ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: TRAGEDY MACHINE(S): PERFORMANCES OF POWER AND RESISTANCE IN INDEBTED GREECE

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_TragedyMachine(s): Performances of Power and Resistance in Indebted Greece_ looks at the negotiations between Greece and its international creditors, street protests and demonstrations, refugee camps, and theatre productions in Greece within the larger context of the 21st century European debt-economy. Building upon Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s works on Nietzsche’s notion of tragedy, it introduces a concept of tragedy valid in contemporary frames of European neoliberalism. _TragedyMachine(s)_ argues that the relations between Greece and its international creditors are non-resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor, hidden beneath the appearance and seeming promise of a resolution that nonetheless remains elusive. In the first chapter, titled “The Tragedy of the Greek Debt Crisis” I contend that the works of Deleuze and Guattari on Nietzsche’s notions of tragedy help us grasp the conceptual foundations of the 21st century European debt-economy. In the second chapter titled “Dromocratic Democracies,” I draw upon the tensions between Austin’s notion of a “happy performative” and Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of “order word” and “collective assemblages of enunciation.” I closely examine why the NOs of both the “NO” demonstration—the demonstration that took place two days before the Greek bailout referendum of 2015—and the Greek referendum of 2015 did not succeed in their resistance against Greece’s international creditors. The third chapter titled “Imperceptible Performances” focuses on the flows of forced migration that emerge from the Syrian War. In the fourth and last chapter of my dissertation titled “Theatres of Dramatization” I look at Zero Point Theatre Group’s—one of the most popular Greek avant-garde theatre companies—production of Buchner’s _Woyzeck_ and Yiannis Houvarda’s—a well-known Greek director—production of Aeschylus’ _Oresteia_. I argue that these two productions dramatized the destruction of promises of resolution of the non-resolvable power relations between Greece and its international creditors.
TRAGEDYMACHINE(S): PERFORMANCES OF POWER AND RESISTANCE IN INDEBTED GREECE

by

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Anti-Prologue

Refrains of Tragedy

Tragedy: Since the first memorandum between Greece and its international creditors in 2010, both national and international discursive spheres have been saturated with narratives of “tragedy.” Like a constant refrain that is produced by an invisible gramophonic machine, “tragedy” is picked up by activists, elected members of Greece’s current government, elected representatives of Greece’s official opposition, Greece’s international creditors, refugees, members of both the far right and the far left, national and international press and performance art and theatre artists, so to enunciate very different collective experiences and initiate very different performances of power and resistance. This contingent relation between various enunciations of tragedy and different initiations of collective performances of power and resistance was particularly intensified after the Greek snap elections in January of 2015. This dissertation will trace this intensification of the non-causal contingency between different enunciations of tragedy and different initiations of power and resistance in four different spheres: in the spaces of negotiation between Greece and its international creditors, in street protests and demonstrations, in the refugee camps, and finally in theatre spaces. These four different spheres will also lay the pathway for the four chapters of this dissertation.

Depending on what the performances of power and resistance that emerged from these four different spheres intended to achieve, in 2015-2016 Greece, these spheres became the stage for different conceptualizations and enunciations of tragedy. More particularly in 2015-2016 Greece, tragedy fluctuated between notions of poetic praxes that have the capacity to challenge the status quo and notions of supposedly unavoidable
events that cannot be challenged or changed by any praxis of ποίησις (poiisis). In my contention the latter is one of the most aporetic contemporary uses of tragedy: although tragedy is conceptually founded upon the poetic praxis of ωδή (ode)—and, as I will be arguing in detail in this dissertation’s fourth chapter, upon the dramatization of that praxis—tragedy today is often associated with happenings and events that are emptied—at least on a level of performance and presentation—of human action (Taxidou 2004).

This tension between notions of tragedy that, in Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016, are associated with revolutionary poiisis on a level of actual reality and notions of tragedy that, within the same spatiotemporal contexts, are associated with events and happenings that are emptied of human poiisis lays the conceptual ground for elaborating on the four different spheres/case studies of this dissertation. Furthermore, in 2015-2016 Greece, this tension between conflicting notions of tragedy is framed in terms of potential disruptions or continuations of conditions of indebtedness.

Before I elaborate more on the notions of tragedy that are framed in terms of potential disruptions or continuations of conditions of indebtedness—disruptions and continuations that as I have already argued this dissertation traces in the spheres of negotiation between Greece and its international creditors, of street protests and demonstrations, of refugee camps and finally, of theatre spaces—I would like to offer a brief description that, in my contention, would situate us in Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016. On January 25th 2015, the left-wing party of ΣΥΡΙΖΑ (SYRIZA)—a coalition that stands for Greece’s radical left—won the Greek snap legislative elections—a victory known as “first time left”—disrupting a 30-year
Greek bipartisanship that was previously shared between the right-wing party of New Democracy and the center-left party of PA.SO.K. During these 30 years of Greek partisanship, Greece’s relation with the European Union was formulated and equilibrated as a relation of dependency that was founded upon Greece’s indebtedness to its European and international creditors—the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since 2010, the equilibration of Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors was maintained via creditor/debtor informal memorandum agreements that were signed during “exceptional”—and by exceptional I mean informal—eurogroup meetings that were not, in any way, answerable to the Greek Parliament or to any elected Parliament.

This exceptional and informal aspect will be thoroughly addressed in the first chapter of this dissertation. For now I would like to mention that before the victory of SYRIZA in January of 2015, the right-wing government of New Democracy and Greece’s international creditors were about to come to a third memorandum agreement. Promising an alternative strategy, the left-wing party of SYRIZA won the snap elections of 2015 because of its, at the time, nonnegotiable reassurance, that SYRIZA, if elected, would not sign a third memorandum with Greece’s international creditors.

After this very brief description of Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016, I would like to elaborate on the first of the four spheres that I mentioned above: the sphere that emerges from the negotiations between Greece and its international creditors. In order to do so, I will focus on three different moments. One that includes the left-wing party of SYRIZA, one that includes Greece’s international creditors and finally, one that refers to Greece’s official opposition. Let’s start with the first one. Alexis
Tsipras—president of SYRIZA and current Greek prime minister—during his last interview before the snap elections of 2015, stated that in the upcoming elections “the Greek people will have to make a decision regarding a very clear dilemma: whether they want the tragedy that they have been experiencing during the last years to continue (…) or whether they want a way-out.”

Tsipras’s strategic choice to describe Greece’s condition of indebtedness as an endless “tragedy” and SYRIZA’s potential victory as a definite exodus from this ongoing tragedy, coded tragedy as an undisrupted continuity of Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors that, according to Tsipras’s statement, is intrinsically contradictory to change and interlinked to the forces of both Greek and European political right.

As a result, in the context of Tsipras’s pre-electoral speech, any collectively desired disruption of Greece’s tragedy could only happen in terms of extrinsic intervention: that of the left-wing party of SYRIZA that, until that day, it existed outside Greece’s well-rooted bipartisanship system and thus outside any promised agreements that had already happened between Greece’s previous governments of New Democracy and PA.SO.K and its international creditors.

After describing the first moment that referred to the left-wing party of SYRIZA, let’s continue with the one that refers to Greece’s international creditors. When SYRIZA won the elections in January of 2015, the former government of the right-wing party of New Democracy, had already “promised” to accept an upcoming “third economic adjustment program”, or in other words, a third memorandum. Although I am placing

1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iLIEIvIMGgo (Author’s translation)
particular emphasis on how, in neoliberal frames of 21st century Europe, a left-wing party is always already spoken for and about in the first chapter of this dissertation, for now I will reiterate Wolfgang Schauble’s—Germany’s Federal Minister of Finance—response to SYRIZA’s refusal to sign a third memorandum between Greece and its international creditors, in March 2015. According to Schauble, SYRIZA’s resistance to the upcoming third memorandum agreement was a “tragedy staged by the Greek institutions in Athens, and thus it is hard for us to find a potential solution.”\footnote{http://www.tanea.gr/news/economy/article/5220276/soimple-to-thema-ths-elladas-den-einai-to-xreos-alla-h-epistrofh-stis-agores/} As opposed to Tsipras’s coding of tragedy as an undisrupted continuity of a painful condition of Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors, Schauble’s signification of tragedy, “describes” the abrupt change, “staged” by the “first time left” that threatens to change Greece’s equilibrated indebtedness. For the German politician of the Christian Democratic Union, Schauble “the staged tragedy in Athens” not only challenges Greece’s conditions of indebtedness—a condition that Greece’s international creditors did not want to alter—but is also staged by the, so called, infantile, uncooperative, reactionary and unpredictable newly left-wing government of SYRIZA that is too naïve to understand the risks of disrupting Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors.

Greece’s official opposition seemed, at the time, to be on the same page with Wolfgang Schauble and Greece’s international creditors. While, from February to June 2015, the left government of SYRIZA was strongly resisting signing a third memorandum during its first negotiations with Greece’s international creditors, the right-wing party of New Democracy was strategically describing SYRIZA’s resisting efforts as “tragedy.” According to Adonis Georgiadis—current Vice-President of the right-wing
party of New Democracy—“The “first time left”, is turning into a national tragedy”

While the left-wing government of SYRIZA was trying to resist another memorandum and to disrupt Greece’s equilibrated condition of indebtedness, Greece’s official opposition was signifying left’s resistance as “national tragedy” Interestingly enough, since SYRIZA’s victory in January 2015, both Greece’s international creditors and Greece’s official opposition perpetuate narratives of tragedy in order to signify “first time left’s” resistance to the upcoming third memorandum.

The negotiations between the newly elected left-wing government of SYRIZA and Greece’s international creditors were extremely intensified during the June 28 Eurogroup meeting. During this meeting, the president of both the Eurogroup and the Board of Governors of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Jeroen Dijsselbloem extorted Yianis Varoufakis, the at the time Greece’s Minister of Finance and current co-founder of the DiEM25, forcing him to sign a third memorandum. Approximately two hours after Dijsselbloem’s “exortion”, Tsipras froze the negotiations and called for a Greek referendum scheduled for the 5th of July.

On July 3rd, five days after the June 28 eurogroup and two days before the Greek referendum of 2015, more than 200000 people assembled in Syntagma Square—the central square of Athens which is right in front of the Greek Parliament— in order to publically and collectively say “OXI” (NO) to the severe austerity measures “suggested” by Greece’s international creditors. Christos Thivaios, one of the invited artists who performed during the demonstration, shouted into the microphone “Because we owe more to our poets than we owe to our creditors.” During the street tragedy of the “NO”

3
4 Democracy in Europe Movement
demonstration, Greece’s indebtedness, was not coded in terms of credit, but in terms of poetic creativity. The street tragedy of the “NO” demonstration in July 2015, dramatized the collective and shared hope that Greece’s equilibrated condition of indebtedness to its international creditors can be disrupted.

As opposed to the disruption of the notion of indebtedness that the “NO” demonstration dramatized, public discourse and art that was produced and was created for and about the refugee camps often linked notions of tragedy to “unavoidable” events fully inaccessible to human agency. During my visit to a number of refugee-camps and hot-spots in both Turkey and Greece, I accidentally ran into a photography exhibition titled “The Tragedy of the Century: Refugees”. The exhibition took place on Istiklal Caddesi—one of the most crowded streets inside the city of Istanbul—and included oral histories, quotes and pictures taken by refugees. All these dispossessed human lives that, as curators noted, were “forced to leave their homelands, because of the humanitarian crisis, disasters, wars and terrors in the Middle East” are kept in camps in Turkey and Greece, most of the time under the most inhuman circumstances, so that they never intermingle with the rest of society. The hosting countries expected from the refugees to pay their debt to their hosts, by remaining imperceptible outsiders. Therefore in order for this condition of indebtedness not to be disrupted, the only way the “unavoidable” tragedy of the refugees can reach the gaze of the rest of the society is through simulacrums: pictures that are simultaneously haunted and dispossessed by the bareness of the physical presence of those depicted in the pictures.

Far from understanding tragedy as an agentless imposed condition three theatre productions of tragedy: the production of Woyzeck by Zero Point Theatre Group that
happened right before the Greek snap elections of 2015 and the production of *Oresteia* by Houvardas and of *Antigone* by Efthimiou that happened in post-referendum Greece emphasized tragedy’s poetic aspect. Although I will elaborate in detail on those productions in the second and fourth chapter of this dissertation, for now I would like to briefly focus on Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of *Woyzeck*. During the political turmoil before the Greek snap elections of January of 2015, and the “first time left” victory of SYRIZA, the Zero Point Theatre Group—a Greek theatre group that explores the political manifestations of experimental tragedy—staged a very radical production of Buchner’s *Woyzeck*. The Zero Point theatre group chose to stage *Woyzeck* during the Greek left’s struggles because, according to group’s founder and director Savas Stroubos, Buchner, in this “segmented tragedy”, conceptualizes “the tragedy of dehumanization (…) since for us the entire world is a series of concentration camps (…) and it is because of that aspect of tragedy that the play is timely relevant.” In this context, tragedy is coded as the visible dramatization of a series of invisible processes of dehumanization that organize human experience in contemporary versions of both perceptible and imperceptible concentration camps. In this context, the poetic force of tragedy sheds light on these invisible aspects of the political that within frames of 21st century Europe are mainly exerted via both abstract and concrete imposed conditions of indebtedness.

I started this section by arguing that, especially since SYRIZA’s “first time left” victory in 2015, different narratives of “tragedy” repeat themselves like a constant refrain that is produced by a hidden and invisible gramophonic machine. This invisible gramophonic machine not only produces different codes and significations of tragedy but it also assembles all these contradictory codes and significations together. As we see in
the four contradictory moments of tragedy that I just described above, SYRIZA’s “first time left”, Greece’s official opposition, Greece’s international creditors, activists and street demonstrators, refugees, and theatre artists, choose narratives of “tragedy” in order to enunciate different collective experiences of Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors and thus to initiate different performances of power and resistance. What is the common thread relating these contradictory moments and uses of tragedy? The common thread between them will be the path of this dissertation.

Throughout this dissertation I will understand 2015-2016 Greece within frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe as the Greek debtor/nation-state that, especially since the election of the left-wing government of SYRIZA in February 2015, is called to prove its “westerness” via being indebted to the rich European North. The “European” not only implies the narratives that perpetuate schizoid inequalities and power differentials between the “lazy and poor European South” and the “productive and rich European North” but it also refers to the Grexit discussions of 2015.

A very important conclusion that, I contend, emerges from a close observation of this constant and contradictory repetition and differentiation of the refrain of tragedy in 2015-2016 Greece is that there is a non-causally contingent relation between different enunciations of tragedy and different initiations of performances of power and resistance. This non-causally contingent relation between different enunciations of tragedy and different performances of power and resistance in Greece, after the victory of the left-wing party of SYRIZA in January 2015, will be the main focus of this dissertation.

As I mentioned in the beginning of the Anti-Prologue, this dissertation will trace this relation between different enunciations of tragedy and different performances of
power and resistance in Greece after the snap elections of January 2015, in four different spheres: in Greece’s negotiations with its international creditors, in street protests and demonstrations, in refugee camps, and finally in theatre spaces.

Before moving forward with this dissertation’s conceptual methodology, I would like to share one of the most catalytic experiences from which this dissertation emerged. While Greece’s relations with its international creditors have always been one of the main referential axes of my research interests, activism and creative practice, this dissertation’s focus on the relations between different enunciations of tragedy and different initiations of performances of power and resistance, initiated with my participation in the “NO” demonstration on 3rd of July of 2015. Although I am placing particular emphasis on the “NO” demonstration in the second chapter of this dissertation, for now I would like to briefly explain why this particular demonstration was one of the most decisive moments of my research and writing process.

The “NO” demonstration took place five days after the newly elected left-wing government of SYRIZA refused to make the payment due to Greece’s international creditors and thus, froze the negotiations and called for a Greek referendum. The Greek referendum of 2015 asked from the Greek citizens to vote whether they approve ("YES") or disapprove ("NO") the proposal made to Greece by the European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, during the Eurogroup meeting on the 25th of June 2015.

In response to SYRIZA’s call for the Greek referendum of 2015, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), under the presidency of Jeroen Dijsselbloem—both the president of the Eurogroup and the president of the Board of Governors of the ESM—
stopped providing Greek banks with money, causing their immediate closure. Three days before the Greek referendum of 2015, more than 20000 people gathered in the central square of Syntagma, and hundreds of thousands of people occupied public parks and squares all over Greece, in order to publically say “NO” to the austerity measures “suggested” by Greece’s international creditors. Although the public gatherings on the 3rd of July of 2015 happened upon SYRIZA’s call, the demonstrators were not just registered voters or supporters of SYRIZA. On July 3rd of 2015, the hundreds of thousands of people that were publically demonstrating both their support for SYRIZA’s negotiations with Greece’s international creditors and their resistance to the, at the time, upcoming third memorandum, included Greek citizens, non-citizens, undocumented immigrants, refugees, voters and registered members of a wide range of “anti-memorandum” parties—SYRIZA included—members of the Greek government, elected members of the parliament as well as supporters of both the far left and the far right.

These hundreds of thousands of people said publically and collectively “NO” to the austerity measures “suggested” by Greece’s international creditors, not through setting aside but through affirming and assembling their differences. Additionally, they publically and collectively demonstrated their resistance to the upcoming memorandum, not in spite of but because of the scaremongering performed by Greece’s international creditors—a scaremongering that, as we see in the moments that I describe above and as we will continue to see in the moments that I will be describing throughout this dissertation—was strategically communicated and coded in terms of tragedy. Especially during Greece’s negotiations, Greece’s international creditors used narratives of tragedy

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5 Caused indirectly the immediate closure of the Greek banks. I will elaborate more on this in the first chapter of this dissertation.
in order to force the government of SYRIZA to accept another memorandum of indebtedness. On the 3rd of July of 2015, the assembled crowd of hundreds of thousands responded to Greece’s international creditors by signifying its own tragedy. Instead of signifying tragedy in terms of perpetuating conditions of indebtedness the street tragedy of the “NO” demonstration coded tragedy in terms of resistance, collective enunciation and poetic transformation.

Although this dissertation’s focus on the relations between different enunciations of tragedy and different performances of power and resistance initiated with my direct participation in this street “unmaking” of the tragedies coded by Greece’s international creditors, the “NO” demonstration was one of the many situations that manifested this contingency. Since the “NO” demonstration on 3rd of July 2015, the interplay between different enunciations and performances of tragedy was particularly intensified in four different situations: when the left-wing government of SYRIZA, in spite of the deafening results of the Greek referendum against the new bailout agreement, ended up signing a third memorandum, on the Greek shores where dead bodies of refugees were washed up on a daily basis and finally in theatrical productions of tragedy, where artists intended to conceptualize theatrical stages as social spaces for collective imagination that could disrupt things as they are.

Even though this dissertation focuses on the relations between various enunciations of tragedy and different performances of power and resistance within frames of Greece within the larger European context of 2015-2016, my current research and writing is also in constant dialogue with both European and global manifestations of these relations: from Trump’s election because of his fascist aesthetics, to the nationalist
and inhumanly xenophobic governments of Poland and Hungary, from the Brexiteers of June of 2016 to the shameful EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, from the European technocrats that make decisions without being answerable to any kind of parliamentary formation to a series of European referendums that either voice the highly nationalistic states of the rich European North or are ignored as part of the leftist, reactionary, naïve and lazy poor European South, from Golden Dawn’s fascist activities to SYRIZA’s failure to disrupt the current neoliberal status quo, from a neoliberal conceptualization of Europe on conditions of indebtedness and on creditor/debtor power differentials to growing inequality and perpetual austerity. As I have already argued, within frames of 2015-2016 European Greece tragedy, like a constant refrain produced by an invisible gramophonic machine, becomes the voice of the European technocrats, of both Greek and European neoliberal forces, of the refugees, of the dispossessed, of the extreme far-right, of the far-left, of the political left, of performance art and theatre artists, of street protestors and demonstrators, of the indebted and so on.

Why does our current condition display such a need for differentiated references to tragedy and for producing various refrains and multiple versions of this abstractly concrete theatricalized conceptualization of lived experience? Also, where and what kind of resistance emerges from this produced multiplicities of refrains of tragedy? After SYRIZA signed the third memorandum of indebtedness between Greece and its international creditors in August 2015, a lot of supporters both from the left and the far-left, me included, were immensely disappointed. Was Deleuze predictive when, via post-May ’68 lenses, he argued that, “there can be no left-wing government” (2002, 191) implying that once left becomes the governing norm it fully loosess its revolutionary
force? Were Deleuze and Guattari far-sighted when, back in the late 70s, drew upon Nietzsche’s understanding of tragedy, and, in their *Anti-Oedipus*, they argued that tragedy entails both the revolutionary and fascist forces of deconstruction? Additionally, were Deleuze and Guattari right, when even before the burst of the neoliberal bubble in the 80s, they drew upon Nietzsche’s understanding of tragedy in order to argue that today’s resistance needs to understand that power performs in terms of creditor/debtor power differentials that are designed to never cancel debt? These are some of the main questions that this dissertation takes up.

These references to Deleuze and Guattari are not accidental. Throughout this dissertation I will argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, in the larger context of their other writings, lays the ground for a radicalized conceptualization of tragedy that could grasp how both power and resistance perform under conditions of sustainable indebtedness in frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe.

**TragedyMachine(s): Refrains and Machines**

In the previous section, titled “Refrains of Tragedy”, I looked at four different moments in Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016 during which the refrain of tragedy was repeatedly enunciated in order to initiate different performances of power and resistance. I argued that, in Greece after the victory of the left-wing party of SYRIZA in 2015, there is a non-causally contingent relation between different enunciations of tragedy and different performances of power and resistance. I particularly described the different enunciations of tragedy as refrains, produced by an
invisible gramophonic machine that assembles together the different performances that are initiated by the repetition of the refrain of tragedy.

I contend that, from both an ontological and epistemological point of view, this dynamic interplay between the repetition of the same phonetic sound—a sound that in our case is tied to the word of tragedy—and the production of difference, in terms of performances, is very well grasped by Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of refrain. But, as I will argue in this section, that affective aspect of the phonetic dimension of the repetition of the refrain does not come until Deleuze and Guattari’s second conjoint work, published in 1980 and titled *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. While in *A Thousand Plateaus* (ATP), Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of refrain transformed into something less discursive and more affective, in their first conjoint work titled *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (AO) their conceptualization of refrain was expressed in terms of the discursive repetition of the story of Oedipus’s tragedy, and of the difference that this repetition produces.

It is my contention that a close elaboration of this metamorphosis—a metamorphosis that as I argued above, starts, in *Anti-Oedipus* with Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of refrain as a differentiated discursive repetition of the story of Oedipus’s tragedy, and continues, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, with Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of refrain as differentiated phonetic repetitions of sounds that produce affect and thus, initiate different kinds of performances—would lay the ground for a radicalized conceptualization of tragedy that would be valid in frames of 21st century Greece and neoliberal Europe.
In AO, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of refrain in order to frame their opposition to both Freud and Lacan’s discursive clinicalization of Oedipal tragedy. They specifically argue that both Freud and Lacan, through clinicalizing Oedipal tragedy, turned the latter into “an old refrain” (83). Although one would assume that Deleuze and Guattari accuse both Freud and Lacan of being imprisoned into the same epistemological paradigm, that’s not really the case. The authors of *Anti-Oedipus* argue that it is because of the repetition of this “old refrain” that they “were unable to posit any difference in nature, any border line, any limit at all between (...) Oedipus-as-crisis and Oedipus-as-structure” (83). While both Freud and Lacan use Oedipal tragedy as an “old refrain” in order to perpetuate a very clear binary between structure and crisis, Deleuze and Guattari argue that it is this “old refrain” of Oedipal tragedy—a refrain the combines notions of dramatic poetry with notions of discourse, assumed knowledge and so forth—that shows that structure and crisis are always immanent to each other. From this point of view, Deleuze and Guattari’s (Anti) Oedipal tragedy enunciates both the structural aspect of crisis and the critical aspect of structure.

This contingency between “Oedipus-as-structure” and “Oedipus-as-crisis” disrupts any discursive narratives that causally link the death of tragedy to the death of rituals dedicated to the worship of the twelve Gods of Olympus. In their *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari use the work of Lacan in order to challenge these causally oriented understandings—understandings that in my contention emerge from Steiner’s work on tragedy—that link the death of tragedy to the death of the twelve Gods of Olympus. While Lacan argues that, “tragedy has no way of holding its own indefinitely in the forms of society where the tragic sense is increasingly lost … a myth cannot sustain itself when
it supports no ritual, and psychoanalysis is not the Oedipus ritual” (83). Deleuze and Guattari contend that it is Lacan’s question, and not tragedy, that “merely retreats” (83). Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari, I contend that today we should no longer be asking whether tragedy is lost or not but whether tragedy, as a concept of lived experience, is immanent to its own destruction. And most importantly what are the political stakes of that immanent destruction.

Although it may seem that we are off of topic, or maybe too immersed in theory, I would like to elaborate a bit more on Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualizations of “refrain” as expressed in their first collaborative work titled *Anti-Oedipus*, since I contend that this particular discussion of refrain is an outstanding forewarning in regards to Greece’s current condition. The authors of *Anti-Oedipus* also argue that tragedy’s immanently deconstructive dimension is its “real machinic element.” Although I will be focusing in detail on Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of machines throughout this dissertation, for now I would like to briefly define Deleuze and Guattari’s reference to tragedy’s “machinic element” as a synthesis of very contradictory and heterogeneous elements that produce the continuation and disruption of various flows. In *AO* Deleuze and Guattari write “In a word, every machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the machine to which is connected, but at the same time is a flow itself, or a production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 39). It is because of that “real machinic element” of the repetition of the refrain of tragedy, that tragedy performs as a synthesizer that combines its own deconstruction with its own construction.
One could argue that, while I described Deleuze and Guattari’s first conceptualization of the refrain in terms of the discursive repetition of the tragedy of Oedipus, the story of Oedipus was left behind. Although it might seem that this is the case, it is my contention that it is not the story of Oedipus that is left behind. As opposed to a forgotten story, the tragedy of Oedipus, through its metamorphosis into a repetitive refrain, or in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, through its metamorphosis to a “eternal lullaby” (354) becomes something that is open to any kind of coding and signification. The repetitive invocation of “the eternal refrain of Oedipus, the eternal lullaby,” (354) does not say the same story again and again: on the contrary it makes the story open to any kind of meaning-making processes, coding and significations.

It is the eternal and infinite repetition of the refrain of tragedy that forces tragedy to infinitely and eternally resist its own crystallization. From this point of view, discourse is mixed with language, dramatic poetry, knowledge, memory and/ or assumption of knowledge, abstract meaning and vaguely common references, in ways that this mix exceeds all of the above. But that exceeding is not an externally synthetic whole that rules over its parts. On the contrary that exceeding is discourse and non-discourse, knowledge and non-knowledge, memory and non-memory, all at once.

The repetition of a refrain makes it abstract and always pluralized. In ATP Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of refrain understands the latter as something that produces various flows of affect. As in Demystifying Deleuze Rob Shields and Mickey Valle remind us, refrain in ATP becomes a concept for the “rhythmic” and “periodic” (Shields and Vallee 2012: 150) repetition of sounds, videos, images, objects etc that it vaguely refers to what is assumed to be commonly experienced, imagined or remembered.
and that it simultaneously introduces new experiences, imagination and memories. In Deleuze and Guattari’s language affect is “anything that ‘comes into being when something is affected or affects something else’ and that affect is ‘the determination of all potentiality’” (16). Furthermore Deleuze and Guattari often describe this process of “coming into being” as a process of territorialization, which is always already a process of deterritorialization. Refrains are parts of both of these processes. Deleuze and Guattari write “It is as though forces of deterritorialization affected the territory itself, causing us to pass from the territorial assemblage to other types of assemblages […] The grass stem and the refrain are two agents of these forces, two agents of deterritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 325). Therefore refrains are rhythmically repeated sounds, images, objects, sentences, catchphrases and so forth that not only establish new territories of knowledge, memory and experience but also that move beyond any kind of meaning-making processes like for instance language and signification, that claim to be specific.

Before making a direct connection between Deleuze and Guattari’s ontological and epistemological understandings of refrain and Greece’s current condition, I would like to elaborate momentarily on the historical context out of which the concept of refrain emerged. Deleuze and Guattari came up with the concept of refrain when in state-happy, post May’ 68 France and post-1977 Italy the political lefts switched from “oppositional parties” to “governing parties” and as a result lost their revolutionary force (Guattari 2007: 13). It was in this context that the authors of Anti-Oedipus turned to the works of Nietzsche on tragedy in order to reveal the masks of seemingly resolvable exchanges and to conceptualize resistance under condition of dialectically unresolvable power disparities between a creditor and a debtor.
In Deleuze’s opinion, Nietzsche was the one who turned to tragedy in order to “lay bare the condition of judgment” (Deleuze, 1997: 126) and to understand “the adventure of debt as it becomes infinite and thus un-payable” (126). In his *Essays Critical and Clinical*—a book that includes essays and articles that Deleuze wrote mostly during his collaboration with Guattari between 1970 and 1993—Deleuze writes, “Nietzsche’s greatness lies in having shown, without hesitation, that the creditor-debtor relation was primary in relation to all exchange. One begins by promising, and becomes indebted not to a god but to a partner, depending on the forces that pass between the parties” (127). In 2015-2016 “European” Greece, both Greece’s international creditors and the government of SYRIZA use refrains of tragedy in order to introduce this promise of dialectically resolvable exchange in the name of Greece’s evaluation so that Greece keeps paying but never fully repaying its debt.

One of the conclusions that can be drawn from these repetitive and different enunciations of tragedy has to do with the abstract openness and non-specificity of the word “tragedy”. In 2015-2016 Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016, tragedy, just like a refrain, has been repeatedly picked up by so many and so different institutional and non-institutional bodies, national and international public spheres, governmental and non governmental organizations, committees, resisting minorities, political parties etc, neither because the word “tragedy” means something very specific, nor because tragedy is causally tied to concrete initiations of performances. On the contrary so many and so different bearers of signification choose “tragedy” because tragedy, in this context, has become abstractly open to multiple coding processes, meanings, interpretations, significations and performances. As opposed to
establishing specific references to concrete meanings, this abstract openness of different enunciations of tragedy in 2015-2016 European Greece—a nation-state of a very specific geopolitical location that is member of both the European Union and the Eurogroup—underlines the non-causal relation of contingency between Greece’s current condition and the need for theatrically-oriented words that grasp and constitute the current status quo in terms of masked multiplicities. In 2015-2016 European Greece, especially after the victory of the left-wing party of SYRIZA, tragedy becomes a “go to” word not in spite of but because of the referential theatricality that the latter entails.

Why does tragedy Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016 tragedy becomes one of the most repetitive refrains of 21st century European economy of debt? Why is Greece contingently in need of enunciations that blend theatrical concepts of tragedy with theatrical masks of different meaning-making processes, coding and significations? For two reasons: one, because this kind of theatre bases its force in processes of deconstructing any pre-established significations and replacing them with different ones and two, because these kinds of theatrical masks obscure non-dialectical contradictions as dialectical oppositions. Before I further elaborate on those two reasons and on their relevancy to 2015-2016 Greece, I would like to argue that these two reasons are interlinked to Deleuze’s and to Deleuze and Guattari’s works on Nietzsche’s conceptualization of tragedy. Although the next section is particularly focused on Deleuze and Guattari’s understandings of Nietzsche’s conceptualizations of tragedy, and on the relations between those conceptualizations of tragedy and grasps of history and lived experience, for now I would like to mention that according to Deleuze and Guattari,
Nietzsche is the first one who, via understanding history and lived experience as tragedy, gets life’s deconstructive and non-dialectical force.

I content that there is a very important connection between the two reasons for which, in the beginning of the previous paragraph I argued that 2015-2016 Greece within frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe is in need of refrains of tragedy. Based on my argument in the beginning of the preceding paragraph, the first reason, according to which 2015-2016 Greece intensifies a relation between its condition of indebtedness and different enunciations of tragedy, has to do with tragedy’s conceptual capacity to deconstruct any pre-established significations and replace them with different ones: especially when these pre-established significations are linked to conditions of indebtedness.

Throughout this dissertation I will argue that this non-causally contingent relation between different enunciations of tragedy and different conceptualizations of forces of deconstruction and construction, manifests itself as different performances of power and resistance. According to Deleuze and Guattari—as I will in detail explain in the next section—Nietzsche is the first one who gets tragedy’s conceptual capacity to deconstruct, and thus resist, any pre-established significations, while at the same time it establishes new ones. Deleuze and Guattari specifically argue that Nietzsche suggests that it is through deconstruction that our “new socius” proceeds (192). I contend that it is because of this grasping of history as deconstruction—a grasping that emerges from Nietzsche’s work on tragedy and the conceptual interplay between tragedy and history—that the authors of *Anti-Oedipus* “shake loose the yoke of Oedipus and carry it to the point of its auto-critique” (268). Writing from a post May 68 point of view, when all the European
state-happy masks fell and yet Europe chose to keep looking the other way, Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Nietzsche’s understanding of tragedy as a non-dialectical contradictorily coexistence of forces of deconstruction and construction, in order to shed light on deconstructive resistance’s authoritative capacities. They specifically argue that, resistance in our times “is like the story of the Resistance fighters who, wanting to destroy a pylon blew up and fell back into its hole” (268). We are no longer—if we ever were, which I don’t think is the case—dealing with an either/or question that creates a dialectical binary and oppositional tension between power and resistance. As one can see in Greece within frames of 21st century Europe, both power and resistance found themselves upon conceptual forces of deconstruction. This dissertation looks at how the repetition of the refrain of tragedy functions like a machine that somehow synthesizes all those heterogeneous forces together, so to grasp performances of resistance that do not “fall back”, to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari, into the pylon’s hole.

Because it might seem that we are again too immersed in theoretical discussions that take us off of this section’s intention to conceptualize TragedyMachine(s), before moving on to the second reason that explains why 2015-2016 Greece intensifies a relation between its condition of indebtedness and different enunciations of tragedy, I would like to summarize what I have been describing since the beginning of this section. I looked at Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016 and I argued that there is a non-causally contingent relation between different enunciations of tragedy and different performances of power and resistance. I argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “refrain” could grasp this non-causally contingent relation between abstract enunciations and specific initiations of performances. I also contented that, although
Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on the concept of “refrain” both in *Anti-Oedipus* and in *A Thousand Plateaus*, in *Anti-Oedipus* they conceptualize refrain in terms of discursive repetitions of Oedipal tragedy. I specifically focused on how these repetitions of the “refrain of Oedipus,” produce difference, through deconstructing any pre-established significations and through simultaneously constructing new ones. I also placed particular emphasis on how Deleuze and Guattari understand this contradictory synthesis of heterogeneous processes of deconstruction and construction as the “real machinic element” of the repetitive refrain of the tragedy of Oedipus. After understanding 2015-2016 Greece’s condition as a parallel trajectory to Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of refrain, I focused on the non-causal contingency between different enunciations of tragedy and different performances of power and resistance. I argued that in 2015-2016 Greece, there are two reasons that intensify this contingency: the first one has to do with tragedy’s conceptual force of deconstruction, that in my contention, emerges from Deleuze and Guattari’s works on Nietzsche’s understandings of tragedy.

The second reason that in my opinion explains the non-causally contingent relation between Greece’s cotemporary condition and the multiple enunciations of tragedy and the different initiations of power and resistance has to do with masking non-dialectical relations as dialectical ones. But this dialectical masking of non-dialectical contradictions is not independent from the contradictory synthesis of forces of deconstruction and construction that I described above. On the contrary, if Deleuze and Guattari’s works on Nietzsche’s understandings of tragedy, shed light on tragedy’s conceptual force to trace deconstruction as both power and resistance on a level of lived
experience, then Deleuze and Guattari simultaneously shed light on the non-dialectical, but yet very contradictory, tension between power and resistance.

But before we move to more specific elaborations on the potential manifestations and stakes of these non-dialectical tensions that mask themselves as such in order to mask their capacity to perform as non-oppositional multiplicities, I would like to switch my focus from Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of refrain in Anti-Oedipus, to Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of refrain in A Thousand Plateaus. It is my contention that this change of focus will lay the ground for a clearer understanding of the interplay between different enunciations of the refrain of tragedy and non-dialectical tensions between forces of power and resistance.

In the very beginning of this section I argued that while in Anti-Oedipus the concept of refrain emerges from discursive repetitions of the tragedy of Oedipus, in A Thousand Plateaus the concept of refrain becomes a phonetic repetition that is less discursive and more affective. It becomes the song of a child who is “gripped with fear, in the dark” and “comforts himself by singing under his breath (…) the song is like a rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 311). But that production of phonetic repetition does not emerge from a dialectical opposition against a concretely known and visible antagonistic force. On the contrary, just like in the case of the repetitive refrain of Oedipal tragedy that, in the case of Anti-Oedipus, it remains open to any kind of significations, the child “in the dark” produces rhythmic, melodic and repetitive phonetic sounds in order to resist multiple forces that could be potentially threatening.
I contend that it is because of this openness of the repetitive refrain that we are not dealing with dialectical oppositions that pre-schematize power and resistance in terms of graspable thesis-antithesis. On the contrary we are dealing with multiplicities of forces that move beyond dialectics. According to Deleuze and Guattari “the combat, if combat there is, has moved” (345). Additionally, according to the French philosophers, Nietzsche, in *The Birth of Tragedy* “became aware of this situation long ago, even before it had been installed” (345). But there is one huge problem. Yes, the combat has moved and yes, schematizing resistance in terms of oppositional dialectics can no longer be efficacious. But these multiplicities of forces use masks of dialectics in order to produce an antithetical resistance that is doomed to never be efficacious. It will be my contention throughout this dissertation that, especially in the case of 2015-2016 Greece within frames of 21st European neoliberalism, these multiplicities of forces that move beyond dialectics, ironically enough used the refrain of tragedy in order to be framed as dialectical, either because they failed to conceptualize non-oppositional conceptualizations of resistance or because they simply wanted to conceal their intensity.

Deleuze, in his *Negotiations*, asks “in what situations we feel like humming a tune” (Deleuze, 1990: 25-26). And I ask again: Why in 2015-2016 Greece within larger frames of European economy of debt, different bearers of signification picked up the refrain of tragedy in order to enunciate different experiences and thus to initiate different performances of power and resistance?

Based on what I answered earlier in this section, this contingency occurs because of two reasons: one, because of tragedy’s conceptual force of deconstruction, and two, because of tragedy’s conceptual force of non-dialectical tensions and contradictions. Both
of those reasons emerge from Deleuze and Guattari’s writings on Nietzsche’s grasps of tragedy. Although the next section will particularly focus on the connections between Deleuze and Guattari and Nietzsche in terms of conceptualizing lived experience and history as tragedy, for now I would like to underline one of the biggest contradictions of my own argument.

Up to this point I have understood tragedy; one as a refrain whose reoccurrence is intensified in Greece after the victory of the left-wing government of SYRIZA in February 2015; two, as a repetitive refrain that, in 2015-2016 Greece is contingently but non causally related to different initiations of power and resistance, as a concept that, based on Deleuze’s and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s writings on Nietzsche, grasps non-dialectical tensions and contradictions and understands both the deconstructive and constructive aspects of power and resistance; three, as a concept of repetition that produces difference and finally; four, as performance. Enunciation-Concept-Performance: One could argue that I jump from one to another without being clear. I would have to disagree. In 2015-2016 Greece, tragedy is all of those things together. It is not just theatre, just language, just form, just content, just voice, just concept, just refrains, just discourse, just affect, just sounds, just performance. It is not just power or just resistance, just deconstruction or just construction, just dialectics or just non-dialectics. It is everything all at once.

It is because of the always already decentered, differentiated and pluralized aspect of the refrain that the latter is irreducible to just discourse, or just language, or just signification. It is because of the pluralized aspect of the refrain that the latter produces affect. In Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity—a book
that applies the theories of Deleuze and Guattari in order to theorize the neoliberal condition—Maurizio Lazzarato describes refrain as a means of “subjective mutation [that] is not primarily discursive; it does not primarily have to do with knowledge, information, or culture since it affects the nucleus of non-discursivity, non-knowledge, and non-acculturation” (Lazzarato 2014: 16). And that’s where I contend that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of machine joins our discussion. Although I have been arguing that in 2015-2016 Greece, tragedy feels like a constant refrain that is produced by an invisible gramophonic machine, since the very beginning of this Anti-Prologue, I never really explained what this gramophonic machine is about.

The gramophonic (γραμμόfono) machine is the machine that synthesizes written inscriptions (γραμμα, gramma,) with phonetic sounds (φωνη, phone). Although I will be focusing on Deleuze and Guattari’s different conceptualizations of machines throughout this dissertation, for now I will just argue that, for the authors of Anti-Oedipus, machine is a “synthesizer” (1987:343) that synthesizes “disparate elements” (343) together and that produces and disruption and the continuation of various kinds of flows. In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of “phonographic connections” (191) in order to describe the processes of bodily and embodied inscriptions of unwritten laws in non-capitalist societies. Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of “the machine” and “phonographic connections,” I argue that in Greece within the larger context of 2015-2016 Europe the refrain of tragedy is both discursively and phonetically repeated as something abstract, because of is openness towards multiple significations, and that it is that abstract openness that gets to be in-scripted, pretending that is something concrete when it is not. It is my contention that this hypocritical inscription—
an inscription that performs concreteness while being abstract—is one of the biggest current challenges that Greece has to face.

Although I will be focusing on this hypocrisy throughout this dissertation, for now I would like to link this hypocrisy with what I have argued above and to ground it in specific examples. If one looks at the text of the third memorandum, the text of the Greek referendum, the series of laws that the Greek parliament voted after Greece’s acceptance of the third package of austerity measures in August of 2015—I will be focusing on those documents in the next two chapters—they all maintain a certain level of abstraction while they are performing being concrete. And the relation between their abstraction and their concreteness is not a relation of a dialectical opposition but just like I argued above, a relation of contradictory coexistence. This is why I contend that we no longer deal with “phonographic” but with gramophonic connections.

Let me offer a quick summary, so to finally assemble the concept of TragedyMachine(s). Since the beginning of the Anti-Prologue, I have argued that in Greece, after the victory of the left-wing party of SYRIZA in February 2015, an invisible gramophonic machine produces multiple repetitions of the refrain of tragedy. I also argued that in 2015-2016 “European” Greece there is a non-causally contingent relation between the repetitive refrain of tragedy, various enunciations of different experiences and different initiations of performances of power and resistance. Furthermore, I contended that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of refrain could grasp the production of difference that emerges from the repetition of both the discursive and phonetic aspects of the word “tragedy”. Additionally, I discussed how Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “the machine” could understand how all this difference and heterogeneity is “consistently
synthesized” and “held together” without having specific teleological goals or forming higher unities. Finally, I described how, in 2015-2016 Greece “formal” documents, like the third memorandum between Greece and its international creditors, or the Greek referendum of 2015, inscribe the discursive and phonetic abstraction of the refrain of tragedy, while pretending that the latter is something concrete.

TragedyMachine(s): Multiplicities of gramophonic machines that, in 2015-2016 Greece within frames of 21st century European neoliberalism, synthesize repeatedly abstracted enunciations of the refrain of tragedy, with different and concretized performances of power and resistance. This synthesis is not a dialectical synthesis that emerges from the conflict between two antithetical forces, but a connective synthesis of multiple contradictions. In 2015-2016 Greece, the main manifestation of this gramophonic synthesis of abstracted refrains of tragedy with concretized performances of power and resistance is the inscription of debt and the production of disruption and continuations of flows of debt and conditions of indebtedness. Tragedy becomes a refrain of 21st century European debt economy because of tragedy’s vague and abstract implications to the continuation and disruption of conditions of indebtedness.

As a result in 2015-2016 Greece, TragedyMachine(s) produce asymmetrically non-resolvable power relations between Greece and its international creditors that are hidden beneath masks and promises of resolution that are designed to remain elusive. In order for resistance to be successful it needs to never cease to destroy these seeming promises of resolution. The next section starts from this hypothesis.
2015-2016 Greece and The Relevancy of TragedyMachine(s): Nietzsche, Deleuze, Guattari

As I argued in the very beginning of the Anti-Prologue, the relation between Greece and Europe has primarily been a relation between Greece and its International Creditors. Greece’s formation, not only as a nation-state, but also as a European nation-state, was founded upon relations of indebtedness. More specifically, Greece was recognized as nation-state in 1830 because of the two loans it received from Britain. Additionally, the nation-state of Greece, became part of the European Economic Community—the first conceptualization of what would later become the European Union—when, in 1978, Kwstadinos Karamalis, the then Greece’s prime minister, and founder and president of the right wing party of New Democracy, “received” European money so that Greece could “belong to the West”, as he stated in one of his celebratory proclamations.

In this section—the third and last section of the Anti-Prologue—I will argue that Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors is an indebtedness that is designed to preclude exodus. I will look at 2015-2016 Greece, and I will draw upon the relations between the different repetitions of the refrain of tragedy and different initiations of performances of power and resistance—a relation that is extensively described in the first section of the Anti-Prologue—in order to argue that Greece’s unresolvable indebtedness to its international creditors is founded upon creditor/debtor power differentials that sustain, and thus never actually cancel, debt. Using the concept of TragedyMachine(s)—a concept that was introduced in the second section of the Anti-Prologue—I will draw a parallel trajectory between the machinic assemblage of different repetitions of the refrain
of tragedy in 2015-2016 “European” Greece, Greece’s unresolvable indebtedness to its international creditors and Deleuze and Guattari’s writings on Nietzsche’s understanding of the connections between the concept of tragedy and notions of “infinite” debt.

Let’s go back to the very contradictory enunciations of the refrain of tragedy that I described in the first section of the Anti-Prologue. The left-wing government of SYRIZA, refugees, parliamentarians of Greece’s official opposition, street demonstrators and protestors, representatives of Greece’s international creditors, theatre artists: all these different bearers and agents of signification picked up the refrain of tragedy in order to both enunciate different experiences and initiate different performances of power and resistance.

Furthermore, all of these various references to very different significations of tragedy implied an abstractly common reference to different conditions of indebtedness. Alexis Tsipras, right before the Greek elections of February 2015, communicated the vote in favor of the left-wing party, in terms of Greece’s potential exodus from the “tragedy” of its unending indebtedness. Both Wolfgang Schauble—Germany’s minister of finance—and Adonis Gewrigadiis—elected parliamentarian and member of the right-wing party of New Democracy—used “tragedy” in order to frame SYRIZA’s resistance to the upcoming third memorandum as a resistance that put Greece’s equilibrated condition of indebtedness in jeopardy. Christos Thivaios referred to “tragedy” during the “NO” demonstration in order to conceptualize indebtedness in terms of poetic creativity. The refugees, whose pictures were exhibited right in the middle of Istiklal Street in Istanbul, signified their condition as “tragedy” in order to shed light on the imperceptible and unwritten conditions of indebtedness that their “hosts” inscribed on their bodies. Finally
the Point Zero Theatre Group chose to stage the tragedy of *Woyzeck* right before the Greek elections of February of 2015 in order to shed light on the invisible aspects of the political that within frames of 21st century Europe are mainly exerted via both abstract and concrete imposed conditions of indebtedness.

According to the conceptualization of TragedyMachine(s) that I introduced in the previous section, in 2015-2016 “European” Greece, very contradictory uses and enunciations of refrains of tragedy are synthesized with very contradictory and non-dialectically related performances of power and resistance. Additionally, based on the concept of TragedyMachine(s), within frames of 2015-2016 Greece, these multiplicities of syntheses of uses of tragedy and various performances of power and resistance manifest themselves in terms of conditions of both abstracted and concretized indebtedness. Since both tragedies and performances come in multiplicities, conditions of indebtedness will also come in multiplicities.

These multiplicities of conditions of indebtedness synthesize two very contradictory relations. The first relation has to do with the resolvable dialectics of exchange, according to which the creditor lends the debtor money and the debtor eventually pays the creditor back with a certain amount of interest. Based on this dialectical relation of resolvable exchange, the creditor demands to be repaid and the debtor either does or does not pay its creditor back. The second relation has to with the non-dialectically unresolvable type of exchange. According to this relation, the creditor demands from the debtor to pay them, but never fully repay them, so that the latter never manages to exit their condition of perpetual indebtedness. This non-dialectical relation of unresolvable exchange is a relation of creditor/debtor power differentials that
perpetuates, sustains and thus never cancels debt. These two relations, the dialectical relation of creditor/debtor resolvable exchange, and the non-dialectical relation of creditor/debtor power differentials, are contradictory coexistent. It is not a question of choosing one versus the other. On the contrary it is a matter of understanding when the non-dialectical relation of creditor/debtor power differentials, bears masks of dialectical relations of resolvable exchange, in order to camouflage its intensity.

Nietzsche traced this contradictory synthesis of dialectical relations of resolvable exchange, on the one hand, with non-dialectical relations of creditor/debtor power differentials, on the other, in attic tragedy. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche, conceptualizes attic tragedy in terms of “two very different tendencies”, that “walk side by side, usually in violent opposition to one another, to ever more powerful births, perpetuating the struggle of the opposition only apparently bridged by the word “art”: until finally, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic “will”, the two seem to be coupled, and in this coupling they seem at last to beget the work of art that is as Dionysiac as it is Apolline—Attic tragedy.” (Nietzsche, 1993: 14) Although in his later work *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche argues that *The Birth of Tragedy* “smells offensively Hegelian”, I argue that, Nietzsche in his *Birth of Tragedy*—as opposed to what he claimed in his *Ecce Homo*—managed to conceptualize how multiplicities of forces perform in both dialectical and non-dialectical terms.

Drawing upon Nietzsche’s statement reiterated in the last paragraph, I contend that, while the “violent opposition” between Apollo and Dionysus implies a dialectical tension between two opposites, the simultaneous emergence of “more powerful births” grasps multiplicities of tensions that perform in non-dialectical terms. Thus, I argue that
according to Nietzsche’s conceptualization of tragedy, the contradictory coexistence of Apollo with Dionysus helps us grasp the contradictory coexistence of dialectical with non-dialectical tensions. Later in *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche, specifically argues that this non-dialectical tension that “overcomes us at the sight of this divine counterpart of the dialectic” (Nietzsche, 1993: 47). From this point of view, it is because of this “counterpart”, because of this mask of dialectic, that the non-dialectical force “overcomes us” Therefore, resistance, in order to be efficacious, needs to perform within the unmasked and non-dialectically oriented field of forces. To sum up, for Nietzsche, attic tragedy emerges as the contradictory synthesis of dialectical with non-dialectical forces. Additionally, according to the author of the *Birth of Tragedy*, attic tragedy sheds light on the dialectical masks that non-dialectical tensions use, in order to mask their intensity.

One of the main conceptual arguments of this dissertation will be that Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus* is founded upon these two conclusions. They specifically write in their *Anti-Oedipus* that, “we live today in the age of partial objects, bricks that have been shattered to bits, and leftovers (...) we no longer believe in the dull gray outlines of a dreary, colorless dialectic of evolution, aimed at forming a harmonious whole out of heterogeneous bits by rounding off their rough edges” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 42). It is my contention that there is a very important conceptual connection between Nietzsche’s “more powerful births” and Deleuze and Guattari’s “partial objects, bricks, bits and leftovers” They both understand that multiplicities of forces do not necessarily perform in terms of dialectical oppositions. They also understand that if one reduces the multiplicities of forces into dialectical and antithetical
oppositions, either intentionally hides or naively ignores the actual intensity of these multiplicities.

Nietzsche and later Deleuze and Guattari drawing upon Nietzsche, link the non-dialectical tensions between multiplicities of forces, with notions of infinite debt. Simply stated, if the non-dialectical opposition is not between Apollo and Dionysus and it is between creditors and debtors, then the more this relation is schematized as dialectically resolvable exchange that takes places between two opposites, the more the creditor/ debtor power differentials are perpetuated. Nietzsche continues exploring this non-dialectical creditor/ debtor relation of power differentials in *The Genealogy of Morals*. He specifically writes that “the contractual relationship between creditor and debtor” (Nietzsche, 2013: 49) is founded upon a very strange logic of “compensation”: “The equivalence consists in this: instead of an advantage directly compensatory (...) that is, instead of an equalization in money, property or some kind of chattel, the creditor is granted by way of repayment and compensation a certain pleasure, a sense of satisfaction” (49-50) From this point of view, the creditor wants to keep enjoying the fact that he will never be fully repaid. Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Nietzsche’s grasp of this non-compensatory creditor/ debtor relation and argue that, “a time will come when the creditor has not yet lent while the debtor never quits repaying.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 197) And the question emerges: Has that time come?

If one takes into serious consideration that 21st century Europe is geopolitically divided into the “rich” and “productive” creditor/ North and the “poor” and “lazy” debtor/ South, and that the former imposes conditions of perpetual indebtedness onto the latter, then I contend that the answer is definitely yes. If Deleuze and Guattari, through
the works of Nietzsche, were farsighted enough to grasp contingent relations between tragedy and non-dialectical creditor/debtor power differentials, then I contend that Greece’s current condition requires a deep consideration of their works.

At this point, I would like to briefly summarize what I have been arguing since the beginning of the Anti-Prologue in order reframe this urgency before I move on to the first chapter of this dissertation. In the beginning of this Anti-Prologue I described five different moments during which “tragedy” was repeatedly picked up by five different bearers of signification in order to be coded differently. I argued that in 2015-2016 Greece there is a non-causally contingent relation between different enunciations of tragedy and different initiations of performances of power and resistance. I argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of “refrain” and “the machine” could grasp this contradictory coexistence between repetitions of the word of “tragedy”, initiations of different performances of power and resistance and multiple notions of indebtedness. I came up with the concept of TragedyMachine(s) in order to argue that, in Greece within frames of 21st century European neoliberalism, all these heterogeneous elements are somehow “held consistently together.” Finally, I looked at how both Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari, grasped a contingent relation between tragedy and creditor/debtor power differentials that never cancel and thus sustain debt.

Drawing upon Nietzsche’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual contingency between tragedy and perpetual debt, it will be my contention throughout this dissertation, that 2015-2016 Greece’s current condition is contingently ready for a radicalized conceptualization of tragedy that could grasp how resistance could perform beyond conditions of indebtedness. If creditor/debtor power differentials are not dialectically
resolvable then resistance should not be framed in dialectical terms. Moving across the ground that has already been laid by the five different uses of tragedy that I described in the beginning of the Anti-Prologue, this dissertation is looking at Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016 in order to shed light on the non-dialectical aspects of both power and resistance.

Chapter Break Down

In the first chapter of this dissertation titled “The Tragedy of Greek Debt Crisis” I further elaborate on the Anti-Prologue’s argument that Deleuze and Guattari’s focus on Nietzsche’s notion of tragedy is in fact a strategy for understanding how the asymmetrical and non-resolvable power relations between creditor and debtor are hidden beneath the appearance and seeming promise of a resolution that nonetheless remains elusive.

Drawing upon that thought process I understand the relations between Greece and its international creditors as creditor/debtor power relations that are designed to remain unresolved. I closely examine the conceptual differences between Nietzsche’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s, on the one hand, and Hegel’s, on the other, understandings of tragedy. I argue that in 2015-2016 Greece, Hegel’s Antigone haunted the strategies of the government of SYRIZA and as a result SYRIZA understood and framed Greek debt as resolvable only to perpetuate Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors. Furthermore I investigate how Václav Havel’s Memorandum sheds light on the 21st century neoliberalism and European debt economy.
In the second chapter of this dissertation titled “Dromocratic Democracies” I draw upon the tensions between Austin’s notion of a “happy performative” and Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of “order word” and “collective assemblages of enunciation.” I closely examine why the NOs of both the “NO” demonstration—the demonstration that took place two days before the Greek bailout referendum of 2015—and the Greek referendum of 2015 did not succeed in their resistance against Greece’s international creditors. Furthermore I understand the “NO” demonstration as a theatricalized mergence of the demos with the state performed on the dromos (street). Drawing upon the works of Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt and Paul Virilio I investigate the revolutionary capacities of that mergence. Finally I elaborate on the conceptualizations of resistance that, in my contention, Eleni Efthimiou’s production of Anouilh’s Antigone—a production that took place one year after the Greek referendum of 2015—introduced.

In the third chapter of this dissertation I focus on the millions of people who flee Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran and cross the Mediterranean on unsafe rubber-hulled boats in order to reach the shores of Greece. I understand these crossings—known as Mediterranean crossings of the “boat people”—as performances that force the production of law on refugees and asylum seekers to perceive and include the lives of the “boat people” as lives defined by their bareness. I examine how these performances of bare life were rendered imperceptible, and thus dispossessed of their own bareness by the two EU-Turkey statements that were announced on November 29 2015 and on March 18 2016, by the photography exhibition organized by St. Antony de Padua on Istiklál Caddesi in Istanbul, and finally by the «Δρόμοι Επιβίωσης» (Roads of Survival) photography exhibition organized by the government of SYRIZA in Athens. Finally I
investigate how the MARCH IN SOLIDARITY WITH MIGRANTS/ REFUGEES AND SELF-ORGANIZED SOLIDARITY PROJECTS that took place on July 23rd 2016 at Πεδίο του Άρεως (Pedio tou Areos) in Athens shed light on that dispossession.

In the fourth and last chapter of this dissertation titled “Theatres of Dramatization” I challenge Hans-Thies Lehmann’s notion of post-dramatic theatre through Deleuze’s concept of dramatization in order to look at Zero Point Theatre Group’s—one of the most popular Greek avant-garde theatre companies—production of Buchner’s *Woyzeck* and Yiannis Houvarda’s—a well-known Greek director—production of Aeschylus’ *Ωρέστεια*.

Drawing upon the concept of TragedyMchine(s) that this dissertation introduces I argue that if tragedy is to be understood as a concept that grasps how the disproportionate, lopsided and non-resolvable power relations between Greece and its international creditors are hidden beneath the appearance and the seeming promise of a resolution that nevertheless remains elusive then the challenge that 21st century Greek theatre has to take is to destroy any illusions and promises of resolution. I trace this theatricalized destruction of illusions and promises of resolution in Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of *Woyzeck* and in Houvarda’s production of *Ωρέστεια*. 
Chapter 1: The Tragedy of Greek Debt Crisis

Stasis#1

February 21 2017: My mom calls in order to talk about yesterday’s Eurogroup meeting on the Greek debt crisis. I am in Hyattsville, Maryland and my mom is in Athens, Greece.

My mom: What do you think SYRIZA should do about the crisis?

Me: Whose crisis?

My mom: the Greek debt crisis

Me: Mom, I think that if Greek debt was actually in crisis ... in other words if Greek debt was dying then Greece should be super happy right? It is not the debt that is in crisis. This is just a story that people say in order to legitimize austerity politics. It is the debtor Greece that is in crisis.

My mom: Funny ... yes ... if debt was in crisis then this would mean that we should be OK right? But you know people keep describing it like that. I mean as the “Tragedy of Greek debt crisis”: TV, newspapers, politicians ... everyone.

Me: I know

Stasis#2

“A debt is a debt is a debt.”

That’s what a high official of the Federal Republic of Germany told Yianis Varoufakis during Varoufakis’ first official visit to Berlin (Varoufakis, 2016: xvii)

1.1 The Need for a Non-Dialectical Philosophy of Tragedy in 2015-2016 Indebted Greece

Earlier in the Anti-Prologue I argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s focus on Nietzsche’s notion of tragedy is in fact a strategy for understanding how the disproportionate, lopsided and non-resolvable power relations between creditor and debtor are hidden beneath the appearance and seeming promise of a resolution that nonetheless remains elusive. It masquerades as a debt that can be resolved in order to conceal and legitimize its own un-resolvability. Looking at Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016, this chapter will examine how both the government
of SYRIZA and Greece’s international creditors perpetuate Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors through competing and often contradictory narratives that exist within what is called the “tragedy of Greek debt crisis.” I am interested in how those narratives shape both performances of power and resistance, especially with regard to the ongoing evaluations of Greece by its international creditors. Here the performances of power and resistance I argue play out in a disingenuous construction of the creditor/debtor relationship that implies that Greece’s debt can be paid while essentially rendering it un-payable and hence as a permanent means of political leverage.

On a conceptual level, Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari traced this disingenuous construction of the creditor/debtor relationship that renders debt infinitely un-payable, to Hegel’s “master/bondsman” dialectic – commonly referred to as “master/slave” dialectic—and in the manifestations of the latter in Hegel’s philosophy of tragedy. But before focusing on Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari’s critical differentiations from Hegel I would like to briefly elaborate on Hegel’s “master/slave” schema and the relations between the latter and Hegel’s philosophy of tragedy in order to understand the kind of conceptualization of resistance that Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari move away from. It is my contention that this brief elaboration will lay the groundwork for the next section’s main argument: that in 2015-2016 Greece, Hegel’s Antigone haunted the strategies of the government of SYRIZA and as a result SYRIZA understood and framed Greek debt as resolvable only to perpetuate Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors.

In _Phenomenology of Spirit_, Hegel, conceptualizes the bondman’s resistance against his master in terms of asymmetry, antithetical dependence and labor. During the
first formational phases of the “master/ slave” relation, Hegel argues that the master is more powerful and fully independent in relation to his slave. In other words for Hegel the “master/ slave” relation begins as an asymmetrical power relation between the strong and independent “master” and the weak and dependent “slave.” Hegel specifically argues that the master “is the power dominating existence, while this existence again is the power controlling the other (the slave), the master holds, par consequence, this other subordination”(Hegel, 1977:156). However, according to his ontology, any kind of “self-consciousness”—including the self-consciousness of the master—needs to affirm its existence through its equally antithetical double. Hegel specifically argues that “self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or ‘recognized.’” (156) But in the case of the master/ slave relation the slave is not equal to his master. As a result the master’s need for recognition, or, to paraphrase Hegel the master’s fear of never being fully recognized, is what transforms the master’s initial strength and independency into dependency since the master’s asymmetrical power and domination over his slave keeps him from being affirmed and recognized by someone equal.

For the Hegelian slave on the other hand, who is initially weaker and dependent upon his master, the more he labors for his master the more he understands that his master’s domination over him keeps his master from being fully recognized. Hegel specifically argues that, “by serving he [the slave] cancels in every particular aspect his dependence” (157). It is “through work and labor” that the slave becomes conscious of his independence and ends up “having and being a mind of his own” (157). Hegel
conceptualizes the slave’s independence in terms of intensified slavery, labor and service—what in Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is often understood as negative affirmation—and the master’s dependence in terms of intensified power, domination and fear: the master still controls the slave but is afraid that he will never be recognized by his (non)equally antithetical double and the slave still services his master but the more he labors the more independent he becomes. Therefore, based on Hegel’s schema, the asymmetrical power relations between the master and the slave become a mutual and resolvable exchange. The master’s power and domination comes with the price of fear and dependency and the slave’s independence comes with the price of slavery, labor and service.

This transformation of the asymmetrical power relations between the master and the slave into a “give and take” kind of mutual and resolvable exchange is also present in Hegel’s philosophy of tragedy. Although much could be written on the relations between Hegel’s schema of “master/slave” dialectics and Hegel’s philosophy of tragedy for now I would like to focus to Hegel’s interpretation of Antigone. I choose to focus on Hegel’s understanding of Antigone not only because according to Hegel Antigone is “the absolute example of tragedy” (Hegel, 1978:325) but also because—as I will argue in the next section—I contend that Hegel’s grasping of Antigone’s resistance against Creon influenced the strategies of SYRIZA during its negotiations with Greece’s international creditors. As a result SYRIZA founded its resisting strategies upon the assumption and the promise that the asymmetrical and disproportionate power relations between Greece and its international creditors can be transformed into some kind of mutual and resolvable exchange.
But before focusing on SYRIZA I would like to go back to Hegel’s interpretation of Antigone in order to lay the conceptual ground for the next section’s argument regarding SYRIZA’s strategies in relation to Greece’s international creditors. Drawing upon Judith Butler’s statement that, “Antigone emerges as a figure for Hegel in the *Phenomenology* only to become surpassed in the course of Hegel’s description of what she does” (Butler, 2002:12) I would like to argue that Hegel saw in the Sophoclean Antigone what he needed to see in order to support his schema of the “master/ slave” dialectic. Just like in the case of the “master/ slave” dialectical schema where both the master and the slave need to affirm their “self-consciousness” (Hegel, 1977: 157) through the equalized and doubled other, Antigone and Creon need to challenge and eventually cancel their one-sidedness through confronting each other. According to Hegel in the case of the Sophoclean Antigone both Creon and Antigone’s “one-sidedness ends both in injustice, because they are one-sided, though at the same time both obtain justice too” (325) It is only when Antigone’s “one-sidedness” collides with Creon’s “one-sidedness” that each unjust “one-sidedness” is justly equalized and eventually balanced in relation to the other (325) For Hegel this balancing equalization between Antigone and Creon is “introduced in the shape of a Nemesis.” (325) As one etymology suggests Νέμεσις (Nemesis) comes from the root νέμω (nemō), which means to allocate or distribute. Additionally, according to Hegel Nemesis does not either emerge from within the collision nor it is immanent to the collision but comes as an externally imposed higher and unifying authority that drives the collision towards a higher goal.

Therefore according to the conceptual limitations of the Hegelian schema, resolution happens as long as the conflict between two sides is an absolute oppositional
conflict driven by a higher unity. This higher unity equally distributes the power that initially emerged from asymmetrical power relations. It is this oppositional conflict driven by a higher unity that transforms any asymmetrical, disproportionate and non-resolvable power relations into a mutually resolvable exchange. Besides, that’s why Hegel appreciates Sophoclean tragedy so much. Because according to Hegel the tragedies of Sophocles are “eternal patterns” or “models” (325) where the “powers which are in collision, in virtue of their one-sidedness, divest themselves of the one-sidedness attaching to the assertion of independent validity, and this discharging of the one-sidedness reveals itself outwardly in the fact that this individuals who have aimed at the realization in themselves of a single separate moral power, perish.” (324-325) So for Hegel nothing can exist outside the collision between two antithetical doubles. He specifically argues that, “the necessity of the reaction however must not be occasioned by means of anything out of place or at cross purposes with the main action.” As a result resistance can only conceptualize itself in terms of antithetical opposition to the power which it resists.

According to Nietzsche this Hegelian conceptualization of conflict resolution in terms of antithetical opposition imprisons resistance within spheres of reactionary negation. Nietzsche argues that the Hegelian resistance of the “slave” always needs the “external stimuli” (Nietzsche, 2013: 19) of the power against which it reacts in order to understand and define its capacities. In *The Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche argues that the (Hegelian)\(^6\) slave “says ‘no’ from the very outset to what is outside itself” (19) and he adds, the slave “requires objective stimuli to be capable of action at all—its action is

\(^6\) Not directly stated but clearly implied
fundamentally a reaction.” (19) And while the slave defines his actions merely through the external “world” (19) of his master, “the master seeks its antithesis in order to pronounce a more grateful and exultant ‘yes’ to its own self.” (19-20) Therefore for Nietzsche, the Hegelian slave uses the externality of his master in order to limit his range of action and resistance; the master uses the externality of his slave in order to further himself.

But while for Hegel this particular exchange between the master and the slave “equalizes” (Hegel, 1978:325) their initial disparity, for Nietzsche it “masquerades” (Nietzsche, 1993:41) and thus perpetuates the non-resolvability of their power relations. Both Hegel and Nietzsche start from the assumption that the relations between the master and his slave are asymmetrical, lopsided and disproportionate. According to Michael Hardt “that’s where Hegel and Nietzsche go towards opposite directions” (Hardt, 1993:42). But as I will be arguing throughout this chapter, Nietzsche’s direction is not conceptually anti-Hegelian. As opposed to Judith Butler who argues that, “references to a break with Hegel are almost always impossible, if only because Hegel has made the very notion of “breaking with” into the central tenet of his dialectic” (Butler, 2012:184) I contend that Nietzsche does not frame his ontology in dialectically anti-Hegelian terms. On the contrary Nietzsche understands Hegelian dialectics as a mask that carries to infinity any kind of asymmetrical power relations it claims or promises to equalize.

In order to support his understanding Nietzsche, like Hegel, looks at tragedy. But according to Nietzsche the Sophoclean tragedies are nothing but “appearances” (Nietzsche, 1993:46) that “heal the gaze seared” by the “terrible night” of the dangerous vanity of any seeming promise of a resolution that nevertheless remains elusive.
Furthermore for Nietzsche these Sophoclean “appearances” that conceal any kind of dialectical vainness are various manifestations of the “Apolline mask” (46). Therefore Nietzsche chooses to elaborate on the mythical productions of Apollo and Dionysus and on how the latters are “projected” (46) onto different notions of tragedy. In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche introduces the abstraction of Apollo in order to understand any kind of dialectical thinking that introduces seeming and illusionary promises of resolutions that remain elusive and the abstraction of Dionysus in order to conceptualize any kind of potential destruction of these illusionary promises of resolution.

Although in his *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche asserts that *The Birth of Tragedy* smells “offensively Hegelian” (Nietzsche, 1993: xv) I contend that in *The Birth of Tragedy* through his abstract conceptualization of the tension between Apollo and Dionysus, Nietzsche really manages to grasp performances of resistance that do not define themselves in terms of dialectical oppositions. Nietzsche specifically talks about a “longing for illusion and for redemption by illusion” (25) that, as he argues, is one of the “inevitable products of the Apolline” mask.” (45) Additionally, according to Nietzsche, that mask of Apollo “clings tightly to the bough of the dialectic.” For the author of *The Birth of Tragedy* “the Apolline tendency is cocooned within its logical schematism.” (69)

And in *The Birth of Tragedy*, while Apollo, who, as Nietzsche reminds us etymologically is the “shining one” (16), introduces illusionary possibilities of dialectically resolved redemptions that “hone a sophistical dialectic for the speeches of the heroes” (54) that “speak only counterfeit, masked speeches” (54), Dionysus “appears in a multiplicity of figures” (51). It is because of these multiplicities that, for Nietzsche, Dionysus reveals the

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7 The translation uses the term Apolline instead of Apollonian. I am using the term Apollonian since I contend it is closer to the Greek Ἀπόλλωνιος.
“abysses” (67) of “something utterly irrational, full of causes without apparent effects, effects without apparent cause” (67) and destructs any dialectically Apollonian “sense of triumphant cheerfulness” (46). While Apollo introduces the illusionary possibility of dialectically resolvable redemption in dialectically concrete terms, Dionysus forces these illusions of dialectical concreteness “into self-destruction” (69) and as a result Dionysus reveals the concealed force of non-oppositional and non-dialectical difference.

Deleuze was particularly interested in Nietzsche’s conceptualization of Dionysus as an abstract force that destroys any kind of dialectical masks. In his *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze argues that “the dialectic proposes a certain conception of the tragic: linking it to the negative, to opposition and contradiction” (Deleuze, 1983: 11) and he adds, “Apollo is the divine incarnation of the principle of individuation. He constructs the appearance of appearance” (11). Deleuze’s Nietzschean Apollo is the force that in the case of an asymmetrical conflict or contradiction constructs fake “appearances” of individuation in order to, as Nietzsche describes, to “overcome his suffering” (Nietzsche, 1993: 80) through the negative. Deleuze’s Nietzschean Dionysus on the other hand “is not content with resolving pain in a higher pleasure” (Deleuze, 1983:13) and does not “submit to the labor of the negative” (16) like Hegel’s slave and Antigone do.

Therefore for Deleuze the Nietzschean tension between Apollo and Dionysus is not a Hegelian dialectical tension between the master and the slave or between Creon and Antigone. Deleuze argues that, “Dionysus and Apollo are therefore not opposed as the terms of contradiction but rather as two antithetical ways of resolving it” (12). During a contradiction between two asymmetrical forces Apollo is the one who introduces masks and promises of dialectical resolvability and mutual exchange and Dionysus is the one...
who destroys these fake promises and deals with the contradiction in its full lopsidedness and disproportionateness.

For Deleuze, and later for Deleuze and Guattari, this conceptualization of illusionary promises of resolvable and mutual exchanges—and their potential destruction—is one of Nietzsche’s biggest contributions with regards to a philosophy of difference that does not just grasp resistance within the limitations of the power it fights against. If according to Nietzsche, including Deleuze’s Nietzsche—asymmetrical power relations, use masks of resolvable conflict and mutual exchange in order to secretly perpetuate their asymmetry then the conflict remains unresolved. However non-resolvable conflicts that emerge from asymmetrical power relations produce un-payable debt.

According to Deleuze Nietzsche was the first one who looked at notions of tragedy and through his abstract concept of Apollo managed to grasp how any kind of dialectical framing of resolution perpetuates debt. In Deleuze’s terms Nietzsche was the one who turned to tragedy in order to “lay bare the condition of judgment” (Deleuze, 1997: 126) and to understand “the adventure of debt as it becomes infinite and thus un-payable” (126). I contend that this notion of infinite and un-payable debt understands any kind of power asymmetry in terms of creditor/debtor disproportionate and lopsided relations. This is why in Essays Critical and Clinical—a book that includes essays and articles that Deleuze wrote mostly during his collaboration with Guattari between 1970 and 1993—Deleuze writes, “Nietzsche’s greatness lies in having shown, without hesitation, that the creditor-debtor relation was primary in relation to all exchange. One begins by promising, and becomes indebted not to a god but to a partner, depending on
the forces that pass between the parties” (127). Later, in *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari argue that Nietzsche was the first one who was able to grasp the “debtor-creditor relationship, by eliminating every consideration of exchange” (180). They add, “this is how finite debt finds itself taken into an immense machinery that renders the debt infinite and no longer forms anything but one and the same crushing fate: ‘the aim now is to preclude pessimistically, once and for all, the prospect of a final discharge: the aim now is to make the glance recoil disconsolately from an iron impossibility.’ (Nietzsche, 1969: 21)” (132). This is why I contend that resistance that is founded upon notions of “discharge” or even exodus or resolution is doomed to remain insufficient and unsuccessful.

In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms this kind of insufficient and unsuccessful resistance does nothing but perpetuate the asymmetrically non-resolvable creditor/debtor power relations. They compare this kind of resistance to processes “of establishing each of the formal operations that will make it all possible: […] the linearization of the chain between masters and slaves” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 219). And the very crucial question emerges: How and by whom can that chain break?

In the case of Greece, SYRIZA founded its resistance on the assumption and the seeming promise that the asymmetrical power relations between Greece and its international creditors can be equalized and lead to a mutual and resolvable exchange. As a result SYRIZA ended up becoming an “one-sidedness” fully absorbed by Greece’s international creditors. As I will argue in the next section, SYRIZA’s choice to found its resistance upon appearances and seeming promises of a mutual exchange was not a choice of the potential “not yet” that could challenge the “always already” actuality of
European debt and austerity politics, as in “The Performative Dialectics of Defeat: Europe and the European Left after July 13 2015” Athena Athanasiou suggests—an article that she published right after SYRIZA signed the third memorandum with Greece’s international creditors. On the contrary I will contend that SYRIZA’s resistance was conceptually limited and limiting from its very beginning. In order to do so I will draw upon this section’s elaboration on Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari’s differentiations from Hegel and I will place particular emphasis on the dynamic relations between SYRIZA’s public references to Antigone and SYRIZA’s public conceptualization, framing and staging of resistance. While SYRIZA’s public conceptualization of resistance will be traced in SYRIZA’s negotiating strategies and governmental programs, its public framing and staging of resistance will be traced in slogans, statements and in the directorial and dramaturgical choices that were made during SYRIZA’s public events, speeches and demonstrations.

Can SYRIZA perform outside the asymmetrical power relations between Greece and its international creditors in ways that structurally challenge, borrowing a phrase from Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013) European politics of “debtocracy”? This is the main question that the next section takes on. But before moving forward with the next section let me make something very clear: As someone who supported SYRIZA’s efforts during its negotiations with Greece’s international creditors, my intention is not to undermine SYRIZA. On the contrary this dissertation’s intention is to conceptually widen the field of resistance so that the political lefts of Europe can structurally challenge Europe’s debt and austerity politics. Besides, that’s what Alexis Tsipras—the Greek prime minister and president of the left party of
SYRIZA—promised to do right after he signed the third memorandum with Greece’s international creditors: to “widen the field of resistance.”

### 1.2 SYRIZA and The Tragedy of Greek Debt Crisis

January 2017: Ράδιο Αρβύλα (Radio Arvyla): a Greek live show that satirizes Greece’s political and social life. The show’s four hosts—Kanakis, Servetas, Kiousis and Panagiwtopoulos—comment on one of the thousands of videos of Tsipras being publically mocked and called a “traitor.” Just two years prior Tsipras was considered a hero and Greece’s only hope. According to Tsipras’ last speech before SYRIZA’s victory in the Greek snap elections of February 2015—a victory known as “first time left”—the left government of SYRIZA would help the Greeks to find an exit, a “way-out” from the “tragedy that they have been experiencing during the last years.”

From January 2015 to June 2015 Tsipras and the government of SYRIZA performed in two different speeds: on the one hand SYRIZA continued paying Greece’s pre-agreed debt obligations on time. On the other hand SYRIZA resisted accepting the third package of severe austerity measures “suggested” by Greece’s international creditors: the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

SYRIZA’s resistance reached its peak when, on June 28 2015, Tsipras froze the negotiations with Greece’s international creditors and called for a Greek referendum. The

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10 Ομάδα Αλήθειας. “Αποδοκιμασίες για τον Τσίπρα στην Κρήτη” Filmed [December 2016] YouTube Video, 1:22. Posted [December 2016] [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-6NnreQbv8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-6NnreQbv8)
referendum took place on July 5 2015 and asked the Greek people to vote “YES” or “NO” to the austerity measures suggested by Greece’s international creditors. According to the results of the referendum, 61.31% voted to reject the austerity measures “proposed” by Greece’s international creditors. Right after the referendum Tsipras rejoined the negotiations and on July 15 2015 he ended up signing the third memorandum between Greece and its international creditors: a memorandum that is even more severe than the previous two. Within six months Tsipras “the hero” became Tsipras “the traitor.”

What went wrong? Is Costas Douzinas, the “reluctant politician who was unexpectedly propelled from academia into the world of Greek politics as SYRIZA MP” (Douzinas, 2017), right to argue that part of SYRIZA’s challenges is to widen its range of resistance while following the same policies it strongly opposes? (Douzinas, 2017)? Is SYRIZA’s defeat the “not yet” actualized potentiality that does not “signpost a logical impossibility” as Athena Athanasiou suggests in “Performative Dialectics of Defeat”—an article that she published in Open Democracy on August 15 2015, when the Greek Parliament officially passed the third memorandum? Did Tsipras simply “jettison his radicalism to stay in power at all costs” as Costas Lapavitsas—a professor of economics at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and former SYRIZA MP—argues in his article in The Guardian “One year on, SYRIZA has sold its soul for power”? Was SYRIZA a wave that started “talking left” but ended up “walking right” as Helena Sheehan—a Marxist historian and activist—claims (Sheehan, 2016)?

With these questions in the background, this section looks at SYRIZA’s public conceptualizations, framings and staging of resistance. Earlier in the Interlude I drew

\[\text{Douzinas’ book SYRIZA in Power: Reflections of a Reluctant Politician is about to be published in August 2017.}\]
upon Deleuze and Guattari’s understandings of Nietzsche’s notion of tragedy in order to understand how the disproportionate, lopsided and non-resolvable power relations between creditor and debtor are hidden beneath the appearance and seeming promise of a resolution that nonetheless remains elusive. In this section, I will trace how Hegel’s notions of Antigone haunted SYRIZA’s public conceptualizations, framings and staging of resistance. As a result, I contend that SYRIZA ended up masking the asymmetrical and non-resolvable power relations between Greece and its international creditors as relations that can be transformed into relations of mutual exchanges among equals. In response to the discourses that frame this stance of SYRIZA in populist terms (Cus and Papasarantopoulos, 2016) I contend that this “masking” was not a populist act but a choice that is interlinked to SYRIZA’s Hegelian’s orientation to resistance.

SYRIZA based its public conceptualization of resistance around the assumption that Greece’s international creditors are interested in the repayment of Greek debt—an assumption that as I have been arguing since the beginning of this dissertation also presumes that the disparities between creditor and debtor can be resolved—and not in the perpetuation of Greece as a debtor. According to the governmental program of SYRIZA that Tsipras announced at the Thessaloniki International Trade Fair 13 on September 6, 2015—approximately four months before SYRIZA’s victory in the Greek snap elections of January 2015—Tsipras stated that, “We are going to negotiate within the existing frames of the European Union and the European institutions towards a new realistic agreement that would serve the [Greek] debt (…) in order to achieve the following: To cancel the majority of the face value of the (Greek) debt so that the debt becomes

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13 The Thessaloniki International Trade Fair is an annual commercial exhibition where the prime minister, the official opposition’s president and other parties’ presidents announce their governmental programs.
sustainable with strategies that do not burden the people of Europe [and that utilize] the collective European mechanisms. It happened for Germany in 1953. It should happen for Greece in 2015” (Καθημερινή, 2015). Let’s break down some of the conceptual and material implications of these statements starting with notions of debt sustainability within the existing European structures.

Sustainable debt is the “healthy” debt that is not dying, or, in other words the debt that is not and never going to be fully repayable, fully cancellable and resolvable. In Greek sustainable debt is translated as βιώσιμο—from the root bio—debt, which means the debt that is livable. As argued in the Interlude, this kind of never fully repayable, never fully cancellable and never fully resolvable debt is the “infinite debt” that in Nietzsche’s terms “precludes pessimistically, once and for all, the prospect of a final discharge” (Nietzsche, 1969:21) and in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms “eliminates every consideration of exchange” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 180). According to Maurizio Lazzarato this is one of the most important contributions of Deleuze and Guattari. In his thought provoking book The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition, Maurizio Lazzarato argues that “by asserting its [debt’s] infinite nature (…) Deleuze and Guattari grasped very early on and throughout their work one of the major transformations of modern-day capitalism” (Lazaratto, 2012: 89) and he adds, “the power of debt leaves you free, and it encourages you and pushes you to act in such a way that you are able to honor your debts” (30). In my contention, within frames of contemporary European debt politics, notions of debt sustainability are funded upon a very cruel contradiction: nations-states are expected to repay debts that by default are designed to be un-payable and un-resolvable.
There is a plethora of European mechanisms that both conceptually and materially inscribe this cruel contradiction into the very core of the European Union. The next section places particular emphasis on the “informal” and, borrowing a phrase from Giorgio Agamben, “exceptional” aspect of these mechanisms and on the capacity of these mechanisms to use national parliaments as tools of legitimization and formalization of their informality and exceptionality. For now I would like to contend that, on a level of public discourse, one of the most successful mechanisms that manages to crystalize notions of debt sustainability as the “right” and, as I will argue in detail in the next section, as the “only” solution—also known as There Is No Alternative (TINA)—is the production of narratives of “ethos.” According to those narratives, the poor, lazy and unproductive European south needs to labor more in order to pay the price of its laziness and unproductivity to the rich, productive and hard-working north. Although I could cite innumerable Angela Merkel, Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsseloem, Jean-Claude Juncker and Wolfgang Schahuble’s quotes that perpetuate this narrative, I will wait until the next section where I am specifically focusing on Greece’s international creditors. For now I would like to recall an experience of mine that happened back in 2010: when Giorgos Papandreou signed the first memorandum with Greece’s international creditors and I had to migrate to the US in order to send money home.

One of the three jobs that I did during the years 2010-2011 in the US was work at a Greek freight broker agency that imported the “Olympus” Greek yogurt from Greece. The freight broker agency was located inside an accountant’s office, owned by a Greek American whose parents migrated to the US almost 60 years ago. One day I was not

doing so well because my parents and I struggled to pay the χαράτσι (haratsi): a very high real estate tax that after the first MOU was combined with the electricity bill. Anyone who did not pay the χαράτσι did not have electricity. When I communicated that struggle to the owner of the accountant’s office he simply replied “You had it coming you know? All these years just lazing and vacating while other European states work non-stop? I have to admit I am kind of happy” As someone who experiences Greece’s condition from within while being part of the “brain drain” who had to migrate in order to send money home, I would like to mention that, especially after the victory of the left party of SYRIZA, this narrative was the predominate narrative in the public discourse of Greece’s international creditors. This is why Tsipras in his programmatic statements promised that SYRIZA’s decisions would not burden “the people of Europe.” In order to put an end to the conceptual and eventually the structural production of this narrative, and to “convince” the rich North to recognize Greece as equal among equals, Tsipras and SYRIZA chose to perform within the frames that produce this narrative—the “existing frames of the European Union and the European institutions” like he said—and to thus perpetuate notions of Greek debt sustainability without publically re-assigning new meaning upon them.

But the European Union is not a synthesis of equal nation-states. On the contrary, the European Union is a surplus economy that is founded upon non-resolvable asymmetrical power relations among the nation-states that assemble it. As Yianis Varoufakis—Greece’s former finance minister and current co-organizer of the Diem25 movement in Europe—reminds us, within frames of the European monetary union “just as one person’s debt is another person’s asset, one nations deficit in another’s surplus.”
(Varoufakis, 2016: 9) As Varoufakis also reminds us, Nicholas Kaldor—a post-Kaynesian economist—argued that, “it is a dangerous error to believe that a monetary and an economic union can precede a political union” (88). This why Varoufakis argues that “you can’t go from a European cartel to a European democracy” (97). Although the next section elaborates in detail on EU’s economical and political aspects for now I would like to draw upon Varoufakis and to argue that EU is a surplus economy that uses masks of “solidarity” and equality in order to make the debtor/nation-states take the asymmetrical power relations with their creditors for granted—known as There Is No Alternative (TINA) narratives—without even challenging them.

It is because of this emphasis on the monetary aspect of the European Union that according to the Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, and Germany’s former minister of finance, Wolfgang Schäuble, “debt write-off will not work in the currency union.” Tsipras tried to challenge the European Union’s emphasis on its monetary aspect by publically arguing that EU’s masks of political solidarity that serve its interests as a surplus economy are not masks but the actual conceptual constitution of the “original” European Union. But according to Tsipras this kind of European Union is lost, gone and forgotten. During the official proclamation of the referendum, Tsipras argued that the referendum would enhance Greece’s negotiating power so that the left government of SYRIZA could fight for a “sustainable agreement that respects democracy and the common European rules and that will lead to the final exodus from the crisis.”15 He also stated that, “there are no owners and guests in Europe.”16 But that was not the only time

16 ibid
Tsipras publically and officially conceptualized the constitution of the European Union as a politically oriented democratic constitution. The list of similar statements by Tsipras is long.

The paradox here is that according to SYRIZA’s constitutional principles EU was never considered as a democratic political union but as a monetary union that would become a democratic union only after the multiple interventions of the various European lefts. Furthermore, according to SYRIZA’s radically left orientations, the monetary European Union is founded upon the segregation between “owners and guests.” Right after Pierre Laurent—head of the European Left—announced Tsipras candidacy for the presidency of the European Commission back in 2013, Tsipras’s in his acceptance speech stated that, “we were the ones [SYRIZA and the European left] who, even before the genesis of Eurozone, highlighted the flaws, inadequacies and destabilizing asymmetries of the plan. We kept declaring, and we were proved right, that there can be no union segregated by a monetary wall.”\(^\text{17}\) But even during his speech at the “NO” demonstration three days before the Greek referendum in 2015 Tsipras publically stated that “the Europe that we once knew, the Europe of its constitutional values has nothing in common with the Europe of the extortions and the ultimatums.”\(^\text{18}\) As opposed to SYRIZA’s programmatic statements before SYRIZA’s victory in the Greek snap elections of 2015, Tsipras and the left government of SYRIZA chose to frame the “not-yet” democratic European potentiality as a forgotten actuality.

\(^{17}\) enet.gr Ελευθεροτυπία “Ανακοινώθηκε η υποψηφιότητα Τσίπρα για την Κομισιόν” December 14 2013 http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.politikh&id=404686
According to SYRIZA’s public conceptualization and framing of resistance, Greece—“the birthplace of democracy”\footnote{info news 24. “ΟΜΙΛΙΑ ΤΣΙΠΡΑ ΣΥΓΚΕΝΤΡΩΣΗ «ΟΧΙ» 3-7-2015” Filmed [July 2015] YouTube video, 10:35. Posted [July 2015].} as Tsipras stated in the speech that he gave during the “NO” demonstration—is what Europe needs so that it can find again its lost conceptual basis. During the same speech Tsipras introduced a parallel trajectory between the mythical abduction of Europe by Zeus and Europe’s current condition. According to Tsipras Zeus has now been replaced by the “technocrats”.\footnote{Ibid} Additionally, for Tsipras “in this land [Greece] where democracy was born, democracy will be reborn”\footnote{Ibid} These highly problematic nationalist aspects of Tsipras and SYRIZA’s public framing of resistance are the main focus of the third chapter where I am also examining the rise of the Greek extreme far right. For now I would like to emphasize that SYRIZA—a party of the radical left that fights nationalism and its manifestations—used notions of nationalism in order to publically argue that Europe’s current condition does not prove that there was something wrong with EU’s conceptual foundation but, on the contrary, that something went wrong with its actualization.

Let me recount my steps in regards to Tsipras and SYRIZA’s public conceptualization of resistance in order to explain why I contend that ghosts of Hegel limited the conceptual capacities of the former. As opposed to the oppositional SYRIZA—when SYRIZA was an oppositional party—governing SYRIZA chose to publically frame and conceptualize its resistance against Greece’s international creditors not only by describing the European Union as a synthesis of equalities and not as an assemblage, borrowing a concept from Deleuze and Guattari, of asymmetrical power

\footnote{Ibid}
relations—but also by framing everything that the left government of SYRIZA imagines for the European Union to become, as a lost gone and forgotten actuality. By doing so, SYRIZA masquerades the asymmetrical power relations between Greece and its international creditors as relations that are transformable to a mutually resolvable exchange.

Therefore, while the oppositional SYRIZA highlighted the asymmetrical and non-resolvable power relations between Greece and its international creditors, the governing SYRIZA, the SYRIZA that “negotiates” directly with Greece’s international creditors, chose to publically frame and conceptualize the asymmetrical and non-resolvable relations between Greece and its international creditors as relations between equals. In response to the narratives that describe Greece as the “lazy and poor South” that I described earlier in this section, the left government of SYRIZA wants to be reciprocally recognized by Greece’s international creditors as their equal. As a result, in the name of non-existing equality, SYRIZA introduces the seeming promise of a resolution that is doomed to remain infinitely elusive.

That brings us back to this section’s main argument: that particularly during the 2015-2016 political turmoil, SYRIZA’s public conceptualizations, framings and staging of resistance, were haunted by Hegel’s specters—paraphrasing Derrida—of Antigone. The next sub-section elaborates on these hauntings in order to potentially “exorcise” them and to investigate what a non-dialectical reading of Antigone has to offer to praxes of resistance that have to and are asked to perform within 21st century frames of European neoliberalism.
1. 3 *Antigone* in Indebted Greece: An Unwritten Archive of Resistance

Drawing upon the thought process that I introduced in the first section of this chapter I contend that Hegel’s reading of *Antigone*, or better, the notion of history that Hegel constructs through his reading of Sophocle’s tragedy of *Antigone*, can be summarized in three conceptual steps: one, two equally oppositional forces collide with each other and thus complement each other’s one-sidedness (while they are both conscious and dependent upon the other’s one-sidedness), two, this collision is teleologically oriented towards a higher unity and that teleological orientation is driven by a both a higher and an external force of νέμεσις (nemesis, distribution/ allocation) and three, that externality of nemesis transforms the tension between the colliding forces into a mutual exchange.

So for Hegel, tragedy—and on another level history, since Hegel looks at attic tragedy in order to theorize on history—continuously leads to a mutually resolvable exchange. The notion of tragedy that this dissertation proposes addresses the disproportionate and non-resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor. Furthermore, according to the concept of tragedy that this dissertation introduces, notions of exchange perform as masks that perpetuate the non-resolvable creditor/ debtor power relations.

As argued earlier, in 2015-2016 Greece SYRIZA chose to do what Hegel did: it conceptualized its resistance against Greece’s international creditors in terms of a teleologically resolvable exchange. SYRIZA failed to understand that any promise of mutually resolvable exchange between Greece and its international creditors is nothing but a “mask”, an “appearance” that, in Nietzsche’s terms “hones a sophistical dialectic
for the speeches of the heroes” (54) and that “speaks only counterfeit, masked speeches” (Nietzsche, 1993: 54). By claiming that equality exists where equality does not exist, both Hegel and SYRIZA prevent any potential equality from actualizing itself mainly because they refuse to acknowledge its absence. According to David Graeber—the London School of Economic’s anarchist-activist who influenced the Occupy movement—debt is what happens “in the shadow of eventual equality” (Graeber, 2011:122) And he adds, “the fact that is perceived as equality makes things even more difficult” (191). As Butler reminds us, in the case of Hegel’s Antigone, Antigone desires to be recognized by her dead brother (Butler, 2000: 12). But while for Hegel Antigone’s quest for recognition where recognition is impossible is what is necessary for history to progress, for Butler this “impossibility” is what should make us ask what “would have made her life possible” (24). Hegel wants his Antigone to keep questing for a recognition that nevertheless remains elusive.

Although SYRIZA, as I described earlier does not want to, it nonetheless introduces the seeming promise of a resolution and an equality that also remains elusive, and it does so by publically conceptualizing and framing its resistance in Hegelian terms. Because of this specific understanding of resistance SYRIZA did not manage to really ask what, paraphrasing Butler, “would have made its pre-victory programmatic statements possible” But if the promise of resolution remains elusive then what kind of “exodus from the tragedy of Greek debt crisis” did Tsipras promise?

The kind of ironically inclusive exodus, that Hegel finds in his Antigone. For Hegel Antigone is the “everlasting irony of the community” (Hegel, 1977). Her exclusion is immanent to the community that casts Antigone as an outsider. SYRIZA, especially
during its negotiations with Greece’s international creditors staged no-exit kind of exodus. This exodus with no-exit, beyond masquerading the asymmetrical power relations between Greece and its international creditors as resolvable, also included masking Greece’s current condition as a “sovereign debt crisis” and not as a crisis that jeopardized Greece’s ability to continue being a good debtor.

A good debtor slowly pays but never fully repays its debt. This means that Greece’s international creditors lend Greece not in spite of but because of Greece’s inability to fully repay its debt. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari describe this condition as the “tragic regime of infinite debt” where “nothing is ever over and done” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 587) Additionally, in Anti-Oedipus, they argue that “the infinite creditor and infinite credit have replaced the blocks of mobile and finite debts (…) A time will come when the creditor has not yet lent while the debtor never quits” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 197) From this point of view there is not an exodus from the tragedy of the Greek debt crisis simply because Greek debt is not in crisis. It is the good debtor Greece that is in crisis and a good debtor remains always inclusively excluded by its creditors.

I contend that unfortunately the Greek referendum of 2015 also became part of SYRIZA’s no-exit exodus. Tsipras and the left government of SYRIZA did not conduct a referendum that asked the Greek people to decide whether they want to participate or not in the conceptual and structural production of its indebtedness. On the contrary the Greek referendum of 2015 referendum asked from the Greek people to vote “YES” or “NO” to the “proposal made to Greece by the EC, the IMF and the ECB during the Eurogroup meeting on June 25 2015.” And although both the official opposition and Greece’s
international creditors argued that the referendum was on Greece’s “membership” in the European Union—as Jean-Claude Juncker stated in his press conference on the Greek referendum on June 29 2015—Tsipras, right after the announcement of the referendum results—according to which 61.31% voted “NO”—stated that “I know really well that the order that you [the Greek people] gave me is not an order of exodus from Europe” As a result the Greek referendum of 2015 said “NO” to one of eurogroup’s specific proposals not to the conceptual and structural circumstances that produce this kind of proposal.

Ironically enough three days after the Greek referendum, from within the European parliament Tsipras “legitimized” the “NO” result of the referendum through the figure of Antigone. He specifically referred to Sophocle’s Antigone and stated that, “since you referred to ancient Greek tragedy, I would like to remind you that one of the most important ancient tragedians, with his masterpiece Antigone taught us that there are moments when the greatest law of all human laws is justice for all human beings and I think that now is one of those moments” Ten days after the Greek referendum and seven days after his speech in the European parliament Tsipras and the left government of SYRIZA signed a third memorandum with Greece’s international creditors. Just like Hegel’s Antigone was always already dispossessed from the possibility of living, SYRIZA was always already dispossessed from the capacity to resist. In the speech that Tsipras gave in the Greek parliament on August 13, 2015—when the government of SYRIZA asked from the rest of the parliament to vote for the third MOU that Tsipras had

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already signed with Greece’s international creditors on July 15, 2015—he said that “the dilemma that Greece’s international creditors imposed on SYRIZA during the negotiations was: a memorandum with euro or memorandum with drachma” finaly implying that Greece’s international creditors wanted to prevent Greece from exiting its current condition of indebtedness to its creditors.

From a theatre and performance studies perspective the two questions that in my contention need to be addressed ask, why in contexts of 21st century neoliberal Europe Hegel’s reading of Antigone becomes an integral part of SYRIZA’s public conceptualizations, framings and staging of resistance? Additionally, moving one step forward, would the exorcism of Hegel’s specters of Antigone introduce more efficacious praxes of resistance? Starting from the first question I would like to clarify one thing. The question does not intend to address the affinities between Hegelian theories and philosophies on the one hand and political lefts on the other. Besides the histories of those affinities are long and well known. The question intends to address the reasons why Hegelian readings of Antigone were so popular among Greece’s left government of SYRIZA especially when the latter tried to challenge and disrupt 21st century European debt economy.

Drawing upon the thought process that this chapter introduces one could answer this question by arguing that neoliberalism creates its own resistance but does it in a way so that resistance never succeeds in disrupting neoliberalism. As a result a left government of a debtor nation-state is doomed to frame its resistance in terms of mutual exchange while 21st century European neoliberalism makes sure that a mutually

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resolvable exchange between a debtor nation-state and its international creditors never happens. Drawing upon that thought process I would like to argue that exactly because of the very long histories of affinities between Hegelianism and political lefts, Hegelian readings of Antigone somehow belong to SYRIZA’s unwritten archive of resistance—archive because of Tsipras’ vague reference to the textuality of both Sophocle’s Antigone and Hegel’s analysis of Antigone, and unwritten because these textualities perform on a level of specters and phantasms. I contend that when, during the assembly of the European Parliament on July 8th 2015 Tsipras referred to the non-textual aspect of the “greatest law of all human laws” the Greek prime minister called for a conceptualization of resistance that exists in a space where textuality is continuously in negotiation with its multiple specters and its potential actualizations.

Certain theatre and performance studies discourse has shed light on the non-causal, non-hierarchical—especially in terms of temporality—relations and very creative tensions between notions of textuality, spectrality and actualization. As Bill Worthen argues in “Antigone’s Bones” it is because of works like Diana Taylor’s The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas that we deal with these tensions in terms of a “constant state of interaction” (Worthen 2008: 11). That “constant state of interaction” does not only take away any notion of prioritization of the text over the performance and vice versa but it also takes away any notion of inadequate similitude.

Ironically enough both Taylor and Worthen refer to Antigone in order to offer some “ground” to this constant state of interaction. Firstly Worthen cites Taylor,

What changes over time is the value, relevance, or meaning of the archive, how the items it contains get interpreted, even embodied. Bones might remain the same, even though their story may change, depending on the paleontologist or forensic anthropologist who examines them. Antigone might be performed in multiple ways, whereas the unchanging text assures a stable signifier (Taylor 2003: 19).

And then Worthen draws upon Taylor’s notion of Antigone’s bones and writes,

The purpose of acting is not merely to clothe Antigone’s bones with new flesh—the zombie theory of drama—but to use writing as a means to render the present relation with an audience significant (Worthen 2003: 8).

Even though the focus of this section is not acting but the praxes of resistance that, especially during SYRIZA’s negotiations with Greece’s international creditors, were in a “constant state of interaction” with the publically communicated specters of Hegelian Antigone, I contend that Taylor and Worthen’s arguments lay the ground for understanding how, even though SYRIZA’s resistance was publically framed in terms of very limited Hegelian schemata, Tsipras’ public references to a vague textuality of an unwritten archive put the limitations of these schemata in constant negotiation with performances that can potentially move beyond these limitations.

From this point of view the negotiations do not just take place between text and performance but also between the unwritten archive of public discourse of textuality and multiple performances. In my contention that unwritten archive is not conveyed, repeated and differentiated on a level of collective memory, knowledge or imagination but also on a level of assumption. Tsipras assumed that his references to Antigone and to Hegel’s analysis of Antigone would interact with and trigger certain performances of resistance.
What Tsipras fortunately missed is that the only thing he achieved by his assumption and his reference to this unwritten archive of SYRIZA’s resistance is that he shed light on the ongoing interactions between that unwritten archive and performances of resistance.

These interactions really challenge any text VS performance dichotomies since they clearly reveal the simultaneity and coexistence between the textual and the non-textual and aspects of textuality. Worthen is right to alert us that this is not the same with understanding nontextuality in terms of performances that are resistant to text. In “Antigone’s Bones” Worthen argues that the latter are “concerned to model the nontexual transmission of history through forms of performance outside of or strategically resistant to writing” (22). And he adds, “writing bears its alterity to embodiment and subjection into the location and temporality of enactment” (27). In other words, writing is written in order to be altered, challenged, ignored, differentiated, betrayed, exorcised.

When from within the space of the European Parliament Tsipras framed SYRIZA’s resistance against Greece’s international creditors in terms of Antigone’s nontextuality, he—I believe unintentionally—positioned resistance on a stage where textuality, specters of textuality and praxes of actualization never stop to negotiate with each other. That I contend answers the second question of this section: the question that intended to investigate the more efficacious praxes of resistance that, in 2015-2016 Greece can potentially emerge from the exorcism of Hegel’s specters of Antigone.

But Tsipras was not the only one who referred to the non-textual aspects of dramatic textuality. Larry Eliott in his article “Greek Debt Crisis: an existentialist drama with no good end in sight” published in the guardian on February 5 2017 argues that,
“Sartre’s *Huis Clos [No Exit]* has three damned souls arguing in a room for eternity. Greece has Tsipras, Schauble and Lagarde […]”

The next section places particular emphasis on how Greece’s international creditors publically frame, conceptualize and stage their politics of debt.

1.4 IMF, EC and ECB: Staging the “Ethography” of Un-payable Debt OR

*Memorandum Stage Right?*

Gross: Do you know Ptydepe?

Hana: No

Gross: Then how did you know this was an official memorandum?

Hana: They say that in the first stage Ptydepe was used only for important official memoranda and that these are now being received by some of the stuff (Havel *Memorandum* 1967: 13).

Havel’s *Memorandum* sheds light on how memoranda produce memory that is not memory and that is rendered memory by force only to be forgotten as the new status quo. In the previous section I argued that Hegel’s *Antigone* haunted SYRIZA’s public conceptualizations, framing and staging of resistance in ways that restrained SYRIZA from introducing to the spheres of public discourse and performance the kind of language and concepts that could make explicit the implicit and aspects of the power that the left government SYRIZA was fighting against. As a result the left government of SYRIZA failed to publically grasp the disproportionate, lopsided and non-resolvable power

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relations between Greece and its international creditors that, especially within frames of 21st neoliberal Europe, are hidden beneath the appearance and the seeming promise of a resolution that nonetheless remains elusive.

This section will place particular emphasis on how, within frames of 21st neoliberal Europe, Greece’s international creditors—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB)—publically conceptualize, frame and stage, and eventually legitimize, their neoliberal politics of debt. I will closely examine how these public conceptualizations, framings and staging of these politics are inscribed into a ongoing production of memoranda. I will investigate how this production of memoranda plays out in a disingenuous construction of a creditor/debtor relationship that implies that Greece’s debt can and has to be paid while essentially rendering it un-payable and hence a permanent means of political leverage. Noam Chomsky in his Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order reminds us that according to George Kennan—the American diplomat and historian known for publically deconstructing his own policies that influenced the Marshall Plan—“we should ‘cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards and democratization’ and must ‘deal in straight power concepts.’” (Chomsky, 1999: 15) Drawing upon Chomsky’s reminder of Kennan, this is exactly what this section does: it frames in terms of “straight power” the cruelty of the politics of debt that Greece’s international conceal behind masks of an “ethos of payback.”

Especially during SYRIZA’s negotiations with Greece’s international creditors, the latters use masks of “ethos” in order to legitimize, borrowing a phrase from Deleuze
and Guattari, the “schizophrenic” aspect of Greek debt. As I will argue later in this section I am using Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “schizophrenia” in order to understand Greek debt because on the one hand Greek debt is designed by Greece’s international creditors to never be fully repaid and on the other hand, in the name of an illusionary resolution and a vague notion of a “payback ethos” Greece’s international creditors demand its repayment.

One of the most unacceptable, racist and sexist undertones of this, frequently unethical, vague notion of a “payback ethos” manifested itself through Jeroen Dijsselbloem’s—finance minister of Denmark, current president of the eurogroup and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)—most recent statement about the European South. In an interview on March 20 2017 with the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ) the Dutch finance minister stated that, “One [the southern European countries] cannot spend all the money in drinks and women and then ask for help.”28 As if the statement was not enough on its own when during the European Parliament press conference on March 26 2017 Dijsselbloem was asked whether he is going to apologize, he very clearly responded “No”29 But before focusing on more specific examples that come from the public and institutionalized stages on which Greece’s international creditors perform, and that are vaguely related to this unethical notion of “payback ethos” that divide Europe in the responsible North that shows solidarity to the lazy and selfish South that vacates, I would like to revisit Deleuze and Guattari in order to lay the conceptual ground that will serve as a theoretical lens for this section’s main arguments.

29 Football/ News. “Journalist Spanish asked
This brief elaboration on the conceptual ground of this section’s arguments will shed light on the ways that these vague notions of “payback ethos”—notions that as one can see in Dijsselbloem’s case can often become unethically racist and sexist—find their way into the memorandums, structural reforms and austerity measures that the IMF, the EC and the ECB impose on Greece.

Earlier I borrowed Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “schizophrenia” in order to grasp how Greek debt is produced to be at the same time both payable—on a level of illusion—and un-payable—on a level of impossibility. Greek debt carries both the illusion of its capacity to be repaid—what, as I argued earlier in the Interlude, Nietzsche defines “redemption through illusion” (Nietzsche, 1933: 25)—and the impossibility of its resolution. Deleuze and Guattari understand this coexistence between the production of the illusion of a resolution and the production of the impossibility of that resolution, as schizophrenia. In *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* Deleuze and Guattari describe schizophrenia as a process that produces “the illusion of substantiality but which is none other than [its] alienated form” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 94) But for Deleuze and Guattari it is not about making a choice between the illusion of resolution’s substantiality on the one hand and its impossibility on the other but about understanding the very real manifestations of their synthesis and coexistence.

In order to conceptualize this kind of contradictory coexistence, Deleuze and Guattari turn to tragedy. In *Anti-Oedipus* they draw upon Arthur Miller in order to go “against the [Hegelian] tragedy, against ‘the fatal drama of the personality’, against ‘the inevitable confusion between mask and actor.” (299) And this is where I contend that Deleuze and Guattari put Nietzsche in dialogue with Marx. I would like to briefly remind
us that in the two previous sections I argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s focus on Nietzsche’s notion of tragedy is in fact a strategy for understanding how the non-resolvable power relations between creditor and debtor are hidden beneath the illusion of a resolution that remains elusive.

It is that production of illusion of resolution—a production that as I contended earlier combines the illusion of resolution with its complete unfeasibility—that through the works of Marx, Deleuze and Guattari understand as the “hypocrisy” (259) of the capitalism regime. They specifically argue in Anti-Oedipus that capitalism “produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear” and they add, “it [capitalism] continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit.” From this point of view the “real” becomes “more and more artificial” (34) According to Deleuze and Guattari, Marx managed to grasp this “hypocrisy” of capitalism and this “artificiality” of the real through his notion of surplus value: “Marx termed the twofold movement of the tendency to a falling rate of profit, and the increase in the absolute quantity of surplus value, the law of the counteracted tendency.” (34) But if for Deleuze and Guattari Marx managed to grasp the coexistence between reality and artificiality, or the coexistence between the illusion of resolution and the impossibility of resolution, not in terms of a Hegelian oppositional synthesis but in terms of a “twofold movement” then Deleuze and Guattari’s Marx is a less Hegelian and a more Nietzschean Marx. Borrowing a phrase from Derrida, it is the “specter” (Derrida, 1994) of Deleuze and Guattari’s Nietzschean Marx that, in this section, is going to shed light on the memorandums, structural reforms and austerity measures that the EU and the Eurozone impose onto the European South.
But before I go there I would like to take some time and look for this Marx in Marx himself. This Marx is the Marx that understands the coexistence between the illusion and the impossibility of resolution of debt as the foundation of the non-resolvable creditor/debtor power relations. Furthermore this Marx is the Marx that frames these non-resolvable creditor/debtor power relations in terms of an obligatory “morality of the poor.” In his *Comments on James Mill* Marx understands two types of credit relationship. One of these two types occurs when “the man to whom credit is given is himself a man of means” (Marx, 2000: 29). In that case Marx argues that, “credit becomes merely a medium facilitating exchange.” (Marx, 2000: 29) For Marx this type of creditor/debtor relation between people of the same class is not a power relation.

The other type of credit relationship happens when “a rich man gives credit to a poor man whom he considers industrious and decent.” (29) In this case Marx specifically argues that, “all the social virtues of the poor man, the content of his vital activity, his existence itself, represent for the rich man the reimbursement of his capital with the customary interest.” And he adds, “owing to the fact that in the credit system the moral recognition of a man, as also trust in the state, etc., take the form of credit, the secret contained in the lie of moral recognition, the immoral vileness of this morality, as also the sanctimoniousness and egoism of that trust in the state, become evident and show themselves for what they really are.” (Marx, 2000: 29) I contend that in this moment, through this conceptualization of the immoral power relations that emerge from notions of “trust and morality” Marx differentiates himself from Hegel. Simply stated, Hegel’s reciprocal recognition, through the lenses of Marx becomes a permanent means of political leverage.
This kind of political leverage that emerges from non-resolvable creditor/debtor power relations that produce both the illusion and the impossibility of a resolution becomes a constant script or, borrowing a phrase from Marx, a “borrowed language” for events that “first time occur as a tragedy the second as a farce” (Marx, 2002: 15). For Nietzsche this constant script is part of a system of “mnemotechnics” (Nietzsche, 2013: 37). Nietzsche argues that, “when man thinks it necessary to make for himself a memory” (37) this system of “mnemotechnics” makes sure to “hypnotize the whole intellectual system through these ‘fixed ideas’” and becomes the means of freeing those ideas from the competition of all other ideas so as to make them unforgettable” (Nietzsche, 2013: 37) For Deleuze and Guattari Nietzsche’s concept of “mnemotechnics” becomes a strategy for understanding capitalism not in terms of exchange but in terms “inscription” of infinite and unresolvable debt (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 185) Bridging this thought process to this chapter’s main argument that both the left government of SYRIZA and Greece’s international creditors use concepts and language that do not and cannot frame Greece’s condition of indebtedness in terms of power relations, this section will offer concepts and language that do other wise.

In the following paragraphs I will relate the thought process that I have been introducing since the beginning of this section to the ways Greece’s international creditors—the EC, the ECB and the IMF—publically conceptualized, framed, stages and eventually legitimized their neoliberal politics of debt. The Economist two days before the eurogroup that happened on February 20 2017 published an article that referred to another one of what Derrida would call Marx’s specters. According to the article “If history repeats itself first as tragedy then as farce, it continues thereafter as endless
iterations of Greek dramas.” 30 In the rest of the section I will closely examine the public concepts and language that Greece’s international creditors used in order to stage these dramas in the name of a vague and frequently unethical notion of “payback ethos.”

When on June 28 2015 the left government of SYRIZA froze the negotiations with Greece’s international creditors and called for a Greek referendum that asked from the Greek people to say either “Yes” or “No” to the austerity measures “suggested” by Greece’s international creditors, IMF, EC and ECB representatives kept bombarding public and institutionalized stages with narratives according to which the “trust” between Greece and its creditors was broken. Although the list of examples is seemingly inexhaustible for now I would like to focus on the statements that Jean-Claude Juncker—the president of the European Commission—made during the first European Commission conference on the Greek referendum. He publically stated that he feels “betrayed” and that the Greek government did not act based on the “True European Spirit, based on rules, based on mutual trust” 31 As I argued earlier in this section for Marx this kind of demand of performing “trust” becomes a permanent means of political leverage.

But the question is not if Juncker’s perception of “trust” and “ethos” demands “and the weak suffer what they must”—borrowing a phrase from Thucydides—kind of performances. The question is how this perception of “ethos”—an “ethos” that does not disrupt the already existing unethically asymmetrical power relations—finds its way into the memorandums, austerity measures and structural reforms that not just Greece’s international creditors, but also the European North, impose not just on Greece but also

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30 The economist. “Greece’s creditors are now the main impediment to solving the country’s woes” February 18 2017 http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21717043-biggest-difference-now-between-imf-and-europeans-greeces-creditors-are-now-main
on the European South. After the Greek referendum of 2015, Greece’s international creditors publically framed the obligatory future steps that the left government of SYRIZA had to follow in terms of “trust rebuilt.” The president of the eurogroup Jeroen Disijjelbloem, the president of the European Council Donald Tusk, the president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, the Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, the finance minister of Germany Wolfgang Schaeuble: all stated that “the first goal is to rebuild trust in Greece”\textsuperscript{32} These narratives of “trust rebuild” defined the measures that the Greek government had to follow.

Greece’s international creditors inscribed this “trust rebuild” into the measures that they imposed on Greece. According to the official Euro Summit Statement in Brussels on July 12 2015 “The Euro Summit stresses the crucial need to rebuild trust with the Greek authorities for a possible agreement (...) given the need to rebuild trust with Greece, the Euro Summit welcomes the Greek authorities to legislate without delay a first set of measures (...) Immediately, and only subsequent to legal implementation [of those measures] may a decision to mandate the Institutions to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) be taken”\textsuperscript{33} In short, Greece’s European creditors publically conceptualize notions of “ethos” in terms of a “trust” that does not challenge the unethically asymmetrical power relations between Greece and its international creditors. Furthermore they inscribe this “ethos” into the memorandums that they impose on Greece. The word memorandum, as one etymology suggests, comes from the root memorare: to remember.


\textsuperscript{33} EUROSUMMIT, “Euro Summit Statement Brussels, 12 July 2015”
This is exactly the thought process that I introduced earlier in this section. Let me recount my steps: I argued that Marx conceptualized the “immorally” asymmetrical—to paraphrase Marx—creditor/debtor power relations in terms of an ethos of a “vile and egoistic” (Marx, 2009: 29) trust. I also argued that Nietzsche conceptualized the “inscription” of this “ethos of trust” in terms of a production of “mnemotechnics”: a production that through its inscription makes sure to “build a memory for the man” (Nietzsche, 2013: 37) Also a production that makes sure to “hypnotize” (37) concepts, language and ideas that challenge this specific production of inscription. This is what Deleuze and Guattari meant when they argued that within the capitalist regime “society is not exchangist, the socius is inscriptive” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 185). Furthermore for Deleuze “memorandum […] is at the same time afflicted with an essential forgetting, in accordance with that law of transcendental exercise which insists that what can only be recalled should also be empirically impossible to recall” (Deleuze 1994: 140). This is why earlier I drew upon Havel’s memorandum and argued that memoranda produce memory that is not memory and that is rendered memory by force only to be forgotten as the new status quo. Furthermore this is exactly what I define as “ethography”: a synthesis of vague notions of “ethos” that not only never challenge the unethically asymmetrical creditor/debtor power relations but also inscribe those power relations onto texts that end up having the validity of a law.

Within frames of 21st century European Union this production of “ethography” is related to the production and perpetuation of two kinds of narratives. The first one has to do with the “hypnotic” aspect of this “ethography” in terms of blocking the production of alternative conceptual solutions. These kinds of narratives are widely known as various
versions of the Thatcherian There Is No Alternative (TINA); Thatcher used to say that “there is no alternative” to market economy. EU’s representatives are currently reclaiming these narratives in order to convince everyone that neoliberalism is the only solution.

The second one has to do with the “exceptional” –to paraphrase Agamben—aspect of the law production that occurs within the European Union. Although EU’s “exceptional” law production will be the main focus of the next chapter where I will extensively elaborate on performances of resistance, for now I would like to argue that within frames of 21\textsuperscript{st} century European Union the decision making processes happen within “informal bodies”\textsuperscript{34}, like the eurogroup, that are not minuted, are not answerable to any nationally elected parliament and have more power than the institutional formations of the European Union. As Agamben reminds, this kind of “exceptional” aspect of law production is characterized by the “provisional abolition of the distinction among legislative, executive, and juridical powers” (Agamben 2005: 8). This “exceptional” aspect of the law production that occurs within frames of 21\textsuperscript{st} century European Union challenges the stories that neoliberalism tells itself—including the stories Greece’s international creditors tell themselves—regarding the boundaries between the political and the economical.

As I briefly argued in the previous section 21\textsuperscript{st} century neoliberal Europe is a surplus economy. This means that EU needs to create the political circumstances that can support, produce and reproduce this kind of surplus economy. This is what Noam Chomsky meant when, during his public “No debate” in New York public library on

\textsuperscript{34} European Council, Council of the European Union “Eurogroup”
April 27 2016 with Greece’s former minister of finance Yianis Varoufakis, he argued that, “neoliberalism is not liberal and is not new.” As one can see in the examples that I mentioned earlier regarding the ways that Greece’s international creditors publically conceptualize, frame, stage and eventually legitimize their politics of debt, “measures” that are agreed during “informal” European meetings are imposed onto nationally elected parliaments.

Greece’s international creditors claim to separate the political sphere from the sphere of economy. During his press conference on the Greek referendum of 2015 the president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker stated that he “worked together with Jeroen Dijsselbloem for talks on a more political level as was the wish of the Greek authorities. This was not left to anonymous technocrats” But Juncker’s understanding of the “political” was not an understanding that focused on the decision-making processes but an understanding that focused on the implementation of the decisions that had already been made. Within 21st century neoliberal Europe the separation between the political sphere and the sphere of economy is an illusion, a mask. That’s why according to Deleuze and Guattari “There has never been a liberal capitalism” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 253) If Deleuze and Guattari are right, then where can revolutionary resistance perform? This will be the main question of the next chapter.

Chapter 2: Dromocratic Democracies

2.1 Affirming Negation and Negating Affirmation: The “YES” and the “NO”

Demonstrations Before the Greek Referendum of 2015

On June 28\textsuperscript{th} 2015 the newly elected Greek Prime Minister and President of SYRIZA Alexis Tsipras froze the negotiations with Greece’s international creditors and called for a Greek referendum scheduled for the 5\textsuperscript{th} of July of 2015. According to Tsipras’s announcement the referendum would ask the citizens of Greece whether they accept (NAI, YES vote) or reject (OXI, NO vote) the most recent proposal of austerity measures “suggested” by Greece’s international creditors. On Friday July 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2015 two different and massive demonstrations were staged in the city of Athens: the NAI (YES) demonstration and the OXI (NO) demonstration. Those who intended to vote YES joined the YES demonstration and those who intended to vote NO joined the NO demonstration.

The directorial and dramaturgical choices of the two demonstrations were, of course, completely different. The YES demonstration used the Παναθηναϊκό Στάδιο (Panathenaic Stadium) also known as Καλιμάρμαρο (Kalimarmaro) as its stage in order to perform the Europeanness that the demonstration’s “NAI: Μένουμε Ευρώπη” (YES: We are staying in Europe) slogan implicated. The Panathenaic Stadium served as the perfect stage for that performance of Europeanness for two reasons: One, it very clearly played back to the “neoliberalization” of a constructed ancient Greece (or, more accurately of many constructed ancient Greeks) that serve as a means of embellishment and thus legitimization of the infinite cruelty of European neoliberal politics; two, within frames of Olympian culture (frames that are very often founded upon and associated with notions of extreme nationalism and that very often flirt with right-wing and far-right politics) this specific stadium is “admired” and “celebrated” as the last Greek venue from
where the Olympic flame is handed over to the country/host of the Olympic games.

Therefore, by using the Panathenaic Stadium as its stage, the “YES” demonstration not only perpetuated but also counted on perpetuating the highly problematic narratives that frame Greece as an origin of Western civilization in order to convince the rest of Europe that it wouldn’t be able to maintain its “Westness” without Greece.

The political orientation of the “YES We Are Staying in Europe” demonstration was clearly a right-wing one. The demonstration was organized around speeches given by right-wing organizations and by voters and representatives of New Democracy. Furthermore, various Greek singers who have publically demonstrated their support for Greece’s political right performed during the demonstration. In addition to its right-wing orientation the “YES” demonstration was founded upon a non-literal reading of the question that the upcoming Greek referendum of July 2015 was going to address.

According to this reading—a reading that was very common among various representatives of Greece’s official opposition and of the European Union as well as the majority of Greek press and media—a “YES” vote at the upcoming referendum would imply that Greece chooses to leave the euro—a process known as Grexit—and to return to δραχμή (drachma). As stated by one of the many facebook posts of the demonstration “The referendum […] asks us to choose between [saying] YES or NO to the common European currency, YES or NO to Europe. The dilemma is not [about voting] YES or NO to the proposal suggested by the government or by TROIKA” (Το Ποντίκι 2015). It is because of this kind of framing of the YES demonstration—especially because of its clear right-wing orientation—that I contend that this specific demonstration renders perceptible, and thus helps us grasp, the often very carefully concealed interdependencies
between various national political rights of Europe and 21st century European neoliberalism.

Although I will closely elaborate on the concealed interdependencies between various national political rights of Europe on a level of nation-state and 21st century European neoliberalism in the third section of this chapter for now I would like to briefly define the latter. Throughout both this chapter and dissertation I understand 21st century European neoliberalism as a debt economy that mainly profits from the—mostly always virtual—surplus value of indebted public life: health, education, access to water, electricity etc. Furthermore, as argued in the Anti-Prologue and Chapter 1, I contend that the European economy of debt is founded upon the asymmetrical power relations between certain nation-states that perform as creditors and certain nation-states that perform as debtors. Therefore the public life—the life of δήμος (demos, public)—that 21st century European neoliberalism puts in debt is always-already organized in creditor/nation-states and debtor/nation-states.

It is because of its profiting from indebting the nationally organized public life that the current European economy needs strong nation-states since, within frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe, it is the nation-states that are rendered responsible for applying the measures imposed by the EU and for making sure that certain public lives are profitably indebted. In this respect, we have a very clear conceptual sense of how the nation-state performs—what function it serves—within the structures of European neoliberalism. Consequently, the European Union is not opposed to the conceptual formation of the nation-state. On the contrary it needs it. This is a direct criticism of narratives and discourses that understand and promote the neoliberal European Union as
a market economy that is slowed down by the nation-state. This is exactly what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they write in *Anti-Oedipus*, “There has never been a liberal capitalism […] The State is thus induced to play an increasingly important role in the regulation of the axiomatized flows with regard to production and its planning the economy and its ‘monetarization’ and surplus value and its absorption (by the State apparatus itself)” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 253). For Deleuze and Guattari what is defined as “liberal free market”, is not “liberal”—which is also one Noam Chomsky’s most known arguments (Chomsky 1999)—it is not “free” and it is not “market.” On the contrary it needs the State in order to produce other kinds of flows of surplus value: flows that emerge from debt.

In *The Making of the Indebted Man* Maurizio Lazzarato offers a similar understanding of Deleuze and Guattari. For Lazzarato “Deleuze insists on the point: an economy has never functioned as a market economy. Regardless of the social structure, an economy includes exchange and makes exchange networks work on the basis of money as purchasing power solely as a function of another flow” (Lazzarato 2012: 83). Bridging the machinic philosophy of tragedy that the previous chapter introduced with this chapter’s argument that 21st century European neoliberalism and nation-state go together I contend that the synthesis of the neoliberal Europe with the formation of nation-state performs like a machine that produces the continuation and the disruption of flows of debt.

As I argued earlier within frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe the main target of that production of debt is public life. But very often that production of indebted public life is concealed beneath narratives and discourses that focus on a pseudo-oppositional
conflict between the market of the European Union and the nation-state. As very successfully—at least in my contention—Colin Crouch argues in *The Strange Non-death of Neoliberalism*, neoliberalism conceals putting public life in debt beneath masks that pretend that the actual tension lies between the free market, on the one hand, and the State on the other. According to Crouch,

> At the heart of the conundrum is the fact that actually existing, as opposed to ideologically pure, neoliberalism is nothing like as devoted to free markets as is claimed. It is rather devoted to the dominance of public life by the giant corporation. The confrontation between the market and the state that seems to dominate political conflict in many societies conceals the existence of this third force (Crouch 2011: 5).

Furthermore, for Crouch, the privatization of public life is simultaneously an indebtedization of public life. In a section of the same book titled “Privatized Keynesianism: Debt in Place of Discipline” Crouch writes, “The general buoyancy of [this] economy [is] being sustained by debt” (109). Drawing upon Crouch I argue that within the current frames of neoliberal Europe the question that resistance should be addressing is not Market VS State but Debt Economy VS Public Life.

> Using the State (κράτος) in order to put public life—the life of demos (demos, δῆμος)—in debt leaves that demos utterly dispossessed of its κράτος (state). Additionally performances of support of neoliberal politics—like the “YES” demonstration—do not challenge but on the contrary perpetuate and enhance demos’ dispossesion of its κράτος. As a result democracy is in danger. In such contexts, it is in fact difficult to envision democracy as an existing possibility. Earlier I made the case that the orientation of the
“YES We Are Staying in Europe” demonstration was clearly a neoliberal and a right-wing one. Additionally I contended that the “YES” demonstration was founded upon a non-literal reading of the question that the upcoming Greek referendum was going to address. Bridging these arguments with the thought process that I unfolded above I argue that by directly refusing to say “NO” to European production of indebtedness, the “YES” demonstration not only affirmed the presence of demos in a public space in terms of what in the previous chapter I defined as the negativity of the debtor but it also eliminated the main process of democracy: disagreement. For the “YES” demonstration the demos of a debtor/nation-state can only exist when it publically affirms both its condition of indebtedness and the dispossession of its κράτος (state).

Drawing upon the thought process that I unfolded above I contend that the “YES” demonstration lays the ground for us to identify the shared ground between Greece’s right-wing politics—and thus any praxis of “resistance” that is founded upon these politics—and the elimination of democracy in 21st century European neoliberalism. This is of great importance because within frames of 21st century Europe national rights gain power by pretending to resist European neoliberalism when in fact they actually support it.

Although I will elaborate more on this matter in the third section of this chapter for now I would like to argue that the “YES” demonstration revealed this shared ground between national right-wing politics and European neoliberalism in three ways: one, by publically refusing to challenge European debt politics it affirmed Greece’s position within the European Union in terms of what in the previous chapter I described as the negativity of the debtor; two, it affirmed the demos’ dispossession of its κράτος (state)
since it chose to not even deal with the question of the referendum in literal terms; and three, it affirmed that within frames of 21st century European neoliberalism there is no space for a debtor/nation-state to directly say “NO” to a measure imposed by the European Union. The “YES We Are Staying in Europe” demonstration performed affirmation in terms of negation since it affirmed Greece’s position in Europe through Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors. As I argued in the first chapter of this dissertation when the debtor affirms its existence through its condition of indebtedness to their creditor this affirmative relation is an affirmative relation of negation.

The “NO” demonstration on the other hand performed negation in terms of celebratory affirmation of conflict and disagreement. The theatricality and the dramaturgical choices of the “NO” demonstration were completely different from the theatricality and the dramaturgical choices of the “YES” demonstration. The “NO” demonstration was staged on Syntagma (Σύνταγμα) Square—the Square that is right in front of the Greek Parliament and that in Greek means constitution.
Historically the Syntagma Square has performed and still performs as the stage for various uprisings, protests, occupations and demonstrations. The first one was the uprising of September 1843. On September 3rd, 1843 millions of Greek people and the army gathered outside the royal palace of King of Greece Otto—what today is the Greek Parliament—and forced the latter to grant a constitution. The Syntagma Square was named after the constitution that King Otto was forced to grant.

In terms of Athens’ spatiopolitical organization—the organization of the space of the polis—the Syntagma Square connects the Greek Parliament—the space that within frames of representative democracy is considered to be the space of the State (κράτος)—with the αρχαία αγορά (ancient market)—the space that within frames of direct democracy is considered to be the space of the demos (δήμος). Therefore the Syntagma Square performs as a constant material reminder that in representative democracy the demos (δήμος) is by default dispossessed of its κράτος (State) and thus that the democracy (δημοκρατία) that we know and experience is more undemocratic than it is democratic.

The utter un-democratization of democracy conducted and legitimized in the name of democratization is probably one of the biggest, not to say the biggest, challenge democracy has to face in 21st century Neoliberal Europe. For many scholars who focus on the interlinkages between neoliberalism and the elimination of democracy, the latter lies in the economization, liberalization and free-marketization of the political. In *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution* Wendy Brown argues that, “neoliberal reason, ubiquitous today in statecraft and the workplace, in jurisprudence, education, culture and a vast range of quotidian activity is converting the distinctly
political character, meaning and operation of democracy’s constituent elements into economic ones” (Brown 2015: 17). But as argued above understanding the “undoing” of democracy—to paraphrase Brown—in terms of conceptual separation of the sphere of the political from the sphere of economy brings us back to the Market VS State question which, as I also contented above, is a question that ends up serving neoliberalism since it conceals the Debt Economy VS Public Life question.

Throughout this chapter I argue that it is not the economization of the political that un-democratizes democracy and that abandons the demos completely dispossessed of its κράτος (state). In the next chapter I closely elaborate on the connections between neoliberalism, democracy and the spheres of the political and the economical. On the contrary here I am arguing that it is the “profitable”—at least on a level of clear intentions—indebtization of the demos—of the public life—by the European Union via the nation-state that continuously dispossesses demos of its κράτος (state) and therefore never ceases to put democracy in jeopardy.

By occupying Syntagma Square as its stage—a square that as I already described is spatiopolitically designed to remain inbetween the space of the state (Greek Parliament) and the space of the demos (ancient market) without really fully belonging in any of these two spaces—the “NO” demonstration claimed a new space for a new mergence of the demos and the state. Throughout this dissertation I understand the mergence of the demos with the state as a blurring of the demos with the state (with its κράτος) that; one, does not homogenize and erase difference but allows new differences to emerge; two, that resists any impositions of externally oriented wholes; and three, as a constant process of becoming where none of the merged elements exceeds the others.
Going back to the “NO” demonstration, I contend that the “NO” demonstration publically and collectively conceptualized this innovative mergence of the demos and the state as a praxis of resistance against the indebtization of the demos by the EU via the state. Earlier I argued that the theatricality and the dramaturgical choices of the “NO” demonstration were, as expected, completely different from the theatricality and the dramaturgical choices of the “YES” demonstration. In the paragraphs above I focused on the connections between the staging of the “NO” demonstration and public conceptualizations of resistance oriented around a new mergence of the demos and the state. In the comments which follow, I am tracing the conceptualizations of resistance that the “NO” demonstration introduced in terms of its script, performance and affect.

In terms of its script, the “NO” demonstration was framed around a very literal reading of the question “do you reject or approve the proposal made to Greece by the EC, ECB and IMF during the eurogroup of June 25th 2017” that the upcoming Greek referendum was going to address. As opposed to what happened in the case of the “YES” demonstration, the literal reading of the upcoming referendum’s question performed by the “NO” demonstration not only directly rejected the non-democratic indebtization of the demos by the EU via the nation-state—an indebtization that as argued above constantly hinders democracy—but also claimed the public space of the Syntagma Square in order to perform disagreement. At this point I would like to remind us that earlier I contented that the elimination of democratic potentialities in neoliberal Europe is founded upon the production of indebted public life and the elimination of space for disagreement. The “NO” demonstration challenged both the production of indebted
public life and the elimination of space for disagreement in ways that the demonstration itself claimed and created space for new democracies to emerge.

The establishment of space for the emergence of new democracies was also supported by the two slogans of the “NO” demonstration: “We Shall Stop Them with the No of Dignity, of Democracy, of Life” and “NO We Are Writing History.” According to the demonstration that creation of space for emerging democracies requires poetic praxis. Christos Thivaios—one of the many artists who performed during the “NO” demonstration and who have publically expressed their left orientations—publically replaced the production of indebtedness with praxis of ποίησις (poiesis, creation) by shouting into the microphone “because we owe more to our poets than we owe to our creditors.”

A few songs after Thivaios’ performance, the TV monitors that were placed around the Syntagma Square and that until this moment were live streaming the performances that were happening during the demonstration, started live streaming Alexis Tsipras who together with other ministers and elected parliamentarians of the SYRIZA-ANEL government, stepped out from Maximos Mansion—the official seat of the prime minister of Greece that is located right next to the Greek Parliament and the Syntagma Square—and joined the crowd of 20000 people that had gathered for the “NO” demonstration. When Tsipras made it to the demonstration the host of the demonstration Giorgos Kimoulis—one of the most respected Greek actors and someone who has also publically expressed their left orientations—introduced Tsipras by saying “Greece’s international creditors rejected the proposal submitted by SYRIZA because of five words:
Alexis Tsipras: Greece’s Prime Minister” implying that there is no space for political left and disagreement in the “democratic” frames of neoliberal Europe.

I contend that this whole process was a theatricalized mergence—a mergence in theasis, or, in other words a mergence designed to be seen and witnessed—of the demos with the state. In terms of affect that theatricalized mergence of the demos with the state was a celebratory affirmation of the disruption of the money flow that was coming both from Greece’s international creditors and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to Greece. One should take into serious consideration that after Tsipras’ called for the Greek referendum on June 28th 2015 the ESM stopped providing the Greek banks with money causing their immediate closure. On the day of the “NO” demonstration the banks had remained closed for a week. As a result people were not getting paid, grocery stores were running out of groceries, hospitals were running out of supplies etc. The banks remained closed until August 13th 2015, when Tsipras, in spite of Greek people’s resistance, ended up signing a third memorandum between Greece and its international creditors.

Let me recount my steps. In the comments above I described how by publically and collectively saying “NO”, the “NO” demonstration celebrated disagreement and conflict in terms of affirmation in ways that within frames of 21st century European neoliberalism—frames that as I have been arguing since the beginning if this dissertation eliminate any space for conflict and disagreement hindering democracy—created space for new democracies to emerge. In contrast to the “YES” demonstration, the “NO” demonstration refused by directly saying “NO” to imposed indebtedness, to define resistance in terms of what in the previous chapter I defined as the negativity of the debtor.
At this point I would like to argue that refusing defining resistance negatively brings us to a new affirmation. Furthermore I argued that through theatricalizing the mergence between the demos (δήμος) and the state (κράτος) the “NO” demonstration not only created the space for new democracies (δημοκρατία) to emerge but also introduced a new subject of resistance. Finally, I made the case that this revolutionary subject of resistance that came from the theasis of a new synthesis of the demos with the state had a direct affect in the continuation and the disruption of money and debt flows produced by both the Greek nation-state and Greece’s international creditors.

In the next two sections I further elaborate on these revolutionary aspects of the “NO” demonstration. I argue that we currently lack the theoretical tools that can grasp and clearly address the efficacy of the future-life, in terms of resistance, of these aspects. I draw upon the works of Deleuze and Guattari in order to propose theoretical tools that in my contention can fill this discursive void. I trace this void on two different levels: on a level of language and theories of performatives and on a level of performance theory and performance as a process of production of new subjects of resistance that can actually challenge 21st century European Neoliberalism. Finally, in the third section of this chapter I will closely examine how the tension between the “YES” and the “NO” demonstrations echoes the “YES” of Creon and the “NO” of Antigone in Jean Anouilh’s Antigone.
2.2 The “NO” of the “NO” Demonstration and Greek Referendum: Celebrating an Infelicitous Performative

According to the results of the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 the turnout was 62.5%: a turnout that far exceeded the turnout of the Greek snap legislative elections of January 2015, which was 56.6%. Some 61.31% of the referendum’s voters voted “NO” rejecting the austerity measures “suggested” by Greece’s international creditors; 38.69% voted “YES” and only 5.8% of the votes were blank or invalid. In spite of Greek people’s vote and resistance—as described earlier the Greek banks had remained closed and thus money stopped circulating for approximately two and a half months—on July 13th 2015, the Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras and the government of SYRIZA-ANEL ended up agreeing to a third memorandum of understanding between Greece and Greece’s international creditors. On August 13th 2015 the Greek Parliament approved that memorandum agreement.

Why did such a decisive vote ultimately perform in ways that were clearly at odds with the expressed wishes of the voters? This is the question that this section addresses. In the comments which follow I draw upon the tensions between J. L. Austin’s notion of “happy performative” and Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of “order word” and “collective assemblage of enunciation” in order to introduce theoretical tools that shed light on the successful aspects of that “NO” so that the latter lay the ground for new praxis of resistance and democracies to emerge.

Let me start with J. L Austin and his theory on performatives. J. L. Austin made explicit that to say something is to do something. As Lazzarato writes J. L. Austin helps us understand how “the enunciation accomplishes rather than describes an action”
In How To Do Things With Words Austin writes, “The term performative […] indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action” (Austin 1967: 6). But Austin points out that uttering is not enough. On the contrary for Austin,

it is always necessary that the circumstance in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether ‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or even acts of uttering further words (8).

So although for Austin to say something is to do something this does not necessarily mean that the doing is in sync with the implicit or explicit intention of the saying. In order for that sync to be achieved the uttering needs to take place in “appropriate” and commonly shared contexts and settings that would trigger a certain continuation of expected and proper actions.

In addition to the importance of the proper contexts and settings Austin also emphasizes the importance of the “properness” of the uttering subject. He specifically writes, “The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked” (34). Furthermore, for Austin, if the performative is not performed within proper contexts, in proper ways and by proper subjects it is doomed to remain “unhappy” and “infelicitous.” Austin calls “the doctrine of the things that can be and go wrong on the occasion of such utterances, the doctrine of Infelicities” (14). The very crucial question that in my contention emerges from Austin’s thought process asks what happens when the intention of the performative is to challenge
and change the expected, materially crystalized and structuralized and naturalized even properness of the contexts within the performative is performed, of the ways in which the performative is performed and finally, of the subject by which the performative is performed? What happens when the intention of the performative is to succeed in not being properly performed? In other words what happens when the intention of the performative is to affirm and celebrate its—to paraphrase Austin—“unhappiness” and “infelicity”?

In order to answer the questions addressed above I would like to understand the “NO” of the “NO” demonstration and the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 through Austin’s lens. Before doing that I would like to closely elaborate on the contexts, on the ways and on the subjects that 21st century neoliberal European Union and, most importantly, 21st century neoliberal eurozone considers proper. As I have been arguing throughout the previous chapter, in the 21st century’s neoliberal European Union and eurozone the proper context for any decision-making processes is the eurogroup which according to the Consillium Europa official webpage is “an informal body where the ministers of the euro area member states discuss matters relating to their shared responsibilities related to the euro” (Consillium Europa). Furthermore, according to the same official web-page, “The eurogroup usually meets once a month, on the eve of the Economic and Financial Affairs and Council meeting. The commissioner for economic and financial affairs, taxation and customs and the president of the European Central Bank also participate in the eurogroup meetings” (Consillium Europa). What the official definition of the eurogroup leaves out is that this “informal body of meetings” is not minuted and most importantly not answerable to any elected parliament.
It is because of eurogroup’s “informality” that the latter has more power than any other formally recognized institutional formation of both the European Union and the eurozone. But the eurogroup’s structural and institutional informality does not stop at the eurogroup. It spreads to other levels and formations like for instance the euro-working group: the eurogroup’s sub-cabinet. During their public debate at the New York Public Library, a few months after Varoufakis “resigned” from being Greece’s minister of finance, Noam Chomsky and Yianis Varoufakis had the following dialogue:

- Yianis Varoufakis: […] there is the real ruler of the European Union, a gentleman named Thomas Wieser, nobody’s heard of him, he holds the real power.
- Noam Chomsky: What is his position?
- Yianis Varoufakis: He is the head of the Euro Working Group which is the cabinet under the Eurogroup
- Noam Chomsky: The nonexistent group
- Yianis Varoufakis: They are the shadow cabinet of the nonexistent Eurogroup […]
- Noam Chomsky: How does the Eurogroup get established? […]
- Yianis Varoufakis: I think it just sprung out, out of the shell like, you know, Aphrodite in Cyprus […] (Yianis Varoufakis 2016)

According to the current structure of neoliberal European Union and eurozone the properness of the contexts within which a performative takes place is founded upon non-democratic vagueness.
The same non-democratic vagueness haunts the “proper” ways in which a performative is supposed to be performed in order to be a successful performative—or in Austin’s words a happy performative—within contexts of the European Union and the eurozone. One would expect that if the European Union is as democratic as it claims to be that a referendum would be the most proper way for an utterance to be performed. But right after Tsipras called for the referendum the majority of European leaders publically rejected Tsipras’ decision as a “loss of the shared trust” between Greece and its international creditors. One of the many examples was President Donald Tusk’s remarks on July 13th 2015 right after prime minister Tsipras ended up signing a third memorandum of understanding between Greece and its international creditors. President Tusk specifically said, “I welcome the progress and the constructive position of Greece that helps to bring back trust among eurozone partners” (European Council 2015). So, within non-democratic European contexts, referendums—the demos direct participation in decision-making processes—are considered to disrupt the trust that the creditors show to their debtors so that the debtors never challenge the asymmetrically non-resolvable creditor/debtor power relations.

Within non-democratic European contexts that, as I have already argued, are founded upon the production of surplus value that emerges from the asymmetrically non-resolvable creditor/debtor power relations, the demos of a debtor/nation-state is only included in order to pay the imposed debt and the government—or in other words the State—of a debtor/nation-state is only included in order to implement on a national level the measures decided by the creditors. Therefore, within in this kind of debt economy, the only proper subjects that can perform an utterance happily and successfully are the
creditors: hence the participation of the European Central Bank in the “nonexistent” and “informal” body of the eurogroup.

Let me summarize the contexts, the ways and the subjects that the 21st century’s neoliberal European Union and most importantly 21st century neoliberal eurozone considers “proper” for an utterance to succeed: the context is the nonexistent and non-transparent informal space of the eurogroup; the ways are the ways of the creditors that utterly exclude the demos of the debtor/nation-states and the subjects are the creditors that utterly exclude the elected governments of the debtor/nation-states. Keeping Austin’s arguments in mind, one legitimately could argue that both the “NO” demonstration and the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 did everything wrong. Instead of the “informal” body of the eurogroup that excludes the demos, the “NO” demonstration chose the public squares, parks and streets of Greece and the referendum as the setting of elections that is founded upon the demos for their contexts. Both the “NO” demonstration and the Greek referendum chose the way of the newly introduced mergence of the demos with the State and not the way of the creditors.

This is where we come back to the initial question that this section addressed: How does a performative succeed in its improper performance and production? How can it challenge the properness within which this specific performative is expected and/or demanded to perform while remaining in sync with its direct intentions? To phrase that question in terms of the “NO” of the “NO” demonstration and Greek referendum, how could that “NO” succeed in saying “NO” to the condition of indebtedness imposed on Greece by its international creditors and simultaneously revolutionize and actually replace the informal and non-democratic space of the eurogroup with Greece’s public
spaces and elections, on the one hand, and the creditors with this newly introduced emergent of the demos with the state, on the other?

Within the larger context of this chapter’s arguments, this question reveals the limitations of Austin’s theory. Granted, by getting really close to understanding change and transformation in terms of one’s affirmative failure to adjust to structuralized contexts and ways that one wants to challenge, Austin succeeds in not falling into the structure VS agency trap that has haunted and monopolized European discursive production of theory for more than one century. Still, he never elaborates on intentional change or its efficacy. Lazzarato articulates, and in a way summarizes, that critique very clearly when in Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity writes, “What is strongly emphasized [in Austin’s theory] is the ‘conventional’ function of language as a reproduction of social obligations, in other words, its function of reproducing already instituted social relations” (Lazzarato 2014: 171). But how do we get from there to change? How do we get from there to a “NO” of a demonstration or a referendum that succeeds in its resistance?

Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Austin in order to take Austin towards a different direction. In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia they argue that Austin’s famous theses clearly demonstrate that the various extrinsic relations between action and speech by which a statement can describe an action in an indicative mode or incite it in an imperative mode etc are not all there is. There are also intrinsic relations between speech and certain actions that are accomplished by saying them (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 77).
So for Deleuze and Guattari Austin’s emphasis on the performative aspects of communication does not just reveal the extrinsic or external relations between speech and action—what Lazzarato describes as “already instituted social relations”—but it also underscores the sense in which a performative, in order to succeed, must both rely on and produce “implicit or non-discursive presuppositions” (77) that are commonly shared and left unsaid. This concept can be identified as an “unspoken performative.”

In Deleuze and Guattari’s work, this implicit aspect—in terms of unsaid non-discursiveness—of a performance of any kind of utterance becomes the concept of order-word. For the authors of *A Thousand Plateaus* order-words are “not a particular category of explicit statements (for example, in the imperative), but the relation of every word or every statement to implicit presuppositions, in other words, to speech acts that are and can only be accomplished in the statement” (79). What I contend is of particular importance here is the relationally internal aspect of this implicitness. It is because of the internality of the implicit that the latter lays the ground for conceptualizations and praxes of resistance that are not founded upon imposed externalities.

One could argue that this is the ultimate manifestation of self-governmentality. I, on the contrary, contend that this is not the case for two reasons: one, because “order-word” grasps internality in its emergence and production and not in its enclosing, two, because “order-word” is never one but always many. Deleuze and Guattari argue, “the relation between the statement and the act is internal, immanent, but it is not one of identity” (79). And they add, “indirect discourse is not explained by the distinction between subjects; rather, it is the assemblage, as it freely appears in this discourse, that explains all the voices present within a single voice” (80). Therefore the collective
production of the internal relationality and implicitness of an “order-word” assembles all the multiplicities—all the different implicit significations, meanings etc—together without organizing them under an external authority of the whole.

Why “order-word” then? Why include “order” in the conceptualization of the latter? As argued earlier, Deleuze and Guattari drew upon Austin in order to push Austin in a different direction. In *How to Do Things With Words* Austin writes, “both grammarians and philosophers have been aware that it is by no means easy to distinguish even questions, commands, and so on from statements by means of the few and jejune grammatical marks available, such as word order, mood, and the like […]” (Austin 1965: 1). What Austin implies here is that it is impossible to isolate an explicit statement from its implicit undertones that relate for instance to mood and word order. Through their concept of “order-word” Deleuze and Guattari place particular emphasis on the obligatory aspect of that implicitness; an implicitness that is both collectively produced and always multiple.

In Deleuze and Guattari’s works that collectively produced and always multiple aspect of the “order-words” transforms into the concept of the “collective assemblage of enunciation.” For Deleuze and Guattari “the order-words or assemblages of enunciation in a given society (in short the illocutionary) designate this instantaneous relation between statements and the incorporeal transformations or non-corporeal attributes they express” (81). And they add, “The notion of collective assemblage of enunciation takes on primary importance since it is what must account for the social character” (80). But this social character is founded upon internal relations and internal relations only. The minute these relations become externally imposed they no longer are either collective or
assemblages since they establish hierarchies. I contend that Deleuze and Guattari came up with the concepts of “order-word” and “collective assemblage of enunciation” not only in order to fill Austin’s gap—the one Lazzarato points out regarding the perpetuation of the existing structures—but also in order to grasp the emergence of collective, non-hierarchical and always multiplied performances of utterances of resistance.

I contend that the “NO” of the “NO” demonstration and the Greek referendum falls under this category of collective, non-hierarchical and always multiplied performances of utterances of resistance. As described above that “NO” was produced by the theatricalized mergence of the demos with the state. One could argue that this “NO” was a response to a governmental call. But even if this was the case both the demos and the state recalibrated themselves during this theatricalized mergence. The crowd of the 20000 people that gathered on Syntagma square in order to merge with the state and collectively dramatize their resistance included citizens, non-citizens, supporters of both the far left and the far right, immigrants, refugees as well as many elected parliamentarians that belonged to a wide range of political parties.

Each one was performing their own “NO”. But just like Deleuze and Guattari argue in A Thousand Plateaus “rather, it is the assemblage […] that explains all the voices present within a single voice” (80). The “NO” of the far-right was completely different from the “NO” of the far-left, the “NO” of the citizens was completely different from the “NO” of the non-citizens, the “NO” of the immigrants was completely different from the “NO” of the refugees, the “NO” of the government of SYRIZA was different from the “NO” of the rest of the parties of the parliament and so on. Both the “NO”
demonstration and the Greek referendum were celebratory and collective performances of all the multiple versions of all these “NOs.” Going back to the interlinkages between Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari that this dissertation’s Anti-Prologue introduced I contend that these celebratory and collective performances of these “multiplicities” of the “NO” reveal the non-dialectical aspects of the latter.

Grasping the non-dialectical aspects of all the “NO” multiplicities is important because, as argued in the Anti-Prologue, this kind of grasping does not limit the conceptual planning of resistance in frames of reactionary negation that is one, externally related to what it resists against and two, ends up perpetuating what it resists against. Drawing upon the previous chapter’s thought process I contend that the “NO” performative that was performed by the theatricalized mergence of the demos with the state did not succeed in being unhappy because the state ended up removing itself from its mergence with demos. Furthermore, the state also decided to turn the unhappy “NO”—an unhappiness that, as argued, entailed the joy of affirmation—to a happy “NO”—a happiness that, as also argued, entailed the misery of negation—in order to fit the frames of European debt economy. The next section elaborates further on the kind of resistance that can be potentially performed by a different mergence of the demos with the state.

2.3 Dromocratic Democracies: Demos and the State on the Dromos

In the previous section I described how in the midst of the Greek bailout referendum 2015 the demos merged with the state and the state merged with the demos in order for this mergence—a mergence that was very theatricalized—to say “NO” to Greece’s international creditors. As I also argued above the performance of this “NO”
utterance was collective non-hierarchical and multiplied. This section puts this
demos/state mergence within contexts of 21st century European neoliberalism and
European debt economy in order to closely examine the efficacy of the demos/state
mergence as a resisting and potentially revolutionary agent.

As I have been arguing since the beginning of this dissertation, the 21st century
European debt economy is founded upon asymmetrically non-resolvable creditor/debtor
power relations. Within frames of this economy the demos is only included in order to be
the infinite tax-payer, and the state is only included in order to implement the measures
decided among and by the creditors. Therefore the relations between EU formations on
the one hand and the demos of a nation-state and the nation-state on the other are not just
relations of power differentials but also relations of dependency. Earlier I drew upon
Crouch in order to demonstrate how these relations of dependency are hidden beneath
Market VS State narratives.

It is worth returning to Crouch in order to further elaborate on these relations of
both power differentials and dependency between EU formations on the one hand and the
demos of debtor/nation-states and debtor/nation-states on the other. In the Strange Non-
death of Neoliberalism Crouch argues that while “neoliberalism claims to be about free
markets” (Crouch 2011:2) that’s not really case. For Crouch one of the most indicative
examples that support this argument was the financial crisis of 2008: when the markets
and most importantly the banks collapsed and it was decided that the nation-states, and
most importantly the low and middle classes of the demos of these nation-states, should
save both the market and the banks. Crouch writes, “Although it was the behavior of the
banks that caused the 2008-9 crisis, they emerged from it more powerful than before.
They were considered so important to the early twenty-first-century economy that they had to be protected from the consequences of their own folly” (1). And he adds, “Whereas the financial crisis concerned banks and their behavior, resolution of the crisis has been redefined in many countries as a need to cut back, once and for all, the welfare state and public spending [therefore the banks] depended in part on the contributions of taxpayers to the rescue operation” (1-2). Although it might sound a bit over-simplistic, for the banks to be “saved” certain nation-states had to be in more debt so that the former could absorb the surplus value of this debt-production.

According to Crouch this relation between the banks and the market, on the one hand, and indebted nation-states on the other, is a relation of “interdependency”(8-9). That “interdependency” is performed at the expense of public life and social rights: “The European Union held to a model of balancing a competitive economy against strong social rights as a so-called ‘European social model’”(18). Furthermore, according to this model, in order for that “competitive economy” to thrive public life—the life of demos—needs to put in debt. Therefore, as argued earlier, the tension is not between the supposedly “free” market and the static state, but between the supposedly “free” market and public life. In other words EU needs the nation-state in order to put its demos in debt.

It is because of these relations of dependency that I contend that discourse that perpetuates the Market VS State tension falls right back into the neoliberal trap. This is why I find Deleuze and Guattari’s work particularly important. One of the most important contributions of Deleuze and Guattari to political theory is their understanding of capitalism as a “state capitalism” that is founded upon the state’s “capturing” of the surplus value that emerges from taxes, rent and profit—in other words from debt—and
not upon the market (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:442). In *A Thousand Plateaus*: 

*Capitalism and Schizophrenia* Deleuze and Guattari introduce a non-neoliberal oriented language that not only grasps both the relation of dependency between capitalistic formations—like for instance the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund—and the formation of the nation-state but that also articulates how this relation of dependency is built upon the production of debt. They specifically draw upon Marx in order to argue that, “Marx made the observation in the case of capitalism: there is a violence that necessarily operates through the State, proceeds the capitalist mode of production […] and makes possible the capitalist mode of production itself” (447). For Deleuze and Guattari the capitalist mode of production is interlinked with the production of debt. Furthermore the state is the one that is responsible for that production of debt. Within frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe though the formation of the nation-state looses its monopoly over the production of debt. Debt is now produced by creditors—like the European Central Bank or the International Monetary Fund—that need the formation of the nation-state so that the latter implements the decisions of the former. So the international creditors do nor replace but are dependent upon the formation of the nation-state.

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari grasp this specific interrelation of dependency through the concept of apparatus of capture: “we shall call [apparatuses of] Capture this difference or excess constitutive of profit, surplus labor, or the surplus product” (446). Furthermore, as they argue in *Anti-Oedipus* this praxis of capturing surplus “labor” and “product”—which in my contention is another way of saying surplus value—is a “system of cruelty” where “debt becomes infinite” (Deleuze and Guattari
And within this system of cruelty of the apparatuses of capture—which according to Deleuze and Guattari are rent, profit and taxation (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 442)—“capitalism has from the beginning mobilized a force of deterritorialization infinitely surpassing the deterritorialization proper to the State [which] has been deterritorializing to the extend that it makes the earth\(^{37}\) an object of its higher unity\(^{38}\), a forced aggregate of coexistence, instead of the free play of territories among themselves” (453). And they add, “Thus the States, in capitalism are not cancelled out but change form and take on a new meaning: models of realization for a worldwide axiomatic that exceeds them” (453-454). Within frames of 21\(^{st}\) century neoliberal Europe the international creditors exceed the formation of the nation-state but do not replace it. On the contrary they change the nation-state’s role.

It is because of that very critical and nodal position of the State that I contend that the mergence of the demos with the state that this section proposes can emerge as a resisting and revolutionary agent or subject that can actually challenge and disrupt frames of neoliberal capitalism. Bridging that contention to the unsuccessful and completely ignored “NO” of the NO demonstration and the Greek bailout referendum of 2015, it was the state that chose to leave its mergence with the demos and to go back to being a formation exceeded and used by Greece’s international creditors. In other words it was the state and not the demos that stopped being part of a potentially revolutionary agent that could actually challenge the frames of 21\(^{st}\) neoliberal Europe. It is important for us to remember that when the government of SYRIZA signed a third memorandum with

\(^{37}\) In the First Chapter I drew upon Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of Nietzsche in order to understand that process as a process of geopolitical inscription (graphein) on the face of the earth (γαία).  

\(^{38}\) in our case this supposed “higher unity” is the European Union
Greece’s international creditors, the banks of Greece had remained closed for almost one month. In spite of that the demos was ready to take its chances.

Let me elaborate more on the revolutionary potentialities that the demos/state mergence entails within frames of European debt economy. In order to do so I would like to draw upon Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of War Machine. Deleuze and Guattari’s War Machine should not be confused with military institutions. On the contrary Deleuze and Guattari argue that, “One of the fundamental problems of the State is to appropriate this war machine that is foreign to it and make it a piece in its apparatus, in the form of a stable military institution […]” (253). The War Machine is everything the State is not and for that reason the latter tries to pin it down—to “slow it down” in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms—and appropriate it. Earlier I argued that in the case of the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 the state chose to exceed its mergence with the demos and as a result was fully appropriated and defeated by Greece’s international creditors. In the next paragraphs I closely examine how Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of War Machine informs the notion of the mergence of the demos with the state that this dissertation introduces on a level of revolutionary praxes of resistance.

Although elaborating in detail on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the War Machine could be a topic for a whole another dissertation for now I would like to underline War Machine’s revolutionary capacities in terms of coexistence, movement and space:

The war machine, with infinitely lower ‘quantities’, has as its object not war but the drawing of a creative line of flight, the composition of a smooth space and of the movement of people in that space (456) […] but
the regime of the war machine is on the contrary that of affects, which relate only to the moving body in itself, to speeds and composition of speeds among elements (441).

Let me break down some of Deleuze and Guattari’s vocabulary here. As Eugene Young, Gary Genosko and Janell Watson remind us (Young, Genosko and Watson 2013), in *Dialogues*, Deleuze understands “lines of flight” as a “collective historical determination” (Deleuze 1997:23) and that in *Anti-Oedipus* lines of flight are translated as “lines of escape” (Young, Genosko and Watson 2013:81) because that specific concept intends to grasp “something that flows or flees, that escapes the binary organizations, the resonance apparatus […]” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 238). Furthermore in *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* Deleuze and Guattari describe “lines of flight” as processes “always repelled, always kept outside, moving too fast to really be captured” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 45). To sum up “lines of flight” are collective processes that both escape and challenge the status quo.

As I have been arguing throughout this chapter this is what the NO demonstration and the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 were about: about a collective process, shared among the demos and the state that intended to both escape and challenge the status quo. For Deleuze and Guattari the stage for these “lines of flight” is a “smooth space.” In Deleuze and Guattari’s work, a smooth space is a non-hierarchical space, or in Deleuze and Guattari’s words a “de-stratied space” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 474) that is not “instituted by the State apparatus” (474). Although smooth space is not a space instituted by the State “these two spaces” (474)—the smooth and de-stratied space, on the one hand and the space is that is instituted by the State on the other—need to exist “in
“mixture” (474-475) in order for the lines of flight to successfully produce affect: what, as Young, Genosko and Watson write, for Deleuze and Guattari, does not only entail “dynamic and kinetic relations between bodies” but also the “capacity for action and novelty” in terms of “an affirmation of the necessity of chance” (Young, Genosko and Watson 2013:61). So in order for an affect to be affective it needs to be produced by a collective revolutionary process (lines of flight), to take place on a smooth space that is both State and non-State instituted and to finally affirm the chance of novelty.

Going back to the main focus of this section, I contend that the theatricalized emergent of the demos with the state and the state with the demos that happened right before the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 effectuated everything Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of War Machine intends to effectuate: it was a collective process that intended to materially challenge the structures of 21st century European debt economy; it established a non-hierarchical space that was defined by both the demos and the state; and finally it introduced the demos/state mergence as the new and potentially efficacious resisting and revolutionary agent. The very crucial question that in my contention emerges asks how would that revolutionary agent look like?

In order to answer that question I would like to draw upon the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri since they very successfully ground Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts onto more materially concrete epistemological paradigms and come up with a state-form that can really challenge 21st century neoliberalism. In Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of State-Form—a book dedicated to Guattari—Hardt and Negri draw upon Deleuze and Guattari’s works on Nietzschean Dionysus in order introduce a new state theory. Quick parenthesis: in the first chapter of this dissertation titled “The Tragedy of
I argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of Nietzsche’s concept of Dionysus lays the ground for political praxis that can disrupt current frames of European debt economy. I contend that in *Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of State-Form* Hardt and Negri extend the Nietzsche-Deleuze and Guattari chain of Dionysean thought into a very tangible non-state state theory. Hardt and Negri’s main argument regarding the 21st century European nation-state is that the latter is founded upon an aporia,

The first and fundamental paradox (from which all of others derive) consists in the fact that, in the ideal type of this figure of the State, the
hegemony of civil society is made to serve in the absence of civil society itself [...] in order to affirm the preeminence of an idea of the image of civil society, the postmodern state [...] annuls every social power and obliges it to find meaning only in the form of the State (Hardt and Negri 1994: 268)

But for Hardt and Negri it is because the European nation-state—a formation that is a necessary part of European debt economy—uses the mask of a state with social rights in order to fully eliminate the social state—a thought process similar to the one that was introduced in the first chapter of this dissertation—that the realm of this pseudo-socius will fully disappear.

That disappearance of the realm of the pseudo-socius—what Hardt and Negri call “evacuation of the social”—will create space for the political to prevail. Hardt and Negri argue that, “the extinction of the social and the totalization of the political are given as a definitive result of capitalist development” (269). Hardt and Negri admit that an

39 In Hardt and Negri’s work civil society is the social state
argument like that is a “repetition of the traditional Marxist vision in that it sees the withering away of the State in the society of mature capitalism” (269). Additionally, according to Hardt and Negri this is the moment when “democracy is realized” (269). Let me clarify something very important. Hardt and Negri’s argument is not that full democracy and the domination of the political will emerge because capitalism is rotting.

On the contrary Hardt and Negri’s point is that the celebratory affirmation—which in their introduction they call “the practice of joy” which is an abstract reference to Nietzsche’s philosophy—of the fact that the absence of human, social and civil rights is founded upon masks of presence of human, social and civil rights is one of the main prerequisites for full democracy to actualize itself: for the demos and the state to be merged without anything exceeding them; neither notions of whole nor the state. In my contention that’s what Hardt and Negri mean when they say they trace “the Dionysian powers of the netherworld” (Preface). That’s what in my contention the “NO” demonstration and the Greek referendum intended to do. The state—the government of SYRIZA—decided to exceed the demos/state mergence and to turn “NO” into a “YES” to everything, as the first celebratory anniversary of the “NO” demonstration that took place on Syntagma square on July 3rd 2016 addressed. But the “NO” performed by the theatricalized mergence of the demos with the state remains.

I will further elaborate on that aspect of performance in the last part of this section where my focus is performance theory. For now I would like to closely examine what kind of spaces can stage these kinds of performances of resistance. Earlier I drew upon Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of smooth space in order to describe how the demos merged with the state in a non-state state space. I also briefly introduced interconnections
between this kind of spaces and notions of speed and mobility. As Deleuze and Guattari remind us Paul Virilio is really good at grasping that (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 1987). In Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology Virilio introduces the concepts of dromology and dromocracy: “there is no democracy, only dromocracy; there is no strategy, only dromology” (Virilio 1977: 69). What Virilio means is not that we need to replace the demos with the dromos—coming from the Greek δρόμος meaning street—but that the demos needs to take over multiple speeds, and to theatricalize this taking over of multiple speeds, in order for its resistance to be efficacious. Let me elaborate further on that since Virilio’s emphasis on the street allies with the site of the “YES” and “NO” demonstrations that have been the focus of this chapter.

According to Virilio what is unique in the case of the dromos is that it is the perfect spectacle of multiple speeds. Virilio writes, “the spectacle of the street is traffic […] movement of progression, of procession […] the street is like a new coastline and the dwelling a sea-port from which one can measure the magnitude of the social flow, predict its overflows […] situated between two speeds of transit, acting as brakes against the acceleration of the incursion” (33). This notion of staged multiple speeds brings us back to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of machine since both concepts grasp the production and the disruption of various flows.

I contend that the “NO” demonstration—just like Virilio’s dromos—was also in between two speeds. On the one hand, through the theatricalized, immediate mergence of the demos with the state it intensified the speed of the smooth space: what Deleuze and Guattari describe a “moving too fast to really be grasped” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 45). I think that an indicative “proof” of that kind of speed was EU not taking the
referendum into serious consideration. I also think that this imperceptible aspect of the
demos/state mergence provides the latter with revolutionary capacities that were left
fully unexplored because the government of SYRIZA decided to sign a third MOU
between Greece and Greece’s international creditors. On the other hand, the same
demonstration was a celebration of the slowing down of the money and debt flow from
and to Greece’s international creditors. As I described earlier in this section, during the
summer of 2015 the Greek banks remained closed for approximately 2.5 months.

Understanding street demonstrations in terms of multiple speeds helps us grasp the
relations between the streets and our lived material realities on a level of change, affect
and transformation. This kind of understanding challenges theories that consider street
demonstrations as separate spaces and processes that do not have the capacity to affect
the material realities around them.

This section defines as dromocratic democracies the democracies that unfold from
new mergences of the demos with the state on the street. The last question that this
section deals with asks what kind of performance theory can grasp the revolutionary
capacities of a new demos/state mergence that is staged on the streets: what this section
defines as dromocratic democracies. On a conceptual and ontological level the answer is
easy: those performance studies theories that don’t limit performance within linearly
oriented understandings of space and time but those that grasp performance in terms of
multiple affects and spatiotemporalities and that, most importantly, do address the
political stakes of that grasp within neoliberal contexts.

Earlier I described how in my contention the performance of the “NO” utterance
by the mergence of the demos with the state that happened in Greece right before the
Greek bailout referendum of 2015 was a performance of multiple affects and spatiotemporalities. That staging of the mergence of the demos with the state as a resisting and revolutionary agent calls for performance studies theories that do not simply understand performances of resistance in terms of state opposition. In *Social Works* Shannon Jackson argues that, “if our critical language only values agency when it is resisting state structures then we can find ourselves in an awkward position” (Jackson 2011:12). I think that the “NO” demonstration is the perfect example of that awkward position.

In order for performance studies theory to both conceptualize and grasp efficacious performance of resistance against neoliberalism it needs to put each performance in its neoliberal context. This in fact is what scholars like Maurya Wickstrom have suggested. In *Performance in the Blockades of Neoliberalism: Thinking the Political Anew*, Wickstrom argues that if we keep framing resistance in neoliberal language—a language that can very successfully appropriate notions of representation, identity, voicing the voiceless, visibility, majority etc—we end up enhancing neoliberal realms. Wickstrom writes,

[…] in my discomfort with the way in which theatre made about, for, or with refugees or asylum seekers—the displaced of the world—was almost always about their ‘plight’, almost always represented itself as giving ‘voice to the voiceless’, and advocated for these ‘victims’ through humanitarianism, human rights or development positions. For me, these practices were beginning to ring hollow […] what was and is missing from
them is what is obscured or misrecognized when it appears: a fundamental axiom of Equality (Wickstrom 2012: 2).

Although one might think that this quote is more suitable for the next chapter titled “Imperceptible Performances” because of the latter’s focus on the increased flows of people who flee their countries in order to stay alive I contend that Wickstrom’s point informs this chapter’s thought process in very important ways.

Wickstrom calls for performance studies discourse that reveals and challenges the neoliberal undertones and aspects of notions of representation, voicelessness, visibility/invisibility and so forth. In response to Wickstrom’s call, in this chapter I introduced connections between the works of Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri and Virilio in order to also argue that today, probably more than ever, we are in need of theorizations and conceptualizations of performances of resistance that intend to really destroy the most well crafted masks of neoliberalism.

The next and last section of this chapter—a section that performs as a non-concluding “epilogue” for the entire chapter—will focus on Elenis Efthimiou production of Jean Anouilh’s Antigone that took place in one of the spaces of the National Theatre of Greece during the summer of 2016. In my contention this particular production staged notions of state and time in ways that trigger theatre and performance studies discourse to engage in critical discussions that grasp the interrelations between time and the neoliberal formation of the nation-state.
2.4 Anouilh’s *Antigone* One Year After the “NO” of the Greek Bailout Referendum

The catchphrase of the one-year celebratory anniversary of the “NO” demonstration that took place on Syntagma Square on July 3rd of 2016 was: “SYRIZA turned our ‘NO’ to a ‘YES’ to everything.

Earlier I argued that the government of SYRIZA turned the unhappy “NO” performative into a happy performative, completely emptied from its revolutionary capacities because SYRIZA (the state) decided one, to distance itself from the demos/state mergence that both the “NO” demonstration and the Greek bailout referendum performed and two, to make the “NO” performative fit the non-democratic structures of EU’s debt-economy.

According to the program of *Antigone*: a play written by Jean Anouilh, directed by Eleni Efthimiou and produced as part of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival of 2016, The youth and the senility confront with each other in order to reveal a society [that is] scared […] Creon comes as a savior and says “YES” to authority and as a humble laborer [of authority] manages people (Πρόγραμμα Φεστιβάλ Αθηνών Επιδαύρου 2016: 111).
In the comments which follow, I argue that, through choosing as its stage one of the spaces that are usually run by the National Theatre of Greece, and through putting Creon’s negatively affirmatory “YES” within frames of multiple speeds, this particular production of Anouilh’s Antigone introduced relations between Anouilh’s text and Greece’s current realities in ways that revealed the interdependencies between the neoliberal version of nation-state and multiplicities of spatiotemporalities.

In order to elaborate on this argument I need to briefly talk about Anouilh’s text. I contend that Anouilh’s Antigone really challenges Hegel’s dialectical reading of the Sophoclean Antigone since the French playwright creates a non-dialectical and non-oppositional tension between Creon and Antigone. Creon on the one hand, just like it is stated in program of Efthimiou’s production, is the one who says “YES” to authority,

- Creon: One morning I woke up and I was King of Thebes. And God knows, I would have chosen anything but that, anything but power …
- Antigone: You could have said no
- Creon: I could. But, I would have seemed like a workman refusing a job, it wouldn’t have been honest. So I said yes.
- Antigone: Well that’s your problem. I haven’t said yes. What have your politics got to do with me, your politics and your pragmatism, your pathetic stories I can say “no” to whatever it is that I hate, and be responsible only to myself. But you, with your crown and your guards and your whole entourage, you have no choice but to put me to death … because you said “yes.” (Anouilh 2002: 31).
Antigone on the other hand dies fully dispossessed of her capacity to say “no” and also the one who dies in search of a “no.”

In Anouilh’s *Antigone* Creon kills Antigone because he wants not only to silence her no but most importantly to make her “no” irrelevant. While Antigone does everything in her power in order to say no,

- Antigone: I am here to say no to you and die (33)

Creon begs her to change her mind so that he does not have to kill her

- Creon: That’s too easy, saying no.
- Antigone: Not always.
- Creon: Oh yes it is. To say yes you have to roll your sleeves up and sweat and plunge both arms into like up to the elbow. Saying no is easy even if it means you have to die. All you have to do is wait, wait to go on living or wait to be killed. It is the coward’s way out

He does not authoritatively and directly forbid her to say “no.” He does not want to punish the no. Antigone wants her “no” to be punished. This is why Antigone says to him,

- Antigone: Don’t feel sorry for me. Don’t soften. Be strong. Do what I’m doing. Do what you have to do. And if you are human, do it quickly. That’s all I ask. I can’t be this brave forever.

Creon on the contrary does not want just to eliminate any possibility for a “no” to emerge but mainly to empty Antigone’s “no” of all its resisting and revolutionary capacities.

This is why according to Anouilh’s text both Polynices and Eteocles are,
- Creon: Two crooks, that’s all, plotting against us and against each other. Who murdered each other over a division of the spoils. With the difference that I, for reasons of state, had to make a hero out of one of them. So I had their bodies found on the battlefield. And we discovered them […] so I picked the more presentable corpse for my State funeral and ordered the other to be left where it lay. To be frank I don’t really know which was which. And guess what, I don’t really care. (36)

In Efthimiou’s production of Anouilh’s *Antigone* that emptying of Antigone’s “no” from all its resisting and revolutionary capacities by the state was staged in one of the spaces that belong to the National Theatre of Greece, or in other words the State Theatre of Greece: the space of the Rex theatre—which is a very old inside theatre. As part of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival 2016 the state space of the Rex theatre hosted Efthimiou’s production of Anouilh’s *Antigone*: a production that in my contention was a direct critique to “SYRIZA’s turning our ‘NO’ to a ‘YES’ to everything.” Furthermore, during the same Festival, the National Theatre of Greece staged Sophocle’s Antigone on the stage of the ancient theatre of Epidaurus.

So, during the summer of 2016 two different Antigones were running: one produced by the National Theatre of Greece and staged on the ancient theatre of Epidaurus, and one produced by Efthimiou and staged on the state space of the Rex theatre: an inside theatre space that the National theatre of Greece owned but not occupying. I was only able to go to Efthimiou’s production of *Antigone*. From even before I entered the theatre space I found particularly interesting that there was no poster
of the production outside the theatre. Additionally there was no program or playbill for sale and outside the theatre was kind of dark. Everything outside the theatre space felt as if it was dying. The same feeling was also conveyed inside the theatre space. Although it was the middle of July—summer in Greece is particularly hot—there was no air condition. The Rex theatre is a very old theatre space with thick red carpets and veiled seats. As a result the building’s temperature was really high.

As opposed to the space of the audience that was extremely hot the stage was surrounded by fans that were on during the entire performance. I contend that this simultaneous coexistence of these two different speeds and air flows: the static one of the audience space and the mobile one of the stage somehow related to the multiple temporalities that, as I argued earlier, the neoliberal nation-state imposes on its citizens. This particular production of Anouilh’s *Antigone* dramatized this kind of contradictory coexistence of two different speeds through staged notions of time and staged notions of age.

The first ones were manifested via the use of “time specific objects”—like Eleni Efthimiou called them⁴⁰—on stage. Although the majority of the sets on stage resembled an asylum—from the stretchers to the white tiles on the walls—the guard’s shed had a small Christmas tree in it. Additionally the walls had many clocks stuck at five o’clock on them. So somehow the speed of the play—or on another level the implied speed of an asylum—was contradicted by the static time references of the Christmas tree and the clocks.

⁴⁰ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15VGBonqbrU
The multiple notions of age manifested themselves through the infantilization of Antigone, Haemon and Creon’s assistant over Creon. While Creon was this very old, dying body, Creon’s assistant was a kid and Haemon and Antigone were particularly young and playful. For the director of this production, Eleni Efthimiou, “playfulness” could potentially be an answer to a state and a “society that eats its own flesh” (Greek Festival 2016). But that dying state has the capacity to make that playfulness fit in structures that render it inactive. Just like the government of SYRIZA asked from the Greek people to vote “NO” at the Greek referendum and then the same government of SYRIZA turned that “NO” into a “YES” to everything Anouilh’s Antigone ends with Creon saying to his very young assistant,

- Creon: I’ll say it to you. The others don’t understand. When there is a job to be done you can’t just put your hands in your pockets and ignore it. And okay, people say it’s dirty work and they are right. But someone has to do it, don’t they?
- Page: I don’t know sir
- Creon: Of course you don’t. You are lucky. I hope to God you never find out. You’re in quite a hurry to grow up, aren’t you?
- Page: Oh yes sir.
- Creon: Well don’t be. You are mad. Never grow up. Five o’clock. We’ve got something at five o’clock. What was it at five o’clock … remind me.
- Page: Council meeting sir.
- Creon: That’s right. Council meeting. Five o’clock. Well we mustn’t be late, must we?

Just like Creon asked from his assistant to remain young while making him fit the structures of the upcoming meeting, the “NO” of the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 was turned into something irrelevant and inactive the minute it entered the eurogroup meeting of July 13th 2016.
Chapter 3: Imperceptible Performances Migratory Flows at the Thresholds of European Debt-Economy

3.1 The EU-Turkey Statements: Stages of Imperceptibility

The flows of forced migration that emerged from the Syrian War are considered to be the largest migratory flows since World War II. It was not until 2015 and 2016 that these migratory flows reached Europe in large numbers. In order to survive the war, millions fled Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran, passed through Turkey, crossed the Mediterranean on rigid-hulled inflatable boats and reached the northeastern Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Those crossings of the Mediterranean on rigid-hulled inflatable boats are known as Mediterranean crossings of the boat people.

Disrupting narratives that associate migration with hiding, the boat people of the Mediterranean crossings wanted to be seen. They often punctuated their inflatable boats right before they reached the shores of the Aegean islands in order to force the gaze of international law to perceive them as what they really were—stateless, nationless lives in utter jeopardy—and to actually create the circumstances for what should otherwise be undeniable and taken for granted; their right to apply for asylum. However, the European Union dispossessed these lives of that right to apply for asylum through the so-called EU-Turkey statements or EU-Turkey deal in ways that were imperceptible to the gaze of International Law.

Let me briefly explain how. In short, according to the EU-Turkey statement that was released to the press on March 18 2016—and that was subsequent to the one that had been announced on November 29 2015—“All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey” (European
Interdisciplinary scholarship that combines Legal Studies with European Union Studies, International Affairs and Refugee Studies has demonstrated that the EU’s decision to forcibly return migrants to Turkey, their transit country, is contradictory to and inconsistent with the “non-refoulement” principle of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (Laura Batalla Adam 2017, Kelly M. Greenhill 2016). According to the “non-refoulement” principle “a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom. This is now considered a rule of customary international law” (UNHCR 2001-2017). The EU-Turkey statements eluded the gaze of the international law and, more particularly, the principle of non-refoulement by implying that Turkey is a safe country.

However Turkey upholds a geographical limitation on the 1951 Refugee Convention. According to this limitation, within Turkish territory the Convention only applies “to persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe” (United Nations 1951). This means that the migrants who were forcibly returned from Greece to Turkey—which were the majority of the migrants who made it to the shores of Greece—cannot apply for asylum since they originated from non-European countries (Batalla Adam 2017: 53, Kivilcim 2016: 196). As a result these potential asylum seekers were, and are to this day, detained in Turkey under a status of temporary protection.

Legal Studies scholars and Anthropology researchers and ethnographers have showed that both on an institutional and a practical level the status of temporary protection permanently prohibits the ones detained in the refugee camps of Turkey not only from applying for other international statuses but also from accessing any kind of services that relate to their survival both directly and indirectly, like for instance
healthcare, education and access to the job market (Kivilcim 2016). As a result due to the EU-turkey statements Turkey becomes a “buffer zone” (Hürsoy 2017) or a “container or buffer state” (Keyman 2016) in which all the forcibly returned migrants that initially fled their countries in order to survive the war are left to die.

In addition to taking into serious consideration Turkey’s geographical limitation on the Refugee Convention, before defining Turkey as a “safe third country,” one should also keep in mind that Turkey is currently an active participant in the Syrian War—the Turkish military intervention started on August 24 2016 and since then the Turkish army has been bombing Syrian Kurds in the name of anti-ISIL war (Žižek 2016). In addition, since 2014, Turkey has been building a 828km wall and fence across its border with Syria. Just in 2016 dozens of Syrian refugees—including children—have been reported “shot dead” by Turkish border guards while trying to cross this wall (Independent 2016, Spiegel 2016, Aljazeera 2016, New York Times 2016). The tragic irony is that the EU relied on Turkey not being a safe third country for all the forcibly returned migrants so that Turkey could do EU’s dirty job of filtering the rapidly increasing migratory flows.

In exchange Europe promised to lift the visa requirement for Turkish citizens. As per the EU-Turkey statement of March 2019 “the fulfillment of the visa liberalization roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016” (European Council, Council of the European Union 2016). To cut a very long story short, EU had Turkey do its dirty work so that the former would maintain its pseudo-humanitarian masks of Western civilization and democracy. The EU-Turkey statements transferred asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey so that the former are permanently
caught in a “temporary” status of protection and that are indefinitely prohibited from applying for, and thus for finding asylum in Europe.

As I argued in the beginning of this essay, the Mediterranean crossings of the boat-people—the ones who managed to pass through Turkey and reached the Greek islands that are off the shores of Turkey on rigid-hulled inflatable boats—forced the gaze of international law to perceive them as what they were; bare, nationless, stateless lives in utter jeopardy. The boat people put their lives in danger and crossed the Mediterranean on unsafe boats in order to create the circumstances for what should be an undeniable fact: their right to apply for asylum.

Europe’s inhumane response to these rapidly increasing inflows of bare lives was to return these lives to Turkey: where the absolute vulnerability of the latter is imperceptible to the gaze of International Law. This European cruelty was one more reminder of what Giorgio Agamben argues in *Homo Sacer*; that “Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life” (Agamben 1998: 7). In the case of the EU-Turkey statements this production of cruelty started from before the forcible return of the migrants to Turkey. It started from the detainment of the migrants in the hotspots and refugee camps of Greece.

Due to the ban that the government of SYRIZA instituted on journalists, representatives of various organizations and academic researchers on February 29th 2016 the only relatively direct information we could get from the hotspots and refugee camps of Greece came from reports of various NGOs and Human Rights Organizations that worked there. According to the report that Αίτημα (Etima) NGO—an NGO that provides free legal assistance to asylum seekers and refugees in Greece—published in April of
2017, after the announcement of the EU-Turkey statement on March 18 2016 both the hotspots that were located on the Greek islands off the shores of Turkey and the camps that were located in the periphery of the city of Athens performed as detention centers that restrained the migrants from applying for asylum.

The Αίτημα report specifically describes how, following March 20 2016, the registration of incoming migrants was delayed “up to 8 months on the islands” and “up until 10 months on the mainland” (Αίτημα 2017). As a result the incoming migrants that had just passed through Turkey and risked their lives in order to reach the shores of Greece were returned to Turkey without ever getting anywhere near the Greek asylum services. Similar cases have been also reported by international NGOs. As Batalla Adam states in “The EU-Turkey Deal One Year On: A Delicate Balancing Act” Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports at least thirteen cases of asylum seekers that had asked to apply for asylum in Greece and that were forcibly returned to Turkey before doing so (Batallla Adam 2017: 47).

Therefore I contend that the crucial question that needs to be addressed asks why, in spite of the intense efforts of scholarship, activists and various organizations to stop the deal by addressing its contradictions to and inconsistencies with the International Law, the deal could not be stopped. I argue that the focus of the spheres that intend to stop the deal needs to change from asking weather the deal is illegal or not to asking one, how the deal performs having the validity of law while it is nothing but a series of informal of press releases and two, how the deal performs legality by escaping the gaze of international law because it is inconsistent with the later. These are the two questions that this chapter takes on.
It is because of this necessary shift in focus from notions of legality and illegality to notions of gaze and imperceptibility that I contend that the current discursive approach of the EU-Turkey statements in particular and the flows of forced migration that emerged from the Syrian War more broadly needs to be complemented with a Performance Studies, and more specifically a Performance Philosophy methodology. In order to lay the conceptual ground for this methodology I would like to refer to the three asylum seekers, two Pakistani and one Afghan, who attempted to challenge the legality of the EU-Turkey statements in the General Court of the European Union.

On February 28 2017 the General Court of the European Union released a statement to the press according to which “the General Court declares that it lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the actions brought by the three asylum seekers” (General Court of the European Union, Press Release No 19/17 2017). The press release explained this “lack of jurisdiction” by stating that the three asylum seekers claimed that the EU-Turkey statement is an international agreement that “infringes the rules of the FEU Treaty.”

In brief, the Court responded one, that the claim of the three asylum seekers falls under the umbrella of the Article 263 TFEU and therefore the Court “lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the actions pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, and, accordingly dismisses them,” and two, that “neither the European Council nor any other institution of the EU decided to conclude an agreement with the Turkish Government on the subject of the migration crisis.” In other words, according to the General Court of the European Union the EU-Turkey statements could not be processed formally because they were not
produced by any of the formal EU institutions. They were nothing but informal press releases.

The Court’s response proves what has been this chapter’s main argument; that the EU-Turkey statements operate by performing multiple evasions of the gaze of the legal apparatus. These performances of evasion might involve the appropriation of different terms, countries, categories of people, categories of institutions or non-institutions, spaces that slip outside of juridical frameworks etc. The EU-Turkey statements established multiple and simultaneous stages of imperceptibility not only by rendering the ones who fled their countries in order to survive the War and its innumerous consequences imperceptible to the gaze of International Law but also by rendering themselves imperceptible to any kind of legal apparatuses and institutions that could actually challenge these statements.

If the EU-Turkey statements are unstoppable because they are not perceptible—or, to paraphrase the press release of the General Court of the European Union they simply do not exist within—to any kind of legal apparatus or formal institution, where does that leave the field of resistance? One could argue on the same stages of imperceptibility. In *Homo Sacer* for instance Agamben argues that the bareness of the lives of the refugees will force Western politics to finally treat bare life as the life that is “no longer separated and excepted either in the state order or in the figure of human rights” (Agamben 1998: 134). Reframing Agamben’s argument in terms of gazing and imperceptibility, one would hope that the bare lives of refugees that are rendered imperceptible by and to the gaze of Western politics will force the latter for stop founding
itself on notions of imperceptibility once and for all by forcing Western politics to confront their limits.

However the EU-Turkey statements prove that these notions of imperceptibility can also be used and appropriated by the ones who have the power to include/exclude certain lives over others in the polis, which in our case is the European Union. Furthermore Agamben’s assumption that the existence of refugees will automatically push the Western politics to its limits in ways that inclusion and exclusion will be rendered irrelevant somehow neglects or leaves unaddressed the—to some extend very cruel—implication that the extremely vulnerable ones are the ones who should labor for revolutionizing the status quo without the collaboration of those who are always-already part of the polis. Paraphrasing Schmitt, it is also the one who has the power to include/exclude that should critically reflect upon and challenge this power.

Earlier I made the case that the EU-Turkey statements operate by performing multiple evasions of the gaze of the legal apparatus via establishing different stages of imperceptibility. I contend that the challenge that we need to take on is to come up with theoretical tools that grasp, address and shed light on these evasions. I also contend that a Performance Philosophy methodology, that reads the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari through the lens of performance and that is informed by the current frames of European debt-economy can provide us with some of these tools needed to respond to this challenge successfully.

3.2 Performances of Imperceptibility, Performances of Exception and Nomadic Detainments
Since the beginning of this dissertation I have been arguing that the European economy of the 21st century is a debt-economy founded upon the non-resolvable power relations between creditor nation-states and debtor nation-states. In order to actualize this economy the European Union has created a number of informal bodies or meetings that have more power that EU’s formal institutions. These informal bodies are not minuted, are not answerable to any kind of formal institution or nationally elected Parliament, and are imperceptible to the existing legal apparatuses. They produce informal statements or agreements that are usually announced as press releases and that end up having more validity than law.

It is because of this imperceptibly informal organization of Europe that during their public debate in New York Public Library on April 27 2016 Noam Chomsky and Yianis Varoufakis—former Greek minister of finance and current co-organizer of the Democratizing Europe movement (Diem25)—described EU’s informal meetings, for instance the Eurogroup or the Euroworking group, as “nonexistent groups” (Yianis Varoufakis 2016). Ironically enough, by announcing that “neither the European Council nor any other institution of the EU decided to conclude an agreement with the Turkish Government on the subject of the migration crisis” (General Court of the European Union, Press Release No 19/17 2017) the General Court of the European Union framed the EU-Turkey deal in terms of “non-existence.”

Therefore it seems that the concept of imperceptibility—a concept that once actualized it allows something to exist but that also renders it simultaneously imperceptible to and thus non-existent for certain gazes—is a core concept of the 21st century European debt-economy. Furthermore, enacted imperceptibility allows
something to perform nomadism and to move from one discursive sphere or category to
another, from one geopolitical territory to another and from one legal apparatus to
another. In *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* Deleuze and Guattari
write, “Becoming imperceptible means many things (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 279)
[...] it is jumping from one plane to the other” (282). This “jumping” describes how the
EU-Turkey deal performs; it jumps from planes of formal institutions to planes of
informality, from planes of law to planes of press releases, from formally defined
geopolitical territories to territories that it constructs as “container or buffer” zones and so
forth.

In order for this leap to be efficacious it needs to one, not to be limited to pre-
established formations or conceptions—earlier I made the case that the EU-Turkey deal
did not fall under the umbrella of any of the existing formations of the EU—and two, to
establish new connections and conditions that cannot be perceived by any of the already
existing formations or conceptions—like for instance the EU-Turkey deal turned Turkey
into a “container or buffer” state that rendered the detained migrants imperceptible to the
gaze of international law.

A number of Deleuze Studies scholars have elaborated on those two aspects of
efficacious imperceptibility. Mark Bonta and John Protevi for instance talk about
imperceptibility’s capacity to “enter into becomings” (Bonta and Protevi 2004: 98) and
Stamatia Portanova describes imperceptibility as something that is not “capturable”
within existing ranges of perception (Portanova 2013: 242). In *Demystifying Deleuze* Rob
Shields and Mickey Vallee remind us that “one cannot become imperceptible if tied
down to pre-established self-perceptions” (Shields and Vallee 2012: 92) and that
according to Deleuze and Guattari “to become imperceptible is to ‘make a world’” (91). In *Deleuze and Contemporary Art* Stephen Zepke and Simon O’Sullivan write that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of imperceptibility “has been cynically described as ‘what you don’t see is what you get’” (Zepke and O’Sullivan 2010: 118). Furthermore the same scholars remind us that scholars like Galloway and Thacker, who focus on the common ground between Deleuze Studies and Media Studies, understand imperceptibility as “tactics of non-existence” (118). A close elaboration of the above conceptualizations of imperceptibility could possibly lead to the conclusion that both Deleuze and Guattari and scholars who focus on the works of the former frame the concept of imperceptibility mainly in terms of praxes of resistance.

However—as the EU-Turkey statements prove—imperceptibility cannot be just enacted as a performance of resistance. On the contrary it can also perform as a tool of power. The EU-Turkey statements performed in all of the ways I summarize above: they entered “new becomings,” they made “new worlds” and they appropriated “tactics of non-existence.” But the goal of all these performances of imperceptibility was to create spaces in which those who fled their countries in order to survive the war could literally be filtered out and forgotten by the rest of the world. As I argued earlier the academics, activists, NGOs, Human Rights Organizations and politicians who fought for stopping the deal lacked the conceptual and theoretical tools that would allow them to grasp how the EU-Turkey statements perform. As a result, in spite of the intense efforts to stop the deal the deal could not be stopped.

One of the main intentions of this chapter is to provide the necessary conceptual lenses that can shed light on the imperceptible performances of the EU-Turkey
statements. As I described earlier when the so-called European Migration Management Support Teams—like for instance FRONTEX (European Border and Coast Guard Agency) or EASO (European Asylum Support Office) for instance—in collaboration with military operations like the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFORMED) and the Greek asylum services started implementing the EU-Turkey statements, the majority of the spheres that attempted to stop the implementation of the deal framed the latter as illegal or contradictory to and inconsistent with the international law. I contend that the conceptual ground of these approaches is founded upon notions of exception that understand the EU-Turkey statements as statements that operate outside the law and that perform suspension of the law. I also contend that, once applied to the case of the EU-Turkey statements, the lens of exception leaves certain stakes of the statements unaddressed.

Let me explain why by briefly elaborating on one of the most important and most referenced works of our century on the state of exception; Giorgio Agamben’s *State of Exception*. In this work Agamben locates the suspension of the law in the liminal spaces between the sphere of the political, on the one hand and the juridico-constitutional sphere, on the other. He asks,

if exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis and, as such, must be understood on political and not juridico-constitutional grounds (De Martino 1973, 320) then they find themselves in the paradoxical position of being juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms, and the state of exception appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form (Agamben 2005: 2).
To a certain extent that is exactly what happened with the EU-Turkey statements; they ended up having the validity of law without being law. However, the EU-Turkey deal was not produced by a political sovereignty. This is why I contend that in order to understand how the EU-Turkey statements perform we need conceptual tools that add on the lens of exception. On the contrary the EU-Turkey deal was produced by a debt-economy that uses the sphere of the political in order to assemble different nation-states together via non-resolvable creditor/debtor power relations.

It is because of this very unclear blurring of the lines if the spheres of the political with spheres of economy and juridico-constitutional spheres that the General Court of the European Union released a statement to the press on February 28 2017 regarding the “actions brought by three asylum seekers against the EU-Turkey agreement,” saying that even if the agreement was formally concluded by the “Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the EU and the Turkish Prime Minister”—something that, as the Court makes really clear, “has been denied by the European Council, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission”—the Court “does not have any jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of an international agreement concluded by the Member States” (General Court of the European Union, Press Release No 19/17 2017). In brief, according to the Court, even if different European nation-states and Turkey came to an agreement, EU and its institutions would have nothing to do with that agreement that by the way not only has EU’s name on it but also states EU’s commitments to Turkey regarding the visa liberalization processes for Turkish citizens.
This is not a moment of political sovereignty acting independently of or superseding the juridical sphere. This is a moment of an economy using the sphere of the political and the juridico-constitutional in order not only to enhance its power of decision-making but also to render this enhancement of power imperceptible. As Susi Foerschler points out in “Quo Vadis Europe”, right after the press release of the statement on March 2016, “academics heatedly debated whether it was a binding international agreement under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that would have merited involvement of the European Parliament under Article 218 TFEU or merely a non-binding press statement” (Foerschler 2017: 1). The Court’s response proves that the right answer to this question is the second answer.

Furthermore, as opposed to Agamben’s argument regarding the “paradoxical position of being juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms,” (2) the EU-Turkey deal introduces itself in legal terms. By stating that the return of the migrants from Greece to Turkey “will take place in full accordance with EU and international law” (European Council, Council of the European Union March 2016) the deal defines itself through the law that it then renders meaningless and irrelevant. Therefore the EU-Turkey deal does not perform as an exception to the international law. On the contrary it claims it is in accordance with the international law in order to perform on levels, ways and territories that are imperceptible to the latter.

The irony behind these performances of imperceptibility is that they immobilize the migratory flows of those who fled their countries in order to survive the war through detaining them in the hotspots and camps of Greece and Turkey while allowing the powers that control these flows to move. Although forced displacement is often
associated with movement and nomadism there is nothing mobile about the migratory flows of 21st century. On the contrary the migratory flows that emerged from the Syrian War are forced into series after series of nomadic detainments: from one hotspot to another, from one camp to another, from one detainment center to another.

The notion of nomadic detainment captures the connections between the forced production of flows of speed and the forced production of abrupt disruptions of these flows. Although the concept of nomadism has been theorized by Deleuze and Guattari extensively, just like in the case of the concept of imperceptibility, it has been mainly theorized as praxis of resistance. In *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* Deleuze and Guattari argue that the nomad performs outside existing formations, conceptions and conventions. They specifically describe the nomad as “a hunter [that] follows the flows, exhausts them in place, and moves on with them to another place” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 162) and that “is everywhere apparent but remains different to conceptualize” (390). The problem that we are currently facing is that the roles have been reversed. Performances of resistance become the “exhausted” flows that are forcibly moved from one place to another and the 21st century European debt-economy in general and the EU-Turkey statements in particular become the nomads that exhaust and detain them.

What is it to be done then? If there is nothing that can stop the EU-Turkey statements—the Court’s response to the three asylum seekers literally says that no formal action can actually challenge the deal—and if the migratory flows that are being forcibly moved from one detainment center to another in order to die are too exhausted to even stay alive, how can we address the ways in which the statements perform in ways that actually affect their implementation? This chapter proposes to come up with conceptual
tools that actually grasp and capture how these statements perform. But since the statements are designed to remain un-captured by existing concepts this chapter suggests new conceptual tools that emerge from the dynamic interplay between the works of Deleuze and Guattari and a Performance Studies approach informed by the current frames of European debt–economy. In other words if the power of the EU-Turkey deal is founded upon performances of imperceptibility then what needs to be done is to make that imperceptibility perceptible and exhaust its power.

From a level of ontology to a level of research practice the majority of Performance Studies is dedicated to shedding light onto the imperceptible through tracing the actual, very material manifestations of that imperceptibility. As Performance Studies scholar Diana Taylor argues in *The Archive and the Repertoire; Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas* this tracing needs to examine “cultural expressions” not in terms of “textual analysis” but as “embodied and performed acts [that] generate, record and transmit knowledge” (Taylor 2007: 20). Building on Taylor’s work I contend that one of the ways in which we can address the material manifestations of the imperceptible performances of the EU-Turkey statements is through closely investigating the “cultural expressions” that, especially during the years of 2015 and 2016—when the migratory flows of those who fled Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran in order to survive the war increased radically—“generated, recorded and transmitted knowledge” regarding the “embodied and performed acts” of the migrant body. The next section focuses on one of these cultural expressions: the photography exhibition of St. Antony de Padua on İstiklal Caddesi in Istanbul, Turkey.
3.3 The Infinitely Indebted Migratory Body: The Photography Exhibition of St. Antony de Padua in Istanbul

Istanbul, June 2016: I am on İstiklal Caddesi—the street that connects Taksim Square with the Galatasaray High School, the Galata Tower and the area around the Galata bridge. This specific route has staged numerous demonstrations and protests such as the annual Istanbul pride and the Gezi Park protests. In addition to Galata’s High School, Tower and bridge area, İstiklal Caddesi is also surrounded by numerous restaurants, taverns, hookah cafes and stores, buildings of various embassies, art and theatre spaces, academic institutions, mosques, synagogues and churches. One of the churches is the Roman Catholic church of St. Antonio di Padova, also known as St. Anthony of Padua Church, Sent Antuan Bazilikasi.

On my way from Taksim Square to the bridge of Galata I run into a photography exhibition organized by the church of St. Antony of Padua. The exhibition was located in the church’s yard. Above the yard’s main entrance there was a poster of a picture taken during Pope Francis’s visit at the reception and identification center (hotspot) of Μόρια (Moria) located on the Greek island of Λέσβος (Lesbos). Lesbos, also known as Μυτιλήνη (Mytilini), is located in the northeastern part of Aegean Sea and is very close to Turkey. Because of its geopolitical location, the island of Lesbos—together with the islands of Chios (Χίος), Samos (Σάμος), Leros (Λέρος), Kalimnos (Κάλυμνος) and Kos (Κώς)—is administered in such a way that it performs as a geopolitical filter and detention center for those who fled Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran in order to survive the war.
A picture of Pope Francis and the ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew holding a crying baby titled “The Tragedy of Our Century: Refugees” was located above the main entrance of the exhibition. This picture was also supplemented by the following text from Matthew 25:35: “I was hungry, you gave me food; I was thirsty, you gave me water; I was a stranger, you accepted me;” That specific picture made me think of two things: one, that a contemporary understanding of tragedy has very useful insights to offer into the kinds of performances that the migratory body is expected and asked to perform, and two, that these obligatory performances are closely related to notions of access to a polis. Let me start with the first.

The concept of tragedy that this dissertation proposes understands the relations between a creditor and a debtor as disproportionate, lopsided, asymmetrical non-resolvable power relations hidden beneath promises of resolution that are designed to remain elusive. I contend that the power relations between asylum seekers and asylum providers are also non-resolvable power relations hidden beneath the promise of an asylum that may or may not be granted. But even when asylum is granted the power relation is not resolved. On the contrary the asylee is rendered infinitely “indebted” to its asylum provider for being granted asylum. As a result the former needs to keep performing submission to the latter within the frames that the latter defines in order to keep paying but never fully repaying their “debt.”

Attic tragedy made this non-resolvable power relation between the asylum seeker/asylee and the asylum provider obvious and explicit. The ἴκέτης (suppliant) had to perform ἰκεσία (supplication) in order to be granted ἀσύλο (asylum, a safe space that cannot be violated) either by gods or by mortals. Aeschylus reminds us not only that one
has to perform supplication in order to be granted asylum but also that the asylum
providers expect and demand these performances of supplication. In Aeschylus Ικέτιδες
(The Suppliants) right before the ΔαναΪδες (Danaids) flee Egypt in order to seek for
asylum in Άργος (Argos), their father Δαναός (Danaus) gives them the following advice:
“And remember to be submissive: you are an alien, a fugitive, and in need. Bold speech
does not suit the weak” (Αισχύλος 12). Furthermore when the king of Argos, Πελασγός
(Pelasgus)—decided to try and convince both the Argive gods and the city of Argos to
grant asylum to the Danaids he advised the latter to make their performances of
supplication more obvious by leaving “suppliant boughs, the signs of your [Danaids’]
distress” outside all the temples of the city (Αισχύλος 26). The Danaides had to perform
indebtedness to both the gods and the city of Argos in order to be granted asylum.

As opposed to the concept of tragedy that this dissertation proposes, according to
which the non-resolvable creditor/debtor power relations are hidden beneath masks of
resolution, by dramatizing the destruction of these masks, attic tragedy made these power
relations explicit and perceptible. Within contemporary frames the ικέτης becomes an
asylum seeker. The term asylum seeker masks the performances of submission that the
asylum provider demands from the asylum seeker to perform beneath a teleologically
charged promise of a safe space—a safe topos—that may or may not be found. While the
term itself implies that one needs to perform submissive indebtedness to their asylum
provider in order to be granted asylum, “asylum seeker” conceals that demand of the
asylum provider beneath performances of “seeking.” As a result the term “asylum
seeker” renders the seeker responsible for finding a safe topos that only the asylum
provider can give.
That, in my contention, is the ultimate aporia of the term asylum seeker: it asks from the asylum seeker to find something that is designed not to be found but to be given. The asylum seeker is doomed to keep looking for a topos that can only be given to the former by their asylum provider. Even when this topos is given it is not really given. The asylee has to keep performing submissive indebtedness to their asylum providers in order to prove that they still deserve the “safe” topos that was given to them. These non-resolvable power relations between the asylum seeker and the asylum provider establish asylum as an a priori non-safe topos for the former. Bridging this thought process to the overall argument of this dissertation, the non-resolvable power relations between an asylum seeker and an asylum provider is another TragedyMachine that produces infinite debt while simultaneously rendering it imperceptible.

Within frames of 21st century European debt-economy that production of the imperceptible infinite debt that the asylum provider imposes on the asylum seeker materializes itself in two ways: cheap labor and intensified and very directed circulation of money. Although this chapter will not elaborate in detail on the mechanisms of the European debt-economy that turn the human flows of those who flee their countries and seek for asylum in Europe into flows of profit, for now I would like to argue—as I have been arguing since the beginning of this dissertation—that a debt-economy needs debt in order to be profitable and that the “weaker” one is the more indebted they become.

Therefore within the frames of cruel European debt economy asylum seekers—at least before the debt crisis of 2008 and the increased flows of those who flee Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran during the years of the Syrian War—were evaluated based on how profitable their condition of indebtedness to their asylum providers—
European nation-states answerable to the European Union—could be for the latter. Even though I find Žižek’s book on refugees titled *Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbors: Against the Double Blackmail* extremely problematic in terms of many of its, often unacceptable assumptions, it does address the refugee condition in terms of cheap labor and money circulation. Žižek argues, “The way the universe of capital relates to the freedom of movement of individuals is thus inherently contradictory: it needs ‘free’ individuals as cheap labor forces, but it simultaneously needs to control their movement since it cannot afford the same freedoms and rights for all people” (Žižek 2016: 61). Until the multiple debt-crisis and the Syrian War, Europe rendered this criterion—at least in terms of the documents, policies and law production that made it to the spheres of public discourse—hard to grasp, hard to concretize and imperceptible.

This imperceptibility was maintained by the interviews between asylum seekers and asylum providers. Interviews between institutional bodies of each potential asylum provider/European nation-state and the ones who apply for asylum were supposed to “evaluate” each application for asylum based on the applicant’s vulnerability. If this is really the case the all the asylum seekers need to do is to follow Pelasgus’ advice and make the “signs of their distress” obvious. The fact that, because of the two cruel and inhumane EU-Turkey statements that were announced on November 29 2015 and on March 18 2016, the millions who fled Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran crossed the Mediterranean on extremely unsafe rigid-hulled, inflatable boats were returned to Turkey, proves that this is not really the case.

If Pelasgus’ advice applied in frames of 2015-2016 Europe and Greece then the millions of dead bodies and the millions of leaky rubber-hulled boats that the
Mediterranean washed up on the shores of Greece would perform as “signs of distress” successful enough to convince the asylum providers that the lives of those who flee their countries were in extreme danger. But as the EU-Turkey statements prove, in 2015-2016 Europe and Greece, the extreme vulnerability of the asylum seekers was not the primary concern of the asylum providers. On the contrary the two EU-Turkey statements rendered the vulnerability of those who flee Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran imperceptible via returning them back to Turkey: where both the 1951 Refugee Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol apply only partially. In Greece during the years of 2015-2016 the millions of people who crossed the Mediterranean on unsafe rubber-hulled boats in order to survive were returned to Turkey—to a topos—where their vulnerability is imperceptible to the gaze of both the Convention and its Protocol.

Because the photography exhibition of St. Antony de Padua on İstiklâl Caddesi in Istanbul, Turkey intended to transmit and reproduce these non-resolvable power relations between the migrants and their potential asylum providers it depicted the ones detained in the hotspot of Moria as bodies infinitely indebted to their “saviors.” As a result, like attic tragedy but unintentionally, this specific photography exhibition rendered the imperceptible, non-resolvable power relations between the migrants, on the one hand, and their potential asylum providers on the other perceptible. Relating that thought process to the crucial question regarding the efficacy of resistance that the previous section addressed, it is important to capture moments in which power systems that perform on a level of imperceptibility render themselves perceptible.

That thought process takes us to the second focus point of this section: the economy of the migrant body that is granted access to the polis. The text from Matthew
that supplemented the pictures of the photography exhibition organized by the St. Antony de Padua framed the ones depicted in the pictures as lives that were ready to access the European economy because they were ready to perform submission to their “saviors” that covered their basic needs. Hannah Arendt has theorized extensively this interplay between notions of economy and notions of access to the polis.

For Arendt the formation of Greek polis lays the conceptual ground for us to grasp the life that does not become “fully human” until it enters the polis. In *The Human Condition* Arendt argues that the “mastering of the necessities of life in the household was the condition for freedom of the polis” (34). And although Arendt’s intention is to demonstrate how, as she writes in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, “we are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights” (Arendt 1973: 299) this section proposes a reversed understanding of Arendt’s argument.

For Arendt the sphere of the polis—the poli(s)tical sphere—equalizes the inequalities of the economical sphere; the sphere where the oίκος (ecos, household) is under νομήν (allocation). The reading of Arendt’s argument that this section proposes understands the polis as the publically perceptible sphere that perpetuates the economical inequalities via concealing them and rendering them imperceptible. Drawing upon this reversed understanding of Arendt I contend that being granted access to the polis is not just founded upon rendering the economical inequalities imperceptible but also upon the imperceptible and non-resolvable power relations between those who can cover their basic needs—their necessities of life—only through covering the necessities of lives of
others and those who have their necessities of life covered by others so that they can
carelessly enjoy the privileges of the polis.

I contend that the photography exhibition of St. Antony de Padua made these
power relations very explicit. By making these power relations explicit the exhibition did
not just creat possibilities for further enactments, performances and embodiments of these
relations but it also introduced possibilities for their disruption. The next section closely
investigates how the MARCH IN SOLIDARITY WITH MIGRANTS/ REFUGEES AND
SELF ORGANIZED SOLIDARITY PROJECTS that took place on July 23rd 2016 at
Πεδίο του Άρεως (Pedion tou Areos) in Athens disrupts the further embodiment of these
relations and frames the migratory body not in terms of power relations and performances
of submission but of equality.

3.4 MARCH IN SOLIDARITY WITH MIGRANTS/ REFUGEES AND SELF
ORGANIZED SOLIDARITY PROJECTS

Picture taken by Daniel Dilliplane

Especially during the years of 2015 and 2016—when the flows of those who flee
Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran kept increasing—numerous anarchist groups
and groups of anarchists occupied abandoned buildings and houses all over Greece so that the refugees who were detained in the hotspots and refugee camps of Greece under the most inhumane “living” conditions could live elsewhere. These occupations were self-organized units within which the refugees themselves created and produced the circumstances and laws that defined their own lives: what as one Greek etymology suggests is grasped by the notion of αυτονομία (autonomy). But in order for the autonomy of these self-organized collectives to be preserved and maintained the collectives had to remain imperceptible to the gazes of the municipality, press and media, volunteers, neighbors, law, police, citizens etc.

This is why I contend that this autonomy was founded upon an aporia: On the one hand these collectives were fighting for “smashing the borders”—outside almost every collective there was a “smash the borders” banner—while on the other hand the same collectives raised their own borders in order to maintain their autonomy via rendering it imperceptible. When I tried to enter the collective “Housing Refugees Squat” on 26 Notara Street in Exarcheia, Athens, I was immediately told by the person who guarded the building—member of the anarchist group “Ρουβικόνας” (Rouvikonas) that was responsible for this particular occupation—“better not.” One could easily argue that this resembled the ban the government of SYRIZA-ANEL instituted on journalists, researchers and organizations prohibiting the latter from accessing the hotspots and refugee camps of Greece. But these collectives did not raise their borders and did not use detainment practices for no reason. What happened in the city of Thessaloniki on July 23rd 2016 was the biggest proof of that.
On July 23rd 2016 the municipality of Thessaloniki forced the anarchists and the refugees that were occupying the city’s abandoned orphanage, the abandoned building on Nikis (Νίκης) Avenue and the abandoned building on Karolou Dil (Καρόλου Ντηλ) known as the Hurriya collective to vacate these buildings. Needless to say that these three occupations were three of Greece’s most crowded and most functional occupations. In the morning of July 23rd 2016 the municipality of Thessaloniki in collaboration with the city’s police started by force vacating and eventually demolishing the city’s orphanage and proceeded with force vacating the other two buildings. This process ended in seventy-four arrests.

Later in the day numerous protests and demonstrations took place all over Greece responding to the brutality performed by the municipality and the police of Thessaloniki. One of these demonstrations was the MARCH IN SOLIDARITY WITH MIGRANTS/REFUGEES AND SELF ORGANIZED SOLIDARITY PROJECTS that took place at 6:00pm on July 23rd 2016 at Πεδίον του Άρεως (Pedion tou Areos). I was part of the demonstration. During the MARCH refugees that were living in various collectives and occupations of Athens performed as the demonstration’s avant-garde. But, as opposed to military avant-gardes, this particular avant-garde was guarded.

More specifically, demonstrators who held banners that were hanging from wooden sticks were “guarding” the demonstration surrounding from the sides both the demonstration’s avant-garde and the rest of the demonstrators that were following the former. The ones who were “guarding” the demonstration were prohibiting the ones who were spectating the demonstration from recording and from taking pictures of the MARCH. Furthermore, some of the demonstrators were occasionally diverging from the
crowd of the MARCH in order to write “Smash the Borders” with graffiti sprays on the walls of various buildings in the city of Athens.

Let me break down the multiple levels of perceptibility and imperceptibility that this particular demonstration produced. By “guarding” the avant-garde—the refugees and the migrants who led the MARCH—the demonstration made the former’s detainment perceptible and it thus rendered them simultaneously perceptible and imperceptible to the gaze of the MARCH’s spectators. Additionally, by banning the MARCH’s spectators from recording and from taking pictures of the MARCH—in other words from reproducing representations of the MARCH—the demonstration on July 23rd 2016 did not just make perceptible the limits of reproduction and representation—limits that, as argues in the previous section, when concealed and masked become means of political leverage—but it also introduced resistance in non-reproducible and non-representational terms.

Furthermore, the writing on the walls inscribed traces of the MARCH onto various buildings of the city of Athens. The “Smash the Borders” graffiti in combination with the guards of the demonstration restraining the spectators of the demonstration from reproducing and representations of the MARCH made very perceptible that all that remains from performance is traces that are relationally distant to the performance itself. It also made very perceptible that performances of resistance need to exist both on a level of relationality and a level of distance. Finally the MARCH made also perceptible that in an era that criminalizes solidarity, self-organization and autonomy any performances of solidarity, self-organization and autonomy need to become gaze-less and imperceptible. In the following paragraphs I will further elaborate on these four different levels of
perceptibility and imperceptibility that this demonstration produced. In order to do so I would like to refer to Peggy Phelan’s elaboration on the ontology of performance.

In *Unmarked: The Politics of Performance* Phelan conceptualizes the ontology of performance in terms of non-reproducibility, non-representability and disappearance. She writes, “Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations; once it does so it becomes something other than performance” (Phelan 1993:129). And she adds, “Performance’s being […] becomes itself through disappearance” (130). Furthermore, according to Phelan, it is because of performance’s ontological resistance to reproduction and representation that other arts that intend to represent—either because they are counting on representation’s innate failure to fully represent (what, as I argued in the previous section, happened in the case of the «Δρόμοι Επιβίωσης» exhibition) or because they are “genuinely” trying to cover the distance between the original and the simulacrum—are lured by both performance art and performance.

In *Unmarked* Phelan refers to Sophie Calle’s art as one of the most indicative examples of that lure. In brief when some of the paintings from the galleries of the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston were stolen, Calle—who had photographed the galleries before the thievery—asked from the visitors and staff of the museum to describe the missing paintings and, as Phelan describes, she then “transcribed those texts are placed them next to the photographs of the galleries” (138). For Phelan, Calle’s act of placing the descriptions next to the photographs was itself a performance because Calle’s act of intention was not to reproduce or fully represent that that was lost. On the contrary
Calle’s act performed as a constant reminder that something was lost. Phelan specifically writes, “The description itself does not reproduce the object, it rather helps us to restage and restate the effort to remember what is lost […] The disappearance of the object is fundamental to performance; it rehearses and repeats the disappearance of the subject who longs always to be remembered” (145). Although the intention of this section is not to focus on the role of memory in performance, mainly because I contend that a discussion like that needs to include cognitive science and most importantly not to assume that everyone’s experience of memory is the same, I find Phelan’s emphasis on performance’s capacity to use reproduction and representation in order to reveal the failure of both to fully reproduce and to fully represent an emphasis of great importance.

As argued earlier the MARCH did exactly that: it produced multiple levels of perceptibility and imperceptibility in order to reveal the innately pseudo aspects of both reproduction and representation. By rendering the demonstration’s avant-garde—the refugees that were initially detained in the hotspots and refugee camps of Greece and that they then managed to leave the camps and to live in occupied buildings—perceptibly detained and thus both perceptible and imperceptible at the same time, and also by prohibiting the spectators from recording and from taking pictures of the demonstration, the MARCH revealed the non-reproducibility and the non-representability of the realities of the refugees who were detained in Greece only to be returned to the places from which they left in order to survive. As a result the MARCH publically conceptualized resistance in non-representational terms. Additionally the MARCH made also perceptible that when performances of solidarity are criminalized then these performances need to be rendered gaze-less and imperceptible.
When representation becomes a permanent means of political leverage only performance can make perceptible that representation is nothing but a mask that is founded upon a promise of representation that is designed to remain elusive. The question that emerges is what kind of performance? Based on what I have been arguing not just in this chapter but also since the beginning of this dissertation the kind that neither pretends to reproduce nor pretends to represent. On the contrary the one that affirms its resistance to representation in order to directly address the multiple levels on which perceptibility and imperceptibility is produced.
Chapter 4: Theatres of Dramatization

4.1.1 Drama Has Always Been Post-

If tragedy is to be understood as a concept that grasps how the disproportionate, lopsided and non-resolvable power relations between Greece and its international creditors are hidden beneath the appearance and the seeming promise of a resolution that nevertheless remains elusive then the challenge that 21st century Greek theatre has to take is to destroy any illusions and promises of resolution. This chapter will trace this theatricalized destruction of illusions and promises of resolution in two theatre productions that took place in Greece both before and after the victory of the left government of SYRIZA in the snap elections of February 2015: in Zero Point Theatre Group’s (Οµάδα Σηµείο Μηδέν) production of Buchner’s Woyzeck and in Yiannis Houvardas’ production of Aeschylus Ορέστεια (Oresteia).

But before moving forward with the rest of the chapter I would like to situate my call for conceptualizing and creating theatre in terms of non-resolution, within Lehman’s discussion of “postdramatic” theatre. Lehmann’s term “postdramatic” has become one of the key terms that theatre and performance studies scholars use in order to refer to the kind of theatre that blurs the imaginary lines between the doubles introduced and imposed by representational thinking: actor and spectator, original and simulacrum, reality and illusion etc. In order to communicate the applicability and popularity of his term Lehmann writes, “The term and subject of ‘postdramatic theatre’ that I introduced into the debate some years ago have been picked up by other theoreticians” (Lehmann 2006:26). In the comments to follow I will draw upon Deleuze’s “The Method of Dramatization” and Foucault’s “Theatrum Philosophicum” in order to argue that that the
epistemological paradigm within which Lehman performs contradicts and hinders his own argument. I contend that this discussion of the epistemological tensions between Lehmann on the one hand and Foucault and Deleuze on the other lays the conceptual ground for this section’s main argument: that the Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of *Woyzeck* in Greece right before the snap elections of January 2015 dramatized the destruction of notions of resolution and exodus and the conceptualization of resistance in terms of inbetweenness that starts at degree zero.

In short for Lehmann dramatic theatre is the representational theatre that produces illusions on stage. For that reason, according to Lehman, dramatic theatre is the theatre that is bound to linear storytelling. Postdramatic theatre, on the other hand, is the theatre that comes after that. Lehman specifically argues that, “the adjective postdramatic denotes a theatre that feels bound to operate beyond drama, at a time ‘after’ the authority of the dramatic paradigm in theatre” (27). Although I agree with Lehman’s intellectual intention with regard to the urgent need for concepts that do not imprison theatrical praxis within notions of imposed linearity, inadequate similitude, and productions of illusion, I contend that a term that by definition is founded upon presuppositions of linear time (post-) can’t get us there.

One might argue that Lehmann does not need to be non-linear in his historiography in order to write about non-linear theatre. I on the other hand contend that by temporalizing theatre based on a imposed and linearly progressive form, Lehmann renders what he defines as “dramatic” theatre always dispossessed of its drastic capacities. Let me be more specific. Lehman assumes that the notion of “drama” is bound to representation, linearity, and already established linguistic patterns. As a result he not
only completely ignores the Greek etymology that suggests that δράμα (drama)—coming from the root δράω-δραω which means to act—is not bound to language or text, but also he utterly neglects the discourse that is founded upon the drastic understanding of drama that the Greek etymology suggests. This kind of discourse focuses on drama’s capacities to perpetually resist any imposed notions of doubles.

According to more drastic and dramatic understandings of drama, concepts of doubles can refer to a relationship between an original and its simulacrum, or to a relationship between reality and its illusions or even to a relationship between two antithetic forces that move history progressively and linearly by introducing seeming promises of resolution that nevertheless remain elusive. Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of *Woyzeck* dramatized the destruction of these promises of exodus and resolution and it introduced alternative conceptualizations of resistance. But before I elaborate on the conceptualizations of resistance that in my contention this particular production of *Woyzeck* introduced I would like to go back to the relations between drastic understandings of drama and notions of similitude.

One of the most important examples of discourse that focuses on these relations is the lecture that Deleuze gave on “The Method of Dramatization” in 1967. For Deleuze the process of dramatization destroys any Platonic residues regarding notions of representation, similitude, and linearity. Therefore, in his efforts to move away from Platonism Deleuze states that “under dramatization the Idea incarnates or actualizes itself, differentiates itself. Thus the idea must already present characteristics in its own content which correspond to the two aspects of differentiation” (Deleuze 1967: 90). I contend that this understanding of dramatization as a drastic process of differentiation that dissolves
itself into non-oppositional multiplicities of masks is one of the most discursively unexplored and simultaneously most important potential contributions of Deleuze—and later of Deleuze and Guattari—to the field of theatre and performance studies. This dissolution into non-oppositional multiplicities is particularly important since it grasps the elusiveness of any promises of exodus and resolution.

For Deleuze and Guattari the process of dramatization produces masks of multiplicities that cannot be reduced to schemata of oppositional doubles. One year after his lecture on “The Method of Dramatization” Deleuze returns to the notion of dramatization in *Difference and Repetition*. He specifically describes dramatization as “the differentiation of differentiation” (Deleuze 1994: 217) that cannot be reduced to schisms between the original and its simulated representation. Deleuze turned to drama, and the process of dramatization, in order to find difference without representation. For Deleuze, and later for Deleuze and Guattari, notions of representation understand difference as second-rate simulacra. For Deleuze the theatre of differentiation “is opposed to the theatre of representation, just as movement is opposed to the concept and to representation which refers back to the concept” (10). He adds: “in the theatre of repetition [differentiation] we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organized bodies, with masks before faces, with specters and phantoms before characters—the whole apparatus of repetition [differentiation] as a ‘terrible power’”(10). It is the dramatization of this “terrible power” that refuses to understand difference in terms of simulated representation.
Foucault became so fascinated by Deleuze’s notion of dramatization that in “Theatrum Philosophicum”—an essay that Foucault published one year after Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*—Foucault stated that, “perhaps one day this century will be known as Deleuzian” (Foucault 1997:216). Drawing upon Deleuze’s description of the theatre of repetition Foucault in the same essay argues that one of the “stages” on which “this series of liberated simulacrum is activated is that of the theatre, which is multiplied, simultaneous, broken into separate scenes that refer to each other and where we encounter, without any trace of representation (copying or imitating) the dance of masks, the cries of bodies and the gesturing of hands and fingers.” He adds: “the philosophy of representation—of the original, the first time, resemblance, imitation, faithfulness—is dissolving” (Foucault 1997: 220). The theatre of dramatization resists and destroys notions of representation and similitude through producing differentiated multiplicities that cannot be reduced to constructed and imposed schemata of oppositional doubles.

Deleuze and Foucault’s understanding of drama does everything that Lehmann’s term of “postdramatic theatre” wants to do (and does not) and also it performs in an epistemological paradigm that is fully liberated from notions of linearity, representation and resolution. In the comments which follow I address the political stakes of this liberation. Even Lehman in his later works—although he never abandons the notion of “post-dramatic”—he understands political praxis in terms of non-resolution. In an essay titled “A Future for Tragedy? Remarks on the Political and the Postdramatic” Lehman relates the “dimension of the political” to a Dionysean “transgression” that “may find articulation without dramatic structure” (Lehmann 2013:85) in order to distance “postdramatic tragedy” from Hegel’s understanding of tragedy as conflict resolution. He
specifically argues that the tragedy of today is “no more drama” (105). Although I agree with Lehmann that today—probably more than ever—we need to relate notions of the political with notions of tragedy that are conceptually free from seeming promises of resolution, I think that epistemologies like Lehmann’s—including their epistemological traditions and genealogies—established these kinds of promises of resolution in the first place. Through focusing on Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of *Woyzeck* (2014) the next section imagines new ways of shaping the political. From Lehman’s “no more drama” we move to “no more resolutions.”

4.1.2 Zero Point Theatre Group: *Woyzeck* Degree 0

December 2014, Athens, Greece: SYRIZA—the Greek coalition of radical left—is becoming more and more popular. Everyone is waiting for the “first time left” that will “do things differently.” SYRIZA’s campaign publically framed the party as the future government that would resolve the conflict between Greece and its international creditors and that would lead Greece to its exodus from the crisis. Drawing upon the thought process that I introduced in the Introduction this section argues that Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of *Woyzeck*—a production that took place in Athens two months before the Greek snap elections in January 2015—widened the field of resistance by dramatizing the destruction of notions of resolution and exodus.

Zero Point Theatre Group is a Greek avant-garde theatre company that since its creation in 2009—when the at the time Greek government of PA.SO.K was in the process of signing the first Memorandum of Understanding between Greece and its international creditors—has been staging plays that are directly related to conceptualizations of
revolutionary praxes and resistance. In Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of *Woyzeck* (2014) this dramatization of the destruction of notions of resolution and exodus manifested itself both on a spatiotemporal and a conceptual level. On a level of both time and space, all the directorial, dramaturgical and staging choices “radiated” (Στεργιόπουλος 2014)—to borrow a phrase from Despoina Hatzipavlidou, one of the members of the group—an infinite condition of inbetweeness without edges, ends, or antithetically symmetrical extremes. Everything about Zero Point Theatre Group’s dramatization of *Woyzeck* (2014) was simultaneously edgeless and in-between. The production itself was the middle part of a trilogy that included *In the Penal Colony* by Franz Kafka and *We* by Yevgeny Zamiatin. According to Savas Stroubos—member and director of Zero Point Theatre Group—the assemblage of these three plays performs like a “trilogy of de-humanization” (Қаку̀ющі, 2014): An de-humanization without a clearly polished beginning or end.

The building where Zero Point Theatre Group rehearses and performs is located in the area of Metaxourgeio in Athens: where brothel owners and drug dealers build their long and successful careers via and on the bodies of the dispossessed, the undocumented, the homeless, the destitute; where the streets perform both as beds and tombs; where the State always looks the other way. And that’s the thing about the building of Zero Point Theatre Group: it forces you to be affected. On your way to Leonidou 12—the street on which Zero Point Theatre Group’s space is located—you cannot just look the other way. Even if you choose not to perceive or to notice what is happening around you, even if you choose to look the other way like the State does, the smells of commodified sex, of piss and of the dying and rotting bodies haunt you. Everything around you is dying and rotting
without ever becoming fully dead. There is neither a specific starting point nor a clearly
defined telos. In Metaxourgeio everything feels like it is dropped out of nowhere and that
it can only proceed in media res.

This surrounding condition of perpetual inbetweenness is also conveyed within
the space in which the Zero Point Theatre Group rehearses and performs. That space is
located under a three-level, old, unoccupied office-space building. While on the outside
the building’s roller door gives the impression of a store or a garage, when you move
towards the inside, the aesthetics of the space change completely. The room’s white walls
and the floor’s cold tiles in combination with the wooden benches that are placed with
their backs against the room’s two parallel walls situate you in some kind of a waiting
area. But the surrounding polyphonies and multiplicities of signs and references make it
impossible for you to wait for something specific and thus to find an exodus that can put
an end to your waiting. You are caught perpetually in-between the empty office-space
building, the storage, the garage, the waiting room and the knowledge that you just
walked into a theatre space that dramatizes the very fact that everything around you
performs as a mask.

The stage—a narrow wooden passageway that is made of the same wood as the
benches and that is placed in parallel to the walls with the benches—is part of that
dramatization. Because of this staging of the stage Woyzeck, Adres, Maria, the Doctor,
the Captain, the Showman and the Drum Major have no other option but to appear and
disappear from stage middle. While the one edge of the wooden passageway is blocked
by the room’s wall, the other is blocked by the building’s roller door. The staging of the
wooden passageway does not allow access to its oppositional edges. As a result the actors can only access the stage from the middle—*in media res*.

In addition to the actors that can only access the stage from the middle, the stage itself is both parallel to and in-between the walls with the benches on which the audience is seated. Because of the spatial dynamics audience members are situated close not only to those next to them but also to those across from them. It is impossible to look at the stage without simultaneously looking at the audience on the benches across you. No matter if it is performed on the wooden passageway or on the wooden benches every breath, every sound, every gesture, every facial expression, every posture, is accompanied by either intentional or unintentional witnessing. This dramatization of both intentional and unintentional witnessing and/or spectating resists and eventually destroys any oppositions between the supposedly clearly defined off-stage originals on the one hand and their supposedly clearly defined on-stage simulacra on the other. I contend that this is why the stage and the benches are made of the same material. Everything around you performs as masks. Zero Theatre Group’s dramatization of *Woyzeck* (2014) intensifies these multiplicities of masks and thus destroys any oppositional schemata that, because of their conceptual incapacity to grasp multiplicities in terms of difference, end up reducing multiplicities to antithetic oppositions.

Any oppositional or dialectical dualisms are dramatized as one of the many masks that are destroyed only to reveal more masks. This dramatized dissolution of constructed oppositions into material multiplicities destroys the essentialization of dualisms. What I find particularly fascinating about this production of *Woyzeck* (2014) is that Zero Point Theatre Group dramatized this destruction of any supposedly resolvable oppositional and
dialectical tensions through the staged presence of the Showman. In this production, the Showman, the Doctor, and Adres, are performed by the same actor—Despoina Hatzipavlidou. For Hatzipavlidou while the Doctor is the “victimizer” and Adres is the “victim” the Showman is the always in-between “zero point that, just like the name of our group, emits a more philosophical logos” (Στεργιόπουλος 2014). However, in my contention this “zero point” is not the average of two extremes.

Bridging Hatzipavlidou’s quote with the concept of dramatization and the notion of edgeless inbetweenness that this article introduces, I contend that the Showman’s “point zero” dramatized by Zero Point Theatre Group did not perform as the symmetrical middle of two opposites. On the contrary, I contend that, because the Showman was embodied by the same actor who embodied the Doctor and Adres, the Showman destroyed any assumed or imagined antithetical symmetry between the edge of the Doctor, on the one hand, and its oppositional edge of Adres, on the other. Although according to one of her interviews, Hatzipavlidou approached the Showman as the “middle” (Στεργιόπουλος 2014) of the Doctor/Victimizer - Showman – Adres/Victim tri-symmetry, I argue that the dramatization of this, simultaneously assumed, imagined, embodied and taken for granted tri-symmetry by the same body scattered its oppositional masks into multiplicities that do not and cannot fit any schemata of linear organization. The Showman, who by definition produces masks, “dethroned” the Doctor and Adres from their oppositional extremities. As a result the Showman also destroyed any seeming promises of resolution that come along with these extremities.

In addition to the casting and staging of the Doctor/Showman, this destruction of seeming promises of resolution was also dramatized by the Zero Point Theatre Group’s
understanding and translation of Büchner’s text. The group worked with Iwanna Meitani—the production’s translator—during the rehearsals. As a result Meitani’s translation was based on Büchner’s text but the choices regarding the sequence of the scenes were made within the rehearsal space during the group’s rehearsals. According to Zero Point Theater Group’s director, Savas Stroubos, Büchner’s play calls for multiple and new “sequences of scenes” (Στρούμπος 2014). Furthermore for Stroubos Woyzeck’s “fragmented and shattered flow” is related to the “fragmented rhythm of all the images that are stored in the mind of a delusional pariah whose name is Woyzeck” (Στρούμπος 2014). Zero Point Theatre Group’s emphasis on the interplay between the sequence of the scenes and the experience of madness was also part of the group’s creative process. As a result the sequence of the scenes changed, not based a constructed notion of resolution or an intended telos of resolution, but on the group’s experimentation with various embodiments of madness.

Therefore both the audience and the actors on stage were always caught in between various spatiotemporalities: the forest now, the street yesterday, the tavern in the future, the infirmary, the captain’s office and so forth. The sequence of the scenes that both Meitani and the group chose emerged during the rehearsals. According to Stroubos, “the group follows a very intense psychosomatic process” and embodies “the dimensions of human existence that everyday life tends to push back and to hide” (Στρούμπος 2014). Madness is one of those dimensions. It was the group’s collective experimentation with madness that defined the sequence of the scenes.
Let me briefly recount my steps: In the beginning of this section I argued that
Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of *Woyzeck* (2014) presaged the non-efficacy of
SYRIZA’s promises of exodus from and resolution of the crisis through dramatizing the
destruction of notions of exodus and resolution. I also argued that, through this
dramatized destruction of notions of exodus and resolution, Zero Point Theatre Group’s
production of *Woyzeck* (2014) conceptualized resistance in terms of an infinitely edgeless
inbetweenness and thus liberated resistance from reactionary thinking. I traced this
edgeless inbetweenness in the Metaxourgeio area of Athens, where Zero Point Theatre
Group rehearses and performs, inside Zero Point Theatre Group’s space and finally in the
dramatization of the Showman and the sequence of the scenes. Finally, I contended that
Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of *Woyzeck* (2014) called for concepts that
understand multiplicities in terms of difference and not in terms of dualisms.

In the introduction I argued that the concept of dramatization that Deleuze
introduces in “The Method of Dramatization” does exactly that: it understands
multiplicities in terms of difference without reducing them to oppositional doubles.
Therefore I contend that the concept of dramatization can grasp the notions of infinitely
edgeless inbetweenness that Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of *Woyzeck* (2014)
introduces. In the following section I argue that this notion of edgeless inbetweenness
that Zero Point Theatre Group dramatized through Buchner’s *Woyzeck* (2014) in Greece
two months before the snap elections of January 2015, widens the conceptual capacities
of resistance by introducing a non-oppositional, and thus a non-resolvable—at least in
terms of oppositions—understanding of the tensions between power and resistance. In
order to do so I explore how this edgeless inbetweenness has been communicated in the
works of Deleuze and Guattari on Büchner and *Wozzeck*, Lukács on *Woyzeck*, and Adorno on *Wozzeck*. I contend that the dialogue between these four theorists lays the ground for a close examination of the political stakes of the conceptual differences between notions of inbetweenness that are designed in order to choose between two ends and notions of inbetweenness that take the risk and choose to fully destroy ends.

### 4.1.3. Zero Point Theatre Group’s *Woyzeck* In-Between Lukács, Adorno and Deleuze and Guattari

It is this kind of edgeless inbetweenness that Deleuze and Guattari find in the works of Büchner. Comparing Büchner with Lenz and Kleist in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1987) they write “But Kleist, Lenz and Büchner have another way of travelling and moving: proceeding from the middle, through the middle, coming and going rather than starting and finishing” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 25). For the authors of *A Thousand Plateaus* this kind of “travelling and moving” understands and “knows” how to “move between things, establish a logic of the AND, overthrow ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and beginnings” (25). They also add: “The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed. *Between* things, does not designate a localizable relation going from the one thing to another and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle” (25). Before I elaborate more on Deleuze and Guattari, I would like to bring Lukács and Adorno into my discussion of this notion of
Woyzeck’s edgeless inbetweenness in order to hopefully offer some matter-real “ground” to this topos where things “speed up.”

Long before A Thousand Plateaus, in German Realists in the Nineteenth Century (1993) Lukács argues that the ones who understand Woyzeck in terms of “demonic inbetweenness” are part of what the former understands as the “demonic-dramatic lineage” (72) of “Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche” (90). As one Greek etymology suggests, demon (δαίμων) is the one who remains always inbetween. In my contention though Lukács finds Buchner more inbetween than Lukács wants to admit. In “The Real Georg Buchner and his Fascist Misrepresentation” Lukács argues that, “what [Buchner] seeks politically, the concretization of the ‘poor’ in the revolutionary proletariat, does not exist in his reality, the reality of Germany.” And he adds, “He [Buchner] cannot therefore find a dialectical conception of history even in his consistent materialism” (Lukacs 1993:86). But for Lukács—and this is where Lukács and Deleuze and Guattari understand Buchner differently—Buchner does not dramatize this absence of a materially concrete dialectical conceptualization of history. On the contrary, according to Lukács, Buchner “instead of vacillating to and from between the contradictory extremes” (86) always chooses the extreme of the plebeian.

But there is a fundamental difference between Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of Buchner’s works as dramatizations of the absence—or in this section’s terms of the destruction of the illusion—of a concrete dialectical conceptualization of history, and between Lukács’ understanding of Buchner, and Woyzeck in particular, as the “greatest depiction of the German ‘poor’ of that time” (87). While for Deleuze and Guattari Buchner scatters any notions of clearly defined oppositional extremes into
infinite multiplicities, for Lukács *Woyzeck* occupies the extremity of the plebeian that is clearly opposed to the extremity of the rich. And even when Lukács’ surrounding materiality proves his dialectical schema wrong, even when he encounters “the insolubility of the objective contradictions in reality (and also in Buchner’s head)” that in his contention “are reflected in the fact that the people’s bitterness is still without direction, oscillating from one extreme to the other,” (78) Lukács never questions dialectics. On the contrary he understands dialectics as the only materially concrete way to approach matter-reality even when matter-reality itself proves dialectics wrong or insufficient.

I contend that Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of *Woyzeck* (2014) dramatized this insufficiency of dialectics. Savas Stroubos—member and director of Zero Point Theatre Group—in one of his published reflections on the play writes “Logic demands to turn [fragmented] notions into whole ones […] it demands to impose meaning, to clean history of its contradictions. Logic thinks in terms of two [antithetical] edges […] the fragment comes aggressive and audacious […] to talk about the sound of silence and the smell of death” (Στρούβος 2014). Dialectics remove from history its valuable contradictions rendering history passive and inactive. *Woyzeck* reminds us of that. Theatre reminds us of that. This is why Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Dostoyefsky, Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari turn to theatre in order to understand political praxis.

For Lukács intellectuals like Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Dostoyefsky and Nietzsche—one could easily situate Deleuze and Guattari in the same “chain” of thought—that think in terms of oscillating multiplicities are part of the “demonic-dramatic lineage” of “demonic inbetweeness” (72). In Lukács’s contention this
“demonic-dramatic lineage” of “demonic inbetweenness” is nothing but a “period of capitalist apologetics,” a “repeated call for despair-in the service of a reactionary capitalism” (90). In other words for Lukács dialectically oriented schemata are more materially concrete and, eventually, more capable of inciting revolutions, than concepts that affirm multiplicities and conditions of inbetweenness that are utterly dispossessed from promises of oppositional resolution.

Lukács wants to fully destroy capitalism and fascism. And for Lukacs, any conceptualizations of teleological dialectics fueled with the “consciousness of the poor,” (86) was resistance’s only hope against both. Earlier I argued that Lukács’s dialectics was less materially concrete than Lukács himself wanted to admit. However, exactly because Lukacs wanted to offer a concrete conceptualization of a revolution that would clearly differentiate itself from both the “educated liberals” (75) or in other words, the “rich” and the “noble,” (74) and the “National Socialist Revolution,” (72) he insisted on understanding class struggle-driven rebellion as resistance’s only safe solution. In my contention Lukács turned to Büchner not just because Büchner, according to Lukács, perceived “with clarity the economic foundations of a liberation of the working masses” (74) but mainly because Buchner the “plebeian revolutionary” was highly appropriated by the two things Lukács feared the most: the bourgeois and the fascists.

It was this combination between Büchner’s work and its appropriation by Germany’s “educated liberals” and “National Socialist Revolution” that allowed Lukacs to “concretely”—at least in his own terms—differentiate any class struggle-driven revolutions from both capitalism and fascism. Lukács strongly believed that it was the “dramatic lineage” of “demonic inbetweenness” that allowed the bourgeois and the
fascists to appropriate Buchner. Therefore Lukács wanted to rescue Büchner from this chain of thought of dramatic inbetweenness by understanding Büchner’s dramas as “poetic reflections of life” that “adhere to historical fact” (87). For Lukacs the most efficacious way of fighting capitalism and fascism was to understand both as historically concrete and thus, to situate resistance on capitalism’s and fascism’s oppositional extremities. He understood Büchner as part of those oppositional extremities. But it did not occur him once that both capitalism and fascism might not perform in terms of concreteness and that Büchner not only might have suspected that but also that he might have dramatized his suspicion.

In Greece of 2014, Zero Point Theatre Group had to deal with the same challenges: capitalism and fascism. On the one hand Greece was the infinitely indebted Greece of the unemployed who sell their labor for free, of the homeless who search in the streets for leftovers, of the underpaid who are asked to pay taxes with salaries they don’t get, of the retirees who buy their drug prescriptions with pensions they never receive, of the ones who commit suicide because there is no exodus, of the ones who had no other option but to emigrate, and no matter where or how far they go they will always remain imprisoned in a system that cruelly feeds upon its own irregularities.

On the other hand, 2014 Greece was the Greece where the monster of fascism fed on human death, hunger, fear and desperation. Golden Dawn—Greece’s extremely violent neo-fascist party—became the third party of the Greek parliament. For Stroubos “the camp is our world” (Left.gr 2014) and for Eleana Geourgouli—member and performer of Zero Point Theatre Group—“today we need to confront classic texts [like Woyzeck] because they carry an abstracted density” (Left.gr 2014). As opposed to

Adorno, distinguished from Lukács, gets closer to understanding Büchner’s dramas in terms of unresolvable contradiction and inbetweenness. Moreover Adorno’s epistemological paradigm consists of dialectical schemata full of unresolvable contradictions. But although Adorno’s contradictions remain unresolvable, or in other words always in-between, he, just like Lukács, never abandons dialectics. In the following paragraphs I will closely examine the “inbetweenness” of these unresolvable contradictions that Adorno traces in Buchner’s *Woyzeck* through his analysis on Berg’s *Wozzeck*. James Harding in “Integrating Atomization: Adorno Reading Berg Reading Buchner” argues that “Adorno’s interpretation of Alban Berg’s operatic rendition of *Woyzeck* provides the basis for an as-yet unexplored reading of Georg Büchner’s unfinished drama” (Harding, 1992:1). Although the reading of *Woyzeck* that this section proposes differs from the one that Harding explores in ways that that I will be describing in the next paragraphs, for now I would like to draw upon Harding’s argument and examine how Adorno’s analysis on *Wozzeck* unfolds any “not-yet” explored aspects of *Woyzeck*’s “inbetweenness.” My goal remains the same: to understand Büchner’s *Woyzeck* as a dramatized crash-test on dialectics.

In order to do so, in the comments to follow I place particular emphasis on Adorno’s understanding of Berg’s music for *Wozzeck* as an intensification—or, drawing
upon the thought process that this article’s introduction suggests, a dramatization—of the “in-between” (Adorno 1994:84) aspects of Buchner’s drama. Furthermore I examine the political stakes of the differences between Adorno and Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of “inbetweenness.”

In “Alban Berg” Adorno understands Berg’s opera of Wozzeck as a dramatization of Woyzeck’s unresolved contradictions. He specifically argues that the “intention” behind Berg’s “composition” of Wozzeck is to “seek justice for the drama” (84). For Adorno that justice “brings to light those aspects of the work that had been buried” (84). And according to Adorno this buried drama, these forgotten aspects of the work, had to do with the “fragments” of Woyzeck: with “every last comma of its texture” that Berg “respects” and “illuminates how closed is the openness, how complete the incomplete in Buchner” (84). Berg’s music brings back to life, intensifies and dramatizes the “in-between” and the “interlinear” (84) aspects of Buchner’s text. But although Adorno’s epistemology of unresolved contradictions grasps how these “in-between” aspects of Buchner’s work do not “shrink from extremes,” (85) Adorno never questions the assumed and simultaneously naturalized existence of these kinds of extremities.

But there is a fundamental difference between Lukács’s and Adorno’s non-questioning of these extremities. As Harding reminds us Adorno’s analysis of Berg’s Wozzeck is “consistent with Adorno’s classic critique of Georg Lukács and thus offers an implicit challenge to Lukács’s own interpretation of Buchner’s work, an interpretation that Lukács bases upon an analysis of class conflict” (Harding 1992:2). In the next couple of paragraphs I will draw upon Harding in order to argue that Adorno differentiates his analysis from Lukács’s class struggle-driven interpretation of Woyzeck by shifting the
focus from class conflict to the tension between notions of the whole and notions of the particular. In my contention this conceptual shift from Lukács’s emphasis on class conflict to Adorno’s unresolvable tensions between the whole and the particular is a conceptual shift from externally oriented dialectics—as Harding argues Lukacs’s dialectics is a class conflict that “will eventually supersede itself” (3)—to internally oriented, infinitely rotting dialectics.

But Adorno’s internally oriented and infinitely rotting dialectics differ from Zero Point Theatre Group’s dramatization of edgeless inbetweenness that I described in the beginning of this section. Adorno’s reverse dialectics are the dialectics of the particular. Harding argues that, “the critical strategies of Adorno’s Alban Berg lay the foundation for a materialist analysis of Woyzeck in which the relation between particular and universal is reversed, the later being subordinated to the evolution of the former”. Additionally for Harding “this reversal is consistent with Adorno’s classic critique of Georg Lukács and thus offers an implicit challenge to Lukács’s own interpretation of Buchner’s work, an interpretation that Lukács bases upon an analysis of class conflict” (1). But, for Harding, Adorno’s negative understanding of both Wozzeck and Woyzeck’s particularity places the latter always-already dependent upon the sovereignty of the whole. And although I agree with Harding that Lukács’s reading of Woyzeck grasps class conflict-resolution in terms of an externally oriented teleology, and that Adorno’s reading of Wozzeck and Woyzeck frames the resistance, and eventually the potential domination, of the particular in terms of internality, I contend that Harding opens the door to a non-dialectical reading of Woyzeck in which Harding himself does not engage.
I also contend that Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Büchner and that the Zero Point Theatre Group production of *Woyzeck* (2014) offers a non-dialectical understanding of the play. In order to explain how I will briefly return to Adorno’s analysis of *Wozzeck*. According to Adorno “the ultimate paradox of the *Wozzeck* score is that it achieves musical autonomy not by opposing the word but by obediently following it as its deliver.” And Adorno adds, “*Wozzeck* fulfills Wagner’s demand that the orchestra follow the drama’s every last ramification and thus become a symphony, and in so doing finally eliminates the illusion of formlessness in music drama” (Adorno 1994:87). Adorno likes Berg’s “music drama” because it intensifies the resistance of Büchner’s dramatic text to form a whole that becomes something more than its parts and thus that dominates and over-defines its parts. But while Adorno exorcises the sovereignty of the whole he simultaneously legitimizes the sovereignty of the particular. And this I contend can be highly problematic because Adorno is afraid to exorcise sovereignty once and for all. In fear of fascism and capitalism and their shared affinities both Lukács and Adorno are afraid to eliminate all forms of power.

I contend that Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of both Büchner and Berg in terms of “inbetweenness” does exactly that: it exorcises any form and/or formation of centered power. This condition of “inbetweenness” does not merely resist organization—and thus any internally or externally oriented centralization that goes along with it—but it also resists being grasped in terms of perceivably concretized—what Deleuze and Guattari understand as “localizable” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:297)—opposition. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari parallelize “Berg’s B in Wozzeck” and “Schumann’s A. Homage to Schumann, the madness of Schumann.” For the authors of *A
Thousand Plateaus the music of both Berg and Schumann performs as “a transversal” that “breaks free of the vertical and the horizontal as coordinates; and the transversal breaks free of the diagonal as a localizable connection between two points.” And they add: “In short, a block-line passes amid (au milieu des) sounds and propels itself by its own non-localizable middle (milieu). The sound block is an intermezzo” (297). The most important aspect of that “intermezzo” is that “it runs between points in a different direction that renders them indiscernible” (298).

While Adorno’s Berg resides in the domination of the particular in order to resist the domination of the whole, Deleuze and Guattari’s Berg fights all sorts of domination by producing a “moving matter of continuous variation” (340). What in my contention needs to be taken into consideration is that in Deleuze and Guattari’s case the “continuous variation” does not shatter any kind of centralized authority—either fragmented (Adorno) or unified (Lukács)—into millions pieces. On the contrary Deleuze and Guattari’s the “in-between” understanding of Buchner’s Woyzeck and Berg’s Wozzeck reminds us that any kind of domination is founded upon an elusive promise of resolution simply because opposition is nothing but a constructed schema.

Bridging my thought process to the process of dramatization that was introduced in the Interlude I would like to argue that this is what dramatization does: it never ceases to produce differentiated multiplicities that are irreducible to schemata of oppositional doubles and it thus never ceases to remind us that resolution is nothing but a promise designed to remain elusive. Strong It also reminds us that both performances of power and of resistance can be founded upon this elusive aspect of resolution. Like Zero Point Theatre Group, in fear of capitalism and fascism both Lukács and Adorno found in
Woyzeck a praxis of resistance. But neither Lukács nor Adorno exorcises notions of elusive resolution—and the dangers of domination they entail—like Deleuze and Guattari’s understandings of Woyzeck and Wozzeck do.

Echoing Deleuze and Guattari, the Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Buchner’s Woyzeck presaged the non-efficacy of Greece’s resistance against its international creditors by introducing conditions of “inbetweenness” and by dramatizing the destruction of notions of resolution and exodus. Right before the Greek snap elections of January 2015—when Woyzeck was produced by the Zero Point Theatre Group—capitalism and fascism over-defined Greece’s status quo. On the one hand the party of SYRIZA—Greece’s radical left—was founding its campaign upon promises of resolution of the asymmetrical conflicts between Greece and its international creditors. But, within frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe, these kinds of promises of resolution are designed to remain elusive in order to perform as a permanent means of political leverage. On the other hand Golden Dawn—Greece’s extremely violent neo-fascist party—was becoming more and more popular.

Five months after its victory—a victory that was based on SYRIZA’s promise not to sign a third memorandum—the government of SYRIZA ended up signing a third memorandum. Six months after its victory the government of SYRIZA resigned and called for snap elections. According to the results of the Greek snap elections of September 2015, Golden Dawn remained the third largest political party in the Greek parliament. Even before the Greek snap elections of January 2015, the Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck anticipated Greece’s emerging relations to capitalism and fascism and dramatized conceptualizations of resistance that would not rely on notions of
resolution and exodus and that would perform always “in-between.” For Despoina Hatzipavlidou—the Zero Point Theatre Group’s actor who performed the Showman, the Doctor and Adres—the Showman performs as a “zero point.” Bridging Hatzipavlidou’s quote to this section’s thought process I contend that the Showman, as someone who never ceases to produce dramatized multiplicities, always starts at degree zero.

But this notion of degree zero has nothing in common with the notion of ground zero. Returning to one of Deleuze and Guattari’s passages that I cited earlier, “Making a clean state, starting or beginning again from ground zero, seeking a beginning or a foundation—all imply a false conception of voyage and movement (a conception that is methodical, pedagogical, initiatory, symbolic…). But Kleist, Lenz and Buchner have another way of travelling and moving: proceeding from the middle, through the middle, coming and going rather than starting and finishing” (25).¹ Both capitalism and fascism rely on promises of resolution that, especially within frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe, are designed to remain elusive in order to be used as permanent means of political leverage.

Foreseeing the interplay between the capitalist masks of fascism and the fascist masks of capitalism and notions of ground zero, the Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck in Greece right before the snap elections of January 2015 dramatized the destruction of notions of resolution and exodus and the conceptualization of resistance in terms of inbetweenness that starts at degree zero. As described above I traced this inbetweenness that starts at degree zero in the Metaxourgeio area of Athens, where Zero Point Theatre Group rehearses and performs, inside Zero Point Theatre Group’s space and finally in the dramatization of the Showman. For Deleuze and Guattari
“beginning at a degree zero” is a beginning that always starts “in the matter of variation, in the medium of becoming or transformation” (507). Maybe infinite variation and transformation can successfully challenge capitalism and fascism and their produced affinities. But because I want to avoid any implied panaceas that this statement might entail, for now I would like to call for concepts that might get us there. I contend that the concept of dramatization could be one of them.

In an effort to relate the concept of dramatization to the notion of TragedyMachine(s) that this dissertation introduces I would like to argue that the latter assembles dramatization as production of multiplicities irreducible to oppositional doubles, with other productions. These productions might or might not lessen the revolutionary force of irreconcilable contradictions to seeming promises of resolution that are designed to remain elusive. For Stroubos, Büchner’s Woyzeck “throws tragedy, as Büchner received it from Goethe and Schiller [when tragedy] dealt with the passions of Kings, masters and knights […] to the hell of a delusional pariah […] to the dregs of society.” (Left.gr 2014) I understand Stroubos’s statement not as an urge to understand tragedy in strict terms of class struggle but in terms of an intense unfolding of multiplicities that resist “rationalized” schemata of oppositional doubles. It is this intense unfolding of multiplicities, that produces non-resolvable and infinitely edgeless conditions of inbetweenness. The next section traces this inbetweenness in Yiannis Houvardas’s (Γιάννης Χουβαρδάς) production of Oresteia (Ορέστεια).
4.2.1 *Oresteia* in Post-Referendum Greece

Yiannis Houvarda’s *Oresteia* was part of the Athens and Epidaurus Festival of 2016. It opened on July 8 2016 in the ancient theatre of Epidaurus, toured all over Greece and closed on September 7 2016 in the Odeon of Herodes Atticus in Athens. The previous summer, the summer of 2015, was a summer of political turmoil for Greece. After very long negotiations with Greece’s international creditors, Greece’s then newly elected government of SYRIZA—an acronym that stands for Greece’s radical left—rejected the severe austerity measures “suggested” by the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). SYRIZA then called for a referendum.

The Greek referendum that took place on July 5 2015 asked from the Greek people to vote YES (NAI) or NO (OXI) to the most recent EC, ECB and IMF’s proposal. The results of the referendum were decisive. 61.31% of the voters rejected the proposal of EC, ECB and IMF. Yet, less than ten days after the referendum the government of SYRIZA ended up signing a third memorandum with Greece’s international creditors that included more severe austerity measures than the ones that were initially proposed. After the Greek parliament approved the memorandum agreement on August 13 2015, Alexis Tsipras—prime minister of Greece and president of SYRIZA—resigned and called for snap legislative elections. The elections took place on September 20 2015. SYRIZA won again but just like in its previous victory after the Greek snap legislative elections on January 25 2015 SYRIZA had to coalesce with the conservative, right-wing party of ANEL (ANEΛ)—an acronym that stands for the Independent Greeks.
Since then, the asymmetrical and non-resolvable power relations between Greece and its international creditors have been hiding beneath masks and promises of resolution that are designed to remain elusive in order to perform as a permanent means of political leverage. The elected government of SYRIZA is turned to a spectator. The “informal body” of the eurogroup—a definition provided by the official website of the Council of the European Union—remains unminuted41, non-answerable to any elected parliament and more powerful than the formally recognized institutional formations of the European Union.

How can a 21st century production of the ancient tragedy of Oresteia conceptualize power as performed within the neoliberal frames of the Eurozone? How can a production of Oresteia in Greece of 2016 dramatize the transformation of both elected governments and entire countries to spectators? How can a production of Oresteia in Greece of 2016—a tragedy that is mostly discussed as the theatricalized moment of transition from αυτοδικία (aftodikia, self justice) to institutionalized justice—disrupt that narrative and dramatize the non-institutional aspect of institutionalization and the well hidden dangers that the latter entails? Finally, how can Oresteia as part of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival of 2016 engage critically with the production of its own production?

These are the questions that Houvarda’s Oresteia took on. In the following comments, I argue that this specific production of Oresteia critically examined how power, within frames of 21st century Eurozone, power does not perform in terms of a whole that dominates its parts but in terms of parts that group with other parts in order to dominate them. I examine how Deleuze and Guattari offer conceptual tools that can grasp

41 no one is keeping minutes
these performances of power in ways that current discourse of Theatre and Performance Studies does not. I also argue that Houvarda’s choices regarding the dramatizations of Athena, Orestis, Erinyes/Evmenides and the chorus made clear that absolute power produces institutions not only in order to conceal and legitimize its performance outside these institutions by rendering this performance fully unuttered but also in order to turn its production of sounds—sounds that inscribe pain and death onto certain bodies—into legitimized texts. Finally, I make the case that this production of *Oresteia* dramatized the cruel asymmetries and power relations of its own production.

### 4.2.2 *Oresteia* Machines and the Eurozone

On your way from the parking lot to the theatre space of ancient Epidaurus—approximately a 15-20 minute walk—everything scatters you in multiple temporalities. Although these multiple temporalities refer to time and space on an abstract level they simultaneously resist spatiotemporal concretization. Of course the tour guides, ready to construct and commodify highly problematic narratives of originality, will claim otherwise. But the blending of the stones that have been there since the 4th and the 2th century B.C with the ones that were recently added in order to support the theatre’s construction while looking like “ancient”, the cafeterias and the restaurants, the tourist attractions, the facilities that are part of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival (Hellenic Festival S. A), all perform topographically, but none of these topical inscriptions (graphein) rests on one specific topos.

This atopic aspect, in terms of specificity, of the topographical performances of the multiple temporalities was also part of the production of *Oresteia* directed by
Houvardas. On your way to the seats you could see the sets of *Oresteia* from multiple angles since in the ancient theatre of Epidaurus you can only get to the seating area through the landscape that is behind the space that is marked as the stage. The sets included two living rooms placed upstage left and downstage right, a group of chairs placed upstage right, a lounge chair placed downstage left, a wooden piece of furniture that looked like a cupboard also placed upstage left in the middle of one of the living rooms, and a construction that looked like a gigantic wooden wardrobe with metallic balusters built on top of it placed upstage center. Finally, you could see one of the actors lying next to one of the sofas and another one on the top of the gigantic wooden construction.

![Picture taken by Daniel Dilliplane](image)

Even before the opening, the aesthetics of what was already on stage situated you inside a mid-class living room in Greece during the decade between 1940 and 1950: when Greece went through a war with Italy, a period of occupation by the axis powers—Nazi Germany, the Empire of Japan and the Kingdom of Italy—a period of restoration
and a civil war. But even though the sets on stage situated you somewhere near this
decade, the gigantic box, the costume of the actor that was lying on top of it, the soil that
performed both as the floor for the sets and the stage, the spikes that were growing right
next to one of the chairs, the landscape beyond the stage and finally the indebted Greece
that, even if you were not from Greece, you encountered every step of your way to the
ancient theatre of Epidaurus—in the homeless, in the highway signs that reminded you
that these roads were indebted to EU, in the stores that went bankrupt—resisted situating
you in the specificity of that decade.

According to Houvardas the references to that decade were a “loose poetic
metaphor, a smooth conceptual journey to a period of our history […] that, in the third
part […] launched in to a sphere of ideas somewhere in space” (Dimadi 2016). This
simultaneity between the atopic and the topographic performances of the multiple
temporalities—temporalities that Oresteia dramatized through innumerous multiplicities
of signs—was intensified throughout the entire show. Some of these multiplicities were
culturally specific references in the temporalities that only Greek audiences might
recognize. Klytemnestra’s white apron covered in blood in combination with her big combat boots blended implied notions of gendered domestic labor with acts of war. Agamemnon’s furry military uniform was contradicted by Orestis’ polished suit and big myopic glasses. The Messenger’s military uniform and crutches challenged the notions of class and privilege that the silken robe of Aigisthus implied. Kassandra’s black high heel boots and babydoll were contradicted by the grey long-hair wigs and the long black cassocks of Erinyes. Electra’s chintz-like woolen jacket and braces was cancelled out by Athena’s white suit. Apollo’s cane with strikes and polka doted bow tie were in utter incompatibility with the cheap, dirty shirt that the Guard was wearing. Pilades’s cheap suit was contradicted by Pythia’s gold-glitter dress. The actors’ voices that were occasionally coming through a speaking trumpet were blended with the voices of Sofia Vembo, Stella Greka and Kakia Mendri—Greek singers famous for singing songs dedicated to Greek resistance during the decade between 1940–1950—that were coming through the gramophone placed inside the wooden furniture that looked like a cupboard, all scattered signs that carried you into various spatiotemporalities without allowing you to rest in any of them.

Current discourse in Theatre and Performance Studies understands this capacity of multiplicities of signs to both perform topographically—in terms of topic continuities—and atopically—in terms of topic disruptions—as processes of de-hierarchization. For example, in his intellectual and discursive effort to offer conceptual tools for theatre that performs in terms other than the ones of telos, linearity, illusion and inadequate similitude, Hans-Thies Lehmann introduces the concept of “parataxis/ non-hierarchy” (Lehmann 2006:86) of signs. In Postdramatic Theatre Lehmann defines the
“parataxis” of signs as a process of “de-hierarchization of theatrical means” that
governs the super – and subordination of elements in order to avoid confusion and to
produce harmony and comprehensibility” (86). And, he adds:

we can repeatedly note a non-hierarchical use of signs that aims at a
synaesthetic perception and contradicts the established hierarchy, at the
top of which we find language, diction and gesture and in which visual
qualities—such as an experience of an architectonic space—if they come
into play at all—figure as subordinate aspects (86)

But, in my contention, in his attempt to grasp theatrical praxis that is not
subordinate to teleologically oriented storytelling designed to produce illusions of totality
and wholeness, Lehmann neglects that the hierarchy that emerges from the power
relations between a logocentric and formalized whole, on the one hand, and the parts that
are in service to this whole, on the other, is not the only hierarchy there is or can be.
Lehmann also seems to neglect that the word parataxis (παράταξις)—as one Greek
etymology suggests—implies things being put in order by an authority. Furthermore
parataxis as a living term within frames of Greek everyday life is closely associated with
deeply hierarchical formations like for instance political parties and the military.

I contend that Lehmann’s “de-hierarchization” allows two other interconnected
hierarchies not only to emerge but also to remain hidden and unaddressed. The first one
regards to the production of the works Lehmann understands as non-hierarchical. In
*Postdramatic Theatre* Lehmann completely overlooks that the works he defines as non-
hierarchical—for instance the works of Robert Wilson or Jan Fabre (19)—are works
where the artists have absolute power over their creations and that this absolutism of the artist remains unchallenged or gets to be enhanced by the scattering of the signs.

The second hierarchy regards the power relations and asymmetries among the multiplicities of signs. Lehmann disregards that the multiple particularities of signs—especially because the latter are always already overcharged with meanings irreducible to one signification—relate to each other via multiple power relations and asymmetries. In both of these cases the destruction of one hierarchy does not eliminate hierarchy once and for all but lays the ground for multiple hierarchies to emerge. Instead of the domination of the whole we are left with dominations of some of the parts—the artist included—not in relation to a whole but in relation to other parts. But unfortunately that does not decenter or de-hierarchize domination. Therefore I contend that the emphasis should not be placed on processes of hierarchization and de-hierarchization but on productions of continuities and disruptions.

In the following paragraphs I argue that *Oresteia* by Houvardas conceptualized power not in terms of the domination of the whole over its parts but in terms of the domination of some parts over other parts. I contend that in this particular production of *Oresteia* that domination of some parts over other parts emerged from the multiple productions of topographic continuities and atopic disruptions. Furthermore I examine how the works of Deleuze and Guattari offer the theoretical tools that can grasp these relations between performances of power and productions of continuities and disruptions. In this particular production of *Oresteia* the domination of some of the parts/ signs did not emerge from the resistance of the latter against a whole that was becoming something other and/ or more than its parts, but from parts/ signs that, when put together with other
signs, became something other and/or more than other parts. The intensification of the atopic and topographic temporalities of the signs made this domination of some of the parts in relation to other parts more visible and explicit. They also dramatized how this domination of some of the parts is often hidden beneath promises of a whole that are designed to remain elusive.

For Deleuze and Guattari this kind of spatiotemporal doing and undoing serves as a great stage for us to observe and grasp the domination of parts over other parts. In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari write: “[this] non-localizable intercommunications and dispersed localizations [are] bringing into play processes of temporalization, fragmented formations and detached parts, with a surplus value of code, and where the whole is itself produced alongside the parts, as a part apart or, as Butler would say, ‘in another department’ that fits the whole over the other parts” (Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 286-287). On a conceptual level, for Deleuze and Guattari this production of the whole “alongside the parts” is produced by what Deleuze and Guattari understand as a “machine.”

Although providing a singular definition for Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of machine would be a topic for a whole book since the concept itself, throughout Deleuze and Guattari’s works, transforms into, among others, abstract-machines, desiring-machines, social-machines, War-machines and so on, for now I would like to briefly describe machine as a group of heterogeneous and “disparate” (343) elements that produces “interruptions or breaks” (38). In Chaosophy — a collection of interviews of Deleuze and Guattari as well as essays that Guattari wrote between 1969 and 1992 — Guattari writes, “For the machine possesses two characteristics of powers: the power of
the continuum (…) but also the rupture in direction” (Guattari, 2007: 96). Additionally, in
*Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari write: “In a word, every machine functions as a break
in the flow in relation to the machine to which it is connected, but at the same time is also
a flow itself, or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it”
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2009: 36). *Oresteia* produced “continuums” and “ruptures”
through the atopic and topographic performances of the multiple signs.

Echoing Deleuze and Guattari, *Oresteia*, connected two actual machines together:
the machine of the gramophone and the machine of the gigantic box placed upstage
center. On the one hand the gramophone kept playing songs by Vembo, Greka and
Mendri dedicated to Greek resistance during the years of occupation. On the other hand
the gigantic box kept changing colors and appearances and producing different sounds. It
performed as a door that only Klytemnestra could use in order to come out to the stage, as
a guard tower on which the Guard guarded the boarders of the city, as a static on stage
machina that both Apollo and Athena had to access—as opposed to the deus ex machina
where the machine is the tool that gives access to the gods—in order to perform their
monologues, as Orestis’s prison when he was haunted by the Erinyes and finally, as a
death machine that vomited out the dead bodies of Agamemnon and Kassandra. The
sounds of resistance produced by the gramophonic machine—sounds that were also
implying a topographic continuity in terms of resistance in Greece during the decade
between 1940 and 1950—were continuously interrupted by a death machine—the
gigantic box—that via its multiple performances, inscribed sounds onto the production of
pain and death. Additionally, just like Deleuze and Guattari predicted, the gigantic box—
a machine that was a part among other parts—got to perform as a whole “alongside the parts.”

Through the machine of the gigantic box Oresteia staged conceptualizations of power in terms of domination of parts over other parts that—like a machine—combines heterogeneous elements and produces both continuities and disruptions of all sorts of flows through inscribing sounds onto their “authorized” production of pain and death. In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Nietzsche’s works on tragedy and introduce the notion of “phonographic connection” (191), from the Greek phoni (φωνή, voice) and the Greek graphein (γραφειν, write), in order to describe the cruelty of inscription of unwritten laws: what Deleuze and Guattari call “the coding of pain and death” (192). How was that relevant to what Greece was experiencing?

Twenty-first century Eurozone is a surplus economy founded upon the asymmetrical and non-resolvable power relations between its parts: the creditor member-states of the European North and the debtor member-states of the European South (Lazzarato 2015, Varoufakis 2016). Greece is part of the latter. The surplus economy of the Eurozone does not perform as a whole that becomes something other and/ or more than its parts but as a machine that, just like Oresteia’s box machine, brings together asymmetrical and heterogeneous parts so that some of these parts dominate others. This domination is exercised through non-institutional formations like the Eurogroup. Additionally, this domination is based on decisions that are made behind closed doors, only to be verbally announced as de facto rules that will be forcefully imposed onto elected national parliaments in order to conceal the commanding sounds of their voices (phoni, φωνή) beneath the productions of written laws on a national level. But, just like in
Oresteia’s box machine, it is the sound of these decisions that inscribes pain and death. The written law is designed to infinitely remain one of the parts that are dominated.

4.2.3 The limited chorus, the unuttered intervention of Athena and the indebtedness of Orestis and Erinyes

Houvarda’s production of the Oresteia trilogy lasted 2 hours and 15 minutes. In order to achieve that duration, the production’s translator, Dimitris Dimitriadis, limited the parts of the chorus and placed particular emphasis on the dialogic parts of Oresteia. In one of his interviews, Houvardas stated that he wanted to

create a very dynamic team of actors that would do all the work, including the ‘clean’ and the ‘dirty’ work. Something like a theatre gang, with common codes and conspiratorial relations, flexible, bonded but theatrically fearless. Furthermore I was interested in staging the whole trilogy without the exhaustion of a 3-4 hour performance. It was important to me that the audience watched carefully the last and, in my opinion, the most important part of the trilogy, “Evmenides.” Therefore […] we focused on the dialogical aspects of the play getting from the parts of the chorus the ones with the most intense poetic volume. (Dimadi 2016)

Houvarda’s choice to limit the chorika (χορικά, the parts of the chorus) was unexpectedly welcomed by the audience of the festival. The audience of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival often expresses its disapproval through catcalls and through leaving the theatre before the end of the show. Oresteia’s premiere ended with almost no catcalls. Furthermore very few people left the theatre of Epidaurus during the show. I described the audience’s welcoming of this particular production of Oresteia as unexpected because
the majority of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival consists of tourists and of theatre-goers that go to the ancient theatre of Epidaurus in order to experience an actualization of the highly problematic narratives that not only dictate a relation between notions of authenticity, on the one hand, and Greek theatre and Greek tragedy on the other, but also that they dictate how this pre-set understanding of “authentic Greek tragedy” should look like on stage.

This audience is not usually willing to reflect critically on the very important political stakes of these constructed narratives and to eventually welcome theatre that disrupts them. That said, since the administration of Giorgos Loukos in 2006—an administration that ended in early 2016 for reasons that I will examine in the third and last part of this section—the festival includes more experimental theatre and avant-garde performances creating a polyphony of artistic voices.

Although Houvarda’s choice to limit the parts of the chorus was unexpectedly welcomed by the festival’s audience it was not welcomed by theatre-critics. Matina Kaltaki—a theatre-critic that publishes in LiFO—made one of the most severe criticisms. According to Kaltaki “this was not Oresteia […] if the director distorts the form (through for instance cutting the parts of the chorus) he distorts the content that was always already distorted from turning the prototype into a pocket version” (Kaltaki 2016). My disagreement with Kaltaki can be traced on two different levels. On a level of conceptualizing theatre as poetic praxis I contend that theatre not only can but has to experiment with the inter-linkages between content and form. On a level of this particular production of Oresteia, I contend that Houvarda’s choice to cut down the parts of the chorus was more than a “pocket” choice.
Cutting down the parts of the chorus not only shrunk the trilogy’s time but it also reduced the “distance” between the chorus and *Oresteia’s* protagonists. In this particular production the chorus consisted of three chorus-leaders that were all the time fully merged with the rest of the actors. Furthermore in many occasions during the show the actors merged with the chorus-leaders and performed as chorus. This blurring of the boundaries between the chorus and the protagonists not only gave the chorus access to structures that could only be accessed by the protagonists but also limited the elitism of the latters. Although in terms of Aeschylus’ text Houvardas did reduce the chorika, in terms of on-stage performance the role of the chorus was enhanced.

For Friedrich Nietzsche understanding chorus as sufficient in itself rather than as defined through a dichotomy between itself and the protagonists was of great importance. Not on a level of actual theatre production but on a level of philosophy of tragedy Nietzsche challenges discourses that impose dichotomies between the chorus and the rest of the actors. In *The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music* Nietzsche argues that:

“the tradition [that] tells us quite categorically that tragedy arose from the tragic chorus […] obliges us to penetrate to the core of this tragic chorus as the true primal drama, disregarding the usual aesthetic clichés: that it is the ideal viewer of that it represents the populace as against the noble of the drama proper” (Nietzsche 2009: 35).

And he adds, “this latter interpretation” if found “edifying” by “certain politicians” because it suggests that “the immutable moral law of the democratic Athenians was represented in the popular chorus, always correct in its appraisal of the passionate misdeeds and extravagance of the kings” (35). Leaving aside Nietzsche’s
highly problematic arguments that are oriented around notions of originality, I contend that the connections he establishes between means of political leverage and narratives that understand the chorus as the representatives of the “populace” or the “demos”, reveal that those who have access to decision-making processes use notions of representational inclusion in order to exclude the ones who they claim to include. These narratives/ means of political leverage conceal that the chorus is excluded in the name of a promise of inclusion that is well designed to remain elusive.

As a result Nietzsche turns to A. W. Schegel in order to find philosophies of tragedy that understand the chorus not in terms if inclusion-exclusion but in terms of, what later discourses will define as, affect. Nietzsche reminds us that for Schegel the chorus is the “ideal spectator” (36) because it positions itself “on stage” allowing “the world on stage to affect him not in an aesthetic way but in a physically empirical way” (37) calling for other spectators to do the same. The question is to be affected by what? In regards to this question Nietzsche draws upon Schiller and argues that, “the chorus is a living wall against encroaching reality because it […] depicts existence more truly, more authentically, more complete than the man of culture who sees himself as the sole reality. The realm of poetry […] wishes to […] cast off the mendacious finery of the supposed reality of the man of culture” (37). From this point of view theatrical tragedy destroys the illusions of reality on stage. If a forth wall is created it is only for protecting the staged destruction of the illusions of reality by the illusions of reality.

According to Nietzsche one of the most dangerous illusions of reality is the one that disguises all sorts of absolute power—what in my contention Nietzsche understands as the “Apollonian masks”— as inclusive and democratic in terms of access of both its
production and its exertion. For Nietzsche “Aeschylus places the Olympian world on his
scale of justice” (48). But although Aeschylus stages how justice transforms from
something constructed to something deified he never destroys that illusion of deification,
or as Nietzsche says “he does not plumb the full depths of its terrors” (49). I contend that
this is exactly what Houvarda’s *Oresteia* did: it revealed the terrors of absolute power
especially when the latter is hidden beneath the appearance of justice.

Earlier I described how Houvarda’s choice to cut down the chorika from
Aeschylus’s text intensified the presence of the chorus on stage. Drawing upon
Nietzsche—and his interpretations of Schegel and Schiller—I laid the conceptual ground
so that the blurring between the chorus and *Oresteia*’s protagonists is understood in terms
of unraveling of one of the illusions that absolute power constructs; as I have been
arguing since the beginning of this section absolute power is founded upon promises of
inclusion that are designed to remain elusive. It is this elusiveness of these promises that
Houvarda’s *Oresteia* dramatized.

In the last part of this particular production of *Oresteia*’s trilogy—the part of
Evmenides—Athena, right after she announced her decision to institutionalize justice, she
moved to the theatre’s second diazoma (διάζωμα, frieze), right in the middle of the
audience, in order to choose the “best citizens” (Liouliou 2016: 62)—according to
Demetriades’s translation of Aeschylus’s text—that would participate in *Orestis*’s trial.
While—only after upon Athena’s call—*Oresteia*’s spectators were emptying the
audience space from spectators by moving towards the stage, everyone on stage was
turning into a spectator spectating Athena who positioned herself on top of everyone else.
On the one hand there was Athena that emptied and occupied the space of the spectators
and on the other hand there was the stage that besides the ghost of Klytemnestra, Apollo and Orestis it included the audience members that were “chosen” and promised that they would participate in the decision-making process of Orestis’s trial and the Erinyes that consisted of the chorus leaders, Agamemnon, Aigisthos, the Guard and the Messenger.

Athena emptied and occupied the space of the spectators and positioned herself on top of both that space and the stage. The stage momentarily blurred the boundaries between actors and spectators, and the chorus and the protagonists, in order for Athena to turn it into a spectator. Schegel’s “ideal spectator” was fully affected by the unraveling of the illusions beneath which absolute power remains hidden. Houvarda’s *Oresteia* dramatized how absolute power conceals its exclusive production and exertion beneath promises of inclusion that are designed to remain elusive.

At this moment, the moment during which Athena sent the citizens of her choice on stage—leaving the excluded ones fully unnoticed and unheard—turned everyone on stage into a spectators in the name of an elusive and fake promise of inclusion, occupied both the space of the stage and the space of the spectators and positioned herself outside and higher than both, *Oresteia* revealed one of the most efficacious foundations of absolute power. As Giorgio Agamben reminds us in the *State of Exception*—one of the most important contemporary understandings of Carl Schmitt’s notion of state of exception—“Being-outside, and yet belonging: this is the topological structure of the state of exception, and only because the sovereign, who decides on the exception, is, in truth, logically defined in his being by the exception, can he too be defined by the oxymoron ecstasy-belonging” (Agamben 2005: 30). Drawing upon Agamben I contend that this ecstatic topology of absolute power is founded upon its hypocritical capacity to
hide its production and exertion beneath pseudo-promises of participatory agency and inclusivity. I also contend that, because of its hypocritical capacity, the production and exertion of absolute power is performed, paraphrasing Shakespeare, “out of joint”: fully unuttered.

Once the citizens of her choice moved from the auditorium to the stage Athena positioned herself on the top of the gigantic box-machine. From the top the box-machine—the machine that during the entire performance was inscribing pain and death onto bodies—Athena initiated the voting process for the trial by voting for Orestis and by announcing that in case of a tie her vote will prevail. Following Aeschylus’s text in this production of Oresteia the number of votes against Orestis ended up being equal to the number of votes for Orestis. As a result Athena imposed her initial decision without justifying or being asked to justify her power to do so. As opposed to the scenes before and after Athena’s decision, in this particular production of Oresteia, the moment when Athena decides to acquit Orestis was designed to be performed fast and remain relatively unnoticed. The decision-making process behind Orestis’s acquittal remained fully unuttered and fully hidden beneath the process of the trial; the institutionalized and elusive promise of participatory inclusion that was predestined to be ignored.

In addition to the unuttered aspect of Athena’s decision to acquit Orestis and her use of institutionalized justice in order to legitimize that unuttered aspect, Houvarda’s Oresteia dramatized Orestis’s acquittal not as a resolution but as a condition of infinite indebtedness to Athena. According to Demetriades’s translation of Aeschylus text, during his defense of Orestis Apollo promised Athena that, “he [Orestis] be eternally faithful to
you so that you can win, Goddess, allies him and his decedents” (Liouliou 2016: 65). But
Orestis was not the only one who remained indebted to Athena.

From a dramaturgical and directorial perspective, Houvardas synthesized
Orestis’s condition with Evmenides’s infinite indebtedness to Athena. In his interview in
“To Βήμα” (Vima) newspaper, Houvardas talked about Erinyes’s transformation to
Evmenides in terms of an asymmetrical and non-resolvable exchange that renders
Erinyes infinitely indebted to Athena: “The Erinyes that are transformed to Evmenides
are bought by Athena. It is as if they are taking ministries given by Athena. They are
‘redeemed’ but they [remain] under the edifice of Athena” (To Βήμα 2016). This
production of Oresteia dramatized the destruction of what Nietzsche in The Birth of
Tragedy defines as “redemption by illusion” (Nietzsche 1993: 25). This production of
Oresteia showed that Erinyes’s redemption was nothing but an illusion that beautified
that Erinyes were bought off and silenced by Athena.

This redemption by illusion echoed post-referendum Greece: where the left
government of SYRIZA, from resisting Erinyes, was forcefully transformed to silenced
and “redeemed” Evmenides infinitely indebted to Greece’s international creditors. On a
stage level, after this unequal exchange between Athena, on the one hand, and Orestis
and the Erinyes/ Evmenides on the other was established, Athena remained on the top of
the box-machine and Orestis and Erinyes sat on the stage’s living rooms that since the
beginning of the third part of the trilogy had been covered with huge, transparent covers
made of plastic. Once Pythia entered the stage everyone started singing in an ironic and
mocking way Kakia Mendri’s song “Life Restarts for Us” (Η Ζωή Ξαναρχίζει για Εμάς):
a song created by Andrea Poggis (music) and Kostas Karfniwtis (lyrics) in 1947 and
associated with the very much desired end of the Greek civil war that started in 1946 and ended in 1949.

But Athena’s voice was louder. Also, while everyone was signing, Pythia distributed to Evmenides flyers with the lyrics of the song so that Evmenides sang along with Athena without voicing anything other than what Athena wanted them to voice. Athena’s sound—coming from the top of the box-machine—turned into texts that were then inscribed onto the bodies of the Evmenides; onto the bodies of those who were rendered infinitely indebted. Once the song was over, Pythia ordered everyone to “maintain pandemic silence” (EPT 2016) and everyone covered themselves with the plastic, transparent covers. Athena remained on top of the box-machine waving like a politician. The play ended with the box-machine producing one last deafening sound.

Picture taken by Daniel Dilliplane

This specific production of Oresteia made clear that absolute power produces institutions not only in order to conceal and legitimize its performance outside these institutions by rendering this performance fully unuttered but also in order to turn its
sounds—sounds that inscribe pain and death onto certain bodies—into legitimized texts. Drawing a parallel trajectory between this production of Oresteia and Greece during the years of 2015-2016 I contend that it was exactly this kind of conceptualization of power that the left government of SYRIZA—a government that was elected because of its promise to resist politics of debt—failed to grasp and address. In my contention, the stage of Oresteia, that through the mixing of the chorus with the play’s protagonists blurred notions of agency and spectatorship only to be transformed and turned by the absolute power of Athena into a spectator, was Greece two days before the Greek referendum of July 2015.

On July 3 2015 millions of people—including members of the Greek government of SYRIZA and other αντιμνημονιακά (anti-memorandum) parties of the Greek parliament—occupied Greece’s public squares, parks, streets and buildings in order to publically say “NO” to the severe austerity measures that Greece’s international creditors were about to impose on Greece. This blurring between the Greek parliament and the Greek electorate was particularly intensified on Syntagma square in Athens, when the Greek prime minister and president of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras, stepped out from Maximos Mansion—the official seat of the prime minister of Greece that is located near the Greek Parliament—and joined the demonstration. But the illusion of inclusion lasted no more than one day: the day of the referendum.

According to the results of the referendum the 61.31% of the voters rejected the EC, ECB and IMF’s proposal. After a very long and painful “negotiating fight” the government of SYRIZA, like the “redeemed” and silenced Erinyes, ended up signing a third memorandum between Greece and its international creditors. Just like the actors of
Oresteia, both the Greek government and the Greek electorate were transformed into passive spectators whose actions were “allowed” to be taken, only to be ignored by “informal bodies” like the eurogroup. Just like Athena’s voice silenced the voices of the chorus on stage, the third memorandum silenced the voice of the Greek bailout referendum of 2015.

Within frames of 21st century European Union and Eurozone informal bodies like the eurogroup are not minuted—keeping their discussions and processes opaque—are not answerable to any elected parliament, are stronger than any other institutional formation of the European Union and they have the power to impose the sounds of their decisions—decisions that are announced as unchangeable facts—onto parliaments and other institutionalized formations in order to legitimize them as laws. Furthermore, just like in the case of Orestis and Erinyes/Evmenides, the resolution that the third memorandum offered was not an actual resolution but a perpetuation of Greece’s asymmetrical and non-resolvable condition of indebtedness to its creditors hidden beneath the promise of a resolution that is designed to remain elusive.

4.2.4 Jan Fabre and the 2016 Athens & Epidaurus Festival

In the next pages I would like to briefly elaborate on the processes of production of Oresteia’s production and Oresteia’s larger position within the Athens and Epidaurus Festival: Greece’s biggest festival that takes place every summer in different venues all over Greece. The intention behind this brief elaboration is to differentiate theatre that very fearlessly addresses the cruel asymmetries and power relations that are always already embedded in its production—like for instance, in my contention, Oresteia did—
from theatre that pretends to be non-hierarchical only to hide the deeply hierarchical organization of both its surrounding materiality and its own production. In the first section of this essay I argued that Lehmann fell into the trap of the second kind of theatre production and understood deeply hierarchical theatre as “non-hierarchical” theatre. I used Lehmann’s understanding of Jan Fabre’s art in order to support my arguments. Fabre was not a random choice.

On February 9 2016, with zero transparency and without initiating any dialogue between the ministry and the unions of the artists that labor for the Athens and Epidaurus Festival, Aristides Baltas—the at the time Greece’s minister of culture and athleticism—announced that “the new artistic director of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival will be Jan Fabre” (Υπουργείο Πολιτισμού και Αθλητισμού, Δελτία Τύπου 2016). Although much can be said about the incongruity between SYRIZA’s left orientations and the way the ministry of Culture and Athleticism decided to hire Jan Fabre as the artistic director of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival, for now I would like to place particular emphasis on how Fabre’s work, both as an administrative director, or as “the festival’s curator” (CameraStyloOnline 2016) as he called himself, and as an artist. I contend that, on both an artistic and administrative level, Fabre concealed the production and exertion of absolute power beneath elusive promises of inclusion and “wholeness” that produced and legitimized cruel hierarchies. Bridging this thought process to my criticism of Lehmann’s notion of postdramatic theatre—a criticism that was introduced in the beginning of this chapter—I will closely examine the political stakes of Lehmann’s understanding of Fabre.
Fabre visited Athens only to announce his plans and decisions regarding the festival. On March 29 2016 Fabre called for a press conference in order to announce the festival’s program and to introduce his main collaborators. Greek artists, directors, actors and performers were fully excluded not only from the process of the press conference but also from both the festival’s program and the team of Fabre’s collaborators, except for the festival’s vice president Yianna Theodoratou.

After Fabre introduced his collaborators in full absentia of the artists who labor for the festival, he projected a picture of Belgium’s national football team and stated, “I would like to start with this slide […] to the ladies, that’s the men’s national soccer team of Belgium.” And he added,

I chose this symbol for different reasons […] first of all my first year will be about Belgium […] because I know the country […] Also, the [players of] the Belgium national team are not only Flemish, but they have a background from Ukraine, from Uganda, Turkish roots, different nationalities, that’s also Belgium, that’s also Europe. Essentially the first year of the festival will be about this. We invite people who live in Belgium, work in Belgium, essentially this pluralistic society, this open society” (CameraStyloOnline 2016).

In addition to his gendered and sexist offering of “further clarification” to the female population of the room regarding the men’s national soccer team of Belgium, Fabre legitimized the absolutism of what earlier I understood as an absolutism of the part—in this case an absolutism of the part with very specific nationalistic undertones—in the name of “pluralistic openness”.

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But, according to Fabre, this “pluralistic openness” can be plural and open only when it is dictated by Fabre, only when it is performed in Fabre’s terms, and only when it serves as a stage for Fabre’s works and vision. Fabre’s “pluralistic openness” was not open enough to include those who labor for the festival, those who go to the festival, those who pay for the festival through their taxes, those who administer the festival and so on. In response to Fabre’s absolutism, on April 1 2016 more than 500 actors gathered in Σφενδόνη (Sfendoni) theatre in Athens and demanded from both minister Baltas and Fabre to resign.

Apparently Fabre’s “pluralistic openness” was not open enough to include those who challenge him. As a result, Fabre resigned. But he announced his resignation, not to the ministry that hired him, but via the Belgian newspaper l’ Avenir: “I accepted the proposal made by the Greek minister of culture under the condition that I would be absolutely free to make my artistic choices. I don’t think that something like that is possible in Greece. I don’t want to work in this hostile environment to which I came with open mind and open heart” (To Βήμα 2016). Freedom, including artistic freedom, does not mean that one has the absolute power to conduct experiments on the backs of others and when the others resist that they are narrow minded.

The kind of freedom that emerges from absolute power and cruel hierarchies is not freedom; it is just power. This is exactly what Lehmann’s understanding of “non-hierarchical” theatre fails to grasp allowing the absolutism of the part to legitimize itself in the most invisible ways. Fabre ignored, or chose to ignore, that his choices could not be isolated from Greece’s socio-political contexts. Within frames of 21st century neoliberalism we need theatre and concepts that address fearlessly the existing power
relations and not theatre and concepts that conceal those relations in order to make them stronger. This particular production of *Oresteia* was not part of the program that Fabre announced during the press conference on March 29 2016. Fabre legitimized its exclusion—like every other exclusion—in the name of “pluralistic openness.” By dramatizing the destruction of these kinds of fake promises and masks *Oresteia* became more real than the life that is often defined by absolutisms of parts that perform as wholes and that pretend to include difference only to cruelly exclude and erase it.
Non-Epilogue

The concept of tragedy that this dissertation introduces understands the relations between a creditor and a debtor as disproportionate, asymmetrical, lopsided, non-resolvable power relations, hidden beneath promises of resolution that nevertheless remain elusive. It is because of the conceptual capacity of this notion of tragedy to understand the interrelations between conditions of indebtedness, on the one hand, and non-dialectical, or most accurately dialectically unresolved, tensions between a creditor and a debtor, on the other, that I content that the notion of tragedy that this dissertation introduces is valid in 2015-2016 indebted Greece. As this dissertation demonstrates, when contextualized within frames of 21st century European debt-economy and 2015-2016 indebted Greece, this specific concept of tragedy does not only grasp performances of power, but also it introduces revolutionary praxes of resistance.

The initial idea for this project though did not emerge from Greece’s actual, political realities. On the contrary it emerged from my familiarization with the production of American discourse—mostly on an educational level—on tragedy. When I came to the US I realized that dialectically oriented understandings of tragedy are more popular than understandings of tragedy that are conceptually closer to the notion of tragedy that this dissertation suggests. Elaborating on why, within specific sociopolitical and geopolitical contexts, certain philosophies of tragedy—both in terms of discursive and theatre and performance production—become more popular over others, and how these philosophies of tragedy relate to revolutionary praxis of resistance, is one of the many projects that this dissertation introduces and need further elaboration.
As described in this dissertation’s Anti-Prologue, it was not until the “NO” demonstration that took place two days before the Greek bailout referendum of 2015, that the idea of examining how a contemporary philosophy of tragedy informs praxes of resistance that are valid in current frames of European debt-economy, became more crystalized. The political turmoil in Greece during the years of 2015 and 2016 intensified the need for a more detailed exploration of that idea. Between 2015 and 2016 everyone was talking about the “tragedy of the Greek debt crisis”: activists, journalists, artists, Greece’s international creditors, Greece’s left government of SYRIZA and so forth. It was because of all these very repetitive but yet very different references to tragedy that I decided to investigate the contingencies between these references to tragedy and the need for a rigorous philosophy of tragedy that addresses the political stakes of notions of indebtedness.

The final “push” was given during the “NO” demonstration when Christos Thivaios—one of the many artists that performed during the demonstration—shouted into the microphone: “we owe more to our poets than we owe to our creditors.” In contexts of lived Greek language and Greek public discourse, tragedy is a poetic praxis always already politically charged. The “NO” demonstration staged that political praxis in terms of resistance against conditions of imposed indebtedness. On a level of performance philosophy, and more particularly on a level of philosophy of tragedy, Deleuze and later Deleuze and Guattari, traced these interrelations between notions of tragedy, performances of power and of resistance and conditions of indebtedness in Nietzsche’s works on tragedy. Although I had been working on the interplay between the works of Deleuze and Guattari and notion of performance for a really long time, it was not until
the “NO” demonstration that I started rereading both *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* and *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* through a lens of philosophy of tragedy that sheds light on aspects of 21st century European debt-economy that the discourse of political economy leaves relatively unexamined.

Even though the works on the political economy of debt that this dissertation draws upon—like for instance the works of Maurizio Lazzarato and David Graeber—examine in the most critical ways the production of debt, I contend that they need to be complemented with more conceptually abstract understandings of conditions of indebtedness, like the one that this dissertation proposes. This is also something that I would like to explore more in the future. I am particularly interested in how the philosophy of tragedy that this dissertation introduces, performs as a conceptual lens that grasps the non-dialectics of European debt-economy and the non-dialectics of potential praxes of resistance against politics of debt and austerity.

In addition to a philosophy of tragedy that is valid in 21st century European debt-economy, this dissertation’s emphasis is also placed on the very fertile tensions between notions of performance and the works of Deleuze and Guattari. This dissertation “applied” this fertile tension between Deleuze and Guattari, on the one hand, and performance, on the other, on the following case studies: the negotiations between the Greek government of SYRIZA and Greece’s international creditors, the “YES” and “NO” demonstrations that took place before the Greek bailout referendum of 2015, Efthimiou’s production of Anouilh’s *Antigone*, the two EU-Turkey statements on migrants, the photography exhibition organized by St. Antony de Padua in Istanbul, the “Roads of Survival” exhibition organized by the government of SYRIZA, the MARCH IN
SOLIDARITY WITH MIGRANTS/ REFUGEES AND SELF ORGANIZED
SOLIDARITY PROJECTS, Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck and
finally Houvardas’ production of Oresteia.

Both in the Anti-Prologue and in the first chapter of this dissertation, titled “The
Tragedy of the Greek Debt Crisis,” I introduce a philosophy of tragedy that grasps the
dialectically unresolved tensions between a creditor and a debtor. I then apply this
concept of tragedy on the negotiations between Greece and its international creditors that
happened before and after the Greek bailout referendum of 2015. This discussion
regarding the relevancy and the applicability of the concept of tragedy within current
frames of European economy lays the conceptual ground for the rest of the chapters of
this dissertation. “The Tragedy of the Greek Debt Crisis” implicitly argues that the
European Union is not a unitary whole that rules over its different parts but an
assemblage of the asymmetrically non-resolvable power relations between creditor
nation-states and debtor nation-states. Within current frames of European debt-economy
the memory of “paying back” is so internalized that it is forgotten as the new status quo.

The second chapter of this dissertation titled “Dromocratic Democracies” uses the
notion of tragedy that the first chapter introduces in order to closely investigate the
dynamic interplay between street performances and the need for non-discursive
understandings of what performance studies theories define as “performatives.” I
particularly draw upon the tensions between Austin and Deleuze and Guattari in order to
investigate how street performances of resistance call for non-discursive, non-semiotic—
or, not merely discursive or not merely semiotic—understandings of the catchphrases that
are used during these performances.
I then examine how, in the case of the “NO” demonstration, a response to this call that comes from the interlinkages between performance studies and Deleuze and Guattari studies, can grasp the emergence of new agents of resistance and revolution. “Dromocratic Democracies” argues that the mergence of the demos with the state can be one of those resisting and revolutionary agents. This is another project I would like to investigate more: How, within current frames of European debt-economy, a concept of tragedy that orients itself around the non-resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor can grasp the revolutionary potentialities of the mergence of the demos with the state without being reduced to a state philosophy. I am particularly interested in how the theatricalized mergence of the demos with the state becomes the stage for performances of resistance both in terms of produced precepts and affects.

This question that addresses the revolutionary capacities of the mergence of the demos with the state is particularly challenging since, as I argued in the beginning of the Non-Epilogue, according to specific discursive productions, notions of tragedy are often associated—even when that association occurs in terms of opposition—with the existence of a state that (re)presents its demos in ways that exceeds it. Tracing notions of tragedy and/or theatre and performance in non-state philosophies is also a project that I would like to explore in the near future.

The third chapter of this dissertation titled “Imperceptible Performances” looks at the two EU-Turkey statements on migrants, and at two photographic exhibitions and one street demonstration that were organized around the refugee camps and hotspots of Greece. Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of imperceptibility the chapter argues that the political production and organization of perceptibility is founded upon
rendering the economic aspects of the political production and organization of perceptibility imperceptible. It traces implications of that argument in the tensions between the works of Deleuze and Guattari and the works of Hanah Arendt, Giorgio Agamben and Walter Benjamin.

As chapter three demonstrates, at the threshold of European debt-economy the production of the EU-Turkey statements—statements that contradict the International Law on Refugees—performs not in terms of exception, as Agamben argues, but in terms of elusion and imperceptibility. Drawing upon this notion of imperceptibility the third chapter of my dissertation finally introduces the work of performance studies scholar Peggy Phelan in order to bridge the notion of imperceptible economy to notions of non-representation and non-representability. As the chapter demonstrates the ones detained in the hotspots and refugee camps of Greece were rendered imperceptible only to labor as staged for the West to, once again, perform heroism. This interplay between the political economy of the refugees—a political economy that is founded upon rendering the economic power relations imperceptible—and notions of non-representation is also something that I would like to keep exploring.

Finally, the fourth chapter of this dissertation titled “Theatres of Dramatization” looks at Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck and Houvarda’s production of Oresteia. It closely investigates how Deleuze’s concept of dramatization resists notions of dialectics and notions of representation. The political stakes of the tensions between notions of performances and Deleuze’s notion of dramatization is also something that my research will keep exploring.
My dissertation is a first draft of an ongoing project that is always in a state of flux. What I presented here is by no means definitive. On the contrary, it is a first attempt to explore how the interplay between Deleuze studies and Theatre and Performance studies sheds light on aspects of the debt and refugee crises that occur within the larger contexts of 21st century European debt economy that would otherwise remain unaddressed. A lot of the introduced concepts are still vague and the some of the connections between the case studies and the introduced theories might feel abrupt.

My experience though as someone who had to migrate in order to survive the crisis, as someone who not just researches but lives the crisis, and, finally, as someone whose house in Greece is less than ten minutes away from the refugee camp of Eliniko, I contend that both the debt and refugee crises that our century faces need to be addressed in terms of asymmetrically non-resolvable power relations. Both in the Anti-Prologue and the first chapter of this dissertation I argued that power performs in what Nietzsche, through his focus on tragedy, conceptualized as the force of Dionysus; a force that both destroys and hides behind masks that produce illusions of resolution. The challenge for resistance is to do the same.
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