

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: JOINT CULTURE IN THE U.S. MILITARY:
 ACCOMPLISHING THE MISSION BY
 ADAPTING TO ORGANIZATIONAL
 DIVERSITY

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This dissertation develops the concept of joint culture by analyzing the experiences of military service personnel who served in joint assignments through the perspectives of organizational and cognitive anthropology and the application of participant observation, semi-structured interviews and schema analysis grounded in interviewee narratives. This dissertation uses a logical framework to organize and conduct interviews and guide the analysis of interviewee narratives. Concepts and themes from interviews are systematically examined following the logical framework to posit a set of cognitive structures associated with joint culture. At least two joint cultural schemas are present in the accounts of joint service that interrelate to form a cultural model of jointness that prepares personnel to function in a joint cultural environment. First, a schema *of* joint culture, the tacit cognitive structures focused on the priority of mission accomplishment that motivates personnel to work through the inter-organizational differences encountered in the joint environment. Second, a

schema *for* joint culture, the more procedural or process focused explicit cognitive structure that informs how service personnel figure out the steps before, during and after a joint assignment. These schemas dynamically interrelate and are intersubjectively shared in adaptive ways as service personnel navigate their joint assignments. This dissertation finds that while military service personnel may not understand formal joint concepts or benefit from formal joint credit for each of their joint assignments, they believe joint service is valuable as an opportunity to learn from the other services and because of the organizational diversity that brings complimentary capabilities together to accomplish the mission. This dissertation adds to the growing body of literature that deals with anthropology *of* the military and may represent the first cognitive anthropological research into an important cultural context for many military personnel and illustrates how anthropological methods can be applied to military cultural contexts.

JOINT CULTURE IN THE U.S. MILITARY: ACCOMPLISHING THE
MISSION BY ADAPTING TO ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY

by

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Dedication

To my wife. Thank you for your love, patience and encouragement.

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In the 40 or so years that I have been affiliated with the DoD, I have met countless wonderful, intelligent and brave individuals in all services. I am proud to count myself among you but do not deserve the same level of gratitude bestowed on those of you who have served in harm's way. Thank you to the military men and women who participated in this research. You know who you are and you added to my appreciation for the richness of military life, a life of service, camaraderie, and duty. It has been honor serving with you.

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List of Abbreviations

AAA	American Anthropological Association
ADCON	Administrative Control
AEF	American Expeditionary Forces
ATACM	Army Tactical Missile
AVIP	Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program
C2	Command and Control
CAS	Close Air Support
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CEAUSSIC	Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
COEC	Cyberspace Operations Executive Course
CONOP	Concept of Operations
DC	Direct commission
DLNSEO	Defense Language and National Security Education Office
DMRR	Defense Manpower Readiness Report
DoD	Department of Defense
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
EA	Executive Assistant
EPME	Enlisted Professional Military Education
GBR	Great Britain
HTS	Human Terrain System
HTT	Human Terrain Team
IRB	Institutional Review Board
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDAL	Joint Duty Assignment List
JFOWC	Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course
JIIM	Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational
JP	Joint Publication
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
JSOFSEA	Joint Special Operations Forces Senior Enlisted Academy
JSOU	Joint Special Operations University
MA	Military Anthropology
MARPAT	Marine Pattern Camouflage

MLDC	Military Leadership Diversity Commission
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OTS	Officer Training School
PAA	Position Area for Artillery
PCS	Permanent change of station
PME	Professional Military Education
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SEAL	Sea Air Land
SfAA	Society for Applied Anthropology
SJIOAC	Senior Joint Information Operations Applications Course
SJPME	now SEJPME - Senior Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Center
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USC	United States Code
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two
XO	Executive Officer

Chapter 1: Introduction

This dissertation is about the interplay of military service cultures when they come together to serve and accomplish their missions in an environment with other US military services, US government and non-governmental organizations and multi-national militaries and organizations. This mixed environment is called a “joint” environment and the activities that the military services perform together with these other organizations are known as “joint” activities. The umbrella term for the law and policies that govern joint assignments and activities is “jointness.” The goal of this dissertation is to characterize the culture of that inter-organizational or joint environment. From the accounts of military service members based on their experiences, I have posited two cognitive structures, or schemas, that inform that inter-organizational or joint culture.

As a way to begin unpacking the complexity of the cultural dynamics in these inter-organizational environments, this dissertation draws from a number of data sources. First, it draws from the DoD literature about jointness, joint operations and best practices and lessons learned in the joint environment. Second, it uses my own 37+ years of experience during which I dedicated my life to the national security of the United States in uniform and as a civilian. Throughout that time, I served in the United States Air Force in multiple joint assignments and worked closely with military members as a DoD civilian which made me acutely aware of the cultures, customs and traditions of the military services. It also made me acutely aware of the importance of the subjects of joint duty, joint service, the perceptions some service members hold of the other services. Finally, and most importantly, it pulls interview

data from the experiences of 10 people, some from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, based on their accounts of that “joint” cultural dynamic. This dissertation also contributes to the body of anthropological work about the military by positing schemas of joint culture from the US military perspective. In doing so, it adds to the important role anthropology can play in understanding a segment of our society and can be the basis for follow-on research into improving US military joint operations and training.

The concepts and theories related to organizational and cognitive anthropology are the approaches that were applied in this dissertation for discovering the characteristics contained in joint culture. These approaches allow disciplined data gathering through the use of a systematically developed semi-structured interview protocol. They also allow the situating of anthropology in a social setting dominated by institutional cultural norms, rigorous and thorough parent service indoctrination processes that create “ethnicity-like” military service cultures, and the cultural analysis to benefit from the author’s interpretive expertise derived from almost 40 year living and working with the military and DoD. The challenge in analyzing the cultural dynamics in a joint environment is the constantly changing composition of joint organizations in terms of the cross-institutional mix of members whose individual experiences with jointness vary widely and whose institutional systems of meaning can be highly focused inward toward their own institutional history, language, and norms of behavior.

The dissertation is broken down into six main chapters: Chapter 2: The History of Jointness - the background, history, and law surrounding the US military’s

inter-organizational relationships; Chapter 3: A Cultural Approach - the literature and theories of organizational and cognitive anthropology is reviewed; Chapter 4: Cultural Analysis and the Joint Service Experience – introduction to the Core Logic framework and the methods of cultural analysis and a profile of the interviewees is reviewed; Chapter 5: Summary of Interviews - the accounts of the 10 interviewees are analyzed in terms of the semi-structured interview protocol; Chapter 6: Findings – cultural themes from the semi-structured interviews are interpreted to form a joint cultural schemas; Chapter 7: Conclusions – limitations and directions for future research.

In chapter two, an efficient and thorough analysis of joint inter-service activities from the formation of the US up to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, also known as Goldwater-Nichols is reviewed (Locker 2001). Goldwater-Nichols has become the metaphor for “jointness” in the military and DoD communities and this summary provides an analysis targeted at the subject of this dissertation, the inter-service cultural dynamics between the military services.

Chapter 3 lays out the concepts and theories related to organizational and cognitive anthropology. These are the approaches applied in this dissertation for discovering the characteristics of a joint culture. The following concepts will be discussed in the literature review: Organizations create structures of meaning and regimes of instrumental rationality (Batteau 2001:726) and the ability of humans to adapt and function within a culture is the result of intersubjectively shared but implicit knowledge structures, also known as cultural models, the principles of which

come to anthropology from cognitive psychology in the form of schema theory (D'Andrade, 1987; Shore, 1996; Strauss and Quinn, 1997; Ross, 2004).

Chapter three then goes on to consider how military service indoctrination processes transform civilians into military service personnel in boot camp. Applying Turner's account of ritual process to what people experience in basic military training, I show how the liminality phase of the neophyte (Turner 2008) is precisely what basic military trainees experience on their transition from civilian to military life after which they are then "reincorporated" (Turner 2008) and ready to behave in accordance with military standards.

Chapter four describes the research methods used in this dissertation: participant observation, semi-structured interviewing, the development of what I call the "Core Logic Framework", and a profile of the sample of interviewees. Participant observation discusses my almost four decades of living and working with military and DoD personnel. I used that insider's perspective to provide interpretive insights into the meaning of the dynamics of joint contexts. I chose a semi-structured interview data gathering approach because of the control and comparability potential it affords while still allowing for rich ethnographic insights that can further illuminate the cultural context (Bernard 2002: 205). The semi-structured interview protocol and the summary of interviews are both structured around the core logic framework.

The design and purpose of core logic framework are simple. I wanted a systematic way to map the recurring themes expressed by military personnel have as they move through the joint assignment process. Chapter four concludes with a brief

profile of the interviewees in terms of their services, rank, years of service, years spent in joint assignments, and when they experienced their first joint assignment.

Chapter five is the summary of interviews structured around the core logic framework and is a procedural look at what military members experienced prior to and during joint assignments. Extended quotations are provided to illuminate especially salient points and where interviewees' experiences agreed and differed with one another.

Chapter six, Findings is where the joint culture is analyzed explained. The key themes from interviews are summarized in the form of a cultural schemas *of* and *for* jointness. The two schemas are explained and then related to create a "map" of joint cultural knowledge.

Chapter seven, Conclusions covers the limitations of this research and posits some possible future research directions that can address those limitations or address the issues that service members raised with regard to jointness.

Anthropology of the military

This dissertation contributes to the body of anthropology of and about the military from the perspective in which the military services are treated as cultural communities of people who live within a set of institutionally situated organizations and structures. This body of anthropological literature sees the military services as communities of people that have the same kinds of life issues that affect the rest of society, but in different contexts and expressed with different language. This dissertation treats those military services as vital and living cultural communities and

applies the compassion and empathic understanding of anthropology to social contexts within those communities.

To be sure, anthropology has not spent a great deal of effort understanding the military from the inside. As Harrell notes (2003), that is likely because of the tension in anthropology between two ideological positions that are somewhat at odds with one another; one being distrustful of the military as an institution, the other able to separate personal political views from the need to recognize and study the military from the inside (Harrell 2003a). Even though this dissertation is written from that latter perspective, it is valuable and even necessary to contrast this kind of anthropology, an anthropology of the military with other applications of anthropological knowledge that are for the military.

Applying what may become a reference taxonomy of anthropological engagement with the military, Lucas's thumbnail sketch is a useful way to acknowledge anthropology's opposition to some types of military-related work while focusing on more public and openly applied engagements designed to help the members of a human community that happens to be military (Lucas 2009).

Lucas characterizes three types of "military anthropology." The first, which Lucas classifies as MA1 Anthropology of the military is where the perspectives and methods of anthropology are used to study the culture of the military community (Lucas 2009). The second, which Lucas classifies as MA2 Anthropology for the military is where anthropologists and the perspectives and methods of anthropology are put to service in support of the military (Lucas 2009). The most notable recent example is the Human Terrain System (HTS). The third, which Lucas classifies as

MA3 Anthropology for the military is where educational programs such as language, culture, and regional studies are developed such as those at the military academies (Lucas 2009).

With regard to the professional and ethical concerns raised about these three types of anthropology, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) expressed concern about MA2, Anthropology for the military in the form of the Human Terrain System (HTS)¹ (AAA 2009):

“Despite an often voiced personal commitment to ethics among particular human terrain team (HTT) social scientists, this lack of clarity regarding the status of HTT research and the IRB process – in short, an absence of a well-defined ethics framework built into the program – promotes the idea that HTS potentially operates under a state of exception.” (AAA 2009:49)

While the AAA is concerned about MA2 or the HTS (AAA 2009:48-50), MA1 and MA3 are possible without violations of anthropological standards of ethical practice (AAA 2009:45-46, 52). This dissertation is of the type Lucas classifies as MA1 and under the guidance and direction of this dissertation’s committee and the institutional review board process of the university under which it is written. Great attention has been paid to avoid any breaches of ethical standards. And while the body of this type of anthropological work *of* the military is not great, one of its first historical examples was the work of the noted anthropologist Ralph Linton.

In his preface to a compendium of anthropology in the military, John Hawkins cites Ralph Linton’s interesting insider’s insights from military service in World War I (WWI) as possibly the first example of a contribution to anthropology of the military (Linton 1924: 296-300; Hawkins 2003: ix). Linton’s account was of the development and use of his military unit’s insignia (the rainbow) and how that

insignia took on the symbolic importance of a closely guarded identity for tenured members of his unit (Linton 1924: 297-298). Outsiders were strictly prohibited from using the insignia and even new members of the unit had to establish seniority before they could wear it and identify with it (Linton 1924: 298). As an anthropologist, Linton considered the almost totemic significance of military unit insignia similar to that observed in, what at the time were referred to as “primitive groups”, that focused on “a clan or gentile” system (Linton 1924:300). Linton mentioned that all units that comprised the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF, aka the US Army forces in Europe during WWI) had attained unit identities that were “well defined, and often mutually jealous, groups each of which had its individual complex of ideas and observances” (Linton 1924: 299). Those ideas and observances became for the members of military units “a basis for mutual understanding and tolerance and united all the groups against persons or organizations outside the system” (Linton 1924: 298). Over the ensuing 90 or so years, other anthropologists have also studied aspects of military life. A few examples follow.

One important study was by Jeanne Guillemin entitled *Medical Risks and the Volunteer Army* (Guillemin 2003). Guillemin examines the refusal of some military personnel to participate in the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP) for troops bound for Iraq. Because the military failed to convince soldiers of the risk of exposure on the battlefield, they objected to being subjected to a risky vaccine whose long term ill effects were not known. It was because of the objections of soldiers that the vaccine underwent additional reviews. Ultimately the program was substantially curtailed and became voluntary. (Guillemin 2003:29-44)

In another case, Margaret C. Harrell studied Gender- and Class-Based Role Expectations for Army Spouses (Harrell 2003b). Here Harrell situates current gender- and class-based role expectations for Army spouses in an historical context dating back to before the Civil War. That historical context provides important cultural background to the negative regard for enlisted soldiers and their wives and the contrastingly high regard for the aristocratic officer corps. While current obligations have abandoned many of the 19th century prejudices, there is still a social caste in which officer's spouses (wives) are expected to volunteer for the benefit of the unit, whereas enlisted spouses are simply expected to not present difficulties and are perceived consistent with a class-based stereotype of lack of intelligence, immorality and being uneducated. (Harrell 2003b:69-94)

This dissertation is another contribution to a small, but growing body of anthropology of the military. It frames, for the first time, an important issue affecting the military services in an inter-service cultural context and may help identify aspects of the problem that can be addressed in a targeted way. The implication is not that one or the other culture needs to be changed, but that framing jointness as a cultural setting may enable the military services to better prepare members for joint assignments. Of course how to prepare them remains to be discovered. However, defining jointness or joint service as a cultural context could add to the discussion about cultural competency education and training elements that specifically deal with participation in a joint context.

Chapter 2: History of Jointness

On 1 October 1986, the Congress of the United States passed Public Law 99-433 also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, a moment regarded as the beginning of the concept and doctrine of “jointness” in military history. This law, which was an amendment to Title 10 of the United States Code (USC - the permanent laws of the United States), referred to as simply “Goldwater-Nichols” within the DoD, marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the DoD. Among other things the law did was:

ESTABLISHMENT. —The Secretary of Defense shall establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps on the active-duty list who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters” (US Congress 99-433 Section 401 Chapter 38 Section 661, 1986)

A critical effect of Goldwater-Nichols on the culture of the DoD was its emphasis on the concept of “jointness” or “joint matters”:

From 10 USC 99-433 sec. 668: Joint Matters-
“(1) ...the term "joint matters" means matters related to the achievement of unified action by integrated military forces in operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the information environment, including matters relating to-(A) national military strategy; (B) strategic planning and contingency planning; (C) command and control of operations under unified command; (D) national security planning with other departments and agencies of the United States; or (E) combined operations with military forces of allied nations.
(2) In the context of joint matters, the term "integrated military forces" refers to military forces that are involved in the planning or execution (or both) of operations involving participants from-(A) more than one military department; or (B) a military department and one or more of the following: (i) Other departments and agencies of the United States. (ii) The military forces or agencies of other countries. (iii) Non-governmental persons or entities.”

While the definition within the law is exhaustive, the terminology within the definition obscures the salient point of cultural conflict created by the “joint” concept.

To appreciate the impact of jointness on the military service cultures of the DoD, one must appreciate the fact that the highly independent individual military services were now compelled to work together in ways previously unimagined. Mr. James Locker, a US Military Academy (known as West Point) graduate and professional Senate Armed Services Committee staff member, has written a useful analysis of Goldwater-Nichols that addresses some of the US military's history, long standing inter-service rivalries and operational failures that led to Goldwater-Nichols (Locker 2001). While an exhaustive history of the US military is beyond the scope of this dissertation, Locker appropriately selects important aspects of that history that are relevant to the concept of jointness.

From the founding of the nation until 1942, the US military (no DoD existed yet) consisted of two entirely separate military service departments, the Navy with its culture of decentralized organization relying on cooperation and coordination and the Army (known then as the Department of War) that favored more centralized control (Locker 2001:95-96). It was not until 1942 that President Roosevelt created what we now know as the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS also known as the Joint Chiefs) by executive decision and that was done primarily to work effectively with the British, who already had a combined chiefs of staff organization, during World War II (WWII) (Locker 2001: 96). Along with the JCS, President Roosevelt's executive decision created a new organizational construct in response to Pearl Harbor known as the "Unified Theater Commands." These two changes challenged the 150-year cultures of independent operation enjoyed by the two halves of our national defense. The Army and the Navy were now required to pass their national security advice

through the Joint Chiefs and they had to report to supreme commanders in the major theaters of war.

There were two theaters during WWII and were led by General Eisenhower in Europe and General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific and these theaters were subordinate to the JCS. This is a subtle, but important, point of cultural import. Remember, the JCS was comprised of representatives from the two military departments with their inter-service competitions and rivalries alive and well. The unifying construct, the Unified Theater Commands, which was supposed to bring some cooperation to the war effort, was subordinate to and susceptible to the same inter-service dysfunction that was the rationale for its creation in the first place. This tension was felt most profoundly in the Pacific theater where because of inter-service tension, the Unified Theater principle essentially failed and the theater was divided into two commands, one Army (led by MacArthur) and one Navy (led by Nimitz) (Locker 2001: 96). It was not until after WWII that the Department of Defense was created, the Secretary of Defense as a cabinet position was established as the principal advisor to the President on defense matters and the three separate service departments we have today were created (Army, Navy including the Marine Corps, and Air Force) (Locker 2001:96; DoD 1978:22-35).

Important to the concept of jointness was the fact that it was not until 1958 that the theater commands, at the time called “Unified and Specified Commands” were directly subordinated to the Secretary of Defense and no longer under the operational control of the military services (DoD 1978: 190). Even though the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was far from perfect in its

empowering of the Unified and Specified Commands, for the first time the concept of inter-service cooperation and integration could be pursued without service parochialisms standing the direct line of operational control. However, what looked good on paper remained largely stagnant because while the services no longer controlled the Commands, they still controlled their respective service resources and personnel and they never fully complied with strengthening the Unified commanders (Locker 2001:99). From 1958 to 1983, the DoD remained virtually unchanged and because of the on-going service resistance to joint operations and command, there were several operational setbacks. Of particular note was the failed Iranian hostage rescue in 1980 (Locker 2001: 99).

An important example of how the lack of jointness tragically failed was the 1980 attempted rescue of US hostages held in Iran. Referred to as “Operation Eagle Claw,” the operation involved Marine Corps helicopters, Air Force fixed wing refueling aircraft, and Army commandos and was expected to be a coordinated operation, but this was in the era before the concept of joint operations was part of standing DoD policy, doctrine or training let alone incorporated into the individual service cultures. Regardless of whatever aspirations planners had for the participants in the operations to execute their responsibilities cooperatively, the participating units trained separately, met for the first time in the deserts of Iran, had no shared command and control procedures, no visible identification, no compatible radios, no agreed upon plan, and no single clear line of authority to an overall commander (Locker 2001:100). So when the desert sands of Iran caused poor visibility and one of the Marine helicopters to collide with one of the Air Force refueling aircraft, the

ensuing crash and explosion cost the lives of eight service members and the entire operation to be abandoned. In the process of abandoning the operation, secret documents, weapons, and communications gear were compromised (Locker 2001:100).

As tragic as the failed Iranian hostage rescue was, and its inclusion here is in no way meant to denigrate the loss of those heroic service members, it was also a very public example of the failure of the military to work together, a failure to embrace jointness. Then, in 1982, the Chairman of the JCS, General David Jones, testified before congress that his efforts to reform the JCS from within had failed and that Congress was going to have to mandate the necessary reforms (Locker 2001:101). Goldwater-Nichols resulted about three years later.

Over the past 30 years since Goldwater-Nichols, the DoD has reminded everyone about the need for more cooperation and collaboration, in other words, more jointness. The primary document used to advance the policy of jointness is the JCS Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations. Last updated in 2011, JP 3-0:

“reflects the current guidance for conducting joint activities across the range of military operations and is the basis for U.S. participation in multinational operations where the United States has not ratified specific doctrine or procedures. This keystone publication forms the core of joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team.”

Joint Operations covers everything from understanding the national security environment to organizing for and planning operations. This dissertation is focused on the portion of Joint Functions that the DoD refers to as “creating shared understanding” (DoD 2011c: III-11). JP 3-0 provides the following diagram as a guide:




Figure III-2. Creating Shared Understanding

Figure 2.1: from Joint Publication 3-0: Creating Shared Understanding (JP 3-0: III-12)

From JP 3-0: “**Creating Shared Understanding.** In one sense, decisions are the most important products of the C2 (Command and Control) function, because they guide the force toward objectives and mission accomplishment. Commanders and staff require not only information to make these decisions, but also the knowledge and understanding that results in the wisdom essential to sound decision making (Figure III-2).” (DoD 2011c: III-11)

It is clear from JP 3-0 that collaboration and jointness are still goals for the DoD. It is interesting to note, however, that the section *Creating Shared Understanding* was not part of joint doctrine until the 2011 revision (DoD 2011c: iii). So the narrative of the need to create a climate, a culture that encourages and embraces shared understanding is a fairly recent development in the long history of the DoD joint cultural transformation. However, since its addition to JP 3-0 in 2011, the DoD has been consistent in repeating the narrative that the DoD needs to continue the transformation toward an environment of shared understanding as part of the concept of jointness and joint operations in its *Insights and Best Practices Focus Papers* series (DoD 2007; 2011; 2013b-j; 2014b). These papers are developed by the joint staff through “regular contact and dialog” (DoD 2017) with joint units and shared across the DoD as examples of best practices.

By all accounts, the goal of jointness is for future military operations to be integrated in a cross-domain (meaning across military services) way with an increasing emphasis on shared context of understanding among participants. There is a clear statement in the “Mission Command White Paper” by the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Martin Dempsey (DoD 2012c: 3), that the future of military operations will require smaller units at the tactical level operating in a decentralized way. General Dempsey points out that the need for an increasingly decentralized reliance on small units (which tend to be units composed of lower ranking personnel) at the tactical level will increase the need to “create jointness deeper and sooner in the force.” The DoD acknowledges that sometimes mission partners (US and coalition) may not be comfortable with the empowerment of

subordinate levels in decision making that affects mission operations (DoD 2013:3). But joint doctrine as well as other supporting documents like General Dempsey's white paper and DoD best practices increasingly interpret jointness as an acknowledgement that the dynamic contexts of current and future military operations require lower level and lower ranking personnel to be trained in joint concepts.

The DoD has a stated need for military members to reflect more broadly on the contexts of modern national security operations (DoD 2013b-j; 2011c) and there has been a move toward a more unified, coordinated and collaborative application of military power (Locker 2001). However, there remain deep-seated cultural differences between the military services and what amounts to a new "joint" cultural setting.

Chapter 3: Cultural Approach

The concepts and theories related to organizational and cognitive anthropology are the approaches that will be applied in this dissertation for discovering the characteristics of a joint culture. The following concepts will be discussed in the literature review below:

Organizations create structures of meaning and regimes of instrumental rationality (Batteau 2001:726). The ability of humans to adapt and function within a culture is the result of intersubjectively shared but implicit knowledge structures, also known as cultural models, the principles of which come to anthropology from cognitive psychology in the form of schema theory (D'Andrade, 1987; Shore, 1996; Strauss and Quinn, 1997; Ross, 2004).

Organizations Create Structures of Meaning

Anthropology's contribution to the study of organizations and organizational culture is important background for the research in this dissertation because organizations create structures of meaning and regimes of instrumental rationality (Batteau 2001:726). Anthropology has demonstrated that organizational culture is a blending of the cultures employees bring into the organization combined with the meanings and artifacts already present inside the organization. The result is a dynamic renegotiation of meaning and culture and this presents opportunities to challenge old ways of doing things and habits of thought (Batteau 2001:726).

Anthropology's multi-national origins and international collaborations have made important and on-going contributions to the understanding of social structure and social organization as well as organizational culture. Hamada highlights the

notable use of anthropology to industrial research with the work of W. Lloyd Warner, during the 1920's on the Hawthorne Studies, using functionalist techniques from Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown (Jordan 2003:10) (Hamada 1994:9-27). The lessons from the Hawthorne studies were that Warner, through the application of anthropological fieldwork techniques, found that the shop floor was an interconnected social system that had strong control over worker behavior. The social system's behavioral control had implications for incentive systems that management tried to put in place (Wright 1994:6). It is interesting to note that Warner's students at Harvard went on to found the Society for Applied Anthropology (SfAA). Another of Warner's student and collaborator on Hawthorne was Burleigh Gardner (1902-1985) who looked at a business organization as a socio-cultural system within the larger society (Hamada 1994:10-12).

In addition to the early work of anthropology in organizational settings, it is important to appreciate different perspectives on the concept of organization because when some people use the word organization, they may mean different things. One notable difference is between the concepts of "organization" as defined by Scott (1998) and that offered by Firth (1954).

First and foremost, the definition offered by Scott is as follows:

"Organizations are social structures created by individuals to support collaborative pursuit of specified goals." (Scott 1998: 10)

This definition differs from that offered by Firth when discussing social organization and social structure:

"a structural system is concerned with a system of social positions, and organization with a system of roles." (Firth 1954:9)

Scott seems to be saying that when classifying human collective behavior, the organization is the super-ordinate category that encompasses the structure and all other elements as well. Firth seemed to see structure (relationships) and organization (activities) as parallel, different ways or perspectives to describe collective human behavior, neither one being more important or above the other.

This distinction may seem small, but Scott is taking a social situation (Spradley 1980:39) comprised of relationships of people, activities, and artifacts and calling the whole thing an organization. Firth would look at that same social situation and, of the many ways to describe it, have the relationships (structure) and on-going activities (organization) within it and around it as available perspectives. To anthropologists, like Firth, the interplay of all of the elements in the social situation are potentially equally significant to interpreting, understanding and describing its purpose, meaning and significance to the people involved and the question to be answered or problem to be solved (Spradley 1980:45). It is the role of participant observation in the study of organizations and their cultures or perhaps more to the point, the relative priority of purposive proximity that results in gradual socialization and enculturation as a means of understanding and thickly describing, ethnographically, the local knowledge of behavior in an organized human behavior setting (Spradley 1980:3-25; Dewalt et al 2000:259-265; Geertz 2000:9-10). It is interesting to note, that in Scott's account of Hawthorne, Elton Mayo and the Human Relations School (Scott 1998:61-63), no mention is made of the industrial anthropological contribution of W. Lloyd Warner (Hamada 1994:11). Instead, the discovery of the underlying regional community ideologies and behaviors of workers

(Hamada 1994:11) are characterized as a social-psychological “informal structures” (Scott 1998: 62). Contemporary cognitive anthropologists might call those “informal structures” cultural models or cultural schemas.

Cognitive Anthropology and Cultural Models

The term “cultural model” describes the concept that the ability of humans to adapt and function within a culture is the result of intersubjectively shared but implicit knowledge structures, also known as cultural models, the principles of which come to anthropology from cognitive psychology in the form of schema theory (D’Andrade, 1987; Shore, 1996; Strauss and Quinn, 1997; Ross, 2004). Cultural models have become devices that anthropologists use to capture the tacit portions of knowledge domains as part of larger attempts to describe context-specific human behavior and meaning. There is some variability with which the terms “schema” and “cultural models” are used or are familiar to the reader. This dissertation uses the definitions of “schema” and “cultural model” taken from D’Andrade’s “ontology of cultural forms” (D’Andrade 1992: 179-180):

“Schema – the organization of cognitive elements into an abstract mental object capable of being held in working memory with default values or open slots which can be variously filled in with appropriate specifics. For example, most Americans have a well-formed schema for a commercial transaction in which a buyer and seller exchange money for the rights over some object.”

“Model – a schema or interrelated set of cognitive schemas used to represent something, to reason with or to calculate from by mentally manipulating the parts of the model to solve some problem.”

Further, and a key element of the difference between a schema and a cultural model is that the schema exists in the abstract and becomes a model by being intersubjectively shared.

As people live their lives and move through this kaleidoscope of constantly changing contexts, they carry with them implicit general sets of knowledge that equip them to function within each context as it was the last time they experienced it. The pattern of the memory of life's ever-changing contexts is laid down in mental structures that enable the recognition of what has become routine or familiar and it is this notion of recognition based on prior experience is the central tenet of schema theory and cultural models theory (Mandler 1984; D'Andrade 1987). But few humans are capable of retaining detailed accounts of each and every experience. Schemas provide the answer in the form of hidden simplified cognitively-stored patterns that enable recognition (D'Andrade 1992). These simplified structures also equip people to solve new problems in each context or in totally new contexts because each person can tap into their version of that knowledge and repurpose it to meet new demands (D'Andrade, 1992). A schema becomes a cultural model when it is intersubjectively shared (D'Andrade, 1987). Notable alternative interpretations of the concept of cultural models have been offered by Shore, Kronenfeld, Hutchins and Atran et. al. and they will be discussed briefly below.

Shore (1996), who was concerned about how shared a model must be to qualify as a cultural model, expanded upon D'Andrade's sharedness concept by drawing a distinction between individual mental models and instituted cultural models². But because, as Shore put it, humans are "opportunistic and creative model builders and model readers of great virtuosity" (Shore 1996:46), relative to the shared experience, each person subconsciously develops his or her own individual mental model based on the instituted cultural model. The term Shore uses for this sort of

intermediate, quasi individual quasi institutional model is the *conventional* cognitive model (Shore 1996:47). Shore describes individual mental models as idiosyncratic because they are not shared, in their details, by others in the community, but there are stock social concepts that are individualized. The institutional models have public objectification like formal rituals (Shore 1996:52). Shore contrasts the dynamic, changeable, and detailed nature of individual models with societal cultural models that he describes as emerging gradually, are slow to change, and by contrast with personal models, and are less detailed (Shore 1996:52).

According to Kronenfeld (2008), people acquire these implicit context-specific cultural models from the moment they are born as they grow, learn, explore, develop, adapt and mature. Kronenfeld further positions cultural models in the larger cultural context in that culture and language are epiphenomenal but that individuals rely on them as if they actually exist and that the individual representations of the presumed collective representations can vary in detail and specificity (2008:68). It is shared experience and interactive and communicative interdependence that keeps the individual representations close enough to function as a distributed cognitive system. He identifies three kinds of cultural cognitive structures: 1. Cultural conceptual systems that organize abstract knowledge, 2. Cultural models are abstract, general models that provide scenarios for how to behave or interpret the behavior of others, and 3. Cultural models of thought that provide the basic presumptions about how the world is organized as a device for breaking down and organizing unfamiliar problems (Kronenfeld 2008:69).

Kronenfeld defines cultural models as abstract plans relating context-specific skills, knowledge, goals, values, perceptions, emotional states, etc. to actions. When cultural models are triggered, at first they are general with only generic detail and do not automatically apply to any specific situation until instantiated (Kronenfeld 2008:69). Even after instantiation, they are still general in nature and several may be considered for any situation making up what Kronenfeld calls a “kit bag” of scenarios linked to different scenarios that people can apply as needed (Kronenfeld 2008:70). Cultural models can be used in everyday life if they are dynamic and constantly changing and act like a reference library and are inferred anew as individuals experience the world around them (Kronenfeld 2008:72). Cultural models enable effective interaction in a given cultural context.

Hutchins (1995) has been one of the leading proponents of cautioning against an in-the-mind-only view of human-cultural cognition. He has shown that cultural cognition and therefore human cognition is a process that is more than the manipulation of symbols inside a person’s head. Culture, in Hutchins’ view:

“...is a process, and the “things” that appear on the list-like definitions of culture are residua of the process. Culture is an adaptive process that accumulates partial solutions to frequently encountered problems...culture, context, and history...These things are fundamental aspects of human cognition...” (Hutchins 1995: 354)

Hutchins’ view is that studying human cultural cognition should be done with a view to the larger process environment within which cognition takes place (Hutchins 1995:365-374).

Atran et al (2005) offer a related perspective to the study of cognition in their analysis of the way different populations think about nature and how differences in

conceptualizations may affect the way those populations behave toward nature. Atran et al claim that how we define culture may not be the best guide to how to study it (Atran et al 2005:745). In fact, Atran et al want to develop an approach that guards against potential conceptual definitional biases and works toward identifying the causal processes involved in the dynamic relationship between cultural knowledge and observed behaviors (Atran et al 2005:745). Atran et al are perfectly comfortable with the notion that cultural ideas and beliefs may not be shared. Their approach still looks for informant agreement, but their view is that there may be knowledge shared only among a privileged group. Too narrow a focus on agreement, in their view, “directs attention away from understanding the dynamic nature of social processes.” (2005:745) Atran et al summarize their position that:

“the systematic distribution of ideas and behaviors, or cultural path, results from the integration of distinct cognitive, behavioral, and ecological constraints that neither reside wholly within the mind nor are recognizable in a world without minds. Cultural paths do not exist apart from individual minds that constitute them and the environments that constrain them, any more than a physical path exists apart from the organisms that tread it and the surrounding ecology that restricts its location and course” (2005:754).

From Civilian to Military Cultural Models

The preceding conversation about mental schema and cultural models and how they form is fundamentally what occurs in the processes of socialization and enculturation early in life. I maintain that a similar process occurs later in life like when adults make the decision to enter the military, they are socialized and enculturated anew. This time into a new society, a new ethnicity, that of their parent military service. Drawing on Herskovits, the two processes of socialization and enculturation draw a continuum from joining a society to truly sharing and

internalizing the beliefs of that society. Socialization is “the process by means of which an individual is integrated into his society.” (Herskovits 1967: 23) Whereas enculturation is “in essence a process of conscious and unconscious conditioning, exercised within the limits sanctioned by a given body of custom.” (Herskovits 1967: 24).

These processes of socialization and enculturation are common to all human beings and are an unavoidable part of being human. In fact, they are so endemic to the human experience they occur without notice to each and every one of us as we live our lives and embrace the people, places and behaviors of our immediate surroundings. As humans mature, the cultural models that result from early life become so conditioned that new forms of behavior can constitute a cultural change (Herskovits 1967: 25). Yet, mature individuals can change their cultural models by deciding to make a change, by deciding to reinvent themselves.

One way cultural models can change is when a person chooses a life path that sends them in a new direction that is a departure from where they started. The affirmative decision to make the change can be a life-altering one. The change can have consequences that challenge previously well-established social groupings, norms of behavior and even language itself. The breaking down of the established cultural model the individual has built over their early life requires a new socialization process; new language, new behaviors, new places and things, and new rules governing acceptable participation in a new social milieu. The incorporation and adaptation of one's existing cultural model into the new social context requires the individual to pass through many of the same ritual process steps that they may have

already passed through as children. Joining the military as an adult is one such life changing transformation.

The transformation from civilian to military life is roughly the same for all military services in terms of its ritual significance and general components. What separates the services are their different histories, missions, cultures and traditions. Those service specific characteristics are socialized in surprisingly similar ways and with the results being that once a person passes through the initial socialization process, they are of course a member of the armed forces of the United States, but they are first and foremost a member of that military service. That socialization begins and is most profound, in boot camp.

Boot camp, is also known as basic combat training in the Army, basic military training in the Air Force, Marines and Coast Guard, and boot camp in the Navy. Viewed through the lens of a ritual socialization process as described by Turner (2008: 94-95), boot camp is an intense period of separation from familiar social groups and norms of behavior, descent into a liminal period of military initiation and conditioning as a neophyte basic trainee, followed by a reemergence culminating in graduation from boot camp with all the rights and obligations that come with acceptance into the military. In this sense, boot camp truly is a rite of passage.

As a ritual process, initiation into military life at boot camp begins with a complete separation from all of the trappings of civilian life. Symbolically, this is represented by the placing into storage all civilian attire and belongings the new service inductee brought with them when they traveled to boot camp. Next is the

issuance of a starter military uniform that is completely devoid of any symbols of rank, status, or achievement that will be acquired throughout their upcoming military careers. This first uniform is labeled with the trainee's name and their service signifying that they have entered their service at the lowest level with no status other than membership. Each trainee also receives a haircut to further standardize their appearance. Male trainees now look like one another and female trainees a similarly uniform haircut is given although not as short as the men.

The ritual value of storage personal civilian belongings, donning the same blank uniform, and wearing the same gender-specific haircut is to immediately reinforce uniformity of appearance and status while in basic training. As Turner describes it, those in this liminal state “have nothing that may distinguish them from their fellow neophytes or initiands” (Turner 2008: 95). The military services are stripping away the trappings of civilian life each basic trainee is being quickly indoctrinated into the material, social and behavioral aspects of their new military service culture.

Each trainee will be “fashioned anew” (Turner 2008: 95) with the service specific training and experiences their parent service has designed to create Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines. Neophyte basic trainees experience what Turner describes as intense comradeship or “communitas” in their shared lowly status (2008: 96). Their experiences in boot camp:

“the ordeals and humiliations, often of a grossly physiological character, to which neophytes are submitted represent partly a destruction of the previous status and partly a tempering of their essence in order to prepare them to cope with their new responsibilities and restrain them in advance from abusing their new privileges.” (Turner 2008: 103)

The cultural blank slate that is created through the separation, liminality and trials of basic training is filled with service-specific doctrine and training that shapes the trainee's cultural model of what it means to be a member of a given branch of the armed forces. Each trainee learns what it means to be a soldier, sailor, airman or marine. These lessons are reinforced from then on as the trainee graduates from basic training and is expected "to behave in accordance with certain customary norms and ethical standards binding on incumbents of social position in a system of such positions" (Turner 2008: 95). So while the services socialize in similar ways, the content of the training and indoctrination is very service specific about what it means to be a member of that service.

A comprehensive description of the military services is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The basic differences have to do with each service's domain of operation, where they fight and how. But simply listing the characteristics of those domains fails to illuminate the criticality of the fact that it is the systems of meaning and customary norms (Turner 2008: 95) endogenous to each military service that are socialized and enculturated in the ritual of boot camp and are reinforced throughout a military member's career. The resulting differences appear in specific contexts where the services have to negotiate those differences together, like in a joint environment.

The decision to join the military is a life changing decision. The military is analogous to a separate society, a separate culture and some might say a separate ethnicity with the common threads of heritage, customs, and values that are unique to a group of people (Daley 2000: 291-303). But the military is not monolithic in the sense of a single identity even though there are many common elements that cross all

military services. Instead, it is my assertion that through the differential military service socialization processes, individuals acculturate into separate cultures and become members of, what may be usefully referred to separate military “ethnicities.” The way Omohundro defines the term “ethnicity” is useful for emphasizing the contrasts between the services that they themselves continually reinforce:

“The ethnic group invests effort to distinguish itself from others in the wider society...Ethnic group members are also aware of their group identity and distinctiveness, and they usually invest effort to foster such awareness in themselves and their fellow citizens.” (Omohundro 2008: 31)

Maybe by considering the services as ethnicities, as Daley suggested, new analytical lenses can be applied to the dynamics of multi-service jointness. If we apply Jenkins’s standard anthropological model of ethnicity (2008: 14) as a framework for considering what we know about military indoctrination, it is plausible to conclude that the separate military services can be thought of as “ethnicities.”

Jenkins states that ethnicity (all quotations below are from Jenkins 2008: 14):

“Ethnicity is a matter of cultural differentiation – a dialectical interplay between similarity and difference.”

“Ethnicity is centrally a matter of shared meanings – produced and reproduced during interaction.”

“Ethnicity is no more fixed or unchanging than the way of life of which it is an aspect, or the situations in which it is produced and reproduced.”

“Ethnicity, as an identification, is collective and individual, externalized in social interaction and the categorization of others, and internalized in personal self-identification.”

Military ethnicities modify a person's existing civilian cultural models to enable successful behavior in new military service social contexts. The separate military service ethnic identities create cultural models of what it means to be a

member of a specific service, what it means in that military service to be a member of the other military services, and possibly even what it means to work in a joint context. So when we think about the cultures of the military services in joint contexts, we are considering more than differences in uniform or rank insignia even though those are important. We are thinking about the artifacts of a process of transformation and adaptation that each military member went through as a former civilian based on a decision they made to begin a new life in the military service of their choice.

We may not know why the military services evolved over time to take the views they do. Maybe it is because the services truly are culturally distinct enough and continually emphasize the inter-service differences to be considered ethnicities. If we accept that from the anthropological model of ethnicity provided by Jenkins (Jenkins 2008), and Omohundro's definition (Omohundro 2008), then we could make a strong case that the military services could be thought of as separate ethnicities. It should come as no surprise then that the within service shared meanings and ways of life would impact each service member's service-specific cultural model. Specifically, impacted would be how the military services learn and how they reflect upon information. Or to bring this thought closer to the problem of jointness, how the services would entertain ideas from other services. How receptive they are to alternatives or in other words, how the services view information and analysis.

While available literature on the perspectives the services with regard to information, analysis of options, and critical dialog about decisions is limited, Builder analyzed the information and operations analysis styles of the services in a study for the Rand Corporation (Builder 1989). Builder found that while all of the services used

formal analysis, they used it in different ways and for different purposes. Builder's analysis (see Appendix E for a list of Builder's descriptions) found that the Air Force is the most comfortable with analysis and so much so that it is used to support decisions of all kinds, not just those related to formalized planning, programming, or budgeting processes (Builder 1989: 104-105). The Army, on the other hand, seems more concerned about getting a single answer rather than illuminating alternatives (Builder 1989: 105-106). The Navy seems more concerned with confirming Naval experience, traditions, and institutional judgment rather than evaluating the Navy (Builder 1989: 106-107). These three approaches to analysis could have important ramifications for team learning and collaboration in an inter-service environment.

If each service does not have a tradition of open-minded information analysis that may challenge the status quo, there may be friction if a team member has alternatives to a finding or conclusion. Or the converse may occur where a team member does not question a decision, at the appropriate time of course and not in violation of orders, because that member does not come from a tradition of debate based on valid analysis of possibilities. It would seem that the whole point of jointness is to avoid doctrinaire solutions and learn from the diversity of ideas present in the joint context. Level of comfort with analysis as a way to adjudicate complex problems would seem to indicate a willingness to listen to alternatives that may even go against service traditions or be more grey than black and white. Trust may become an issue for members whose service tradition may not have prepared them for such a context. How does one proceed when there is not a single right answer or information

is leading to an answer that indicates one's parent service may need to change the way it does certain things?

Summary

This dissertation applies the perspectives from organizational and cognitive anthropology to the study of joint culture. Organizational anthropology contributes an important perspective that views the organization as an environment that creates structures of meaning that are dynamically renegotiated between employees and the organization. Cognitive anthropology provides the perspective that humans develop and retain cognitive structures based on experience that enable them to function as they encounter it. This study also acknowledges that the military services' ritual indoctrination processes and their differential appreciation for critical information analysis and debate can create self-reinforced separations between the services that are analogous to separate ethnicities.

Chapter 4: Cultural Analysis of the Joint Service Experience

As I mentioned above, the ethnographic research in this dissertation looks at what military service members experienced in their multi-service and multi-agency assignments. My research methods fall into three broad categories, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and the interpretation of findings. This mixed approach is designed to leverage a life-long career of complete participation that identified the research question as well as allowed a targeted examination of reference materials in the publicly available DoD library. Semi-structured interviews were a vital part of the research to provide empirical data from military members who experienced joint assignments and their account is vital to the credibility of the results of this research.

Participant Observation³ as an insider

I have worked in the DoD as an active duty Air Force military service member and as a DoD civilian civil service employee for a combined period of over 37 years. I have dedicated my life to the national security of the United States in uniform and as a civilian. Throughout that time, I worked closely with military members from all of the four services consulted in this dissertation. That close and continuing contact with the military has made me acutely aware of the cultures, customs and traditions of all four services. It also made me acutely aware of the importance of the subjects of joint duty, joint service, the perceptions some service members hold of the other services. That experience also includes the almost axiomatic, occasional and fleeting, frustration service members feel with the bureaucracy of the military and the DoD. Sharing the joys and sorrows of military service is part of the experience that comes

with life in the DoD as it likely is in any profession. Having been so immersed in DoD and military cultures for so long, my role as an ethnographer of the military is one of an insider or complete or ordinary participant (Spradley 1980:61) (Dewalt and Dewalt 1998: 263). Bernard cautions that aspiring to become a complete participant can be a deception if used to disguise the fact that one is doing research (Bernard 2002: 327). As I was already a complete participant before embarking on research and all of my interviewees knew me in my professional DoD capacity, my participation status was not an attempt to hide my research.

I was in the military as an occupation and life choice and came to anthropology later. I say this so as not to imply some kind of undeclared status as a researcher masquerading as a native. There are legitimate ethical concerns that can be raised by such behavior (Bernard 2002). Instead, I feel I can legitimately claim the title of insider. It was after almost four decades of military and DoD service that I spent the years in university to learn the theory and methods of anthropology and to hone my perception about the dynamic socio-cultural contexts that are the military from the perspectives of anthropology.

My status as an insider means I understand how to navigate the DoD and military bureaucracies and their rules and protocols. I have, in a sense, expert knowledge within the limits of my own training and experience. In my experience, the informal military social bond is built from a combination of common service experiences, occupational specialties, assignments, or other duty. If one is planning to write about the experiences of military personnel, a level of solidarity with shared experiences goes a long way in easing minds and establishing rapport. It must be a

genuinely empathic understanding that comes from a life choice of actual military duty. Also, respecting the position and rank of the person with whom you are interacting is a must. As a civilian, as I am now, knowledge of and respect for traditions and protocols are what convinces colleagues of one's credibility and trustworthiness. However, it is important to know a lot without being a know-it-all. In my experience, humility in one's own ability while still confident in purpose are the hallmarks of the military ethos.

Military members respect clarity of purpose, relevance of one's mission, and competency in its execution. These are also the characteristics of good research. So, translating the objectives of this dissertation's research into a context acceptable to the military was made easier by my insider's perspective. That perspective also allowed me to identify jointness as an issue of concern to many people who serve and to gain their support in conducting my research. And of course, those years of participation with the military informed my choice of research focus and led to my selection of military-related documents and the crafting of my semi-structured interview questions.

The professional literature of the DoD that informed the research direction of this dissertation is a somewhat arcane corpus of DoD government publications and relevant military-related journal articles. I say arcane only because it is not a library of which many people avail themselves, inside the military or out. But for the purposes of understanding DoD goals and actions with regard to joint duty, government publications serve not only to inform this research, they also serve as guides and even policy for the military. That professional literature comes from

publicly available, on-line resources that contain the joint doctrine, policies and best practices relevant to joint service that influence the experiences of service members in joint assignments.

Semi-structured Interviews


Semi-structured interviewing provides what is a highly interpretive insider's ethnographic account of military service with a systematic approach to the study of joint service. While my personal experience with the military has allowed me to identify an issue of importance to the military, semi-structured interviewing added rigor and comparability as well as using my interviewees time efficiently (Bernard 2002:205). Comparability is achieved by following the protocol's questions and pursuing opportunities for the interviewee to explain (Bernard 2002:205) the sequential moments from when they were notified about their joint assignment, the preparation for it, and their reactions to it upon arrival. Joint assignments are fit into the normal flow of assignments throughout one's military career, but they also add complexity to a military member's professional progression within their parent service. The semi-structured interview protocol was constructed specifically to focus on those challenges. Anyone wishing to verify and validate my findings need only implement the interview guide (see Appendix C) to produce comparable data across interviewees.

Core logic – A framework for analyzing joint experiences

In this dissertation, I am examining the processes of recruitment, preparation for and service in joint assignments with other services, agencies and nationalities. Together this process from beginning to end is framed in what I have described as the

core logic of this dissertation (see Figure 2 below). The term “core logic” helps to unpack the general categories of experiences all military members have from before arriving at a joint assignment to the on-site experiences while at the duty station through the member’s perceptions of the joint assignment that result in a perceived value of jointness. While each service member’s personal experiences are unique, the core logic framework creates a structure within which to position the interaction of events and responses that are the subject of this research.

Figure 4.1: The core logic framework



The core logic framework is structured in a loop of dynamic cultural influences that together act as a kind of roadmap to the key elements of joint service that I have learned are important to the members of the armed forces. The core logic drove the development of the semi-structured interview protocol and formed the general outline for identifying patterns in interview responses. The core logic consists

of four parts that encompass the stages of joint service: Causes, Effects, Impacts, and Adaptations.

Causes

In this dissertation, the concept of “causes” is meant to be the things that produce an effect. In the case of joint service, these are the experience prior to the joint assignment. Another way to think about it is that causes are each service member’s career experiences prior to and arrival on site at a joint assignment which is a “joint” socio-cultural context comprised of members from multiple different services, agencies or nationalities. Causes or prior experiences includes how each member’s parent service advocated for joint assignments, selected members to serve in joint assignments and it includes the training and preparation service members receive prior to and after arrival at their joint assignment. These experiences surrounding the move to a joint context require each service member to individually adapt their service-specific systems of meaning based on experience and training to understand, and collaborate in the joint context for the achievement of stated and (presumably) shared military goals.

My experience with the military has shown me that in addition to doing their jobs proficiently and professionally, military members spend a lot of time planning for or recovering from permanent changes of station or PCS moves. In other words, they move, a lot, and moving consumes a great deal of time and attention. Also a PCS move is more than a plane ride. It is the preparation before the move which sometimes includes influencing where one will be moving, but most of the time the service member has little to no say in the matter. There is the shipment of belongings

and if the member's family is coming along, all of the health, educational, and housing needs have to be considered and arrangements made for the family at the new duty station. After arrival at the new location, the member has to get settled at their new unit while the family has to get settled into a new life. This issue of PCSing, as it is known, and its impact on the lives of military members and their families is probably the one common area of shared experience across all branches of the military that creates the greatest sense of camaraderie and solidarity. However, it is a member's military service that provides the stability during this time of personal upheaval.

Within each military service, the familiarity of service norms and traditions are an important socio-cultural anchor throughout the PCS process. The "ADCON", short for administrative control, is the parent service administrative organizational structure that helps the member through the PCS transition. ADCON produces the paperwork, known as "orders," that sets the parameters of a service member's PCS, detailing where, with which military unit and for how long a member will be stationed at the new location. These orders also authorize a member to work with military travel offices for the travel of self and family. Those orders also act as the authorization for a member to have their belongings packed up and shipped to the new duty station. Orders are, in effect, the currency of the transfer of duty station. And while they mention the new parent service military unit, they do not detail the nature of the work a member will be doing at the new location. The gaining unit, the parent service unit at the member's new location, has the obligation to indoctrinate and train the member on their new duties.

If a member is moving to a joint assignment, then a wider set of norms comes into play, those that enable the services to relate to one another through rank structures and occupational similarities. All military members from boot camp on have received basic information about the uniform and rank insignia of the other services. So they are equipped with enough information to avoid lapses in fundamental military protocols like knowing when and whom to salute. But functioning at a high level in a mixed service, or agency, or nationality environment is a different matter. The archive of DoD doctrine and best practices provide broad recommendations for how a joint organization could or should function. But to discover if those best practices are enabled in the flow of actual military experiences, the manner in which service members are recruited and prepared for joint assignments, and service members' perceptions of that process, is of research interest.

These pre-joint assignment experiences are key to understanding joint experiences writ large because the day to day interactions with members from other services, agencies or nationalities are the opportunities for implementation of best practices. The joint context requires each service member to individually adapt their service-specific cultural models based on experience and training to understand, collaborate, and inform the joint context for the achievement of stated and (presumably) shared military goals. This transition period is an opportunity to realize the DoD vision of top-to-bottom jointness with training and orientations.

Effects

The next stage in the core logic framework is Effects. Effects are the experiences military members have while serving in assignments where they are

working with personnel from other services, agencies or nationalities. My time in and with the military has shown me that members initially behave based on service-institutionally situated and shared cultural models of military life that are the result of service-specific indoctrinations and experiences of day-to-day life in the military. The military services are very specific in their indoctrination and military training goals; to produce the best service members in their respective services who can accomplish whatever war-fighting or support jobs the military needs them to do in their occupational specialties. The singular focus on the rituals, traditions, rules and regulations of each military service effectively creates separate institutional culture-cognitive models that prepare, enable, and even give a situated agency based on their rank and position to each service member while in the military. The Effects portion of the core logic focuses on how military members' experiences with other services, agencies or nationalities challenge those service-specific institutional cultural models the results of which might be that the members behave differently in the joint context due to a possible "culture shock" that results from their lack of preparation for the new social context.

Impacts

The core logic then frames the analysis of the consequences of how what happened during the joint assignment affected members' understanding of the meaning of jointness and the value of continued participation in joint contexts. Through the narratives that members provided during the semi-structured interviews, I was able to identify a pattern regarding the value of jointness, what jointness means, and both contribute to an understanding of joint culture.

Adaptations

The final part of the core logic framework is called adaptations. By adaptations I mean how the parent services have adapted their views of joint service over that time span of each interviewees period of military service. By listening to military service personnel describe their first joint experience to the last, we might be able to have interviewees describe any changes they observed in the behavior and rhetoric of their parent service with regard to joint service. Adaptations also looks to characterize how the individual changed over the course of their military careers with regard to their views of the value of joint service.

Interview process and Profiles of interviewees.

The sample contributing to this study consists of those individuals who have served or are currently serving on active duty and have served or are currently serving in a joint assignment. This population includes members of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. All participants were 18 years of age or older and there was no exclusion based on gender, religion, ethnicity, or socio-economic status. Ten individuals participated.

Using a snowball sampling technique, my professional associates put me in contact with other current or prior military members who may have been willing to participate and met selection criteria of having served in a joint (multi-service, multi-agency, or multi-national assignment). I would then contact the candidate interviewee and introduce my project. I fully expected some candidates to politely refuse, but all agreed to be actual participants. We would then coordinate a time and place for the interview. As all interviewees were from the intelligence occupational specialty, they

and I worked in an environment where digital voice recording devices are prohibited. Plus, while they were willing to support my research, they also had lives outside of the professional work setting where we met, as did I for that matter. And unlike the close knit community that, in my experience, forms around military service posts *overseas*, here in the US, there is an understandable divide between their military/private lives and their working lives. That divide is largely due to logistics that are a combination of family obligations and for active duty personnel, other military duty obligations. Eventually, 10 candidates were interviewed at times and places we agreed upon and the interviews were recorded.

All personnel were given the same semi-structured interview questions (see Appendix C for the complete list of semi-structured interview questions). But as a lead-in to the questionnaire and after describing my project in more detail and explaining the institutional review board (IRB) process, I asked each participant for some background information: gender, age in years, branch of service, years in service (active and reserve), and years serving in joint assignments. Their service breakdowns and number of participants were as follows: Army 4, Air Force 3, Navy 2, Marines 1. There were 4 women and 6 men. I did not ask them their personal ethnic identities. Regarding the mix of officers and enlisted, I felt fortunate to have four members of the Army all of whom were officers with prior enlisted service.

They all went to officer's candidate school or OCS, which is:

“the U.S. Army's main training academy for prospective Army Officers. The school is generally open to qualified enlisted, along with civilians who hold at least a four-year college degree. Candidates who successfully complete the rigorous, 12-week school receive formal commissions as U.S. Army Officers and assume the ability to command Soldiers.” (US Army 2016)

These Army personnel could speak with authority about serving joint environments as both enlisted and officers.

Below is a table (Table 4.1) that captures background information about each interviewee. The table relates the parent service of each interviewee to their occupations, years of service, years in joint assignments, percent of career in joint assignments, whether they were enlisted or officer and the number of years of service at time of first joint assignment. Of note is that on average across all services interviewed, interviewees had approximately 20 years of parent military service and approximately 13 years in joint service assignments or approximately 65% of their careers were in joint contexts.

Another notable detail about interviewees' joint duty is the point at which they experienced their first joint assignment. Eight of the ten people interviewed experienced their first joint assignment within their first 3 years of service. Another way to think about this is that for interviewees who were or remained enlisted, their first joint assignment occurred in their first term of enlistment. In other words, they went to a joint assignment after having just been indoctrinated into their parent service.

Table 4.1: Catalog of interviewee background information

	Parent Service	Occupation	Years of Service	Years of service at the time of first joint assignment	Years in Joint Assignments	Percent of Career in Joint Assignments	Enlisted/ Officer
1	Air Force	Intelligence	15	1	11	73%	Enlisted
2	Army	Intelligence	12	2	8	67%	Officer (Prior Enlisted)

	Parent Service	Occupation	Years of Service	Years of service at the time of first joint assignment	Years in Joint Assignments	Percent of Career in Joint Assignments	Enlisted/ Officer
3	Marines	Intelligence	20	2	16	80%	Enlisted
4	Air Force	Intelligence	20	1	6	30%	Officer
5	Navy	Aviation/Intelligence	24	8	12	50%	Officer
6	Army	Intelligence	18	2	18	100%	Officer (Prior Enlisted)
7	Navy	Intelligence	26	3	12	46%	Officer
8	Army	Military Police/Artillery/Intelligence	20	2	10	50%	Officer (Prior Enlisted)
9	Air Force	Intelligence	20	8	12	60%	Officer
10	Army	Intelligence	24	1	23	96%	Officer (Prior Enlisted)
			Ave ~20 yrs	Ave ~3 yrs	Ave ~13 yrs	Ave ~65%	

Summary

The ethnographic research in this dissertation looks at the difference between service members' expectations based on the stated goals of jointness, to the extent they have a clear idea, and what military service members experienced in their multi-service and multi-agency assignments. My research methods fall into three broad categories, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and the interpretation of findings. This mixed approach is designed to leverage a life-long career of

complete participation that identified the research question as well as allowed a targeted examination of reference materials in the publicly available DoD library.

I introduced the core logic framework that I used to guide the development of the semi-structured interview protocol as well as the analysis of interviews. The core logic framework is structured around the concept that a military member's service career is a continuum of PCS assignment experiences. Because of the importance of jointness and joint service to the DoD, the core logic framework acts a roadmap for following the causes, effects, impacts and adaptations of joint service as a way of understanding the manner in which jointness is treated in the flow of military service.

Semi-structured interviews were a vital part of the research to provide empirical data from military members who experienced joint assignments and their accounts form the basis for the first cultural model of jointness. In chapter five, those interviews are summarized using the core logic framework. In chapter six, the recurring and shared themes from the experiences of service members are re-grouped to form the schemas and description of joint culture.

Chapter 5: Analysis of Interviews

Introduction

The results of the semi-structured interviews will be discussed in two parts. First I will summarize the interviews following the core logic framework here in chapter 5. That summary will look for patterns and include extended verbatim quotations from the interviewees (note: quotations include in situ parenthetical explanations for clarity). That summary will also be grouped according to the flow of the semi-structured interview protocol (see Appendix C). Second, it is in chapter 6 that the themes will be regrouped into common categories to develop two joint cultural schemas and to describe joint culture. I chose this approach because some of the themes transcended the flow of the semi-structured interview protocol and appeared in multiple locations throughout the flow of a person's joint assignment.

Causes

The first stage of the core logic framework is "Causes" or those experiences that military service members have prior to and immediately following a PCS move. Here we are looking at those experiences specifically surrounding a PCS move to a joint assignment. Having "PCSeD" many times myself (I PCSeD 7 times in 12 years while on active duty military service), I was very familiar with the process of PCSing. The purpose in concentrating on this seemingly insignificant period of time is to understand if any of those interviewed received any training or orientations prior to moving to a joint assignment. Causes tries to understand if military services are preparing personnel for joint assignments and if so, how. What this dissertation found from the experiences of interviewees was a shared pattern of experiences before

PCSing to a joint assignment. There were no training sessions or orientations provided to personnel prior to a joint assignment. The pattern reflects broad agreement across ranks and services with some differences in what they knew about the assignment beforehand. First I will look at the commonalities and then at the differences.

Pre-PCS

Common Experiences

First, none of the six enlisted, or prior-enlisted, personnel knew that when they PCSed to their first joint assignment that it was, in fact, joint. Further, only one of those interviewed (officers and enlisted) had much if any say in the choice of assignment. This latter point is not unusual in the military in that many members have no control over their assignments *intra*-service. I raise it here to emphasize the point that since it is routine for the military to assign personnel *intra*-service with little choice, in the experience of those interviewed, there was no change in procedure when personnel were assigned to duty stations that end up being *inter*-service or joint.

Also, that first joint assignment happened very early in their careers. As I mentioned in the interviewee profile section and cataloged in Table 4.1 (above), 8 of the 10 people interviewed PCSed to their first joint assignment within 3 years of joining their parent service. That is much too early for any of them to have received any formal joint professional military education (JPME) as they would have been too junior in rank to qualify for it. However, none of those interviewed received any pre-PCS joint training or orientations prior to that first joint assignment. Some of those interviewed would have extensive JPME later on in their careers, but for that first

assignment, most had to rely on the rudimentary military service awareness training provided in boot camp.

Of course all of this changed once personnel had served that first joint assignment and got into the routine of military life and career advancement. It was after that first assignment that all members became more knowledgeable about how the military assignments process worked within their parent service and for officers, they became aware of opportunities for JPME. I will discuss below the value of JPME in preparing officers for joint assignments based on the experiences of those interviewed. However, when discussing her time as an enlisted professional military education (EPME) instructor, the senior enlisted Air Force member mentioned that prior to selection for NCO status, junior enlisted personnel received no introductory or primary joint training or education which would be near the end of their first enlistment and after when they were most like to have had a joint assignment already.

One Naval officer described their pre-PCS experience like this:

“My first tour was really luck. And I will tell you that I think that was the senior Navy leadership trying to place me in a job that would, 1. Help my career, and 2. Would enable me to learn a little. In all honesty, the Navy doesn’t really talk to officers about joint, until you’re an O-4 (Lieutenant Commander). Now, there’s lots of opportunities where you can work with other services. And they might say, hey, you’re going to be able to work with other services and that’s great. But they don’t emphasize it because it doesn’t count. So, right now, the way the Navy career path works is, you are expected to spend your time steeped on the Navy side so that by the time you move to being a staff officer, a staff grade officer at O-4, that’s when you go do your joint tour. Because then you can best represent and compete with the other services on whatever the joint venture is. You know enough about the Navy to move forward. So, when I was coming to the assignments prior to O-4, they weren’t emphasizing joint. They said, hey, where do you want to go. And they said, if that’s where you want to go, ok.

When going to that first joint assignment after making O-4, it was you can hit two milestones at once. You’re going to hit your first major (significant not the rank) leadership billet. Division officer (typically O-1s,

ensigns and O-2s lieutenant junior grades), department head (typically O-3s lieutenants and O-4s lieutenant commanders), those are pre-reqs, but you actually have to go through a selection board to be an XO (executive officer – executes the policies of the commanding officer⁴ typically O-5s commanders). So you’re going to get your first selection tour, so that was good. And you are going to be working with joint entities on the base. But the Navy still won’t count that as a complete joint tour because you’re not signing the evaluations of joint people. I was in a Navy unit working with other military units. So, from my perspective, I did lots of joint work, but I did not receive any joint credit for it. And smart people ask the questions sooner rather than later. Which is, ok, I know that if I get a joint tour prior to O-4, it won’t count ask my JPME, joint phase something equivalent. It won’t count as my phase 1 unless I’m already an O-4.

I mean, they’ll touch very lightly on joint subjects in many of the courses that you go to. But you’re not going to get intensive joint training unless it’s specific to getting a joint qualification. And that’s driven by, are you going to a JDAL (joint duty assignment list) coded billet? And you can only fill those if you are O-4 and senior. The Navy won’t waste any of those on an O-3 and below because it won’t count toward your JPME phase 1 and 2. You gotta do the job and you gotta get the school and this counts as your two phases. So interestingly enough, I had a bunch of joint experiences, but I didn’t necessarily receive credit.”

One Army officer described the pre-PCS experience like this:

“Needs of the Army. No wish list. I came back from my previous assignment and was already to go to [his next army assignment]. Our unit was geared up and ready to go and they said, you’re not going.”

He ended up going to the joint assignment instead of staying with his unit.

The Senior Enlisted Marine described the pre-PCS experience like this:

“I was guaranteed East Coast (of the U.S.) in my contract to join the Marine Corps. And then it was explained to me that it can only be Camp Lejeune because of my career field there was no duty stations other than Camp Lejeune for my tour. So I might as well have chosen that. And then basically I was just offered the joint assignment (at the time he did not know it was joint). I wasn’t even sure where the assignment was. So I remember waiving my East Coast option and then they gave me my orders to the joint assignment...when I got my orders I was leaving quite quickly, near Christmas time. So I left literally days after receiving the orders. The orders were to report to the commander in a location in a foreign country that was some distance from the actual duty location. My orders took me only as far as the city where the commander was located. So I get to the airport in that city and I look for the Marine

Corps liaison office. Which I could not find. I had to call the travel number on the back of the orders and sleep in the airport until the time cycled back around to the East Coast so I could speak with someone. I had to book my own train ticket and find my way to the location of the joint assignment on my own. I was very nervous the entire time. I almost got robbed like twice in the airport. I was asking way too many questions. I was looking way too lost. So I just ended up at the joint assignment based on, I presume, just a detailing quota for Marines over there. Nothing influenced that other than the pure assignment system.”

Different Experiences

Only one of the people interviewed had complete control over their first joint assignment and some of the others did engage in a dialog with their parent service about the joint assignment. Still, only one of them knew it would be a *joint* assignment. Also, it should be noted that the opportunity to speak with someone in the parent service about PCSs is quite common across the military. Some members even get to fill out a list of desired locations to which they might like to be assigned. This list is commonly referred to as a “dream sheet.” The dream sheet is called that because the needs of the parent service still prevail and enough people have experienced disappointment in their dream sheet not influencing the service’s decision where the member would PCS. So, while the dream sheet is by no means binding on the service, a dialog between the member and the service at least allows the service member’s desires to be heard and cataloged. Again, for this project, only one of the people interviewed got to choose their joint assignment where they would PCS.

One Air Force officer described the pre-PCS experience like this:

“My supervisor at the time. A retired chief (Chief Master Sergeant), when I was at my previous assignment. I said, hey I’m looking to go to a place close to home where most of my family is. I was married and had one kid at the time. But it was closer to New Jersey and it was kind of the closest base in my career field, because I’m a mathematician by training. There’s not a whole

lot of positions out there to have. And he said, well you can be a big fish in a small pond, but if you go there you be a little fish in a big pond. So he kind of gave me career advice. If you go there, there's a good chance you could get over looked or whatever. He thought I should have gone to somewhere within the Air Force chain to stay within the Air Force and get known. But I said no I volunteered to go to the joint assignment. There was no problem getting the assignment.”

In summary, the first stage of the core logic framework, causes, revealed what military personnel experienced prior to that first joint assignment. We learned that only one had a choice and none knew the assignment was to be joint. For that first joint or *inter-service* assignment, a pattern emerged for pre-PCS experiences based on those similar experiences shared across service lines, especially for enlisted personnel, that mirrored the normal *intra-service* PCS experience. With one exception, members had little-to-no choice in PCS destination and members had no advance warning that the new assignment will be *inter-service/joint*. With the emphasis placed on jointness by the DoD and the desire for “creating jointness deeper and sooner in the force” (DoD 2013:3), it is interesting that there would be no training for personnel prior to that first joint assignment.

Effects

Effects are the experiences military members have, after arrival at a joint assignment, while serving in assignments where they are working with personnel from other services, agencies or nationalities. The Effects portion of the core logic focuses on how military members' experiences with other services, agencies or nationalities challenge their parent service-specific institutional systems of meaning the results of which might be that the members behave differently in the joint context.

Orientations or training post-PCS

After arrival at their joint assignments, some enlisted personnel received off-duty seminars developed on the initiative of fellow service members to help with inter-service operations and relationships.

The senior enlisted Air Force member interviewed described it as follows:

“It was not part of the technical training (at the training assignment). If the orientation sessions were more institutionalized and more formulated, I think that would help. I think there is a need to understand the differences. This also goes for civilians and contractors. The biggest thing with those types of orientation sessions is that it can’t be the military giving an orientation on the civilians, only. It needs to be both. It doesn’t really help if the Air Force has this great idea to teach their airmen about the other services if the other services aren’t doing the same. Because I think it’s one of those things that you kind of have to be at the same level before you can begin to really appreciate it.”

The senior enlisted Marine (retired) interviewed described it as follows:

“When I went to a joint assignment on an Air Force base, I knew I would have to apply for Air Force housing. And all that was an address. Luckily the Air Force knew more about the Marine Corps than I had any clue about anything for the Air Force. I had no idea, zero. But at that assignment I became quite good friends with the Army unit. Once again, through the Air Force, the top three (enlisted ranks), recognized the other services. I met some senior enlisted from the Army who through a conversation, we had a top-three meeting, they were going to burn off some ammunition, because they had to reduce the ammunition inventories. So I asked if I could bring a bunch of Marines to fire some weapons. So I brought some Marines and I said, look we’ll clean all the weapons, as a senior enlisted I think it’s great for the Marines to keep fresh. And they gave us, no kidding, half a day to shoot off thousands and thousands of rounds that were expiring. It all starts with an Air Force person trying to bring me into a community. Every instance of cooperation is someone for some reason bringing others in. Not through training, not through publications, personally coming in and approaching you and bringing you in in the absence of training.”

Where available, these seminars were felt to be useful. All enlisted members wished they had received some kind of orientation or training prior to arriving at their joint duty assignments. The senior enlisted Air Force member described it as follows:

“That discussion never happened (about the assignment being joint). However, because my technical school was joint, they did somewhat have that discussion with us. It just wasn’t in the context of when you were “permanent party” meaning when you are done with technical school. It was more so, hey you go to school with all of these different services, so we, as part of our training progression, where you were allowed to have more and more liberty, you know, as your time went through training, part of that encompassed learning the other services ranks, how to address them how to speak to them and everything else. So, the jointness piece, from a military perspective was already kind of there and part of the training. But specifically for the joint assignment, that was never addressed.”

All enlisted had no pre-conceptions about joint duty prior to arriving at their joint assignment largely because they were unaware that their assignment was going to be joint.

On-duty Service Differences

Returning to the core logic framework, perhaps the most consequential *Effect* of the joint experience is expressed in the differences people notice between their parent service and other services. Perhaps as a positive consequence of having no pre-PCS jointness training, all enlisted personnel interviewed had no explicit pre-conceptions about joint duty prior to arriving at their joint assignment. Again, they were unaware that their assignment was going to be joint. So the enlisted members approached their first joint assignment with a naïveté toward jointness. Their reactions to service differences, while based on a fairly brief exposure to their parent service, was useful to understand the impact of those differences on mission performance. The senior enlisted Air Force member described some of the differences as follows:

“To give an example where the Air Force, you know, it’s perfectly appropriate to call either a staff sergeant, a technical sergeant, a master sergeant, or senior master sergeant, we can call them all “sergeant.” But sergeant is an actual rank for the Army and so we were taught very quickly

that, ok, we understand that you were told in basic training that this is ok to do for us (the Air Force), but it is not ok for you to do that in a joint environment. With that there also came, you know, just the differences, I think between how Air Force spoke to their superiors. Because, your superiors are, yes there is still that military structure. Right, where you understand somebody out-ranks you, somebody is bigger and better than you are just by sake of their rank or their experience. But very early on for us, or at least me for my Air Force perspective, is that your supervisors were supposed to be mentors. So yes, you may have messed up and they would quickly correct you. But the point was for you to learn a lesson. And I think that the other services had that same approach, but I don't think that they used it as soon as they did for the Air Force. So, where you saw a lot of soldiers getting, "you are going to do push-ups" or those types of things (as a disciplinary measure). The Air Force had already kind of started to weed that out of us in technical school. Whereas for the other services I noticed it kind of lasting a lot longer."

Yet, even though none of the enlisted knew or felt prepared for a joint assignment, all service members, including officers, felt that because of their personal professional skills acquired in their parent service, they were able to navigate the bare basic differences in service, agency and national cultures in spite of what they referred to as "culture shock." One Army officer described what he meant by "culture shock" at his first joint assignment, back when he was still enlisted, as follows:

"I remember one soldier I was working with, he was very surprised, because he was like, I joined for the Army (meaning to be in the Army) and where are all the Army people. Because we were actually stationed on an Air Force base. It was a complete culture shock. Yes, I was aware of the other services, however I didn't understand how much we would interact with each other. There wasn't someone to guide and tell us all these different things. It's just, you show up to work and, wait a minute, there's all these other services."

The senior enlisted Marine described his culture shock experience at his first joint assignments, a training assignment, like this:

"Going to that assignment was a bit of a shock to me actually. Because I had been very Marine Corps-centric. Boot camp was very Marine. My friends were everyone's green. I don't care where you come from. I don't care what you do. It's all what are you going to do. How hard are you going to work? If you try you won't fail. Ultimately, as long you are working you won't fail. I carried that forward with me. That, as long as you try you can

never fail. Some of the stuff, the hikes, the ten mile things, just killers. They ran you to failure. So when you failed it was a victory because you were in it to fail. And that's what they wanted you to do to test yourself because if you're not afraid of failing. So the Marine Corps instilled that in me and the comradery component, I absolutely loved. The teams, small units, the constant changing of leadership.

So the joint assignment was the first time that I was professionally introduced to other services. It was pretty much Navy and Marine Corps. So we got introduced to sailors. The Marines and Sailors were intermixed in the course. For some portions of it and not others. It was clear that there were cultural differences between Navy and Marine Corps right out of the box. The way you worked. They always marched together. It was strongly reinforced. Marines always travelled in twos. You never were alone. You marched everywhere you went. You were always in step with each other. And you were living the ideal of a highly professionalized military in an environment that was going to challenge that. And they (the Marines) told us that. They said, you will be challenged professionally, but to maintain a professional persona all the time. Do not compromise what you know to be right to what you find to be easy. They would say, you are going to have times when you are not observed, there's other relationships that can occur here. These are the rules. This is what I (a Marine senior enlisted leader) expect of you and don't compromise yourself. You have a lot of responsibility. Do it well. There was no question that if you did something wrong then you were going to be punished. It was very open.

The introduction was that you would be challenged. You will follow the rules. You couldn't wear a white tee shirt (in public) was one of those rules (the Navy had for off-duty attire on the base). So one of the (Marine) guys left his white tee on (after exercising) and we went for chow. The sailor wouldn't let him in the chow hall. The sailor that was policing the appearance of the students, wouldn't let him in because he had an unmarked shirt. So he (his Marine friend) grabbed a marker and he wrote USMC (United States Marine Corps) Navy stinks on his tee shirt. And he said, now it's marked. And through pure intimidation, the sailor kind of backed down. It didn't matter if the sailor was right at the time. The Marine had to demonstrate that he was going to be smarter than the sailor was.

In hindsight, there was no attempt to learn. It was gatekeeping. To learn about the other services. There was no attempt to learn, appreciate, understand. It was contempt.”

The “culture shock” that came with an inter-service or joint assignment, came in different forms. One commonly mentioned form was in the observance of rank. Sometimes rank status observance in accordance with service-specific protocol mattered more than good working relationships. One Navy officer mentioned that

while his service and occupational specialty was informal with regard to terms of address, that officer found another service very formal to the point of being aggressive with regard to proper rank-based terms of address. The officer in question viewed the entire episode humorously since the rank difference was only one increment (pay grades O-3 to O-4). That rigid formality continued until the officers attained the same pay grade and then terms of address became informal again. That Navy officer described it as follows:

“There were cultural things. I will also have to say this. I was an aviator. Which is a different sub-culture even, I’m brown shoe (a uniform option for aviators alone), amongst black-shoe Navy. There is discipline, but there is maybe a looseness about it. If you’re the skipper, you are ‘sir’ and even if you are the department head you are ‘sir.’ Beyond that, if you’re a senior officer but you had no position, I owe you respect, but I may not listen to you. Because I will listen to my chain of command. We’ll have dentists show up. Flight surgeon. You know, they’ll be senior.

A distinction in the Navy is I was an unrestricted line officer. This means I am unrestricted from command. I can take command of anything. There are other officers that are restricted line and staff. Restricted lines are intelligence, cryptology, judge advocate general (JAG), dental corps, etc. So there’s always the drill. Three of you show up in a life raft. An unrestricted ensign (O-1, the lowest officer rank in the Navy), a JAG admiral, an intelligence officer admiral, who’s in charge? The ensign. Because he is unrestricted line. He takes command. So, on our aircraft we had cryptology guys. They could not take command of the aircraft even though he is a [rank of] commander (officer grade O-5). The lieutenant is in charge. And there has been a couple of times I had to be very diplomatic with the commander who’s a cryptology officer what he’s trying to tell us to do as part of the mission. And we’re saying, uh, sir, yes sir, but all due respect we’re running this mission.

“[While at his first joint assignment] one issue popped up. And that’s because I bumped into an Army guy. You see in the Navy, the distinction between, we don’t even have this term, ‘company grade and field grade’ (company grade is a term for O-1 through O-3 while field grade is a term for O-4 through O-6, major through colonel in the Army, Air Force and Marines only). So there was this major. Again, I look at the structure of the organization. So, O-5’s are branch chiefs that’s a leadership rank. O-4’s, O-3’s and anything below if they might be there, were action officers. An O-3 action officer, an O-4 action officer, all action officers. Now, if it comes down

to somebody's got to be in charge, the O-4's in charge. Roger that. If there's no one around, you're just another guy like me.

Well this major wanted me to call him 'sir' all the time. I'm not going to do that. Dude, we are action officers. He got angry enough that he went to the senior Army officer. A very senior lieutenant colonel, who called me aside, said, you're Navy and you're new with this, but here in this world. It's the quote of quotes, I love this quote, in this world, it is not appropriate for a company grade officer to refer to a field grade officer as 'dude, pal, or bud'. There were two Army officers that kept taking exception. One was the guy I worked with and the other was the admiral's EA (executive assistant). The admiral's EA, who at that time I equated EA to secretary. I keep, 'dude, I need to see the admiral.' He hated it that railroad tracks (the rank insignia for this Navy officer's current rank of lieutenant was two parallel metal bars that is commonly referred to as 'railroad tracks') was talking to oak leaves (the rank insignia for all services, including Army majors, at the grade of O-4 is a bronze oak leaf) as 'dude.' And so I got pulled aside and got my own little lecture on it. What was funny was that when I did promote to lieutenant commander (the Navy equivalent to the Army major), hey, we're buddies now. Now it is appropriate to use 'dude.' It was one of those, go away. If this is what matters to you, screw you.

Now that might be an aviator thing. Because in aviation, you are either a good stick (a good pilot) or not. You either could handle the aircraft or you can't. Because when you're at altitude, you're on your own. You either can do it or you can't do it. There ain't no calling home. There ain't no time out. You're moving at 330 miles per hour. That's the whole thing about the brown-shoe Navy vs. the black-shoe Navy. I can imagine that it's the same in the SEALs (sea, air, land teams – the Navy's special operations forces), or other communities of individualized skill sets. But I do know on a surface ship, they are rank conscious. Even to the point that when you go into the admiral's mess (dining facility), when I was on the carrier (aircraft carrier), I had to sit at the kiddies' table."

The acceptance and protocol surrounding relationships between officers and enlisted varied widely among the experiences of those members interviewed. From first-name basis in the work center to formal admonishments to not even associate, however accidentally and even off-duty, across the enlisted-officer divide. Those rank protocol differences were not just experienced across American military service lines. They were also present, but in a very different way across nationality lines. These differences further contributed to the "culture shock" upon arrival at joint duty

stations. One Army officer described his experiences in one of his joint assignments this way:

“The culture between the services. The culture between working with the host nation nationals. So not only was I working with different services. I was also working across nationalities. The host nation and the US, the Army, Marines, and Navy. So all that had to be learned very quickly. How to facilitate. How to maneuver through all that but yet do the mission. You were expected to figure it out. The whole term ‘iron majors’ (generally means maximum professionalism and self-sufficiency in all situations and presenting oneself to be the model of an Army officer at all times).

I tell you it’s about people. That’s something you learn very quickly. It’s about communication and people. Being flexible. Trying to figure out what was important to them because it might not be the same to you. A prime example was, talk about the host country, we as Americans, we’re, as a staff officer, we’re taught to do analysis and here’s x, y and z and so on what we know to be true. Here’s your courses of action. Whereas, the host nation was different in that, ok boss, we know this is what you want so here you go. They worked to give the boss what he wanted vs. what’s the best course of action. And then you might tell the boss is well what you want to do is not the best. So, that was interesting because the two counterpart generals on the US and host nation side had to come together to decide what’s the best thing to do and how to operate and yet when I’m working with my host nation counterpart he’s trying to say, this is what my boss wants to do. I’m saying, I’m not going to tell my boss that because that isn’t the best thing to do. It was interesting learning how to develop that trust. How to develop that communication and really the art of persuasion. Convincing a culture where the subordinates didn’t say no, trying to teach them how to present things to their boss in such a way that it’s the boss’s idea. But at the same time I’ve got to keep in mind that I’m an American and this is what’s best for us. So how do I convince this other guy to convince his boss that it’s the best thing to do?”

Differences related to gender

The sample of interviewees included four women to explore any gender-related differences within or between the services. There were issues of gender bias identified by the women interviewed. One enlisted female mentioned the general tendency for male military members to protect female members by shielding them from unpleasant or menial, especially physically demanding, tasks. But males’ tacit

perceptions of the vulnerability of female members did not rise to the level of sexual harassment in the opinions of the female members interviewed. The senior enlisted Air Force member described it like this:

“Not that women should be given privileges, but oh, [the male supervisors would say] we can’t tell them to go to this detail, because, you know they’re a woman. Or, you know, we can’t ask them to, you know, it’s not right to ask somebody to whatever it may be. Stay late or do some kind of manual labor, because, you know, we’ve got some young healthy guys here who can do it. I think it is still gender bias. I don’t believe anything crossed the line. I don’t believe that anybody did harassment or anything like that. I think that there is still, yeah, that’s obvious that there’s still bias there.”

The male Navy aviator described gender differences like this:

“The difference was, were you in a warfare specialty or not from the perspective of the men. At this time, women were not in combat roles yet. So, if you were from combat arms, women were, alright, you have your special place. You must work, here, this is for you. The men that came from the more staff, intel, non-combat, were more comfortable working with women. I also noticed that certain services, the regimentation was between officers, but with the enlisted, first name basis. And, in fact I saw the opposite. Amongst the Navy, I would never refer to an enlisted person by their first name. Petty Officer, Seaman, whatever. Never their first name. Amongst officers, if we were of like rank, meaning we were all action officers, first name. If you were senior, you are ‘sir.’ Sir or Commander or Captain. But there were plenty of times where, like the Air Force, they refer to enlisted by first name. Like, hey, go see Peggy. Who the hell is Peggy? You don’t know who Peggy is? She’s in the Navy with you. What Peggy? Petty Officer, oh, I never knew her name was Peggy. Not that I’m ever going to use it, because for us in the Navy, that’s fraternization. (In the Navy that was considered) unduly familiar. Air Force did it all the time (not because they fraternized, but because that is the protocol/social convention when in informal settings).”

The retired female Air Force officer described the difference on the way the services treated women as follows:

“I would say, when I was on the Joint Staff I noticed that male Navy officers were a lot more dismissive of female officers. That was my interaction. And it was significant enough for me to take notice of it. And I’m not particularly sensitive to that kind of thing because I can pretty much hold my own. But I did notice that there seemed to be a level of dismissiveness that

I did not notice in the Army nor did I notice it in the Air Force nor in my interactions with Marines.”

That same female Air Force officer also mentioned how unusual it was for an international military conference, which except for her was entirely comprised of men, to have a female representative from the any country (she was the US representative at the time). She, however, was not intimidated or impeded in her objectives as US representative at the conference. She described it this way:

“Before I took that job, I got a chance to talk with the guy previously that was doing it. I had all his notes and I stepped into his job. It was enough. Any questions I had, I asked and I found out. But there were definitely some, you could tell in these groups they weren’t used to dealing with women in the military of a certain rank. And I could see that. Sometimes they didn’t even know what to call me. And that was a little uncomfortable for them. It was always, you never wore uniforms to these things. Even at NATO headquarters. You are always in civilian clothes. And so after you go a few times people get to know you, because it’s some of the same groups of people that are attending these. They would do toasts. It’s all very formal. They would do toasts around the table. Sometimes they would forget that I was there and they would do a toast to gentlemen and then they would look at me and, oh, and lady. You know because they were not accustomed to having a woman their equal that was also representing the US. And there is a protocol to the seats around the table. You know you sit behind your sign. And there was actually a big stink when they wanted to change the nomenclature and go from, you know, our name was USA so we pretty much stayed the same when they did the change. But UK was always next to us and they were going to change them to GBR and they were going to go to a different place at the table and it caused a big stink. Other people around the table too. You couldn’t have the Turks next to the Greeks. And there was a lot of issues with the seating just around the table to even start the meetings.”

That same Air Force officer observed that there were other marked differences between the US military services in terms of their reliance on formal regulations on the job. This officer’s parent service approach was to use temporary and somewhat dynamic standard operating procedures (SOPs) as opposed to formally coordinated and signed service regulations. This was due to the fact that they felt that SOPs were

more agile and coordinated locally than regulations that had more formal and higher level and lengthy coordination processes. The officer felt that the reliance on regulations versus SOPs may have indicated a difference in the level of detail with which the other military services were comfortable. That officer felt that their service trusted its personnel to use good judgment within the broad outlines of a less formal local SOP. She described it this way:

“I had a lot of exposure to different kinds of CONOPS (concepts of operations) for different jobs and other kinds of preparatory documents whatever you might call them. It wasn't until I got to the Joint Staff that I realized how much Air Force doctrine there was that I didn't know about. And I do remember thinking, I wish I had known more about this whole doctrine thing earlier on. Yeah, I knew about certain one that were more common in the career field. There were a lot of other things that were more obscure that there was doctrine on that I did not realize. I also realized that once I got to the Joint Staff, that Army had way more doctrine than the Air Force did. And they grow up in doctrine from day one. And for the Air Force it seemed to be slightly different. It's like, yeah, it's there, but it's not engrained and just beaten into you like it is in the Army.

At the time, I believe, the Army had a doctrine center. I don't believe the Air Force had an official doctrine center in the same way that the Army did. Now there were some doctrine experts. More pockets of it depending on what you worked and who was responsible for writing different kinds of doctrine. But I don't know that we had the same kind of doctrine center, long standing doctrine center like the Army did at TRADOC (US Army Training and Doctrine Center).

I think the Air Force had other types of documents to augment places where maybe they were short of doctrine. I think a lot of things were changing with the Air Force that maybe in the Army certain things had not changed as much depending upon what the topic was. Because in the Air Force when you needed to get something, you might have a basic doctrine on something, but if there had been a change, instead of worrying about changing the doctrine right away, they would come out with a CONOP, a how to, or some kind of interim procedure to make it happen. They wouldn't wait to update the doctrine. That would come later.

I think the Army had so much of it. There were so many Army field manuals on everything that you can imagine. The Air Force, as I recall, we just didn't have that many. There were so many field manuals on various things. And we would tend to have big over-arching kinds doctrine and then you would have other documents that are drilling down to the more specifics

that are changed a lot more often. You are not tied to the same level of trying to get them through the whole tedious process.

I mean there's a process if it's joint doctrine, then it has to go through the joint staff and all this stuff has to be done. If it's Air Force doctrine, it's still a tedious process on the lower level, but when there needed to be a change, you would go ahead and update the CONOPs and other documents and tie them back. And the doctrine would be updated later. But by the time that that doctrine was updated, the concept might have changed again.

The Army seemed to have a lot more detailed instruction about things. And it seemed like the Air Force, we just didn't have nearly the level of detail that it seemed like some of the Army field manuals. Just a lot more topics that we would never do. That we wouldn't have a field manual equivalent on it. We might have instructions and guidance, but it would not be presented in the same way. We're big on CONOPs.

I think it's just differences in the way that the Army feels it needs to prescribe what needs to be done. I don't think the Air Force felt that on a lot of the same topics, that you don't need to be told to that level of detail. Or they have other ways to get you to that point in training, but they would not actually publish in doctrine. It might still be out there, but it wasn't doctrine in the sense that it was treated that way. It's a lot quicker to update it when you need to when you are not tied to a prescribed process to do it. Which you certainly come to appreciate when you are on the Joint Staff and having to do that tedious process."

This same officer had experience with doctrine at an international level as well. She described her experiences at the international level this way:

"At the international level, in writing NATO doctrine, it's a whole other level of ridiculousness that goes into it. I participated in five NATO doctrine writing trips abroad at various locations and you were working on particular topics and in the doctrine world, the US, UK, Canada are considered the standard. Most NATO doctrine is based on those documents. However, having said that, there are certain topics that are particularly sensitive in Europe and one of the things we were working on is writing a NATO doctrine about captured personnel and their treatment. Just coming up with a term that might be acceptable in all of these countries was mind-boggling. We went through lists and lists. There were all kinds of issues. They would be represented by their representatives and we'd go to these meetings and they would have certain agendas, certain things they were trying to work. Interestingly enough, the conference is done in English. So, several of the participants from certain countries had to learn English to be able to come and present at these meetings."

Even though there were surface level differences among the services, among officers and enlisted, similar technical occupational specialties and classifications/distinctions were likely to be a source of solidarity across service lines. One Army officer who was trained by Marines while at artillery school described the experience as follows:

“The Marines, they were on board. We have a very similar culture. When I went to artillery school, none of my instructors were Army. I had all Marine officers. No Army officers. Even though it was a joint school. Between Marines and Army. It was all Marines. I went through that entire course and had no Army instructors.”

However, those inter-service solidarities based on similar occupational specialties could become sources of friction. Even within the same service, different technical specialties and classifications can be a source of friction and suspicion more than differences in service. Remember back to the Navy officer who contrasted the “brown-shoe Navy” with the “black-shoe Navy.” There are also commonly shared and important classifications/designations that seem to cut across service lines and are a source of solidarity are the combat arms vs. non-combat arms distinction and the company vs field grade officer distinction. Examples of specialties that seem to have the same effect are intelligence and artillery. An Army officer described the degree to which these binaries are observed and valued can exacerbate or alleviate existing inter-service differences in rank observance or inter- or intra-service cooperation and trust. He described it as follows:

“The Marines, they were on board. Right, we have a very similar culture. But working with the Air Force, and somewhat, I’ll say, the Navy, especially the Air Force, you had to coddle them. You couldn’t just go in and say, move out and draw fire. You had to learn, you know, to say please. You had to get used to calling me by my first name. They weren’t as rigid as we

were. We being the Army and Marines. So that was a big difference. There were several ways that got in the way.

In particular, there was one situation, I can remember the outcome, I'm trying to remember the lead up to it. It was a matter of divvying out duties. I was a major in charge of majors. They didn't like the delivery by which tasks were given. Because I came from an artillery world at the time. So once tasks were given, they weren't, you know, please or maybe. It was all done in a respectful way though, but it was done in such a way that the artillery community operated. I was like, hey, I need you to do this. I wasn't used to, 'well I'll get to it when I come back.' Or I need you to do this, and then they want to take off, and I'm like, whoa, where're you going?

When I say expectation of performance, I'm not talking about the quality of the work. I'm talking about the method by which they achieved their goals. Like I said, the Marines and Army, I think, were very lock-step in method and rigid on how we do things. Whereas the Air Force was kind of willy-nilly, you know, in how they get there as long as we get there, you know. The Navy guys that we worked with, they were, some of them were hard-chargers, depending upon what their jobs were, but they still...they kind of were in the middle. They didn't cause any trouble. They were just like, whatever. I hate to say it that way, but they were just like whoever is in charge, whatever. We can roll with it. But you could tell the Air Force was on one side of the pendulum and the Army and Marines were on the other."

In summary, the effects portion of the core logic framework addressed those experiences military members have, after arrival at a joint assignment, while serving with personnel from other services, agencies or nationalities and focused on how military members' experiences with other services, agencies or nationalities challenge their parent service-specific institutional systems of meaning. From the interviews conducted as part of this research, several patterns emerged from on-duty experiences in the joint environment. One interviewee used the term "culture shock", to describe the service differences they experience. Those differences were expressed in a variety of ways and while not everyone used the term "culture shock", many of the differences were common at inter-service assignments. Perhaps the most often mentioned was how observances of military rank vary among the services. Among those members with less strict parent service or occupational rank observance

traditions, strict rank observances can be viewed as more important than mission cohesion. Many interviewees felt that the personal professional skills learned from their parent services were useful to avoid the grossest of errors in military protocol. Subtle gender differences exist in the way males relate to and task females. The women interviewed noticed this more than the men, but none felt that it rose to the level of harassment. One interviewee felt that some services seemed to need more formal rules than others. Formality of rules was perceived as a trust issue. Finally, similar occupational specialties can bridge the inter-service divide, like in artillery and aviation, but different occupational specialties can be a source of friction, like in the differences between combat arms and non-combat arms specialties.

Impacts

Impacts looks at the consequences of how what happened during the joint assignment affected members' understanding of the meaning of jointness and the value of continued participation in joint contexts. While jointness is generally considered valuable, some interviewees offered suggestions on how to improve the joint experience.

Everyone interviewed believed that joint service was valuable. Some were more definitive and unqualified than others, but all were effusive in their praise of joint assignments and the value of service with other military services. The common thread or theme that tied all perceptions of value together is that jointness is the way we fight and win wars. In that context, members felt that it is important to understand each other in terms of what each service brings to the table and joint assignments, in their view, contributed to that understanding. One Army officer who saw service in

Iraq as an artillery officer, and who came to the intelligence field later, felt that in combat, hearing the “fast movers,” the Air Force and Navy strike aircraft, pass overhead gave him confidence and reassurance in battle. He spoke with awe about seeing all the instruments of American military power pointing in the same direction and collaborating in a shared effort. That same officer also spoke of more on-the-ground experiences of working with other services to collaborate in sharing information on more immediate objectives. Those moments were impactful in demonstrating to that officer the value of jointness. Here is how he described with his take on jointness:

“Strength through diversity. We all have one thing in common. That’s to defeat the enemy. We all have a different perspective on how to defeat the enemy. Through that diversity we are able to bring all different powers to bear at the same time in such a dynamic way that we can defeat our enemies. When you have that type of different ways to affect the enemy, the ability for them to respond is greatly reduced...we had all this synchronized so that we would all hit these targets... It was just, that’s what I mean by diversity of different services to bring all that to bear. That’s the power of jointness. You cannot achieve that without jointness. You just can’t.”

That officer’s experiences in Iraq were also an example of occupational specialties overcoming service differences to enable mission success. Common occupationally-situated perspectives seemed to bolster the belief in the value of jointness in the aviation field as well. One officer who was a Naval Aviator, spoke with great confidence that all of the times he flew missions in which the Air Force or Army participated, it was the shared mission objectives and each participant’s clarity of individual mission that ensured success.

“Army, Air Force, immaterial. As long as we all get what the objective is, I’ve never had a problem. Maybe because I’m aviation and I’m not so structured. As long as I know what you’re doing here and what I’m doing here and we both get it, let’s go do it. I don’t care what you wear and I don’t care

what I'm wearing. Let's go make it happen. And honestly, all we need to do is find out who's got lead. You got lead, I got lead? It doesn't matter. I don't need to look at what you got on your collar."

"Call it the same as embracing diversity. Jointness is embracing diversity. The same way that embrace diversity that, like knocking out barriers for exclusion. Why not have a woman? Why not a person of a different race or orientation? Open it up. And that's jointness. Embracing diversity. The answer might not be the battleship. The answer might be a single weapon on a single aircraft. It allows for greater approaches to how you are going to do stuff. It also means that you know who the right person is."

Some enlisted members felt that greater integration among the services, as opposed to simple co-location, would have improved operations. One Army officer advocating for a single military service with domain specialties for land, sea, air and cyberspace.

The senior enlisted Marine who participated offered the following:

"I would have liked, as a point of academics, to learn, as a requirement, to learn of the other services. My entire career in the Marine Corps no primary military education that required me to learn anything about any other service. You know it is more important that I read "The Red Badge of Courage" than it is that I read the history of the Air Force. Never came up. I got some books from the Army, training books from the Army, and I actually put them in the unit library. I had people give them back to me. 'That's an Army book.' I'm like, yeah, but it's a great book. It's got some really great stuff in it. Only years later were some of those books actually introduced to the Marine Corps reading list. It was peculiar to me. I'm not afraid of other people. I'm not afraid of learning from other people. It's become so institutionalized (the reluctance to learn from other services) and where's the benefit? Why is jointness important to your average military person? It's to get promoted. It's not that I want to learn something from it. It's not that maybe I can expand the capabilities of my parent service or I'll incorporate something. It's I need to get promoted. And why do you need it to get promoted? Well some Goldwater-Nichols thing decades ago, so it's important.

I've learned more about other services being retired working with other retired people. The people you work with who are prior service as DoD civilians. I've learned so much more. I socialize so much more. We do more interactions together. Most of my friends now are not Marines. A lot of them are retired military or have military service. I wish I had that in the military. If I would have had that at a young age in the military, it would have been awesome. Why do I have it now? It's because I'm not wearing a uniform any

more. To me, that's what it boils down to. I mean there's no social stigma to hanging around with guys in the Army.

Thinking about it, in the service, at what point in time would you introduce this? What is the best time? Because you don't want to do it too early. But for me once, 'you know Air Force girls are going to get you in trouble.' You get these things that are introduced to you that are not healthy for jointness. And there's no training behind it. So you get these social stigmas. My friend and I would run with the Army. We would run with our classmates (at a joint training assignment) on the physical fitness tests. So we went to all the Army physical fitness tests and ran the courses with them. To help them run better because they were having trouble and they were our classmates. And we wanted to help our classmates. And we went and ran with them. Man, talk about people, you know said we shouldn't run with them unless if you're not going to beat them. I was like, I'm out there with my classmates. We can't go and put a sticker on our foreheads every second. I want this person to pass his physical fitness test so he can complete his training. I don't care if the Army guy beat me on this course. He's probably just faster than I am. What's the problem with that? 'Don't go out there if you're not going to beat them.' So my friend and I stopped associating with them. I was not going to convince them (the Marine Corps) that helping my classmate was more important than presenting the flag (the Marine Corps flag). It wasn't going to happen. I personally thought I was better representing the Marine Corps. We were certainly, percentage wise, were the minority.”

In summary, while the training provided in preparation for joint service is somewhat less than expected and parent service endorsement of jointness somewhat less than enthusiastic, everyone interviewed believed joint service to be a valuable and necessary experience for the US military. A recurring theme is that it is important for each military member to appreciate the contribution of the other services. So while there are many differences in the ways the services behave on the job, those same service differences seemed less significant in the middle of combat operations where clarity of mission and inter-service coordination, synchronization and cooperation emerged as the true value of jointness. Interestingly, these are the stated goals for jointness (DoD 2013b-j; 2011c) (Locker 2001). Yet they seem to emerge as a by-product of joint service instead of a targeted training goal.

Adaptations

Service members who have served in joint assignments felt that joint service was important and a valuable experience for all military members. However, did their parent services change their views of joint service over the time span of each interviewees period of military service? By characterizing the first joint experience to the last, we might be able to have interviewees describe any changes in they observed in the behavior and rhetoric of their parent service with regard to joint service. Below the account of the senior enlisted Marine interviewed is highlighted. His views are representative of the others interviewed.

The senior enlisted Marine interviewed had this to say:

“I haven’t noticed any change in the Marine Corps visa vis the other services...So, no. It’s not there. I mean look at the participation at the Joint Ball for Armed Forces Week. When it was brought up, you had to go, no one wanted to, you have to deal with the other services. It was not a time for celebration. It was a forced event. Armed Forces Week is not. The spirit of it is good. I’d talk to the other services. I tried to get other services go participate in activities of the other services. Normally the dominant service is willing to entertain the inclusion of another service member into their activities and stuff. It’s not forced. It’s not designed. If anything else, if the opportunity presented itself, everyone would go to their independent corners.”

Regarding support for joint duty in more broadly, he added:

“Several times, even Headquarters Marine Corps, ‘let’s see if we can get another service to be there so we don’t look like we’re doing it. It wasn’t that we wanted to bring in expertise. It wasn’t that we wanted to be joint. It’s just that we wanted to have the perception of joint vs. actually becoming joint. It’s that when people say ‘integrated’, it’s really separate parts sitting together. They’re not blended. And, you know, ‘we want to have an Air Force person there because it will look better.’ It wasn’t that the Air Force was going to bring expertise, experience or a point of view that could contribute. It was that we wanted to demonstrate a certain thing, not necessarily become that. Because, what’s the benefit? Where is the benefit of the joint duty assignment? It’s kind of not working well. My experience is that half the time they don’t actually do joint duties. And I think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff has recognized that. There is not real joint duty. I have some friends who did

real joint duty in NATO during the Cold War and they have some pretty good experiences working over in Brussels.”

Regarding collaboration and information sharing, a central tenet of the jointness concept, he offered the following:

“I would have to adopt processes that are resident in the other services that may not be supported by mine. You would have to develop joint doctrine, the spirit of that, but in practicality the services have their own doctrine that they follow that has primacy. Where is the benefit? Even now, if I was still active duty, to do it would make me uncomfortable because there is no benefit to it. You’re at more of a risk. You really are assuming a level of risk within your parent service. I would say that unless you know that you’re going to go do something that’s really cool. That somebody is actively working and it would be personality driven. Or leveraging somebody I trust’s opinion. But to holistically look at it. First thing I’d say is that I probably don’t believe it. That it’s really joint. That you’re not going to do joint stuff. You are going to do your stuff there and you’re going to be tethered to your service conditions and you just need to get through that joint stuff. Don’t lose focus. Don’t lose your track. Don’t drift. Don’t become like them. You know, you need to stay as pure as possible and then talk the talk and then come home.”

He provided an example of how he experienced his parent service trying to preserve its own identity in the face of jointness:

“Case in point, an actual example of good thinking. So Marine Corps went to a new uniform. So after Desert Storm, we were brown and green. You had desert camouflage and woodland. So the Marine Corps gave us brown tee shirts so that you could use them with both uniforms. Because the green ones weren’t a tactical match to the desert camouflage. Well we had those for like a month. And somebody made a little comment, ‘so you’ve got the Marine Corps is becoming like the Army because the Army has been wearing brown tee shirts for a long time.’ So, no kidding, brown tee shirt were off limits. Everyone go back to green tee shirts. We’re not going to be like the Army. And so all of us put on our desert stuff, putting back on our green tee shirts going why in the world am I wearing a green tee shirt with my brown fatigues, so I don’t look like an Army guy. There was no practicality for that. Now whether it was fact or fiction, to a person we were doing it because the Army had brown tee shirts and we weren’t going to be like the Army. Look at MARPAT, the Marine pattern camouflage utilities, so when it came out then the other services started doing it. Now there could have been a functional reason for it. Like the Air Force and the Navy, everyone asked why do you have that color pallet? You can’t look like the Air Force.

So service identity I think is necessary if you are going to have a separate service. But when does it go too far? When is it now not conducive to the concept of jointness? When are we pushing too hard about individual (service) identity? When you are brought up differently, so when does that get relaxed a little bit? When is it more beneficial to listen to others without the fact that I believe I'm culturally trained that I'm superior in thinking to you. So when does that happen? People were even talking, we've got the M-1 tanks and we didn't want to get them because the Army had them. We had M-60s and they said we can't get M-1s the Army uses M-1s. How will we know we're the Marines? We'll paint them a different color. So that always comes back the primacy. How do you get away from that? How do you instill jointness? Where do you get credit for thinking collaboratively? Yeah, you have to have a joint tour to be promoted, to a certain degree. That's a box to check. And that's what personally it's become even in DoD. Joint duty is to check a box. I would like to go to a program where I'll actually be working jointly where people would actually take the documents and work them together and come up with joint strategies. Not my experience."

He then concluded by asking us to imagine a cultural experiment:

"A cultural experiment. If you put people together and you took off their uniforms and you forbade them from declaring their service and they go through a series of drills. Then you have them all identify each other by service, I'd be curious to see what that would look like and why. And you give them common tasks and you'd see what influences are driving them. If they can come up with a joint activity. It would be really interesting to see the results of that."

Perceptions of JPME

Because it is such an important part of realizing the vision of jointness as expressed in law, I felt it was worth capturing the views of the officers interviewed regarding the value of jointness. While officers may have had the opportunity, depending on their rank, to attend JPME, attendance was only seen as a necessary box to check on the way to promotion, not as a way to improve joint service or understand the joint environment. JPME was seen more as an exercise in understanding regulations than in understanding the other services, agencies or nationalities. Therefore, even if they had attended JPME prior to their first or any joint assignment

for that matter, they doubt it would have helped much with the inter-cultural dynamics experienced in a joint assignment.

I provide a table of the joint professional military education (JPME) experiences for the military personnel interviewed (note: table columns are repeated for continuity across tables and ease of reference):

Table 5.1: Levels of JPME among interviewees

	Parent Service	Occupation	Years of Service	Years in Joint Assignments	JPME? If so, what levels	Enlisted/ Officer
1	Air Force	Intelligence	15	11	No	Enlisted
2	Army	Intelligence	12	8	No	Officer (Prior Enlisted)
3	Marines	Intelligence	20	16	No	Enlisted
4	Air Force	Intelligence	20	6	No	Officer
5	Navy	Aviation/ Intelligence	24	12	No	Officer
6	Army	Intelligence	18	18	No	Officer (Prior Enlisted)
7	Navy	Intelligence	26	12	Yes. JPME phases 1 and 2.	Officer
8	Army	Military Police/Artillery/ Intelligence	20	10	Yes. JPME phase 1	Officer (Prior Enlisted)
9	Air Force	Intelligence	20	12	No	Officer
10	Army	Intelligence	24	23	No	Officer (Prior Enlisted)
			Ave ~20 yrs	Ave ~13 yrs		

The retired Navy officer who had been to JPME, described its value like this:

“By the time I got to doing it formally, which was in a JDAL coded billet (her final assignment in the Navy), they sent me to JPME in-route, so I got the course beforehand. But I’d actually gone to a really great joint class before I ever went to my fourth assignment, I went to a [joint] class in Norfolk... (not part of the JPME

phases), which is a great course. I loved it...Just that course alone made so much better on the Navy side when I deployed, I got it. I'd had some experiences in my younger tours. This kind of brought it home. I was able to do a lot of the planning and had a much better picture where I could at least say, we need to go and talk to so and so on the ground because we don't know enough about that. That's an Army thing or that's an Air Force thing. There was absolutely nothing that you do with those higher levels of planning that won't ultimately impact other services. So, you never fight a war on your own. And even if all you're doing is keeping the peace, you're still keeping somebody informed so in case it went to war you would know what is going on."

With regard to the value of JPME specifically, she envisioned a "JPME phase 3, not meaning the general officer Capstone course (see Appendix B), that would be more of an applied JPME as opposed to the more theoretical JPME that occurs in phases 1 and 2. She talked about it as follows:

"I usually found that when you had to try to figure out how you apply the different services to move forward (on some joint activity), I had very few people who actually understood that well...Because in the absence of a group of people who understood it well or had the time to devote to moving it forward, people just created what they thought was a good idea and it completely negated all of this joint training that we had gone to the trouble of going to in phase 1 and 2. It seems to me that when it comes to implementing that joint training in war time, you ought to have a joint expert who is so well steeped in that operational planning and how you do business, that the very first thing you do is bring those people in at the beginning to help set up you staffs and get things running until it becomes a natural muscle movement. Then they go away. You need to have that.

If I could design anything absolutely the way that I wanted, I would say that you should have a JPME phase 3 (not meaning the existing third phase of JPME known as the general officer Capstone course). It's one thing to plan something and to get the process going. It's another thing to execute that process and then to apply it to all the daily situations that you will be in once that plan starts being executed. Because, obviously, your JPME phase 1 and 2 teach you how to do the operational planning and they teach you how to feedback into this process as things change. What they don't teach you how to do is, how do you monitor things? That's part of your everyday job. And then feed back into this continual process. It doesn't have to be a long training, but it has to be eye-opening and it has to be something that will make people understand why it's important as part of your regular day job to know about this joint planning process. I got the impression that there was a lot of people that although they had been to the training, didn't really think it applied to them even though they were in a joint war. And they often used the excuse that we were working with coalition forces...as a reason why they wouldn't use the joint process. I said, we're the lead here. We should set up this process and have them integrate in. That's

also the reason why we have foreign partners attend our JPME phase 1 and 2 training. It's so that when they go back to their home countries, they can continue to advocate on how to plug into that process. But there are many places we ignored that in Afghanistan.”

Joint professional military education (JPME) is not common among the sample that participated in this research. None of the six enlisted, or prior-enlisted, had JPME, which is a natural result of the service rules surrounding rank that dictate when enlisted personnel should receive JPME (see Appendix B). However, none of those enlisted personnel received any “jointness” training or orientations early in their careers prior to their first inter-service, or joint, assignments. Two of the officers interviewed had some JPME and two did not. Of the two that had some JPME, they felt that it needed improvements. Also one officer who had JPME 1 and 2 found themselves in a joint environment where the other people in the organization did not and did not understand joint processes. The two officers who did not have JPME either did not mention it or felt it was just a box to check and did not feel held back in doing their job by not having it. Overall, the impact of JPME on the joint experiences of the sample interviewed was neutral but if it provided the kind of inter-service or inter-organizational cultural competency training to make working in a joint environment less of a surprise, they probably would appreciate it more.

Summary

In this chapter we got a glimpse of the important aspects of joint assignments from pre-PCS to service in a joint environment to reflections on how to make joint assignments and jointness in general even better. In the next chapter I will refocus the discussion of the themes from the interviews more toward the shared elements of

joint culture. More specifically I will discuss those themes in the context of two interrelated cultural schemas, a schema of and a schema for jointness. Because both schemas interact to create the framework of anticipatory joint cultural knowledge a service member carries with them, I map the two schemas together to illustrate that knowledge.

Chapter 6: The Culture of Jointness

Above I summarized the results of the semi-structured interviews by navigating the interview process with the core logic framework that was used to develop the semi-structured interview protocol. That summarization allowed for a descriptive and almost "procedural" look at the experience of jointness from the perspective of those who have lived it. As we saw, many common or shared themes emerged from the various accounts of the lived experience of joint service. One approach to understanding and developing shared cognitive structures is to look for those commonly held ideas. To review, there are two types of cognitive structures that may be revealed in the analysis of interviews. First are schemas that are simplified structures that equip people to solve new problems in each context or in totally new contexts because each person can tap into their version of that knowledge and repurpose it to meet new demands (D'Andrade, 1992). A schema becomes a cultural model when it is intersubjectively shared and/or interrelated with one or more other schemas (D'Andrade, 1987; 1992). By reviewing the contents of interviews we can understand interviewees' similar experiences and the shared ways they express them. Within those experiences there were common themes that emerged as joint cognitive structures both of which are joint cultural schemas which together interrelate to form a cultural model of jointness.

Before describing the joint cultural schemas and model, I would like to briefly discuss the way I use the term "models" in this dissertation. Geertz makes an important distinction about models, in the general sense, not drawing a fine line between schemas and models as the terms are used in cognitive anthropology, but

between models created to capture cultural concepts. Models designed to capture cultural concepts in an “objective conceptual form” (Geertz 1973: 93) he describes as models *of* cultural patterns (Geertz 1973: 93). Models *of* are a more of an outsider’s view of cultural patterns depicted in a way as to make the cultural concepts fit a conceptual form that will render those patterns intelligible to outsiders. Geertz contrasts models *of* with models that adapt themselves to the relationships expressed in the cultural meaning (Geertz 1973: 93). The models that adapt the conceptual form to the cultural meaning are referred to as models *for* (Geertz 1973: 93). Models *for* are more of an insider’s view of cultural patterns. Why leverage this distinction? What possible value does it add to the development and analysis of the culture of the joint environment?

While reviewing the content of the interviews gathered in this dissertation and reflecting on my own participant observation experience and knowledge, I realized that there were at least two interrelated patterns embedded in the accounts of jointness. Both patterns emerged as useful ways to display and describe the experiences of US military personnel as they navigate joint service. The first was related to the *procedures* or process of transferring to a joint assignment. Patterns emerged in the accounts of the process of transferring to a joint assignment and the challenges on-duty. The other is sort of a *tacit priority* of objectives based on a US military person’s natural focus on duty and mission. If I put myself in the shoes of those who serve and consider their accounts of joint service, then the joint cultural dynamics of a joint assignment process or *procedures* are to be learned and to which service members adapt. However, if one looks at the accounts of service members

serving in joint assignments from an order of precedence or *priority* point of view, and then categorizes those ideas into a “mission centered” depiction, that becomes the cultural pattern *of* jointness. I conclude that these are both schemas vs. cultural models because they exist in the minds of people out of the immediate context of their application. While they were cultural models while in the context of their use and those experiences helped to create the conceptual framework that these interviewees carried to the next joint assignment, in the meantime, before they are intersubjectively shared in another joint cultural context, they remain simplified structures. Of course they tap into prior experiences as a way to employ and adapt that experience the new context, but until that in situ adaptation is taking place, and the basic outlines of the cultural schemas are instantiated and intersubjectively shared, they remain schemas. The cultural model of jointness emerges, in the case of this research, not only when the schemas were intersubjectively shared, but because they are also interrelated. Both schemas were interrelated when service members shared their perspectives on joint experiences. Service members are simultaneously figuring out and adapting to the moment-to-moment joint cultural encounters associated with joint service motivated by a desire to accomplish the mission.


The joint cultural schemas become a joint cultural model when they are intersubjectively shared (D’Andrade, 1987), as when people from their separate military services begin to live and work in a joint environment or when they are interrelated (D’Andrade, 1992) as in the accounts of joint service provided by the interviewees. Together, they and their new joint organization, navigate emergent norms of behavior based on a negotiation of service-specific military protocols each

member brings to the assignment. A key feature of the joint environment is the fleeting nature of relationships. Relationships are fleeting because of the asynchronous, or uncoordinated movement of personnel into and out of the joint organization. Each organization has its own “rotation” (PCSing) schedule which complicates the renegotiation of the kinds of behavioral norms, like formal and informal joint concepts, customs and courtesies, and understanding and appreciating the organizational diversity mix in the joint organization. This concept of the fleeting nature of relationships in organizations has been usefully referred to as *contingent* by Smircich (Smircich 1983: 347).

I assert, then, that the culture of jointness is contingent on the mix of services and other organizations present in the joint environment. From the interviews, I see two primary ways to depict the joint experience from the perspective of those who have lived it. One can be described as the *priorities* of service members and the other could be described as the *process* of joint service. Both usefully depict the joint cultural experience but from different modeling perspectives.

The joint environment is thus depicted in Figures 3 below which introduces the cultural schema *of* jointness, the tacit *priorities* informing and motivating the actions of the personnel interviewed. I maintain that it is a cultural *schema* of jointness because it does not become a *model*, as D’Andrade advocates, until it is intersubjectively shared in the dynamic and contingent environment that is the joint assignment.

Figure 6.1: A Cultural Schema *of* Jointness




If we step through the cultural schema *of* jointness, we can remember from the accounts of the value of jointness, that for military personnel, mission is the highest priority. That is why the “mission” ring of the somewhat eclectic Venn diagram encompasses all others. Because if one is motivated by mission as the highest priority, then what comes next is, by definition, less important, not unimportant, just less important. We saw that in the accounts of both the Naval aviator and the Army artillery officer. They both spoke with great pride in how all instruments of national power brought together in the joint environment showed the inherent “strength through diversity” of the joint environment to accomplish the mission. That camaraderie of diverse organizations, is a crucial element of the schema *of* jointness. Again, it is not as important as accomplishing the mission, but it is still vitally important to joint culture. This is why diversity is nested within the joint mission. We also saw from the interviews that because joint organizations come together to accomplish the mission, a dynamic adaptation occurs that allows a renegotiation of customs and courtesies and the application of joint policy. Again, these are important, but they become aspects of the joint environment to which service members become

accustomed because joint culture is about a compromise, a renegotiation of the rules of behavior.

By contrast, if we view the schematic of joint experience in a more *procedural* or linear step-wise fashion, in terms of the cultural patterns *explicitly* encountered, then we see more of a schema *for* jointness in Figure 4 below. The elements of the schema for jointness are not depicted in priority order, but in the order encountered. From the parent service, pre-PCS experience to the first arrival at the joint assignment to juggling the inter-organizational dynamics of the make-up of the joint organization to ultimately making all work in terms of accomplishing the mission. The cultural schema for jointness is also still a schema until intersubjectively shared on-site. Ahead of time, or after the assignment is over, these become the challenges people remember and retain for the next joint experience.

Figure 6.2: A Cultural Schema *for* Jointness



The schema for jointness is dynamic and adaptive as well, but is more about the bureaucracy of joint assignments, than the mission. This is why “figuring it out” is the ring of the Venn diagram that encompasses all others. As we saw in the interviews, service members have very little guidance other than standard service-

specific procedures for navigating the joint assignment process. As we also saw, the degree to which the services apply both the joint training goals of the DoD and the crediting of “joint” service, while strictly in compliance with the law, does not give service members for each and every joint assignment. So, the disconnect between formal and informal jointness is the first step in the process of PCSing to a joint assignment that must be figured out. Along with developing the understanding of joint assignments, as procedurally indistinguishable from normal intra-service assignment as they may be, upon arrival, service members are confronted by the inter-service differences in customs and courtesies. Armed with their intra-service standards of military protocol surrounding customs and courtesies, service members re-negotiate the rules of behavior in the joint cultural setting. It is in that encounter with the differing customs and courtesies that service members discover the organizational diversity of the joint setting. All of the organizations bring their own institutional structures of meaning (Batteau 2001) that must be understood on the way to accomplishing the mission. Again, the Venn diagram that depicts the cultural schema *for* jointness is not intended to imply that one element is more important than the others. These are nested concepts because they are encountered in an order that is a by-product of the joint assignment process.

So, I have identified two joint cultural schemas. One lays out the clear *priorities* of service members with accomplishing the mission at the top of the list. The other looks more step-wise at the journey to jointness each service member takes in their own way and with their own capacity to solve each challenge along the way. However, a difficulty in describing joint culture, for me as the researcher, is to do so

without imposing my bias by arbitrarily preferring the *procedural* account of the steps in the joint assignment process over the importance of mission, or the *priorities* of the joint assignment. I needed to find a way to illustrate the joint cultural context in an integrated way because those interviewed seemed to be using both schemas at the same time when they shared their experiences with jointness. One solution is to combine the two perspectives. By building a matrix of the two schemas, I found that it captured the general joint cultural knowledge interviewees were communicating in their personal accounts of joint service. The matrix or general joint cultural knowledge table emerged as a two-dimensional cultural model of jointness by combining the schemas *of* and *for* joint culture.

The idea for building a matrix of the two schemas was inspired by Spradley's descriptive question matrix for participant observation (Spradley 1980:82-83) combined with Bernard's discussion of displaying concepts and models as part of grounded theory text analysis (Bernard 2002: 462-476). Spradley developed his original descriptive question matrix to help ethnographers grapple with the complexity of social situations by focusing their attention on the interrelationships among key features of the social setting (Spradley 1980: 80). Spradley viewed the descriptive question matrix as an important antecedent to going into a social setting as a participant observer to guide question development. Bernard's discussion of grounded theory goes beyond the process of discovering substantive categories of themes grounded in interviewee narratives (Bernard 2002: 470). Bernard explains that it is important to display concepts and models derived from interviews and that is done by relating the categories of themes to one another (Bernard 2002: 470). I have

used the concept of social setting interrelationships from Spradley and the relationship of concepts grounded in interview data from Bernard as inspiration for the cultural model of jointness, interrelationships that are a combination of the schemas *of* and *for* jointness.

These cognitive structures, the schema *of* jointness and the schema *for* jointness interrelate and form a cultural model of jointness. The cultural model of jointness or intersection of the interrelationship of these two schemas is tacit in the sense that service members do not carry an explicit written checklist of the things they need to know to function effectively in a joint environment. However, those interviewed do seem to be both goal driven and motivated to figure things out as they go. That intersection reveals their desire to make progress toward the mission and is what it means to serve in a joint assignment. Cultural meaning is constructed incrementally, situation by situation, figuring out the unfamiliar while staying true to their primary objective.

To illustrate this, I have outlined a cultural model of jointness (Table 6.1 below) that is based on the experiences of the people interviewed. The table relates the schema *of* jointness to the schema *for* jointness and posits the kinds of joint cultural knowledge a person might need at each step and priority. Some of the intersection points in the map were addressed explicitly by the interviewees. The cultural model of jointness and how interviewees addressed it is explained in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1: A Cultural Model of Jointness

A Cultural Model of Jointness			Schema <i>of</i> Jointness				
			A	B	C	D	E
			Priority 1: Mission	Priority 2: Organizational Diversity	Priority 3: Adapting to all new circumstances	Priority 4: Customs and courtesies	Priority 5: Joint Policy vs. Joint Reality
Schema <i>for</i> Jointness	1	Step 1: Figuring it out	Figuring out how to accomplish the mission	Getting to know each other	Figuring out how to succeed in a given situation.	Understanding joint organizational practices and protocols.	Making the joint environment work.
	2	Step 2: Disconnect between formal and informal jointness	Formal - doctrine (rules) and regulations for the mission. Informal - getting the mission done with or without jointness	Working with the other organizations just enough even though integration and learning together is the policy.	Understanding the level of jointness required for a given situation	Being flexible with regard to inter-organizational protocols.	Knowing the difference between joint policy and joint reality.
	3	Step 3: Customs and Courtesies	The customs and courtesies that are necessary to get the mission done.	Learning the customs and courtesies that come with the specific joint organizational mix	Learning to selectively apply customs and courtesies in an idiosyncratic joint organizational environment.	Inventory of customs and courtesies based on joint organizational mix.	Maintaining proper protocols regardless of the how joint policy is applied.
	4	Step 4: Organizational Diversity	Learning what each member of the joint organization contributes to the mission	Inventory of organizations and their capabilities and contributions to the joint organization	Understanding the contributions of joint members in a given situation	Learning how each joint organizational member needs to be treated.	Doing your job regardless of whether or not mission assignments are given according to policy.
	5	Step 5: Mission	Getting the mission done.	Figuring out how to get the mission done with the available organizational mix	Getting the mission done in spite of personal or procedural adjustment to the way it would be done in the parent service.	Staying focused on the mission and applying customs and courtesies appropriately.	Getting the mission done regardless of the level of formal application of joint policy.

As a way of explanation, each row will be take in turn beginning with step 1, figuring it out and continuing down the rows working through the cultural model of jointness.

Figuring it out

While US military service members are mission focused, we learned from interviews that joint service is first and foremost a process of figuring out what to do in a given joint situation. Service members begin by building upon their service-specific cultural models that are first developed during indoctrination at boot camp and reinforced through regular day-to-day intra-service activities, to develop an emergent joint schema with useful parts retained and new structures added to accommodate sources of uncertainty that need to be filled in with experience and time in the joint environment. A major source of uncertainty is the disconnect between what I call formal and informal jointness. This disconnect is revealed in two ways, the unevenness of formal joint training prior to and after arrival at a joint assignment and the somewhat unenthusiastic formal embrace of jointness and joint concepts by the parent service. Informal jointness seems to be the most common and service members succeed through their own devices and professionalism regardless of the mix of organizations or nationalities.

Jointness as a concept applies to more than US inter-service assignments. The concept extends to assignments with foreign nationals as well (10 USC 99-433 sec. 668). When dealing with a foreign military or other foreign organization, navigating the differences between US organizations must seem easy by comparison. The sample of interviewees in this dissertation included two officers, one Army and one Air Force, who worked with foreign militaries on a regular basis. Both were intelligence officers at the time of their multi-national service. Neither officer had any language training in the languages of the foreign militaries with whom they worked. Luckily all

communications occurred in English, but both officers were left to their own devices to understand how to interact with the foreign representatives that they encountered on the job.

Regarding preparation for multi-national service, the Air Force officer described it like this:

“You are told as an Air Force officer; you are going to be asked to work in a lot of different situations. You are going to be put in good situations, bad situations, uncomfortable, into situations you know nothing about and you weren’t prepared for. And so it’s up to you how you respond to it. So you were told up front, you know, you figure this stuff out.”

Something the Army officer described was the differences in candor between the US forces and their foreign counterparts. He described

“...How to facilitate. How to maneuver through all that but yet do the mission. You were expected to figure it out. The whole term ‘iron majors’ (an Army term that generally means maximum professionalism and self-sufficiency in all situations and presenting oneself to be the model of an Army officer at all times).

A prime example was, talk about the host country, we as Americans, we’re, as a staff officer, we’re taught to do analysis and here’s x, y and z and so on what we know to be true. Here’s your courses of action. Whereas, the host nation was different in that, ok boss, we know this is what you want so here you go. They worked to give the boss what he wanted vs. what’s the best course of action... So how do I convince this other guy to convince his boss that it’s the best thing to do?”

Neither officer mentioned the need for additional training prior to their joint assignments where they worked with foreign nationals because both felt that it was their job to figure out the best way to get the job done. The Naval aviator describe how he figured it out like this:

“Army, Air Force, immaterial. As long as we all get what the objective is, I’ve never had a problem. Maybe because I’m aviation and I’m not so structured. As long as I know what you’re doing here and what I’m doing here and we both get it, let’s go do it. I don’t care what you wear and I don’t care what I’m wearing. Let’s go make it happen. And honestly, all we need to do is find out who’s got lead. You got lead, I got lead? It doesn’t matter. I don’t need to look at what you got on your collar.”

All of these officers’ accounts of figuring it out follow the same general unconscious priority system. Focus on the mission and work it out with the other parties involved. Jointness as an exercise in figuring it out can be viewed through the lens of the cultural model of jointness. We can see the intersection of row 1, figuring it out, and columns A through E, priorities 1 through 5. An extract from Table 6.1 is provided here for ease of reference:

Extract from Table 6.1: Step 1: Figuring it out

A Cultural Model of Jointness			A	B	C	D	E
			Schema <i>of</i> Jointness				
			Priority 1: Mission	Priority 2: Organizational Diversity	Priority 3: Adapting to all new circumstances	Priority 4: Customs and courtesies	Priority 5: Joint Policy vs. Joint Reality
1	<i>Schema for Jointness</i>	Step 1: Figuring it out	Figuring out how to accomplish the mission	Getting to know each other	Figuring out how to succeed in a given situation.	Understanding joint organizational customs and courtesies.	Doing just enough jointness to get by.

All officers had a clear focus and priority on accomplishing the mission and both learned what they needed to about the organizations with whom they worked. They figured out how to succeed in a given situation through the targeted application of protocols and practices across the organizational mix in the joint environment all the while making the joint environment succeed by accomplishing the mission.

However, to get to the stage that a service member is interacting with other organizations in a joint environment, that service member first has to get to the joint assignment. Along that journey to the joint assignment, of which we caught a glimpse

using the core logic framework in the summary of interviews above, the service member has to understand and deal with their parent service's uneven treatment of formal jointness. That unevenness comes in a variety of ways: training, like joint professional education (JPME) and pre-PCS orientations and selection for assignments and credit for previous assignments that happened to be joint, but may not have been treated as such or during which the service member was too junior in pay grade to receive credit even if it were a formally coded joint assignment. I refer to this set of challenges as the disconnect between formal and informal jointness.

Formal vs. informal jointness

While everyone interviewed felt that joint service was beneficial and they would all recommend it to other members of their parent services, the concept of jointness as it relates to DoD requirements is viewed, at best, as a necessary evil. However, the benefits of working side-by-side with other services was, on balance, viewed as a net positive. This seemed to indicate a disconnect between the formal policy-driven view of jointness and the informal or lived experience with jointness. This disconnect was especially acute when the conversation turned to two areas, first, joint professional military education (JPME) and second, to receiving joint duty credit for joint service performed in “uncoded billets” or joint service that was performed before the earliest grade of eligibility for joint credit, O-4, Major or Lieutenant Commander. Of course, the enlisted corps in all services never receives “formal” credit for joint service. The enlisted members interviewed benefited in other ways, like learning and growing as professionals, but I would call that type of benefit, “informal.”

Regardless of whether they were officer or enlisted, everyone interviewed felt that both JPME (even for enlisted) and joint duty credit (for officers) were just boxes to check on the way to higher promotions. The real value of jointness to those interviewed was discovered through experience. The value of jointness is expressed in the realization that joint is how we fight and win wars, in how we accomplish our primary mission. To serve in such an environment was an opportunity to experience that first hand. Interestingly, even though formal policies recommending joint duty or JPME were not that highly regarded, interviewees thought that having some kind of formal training in the socio-cultural inter-organizational dynamics would have been useful in preparation for joint assignments. This would benefit the service member not just by helping them understand appropriate customs and courtesies, but to know enough about joint organizations and activities to adapt to a given situation.

The disconnect was not just on an individual level, the parent services also seemed to be lukewarm on the idea of formal jointness as well. None of the people interviewed experienced any enthusiasm on the part of their parent services with regard to advertising joint opportunities or talking up the virtues of joint environments. In fact, tacit messages seemed to one of inter-service competition more than voluntary or opportunistic learning or mutually beneficial cooperation.

The disconnect between formal and informal jointness follows cultural model of jointness (Table 6.1 above) along row 2 and, again, along columns A through E, priorities 1 through 5.

Extract from Table 6.1: Step 2: Formal vs. Informal Jointness

A Cultural Model of Jointness	A	B	C	D	E
	Schema <i>of</i> Jointness				

			Priority 1: Mission	Priority 2: Organizational Diversity	Priority 3: Adapting to all new circumstances	Priority 4: Customs and courtesies	Priority 5: Joint Policy vs. Joint Reality
2	<i>Schema for Jointness</i>	Step 2: Formal vs. Informal Jointness	Formal - doctrine (rules) and regulations for the mission. Informal - getting the mission done with or without jointness.	Working with the other organizations just enough even though integration and learning together is the policy.	Understanding the level of jointness required for a given situation	Being flexible with regard to inter- organizational protocols.	Knowing the difference between joint policy and joint reality.

We heard from interviewees that while they were themselves focused on accomplishing the mission, they received conflicting messages that appeared to show a disconnect between formal and informal jointness. Yet, in spite of that disconnect, everyone interviewed felt that the organizational diversity in a joint setting is a positive thing and they worked with other organizations enough to get the job done, but would like to have seen a more formal philosophy of true integration vice simple collocation. How personnel reacted in a given joint situation lacked the guidance of formal training or education. It was through flexibility and adaptability that interviewees overcame the disconnect between formal and informal jointness.

The lived experience of jointness is a story of the difference between what policy says and joint reality. The primary example is in the fact that everyone had multiple and frequent assignments of a joint nature, but very few of those assignments were credited by the parent service as joint in the formal sense that it checked the joint tour block for promotion. Also, JPME was not common among those

interviewed yet it is supposed to be the companion to joint assignments as laid out in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSI) 1800.01E for officers and 1805.01B for enlisted and as stated in law (10 UCS Chapter 107). In defense of the services, if they do not formally consider an assignment as joint or if the service member is too junior in rank at the time of the assignment, then JPME would not be needed.

Knowing or expecting there to be a disconnect between formal and informal jointness is a part of the joint experience. Service members rarely receive formal parent service credit for assignments where they work side-by-side with members from other services, US agencies, or foreign countries. Service members receive very little practical joint training prior to or during joint assignments or as part of a larger career development plan. With time and experience in their parent services, military members acquire savvy with regard to joint environments. However, each assignment is a unique and because the mix of personnel is protocols for interaction are contingent upon which organizations are present. Learning the protocols for how to relate to others in the joint environment is renegotiated on each assignment. The element of the cultural schema for jointness that covers the learning and understanding protocols of behavior is called customs and courtesies.

Customs and courtesies

While the military symbols and protocols that form the basis of initial interactions, commonly referred to as customs and courtesies, are understood to demand that members behave in certain ways. As we have seen above, not everything that carries a general intra-service *importance* has the same level of service-specific

significance. Intra-service significance can be completely missed by other services. As we saw from the interviews, a lot of the inter-service differences centered on the most fundamental of the customs and courtesies, those associated with rank.

To allay any fears and to the best of my knowledge, at the level of commonly understood rules and regulations regarding the protocol surrounding signs of respect, there is no disagreement among the service branches on what to do in an inter-service, or joint environment. What we saw above in the interview summary of on-duty experiences were differences in the standard service-specific cultural practices surrounding terms of address and differences and the *significance* attached to some forms of rank-based terms of address or categorizations like those dealing with command eligibility or that are connected to specific occupational specialties, like aviation.

For example, the senior enlisted Air Force member interviewed described her first exposure to the differences in terms of address in a joint environment as a wakeup call for when and how to use the standard Air Force term of address, “sergeant” in an inter-service environment, especially with the Army. In the Army, the term of address “sergeant” is reserved exclusively for the specific Army rank of sergeant (pay grade E-5). In the Air Force “sergeant” is an acceptable term of address for all non-commissioned officers (NCOs) with the term “sergeant” in their official rank designation except chief master sergeants, who are referred to as “Chief.”

The Naval aviator interviewed shared a different experience, this time an intra-service difference that had to do with the command status of fellow officers. In addition to the looseness with regard to formal customs and courtesies that he felt

comes with being an aviator, he described how officers outside his chain of command are given a basic due respect based on their rank, but he may not listen to them.

Differences in terms of address, or how one military person speaks to another military person, is a long-standing point of concern among the military services and is not a new discovery in this dissertation. I emphasize it in the cultural schema *for* jointness because it is an ever present characteristic of the culture of the joint environment.

While the concept of terms of address includes when to use terms of rank, as in rank titles, when addressing another person, it also includes what is considered within the service to be a general tone and climate of respect in common everyday interactions. It seems as if it is in the everyday interactions where the service cultures differ. More specifically, in addition to when to use rank titles, it is in the service-specific *expectations* of what amounts to a tone of proper respect that seems to be at issue. One of the Army officers interviewed felt that in terms of the formality and rigidity of rank relationships, the Army had a closer affinity to the Marines, than, say, the Air Force who seemed less formal. He felt that orders did not need explaining or convincing to be carried out in the Army and Marines, whereas with the Air Force it was more of a negotiation that he referred to as “coddling.”

A socially appropriate pattern of when to use rank titles and how to interact across service lines is not truly shared. It may be understood on a more basic and more theoretical level, but it is not internalized through lived experience. It becomes shared through a renegotiation as corrections are given and adjustments are made to parent service expectations, but the routine joint “fabric of meaning,” to use Geertz’s

phrase (Geertz 1973:144-145), does not begin to be shared until the member enters an inter-service or joint environment.

Because the joint organizational mix is constantly changing, relationships are contingent based on time on station and the mix of services and ranks. The work environment could be informal with regard to customs and courtesies one day and become more formal the next with a simple change of leadership. This dynamic requires personnel to adapt to the changes. They fall back on their general military training and renegotiate the relationships.

Customs and courtesies can also be followed through the cultural model of jointness (Table 6.1 above) along row 3 and intersecting columns A through E, priorities 1 through 5.

Extract from Table 6.1: Step 3: Customs and Courtesies

Map of joint cultural knowledge			A	B	C	D	E
			Schema <i>of</i> Jointness				
			Priority 1: Mission	Priority 2: Organizational Diversity	Priority 3: Adapting to all new circumstances	Priority 4: Customs and courtesies	Priority 5: Joint Policy vs. Joint Reality
3	<i>Schema for Jointness</i>	Step 3: Customs and Courtesies	The customs and courtesies that are necessary to get the mission done.	Learning the customs and courtesies that come with the specific joint organizational mix	Learning to selectively apply customs and courtesies in an idiosyncratic joint organizational environment.	Inventory of customs and courtesies based on joint organizational mix.	Maintaining proper protocols regardless of the how joint policy is applied.

As it does throughout the joint experience, mission focus motivates service personnel to apply the appropriate customs and courtesies necessary to accomplish the mission.

Service members expect to have to learn the customs and courtesies that come with the specific joint organizational mix because there is little to no training relevant to the joint context beforehand. The on-the-spot learning of context-specific customs and courtesies means that service members also have to learn to selectively apply that knowledge by adapting to each situation in the joint environment. Of course, the mix of customs and courtesies is contingent on the mix of organizations in the joint environment and protocol is applied regardless of whether or not the joint assignment is formal.

Intra-service customs and courtesies make up a large part of the indoctrination that military members go through when they leave civilian life and join the military. As a result, customs and courtesies are almost second nature for service members when interacting within their own parent service. However, the joint environment challenges those ingrained norms of behavior. The contingent mix of organizations means that service members are vigilant to personnel changes and differences in both formal and informal interaction rules. Yet it is the mix of organizations, the diversity, of the joint environment that makes it attractive to those interviewed.

Diversity

The attribute of the joint environment that makes it the joint environment is the diversity of organizations present. According to 10 USC 99-433 sec. 668:

“...the term "integrated military forces" refers to military forces that are involved in the planning or execution (or both) of operations involving participants from-(A) more than one military department; or (B) a military department and one or more of the following: (i) Other departments and agencies of the United States. (ii) The military forces or agencies of other countries. (iii) Non-governmental persons or entities.”

So a diverse mix of organizations is the definition of jointness. As we saw above, that diversity can cause problems with knowing the appropriate customs and courtesies for a given situation. However, those interviewed see diversity as one of the main sources of value that service members take away from a joint assignment.

The Naval aviator interviewed described it as “embracing diversity” in that when the US military conducts operations, it is done as a single entity, a single military force. He added that to do so, one must keep an open mind to a variety of options and capabilities that are represented in the joint mix of organizations present in the joint environment. It is a mission focus that allows the consideration of one option over another based on what is best for the mission. That appreciation for the diversity of the joint environment is enhanced by face-to-face experience working side by side with inter-service colleagues. The female Army officer interviewed saw that face-to-face, side-by-side joint experience as the best way to overcome pre-conceived notions about other services.

What each member of the joint organization can contribute to the mission is both a learning opportunity and a source of strength for the joint mission. That diversity was expressed in terms of military services, US government agencies, nationalities, genders, and occupational specialties. Service members are challenged to understand those contributions while keeping protocol straight during interactions.

Appreciating the value of joint service in terms of diversity, however, seems to have become a personal initiative because parent services did not seem to accentuate the organizational diversity value of joint service. The senior enlisted Marine interviewed felt that it was mostly through his own initiative that he was able

to experience and learn about the valuable contributions of the other services because, to him, the Marines were more concerned about accentuating the superiority of the Marine Corps than in learning from the other services or even having joint learning materials available to other Marines. However, if service members are willing to take the initiative, as that senior enlisted Marine did in partnering with other senior NCOs at one of his joint assignments, and learn from the diverse professional social environment created by jointness, they seem to view the experience as positive and worth recommending to others in their parent service.

The cultural model of jointness (Table 6.1 above) traces the element of diversity (line 4) through the schema *of* jointness, or the priorities of joint service, columns A through E.

Extract from Table 6.1: Step 4: Diversity

A cultural model of jointness			A	B	C	D	E
			Schema <i>of</i> Jointness				
			Priority 1: Mission	Priority 2: Organizational Diversity	Priority 3: Adapting to all new circumstances	Priority 4: Customs and courtesies	Priority 5: Joint Policy vs. Joint Reality
4	Schema <i>for</i> Jointness	Step 4: Diversity	Learning what each member of the joint organization contributes to the mission	Inventory of organizations and their capabilities and contributions to the joint organization	Understanding the contributions of joint members in a given situation	Learning how each joint organizational member needs to be treated.	Doing your job regardless of whether or not mission assignments are given according to policy.

As we learned from those interviewed, the strength of diversity in a joint assignment is primarily seen in the contributions of each organization to the success of the mission. Those contributions are learned through joint experience either as a byproduct of the working with the other organizations or through personal initiative. Specific situations demand the best mix of capabilities from a diverse set of contributing organizations. Jointness is about learning that best mix, but it is also about applying the proper protocols for the right organizations. Finally, the strength of diversity that is jointness is discovered on-the-job and is not taught. This is ironic because achieving the best mix of diversity of organizational contribution is the foundational concept behind jointness. The DoD's Insights and Best Practices Paper dealing with Joint Operations describes it this way:

“Every headquarters we visit identifies the need for continuing efforts to maintain effective unity of effort with both our USG agencies and multinational partners as key to achieving success in this complex environment. The military can't do it alone and they recognize the value of harmonizing and synchronizing military actions with the actions of other instruments of national and international power.”
(DoD 2013b: 8)

Accomplishing the Mission

Finally, there is a mission to accomplish. Throughout this analysis, as we review the perspectives of those who have experience joint assignments and lived and worked with other services, agencies or nationalities, the highest priority has been the accomplishment of the mission.

Extract from Table 6.1: Step 4: Getting the mission done

A cultural model of jointness			A	B	C	D	E
			Schema <i>of</i> Jointness				
			Priority 1: Mission	Priority 2: Organizational Diversity	Priority 3: Adapting to all new circumstances	Priority 4: Customs and courtesies	Priority 5: Joint Policy vs. Joint Reality
5	Schema <i>for</i> Jointness	Step 5: Mission	Getting the mission done.	Figuring out how to get the mission done with the available organizational mix	Getting the mission done in spite of personal or procedural adjustment to the way it would be done in the parent service.	Staying focused on the mission and applying customs and courtesies appropriately.	Getting the mission done regardless of the level of formal application of joint policy.

It is so obvious and so endemic to the military experience that it becomes the underlying assumption, the context, for all discussions about jointness and joint culture. Accomplishing the mission is of course why the concept of jointness was originally developed. Yet, *how* the mission is accomplished is by leveraging the capabilities of a heterogeneous mix of organizations. The fact that it is necessary to leverage those capabilities was crystal clear to everyone. Accomplishing the mission through the contributions of members to a joint organization seemed to be an exercise in negotiating a series of cultural differences without training beforehand.

The symbol of joint mission accomplishment is, for the US military personnel interviewed, the power of the United States to defeat enemies in a coordinated application of the strengths of the military services. Remember the pride with which the Army artillery officer described the other services applying their capabilities in the same direction and at the same time as his artillery unit did. He did not share this

experience with one service superior to the others. His account was one of pride in the coordination and mix of forces supporting one another in the accomplishment of the mission. The Naval aviator shared the same sentiment in his account of flying missions with other services or nationalities. Embracing diversity is how he phrased the power of the coordinated application of power to get the mission done. In my experience, these views are not unique. The joint mission is supporting one another, working together to prevent an enemy from harming the US and others in the military regardless of service. So mission is simultaneously the highest priority as indicated in the schema *of* jointness, and the ultimate experience of joint cultural negotiation as indicated in the schema *for* jointness.

Summary: Joint Culture

Through the experience of joint service, military members learned that the different military services apply formal customs and courtesies differently in the less formal work place. Through the experience of joint service, military members see past the policy and doctrine attached to the concept of “jointness” as articulated in law and the boxes to check on the way to promotion. In its place, service members discover that lived jointness is a focused appreciation of the strengths of the individual military services through the coordinated application of that diversity to accomplish the mission. All of this means that in a given joint assignment, service members have to figure out how to navigate the joint organization to identify people and processes to get things done.

There are two cognitive structures that stand ready to enable people to function in a joint setting. First, the schema *for* jointness (Figure 4 above and Table

6.1 rows 1 through 5 above), is one that enables military service personnel to navigate the joint assignment process. At each step along the way, service members figure out how to proceed to the next step. Most of the time there is little to no training prior to a joint assignment. A lot of the time the joint assignment may not be creditable as checking the box for joint duty because the assignment is coded that way. Upon arrival at the joint assignment, new organizations may be present with whom the service member may not previously worked. That organizational diversity and the contributions of each organization has to be learned and understood because everyone in the joint environment works together to get the mission done.

The second, the schema *of jointness* (Figure 3 and Table 6.1 columns A through E above), is one that keeps service members focused on the things that matter. Top of the list is getting the mission done. Mission accomplishment is the thread that ties all of the steps of the joint assignment together. With mission in mind, the different organizations in the joint environment become more important than just a group of different customs and courtesies to learn. They can be critical to mission accomplishment and working with them in a holistic and cooperative way leveraging their strengths is important. Adaptation may be necessary especially if those partners in the joint environment do not share the goals for the mission. Learning how to work in a joint environment can mean persuading and compromising where possible. None of which would be possible without putting a priority on protocols that enable cooperation and trust and sometimes working in a way that gets the mission done without formally applying joint policy and doctrine.

Finally, jointness is about accomplishing the mission. Whether the mission is coordinating a plan with a foreign partner or coordinating a combat strike on an enemy position. Service members work together, professionally applying their service-specific knowledge, skills and abilities to accomplish the mission. The lived experience of joint assignments instantiates the joint cultural schemas in dynamic and contingent ways that are unique to the composition of the joint organization at the time. Joint culture is messy and complicated, but through the initiative of professionals, each time they join a joint organization, they figure out what to do. They work with people from different organizations and backgrounds. They negotiate protocol and processes and they learn who can do what and how all that can help them get the job done.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and Directions for Future research

The strength of anthropology is that it focuses on the real life experiences and perspectives of people involved in their contexts, on the ground. Participant observation fieldwork is the foundation of cultural anthropology (Bernard 2002: 322) which places the researcher in the midst of the situation being studied to acquire the experiential knowledge (Bernard 2002) to inform interpretations and explanations of social phenomena. Supported by a systematic interviewing approaches, anthropology reliably characterizes the dynamics of the situation that can lead to solutions to problems people face. This dissertation demonstrated the value of having anthropology study issues of importance to the military and DoD from the perspectives of military personnel themselves. We learned that most people do not really understand joint concepts. Jointness seems to the people interviewed as nebulous and somewhat ill-defined and any opportunity for enthusiasm is tempered somewhat by the lukewarm support from the services. Yet, the military personnel interviewed feel that joint service is important and valuable because of the insights it provides into the diversity of organizations and capabilities that come together in a joint environment. The consensus on jointness is that it is strength through diversity.

In this dissertation we learned that the enlisted personnel interviewed served in a multi-service or joint assignments during their first enlistment. It is not that this is necessarily a problem. It is mentioned here simply to point out that it seems to be more of a byproduct of the way intelligence specialties are assigned by their parent services than an intentional implementation of General Dempsey's desire to see jointness at the lower levels of the force (DoD 2012). On a positive note, we learned

that even though those early joint assignments can be confusing, most service members are well-equipped with sufficient general military knowledge to adapt to and gradually become comfortable in the joint environment. Their singular focus on accomplishing the mission is a goal that guides them through the rough spots.

Cognitive Anthropology

This dissertation grappled with the fluid concepts of schemas and cultural models in cognitive anthropology to come up with a way to depict the complexities that military service personnel face in joint environments. While perhaps not the most elegant application of existing methods, this dissertation attempted to be very clear about the nature of models, definitions of schemas and cultural models, and employed a matrix approach to illustrate the interrelationships between the major schemas discovered in interviewee narratives as a way to explain a cultural model of jointness. Also, this may be the first time cognitive anthropology has been applied in military anthropology research.

In-person fieldwork, interviews and systematic text analysis are the hallmarks of applied anthropology generally and cognitive anthropology particularly. Applied anthropologists increasingly study domestic cultural settings to address any number of problems or concerns, in the present as well as the past. While this dissertation was very much in the minds of those interviewed, applied anthropology is an holistic discipline that can bring all the strengths of anthropology, archeology, biological anthropology, and socio-cultural anthropology to bear on understanding the human experience in all its forms. The military is an important community of Americans that has many unique contexts, traditions, and norms of behavior that lends itself to

anthropological inquiry. There is a growing body of anthropology whose interest area is the military community. This dissertation is on more contribution to that work.

Military Anthropology

The work in this dissertation makes a contribution to anthropology of the military by examining jointness from the perspective of military personnel who have lived it. A core logic framework guided a systematic navigation of the process and experiences of military personnel as they move through their joint assignments and how they navigated the cultural complexities they encountered on the way. From members of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines common themes emerged from their accounts to form cultural schemas *of* and *for* jointness. Together, the two joint cultural schemas form a cultural model of jointness. If any corners of the DoD think that jointness can still be improved, then the kind of research in this dissertation can be focused on any number of experiences that comprise joint service.

Directions for future research

The research in this dissertation is limited in a number of ways. First, it includes the joint experiences of a small number of service members from four services and largely from the intelligence occupational specialties within those services. The research does not include members from the US Coast Guard or anyone from civilian government agencies or contractor personnel. Also, this dissertation does not include any of the experiences of our foreign partners. All of these limitations are opportunities to build on this dissertation's conclusions by expanding the population of joint participants from which to sample.

Any of the specific points along the continuum of a joint assignment could also be excellent fodder for follow-up research. From preparation and recruitment for joint assignments to pre-PCS training or orientations upon arrival at the joint assignment. How to design such training and orientations would require a greater depth of research. Of course on-site contrasting service cultural models of customs and courtesies may also be addressed in follow-on research possibly with the aid of the structural diversity focus in the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) (see Appendix D for a description of the MLDC).

Joint professional military education (JPME) for both officers and enlisted would be another opportunity for future research. JPME has a schedule and general content laid out in joint policy documents for officers and enlisted personnel (see Appendix B). If raising the profile of JPME in terms of its value in overcoming the inter-service cultural differences is important, then designing supplementary JPME modules or courses could be another opportunity for follow-on research.

Appendices

Appendix A – 10 USC Ch. 107 Professional Military Education

From Title 10—ARMED FORCES

Subtitle A - General Military Law

PART III - TRAINING AND EDUCATION

CHAPTER 107—PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Sec.2151. Definitions

2152. Joint professional military education: general requirements.

2153. Capstone course: newly selected general and flag officers.

2154. Joint professional military education: three-phase approach.

2155. Joint professional military education Phase II program of instruction.

2156. Joint Forces Staff College: duration of principal course of instruction.

2157. Annual report to Congress.

Prior Provisions

A prior chapter 107 was renumbered chapter 106A of this title.

Amendments

2006—Pub. L. 109–364, div. A, title X, §1071(a)(12), (13), Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2399, substituted "Joint professional" for "Professional" in item 2152 and "Phase" for "phase" in item 2155.

§2151. Definitions

(a) Joint Professional Military Education. —Joint professional military education consists of the rigorous and thorough instruction and examination of officers of the armed forces in an environment designed to promote a theoretical and practical in-depth understanding of joint matters and, specifically, of the subject matter covered. The subject matter to be covered by joint professional military education shall include at least the following:

- (1) National Military Strategy.
- (2) Joint planning at all levels of war.
- (3) Joint doctrine.
- (4) Joint command and control.
- (5) Joint force and joint requirements development.
- (6) Operational contract support.

(b) Other Definitions. —In this chapter:

- (1) The term "senior level service school" means any of the following:
 - (A) The Army War College.
 - (B) The College of Naval Warfare.
 - (C) The Air War College.
 - (D) The Marine Corps War College.

(2) The term "intermediate level service school" means any of the following:

(A) The United States Army Command and General Staff College.

(B) The College of Naval Command and Staff.

(C) The Air Command and Staff College.

(D) The Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

(3) The term "joint intermediate level school" includes the National Defense Intelligence College.

(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1897; amended Pub. L. 112–81, div. A, title V, §552(a)(2), Dec. 31, 2011, 125 Stat. 1412; Pub. L. 112–239, div. A, title VIII, §845(c), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 1848.)

Amendments

2013—Subsec. (a)(6). Pub. L. 112–239 added par. (6).

2011—Subsec. (b)(3). Pub. L. 112–81 added par. (3).

Change of Name

National Defense Intelligence College changed to National Intelligence University by Department of Defense Instruction 3305.01 on Feb. 9, 2011.

§2152. Joint professional military education: general requirements

(a) In General. —The Secretary of Defense shall implement a comprehensive framework for the joint professional military education of officers, including officers nominated under section 661 of this title for the joint specialty.

(b) Joint Military Education Schools. —The Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall periodically review and revise the curriculum of each school of the National Defense University (and of any other joint professional military education school) to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters. The Secretary shall require such schools to maintain rigorous standards for the military education of officers with the joint specialty.

(c) Other Professional Military Education Schools. —The Secretary of Defense shall require that each Department of Defense school concerned with professional military education periodically review and revise its curriculum for senior and intermediate grade officers in order to strengthen the focus on—

(1) joint matters; and

(2) preparing officers for joint duty assignments.

(Added and amended Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), (b), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1897, 1900.)

Codification

Subsecs. (b) and (c) of section 663 of this title, which were transferred to this section by Pub. L. 108–375, §532(b), were based on Pub. L. 99–433, title IV, §401(a), Oct. 1, 1986, 100 Stat. 1027.

Amendments

2004—Subsecs. (b), (c). Pub. L. 108–375, §532(b), transferred subsecs. (b) and (c) of section 663 of this title to end of this section. See Codification note above.

§2153. Capstone course: newly selected general and flag officers

(a) Requirement. —Each officer selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier general or, in the case of the Navy, rear admiral (lower half) shall be required, after

such selection, to attend a military education course designed specifically to prepare new general and flag officers to work with the other armed forces.

(b) Waiver Authority. —(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense may waive subsection (a)—

(A) in the case of an officer whose immediately previous assignment was in a joint duty assignment and who is thoroughly familiar with joint matters;

(B) when necessary for the good of the service;

(C) in the case of an officer whose proposed selection for promotion is based primarily upon scientific and technical qualifications for which joint requirements do not exist (as determined under regulations prescribed under section 619(e)(4)¹ of this title); and

(D) in the case of a medical officer, dental officer, veterinary officer, medical service officer, nurse, biomedical science officer, or chaplain.

(2) The authority of the Secretary of Defense to grant a waiver under paragraph (1) may only be delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, an Under Secretary of Defense, or an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Such a waiver may be granted only on a case-by-case basis in the case of an individual officer.

(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1897.)

References in Text

Section 619(e)(4) of this title, referred to in subsec. (b)(1)(C), was repealed by Pub. L. 103–160, div. A, title IX, §931(b), Nov. 30, 1993, 107 Stat. 1734. See section 619a(f) of this title.

¹ See References in Text note below.

§2154. Joint professional military education: three-phase approach

(a) Three-Phase Approach. —The Secretary of Defense shall implement a three-phase approach to joint professional military education, as follows:

(1) There shall be a course of instruction, designated and certified by the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Phase I instruction, consisting of all the elements of a joint professional military education (as specified in section 2151(a) of this title), in addition to the principal curriculum taught to all officers at an intermediate level service school or at a joint intermediate level school.

(2) There shall be a course of instruction, designated and certified by the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Phase II instruction, consisting of—

(A) a joint professional military education curriculum taught in residence at, or offered through, the Joint Forces Staff College or a senior level service school that has been designated and certified by the Secretary of Defense as a joint professional military education institution; or

(B) a senior level service course of at least ten months that has been designated and certified by the Secretary of Defense as a joint professional military education course.

(3) There shall be a course of instruction, designated and certified by the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Capstone course, for officers selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier

general or, in the case of the Navy, rear admiral (lower half) and offered in accordance with section 2153 of this title.

(b) **Sequenced Approach.** —The Secretary shall require the sequencing of joint professional military education so that the standard sequence of assignments for such education requires an officer to complete Phase I instruction before proceeding to Phase II instruction, as provided in section 2155(a) of this title.

(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1898; amended Pub. L. 112–81, div. A, title V, §552(a)(1), Dec. 31, 2011, 125 Stat. 1412; Pub. L. 113–291, div. A, title V, §506, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3356; Pub. L. 114–92, div. A, title V, §554, Nov. 25, 2015, 129 Stat. 824.)

Amendments

2015—Subsec. (a)(2)(A). Pub. L. 114–92 inserted ", or offered through," after "taught in residence at".

2014—Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 113–291 substituted "consisting of—" for "consisting of a joint professional military education curriculum taught in residence at—" in introductory provisions, added subpars. (A) and (B), and struck out former subpars. (A) and (B) which read as follows:

(A) and (B) which read as follows:

"(A) the Joint Forces Staff College; or

"(B) a senior level service school that has been designated and certified by the Secretary of Defense as a joint professional military education institution."

2011—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 112–81 inserted "or at a joint intermediate level school" before period at end.

§2155. Joint professional military education Phase II program of instruction

(a) **Prerequisite of Completion of Joint Professional Military Education Phase I Program of Instruction.** — (1) After September 30, 2009, an officer of the armed forces may not be accepted for, or assigned to, a program of instruction designated by the Secretary of Defense as joint professional military education Phase II unless the officer has successfully completed a program of instruction designated by the Secretary of Defense as joint professional military education Phase I.

(2) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may grant exceptions to the requirement under paragraph (1). Such an exception may be granted only on a case-by-case basis under exceptional circumstances, as determined by the Chairman. An officer selected to receive such an exception shall have knowledge of joint matters and other aspects of the Phase I curriculum that, to the satisfaction of the Chairman, qualifies the officer to meet the minimum requirements established for entry into Phase II instruction without first completing Phase I instruction. The number of officers selected to attend an offering of the principal course of instruction at the Joint Forces Staff College or a senior level service school designated by the Secretary of Defense as a joint professional military education institution who have not completed Phase I instruction should comprise no more than 10 percent of the total number of officers selected.

(b) **Phase II Requirements.** —The Secretary shall require that the curriculum for Phase II joint professional military education at any school—

(1) focus on developing joint operational expertise and perspectives and honing joint warfighting skills; and

(2) be structured—

(A) so as to adequately prepare students to perform effectively in an assignment to a joint, multiservice organization; and
(B) so that students progress from a basic knowledge of joint matters learned in Phase I instruction to the level of expertise necessary for successful performance in the joint arena.

(c) Curriculum Content. —In addition to the subjects specified in section 2151(a) of this title, the curriculum for Phase II joint professional military education shall include the following:

- (1) National security strategy.
- (2) Theater strategy and campaigning.
- (3) Joint planning processes and systems.
- (4) Joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and the integration of those capabilities.

(d) Student Ratio; Faculty Ratio. —Not later than September 30, 2009, for courses of instruction in a Phase II program of instruction that is offered at senior level service school that has been designated by the Secretary of Defense as a joint professional military education institution—

- (1) the percentage of students enrolled in any such course who are officers of the armed force that administers the school may not exceed 60 percent, with the remaining services proportionally represented; and
- (2) of the faculty at the school who are active-duty officers who provide instruction in such courses, the percentage who are officers of the armed force that administers the school may not exceed 60 percent, with the remaining services proportionally represented.

(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1898; amended Pub. L. 109–364, div. A, title X, §1071(a)(13), (14), Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2399.)

Amendments

2006—Pub. L. 109–364, §1071(a)(13), substituted "Phase" for "phase" in section catchline.

Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 109–364, §1071(a)(14), inserted "Phase" after "Education" in heading.

Pilot Program on JPME Phase II on Other Than In-Residence Basis

Pub. L. 112–81, div. A, title V, §552(b), Dec. 31, 2011, 125 Stat. 1412, provided that:

"(1) Pilot program authorized. —The Secretary of Defense may carry out a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of offering a program of instruction for Phase II joint professional military education (JPME II) on another than in-residence basis.

"(2) Location. —The pilot program authorized by this subsection shall be carried out at the headquarters of not more than two combatant commands selected by the Secretary for purposes of the pilot program.

"(3) Program of instruction. —The program of instruction offered under the pilot program authorized by this subsection shall meet the requirements of section 2155 of title 10, United States Code.

"(4) Report. —Not later than one year before completion of the pilot program authorized by this subsection, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the pilot program. The report shall include the following:

"(A) The number of students enrolled at each location under the pilot program.

"(B) The number of students who successfully completed the program of instruction under the pilot program and were awarded credit for Phase II joint professional military education.

"(C) The assessment of the Secretary regarding the feasibility and advisability of expanding the pilot program to the headquarters of additional combatant commands, or of making the pilot program permanent, and a statement of the legislative or administrative actions required to implement such assessment.

"(5) Sunset. —The authority in this subsection to carry out the pilot program shall expire on the date that is five years after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 31, 2011]."

§2156. Joint Forces Staff College: duration of principal course of instruction

(a) Duration. —The duration of the principal course of instruction offered at the Joint Forces Staff College may not be less than 10 weeks of resident instruction.

(b) Definition. —In this section, the term "principal course of instruction" means any course of instruction offered at the Joint Forces Staff College as Phase II joint professional military education.

(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1900.)

§2157. Annual report to Congress

The Secretary of Defense shall include in the annual report of the Secretary to Congress under section 113(c) of this title, for the period covered by the report, the following information (which shall be shown for the Department of Defense as a whole and separately for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and each reserve component):

(1) The number of officers who successfully completed a joint professional military education Phase II course and were not selected for promotion.

(2) The number of officer students and faculty members assigned by each service to the professional military schools of the other services and to the joint schools.

(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §532(a)(2), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1900; amended Pub. L. 109–364, div. A, title X, §1071(a)(15), Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2399.)

Amendments

2006—Par. (1). Pub. L. 109–364 substituted "Phase" for "phase".

Appendix B – Officer and Enlisted JPME Schedules

Table B.1: Officer JPME Schedule from CJCSI 1800.01E 29 May 2015, Annex A, Appendix A

Grade/Rank	<i>Cadet/Midshipman</i>	<i>O-1/O-2/O-3</i>	<i>O-4</i>	<i>O-5/O-6</i>	<i>O-7/O-8/O-9</i>
Education Level	<i>Pre-commissioning</i>	<i>Primary</i>	<i>Intermediate (JPME Phase 1)</i>	<i>Senior (JPME Phase 2)</i>	<i>General/Flag (The Capstone Course)</i>
Educational Institutions, Programs, and Courses	Service academies, ROTC, OCS/OTS/DC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Branch warfare or staff specialty schools • Primary-level PME courses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air Command and Staff College • Army Command and General Staff College • College of Naval Command and Staff • Marine Corps Command and Staff College • JFSC; Joint and Combined 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air War College • Army War College • College of Naval Warfare • Marine Corps War College • Eisenhower School • National War College • JFSC and Combined Warfighting School, AJPME • JFSC: Joint Advanced Warfighting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CAPSTONE • Joint Functional Component Commander Courses • SJIOAC • JFOWC • COEC • PINNACLE

Grade/Rank	<i>Cadet/Midshipman</i>	<i>O-1/O-2/O-3</i>	<i>O-4</i>	<i>O-5/O-6</i>	<i>O-7/O-8/O-9</i>
Education Level	<i>Pre-commissioning</i>	<i>Primary</i>	<i>Intermediate (JPME Phase 1)</i>	<i>Senior (JPME Phase 2)</i>	<i>General/Flag (The Capstone Course)</i>
			Warfighting School, AJPME • National Intelligence University		
Level of War Emphasized	Conceptual Awareness of all Levels	Tactical	Operational Strategic		

Grade/Rank	<i>Cadet/Midshipman</i>	<i>O-1/O-2/O-3</i>	<i>O-4</i>	<i>O-5/O-6</i>	<i>O-7/O-8/O-9</i>
Education Level	<i>Pre-commissioning</i>	<i>Primary</i>	<i>Intermediate (JPME Phase 1)</i>	<i>Senior (JPME Phase 2)</i>	<i>General/Flag (The Capstone Course)</i>
Focus of Military Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intro to Service Missions • U.S. Constitution • U.S. Government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assigned branch of staff specialty • Domain knowledge (land, air, sea, space and cyber) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Warfighting within the context of operational art • Introduction to theater strategy, plans, national military strategy, national security strategy • Operational art in all domains • Joint leader development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service Schools: Strategic Leadership/Leader Development, National Military Strategy, Theater Strategy • NWC; National Security Strategy • Eisenhower: National Security Strategy with emphasis on resource components • All: Theater Strategy and campaigning, planning processes and systems, JIIM capability and int. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Matters and National Security • Interagency Process • Multinational Operations
Career-long Development	Life-long Learning Skills/Self-development/Advanced Education				
	Cultural Education from Awareness to Competence				

	<u>Joint Introduction</u>	<u>Joint Awareness</u>	<u>JPME Phase I</u>	<u>JPME Phase II</u>	<u>Capstone</u>
Joint Emphasis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Military Capabilities (in all domains) and Organization • Foundations of Joint warfare 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Warfare/Cross Domain Fundamentals • Joint Campaigning • Operational Adaptability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National military capabilities, command structure and strategic guidance • Joint doctrine and concepts • Joint and multinational forces at operational level of war • Joint planning and execution process • Joint command and control • Operational adaptability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National security strategy and national military strategy • Joint warfare, Theater strategy and Campaigning in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and multinational-national environments • National and joint planning systems and processes across all domains • Integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities • Desired leader attributes • Strategic adaptability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National security strategy • Joint operational art • Joint functional component CC courses and JFOWC • National planning systems and organization • Theater strategy, campaigning and military operations in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments • Information operations

Grade/Rank	<i>Cadet/Midshipman</i>	<i>O-1/O-2/O-3</i>	<i>O-4</i>	<i>O-5/O-6</i>	<i>O-7/O-8/O-9</i>
Education Level	<i>Pre-commissioning</i>	<i>Primary</i>	<i>Intermediate (JPME Phase 1)</i>	<i>Senior (JPME Phase 2)</i>	<i>General/Flag (The Capstone Course)</i>
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desired leader attributes <u>AJPME</u>	<u>AJPME</u>	
Desired Leader Attributes	Understanding security environment and instruments of national security				
	Anticipating and responding to surprise and uncertainty				
	Anticipating and recognizing change and leading transitions				
	Operating in intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding				
	Making ethical decisions based on the profession of arms				
	Thinking critically/strategically and applying joint warfighting principles at all levels of warfare				

**Table B.2: Enlisted Professional Military Education (EPME) Continuum from
CJCSI 1805.01B 15 May 2015, Annex A, Appendix A**

Grade/Rank	<i>E1-E3</i>	<i>E4-E6</i>	<i>E6-E7</i>	<i>E8-E9</i>	<i>E9</i>
Education Level	<i>Introductory</i>	<i>Primary</i>	<i>Intermediate</i>	<i>Senior</i>	<i>Executive</i>
Educational Institutions, Courses, and Opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service Initial Entry Training • Basic Development Schools and Courses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PME Academies, Schools, and Courses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PME Academies, Schools and Courses • SJPME I Course 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PME Academies, Schools, Courses, Seminars, Symposia, and Conferences • JSOU JSOFSEA • SJPME II Course 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PME Academies, Schools, Courses, Seminars, Symposia, and Conferences • NDU KEYSTONE
Level of War Emphasized	Tactical			Operational	Strategic

<p>Focus of Military Education and Professional Development Programs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Followership and Fundamentals of Leadership • Establish Tactical Warfighter Skills • Service-specific Competencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leadership and Management Skills in Service and MOS/AFSC/RATING • Expand Tactical Warfighting Skills • Small Team/Unit Leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advanced Leadership and Management Skills in Service and MOS/AFSC/RATING • Advanced Tactical Warfighting Skills • Introduce Operational Level of War • Unit/Organizational Leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advanced Leadership and Management Skills in a Joint Environment • Expand Operational Level of Warfighting • Introduction to Interagency and Multinational Operations • Organizational and Command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advanced Leadership and Management Skills in a Joint Environment • Introduction to Strategic Theater Level of Warfighting • Expand Interagency and Multinational Operations • Command Senior Enlisted Leadership
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Grade/Rank	<i>E1-E3</i>	<i>E4-E6</i>	<i>E6-E7</i>	<i>E8-E9</i>	<i>E9</i>
Education Level	<i>Introductory</i>	<i>Primary</i>	<i>Intermediate</i>	<i>Senior</i>	<i>Executive</i>
				Senior Enlisted Leadership	
Joint Emphasis Areas	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Basic</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Military Capabilities • Joint Forces Overview • Joint Forces Non-Commissioned and Petty Officer • Introduction to Joint Interagency Intergovernmental 		<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Senior</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Strategic Overview • JIIM • Foundations of Joint Operations • Joint Force Leadership 		<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Keystone</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Military Capabilities and Organization

Grade/Rank	<i>E1-E3</i>	<i>E4-E6</i>	<i>E6-E7</i>	<i>E8-E9</i>	<i>E9</i>
Education Level	<i>Introductory</i>	<i>Primary</i>	<i>Intermediate</i>	<i>Senior</i>	<i>Executive</i>
	and Multinational (JIIM) warfighting organizations		<u>Career</u>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint Doctrine • JIIM Capabilities • Joint Force Leadership
Career Long Development – Enlisted	Operate on commander’s intent and enable mission command at all levels				
Desired Leader	Make sound ethical decisions based on the values and standards of the profession of arms				
	Utilize available resources to enhance the discipline, readiness, resiliency, and health of the total force				

Grade/Rank	<i>E1-E3</i>	<i>E4-E6</i>	<i>E6-E7</i>	<i>E8-E9</i>	<i>E9</i>
Education Level	<i>Introductory</i>	<i>Primary</i>	<i>Intermediate</i>	<i>Senior</i>	<i>Executive</i>
Attributes (EDLAs)	Anticipate, communicate, and mitigate risks				
	Operate in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments				
	Thinking critically and develop agile and adaptive leaders				

Appendix C – The Semi-Structured Interview Protocol

Semi-structured interview questions

Each participant was instructed as follows:

Please answer the following questions based on your experience and what you think and believe. Questions in parentheses are reminders to me for possible follow up or elaboration.

1. (Causes) How did you come to be assigned to joint duty? (Did you volunteer or were you compelled to go?)
2. (Causes) How did your parent service talk about joint assignments? (In other words, did the service encourage and emphasize possible rewards following joint duty or did you perceive that was it tolerated as a necessary evil?)
3. (Causes) How did your parent service formally prepare you for duty in a joint environment pre-pcs (pcs means permanent change of station – the universal term used in the military to mean moving to a new duty station)? (Were there training or orientation sessions prior to the assignment addressing the different service perspectives? What about different US government agency perspectives? How about different nationalities, both allied, host nation and even adversary nationalities?)

Topics to explore are:

- a. rank and authority differences – vertical treatment as well as horizontal affiliations at the same rank
 - b. gender differences – how do the different institutions relate to men and women especially when it comes to matters of information and expertise sharing?
 - c. language differences – both in terms of US English military jargon, US bureaucratic terminology, and foreign language concepts and the use of translators. norms of official and unofficial behavior – especially the fidelity to rules, policies and law)
4. (Effects) Were there any training or orientation sessions addressing joint duty for you upon arrival at the joint duty station? (If so, were they provided by your parent service or the host agency or government?)

5. (Effects) Were the messages the same or different from the pre-pcs training or orientation sessions?
6. (Effects) How did any differences show up on duty?
7. (Impacts) How did the reality of joint duty compare to your expectations?
8. (Impacts) What were the most memorable instances of difference and similarity between joint duty and parent service duty?
9. (Impacts) How did the experience of joint duty affect your perspective on joint duty? (How were you recognized or rewarded for joint duty?)
10. (Adaptations) Have you perceived any changes in the way your parent service approaches (recruits, assigns, trains, advocates for, rewards) joint duty?
11. (Adaptations) Would you recommend joint duty to others in your parent service? (Why or why not?)
12. (Adaptations) Do you think joint duty is important (Why/why not?)
13. Are there any aspects of joint duty that I did not cover that you would like to add?

Appendix D – The Military Leadership Diversity Commission

The Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), established by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2009, was tasked “to conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies and practices that shape diversity among military leaders” (MLDC 2011: 3). The commission developed a four-dimensional model of diversity (MLDC 2011: 16-17):

1. Demographic diversity – immutable differences among individuals, such as race/ethnicity, gender and age as well as differences in personal background, such as religion, education level and marital status. A critical component of overall diversity. By adding cultural and linguistic knowledge from a variety of demographic backgrounds, the US military is likely to “know the enemy” better and be better able to work with international partners.
2. Cognitive diversity – different personality types, such as extroverted/introverted, and to different thinking styles, such as quick and decisive versus slow and methodical.
3. Structural diversity – organizational background differences, including Service, occupation, component (i.e., Active or Reserve), and work function. It provides the expertise of service members affiliated with particular occupations, Services, or components. It also enables needed capabilities to be brought to the table and fully incorporated into the mix. Exchanging information and perspectives across different

branches or occupations can result in innovative ways of confronting the threat.

4. Global diversity – occurs through contact with those (e.g., members of foreign military services) who have national affiliations with countries other than the United States.

Appendix E – Different Military Service Cognitive Styles Toward Analysis

(Direct block quotations from Builder 1989: 104-109)

- “Air Force – approach to analysis is sophisticated and elegant
 - The Air Force has relied upon analysis from its inception to support operational, developmental, and acquisition decision making at high levels.
 - The airplane, the focal instrument of the theory of air power and independent air forces, was itself conceived and born by means of requirements analysis.
 - The father of the Air Force, Hap Arnold, took a bold step to ensure that the new institution could retain in peacetime some of the benefits afforded by its wartime scientists and operations analysts.
 - Air Force officers are accustomed to dealing with analysis on every aspect of flight and the application of air power.
 - Supporting decisions with analysis is quite natural.
 - Analysis in the Air Force is not restricted to the formalized planning, programming, and budgeting process; it is often regarded as the most effective medium for debate within the Air Force itself.
- Army – approach to analysis is ingenuous and credulous
 - Army analyses are oriented toward feeding numbers to the planning, programming, and budgeting process
 - Large-scale simulation models with long, evolutionary lives are routine.

- Detail and scope are prized, even at the expense of clarity or understanding.
- The Army appears to have an implicit faith in the analysis and analysts.
- The stature of an analyst seems to rest upon the number of factors taken into account, the amount of detail included, and the number and credentials of the analysts who did the work.
- Less clear is whether that faith rests with the validity of such requirements analyses or with their effectiveness in feeding credible (i.e. acceptable) numbers into the bureaucratic programming process.
- Much of Army analysis appears to be aimed at getting a single answer rather than illuminating the alternatives in the face of recognized uncertainties.
- Does the Army believe in the results or believe in the technique as a device to keep the Department of Defense satisfied?
- Navy – approach to analysis is suspicious and pragmatic
 - Has been at the forefront of operations analysis – to improve the tactical or operational use of its existing platforms or forces.
 - Has little tolerance of analysis for planning or evaluating the Navy, by either requirements or systems analyses.
 - Analysis of naval force requirements or effectiveness is a direct threat to the Navy’s traditional institutional prerogatives.

- The Navy does not need analysis to define its requirements; it has always known what its requirements were.
- Navy requirements come from its experience and traditions, and from the quality thinking of its people, well steeped in both.
- Navy institutional judgments are infallible. If analysis gave results that were contrary to those judgments, then, very simply, the analysis must be wrong, either in the way it was formulated or in the way it was executed.”

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¹ The Human Terrain System's (HTS) mission statement is as follows: "The U.S. Army Human Terrain System functions as the primary and enduring social science-based human domain research, analysis, and training capability, focused on enabling leaders to remain adaptive when shaping current and future complex strategic and operational environments which support Unified Action Partners world-wide." Accessed at <http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/index.html> on 26 April 2015. The portion of the program with which the AAA has the most concern is what is known as the Human Terrain Teams (HTT) that perform field research in combat zones and are sometimes embedded with military units (AAA 2009:14).

² This distinction is partly the result of different research foci in their parent disciplines. Individual mental models come from cognitive psychology while cultural models come from anthropology (Shore 1996:49).

³ For this dissertation, the term "participant observation" is intended to capture not only the period of time when I had a focused research interest in studying jointness, but also that extended period of time when I was a complete participant sharing the experiences of the military and gaining an insider's perspective.

⁴ STANDARD ORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONS OF THE U.S. NAVY: OPNAVINST 3120.32D 16 JUL 2012, pp. 3-3 accessed at <https://www.usna.edu/Training/files/documents/References/2C%20MQS%20References/2015-2016%20MQS/OPNAVINST%203120.32D%20Navy%20SORM.pdf> on 4 February 2017.