ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS

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A state’s foreign policy is directed toward a variety of external actors. Most understanding of foreign policy behavior, however, is derived from observations of states interacting with other states. This study examines how foreign policy decision-making during crisis differs when it is directed toward violent non-state actors. A crisis is defined as an event in which a state perceives a threat to one or more of its basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response, and a heightened probability of engaging in military hostilities. Violent non-state actors are those non-state groups that pursue their political goals through the use of or threat to use violence. Additionally, the non-state actors of interest are those that threaten an external state’s national interests in such a way that it represents a crisis for that country, necessitating some form of foreign policy response.

This study argues that because non-state actors lack many of the structural characteristics associated with a state, such as a recognized foreign ministry or the lack
of trust states have in a non-state leader’s ability to enforce agreements, states respond to these crises more violently than they do when responding to crises triggered by states. International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data confirms that the major response by states toward crises triggered by violent non-state actors are more violent than responses to crises triggered by states. Empirical results also show that non-state groups with more pronounced political and military structures are less likely to be responded to violently. Other factors, such as the nature of the value threatened and type of violence used to trigger the crisis, do not have a significant impact on how states respond.

This study argues that a set of international norms have emerged that help mitigate the level of violence between states and that these norms do not apply as strongly to these violent non-state groups. However, non-state groups that are able to establish institutional structures similar to those of states are more likely to lessen the level of violence directed toward them.
FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING AND VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables iv

List of Figures v

Chapter 1: Introduction: A Different Threat 1
  Violent Non-State Actors in Historical Context 4
  Non-State Actors in Today’s International System 9
  Challenges to Sovereignty 11
  Non-State Power 15
  State versus Non-State 22
  The Impact of Violent Non-State Actors 27
  Beyond Intervention 34
  Foreign Policy Decision-Making during Crisis 39
  Obstacles and Challenges 42
  Outline and Structure of Dissertation 45

Chapter 2: State Decision-Making and Crisis Bargaining with Violent Non-State Actors 50
  Foreign Policy Decision-Making 51
  Action-Reaction and Sequential Games in Foreign Policy Decision-Making 55
  Sequential Decision-Making and Crisis Bargaining Between States and Non-States 59
  Values and Threats 71
  Conclusion 75

Chapter 3: Violent Non-State Actors 77
  Defining Violent Non-State Actors 83
    Revolutionary/Ideological Movements 88
    Ethnopolitical/Identity Movements 90
    Fundamentalist/Religious Movements 93
  Violent Tactics 99
    Guerrilla Tactics 102
    Terrorist Tactics 105
  Conclusion 111

Chapter 4: Data, Hypotheses and Methodology 112
  Case Selection 114
  Classification of Violent Non-State Groups and Tactics 119
  Hypotheses 124
  Methods and Variables 133
    Dependent Variables 134
Independent Variables

Chapter 5: State Responses to Non-State Actors during Foreign Policy Crises

Violence and State Responses to Non-State Actors

Why Violence?

States, Non-States and Values Threatened

International Organization Involvement

Violent Responses and Actor Type and Tactic

Conclusion

Chapter 6: Foreign Policy and Violent Non-State Actors in a Transnational World

Bibliography
LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1. United States and Soviet Crisis Involvement, 1945-1981 81
Table 4.1. Countries Experiencing Foreign Policy Crises 115
Table 4.2. Violent Non-State Groups 121
Table 4.3. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Violent Non-State Actor Tactic 130
Table 4.4. Violent Non-State Actor and Gravity of Value Threatened 132
Table 4.5. Value Non-State Actor and Issue Crisis 133
Table 4.6. List of Cases 140
Table 5.1. Frequencies of Crises Triggered and Major Response 142
Table 5.2. Frequencies of Crises Triggered and Principal Technique 143
Table 5.3. Major Response by Crisis Actor 144
Table 5.4. Primary Management Technique by Crisis Actor 145
Table 5.5. Major Response to Crisis Trigger and Triggering Entity 146
Table 5.6. Major Response to Crisis Trigger (More Powerful State) 147
Table 5.7. Principal Crisis Management Technique and Triggering Entity 148
Table 5.8. Principal Crisis Management Technique (More Powerful State) 148
Table 5.9. Content of Crisis Outcome and Triggering Entity 150
Table 5.10. Major Response to Crisis and Content of Crisis Outcome 151
Table 5.11. Extent of Satisfaction about Outcome and Triggering Entity 151
Table 5.12. Gravity of Value Threatened and Triggering Entity 154
Table 5.13. Gravity of Value Threatened and Major Response 155
Table 5.14. Gravity of Value Threatened from State and Major Response 156
Table 5.15. Gravity of Value Threatened from Violent State and Major Response 157
Table 5.16. Gravity of Value Threatened from Violent State and Major Response from Stronger Crisis Actor 158
Table 5.17. Crisis Trigger and Content of Global Organization Involvement 160
Table 5.18. Crisis Trigger and Content of Global Organization Involvement 161
Table 5.19. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Major Response 162
Table 5.20. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Principal Technique 163
Table 5.21. Violent Non-State Actor Tactic and Major Response 164
Table 5.22. Group/Tactic and Major Response by Crisis Actor 165
Table 5.23. Violent Non-State Actor Tactic and Violence Associated 166
Table 5.24. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Violence Associated 166
Table 5.25. Violent Non-State Actor Tactic and Global Organization 167
Table 5.26. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Global Organization 168
Table 5.27. Breakdown of Global Organization Activity 169
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1. State-State Interactions 10
Figure 1.2. State/Non-State Interaction 11
Figure 2.1. International Interaction Decision Tree 61
Figure 2.2. Crisis Subgame Decision Tree 62
Figure 4.1. Violent Non-State Actor Triggered Crises Per Decade 116
Chapter 1

Introduction: A Different Threat

When hijacked airplanes slammed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11th, 2001 there was a prevailing sense that the world was facing an entirely new challenge. Instead of threats emanating from “rogue” states or a competing superpower, the world now turned its attention toward non-state actors seeking to advance their political agendas through violent means. This type of threat, however, is not new. From pirates on the Barbary Coast to groups such as al-Qaeda today, violent non-state actors have always posed serious obstacles to the interests of states. However, in a shrinking and increasingly interdependent world with greater access to lethal weaponry and advanced communications technologies, these groups present an ever more complex challenge to contemporary foreign policy decision-makers. How policymakers assess these threats and subsequently formulate policy toward these groups constitutes an essential part of our understanding of how such decisions are made in a transnational era.

This study examines the threats violent non-state actors pose to states and how states respond to these groups. While sharing some characteristics, violent non-state actors are fundamentally different from states and, therefore, pose a challenge for international relations scholarship. The scope of this work is bounded substantively and conceptually in that it focuses specifically on those cases in which a state actor
experiences a foreign policy crisis from the actions of a non-state actor. This
dissertation asks whether foreign policy responses to crises triggered by such groups
mirror or differ from those that are made toward states that pose similar threats. Either
outcome presents an interesting puzzle. If policy outcomes are similar, then why is it
that states develop similar responses to non-similar units? If the policies are different,
then how are they different and how does the structure of these asymmetric
relationships determine those differences?

The study of international relations has devoted most of its attention to the
behavior of states acting within a constrictive international system. The state, which is
generally understood to hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence
(Weber 1964: 154), has been the primary arbiter of how change occurs within that
system (Carnoy 1984; Jessop 1990; Poggi 1990). It is considered the principal unit of
analysis in international relations theory and, as a result, most theorizing has been
directed toward state-state interactions (see Waltz 1979; Keohane 1986; Wendt 1999).
While a state-centric research agenda has produced key insights into the power
relations and mechanisms that exist between states, it tends to ignore another level of
interactions that takes place between states and non-state actors.

Non-state actors, both violent and non-violent, have proliferated throughout the
globe and their impact can be seen on numerous levels. In fact, one could argue that
two of the most significant historical markers of the last fifteen years—the fall of

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1 A foreign policy crisis is defined by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000: 3) as “a threat to
one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the
value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities.” A
trigger is the “catalyst to a foreign policy crisis” (pg. 9).
Eastern Bloc Communism and September 11th—were the result of the actions of non-state actors, both violent and peaceful (see Evangelista 1999). However, the wider impact that these groups have on the international system has not been widely discussed. This criticism of international relations theory is not new and there is a growing literature on the role that non-state actors play in affecting state behavior. This work, however, has been mostly concerned with issues pertaining to the field of international political economy, focusing on multinational corporations, transnational advocacy networks, international regimes, and knowledge networks and focus less on the international impact of violent groups (see Keohane and Nye 1971; Rosenau 1990; Haas 1992; Risse-Kappen 1995; Conca 1996; Smith et al. 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Florini 2000; O’Neill, Balsiger and VanDeveer 2004).

Violent non-state actors are understood here as organized groups, not formally affiliated with any internationally recognized government, which seek to obtain their political goals through violent means. They can be motivated by ethnic, ideological, religious, or economic goals and include a wide range of groups with varying objectives, from those seeking to overthrow the government of an existing state to those hoping to gain greater regional autonomy. While non-state actors with purely economic motivations, such as transnational criminal organizations, are not included in this analysis, many groups with strong political, ethnic, or religious motivations include an economic component as well. Groups such as the FARC and United Defense Forces of Colombia, for example, have both relied heavily on drug sales to fund their political activities—and enrich their members’ own personal coffers (Manwaring 2002; Kirk 2003). Because this dissertation is ultimately concerned with
foreign policy decision-making, in contrast to domestic policy concerned with internal security threats, an additional component of the definition for violent non-state actors is that they are based outside of a state’s borders and are not indigenous threats to the state in question.

This research looks at three aspects of the interactions that take place between states and violent non-state actors, specifically during foreign policy crises. First, it explores the specific ways in which a violent non-state group threatens the interests and values of a state and how the nature of the threat impacts the frame through which decision-makers formulate a response. Second, it examines how the interactions states have with these groups differ from the types of interactions that take place between states. Third, it looks at the dynamics of the interactions that take place between states and specific categories of violent non-state actors.

This research will add additional insight into how these groups fit into our broader theoretical understanding of the international system as well as how their activities affect the specific behavior of states operating within that system. With a better knowledge of those dynamics, practitioners may be able to formulate better policies for responding to the challenges presented by such groups.

Violent Non-State Actors in Historical Context

Historically violent non-state actors have time and again played a prominent role in states’ foreign policies. These non-state actors can be classified into two types of groups: first, those that are formally sanctioned by the state and used by the state to project and expand its power, and, second, those that oppose the state (or the elites who
are working to control the state) and compete against its efforts to centralize and consolidate power.

At the outset of the Westphalian state system—before states had fully centralized and consolidated their capabilities to project power abroad—the activities of such non-state actors as privateers and mercantile companies were openly sanctioned by the state. States used these non-state actors to pursue their political and economic goals, and, in turn, privateers and mercantilists used the acquiescence of these weak states to legitimatize their own activities. From the thirteenth century until the war of 1812, privateers—ships that are privately owned but sailing under a commission of war from a state—played central roles in the outcome of numerous conflicts, including the American revolutionary war in which the Colony’s Continental Navy of sixty-four ships was supplemented by over 1,600 privateer ships.\(^2\) In addition, mercantile companies, such as the English East India Company, the Dutch East India Company, and the Hudson Bay Company, were authorized by states to carry out many of the duties normally associated with the modern state. The charter of the Dutch East India Company, for example, granted it the authority “to make war, conclude treaties, acquire territories and build fortresses” (quoted in Thomson 1994: 10-11). Of course not all non-state actors were sanctioned by the state. Pirates persistently contested states’ economic and political goals, and, as Sir Walter Raleigh eventually discovered,

\(^2\) See <www.usmm.org/revolution.html> for additional information about the role of privateers during the Revolutionary war.
previously sanctioned non-state actors could later become enemies when they grew too ambitious or political alignments changed (Irwin 1998; Thomson 1994).

However, states’ reliance on non-state actors as a means to pursue their political and economic goals fostered a number of unintended consequences, such as privateers morphing into organized piracy, mercenaries dragging their home states into unwanted wars, and mercantile companies battling other mercantile companies or even their state sponsors (Thomson 1994: 43). This chaos, brought about by both the state’s inability to assert control over these actors and their lack of resources to project sufficient forces of their own, led to an eventual transition in the international system. Recognizing the perils of such a chaotic international order, the state began to assert control over various forms of non-state violence. Although this shift came about slowly, states in the end found that in order to stop the activities of non-sanctioned violent non-state actors, sanctioned activities also needed to be eliminated. Because it was difficult to distinguish who were legitimate privateers and who were pirates, piracy was not effectively dealt with until states stopped employing privateers. Various agreements and laws of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such as the Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800, the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and the U.S. Neutrality Act of 1794 led to the eventual delegitimization of these practices (Thomson 1994: 69-106).

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3 Piracy is defined by international law as consisting of “acts of violence done upon the ocean or unappropriated lands, or within the territory of a state through descent from the sea, by a body of men acting independently of any politically organized society” (Hall 1924: 314 [quoted in Thomson 1994: 22]).
Accordingly, once state-sponsored privateering was abolished, all non-state violence on the high seas became criminal acts, which states, and a state-controlled military, could more effectively confront. A similar evolution occurred as well in the transition from mercenary armies to state-controlled standing armies (Thomson 1994). Eventually this led to a greater centralization and consolidation of the state, giving it improved means to both coerce and to enforce the rule of law.

Despite these changes, other non-state groups have continued to play an important role in international politics. Ironically, the same centralization and consolidation that led to the demise of one group of violent non-state actors also led to the creation of a new type of contender. The centralization of the state throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries helped shift challengers away from localized concerns to national issues as the state’s growing dominance threatened local power dynamics, igniting numerous cases of social unrest and rebellion (see Tilly 1990; Zagorin 1982; Anderson 1979). No longer did a feudal system serve to limit an individual’s concerns to local issues. With greater state control, along with advances in communications, people became more aware of not just national issues but international issues as well. As a result, growing numbers of contentious groups from a variety of sectors of society began to emerge with a much broader scope and impact (see McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).

This new dynamic resulted in the development of groups whose goals and actions extended beyond the traditional confines of the state and could challenge the national interest of other states within the international system. Throughout the past century, revolutionary, ethnopolitical, and fundamentalist groups have not just
threatened those states within whose borders they operate, but have also presented an existential threat by directly challenging the interests of external state-actors. The conflicts that emerge from issues related to these three types of political groups are what Goldstein (2004: 198-210) refers to as “conflicts of ideas” — meaning that instead of conflict being rooted in more tangible items such as territory or resources, it instead grows out of groups’ pursuit of more abstract political ideals and their own interpretations of the self and others. This is not to say, however, that issues such as territory and the control of resources do not play a role in what drives these conflicts. However, these explanations are not exclusive and a settlement over territorial or resource differences does not necessarily result in an abatement of the conflict.

Historical examples abound of states being affected by the activities and threats posed by these non-state groups. For instance, the Chinese Boxer Rebellion of 1900, in which Chinese peasants rose up against the foreign presence in their country, affected German, American and British interests (See Cohen 1997; Boot 2002). Many similar conflicts arose throughout the early and mid-twentieth century as well, as local independence movements challenged the legitimacy of colonial governments. Additionally, throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union often used violent non-state groups to forward their own political and economic agendas and to indirectly threaten the interests of their rival (Thompson 1966; Katz 1990; Hahn and Heiss 2001). More recently, the effects of such groups have been seen in such diverse places as Colombia, Somalia, Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia, to name just a few.
Non-State Actors in Today’s International System

The international system is generally understood as a set of well defined and well-established “rules of the game” that determine what a state is and how states interact with each other. The system is anarchic, meaning that there is no centralized government to enforce rules. Thus the power of one state is countered by the power of another and each state must rely on self-help in order to survive (Waltz 1979). Realist international relations theory describes the international system as a structure defined by the observable attributes of its member states. Consequently, this structure constrains the choices of state actors (see Waltz 1979; Keohane 1986; James 2002). However, others have argued that humans and their organizations are purposeful actors that, through their actions, can shape and transform the society within which they live. Thus, the structure of the system and the agency of the actors are dependent on each other (Wendt 1987: 338; see also Onuf 1989; Wendt 1999; and Adler 1998).

Regardless of one’s theoretical outlook, however, the role of the state in international relations theory remains dominant. It assumes that only the state is powerful enough to have a salient effect on the structure of the international system and therefore is the unit of analysis about which we need to be most theoretically concerned. However, the preponderance of activity by violent non-state actors causes enough disruption within the system to affect the interests of state actors and thus alter the interactions that take place in the system. Walt (1996) has demonstrated that recently successful revolutionary movements have had such an effect. This research asks whether such movements can have similar effects without their first having to overthrow an existing state. To do this, one must step away from theories that only
take into account states and apply other methods for understanding the international system and the variety of actors operating within it.

Traditionally international relations theory and foreign policy analysis has focused solely on state versus state interactions and the policies made toward other states (see Figure 1.1).

**Figure 1.1. State-State Interactions**

![Diagram of State-State Interactions](image)

However, state behavior often appears more similar to what is diagramed in Figure 1.2, where C represents a violent non-state actor operating in state B. Here states obviously do continue to interact with each other; but, they also interact with non-state groups, while those groups interact with the states in the international system as well as with the governments which are the recognized rulers of the territories within which they exist. This multi-level of interactions creates a more complicated picture of the global system. The role of these groups cannot be properly understood if our theories do not recognize their capabilities and larger role within the system.
Figure 1.2. State/Non-State Interactions

The inclusion of violent non-state actors into the model complicates a number of basic assumptions of international relations theory, including concepts of sovereignty and power. The activities of these groups not only weaken the sovereignty of the nation within which they reside (in that they challenge that state’s internal authority), but also create a dilemma in terms of what a state’s appropriate response should be to a violent non-state actor operating within the borders of another state. Any decision on how to respond to these groups includes a parallel decision regarding the sovereign rights of another state. In addition, the large power disparities that exist between states and non-states indicate that traditional conceptions of power need to be adjusted in order to understand the dynamics of these interactions.

Challenges to Sovereignty

The role of violent non-state actors in the international system and how states respond to them is linked to the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is generally regarded as the principle enabling concept of international relations whereby states are able to assert authority within a distinct territorial boundary and claim membership within the international community. It therefore implies that a sovereign has autonomy
in its foreign policy and has exclusive control over its internal affairs (Evans 1998: 504). Alan James defines sovereignty as the “constitutional independence” of other states, meaning that a “state’s constitution is not part of a larger constitutional arrangement” (James 1986: 25). Jackson (1987) describes sovereignty as a legal order and an activity constituted and regulated by rules. These consist of constitutive rules and instrumental rules. Constitutive rules define the “game,” such as the legal equality of states, mutual recognition, the principal of non-intervention, making and honoring treaties, and diplomacy. Instrumental rules are the maxims derived from experience that contribute to “winning” play, such as the conduct of foreign policy (Jackson 1987: 522). Violent non-state actors challenge the sovereignty of states in two ways: first, by challenging a state’s ability to enforce rules; and, second, by working to overthrow an existing sovereign in order to become a sovereign itself.

According to traditional notions of sovereignty, a sovereign state has certain rights, capacities, and obligations, including: the right to its territorial integrity; the right to use necessary and proportionate force in individual or collective security; the right to govern its population; eligibility to become a member and full participant in international bodies such as the United Nations; the capacity to own, purchase, and transfer property, to enter into contracts, and to be subject to legal remedies; the capacity to join with other states to make international and transnational law through international treaties, agreements, and conduct; the duty to respect territorial integrity, political independence, and rights of other sovereign nations, and the duty to abide by international norms of conduct agreed to by treaty or considered universal and part of customary law (Heller and Sofaer 2001: 26-27). Sovereign states, therefore, are
autonomous actors and can be seen as analogous to the individual in liberal political theory. While some of the rights, capacities, and obligations of a sovereign state may apply to entities other than states, many of these capacities are exclusive to sovereign states, such as the right to membership in the United Nations. Furthermore, only states are fully connected to all these rights, capacities, and obligations.

The origin of the concept of sovereignty is closely related to the evolution of the state and the development of centralized authority and political control. Stateless societies lack this central symbol or instrument of rule. In a stateless society the political system is based on lineage or on tribal institutions and all political activity takes place within that context. Even when the central authority of a state is weak, as is found in primitive states or quasi-states (Jackson 1987), it still represents a fundamentally different form of rule than what is found in a stateless society (Hinsley 1966: 7-9). In many instances, violent non-state actors represent an effort to decentralize the state in order to create a political system more similar to a stateless society. Such a system may appear desirous, especially if the current political system threatens the rights and interests of minority groups.

Camilleri and Falk (1992) argue that part of the ambiguity surrounding the concept of state sovereignty has to do with the complex relationship between the concepts of power and authority. Authority, according to Rees (1950) can be divided into three types: moral, customary, and coercive. Moral authority exists when rules are obeyed because they accord with one’s conscience. Customary authority exists when rules—or social norms, customs, or conventions—are obeyed for fear of incurring the disapproval of another person or persons. Coercive authority exists when laws are
backed by force. These three forms of authority can overlap in practice; however, what distinguishes a state from other institutions is its capability for coercive authority or supreme coercive power (Camilleri and Falk 1992: 17). According to Boli (2001), the most important aspect of sovereignty is authority. Claims of authority do not extend beyond the state, and within the state, while there may be competing groups capable of exercising limited authority; the sovereign state possesses ultimate authority (Boli 2001: 58).

However, Rosenau (1990) argues that our analytical use of the term sovereignty needs to be adjusted to fit the structures of today’s global system. First, an actor’s effectiveness in the global system is not determined by the sovereignty they possess nor the legal privileges accorded them, but instead is a relational phenomenon connected to the authority they can command and the compliance they can elicit from others. Second, the possession of sovereignty does not necessarily guarantee freedom of movement and it can, in fact, constrain a state’s actions and effectiveness due to the responsibilities and obligations that it imposes. On the other hand, non-sovereign entities may be freer to exercise their authority. Thus, Rosenau distinguishes between “sovereignty-bound” and “sovereignty-free” actors. By understanding the limitations and opportunities that are associated with sovereignty we can move past a theoretical perspective that concedes too much explanation to state actors and incorporates non-state entities (Rosenau 1990: 40-42).
Non-State Power

Challenges to traditional state sovereignty exist at numerous levels. Liberal interdependence theorists, for example, argue that economic interdependence, global-scale technologies, and democratic politics are eroding the sovereignty of the state. Because of these emerging factors states are less able to control their borders and therefore non-state or sub-state actors are more able to control elements that have traditionally been under the domain of the state (Keohane and Nye 1977). These challenges are what might be commonly referred to as “soft” power challenges (Nye 1990). A second challenge to state sovereignty is the role of non-state actors who have the ability to challenge a state’s coercive authority, or “hard” power challenges. These groups, some of which were deliberately left out when post-colonial boundaries were drawn, often possess political structures, the means to use force, and control over a significant amount of territory. In fact, these groups can possess many of the characteristics of a state, albeit a weak one. Because post-colonial claims to sovereignty rested more on normative arguments than empirical (Jackson 1990), the leaders of these movements are often able to couch their claims for independence on the same logic that the leaders of the state from which they wish to secede once used to gain their own independence.

Non-state actors have used both soft power and hard power to pursue their political goals. The distinction between hard and soft power is a matter of degrees, with hard power being generally understood as the ability to change what others do and soft power being the ability to shape what others want. Thus, soft power relies on persuasion, cultural dominance, and ideology, while hard power relies more on the use
and threatened use of force (Nye 1990: 181, fn. 11). Groups that have utilized soft power without threatening violence do not generally provoke a military response. Groups such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and the International Campaign to Ban Land-mines have all used various elements of soft power to pursue their political agendas. In addition, the peaceful political uprisings in Eastern Europe that helped lead to the break-up of the Soviet bloc incorporated all the elements associated with soft power. However, there are also plenty of examples of non-state actors using hard power against states. Groups such as al-Qaeda, the Rwanda Patriotic Front, and the Mujahuddin all have challenged states with, sometimes, brutal force.

The relationship between state and non-state actors is highlighted by the large power differentials between the two sides. A group or state’s ability to act is partially determined by the constraints imposed by the system in which it operates. Actors with less power, it is assumed, will have fewer options for action against more powerful rivals. These constraints, however, do not mean that the smaller power is without options. Violent non-state actors are characterized by their lack of traditional power; therefore, they have different strategies for challenging the status quo. The options and strategies available to them are different from state powers. Therefore, we should ask: given the limited strategic options available to violent non-state actors, do states respond differently to these groups than they do to state challengers and if so, how? This can be at least partially answered by taking a closer look at the concept of power and how it relates to these groups.

From a traditional realist perspective, power constitutes a central concept for understanding state behavior. Because an increase in power capabilities generally
leads to increased options for influencing others, states seek to gain power (Waltz 1979). Asymmetric relations in which the smaller state-power is successful against a more powerful opponent appear to run counter to our understanding of power and state influence. Assumptions about power and power resources generally predict that the more powerful an actor, the more likely that actor will emerge victorious in a conflict, often leading us to ignore the role that lesser powers play in the international system. If power reflects capabilities, then more powerful actors should always be capable of prevailing. How to conceptualize power has always been problematic with national power generally being defined as the “the total capabilities of a state to gain desired ends vis-à-vis other states” (Sprout 1951: 40). In order to understand the interactions between states and violent non-state actors what is meant by state power capabilities, as well as the power capabilities of these non-state actors, needs to be further conceptualized. This is problematic as these groups, while possessing many similarities to states, are also fundamentally different.

The nature of international politics is such that the status quo is constantly being challenged by those seeking to change the distribution of power and resources. These challengers often emerge from less powerful actors dissatisfied with their position vis-à-vis larger states—and while these attempts to change the status quo may not always be successful, they have a noticeable impact and demonstrate the importance of lesser powers within that system (see Morrow 1991).

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4 For an overview of the development of power analysis in international relations theory see Baldwin (1979).
Because small power success in international conflict runs counter to the assumptions of international relations theory, a number of scholars have tried to identify why, in certain cases, small powers are able to defeat larger powers (see Arreguín-Toft 2001; Paul 1994; Fischerkeller 1998; Gambari 1975 and 1989; and Mack 1975). Gambari (1975 and 1989), for example, argues that power is derived through these states’ ability to manipulate the international governing system to their advantage. Mack (1975), on the other hand, argues that because stronger powers are more secure, and therefore less likely to have their survival at stake, they will be less interested in winning. A small power, however, will have a high interest in winning because only victory guarantees its survival (see also Snyder and Diesing 1977). Others argue that the strategies adopted by either side during a conflict are a strong predictor of whether a conflict’s outcome will favor the larger or smaller power (Avant 1993; Arreguín-Toft 2001).

Understanding the relevance of the power violent non-state actors possess and how policymakers conceptualize that power is an important first step for understanding the policies directed toward them. Up to this point, most discussion on asymmetric power has been focused on small state powers—even less has been written about the power capabilities of sub-state groups in the international context. Recent research has examined the power of ethnic groups and their capabilities for influencing their own country’s foreign policy (see Moore 2002; Saideman 2002b). However, these efforts have tended to address questions of linkage politics (Wilkenfeld 1973; Rosenau 1969) and two-level games (Putnam 1988) rather than the power of these groups in relation to the international system as a whole.
Mingst (1995) also looks at “linkage actors” (individuals, government representatives, and non-state actors who work across national boundaries to influence public policies) and begins to map out how non-state actors specifically are playing a more influential role in the international system. She identifies four strategies they utilize to influence government policy: the power approach, the technocratic approach, coalition building, and grassroots mobilization. The power approach entails making diplomatic contact at the highest level in an effort to influence the decision-making process. For example, a non-state actor may appeal to a state on moral or humanitarian grounds or it may try to pressure a state by threatening violent reprisals if it doesn’t comply. The technocratic approach involves the linkage actor’s specialized knowledge to influence the decision-making process or the legal system. Coalition building brings together many different linkage actors and their resources in order to create a stronger and more effective mechanism for influencing state policy. Al-Qaeda’s success, it could be argued, was in a large part due to its ability to create a coalition between a collection of similar Islamist organizations throughout the world. Finally, grassroots mobilization entails building widespread public involvement in a cause. While some have argued that many violent non-state groups resort to violence because they are unsuccessful at creating such grassroots support (see Lichbach 1995: 59), grassroots mobilization is often a major part of many of these groups’ activities.

In many ways several non-state groups share many similar characteristics with states, allowing them to exist almost as quasi-states. Many, for example, possess political and diplomatic components, have significant quantities of arms, have an organized military structure, and/or control territory.
Even with these similarities there remain serious difficulties with equating the power of violent non-state actors with the power of states, especially when considering the way state power has traditionally been conceptualized and measured. For example, Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972), look at indicators that measure industrial capacity (measured by figures for energy consumption), military capacity (measured by military spending and the number of soldiers), and demographics (measured by the total population and the number of inhabitants in cities of twenty thousand and more). Applying such indicators to violent non-state actors is clearly problematic. These groups normally lack industrial capabilities, their war-fighting tactics include methods different from those traditionally employed by regular state armed forces, and demographics are often irrelevant to the political causes being pursued by many of these groups or to their effectiveness at threatening the interests of a state. These problems are not exclusive to Singer, Bremer and Stuckey—most efforts to measure power rely on indicators that are not easily applied when considering violent non-state actors (see also Sprout 1951; Organski and Kugler 1980; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).

To understand these groups’ role, therefore, we need to use a different conceptualization for what we mean by power, especially one that considers how smaller actors are able to maximize their own limited power capabilities to their own advantage.⁵ This requires us to understand both the context of these relationships as

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⁵ Bachrach and Baratz (1963) explain how power, influence, force and authority differ from each other in important ways. According to Bachrach and Baratz, power is a relationship in which two or more parties have a conflict of interests or values that leads party A to threaten sanctions against party B if party B does not conform to A’s
well as the choice options available to each side. Many analytical frameworks examine both the attributes of the actors as well as the “environmental” constraints that help determine the available options (see Sprout and Sprout 1957; Singer 1969; Rosenau 1966; Starr 1978). Guzzini (1993) also separates the concept of power, which he identifies as the context-based decision-making processes of each actor, from the concept of governance, which he characterizes as the structural characteristics of the system that restrict and shape each actor’s ability to bargain and to act. While structural factors in part shape the manner in which the interactions between states and non-state actors are able to take place, understanding the full extent of these factors on these interactions is methodologically difficult. However, there are some aspects of structural power that will be useful for our analysis. For example, some violent non-wishes. Party B’s desire to comply is a function of B’s understanding of the threat and the deprivation that would result being more damaging than not complying. Force is the actual application of the threatened sanctions. However, if the application of force does not result in the target group changing its behavior, then no power relationship is established. Bachrach and Baratz argue that influence is different from power and force in that B acts in accord with A’s wishes not because A compels B to do so through sanctions or through the threat of sanctions, but because B agrees with A’s objectives or because A is able to offer rewards that are valued enough by B to warrant compliance. Authority exists when one party, B, sees A’s command as reasonable and B’s set of values permits A to command B to perform certain acts.

6 Structural power has been characterized in three ways: indirect institutional power, non-intentional power, and impersonal empowering. Indirect institutional power, or metapower, is control over outcomes not via direct confrontation but by changing the setting in which the confrontation occurs (see Krasner 1982). Nonintentional power refers to an action’s unintended (and sometimes unconscious) effects (see Strange 1985). Impersonal power is described two ways; first, as a positional concept in which the “impersonal bias of international relations” gives advantage to certain actors due to their specific roles and positions in the international system (see Caporaso 1978); and, second, as a concept that links knowledge and power and argues that power requires prior “intersubjective recognition” (see Ashley 1978).
state actors hold a privileged status in international or regional bodies, such as the
PLO’s non-member status at the United Nations. And throughout the Cold War, both
superpowers were able to give legitimacy to various violent non-state groups by
labeling them “national liberation movements” or “freedom fighters” and supplying
them with the equipment necessary to pursue their goals. These levels of
legitimization give them advantages in bargaining and negotiation not available to
other, less integrated, violent non-state actors.

This study, therefore, understands power as those factors that enable an
individual or group to threaten sanctions against another that sufficiently threaten an
opponent’s value system. Thus the factors that a challenger can utilize to assert power
relations will depend on what the threatened group values and the abilities of the
challenger to jeopardize the continued or future fulfillment of those values (Ferris
1973). It is for this reason that violent non-state actors are able to have a significant
effect on the international system, and why foreign policy decision-makers spend a
significant amount of their time worrying about these groups.

State versus Non-State

How to effectively deal with challenges from violent non-state actors remains a
central issue among foreign policy decision-makers (see Klare and Kornbluh 1988;
Peters 1994; Bunker 2003). As the frequency of interstate conflict recedes and
intrastate and extra-state conflict becomes more salient (see Sarkees, Wayman, and
Singer 2003; Byman and Van Evera 1998; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1996; van
Creveld 1991), the goals, motivations, and tactics of these groups; their external
effects; and how states respond to these actors need to become a more integral part of our understanding of international political relations.

Since September 11, 2001 violent non-state actors have received increased media and academic attention. The general popular consensus seems to be that the events of that day mark a new era in global security. However, it is not entirely clear that these groups have not always had at least some impact on states’ foreign policies. It is plausible to argue that the magnitude of the attack was simply a historical anomaly and that the overall tangible role of these groups in the international system has not dramatically changed. Under such assumptions, September 11 would reflect neither a systemic shift nor the beginning of a new long-term trend in these relations. In order to make a judgment regarding the impact of these groups post-September 11, a framework should first be created for understanding their role—and how states have responded—prior to September 11. Once this framework is developed the impact of September 11 and post September 11 foreign policy can be better evaluated.

There are a number of reasons to believe that this is an important course of study. First, as already discussed, conflicts involving violent non-state groups have been a consistent feature of international politics. There are numerous cases in which the actions of these groups have triggered a foreign policy crisis for a state. Since World War II, for example, we have seen communist insurgents in Greece trigger a

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7 There is evidence from tapes released following the September 11 attacks that Osama bin Laden was surprised at how much damage the planes caused and, in fact, did not expect the World Trade Center towers to collapse on themselves. However, other evidence indicates that al-Qaeda operative, Ramzi Yousef, had been exploring (at times somewhat naively) ways in which to knock down the towers.
crisis for the United Kingdom, the Viet Cong challenge American interests in Southeast Asia, the Polisario Front engage Morocco, and the Mujahuddin successfully fend off the Soviets in Afghanistan, to name just a few. Thus, the activities of al-Qaeda are seen here as another case in a long list of violent non-state action and not necessarily a new phenomenon (although the magnitude of their activities in comparison to other violent groups may be larger).

This assertion is backed by event data. According to the Armed Conflict Dataset, between 1946 and 2001 there were 462 event years of internationalized internal conflict—internal conflicts that include the intervention of an outside power; outnumbering the number of interstate conflicts, 397, which took place during the same time period. And the International Crisis Behavior data-set (ICB), the primary source of data for this dissertation, identifies sixty-five post World War II foreign policy crises triggered by violent non-state actors.

Additionally, there is also no indication that these types of conflicts won’t continue to be relevant in the future. Violent non-state actors operate on all continents and will continue to threaten the interests of states. The Federation of American Scientists’ Intelligence Resource Program has identified 387 liberation movements, terrorist organizations, substance cartels and other armed non-state groups currently operating around the globe. While not all of these groups are currently active or pose a threat to an outside power, their sheer number indicates their salience and the importance for understanding how policy is made toward them.8 As James Rosenau

8 This list is available at www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ as of February 1, 2004.
(1990: 15) notes, the emergence of new communications technologies and their impact on peoples’ abilities to organize “is so much greater and speedier than in the past that the practical effect is an expanded capacity for identifying and articulating self-interests and participating effectively in collective action.”

Second, internal conflicts that involve an external actor tend to be more violent than internal conflicts that do not involve an external actor. Of the 462 cases of internationalized internal conflict identified by the Armed Conflict Dataset, 317, or 68.6 percent, are classified as wars, meaning they had over 1,000 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period. This is as violent as interstate conflicts, in which 67.3 percent of the cases were wars; and significantly more violent than internal conflicts that do not involve an outside power, in which only 36.4 percent were wars.

Third, this study finds that states are more likely to respond to crises triggered by violent non-state actors via military rather than non-military means. This may seem an obvious response given that these actors are in general defined by their propensity to use violence, and therefore, it should be expected that states would generally respond to violence with violence as well. However, according to data from ICB (discussed in greater detail in chapter five), when another state uses violence to trigger a crisis, states will respond violently at a lower rate than if the crisis was triggered by a non-state actor.\(^9\)

\(^9\) Of the sixty-five ICB cases in which violent non-state actors are the trigger to a crisis, 27 were triggered by violent acts, 25 were triggered by indirect violent acts, 3 were triggered by non-violent military acts, 1 was triggered by an internal challenge, 5 were triggered by political acts, 3 were triggered by external changes, and 1 was triggered by other non-violent acts. See chapter five for a more detailed discussion.
The fact that states tend to use military solutions as the major response to crises triggered by violent non-state actors should not be surprising when we look at the perceptions held by some academics and policymakers regarding these groups and the conclusions for how they should be dealt with. Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. Army officer writing for the journal *Parameters*, for example, argues that these groups represent a new “warrior class” and that:

[T]his type of threat generally requires a two-track approach—an active campaign to win over the populace coupled with irresistible violence directed against the warlord(s) and the warriors. You cannot bargain or compromise with warriors. You cannot ‘teach them a lesson’ (unless you believe that Saddam Hussein or General Aideed have learned anything is worthwhile from our fecklessness in the clinch). You either win or you lose. This kind of warfare is a zero-sum game. And it takes guts to play (Peters 1994: 24; italics in original).

What Peters articulates, perhaps somewhat over-dramatically, is an assumption by many that these groups have an irrational propensity toward violence and thus are impossible to engage in any type of rational negotiation. Or as President George W. Bush stated on July 14, 2004 regarding the targets of the United States’ “war on terror”: “It’s an enemy which hates America because of our love of freedom. You can’t negotiate with them. Therapy is not going to work with them. They’re cold-blooded people, that’s the way they are.”10 These views are demonstrative of some the psychological hurdles policymakers may be facing when confronting challenges from these groups.

For those who characterize these groups as such, there is only one viable alternative—to destroy them before they destroy you. These extreme characterizations,

however, ignore the political nature of these non-state groups. Because these groups are ultimately political, this research assumes that bargaining solutions do exist. However, to understand these bargaining solutions one has to develop a better characterization of the dynamics involved in conflicts between states and non-states. The remainder of this chapter examines the influence of violent non-state actors, the politics of intervention as they relate to these actors, and the special case of foreign policy decision-making during crises.

The Impact of Violent Non-State Actors

In *Turbulence in World Politics*, Rosenau (1990) discusses the rising importance of non-state groups. He argues that the international system has been transformed in such a way that a multi-centric world consisting of thousands of non-state, non-sovereign actors has emerged. This multi-centric world coexists in a non-hierarchical relationship with the state-centric system and is characterized by high degrees of complexity. With so many interdependent actors, the international environment is “dense (rather than thin) with causal layers” (Rosenau 1990: 9). Such an interdependent and complex system means that miniscule developments at the micro level can result in unexpected macro outcomes (Rosenau 1990: 30).

Rosenau (1990: 12-13) argues that the emergence of this “turbulent” world, in which change can be initiated from an array of actors, can be attributed to a number of sources. First, the shift from an industrial to a post-industrial world has led to the creation of technologies that make the political distance between groups much shorter and the ability to convey information much quicker. Second, the impact of emerging
transnational issues such as terrorism, the drug trade, currency crises, and AIDS, has been enhanced by the world’s increased interdependence and the emergence of ever more effective communications technologies. Third, because of the transnational nature of these emerging issues, states have been less capable of providing satisfactory solutions. This is partly due to the fact that the solutions to these emerging issues often fall outside a state’s jurisdiction, old issues are now increasingly intertwined with international components, and states are less able to force its own citizens’ compliance. Fourth, because of the weakening of the international system, sub-systems have gained greater coherence and effectiveness, thus leading to an overall decentralization of organizational structures—a reverse of the centralization that took place after the emergence of the Westphalian system. Finally, the growing sophistication of the world population due to increased access to information makes it less likely that individuals will be “detached, ignorant, and acquiescent” in respect to world affairs (Rosenau 1990: 12-13).11

Held (1995) further argues that the state is suffering a double crisis. First, the intensification of globalization is causing states to be less able to fulfill their traditional functions. Second, the ability of the state to achieve mass loyalty from its population is decreasing as the number of groups demanding the right to control their own political

11 Rosenau (1990) further argues that our terminology should change when referring to the various actors and entities that make up our field of study. The international system should be referred to as the “global,” “world,” or “postinternational” system; states should be referred to as “sovereignty bound” actors and non-state actors should be referred to as “sovereignty free” actors. While his justifications for these new labels are sound, and at the risk of being bound within a “conceptual jail,” this dissertation will use the terminology traditionally used in the field.
futures increases. This has created a political culture on the local and regional level, which has “criss-crossing loyalties, conflicting interpretations of rights and duties, and interconnected authority structures which displace notions of sovereignty as an illimitable, indivisible and exclusive form of public power” (Held 1995: 137).

This argument is expanded upon by Guibernau (1999) who argues that globalization is radically transforming society in such a way that it is weakening traditional state structures and allows for alternative, non-state, political units to expand and consolidate. He attributes this growth of “nations without states” to explanations which center on macro phenomena that has led to the weakening of the nation-state, as well as micro phenomena as non-state groups take advantage of the need individuals have for a greater voice and stronger community. First, Guibernau argues, that the proliferation of supranational and international institutions initially created to handle financial and security issues has helped lead to the proliferation of non-governmental organizations and non-state groups. These groups have been able to take advantage of this new political space and make demands on states that they were otherwise unable to do. As nation-states have become more aware of their own growing weakness they have been more willing to transfer certain aspects of their sovereignty to supranational institutions. This surrender of sovereignty has led states to resist further change and shore up those areas where they still have control, such as asylum and immigration policies. However, the erosion of borders and frontiers has further deteriorated the state’s ability to control economic and cultural flows. In addition, the growing norm for democratically ruled states has contributed to more groups demanding that their right to self-determination is the ultimate consequence of democracy (although there is
little consensus to what self-determination actually means). This demand has created a
growing level of apathy toward traditional politics and has corresponded with a rise in
new social movements. Nationalism encompasses one of these types of social
movements, as do fundamentalist and revolutionary movements. Finally, people are
increasingly seeking both individual as well as collective forms of identity not
necessarily provided by the state and which are being re-created in these emerging non-
state groups (Guibernau 1999: 176-179).

Further evidence of the growing complexity of the international system brought
about by the growing influence of non-state groups is provided by Holsti (1991) and
James (2002). According to Holsti (1991), as the Westphalian system emerged
between 1648 and 1714, the conflict-producing issues that states faced were limited to
just twelve categories, with territory and strategic territory, commerce/navigation,
dynastic succession, and state/regime survival being the most dominant. However, in
the world that emerged after World War II the number of distinct issues leading to
international conflict rose to twenty. In addition, the nature of these conflicts has
shifted away from territory disputes, commerce/navigation issues, and
dynastic/succession transitions to now include wars of national liberation, state
creation, ideology, and ethnic and religious movements—all of which more heavily

In addition, the modern era lacks a single issue, or single set of issues, that
dominates as the source of conflict. James (2002), using Holsti’s data and Ray and
Singer’s (1973) index of concentration, shows the extent to which conflict is produced
by one issue versus many. According to his scale, a score of 1.0 indicates that conflict
during one era stems from one issue while a score of 0 indicates that the source of conflict is evenly distributed over all issues. James (2002: 9) calculates the concentration scores for each of the periods identified by Holsti as:

1648-1714: 0.24
1715-1814: 0.26
1815-1914: 0.19
1918-1941: 0.11
1945-1989: 0.07

As James demonstrates, the historical trend is toward a more even distribution of salient international issues, with the most recent period of 1945-1989 posing the most even distribution of all time periods. Thus, the types of issues driven by the goals and activities of violent non-state actors are becoming as likely to dominate a state’s foreign policy decision-making process as much as any other set of issues. Unfortunately, international relations theorists have too often remained focused on the types of issues that tended to dominate world politics throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, despite the growing impact of these groups on state behavior, have not adjusted to incorporate non-state actors into their analysis.

Nevertheless, there has been some important work on the nature of these groups and state responses to them (Adelman 1985; Maoz 1989; Walt 1996). Walt (1996), for example, examines what effect violent non-state actors, particularly ones in the midst of making the transition following a successful revolutionary movement, have on the likelihood for increased systemic conflict. He contends that systemic conflict is more likely following successful revolutions and he is specifically interested in discovering
why this is the case by focusing on the perceptions and emerging insecurities that generally follow these events.

Walt argues that revolutions have three major impacts that increase the level of perceived threat by other states, consequently leading to a higher likelihood for war (Walt 1996: 331). First, a state experiencing a revolution typically suffers a reduction in its overall capabilities, especially its abilities to fight. As a result external states, seeking to improve their own positions or to prevent other powers from doing the same, may be tempted to take advantage of these windows of opportunities and intervene. Second, revolutions bring to power groups with contrary ideologies to the old regime. During the build up to the revolution, the leaders of the revolutionary movement will have likely portrayed the old regime, and close allies of the regime, in very critical terms. This unfavorable rhetoric, which will have been reciprocated by the old regime and its allies as well, leads to an atmosphere of suspicion and increased insecurity. Furthermore, because revolutions tend to be violent, the new leadership will not immediately be accustomed to the diplomatic exchanges that generally take place between states, thus leading to a higher likelihood for misstatements and misinterpretation. Third, the uncertainty surrounding the capabilities of a new revolutionary state creates a higher likelihood for misinterpretation with regards to the aims and intentions of the new regime, thus leading to a heightened perception of insecurity by states. Generally successful revolutions are carried out by what at first seem to be inferior forces coupled with ideological goals that appeal to a mass audience. Thus, it is difficult for state leaders to assess whether similar elements exist or not in their own states. The possibility that the revolution will spread may scare
some states while increasing the optimism of the new regime. This leads to decisions based on highly uncertain information regarding the actual capabilities and motives of the new regime (Walt 1996: 331-340).

Adelman (1985) further argues that successful revolutionary movements can rapidly transform states which are weak in power but rich in resources into strong and feared members of the international system. Such a rapid transformation, Adelman argues, presents a threat to status quo powers. Maoz (1989) also finds that states that undergo revolutionary state formation or regime change are more likely to be involved in post-revolutionary interstate disputes than states that become independent or undergo regime change via an evolutionary process. Maoz further finds that the correlations between the size of the international system and various interstate disputes such as frequency, severity, geographical distribution, are explained by the amount of revolutionary state formation processes (1989: 227). Maoz argues that “actions of states that are based on perceptions that revolutions have destabilizing potential in the international system because they are contagious are self-fulfilling prophesies. Forceful reactions to such changes are themselves the source of a contagious spread of international conflict” (Maoz 1989: 227).

Walt, Adelman and Maoz all argue that revolutionary regime change all lead to an increase in violence in the international system. Some of the same characteristics that lead to increased violence following a successful revolutionary movement are also present in state interactions with non-state actors. Fearon (1995, 1998), for example, identifies bargaining problems and enforcement problems as hindrances to international cooperation. This study argues that the heightened difficulties of
bargaining with non-state actors, as well as trusting that a non-state actor can enforce an agreement upon its constituency, creates a similar dynamic as that found in conflicts with new revolutionary states. This bargaining problem is discussed in greater detail in chapter four.

The existence of these groups—and the uncertainty regarding how much threat they pose to a particular state—represent an additional level of complexity to the number and types of decisions confronted on a daily basis by foreign policy decision-makers. This is in addition to the challenge presented by the fact that these groups generally operate within an existing and (usually) functioning nation-state. Therefore any decision must concern not only the violent non-state actor, but the sovereignty of the state within which that actor operates as well. Thus, any analysis of these groups cannot ignore the context of the larger sovereign system of states and the politics of intervention.

Beyond Intervention

Intervention into the affairs of another country constitutes a major type of response that states make when threatened by a violent non-state actor and has been one of the major lenses by which past researchers have sought to understand these relationships (see Harff 1992; Reed and Kayson 1993; Haass 1999). However, not all interventions take place in response to the activities of violent non-state actors, nor do all threats posed by non-state actors result in an intervention. The dynamics of intervention, a state’s capacities to carry out an intervention, and a state’s commitment
to adhere to international norms, help determine how a state is able to respond to threats from these groups.

Determining what constitutes an intervention, though, has often lacked clarity (Rosenau 1969). Oppenheim (1905), for example, defines intervention as the “dictatorial” or coercive interference of an outside party or parties in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Hoffman (1984) argues that intervention can take on a variety of forms, from coercive intervention in which the use or threat of force is used, to economic coercion in which boycotts, embargoes, and trade sanctions are put in place in order to compel certain behaviors. In addition, according to Hoffman, intervention is limited to an activity carried out by states, groups fighting for statehood, or collections of states. Thus the activities of private actors, such as multinational corporations or labor unions, are not part of the definition of intervention. Finally, intervention is an activity that is meant to affect the internal, not external, activities of its target (Hoffman 1984: 9-10). Thus, intervention has generally been defined as “an organized and purposeful activity meant to change or prevent change in the political authority structure of other states through a variety of instruments” (Young 1968: 178). Therefore, intervention that is meant to change political authority involves assisting in the overthrow of the existing power, while intervention that prevents change is targeted toward those groups seeking to overthrow the existing regime.

The concept of intervention, Hoffman points out, leads to a number of contradictions within the field of international relations. First, the principle of sovereignty claims that a state has total dominion over its internal affairs, thus intervention under such conditions would be considered illegitimate. On the other
hand, the principle of sovereignty also legitimizes the idea of self-help, meaning that states are free to pursue their own self-interest, which at times may involve trying to influence the domestic affairs of others. Second, the constitutive principle of international order isn’t just respect for any sovereignty, but also respect for self-determination. That is, people have the right to self-rule and guaranteeing that right should be an explicit goal of the international community. Therefore, according to this standard, intervention carried out in order to insure another country’s self-determination and for the purpose of supporting national liberation movements would appear to be legitimate. Third, there has been a recurring belief in international relations thinking that the most effective way to prevent chaos in the international system is through the promotion of legitimate governments, such as the nineteenth century liberals’ belief that an international system of constitutional governments would produce the most peace and order (Kant 1795). Today similar arguments are made in regards to expanding the number of democratic regimes with free market systems. Such notions continue to be used to justify intervention as a method to promote governmental legitimacy (Hoffman 1984: 11-12).

An obvious example of all these points is the United States’ justification for invading Iraq in March 2003. The invasion was framed as not just necessary to guarantee U.S. security, but that it would also bring self-determination and democracy to the Iraqi people. U.S. leadership was vocally committed to the idea that such a policy would help lead to the creation of a democratic Iraqi state, which would eventually lead to an expansion of democratic, pro-Western governments throughout the Middle East. This and other cases of intervention raises question as to how
embedded a norm against intervention actually is, and these contradictions help explain why, despite the supposed norm, such a large number have taken place since World War II.

Others would argue that decisions to intervene or not intervene have less to do with any type of adherence to international norms than with a country’s pursuit of its own national interest (Regan 2000; Yoon 1997). For Regan (2000), the decision to intervene is based on a rational calculation involving a cost-benefit analysis. First, Regan argues, the decision-maker or decision-making unit will determine what the likely outcome of the conflict will be without an intervention. If a decision-maker estimates the probability for a successful outcome to be high without an intervention then the expected utility for not intervening will also be high and the chances that an intervention will occur will be low. However, if the expected utility for not intervening is sufficiently low then the decision-maker will attempt to determine what the possible outcomes of an intervention would be. This leads to a preference order for the decision-maker in which a successful outcome without intervention is preferred over a successful outcome with intervention, which is preferred over an unsuccessful outcome without intervention, which is preferred over an unsuccessful outcome with intervention (Regan 2000: 44-45). Factors such as the state of geopolitical politics, the intensity of the fighting taking place in the target country, and the severity of any humanitarian crisis that may be taking place within the target country all help determine the value of the expected utility function (Regan 2000: 60-63). Additionally, once an intervention has occurred, further cost-benefit analysis will
continue to take place as competing parties inside the country vie for strategic advantage based on the new political reality (Carment and Rowlands 1998).

Regardless of the approach, past research on intervention is limited in its usefulness. Like most thinking in international relations, the intervention literature focuses mainly on the relationships between states and does not distinguish very well between interventions that are targeted at states and those that are targeted at non-state actors operating independently within a state. The intervention literature also tends to place higher emphasis on changing a state’s behavior, rather than the behavior of a non-state actor, limiting its usefulness for this research project. Indeed, there is an important difference between interventions that are intended to put an end to a violent civil war or to administer humanitarian aid and those which target a specific group because that group in and of itself represents a threat to the intervening state (although ultimately policies toward these two types of groups may look very similar).

The political motivations of a non-state group, its relationship to the state within which it operates, and its sources of funding and external support all have an impact on how a state formulates its policies toward these groups. A violent non-state actor, for example, may be operating within a state with the explicit or implicit support of that state, such as al-Qaeda’s relationship with the Taliban in Afghanistan. On the other hand, a violent non-state actor may be acting without any support from that state, such as Asbat al-Ansar in Lebanon. Groups that exist without state support are usually able to do so by taking advantage of a state’s weak political institutions. On the other hand, a weak state may also seek to support violent non-state groups as a cheap and less-detectable way of expanding its power. This has been the case with
regards to Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah or Cuba’s support of Marxists in Angola. In addition, states have found that sponsoring non-state actors is an effective way to intervene without becoming directly linked to the conflict.

This distinction of how much a violent non-state actor is supported by their “host” country is important, as it will help determine the strategy decision-makers will choose to pursue in their policies. It is also necessary to identify the conditions in which interventions tend to take place. A state generally doesn’t choose to intervene in another state unless the conditions constitute a threat to its basic values. Such threats often manifest themselves in the form of a foreign policy crisis. The following section discusses foreign policy crises and non-state actors’ role in triggering these crises.

*Foreign Policy Decision-Making During Crisis*

Empirical evidence for this dissertation is limited to cases that constitute a foreign policy crisis for a state-actor. Foreign policy decision-making is a constant process that takes place on multiple bureaucratic levels. In fact, most day to day foreign policy decision-making follows a fairly routine process, while crisis decision-making occurs more rarely. A foreign policy crisis is defined by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000: 3) as an event in which a state perceives "a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities."\(^{12}\) The change in

\[^{12}\text{This definition differs slightly from Hermann (1969: 14) who defines crisis as "a situation that (1) threatens the high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, (2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed, and (3) surprises the members of the decision making unit." Brecher and Wilkenfeld}^{12}\]
the probability of military engagement is a relative measurement, meaning that it must be qualitatively higher than the norm. Thus, it does not matter whether the normal expectation for war was high or low, only that the probability of engagement becomes greater (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; see also Snyder and Diesing 1977). A crisis can be conceptualized as either a micro- or macro-level phenomena. The micro-level (foreign policy crisis) involves crises as they are experienced by individual states. The macro-level (international crisis) involves crises that challenge the structure of the larger international system. An international crisis involves a change in type and/or increase of disruptive interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities; that, in turn, destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system, whether global, dominant, or subsystem (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000: 4-5).

While most foreign policy crises are typically triggered by the actions of another state, non-state actors, either external or internal, have also threatened the values and security of states. For example, revolutionary activity in Yemen in the 1960s triggered a crisis for Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and a secessionist movement in the Katanga region of the Congo in 1960 triggered a crisis for Belgium when a number of its citizens were taken hostage. The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset cites sixty-five such crises. While this is a small percentage of the total number of

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omit surprise as a necessary condition; change the amount of time for response from "short" to "finite;" allow for internal, as well as external, triggers for the crisis; identify "basic values" in place of "high-priority goals" as the object of perceived threat; and, includes "higher-than-normal probability of involvement in military hostilities" as a necessary condition.
post-World War II cases coded in ICB (9.5 percent), when these sixty-five cases are compared to only those cases triggered by an indirect violent or violent act by another state, which are more typical of the types of crises triggered by violent non-state actors, the frequency of cases becomes much more impressive (21.7 percent).

Limiting the focus of this dissertation to cases in which violent non-state actors trigger a foreign policy crisis has a number of advantages. First, the decision-making that takes place during a crisis tends to be made higher up on the decision ladder. As a result it is more likely that decisions will be made by individuals rather than simply by bureaucratic inertia, allowing for explanations that take into account unit-level factors such as cognition, leadership, ideology, and risk-taking. Second, because a foreign policy crisis requires that essential values are threatened the responses by states are based on a perceived real threat rather than on possible future threat. Third, the finite time for response gives a limited period for looking at the interactions that take place between a state and violent non-state actor. All of these factors allow for a more specified research agenda.

There are, however, disadvantages to focusing solely on foreign policy crises. As with any adversary, states plan for possible contingencies and try to determine future threats. These plans are often drawn up in a state’s intelligence agency, defense

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13 A number of crises triggered by non-state actors are not included in these sixty-six cases because the non-state actor in question is either 1) not violent or 2) resides within the boundaries of the state experiencing the crisis. The ICB’s designation of non-state actors includes a wide range of entities including the United Nations, regional organizations, OPEC, the PLO, and rebel forces. Of the 694 post-World War II crises, 147 or 21.2 percent are triggered by a non-state actor. Thus the ratio of crisis triggered by non-state actors is similar between the set of cases that include all crises and the set of cases that only include violent crises.
ministry, or foreign ministry long before a crisis emerges, and if possible, a state will work to prevent these groups from ever challenging the state. As a result, many decisions regarding policy towards violent non-state actors do not occur during a crisis. Thus, it limits the number of cases and excludes some obvious examples of state decision-making toward violent non-state actors, such as U.S. or Soviet support given to governments battling insurgencies during the Cold War. According to ICB, these insurgent groups’ actions did not always constitute a crisis for the United States or Soviet Union; however, a significant amount of time and effort was spent formulating and executing policy toward these groups.

While this is a limitation to the comprehensiveness of this specific study, future research will expand beyond this limited number of crisis cases. As for now, however, a focus on crises allows us to make some general theoretical assumptions about these interactions and to test a number of hypotheses generated from these assumptions. Chapter four discusses in more detail the criteria for case selection, along with the advantages and shortcomings of this approach.

Obstacles and Challenges

One of the first difficulties with focusing on foreign state responses to violent non-state actors is that the academic literature concerning these two topics is situated in two relatively distinct fields. Comparativists interested in intra-state conflict and contentious politics, for example, have studied how violent non-state actors emerge, develop their identity and group goals, and seek to obtain those goals (see Gurr 1970; Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994; Lichbach 1995; and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).
Comparativists, however, tend to give less importance to these groups’ influence on outside states, and the implications of the responses given by those states toward those groups. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001: 11), for example, include “outside actors” in their simple polity model of contentious politics, but do not expand on these actors’ specific roles in effecting the behavior of contentious groups. On the other hand, foreign policy analysis specifically, as well as international relations theory more generally, has done little theorizing or empirical research on how policy is formulated and which policies are implemented toward non-state groups that fall outside their territory yet pose a threat to their national interests.\textsuperscript{14}

As a result, the scant amount of theoretical work that has been done up to this point seems to have left little impression on the discipline (i.e. Beres 1974). Previous work on the interactions between states and non-state groups has tended to either be less theoretically rigorous policy prescriptions of strategies states should adopt when confronting these groups, or normative discussions considering whether external states should be confronting these groups at all (see Clutterbuck 1990; Vincent 1974; Barnet 1968; Thompson 1966). Some efforts have focused on the effectiveness and consequences of specific policies (Haass 1999; Enders and Sandler 1993; Enders, Sandler, and Cauley 1990; Poe 1988; Jenkins 1986), while other work on the subject unfortunately reads more like political propaganda than serious academic analysis (see Bell 1971). In addition to this more generalized work there are numerous studies that focus on a single case or a set of regional cases with little attempt to apply them to a

\textsuperscript{14} See Rosenau (1968) for an early discussion on why this divide exists.
broader theoretical framework (Coll 2004; Woodward 2002; Benjamin and Simon 2002). Even Rosenau’s *Turbulence in World Politics* (1990), which creates a larger theoretical framework for thinking about these groups, has failed to generate an extensive research program beyond its publication.

An additional obstacle to this research is that it is issue related—that is, it focuses on just foreign policy decisions dealing with a specific issue. Generally, the field of foreign policy analysis has concentrated on domestic and international structures and has not focused on how specific issue areas themselves affect the foreign policymaking process. Zimmerman (1973) argues that important differences in foreign policy-making may not be because the domestic structures of different countries vary, but because decision-makers are confronting different types of issues. By focusing on a single issue, albeit a broad one, this research addresses one of the principle criticisms of foreign policy analysis—that the behavior of states is most strongly determined by the structure of the international system itself and that internal processes have a less significant impact on foreign policy decisions and outcomes. By limiting the scope of this research and only looking at specific cases in which states confront violent non-state actors, we can make a better determination of whether or not state behavior changes as a result of the specific issue being confronted (see also Wolfers 1962; Potter 1980; and Evangelista 1989).

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15 There has been a call for an issue-based approach to studying world politics (O’Leary 1976; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981; and Diehl 1992) and various early efforts to incorporate issue areas into their analysis include Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein (1969); Brewer (1973); Hermann (1978); Keohane and Nye (1977); Lowi (1964); Rosenau (1966); and Zimmerman (1973). However the incorporation of issue areas into the study of foreign policy have more commonly been the exception than the rule.
An additional challenge to this research is determining whether issues related to violent non-state actors will remain a relevant topic of research. Current political rhetoric would indicate that violent non-state actors will continue to pose a major challenge to foreign policy decision-makers into the foreseeable future. Whether these groups will continue to grow or diminish in influence due to this growing attention remains a topic of debate. Nevertheless, this dissertation argues that these groups have always had an important impact on the international system and, the current debate notwithstanding, this impact will continue. If violent non-state actors represent a significant future threat to states, a more rigorous, and universal, knowledge of these relationships must be developed.

Finally, as with any major research project, there are questions concerning the operationalization of terms and the collection and interpretation of data. These questions will be addressed throughout the dissertation.

Outline and Structure of Study

This study starts from the premise that non-state actors, specifically violent non-state actors, have a growing influence on states and the international system. Part of the expansion of these groups is due to the weakening of traditional state structures which allow for more actors to compete for political space. However, the weakening of the state does not mean that the state has become a powerless player. In fact, despite these groups’ growing influence, the traditional nation-state remains the most powerful actor within the international system. Thus, we can expect states to respond to the
emerging challenge of non-state actors. This study seeks to understand that response as it relates specifically to challenges from violent non-state actors.

Ultimately, this study is about how the state, specifically the foreign policy apparatus of the state, deals with the threat of violent non-state actors. State decisions are made by a collectivity of individuals. Foreign policy analysis seeks to understand these decisions by exploring the processes involved in foreign policy decision-making. Foreign policy decisions are informed by the decision-makers’ belief systems regarding the international system, their perceptions of the power and intentions of the opponent, and their calculation regarding which policies will have the highest impact with the least amount of cost. Therefore, this study seeks to understand why it is that states, confronted with a crisis triggered by a violent non-state actor, are more likely to employ a military response than had the crisis been triggered by another state. A better understanding of the processes that states go through when deciding how to confront these actors, and the effectiveness of past policy outcomes, will provide a better framework for understanding these problems in an increasingly transnational world.

In order to understand how decision-makers determine the level of threat represented by these groups and formulate an appropriate policy response, a framework must be developed that appropriately captures this dynamic. The theoretical framework of this study is derived from three traditions: traditional international relations theory; theories of foreign policy processes, outcomes and behaviors especially as they relate to crisis decision-making; and theories of bargaining and interdependent decision-making. Each of these approaches is used in order to create a more complete understanding of the dynamics that exist between states and violent non-state actors.
Because this study is ultimately concerned with the foreign policy behavior of states it tries to comply with the evaluative criteria for research in foreign policy set forward by Wilkenfeld, Hopple, Rossa and Andriole (1980): comprehensiveness, comparability, operationalizability, and public policy relevance. Comprehensiveness does not require an analyst to deal with the entire scope of foreign policy behavior; it does, however, require him or her to be comprehensive regarding the specific area of study. This requires the analyst to account for all possible internal and external source variables that may have causal significance on the area being studied. Therefore, analysis should pull from all five social scientific levels of analysis: 1) individual, 2) group, 3) composite group (or state), 4) interstate and/or multi-state, and 5) global systemic. Second, foreign policy behavior must be comparative, and, therefore, be able to be differentiated according to the type of state involved and the type of event being analyzed. Third, foreign policy analysis must have carefully constructed concepts and use variables that may be adequately operationalized. Because many of the most important internal and external variables prove difficult to measure, it is important to integrate a combination of both hard and soft data. Fourth, foreign policy analysis should have policy relevance and at least attempt to contribute to the rationality of foreign policy decision-making (Wilkenfeld et al 1980: 19-39; see also Andriole, Wilkenfeld and Hopple 1975: 164-168).

Finally, this study attempts to understand foreign policy processes in a globalized transnational world. It encompasses what Neack (2003) refers to as the “third generation” of foreign policy analysis and attempts to respond to her observation
that “[a]s nonstate actors rise in importance and power, foreign policy analysis will need to incorporate them into foreign policy studies” (pg.200).

The complexity of the foreign policy process makes any research into its workings a complex task. The origins of a state’s foreign policy can be found on numerous bureaucratic levels depending on the nature of the issue being addressed and generally the agency or individual most capable of managing the issue. This dissertation does not attempt to deconstruct those inner workings. Nevertheless, it does make some broader theoretical assumptions regarding foreign policy outcomes based on the type of crisis a state faces and deduces how these outcomes emerge.

The remainder of the dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter two looks more closely at foreign policy decision-making, both in terms of the international environment in which foreign policy decisions are made and how bargaining interactions are used to signal intentions between opponents. Chapter three further expands on what is meant by violent non-state actors and breaks down the different types of violent groups along with the tactics which they use. Chapter four goes into greater detail on the data to be used and states the principal hypotheses of this dissertation. Chapter five tests those hypotheses, first determining whether a difference exists in the way that states respond to crises triggered by non-state actors in comparison to crises triggered by states. It finds that states indeed do respond more violently to these crises. Chapter five then tests three possible explanations for why states respond to these crises more violently. First, it identifies the types of values that non-state actors generally threaten and tests whether state responses are based on which values are being threatened or if state responses to non-state actors remain significantly
more violent. Second, it looks at the roles of international institutions and whether a difference exists in the frequency with which international organizations become involved in these crises and the effectiveness of that involvement. Third, it looks at the nature of the violent non-state actors themselves and whether the structural framework within which these conflicts occur leads to more violent responses from the state.

The findings of this dissertation are an important addition to our understanding of state behavior, both specifically behavior directed toward violent non-state actors, but also as it relates to other states. By identifying the deficiencies that exist in confrontational state/non-state interactions, we can begin to uncover the processes through which these types of conflicts can ultimately be resolved.
Chapter 2

State Decision-Making and Crisis Bargaining with Violent Non-State Actors

A successful research program begins by developing the core concepts that it will be addressing. By clearly defining what it is that is being explained, a research program can be compared to past work and replicated in the future. Additionally, proper concept formation is an important aspect of guaranteeing measurement validity (Adcock and Collier 2001). The next two chapters focus on the two main concepts being addressed in this dissertation—foreign policy decision-making (chapter two) and violent non-state actors (chapter three).

When violent non-state actors threaten the national interests of a state, that state’s foreign policy decision-makers must decide how to respond to that threat. All states have created the appropriate bureaucracies for handling foreign conflicts. These agencies, however, have been designed to interact primarily with other states which presumably also have a similar bureaucratic structure. Thus, when a state’s navy, for example, violates the territorial waters of another state both states know who to protest to and who to negotiate with. However, this is not the case when a state is threatened by a violent non-state actor. While violent non-state actors may share some similarities; they rarely possess all the same organizational structures of states. Without these structures states presumably are unable to interact with non-state groups in the same way they do with other states. How the differences in the structure and capabilities of
non-state actors affect the ways decision-makers respond to these threats is the main focus of this chapter. First, the chapter discusses the ways in which scholars have previously thought about foreign policy decision-making and bargaining games between states. It then creates a framework for understanding how the structural differences of non-state actors might change how a state chooses to respond to these threats.

*Foreign Policy Decision-Making*

Most existing models of foreign policy decision-making were developed with only state versus state interactions in mind and tend to ignore how different types of issues and actors can change the nature of the policies being formulated. In addition, many previous models only implicitly assume the interdependent nature of these decision-making processes instead of making it an explicit part of the model.

Foreign policy analysis focuses on the intentions, statements, and actions of a state toward the external world (as opposed to the domestic) and the response that external actors have toward those intentions, statements, and actions (Gerner 1995: 18). It differs, however, from traditional international relations analysis in that it focuses primarily on the decision-making unit rather than just on the state as an amorphous unitary actor. Hermann (1978: 34), therefore, defines foreign policy as “the discrete purposeful action that results from the political level decision of an individual or group of individuals . . . [it is] the observable artifact of a political level decision. It is not the decision, but a product of the decision.” How to properly do such analysis in a systematic and comprehensive way, however, has been problematic. Because foreign
policy analysis, in effect, pries into the black box of the state, it must incorporate into its analysis both the external and internal pressures affecting the decision-making process. There are several reasons why an approach that accounts for the decision-making process of the actors is preferable to a strict system-level or structural approach that assumes states and non-state groups (if non-state groups are considered at all) to be unitary actors. Foremost, the huge asymmetric differences that exist between most states and violent non-state actors create a number of analytical problems. Only a small percentage of non-state actors are able to successfully threaten a state to the point that it will constitute a foreign policy crisis, and the methods they utilize to do so vary greatly between groups. In terms of real power, violent non-state actors should have little impact on the international system. Yet non-state groups appear to have greater influence than what would normally be theorized from a pure power analysis. Using a realist metaphor, one might ask: why is it that some ping-pong balls are able to move some billiard balls?

Foreign policy decisions are made based on the values, goals, threat perceptions and propensity for risk of those in power and their challengers. In addition, foreign policy analysis seeks to understand the complexity of both the strategy and tactics of the actors involved. While power still plays an important role, the flexibility that foreign policy analysis provides, and its willingness to look into the “black box,” allows for the discovery of mechanisms (both on the state and individual level) that might otherwise be overlooked with solely a systemic explanation. Foreign policy analysis, by taking
into account multiple levels of analysis, provides us with a richer explanation for these interactions.¹

The field of foreign policy analysis grew out of a desire by scholars to create a systematized, scientifically rigorous understanding of the foreign policy behaviors of states.² Early efforts by this “first generation” of scholars sought to create generalizable and testable models, and to collect extensive cross-national data in order to identify trends and make broad comparisons between states.³ These efforts have generated mixed results. The early collection of events-data allowed for a detailed comparison of the external behaviors of multiple states. However, it was quickly recognized that such a methodology was ill-suited for answering a number of foreign policy questions, such as decisions not to take action and some of the more subtle cognitive effects of the decision-making process (Rosenau 1987: 7).

Despite the early optimism that a rigorous scientific approach could be applied to the study of foreign policy (McGowan 1975), the effort has run into a number of roadblocks. Scholars have attempted to extend beyond these efforts and apply a wider

¹ For a recent analysis of how foreign policy analysis uses individual, state, and systemic levels of analysis see Neack (2003).

² For an early discussion on the goals and promises of comparative foreign policy as a field see Rosenau’s 1966 article “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy.”

³ The distinction between “first generation” and “second generation” foreign policy scholarship was first made by Neack, Hey, and Haney (1995) to distinguish between scholars of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s who used positivist methods to create a unified field of comparative foreign policy, and a new group of scholars that use a diverse set of methodologies and theoretical approaches to understand the foreign policy behavior of states.
range of methodological approaches, including attempts to understand cognitive and collective processes, as well as the domestic and international influences on foreign policy decision-making (see Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau 1987). This “second generation” of foreign policy analysis grew out of a desire by scholars to move past the heavily positivist approach of the first generation behavioralists to take into account multiple levels of analysis, advances in psychological understanding, and new developments regarding domestic processes that were emerging from the field of comparative politics.

More recently, Neack (2003) has argued that a new foreign policy, or “third generation,” is emerging that takes into account the effects of an increasingly globalized world. This globalized world includes greater influence by non-state actors including non-governmental organizations, transnational grass-roots coalitions, and violent groups. Globalization, Neack contends, loosens states’ control over its domestic and foreign policies and opens the door for other actors to make an impact (Neack 2003: 198-199). This new approach to foreign policy analysis integrates the approaches developed by scholars such as Keck and Sikkink (1998) who try to understand the role that transnational organizations and epistemic communities have on state behavior. This dissertation reflects this third generation approach to foreign policy analysis. By focusing on violent non-state actors it not only expands on the types of groups and issues that affect foreign policy decision-making, but highlights the transnational and interdependent nature of the global system.
Action – Reaction and Sequential Games in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Foreign policy decisions are not made in a vacuum, nor are they made independent of one’s assessment of the motivations and strategies of an opponent. Game theory has provided one way to understand the dynamics involved in international conflict. Game theory assumes a scenario in which two or more rational players make a choice from a specified and well-defined set of choices with no knowledge of the choices being made by other players (Luce and Raiffa 1957: 5-6). While there are obvious difficulties with game theoretic solutions to practical foreign policy problems, such as limits to rationality (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and the difficulty of describing the strategy sets available to players (Luce and Raiffa 1957), game theory does help us make limited predictions that are useful in regards to understanding these complex interactions.

A number of studies of foreign policy behavior have focused on some variation of action-reaction models (see Ward 1982; Dixon 1983; Goldstein and Freeman 1990, 1991; Rajmaira and Ward 1990; Lebo and Moore 2003). Action-reaction models generally assume that foreign policy behavior is based on bureaucratic inertia plus strategic responses to an opponent’s actions plus an inherent level of hostility or cooperation toward that opponent. The action-reaction model has been modified by Rajmaira and Ward (1990), Ward and Rajmaira (1992), and Rajmaira (1997) to take into account work done by Axelrod (1984, 1986), Keohane (1986), and Keohane and Axelrod’s (1985) work which demonstrates that interactions between rival dyads will be characterized by short-term reciprocity within the context of a long-term equilibrium.
process based on each actor’s expectations of the other’s behavior—what is known as the tit-for-tat strategy.

Within any bargaining scenario opponents communicate tacitly through an exchange of threats, bluffs, and concessions. This bargaining is sequential, each side is uncertain about the other side’s resolve, and the actions of each side helps reveal different, but still uncertain, expectations regarding the ultimate outcome of the interaction. In any bargaining situation there will exist a level of uncertainty about the other side’s military capabilities, its willingness to take risks, and its perception and attitude toward the status quo. As the bargaining sequence advances, however, each side’s moves partially reveals its capabilities, short-term tactics and long-term strategies (Morrow 1989). Thus, when one actor chooses to use violence against another, the nature of that action, the resources used, and what is targeted reveals information about that actor’s goals and capabilities and allows one to update its own strategy for future confrontations.

A number of empirical studies have been done to demonstrate that states will adopt a strategy of matching behavior or reciprocity when responding to the actions of another state (Wilkenfeld 1991; Brecher 1993; Hensel and Diehl 1994; Leng 2000; Trumbore and Boyer 2000; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). Wilkenfeld (1991: 144) defines matching behavior as a “reciprocal relationship between incoming behavior (crisis trigger) and outgoing behavior (crisis response).” If a state suffers a crisis due to a military attack by another state, the crisis actor will likely respond with a military attack of its own. Additionally, if a crisis is triggered by a non-violent act such as a protest or threat, the crisis actor will likely respond to that non-violent threat with a non-
Wilkenfeld (1991), using data from the International Crisis Behavior dataset, finds that while matching behavior is demonstrated in all categories of conflict, crisis situations in which there are high levels of societal unrest and/or mass violence are more likely to see a crisis actor respond violently to non-violent triggers. Conversely, he found that non-violent responses to violent triggers were more likely when the crisis trigger represented a low threat to values and when the power relations between parties was relatively equal. Similar results are reported by Hensel and Diehl (1994).

As with most IR models, action-reaction models in international relations have mostly been concerned with conflict and cooperation between states. However, some assumptions should be modified when looking at these models in the context of state versus non-state interactions. For example, using Morrow’s (1989) limited information crisis bargaining game we can see that many of its assumptions are strained when applying it to an interaction that takes place between a state and a violent non-state actor. For instance, a state’s uncertainty of a violent non-state actor’s military capabilities would be very high as non-state actors do not usually rely on traditional forms of military force, but rather adopt non-conventional strategies that are more difficult to assess. Additionally, unlike a state, whose military’s strategic doctrine is usually highly embedded and thus impervious to change, a violent non-state actor might be more inclined to attempt multiple strategies that rely on randomness and surprise. Consequently, these strategies can be extremely difficult for a state to plan for, as they often are part of a new and evolving repertoire that relies on surprise and randomness, such as al-Qaeda’s use of passenger jets or the use of suicide bombers by the Tamil
Tigers or Islamic Jihad. This uncertainty and flexibility makes it harder for the state to update its strategy. Additionally, violent non-state actors usually do not possess the same political institutions as a state. Therefore assumptions we may make regarding appropriate diplomatic responses to crises may not be feasible when a state is confronting threats from violent non-state actors.

Any foreign policy decision relies on how a state assumes an opponent will respond and how that opponent actually responds. These assumptions, when confronting violent non-state actors, are especially problematic because many of the structural characteristics that exist in interstate relationships are not always present in relationships with non-state actors, such as a recognized foreign ministry or the legitimacy of a group’s leaders to speak for a larger population base. As a result, a state might not be entirely convinced that a non-state actor has the capability to enforce an agreement on those it claims to represent. For example, during the negotiations during the Bosnia crisis the United States negotiating team led by Richard Holbrooke refused to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs, which were operating as a non-state group (although not entirely independent of Serbia), and instead insisted that all communication be with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. The U.S. negotiators recognized the difficulty of negotiating with any group with no state affiliation and knew they were more capable of putting pressure on the Bosnian Serbs if they dealt directly with the Bosnian Serbs chief supporters (Holbrooke 1998: 138-140).

How states respond to what could be termed “structurally deficient” non-state actors during crises will be the focus of the following section. It will first discuss theories of sequential decision-making and crisis bargaining as they relate to state-state
interactions. It will then adjust these models to take into account the structural deficiencies present in non-state groups.

Sequential Decision-Making and Crisis Bargaining Between States and Non-States

One method for better understanding the decisions made by states and non-state actors is by utilizing a decision-tree. A decision tree maps the possible actions that two actors can take during a sequential-move game. Each decision node along the tree represents a point in the game at which decisions are made. Each node is associated with a single player and the decisions available to that player at that turn. In addition, each game has one initial node, which is the starting point of the game; and terminal nodes, which represent the set of possible outcomes in a given game. The branches of a decision tree represent each of the possible actions that a player can take at each decision node. Each branch leads to another decision node, usually for a different player, or to a terminal node in which case the game ends. (Dixit and Skeath 1999: 46-47; Luce and Raiffa 1957: 39-55).

Decision trees are useful for understanding the dynamics of a sequential game. With full knowledge of each actor’s preference order for outcomes we can use backward deduction to predict the likely outcome for each game. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) use a decision tree to describe conflictual interactions between states and explain why rational state actors might choose to go to war. They argue that decision-makers assess the desirability of different outcomes and choose their strategies based on their awareness of the countervailing strategies available to their opponent. While their conclusion that states will choose to go to war when the expected utility of
going to war is greater than the expected utility of any other available option is not groundbreaking, they do help explain the step-by-step process of an interdependent decision game between states, which can be modified to understand the decisions that take place between state and non-state actors.

Figure 2.1 shows the first set of moves in Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s (1992) international interaction game involving two state actors. At node 1 state A must choose whether or not it makes a demand on state B. If state A chooses to not make a demand (~DA) on state B then the game moves to node 2 and if state A does make a demand (DA) on state B the game moves to node 3. At node 2 or 3 state B must choose whether or not it makes a demand on state A. At node 2 if state B chooses to not make a demand (~DB) as well then the game ends at the status quo (SQ). However, if at node 2 state B chooses to make a demand (DB) on state A the game continues at node 4. At node 3 if state B chooses not to make counter state A with a demand of its own (~DB) then state B acquiesces to state A (AcqB) and the game ends. However, if at node 3 state B counters state A’s demand with a demand of its own (DB) the game continues at node 5. At node 4 state A did not make a demand, but State B did. Therefore, state A must now choose whether it responds with a demand (dA) of its own and continue the game at node 6 or to not make a demand (~dA) and acquiesce to state B (AcqA) thus ending the game. At node 5 state A has made a demand and state B has countered with its own demand leaving state A with the decision to fight (FA) or not fight (~FA). If state A makes a counter demand to state B at node 4, then at node 6 state B must choose whether to fight (FB) or not fight (~FB).
At nodes 5 and 6 the game moves into what Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) consider a crisis subgame. Prior to nodes 5 and 6 the two sides are making demands without resorting to the threat of military force. However, at nodes 5 and 6 when both sides have made new demands, each side must choose whether to resolve its differences with or without resorting to arms.

**Figure 2.1. International Interaction Decision Tree**

![Decision Tree](image)

*Adapted from Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) page 30.*

Figure 2.2 shows the game at the crisis subgame with the terminal nodes of negotiation (Nego), war (WarA or War B), or capitulation (CapA or CapB). Node 5 and node 6 (in Figure 2.1) are mirror images of each other except for who starts. If state A chooses not to fight (~FA) at node 5 then at node 9 state B must choose whether to fight or not. If state B chooses not to fight (~FB) then the game ends in negotiation. If
state B chooses to fight then the game moves to node 12. If at node 5 state A chooses to fight (FA) then at node 10 state B must choose whether to fight (FB) and end the game in a war initiated by A (WarA) or not fight and have the game end with state B capitulating (CapB) to state A. At node 12 state A must choose whether to fight (fA) and end the game in a war initiated by state B (WarB) or not fight (~fA) and have the game end with A capitulating to state B (CapB).

**Figure 2.2. Crisis Subgame Decision Tree**

![Decision Tree Diagram]

From Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) page 34.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992: 40-41) make a set of assumptions regarding this international interaction game. The assumptions are that 1) the players choose the strategy with the greatest expected utility; 2) the change in welfare that would result from a war or from a negotiation is not known with certainty; 3) capitulations result in changes in welfare that are certain rather than probabilistic; 4) all nations prefer to resolve their differences through negotiation rather than war; 5) the
status quo represents the middle point from which the utility one expects to gain if one’s demands are obtained and the utility one expects to lose by acceding to the adversary’s demand are measured; and 6) each outcome has a set of potential benefits and/or costs associated with it.\(^4\)

How the interaction game is played depends on each side’s preference ordering for outcomes. For example, according to Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s (1992: 47) ordinal restrictions on ordering, either player would prefer the status quo to acquiescing or capitulating; acquiescence by one’s opponent to all other outcomes; acquiescing to one’s opponent to capitulating to one’s opponent; negotiation to acquiescing, capitulating or war; and capitulation of one’s opponent to war. However, each player would also prefer initiating a war to having a war initiated against it since that often has certain advantages for the initiator (see Quester 1988). While these restrictions put some limitations on each side’s preference ordering, there remain plenty of possibilities for variation.\(^5\)

Knowing each side’s preference orders we can then predict how the game will play out in a game in which both sides possess perfect knowledge of the other side’s preferences as well. For example, if state A’s preference order in a crisis subgame (Figure 2.3) is CapB > Nego > WarA > WarB > CapA and state B’s preference order is

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\(^4\) Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s (1992: 41) assumptions (7A and 7B) also include a realpolitik and domestic variant which they use to test which theoretical assumption provides the greatest explanatory power. As this discussion is not central to this dissertation these two assumptions have been relegated to this footnote.

\(^5\) Even with the restrictions Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992: 50) calculate that there remain 2,704 possible pairings of preference orders.
CapA > Nego > WarB > WarA > CapB, then the equilibrium outcome of the game would be negotiation, assuming that both sides are playing with full information.⁶

Not all conflicts, however, end in negotiation and Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) attempt to show how states will choose to go to war even with full information. One common explanation for why war occurs is that one or both parties are unable to communicate their intentions properly, thus leading to imperfect information regarding an opponent’s preferences (Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose 1989; Stoessinger 1974; Blainey 1973). Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, however, argue that the domestic variation of their interaction model shows when states might choose to go to war with both sides fully aware of the other side’s preference. In the domestic variation they argue that the key foreign policy leader is not the sole actor shaping foreign policy objectives, but instead domestic political processes also play an important role (pg. 17). These domestic processes can lead to variations in a state’s preference ordering from what would be expected in a unitary actor model and allow for some cases in which war could be initiated even under full information (see pg. 72-78).⁷

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⁶ This result can be arrived at by starting the game at the terminal nodes. At node 12 the player with the move is A after B has attacked him, because A prefers war over capitulation we will choose to fight. Thus at node 9 player B, knowing that A will choose war over capitulation, is actually choosing between war and negotiation. Because player B prefers negotiation to war, B will choose to not fight and end the crisis with a negotiation. This same logic applies for state A as well.

⁷ For example, if state A prefers capitulating to state B rather than fighting a war initiated by B and prefers fighting a war that it has initiated rather than acquiescing to state B, and if state B prefers state A capitulating to negotiation and prefers fighting a war initiated by A than acquiescing to A then the equilibrium outcome is a war initiated by A.
One of the key criticisms of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s approach is that their assertion that states will choose to wage war when they prefer to go to war is a tautology. Fearon (1995: 387) challenges the preference ordering assumptions of *War and Reason* countering claims that states will go to war when states are deadlocked and arguing that “there always exists a set of negotiated settlements that both sides prefer to fighting.” Fearon’s (1995) bargaining model demonstrates the range of negotiation that exists for two opponents and how, despite both party’s preference to a bargain over war, there still remains a potential for violent conflict. His assumption that all states would prefer to reach a pre-war bargain rather than engage in a potentially risky and costly conflict raises the question of why states are unable to reach an alternative outcome that both would prefer over a fight.

Fearon is also critical of arguments that states choose to fight rather than reach a mutually acceptable settlement due to leaders making rational miscalculations or rationally overestimating their probability of military success, thus producing an agreement regarding relative power that can only be resolved through war. The other variation is that states may lack information regarding an opponent’s willingness to fight and therefore initiate a conflict mistakenly believing that war will not follow (see Levy 1989).

Fearon (1995) also argues that these explanations are not sufficient since in both cases there is an incentive for each side to share private information that would lead to a peaceful resolution. Therefore, Fearon looks at the incentives states may have for misrepresenting themselves while bargaining. While states have an incentive to come to an agreement that is cheaper than war, they also have the incentive to do well in the
bargaining. Sometimes, Fearon argues, states cannot use “quiet diplomatic conversations to discover mutually preferable settlements” (pg. 400). The use of force may be seen as necessary to cultivate a reputation for having lower costs for fighting, which may help in future bargains. The use of force can also be used as a credible means to reveal private information about one’s military strength. Thus, a rising power may use force as a way to demonstrate its increased capabilities, while a declining power may refuse to fight in order to hide its decreased capabilities (Fearon 1995: 400-401).

Commitment problems are a second reason states may still go to war despite both sides sharing an equal assessment of the bargaining range. Commitment problems emerge when for structural reasons states are unable to trust each other to uphold the deal. In an anarchic system states may find that there are incentives to renege on a non-enforceable bargain. When this is the case states will be reluctant to enter into an agreement and be inclined toward war (Fearon 1995: 401-409).

As with the foreign policy models discussed above, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s (1992) international interaction game and Fearon’s (1995) bargaining model also focus exclusively on interactions between states. As a result their findings are specific to these types of interactions. A state versus non-state interaction game, however, might yield different results. Do these same assumptions and logical inferences hold for an interaction game between a state and a non-state actor? How states calculate likely outcomes and consequently order their preferences may differ when the interaction is with a non-state actor. For example, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s assumption four—that all nations prefer to resolve their differences through
negotiation rather than war—may lose some of its strength. The dynamics of the game when it involves a non-state actor means that in many of these interactions the state will assume that there is little chance for a sustained war since most non-state actors do not possess the needed resources to engage in such an action. Therefore, a state will conclude that there is less chance for a conflict that involves a state and a non-state actor to result in a devastating, mass-casualty war.\(^8\) Thus, states when dealing with an opponent that they consider militarily weak, may prefer a war that they believe they have a high likelihood of winning outright to a negotiation where their military superiority might not necessarily translate into the most favorable outcome. Allowing for a relaxation of assumption four, therefore, creates a game, when played by two asymmetric actors, that has a high potential for ending in “war.”

This can be demonstrated in a game in which player A, or the state, has a preference order in which CapB > WarA > WarB > Nego > CapA. In the first phase of the game the non-state actor chooses to make or not make a demand on the state in question (node 1). (At this point it is not necessarily the case that the non-state actor would be designated as violent.) The demand can be direct such as asking for an outside power to remove its troops from a territory or it can be indirect such as a non-state actor making a demand on its own government that, if carried, out would threaten the interests of another state.

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\(^8\) Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992:69) distinguish between the variables WAR and BIGWAR, where WAR represents conflicts in which fatalities fall between the Correlates of War one thousand killed threshold and BIGWAR having fatalities above that threshold. In an interaction between states and violent non-state actors
If the non-state actor makes a demand, the state must then choose to acquiesce or to make a counter demand (node 3). The state’s decision will be based on its calculations for whether its expected utility would be greater in a fight, negotiation, or war versus what it loses for acquiescing. Because of the large power differences that exist between states and non-state actors, it is assumed that most states will assume that a greater utility could be gained by continuing on over acquiescing. Therefore, it is likely that the game will progress to node 5. At node 5, the non-state actor must choose whether it will fight or not fight. At this point the game moves into the subcrisis game (figure 2.2). If the non-state actor does choose to fight the state must choose how to respond (node 10). The state can either capitulate or fight back. Again, because of the large power differences that generally exist between states and non-state actors it is assumed that most states will choose to fight rather than capitulate, thus ending the game in a “war.” However, if the non-state actor chooses to not fight the game moves to node 9. At this point it is up to the state to choose whether to fight or not.

The fog and uncertainty associated with war make decisions to go to war riskier than other, less violent, outcomes. In terms of an expected utility function, a risky war is often seen as less desirable than even a sub-optimal negotiation. However, states may calculate the probabilities of victory differently when confronted with non-state threats. The large power differences between states and non-state actors may lead to a state believing that the probabilities for victory are much greater against a non-state actor; thus changing its expected utility to favor war.

This change in the preference order by states when confronting non-state actors will affect decisions to escalate a conflict, both for the state and the non-state actor. If
non-state groups know that making demands against a state will likely result in violent repercussions, they may be less willing to make challenges altogether. Despite the deterrence inherent in these asymmetric relationships, non-state actors continue to challenge states—and often do so violently. There are several explanations for this behavior. First, non-state actors might not be aware that their demands are posing a threat to an external state actor. In many instances demands made by non-state actors are directed solely at internal state actors without consideration for how those demands impact the larger regional or international status quo. Thus, what a non-state actor perceives as an internal conflict escalates into an external conflict.

Second, outside actors may see non-state actors as a tool for increasing their own regional or international power. Throughout the Cold War various non-state movements would declare either a Marxist or Western allegiance with the aim of receiving military and financial aid from either the Soviet Union or the United States. These additional resources not only improved their abilities to make demands, but they also increased the likelihood that the non-supplying superpower would feel threatened by their actions. Empirical findings from Gurr’s Minorities at Risk project (2000: 236) find that ethnopolitical groups receiving transnational support from foreign governments are 3.4 times more likely to rebel than groups not receiving foreign aid.

Third, high levels of oppression on either a domestic or international scale to all forms of opposition may push groups to take up arms since even non-violent organizing is attacked. In Colombia, for example, President Guillermo Valencia’s legalization of “self defense” groups in 1965 and the introduction of “state of siege” legislation that allowed troops to arrest and court martial civilians accused of vague and generalized
crimes, caused an environment in which the only method of dissent appeared to be taking up arms (Kirk 2003: 56). Gurr (2000: 235) also finds that ethnopolitical groups subject to repression are 16.4 times more likely to rebel than groups that are not subject to repression.

Fourth, because a state would be expected to dominate on a traditional battlefield, violent non-state groups usually seek non-traditional methods by which to carry out their attacks. Clandestine terrorist groups or guerrilla forces are less visible targets than an organized military. The ability to use non-traditional forms of violence creates the perception by non-state groups that they are “non-touchable” and that their cause is winnable.

Fifth, what could be classified as “non-rational” factors, can also contribute to a group’s belief that they can violently engage a state actor. Groups that believe in the “inevitable tide of history” or believe they are operating under a “divine mandate” may choose to fight despite their weaker position. Individuals in such movements will also be more willing to fight despite their low chances for success.

Without the institutional structures in place that allow non-state actors to be able to bargain with states, it is likely that these two types of conflicts will exhibit high levels of matching behavior—even more so than is observed in state-state interactions. However, there may be other factors as well that impact the dynamics of these relationships that are discussed briefly below.
Values and Threats

Violent non-state actors’ actions are not always aimed directly at a state that suffers the foreign policy crisis. For example, a crisis can be triggered by a non-state actor striking or overthrowing the regime of an ally. The challenge presented by violent non-state actors derives from both the actual actions of the group and from the perceptions and interpretations of those actions by the state experiencing the crisis. While the damage a non-state actor inflicts can at times be great, there are very few cases in which the actions of such a group actually threaten the existence of a state—one of the key concerns of the state according to a realist interpretation of state behavior (Waltz 1979). Even instances in which a non-state actor has successfully inflicted grave damage against a state are rare. Generally what a violent non-state actor does to trigger a crisis for a state smaller in scale in comparison to the capabilities available to a state. However, non-state actors have clearly challenged states and states have responded dramatically to these challenges. This section examines the concept of threat and how it is that non-state actors do threaten a state to the extent that it triggers a foreign policy crisis.

Foreign policy decision-makers respond to international events based on their perceptions of threat. Cohen (1978: 93) states that:

Threat perception is the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction in international crisis. When threat is not perceived, even in the face of objective evidence, there can be no mobilization of defensive resources. Hence the phenomenon of surprise. Conversely, threat may be perceived and countermeasures taken, even when the opponent possesses no malicious intent.

Threat itself should be understood in both its passive and active forms. In its passive form threat refers to the anticipation of danger whether that danger is real or
not; whereas, in its active form threat refers to the action of one actor imposing sanctions on another. Decision-makers arrive at decisions by going through, first, an initial stage of observation in which cues are received, followed by a secondary stage of appraisal in which those cues are evaluated and recognized as either threatening or benign (Cohen 1978: 95). During this process decision-makers filter out information they consider, whether consciously or unconsciously, to be irrelevant. This filtering process functions as a heuristic device to help the decision-maker focus on those cues that are most key to his or her country’s national interest. However, observation and appraisal can also be hindered by these shortcuts, as decision-makers ignore unfamiliar cues that may have far-reaching consequences.

Cohen (1978: 96-99) identifies three conditions that cue high levels of threat perception by decision-makers. First, the events are concerned with or involve areas of high strategic or emotional importance. Second, the triggering events take place within an atmosphere of tension and mistrust between the actors involved. Third, the decision-makers feel a high sense of vulnerability to their opponent in the specific area of the crisis.

Threat can be magnified when the opponent is not just viewed as a political challenger, but fits a sinister enemy image. Finlay, Holsti and Fagen (1967:1) describe the enemy as:

Something or someone we perceive to be threatening harmful, or injurious to our welfare or wishes. More particularly, we perceive malice or malevolence in the acts or intentions of another party. It is a result, then, of our view of those intentions and activities which leads us to consider as an enemy. Our view of his intent may be quite sound—that is, it may have basis in “objective fact”—or it may be a projection of other factors, such as our aggressive impulses from the past directed toward an available target. In this latter connection, our idea of an
enemy depends to a large extent upon how we consciously or unconsciously view ourselves, for the image of the self often shapes the image of the other.

Further, Finlay, Holsti and Fagen (1967: 2) characterize a salient enemy as an active threat, strong, proximate, and ego-relevant. That is, an enemy has the capability to do immediate and significant damage to oneself, and directly affects one’s belief system. An enemy, of course, can be politically useful. By fostering an environment of good versus evil and us versus them, enemies can help a leader achieve policy and political objectives and can bolster a leader’s “good-guy” image. By characterizing a challenger as evil or immoral, a policymaker can be given additional leeway with potential policy options (Wayne 2003: 105).

Understanding the limitation of violent non-state actor power, the first question we should ask is what values these groups threaten and how these differ from the types of values threatened by states. According to ICB, threats to values can include economic, political, limited military, territorial threats as well as threats to a state’s influence in the international system or regional subsystem, the threat of grave damage due to large casualties in war or mass bombings, and threats to a state’s existence. However, violent non-state actors generally do not possess the resources to cause grave damage to a state, cause severe economic hardships, or to threaten a state’s existence. Therefore, depending on its goals and capabilities, a violent non-state actor can reasonably make political and limited territorial threats as well as cause limited military damage and threaten a state’s influence in either the international system or a regional subsystem (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).
What values a state threatens might have important implications for how a state chooses to respond to that threat. For example, power transition theory argues that war can best be predicted by understanding the dynamics of power between two state actors (Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980; de Soysa, Oneal and Park 1997; DiCicco and Levy 1999). When one state’s power approaches the power of a dominant state, power transition theory predicts that there will be a higher likelihood for war. Thus, one might expect to see crises that threaten the influence of a state to be more likely to lead to a violent response as that state tries to maintain its regional or international position.

A state’s domestic politics may also impact how they perceive threats from external non-state actors. Farnham (2003) examines how liberal-democratic norms shape the threat perceptions of democratic leaders. Farnham argues that democratic leader’s expectation that others will abide by certain norms with regards to the peaceful settlement of disputes, leads democratic leaders’ to react more aggressively when those norms are violated. This reflects Cohen’s (1979) argument that once an opponent violates a trust or undertakes an illegitimate and impermissible action, that opponent is then expected to systematically violate those norms in the future as well. This is especially salient with non-state actors as they are challenging the legitimacy of and work outside of the nation-state system of which liberal democracies are a part. Thus, actions by non-state groups are often perceived to violate global norms.

Farnham (2003: 405) further argues that these norms are unique to democracies and leaders of democratic countries. A “democratic culture of conflict resolution” emphasizes “important procedural norms,” such as “reciprocal responsiveness, mutual
adjustment, and joint gains,” as well as the concept of balance of power being replaced with “reciprocal exchanges” (see also Raymond 1994: 27; Chan 1997: 76; and Mousseau 1998: 227). Thus, non-state actors that rely on violence or the threat of violence to pursue their political goals should be especially problematic for such states.

Conclusion

Foreign policy decision-making is an interdependent process. However, most thinking regarding these decisions focuses on interactions between states. With violent non-state actors playing an increasingly important role in the world, how states choose to respond is an essential mode of inquiry. This chapter has examined questions of reciprocity, sequential decision-making and bargaining and proposed how the characteristics of violent non-state actors change the dynamics of these interactions. In a bargaining scenario the capabilities of each actor, the perception of each actor's opponent’s capabilities, along with those actors’ abilities to communicate between each other are essential in reaching an efficient solution. When bargaining takes place between two state actors both sides possess rough knowledge of each others’ capabilities, each sides’ willingness to use force, and the knowledge that if force is used it will be conventional in nature. In addition, both states have a recognized political structure and traditional institutions to which protests, threats and compromise can be directed.

With violent non-state actors, however, this is not always the case. Non-state actors use non-traditional forms of violence thus making it harder to know their capabilities and their willingness to use those capabilities. Also, non-state actors don’t
possess the formal institutions found in states making it difficult for states to develop a diplomatic response to these crises. Additionally, the leaders of non-state groups do not always have the power to enforce any agreements that are made. When an agreement is reached, but perceived by a proportion of a non-state group as disagreeable, it can be difficult for non-state leaders to enforce compliance. More often than not, the group will split creating a new headache for the crisis actor. Thus, non-state actors pose a number of problems for states: their capabilities and motivations are less knowable, they lack the political institutions that make negotiating agreements possible, and even when a negotiation does take place they may not be able to enforce that agreement among the population they purport to represent. Chapter three will further examine the structure of these non-state groups both in terms of the political issues they pursue and the violent tactics they employ.
Chapter 3

Violent Non-State Actors

Violent non-state actors are those non-state groups that pursue their political goals through the use of or the threat to use violence. Here, the non-state actors of interest are those that threaten, whether intentionally or unintentionally, an external state’s national interests in such a way that it represents a crisis for that country, necessitating some form of foreign policy response. Often the challenge presented can be indirect, such as revolutionary or fundamentalist movements that threaten the regime of an ally or contribute to system or regional instability; it can also be direct such as al-Qaeda’s September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States or a secessionist movement that challenges the existing borders of a state. While their actions often have a global impact, the majority of these groups operate in the Third World, taking advantage of the weak political institutions prevalent there (Migdal 1988; Jackson 1990). Not included in this definition are violent groups that do not threaten any outside state’s national interest or groups that might be considered a threat but do not employ, do not threaten to employ, nor have the intention to employ violent means. In addition, this dissertation focuses exclusively on politically motivated groups and does not look at those violent non-state groups with purely economic goals such as transnational criminal organizations.
Many states have relations—both cooperative and antagonistic—with violent non-state actors operating outside their state boundaries. In addition, non-state groups have always competed for domestic and international political power. When a country (or the international system as a whole) does not possess the pluralistic institutions in which groups can peacefully contend for political power, or when the institutions exist but do not satisfy political aspirations, some groups will choose to adopt an armed response.\(^1\) The actions taken by these groups potentially threaten external state-actors and often have far-reaching international implications. A state, for instance, may feel threatened by armed uprisings in other states when those uprisings challenge a friendly government, threaten members of a state’s majority ethnic group living within the other state’s border, threaten economic interests, or represent a hostile ideology.

However, as demonstrated by the policies of the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, the relations between states and violent non-state actors operating in other states are not always antagonistic, and may, in fact, be used to advance the mutual goals of both actors. Violent non-state actors may challenge a government hostile to the external state’s goals, be members of a kindred ethnic group, or purport to represent a common ideology. In many cases these groups are able to successfully achieve their goals because of the external support received from state actors (Bob 2000; Regan 2000; Saideman 2002a). This support often comes because a state sees the activities of the group as an easy way to advance its foreign policy.

\(^{1}\) Although increased political opportunities does not necessarily guarantee that violent groups will cease to exist. In Spain, for example, violence increased after the establishment a democratic government (Shabad and Llera Ramo 1995).
objectives without direct involvement. By aiding the enemy of one’s enemy with arms or funding, a state is able to indirectly attack and disrupt another state’s activities (O’Brien 1996). For example, during the Cold War both superpowers were involved in supporting numerous non-state movements including the United States funding and helping arm the Nicaraguan Contras (albeit illegally) in their attempt to overthrow the Socialist Sandanista government and the Soviet Union aiding the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola in its successful effort to win Angola's "second war of liberation" (see Katz 1990).

Since the end of World War II, states’ interests in violent non-state actors have grown for a number of reasons. Foremost was the Cold War relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, coupled with the impact of the decolonization movement. Both sides of the Cold War rivalry perceived the other as attempting to expand their respective ideology across the globe—or to at least prevent the other from doing so.

These perceptions were not entirely misplaced. Trotsky, at the First Comintern Congress in 1919, stated: “Our task is to mobilize the forces of all genuinely revolutionary parties of the world proletariat and thereby hasten the victory of communist revolution throughout the world” (quoted in Barnet 1968: 61). Kruschev echoed this sentiment in a June 1960 speech at the United Nations in which he pledged support for “wars of national liberation” while emphatically banging his shoe on the table. In the United States, national security doctrines such as the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines and Kennedy and Johnson’s counter-revolution policies were derived with the explicit goal of preventing Communist expansion into an ever-
broadening sphere of U.S. influence. This rivalry led to a series of interventions into
the affairs of other states, often with the intention to either support or counter
revolutionary movements that were perceived to help or hinder either sides’ larger
strategic goals. ²

The prevalence of the superpowers in post World War II crises involving violent
non-state actors is reflected in ICB data. Of the fifty-four ICB cases in which a violent
non-state actor triggers a crisis for a state between 1945 and 1991 only eight do not
involve either the United States or the Soviet Union (See Table 2.1). While there is no
case in which the United States and the Soviet Union had simultaneous direct military
involvement, in nineteen cases the Soviet Union and in seventeen cases the United
States provided either covert support or had semi-military involvement. Additionally,
the Soviet Union was either politically or economically involved in fifteen cases and the
United States was economically or politically involved in fifteen cases. However, the
United States was much more susceptible to experiencing a foreign policy crisis at the
triggered by a non-state actor. The United States was the crisis actor in eleven cases
during the Cold War while the Soviet Union was the crisis actor in just two. ³

² Yoon’s (1997) study on U.S. intervention in Third World internal wars between 1945-
1989 shows a significant relationship to instances of U.S. intervention when there either
occurred previous intervention by a Soviet ally or a communist presence in an internal
war. Yoon did not find, however, a significant relationship between direct Soviet
intervention and U.S. intervention despite such high profile cases as Angola, Nicaragua,
Afghanistan, and El Salvador.

³ A crisis actor is a state that experiences a threat to its values, a heightened probability
of military engagement, and a limited time for response. While the United States and
the Soviet Union were involved in some capacity in most of these crises there are only a
few in which either experienced a crisis for themselves.
Table 3.1. United States and Soviet Crisis Involvement, 1945 - 1991

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR Not Involved/Neutral</th>
<th>Political or Economic Involvement</th>
<th>Covert or Semi-Military Involvement</th>
<th>Direct Military Involvement</th>
<th>USSR Crisis Actor</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>54</td>
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</table>

The end of the Cold War did not end states’ reliance on violent non-state actors to pursue their political goals. When the United States invaded Afghanistan following September 11th it was able to largely avoid the use of its own ground troops by relying on the Northern Alliance—a hodge-podge of regional warlords and former members of the Afghani ruling class who were already engaged in a civil war against Afghanistan’s Taliban government. However, reliance on such groups can be problematic as the United States discovered when it could not prevent the armies of the Northern Alliance from entering Kabul after the Taliban fled. Nor was this non-state group particularly helpful in the task of pinning down al-Qaeda, as its principal goal was to overthrow the Taliban regime (Woodward 2002).

Similarly, regional rivalries between states have also exacerbated conflict involving violent non-state actors. The Yemen civil war, for instance, brought to the
fore the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Egypt concerning the future direction of the region. Saudi Arabia, which supported the Royalists, used the conflict to assert its vision of a dynastic-dominated region, while Egypt and Nasser used the conflict to promote its version of pan-Arabism (Dresch 2000; Gause 1990; Badeeb 1986; Rahmy 1983).

There have also been significant instances of violent events caused by non-state actors not necessarily attributable to Cold War or regional rivalries. Numerous groups resorted to violent means in order to promote ethnic, religious, and ideological goals that existed independent of superpower influence. There has been, until recently, a steady increase in ethnopolitical protest and rebellion since World War II. Upward trends in ethnopolitical conflict began in the 1950s and accelerated in the 1970s, reaching their height in the mid-1990s after which they begin to decline (Gurr 2000). Self-determination movements, although largely unsuccessful outside of the context of decolonization, also saw a steady rise of cases up until the mid-1990s (Gurr and Quinn 2003: 31). Not all of these events have had a direct effect on outside states, but as more groups have sought political goals through violent means the greater impact these pursuits have had on other states in the international system.

The consequence has been a long period of bloodshed as groups have utilized an array of violent methods to pursue their political goals. Between 1981 and 2002, for instance, the United States Department of State recorded an average of 442.6 international terrorist attacks per year (with a high of 665 occurring in 1987 and a low of 199 occurring in 2002). And with access to greater numbers of small arms and light weapons, ever more lethal armed guerrilla groups have continued to proliferate

Defining Violent Non-State Actors

In general, the term “violent non-state actor” would denote any non-state group that uses violence, regardless of their political and/or economic goals or the target of their violence. Any group, from street gangs to revolutionary movements, could fit into such a broad category. Such an all-encompassing definition, however, does not suit the research goals of this project. As previously stated, this dissertation is specifically interested in the foreign policy of states threatened by non-state actors that operate outside their borders. More so, it is especially interested in those violent non-state actors whose actions lead to a foreign policy crisis for that state actor.

Several prior attempts have been made to understand these types of actors and the societal conditions that lead to the formation of such groups and encourages individuals to join (Crenshaw 1995; Peters 1994; Crayton 1991; Weinberg 1991). Peters (1994), in a rather crude description of this phenomenon, refers to those who join and make up such groups as the “new warrior class.” Warriors, according to Peters (1994: 16), are “erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order.” These individuals, Peters argues, have helped fuel conflicts throughout the world, including in such diverse places as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Angola.
Peters is most concerned with the structural conditions that tend to spur individuals toward joining these violent groups. He argues that these “warriors” emerge from four social pools. The first pool consists of those from the “underclass”—typically unemployed and uneducated “men” with a rudimentary understanding of nationalist ideology. These men are not, according to Peters, motivated by coherent political goals, but instead are drawn to violence for violence’s sake. When fighting and violence have taken over a society many of the important structural elements of that society (such as schools, formal worship systems, communities, and families) are destroyed. This destruction, Peters argues, leads to the second pool of warriors—men who would have otherwise led productive lives but are drawn into the company of these violent groups due to these societal breakdowns. The third pool is made up of the “patriots” or those “who fight out of strong belief, either in ethnic, religious, or national superiority or endangerment, or those who have suffered a personal loss in the course of a conflict that motivates them to take up arms.” The fourth pool of warriors comes from the dispossessed, cashiered or otherwise failed military men left over from the decommissioned armies of the post-Cold War world. Thus, according to Peters, states suffering social and economic breakdowns; split between religious, nationalist or ethnic lines; and already or recently engaged in armed conflict will find a large pool of individuals willing to join violent non-state groups.

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4 Peters specifically references men, claiming that these individuals are typically unattractive to women and use membership in these groups as a method to “seize the women” who once avoided them. However, how he has been able to sufficiently test this hypothesis remains unclear. For an analysis on the role of women in terrorist organizations see Cunningham (2004).
Weinberg (1991) further argues that the appearance and disappearance of groups that utilize political violence generally, and terrorism specifically, corresponds with developments internal to political parties and to changes within the political system in which they operate. Political parties vie for political power and, in an open political system, are generally able to do so via peaceful means. However, a political system that prevents political parties from operating can also push groups to adopt violent means. At times political parties have deliberately formed subsidiaries to carry out a party’s goals through violent acts, such as the Combat Organization of the Russian Social Revolutionaries. On the other hand, violent non-state actors with a strong popular base have also shifted their tactics away from violence to become viable political parties, such as the PLO in Palestine or the IRA in Northern Ireland, when the political system allows for increased participation.

This argument is echoed by Crenshaw (1995) who contends that groups that use terror, which unlike other forms of political violence such as riots, require a sustained commitment, must be able to justify itself to some part of society’s values and aspirations. Crenshaw speculates that terrorists “may see themselves acting as representatives of groups within society, defending and preserving an identity, or preventing the assimilation of a religious or ethnic community into an alien society that would dilute its values and traditions” (pg. 15). Like all political actors, these groups have a perception of what constituencies want and have chosen a specific, albeit violent, method for helping that constituency achieve its goals.

5 This can be applied to members of guerrilla movements as well.
Therefore, the first condition for the definition of violent non-state actors is that they seek to obtain political goals, that is, they are making some demand on either the state or on the larger international political structure. In order to distinguish between the various types of non-state actors that make political demands, this research classifies violent non-state actors into three categories: ideological or revolutionary movements, ethnopolitical or identity movements, and fundamentalist or religious movements. Most significant violent groups (with the exception of transnational criminal organizations which are not a focus of this research) fall into one (or more) of these categories.

The second condition is that they rely on violence, or the threat of violence, to pursue their political goals. At the very least a group must either use violence, implicitly or explicitly threaten to use violence, or be actively acquiring the means to wage violence in order to be classified a violent non-state actor. In addition, their potential to use violence must threaten the interests of an outside state. Thus a group such as the Khalistan National Army which targets the Indian government in their effort to obtain a Sikh homeland in India’s Punjab province would not fit this definition as it is solely an internal threat to India. However, the Greek revolutionary movement 17 November, which seeks to force U.S. and NATO military bases out of Greece, would.

Below is a more detailed description of each of the three categories of non-state groups. As is often the case, no group fits any one category perfectly; therefore these categories represent ideal types. For instance, the distinction between an ethnopolitical/identity group and a religious/fundamentalist group can at times prove problematic. This becomes clear, for instance, when looking at the complicated case of the Lebanese civil war and the divisions between Christians and Muslims. For some,
such as leftist Muslims upset over their under-representation in the Lebanese government, the conflict was fueled by secular divisions based on a distinct communal identity and questions of representation; while for others, such as Hezbollah, the conflict was ultimately motivated by the religious goal to create an Islamist state. Ideological movements, as well, may draw most of their leadership and/or followers from a single ethnic group with strong nationalist and identity-based motivations, such as the Vietninh or Pathet Lao in Southeast Asia. While these groups were clearly driven by ideological goals to establish a Marxist state, many of those drawn into the group were drawn in for nationalist reasons with the hopes that its Marxists elements could later be marginalized (Karnow 1991).

Decisions on how to classify groups into one of these three criteria were based on two criteria. First, how the state experiencing the crisis perceives the group is taken into account. Because this dissertation is about state responses to these groups, the crisis actors’ perceptions are of paramount importance. Second, if there remains a question regarding the classification then the most dominant excluding factor of the group is used. For example, a group that is perceived to be both an identity-based and ideological movement would consider which of these two categories excludes membership. However, a group may appeal to broad-based nationalist ideals, but its leadership consists exclusively of members of a specific ideological persuasion. Because the ideology is exclusive, and presumably excludes nationalists that do not agree with that ideology, the group is therefore classified as a revolutionary/ideological movement. While no classification method is perfect, this provides a basic framework for understanding the political motivations of each of these groups.
Revolutionary/Ideological Movements

Ideological movements are primarily concerned with the revolutionary overthrow of an existing political system in order to replace it with a competing form of secular government. Revolution is generally considered to refer to a radical and sudden change in a system of government through non-electoral means, often accompanied with violence (Evans 1998). A revolution is not simply the replacement of one set of rulers with another, but instead it seeks to create a new state based on fundamentally different values, social classes, political institutions, and political communities (Walt 1996). Analyses of when and why revolutionary groups have emerged have ranged from studies concerning the psychological motivation of actors (Gurr 1970), to structural explanations (Skocpol 1979), to rational actor models (Ginkel and Smith 1999; Lichbach 1995). Successful revolutions generally rely on the convergence of a number of factors, including a decline in state resources, elite alienation, and increased social mobility (Goldstone 1991).

The primary motivation for group members in an ideological movement is to pursue an agenda that seeks political change not predicated by ethnicity or religion. Whereas ethnopolitical or fundamentalist movements—to be explained in more detail below—may be more willing to seek group autonomy or a set of group-specific concessions, an ideological movement generally seeks the complete overthrow of the existing political structure of the country within it they operates. These movements can be situated either on the left or the right of the political spectrum, and usually represent
a dramatically different ideology from the current ruling elite. Efforts to install a Marxist regime or a *coup d’etat* to put into place a right-wing military *junta* would be examples of revolutionary/ideological movements.

Revolutions can be purely ideologically driven, or they can be motivated by the desire to overthrow an oppressive, corrupt or unpopular regime. In some cases ideology is often an outgrowth of, rather than an impetus to, revolution. In Russia, for example, communism did not become a major force until after the fall of the Czarist regime (see Figes 1996) and Migdal (1974) argues that Communists gained adherents among the peasantry not because of the attractiveness of communist thought, but because communist parties were more prepared to organize peasants for land reform and protecting traditional village communities from the state or landlords. Others have argued that both the Iranian and the Nicaraguan revolutions were more a result of the outgrowths to the policies of the Shah and Somosa respectively, than they were of any religious or ideological impetus (Walker 1995; Green 1984). Therefore, the emergence of movements seeking to overthrow an existing political system is not necessarily predicated on an established ideological belief system, but instead can be a reaction to policies of the state. Nor does an ideologically motivated group need to even come close to achieving its goal of overthrowing the state in order for it to be considered a threat by the state and its allies.

A group, therefore, is classified as ideological if its political goals include changing the political structure of the centralized government from any form of government to one that is secularly defined. Generally, ideological movements are more concerned with regime change than with lesser concessions such as power sharing
or autonomy (although this may ultimately be the outcome). While a revolutionary movement’s political goals are likely to be directed primarily toward its own government, its actions often will threaten the interests of an outside state. For example, the numerous groups fighting in Angola’s civil war in the mid 1970s led to crises for multiple states including South Africa, Cuba, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Because successful revolutions require a convergence of multiple factors, the presence of ideologically driven groups does not necessarily indicate that widespread revolutionary activity is occurring. Without elite or mass support it becomes extremely difficult for such groups to pose a viable threat to an existing government (see Goldstone 1991). However, just the existence of such a group, specifically an armed group willing to use violence to achieve its goals, may cause a state to perceive it as a viable future threat. Outside states as well may react to these groups, not necessarily because of the current threat, but because of the unknown future threat they represent.

Ethnopolitical/Identity Movements

Few states have homogenous populations. Instead, most are made up of multiple ethnic groups each with its own unique culture, history, and claims. As the colonial era drew to an end, many of these groups sought to exercise their claims on their right for national self-determination. Emerging international norms of equality, in addition to improved modes of travel and advancing information technologies, led to groups comparing their own standing in society against that of other groups living in close proximity. This new awareness helped spur a number of movements by aggrieved
ethnic groups to either pursue a state of their own, or, at the least, achieve a level of autonomy that would protect them from the interference of others (Horowitz 1985: 5).

Identity is defined as “the understanding of oneself in relationship to others” (Barnett 2002: 62; see also Tajfel 1978; Dittmer and Kimm 1993; Smith 1991; and Wendt 1994). It is not psychological, but derives from an individual’s knowledge of belonging to a social group that distinguishes him or herself from an other. Barnett (2002: 62) further states that “all political identities depend on the actor’s interaction with others and the actor’s place within an institutional context. Thus, national and state identities are partly formed in relationship to those outside the community and the larger territory.”

Identity can take on many forms, but is most often centered on ethnic, nationalist, or religious ties. Strong ethnic identity has been shown to be an especially salient characteristic of many peoples throughout the world, with ethnic identity often trumping all other forms of identity including citizenship (Kinket and Veryukten 1997; Belote and Belote 1984; Campbell, Mare, and Walker 1995; Veryukten 1991; Driedger 1976; Nelson 1979). Thus we are likely to see identity conflicts arise when competing identities, such as an ethnic identity versus a national identity, call for contradictory behavior (Barnett 2002).

Gurr (2000a: 65) defines ethnopolitical conflict as those “conflicts in which claims are made by a national or minority group against the state or against other political actors.” Gurr argues that the greater salience of ethnocultural identity for a group with shared descent, historical experience, and cultural traits, the more likely that that group will define their interests in ethnocultural terms and the easier it will be for
its leaders to mobilize them for collective action. These groups, Gurr argues, differ from the self-interested actors characterized by Tilly (1978), because they not only resent their disadvantages and seek redress, but do so with passion, self-righteousness, and solidarity with their kindred (Gurr 2000a: 69).

According to the Minorities at Risk project, violent ethnic conflict continued to increase following World War II and suffered a dramatic spike at the end of the Cold War as new states, mainly in Eastern Europe, emerged. However, the number of ongoing ethnopolitical conflicts has decreased since its peak in 1993. Of the 59 armed conflicts with ethnonationalist motivations reported in 1999 by the Minorities at Risk project, 23 were de-escalating, 29 remained constant in their intensity and seven were escalating. Two-thirds of new ethnonationalist rebellions and protest since 1985 began between 1989 and 1993; and very few have begun since 1993. Between 1980 and 1998, discrimination decreased for over one-third of the groups monitored by Minorities at Risk (Gurr 2000b: 52-54).

The impact that ethnopolitical conflicts have on interstate conflict has been highlighted in numerous studies (see Brown 1993; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Carment 1993; Carment and James 1995; Davis, Jaggers, and Moore 1997; Moore and Davis 1998). Gurr and Harff (1994: xiii), for example, note that of the 22 “hot wars” being fought in 1993, all but five were connected to some form of communal rivalries or ethnic challenges. Additionally, Lake and Rothchild (1998: 3) in the introduction of their edited volume cite many analysts’ fears that internal ethnic conflict will escalate and draw in outside states and opportunists.
In sum, identity/ethnopolitical movements consist of those violent groups whose main political goal is to advance a political agenda centered on ethnic or nationalist goals. Cases of nationalist movements were most prominent during and following decolonization in which newly formed and emerging states were working to rid themselves of their former European masters. Ethnopolitical movements, on the other hand, usually arise when multiple ethnic groups seek political power within a state and do not necessarily want to overthrow a political system per se, but at the very least seek to gain greater representation in it or autonomy from it. In both cases, the group is seeking greater political power based primarily on questions of identity and not ideology or religion—although questions of ideology and religion often accompany these movements. Examples of identity/ethnopolitical movements include the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Army for the Liberation of Sahara, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front.

**Fundamentalist/Religious Movements**

The third category, fundamentalist/religious movements, is characterized by those movements in which the member’s primary motivation is the advancement of a religious theology. These can include efforts to put in place a theocratic regime, target members of a rival religious sect, or counter forces perceived as undermining one’s religious society. Fundamentalist movements exist in most major religions including Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Islam. And while many violent fundamentalist movements are situated in the Islamic world, they do not constitute the entire scope of
these movements. Christian, Jewish, and Hindu groups have also regularly utilized violent means to achieve their goals.

Fundamentalism is commonly connected to the idea that only a strict adherence to religious tenets can bring about a prosperous society and generally rejects Western secularism. Islamic fundamentalism, for example, views the decline of Muslim power brought about by military defeat and Western colonialism to an abandonment of religious faith and piety amongst Muslims. Thus, Islamists believe, only a return to a devotional lifestyle can bring about a civilizational revival (Davidson 2002). Such beliefs, of course, are not unique to Islam and can be found in all major religions including Christianity and Judaism. Today, Islamic fundamentalism generally receives more attention from policymakers and commentators because the activities of these groups, at least recently, have had larger international implications. In fact, all but one ICB crises instigated by fundamentalist violent non-state actors between 1945 and 2001 stem from Islamic groups (see chapter four).

In the selection of cases from the ICB used in this dissertation, not only are crises triggered by religious/fundamentalist groups the rarest, but they also emerge much later than the other two groups, with the first instance being during the Lebanon Civil War in 1976. Following the oil crises of the 1970s there was a resurgence of fundamentalist/religious movements, specifically Islamic movements, in the Middle East. While these movements existed prior to the oil crises (Mitchell 1987), there has been a noticeable difference in the level of mass support for these movements since 1973 (Davis 1987: 38-39).
Generally the term fundamentalism garners negative reactions and is used here somewhat cautiously. Esposito (1999: 5-6) makes the point that fundamentalism, especially with regards to Islam, has been used rather loosely by both the press and the media. The term “Islamic fundamentalism,” Esposito argues, is “too laden with Christian presuppositions and Western stereotypes, as well as implying a monolithic threat that does not exist; more fitting general terms are ‘Islamic revivalism’ or ‘Islamic activism,’ which are less value-laden and have roots within the Islamic tradition” (pg. 6). With this caveat in mind, the term fundamentalism will continue to be used here, with the idea that can be applied to a wide range of religious political movements.

There are a number of possible reasons why more attention has been given to Islamist movements over other forms of religious political movements. Christianity’s major population center is among the Western states and since the Peace of Westphalia has followed and promoted an international state system that for the most part has been governed by secular law rather than theological decree. While political Christian movements have existed and various Western leaders have at times claimed divine guidance to their rule, these trends have been rare and generally have not triggered crises for other states—especially since World War II. In addition, Jewish Zionist groups, since the creation of the state of Israel, have for the most part been able to pursue their political goals through internal Israeli politics.

Islam’s history, on the other hand, is rooted in a mixture of early Muslim domination ranging from Mohammed’s conquest of the Arabian Peninsula, to the religions’ rapid expansion through Northern Africa and Asia, to the long dominance of the Ottoman Empire, followed by a legacy of colonial occupation by various Western
powers. With struggling post-colonial economies and political systems it is not surprising that individuals have latched onto an idealized Islamic past as a solution to these current woes. Because this vision of a glorified Islamic history does not conform to either the current Western state system put in place when colonial powers left or the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine, these movements tend to be directed at targets that extend beyond their internal governments.

Since the 1970s there have been a number of additional factors that have contributed to the level of animosity toward the West from various segments of Islamic society. First, during the Iranian revolution Ayatollah Khomeini invoked intense hatred toward the United States and the West, thus giving the conflict larger geopolitical meaning. This animosity was especially salient to American leaders due to its previous relationship with the Shah and the geostrategic importance Iran has traditionally held. Second, scholars like Huntington (1993) argue that the differences that exist between Islam and the West are leading to a “clash of civilizations.” Just as the competing ideologies between Communism and Western Liberalism fueled Cold War rivalries, there is a sense that a new divide exists between the secular West and Islam. This is in line with the idea of an Islamic resurgence in which Muslims accept modernization but reject Westernization. This rejection of the Western cultural norms that often accompany modernization has led to clashes between fundamentalists, Westerners, and secular governments in the Middle East (Huntington 1996). Third, some Islamist groups have been particularly effective at using violence against Western targets. These successes, and their continual efforts and stated goals to attack Western targets, have inspired other aspiring Islamist groups to adopt similar tactics and rhetoric.
Politically, Islamist groups pursue a range of goals. At the most extreme end are those which want to overthrow the current system of states and put in place an Islamic Caliphate that would effectively rule those under its dominion according to Islamic law. Other groups focus their efforts on a single state, trying to establish, either by violent means or through legitimate elections, a government that rules by Sharia.

Gunaratna (2002: 123-126) identifies four prominent types of Islamist groups operating in the world today: revolutionary, ideological, utopian, and apocalyptic. Revolutionary Islamists, according to Gunaratna, seek to legitimize violence by advocating and practicing collective decision-making. Revolutionary groups include Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Algeria’s Armed Front of the Islamic Jihadists. Ideological Islamist groups have a coherent discourse of political violence, offering a systemic set of ideas to justify violence. Violence by ideological Islamist groups are highly regulated and controlled from above and designed to suit desired political and social goals. These groups often have a widespread constituency and a social service component that by extension limits the scale and scope of violence. Examples of ideological Islamist groups include Hezbollah, Islamic Group of Egypt, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Utopian Islamist groups attempt to change the existing order. They work both locally and nationally and do not seek alliances with the state, as it is the state that they contest. According to Gunaratna (2002: 124), these groups “have no rational political approach or strategy and endorse no traditional social structure; they are reinventing tradition.” As such, their approach includes no dialogue, no negotiation, and no peacemaking. Examples of utopian groups include: the Salafist Group for Call and Combat of Algeria,
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and, until September 11, al-Qaeda. Apocalyptic Islamist groups use collective violence indiscriminately. They believe that the use of violence has been divinely proscribed and thus they are the most likely of all groups to engage in mass-casualty, catastrophic terrorism. Gunaratna identifies al-Qaeda post-September 11 and the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria as the only two Islamist groups that could be classified as apocalyptic.

In sum, fundamentalist/religious movements are those whose primary political goals are motivated by their religious beliefs. The methods with which these groups pursue these goals range from peaceful efforts through recognized political parties or social groups to casualty-producing violence. They may seek to establish a religious state such as the Shi’ite clerics in Iran or the Taliban in Afghanistan or they may also attempt to target the “infidels” around the world that act counter to their religious code, such as al-Qaeda’s efforts to attack U.S. and other Western targets.

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Over the past sixty years each of these categories of groups has challenged states and been the focus of academic scrutiny. Throughout the Cold War ideological groups and their potential impact on the global balance of power was of chief concern to policymakers in both the West and Eastern blocs. Following the break up of the Soviet Union ethnic conflict and its destabilizing effects dominated both academic and policymaking discussions. The Iranian revolution and September 11th both resulted in increased attention to the impact of fundamentalist groups. Most previous scholarship
in this area has looked at each of these specific groups independently and has not tried to understand them as a unified category (i.e. violent non-state actors). This makes sense when trying to understand the development, motivations, and goals of each type of group as they vary dramatically. However, it is not clear whether decision-makers, when their respective state is threatened by such groups, are as nuanced in their distinction. It is possible that these groups, regardless of their political motivations, trigger similar responses from the threatened state.

*Violent Tactics*

Non-state actors use a variety of tactics to accomplish their goals. Violence is one of those tactics. Research on contentious political groups has shown that violent tactics can be highly effective at helping groups obtain their goals. In *Strategy of Social Protest*, Gamson (1990) finds that violence and, more generally, disruptive tactics by protest groups are associated with success. Similar conclusions have been reached by Steedly and Foley (1979), Mirowsky and Ross (1981), McAdam (1983), Tarrow (1984), and Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (1975).

According to Lichbach (1995: 56), there are a number of reasons why violence helps groups achieve successful outcomes. Violence may be used by a group early on in order to publicize their existence, advertise their grievances, and to make known their political programs and solutions. Once a group has achieved recognition it may still choose to pursue a violent campaign. A continuing campaign of violence disrupts the status quo, challenges the veil of legitimacy valued by authorities, shocks people out of their complacency, and demonstrates that groups’ potential for further violence
In addition, a violent group gains a number of advantages in terms of their negotiations with the state. If a group does not have access to normal political channels, its viewpoints will be dismissed unless it can credibly threaten the regime. A group that can carry out sustained violent activities can increase the costs to the state to a point in which it is motivated to make concessions (Lichbach 1995: 54-61). However, this point may not come until a significant amount of lives and resources have been spent by the regime to militarily defeat the rebelling group.

Violence can also increase a group’s bargaining resources (Lichbach 1995: 58). First, the use of violence can produce a reputation for irrationality. An irrational, or reckless, strategy can sometimes make the costs associated with uncertainty too high for the state, thus forcing a negotiation (see Schelling 1966: 42; Chong 1991: 179). Second, violence helps establish a group’s reputation for toughness helping them gain concessions at the negotiation table. Third, violence makes a group’s threats more credible giving them additional resources with which to bargain (Lichbach 1995: 58; see also Schelling 1966; Chong 1991). In addition, sustained violence can sap a state’s resources and can expose a regime’s weaknesses (Lichbach 1995: 58). The tactics that non-state actors choose to employ not only help determine their chances of success, but also the type of foreign policy response one can expect. For example, policies toward a violent non-state actor that is terrorizing a state’s civilian population will likely be most immediately concerned with decreasing the number of its citizens being killed by the group regardless of the political, ethnic, or religious motivation of the group.

Which tactics a violent non-state group chooses to employ will likely be based on their perceptions of which tactics are most likely to bring about their stated goals.
with the least likelihood of threatening their future existence. Traditional military
doctrine distinguishes between counterforce and countervalue strategies (Wagner 1991;
Lutz 1983). Counterforce strategies are those that target an enemy’s force structure
while a countervalue strategy targets those things that the enemy values such as its
population centers. A counterforce strategy is utilized for the purpose of weakening or
preventing the enemy’s retaliatory capabilities while a countervalue strategy is intended
to punish and cause pain to the enemy. A similar dichotomy can be used to differentiate
between the types of tactics utilized by violent non-state actors. Violence can either be
directed toward a government’s military or security forces, or toward non-military
targets such as the civilian population, the economic sector, diplomats, or landmarks.
Presumably violent non-state actors will choose the tactic that is most likely to help
meet its larger strategic goals. However, it should also be assumed that groups will
avoid violent tactics which could expose them to a devastating response by the state.

Here violent acts directed at a state’s military are referred to as guerrilla tactics
and violent acts directed toward non-military targets are referred to as terrorist tactics.
Each tactic has its corresponding strengths and weaknesses for the group that employs
it, and which tactic a group chooses to use will depend largely on its political or
economic goals, military capabilities, and the tactics being deployed by its enemies.

The use of these terms to describe tactics can be problematic. Today they are
not typically seen as neutral descriptive terms. This is in large part due to the negative
connotations that have been attached to each through the political discourse of the past
century (Crenshaw 1995: 8). As a result some scholars either are reluctant to use these
terms for fear of partisan bias or use the terms so broadly that they include a wide range
of activities by a wide range of actors, including states (Lustick 1995; Stohl and Lopez 1984). It is for this reason that groups’ principal identification in this research is not based on the types of tactics they use, but rather by their stated political goals and purpose. Thus groups are not considered to be simply a “terrorist” or “guerrilla” organization; rather they are classified as a[n] “ethnopolitical/identity,” “revolutionary/ideological,” or “religious/fundamentalist” group that utilizes “terrorist” and/or “guerrilla” tactics to achieve their political goals. And while not all political violence is purposive, it is assumed that at least limited rationality is utilized in these groups’ decisions to use it. Below is a more detailed explanation of the two types of tactics.

**Guerrilla Tactics**

Guerrilla warfare has been commonly used by both non-state and weaker state actors throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century. Guerrilla warfare avoids direct, massed engagements with the enemy and instead relies on a series of minor skirmishes, ambushes, destruction of communication and supply lines, and lightning raids and withdrawals, in order to sap the enemy’s strength. Groups with a military disadvantage, whether in number of soldiers or lack of substantial military technology—as is generally the case with most violent non-state actors—are more likely to rely on these more stealthful tactics rather than engage in open conventional warfare. Successful guerrilla warfare, therefore, uses “local knowledge” and local support in order to compensate for its inferior numbers (Evans and Newnham 1998; Thompson 1994; Wickham-Crowley 1992; Laqueur 1976).
Mao Tse-tung (1961 [1937]) argues that successful guerrilla movements have five major components: 1) mass support; 2) party organization; 3) military organization; 4) favorable terrain; and 5) economic strength. Guerrilla tactics have been used in a large range of armed activity, including: sophisticated popular wars; armed national liberation movements conducted on a national or local level; smaller, more regionally isolated guerrilla movements posing little threat to authorities; commando actions launched from a neighboring country; and military struggles that never evolve into to much more than violent headline-grabbing activities (Chaliand 1982).

In many places guerrilla warfare has become synonymous with “revolution.” Sarkesian, writing in the mid-1970s, defines guerrilla warfare as “armed struggle between pre-existing and challenging political systems. Such wars are primarily socio-political in nature, and although armed conflict is important and may determine the outcome, the ‘politics’ of the conflict are the fundamental causes and determinants” (Sarkesian 1975: 3-4; see also Pike 1966). While the relation between revolutionary movements seeking to overthrow a government and guerrilla warfare are highly correlated, it is not assumed that this tactic is used exclusively by these movements. Guerrilla tactics have also been employed by fundamentalist groups and ethnopolitical groups, as well as by the state itself, depending on the nature of the conflict.

Why non-state groups choose to employ guerrilla tactics can be divided between explanations that relate to the structure of the international system and the influence of external state actors, and the capabilities and advantages that guerrilla warfare strategies give to the insurgent group (Scott 1970: 4-5). Post-World War II guerrilla war, for instance, can not be completely understood outside the context of the Cold War. The
Soviet Union and the United States used guerrilla movements to contend with each other without having to engage in direct confrontation. Both countries found that there were plenty of groups willing to accept a superpowers’ military and financial aid for at least a bit of lip-service to the sponsors’ ideological viewpoint. MacFarlane (1990: 7), in a discussion of the successes and failures of Soviet third world policy, argues that “[r]evolutionary forces in the third world have an interest in making [Marxist] claims, whether or not these reflect true commitments, in that they may facilitate access to assistance from the USSR and its friends.” Other groups were just as quick to declare a liberal-capitalist, or at least an anti-Marxist, ideology with the hopes of soliciting similar support from the United States. The ability to carry out these policies is enhanced by the growing capacity which states have for supporting insurgencies around the globe. Both advances in military technology and in the ability to transport these arms, made it increasingly easier for these groups to arm themselves in such a way that they could challenge state armies (see Klare and Andersen 1996). For example, the supplying of Stinger missile by the United States to Mujahuddin guerrilla forces fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan played a decisive role in the outcome of that war (Coll 2004). In addition, the presence of nuclear weapons meant that low intensity conflict and proxy wars were more desirable to the superpowers as they were less likely to escalate into larger conventional wars which could subsequently result in a nuclear exchange.

Beyond the dynamics of the Cold War rivalry there are other factors that contributed to the use of guerrilla tactics. First, the emergence of new, and consequently weak nations, particularly in Africa and Asia, provided a political
structure through which it was easier for groups to politically and violently challenge the state. However, the professionalization of states’ armed forces meant that armed civilians and mass uprisings were no longer sufficient to defeat government forces; thus, challengers had to be more disciplined as well. Guerrilla warfare confers certain advantages to the guerrilla, is economical, and may be the only way in which a group can engage the government. Finally, guerrilla groups generally include a political wing to their operations it, thus allowing them to challenge the government both politically and militarily (Scott 1970).

A group is determined to be using guerrilla tactics if its principal targets at the outset of a crisis are a state’s military forces and generally tries to avoid civilian casualties. The violent non-state actor may target the military forces of the state in which it resides or it may seek to target the forces of an external state. For example, a non-state group might target the armed forces of its own government such as Nicaraguan Contra attacks against the Sandinista government or it can target the armed forces of an occupying or colonial power such as the Vietminh offensive against the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

**Terrorist Tactics**

Defining terrorism has always been problematic. Crenshaw (1995) in her opening essay in an edited volume on terrorism avoids giving a strict definition of terrorism, saying instead that “[t]errorism is an ambiguous variable not easily measured or quantified, in part because there are multiple forms of terrorism, and they are easily confused with other styles of violence” (Crenshaw 1995: 6). Some analysts have even
sought to depoliticize terrorist groups by emphasizing the psychological needs of its members and simply classifying individuals who use terrorism as “psychopaths” (Crayton 1983). This research, however, accepts terrorism as a tactic that can help advance a larger strategic purpose for certain types of non-state groups.

There have been numerous attempts to define terrorism with varying degrees of success (see Hoffman 1998; Tucker 1997; Silke 1996). Schmid and Jongman (1998), for example, identify over one-hundred separate definitions of terrorism. One of the primary difficulties with defining terrorism, as Crenshaw (1995) points out, is that it has been broadly used in the past to describe a wide array of undesirable activities. Thus terrorism has taken on a pejorative meaning causing it to sometimes be avoided when it should be used and used when it should be avoided. This problem was particularly acute in the 1970s when discussion of the subject in the United Nations General Assembly and elsewhere struggled with whether the actions of groups that were identified by some as “national liberation movements” should be considered terrorists (Pillar 2001).

Pillar (2001) suggests that a reasonable definition of terrorism is found in Section 140(d)(2) of the United States’ 1988 and 1989 Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Terrorism is defined here as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” The type of violence designated as terrorist activity has also been codified in Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. These include: hijackings; kidnappings; assassinations; the use of conventional, biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons; or threat of carrying out any of these activities. This definition provides a
sufficient framework for classifying terrorist activity. Because this research is concerned with the actions of non-state actors it will focus only on those terrorist acts carried out by “subnational groups” and not those carried out by “clandestine agents” which is a reference to state-sponsored terrorism. This definition conforms closely to Thornton’s (1964: 73) now classic definition of terrorism as “a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence.” While Thornton does not emphasize its use against non-combatants this has become a standard part of most modern definitions of terrorism (see McCormick 2003).

Terrorism as a method of political violence has been particularly prominent in the last two decades of the twentieth century. During the 1980s and 1990s six hundred and sixty-six Americans died from international terrorism. Total global deaths from international terrorism were 7,152 with more than 31,000 wounded. During this same time, U.S. casualties from non-terrorist hostile action, such as U.S. participation in the Iranian hostage crisis, peacekeeping in Lebanon, the escorting of Kuwaiti tankers, and operations Urgent Fury in Granada, Just Cause in Panama, Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf, Restore Hope in Somalia, and Uphold Democracy in Haiti totaled just 251 (Pillar 2001: 19-20). While these numbers may seem small in comparison to the number of casualties accrued during the major wars of the twentieth century; terrorism, even prior to September 11th, has evolved to be a major foreign policy concern for countries throughout the world.

6 See below for definition of international terrorism.

7 World War II had 291,557 U.S. battle deaths; Korea had 33,651; and Vietnam had 47,378.
There are a number of reasons why a non-state group sees terrorism as a preferable tactic. Lichbach (1995: 40) argues that historically terrorism as a tactic imposes fewer personal costs than other alternatives. Past research has shown that terrorists, for example, rarely become casualties (Gurr 1979: 38); few are captured (Jenkins, Johnson, and Ronfeldt 1978: 92); of those captured and tried few receive heavy sentences (Laqueur 1987: 92; Wilkinson 1979: 115); and of those that do receive heavy sentences, few actually serve their full prison term (Wilkinson 1979: 115). Crenshaw (1981) notes that terrorist groups take advantage of “permissive” factors that create the tactical opportunity to carry out acts of terror. These openings create the strategic space by which terrorist organizations emerge and evolve over time (Weinberg and Davis 1989). However, it should be noted that not all terrorism is purposeful. Some groups have subordinated their political goals for the need to act, making violence an act of expression rather than an instrument of political change (McCormick 2003: 480).

From a strategic perspective, terrorism is an instrumental, preference-based activity used to achieve a specified and known set of long and short-term political goals (McCormick 2003: 481; see also Hacker 1976; Price 1977; Corsi 1981; Waterman 1981; Sandler et al 1983; Muller and Opp 1986; Lapan and Sandler 1993). For example, Carlos Marighela, the leader of the Brazilian “urban guerrillas,” argued in his *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (1971) that terrorism leads to increased repression,

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8 While the severity of sentencing for terrorists may be changing due to the increase and future threat of mass casualty terrorist events, many known terrorists remain at large and prosecution remains difficult due to the lack of evidence in many cases.
thus transforming the political situation in a country into a military situation and
causing the authorities to intensify their repression to such an extreme that the
population would be compelled to revolt (see also Hayden 1969). Thus, terrorist
activity is seen within the context of a reciprocal relationship in which each decision, or
move, is based on the past and anticipated moves of one’s opponent, its constituents,
and any other actors that affect its strategic environment (Schelling 1960; McCormick
2003). In such a strategic environment, when conditions vary, how and when terrorism
is employed will vary as well (see Ross and Gurr 1989; Gurr 1990; Kellen 1990).

Crenshaw (1981), Gurr (1990), and Ross (1993) argue that the decision to adopt
terrorist tactics is one of constrained choice, due to the lack of suitable alternatives
either due to the fact that the group does not receive widespread popular support within
an open society, or face a highly coercive state that shuts off alternative forms of
opposition. Either way, terrorism is used as a tactic of the weak.

One emerging mitigating factor with regards to a group’s calculation to use
terror is a growing international consensus concerning appropriate norms for responses
to acts of terrorism. Increasingly the United Nations Security Council, as well as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other international bodies, has strongly
condemned the use of terrorism and ruled that forceful responses to terror are justified
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In 1999, for example, the Security
Council approved Resolution 1269, which “Unequivocally condemn[s] all acts,
methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their
motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever
committed, in particular those which could threaten international peace and security.”
The implication of Resolution 1269 is that the Security Council, pursuant to Article 39, has the right to take appropriate measures against these groups in order to “maintain or restore international peace and security,” including the use of force. Furthermore, following the September 11th attacks the Security Council passed Resolution 1390 to employ its Chapter VII authority to impose sanctions on the Taliban and al-Qaeda. And while the Security Council did not explicitly authorize the United States or a regional organization to use force pursuant to article 42, they twice referred to the right to individual and collective self-defense prior to coalition combat operation in Afghanistan nor did they condemn the action once it was launched.9

In sum, a group is determined to use terrorist tactics if its principal target is the civilian population or non-military government personnel. Terrorism as a tactic has been used by all three categories of groups this research is interested in and presents one of the more pressing problems facing foreign policy decision-makers.

* * *

This dichotomy between terrorist and guerrilla tactics helps create a better conceptual framework for the types of threats that nation-states face. Groups choose their tactics based on what they perceive to be the most efficacious for achieving their goals (Lichbach 1995: 53-61; Tilly 1978: 153; Alinsky 1971: 126). In general, guerrilla tactics will be used when the group is trying to gain popular support from the general population.

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9 For a detailed discussion of counter-terrorism and international law see Schmitt (2002).
population, and, therefore, does not want to be perceived as targeting the population; is strong enough to weaken a state’s military strength in a direct confrontation; or is provided with sufficient targets of opportunity based on the positioning of the military forces. In addition, guerrilla tactics can also be used as a method for provoking the state into more and more violent responses toward the general population. Terrorism, on the other hand, will be used as a form of punishment to states and populations that target the non-state actor’s leadership and operations or do not comply with the violent non-state actor’s demands; by a violent non-state actor that is too weak to challenge a state’s military forces; when there is little concern for popular support; or when civilian targets of opportunity present themselves providing maximum exposure to one’s cause with little risk. Some groups will utilize both tactics but will be classified in this research depending on which tactic is used to trigger a crisis for a state.

Conclusion

This chapter has tried to clarify what the concept violent non-state actor means and how to distinguish between the different subsets of groups that fit inside this larger category. It has also drawn a distinction between the types of violent tactics these groups use to pursue their political goals. How these groups emerge, recruit adherents and make claims on governments have been thoroughly discussed in previous works. While any system of categorization is flawed, the hope is that this framework provides a basic premise from which to begin understanding the relationship between these groups and external states. How states perceive and respond to these groups will be the focus of the remainder of this dissertation.
Chapter 4

Data, Hypotheses and Methodology

This study is cross-national in scope and uses quantitative methods to test its hypotheses. Data comes from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset. ICB is suited for this specific research project for a number of reasons. Its emphasis is on crisis rather than simply militarized conflict or war. As discussed above, crisis carries a specific meaning that does not necessarily include casualty-producing conflicts. By looking at cases in which a state’s decision-makers are faced with a threat to their core values and a heightened sense of military engagement, rather than just at cases with casualties, we are able to get a more detailed picture of the policy process as it relates to these groups. A data-set that looks solely at conflicts that produce casualties would miss many of the cases that ICB captures. On the other hand, a focus on crisis narrows the scope of the inquiry to a reasonable level. Additionally, ICB provides an extensive list of variables that are particularly relevant to this research. Variables that look at the major and primary responses to a crisis, the centrality and severity of violence, the internal make-up and governmental form of the decision-making unit, and the type of value being threatened are all important for this analysis. Also, the urgency associated with crisis decision-making allows the ICB data to capture outcomes that are more highly driven by elite decision-making rather than simply bureaucratic processes or inertia. Outcomes, therefore, are more likely to be the result of individual or small-
group problem solving processes and thus can at least be partly explained through psychological and cognitive approaches.

Previous analysis using ICB has already uncovered a number of important findings concerning when and how crises escalate (Brecher, James, and Wilkenfeld 2000). For example, Brecher (1993) and Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000: 180-184) find that violent triggers have a high propensity to lead to violent responses. That is, states are more likely to respond to violent threats with violence and to non-violent threats with non-violence. Steinberg (1981) and Leng (1980) have observed this matching behavior as well.

Carment (1993) finds that economically weak and dependent regions such as Africa and the Middle East are more likely to experience crisis escalation, which he explains is due to the fact that these regional actors’ lack of caution owing to their dislike of the status quo. Carment (1993) also finds that ethnic conflicts are more disposed toward crisis escalation than non-ethnic conflict, and that ethnic conflicts that involve irredentist issues are more likely to lead to crisis escalation than secessionism and anti-colonialism. Additionally, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000: 138) find that crises with an ethnic component that occur within the context of a protracted conflict are especially susceptible to escalating violence; that conflicts involving ethnicity have a higher level of threat perception among the crisis actors; and the involvement of major powers in ethnic conflicts has a negligible or negative effect on crisis management. Missing from past analyses of ICB is a comprehensive look at how states respond to crises triggered by non-state actors, specifically those non-state actors that pursue their goals through violent means.
This chapter discusses how cases from the ICB dataset were selected for this dissertation, gives an overview of the hypotheses to be tested, the methodologies that will be utilized to test those hypotheses, and the dependent and independent variables being used. Chapter five provides the empirical tests for these hypotheses.

Case Selection

The dataset in its original form consists of data from 956 foreign policy (actor) crises from 1918-2001. This research focuses specifically on foreign policy crises triggered by violent non-state actors operating outside a state’s borders since the end of World War II.\(^1\) Therefore, it looks at sixty-five cases in which a state experiences a crisis triggered by a violent non-state actor.\(^2\) These sixty-five cases were selected by, first, selecting for ICB cases that were triggered by a violent non-state actor and then excluding cases in which the trigger was internal.\(^3\) This selection criterion was able to identify cases that exactly fit the central research question of this dissertation.

The first crisis, the Greek Civil War, takes place in 1944-1945 and the last crisis, the India Parliament Attack, takes place in 2001-2002. Thirty-eight of the crises affected only one state actor and eleven affected multiple states, such as the Vietminh

\(^1\) The data is from ICB’s foreign policy crisis dataset rather than its international crisis data-set. A foreign policy crisis is a crisis that is specific to a state actor, while an international crisis has larger international or regional implications (see Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).

\(^2\) These sixty-five cases occur within a total of forty-nine individual events. There are more cases than events because some of the cases involve multiple state actors.

\(^3\) Crises triggered by an international organization are also coded as non-state actors in ICB. These cases were excluded from this research.
invasion of Laos (France and Laos), the war in Angola (Zambia, Zaire, South Africa, Cuba, Soviet Union, United States), and the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya (United States and Afghanistan). The states experiencing crises by violent non-state actors range significantly in their power and size. While many of the states are great powers, superpowers, and former colonial powers; others include smaller states such as Mali, Rwanda, Nicaragua, and Laos. By far the most common country to have crises triggered by violent non-state actors in the ICB dataset is the United States with twelve. Other states with multiple crises include Belgium (4), Egypt (4), France (5), Israel (5), Morocco (2), Saudi Arabia (2), South Africa (2), Soviet Union/Russia (2), Syria (2), Thailand (2), and the United Kingdom (5). (See table 4.1.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Crises</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Crises</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Soviet Union/Russia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the threat from violent non-state actors is not new, it could be considered a re-emerging phenomenon. The breakdown of colonial states, the on-going Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the emergence of global Islamist movements have all accompanied increases in the number of foreign policy crises triggered by violent non-state actors. As Figure 4.1 indicates there is a spike in ICB crises triggered by non-state actors in the 1960s and 1970s, a drop-off in the 1980s, and another increase in the 1990s and the first part of the 2000s. The spike in the 1960s corresponds with an increase in ideologically driven movements while the spike in the 1970s corresponds with a continuation of these movements plus increased fundamentalist activities. The increase in the 1990s and early 2000s corresponds with an increase in ethnopolitical movements and the continued impact of fundamentalist movements.

This case selection criteria, however, excludes some ICB cases that would otherwise seem to fit the selection criteria. For example, the four cases in ICB involving Nicaraguan Contras are not included in the sixty-five cases. While each of these crises is concerned with the funding, support, and activities of a violent non-state
actor (the Contras), ICB codes each of these crises as being triggered by the activities of either Honduras or Nicaragua, respectively. That is, crises were being instigated by the various actions of states in regards to the Contras rather than by the activities of the Contras themselves. It was decided that such cases should not be recoded from how they were originally coded in ICB under the assumption that excluded cases would be excluded systematically. However, it should be noted that when the same statistical tests were run including the four Contra cases, there was no significant statistical difference with the results reported in the proceeding chapters.

A second criticism of the case selection is that because the ICB data was gathered with the goal of understanding state behavior, there are some obvious events missing that, had they been carried out by a state, would clearly have been coded as a crisis, such as the Beirut terrorist attacks in October 1983 and the U.S.S. Cole bombing in 2000. Had either of these events been instigated by a state rather than a non-state actor, there is little doubt that it would have constituted a foreign policy crisis for the states against whom the attacks were targeted. Therefore, it appears that a higher threshold exists in ICB for an event to be considered a crisis for actions carried out by non-state actors than for actions carried out by states.

One explanation for why these events do not always rise to the level of a foreign policy crisis, however, is that it is sometimes not immediately clear who carried out the attacks. For example, United States officials were not certain al-Qaeda carried out the U.S.S. Cole attack until February 2001, a full five months after the attack and with a
new administration in office (Benjamin and Simon 2003: 324). With no clear knowledge of what and who to respond to these events make it difficult to comply with the limited-time-for-response requirement used to identify foreign policy crises.

In addition, it is not entirely clear whether the inclusion of these events would impact the overall results of this research. The Beirut attacks against the U.S. Marine barracks killed 241 U.S. military personnel. Simultaneously, 58 French paratroopers were killed in a separate attack. The French responded by launching an air strike into the Bekaa valley against Iranian Revolutionary Guard positions. The U.S. called the attack a “despicable act” and pledged to remain in Lebanon. They did plan to take greater military action by targeting the Sheik Abdullah barracks in Baalbek, Lebanon, but the mission was aborted due to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger’s fears that the attack would damage U.S.-Arab relations. The U.S. did, however, engage in a limited number of shellings off Lebanon from the U.S.S. New Jersey. Therefore, the inclusion of this case would have added a violent response from France and at least a military response from the United States, which, as will be shown in subsequent chapters conforms to this research’s overall findings.

Another difficulty is that responses by states toward these groups are often covert and consequently not known of for years following the action. In 1985, for example, the United States suffered a series of terrorist attacks against its citizens abroad. In June, TWA Flight 847 was hijacked by Lebanese terrorists who proceeded

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*Benjamin and Simon (2003) and Clarke (2004), who were part of the Clinton Administration’s anti-terrorism team, argue that part of this uncertainty was related to the negative domestic response to the Clinton Administration’s use of force against al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical plant in Sudan in reaction to the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.*
to kill a Navy diver on board. In October the cruise ship *Achille Lauro* was hijacked in Italy by the Palestinian terrorist Abu Abbas resulting in the murder of a sixty-nine-year-old Jewish-American tourist. And just after Christmas gunmen from the Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization opened fire on passengers at the El Al ticket counters in Rome and Vienna killing nineteen people, including five Americans. None of these events triggered a foreign policy crisis for the United States (or any other state for that matter); but there was a response. The increased fear regarding travel abroad caused by these events led the Reagan administration to sign National Security Directive 207 on February 1, 1986 which authorized covert action against terrorist groups worldwide and formed the National Security Council committee that would become the main instrument for presidential decision-making regarding terrorism into the future (Coll 2004: 139-140).

These potentially missing cases do not diminish the findings of this research. While one can hope that the cases that are missing are missing systematically, there is little evidence that the foreign policy behaviors demonstrated during the cases highlighted here, as well as others, diverge from the overall findings of this research.

*Classification of Violent Non-State Groups and Tactics*

For each of the crises the violent non-state actor is classified into one of the three categories discussed above: ideological, ethnopolitical, or religious. In addition, the primary tactic used by the violent non-state actor (terrorism or guerrilla warfare) is also coded. Of the sixty-five cases, ideological/revolutionary groups triggered 34 crises, ethnopolitical/identity groups triggered 20, and 11 were triggered by
religious/fundamentalist groups. In 25 of the crises the violent non-state actor used terrorism as its primary tactic, and in 40 of the crises the primary tactic was guerrilla warfare. Table 4.2, gives a rough breakdown of the groups included as crisis triggers in the ICB and how they have been classified.

Classifying violent non-state actors into one of the three categories can also be problematic. For groups that fit two or more categories, the category that is most salient for the historical narrative of the crisis will be used. Many of these groups could be classified into multiple categories. For example, reasonable arguments could be made to classify the Vietminh as either a revolutionary/ideological or an ethnonationalist/identity group. Those who composed the Vietminh had two goals. One was to expel colonial powers, specifically France, from Vietnam and establish and independent Vietnamese state ruled by Vietnamese. Because its leadership—particularly Ho Chi Minh—was communist, its other goal was to install a communist government into any independent Vietnam state. Thus, the group consisted of elements from both classifications. The Vietminh were involved in two different crises: the invasion of Laos in 1953 and Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The invasion of Laos triggered crises for France and Laos and Dien Bien Phu triggered a crisis for France. Therefore, to determine whether to classify the Vietminh as ethnopoltical or revolutionary the perceptions of Laos and France, the crisis actors, should be examined.
Table 4.2. Violent Non-State Groups and Tactic Used to Trigger Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological/Revolutionary</th>
<th>Guerrilla Trigger</th>
<th>Terrorist Trigger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Greek Communists</td>
<td>-Revolutionary Council of Stanleyville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Tudeh Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Chinese Communists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Vietminh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Costa Rican Rebels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Pathet Lao</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Yemen Republicans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Yemen Royalists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Vietcong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Juan Bosch Supporters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-MPLA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-UNITA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-FNLA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Khmer Rouge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity/Ethnopolitical</th>
<th>Guerrilla Trigger</th>
<th>Terrorist Trigger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Army for the Liberation of Sahara</td>
<td>-Palestinian Feda’iyyun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Tanganyika Rifles</td>
<td>-Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Congolese Force Publique</td>
<td>-Polisario Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-EOAKA-B</td>
<td>-SWAPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Western Somalia Liberation Front</td>
<td>-Katangan Rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Polisario Front</td>
<td>-Egypt Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Rwanda Patriotic Front</td>
<td>-Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-i-Taibu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious/Fundamentalist</th>
<th>Guerrilla Trigger</th>
<th>Terrorist Trigger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Lebanese Christian Forces</td>
<td>-Mujahuddin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Amal Militiamen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Hizbullah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What were France’s main concerns regarding the Vietminh? The French were threatened by the Vietminh because they threatened the French’s colonial holdings in

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Note that not all groups are listed in table and that the names of groups are how they are designated by ICB coders. Some crises are triggered by non-state actors in which no official name has been given such as the rioting Zairian troops that triggered the 1991 foreign intervention in Zaire. In addition, some cases triggered crises for multiple actors so there are is a smaller number of specific groups than foreign policy crises. Table 4.6 provides a full listing of ICB cases used in this study.

The term guerrilla and terrorist determine the type of tactic used to trigger the crisis. It is possible, however, that this tactic is not the primary tactic of the group.
Indochina. It was apparent by 1949 that the French would not be able to destroy the Vietminh movement with military force. Therefore, the French sought to destroy the movement by luring the non-communists away from it. They formally attempted to do this in 1949 with the Bao Dai-Auriol agreement in which France recognized the notional independence of Vietnam and recognized the flamboyant and ultimately embarrassing Bao Dai as the Head of State. This failed for two reasons. First, the agreement was unsatisfactory even to the non-combatant nationalists in the French controlled regions of the country, let alone the nationalists fighting besides the communists. Second, the nationalists in the Vietminh felt that they could align themselves with the communists until they achieved victory and then isolate them once in power, as had been the case in France, Italy and Greece (See Karnow 1991; Cable 2000). Because the French were primarily concerned with the communist element within the Vietminh they are coded as a revolutionary/ideological movement.

However, the Vietminh invasion of Laos also triggered a crisis for Laos. The French granted Laos independence in 1953. However, it was not resolved who would lead the country and Laos was divided between three groups competing for political power. Officially the neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma ran the government from Vientiane—but in the south the right wing, pro-U.S. Prince Boun Oum of Champassak dominated, and in the north the Prince Souphanouvong led the left-wing resistance group the Pathet Lao with assistance from the North Vietnamese. The groups were divided among ideological lines and not ethnicity (Prince Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong were half-brothers), and the Vietminh in northern Laos bolstered the
strength on the Pathet Lao, therefore the Vietminh would also be classified as a revolutionary/ideological group to the Laos as well.

How to classify the tactics used by each of these groups is also problematic. For example, the Afghanistan invasion triggered a crisis for the Soviet Union when Islamic fundamentalists (later known as the Mujahuddin) rose up to challenge the newly installed Soviet-backed government in March 1979. The most serious of these incidents was in Herat where the army mutinied and killed 350 Soviet citizens. While the most dominant strategy throughout the course of the conflict was guerrilla warfare, this initial action, which triggered the crisis for the Soviet Union, is classified as a terrorist act because it targeted civilians. The crisis was resolved for the Soviet Union on December 27, 1979 when the Soviet-backed Babrak Kamal was installed as head of the Afghan government. However, this was just the beginning of the conflict, which lasted until 1991 when Soviet troops finally withdrew.

This case points to an additional difficulty when using ICB, especially in relation to violent non-state actors—many cases of sustained conflict with violent non-state actors do not maintain a level of crisis even though the conflict itself continues. Often the mechanisms that states use to confront these groups are routinized within its bureaucracies and are dealt with via the basic repertoires and standard operating procedures of that given agency (Allison 1999: 143-185). Therefore, data from ICB for conflicts that might be initiated by a crisis but then are sustained over time at a sub-crisis level are limited. However, there are three cases in ICB of protracted crises in which violent non-state actors are the triggers. These are the Vietnam War, the Yemen War, and the conflict over Western Sahara.
These reservations aside, ICB remains the best current data source for answering the research questions posed by this dissertation. Foremost, it is the only data-set that sufficiently looks at a range of conflicts triggered by violent non-state actors that can be sufficiently compared to conflicts triggered by states. In addition, because the bulk of ICB looks at crises between states, it allows for comparison between the reactions that decision-makers have toward conflicts involving other states and the conflicts identified here involving non-state actors.

Hypotheses

Previous discussion about the relationship between states and non-state actors suggests that the tools for non-violent diplomacy and statecraft are less prevalent than they are in traditional state-state interactions. As a result this dissertation theorizes that the response by states to non-state actors should be more violent than responses to states. While it has been shown in previous studies that states show matching behavior when responding to crisis triggers, chapter two argues that in state-state interactions there exists a structure, both domestically and internationally, that assists states in opting out of a violent confrontation. These options do not necessarily exist for non-state actors. From these assumptions we can hypothesize that state responses to crises triggered by non-state actors will be more violent than responses to crisis triggered by states. Thus, hypothesis one:

*H1: Crises triggered by violent non-state actors will elicit more violent responses by states than crises triggered by other states.*
Assuming that hypothesis one is confirmed the next set of hypotheses should explain why this is true. These can be broken down into three categories of explanation. First, the values which a non-state actor threatens might be salient enough to elicit more violent responses across the board. Violent responses by states may not be due to the fact that the crisis is triggered by a violent non-state actor, but because the issues that non-state actors tend to threaten generally bring about violent responses. For this to be confirmed, state responses to different threats should be uniform between those crises triggered by states and crises triggered by non-state actors. Hypothesis two, therefore, states:

\[ H_2: \text{The types of values that violent non-state actors typically threaten are more likely to elicit violent responses from states in general.} \]

A second explanation, again assuming hypothesis one, concerns the role of international organizations and their function in resolving conflicts between states. Since World War II, the United Nations has provided a forum in which states can attempt to resolve their conflicts peacefully. While international organizations have not been involved in the abatement of all conflicts, nor always been successful when they have been involved, international norms have arisen that have contributed to the growing obsolescence of major war (Mueller 1989). These institutions, however, were designed to respond to conflicts between states and not with conflicts between states and non-state actors. Consequently, it is possible that these types of conflicts are at
something of a structural disadvantage when it comes to utilizing the United Nations and other regional or international institutions in resolving these conflicts. This lack of international help might also provide an explanation for the higher levels of violence associated with them. Hypothesis three, therefore, states:

\[ H3: \text{International organizations will be more effective in dealing with crises triggered by states than with crises triggered by non-state actors.} \]

The third explanation is that it is the structure of these groups themselves which bring about more violent responses from states. The above hypotheses assume that states approach these groups uniformly and do not distinguish between the types of groups triggering a crisis or the tactics used. It is possible that the fundamental challenges posed by these types of groups are not distinct enough to elicit any major differences in policy between them. Thus, a state would respond relatively similarly to a challenge from an ideologically motivated group as it would from a challenge from an ethnonationalist movement. However, it may also be the case that state responses are determined either by the type of group triggering the crisis or the violent tactics that group uses. Therefore, the following set of hypotheses test how states respond to violent non-state actors in relation to the categories that were developed in chapter three to see if state responses differ depending on either the political goals of the group or the tactics the group uses. As was discussed in chapter three, violent non-state actors can be further broken down based on their specific political goals and the types of tactics that they use to pursue those goals. The types of political groups discussed in chapter
three include revolutionary/ideological, ethnopolitical/identity, and religious/fundamentalist movements and the types of tactics that can be employed include guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

Based on the theoretical discussions regarding the nature of these groups, there are a few potential explanations for how states might respond to different types of violent non-state actors. If differences exist between groups, it is likely that states will respond to groups that most resemble a state themselves (i.e. they control territory, they have a recognized political unit, they have more conventional armed forces, etc.) similarly to the ways they generally respond to states during crises. That is, while there remains a high likelihood that force will be used, non-state actors with these characteristics will be more structurally capable to reach a negotiated solution to a crisis than a non-state actor that does not possess these characteristics.

However, another theoretical possibility is that the more easily identifiable and, consequently, targetable the violent non-state actor is, the more likely the state will see the group as an easily defeatable foe and will respond to a crisis with significant force. The asymmetric nature of the two sides allows for the perception that a state actor can easily prevail over the smaller non-state force. Thus, non-state actors that have a visible political unit, control specific territory, and have more traditional armed forces will present themselves more as a “target of opportunity” than a more elusive non-state actor, and, thus, be more likely to invite violent retaliation from a state.

These two counter arguments identify two important questions about political interactions. If the first explanation proves correct then it can be argued that international interactions are more highly determined by the institutional structures of
conflicting actors. If the second explanation proves correct then it can be argued that international interactions are more highly determined by power differences (both perceived and real) between conflicting actors.

Taking these two arguments into account this chapter tests the following hypotheses:

**H4.1:** States will be less likely to resolve crises with violence when a revolutionary/ideological group is the crisis trigger.

**H4.2:** Crises will be more likely to escalate to major clashes or war when the group uses guerrilla tactics.

**H4.3:** Crises will be more likely to escalate to major clashes or war (rather than minor clashes) when a revolutionary/ideological group is the crisis trigger.

**H4.4:** Responses to terrorist tactics will be more likely to be violent, but less likely to escalate to major clashes or war.

**H4.5:** State responses to revolutionary/ideological groups will be most similar to how states respond to states, followed by ethnopolitical/identity groups.

These hypotheses are driven by three assumptions regarding the nature of these groups in relation to each other. Assumption one is that revolutionary/ideological groups are the most likely of the three groups to have an organized political wing and that those political wings will be similar in structure to the political wings of governing coalitions. Revolutionary groups seek widespread political change; therefore they are the non-state group most likely to structure the organization of their group to resemble a
traditional governing unit. In fact, it has been argued that a political wing is a necessary condition for a revolutionary/ideological group’s existence. (See Bakunin 1974 [1870] for an early discussion on the importance of a political apparatus for revolutionary violent movements.) Political wings are also found in ethnopolitical and fundamentalist groups, but not to the full extent that they are found in revolutionary groups.

Assumption two is that identity/ethnopolitical movements are the most likely to control territory. Because ethnic groups have generally occupied a specific territory for generations, these conflicts are more likely to center on questions of territory, land ownership, and who has the right to establish laws and govern that territory. A deduced consequence of this assumption is that because these conflicts are over territory with the non-state group confined to a specific region, responses to these groups can be more targeted. However, this concentration of ethnic groups within specific regions opens up the possibility that state responses will be less concerned with civilian casualties and may even lead to genocide.

Assumption three is that revolutionary/ideological groups are most likely to use conventional armed forces. By conventional armed forces it is meant that the structure of their military wing is hierarchical and that their application of force generally involves traditionally military arms—mostly light and medium sized weapons. These types of armed forces and military structures will likely be deemed necessary for groups that seek a full scale overthrow of an existing state government as they will need sufficient firepower to challenge the state’s armed forces and will need a legitimate military in place if they succeed in overthrowing the government.
Table 4.3 confirms this assumption by showing that, from the ICB data, revolutionary movements are significantly more inclined to use guerrilla tactics (91.2 percent) than ethnopolitical and religious movements (35.0 percent and 18.2 percent respectively).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Terrorist</th>
<th>Guerrilla</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>3 (8.8%)</td>
<td>31 (91.2%)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnopolitical</td>
<td>13 (65.0%)</td>
<td>7 (35.0%)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>9 (81.8%)</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25 (38.5%)</td>
<td>40 (61.5%)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 27.306; p (two-sided) = .000ª
ª One cell (16.7%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.55.

There are a number of possible explanations for this finding. First, revolutionary/ideological groups are likely to adopt a more traditional military structure for the same reason that they adopt traditional political structures—because their ultimate goal is to control the state. By constructing their organization to reflect traditional political and military structures, a revolutionary group can be perceived to be capable of taking over a state apparatus. Second, guerrilla warfare, because it is generally waged against a fully armed state, requires military hardware—hardware that was made readily available during the Cold War to groups that purported to support either the Soviet Union’s or the United States’ ideological goals. Because the equipment required to wage successful guerrilla warfare is generally smaller than what
is needed for standard conventional war, the superpowers, along with other willing suppliers, were able to help build lethal forces throughout the world relatively easily (Klare and Andersen 1996). Third, because revolutionary movements are directed toward the overthrow of political systems and tend to survive on the support of the masses, they are less willing to use force that targets civilians. Ethnopolitical and religious movements, on the other hand, generally build their support by targeting other ethnic groups or segments of the population that do not adhere to a strict set of religious beliefs. This belief in the “impurity” of others may partially explain why these groups are more likely to use terrorism as a tactic.

Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, which look at the gravity of the value threatened and the issue of the crisis, give further credence to the above assumptions. Table 4.4 shows that for crises triggered by revolutionary groups the most common values threatened are threats to influence and political threats. Of the twenty crises triggered by an ethnopolitical group, five, or one quarter, involve a territorial threat to the crisis actor. For fundamentalist groups, however, six of the eleven crises threaten limited or severe military damage.
In addition, when the cases are broken down according the issue of the crisis (Table 4.5) we see that revolutionary movements are more likely to be perceived as political or diplomatic issues than is the case with ethnopolitical or religious movements. This conforms to the assumption that because the structure of revolutionary movements are more commonly framed as political problems rather than military or security problems, decision-makers will be more inclined to seek out political solutions.
Chapter five will test each of these set of hypotheses. Below is a discussion of the variables to be used and the methods by which these tests will be carried out.

Methods and Variables

This dissertation uses both nominal and ordinal data. The majority of the data used in this dissertation is nominal, meaning that they are discrete categorical variables. Nominal data are the building blocks of social science research and helps categorize events, groups, and activities (Reynolds 1977). Ordinal data can tell us whether a value is greater than another, but unlike interval data, is unable to tell us how much greater that value is (Hildebrand, Laing, and Rosenthal 1977). This study uses a variety of statistical techniques to test the above stated hypotheses, including logit and chi-square tests.

Below is a description of the dependent and independent variables that will be used in this research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideological/ Revolutionary</th>
<th>Identity/ Ethnopolitical</th>
<th>Religious/ Fundamentalist</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military-Security</td>
<td>10 (29.4%)</td>
<td>12 (60.0%)</td>
<td>7 (63.6%)</td>
<td>29 (44.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political-Diplomatic</td>
<td>24 (70.6%)</td>
<td>5 (25.0%)</td>
<td>4 (36.4%)</td>
<td>33 (50.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic-Development</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>1 (5.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>1 (1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural-Status</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>2 (10.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>2 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34 (100.0%)</td>
<td>20 (100.0%)</td>
<td>11 (100.0%)</td>
<td>65 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dependent Variables

**Crisis Management Technique I: Major Response to Crisis:** The major response is the specific action that decision-makers use to respond to a crisis trigger. Responses a state can take include: no response, verbal act, political act, economic act, other non-violent act, non-violent military act, multiple including non-violent military act, violent military act, or multiple including violent military act. For analysis purposes, this variable has been transformed into two dummy variables: Military Action Major Response and Violent Action Major Response. Military Action Major Response includes all cases in which the military was used, either non-violent or violent, as part of the major response. This variable is dichotomized to include Military Acts and Non-Military Acts, with Non-Military Acts including no response, verbal acts, economic acts, and other non-violent acts. Violent Major Response includes all cases in which violence was used as part of the major response. This variable is dichotomized to include Violent Acts and Non-Violent Acts, with military acts that do not use violence being included as a non-violent act.

**Major Response II: Principal Technique:** The principal technique is the primary crisis management technique, as distinct from a specific act, used by an actor to respond to a foreign policy crisis. Responses include: negotiation, adjudication or arbitration, mediation, multiple not including violence, non-military pressure, non-violent military, multiple including violence, and violence. This variable has also been transformed into two dummy variables: Military Technique and Violent Technique. Military Technique includes all cases in which the military was used either violently or non-violently as the
principal technique. Non-Military Techniques include negotiation, adjudication or arbitration, mediation, multiple not including violence, and non-military pressure. Violent Technique includes all cases in which violence was used as the principal technique. Non-Violent techniques include the previous list of non-violent techniques and cases in which non-violent military techniques are used.

**Content of Crisis Outcome:** This variable measures the content of the crisis outcome from the crisis actor’s perspective. They are based on whether the crisis actor achieved or did not achieve its basic goals and include victory, compromise, stalemate, or defeat.

**Extent of Satisfaction about Outcome:** This variable codes the extent of satisfaction the parties involved in the crisis have with the ultimate outcome. The variable measures whether the crisis actor is satisfied or dissatisfied with the outcome of the crisis.

**Independent Variables**

**Triggering Entity:** This variable identifies the entity that triggered a foreign policy crisis, i.e., initiated the act which was perceived by a state as creating a threat to basic values, time pressure and heightened probability of military hostilities. Here the triggering entity is dichotomized to be either a state or a non-state actor. Crises that were triggered by something other than a state or a non-state actor have been eliminated from this dataset.

**Trigger:** The trigger or precipitating cause of a foreign policy crisis refers to the
specific act, event or situational change which leads decision-makers to perceive a threat to basic values, time pressure for response and heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities. Triggers include verbal acts (protest, threat, accusation, or demand); political acts (subversion, alliance formation by adversaries, diplomatic sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, or the violation of a treaty); economic acts (embargoes, dumping, nationalization of property, or the withholding of economic aid); external changes (intelligence reports; changes in a specific weapon, weapon system, or offensive capabilities; changes in the global system or regional subsystem; or a challenge to a state’s legitimacy by an international organization); other non-violent acts; internal verbal or physical challenges to a regime or elite (indictments by the media, proclamations of a new regime, the fall of government, coup d’état, or acts of sabotage, terrorism, assassination, riots, demonstrations, strikes, arrests, martial law, execution, mutiny or revolt); non-violent military acts (shows of force, war games or maneuvers, mobilization, movement of forces, or changes to an offensive force posture); indirect violent acts (revolts in another country, or violent acts directed at an ally, friendly state or client state; and violent acts (border clashes, border crossings by limited force, invasions of air space, sinking of ships, sea-air incidents, bombings of large targets, large-scale military attacks, and war).

**Tactic Used:** The tactic used is the tactic the violent non-state actor employed to trigger a crisis for the state. Tactics include either a terrorist act or a guerrilla act. See chapter three for a more detailed explanation of this dichotomization.
Power Discrepancy: ICB determined a power score for each crisis actor and its principal adversary (whether or not the latter was a crisis actor) on the basis of the total of six separate scores measuring size of population, GNP, territorial size, alliance capability, military expenditure, and nuclear capability, at the onset of the crisis. The power of a crisis actor and the power available to it from tight alliance partners (if any) - immediately prior to the crisis actor's major response - was then compared to that of its principal adversary or adversaries to create a final power discrepancy score.

Gravity: This variable identifies the object of gravest threat at any time during the crisis, as perceived by the principal decision makers of the crisis actor. When two or more values were threatened, the most severe was coded. The seven possible types of threat that might face a crisis actor include economic threats; limited military threats; political threats such as threats of overthrowing a regime, changes of institutions, replacement of elites, interventions in domestic politics, and subversion; territorial threats such as threats of integration, annexation, or separatism; threats to influence or declining power in the international system or regional subsystem; threats of grave damage such as large casualties in war or mass bombings; and threats to existence such as threats to the survival of the population, of genocide, total annexation, colonial rule or occupation.

Violence Associated with Crisis: This variable measures the extent of violence experienced by a crisis actor, regardless of whether or not that actor uses violence as its
management technique. Violence associated with crises include: no violence, minor clashes, serious clashes, and full-scale war.

**Content of Global Organization Involvement:** This variable identifies the content of global organizational (e.g. the United Nations) involvement in the crisis. Types of involvement include: no involvement, discussion without resolution, fact-finding, good offices, condemnation, call for action by adversaries, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, observer group, and emergency military forces.
Table 4.6: List of Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Violent Non-State Actor</th>
<th>State Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greek Civil War I</td>
<td>1944-1945</td>
<td>Greek Communists</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1945-1946</td>
<td>Tudeh Party</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Civil War</td>
<td>1948-1949</td>
<td>Chinese Communists</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion of Laos I</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Vietminh</td>
<td>France, Laos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dien Bien Phu</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Vietminh</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica/Nicaragua II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ifni</td>
<td>1957-1958</td>
<td>Army for the Liberation of Sahara</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo I-Katanga</td>
<td>1960-1962</td>
<td>Mutinied Soldiers</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathet Lao Offensive</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Pathet Lao Troops</td>
<td>United States, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietcong Attack</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Vietcong</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali/Mauritania</td>
<td>1962-1962</td>
<td>Guerrillas</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam Tha</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Pathet Lao</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen War I</td>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>Jordan, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa Rebellions</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Mutiny by First Battalion</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen War II</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Royalists</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo II</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Revolutionary Council of Stanleyville</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen War III</td>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>Royalists</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleiku</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Vietcong</td>
<td>South Vietnam, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Intervention</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Juan Bosch Supporters</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen War IV</td>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>Royalists</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Samu</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Palestinian feda’iyyun</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tet Offensive</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Vietcong</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karameh</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Palestinian feda’iyyun</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conakry Raid</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Guerrilla mercenaries</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus III</td>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>Military coup by EOAKA-B</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War in Angola</td>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNITA &amp; MPLA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Groups/Participants</td>
<td>Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Civil War I</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>FNLA, MPLA, Lebanese Christian Forces</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entebbe Raid</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
<td>Syria, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogaden II</td>
<td>1977-1978</td>
<td>Western Somalia Liberation Front</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Hostages in Mauritania</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Polisario Front</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassinga Incident</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>SWAPO Guerrillas</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaba II</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Katangan Rebels</td>
<td>Belgium, United States, France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Invasion</td>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>Mujahuddin (Muslim Fundamentalists)</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt Air Hijacking</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Anti-Mubarek “Egypt Revolution”</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf Of Syrte II</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Terrorist attack at West Berlin discotheque</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Intervention in Lebanon</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Amal Militiamen</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand Wall</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Polisario Front</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia Peace Conference</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>Khmer Rouge</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galtat Zemour II</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Polisario Front</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda/Uganda</td>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>Rwanda Patriotic Front</td>
<td>Rwanda, Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Intervention in Zaire</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Rioting by regular Zairian troops</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Accountability</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Hizbullah</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Grapes of Wrath</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Hizbullah</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Embassy Bombings</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Afghanistan, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor II</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Pro-Indonesian Militias</td>
<td>Australia, United Kingdom, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan/US</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India Parliament Attack</td>
<td>2001-2002</td>
<td>Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-i-Taibu</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5

State Responses to Non-State Actors during Foreign Policy Crises

This chapter tests the hypotheses that were put forward in chapter four. It seeks to first determine whether the hypothesized differences between crises triggered by states and crises triggered by non-state actors discussed in previous chapters exist and then provide empirical evidence to explain these differences. First, it will look at the types of threats that non-state actors pose to states and whether these threats are more likely to elicit a violent response from states in general. Second, it will examine the role that international institutions play in mediating and helping resolve these conflicts. Global organizations, such as the United Nations, were specifically designed to help states bring about peaceful resolutions to conflicts. Because these institutions were designed to mitigate conflicts between states, this study proposes that they are less effective when facing conflicts between states and non-state actors. Third, this chapter examines whether, as hypothesized, differences exist in how states respond to different categories of non-state actors and different types of violent tactics. Differences in responses toward groups with different political structures suggest that there are structural impediments in these state/non-state relationships that prevent the two sides from reaching a bargained solution. The ramifications of these findings will be discussed in chapter six.
There is a high likelihood that foreign policy crises triggered by violent non-state actors will be met with military force. When a non-state actor challenges the state with either the use of force or the threat of force, military actions, as Table 5.1 and 5.2 indicate, are the most common response. States’ major response to foreign policy crises triggered by violent non-state actors, including crises triggered by non-violent events, use some form of violent military means 67.7 percent of the time. States used non-violent military action in an additional 21.3 percent of the sixty-five cases used here. In fact, states’ major response to crises triggered by violence was non-violent verbal or political acts just seven times or 10.7 percent.

Table 5.1. Frequencies of Crises Triggered by Violent Non-State Actors and States’ Major Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis Trigger</th>
<th>Verbal Act</th>
<th>Political Act</th>
<th>Non-Violent Military Act</th>
<th>Multiple, Including Non-Violent Military</th>
<th>Violent Military</th>
<th>Multiple, Including Violent Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Change</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Violent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Challenge</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Violent Military Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Violent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1.5%) (9.2%) (16.9%) (4.6%) (50.8%) (16.9%)
Similarly, Table 5.2 shows that the principal technique used by states for crises triggered by violent non-state actors includes a violent response 74.9 percent of the time and a non-violent military response in an additional 9.2 percent of cases. The raw data, therefore, shows a high propensity for the use of violent crisis management technique by states when threatened by a violent non-state actor. However, it is not that surprising that states would respond as such. As discussed before, previous analysis has shown that violent triggers lead to violent crisis management techniques. Therefore, to identify whether there are any comparative differences between how states respond to states and who states respond to non-state actors, this data should be compared to crises triggered by states—especially states which use violence to trigger a crisis with another state.

Table 5.2. Frequencies of Crises Triggered by Violent Non-State Actors and States’ Principal Technique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negotiation</th>
<th>Multiple, Not Including Violence</th>
<th>Non-Violent Military</th>
<th>Multiple, Including Violence</th>
<th>Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Act</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Change</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Non-Violent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Challenge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Violent Military Act</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Violent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        | (9.2%)     | (4.6%)                           | (9.2%)               | (41.5%)                       | (35.4%)  |

To compare the difference between states’ major responses to crises triggered by violent non-state actors and crises triggered by other states, a logistical regression is used in which the dependent variables are: military response and violent response. Each of the independent variables incorporates an explanation that has previously been used
to explain why states go to war: Violent Non-State Actor Trigger, Violent Trigger,
Territorial Threat, and Threat to Influence. Thus, the sixty-five cases of crises triggered
by violent non-state actors are integrated into the entire post-World War II ICB dataset
(572 cases).

As can be seen in Table 5.3, having a non-state actor as the triggering entity is a
significant predictor that a state’s major response will involve military and/or violent
techniques to resolve a crisis (p < .01). However, the other independent variables
cannot be discounted, as they are all significant as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.3. Major Response by Crisis Actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Response</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violent Response</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indep. Var.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (Std. Error)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-State Actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Trigger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant at * .10 level; ** .05 level; *** .01 level

To compare the primary technique—the crisis management technique that
embodies the crisis actors overall strategy during the crisis rather than a specific
act—used by states faced with a crisis triggered by a state versus a crisis triggered by a
non-state actor a logistical regression is used as well in which the dependent variables
are: Military Technique and Violent Technique. The independent variables are also Non-State Actor, Violent Trigger, Territorial Threat, and Threat to Influence. Non-State Actor (p < .01) and Violent Trigger (p < .01) remain significant, but both Territorial Threat and Threat to Influence lose their significance (Table 5.4).

**Table 5.4. Primary Management Technique by Crisis Actor**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indep. Var.</th>
<th>Military Response</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Violent Response</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (Std. Error)</td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
<td>Prob.</td>
<td>B (Std. Error)</td>
<td>Exp(B)</td>
<td>Prob.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-State Actor</td>
<td>1.151 *** (.382)</td>
<td>3.161</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
<td>1.289 *** (.328)</td>
<td>3.627</td>
<td>78.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Trigger</td>
<td>1.217 *** (.215)</td>
<td>3.377</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>1.583 *** (.204)</td>
<td>4.867</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Threat</td>
<td>-.215 (.226)</td>
<td>.807</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>.066 (.226)</td>
<td>1.068</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Influence</td>
<td>.290 (.228)</td>
<td>1.337</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>.191 (.225)</td>
<td>1.210</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>.133 (.159)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.701 *** (.163)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Square</td>
<td>50.926 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>89.626 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.193</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Cases</td>
<td>572</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>572</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant at *.10 level; **.05 level; ***.01 level

This analysis builds support for hypothesis one. The presence of a violent non-state actor as a trigger to a crisis is a strong predictor for whether a state will choose to use violence when responding to a crisis. However, as Table 5.1 and 5.2 indicate, 52 of the 65 (80 percent) cases triggered by these groups also involve a violent trigger. Therefore, for a stronger test of these hypotheses we should compare cases involving violent non-state actors against a more similar subset of cases. To compare the responses a state makes to a crisis triggered by a violent non-state actor versus a crisis triggered by a state, 238 cases of state-triggered crises have been selected. These 238
cases only include those crises in which the trigger was a violent act. This allows for better comparability between the two sets of cases as most of the cases triggered by a violent non-state actor were also triggered by a violent act. However, because not every case triggered by a violent non-state actor was triggered by a violent act, it should be noted that the sample of state-triggered cases are slightly more biased toward violent and military solutions. The 238 crises were caused by either indirect or direct violent triggers and were selected from the 507 post-World War II crises triggered by states. If significant differences remain, then hypothesis one can be confirmed.

As Table 5.5 indicates comparisons between states’ major responses toward violent non-state actors versus major responses toward other states shows a significant difference between the two (p = .002). For crises triggered by states with either violence or indirect violence only 53.0 percent result in a violent response. There is also a stronger propensity to respond to such crises via political channels rather than military channels. From this data we see that states are more likely to respond to non-state actors more violently than to states that trigger a crisis through violent means.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.5. Major Response to Crisis Trigger and Triggering Entity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verbal, Political or Economic Act</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Violent Military Act</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violent Military Act</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 11.187, p = .002
It is possible, however, that the discrepancies between how states respond to other states and how states respond to non-state actors are due more to power differentials than actor type. A state may simply respond more violently to actors that are weaker than it, perhaps perceiving a higher likelihood of defeating its opponent. However, this finding remains strong even when selecting just for cases in which the crisis actor is stronger than the state which triggered the crisis (Table 5.6). In fact, there is little difference between the types of responses shown in Table 5.5. In fact, for cases in which the crisis trigger was violent and the crisis actor was more powerful than the crisis trigger, violence is only used in 48.4 percent of the cases, non-violent military actions are used in 18.3 percent of the cases and non-violent acts are used in 33.3 percent of the cases ($p = .004$). This indicates that the significant difference in violence seen in cases triggered by violent non-state actors is due to something other than the power differentials between the two actors involved.

### Table 5.6. Major Response to Crisis Trigger and Triggering Entity (Crisis Actor More Powerful than State Trigger)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Violent Non-State Actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbal, Political or</td>
<td>31 (33.3%)</td>
<td>7 (10.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Act</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Violent Military</td>
<td>7 (18.3%)</td>
<td>14 (21.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Military Act</td>
<td>45 (48.4%)</td>
<td>44 (67.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 10.838, $p = .004$

When we look at the principal crisis management technique used by states to respond to crisis (Table 5.7), the trend is also toward more violent responses for violent
non-state triggers. However, this finding is not as strong as the major response data, nor is the finding statistically significant ($p = .132$). In addition, when only cases in which the crisis actor is a state that is more powerful than its opponent are included (Table 5.8) the results are also not significant ($p = .598$). This suggests that states, when responding to a crisis triggered by a violent state, are more inclined to initially seek non-violent solutions than they are when responding to a crisis triggered by a violent non-state actor. However, if initial efforts at resolving the conflict with another state peacefully are not successful, states will adopt a more aggressive approach.

Table 5.7. Principal Crisis Management Technique and Triggering Entity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Violent Non-State Actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation, Mediation</td>
<td>55 (23.1%)</td>
<td>9 (13.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and other Non-Violent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techniques</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Violent Military</td>
<td>18 (7.6%)</td>
<td>6 (9.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>165 (69.3%)</td>
<td>50 (76.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 2.668, $p = .132$

Table 5.8. Principal Crisis Management Technique and Triggering Entity (Crisis Actor More Powerful than State Trigger)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Violent Non-State Actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation, Mediation</td>
<td>18 (19.4%)</td>
<td>9 (13.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and other Non-Violent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Techniques</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Violent Military</td>
<td>10 (10.8%)</td>
<td>6 (9.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>65 (69.9%)</td>
<td>50 (76.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 1.027, $p = .598$
These results confirm hypothesis one, specifically as it relates to the major response of states toward a non-state crisis trigger. When a state faces a crisis triggered by a violent non-state actor that state is more likely to use violence as its major response than when faced by a crisis triggered by a state. However, this result is not significant when comparing the principal crisis management techniques states use when responding to crises triggered by states with crises triggered by non-state actors. This could be due to the inability of states to convert efforts at non-violent major responses into acceptable outcomes—especially when the crisis actor is a state more powerful than its opponent.

Why Violence?

A state’s decision to use violence may be partly due to its perception regarding its probability for “winning” outright. A state assessing the threat from a violent non-state actor is likely to perceive it as weak in comparison to the capabilities available to most states. Because of this large power discrepancy, a state may calculate that it can reach a satisfactory outcome without conceding its position to the non-state actor. In such cases, there may not be a mutual zone of agreement between the two sides. Thus, if violent non-state actors are perceived as beatable, decision-makers will choose the option that would most likely lead to an unconditional victory (military force) over a partial victory (negotiation) in which they would be expected to make concessions.

At first glance, ICB data suggests that such a perception might not be entirely misplaced. Table 5.9 shows that for crises triggered by violent non-state actors the crisis actor is more likely to see the conflict end in victory (55.4 percent) than with a crisis triggered by a state (28.9 percent). Additionally, for crises triggered by states we
see many more instances of them ending in either a compromise or a stalemate (57.0 percent for state triggers versus 29.2 percent for non-state triggers). Interestingly, there is little difference between the percentages of crises that end in defeat for the crisis actor (14.0 percent for state triggers versus 15.4 percent for non-state triggers).

Table 5.9. Content of Crisis Outcome and Triggering Entity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Violent Non-State Actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victory</td>
<td>68 (28.9%)</td>
<td>36 (55.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>58 (24.7%)</td>
<td>8 (12.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td>76 (32.3%)</td>
<td>11 (16.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defeat</td>
<td>33 (14.0%)</td>
<td>10 (15.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 18.055, p = .000

Breaking apart the data, however, it is not clear that it is the use of violence by the state that is leading to a higher percentage of victories against non-state actors. Table 5.10 looks at the outcome of a crisis (victory or compromise, stalemate or defeat) as it relates to the major response (military force or no force) used by states in crises triggered by violent non-state actors. While the percentage of crises ending in victory is greater for crises in which military force was the major response (59.1 percent versus 45.5 percent), it is not a statistically significant difference (p = .192).
Table 5.10. Major Response to Crisis and Content of Crisis Outcome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Compromise, Stalemate or Defeat</th>
<th>Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Violent Military Force Used</td>
<td>11 (52.4%)</td>
<td>10 (47.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Military Force</td>
<td>18 (40.9%)</td>
<td>26 (59.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cramer’s V = .108, p = .192

In addition, as Table 5.11 indicates, while the crisis actor is more often unilaterally satisfied at the end of the crisis, there is no difference between the overall satisfaction of a crisis actor responding to a state and a crisis actor responding to a violent non-state actor. For crises triggered by states the crisis actor is satisfied with the outcome 65.6 percent of the time and for crises triggered by violent non-state actors the crisis actor is satisfied 66.6 percent of the time.

Table 5.11. Extent of Satisfaction about Outcome and Triggering Entity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Violent Non-State Actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Satisfied</td>
<td>78 (32.8%)</td>
<td>14 (21.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Actor Satisfied, Adversary Dissatisfied</td>
<td>78 (32.8%)</td>
<td>28 (43.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Satisfied, Crisis Actor Dissatisfied</td>
<td>56 (23.5%)</td>
<td>13 (20.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Dissatisfied</td>
<td>26 (10.9%)</td>
<td>9 (14.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 4.355, p = .113

Therefore, while we see that states are more likely to be victorious in crises triggered by violent non-state actors, victory is not necessarily related to the decision to use force. Further, there is no difference between the level of satisfaction for the crisis
actor between crises triggered by states and crises triggered by non-states, except that in
the case of non-state crises the adversary tends to be dissatisfied more often. While
perceptions (or misperceptions) of likely victory could be one explanation for the higher
propensity by states to use force, it is not completely satisfactory.

As has been previously discussed, nations tend to try to avoid war and generally
see it as a last resort. Data here and elsewhere show that there exists a high degree of
matching behavior in conflicts triggered by states. However, in roughly a third of ICB
cases in which a violent state is the trigger, a non-violent major response will be
pursued. This is not the case with violent non-state actors. While it may be true that
states might see their chances for military victory as high, it should also be expected
that their advantages in soft power resources could just as well result in a satisfactory
outcome. Therefore, there must be an additional explanation for why states will so
quickly forego an attempt at a bargained solution in favor of a military response.

*States, Non-States and Values Threatened*

What specific values a crisis triggering event threatens could impact how a state
responds to any given crisis. A political or economic threat, for example, is probably
less likely to trigger a violent response than a territorial threat or an attack that inflicts
grave damage on a state. This section examines first the types of threats by non-state
actors that tend to trigger crises for states. It then looks at which types of threats elicit
which types of responses from state actors. If states respond to threats from non-state
actors similarly to the way in which they respond to threats from states then one can
claim that it is the nature of the threat that drives state responses.
Table 5.12 compares the values threatened in crises triggered by states with the values threatened in crises triggered by violent non-state actors. For crises triggered by states the types of values threatened are fairly evenly divided with territorial threat being the most common (27.7 percent), followed by threats to influence (25.8 percent), grave damage or threat to existence (18.1 percent), economic or political threat (17.9 percent), and limited military damage (10.4 percent). For crises triggered by violent non-state actors, however, the distribution is even less. The most common value that violent non-state actors threaten is a state’s international or regional influence (56.5 percent). Economic or political threats and limited military damage both make up 16.1 percent of the sample respectively, while territorial threats and cases of grave damage are rather rare (8.1 percent and 3.2 percent respectively). As can be seen, there is a significant difference in which values are threatened depending on whether the trigger is a state or a non-state actor. With over half of the cases of crises triggered by violent non-state actors threatening a state’s influence one explanation for why we see violent state responses to these crises is that this particular type of threat elicits violent responses regardless of the type of trigger.

1 There are no ICB cases in which a violent non-state actor threatens a state’s existence. For statistical reasons, therefore, these two categories have been combined. This is also the case with economic threats which have been combined with political threats.
Table 5.12. Gravity of Value Threatened and Triggering Entity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Violent Non-State Actor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic or Political Threat</td>
<td>95 (17.9%)</td>
<td>10 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Military Damage</td>
<td>55 (10.4%)</td>
<td>10 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Threat</td>
<td>147 (27.7%)</td>
<td>5 (8.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Influence</td>
<td>137 (25.8%)</td>
<td>35 (56.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grave Damage or Threat to Existence</td>
<td>96 (18.1%)</td>
<td>2 (3.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>530 (100.0%)</td>
<td>62 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 35.462; p = .000

On the other hand, the most common value threatened by violent non-state actors is threats to influence (Table 5.13). In fact, threat to influence is overwhelmingly the value most threatened by violent non-state actors, constituting thirty-five (or 53.8 percent) of all cases. The next two common threats are political economic and limited military damage with ten each respectively. Table 5.13 also shows that states respond predominantly with violence to each category of threat with the exception of economic and political threats. If states have a tendency to respond violently to the types of threats that non-state actors most commonly pose then the nature of the threat could explain states’ violent responses to these types of crises. If this is the case, then states’ violent responses to these crises would be explained not by the type of actor that triggers the crisis, but by the value that is threatened. To determine this, the response of the crisis actor is compared between the different categories of value threatened and whether the triggering entity was a state or non-state actor.
Table 5.13. Gravity of Value Threatened from Non-State Actor Crisis Trigger and Major Response from Crisis Actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Category</th>
<th>Violent Response</th>
<th>Non-Violent Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political or Economic Threat</td>
<td>2 (20.0%)</td>
<td>8 (80.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Military Damage</td>
<td>8 (80.0%)</td>
<td>2 (20.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Threat</td>
<td>4 (80.0%)</td>
<td>1 (20.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Influence</td>
<td>25 (71.4%)</td>
<td>10 (28.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grave Damage or Threat to Existence</td>
<td>2 (100.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41 (66.1%)</td>
<td>21 (33.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.14 shows the breakdown between violent responses and non-violent responses for crises triggered by states for all post-World War II ICB cases. Non-violent responses make up the majority of responses (65.3 percent) to these crises. Not surprisingly the threatened value most likely to result in a violent response is a territorial threat (44.2 percent) followed by grave damage or threat to existence (41.7 percent). For crises that threaten a state’s influence, the most common value threatened for crises triggered by non-state actors, 35.0 percent result in a violent response. While this is a greater frequency of violent responses than political or economic threats or even limited military damage, it does not give overwhelming support for the hypothesis that crises which threaten the influence of the crisis actor are more likely to result in violence.
Table 5.14. Gravity of Value Threatened from State Crisis Trigger and Major Response from Crisis Actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Condition</th>
<th>Violent Response</th>
<th>Non-Violent Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political or Economic Threat</td>
<td>17 (17.9%)</td>
<td>78 (82.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Military Damage</td>
<td>14 (25.5%)</td>
<td>41 (74.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Threat</td>
<td>65 (44.2%)</td>
<td>82 (55.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Influence</td>
<td>48 (35.0%)</td>
<td>89 (65.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grave Damage or Threat to Existence</td>
<td>40 (41.7%)</td>
<td>56 (58.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>184 (34.7%)</td>
<td>346 (65.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 21.850; p = .000

Again, limiting the data to just those cases in which the crisis trigger was a violent state actor (Table 5.15) we see an increase in the ratio of violent responses to non-violent responses especially in regards to territorial threats (+26.6%), and to a lesser extent political or economic threats (+15.4%), threats to influence (+13.9%), and grave damage or threat to existence (+7.2%). Surprisingly, cases in limited military damage see a decrease in violent responses (-5.9%).
Table 5.15. Gravity of Value Threatened from Violent State Trigger and Major Response from Crisis Actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Violent Response</th>
<th>Non-Violent Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political or Economic Threat</td>
<td>9 (33.3%)</td>
<td>18 (66.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Military Damage</td>
<td>11 (31.4%)</td>
<td>24 (68.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Threat</td>
<td>51 (70.8%)</td>
<td>21 (29.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Influence</td>
<td>22 (48.9%)</td>
<td>23 (51.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grave Damage or Threat to Existence</td>
<td>22 (50.0%)</td>
<td>22 (50.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115 (51.6%)</td>
<td>108 (48.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi Square = 20.151; p = .000

When crises in which the crisis actor was the lesser power are excluded (Table 5.16) there remains little difference in how states respond. The two major differences are political or economic threats, which sees a 17.9 percent increase in violent responses, and grave damage or threats to existence, which sees a 21.3 percent increase. In general, however, states’ major response to violent triggers by less powerful states is about evenly split between violent and non-violent actions with territorial threats being the most likely to elicit such a response followed by threats to influence. These findings do not give strong supporting evidence for hypothesis two. States are not more inclined to respond to threats to influence—the type of value most frequently threatened by violent non-state actors—more violently than other types of threats.
### Table 5.16. Gravity of Value Threatened from Violent State Trigger and Major Response from Stronger Crisis Actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Violent Response</th>
<th>Non-Violent Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political or Economic Threat</td>
<td>2 (15.4%)</td>
<td>11 (84.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Military Damage</td>
<td>3 (37.5%)</td>
<td>5 (62.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Threat</td>
<td>21 (72.4%)</td>
<td>8 (27.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Influence</td>
<td>15 (51.7%)</td>
<td>14 (48.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grave Damage or Threat to Existence</td>
<td>4 (28.6%)</td>
<td>10 (71.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45 (48.4%)</td>
<td>48 (51.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 15.083; p = .005

2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.87.

---

**International Organization Involvement**

The rest of this chapter examines the structural conditions under which these crises take place, both within the context of global institutions and the institutional limitations of the non-state actors themselves. States have an incentive to resolve conflict peacefully and have created institutions by which this can be accomplished. Hypothesis three posits whether the level of international organization involvement in these conflicts differs between conflicts triggered by states versus conflicts triggered by non-state actors. With the creation of the United Nations, the post-World War environment saw an expansion in the scope of international organizations in conflict resolution. However, the United Nations’ Charter was specifically worded to deal with conflicts between states and guard against incursions by one country into another country’s internal affairs. As a result, the United Nations in its design is less suited to deal with conflicts between states and violent non-state actors. Article 34 of the Charter
states that “the Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute.” However, Article 35 states that only members of the United Nations or non-members that are recognized states can bring disputes to the attention of the General Assembly or the Security Council. Consequently, non-state actors are less able of bringing international attention to their cause without the support of a state sponsor. While the provisions of the Charter certainly do not preclude the United Nations from becoming involved in conflicts between states and non-state actors, the state-centric nature of the institution indicates that it is more likely to become involved in conflicts triggered by states than conflicts triggered by non-states.

Because conflicts between states and violent non-state actors fall outside the framework of the original design of the United Nations, international institutions may be less capable of playing a role in their resolution. Initial observations bare this out. Table 5.17 compares the difference between global organization involvement in crises triggered by states and crises triggered by non-state actors. The data show that the United Nations does play a prominent role in many of the crises triggered by violent non-state actors. Over half of these crises have global organization involvement (53.8 percent); however, for crises triggered by states nearly two-thirds (65.4 percent) involve a global organization. While the differences are not overwhelming, the result is statistically significant (p = .046).
Table 5.17. Crisis Trigger and Content of Global Organization Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All State Triggers</th>
<th>Non-State Trigger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Organization</td>
<td>349 (65.4%)</td>
<td>35 (53.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Global Organization</td>
<td>185 (34.6%)</td>
<td>30 (46.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 3.336; p (one-sided) = .046

*aContinuity correction for 2x2 table*

However, if crises with violent non-state triggers are compared to just those cases in which the crisis was triggered by a violent state action the result becomes slightly more pronounced with the United Nations being involved in 69.6 percent of those cases (Table 5.18). This difference when compared to UN involvement in crises triggered by violent non-state actors is also statistically significant (p = .013). These results indicate that, while not totally isolated from international institutions, crises involving non-state actors are less likely to include UN involvement. Without the mitigating factor associated with UN involvement, these crises may face additional obstacles for coming to the bargaining table. While these results confirm hypothesis three, they are tenuous in that they do not provide a strong explanation for why the level of involvement is lower. This area of inquiry requires additional future research.
Table 5.18. Crisis Trigger and Content of Global Organization Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Violent State Triggers</th>
<th>Non-State Trigger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Organization Involved</td>
<td>156 (69.6%)</td>
<td>35 (53.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Global Organization Involved</td>
<td>68 (30.4%)</td>
<td>30 (46.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 4.927; p (one-sided) = .013

*aContinuity correction for 2x2 table

Violent Response and Actor Type and Tactic

One of the key theoretical assumptions of this study is that because non-state movements lack the structure of states, states that are challenged by these groups are less capable of resolving these crises through diplomatic or other non-violent means. As a result states are more prone to respond with military force. As discussed in chapter four, some non-state groups share more state-like characteristics than others. For example, some groups possess a recognizable and active political unit, some control territory, and others control armed forces with a traditional military structure. If increased violence toward these groups is due to their lack of state-like structure than we should see groups that possess a higher degree of these characteristics to see responses from states that are more similar to how states respond to other states. Chapter four also makes the assumptions that revolutionary/ideological groups will be most likely to have a political wing and command more traditional armed forces and that ethnopolitical/identity movements will be most likely to control territory.
Fundamentalist/religious groups will be the least likely to resemble a state due to their political goals and the tactics that they have generally used to pursue them.

As can be seen in Table 5.19, a state’s major responses to crises triggered by revolutionary movements are much less likely to involve violence than crises triggered by ethnopolitical or religious movements. Close to half (44.1 percent) of all crises triggered by a group classified as revolutionary receives some form of non-violent response, while only 20.0 percent of ethnopolitical and 18.2 percent of fundamentalist movements are responded to non-violently (p = .051). This finding confirms hypothesis four and indicates that crises that involve revolutionary non-state actors have certain structural characteristics, different enough from ethnopolitical and religious movements, to allow for an initial non-violent response to the crisis.

### Table 5.19. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Major Response by Crisis Actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Violent Response</th>
<th>Non-violent Response</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>19 (55.9%)</td>
<td>15 (44.1%)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnopolitical</td>
<td>16 (80.0%)</td>
<td>4 (20.0%)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>9 (81.8%)</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44 (67.7%)</td>
<td>21 (32.3%)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 4.557; p (one-sided) = .051<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> One cell (16.7%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.55.

Interestingly, just as with state responses to state triggers, crises triggered by revolutionary groups see the number of cases in which the principle technique is violent increase from the number of violent major responses (Table 5.20). Nineteen of the
thirty-four cases triggered by a revolutionary group (55.9%) employ violence, but in twenty-four of the cases states employ a violent principal technique (70.6%). There is little difference for ethnopolitical groups and religious groups, which is not surprising since most major responses toward these groups are already violent. There is no significant difference between the type of group and type of principal technique used (p = .438).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Violent Technique</th>
<th>Non-violent Technique</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>24 (70.6%)</td>
<td>10 (29.4%)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnopolitical</td>
<td>17 (85.0%)</td>
<td>3 (15.0%)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>9 (81.8%)</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40 (76.9%)</td>
<td>15 (23.1%)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 1.652; p (one-sided) = .438\(^a\)
\(^a\) Two cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.54.

Additionally, as Table 5.21 below shows, there is no significant relationship between the type of tactic a group uses and whether a state responds violently or non-violently. While terrorist tactics are responded to violently 76.0 percent of the time compared to 62.5 percent for guerrilla tactics, this difference is not statistically significant (p = .390). This preliminary finding indicates that the political motivations of a group are more of a determining factor in how a state will respond to a violent non-state actor than the tactics the non-state actors use.
Table 5.21. Violent Non-State Actor Tactic and Major Response by Crisis Actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Violent Response</th>
<th>Non-Violent Response</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td>25 (62.5%)</td>
<td>15 (37.5%)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist</td>
<td>19 (76.0%)</td>
<td>6 (34.0%)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44 (67.7%)</td>
<td>21 (32.3%)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = .739; p (two-sided) = .390

a Chi-square with continuity correction for 2x2 table.

If the data is broken down further to show the differences between the type of group and the type of tactic that they use it indicates that guerrilla tactics tend to elicit slightly more violent responses from states, except in the case of revolutionary/guerrilla groups that have a much higher rate of non-violent responses (45.2 percent). Of the seven cases in which an ethnopolitical group uses guerrilla tactics only one resulted in a non-violent response and neither of the two cases in which a fundamentalist group used guerrilla tactics neither resulted in a non-violent response (see Table 5.22).
Table 5.22. Group/Tactic and Major Response by Crisis Actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Violent Response</th>
<th>Non-Violent Response</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary/Guerrilla</td>
<td>17 (54.8%)</td>
<td>14 (45.2%)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary/Terrorist</td>
<td>2 (66.7%)</td>
<td>1 (33.3%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnopolitical/Guerrilla</td>
<td>6 (85.7%)</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnopolitical/Terrorist</td>
<td>10 (76.9%)</td>
<td>3 (23.1%)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalist/Guerrilla</td>
<td>2 (100.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalist/Terrorist</td>
<td>7 (77.8%)</td>
<td>2 (22.2%)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While it cannot be definitively shown whether which tactic a non-state actor chooses to use—indeed, of the type of violent non-state group—does not determine whether a state will adopt a violent or non-violent response, hypothesis 4.2 postulates that the level of violence that a state uses to respond to a crisis will be higher against groups that use guerrilla tactics than against groups that use terrorist tactics. Table 5.23 bears this out, showing that for crises triggered by an act of terrorism just 40 percent led to serious clashes or war. However, 65 percent of all crises triggered by guerrilla tactics led to serious clashes or war (p = .043).
Table 5.23. Violent Non-State Actor Tactic and Violence Associated with Crisis Actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Serious Clashes and War</th>
<th>No Violence and Minor Clashes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>10 (40.0%)</td>
<td>15 (60.0%)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla</td>
<td>26 (65.0%)</td>
<td>14 (35.0%)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36 (55.4%)</td>
<td>29 (44.6%)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 2.945; p (one-sided) = .043

*Chi-square with continuity correction for 2x2 table.

On the other hand, Table 5.24 does not show any statistically significant relationship between the type of violent non-state group and the level of violence associated with a crisis (p = .735). As such, we can conclude that level of violence is more strongly associated with the type of tactic a non-state group uses than the type of non-state group.

Table 5.24. Violent Non-State Actor Type and Violence Associated with Crisis Actor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Serious Clashes and War</th>
<th>No Violence and Minor Clashes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>19 (55.9%)</td>
<td>15 (44.1%)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnopolitical</td>
<td>12 (60.0%)</td>
<td>8 (40.0%)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalist</td>
<td>5 (45.5%)</td>
<td>6 (54.5%)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36 (55.4%)</td>
<td>29 (44.6%)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = .615, p (two-sided) = .735

How does the use of terrorist or guerrilla tactics affect the likelihood that a global organization would become involved in a conflict? The United Nations has become more outspoken in its overall condemnation of the use of terrorism. However,
the larger scale of fighting that generally accompanies guerrilla warfare may help draw it into these conflicts. As Table 5.25 shows, there is no clear difference at all between global organization involvement based on the type of tactic used by the violent non-state actor (p = .984).

Table 5.25. Violent Non-State Actor Tactic and Content of Global Organization Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Terrorist Tactic</th>
<th>Guerrilla Tactic</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Organization Involved</td>
<td>14 (56.0%)</td>
<td>21 (52.5%)</td>
<td>35 (53.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Global Organization Involved</td>
<td>11 (44.0%)</td>
<td>19 (47.5%)</td>
<td>30 (46.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = .000; p (two-sided) = .984

Global organization involvement does show a significant difference when compared between type of violent non-state actor (p = .020). However, fundamentalist/religious groups in which ten of the eleven cases had some form of global organization involvement largely account for this difference (see Table 5.26). Many of these cases, however, took place within the context of an ongoing United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Middle East and, thus, already had UN involvement before the crisis was triggered.
Table 5.26. Violent Non-State Actor and Type and Content of Global Organization Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Revolutionary</th>
<th>Ethnopolitical</th>
<th>Fundamentalist</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Organization</td>
<td>17 (50.0%)</td>
<td>8 (40.0%)</td>
<td>10 (90.9%)</td>
<td>35 (53.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Global</td>
<td>17 (50.0%)</td>
<td>12 (60.0%)</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
<td>30 (46.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi-Square = 7.825; p (two-sided) = .020

Table 5.27 breaks down the type of global organization activity between violent state triggers and the three classifications of violent non-state actors. While violent state triggers are more likely to have a global organization become involved, thirty-three of these cases only involve discussion without resolution or 21.2 percent of all instances in which there is global organization involvement. For violent non-state groups only three involved discussion without resolution. This breakdown demonstrates that while crises triggered by states are more likely to elicit the attention of the United Nations, the likelihood for that response to result in meaningful action is about equal between crisis triggered by states and crises triggered by non-states. (For violent state triggers 45.1 percent result in no global organization activity or discussion without resolution; for violent non-state triggers, 50.8 percent result in no activity or discussion without resolution.)
Table 5.27. Breakdown of Global Organization Activity and Triggering Entity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Violent State</th>
<th>Revolutionary</th>
<th>Ethnopolitical</th>
<th>Fundamentalist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No GO Activity</td>
<td>68 (30.4%)</td>
<td>17 (50.0%)</td>
<td>12 (60.0%)</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss without Resolution</td>
<td>33 (14.7%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
<td>1 (5.0%)</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact-Finding</td>
<td>2 (0.9%)</td>
<td>4 (11.8%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Offices</td>
<td>11 (4.9%)</td>
<td>2 (5.9%)</td>
<td>2 (10.0%)</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condemnation</td>
<td>14 (6.3%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
<td>1 (5.0%)</td>
<td>5 (45.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for Action</td>
<td>69 (12.9%)</td>
<td>4 (11.8%)</td>
<td>2 (10.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>10 (4.5%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>2 (0.9%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer Group</td>
<td>15 (6.7%)</td>
<td>1 (2.9%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>3 (27.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Military Force</td>
<td>5 (2.2%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>2 (10.0%)</td>
<td>2 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General-Other</td>
<td>22 (9.8%)</td>
<td>3 (8.8%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

This chapter has tested the hypotheses posited in chapter four concerning state responses to violent non-state actors. Hypothesis one, that state responses to violent non-state actors will be more violent than state responses to other states, is strongly confirmed when looking at a state’s major response. However, for principal technique the evidence is not as strong. Hypotheses two, three, and four attempt to provide an explanation for this finding. The theoretical assumption of this dissertation is that non-
state actors lack the structure with which they can enter into a good-faith bargain with a state. As a result, states will rely more strongly on military force when responding to these crises. Hypothesis two, however, asks whether the violent response by states could be explained by the type of values that non-state actors threaten. Over half of the cases in which a non-state actor triggered a crisis for a state threatened the influence of the state. However, when compared to crises triggered by states there is no evidence to suggest that threats to influence are more likely to elicit a violent major response. Therefore, there is not strong supporting evidence for hypothesis two. Hypothesis three examines the role of the United Nations and whether it is as involved in these crises as it is in crises involving state triggers. The findings here indicate less of a UN role for these crises, suggesting that non-state actors’ lack of formal membership within international institutions hinder this involvement. Hypothesis four asks whether the structure of non-state actors themselves invite more violent responses. Based on the assumptions regarding which types of groups will be more state-like, evidence suggests that the more a non-state actor possesses similar characteristics to a state, especially in terms of having a recognizable political unit, the more likely the state will use a non-violent major response.

The findings here suggest that the reason that we see a higher likelihood of violence toward non-state actors is due to the structural characteristics of these groups. States’ inability to respond to these groups in the same way they respond to crises triggered by states creates a situation in which more violent responses are used to deal with these crises. Chapter six concludes this study by summarizing and discussing the implications of this research.
Chapter 6

Conclusion: Foreign Policy and Violent Non-State Actors in a Transnational World

This study has attempted to answer one central research question: How do states respond to crises triggered by violent non-state actors? The tragedy of September 11th has brought increased attention to this question. However, the importance of this research extends well beyond the events of that day. Non-state actors are diverse in their internal structure, their political goals, and their means for achieving those political goals. However, the growing influence of these groups makes it essential that political science scholarship gain a greater understanding of their role without overstating their true importance.

An ongoing debate exists concerning the role of non-state actors in international relations. As was discussed in chapter one, most traditional international relations theory focuses on the state and its relationship with other states. Consequently non-state actors have rarely fit into our analytical equations. Nevertheless, numerous examples can be given of non-state groups challenging states. These challenges have come in many forms, from non-governmental organizations advocating for various political causes to violent revolutionary, ethnic or fundamentalist movements seeking to change their political environment. The question addressed here is whether state responses to these groups, specifically those groups that trigger a foreign policy crisis for a state, are similar to or differ from the types of responses states make toward crises triggered by other states.
Most previous research on these groups has centered on how the activities of these groups has affected the domestic political structures of the countries within which they operate. This research, on the other hand, looks at how states respond to crises triggered by external violent non-state groups. This approach is important for three reasons. First, international relations’ almost exclusive focus on states has left many of the types of threats states face undertheorized. This study has provided a theoretical outlook for understanding how states would approach a conflict involving a violent non-state actor. By specifying the structural differences in these conflicts, in comparison to conflicts just between states, a slightly different set of outcomes can be deduced, specifically that states should be more likely to use violent responses to non-state triggers. Second, this research disaggregates ICB data in a way that gives a more detailed understanding of state behavior during crisis. Past studies using ICB data have generally not made a distinction between crises triggered by states and crises triggered by non-state actors. By limiting the focus of this research to this specific sub-set of crises, this study shows that in the case of foreign policy crises, important empirical differences exist in the ways states responds to states versus how they respond to non-states. Finally, this research highlights some of the difficulties that states face when confronting crises triggered by these groups. The lack of an institutional framework through which parties can work to derive a non-violent solution appears to lead to a higher level of violent confrontation. Knowing these differences exist provides a starting point for finding new policy solutions to these conflicts.

This study reports the following findings:
1. When a state experiences a crisis triggered by the actions of a violent non-state actor, it is more likely to react to that crisis with military action or violence than to crises triggered by another state.

The theoretical assertion of this research is that the dynamic of the relationship between states and non-state actors during crises is such that they encourage more violent state responses. States, when responding to crises triggered by another state, have a set of tools through which to respond. These include established diplomatic channels, international norms and institutions that encourage dialogue between states, the greater ability that states have to enforce agreements, and a better understanding of an opponent’s capabilities and preferences. Non-state actors, on the other hand, do not always have an obvious political leader with which to negotiate, often act outside international norms, are not generally members international institutions, are less capable of enforcing agreements, and can more successfully obscure their capabilities and preferences. As a result states are less capable of pursuing diplomatic channels when responding to a crisis triggered by a non-state actor. Coupled with the fact that states will likely perceive non-state actors as weaker, and therefore more easily defeated than a state adversary, states will be more inclined to respond with military force.

Empirical evidence from ICB data indicates that, indeed, states respond more violently to non-state actors. This is especially true with regards to the major response of states toward a crisis trigger, indicating that the difficulties with pursuing diplomatic or non-violent solutions are grounded in the structural differences that exist between crises triggered by states and structures triggered by non-states. These findings remain strong even when compared to just those crises triggered by states committing a violent act and
cannot be explained simply by the large power differentials between states and non-state actors. Thus, while states have been shown to demonstrate matching behavior when confronted by another violent state actor, the international structures that have been developed to mitigate violent activity ease that behavior to some extent when confronted by rival states. Violent non-state actors, on the other hand, do not possess these same characteristics, and therefore states seem to exercise what could be considered hyper matching behavior when responding to crises triggered by these groups.

2. Whether a state perceives the actions of violent non-state actors as threatening is highly linked to whether the state perceives those actions as direct or indirect challenges to its own level of influence within the international or regional system.

The challenge violent non-state actors pose toward states often lies in a given state’s perceived role in the larger international or regional system. Non-state actors may not be able to cause serious physical damage to a state, but their ability to challenge the regimes of allies and to carry on sustained low-intensity warfare contributes to their overall disruptiveness. Even in cases where non-state groups are able to cause serious damage, they often do not have the resources to continue a sustained campaign. Therefore, in order for the actions of a non-state actor to constitute a crisis for a state, this research finds that those actions are generally connected to that state’s overall perceived standing within a regional or international system. This has been especially true with regards to groups designated here as revolutionary/ideological. Throughout the Cold War both superpowers responded violently to groups considered
to be hostile to their respective ideologies. Consequently the actions of small non-state groups became magnified in a global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Although the Cold War has ended, non-state groups continue to threaten the status quo and present challenges to states’ influence. Islamist political movements threaten secular regimes generally considered to be friendlier to Western interests and influence; ethnopolitical movements challenge state borders and the legitimacy of many multi-ethnic states; and, while the prominence of revolutionary movements have resided, there is always the chance that such groups will re-emerge as political systems fail and economic divisions persist. Therefore, our understanding on non-state groups and their impact on states should continue to be largely rooted in their impact on states’ overall standing and influence within the larger regional and international system.

3. The more a violent non-state group reflects traditional state structures (an organized political structure, control of territory, conventional armed forces); the more state responses will mirror the types of responses that states make toward other states.

The third major finding of this dissertation has to do with the nature of the non-state groups themselves. While it was shown that states respond to crises triggered by violent non-state actors as an aggregate group more violently than to crises triggered by states, it was not clear whether states responded to different types of violent non-state groups differently. Based on the finding that states respond more violently to these groups, this study hypothesized that non-state groups that share more similar characteristics with states will be more likely to see states respond to crises with non-
violent acts. This research makes a series of assumptions with regards to the three subcategories of groups and the two subcategories of tactics. These assumptions include: ideological/revolutionary groups will be more likely to have a recognizable political structure and military command; groups that use guerrilla tactics will also have a more traditional military command; and identity/ethnopolitical groups will be the most likely to control territory. Accepting these assumptions we should expect to see states using non-violent major responses toward ideological/revolutionary movements more frequently than toward other groups. According to data here these assumptions prove accurate. However, future research will require further coding of these cases in order to reach a more definitive conclusion in this regard.

Future Directions

The findings of this study prompt some important normative and policy questions. Empirically the results are interesting, but do they point to an inefficiency in state behavior that should be addressed on a policy level? The decision to use force is one of the most critical decisions a leader can make. Not only are the lives of those who are targeted at stake, but so are those who are sent to carry out the policy. In addition, the use of force is always a highly risky decision even in cases in which there exist large asymmetries between the sides as in most of the cases cited here. Therefore, is it within most states’ interests to continue using force as the major response to these types of crises? The past half century has seen some important transitions in how force is applied by states and the growth of institutions and norms that mitigate war between
states. Many past justifications for war are no longer seen as valid, with states pursuing other means for resolving disputes.

Is it possible that, with the growing impact of non-state groups on international politics, that states will begin to seek ways to address these conflicts without resorting to force? To do this states will have to begin to address some of the structural deficiencies identified here, most importantly their ability to communicate effectively with leaders of non-state movements. However, increased communication might be hampered if the non-state leader is not able to guarantee that agreements made can be enforced or carried out on the local level.

Additionally, non-violent solutions are hampered by the problem that some non-state groups are motivated by truly unacceptable goals. Could a state reasonably seek a negotiated solution with a group such as al-Qaeda after September 11 and would al-Qaeda be willing to participate in such a negotiation? Some crises require the use of force, but not all crises are triggered by al-Qaeda or groups that approach al-Qaeda’s extreme positions and excessive tactics. Therefore, analysts and policymakers should continue to seek ways for states and non-state groups to be able to redress grievances without resorting to force. These efforts could occur both on the bureaucratic levels via states’ foreign ministries or on the international level through the auspices of the United Nations and other regional organizations.

However, it is important that the impact of violent non-state actors not be overstated. Jervis (2002), in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association stated that:

Jervis (2002), in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association stated that:
Recent terrorist attacks are of unprecedented magnitude and will have a significant impact on domestic and international politics, but I do not think they have the potential to be a functional substitute for great power war—i.e., to be the driving force of politics. . . [A]lthough the events of September 11 have triggered significant changes in American foreign policy and international alignments, I believe that in a fairly short period of time previous outlooks and conflicts of interest will reassert themselves.

That said, the study of state responses to violent non-state actors remains an important topic, at least for the near future. This research is a first step to understanding those interactions.

However, it should also be noted that the nature of the data in this dissertation limits the conclusions that can be drawn. Because the cases of this study are specific to foreign policy crises, and not other types of state/non-state interactions, these findings are limited in their scope. That said, it is reasonable to suggest that even in cases in which states interact with violent non-state actors outside of a crisis situation the same deficiencies we see in crises will continue to manifest themselves. Thus, it will be difficult for states and non-state actors to arrive at any type of negotiated solution and instead we might expect to see these non-crisis conflicts continue for years.
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