

ABSTRACT

Title of Document: EXAMINING LABOR UNION POLITICAL MOBILIZATION TACTICS IN THE MODERN CAMPAIGN CONTEXT

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In this project, I will discuss topics in American political behavior, specifically, the role labor unions play in determining the political participation of their membership.

In the face of diminishing resources, declining membership, and unfriendly state legislatures, labor unions employ a whole host of mobilization tactics to achieve desired electoral outcomes. Traditional strategies such as in-person or member-to-member contact, mail or phone contact, and online digital engagement has all required a fresh start to keep up with the changing campaign environment.

This project offers three different examinations of field experiments conducted by labor unions in three different electoral contexts. The first experiment tests two competing Get Out the Vote (GOTV) mobilization methods in the August 2014 primary elections. Union members in two states were randomly assigned to receive: 1) A letter grading their past voting performance or; 2) a letter encouraging them to 'Make a Plan' to vote or; 3) were placed in the control group and received no contact.

The treatments pushed members either to return their mail ballots or to vote early, in-person. The second experiment investigates what type of phone script is most effective at encouraging union members to connect to their state representative's office, and to advocate for or against a certain piece of legislation. This chapter builds on one previous field experiment to determine whether these phone scripts are a viable way to encourage members to interact with their elected officials, and which type of script language encourages union members (and constituents) to contact their legislator. Finally, my third field experiment focuses on two canvassing experiments conducted by the state affiliate of a national labor union before the April 1st, 2014 election. Targets of the membership organization were randomly assigned to treatment and to control groups. Post-election turnout records determined that the canvass successfully stimulated turnout among those who received a face-to-face contact from the labor union.

EXAMINING LABOR UNION POLITICAL MOBILIZATION TACTICS IN THE
MODERN CAMPAIGN CONTEXT

By

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Preface

This dissertation presents the results from the unique opportunity I had to design and test the strategies unions used to mobilize their members toward political action. The project consists of three randomized controlled field experiments. When these experiments were conducted, I was employed by the membership organization in question. I worked as part of the data and analytics staff for each of these organizations and was directly responsible for the research design, randomization, and analysis for each of the field experiments. In the case of the canvass experiment (Chapter 4), my partner organization had already generated the scripts for the canvass, and I provided direction based on best practices before randomizing the lists that were then assigned into turf for walk lists. For the papers in Chapter 2 and 3, I was directly responsible for generating the messages to test. As such, this project presents an opportunity to pioneer the process of injecting social science theories and methods into the operations of mass membership organizations.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to two educators: William Louis “Bill” Olson, who taught AP U.S. History and AP Government at Clovis High School for 39 years. Mr. Olson was passionate, tough, and dark-humored, all of which endeared him to me long after I left his classroom. Though he did not witness the completion of this project, I know he knows it is for him. The second, Dr. Christopher Mann, has been a professor, mentor, co-researcher, and friend to me for nearly a decade. As I often say to him, “You’re literally the reason I’m here...I hope I haven’t embarrassed you.”

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In addition, much gratitude to my partner organizations for the opportunity to work with them. This project would not have happened without their support and cooperation.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the numerous academics and practitioners who offered their guidance on this project. Specifically, I would like to acknowledge Natalie LeBlanc-Jackson, Liz McElroy, Matt Morrison, Eric Heggie, Kristopher Garcia and Michael Podhorzer. I am grateful for their invaluable feedback and perspective.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The unexpected results of the 2016 Presidential Election left many Democratic political organizations spending the concluding months of 2016 in deep introspection. Predictive models, polling, and experts everywhere seemed convinced of Hillary Clinton's electoral success. When this did not happen on Election Day, pro-Clinton groups began to take stock of what they had done, what happened, and how they could have fallen short of a presidential victory. Chief among those conducting this exercise were labor unions. They had spent considerable monetary resources and sent thousands of their members to critical electoral states to canvass, call, and otherwise engage voters on Clinton's behalf. In the end, they had nothing to show for it.

As the dust settled, critical patterns emerged. Support among labor union households (and other typical Democratic-strongholds) in key states did not materialize for Hillary Clinton in the same way they had for Barack Obama in 2012 and 2008. Circling around the key electoral states and union strongholds in the Midwest like Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, the exit polls told a clear story of underperformance. In Michigan, Clinton dramatically underperformed Obama's 2012 and 2008 support levels among union households. While she carried union households in Michigan by 13 points, Obama carried union households by 33 points in 2012 and 36 points in 2008 (CNN Exit Polls 2016). In Wisconsin, she carried union households by 15 points while Obama carried them by 32 points in 2012 and 22 points¹. Even further disheartening, Donald Trump's margin of victory in each of these union-dense states was slight.

¹ CNN did not conduct a 2016 exit poll among union households in Pennsylvania.

He won Michigan by 10,704 votes, Pennsylvania by 67,416 votes and Wisconsin by 22,177 votes. A November 10th *Politico* article summed up the mood, “Organized labor is searching for answers after union households failed to turn out for Hillary Clinton despite a massive voter mobilization effort -- a sharp departure from decades of union support for Democratic presidential candidates” (Hesson and Levine, 2016).

The 2016 election cemented what many within labor organizations already knew: Labor unions can no longer assume their members will turn out and vote for who their union has endorsed. As Eric Heggie, the National Field Director of the United Automobile Workers (UAW) explains, “Union members are like every other American, but they just happen to benefit from working within the structure of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. This means that their support for issues, causes, and candidates is not always automatically determined by what their Union decides to support, but more often by demographics of those members.” (Heggie, 2017)

Labor unions cannot be frivolous in their communication to their members around political issues. They are not the sole determinant of the political action of their members. The tactics and communication used by labor unions to mobilize and persuade their members must be driven by testing. While some union members have fully embraced a culture of field experiments, others are just beginning the process. Working America, the community affiliate of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), has been conducting field experiments since 2008. Their Political Director, Matt Morrison, explains how prolific the use of testing has become: “We use testing to refine targeting through EIPs [Experiment Informed Programs]; [we] compare the efficacy of voter contact canvass models to measure persuasion and turnout effects. We are examining ways to make the testing even more effective at building activists, member contributors, and other valuable returns on the effort.”

(Morrison, 2017) Conversely, other unions are just beginning to incorporate testing into their programs, “We have begun to implement testing on different forms of communication, carrying out a test post-election during our survey process to test the click-through rate based on the gender of the sender,” Heggie of UAW says. “Testing has increased as it was not institutionalized previously, but we are working to try and do that.” (Heggie, 2017) Regardless of the testing culture within a specific union, leadership agrees that ignoring the results of 2016 and not employing data-driven decision-making could lead to the extinction of the American Labor Movement.

This dissertation will focus on testing conducted by labor unions to optimize communication in order to generate greater political participation among their members. Given the grim outlook for organized labor in the United States, evaluation of voter mobilization programs conducted by labor unions is mission critical for their survival and relevance. Prior to discussing the three different field experiments conducted by labor unions, I review some of the existing literature on mass membership organizations and political participation. I will then cover how labor unions operate within the modern American political environment. Finally, I offer the unique contributions of the research in this dissertation and provide a roadmap for the chapters ahead.

Mass Membership Organizations and Political Participation

There is a strong observed correlation between membership in mass organizations and participation in electoral politics. Mass organizations have been defined broadly to include political parties, civic organizations, professional associations, labor unions and the like. Consequently, scholars have long asserted that membership in mass organizations is a significant

cause of participation². Organizational membership shapes members view of the political world, and organizations act as a resource to subsidize the cost of political learning for their members (Verba and Nie, 1972; Conover, 1984). Other research indicates that membership in mass organizations increases mobilization via indirect mechanisms: Members foster leadership and participation skills and then use them in a political context (Leighey, 1996). Additionally, members of a group are more likely to be exposed to a more politically active social network. This may result in increasing their likelihood to participate due to social norms and social rewards/sanctions (Fowler, 2005; Kloffstad, 2010; Sinclair, 2012). Thus, membership in mass organizations is a major determinant of political participation.

Mass organizations offer citizens an opportunity to pursue public and private goods through collective action. Some of these goods are non-political, such as unions engaging in collective bargaining, professional associations providing training, or civic organizations coordinating charitable donations. For many mass organizations, at least some of these public and private goods are pursued through collective political action. Mass organizations also offer members an opportunity to pursue social rewards. In return, these mass organizations provide members a privileged position within the larger, pluralistic political environment (Schattschneider, 1960; Dahl, 1974). In order to coordinate collective political action by their membership, mass organizations offer their members cognitive shortcuts to make political decisions such as information about policies, candidate endorsements, and reminders to vote. Mass membership organizations also deliver social rewards and sanctions for participating in collective political action via formal and informal monitoring of compliance with group norms about voting. The activities by and within mass membership organizations are thought to

² e.g. Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960; Miller et al., 1981; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Radcliff and Davis, 2000; Beck et al., 2008.

increase the levels of participation of group members (e.g. Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Miller et al., 1981; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Radcliff and Davis, 2000; Beck et al., 2008).

Organizations often spend considerable resources to mobilize their members, as well as sympathetic nonmembers in the electorate-at-large. Since they are a known and trusted source of information to members, membership organizations may enjoy advantages in communicating about elections. Mass organizations' advantage communicating with their members and the general public may increase with the strength of an organization in a community. For example, sharing enrollment within a population (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; Converse, 1964; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Beck et al., 2008). However, recent research contends that membership organizations engaging in collective political action have declined due to a general decay in social capital. Putnam (1995; 2000) argues a general decline in political involvement stems from an aggregate loss in membership of all types and the consequent loss of social capital. The reduction of interaction provided by these organizations leads to a less engaged electorate. The simultaneous decline of politically oriented mass membership organizations and political participation (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Niemi and Weisburg, 2001; c.f. McDonald and Popkin, 1991) reinforces the expectation that mass membership organizations contribute to political participation.

The literature on mass membership organizations often focuses on labor unions. Labor unions were a major economic and political force in mid-twentieth century America when scholars were developing their understanding of the role of mass membership organization in political participation. Unions provide large economic private goods (wages and benefits, working hours, working conditions, etc.) so they have strong ties to their members. However,

these economic goods provided by labor unions are inextricably tied to public policy about collective bargaining rights, public employee salaries, workplace regulations, and much more. As a result unions have strong incentives to engage in external collective political action.

Union members can be difficult to mobilize since their decisions to join a union are often driven by employment choices and not political ones (as opposed to individuals that may self-select into organizations or political parties). Additionally, many union members come from working-class backgrounds and may lack the basic knowledge to politically participate. Labor unions utilize three noteworthy processes to spur political action of their members: 1) labor unions cultivate organizational and civic skills of their members as a way to achieve organizational and political goals (Markowitz, 1998; Clawson, 2003; Sharpe, 2004); 2) unions shape the political identity of their members by encouraging collective acts (Fantasia 1989; Weinbaun, 2004; Nissen, 2010); and 3) unions directly mobilize their members (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Asher et al., 2001; Meyer, 2007).

Leighey and Nagler (2007) found that unions have a positive and statistically significant impact on individual voter turnout through two mechanisms: being a union member and residing in a state with a higher union membership. Unions increase participation among their members, and pro-union non-members (although at lower rates). The increase in aggregate turnout is a product of direct voter contact and indirect changes in social norms about voting. Gerber and Rogers (2009) note: “Anything that affects turnout directly also has a secondary effect through the induced change in [overall turnout]. Therefore, if there is a strong union or party organization in a town, turnout will increase directly as well as indirectly,” (p. 187).

Previous studies of unions and political participation frequently focus on the outcomes of elections. At the aggregate level, voter turnout and union density are correlated (Radcliff and

Davis, 2000; Radcliff, 2001). Individual level research shows that union members often support Democratic candidates (Sousa, 1993; Juravich and Shergold, 1988; Asher et al., 2001) and are much more likely to vote than nonunion citizens (Masters and Delaney, 1986; Freeman, 2003; Leighley and Nagley, 2007; Rosenfeld, 2010). Additionally, union members in states with high union densities have higher voting rates (Leighley and Nagler, 2007). Unions also influence outcomes (Democratic vote share) without influencing turnout (Sousa, 1993), but unions spend massive resources on mobilizing members to vote so they clearly see it as an important path to influencing electoral and other political outcomes.

Utilizing analysis of multiple publically available datasets, Kerrissey and Schofer (2013) find, “The effect of union membership is broad, spanning most types of political and civic involvement, including voting, protesting, signing petitions, association membership and so on” (p. 919). These effects are strongest among those with low levels of education. Unions provide training and mobilizing efforts tailored specifically to boost participation among low-education voters. Additionally, Harrison (2004) found that unions affect members differently and that unions have a higher importance in the structural life of men, African Americans, and the working class. Essentially, labor unions can close the participation gap for voters who, without membership to a labor union, might opt not to participate in the political process.

These incentives and characteristics of unions provide a clear illustration of why a causal link is often assumed between mass organization membership and political participation. Therefore, unions should be seen as something of an easy case (Gerring, 2007) for demonstrating that organizational membership influences the effectiveness of political mobilization. Conversely, if union membership fails to improve electoral mobilization then it seems unlikely that organizations with weaker ties to their members will influence mobilization.

Labor Unions in Modern American Politics

In 2016 public-sector labor unions found themselves in the middle of a Supreme Court case that would determine their relevancy in American politics for the foreseeable future.

Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association centered on whether the 1977 case, *Abood v. Detroit Board of Education* should be overruled, with public sector “agency shop” processes (meaning an employer may hire union or non-union workers, the employees need not join a union to remain employed but must pay “agency fees” to cover collective bargaining costs³), would be invalidated under the First Amendment. This would strip labor unions of their power to charge fees to nonmembers for the costs of representing them at the bargaining table, thus greatly weakening the ability of unions to collectively bargain, organize, politically agitate, etc. The anomalous death of conservative Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia led the Court to split in a 4-4 decision. Thus, the lower court case was upheld and public-labor unions were able to let out an ever-so-slight collective sigh of relief. As explained by *The Atlantic’s* Charlotte Garden, “That [decision] alone is a victory for public unions, which will not be forced to divert member dues away from political activity in the middle of a presidential campaign season” (Garden, 2016).

The *Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association* was not the first challenge to public-sector unions or labor unions in general and it will not be the last as similar cases make their way through lower courts. Recent trends have culminated to a point where labor unions find themselves fighting declining membership rates, anti-union laws and sentiment, unfriendly elected officials, and perhaps most important, the declining political involvement and voting rates in recent elections. About a fifth (20.1 percent) of wage and salaried workers belonged to a


³ Pynes, Joan. *Human Resources Management for Public and Nonprofit Organizations*. 2d ed. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley and Sons, 2004

union in 1983. By 2014, that figure had declined to 11.1 percent. In 1954, unionization reached its highest levels, with 34.8 percent of all U.S. wage and salaried workers belonging to a union (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014; Congressional Research Service, 2014). Furthermore, while the public's perception of labor unions has improved in recent years, it still remains lower than those within the labor movement would like. Approval soared above 70 percent when union membership was higher in the 1950s-1960s. Labor unions saw a sharp drop in their support in the early 2000s, which many attribute to the Great Recession of 2008. The advantages that union workers enjoyed when it came to their pay and benefits generated resentment among the non-unionized workforce. Furthermore, the diminishing power of unions in the private sector greatly diminished their ability to agitate for better working conditions with their employer, subsequently affecting the rate at which wages increased for non-union workers. James Surowiecki of *The New Yorker* noted the difference in labor union's popularity between the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of 2008 in a 2011 article stating:

The bailouts of General Motors and Chrysler saved the jobs of tens of thousands of U.A.W. workers, but were enormously unpopular. In the midterm elections, voters in several states passed initiatives making it harder for unions to organize. Across the country, governors and mayors wrestling with budget shortfalls are blaming public-sector unions for the problems. (Surowiecki, 2011)

Labor union's favorability does seem to have recovered, as the opinions of unions has steadily been improving and is nearly recovered to levels seen prior to the Great Recession of 2008. Currently approval rates now sit close to where they were in the early 1980s. Figure 1 below outlines the approval and disapproval rates of labor unions from 1936 to 2014 (Gallup, 2014).

Figure 1: Approval and Disapproval Rates of Labor Unions



Additionally, Pew Research notes in their 2013 national survey of 1,512 adults the effect the recession appears to have had on public views of labor unions:

Public views of business corporations and labor unions, which had mostly been in the positive territory from the 1980s through the early 2000s, turned less favorable during the economic recession. And in August 2011, amid fears of a new economic downturn and widespread dissatisfaction with national conditions, favorable ratings for business and labor hit all-time lows. Since then, favorable opinions of business corporations have increased 17 points and positive views of labor unions have risen 10 points. (Pew Research, 2013)

Some research stipulates that unions are diminishing in power and have therefore lost their political impact (Goldfield, 1986; Dark, 1996; Levi, 2003). Faced with dilapidated union membership rates, general decline in political interest and participation, and increasing hostility to their policy, economic, and political agendas, unions have strong incentives to mobilize every

member for collective political action to protect and enhance their standing politically and their ability to deliver the economic benefit that attracts and retains union members. Consistent with the broader findings of Putnam (1995, 2000) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) about the role of mass organizations, Leighy and Nagler (2007) find the shrinking membership of unions has an overall negative impact on aggregate voter turnout, but unions still play a critical role in mobilizing their members and supporters.


Compounding the fluctuating public sentiment and declining rates of participation is the amount of right-to-work legislation passed at the state-level. Right-to-work laws, “prohibit union security agreements, or agreements between employers and labor unions, that govern the extent to which an established union can require employee’s membership, payment of union dues, or fees as condition of employment, either before or after hiring” (Legal Defense Foundation, 1998). Twenty-six states currently have right-to-work provisions in their laws or state constitutions. States with union-dense industries like Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, and West Virginia have more recently become right-to-work states. In practicality, this means that labor unions have to work hard to actively recruit employees to become a union member. Furthermore, this means that the pool of money generated by union dues is much smaller in these states, making it even more difficult for labor unions to generate legislative and electoral traction to beat back anti-union policies. When unions do decide to expend resources in these states, they have to be strategic with their limited resources. In many cases, labor unions pour financial and logistical resources into states to fight these laws. During the 2016 presidential election, Missouri became a prime electoral target for labor unions as the election of a Republican governor would have led to the passage of right-to-work laws. Democrat State Representative Jake Hummel accurately summed up the options for labor unions, “For organized labor, it is make or break. If

we don't get Chris Koster elected, Missouri will very quickly be a right-to-work state.”⁴ While not a key swing state by any means (Missouri has consistently voted Republican in presidential election years), labor unions spent considerable resources guaranteeing the election of Democrat Chris Koster. Koster's campaign received more than 2 million dollars in donations from labor unions⁵ and labor unions such as the AFL-CIO sent volunteers to canvass and phone bank voters on behalf of Koster. As the AFL-CIO's Deputy Political Director Liz McElroy explains,

Missouri wasn't a priority state for many progressive groups or for the Democratic Party in 2016, but it was absolutely critical for us. We had to work to safeguard against Missouri becoming the 27th right-to-work state so we committed time and resources to the Governor's race in Missouri where other groups were not as invested.” (McElroy, 2017)

In spite of the various obstacles American labor unions face, they remain a powerful force in American politics. The chart below outlines the reported turnout of union and non-union households from the American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys conducted in presidential election years from 1948 until 2012.

Figure 2: Turnout Trends in Union and Non-Union Households from 1948-2012



⁴ (St. Louis Dispatch, 2016)

⁵ (The Kansas City Star, 2016)

Since 1948, union households have consistently voted at higher rates than non-union households (with the exception of 1960). The reported turnout gap between these households was as high as 12 percentage points and averages just under six percentage points across presidential elections. While turnout overall has waxed and waned over time, unions households have consistently voted at a higher rate than non-union households. Additionally, reported turnout of union members has actually grown over time, increasing their power as part of the electorate and making the efforts of unions even more critical as they can shape elections as a powerful voting bloc.

In 2013, *FiveThirtyEight's* Nate Silver conducted an analysis examining the effects of union membership on Democratic voting. He concluded that belonging to a union, even when controlling other demographic factors, was extremely important in determining the vote share for Barack Obama in 2012:

Specifically, 64 percent of union members in the Annenberg data set voted for Barack Obama. By contrast, if these same voters were not members of unions but every other demographic characteristic were held constant, the analysis predicts that 52 percent of them would have voted for Mr. Obama anyway. Thus, the marginal impact of being a union member on the likelihood on voting for Mr. Obama was 12 percentage points (64 percent less 52 percent) on average. Because about 10 percent of voters in the study were union members, this boosted Mr. Obama's overall vote share by 1.2 percentage points. (Silver, 2013)

Where does all of this leave labor unions in a modern campaign context? They face quite a few, non-trivial hurdles: declining membership, declining voter participation, antagonistic lawmakers, and highly variable public support. Yet despite these obstacles, labor unions remain a

political force in electing candidates and mobilizing their membership. There remains a key distinction between the union mobilization of the past and union mobilization in more recent elections: resources. Money generated by union dues has shrunk to a level where it is impossible to mail, canvass, or call each, individual member of a labor union. As a consequence, labor unions have to be strategic in not only *which* union members they target their political communication to, but also *how* and *what* to say to ensure members are participating in the political process. As Kris Garcia, former Political Data Director at the National Education Association explains, “We no longer have the luxury of assuming our members will vote in a given election. We have become more focused on member mobilization the last four cycles, implementing programs specifically aimed at making sure our members show up come Election Day.”⁶ The key way in which labor unions determine this is via large-scale field experiments. Political parties and non-partisan civic engagement groups have been conducting field experiments since 2005 (see Mann, 2006) and labor unions have also embraced this approach for measuring program effectiveness and establishing best practices. Natalie LeBlanc-Jackson, President of the California office for the Pivot Group, a firm specializing in direct mail, explains how the quantity of field experiments has increased over time, “We’ve gone from conducting one mail experiment a cycle to including them as a standard part of our scope of work that we pitch to clients in a matter of six years. As long as the budget is there, we push organizations and candidates to test their communication before rolling it out as program.” (LeBlanc-Jackson, 2015) Unions are at the forefront of this new age of field experiments; whether it’s voting, communicating with elected officials, or taking other political actions, organizations are leaning on the previous lessons of social science to optimize their political programs and communication.

⁶ (Garcia, 2015). Personal Interview.

In that vein, the research presented in this dissertation covers various experimental projects undertaken by labor unions in order to optimize the political communication to their memberships.

Contributions

An important contribution from this work is the research reflecting how real world organizations sought to spur their members to participate in politics. As a result, the findings will be part of the accumulating knowledge base these organizations use in the future (and in some cases, the lessons were utilized within the same election cycle). Each of the findings from these experiments will drive future resource allocation decisions for my partner organizations.

However, no research project is perfect. This work encountered budget constraints, restrictions on the ability to deviate from a set of established best practices, and the inherent limitations in focusing on just one type of membership organization. These types of projects often lack the perfection achieved in more contained environments. Nevertheless, field experiments are often hard to come by, and the results are far more meaningful for both researcher and practitioner.

Each paper in this proposal outlines the design, implementation, and the result of a field experiment aimed at testing the effectiveness of various mobilization methods. The field experiments in each chapter all meet Gerber and Green's four criteria for "an ideal field experiment": (1) the treatment resembles the intervention of interest in the world; (2) the participants resemble the actors who ordinarily encounter such interventions; (3) the context for the experiment resembles the context of interest; and (4) the outcomes resemble the actual outcomes of interest (Gerber and Green, 2012).

Considering the myriad of variations between communication modes, communication timing, messenger type, etc. membership organizations and unions can utilize field experiments to decipher meaningful change versus random noise. Program evaluation allows for mass membership organizations to assess the overall impact of their specific programs as well as determine best practices. In each of the papers in this dissertation, the union wished to utilize a field experiment to determine if their previously used methods were actually working among their members.

This project not only adds to the current literature, but the findings of this research also have larger implications for the study of political participation as well as specific commentary on union member participation. The first chapter contributes to the larger literature by measuring two competing GOTV tactics via letter and a live follow up phone call in two experiments. The first experiment aimed to mobilize members to return their mail ballot and the second encouraged members to cast their ballot prior to Election Day. In the first test of its kind, the experiment measured the treatment utilizing the union member's past voting record (e.g. Davenport, 2009; Panagopoulos, 2009; Green, Gerber and Larimer, 2008) versus asking the member to "Make a Voting Plan" (e.g. Nickerson and Rogers, 2009; Rogers and Gerber, 2008). The subsequent chapter discusses an advocacy experiment aimed at determining whether an appeal to union members to reach out to their elected officials is effective. The experiment tests three different types of appeals to determine which is most effective. The last chapter outlines two canvassing experiments that took place during municipal elections in the spring of 2014. While at first glance the experiments seem to be standard canvassing experiments empirically and theoretically, the use of volunteer canvassers makes the intent-to-treat and treatment-on-

treated effects all the more impressive⁷. Considering that a majority of previous research had utilized paid canvassers to achieve increases in turnout, I offer that utilizing volunteer canvassers may be just as effective (if not more) for organizations aiming to increase turnout.

Dissertation Outline

This dissertation will provide three instances of a labor union increasing the desired action rate of its members as measured by large-scale field experiment. Each experiment was conducted in a different state and electoral context. Each offers evidence that, despite declining membership rates, labor unions remain a powerful force in politically mobilizing their members.

Chapter two discusses the impact of mobilizing union members to vote prior to Election Day. Here I offer the first comparison of two proven mobilization tactics: social pressure using a person's previous vote history and walking the person through a "voting plan". By conducting a field experiment in Arizona and Florida, states with large portions of the electorate casting a ballot prior to Election Day, I am able to conclude not only which treatment was more effective, but how treatment effects varied by vote method.

Chapter three focuses on how varying language delivered via live phone call can influence the action rate of the person answering the phone. This test is one of a handful of advocacy experiments aimed at concluding whether or not an appeal to contact elected official is effective. Furthermore, it utilizes different scripts delivered to treatment groups to determine if there is a difference between script type and action rate among union members.

⁷ Intent-to-treat effect refers to the impact of being randomly assigned to the treatment whereas treatment-on-treated effects refer to the effects of those who were randomly assigned to the treatment group and actually received the treatment.

Chapter four provides an example of how labor unions can greatly impact the outcome of local elections. By utilizing volunteer canvassers in an off-year election, a local labor union was able to increase turnout in a citywide election. The novelty in this experiment is that the volunteer operation produced not only a statistically significant impact in turnout, but also an impact in-line with effect sizes produced by paid canvass operations. This offers a promising avenue of research for canvass field experiments, especially as organizations like labor unions face diminishing resources.

Finally, I conclude my dissertation in chapter 5. I review the key findings presented in the preceding chapters. Additionally, I discuss future projects that will build on the analysis and research agenda offered in this dissertation

Chapter 2

MEASURING THE GOTV EFFORTS OF A NATIONAL LABOR UNION: RESULTS FROM TWO FILED EXPERIEMENTS

Introduction

Previous literature indicates that a voter's likelihood of casting a ballot is tied to their social and political interactions (Gosnell, 1927; Eldersveld, 1956; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Putnam, 2000). These interactions become even more critical in less-salient elections, where there may be less media coverage or campaign activities by political parties and candidates (Green, Gerber and Nickerson, 2001). These facts are not lost on membership groups like labor unions who have a vested interest in an off year, local, or primary election where there is less competition for voter's attention and their impact can be greater. These groups are constantly refining communication modes and mediums in order to determine which practices will cause a favorable outcome in the elections (where the group's communication may be more valuable as there is less fanfare to compete with). This paper offers a look into one union's efforts to mobilize its members in the 2014 primary election by encouraging members to take advantage of convenience voting reforms available in their state.

The fundamental contribution of this research is to determine which of two long standing Get-Out-The-Vote practices is most effective at increasing turnout and encouraging members to utilize early in-person voting (EIPV) and voting by mail (VBM): social pressure (i.e. a voter report card) or plan making (i.e. walking a voter through a voting plan). It is worth noting that social pressure and plan-making have not been compared as GOTV tactics prior to this experiment. Previous field experiments have shown that EIPV and VBM recruitment increases turnout (Mann, 2013; Mann and Mayhew, 2013; Mann and Kalla, 2013). At the time of this

study, 33 states and the District of Columbia allowed early voting, and 27 states, plus the District of Columbia permitted voters to cast a ballot via mail without an excuse (National Council of State Legislatures, 2014). A potential solution is to have membership organizations find ways to encourage participation among their members, and to encourage members to take advantage of convenience voting reform.

This paper proceeds as follows: First, I briefly review how these experiments are situated within the greater literature about organizational membership and political participation as well as voter mobilization strategy via early voting and voting by mail recruitment. Second, I describe the design of my field experiments conducted in partnership with a national labor union in Arizona and Florida. Third, I present the results of the field experiments. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the results and what role labor unions can play in increasing the rates of convenience voting (i.e. voting by mail and voting early) and overall turnout going forward.

Group Membership and Political Participation

As discussed in the introduction, organizational membership deeply affects one's political behavior (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 1954; Miller et al., 1965). This occurs for a number of reasons: 1) Organizations often act as a resource to subsidize the cost of political learning for their members (Verba and Nie, 1972; Conover, 1984); 2) Members often foster leadership and participation skills and then utilize those skills in a political context (Leighey, 1996); and 3) Members of a group are more likely to be exposed to a more politically active social network, which in turn increases their likelihood to participate due to social norms and social rewards or sanctions (Fowler, 2005; Klobstad, 2010; Sinclair, 2012).

Membership organizations have a positive and statistically significant impact on individual voter turnout through two mechanisms: being an organization member and residing in a state with a higher group membership. Mass organizations increase participation among their members and non-group members although at lower rates (Leighey and Nagler, 2007).

Convenience Voting Reforms and Opportunities for Mobilization

Recruiting individuals to cast a ballot by mail has been an effective tactic for increasing participation across a wide variety of electoral contexts (Mann, 2013; Mann and Mayhew, 2013 forthcoming; Mann and Kalla, 2013; Hanmer et al., 2015; Herrnson et al., 2015). Observational studies of allowing voting-by-mail (or no excuse absentee voting) expresses doubt as to whether implementing such “convenience voting” reforms increase aggregate participation or further exacerbate the gap between voters and non-voters (Menger et al., 2015; Burden et al., 2013; see Gronke et al., 2008 for a review). Political elites utilize vote by mail reforms to mobilize targeted individuals – specifically, organizational members. According to a meta-analysis of 52 large-scale field experiments across different types of elections and messengers, a treatment explaining and endorsing the vote-by-mail process (easy, convenient, etc.) and providing a mail application for a ballot has consistently increased turnout by 0.83 percentage points (Mann, 2013). This sustained increase in turnout means a healthy widening of the pool of citizens participating in the democratic process as well as the benefits individuals gain from engaging in the voting process (Pateman, 1970). Based on this analysis, a similar vote-by-mail recruitment treatment in these experiments is expected to increase participation. The question is which treatment works best between two commonly utilized social pressure elements: plan making or previous voting record.

For the partner organization, early voting and vote-by-mail recruitment were attractive because they not only offered an opportunity to determine if appeals to get members to utilize convenience voting reforms increased participation – but specifically – which appeal among commonly used tactics was most effective. Mass membership organizations continually refine the messaging of their mobilization tactics in order to maximize member political participation. The treatments both included a “Thank You for Voting” message and the subsequent text included either plan making elements that prompted the member to think about when and where they would cast their ballot, or return their mail ballot (e.g. Nickerson and Rogers, 2009; Rogers and Gerber, 2008), or the member’s past voting record (e.g. Mann, 2013; Davenport, 2009; Panagopoulos, 2009; Green, Gerber and Larimer, 2008; Gerber 2006). Both of these tactics have proven effective as social pressure methods. This research offers the opportunity to directly compare these tactics.

Plan Making

There is a robust amount of psychology literature indicating why plan making is an effective tactic for altering behavior and demonstrating how plan making is an effective way to encourage voting. Merely asking a person if they intend to engage in a certain behavior increases their likelihood of engaging (Nelson and Norton, 2005; Morwitz, Johnson and Schmittlein, 1993; Greenwald et al., 1987; Sherman, 1980). Its effectiveness is driven mainly by the increase in cognitive awareness and accessibility of the task because the intention is primed by the question (Morwitz and Fitzsimons, 2004). Guiding people on how to implement the when, where, and how of fulfilling their intentions increases their likelihood of following through for three reasons: 1) plan making encourages people to develop strategies for avoiding logistical hurdles; 2) plan

making helps people to remember their intentions as well as engage pre-determined strategies for overcoming challenges they may face while acting on their intentions; and 3) plan making induces a sense of commitment to engage in the stated behavior (Gollwitzer, 1999). Encouraging people to make plans has increased follow-through on various behaviors—from committing to eat additional fruit each day (Armitage, 2007), getting more exercise (Prestwich et al., 2004), recycling (Holland et al., 2006), or dieting (Achtziger, 2008). Prompting people to make plans insures a greater rate of success.

Given the tactic's prosperity in these varied arenas, it makes sense that plan making is also an effective way to encourage voter turnout. By prompting the voter to think through *when* they would vote, *how* they would get to their polling place, and *where* would they be coming from prior to voting, Nickerson and Rogers (2010) observed an increase of 4.1 percentage points compared to the control group. Additional analyses revealed that plan-making was particularly effective among citizens who did not already have a plan for how to get to their polling place. Thus, citizens who had never previously developed a voting plan were most responsive to the plan making intervention.

Social Pressure

Previous studies have examined the results of applying different amounts of social pressure in order to increase turnout. Social pressure is a chief principle of American politics. Interest groups, diplomats, legislators, and political organizations all utilize social pressure to push for an outcome in their favor. These social pressure methods borrow from social psychology research on shaming people into complying with certain behaviors. Preliminary research on shaming and voting was conducted in two pilot studies in which voters were provided their vote history and that of their neighbors. Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) found

that sharing an individual's vote history as well as the vote history of their neighbors via mail increased turnout by 4.9 and 8.1 percentage points, respectively. Additionally, these social pressure mailers out performed mailers that included messaging about civic duty and mailers containing "Hawthorne Effect" language that included telling the recipient they were being studied to find out why people choose not to vote. The efficiency of these social pressure treatments is generated through the threat of social penalty for failing to vote since targets are now aware that their neighbors may know whether or not they voted. Additional voter mobilization experiments utilizing a person's voting record have proven to be a consistent way to increase turnout (e.g. Mann, 2013; Davenport, 2009; Panagopoulos, 2009). However, social pressure is not foolproof. Brehm and Brehm (1981) focused on a campaign to reduce littering and found that shaming failed to increase compliance and instead decreased it. As Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) point out, "the compliance-inducing effects of heavy-handedness are in tension, which makes the net effect of a shaming campaign an open empirical question" (p. 35). This is, of course, a prime concern for the sponsoring organization of the communication whose last desire would be non-compliance and even worse backlash.

Plan Making and Social Pressure Meet Convenience Voting

Given the wealth of research in psychology and political science indicating the success of these two tactics, my partner organization sought to answer whether or not one method was superior to the other and whether or not these effects varied by vote method (voting by mail versus early voting). It is important to contextualize this prior research on plan-making and social pressure within the election in question. First, the experiment was conducted during a primary election where arguably fewer appeals were being made to voters by political or civic engagement organizations, and where there was arguably less media attention. The organization

could feel confident that either of their interventions would be successful since they very well could be “the only game in town.” Fewer citizens participate in primary elections so it is therefore reasonable to assume that many voters would not have a plan to vote in the primary, and the plan-making treatment would have spurred them to do so. Conversely, a social-pressure vote history treatment might also succeed in this environment as utilizing prior vote history as a social pressure mechanism has proved to be consistently successful since 2006. Another contextual element to consider is the amount of voting occurring in these states prior to Election Day and how vote method in prior elections might interact with the treatments themselves.

Finally, it is worth considering how the plan-making treatment might function differently within the mail ballot chase experiment versus the voting early in-person experiment. For the ballot chase experiment, the plan-making treatment prompts the voter to think about when they will fill out their ballot, when they will return their ballot, and whether or not they will send their ballot back via mail or drop it off in-person. For the early voting experiment, the plan-making treatment prompts the voter to think about when they will be voting, what time of day they will vote early, and at which vote center they intend to early vote. This is of particular note in Arizona where the Permanent Early Vote List (PEVL) is comprised of voters who have absentee voted before and therefore may not need to make a plan to return their absentee ballot, but may be instead compelled by a social pressure treatment. In terms of early voting, there are arguably additional plan-making elements to voting early in-person as opposed to sending in an absentee ballot. Voting early still requires the voter to know where and when they can vote. Furthermore, their early voting location may be different than that of their Election Day polling place and the hours during which a voter can cast a ballot may vary. Given these logistical hurdles, it may be the case that voting early may actually require *more* plan making than voting on Election Day.

Hypotheses

These experiments were designed to evaluate the effectiveness of labor unions' efforts to mobilize their members to participate in elections. Each hypothesis applies to both pre-Election Day turnout (either via VBM or EIPV) and overall turnout. I expect changes in how people vote and whether people vote. Additionally, provided the context in which this experiment is conducted, I also expect the treatments to behave differently within each experiment. Specially, I expect that the plan-making treatment will perform better for those mobilized to vote early in-person while the social pressure treatment will perform better for those mobilized to vote by mail.

My first hypothesis is based on prior experiments on convenience voting recruitment as a voter mobilization tactic:

H1: A mailing and phone call encouraging use of voting by mail or voting early in person will increase the use of pre-Election Day voting methods (H1a) and overall turnout in the 2014 primary election.

Support for the first hypothesis is a pre-requisite to investigating the hypothesis of central interest about the importance of mass membership organizations and their utilization of convenience voting reforms. The second hypothesis states the treatment effect is conditional on which convenience voting reform the member was encouraged to utilize, specifically:

H2: The Plan-making treatment will perform better within the EIPV mobilization experiment while the social pressure treatment will perform better within the ballot chase experiment.

Research Design

I collaborated with a national labor union to conduct parallel experiments mobilizing their members to either vote early or to vote by mail in Arizona and Florida during the 2014 primary election⁸. The labor union selected Arizona and Florida because both states offer early voting and voting by mail without an excuse. In Florida and Arizona, voters must request a mail ballot prior to Election Day. However, Arizona maintains a list of absentee voters via a PEVL, and those voters who signed up to vote by mail in previous elections were automatically sent a mail ballot. In addition, the organization utilized the late primary schedule in both states in order to determine which mailer language was most effective at mobilizing members to vote early, and by mail to utilize in the following November general election. In Arizona, early voting begins 26 days before Election Day and absentee voting is available without an excuse. In Florida, early voting begins 10-15 days before Election Day and concludes three days before Election Day and offers no-excuse absentee voting. Of particular interest to the labor union was how effective treatments like these could be in Right-to-Work states where union membership is much lower than those states without Right to Work laws.⁹ Both Arizona and Florida have unionized workforce rates under the national average of 11.1 percent. In 2014, about seven percent of the workforces in Arizona and Florida were represented by a labor union (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).

⁸ Arizona utilizes a hybrid primary system. Unaffiliated voters may choose which party's primary they vote in while voters registered with a party can only vote in that party's primary. Florida utilizes a closed primary system. Only those voters registered with a party can vote in that party's primary.

⁹ According to the Legal Defense Foundation, "right to work laws prohibit union security agreements, or agreements between employers and labor unions, that govern the extent to which an established union can require employees' membership, payment of union dues, or fees as a condition of employment, either before or after hiring. (Baird, Charles W. "Right to work before and after 14 (b)." *Journal of Labor Research* 19.3 (1998): 471-493)

Two parallel experiments were conducted in Arizona and Florida. One was distinctly aimed at mobilizing members to vote early in-person in Arizona and Florida, and the other aimed to increase voting by mail by those members who received or requested a mail ballot in Arizona and Florida. I compared two treatments: 1) sending a letter which encouraged members to “make a plan” to vote early or return their mail ballot, and; 2) sending a letter which included the member’s vote history for the past four general elections acquired from the secretary of state. Both treatments included a “thank you for voting” message in the text and were followed up with a live phone call mirroring the text of the letters¹⁰. The “make a plan” treatment for early voting included questions encouraging the target to plan when they would cast their ballot, and included early voting locations specific to the county of the target. Those that were on PEVL in Arizona as well as those who had requested a mail ballot in Florida by the time of conception for the mailers were put in the population for the vote by mail experiment. Everyone else was placed in the early voting experiment. The “make a plan” treatment for mail ballots included similar plan-making questions, but focused on when the target intended to fill out and return their mail ballot. The voting record treatment provided a summary of the target’s voting history from the state election office.

The EIPV experimental population consists of 42,131¹¹ registered voters who met the following conditions: 1) members of the organization; 2) residents of Arizona or Florida; 3) were not already signed up for permanent mail voter status or had not already requested a mail ballot as of the first week of August 2014. Members in the EIPV experiment were randomly assigned to three conditions: 1) a letter encouraging the member to “make a plan” to vote early which included early voting locations in the member’s county; 2) a letter including the member’s voting

¹⁰ Copies of the [mailers](#) and [phone scripts](#) can be found in the appendix.

¹¹ A breakdown of assignment by state is included in [Table S1](#) in the Supplemental Materials.

history in the past four general elections provided by the secretary of state; or 3) the control group, which received no contact from the membership organization about voter turnout in the 2014 election. Both treatments were followed up by a live phone call¹² that echoed the text of the mailers; the plan making treatment call prompted the target to think about when and where they would vote early, and the vote history treatment call referenced the letter summarizing the member's vote history.

The VBM experiment population consists of 12,047 registered voters who met the following conditions: 1) members of the organization; 2) residents of Arizona or Florida; 3) were already permanent absentee voters or had requested a mail ballot as of the first week of August 2014. The treatments were acting as a mail ballot chase mechanism for those in this experiment. Those in the VBM experiment were assigned to the same three conditions as the EIPV experiment: 1) the plan making treatment, which prompted members to think about when and where they would fill out their ballot and when they planned to return their ballot; 2) the vote history letter, which included the member's vote history from the past four general elections; or 3) the control group, which received no contact from the membership organization. Again, both treatments were followed up by live phone calls matching the treatment letter the member was assigned.

In both experiments, random assignment was done at the household level to prevent violating the non-interference assumption (Nickerson 2008; McConnell, Sinclair and Green 2010). Since the electoral context of each state was fundamentally distinct, the random assignment was stratified by state to create parallel experiments. In addition, both experiments included blocking for drop-off voters (those members who cast a ballot in 2012 but not in 2010).

¹² Unfortunately, disposition data from the phone calls were not made available by my partner organization so phone contact rates are not included as part of the analysis.

[Table 1](#) in the appendix shows the randomly assigned groups in the EIPV Experiment with the anticipated balance across covariates: 14,040 households received the plan making letter and follow-up phone call, 14,060 households received the vote history letter and follow-up phone call, and 14,031 households were placed in the control group and received no contact. Table 2 shows the randomly assigned groups in the VBM Experiment with the expected balance across the observable covariates: 4,031 households received the plan making letter and follow-up phone call, 3,998 households received the vote history letter and follow-up phone call, and 4,018 households were placed in the control group and received no contact. Table S2 in the supplemental materials reports the results of a multinomial logistic regression of random assignment on observable covariates for the two experiments; furthermore, showing that the randomization worked as expected.

The effect of the treatments is measured using publicly available individual voting records acquired from the Arizona and Florida Secretary of State's Office after the 2014 Primary Election by Catalist LLC. The individual level data allowed us to measure the effects of each treatment on method of casting a ballot (mail, early or polling place) and overall turnout.

[Table 3](#) reports the mean rate of voting overall on Election Day, and prior to Election Day for the 2014 primary election in Arizona and Florida. Since Arizona does not decipher between ballots cast early in person or early by mail, pre-Election Day voting includes both EIPV and VBM. Random assignment was conducted at the household level. I utilized logistic regression analysis for my hypothesis testing, because it accounts for (potential) intra-household correlation in voting behavior by clustering the standard errors at the household level (Arceneaux, 2005; Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009). Clustered randomizations are often utilized in canvass experiments where assigning entire voting geographies (precincts, for example) to

either the treatment or control group insures a simpler process for cutting walk lists.

Implementation becomes much easier as canvassers are not assigned specific households or individuals. This same theory of clustering the randomization for mail experiments occurs at the household level and accounts for the very real possibility of co-habitants of the same address opening the mail belonging to the other habitant (as well as other messy correlations in voting behavior of those sharing a household). I reported the change in average probability between the control and treatment groups based on these regression analyses. Additionally, I included supplemental analysis of the treatment effects on voters with varying levels of previous pre-Election Day voting experience.

Results

Experiment 1: EIPV Mobilization

Each experimental condition, as detailed in [Table 4](#), presents the mean rates of voting in both Arizona and Florida based on the population being mobilized to vote early. This means that they were sent a mail piece that encouraged them to vote early in-person and were provided information about early voting locations in their county. These rates are calculated from logistic regression to account for the clustering of standard errors in multi-member households. [Table 4](#) displays the change in probability from the treatments in a model without additional covariates. [Table S3](#) in the supplemental materials section reports the logit coefficients and the results of a model including the set of covariates in [Table 1](#) that are commonly associated with voter turnout. As expected from random assignment, the inclusion of the covariates does not alter the results.

As seen in [Table 4](#), the vote history treatment increased turnout by 0.5 percentage points compared to the turnout rate of the control group of 9.1 percent ($p=0.072$). The plan-making treatment increased turnout by 0.9 percentage points at a statistically significant level ($p=0.006$).

However, the difference between the treatments is statistically indistinguishable ($p=0.847$). Here I observed evidence that communication from a mass organization encouraging members to utilize early voting is successful but no additional evidence showed that one treatment outperforms the other. [Table 4](#) also reports the overall mean rate of voting as well as the overall mean rates of voting with each voting method. The vote method is characterized by either polling place voting occurring on Election Day or by pre-Election Day voting, which includes voting by mail and early in-person voting. For the vote method analysis, non-voters were included. In terms of Election Day voting, both treatments have little effect on the rate of Election Day voting. Both coefficients are substantively and statistically insignificant. This is to be expected considering the treatments were both aimed at pre-Election Day voting recruitment. The third column of Table 4 reports the effect of the treatments on pre-Election Day voting, we observe that both treatments were effective at increasing pre-Election Day voting. The vote history treatment increased pre-Election Day voting by 0.6 percentage points ($p=0.009$) and the plan making treatment increased turnout by 0.7 percentage points. Yet, the difference between the treatments was statistically insignificant ($p=0.608$). The membership organization was successful at increasing turnout in the 2014 primary election by encouraging members to take advantage of early voting available in their states, and was also successful at pushing their members to utilize pre-Election Day convenience voting reforms. While the impact is small, the trend of increased turnout is encouraging for organizations trying to increase member turnout in non-presidential elections.

Experiment 2: VBM Mobilization

[Table 5](#) reports the mean rates of voting in both Arizona and Florida based on the targeted population being mobilized to return their mail ballot. These rates are calculated using

the same process described above. In the case of the VBM population, both treatments increased turnout above the 31.1 percent turnout rate of the control group. The plan making treatment significantly increased turnout in those mobilized to return their mail ballot by 2.0 percentage points ($p=0.027$) and the vote history treatment increased turnout by 3.0 percentage points and was also statistically significant ($p=0.002$). However, the 1.0 percentage point increase between the treatments was statistically indistinguishable ($p=0.178$). Much like the EIPV experiment, I observed little effect of the treatments on Election Day voting (which is to be expected); both coefficients are negative but not substantively significant at -0.002 percentage points for the vote history treatment and -0.003 percentage points for the plan making treatment with p-values well outside the levels of statistical significance. For pre-Election Day voting, both treatments significantly impact the use of pre-Election Day voting methods. The vote history treatment increased pre-Election Day voting by 3.2 percentage points ($p=0.001$) and the plan making treatment increased pre-Election Day voting by 2.3 percentage points ($p=0.011$), the 0.9 percentage point difference between the treatments is inconsequential ($p=0.204$)¹³. These communications offer another successful attempt by a mass membership organization to increase turnout as well as mobilize the members to the method of voting encouraged by the treatment.

Heterogeneous Effects and Prior Early Voting

I wanted to examine the possibility of heterogeneity in the treatment effects across groups with prior pre-Election Day voting experience. The content of the two treatment questions have the potential to affect various types of voters in different ways. Given that one of the treatments asked voters to ‘make a plan,’ it is possible this type of treatment would not resonate with voters

¹³ Full analysis overall and by state are included in Tables [S4](#), [S5](#) and [S6](#) in the Supplemental Materials.

who had experience voting prior to Election Day in past elections. Should this be the case, there is an expectation that the vote history treatment would be more impactful among frequent pre-Election Day voters as they would already be comfortable with voting before Election Day (and would conceivably already have a plan). Conversely, if a voter had considerable experience voting prior to Election Day, it is also plausible that they could be more receptive to the treatment considering they have engaged in the process before. Therefore, I examined whether the average treatment effects varied across rates of pre-Election Day voting.¹⁴ I divided the experimental population into categories based on past pre-Election Day voting to look for heterogeneous treatment effects.¹⁵ This analysis was conducted for both the EIPV and VBM experimental population.¹⁶

Figure 3 shows the average treatment effects on turnout (and 95% confidence intervals) for those in the EIPV Experiment within each pre-Election Day voting category. There is some support for the hypothesis that the ‘make a plan’ would be less effective among those individuals with greater pre-Election Day voting experience. For those who have voted prior to Election Day in one of four previous general elections, the plan-making treatment effect is near statistical significance ($p=0.068$; one-tailed) while the vote history treatment is not ($p=0.493$). Conversely, for those who have voted prior to Election Day in two of four previous general elections, the vote history treatment significantly impacts turnout at conventional levels ($p=0.001$) while the plan-making treatment does not have an effect on turnout ($p=0.279$). While there does seem to be

¹⁴ For this analysis I did not distinguish between voting by mail prior to Election Day and voting in-person prior to Election Day. Since Arizona does not distinguish between these two methods on their voter file, I group both voters with previous experience of voting by mail and voting early in-person together under the “Pre-Election Day Voter” category.

¹⁵ The groups were defined by having voted prior to Election Day in one of four previous general elections, two of four previous general elections, three of four previous general elections, and four of four previous general elections. Those elections are 2012, 2010, 2008, and 2006.

¹⁶ Full analysis is available in Tables [S7](#) and [S8](#) in the Supplemental Materials.

some support for the expectation that the make a plan treatment may underperform with frequent pre-Election Day voters, neither treatment makes a significant impact on three of four or four of four pre-Election Day voters.





Figure 4 shows the average treatment effects on turnout (and 95% confidence intervals) for those in the VBM Experiment within each pre-Election Day voting category. The only significant impact on turnout was among voters who had voted prior to Election Day in two of the previous four general elections. Both the vote history and plan-making treatments had a similar significant impact ($p=0.046$ and $p=0.011$, respectively) but not significant difference between the two. Both treatments approach statistical significance for one of four and three of four voters, but their substantive impact is nearly identical. With regard to the VBM experiment,

there does not seem to be an indication that the plan-making treatment underperformed with frequent pre-Election Day voters.

Figure 4: Heterogeneity by Previous Early Voting
Treatment Effects on Overall Turnout in VBM Experiment



Discussion and Conclusion

In a field experiment first of its kind, a national labor union was able to test two standing GOTV best practices against one another to determine not only whether or not their intervention was effective, but which intervention was more impactful. The results from two voter mobilization field experiments among labor union members in Arizona and Florida during the 2014 primary election support the expectations that membership organizations enhance voter mobilization. And additionally, that labor unions can increase participation in states where large

swaths of the workforce are not unionized. Furthermore, the results from these experiments also support the expectation that EIPV and VBM recruitment consistently increase voter turnout.

If voter turnout trends continue on their current path, it will become absolutely critical for membership organizations, civic groups, and political parties to find a way to engage the electorate. The path forward may be forged by convenience voting reforms but organizations will still have to take on the important task of informing members that these opportunities exist. Evidence from this experiment indicates that mobilizing members to take advantage of these reforms by either casting a ballot before Election Day in person or voting by mail is a successful way to increase turnout in a primary election.

As more states offer voters multiple ways to cast ballots, organizations and groups in those states will have to find ways to best mobilize their members. The landscape of ballot casting is constantly evolving, and thus the tactics of how to mobilize voters within the landscape must also evolve. This research offered an opportunity to do just that: to examine two consistently utilized methods of GOTV social pressure and determine which was most effective at increasing turnout of the targeted electorate. Unfortunately, the results are not exactly tidy, but there does seem to be evidence that utilizing a voter's previous vote history is more effective than asking the voter to make a plan to cast a ballot (whether that be early or by mail). Additionally, as more and more states offer voting by mail without an excuse, and a higher proportion of the electorate receives a ballot – mail ballot chase campaigns will become an important element of campaign strategy among interested parties. In the case of the VBM Experiment, there is a strong indication that mass membership organizations can increase turnout among their members by chasing ballots and slight indication that the best way to accomplish this is to utilize social pressure elements around previous voting history. However, should an

organization fear backlash from invoking social pressure via a member or voter's previous vote history, this research indicates that plan-making treatments are a viable (and perhaps a more palatable) option (especially in the case of early in-person voting).

It is also worth discussing the implications of this research for organizations like labor unions who benefit from recruiting members to use convenience voting reforms. Knowing which messages motivate their members to cast a ballot prior to Election Day is critical for a number of reasons. First, there is strong evidence that convenience voting not only increases turnout in the election in question, but also subsequent elections (Mann, 2013; Mann and Mayhew, 2013). Second, if labor unions know they can successfully push their members to vote prior to Election Day, this allows them to “bank” votes. Further letting them better predict election results prior to Election Day (particularly in union-dense areas) based on publicly available early vote data, and to allocate their resources more efficiently. Finally, the results of this research have large implications for resource allocation. Voter turnout programs are costly for membership organizations. Knowing that members can be mobilized by a certain message or medium is critical for labor unions. In the case of these experiments, a letter and a phone call, methods far less expensive than canvassing or television ads, successfully mobilized members.

As with any field experiment, replication across various electoral environments is necessary to insure the external validity of findings. Additionally, more research that marries the role of mass organizations in member participation and the availability of convenience voting reforms as a mobilization strategy is necessary to further best practices and research around large membership organization mobilization efforts.

Chapter 3

CALL ME MAYBE? VARYING PATCH-THROUGH SCRIPTS TO OPTIMIZE AVOCACY PROGRAMS

“I would say that about 40 percent of our off-year live programs are patch [through] programs, it’s a much lower portion of our on-years (about 15 percent). What we have seen is a shift from very large national efforts to a lot more state-based work. Our fights are mostly reactive; opposing the Trans Pacific Partnership or asking voters to stand with Planned Parenthood.”

-Marty Stone, Partner at Stones’ Phones

Introduction

Labor unions employ a host of different tactics to increase the power of various member advocacy programs. One of those tactics is known as patch-through calls, where either a live or automated message is delivered to a constituent. The message urges the person to “take action” on an issue by pressing one to be connected to a targeted elected official’s office. The organization often encourages the constituent to convey approval or disapproval of a legislator’s actions, whether it be supporting or opposing a bill, making controversial statements, or inaction on a cause important to the organization in question.

Labor unions are not the only political players utilizing patch-through programs to drive legislator action. Jennifer Matthews, a partner at AMM Strategies (a telephone strategy firm whom consults with Democratic candidates and progressive coalitions), notes that she has worked on several campaigns in which patch-through calls changed the outcome of the campaign. Matthews states, “In 2016, we worked with a statewide organization in Colorado to defeat Senate Bill 238. [The] bill would allow any business to ignore Colorado’s nondiscrimination laws and claim that their religion is the reason why.” (Matthews 2017) In April of 2017, AMM conducted a patch-through program in Florida in which the script asked

voters to call for the resignation of State Senator Frank Artiles, a Republican from the Miami area who had reportedly used a racial slur in reference to a group of black legislators. Senator Artiles resigned on Friday, April 21st 2017.

The union's appeals to their members to take action are not without challenges. Between declining approval ratings (Gallup, 2014), declining membership rates (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016), and an increase in Right-to-Work laws, labor unions have their hands full. When focusing specifically on phone-based mobilization efforts by unions, general phone contact and cooperation rates have declined tremendously over the past decade from 90 to 62 percent and 43 to 14 percent, respectively (AAPOR, 2012). Additionally, getting the member or target to stay on the phone long enough to hear the call to action is critical to insuring the campaign's success. As such, phone script optimization becomes essential for unions and organizations. This experiment aims to do just that: not only measure whether appeals to union members increases their advocacy but which type of appeal is most effective.

Given the hurdles faced by labor unions and other organizations in motivating their members to contact legislators, it begs the question: Why even bother? The short answer is: It works. As Fenno (1977) states, "The constituency that a representative reacts to is the constituency that he or she sees." (p. 883) Representatives normally try to act in-step with their constituent's wishes (Fowler and Shaiko, 1987; Goldstein, 1999; Kingdon, 1989; Kollman, 1998; Lee, 2002) and depend rather crucially on constituent communication as they make decisions (Kingdon, 1989; Bergan, 2009; Miller, 2010; Bergan and Cole, 2014). In cases where a legislator's vote can directly influence an individual's working conditions, salary, pensions, etc. (as is the case for labor union members) members can be motivated to take the action needed to have their voice heard. It is a near guarantee that legislators will listen to that voice.

This research aims to marry advocacy experimental research and the roll of group membership, specifically labor unions, on political participation. This advocacy experiment builds on previous research in two important ways: 1) It offers the perspective of a labor union within advocacy research; and 2) Builds on previous patch-through experiments to determine what phone script best optimizes patch-through campaigns. In the eyes of labor unions it is paramount to find additional ways to encourage political participation among their membership. This research offers insights on that front.

This chapter proceeds in the following manner. First, I briefly review how group membership affects political participation (and how labor unions specifically boost the political participation of their members). Next, I cover previously conducted advocacy experiments. Then I describe the design of my field experiment conducted in partnership with a statewide labor union. Third, I present the results of the field experiment. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications within the research of advocacy experiments and mass membership organizations. I found that there are no statistical differences of patch-through rates across treatment conditions. In examining the race of union members and legislators included in the experiment, I found that union members of color were more likely to patch-through to legislators of color. Although there are some substantive differences between the treatments among white union members and union members of color, I did not detect any differences across treatments among the varying racial groups (though admittedly this may be due to a lack of statistical power).

Group Membership and Political Participation

Scholars have long maintained that membership in a mass organization significantly impacts political participation (e.g. Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell,

Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960; Miller et al., 1981; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Radcliff and Davis 2000; Beck et al. 2008). Additional research indicates that membership in mass organizations increases participation indirectly: members foster leadership and participation skills and then utilize those skills in a political context (Verba et al., 1995; Leighey, 1996). Members of a group are more likely to be exposed to a more politically active social network, which in turn increases their likelihood to participate due to social norms and social rewards and sanctions (Fowler, 2005; Klofstad, 2010; Sinclair, 2012). Given all of the contributing factors of mass membership organizations, organizations are a major determinant of political participation.

Leighey and Nagler (2007) find membership organizations have a positive and statistically significant impact on individual voter turnout through two mechanisms: being an organization member and residing in a state with a higher group membership. Mass organizations increase participation among their members, and also non-group members (although at lower rates). They estimate that if union membership levels remained as they were in 1964, overall turnout would have been approximately 4.9 percentage points higher in 2004 (p. 436). While they do not provide a specific point estimate for non-union members, they do note, “individuals living in states with stronger unions are more likely to vote, and this is true controlling for other aspects of campaign mobilization and demographic characteristics.”

Much of the literature on mass membership organizations focuses on labor unions. Union members can be difficult to mobilize since their decisions to join a union are often driven by employment decisions and not political ones (as opposed to individuals that may self-select into organizations or political parties). Additionally, many union members come from working-class backgrounds and may lack some of the basic knowledge to politically participate. Much like other political actors, labor unions provide resources to their members in order to boost

participation. Kerrissey and Schofer (2013) indicate that labor unions utilize three noteworthy processes to spur political action of their members: 1) labor unions cultivate organizational and civic skills of their members as a way to achieve organizational and political goals (Markowitz, 1998; Clawson, 2003; Sharpe, 2004); 2) unions shape the political identity of their members by encouraging collective acts (Fantasia, 1989; Weinbaun, 2004; Nissen, 2010); and 3) unions directly mobilize their members (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Asher et al., 2001; Meyer, 2007).

Previous studies of unions and political participation frequently focus on the outcomes of elections. At the aggregate level, voter turnout and union density are correlated (Radcliff and Davis, 2000; Radcliff, 2001). Individual-level research shows that union members often support Democratic candidates (Sousa, 1993; Juravich and Shergold, 1988; Asher et al., 2001) and are much more likely to vote than nonunion citizens (Masters and Delaney, 1986; Freeman, 2003; Leighley and Nagley 2007; Rosenfeld 2010).

Utilizing analysis of multiple publically-available datasets, Kerrissey and Schofer (2013) find “The effect of union membership is broad, spanning most types of political and civic involvement, including voting, protesting, signing petitions, association membership and so on” (p. 919). These effects are strongest among those with low levels of education. Unions provide training and mobilizing efforts tailored specifically to boost participation among low-education voters. Additionally, Harrison (2004) found that unions affect members differently and that unions have a higher importance in the structural life of men, African Americans, and the working class. Essentially, labor unions can close the participation gap for voters who, without membership to a labor union, might opt not to participate in the political process.

Constituency Communication, Advocacy, And Field Experiments

There have been a handful of experiments conducted to determine whether or not constituent opinions matter. Butler and Nickerson (2011) surveyed over 10 thousand New Mexicans across the 70 State House districts on various budget proposals. District specific results were sent to a randomly selected half of the legislature. Legislators receiving their district specific survey results were much more likely to vote in line with constituent opinion than those who did not. Their results support a long-line of observationally based research indicating that constituent opinion matters and can affect legislator behavior.

Additional research focusing on *who* is likely to contact their elected officials found that voters were more willing to contact their legislators of their same race (Broockman, 2014) and of their same political party (Broockman and Ryan, 2014). Michelson and Bedolla (2014), found that nativity and national origin often drive why certain individuals are mobilized to participate in the political process. Broockman and Ryan (2014) utilized observational, field experimental, and natural experimental approaches to find that 25 percent of respondents reported a preference for contacting a co-partisan while seven percent reported a preference for contacting the out partisan (p. 1097). Brookman (2014) argues that this leads to politicians receiving communication from constituents of their racial group more often than other racial groups. However, “this phenomenon might explain the pattern that American minorities on the whole communicate to their representatives much less often than whites, even though both groups appear to communicate to co-racial representatives at similar rates” (p. 308).

In specifically focusing on the impact of patch-through calls, Bergan and Cole (2013) randomized how many calls a representative received regarding anti-bullying legislation. They found that receiving constituency calls increases the probability of supporting the bill by 11-12

percentage points (p. 12). Academics are not the only people conducting this research, as higher constituent communication is a common goal across various organizations. In 2013 TakeAction Minnesota¹⁷ conducted a patch-through experiment on a budget bill in the state legislature. Targets randomly received one of three messages: 1) A baseline message which contained a call to action; 2) The baseline message and an internal efficacy message (i.e. “scientific studies have shown calls from constituents work!”; or 3) The baseline message and an external threat message, which referenced opponents of the tax plan (i.e. “corporate lobbyists”). The group found that the external threat message was effective at increasing the patch-through rate over the baseline message but that the internal efficacy message actually produced a lower patch-through rate than the baseline message (Analyst Institute , 2013)¹⁸. A patch-through experiment conducted by a national labor union aimed to determine whether the effectiveness of patch-through robocalls¹⁹ to priority Senators could be optimized by script language. Targets were randomly assigned to receive one of three scripts urging them to call their senator: 1) a baseline script; 2) an urgency message that stressed immediate action; or 3) an activist identity message stressing that “activists like them” should call their senator. The best performing message was the urgency message, which increased the rate of patch-throughs by 1.4 percentage points over the baseline control message and the activist identity message ($p < 0.001$); the urgency script preformed best not only in the non-targeted states but in the targeted states as well (Analyst Institute, 2013).

¹⁷ TakeAction Minnesota is, “a statewide network of people – people just like you — working to realize racial and economic equity across Minnesota.” (<http://www.takeactionminnesota.org/about-us/>)

¹⁸ The Analyst Institute is, “A clearinghouse for evidence on voter contact and engagement programs, we collect, synthesize, and interpret research in order to make evidence-based recommendations to the progressive community through materials, trainings, and consulting.” (<https://analystinstitute.org/our-mission/>)

¹⁹ Robocalls refer to phone calls delivered by a pre-recorded automated message. They are also referred to as IVR calls, which stands for Interactive Voice Recording.

This research focuses very specifically on one element of advocacy experiments with a unique bend toward mass membership organizations and how they engage and mobilize their members. While other research has focused on who is mobilized to contact their legislators, or whether or not contacting legislators changes their behavior, this experiment emphasizes what to say in order to maximize contact of legislators by constituents. The results of this research have implications for both the academic study of political participation in the United States as well as the practical implementation of engagement efforts conducted by various organizations. From a practical perspective, knowing what to say in order to generate the greatest number of patch-throughs can directly lead to the adoption or defeat of legislation that could help or hurt an organization. Additionally, as organizations such as labor unions face dwindling resources to communicate with their members, optimizing the communication for cost savings is critical. Using the patch-through experiment conducted by a national labor union as an example, researchers determined that if everyone was called with the winning message an additional 584 patches would have been generated (compared to the baseline message) thus reducing the cost per patch-through to \$8.50 per complete from \$11.26 per complete (Analyst Institute , 2013). In a political environment with shrinking resources and increasing phone costs for membership organizations, the optimization of communication becomes critical. So, while this research focuses on one particular piece of advocacy programs, the impact of that piece has much broader implications.

Research Design

I collaborated with a statewide labor union who wished to determine what script language would lead to the greatest amount of their targeted members patching through to their state

representative. The goal of the patch-through program was to encourage state assembly members to stand against a piece of legislation proposed by the state’s governor. Members in 16 assembly districts²⁰ were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 1) a baseline script based on previous patch-through scripts urging the member to contact their representative (12,339 members); 2) a baseline script that also included urgent language encouraging members to act “immediately” or “right away” and contact their legislator (12,338 members); 3) a baseline script that also included activist identity language encouraging “activists like them” to contact their legislator (12,339 members); or 4) a baseline script that also included language emphasizing the “ease of making your voice heard” on an important issue and that contacting their legislator would be “quick and easy” (12,339 members). I worked with the partner organization on the development and production of the treatment and then worked with the organization’s phone vendor to ensure proper data collection²¹.

The experimental population consisted of 49,355 union members who met the following two conditions: those had an available landline phone number and resided in one of the 16 targeted state assembly districts. These members were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions described above. When the target opted to patch-through to their representative’s office, the phone vendor who conducted the calls recorded this. This disposition data was provided to my partner organization 48 hours after the completion of the campaign.

All of the calls were conducted via live phone call. The list was generated from the labor union’s full membership file, but limited to the districts in which there were targeted legislators. The sector of my partner organization is predominantly female, which is why a majority of those

²⁰ Descriptive statistics of the State Assembly districts can be found in Table S9 in the Supplemental Materials.

²¹ Fortunately, my partner organization did not have any strong objections to any of the scripts I proposed and was amendable to the variations I advocated.

in the targeted universe are female. My partner organization wished to target Democratic state assembly members and ask them to stand in opposition to legislation proposed by the state's governor. Randomization was done at the household level to prevent violating the non-interference assumption (Nickerson, 2008; McConnell, Sinclair and Green, 2010). In the rare instance a household contained two union members, a target was randomly selected within the household. [Table 6](#) shows the randomly assigned groups in the experiment with the expected balance across observable covariates. [Table 7](#) reports the results of a multinomial logistic regression of random assignment on observable covariates for the experiment. An interactive voice recording (IVR) screen was conducted prior to the calls beginning to ensure the list only included working phone numbers. Cell phones were excluded as the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) bans the predictive dialing of cell phones.²² The program lasted four days as the organization wanted to apply pressure to the elected officials around the time of voting on the measure. Full scripts are included in the [Appendix](#).

As noted in the Appendix, the control group received a script that is based on the partner group's boilerplate language utilized in previous patch-through efforts. While not a 'no-contact,' pure control group, this design is still equipped to measure the meaningful differences between the treatments and the control group. In this case, I am not trying to make an argument for varying the script language versus no language at all, but that varying the language compared to a standard template is a worthwhile endeavor and increases patch-through rates. As Morton and Williams (2006) point out, "the aspect of control that is most important is not the fact that the researcher has a comparison, but that the researcher can control confounding variables in order to

²² While contact to cell phones typically yields higher response rates, the FCC ban means cell phones must be hand dialed, and this is typically prohibitively and thus an unviable option for groups conducting phone calls.

make the comparison meaningful.”²³ Moreover, as Gerber and Green (2002) argue, the relationship between political scientists and political actors benefits from interaction; and while in service of adding to the academic research on advocacy mobilization, this work seeks to answer a very practical political question of whether or not this specific intervention is worthwhile.

The partner organization’s selection parameters raise the question of external validity. Admittedly, the results from all field experiments are specific to the context in which they are conducted, including this experiment. Since these experiments were conducted in partnership with a large membership organization and sought to answer a pragmatic as well as theoretical question, the experiments have a high degree of realism on Gerber and Green’s four criteria for “an ideal field experiment”: “(1) whether the treatment used in the study resembles the intervention of interest in the world, (2) whether the participants resemble the actors who ordinarily encounter these interventions, (3) whether the context within which subjects receive the treatment resembles the context of interest, and (4) whether the outcome measures resemble the actual outcomes of theoretical or practical interest” (Gerber & Green, 2011, Chapter 2). While the partner organization did selectively target within their overall membership, this selectivity reflects normal and typical practices by political elites (and specifically by our partner organization). The results may not be generalizable to all members of all organizations, but they represent the actual activity of mass membership organizations and thus provide valuable insights about my research question.

²³ Or more succinctly put, “There is no perfect or true experiment” (Morton and Williams 2006).

For the analyses, I excluded subjects who never picked up the phone or who hung up the phone within seconds of answering. This is in line with previous patch through experiments (i.e. Broockman 2014). The treatment was never administered to these subjects because they never heard the script and its subsequent variations. This meant that 4,487 subjects received the full treatment. There was an effort made by the vendor to ensure that targets were not patched through to a busy line at their legislator’s office. However, this is often times unavoidable as multiple operators are patching targets through to the same office. During this campaign, 4.6 percent of live answers were patched through to a busy signal (0.2 percent of the whole targeted universe). These targets were then reconnected with the operator and provided their legislator’s office phone number so they could call back at a later time. I included these cases as part of those that are considered “successful” patches. The justification is that because the target receiving the script was motivated to press one and contact their legislator, the treatment was deemed successful in generating a patch-through. The effect of the treatments is measured using the call disposition data provided by the vendor conducting the phone calls. I reported the change in average probability between the baseline and treatment groups based on these regression analyses. The following section covers the results overall as well as building on research from Broockman (2014). I examine the effects of legislator and member race on patch through rates to see if the trends he observed for constituents are replicated among union members.

Results

Overall

For each experimental condition, [Table 8](#) presents the mean rates of patch-throughs of union members to their legislators and displays the change in probability from the treatments in a model without additional covariates. [Table S10](#) in the supplemental materials section reports the

logit coefficients and the results of a model including the set of covariates in [Table 6](#) that are commonly associated with political participation. As expected from random assignment, the inclusion of the covariates does not alter the results.

As seen in Column 1 through Column 3 in Table 8, none of the treatment conditions significantly increases the rate of patch-throughs compared to the baseline script. In fact, contrary to previous research, the urgency script performs the worst among the four scripts. The patch through rate of those receiving the baseline script was 37.0 percent, while the patch through rate of those receiving the urgency script was only 35.4. However, the difference between the patch through rates is not statistically insignificant ($p=0.795$, two-tailed). In examining the differences between the identity and baseline script, the identity script increased the patch-through rate over the baseline script by .4 percentage points though that increase is also not statistically significant ($p=0.430$). Finally, in comparing the ease script to the baseline script we see that the baseline script outperforms the ease script but only by .3 percentage points and that difference is not statistically significant ($p=0.575$).

Columns 4 through Column 6 report the comparison between treatments to see if there are any differences between treatments. Column 4 reports the difference between the urgency and identity scripts. The mean patch-through rate of those who received the identity script was 37.4 percent and the mean patch-through rate of those who received the urgency script was 35.4 percent. The two percentage point difference between the two treatments is close to statistical significance ($p=0.161$, two-tailed). However, the additional comparisons do not yield anything of note, as the differences between the urgency and ease messages are both statistically and substantively insignificant. The same is true of the comparison between the identity and ease scripts, as the difference of those treatments is also not statistically or practically significant.

Results by Constituent and Legislator Race

Building on research conducted by Broockman (2014), I examine if there were any differences between the patch-through rates of white union members and union members of color to legislators of various races.²⁴ To accomplish this, I compare the average patch through rates to white legislators and legislators of color based²⁵ on the union member's race across all 16 targeted districts. For the voter's races, I utilized commercially available data from Catalist LLC²⁶ and coded the members' races as either white or other.²⁷

[Table 9](#) reports the mean patch-through rate of white union member and union members of color. Column 1 reports the mean rate of patch-throughs of white and union members of color to white legislators. The average patch-through rate of union members of color to white legislators was 36.8 percent while the patch-through rate of white union members to white legislators was 36.2 percent. The difference of the patch-through rates of the groups is .6 percentage points and is not statistically significant at conventional levels ($p=0.384$). Column 2 reports the mean patch-through rate of white union members and union members of color to legislators of color. The rate of patch-throughs to legislators of color by white union members was 33.4 percent while the rate of patch-throughs of union members of color to legislators of color was 38 percent. The difference in patch-through rate of 4.6 percentage points is

²⁴ I would have also presented results of analyses I on the differences in patch-through rates based by political party, however, there wasn't enough diversity within the sample to conduct co-party analysis. The targeted legislators were all Democrats and over 90 percent of the experimental sample were registered Democrats.

²⁵ I concede that this coding of a legislator's race is a rather blunt instrument. It was done utilizing information from legislator biographies, websites and other publicly available data. I am confident that the classification of legislator of color is appropriate given the data available.

²⁶ This data was included in the original file provided by my partner organization and was included as part of the random assignment to treatment.

²⁷ Admittedly, this is a blunt classification as Latino and African American voters and legislators will be grouped together but this was a way to have enough observations for analysis.

statistically significant at conventional levels ($p=0.060$)²⁸. While examining rates of legislator communication was not the primary research goal of this project, I observed at least some support of the hypothesis that a constituent's race impacts their likelihood to contact a legislator belonging to the same racial group. And although not statistically significant, it is worth noting that union members of color contacted their legislator at a higher rate, regardless of the legislator's race.

Beyond confirming the observational differences in patch-through rates of same race groups discovered in previous research, I also wanted to examine the effects of co-racial union members and legislators to determine if there was a difference across treatments (despite a lack of statistical power)²⁹. [Table 10](#) reports the difference in mean patch through rates of white union members to white legislators by assignment. Compared to the baseline script, only the identity script increased the patch-through rate of white union members to white legislators. This increase over the baseline rate of 37.2 percent was .6 percentage points but is not statistically significant ($p=0.429$). The baseline script outperformed both the urgency and ease scripts, by 1.2 and 3.5 percentage points, respectively. However, again neither of these differences are statistically significant. Columns 4, 5, and 6 report the mean patch through rates comparing the urgency versus identity script, the urgency versus ease script, and the identity versus ease script. The only comparison that remotely approaches statistical significance is Column 4 where the identity script out performs the urgency script by 1.7 percentage points ($p=0.284$).

²⁸ Additionally, I examined the difference in patch-through rates of white union members to white legislators (36.2 percent) and legislators of color (33.4 percent) but found that there was no statistically significant difference between the patch-through rates ($p=0.838$).

²⁹ There were approximately 1,000 observations included in the white union member and white legislator analysis while there were approximately 600 observations included in the union member and legislators of color analysis.

[Table 11](#) reports the difference in average patch-through rate of union members of color to legislators of color by assignment. As reported by column 1, 2, and 3, the baseline script outperformed the urgency, identity, and ease scripts. The baseline script patch-through rate was 38.4 percent while the patch-through rate for those receiving the urgency script was 37.7 points, the rate for those receiving the identity script was 37.5 percent, and the rate for those receiving the ease script was 38.3 percent. The differences between the baseline and other scripts are not statistically significant. As in the previous table, columns 4, 5, and 6 report the comparison between the various scripts. Similar to the rates of patch-through of white union members and white legislators, none of these comparisons are statistically significant. Sadly, this additional analysis to determine what kind of language leads to higher patch-through rates of co-racial groups was unfruitful, yet certainly worthy of further investigation.

Discussion

The results from this experiment indicate varying phone script language does not appear to generate higher rates of legislator contact via patch-through calls. Unlike prior research, varying patch-through script language, utilizing words that convey a sense of urgency did not increase the patch-through rate of those union members receiving the urgency treatment. Additionally, scripts including language around activist identity or language conveying the ease of contacting their legislator had no impact on the patch-through rates of the union members that received those treatments. These results are certainly disappointing as unions are consistently attempting to spur political action among their members. However, from a programmatic perspective, knowing that a baseline script performs at the same rate as other altered language is also helpful in making decisions about member communication.

There are a number of reasons that the varied patch-through scripts might have failed. For one, this was a very specific issue up for deliberation within the state assembly, so it is possible these union members were unaware of its existence. Therefore, stressing the urgency, their activist identity, or ease of the making their voice heard on the issue was not effective. Although each script attempted to provide some background on the issue, the scripts may have not cleared the first barrier to entry of knowledge on the issue. Even though the variations between scripts failed to yield significance, an almost 40 percent patch through rate did satisfy the organization, especially as the desired outcome around the legislative issue was achieved. However, given the limited amount of research on the optimization of patch-through calls, every field experiment offers an opportunity to expand the realm of research. As such, it is unlikely that every attempt will be successful.

In examining patch through rates based on union member and legislator race, I found that union members of color are more likely to communicate with legislators of color. This complements previous research on constituent communication and race. Union members of color were slightly more likely to communicate with their legislator regardless of race, although that slight difference in contact rate is not statistically significant. Given that people of color engage with their representatives at a much lower rate compared to their white counterparts, there may be some evidence that this communication by the labor union is spurring political action among groups that feel disenfranchised by the political process. This also complements previous research, which stipulates that membership to group, specifically labor unions, can lower the barriers to participation and broaden the pool of who is politically engaged. Unfortunately, a further investigation to determine if there were differences across script type did not reveal anything statistically significant. This is likely due to the analysis being underpowered, but

knowing what language spurs greater participation among these subgroups is worthy of additional research.

As with any field experiment, replication across various environments is necessary to insure the external validity of findings. In the realm of field experiments, there is still a lot to learn about communication optimization tailored toward political acts other than voting. Further testing should be conducted to determine what types of language increase constituent communication with their legislators. This future research should also examine modes of communication beyond just live phone calls. Additionally, more research marrying the role of mass organizations in member participation and advocacy experiments can help to answer the critical questions around who participates.

Chapter 4:

DON'T KNOCK LABOR UNIONS: EXAMINING OUTCOMES FROM TWO DOOR-TO-DOOR CANVASSING EXPERIMENTS

“Every additional vote you get out could be the difference between us winning and losing. And I gotta tell you, we are behind.”

-Richard Trumka, AFL-CIO President, November 2014

“As effective as high quality field campaigns are today, they’re likelier to get even better as the research improves. Successful turnout interventions also seem to have lasting impacts on individuals, leading them to become lifelong voters, as well as on their cohabitants. But to take advantage of these innovations, campaigns need to seriously increase their focus on field.”

-David Brookman and Joshua Kalla; *Vox Media*, November 2014

Introduction

Amid the unique characteristics of the United States is the prolific nature in which elections occur in a given calendar year. However, few voters cast their ballots in as many contests as they are able to, especially when their ballot lacks a presidential candidate (and subsequent fanfare). Over the last few cycles voter turnout in the United States has hovered around 60 percent of the voting eligible population during presidential election years while for decades turnout has only reached about 40 percent during midterm elections. More details on turnout among the voting eligible population from 1916 to 2016 are shown in Figure 1, from FairVote.Org.³⁰

³⁰ United States Elections Project (<http://www.electproject.org/>)

Figure 5: Historical Presidential and Midterm Voter Turnout Rates in the United States




Figure 5 not only outlines that overall turnout has decreased for both Presidential and midterm elections, but that midterm turnout does not remotely approach the levels of turnout observed in presidential years. Even further disheartening is the nosedive turnout takes in odd year primary and local elections where as little as one-fifth of the electorate votes (Morlan, 1984; Gerber and Nickerson, 2003). This is particularly concerning because local elections arguably contain more consequential offices and ballot measures that directly impact voter’s day-to-day lives. As a report from the Knight Foundation explains, “Local elections determine how neighborhoods look and feel, whether and how streets are kept clean and safe, how roads and transit work, what it’s like to have a job, start a business and have kids in the places we live” (The Knight Foundation, 2015). Hajnal and Troustine (2005) also note the importance of local contests:

While presidential and Congressional elections get much of our attention, they are only one element of American democracy. The vast majority of elected officials

emerge from local contests and more votes are cast in the multitude of local elections than in national contests. In short, it matters who wins and who loses in a political arena that touches regularly on the lives of residents. (p. 531)

Many of the socioeconomic and demographic factors contributing to a person's likelihood to vote in a presidential or statewide election also contributes to a person's likelihood to vote in a local election (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Even though the participation gap for local elections can be exacerbated in several ways. One of the contributing factors to the decline in local elections is media coverage. A 2014 study conducted by Danny Hayes and Jennifer Lawless found that a diminished news environment depresses citizen engagement. This is especially noteworthy given the cutbacks to local and state journalism, voters have less information on the candidates and ballot measures in a given election and are thus less likely to vote (Hayes & Lawless, 2014). Other factors noted in Portland State's research project *Who Votes for Mayor* noted that turnout varied dramatically among neighborhoods. Many residents live in voting "deserts," areas where turnout in their neighborhood is half (or less) than the citywide average (Portland State University, 2016). This means that a small portion of each city determines who represents everybody. The consequences of this are hard to understate.

One of the unfortunate outcomes of stymied turnout in local elections is that minority candidates and minority voters often times fail to win. Low levels of voter participation from African Americans, Latinos and Asian Americans leads to systematic underrepresentation on local governing bodies. Minority representation has consequences for both improving racial and ethnic relations and the distribution of public goods in cities. As explained by Hajnal and Troustine (2005): "There is a real possibility that minorities are losing out due to low voter

turnout. As more and more policies are both initiated and implemented at the local level and as the problems of many urban areas become more acute, the decisions that local voters make are taking on growing importance.” (p.531)

All of these factors contributing to the electoral environments of local elections are not lost on groups like labor unions who have a vested interest in the political mobilization of their members especially as it might relate to a specific elected office or ballot measure. State and local policies directly affect labor unions abilities to collectively bargain, so their attention to these races is paramount to their survival. Given that levels of turnout in these elections vacillate between one-fifth and one-half of the registered electorate (Green, Gerber and Nickerson, 2003), labor unions (as well as other political groups) often expend the time and resources to engage in door-to-door canvassing to increase turnout in local contests.

Labor unions spend quite a bit of their resources funding and staffing canvassing efforts. One of the many outcomes of the 2010 Supreme Court Case *Citizens United v. FEC* is that unions can canvass non-members as well as members. Prior to this Supreme Court decision, labor unions were restricted in how they could spend their money on election communication. Critically, it allowed labor unions to make independent expenditures from its general treasury without creating a political action committee (PAC). Now, unions can take member dues and spend them on materials in support of or opposition to a candidate for office with greater ease. In practice, this means they can knock on every door in a neighborhood, tripling or quadrupling the number of voters they reach. For example, in 2014, The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) pledged to knock on 3 million doors over the eight months leading up to Election Day (The Economist, 2014). In a time when labor unions find their power dwindling, contact by labor union members has been the key to winning critical electoral battles. While critical battles for

labor unions include crowded presidential elections, they also include mid-term elections, off year elections, and special elections. Oftentimes, these contests include fights at the bottom of the ballot where a measure or referendum may directly impact members of a labor union within that jurisdiction such as the adoption of right to work laws that greatly hinder a union's ability to organize their members. This paper outlines two experiments in Wisconsin during the April 1st, 2014, spring election. I aimed to measure the effectiveness of door-to-door canvassing efforts by a local labor union in Stoughton and Oshkosh School Districts. Treatment groups were contacted at home in the three weeks leading up to the election. Control groups were not contacted. Unlike previous experiments conducted in face-to-face contact, canvassers were not paid. They were volunteers working as part of a coalition who were invested in the success of a local initiative aimed at increasing funding for public schools. While not a direct comparison of paid versus volunteer canvassers, the findings of this research have strong programmatic implications for groups like labor unions, who have a vested interest in local election outcomes but not necessarily the monetary resources necessary for a paid field program.

This paper proceeds as follows: The following section describes previous research on face-to-face contact. The next section makes the case for volunteer versus paid canvassers and examines how volunteerism might generate better results than paid canvassers. The subsequent section discusses the design and implementation of the experiments. I then analyze the effectiveness of the GOTV outreach in each school district and then for the sample as a whole. The results show that face-to-face interaction significantly increased voter turnout in the spring municipal 2014 election. Additionally, these effects are similar in magnitude to other canvassing experiments (Gerber and Green, 2000b; Gerber, Green and Nickerson, 2003; Michelson 2003; Nickerson, 2006e). As groups like labor unions face a shortage of resources, this research

(though not conclusive) offers evidence that a cheaper, volunteer-based canvass may be a viable option going forward. Often, the most laborious process of a canvass operation is the recruitment of volunteers or paid canvassers. By being able to count on their membership to be viable communicators within their communities, labor unions may be able to drive mobilization in local elections where voter turnout is lacking.

The Potency of Face-to-Face Contact

Mobilizing an “army” of canvassers is not as easy as it used to be for labor unions, even though they are made of up members that are, on average, more politically aware than the typical voter. David Brookman and Joshua Kalla note, “Decades ago, a rich network of civic organizations – think churches, Elk Lodges, and labor unions could supply amply volunteers for field work. But, as the organizations’ memberships have flagged, professionally-managed, centralized, DC-based groups with weaker grassroots ties have tended to take their place” (Brookman and Kalla, 2014). However, when an organization can successfully generate volunteers, engage on a local level, and conduct face-to-face mobilization prior to an election they are frequently successful at mobilizing and persuading voters. The previous literature on canvassing almost universally indicates a positive impact on turnout or persuasion. This means that if an organization can clear the logistical hurdle to set up a canvass operation, it is usually worth their while.

As noted by Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009), the effectiveness of door-to-door mobilization is straightforward. Canvassers are better able to connect with voters in person as opposed to via phone or mail. This makes the social pressure to participate even more effective. Additionally, emphasizing a local connection to the target increases the likelihood of the communication being effective (McNulty, 2005). In addition to voting, in-person contact is more

effective in motivating behaviors like recycling and blood donation (Jason et al., 1984; Reams and Ray 1993; Cotterill et al., 2009).

Since the first face-to-face mobilization experiment conducted by Harold Gosnell in 1927, political organizations, civic groups, and membership organizations similar to labor unions developed a storied history of utilizing canvassing to mobilize and/or persuade targeted voters. There is ample evidence that this is a viable tactic (Green, Gerber and Nickerson, 2003; Bennion, 2005; Arceneaux, 2006; Middleton, 2006; Nickerson, 2006e). Additionally, there is evidence this tactic is effective among minorities (Michelson, 2005), students (Bennion, 2005), voters with lower predicted voter propensity scores (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009), and those sharing a household with a canvass target (Nickerson, 2006e). Further investigations into canvass effectiveness have focused on the timing of the contact and found the most effective timing is the two weeks prior to Election Day (Nickerson, 2006c). In research comparing six different door-to-door efforts, Gerber, Green and Nickerson (2003) found effect sizes ranging from 7.8 percentage points to 14.4 percentage points in various off-year local elections. Small non-partisan civic groups are not the only ones utilizing face-to face contact. In 2012, Obama Campaign Manager Jim Messina stressed the importance of “the Ground Game” as Obama for America set up 5,100 GOTV stations in battleground states. The campaign recruited 700,000 volunteers to knock on doors in the weeks before the 2012 election (Obama for America, 2012).

In 2004, MoveOn.org and Grassroots Campaigns Inc. utilized neighbor-to-neighbor canvassing in hopes of dramatically increasing turnout. They concluded that targeting households with canvassers from a matching geographic region can increase turnout (Middleton and Green, 2008). Moreover, Sinclair, et al. (2008) targeted low-income voters in Los Angeles and found that canvassers from the same zip code as the canvass targets increased turnout at a

greater level than canvassers who were from the surrounding areas. Canvass targets were randomly assigned canvassers who were either from their zip code or from an area outside of the region. Targets that were canvassed by those sharing a zip code turned out at a higher rate than those contacted by a canvasser from a surrounding area. Multiple studies focusing on Hispanic voters have found that Hispanic canvassers achieve higher contact rates when targeting Hispanics, in turn resulting in increased treatment effects (Michelson, 2005; 2006). In sum, a connection between the canvasser and the target helps increase the effectiveness of the outreach effort.

Research has also been conducted on the effectiveness of utilizing candidate canvasses during an election cycle. In 2004, Kevin Arceneaux partnered with a candidate for county commissioner in New Mexico during a primary election. Voters were assigned to be canvassed by either the candidate, a volunteer, or not at all. The candidate's canvass increased support by 42 percentage points among the voters they actually contacted (i.e. treatment-on-treated effects) while the paid canvasser increased support by only 18 percentage points. In 2010, economists at George Mason University partnered with a candidate in the 2010 general election. The candidate either personally canvassed households, left campaign literature, or did not contact a household. The canvass decreased total turnout, but among people who voted and who were successfully contacted, the canvass increased support by 21 percentage points. Although the literature did boost support by five percentage points, this was not statistically significant (Analyst Institute, 2014). In June of 2016, the Analyst Institute conducted a meta-analysis on the effects of persuasion canvasses. They collected results from several past persuasion canvassing experiments and divided the results into either statewide and federal elections or low salience elections (defined as a primary, special, state legislative, city council, or ballot initiative

election). For statewide persuasion canvasses the average intent-to-treat (ITT) effect was 0.2 percentage points and the average ITT effect for low salience elections was 2.1 percentage points (Analyst Institute , 2016). In sum, numerous studies show how canvassing can drive up voter turnout or voter support for a given candidate.

The Case for Volunteer Canvassers

Figure 3b in the appendix provides an overview of previous canvassing experiments and their effects on turnout. Previous research has overwhelmingly depended on paid canvassers to generate an effect on turnout. Although there are no direct comparisons of volunteer versus paid canvass effects, this research has been conducted with regard to professional versus volunteer campaign phone calls. Nickerson (2006) analyzed a series of eight volunteer phone campaigns to mobilize voters and found the phone calls increased turnout by 3.8 percentage points attributing the success of the phone calls to the chatty and informal nature of the calls. These results stood in contradiction to Gerber and Green (2000b; 2001), which found that professional calls had a null effect on turnout. In Nickerson's (2007) comparison of calls by paid callers and volunteers, calls with a conversational tone increase voter participation. Paid callers can be as effective when coached to be conversational, and conversely the effectiveness of volunteers disappears when they are encouraged to be mechanical or overly hasty. Ha and Karlan (2009) validated the effect of using a conversational style call by varying the number of questions asked of the respondents using calls made by a commercial phone bank. Given that the successful elements of volunteer communication are the ability to connect with the recipient of the communication, volunteer canvassers should experience similar success at increasing turnout.

Another element of volunteer success lies in the intrinsic motivation or belief in the cause he or she is volunteering for. While a paid canvasser may be motivated solely (or primarily) by

financial gain a volunteer can be motivated by a multitude of elements. Clary et al. (1998) highlight six main functions served by volunteering: values (expressing or acting on important values), understanding (seeking to learn more about the world or exercise skills that are often unused), enhancement (growing and developing psychologically through volunteer activities), career (gaining career-related experiences through volunteering), social (allows the individual to strengthen his or her social relationships), and protective (volunteering reduces negative feelings). For volunteers, these motivations generate the successful types of authentic conversations leading to an increase in voter turnout.

Hypotheses

The experiments I reported on were designed to evaluate the effectiveness of a labor union's efforts to mobilize voters in a local election. Given the abundance of research pointing to the effective increase in voter turnout due to face-to-face contact, I expected to observe changes in voting rates based on assignment to either the treatment or control group in both experiments. My hypothesis is based on prior canvassing experiments:

H1: Voters who receive face-to-face contact prior to the election will have higher rates of turnout than those in the control group for each experiment.

Additionally, although I do not have a direct comparison, I expected to observe effect sizes in line with previous canvassing experiments that utilized paid canvassers. Based on the literature on volunteer actions and motivations I expected:

H2: The higher rates of voter turnout for the treatment groups in each experiment will be similar in effect size as other previous canvassing experiments which utilized paid canvassers.

Research Design

Canvasser Description

The canvassers in this experiment were from the communities in which they were canvassing. A vast majority of the canvassing volunteers were also members of the local labor union spearheading the campaign in favor of the public-school funding referendum on the ballot. Given the conclusions of previous research about the make-up of canvassers and the advantages of volunteer contact, my partner organization wanted to ensure each canvasser did not have to manufacture a local connection, but could speak with voters with a genuine, local perspective. Because previous research on canvassing indicated this approach would be successful, there is an expectation that even though these canvassers were not paid, their efforts would be effective at increasing turnout. From a practical perspective, paid canvasses often cost groups an average of 20 dollars per vote (Gerber and Green, 2008). My partner organization did not have the funding to conduct a paid canvass. This is not an uncommon problem as organizations often opt for less personal (and less expensive) communication such as mail or phone calls. However, the successful results of this experiment are particularly encouraging for smaller community groups and unions whose budgets may not allow for paid face-to-face contact.

The training the volunteers received encouraged chatty and personal conversations with people at their doors. Instead of the chatty or personal conversations being imposed upon paid canvassers and having to be trained to have these types of conversations, these volunteers were able to access that ability without consciously activating it so their communication was perceived genuinely. The unpaid volunteer advantage is natural communication. This is starkly different from paid volunteers who must be trained to engage naturally.

Experimental Design

In March of 2014, a local union (in cooperation with a broader community coalition) spearheaded two canvass experiments in Stoughton and Oshkosh, Wisconsin to mobilize voters in the spring election. The ballot included a school operating referendum granting public schools the option to spend more money. Canvassers were unpaid volunteers with strong ties to the community (a majority of who were union members). They received a basic script and training prior to working their shift. Canvasses occurred from March 20th to April 1st.

The election in question was a local, city wide election including school district-specific referenda. In addition to the referendum in question, races on the ballot included County Supervisor, City Council, School Board and Court of Appeals. Spring elections occur often in Winnebago and Dane counties (where Oshkosh and Stoughton School Districts are located).

Targets were randomly assigned to either receive a door-to-door canvass, or were placed in the control group. Treatment groups received two postcards about the referendum. Data was randomized at the household level, so that individuals in the same household were assigned to the same condition. In each experiment, 60 percent of the sample was assigned to the treatment group and 40 percent to the control group. This split was based on a discussion with the partner organization on how much of the population they felt comfortable assigning to the control group as well as how many doors they felt confident they could contact within the allotted timeframe. Summary tables regarding the balance across groups can be found in the appendix.

In Stoughton, 2974 cases were randomly assigned to either the treatment or control group. 12,424 households in Oshkosh were randomly assigned to either a treatment group or control group.³¹ The treatment was a brief script identifying the partner organization and

³¹ The difference in universe size in the two cities is due to the difference in population size as well as the number of targeted voters in each city.

reminding the voter that there would be an election on April 1st. The treatment script also mentioned to the target that there was a school referendum on the ballot. The treatments were intentionally concise to allow the canvasser to guide a free-flowing conversation. The full script for the treatments can be found in the [appendix](#).

Post-election, a commercial voter file vendor obtained the voter turnout records for Stoughton and Oshkosh cities. It should be noted that this paper does not rely on self-report vote history, but instead utilizes official vote record to determine the experiments' effectiveness as opposed to self-reported voting behavior.

As noted above, in both experiments, randomization was done at the household level. There were a total of 15,388 households (15,399 individuals).³² [Tables 12](#), [13](#), and [14](#) show the quantities assigned to each condition. The random assignment was well balanced for observable covariates about age, gender, race, and past voting in the previous three general elections.

Results

Intent-to-Treat Effects

Randomized experiments provide an unbiased estimate of the effectiveness of being assigned to a treatment.³³ Furthermore, there is a key obstacle that arises in field experiments. Some voters randomly assigned to the treatment group cannot be reached. In the case of canvass experiments, targets in households assigned to the treatment group may not be home when a canvasser knocks, may not come to the door, etc. Therefore, it becomes important to distinguish

³² My partner organization provided the targeting criteria for the canvass targets, which included an initial screen for multi-person households. Data was delivered to me for randomization that included 11 multi-person households. Given the small number of multi-person households, they were excluded from analysis.

³³ Anderson-Cook, Christine M. "Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 100, no. 470 (2005): 708-708.

between intent-to-treat (ITT) effects and the effects on those actually contacted. ITT analysis includes every subject who is randomized according to randomized treatment assignment (ignoring noncompliance, deviation, withdrawal, or anything that happens after randomization). Treatment-on-treated (TOT) analysis is limited to those who actually received the treatment. In the case of these experiments, the TOT analysis is limited to those who were successfully canvassed. The canvasser at the door marked a successful canvass electronically. The interaction data was matched back to the original randomized list in order to conduct this analysis.

[Table 15](#) provides results on the intent-to-treat effect and the treatment on treated effects. The intent-to-treat effects of face-to-face contact are calculated by examining the mean voting rate of control and treatment groups while controlling other factors impacting turnout (i.e., age, race, vote history, etc.).³⁴ Column A in Table 3 presents the difference in turnout between the control and treatment groups in each city. In both Stoughton and Oshkosh, the treatment group turned out at a higher rate than the control group. In Stoughton, the turnout rate of the control group was 43.5 percent, while the turnout of the treatment group was 46.2 percent. The increase between the control and treatment group was 2.7 percentage points and is statistically significant ($p=0.086$; one-tailed). In Oshkosh, the turnout rate of the control group was 44.3 percent and the turnout of the treatment group was 46.5 percent. The increase between the control and treatment group was 2.2 percentage points and is statistically significant ($p=0.017$; one-tailed). Taking both experiments into account, face-to-face contact has an intent-to-treat effect of 2.3 percentage points. The combined turnout of the control groups is 44.2 percent and the turnout of the treatment group is 46.4 percent. This difference between groups is statistically significant at conventional levels ($p=0.006$; one-tailed), and is consistent with previous canvassing experiment

³⁴[Table 16](#) in the appendix reports the full output of the OLS intent to treat estimates.

results. Academics and practitioners alike utilize these intent-to-treat estimates to determine the effectiveness of GOTV on aggregate levels of turnout. The results I have reported fall within the range of effect sizes presented in previous work (see Gerber and Green, 2000b; Gerber, Green and Nickerson, 2003; Michelson 2003; Nickerson 2006e).

Effect of Canvass Contact

As Nickerson et al. (2005) point out, “The chief advantage of field experiments is that inquiry takes place under real-world conditions, thereby ameliorating concerns about external validity. The downside to the real-world setting is that political [groups] cannot feasibly contact every targeted voter” (p. 6). Estimating the mobilizing effect of the canvassing among those in the treatment group requires an additional step to account for the fact that many voters in the treatment were never contacted. Instances where canvassers found no one home, incorrect addresses, non-locatable addresses, or where the target dismissed them, all contribute to a diminished rate of actual contact within the treatment groups.³⁵ Column B in Table 15 shows the rate at which those in the treatment group actually received the treatment. In Stoughton, just fewer than one in three targets was actually canvassed. In Oshkosh, the number dwindled to one in ten. While these numbers may seem low (especially compared to contact rates of other campaign communication modes), they fall in line with previous canvassing experiments. Gerber, Green and Nickerson (2003) witnessed an average contact rate across six sites just below thirty percent (with the lowest rate being near 14 percent). Additionally, Nickerson, Friedrichs and King (2005) witness a contact rate of just eight percent.

³⁵ It is worth noting that temperatures at the canvassing sites during the time of the canvass were at or below freezing: an average minimum temperature of 23 degrees Fahrenheit. This led to canvassers failing to show up for shifts or cutting shifts short on account of the weather.

Column C reports the effects of being successfully contacted.³⁶ The impact of successful contacts in the city of Stoughton is 8.5 percentage points ($p=0.085$). In Oshkosh, the impact of a target being successfully canvassed is 21.7 percentage points ($p=0.016$). Overall, I found an average treatment effect of 17.0 percentage points. This estimate is statistically significant at the .01 level using a one-tailed test. [Table 17](#) reports the full output of the two-stage least squares estimates of the effect of actual contact.

For the local labor union I partnered with, the most rewarding finding was that both referenda passed. In Oshkosh, the measure passed with 59.4 percent of the vote. In Stoughton, it passed with 63 percent of the vote. The results above reiterate that face-to-face contact is a viable mobilization tactic in GOTV efforts. These results are similar to those found by similar studies examining GOTV canvassing efforts across various elections and in multiple states. While campaigns look to expand the ways in which they communicate with voters (phone, text, advertisements via social networking websites, etc.) my findings (and that of previous research) indicate that the best method remains face-to-face contact.

Discussion and Conclusion

In 1999, Gerber and Green noted,

If voting is primarily a matter of individuals' enduring propensities to vote, little can be done about declining turnout rates short of changing the ways in which children are raised by their parents or socialized in schools. On the other hand,

³⁶ The estimator in Column C is the equivalent of performing a two-stage least squares regression of vote on actual contact using randomization as the instrumental variable. For other examples see: Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996, Gerber, Green and Nickerson 2003, Nickerson 2005.

those who stress environmental factors propose to ease registration requirements or reinvigorate parties and other mobilizing organizations. (p. 10941)

Essentially, if agents of mobilization (for example civic groups, political parties, or labor unions) are to blame for lagging turnout, they can also be part of the solution (as evidenced by the results of this research). Particularly in non-presidential years, when voters report levels of contact that are a fourth of what they are during presidential election years (Goldstein, 2002).

The results presented in this paper echo the results of previous research findings that canvassing mobilization campaigns have the ability to increase turnout in local elections. In addition, this research builds on previous canvassing experiments because it examined the use of volunteer canvassers, as opposed to paid canvassed efforts. Although it is often the most taxing type of campaign communication, face-to-face contact remains one of the most effective ways of increasing turnout in a given election. Overall, each successful canvass with a registered voter increases the voter's probability of voting by 17 percentage points, which is impressive considering the average level of turnout in municipal elections hovers around 25 percent (Alford and Lee, 1968; Morlan, 1984; Bridges, 1997). While voter turnout may fall during these contests, their ballots arguably have a greater chance of affecting the outcome of the election. In this same vein, the contact made during these elections may be more meaningful, as there is less of it overall. GOTV efforts ironically tend to be low in local elections, compared to statewide or national contests, further compounding the disparities between voters and non-voters. This research shows that volunteer canvassers in a local GOTV effort had a striking impact on voter participation.

The results of this experiment also have implications for how labor unions and other political or civic organizations utilize their members and volunteers for campaign

communication. In this case, utilizing volunteer canvassers saved the group thousands of dollars in paid communication and produced results greater than those produced in previous research with paid canvassers.

As with any field experiment in a given election, this research should be replicated across election types and locations to ensure external validity. However, the results make a compelling argument that if there is a volunteer base from which to draw, volunteer canvassers may be just as effective as paid canvass efforts. An admitted shortcoming of this research is the lack of direct comparison of volunteer versus paid canvasses and future research should investigate this comparison as has been done with volunteer versus paid phone calls (Nickerson, 2007).

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

Dissertation Summary

This dissertation offers evidence from three different field experiments (conducted in cooperation with a labor union) that mass membership organizations can drive the political actions of their members but with varying levels of success. Academics and practitioners alike have long maintained that mass membership organizations, such as labor unions, play a critical role in the participation levels of their members in the realms of voting, political participation, issue advocacy, and other political activity. However, this research indicates that despite recent hurdles, labor unions are a critical element in the civic participation of their members.

In Chapter two, I expanded on previous work within the GOTV field experiment literature by testing two long-standing practices: social pressure and plan making. In a first of its kind experiment, I compare these tactics in encouraging union members either to vote early in-person or to return their mail ballot across two experiments in Arizona and Florida. I found that both social pressure and plan making statistically increased turnout in both experiments; however, the differences between the treatments were indistinguishable from zero. In examining treatment effects by previous method of voting, I found some evidence that plan making may not be effective with voters who have a history of voting prior to Election Day in previous elections. These results are encouraging for labor unions on several fronts: 1) Labor unions can successfully increase the overall turnout of their members; 2) This increase can occur in states (such as Arizona and Florida) where union density is not very high; and 3) As states increase the opportunities to cast one's ballot prior to Election Day, labor unions can utilize these reforms to mobilize more of their members.

Chapter three offered a lens into how labor unions optimize advocacy programs to spur greater action by their members. In building on previous advocacy experiments, I examined four different script types to see if any generated greater rates of patch-throughs to state legislator offices. Unfortunately, I did not find any differences in patch-through rates across conditions. However, in examining subgroup analysis, I did discover that union members of color were more likely to patch through to legislators of color compared to their white union counterparts. This finding is supported by previous literature, indicating people are more likely to patch-through to their representative's office as they share the same racial or partisan identity. As labor unions find themselves with an increasingly diverse workforce, mobilizing union members of color will be critical for survival. Additionally, the fact that they appeared to participate at a higher rate than their white counterparts can be an incredible tool for labor unions within the world of legislative advocacy.

The final field experiment in chapter four examines the effectiveness of a volunteer canvass operation in a local election. In the three weeks leading up to Election Day, the treatment group received one face-to-face contact from a community membership organization encouraging them to vote in the spring election. Post-election turnout records determined that the canvass successfully stimulated turnout among those who received a face-to-face contact from the volunteer canvassers. Additionally, this effect was equal to or greater than similar canvass operations conducted by paid canvassers. While this chapter lacks a direct comparison, the initial findings indicate that smaller organizations or labor unions may be able to rely on volunteer canvassers and that their efforts will be impactful.

Each chapter offers a view into a particular mobilization effort conducted by different labor unions. In line with previous field experiments conducted on voter mobilization, the

greatest impact on voter turnout was achieved by face-to-face contact. While each of these experiments is limited in its generalizability, the opportunity to directly collaborate with a labor union and optimize their political mobilization programs cannot be understated. Much of the existing literature on mass membership organizations focuses specifically on labor unions. This research certainly lacks the perfection that can be achieved in a laboratory type setting, but field experiments incorporating real life campaign elements are often hard to logistically accomplish, making the contributions of this work unique and impactful.

The success or failure of labor unions to optimize tactics to mobilize their members and supporters has consequences affecting a much larger coalition of people. While each of my chapters focuses on a specific field experiment, the collective goal of these interventions is to offer tactics for labor unions to increase their political power in the United States. This is cyclical process: As more members are mobilized to take political action, there's a greater chance of electing pro-union candidates. In turn, these legislators are more likely to pass labor friendly policies like protecting collective bargaining, overturning right to work laws, or protecting public pensions, which greatly increases the ability of labor unions to organize. The easier it is for a labor union to organize their members, the greater the power of the union, the easier it becomes to mobilize union members and the community around them. Each of these experiments is a step toward ensuring the next revolution of that cycle.

Future Research

Given the nature of field experimental work, all of the research presented here would have to be bolstered by additional experiments. This is not as straightforward as collecting additional observational data. However, provided there was an opportunity, there are a number of ways I would like to expand the research on mass membership organizations and political

mobilization. First and foremost, I think replicating a similar legislative advocacy experiment to the one I conducted in chapter three by increasing the size of the targeted universe may generate better results. The racial subgroup analysis proved very promising. However, increasing the overall size of the universe or the length in the campaign might have allowed for the detection of differences across scripts within the subgroups. Additionally, including more targeted legislators of different races would allow for more precise subgroup analysis on patch-through rates by race. This would provide even further strategic guidance for labor unions in not only determining which script would generate the greatest rate of legislative advocacy among their members, but also if different scripts performed better among different subgroups of their membership.

I would like to expand on chapter four regarding the research on volunteer canvassing operations. Specifically, utilizing a field experiment to directly measure the impact of volunteer versus paid canvassers on voter turnout or persuasion on a candidate or issue. While chapter three offers evidence that volunteer canvassers can be just as effective in increasing voter turnout as paid canvassers, an additional experiment including a direct comparison would better answer this question. As labor unions weight the monetary cost of communication to their members in the face of shrinking margins, knowing the volunteer communication may be just as potent as paid, face-to-face communication is a critical insight for future resource allocation.

Labor unions have many unique opportunities to not only increase the political activity of their members but also those in their immediate networks. Several pieces of research demonstrate that networks can structure participation (e.g., Bond et al., 2012; Nickerson, 2008; Mann and Klofstad, 2012) and shape preferences (e.g., Sinclair et al., 2012). Two networks union members consistently interact with are those with who they share a household and those they interact with while at work. Previous work on those sharing a household with a union

member indicated union household turnout at higher rates than non-union households. In an experiment conducted in cooperation with a labor union, The Analyst Institute discovered that letters sent to the union member encouraging them to talk to the householder on which candidate to support was more effective than letters directly addressed to the householder from the union. This indicates that discussions among those sharing a household with a union member may be a point of leverage for labor unions to increase turnout or persuasion of non-members (The Analyst Institute, 2014). Another promising avenue of research for labor unions is how they can leverage worksites to persuade or increase turnout of their members. A previous field experiment found evidence of the social transmission of information within the worksite. The experiment found that respondents sharing a workplace with those who were invited to a town hall forum (the treated) were more likely to report hearing about the ballot measure, and to cite the treatment communication as a source through which they heard about it (Mann et al., 2014). Pushing this research forward to include efforts to drive turnout or union membership via the work place could prove incredibly powerful for labor unions.

Appendices and Supplemental Materials

M 1: EIPV Treatment Mail Pieces

<fullname>
<mailaddressline1>
<mailaddresscity>, <mailaddressstate> <mailaddresszip>-<mailaddresszip4>

August 10, 2014

Dear <firstname>,

We want to thank you for <recent_1>.

Voting takes time and trouble, and the fact that you <recent_2> is important. Official public records from the <state_election_office> show that you <recent_3>. We want to thank you. We hope that you will continue your record of exercising your civic duty by voting in the important election on Tuesday, August 26th.

Early voting is easy and convenient. Voting early is just like voting on Election Day, but you choose when and where you vote, and you will have plenty of time to fill out your ballot. Thousands of members like you will be voting early. We encourage you to join them.

You can vote at any early voting location in <countyname> County. Early voting is open from <day_1> to <day_2>. You can find information about voting locations and hours, including any last minute changes, at <url>. The early voting locations and hours of operation for <countyname> County are below.

Make a plan now to vote early:

- 1) Decide where to vote early using the list of locations below.
- 2) Decide when to vote early using the days and hours listed below.
- 3) Take a moment to plan how you will get to your polling place.

Thank you in advance for voting in this important election. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting and making our democracy work.

Sincerely,

PS - Thank you for voting in the August 26th primary election.

Early Voting Dates & Hours:
July 31ST-August 22ND: Mon-Fri 8AM-5PM

ARIZONA SUPERIOR COURT 115 North Church Ave., Tucson, 85701	PIMA COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 6920 E Broadway Blvd., Tucson, 85710
PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT 6401 S Tucson Blvd., Tucson, 85706	

<fullname>
<mailaddressline1>
<mailaddresscity>, <mailaddressstate> <mailaddresszip>-<mailaddresszip4>

August 10, 2014

Dear <firstname>,

We want to thank you for <recent_1>.

Voting takes time and trouble, and the fact that you <recent_2> is important. Official public records from the <state_election_office> show that you <recent_3>. We want to thank you. We hope that you will continue your record of exercising your civic duty by voting in the important election on Tuesday, August 26th.

Early voting is easy and convenient. Voting early is just like voting on Election Day, but you choose when and where you vote, and you will have plenty of time to fill out your ballot. Thousands of members like you will be voting early. We encourage you to join them.

You can vote at any early voting location in <countyname> County. Early voting is open from <day_1> to <day_2>. You can find information about voting locations and hours, including any last minute changes, at <url>. The early voting locations and hours of operation for <countyname> County are below.

A summary of your recent voting record from the <state_election_office> is below. We hope you will add voting in the August 26th primary election.

Voting Record for:
<FullName>
2006 General Election: <voted06>
2008 General Election: <voted08>
2010 General Election: <voted10>
2012 General Election: <voted12>

Thank you in advance for voting in this important election. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting and making our democracy work.

Sincerely,

PS - Thank you for voting in the August 26th primary election.

Early Voting Dates & Hours:
7/31-8/22/ Mon-Fri 8AM-5PM

ARIZONA SUPERIOR COURT 115 North Church Ave, Tucson, 85701	PIMA COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 6920 E Broadway Blvd, Tucson, 85710
PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT 6401 S Tucson Blvd, Tucson, 85706	

M 2: VBM Treatment Mail Pieces

<fullname>
<mailaddrline1>
<mailaddrcity>, <mailaddrstate> <mailaddrzip>-<mailaddrzip4>

August 10, 2014

Dear <firstname>,

We want to thank you for <recent_1>.

Voting takes time and trouble, and the fact that you < _____ recent_2 _____ > is important. Official public records from the < ___ state_election_office ___ > show that you < _____ recent_3 _____ >. We want to thank you.

We hope that you will continue your record of exercising your civic duty by voting in the important election on Tuesday, August 26th.

Voting by mail is easy and convenient. You choose when and where you vote, and you will have plenty of time to fill out your ballot. Thousands of members like you will vote by mail in this election. We encourage you to join them.

You should have received your mail ballot from the < _____ county_office _____ > for the August 26th primary election. If your ballot did not arrive in the mail, or if you need a new ballot because you had problems filling it out, please call the < _____ county_office _____ > at < county_phone > to request a replacement ballot.

Your ballot must arrive in the Clerk's Office by August 26th. Mail it early enough or drop it off at a location set up by the < _____ county_office _____ >. For locations and hours to drop off your ballot, go to < _____ url _____ >.

Make a plan now to send in your mail ballot:

- 1) Decide when to fill out your ballot at home.
- 2) Decide when to return your ballot.
- 3) Take a moment to plan where you will put your ballot in a mailbox or ballot dropbox.

Remember to sign the return envelope before returning your ballot.

Thank you in advance for voting in this important election. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting and making our democracy work.

Sincerely,
[Redacted]

PS - Thank you for voting in the August 26th primary election.

<fullname>
<mailaddrline1>
<mailaddrcity>, <mailaddrstate> <mailaddrzip>-<mailaddrzip4>

August 10, 2014

Dear <firstname>,

We want to thank you for <recent_1>.

Voting takes time and trouble, and the fact that you < _____ recent_2 _____ > is important. Official public records from the < ___ state_election_office ___ > show that you < _____ recent_3 _____ >. We want to thank you. We hope that you will continue your record of exercising your civic duty by voting in the important election on Tuesday, August 26th.

Voting by mail is easy and convenient. You choose when and where you vote, and you will have plenty of time to fill out your ballot. Thousands of members like you will vote by mail in this election. We encourage you to join them.

You should have received your mail ballot from the < _____ county_office _____ > for the August 26th primary election. If your ballot did not arrive in the mail, or if you need a new ballot because you had problems filling it out, please call the < _____ county_office _____ > at < county_phone > to request a replacement ballot.

Your ballot must arrive in the Clerk's Office by August 26th. Mail it early enough or drop it off at a location set up by the < _____ county_office _____ >. For locations and hours to drop off your ballot, go to < _____ url _____ >.

A summary of your recent voting record from the < ___ state_election_office ___ > is below. We hope you will add voting in the August 26th primary election.

Voting Record for:
<FullName>
2006 General Election: <voted06>
2008 General Election: <voted08>
2010 General Election: <voted10>
2012 General Election: <voted12>

Remember to sign the return envelope before returning your ballot.

Thank you in advance for voting in this important election. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting and making our democracy work.

Sincerely,
[Redacted]

PS - Thank you for voting in the August 26th primary election.

M 3: Vote History Treatment Phone Scripts

'Vote History' Treatment – EIPV

Hi, this is _____ from _____. May I please speak to _____?

Hi, _____. I'm calling to thank you for being a good voter in the past and ask you to vote in the primary election will be held on August 26th. You should have received a letter summarizing your recent voting activity. Voting takes time and energy, and we want to thank you for doing your part. We hope that you will continue your record of exercising your civic duty by voting in the important election on Tuesday, August 26th.

You can vote at any early voting location in <countyname> County. Early Voting is open from <day_1> to <day_2>. You can find information about voting locations and hours, including any last minute changes at <url> or by calling the <county_office> at <county_phone>.

Thank you in advance for voting. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting and making our democracy work.

‘Vote History Treatment - Absentee

Hi, this is _____ from _____. May I please speak to _____?

Hi, _____. I’m calling to thank you for being a good voter in the past and ask you to vote in the primary election will be held on August 26th. You should have received a letter summarizing your recent voting activity. Voting takes time and energy, and we want to thank you. We hope that you will continue your record of exercising your civic duty by voting in the important election on Tuesday, August 26th.

You should have received your ballot from the <county_office> for the August 26th primary election. If your ballot did not arrive in the mail, or if you need a new ballot, please call the <county_office> at <county_phone> to request a replacement ballot. Your ballot must arrive in the Clerk’s Office by August 26th. Mail it early enough or drop it off at a location set up by the <county_office>. For locations and hours to drop of your ballot go to <url>.

Thank you in advance for voting. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting and making our democracy work.

M 4: Make a Plan Phone Scripts

'Make a Plan' – EIPV

Hi, this is _____ from _____. May I please speak to _____?

Hi, _____. As you know, the primary election will be held on August 26th. You should have received a letter listing the early voting locations available in <countyname> County. Early Voting is open from <day_1> to <day_2>. You can find information about voting locations and hours, online or by calling the <county_office>.

- Have you planned what time and day you think you'll be voting?
 - *(prompt if needed: you can vote early in the morning, before work, at lunch time, in the afternoon, in the evening.)*
 - *prompt if needed: You can look at the mailing we sent or I can give you the website or the phone number for the county election office where you can detailed information on where to vote and when they are open. <URL> and <countyphone>*

- At which of the early voting locations do you plan on voting?
 - *prompt if needed: You can look at the mailing we sent or I can give you the website or the phone number for the county election office where you can detailed information on where to vote and when they are open. <URL> and <countyphone>*

Thank you in advance for voting. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting and making our democracy work.

‘Make a Plan’ – Absentee

Hi, this is _____ from _____. May I please speak to _____?

Hi, _____. As you know, the primary election will be held on August 26th. You should have received your ballot from the <county_office> for the August 26th primary election. If your ballot did not arrive in the mail, or if you need a new ballot, please call the <county_office> at <county_phone> to request a replacement ballot. Your ballot must arrive in the Clerk’s Office by August 26th. Mail it early enough or drop it off at a location set up by the <county_office>. For locations and hours to drop of your ballot go to <url>.

- When do you think you’ll fill out and return your ballot? (*prompt if needed: today, tomorrow, in the next few days, right before Election Day*)

- Are you sending your ballot back in the mail or do you plan to drop it off?

Thank you in advance for voting. We look forward to thanking you after the election for voting and making our democracy work.

Table 1: Balance Check: Mean Values of Observable Covariates within EIPV Experiment

	Control	Vote history	Plan Making	Total
Age	48.04	48.10	47.98	48.04
# Voters in Household	1.067	1.068	1.069	1.068
Hispanic [^]	0.124	0.119	0.120	0.121
African American [^]	0.234	0.232	0.227	0.231
Female	0.796	0.789	0.797	0.794
Voted in 2006 General Election	0.538	0.537	0.539	0.538
Voted in 2008 General Election	0.872	0.868	0.869	0.870
Voted in 2010 General Election	0.653	0.654	0.654	0.654
Voted in 2012 General Election	0.895	0.893	0.891	0.893
Voted in 2006 Primary Election	0.173	0.171	0.172	0.172
Voted in 2008 Primary Election	0.151	0.149	0.152	0.151
Voted in 2010 Primary Election	0.147	0.147	0.150	0.148
Voted in 2012 Primary Election	0.130	0.128	0.127	0.128
Observations	14,031	14,060	14,040	42,131

mean coefficients; *t* statistics in parentheses

Notes: [^]Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models.

Table 2: Balance Check: Mean Values of Observable Covariates within Random Assignment Groups in VBM Experiment

	Control	Thank You	Plan Making	Total
Age	49.99	49.69	50.16	49.95
# Voters in Household	1.066	1.065	1.077	1.070
Hispanic [^]	0.124	0.119	0.124	0.122
African American [^]	0.116	0.112	0.122	0.117
Female	0.799	0.808	0.796	0.801
Voted in 2006 General Election	0.599	0.600	0.587	0.595
Voted in 2008 General Election	0.895	0.890	0.889	0.892
Voted in 2010 General Election	0.707	0.711	0.709	0.709
Voted in 2012 General Election	0.945	0.947	0.943	0.945
Voted in 2006 Primary Election	0.192	0.193	0.182	0.189
Voted in 2008 Primary Election	0.240	0.239	0.244	0.241
Voted in 2010 Primary Election	0.205	0.206	0.208	0.206
Voted in 2012 Primary Election	0.196	0.198	0.202	0.199
Observations	4,018	3,998	4,031	12,047

mean coefficients; *t* statistics in parentheses

Notes: [^]Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models

Table 3: Difference in Mean Overall Turnout and by Voting Method

	(1) Vote history vs. Control		(2) Plan Making vs. Control		(3) Vote history vs. Plan Making	
	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u
Overall Turnout	0.010**	0.003	0.011**	0.001	-0.001	0.389
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
	0.149		0.150		0.149	
	0.139		0.139		0.150	
Election Day Voting	-0.001	0.303	0.000	0.334	-0.001	0.172
	(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)	
	0.040		0.041		0.040	
	0.041		0.041		0.041	
Pre-Election Day Voting (either VMB or EIPV)	0.011***	<0.001	0.010***	<0.001	-0.001	0.339
	(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.002)	
	0.110		0.109		0.110	
	0.099		0.099		0.109	
Observations	54178		54178		54178	

p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test
 Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Control
 * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4: Difference in Mean Turnout and Voting Method in 2014 Primary Election - EIPV Mobilization

	(1) Vote history vs. Control		(2) Plan Making vs. Control		(3) Vote history vs. Plan Making	
	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u
Overall Turnout	0.005 (0.003)	0.072	0.009* (0.003)	0.006	-0.004 (0.004)	0.847
	0.096		0.099		0.096	
	0.091		0.091		0.099	
Election Day Voting	-0.001 (0.003)	0.626	0.002 (0.003)	0.206	-0.003 (0.003)	0.873
	0.047		0.050		0.047	
	0.048		0.048		0.050	
Pre-Election Day Voting (either VMB or EIPV)	0.006* (0.002)	0.009	0.007** (0.003)	0.004	-0.001 (0.003)	0.608
	0.049		0.050		0.049	
	0.043		0.043		0.050	
Observations	28091		28071		28100	

p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test

Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Control

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5: Difference in Mean Turnout and Voting Method in 2014 Primary Election - VBM Mobilization

	(1) Vote history vs. Control		(2) Plan Making vs. Control		(3) Vote history vs. Plan Making	
	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u
Overall Turnout	0.030** (0.010)	0.002	0.020* (0.010)	0.027	0.010 (0.011)	0.178
	0.341		0.331		0.341	
	0.311		0.311		0.331	
	(1) Vote history vs. Control		(2) Plan Making vs. Control		(3) Vote history vs. Plan Making	
	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u
Election Day Voting	-0.002 (0.003)	0.778	-0.003 (0.003)	0.881	0.001 (0.003)	0.339
	0.015		0.014		0.015	
	0.017		0.017		0.014	
	(1) Vote history vs. Control		(2) Plan Making vs. Control		(3) Vote history vs. Plan Making	
	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u
Pre-Election Day Voting (either VMB or EIPV)	0.032** (0.010)	0.001	0.023* (0.010)	0.011	0.009 (0.010)	0.204
	0.326		0.317		0.326	
	0.294		0.294		0.317	
Observations	8016		8049		8029	

p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test

Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Control

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

M 5: Patch Through Scripts

Baseline Script:

Hi, this is _____ from the [ORGANIZATION NAME]. [ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN] [TARGET] needs to hear from us that we oppose the Governor's Education Tax Credit. The tax credit will divert \$150 million away from public schools in order to fund private schools; public schools serve all children in our communities – not a selective few. New York state public schools are still owed approximately \$5 billion dollars. Representatives need to hear that New York public schools should be the priority.

Make your voice heard, we'll connect you to [ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN] [TARGET]'s office and you can tell them that as a constituent you want them to stand against the Governor's Education Tax proposal.

Can we connect you to Representative [TARGET]'s office?

Q1 01 IF YES: Great! We'll connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]'s office.

Tell them that you're a constituent and that you want them to stand against Cuomo's Education Tax Credit. Got all that? [pause] Great I'll connect you now.

PT 01 Patch successful

PT 02 Patch unsuccessful: Looks like the line is busy. I'd like to encourage you to still contact your [ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN]. The number is [patchnum]. Got that? [pause] Thank you, have a great day. [end]

Q2 02 IF NO: Thank you for your time. Have a great day. [end]

Baseline Script + Urgency:

Hi, this is _____ from the [ORGANIZATION NAME]. ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET] needs to hear from us **today** that we oppose the Governor's Education Act Tax Credit. The tax credit will **cut** \$150 million away from public schools in order to fund private schools; public schools serve all children in our communities – not a selective few. New York state public schools are still owed approximately \$5 billion dollars **now**. Representatives need to hear that New York public schools should be the priority **today**.

To make sure they hear your request **today**, we'll connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]'s office **now** and you can tell them **right away** that as a constituent you want them to stand against the Governor's Education Tax proposal.

Can we connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]'s office?

Q1 01 IF YES: Great! **In just a second** we'll connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [target]'s office. Tell them that you're a constituent and that you want them to stand against Cuomo's Parental Choice in Education Act Tax Credits **now**. Got all that? [pause] Great I'll connect you now.

PT 01 Patch successful

PT 02 Patch unsuccessful: Looks like the line is busy. I'd like to encourage you to still contact your ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN. The number is [patchnum]. Got that? [pause] Thank you, have a great day. [end]

Q2 02 IF NO: Thank you for your time. Have a great day. [end]

Baseline Script + Activist Identity:

Hi, this is _____ from the [ORGANIZATION NAME]. ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET] needs to hear from education supporters like you that you oppose the Governor's Education Act Tax Credit. We are calling supporters like you who have made your voice heard in the past to tell representatives that the tax credits will divert \$150 million away from public schools in order to fund private schools; public schools serve all children in our communities – not a selective few. New York state public schools are still owed approximately \$5 billion dollars. Representatives need to hear that politically engaged constituents like you know New York public schools should be the priority.

To join thousands of other supporters making their voice heard we can connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]'s office and you can tell them that as an active constituent you want them to stand against the Governor's Education Tax proposal.

Can we connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]'s office?

Q1 01 IF YES: Great! We'll connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [target]'s office. Tell them that you're one of thousands of politically engaged constituents that want them to stand against Cuomo's Education Tax Credit. Got all that? [pause] Great I'll connect you now.

PT 01 Patch successful

PT 02 Patch unsuccessful: Looks like the line is busy. I'd like to encourage you to still contact your ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN. The number is [patchnum]. Got that? [pause] Thank you, have a great day. [end]

Q2 02 IF NO: Thank you for your time. Have a great day. [end]

Baseline Script + Ease:

Hi, this is _____ from the [ORGANIZATION NAME]. ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET] needs to hear that you oppose the Governor's Education Act Tax Credit. **Don't worry - contacting your representative is quick and easy.** The tax credits will divert \$150 million dollars away from public schools in order to fund private schools; public schools serve all children in our communities – not a selective few. **We can help you quickly tell your representative** that New York Public schools should be the priority.

Making your voice heard is easy - we simply connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]'s office and you tell them that you want them to stand against the Governor's Education Tax proposal- **we do all the work to connect you.**

Can we **quickly** connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [TARGET]'s office?

Q1 01 IF YES: Great! We'll connect you to ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN [target]'s office. Tell them that you want them to stand against Cuomo's Education Tax Credit. Got all that? [pause] Great I'll connect you now.

PT 01 Patch successful

PT 02 Patch unsuccessful: Looks like the line is busy. I'd like to encourage you to still contact your ASSEMBLYMAN/WOMAN. The number is [patchnum]. Got that? [pause] Thank you, have a great day. [end]

Q2 02 IF NO: Thank you for your time. Have a great day. [end]

Table 6: Mean Values of Observable Covariates within Random Assignment Groups

	Baseline	Baseline + Urgency	Baseline + Identity	Baseline + Ease	Total
Age	63.87	63.91	63.92	63.97	63.92
Hispanic [^]	0.143	0.139	0.137	0.143	0.141
African American [^]	0.263	0.256	0.261	0.264	0.261
Female	0.605	0.611	0.609	0.609	0.609
Voted in 2008 General Election	0.926	0.928	0.927	0.930	0.928
Voted in 2010 General Election	0.855	0.858	0.860	0.859	0.858
Voted in 2012 General Election	0.930	0.928	0.927	0.924	0.927
Voted in 2014 General Election	0.628	0.626	0.620	0.627	0.625
Observations	49350				

mean coefficients; *t* statistics in parentheses

Notes: [^]Race data is based on Catalist LLC's predictive models.

Table 7: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Random Assignment on Observable Covariates
Patch Through Experiment

Baseline	(BASE)	
Baseline + Urgency		
Age	-0.000	(0.001)
Hispanic^	-0.041	(0.038)
African American^	-0.047	(0.031)
Female	0.031	(0.026)
Voted in 2008 General Election	0.024	(0.051)
Voted in 2010 General Election	0.021	(0.039)
Voted in 2012 General Election	-0.044	(0.051)
Voted in 2014 General Election	0.000	(0.027)
Constant	0.008	(0.083)
Baseline + Identity		
Age	-0.000	(0.001)
Hispanic^	-0.050	(0.038)
African American^	-0.019	(0.030)
Female	0.019	(0.026)
Voted in 2008 General Election	-0.007	(0.051)
Voted in 2010 General Election	0.041	(0.039)
Voted in 2012 General Election	-0.045	(0.051)
Voted in 2014 General Election	-0.030	(0.027)
Constant	0.037	(0.083)
Baseline + Ease		
Age	0.000	(0.001)
Hispanic^	0.001	(0.038)
African American^	0.005	(0.030)
Female	0.020	(0.026)
Voted in 2008 General Election	0.055	(0.051)
Voted in 2010 General Election	0.029	(0.039)
Voted in 2012 General Election	-0.094	(0.050)
Voted in 2014 General Election	0.002	(0.027)
Constant	-0.016	(0.083)

N	49,350
LR	15.035
Df	24
p_value	0.920

Standard errors in parentheses

Notes: ^Race data is based on Catalist LLC's predictive models.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8: Difference in Mean Patch Through Rate (Overall)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Urgency vs. Baseline		Identity vs. Baseline		Ease vs. Baseline		Urgency vs. Identity		Urgency vs. Ease		Identity vs. Ease	
	b	p_u	B	p_u	b	p_u	b	p_u	b	p_u	b	p_u
Patch Through Rate	-0.017	0.795	0.004	0.430	-0.004	0.575	0.020	0.161	0.013	0.264	-0.007	0.641
SE	(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.021)	
Mean of Treatment	0.354		0.374		0.367		0.374		0.367		0.367	
Mean of Control	0.370		0.370		0.370		0.370		0.370		0.370	
Observations	2267		2249		2255		2232		2238		2220	

p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test

Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Baseline

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 9: Difference in Mean Patch Through Rate by Race (Overall)

	(1)		(2)	
	White Legislator Patch- Through Rate		Legislator of Color Patch- Through Rate	
	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u
Difference in Patch- through Rate	0.006	0.384	0.046	0.060
	(0.020)		(0.029)	
	0.368		0.380	
	0.362		0.334	
Observations	2827		1660	

p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test

Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of PT Rate of Union Members of Color; Row 4 = Mean of PT Rate of White Union Members

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 10: Difference in Mean Patch Through Rate of White Union Members to White Legislators (Overall)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Urgency vs. Baseline		Identity vs. Baseline		Ease vs. Baseline		Urgency vs. Identity		Urgency vs. Ease		Identity vs. Ease	
	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u
Patch Through	-0.012	0.654	0.005	0.429	-0.035	0.879	0.017	0.284	-0.023	0.783	-0.040	0.909
	(0.030)		(0.030)		(0.030)		(0.030)		(0.030)		(0.030)	
	0.361		0.378		0.337		0.378		0.337		0.337	
	0.372		0.372		0.372		0.361		0.361		0.378	
Observations	1048		1016		1025		1022		1031		999	

p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test

Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Baseline

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 11: Difference in Mean Patch Through Rate of Union Members of Color to Legislators of Color (Overall)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Urgency vs. Baseline		Identity vs. Baseline		Ease vs. Baseline		Urgency vs. Identity		Urgency vs. Ease		Identity vs. Ease	
	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u	b/se/mu_1/mu_2	p_u
Patch Through	-0.007	0.575	-0.009	0.597	-0.001	0.510	-0.002	0.521	0.006	0.436	0.008	0.414
	(0.038)		(0.037)		(0.038)		(0.038)		(0.039)		(0.038)	
	0.377		0.375		0.383		0.375		0.383		0.383	
	0.384		0.384		0.384		0.377		0.377		0.375	
Observations	654		685		662		657		634		665	

p for upper bound for reference in recalculating one-sided hypothesis test
 Row 1 = Diff Mean; Row 2 = SE of diff; Row 3 = Mean of Tx; Row 4 = Mean of Baseline
 * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 6: Previous Canvassing Experiments

Citation	Canvasser Type	ITT Effect Size (Pooled)*
Davenport, T. C. (2010). Public accountability and political participation: Effects of a face-to-face feedback intervention on voter turnout of public housing residents. <i>Political Behavior</i> , 32(3), 337-368.	Paid	4.9 Percentage Points
Gerber, A. S., & Green, D. P. (1999). Does canvassing increase voter turnout? A field experiment. <i>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</i> , 96(19), 10939-10942.	Paid	2.4 Percentage Points
Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. "The effects of canvassing, telephone calls, and direct mail on voter turnout: A field experiment." <i>American Political Science Review</i> 94.03 (2000): 653-663.	Paid	2.4 Percentage Points
Green, D. P., & Gerber, A. S. (2001). Getting out the youth vote: Results from randomized field experiments. Yale University.	Paid	2.1 Percentage Points
John, Peter, and Tessa Brannan. "How different are telephoning and canvassing? Results from a 'get out the vote' field experiment in the British 2005 General Election." <i>British Journal of Political Science</i> 38.03 (2008): 565-574.	Volunteer	3.6 Percentage Points
Lenoir, Brandon W. and Donald P. Green. (2014). Getting Low Probability Voters to the Polls: The 'Stalking' Strategy: Results from Three Randomized Field Experiments.	Paid	2.0 - 4.0 Percentage Points
Michelson, M. R. (2003). Getting out the Latino vote: How door-to-door canvassing influences voter turnout in rural central California. <i>Political Behavior</i> , 25(3), 247-263.	Paid	1.3 - 7.1 Percentage Points
Michelson, M. R. (2006). Mobilizing the Latino Youth Vote: Some Experimental Results*. <i>Social Science Quarterly</i> , 87(5), 1188-1206. Chicago	Paid	2.4 Percentage Points
Nickerson, D. (2015). Do Voter Registration Drives Increase Participation? For Whom and When? <i>The Journal of Politics</i> , 77(1), 88-101.	Paid	2.0 - 3.0 Percentage Points
Nickerson, D. W. (2008). Is voting contagious? Evidence from two field experiments. <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 102(01), 49-57.	Paid	2.9 Percentage Points
Panagopoulos, Costas. "Street fight: The impact of a street sign campaign on voter turnout." <i>Electoral Studies</i> 28.2 (2009): 309-313.	Paid	3.6 Percentage Points

M 6: Canvassing Script

Hello, is [**TARGET NAME**] home? My name is [**FIRST NAME**].

I am a volunteer with [**PARTNER ORGANIZATION**] and we are out today encouraging people in our community to vote on Tuesday April, 1st. As you may know, there is a referendum on the ballot to increase revenue for public schools in your community. You have the power to make a difference in your community. Can we count on you to vote on April 1st?

Thank you for your time.

Table 12: Randomization Balance Check - Stoughton Experiment

	Treatment	Control
Households	1983	991
Average Age	55.4	55.9
Average Pct. White	91	91
Average Pct. Female	59.3	59.6
Voted in 2012	89.9	90
Voted in 2010	75.6	75.8
Voted in 2008	84.1	84.2
Voted in 2006	71	71
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Assignment on Covariates		
$\chi^2 = 1.80$ (6 d.f.) $p = 0.937$		

Table 13: Randomization Balance Check - Oshkosk Experiment

	Treatment Group	Control
Number of Households	9333	3081
Average Age	53.7	53.7
Average Pct. White	91.3	90.1
Average Pct. Female	53.6	53.3
Voted in 2012	90.5	90
Voted in 2010	77.3	77.6
Voted in 2008	86.5	86.1
Voted in 2006	71.5	72
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Assignment on Covariates		
$\chi^2 = 9.27$ (6 d.f.) $p = 0.1591$		

Table 14: Overall Randomization Check

	Treatment Group	Control
Number of Households	11,316	4072
Average Age	54	54.1
Average Pct. White	91.2	91
Average Pct. Female	54.7	54.8
Voted in 2012	90.1	90
Voted in 2010	77	76.2
Voted in 2008	86.1	85.7
Voted in 2006	71.4	71.9
Multinomial Logistic Regression of Assignment on Covariates		
$\chi^2 = 5.31$ (7 d.f.) $p = 0.6226$		

Table 15: Treatment Effects by Location

	Differences in Voting Rates in 2014 Election	Percentage of Treatment Group Actually Contacted	Effects of Actual Treatment on voting in 2014
	(A)	(B)	(C)
Stoughton (n=2974)	2.7* (1.9)	29.5	8.5* (6.2)
Oshkosh (n=12,414)	2.2** (1.0)	10.2	21.7** (10.3)
All Sites (n=15,388)	2.3** (0.9)	13.5	17.0** (6.8)

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; one-tailed

Table 16: Percentage Point Boost on Aggregate Turnout

	Stoughton		Oshkosh		Overall	
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Treatment	3.3** (1.9)	2.7* (1.9)	2.0** (1.0)	2.2** (1.0)	2.3** (6.7)	2.3** (0.9)
Age		-0.1** (0.06)		-0.04* (0.0)		-0.05 ** (0.0)
Female		-9.9 (1.9)		-0.1 (0.9)		-1.8** (0.8)
White		26.9*** (5.6)		1.4 (2.1)		0.8 (2.0)
Voted in 12		38.2*** (2.8)		17.7*** (1.9)		19*** (1.7)
Voted in 10		17.6*** (2.6)		9.3*** (1.3)		10.8*** (1.1)
Voted in 08		10.0** (3.6)		-0.6 (1.9)		0.1 (1.7)
Voted in 06		17.0*** (2.7)		16.6*** (1.2)		16.6*** (1.2)
Constant	43.5*** (1.5)	-41.4*** (7.3)	44.3*** (0.8)	11.4*** (2.3)	44.2*** (0.8)	10.5*** (2.1)
N	2974	2974	12,424	12,424	15,398	15,398

*OLS Estimates. Standard errors are in parenthesis.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; one-tailed

Table 17: Percentage Point Boost from Face-to-Face Contact

	Stoughton		Oshkosh		Overall	
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Door-to-Door						
Contact	11.3** (6.6)	8.5** (6.20)	20.0** -10.1	21.7** -10.3	17.2** (6.7)	17.0** (6.7)
Age		-0.1** (0.06)		-0.04 (0.0)		-0.06 ** (0.0)
Female		-10 (1.9)		-0.08 (0.9)		-1.9** (0.8)
White		26.7*** (6.4)		0.08 (2.2)		0.3 (2.0)
Voted in 12		37.0*** (5.0)		17.0*** (2.2)		18.2*** (2.0)
Voted in 10		17.3*** (2.8)		8.9*** (1.3)		10.5*** (1.2)
Voted in 08		10.1 ** (3.8)		-0.5 (1.9)		0.4 (1.7)
Voted in 06		16.8*** (2.7)		16.4*** (1.2)		16.3*** (1.2)
Constant	43.5*** (1.5)	-39.4 (9.0)	44.3*** (0.8)	12.8*** (2.3)	44.2*** (0.8)	12.4*** (2.2)
N	2974	2974	12,424	12,424	15398	15398

*estimates calculated from 2SLS using assignment as instrument for contact. Standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; one-tailed

*OLS Estimates. Standard errors are in parenthesis.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; one-tailed

Supplemental Tables

Table S 1: Counts by State and Mobilization Type

	Arizona			Florida		
Mobilization Type	Control Group	Voter Report Card	Plan Making	Control	Voter Report Card	Plan Making
Early Voting	581	587	605	13540	13473	13435
Voting by Mail	1440	1437	1431	2578	2561	2600

Table S 2: Balance Check: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Random Assignment on Observable Covariates for EIPV and VBM Experiments

	EIPV Experiment	VBM Experiment
Control	(BASE)	(BASE)
Voter Report Card		
Female	-0.038 (0.030)	0.061 (0.057)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
African American^	-0.012 (0.029)	-0.049 (0.071)
Hispanic^	-0.052 (0.038)	-0.064 (0.069)
Voted in 2006 General Election	-0.002 (0.029)	0.015 (0.055)
Voted in 2008 General Election	-0.032 (0.040)	-0.069 (0.079)
Voted in 2010 General Election	0.012 (0.030)	0.026 (0.055)
Voted in 2012 General Election	-0.012 (0.043)	0.047 (0.101)
Voted in 2006 Primary Election	-0.013 (0.035)	0.015 (0.062)
Voted in 2008 Primary Election	-0.012 (0.036)	-0.009 (0.057)
Voted in 2010 Primary Election	0.002 (0.037)	0.011 (0.061)
Voted in 2012 Primary Election	-0.008 (0.038)	0.022 (0.059)
# Voters in Household	0.007 (0.048)	-0.018 (0.091)
Constant	0.042 (0.089)	0.085 (0.182)
Plan Making Treatment		
Female	0.011 (0.030)	0.007 (0.056)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
African American^	-0.042 (0.029)	0.061 (0.070)
Hispanic^	-0.049 (0.038)	-0.003 (0.069)
Voted in 2006 General Election	0.008 (0.029)	-0.050 (0.054)
Voted in 2008 General Election	-0.017 (0.040)	-0.067 (0.079)
Voted in 2010 General Election	0.010 (0.030)	0.025 (0.055)
Voted in 2012 General Election	-0.033 (0.042)	-0.026 (0.099)
Voted in 2006 Primary Election	-0.016 (0.035)	-0.075 (0.063)

Voted in 2008 Primary Election	0.014 (0.036)	0.031 (0.057)
Voted in 2010 Primary Election	0.023 (0.037)	0.036 (0.060)
Voted in 2012 Primary Election	-0.013 (0.038)	0.040 (0.058)
# Voters in Household	0.026 (0.048)	0.169 (0.088)
Constant	0.044 (0.089)	-0.208 (0.179)
<hr/>		
N	42,131	12,047
LR	11.993	22.021
df	26.000	26.000
p_value	0.991	0.688
<hr/>		

Standard errors in parentheses

Notes: ^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S 3: Logistic Regression for Average Treatment Effect on Turnout in 2014 Primary Election Based on Mobilization Type

	(1) EIPV Mobilization [no covariates]			(2) EIPV Mobilization [with covariates]			(3) EIPV - EDay Voting [no covariates]			(4) EIPV - EDay Voting [with covariates]			(5) EIPV - Pre-EDay Voting [no covariates]			(6) EIPV - Pre-EDay Voting [with covariates]		
	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p
Voter Report Card	0.060	0.005	0.143	0.065	0.004	0.129	-0.018	-	0.749	-0.020	-	0.727	0.135*	0.006	0.019	0.140*	0.005	0.016
	(0.041)			(0.043)			(0.056)	0.001		(0.057)	0.001		(0.057)			(0.058)		
Make A Plan	0.101*	0.009	0.013	0.110**	0.007	0.009	0.046	0.002	0.412	0.045	0.001	0.427	0.150**	0.007	0.009	0.158**	0.005	0.007
	(0.041)			(0.042)			(0.056)			(0.057)			(0.057)			(0.058)		
Female				-0.034		0.409				-0.106		0.054				0.047		0.410
				(0.042)						(0.055)						(0.057)		
Age				0.015***		0.000				0.003		0.213				0.024***		0.000
				(0.002)						(0.002)						(0.002)		
African American^				-0.210***		0.000				-0.224***		0.000				-0.159**		0.006
				(0.042)						(0.056)						(0.057)		
Hispanic^				-0.630***		0.000				-1.138***		0.000				-0.224**		0.008
				(0.070)						(0.122)						(0.084)		
Voted in 2012 General Election				0.997***		0.000				1.263***		0.000				0.782***		0.000
				(0.105)						(0.176)						(0.129)		
Voted in 2012 Primary Election				1.367***		0.000				1.180***		0.000				1.338***		0.000
				(0.041)						(0.056)						(0.055)		
Voted in 2010 General Election				0.451***		0.000				0.554***		0.000				0.336***		0.000
				(0.050)						(0.072)						(0.066)		
Voted in 2010 Primary Election				0.922***		0.000				0.850***		0.000				0.875***		0.000
				(0.042)						(0.056)						(0.058)		
	(1) EIPV Mobilization [no			(2) EIPV Mobilization [with			(3) EIPV - EDay Voting [no			(4) EIPV - EDay Voting			(5) EIPV - Pre-EDay Voting [no			(6) EIPV - Pre-EDay Voting		

	covariates]			covariates]			covariates]			[with covariates]			covariates]			[with covariates]		
	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p
Voted in 2006 General Election				0.366***		0.000				0.647***		0.000				0.064		0.265
Constant	-2.307*** (0.029)		0.000	(0.043) -4.662*** (0.139)		0.000	-2.998*** (0.040)		0.000	(0.063) -5.251*** (0.216)		0.000	-3.103*** (0.042)		0.000	(0.057) -5.519*** (0.179)		0.000
N	42131.000			42131.000			42131.000			42131.000			42131.000			42131.000		

Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC.

Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect.

The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect).

^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models.

One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect.

p-value for convenience in adjusting stars for one-sided hypothesis tests

Table S 4: Logistic Regression for Average Treatment Effect on Turnout in 2014 Primary Election Based on Mobilization Type

	(1) VBM Mobilization [no covariates]			(2) VBM Mobilization [with covariates]			(3) VBM - EDay Voting [no covariates]			(4) VBM - EDay Voting [with covariates]			(5) VBM - Pre-EDay Voting [no covariates]			(6) VBM - Pre-EDay Voting [with covariates]		
	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p
main																		
Voter	0.136**	0.030	0.004	0.151**	0.032	0.003	-0.135	-	0.445	-0.136	-	0.441	0.150**	0.032	0.002	0.166**	0.034	0.001
Report								0.002			0.002							
Card	(0.048)			(0.051)			(0.177)			(0.177)			(0.048)			(0.051)		
Make A	0.092	0.020	0.054	0.095	0.020	0.061	-0.212	-	0.238	-0.210	-	0.244	0.110*	0.023	0.023	0.114*	0.023	0.026
Plan	(0.048)			(0.051)			(0.180)			(0.180)			(0.048)			(0.051)		
Female				0.015		0.764				-0.068		0.705				0.022		0.677
Age				0.018***		0.000				0.001		0.901				0.019***		0.000
African				(0.002)						(0.007)						(0.002)		
American^				-0.023		0.730				0.189		0.384				-0.039		0.552
Hispanic^				(0.065)						(0.217)						(0.066)		
				-0.089		0.174				-0.344		0.210				-0.068		0.305
				(0.066)						(0.274)						(0.066)		
Voted in				0.590***		0.000				0.730		0.153				0.566***		0.000
2012																		
General																		
Election				(0.112)						(0.511)						(0.113)		
Voted in				1.092***		0.000				0.164		0.371				1.100***		0.000
2012																		
Primary																		
Election				(0.050)						(0.183)						(0.050)		
Voted in				0.412***		0.000				0.236		0.246				0.411***		0.000
2010																		
General																		
Election				(0.054)						(0.204)						(0.055)		
Voted in				0.846***		0.000				0.148		0.408				0.854***		0.000
2010																		
Primary																		
Election				(0.051)						(0.180)						(0.051)		
Voted in				-0.262***		0.001				0.387		0.287				-0.289***		0.000
2008																		
General																		
Election				(0.078)						(0.364)						(0.079)		

Voted in 2006 General Election			0.409***		0.000		0.530**		0.005		0.381***	0.000
			(0.049)				(0.191)				(0.050)	
Constant	-0.794***	0.000	-3.057***	0.000	-4.032***	0.000	-5.683***	0.000	-0.876***	0.000	-3.108***	0.000
	(0.034)		(0.159)		(0.121)		(0.675)		(0.035)		(0.161)	
N	12047.000		12047.000		12047.000		12047.000		12047.000		12047.000	

Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC.

Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect.

The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect).

^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models.

One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect.

p-value for convenience in adjusting stars for one-sided hypothesis tests

Table S 5: Average Treatment Effect on Method of Voting in 2014 Primary Election in AZ

	(1) Overall Turnout - AZ [no covariates]			(2) Overall Turnout - AZ [with covariates]			(3) EDay Turnout - AZ [no covariates]			(4) Eday Turnout - AZ [with covariates]			(5) Pre-EDay Turnout - AZ [no covariates]			(6) Pre-EDay Turnout - AZ [with covariates]		
	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p
Voter Report Card	0.112	0.023	0.105	0.136	0.026	0.073	0.076	0.003	0.609	0.083	0.003	0.584	0.106	0.020	0.144	0.125	0.021	0.112
	(0.069)			(0.076)			(0.149)			(0.151)			(0.073)			(0.078)		
Make A Plan	-0.003	-	0.965	-0.013	-	0.863	-0.019	-	0.899	-0.019	-	0.900	0.001	0.000	0.988	-0.007	-	0.933
	(0.070)	0.001		(0.076)	0.002		(0.152)	0.001		(0.154)	0.001		(0.074)			(0.079)	0.001	
Female				0.047		0.521				-0.327*		0.016				0.151*		0.047
				(0.073)						(0.136)			(0.074)			(0.076)		
Age				0.023***		0.000				0.020***		0.000				0.018***		0.000
				(0.003)						(0.005)						(0.003)		
African American^				0.275		0.086				0.399		0.168				0.179		0.280
				(0.160)						(0.289)						(0.166)		
Hispanic^				-0.114		0.248				-0.070		0.735				-0.103		0.314
				(0.098)						(0.207)						(0.102)		
Voted in 2012 General Election				1.150***		0.000				1.253**		0.007				1.046***		0.000
				(0.170)						(0.462)						(0.174)		
Voted in 2012 Primary Election				1.531***		0.000				0.549**		0.001				1.500***		0.000
				(0.084)						(0.167)						(0.085)		
Voted in 2010 General Election				0.704***		0.000				0.873***		0.000				0.614***		0.000
				(0.092)						(0.227)						(0.096)		
Voted in 2010 Primary Election				1.105***		0.000				0.566***		0.000				1.070***		0.000
				(0.069)						(0.138)						(0.072)		
Voted in 2008 General Election				-0.488***		0.000				0.027		0.931				-0.524***		0.000
				(0.121)						(0.307)						(0.125)		
Voted in				0.445***		0.000				0.458*		0.016				0.389***		0.000

2006 General Election			(0.084)				(0.190)				(0.088)	
Constant	-0.922*** (0.049)	0.000	-4.200*** (0.239)	0.000	-3.054*** (0.107)	0.000	-6.456*** (0.598)	0.000	-1.156*** (0.052)	0.000	-4.066*** (0.245)	0.000
N	6081.000	6081.000	6081.000	6081.000	6081.000	6081.000	6081.000	6081.000	6081.000	6081.000	6081.000	6081.000

Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC.

Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect.

The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect).

^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models.

One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect.

p-value for convenience in adjusting stars for one-sided hypothesis tests

Table S 6: Average Treatment Effect on Method of Voting in 2014 Primary Election in FL

	(1) Overall Turnout - FL [no covariates]			(2) Overall Turnout - FL [with covariates]			(3) EDay Turnout - FL [no covariates]			(4) EDay Turnout - FL [with covariates]			(5) EIPV Turnout - FL [no covariates]			(6) EIPV Turnout - FL [with covariates]			(7) VBM Voting - FL [no covariates]			(8) VBM Voting - FL [with covariates]		
	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p
main																								
Voter Report Card	0.112	0.023	0.105	0.136	0.026	0.073	0.076	0.003	0.609	0.083	0.003	0.584	0.106	0.020	0.144	0.125	0.021	0.112	0.078*	0.009	0.020	0.086*	0.008	0.015
	(0.069)			(0.076)			(0.149)			(0.151)			(0.073)			(0.078)			(0.034)			(0.035)		
Make A Plan	-0.003	-0.001	0.965	-0.013	-0.002	0.863	-0.019	-0.001	0.899	-0.019	-0.001	0.900	0.001	0.000	0.988	-0.007	-0.001	0.933	0.114**	0.013	0.001	0.123**	0.011	0.000
	(0.070)			(0.076)			(0.152)			(0.154)			(0.074)			(0.079)			(0.033)			(0.035)		
Female				0.047		0.521				-0.327*		0.016				0.151*		0.047				0.034		0.331
				(0.073)			(0.136)			(0.136)			(0.076)			(0.076)			(0.035)			(0.035)		
Age				0.023**		0.000				0.020**		0.000				0.018**		0.000				0.018**		0.000
				(0.003)			(0.005)			(0.005)			(0.003)			(0.003)			(0.001)			(0.001)		
African American^				0.275		0.086				0.399		0.168				0.179		0.280				-0.274**		0.000
				(0.160)			(0.289)			(0.289)			(0.166)			(0.166)			(0.035)			(0.035)		
Hispanic^				-0.114		0.248				-0.070		0.735				-0.103		0.314				-0.434**		0.000
				(0.098)			(0.207)			(0.207)			(0.102)			(0.102)			(0.053)			(0.053)		
Voted in 2012 General Election				1.150**		0.000				1.253**		0.007				1.046**		0.000				0.914**		0.000
				(0.170)			(0.462)			(0.462)			(0.174)			(0.174)			(0.083)			(0.083)		
Voted in 2012 Primary Election				1.531**		0.000				0.549**		0.001				1.500**		0.000				1.335**		0.000
				(0.084)			(0.167)			(0.167)			(0.085)			(0.085)			(0.034)			(0.034)		
Voted in 2010 General				0.704**		0.000				0.873**		0.000				0.614**		0.000				0.340**		0.000
				(0.084)			(0.167)			(0.167)			(0.085)			(0.085)			(0.034)			(0.034)		

Electio n															
Voted in 2010 Primar y Electio n		(0.092)				(0.227)				(0.096)				(0.039)	
		1.105**	0.0			0.566**	0.0			1.070**	0.0			0.845**	0.0
		*	00			*	00			*	00			*	00
Voted in 2008 Genera l Electio n		(0.069)				(0.138)				(0.072)				(0.036)	
		-	0.0			0.027	0.9			-	0.0			-	0.0
		0.488**	00				31			0.524**	00			0.166**	04
		*								*					
Voted in 2006 Genera l Electio n		(0.121)				(0.307)				(0.125)				(0.057)	
		0.445**	0.0			0.458*	0.0			0.389**	0.0			0.289**	0.0
		*	00				16			*	00			*	00
Consta nt	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-
	0.922**	00	4.200**	00	3.054**	00	6.456**	00	1.156**	00	4.066**	00	1.979**	00	4.403**
	*		*		*		*		*		*		*		*
	(0.049)		(0.239)		(0.107)		(0.598)		(0.052)		(0.245)		(0.024)		(0.112)
N	6081.0		6081.0		6081.0		6081.0		6081.0		6081.0		48097.		48097.
	00		00		00		00		00		00		000		000

Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC.

Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect.

The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect).

*Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models.

One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect.

p-value for convenience in adjusting stars for one-sided hypothesis

Table S 7: Heterogeneity by Drop Off Voter Status in Intent-to-Treat Effect on Turnout in 2014 Primary Election

	(1) Arizona [no covariates]		(2) Arizona [with covariates]		(3) Florida [no covariates]		(4) Florida [with Covariates]	
	b/se	p	b/se	p	b/se	p	b/se	p
Make A Plan	0.260 (0.173)	0.133	0.279 (0.190)	0.142	0.097* (0.038)	0.011	0.107** (0.039)	0.006
Interaction: Plan Making Treatment & Non-Targeted 2014 Drop Off Voter	-0.321 (0.190)	0.091	-0.347 (0.207)	0.094				
Interaction: Plan Making Treatment & Targeted 2014 Drop Off Voter	0.000 (.)	.	0.000 (.)	.	0.094 (0.084)	0.264	0.080 (0.087)	0.355
Voter Report Card	0.123 (0.176)	0.486	0.059 (0.193)	0.758	0.060 (0.038)	0.115	0.070 (0.039)	0.076
Interaction: Voter Report Card Treatment & Non-Targeted 2014 Drop Off Voter	-0.002 (0.193)	0.991	0.092 (0.210)	0.662				
Interaction: Voter Report Card and Targeted 2014 Drop Off Voter	0.000 (.)	.	0.000 (.)	.	0.092 (0.085)	0.276	0.077 (0.087)	0.375
Not a Targeted 2014 Drop Off Voter	1.264*** (0.139)	0.000	-0.232 (0.476)	0.625				
Targeted 2014 Drop Off Voter	0.000 (.)	.	0.000 (.)	.	-0.963*** (0.061)	0.000	0.029 (0.462)	0.950
Female			0.049 (0.073)	0.505			0.034 (0.035)	0.333
Age			0.023*** (0.003)	0.000			0.018*** (0.001)	0.000
African American^			0.273 (0.160)	0.089			-0.274*** (0.035)	0.000
Hispanic^			-0.114 (0.099)	0.245			-0.434*** (0.053)	0.000
Voted in 2012 General Election			1.150*** (0.170)	0.000			0.915*** (0.083)	0.000
Voted in 2012 Primary Election			1.532*** (0.084)	0.000			1.335*** (0.034)	0.000
Voted in 2010 General Election			1.021* (0.467)	0.029			0.423 (0.459)	0.357
Voted in 2010 Primary Election			1.107*** (0.069)	0.000			0.845*** (0.036)	0.000
Voted in 2008 General Election			-0.490*** (0.121)	0.000			-0.166** (0.057)	0.004
Voted in 2006 General Election			0.445*** (0.084)	0.000			0.289*** (0.035)	0.000
Constant	-1.917*** (0.128)	0.000	-4.274*** (0.260)	0.000	-1.722*** (0.027)	0.000	-4.476*** (0.473)	0.000
N	6081.000		6081.000		48097.000		48097.000	

Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC.
Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect.

The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect).
^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models.
One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect.
p-value for convenience in adjusting stars for one-sided hypothesis tests

Table S 8: Heterogeneity by Prior Pre-Election Day Voting in Intent-to-Treat Effect on Turnout in 2014 Primary Election

	(1) EIPV Experiment [no covariates]		(2) EIPV Experiment [with covariates]		(3) VBM Experiment [no covariates]		(4) VBM Experiment [with covariates]	
	b/se	p	b/se	p	b/se	p	b/se	p
Voter Report Card Treatment	-0.050 (0.075)	0.503	-0.055 (0.077)	0.474	-0.120 (0.185)	0.518	-0.118 (0.194)	0.542
Plan Making Treatment	0.034 (0.073)	0.645	0.045 (0.075)	0.551	-0.285 (0.189)	0.131	-0.250 (0.197)	0.203
1/4 Early Voter	0.335*** (0.091)	0.000	0.261** (0.093)	0.005	0.104 (0.154)	0.498	-0.016 (0.162)	0.919
2/4 Early Voter	0.730*** (0.087)	0.000	0.521*** (0.091)	0.000	0.332* (0.143)	0.021	0.007 (0.152)	0.962
3/4 Early Voter	0.862*** (0.078)	0.000	0.615*** (0.082)	0.000	0.735*** (0.144)	0.000	0.251 (0.154)	0.103
4/4 Early Voter	1.442*** (0.122)	0.000	0.842*** (0.128)	0.000	1.200*** (0.153)	0.000	0.417* (0.164)	0.011
Interaction: Voter Report Card & 1/4 Early Voter	0.075 (0.128)	0.556	0.101 (0.132)	0.445	0.321 (0.219)	0.143	0.323 (0.230)	0.160
Interaction: Voter Report Card & 2/4 Early Voter	0.342** (0.120)	0.004	0.389** (0.124)	0.002	0.357 (0.205)	0.081	0.382 (0.215)	0.075
Interaction: Voter Report Card & 3/4 Early Voter	0.056 (0.111)	0.613	0.070 (0.114)	0.541	0.267 (0.206)	0.195	0.274 (0.216)	0.204
Interaction: Voter Report Card & 4/4 Early Voter	0.174 (0.171)	0.307	0.058 (0.176)	0.744	0.097 (0.219)	0.656	0.120 (0.229)	0.599
Interaction: Plan Making & 1/4 Early Voter	0.197 (0.124)	0.114	0.197 (0.128)	0.124	0.446* (0.223)	0.045	0.361 (0.232)	0.121
Interaction: Plan Making & 2/4 Early Voter	0.086 (0.122)	0.482	0.109 (0.126)	0.384	0.523* (0.208)	0.012	0.519* (0.217)	0.017
Interaction: Plan Making & 3/4 Early Voter	0.079 (0.108)	0.465	0.046 (0.112)	0.682	0.342 (0.210)	0.104	0.291 (0.219)	0.183
Interaction: Plan Making & 4/4 Early Voter	0.005 (0.170)	0.978	-0.028 (0.176)	0.872	0.260 (0.221)	0.240	0.244 (0.230)	0.289
Female			-0.041 (0.042)	0.328			0.019 (0.052)	0.719
Age			0.012*** (0.002)	0.000			0.018*** (0.002)	0.000
African American^			-0.384*** (0.044)	0.000			-0.014 (0.066)	0.832
Hispanic^			-0.671*** (0.071)	0.000			-0.078 (0.066)	0.234
Voted in 2012 General Election			0.798*** (0.106)	0.000			0.392*** (0.119)	0.001
Voted in 2012 Primary Election			1.319*** (0.042)	0.000			1.073*** (0.050)	0.000

Voted in 2010 General Election			0.408*** (0.050)	0.000			0.364*** (0.055)	0.000
Voted in 2010 Primary Election			0.892*** (0.043)	0.000			0.808*** (0.051)	0.000
Voted in 2008 General Election			-0.301*** (0.073)	0.000			-0.331*** (0.079)	0.000
Voted in 2006 General Election			0.351*** (0.044)	0.000			0.362*** (0.051)	0.000
Constant	-2.753*** (0.052)	0.000	-4.493*** (0.145)	0.000	-1.309*** (0.128)	0.000	-2.845*** (0.198)	0.000
N	42,131		42,131		12,047		12,047	

Notes: Validated vote data from public records compiled by Catalist LLC.

Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect.

The rate of contact with the mail is unknown, so it is not possible to calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (treatment-on-treated effect).

^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models.

One tailed hypothesis testing for treatment effect.

p-value for convenience in adjusting stars for one-sided hypothesis test

Table S 9: Descriptive Statistics of State Assembly Districts

District	County	Total Population	% Democrat	% Republican	% Other	% Unknown	% White	% Black	% Hispanic	% Asian
16	██████	134,721	33.5%	22.8%	4.1%	39.6%	80.5%	1.1%	4.3%	13.3%
26	██████	115,263	41.7%	15.8%	3.7%	38.8%	68.2%	0.6%	8.3%	21.9%
28	██████	113,219	42.9%	13.4%	3.7%	39.9%	67.4%	1.8%	15.6%	13.5%
31	██████	100,934	57.7%	4.5%	2.4%	35.5%	7.9%	64.8%	15.0%	8.1%
33	██████	120,276	59.5%	5.6%	2.5%	32.5%	12.2%	65.3%	8.8%	11.7%
36	██████	112,548	49.1%	8.8%	4.0%	38.1%	71.1%	1.3%	17.6%	8.1%
51	██████	87,246	54.1%	7.2%	3.3%	35.5%	33.9%	6.8%	44.2%	13.1%
53	██████	105,686	66.0%	4.2%	3.4%	26.4%	32.4%	9.8%	51.6%	4.8%
71	████████	130,313	67.7%	4.1%	3.2%	24.9%	22.2%	37.2%	37.7%	1.6%
82	██████	120,970	52.1%	10.0%	3.5%	34.4%	41.2%	25.4%	29.7%	2.1%
86	██████	92,531	65.1%	3.8%	2.2%	28.9%	2.5%	33.9%	61.7%	0.6%
89	████████	121,798	54.0%	8.7%	3.7%	33.6%	27.7%	50.3%	18.9%	1.3%
91	████████	123,548	34.7%	18.8%	5.2%	41.3%	76.0%	5.6%	15.6%	1.8%
104	██████	107,373	36.3%	19.2%	5.9%	38.6%	65.9%	18.7%	13.4%	0.8%
108	██████████	117,274	45.5%	10.7%	8.0%	35.8%	71.6%	22.4%	4.1%	1.0%
140	██████	140,662	39.2%	24.9%	6.6%	29.3%	95.1%	1.9%	2.4%	0.4%

Table S 10: Logistic Regression for Average Treatment Effect on Patch Through Rate

	(1) Patch-Through Experiment [no covariates]			(2) Patch-Through Experiment [with covariates]		
	b/se	dc	p	b/se	dc	p
Urgency Script	-0.072 (0.087)	-0.017	0.410	-0.076 (0.088)	- 0.017	0.388
Identity Script	0.015 (0.087)	0.004	0.861	0.012 (0.087)	0.003	0.890
Ease Script	-0.016 (0.087)	-0.004	0.851	-0.022 (0.088)	- 0.005	0.802
Female				0.040 (0.064)		0.538
African American^				-0.184 (0.159)		0.245
White				-0.189 (0.155)		0.223
Hispanic^				-0.032 (0.173)		0.851
Age				-0.004 (0.002)		0.104
Voted in 2014 GE				-0.014 (0.075)		0.849
Voted in 2012 GE				-0.020 (0.123)		0.870
Voted in 2010 GE				0.171 (0.097)		0.079
Voted in 2008 GE				-0.216 (0.138)		0.117
Constant	-0.530*** (0.061)		0.000	-0.064 (0.262)		0.808
N	4487			4486		

Notes: Average Treatment Effect is sometimes known as the intent-to-treat effect.
 ^Hispanic and African American are based on Catalist LLC's predictive models.
 p-value for convenience in adjusting stars for one-sided hypothesis

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