ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: COSMOPOLITANISM, MOBILITY, AND ROYAL OFFICIALS IN THE MAKING OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE (1580-1700)

Adolfo Polo y La Borda Ramos, Doctor of Philosophy, 2017.

Dissertation directed by: Professor Alejandro Cañaque, History.

This dissertation explores the worldwide mobility of seventeenth-century Spanish imperial officials who traveled around the Americas, Asia, Africa, and Europe. My study focuses on the lower echelon of imperial officials in order to demonstrate how their experiences of service to the king in a variety of locales affected the governance of the Spanish Empire and how such a polity was imagined by these officials as a global, yet connected and coherent unity. I argue that the officials’ circulation was central for the cohesion and stability of the empire. It allowed the actual and imagined overcoming of the far-flung geography of Spain’s empire and the incorporation, and sometimes exclusion, of diverse subjects across the globe. The intense and extensive mobility of the officials permitted the consolidation of certain imperial political practices, values, and patterns of rule and administration, which played a decisive role in the emergence of a common imperial identity built from the ground up. This imperial identity worked to give cohesion to a polity as heterogeneous as the Spanish Empire. Imperial official’s interactions with very different peoples and cultures spawned a cosmopolitan imperial culture that unified the many cultural, geographic, demographic, and social peculiarities.
of diverse societies under the umbrella of the imperial mission of enforcement, defense, and expansion of the crown’s rule and spread of Catholicism.

This work departs from the traditional national and area models of study by emphasizing the utility of an analytical framework that takes the whole imperial system—and not just one of its component regions—as the unit of analysis, in order to show that the histories of Europe, America, Africa, and Asia were far more entangled than previously thought. Despite the empire’s enormous diversity, extension, discontinuous territoriality, and the near-autonomous status of many imperial outposts, a great number of Spanish imperial subjects saw the empire as an integrated and coherent political unit. I analyze some of the conditions and settings that made possible the global mobility of the officials, and some effects of such circulation in the ruling and political imagination of the empire.
COSMOPOLITANISM, MOBILITY, AND ROYAL OFFICIALS IN THE MAKING OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE (1580-1700)

by

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Professor David Sartorius
Para María y el futuro.
Acknowledgments

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I must also thank the helpful staff at the various archives and libraries were I have worked, particularly at the Archivo de Indias, Archivo General de Simancas, Archivo Histórico Nacional, and the Biblioteca Nacional. Their silent but extremely efficient work, as well as their advice, made my research smooth. Antonio Ramos, the parish priest of Alfocea in Aragón, generously opened the doors of the church of the Immaculate Lady.

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# List of Abbreviations

## Archives and Libraries

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGI</td>
<td>Archivo General de Indias, Seville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHN</td>
<td>Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGS</td>
<td>Archivo General de Simancas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMCO</td>
<td>Archivo Municipal de Córdoba, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNE</td>
<td>Biblioteca Nacional de España</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL</td>
<td>Huntington Library, San Marino, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAH</td>
<td>Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid</td>
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## Other Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CGIF</td>
<td>Colección general de documentos relativos a las islas Filipinas existentes en el Archivo de Indias de Sevilla.</td>
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<td>Exp.</td>
<td>Expediente</td>
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<td>Leg.</td>
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Introduction: The Spanish Imperial Officials and their World

On May 1590, while working as a tax collector in Andalusia, the not yet famous writer Miguel de Cervantes asked the king to appoint him corregidor (chief magistrate) of the city of La Paz in present-day Bolivia. Cervantes, like many of his contemporaries, was hoping to improve his social and economic condition by crossing the Ocean under the king’s patronage. He supported his petition by exposing his many merits and services to the Monarchy for more than 30 years, which took him away from his native Castile: he served in Rome as an aide to the cardinal Acquaviva; as a soldier in various Mediterranean posts like Naples, Sardinia, Sicily, and in the much celebrated battle of Lepanto, where he badly injured his left arm; and above all, he suffered imprisonment and enslavement by the Muslims in North Africa from 1575 to 1580.¹

Although the literary talents of the creator of El Quijote were exceptional, his wanderings throughout this wide array of settings were not. Indeed, thousands of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century imperial officials circulated widely around the Spanish Empire and traveled across the Americas, Asia, Africa, and Europe to serve the king and assert his authority, and promote Catholicism.

This dissertation explores the meaning and historical significance of the worldwide mobility of the Spanish imperial officials in order to demonstrate how their experiences of service to the king in a variety of locales affected the governance of the Spanish Empire and how such a polity was imagined by these officials as a global, yet

¹ AGI, Patronato, 253, R. 1, fol 1-2 “Méritos y servicios de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra,” 1590. Cervantes also asked as alternative options to be granted with posts of accountant in Nueva Granada, governor of Soconusco, or auditor to the galleys in Cartagena, however the Council of the Indies rejected his petition and, thankfully for his readers, he remained in Castile where some years later he published his celebrated novel.
connected and coherent unity. While Benedict Anderson has argued that the circulation of colonial officials facilitated the imagining of the new nineteenth-century American republics and, therefore, their break from Spain, I show that, in contrast, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such mobility was an essential mechanism of imperial stability. In recent years, scholars have begun to pay attention to the effects of mobility in the stabilization and formation of communities. They have argued against the traditional view of mobility as a centrifugal force that dispersed the members of such polities and thus weakened them. I argue that the circulation of the royal officials, which was sponsored by the crown, was central to the cohesion and stability of the empire. It allowed the actual and imagined overcoming of the far-flung geography of Spain’s empire and the incorporation, and sometimes exclusion, of diverse subjects across the globe.

The intense and extensive mobility of the officials permitted the consolidation of certain imperial political practices, values, and patterns of rule and administration, which played a decisive role in the emergence of a common imperial identity built from the ground up. This imperial identity worked to give cohesion to a polity as heterogeneous as the Spanish Empire. Imperial official’s interactions with very different peoples and cultures spawned a cosmopolitan imperial culture that unified the many cultural, geographic, demographic, and social peculiarities of diverse societies under the umbrella

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3 Heather Roller has shown that in the eighteenth century native Amazonians engaged in various forms of mobility not because they were forced by colonial authorities, but also because it fitted their own interests and served as a way to consolidate their communities, and not as a form of resistance to colonial rule. Heather F. Roller, Amazonian Routes: Indigenous Mobility and Colonial Communities in Northern Brazil (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014). Likewise, Pekka Hämäläinen contends that, also in the eighteenth century, the Comanche were able to build an empire in North America thanks to their nomadic nature and control over large areas, trading routes, and posts. The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
of the imperial mission of enforcement, defense, and expansion of the crown’s rule and spread of Catholicism. In the end, this dissertation is a study of how royal officials exercised imperial power, which tried to homogenize subjects, in heterogeneous ways.

My dissertation uncovers the mechanisms that allowed for the working, maintenance, and union of the empire. Contrary to traditional historiography that has focused on the crisis of the empire and sought reasons of its decay, I am interested in revealing the political devices and culture that held the Spanish Empire together and made it a functioning and viable polity. While over the past decades there has certainly been a great advancement in our understanding of how the colonial subjects responded, adapted, rejected, and challenged the empire, our knowledge of the imperial mechanisms of power is still very limited. I follow Frederick Cooper’s recommendation to “take seriously what it meant for a polity to think like an empire, to conjugate incorporation and differentiation, to confront problems of long-distance extension and recognize limits of control over large and diverse populations.” This study contributes to our comprehension of how the Spanish Empire bound distant people and places, how power was actually enforced, how the far-away regions were administrated locally and incorporated into the global polity, how they were connected, and how some people were included as others were excluded.

My dissertation builds upon a traditional institutional historiography that was concerned with the ways in which political institutions and laws were transplanted from

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the center of the empire onto the periphery. I bridge such studies with a newer 
historiography that looks at the political culture and the actual practices of power to 
appreciate in greater depth the workings of the empire. This perspective allows me to 
uncover the actual practices of imperial government on the ground, and to observe how 
the global empire and its diversity was experienced, seen, and understood by the mobile 
imperial officials.

My story centers on the lower echelon of imperial officials who primarily carried 
out political and administrative duties: the governors and the district and town 
magistrates, known as corregidores. I do not examine high-ranking officials such as 
viceroys or royal councilors, but rather, train my eye on those officials who interacted 
daily with the crown’s subjects and arguably constituted the backbone of the Spanish 
Empire. These were the ultimate enforcers and representatives of the empire. In fact, for 
the majority of the imperial subjects, these officials were the most visible, concrete, and 
closest manifestation of the king’s authority.

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regards, some of the best available interpretations of the Iberian’s mechanisms of government, which 
clearly speaks to historian’s neglect of such matters.

7 For some of the most recent historiography on the paradigms and mechanisms of imperial service see 
Alicia Esteban Estringana, ed., *Servir al rey en la monarquía de los Austrias: medios, fines y logros del 
servicio al soberano en los siglos XVI y XVII* (Madrid: Sílex, 2012); Juan Francisco Pardo Molero and 
Manuel Lomas Cortés, eds., *Oficinas reales: los ministros de la Monarquía Católica: siglos XVI-XVII* 
(Valencia; Murcia: Departament d’Història Moderna, Universitatde València ; Red Columaria, 2012). 
These books follow the footsteps of previous studies that have renovated the field of institutional 
historiography, such as António Manuel Hespanha, *Visperas del Leviatán. Instituciones y poder político* 
(Portugal, siglo XVII) (Madrid: Taurus Humanidades, 1989); António Manuel Hespanha, *La gracia del 
derecho: economía de la cultura en la edad moderna*, trans. Ana Cañellas Haurie (Madrid: Centro de 
estudios constitucionales, 1993); Marvin Lunenfeld, *Keepers of the City: The Corregidores of Isabella I of 
Castile, 1474-1504* (Cambridge, CB; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Robert Descimon, 
Jean-Frédéric Schaub, and Bernard Vincent, eds., *Les figures de l’administrateur: institutions, réseaux, 
études en sciences sociales, 1997).
While most of these imperial officials served at some point in the military, they did not form a uniform class or social group. They were members of the high nobility, or impoverished residents of urban centers. Some had little education, while others trained at prestigious universities. Some took offices as part of a pre-established familial path of social climbing, while others accepted posts as their only means of survival. With their common service to the king in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, they all shared similar experiences of rulership and administration of the global empire.

The officialdom of the early modern Spanish Empire was far from being a modern bureaucracy. Several scholars have already shown the perils of using anachronistic terms and concepts to understand, analyze, and describe the early modern political systems. Modern concepts, closely associated with the modern nation-state and its institutions, practices, and ideologies, have, for the most part, obscured more than clarified our understanding of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century polities. In fact, the main characteristics of a modern bureaucracy—labor division, professionalization, meritocracy, and service to an impersonal state—did not exist at the time. The administrative organization of the Spanish Empire was a flexible and permeable one. Officials engaged with the political and administrative apparatus by means of personal bonds. They did not work for an abstract entity, but as faithful subjects, served their king. Thus, such service needed not to be constant, but depended on the particular needs of the sovereign and of his subjects. Likewise, officials did not work for a salary in the strict

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8 For a critique against this historiography obsessed with the nation-state and that has studied the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries seeking for the “roots” of such state, see Alejandro Cañeque, *The King’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceroyal Power in Colonial Mexico* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1–16; Cañeque, “The Political and Institutional History of Colonial Spanish America.”

sense. Although they might receive some payments, they served with the promise of future royal rewards, which could take many forms, from money to honorary distinctions. Moreover, a clear distinction between the public and private spheres had not yet emerged.

Official’s functions and duties were not clearly delimited or described. Most of the time, officials were only given the broad command of promoting the general good and ensuring the development and protection of the republic. Imperial officials often crisscrossed not only geographical boundaries, but also boundaries within the imperial system and within the structures of government and administration. In fact, institutional limits were really hard to set, and sometimes were plainly non-existent. This is why the fields in which officials could act were so varied and there was not a professionalization of their service. Officials received appointments not only because of their ‘professional’ merits, but also due to other factors, such as the honor of the official and his family, and of course, the will of the monarch. A judge could be commissioned to administer a city, to quash a rebellion, or to conduct military actions. Likewise, a soldier could easily be appointed as treasurer, despite not having any expertise on financial matters. In the same vein, civil and religious spheres were closely connected. Some officials became ordained, and many religious officials held government posts. In fact, it was not unusual for bishops to act as temporary viceroys. Therefore, while in this dissertation I focus on

10 Such was the case of Juan Francisco de Montemayor, judge of the Royal Audience of Mexico City, who was given the political command of Oaxaca in order to put an end to the 1660 Indigenous revolt there. See Chapter Four.
11 AGI, Lima, 297 “Sobre particulares de don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, tesorero de la Real Hacienda de Lima” (Madrid, February 8, 1631). The captain Hurtado de Corcuera was a renowned soldier who had a distinguished participation in the 1623 Siege of Breda. Although in 1630 he was officially appointed as royal treasurer of Lima, despite his openly manifest inexperience, he was also commissioned to train the soldiers and to organize the defense of the Peruvian port of Callao, without neglecting his fiscal duties. He later was appointed governor of Panama, of the Philippines (see Chapters Two and Four), corregidor of Córdoba (see Chapter Four), commander in chief of Asturias, and governor of the Canary Islands.
12 For instance, Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, whose activities and writings are studied in Chapters One and Five, was ordained priest at the end of the sixteenth century, after several years of royal service in which, among other things, inspected some provincial governments, and raided against runaway slaves.
those officials who had political and military duties, on some occasions, I also analyze officials who at first glance would be regarded as holders of religious, legal, or financial offices.

Accordingly, I depart not only from the conceptual constrains of the nation-state, but also from its physical and geographical limitations and boundaries. The historiography of the Spanish Empire is, for the most part, a fragmented one. Most historians, taking the nation-state as their point of departure, have concentrated on national histories, while paying little or no attention to the connections with other parts of the empire. Additionally, there is a remarkable lack of communication between the historiographies produced on the two sides of the Atlantic. Whereas North and South American scholars of the Spanish Empire tend to overlook its European domains, something similar occurs with European historians, who tend to ignore the American experience.13

I firmly believe that the geographical divisions imposed by the nineteenth- and twentieth-century nation-states should not lead us to a compartmentalization of the study of the Spanish Empire, which at that time was a global polity. The histories of Europe, America, Africa, and Asia were far more entangled and interdependent than previously thought. There existed interconnections that remain buried if imperial regions are considered in isolation. To study the imperial mechanisms of power and authority it is necessary to use a holistic approach that takes the whole imperial system—and not just one of its component regions—as the unit of analysis.

13 For example Matthew Restall does not include any studies about Europe on his historiographical review of the Spanish empire “The Decline and Fall of the Spanish Empire?,” William & Mary Quarterly 64, no. 1 (January 2007): 183–194; and in Antonio Alvarez-Ossorio Alvariño and Bernardo José García García, eds., La monarquía de las naciones: patria, nación y naturaleza en la monarquía de España (Madrid: Fundación Carlos de Amberes, 2004) there is only one out of twenty-nine articles that deals with America.
In the seventeenth century, and especially during the union of the crowns of Castile and Portugal from 1580 to 1640, the Spanish Monarchy became a global empire. Its presence extended to almost every corner of the world, from populous European cities such as Naples and Brussels, to frontier forts such as Valdivia in Chile, and Oran in North Africa, to port cities in India and in East Asia, such as Goa and Manila, to young cities in the New World such as Lima and Buenos Aires. The Spanish monarch ruled over a great diversity of peoples, from Castilian peasants to the natives of the Philippines, from Catholics and Protestants to converted Muslims, from naturalized French traders to enslaved Africans. Difference and heterogeneity lay at the core of the empire. The myriad people, places, languages, cultures, and organizations were located in disjointed spaces, separated by vast oceans, mountains, deserts, and jungles. In practice, many of these regions maintained near autonomy. However, despite this enormous diversity, extension, discontinuous territoriality, and the near-autonomous status of many imperial outposts, a great number of Spanish imperial subjects saw the empire as an integrated and coherent political unit. Thus, I approach the study of the Spanish Monarchy as people perceived it in the seventeenth century. In this way, this dissertation is an answer to John Elliott’s question: “to what extent did these men [the imperial officials] see it [the Spanish Empire] as a coherent unit as a result of their experiences on both sides of the Atlantic?”

My project joins the still incipient endeavor of tracing the globalization of Spanish government. Globalization is a slippery term. I agree with Frederick Cooper,

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who warns against a reckless use of this concept. The fact that we live now in a world defined by the unprecedented intense and almost instantaneous global connections certainly impacts our understanding of the past. Jeremy Adelman, in light of the current rising of neo-nationalism across the globe, has argued for the necessity of revising the precepts, goals, and possibilities of global history, which despite the expectations and promises, has not lessened the hegemony of the nation-state as the framework of historical analysis, or the affection for nationalism. I agree with his assessment and critical reflection about the excessive optimism generated by the new interest on the global paradigms and the desire to write a celebratory history of the past, in which we could find past connections, tolerance, diversity, and inclusion. The history of an early modern globalization should not be the history of inexorable progress toward the formation of our contemporary world, nor the craving for an idealized better world. It should be a history of global dynamics and relationships on their own terms, which were much conditioned by peculiar power structures. In consequence, it is important to look at the global linkages, but also at their darker effects: at the structures of dominion and exclusion that they created. Furthermore, past globalizations and connections should not

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16 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 91–112.

be taken for granted just because there was a claim for the universal. This dissertation exposes how such linkages occurred and what their consequences were. Moreover, following Cooper’s advice, I show how the different constitutive regions of the empire were bounded, how the global empire was actually put into practice, including and excluding people, in well-determined spaces.\(^\text{18}\) This perspective allows seeing how the Spanish Empire was actually developed across the globe and what were the requirements and effects of such globalization, which was not mere rhetoric, but truly impacted on the government and development of the polity and on the lives of its members.

In this regard, cosmopolitan culture played a pivotal role structuring the empire and allowing for diversity. The linkages between cosmopolitanism and imperialism are, indeed, intense. I move away from moral understandings of cosmopolitanism that idealize it as an intrinsically positive value and that also tend to be driven by contemporary issues and problems. Instead, I take cosmopolitanism as a conceptual tool to analyze the capacity of imperial officials to bridge different cultures and to establish permanent structures that knitted together such distinct societies.\(^\text{19}\) Furthermore, this approach to cosmopolitanism also breaks away from the European and Enlightened framework to which it is usually ascribed—the idea of cosmopolitanism as a project of global tolerance in a world composed by modern nation-states—and instead, follows a more “cosmopolitan” understanding of cosmopolitanism, one more attentive to its multiple notions and locus.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{18}\) Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 112.


\(^{20}\) Akhil Gupta claims that in order to be fully coherent with the notion of cosmopolitanism we have to step away from the usual Eurocentric historical significance of cosmopolitanism and acknowledge that there
I highlight the simultaneous nature of an empire that was being built at the same time and by the same people across the globe, not only in America and Asia, but also in Europe. It was an empire that scholars have come to define as a “polycentric monarchy,” a system that “allowed for the existence of many different interlinked centers that interacted not only with the king but also among themselves, thus actively participating in forging the polity.”\(^{21}\) Power did not flow in one clear and unique direction, but through multiple and interconnected foci. The colonial experience was not the product of an exclusive relationship between America and Europe. Colonial governance in America was affected by, and it affected, other imperial regions. This imperial approach, which is neither celebratory nor judgmental, critically appraises the emergence of colonial difference and the colonial subject, asking whether and how the experiences of the imperial officials in “colonial” America differed from those in Europe, and how these regions were mutually influenced.

Those multiple experiences in diverse settings were promoted by the crown itself, for which mobility was central. Mobility was indeed a major factor in imperial rule: the sovereign was able to reach his most far-away possessions thanks to the intermediation of various officials who physically displaced to those locations and served there as images of the king. Institutional historiography has already taught us that the consolidation of Spain’s global hegemony was possible because of the widespread mobilization of officials around the world, who, almost literally, papered it.\(^{22}\) Moreover, the crown relied

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\(^{21}\) Cardim et al., *Polycentric Monarchies*, 4.

\(^{22}\) Cf. note 6.
on these men in order to transplant institutions and experiences of government from one region to another. However, the monarchy also stimulated the mobility of its officials as means to control them, allowing them to hold their posts only for limited periods of time. Officials were constantly transferred from one post to another, and were not expected to settle in the provinces they ruled. The purpose was to avoid any attachments to the distant regions that could diminish officials’ objectivity and loyalty; and instead, to have the officials thoroughly engaged and identified with the imperial project.  

The sources I have used are also varied in their kind and origin. I integrate disjointed sources traditionally used by Latin Americanists with those used by Europeanists. Most of my research took place in the imperial archives in Spain. The Archivo General de Indias holds documents related to the Spanish empire in America and the Philippines, the Archivo General de Simancas has information related to the Councils of Italy, Flanders, and Portugal; and the Archivo Histórico Nacional contains all of the documentation pertaining to the Spanish kingdoms of Castile, Aragon and Navarre. Although this seems to be a clear administrative division, it follows a logic driven by the modern nation-state. The three archives contain similar and related documentation and they even hold documents from regions theoretically foreign to them. These imperial archives were originally part of one unique imperial collection, but since the advent of the nation-state they have been split and organized following fictional divisions of the Monarchy and forgetting the composite and global nature of the seventeenth-century Spanish empire. These archives themselves express the cosmopolitan, heterogeneous, and global nature of the empire. As any scholar who has worked on any of these repositories

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23 Officials were not even legally allowed to get married or to engage in business with local citizens, something that, evidently, seldom complied.
could testify, they contain rich information on various issues from distinct and apparently unrelated regions, written in multiple languages, and provide much detail about the local dynamics and perspectives of the distant imperial provinces. I have complemented this varied information with documentation held in the National Library of Spain, which also comes from and touches on subjects from all across the empire, and in some local archives and libraries that I occasionally could consult. The quantity, quality, and diversity, both of topics and of locations, of the information found in these archives have exonerated me from going into local archives in each of the multiple regions I study. Moreover, while researching in regional and national archives across the world might have given some peculiar and complementary insights, the logistics that such a research would suppose escape the possibilities of this doctoral dissertation.

The documents found in these archives are of different kinds. First, I have relied heavily on official documentation: reports and letters written by the officials while on their posts, the juicios de residencia (the judicial reviews and investigations after their terms), the informaciones, that exposed the deeds and services performed by the officials, as well as the consultas, which were produced by the king’s advisers in the various Councils and dealt with a wide range of issues from the selection of candidates for the offices, to the definition of imperial policies, or to the reward of individuals. Second, I have also used other types of documents: private letters from the officials, memoirs, autobiographies, and travel narratives, as well as other books written by the officials such as literary works, manuals, geographical descriptions, maps, and treatises.

My approach to the imperial mobility is two-fold. On the one hand, I seek to unveil the peculiar mindset of the people who were in charge of enforcing the imperial
mission in a wide-array of scenarios. I analyze how these mobile officials saw and understood the Spanish Monarchy, the other societies they dealt with, and their own role in these interactions. On the other hand, this dissertation also studies the nuts and bolts of government, how mobility and long-distance rule was actually possible, and what were some of the concrete effects of the officials ruling and of their experiences across the world.

In order to answer these questions my dissertation combines a birds-eye perspective with a detailed look. I have paid attention to the whole of the empire, while showing also the activities of the imperial officials in specific circumstances. My dissertation looks at the political culture of the Spanish Empire and the consequences of imperial officials’ mobility from 1580 to 1700, when the imperial institutions were firmly established and the empire had reached its largest territorial size. Moreover, this long duration allows us to see from a broad perspective the permanent dynamics that structured, stabilized, and made possible the empire.

In order to present the workings of the empire in various places and time I have opted for a patchwork approach. I use cases scattered throughout the Spanish Monarchy in a long temporal arc. It was logistically impossible to track down the paths of the thousands of imperial officials dispersed throughout the world, or to cover the almost infinite locations. While there are some names and places that are repeated more often than others, I have not written detailed biographies, or exhaustive studies on various regions. Not only that the dissimilar and often incomplete nature of the sources does not allow me for such endeavors, but such approach risks fixating the empire and its
connections. Instead, I simultaneously look at multiple actors and places, showing the totality of the global Monarchy and the constant dynamics and flux within it.

Most often, sources were produced in very specific local contexts and therefore the global linkages are disguised. In other words, officials (like any other person now and then) rarely were making global arguments or being explicit about their more profound ideologies and how they thought of the Monarchy. I have inferred such observations by looking at small pieces of evidence alongside each other and comparing them. When viewed in isolation, the many fragmented cases I present provide only a tiny glimpse into the mobility of the officials and its effects, but by putting together as many of these short blinks into the past as possible to complement each other, I am able to draw a comprehensive picture of the political culture of the early modern Spanish Empire. Moreover, since this is not a social history about the officials, I am not concerned with presenting statistics of the number of officials, how often they travelled, or how significant in numbers was their mobility. In this dissertation I provide a thick description of the practices and culture of mobility, and the breath of sources, places, and people that I present should serve as a counterbalance to questions that could be raised about the quality of the representation of these officials.

In looking at the Spanish Empire through the lens of mobility, I follow Stephen Greenblatt’s methodological and theoretical suggestions for tackling such phenomena, whether in the early modern world or in contemporary times. In “A Mobility Studies Manifesto,” Greenblatt emphasizes that mobility is a crucial concept to understand how societies and cultures were articulated and constantly redefined. He briefly outlines some
of the main elements that, in his view, a study on cultural mobility should have. In the first place, he argues that we must think of mobility in a highly literal sense. It is necessary to look at the physical dimension of people’s movement, as well as to the logistics that made such movement and circulation possible, and their consequences. Additionally, he contends that we should be attentive to the tensions that emerged between the individual agency and the structural forces constraining it, how mobility was regulated, promoted, contained, and how it escaped out of the institutions. Moreover, it is worth paying attention to the dissenting voices that challenged the status quo. Also, he urges us to look at the “contact zones” in which cultural goods were exchanged, the places and moments in which different individuals met. Finally, Greenblatt also suggests that we should analyze the sensation of “rootedness:” how people perceived certain categories as fixed or permanent, and how they were confronted.

In consequence, I investigate five major themes that impacted the mobility of officials and that defined the workings and governance of the Spanish Monarchy. Roughly, the dissertation can be divided in two parts; in the first two chapters I analyze some of the technological, social, and political conditions and settings that made possible the global mobility of the officials, and in the following chapters I look at some effects of such circulation in the ruling and political imagination of the empire. In Chapter One, I deal with physical and tangible aspects of the worldwide circulation of royal officials. After evaluating the notion of distance and its impact on the governance of the far-flung empire, I sketch some of the major patterns of Spanish mobility and how the Monarchy organized the circulation, and then study the logistics of travel and the new technologies

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that enabled such movement, as well as how all this affected the imagining and material representations of the world.

In Chapter Two, I argue that the engagement of the imperial officials with distant societies completely foreign to them was only possible thanks to a clever use of their personal networks of patronage. Patrons, clients, as well as brokers played a vital role in shaping the activities of the officials. Therefore, I look at some of these networks from an imperial perspective to shed light on how the culture of bounty and clientelism, which was based upon personal and local linkages, adapted to the global dynamics and new geographies, facilitating the government of the empire, even in regions thousands of miles away from the core of those networks.

In the third chapter, I explore the political significance of experience. It was deemed as one of the major attributes of a good ruler and imperial officials acquired it thanks to their mobility and by actually serving in different places across the world. I integrate the political theory with the actual practices of the officials to see how their expertise was gained, valued, and transferred across the different imperial locations—not only from Europe to America, but also the other way around—and how it spawned a new epistemological milieu that privileged direct and sensorial experience.

In Chapter Four, I look at one particular experience of government: the repression of dissent. I analyze different scenarios of opposition to royal authority to contrast how officials acted and thought, incorporating and rejecting subjects. I study how a same official performed in two very distinct circumstances and locale, but more importantly I pay close attention to the circulation of political ideas. I trace the global mobility and
transmission of some of the tropes and stereotypes, as well as practices of government, on which royal officials relied for imposing royal authority.

Finally, in the last chapter, building upon the previous themes I study the tensions, extents, and limits of Spanish imperial cosmopolitanism in order to illustrate how diversity was subsumed. I explore the officials’ self-perception as Catholic soldiers, as their own actions and the interactions with other people were read through the lenses of their Catholic identity, which also fostered a sense of Spanish exceptionalism. I also evaluate the global interactions on areas usually deemed ‘peripheral,’ expressing the unity and coherence of the polity despite its dispersion and diversity.
Chapter One: An Empire on the Move

Qui navigant mare, enarrant pericula ejus. Los que navegan podrán contar los peligros del mar, dice el que mejor lo sabe. Y así, como hombre que por mis pecados he navegado, quise contar á vuestra merced los trabajos de mi navegación.¹

La distancia que hay desde Sevilla a Las Charcas causa horror.²

The Spanish Empire was built upon movement. People, goods, and ideas circulated intensely within and without this far-flung early modern polity, which had possessions on every continent. The mobility of imperial officials was one aspect of the dense culture of circulation. Mobility was nothing new, however, either for the Spanish Monarchy or for other Mediterranean societies.³ Mediterranean culture had a long tradition of mobility and exchange dating from Antiquity, when the Phoenicians first sailed the Mediterranean and built their commercial empire. Nonetheless, the mobility of the early modern Spanish Empire represented something new. It transcended all of the

¹ Eugenio de Salazar, Cartas de Eugenio de Salazar, vecino y natural de Madrid, escritas a muy particulares amigos suyos (Madrid: Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles, 1866), 35.
² AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 46b “Carta del doctor don Pedro de Navia, capellán del marqués de Villagarcía” (Santiago, October 14, 1657).
mental, geographical, political, technical, and scientific limits inherent in Ancient and Medieval times.

In this chapter I will discuss aspects of Spanish mobility that made possible the Spanish Empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, overcoming major geographical challenges. After presenting the different types of people and movement across the empire. I will analyze the organizations, routes, and new technologies that facilitated such mobility. This chapter also discusses some of the conditions and consequences of the dramatic expansion of the period: what it meant for people to move across the Empire, their recognizing of difference, their experiences and new appreciations of distance, and how it all affected the development of a new concept: that of an early modern globalized world.

Take for example the fascinating, and for the most part unknown, case of Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, a soldier, governor, merchant, priest, writer, and founder of cities (Fig. 1). Ordóñez de Cevallos left his native Jaén in Andalusia when he was only nine years old, only to return thirty-nine years later after having joined multiple expeditions and, according to his own account, having traveled more than 33,000 leagues across the five parts of the World: Europe, Africa, Asia, America, and Magallanica (current-day Australia). When he returned to Jaén, in the early years of the seventeenth century, Ordóñez de Cevallos penned his memoirs. The book, entitled *Historia y viaje del mundo del clérigo agradecido don Pedro Ordóñez de Zevallos*, and first published in

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4 Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, *Historia y viaje del mundo del clérigo agradecido don Pedro Ordóñez de Zevallos a las cinco partes de la Europa, África, Asia, América y Magalánica*. (Madrid: Juan García Infanzón, 1691), 392.
1614, exemplifies the scope and possibilities of mobility for members of the early modern Spanish Empire.5

Figure 1. Portrait of Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos in *Quarenta triunfos de la santissima cruz de Christo N.S. y maestro* (Madrid: Luis Sánchez, 1614), fol. 1.

The book is divided into three parts. The first two are autobiographical, corresponding each to two phases of his life and demarcated by his ordaining in Santa Fe de Bogotá at the end of the sixteenth century, while the third one describes the travel routes and most salient things the author saw and learned during his travels. Ordóñez de Cevallos reveals a life of incessant movement. After coming and going between Europe, Africa, and America (where he held several government posts and served as a soldier), he unexpectedly circumnavigated the world, departing from Acapulco and returning to Pernambuco, a formidable adventure which he is allegedly the first man to undertake departing from America. After a failed return trip to Spain in which he was shipwrecked in the Caribbean Sea, Ordóñez de Cevallos left Mexico in hopes of reaching Guayaquil on the Pacific, but encountered stormy conditions that left him waylaid in the Philippine Islands. From there, he traversed Asia in order to preach the Christian gospel, hoping to convert the native population. In particular, he spent a lot of time and energy in the Cochinchina, where he would have converted the crown princess. Then, Ordóñez de Cevallos travelled through India and, later on, reached Africa. Although he wished to return to Europe, his fellow travelers persuaded him to set sail across the Atlantic to America. From Buenos Aires he returned to Guayaquil, and then, finally, Spain.

Unquestionably, the fabulous and exceptional nature of the events narrated by Ordóñez de Cevallos, as well as the troubling lack of a chronology or chronological markers, raise some doubts about the veracity of his journey, especially the Asian portion. However, it is undeniable that he traveled a lot, even if not as much as he

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6 Miguel Zugasti thinks that the journey is, for the most part, veridical. Its narration, he argues, belongs to an “epic” mentality now foreign to us, as evidenced by the author’s consistent identification and description of historic characters and events. Zugasti thinks that many of the book’s incongruences are easily explained
claims. Most importantly, it is clear that he knew a great deal about the world and traveling in it. He had certainly read the many other travel accounts, descriptions, and notices that circulated profusely at that time, and had an awareness of what lay beyond the oceans. To be sure, Viage del mundo reflects the mindset of a time and a society permanently on the move, in which the Spanish Empire had become a truly a global and connected polity.

Despite how striking Ordóñez de Cevallos’ trip was, however, he was not alone in this kind of experience. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many people were curious and eager to know the world beyond their borders. The young Frenchman François Froger, for instance, claimed he had “deseado siempre con gran pasión ver tierras extrañas,” and when he was only 19 years old embarked on an expedition to the Strait of Magellan. Likewise, in 1586 Spaniard Simón Pérez de Torres left Seville for an astonishing journey that, according to his account, took him across America and Asia and back into Europe. Indeed, Christopher Columbus’ transatlantic voyage, and previous Portuguese explorations, inaugurated an era of movement that saw the Europeans spread out from the Mediterranean into far-away lands in Africa, Asia, America, and islands around the world. They settled, conquered, and ruled in regions mentally and physically

by the fact that Ordóñez de Cevallos wrote the text many years after his travels took place. Zugasti, “Épica, soldadesca y autobiografía.”


8 BNE, Mss/3165 François Froger, “Relación de un viaje que se hizo en los años 1695-1697 a las costas de África, Estrecho de Magallanes, Brasil, Cayenna e Islas Antillas, por una escuadra de bajeles del rey, mandada por el sr. de Gennes, hecha por el sr. Froger, ingeniero voluntario en el navío llamado El Halcón Inglés, en Amsterdam, herederos de Antonio Schelte, 1699; traducido al español en el mismo año en Madrid.” 1699, fol. 228.

9 BNE, Mss/3181 Simón Pérez de Torres, “Discurso de mi viaje a la India,” n.d.
distant from home. These men and women, thus, developed a new conception of a distant and large, but at the same time united, world.

This movement went beyond isolated and individual cases. Daviken Studnicki has recently studied the extensive mobility of the Portuguese. According to him, the Portuguese built their nation upon the Atlantic. He defined the Portuguese empire—“The Nation”—in terms of its diasporic community, consisting of Portuguese merchants, sailors, and traders who travelled around the world, establishing the empire’s outposts and selling its goods. Through the seventeenth century, this maritime community inserted itself into the networks of the Spanish empire in America; indeed, the Portuguese played an essential part in the development of such empire. According to Studnicki, they controlled much of the trading network in the Seville-Lima axis, particularly the slave trade. These men created an identity by moving across the Atlantic (and beyond). However, despite the movement and the large distances, they were able to maintain their ties to their homeland and formed Portuguese communities wherever they went.¹⁰

Portuguese mobility existed for the most part in the form of enclaves. They infiltrated existing networks and societies and formed their own communities within these societies. Portuguese expansion contrasts with the manner in which Spaniards established their empire by attempting to fully carve out their own societies. Thus, in the case of the Spanish, a large-scale movement of imperial officials and authorities was required.¹¹ The impressive mobility of all kinds of people, commodities, products, ideas, books, and objects across the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans proved

¹⁰ Studnicki-Gizbert, *A Nation upon the Ocean Sea*.
to be crucial for the development of the Spanish Empire, which became a vibrant society in a state of permanent and incessant movement.

Tamar Herzog has studied the mechanisms through which the many foreigners who circulated within the Spanish Empire became naturalized and accepted as Spaniards. Herzog argues that identities in the early modern Spanish world were formed in local communities, where people were defined as either “good” or “bad” vecinos, and based on that judgment were allowed and recognized (or not) to participate in the community and enjoy their rights and privileges. In Herzog’s analysis, the state and the king had little to do with this process: it was almost exclusively a local affair in which the ability of an immigrant to settle, own a house, and participate within the Spanish community were the main factors that determined that person’s inclusion or exclusion. In this formulation, identities in the early modern empire were defined only once people halted. However, I argue that other figures in the empire—such as the mobile imperial officials that this dissertation examines—defined their identity precisely through the process of movement, and very much in relation to the king and the Monarchy.

Above all, it was imperial subjects’ capacity to serve the Monarchy anywhere in the world that defined them as members of the Spanish polity. Take for example the case of don Gabriel Niño de Távora. He was the son of don Juan Niño de Távora who had served as the governor of the Philippines from 1626 until his death in 1632. Like his father, don Gabriel dedicated his life to the service of the King, wherever he was needed. In 1634, after some years fighting the rebels in Flanders, he voyaged to New Spain from where, following in his father’s footsteps, he sailed for the Philippines. He spent several

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years in that archipelago and was even appointed governor of Terreñate, a tiny but strategic island in the Moluccas. In 1643 he moved back to Spain where he led a military company in the fight against the Portuguese in Badajoz and in Seville. In this case, then, the king and the Monarchy had much to do in the forging of don Gabriel’s identity. He never settled anywhere for long and his interactions with the local communities were limited. Instead of getting involved in the local networks of the community, he engaged in familial and imperial networks of service to the king.

The case of the Niño de Tavoras was not, by any means, unique. There were many families that tied their futures to service to the king. This dissertation shows the ways in which the global Spanish empire was built upon the service of mobile people who tied their fortunes to the empire, and whose mobility (both geographical as well as social) was dependent upon their own networks and those of the monarchy.

While thinking of this early modern mobility, it is important to fully take into consideration the extremely large dimensions, as well as the discontinuous territoriality, of the early modern Spanish Empire. As Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos put it, the possessions of the Spanish king were “un piélago.” In Spanish this word refers to the open and deep sea, both in its geographical and figurative senses. It seems to be a perfect choice for describing the Spanish Monarchy and how many of its inhabitants thought of it: the Spanish Empire was not only a large, immeasurable territorial empire; but it was,

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14 See, for example, Yuen-Gen Liang, Family and Empire: The Fernández de Córdoba and the Spanish Realm (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). Familial service to the king is studied in more depth in Chapter Two.
15 Ordóñez de Cevallos, Historia y viaje del mundo, 405.
contrary to received wisdom, a maritime empire too.\textsuperscript{16} The limits and possibilities were not only marked and defined by grounded boundaries, but, as argued by Ordóñez de Cevallos, by the ocean:

\begin{quote}
Que se dice que no hay reino ni provincia que toque en la mar, que en más de cuatro mil leguas por esta parte, y más de tres mil por la otra, que en todos tenga el gran Rey de España tierra y puertos, con pensiones para ello que se puede decir vasallaje, como en sus lugares he tocado.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

Lauren Benton has emphasized the spatial developments of empires. Early modern empires, she argues, tried to impose their authority over extremely large and irregular territories. Therefore, empires were built upon diverse spatial and geographical formations, which were neither predictable nor unavoidable. These imperial geographies were historically contingent. The integration of these disconnected and distinct territories depended on empires’ ability to connect them. Therefore, Benton claims, empires’ were crafted and organized around specific enclaves and corridors that made possible the bringing together of the separate parts, and which usually followed natural paths.\textsuperscript{18} In this regard, the role of islands as intra-imperial—and often inter-imperial—bridges was fundamental.\textsuperscript{19} It was the ability to surmount and encompass the aquatic spaces what made the Spanish Empire the largest and most powerful polity of its time.

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\textsuperscript{16} Brian Patrick Jones argues in his doctoral dissertation for the importance of paying attention to the oceanic dimension of the Spanish Empire: “Making the Ocean: Global Space, Sailor Practice, and Bureaucratic Archives in the Sixteenth-Century Spanish Maritime Empire” (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, 2014).
\textsuperscript{17} Ordóñez de Cevallos, Historia y viaje del mundo, 406.
\textsuperscript{19} For a study of Havana, one of the most important Spanish island ports, and its connections with the rest of the world and its development, see Alejandro de la Fuente, Havana and the Atlantic in the Sixteenth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). Similarly, the Azores islands played a central role connecting Europe, Asia, and America: Jean-Frédéric Schaub, L’île aux mariés: Les Açores entre deux empires (1583-1642) (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2014).
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Evidently, the unusually large dimensions and previously unseen characteristics of the early modern transatlantic and transpacific Spanish Monarchy were important challenges to individual mobility, and to the government of the polity. Therefore, it is worth considering first about the idea of distance to better understand the workings of the far-flung Spanish empire.

**A Distant Empire**

Distance was a central theme for the imagining and ruling of the Spanish Empire. Early modern inhabitants were aware of the long distances that separated them. For instance, Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos exposed the hazardous path through which people in America had to go when they went to the royal court in Spain to ask for rewards. They had to travel “por tierra y mar tres mil leguas, mudando muchos temples, con mucho riesgo de la vida, y con excesivo gasto de la hacienda.” In fact, Ordóñez de Cevallos was obsessed with the long distances separating the Spanish Empire, in which he frequently traversed. Miguel Zugasti notes that despite Ordóñez de Cevallos’s disdain for providing chronological information, he reiterates over and over the number of leagues he covered in his travels. Likewise, don Pedro de Navia, the chaplain of the marquis of Villagarcía who had been appointed as president of Charcas, worried by the uncertain fate of his patron, fretted that “la distancia que hay desde Sevilla a Las Charcas causa horror,” and that such journey was “tan larga jornada.”

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20 Ordóñez de Cevallos, *Historia y viage del mundo*, 424. A league is an archaic unit of length, and its value varies in each region. It often referred to the distance a person could walk in an hour, roughly three miles.

21 Zugasti, “Épica, soldadesca y autobiografía,” 1783.

22 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 46 “Carta del doctor don Pedro de Navia, capellán del marqués de Villagarcía” (Santiago, October 14, 1657)
these people, and their descriptions of foreign places as being far-off, were profoundly impacted by the idea and sensation of distance.

Such long distances where, first and foremost, physically perceived by weather and climate conditions. The “muchos temples” that people experienced were perhaps the most evident signs of moving from one region to another. Ordóñez de Cevallos, for instance, described the peculiar and favorable weather of New Spain that made it a prosperous and healthy region.23 Weather not only determined the physical conditions in which people lived, but also impacted their behavior and morality.24 The author claimed that in the city of Bogotá there was “un clima particular que influye diferencias y disensiones entre las cabezas.”25 The captain Domingo de Toral y Valdés, who in the first decades of the seventeenth century served the king as soldier and in other posts in Europe and in Asia, and who travelled across much of the Middle East, was convinced that

los hombres que pasan de España a aquellas partes de la India es mudar en ellos el natural, cosa general no atribuyendo a la mudanza de estado más que a la de diferente clima [...] Entiendo que los hombres en aquella parte no les queda ser ninguno de la condición que tenían en España.26

People had to travel thousands of kilometers across the far-flung empire, and more importantly, they knew of the many implications of the far away positions. In a world where the location of political actors greatly defined their power, this understanding of proximity and its effect on political power was vital. Proximity to the center, to the King, defined the identity and political power of both individuals and

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23 Ordóñez de Cevallos, Historia y viage del mundo, 362.
24 In the early modern world, as part of a humoralist conception of the human body, it was universally accepted that climate shaped the character of the people, see Rebecca Earle, The Body of the Conquistador: Food, Race, and the Colonial Experience in Spanish America, 1492-1700 (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), especially 21-23.
26 BNE, Mss/6227 Domingo Toral y Valdés, “Relación de la vida del capitán Domingo de Toral y Valdés” circa 1634, fol. 196–196v.
institutions. Being distant from the King had many limitations. The governor of the Philippines, Santiago Vera, argued that the problems in such islands were more difficult because they were “en tierra tan nueva y distante de vuestra real persona.” Distance not only conditioned the timely and proper application of the king’s justice and law, but it presented logistical problems, too. News took a long time to arrive, and there was always the risk of losing the mail altogether. Thus, Vera, like many of his contemporaries, always wrote duplicates.

Not only was the news sent in duplicate; on some occasions, so too were individuals. In 1663, the count of Santiesteban, viceroy of Peru, concerned about the poor condition of Callao’s fortress and dikes, requested the Council of the Indies to send him a military engineer, ideally from Flanders or Italy, expert in building dikes. The viceroy also requested two experienced officials to assist the engineer. Santiesteban asked for two officials so the job could be completed promptly, but also “como si sucediese morir uno en el viaje, que haya otro que le sustituya.” The viceroy’s request seemed reasonable to everyone in the Council, which ordered the governor of Flanders, the marquis of Caracena, to find the three suitable officials right away so they could be dispatched as quickly as possible. I don know if the Flemish engineer and the two other officials ever set foot in Peru, but communications such as this one clearly reveal the prevalent consciousness of the distance that separated parts of the empire, and the hazards of

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28 AGI, Filipinas, 34, N. 75 “Carta de Santiago de Vera sobre situación general” (Manila, June 26, 1587).

29 AGI, Lima, 297 “Sobre que se envien ingeniero y maestros de diques para reparar la fortificación del Callao” (Madrid, August, 1663).
transatlantic travel. They also speak of the generally unseen links between distant parts of the empire, such as Flanders and Peru, which might otherwise be considered as totally unrelated to each other.

Nonetheless, people did not always complain about the distance. Sometimes it could be used to highlight local qualities, too. The admiral Jerónimo Bañuelos y Carrillo, a seasoned sailor and military man who sailed with a naval squadron to the Philippines, and later served as corregidor of Veracruz, wrote a treatise on the political situation of the Asian archipelago. He contended that even though Manila was “la más remota de España, y la más apartada para el auxilio de Su Majestad,” it was a well-provided city that boasted the greatest commerce in the world.  

Despite being far-removed from its sovereign, Manila had enough resources to overcome the limitations of distance, and thus, more reasons to be praised.

The language of distance was deeply rooted in the political culture of the Spanish Monarchy. The idea of being distant from the king was expressed by everyone from the councilors in Madrid to indigenous people at the ends of the empire. Noblemen and plebeians articulated their demands and explained their needs by means of the physical or mental separation from the center of the empire, the king. The Indigenous people of Pampanga in the Philippines cleverly argued that they were “los más leales vasallos que en este último polo del mundo reconocemos el vasallaje de Vuestra Real Persona,” but nonetheless, “somos los que más vejaciones padecemos, los que más trabajos sufrimos y los que más desdichas lloramos.” The indigenous population shared the Monarchy’s political culture, and knew how to articulate their demands according to the needs,

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30 Jerónimo de Bañuelos y Carrillo, *Tratado del estado del las Islas Philipinas y de sus conueniencias* (Mexico: Imprenta de Bernardo Calderón, 1638), fol. 3.
31 AGI, Filipinas, 193, N. 22 “Carta de los principales de Pampanga” (Manila, June 12, 1680).
actions, and structure of the empire. In fact, their arguments were similar to those of a Spaniard and member of Manila’s elite such as Juan Núñez. In 1598, Núñez bitterly complained against the governor of the Philippines, Santiago de Vera, for only favoring his recently-arrived circle of retainers, leaving aside the rest of the Spaniards’ society, especially those “soldados viejos” like himself, who had long ago settled in the islands. Núñez begged for greater protection and justice, that the king “se acuerde de los que en estas partes tan remotas estamos sirviendo a Vuestra Magestad.” 32 Both the natives from Pampanga and the Spaniards from Manila used the fact of being distant from the king as proof of their greater loyalty, and as an argument for more and better protection, that is, greater rights and flexibility within the colonial society in which they lived.

In 1662 the Council of the Indies stopped the appointment of Juan de Balboa as governor of Santiago de Chile. He had sufficient merits and experience to occupy the new position: at the time he was the governor of Santo Domingo in the Caribbean, and previously had served as the governor of Gibraltar. However, there were also damning accusations against Balboa while he was at the head of the government of Santo Domingo. 33 Councilors were aware of the difficulties inherent in long-distance ruling. As Frederick Cooper has graphically described, empires had “long arms and weak fingers.” 34 Empires could be present in far-away places, and sometimes could appear as mighty and absolutely powerful, but on the ground, in each specific location, the empire’s actual capacity to rule had limitations. It was dependent on the capacity and willingness of local actors, and contingent to multiple negotiations and conditions that were liable to slip

32 AGI, Filipinas, 35, N. 16 “Carta de Juan Núñez quejándose del gobernador” (Manila, June 24, 1598).
33 AGI, Santo Domingo, 2, N. 71 “Sobre el nombramiento de Juan de Balboa y lo que conviene hacer con Don Félix de Zúñiga” (Madrid, October 15, 1658).
34 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 197.
away from the empire’s authorities at the center. Accordingly, the councilors feared that if Balboa had truly committed any wrongdoings

en la isla de Santo Domingo, que es la provincia de las Indias que está más cerca de la presencia de VM, estando más lejos de ella el reino de Chile, con mayor razón se podría recelar continuaría en ella en parte más remota y con mayor exceso.\footnote{AGI, Santo Domingo, 2, N. 90 “Sobre un documento de Juan de Balboa” (Madrid, October 9, 1662).}

David Garrett contends that distance was a positive key ingredient in the construction of royal authority. Studying the case of the late seventeenth-century viceroyalty of Peru, under the rule of Charles II, he argues that the gulf separating Cusco from Lima and Madrid was not necessarily an obstacle for the development of the king’s power. He points out that “subjects were quick to lament that distance left them vulnerable to abusive local officials,” which could suggest that it was a weak and ineffective political and judiciary system, at the whims of corrupt and hard-to-control authorities.\footnote{David T. Garrett, “‘En lo remoto de estos reynos’: Distance, Jurisdiction, and Royal Government in Late Habsburg Cusco,” \textit{Colonial Latin American Review} 21, no. 1 (2012): 17.} However, because the political system was built upon a vertical and hierarchical judiciary structure that compelled people to appeal to a central authority in Madrid, the King and his Council had the final say on all disputes and legal matters and involved themselves in the local affairs of every city. Thus, these locations (Cuzco, Lima, and Madrid) were interdependent in handling administrative and political affairs of the empire. Moreover, the wide gap separating the three cities engendered a “temporal disjuncture, with royal government operating in a different time than local life, even when Madrid and Lima engaged directly in the politics of the highland cities.”\footnote{Ibid., 19.} The powerful but distant king, therefore, remained simultaneously outside of everyday life
and ever-present. His authority, law, and legitimacy were acknowledged, while he was not held responsible for the exploitations and failures of the system.

Arndt Brendecke has presented a similar argument. In Imperio e información, he explores the use of data and information to rule over the vast Spanish empire, and explains how such information was acquired by officials. According to Brendecke, early modern knowledge can be defined according to two major paradigms. On the one hand, the king was thought as omniscient toward his distant kingdoms. On the other hand, he was blind and, thus, much in need of the counsel of others to hear and see at a distance. Informaciones from royal officials as well as from private subjects provided the king with eyes and ears over his out-of-reach holdings and subjects.38 Brendecke acknowledges that the information available at the imperial center was fragmentary, contingent, and reflective of particular interests who wrote to the king expecting favors. Yet, with numerous interests and informants acting at the same time and stepping on each other’s toes, and building upon the theory of checks and balances, Brendecke contends that there emerged a “triangle of vigilance” that helped the king maintain his grip on his far away possessions. The base of the triangle was constituted by the multiple and fragmented acts of vigilance, the sides by acts of communication, and the king was always at the top, constantly receiving pieces of information. In effect, the distant king, due to his “blindness,” was exonerated of any wrongdoings, while his central position and authority as judge (to punish and most importantly to reward) lent stability and cohesion to the Monarchy.39

38 On the Informaciones de méritos y servicios, see Chapter Three.
39 Arndt Brendecke, Imperio e información: funciones del saber en el dominio colonial español (Madrid; Frankfurt am Main: Iberoamericana; Vervuert, 2012), 253–266. There is an English edition of the book
The King’s physical and temporal distance, paradoxically, allowed for the stability and continuity of imperial rule. Nonetheless, as Alejandro Cañeque has explained, it was also necessary to make the king present, visible, and concrete in each and every one of his domains. Imperial officials fulfilled this duty. They acted as representatives of the Spanish king in each of his domains, no matter how distant they were from the court. The count of Castrillo, president of the Council of Indies and later viceroy of Naples, bluntly expressed his point-of-view that the officials going to America were not linked to the region, but on the contrary, “que vayan con la mira de volver a morir a su naturaleza.” It was fundamental that imperial officials on the ground not settle on those regions, rather, their dependence was to the distant king. It was necessary, therefore, to have imperial officials constantly on the move.

A Mobile Society

Mobility of people was hardly a phenomenon new to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries or to the New World. Ida Altman, one of the leading scholars of early modern Spanish migration, has argued that in order to fully understand transatlantic migration we must examine the patterns of internal emigration in Castile that existed prior to and during the transatlantic migration. Moreover, we cannot look at the two

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40 Cañeque, The King’s Living Image, chap. 1.
41 AHN, Estado, 6402-2, N. 84 “Consulta del conde del Castrillo sobre que el licenciado Íñigo López Bravo no aceptó la presidencia de Quito” (Madrid, June 24, 1653).
periods of migration as isolated and disconnected events. Quite the contrary, they were related, mutually dependent, and had effects on both sides of the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{43}

It is worth noting that the movement of royal officials was just one among many other possible kinds of mobility, which often intertwined. With trade and economic profit standing at the center of early modern mobility, for instance, merchants, no less than government officials, moved profusely across the empire and beyond its borders.\textsuperscript{44}

Religious officials were amongst the most mobile individuals of their time.\textsuperscript{45} Religion served as a primary cause of people’s movement: it provided justification for most of the wars, imprisonments, and captivities. Likewise, officials related to the judiciary and legal system (lawyers, attorneys, judges, and oidores) circulated widely. Many scholars have identified a sort of \textit{cursus honorum}, a path that these officials followed which determined their advancement.\textsuperscript{46} Diplomacy and foreign relationships also fostered movement, as

\textsuperscript{43} Ida Altman, \textit{Emigrants and Society: Extremadura and America in the Sixteenth Century} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Ida Altman, \textit{Transatlantic Ties in the Spanish Empire: Brihuega, Spain, & Puebla, Mexico, 1560-1620} (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000). As Ida Altman shows, scholars have been studying for several decades the effects of mobility in the Spanish World either looking at the institutions and policies, the family and kinship structures, the native adaptation and responses, as well as the constant negotiation between Europeans and Americans. Nonetheless, these studies have usually thought of Europe and America in independent and unrelated terms. Ida Altman, “Review Essay: Migration and Mobility in the Sixteenth-Century Hispanic World,” \textit{Renaissance Quarterly} 67, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 544–552.

\textsuperscript{44} The incessant movements of Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos started many miles away from America. While a youngster he left his native Jaén in Andalusia and worked for several trading companies that took him around Europe, the Mediterranean to the Middle East. In between his services as royal official and soldier, he shuttled back and forth to America and then went through most of northern Europe, looking for commercial opportunities. He bought wheat from France, dogs from Ireland, and also profited from American emeralds. Moreover, he also traveled into Africa, to Guinea, Saint Tomé and Congo, from where he bought slaves that were sold at Sanlúcar de Barrameda, in Spain. Ordóñez de Cevallos, \textit{Quarenta triunfos}, Prólogo al lector.


foreign officials traveled to and within the Spanish Monarchy, and ambassadors from the most varied places visited the Spanish realms.

Many of the foreign relationships, however, revolved around war and military activities, which fostered a massive circulation of people and established routes, logistics, and patterns of movement. Throughout the seventeenth century, the Spanish Monarchy maintained many open flanks and engaged in military operations against all of its neighbors, sometimes simultaneously. Moreover, the Spanish military was also active beyond the empire’s borders and participated in many distant disputes. On several occasions, the king sent troops to support his European allies, especially the German Emperor.

The war in Flanders, which lasted from 1566 to 1648, was perhaps the most important driving force of military movement during the seventeenth century: thousands of men of different social and geographical origin fought there. In fact, most of the imperial officials studied in this dissertation had some contact and experience with Flanders. Furthermore, the need to send troops and supplies to Flanders, avoiding French and English territories and their zones of influence, led to the development of the “Spanish Road,” which traversed most of Central Europe and relied heavily on Spanish possessions in Italy, as well as on Habsburg territories. Thus, the war in Flanders required

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a huge mobilization of peoples across most of Europe. Moreover, the war in Flanders soon acquired a global dimension. Pedro Esteban Dávila, while serving as governor of the island of Tercera in the Azores in the 1620’s, contended that “hoy con la guerra de Flandes, y el poco seguro de la mar se pasa grande necesidad,” and further claimed that such a scenario made the Azores islands “una de las más principales fronteras que Vuestra Majestad tiene.” There was a clear global awareness both of the global dimensions of the empires, and of the global scale of the confrontation. The Dutch (a global empire in its own right) fought the Spanish everywhere they could, conditioning the politics in regions far away from Europe, such as the Caribbean, Brazil and Southeast Asia.

Another main military and political European destination was Italy. The political and military posts in Italy were greatly desired, which also stimulated the circulation of people serving there. Those posts shared the same prestige as the ones in Flanders and, therefore, the city council of Manila was pleased with the appointment of Juan Cerezo as governor of the Philippines because “siendo como es muy soldado, de la escuela de Flandes y Italia, donde ha militado y que tiene entendidas las materias de la guerra y

48 Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars, 2nd ed. (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Fernando González de León, The Road to Rocroi: Class, Culture and Command in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1567-1659 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009).
49 BNE, Mss/801, f. 4 - 8 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta escrita al rey nuestro señor por sus consejos de estado y guerra don Alonso Cimbrón” (Tercera, August 24, 1622), fol. 5–5v.
51 See for example, AHN, Estado, 1418, N. 42 “Relación de los militares que se han mostrado pretendientes a la vacante del castillo de Otranto en el reino de Nápoles,” 1704; AHN, Estado, 1413 “Memoriales de particulares con pretensiones en Milán apoyadas en servicios prestados en Flandes y otros puntos,” n.d.; AHN, Estado, 2261 “Documentos relativos a la provisión de varios gobiernos militares y capitánías de armas en el reino de Sicilia,”1618-1713; AHN, Estado, 2266 “Consultas del Consejo de Italia sobre asuntos relativos a la secretaría de Sicilia, su personal y algunos empleos,”1606-1689.
gobierno será en este el que han menester estas islas.”

Likewise, as already mentioned, Spanish soldiers had to first reach Italy and the Duchy of Milan in order to march north into Flanders. Naples and the Mediterranean islands served as a hub for travel to the Middle East. Italy was one of the most vibrant and cosmopolitan regions of the early modern world. Many individuals, and not just soldiers, moved to and through Italy, so it is not surprising that Cristóbal Suárez de Figueroa set his novel *El pasajero* on the road from Madrid to Italy, where by coincidence a soldier, a jurist, a professor, and a goldsmith came together. They shared the same road and destination but had different motives.

Military activities were not, by any means, restricted to the European theater. Rather, subjects of the Spanish monarch engaged in military activities across the world. They fought against local opposition to Spanish rule (for example, the Araucanians in Chile), as well as against European enemies abroad (such as Dutch, French and English pirates and corsairs in the Caribbean). The Spanish were well-aware of the global reaching of their military power. Writer Cristóbal Suárez de Figueroa, despite not being a soldier himself, proudly boasted of the presence of the Spanish soldiers all around the globe, and did not withhold his praises:

> Testigos de lo que valen [los españoles] son innumerables trofeos y vitorias alcanzadas en todas edades. ¡Cuántas en España, cuando Gentiles con Romanos: cuántas en la misma, cuando Cristiano con Moros: cuántas en Francia, defendiendo la Religión y el bando Católico: cuántas en Alemania, apoyando contra injustas contradicciones tan justa pretensión como el diadema de Carlos: cuántas en Flandes contra sediciosos: cuántas en Italia amparando su libertad: cuántas en las costas de África: cuántas y cuán

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52 AGI, Filipinas, 27, N. 177 “Carta del cabildo secular de Manila sobre gobernador Juan Cerezo” (Manila, October 14, 1633).

prodigiosas en los distritos Orientales! ¿Quién no los tiembla? ¿Quién no los estima? Témelos el Turco: ámalos el Preste Juan: respéctalos el Persiano, y cualquier Potentado los desea tener por amigos. Merecen pues a montones las historias, y apenas hay quien tome la pluma para celebrar parte de sus hechos. Los que piden infinitas lenguas son los esparcidos por regiones remotas, como por las Antárticas y Occidentales.  

The center of the Spanish activities in North Africa was Oran. By the first years of the sixteenth century, the Spanish kings had conquered several territories key to assuring the Reconquista and which then served as a firewall against the Muslim kingdoms in the region. The African posessions were basically military enclaves that served to protect the Christian population and to exert pressure over the Muslim enemies. They also were centers from where captives were rescued and traded off. Additionally, on some occasions, the North African territories were used as prisons to house unruly noblemen that had been exiled. Such was the case with the versatile and polemic Gabriel Fernández de Villalobos, the count of Variñas, who lost royal favor and was exiled to Oran by Charles II around 1695.  

America was another critical destiny for the Spanish military. Although there was not a permanent standing army in the New World, there were several fronts in which

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56 AHN, Diversos-Colecciones, 43, N. 37 “Memorial del marqués de Variñas desterrado en Orán” (Orán, March 1, 1695); AHN, Estado, 2040, 6 “Resumen de diferentes cartas y papeles sobre las ideas movidas por el marqués de Variñas en orden a verse libre de la esclavitud que padece en Argel desde que se huyó de Orán.” (Madrid, November 1, 1698); AHN, Estado, 2040 “Consulta sobre las ideas y cavilaciones del marqués de Bariñas” (Madrid, November 15, 1698). Variñas is mostly famous for his *arbitrista* writings in which he complained about the decay of the empire and proposed measures to avoid the lost of the Indies. BNE, Mss/2933 Gabriel Fernández de Villalobos, “Estado eclesiástico, político y militar de la América o grandes de las Indias,” n.d. There are published versions of his writings: *Vaticinios de la pérdida de las Indias* (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1899); *Estado eclesiástico político y militar de la América (o grandeza de Indias)* (Madrid: Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, 1990).
soldiers and officers served. On the southern frontier of Peru, a continuous ongoing fight raged against the Araucanians of Chile. The marquis of Santillán, councilor in the Council of the Indies, considered “aquella guerra por de tanto mérito como la de Flandes.” This war was so long, intense, and difficult that Chile was deemed the Flandes indiano, the American Flanders. In addition, many men served in the ports and in the garrisons, fighting against the pirates and corsairs that lurked around the Spanish American possessions looking for silver. These activities were considered to be on equal footing to other military actions across the empire. The baron of Sueiro petitioned to be appointed commander of the port of Callao, Lima as a reward for his many years fighting in Europe (from Germany to Italy, and of course, Flanders), which he presented as proof of his value and experience.

Along with this worldwide mobility of the Spanish military, it is noteworthy to mention that such military movement included many foreigners. There were men from almost every nation serving in the Spanish tercios, the Spanish infantry corps. In 1660, Juan de Soria Sagasta reported the recent arrival to Seville of the “tercio de napolitanos,” commanded by Manuel Carrafa and composed by “alguna mezcla de españoles, romanos y de otras naciones.” Likewise, there is the case of the Irishman Juan Ratheo, who served for more than twenty years in Ireland, Flanders, and Sicily, where his son,

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57 AGI, Lima, 297 “Sobre la pretensión que tiene el capitán don Francisco Mendez de Amaya de no pagar media anata” (Madrid, December 6, 1679).
59 Roxana Nakashima, “‘Contra los corsarios, al servicio de Su Majestad’: expediciones inglesas por el Mar del Sur (1576-1594) en las informaciones de méritos y servicios de los vasallos del rey,” in Vivir, defender y sentir la frontera, ed. María Martínez Alcalde and José Javier Ibáñez (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, Servicio de Publicaciones, 2014), 311–329.
60 AGI, Lima, 297 “Pretensión del barón de Sueiro de que se le haga merced del tercio del Callao,” November 13, 1687.
61 AGS, EST, Leg. 1975 “Carta del comisario Juan de Soria Sagasta al Consejo” (Alcalá del Río, November 23, 1660).
Jacinto Ratheo, also served as soldier. In the Philippines, the governor Juan de Taboada appointed the Portuguese Diego López Lobo as admiral of the islands’ fleet. The city council of Manila protested such nomination, reminding that foreigners were forbidden to hold any position and receive an *encomienda*. Similarly, Manuel de Ovalle was allowed to move into Callao and serve in the port’s prison. The king authorized such a move “no embargante que sea de la dicha nación portuguesa” as a reward for Ovalle’s nineteen years of service in the Philippines and for his captivity in Algiers after the ship in which he was returning to Lisbon was attacked by the Turks.

Henry Kamen has argued that the Spanish Empire was only possible because of its ability to assimilate peoples from different countries and nationalities. Castilians, it is said, were the organizers and catalysts of the foreign politics, economies, and militaries that were the real force behind the empire. It was the Genovese and Portuguese who sailed across the Globe, the Native Americans who defeated the Incas and the Aztecs, the Italians and the Flemish who financed the crown’s activities, and the Germans who fought the European wars. Although Kamen’s portrayal of the Spanish Empire underestimates the mobility and preeminence of the Castilians, he is right in highlighting the usually overlooked role played by foreigners.

It was not only Europeans who moved throughout the Spanish Monarchy. A substantial number of American subjects also crisscrossed the Atlantic to serve the king. The Peruvian Pedro Alfonso Flores y Montenegro, viscount of Peñaparda, is an example of a person who fully inserted himself into the crown’s service in the peninsula. He was

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63 AGI, Filipinas, 27, N. 154 “Petición del cabildo secular de Manila sobre extranjeros,” August 2, 1632.
64 AGI, Lima, 297 “Sobre un entretenimiento para el alférez Manuel de Ovalle,” July 14, 1626.
corregidor (the chief magistrate) of Córdoba in Andalusia, and Salamanca in Castile. The councilors of Castile even proposed him for the corregimiento of Madrid, the home of the imperial court. 66 José Javier Ruíz Ibáñez and Gabriela Vallejo Cervantes have studied the case of the Mexican don Diego de Villalobos y Benavides who left New Spain and settled in Europe where he served the king as a soldier and official in many posts in Flanders and Castile. The study of the ways in which this not so fully successful official incorporated into the royal service highlights Villalobos’ clever and continuous use of New Spanish networks in Europe, like when he mobilized the Mexicans residing in Spain as witnesses to obtain his hidalgía. 67

The circulation of Spaniards born or with experience in the New World—indianos, as they were called at the time—beyond America was fundamental for the ruling of the empire. Jean-Paul Zúñiga has studied the largely overlooked voyages of Americans to Europe. 68 He argues that although it was not significant in demographic numbers, the migration had a tremendous impact on the political culture of the Monarchy. His argument is two-fold. On the one hand, the presence of indianos and the information and knowledge of America that they brought with them was used by the Council of the Indies, an administrative unit composed of people who were mostly static and did not know America first-hand. Therefore, in order to give proper laws and directives for ruling such far-away, large, and diverse regions, the councilors depended

66 AHN, Consejos, 4735, N. 19 “Sobre pretensión del vizconde de Peñaparda,” n.d.; AHN, Consejos, 13620, 13, N. 19 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de Madrid” (Madrid, May 13, 1648); AHN, Consejos, 25715, Exp. 16 “El vizconde de Peñaparda, corregidor de la ciudad de Salamanca, contra el fiscal y el receptor de penas de cámara,” 1656; AHN, Consejos, 13597, 2, N. 1 “Corregidores de Córdoba desde el año de 1592 hasta el de 1820,” 1820.
on the news and analysis of the *indianos*, as well as by the network of officials they had on the ground. Indeed, Arndt Brendecke argues that the imperial officials were in a permanent struggle to fully get a sense of America, which seemed so distant in so many ways. At the end of the seventeenth century, the president of the Council of Castile, the cardinal Diego de Espinosa, asked for a report on the Indies and its people. The clergyman Luis Sánchez, who had spent eighteen years in America, wrote the report and concluded that the Spanish were extremely cruel to the natives and that Spanish domain was a structural failure because the distance, large dimensions, and diversity of people made America almost impossible to grasp. An anonymous reader plainly synthesized this argument with a brief marginal note: “las Indias no se entienden.”69 The information provided by the Americans themselves or by people with direct contact and experience in the continent was absolutely crucial for transcending such knowledge gaps.70

On the other hand, Zúñiga contends that the movement of Americans was an important symbolic act. It reinforced the bonds between the two continents, and *indiano’s* sense of belonging to a common and superior polity: the Spanish Monarchy. Zúñiga shows that, for Americans, going to Europe truly meant going back to the mother country. It was a renewal of the unifying ties. It built and reinforced an idea of *hispanidad*, which encompassed local nationalism, and which allowed for the inclusion of Americans, as well as Castilians, Aragoneses, Neapolitans, and many others. This later phenomenon, I argue, was also an expression of Spanish imperial cosmopolitanism, which allowed for the existence of multiple singularities simultaneously incorporated under the universal umbrella of the Spanish Monarchy.

69 Quoted in Brendecke, *Imperio e información*, 315.
70 The role played by officials’ direct experience in the ruling of the empire is studied in Chapter Three.
Indeed, many men returned to Europe to continue their services. After a first experience in America, Ordóñez de Cevallos went back to Europe to resume his personal activities. The travels of León Pinelo, the famous writer, historian, and royal official, probably born in Valladolid, Spain, provide good examples, too, of the possibilities of imperial mobility. Pinelo first departed from Spain and crossed the Atlantic with his parents as a teenager in 1604. After spending some years between Buenos Aires and Córdoba he was sent to Lima in 1612 to study at the university. Ten years later he sailed back to Europe, where he settled and held chief positions like attorney of the Council of the Indies and judge of the House of Trade.71

These men brought America and the other regions in which they lived with them. While in Jaén, Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos dedicated himself to preserving his memories. His book was an exercise in arranging and giving sense to his experiences in America, Asia, Africa, and even Europe. León Pinelo dedicated his life to the study of the Indies and to the organization of its knowledge. In a less intellectual, but far more visual and illustrative fashion, the oidor Juan Francisco Montemayor y Córdoba proudly placed in the chapel’s altar he built in Alfocea, Aragon, the image of the Immaculate Lady that he brought from Mexico. Likewise, the governor of the Philippines Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera sent several paintings to decorate Basque churches.72

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71 For Pinelo’s biography and a study of his work, see Guillermo Lohmann’s prologue of Antonio de León Pinelo, El gran canciller de las Indias, ed. Guillermo Lohmann Villena (Sevilla: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1953).
All this varied and extensive mobility needed to be regulated and organized. The Spanish Monarchy commissioned several institutions to this end. First of all, movement between kingdoms, even those ruled by the same king, was not considered a right, and nor was it free. Inter-kingdom movement required getting permission or a letter of safe-conduct from the king. This was not a policy exclusive to the Spanish Empire, but was common practice everywhere. When, for example, the expert in Arabic language, Abel Mesi, went to North Africa he obtained a passport from the Muslim Moroccan king that allowed him to travel safely.\textsuperscript{73}

Permission to move—to go somewhere, but also to return—was usually given by any of the different Councils that ruled the empire and by the political authorities on the ground. Military movement, perhaps the largest type of movement within Europe, was mostly regulated by the Councils of the State, War and Navy.\textsuperscript{74} These institutions gave permissions to captains to draft people to form the companies, and those Councils also ordered the companies’ dissolution.\textsuperscript{75}

The Council of the Indies and its dependent House of Trade in Seville regulated the transatlantic movement.\textsuperscript{76} The laws stipulated that every person who desired to go to America had to be approved by the House of Trade. This institution kept records of all

\textsuperscript{73} AHN, Estado, 2887 “Carta de don Abel Mesi” (Ceuta, August 30, 1690).
\textsuperscript{74} See, for example, the petitions of passports of the colonel Jacques Francechy and the captains Gabriel de Currugalegui and Francisco Navarro AGS, CAC, 8866, N. 18 “El Coronel Jaques Francechy,” June 2, 1605; AHN, EST, L. 261, f. 117v. “D. Gabriel de Currugalegui y D. Francisco Navarro” (Madrid, October 27, 1666).
\textsuperscript{75} In those cases the soldiers struggled to join a new company. Usually they had to return to the court to ask to be reformados, that is, to be admitted into a new company. Centenero de Arce, “¿Una monarquía de lazos débiles?,” 134–135.
\textsuperscript{76} Schäfer, El Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias, 319–379; Antonio Acosta Rodríguez, Adolfo Luis González Rodríguez, and Enriqueta Vila Vilar, eds., La casa de la contratación y la navegación entre España y las Indias (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2004).
the individuals who received permission to embark.\textsuperscript{77} The purpose was to keep tight control over who could go to America. It was essential that those going to America were good Catholics, as the Crown hoped to keep the New World free of other religions. At the same time, imperial officials could not move or leave their posts without permission (either from the Council or from the viceroy). They had to keep serving, even if they did not wish to; and they had to move if they were commanded to do so. The Council of the Indies constantly received requests from officials to move, either to another region in the same continent or to return to Europe. Although there was a great deal of illegal movement, Spanish officials were not part of it. They had to follow the official rules. Thus, the movement of officials was highly scrutinized and, for the most part, controlled and directed from the Spanish authorities. In addition, the House of Trade aimed to regulate every aspect of transatlantic travel, including types and number of ships and their crews; the routes used; and it provided vital knowledge of winds, currents and other vital geographical and astrological data. This institution became a major center of scientific and technologic development.\textsuperscript{78}

**The Travel Routes**

Mediterranean travel had already been mastered by the time of the Catholic Kings, at the end of the fifteenth century. There were several Portolan charts (the nautical maps) that, along with magnetic compasses, guided the sailors around the Mediterranean Sea. Pilots and cosmographers had identified and knew well the geography, especially the

\textsuperscript{77} Archivo General de Indias, *Catálogo de pasajeros a Indias durante los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII* (Sevilla: Imprenta editorial de la Gavidia, 1940).

areas along the shores. There were several well-supplied and frequently traveled routes that linked the Mediterranean with other regions, such as the Silk Road that went to Asia, or the routes that went to Jerusalem, a key destination for pilgrims.\textsuperscript{79}

The Portuguese were among the first Europeans to overcome the limits of the Mediterranean. Since the fifteenth century they had been exploring the African coast, seeking gold as well as new routes to India and Asia that bypassed the Muslims who controlled access to these profitable markets.\textsuperscript{80} The tale of Fernão Mendes Pinto, who in the sixteenth century travelled to India and China, and took part in the first Portuguese expedition that reached Japan, illustrates the Portuguese leadership in transoceanic exploration at the time.\textsuperscript{81} The groundbreaking geographical and technological developments of this small Atlantic kingdom were at the core of the European expansion.\textsuperscript{82} Once the Portuguese left the Mediterranean basin, there began an era of scientific and geographical discovery that led to intense transatlantic movement that radically transformed the world.

Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, who as we have seen travelled extensively across the globe, provides detailed directions and information about the shipping route from


\textsuperscript{81} Fernão Mendes Pinto, \textit{Historia oriental de las peregrinaciones}, trans. Francisco de Herrera y Maldonado (Madrid: Melchor Sánchez, 1664).

Portugal to Asia, called the *carreira da India*. The ships departed from Lisbon, stopped in Madeira, and then passed by the Canaries and islands of Cape Verde. From that point, going straight to the cape of Good Hope was not possible because of the strong winds and currents that could easily push a ship to the Brazilian shores, which is how, in fact, Brazil was first reached. Therefore, ships had to perform complicated maneuvers heading south until they viewed the islands of Tristán de Acuña, located in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean about 450 leagues from Good Hope. From there, the vessels could finally sail East to the Cape. Afterwards, the Portuguese ships sailed up the coast of East Africa to Mozambique, and crossed the Indian Ocean to Goa, in India, a journey that could last two months. The next destination was Malacca in Malaysia; and from that port, the rest of Asia and the archipelagos was accessible. For example, it was possible to reach the kingdom of Cambodia and its homonymous river, which was “tan grande como el Marañón, río que nace a las espaldas del Cuzco, en las sierras de los Andes.”\(^8^3\) It was also possible to reach the gulf of Cochinchina, although Ordóñez de Cevallos suggested prudence because of the many shoals and rocks that made it necessary to employ local pilots.\(^8^4\) From this region, the Portuguese city of Macao off the coast of China was a relatively short distance. And if one were to continue sailing east through the various islands, they would finally arrive at the Philippines Islands.\(^8^5\) Thus, the perception of a globally connected world was born.

For its part, the Spanish Monarchy very soon took control of the transatlantic routes to America. Although the initial expeditions to the New World were left mostly in the hands of private entrepreneurs, it did not take long for the House of Trade to step in to

\(^8^3\) Ordóñez de Cevallos, *Historia y viage del mundo*, 345.
\(^8^4\) Ibid., 346.
\(^8^5\) Ibid., 342–346.
regulate the travel and to define the routes for the American voyage, or the *carrera de Indias*, as it was called at the time. For logistical and military necessity, the House of Trade organized the travel around two fleets that went to the two American viceroyalties: New Spain and Peru.86

The fleet system consisted in grouping merchant and passenger ships in a convoy protected by a large and heavily armed naval squadron. The purpose was to prevent ships from sailing alone and unprotected, making them easy prey for foreign pirates and corsairs, and to provide mutual support in the case of emergencies.87 A fleet could be quite large, for example, in 1589 it was composed of 94 ships. Although the fleet system was rigid and slow, it proved to be successful (especially from the logistical and military point of view). Historian Pablo Pérez-Mallaina claims that crossing the Atlantic was, overall, a safe journey. According to his data, 17,967 watercrafts floated in the *carrera de Indias* between the years 1504 and 1640. Of those ships, only 412 (2.29%) were lost in a wreck, while 107 (0.59%) were taken by pirates or corsairs. Moreover, he notes that during the sixteenth century, enemies of Spain did not capture a single fleet, and the destruction wreaked by the most famous corsairs (like Francis Drake and Richard Hawkins) was minor and peripheral, despite the English propaganda.88

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88 Pablo Emilio Pérez-Mallaina, *Andalucía y el dominio de los espacios oceánicos: la organización de la carrera de Indias en el siglo XVI* (Sevilla: Fundación Corporación Tecnológica de Andalucía, 2010), 136–143.
The traditional understanding is that one large fleet sailed from Seville and, once in the Caribbean, split into the New Spain and the Tierra Firme fleets. However, following Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos—who in the third part of *Viaje del mundo* provides a detailed account of the routes, length and times of the transatlantic trip—as well as the descriptions and studies of modern scholars, it is clear that the two fleets were organized separately.89 The fleet bound for New Spain was scheduled to depart each spring, to avoid the hurricane season, but typically departed in the summer, in July. The second fleet, bound for Tierra Firme, was supposed to depart in August, to arrive right after the end of the rain season, but usually left Seville in the spring.90 Both fleets departed from Seville and followed similar routes. They sailed either from the port of Cadiz or from Sanlúcar de Barrameda (where the Guadalquivir river empties into the sea). Thence, the fleet voyaged to the Canaries (about 230 leagues away), a leg of the trip that lasted eight to ten days and involved passing through rough waters. It was a necessary stop for gathering water, wood, and other provisions indispensable to cross the Atlantic. Next, the fleet sailed south until the point of Cape Verde, where it turned west to catch the Trade winds, blowing East to West. This part of the journey lasted around a month, before the fleet reached a small island in the Antilles, called the Desired (about 830 leagues from the Canaries). After reposting, the ships would either sail for another month across the Caribbean to Veracruz on the mainland, if the destiny was New Spain, or they would sail South to Cartagena, which was about ten days away, and from there reach the port of

89 Pérez-Mallaina’s description of the transatlantic routes matches almost exactly the one provided by Ordóñez de Cevallos. Ibid., 133–140.
90 Schäfer, *El Consejo Real y Supremo de las Indias*, 324. The departure and return dates of all the fleets can be found in AGI, Mapas y Planos, Libros, Manuscritos, 80 “Tabla cronológica de generales que fueron a Yndias con flotas y galeones, y de los gejes que fueron a comisiones particulares desde su descubrimiento,” 1787. This document clearly testifies to the success of the fleet system and to the intense frequency and speed of the transatlantic journeys.
Portobelo in Tierra Firme and the viceroyalty of Peru. However, most often the fleet that went to Tierra Firme followed a slightly different path, and instead of going to the Desired island, crossed the Atlantic along a route further south that took it to the Lesser Antilles, near Trinidad and close to current-day Venezuela. These were mostly deserted islands where the ships could resupply before sailing to Cartagena, which was about fifteen days away.\footnote{Ordóñez de Cevallos, \textit{Historia y viage del mundo}, 347–349, 431–432.}

Both fleets followed a similar return route. After two or three weeks sailing on the Caribbean Sea, they reached the port of Havana. Then, they took the Westerlies, the constant winds blowing West to East, and passed through the dangerous stretch of Bahamas. Upon reaching approximately 40 degrees of latitude north, they plotted a course towards Spain, usually passing by the Azores, the Portuguese archipelago that also served as a stopping point for the \textit{carreira}. This last leg of the trip took around a month. If nothing went wrong, the New Spain fleet that departed the previous summer would return by the end of the following summer, after fourteen or fifteen months at sea. The Tierra Firme fleet, if it sailed at the beginning of the year or in spring, at the latest, might return by the end of the same year, before winter, in a round-trip journey lasting ten to twelve months.\footnote{Pérez-Mallaína, \textit{Andalucía y el dominio de los espacios oceánicos}, 140.}

Once people crossed the Atlantic, the journey continued for those going to Peru and Asia. Those traveling to Peru left from Portobelo and after a short, but extremely difficult, passage through the jungles, “que es el más mal camino del mundo,” reached the city of Panama and the Pacific Ocean or \textit{Mar del Sur} (Southern Sea), as it was
known.\(^3\) The ships going to Callao in Peru and the other ports on the Pacific coast sailed from there. Navigating north from Callao to Panama could only take from two to three weeks, benefiting from winds and currents. Going south was much more difficult and could take as long as two months of sailing.\(^4\) This is why, most of the time, to avoid long and difficult journeys, travellers would often sail south only to Paita (north of current-day Peru). Thence, they traveled south to Lima overland for about two hundred leagues in forty days. This was not an easy journey either, as it mostly went through hot and arid deserts.\(^5\)

Lima was the hub from which the rest of South America was reached. The most important and travelled route was the one to Potosí. From there one could follow several Andean roads to destinations as far away as Buenos Aires on the shores of the Atlantic. The easiest way to reach the mining center of Potosí was by sailing south for about forty days from Lima to Arica. Once there, it was only about one hundred leagues overland to Potosí. In 1657, don Felipe Obregón, a neighbor and councilor of Potosí, informed the newly appointed president of Charcas, the marquis of Villagarcía, that the cost of this journey (from Seville to Potosí) for a person with a small entourage could easily reach 25000 pesos, an enormous sum.\(^6\)

Transpacific journey was organized around the Manila Galleon, connecting once a year the Mexican western port of Acapulco with the Philippine port of Cavite in the bay

\(^{3}\) Ordóñez de Cevallos, *Historia y viaje del mundo*, 391.
\(^{5}\) A vivid description of the journey can be found, for example, in AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 39 “Papel de don Francisco de Soto Guzmán con información sobre el viaje a Charcas,” November 3, 1657.
\(^{6}\) AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 31 “Papel que me dio El Sr. don Felipe Obregón, vecino de Potosí, del viaje a Charcas,” 1657.
of Manila. Due to prevailing winds, this was a relatively short journey of about two months. The return voyage was much longer and more complicated. The ships had to sail north towards Japan (passing nearby Guam, the largest island of the Ladrones or Marianas), where they could pick up easterly winds and currents of Kuro-shio (also known as the Japan current, the corriente negra or black current), and from there, after five to six exhausting months, hit the coast of Northern California, eventually following the coastline south to Acapulco.

Although circumnavigation of the globe was shown to be possible by Ferdinand Magellan’s sixteenth century expedition, it remained something exceptional, undertaken mostly by outlaws or enemies of the Spanish Empire. Magellan’s route went through very risky passages that Iberian pilots and authorities preferred to avoid. Moreover, because of the Treaty of Tordesillas between the crowns of Portugal and Castile, and the subsequent division of the world, Spanish ships were not supposed to pass through Portuguese territories, even when the two crowns were united from 1580 to 1640. However, in exceptional circumstances this ban was overlooked, as when a large fleet was sent to the Philippines in the 1610s to rescue it from the Dutch attacks. This socorro sailed the African route, through Portuguese domains, stopping for provisions in Angola and passing by the Cape of Good Hope.

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99 The preparation of this fleet was an enormous enterprise that required years of planning, and several obstacles to overcome. First it was discussed if it was better to sail through the Strait of Magellan, or if it was better to go through Africa and the Portuguese possessions in the Indian Ocean. The organization of the fleet began in 1614 and it finally sailed to the Philippines, after many changes in the initial plans, of course, in July of 1617. AGI, Filipinas, 200 “Documentos sobre las armadas de socorro de Ruy González
Most of the time, people in the Philippines could not go to Europe through the Indian and African routes dominated by the Portuguese. Even if one were to accept Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos’ journey (from the Philippines to Cochinchina, India, Africa, and Brazil) as real, one would have to acknowledge that such journey would have been, at the very least, extraordinary and highly impractical, the product of individual adventurism and fortuitous events. Most people in the Philippines going to Spain took the eastern route, across Mexico, and sailed on the fleet from Veracruz.

Despite the optimistic data and general picture provided by Pérez-Mallaina, sailing across the Atlantic was, without a doubt, a harsh and long journey and experience for a traveler. For Ordóñez de Cevallos it was a trip “con mucho riesgo de la vida, y con excesivo gasto de la hacienda.” He clearly knew what he was talking about: when he was sailing back to Spain, his ship ran aground on the shores of the Cape San Antonio, in Cuba, where it broke up. This was “una desgracia grandísima” that forced him to abort his plans and to sail to New Spain, where “llegué con hartas tormentas, y tormento por el poco dinero.”

Diego Portichuelo de Rivadeneyra, attorney of Lima’s Metropolitan church and fiscal of the Inquisition, could also testify to the perils of the transatlantic passage. His *Relación del viaje y sucesos que tuvo desde que salió de la ciudad de Lima* retells the string of misfortunes and accidents suffered during his journey on board a fleet of galleons from Lima to Spain in October of 1654. They suffered two major shipwrecks (one in the Pacific Ocean and another in the Caribbean Sea), an assault by English

\[\text{de Sequeira y de Alonso Fajardo de Tenza,} \ 1618 \ 1613; \ AGI, Filipinas, 37, N.49 \ “\text{Petición de Bento Baña Cardoso, gobernador de Angola, sobre navío,”} \ 1617.\]

\[\text{100 Ordóñez de Cevallos,} \ \text{Historia y viaje del mundo,} \ 424.\]

\[\text{101 Ibid., 135.}\]
pirates, and along with these setbacks, of course, the loss of much of the precious cargo: the American silver that was being delivered to Spain.\textsuperscript{102}

Not only were such voyages dangerous, long, and expensive, but life on board was not easy, regardless of the social and economic position of the traveler. Eugenio de Salazar was a lawyer and a writer from Madrid, who, after serving for some years in the Audience of Galicia and in Madrid, in 1567 was appointed governor of the Canaries and in 1573, \textit{oidor} of Santo Domingo. Once in America he served in various judiciary and academic positions in Guatemala and in Mexico. Finally, in 1599 he returned to Spain where he was named councilor in the Council of the Indies. In a letter to a friend, Salazar described the penuries of the transatlantic journey; it is one of the most vivid and compelling testimonies of early modern mobility.\textsuperscript{103}

From the beginning, the author states that sailing the Atlantic was a wretched experience:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Qui navigant mare, enarrant pericula ejus.} Los que navegan podrán contar los peligros del mar, dice el que mejor lo sabe. Y así, como hombre que por mis pecados he navegado, quise contar á vuestra merced los trabajos de mi navegación.\textsuperscript{104}
\end{quote}

In the pages that follow, Salazar develops his argument and narrates the struggles of his journey. He graphically calls the ship a “casa del diablo.” One of the most difficult problems to deal with was seasickness. He writes that it was difficult to hold down the scant, and most of the time rotten and stinky, food. The long duration of the journey brought many other problems. People became bored, frustrated, and scared from only

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{102}] Diego Portichuelo de Rivadeneyra, \textit{Relación del viaje y sucesos que tuvo desde que salió de la ciudad de Lima, hasta que llegó a estos reynos de España el doctor don Diego Portichuelo de Rivadeneyra} (Madrid: Domingo García Morrás, 1657).
\item[\textsuperscript{103}] Eugenio de Salazar, “Carta escrita el licenciado Miranda de Ron, particular amigo del autor. En que se pinta un navío, y la vida y ejercicios de los oficiales y marineros de él, y como lo pasan los que hacen viajes por la mar,” in \textit{Cartas de Eugenio de Salazar}, 35–57.
\item[\textsuperscript{104}] Ibid., 35.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
looking at the sea and sky for weeks without end. It felt like time ceased, especially in such tight physical spaces, where there was not enough room and people were literally squeezed together. For Salazar, most of his travel companions were not the friendliest people. The former oidor describes them as hustlers, dishonest, and troublemakers. Additionally, there was always the real risk of running into pirates and other enemies and being robbed, kidnapped, and/or killed. Reaching the Desired Island was truly a moment of joy in which they could leave behind, at least for a short time, the dreadful ship and the ocean, because “en la mar no hay que esperar que el camino, ni la posada, ni el huésped se mejore; antes cada día es todo peor, y más enfadoso con el aumento de trabajos de la navegación.”

Salazar also dedicated several lines to describe the harsh life and behavior of the pilots and mariners. Their duties and activities on board were truly tough to bear; these men were constantly risking their lives. Climbing to the top of the mast, handling the heavy lines, anchors, or sails required a high degree of coordination and strength. The slightest error could result in injury or even death. This maritime world appeared to Salazar fascinating and secretive. Crewmen spoke in an unintelligible dialect, and it seemed that they had their own language. Salazar admitted to his friend that he “estaba embelesado mirando esta ciudad y los ejercicios de la gente de ella, y maravillado de oír la lengua marina ó malina.” Salazar was also impressed by the seamen’s order and rules. They followed their own, very strict, codes and hierarchy; and whatever the captain commanded, was obeyed instantly, without question.

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105 Salazar, *Cartas de Eugenio de Salazar*, 50.
106 Ibid., 42–44.
Despite the difficulties and dangers, many people, especially pilots, did cross the Atlantic on multiple occasions. Such was the case of Tomás de Larraspuru, who first sailed in 1608, and by the time he retired had made the transatlantic journey thirty-six times, a truly amazing figure. But sailors were not the only ones that came and went. While don Cristóbal García de Bocanegra was acting as corregidor of Gibraltar, the king ordered him to go to America with the armada. It was a quick trip, and about a year and half later he was serving again in Gibraltar. Likewise, although the trip to and from the Philippines (either sailing East or West) was, undeniably, a long and exhausting one, it did not deter people from making it, and sometimes on more than one occasion. Fernando de los Ríos Coronel, who despite being fully aware that the Philippines was “tan apartado de los ojos de Vuestra Alteza donde con tanta dificultad se va y se viene,” made three journeys between the archipelago and Spain between 1588 and 1624. Ríos Coronel was not alone in this kind of imperial mobility; there were many others who moved widely. Pedro Esteban Dávila wrote to the King in 1622, while serving as the governor of the island of Tercera, in the Azores, asking to be favored with the governorship of Philippines, where he served as lieutenant for a couple of years since 1616. Esteban Dávila did not get such appointment, but in 1632, after spending some time between

107 Pérez-Mallaina, Andalucía y el dominio de los espacios oceánicos, 150–151.
108 AHN, Consejos, 13606, 1, N. 16 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de Gibraltar” (Madrid, July 24, 1626).
109 AGI, Filipinas, 27, N. 51 “Petición del procurador Ríos Coronel sobre varios asuntos,” July 1605, fol. 48. Ríos Coronel is both referred as Hernando or Fernando. For a study on this fascinating character see John N. Crossley, Hernando de Los Ríos Coronel and the Spanish Philippines in the Golden Age (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011).
Madrid and Lisbon, he was appointed governor of Buenos Aires, where he traveled after crossing the Atlantic for the third time.

Of course, just like many other things in the early modern Spanish Empire, the system of mobility that I have briefly sketched was fragile and unstable. Much of the routes and patterns described were something rather desired and always theoretical, and subject to many changes. Navigation was imprecise and ships did not always reach the intended destination. Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos had such an experience when he tried to navigate to Guayaquil from Acapulco, but ended up in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{111} As Elvira Vilches points out, the Atlantic was a contingent space that was impossible to fully measure and fix. This characteristic impacted the way the Atlantic world was perceived (the places and their people) as well as how the imperial enterprise was carried out.\textsuperscript{112} There were always great levels of uncertainty and unpredictability, and alongside, of possibilities. For example, the captain Simon Estacio da Silveira proposed opening a new path that would make it feasible to reach Spain from Peru in only four months. His planned route would cross South America by the Marañón River, avoiding the dreadful land passage of Panama.\textsuperscript{113} Today we know that such corridor would be impossible because there are no rivers that cross through the Andes, but in the still obscure geography of the early modern world such an idea was still a much-desired possibility.

Actually, there were several easier, and many times informal and illegal, routes. For instance, despite prohibitions, for several decades a direct commercial route linked

\textsuperscript{111} Ordóñez de Cevallos, \textit{Historia y viage del mundo}, 364.
\textsuperscript{113} BNE, R/17270(13) Simão Estaço da Silveira, “El capitán Simon Estacio Da Silveira, procurador general de la cõquista del Marañon.” (Madrid, June 15, 1626).
Manila with Lima.  

Likewise, officials going to Potosí were advised to sail directly to Buenos Aires and from there, travel overland to the mining center, avoiding the above-described Panama route. Similarly, when Pedro Esteban Dávila was appointed governor of Buenos Aires, he sailed straight from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro, where he arrived only two months later. Ordoñez de Cevallos confirms that such route was “muy buen viaje y muy breve,” but ships usually did not get permission to go through it, “por no descomponer la carrera de Indias.”

There were, indeed, several unofficial routes beyond the official ones, established in efforts to ensure the crown’s direct control and monopoly. The early modern world was more mobile and flexible than historians had previously imagined. Scholars are beginning to trace, reveal, and unpack the many interactions, connections, routes, and movements that linked, literally, the whole world. The work of David Wheat breaks ground in this regard. Exploring the many direct links that in the seventeenth century connected the West African coast with Mexico, Wheat shows that there was a vibrant traffic (mainly motivated by the slave trade and contraband) that connected these Atlantic shores and did not necessarily pass through Europe. In fact, there were sailors specialized in designing complicated routes linking, for instance, Luanda in Angola, and Veracruz, the door to the Caribbean and New Spain.

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115 AHN, Estado, L. 210 “Cartas de enhorabuena a D. Mauro de Mendoza Camaño y Sotomayor, marqués de Villagarcía, nombrado presidente de Charcas,” 1657-1658, fols. 30–32, 40. Villagarcía’s appointment and how he gathered information from various clients is studied in Chapter 2.
117 Ordoñez de Cevallos, Historia y viaje del mundo, 420.
118 David Wheat, “García Mendes Castelo Branco, fidalgo de Angola y mercader de esclavos en Veracruz y el Caribe a principios del siglo XVII,” in Debates históricos contemporáneos africanos y afrodescendientes
In a further work, Wheat expanded his scope and demonstrated the links between the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. Through the study of the fate of eight Mozambican musicians that once belonged to the Portuguese captain-major Diogo d’Azambuja de Melo, and who in 1594 were taken by force by the governor of Havana, Juan de Tejeda, Wheat shows that the Asian and American regions were far more connected than previously thought, and that many people traveled between those places. He emphasizes the idea that there were many binding ports in which the carreira (the Portuguese route to Asia) met with the carrera (the Spanish route to America) and in which many contacts and exchanges took place. Wheat claims that the maritime routes and cycles have been studied in isolation and that the connections between the slave, military, political, and commercial routes have been overlooked. Moreover, Wheat argues that the connections triggered by the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns from 1580 to 1640 have been underestimated, and debunks the classic portrayal of this union as mere formal connections at the top of the political and legal structures.  

Wheat actually illustrates Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s argument that the Portuguese and Spanish empires were in constant interaction and were, indeed, composite and connected empires. 

There are, in fact, several testimonies of such entanglements between the Portuguese and Spanish empires, which ultimately implied a global connection. In this regard, the Philippines played a crucial role; it was a hinge that brought together and

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united very different worlds and societies. In 1616 Francisco de Lucena (a Portuguese nobleman and member of the Council of Portugal) sent a set of six letters to the captain of Mozambique, Ruy Melo de Sampaio, by way of the Philippines. Thus, Lucena first delivered the mail to Juan Ruiz de Contreras, a Secretary in the Council of the Indies, who arranged the proper circulation of the letters. Not only does this show the channels that existed between the Iberian possessions in Asia; but, in the letters there is an openly stated desire for more communication between the Portuguese viceroy of India and the Spanish governor of the Philippines. Amidst this archipelago converged all sorts of peoples, goods, languages, religions, and news. In 1615 an unknown royal official transcribed news that arrived in the Philippines not only from India, but also from Constantinople and even Flanders. The news dispatches informed about the military and political disputes that were taking place around the Indian Ocean between the Dutch, the English, the Portuguese, and the native authorities. This official and the Spanish authorities were well informed about what was going on in Asia and around the world. Looked through this prism it becomes difficult to conceive the Philippines as a region on the periphery. Quite to the contrary, it appears to have been a nodal point that made possible the global Spanish Empire.

The Technology of Movement

Evidently, geographical knowledge and geography itself greatly determined movement. Greg Bankoff argues that it is imperative to take into account geographical and meteorological circumstances to have a complete understanding of the imperial

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{121} AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 103 “Carta de Francisco Lucena sobre pliegos para Mozambique” (Madrid, November 29, 1616). \textsuperscript{122} AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 4 “Copia de capítulos de carta sobre cosas de la India,” 1615.}
practices and culture because “not only did the prevailing winds set the routes and therefore the form and extent of the imperium, but they also established the beat or pulse at which it operated.”

The impact of geography in shaping the trading routes, the imperial enclaves and corridors, and therefore, the nature of the empires themselves should come as no surprise. However, and contrary to Bankoff, I am not arguing for a geographical over-determination.

Empires and the people who built those empires had different choices and opted for one or some of them, leaving aside other legitimate possibilities. Let us not forget that, ultimately, geography is about politics, too. For instance, the predominance of Lima over Buenos Aires as the official American port during the seventeenth century did not have much to do with geography, but with historical circumstances. As we have seen, getting to the Atlantic port was a lot easier, and from there it was also easier to reach Potosí, the mining center and source of the much-coveted American silver. Lima, established at the dawn of Spanish presence in South America, became the center of the viceroyalty because of political arrangements that gave this city—where the imperial institutions had been set—the monopoly on trade, which was fiercely defended by the powerful merchant’s guild. Different empires had more than just one enclave or possible route in the same region. In the Caribbean, the French, English, and Dutch

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124 According to Bankoff, the Spanish Empire’s “realization, in particular its extent and its pulse was largely determined by the Pacific wind system.” “Winds of Colonisation,” 67.

125 Cf. p. 76.

126 For a study on the political construction of Lima as the center of the viceroyalty see Osorio, Inventing Lima, chap. 1. In 1657, the captain don Francisco de Soto Guzmán reasoned on why the port of Buenos Aires should be allowed to directly trade with Spain, against Lima’s opposition, AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 41 “Apuntamientos de las razones que se deben representar para que se despachen por lo menos dos navíos de registro” (Cádiz, November 11, 1657).
established themselves in what Spaniards considered minor and unimportant islands at
the time, like Guadeloupe and Martinique. Empires were never closed nor fixed spaces.
As Lauren Benton argues, there are many incongruences and exceptions in the
geography-empires relationship.\textsuperscript{127} The early modern Spanish Empire was an extremely
large, yet well connected polity. Geographical limitations were overcome and different
regions were integrated under the Spanish Monarchy. The empire was built upon a
continuous effort to master the geographical challenges and take advantage of the
possibilities that arose.

One example of such constant curiosity occurred in 1638 when the influential
writers, humanists, and royal officials don Francisco de Calatayud y Sandoval and don
Lorenzo Ramírez de Prado wrote to the king about the discoveries and possible
inventions of Alejandro Quintilio, “doctor en destilar aguas y sacar quintas esencias.”\textsuperscript{128}
Calatayud and Ramírez were excited about the possibility of making a small device that,
carried on board of the ships, could convert seawater into fresh water. The advantage and
possibilities of an invention like this were huge, as a shortage of fresh water “ha visto
llegar a último extremo de congoja los navegantes” and was indeed one of the main
limitations and dangers of early modern navigation. They asked the king to set up a

\textsuperscript{127} Benton, “Spatial Histories of Empire,” 76–77.
\textsuperscript{128} Alejandro Quintilio was a Roman established in Madrid. He was an agent of the Venetian Vittorio
Agarotti, an alchemist who created a medicine that Quintilio commercialized and later appropriated.
Quintilio wrote \textit{Relacion y memoria de los maravillosos efectos y notables prouechos que han hecho y hazen
los poluos blancos solutiusos de la quinta essencia del oro} (Madrid: Luis Sánchez, 1616); For a study on
these alchemists see Miguel López Pérez, \textit{Asclepio Renovado: alquimia y medicina en la España moderna
(1500-1700)} (Madrid: Corona Borealis, 2003), 199–232; José Rodríguez Guerrero, “La primera gran red
comercial de un medicamento chymico. Vittorio Algarotti y su quintaesencia del oro medicinal,” \textit{Azogue.
proper board (led by them and another person expert on maritime issues) to discuss and experiment with that invention.\textsuperscript{129}

Moreover, in that same consultation Calatayud and Ramírez also made reference to other inventions proposed by Fernando Ríos Coronel to the Council of the Indies and the House of Trade. Ríos Coronel, besides being an incessant traveler, was a curious man and avid inventor. He asked permission to take a glazier and a watchmaker with him to the Philippines, as there were none in the archipelago.\textsuperscript{130} Because of his many voyages to the Philippines he was well aware of the difficulties of long-distance navigation. Already by 1598 he had presented an astrolabe of his own making, and written a book on the methods and techniques to properly measure distance and improve the accuracy of navigation charts.\textsuperscript{131} Ríos Coronel’s inventions were warmly welcomed by the pilots and courtiers, but especially by scientists, such as the renowned cosmographers, geographers, mathematicians, and inventors Juan Bautista Lavaña and Andrés García de Céspedes.\textsuperscript{132}

During the early modern era, sea-faring explorers began to overcome geographical limitations thanks to major technological and scientific advancements emanating from Europe, especially the Iberian Peninsula, since the sixteenth century, and which built on a foundation established by medieval, particularly Muslim, navigators and scientists. New inventions, the recovery and refinement of classical theories, and the adaptation of medieval techniques made possible the impressive early modern global mobility. In fact, for authors ranging from Francis Bacon, Fernando Botero to Andres

\textsuperscript{129} AHN, Estado, 674, N. 2 Lorenzo Ramírez de Prado and Francisco Calatayud to Philip IV, April 28, 1638. After several experiments the councilors ultimately decided not to pursue the development of such device as they were not certain that the distilled water was safe to drink. AHN, Estado, 674, N. 2 “Junta de Don Lorenzo Ramírez de Prado y Pedro de Arce para ver la propuesta de hacer dulce el agua de la mar” (Madrid, November 1640).

\textsuperscript{130} AGI, Filipinas, 36, N. 13 “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre llevar relojero y vidriero,” August 28, 1607.

\textsuperscript{131} AGI, Filipinas, 35, N. 15 “Carta de Ríos Coronel sobre el astrolabio” (Manila, June 22, 1598).

\textsuperscript{132} AGI, Filipinas, 36, N. 22 “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre sus instrumentos de navegación,” 1608.
García Céspedes, the hallmark of the Renaissance was the newfound capacity of men to transcend the natural and geographical limits that had restrained human mobility for centuries. Evidence that humanity had entered a new age of mobility, an age of widening vistas of discovery and conquest, was represented by the novel possibility of sailing beyond the Pillars of Hercules, enabling governments to spread the Christian faith beyond Europe’s frontiers (Fig. 2 & 3).

Figures 2 & 3. Left, frontispiece of Andrés García de Céspedes, *Regimiento de navegación* (Madrid, Juan de la Cuesta, 1606). Right, frontispiece of Francis Bacon, *Instauratio Magna* (London, Joannes Billius, 1620). Both images depict a ship sailing beyond the Pillars of Hercules, the former limits of European’s known world, representing the great technological advancements of the time and the global mobility in which Europeans embarked. Clearly, Bacon’s image and worldview were much influenced by Spanish mobility and imperial expansion.
One of the main difficulties of transatlantic and transpacific navigation was the lack of qualified people who possessed good knowledge of the ocean, the winds, the maritime currents, and geography. Officials complained constantly about this issue. In an ironic and desperate move, in 1616, Spanish authorities commissioned Francisco de Tejada and Antonio de Zúñiga, the officials charged with preparing the armada that was set to sail to the Philippines, to look in Andalusia and Portugal for Flemish pilots experts in sailing the Indian Ocean. The Council of the Indies hoped to hire expert pilots to sail around the Philippines’s sea in order to check rising Dutch influence in that region. Similarly, members of the Council consulted with other officials the possibility of drafting Neapolitan sailors to go to the Philippines.

Only a handful of Europeans had experience and knowledge of sailing in this part of the world. Europeans had to rely on local and indigenous knowledge in order to succeed. Francisco de Tejada openly admitted this situation stating that even the most experienced pilots “no saben que ha habido piloto de alguna nación natural o extranjera que haya hecho el viaje desde Europa a Filipinas sin valerse de los pilotos de las Javas y Malaca para la navegación del archipiélago de San Lázaro a Manila.” In fact, European

133 While Zúñiga did not have any luck and was unable to find a proper pilot, Tejada uncovered some names: Joan Bayesa, who lived in Sanlúcar de Barrameda and who spent more than 12 years navigating around China’s coastline. Tejada also got notice of a pilot who had been in China 28 years and was currently living in Talavera de la Reina. Finally, he was able to meet in Seville with a pilot from Bruges who had sailed around Sundaland (southeast Asia), and who could take with him another Dutch pilot who had arrived recently from India. AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 21 “Carta de Francisco de Tejada sobre pilotos” (Sevilla, February 22, 1616); AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 15 “Carta de Antonio de Zúñiga sobre buscar pilotos holandeses” (Lisboa, February 8, 1616); AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 14 “Carta de Antonio de Zúñiga sobre buscar pilotos holandeses” (Lisboa, February 6, 1616).

134 AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 31 “Oficio de Ruiz de Contreras a Antonio de Aróstegui sobre leva de marineros en el extranjero” (Madrid, August 3, 1616).

135 One of those pilots was the Portuguese Morera who was famous for having sailed to Asia on several occasions. He vainly claimed that passing through the Strait of Magellan was, in fact, something quite easy. AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 46 “Carta del marqués de Salinas sobre piloto portugués.”, September 11, 1616.

136 AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 153 “Carta de Francisco de Tejada sobre mes de salida y ruta” (Sevilla, February 9, 1617).
movement and expansion was built upon centuries of Western knowledge in combination with native expertise. It was the integration of such local perspectives into the European mental, political, technological, economic, and social structures that configured the early modern world.

It is usual for historians to skip over the importance of technology in the development of the early modern world. As John Law claimed some years ago in his study on early modern Portuguese long-distance rulership, a full understanding of the practice of early modern power requires studying the social, technological, economic, and political developments of the society. He argued that the Portuguese, in order to assert their authority in India, needed to be able to communicate back and forth between the metropolis and the imperial regions. To overcome distance and geographic limitations they developed a complex network and system of communication that allowed for the movement of people, documents, and devices. Law connected the practices of social and political control with the technological advancements of the time. Further, he argued that scientific development cannot be considered only as a mere consequence of the imperial expansion, but rather, had its own history and exerted an impact on the development of the Portuguese empire itself. For him, the social, political, and technological processes were deeply intertwined and cannot be seen isolated.

Law also emphasizes that the global expansion of the Iberian monarchies was not mere coincidence or luck, nor a one-man adventure. In fact, the mastering of ships, astrolabes, cartographic maps, and the training of the pilots who could use and integrate all of them, was the result of many people’s efforts, a combined set of actions and tryouts
over many years.\textsuperscript{137} It is worth to bear in mind that, as Jean-Paul Zúñiga argues, “no circulation is ever random. On the contrary, it is always determined by a series of cultural, geographical and/or economic circumstances, as well as by specific power relations.”\textsuperscript{138} Therefore, the new developments were contingent upon the particularities and history of the Spanish Empire itself. A clear example of this was the journey of Christopher Columbus. Contrary to myth, Columbus was not alone in thinking that the earth was round. In fact, the spherical earth hypothesis had become established scientific opinion by that time. The major criticisms and doubts about his project had to do with Columbus’s scientific calculations about the size of the Earth and whether the mission could succeed. Many people supported and lobbied for Columbus, including some very powerful, rich, and intelligent men. His journey was not the result of a single man’s dreams, but a collective enterprise where the scientific, economic, and political ambitions of many people converged.\textsuperscript{139} The transoceanic journeys were made possible by a new set of political, social, economical, military, and technological conditions that paved the way for the development of new ships and weapons during the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{140}


\textsuperscript{139} Mauricio Nieto Olarte, \textit{Las máquinas del imperio y el reino de Dios: reflexiones sobre ciencia, tecnología y religión en el mundo atlántico del siglo XVI} (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2013), 25.

\textsuperscript{140} The Italian historian Carlo Cipolla made this point many decades ago. He contended that European global expansion must be understood as a consequence of Europe’s naval superiority since the 1500’s, when new sailing and weaponry technologies appeared. Such technology broke the long-lasting equilibrium between Europe and the East and gave predominance to the Atlantic navies over the rest of the world. Carlo M. Cipolla, \textit{Cañones y velas en la primera fase de la expansión europea 1400-1700} (Esplugues de Llobregat: Ariel, 1967). Indeed, the Chinese also had the technology for a global expansion, but decided not to use it, see Felipe Fernández Armesto, \textit{Pathfinders: A Global History of Exploration} (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), chaps. 4–5.
The early modern transatlantic ship was, certainly, among the technological and scientific marvels of its day, upon which the development of the empire depended. A state-of-the-art and complex device, its hull construction and sail configurations, along with the top-notch technology that it carried enabled early modern navigators to plot and follow a course and survive over long journeys in the midst of unknown, vast, and stormy oceans.\textsuperscript{141}

Pilots and scientists were constantly trying to innovate and to come up with newer inventions that could make sailing and life on board easier, faster, and more comfortable. One of the major advancements was the improvement in the ability of ships (and their crew) to harness the wind and heavy seas. The development of the lateen or triangular sail, to supplement the classic square one, which seriously limited a ship’s ability to point into the wind, allowed ships to point more sharply. Crosswind sailing proved extremely useful outside the Mediterranean where wind currents were less constant and predictable.

The caravel, undoubtedly of Portuguese origin and used by Christopher Columbus on his journey to America, was a small ship with a stout hull that dominated the Atlantic during the sixteenth century. Despite being a relatively fragile ship, the caravel could reach high speeds (up to 8 knots) and, more importantly, follow a course sailing reasonably close-hauled, as against as possible to the wind, and because of its size it could confidently get close to shores of unknown depths.\textsuperscript{142} The galleon, a much larger ship with three masts and a combination of sails that made it manageable in all kinds of winds, was a response to the increasing demand for ships with greater capacity to transport more people and goods. It also had military advantages, as it was able to carry

\textsuperscript{141} Pérez-Mallaina, \textit{Andalucía y el dominio de los espacios oceánicos}, 110–111.  
\textsuperscript{142} Nieto Olarte, \textit{Las máquinas del imperio}, 101.
more and heavier weapons. It quickly became the predominant ship sailing the carrera de Indias.143

Along with the ships, various tools developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sharpened the science of navigation. In order to successfully complete a transatlantic journey, pilots in open sea needed to determine their ship’s location, speed, and direction.144 Directionality had been resolved to a great extent by the compass, an instrument invented by medieval Mediterranean sailors, which points the magnetic north and gives pilots an accurate—although not precise, because of magnetic deviations—indication of the ship’s direction.

Speed was a more complicated parameter to measure precisely. Knowing the speed, however, was essential to calculate the distance traveled, which was necessary for determining the ship’s location. Pilots calculated speed by throwing into the water a chip log, a long line with a number of knots tied at uniform intervals and a weight at the end, which stayed relatively in the same place while the ship moved away. Then, pilots let the line run and counted the number of knots that passed during a given time. This is why a ship’s speed is measured in knots per hour. Currents and the movement of the water also affected the proper calculation of the speed, but the main problem with this method was measuring the passage of time. Accurate clocks that could be transported onto the ships had not yet been invented. Time on board was calculated with hourglasses, devices that

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143 Ibid., 104.
usually measured thirty- to sixty-minutes intervals, and were known to be inaccurate because of the movement of the ship, weather conditions, and failure of sailors to turn them over in due course.¹⁴⁵

The location of the ship was even still a more difficult problem to overcome, for it depended on accurate calculations of the ship’s orientation, speed, and distance traveled. To determine a ship’s location and place it on a chart, one must determine two variables: latitude and longitude. The first refers to the ship’s north-south position, and the latter to its east-west position. The calculation of these coordinates on open sea, where pilots could only see water and sky, was made by the observation of the sky and by determining the position of the celestial bodies. It was the combination of new and ancient techniques and knowledge, which for centuries had been preserved and expanded by Christian, Jewish and Arab scientists, mainly at the Iberian universities.

European pilots had been calculating latitude for centuries by looking at the Pole star and determining its altitude in degrees. Although it was an old technique, measuring latitude was difficult to do on open sea, especially with bad weather and a rocking boat. Also, when sailing south the Equator (where the sky changes) it was necessary to get new points of reference. Early modern pilots mastered this practice and, using astrolabes, quadrants, cross-staffs, and complex astrological charts, were able to calculate the altitude of the sun, moon, and stars.

The calculation of the ship’s longitude was the most difficult issue to resolve, and it was not until the eighteenth century that this problem was completely solved. To measure the ship’s distance to a meridian point, it is necessary to use another variable: time. The Earth makes a complete turn (360°) every twenty-four hours, thus each hour is

¹⁴⁵ Nieto Olarte, Las máquinas del imperio, 116–153.
equivalent to 15°. If we know the difference of time between two points, we can calculate
the longitude that separates them by multiplying the time difference by 15.\textsuperscript{146} Therefore,
pilots needed to calculate the time at their point of departure and at their point of location.
They did the first by keeping a record of the hourglasses, which were turned over every
thirty minutes; they calculated the second, the local time, by periodically looking at the
sky and determining the altitude of the sun and the stars.

In order to make all these calculations useful, pilots had to locate their ships on
nautical charts. These are essential tools developed by cosmographers using extensive
information, which began to be collected during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Imperial policies and rivalries affected the collection of the information and the
production of maps and nautical charts. Spanish officials sought to gather such
information but keep it as secret as possible. Maria Portuondo has shown the tension that
existed between the practical need for disseminating geographical knowledge of the New
World, so pilots could safely and easily reach the American ports, and the imperial
strategy of keeping this information secret and out of the reach of Spain’s enemies.\textsuperscript{147}

Cosmographers had to rely on information supplied by pilots and other travelers,
and there was much tension between the mapmakers and the users. There were heated
debates on how to better represent a spherical world on a two-dimensional map, and on
the accuracy of geographical and astrological measurements. While cosmographers

\textsuperscript{146} López Piñero, \textit{El arte de navegar}, 17.
\textsuperscript{147} María M. Portuondo, \textit{Secret Science: Spanish Cosmography and the New World} (Chicago: University of
criticized pilots for their lack of education and ability to follow their markings, pilots accused cosmographers of lacking experience at sea.\textsuperscript{148}

In fact, there was a great deal of geographical information circulating around the Atlantic and the rest of the World. Many people, like Ordóñez de Cevallos, moved and wrote about their travel experiences. All these early modern chronicles, travel journeys, descriptions, and maps put the European reader closer to the distant and diverse regions. Reading these accounts allowed for the experience of travel and movement while sitting at home. This was very important, not just for leisure, but also for imagining and governing the far-flung empire.

\textbf{Representing the World}

There were many representations of the new and distant worlds, whether in the form of texts or drawings. In this context there was an emergence of the maps and the cartographic arts as powerful tools to describe and represent the world with its various regions. It was the capacity of maps to represent time and space in one plane, as Mauricio Nieto Olarte states, that made the world accessible everywhere. Now it was possible to take a tiny Asian or Caribbean island to Madrid. It was possible to put the whole world in just one place.\textsuperscript{149}

The Spanish Empire was at the forefront of this modern project. In 1500, Juan de la Cosa, a major cosmographer, politician and conquistador who was part of Columbus enterprise (he was the owner of one the three caravels that reached America in 1492),

\textsuperscript{149} Nieto Olarte, \textit{Las máquinas del imperio}, 17.
drew the first map including America. Moreover, as we have already seen, the impressive mobility that made possible and connected the global empire depended on elaborated nautical charts that could guide pilots and their ships to their destinations. Most of these maps were kept secret, destroyed, or were lost and, unfortunately, few remain. However, we know of their existence and their importance for navigation and for the ruling and preserving the empire. The works of Alison Sandman and Ricardo Cerezo Martinez show the complexities of mapmaking. They explain the process of production and commercialization of charts (both legal and illegal), the main actors, and the most important charts that were made.  

Along with nautical charts, there were other graphic representations of the world. They were less technical, but not less significant or impressive. Richard Kagan has explored the visual representations of the cities of the New World by European artists and cosmographers, most of whom came from northern Europe.  

Like others, Kagan agrees that the discovery of the New World brought increasing attention to the production of maps, something that has been linked to the development of European science. Nonetheless, Kagan contends that the majority of this cartography was not as scientific and objective as its practitioners pretended. Most of the production consisted of “maps of experience,” maps depicting the world in terms of the local audience. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the European Atlases, American cities were often represented as far off and exotic. Usually, the drawings did not match reality. They did not reflect change.


152 Kagan, Imágenes urbanas del mundo hispánico, 86.
over time. Kagan shows how the same images were used time and again and had the
effect of projecting immobility, and even backwardness, over America. As an example,
one of Francis Drake’s companions made the first image of Santo Domingo in 1585 and
it was published in 1588. Then it was repeated, without changes and supposedly
representing contemporary Santo Domingo, in 1599, 1671, 1681, and 1683, almost one
hundred years later!\textsuperscript{153}

Additionally, these representations of the world served not only to define
America, but also Europe, both in discursive and scientific senses. When European
cosmographers began to represent the New World there was not a developed cartographic
science. There were not many scientific maps of Europe and Europeans were still
developing the new (more technical) methods for representing the world, which radically
differed from medieval conceptions of time and space. At the same time, old forms and
traditions endured. A nice example is Juan de la Cosa’s map. It graphically represents the
recent lands discovered by the Europeans in their new transatlantic adventures. However,
he followed the medieval and Mediterranean cartographic tradition and could not avoid
also drawing lines representing wind flows over the Atlantic, which were without any
basis and useless for navigation.

The definition of maps and boundaries and limits were subject to negotiations that
were far from being merely about science or geography. As we have already discussed, in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was impossible to determine longitude with
precision. This was particularly important when Castile and Portugal were trying to
define the position of the ambiguous line of Tordesillas. In a sharp study, Seth Kimmel
shows how the Spanish Monarch cleverly used inaccuracy in order to support his

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 126.
imperial projects. Because longitude was ultimately defined through political negotiation rather than scientific calculation—although it was set on a scientific language—it provided room for multiple interpretations. The cartographic limitations set the limits, but also the possibilities of imperial enterprises, and imperial officials could profit from these inaccuracies.\(^{154}\) Scientific and logistical limitations set, indeed, the limits and boundaries of the Spanish Empire and of its possibilities. This ambiguity provided the conditions for the emergence of more flexible and porous language and imperial political practices.

Ricardo Padrón, in his study of maps and visual and textual representations of the world, argues that in the early modern period there were mixed conceptions of space. The cartographic revolution was taking place at that time and as a consequence, the abstract notion of space—which could be positioned on a two (or even three) dimensional graphic—was not yet the norm. It coexisted with a medieval conception of space, a linear one, mainly linked with distance and time.\(^{155}\) These particular conceptions of space, distance, and time endured for several centuries. Sylvia Sellers-García argues that in eighteenth-century Central America distance was still measured in terms of space and time.\(^{156}\) Therefore, Padrón claims, Europeans were not only learning to draw maps, but to think cartographically. This kind of thinking made possible during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a rationalized perception of the world, and a desire to hold it under just one political system. As David Inglis argues, Iberian elites began to think in global terms, and to place themselves within the world. They started to develop a sense of


“universum,” of belonging to the world. This came, of course, hand in hand with imperial desires of universal rulership.\textsuperscript{157}

Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos’ narration of his journey is a great example of such yearning for global dominion. By fitting into one book his expedition across the world, he put the distant regions on an equal footing, as part of the same unity, which was Spanish and Catholic. The world was seen as encompassed by the imperial enterprise. Ordóñez de Cevallos’s experiences of mobility, and those of thousands of imperial officials, were the proof and the foundation of the global articulation of the Monarchy. Because of the new technological and geographical advancements, he and many others began to perceive the world as one large but connected entity over which it was possible to travel, connect people and nations, and rule as a Catholic empire.

\footnote{157 Inglis, “Mapping Global Consciousness.”}
In 1657, Phillip IV appointed the Galician don Mauro de Mendoza Caamaño y Sotomayor, marquis of Villagarcía, as president of the Audience of Charcas in the viceroyalty of Peru, and home to the famous silver mines of Potosí. Although at first, the marquis—who did not have any previous experience in government and service to the king, nor direct links with America—accepted this unsolicited nomination, he eventually

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1 BNE, Mss/801, f. 84v - 88 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por su Consejo de Estado y Guerra” (Tercera, February 19, 1624).
2 AGI, Santo Domingo, 2, N. 81 “Personas para la alcaldía mayor de la tierra adentro de Santo Domingo” (Madrid, July 20, 1660).
3 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 36 Mauro de Pardiñas, “Individuales noticias del viaje que se puede hacer a la provincia de Las Charcas” (Cádiz, November 4, 1657).
4 AGI, Lima, 1, N. 78 “Consulta del presidente del Consejo de Indias,” September 4, 1586.
declined the post, mostly due to the negative of his wife. His temporary appointment, however, left an unusual trail of private documents that allows us to see the inner workings of the patronage system. Villagarcía kept a well-organized folder with the documents he received on this matter, from congratulatory letters from clients, patrons, and friends, to more personal missives discussing the pros and cons of the nomination; information and notices about the post, the region, and the travel; and correspondence with the Council of the Indies. In other words, the collection of papers reveals the marquis’s network of patronage, the people that constituted it, and how he benefited from his clients and brokers. Moreover, this particular case gives us a glimpse into the relationship between husband and wife, and the private assessments and negotiations surrounding the transatlantic journey. These documents also show how various people, from acquaintances of the marquis to complete strangers eagerly offered to become his clients, and how they helped him extend his network into America, a region completely foreign to him.

5 The reasons behind Villagarcía’s appointment are unclear. In the congratulatory letters he received it was constantly celebrated that the marquis was appointed without him having asked for it. Nonetheless, it is also true that Villagarcía and his kin actively took part in the court dynamics and sought the king’s patronage. Previously, he had served the queen Mariana of Austria as her High Stewart. His brother was Fernando Andrade y Sotomayor, bishop of Burgos, Sigüenza, and Santiago de Compostela, and temporary viceroy of Navarra. He was behind don Mauro’s entitlement as the first marquis of Villagarcía and viscount of Barrantes. Moreover, these brothers were nephews of the powerful priest Antonio de Sotomayor who became the Inquisition’s General Inquisitor (1632-1645), and was a major actor in contemporary politics. He secured Galicia’s right of two votes in the kingdom’s Cortes Generales, and developed his own large network of clientage. María del Carmen Martín Rubio, El marqués de Villagarcía, virrey del Perú (1736-1745) (Madrid: Polífemo, 2010), 37–38; Jaime Contreras, El Santo Oficio de la Inquisición en Galicia, 1560-1700: Poder, sociedad y cultura (Madrid: Akal, 1982), 208–231.

6 Although scholars of the early modern Spanish Empire have access to large and very rich archives, most of the documents held in them have an official origin or purpose. Personal and private documentation remain relatively scant. A major exception is Enrique Otte, Cartas privadas de emigrantes a Indias, 1540-1616 (Sevilla: Consejería de Cultura, Junta de Andalucía; Escuela de Estudios Hispano Americanos de Sevilla, 1988).

7 The labeling of the letters, as well as some side annotations, suggest that it was the marquis himself who organized and kept the letters.

8 AHN, Estado, L. 210 “Cartas de enhorabuena a D. Mauro de Mendoza Camaño y Sotomayor, Marqués de Villagarcía, nombrado Presidente de Charcas.”
In this chapter I will discuss how networks of patronage worked and how they impacted the global mobility of imperial officials. Patronage networks were indispensable to itinerant officials who relied on their clients, patrons, and brokers—whether they were Spaniards or natives from across the world—to help them govern distant regions by gathering resources and information, and implementing their objectives. I analyze how families built and sustained networks of imperial patronage and how they coped with the officials’ mobility. These personal networks, constructed upon kinship and local community ties, eventually extended globally and were embedded within the imperial networks of royal service and patronage, allowing the king to consolidate his authority.

In recent years, historians have begun to acknowledge the centrality of the patronage system in configuring the government of the Spanish Empire. Patron-client relations were, perhaps, the most important mechanism holding the empire together, and making possible the preservation of the social order and the king’s authority. The personal ties of loyalty, based upon ideals of service and gratitude—as well as magnificence and gift giving—were essential to a hierarchical political system that was conceived as a political body, with the king at its center, as its head.9 In this regard, the language used by officials provides a map for decoding how patronage was articulated and understood. Thus, a careful and close reading of the texts is needed, paying attention to seemingly insignificant details, such as the words and manners used by people to communicate, the consistency of their use, and the moments in which some expressions

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were privileged over others. Clients and patrons expressed their desires, gave orders, and requested or granted favors and bounty using a sophisticated and grandiloquent set of expressions. As a result, historians have begun to pay greater attention to the patronage networks interwoven into the daily lives of early modern people.  

Most patronage studies of the period, however, focus on concrete and well-defined geographical areas and are thus locally oriented. Theses dense local networks have been described largely in isolation from the wider network of connections spanning the empire. Furthermore, although it is accepted that outsiders, such as the constantly moving imperial officials, were quick to integrate or even to create their own local networks, a situation which the crown tried to avoid and prevent, the mechanisms by which people with little or no experience or knowledge of a society interacted with complicated local networks are seldom explained.

12 James Casey argues that the king appointed viceroys with strong local connections, which ensured a successful government, because “a viceroy who was a complete outsider and who could not or would not get involved in personal dealings, was heading for financial and emotional disaster.” Although he is mostly thinking on Spain, this leaves the question open regarding the American case in which, most oftenly, the newcomers had none or very few linkages. James Casey, “Some Considerations on State Formation and Patronage in Early Modern Spain,” in Patronages et clientelismes, 1550-1750: France, Angleterre, Espagne, Italie, ed. Charles Giry-Delioison and Roger Mettam (Villeneuve d’Ascq; London: Centre d’histoire de la région du Nord et de l’Europe du Nord-Ouest; Institut Francais du Royaume-Uni, 1995), 109. Moreover, some scholars have argued that the eighteenth-century Bourbon Reforms aimed to rein in local elites’ power, who during the previous centuries had taken over the political and judiciary structures of American government, weakening the authority of the king, see Mark A. Burkholder and D. S. Chandler, From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687-1808 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977).
The key to this swift integration, I argue, rested in the imperial and global nature of those networks. On the one hand, most imperial officials nurtured multiple connections that transcended local frontiers and linked them with far-away provinces, most importantly with the royal court, but also with other regions of the empire. On the other hand, these officials also relied on the established official networks of the empire.

Imperial officials, by combining personal and imperial networks, were able to gather information about people and events across the globe, and exert their own influence on them. Thus, the operation of the empire rested upon communication among a diverse, overlapping collection of networks linking distant and geographically disconnected regions. The quantity and quality of knowledge managed by government officials, and the ease and swiftness with which they transmitted the information from one side of the empire to the other, speaks to the sophistication of system. When officials stepped foot for the first time on distant and strange land, already they had in place a web of contacts and knowledge that shaped their behavior.

Moreover, as several scholars have already pointed out, these networks strengthened the power of the king and his authority in this far-flung polity. The monarch was the primary source and distributor of the favors and gifts, regardless of the many intermediaries that might intervene. By the seventeenth century, the king had become the most important and major patron, progressively displacing the nobility, which also grew dependent on his favors.13 Service to the king became the door to royal bounty, and in the

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seventeenth century almost the whole of society took part in one way or another in serving his majesty. In this way, more and more individuals, families, and networks became linked to the Monarchy, their economic, social, and political development, as well as their identities, directly depended on their service to the king across the vast empire.

In this chapter, the practices of patronage will be analyzed in close detail. First I will study the connection between patriarchy and patronage, and the internal negotiations and configurations within the family of a mobile official. Then, I will look at the insertion of families within the imperial structures of patronage, the global articulations of those familial and imperial networks, and finally, the reliance of officials on clients, brokers and patrons for governing. The culture of patronage can only be understood by looking at pieces of evidence of its actual social practice, and by examining its language—jargon, expressions, titles, etc.—which isolated and out of context, would lack any meaning.\[^{14}\]

Clifford Geertz coined the term “thick description” to describe an ethnography that decodes the “stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures” that give sense to human actions, from twitches and winks to parodies. These actions are never fully coherent or rational, but acquire a meaning within their cultures. One must reason abstractly from the peculiar and incomplete cases in order to form a thick description of what lies beneath them. This methodology allows for exposing the “webs of significance” in which humans

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\[^{14}\] In this regard, it is important to follow Sharon Kettering’s admonition to study the actual practices of patronage, and not look solely to the language deployed, because “patrons and clients sometimes wrote one thing and did another.” Sharon Kettering, “Patronage in Early Modern France,” French Historical Studies 17, no. 4 (1992): 851.
beings live.\textsuperscript{15} Patronage, which was firmly enrooted in the major political activities as well as in the daily and quotidian familial interactions, constituted one of these webs spun by men and women, which articulated human actions and gave them sense. Patronage, was essential and constitutive of the early modern Spanish culture. Its patterns and rules defined relationships and behavior, and fundamentally shaped society. These asymmetrical patronage relationships affected every sphere of life in the early modern Spanish world, from economics to politics to culture to, evidently, the personal and intimate lives of subjects.

\textbf{The Networks of the Marquis of Villagarcía}

The news of the 1657 appointment of the marquis of Villagarcía as president of Charcas circulated immediately. Although don Mauro normally resided in Galicia with his wife and family, at the time he was staying in the imperial court where, in the company of his son, don Antonio, he served as a representative of Galicia in the \textit{Cortes}, General Assembly, of Castile. It did not take long before letters from all parts of the peninsula began to arrive in Madrid. Villagarcía had himself informed many people about his nomination, while others received the news through other channels, including short letters, local gossip, and informal talk. Unfortunately, their ephemeral nature makes such documents difficult to locate, and thus many of the personal exchanges are unavailable to contemporary historians.

Between October of 1657 and January of 1658, the marquis received at least forty-four letters, seventeen of which were informative and pragmatic (i.e., related to business and travel affairs), and twenty-seven were congratulatory letters from his circle

of friends, relatives, and clients.\textsuperscript{16} As was common, the letters—especially the celebratory ones—were written in a language that would seem dense and stilted by today’s standards. The correspondents expressed joy for the unsought appointment, and wished him well in his upcoming endeavor. In several cases, people lamented, in dramatic tones, that the office was so far away from Spain and, thus, “habérsenos de alejar tanto Vuestra Señoría.”\textsuperscript{17} As discussed in the first chapter, the notions of distance played an important role in the imagination of the inhabitants of the Spanish empire, and many truly feared it. The list of people who congratulated the marquis was long and varied, suggesting the range and variety of Villagarcía’s relationships. He took part in several patronage networks, acting sometimes as patron and others as client.

The correspondence of the marquis makes evident the importance of the ties of \textit{paisanaje} (fellow countrymen) in his life and career. Most of don Mauro’s correspondents were from Galicia. They appear to have been his friends and comrades. Such was the case even with the important and powerful cardinal Sandoval, archbishop of Toledo, who was born in Santiago de Compostela in 1589, around the same time as the marquis. The two men had common childhood and adolescent experiences, and were probably related.\textsuperscript{18} Sandoval was the first person to congratulate the marquis by letter, and in the missive addressed him in reverential terms, even calling him “Señor mío.”\textsuperscript{19} However, it is highly unlikely that the most important cardinal of Spain was a client of

\textsuperscript{16} For a list of all the letters see Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{17} AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 3 Benito de Aguiar, “Enhorabuena de don Benito de Aguiar, camarero del cardenal Sandoval” (Toledo, October 9, 1657). Likewise, the nun Juana de San Miguel begged the marquis to carefully evaluate if such long and complicated journey was worthy. AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 14 “Enhorabuena de sor Juana de San Miguel” (Vista Alegre, October 25, 1657).
\textsuperscript{18} Don Mauro was born in Villagarcía in 1594, and both Sandoval and Villagarcía were related to the Galician Ossorio family.
\textsuperscript{19} AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 2 “Enhorabuena del cardenal Sandoval, arzobispo de Toledo” (Toledo, October 9, 1657).
the marquis. In this case, an expression such as “my lord” did not indicate a relationship of clientage; instead, Sandoval was using the rhetoric of patronage to signal respect and familiarity.\textsuperscript{20} Theirs was a bond of friendship. The fact that patronage was expressed using a language of friendship—and also, the other way around, as in the above-mentioned case—further complicates our understanding of these bonds. As Sharon Kettering, a historian of seventeenth-century French patronage, notes, patronage and friendship were closely related, but different types of personal relationships. While patronage could evolve from friendship, not all friends engaged in patronage, nor were all clients friends. Moreover, friendship was less dependent on obligatory favors and retributions.\textsuperscript{21} Nonetheless, as will be seen shortly, the early modern practices and understandings of friendship spawned powerful ties that provided legitimacy to the whole political system.

The culture and language of patronage also informed family structure. It was the father—the head of the family—who held the role as first patron. The father was duty-bound to take care of and reward the other members of his family. In this respect, patronage was closely related to patriarchy. According to Kettering, “the role of the patron was modeled on that of the patriarchal father [...] and the role of client on loyal, 

\textsuperscript{20} Also, the servants of the cardinal rushed to congratulate Villagarcia, showing that the acquaintance of these men also meant a relationship with their retainers. Aguiar, “Enhorabuena de don Benito de Aguiar”; AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 5 “Don Diego de Vera, secretario de cámara del cardenal Sandoval” (Toledo, October 9, 1657); AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 21 “Enhorabuena de Don Rodrigo de Mandía y Parga, obispo de Siria, maestre escuela de Salamanca” (La Comarca, October 31, 1657).

\textsuperscript{21} Sharon Kettering, “Friendship and Clientage in Early Modern France,” \textit{French History} 6, no. 2 (1992): 139–158. As it will be shown in the next chapter, Neostoicism was at the core of early modern Spanish thought and friendship was deemed as one of the most important, valuable, and pure of the relationships for the Stoics. See Cicero, \textit{On Friendship} (various editions). On early modern friendship see Maurice Aymard, “Friends and Neighbors,” in \textit{A History of Private Life}, ed. Roger Chartier, vol. 3: Passions of the Renaissance (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1989), 447–492.
obedient family member and servant.”\(^{22}\) Bianca Premo has defined patriarchy as the “belief that multiple individuals—male and female, young and old—were naturally subordinate to an authority figure, usually a male based on the hierarchical model of the Western family.” The basic structure of patriarchy, in which an authority figure watched over his dependents, shaped power relations throughout the empire, not only in the family, but it structured the whole of the Spanish Empire, “with the king taking the role of father.”\(^{23}\)

Early modern societies were built upon pacts among elite men, which helped to foster the rule of the men and the father and the submission of women and children.\(^{24}\) Through these arrangements, men attempted to control families, as well as material resources and the paths to political positions and authority. The king as “father” was an ideological construction sustained by his ability to reward and protect his “children.”


\(^{23}\) Bianca Premo, *Children of the Father King: Youth, Authority, & Legal Minority in Colonial Lima* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 9–10. A similar argument was conveyed by Julie Hardwick for the case of France, *The Practice of Patriarchy: Gender and the Politics of Household Authority in Early Modern France* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). However, Kimberly Gauderman argues against the use of the concept of patriarchy, which tends to depict the power and authority of men as unchallenged, while also presenting women as powerless and completely dominated. In her view, patriarchy is not helpful for understanding the social and familial dynamics of the early modern Spanish world, in which power was, in fact, decentered, and subject to multiple and constant negotiations; *Women’s Lives in Colonial Quito: Gender, Law, and Economy in Spanish America* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 11–15.

Thus, patriarchy was the ideology behind the hierarchical society, while patronage—and the bonds it generated—was both an expression of such hierarchies and a political mechanism that facilitated such an unequal society and prevented social conflict and unrest from boiling over.25

Some of the strongest and most important ties of patronage appeared among neighbors and kinsmen. Relatives of the marquis of Villagarcía soon manifested their joy for the nomination. His nephew, the marquis of Arcos, who was also an imperial official serving in the African fortress of Ceuta, wrote a warm letter celebrating the appointment.26 It is important to note that family was understood in a very broad sense rather than in the narrow contemporary conception of parents and children. Members of the family included, of course, the grandparents, but also the uncles and aunts, the cousins, the nephews, and, very importantly, the in-laws. Moreover, there was an awareness of the familial branches and connections. Even very distant relatives were thought of as part of the family.27 No doubt the family was the primary source of identity in the early modern Spanish world, as well as the most immediate source of assistance and patronage.

25 José María Imízcoz argues that patronage was concomitant to inequality and one of the most effective mechanisms of social control, “La relaciones de patronazgo y clientelismo. Declinaciones de la desigualdad social,” in Patronazgo y clientelismo en la Monarquía Hispánica (siglos XVI-XIX), ed. José María Imízcoz and Artola Renedo Andoni (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, Servicio editorial, 2016), 19–28.

26 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 22 “Enhorabuena del marqués de los Arcos y de Tenorio, señor de la casa de Sotomayor, gobernador y capitán general de Ceuta” (Ceuta, October 31, 1657).

27 Alida Metcalf, while recognizing the difficulty of defining precisely ‘family,’ distinguishes between the larger family and the household. The latter refers to the people actually living together in the same space and at the same time. Family is a more ample concept, as it includes people who might have left the household, and even kin not biologically related. Alida C. Metcalf, Family and Frontier in Colonial Brazil: Santana de Parnaíba, 1580-1822 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 13. Likewise, Naomi Tadmor unravels how people in eighteenth-century England spoke and thought of their families. She departs from polarizing and simplifying perspectives that have defined families as either ‘nuclear’ or ‘extended,’ to argue, instead, that there existed simultaneously contrasting understandings of what a family was. Naomi Tadmor, Family and Friends in Eighteenth-Century England: Household, Kinship, and Patronage (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Nonetheless, we should differentiate familial relationships from patronage relationships. Kettering contends the two are easily confused but distinct; patronage, like family, involved “overlapping, personal bonds, but clientage was a separate relationship in a kinship-dominated society.” While these two linkages relied on the same language and values, and in many ways clienteles acted as artificial kinship, not every family tie evolved into patronage, and not all of the clients were kin. Moreover, whereas kinship was an involuntary, permanent, and formal relationship that imposed obligations, patronage was “informal, voluntary, [and] often impermanent.”

The marquis’s private correspondence allows us to explore his private relationships, and in doing so, analyze how the culture of patronage and mobility defined them. Among the collection of letters, two are written by the marquise, doña Antonia de Caamaño Mendoza (niece of don Mauro and lady of Rubianes), to her husband. In the exclusively male world of Spanish imperial officialdom, letters by women are rare; only men held offices, and mostly men wrote the official documentation. However, on this

28 José Martínez Millán criticizes the false and simple equation of family networks with patronage ones, and those studies that claim to be about patronage, but which really are genealogical. “Las investigaciones sobre patronazgo y clientelismos en la administración de la Monarquía Hispana durante la edad moderna,” *Studia Historica. Historia Moderna* no. 15 (1996): 103.
29 Kettering, “Patronage and Kinship in Early Modern France,” quotations in 409 and 432.
30 Doña Antonia was the daughter of José Caamaño y Figueroa and Ana María de Caamaño y Mendoza, sister of don Mauro. RAH, Salazar y Castro, 9/294, f 233 “Costados de Antonio de Mendoza Sotomayor, Caamaño y Caamaño, Andrade y Caamaño, II marqués de Villagarcia.,” n.d.
31 Nonetheless, this is not to deny that noblewomen played also an important role in the networks of patronage and they also could act as patrons and brokers, see Sharon Kettering, “The Patronage Power of Early Modern French Noblewomen,” *The Historical Journal* 32, no. 4 (December 1989): 817–841. Likewise, many women wrote to the king asking to be rewarded claiming benefits in their condition of widows, daughters, mothers, or sisters. See, for example, AHN, Consejos, 4409, N.185 “Doña María de Guzman, viuda de Juan del Castillo, merced de 45 mil pesos de por vida” (Madrid, October 23, 1583); AGI, Indiferente, 759 “Refiere los servicios del marido, padre y suego de doña Jacinta March de Castelvi” (Madrid, March 16, 1636); AGI, Santo Domingo, 2, N. 47 “Sobre la pretensión de la condesa de Peñalba” (Madrid, August 17, 1654); AHN, Consejos, 13619, N. 39 “Petición de doña María de Peralta y Cárdenas a la reina” (Madrid, March 31, 1675). For other examples of private letters from women see Otte, *Cartas privadas de emigrantes a Indias*; M. Mónica Ghirardi and Jaqueline Vassallo, eds., *tres siglos de cartas de mujeres: reedición comentada de la obra literatura femenina de Pedro Grenón* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones CICCUS, 2010).
occasion we can gain a sense of how a woman understood the transatlantic journey, the networks that she established, and how she influenced the official’s mobility. These documents are powerful and illustrative portrayals of the internal negotiations and challenges for a couple facing such passage, as well as the familial nature of patronage, and how patronage culture was also shaped by family interactions and negotiations. Since the available letters expose the progression of the marquis’s decisions with regards to his journey, it is further possible to get a sense of how much his wife and closest retainers influenced his resolution to step back and reject the post he had initially accepted.

Before analyzing the marquise’s letters, it is worth looking at the role played by the marquises’ chaplain, the Inquisitor don Pedro de Navia. As already noted, early modern families encompassed many more members than just those related by blood, or even inhabiting under the same roof. Such was the case of this confessor, who despite not being a direct relative to the Villagarcías and living in a different town, he greatly impacted on the family’s development. Patronage and spiritual bonds could be as forceful as kin. In the early modern world the chaplains, confessors, and/or spiritual advisors were figures of special importance. They were present everywhere, from the noble households to the most humble villages. However, we still know very little about them. While there are some important works on the royal confessor, there is almost nothing written on the large number of private and domestic confessors.32 The royal confessor was one of the

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closest and most influential advisers to the king. Not only did he have intimate and daily interactions with the monarch, but he was the conscience of the king. As his moral guide, his duty was to remind the king of what was just and fair, and judge him according to divine law.33 Because the king impersonated the polity, there was nothing private about the king’s actions. Thus, the royal confessor was also a political advisor, and he had the right and duty to counsel the king in all of his decisions. These were no minor powers. Not surprisingly, royal confessors participated in and developed their own networks of patronage, and actively took part in the government of the empire.

From our knowledge of the king’s confessor role, we can extrapolate the functions of the domestic chaplains. Almost every noble household had a chaplain in residence who became a major component of their family. Chaplains were not only moral advisors, but also political and economic agents. In fact, of all the marquis of Villagarcía’s kept letters, the first two were written by his chaplain, who was also archdeacon of Mendo and canon at the cathedral of Santiago, where he resided. The first letter was addressed to the marquis, while the second was to doña Antonia. In those two letters, the importance of the chaplain as an advisor to both of the spouses was clearly manifested. He was the lady’s confidant, and also her interlocutor in front of her husband.

Additionally, don Pedro de Navia acted as the couple’s administrator and took care of several of their businesses.

In his first letter to the marquis, on October 7, don Pedro de Navia openly expressed his doubts and confusion about the marquis’s decision to embark on the journey. He worried about the possible harmful consequences to doña Ana and their children. In a clear manifestation of their high degree of intimacy, the chaplain also told the marquis that “no sé lo que sentirá de él mi señora la marquesa, pero entiendo se conformará siempre con el dictamen de vuestra señoría.” He felt with the liberty, and perhaps the obligation, of speaking on behalf of the marquise. Moreover, don Pedro confirmed that the lady, who had remained in their town of Vista Alegre in Galicia while the marquis went to the Cortes in Madrid, had received the letters don Mauro wrote her. He was an intermediary between the spouses and affirmations like, “por el suyo [the marquise mail] incluso sabrá vuestra señora que [she] goza salud,” even suggest that he had access to their communications.34

The following day, the chaplain wrote to the marquise.35 In this letter he also discussed his fears and perplexity about the marquis’ appointment. He told her about the rumors that were hastily circulating in the city of Santiago. Everyone had an opinion of whether don Mauro should or should not go to America. Some affirmed that this was a position of such importance that it could not be turned down, while others (amongst whom was don Pedro) feared the journey because Las Charcas was “lo más lejos que tiene las Indias.” He also had talked with the canon don Sancho de Arango and with don

34 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 43 “Carta del inquisidor don Pedro de Navia, arcediano de Mendo y canónigo de Santiago” (Santiago, October 7, 1657).
35 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 44 “Carta de Don Pedro de Navia a la marquesa de Villagarcía” (Santiago, October 8, 1657).
Francisco de Gayoso—who had just arrived in town and was a guest of the first. They too discussed the pros and cons of the post, and whether the marquise should go with her husband, to which the chaplain affirmed, “vuestra señoría era tan rendida a la voluntad del señor marqués y tan madre de sus hijos que haría lo que su señoría dispusiese.” Once again, the chaplain appeared not only as the interlocutor, but as the public voice of the marquise.

Moreover, such an affirmation expressed the ideal role of the woman in a patriarchal society. She was expected, as a wife and as a mother, to follow her husband’s commands. It was a consolidation of the figure of the father as ruler and patron, and of the wife as his retainer. Nevertheless, this arrangement was never something closed or absolute, as there was a lot of room for negotiation. In fact, the wife was also the first and most important counselor of her husband and had a major influence on his decisions. Thus, Navia reassured the marquise that even though she had to comply with her husband’s resolutions, “debe proponerle todas las dificultades que se le ofrecieren,” and that she should lay down her arguments as smoothly and kindly as possible “para saber aprovecharse de la ocasión y conseguir lo que puede llevarle.”

Doña Antonia followed the advice of her chaplain, and wrote a carefully crafted letter to her husband. Using very flowery language, she exposed her reticence to undertaking the transatlantic journey and to the post the king had granted him. She began her missive addressing him “dueño mío” (owner of mine) and emphasizing that she will

36 In a similar vein, in Lope de Vega’s Peribáñez y el comendador de Ocaña, king Enrique III relied on his wife’s advice when facing the decision of going into war. Quoted in Gabriela Carrión, Staging Marriage in Early Modern Spain: Conjugal Doctrine in Lope, Cervantes, and Calderón (Lewisburg, PA; Lanham, MD: Bucknell University Press; Rowman & Littlefield Pub. Group, 2011), 47. For an example from the English world of the wife as counselor, see The Carefull Wife’s Good Counsel: Or, The Husband’s Firm Resolution to Reform His Life, and to Lay Something up against a Rainy Day. To the Tune of The Spinning-Wheel. Licensed according to Order (London: Printed for P. Brooksby, J. Deacon, J. Blare, J. Back, 1683).
always obey and follow him. She reminded him of old promises, which she still stood by and was prepared to fulfill:

cuando hablamos acá que iría a Indias contigo, siempre diré lo mismo pues para mí ninguna cosa me puede parecer de conveniencia sin ti, ni de trabajo en tu compañía, y así vuelvo a decir lo mismo y que yo no tengo más libertad ni gusto que obedecerte y acompañarte aunque sea al cabo del mundo como en fin lo es esto que si hacemos la jornada le tomaremos de una punta a otra.  

It is worth highlighting the tone in which she wrote. She addressed him as “tú,” in the most informal way. Most likely, she was the only person who did that. In a context in which protocol mattered deeply and was highly regulated, not even powerful men like cardinal Sandoval could address him that way.  Despite at first calling him “my owner” and stating the hierarchy within the family, she also spoke to him as an equal. Moreover, in various passages of the letter she called him “amigo mío.” Friendship was, indeed, the strongest bond of a couple. In a world in which many feelings and emotions were not considered private, but belonged to the public sphere, friendship and love were not necessarily romantic values. Instead, they were the basis of social and political contracts. Alejandro Cañeque argues that the early modern understanding of friendship, which involved “mutual good will, trust, and well-wishing,” was founded on the Aristotelian discourse in which “friendship gives rise to and sustains the most long-lasting political bonds.” Very importantly, this relationship was not only among equals, but it could also involve people with different degrees of power. Therefore, political love and friendship—

37 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 45 “Carta de la marquesa de Villagarcía” (Vista Alegre, October 11, 1657).
38 In 1586, Phillip II put an end to the prevailing arbitrary use of treatments, and issued a normative on how to properly use them. This regulation was followed throughout the seventeenth century. Pragmática, en que se da la orden y forma que se ha de tener y guardar, en los tratamientos y cortesías de palabra y por escrito, y en traer coroneles, y ponellos en qualesquier partes y lugares (Alcalá: Juan Íñiguez de Lequerica, 1586).
Greeks used the same word, *philia*, for referring to these two concepts—bound rulers and ruled, and ultimately legitimized the king’s rulership.\(^{39}\)

As we can see, the concept of friendship sustained patronage culture and language. Patronage was ultimately understood as a relationship of friendship in which people made and owed favors to others. By calling him her friend, the marquise was making evident their profound bond and mutual dependency. Even couples were expressed and shaped in terms of patronage. The patron-client relationships truly structured the whole of society, beginning with the family itself. It encompassed more than the relationship between rulers and ruled, but determined the organization of society and how people were jointed and linked. Patronage, an expression of the patriarchal society, was a manner of understanding human relationships that permeated all human activities.

The marquise’s words of obedience were immediately followed by a request to listen to her opinions. She affirmed, “también gustarás de que te diga los reparos que se me ofrecen, no para otra cosa que para que los peses y luego elijas a tu voluntad.”\(^{40}\) It was her duty to offer counsel to her husband, and it was his right to act and decide according to his own will, to follow what he thought was best after having carefully deliberated. This was another expression of the Spanish political culture being put into practice within the most basic unit of society. The way in which doña Antonia offered her advice clearly resonates with the early modern conception of the king’s authority and obligations. It was accepted that the monarch had absolute power, but this did not mean


\(^{40}\) AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 45. “Carta de la marquesa de Villagarcía,” October 11, 1657.
that he could do whatever he wanted without restraint. To the contrary, the king was expected to listen carefully to his councilors before making any decision.41

The marquise expressed several objections to embarking on the transatlantic enterprise. She complained about the long distance, writing “esto es a lo último de la Indias, como se ve por los mapas.” Because the journey would be taxing for their younger children, they would have to be left alone at home, and they would only have don Pedro de Navia to look after them. Even if they were to bring with them their eldest son, Antonio, she would be worried about his safety on such long voyage, and still would miss the rest of the family, which probably she would not see ever again. In a truly dramatic tone, the marquise claimed that “esto te confieso me quiebra el corazón.” Furthermore, there were economic complications. They would have to find someone to manage their estates, and it was very likely that in their absence their farm would not profit as much, and “cuanto se adquiera por allá se perderá por acá.” She also admitted that she did not have the strength she once had. This entire scene anguished the marquise, “solo pasar por la imaginación quita el juicio.” Doña Antonia, sought counsel and solace in no other than don Pedro de Navia. She had spoken to their chaplain who “como padre y amigo habla lo que siente.” Once again, friendship and counsel, now from the retainer and spiritual advisor appear deeply intertwined in these networks of patronage. Finally, she begged the marquis to go back home to see her and to leave things properly arranged. It was already more than three years that he had been away and since they had seen each other. In a last attempt to make him change his mind, she told her husband to use her poor

41 For a discussion on the importance of the councils in the performing of power in the Spanish Empire, see Cañeque, The King’s Living Image, chap. 2.
health condition as an excuse to leave the court, and even to reject the nomination and to request another office, and it would not matter if it was of lesser value.42

A week later, the marquise wrote a second letter revealing, with even bitter words, her disillusion with her husband’s determination to accept the post and go to Las Charcas, while at the same time, she reassured “que lo que tú ordenares y dispusieres ejecutaré con gusto porque no tengo otro que el tuyo.” She lamented that don Mauro had not received her first missive with her concerns on the matter. Doña Antonia reprimanded him for rushing to his decision, and that he should have taken more time to think it over. She continued with her objections and, now in a more aggressive tone, told him that no one believed that such was a proper position for him and that “cuantos oyen que se te ha dado este puesto se ríen de pensar que nos había de pasar por pensamiento el ir allá.” She definitely did not want to go. Thus, she offered him a way out: although he had already said yes to the king’s offer, he could always say that even though he much wanted to go to the Indies to serve the king, he could not do it because of the marquise’s sicknesses and poor health condition, and because none of their relatives approved the journey. She also told the marquis that he could negotiate with the Council to trade off the post for another one in Spain, or to find the way to place their son Antonio in some office.43

The marquis of Villagarcía took the words of his wife very seriously. He labeled the first letter with the following title:

De la marquesa con las advertencias y reparos tan prudentes y cuerdos como suyos y de su capacidad y consejos hablando en la ida a la Presidencia de Las Charcas. Debo ver con toda veneración y estimación muchas veces esta carta.44

42 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 45 “Carta de la marquesa de Villagarcía,” October 11, 1657.
43 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 47 “Carta de la marquesa de Villagarcía” (Vista Alegre, October 18, 1657).
44 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 45 “Carta de la marquesa de Villagarcía,” October 11, 1657.
In order to make an informed decision, he needed to receive the best possible advice, and no one seemed to be in the better position to counsel him than his best friend, his wife. The words don Mauro and doña Antonia exchanged should not be understood as the expression of romantic or idyllic feelings. Instead, they were an expression of their friendship, which as we have seen, was a political bond that sought the mutual good. Let us not forget that there are many aspects to marriage, and many reasons why people chose to marry.\(^45\) Just as almost any other early modern marriage, the Villagarcía’s union was instrumental. The marquis married his niece not necessarily because he felt in love with her, but it was a social, political, and economic arrangement. Therefore, the language and expressions of love and friendship did not only refer to private feelings, but also to their bond of patronage.

The opinion of the marquise mattered to her husband, and they were not empty words when he affirmed that he ought to read the letters several times and with veneration. Although at first he had accepted going to the Indies, and was making plans to do so, he retracted at the last minute. On February 8\(^{th}\), 1658 the secretary of the Council of the Indies, don Juan Bautista Sáez de Navarrete, urged the marquis to get his official title of president of Las Charcas as soon as possible because he should embark in the fleet to Tierra Firme that was soon to depart.\(^46\) A week later, the marquis replied that he had no problem in getting the title, but that he found it difficult to embark in the

\(^{45}\) Recently, Ruth Karras has explored the understandings and practices of marriage in the Medieval world. She shows that there were many reasons to why people married, and that there were many other forms of unions that were also legitimate and widespread. Ruth Mazo Karras, *Unmarriages: Women, Men, and Sexual Unions in the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). For other studies on the history of marriage and on its multi-layered nature, see Nancy F. Cott, *Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000); Stephanie Coontz, *Marriage, a History: From Obedience to Intimacy or How Love Conquered Marriage* (New York: Viking, 2005).

\(^{46}\) AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 49 “Copia del papel de don Juan Bautista Sanz de Navarrete, secretario de la Cámara de Indias” (Madrid, February 8, 1658). Sometimes he is also referred as Saez de Navarrete.
upcoming fleet. As much as he desired to serve and obey the king, he claimed that he needed to go home first, to see his wife and children. Furthermore, he expressed his worry over his personal finances and his estates, because being so far away could damage his interests. Finally, don Mauro argued that he had very young children who could not go with him, and he had to find someone to whom entrust their care and education.  

Even though at no point the marquis mentioned the communications with his wife, it is clear that Villagarcía truly read the letter and objections of the marquise several times. All of the arguments he presented were the ones that doña Antonia had given him. 

The secretary Sáez de Navarrete wrote the marquis back saying that, although since the moment of his appointment he had had enough time to go to Galicia and make all the needed arrangements, the Council could understand his reasons to delay his journey, and that he would be allowed to embark in the next year’s fleet. Nonetheless, the Council commanded him to clearly state if he was certain to travel or not. Don Mauro answered in the most ambiguous way, saying that his wish was always to serve and go wherever he was ordered, but that he could not assure anything as he was ignorant of God’s designs and of the future contingencies that could happen, which could not only complicate, but make impossible his travel. Therefore, he would accept, humbly and with resignation, if the Council decided to appoint someone else for the post. Several months later, the marquis wrote the secretary to find out what had been the Council’s decision on the matter. It seems that after his vague answer, he did not receive any other

47 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 49 “Respuesta del Marqués” (Madrid, February 15, 1658).
48 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 50 “Copia del segundo papel de don Juan Bautista Sanz de Navarrete, secretario de la Cámara de Indias” (Madrid, February 18, 1658).
49 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 50 “Respuesta del Marqués” (Madrid, February 28, 1658).
Sáez de Navarrete’s reply was rather curt. After summarizing the marquis’s motives for not traveling and his request for the Council to intercede for him and to be appointed butler of the Queen, the Council just informed him that don Luis de Baraona Sarabia, judge in the High Court of Valladolid, had been appointed for the presidency of Las Charcas and that he had accepted it. No further explanations or indications were given.

The unusual correspondence of the marquis of Villagarcía allows us to peek into some of the familial tensions that officials could face when accepting offices in distant places and had to move across the world. These private documents challenge and complicate our understanding of early modern patriarchy and the agency of women. In fact, the rule of the father, even of someone as powerful as a nobleman, was much conditioned by others, and particularly by his own spouse. The obedient and submissive wife could rely on subtle methods to impose her will, and she did not even need to be physically with him. While it is undeniable the preeminence of the figure of the father, some women could have opportunities to impact on their husbands by maneuvering the same tools and practices that solidified men’s power, those of counsel, friendship, and patronage. Familial negotiations affected the activities of royal officials, whose global mobility, and ultimately the rule of the empire, was permeable to what intimate actors thought, said, and did. Indeed, families and imperial service were tightly bound.

50 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 51 “Carta del marqués de Villagarcía al secretario don Juan Bautista Sanz de Navarrete” (Madrid, October 4, 1658).
51 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 51 “Respuesta de la Cámara” (Madrid, October 12, 1658).
52 Kimberly Gauderman has already challenged the idea that women were helpless and has shown that, in fact, they were protected by the political and judiciary systems: “The Authority of Gender: Women’s Space and Social Control in Seventeenth-Century Quito,” in New World Orders: Violence, Sanction, and Authority in the Colonial Americas, ed. John Smolenski (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 71–91.
**Familial and Royal Service**

Throughout these letters the importance of looking for an office for Villagarcía’s eldest son, don Antonio, is constantly mentioned. There were two major explanations for this goal. First, it is assumed that the personal, social and political improvement of the marquises’ offspring depended on what his father could obtain for him. In the early modern Spanish world a person’s fate was very much related to his family. The second one is that a person’s advancement was tied to the service to the king, even in the case of the noblemen. By the seventeenth century the Spanish monarchy had managed to get hold of the power and to control the traditionally unruly noble families, which had become entwined with the imperial institutions, networks, and projects. Royal service, in the most varied of posts and places, provided a sense of identity to many men and families who identified themselves with the Spanish king.53 Indeed, several years later, don Antonio served as royal ambassador in Genoa and Venice, then occupied a seat in the Council of War, and finally, after rejecting the viceroyalty of Peru, was appointed viceroy of Valencia. His son José Antonio followed this path, too. After serving as ambassador in Venice and as the last viceroy of Catalonia, he was appointed viceroy of Peru in 1735. He accepted the nomination and finally a Villagarcía crossed the Atlantic. After his term, and on his return voyage, he died.54

The case of this Galician family was one among many examples of families linking their fate to the royal service, and growing under the shadow of royal patronage.

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53 Raffaele Puddu argues that the military—where convened people from different social and geographical backgrounds—became a space of unity and were the Spanish identity was forged. *El soldado gentilhombre* (Barcelona: Argos Vergara, 1984). See also Alicia Esteban Estríngana, “El servicio: paradigma de relación política en los siglos XVI y XVII,” in *Servir al rey en la monarquía de los Austrias*, ed. Alicia Esteban Estríngana (Madrid: Sílex, 2012), 11–50.

Yuen-Gen Liang has studied the ways in which members belonging to the lower strata of the powerful and influential Fernández de Córdoba’s clan tied their destinies to the Crown. Several of them served in different posts ranging from Oran to Navarra during the fifteenth century. Liang shows the complex networks of political patronage that allowed this mobility. Moreover, he emphasizes that the king depended on men whose lives were spent defending the monarchy’s interests in order to construct and preserve his empire. The author focuses on the extremely tricky familial arrangements that, on the one hand, allowed the consolidation and preservation of the Fernández de Córdoba’s patrimony, and on the other, weakened some of the members of the clan. They were forced to look for opportunities outside their family business and commit to the royal service.\textsuperscript{55}

Halfway through the seventeenth century, this pattern had consolidated. More and more members of the nobility (mostly the youngest or illegitimate children) engaged with imperial patronage, and linked their lives to the future of the empire. They were willing to serve in far away provinces and work for the imposition and consolidation of the king’s authority. The Fernández de Córdoba, indeed, continued strengthening their ties to the Spanish Empire. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries many men and women of this clan crossed the Atlantic. Some settled permanently in America, while many others returned to the Peninsula.\textsuperscript{56} One of the most representative figures was Diego Fernández de Córdoba, marquis of Guadalcázar, who between 1612 and 1629 served as viceroy of the two American viceroyalties. Alongside him traveled many

\textsuperscript{55} Liang, \textit{Family and Empire}.

members of his family, who held diverse offices, always appointed by him.\textsuperscript{57} As will be
discussed shortly, the viceroys had their own entourage they needed to reward, and upon
which they depended to effectively govern.

One of Guadalcázar’s closest retainers was his nephew Luis Fernández de
Córdoba y Arce.\textsuperscript{58} Like his uncle, he came from Córdoba and was a member of the city
council. He travelled to New Spain where his uncle appointed him governor of Tlaxcala.
While in Mexico, he joined the navy that sailed to the Philippines, led by Alonso Fajardo.
After he returned to Mexico, Guadalcázar named him governor of the fort of San Juan de
Ulúa. In 1622 he followed his uncle to Peru. There he was in charge of the defense of the
Port of Callao against the attacks of the Dutch corsair Jacques l'Hermite. Later, in 1625,
his uncle appointed him governor of Chile where he put an end to the defensive war and
reassumed the offensive against the Araucanians.\textsuperscript{59} Meanwhile, in 1624, by power of
attorney, he got married in Cuzco to doña Juana de Arce y Tordoya, descendent of a
prominent family of \textit{beneméritos}, and lady of the village of El Carpio, in Córdoba,
Spain—where she was born. Thanks to this Peruvian marriage, don Luis Fernández de
Córdoba y Arce became lord of a village in his Andalusian hometown. In 1630, he
returned to Spain where he continued to seek royal patronage, although this time he did
not depend directly upon his uncle. No doubt he had royal favor, as three years later he
was accepted into the Order of Santiago. Moreover, the Council of the Indies interceded
for him and suggested the king could grant him a nobility title, and employ him in any

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 169.
\textsuperscript{58} BNE, Mss/18719/30 Sebastián de la Vega, “Certificación de los servicios prestados por D. Luis
Fernández de Córdoba y Arce, en base a los papeles que presentó ante el Real Consejo de Indias” (Madrid,
\textsuperscript{59} José Manuel Díaz Blanco, \textit{Razón de estado y buen gobierno: la Guerra Defensiva y el imperialismo
español en tiempos de Felipe III} (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2010), 296–297. The defensive war was
an attempt of a peace treaty with the Araucanians, which is treated in more detail in Chapter Four.
These kinds of recommendations were effective, and between 1638 and 1644 don Luis was the governor of the Canary islands. After all this extensive mobility throughout the empire, he did not wish to remain idle. In 1646 he requested the king to name him royal ambassador in Genoa. This official had built his fame and fortune, while helping to lay a foundation for the Spanish Empire in the most far-away and apparently disconnected regions, and simultaneously, relying on family and patronage ties and networks.

In such a patriarchal society, illegitimate children had certainly less opportunities to access resources within their own families and thus they had to look for external sources of favor. The need to become inserted within the imperial networks of patronage, and bonded with the Spanish monarch by serving him and expecting his reward, is clearly illustrated by the life of Pedro Esteban Dávila. Born around 1584, Dávila was the natural son of don Pedro Dávila y Enríquez, marquis of Las Navas, and of Jerónima de Ocampo y Milano, a domestic of the marquis’s mother. Despite being an illegitimate child, he grew up under the permanent protection and guidance of his father. He lived in the paternal home (in the town of Las Navas del Marqués, nearby the famous Phillip II’s monastery of El Escorial) where he was educated and benefitted from the company of men like the famous writer Lope de Vega—a retainer of the marquis who served him as his secretary, and years later wrote the comedy El marqués de las Navas. Nonetheless,

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60 AGI, Indiferente, 759 “Que a don Luis Fernández de Córdoba, en consideración de sus servicios, puede V.M. hacerle la merced que fuere servido” (Madrid, May 5, 1637).
61 AGS, EST, LEG 3636, 61 “Memorial de Luis Fernández de Córdoba y Arce solicitando el puesto de embajador de España en Génova,” 1646.
63 Pérez-Minguez, Un castillo y varios castellanos, 12.
Pedro Esteban Dávila could not inherit his father’s wealth or titles, so he was forced to look for opportunities in the royal service.

Dávila began his services and his personal quest for fame and fortune in the Spanish army in Milan, from where he passed to Flanders. The Twelve Years’ Truce, from 1609 to 1621, was a period of military inactivity, so he returned home to Las Navas. There were few options for him to engage in the royal service, so he remained “arrinconado y sin ninguna recompensa de mis servicios, comiendo y sustentándome de lo que mi padre me daba.”

Dávila could not sustain himself alone. He needed the protection of his father and the king. In 1616 he learned about the large fleet that was being organized to sail to the Philippines under the command of Alonso Fajardo to support and defend that archipelago. The young Esteban Dávila saw in this dangerous journey an opportunity for self-betterment. His father, too, urged him to embark on this enterprise and strengthen his ties with the king, saying “que sus hijos los tenía para servir a Vuestra Majestad en las ocasiones de riesgo.” Before joining the fleet, he asked to be appointed the future governor of the Philippines. He requested the support and intermediation of Juan Ruiz de Contreras, secretary of the Council of the Indies, and who was handling the preparation of the fleet: “pues soy hechura de vuestra merced le suplico

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65 AGI, Filipinas, 37 N.30 “Peticiones de aprobación de nombramientos hechos por Pedro Esteban Dávila,” June 28, 1616; AGI, Filipinas, 37, N. 32 “Petición de Pedro Esteban Dávila sobre su ocupación,” August 23, 1616. This is the same navy that, from New Spain, joined Luis Fernández de Córdoba y Arce. On the arrangements and logistics of this navy, see AGI, Filipinas, 200 “Documentos sobre las armadas de socorro de Ruy González de Sequeira y de Alonso Fajardo de Tenza.”
66 Few men were willing to embark on the fleet and it was necessary that the duke of Medina Sidonia one night and by surprise “echó la red” to, literally, capture sailors in his town of Sanlúcar de Barrameda. AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 83 “Carta de Francisco de Tejada sobre juntar marineros” (Sanlúcar de Barrameda, October 24, 1616).
los esfuerce y me haga esta merced.”  
He failed to receive the nomination, but sailed anyway to the Asian archipelago in May of 1617. He would later affirm that “pasé por todo porque no era tiempo, ni ocasión de rehusar.” He knew his situation was rather precarious, and that he would have to cling to every opportunity to obtain salary and royal favor.

Not long afterward, Dávila was back in Europe. His father, once again, vigorously mediated for him. He wanted to secure the future of his son. First, the marquis requested a salary increase for his son in the army of Flanders, the most reputed of the war theaters and which promised better opportunities. The king responded favorably, granting him an *entretenimiento* (bonus) of 100 escudos a month. Some years later, the marquis, using all the resources and contacts at his disposal, requested again for his son, and once more, found the favor of the monarch, Phillip IV, who wrote to the infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia, sovereign of the Spanish Netherlands. The recently enthroned king claimed, “Vuestra Alteza sabe la calidad desta persona y casa del marqués y lo que merece.” The king, well aware of his obligations and role as bounty giver, personally interceded in favor of the marquis’s petition, “he querido encomendarlo mucho a Vuestra Alteza asegurándole que será para mi esto de particular gusto.” In a clear example of how the networks of imperial patronage worked to obtain reward in a composite monarchy, the absolute monarch was not giving a direct order, but a suggestion to his great-aunt —

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68 AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 56 “Carta de Pedro Esteban Dávila pidiendo la sucesión de Jerónimo de Silva” (Las Navas, September 22, 1616).
69 AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 195 “Carta de Diego de Castro Lisón sobre personas que han quedado en la armada” (Cadiz, May 15, 1617).
70 Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por su Consejo de Estado y Guerra,” fol. 87v.
71 His salary was set in 150 escudos a month that mounted 1636 ducats a year, not an insignificant amount at all. AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 131 “Sueldos de la armada de Filipinas,” 1616.
72 AHN, EST, Leg. 1482, N. 40 “El Marqués de Las Navas por su hijo,” n.d.
which, nonetheless, she accepted. It is interesting to note that not even a ruler like Philip IV could issue a direct order to her. Although, theoretically, she was a subject of the Spanish King, she acted as an independent ruler.\(^75\) The marquis also pressed to get his son admitted into the Order of Santiago. Because of his illegitimate origin, such an honor was difficult to achieve; but it was not impossible. The process of gaining admission started around 1616 and indeed got stuck for several years. It was tough to prove the noble and clean ascendency of don Pedro’s mother. However, in 1621, a short side note—most likely written by the king—appeared that ordered the issue resolved immediately since Esteban Dávila had to sail as soon as possible to govern the Tercera island in the Azores.\(^76\)

The protection and favor of the marquis of Las Navas had succeeded. In the same year don Pedro was allowed into the Order of Santiago and he also was given a preeminent post in a strategic port, where ships from the East and the West Indies converged. When his father died, Pedro Esteban Dávila lost his most important supporter and provider. Thus, in the most pitiful tone, he begged the king for his protection:

\begin{quote}
no tengo otra cosa de que me sustentar, si no de mi sueldo. Cuando mi padre, que dios tiene en el cielo, vivía, suplía esta necesidad. Hoy señor tengo solo a Vuestra Majestad, a quien suplico humildemente se duela de mi, y no permita que pida limosna para comer haciéndome merced de mandar que no me cese el sueldo de castellano de este castillo.\(^77\)
\end{quote}

Although he was resorting to a commonly practiced rhetoric of neediness—by which petitioners of royal favor claimed to be poor and in a miserable condition, and left to the

\(^75\) On the government of Isabella Clara Eugenia and her husband, the Archduke Albert see Luc Duerloo, \textit{Dynasty and Piety: Archduke Albert (1598-1621) and Habsburg Political Culture in an Age of Religious Wars} (Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012).
\(^76\) Pérez-Mínguez, \textit{Un castillo y varios castellanos}, 134–137.
\(^77\) BNE, Mss/801, f. 133v-136v Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por los Consejos de Estado y Guerra” (Tercera, August 20, 1625), fol. 136.
mercy of the magnanimous king—it is also true that he had no other option than relying on royal patronage. The king now was the only father to him. Being an imperial official, and linking his destiny to that of the empire was posited as the only way to survive.

Don Pedro surely knew how to navigate the imperial networks of patronage and gain royal reward and protection, even after his father died. He did not hesitate in reminding the king, as well as other patrons, of his services and of his condition of retainer. In the midst of his confrontation with Manuel Docanto and the local Portuguese elites in Azores, he wrote to don Baltazar de Zúñiga, councilor of State, hoping to obtain some kind of reward, that “como hechura suyo espero en Dios de procurar merecerlas.”\(^78\) Similarly, he wrote to the councilors of War and State affirming to be “hechura de la mano de vuestras señorías.”\(^79\) He also sought support from the marquis of Castel Rodrigo, captain-major of Angra, “como a hechura y criado de vuestra excelencia.”\(^80\) He was conscious that it was indispensable to lobby, and to knock on as many possible doors, in order to be prized and secure his position. Indeed, after his term in the Azores ended abruptly, and not on the best terms, he managed to be appointed governor of Buenos Aires.\(^81\) His alleged military expertise and experience dealing with smugglers made him a fit candidate in the midst of the Dutch offensive in South America and the rise of illegal trade through the Atlantic port.\(^82\)

\(^78\) BNE, Mss/801, f. 3-4 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta escrita a D. Baltazar de Zúñiga” (Lisboa, July 16, 1622). On the government of Pedro Esteban Dávila in the island, and his heated quarrel with the Portuguese local elites see Schaub, *L’île aux mariés*, 127–171.
\(^79\) BNE, Mss/801, f. 39-42 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus Consejos de Estado y Guerra con el alférez Francisco Cerezo despachado por el marqués de Cropani” (Tercera, June 26, 1623), fol. 28v.
\(^81\) His successor in the archipelago was no other than Íñigo Hurtado de Corcuera, see p. 121
\(^82\) The government of Pedro Esteban Dávila in Buenos Aires was not exempt of controversy. He had major confrontations with the bishop of Buenos Aires as well with Andrés León Garavito who travelled with him
Furthermore his immersion in familial networks continued unabated. While serving in the Azores, he had the help and support of Antonio Correa Dávila, a native of those islands, “pariente de la casa de mi padre,” and for whom he requested a royal thanks and recompense. Familial networks of patronage continuously converged with the networks of imperial service and patronage. Although Esteban Dávila, as any other member of the nobility, was very conscious of the importance of his lineage and family—he proudly affirmed, “que no siempre tendrá Vuestra Majestad hijos del Marqués de las Navas que enviar aquí”—he did not have the means to reward his clients directly. The best he could do was to intercede with the king on behalf of them. Almost any reward a person could offer was expressed in relationship to imperial service. Everyone and everything turned upon the imperial axis, and, progressively, the king had become the ultimate provider of favors.

from Europe and was commissioned to take the residencia of the outgoing governor, Francisco de Céspedes. See AGI, Escribanía, 892A “Residencia de Pedro Esteban de Ávila,” 1638; Oscar Trujillo, “La Mano Poderosa: los gobernadores de Buenos Aires y los juicios de residencia. (mediados del siglo XVII)” (presented at the X Jornadas Interescuelas/Departamentos de Historia, Escuela de Historia de la Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional del Rosario. Departamento de Historia de la Facultad de Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Rosario, 2005): http://www.aacademica.org/000-006/518. Nonetheless, it seems that he came out unscathed from all the accusations. In 1642, he was living in the island of Santa Catalina in the Caribbean. BNE, Mss/2374, f. 637-639v. “Relación del suceso que tuvo Francisco Díaz Pimienta, general de la Real Armada de las Indias, en la isla de Santa Catalina” (Madrid, 1642), fol. 639. Apparently, his relative Luis Enríquez de Guzmán, conde de Alba y Aliste, who at the time was viceroy of Peru appointed him as governor of Laicacota. He would have died in 1657. Molina, “Dávila, Pedro Esteban.”

BNE, Mss/801, f. 77v-79 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Consejo de Guerra sobre la consignación” (Tercera, November 10, 1623).

Esteban Dávila, “Carta escrita al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus Consejos de Guerra e Indias con Fernando de Sosa, general de la flota de Nueva España,” fol. 13.

Antonio Feros argues that during this time the king’s power reached its peak. The monarchy achieved this not by eliminating the many private networks of patronage, but instead, by relying on them, and by centralizing on the crown the capacity to reward. Thus, noblemen became dependent on royal favor. "Clientelismo Y Poder Monárquico,” 36–40. Sharon Kettering conveys a similar argument for the French case, where the king consolidated his power outside Paris by controlling over the nobility’s patronage. Kettering, “The Decline of Great Noble Clientage during the Reign of Louis XIV.”
Patronage Networks in a Global Empire

As we have seen, networks of patronage were not constrained by geography. The marquis of Villagarcía’s large network of clients provided him resources, information, and even contacts that the proposed president of Las Charcas alone could not obtain. In fact, at the time of his appointment he had few American connections and little knowledge about America or the post in which he had been selected to serve. His chaplain, don Pedro de Navia, bluntly affirmed that “aquí no hay persona alguna que haya estado en las Indias para poder informarme,” and that he was “sin ninguna noticia [...] como le sucedió al señor marqués cuando se le propuso.” Proof of his ignorance was that Navia, at first, believed that his friend doctor Peña, who was serving as bishop of Quito, would be very pleased to have the marquis so close. Of course, Quito and La Plata were more than two thousand miles apart. He did not know much about America, other than the circulating generalities, clichés, and especially, gossip. Mobility of people came along with a circulation of knowledge. He said, “me aseguró persona suya” that don Francisco de Nestares Marín, the current president of Las Charcas, and whom Villagarcía was to replace, had already sent to his relatives in Spain over 500,000 pesos, something which the marquis could never do because Nestares “es muy mañoso y vuestra señoría apenas lo será para adquirir tanto.” Navia was accusing the current president of being cunning, a surprising judgment of someone who historians have portrayed as a champion of the fight against corruption. Nestares Marín had been sent to Potosí with the

86 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 44. “Carta de don Pedro de Navia a la marquesa de Villagarcia.” On the ideas of distance see Chapter One. The Galician Alonso de la Peña y Montenegro was bishop of Quito since 1653 to his death in 1687. He is most famous for writing a manual for doctrineros, the priests in charge of the evangelization of the native Americans. Alonso de la Peña Montenegro, Itinerario para párrocos de indios, ed. C. Baciero (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1995).
87 The circulation of experiences and knowledge is studied in more depth in Chapters Three and Four.
88 “Carta del inquisidor don Pedro de Navia, arcediano de Mendo y canónigo de Santiago.”
explicit mission of investigating a massive swindle by which millions of coins containing much less of the required silver were minted.\textsuperscript{89}

Therefore, in order to overcome his ignorance and lack of direct personal connections, don Mauro wrote to some of his clients who could serve as brokers, and contacted others who could offer what he needed. Sharon Kettering contends that brokers were essential intermediaries in the patronage system by enabling patrons to reach out to other clients and resources. Nonetheless, a broker was not a mere go-between, but supplemented the exchange with his own resources. Brokers themselves had clients of their own, and, suggests Kettering, it was that preexistent network which secured them patronage and qualified them as brokers. Brokers were not “created” by their patrons, although they could have been raised and protected by them.\textsuperscript{90} While Kettering studied the French case, much of her conclusions serve to illustrate Spanish patronage, despite the latter being much larger, complex, and sophisticated. Thanks to a clever use of Spanish and native brokers, Spanish officials accessed information and resources from all over the world that otherwise were inaccessible to them, facilitating their mobility and the rule of the empire.

The captain don Mauro de Pardiñas Villar de Francos—who was based in Cadiz and conducted some of Villagarcía’s business, like the trade of indigo—soon became the marquis’s intermediary and his door into American networks.\textsuperscript{91} Although the

\textsuperscript{89} Eduardo Dargent Chamot, “La ‘ceca’ de Potosí y la circulación de monedas de plata falsificadas en el virreinato peruano (siglos XVI-XVII),” Diálogo Andino - Revista de Historia, Geografía y Cultura Andina no. 38 (December 2011): 75–84; Kris Lane, “Corrupción y dominación colonial: el gran fraude a la Casa de la Moneda de Potosí en 1649,” Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana “Dr. Emilio Ravignani” no. 43 (2015): 94–130.

\textsuperscript{90} Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients, 42–44.

\textsuperscript{91} Some years later the son of this captain, Juan Isidro Pardiñas, crossed the Atlantic, accompanied by his retainer Alonso Barragán, to serve as governor of Nueva Vizcaya. AGI, Contratacion, 5446, N. 19 “Licencia a Juan Isidro de Pardiñas” (Cadiz, April 17, 1684).
communication between Villagarcía and don Mauro had been scant over the previous months, Villagarcía reactivated it by reaching out to his client. Pardiñas replied promptly and was eager to serve. After reaffirming his bonds to the marquis and his family, and justifying his past silence because “no debemos los criados introducirnos con los dueños sin causa legítima,” he congratulated the marquis for his appointment and offered his valuable services.

Evidently, his location in an Atlantic port city gave this client and broker a privileged position, and he tried to make the most of such a situation. First of all, he invited the marquis to stay at his house in Cadiz before his departure. More importantly, he soon began to collect information about Charcas, the best travel routes to the city, and the inner workings of the royal institutions. The next day he wrote again, now with practical information. Pardiñas asserted that the best way to get to Charcas was via Buenos Aires, and not by the official path that went with the fleet through Panama. Moreover, he proposed a way of traveling that would not cost Villagarcía anything. He assured him, that if requested properly, the marquis could obtain royal permission to sail to Buenos Aires in a bajel de visita, a single ship that would cross the Atlantic alone. Pardiñas guaranteed the marquis that if he got the permission, he could contact people who would prepare the ship and provide the crew at no cost, “esto se entiende dejándole embarcar en la nave sus haciendas.” In effect, Pardiñas was proposing to partake in, or at least to facilitate, smuggling merchandise into America. The offer suggests how easily a new imperial official—supposed to defend the king’s interest, which included, especially

92 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 19 “Enhorabuena del capitán don Mauro de Pardiñas Villar de Francos” (Cadiz, October 28, 1657).
93 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 20 “El capitán don Mauro de Pardiñas Villar de Francos propone el medio que puede haber para hacer el viaje a Las Charcas” (Cadiz, October 29, 1657).
94 On the travel routes and logistics see Chapter One.
in that region, preventing illicit trade—could insert himself into the contraband networks operating in the Atlantic. This case exposes the occasional contradictions between the imperial and private networks, and how sometimes officials used their own resources in order to better rule and enhance imperial power, while in other occasions those same networks could weaken royal authority. In other words, imperial mobility and rulership were impossible without officials reliance on their retinues, which at the same time opened the door to the possibility of illegal practices.

Captain Pardiñas also wrote a client of his own, don Francisco de Soto Guzmán.95 Soto Guzmán had resided for a time in Charcas but was back in the Peninsula; as a result, he had a first-hand knowledge of the region that Villagarcía was supposed to govern. At the request of Pardiñas, Soto Guzmán wrote a document containing detailed information on the travel routes, time, and costs, and confirmed that the most comfortable, shortest, and cheapest route was through Buenos Aires. Soto Guzmán also gave advice on the procedure that the marquis should follow to obtain the license to sail directly to that port.96 The information provided by Soto Guzmán is truly impressive. Not only did he know the days and leagues that had to be travelled, but he also identified people serving at various posts who should be contacted. In this way, Soto Guzmán and Pardiñas were smoothing and guiding the formation of the marquis’ networks in the New World, even before he set foot on the continent.

Moreover, Soto Guzmán provided examples of officials who in the past had received permission to sail directly to Buenos Aires, such as don Juan de Palacios, who

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95 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 38 “Carta de don Francisco de Soto Guzmán al capitán Mauro de Pardiñas” (Posada, November 3, 1657).
went as Inspector of the Audience of La Plata and sailed from Lisbon around the year 1638, and don Pedro de Baigorri, who at that time was the governor of Buenos Aires and had departed from Cadiz in 1652. Displaying his knowledge of many American actors and their interests, Soto Guzmán also recommended getting in touch with the court agent of don Francisco de Nestares Marín, the outgoing president of La Plata, because that official was also seeking a permission to travel directly from Buenos Aires to Spain. Soto Guzmán was not sure who this agent was (he believed that it was Nestares’s nephew, don Jacinto de Nestares Marín, canon in Palencia), thus he suggested asking the secretary of the Council of the Indies, don Juan Bautista Sáez Navarrete, for the name of the agent.

Unsurprisingly, some days after writing this document, which Pardiñas forwarded to the marquis, Soto Guzmán wrote to Villagarcía and offered his services. He begged “me admite por muy siervo suyo y que como a tal me mande cuanto gustare.” The network of patronage and the list of clients of don Mauro de Mendoza Caamaño y Sotomayor continued to grow. Such is an explicit example of how new patronage relationships were formed. José Martínez Millán argues that patronage usually was not established by a written document, or in an explicit or formal manner. Rather, it typically followed the request of a favor from a potential client to a potential patron. In this case, Soto Guzmán asked to be accepted as a client after he had served the marquis and before having received any reward, just with the hope and promise of future bounty. He had

97 Soto Guzmán also gave the marquis a short economic and political treatise in which he expounded the many reasons for allowing two ships a year to arrive into the port of Buenos Aires. According to him, this was the only solution to ensure the proper supply of the region, as well as to provide the neighbors of that region the possibility of selling abroad their goods. “Apuntamientos de las razones que se deben representar para que se despachen por lo menos dos navíos de registro.”

98 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 40 “Papel de don Francisco de Soto y Guzmán sobre lo que se debe representar para pedir navío de registro para ir a la presidencia de Los Charcas por Buenos Aires” (Cádiz, November 11, 1657).

many interests in America, and certainly having the President of Las Charcas as a patron would be of great advantage.\textsuperscript{100} The culture of patronage gave meaning and articulated the Spanish Monarchy. Two persons with different origins, goals, and even locations interacted and engaged by means of the language and mutually beneficial practices of patronage, and in the long run made feasible the global empire.

Nonetheless, the marquis of Villagarcía did not rely only on Pardiñas and Soto Guzmán. His position and large network gave him access to more people, resources, and information on the far-away region. Don Gómez Dávila, the designated future corregidor of Potosí, wrote the marquis as soon as he found out about don Mauro’s nomination. Dávila rushed to present himself, to offer his services and obedience, and to establish a relationship with his soon-to-be superior.\textsuperscript{101} Likewise, don Felipe Obregón y Cereceda was a vecino and city councilor of Potosí who at the time was also in Madrid to represent that city and its guild of azogueros, mercury miners.\textsuperscript{102} The azogueros were a powerful and rich collective, who, through the use of azogue (mercury), refined the silver extracted from the mine and produced silver bars. Although we do not know for sure how these two men met, we can plausibly assume that news of Villagarcía’s appointment was circulating in the court and that Obregón was eager to contact the new president and bring him into his network, or at least, not to antagonize him. Because the Crown controlled the production and transportation of the mercury, and one of the most important duties of the president of the Audience of Charcas was to distribute this

\textsuperscript{100} Soto Guzmán was, indeed, invested on the transatlantic trade. In 1662 he was prosecuted for financing an illegal shipment into Buenos Aires. He was accused of being a front man for English and Dutch merchants who smuggled goods into the South American port AGI, Escribania, 1029B “El fiscal con Francisco de Soto y Guzmán,” 1662.
\textsuperscript{101} AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 7 “Enhorabuena de don Gómez Dávila, corregidor nombrado de la Villa Imperial de Potosí” (Sevilla, October 16, 1657).
\textsuperscript{102} AGI, Charcas, 416, L.5, f. 154v - 155 “Carta del secretario del consejo al presidente y jueces oficiales de la Casa de Contratación de Sevilla” (Madrid, April 24, 1657).
mineral, the miners and the president of Charcas had a close but tense relationship.\textsuperscript{103} Obregón also gave detailed information on the length, difficulty, and costs of the two possible routes (either through Panama or Buenos Aires) to the province of Charcas.\textsuperscript{104} Additionally, he wrote a letter with extended information on the mining center of Potosí, its history, population, weather, the available veins to work, its royal offices, and even its bakeries.\textsuperscript{105}

In his report to the marquis of Villagarcía, Felipe de Obregón also outlined the duties of the president of the Audience, noting that he would have to live seven months in the city of La Plata (where the Audience resided), and five more in Potosí in order to oversee the distribution of mercury, the collection of the king’s money, and the dispatch of the silver to Lima. He hinted that in such a post Villagarcía could make up to 150,000 pesos—a truly large sum, to be gained not on salary, evidently, but “en las cosas que a Vuestra Señoría tengo referido por menor.”\textsuperscript{106} All this on top of “las comodidades que en aquél reino puede tener el sr. don Antonio,” the son of the marquis.\textsuperscript{107} Although what Obregón was referring to exactly remains cloudy, it is safe to presume that he was engaged in shady activities. Once again, the new president, who had not even departed from Spain, was being exposed to, and invited to take part in, private businesses and join

\textsuperscript{103} The miners received a fixed amount of mercury based on the expected amount of silver that it was going to be refined. Héctor Noejovich has found that the consumption of mercury does not match the silver produced—especially around these years—, and it all indicates that there was a major fraud to the Crown finances, in which were involved the miners, as well as the imperial authorities in charge of handling the mercury. Héctor Omar Noejovich, “El consumo de azogue: ¿indicador de la corrupción del sistema colonial en el virreinato del Perú? (siglos XVI-XVII),” \textit{Fronteras de la Historia} 7 (2002): 77–98.
\textsuperscript{104} AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 31 “Papel que me dio el sr. don Felipe Obregón, vecino de Potosí, del viaje a Charcas,” 1657.
\textsuperscript{105} AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 34 “Noticias de la Villa Imperial de Potosí, su cerro, minas y todo lo concerniente a ellas y a su riqueza,” 1657.
\textsuperscript{106} The salary of the president of Las Charcas was set in 5,000 pesos, \textit{Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias}, vol. 1 (Madrid: Boix, 1841), 167.
\textsuperscript{107} AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 32 “Noticias sobre la provincia de Los Charcas, autoridad y jurisdicción del presidente,” 1657.
existing local networks. Obregón was keen to ally with the person responsible of overseeing the mining production, and who could facilitate several of his illegal practices.

In another letter to the marquis of Villagarcía, the captain Mauro de Pardiñas remarked that if the right buttons were pushed, there should not be a problem gaining permission to sail to Buenos Aires. He argued that the processing could be expedited if the marquis were to be commissioned also to conduct a residencia to the outgoing governor of Buenos Aires, don Pedro Baigorri. The captain affirmed that the excesses of Baigorri were well-known and that the secretary of the Council of the Indies, don Juan Bautista Sáez Navarrete, sought to punish the governor. According to this informant, Sáez Navarrete would be especially interested in helping out with this case because Baigorri had previously conducted a harsh residencia against his predecessor, who happened to be “hechura del señor secretario.” Nonetheless, all this had to be done as smoothly and swiftly as possible, as the secretary was a “ministro en quien se debe presumir no caben venganzas.” Furthermore, the secretary was also “deudo de la persona que actualmente está sirviendo la presidencia de Las Charcas” (don Francisco de Nestares), and thus, Sáez Navarrete wanted to satisfy Nestares’s desire of returning as soon as possible to Spain. Pardiñas also suggested that it would be greatly beneficial to get in touch with the President’s agent in Madrid, whom Pardiñas had already identified and knew his whereabouts.108

The culture of patronage influenced all the activities of the monarchy and its officials. Favoring or punishing someone was never an “objective” or “clean” decision; rather, it was determined by a complex calculus involving multiple parties in the imperial

108 AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 27 “El capitán don Mauro de Pardiñas dice las conveniencias que hay para que solicite navío para ir por Buenos Aires” (Cadiz, November 26, 1657).
networks of patronage, in which the activities of one person in one side of the empire had effects over the other end of the Monarchy. This was especially evident for someone like the secretary Sáez Navarrete who, because of his high position, stood at the epicenter of the imperial networks and maintained contact with patrons and clients throughout the empire.

In that same letter, Pardiñas also advised Villagarcía paying attention to what the Jesuit priests were doing. He told him that in the following days about 60 priests were to depart on a direct ship to Buenos Aires. The license for this vessel had been granted thanks to the deeds of father Julián de Pedraza, who was “noticioso y mañoso como teatino,” and who was always looking for an opportunity to get special permission to open traffic to those provinces in order to send people and goods.\(^{109}\) The networks of the religious orders were large and had great influence. As a result, a person like the marquis of Villagarcía could greatly benefit from them. Martín de Lezava, the Provincial of the Jesuits in Castile, was a client of the marquis and one of his chaplains. In his congratulatory letter, he offered to write to the Superior of the Jesuits in Charcas and to the rectors of the various Jesuits schools in the region telling them of the “grandes obligaciones que deberán de servir a Vuestra Señoría.”\(^{110}\)

These examples show how imperial networks, both secular and religious, could intertwine. Circulating around the empire were innumerable actors and networks, each constantly pressing for the greatest possible advantage. Network deals (at least preliminary ones) could be made thousands of miles from the place where they would eventually be enforced, and were not necessarily contingent on local realities. In the case

\(^{109}\) Ibid.
\(^{110}\) AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 24 “Enhorabuena del Padre Provincial de la Compañía de Jesús de la provincia de Castilla” (Santiago, November 3, 1657).
of the marquis of Villagarcía, many of these transactions occurred at the royal court. There were many global networks hinged throughout the Spanish Empire, and especially in Madrid, as the royal court was a major political, social, cultural, and economic hub. In that city, various networks, individuals, agents, friends, and enemies from all across the empire came together to exchange knowledge, goods, and services, thereby shaping the development of the global empire, and determining the fortunes of local actors who were thousands of miles away from Spain, but who kept an eye and ear on what was happening at the court.

Nonetheless, because of the large scope of the networks and of the many centers that actively made up the empire, these interactions occurred not just in the imperial capital but in many other unexpected regions as well. In fact, even the Phillipines, which took several months to reach from Madrid, was perfectly integrated and connected to the whole of the empire. Let us examine, for instance, the case of the captain don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera who in 1644, after his term as governor of the Philippines, became the subject of an unusually harsh residencia (judicial review).

Almost immediately after his successor, don Diego de Fajardo, arrived in Manila, the investigations began. Hurtado de Corcuera had received special permission for leaving the archipelago without having to be present during his residencia, as long as he provided the due bond in deposit. Don Sebastián thus presented three guarantors, “los más ricos de

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111 On the decentered nature of the Spanish Empire see Cardim et al., Polycentric Monarchies; Christine Daniels and Michael V Kennedy, eds., Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820 (New York: Routledge, 2002).
112 The complete residencia is in AGI, ESCRIBANIA, 409A, 409B, 409C, and 409D. However, because of their bad condition it has been impossible to consult all of the legajos. Nonetheless, the extraordinary duration and complexity of this process has left an important trail of other sources (mostly letters) that I have been able to study.
Evidently, there were many linkages and connections between the Asian archipelago and New Spain, and it should not come as a surprise that the governor of the Philippines relied on three of the richest men of Mexico to pay his bond. Although I have not been able to identify these men, we can assume they were merchants involved in the lucrative Asian trade who had profited from their partnership with Hurtado de Corcuera.

Fajardo claimed that the security money could not be deposited in New Spain, and if Hurtado de Corcuera wanted to leave the archipelago he would have to deposit the money in the Philippines. Moreover, only four days after he initiated the residencia, the new governor contended that the accusations were extremely serious (especially the loss of the island of Formosa to the Dutch) that he could not allow don Sebastián to leave the island, and that he had to be put in jail. Also, the amount of the alleged money owed to the Royal Treasury by Hurtado de Corcuera and his retainers kept growing until it reached an exorbitant sum. What the former governor believed was going to be a relatively easy process turned into a severe prosecution. Despite his bitter and constant complaints, Hurtado de Corcuera was to remain in prison several years until the Council of the Indies revised the case and he and his retainers were finally allowed to return to Spain, where he continued to serve the king in various prestigious posts.

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113 AGI, Filipinas, 22, R. 1, N. 1, f. 135-135v. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera to Philip IV, “Pide que se le deje embarcar,” August 24, 1644, fol. 135.
114 AGI, Filipinas, 22, R. 1, N. 1, f. 130-132 Diego de Fajardo, “Sobre residencia de Corcuera,” December 5, 1644, fol. 130. Hermosa was the Spanish name of current-day Taiwan.
115 Sebastián Caballero de Medina, the fiscal prosecutor commissioned to investigate the government of Hurtado de Corcuera, claimed that the fines for all the list of charges of the governor and his network added up to 4,816,991 pesos. AGI, Filipinas, 22, R. 1, N. 1, f. 207 “Testimonio de la residencia de Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera” (Manila, December 5, 1644).
116 It was only in 1647 when the Council approved that Hurtado de Corcuera could return to Spain. AGI, Filipinas, 22, R. 1, N. 1, f. 144-145 Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera to Philip IV, “Dando cuenta de su prisión y de los malos tratos que recibe,” July 25, 1645; AGI, Filipinas, 341, L. 6, f. 35v-36 “Licencias para venir a España con Corcuera” (Madrid, March 3, 1647). For a comparative study of the activities of Hurtado de Corcuera back in Spain with those in the Philippines see Chapter Four.
1658 the *residencia* was still open and subject to debate in the Council.\(^{117}\) The unusual length of this trial clearly speaks to the intricacy of the process, as well as to the spite from Fajardo and many others against Hurtado de Corcuera.

This *residencia*, no doubt, shook the social and political structures of power in the Philippines. Scholars have rightfully seen in this process a response of the local elites to Hurtado de Corcuera (unanimously portrayed as a stubborn and overly proud governor) and a change in the power balance. According to William J. McCarthy, the bitter and long trial exposes the polemical and corrupt nature of Hurtado de Corcuera’s government (and basically of almost any Philippine governor) that produced a long list of enemies for the governor.\(^{118}\) Likewise, Antoni Picazo Muntaner argues that Hurtado de Corcuera built a powerful and dense network in the Philippines, which allowed him to rule and profit financially. However, those same networks also generated several antagonisms. The many opponents of the governor (mainly the city council and the bishop of Manila) had weaved their own competing patronage networks. The arrival of Diego Fajardo left Hurtado de Corcuera powerless. Picazo Muntaner contends that the governor’s foes saw with the trial an opportunity to turn things around, which they quickly seized. Things changed so dramatically that the network built around don Sebastián completely disappeared after his incarceration.\(^{119}\)

In fact, Hurtado de Corcuera himself was conscious of the enemies he had made as governor of the Philippines. He knew that many saw him as a bad governor and had

\(^{117}\) AGI, Filipinas, 2, N. 172 “Consulta sobre residencia de Hurtado de Corcuera” (Madrid, August 26, 1658).


transmitted their complaints to the court and the royal councilors. He accused the Manila city council of being behind the charges—libels, according to him—and of preventing him from receiving a fair trial. He claimed that the animosity against him was consequence not of bad government, but instead of good government and attempts at government reform. He claimed that in defending the Crown’s interests, he had made enemies with a class of self-serving officials who did not have the best interests of the Monarchy in mind. His enemies wanted to get him out of their way so they could undo his accomplishments, because they “querrán otro gobernador que será bueno para ellos, será malo para el servicio de Vuestra Majestad.”

That Hurtado de Corcuera had many antagonists during his tenure should not come as a surprise. These sorts of disputes were common in the early modern Spanish world. It was not unusual for the local elites to face off with imperial authorities, and that Spanish officials and administrators fought amongst themselves. What is rather peculiar is the ease and promptness by which Diego de Fajardo allied with the former governor’s enemies. He could have easily acted in a very different way, just like most of the officials throughout the empire, who conducted residencias and did not find any

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120 AGI, Filipinas, 22, R. 1, N. 1, f. 137-138v. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera to Philip IV, “En respuesta a una cédula en que se le ordena espere para retirarse a su sucesor,” July 26, 1643, fol. 137v.
121 AGI, Filipinas, 22, R. 1, N. 1, f. 140 Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera to Philip IV, “Da las gracias por la llegada de Diego Fajardo,” August 22, 1644.
illegality in their predecessors’ activities. Indeed, that was what usually occurred, and these trials were often just a formality. The newcomers rapidly adapted to the new society and kept the networks and power relationships mostly intact.

It could be surmised that the character of Hurtado de Corcuera or the blatant evidence of his misdoings forced the new governor to act against his predecessor without any hint of indulgency. However, after a lengthy process and many appeals, most of the accusations against Hurtado de Corcuera were discharged. In fact, his tenure does not appear any more corrupt or problematic than that of many other government officials throughout the empire. Ultimately, the Council of the Indies decided that he, as well as his clients and family, had been treated with unusual and excessive harshness, and therefore, nullified the residencia.

Perhaps the explanation for Fajardo’s behavior can be found thousands of miles away, in the Azores. Around 1628, don Diego de Fajardo was appointed governor of the strategic fortress in the island of Tercera, in the Azores. On that occasion he replaced no other than Íñigo Hurtado de Corcuera, brother of don Sebastián. Therefore, when Fajardo went to the Philippines, he clearly knew whom he was going to replace. This was, at the least, the second time in which he had crossed paths with a Hurtado de Corcuera. We can safely presume that when Fajardo arrived in the Philippines, he was not neutral about his predecessor. He had already forged an image of the governor,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{124}}\text{AHN, Consejos, L. 720 “Libros de residencias de corregidores consultados con Su Magestad,” n.d. This book lists the corregidores that served in Castile and the result of their residencias. Almost of all of them were declared exempt of charges and could serve in similar posts, even in cases in which there were flagrant mistakes or misbehaviors. Although for the American case I have not found a source like this, summarizing all the residencias, there are no reasons to believe that it was any different.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{125}}\text{AGI, Filipinas, 2, N. 172 “Relación del último estado que tiene la residencia de Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera” (Madrid, June 4, 1658); McCarthy W.J, “Cashiering the Last Conquistador,” 58.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{126}}\text{Schaub, L’île aux mariés, 156; AGI, Filipinas, 2, N. 33 “Consulta sobre ida de Diego Fajardo a Filipinas” (Madrid, April 10, 1641); AGS, GYM, LIB 142, f. 83v - 85v. “Nombramiento de Íñigo Hurtado de Corcuera como gobernador de Tercera” (Madrid, April 2, 1625).}\]
especially in a moment in which people defined themselves primarily in terms of family and kin. So, if Fajardo had some kind of aversion to Íñigo Hurtado de Corcuera, this could have reflected negatively on his brother. Fajardo might have been predisposed to ally with Hurtado de Corcuera’s enemies.

In fact, this was Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera’s reasoning. Since the beginning of the episode, he had claimed that the origin of the persecution and bad treatments against him were the old quarrels that Fajardo had carried on with his brother, which had given him “más bríos y peor voluntad para conmigo.” And years later, when don Sebastián was back in Spain and appealed the residencia to the Council of the Indies, he presented as his first argument to nullify the trial that “Diego Fajardo era su enemigo capital con dependencias antiguas, desde don Íñigo de Corcuera y el dicho don Diego, sobre que hubo grandes pleitos.” Furthermore, according to Hurtado de Corcuera, his successor never hid such enmity, and “manifestó don Diego Fajardo esta enemistad con palabras en el viaje que hizo a Manila.”

While difficult to prove these personal connections and motivations, which have distant origins in both time and location, they should nonetheless not be underestimated. History is often decided by small details, imperceptible to later historians. Personal likes and dislikes, no doubt, lay behind many historical events, even if they are hard to prove. Historians seldom can find sources that directly speak to the internal motivations, predilections, fears, or aversions of their historical subjects; we usually only get to see their effects. It is difficult to fully explain the reasons behind Fajardo’s evident aversion

128 AGI, Filipinas, 2, N. 172 “Sumario de las nulidades o agravios que Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera presentó en contra de la residencia que se le hizo” (Laredo, n.d.), fol. 13. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find any records on the conflict between Fajardo and Íñigo Hurtado de Corcuera.
towards Hurtado de Corcuera, but it is also clear that Fajardo did not act in the dark. He was well aware of who he was going to find in the Philippines. These mobile officials, even if located in South East Asia or the middle Atlantic, were well connected with the rest of the empire. Although they were constantly moving from one post to the other and crossing oceans and continents, their patronage networks kept them in contact with people all over the empire, and allowed them to lobby for their causes, and to make allies and enemies, even before reaching their destinations. The way in which the newcomers inserted themselves into local societies was not only determined by local conditions, but also by the royal officials’ imperial networks, and they operated in many different centers.

Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, a patriarch and patron on his own right, also relied heavily on these networks of global range. While serving in the Philippines and other parts of the empire, he maintained contacts with members of his family, his patrons, and his retainers. They were his informants, brokers, and lobbyists. Some of them were part of his entourage and moved with him. For instance, when Hurtado de Corcuera was still serving in Panama and had been appointed governor of the Philippines, his brother Íñigo, who was stationed in Madrid, requested on his behalf that more men were sent to the Asian islands. Moreover, during the residencia Íñigo represented Sebastián in the court and actively tried to get him out of jail. From Berguenda, the family’s hometown

129 AGI, Filipinas, 40, N. 51 “Petición de Íñigo Hurtado de Corcuera de más gente para su hermano” (Madrid, June 2, 1634).
130 AGI, Filipinas, 2, N. 172 “Relación del último estado que tiene la residencia de Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera.” It seems that the Hurtado de Corcuera brothers had a close relationship and were always looking after each other. They worked to preserve and augment not only their personal social and economic conditions, but those of their family. This was particularly evident because none of them had any children, so their nephews and nieces became their heirs. Íñigo and Sebastián served together in Flanders in the 1610’s, and when their oldest brother, Pedro, died serving in La Mamora, a presidio in North Africa, Íñigo returned to Spain to take care of his estate and family, leaving Sebastián in charge of his company of
in the Basque Country, a nephew wrote letters asking the king to properly reward don Sebastián, and to give him license to end his government in the Philippines and to return to Spain, and also complained about don Jerónimo de Bañuelos y Carrillo, who in Mexico had published a book in which he criticized don Sebastián’s government.¹³¹ Several years later don Pedro Hurtado de Corcuera, in his will, left several jewels to his uncle Sebastián, who was the head of the family and holder of its state.¹³² Likewise, don Sebastián was a client of his uncle, don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, count of Corzana.¹³³ He was a close and direct relative, but belonged to a more prestigious branch of the family. On several occasions he stood up for don Sebastián, providing protection and granting him access to the royal court. In 1638, Corzana wrote to the Council of the Indies to defend his nephew’s government in the Philippines, and to dismiss the many criticisms that Hurtado de Corcuera’s enemies were spreading and had reached the court.¹³⁴ In 1656, when the former governor was back in Spain, the count asked him to

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¹³¹ AGI, Filipinas, 8, R. 3, N. 104 “Memorial de Pedro Hurtado de Corcuera y Mendoza, en nombre de su tío, Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, gobernador de Filipinas, sobre que se le nombre sucesor y se le dé licencia para volver a estos reinos” (Berguenda, April 14, 1639). AGI, Filipinas, 8, R. 3, N. 104 Pedro Hurtado de Corcuera to Juan de Solórzano, May 1, 1639.

¹³² AGS, CME, 609, 35 “Testamento de Pedro Hurtado de Corcuera” (Berguenda, prob 1658).

¹³³ Don Diego was born in 1571 in La Corzana, a town in Alava, close to the Hurtado de Corcuera’s Berguenda. He was the first viscount of Corzana and later the first count of Corzana. He was steward of the queen, corregidor of Toledo in 1621, asistente of Seville in 1628, and in 1623 ambassador in England, France, and Flanders. In his final years he retired to his states where he died in 1671, at the extraordinary age of 100 years old. Antonio Rodríguez Villa, Noticia biográfica y documentos históricos relativos a don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza (Madrid: Estereotipia de Aribau y Cª, Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1873), V–LIX; Antonio Rodríguez Villa, Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza y Sandoval, conde de la Corzana, 1650–1720 (Madrid: Fortanet, 1907), 7–8.

¹³⁴ AGI, Filipinas, 8, R. 3, N. 104 “Memorial del vizconde de la Corzana, en nombre de su sobrino Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera” (Manila, October 14, 1638).
look over the education of Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, his grandchild and the future third count of Corzana, and to administer his estate.\footnote{BNE, Mss/5757, f. 87v - 89 Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera to Count of Peñaranda, “Respuesta sobre la provisión del gobierno de Panamá,” December 22, 1656.}

Don Sebastián’s relatives interceded for him, but he also protected them and incorporated them into the royal service. When in 1659 the captain was in charge of the organization of the defense of the Principality of Asturias, don Sebastián asked permission to appoint as his lieutenant one of his nephews who had been with him the past three years, a petition to which the king agreed.\footnote{AGS, EST, Leg. 1934 “Sobre lo que escribe don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera” (Madrid, January 17, 1659); AGS, EST, Leg. 1934 “Carta a Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera” (León, January 31, 1659).} Likewise, another of don Sebastián’s nephews, don Pedro, accompanied him to the Philippines and became his closest and most trusted assistant.\footnote{Among the various offices don Pedro held, he was the person who authorized the Sangleys to enter and stay in the islands, after paying a fee that he collected, and as a soldier, he took part in the many military campaigns conducted by the governor. AGI, Escribanía, 409 B, f. 653 - 683. “Autos contra Pedro Hurtado de Corcuera por el tiempo que fue juez de licencias de los sangleyes” (Manila, 1645 1644); Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, Memorial de D. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, hablando de sus servicios en el Perú y Filipinas (Córdoba, 1653). Another son of Pedro, named Francisco, asked for permission to go the Philippines to serve under his uncle, but the king denied it. AGI, Filipinas, 5, N. 426 “Petición de Francisco Hurtado de Corcuera de licencia para Filipinas,” May 26, 1634.} The Hurtado de Corcuera’s familial ties remained strong despite the distance and time that separated them. Those locally based bonds quickly adapted to the global and imperial scenario, and this family, rooted in the deep Basque Country, was able to extend its networks in places such as Madrid, North Africa, the middle of the Atlantic, and as far as the Philippines.

**Patronage and Local Rulership**

Despite the significance of the imperial networks of patronage, the trial of Hurtado de Corcuera did expose the various local Philippine actors who aligned in different networks, either as enemies or friends of the polarizing governor. There were
those who opposed the official and testified or presented charges against him, as well against his relatives and clients. Judiciary records also show the many people—royal officials, judges, soldiers, or merchants—who became retainers of the governor.  

Religious institutions, too, were part of the network. The Jesuits greatly profited from their linkage with the governor, and in fact, were among the few allies that stayed by his side during his residencia by helping him to communicate while in jail, and to hide and smuggle jewels.  

Among all Hurtado de Corcuera’s clients, there is one that deserves particular attention: Manuel Chunquian. He was a “Sangley”: a Chinese person living in the Philippines. During the governor’s residencia, Chunquian was accused by other Sangleys of wrongdoing, namely, exploiting other Chinese and making illegal profits, all under the protection of the governor, his patron. There are two lawsuits against Chunquian: the first was an accusation promoted by Bartolomé Huico, a Sangley carpenter; the second contained the charges against Chunquian and Sucsi, another Sangley accused of being a servant of the first one, presented by the Sangley merchants Toyoc, Quiqua, and Gomo.

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138 For a list of the charges against the governor and his retainers see AGI, Filipinas, 22, R. 1, N. 1, f. 146-147v. “Memorial de los autos y otros recaudos que hay en la residencia de don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera,” n.d.; AGI, Filipinas, 22, R. 1, N. 1, f. 488-506v “Testimonio de las causas civiles y criminales que están pendientes contra Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, sus parientes, criados y allegados” (Manila, December 5, 1644); “Testimonio de la residencia de Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera.”  
140 His Chinese name was recorded as Chunquian, and that is how he was usually referred. However, while the residencia was taking place he was baptized and christened as Manuel. He died shortly after, on December 17, 1644. AGI, Escribania, 409 B, f. 795 - 827. “Querella y demanda de Bartolomé Huico, carpintero sangley, contra Manuel Chunquian, sangley, criado de Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera” (Manila, 1644-1645), fol. 823.  
Manuel Chunquian served as a broker between the governor and the large and extremely important Chinese population in the islands. As already mentioned, brokers were important figures in the patronage system, as they provided patrons with resources otherwise inaccessible to them. Chunquian acted as a necessary intermediary for reaching and controlling the Sangleys living in Manila. Hurtado de Corcuera put him in charge of the collection of taxes on Chinese games and festivities. Moreover, it seems that the governor relied on him to organize and move thousands of Sangleys from Manila to Calamba, a town about 100 miles South, where they were forced to work. Evidently, for Hurtado de Corcuera, as well as for any other governor, it would have been impossible to access the Chinese population without intermediaries. Language alone was a major barrier, but above all, Spanish authorities did not have the cultural, social, or political resources to impose their authority on, or to negotiate by themselves with, the Sangleys. The situation with the Sangleys was not an isolated case, but intrinsic to Spanish political culture. Across the world, the Spaniards relied on native intermediaries, whether Andean curacas, the Muslim Q’adis, or Italian noblemen.

During the trial, Chunquian acknowledged that he was a retainer of the governor, and that he only followed orders, having no more authority than that granted by the

142 “Querella de Huico contra Chunquian,” 1644-1645, fol. 796.
143 Ibid., fol. 797. As it will be seen in detail in Chapter Four, this forced movement and labor ignited a massive revolt, which was brutally crashed.
Spanish official. This Sangley, however, who apparently did not even speak Spanish and required an interpreter during his trial, was able to act as a broker not because Hurtado de Corcuera put him in charge, but because of his networks and influence upon the Chinese. It was this previous condition that made the Sangley valuable and that got him the governor’s protection and favor. In the two proceedings, it was claimed that Chunquian was always surrounded by a large entourage of Sangleys who did as ordered. He built a powerful network and was obeyed by the Sangley merchants, who had to pay him a commission. He and his circle, in an exhibition of their growing power, began to use the “don” before their names, so he demanded that the other Chinese called him don Chunquian.

Perhaps the most important attribute of Chunquian, which was sanctioned by Hurtado de Corcuera, was his role as judge of the Sangleys. The three Sangley merchants affirmed that Chunquian was in charge of the administration of justice among the Sangleys. They argued that such a position was outrageous and against all law because Chunquian had not been baptized and was an infidel, and thus could not intervene in the matters of Christians. So, they claimed, he illegally judged the many baptized Sangleys of Manila. The carpenter Bartolomé Huico also acknowledged the legal authority that Chunquian had upon the Sangley community. He accused the governor’s retainer of eliminating any menace to his authority by wrongfully prosecuting the most notable

146 AGI, Escribania, 409 B, f. 814v-819v “Confesión de Chunquian” (Manila, December 6, 1644).
147 “Querella de Huico Contra Chunquian,” fol. 796; “Autos de Sangleyes Mercaderes,” fol. 828.
148 “Querella de Huico Contra Chunquian,” fol. 797.
Sangleys. After seizing them, he ordered either to banish them or to send them to forcefully work in the galleys or in the foundry.\textsuperscript{149}

These examples speak to the complicated nature of power and rule in the Philippines and other areas of the Spanish Empire. While Spaniards held sway over the upper jurisdiction and oversaw the government of all subjects (even the Chinese, who technically were not subjects of the Spanish king), lower levels of jurisdiction also existed, and native communities retained much of their autonomy. The Spanish Empire was in fact built upon the confluence and overlapping of varied and asymmetric systems of justice and government. Spaniards could not (nor did they wish to) impose one unique and absolute law upon everyone.\textsuperscript{150} This was particularly true in the Philippines where the Chinese outnumbered Spaniards, and retained much of their culture, religion and customs, and linkages with China.

The charges against Chunquian also expose the various competing networks that existed within the Chinese community, and which could engage with the Spanish networks. It is very telling that a carpenter who apparently was not rich and did not have any major social or political influence made the principal accusations against Chunquian. It is most likely that he was only serving as an intermediary and following the directives of Hurtado de Corcuera’s adversaries. However, the charges presented by the three

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 797.

\textsuperscript{150} In the American case there was an explicit attempt to separate Indigenous and Spanish societies. While this division was mostly theoretical, as it was impossible to keep the República de Indios and the República de Españoles away from each other, they had indeed different regulations (for instance the Inquisition did not have authority over the Indians), and even distinct juridical institutions, like the General Indian Court studied by Woodrow Borah. On the complex nature of the legal system in America see for instance, Woodrow Borah, Justice by Insurance: The General Indian Court of Colonial Mexico and the Legal Aides of the Half-Real (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Charles R. Cutter, The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain, 1700-1810 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995); Brian Philip Owensby, Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2008).
merchants seem to be motivated by their own disagreements and disputes with Chunquian and his retainers. In fact, most of the accusations are directed not at Chunquian, but to one of his alleged servants, a Sangle named Sucsi, who emphatically rebuffed all the accusations. He denied he was Chunquian’s servant or relative, or even that he had known him prior to their arrival in the Philippines. He contended that he was from the Chinese region of Santuo, while Chunquian was from Cheboy, and they had lived far away from each other.

Sucsi acknowledged that he knew the plaintiffs well. They were his “enemigos capitales,” ever since the previous year, when those merchants had a discussion and a fight with one of his nephews. Moreover, he affirmed that the merchants, along with the other witnesses, were anayas while Sucsi was a chincheco, two very different Chinese ethnic groups. The tensions between these two factions dated from long ago, and most likely had their origin in China, as the Spanish governor of the Sangleys, the sergeant Andrés de Cueto, confirmed. Quite interestingly, in his defense Sucsi provided the testimony not only of many Sangleys, but also of several Spanish officials who assured they knew him, and who expounded on the “bad nature” of the anayas. The captain Juan de la Barrera confirmed that he had never heard that Sucsi and Chunquian were relatives, but he could attest to the vindictive and arrogant character of the anayas. This captain spoke from his experience as he had served as lieutenant of the company that guarded the Parián (the Chinese borough). Through these transactions, Spanish and Sangleys coexisted and interacted, although sometimes these relationships could break down and end up in violent scenarios. Hurtado de Corcuera’s behavior vividly illustrates these

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151 “Autos de Sangleyes Mercaderes,” fol. 852.
152 Ibid., fol. 854.
153 Ibid., fol. 870.
tensions. While he could lead a vicious and brutal repression against the revolted Sangley, and annihilate almost its entire population, he could also protect and take a Sangley as one of his closest allies and servants.\textsuperscript{154}

That a governor of the Philippines relied on a Sangley for ruling should not come as a surprise. It was part of the prevailing political culture in which the impossibility of governing without retainers was acknowledged. Imperial officials became patrons of a wide array of actors, including of course, several native leaders who acted as brokers between Spanish authorities and local societies. Yanna Yannakakis has studied the key role of native intermediaries in Oaxaca, Mexico. For instance, Felipe de Santiago and Joseph de Celis were two late seventeenth-century Indigenous leaders defined as \textit{ladinos}; they were bicultural, skilled in Spanish language and customs, and often dressed in Spanish clothing. They served to connect the Spanish and the native worlds and helped, on the one hand, to preserve indigenous autonomy, and on the other, to secure Spanish rule and diminish possible outbursts by native populations. These native leaders were caught in between the pressure from the local Spanish governor and priests, the most concrete manifestations of the imperial authority, and pressure from the Indigenous community, who demanded greater autonomy and wished to be relieved of the heavy tax burdens and exploitations.\textsuperscript{155} Similarly, Steve Stern, in his classic study on colonial Peru, defined the position of such indigenous leaders as a “tragedy of success,” in which they were capable of negotiating better native terms while simultaneously supporting colonial rule. They were, in many regards, the enforcers of colonial rule at the local level.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{154} An extended study of the Sangley rebellion and Hurtado de Corcuera’s repression is on Chapter Four.
\textsuperscript{155} Yannakakis, \textit{The Art of Being in-Between}, chap. 1.
\textsuperscript{156} Stern, \textit{Peru’s Indian Peoples}, chap. 7.
Imperial official’s dependency on native brokers was so acute that in 1657 the governor of Tucumán (in present-day Argentina), Alonso Mercado y Villacorta, was persuaded into officially recognizing the Spaniard Pedro Bohorques as an Inca ruler. The fascinating story of Bohorques—usually described by contemporaries and scholars alike, as a trickster, swindler, or a conman—is well known.\textsuperscript{157} Despite being a “native of Granada, and that he has resided for thirty years in these kingdoms, of the age of fifty, white and blond,” he managed to insert himself among the indigenous societies of the Calchaquí valley.\textsuperscript{158} In less than three years he had manipulated and convinced of his high-sounding plans the natives, the missionary priests, the principal citizens of the province, and the governor of Tucumán. He made great promises to all of his interlocutors, and they all believed him. He knew what people desired and wanted to listen. Bohorques promised the American natives freedom and a return to the yearned pre-Spanish status quo; while simultaneously, he offered Spaniards an alternative path to convince and rule people who for a long time had been reluctant to any Spanish contact, as well as obtaining from them information on how to get to the Paititi, the mythical land of gold. Evidently, these were opposed promises, but it seems that Spaniards and Calchaquies believed and trusted him to some degree.


\textsuperscript{158} Quoted in Lorandi, \textit{Spanish King of the Incas}, 227.
Bohorques was able to make these promises because of his cosmopolitanism and profound knowledge of both worlds. He moved from Spain to America in 1620, and somehow convinced two viceroys to each authorize him to organize expeditions into the jungle in search of the Paititi. Both expeditions ended up badly, especially the last one, after which the viceroy imprisoned him in Valdivia, Chile. During these campaigns, Bohorques served as a royal official and worked to extend and confirm Spanish power throughout the region, while also looking for his personal profit. In between of his adventures, he got married to Ana Bonilla, a woman of indigenous ascendency. After all these years wandering around, this man got acquainted with indigenous population and culture. Most importantly, he learned to speak Quechua, the native Inca language that became lingua franca throughout the Andes.\textsuperscript{159} When Bohorques arrived in Tucumán, after fleeing out from jail, he convinced the Calchaquíes that he was an Inca, the heir of the last native rulers of the Andes. We do not have any sources to know for sure what this people thought of him, but at the least they saw on him an opportunity, and played along. They accepted Bohorques as their leader, despite the physical evidence that he was far from being a native.

Bohorques’s abilities as a broker gave him legitimacy in front of both groups. Indigenous’ confidence on him was the main reason for being accepted by the Spanish authorities, who argued that his manners were “easy and accommodating to the nature of these people, that we have conferred and judged to be right and quite pleased to abide by the will of experienced and reasonable people of this province.”\textsuperscript{160} Ana Maria Lorandi contends that Bohorques “was unlike other conquistadors in trying to integrate himself—

\textsuperscript{160} Quoted in Lorandi, \textit{Spanish King of the Incas}, 151.
not merely as just another Indian, but as a leader capable of conducting the people to a new destiny.”\textsuperscript{161} He was eager and capable of integrating into the Indigenous world, and apparently, to be accepted by them. Nevertheless, this cultural mobility had its costs. Bohorques found soon that belonging to the two worlds could mean, at the end, belonging to none. In fact, soon after the viceroy of Peru, the count of Alba de Liste, received news of Bohorques presence and activities in Tucumán he ordered to stop and incarcerate this man because “nada de lo que tiene entre manos puede ser bueno un hombre que no ha cabido en el mundo.”\textsuperscript{162} Bohorques easiness to merge with the natives could be useful and sometimes praised, but it raised suspicion, too. Living in-between the fissures of the two worlds, finally crushed him.

Rulers, certainly, needed to rely on brokers and clients in order to govern. In Milan, the governors developed a refined and large court that became the center of Spanish power. There, governors’ favor was distributed among the local elites, who acted as brokers, and tied the local resources and societies to the Spanish Empire.\textsuperscript{163} Alejandro Cañeque has shown how important was the capacity of New Spain’s viceroys of providing posts on their circle of retainers. Their political activities and success were greatly dependent on having loyal clients occupy key positions in order to assure obedience and the fulfillment of their orders and policies. Moreover, the viceroys, as major patrons, needed posts and rewards to distribute among their clients. This situation, evidently, generated much tension because of the abuses that could occur, and the discomfort among the members of the local elites who felt they were being displaced.

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 131.
\textsuperscript{162} AGI, Charcas, 58, 1er. cuad, f. 61v.-62v. Conde de Alba de Liste to Alonso Mercado y Villacorta, December 1, 1657.
\textsuperscript{163} Alvarez-Ossorio Alvariño, Milán y el legado de Felipe II.
Furthermore, many feared that the viceroys, if not fully controlled, could appear as powerful as the distant king. Thus, reining in their capacity to reward and ensuring that the king remained the primary source of favor and bounty became a priority.¹⁶⁴

In a society defined by the culture of patronage, having access to posts that could be given to clients was, no doubt, a valuable prerogative. The miner Felipe de Obregón, in his information on Potosí to the marquis of Villagarcía, listed the government posts that existed in the province. He distinguished between two kinds of corregimientos: those provided by the king and those given by the viceroy. He also noted that if any of the holders of those and other offices died, it was the president of La Plata who appointed someone temporarily.¹⁶⁵ Such was an appealing prerogative. Throughout the seventeenth century the viceroys constantly fought to maintain the privilege of having posts at their disposal to grant and distribute at their will, something that the crown hesitated to allow because it justly feared that such policy could lessen the king’s authority.

A height of this tension between the crown and the viceroy occurred in 1678. The king, worried by the excesses of the viceroys and their entourages, and pressed by the beneméritos’, the local descendants of the conquistadores, constant claims for greater access to royal bounty, issued a Royal Decree forbidding the viceroys to provide any posts at all. The monarch reserved this prerogative for himself only because in theory he would favor the local elites. It was not a very sophisticated attempt by the Crown to put an end to the viceroys’ common practice of using such privilege to appoint their clients and family, despite the numerous orders prohibiting it. Nonetheless, it was an impractical and unrealistic decree. The crown realized that it was impossible to bypass the viceroys ¹⁶⁴ Cañeque, *The King’s Living Image*, 142–153. ¹⁶⁵ AHN, Estado, L. 210, N. 33 “Los gobiernos y corregimientos de la jurisdicción de la Audiencia de Los Charcas,” 1657.
who, despite the ban, continued providing posts “temporarily.” They needed to do so in order to successfully rule and administer the viceroyalty. To rule without the capacity of making appointments was unfeasible.  

Only two years after this prohibition the king reversed his opinion. In 1680, don Melchor de Navarra y Rocafull, duke of La Palata, who was going to Peru to serve as its viceroy, presented a memorial in which he requested that the American viceroys were allowed to provide up to twelve posts among their clients, servants, and relatives. He argued that his predecessors had been forbidden to do so because if they favored their entourages, the large number of beneméritos would feel aggravated by being displaced and not properly rewarded. In an extremely honest passage, La Palata acknowledged the validity of that argument and the need of rewarding the local elites, but he also observed that it was impossible for the viceroys to obey such prohibition and “no pudiéndolo observar ningún virrey se mira esta transgresión como cargo ordinario de residencia que no pudiendo servir para la enmienda, aprovecha para la multa.” He bluntly claimed that a good ruler needed to reward his clients, and the efficacy of his government relied on having a large retinue that could inform and assist him. This was so essential that not even the threat of a negative residencia would deter these officials from engaging in the practices of patronage.

Truly, the imperial official was pointing out a common practice. Viceroyos were constantly placing in posts the many clients and relatives who travelled with them. This,  


167 AGI, Lima, 344, N. 7, 4 “Sobre un papel de don Melchor de Navarra en que propone se le permita proveer doce oficios” (Madrid, October 8, 1680).
the Crown and the Council of the Indies were very well aware of, but could not fully control. For instance, forty years before this memorial, the marquis of Mancera, at the time the viceroy of Peru, wrote a letter justifying the appointment of his only child, the twenty-year old don Antonio de Toledo, as governor of the port of Callao. He claimed that he did so because in Peru there were not any fit persons for that important post—although, ironically, he also praised the abilities of Isidro Coronado who had been the governor, and now was his son’s assistant. Mancera also argued that when his predecessor, the count of Villardompardo, appointed his own son, don Gerónimo de Portugal y Torres, to that post, it proved to be a good decision, and it was a good example to follow. The Council of the Indies responded in an ambiguous way. Because that appointment was expressly forbidden it was not right to formally approve and confirm it. However, because Mancera’s predecessors had given offices to their family and retainers, it would be unjust to reprehend the viceroy. Thus, the Council, without making any formal commitment that could be detrimental in the future, concluded “se puede tolerar el haber nombrado a su hijo, escribiéndole sin aprobar el nombramiento.”

Navarra y Rocafull argued that because of these precedents, continuing with the prohibition to the viceroys of providing offices to their clients, and fining and sanctioning those who transgressed the laws, only lessened the authority and prestige of the office of the viceroy. Because no viceroy could govern without fulfilling his duties as patrons, he argued, it was necessary to allow and formalize their prerogative to provide some posts. Trying to find a balance between the demands of the beneméritos and the viceroy’s

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retinue, he asked to have twelve posts at his free disposal. The Council opposed this proposal and suggested the king continue following the reiterated royal decrees that forbade such practices. Otherwise, it might anger and upset the local population who were constantly pressing to get the king’s reward. The Council also feared that it would be harder to control the excesses of the viceroy’s clients, who would feel more protected and prone to abuse the Indians. However, one of the councilors, don Tomás de Valdés, expressed a contrary opinion. He agreed with don Melchor that because of “la calidad de sus personas y decencia de su puesto,” it was impossible for the viceroys not to bring with them “criados y allegados.” Therefore, they would always have to, finally, break the law. He suggested allowing the viceroys to provide eight posts, instead of the twelve requested by Palata.  

Charles II decided not to follow the Council’s advice and instead accepted the request of the duke of La Palata, ordering that the viceroys of Peru and New Spain would each be allowed to provide twelve posts—even first-class ones—to their clients and relatives. This was an open recognition of the importance of the patronage system upon which the smooth functioning of the polity rested. Although there were many downsides to granting the viceroys such privileges, it was also true that the prevailing political culture made it unthinkable that a viceroy would travel alone and that he would not

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169 “Sobre un papel de don Melchor de Navarra.”  
170 AGI, Lima, 344, N. 8, 9 “Da cuenta a V.M. de la duda en la ejecución de la resolución acerca de que a los virreyes se les permita proveer doce oficios” (Madrid, October 16, 1680). The American offices were divided in three categories or classes, depending on the prestige and resources that each carried. The Council, following the king’s order, made a list of the sixty posts that were provided by the Peruvian viceroy, and then chose those twelve corregimientos that could be given to the viceroy’s clientele. From the first class: Azángaro y Asillo, and Condesuyos in Arequipa; from the second class: Huarochirí, Chancay, Aimaraes, and Cotabambas; and from the third class: cercado de Lima, Camaná, Moquegua, Parinacochas, Calca y Lares, and Santa. AGI, Lima, 344, N.9, 7 “Propone los doce oficios que parece se podrán señalar de los que son a provisión del puesto de virrey del Perú para que nombre en ellos criados y allegados” (Madrid, November 7, 1680).
reward his clients and family. The scenario of an ungrateful and non-magnificent patron was, ultimately, even more undesirable. It underscored the foundations of the early modern Spanish monarchy.

Patronage culture and networks were the lifeblood of the Spanish political system. They were central for the ruling of the geographically disperse possessions of such a far-flung empire. Officials relied permanently on these networks not only for ensuring local rule, but also for gaining access to information, resources, and even people, which were distant (geographically and socially) to them. Thanks to these networks, officials (and their families) engaged with the rest of empire. The constant itinerancy of these men would have been impossible without the support of these networks, which facilitated the immersion of the foreign officials into the local dynamics and integrated them into different societies.

The networks of patronage proved to be extremely flexible. These locally based bonds—intimately linked to friendship and kinship—adapted to the new circumstances of the global empire, and to the intense mobility of the imperial officials. While patronage was founded upon personal and direct relationships between two people, it made possible the linkages between the many scattered centers of the empire, and the strengthening of the royal authority across the world. Certainly, these networks helped to consolidate private structures of power (whether that of the marquis of Villagarcía, the miners of Potosí, the smugglers of Buenos Aires, or the Sangley merchants in the Philippines) whose interests did not always coincide with those of the monarchy. Although it might seem counterintuitive, in the long run the dispersion of power and the circulation of the officials did not weaken the king; quite to the contrary, because of his
monopoly over royal favor, the monarch’s authority was cemented, and he emerged as the undisputed fount of political power.
Bien sabe Vuestra Excelencia que la experiencia es maestra de la ciencia.¹

La verdad solo puede juzgar dellas quien ha visto y tocado con las manos lo que hay y ha pasado en estas provincias.²

In the first days of June 1626, the 75-year old don Juan de Oñate died in Guadalcanal, province of Seville. Death reached this intrepid man thousands of miles away from America and his native Zacatecas, and from the territories of New Mexico, which by the turn of the sixteenth century he had conquered.³ Although at first, the presence of this former soldier and governor in the Spanish small town of Guadalcanal might come as a surprise, it becomes much more understandable when we view him not as a conquistador, but look instead at his lesser-known activities as miner and businessman. Oñate had gone all the way to Guadalcanal after being commissioned by the king to inspect the mines in that region. At that time, he was perhaps one of the

¹ BNE, Mss/5757, f. 87v - 89 Hurtado de Corcuera to count of Peñaranda, “Respuesta sobre la provisión del gobierno de Panamá.”
² AGI, Patronato 230A, R.3 “Juan Francisco de Montemayor: Ordenanzas de indios,” 1662, fol. 4.
³ According to Marc Simmons, Oñate perished when he was inspecting a flooded mine which suddenly collapsed, a statement also conveyed by Iñaki Zumalde: Marc Simmons, The Last Conquistador: Juan de Oñate and the Settling of the Far Southwest (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 194; Iñaki Zumalde, Los Oñate en México y Nuevo México (Oñate, Spain; Zacatecas, Mexico: Ayuntamiento de Oñati; Ayuntamiento de Zacatecas, 1998), 76. However, neither of these authors provides any supporting evidence for such assertion. Therefore, although less romantic, Eric Beerman's affirmation—based upon the study of Oñate's will—that the old conquistador had a natural death becomes much more plausible: Eric Beerman, “The Death of an Old Conquistador: New Light on Juan De Oñate,” New Mexico Historical Review 54, no. 4 (1979): 311. On Juan de Oñate’s troubled conquest and colonization of New Mexico, see Huntington Library, Ritch Papers, Boxes 1, 28; George P. Hammond and Agapito Rey, eds., Don Juan de Oñate, Colonizer of New Mexico, 1595-1628, 2 vols. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1953); Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Arizona and New Mexico, 1530-1888 (Albuquerque: Horn & Wallace, 1962); Stan Hoig, Came Men on Horses: The Conquistador Expeditions of Francisco Vázquez de Coronado and Don Juan de Oñate (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2013). For a genealogical study of Juan de Oñate and his Basque heritage see Donald T. Garate, “Juan de Oñate’s ‘Prueba de Caballero’, 1625: A Look at His Ancestral Heritage,” CLAHR: Colonial Latin American Historical Review 7, no. 2 (1998): 129–173.
richest men in the world—and not as a result of his endeavors in New Mexico, for which he is best known today. In fact, it was after his involvement in this troubling (and to many extents, failed) New Mexican enterprise that he returned to Zacatecas, where he resumed his previous business and fully and successfully devoted himself to improving the production of his inherited mines. In 1607, faced off against other conquistadores and officials who mobilized against him, Oñate was forced to resign as governor of New Mexico. He was accused of being cruel, despotic and incapable of handling the new settlements. In the following years he was punished by the Crown and was banished from the New Mexican territories. He was forced to settle again in Zacatecas, which at that period emerged as one of the world’s major centers of silver production.4

Therefore, it made perfect sense when, in 1624, Philip IV appointed Oñate—who had traveled to Spain to appeal the sentences against him—as Visitador General de minas y escoriales de España, the General Inspector of Spain’s mines.5 In selecting him the monarch was not relying on Oñate the seasoned conquistador or former governor, but on Oñate the expert miner. The goal of such appointment was clear: the crown hoped to increase silver production in the Iberian Peninsula, which in previous decades had stagnated. Almost certainly there was no one in Spain with greater direct experience of silver mining than Oñate. In accepting the position, Oñate requested to bring six Mexican Indians, experts in mining, to assist him.6 It is hard to imagine a European team capable

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5 Beerman, “The Death of an Old Conquistador,” 307. Oñate was partially vindicated and was monetarily reimbursed by the crown, but the banishment was maintained. Nonetheless, Oñate’s recent appointment by the king clearly shows that he had regained royal favor.
6 Simmons, The Last Conquistador, 193; Zumalde, Los Oñate en México y Nuevo México, 75.
of outmatching the mining experience and expertise of Oñate and his Native American crew.

In this chapter, I will examine the concept of ‘experience’ in the ruling and administration of the Spanish Empire, how experience was achieved and transmitted, and how the experience of the mobile officials in diverse locations shaped and validated their actions in other regions. Not only did officials move physically, but there were also several notions of what a good imperial official ought to do circulating intensely across the imperial space. Their former services on political matters, military affairs, or economic and financial endeavors, gave credence to their future activities in other regions and context, and served also as a blueprint for other officials who found themselves in similar circumstances, despite the physical and temporal distance.

Officials appointed by the king gained experience on the ground by serving in their posts. Their actual practices of power and authority in multiple locations gave these men a profound and direct knowledge of the situation of the Monarchy, and of the peculiar conditions of its distinct regions. The mobile officials knew about the new geographies, peoples and their customs, new technologies, trade, routes, war, and, of course, the ways to govern and administer the empire.

Experience was a highly valued trait in the early modern Spanish Empire. It was common to praise the experience of the officials, or to criticize their lack of it. This was not mere rhetoric or empty words. The king and his councilors took seriously the experience of the officials. The monarch was expected to reward experienced officials, and the king greatly benefited from their vast knowledge. Officials’ experience had a great impact on the way the empire was administered. Not only did their experiences
benefit the officials themselves, who knew better how to respond and handle different situations, but also the officials’ experience was passed along. Imperial officials translated their tangible experiences into written memorials, reports, and books. These documents, which circulated profusely across the empire, helped to build a shared knowledge of how to effectively govern the many spaces and subjects of the Spanish king.

**The Ideal of Experience**

Experience was at the center of the political thought in early modern Spain. Diego Saavedra Fajardo, the most influential seventeenth-century Spanish political writer, devoted a whole chapter—or device—of his *Empresas políticas* to explain the importance of experience to good government, and the ways in which experience could be obtained. Just as with the other ideas he discusses, Saavedra Fajardo begins by displaying and explaining an image that conveys his argument (Fig. 4). The device’s motto is *Fulcitur experientiis*, supported by experience. The figure depicts a Rostral column, a Roman victory column erected to celebrate the naval victories. From a plinth, a column emerges where the prows of the triumphant ships are mounted. The solid column represents wisdom, which is obtained through “speculation and study,” while the prows, “that had run through so many perils upon the ocean,” signify the experience.  

According to Saavedra Fajardo, these two attributes together made for a perfect governor. Wisdom

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referred to the abstract, universal and constant matters; and experience concerned unique events and concrete and particular circumstances.

Figure 4. Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, *Idea de un príncipe cristiano representada en cien empresas* (Monaco: Nicolao Enrico, 1640), p. 184, “Fulcitur Experientiis.”
Saavedra Fajardo posited that there are two types of experience. The first is personal and directly acquired experience. The second is indirect experience, cultivated either by the study of History, or by communications with those with direct experience.\(^9\) Therefore, wisdom, too, is a form of experience. Nonetheless, he asserts that indirect experiences are not as persuasive as one’s own experiences, which “are too deeply engraved, as I may say, on our breasts to be soon effaced.”\(^10\) For instance, he argues that a shipwreck seen from the coast would surely be touching, but nothing compared to surviving one, which would be a major life lesson.

Saavedra Fajardo also maintains that the best teachers for a prince are not those “who are most eminent for learning and knowledge,” but those practical men “who are learned and experienced politicians.”\(^11\) Hence, Saavedra Fajardo urged the monarch to rely on officials with actual experience, and cautioned him about leaving the government in hands of those who were too thoughtful and committed to a monastic life. In his writing he argued that the later kind of advisors lacked any on-the-ground experience and knowledge of practical things, for when ruling they would fail either for being too shy, or too daring.\(^12\) Indeed, for this writer with ample experience as an imperial official throughout Europe, making mistakes by stepping into action was much more desirable than remaining safe and idle.\(^13\) He affirms, “from errors proceeds experience, and from thence the best maxims of government.”\(^14\)

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\(^9\) Ibid., 203–204.
\(^10\) Ibid., 216.
\(^11\) Ibid., 31.
\(^12\) Ibid., 215.
\(^13\) Saavedra Fajardo was Spanish ambassador in Rome, Bavaria, the 1636 Diet of Regensburg, and during the signing of the Peace of Westphalia.
\(^14\) Saavedra Fajardo, *The Royal Politician*, 207.
For Saavedra Fajardo, experience was fundamental for officials’ good
government because it taught them how to behave in different circumstances. Although
there is one universal reason, he argues, the spirits of men are varied, and therefore there
are many possible paths. The key for successful ruling is in adapting to the nature of the
subjects, which should be “suitably to the person’s nature, as they change the bit
according to the horse’s mouth.”¹⁵ Not every official could accommodate to every
scenario, or to every kind of people. It was up to the king, then, to choose the right person
for each situation. This was of absolute importance for Saavedra Fajardo. He urged the
monarch to carefully examine the qualities of the officials before appointing them, as he
asserted, “more kingdoms having been destroyed by their [the ministers’] ignorance than
by that of princes”¹⁶

Counterbalancing his arguments, the author closes his chapter noting that too-
experienced officials could also be problematic. If they did not pause to think and
evaluate every given situation, and, overconfidently, jumped into dangerous situations,
they would also fail in their government. The king’s council, writes Saavedra Fajardo,
should be formed by people with great experience as well as by novices, whose fears
would ensure moderation and caution.¹⁷

Saavedra Fajardo’s insistence on the value of experience was not unique.
According to Jeremy Robbins, the prizing of experience was part of a broader Spanish
epistemological trend that emphasized the “arts of perception” as means to truly
apprehend the world. Robbins argues that seventeenth-century Spanish thought was

¹⁵ Ibid., 219.
¹⁶ Ibid., 222. Likewise, he suggested to continue with such vigilance, and permanently cast a wary eye on
officials’ reports, as many tended to write not what they did, but what they should have done.
¹⁷ Ibid., 223–224.
defined by two major philosophical currents that were intertwined: Neostoicism and Scepticism. For Robbins, the work of Saavedra Fajardo is the best example of this conjunction, although he contends that the entanglement of those doctrines became a general frame of mind—which permeated all Spanish activities, from literature to political theory. In this vein, Robbins critiques studies that focus solely on Northern Europe while overlooking seventeenth-century Spanish epistemology, forgetting that Spain was the Western most import polity at the time and that it was neither idle nor in decline. In fact, contrary to the prevailing opinion, Spanish scientists, philosophers, and political thinkers—like Diego Saavedra Fajardo—were widely read and influential on European thought. Likewise, Spaniards fully engaged with the new ideas and concepts, and actively took part on Humanist ideas and fostered its development. In fact, Robbins contends that Spanish empiricism fostered a mindset that was receptive to the new science developed by men like Bacon and Locke, and which was built upon experimentation.18

According to Robbins, while scholars have overlooked Scepticism (mainly because there are fewer philosophical discussions to trace), it truly had a major impact on early modern Spanish thought. Its philosophical “claim that no secure knowledge was possible in any area of human activity, from intellectual disciplines down to simple acts of perception,” was widely accepted by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spaniards.19 Evidently, this was a subversive thought that called into question all possible knowledge.

19 Ibid., 36.
The only certainty unto which people could hold was Catholic faith. Therefore, knowing the truth, and unveiling the treacherous nature of things was mainly a moral activity.\(^{20}\)

Stoic ideas, thanks mainly to the work of Justus Lipsius and other humanists, became predominant in seventeenth-century Europe.\(^{21}\) As part of the Renaissance milieu, classic ideas and authors, mostly Seneca and Cicero, were assimilated into Christian doctrine, and Stoic moral and maxims became widely accepted. Nonetheless, Neostoicism was an eclectic movement and fully defining its boundaries is hard.\(^{22}\) In Europe, Neostoicism had its greatest impact in Spain.\(^{23}\) Seneca was well known to the Spaniards throughout the Middle Ages (perhaps because the philosopher had been born in Córdoba), and by the turn of the seventeenth century, Stoic ideas such as “the deceptiveness of appearances and of 'common-sense' opinions, the misery and brevity of life, the inevitability of death and the need to prepare for it, and the decrying of 'external'...

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 26–37.


\(^{22}\) In fact, the same can be said about Stoicism itself, which lacked a coherent and cohesive program. The Stoics originally were defined as those individuals that around the 3\(^{rd}\) century BC met at the Painted Stoa, in Athens. Thus, although they had many common views, they also had many disagreements. It was through the later writings of Cicero and Seneca that a more rounded doctrine emerged. John Sellars summarizes in a nutshell the major claims with which Stoicism came to be identified: “that virtue (aretē) is the highest good and is sufficient for happiness (eudaimonia), that the soul is undivided and rational, meaning that emotions (pathē) are the product of judgments under one's control, and that the cosmos is a single living being, identified with God, of which we are all parts.” However, it is also true that the meaning and implications of those maxims have also changed through time. John Sellars, “Introduction,” in The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition, 3–4.

\(^{23}\) The works of Seneca, Lipsius and others circulated profusely in Spain, whether in their original languages or translated into Spanish, and men like the Count-duke of Olivares possessed several of these books. Moreover, Lipsius himself (a Catholic subject of Phillip II) dedicated some of his works to Spanish noblemen such as the Duke of Frias, and the Count of Fuentes. Henry Ettinghausen, Francisco de Quevedo and the Neostoic Movement (Oxford: University Press, 1972), 14. For a comprehensive analysis of the editions and translations of the work of Seneca, and its reception in Spain see Karl Alfred Blüher, Séneca en España: investigaciones sobre la recepción de Séneca en España desde el siglo XIII hasta el siglo XVII (Madrid: Gredos, 1983).
goods in general” were a commonplace. Stoic ideas can be found in the writings of almost any Spanish writer or thinker of that period, including Francisco de Quevedo, the most prominent exponent of Spanish Neostoicism.

Altogether, Neostoicism and Scepticism, argues Robbins, “urged individuals to beware of, and to remove, an excess of credulity.” These doctrines emphasized the idea of human fallibility, the inherent difficulty of discovering the truth and essence of the world, and the question of knowledge and perception was posited by means of the terms *ser/parecer* and *desengaño/engaño*. It was necessary to take distance from the object to know, and to develop proper techniques of perceptual examination for unveiling the truth. In this context of epistemological uncertainty—in which it was acknowledged the impossibility of full knowledge, and that the world was extremely diverse, albeit ruled by one unique reason—experience acquired a fundamental role. Only through the careful observation and judgment of many particular events was it possible to know the general essence of those events and draw conclusions. Moreover, because of the uncertain and deceptive nature of external appearances, the goal of knowledge was to capture the true essence of things. Therefore, knowledge became a moral enterprise: only by discerning good from bad could the truth emerge. Catholic doctrine, thus, was taken as the foundation against which reality was measured and interpreted.

Because of these ideas, a form of empiricism emerged that heavily relied on the concepts of experience and contingency. Robbins states the three features of this

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25 Other major figures of this intellectual current are Baltasar Gracián, Pedro de Rivadeneira, Juan de Mariana, Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas, and Antonio López de Vega.
27 Ibid., 8.
28 As it will be seen in Chapter Five, these Neostoic ideas also sustained a cosmopolitan culture that hoped to encompass the world’s inherent diversity under one logic and reason.
empiricism: knowledge arose from sense-experience, it was based on an intense scrutiny of the outside world, and the personal direct experience or that of credible witnesses were privileged as sources of knowledge and information.\textsuperscript{30} In this regard, the imperial officials were at the forefront of early modern empiricism. Certainly, they had plenty of personal and direct engagement with the outside and far-away world. They were constantly experiencing it, and adapting to the volatile circumstances; and perhaps more importantly, as first-hand observers, they were reporting all of it.

From the perspective of the history of science, Antonio Barrera-Osorio points in the same direction. He has argued that the encounters and personal experiences of Spanish officials with the New World led to the emergence of Empiricism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The recent discoveries of new commodities, but also of new technologies and experiences of navigation fostered what he defines as an Early Scientific Revolution, in which there was a new emphasis on empirical observation and personal experience, and a criticism of the classical texts. Barrera-Osorio shows that empirical observation became the common practice of sailors, merchants, explorers, naturalists, adventurers, and imperial officials that interacted with the overseas possessions, societies, and nature. Progressively, these experiences were later institutionalized and incorporated—mainly through the House of Trade in Seville—into Spanish practices of imperial government and knowledge production.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 18.
María Portuondo coincides in the importance of the New World for the development of a modern science that moved away from the classic principles in favor of new approaches in which sensitive experience was key. The immense flow of new knowledge that went from the New World to Europe was integrated in innovative ways. One of the major concerns of the Spanish authorities was to know the new world that suddenly appeared. This was at the origins of modern cartography—but modern scholars have neglected such scientific development, mostly because this knowledge was kept secret and the physical evidence destroyed. Portuondo shows that such information was gathered through questionnaires filled by officials on the ground, and then those partial pieces of intelligence where to be integrated and combined by the imperial cosmographers.\(^{32}\)

In this regard, the reports of the imperial officials were of extreme importance for the imperial government. They were the king’s eyes and ears outside the royal court. The impressive amount of information processed by the imperial councils was based on the particular experiences of officials, and served to draw an image of the nature and situation of the empire, from the far-away Philippines to a closer place such as Murcia. Most commonly, officials framed their experiences in a standard format: the *Informaciones de méritos y servicios*. These documents, which will be studied later in this chapter, were presented by the officials as means to obtain royal reward. In them, officials summarized their most relevant actions in the various posts in which they served around the globe. They assembled those services together to project a coherent narrative of themselves as good and ideal officials. The *informaciones* of officials from all across the Monarchy provided much, although scattered, concrete information on local events,

\(^{32}\) Portuondo, *Secret Science.*
and altogether, like a patchwork, they sketched a comprehensive vision of the whole empire.

**Moving and Experiencing the Empire**

A mobile official like Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera knew very well the value of experience and basked in his own. In 1656, already in the last years of his life, he rejected (for the third time) his second appointment as governor of Panama with a rather peculiar argument: that he had too much experience. Following the widely accepted premise that “la experiencia es maestra de la ciencia,” he affirmed that having served over 24 years in three different parts of the Indies (Peru, Panama, and the Philippines) he had lots of knowledge and information about that region and, if he was sent to such a faraway region, could not easily share it with the council. Thus, he tried to persuade the count of Peñaranda, president of the Council of the Indies, to instead nominate him as a member of that Council.33

Hurtado de Corcuera’s experience did, indeed, help him in the diverse posts he held. Because he had been in the army since a teenager, the military was his field of major expertise. In 1656, in the midst of the war against England, because of his “mucha experiencia y autoridad,” he was commissioned to organize the military defense of the

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33 BNE, Mss/5757, f. 87v - 89 Hurtado de Corcuera to Count of Peñaranda, “Respuesta sobre la provisión del gobierno de Panamá.” The former governor of the Philippines did not only reject the post in Panama, but also the government of the island of Santo Domingo. This was a strategic post for the control of the Caribbean, where the presence of English and French colonizers was continuously growing and menacing Spanish authority. The councilors were well aware of the situation and of the need of a person with the “experiencia, valor y prudencia que pedía el estado de las cosas y la defensa de aquella isla.” Thus the post was offered to Hurtado de Corcuera, “por el crédito que tenía,” as he conveyed all that qualities. AGI, Santo Domingo, 2, N. 70 “Sobre papeles que dan cuenta de los excesos de don Félix de Zúñiga y Avellaneda” (Madrid, August 28, 1658), fol. 15v. Hurtado de Corcuera was also appointed corregidor of Sanlúcar de Barrameda by the king. He did not hold the post, as he was then governor of the Canaries. AHN, Consejos, 13628, 4, N. 22 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de San Lucar de Barrameda” (Madrid, May 5, 1659).
Principality of Asturias, in northern Spain. The king ordered him to survey the land to set its defense, but also to teach basic military notions to the common people, so they could be prepared to take arms in case of an English invasion.\(^\text{34}\) Philip IV gave the old captain ample powers, and commanded the Principality’s corregidor to obey and follow Hurtado de Corcuera, as he was “persona de las calidades y experiencia militar que sabéis.”\(^\text{35}\) In fact, Hurtado de Corcuera himself declared, “yo he pasado palabra que por haber sido capitán de caballos en Flandes, y general de caballería en el Pirú, les asistiré, seré su capitán y gobernaré.”\(^\text{36}\)

The military was, no doubt, an area in which a good imperial official was expected to have substantial experience. Military service was a major component of the Spanish ideal of nobility. As shown in Chapter One, the Spanish Empire was constantly facing war in Europe, America, Asia, and Africa, and there was a huge mobility of Spanish soldiers across the globe. Moreover, those war theaters were important schools for the imperial officials. When in 1653 the lawyer Juan Francisco de Montemayor was temporarily left in charge of the government of the island of Santo Domingo he had to arrange a military expedition to the nearby northern island of Tortuga, which had been occupied by French pirates. Although his training was academic, he had begun his imperial services in the war of Catalonia in the 1640s. This was a life experience that greatly influenced him. When some years later Montemayor prepared his información de méritos, he greatly emphasized his service in the war. Diverting from the usual concise format of the informaciones, he described with great detail all of those activities. As a

\(^{34}\) BNE, Mss/5757, f. 6 “Nota,” n.d.
\(^{35}\) BNE, Mss/5757, f. 8v-9 “Carta de S.M. a el corregidor del Principado” (Madrid, February 18, 1656).
\(^{36}\) BNE, Mss/5757, f. 52v - 53v “Carta de Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera sobre las dificultades de las compañías de Caballos,” 1656.
graduate in law, he had judiciary commissions, mainly referred to the judgment of fugitive soldiers. At some point, Montemayor was put in charge of securing the provisions of the army. He also held positions of political authority and, on some occasions, directly took part in military actions. Unsurprisingly, then, while governing Santo Domingo, he affirmed that because he could not find in the island a trusted soldier with enough experience, he himself would direct the actions against the French occupiers relying on “algunas noticias que me han quedado del tiempo que en servicio de V.M. asistí en el ejército de Cataluña.”

The war of Flanders, above all, taught many imperial officials how to fight. The captain Manuel Coello, who in 1667 had traveled to Peru as part of the entourage of the viceroy count of Lemos, related that on one occasion, during the military activities to break up the rebellion in Puno, the countess of Lemos was left in charge of the government. He affirmed that she acted outstandingly. Coello praised the lady, and claimed that she seemed to have great experience, “como si hubiera muchísimos años sido general de Flandes.” In many ways, this war became the largest and most prestigious school in which Spanish soldiers and officials received their educations. Such was the opinion of Jacinto de Aguilar y Prado, a writer, historian and soldier, who, in the 1610s, voluntarily went to Flanders to fight “porque si un soldado no sirve en aquellos

38 AGI, Patronato, 273, R. 5, f. 77-78 Juan Francisco Montemayor y Córdoba de Cuenca, “Carta de Francisco Montemayor y Cuenca dando cuenta del estado de la isla” (Santo Domingo, September 1, 1653).
39 BNE, Mss/11017, f. 193 - 206v. Manuel Coello, “Carta del capitán Manuel Coello, sargento mayor de la gente de guerra que llevó el conde de Lemos, virrey de Perú, para la pacificación de Puno, escrita a un correspondiente suyo de la ciudad de Cádiz. Con relación del viaje y sucesos” (Lima, January 29, 1669), fol. 204v. For a study on the rebellion of Puno, see Antonio Acosta Rodríguez, “Conflicto the rebels of Puno,” in *Primeras jornadas de Andalucía y América* (La Rábida: Instituto de Estudios Onubenses, 1981), 27–52.
países, parece que sus servicios son de menor tonsura, aunque sean dignos de estimación. 

Similarly, when Pedro Esteban Dávila was stationed in the Azores—a Portuguese possession with a tradition of rebellion against Spanish authority but at the time under the rule of the Spanish monarch—he asked the king to appoint as the island’s Sargent Major “un soldado portugués de los de Flandes,” one with the required knowledge and merits, but also a Portuguese soldier who had already proven his loyalty and who would consider himself more “Spanish” because of his military experience and services in such conflict.

Moreover, this war was truly a mosaic in which people from all around the empire came together and, although serving in companies divided by nations, shared the same experiences and saw themselves as Spaniards. In his study on the political culture of the Spanish soldiers, Raffaele Puddu argues that the service in the army created common bonds and a common identity that transcended class boundaries. All the soldiers fighting the Dutch, despite of their origin, served under the same banner and followed a common goal. Furthermore, this war reinforced the Catholic identity of the Spanish Monarchy. It was not only a war against political rebels, against people who opposed the king’s rule, but more importantly, was a war against heresy. Therefore, the Spanish soldier was, above all, a Catholic soldier, a theme on which several writers dwelt and that will be discussed in depth in the last chapter.

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40 Jacinto de Aguilar y Prado, *Compendio histórico de diversos escritos en diferentes asuntos* (Pamplona: Carlos de Labayen, 1629), 27.
41 BNE, Mss/801, f. 39-42 Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus consejos de Estado y Guerra con el alférez Francisco Cerezo despachado por el marqués de Cropani.”
44 In his Doctoral Dissertation Dennis Grê has studied the chronists of Flanders paying special attention to their moral discourses. Dennis Grê Ponce, “La moral y la guerra. los cronistas de flandes: expresión de la cultura política de la Monarquía Hispánica (Siglos XVI Y XVII)” (Doctoral Dissertation, Universidad de Murcia, 2015).
Evidently, a good official could not only be a war hawk. He was expected to also have other types of experience. Political skills were greatly appreciated. In 1580 the outgoing viceroy of New Spain, Martín Enríquez, wrote to his successor reminding him that in the Indies everything was so different to Spain and that if “el gobernador nuevo no se vale de lo que puede advertirle el que acá ha estado” it would be impossible to do things right, at least at the beginning. Indeed, he claimed that because “por haberme faltado a mi esta luz cuando aquí vine, fue necesario creer a otros y errar algunas por su causa.”

There were some peculiarities about the American scenario that were only grasped once in the region and from people who had direct contact with it. The official affirmed that some of the ideals or precepts that could be valid elsewhere did not necessarily apply in the New World, for which a particular experience was needed.

Nevertheless, it is also true that regardless of being in America or in Europe, it was never an easy job to engage with the native populations, to negotiate with the local elites, to avoid upheavals, and overall, to impose royal authority. In 1647 there was social unrest in the city of Salamanca, so the councilors considered that the corregidor should be don García de Porres, who was oidor in Valladolid. They believed that the qualities of a judge, as well as the prestige of his office, would serve better to calm down the mood of the population, and to secure the peace. The members of the Audience of Mexico followed the same logic in 1660, during the revolt of Oaxaca. At first, the viceroy had appointed an alcalde del crimen—a criminal judge—to go to Oaxaca, but the Royal Audience argued against it. The oidores considered that it was better to send a ministro

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45 BNE, MSS/8553, f. 23-35 “Instrucción que por mandado de S.M. hizo el virrey Martín Henríquez para el conde de La Coruña, sobre el gobierno de Nueva España,” September 25, 1580, fol. 23.
46 AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, “Que a don García de Porres se le haga merced del corregimiento de Salamanca” (Madrid, February 17, 1647).
**tocado**—a civil judge—because sending an *alcalde del crimen* would give the impression that “solo va al castigo” and the Indians could be intimidated.\(^{47}\) The viceroy agreed and chose Juan Francisco Montemayor, the former governor of Santo Domingo and now *oidor* in the Audience of Mexico, to restore order in the region. Likewise, in 1677 the Council of Castile argued that it was better to send a judge as *corregidor* of Córdoba, in Andalusia, instead of the customary civil minister (*de capa y espada*). The councilors maintained that at that time the city’s elite was extremely unruly and difficult to control, and that the powerful noblemen had taken over all the institutions, threatening the people and preventing them from even complaining. Furthermore, they contended that “en todos tiempos se haya tenido por remedio conveniente el enviar a Córdoba ministros togados.” In light of past experience in similar circumstances, they considered that sending a judge was more effective “para reprimir la libertad y licencia de mucha de la gente noble, a quien los corregidores de capa y espada no pueden reducir a la quietud, respeto y obediencia necesaria.”\(^{48}\)

Hurtado de Corcuera had too been governor of various regions. The nature of that post—which required him to oversee basically every activity in the territory under his authority—gave him knowledge and experience not only on political matters, but also in many other topics such as commerce, fiscal policies, or even judiciary issues.\(^{49}\) While in Asturias, he proposed to build a castle in the port of Santoña. The purpose of this building was not strictly military, but economic and political, namely, to better control the foreign

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\(^{47}\) AGI, Patronato, 230A, R.2 “Motines y alborotos de Indios: Tehuantepec, Nexapa e Iztepec,” 1660, fols. 164–165. For a detailed study of the revolt of Oaxaca, see Chapter Four.

\(^{48}\) AHN, Consejos, 13597, 2, N. 58 “Con otra consulta de este consejo, satisfaciendo a lo por ella mandado” (Madrid, May 24, 1677).

\(^{49}\) His terms as governor of the Philippines and as *corregidor* of Córdoba where in each place had to suppress popular revolts are studied in more detail in Chapter Four.
ships that were constantly smuggling goods. He complained that the French, Dutch, and Flemish ships that sailed there to buy oranges and lemons carried undeclared merchandise, which was exchanged for the fruits without paying the proper taxes. He argued that in order to secure the land it was important also to secure its trade. He knew this because “el haber servido a V.M. en tantas partes de las Indias, las noticias y experiencias que tengo en estas materias me han enseñado a reparar en este punto.” His experience in major trading hubs such Panama and the Philippines made him aware of the perils of the illegal trade, but also of the methods to stop it. His overseas experiences gave credence and legitimacy to his decisions in Europe.

Still, not every experience was positive, or desirable for transplanting. Sometimes, officials could also learn and carry vices throughout the empire. In 1623, when Pedro Esteban Dávila was governing the Tercera Island, in the Azores, he bitterly complained of Guillermo de Rojas, inspector of the island’s castle. The governor affirmed that his subordinate was reluctant to obey and to collaborate with him. He accused him of having learned too many swindles during his past tenures, “ha intentado conmigo algunas de las cosas que con el maestro de campo don Gonzalo Mesía,” his predecessor. Dávila alleged that the inspector’s behavior was nothing new, that previous officials had justly punished Rojas. Moreover, Esteban Dávila affirmed that even before reaching the island he had been warned to be watchful on said official, it was known that “en Perpiñán, Barcelona, esta isla y en todas partes donde ha servido ha tenido mil inquietudes y pendencias.”

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50 BNE, Mss/5757, f. 35 - 36v Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, “Sobre el puerto de Santoña” (Castro, April 23, 1656), fol. 36. 
51 BNE, Mss/801, f. 18-19v Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus consejos de Estado y Guerra” (Tercera, January 9, 1623). Furthermore, Esteban Dávila argued that because Rojas had been born in Flanders, from a Flemish mother, he could be more prone to make deals with the many Dutch that sailed by the archipelago, making more necessary his expulsion from the island.
In 1643, news from Oran reached the court alerting that the Muslims from Algiers were preparing an attack upon the North African fortress. Philip IV response was to appoint don Juan de Meneses, a member of the council of War, as corregidor of Cartagena in Spain. The idea, suggested by the Council of War, was to have someone of experience and authority ready to act and to prevent any military actions from the Algerians. However, when the Council of Castile found out about such nomination, it caused a great fuss. The councilors complained bitterly about an official they deemed utterly incapable. They affirmed that “en todas las partes que ha estado ha dado muestras de no ser a propósito para ningún gobierno.” Contrary to what would be expected of a veteran official, in the councilors’ eyes, his experiences had not served to form him and to improve his abilities. Moreover, based on the evidence of Meneses’ previous positions (especially patent on his visita) they sharply concluded that “este sujeto es más a propósito para ser mandado que para mandar.” The councilors suggested keeping Jerónimo de Medinilla, who at the time was Cartagena’s corregidor, at his post. They argued that this official had enough credit and experience to act in case of a military attack, as he had served in the fleet, the war in Catalonia, Italy, and at that moment was arranging the aid for Oran.52

It is not clear what the origins were of the evident animosity against don Juan de Meneses and Guillermo de Rojas, and whether they were in fact incompetent officials. What is clear is that both Pedro Esteban Dávila and the Council of Castile relied on a discourse of negative experience in order to justify and convince the king to move aside those officials—which, in the case of Meneses, happened immediately. Contrary to the

52 AHN, Consejos, 13619, N. 15 “Propone los inconvenientes que puede tener enviar a don Juan de Meneses a Cartagena y las conveniencias en que don Gerónimo de Medinilla continúe su gobierno” (Madrid, July 12, 1643).
common idea that experience provided knowledge and the basis for good government, for Dávila and the councilors, the experience gained by Meneses and Rojas was only negative. They asserted that the (bad) officials had only acquired and augmented negative methods and habits. These cases reinforced the idea of always being attentive to the behavior of the officials. Not in vain Saavedra Fajardo advised on the necessity of always casting an eye upon the officials on the ground.⁵³

Quite unsurprisingly, men with the experience of Hurtado de Corcuera were scarce. Most of imperial officials could neither accumulate his level of experience (both in terms of the number of posts he occupied, and of the regions in which he moved), nor excel in so many different arenas. Authorities across the empire were constantly complaining about the difficulties of finding suitable officials, and warned about the dangers of appointing people lacking the needed credentials. The count of Castellar, viceroy of Peru, informed the king in 1676 how hard was to find a person fit for the government of the port of Callao, an office too important to be handled by people without enough experience, especially in a moment when authorities feared a pirate attack. The Audience of Lima had proposed to appoint don Francisco Meneses, who had been governor of Chile. However, Castellar dismissed such proposal because Meneses was too old and was retired in Trujillo. The Audience, then, designated instead two persons: don Diego de Martos, at the time corregidor of Chucuito, as maestre de campo general, the military chief, and don Miguel de Moroña, corregidor of Cuenca, as gobernador general de la caballería, the cavalry’s commanding officer. The viceroy did not deem these men suitable either. He claimed that although Martos had served in Italy and Portugal, and had always been brave and efficient, he had always been in the cavalry, and “carece de las

⁵³ Cf. p. 150.
experiencias [of infantry] que requieren estos empleos.” As for Moroña, Castellar contended that his lack of experience made him unfit. Having Moroña been only a captain, the viceroy sharply sentenced, “no habiendo mandado nunca difícilmente lo sabrá hacer.”

The case of Callao was not exceptional, and it had nothing to do with its location or distance from the imperial court. The Council of State struggled on several occasions to find seemly officials to be appointed as corregidores of Murcia and Cartagena, in Spain. This was a major Mediterranean post very difficult to govern because of external and internal constrains. There was the constant threat of a foreign attack (mainly from the Turks and North African corsairs), and internal pressure from the local elite—led by the powerful marquis of Los Vélez. The councilors could not always pick someone like don Gonzalo de Ulloa Carvajal, who had an impressive record of service in Italy, Salamanca, Andújar, and Jaén (where he affirmed he had convinced the Prince of Morocco to convert to Catholicism). In 1646 the king explicitly requested to find someone capable in the military and political government, administration of the millones (a tax to support the Spanish military endeavors), and who would also look after the building of the fortresses. The councilors noted that such a person was almost impossible to find: men skilled on military affairs, usually lacked knowledge and abilities on financial matters. Thus they proposed to find someone competent in the political and financial administration to govern both Murcia and Cartagena, and leave a seasoned military man exclusively in

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54 AGI, Lima, 297 “Sobre propuesta del virrey para el gobierno de las armas de aquellas provincias” (Madrid, April 21, 1676).
55 AHN, Consejos, 13619, N. 4 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de Murcia” (Valladolid, September 21, 1604).
charge of the defense of the Mediterranean port. A decade later, the councilors were still looking for someone who could be in charge of the administration of justice, the political and military government, and the collection of taxes; in short, someone “que pueda encargarse de todo y en quien concurran las partes de autoridad, valor, prudencia, y experiencia de negocios graves.”

Things were not promising in Italy, either. The duke of Segorbe, viceroy of Naples, reminded the king, in 1670, of the necessity of having experienced soldiers, especially in places like Lucera and Trani, where the menace of a Turkish invasion was always present. Segorbe concluded that he could not find many men with enough experience and skills in that region. Some years later, the king asked his councilors to confirm the expertise of don Juan Ortíz Cortés. They had to determine if he was suitable to occupy the government of Lecce (a region always harassed by the Turks), or if he should be appointed somewhere else, where such experience was not required. In 1682, the Council of State dismissed the first of the three candidates for the government of Calabria Ultra advanced by the viceroy, the marquis of Los Vélez. The councilors argued that the marquis of Castelforte was not fit for the post, as he was “mozo sin experiencia.” The king agreed with them and with the need to provide the post in a “soldado de muchas experiencias.” He then appointed the maestre de campo don Guillermo de Sicilia, who

56 AHN, Consejos, 13619, N. 17 “Dice lo que se les ofrece cerca de los que V.M. ha sido servido de mandar sobre la provisión del corregimiento de Cartagena” (Madrid, December 1646).
57 AHN, Consejos, 13619, N. 27 “Propone sujetos para el corregimiento de Murcia” (Madrid, October 13, 1655).
58 AHN, Estado, 2015, N. “Da cuenta de los sujetos proveídos en Napoles” (Nápoles, September 9, 1670).
59 AHN, Estado, 2015, N. 25 “Sobre nombramientos en varias plazas” (Madrid, September 26, 1681).
was not in the proposed shortlist, but who had been recently named governor of the province of Basilicata.\textsuperscript{60}

It is important to note, as several of the examples show, that in the early modern Spanish Empire there was not a clear and fixed division between the function of the officials, and in more than one occasion, the same person could occupy different positions. The reason is because, contrary to what some scholars have stated, this political and administrative system was far from being a modern bureaucracy with a division of labor, well-delimited offices, duties, and rights, and a clear path of professional development.\textsuperscript{61} While in theory there was a distinction between officials with political and military attributes (\textit{capa y espada}) and officials who specialized in matters of justice (\textit{togados}), a person could perfectly have both qualities.\textsuperscript{62} Offices did not always have the same requirements and attributes; they could change depending on the circumstances and the nature of the office holder.

Accordingly, the promotion of an imperial official did not follow an established and objective pattern. In the last instance, officials’ appointments did not depend on their own merits, and not even on the advice of the councilors, but on the will of the king. The offices belonged to the king who as a favor, and as expression of his grace and magnificence, provided them freely to his most loyal and obliging subjects. In consequence, although the ideal official was expected to have experience, this was not

\textsuperscript{60} AHN, Estado, 2015, N. 29 “Consulta sobre la provisión del gobierno de Calabria Ultra” (Madrid, July 17, 1682). In replacement of Sicilia in the government of Basilicata, the king appointed don Diego Ferralta who was in the shortlist for Calabria Ultra.
\textsuperscript{61} For instance, Irene Silverblatt sees in the Spanish Inquisition the roots of modernity, and a well disciplined, delimited, and developed bureaucracy. Irene Silverblatt, \textit{Modern Inquisitions: Peru and the Colonial Origins of the Civilized World} (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).
\textsuperscript{62} Jerónimo de Bobadilla in his famous treatise on the office of the \textit{corregidor}, contended that if the official was only of \textit{capa y espada} he should appoint someone \textit{togado} as his lieutenant, who could assist him in the administration of justice. \textit{Politica para corregidores y señores de vassallos en tiempo de paz y de guerra} (Madrid: por Luis Sánchez, 1597), bk. 1 Chap. 12.
always the case. Just as a token, in 1625 Philip IV ordered the Council of Castile to elaborate the shortlist of possible officials for the *corregimiento* of Córdoba, in Spain, in which they had to include don Gaspar Bonifaz, the king’s equerry. The councilors obeyed, but noted that Bonifaz had not held any offices and thus was short on experience. They considered he was not suited for governing the city. Hoping the king would change his mind, they decided not to formally propose any official. The king did not pay attention to the opinion of his councilors, and appointed Bonifaz as *corregidor*. The councilors had to obey the king, who was not required to explain his decisions.63 Although this case could serve as an example of the traditional image of the absolutist monarch, one who had unrestricted and unchecked power, this was more an exception than the common norm.64 Most of the time, the king would follow the established path and follow the advice of his councilors. In fact, some years later, the councilors complained about Bonifaz, who they accused of being absent from his post and not fulfilling his duties. The councilors claimed that now it was necessary to send Antonio Valdés to Córdoba, who was someone of stronger arm than usual “para el castigo de los excesos de las personas poderosas, mirando por la administración de ella [the city], protección y defensa de los miserables.” The king conceded with a brief “como parece.”65

Evidently, experience was closely tied up with age. In 1651, the 35-year old Francisco de Herrera did not accept the *corregimiento* of Salamanca—a city in permanent turmoil, notorious for “los tumultos que de ordinario hay entre estudiantes y

63 AHN, Consejos, 13597, 2, N. 14 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de Córdoba” (Madrid, September 5, 1625).
64 Several scholars have already debunked such image, and have shown that the king’s power was in fact much limited. See, for example, Hespanha, *Visperas del Leviatán*; Ruth Mackay, *The Limits of Royal Authority: Resistance and Obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile* (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
65 AHN, Consejos, 13597, 2, N. 15 “Sobre la provisión del corregimiento de Córdoba en el licenciado don Antonio de Valdés” (Madrid, October 6, 1629).
Herrera justified his rejection by claiming that he was too young and inexperienced. He feared that he lacked “canas y experiencia” for holding such a tricky office. Thus, for an official, being old in the early modern world was not a disadvantage, quite the contrary. Melchor de Ávalos de Castillo was proposed for the *corregimiento* of Trujillo in Peru, and was praised for having “canas y autoridad.” In a text on the government of the Indies, the controversial Pedro Mexía de Ovando contended that the imperial officials should always be “con canas y talento.” This celebration of officials’ age held true even when they were extremely old and closer to their final days. Juan de Oñate was appointed inspector of the mines of Spain when he was 74 years old. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera held his last office in the Canaries (after having turned down several others) in 1660, at 73 years of age. Their acquired wisdom and knowledge was much appreciated and it usually surpassed other issues related to their old age—like lack of mobility, illnesses, or hearing impairment.

This respect for age went hand in hand with the early modern veneration for tradition. Political writers openly expressed their disdain for novelty and change. In his highly influential *Della ragion di stato*, Giovanni Botero devoted a whole section (“De no hacer novedad”) to this idea. He affirmed that there was nothing more loathsome for the good government that changing those things to which antiquity had given reputation.

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66 AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, N. 21 “Propone a don Juan de la Zarraga” (Madrid, March 18, 1645).
67 AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, “Carta de don Francisco de Herrera Enríquez a don Diego Riaño de Gamboa” (Toledo, June 20, 1651).
68 AGI, Lima, 275, f. 482 - 483v. “Sobre las calidades de corregidores” (Lima, April 20, 1612).
69 Pedro Mexía de Ovando, *Libro o memorial práctico de las cosas memorables que los reyes de España, y Consejo Supremo y Real de Indias han proueido para el gouierno politico del Nueuo Mundo* (Madrid, 1639), fol. 39. Mexía de Ovando is most famous for having written *La Ovandina*, a polemical compendium of genealogies of the American society, many of which were plainly invented by the author. The book soon was censored by the Inquisition, see Pedro Guibovich Pérez, *Censura, libros e inquisición en el Perú colonial, 1570-1754* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 2003), 196–198.
For the Italian writer, “la novedad trae consigo odio.” Thus, it was always wise to respect and follow ancient knowledge, ideas, and uses. Diego Saavedra Fajardo conveyed a similar idea and sentenced: “for there is no new thing under the Sun; the thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done, is that which shall be done. The persons are changed not the scenes, manners and customs are always the same.”71 The past served as constant example, and the experience of the officials made possible to navigate already known scenarios.

History was a fundamental source of knowledge, and, in consequence, of indirect experience. For the members of the early modern Spanish Empire the past was the greatest of teachers, and they eagerly looked back at it seeking examples that could shed light on the current issues.72 Above all, the Bible and the life of Jesus provided the best historical lessons and sources of inspiration. However, it was the Roman Empire which provided the main political framework and language under which the newborn empire was understood and explained.73

Nonetheless, the movement and experience of the officials put such ideals into question. They were in constant contact with the contingent world, in which there were many unforeseen factors and things did not necessarily go as planned. In fact, Saavedra Fajardo himself moderated his assertion, and a few pages later he acknowledged the importance of contingency, and the appearance of new unexpected and different circumstances. Thus, in a radically modern fashion, he warns against an excessive veneration of the past, and opens the door for novelty and change: “innovations are not

71 Saavedra Fajardo, The Royal Politician, 206.
73 Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France C. 1500-C. 1800 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), 11.
always dangerous; it is sometimes convenient to introduce them. Were there no alterations, the world would never be perfected.”

Because of the singularity of every situation, the past alone could not serve as a guide. It was also imperative to fully know the present, and the understanding of contemporary issues was only achieved either by direct experience or by the communication with someone possessing such experience.

The only way to gain experience was by actually doing: by moving, and having direct on-the-ground engagement with the world. Saavedra Fajardo advised against the idle and contemplative spirits that remained cloistered away. In this vein, a still young and ambitious Pedro Esteban Dávila complained of the few responsibilities and activities he had as governor of Tercera. He requested the king to give him another post, no matter where and how difficult it could be. Desperate, he claimed, “sáqueme V.M. de este rincón, que este puesto es para enviar viejos a descansar.”

Unsurprisingly, Spanish imperial officials tried to take advantage of their activities on the ground as much as possible. Their multiple services to the king took them across the empire and had them facing very diverse situations, people, and geographies, giving them great knowledge of things obscure for the rest. Not only officials with ample and proven experience like Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera believed so, but it was a widely spread idea. The soldier and writer Jacinto de Aguilar y Prado stated in 1623 that during his conversations and discussions with other soldiers they defended their opinions “no solamente [con] innumerables historias, pero [con] la misma

74 Saavedra Fajardo, *The Royal Politician*, 213.
75 According to Jeremy Robbins, this shift of interest in contemporary knowledge and experience prepared the ground for “breaking the intellectual hold of the authority of antiquity,” and for the emergence of a new modern science. Robbins, *Arts of Perception*, 77.
76 BNE, Mss/801, f. 11v-13v. Esteban Dávila, “Carta escrita al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus consejos de Guerra e Indias con Fernando de Sosa, general de la flota de Nueva España,” fol. 13v.
experiencia, madre de toda verdad.”\textsuperscript{77} Forty years later, Juan Francisco de Montemayor claimed, “la verdad solo puede juzgar dellas [of his actions and decisions] quien ha visto y tocado con las manos lo que hay y ha pasado en estas provincias.”\textsuperscript{78} He was trying to defend himself from the strong accusation against his violent actions during the 1660 revolt of the Indians of Oaxaca. Juan de Torres Castillo, one of the chroniclers of that revolt and a Montemayor’s aide, had a similar opinion. According to his account, when he got news of the revolt he conferred with don Antonio de Lara Mogrovejo, alcalde del crimen of Mexico, to inform the viceroy of what they deemed was a very dangerous situation, “por las muchas experiencias que [Lara Mogrovejo] tiene adquiridas del natural de los indios” because he had governed them in Guatemala.\textsuperscript{79}

Direct experience was highly valued not only by the officials, but by the society as a whole. Many other mobile subjects also claimed to hold the truth based on what they had seen, listened to, and felt. The missionary priest Domingo Fernández Navarrete introduced his description of China by reaffirming that chronicles written by direct witness were much more trustworthy. In his view, most of the things written in Europe about China and Asia were false. Thus, Fernández Navarrete assured readers that his narration, based upon his own “noticias, experiencias, vista de ojos,” as well as on conversations with other eyewitnesses, “noticiosos, experimentados, y testigos oculares en aquellas regiones,” would divert from and contradict most of published accounts.\textsuperscript{80}

Imperial officials, and the many other people who were permanently on the move, were

\textsuperscript{77} Aguilary y Prado, \textit{Compendio histórico}, fol. 69v.
\textsuperscript{78} “Juan Francisco de Montemayor: Ordenanzas de indios,” fol. 4.
\textsuperscript{79} Juan de Torres Castillo, \textit{Relación de lo sucedido en las provincias de Nexapa, Iztepex, y la Villa Alta, inquietudes de los indios... castigos en ellos hechos y satisfacción que se dió a la iusticia...} (Mexico: Juan Ruiz, 1662), 8.
\textsuperscript{80} Domingo Fernández Navarrete, \textit{Tratados históricos, políticos, éticos, y religiosos de la monarchía de China}. (Madrid: Imprenta Real, por J. García Infançon, a costa de F. Anisson, 1676), “Al pio y curioso lector.”
highly conscious of their circumstances, and bragged about their own tangible and direct experiences. They affirmed that because they had seen, heard, and touched the world, they had more credibility than any others to make opinions, judge, govern, and advise. They were what Serge Gruzinski rightfully identifies as the “experts” upon whose shoulders the global Spanish Empire was built.  

Transplanting Experiences across Imperial Spaces

The circulation of the officials was intense and worldwide. Historiography has usually emphasized the transmission of people, ideas, values, institutions, and even diseases from Europe to America, leaving aside the movement in the opposite direction. Nonetheless, there was also a sizable number of officials with experience in America who returned to Europe. They presented their services in the New World as credit for opting for posts in the Iberian Peninsula. In 1616, Don Juan de Toledo Meneses was the first candidate on the shortlist of proposed officials for the corregimiento of the city of Salamanca elaborated by the Council of Castile. In the brief summary of his merits and

81 Gruzinski, Las cuatro partes del mundo, 185–205.
82 See for example, Haring, The Spanish Empire in America; John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967); Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange; Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Pub. Co, 1972). In a pioneering work, John Elliot explored the impact of America in Europe’s culture, contending that it was minimum at first, but progressively, the Old and the New World were incorporated into one system of thought, an Atlantic World. The Old World and the New 1492-1650 (Cambridge [Eng.]: University Press, 1970). In recent years, scholars are beginning to trace the movement of ideas and goods from America to Europe. Marcy Norton studies the adaptation of Europeans to the consumption of tobacco and chocolate. Sacred Gifts, Profane, Pleasures: A History of Tobacco and Chocolate in the Atlantic World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). Likewise, the production in the field of the History of Science is vibrant, and historians are paying attention to the development of new knowledge in America and its impact upon Europe, see for example: Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001); Barrera-Osorio, Experiencing Nature; James Delbourgo and Nicholas Dew, eds., Science and Empire in the Atlantic World (New York: Routledge, 2008); Daniela Bleichmar et al., eds., Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, 1500-1800 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); Portuondo, Secret Science.
83 Cf. Chapter One.
experiences the councilors noted that he had started to serve the king 30 years before in the Indies, and from there—in an opposite direction to most other officials—he had passed to Flanders, where he acted under the patronage of the Archduke Albert. He was described as “cuerdo y de buenas partes.” No doubt, he had the favor of the councilors as they affirmed that his name had also been suggested for the corregimientos of Palencia, Badajoz, Las Cuatro Villas de la Costa de la Mar, Toro, Logroño, and Ronda y Marbella in two occasions. Even though Toledo de Meneses did not get the appointment on that occasion, he continued to be a usual candidate, and five years later the king finally named him corregidor of Salamanca. However, he did not last for a long time in such office, as he soon relinquished his post in order to join the duke of Alcalá in Rome.

Toledo Meneses was not the only indiano that served in Salamanca, and he definitively was not the only official with American experience acting in Europe. In that same 1616 shortlist, the councilors recommended don Francisco de Brizuela. He was the son of Melchor de Brizuela, who after serving in Peru went to Spain, and fought in Portugal. Then, he was part of Queen doña Ana’s entourage in El Escorial, where he also oversaw the building of that monastery. Finally, don Melchor was named corregidor of Mérida, where he died.

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84 Toledo Meneses was suggested for the office in Las Cuatro Villas three years earlier AHN, Consejos, 13600, N. 7 “Nombramiento para el corregimiento de las Cuatro Villas de la Costa de la Mar,” May 12, 1613.
85 In 1616 the King chose instead don Diego Pareja. AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, N. 9 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de la ciudad de Salamanca” (Madrid, February 5, 1616); AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, N. 11 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de la ciudad de Salamanca” (Madrid, October 16, 1621).
86 AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, N. 12
87 Francisco de Brizuela was also proposed for the government of Panama, and three years later, he appears serving as corregidor of Madrid. AGI, Panama, 85 “Propone personas para el cargo de gobernador y capitán general de la provincia de Tierra Firme y presidente de la Real Audiencia de ella” (Madrid, December 23, 1627); AHN, Consejos, 13620, 13, N. 12 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de Madrid” (Madrid, February 15, 1630).
88 Some other cases of successful officials with an American background are Pedro Suárez Lanchero who was appointed corregidor of Salamanca. Most of his merits were the services of his father and grandfather.
For these officials, as well as for the king and his councilors, the previous experience of these men across the Atlantic was not only much praiseworthy, but also deemed as valid and useful in the Old World. Indeed, for the inhabitants of the Spanish Empire, Europe and America, although each had its own intrinsic peculiarities, were profoundly intertwined and the experiences in one region could easily be translated into the other.

Perhaps, mining is one of the fields where it becomes clearer the impact of the American experience on the development of early modern science and technology, and also on the government of the empire. Juan de Oñate was a mining expert indeed. Although now he is more associated with the conquest of New Mexico, those activities were in fact just a break from his overall dedication to mining. Even his first services to the crown were connected to this field. In 1592, Oñate was appointed by the viceroy of New Spain, Luis de Velasco, as the alcalde mayor (chief magistrate) of the recently created Mining District in Mesquiqui Potosí. The Tlaxcalan Indians who lived in the area had shown some silver veins to the Spanish authorities, who rushed into their exploration and exploitation. Juan de Oñate was in charge of surveying the land and issuing the permits to establish residences and refining mills. He actively took part in the

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in America. AHN, Consejos, 13628, 3, N. 14 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de la ciudad de Salamanca” (Madrid, March 18, 1633). Diego de Agreda served for many years in the Indies before being proposed for the corregimiento of Córdoba. AHN, Consejos, 13597, 2, N. 6 “Nombra personas para el corregimiento de Córdoba” (Valladolid, October 2, 1602). Francisco de Alvarado y Velasco took part in the conquest of Chile, the Philipines, and New Galicia before returning to Spain as corregidor of Aranda and Sepúlveda. AHN, Consejos, 13606, 1, N. 13 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de Gibraltar” (Madrid, June 5, 1621). Diego de Rozas fought in Aragon and in the island of Tercera in Azores. Then he crossed the Atlantic. Fought Francis Drake in Cartagena, and stayed for a time in Havana. Later on, Rozas returned to Europe, served in La Mamora in North Africa, and held minor offices in the royal court before he was appointed corregidor of Betanzos and La Coruña AHN, Consejos, 13597, 1, N.14 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de las ciudades de La Coruña y Betanzos” (Madrid, November 8, 1630). Fernando de Saavedra, oidor of the Audience of Lima, was named corregidor of Murcia AHN, Consejos, 13619, N. 21 “Títulos de corregidor de Murcia y Cartagena para el licenciado don Fernando de Saavedra” (Madrid, July 9, 1648). There are many more examples in Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Los americanos en las órdenes nobiliarias, 2ª ed. (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1993).
founding of what soon would be known as San Luis de Potosí, the major silver mine of North America. However, not long after, he left his post in San Luis to fully dedicate himself to his personal project of settling New Mexico, a region that he governed between 1598 until 1608. This enterprise was mostly financed with the profit of his and his family’s silver mines in Zacatecas, to where he returned after his adventure as conquistador ended badly. For the next decade he was dedicated solely to his mines, something in which he excelled.

Juan de Oñate reflected some of his knowledge in his “Tratado de Re Metálica.” It is a short manual discussing the best available methods of ore beneficiation. In very technical language, the author describes the practices of mining: finding the silver veins, extracting the metals, and then, refining them. The document mostly focuses on the Patio process, which used mercury amalgamation to recover silver from the ore. It was invented in 1554 by Bartolomé de Medina in Pachuca, Mexico, and revolutionized the mining industry as it was much more efficient than smelting to refine silver. It is very likely that Juan de Oñate became a major proponent of this technique in Europe.

When in the 1620’s Oñate arrived in the Iberian Peninsula, he was widely known and respected. Antonio Rodríguez, a retainer of the duke of Alva, who at the time was serving as viceroy of Naples, kept the duke updated on the presence of Oñate in the court. The informant did not spare his praises to the Mexican: “le miro con particular respeto y

90 Juan de Oñate, “Tratado de re metálica,” in Nuevas leyes de las minas de España: 1625, ed. Homer E. Milford et al. (Santa Fe, N.M: Sunstone Press, 1998), 78–96. This treatise first appeared published as part of Mariano Cuevas, S. J., ed., La Puebla de los Angeles en el siglo XVII (México: Editorial Patria, 1945), 229–247. However, there is not an original copy of this treatise. The document published by Milford and Cuevas is an anonymous text, apparently written in the second half of the seventeenth century, but based on Oñate’s writings on metallurgy.
Oñate was much celebrated for his conquering adventures, as well as for his mining business and his richness, on proof of what he had brought precious metal objects as present to the king. Rodríguez told his patron that Oñate had generously offered the king his mining expertise to “wake up” the mines of Spain, which for so long had remained idle. He claimed that in Mexico, Oñate had “resurrected” previously exploited and abandoned mines, and that he hoped to do the same with slag heaps left by the Romans.

Many believed that thanks to the guidance and experience of Oñate it was possible to profit from the available mineral resources in Spain. Among these people was the king himself, who entrusted this Mexican with the recovery of the Spanish mining industry. On January 16, 1624 Philip IV created the Junta de Minas, the first board dedicated solely to the government and administration of the Iberian mines. It was given ample attributions and exclusive jurisdiction in anything related to the mines. Among its members was the powerful and ubiquitous count-duke of Olivares, as well as some other major figures of the imperial administration such as the marquis of Alenquer, Diego de Silva y Mendoza; the lawyers Baltazar Gilimón de la Mota, and Gregorio López Madera; and the Jesuit priest Hernando de Salazar—who later acted as Oñate’s will executor.

Their first task was to assess the evaluations and suggestions proposed by Oñate, after his inspection of the Spanish mines.93

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92 Universidad de Sevilla, Fondo Antiguo, A 109/085(134) Antonio Rodríguez, “Copia de una carta al duque de Alva, virrey de Nápoles, sobre los hechos de don Juan de Oñate y su venida a España.” (Madrid, January 1625), 2.

From 1624 to his death in 1626, Juan de Oñate dedicated soul and body to a full inspection of the major mines of Spain.\(^9^4\) He was in Burgos, Cartagena, Granada, and Guadalcanal.\(^9^5\) At his request, the king ordered the viceroy and _corregidores_ from Castile, Portugal, and Aragon to send inventories of the mines in their jurisdiction, as well as samples of their minerals. Oñate’s idea was to launch a major mining production, beginning with the abandoned mines. He was confident of the viability of his project and that the old mines still had minerals because either they had not been fully exploited, or the minerals had grown up again.\(^9^6\)

As a part of these inspections and of the activities of the recently established board, the 1584 mining code was reprinted in 1625 under the direction of Juan de Oñate.\(^9^7\) The 1584 code, issued by Phillip II, was known as the _Ordenanzas del Nuevo Cuaderno_ (the New Code Law). It was the first royal attempt to hold control over the Spanish mining centers by incorporating them into the property of the crown.\(^9^8\) While in the Oñate’s 1625 reprint some updates were made, there were no real major changes to the laws. It was mainly published because editions of the first ordinance were scarce, and some printing errors had to be fixed.\(^9^9\)

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\(^9^4\) Evidently, Juan de Oñate was not alone in this enterprise. As any early modern powerful person, he had with him an entourage of assistants and servants. Along the already mentioned Mexican Indigenous, he relied on the services of Juan de Rucavado. HL, Mss HM 1567 Juan de Oñate, “Nombramiento de Juan de Rucavado” (Guadalcanal, March 15, 1625).

\(^9^5\) Beerman, “The Death of an Old Conquistador,” 307–310; Simmons, _The Last Conquistador_, 194.

\(^9^6\) Relanzón López, _La minería española en la edad moderna_, 65.

\(^9^7\) Juan de Oñate, _Nuevas leyes y ordenanzas hechas por Su Magestad del rey don Filipe... cerca de la forma que se ha de tener... en el descubrimiento, labor y beneficio de las minas de oro, plata, acogue y otros metales... que... a espensa de don Juan de Oñate, adelantado del Nuevo Mexico, hizo imprimir Andrés de Carrasquilla..._ (Madrid: Luis Sánchez, 1625).

\(^9^8\) Relanzón López, _La minería española en la edad moderna_, 49.

Andrés de Carrasquilla, secretary of Juan de Oñate, was in charge of reprinting the mining statute and wrote its prologue. In it, he expands on his patron’s deeds: how he left his fortune and home, and despite his age, crossed the Atlantic to serve the king. More interesting are Carrasquilla’s arguments about the mining resources available in Spain and how the Spaniards related to them. He maintains that ancient Spaniards had rejected the riches at their home, leaving others, like the Romans or the Phoenicians, to benefit from them. Oñate’s secretary seems perplexed by the fact that Spaniards had traveled long distances looking for treasures that were already at home, although he remarks, “nada es tan nuestro como el Nuevo Mundo.” Carrasquilla thinks that Spaniards acted the same way as the American Indians, who gave away their gold and silver in exchange for meaningless glass beads. If the Indians had been braver, he adds, they might have crossed the ocean to find in Europe the wealth they rejected at home, just as the Spaniards did. According to the eulogistic writer, it was only thanks to Oñate’s vision and wisdom—derived from his great experience—that Spaniards were now realizing the enormous wealth laying under their feet, which, properly exploited, would ensure the fortune of the Monarchy.  

Juan de Oñate’s mining experience and expertise was not unique. He was part of a long tradition of America-based men dedicated to this activity. They were truly experts on the field, and were constantly renewing and improving it. They wrote treatises, did research and experiments, and came up with new inventions and methods. Overall, they were developing a state-of-the-art technology. For instance, the already-mentioned Bartolomé de Medina invented in 1554 the Patio process, which quickly became adopted throughout America. Some years later, in 1590, Alonso Barba perfected this method in

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100 Oñate, Nuevas leyes, 4–7.
South America by making a heat amalgamation. This reduced the time of the process to only a couple of hours.\footnote{Relanzón López, *La minería española en la edad moderna*, 34.} Carmen Salazar-Soler has studied the cases of several of these American mining experts who wrote letters and reports in order to guide the mining policies. Their expertise relied on their great first-hand experience on these matters. Not only that they lived and worked in mines for several years, but also studied them. Moreover, they acted as cultural passeurs, transmitting Western ideas to America, but also sharing the American (both Spanish and Indigenous) knowledge in Europe.\footnote{Carmen Salazar-Soler, “Los ‘expertos’ de la corona. Poder colonial y saber local en el Alto Perú de los siglos XVI y XVII,” *De Re Metallica* 13 (2009): 83–94.}

In this regard, it is widely accepted that much of the mining innovations came as a consequence of a creative entanglement of Western and American knowledge. However, the indigenous voices have been silenced and it remains difficult to clearly identify their contribution to the development of early modern science. Recently, Allison Bigelow has compared the translations (and misinterpretations) in English and German of Alonso de Barba’s *Arte de los metales* (the most important early modern mining treatise) to unveil the concepts that European translators did not fully understand, because they came not from Spanish, but because their origin was in Quechua and the Andean thought.\footnote{Allison Bigelow, “Incorporating Indigenous Knowledge into Extractive Economies: The Science of Colonial Silver,” *The Extractive Industries and Society* 3, no. 1 (2016): 117–123.}

Indeed, Juan de Oñate was not the first, nor the only, imperial official who proposed to apply and transfer his American mining experience into Spain. In 1649 the famous Alonso Barba also traveled to Spain in company of another Potosí miner, Agustín Núñez de Zamora, to analyze some recently discovered mines in Niebla, Andalusia.\footnote{Salazar-Soler, “Los ‘expertos’ de La Corona,” 91.}
1601, the captain Martín de Ocampo, a former corregidor of Cuenca, Peru, now back in Spain, wrote a memorial to the king. He hoped, in a similar vein to Oñate and Carrasquilla, to bring to the monarch’s attention the hidden treasures that laid in Castile, and from which the Crown was not fully profiting.\(^{105}\) He equally argued that the Spanish mines were not nearly exhausted. If they were not being exploited, it was because of Spaniards’ lack of proper knowledge and techniques.

Ocampo’s main focus was on the mercury mine of Almadén. He detailed the current process and costs of production of mercury—in which the crown took part by providing the mine and 150 workers (100 free moriscos and 50 forced workers)—and of its transportation to Seville.\(^{106}\) Ocampo proposed a new method to obtain and refine the mercury, which would be less expensive and more productive. He claimed that with this technique, which had been tested and proved in front of experts in the royal court, all the mercury needs in America would be satisfied. Thus, it would not be necessary to continue exploiting the mines of Huancavelica in Peru, and also incurring associated expenses: paying the workforce and the officials, buying the mercury for the miners, and financing its transportation. More importantly, the plan would help to rein in the abuses of the Indigenous people who were forced to work in the Peruvian mines in really poor conditions.\(^{107}\) He argued that his exposition was based on the “conocimiento y experiencia que ya se tiene de las cosas referidas.”\(^{108}\) He presented his experience as the best evidence to support his assertions.

\(^{105}\) BNE, R/17270(43) “El capitán Martín de Ocampo, corregidor que fue de la ciudad del Pirú, [...] ha hecho esta relació y apuntamientos, para por ella enterar a V. M/ del tesoro grande que tiene en las minas de azogue, que llaman del Almaden en este reyno,” 1601.

\(^{106}\) Ibid., fol. 287v.-288v.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., fol. 289.

\(^{108}\) Ibid., fol. 290v.
Martin de Ocampo’s proposal was not accepted. The Almadén mines continued to be exploited with the same methods by the Fugger, a powerful German family that banked several of the Crown’s activities. Nonetheless, Ocampo’s actions eventually gained him royal favor. In 1615 the king granted him the right to exploit, for thirty years, the mercury mines he had discovered in Canales, León. Moreover, the crown committed to buy him all the mercury that he would place in Seville.\(^{109}\) Ocampo had secured a quite profitable business.

Some years later, other *indianos* got involved in the activities of the mine of Almadén. In 1646 Juan Alonso de Bustamante built there the Oven of Aludeles, after he returned from Huancavelica, Peru, where ten years earlier the oven had been invented by Lope Saavedra Barba.\(^{110}\) In 1652 Diego de Sotomayor, a partner of Bustamante, asked to be rewarded for such improvement. The councilors of the Indies affirmed that the new technology had significantly improved the production of the mine, and the American need for mercury had been satisfied without having to buy it from Germany. They conceded, then, that it was appropriate to grant him immediately a *corregimiento* in Peru, as well as an *encomienda*, similar to how Bustamante had been favored.\(^{111}\)

\(^{109}\) “Asiento que se tomó por mandado de S. M. con el capitán Martín de Ocampo,” in Tomás González Carvajal, ed., *Registro y relación general de minas de la Corona de Castilla. Primera parte. Comprende los registros, relaciones y despachos tocantes a minas, en que se expresan los pueblos y sitios en que se hallaron*, vol. 1 (Madrid: Miguel de Burgos, 1832), 229–239.

\(^{110}\) Relanzón López, *La minería española en la edad moderna*, 34.

\(^{111}\) AGI, Lima, 8 “Consulta de la Cámara” (Madrid, May 24, 1652). The councilors don Francisco Zapata and don Juan González were of this opinion. However, the count of Castrillo and don Fadrique Enríquez contended that it was not required to reward Sotomayor right away, and it would be enough to have him proposed for future posts, which he could gain because of his merits. The king agreed with the latter, and ordered the Council to suggest Sotomayor for an office as soon as possible.
Codifying the Experience: The Informaciones de Méritos y Servicios

Evidently, Martín de Ocampo, Juan de Oñate, Diego de Sotomayor, and many others acted with the hope of having access to royal bounty. According to the precepts of the culture of patronage, described in the previous chapter, it was expected that the king would reward fairly and properly the services of his subjects. Therefore, imperial officials rushed to advertise all the services they performed. However, they needed to not only make claims about their (and their families’) many services, but also to prove them. The most common way in which the officials did this was through the Informaciones de méritos y servicios, a service record of the officials.

These documents, also often referred to as relaciones or probanzas, had been popular since the first years of the Spanish presence in America. The first Spanish conquistadores and officials in the New World—who were extremely mobile and carried out their activities in a variety of locales—used these documents to present their services to the far-away king and to request reward. The informaciones were also soon adopted by local indigenous elites who relied on them to consolidate their power. In fact, informaciones have proven to be a very rich historical source and scholars are using them in very clever ways, for instance, as windows into ideas of gender and identity, or into the notions and boundaries of idolatry.

The informaciones tended to be short documents (around four or five folios), and were usually handwritten, but there were also many officials who preferred to have their informaciones printed. These documents gave detailed information on how, when, and where officials had served the crown. Normally, they would state the date in which officials began serving, and then list all of the official’s activities. The officials would enumerate the posts in which they had served, their obligations, and how successful they were in achieving their goals. In these documents the officials outlined what they considered were their most important and outstanding achievements. I. A. A. Thompson correctly notes that, in concordance with the military ideal of the hidalgo, most of the services cast by royal officials were portrayed as of a military nature, and even those that were not connected to the military (like being member of the city council), were militarized as much as possible. The informaciones, he argues, represent an “ideological declaration” of the nature of royal service. The activities and behaviors exposed in them matched the archetypical image of the Castilian hidalgo. Similarly, Robert Folger in one of the few monographic studies of the informaciones, contends that through the process of writing and production of these texts the supplicants of royal favor assumed the image of an ideal subject of the king. According to Folger, this process led to the homogenization of the subjects and their services, thereby challenging the idea of a subjective authorship. The individual disappeared, and the documents were in fact “generated by a bureaucratic apparatus.”


116 Ibid., 284.

117 Robert Folger, Writing As Poaching: Interpellation And Self-Fashioning In Colonial Relaciones de Méritos y Servicios (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2011), 4, 10.
Although in many regards Folger’s argument is appealing and innovative, it is driven by a mistaken conception of the workings of the Spanish Empire’s political culture, which leads to a distorted view of the relaciones, the imperial service and servants, and of the structures and systems of power. Folger tries to apply to seventeenth-century Spanish America theories by Certeau, Althusser, and Foucault on the modern state, bureaucracy, and power. He finds in the Spanish Empire the perfect and absolute modern state, but overlooks the vast historiography that has renewed our understanding of the limits of the power and the capacity to control of the Spanish king. He bases his arguments on his readings of a few digitized relaciones, and of the laws (the Recopilaciones de Indias) that tried to regulate the process of royal reward. He sees those laws as rigid and fully coercive. Folger thinks of a Spanish bureaucracy that held tight and absolute control upon the subjects, who consequently were homogenized and standardized. Therefore, he claims that there was an “eradication of individuality, in our modern understanding.” However, his analysis fails to understand the nature of the much flexible and casuistic early modern Spanish legal and political system, as well as of the culture of patronage. For instance, he mistakenly affirms that “the principle that the prince awards with mercedes (offices and privileges) those who can prove their merits, or those of their ancestors, lost significance after the death of Philip II.” Curiously, Folger illustrates his arguments with the 1578 relación of Miguel de Cervantes. He defines it as “atypical” because, according to him, it was illegal that someone without connections to America requested a post there, and notes that “there is no trace of the ‘genius’ of the

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118 Ibid., 43.
119 Ibid., 130. See Chapter Two for a study, from an imperial and global perspective, of the practices and culture of patronage during the seventeenth century, and its central role in the ruling and workings of the empire.
creator of *Don Quijote.*” However, the first published book of Cervantes appeared in 1582, and more importantly, there was nothing unusual in the soldier and writer’s request. Thousands of men with very similar lives, and without any direct ties to the New World hoped to cross the Atlantic and change their fortunes there.

Officials could also use the *informaciones* to defend themselves from their enemies’ accusations, and to justify their failed services. In what might appear to present-day readers as a dramatic and grumbling tone, officials related the many sacrifices they had to endure to fulfill their duties and, usually, lamented their precarious situation that left them at the mercy of the king’s favor. Informaciones—like the letters of remission studied by Natalie Z. Davis—were, certainly, literary productions. They could acquire an epic tone, in which the official did lavished compliments on himself, presented himself as self-immolating, and basically claimed to be the reason for the survival of the Monarchy. As already mentioned, the officials fashioned stories that presented themselves as being in harmony with the archetypical image of the Spanish imperial official, who sacrificed his life in order to defend the king and Catholicism and always behaved honorably. Such letters did not necessarily expose the “truth” of past events, but instead revealed how these officials made sense of them, and how they incorporated fragments of their personal experiences into a larger discourse of royal service.

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120 Ibid., 43.
121 The language of poverty and misery, as a means of requesting royal favor, was well extended and engraved in Spanish political culture. Even the wealthiest and most powerful men of Spain expressed in those terms. The duke of Medina Sidonia, arguably the richest Spaniard, requested in 1588 two *encomiendas* for his children before accepting to command the *Armada Invencible* against England, because such office would leave his “family deeply in debt.” Quoted in Geoffrey Parker, *Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II* (Yale University Press, 2014), 289. Thompson, “La economía política del ‘servicio,’” 287–288.
Because in the early modern world there was not a clear separation between the public and private spheres, officials could often list as services to the king activities that now we would consider to be private, such as commercial enterprises, or writing a book. Moreover, not all services were provided for the king himself, but often to the abstract entity of “the Crown,” or in some cases to “the Republic.” Therefore, the king, who embodied the polity, had the obligation to reward past services done to his ancestors, as well as those activities that did not necessarily benefit him directly, but that were in favor of the community.

Royal service was never thought as an individual achievement. Quite to the contrary, it was a familial endeavor. When in 1699 the marquis of Villa Rubia requested to be appointed as corregidor of Huaylas in Peru, he claimed that he was “heredero y sucesor de los servicios y casa de don Juan de Garay y Otañez,” who had served the king in Catalonia several decades before. In fact, the marquis provided evidence not of his services, but of Juan de Garay’s. The councilors and the king considered the petition to be fair and granted the marquis the corregimiento. However, the sisters of the marquis protested the appointment. They argued that, as legitimate daughters of Simón Otañez del Campo Garay, they were also heirs of don Juan de Garay’s services, and that because of their pitiful current state the king should reward them instead. The councilors ruled, without providing any explanation, that the women did not have the right to claim either

123 Amongst his services, Juan Márquez Cabrera included the writing of his manual for soldiers (based upon his own military experiences in Italy, Catalonia, Portugal, and the Windward Islands) AGI, Indiferente, 124, N. 50 “Méritos: Juan Márquez Cabrera,” 1664. His book had been published that same year, and it was cleverly dedicated to the Council of the Indies. In the introduction he praised the power of the Spanish king as there was no other who “tenga más puestos y conveniencias que dar a sus soldados.” Juan Márquez Cabrera, Espejo en que se debe mirar el buen soldado (Madrid: Domingo García Morrás, 1664), 4. Four years later he was made governor of Honduras, and then of Florida. For a discussion of this book and the ideal of the Catholic soldier, see Chapter Five.

the inheritance or the services, and therefore should not object to their brother’s nomination. However, because of their miserable situation and the fact that they were indeed descendants of Juan de Garay, the king could display his natural clemency and bountifulness and provide them some kind of support.\textsuperscript{125}

Because imperial service was deemed as service to the crown, and because the king inherited the services done to his ancestors, officials also inherited the credit and the possibility of royal favor when such deeds had not been yet rewarded. Officials (and any person seeking royal favor) would list not only their services but those of their families and even their in-laws. Likewise, the mere fact of belonging to certain families or kin was considered a service by itself.\textsuperscript{126} In 1676, don Antonio Vélez de Medrano presented his \textit{informaciones} to the Council of Castile. After summarizing his current services as governor of Newport, in Flanders, and his actions in the military in Flanders, Catalonia, Extremadura, and Galicia, he presented the services rendered by his ancestors. He started with his father, the general don Pedro Vélez de Medrano; continued with his grandfather, don Antonio Vélez de Medrano y Mendoza and his great-grandfather, Rodrigo Vélez de Medrano, and finished with the father of this, his great-great grandfather, Hernán Vélez de Medrano. All had some experience of service to the king, and had moved across the empire, from Sicily to Brazil, and Malaga. Finally, don Antonio mentioned he was descendant and heir of Don Andres Vélez de Medrano who would have been favored by king don García, in some immemorial time.\textsuperscript{127} This official deemed the quality and the

\textsuperscript{125} AGI, Lima, 14 “Pretensión del marques de Villa Rubia del corregimiento de Huaylas” (Madrid, September 21, 1699).

\textsuperscript{126} Thompson, “La economía política del ‘servicio,’” 288–289.

\textsuperscript{127} AHN, Consejos, 4450, N. 26 “Méritos del sargento general don Antonio Vélez de Medrano,” April 13, 1676. He probably was referring to King Garcia, the Tremulous, who ruled Pamplona in the early eleventh century.
services of his lineage to be of similar or even greater importance than his own services. Moreover, his services could not be evaluated in isolation, but as part of his family tradition of service and loyalty to the crown.

Evidently the word of the officials was not enough to prove their services. They accompanied their memorials with letters and certifications from their peers, and especially from their superiors and patrons. In order to elaborate on the informaciones, witnesses were questioned. They were most commonly brought by the candidate to support the officials’ assertions. As the imperial institutions grew and became more sophisticated, official’s informaciones were checked against records in the imperial archives. The councils would corroborate and certify the information provided by the officials, making it official. The informaciones presented by don Sebastián de Seruela y Caxa in 1652 were verified by one of the secretaries of the Council of the Indies, who confirmed that “consta ser ciertos los servicios que presenta.”

Likewise, in 1639, Philip IV ordered a search of the Secretary of State’s papers to find information on how and in what circumstances his predecessors awarded grandees. Those archives—as any modern historian could testify—contained records of the informaciones and many other documents, and served as a source of knowledge and information for the crown. Robert Folger also pays special attention to the role played by the imperial archive, which he defines as “an imagined totality of information accumulated by state apparatuses.” He claims that the archive provided “a master-text that quashes the fictional, 'literary' potential of individuals written exchanges with the authorities, including relaciones de

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128 AGI, Lima, 8 “Consulta de la Cámara” (Madrid, September 4, 1652).
129 AHN, Estado, 674, 3 “Para que se busquen los ejemplares de la forma en que los señores reyes han hecho por lo pasado grandes” (El Retiro, January 24, 1639).
méritos y servicios.” Evidently, this total archive did not exist. Folger acknowledges this, and that such an archive could only be imagined. Notwithstanding, he chooses to read the informaciones as if ‘the Archive’ existed, obviating scholarly works that show its flexible, negotiated, and incomplete nature.

The informaciones circulated widely throughout the court. Imperial officials presented them to one or several of the king’s Councils. The use of these documents had been established and was common for many centuries in Castile. However, their use and number increased exponentially along with the growth of the monarchy and its institutions and the number of people involved in the imperial enterprises. This is why examples of informaciones abound in all of the archives, whether in Europe, America, or Asia. There are some collections devoted exclusively to holding these documents, and they can be found almost anywhere. They are perhaps the most common type of document in the early modern Spanish world. This by itself suggests the importance of the culture of patronage, royal service, reward, and the overall value of experience. Moreover, the informaciones inspired a major form of writing: the autobiography. Robert Folger argues that several literary works of the period—like Baltasar Dorantes de Carranza’s Sumaria relación, Alonso Borregán’s Crónica de la conquista del Peru, and Rodríguez Freyle’s El carnero—usually judged works of minor literary quality, should be read as part of this genre.

130 Folger, Writing as Poaching, 10–11.
131 Ibid., 15.
132 See, for example, Kathryn Burns, Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2010).
133 For a study on the use of these documents, and the dynamics of royal grace in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see Dios, Gracia, merced y patronazgo real.
134 Folger, Writing as Poaching, chap. 3.
As has been shown throughout this chapter, the *informaciones* were read and scrutinized by the councilors, who relied on them to assess the service and experience of the officials. In these documents, the mobility and expertise of imperial officials was codified. Councilors relied on these documents to choose candidates for different offices across the empire, as well as to support officials’ requests for favor and retribution. Moreover, the crown itself learned from them. The multiple testimonies of activities across the whole world provided the king with valuable on-the-ground information on his far-flung empire. When assembled, the scattered pieces and examples provide an impressive, comprehensive vision of the workings of the empire.

The experience of the imperial officials, which developed through their mobility and daily direct contact with diverse populations, became vital for ruling of the Spanish Empire, not only because experience made them better officials and helped them solve everyday problems of imperial rule, but because experience provided a major source of information and knowledge that had practical and immediate consequences on the imperial policies. Their experience around the world, in the most diverse locations, greatly shaped the ways in which the rest of the Spanish society thought and knew the world. Moreover, as it will be seen in the following chapter, official’s experiences of ruling and government circulated across the empire, and defined the ways in which they related with distinct imperial subjects and imposed the king’s authority.
Cosa conocida es que el Monarca de las Españas no solo es dueño del Nuevo Mundo, sino también que posee en Europa diferentes reinos y estados, provincias y ciudades, y que tiene dominio sobre varias naciones y vasallos con poder soberanos, pero es tan suave el yugo de su dominación que a cada cual de ellos permite gozar de sus fueros y gobernarse por sus leyes y estilo sin reducir a ninguno de sus estados en forma de provincia, aunque con derecho lo pudiera hacer con todos.\footnote{AHN, Estado, 671, N. 6 “Impreso anónimo sobre la posesión de América y Europa,” prob 1666, fol. 1.}

Y lo que principalmente se debe procurar es su pacificación, reducción y quietud y el desagravio de los indios.\footnote{AGI, Patronato 230A, R.1 “Delitos y castigo de los indios de Tecoquílco e Iztepec,” 1660, fol. 4.}

In 1610, Phillip III—following the advice of the Jesuit priest Luis de Valdivia and the viceroy of Peru, the marquis of Montesclaros—decided to conduct a “defensive war” against the Araucanians in South America.\footnote{On the Defensive War, its implementation and further discussion in favor of a renewal of an offensive approach in 1626 see Díaz Blanco, Razón de estado y buen gobierno.} This was a radically different way to engage with the indigenous population who fiercely rejected Spanish dominion. The new official policy sought to make peace with the Indians, stop the on-going war and military offensives, and rein in Spanish abuses of the natives. However, this strategy had many detractors. Four years later, Alonso González de Nájera, while governing the castle of Porto Ercole in Tuscany, finished writing his Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del reino de Chile.\footnote{BNE, Mss/10646 Alonso González de Nájera, “Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del reino de Chile: donde se manifiesta las principales ventajas que en ella tienen los indios a nuestros españoles y los engaños que de nuestra parte han sido causa de la dilación de su conquista...: dividido en cinco partes” (Puerto Hércules, 1614). The manuscript remained largely unknown until 1866 when it was published as part of the}
proposed a path to victory. The author expressed his disdain for the Araucanians, who he believed were little more than war-mongering barbarians. The only acceptable outcome, he argued, was to launch an offensive campaign against the Araucanians, defeat and enslave them, and then disperse them out throughout the viceroyalty.

The tension and continuous debate about how to impose royal authority reached beyond Chile and America and affected the whole empire. Spanish officials in Europe, Africa, America, and Asia reacted in very different ways to similar challenges to royal power. In the following pages, I will focus on the rebellions of the Araucanians, the Sangleys of Manila, the peasants of Córdoba, and on the expulsion of the moriscos. In the process, I will unveil the ways in which imperial officials perceived the rebels and dealt with the king’s enemies. Those attitudes and actions were informed by the immense number of preconceived notions, prejudices, stereotypes, and ideas about rulership and governmentality that circulated across the empire. I will also explore how officials worked to implement imperial authority across the global empire, and how their own personal experiences, as well as those of their colleagues, shaped their behavior.

There was not a unique way of imposing power; context was key. Imperial power, which worked under the pretense of being capable of homogenizing imperial subjects, was in fact dependent on local conditions and negotiations between local actors. What is monumental Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España: Alonso González de Nájera, *Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del reino de Chile* (Madrid: Imprenta de la viuda de Calero, 1866). Despite the fact of being a theme so specific to the American continent, “que tratan hechos, casos y usanzas tan peregrinas,” González de Nájera did not see any problem in dedicating his book to the viceroy of Naples, don Pedro Fernández de Castro, count of Lemos. In a clear global consciousness of the Spanish Empire, he argued that even though the events narrated were “exquisitas y de provincias apartadas,” the viceroy would find them of great interest and value, specially because of the curious spirit of the count who always was eager to learn more about “aquellas partes que menos comunican los de las nuestras.” (González de Nájera, “Desengaño y reparo,” fol. II.) No doubt that the count of Lemos should have had some interest on the Chilean matters, until 1608 he had been the President of the Council of the Indies, and they surely met in Madrid when the author was lobbying for his cause.
striking about this is that mobile officials, with little experience on the ground, were able to swiftly grasp particulars and adapt to new circumstances. These officials were aware of the uprising’s singularities, and sometimes understood and even sympathized with the rebels’ motives. At the same time, Spanish officials remained conscious of their imperial mission: to impose the Spanish king’s authority and spread the Catholic faith. These royal servants understood the global nature and impact of their actions. They did not think of their activities in service to the king as isolated events, but rather as activities connected to global events. They did not forget that their mission was imperial, and thus universal, even though it was always enforced in local and specific ways.

**The Imperial Mission: *Reducir***

The control of dissent and imposition of the monarch’s authority were expressed as the desire and need to “*reducir*” (to reduce) the other. This word is used repeatedly in the early modern Spanish documentation, regardless of the geographic location of the uprisings or the subjects in rebellion. González de Nájera contended that all of the governors of Chile had the authority to reduce the “naturals” (indigenous peoples) by soft and benevolent means, or by force.\(^5\) In 1660, Mexico’s Audience sought to achieve the “pacification, reduction and quietude” of the revolted Indians in Oaxaca.\(^6\) The *oidor* (judge) Juan Francisco Montemayor’s first service to the king was in the war that sought to “reduce to its obedience the principality of Catalonia.”\(^7\) In 1623, the Council of Castile, worried by the excesses of Córdoba’s elite, proposed don Antonio Chumacero de

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\(^7\) AGI, Indiferente, 116, N.3 “Méritos de Juan Francisco Montemayor y Córdoba de Cuenca,” fol. 12.
Sotomayor as *corregidor* (chief magistrate) of the city. Chumacero de Sotomayor had previously served the king by imposing his authority over the powerful elite of Asturias, and therefore appeared to be a fit candidate to “reduce [the noblemen of Córdoba] to the needed tranquility, respect and obedience.” Similarly, the Council of Castile praised Juan Barrio de Sepúlveda for having led the “reduction and pacification” of the revolted runaway slaves in Panama. Likewise, the news of the “probable reduction” of the rebels that rose up in Messina, Italy was soon widely published and celebrated across the Monarchy.

*Reducir* did not only refer to an ideal of dominion, or diminishing the other. Sebastián de Covarrubias, in the first comprehensive Spanish dictionary, defined “reducir” as “convencerse” (to be convinced), and “reducido” as “convencido y vuelto a mejor orden” (convinced and turned to a better order). Pedro Esteban Dávila used the word in that sense when he was the governor of Tercera in the Azores Islands and complained about the Portuguese who lived there. These new subjects of the Spanish king, he contended, were untrustworthy and disloyal, but unfortunately he was incapable of “persuading and reducing them.” In other words, they refused to collaborate with him and only recognized the Portuguese authorities despite his entreaties.

*Reducir* was an expression that summed up the officials’ wish to control the different peoples and societies that composed the Spanish Monarchy, and belied officials’

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8 AHN, Consejos, 13597, 2, N. 12 “Propone al licenciado Don Antonio Chumacero de Sotomayor para el Corregimiento de Córdoba” (Madrid, March 16, 1623).
9 AHN, Estado, 6402-1, N. 98 “El doctor Juan del Barrio de Sepúlveda, Oidor de Quito,” April 11, 1600.
10 *Avisos que ha traído un correo extraordinario, despachado de Nápoles a 2 de enero 1675 por el ... señor marqués de Astorga, virrey y capitán general de aquel reino, tocante al asedio y a la reducción probable de los amotinados de la ciudad de Mecina a la obediencia de S. Magestad* (Zaragoza: por los herederos de Diego Dormer, 1675).
12 BNE, Ms/801, f. 54v-58 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus consejos de estado y guerra con Thome Correa de Acosta” (Tercera, September 5, 1623), fol. 55.
strongly held conviction of the superior morality of the Spanish imperial enterprise. To *reducir* the Indians, the Sangleys, the *moriscos*, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Catalans, or the peasants and noblemen of Córdoba meant not only to appease their mood and subject them, but more importantly, to convince them of the benefits of subjugation. The goal was to incorporate them under the “better order,” which was Spanish and Catholic.

Officials commonly displayed a tendency to denigrate and diminish those who were to be reduced. Officials in the Philippines frequently made derogatory comments about the Chinese living in the archipelago, along with depictions of them as weak, cunning, and homosexual.\(^\text{13}\) Montemayor affirmed that the Mexican indigenous people were cowards by nature and “children of the lie.”\(^\text{14}\) Pedro García de Ovalle, a judge in Buenos Aires, asserted that the inhabitants of the Calchaquí Valley were “stubbornly rebellious,” a notion also conveyed by the governor of Tucumán, Alonso Mercado y Villacorta.\(^\text{15}\) For him, the Calchaquí tribes were sub-human and barbaric.\(^\text{16}\) All these officials held onto well-established stereotypes. In fact, Spanish officials often referred to the wretched and barbarian condition of the American Indians. These negative descriptions were not exclusive to the Chinese or the Indians, but were used to portray almost anyone. The king and the marquis of Castel Rodrigo, viceroy of Sardinia, discussed the need to fight against the neighboring Muslims, whom they perceived as nothing but barbarians.\(^\text{17}\) Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera also claimed that the peasants in Asturias, Spain were so rude that it was impossible to teach them anything.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{14}\) AGI, Patronato, 230A, R.4, f. 16-20 “Francisco de Montemayor al virrey” (Nexapa, August 23, 1661).
\(^{15}\) AGI, Charcas, 26, R. 15, N. 113, b “Pedro García de Ovalle” (Buenos Aires, May 16, 1665).
\(^{16}\) AGI, Charcas, 26, R. 15, N. 113, a “Carta del gobernador de Tucumán” (Esteco, January 27, 1665).
\(^{17}\) AHN, Estado, L. 100, f. 156 “Que se armen bajeles contra moros” (San Lázaro, October 24, 1661).
These negative representations were part and parcel of the rhetoric of a civilizing mission. The Spanish presence in America and Asia was justified as long as the Spaniards took care of and protected the natives, and raised their allegedly wretched condition. Such attitudes were part of the political culture of colonialism, which justified Spanish rule over, and the exploitation of, indigenous populations.19 Evidently, the other side of the Spanish “better order” was the other’s “worst order.” Such judgments by the royal officials served to justify their imperial mission overall. To reduce, then, was seen as the natural conclusion derived from both Spanish superiority as well as the perceived inferiority of an “other” who could not refuse, in moral or practical terms, the Spanish order.

The Araucanians of Chile

The indigenous population in the Araucania in southern Chile had been impossible to reduce to Spanish authority. They lived outside Spanish rule and fiercely rejected it, even attacking Spanish towns and garrisons. This ongoing intense war became a source of continuous concern for royal officials and chroniclers, as well as for today’s historians. Many documented this conflict as it occurred, and scholars have studied it from diverse perspectives.20 From at least the seventeenth century, the war was compared


20 One of the most famous works on this matters is Alonso de Ercilla’s La Araucana, its first part, out of three, was first published in 1569, and since then several editions have appeared. For a current English version, see Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga, The Araucaniad: A Version in English Poetry of Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga, trans. Charles Maxwell Lancaster and Paul Thomas Manchester (Nashville, TN: The Vanderbilt
to the concurrent conflict in Flanders; as a result, Chile was referred to as the “Flandes
Indiano.” 21 Both were endless wars, and in both the stubborn rebels were impossible to
defeat. In both scenarios, the Spanish military was credited as the most seasoned and
prestigious in the world. Their experience significantly shaped the war methods of
Spanish soldiers across the globe.

Moreover, many soldiers moved from one warfront to another. The
aforementioned Alonso González de Nájera, a veteran of Flanders, joined a company of
soldiers in 1600 that sailed to Chile to support the new governor, Alonso de Ribera, as
part of a new warring against the Araucanians. This offensive was a response to the
massive Indian rebellion that started in 1598 with the Disaster of Curalaba, in which
several Spaniards, including the governor, Martín Óñez de Loyola, were killed in an
ambush. In 1608, González de Nájera was commissioned by the governor don Alonso
García Ramón to return to Madrid to request more funds to continue the war. However,
his petitions were unsuccessful. 22 Not only was additional funding rejected, but the
overall strategy changed dramatically. Despite efforts by those who hoped to continue
aggressively attacking the Araucanians until their final surrender, the crown opted instead
for a more conservative approach by conducting a primarily defensive war strategy.

University Press, 2013). For contemporary studies, see Rolf Foerster G., Jesuitas y Mapuches: 1593-1767
(Santiago de Chile: Universitaria, 1996); Guillaume Boccara, Los vencedores: Historia del pueblo
mapuche en la época colonial, 2. ed. (San Pedro de Atacama, Chile: Línea Editorial IIAM, 2009).
21 The most outstanding example of this expression is the seventeenth-century text of the Spanish priest and
soldier Diego Rosales, which was first published two centuries later by Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna,
Historia general de el reyno de Chile, Flandes indiano (Valparaíso: Impr. del Mercurio, 1877). For studies
on the use of this term, see Carlos Lázaro Avila, Las fronteras de América y los “Flandes indios”
(Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Centro de Estudios Históricos, Departamento de
Historia de América, 1997), chap. 5; Baraibar, “Chile como un ‘Flandes indiano’ en las crónicas de los
siglos XVI y XVII.”
22 José Toribio Medina, “Introducción Biográfica,” in Desengaño y reparo de la guerra del reino de Chile,
by Alonso González de Nájera, ed. José Toribio Medina (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Ercilla, 1889), V–
VII.
This new policy was informed by the “reason of state,” which above all sought to preserve the polity. Royal authorities, namely the marquis of Montesclaros, viceroy of Peru, claimed that the war was too expensive and futile, so they argued for a change of approach that will allow them to conserve available resources. Curiously, it was the Jesuit priests, led by Luis de Valdivia, who introduced the idea of a defensive war. While in other regions of the empire there was a tension between the proposals of the radical Catholics (whose priority was to defend religion) and the exponents of the reason of state, the radical Catholics in Chile did not object to ceasing the military offensive there. In the American case, the mission of spreading and defending the Faith did not conflict with the new policy. This contrasts with the European scenario. In 1609, Phillip III also signed a treaty with the Dutch Republic, the “Twelve Years’ Truce.” This armistice was highly contested by the radical Catholics who urged the crown to continue the war in order to fulfill its duty to protect Catholicism and defeat heresy. Historian José Manuel Díaz Blanco contends that while the Dutch were considered plainly as heretics who consciously rejected Catholicism, the special condition of the American Indigenous peoples made it feasible for Catholic extremists to agree to stop the war. Conversely, the Dutch rebellion lacked any justification, and it had to be suppressed no matter the cost. The Jesuits viewed the rebellion of the Araucanians, however, as legitimate. Luis de Valdivia argued that the Indians were fighting against Spanish exploitation, and they had the right to fight tyranny. The solution, therefore, was to stop Spanish abuses. If the

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Araucanians were fairly treated, they would have no reason to rebel, and they would willingly embrace Catholicism and Spanish rule.²⁴

However, González de Nájera, who was suddenly without a job in Chile and had no reason to return to South America, had a different opinion. After serving as major sergeant in Castile, where he was commissioned to enforce the militia’s reforms outlined by the king’s favorite, the duke of Lerma, he was named governor of Porto Ercole in Tuscany.²⁵ During his time as governor, he finished his manuscript reflecting on the Chilean situation. _Desengaño y reparo_ is a heated exposition of González de Nájera’s warmongering opinions and his disdain for the indigenous population. For him, the Chilean natives possessed almost every possible defect: they were lazy, weak, cruel, lascivious, belligerent liars, idolaters, and drunkards.²⁶ He argued against the prevailing notion that the Araucanians were mighty fighters and almost impossible to defeat, noting that they were no stronger than any other peasants in the world. In fact, he made a detailed comparison between the Araucanians and the Castilian peasants to demonstrate that the former were by no means braver than the latter. The only reason for the Araucanians’ alleged ferocity was their uncouth appearance. If the Spanish peasants shaved and wore simpler clothes, González de Nájera argued, they would also look fearsome.²⁷

For González de Nájera, the explanations to why the Spanish could not win the war had to be found somewhere other than in the Araucanians. One important reason was the geography of the area. The Indians took advantage of the difficult terrain, familiar to

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²⁴ Ibid., 279–280.
²⁵ Centenero de Arce, “¿Una monarquía de lazos débiles?,” 148.
²⁷ Ibid., fol. 24–24v.
them, similar to the Swiss in the Alps or the *moriscos* in the Alpujarra mountains in Granada. The Araucanian cavalry also surpassed that of the Spaniards. Most importantly, González de Nájera contended that the Araucanian victories were due to the more than fifty fugitive Spaniards living among them. Some were mestizos, but the majority were “legitimate Spaniards” who changed their names, clothing, and physical appearance. He denied Indigenous rationality and agency and argued that those Spaniards taught Indians to fight according to Spanish strategies, helping them to surpass their natural limitations. The writings of González de Nájera present the effects of these cases of extreme Spanish mobility and fix the limits of movement as well as the boundaries that separated the Spanish from the others.

González de Nájera concluded that in order to defeat the Indians it was necessary not only to continue the war, but to amplify it. A change in strategy was also needed. To defeat the enemy, he advocated creating a permanent and ever-expanding fortified frontier from which the Araucanians could be raided and progressively pushed far south until their final conquest. At this point of the book, the most radical ideas of the author emerged. Because of the diabolical nature of the native population, he argued, it was impossible to trust them and make peace. He earnestly criticized those (like the Jesuit Valdivia) who supported such appeasement policies. He also contended that because of Indigenous natural aversion to anything Spanish, they would never truly and completely

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28 Ibid., fol. 57.
29 Ibid., fol. 67v.-73v.
30 Ibid., fol. 74–74v.
31 Rolena Adorno has studied the case of Gonzalo Guerrero, the alleged first conquistador that went native, to show Spanish anxieties on this regard. *The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), chap. 9. Likewise, the work of Inga Clendinnen has shown the confusion brought by the initial contact between the Spanish and the Indigenous people in Yucatan, *Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517-1570*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
assimilate into Spanish society. The soldier and writer believed there was little possibility of evangelizing the Araucanians, who would remain tethered to their idolatries. The only possible solution González de Nájera could conceive was to denaturalize the Indigenous population. This entailed a complete eradication of the natives from their homes and enslavement throughout the viceroyalty, in order to send them as far away as possible from their homeland and to separate them from each other. For the author, forced removal and enslavement of the Araucanians, represented a positive step in the right direction, as “it will be worthier that they live in other parts as slaves of Christians, than in their land as captives of the devil.”

**The Expulsion of the moriscos**

In order to support his drastic proposals, the governor of Porto Ercole looked to the recent process of expulsion of the *moriscos*, the Muslims that after the Reconquista were allowed to remain in the Iberian Peninsula once converted and baptized, from Spain as a model. This “praiseworthy” action, in his own words, kept the kingdom free of such “suspicious and unworthy vassals,” and prevented them from harming the Christians. For him, his proposal was even more beneficial. While the *moriscos* had been sent back to Africa to continue in their infidelity, he planned to distribute the enslaved Araucanians among Christians that ultimately would guide them and teach them. Indeed, from 1609 to 1614 the Spanish crown put in action an aggressive policy of

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33 Ibid., fol. 190v. This brutal policy was put into practice several decades later by Alonso Mercado y Villacorta against the Indigenous Calchaquies, in Tucumán. See Giudicelli, “De la déportation à l’invisibilisation.”
34 The term *moriscos* is a short form of “nuevos cristianos de moro.”
expelling (mostly to North Africa) more than 280,000 *moriscos* that lived in the Iberian Peninsula.\(^{36}\)

That González de Nájera chose the expulsion of the *moriscos* as the paradigmatic case to be imitated in America should not come as a surprise. One of the executors of that deportation was captain Alonso de Sotomayor, a well-reputed official who had served in the wars in Europe and then in America as governor of Panama and Chile.\(^{37}\) Back in Spain, at the end of 1609 he accepted a commission to direct and coordinate the expulsion of the *moriscos* living in Toledo and La Mancha.\(^{38}\) Sotomayor and González de Nájera had actually met in Madrid circa 1608. The former was then serving as councilor in the Council of War, and sat on the board that discussed González de Nájera’s request to support the war in Chile. The erstwhile governor of Chile was also a vocal defender of the offensive war against the Araucanians. In *Desengaño y reparo*, González de Nájera openly praised Sotomayor and proudly affirmed that the two of them shared the same opinions about Chile.\(^{39}\) It is plausible that in those meetings they also spoke about the *moriscos* and the “solution” that Sotomayor would soon lead in Toledo.

I am not arguing that González de Nájera and Sotomayor were the masterminds or the ideologues behind the deportation of the *moriscos* or the denaturalization of the


American natives. But for these enforcers of the king’s authority—and, in general, for the rest of Spanish society—the struggles against the Araucanians and the *moriscos* were hot topics that could be easily related. Around the same time, the priest Reginaldo de Lizárraga saw striking similarities between the Muslims and the Araucanians and affirmed that the latter “believe that after death they go beyond the sea, where they have many women, and get drunk. It is the paradise of Mohammed.”\(^{40}\) Although *moriscos* and Indians had their own long and specific histories, Lizárraga interpreted those histories from the same starting point: the preeminence of the King’s law and of the Catholic religion. Imperial officials shared the goal of imposing and defending the empire’s rule and religion everywhere on the globe. This mission brought them together and gave them a common identity. There was, in fact, a common and imperial understanding of the problems that affected imperial hegemony.

In addition, there were practical similarities between the challenges of dealing with the American Indigenous population and the *moriscos*. After the Catholic Kings finished the Reconquista in 1492, they faced the problem of incorporating the majority of the population, which was Muslim and Arab-speaking, into their legal and social system. At first, Muslims were allowed to practice their religion freely, but soon, less tolerant opinions prevailed, and Muslims were forced to be baptized and convert to Catholicism. A massive and difficult process of evangelization of non-Spanish speaking populations took place in the Iberian Peninsula. The resemblance between this process and the evangelization of America did not escape the eye of the Jesuit Cristóforo Rodríguez, who in 1556 tried to convince Ignacio de Loyola of the necessity and benefits of taking part in

the evangelization of the *moriscos*. He argued that if just two priests were ordered to participate in such an enterprise, “the Lord would open here other Indies.” The American case appeared as the archetype of evangelization, and a model for Europe.

It is worth underscoring the synchrony of the events in America and in Europe. Scholars have often assumed that the Spanish Monarchy was a well-defined polity when the Spanish arrived in America. However, the Spanish Empire was being built at the same time in those two regions, usually by the same people. The conquest and incorporation of different peoples, the effort to rule under one religion, and the imposition of the institutions of justice, taxation, military, and political government were undertaken almost simultaneously in Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and the Atlantic islands. Significantly, an exchange of experiences and expert knowledge shaped the process not only in America and Asia but also in Europe. The people who undertook the evangelization of America learned a great deal from the same processes in Granada (and many of them took part in both campaigns), but the conversion of the Amerindians also served as example and guide for the Old World. Drawing on what he considered the positive experience of evangelizing the Amerindians, the Franciscan Diego Valadés published a textbook for priests in which he argued for the intense use of images to aid the transmission of concepts to the “rude” Italian peasants. Likewise, when the celebrated bishop of Puebla, Juan de Palafox, returned to Spain, he decided to use the

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41 Quoted in Adriano Prosperi, “‘Otras Indias’: Missionari della Controriforma tra contadini e selvaggi,” in *Scienze, credenze occulte, livelli di cultura: Convegno Internazionale di Studi: (Firenze, 26-30 Giugno 1980)*, by Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1982), 207.
43 Prosperi, “‘Otras Indias’: Missionari della Controriforma tra contadini e selvaggi,” 224.
communicative strategies (mostly visual, but also sermons) that he had learned in the New World to convert the “rustic” Castilian farmers.  

However, not everyone wanted to convert the moriscos. Many believed that such an enterprise was doomed to fail, mainly because of morisco reticence to abandon their religion and customs and truly assimilate into Spanish society. Moriscos’ loyalty to the Spanish crown was called into question. They were portrayed as an internal enemy, much like the “fifth column” of the Ottoman Empire. It seems that most of the Christian population despised the moriscos. While priests were generally more condescending with the Indigenous people regarding heterodox Catholicism, they were much less tolerant with morisco “deviations.” The main difference is to be found, once again, in the notion of the Amerindians as wretched and undeveloped children. Their failures were to be reprimanded, but ultimately forgiven. Moriscos, on the other hand, were considered apostates. Their deliberate rejection of Catholicism could neither be tolerated nor forgiven.

46 Domínguez Ortiz and Vincent, Historia de los moriscos, 129–155. Nonetheless, there were some important exceptions, like Miguel de Cervantes, who portrays a rather sympathetic vision of the moriscos. (Don Quixote, second part, chaps. LIV, LXIII. See also Stuart B. Schwartz, All Can Be Saved: Religious Tolerance and Salvation in the Iberian Atlantic World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). For an analysis of the ideas and representations about the moriscos that were debated in the seventeenth century, especially from the time of the Expulsion and onwards, see Antonio Feros, “Rhetorics of the Expulsion,” in The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain, 60–101.
47 Bernardo Pérez de Chinchón affirmed that it was easier to convert an Indigenous person than a Muslim. Libro llamado antialcorán, que quiere dezir contra El Alcorán de Mahoma: repartido en veynte y seys sermons (Salamanca: Juan y Andrés Renaut. A costa de Claudio Curlet, 1595), 322.
Hardliners against the *moriscos* advocated their expulsion, and celebrated when Phillip III took this very step in 1609.\(^\text{48}\) The priest Pedro Aznar Cardona penned a fierce diatribe against the *moriscos* and justified their expulsion based on their “natural rejection” of Christianity.\(^\text{49}\) The repudiation of the *moriscos* revealed the most intolerant aspects of Spanish society. The advocates of the expulsion wished to eradicate all signs of difference. The priest Damián Fonseca, in a brutally honest passage, contended that the forced deportation was justified because *moriscos* sought freedom of conscience.\(^\text{50}\) For this author, the mere desire for religious tolerance deserved punishment. Under the premises of imperial Catholicism, it was the Monarchy’s duty to fight and exterminate heresy and religious deviation.

**The Slaughter of the Sangleys**

The expulsion of the *moriscos* undoubtedly set a precedent for many of those who feared and rejected difference, usually expressed in terms of religious difference. Religion, however, was not only about faith, but about culture and civilization generally. The 1609 forced deportation served as an example—and even as an ideal in other parts of the world—of how to impose Spanish civilization, which some imperial officials understood, or at least desired, as unique and exclusive. Throughout the seventeenth century, the authorities of the Philippines (almost the antipodes of the Peninsula and the

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\(^{48}\) Antonio Feros points out that the expulsion of the *moriscos* was carried out in 1609 to divert the criticism that the Monarchy was facing because of the truce signed with the Dutch rebels. By expelling the Muslims, Phillip III was still able to expose his militant Catholicism and please the most radical defenders of the imperial Catholicism. *Kingship and Favoritism*, 204.

\(^{49}\) Pedro Aznar Cardona, *Expulsión justificada de los moriscos españoles y suma de las excellencias christianas de nuestro rey don Felipe el Catholico Tercero* (Huesca: Pedro Cabarte, 1612), pt. 2, 3v.-4.

\(^{50}\) Damián Fonseca O. P., *Iusta expulsion de los moriscos de España: con la instrucccion, apostasia, y traycion dellos: y respuesta á las dudas que se ofrecieron acerca desta materia* (Roma: Giacomo Mascardo, 1612), 126–127.
moriscos) made several references to the expulsion of the moriscos and proposed this method as a solution to their own problems. At the time, Manila was one of the most cosmopolitan cities of the world, a major hub in Southeast Asia, and a crossroads and melting pot where Philippine natives, Chinese, Japanese, Indians, Armenians, American Indians, Spanish Americans, Europeans, and Africans met and lived. Such groups arrived with their own languages, dresses, and culture, as well as various religions, from Islam, to Confucianism, to native practices.\footnote{Even halfway through the eighteenth century, Manila was still a vibrant and diverse city. The Jesuit Pedro Murillo Velarde, in his 1740 account, is very telling on this regard: “Estando una hora en el Tuley o Puente de Manila se verán pasar casi todas las naciones de Europa, Asia, América y África; se verán sus trajes y se oirán sus lenguas. El prodigio es que todos estos para comunicarse entre sí hablan en español; pero cómo. Cada nación ha formado una jerigonza por donde se entienden. Y oí un día un gran pleito entre un sangley, un armenio y creo que un malabar; todos hablaban español y yo no entendía a ninguno, por no haber estudiado entonces sus vocabularios.” Quoted in Antonio García-Abásolo, “Los chinos y el modelo colonial español en Filipinas,” Cuadernos de Historia Moderna (April 11, 2012): 234.}

Not surprisingly, coexistence in the islands proved hard. Most of the tensions involved the large Chinese population, which Spanish called sangleyes.\footnote{According to the governor Francisco de Sande, the term sangley meant “people that come and go.” AGI, Filipinas, 6, R. 3, N. 25 “Carta de Sande dando cuenta de su llegada y de la situación” (Manila, June 7, 1576). For a comprehensive study of the Chinese in Manila see Juan Gil, Los chinos en Manila (siglos XVI y XVII) (Lisboa: Centro Científico e Cultural de Macau, 2011).} Their situation was peculiar as they crisscrossed between two empires, and theoretically, were not subjects of the Spanish Monarch. They paid for a license to live in the islands and be governed under the Spanish laws, and were placed within a specific quarter called the “Parián” that changed location many times over the years, but always remained outside the walls of Manila and within a cannonball’s range. They fulfilled all kinds of needs and became essential to the Manilan economy. They were the providers of cheap and much needed goods and workers.\footnote{García-Abásolo, “Los chinos y el modelo colonial,” 231.} Such was their growth that in just a few years they greatly
outnumbered the Spanish population. Throughout the seventeenth century, Sangleys numbered around 20,000-30,000, while the Spanish hardly reached 2,000.\textsuperscript{54}

The relationship between the Spanish and the Sangleys was tense and rife of conflict. When analyzing this relationship, there are two opposing perspectives. On the one hand, Antonio García-Abásolo affirms that despite of some violent events and the deep cultural and religious differences, in the end, a pragmatic approach prevailed and “every necessary accommodation was made to create an environment of understanding and amicable coexistence.” This was, then, a model of coexistence in the early modern globalized world.\textsuperscript{55} On the other hand, Manel Ollé argues that the extreme violence and continuous conflict between these two groups should not be overlooked or underestimated. For this historian, violence was at the core of the Chinese-Spanish relationship, which was anything but amicable.\textsuperscript{56} Both scholars concur in pointing out that the root of the problems was the cultural differences that seemed insurmountable. García-Abásolo highlights Spanish efforts to assimilate Sangleys and baptize them.\textsuperscript{57} However, Ollé emphasizes that integration was never possible because of Spanish authorities’ intolerance and Chinese unwillingness to integrate.\textsuperscript{58}

Certainly, the high levels of violence (both physical as well as rhetorical) against the Chinese make it difficult to envision a harmonic society. Spaniards distrusted and scorned the Sangleys, but they also exploited and, ultimately, depended on them. Some

\begin{footnotes}
\item[54] Ibid., 236. There is no demographic information for the native population.
\item[55] Ibid., 223.
\item[57] García-Abásolo, “Los chinos y el modelo colonial,” 268.
\item[58] According to Ollé, Sangleys lived isolated and continued practicing their rituals and customs, and kept strong ties with their homeland, “Interacción y conflicto,” 65, 79.
\end{footnotes}
Spaniards denounced the abuses against the Sangleys, but they remained a minority.\textsuperscript{59}

Overall, a negative vision of the Chinese prevailed. The Spanish constantly insisted upon the dishonest character of the Chinese, mostly based on their allegedly sodomitic practices.\textsuperscript{60} The governor Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera claimed that the Sangleys were the “most spiritless and fearful” people that he had met.\textsuperscript{61} Likewise, Manila’s attorney, Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, considered the Chinese to be “too seditious, cunning, and bribers.”\textsuperscript{62} As Manel Ollé rightly points out, those depictions contrasted with the idealized descriptions of China, usually presented as a highly civilized and ordered kingdom, full of richness and knowledge, and lacking only Catholicism.\textsuperscript{63}

One of the climatic points in this tense and conflictive relationship that highlights the extent of Spanish anxiety, violence, and near absence of consideration for Sangley lives, can be found in the 1639 Sangley revolt. On November 19\textsuperscript{th}, a group of Sangleys assaulted the house of Luis Arias de Mora, governor of the town of Calamba, thirty-four miles south of Manila, at the shores of Lake Bay. The rebels burned the house down and killed the Spanish official, as well as a priest who was with him. This triggered a full-scale revolt across the island that lasted more than four months.\textsuperscript{64} The causes of the uprising are still not clear. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, the governor of the

\textsuperscript{59} That was, for instance, the position of Domingo de Salazar, bishop of the Philippines. AGI, Filipinas 6, R. 10, N. 180 Domingo de Salazar, “Memorial sobre el estado de las islas” (Manila, June 12, 1582).
\textsuperscript{60} Ollé, “Interacción y conflicto,” 68. Depictions of sodomy have been used as a common denigratory trope, see, for example, Peter Herman Sigal, ed., \textit{Infamous Desire: Male Homosexuality in Colonial Latin America} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Zeb Tortorici, “‘Heran todos putos’: Sodomial Subcultures and Disordered Desire in Early Colonial Mexico,” \textit{Ethnohistory} 54, no. 1 (December 21, 2007): 35–67.
\textsuperscript{61} Letter of Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera to the king, June 30, 1636 in Francisco Navas del Valle and Pablo Pastells S.J., \textit{Colección general de documentos relativos a las islas Filipinas existentes en el Archivo de Indias de Sevilla (CGIF)}, vol. 8 (Barcelona: Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 1933), CCXLVI.
\textsuperscript{62} AGI, Filipinas, 27, N. 51, “Petición del procurador Ríos Coronel sobre varios asuntos.”
\textsuperscript{63} Ollé, “Interacción y conflicto,” 68.
\textsuperscript{64} Gil has a detailed comparison of all the revolt’s available narrations. \textit{Los chinos en Manila}, 491–513.
archipelago at the time, and his supporters argued that this was part of a major anti-Spanish conspiracy with ties across the entire region that included Dutch and Chinese enemies, most remarkably the Chinese pirate Zheng Zhilong, who was supposed to give naval support to the rebels. However, they claimed, the Sangleys of Calamba rushed and did not wait long enough for the others, who were not fully prepared to step into the action. Conversely, scholars have claimed that this was a largely local uprising against exploitation and abuses. Charles J. McCarthy even argues that the conspiracy never existed, and that Hurtado de Corcuera invented it to diminish his own culpability and to increase the prestige of his victories.

Whether or not there was a major conspiracy, these events shattered the fragile foundations of Spanish hegemony in the archipelago. The pronounced demographic imbalance, the constant rejection of the Sangleys, and the poor conditions in which the Sangleys lived, bred rebellion, which terrified the Spanish. The idea of a Sangley mutiny was a permanent source of anxiety and concern for the Spaniards; the possibility of an international offensive against the rather weak Spanish presence in Asia always loomed. Hurtado de Corcuera’s conspiracy speaks to an image of the Sangleys as the fifth column of the Chinese empire, similar to how the moriscos and the Ottomans were seen.

The news of the killing of Arias de Mora spread like wildfire, and Sangleys from various towns joined the rebellion. Although the insurgents were mostly unarmed, it

65 Hurtado de Corcuera, *Memorial de D. Sevastián Hurtado de Corcuera*, fol. 2–2v; BNE, Mss/2371, f. 602-603v. Anonymous, “Relación verdadera del levantamiento de los sangleyes, en las Filipinas, y de las vitorias que tuvo contra ellos el gobernador don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, el año pasado de 1640 1641” (Madrid, 1642).
68 A few years before the revolt, Manila’s attorney, worried by the large presence of Sangleys, warned of a possible revolt: AGI, Filipinas, 27, N. 207 “Sobre peligro de chinos y japoneses,” February 11, 1636.
presented a truly dangerous situation for the authorities. Thousands of Sangleys converged, attacking Spanish churches and buildings and killing anyone they could: Spanish fears had become a reality. Hurtado de Corcuera’s response was nothing less than ruthless. He recruited every available man, including the Spanish, “as well as Indians, mestizos, Japanese, and free blacks,” and conducted a merciless attack. He ordered that all the Spanish in Manila “should kill the Sangleys whom they kept.” The command was carried out immediately and on December 2nd “they slaughtered all the Sangleys that were in Manila.” Later on, Hurtado de Corcuera ordered the Parián, the Chinese borough, to be burned down.

After several weeks of intense fighting across the island, the few still living Sangleys surrendered unconditionally, and by March of 1640, the revolt had been completely quashed. The toll of this repression is shocking: while only fifty Spanish and 300 Indians perished, around 20,000 Sangleys were slain, almost the entire Chinese population in the island was annihilated. Some of the imprisoned Sangleys were sent to the galleys, while others were distributed as slaves. Despite the brutality and cruelty displayed against the Chinese, the Crown did not find necessary to reprehend Hurtado de Corcuera. As seen in Chapter Two, the governor after his term was subjected to an

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71 Father Murillo “Historia de las Filipinas” Lib. II, Cap. VIII in CGIF, 8:CCXLIX; Anonymous, “Relation of the Insurrection of the Chinese,” 249; Gil, Los chinos en Manila, 506; The Chinese population was around the 30,000 people prior to the revolt: Ollé, “Interacción y conflicto,” 77.
72 Gil, Los chinos en Manila, 509. For the enslavement of Asians in Manila, and their further export to Mexico, see Tatiana Seijas, Asian Slaves in Colonial Mexico: From Chinos to Indians (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
73 After all, such conflicts and fierce repression were not unusual: Sangleys revolted in 1603, 1639, 1662, and 1686. All of those rebellions ended with the extreme use of violence, see Miguel Rodríguez Maldonado, Relación verdadera del levantamiento de los sangleyes en las filipinas, y el milagroso castigo
unusually harsh inspection, and spent more than five years in prison. Yet in the more than fifty charges against him, there is none condemning his actions against the Chinese.\textsuperscript{74}

Once Hurtado de Corcuera defeated the revolt, he sent news of his victory to China and invited Chinese merchants to return to the island.\textsuperscript{75} Although one might think that after such a dramatic episode the Chinese would have been more wary about going to the Philippines, it seems they did not condemn the massacre nor make any sort of reprisal. Indeed, despite Spanish fears and the harsh treatment Chinese had to bear, the two parties were mutually dependent on each other. The viceroy of Mexico, the duke of Escalona, bluntly expressed this radical pragmatic view. At the same time he rejoiced at Spanish victory, he acknowledged that the killing of almost all the Sangleys had been extremely costly and prejudicial for Spanish interests because the Chinese “although they are bad blood, they still feed.”\textsuperscript{76} It did not take long before a return to normalcy, and soon thousands of Chinese resettled under the same, or even worse, conditions.\textsuperscript{77} As shocking and sad as it might be, the bloodbath of the Sangleys did not have any major effect or consequences.\textsuperscript{78}

The large, undesired, but desperately-needed Chinese population in the Philippines raised several issues that were hard for the Spanish authorities and society to solve. In an anonymous fictional dialogue written at the end of the seventeenth century, a

\textsuperscript{74} AGI, Filipinas, 2, N. 172 “Consulta sobre residencia de Hurtado de Corcuera.”
\textsuperscript{75} Anonymous, “Relación verdadera del levantamiento de los sangleyes,” fol. 603v.
\textsuperscript{76} “Letter of the viceroy of Mexico, duke of Escalona. January, 1 1641,” in \textit{CGIF}, 8:CCXLVII.
\textsuperscript{77} Hurtado de Corcuera raised the cost of Sangleys’ license from eight to ten pesos. Sebastián Cavallero, “Fiscal’s Report on Sangley Licenses. Manila, 1644,” in \textit{The Philippine Islands}, vol. 35, 186.
\textsuperscript{78} García-Abásolo, “Los chinos y el modelo colonial,” 235. The collected trade taxes remained similar to previous years: Gil, \textit{Los chinos en Manila}, 512.
Spaniard and an Armenian debated the two groups’ complex and difficult coexistence. The Armenian appears perplexed in the face of the enormous number of Chinese who lived in the Asian archipelago with absolute freedom, while acting against Spanish goals and values. He even argues that Sangleys were the true lords of the Philippines and that the Spanish did not hold real dominion. After all, the Spanish were dependent on the Sangleys for almost every aspect of their lives, especially in the area of trade and commerce. The Armenian then asserts that the only thing of real value the Spanish possessed was their silver, which did not give them any more authority in the Philippines than in any other kingdom where they could trade. The Armenian continued by highlighting the counter-productive effects of Sangley behavior on the religious indoctrination of the natives of the island, which was, ultimately, the justification for Spanish rule. For him, the Spanish were betraying God and the king: Instead of teaching the “poor naturals” properly, they were left to be contaminated by the Sangleys. The Armenian concluded his diatribe by comparing the Sangleys with the moriscos, who, according to this character, also poisoned Spanish society. Claiming that similar problems required similar solutions, he saw no other answer but to expel the Sangleys from the Philippines once and for all. Thus, almost a century after the fact, the expulsion of the moriscos remained a powerful image and a compelling precedent.

Similarly, the Dominican Jacinto Samper wrote in 1682 an enraged report suggesting that no Sangley should be allowed in the islands. He claimed that because of

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79 BNE, Mss/11014, fol. 1-25v. “Diálogo y conversación entre un español y un armenio contra los Chinos sangleis que vienen a Manila.” The text is not dated, but it mentions the 1686 Royal Decree expelling the Sangleys, and it probably was written around that time. The author was likely a Dominican priest, whose order was pressing for the expulsion of the Sangleys.
80 Ibid., fol. 2–2v.
81 Ibid., fol. 9.
82 Ibid., fol. 11.
83 Ibid., fol. 20.
their atheism they were even more despicable than the *moriscos*, who at least “confessed one god.” In 1677, another Dominican, the Florentine Victorio Riccio, who had lived several years in the Philippines and in China, argued, just like the fictitious Armenian, that the Sangleys were infidels and sodomites. In his view, they were damaging the political body and were a bad influence to the Indians. Their trade also conflicted with Spanish interests, as only they profited from it. These and many other brash testimonies pushed the Crown to approve the expulsion of all the Sangleys who were not baptized on November 14th, 1686.

Nonetheless, as had also been the case with the *moriscos*, many Spaniards opposed the expulsion. Although the city council of Manila agreed on the pernicious character of the Sangleys, it advocated not expelling them, but rather “reducing” them and keeping them tightly controlled in the Parián. In 1667, the Jesuit Francisco Combes offered reasons for why the Sangleys should remain in the Philippines. While he acknowledged that on several occasions they had revolted against Spanish rule, he thought they could still be controlled. In a rather pragmatic argument, he described the Sangleys’ importance, and the many professions and services they fulfilled that the indigenous population could not replace. In another essay, an anonymous writer argued, point by point, against Riccio’s proposals. The author claimed that the Sangleys, while sinners, could easily live among the Christians (just like the Jews and Heretics did in

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84 AGI, Filipinas, 28, N. 131, 962 - 968v. fr. Jacinto Samper, “Informe a favor de la expulsión de los sangleyes” (Manila, June 20, 1682), fol. 965.
85 AGI, Filipinas, 28, N. 131, 982 - 995v. fr. Victorio Riccio, “Discurso y parecer en que se demuestra que no conviene que la nación de china que llaman sangleyes habite ni viva de asiento en las islas Filipinas” (Manila, March 25, 1677).
86 AGI, Filipinas, 331, L. 8, f. 84v. - 85v. “Real Cédula a la Audiencia de Manila” (Madrid, November 14, 1686).
87 AGI, Filipinas, 28, N. 131, 999 - 1000v “Sobre reducir los sangleyes al Parián” (Manila, n.d.).
88 BNE, Ms/11014, fol. 38-41v Francisco Combes, “Razones que se ofrecen para que los sangleyes de esta república de Manila no sean desterrados de ella” (Manila, 1667).
Europe) and that Riccio’s diatribes were lies that overlooked the many Sangleys who were good Christians.  

Similarly, the Jesuit Luis de Morales contended that the expulsion was contrary to the priests’ obligation to spread Catholicism, especially among the Chinese.  

Even more remarkable, the Sangleys themselves protested the order. In a very confident (almost arrogant) tone, the “infidel Sangleys” reminded Spanish authorities of the disadvantages and problems that their expulsion would carry. The Sangleys claimed that the Spaniards had first asked the Chinese to come to the islands, and had then invited them to stay. The Sangleys also argued that the Philippines depended on Chinese trade, which they handled. In a not-so-veiled threat, they contended that without the Sangleys, no Chinese merchant would want to go to the islands. Spaniards would have to go themselves to China to get their goods, just like the English and the Dutch, and face the dangers of sailing and pirates.

This opposition made the 1686 order of expulsion impossible to enforce. There were other practical matters as well, namely the Chinese population could not be fully policed. Spanish authorities did not really know who should be reduced, who had truly converted, and who was merely paying lip service. Moreover, because of the Spaniards’ total dependency on the Sangleys for their survival—despite advocates of the expulsion claiming to the contrary—getting rid of them was unrealistic. Because of this, in 1695, the

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90 AGI, Filipinas, 28, N. 131, 1129 - 1130v. Luis de Morales, “Memorial sobre los siniestros informes que se han presentado para expulsar a los sangleyes infieles” (Madrid, September 13, 1686). He also criticized the proposal of reuniting all the converted Sangleys in the Parían, under the exclusive supervision of the Dominican Order. Although this latter project never advanced, it is clear that much of the debate around the expulsion of the Sangleys was an antagonism between the Jesuits and the Dominicans.
91 AGI, Filipinas, 202, 410 - 412 “Memorial de los sangleyes dando razones para no ser expulsados,” n.d.
Audience of Manila openly recognized that it had completely failed to carry out the royal order, and suggested its revocation.⁹²

**The Defense of the Miserable**

The expulsion of the *moriscos*, the resistance of the Araucanians, and the slaughtering of the Sangleys were powerful images of the struggle against populations different from the Spanish and those who opposed Spanish rule. Nonetheless, despite the aggressiveness of Spanish rhetoric and actions, killing, expulsion, deportation, and denaturalization were not the only methods for dealing with those resisting imperial power. Several officials argued for more moderate policies and strategies to deal with the Monarchy’s perceived enemies. Although it might seem paradoxical, royal officials, even someone seemingly as brutal and bloodthirsty as Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, could grasp the motivations of the dissenting peoples they were crushing.

In 1652, some years after serving in the Philippines, Hurtado Corcuera, the man who slaughtered thousands of Sangleys, was commissioned by the Crown to put an end to the political and social turmoil afflicting the city of Córdoba in Spain. On that occasion, despite the populace’s open affronts to royal authority, he acted in a much more conciliatory manner and avoided the use of violence. That year, the city’s lower classes revolted in what has been called the “Bread Riot.” This was a food riot in which the urban dwellers protested against the scarcity of food, the elevated prices of bread and grains, and the social conditions that favored the rich oligarchy. This was not an isolated event, but was part of a larger wave of popular protests and altercations that shook Andalusia between 1647 and 1652. These movements were fostered by extreme

⁹² AGI, Filipinas, 202, 1 - 5v. “Sobre la continuada expulsión de los sangleyes” (Manila, June 18, 1695).
inequality, permanent war, economic crisis, and the plague that ravaged the region. The case of Córdoba was one of the most notorious because of the strength of the movement, as well as the importance of the city and the noble families that lived in the region. The riot resonated throughout the region and metastasized to nearby towns.

On May 6th, a furious crowd took control of Córdoba. The events in the city had started almost by accident. Apparently, the crying of a devastated mother who had just lost her son due to starvation outraged the people. Rumors spread quickly, and in a few hours an angry mob overtook the city. Evidently, the first target of the crowd was the city’s elite, represented politically by the cabildo. Córdoba was at the time one of the cities in Spain with the greatest social differentiation and segregation of classes. The noble and rich men who ruled the city, owned the fields, and controlled the market were accused of being greedy and of doing nothing to prevent or mitigate the scarcity that afflicted most of the citizens.

Most of the violence and accusations were directed against the city’s corregidor, the Peruvian don Pedro Alfonso Flores y Montenegro, viscount of Peñaparda, who had no option but to flee the city in order to save his life. The popular claim was that he had

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95 Domínguez Ortiz, Alteraciones andaluzas, 181–183.

96 Ibid., 139–141.

97 Flores y Montenegro was born in Lima around 1587 and moved to Broxas, Extremadura. He was descendant of one of Peru’s conquistadores, and heir of important manors in America. In Spain, he took
done nothing to stop the abuses of the cabildo and, to the contrary, had colluded with the oligarchy. It seems that such accusations were not far from the truth. A couple of months prior to the revolt, the Council of Castile, worried by the news that Peñaparda’s “procedures were not in compliance with the duties of a minister,” decided to remove him from his post in order to prevent social and political disturbances. However, social distress moved faster than official paperwork, and when the riots started Peñaparda was still corregidor.

Once the uprisings broke, the rioters demanded a change of authorities. Don Diego Fernández de Córdoba, a charismatic patrician with broad support among the revolting populace, was given control of the government of the city. This move, which adhered to the early-modern formula of “long live the king, death to bad government,” succeeded in temporarily calming the mood. However, tensions remained. The new corregidor tried to reassert the elites’ authority over the city. First, he organized an armed militia to suppress the plebeians who, although mostly armed with rocks, sticks, and knives, greatly outnumbered the city’s forces. Then, he identified and punished the revolt’s leaders, sentencing four of them to death.

The crown was well aware that much more serious action was needed to restore authority and secure the peace. Skipping the traditional process of consultation with the

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part in the war against Portugal, and was corregidor of Salamanca and Cuenca. AHN, OM-Caballeros-Santiago, Exp. 3095 “Pruebas de Pedro Alfonso Flores y Montenegro,” 1623; “El vizconde de Peñaparda, corregidor de la ciudad de Salamanca, contra el fiscal y el receptor de penas de cámera”; Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Los americanos en las órdenes nobiliarias, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1993), 161.

98 AHN, Consejos, 13597, 2, N. 29 “Propone personas para el corregimiento de Córdoba” (Madrid, August 9, 1651). The king appointed don Alonso de Paz y Guzmán, but he never had the opportunity to serve the position. Despite the accusations against Peñaparda, some years later he was appointed corregidor of Salamanca. In fact, the residencia carried out by Hurtado de Corcuera sets him free of any charges AHN, Consejos, L. 720 “Libros de residencias de corregidores consultados con Su Magestad,” fol. 121v.

Council of Castile, the king directly appointed someone with the credentials and confidence required to accomplish the objectives: the captain don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera.\textsuperscript{100} The experienced official was appointed with the explicit mission of restoring peace. First, in order to reinstate the king’s authority, he offered a royal pardon that he brought with him from Madrid.\textsuperscript{101} This was typical behavior for any imperial official dealing with a popular unrest: commit acts of violence to raise fear among the people, and then show mercy and love from a forgiving (though not forgetful) king.

Hurtado de Corcuera also needed to assure the provision of bread in the city at just prices. Thus, don Sebastián turned his attention from the commoners to Córdoba’s elite in order to break their control and monopoly over the much-needed and scarce grains. Seasoned in dealing with the powerful oligarchies who controlled the Asian trade, he had no problems in compelling the patricians, by reason or force, to sell their grains, and he forbade them to stock products or speculate with the price. Additionally, he bought grains from other regions, lowering the price of grain in Córdoba.\textsuperscript{102} The king must have been very pleased with the way Hurtado de Corcuera dealt with the powerful oligarchy, imposing his authority and defending the Monarchy’s interests. In 1658 the monarch dismissed the three people suggested by the Council and motu proprio, at his own initiative, appointed the captain as corregidor of Sanlúcar de Barrameda.\textsuperscript{103} The king needed someone trustworthy to impose his authority over this recently acquired strategic port where powerful Spanish and foreign merchants benefited from the transatlantic trade

\textsuperscript{100} AHN, Consejos, 13597, 2, N. 34 “Corregimiento a Hurtado de Corcuera” (Madrid, June 14, 1652).
\textsuperscript{101} Archivo Municipal de Córdoba (AMCO), AH011201 C10-17 “Autos seguidos para pregonar una Real Cédula relativa al perdón a los que habían intervenido en los alborotos por la falta de pan,” July 28, 1652.
\textsuperscript{102} AMCO, AH60308 C233-28 “Sobre que no se saque trigo” (Córdoba, July 14, 1653); AMCO, JU/J33 “Libro de actas capitulares del Cabildo de Jurados desde el año de 1638 hasta 1660,” fol. 396v; AMCO, AH60308 C233-29 “Que se pueda traer trigo de África u otras partes” (Madrid, August 11, 1653).
\textsuperscript{103} AHN, Consejos, 13628, 4, N.21 “Personas para Sanlúcar de Barrameda” (Madrid, November 14, 1658).
and which until recently had been possessed by the duke of Medina Sidonia. However, Hurtado de Corcuera did not hold the post, because by then he was already on his way to the Canaries to serve as their governor.

As representative of the Crown in Córdoba, Hurtado de Corcuera mediated between the elite and the populace and sought to protect the latter. For that, he relied both on force and the imposition of justice, two major features of royal power. Hurtado de Corcuera, as well as the king and his councilors in Madrid, understood the motivations behind the riots and the violent actions that altered the social order. In fact, the Council ordered Hurtado de Corcuera to disarm the militia organized by Fernández de Córdoba. The councilors considered that such armed body was an extraordinary measure that should not become permanent because it would only strengthen the elite’s power and work against the lower classes. Already in 1622, the Council of Castile had argued that the government of Córdoba needed someone “of stronger arm.” They wanted a person who could serve as a firewall against the city’s elite “to avoid and punish the crimes and excesses of the powerful, looking for the good administration of justice, protection, and defense of the wretched.”

The king, the councilors, and Hurtado de Corcuera followed a familiar pattern of rulership. They used a language and reasoning almost identical to that deployed by the Council of the Indies and other imperial officials when dealing with Indigenous revolts in America. For example, during the 1660 outbreak of Oaxaca, the Council of the Indies

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104 In 1641 the duke of Medina Sidonia tried to overthrow the king. As punishment he was exiled from Castile and lost one of his most valuable possessions. See Luis Salas Almela, *The Conspiracy of the Ninth Duke of Medina Sidonia (1641): An Aristocrat in the Crisis of the Spanish Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 2013).
106 “Consulta del Consejo de Castilla sobre los medios de conservar el orden público en Córdoba” (Madrid, August 8, 1652) in Domínguez Ortiz, *Alteraciones andaluzas*, 264–266.
107 AHN, Consejos, 13597, 2, N.12 “Provisión del corregimiento de Córdoba” (Madrid, August 22, 1622).
gave the order to pacify the Indians “with much gentleness, without afflicting them with harsh punishments.” Similarly, the Royal Audience of Mexico sought the “pacification, reduction, and peacefulness, and the reparation of the said Indians.” It was essential, then, to identify the reasons for the indigenous uprising and to satisfy their demands. Juan Francisco de Montemayor—the oidor commissioned to suppress the revolt, who used extremely violent methods, condemned even by the Crown (Fig. 5)—also argued that the root cause of the upheaval was the exploitation and violence suffered by the Indians.

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**Figure 5.** Portrait of Juan Francisco de Montemayor (Alfocea, Spain). Photo by María Gálvez. He is holding a letter in his right hand, while his left one is laying on a book, and next to it there is a helmet. The letter and the book depict him as a man of letters, essential attributes of a good judge. These qualities, however, do not appear at odds with the helm, which reminds us of Montemayor’s military activities and how he combined the quill with the sword.

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110 AGI, Patronato 230A, R.3 “Juan Francisco de Montemayor: ordenanzas de indios,” fol. 6v.
Consequently, Montemayor finished his mission in Oaxaca—after severely punishing the culprits of the rebellion, and issuing a general pardon for the rest of the population—by promulgating his *Ordenanzas*, a set of laws to restructure the government. The laws covered almost every aspect of Indigenous life and interactions with the Spaniards, from civil to religious authorities to merchants. The idea repeatedly expressed was that Indigenous people had been exploited and abused almost by everyone, and that it was necessary to find a remedy for the situation. Montemayor concluded that it was imperative to undertake radical reforms in order to secure the protection and good treatment of the native population and prevent future upheavals. However, this set of laws did not really reform anything; it merely brought attention to pre-existing laws that supposedly protected the native population. Montemayor reminded *corregidores* and other Spanish officials that it was their obligation “that the Indians be treated with love and care.” Hence, the *oidor* urged these officers to look for the “shelter, conservation and good treatment of said Indians.”

Juan Francisco de Montemayor has usually been portrayed as a hotheaded official, prone to violence and drastic punishments. Héctor Díaz Polanco and Consuelo Sánchez call him “la espada restauradora” (the restoring sword), a man who relied only on violence to reinstate social order. Judith Zeitlin affirms that “the recently arrived Montemayor had little understanding of the nuances of Indian-Spanish interaction, nor did he encourage or support anything which broached the separation between colonist

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111 “Delitos y castigo de los indios de Tecoquilco e Iztepec,” fols. 94–95.
and colonized.” Although it is true that Montemayor was new to New Spain and its complex society, and that he enforced unusually severe punishments, it is questionable to assert that he failed to grasp the society. In fact (and as perplexing as it might seem), despite his recent arrival to Mexico, the official quickly adapted to the local political culture and acted accordingly, as demonstrated by his response to the rebellion.

Montemayor’s Ordenanzas and his overall behavior during the rebellion are indications of his deep understanding of Mexican political culture. On the one hand, he acted as any other imperial official would, whose obligation was to impose and restore the king’s authority. Moreover, he relied on the standard tools officials had at their disposal—especially dispensations of the king’s justice—and which were performed in particular ways. As Alejandro Cañeque has argued, love, fear, and anger were the pillars upon which political legitimacy and control were built. They were not private emotions, but social and political ones. The Spanish Monarchy, overall, was calibrated for a mix of love and fear; thus mercy was very important. Montemayor followed these political ideals almost perfectly. The harsh punishments were administered in order to scare the Indigenous people, a reminder of the dangerous consequences of subverting the royal order. Once completed, he showed clemency by issuing a general pardon to the remainder of the native population.

On the other hand, the oidor clearly understood the special role played by the indigenous population. With his Ordenanzas, he reminded everyone of the king’s love to

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113 Zeitlin, Cultural Politics in Colonial Tehuantepec Community and State Among the Isthmus Zapotec, 1500-1750, 201.
115 Cañeque, “The Emotions of Power.”
the “wretched Indians,” and of his obligation to protect them and take care of them. He was quick to rely on the tropes that other officials and authorities used to portray the natives, and strictures about the way the Spanish should interact with them. In fact, Alejandro Cañeque has analyzed in depth Montemayor’s depiction of the natives as wretched, and argues that such characterizations were part of the political culture of colonialism and justified Spanish rule and exploitation over the Indians.\footnote{Cañeque, \textit{The King’s Living Image}, chaps. 6–7.} In accordance with the early modern Spanish political culture, American Indigenous peoples, like the Castilian plebeians, were the weakest members of the political body, and therefore needed to be both firmly ruled and protected by the king and his ministers.

\textbf{Global Imposition of Authority}

The cases of Córdoba and Oaxaca urge us to think about the linkages and engagement of America’s political culture with the Spanish Empire overall, and to question the limits and extent of its specificity. Moreover, the events help us to see the breadth of the circulation of some political notions—like the defense of the miserable or the ideal of \textit{reducir}—among imperial officials who were moving from one region to another. The way in which Montemayor dealt with the rebels of Oaxaca was not that different from the ways in which other officials dealt with rioters in Castile, Messina, or Granada.\footnote{For an study on the revolt of Mesina, see Luis Antonio Ribot García, \textit{La revuelta antiespañola en Mesina: causas y antecedentes (1591-1674)} (Valladolid: Universidad, 1982). For the revolt of Naples, see Rosario Villari, \textit{The Revolt of Naples} (Cambridge, UK; Cambridge, MA, USA: Polity Press, 1993). Uprisings in Granada are studied in Domínguez Ortiz, \textit{Alteraciones andaluzas}. For a general overview of the historiography and the recent interpretations on European social uprisings see Samuel K. Cohn, Jr., “Authority and Popular Resistance,” in \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern European History, 1350-1750}, ed. H. M. Scott, vol. II: Cultures and Power, 2 vols. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 418–439.} There, too, the Crown constantly argued that it was its duty to protect the poor
and the vulnerable, especially against the abuses of the powerful. Spanish imperial officials did not act in similar ways merely because they were following orders. They shared a common behavior that was the expression of Spanish imperial cosmopolitanism, which I will discuss in Chapter Five. They took similar courses of action because they perceived the differing situations according to a unitary perspective and ideal of how an empire should behave, govern, and suppress dissent.

While there are many similarities in the way royal officials in Córdoba and Oaxaca acted, there are also some shocking differences between their actions in Chile and the Philippines. There is no doubt that circumstances in Castile were distinct from those in the Asian archipelago. Hurtado de Corcuera acted according to the particular parameters set by the distinct scenarios, actors involved, and overall social and political conceptions. It was, indeed, very different dealing with rebellious Chinese than with Castilian peasants. It is worthwhile to underscore that the early modern world was not by any means egalitarian, but rather was built on the premise of hierarchical differentiation. Moreover, such distinctions were conceived as communal rather than individual. Identity related to the community to which one belonged.\textsuperscript{118} Thus, the way rebellions or any other dissenting movement were understood, and how authorities reacted to them, depended to a great extent on the place the rebels occupied within the political body.

Although in both cases (Manila and Córdoba) the rioters reacted against abuses, in the Philippine islands, the Sangleys lacked major advocates. Spanish authorities did not grant any legitimacy to their revolt. Furthermore, although officials always feared popular uprisings in Castile, they also enjoyed a greater margin there to move and act. In Asia, the Spanish presence and power were far more precarious. Thus, in Hurtado de

\textsuperscript{118} Herzog, \textit{Defining Nations}. 

Corcuera’s view, the only way to preserve social order in the islands was by means of violence and terror, and by physically eliminating any possible menace. Nonetheless, fear of rebellion and demographic imbalance alone cannot explain such brutality. In fact, in America, Spaniards were always a minority and authorities were constantly putting out fires and dealing with native rebellions and resistance to Spanish hegemony, typically without resorting to such harsh tactics of repression.

It seems that the most brutal policies were applied against those seen as a potential threat to the society. The *moriscos* and the Sangleys were thought of as a disease on the political body, and as a consequence, they had to be removed.\(^{119}\) Moreover, these populations might ally with Spain’s enemies, making them even more dangerous. They were portrayed as alien to the Spanish Monarchy, as people unable to integrate into the polity. Most Native Americans, in contrast, were perceived (and very often perceived themselves) as full members of the Spanish Empire and although they (as well as Castilian peasants) occupied the lowest positions and were thought as “miserables,” they were integral and essential to the political body. They could be reprehended and punished, but their right to exist was not called into question. The case of the Araucanians serves as an interesting counterpointing case in which Spanish authorities debated whether such population could or not be incorporated into the Monarchy.

The Sangleys, the populace of Córdoba, and the American Indigenous peoples felt poverty, hunger, and exploitation in similar ways. However, the vision and conceptions of them were very different, and accordingly, so was the way in which the Crown and its

\(^{119}\) AGI, Filipinas, 28, N. 131, 1114 - 1121 “Informe sobre que no se permita vivir en Filipinas a los chinos infieles” (Manila, June 9, 1682).
representatives treated them. The political, social, and religious circumstances of the rebels made a great difference. Imperial officials chose different strategies and tactics of accommodation and repression in order to assure their never-changing quest: the imposition and preservation of the Spanish king’s authority wherever they were. In this respect, religious identity played a crucial role. As will be explored in the following chapter, the Spanish Monarchy portrayed itself as the Catholic Monarchy, and thus its ultimate mission was the promotion and defense of Catholicism throughout the globe. Imperial officials thought of themselves as servants of the crown and as soldiers of God. This Catholic identity profoundly shaped Spanish society at all levels. It was what differentiated the polity from other nations, and what invigorated the empire’s sense of moral superiority. Moreover, the ways in which the Crown’s “enemies” were deemed also depended on their beliefs. It made a great difference to deal with newly converted Amerindians than with moriscos who stubbornly rejected Catholic doctrine. Nonetheless, as we have seen, how this Catholic identity and mission was understood also varied a great deal. While all imperial officials agreed on Catholicism’s preeminence and that it should be the world’s only faith, the means of achieving this goal were not universally agreed upon. Some promoted evangelization and conversion of the idolaters, pagans, and heretics, while others lobbied for their physical removal and extermination.

Spanish officials understood and framed their local fights in global and imperial terms. They were all part of one universal struggle of imposing Spanish hegemony. We have already seen the case of Alonso González de Nájera, who presented the war in Chile to an Italian and European Audience. Hurtado de Corcuera and his followers clearly linked the Sangley rebellion to the many others that in 1640 (a truly annus horribilis for
the Spanish Monarchy) inflicted the polity.120 One of the governor’s assistants celebrated the end of “such bloody uprising that it was so close to extinguish in such remote climate the Catholic religion,” and he wished that “the remaining rebels of this Monarchy, that set against her at the same time […] in so many parts of the world” would have the same end.121 For this author it was evident that the triumph in one region signaled the path in the other parts of the empire. The Spanish Monarchy shared the same fate, despite its global dispersion. Likewise, for the chronicler of the rebellion of Oaxaca, Juan de Torres Castillo, “it is of no less glory to secure the Indians, than to defeat in the Italian campaigns,” and the pacification of the Indians was of great importance “not only in the government of this New World, but in all the Monarchy.” Consequently, he contended that it was rightfully due that such victory “was said in Naples, published in all of America and Europe.”122 In fact, imperial power took different shapes in every specific context, but it aimed to be unique across the whole world.

Moreover, the Monarchy clearly and deliberately decided to create a shared consciousness of the global struggles against imperial power among all the regions and imperial subjects. Throughout the seventeenth century, imperial officials knew that they had to face rebellion everywhere, and they celebrated the victories of others across the globe as their own. In 1653, while the Aragonese Juan Francisco Montemayor was the acting governor of Santo Domingo (prior to his activities in Mexico) he received orders to celebrate the recovery of Catalonia.123 He eagerly organized the celebrations, and we

120 That same year, major rebellions broke up in Portugal, Catalonia, Naples, and Sicily. There is an extensive bibliography on these rebellions and on the so-called crisis of the Spanish Monarchy. See Geoffrey Parker’s bibliographical essay in Geoffrey Parker, ed., La crisis de la monarquía de Felipe IV (Barcelona: Crítica, 2006), 413–440.
121 Anonymous, “Relación verdadera del levantamiento de los sangleyes,” fol. 603v.
122 Torres Castillo, Relación de lo sucedido en las provincias de Nexapa, sec. Dedicatory.
123 AGI, Patronato, 273, R.5, f. 97-98, “Celebraciones por el triunfo en Cataluña” (Santo Domingo, 1653).
can presume that he was especially pleased with such triumph, as he begun serving the king in 1642 in the midst of that war.\textsuperscript{124}

News about the activities of the officials, and of the Monarchy overall, circulated rapidly across the globe. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera’s distinguished actions in the 1623 siege of Breda earned him prestige throughout the whole of the Spanish Empire.\textsuperscript{125} When in 1630 he was commissioned to train the soldiers and to organize the defense of the port of Callao, the Peruvian poet and soldier Bernardino de Montoya composed the poem “Al río Lima” to laud the arrived captain. Montoya claimed that with the presence of such a famous, experienced, and brave soldier, the city was much more secure from its enemies.\textsuperscript{126}

Also, it should come as no surprise that Hurtado de Corcuera described some of his military campaigns in the Philippines (against the Muslim kings from nearby islands) by resorting to his previous European experiences. He affirmed that he had never confronted such difficult scenario, not fighting the Arabs, not in the Pyrenees, nor anywhere else where he served the king.\textsuperscript{127} He confidently claimed that if those actions had been “in Flanders or in other part of Europe, they would have been taken of good mark” and he would have been rewarded immediately.\textsuperscript{128} He compared his accomplishments with those of his European peers, and not with his predecessors in ruling the archipelago, or even with other officials in America; this stands in contrast to most

\textsuperscript{124} “Méritos de Juan Francisco Montemayor y Córdoba de Cuenca,” fol. 12.
\textsuperscript{125} Hurtado de Corcuera was awarded one of the only twelve military habits that the king granted to his soldiers as reward. AHN, OM-Caballeros-Alcántara, Exp.739 “Hurtado de Corcuera Mendoza, Sebastián,” 1626; AHN, EST, Leg. 1304, N. 91 “Relación de los servicios de don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera,” 1635.
\textsuperscript{126} Raquel Chang-Rodríguez, \textit{Cancionero peruano del siglo XVII} (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1983), 21, 56–60.
\textsuperscript{127} Letter to Phillip IV, August 20th, 1637 in \textit{CGIF}, 8:LV.
\textsuperscript{128} Letter of Hurtado de Corcuera to the king, July 25th, 1638 in \textit{CGIF}, 8:CLX.
modern scholars, who isolate and break apart these spaces from the rest of the Monarchy. Instead, Hurtado de Corcuera placed himself (as well as the Philippines) alongside those officials serving in Flanders and in Europe. He conceived the empire as one connected and united entity.\[129\]

There was a global and unified perception of the Spanish Monarchy and, therefore, a global understanding of the rebellions that undermined Spanish power. Nonetheless, the ways in which the imperial Spanish officials achieved (or tried to achieve) their universal imperative of *reducir* changed according to the circumstances—but each of them combined, in different degrees, two of the main attributes of the king: military force and clemency. Imperial officials acted according to specific political traditions, as well as to well-established notions and prejudices. In other words, not all rebellions were considered equal and, more importantly, not all rebels were treated the same way. Córdoba’s food riot, the Sangleys’ uprising, and even the Indians’ revolt are events that do not usually make it into the history books on the Spanish Monarchy. They were, indeed, minor in comparison with other historical events. Nevertheless, they were of extreme importance. They were the almost quotidian expressions of the king’s imposition of authority over many dissimilar people and landscapes. They represent the permanent struggle for the maintenance of the imperial order in a highly heterogeneous and diverse world.

\[129\] This is why he had no problem in asking the king to send there “some Italians, Wallons, Burgundians, or Irish”. Letter of Corcuera to the king, July 25th, 1638 in *CGIF*, 8:CLXI.
Chapter Five: Imperial Cosmopolitanism

Que en todas partes el mundo es uno.¹

Son los ánimos de los hombres tan varios
como sus rostros, y aunque la razón es en sí
misma una, son diferentes los caminos que
cada uno de los discursos sigue para
alcanzarla.²

Porque para nada de lo que tiene entre
manos puede ser bueno un hombre que no
ha cabido en el mundo.³

In 1614, Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, the Spanish official-turned priest whose travels we followed in the first chapter, published his *Quarenta triunfos de la santísima Cruz*. In the book, the author presented various stories of Christian crosses that appeared in different forms, “entre tantos enemigos de nuestra santa fe católica, moros, gentiles, idólatras y judíos,” and which would have helped the Catholic armies to defeat their enemies across the globe at various times.⁴ He originally conceived this book as the fourth part of his *Viage del mundo*, also published in 1614, in which Ordóñez de Cevallos penned his travels and experiences in Europe, Africa, America, and Asia, but because the topic was different, he decided to publish it separately. In many ways, *Quarenta triunfos* serves as a companion to his other book; together they present a worldly vision of the Catholic Church and the prevalence of faith in different times and regions. These crosses, claimed Ordóñez de Cevallos, helped the emperor Charlemagne beat back Muslim forces, and appeared in places such as Jerusalem, Genoa, Zaragoza, China, India, and even—

¹ BNE, Mss/6227 Domingo Toral y Valdés, “Relación de Toral y Valdés,” fol. 217v.
³ AGI, Charcas, 58, 1er. cuad, f. 61v.-62v. Conde de Alba de Liste to Mercado y Villacorta, December 1, 1657.
⁴ Ordóñez de Cevallos, *Quarenta triunfos*, prologue.
because the earth did not seem big enough—“en medio de la luna,” a cross so bright it was seen by everyone in the world.⁵

*Quarenta triunfos* exemplifies the culture of Spanish imperial cosmopolitanism. The author sought to incorporate into a single narrative the different regions, societies, and nations of the world. But this was not a neutral exercise by Ordóñez de Cevallos. He presented the “Other”—whether Muslim, Jew, American native, or European heretic—as an enemy to be defeated and turned into a subject of the Spanish crown, and brought to heel under the civilizing order of Catholicism.

However, Ordóñez de Cevallos’s worldview was not the only possible way to look at the world and understand difference. Captain Domingo Toral y Valdés, forced by his humble origins, soon entered into the royal service as a means to survive. First, he went to Lisbon where he joined a company of soldiers that was dispatched to the war in Flanders. After a couple of years in Flanders, fighting in the most precarious conditions, he returned to Spain, traversing France by foot. Once there, he had hoped to follow the path of thousands of other men like him and embark to America but did not receive royal authorization. Nonetheless, his luck seemed to turn for the better when in 1629 he was admitted into the retinue of Miguel de Noronha, the count of Linares and recently appointed viceroy of India. After an arduous journey—it took over five months to reach Mozambique and one of the ships was lost around the Cape of Good Hope—Toral y Valdés served in various posts in the Asian viceroyalty. For unclear reasons, however, his relationship with the viceroy and other officials soon frayed (he was even incarcerated for a while), forcing him to abandon his post and return to Spain on his own. The journey home was Odyssean; he traversed the Persian desert, passed through Baghdad and

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⁵ Ibid., fol. 184v.
Aleppo, crossed the Mediterranean by hopping from island to island, and finally reached Barcelona in 1635. Back in Madrid, the soldier penned his memories and adventures under the title *Relación de la vida del capitán Domingo de Toral y Valdés.*

In his extraordinary autobiography, the errant soldier and writer narrates his experiences in strange lands and tells of how he communicated and engaged with the people he encountered, and how ultimately, despite being alone and lacking resources, he managed to survive and get back to his home. Interactions like these made this native of Asturias appreciate human virtues and kindness, despite the many differences he noted and recorded, from language, customs, dress, and of course religion. While in Aleppo he talked with a Jewish man who had lived in Madrid and owned a large collection of Spanish books, mostly by Lope de Vega. Toral y Valdés defined this man as someone “muy dado a toda humanidad.” Later on, moved by the good treatment he received from a Muslim, he affirmed, “sea Dios alabado que todas las naciones hizo capaces de razón, que más podía hacer un buen cristiano con las obligaciones de hombre noble que hizo este moro.” Contradicting the widespread view that Muslims and Jews were by definition enemies to the Spanish, and vice versa, his own experience taught him that all

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7 Toral y Valdés, “Relación de Toral y Valdés,” fol. 220.

8 Ibid., fol. 218.
groups also shared a common humanity. He came to realize “que en todas partes el
mundo es uno.”

The different global visions of Ordóñez de Cevallos and Toral y Valdés show the
tensions and contradictions within Spanish imperialism. They are also examples of
different perspectives on how to deal with global difference. Furthermore, both
conceptions express the extent to which the imperial ideal elicited a sense of
cosmopolitanism. In this chapter I will analyze the political, cultural and ideological
milieu that made possible visions and texts of people such as Toral y Valdés and Ordóñez
de Cevallos. First, I will define the characteristics and limits of an early modern Spanish
cosmopolitanism, which was marked by its imperial enterprise and by its Catholicism,
and which allowed for bridging cultural differences from a tolerant standing point, as
well as, from an imposing one. Accordingly, I will study the ideal of the Catholic soldier,
and how it impacted the perceptions of the officials themselves, and their interactions
with other societies. Moreover, the idea that the Monarchy had been chosen by God to
carry out his divine plan and was in a constant state of siege by enemies across the world
fostered a sense of Spanish exceptionalism. Spanish officials had, certainly, a great
interest in knowing the world and in presenting and describing it. Thus, the chapter
examines some of these global representations and how they were deployed in
developing a comprehensive vision of the far-flung empire. Finally, a global perspective
was shared by many different subjects across the empire. Many of these representations,
as well as the global encounters, were not produced necessarily in the imperial court or
even in Europe, but in the “margins” of the empire.

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9 Ibid., fol. 217v.
*Quarenta triunfos* and *Relación del capitán Toral y Valdés* are two exceptional examples of early modern Spanish cosmopolitanism. These books were written not by erudite scholars, but by mobile lower-echelon officials, based on their own first-hand experiences. Yet these texts are not mere descriptions. Ordóñez de Cevallos and Toral y Valdés were able to elaborate a more reflective discourse about their experiences, and they are explicit in their comparisons and assessments. Moreover, these two texts were written within an already large and well-established literary and scientific tradition of attempting to explain foreign cultures and peoples. These documents took many forms, ranging from ethnographic descriptions of the many societies, governments, polities, and their customs; to geographical accounts in which maps and early modern cosmography played a major role; as well as literary narratives; navigational maps; voyage accounts; and of course royal officials’ chronicles, reports, letters as well as their *informaciones*; and even judiciary records. All these different types of texts and documents brought into the European imagination foreign and unknown regions, and made possible to think of the whole world as one coherent entity.\(^\text{10}\) Moreover, these documents and their cosmopolitanism were fostered by the non-stop mobility of the Spanish imperial officials, who since the sixteenth century had tirelessly traversed and connected the vast and separated regions of a far-flung empire. These physical and mental movements enabled a unified vision of the globe. Therefore, this chapter is an attempt to answer how the world was seen and understood from the perspective of an itinerant Spanish imperial official.

\(^{10}\) Recently, Ayesha Ramachandran has published a thorough study of how the world became to be envisioned as one in the early modern period, and the different understandings that writers, philosophers and thinkers of the time had of it. In her analysis of these elite scholars, she argues that these worldmakers sought to imagine and represent the world, and the role of humankind in it, in new terms; departing from previous divine conceptions (while never fully abandoning them). Ayesha Ramachandran, *The Worldmakers. Global Imagining in Early Modern Europe* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2015).
One World, Many Cosmopolitanisms

Cosmopolitanism is a concept in vogue. In recent years, scholars from multiple disciplines have been concerned with ideas of cosmopolitanism to grapple with the challenges of otherness and difference that arise in our contemporary and globalized world. They have followed Immanuel Kant’s path to look back and reinterpret the classic Greek notion of cosmopolitanism. These scholars think of cosmopolitanism as a project of a common and universal citizenship that recognizes difference and the possibility of a multicultural society, transcending nationalisms and cultural differences in a contemporary and globalized world, which is politically organized around nation-states.\(^{11}\)

Cosmopolitanism, then, seems to be an easy and straightforward concept: to be a cosmopolitan is to be a citizen of the world. However, it is important to note that cosmopolitanism is not an unequivocal term. While cosmopolitanism rests on the awareness and recognition of human diversity, it leaves open the question of what kind of world is imagined.\(^{12}\)

In a recent study on the practice of cosmopolitanism in Antiquity, Myles Lavan, Richard E. Paye, and John Weisweiler have noted that cosmopolitanism has usually been


understood as a virtue, as an ethical commitment to tolerance, leaving aside its close relationship to imperialism. In fact, they assert that “if cosmopolitanism could develop without empire, the reverse cannot be said.” Thus, they argue for the utility of employing cosmopolitanism as a tool of historical analysis to understand the formation and workings of empires. They define cosmopolitanism as “a complex of practices and ideals that enabled certain individuals not only to cross cultural boundaries, but to establish an enduring normative framework across them.” These scholars contend that historians must study the ways in which imperial elites dealt with difference.

The practice of cosmopolitanism offers two possible ways to deal with difference: to embrace it, thinking that different perspectives have the same validity, like Toral y Valdés did; or to master it so that it fits under “universal values,” which was the position of Ordóñez de Cevallos. Derek Heater thinks of cosmopolitanism as a dichotomy in which the term sometimes has referred to ideas of world citizenship, and other times to ideals of world government, two related but different notions. They speak to the sense of belonging to “a community of the whole mankind” and to the need of a “global political structure.” However, the emphasis of one idea over the other, and the actual meaning of them have changed over time. These two opposite notions respond to the challenges of the cosmopolis, which “meant viewing the whole of the universe and all its inhabitants as if they were a social entity.” While in Ancient Greece and during the Enlightenment, argues Heater, cosmopolitan thought stressed ideas of world citizenship, it was in medieval and early modern Europe when the idea of a world state, in the form of a

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14 Ibid., 10.
16 Ibid., 181.
universal Christian ruler, took precedence. Accordingly, Walter Mignolo differentiates two narratives of cosmopolitanism: one managerial, which he defines as “global designs,” and related to Christianity, nineteenth-century imperialism and contemporary neoliberal globalization; and the other emancipatory, and referring to the ideals of people such as Francisco de Vitoria, Immanuel Kant, or Karl Marx, who challenged and dissented those “global designs.”

In other words, cosmopolitanism can either be read as the ideal to adjust the individual to the world so he or she can fit in everywhere, regardless of their differences; or as the attempt to adjust the world to fit one’s desires, expectations, values, and goals. Thus, imperialism, multiple loyalties, tolerance, recognition of difference, world unity, world dominion, have been some of the competing and contrasting ideas present within cosmopolitanism.

Consequently, cosmopolitan viewpoints may provide justification for imposition of what certain elites consider to be universal truths, and for the exclusion (or forced inclusion) of those who do not conform to their vision of the world. Mignolo explains that cosmopolitan projects, which sought “planetary conviviality,” appeared both during the European Renaissance and Enlightenment, two defining periods for the modern world—a world that is, let us not forget, constituted by colonialism, despite being its

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17 Ibid., 26.
hidden face. Thus, the very forces and project of modernity “link cosmopolitanism intrinsically to coloniality.”\textsuperscript{20} In fact, even Kant’s appeal to inclusion and tolerance has been challenged and confronted against his own paradigms, which included a hierarchical view of mankind, and racism and Eurocentrism, and which impregnated his cosmopolitan ideals with an unequivocal imperialism.\textsuperscript{21}

Cosmopolitanism has, indeed, been articulated by European political thinkers throughout the centuries. In the early modern period, it appeared as an attempt to embrace the world’s difference at the same time that Europeans were conquering the world. In a powerful and suggestive article, Arif Dirlik contends that the power of Eurocentrism, and its distinctiveness from other ethnocentrisms, rests not in having created a universal narrative that excludes other voices; to the contrary, the Eurocentric discourse has succeeded by incorporating other nations’ histories into its master narrative. Different voices and perspectives have been assimilated within one (European) order and system. Central to Eurocentrism, Dirlik contends, is the accumulation of knowledge, the urge to inventory the world’s difference and to include it into new accounts of the past.\textsuperscript{22} During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Europeans set to discover, know, measure, historicize and incorporate the New Worlds they had encountered. It was during this age of discovery that European thought leaders crafted the Eurocentric narrative. They established a set of “universal” parameters against which to compare Europe to the rest of the world.

As is clear by now, contrary to common assumptions cosmopolitanism is not a phenomenon exclusive to the modern or contemporary world, nor one directly connected to the nation-state and its critique. Cosmopolitan ideas and attitudes, and the attendant tension between tolerance and imposition, have been realities since Antiquity and in the Middle Ages. Margaret Jacob has written one of the first studies on early modern cosmopolitanism. Focusing on northern Europe (mainly the Dutch Republic), she finds that many people embraced cosmopolitan ideals, mainly in reaction against the Spanish Empire, which they perceived as backward and oppressive. Jacob understands cosmopolitanism as existing in opposition to nationalism and imperialism, and as a sort of claim for a common universal citizenship. For Allison Games, early modern cosmopolitans (such as tourists, merchants, and ministers) who moved across the globe, connecting and transplanting their experiences, built the English Empire, which evolved from a weak state into a global power. She thinks of cosmopolitanism as an intrinsic characteristic of people who traveled constantly and were forced to adapt to foreign settings. For her, basically anyone who moved and had contact with different geographies and societies is considered a cosmopolitan, without regards to their understanding of cultural differences in relation to the Empire. For Brian C. Lockey, early modern English identity was forged in conversation with two cosmopolitan perspectives. One was nationalist and imperialist. The other one challenged such nationalism and saw England as part of a universal Christian commonwealth. In her recent book on the development

23 For a collection of studies on cosmopolitanism in the Middle Ages, see John M. Ganim and Shayne Aaron Legassie, eds., Cosmopolitanism and the Middle Ages (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
25 Games, The Web of Empire, especially 7-10.
of an early modern worldly vision, Ayesha Ramachandran argues that the cosmographic impulse of knowing the whole world and of encompassing it under one description and perspective engendered cosmopolitanism. While this process could be part of an imperial project, it also fostered a critique of imperialism. Early modern cosmographers acknowledged the challenges and tensions of global desires and the particularities of individuals living around the world. This cosmopolitanism, claims Ramachandran, manifested as an awareness of the vastness of human diversity and the impossibility of knowing and embracing it all.  

Certainly, cosmopolitanism has provided justification for a number of major imperial projects, beginning with the Roman Empire, whose military expansions were defended by such public intellectuals as Cicero and Seneca. Philosophers Peter Sloterdijk has noted that the Stoics articulated their cosmopolitanism by equating, “with refreshing candor,” their city with the world and, therefore, “they made citizenship in this residence an inexhaustible ethical ideal.” For the Roman Stoics, to be a citizen of the world was to be a citizen of Rome, and this had very precise moral connotations. Stoic cosmopolitans understood the expansion of the empire to be a civilizing mission: the incorporation of all known societies under Roman law, which they argued accrued to the greatest benefit for all.

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27 Ramachandran, The Worldmakers, especially 221-227.
29 Peter Sloterdijk, Spheres, trans. Wieland Hoban, vol. 2: Globes. Macrospherology (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2014), 384. Moreover, according to Sloterdijk, the Stoics founded their cosmopolitanism upon ideas of a metaphysical globalization. These ideas were lost in later cosmopolitanisms (based upon colonialism), and there is no distinction between terrestrial and metaphysical globalization.
Later on, in medieval and early modern times, there appeared a Christian strain of
imperial cosmopolitanism. For instance, Dante Alighieri argued for a Christian universal
empire and the sixteenth-century Spanish bishop Antonio de Guevara, one of the most
influential Renaissance intellectuals and an advisor to emperor Charles V, contended that
“[God] willeth that there should be but one Monarchical king and Lord of the World.”
Some years later, Richard Hakluyt, one of the major promoters of English colonialism in
America, came “to finde himselfe [a] Cosmopolite, a citizen... of... one citie universall,
and so consequently to meditate on the Cosmopolitall government thereof.”
Similarly, Phillip IV’s famous favorite, the count-duke of Olivarès, ardently defended the
universality of the Spanish Monarchy. He despised those who had strong nationalistic
feelings and did not integrate and subsume into the broader Spanish Empire, lessening the
king’s universal goals. He claimed, “cursed be the nations, and cursed the men who are
nacionales! ... I love all the vassals of the king... because they seem to be such a pillar of
the Monarchy. I am no nacional—that is for children.”
Guevara, Hakluyt, and Olivarès were aware of the differences within their polities and tried to bridge these differences by
creating universal projects that simultaneously appealed to a sense of national pride and
the Christian cosmopolitan spirit.

Indeed, early modern imperial ideologues, excited by the discoveries of the New
World, found in Stoic scholarship and its cosmopolitanism inspiration and an intellectual
roadmap for building the new empires. Although these men were not necessarily strict

31 Quoted in ibid., 52–53.
32 BNE, Mss/1630, fols. 186-187 Olivarès to Torrecuso, January 4, 1640. The English translation is quoted
University Press, 1986), 564.
33 John M. Headley, “Geography and Empire in the Late Renaissance: Botero’s Assignment, Western
Universalism, and the Civilizing Process,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 53, no. 4 (December 1, 2000): 1119–
adherents to Neostoic doctrine, they were impacted by it. As we have seen in Chapter Three, Neostoicism circulated widely and significantly shaped the seventeenth-century intellectual environment and the activities of the imperial officials. Not only did Neostoicism revive the ideas of Roman imperial ideologues such as Cicero and Seneca, but it also emphasized the existence of a universal reason governing every human being, despite the intrinsic diversity of the world. Stoics proposed that Roman law was a natural law that it affected all humans despite their origin or conditions.\(^\text{34}\) The Spanish political writer Diego Saavedra Fajardo, whom we saw in a previous chapter, argued for the importance of individual experience and adapting to each unique circumstance and noted that “aunque la razón es en sí misma una, son diferentes los caminos que cada uno de los discursos sigue para alcanzarla.”\(^\text{35}\) Therefore, he contended that rulers had to adapt to each distinct locale in order to impose Spanish authority, which had one unique essence. As Dennis Cosgrove has observed, early modern Neostoic thinkers (mainly cartographers) saw the world as being composed of different parts, but at the same time maintained a comprehensive vision in which orbe and empire encompassed or subsumed these differences.\(^\text{36}\)

The Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria has been portrayed as the most important exponent of early modern Spanish cosmopolitanism.\(^\text{37}\) Heavily influenced by Neostoicism, he proposed the existence of universal laws arising from natural law that


\(^{34}\) Heater, World Citizenship and Government, 16.

\(^{35}\) Saavedra Fajardo, Empresas políticas, 429.

\(^{36}\) Cosgrove, “Globalism and Tolerance in Early Modern Geography.”

ruled every human being and society, including, of course, Spaniards and Indians.\textsuperscript{38} These were not divine laws, but rather laws deduced from human nature, which Vitoria considered to be universal across origin and culture. According to Anthony Pagden, Vitoria’s thinking followed Stoic ideas of what was natural to men. One of the main natural conditions was the ideal of communication and sociability. This led Vitoria to conclude that humans and nations had the need and the right to move, to engage with others in trade, and to be hospitable.\textsuperscript{39} Vitoria’s declarations are considered the origins of International Law in that they sought to regulate how nations should engage, and prescribed when it was legitimate to do so and under what conditions. In the last instance, Vitoria was proposing a justification for Spanish conquest of America on the grounds that the Indians rejected European offers to trade with them.

Walter Mignolo notes the contradictions and shortfalls of Vitoria’s project. On the one hand, Vitoria was proposing the configuration of a legal, political, and moral system of universal scope, in which all men were deemed equal. This was, certainly, a true cosmopolitan desire: to embrace all societies, despite their diversity, within one and only system, so that everyone could be a citizen of the same regulated world. On the other hand, Mignolo claims that Vitoria based his argumentation on the distinction between “principes Christianos” and “los bárbaros.”\textsuperscript{40} The Spanish thinker unilaterally presented an insuperable cultural distinction between these two groups and, therefore, his project was not about regulating two sovereign and equal nations, but about two distinct cultural systems interacting. These differences were of profound importance. While Indians and


\textsuperscript{39} Pagden, “Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European Imperialism,” 8–9.

\textsuperscript{40} Mignolo, “Cosmopolitanism and the De-Colonial Option,” 121.
Spaniards as humans were ontologically equal, the Indigenous’ barbarian condition made them incapable of ruling according to human laws. This was the colonial difference. Furthermore, Mignolo contends, the communications and interactions between the two groups were one-sided, as Indians never had a say on Vitoria’s project and were “included within a system only to be disciplined.” Indians were not ready yet to rule themselves according to Vitoria’s European standards. As Anthony Pagden contends, it is difficult to separate cosmopolitanism from its Europeanism, and from the civilizing mission and imperialism that accompanied these ideas.

Early modern Spanish imperial cosmopolitanism was informed by the permanent and almost insurmountable tension between universal ideals and desires, and its local and diverse realities. As discussed in previous chapters, Spanish officials experienced such tensions directly. The Monarchy, through its officials, while recognizing the differences of the empire’s multiple realms, tried constantly to reinterpret the principles that justified its imperial project—the defense and expansion of Catholicism and the king’s authority—in each and every case.

The discourse and world vision of Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos fit within this cosmopolitanism. This imperial official was well aware of human diversity since he had experienced it first-hand. Throughout his life, he had crossed several cultural boundaries, interacting with other Europeans, American natives, black African slaves and freedmen, and Asians. In all of these encounters, Ordóñez de Cevallos attempted to impose his values, either fighting the others and hoping to eliminate them, or preaching to them and attempting to coopt them into his worldview.

41 Ibid., 122.
43 Pardo Molero and Lomas Cortés, Oficiales reales, 12.
Nonetheless, alongside this imperial project there was room for individuals who, usually on the basis of their own personal experiences, proposed, desired, or saw a more tolerant world. The captain Domingo Toral y Valdés visited many of the same regions than Ordóñez de Cevallos did. While he certainly was an imperial official who worked for the preservation and expansion of the Spanish Empire, and for the defeat of its enemies, he was also capable of embracing human difference. By asserting the humanity of Muslims and Jews, he was accepting that there were many different ways of enforcing human laws.

Toral y Valdés’s respect for and appreciation of difference resembles those cases of tolerance studied by Stuart Schwartz, in which humble and common people did not necessarily see religious difference as a threat or as something perilous. In fact, for these men and women everyone could be saved on its own law; living a good life in accordance to moral precepts would assure salvation, despite individual beliefs. Furthermore, Schwartz has suggested that the cosmopolitanism of the common people, understood “in the sense that they were mobile and had seen other lands and other ways,” might have contributed, in some cases, to the development of more open and tolerant ideas in the Iberian world.44 Although Schwartz does not go in depth on the concept of cosmopolitanism, he points to the importance of world mobility for the emergence of such ideas. Indeed, cosmopolitanism was not exclusive to imperial elites and ideologues. There was surely a kind of popular cosmopolitanism as well. The ability to transcend cultural borders was shared by common people, who moved by the thousands to harvest crops, migrated to the Indies, and fought wars. In doing so, they experienced diversity directly. Many of these men became also imperial officials and, as we have seen in the

previous chapters, they—the lower echelon of the Spanish political administration—engaged with the imperial project, dealing in their own ways with the different societies to which they were exposed.

**The Catholic Soldier**

Religious thinking and ideas were no doubt at the core of how early modern people understood their world. Unsurprisingly, a fundamental characteristic of Spanish cosmopolitanism was its religiosity. Brian C. Lockey has argued for taking seriously the religious nature of early modern identity and cosmopolitanism. He rightfully argues against the opinion of Walter Mignolo, who considers religion to be an irrelevant characteristic. For Mignolo, there is no major difference between the religious cosmopolitanism that emerged in the sixteenth century and the more secular cosmopolitanism characteristic of the eighteenth century. Lockey notes that such is a misleading reading as it forgets that Vitoria’s global order was dependent on the supremacy of papal power, while Kant’s world was organized around secular and republican ideals and values. This was not a minor difference. The notion of an overarching spiritual authority was decisive to how early modern people understood and organized their societies. We will go back later in this chapter to the implications of such political and religious imaginings.

Catholicism shaped the goals and methods of the Spanish cosmopolitan project, and also provided its justification. Spanish ideologues pushed for a Spanish Monarchy that carried out the mission of spreading Catholicism in order to become truly the one and

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universal religion. Thus, Spanish cosmopolitanism resonated with the ideal of a universal church, of being a Catholic anywhere in the world. Moreover, Catholicism informed the mission of civilizing the empire’s subjects. Religion served as the watershed that differentiated Europeans from the “barbarians.” Last, but not least, Catholic morality resided at the core of the Spanish project, which was supposed to be ruled and defined by Catholic ideals of good government and coexistence. In this regard, Spanish officials were permanently confronted with the ideals of a good Catholic official, and especially, of the Catholic Soldier.

Raffaele Puddu, in his remarkable study of the characteristics and cultural milieu of the Spanish soldiers, affirms that Catholic morality defined the way in which military service was understood and carried out. The profound interweaving between the service to the king and the service to God provided the ethos that supported all of a soldier’s activities.47 In a later book, Puddu argues that since the sixteenth century it was developed a military identity that was common to the Spanish soldiers throughout the globe. This identity was built around the ideals of a global defense of the king’s authority and the Catholic religion. Furthermore, such Spanish identity was constructed in opposition to three major wars against the enemies of the monarch and the faith: the fight against the Muslim ‘infidels,’ especially in Africa, southern Europe, and the Mediterranean; the conflict with the European ‘heretics,’ mainly the Dutch; and the struggles in the New World against the ‘pagan and barbarian’ Indians.48 Throughout the seventeenth century, those struggles overlapped, and in the context of the early modern globalization, became global in range. Spanish officials could find heretics as far as America or even Southeast

47 Puddu, El soldado gentilhombre, especially ch. 8.
Asia; there were Muslims in the Philippine islands, and the Iberian Peninsula itself; an
the image of the barbarian and uncivilized came to define many other societies, even in
Europe.

Spanish officials were conscious of their duties as Catholic officials. There are
abundant examples of these men’s concerns regarding their religious struggles and the
evangelization of the new peoples they were finding and conquering. Santiago de Vera,
who served as governor of the Philippines at the end of the sixteenth century, affirmed
that the king was not trying to conquer China or any other kingdom, but that the soldiers
and ammunition had to be send there for defending and protecting the true mission: “la
conversión de los naturales y predicación del santo evangelio.” This was done despite the
great amount of money, men, and resources spent on that mission, because it was worthy
that “todos se salven.” ⁴⁹ Such evangelization was part of the civilizing process. To
convert people to Catholicism meant not only to baptize them, but also to inculcate in
them a set of Spanish values and a vision of the world, and ultimately, to reduce them. ⁵⁰
Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, worried by the rising number of European enemies in the
Caribbean, suggested the Spanish king should either order to populate all of the islands,
“o mandar los matasen todos, porque no acuda allí el enemigo hereje, como fue en la
Florida.” ⁵¹ Likewise, the Monarch, worried by the presence of Muslim infidels in the
Philippines, ordered governor Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera to organize a military
campaign against the Muslim kingdom of Mindanao, nearby the Spanish-controlled
island of Luzon. After a difficult victory, Spanish soldiers’ first action was to go

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⁴⁹ AGI, Filipinas, 34, N. 75 “Carta de Santiago de Vera Sobre Situación General.”
⁵⁰ For a discussion on the ideal of reducir, see Chapter Four.
⁵¹ Ordóñez de Cevallos, Historia y viaje del mundo, 349.
immediately to the Mosque and get hold of the “cátedra grande de Mahoma con sus libros y otros aderezos y quemarlos.”\textsuperscript{52}

Catholic mission and identity went well beyond the limits of religion. It permeated all layers of Spanish society and defined its government and political culture, differentiating it from other polities in Europe and in other parts of the world.\textsuperscript{53} Hurtado de Corcuera was worried by the lack of religiosity that some of his soldiers displayed. He complained that there was not a chapel in the Philippines where the soldiers could attend mass—as it was ordered in Flanders—and be properly buried, as befitting “cristianos españoles y vasallos de Vuestra Majestad.”\textsuperscript{54}

Unsurprisingly, Spanish officials—whose political service was impregnated by military ideals and attitudes (many had previously been soldiers)—came to view themselves as ‘Catholic Soldiers.’ The Jesuit priest Alonso de Andrade in his \textit{El buen soldado católico y sus obligaciones} defined these soldiers as those who not only were baptized, but who defended their faith (and every statement of the Church) with their lives and arms.\textsuperscript{55} This book was a manual instructing the virtues that a good Catholic soldier was supposed to have. Above all, claimed Andrade, a Catholic soldier had to show and defend his faith with words and with actions, differentiating himself from the Turks, Muslims, and other heretics.\textsuperscript{56} This defense and exposition of Spanish Catholicism was understood as a global struggle, and Andrade did not hold back in expressing his

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{CGIF}, 8:LI–CVI; quotation in LXXIII.
\textsuperscript{53} See, for instance, Antonio Feros, “‘Por Dios, por la patria y el rey’: El mundo político en tiempos de Cervantes,” in \textit{España en tiempos del Quijote}, ed. Antonio Feros and Juan Gelabert (Madrid: Taurus, 2004), 61–96.
\textsuperscript{54} AGI, Filipinas 8, R. 3, N. 49 “Carta de Corcuera sobre capilla para soldados” (Manila, June 30, 1636).
\textsuperscript{55} Alonso de Andrade, \textit{El buen soldado católico y sus obligaciones} (Madrid: Francisco Maroto, 1642), 6. Another example of this kind of writing is Jerónimo Gracián de la Madre de Dios, \textit{El soldado católico: que prueba con historias, ejemplos razones claras... que los que no tiene letras no han de disputar de la fee con los herejes...} (Bruselas: Roger Velpio y Huberto Antonio, 1611).
\textsuperscript{56} Andrade, \textit{El Buen Soldado}, 8.
universal aspirations. The word ‘Catholic,’ he reminded readers, originally meant universal, “el que lo abraza todo, sin excluir cosa alguna.”\textsuperscript{57}

Andrade’s book is a treatise on morality, and specifically, on how a Catholic soldier should behave. The priest contends that alongside the military training, soldiers require lessons of Christianity, morality, and good customs, so ultimately they can link together “la virtud con las armas, y la vida soldadesca con la vida virtuosa, guardando las leyes de Dios, y las de la milicia, persuadiéndose que pueden muy bien servir a su Dios y a su rey juntamente.”\textsuperscript{58} For Andrade, who spent time in the North African presidios, service to God and king were inseparable.

\textit{El buen soldado} is a celebration of the military. Military activities were the major source of honor, claims Andrade, and they were also a cornerstone of the defense of Catholicism, and in fact, Christ and the Virgin Mary “han tomado la espada, no una, sino muchas veces para defender la Iglesia de sus enemigos.”\textsuperscript{59} Therefore, while the theologians defended the faith with the quill, the soldiers used their swords.\textsuperscript{60} However, Andrade warns that wars can only be started for the right reasons, otherwise they would be unjust wars, an abominable sin. For a war to be just, its goals must be

\begin{quote}
 el servicio y gloria de Dios, la administración de la justicia, sacar de la opresión a los buenos, castigar a los rebeldes, establecer el culto divino, defender la Fe católica, propagar la Iglesia, amplificar el evangelio, desterrar la idolatría, destruir las herejías, dar a cada uno lo que fuere suyo.\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

Andrade criticizes the use of force to achieve political or economic gains, or to increase honor. For this Jesuit, war should only be started once all other possibilities have been

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 225.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 56–57.
\end{flushright}
tried and failed, and when it was absolutely necessary. If a war was just, Catholic armies would unquestionably prevail with God on their side.

Andrade praises the many sacrifices that soldiers make when fulfilling their mission of spreading Catholicism across the world. He acknowledges that not even the most radical hermits live in such harsh conditions. Soldiers truly know hunger and discomfort, claims Andrade; they can spend several days without rest, and a penitent’s sackcloth seemed nothing compared to the soldier’s doublet. Moreover, soldiers are constantly exposing their bodies and lives to harm. On top of all this, they are forced to move and leave their families and homes, “conversando con gentes de diferentes lenguas y que siempre los aborrecen y procuran hacer mal.” Spanish soldiers were cosmopolitans, whose mobility forced them to engage with different populations, who were seen, under the imperial perspective, as enemies to be reduced and distrusted.

Nonetheless, Andrade argues that soldiers of other armies and religions experienced the same sacrifices and penuries. Therefore, going through such harsh experiences does not guarantee salvation. According to the imperial cosmopolitanism of Andrade, it was Catholicism what made the difference in an otherwise universally human experience. While everyone would fight and suffer equally, the fact that Spanish soldiers did it in order to defend Catholic faith, separated them from the rest, gave them preeminence, and ultimately, validated their actions. Soldiers, then, needed to comply with Catholic precepts and morality, and *El buen soldado* explains how to do it. A good soldier, that is, a Catholic soldier, must fully and openly practice the doctrine. He should often attend mass, confess, and receive communion. Furthermore, soldiers should keep away from all kind of vices, mainly gambling and profane swearing. They should instead

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keep themselves busy with religious and military exercises and readings. Moreover, a good soldier should be generous, honest, and specially, docile and obedient.

These kinds of lessons resonated with the activities of the imperial officials. Juan Márquez Cabrera served as governor of Honduras and of Florida during the second half of the seventeenth century. Even before those appointments he was already a seasoned military man, and, based on his own personal experiences, published his *Espejo en que se debe mirar el buen soldado*. This was mainly a technical manual of how a good Spanish soldier should behave, and a guide to specific duties according to the various ranks. The author explains, for instance, how soldiers should carry their pikes, the needed precautions to keep the powder dry, how a sergeant should command, and how a general should distribute tasks among his subordinates. Furthermore, Márquez Cabrera ends his book explaining, with words and diagrams, a complex mathematical formula that would serve to properly and efficiently arrange and move soldiers in different formations.

Nonetheless, Márquez Cabrera also emphasizes that soldiers need to go to mass and confess as much as possible, and that their military activities and behavior should be based upon the virtue. Furthermore, this experienced royal official argues that the larger purpose of the military presence and activities of the Spanish soldiers throughout the globe was to help the “milicia espiritual,” the priests and missionaries, and to open doors for incorporating into Catholicism such a large number of pagans and infidels. Indeed, he affirmed that while all soldiers, regardless their nation of origin, had the obligation to

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63 Márquez Cabrera, *Espejo del buen soldado*. At the time of the writing of his book, Márquez Cabrera affirms that he served in the Fleet, in Italy, Portugal, Catalonia, and in the Windward Islands.
64 Ibid., 116–143.
65 Ibid., 7.
66 Ibid., 2.
serve and obey their kings. Spaniards had even more reasons to do so, as their king was “columna de la Fe y amparo de la Iglesia.”

This manual was thought to be useful in any war theater, whether in Europe or in America. Obviously, for someone like Márquez Cabrera, who moved across the world serving the king, the global nature of the imperial mission was self-evident. He highlighted the importance of always having in the army people expert in the local languages, and to be as cautious and friendly as possible when going through a foreign country. Moreover, he praised the Spanish king’s power to bring under his banners soldiers from many different nations, who would happily join the Spanish army to defeat those enemies who attempted “derribar la iglesia y su corona.”

This official was not alone in linking the Spanish military activities with the religious mission. In 1656, the Spanish Admiralty received a proposal for the creation of a new brotherhood: “Los Católicos Militares de la Fe.” This was to be a military order, dependent on the Inquisition, which had to protect the ports of Cadiz and other ports in the Mediterranean from the attacks of heretics and infidels. The brotherhood would be funded with alms given by every person anytime they registered a notarial protocol, and also with the king’s donation of a fifth of all the ships that were to be captured. It is not clear whether this project ever proceeded, but its design clearly speaks to the interweaving of religious and the imperial aims. No one felt the need to explain why

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67 Ibid., 1.
68 Ibid., 98–99.
69 Ibid., 3.
70 BNE, Mss/18719/21 Francisco Vázquez de Párraga, “Representación que hizo al Almirantzgo Francisco Vázquez de Párraga en 22 de octubre de 1656, sobre la defensa de los reinos y señaladamente de las costas de Andalucía y navegación de la carrera de las Indias” (Madrid, October 22, 1656).
defending the Cadiz port and its Atlantic trade served to extend Catholicism. It was assumed that the Spanish Empire’s activities were inescapably Catholic.

As Alejandro Cañeque has noted, the Spanish crown propagandists made significant and successful efforts to represent the Spanish ruler as the earthly image of God. Through the use of sophisticated images, rituals, and language, human power became identified with the divine. There was a close association between the images of the Monarch and God. At moments, the two icons were blurred and difficult to differentiate.\(^1\) Spanish officials understood they were serving simultaneously two majesties: heavenly and temporal.

This association, however, was far from being absolute or lacking in tension. In fact, Cañeque argues against the reduction of the Church to an instrument of the State. He shows the many conflicts that arose between the ecclesiastic and the civil authorities. Theses frictions came as a consequence of the early modern conception of dual powers, spiritual and temporal, with each embedded in the pontifical and royal authorities, respectively. This paradigm, notes Cañeque, had nothing to do with the separation of Church and state, but related to two distinct jurisdictions. This scheme led to multiple debates about the primacy of those powers, which in the American case translated into a constant rift between the viceroys and the bishops.\(^2\) That is why Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos claimed that the lunar cross, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, appeared to signal the power of the Church over a very particular enemy: not a Muslim, or a heretic, but the Holy Roman emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, who had fought popes Adrian IV and Alexander III. Ordóñez de Cevallos, resorting to an extended rhetoric,

\(^1\) Cañeque, *The King’s Living Image*, 36–50.
\(^2\) Ibid., 79–106.
argued that the moon—whose light was borrowed from the sun, which symbolized God—represented the emperor, who received his power from the pope. The cross, then, epitomized the preeminence of the Roman church over this emperor and augured his submission and punishment.⁷³

**Spanish Exceptionalism. One Empire, Many Enemies**

The struggles to defend the Church’s and the Spanish monarch’s authority profoundly shaped the identity of imperial subjects. The idea of being in a permanent state of siege, surrounded by enemies who hated the Spanish and their empire, played a vital role in how Spanish imperial officials interacted with different people throughout the empire, whether subjects or foreigners. The persistent threat created a sense of exceptionalism, of being different from other nations; but also of internal unity.

Several scholars have already examined the exceptional nature of Spanish history. Tamar Herzog ended her study on the practices and discourses of Spanish nationhood by reflecting whether Spaniards, and particularly Castilians, thought of themselves as radically different from their European peers, and if their practices were indeed atypical. She concluded that against the tropes of a Spanish exceptionalism, Spain was certainly embedded in the European political culture.⁷⁴ Herzog was discussing with a historiography that has claimed, for better or worse, the existance of a unique and exceptional Spanish character, mostly due to the longlasting presence of Muslim and Jewish communities, and their eventual expulsion. Scholars ranging from Claudio Sánchez Albornoz to José Ortega y Gasset have attempted to explain Spanish history, and

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especially its “failures,” by looking to this exceptionalism.\textsuperscript{75} There has been a tendency, thus, to depict Spain (and its empire) as not fully European or modern, a vision that contemporary historians have begun to debunk.\textsuperscript{76} In many regards, this image of Spain was crafted in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when Spanish opponents, mainly the English and the Dutch, spread the “Black Legend.” Under this perspective, the Spanish Empire appeared radicalized and blinded by its stubborn Catholicism, which, as a polity, made it intrinsically and particularly oppressive, violent, intolerant, and overall backwards.

While most early modern Spaniards did not share such a negative self-image, they did view themselves as exceptional. Spanish exceptionalism was closely linked to the empire’s preeminent position on the global stage—as it was the greatest political, military, and economic European power of its time—and to its mission. This kind of exceptionalism has been shared by many imperial powers throughout history, from Ancient Rome to contemporary America, who have perceived themselves as chosen by God, as the carriers of the ultimate responsibility of world order and progress, and as lone wolves who, anxiously and tirelessly, struggle against a global opposition.

To Spanish officials, God’s manifest destiny was self-evident: it was part of a divine plan that they had defeated and expelled the Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula, and then extended their reach to the whole world. Márquez Cabrera started his \textit{Espejo del buen soldado} noting that it was “providencia divina” that Columbus sailed to the New


\textsuperscript{76} See, for instance, the critique to such vision developed by Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, \textit{Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1550-1700} (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2006), 215–233.
World under the Castillian banner, and that Cortés and Pizarro conquered America. The alleged fact that these impressive actions were undertaken by just a few men and not in the most favorable conditions reinforced the idea that they succeeded because they were always protected by God. Moreover, the claim of the constant appareances of Christ, the Virgin Mary, the Cross, and saints, such as the ubiquitous Santiago, assured Spaniards that their actions were being sanctioned by God, and that they had to continue with their mission of spreading and defending Catholicism.

Furthermore, Spaniards proudly perceived themselves as the only polity that was fully Catholic, where all of its members professed the same religion. This was truly ‘the’ Catholic monarchy. For instance, the priest Jacinto Samper affirmed, “la monarquía de España es la únicamente católica en todo el mundo en que no solo es católica la cabeza, sino todos los vasallos que son los miembros de ella.” While others could see this religious intolerance as a vice and a problem, for many Spaniards this was actually a virtue. They had the strong conviction that their law and civilization, with Catholicism at its core, was superior to all others, and therefore it was their obligation to protect and expand it.

Consequently, Spanish subjects sensed that they were alone in their struggles. Because God chose them, they had to endure, by themselves, all sorts of enemies who continuously threatened Spanish authority. This was a heavy burden that, although carried out as stoically as possible, fostered a state of anxiety for Spaniards around the world, and which in turn informed the ways in which cosmopolitanism was practiced. In the National Library of Spain there is a bound collection of assorted documents under the

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77 Márquez Cabrera, Espejo del buen soldado, 2–3.
78 AGI, Filipinas, 28, N. 131, 1114-1121 Samper, “Informe sobre que no se permita vivir en Filipinas a los chinos infieles,” fol. 1114.
title of *Descripción de la India Oriental* that illustrates this agitation.\(^79\) These papers, a miscellanea of letters, descriptions, reports, consultations, and other documents, ranging from 1599 to 1654, when the crowns of Portugal and Castile were united (at least until 1640), that deal with the possessions of the Portuguese crown in East Asia, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and America, contain constant references to the enemies that Catholic subjects faced and who threatened the authority of the Spanish king in such places as Brazil, India, Madagascar, or the Moluccas. An anonymous writer affirmed in 1605 that in Goa it was coming “gente da Europa, inimigos do Christo e alevantado do suave jugo de Vossa Majestade.”\(^80\) The enemies could, in fact, appear in the form of English, Dutch, indigenous people from Africa or the Asian islands, or the Persians.\(^81\) While there were many authors behind those documents, and they were written in different times, they share the idea of an empire under attack and that had to be permanently defended. In the end, this was the imperial mission of these officials, whether they were Castilians, or, in this case, Portuguese: to preserve the global hegemony of the Spanish king.

Surely the most pervasive of the Spanish enemies in this period were the Dutch. In the *Descripción de la India Oriental* it is constantly mentioned the presence of Dutch ships across the world who effectively threatened the Iberians. The anonymous author of a description of various islands in current-day Indonesia claimed that the Dutch were a frequent and very real menace, and that “os natural dele vivem a sombra do inimigo, esta

\(^79\) BNE, Mss/3015 “Descripción de la India Oriental, gobierno de ella y sucesos acaecidos en el año 1639,” various dates.
\(^80\) BNE, Mss/3015, fol. 250-255v. “Relación sobre el estado de la ciudad de Goa y demás fortalezas del sur” (Cámara, December 3, 1605), fol. 250.
\(^81\) See, for instance, BNE, Mss/3015, fol. 231-237v. Felipe Brito, “Relación del sitio que el rey de Arracán y el de Tángü pusieron por mar y tierra sobre la fortaleza de Serio,” 1607; BNE, Mss/3015, fol. 9 - 12v. Bartolomé Ferreira Lagarto, “Apuntamientos a un papel de avertencias tocantes al socorro del estado del Brasil” (Madrid, August 27, 1639).
em sua masia fortificada e fortalecida que mete para espanto." Also, in what appears to be a consulta an imperial official discussed the problems and disadvantages of the Twelve Years’ Truce, the 1609 cease of hostilities between the Spanish Monarchy and the Dutch Provinces. The anonymous author affirmed that the Dutch would navigate and trade without any problems in territories that until then were exclusive to the Portuguese. The author warned that the Dutch would get richer, lessening Spanish interests in the region. Not only would there be fewer opportunities to do business, but the Dutch would sell weapons to the natives. In fact, for this official it was clear that the Dutch would attempt to ally with local authorities for overturning Iberian power. These fears of Dutch attacks and conspiracies were not unfounded. Among this collection of documents there is a translation of a Dutch printed document in which Juan Andrea Moerbeceq argued for the reasons that made it both feasible and desirable to the Dutch Western India Company to launch a military campaign to occupy Brazil, something they eventually did.

Spanish officials felt threatened and anxious not only in regards to the Dutch. In the early modern Spanish documentation, beyond the Descripción de la India Oriental, there is a persistent idea of a global and shared hostility towards the Spaniards. Pedro Esteban Dávila explained the difficulties of his government and interactions with the local Portuguese population in the Azores islands as a consequence of the “odio que

82 BNE, Mss/3015, fol. 41 - 48v. “Relación breue da ilha de Ternate, Tydire e mais ilhas Malucas” (Malaca, November 28, 1619), fol. 43.
83 BNE, Mss/3015, fol. 153-157 “Discurso sobre la supremacía de los reyes de Portugal en los mares de la India,” n.d.
84 BNE, Mss/3015, fol. 217-222 Juan Andrea Moerbeceq, “Razones por la que la Compañía de las Indias Occidentales habían de pescar (sic.) de quitar al rey de Hespería la terra del Brazil,” n.d.
tienen a los castellanos.”

He specifically accused captain Manuel Docanto and other municipal councilors who “han tomado por asunto hacer odioso el nombre castellano a los portugueses, y de hermanos que estaban se conviertan en mortal odio y aborrecimiento.”

Certainly, these tensions were part of the difficult process of integration triggered by the Union of the Crowns, as Jean-Frederic Schaub has argued.

Nonetheless, Esteban Dávila’s assertions resonate with many others expressed by other imperial officials. In 1662, the chronicler of the indigenous revolt of Oaxaca affirmed that the natives had revolted moved by the “natural aversión y odio que tienen por lo común a los españoles.” In the Philippines, the defenders of the expulsion of the Sangleys asserted that a new rebellion was always to be expected because of how much the Chinese loathed the Spanish.

In the “Sumario de todo lo sucedido en Europa el año de 1640 hasta el de 1641” (a document part of the Sucesos del año 1640), the anonymous author intended to explain the ill-fated year—in which multiple conflicts and rebellions arose throughout the empire—as a natural consequence of the large extension of the monarchy, and of the envy generated by its successes:

Como nuestra monarquía es tan dilatada y topa en su extensión con tantos principes y amenazaban los émulos su felicidad y su quietud, convocando y llamando al Turco [...] Los franceses, nuestros contrarios finitimos, inquietan el Orbe para que unido y coligado se oponga a nuestra grandeza, sin dispensar en

85 BNE, Mss/801, f. 80v-83 Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor en el Consejo de Estado de Portugal” (Tercera, November 10, 1623).
86 BNE, Mss/801, f. 44v-47v Pedro Esteban Dávila, “Carta al Rey Nuestro Señor por sus Consejos de Estado y Guerra con Fabricio Pacheco en la carabela de don Juan Figueira de Acaugui” (Tercera, July 19, 1623).
87 Schaub, L’île aux mariés.
88 Torres Castillo, Relación de lo sucedido en las provincias de nexapa, fol. 16.
89 BNE, Mss/11014, fol. 42-65 Pregunta y propuesta si será lícito, necesario... para la conservación de estas islas [Filipinas]... expeler de todas ellas a los chinos o sangleyes infieles que viven en ellas, y a los fieles chinos o sangleyes con pretexto de cristianos y casados con indias naturales de ellas (Manila, 1663).
There was a sense of being hated by everyone and being engaged in a global struggle, and as it has been shown in the previous chapter, imperial officials quickly framed their local conflicts within this imperial context.

Throughout these conflicts, wins and losses, the imperial Spanish officials incorporated into one narrative the multiple people, geographies, societies, and religions in which they dealt. Their own imperial experiences moved them to integrate such a disparate world. The plotline they used to give unity to such diversity was an imperial narrative, fostered by their Catholic mission and sense of national exceptionalism. Nonetheless, the fact that this imperial project attempted to impose one law and authority over diverse regions and people did not prevent officials from acknowledging the differences among those subjects. To the contrary, there was an active interest in getting to know as much as possible of the foreign world, to know the peculiarities of every corner of the planet, and to make them accessible.

**Knowing and Comparing the World**

In the poem, *Descripción de las provincias del reino de Chile*, usually known as *Las Guerras de Chile*, the author described the Chilean natives in the following terms:

- tienen cuerpo membrudo de germanos
- el ánimo español y la altiveza
- astucias como griegos y africanos
- la crueldad de los escitas y fiera [line scratched out]
- el impetu francés y ligereza [on the margin]
- constancia y sufrimientos de romanos,

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90 BNE. Mss/2371, 503-506v. “Sumario de todo lo sucedido en Europa el año de 1640 hasta el de 1641,” 1641, fol. 503v.
y cual infidos partos la firmeza.91

This description relies on what the author believed were known and obvious attributes of different people across the world and time. These identity traits were combined to explain the true nature of the Araucanians, who in this way became incorporated into the European history of the world. Moreover, this is also an effort to clearly define and demarcate the Chilean indigenous, signaling both their similarities to others and what made them different and peculiar. Through this exercise, the Spanish author not only was describing different societies; he was placing them alongside each other, and incorporating them into his own vision.

Imperial officials were ever describing, for European audiences, the foreign peoples with whom they dealt on a daily basis. They relied on recognizable images to expose the distinct places and societies they saw and in which they served. Thus, they constantly drew comparisons. The way to know a different region was by placing it alongside another, to try to perceive its peculiarities and commonalities. An easy way to explain something unknown was by referring to things familiar to the reader. In 1615, a letter arrived to the Philippines from India, briefing on that region and summarizing information from other letters and documents. The anonymous compiler described the most important recent events and the shifting regional politics across the Indian Ocean. In order to express what was at stake in the recent conflicts, he wrote that the Sultan was

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91 BNE, Mss/3932 “Descripción de las provincias del Reino de Chile: Las que por más belicosas han sustentado la guerra, los modos que en gobernarse tienen y algunas no escritas hasta aquí de sus costumbres y otras cosas memorables acontecidas en el discurso de varios gobernadores,” ca 1660, fol. 10. There is still debate about the authorship of the poem. In the nineteenth century the famous bibliophile José Toribio Medina attributed it to the Spanish poet and soldier Juan de Mendoza y Monteagudo: Juan de Mendoza Monteagudo, Las guerras de Chile, ed. José Toribio Medina (Imprenta Ercilla, 1888). However, there are doubts about this, and other names have been proposed, see Carlos Mata Induráin, “Una aproximación a Las Guerras de Chile, poema épico anónimo del siglo XVII,” Taller de Letras 3 (2013): 153–170.
afraid of losing his control over the city of Sumatra, the most important port, “por donde le entra todo en su reino, como Sevilla en Castilla, o Lisboa en Portugal.”  

One of the most evident differences that imperial officials encountered in their journeys, and which had a profound impact on their interactions and how they learned about the world, was language. The Spanish Empire was, indeed, marked by an enormous linguistic diversity. Its inhabitants spoke not only Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, or Catalan, but also Nahuatl, Quechua, Chinese, and even Arabic. The count of Gondomar, a major Spanish official who became ambassador in London in the 1610s, received a letter written in his native Galician congratulating him for speaking in Portuguese when dealing with the Portuguese people, something they appreciated. Because of the composite nature of the Spanish Empire, the Spanish king was thought as an independent ruler in each of his possessions, and had to behave according to every area’s particular laws and customs. He had to speak the language of his subjects and sent letters written in Portuguese to his officials in Portugal, Brazil, and India. Likewise, he received documents in other languages. In 1582, Cachil Guapebaguna, the king of the Moluccas islands, nearby the Philippines, wrote to Philip II. He had just learned about the Union of the Portuguese and Castilian crowns and offered his vassalage. The letter was written in Portuguese and signed in Arabic (Fig. 6). The first was, until then, the official language used by this native leader—who portrayed himself as vassal of the Portuguese crown—to communicate with the European authorities, and the second was his native tongue. The

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92 AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 4 “Copia de capítulos de carta sobre cosas de la India.”
93 BNE, Mss/13141 Diego Sarmiento de Acuña Gondomar, “ Correspondencia de D. Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Conde de Gondomar y Corregidor de Valladolid,” 1602, fol. 101 v.
94 AGI, Filipinas, 200, N. 1 Philip III to Bishop - Viceroy, “Sobre la arribada de carabelas a aquellas partes, para que se las socorra y no se distraiga a su gente en otros efectos,” January 21, 1614.
Figure 6. Detail of letter sent by Cachil Guapebaguna to Philip II. It is written in Portuguese and signed in Arabic. AGI, Filipinas, 34, N. 43.

letter reached the imperial court, where it was translated and read to the king. There were a great number of papers circulating within the empire written in different languages. Pedro García de los Ríos was the secretary in the imperial archive of Simancas who was in charge of organizing, preserving, and translating the many papers written in Latin, French and Italian.

Henceforth, in order to rule and administer the empire, the crown and its officials had to rely on people fluent in the native languages. They were natives but also Spaniards (mainly priests), and they were experts in a great number of languages, from Nahuatl in Mexico, to Kaka, the native language of the Calchaquíes (in current Northwestern Argentina), as well as Arabic in the Mediterranean. These in-between people were absolutely necessary for the functioning of the empire. There was a clear consciousness

95 AGI, Filipinas, 34, N. 43 “Carta del rey de Maluco al gobernador Ronquillo” (Tidore, March 20, 1582).
96 AHN, Consejos, 4436 N. 24 “Recomendacion a don Pedro Garcia de los Rios, Secretario del Archivo de Simancas” (Madrid, May 24, 1659).
97 AHN, Estado, 2887 “Instrucción a Don Manuel Vieira de Lugo para que pase a Mequínez a negociar la libertad de cautivos” (Madrid, July 7, 1690); Giudicelli, “Speaking the Enemy Language.”
98 See the study of Mexican in-betweens: Yannakakis, The Art of Being in-Between.
of the need to communicate with people in their own languages. The Peruvian writer Pedro Mexía de Ovando affirmed that

cuando se pretende que un hombre bárbaro, o una nación de lengua diferente, sean políticos, las personas que han de ayudar a desnudarles de aquella corteza, han de saber su lengua y con ella misma, y no con otra diferente, se les ha de dar a entender aquello que se pretende, porque de otra manera fuera imposible poderlo hacer. Parece más justo y de menos inconveniente que el cura aprenda la lengua de los feligreses, que no ellos la del cura.⁹⁹

Nonetheless, it is also true that Spanish became the imperial language, spoken by many subjects, and the language by which the empire was ruled.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, Spanish was used as the early modern lingua franca. Thus, León Pinelo asserted,

que aunque [Valencia, Vizcaya, and Aragon] tienen lenguas propias, usan de la castellana por su elegancia y facilidad, y por ello está admitida en toda España, en Italia, y Flandes. Por arte y curiosidad la saben y entienden alemanes, franceses y moro. En las Indias, desde el estrecho de Magallanes, hasta lo más Occidental de Nueva España y en todas las islas adyacentes en las mares del Norte y del Sur.¹⁰¹

Once again, this speaks to the permanent imperial tension between the universal and the particular; between homogenizing desires and disparate realities; and of the force of cosmopolitanism in general. Native populations engaged with imperial power while maintaining their own culture and language; but simultaneously, they were pushed to embrace Spanish. On the one hand it was accepted and expected that the many diverse imperial subjects would speak their own language and preserve their customs, but on the

⁹⁹ Mexía de Ovando, Libro o memorial práctico, fol. 92.
¹⁰⁰ J. H. Elliott, Lengua e imperio en la España de Felipe IV (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1994).
¹⁰¹ Antonio de León Pinelo, Epitome de la Biblioteca Oriental, y Occidental, Naútica, y Geográfica (Madrid: Juan González, 1629), fol. 4.
other hand, there was continuous pressure to override such distinctions, and to unify all under one universal culture, which happened to be Castilian and Catholic.

As seen in Chapter One, maps and cosmographies played a major role in recording and exposing of the world. They allowed for a unified representation of the world, which could fit in just one book. All the different geographies, polities, races, religions, animals, plants, were contained under one single narration. It is worthwhile to note, once again, that this inclusion of the different world was enunciated from a European point of view. The vision of the cosmographers was imperialist. Unsurprisingly, these cosmographies start most of the time with an ample description of Europe and of its various kingdoms, which could take most of the book, to then talk of the lesser-known regions of Asia, America, and Africa. The information provided for the latter regions was mostly sketchy and not fully accurate. While early modern cosmographers included in their works different societies, and often contrasted them with their own, at the end of the story, it was their society which prevailed and appeared as the first and most civilized one, and which should lead the way for the others. The words of Giovanni Botero—one of the most celebrated and influential early modern political thinkers—on this regard are exemplary. In his *Relaciones Universales* he asserted that

> parece la hizo naturaleza sólo para que fuese capaz de comunicarla y de recibir en sí todas las riquezas de las demás provincias y ciudades del mundo, para universal señora del

espesoso mar por do se extiende, y para que tuviese debajo de su imperio a la África, a la Asia, y a la nueva América, hacia la cual derrama y mira con muestra y puesto tal que parece la está dando la mano.

In his celebrated Peso político de todo el mundo, the English native, turned into a Spanish subject, Anthony Sherley set out to describe to the Spanish king the whole world and its many regions. Sherley, born in 1565, was a fascinating character. A Catholic English nobleman who moved broadly across the world engaging in particular business, he was also an official of the English crown. He traversed much of Europe and visited Africa and Central America. He also traveled East and spent time in cities such as Constantinople and Aleppo, becoming acquainted enough with the Persian Shah to return to Europe as his representative. He wrote a famous account of his voyage to Persia. Afterwards, he went to Morocco and then to Spain, where he settled. He became a subject of the Spanish monarch and was commissioned to attack enemies’ ships in the Mediterranean, and was even admitted in the Order of Santiago. Finally, he retired in Granada where he wrote a manuscript dedicated to the count-duke of Olivares. Sherley, who had moved throughout the world, hoped to show the king’s favorite “tan inmensa universalidad y atreverme a presentar a Vuestra Excelencia los aspectos, objetos y discursos de todas las naciones y la sustancia de ellas.”

In Peso político the foreign Spanish official hoped to sketch the current state of the world, pointing out to the strengths and weaknesses of every monarchy, revealing its

103 Giovanni Botero, Relaciones universales del mundo (Valladolid: Herederos de Diego Fernández de Córdova, 1600), 2.
104 BNE, Mss/10580 Antonio Xerley, “Peso político de todo el Mundo” (Granada, 1622). There is a contemporary published version of the manuscript, Anthony Sherley, Peso político de todo el mundo del conde D. Antonio Xerley (Madrid: Instituto Balmes de Sociologia, 1961).
secrets to Olivares, so the favorite could develop the policies that would ensure Spanish
global hegemony. He started by describing Spain, and curiously (to say the least) he
defined it by comparing it to the New World. Sherley was complaining that, just like the
Spaniards were migrating to America to capitalize on its natural resources, other nations
were going to Spain, “la India de los modernos,” to butcher its riches. Then, he
described all the major politicies of the world, presenting them all as enemies of the
Monarchy, from the Portuguese, to the French, the Persians, the Dutch, the English, the
Chinese, and of course, the Turks, who Sherley depicted as the major menace to Spanish
power. While he acknowledged the power and richness of England, he claimed that that
country did not have any richness by nature, that their riches were all acquired, and thus,
knowing England’s secrets it could be stopped. However, the Turks had much power “en
sustancia”, and Shirley affirmed:

Me parece que no hay más efectivamente que dos grandes
planetas en materia de dominio, de los cuales esta monarquía
como mayor es el sol y el imperio del turco la luna, y por ser
forzoso que el sol, que es monarquía en razón de las causas que
el tiempo que corre mueve, haga su curso por muchos signos,
algunos de los cuales calentarán más, y otros menos, es
acertado discurso de disponer el todo de manera que no tenga
oposición de la luna, de lo cual siempre siguen muchos y malos
y peligrosos y perniciosos ejemplos (digo) efectos.

Sherley’s document was a “cosmografía y delineamiento” in which the world was
depicted in its diversity, but at the same time, the author was able to draw parallels and
comparisons, and to abstract and encompass it. Indeed, he stated that “aunque el mundo
es representado entre tantos estados y provincias y viven en ellas tanta diversidad de
gentes, las constituciones de estos tantos estados y de estas tantas naciones son tres y no

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107 Ibid., fol. 6v. Sherley was not the only one who made this comparison, miners like Juan de Oñate also
shared this perspective. Cf. Chapter Three.
108 BNE, Mss/10581 Antonio Xerley, “Peso político de todo el mundo v.2” (Granada, 1622), fol. 31–31v.
más la constitución de las unas.”

He categorized all the world’s states into three types: first the necessitous like the English, Venice, or the Dutch, that had nothing on their own and had to acquire almost everything from the outside. Second, more powerful nations, with major resources, like France, Russia, or China. And finally, the Spanish Monarchy, which had the greatest resources and a presence over the entire world. In this way, Sherley blurred the differences between the other nations and presented to the most powerful Spanish minister a unified and comprehensive vision of the world through the lens of Spanish imperialism.

**Global Interactions on the Edges**

The global vision outlined by Sherley was not exclusive to the imperial leaders and ideologues in Madrid, but was shared and built by many other subjects across the polity, despite (and even perhaps, due to) distance and geographic separation. One interesting feature of Spanish imperialism is that it was enunciated and developed not necessarily from the center of the empire, but from its “peripheries.” Imperial subjects on the “margins” of the empire had, indeed, multiple material and physical contacts and interactions with many other different peoples that forced them to rethink the world and their and others’ place in it. Moreover, there was also a circulation of ideas and information that spawned very powerful mental and intellectual connections, in which people outside Europe could relate to others’ experiences, and imagine a united and coherent global empire.

For instance, early modern cosmopolitanism took place in Mexico City. The four parts of the world converged on that American center. There were large native and

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Spanish populations, and also African slaves and freed men and women lived in the city. Despite the official desire to keep these populations separated, there was constant contact among these people, which created a hybrid and mixed society.\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, Mexico served as a door into the Asian world. Because the galleon that connected the Philippines with the rest of the Spanish Empire sailed from the port of Acapulco (on Mexico’s west coast), merchants, clerics, and officials passed through the city of Mexico in their way to or from Asia.\textsuperscript{111} Furthermore, there was also a major presence of Asian slaves in this city, as Tatiana Seijas has recently shown.\textsuperscript{112} Likewise, these material encounters engendered mental connections and Mexicans developed a comprehensive image of the Spanish Monarchy and the world.\textsuperscript{113} Bernardo Balbuena, a Spanish poet and priest, who as a youngster moved to New Spain, clearly expressed this view in 1604 when he wrote:

\begin{quote}
In you [Mexico City], Spain unites with China
Italy with Japan, and finally,
A whole world in trade and order.\textsuperscript{114}
\end{quote}

Not only could Mexicans feel and perceive the whole globe, but Mexico impacted other people and places. After having served in America for over twenty years, Juan Francisco de Montemayor returned to his native Zaragoza to retire and die there. He came back from Mexico, where he had an impressive career (particularly, he had a major

\begin{footnotes}
\item[110] See, for example, the works of Jonathan I Israel, \textit{Race, Class, and Politics in Colonial Mexico, 1610-1670} (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); R. Douglas Cope, \textit{The Limits of Racial Domination: Plebeian Society in Colonial Mexico City, 1660-1720} (Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994).
\item[112] Seijas, \textit{Asian Slaves in Colonial Mexico}.
\item[113] Gruzinski, \textit{Las cuatro partes del mundo}.
\item[114] Quoted in Michael J. Schreffler, \textit{The Art of Allegiance: Visual Culture and Imperial Power in Baroque New Spain} (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 126. The original is in Bernardo de Balbuena, \textit{Grandeza mexicana} (En Mexico: por Melchior Ocharte, 1604), fol. 89.
\end{footnotes}
role crashing an Indigenous revolt in Oaxaca, as it was seen Chapter Four) and had been able to accumulate considerable wealth. The old oidor spent his American fortune in buying a manor for himself in the nearby small village of Alfocea, which he hoped to create splendor by building there a proper church. The church is a beautiful example of how Montemayor became a citizen of the world (Fig. 7). In his will, he stated his desire to place in the church’s high altar, after properly ornamenting it, “la Ymagen de la Concepcion que traxe de Mexico.”

This royal official brought with him a piece of Mexico to this remote land, in the deep provinces of Aragon, which now stands next to the many other Mudejar, Romanesque, or Gothic churches of the region.

Around 1621, an anonymous Paraguayan Franciscan, who at the time was in Madrid, wrote to his Provincial in Paraguay, a region in which missionaries and priests were carrying evangelizing activities. While the Jesuits missions are the most famous today, there were many religious orders acting in that region, and there had been Franciscan reducciones since at least 1580. Paraguay, characterized by its lowlands, difficult terrain, and inaccessibility, was perceived as a frontier zone, not only in geographic and political terms, as it was in the outskirts of the Spanish Empire in America, but also as a frontline of civilization. It was seen as a region inhabited by savages, by Indigenous peoples who needed to be preached to and converted. Although

115 Quoted in Barrientos Grandon, “Juan Francisco Montemayor de Cuenca,” 192, n. 349.
116 For a description of the painters, carpenters, and other artists who were involved in the building of this church see Juan Carlos Lozano López, “El pintor Pedro Aíbar Jiménez, Huesca y los Lastanosa,” in Vincencio Juan de Lastanosa (1607-1681). La pasión de saber (Huesca: Instituto de Estudios Altoaragoneses, Diputación de Huesca, 2007), 200–201. Furthermore, the church and its various chapels have an interesting resemblance, in their gold and white stucco and the Solomonic columns, with many Latin American Indian baroque churches.
this Franciscan was not a royal official, his letter constitutes a good example of the possibilities of mental integration of the far-flung empire. Indeed, even though throughout this dissertation I have tried to uncover the Spanish imperial officials’ vision of the world, such images were not exclusive to Spanish officials or even Spaniards, but were shared by a great number of other people—foreigners, American and Asian natives, among many others—who also came to see themselves as global subjects of the Spanish Monarch.

The object of the short missive to the friars in South America was to narrate the celebrations and festivities organized in Madrid celebrating the proclamation of Philip
IV. The Franciscan described the many foreign ambassadors and their retinues that arrived in the court for the occasion. Madrid, the imperial capital, was a cosmopolitan city in which people from all over the world converged. The priest was mostly impressed by the Turkish cortege, led by a pasha from Cairo, who “entró por la puerta segoviana en una carroza sin cielo, toda forrada de pelusa encarnada y él con una manta encabellada y un turbante de más de cien varas de toca que más parecía carro triunfal que carroza.” It seems that he was not the only one mesmerized by these unusual foreigners. He claims that “se despobló Madrid cuando entró [the Turk ambassador],” everyone went to the city doors to see the newcomers, and the king, in a major and infrequent honor, ordered all his grandees to go out and receive the pasha.\footnote{BNE, Mss/18671/29 “Carta de un fraile del Paraguay al provincial de San Francisco” (Madrid, ca 1621).}

The Turkish embassy was truly exceptional. As Sherley noted, the Turkish and Spanish empires were in a continuous and open confrontation. Their dispute was not only geopolitical, but also ideological and even ontological: it was about the triumph of one religion over the other, of one civilization, and one understanding of the world. They mainly clashed around the Mediterranean, where Christians and Muslims were constantly being taken captive. Although by the end of the sixteenth century, and after the famous Spanish victory in the battle of Lepanto, Philip II had signed an armistice with the Ottoman Sultan in which temporary peace was achieved and thousands of captives were exchanged, the tense relationship and conflict with the Turks continued to be a pressing issue for the Spanish crown during the seventeenth century.\footnote{Henry Kamen, Philip of Spain (New Haven, [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 1997), 162, 242.} The Paraguayan friar seemed to be well acquainted of all this. In his missive, he attached a copy of a letter sent by Philip II to the Great Turk discussing the terms of the rescue of captives.
Through communications like this, people living in Paraguay, a region usually perceived as an imperial frontier, could engage with the global empire. The mobility of people across the world contributed to the circulation of images. Not only that the letter from Madrid was a way to renew the ties with the king and the royal court, but also, the stories told in it made possible for the Franciscans in Paraguay to relate their own experiences of evangelization in the South American jungles to those of the Mediterranean captives. Suddenly, things that could take place in a place like Malta could appear close for someone who could have never stepped out from Paraguay.

The interactions in the Philippines provide another good example of global encounters on the periphery of the empire. The Philippines was one of the farthest possessions of the Monarchy, and one of the most difficult to reach. Nonetheless, this situation did not mean isolation from the rest of the world. Quite the contrary, the Asian archipelago became a geographic node in which people from all over the globe came together and interacted with each other. In 1616, the Spanish officials in Manila received notice of the presence of Dutch corsairs south of the major island of Luzon, nearby the island of Capul, which, although tiny, played a strategic role in guiding the ships that came from Acapulco. The Audience of Manila, which was ruling the islands in the absence of a governor, worried about the news of the threatening newcomers, rushed to interrogate witnesses and to gather information. While there were some Spanish officials, like the sentry Jerónimo Pacheco, who provided some details about the visitors, most reports were given by outsiders such as Chinese and Japanese men, as well as indigenous people of the islands, referred by the Spaniards as ‘Indians,’ a term that

120 AGI, Filipinas, 37, N. 19 “Información sobre los corsarios holandeses” (Manila, December 14, 1616).
homogenized and blurred the differences of indigenous societies in Mesoamerica, the Andes, and Asia.

The first witness was Felipe Antic, a native from Catanduanes, one of the many islands in the archipelago, who gave his testimony with the help of interpreters. He was piloting a small frigate in the company of seventeen more Indigenous men when he ran into another native rowing towards him, who warned him of the Dutch presence. Antic anchored his boat and, from a hidden position, spotted the corsairs, who he described as white, blond, and long-haired men carrying harquebuses. The Spanish judges also interrogated Francisco Quitian (and other five Christian Sangleys), who in his limited Spanish gave the few details he could remember from his encounter with the corsairs, which had left him perturbed. He could only assert that the captain was “muy blanco y tiene los ojos como de gato y las barbas bermejas.” Another witness was Juan de León, a Japanese Christian settled in the Philippines, who was proficient in Spanish and did not require an interpreter. When he and three other Japanese were in his sampan, he sighted three big ships. Suspicious of them, he tried to get away, but they caught him. Various men, then, approached León’s precarious embarkation and after asking him in Spanish why they were running away, they took him and his companions by force into the captain’s ship. Once the Dutch examined these Japanese, they imprisoned them in a small ship. Three days later, León was taken in presence of the Dutch captain, who in “lengua castellana que la hablaba mal” interrogated him about Manila and its defenses, the commerce with China and Japan, the number of ships that had arrived to the Spanish port and the goods they brought, and especially about the forces of the naval squadron that the Spanish governor had sent to fight the Dutch in the Moluccas.
During the five days this Japanese man remained captive he got to see and interact with other prisoners, like the Spanish Martín de Aguirre who had gone to Spain to trade, but was captured along with nine other Spaniards and two Franciscans. Juan de León was also able to meet and get to know the corsairs. He distinguished the differences of clothing and behavior among them, noting that the corsairs “divergían unos de otros y parecen ser de diferentes naciones.” However, León added, como no sabía los nombres de los dichos soldados les decía señor holandés y ellos se enojaban mucho diciendo en castellano: nosotros no somos holandeses, sino caballeros flamencos, gente honrada, que los holandeses es gente ruin y bellaca. Y este testigo, como nunca había visto flamencos, le pareció que todos eran holandeses, y así los nombraba por este nombre.\footnote{Ibid.}

This entertaining passage of León’s testimony speaks to his process of learning and assimilation of the foreign world. While sailing in his skiff in a remote Asian island, Juan de León encountered many people from across the world. He was told about the (slight) differences between two European nations, and he could, to some extent, appreciate them. However, in the end, and in an inversion of the colonial experience, he flattens those Europeans out, and merges them according to his knowledge of the world. It is also interesting to note that the communication between these men occurred in Spanish. A Dutch and a Japanese communicated in Spanish, as did the Chinese Quitian. Today, such exchanges would probably be in English. The language of the most extended and powerful political power served as the global lingua franca, and was used even by those who appeared as enemies.

Martín Castaño, the general procurator of the Philippines in Madrid, had a clear vision of the role and centrality of the archipelago. In 1624 he wrote to the king’s
favorite, the Count-Duke of Olivares, affirming that it was necessary to stop the growing number of Dutch in that region, “esta, señor, es la cosa de mayor importancia al servicio de Su Majestad que hay en el mundo.” Castaño argued that the Dutch outnumbered and outmatched the Spanish and warned they could easily take over the islands. This would be extremely detrimental, giving them access to large riches and power. Thus, he asked to send to the Philippines the navy that was being prepared to rescue Brazil. He suggested not telling the sailors and soldiers about this until they were into the open sea, because people would not willingly enroll to go to the Asian islands. Castaño hoped to persuade Olivares claiming that such action would have a dramatic effect on the global struggles for power, “se hará una cosa tan conveniente como recobrar la opinión entre todos aquellos reinos y naciones que tan perdida está, con que también se volverán los naturales de nuestra parte.” Moreover, as a good Catholic official, he assured that such enterprise would be “de tanta consideración e importancia al servicio de ambas majestades,” because it would secure the establishment and growth of Catholicism.

The Count-Duke seemed to share his perspective. In his short reply he affirmed that this was of extreme importance and had to be taken care as soon as possible.

It is worth noting the intense dispute that existed between the Spanish and the Dutch. The latter built their empire in a clear opposition to the former, and the two powers clashed in basically every region of the world, from Europe itself, to America, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Both empires thought of the struggle in global terms. Benjamin Schmidt shows that the ideologues and leaders of the Republic’s

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122 AGI, Filipinas, 39, N. 32 “Carta de Martín Castaño al conde de Olivares sobre situación en Filipinas” (Madrid, November 4, 1624), fol. 1.
123 Ibid., fol. 1v.
124 Ibid., fol. 2.
revolt against Spanish rule drew constant parallels between the “Spanish Tyranny” against the American “Indians” and the Dutch, and constructed a shared experience of oppression and abuses. Therefore, the Dutch Atlantic emerged as clearly anti-Hispanic. Dutch imperialists, who thought of themselves “not as colonizers in the Atlantic but as the colonized, victims of imperial hostility,” saw in the Indians natural allies, and hoped they would fight together against the Spanish yoke. 125 This context of global conflict complicates the usual understanding of early modern Dutch (as well as English) cosmopolitanism. For Margaret Jacob, the Dutch developed a sense of tolerance and inclusion in opposition to the oppressive (and almost backward) nature of the Spanish Monarchy. 126 However, the negative image of the Spanish Empire was heavily promoted by the Dutch, for whom everyone but the Spaniards had a place in their cosmopolitan world. 127

In one of the documents of the aforementioned Descripción de la India Oriental, one Spanish official described Dutch religious tolerance as one political strategy for gaining allies among the local leaders and opposing Spanish hegemony. The Dutch, claimed the official, treate the Indigenous people “como compañeros, sin hacerles instancia para que dejen la ley en que viven, sus ritos y ceremonias.” According to the official, this practice proved to be successful as the Dutch, and their merchant ships, were warmly welcomed. 128 Likewise, Anthony Sherley narrated the never-fulfilled project of

126 Jacob, Strangers Nowhere in the World, 81–82.
128 “Discurso sobre la supremacía de los reyes de Portugal en los mares de la India.”
the English captain John Norris to conquer Mexico in 1596, who hoped to achieve this with promises of “libertad a los esclavos negros e indios, y de igualdad a los mestizos con los conquistadores” Sherley argued that Spanish enemies would try to exploit Spain’s inherent diversity by trying to turn its subjects into enemies. As we can see, some cosmopolitan visions were articulated in response to Spanish imperial projects, but also as part of other imperial projects.

The case of the Dutch corsairs in the Philippines also signals the ways in which the native population became involved with Spain’s global projects and visions. Similarly, Juan Antonio was a Japanese man who in 1623, after having lived for two years in Mexico City—that American global hub—traveled to Spain. The oidor of Mexico don Pedro de Vergara y Gaviria found out about Juan Antonio’s journey and hired him to take with him a Japanese camp bed as a present for the king. Juan Antonio was received in Seville by Vergara’s brother, don Diego, and then in Madrid by the king himself, in front of whom he assembled the bed. Shortly after, Juan Antonio decided to return home. Just like any other Spaniard would have done, he asked the king for help and protection. He claimed to be in despair and left alone since his parents and two brothers died defending the Catholic faith. Because of his expertise in various languages he petitioned to be appointed as translator and consul in the Philippines. The king did not find this petition outrageous or unusual, but instead gave him permission to return to the Indies (even paying for his journey), and urged the governor of the Philippines to bestow

129 Sherley, “Peso político de todo el mundo v.2,” fol. 131–131v.
130 AGI, Filipinas, 39, N. 21 “Decreto enviando petición del japonés Juan Antonio” (Madrid, January 29, 1624).
him with an appropriate office.\textsuperscript{131} I have not been able to trace the final fate of Juan Antonio, but it is possible that he made it back to Asia, where he became one more of the thousands of mobile imperial officials who on a daily basis kept the global empire together.

The Spanish Empire and its imperial project were, indeed, embraced by many non-Spaniards throughout the globe. The remarkable case of the Peruvian native Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala clearly illustrates this. While he has been portrayed as a prominent case of indigenous resistance and criticism to Spanish colonialism, it can also be argued that he thought of himself as a faithful subject of the Spanish king and as a member of the global Catholic monarchy.\textsuperscript{132}

Guaman Poma was an Indigenous nobleman from the region of Huamanga, in the Peruvian central Andes.\textsuperscript{133} He was born shortly after Francisco Pizarro and his army took over the Inca Empire, and he lived fully immersed and integrated within the colonial society and culture. He was an Indian ‘ladino,’ as he had adopted several defining Spanish traits, most importantly that he spoke Spanish and, as we will see, was a fervent Catholic. Moreover, he also served the king, and helped with the implementation of viceroy Toledo’s reforms. He was an aid and a translator, and assisted the priest Cristóbal de Albornoz when he quashed the indigenous religious movement known as \textit{Taki Onqoy}, as part of his extirpation of idolatries campaign. At the end of his life Guaman Poma

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\textsuperscript{131} AGI, Filipinas, 39, N. 23 “Peticion de Juan Antonio de un oficio en las Filipinas” (Madrid, March 20, 1624); AGI, Filipinas, 39, N. 24 “Licencia de Juan Antonio para volver a las Indias” (Madrid, March 22, 1624).
\textsuperscript{132} Rolena Adorno has written extensively on Guaman Poma’s life and work which she defines as the most creative Andean critique of Spanish colonialism, see Rolena Adorno, \textit{Guaman Poma: Writing and Resistance in Colonial Peru}, 2nd ed., with a new introduction. (Austin, Tex: University of Texas Press, Austin/Institute of Latin American Studies, 2000).
\textsuperscript{133} For a revised biography of Guaman Poma, on light of new documentary findings see, Ibid., xxii–li.
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decided to write a letter to the Spanish king, Philip III, presenting his vision of the Andes, its history, major problems, and possible solutions.

The letter, entitled *El primer nueva corónica y buen gobierno*, which appears to have been written between 1610 and 1615, is a rich and exceptional document. The author’s hybridity is ever-present in his work. It was written mostly in Spanish; however, because Guaman Poma’s native tongue was Quechua, there are also several passages in this Andean language. This mixture of linguistic structures and grammar, but also of cosmologies, and ideas, make the document fascinating. It is a unique window into an otherwise mostly inaccessible world, that of the indigenous Andean society after the conquest. However, this hybridity also obscures the message and sometimes makes it difficult to grasp the author’s ideas, leaving open the door to many different interpretations.

The document has over 1000 pages and 398 drawings that serve to illustrate the main arguments of the author, and it is paginated in a modern fashion. It is divided into two parts: the first is a chronicle in which Guaman Poma presents a history of the Andes, and an ethnographic description of the region’s culture, society, religion, and customs. This section, which has been very useful to scholars of the pre-Hispanic world, can be also read in light of the many cosmographies written around that time that tried to present the foreign world to a European audience.

In the same vein in which Botero or Sherley presented distant regions to the Spanish king, the Peruvian writer sought to explain and present his own world. The

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134 There are several editions of the text. The Danish Royal Library, which holds the original document, has a dedicated website to the document, including a digitized version of the manuscript and its transcription, which is the one I utilize here: Det Kongelige Bibliotek, GKS 2232 4º Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, “El primer nueva corónica y buen gobierno,” 1615: http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm.
purpose, once again, was to make that world accessible and to incorporate it into European history and general knowledge. In fact, Guaman Poma begins his story by describing the “ages of the world,” which begins with Adam and Eve; and continues with Noah and the Flood; King David; and finally the coming of Jesus, when it also starts the history of the Indies with the ruling of the first Inca, Manco Capac.\textsuperscript{135} Following the idea proposed by Dirlik, here we can see Eurocentrism working at its best. The Indigenous chronicler relied on the periodization proposed by the Sevillian scholar Jerónimo de Chaves in the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{136} Guaman Poma sets to make a comprehensive history of the world and to incorporate in it his own region, to give voice to his native experiences, but this is done from the standpoint of Europe. In the end, it is European values and history that set the framework of the \textit{Nueva corónica}.

In the second part of the missive, the Andean writer describes the colonial government and society, drawing a powerful critique of the abuses and exploitation suffered by the native population, and of what the author perceives as a chaotic situation. He was mostly worried by the degeneration of Andean society and by the shortfalls of the evangelization. In fact, an explicit objective of the book was to serve as a tool to facilitate the conversion of the Indians. Thereafter, in a section written in the form of a dialogue between the Spanish king and the author, Guaman Poma provides suggestions for how to solve all the problems, and how to enhance Catholicism. The author does not reject Spanish dominion; quite to the contrary, his proposals aim to improve it. His criticism is not against the king, who he sees (as any loyal and faithful Spanish subject) as inherently

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 22–32.
\textsuperscript{136} Adorno, \textit{Guaman Poma}, xx.
good and just, but against the local officials who are misbehaving and who do not properly fulfill their imperial mission.

For Guaman Poma, the better imposition of the king’s authority in the Andes is clearly linked to an ideal of global Catholicism. Not only does he frame the history and situation of Peru within a project of universal evangelization, but he presents his own work as part of such an endeavor. The title page of the book shows it clearly (Fig. 8). The author appears on the bottom right corner. He is bareheaded and kneeling down, with an expression of devotion and obedience. Above him, and in a similar posture, appears the Spanish king. The two of them are venerating the major figure of the page, the Pope, on the upper left side. The pontiff appears seated on his throne, and is wearing his miter. On his right hand he is holding the papal ferula, and St. Peter’s keys on his left one. In the center of the page there are three coats of arms, those of the Pope, the Spanish king, and a third one depicting a puma and a falcon, which we can presume the author presented as his own. They are lined one above the other, and alongside each of the human figures. Rolena Adorno has proposed a reading of this figure by placing it against what she thinks was the Andean spatial grid. She argues that the vertical line had no major importance. The key, rather, was the diagonal line that directly links the Pope and the author; according to that reading, the Spanish coat of arms would indicate a symbolic mediation between these two characters. Concurrently, claims Adorno, the king is not only left in an unimportant position, but he is positioned to the right of the center, occupying the same place that Guaman Poma in his mapamundi has given to the Collas, one of the four pre-Hispanic communities that formed the Inca empire, and which the author disliked and

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137 For a detailed description of this and all the book’s images see: Carlos A. González Vargas, Hugo Rosati, and Francisco Sánchez, Guaman Poma: Testigo del mundo andino (Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones: Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 2002), 49–51.
Figure 8. The Royal Library, Copenhagen, GKS 2232 4ª: Guaman Poma, Nueva corónica y buen gobierno (1615), Title Page
defined as greedy. Another disruption of this image would be the absence of a central figure (which used to be occupied by Cuzco and the Incas). Adorno finds here another form of critique to the colonized society, and a subtle reminder of the chronicler’s perception of the world being upside down and lacking a proper center. All of this would indicate the author’s ideal of “an autonomously ruled Christian Andean state.”

However, based on the previously mentioned early modern Spanish understanding of the dual nature of power, another reading of this figure is possible. As it has been noted, in the Spanish world a permanent tension existed between the spiritual and temporal powers. Several authors openly defended the primacy of the spiritual power over the Spanish king himself. Accordingly, for Guaman Poma, the supremacy of the Catholic pope is undisputed. The pontiff appears in the most prominent position, fully displaying all the symbols of his power. Guaman Poma, clearly sees himself, as well as the Spanish king, as servants of the Roman bishop. Just like Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos had no qualms in claiming the secondary position of the Christian emperor, the Andean writer—who had a close relationship with the Peruvian clergy, and from whom he learned Spanish and received access to historical, theological, and philosophical works—did not hesitate in declaring the superiority of the spiritual power. This idea did not imply breaking away from the Spanish king, or even going against his authority. This was a discourse with ample legitimacy in the Spanish world and which was defended by people as influential as Castillo de Bobadilla, whose loyalty to the Monarchy was not in doubt. For Guaman Poma, as well as many others, to be a good vassal was to be a good Catholic first.

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138 Adorno, Guaman Poma, 95–99.
139 For a discussion of some of these authors, see Cañeque, The King’s Living Image, 80–93.
Ultimately, Guaman Poma’s letter appears not necessarily as a project of an independent Andean rule, but as a program to fully encompass the Indies within the Catholic world. In fact, he narrates the discovery of America in the chapter in which he tells the history of the popes. At first this might seem unexpected, but for Guaman Poma, this encounter in which the New World was first exposed to Catholicism, and the subsequent conjunction of America and Europe, engendered what he defines as “Pontifical Mundo.” According to him, the world was the result of the union of Castile and the Indies, but always under the authority of the Pope. For this Indigenous writer, to be a citizen of the world meant to be a faithful Catholic.

In his graphic depiction of this Pontifical World, the author divided the image into two sections (Fig. 9). In the upper one, Guaman Poma placed the Indies, represented by five cities, with Cuzco at the center (the other four cities remained unnamed). In the lower section, he represented Castile in a similar fashion: Castile at the center, surrounded by other four cities. This image remains obscure and difficult to understand. The difference in the size of the cities between the two regions is obvious. The Castilian cities appear larger and more imposing than the Peruvian ones. However, they are located at the bottom, as if secondary. The legends of the image ratify this ordering: “las Yndias del Pirú en lo alto de España” and “Castilla en lo auajo de las Yndias.” The meaning of this organization is open to debate. When Guaman Poma affirmed that the Indies were on top of Spain, was he talking about a physical and geographic reality? The drawing of the mountains and the closeness to the sun might suggest such a reading. Was he implying that the Indies stood atop the Spanish polity, that is, were its most important component?

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Figure 9. The Royal Library, Copenhagen, GKS 2232 4º: Guaman Poma, Nueva corónica y buen gobierno (1615), p. 42, “Pontifical World.”
Or was he referring to his recurring idea of the world being upside-down? Or was he indeed subverting the colonial order?

Whatever answer we choose, it is clear that Guaman Poma saw the world as a comprehensive unit, comprised of diverse societies and regions. Walter Mignolo has argued that this representation of the world was a ‘de-colonial’ statement. In the Andean’s mind—argues Mignolo—there was not the idea of ‘friends and enemies,’ but a common world.\(^{141}\) The logic of antagonism was supplanted by an early modern cosmopolitanism which included all of the known world. Surely, this Humanga native was aware of the world that lay beyond Peru and America. He affirmed that God “hizo el mundo y la tierra y plantó en ellas cada cimiente, el español en Castilla, el yndio en las Yndias, el negro en Guinea.”\(^{142}\) Nonetheless, this diversity was to be subsumed under Spanish authority. He proposed that the Spanish king should have in his court four royal representatives: the first, an American prince, who should be Guaman Poma’s son; the second, a prince from Guinea; the third, a prince from the Christians of Rome or from another king of the world; and the fourth, a prince of the Moors and the Great Turk. This four princes would be crowned and hold scepters. At the center of them, however, would appear “la magestad y monarca del mundo, rey don Phelipe.” Guaman Poma defined the Spanish monarch as the high crown, with the others as lower crowns. For this author it was unquestionable that the Spanish king was “monarca del mundo, que ningún rey ni enperador no se puede engualar [sic],” and that he had “debajo de su mano mundo estos rreys coronados.” This was a clear manifestation of the power of the monarch, who ruled

\(^{141}\) Mignolo, “Cosmopolitanism and the De-Colonial Option,” 118.
over “todas las naciones y géneros de personas; yndios, negros y españoles cristianos, turcos, judíos, moros del mundo.”

Guaman Poma’s work is one expression of popular Spanish cosmopolitanism. He was able to bridge cultural boundaries and, in doing so, cemented the Spanish Empire. His work belonged to the same cultural and intelectual world in which men such as Pedro Ordóñez de Cevallos, Domingo Toral y Valdés, and Anthony Sherley lived and wrote. Their works arose from a conception that the world was, indeed, one. Although they all saw themselves as subjects of the Spanish king and worked for the universal consolidation of his authority, their understandings of that world and its diversity were distinct from each other. They depended on their own personal experience, sensibilities, and culture, and sometimes, they could express more tolerant, although exceptional, ideas or even question colonial rule.

It was the cosmopolitan worldview and wide-ranging personal mobility of this period, both materially and intellectually, that made possible the connection of different and far-away regions. These encounters, which were always asymmetrical, forced people across the world to rethink the new world order taking shape. Imperial subjects and officials attempted to make sense of the diversity of customs, languages, religions, geographies, and political organizations, which suddenly appeared in front of them. In an effort to construct a more familiar world, they hoped to encompass this heterogeneity under a single cosmopolitan ideal—a single political, cultural, religious entity known as the Spanish Empire.

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143 Guaman Poma de Ayala, “El primer nueva corónica y buen gobierno,” 963.
Conclusion

In 1646, Luis Fernández de Córdoba y Arce summarized his more than twenty years as an imperial official in a very graphic way: “he peregrinado todo el mundo, sirviendo a Vuestra Majestad en las partes más remotas de él, así en Asia como en la América y Europa.”¹ In just a few words, this official delineated the global dimension of the Spanish Monarchy and the importance of officials’ mobility. According to Fernández de Córdoba, imperial officials arduously moved from one place to another, working to enhance the Crown’s power—reaching even the most remote destinations—and, in this way, made evident their loyalty to the monarch and condition as good vassals.

Through the course of this study we have seen that imperial officials were very aware of their key function in the making and working of the Spanish Empire. They embraced the imperial goal of protecting and spreading the Faith and the King’s rule across the world, and in doing so articulated their own identities to the development of such a far-flung Catholic empire. Although not all imperial officials had the same degree of mobility, and not every one was permanently on the move, they all shared the ethos and understanding of the political culture that I have outlined in this dissertation. More importantly, they were never static. The crown itself prevented this. I have not yet found an official who stagnated, who began and finished his services in the same post.² The

¹ AGS, EST, LEG 3636, 61 “Memorial de Luis Fernández de Córdoba y Arce solicitando el puesto de embajador de España en Génova,” 1646, fol. 1v. A similar idea was conveyed in 1649 by don Miguel de Salamanca when we has proposed for the corregimiento of Madrid, “Con obediencia ciega he obedecido siempre lo que el Rey Nuestro Señor se ha servido de mandarme, sin reparar en riesgos, ni incomodidades. Testimonios bastantes son tan largas jornadas en continuada peregrinación de tantos años.” AHN, Consejos, 13620, 13, N. 21 “Carta de don Miguel de Salamanca,” April 16, 1649.
² The regidores, the local members of the municipal government, could hold their posts for life and live always in the same city. However, although their appointment was confirmed by the king, they were not imperial officials. They were the representatives of local power, many times counterbalancing and
mobility of these early modern officials, and of the society in general, was truly impressive, and its effects powerful.

The culture of mobility was part and parcel of the Spanish Monarchy, as it facilitated the overcoming of the (physical and mental) distances and discontinuous geography characteristic of the empire and it made the king an ever-present image. Mobility was possible thanks to the impressive technological advancements of the time, many of which were sponsored by the Monarchy. The crown also sought to regulate the travel routes, cycles, and methods, and the people who traveled. In fact, the king developed a complex and extensive network of patronage within which its officials and their families moved, tying their destinies to that of service to the crown.

Indeed, officials’ mobility, and their subsequent activities, was conditioned by their networks of patronage. The cases of the Villagarcía’s and the Hurtado de Corcuera’s show that officials’ success depended on their ability to connect with local intermediaries, but also on how they utilized their patrons, clients, and brokers in order to gather information and even make allies, or enemies, before reaching their posts. Patronage bonds, based on personal and direct connections and an expression of a patriarchal society, acquired a new dimension by becoming global and intertwining with the imperial networks.

One important, although self-evident, consequence of officials’ mobility is that it gave them experience, making of them privileged actors within the monarchy’s political system, especially in a time in which direct experience was favored. Juan de Oñate’s American mining expertise was highly valued and put into practice in Spain, also opposing the king’s authority. See, for instance, Polo y La Borda Ramos, “Identidad y poder en los conflictos por las preeminencias en el siglo XVII.”
showing the integration of these two regions. Officials’ experiences were summarized and codified in their Informaciones de méritos. These documents serve as windows into the officialdom’s values and ideals of service, and altogether they represent an enormous corpus of officials’ experience. This accumulated knowledge circulated across the empire, informing the crown and other officials’ policies.

Past events and performances guided officials in one of their most important and constant duties, regardless of their location: controlling dissent to royal authority. Thus, officials, encouraged by the example of the expulsion of the moriscos from the Iberian Peninsula, could voice and enforce aggressive programs, such as the expulsion and enslavement of the Araucanians in Chile. Officials’ violent imposition of authority came along with the imperial mandate of protecting the Monarchy’s weakest subjects (the American Indians, but also the Castilian commoners) from the abuses of the more powerful, as the king had the obligation to take care of those deemed as wretched. However, officials did all of this in many different ways, adapting to the particulars of every region and to how the rebellious people were judged in terms of the whole political body.

Officials’ mobility and daily undertakings reveal how the global empire was articulated in each local scenario, and expose fault lines in how they conceived of the imperial project. Officials’ continuous dealings with the myriad geographies, cultures, and societies that composed the empire spawned an imperial cosmopolitan culture. Some men could be more open and tolerant, like Domingo Toral y Valdés, while others aimed to fully subsume difference under the principles of the Catholic Monarchy. There was,
indeed, a profound linkage between cosmopolitanism and imperialism, the former being indispensable for the latter, as it allowed for bridging the empire’s inherent differences.

As we have seen repeatedly, the activities of the officials did not remain isolated or locally contained, but reverberated across the world. The imperial nexus of connections could be witnessed in everyplace in the empire. While indubitably there was an intense center that gravitated around the king and the royal court, there were many other sites, such as Mexico in New Spain, Manila in Asia, Naples in the Mediterranean, the Azores in the Atlantic, or Oran in Africa, that functioned as global hinges. The early modern Spanish Empire was a dynamic political organization, with many axes and connecting points, and some of them enabled direct interconnections, bypassing Madrid.

Spanish imperial officials permanently swung between the global and the local. They embodied a political organization, which despite being decentered in so many levels, continued to be essentially a Spanish polity. Imperial officials were able to move and interact in different settings and deal with the local societies without losing sight of their imperial mission: the preservation and expansion of the authority of the Spanish monarch, and not that of the many centers in which they acted. Therefore, the integration of the diversity of people that made up the empire across the world was thought and carried out in terms of the needs and goals of the Spanish Monarchy, which had Catholicism as its trademark. This imperial framework, however, was not exclusive to the royal officials, but shared by many of the imperial subjects.

Members of the Monarchy understood that they belonged to a global polity, and they acted accordingly. This emphasis on the global dimension of the empire neither neglects the importance of the local histories, nor implies that imperial rule and the
colonized societies were the same throughout the world. More to the contrary, the
Spanish Monarchy was defined by its heterogeneity and the local processes had their own
particular dynamics, origins, and consequences. The expulsion of the Sangleys, the
efforts to improve the mining production in Spain, or Guaman Poma’s denunciation of
the colonial abuses had their own motives and, surely, they can be studied and interpreted
exclusively in their own terms, as it has usually been the case. My argument, however, is
that such local histories should not be considered in isolation. They did not occur in a
vacuum. There was an intense dialogue between the local and the universal, the peculiar
circumstances and the global desires and goals. Evidently, people in Oaxaca, Terceira,
Córdoba, or Mesina did not think that all of their actions had global reach, but they
framed them within an imperial paradigm.

This global consciousness and mobility forces us to rethink the place of Latin
America within the Spanish Empire, and what was colonial about it. The matter of the
specificity of the American experience is indeed extremely hard to solve and requires us
to look at the whole of the empire, breaking away from the teleology of the national
historiographies and their victimizing narratives. Oscar Mazín and José Javier Ruiz
Ibáñez, after presenting the similarities between America and other territories under
Spanish rule, concluded with the vague affirmation “todo fue específico,” no imperial
experience was completely different to the other, but also neither of them was the same.³
Definitely, we cannot reduce American colonialism to the mere presence of Spaniards on
foreign grounds, or to the imposition of their rule, and not even necessarily to the

³ Oscar Mazín and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, “Estudio Introductorio,” in Las Indias Occidentales, ed. Oscar
Mazín and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, 32. However, they are mostly focused on the articulation of the Spanish
Americans and on the legal aspects of this problem, discussing whether the American territories were
formally a colony or not, and whether its incorporation into the Spanish Monarchy differed in juridical terms
from that of other territories, such as Portugal or the Low Countries.
depiction of the majority of the population as barbarian or wretched. All these things happened, to some degree, in other parts of the empire.

The key to the American specificity, I think, lies in how those elements of imperial rule were combined and structured in peculiar ways in the New World, and the roles played by native Spanish elites as well as local Indigenous populations. The American case is greatly defined by the extent to which the Indigenous population was able to insert themselves into the imperial government and administration at a high level, and in this regard the conclusion is blatant: no American Indigenous was ever appointed corregidor. The integration into the Spanish polity of the native population, who because of their alleged wretched nature and recent incorporation into Christendom were thought of as a different social and political entity, could not be left in hands of the Indigenous’s elite, but instead such duty was handed to the imperial officials. This situation makes more acute to study the role played by the lower echelon of imperial officials, who were the ligaments between the sovereign and the imperial subjects and who actually articulated the Spanish Monarchy, making it possible for Americans, both Spaniards and Indigenous, to think of themselves as members of a global polity. I think that a more refined understanding of the worldwide dynamics of imperial government can help us to better see who and how was included or excluded, exploited or protected, and how such categories could change, or rather remained unaltered.

This imperial political system was built upon the mobility of cosmopolitan imperial officials. The fluidity of the global exchanges and the capacity of the monarchy to encompass difference under the umbrella of its universal rule allowed for the consolidation of the king’s authority, despite the geographic dispersion of his
possessions, and the decentered and diffused nature of early modern power. This intense
circulation did not decrease with the advent of the new century and ruling dynasty.
However, as Enlightenment ideas became more predominant, many of the Spanish
Habsburg possessions were lost and the remaining imperial regions were more clustered,
and a more professionalized body of imperial officials began to take shape, the
characteristics and limits of such mobility changed. Some of its flexibility and much of
its global scope were lost. This new paradigm, solidified with the appearance of the
nation-states, has cast a shadow over our understanding of the early modern Spanish
Empire, concealing the fact that in the seventeenth century the mobile imperial officials
made possible to connect, almost anywhere, the four parts of the world.
Appendix 1

Congratulatory letters received by the marquis of Villagarcía:

- Cardinal Sandoval, archbishop of Toledo, October 9, 1657.
- Don Benito de Aguiar, steward of cardinal Sandoval, Toledo, October 9, 1657.
- The residence Hall of Oviedo de Salamanca, October 1657.
- Don Diego de Vera, Chamber’s Secretary of cardinal Sandoval, October 9, 1657.
- Count of Amarante, Monforte, October 15, 1657.
- Don Gómez Dávila, appointed corregidor of Potosí, Seville, October 16, 1657.
- Maestre de campo don Gabriel Sarmiento de Sotomayor, governor of the stronghold of San Luis, San Luis, October 19, 1657.
- Don Juan de Córdoba, oidor of the Indies, Santiago, October 20, 1657.
- Don Vicente Gonzaga, governor and general captain of the kingdom of Galicia, Pontevedra, October 23, 1657 (written to D. Antonio, son of the marquis).
- My cousin, don Fernando de Castro y Andrade, archbishop of Jaén, Baeza October 24, 1657.
- Don Antonio de Montenegro y Sotomayor, Tuy, October 24, 1657.
- The ecclesiastic cabildo of Santiago, Santiago, October 25, 1657.
- Sister Juana de San Miguel, Vista Alegre, October 25, 1657.
- The nuns of the convent of San Cristóbal, Vista Alegre, October 25, 1657.
- Archbishop of Santiago, Santiago, October 27, 1657.
- Don Vicente Gonzaga, governor and general captain of the kingdom of Galicia, October 28, 1657.
- Friar Diego de Araujo, mayor general of the Benedictine order, October 28, 1657.
- Captain don Mauro de Pardiñas Villar de Francos, Cádiz, October 28, 1657.
- Don Rodrigo de Mandía y Parga, bishop of Syria, maestre escuela of Salamanca, October 31, 1657.
- Count of Paredes, Pontevedra, November 2, 1657.
- Provincial Father of the Society of Jesuit in Castile, Santiago, November 3, 1657.
- Don Fernando de Ordóñez, lord of San Paio de Narla, Betanzos, November 4, 1657.
- Don Alonso Troncoso de Sotomayor, November 11, 1657.
- Maestre de campo don Fadrique de Villar, lord of the house of Villar, Paredes, December 9, 1657.
- Don Antonio Payno, bishop of Zamora, elected archbishop of Burgos, Zamora, January 10, 1658.
- Father Antonio de Luna, rector of the school of the Society of Jesus at Palencia, Palencia, January 22, 1658.
Informative and practical letters

- Captain don Mauro de Pardiñas Villar de Francos proposes the means to travel to Charcas, Cádiz, October 29, 1657.
- Captain don Mauro de Pardiñas says the advantages of requesting a ship to Buenos Aires, Cádiz, November 26, 1657.
- A paper given to me by don Felipe Obregón, neighbor of Potosí, about the trip to Las Charcas.
- News from the province of Los Charcas, authority and jurisdiction of the President (Obregón).
- Governments and corregimientos, (Obregón).
- News from Potosí, its mountain, mines, and everything concerning to them and their wealth (Obregón).
- Paper given to me by don Juan de Santa Ana with individual news from the province, presidency of Las Charcas, where he lived many years and married.
- Don Mauro de Pardiñas, paper with individual news about the trip that can be done to Charcas going via Tierra Firme or Buenos Aires, which will be the shortest and most convenient, Cádiz, November 4, 1657.
- Trip that the president of Charcas should do (Pardiñas).
- Letter from don Francisco de Soto Guzmán to captain Mauro de Pardiñas.
- Paper from don Francisco de Soto Guzmán with information on the trip to Charcas, November 3, 1657.
- Paper from don Francisco de Soto Guzmán with the reasons that could and should be given to get a navío de registro for going to Los Charcas via Buenos Aires, Cádiz, November 11, 1657.
- Don Francisco de Soto y Guzmán with the reasons that should be given His Majesty so every year should be sent from Seville or Cádiz one or two ships to Buenos Aires, Cádiz, November 11, 1657.
- From the marquise, with the prudent and rational warnings and objections on the trip to Charcas. I shall see with all veneration and esteem many times this letter. Vista Alegre, October 11, 1657.
- Inquisitor don Pedro de Navia. Proposes the difficulties and objections for not going to Las Charcas, Santiago October 13, 1657.
- Inquisitor don Pedro de Navia, insisting that it is not convenient to go to Las Charcas, Santiago, October 14, 1657.
- The marquise, saying what she and people in Galicia feel about my resolution of accepting the presidency of Las Charcas because of the distance of the journey and the risks of the sea. Vista Alegre, October 18, 1657.
**Glossary**

*Alcalde del crimen*: Criminal judge of the *audiencia*.

*Alcalde mayor*: Chief magistrate, also known as *corregidor*.

*Audiencia*: The highest royal court of appeals within a jurisdiction

*Beneméritos*: The American subjects descendants from the conquistadors and worthy of royal reward.

*Cabildo*: Municipal council.

*Capitán General*: Commander in chief of a jurisdiction.

*Cédula*: Royal decree

*Consulta*: A written opinion of the royal councils.

*Corregidor*: Chief magistrate

*Corregimiento*: The district of jurisdiction of a *corregidor*.

*Encomienda*: Grant of Indians as tribute payers and laborers.

*Informaciones de méritos y servicios*: Written summary of an official’s, and his family, activities and services rendered to the crown.

*Juicio de residencia*: A judiciary review of an official’s conduct in office at the end of his term.

*Oidor*: Judge in the *audiencia*.

*Morisco*: A person of Muslim heritage and lineage that after the Reconquista was allowed to remain in Spain if baptized.

*Parián*: The *sangley* borough in Manila.

*Sangley*: Chinese living in the Philippines.
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