 188.
2614 Ibid.
Towards the end of December, Blackburn realized his guerrilla no longer needed to restrict themselves to raids and ambushes: they could go toe-to-toe with the enemy.\textsuperscript{2616} He led a guerrilla attack that drove the Japanese out of the west side of the Cagayan River near Tuso by early 1945. “As a matter of fact,” he later said, “the Japanese commander himself, told me when he surrendered to me, that they had lost 3,000 troops trying to cross that river at the town of Enrile, but never made it.”\textsuperscript{2617} “As confidence grew,” Blackburn recalled, “we could take a platoon and go against a company.”\textsuperscript{2618}

By now most of the Japanese appeared “ragged, haggard, weary, and weak.”\textsuperscript{2619} Trainloads of soldiers moved into the northern mountains, often taking many civilians with them. “A particularly sharp eyed lookout,” Lapham wrote, “reported that no less a dignitary than General Yamashita himself, surrounded by a convoy of tanks and motor-cycles, had passed through Talavera in Nueva Ecija province at 1:00 PM, January 3, 1945, headed north.”\textsuperscript{2620}

By January the Mindanao guerrillas operated about seventy radios covering roads, enemy positions, and shipping channels. They held airfields at Dipolog, Labo, Lala and Baroba frequently used by ‘distressed airplanes’ and supply deliveries. Fertig wrote: “Our New Year’s had a touch of sadness. Our trials has brought us close together ad this is the last New Year together. For us 1945 is the year of

\textsuperscript{2616} Blackburn Interview, 158.
\textsuperscript{2617} Ibid., 169.
\textsuperscript{2618} Ibid., 180.
\textsuperscript{2619} Lapham and Norling, 164.
\textsuperscript{2620} Ibid.
victory." He had Childress evacuated from Davao to Leyte, and gave Laurenta command of the 107th Division. Fertig was starting to say goodbye.

Two weeks into a patrol the submarine *Stingray*, now under Lieutenant Commander Howard F. Stoner, delivered 35 tons of supplies to Tongehatan Point, Tawi-Tawi. Over the next ten days Stoner landed two parties on Nipanipa Peninsula, Celebes, and others on Kagean Island and on Pare Pare Bay, Celebes before returning to Fremantle, Australia, on 23 February and departing for America.

On New Year’s Day, SWPA issued orders to all guerrillas on Luzon: “Beginning at dark on Fourth January proceed to destroy targets assigned by the Headquarters under plan of sabotage communicated to you by message of Two Nine November...” Lapham activated all seventy of his squadrons. He noted, “In the five weeks between November 29, 1944, and January 4, 1945, when we received notification from SWPA that American landings in Luzon were imminent, my men were involved in only six authorized engagements or battles forced upon us. Three of these were against the Huks: once they ambushed us, and twice they attacked us openly. Our forces suffered about 65 casualties in these encounters, the enemy perhaps 90.” Now that SWPA approved direct attacks on the enemy, Lapham wrote, “Before that first night was over, practically every one of our squadron managed to get into at least one or two fights with the Japanese.”

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2621 Fertig Diary, 1 January 1945.
2623 Lapham and Norling, 167.
2624 Ibid., 160.
2625 Ibid., 168.
On 5 January, as U.S. airpower struck Formosa, Fertig received assurances from Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, MacArthur’s Eighth Army Commander. He reported, “Eichelberger promised action on serial targets for us and I advised that Surigao and Agusan are primary targets.”\(^{2626}\) On 8 January Fertig confessed to his diary: “Unless we get help or at least heavy air support we will lose the Augusan Coast. I have done all I could to get the Eighth Army to help me but wholly unsuccessful. Of course we are small fry and the big drive for landing on Luzon is in order.”\(^{2627}\)

The next day an armada of seventy U.S. Navy warships entered the Lingayen Gulf and at 0700 hours opened a one-hour naval gunfire barrage. Kamikazes sank several of the ships. At 0800 hours, landing craft began delivering 175,000 men of Krueger’s Sixth Army ashore. For two weeks, the American forces met little resistance as they advanced towards Manila. Yamashita, lacking air power, artillery, or tanks, withdrew his 260,000 men inland to more defensible terrain. Supporting the conventional forces, the guerrillas conducted diversionary attacks, harassed lines of communication, blocked Japanese movements, scouted and provided intelligence. MacArthur directed Krueger to seize Clark Air Field and the port at Manila as soon as possible.

Word rapidly spread of MacArthur’s return. In Batia where Adalia Marquez hid with her children, the news interrupted a music class she was teaching. “In wild excitement,” Adalai recalled, “we threw the lesson book away and I immediately

\(^{2626}\) Fertig Diary, 5 January 1945.
\(^{2627}\) Ibid., 8 January 1945.
played The Star Spangled Banner. People in the fields left their work and came into the hut to sing the tune they knew so well.”

Americans made a second landing closer to Manila on 15 January. The Japanese withdrew their 1st Division from Leyte to Cebu to defend north of Bogoto. The division found “most of the inhabitants in the neighborhood of the area where the Division was to be quartered seemed to have moved out guided by the guerrillas.” Soldier Kiyofumi Kojima recalled, “The enemy, of course, went anywhere they wanted to go, mountainous or not, and we didn’t have the strength to fight hand-to-hand. The fight for the airfields had practically wiped out our army troops and the few naval officers we had. The stragglers who escaped reassembled into a platoon.”

On Luzon, Yamashita led the 152,000 soldiers of the Shobu Group in northern Luzon. Yokoyama had 80,000 troops of his Shimbu Group from east of Manila to the Bicol Peninsula. Tsukada organized his 30,000 men of the Kembu Group around Clark Air Field, the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor. Krueger advanced the XIV Corps on 18 January. After five days, at Clark Field, the Sixth Army encountered the first determined resistance from the Kembu Group. Krueger would not secure the airfield until the end of January. On 2 February XIV Corps continued south toward Manila.

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2628 Marquez, 193.
2631 Andradé, 6.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Sosaku Suzuki held the southern Islands with the Thirty-fifth Army’s 100,000 men, but only about 30,000 were combat trained and equipped. A survivor of the Palawan Massacre, Private First Class Eugene Nielsen, reported to U.S. Army intelligence officers on 7 January and relayed the story of what he had witnessed. Then on 26 January, Lapham arrived at Sixth Army headquarters to press for a liberation of the prison camp at Cabanatuan, warning that the Japanese were going to massacre that camp’s 500 POWs. Colonel Horton White, Krueger’s G-2, tasked the 6th Ranger Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci to liberate the camp. Only four days later, with help from Alamo Scouts and Lapham’s guerrillas, they freed 522 POWs, including 492 Americans. Captain Juan Pajota led over 250 guerrillas in ambushing Japanese troops attempting to reinforce the camp during the operation.

Sixth Army placed an Army artillery battalion and aircraft in support of Volckmann’s guerrillas in the area of Bessang Pass-Cervantes. Close cooperation between the conventional and guerrilla forces required suppling the irregulars with modern radios at all levels of command. As Manuel Segura, leading guerrillas on Cebu, wrote, “communication was vital” during conventional attacks alongside the returning forces. This was especially true with close air support. Volckmann wrote, “We had learned early while working behind the lines to trust nothing that flew, regardless of insignia, unless we were in radio contact with the planes.”

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2633 Volckmann, 216.
Volckmann’s guerrillas conducted several effective large conventional attacks on
dug-in Japanese positions, but only after the 24th Marine Air Group provided a radio
van to help direct air and artillery support.\textsuperscript{2636} By the time the last pockets of
Japanese resistance collapsed, many of the guerrilla units across the Philippines
were essentially fighting as conventional forces.

In a number of ways guerrillas played vital roles in northern Luzon. Colonel
Robert Connolly’s Task Force of the 21st Rangers from the Sixth Army worked with
Blackburn’s guerrillas to capture Aparri.\textsuperscript{2637} Blackburn took Quicho’s battalion and
occupied Aparri before a planned airborne drop. He later recalled, “The Americans
never did provide much assistance. They had that task force there.”\textsuperscript{2638} When the
rains came MacArthur’s fliers found they could not use their hastily constructed
airstrips around Lingayen Gulf. Volckmann informed them that he had cleared
inland airfields at Poro established Base M on Poro point. “So, we became
conventional as hell when they landed,” Blackburn said.\textsuperscript{2639}

In return, the guerrillas avidly appreciated the American forces’ medical
support. The Sixth Army’s 7th Field Hospital at Dagupan “received a number of
Filipino guerrilla patients.”\textsuperscript{2640} The Army also provided medical teams to guerrilla
units but an official Army medical history noted: “Large numbers of severely
wounded casualties tested the guerrilla medics to the full. Surgical instruments
were still few and laboratory facilities poor.”\textsuperscript{2641} Still, by March, Volckmann and

\textsuperscript{2636} Ibid., 198.
\textsuperscript{2637} Reports of General MacArthur, 291.
\textsuperscript{2638} Blackburn Interview, 190.
\textsuperscript{2639} Ibid., 192.
\textsuperscript{2640} Ibid., 190
\textsuperscript{2641} Condon-Hall and Cowdrey, 361.
Blackburn had a medical battalion operating with 98 officers and 808 enlisted men.\footnote{Ibid., 360.}

Fertig jealously stewed on Mindanao. He wrote, “Peralta reports he has only 3500 Nips on Panay. He will be lucky fortunate again and will earn credit as the first guerrilla chief to clear his island. The Gods have smiled on him.”\footnote{Fertig Diary, 8 January 1945.} He felt worn down, and hiking through rain and mud wore him down further. Recent trips to Krueger’s command with their clean clothes, fresh sheets, and hot coffee must have been bittersweet. “Col. Chaffee of Col. Whitney’s section arrived on the plane,” he wrote at the end of January, “He was most agreeable but extremely uninformed about Mindanao. He did not know what areas were garrisoned and which were clear. ...He is against giving Peralta anything, says we have used arms and supplies given us and we will be given still more. As soon as Luzon is under control we will be next.”\footnote{Ibid., 29 January 1945.}

“Since the operation had begun in late January,” one Army history noted, “its units had been fortunate enough to find bridges and fordable crossings almost everywhere they went.”\footnote{Andradé, 12.} It was not fortune; it was guerrillas familiar with area acting as guides for MacArthur’s columns. They knew the best roads, avoided obstacles, and even built bridges and roads.\footnote{Blackburn Interview, 189.} During the 24th Division’s fight on Kilay Ridge in late October, when officers found their maps inaccurate and visibility limited, they “relied on the service of Filipino guides” for their rest of the
campaign.\textsuperscript{2647} The Americans discovered distances indicated on their maps off by as much as fifty percent.\textsuperscript{2648} They had to rely on local sources of information and found that, “In general, the guerrilla reports were more accurate than those of civilians.”\textsuperscript{2649}

Guerrillas also demonstrated shortcomings, however. They seemed to routinely inflate estimates of enemy strengths. In November, guerrillas reported up to 5,000 enemy troops in Carigara when the numbers were far fewer.\textsuperscript{2650} Their reports indicated the Japanese held the Bataan Peninsula with 13,000 men when Yamashita left only 4,000 there. MacArthur committed 35,000 men to the peninsula. When the 38th Division went to capture the San Marcelino airstrip, they found Captain Ramon Magsaysay’s guerrillas had secured the field three days earlier.\textsuperscript{2651}

The fighting on Bataan became especially fierce. B. David Mann was part of the Sixth Army fighting the 10\textsuperscript{th} Division and witnessed massed conventional firepower applied against the defending troops. Mann recalled, “The horror of battle began to tell on the hardiest of the Japanese troops. Near constant bombardments made the soldiers nervous and emotionally disturbed. The necessity of holing up in caves to avoid being killed by explosions made them feel like animals with no chance to escape.”\textsuperscript{2652} One of those defenders, the 39\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Regiment’s Sergeant Nagai remembered, “We all became neurotic, not only because of the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{2647} Cannon, 228.
\textsuperscript{2648} Ibid., 348.
\textsuperscript{2649} Ibid., 250.
\textsuperscript{2650} Ibid., 179.
\textsuperscript{2651} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{2652} Mann, 1171.
\end{flushleft}
overwhelming power of the sounds, but also because of the psychological pressure on us.”2653

On 3 February, a PBY flew Fertig flew to Leyte for the first time since 1921 where he met with Willoughby. “He broke the news,” Fertig wrote, “that I should be under 8th Army in the near future and arranged that I should have lunch with Gen. Byers, or Colonel Thayer his Chief of Staff.” After the meeting, Fertig boasted, “It seems my name has been well publicized with the GHQ.”2654 The next day he went to Tacloban and met General Stivers and his staff. “I was given the key to the city. He took me over to the G-1 Section who is directly concerned with clearing the record of my men. I found that certain changes should be made in order to clear their records properly.”2655

The citizens in Manila had a false sense of security. “There were rumors that President Roosevelt had warned the Japanese that if they touched Manila he would have Tokyo’s Imperial Palace bombed for twenty-four hours, without let-up,” Adalia Marquez recalled, “The people had to say Roosevelt to make it more impressive than saying MacArthur. We had seen General MacArthur in the Islands, but this Roosevelt, he was at the White House, he was President of the United States!”2656

Guerrillas tried to warn Manila’s residents. Isabel Yumol’s old family friend Dolfo and other guerrillas told them: “Today the U.S. Forces entered Manila and are making their fastest drive toward Malacañang Palace, the University of Santo Tomas, and the Bilibid Prison. They are guided and led by guerrillas who know the

2653 Ibid.
2654 Fertig Diary, 3 February 1945.
2655 Ibid, 4 February 1945.
2656 Marquez, 179.
quickest and safest way. They will soon be at Santo Tomas. So, I’m asking all of you to lock and barricade your front doors and close your front windows. Do not go out, or even look out, whatever it is you might hear. The safest place is the middle of your houses.”

On 3 February, recalled Adalia Marquez, “I saw two planes fly very low over our camp. Three followed, then four, five, and soon there was an umbrella of American planes flying majestically through the sky towards Manila.” Under the cover aircraft, the 1st Cavalry Division reached the outskirts of the capital. At 1835 hours that evening, the division entered Manila. Met by two Filipino guerrillas. “Skeptical at first, the Americans subjected the senior of the two, Captain Manuel Colayco, to intensive interrogation, until their doubts were allayed.” Colayco guided the 1st Cavalry soldiers past mined areas to the gates of Santo Tomas where he was killed in by a grenade thrown by a Japanese sniper. The soldiers rescued over 4,000 captives from the prison.

Yamashita decided to leave Manila and ordered the Shimbu Group to move inland, destroying all bridges behind him. However, the naval commander in Manila, Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabachi, decided to fight house-to-house in the capital with his 16,000-man Manila Naval Defense Force. Augmented with three army battalions, Iwabuchi would fight to the death in Manila with 21,000 soldiers.

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2657 Jennings, 78.
2658 Marquez, 194.
2659 Connaughton, et al., 67.
2660 Andradé, 14.
2661 Harries, 436.
MacArthur launched a combined airborne and seaborne assault on Corregidor on 16 February. After ten days of intense fighting, the forces secured the Rock, largely ending the stand of the Kembu Group.

On 19 February, U.S. forces invaded Iwo Jima. The retreating Japanese troops on Luzon became fatally desperate and angry. From 12 to 25 February rumors said the Japanese trucked old men to a church in Calamba and strangled them with rope, massacred more than 2,000 Filipinos, around Manila, and killed 1,000 people in the village of Lipa.2662

In mid-February, Krueger focused his troops on the 30,000-man Shimbu Group in the mountainous area east and south of Manila. The remaining 20,000 of Yokoyama’s men still held Bicol. A diversion of Sixth Army units to the Visayas weakened his hand. Krueger received faulty intelligence that the Wawa Dam was crucial to Manilas water supply when in fact it had not been used since 1938. He also believed his units thee faced fewer than 20,000 Japanese troops instead of the 30,000 actual defenders.2663 When XIV Corps attacked to seize the dam on 20 February, they encountered tough fighting.

The Japanese troops were in an increasingly desperate situation. Matsu Shinji had been drafted in 1939 and discharged in 1944 only to be called back to service for the Philippine duty. Serving in the mountains outside Manila, he observed: “The few Japanese soldiers who survived should have helped each other out. Instead there were those who killed themselves in suicidal explosions, those who killed their fellow men for food. Military police would take away soldiers trying to escape, accuse them of holding antiwar sentiments, and confiscate their food.”2664

2663 Andradé, 22.
2664 Carry, 154-155.
Fighting in Manila went on for two months. “The Japanese attitude,” one chronicler wrote, “put quite simply was: ‘If you are not with us, you are against us.’ They thus declared that all Filipinos, including women and children, found inside the battle area were to be considered guerrillas and exterminated.”2665 “The battle quickly came down to a series of bitter street-to-street and house-to-house struggles,” Dale Andradé noted, “In an attempt to protect the city and its civilians, MacArthur placed stringent restrictions on U.S. artillery and air support. But massive devastation to the urban area could not be avoided.”2666 Fertig reported, “The main body of Japs are in the walled city and have taken many civilians with them. These have butchered [sic] ruthlessly.”2667 Iwabuchi’s troops “plundered, raped, and murdered” civilians inside the walls of the Itramuros district until it was finally overrun.2668

On 26 February, MacArthur declared Corregidor recaptured. The next day he oversaw the re-establishment of the Philippine government while General Eichelberger’s Eighth Army invaded Palawan. On 3 March, MacArthur announced the liberation of Manila. The battle for city caused the deaths of almost 100,000 Filipinos and thousands of American soldiers, even MacArthur could not bring himself to organize a victory parade.”2669

On Palawan, the Japanese ceded Puerto Princessa and withdrew into the hills. The Americans discovered proof of the Palawan Massacre. Intense fighting broke out on the third day of the advance and

2665 Connaughton, et al., 107.
2666 Andradé, 12.
2667 Fertig Diary, 10 March 1945.
2668 Meirion and Susie Harries, 436.
2669 Ibid., 436.
lasted five days. Mopping up lasted until late April. In the end, the Americans lost 12 killed and 56 wounded; the Japanese lost about 900 killed.  

Meanwhile, the 41st Division seized Zamboanga in Mindanao. On 1 March Eichelberger invited Fertig to move into his guesthouse at Eighth Army headquarters on Leyte. “The opportunity was past my greatest expectations,” Fertig remarked, “Both General Eichelberger and his staff lived up to my high hopes.”

The Japanese held Mindanao with the 30th Infantry Division spread along the north coast and the 30th infantry Division in the south centered on Davao. The makeshift 54th Independent Mixed Brigade – created in June and arrived in Mindanao in late August – met the 41st Division in Zamboanga and fell back to the north. Tactical air support from the guerrillas’ makeshift airstrip at Dipolog, played a critical role in the operations. “Two reinforced companies from the 21st Infantry, 24th Division, were immediately airlifted in to bolster the guerrillas and ensure control of the airstrip. Soon thereafter, Marine Corsairs from Col. Clayton C. Jerome’s Marine Aircraft Group, Zamboanga, were using the airstrip to cover naval bombardment and landing preparations off Zamboanga City.” Heavy fighting lasted for over a month, with the U.S. Army losing 220 killed, and the Japanese 6,400 dead.

On 9 March, the United States began incendiary bombing raids against Japan. With the war reaching its climax, some leader worried about securing their place in history. Guerrillas were no exception. Fertig wrote: “Paul Cranston, feature writer for the North American Newspaper Alliance, was trying to get a release on my story. 

2670 Lofgren, 10-11.
2671 Fertig Diary, 24 February 1945.
2672 Lofgren, 11.
2673 Ibid., 12.
If the good God is with me, I should be able to make some money out of the complete story. Tied down as I am, I don’t know whether the world will wait on me or not.”

On 12 March, in northern Luzon, Yokoyama launched a series of counterattacks with the Shimbu Group east of Manila that proved ineffectual. Krueger advanced his XI Corps and forced the Japanese to retreat. As Andradé wrote, “On 17 May the 43d Division, aided by guerrilla forces and air strikes that delivered the heaviest concentration of napalm ever used in the Southwest Pacific, captured the Ipo Dam intact and restored Manila’s water supply.”

The war shattered the Philippine capital. Fertig wrote, “Manila has ceased to exist. Someone said that they are simply pushing the rubble into the bay to make ramps [on] which cargo could be unloaded.” Lapham recalled: “...with no toilets either in the barrios or on the mountain roads in northern Luzon, human waste was scattered everywhere, both outdoors and in what was left of buildings. Anywhere one looked there was decomposing human bodies covered with flies an emanating a paralyzing stink. In barrios the manure contributed by pigs and geese compounded the fetid mess. Nobody washed his hands or changed his clothes for weeks at a time, lice were everywhere, and diseases multiplied predictably.” Cholera and other diseases taxed U.S. Army medical support.

Catching her first sight of Americans as they moved from Espana to Isabelo de los Reyes, Isabel Yumol noted their rifles slung across their bodies without bayonets. She remembered, “I look at the Americans and see tall, slender men, with white skin like those of our nuns from Spain and the non-Filipino Jesuits... A soldier,

2674 Ibid., 24 February 1945.
2675 Andradé, 25.
2676 Fertig Diary, 24 February 1945.
2677 Lapham and Norling, 189.
not in a khaki uniform and without a gun, comes up to us and hands Tommy a little American Flag and three lollipops; he also gives me a flag and two bars of ‘Baby Ruth.’ And so Tommy and I start waving the flag and our V and saying ‘Victory Joe.’”

Eichelberger sent General Rap Brush’s 40th Division into Panay several miles west of Iloilo on 18 March. An Army history noted, “There they were greeted by Col. Macario L. Peralta’s Filipino guerrillas drawn up in parade formation, and General Eichelberger recalled in his memoirs how the guerrillas stood ‘stiff in starched khaki and resplendent with ornaments.’ The strong guerrilla force of 23,000 had secured most of the island’ except the area immediately around Iloilo where 2,750 Japanese were ensconced.”

Eichelberger’s Americal Division under Major General William Arnold landed on Cebu on 26 March against little resistance. Arnold occupied a largely destroyed Cebu City the next day. Outside the city the Japanese put up a stiff fight. Arnold threatened their flank and forced a their retreat. “After clearing the remainder of the Japanese line, Arnold’s men began pursuit on 20 April. Together with Cushing’s guerrillas, they killed any Japanese who turned to fight.” Some 8,500 Japanese moved into the hills and held out until the end of the war. The Americal Division lost 410 men killed, 1,700 wounded, and suffered 8,000 non-battle casualties; the Japanese lost 5,500 dead.

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2678 Jennings, 81.
2679 Lofgren, 16.
2680 Ibid., 20.
2681 Ibid.
George Fukui, who had been raised in American until he was seventeen, served in the Japanese army as an interpreter on Cebu. “We found out that before the War’s end, when the Japanese forces were under attack by American troops, an order had been issued by the Japanese military that resident Japanese children under the age of thirteen would be an encumbrance and should be killed. It was thought that this order had been implemented.”

On 29 March, government leaders Laurel, Aquino and Osias left the Philippines with Japanese Ambassador Murata, first to Taiwan then to Japan. That same day, Eichelberger’s Eighth Army invaded Negros. The Japanese ceded the coast. When the Americans reached the interior on 9 April, eight weeks of intense combat began. MacArthur lost 370 dead and 1,025 wounded, and killed more than 4,000 Japanese in battle, another 3,300 Japanese died from starvation and disease, while 6,000 would surrender at the end of the war.

The Japanese 75th Infantry Brigade’s 354th Independent Infantry Battalion held its position on Negros for fifty-two days at what would become known as Dolan Hill. Air attacks, artillery bombardments and infantry attacks whittled at their numbers. Supplies ran out. Kokubo Sakurai recalled, “Maggots hatched in our bandages, writhing on our flesh and exuding a foul stench. Food supplies were cut off. Having eaten up all the stalks of grasses and plants, and all the insects and reptiles, we became malnutrition cases. One’s entire body swells, one’s strength

\[ \text{Carry, 233.} \]
\[ \text{Lofgren, 18.} \]
gives out, and it becomes impossible to control one’s bodily functions. Hunger gnawed at people’s spirit. There were those who ate human flesh.” 2684

Many Filipinos also faced starvation. Within their areas of operation, the guerrillas had controlled prices of food and restricted the black market. Those controls now vanished. “When the Americans came back,” Blackburn recalled, “they had a civil affairs unit attached to the U.S. divisions in the area. Within twenty-four hours after they moved in, a chicken that had been selling for 50 centavos, was selling for eight pesos, i.e., four dollars, the prices of everything just skyrocketed.” 2685 The returning U.S. and Philippine authorities outlawed the emergency currency printed by the guerrillas. 2686 Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAUs) began to distribute food from U.S. Army stocks to the population. They managed to increase the Filipino’s daily consumption of rice to about one pound per day augmented by bread and corn. 2687 It would take five years to restore Philippine rice production to prewar levels and not until the 1970s would they begin to approach western yields.

Adalia Marquez visited the Manila markets filled with Army issued goods at exorbitant prices. She could barely afford some bread and a GI can of cheese, but on her way home an MP apparently under misguided orders inspected her bags and confiscated her purchases. “The act of the MP left us inarticulate,” she recalled, “I myself felt that if I had commented on what had happened there might be a Gestapo

2684 Carry, 152-153.
2685 Blackburn Interview, 157.
2686 Fertig Diary, 1 May 1945.
who would tell on me.”

Marquez added, “I realized later that the American Military Police was only obeying orders and that the American Army was really trying to break the black market. But as I lay awake on my mat on the floor that night I was embittered – heart-sore. I knew that my [children] were still hungry. Army rules don’t mean much to a mother battling for her brood.” Filipinos like her began to desire greater control over their situation.

Fertig and the other guerrilla leaders presented several ideas for using their men as basis for immediately constructing a new Philippine Army (PA). “My personal opinion is that nothing is being done to organize the PA, and that the delay will be serious,” warned Fertig, “Already the rumor is spreading that the Pro-Japs are taking command of the army. Should that gain sufficient following, you can expect civil war, with the split widening but following the original lines of that who were collaborationists and those who were not. My head aches each time I think of these islands trying to exist as sovereign nation. They are as incapable of self-government as the youngest Central American Republic.”

Eventually, a number of guerrilla units transitioned to become units of the new Philippine Army.

In April, Fertig learned that I Corps planned to form four regiments from his organization with “the rest of the guerrillas to be thrown to the wolves.” He suggested five regiments, one for each division: “Bowler to command the 106th,
which would be the first to be processed and attached to the 24th Div. 108th to be
next and 107-3rd. 105 Div. was all to pass to 41st Div. for tactical command but I
would maintain Admin. Control. My ideas were adopted practically as given and
Bowler instructed to make arrangements to get to Tuibpuan to take command of
106th.” Fertig found that the Philippine Civil Affairs Units working with
MacArthur’s forces planned to place their officers in the command positions of the
new regiments. Fertig had the impression the PCAU thought “the guerrillas were
just a bunch of punks.”

On 12 April, the day President Franklin Roosevelt died, Chick Parsons
assumed his new duties in Manila. “He did promise to keep us in mind,” remarked
Fertig, “and we are going to need friends. I can see that for we are about to be lost in
the shuffle.” Three days later Fertig explained, “It is only a question of time until
we enter another period of adjustment for in some ways our guerrilla life was a free
and easy life with many responsibilities but with compensating privileges. Now
comes men, who may be ignorant, to take over our work. Their snap judgements
may effect our reputation for the whole effort. So again I say: ‘It is in God’s hands
and he has brought me far in safety.’”

Eichelberger sent a battalion of the 164th Infantry to west Bohol near
Tagbalaran. “Assisted by the local guerrilla force, the battalion pushed inland,
located the defenders, and by the end of the month had cleared the island of active

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2693 Ibid, 19 April 1945.
2694 Ibid., 18 April 1945.
2695 Ibid., 12 April 1945.
2696 Ibid., 15 April 1945.
Japanese resistance at a cost of seven men killed.” By 21 April, MacArthur deemed the Visayas secured, and concentrated on Mindanao.

Lieutenant General Gyosaku Morozumi commanded 43,000 troops on Mindanao with a division in prepared defenses in the south around Davao, another division holding Malaybalay and Cagayan in the central and northern coast, and the independent mixed brigade still facing the U.S. 41st Division on the Zamboanga Peninsula. The Japanese combined strong defensive position with the island's difficult geography. Yet, they also suffered severe shortages in artillery, ammunition, communications, and transportation and, as Stephen Lofgren observed: "Further complicating life for the Japanese was a vibrant guerrilla force led by Col. Wendell W. Fertig... Colonel Fertig's 24,000-man force controlled most of the island, keeping the Japanese confined to their garrison towns and to the major roads. The guerrillas were prepared to participate actively in future actions." The Japanese leaders on Mindanao had allowed themselves to believe that the earlier operations in Zamboanga by the U.S. 41st Division “constituted the extent of American plans for Mindanao.”

Eichelberger divided Major General Franklin Sibert's X Corps into two assault forces for Mindanao. Navy Task Force 78.2 would deliver the first, with the 24th Division, near Malabang on 17 April to secure an advance airfield. On 22 April, the second, with the 31st Division, would land farther south near Parang, to secure Highway 1 to Davao. Before the landings, however, Fertig reported that, with

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2697 Lofgren, 21.
2698 Ibid., 22.
2699 Ibid.
support from Colonel Clayton Jerome’s Marine aviators from Dipolog, his guerrillas had driven off a Japanese battalion and secured Malabang and its airfield. Eichelberger’s forces changed plans to exploit Fertig’s accomplishment.

The Japanese did not oppose the 17 April landing and the 24th Division drove on Highway 1 to secure the Mindanao River as a line of supply. The 31st Division landed on 22 April as the Marine Air Group 24 arrived at Malabang. The 24th Division’s rapid sprint of over 115 miles caught Morozumi’s force in Davao off guard and oriented towards the sea. It was overwhelmed on 27 April. On 3 May, the 24th Division entered Davao City. The Japanese would, however, fight fiercely around Davao over the next two months.

On Luzon, I Corps continued to push northeast from Manila towards Bambang against heavy resistance from Yamashita’s Shobu Group. The corps found its units could advance north along the Lingayen Gulf landing more easily. Krueger sent the 33rd and 37th Divisions inland and, in Andradé’s words, “with the aid of air strikes and guerrilla harassment, wore down the defenders until they were on the verge of starvation” and captured Baguio on 27 April. Meanwhile in the south the Americans encircled the remaining Simbu Group in Bicol near Lake Taal and then cut to the east coast. While the 11th Airborne Division isolated the peninsula, the 1st Cavalry Division “with substantial support from guerrilla units,” turned north to seize Infanta by 25 May.

For the Japanese, life in the mountains of Luzon became a horror. Soldier Nishihara Takamaro recalled, “Passing through the jungle, I reached a hill. As far as I could see there were dead bodies, clothed only in dirty, worn loincloths... Spending every day among dead bodies makes one doubt whether on can know where the dividing line between life and death is. One’s thoughts become hazy and

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2700 Ibid.
2701 Andradé, 25.
2702 Ibid.
disoriented.”

Without food or medicine, the men died even without combat. Takamaro said, “a fellow soldier whose name I didn’t know came crawling over to me. Taking off his clothes he bared his pointed rear end. It had become bluish-green. ‘Buddy, if I die, go ahead and eat this part,’ he said, touching his scrawny rear end with his bony finger.”

On the last day of April, Fertig accompanied Eichelberger in a B-17 bomber on an aerial tour of Mindanao. He took the opportunity to make a request: “Use of guerrilla troops by attachment to U.S. units is not utilizing our capabilities efficiently. I have requested that units revert to me for tactical command.”

Eichelberger was noncommittal.

On 3 May, the 31st Division reached Kibawe on the northern end of the Japanese line of communication with Davao City. That trail was a priority target for Eighth Army. “Inspection of the trail, however,” noted Lofgren, “soon reinforced Colonel Fertig’s opinion that the trail’s importance and capabilities had been vastly overrated.”

Eichelberger opted to limit operations there to a reconnaissance-in-force and sent the division north on 11 May. The reconnaissance covered the line in eighteen days. “Yet even with the assistance of Filipino guerrillas, it took the 167th Infantry until 30 June to move five miles beyond the Pulangi River and seize the Japanese trail-force headquarters at Pinamola.”

Skirmishing along the trail cost the American regiment 80 men killed and 180 wounded, while counting for almost 400 Japanese dead.

The 24th Division renewed its attack on 17 May in coordination with Fertig’s guerrillas. Intense Japanese fires slowed the advance but artillery and Marine close air support favored the Americans. “Beginning on 29 May, the 19th Infantry and

2703 Carry, 156-157.
2704 Collingham, 299.
2705 Fertig Diary, 1 May 1945.
2706 Lofgren, 29.
2707 Ibid.
Filipino guerrillas caved in the Japanese eastern flank, seizing the town of Mandong on 15 June and the eastern bank of the Davao River, which flows from north to south into Davao City.”\textsuperscript{2708} Fertig commented in his diary, “It seems that so many break their heads against the stone walls of chance and destiny, who could live much more easily and certainly more amiably if they did not try to build their own world to their own little desires. Perhaps the Jungle has taught me something.”\textsuperscript{2709} The Japanese 100\textsuperscript{th} Division position collapsed and they retreated. The 24th Division lost 350 men killed and 1,615 wounded; the Japanese had lost about 4,500 killed.\textsuperscript{2710}

Fertig continued to press for the inclusion of his men in a new national military. On 17 May, he wrote, “I learned much about the proposed Philippine Army but it does not appear that much can or will be done until Osmeña returns from the States with definite authority.”\textsuperscript{2711} (Osmeña, of course, had returned with MacArthur). Twelve days later Fertig talked with Charles Smith and noted, “He feels that the present Commonwealth Govt cannot stand, that they are definitely interested in running American capital out of the Philippines, that Independence is an accomplished fact; that this is no place for the American after it is all over.”\textsuperscript{2712}

On 2 June, Fertig met with Pendatun in Dansalan. He learned that Pendatun had orders to go to Cotabato to help reorganize Mindanao’s civil government. Fertig left the meeting in the belief that Pendatun would suggest he be named Chief of Staff of the new Philippine Army.\textsuperscript{2713} “I don’t know,” wrote Fertig, “Someone must take

\begin{footnotes}
\item[2708] Ibid.
\item[2709] Fertig Diary, 17 May 1945.
\item[2710] Lofgren, 29.
\item[2711] Fertig Diary, 17 May 1945.
\item[2712] Ibid., 29 May 1945.
\item[2713] Ibid., 2 June 1945.
\end{footnotes}
hold of things if order is to be brought out of chaos. The only place that I would serve with the PA is in command. In any other position, I should find myself outmaneuvered by a cabal, with which [sic] I could not compete.”

Fertig was deceived. There would be no place for him or the other American guerrilla leaders in the post war Philippine Army or government. The Filipinos appreciated their contribution, but were determined to form their own government. The resistance movement had transformed them from a weak confederation of separate communities into a people sharing a national vision and a desire to govern themselves.

Even if there had been a place for the guerrilla leaders, they were not physically able to occupy it. They had suffered physical and psychological damage that would take years to repair. After nearly three years of guerrilla life, Ramsey recalled, “I was down to less than a hundred pounds, and so weak that I could no longer support the weight of my .45 around my waist. Instead I began to carry a little snub-nosed .38 in a belt slung over my shoulder, and even that became a burden.” Blackburn endured malaria for “nearly the whole damn war. I was always getting it.” Similarly spent, Volckmann would move on to an assignment in Washington but “spent more time at Walter Reed Army Hospital than he did at the Personnel Division offices.”

Ramsey’s experience serves as a poignant example of the impact of disease and malnutrition upon the guerrillas. He weighed ninety-three pounds and doctors

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2714 Ibid., 2 June 1945.
2715 Ramsey and Rivele., 290.
2716 Blackburn Interview, 79.
2717 Guardia, American Guerrilla, 153.
determined he suffered from malaria, amoebic dysentery, anemia, and acute malnutrition and “general nervous collapse,” and quickly reassigned him to a desk job at Sixth Army headquarters for a chance to get well. In May, he collapsed getting out of his cot one morning and had to be hospitalized. One day after returning to work he was doing paperwork when he noticed the words on a paper blur and his hand shaking. He recalled, “The spirit dissolved within me. It was coming, and there was nothing I could do about it except to withdraw into that pinpoint back in my brain from which I watched in safety while my nervous system fell to pieces again.” He later explained, “I looked at the poor thing my body had become, and at the shambles of my spirit, and I understood that this was a war that was beginning, not ending. It was a war to recover myself, to redefine my being out the experiences I had had, to make sense of the very senselessness of the war itself. I was in chaos, collapse, splintered from myself. Yet I had not surrendered.”

Ironically, many who worked with the Japanese avoided punishment. On 5 June, Fertig met with Judge Saguin in Oroquieta: “He told me that when he arrived in Leyte, at the call of the President, it soon became evident that the people who had spent the war in the U.S. were very lenient in their treatment of collaborators. Soon it appeared to him that they were considering those who remained behind to live with the Japs, as the real heroes of the occupation.” The puppet governor of

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2718 Ramsey and Rivele, 333.
2719 Ibid., 328.
2720 Ibid., 328.
2721 Fertig Diary, 5 June 1945.
Leyte, Bernardo Torres of Leyte, faced a trial for treason but “the decision was so near a deadlock that they declared it ‘no trial.’”

Meanwhile many of the wrong people faced punishment. On the streets of Manila, Adalia Marquez saw a man she recognized as a guerrilla detained by MPs while a man helping the MPs she knew was a collaborator. The unfortunate detainee, Sunga, explained he had been framed by one of his wartime enemies. “The only bitterness in my heart,” he said, “is that these Americans are misinformed about many of us. Naturally there are many personal grudges to satisfy, and these people don’t know anything except what they are told by stool pigeons. It is possible we will be set free when the Americans are satisfied with our defense, but the harm of imprisonment is already done.” Adalia went to an American Counter-Intelligence Corps officer, Lieutenant William Hartnett, to help sort out collaboration cases.

Hartnett was a good man and tried to do the right things. Yet he surprised Adalia and revealed cultural differences when he innocuously explained why he liked the Philippines: “Why, the girls here paint their lips, their finger nails and even their toe nails, just as in the States. After those jungle days when we saw nothing but thick-lipped, wiry-haired, fuzzy wuzzies, your women here look like queens!” Adalia recalled, “I did not know whether or not to be flattered, although we apparently had the benefit of the comparison.”

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2722 Ibid.
2723 Marquez, 200.
2724 Ibid., 195-196.
2725 Ibid., 196.
The war was winding down. On 22 June, the day after fighting on Okinawa ended, Fertig attended a gala dinner with Admirals Halsey, Combs, Carney and Struebel and Generals Irving, Bruce, Byers, and Eichelberger. He heard praise for the Philippine guerrillas: “Admiral Halsey remarked that the shipping report on the movement of the Jap fleet in June 1944 helped to catch them off guard.”

Since the end of March, the Allies controlled all the areas of Luzon that had any strategic or economic significance. On 30 June, as the Eighth Army relieved the Sixth Army, Eichelberger told MacArthur all Japanese organized resistance had ended.

Mopping up continued in the jungles until the end of the war. The Japanese had lost almost all of their 230,000 military personnel on Luzon, and about 70,000 on Leyte, while the American reported 10,380 killed, 36,550 wounded, and over 93,400 noncombat casualties, including 260 dead, mostly from disease. On Mindanao the Japanese lost more than 10,000 killed in combat, about 8,000 more non-battle deaths, and some 22,000 who surrendered while U.S. forces lost 820 killed and 2,880 wounded. General Yamashita and about 50,500 of his men surrendered only after the close of hostilities on 15 August. Akira Fujiwara estimated that 400,000 of the 498,000 Japanese deaths in the Philippines resulted from starvation.

Reviewing the inadequate Japanese logistical systems, Edward

2726 Ibid., 22 June 1945.
2728 Lofgren, 32.
2729 Collingham, 303.
Drea commented, "the army's incompetence killed more Japanese soldier’s than did the allies."\(^{2730}\)

Airpower, artillery and superior logistics were major factors in the American victory. Some estimates hold that for every pound of supplies the Japanese delivered to each of their soldiers, the Americans supplied two tons to theirs.\(^{2731}\) "Another reason for success," noted Stephen Lofgren, "was the great assistance that organized Filipino guerrilla forces provided. In today’s parlance, the guerrillas constituted a valuable ‘force multiplier’ for Eichelberger’s units. Before MacArthur’s return, guerrillas harassed Japanese units and provided valuable intelligence about Japanese dispositions and the relative suitability of landing beaches. After each landing, the guerrillas eagerly fought alongside the Americans and pursued the Japanese throughout the island interiors."\(^{2732}\)

In a camp holding Japanese POWs on 15 August, Private First Class Shimodaira Tadao recalled, "At around eight o’clock Japan’s surrender was formally announced. Inside our tent we all faced north and bowed in silence. I couldn’t stop my flowing tears... This was fate, it was destiny."\(^{2733}\)

\(^{2730}\) Drea, 238.
\(^{2731}\) Ibid., 452.
\(^{2732}\) Lofgren, 32.
\(^{2733}\) Carry, 231.
Conclusion

The narrative of the Philippine struggle from 1942 through 1944 is a synthesis of three distinctive conflicts fought by the Filipinos, Japanese, and Americans. Each side fought for different objectives in different ways in the face of different challenges yet their actions and reactions were interdependent. They each responded to and caused military, economic, political, cultural, and environmental changes. It is in the aggregate of these changes and responses that we discover the nature of their war and resistance.

For the Filipinos, the war was one phase of both a longer fight against foreign occupation and influence and an inner struggle for social justice and identity. When the Japanese invaded, Filipinos spontaneously rose up in numerous isolated groups to initiate an asymmetrical fight against their occupiers. Many chose to invite American expatriates and refugee soldiers to lead or assist their efforts with their military expertise and possible arms, supplies and recognition from MacArthur. They found that the Americans could also provided neutral leadership behind which politically and socially divided Filipinos could unite. Still some guerrilla leaders like Macario Peralta chose not to recruit Americans so as to maintain a Filipino identity for postwar independence. The choice to incorporate Americans pr not signaled a new and emergent Philippine agency.

The Filipinos’ initial spontaneous enthusiasm for resistance waned as the months and years passed and sapped their faith in MacArthur’s promised return. Indeed, most Filipinos either simply endured the occupation or even collaborated with the Japanese.2734 The Japanese administration however proved remarkably incapable of exploiting this

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2734 Some Filipinos, like others in Japan’s southern conquests, looked “to the Japanese as ‘brothers’ who would help free them from the white colonials.” Dower, 230.
situation. For every act of cooperation purchased with offers of amnesty or independence, the policies of occupation provoked greater resistance. Driving out the Americans crippled the Islands’ economic foundations and led to widespread joblessness, inflation and black markets that undermined legal authority. Japanese efforts to exploit Philippine resources brought popular resentment and provided targets for guerrilla attacks. Their decision to retain in power members of the existing Philippine government exposed Japanese policies to obstructionism. Practices of cultural subjugation ranging from slaps to rapes further infuriated Filipinos and turned them to the guerrillas’ side.

To the Japanese, the occupation of the Philippines was a test of the ideas embodied in the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Once they had conquered the Islands, their war was elsewhere. They had decided even before the invasion to treat acts of resistance as matters of law and order to be handled by the Philippine government. The Japanese rotated first line combat units out of the Islands as quickly as possible to higher priority areas of operations and used second tier conscripts for garrison duties. Unless they enjoyed overwhelming numbers, the garrison troops evidenced reluctance to chase guerrillas into the jungles or to operate at night. Their reliance on rigid tactics enabled increasingly able guerrillas to develop effective countermeasures. As a result, local Japanese commanders often accepted de facto truces that ceded control of rural areas to guerrillas and left much of the urban counterinsurgent efforts to the Kempeitai military police whose harsh methods increased hostility towards the Japanese across wide kinship networks.

Nothing proved more counterproductive to the Japanese occupation than the unanticipated impact on food supplies caused by their policies. Before the war, the
Philippines had depended on imported diary, flour and vegetables from the United States and meat from Australia. The invasion severed those imports without replacement. Japanese efforts to exploit Philippine rice production, combined with the demands to feed the occupying army and the failed effort to grow Formosan hortai rice, brought famine in many areas. The price of rice in Manila rose two thousand percent between 1941 and 1945. As Lizzie Collingham noted, “The wealthy went out into the countryside to barter jewelry, clothes and furniture for rice; the poor were so desperate that they ate foul-smelling rice recovered from the polluted bottom of Manila Bay.” Starving people flocked to guerrilla groups like the Hukbalahaps who managed to maintain ample supplies of rice in their areas.

The existence of the guerrillas discouraged the Filipinos in government from meaningful collaboration. Japanese General Akira Muto had served in China, Singapore, Sumatra and the Netherland East Indies before arriving for duty in the Philippines in October 1944. He found “that in all other colonial areas occupied by the Japanese during the war the conquerors found the native populations to be acquiescent, if not cooperative. Only in the Philippines did they encounter fanatical resistance, despite the Japanese device of setting up an ‘independent’ government in the islands, which government had formally declared war on the United States.” Although 80,000 Southeast Asians from India, Malaya and other countries served in pro-Japanese military forces, President Jose Laurel persuaded the Japanese that forcing Filipinos to serve in an

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2735 Malcolm, 12, 27 and 243.
2736 Collingham, 243.
2737 Ibid.
2738 Reel, 106
army against the United States would lead to a civil war.\textsuperscript{2739} The militancy of the Filipino guerrillas across the Islands provided convincing weight to his argument.

For a long time the American high command was largely ignorant of these events. After Corregidor’s fall, the MacArthur spent months completely cut off from the Philippines and blind to the resistance movement that developed without him. The USAFFE soldiers remaining free in the Islands acted independently of MacArthur’s command. Horan, Thorp and other early leaders that had fought behind Japanese lines in support of USAFFE’s operations became free agents with Wainwright’s surrender. Within the year this first wave of American guerrilla leaders collapsed against the forces of fatigue, illness and effective Japanese counterguerrilla operations. Volckmann, Fertig, Ramsey, Lapham and the other latter American guerrilla leaders who spent that first year ill or otherwise out of the conflict found themselves with time to think about their situation and the choices they faced. Motivated by Filipino sacrifices, these men joined the resistance more for the cause than for MacArthur.

Only gradually were some guerrilla leaders able to make contact by radio with MacArthur’s headquarters. He then began a deliberate program to verify, support and exploit the guerrilla movement. Through adroit grants of recognition, deliveries of supplies by submarine, and the promise of his return, MacArthur began attracting guerrillas to cooperate with his command. He demurred however when guerrillas asked for help to fight the Japanese and instead ordered them to restrict their activities to intelligence gathering operations out of fear that guerrilla attacks would only bring harsh retaliation upon Filipino civilians. For guerrillas who felt that popular support

necessitated demonstrations of military action against the Japanese, such orders could not be wholly obeyed. This difference in purpose added to a reluctance in MacArthur’s headquarters to fully embrace guerrillas who were known to execute prisoners, assassinate suspected collaborators, confiscate civilian properties, and other practices contrary to the laws of war. To compensate, MacArthur built a shadow organization of operatives that worked parallel to the existing guerilla groups.

In part because of MacArthur’s orders, the Philippine guerrillas had less than decisive impact on the Japanese army as reckoned by traditional military measures. The Japanese military suffered a reported 498,600 casualties in the Philippines during the war.\footnote{The Australia-Japan Research Project cites the Senshi Sōsho (the official military history of Imperial Japan). Source: Australia-Japan Research Project at http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/AJRP2.nsf/530e35f7e2ae7707ca2571e3001a112d/e7daa03b9084ad56ca257209000a85f7?OpenDocument accessed 3 February 2018.} Their conquest of the Islands (December 1941-May 1942) produced 11,225 of these casualties while another 419,912 were reported during the Allied invasion (October 1944-September 1945, with eighty percent of the casualties from starvation or disease).\footnote{The total casualties for the invasion and return come second hand from the Senshi Sōsho through Wikipedia. Total losses during the invasion were: 4,130 killed; 6,808 wounded, 287 missing. Total Regional Casualties during the Allied return: Army. 377,500; Navy 121,100; Total 498,600.} These numbers leave 67,463 casualties suffered by the Japanese in the Philippines during the period of occupation. Even assuming an extremely high eighty percent non-battle casualty rate, these numbers leave roughly 13,500 Japanese casualties resulting from combat against the guerrillas.\footnote{Finding a battle/non-battle casualty rate for the Japanese army is problematic. Required statistics do not exist. In most of their battles in the Pacific even their sick and wounded fought to the death. In China they were known to kill their sick and wounded before leaving them. During WW2, the American Army suffered 234,874 battle deaths and 83,400 non-battle deaths (3:1). A better comparison for the Japanese fighting the Philippine guerrillas, during the Spanish-American War the U.S. Army suffered 369 combat deaths to 2,061 non-combat (about 1:5). Nese F. DeBruyne, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, 26 April 2017), Table 1. “Principal Wars or Conflicts in Which the United States Participated U.S. Military Personnel Serving and Casualties (1775-1991), ”1-2.} History indicates that even
counterinsurgency operations that did not result in combat would still have caused a large number of casualties. Combat against the Philippine guerrillas may therefore have cost the Japanese from between one understrength division (13,500 men or 23 infantry battalions) to four-and-a-half full divisions (67,500 men or nearly 113 battalions).

A loss of even 67,500 soldiers would still not have had a critical impact on the overall Japanese war effort. The Japanese army began the war with 51 divisions: 27 committed to China; 400,000 soldiers in 24 divisions available for offenses in the Pacific. A loss of 67,500 men would have constituted a significant seventeen percent of this early force, but during the war the Japanese army grew to five million men and 145 divisions (though of increasingly lower quality). The Japanese managed to garrison the Philippines with between 22 and 24 infantry battalions, the equivalent of one first line division. Throughout the war therefore, counterinsurgency garrison forces and casualties in the Philippines cost the Japanese military somewhere between two to five and a half divisions, about one to four percent of their army’s final strength.

Beyond these numbers, however, the guerrillas impaired the Japanese war effort in significant ways. They denied economic exploitation of the Islands by sabotaging mines, assassinating managers, chasing away workers, disrupting transportation, and helping the U.S. Navy sink ships. Their efforts contributed to a significantly lower transfer of goods and payments from the Philippines to Japan than from other Southeast Asian territories. Iron ore imports from the Philippines to Japan, for example, fell to

2744 Monograph No. 3, Japanese Monographs, 45-56.
just ten percent of prewar levels. The guerrillas helped compel the Japanese to change their priorities from economic exploitation of the Islands to using them as a means for safeguarding shipping routes, but even there guerrilla-supported coast watchers helped sink nearly 800 Japanese vessels in Philippine waters.

Perhaps the guerrillas’ most important achievement was the part they played in MacArthur’s winning argument for returning to the Philippines. At the strategy conference in Hawaii in July 1944, the American military consensus was to bypass the Islands and advance on Formosa. MacArthur countered that the United States could expect no support from Formosa’s population while “we could expect every possible assistance from the Filipinos against the hated Japanese occupation forces. In some areas, indeed, powerful Filipino guerrilla groups had already made substantial progress towards outing the conqueror.” The knowledge that Filipinos were fighting and dying while waiting for America’s promised return significantly influenced President Roosevelt’s decision on strategy in the Pacific.

The Japanese welcomed a decisive battle in the Philippines in hopes of achieving some measure of victory that would persuade the Americans to negotiate an end to the war. The guerrillas played a key role in denying this hope. They conducted critical pre-invasion reconnaissance, sabotaged Japanese lines of communications and supplies, screened the flanks of invading forces, conducted vital public affairs coordination, and even fought as conventional forces at times. Moreover, their service as guides for MacArthur’s columns repeatedly led to faster and more secure Allied movements.

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2746 Dower, 230.
With the support of the guerrillas, MacArthur delivered a crushing blow to the Japanese army. A total of 1,140,429 Japanese military personnel died in combat between 1937 and 1945; 485,000 against U.S. forces.\footnote{Dower, 218.} Reportedly 255,795 of these died (out of 381,550 total casualties) during MacArthur’s campaign to retake the Islands – 47 percent of all Japanese military personnel killed by U.S. forces and nearly 20 percent of all Japanese combat deaths during the war.\footnote{Robert Ross Smith, \textit{Triumph in the Philippines (The United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific)} (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1933), 694.} Another 115,755 surrendered – more than twice the total number of Japanese soldiers who surrendered everywhere else during the entire war. The defense of the Islands also cost Japan nearly all of its remaining combat aircraft and naval vessels. Because of the guerrillas, Japan got a decisive battle in the Philippines but not with the outcome they desired.

The guerrilla campaign in the Philippines during World War II also presents significant challenges to current theories of irregular warfare and counterinsurgencies. This field today is framed by Maoist doctrine that defines guerrilla warfare in terms of revolutionary political means and ends. As Mao explained: “Guerrilla operations during the anti-Japanese war may for a certain time and temporarily become its paramount feature” but “there can be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary importance, because it is they who are alone capable of producing the decision.”\footnote{Mao, 56.} He outlined three phases of revolutionary warfare: a base phase to educate and organize the people; a guerrilla phase to harass the enemy and buy time to build regular forces; and a final conventional phase in which newly built regular forces defeat the existing institutions of power. The three phases could operate in different areas simultaneously. Cold War
theorists studying Maoist ‘wars of national liberation’ fit their observations of guerrilla warfare into this model.

Mao’s model for revolutionary war fails to explain the guerrilla war in the Philippines during World War II. In general, they did not fight for social change but for military objectives. As one Philippine guerrilla leader explained: “Our job isn’t to start a revolution, it’s to prepare for MacArthur’s invasion. We’re military men, not politicians.” Even the political prewar social revolutionaries joined in a United Front that became the Hukbalahap guerrilla movement could not follow Mao’s formula. Under the direction of veterans from the Communist army forces in China, the Huks began organizing forces suited to a transition for conventional decisive operations. However, when MacArthur announced, “I shall return!” he undercut any such development. There would be neither the time nor the rationale for developing revolutionary conventional forces capable of overthrowing either the Japanese or the Philippine government. MacArthur would restore to power prewar elites. As Colleen Woods noted, for “the Huks and their supporters” this meant “the return of a deeply unequal colonial society and a government that would disproportionately serve the interests of the wealthiest or most politically connected class of Filipinos.”

The Philippine guerrilla resistance is better explained by the theories published a hundred years before Mao by Carl von Clausewitz. As an officer in the Prussian army defeated by Napoleon and influenced by the example of Spain from 1807 to 1814, Clausewitz meditated on the possibilities of a popular armed resistance against an

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2752 Ramsey and Rivele, 132-133.
2753 The Japanese killed Crisanto Evangelista, Pedro Abad Santos, Ramon de Santos, Guillermo Capadocia and many others Scaff, 4-7.
2754 Davis, 38.
2755 Woods, 6.
invader. In Chapter 26 of Book Six of *On War*, “The People in Arms,” Clausewitz concluded that, except in extraordinary circumstances, such resistance alone was unlikely to defeat a conventional enemy army. “To be realistic,” he wrote, “one must therefore think of a general insurrection within the framework of a war conducted by the regular army, and coordinated in one all-encompassing plan.” In the Philippines, that regular army was the American army and the all-encompassing plan was MacArthur’s. Clausewitz argued that a people in arms served as “a natural auxiliary” to an army “in areas just outside the [active] theater of war – where the invader will not appear in strength – in order to deny him these areas altogether” and to wear down the enemy until such time as when the army can deliver the decisive counterstroke. This was the purpose for which MacArthur sought to gain control of the organic Philippine guerrilla movement. Clausewitz thus not only provides insight into the conduct of the Philippine guerrillas, he reminds us that Maoist revolutionary doctrine is but a subset of a larger field of guerrilla warfare theory.

MacArthur’s operations also produced significant political impact on the Philippines. The rise and consolidation of power by local guerillas, slowly linked together by his command, provided the framework that turned the previous collection of islands and peoples into a new Philippine nation. When MacArthur left the Philippines in 1942, turmoil reigned across the Islands. As a U.S. Army history noted: “Gradually, however, strong men emerged who formed the guerrilla bands into semi-military organizations. The leader of each band, who was generally an ex-member of the armed forces, gave himself a ‘bamboo commission,’ usually considerably higher than the one he had hitherto

2756 Clausewitz, 579
2757 Clausewitz, 580-582.
possessed.” Through contact, recognition and supplies, MacArthur shaped the competition for power among the local guerrillas. He chose reliable old order Filipinos like Ruperto K. Kangleon over more politically radical competitors like Blas E. Miranda on Leyte. Through tenuous connections with Thorp, Volckmann, Ramsey and others, he helped isolate the Huks on Luzon. By supporting Fertig, he effectively prevented separate Moro interests from seizing power on Mindanao. By these efforts and many others, MacArthur reinforced selected guerrillas who then established local governments united his influence.

The war provided a decisive phase in the long-running internal Philippine political contest. Emerging guerrilla leaders took the opportunity to eliminate competitors for power. Lapham wrote: “Some writers have complained, after the fact, that we guerrillas were inhumanly hard on barrio and town officials who were caught in excruciating dilemmas. I cannot deny this; I can only remind them guerrilla warfare is not a sporting contest among gentlemen who observe Marquis of Queensberry rules. It is a mean, dirty, brutal struggle to the death, devoid of any principle or sentiment save to survive and win.” As reported in Bicol, the guerrillas battles “over matters of area command almost exceeds any fighting against the Japanese.” This environment enabled ambitious politicians to eliminate rivals and build new power bases. Ramon Durano, for example, influenced Fenton to execute a number of his political adversaries on Cebu and emerged as a dominant post-war figure. Others, like Fermin Caram on Panay, tried to use the Japanese to take down their rivals. In this war the guerrilla war

2758 Cannon, 14.
2759 Ibid.,16.
2760 Lapham and Norling, 77.
2761 See Memorandum, “Summary History of Organization of A.I.B.,” 25 January 1943, Box No. 469 Records Group 496, Philippine Archives, NARA II
settled many existing contests for power and generally left those allied to MacArthur and the new government in the strongest positions.

This period of war and resistance shaped Philippine politics for decades afterwards. MacArthur had skillfully prevented any single resistance leader from assuming power across the Philippines and thereby set the stage for a return of the prewar elites to power. He brought Quezon’s exiled former vice president and Nacionalista stalwart Sergio Osmeña, Jr., back as president of the new Philippines. In 1946, MacArthur’s agent in the occupation government, Manuel A. Roxas of the Liberal Party, became president. After a grant of amnesty to nearly all collaborators, occupation administration president Jose Laurel won election to the senate. In 1953 former guerrilla Ramon Magsaysay won the presidency and returned the Nacionalista party to power. Fellow Nacionalista Carlos P. Garcia, a BOFOR guerrilla veteran, followed him in office. Liberal Diosdado Macapagal, a former collaborationist aide to Laurel, won the presidency in 1961. Four years later Ferdinand Marcos won the presidency and would retain power largely on his mythic reputation as a guerrilla leader. He was finally replaced in 1986 in a revolt led by Corazon Aquino, collaborator Benigno Ramos’ daughter-in-law.

Guerrilla veterans and their kin will likely continue to influence future generations of Philippine politics, even if the number of Filipinos who had been guerrillas remains a point of contention.\footnote{In 1941, the Philippine Islands were home to 16,356,000 people. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, \textit{Statistical Abstract of the United States}, Reports of the Sixteenth Census, 2, “Table No.3, Area and Population of Continental United States and Outlying Territories and Possessions: 1930 and 1940,” at https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1942/compendia/statatab/63ed/1941-02.pdf, accessed 5 February 2018.} After the war roughly 1.3 million Filipinos claimed to have served in over 1,000 guerrilla units, but the U.S. Army authorities would recognize
only 260,715 guerrilla veterans in 277 units.\textsuperscript{2763} (By one estimate, 33,000 guerrillas died during the war.\textsuperscript{2764}) The claims of guerrilla veteran status by 7.8 percent of the total population may have seemed extreme, yet the Army’s recognition of only 1.6 percent of population as guerrilla veterans seems low when one considers that about 11 percent of Americans served in the U.S. military during the war – and their country had not been invaded.\textsuperscript{2765} While some Filipinos no doubt submitted false claims in hopes of getting veterans’ benefits, the vast majority had likely supported the guerrillas in some manner and many were doubt ignored for reasons of routine bureaucratic inefficiency.

The price of resistance was extremely high. Estimates of up to 900,000 civilians and 57,000 Filipino soldiers had been killed.\textsuperscript{2766} U.S. Army records counted 131,028 Americans and Filipinos “murdered, starved and tortured to death in the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{2767} The war had left the survivors, especially in the Manila, greatly dependent on both their government and the Americans. Manila suffered battle damage only equaled by Warsaw and only Berlin and Stalingrad lost more than Manila’s 100,000 citizens killed in battle.\textsuperscript{2768} “Large parts of the city had been deliberately and methodically demolished.”


\textsuperscript{2764} This number comes from the Hunters’ Colonel Eleuterio ‘Terry’ Adevoso who became head of the Philippine Veterans Legion after the war. Hartendorp, 610.


\textsuperscript{2767} Hartendorp, 557.

\textsuperscript{2768} Connaughton, et al., 15.
A.V.H. Hartendorp observed, “and what the Japanese demolition had begun, American artillery had had to carry on.” More than 200,000 city residents were left homeless.

Suffering spanned the Islands. During the war, real per capita Filipino income fell by half. GDP per capita fell by 60 percent (compared to Thailand’s drop of 15 percent, Indochina by 35 percent). Years of shortages and famine had devastated large areas. As Collingham noted, “By 1944 it was not uncommon to see the corpses of those who had starved lying in the streets.” It would take five years for the GDP to reach prewar levels and even longer for vital industries like sugar production to recover.

Women especially suffered during the occupation. They endured threats and acts of sexual exploitation. Hundreds of thousands of women had to provide for families in the absence of men who served in the army or with the guerrillas, were imprisoned, or suffered debilitating injury or death. They were also subject to the imposition of cultural system that sought to diminish their place in a traditionally matriarchal society. The Filipinas fought back against their occupiers in a number of ways. Thousands served vital roles within the resistance as spies, couriers, administrative and support agents, or fighters. Their actions comprise a major part of this history and secured their place in society and politics.

Many Filipinos would never recover from the hunger, homelessness and other hardships caused by the war and now sought meaning in their great, shared sacrifice. As Tomas Confesor argued, Filipinos had earned the right to together decide “what system of government should stand here and what ways of life, systems of social organizations

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2769 Hartendorp, 604.
2770 “Between 1938 and 1946, income in the Philippines shrank by more than half. The combined income index of Philippines physical production fell by over three fifths.” Huff and Majima, 13 and Table 4, 34.
2771 Collingham.
and code of morals should govern our existence." The war had changed the basis for such decisions. What had been a population identified by kinship networks, tribes and localities had become a network of local power brokers united in their newfound identity as Filipinos.

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\[2772\] Ibid.
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