ABSTRACT

Title of Document: REBUILDING BALTIMORE, FROM URBAN RENEWAL TO PROJECT C.O.R.E.: NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION, HISTORIC PRESERVATION, AND THE LESSONS OF THE PAST

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This paper explores the evolution of neighborhood revitalization and historic preservation in the City of Baltimore, and assesses the extent to which these practices reflect lessons learned from failed policies of the past. A long history of urban interventions in Baltimore has repeatedly disrupted the city landscape and calcified spatial inequality. Planners today acknowledge this history and have purportedly adapted the planning process to avoid repeating these mistakes. This study examined three modern neighborhood revitalization programs: the Sandtown-Winchester Neighborhood Transformation Initiative (c.1990), Oliver neighborhood revitalization (c.2004), and Project C.O.R.E. (2016), and determined that these changes have not been fully embraced in practice. Given the continued need to adapt planning practices to promote equity in neighborhoods harmed by previous interventions, this study concludes with recommendations for ways that preservationists can be better advocates for historic neighborhoods and their residents in the neighborhood revitalization process.
REBUILDING BALTIMORE,
FROM URBAN RENEWAL TO PROJECT C.O.R.E.:
NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION, HISTORIC PRESERVATION,
AND THE LESSONS OF THE PAST

By

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In January of 2016, the State of Maryland and the City of Baltimore announced a joint $700 million urban revitalization plan: Project C.O.R.E. (Creating Opportunities for Renewal and Enterprise). The plan aims to create space for reinvestment through the widespread demolition of the city’s vacant and abandoned properties. Project C.O.R.E. merits particular attention by preservationists for the thousands of historic structures that are projected to be impacted over the course of the project. More broadly, the timing of Project C.O.R.E.’s announcement prompted concerns about the role of race and power in the project’s planning processes: C.O.R.E. was announced as a means to “[fix] what is broken in Baltimore” not long after the city was shaken by civil unrest in the aftermath of the death of Freddie Gray in the custody of the Baltimore City Police Department.¹ This widely televised period of disorder broadcast to the nation the legacy of disinvestment that has fuelled the physical, economic, and social disintegration of many Baltimore neighborhoods. The city’s high number of vacant properties, estimated to be around 30,000, was a natural target for political leaders compelled to “do something” in the aftermath of this turbulence.

As a plan heavily oriented towards demolition, Project C.O.R.E. invites comparison with the now-infamous urban renewal schemes of the post-WWII period. By relying on a tool so symbolic of the policy failures of a previous era, Project C.O.R.E. raises questions about the repetitive nature of urban redevelopment planning. In particular, urban renewal is broadly regarded within the planning


² See Appendix for the list of questions that guided these interviews.

³ The Baltimore Sun Editorial Board, “Hogan’s Urban Renewal for Baltimore,” The Baltimore Sun,
profession as a deeply problematic, top-down process that deepened structural racism and spatial inequality by disproportionately targeting low-income communities of color in order to promote the interests of wealthy developers. Modern planning practice in many ways developed as a backlash to these failed policies.

As Baltimore embarks on a new, large-scale physical intervention, it is important to understand whether planners are relying on the same processes and tools that have failed (and have at times actively marginalized) vulnerable communities over time. This study draws upon Baltimore’s legacy of urban interventions to evaluate the planning and preservation processes of a series of neighborhood revitalization programs to explore whether these projects represent an improvement on problematic practices of the past. In order to draw conclusions about lessons learned, this investigation begins with an overview of the legacy of the urban renewal era for the City of Baltimore and for the planning profession, and then moves to a detailed analysis of the planning processes and preservation outcomes for three projects in the modern era: the Sandtown-Winchester Neighborhood Transformation Initiative (c.1990 - 2008), neighborhood revitalization work in the Oliver neighborhood (c.2004 - today), and the recent efforts under Project C.O.R.E. (2016 - today). Sequentially examining these case studies allowed analysis of whether planning processes have changed over time in response to the lessons learned from previous projects. Finally, the paper closes with recommendations for historic preservationists engaged in neighborhood revitalization work, and urges a more activist and direct role for the preservation profession in advocating for historic neighborhoods.
The bulk of the analysis for this study focuses on the planning processes underpinning three case study neighborhood revitalization projects. Each program is assessed across similar dimensions of the planning process to allow comparative study: problem definition, project planning and development (including goal setting, implementation, and integration of historic preservation tools), public participation, and outcomes. The Sandtown-Winchester Neighborhood Transformation Initiative (NTI) is now thirty years old; so the analysis of that effort benefits from several reflective studies produced by planners, developers, and philanthropic foundations in the years since, as well as from the passage of sufficient time that it is possible to assess its long-term impacts on select indicators of neighborhood well-being. The Oliver project, now over a decade old, has similarly been the subject of some previous analytical efforts and an assessment of medium-term impacts on the neighborhood is possible.

Project C.O.R.E., at this time less than two years old, is much less well documented. When announced in January of 2016, little information was available to the public about the project’s goals and strategies. It was partially this lack of public information that prompted this study as a means to better understand a seemingly opaque process. Over the course of the year in which this paper was developed, more public information has slowly become available that has provided further insight into the logic and planning processes of Project C.O.R.E. Nevertheless, it is still a very new undertaking about which little written material is available. In order to study C.O.R.E., it was therefore necessary to speak directly to the planners and preservationists involved. In October of 2016, I interviewed preservation regulators
and advocates with organizations including the Maryland Historical Trust (the state preservation agency), Baltimore Heritage, and Preservation Maryland, as well as staff from the state Department of Housing and Community Development, which oversees Project C.O.R.E. These extremely valuable conversations provided insight into the behind-the-scenes processes of Project C.O.R.E. that are difficult to discern from the outside. Equally importantly for this study, they also captured planners’ and preservationists’ thoughts and feelings about their role in the project and its outcomes, and whether they believe that the trajectory of neighborhood revitalization planning suggests that we have, after all, learned something from our professional past.²

This paper presents a detailed look at the selected case studies and targeted recommendations for professional practice, but it is by no means an exhaustive study of every aspect of these undertakings. Neighborhood revitalization programs are complex, often long-lasting and overlapping, and involve a myriad of related processes (such as the use of eminent domain) that are beyond the scope of this project. This project therefore takes a high-level view of each case study in order to draw broad conclusions about policy trajectories.

² See Appendix for the list of questions that guided these interviews.
Chapter 2: The Legacies of Urban Renewal

Baltimore’s vast swaths of vacant property are a tangible symbol of the failures of the past. They are clear manifestations of public policy and development choices over time that have benefited some communities and harmed others. As in many cities, Baltimore’s physical fabric reflects a legacy of deeply racialized planning decisions. Understanding the ways in which public policy crafted the City’s current landscape is the first step in assessing whether today’s planning processes are moving in a more equitable direction or whether they are perpetuating spatialized inequalities.

Project C.O.R.E., when announced, drew immediate comparison to urban renewal, due in part to its emphasis on demolition as a central tool of redevelopment.³ In the aftermath of World War II, American cities were faced with the decline of the industrial age, and looked to their central business districts to remake the urban economy. To achieve this economic redevelopment, cities partnered with the federal government to build highways and clear neighborhoods with redevelopment potential near downtown.⁴ These projects bulldozed and cleared low-income urban communities, “physically dividing neighborhoods, razing buildings, and removing existing residents to make way for future development.”⁵ Urban renewal programs across the country aimed to transform economically declining cities through the

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removal of “slums” and “blight” and their replacement “with more ‘modern’ commercial structures, open space, and middle- and upper-income housing.”

Urban renewal programs were an important tool of racial control. Clearance and redevelopment projects promoted the displacement of African American residents out of areas with development potential and into increasingly concentrated and segregated sections of the city. These schemes reinforced and exacerbated existing racial segregation and enshrined “a pattern of residential apartheid.” Few urban renewal projects pursued property rehabilitation over wholesale demolition, even though residents of targeted neighborhoods often preferred investment in existing properties. More often, these neighborhoods were labeled as “blighted,” a term that persists in Project C.O.R.E. today, and slated for demolition. The terminology adopted by urban renewal proponents to describe the neighborhoods they sought to erase (“slums” and “blight”) is closely tied to what urban scholar Jason Hackworth terms “the pathologization of urban space,” by which already-disinvested neighborhoods are labeled as “hopeless.” These labels are used to validate interventions that seek to clear away problems rather than to address them: “demolition, within this paradigm, is not about community building as much as it is about making the problem disappear.”

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7 Talen, 236.
11 Hackworth, 2216–17.
The City of Baltimore was subject to a number of these schemes in the post-war era. From the 1950s through the 1970s, the Baltimore Urban Renewal and Housing Agency displaced approximately 25,000 people in the pursuit of projects like the downtown Charles Center. These projects left behind physical and social damage to the city’s African American communities. The failure of the urban renewal approach is most apparent in the west Baltimore neighborhood of Harlem Park, home to the city’s infamous “Highway to Nowhere.”

The neighborhood was flagged for highway construction in the 1940s as public policy promoted the growth of automobile-oriented suburbs. City planners outlined an East-West Expressway cutting across several west Baltimore neighborhoods that would facilitate cross-town automobile traffic (Figure 1). African American residents of the impacted Greater Rosemont communities joined a citywide citizens’ coalition, the Movement Against Destruction, which united people of different races and classes in opposition to the proposed project. Despite this resistance, the City condemned 880 homes between Franklin Street and Edmonson Avenue, and demolished over a dozen blocks of homes and businesses there in the late 1960s. On the east side, 300 rowhomes were razed in the historic working class neighborhoods near Canton.

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15 “Harlem Park.”
Eventually, only a roughly one-mile stretch of the route was built before the City cancelled the project amid rising opposition, but this stretch was enough to devastate the Harlem Park neighborhood and leave a legacy of deep mistrust among west Baltimore residents for large planning projects. 

LESSONS FROM URBAN RENEWAL

In addition to radically changing urban landscapes and the lives of impacted residents, urban renewal shaped the future of the planning profession. For planners,

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urban renewal was a pivotal moment with long-lasting significance. It provided a clear example of “what not to do,” and in doing so shaped later urban revitalization efforts.\(^{18}\) In combination with the growing Civil Rights Movement, urban renewal provoked a “backlash” within the planning profession. Planners came to recognize the failure of planning practices that had “eschewed public processes and ignored existing community members and institutions” and had instead “prioritized the knowledge and political or social goals of planners, policy makers, and engineers over knowledge of the existing community.”\(^{19}\) With these lessons in hand, the planning profession shifted in a number of key ways.

With the changing professional and ethical tides of the 1960s, urban planning came to be seen as a top-down process that reinforced existing power disparities by catering to the interests of “tax-hungry city officials, downtown business interests and their hirelings in big planning and architectural firms, and institutional imperialists seeking to expand their campuses or hospital complexes.”\(^{20}\) In response, planners heartily embraced participatory planning models that decentralized formal professional knowledge and gave communities a much larger say in their fates.\(^{21}\) Planning processes today still follow this tradition, in which public engagement processes are a “fundamental feature” of the relationship between planners and the public.\(^{22}\)

\(^{18}\) Teaford, “Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath,” 444.
\(^{19}\) “‘It’s Complicated...’ Long-Term Residents and Their Relationships to Gentrification in Washington, DC.”
\(^{21}\) Teaford, 456.
In hindsight, urban renewal is seen as plagued by a “lack of clear definition” in its goals and strategies. Its goals were often so broadly defined (“to renew the city”) that it struggled to deliver meaningful outcomes for its supporters, who projected multiple objectives onto a vaguely defined strategy. Urban renewal schemes served “the dual and often conflicting objectives of commercial redevelopment and the improvement of urban slums.” Housing developers, commercial interests, and institutional actors had “varied and often clashing expectations,” which urban renewal schemes could not possibly meet. As a result of these muddled priorities, combined with the bureaucratic red tape involved in large-scale land clearance, projects were slow to be implemented and often left incomplete. In many cases, urban renewal projects made it only through the demolition phase, leaving vacant lots to languish.

The widespread destruction of urban neighborhoods also spurred preservation advocates to organize in defense of historic neighborhoods and structures facing the wrecking ball. Jane Jacobs issued a now-famous defense of older buildings, considered a radical idea in a time when so much emphasis was placed on the restorative power of new construction. Jacobs vociferously attacked the philosophy of urban renewal and the ‘expert’ planners responsible for its implementation, writing: “[this] is not the rebuilding of cities. This is the sacking of cities.”

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23 Talen, “Housing Demolition during Urban Renewal,” 236.
27 Teaford, 448.
National Park Service identifies the post-WWII urban renewal era as an important catalyst for the nation’s most important preservation law, the National Historic Preservation Act (1966), which formalized preservation institutions and processes.\textsuperscript{30} Just as planners do, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation condemns the failures of the urban renewal model. In a 2014 report, it highlighted the lessons learned by planners and preservationists from the urban renewal era: that new urban policies are now “designed to be more inclusive, reflect broader community goals, and improve the quality of life for diverse residents.”\textsuperscript{31}

In the years of reflection that have followed the urban renewal era, planners’ conception of urban revitalization work has come to include a more holistic understanding of the elements that drive neighborhood change. Rather than the simple focus on physical redevelopment projects that characterized the urban renewal era, planning today embraces a more holistic view of development that includes community development and capacity building measures. The trajectory of change in urban policy is towards a greater understanding of the inseparability of physical, economic, and community development: away from “a narrow preoccupation with land use toward greater concern with people.”\textsuperscript{32} Despite this reorientation, ongoing tension between bricks-and-mortar projects and more intangible capacity-building measures persists. Plans heavily oriented towards physical projects often appeal to elected officials, who “[carry] the hope that a onetime expenditure fixes the problem.”


\textsuperscript{32} Stone et al., \textit{Urban Neighborhoods in a New Era}, xv.
whereas residents are more likely to see physical deterioration such as blight as a “symptom, not an underlying cause” and to favor improved services in their communities. Community development scholars stress that years of community change projects prove that there is still “a need for greater investment in developing the capacities of individuals, organizations, and support systems.” These capacity-building elements create the conditions for long-term success by building up neighborhood residents alongside the physical environment, and by enabling initiatives to withstand challenges and changes over time.

These elements of modern planning practice, many of which emerged in response to the failures of urban renewal, combined to form a new paradigm for urban redevelopment projects. By the 1990s, the pendulum had swung towards an understanding that “comprehensive” programs were needed to address the intersecting challenges facing long-disinvested urban neighborhoods and residents. In this climate, the Sandtown-Winchester Neighborhood Transformation Initiative emerged as a comprehensive neighborhood revitalization program that would do things differently. The following chapter takes a close look at the planning process behind this project and its ultimate failure to create lasting neighborhood change.

Chapter 3: The Sandtown-Winchester Neighborhood

Transformation Initiative

INTRODUCTION

Freddie Gray’s west Baltimore neighborhood, Sandtown-Winchester, holds particular relevance to an assessment of the evolution of neighborhood revitalization. It is one of the primary neighborhoods now targeted by Project C.O.R.E. for large-scale “transformation,” and is the neighborhood in which the symbolic public
announcement of the project was made (Figure 3). Sandtown-Winchester is especially reflective of the cyclical nature of Baltimore’s urban interventions, because transformation has been attempted in this neighborhood before. The Sandtown-Winchester Neighborhood Transformation Initiative saw an investment of over $130 million flow into the community through the 1990s as part of a comprehensive community revitalization program. With the renewed spotlight on the neighborhood provided by the subsequent announcement of Project C.O.R.E., these past investments deserve new scrutiny.

This chapter explores the planning process and neighborhood outcomes of the 1990s Neighborhood Transformation Initiative (NTI) to provide a better understanding of planners’ approach to this large-scale program and the role for historic preservation in neighborhood revitalization projects. Though Sandtown-Winchester has many historic buildings and is significant to Baltimore’s African American history and culture, historic preservation was not used as a primary tool. Despite the limited use of preservation strategies, the NTI warrants study by preservationists for its significant impact on a historic neighborhood, and its particular effects on historic structures and streetscapes as a result of demolition. The NTI’s strengths and weaknesses provide insight for both planners and preservationists approaching similar projects in the future. Returning to the Sandtown-Winchester NTI in light of Project C.O.R.E.’s projected impact to the same neighborhood also allows an assessment of whether today’s neighborhood revitalization programs reflect lessons learned from past projects. This chapter assesses the initial identification of

Sandtown-Winchester as a target for revitalization; NTI stakeholders and power dynamics; processes for public engagement and decision-making; the role of historic preservation; and the ultimate outcomes for the community.


CONTEXT

Sandtown-Winchester has a long history as a thriving African American community in west Baltimore (Figure 4). The 72-block neighborhood is primarily composed of 19th century residential row houses. It is bordered to the east by Pennsylvania Avenue, a historic cultural and commercial thoroughfare for African American businesses, where Cab Calloway and Billie Holiday once performed, and where future Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall graduated from high
school.\textsuperscript{36} Residents historically found stable employment in small local businesses and major employers like Schmidt’s Bakery.\textsuperscript{37} The neighborhood was economically diverse, though this diversity stemmed from the residential segregation that concentrated Baltimore’s African American residents into a limited geographic area.\textsuperscript{38}


The neighborhood suffered from the impacts of global economic shifts that began in the 1970s. Baltimore’s booming steel and shipping industries fell victim to sharp declines in the 1970s and shed over 100,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector between 1950 and 1995. The city as a whole struggled to recover from these losses, and Sandtown-Winchester struggled more than most. By 1990, its residents, 98% of whom were African American, faced socioeconomic conditions much worse than their peers in other Baltimore neighborhoods, even in similarly racially segregated tracts. Census data show that Sandtown-Winchester lagged behind in measures of housing, education, employment and life expectancy, while outpacing similar neighborhoods’ rates of drug addiction and crime. Jobs and residents had fled the once-thriving community as local employers like the bakery closed their doors. By 1990 only 11,500 residents remained. The neighborhood faced widespread vacancy and abandonment: 600 vacant and boarded-up row houses, known as the “Sandtown-Winchester 600,” were scattered throughout the neighborhood, mixed into blocks with occupied houses.

The conditions in Sandtown-Winchester by the late 1980s were not merely the result of the 1970s economic downturn. They were the product of decades of urban policy, such as the urban renewal programs discussed in Chapter 2, which pursued racial segregation and prioritized the neighborhoods and lives of white residents. One observer, looking at Baltimore’s urban landscape in the aftermath of the death of

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Freddie Gray, summarized the cumulative results of these plans: “If the goal of early segregationist policies was to concentrate black Baltimoreans in a single location, separated from opportunity, then it worked.”

**PROBLEM DEFINITION**

In the late 1980s, amid a raft of issues to address in Sandtown-Winchester, one priority stood out: housing. In addition to the problem of mushrooming vacant properties, approximately 80% of occupied homes were considered substandard and the 1940s-era Gilmor Homes public housing development was a “dreary…barracks.” The first to identify and target this problem in the late 1980s were not professional planners, but the neighborhood activists of BUILD (Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development), “a church-based coalition affiliated with the Industrial Areas Foundation, a nationwide umbrella organization of community action groups founded by organizing guru Saul Alinsky in 1940.”

In 1987, BUILD began heavily lobbying the city’s two mayoral candidates to make homeownership a priority, believing that “creating a critical mass of new owner-occupied houses was critical to community revitalization.” Democratic candidate Kurt Schmoke fully embraced BUILD’s vision. He had run on a platform of opposition to President Ronald Reagan’s War on Drugs, favoring more holistic approaches that included “drug decriminalization, [and] programs in housing,

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44 Yeoman, “Left Behind in Sandtown.”

45 Yeoman.
education, economic development and public health.”

In 1987, Schmoke won election and became the city’s first elected African American mayor. He brought his support for BUILD to City Hall, and within two years had assembled over $20 million from a mix of governmental and philanthropic funders to support the first project in Sandtown-Winchester, 227 row houses to be built on the former Schmidt’s Bakery site.

The project caught the attention of real estate developer James Rouse, a Maryland native famous for creating planned communities including Columbia, Maryland, and festival marketplaces designed to reinvigorate cities’ downtowns, like Baltimore’s Harborplace. After retirement, he founded the Enterprise Foundation as a philanthropic development arm. While their slogan, “Hope from Homes,” clearly prioritized housing, Rouse was adamant that decent housing only went so far in community revitalization. By 1987, he was on the hunt for a project in which the Enterprise Foundation could demonstrate a comprehensive approach to redevelopment, one that would “take on a whole slum neighborhood, with the entirety of its neglect and pathos, and turn it around – to enact a transformation in its social as well as physical structure.” He found such a project in Sandtown-Winchester, and joined the partnership in 1990.

By involving the Enterprise Foundation (EF) in the plans for the neighborhood’s development, Rouse fundamentally changed the nature of the planning processes that were unfolding. While EF brought much-needed capital to the

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47 Coan.
project, it also brought an agenda. Setting out to make Sandtown-Winchester a model of the possibilities for Rouse’s concept of “comprehensive” redevelopment meant that the stakes were high for the program to succeed in a way that adhered to Rouse’s vision. Rather than serving as neutral backers or facilitators of a process that allowed BUILD’s vision to develop, EF wanted a hand on the controls.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

The Neighborhood Transformation Initiative began with a visioning process, a first step common to many plans. While the issue of housing was an underlying priority, Rouse and Mayor Schmoke sought to gather residents’ opinions on the range of issues that should be addressed. In 1990, the Mayor assembled several neighborhood residents as well as representatives from BUILD, EF, and the City to serve on a Sandtown-Winchester Task Force, whose first action was to solicit resident input into direction for the program. \(^{49}\) This began a period of intense public participation in agenda-setting. Four hundred residents attended the initial community kickoff meeting, from which emerged smaller work groups that eventually identified eight priorities: “physical development, economic development, health, education, family support, substance abuse, crime and safety, and community pride and spirit.” These goals were eventually published in a report called the “Puzzle Book,” meant to demonstrate the interconnectivity between the pieces of the comprehensive approach. \(^{50}\)

\(^{49}\) Olsen, 355.

An Enterprise Foundation report from 2000 suggests the organization was pleased with the level of resident engagement. The report touts the numbers of citizens who attended community meetings and who responded to a resident survey, and the popularity of children’s activities and cultural events. While there is value in having good turnout for community meetings, relying on measures like attendance or survey participation can lead to a false impression of resident input. In “Distinguishing Participation and Inclusion,” Kathryn S. Quick and Martha S. Feldman differentiate between two dimensions of public engagement: participation, “oriented to increasing input,” and inclusion, “oriented to making connections” between people in a way that increases the long-term capacity of residents to engage and navigate complex issues. While the NTI citizen engagement processes seem to reflect attempts to do both, they were ultimately unsuccessful in building truly inclusive practices that fostered community capacity, despite the high participation in their programs. As early in the program as 1992, BUILD withdrew its support over NTI’s failure to focus on residents’ “political organizing and leadership skills,” tools they perceived to be critical to long-term leadership and capacity development.

BUILD’s exit speaks to the complex power dynamics at play. Rouse’s comprehensive agenda purportedly encompassed grassroots transformation: he took the time to “[ask] the residents about their small dilemmas [to encourage] their participation and trust.” This seems to adhere to the approach recommended by scholars such as Xavier de Souza Briggs, who notes that many planners “could use

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51 Meyer, 126-127.
53 Yeoman, n.p.
54 Olsen, 355.
some practice in community entrée” including learning ethnographers’ custom of “[emphasizing] curiosity over authority.” However, this process was inevitably shaped the power disparity between Rouse (and his vehicle, the Enterprise Foundation) and Sandtown-Winchester residents. Rouse’s drive to make the project a showcase for his model of comprehensive community transformation made it impossible for him to enter these interactions with a truly open mind about the project’s processes and outcomes. De Souza Briggs, in his work on planners’ public engagement, notes that “situations marked by stark power imbalances, whether real or perceived,” are most likely to fail in fostering honest and open conversation. In the NTI, very real disparities in power were at play as outsiders, led by wealthy white developer James Rouse, entered the community with an agenda already in mind.

Political pressures also helped to steer the process away from a truly resident-led endeavor to an essentially top-down model. Mayor Schmoke, newly elected, was under pressure to produce demonstrable results, but a slow process of capacity building could not be shown off in the same way as bricks-and-mortar development. Maryland’s Secretary of Housing and Community Development at the time, Patricia Payne, noted that the process of leadership development just did not hold the same excitement: “No mayor is going to wait around for that.” As BUILD dropped out of the process, frustrated with its failures to focus on capacity building, observers noted

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56 de Souza Briggs, 8.
57 Yeoman, n.p.
that the project’s central relationships seemed to be with banks rather than residents, who had been relegated to a role of “window dressing.”58

STAKEHOLDERS

At the outset of the NTI, when the process was still being developed, the project’s stakeholders fell into three broad categories: residents (initially represented by BUILD), city government, and the Enterprise Foundation. As the project progressed over the next decade, the number of organizations and stakeholders involved would increase exponentially, as the original partners developed intermediary organizations to work within the community and as the project expanded beyond housing to a comprehensive approach that also sought to address education, employment, and health. One count of the various actors involved tallied “at least eight corporations and five ‘consortiums’ – one of which was the Transformation Consortium. It included eighteen organizations. Also identified were seven other organizations… who either ran programs within the [EF] network or were in some way connected to programs. This does not include local entities such as the City, BUILD, Baltimore School System, Urban League, universities or HUD.” Also involved were at least “sixty-five public and private funders.”59 A vast number of organizations were involved in the project by 1999, when Mayor Schmoke left office and the project began to wind down. Residents, though involved in various programs and groups catering to different subsets of the population, were greatly outnumbered and overpowered by the major institutions now involved.

58 Yeoman, n.p.
59 Coan, n.p.
IMPLEMENTATION

This complex warren of organizations proved difficult for participants to navigate. While large-scale development projects are inherently complex, a large number of actors is not necessarily problematic if the relationships are organized clearly and transparently in a way that creates space for residents to understand and engage the process. In this case, NTI’s original partners (EF, the city, and residents) had moved quickly to implement their vision without formalizing the details of how the relationships would work as the initiative became increasingly complicated. The 1993 “Puzzle Book,” originally intended to capture all of the disparate ideas proposed during the visioning process, became a de facto strategic plan that shaped planning and decision-making even though it was never intended to do so.\(^6\) The driving vision of James Rouse and Mayor Schmoke gave the program an end goal, but a clear plan of how to achieve this end was never articulated. As a result, internal confusion and conflict was rife between the original stakeholders and those who joined the project as its scope expanded. The failure to define specific roles and responsibilities for each partner meant not only that everyone’s role was unclear, but also that there was little accountability when projects strayed off course or when partners found themselves at cross-purposes.\(^6\)

The lack of an implementation plan also meant there was no clear balance between the many priorities encompassed in the comprehensive approach. While the need for social services and community capacity building was clear and had been laid out in the Puzzle Book, the temptation to focus on tangible projects proved

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\(^6\) Brown, Butler, and Hamilton, 29.
\(^6\) Brown, Butler, and Hamilton, 24.
overwhelming. Mayor Schmoke was under pressure to deliver results, and Rouse inevitably drew on his roots as a developer; leading to an early orientation towards physical over human development. The NTI began rapidly acquiring property and building new housing units, which economists later pointed out was a problematic practice in a shrinking city like Baltimore, where the number of housing units already exceeds the population and new units compete with the existing housing stock and can cause older buildings to go vacant.\textsuperscript{62}

This fast push for development came at the expense of resident involvement in the project’s execution. To keep up with the high expectations set from the top, EF chose in 1993 to form an intermediary organization called Community Building in Partnership, Inc. (CBP) to serve as the implementation arm for the NTI. CBP became a powerful organization, with numerous subsidiaries, charged with executing the overall strategy and facilitating daily operations in the neighborhood. With such a central position, an upper-level decision was made that no existing neighborhood organizations could take on this role, despite the existence of several long-standing community development organizations within Sandtown-Winchester.\textsuperscript{63} CBP was governed by a board of directors composed of a mix of neighborhood residents, City officials, and other stakeholders, a structure that suggests it was intended to serve as an independent body that balanced the interests of the participants.\textsuperscript{64} In reality, CBP became highly politicized and controversial. All of the board members were appointed by the mayor, and by many accounts were “not especially attuned to residents…[the] perception was that CBP was more adept with bankers and

\textsuperscript{62} Yeoman, n.p.
\textsuperscript{63} Coan, n.p.
\textsuperscript{64} Brown, Butler, and Hamilton, 18.
bureaucrats than with its client population.” The ill will generated by CBP’s structure and priorities was a serious problem given CBP’s central role in the execution of the overall transformation plan. Their decisions were mistrusted and resented, ultimately undermining the success of the overall mission.

In addition to these complex and troubled internal processes, the NTI did not fit well into external planning processes for the city at large. The Sandtown-Winchester project became the central focus of planning and funding efforts in the city at seemingly every level. Federal programs, philanthropic foundations, city planners, and private investors were directing so much energy and investment at Sandtown-Winchester that other neighborhoods in need were neglected. Community leaders elsewhere in Baltimore resented the NTI for monopolizing the resources available for community development, and saw the conditions in their own communities deteriorate as funds to combat problems like vacancy were all funneled to Sandtown-Winchester.

The speed at which the NTI moved and the lack of clear direction guiding it also hampered the use of historic preservation as a significant strategy. The rush to demonstrate accomplishments left little time for thoughtful planning for the rehabilitation and reuse of historic buildings. By the time of the NTI, planners and city leadership had already embraced an aggressive demolition program as a key solution to this problem – demolishing 4,000 row houses between 1996 and 1999.

65 Coan, n.p.
66 Brown, Butler, and Hamilton, 18.
67 Yeoman, n.p.
with a plan to demolish 20% of the city’s housing stock by 2004.\footnote{Tracie Rozhon, “Old Baltimore Row Houses Fall Before Wrecking Ball,” The New York Times, June 13, 1999, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/13/us/old-baltimore-row-houses-fall-before-wrecking-ball.html.} Preservation advocates at the time expressed dismay at the loss of rowhomes and alley houses so central to the city’s character. Richard Moe, then-president of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, called the destruction of so many of Baltimore’s rowhomes a blow to the city’s “greatest asset,” while Mary Ellen Hayward, who studied the city’s architectural history, questioned the entire strategy underpinning such extensive demolition: “How do we know the population will continue to decline? How do we know these houses won’t come back into fashion?”\footnote{Rozhon.} Ultimately, preservationists’ voices had little effect on the outcome: the balance of the project went to demolition and new construction, rather than rehabilitation, and preservation tools such as the State Rehabilitation Tax Credit went unused.\footnote{James R. Cohen, “Abandoned Housing: Exploring Lessons from Baltimore,” Housing Policy Debate 12, no. 3 (January 1, 2001): 441, https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2001.9521413.}

A chief argument for demolition over rehabilitation was the cost of rehabilitating structures and the perceived lack of market demand for smaller, older homes. At the time of the NTI, the cost to rehabilitate a rowhome in Sandtown-Winchester exceeded the market price for a refurbished home by $40,000 to $65,000, plus an additional $10,000 per unit to eliminate hazards from lead-based paint.\footnote{Cohen, 438–39.} Even when subsidies could bridge this gap, weak demand for smaller homes hurt their marketability. The small size of 19th century rowhomes, typically between 480 and 720 square feet, meant limited space for modern amenities important to many
consumers.\textsuperscript{72} One experimental solution to this dilemma was the creation of “twofers” by the combination of two rowhouses into one unit. This tactic was deployed at a small scale in the $30 million Sandtown Winchester Square development, where 10% of the project’s funding was used to rehabilitate forty-eight 1880s rowhouses in the 1100 block of North Calhoun Street.\textsuperscript{73} On the eastern side of the street, twenty-four 1,100-square-foot homes were traditionally rehabilitated, but the twenty-four 900-square-foot homes on the western side of the street were thought to be too small to market. These houses were combined and reconfigured to create twelve 1,800-square-foot residences. The project was meant to have a minimal impact on the rhythm and scale of the block, while adapting historic buildings to modern preferences. The majority of the homes on both sides of the block were marketed to limited-income homebuyers who earned up to 80% of the area median income, and sold quickly.\textsuperscript{74} This experimental development successfully made rehabilitated historic homes available to lower- and moderate-income buyers, but represented only a small fraction of the overall project.

Ultimately, the flaws in this process bear much of the responsibility for the NTI’s gradual diminishment and eventual halt. Without having taken the time to build robust community leadership, much of its momentum was driven by the big names at the top – James Rouse and Mayor Schmoke. Rouse passed away in 1996, and in 1999, Martin O’Malley replaced Schmoke as Mayor. O’Malley did not have the same loyalty to the NTI, and focused his economic development programs on physical development downtown and in east Baltimore, tapping Johns Hopkins University as

\textsuperscript{72} Cohen, 440.
\textsuperscript{74} Gunts.
an anchor institution for a revitalization program surrounding its campus. At the federal level, the administration of President George W. Bush was less inclined to pour money into programs like the Community Development Block Grants that had powered numerous NTI projects. The 2007-2008 financial crisis was the final nail in the coffin, and caused Community Building in Partnership (CBP) to finally close its doors. With the erasure of the personalities and funding that had driven the NTI since 1990, its programs and resources were pulled from Sandtown. West Baltimore resident Doni Glover described the effects to the community:

Not only did we lose CBP, we lost our community newspaper, a senior center, an AmeriCorps Program, a job placement office, a high blood pressure program sponsored by Johns Hopkins as well as a couple [of] community development corporations. We also lost a program that addressed vacant properties. All of these programs are gone with the wind.

OUTCOMES

Before its termination, the Neighborhood Transformation Initiative could point to a long list of accomplishments within the community that stemmed from the cumulative investment of over $130 million over the decade of its main activity. This investment resulted in the construction or renovation of more than 1,000 units of housing for low and moderate-income families, better-quality city sanitation and public safety, increased health and drug treatment services, and improved educational facilities.

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75 Coan, n.p.
77 Brown, Butler, and Hamilton, 18.
Despite these achievements, there are many reasons to question the long-term impact of this program. Many of the lingering problems in the neighborhood were tragically illustrated by the life and death of Freddie Gray, who grew up in Sandtown-Winchester. His April 2015 death in the custody of the Baltimore City Police Department brought renewed attention to the Neighborhood Transformation Initiative. Local and national newspapers were flooded with headlines detailing the conditions in the neighborhood. In the *Baltimore Sun*, journalists laid out the case in articles such as “Why Freddie Gray Ran,” which documents an unemployment and poverty rate twice the citywide average, and high concentrations of vacancy, lead paint violations, domestic violence, and violent crime. Many commentators drew direct links between Gray, his Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood, and the city’s legacy of racial discrimination in planning, housing, and economic policy, detailed in pieces such as “The Economic Devastation Fueling the Anger in Baltimore,” and “The Deep, Troubling Roots of Baltimore’s Decline.”

In the midst of this overall spotlight on Baltimore and the Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood, some commentators began to place a measure of blame directly on the Neighborhood Transformation Initiative and the Enterprise Foundation, asking “Why couldn’t $130 million transform one of Baltimore’s poorest places?” and declaring the project to be “Rouse’s failure in Sandtown-Winchester.”

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79 Covert; and Bouie.
A comparison of census data from before and after the initiative does cast doubt on the long-term efficacy of its programs (Table 1). Even in metrics where the neighborhood seems to have made some progress, it still falls far behind the citywide averages. In 2015, 35.9% of Sandtown-Winchester residents still lived below the poverty line, which is an improvement over the 41.4% below this threshold in 1990, but still grossly exceeds the 2015 citywide average of 19%. Median household income, the percentage of owner-occupied housing, and the percentage of adults with a bachelor’s degree similarly show slight improvements that mostly fail to match the pace of advances seen in the city at large. Unemployment, which was one of the chief issues raised by residents at the outset of the NTI, has decreased by only one percentage point.

Table 1: Change in Socio-Economic Indicators in Sandtown-Winchester, 1990 - 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>CHANGE SINCE 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sandtown-Winchester</td>
<td>Baltimore City</td>
<td>Sandtown-Winchester</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Below Poverty</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income</td>
<td>$23,776</td>
<td>$42,683</td>
<td>$24,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Owner-Occupied Housing</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Bachelor's Degree or Above</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Census data illustrate that many core community problems remain unchanged.
Sandtown-Winchester—Baltimore's Daring Experiment In Urban Renewal: 20 Years Later, What Are the Lessons Learned?; Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance, Sandtown-Winchester/Harlem Park."

Across the board, these metrics demonstrate that the neighborhood has not made much progress in many of NTI’s core programmatic areas. Ultimately, the NTI’s early success in physical development projects faded away without the investments in neighborhood leadership that were needed to support long-term change.

The project does not boast many preservation successes. NTI’s prioritization of new housing, coupled with the city’s larger emphasis on demolition, had a major impact on Sandtown-Winchester’s historic structures without producing the hoped-for improvements in overall conditions for neighborhood residents. The project also did not stem the tide of vacancy in the neighborhood, itself a serious threat to historic neighborhoods – by mid-2000, the appearance of newly-blighted properties exceeded the pace of rehabilitation. The NTI did result in some indirect benefits to future preservation efforts through mitigation measures resulting from Section 106 review. Federally-funded projects such as the Nehemiah Homes prompted further study of the National Register eligibility of the neighborhood and of individual structures. This analysis likely contributed to the 2004 National Register listing of the Old West Baltimore Historic District, which contains some portions of the Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood.

CONCLUSION

The Neighborhood Transformation Initiative was an ambitious and ultimately unsuccessful plan to transform Sandtown-Winchester into the model of urban revitalization that James Rouse and Mayor Schmoke envisioned it could be. The

initiative’s failure to develop an implementation plan or a clear planning process, to acknowledge and navigate the underlying power disparities, and to build residents’ long-term capacity meant the program’s initial successes were short-lived. These areas of weakness reflect planners’ struggle in moving from abstract ideals about good planning processes to actual implementation of these practices. The NTI has been subject to close scrutiny in the years that followed, with city residents, neighborhood advocates, and some of the institutional partners involved in its execution drawing conclusions about how the project failed to live up to expectations. The next chapters examine whether subsequent neighborhood revitalization projects have embraced some of these fundamental lessons.
Chapter 4: Building from Strength in Oliver

![Image of rehabilitated historic homes in the Oliver neighborhood.](Image)

**Figure 5.** Rehabilitated historic homes in the Oliver neighborhood. Digital Image. Annie E. Casey Foundation, *Building from the Ground Up*, 2015.

**INTRODUCTION**

The practice of neighborhood revitalization has continued to evolve in the years following the Sandtown-Winchester Neighborhood Transformation Initiative. Some of this evolution in practice was directly driven by reflections on the NTI and the limited success it saw in achieving long-term change in Sandtown. Projects begun since that time have tried different tactics in their attempts to successfully intervene in Baltimore’s distressed neighborhoods. One project that has taken a markedly different approach is the work underway in and around the Oliver neighborhood in east Baltimore. Among a number of key differences, the Oliver project’s reliance on historic preservation presents a clear contrast to the methods used in Sandtown, where preservation sat on the sidelines.

This project merits particular attention in a study of neighborhood revitalization in historic communities due to its extensive use of preservation ideas and tools, and because the work has won praise from many quarters: planners,
affordable housing advocates, and preservationists alike. One element of the program, the recently-completed East Baltimore Historic II redevelopment project, was awarded both the 2017 ACHP/HUD Secretary’s Award for Excellence in Historic Preservation and the Maryland Historical Trust’s 2017 Preservation Award for Excellence in Residential Rehabilitation. The $9.3 million East Baltimore Historic II (EBHII) project rehabilitated thirty-two vacant rowhouses and two mixed-use buildings on two blocks in east Baltimore. The significant praise given to EBHII and to the Oliver redevelopment project prompted further study of this effort as a potential model of how neighborhood revitalization and historic preservation could be successfully combined. This case study includes a summary of the evolution of the Oliver neighborhood revitalization program, the approach taken by the developers, and the project outcomes, with specific attention given to EBHII as a widely-praised, preservation-oriented venture.

CONTEXT

Oliver is a historic working class neighborhood within the broader community of east Baltimore, bounded by North Avenue, East Biddle Street, Ensor Street, and North Broadway. The neighborhood falls within the Baltimore East/South Clifton Park Historic District that was listed on the National Register of Historic Place in 2002. The district is characterized by a regular street grid and high-density residential

development primarily in the form of two- and three-story rowhouses built between 1870 and 1930. Interspersed within this residential development are historic industrial and commercial buildings, representing the neighborhood’s working class origins, and community service centers that include churches, schools, and a firehouse. Oliver’s development as a traditional urban neighborhood and its proximity to the city center have created many physical assets in addition to the historic buildings; it is highly rated for its walkability, bikeability, and access to transit.

The area has been the target of longstanding redevelopment efforts as the city has labored to address east Baltimore’s struggles with poverty, vacancy, and crime. The 2000 U.S. decennial Census reported it was Baltimore’s second poorest neighborhood, with low employment, a median income of only $14,900, and a vacancy rate five times higher than the citywide average. Oliver manifested many of the problems evident in the city as a whole. Largely a working class white enclave prior to World War II, it began to include more African American families in the 1950s and 60s. It suffered economically in the 1960s as the city’s industrial jobs vanished, and as in many Baltimore neighborhoods, many white families fled the community after the 1968 riots that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. Oliver’s higher-income African American families also left the neighborhood as civil rights era legal victories lessened formal housing discrimination and opened the Baltimore County suburbs as a residential destination. Families who could afford to

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move out did so. In the ensuing decades, crime and vacancy rose in the neighborhood in a mutually reinforcing cycle.  

PROBLEM DEFINITION

This cycle culminated in a shocking act of violence in October of 2002 that catalyzed the current redevelopment effort. Seven members of the Dawson family, including five children, were killed by arson in their Oliver home in retaliation for Angela Dawson’s reports to the police about ongoing drug activity near her home. This event brought out 400 neighborhood residents and community activists to declare it was time to transform their neighborhood. The seeds of this movement had been underway since 2000, when local ministers affiliated with Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development (BUILD), the community organization initially involved in the Sandtown NTI, recruited 150 volunteers to canvass the neighborhood and identify vacant properties. They found 44% of properties in Oliver to be abandoned homes and vacant lots. As in Sandtown, the years of disinvestment in the community and the resulting physical deterioration of the building stock had pushed housing and vacancy to the forefront of the issues needing to be addressed.

These BUILD-affiliated ministers began raising money from parishioners to purchase and redevelop vacant properties as affordable housing. They simultaneously focused on improving neighborhood services through an after-school program and a

90 Rashid, “Oliver Neighborhood Hopes.”
crime-prevention campaign. In the beginning, BUILD’s Oliver campaign received little attention and few resources from city leadership, who did not see the neighborhood as ready to be redeveloped. After 2002, BUILD could no longer “be simply ignored or waited out [while] the Dawson family arson put the neighborhood in the spotlight.” The organization deployed its thirty years of experience organizing in Baltimore to pressure City Hall to take Oliver’s redevelopment seriously.

The result was the establishment in 2004 of a formal partnership between BUILD, local residents, the City and The Reinvestment Fund (TRF), a nonprofit developer focused on investment in low-income communities. This partnership, TRF Development Partners – Baltimore (TRF-DP), is led by a board of stakeholders that includes representatives from BUILD, TRF, and philanthropic investors. TRF-DP helped facilitate a planning process that resulted in a broad redevelopment plan. The plan targeted long-vacant properties in the neighborhoods of Broadway East and Oliver and sought to bring residents back to these homes and communities as quickly as possible by redeveloping the homes for new owners and renters.

“BUILDING FROM STRENGTH”

Though housing is at the center of the Oliver initiative, as it was in Sandtown, the approach has been noticeably different. These differences appear even in the philosophy that undergirded the two development approaches. Rouse had deliberately

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92 Stoker, Stone, and Worgs.
95 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “East Baltimore Redevelopment Earns 2017 HUD Secretary Award For Historic Preservation.”
sought out a neighborhood in truly dire straits, a “big, tough job,” in order to prove the efficacy of his approach. At the time he had even considered targeting the intervention towards the very neighborhoods near Johns Hopkins University in east Baltimore in which TRF-DP now works, but rejected that in favor of the tougher challenge in Sandtown, where few stabilizing institutions were established.\textsuperscript{96}

In contrast, TRF-DP approached implementation of the plan through a signature strategy which the organization names “Building from Strength.” This strategy focuses on changing underlying market dynamics in order to attract private investment into historically disinvested neighborhoods. TRF-DP uses sophisticated real estate analytics to identify areas of “strength” to target their interventions. They carefully select “distressed areas that are near regional assets or market strength and leverage the existing asset by investing significant funding in the housing stock in the weaker area.”\textsuperscript{97} In this case, market assets were Oliver’s proximity to Penn Station and the Station North Arts District, to the University of Baltimore and Maryland Institute College of Art, and in particular its location adjacent to the East Baltimore Development Inc. (EBDI) work, an eighty-eight acre project tied to a proposed Johns Hopkins University biotech park.\textsuperscript{98} These assets were thought to make the area a potential target for transit-oriented development and as a bedroom community for workers commuting to Washington, DC.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{96} Olsen, Better Places, Better Lives, 353.
\textsuperscript{99} Stoker, Stone, and Worgs. 67.
The contrasting approaches taken by Rouse and TRF-DP model two different styles of neighborhood revitalization that can be seen as similar to the “needs based” and “asset-oriented” approaches used in community development scholarship and practice. A needs or deficit-based approach sees a community’s problems first – an unsurprising perspective given the neglected state of many lower-income neighborhoods.\(^{100}\) In contrast, an asset-oriented development framework is centered on a neighborhood’s previously overlooked physical and human resources. This is an approach particularly well-suited to historic neighborhoods for its emphasis on the many values inherent in existing physical structures. Community development scholars John L. McKnight and John P. Kretzmann specifically call out “vacant land, vacant commercial and industrial structures, [and] vacant housing,” as highly-visible neighborhood features often labeled as blight but which “when looked at from an asset-centered perspective, become opportunities instead.”\(^{101}\)

After using careful market study to determine the neighborhood’s assets and areas with potential, TRF-DP seeks out partners in the community in order to fully understand the neighborhood and earn support for their work. This community-based approach is fundamental to TRF-DP’s operational model; their process “requires effective partnerships with neighborhood organizations.”\(^{102}\) This commitment to genuine partnerships is borne out on the ground. Oliver presented a unique opportunity because BUILD was already at work in the community, had begun a


\(^{101}\) McKnight and Kretzmann, 178.

dialogue about the changes needed, and recruited TRF-DP’s aid in making their vision a reality. TRF-DP’s market analysis convinced the organization that Oliver was a sound investment, but the community itself already had begun the work; raising $1.25 million from within the neighborhood and already beginning the process of buying up abandoned properties. ¹⁰³ BUILD, and an active neighborhood coalition of pastors, had already defined a vision for the future of the neighborhood. These neighborhood organizers then “sought out entities like TRF to help [them] to see the broader perspective” about how to best create the changes they wished to see. The ongoing neighborhood revitalization process in Oliver is still based in a continuing dialogue between residents, the City, and developers. ¹⁰⁴

Within Oliver, TRF-DP strategically selected sites that would spur further private investment. The organization deliberately took an opposite approach to that used in Sandtown-Winchester. There, investment was directed to the “worst area” in the neighborhood, while in Oliver, it went to the “best spot.” ¹⁰⁵ Work therefore began with targeted vacant properties that were closest to the EBDI project, those which sat at key intersections and on major throughways, and which presented the opportunity to redevelop several contiguous properties. ¹⁰⁶ TRF-DP deliberately set out to influence market dynamics, rather than rehabilitate all of the neighborhood’s properties themselves. ¹⁰⁷

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¹⁰³ Rashid, “Oliver Neighborhood Hopes.”
¹⁰⁶ TRF Development Partners, “Building from Strength: Market-Based Community Development.” Slide 11.
¹⁰⁷ Closkey and Keene, “Creating the Market Dynamics for Baltimore Redevelopment.”
Their carefully delineated strategy adheres to the best practices suggested by James P. Connell and Anne C. Kubisch in their “theory of change” approach. They advocate for a clear plan that must be “plausible, doable, and testable” in order to be successful in meeting its goals. Not relying simply on broadly-articulated goals for neighborhood change, TRF-DP’s plan rests on a carefully articulated strategy, down to the block level, of how they will move from A to Z.

HISTORIC PRESERVATION

In keeping with their overall approach of seeking assets and “building from strength,” historic preservation is central to the TRF-DP approach. Their work throughout Oliver has made consistent use of the federal Historic Tax Credit (HTC), along with a mix of other public and private financing mechanisms. The HTC requires that their work be of a high quality, a standard that contributes to the preservation of the neighborhood character as a whole. This paradigm is consistent with their approach throughout the neighborhood, which emphasized the preservation of historic buildings and neighborhood design to foster a strong housing market. Because the HTC requires that eligible properties be income-producing for a period of at least five years, the historic homes rehabilitated by TRF-DP must be kept as rental properties during this period. The project also utilizes the federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, which makes a similar stipulation that properties be maintained

45-46.
110 Mazie. 46.
as rentals for a period of time. To mitigate this, TRF-DP is pursuing a homeownership development program to help its current tenants acquire the financial knowledge and sound credit needed to purchase the properties in which they live when the mandated five-year period is over.

**OUTCOMES**

Data from the neighborhood indicate that the “building from strength” approach is showing successful results. Over the period from 2006 to 2015, TRF-DP acquired over 400 properties in Oliver, including vacant buildings and vacant lots, and developed over 250 homes, both new construction and rehabilitated historic properties. Other achievements include a decline in the number of vacant buildings by nearly half, and a drastic rise in median sale prices, from $18,450 in 2004-2006 to $135,000 in 2014-2016.

Beyond assessing the influence on the housing market, TRF-DP has set out to understand the economic and social impacts of their work on residents’ lives. Amanda Mazie, an intern with TRF-DP from 2013-2015, has documented her experience helping the developer implement an impact assessment survey in Oliver to evaluate residents’ impressions of the redevelopment work, including their reactions to the historic preservation focus of the TRF-DP approach. The survey represents the first iteration of an ongoing effort to incorporate a reflective and evaluative

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113 TRF Development Partners, “Building from Strength: Market-Based Community Development.” Slide 16-17, 20.
element into the TRF-DP model that can help project leaders to be even more attuned to neighborhood feedback, to learn from their work as it unfolds and to apply these lessons to future efforts.\textsuperscript{115} This type of evaluation is critical to Connell and Kubisch’s theory of change model, which relies on midstream assessments to “supply all stakeholders with timely, useful, and rigorous information about the progress of their initiative and can provide early guidance if the theory of change needs to be revised.”\textsuperscript{116} The Oliver assessments go beyond measures of dollars invested and structures built or rehabilitated and attempt to capture the more intangible impacts of their work and to learn from community feedback, including residents’ perceptions of historic preservation.

Mazie specifically incorporated the historic preservation dimension into the survey to understand which, if any, of the neighborhood’s historic elements were important to residents and should be preserved in the redevelopment process, a line of inquiry that is in keeping with the asset-oriented approach used throughout. Though the results of the small-scale survey are not scientific, they did suggest that residents prioritized the preservation of the residential rowhomes’ scale and appearance, and of historic neighborhood design elements including density and walkability.\textsuperscript{117} Importantly, the survey also identified elements that residents believed were still missing from the redevelopment effort: a community center, grocery stores, and increased activities and better schools for neighborhood youth.\textsuperscript{118} This feedback is consistent with broader tensions within neighborhood revitalization over the

\textsuperscript{115} Mazie. 49.
\textsuperscript{117} Mazie, “Urban Development in Practice and Theory.” 55-56.
\textsuperscript{118} Mazie. 56.
prioritization of physical versus human development, in which “elite actors [tend] to treat property as the key to revitalization while residents call for greater attention to service needs.” The feedback from Oliver’s residents reflects this tendency, and reinforces the need to further prioritize the provision of services in the neighborhood moving forward.

The TRF-DP approach is market-oriented and has focused chiefly on physical development projects, but has incorporated some elements of economic development. This includes their focus on transitioning tenants to homeownership, and a pilot workforce development program for formerly incarcerated individuals returning to the neighborhood. TRF-DP partnered in 2012 with Jericho Reentry, an established job training and support service for returning inmates, to establish a safe deconstruction training program. As of 2015, forty Jericho graduates had found work with subcontractors in TRF-DP’s Oliver rehabilitation and demolition projects.

EAST BALTIMORE HISTORIC II

East Baltimore Historic II (EBHII) is a recently completed TRF-DP project within Oliver. While it is similar in outcome to the other rehabilitation projects in the neighborhood, it merits closer inspection as it was recently awarded two prominent preservation awards. It earned both the 2017 ACHP/HUD Secretary’s Award for Excellence in Historic Preservation and the Maryland Historical Trust’s 2017 Preservation Award for Excellence in Residential Rehabilitation.

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The project worked exclusively with historic properties; rehabilitating thirty-two vacant 1880s rowhomes into affordable housing and two commercial buildings into mixed-use spaces housing a coffee shop and workforce development center. The rehabilitated homes and commercial buildings maintain their historic Victorian façades but the interiors have been updated with an emphasis on energy efficiency and modern finishes and features that will attract families to the properties.

Consistent with the approach taken throughout Oliver, this project utilized the federal Historic Tax Credit, and thus the work had to comply with the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards and was subject to the review and approval of both the Maryland Historical Trust (the SHPO) and the National Park Service.

Even though EBHII is only recently completed, its status as an award-winning preservation project and the accompanying public commentary enable an analysis of those elements of the project that preservationists and affordable housing advocates, as represented by HUD, consider to be highly successful. EBHII is considered a success for both its outcomes and for the planning process that steered the rehabilitation. The press statement issued by HUD and ACHP to announce the award outlines the two organizations’ views of the project’s successes. The agencies praise preservation outcomes as well as metrics of economic and community development. ACHP and HUD recognized the project for successfully “advancing the goals of historic preservation, while providing affordable housing and expanded economic

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121 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “East Baltimore Redevelopment Earns 2017 HUD Secretary Award For Historic Preservation.”
122 Steam Machine, Baltimore Project Chapter One.
opportunities for low- and moderate-income families and residents.”

The statement reflects the project’s success in promoting both traditional and more recent preservation values. EBHII met traditional standards of preservation success by saving thirty-two historic structures, and demonstrated preservation fundamentals by carefully documenting the buildings, preserving their footprints and fenestration patterns, and retaining or replicating historic features. In bestowing the 2017 Preservation Award for Excellence in Residential Rehabilitation, the Maryland Historical Trust praised similar traditionally-valued physical details including “fully-restored masonry exteriors and wood cornices.”

Both ACHP and MHT also praised aspects of the project that reflect less tangible preservation accomplishments. ACHP Chairman Milford Wayne Donaldson applauded EBHII for closely following the ACHP’s “best practices in community revitalization,” which were formalized in a Policy Statement On Historic Preservation and Community Revitalization that was issued in October of 2016. This policy statement includes principles that emphasize the inclusion of “diverse residents in communities that have been overlooked” in previous preservation efforts and the need for flexible approaches to preservation in communities that have physically deteriorated as a result of long-term disinvestment.

124 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
126 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “East Baltimore Redevelopment Earns 2017 HUD Secretary Award For Historic Preservation.”
Both awards draw attention to the inclusive planning process that steered EBHII. The Oliver neighborhood revitalization process is driven from the bottom up; it began as a local response to neighborhood conditions and took off after the Dawson arson. The project has maintained its balance of power as it has gone on. TRF-DP continues to rely on a leadership structure that shares power between investors and residents. The group holds quarterly meetings of development and community partners to review the course of the project and discuss whether any revisions in approach are needed, how to further involve community members, and to set goals for the future.¹²⁸

CONCLUSION

The Oliver project can be seen as a largely successful example of a neighborhood revitalization program that operates with a preservationist mindset, and one which meets the goals of a wide range of stakeholders and disciplines. It provides valuable insight into processes and tools that can be effective in the local context of the city of Baltimore. For the purpose of this study, this project has been particularly successful in achieving both traditional and recently emerging goals of historic preservation. The Oliver project has saved buildings from demolition, preserved character-defining features, and brought previously-vacant buildings back into active use. The high-quality process guiding this program is responsible for its broad accomplishments. TRF-DP’s fundamental reliance on a power-sharing structure that balances the voices of developers and residents has created a system that can meet the wishes and needs of diverse stakeholders. Residents retain a key role in the

¹²⁸ Steam Machine, *Baltimore Project Chapter One.*
redevelopment processes that they themselves initiated. Initial efforts at developing a participatory evaluation system, in the form of a resident survey, suggest broad agreement with the direction of the project, with one notable exception. In a now-familiar pattern, community residents still seek an increased focus on the improved provision of neighborhood services amid the ongoing physical transformation.

Overall, the widespread accomplishments in Oliver position this project as a good model for historic preservation and neighborhood revitalization, and one which has clearly embraced some, if not all, of the lessons of the past. Though it is too soon to assess the long-term outcomes of this work, the successes to date in both its outcomes and its processes set a high standard by which other projects can be judged.
Chapter 5: Creating Opportunities For Renewal And Enterprise

INTRODUCTION

Project C.O.R.E. was announced on January 5, 2016 at a joint press conference between Maryland governor Larry Hogan and Baltimore mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake. The ceremonial kickoff, marked by the project’s first demolition, was held on the streets of Sandtown. The choice of location for the project’s announcement naturally prompted comparisons to the failed interventions that had targeted the neighborhood in the past, and the impact of the neighborhood on the life and death of Freddie Gray, who died less than a year before Project C.O.R.E.’s debut.

This chapter explores the planning process of Project C.O.R.E. as a work-in-progress. Project C.O.R.E. is an actively unfolding program, yet relatively little
information is publicly available about the project’s planning processes or long-term goals. This paucity of information is troubling given the context of previous urban redevelopment projects that proceeded with little resident input or oversight. To better understand this ongoing process, this chapter relied on publicly available information about the project’s goals, funding, and processes, and stakeholder interviews with planners and preservationists involved in Project C.O.R.E.’s planning and execution. Because of the limited amount of public information, these interviews were critical to forming an understanding of the complex organization and operations of C.O.R.E. and the behind-the-scenes processes through which it operates. These conversations were essential to this study’s focus on whether planners and preservationists have adapted their practices to lessons learned from previous interventions. Asking these stakeholders to reflect on their roles and strategies throughout the process provided valuable insight into professionals’ opinions of the evolutions and ongoing challenges in their work.

As the most recent project in consideration for this study, Project C.O.R.E. helps illustrate the extent to which the practice of neighborhood revitalization has evolved and adapted to lessons learned from previous programs, and whether preservationists have found ways to be more relevant to the planning process. The project’s announcement in Sandtown also prompts questions about racial and power dynamics in the decision-making process – the project is slated to heavily impact predominantly African American neighborhoods which have been subject to iterative planning and public policy interventions in the past. As a demolition-oriented program, Project C.O.R.E. is particularly relevant to preservationists considering how
and when they can most effectively engage in planning. The project’s seemingly opaque financing and planning mechanisms, and its shifting goals and tactics, made it an appealing vehicle through which to study the planning process and the roles for preservation.

CONTEXT

The press release issued to announce Project C.O.R.E., and the website that provides an overview of the project, describe the conditions it sought to remedy and the goals it was intended to achieve. Governor Hogan framed the investment as a response to the “calls for action” he heard during his visits to the city in the aftermath of the Baltimore Uprising that followed the death of Freddie Gray. Hogan pointed to Baltimore’s vacant housing as “hotbeds for crime” and set a goal, alongside Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, of demolishing 4,000 vacant properties.129 At the time the project was announced, the city reported approximately 16,000 vacant buildings and 14,000 vacant lots.130 Of these vacant buildings, a large majority are at least fifty years old, and over 7,000 of them are located within National Register historic districts.131 These vacant properties are scattered throughout the city, but are clearly concentrated on the west and east sides (Figure 7).

130 Broadwater and Wenger.

Demolition priorities are guided in part by the City’s Housing Market Typology, a classification system developed jointly by the Baltimore City Planning Department, the Department of Housing and Community Development, and The Reinvestment Fund, the developers working in Oliver (Figure 8).132 The classification

of neighborhoods into strata from “Regional Choice” to “Stressed” is intended to help the City “strategically match available public resources to neighborhood housing market conditions.” 133 The Baltimore Housing Roundtable, a coalition of affordable housing advocates, raises serious equity questions about the “use of market typology to determine which neighborhoods should receive augmented public service and public resources.” 134

![Figure 8. Baltimore City Housing Market Typology Map, 2014](image)


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133 Baltimore City Department of Planning.
The language used by the typology and the maps resulting from its application bear striking resemblance to the 1937 Federal Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) Residential Security Map, which “redlined” Baltimore’s communities of color and set up a pattern of disadvantage that is still borne out today (Figure 9). This and other public policies, including urban renewal, created the distressed housing market in these communities by driving down property values and concentrating poverty.


High vacancy rates have serious consequences for residents of disinvested neighborhoods. Census data show that most of Baltimore’s vacant buildings are concentrated in neighborhoods with the lowest life expectancy, while national data link vacant property to a plethora of social and economic costs including increased crime and risk of fire, and decreased home and property values.\footnote{Terrence McCoy, “Baltimore Has More than 16,000 Vacant Houses. Why Can’t the Homeless Move in?,” \textit{Washington Post}, May 12, 2015, sec. Local, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/baltimore-has-more-than-16000-vacant-houses-why-cant-the-homeless-move-in/2015/05/12/3fd6b068-f7ed-11e4-9030-b4732caefe81_story.html; National Vacant Properties Campaign, “Vacant Properties: The True Cost to Communities,” August 2005, 1, http://www.communityprogress.net/filebin/pdf/toolkit/NVPC_VacantPropertiesTrueCosts.pdf.} Some of the city’s vacant properties are in such deteriorated condition that they are at serious risk of collapsing. In April of 2016, not long after a vacant property collapsed on N. Payson Street and killed a person, more than 500 vacant properties were so unstable that they needed to be checked by safety inspectors every ten days.\footnote{Yvonne Wenger, “Some Baltimore Vacants so Decrepit City Checks Them for Stability Every 10 Days,” \textit{The Baltimore Sun}, April 5, 2016, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-vacant-houses-20160404-story.html.}
PROBLEM DEFINITION

Project C.O.R.E. has operated from the beginning with somewhat of a dual identity, even though it clearly targets vacant property. Was the focus to be strictly demolition or a more holistic “renewal,” as the project’s name indicated? C.O.R.E. is housed within the Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development’s Division of Neighborhood Revitalization. In the interviews conducted for this project, staff there discussed C.O.R.E. as clearly in line with that office’s tradition of redevelopment strategies. It was branded as a project that would “Create Opportunities for Renewal and Enterprise” (thus, Project C.O.R.E.) and the goals outlined from the beginning suggested that comprehensive neighborhood revitalization across the City of Baltimore was the intended outcome. The official goals were threefold:

- “To support community growth in Baltimore City.
- To eliminate in a strategic manner as many full blocks of blight as possible.
- To encourage investment in Project C.O.R.E. communities through attractive financing and other incentives.”

The second goal has proven to be central: the removal of as many units of blight as possible. Early project materials and public comments by the Governor and Mayor suggested that the eventual “opportunities” would be created chiefly through demolition. At the project’s first press conference, Mayor Rawlings-Blake described

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138 Melissa Archer, Tiffany Davis, and Sara Luell, Interview - Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, October 20, 2017.
it as “demolition dollars on steroids.”¹⁴⁰ This focus on blight removal bears strong resemblance to the urban renewal programs of the past.

In the scant Four Year Plan for Project C.O.R.E. on the state Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) website, more weight is given to the project’s first phase, “Demolition Of Blighted Properties,” than to its second, “Revitalization Through Redevelopment,”¹⁴¹ even though ‘renewal and enterprise’ is the project’s ultimate goal. Naming and framing C.O.R.E. in terms of its long-term goals makes the clear short-term focus on demolition seem somewhat jarring. Project C.O.R.E.’s promises focused on the “new” amenities that would be created (“a new canvas for Baltimore… new green space, new affordable and mixed use housing”), but the early focus was squarely on the removal of the “old” – tearing down as many blighted properties as possible, as quickly as possible.

When preservationists involved in C.O.R.E.’s early planning were invited to discuss their perceptions of the project’s introduction and initial framing, all agreed that the project’s perceived focus was clearly demolition, not long-term planning for neighborhood revitalization. As the process of demolition has proved slower and more cumbersome than was originally envisioned, the public emphasis has increasingly shifted to grant-funded development and redevelopment projects, with a benefit to the preservation of historic structures and investment in longer-term projects for historic communities. Nevertheless, the early ambiguity over goals and strategies has played out over the course of Project C.O.R.E.’s implementation.

PROJECT PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT

From the beginning, observers have raised concerns about the ways in which the project is framed. Multiple parties in the press and among sources interviewed for this study described the depiction of Project C.O.R.E. as a massive new investment in Baltimore led by Governor Hogan to be deeply misleading. Several days after the project’s announcement in January 2016, the state Department of Legislative Services (DLS) analyzed C.O.R.E.’s financing plan in response to an inquiry from the chairs of the state Senate and House budget committees. Of the over $700 million dollars announced as part of the new initiative, DLS found that only approximately $75 million was new funding and that the total funding for the project was “likely overstated.” Roughly 90% of the project’s financing was “either already-planned DHCD funding, already-anticipated tax credits, or subsidized financing that is not appropriate for demolition work and is not direct State support.” This analysis also raised numerous questions about whether C.O.R.E. was in fact new programming, rather than a repackaging of existing DHCD efforts.\(^\text{142}\)

Community advocates in Baltimore, responding to the project’s announcement, concluded that “[while] any increase in funding for demolition and affordable housing is welcome, to be sure, the ‘game-changer’ that was marketed to the public is, to say the least, not accurate.”\(^\text{143}\) Though the $75 million increase in

\(^{142}\) Warren G. Deschenaux, Executive Director, Department of Legislative Services, State of Maryland to Edward J. Kasemeyer, Chairman, Senate Budget and Taxation Committee and Maggie McIntosh, Chairman, House Appropriations Committee, “Project C.O.R.E. Financing Plan,” January 11, 2016.

funding is significant, attempts to pitch Project C.O.R.E. as investing hundreds of millions in new financing in the City of Baltimore seem highly politicized.

Shortly after Project C.O.R.E.’s announcement, preservationists were brought into the planning process by way of the Maryland Historical Trust Act of 1985. This “state 106” mirrors Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act by mandating a historic preservation review process for state-funded projects. The Maryland Historical Trust (MHT), the state’s historic preservation agency, had an initial phone meeting with DHCD in January of 2016 to discuss the project’s funding in more detail and determine whether any federal funding was used that would necessitate the federal Section 106 process. Since C.O.R.E. is a state and City-funded project, only the Maryland Historical Trust Act was relevant. MHT staff, in response to inquiries about the organization’s role in project planning, report that at the time of this early conversation, Project C.O.R.E. was loosely defined and had only a broad objective: to “demolish blight.”

As early lists of properties targeted for demolition became available, it was clear that C.O.R.E. would have a major impact on the city’s historic structures, including many within historic districts listed in or determined eligible for the National Register. Affected districts included Baltimore East/South Clifton Park, Old West Baltimore, Franklin Square, Old East Baltimore, Coldstream Homestead Montebello, and East Monument. The state’s proposed demolition of contributing structures within these historic districts constituted an adverse effect on historic

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145 Amanda Apple, Interview - Maryland Historical Trust, October 20, 2017.
146 Pousson, “What Does Project CORE Mean for Baltimore’s Historic Neighborhoods?”
properties. Under the Maryland Historical Trust Act, this finding required the state agencies to engage in a consultation process to seek ways to minimize and mitigate harm to these historic properties.\textsuperscript{147} MHT began the process of formulating a Programmatic Agreement that would frame the role for preservation in the project and outline required mitigation strategies. As part of these negotiations, advocacy groups Preservation Maryland and Baltimore Heritage, as well as the Baltimore National Heritage Area, were included as additional consulting parties.

Interviews of preservation advocates involved in the consultation process focused on their impressions of these negotiations and the strategies used to argue for preservation goals. All of the interviewed advocates reported that preservationists were united in pushing for strong mitigation measures. The consulting parties agreed that DHCD would spend approximately 10\% of the proposed $75 million in demolition costs on mitigation. In April of 2016, Preservation Maryland and Baltimore Heritage submitted a joint mitigation proposal outlining how the $7.5 million in mitigation funding should be broken down. The proposal contained three basic elements:

1. \textit{Stabilization}: The bulk of the mitigation funding would go to stabilization of structures within designated local and National Register historic districts. This funding would go to the city’s Vacants to Values program to encourage private purchase, rehabilitation, and homeownership of historic homes; and to a newly-established grant fund administered by Preservation Maryland that

would strategically target key historic properties that serve community needs and further neighborhood redevelopment.

2. **Staff Assistance:** The proposal called for the creation of two staff positions, one housed at the Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community Development, to coordinate citywide efforts surrounding preservation and vacant properties; and one jointly appointed to Preservation Maryland and Baltimore Heritage to better connect city residents and organizations to preservation-oriented redevelopment strategies and resources.

3. **Survey and Documentation:** The smallest amount of mitigation funding would provide for improved survey and documentation of impacted historic structures and neighborhoods, particularly those that would be demolished.\(^{148}\)

Following negotiations between the consulting parties over the proposed mitigation measures, the programmatic agreement was finalized in September 2016. The final mitigation plan heavily favors survey and documentation. It incorporates only some of the recommendations made by preservation stakeholders, including funding for a City Historic Preservation Officer; for stabilization, rehabilitation, and salvage; and for research, survey, and documentation, to include a revised study of Baltimore’s alley houses.\(^{149}\) From this broad slate of potential actions, specific mitigation measures are agreed upon on a yearly basis for each annual wave of proposed demolitions.


\(^{149}\) “Programmatic Agreement Among the Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, the Maryland Historical Trust, and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Regarding Project C.O.R.E. - Demolition and Stabilization Actions,” September 8, 2016, 7–8.
The first round of mitigation included several actions pertaining to properties located at 301 – 307 S. Catherine Street in Shipley Hill (Figure 10). When preservationists reviewed the initial list of properties targeted for demolition, this block of homes stood out for their distinctive architecture, a result of the unusually shaped lot on which they sit.\textsuperscript{150} These properties received specially targeted mitigation measures – a Maryland Inventory of Historic Properties inventory form and Historic American Building Survey (HABS) level architectural drawings and plans for the structures.\textsuperscript{151}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure10.png}
\caption{Vacant homes at 301-307 S. Catherine St., Baltimore, MD were among those targeted in the first round of Project C.O.R.E. demolition. Digital Image. DHCD, Project C.O.R.E. List of Blighted Properties for Demolition, 2016.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{150} Apple, Interview - Maryland Historical Trust.
\textsuperscript{151} “Programmatic Agreement Among the Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, the Maryland Historical Trust, and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Regarding Project C.O.R.E. - Demolition and Stabilization Actions,” 9–10.
Interviews with preservation advocates also focused on their impressions of the agreed-upon programmatic agreement. Of the preservationists interviewed, opinions are mixed. They had agreed early on not to oppose the entire project, recognizing that some demolitions are a necessary part of the city’s redevelopment and that vacant and blighted homes are major challenges to historic neighborhoods. While Baltimore Heritage Executive Director, Johns Hopkins, rated the overall agreement as “a fair outcome,” advocates had clearly argued for a stronger preservation package, as demonstrated by their initial mitigation proposal. Preservation Maryland Executive Director, Nicholas Redding, expressed some frustration with the final, limited role that preservation plays in the overall process. When Project C.O.R.E. was first announced, Preservation Maryland saw “an amazing opportunity for preservation in redevelopment,” but which ultimately appeared to be largely a demolition program.

IMPLEMENTATION

The finalized Programmatic Agreement lays out the processes for preservation activities, but other elements of Project C.O.R.E. fall outside of this agreement and are less clearly governed by an organized strategy. One of the strengths of the Oliver program that sets it apart from the breakdown in the Sandtown NTI is the clearly laid out strategy of how the neighborhood will move from the condition in which it started to the goals it hopes to achieve. Beyond utilizing the broadly conceptualized “Building from Strength” approach, the Oliver project relies on a careful and

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153 Nicholas Redding, Interview - Preservation Maryland, October 11, 2017.
deliberately incremental plan for physical development in which decisions about properties to rehabilitate and demolish are carefully targeted to the corners and blocks that will have the most market impact. This type of careful implementation plan ensures that each step follows from the previous action and builds toward project goals.

In addition to following a clearly laid out internal logic, best practices suggest that neighborhood revitalization programs should be tied to broader plans to tackle urban inequalities and promote access to opportunity at a municipal or regional scale. As noted in both the Sandtown and Oliver chapters, neighborhood revitalization projects in Baltimore have historically struggled to connect to broader citywide planning efforts. Without this connection to comprehensive planning efforts and long-term strategies that take all of the city’s neighborhoods into consideration, efforts can work at cross-purposes or lose momentum over time.

Unfortunately, detailed implementation and long-term plans for Project C.O.R.E. remain opaque to members of the public, as well as to some of the parties who have been closely involved in the process and who were interviewed for this chapter. Project C.O.R.E.’s DHCD homepage mentions a Four Year Plan composed of two elements: Phase I – Demolition of Blighted Properties and Phase II – Revitalization Through Redevelopment. Both are described in limited detail, with five short paragraphs outlining the demolition strategy and only one sentence to explain Phase II: “The state will leverage an estimated $600 million through Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development programs to encourage new
investment in these blighted communities.”154 Over the course of the project’s implementation so far, this online plan has not been updated with any further information, even though both phases are currently underway, nor does a detailed Four Year Plan seem to be available elsewhere, at least not publicly. This at best reflects a serious lack of transparency, and at worst suggests that this multi-million-dollar project is taking an essentially haphazard approach, if a detailed plan does not, in fact, exist.

Discussion with DHCD staff was essential to better understand the breakdown of these project elements.155 DHCD staff report that the two phases of the project are in fact occurring concurrently. Phase I is chiefly comprised of demolitions carried out by the Maryland Stadium Authority (MSA). MSA holds responsibility for demolishing properties identified by the City. These demolitions are governed by the Programmatic Agreement signed by the preservation stakeholders, including the Maryland Historical Trust.

At the same time, there is an annual round of Project C.O.R.E. grant applications each fiscal year. The state DHCD issues a Request for Applications (RFA) for Project C.O.R.E. funding. Both non-profit community development corporations and Baltimore City agencies are eligible to apply for funding to cover eligible expenses, including acquisition, demolition, stabilization, site development, and architectural and engineering services.156 These funds as a whole are intended to

154 Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development, “Four Year Plan.”
155 Archer, Davis, and Luell, Interview - Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development.
bolster the available pre-development funding that allows redevelopment projects to be executed.\textsuperscript{157}

C.O.R.E. funding applications are reviewed by a committee composed of representatives from a number of state agencies, including the Maryland Historical Trust.\textsuperscript{158} Reviewers prioritize projects that clearly “building upon existing community strengths and assets,” which can include proximity to anchor institutions, to other major redevelopment projects, or to transit, and projects that reuse “landmark historic buildings.”\textsuperscript{159} This framework builds on similar work that the Division of Neighborhood Revitalization has been carrying out through programs like the Community Legacy Program, which frequently channels funding to the rehabilitation and revitalization of historic buildings and neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{160} The Project C.O.R.E. RFA funding process is modeled on this successful track record, and embraces many of the elements of modern planning processes, by working in concert with existing resources (including historic structures) and by granting community control over projects. This orientation towards community assets at times seems at odds with the central focus initially given to demolition.

As Project C.O.R.E. has proceeded, and the MSA-led demolitions have proven to be slower to execute than anticipated, more of the project’s public emphasis has shifted to the work being done through these awarded projects. This shift has resulted in outcomes that favor historic preservation more than was initially

\textsuperscript{157} Archer, Davis, and Luell, Interview - Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development.

\textsuperscript{158} Apple, Interview - Maryland Historical Trust.

\textsuperscript{159} CORE Quarterly Report FY 17, p 4.

anticipated. Several rounds of C.O.R.E. funding applications and awards reveal that these funds are frequently being used to support adaptive reuse projects rather than large-scale clearance programs.\textsuperscript{161}

Because C.O.R.E. is so heavily oriented towards demolition, it is important to understand the extent to which demolition choices are made strategically. Demolition site selection is an important process at the heart of Project C.O.R.E., and the element in which preservationists are most heavily involved. Demolition choices are backed by several sources of data, including public input and the knowledge of City planners and preservationists. It relies heavily on the City’s longstanding demolition pipeline, as well as the sophisticated statistical modeling underpinning the City’s Housing Market Typology.\textsuperscript{162}

Despite the veneer of a carefully deliberative process presented by these varied inputs, preservationists involved in C.O.R.E. report that the execution process is quite rushed. When interviewed, project participants reported feeling pressured to keep demolitions moving as quickly as possible, where a more deliberate process would allow for more careful scrutiny about the properties being demolished. Sites are selected for expediency, and not in coordination with a larger redevelopment plan. One stakeholder expressed the view that any attempt to match demolitions to a strategy for reuse of the site is “secondary to blight clearance.”

Increasingly, connections have been drawn between the newly-vacant land created by Project C.O.R.E. demolitions and the City’s Green Network Plan. The Green Network Plan (GNP) was introduced by Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake on

\textsuperscript{161} Apple, Interview - Maryland Historical Trust.
June 15, 2016, approximately five months after the announcement of Project C.O.R.E. The plan re-visions the city’s vacant and abandoned places as new green space for residents, in the form of parks, trails, and community gardens.\textsuperscript{163} The GNP, still in development, proposes a network of connected parks and green corridors that will promote health and provide space for physical activity and active transportation alternatives (Figure 11).\textsuperscript{164}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{baltimore_green_network_map.png}
\caption{Baltimore’s Green Network Plan hopes to boost community health by transforming vacant properties into green spaces. Digital Image. Baltimore City Department of Planning, n.d.}
\end{figure}


The plan is closely connected to Project C.O.R.E.: it relies on the demolition of vacant and abandoned properties to create green and open space. The two plans also rely on an at-times overlapping planning process – the ongoing public engagement process for the GNP is counted as a means of public engagement for Project C.O.R.E. and DHCD staff consider the two processes to be very closely tied together.\textsuperscript{165} The connection between the two plans is clear, but what is not evident is that either plan is operating with a detailed understanding of how demolitions will strategically open up green spaces that can be incorporated into the proposed network of parks and trails. As the planning process for the GNP is still in progress, it cannot possibly act as a strategic guide for the selection of which properties should be demolished to ensure an equitable and functional distribution of green spaces. The GNP simply is not far enough along to serve as the strategic framework underpinning Project C.O.R.E.’s demolition choices.

The relationship between large-scale demolition programs and newly-introduced green space has proved challenging for other cities to manage successfully. Geographers Amy E. Frazier and Sharmistha Bagchi-Sen studied shrinking cities’ attempts to reprogram post-demolition vacant lots as open space, and found that many cities lack a strategic plan for their demolitions and the land uses that will follow, and instead rush to demolish large numbers of structures as quickly as possible, resulting in a “‘swiss cheese’ landscape” where vacant lots sit as

\textsuperscript{165} Archer, Davis, and Luell, Interview - Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development.
unmaintained eyesores. These “greening” processes also pose real risks for the displacement of current residents in a quest to attract higher-income residents through the introduction of new amenities. Though framed as neutral strategies that increase citywide sustainability and community health, greening strategies can effectively trigger a phenomenon described as “eco-gentrification” or “environmental gentrification,” wherein newly revitalized neighborhoods experience rising demand and property values that reduce affordability and trigger displacement.

Scholars who undertook a comprehensive study of the trade-offs of green plans similar to Baltimore’s found that framing increased green and open space as universally beneficial to quality of life ignores the history of “socio-spatial inequalities” and the ways that green spaces have been used in the past to reinforce patterns of segregation. Without acknowledging this history and planning for an inclusive development process, these patterns can easily be replicated.

Baltimore’s Green Network Plan is being developed with the input of residents, community organizations, the non-profit community, and other stakeholders. Planners will use this input to “identify areas that can be strategically set aside for green space to complement and support future economic development and create new community assets like parks, urban gardens, and recreation areas.”

These community engagement processes are not examined in detail here. However,

168 Haase et al., 43–45.
the fact that this process of identification and prioritization is still underway yet is cited as a strategy behind Project C.O.R.E.’s demolition decision, poses the danger that this effort will replicate the spatial inequalities produced by planning processes in the past.

An ad-hoc demolition policy also has serious consequences for historic structures. While preservationists in Baltimore have accepted that some level of demolition is necessary, widespread demolition without plans for what will follow does not preserve any flexibility for stabilized and rehabilitated structures to be used in future development. Amanda Apple, the Maryland Historical Trust Preservation Officer who works mostly closely with Project C.O.R.E., noted that without a pre-planned end use, there is little opportunity for saving existing fabric.  

Project C.O.R.E. is loosely connected to broader citywide planning efforts, but these projects as a whole seem to be moving forward rapidly without the type of “comprehensive and strategic plan of action” recommended by neighborhood revitalization scholars today. This may stem in part from the fact that political pressure surrounding large-scale interventions like Project C.O.R.E. can result in a rush to show off accomplishments. A top-down insistence on fast, demonstrable results does not allow time for a deliberate planning process, as seen in the collapse of the Sandtown-Winchester NTI. There, project leaders had made big promises to community members and funders about the speed and scale of accomplishments, and moved forward too quickly and haphazardly as a result. The failure of the NTI to live up to the high expectations set at the outset led to “post-planning let down” among

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170 Apple, Interview - Maryland Historical Trust.
neighborhood residents as they saw that promises would not be kept. Without stable, continuous support and funding for neighborhood revitalization programs, it is not surprising that these projects tend to “make hay while the sun shines.” With Governor Larry Hogan approaching a re-election campaign in 2018, several years into Project C.O.R.E.’s execution, the pressure to demonstrate success is particularly high.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Modern planning relies on formal public engagement processes to solicit residents’ input and buy-in, one of the key lessons purportedly learned from earlier top-down efforts. These outreach efforts are often legally mandated, but frequently done poorly. It is easy for public agencies operating with limited funding and staff to fall into the trap of engaging in mere “ritual” participation processes that may offer community members the opportunity to share superficial input, rather than establishing “room to actually influence decision-making or behavior” – a much more complex but meaningful role for residents in the planning process. Project C.O.R.E. has utilized several forms of public engagement throughout the project to date. One of the key opportunities offered to residents to influence the project was through a public demolition meeting, held at the Edmonson-Westside High School on June 29, 2016, in order to solicit community input on preferred sites for both

demolition and stabilization (Figure 12). Residents were provided with stickers to mark specific problem properties on large-format maps posted to the wall. Properties could also be suggested via an interactive map of sites targeted for demolition or via email sent directly to City staff. This process provided a mechanism for input described as critical to the project’s success. Nominated sites would be taken into consideration during the annual meetings at which the demolition site list is finalized.

![Demolition Meeting Flyer for June 29, 2016](image)

**Figure 12.** Demolition Meeting Flyer for June 29, 2016


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175 Apple, Interview - Maryland Historical Trust.

The notification flyer was posted to the website of the Baltimore City Department of Planning and interested parties were asked to share the upcoming demolition meeting with anyone else who might be interested in attending. Without any further information about the means used to alert interested residents to the upcoming meeting and to encourage their participation, the process that went into building robust resident attendance and participation is unknown. However, the timing of the meeting does raise questions about how central residents’ input truly was to the decision-making process. The public demolition meeting was held on June 29, 2016, but the list of targeted blighted properties had been compiled and circulated among project stakeholders months earlier, in February. By June, discussions amongst the consulting parties were well underway as to which properties to demolish and which to stabilize or target mitigation measures toward, typically properties of higher architectural or historical significance. While resident input solicited in June 2016 could certainly be incorporated into the decision-making processes for later fiscal years, the fact that the process was so far along at the point that public input was requested belies the claim that this is a process driven chiefly by the community’s “wish list” of what should come down.

It was clear from the stakeholder interviews that in some neighborhoods, residents support demolition, particularly where vacant properties are contributing to criminal activity. However, one interviewee reflected that in communities that have suffered for decades from a lack of public support and funding, any investment is seen as a positive. This “planning from a point of despair,” as described by one

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preservationist, may pose a false choice between demolition and the status quo of unbearable disinvestment.

Ongoing media coverage of Project C.O.R.E. has also highlighted critical perspectives from residents and advocates who feel they have not been given enough of a voice in the decision-making process or enough notice of the project taking place in their communities. On January 6, 2016, the day after Project C.O.R.E.’s official announcement in Sandtown, a Baltimore Brew journalist, Fern Shen, noted a “decidedly mixed” reaction among city residents. While some praised the new investment in the city and the prospect of positive outcomes, others questioned why there had been no advance notice or discussion with residents about issues including displacement and affordability after the project’s completion. Some advocates pointed directly to the city’s checkered track record of planning projects that have prioritized the interests of real estate developers and historically limited the voice of African American residents in decisions affecting their neighborhoods. In an op-ed published in the Baltimore Sun shortly after Project C.O.R.E.’s public announcement, representatives of the civil rights advocacy group, Public Justice Center, and the community land trust, North East Housing Initiative, questioned the project’s commitment to “community-driven processes” given that the list of properties targeted for demolition was compiled before any residents had the opportunity to be involved.

Project C.O.R.E. is a complex operation spanning many agencies and functions, so there are a large number of stakeholders with a seat at the decision-

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making table. Missing at the center of the process, however, seems to be a prominent voice for community residents. DHCD’s most recent quarterly report on Project C.O.R.E. celebrates “numerous meetings with Baltimore City stakeholders” held from April through June, but community representation seems slim. Among the list of “community outreach” accomplishments are: “Bi-weekly meetings with C.O.R.E. Partners (Maryland Stadium Authority, Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community Development, and Maryland Department of Housing and Community Development).”¹⁸⁰ Ongoing internal project planning meetings among governmental agencies does not seem to qualify as the type of robust community engagement promised at the project’s outset.

OUTCOMES

Project C.O.R.E. is now midway through its initial four-year funding period. At this early stage, it is impossible to determine the medium and long-term transformative impacts of this initiative. Instead, outcomes at this stage are measured largely in physical terms, and by the level of funding granted for affiliated projects. Opinions vary on the project’s success so far in achieving its goal of removing 4,000 units of blight. DHCD and the governor’s office reported that as of June 2017, 1,186 units of blight had been removed, an outcome celebrated by the governor as a milestone.¹⁸¹ Of this total, 1,154 units were demolished and 32 were stabilized.¹⁸²

Recent reporting by the *Baltimore Sun* questions the math behind this figure. In an investigative piece published in late October 2017, reporter Ian Duncan notes that of the $75 million pledged by the state for demolition, only $5 million had been spent, nearly two years into the project. State funding, framed as the centerpiece of Project C.O.R.E., accounted for only 131 demolitions, while the City carried out 691 demolitions using their own funds. Duncan’s article delves into the struggles C.O.R.E. has faced in proceeding as originally planned. Demolitions have not been carried out as quickly as was hoped due to the lengthy legal processes required to acquire private properties targeted for demolition, a perennial hurdle that has stymied past efforts to address the city’s vacant properties. At Project C.O.R.E.’s outset, approximately 71% of the properties targeted for the first round of demolition were privately owned. This requires the City to obtain the properties, a process complicated by the fact that many are owned by absentee landlords. The proposed whole-block demolitions also must contend with any homeowners and renters who remain on targeted blocks. While the project planners try to avoid blocks where people are still living, they cannot always do so, requiring the relocation of residents at the expense of further time and money.

As a result of these complications, the project’s emphasis has increasingly shifted towards redevelopment projects, arguably a positive outcome for historic

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184 Pousson, “What Does Project CORE Mean for Baltimore’s Historic Neighborhoods?”
185 Hopkins, Interview - Baltimore Heritage.
preservation. Many of the redevelopment projects funded through C.O.R.E. have stabilized and rehabilitated historic structures, a result that preservation advocates across the board viewed very favorably when interviewed on the subject. One of the many grant-funded adaptive reuse projects is the redevelopment of the historic Hoen Lithograph complex (Figure 13). This project received $400,000 in Project C.O.R.E. funding, and will utilize state and federal historic preservation tax credits to help meet its overall budget of $26 million. This 85,000-square-foot industrial site was constructed between 1885 and 1963, but has sat vacant for over 35 years after the 1981 bankruptcy of the Hoen & Company lithographers.\(^1\)\(^8\)\(^6\) The complex will be redeveloped to serve as the new headquarters of Strong City Baltimore, a non-profit organization that plans to incorporate spaces for neighborhood services and entrepreneurs that will act as a catalyst for neighborhood change.\(^1\)\(^8\)\(^7\)

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Reactions to this shift in focus are mixed. Unsurprisingly, preservationists reported seeing many positive outcomes in the redevelopment projects, especially for a project initially anticipated to have widespread negative impacts on historic structures. Likewise, community representatives in areas that have received funding for such projects speak positively about the change in direction. City Councilman Robert Stokes, who has seen new investment in his district, supports the emphasis on redevelopment rather than on demolitions where there is no plan to reuse the resultant vacant lots. Nevertheless, the shift in focus has caught off-guard some residents who expected to see the widespread clearance of blighted properties that was promised at Project C.O.R.E.’s outset. This sense of disappointment parallels the outcome of the Sandtown-Winchester NTI, when sweeping promises were made up front that the project could not keep, thus increasing residents’ sense of abandonment. Delegate Antonio Hayes, whose district incorporates much of west Baltimore, gave voice to his constituents’ frustrations with the changing nature of Project C.O.R.E.: “At the community level when you lay out a vision, when you make that type of commitment…their expectation is that is going to happen. I wish when the announcement was made, some expectations were more clearly defined.”

Though the shift to redevelopment can be seen as positive from many angles, it again raises questions about the project’s planning process. With a long history of similar problems facing past attempts to address vacancy and blight, why did no one see this coming?

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188 Duncan, “$75M Plan to Demolish Thousands of Baltimore’s Vacant Houses Now Relies on Other Groups, New Accounting.”
190 Duncan, “$75M Plan to Demolish Thousands of Baltimore’s Vacant Houses Now Relies on Other Groups, New Accounting.”
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the haziness over Project C.O.R.E.’s goals and methods has had major implications for the planning process and raises questions about the strategic foundation of the program from the outset. C.O.R.E. reflects that many of the problems that plagued planning processes of the past continue to persist today. The project lacks specific goals and a clear implementation plan, has limited public participation, and ultimately allows only a marginal role for historic preservation. This limited role indicates that preservationists are still struggling to find their place in large-scale neighborhood revitalization efforts.

The final chapter reflects on the trajectory of neighborhood revitalization policy seen in the preceding case studies and concludes with suggestions for ways that preservationists can position themselves to play a more central role in planning processes and to more effectively advocate for the importance of historic preservation in equitable neighborhood revitalization.
Chapter 6: Conclusions & Recommendations

A central question that motivated this study was simply whether planners and preservationists have learned lessons from our past mistakes. Have we embraced new strategies and processes to reverse the spatial inequalities created by a legacy of top-down planning processes? Or are we using the same tools that failed these communities in the past? This chapter interprets the three preceding case studies through the lens of the lessons purportedly learned from the days of urban renewal: the need for clearly defined goals and strategies, the pursuit of holistic development that goes beyond physical projects, the importance of participatory planning, and the incorporation of historic preservation values and methods. These case studies revealed serious ongoing flaws within the planning process, and pointed to the consequences of the politicized processes that often drive this work. Given the evident need to continue improving our planning practices, this chapter concludes with recommendations for ways that preservationists can make a positive difference.

CLEAR GOALS AND STRATEGIES

The challenge of revitalizing Baltimore’s disinvested neighborhoods is extremely complex, and must proceed strategically in order to be successful. The urban renewal era clearly illustrated the pitfalls of haphazard projects not guided by well thought-out strategies. The Sandtown NTI, despite its goal of approaching neighborhood revitalization in a radically new way, also fell victim to this persistent problem. Without a detailed implementation plan, NTI stakeholders did not have a clear understanding of how to reach their goals. This resulted in an ad hoc planning
process in which partners at times moved in opposite directions rather than working smoothly in concert. It is particularly troubling that so much money was invested in this project without an overarching plan to coordinate funded projects.

Project C.O.R.E. has also failed to demonstrate both a well-orchestrated internal logic and a strategic connection to other planning efforts. Demolition choices are not clearly tied to plans for reuse of newly-vacant space. The Green Network Plan, posited as this long-term blueprint, is not yet complete and is not a primary driver of demolition site-selection. Without a well-developed plan for the “Phase II” of Project C.O.R.E. – the redevelopment – demolition decisions cannot be fully guided by plans for neighborhoods’ futures. By taking down historic buildings without a clear strategy that links “demolition targets and priorities with specific stabilization, redevelopment, and reuse goals and strategies,” opportunities to maximize historic assets are effectively foreclosed.\(^\text{191}\)

In contrast, the work in Oliver has proceeded much more strategically. TRF-DP’s work there is guided by both a broad vision and a clearly articulated implementation plan. With an overarching focus on homeownership and social mobility for residents, the developers make targeted investments in an attempt to affect market dynamics, rather than to rehabilitate everything themselves. Projects are connected to broader redevelopment plans for the east Baltimore community at large that are currently underway via the work of East Baltimore Development Inc., a deliberate choice that is part of TRF-DP’s larger “building from strength” strategy.

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MOVING BEYOND BRICKS AND MORTAR

All three case studies reflect a persistent tendency to prioritize physical projects over capacity-building and community development efforts. In the Sandtown NTI, these measures were subordinated to physical development priorities that eventually petered out as funding streams dried up. NTI leaders expected to hit the ground running and for residents to be on board with their priorities, and when community members could not keep up with the promised pace of development, they were replaced by professional staff of the Enterprise Foundation. Rather than charging ahead at this rapid pace, NTI planners should have embraced a slower and more deliberate capacity-building process that gave residents the support and tools to take on increased leadership and responsibility over the long term.

The Oliver project, while also heavily oriented towards physical development, has won some accolades for its pursuit of broader community and economic development goals. There, TRF-DP has created low- and moderate-income rental properties with a pathway to homeownership, an important step towards building long-term wealth and stability among neighborhood residents. The project also incorporates workforce development on several fronts, through the property rehabilitation partnership with Jericho Reentry, and through the development of resources like the CUPS Coffeehouse and Café in EBHII, which offers job-training programs for young people. Nonetheless, the initial community feedback survey

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192 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “East Baltimore Redevelopment Earns 2017 HUD Secretary Award For Historic Preservation.”
distributed to residents suggested that more emphasis is needed on the provision of improved community services.\textsuperscript{193}

Project C.O.R.E. has also fallen into this pattern by emphasizing short-term physical measures like the number of units of blight removed. Demolition programs must work in concert with other ways of increasing opportunity for existing residents. Urban scholar Jason Hackworth analyzed shrinking cities’ growing preference for demolition and found that blight clearance alone does not prompt neutral market forces to seize on previously disinvested neighborhoods. Without corresponding public investment in these neighborhoods, they “do not autonomously revive.”\textsuperscript{194}

Project C.O.R.E. is focused squarely on blight removal, which does not in and of itself improve neighborhood outcomes. “Creating opportunities” for Baltimore’s disinvested communities requires other important measures. A broadly based conception of “development” does not seem to have played a fundamental role in Project C.O.R.E.’s planning from the outset. For example, workforce development was identified as an initial focus, but was not clearly delineated in early project information.\textsuperscript{195} In response to an inquiry as to the status of these elements, DHCD staff reported that work is underway to execute an agreement with the Baltimore-based nonprofit organization, Humanim, to begin architectural salvage work through one of their social enterprise arms, Details Deconstruction. The salvage company

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Mazie, “Urban Development in Practice and Theory,” 56.
\item Hackworth, “Demolition as Urban Policy in the American Rust Belt.”
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trains and hires “hard-to-employ residents” like returning offenders and recovered addicts and promotes the recycling of historic building materials.\textsuperscript{196}

The funding channeled to redevelopment projects has provided resources to nonprofit and neighborhood organizations designing projects that will serve broader community needs. This funding, however, was largely already-allocated money that cannot truly be called a new investment under Project C.O.R.E., per the analysis of Maryland’s Department of Legislative Services.\textsuperscript{197} These worthwhile investments are much closer to a more holistic form of neighborhood revitalization, but they were already in the pipeline before Project C.O.R.E. One interviewee described the rebranding of this funding and these projects as essentially a “shell game.”

**PARTICIPATORY PLANNING**

Public engagement is a key element of modern planning processes. This focus emerged as a direct reaction to the top-down planning processes of the past that emphasized the formal knowledge of planners and developers over residents’ perceptions and priorities.\textsuperscript{198} The process of soliciting community input is designed to mitigate the power disparities inherit in the planning process. Unfortunately, these case studies suggest that this practice has been only superficially adopted.

In the Sandtown NTI, the gulf in social, economic, and political power between residents and project leaders influenced its process and outcomes from the


\textsuperscript{197} Warren G. Deschenaux, Executive Director, Department of Legislative Services, State of Maryland to Edward J. Kasemeyer, Chairman, Senate Budget and Taxation Committee and Maggie McIntosh, Chairman, House Appropriations Committee, “Project C.O.R.E. Financing Plan.”

\textsuperscript{198} Teaford, “Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath,” 456.
beginning. By delegating most of the power for implementing the NTI to the politicized intermediary Community Building in Partnership, the execution of the plan was co-opted by its most powerful participants rather than led by the neighborhood residents whose lives it most impacted. These power disparities were never openly acknowledged and dealt with. John Forester, in *Planning in the Face of Power*, describes planners who ignore “the practical context of power relations, conflicting wants and interests, and political-economic structures” as “walking across a busy intersection with one’s eyes closed.”

Within Project C.O.R.E., residents lack a prominent place in the decision-making process. The demolition site-selection process raises many questions about the timing and meaningfulness of the opportunities given to residents to influence the course of the project. Ultimately, the project’s direction seems shaped largely by political expediency.

In contrast, the Oliver project offers a positive example. It began as an outgrowth of a grassroots community-organizing effort and has maintained a leadership role for neighborhood advocates despite the entrance of a large developer and the injection of large amounts of outside investment. Unlike in the Sandtown NTI, where BUILD left the process in frustration, the advocacy organization still has a clear seat at the table and a guiding voice in the process. Project leadership is shared between stakeholders and feedback mechanisms like quarterly meetings and surveys supply resident direction and allow project leaders to assess and readjust priorities.

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STABLE EMPHASIS ON NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION

Investing in the revitalization of Maryland’s largest city should be a statewide priority. Unfortunately, there is a waxing and waning pattern of focus at all levels of government on neighborhood revitalization efforts. In Baltimore, this policy priority has ebbed and flowed with shifts in political leadership.\textsuperscript{200} In the case of Sandtown, when Mayor Martin O’Malley replaced Mayor Kurt Schmoke, funding for the neighborhood was shifted to the newly prioritized east Baltimore redevelopment efforts surrounding the Hopkins campus.\textsuperscript{201} Project C.O.R.E. could easily suffer the same fate if the winds of political will change. Without continuity in programming and stable ongoing funding, political pressures negatively impact planning processes, and therefore the outcomes of these programs as well. In this respect, Project C.O.R.E. shows very little difference from the earlier Sandtown-Winchester NTI. The pressure to show off accomplishments is detrimental to projects’ equity, by leading to rushed community engagement efforts, limited pre-planning, and an emphasis on physical projects over long term capacity-building and community development measures.

The lack of stable, long-term planning for neighborhood revitalization also has serious consequences for the Baltimore’s historic structures. Without plans for the future, it can be especially difficult to see deteriorated historic structures as opportunities, not just barriers to be removed. These processes prioritize the expediency of demolition, with long-term plans for re-use “to be determined.” Though not specifically a lesson of urban renewal, this instability has clearly

\textsuperscript{200} Stoker, Stone, and Worgs, “Neighborhood Policy in Baltimore: The Postindustrial Turn,” 73.
\textsuperscript{201} Stoker, Stone, and Worgs, 61.
undermined neighborhood revitalization work in Baltimore over a period of many decades.

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis of the planning processes behind three neighborhood revitalization programs in the City of Baltimore revealed mixed results. Important elements of good planning practice that are theoretically central to modern planning processes were not always evident – and some clearly problematic practices persist. Of the three projects assessed in this study, only the work in Oliver demonstrated a meaningful embrace of the planning lessons that evolved in response to earlier policy failures (Table 2). It alone maintained resident leadership, worked strategically towards clear goals, avoided being politicized, and emphasized historic preservation.

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✔ Good
– Fair
✗ Poor
Unfortunately, the Oliver model is not necessarily one that can be broadly replicated across the city. There are serious transparency questions raised by a reliance on private developers to execute neighborhood revitalization processes. Even theoretically well-intentioned actors, such as the TRF-DP partnership, “[operate] mainly outside normal political channels,” with a governance structure that can “[limit] public knowledge and [constrain] participation.” Even though Oliver is working well, a similar project done poorly would have little public accountability.

Oliver also operates in an unstable long-term planning environment. A 2015 assessment of urban policy in Baltimore found that while there is much revitalization work underway at the neighborhood level, a coordinated citywide approach to “remedying neighborhood distress is not a paramount priority.” While there are many scattered, ad hoc efforts, they do not “cumulate or build policy momentum.” This environment raises concerns over the ability to replicate even an arguably successful model like Oliver at a larger scale without a more comprehensive citywide plan. It is also unlikely that developers will take on projects in neighborhoods most lacking in resources. While TRF’s “building from strength” approach has clear benefits, there are many neighborhoods without the specific assets that drew the developer into the project, particularly its proximity to a major anchor institution. For deeply distressed neighborhoods, there is still a clear need for public investment and for quality public planning processes.

202 Stoker, Stone, and Worbs, 73.
WHAT CAN PRESERVATIONISTS DO?

While today’s planning profession has purportedly evolved since the urban renewal era, the underlying processes do not reflect nearly as much progress as one would hope. As the most recent of the three case study projects, Project C.O.R.E.’s many issues suggest pervasive problems with the ways in which we conduct neighborhood revitalization. Preservationists are closely involved in these processes, but have struggled to advocate effectively for the historic built environment and for the people who live there. When asked to reflect on their involvement in Project C.O.R.E., preservationists clearly wished for a better process: Nicholas Redding, Executive Director of Preservation Maryland, spoke of the need to do a better job “rooting our work in the values and goals of the community.” Because of the frequent intersection of historic preservation and neighborhood revitalization, preservationists have a real opportunity to help build a better planning process that reflects the values of the modern, “people-centered” preservation movement. The three case studies suggest a number of best practices that could help improve future plans.

EARLIER INTERVENTION

Preservation cannot have a meaningful impact on planning if it only enters the conversation as the result of regulatory processes that mandate the involvement of consulting parties. For Project C.O.R.E., preservation was only involved on the back end and was conducted in a largely reactive way. Preservationists with the Maryland Historical Trust, Preservation Maryland, and Baltimore Heritage were brought into

204 Nicholas Redding, Interview - Preservation Maryland.
the planning conversation only after the project had already been announced, and then seemingly only in order to fulfill mandated consultation requirements. The planning processes analyzed for this study demonstrate that historic preservation cannot be an effective part of project planning if it enters the game so late. Preservationists need to propose viable solutions for the rehabilitation and reuse of vacant and blighted properties before the decision is made to tear them down en masse.

ASSET-ORIENTED APPROACH

The limited direct role for preservation in the planning of Project C.O.R.E. (as in the Sandtown NTI before it) and the low level of funding provided to offset the loss of historic structures reflect the fact that preservationists are still struggling to find relevance in the broader planning process. In contrast, the neighborhood revitalization underway in Oliver has focused much more extensively on the reuse of historic structures, despite the fact that the building stock was in no better condition than many of the neighborhoods now targeted for demolition under Project C.O.R.E.\(^{205}\)

The asset-oriented approach behind the Oliver effort helps explain why this project has been so much more successful in reusing and rehabilitating historic structures. By viewing older buildings, even those that are vacant and blighted, as having positive potential for the neighborhood’s future, the planners prioritized saving historic resources. In contrast, both the Sandtown-Winchester NTI and Project C.O.R.E. took a problem-oriented approach that positions these properties largely as barriers to progress. Preservationists are trained to view historic structures through

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\(^{205}\) Apple, Interview - Maryland Historical Trust.
this “asset-oriented” lens, and have argued successfully for a host of benefits provided by these resources, which act “as catalysts for economic growth that enhance real estate values and quality of life, contribute to state and local economies, influence the location of businesses, and encourage tourism.”206 Less successful so far have been efforts to apply these arguments to troubled historic neighborhoods and resources that are less clearly seen as “urban amenities.”207 By integrating recognized preservation values with the asset-oriented approach developed in community development practice, preservationists can argue for preserving physically disinvested neighborhoods and buildings as important assets in planning for redevelopment.

For preservationists to be able to convincingly make these arguments, we must be better able to provide data showing that the benefits we ascribe to historic structures bear out in measures of performance important to current revitalization efforts, such as sustainability.208 These types of data would help preservationists better argue that historic structures have a major role to play in sustainability planning efforts like the still-developing Green Network Plan, which is so closely connected to Project C.O.R.E.’s demolitions. This might also require strengthening preservationists’ real estate development training so that an understanding of markets and redevelopment potential are part of the profession’s core training.

208 Ryberg-Webster and Kinahan, 128.
BROADER ACTIVISM

Preservationists increasingly see a role for themselves in the planning and implementation of neighborhood revitalization efforts, but evidence from local planning processes shows that they have not yet convinced others they belong there. In order to do this, and to be better advocates for historic communities, they should show up for historic neighborhoods in ways that depart from traditional preservation advocacy.

This requires preservationists broadening their advocacy beyond preservation-specific measures like the federal historic tax credit or the Maryland Sustainable Communities Tax Credit. Preservation advocates must also strongly support other investments in older urban neighborhoods, where historic resources are concentrated. This includes advocacy such as fighting neighborhood school closures, which can destabilize communities, and promoting homeownership, affordable housing and transportation measures for residents of historically disinvested communities.209 These measures keep people in their neighborhoods and provide a stabilizing force by creating pathways to opportunity.210 These activities fall outside of traditionally measured preservation goals, but they serve to “reconnect concerns for the historic city to the broader community.”211

One key step towards increasing Baltimore residents’ access to opportunity lies in better transportation choices. Good transportation is essential for city residents

living in disinvested neighborhoods who seek higher quality jobs in growing suburban employment centers.\footnote{212} The planned Baltimore Red Line light rail was one such highly-anticipated project that would have provided better connections for “west Baltimore’s low income and largely African American population to thousands of employment opportunities” – the very neighborhoods impacted by Project C.O.R.E.\footnote{213} This critical project was cancelled by the Hogan administration in favor of increased funding for highways in suburban and rural areas. In response, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and ACLU of Maryland filed a federal civil rights complaint charging the state with racial discrimination against African Americans in their transportation funding decisions, and cited the precedent of the failed “highway to nowhere.”\footnote{214} To truly stabilize and protect historic neighborhoods, projects that promote access to opportunity for residents of historic neighborhoods must be promoted alongside traditional preservation activities.

The work being done in Oliver shows the many synergies between historic preservation and non-traditional goals like the protection of affordable housing. Preservationists will see more success in engaging the neighborhood revitalization process by demonstrating a more holistic commitment to issues faced by disinvested communities. If preservationists are to continue to move towards the “people-focused” practice recently embraced by the National Trust for Historic Preservation,

this must include support for the **people** who live in distressed historic neighborhoods.\(^{215}\) This entails support for neighborhood revitalization measures that go beyond property improvement and that address the full range of community needs.\(^{216}\)

This broader attention to issues of equity has gained ground at the city-wide level within the Baltimore City’s Department of Planning, which in 2015 formed an Equity in Planning Committee (EIPC) that will emphasize equity across the department’s programming and train staff to bring this focus to their planning and development work (Figure 14).\(^{217}\) The historic preservation planners at the Commission for Historical and Architectural Preservation (CHAP) have a seat at the table and an opportunity to help the committee make equitable development decisions that “address the systemic racial and economic injustices in Baltimore.”\(^{218}\)

Preservationists, trained to be attuned to meanings and inheritances from the past, can provide valuable insight in these discussions, when allowed space to do so. Neighborhood revitalization planning in particular can benefit from a preservation perspective: the past is very present as cities seek to confront the “legacy of social disruption and neglect” created by previous interventions.\(^{219}\)


BETTER DATA

The role for preservation in neighborhood revitalization is limited by the available information about the historic assets in impacted communities. In the rapidly-moving demolition review process, there is little opportunity for further data collection about the significance of targeted neighborhoods’ historic structures. Project C.O.R.E. attempted to craft demolition priorities with the input of neighborhood residents, collected through a public demolition meeting, but this was only a partial and late attempt to broadly incorporate community preferences into the decision-making process.
Preservationists can have a much greater influence on these decisions by entering the conversation armed with better data about neighborhood resources. This implies the need for a much more comprehensive survey and designation process on the part of the SHPO, one that particularly focuses on previously disinvested neighborhoods where concerns about architectural integrity may have limited such studies in the past. These traditional methods must be bolstered with democratized forms of data collection that go beyond categorization of architectural styles and aim to more holistically capture what neighborhood residents value and want to see preserved. TRF-DP is beginning to capture such information with the preservation preferences survey that they issued to Oliver residents. This process can be greatly expanded by the adoption of tools already modeled by other communities, such as the cultural mapping project underway in San Antonio, Texas (Figure 15).

Housed within the City’s Office of Historic Preservation, this effort asks residents to share their “San Antonio story,” and builds maps of “places of importance identified by the community through oral histories, mementos and memories.” These maps will be used as a tool to guide the city’s historic resource management and planning processes.

At the international level, UNESCO has incorporated this practice into their *Historic Urban Landscape Approach*, by calling for the use of “participatory planning and stakeholder consultations to decide on conservation aims and actions.” They highlight democratized data collection tools like the *Inherity* mobile app created by a Kenyan non-profit technology firm, with which “users can record, take a picture and locate on a map any tangible piece of cultural heritage they think is worthwhile.” UNESCO embraces these tools as a step towards more inclusive planning processes.

The survey and designation process as currently executed by formal preservation arms like the nationwide SHPO offices will have difficulty in adapting this more flexible approach. In a system that officially prioritizes “expert” knowledge, as laid out in the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for Professional Qualifications, there is as yet little space for other ways of knowing. Broadening this pool of knowledge is a critically needed shift for a profession that is still trying to

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222 UNESCO, 20.

diversify its practitioners and to shake off its elitist origins. For now, these types of practices may be best incorporated by the state’s advocacy organizations. A better understanding of local goals and values, and of the physical places that embody communities’ memories and identities, could power a more well-informed consultation process in which advocates have more tools at their disposal when arguing for a greater role for preservation.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Despite the limitations of the preservation bureaucracy, the SHPO must find ways to better incorporate real-world community values and preferences. MHT Compliance Officer, Amanda Apple, clearly expressed that the agency seeks to avoid being the stereotypical “big government” actor that comes into communities and tells residents what to do. Her reflections indicate that preservationists have absorbed the broader understanding of the planning profession that communities must have a say in their fate. Apple noted that MHT strongly prefers to “look for the guidance of the community,” but that the regulatory procedures around demolition site-selection offer limited opportunities to acquire it.224 While a demolition site-selection process may not be the place where MHT can best seek out “community guidance,” there are other avenues available. The statewide preservation plan is one tool that can be better utilized to inform preservation priorities. The current plan expires in 2018, and the process of crafting a new plan is in the beginning stages. The new plan provides an opportunity go beyond the type of “ritual” public engagement practices that often typify public sector planning and to reach new and broader audiences with questions.

224 Apple, Interview - Maryland Historical Trust.
about the role for preservation in their communities.\textsuperscript{225} Focusing on more participatory preservation processes can inject more community input into preservation planning, and thus into the larger planning process for neighborhood revitalization.

MEANINGFUL MITIGATION

By the time they are typically brought into neighborhood revitalization programs, the main option left to preservationists is to push for strong mitigation measures. In projects like C.O.R.E., the resulting preservation outcomes are often lackluster. Preservationists must advocate for mitigation options that actually matter to communities where adverse impacts will occur. For Project C.O.R.E., Preservation Maryland and Baltimore Heritage did this by calling for creative mitigation measures that would directly serve community needs, such as a staff position dedicated to connecting low-income homeowners and non-profits in impacted communities to preservation resources and financing. However, the final plan rejected the most creative strategies, those that would have directly addressed historic imbalances in access to the information and funds needed to engage in preservation and rehabilitation projects. The bulk of the approved mitigation measures, which focus on the documentation of structures to be demolished, do not provide clear public benefits to the communities impacted by demolition. Though architectural drawings and inventory forms have traditionally been considered to provide a public benefit by

\textsuperscript{225} de Souza Briggs, “Planning Together,” 4.
“increasing knowledge of and appreciation for the past,” these benefits largely only flow to professional preservationists.

The Advisory Council for Historic Preservation criticizes these types of measures in their 2016 *Policy Statement on Historic Preservation and Community Revitalization*, arguing that “standard mitigation techniques” such as documentation and data recovery offer “minimal” public benefit. In the case of Project C.O.R.E., mitigation measures are not necessarily even directed into impacted communities, running the risk that neighborhoods already suffering from abandonment and now experiencing widespread demolition will not see the benefits of mitigation spending. This has the dangerous potential to reinforce spatial inequalities. Because the consultation process is one of the few official forums for preservation advocates, they must maximize this opportunity to push for mitigation measures that advance preservation goals but that also make a real difference to communities historically neglected by preservationists.

Staff at the state historic preservation office may be less well-positioned to engage in this type of work than non-profit advocates and city preservationists. SHPOs are often constrained by their roles as state agencies and by the fact that the historic preservation officer is a gubernatorial appointee. State governments, particularly when led by conservative administrations, “tend to be strongly oriented towards economic growth, economic development, and progress.” This makes it

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228 Robert E. Stipe, “Where Do We Go From Here?,” 456–57.
difficult for the state’s official preservation body to take a strong stance against the state’s priority projects, even when they conflict with preservation objectives. Maryland’s preservation plan makes it clear that the state has delegated more progressive advocacy work to non-profit and private organizations, which “have more flexibility than agencies in taking public positions on preservation issues.” While these advocacy groups have more leeway to take strong stances, they do not have the formal mechanism through which to exercise this power that the SHPO does.

Public sector preservationists who seek to be better advocates within the limitations of the regulatory framework should look for guidance in the tradition of equity planning pioneered in the 1970s by Norman Krumholz in his work as Director of the Cleveland City Planning Commission. Krumholz and his staff rejected the “planner’s traditional posture as an apolitical technician,” and instead “consistently operated in a way that was activist and interventionist in style,” regardless of changing political leadership. Equity planning specifically seeks to address persistent spatial inequalities, a relevant role for public-sector preservationists who are brought, albeit indirectly, into neighborhood revitalization processes. Over the ten years in which Norman Krumholz served the Cleveland planning office and explicitly promoted an equity agenda, his staff rarely got everything they pushed for but they did win a significant number of concessions. For better or worse, the SHPO may be the only preservation organization with any formal influence in state-driven

229 Robert E. Stipe, 457.
232 Krumholz, 167–68.
neighborhood revitalization processes. They must recognize this position of power and use it to be better advocates.

The recommendations outlined above are not revolutionary suggestions for the preservation profession: they build upon shifts and changes that have been underway in the field for some time. However, the recent evidence provided by the flawed Project C.O.R.E. planning process show that they are still very necessary and have not yet been fully incorporated. For preservationists in Maryland, focusing on these specific shifts in practice will help foster planning projects that are more responsive to persistent spatial inequalities and that produce better outcomes for historic neighborhoods and their residents.
Appendix

Project C.O.R.E. Stakeholder Interview Questions
Questions for each interviewee were drawn from the list below.

When and how did your organization become involved in Project C.O.R.E.?

Do you consider Project C.O.R.E. to be a neighborhood revitalization program? What sort of outcomes does the project hope to achieve?

How did you frame your arguments for the role that historic preservation should play in the project?

Describe your involvement in the development of the preservation mitigation measures described in the Programmatic Agreement. How is the 10% for preservation broken down?

Are you satisfied with the final Programmatic Agreement? Does it give sufficient weight to preservation?

Please describe the different phases of the project. (Phase I: Demolition and Phase II: Revitalization Through Redevelopment) Are they happening concurrently or sequentially? How is the program’s funding broken down between these elements?

What plans exist for use of the properties after the vacant buildings are cleared?

What is the relationship between Project C.O.R.E. and other citywide planning & preservation strategies (especially the Green Network Plan)?

What is the role for your organization as the project is implemented?

How does DHCD evaluate the project as it progresses?

Have you been involved in efforts to engage residents impacted by the project? What public participation elements have been involved? In what ways can residents contribute to the decision-making process?
Does Project C.O.R.E. support human and/or community development measures like expanded neighborhood services or workforce development?

What preservation successes do you anticipate coming from this project? How effective do you believe it will be in achieving broader neighborhood revitalization goals?

Given the city’s history of urban renewal and similar projects that have had lasting consequences for historically disempowered populations in the city, was there any deliberate attempt to approach this differently than past interventions?

Have you given any thought to how your organization might approach a similar project in the future?
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