ABSTRACT


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This dissertation asks when and why leaders and members of ethno-religious groups choose to express one type of nationalist ideology and ethnic identity during armed conflict instead of another. It argues that patterns of wartime violence and external actors play direct and indirect roles in making certain forms of nationalism and ethnic identity more useful for dealing with wartime circumstances. The dissertation advances this argument by joining together four independent empirical chapters. Each empirical chapter has its own research question, its own dependent variable, and its own theoretical argument. All four chapters focus on one ethno-religious group in conflict: the Bosnian Muslims during the 1990s war in Bosnia.

Methodologically, I apply statistical analysis to an original dataset of over 3,700 speech acts by Bosnian Muslim leaders of the wartime Bosnian government in order to explain why the frequency and form of their wartime nationalist rhetoric varied. I also employ historical evidence and qualitative text analysis to reveal the mechanisms underlying the statistical relationships. In addition, one of the empirical chapters analyzes survey data to explain why, following the war, some Bosnian Muslims supported politicians that made religious appeals.
Using this approach, the dissertation finds the following results. First, intense violence against the predominantly Bosnian Muslim population of wartime Sarajevo prompted the Bosnian Muslim leaders of the Bosnian government to use nationalist ideological claims more frequently in domestic media. Second, contingent wartime events spurred these leaders to shift their rhetoric in domestic media from civic to ethnic nationalism in the second year of the war. Specifically, internal power struggles and external peace proposals increased the usefulness of making ethnic nationalist claims to domestic audiences. Third, Bosnian leaders’ need for external aid combined with their uncertain likelihood of receiving Western military support led them to use both civic and religious nationalist rhetoric in foreign media. Fourth, Bosnian Muslims who experienced internal displacement during the war became more religious as a means of coping with the trauma of displacement, which in turn made them more likely to vote for religiously oriented politicians after the conflict.
NATIONALISM DURING ARMED CONFLICT:

A STUDY OF IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY IN THE BOSNIAN WAR, 1992-1995

by

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Introduction

“We shall turn to our own people, to all citizens who love this country, who carry Bosnia-Hercegovina in their hearts. We shall appeal to them to unite and to use all permissible means to defend the independent and sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina, its integrity and freedom” (May 23, 1993).

“My intimate preoccupation is also the fate of the Muslim nation. I think that nobody can blame me for the fact that on some occasions I have to feel as a member of this nation. The fate of this nation is in jeopardy now” (July 18, 1993).

“Therefore, if you ask me why, [it is] because we are Muslims. I would like to draw attention to this fact - let the Muslims worldwide know now that this is the true reason. I would also like to draw attention not only to the Muslim leaders in the world today, to kings and presidents, but also to the ordinary people and the young people, to watch carefully what is going on and open the archives one day to examine from a distance what is currently the invisible side, everything that took place at these, allegedly, important meetings at which a reason was always found to prolong this agony” (July 18, 1995).

As the leader of the wartime government of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, Alija Izetbegović varied the type of nationalist ideology he promoted in official media appearances during the war. The three quotations above show how he emphasized, respectively, civic, ethnic, and religious tenets on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina to explain the purpose and meaning of the conflict at different points in time, alternately extolling the unity of the Bosnian territorial state, the
primacy of the Bosnian Muslims as an ethnic group, and the plight of the Muslims of Bosnia as followers of Islam.

Izetbegović could potentially draw on these three different kinds of nationalist ideology in his wartime rhetoric because he was a Bosnian Muslim. Together with Serbs and Croats, the Bosnian Muslims are one of the principal ethnic groups within Bosnia and Herzegovina. More specifically, they are an ethno-religious group. As a subset of ethnic groups, ethno-religious groups are unique in their overlap of religious and ethnic identity, to the point where even the group’s name denotes both a religion and an ethnicity. This is the case for “Bosnian Muslims”, with the consequence that individual Bosnian Muslims can potentially express their group identity in a way that aligns with either Bosnian Muslim secular cultural traditions or Islamic religious values and beliefs.

As a result of this choice, ethno-religious political leaders like Izetbegović can also use multiple kinds of nationalism to articulate their political interests, values, and goals. They can align their nationalist principles with the group’s secular cultural identity, its religious faith, or, alternatively, with neither of these aspects of the group’s identity but rather with an overarching civic identity that deemphasizes both ethnicity and religion. Therefore, given that they have multiple nationalist ideologies and identities to choose from, when and why do leaders and members of these kinds of groups choose to express just one of them?

In this dissertation, I investigate this phenomenon in the context of ethno-religious groups fighting armed conflicts. I do so by joining four distinct and separate empirical papers in the body of the dissertation. Each empirical chapter has its own separate research question, its own separate dependent variable, and its own separate theoretical
argument. The four research questions are all framed within the context of armed conflict. In order, the questions are: Why does the frequency of ethno-religious political leaders’ use of nationalist ideology in domestic media vary? Why does the type of nationalist ideology ethno-religious political leaders’ promote in domestic media vary? Why does the type of nationalist ideology ethno-religious political leaders’ promote in foreign media vary? And, following armed conflict, why do some members of ethno-religious groups vote for political parties that use religious appeals while other members do not?

I investigate all four questions through the case of the Bosnian Muslims, with a particular focus on the Bosnian Muslim leaders in charge of the wartime government in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. For the third question, I supplement my analysis through a qualitative historical comparison of the first Russian-Chechen war. The theoretical explanations and causal mechanisms linking these variables are elaborated within each chapter. The fourth empirical chapter (i.e. chapter six) is focused on mass identity and political behavior rather than the rhetoric of political leaders. Its outcome of interest is individuals’ post-war support for religiously oriented political parties, with wartime internal displacement status as the key independent variable.

Although these are four separate dependent variables with four separate theoretical explanations, the common argument is that wartime violence and external actors combine to play a fundamental role in altering the frequency and form of political leader’s ideological rhetoric, as well as ethno-religious group members’ identities. The reason for this is, broadly, that these variables make certain patterns of rhetoric or expressions of identity more useful than others. Thus, changes in wartime violence
trends have a direct impact on the frequency of ideological rhetoric and an indirect impact on the religiosity of ethno-religious group members via internal displacement. External actors, on the other hand, are vital in altering the type of nationalist ideology wartime ethno-religious leaders promote in state and foreign media.

Using this approach, the dissertation finds the following empirical results. First, intense violence against the predominantly Bosnian Muslim population of wartime Sarajevo prompted the Bosnian Muslim leaders of the Bosnian government to use ideological rhetoric more frequently in domestic media. Second, an externally-sponsored peace plan favoring ethnic partition triggered a challenge to the authority of the top leaders of the wartime Bosnian government, which in turn spurred them to shift their rhetoric in domestic media from civic to ethnic nationalism in the second year of the war.

Third, Bosnian leaders’ need for external aid combined with their uncertain likelihood of receiving Western military support led them to use both civic and religious nationalist rhetoric in various foreign media. Fourth, Bosnian Muslims who experienced violence-induced internal displacement during the war became more religious, which in turn made them more likely to vote for religiously oriented politicians after the conflict.

Each of the empirical chapters elaborates the theory and causal mechanisms behind these individual results.

The rest of this introduction gives brief definitions of some of the dissertation’s key concepts before outlining its methodological approach. It then elaborates the dissertation’s key contributions before discussing the importance of studying political ideology. The introduction ends by summarizing the chapters to follow.
Key Concepts
For my purposes, “ideology” means top political leaders’ proclamations of the political values and goals that their polity stands for and/or wishes to embody in practice. These values and goals are rooted in and manifest from broader sets of ideas and doctrines. While it is true that ideology can be expressed in more than just verbal communication, I have decided to use the term ideology in this way on the supposition that political leaders’ choice to give official verbal expression to certain values and goals rather than others is a relatively transparent and direct way for these leaders to expose their citizens to the rudiments of a more systematic political orientation or doctrine. By doing so, these leaders can potentially produce a change in the political self-perception and behavior of both their polity’s citizens and other elites (Wess 1996, 24). In that sense, I posit that verbal articulation of these sorts of values and goals has potentially greater implications and consequences than ordinary discourse or shifts in rhetorical emphasis.

This dissertation focuses in particular on political leaders’ official proclamation of principles that align with one of three ideal forms of nationalist ideology: civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism. Briefly, civic nationalism promotes individual rights, upholds a community based on laws, and confers citizenship to all residents of a territory and state regardless of ethnic identity, whereas ethnic nationalism prioritizes collective rights based on ethnic group identity, language, and culture and emphasizes group members’ attachment and entitlement to a specific homeland based on blood (Smith 1988). On the other hand, religious nationalism extols a group’s specifically religious rituals and traditions, calls for the involvement of religion in public life, supports governing
structures found in religious texts, and demands unity with fellow religious believers across state borders (Juergensmeyer 1993). Religious nationalism is also a non-secular form of ethnic identity, in that it is rooted in intrinsic religious belief and faith. This is in contrast to civic and ethnic nationalism, both of which are secular identities which do not demand belief in spiritual or religious precepts.

Chapter one elaborates my conceptualization of ideology, as well as civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism.

Methodology

With one exception, my exploration of variation in nationalist ideology and identity during internal armed conflict uses evidence exclusively from Bosnia and Herzegovina before, during, and after the country’s war between 1992 and 1995. More specifically, it focuses on the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group during this conflict, particularly its wartime leaders, who were in charge of the Bosnian state. Since the group label “Bosnian Muslim” refers to both an ethnic and religious identity, focusing on this group enabled me to observe the use of both ethnic and religious nationalism at different times, whereas studying other groups might have only elicited observation of ethnic nationalist rhetoric or religious nationalism. The sole exception to the exclusive focus on this case comes in the fifth chapter, where I also use historical evidence from the first Chechen-Russian war as additional support for my hypotheses.

Accordingly, the primary body of empirical evidence in this dissertation is an original dataset of official wartime rhetoric by Bosnian Muslim leaders in the Bosnian government. Consisting of three thousand, seven hundred twenty-six speech acts on both Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and foreign media outlets, this corpus of rhetoric allowed
me to code, classify, analyze and trace variation in the frequency and content of these leaders’ wartime nationalist ideological rhetoric on a yearly, monthly, weekly, and daily basis. My sources for these speech acts were BBC Monitoring, Agence France Presse, and the New York Times. These sources contained a significant amount of rhetorical data from the Bosnian war which could be captured and coded. Using this methodological approach also generated three additional benefits.

First, this approach helped me address any reverse causation issues involved in studying ideology as a dependent variable because I could compare the chronology of wartime events and trends to the occurrence of specific speech acts and ideological claims in order to ascertain whether the former occurred before the latter. Second, by using a single case to code instances of ideological statements and the content of nationalist ideology, I was able to utilize case-specific context to categorize the different types of nationalism. In contrast, some of the instances of nationalist rhetoric might have been categorized incorrectly or missed entirely if I had applied a general quantitative algorithm to code the speech acts or if I had coded a large number of cases and attempted to categorize different types of nationalist ideology for all of them. This is because distinct forms of nationalism tend to be distinguished by different key words and phrases for different groups and states. Proper coding of these ideologies thereby requires close attention to the specific details and rhetorical content of particular cases.

Third, using these sources, especially BBC Monitoring, meant that my analysis utilized much of the same open source intelligence that the international policy community had available to it during the war. Explaining rhetorical and ideological shifts observed in these sources thereby helps explain when and why policymakers are
likely to see changes in wartime ethno-religious leaders’ nationalist ideologies.

Furthermore, BBC captured all of the wartime speech acts on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina, the official government media station during the conflict. Examining this source was crucial, since it allowed me to observe when Bosnian leaders decided to change their ideological principles on the only wartime communications channel that was heard by a large population of Bosnians. Ideological shifts on this medium thereby indicated when the leaders had the need or desire to attempt a shift in nationalist rhetoric that could reverberate throughout society.

In my empirical analyses, I used my coding of Bosnian wartime leaders’ rhetoric to test a series of correlations corresponding to my theoretical arguments. I then used historical evidence, both prior to and during the war, along with interpretive analysis of specific speech acts, in order to illustrate the various mechanisms driving these correlations. To test the link between war and changes in group identity, I shifted away from Bosnian wartime political elites by analyzing a post-war survey of Bosnian Muslims’ war experiences and political attitudes.

**Contributions**

This dissertation makes several contributions through its explanation of ideological rhetoric, its methodological approach, its exploration of the sincerity of political leaders’ beliefs, its focus on the history of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and its demonstration of how wartime violence, audiences, external actors, and structural constraints all shape wartime nationalist ideology and identity.

First, changes in nationalist ideology are endogenous to specific variables within armed conflict, much like shifts in identity (Kalyvas 2008). However, my dissertation
shows that these shifts in ideological rhetoric are not necessarily produced via a process of outbidding in which new leaders or factions holding alternate ideological views come to power. Rather, a single set of leaders can and will alter the type of ideology they use under specific conditions and circumstances in armed conflict.

Specifically, patterns of wartime violence change the frequency of their use of ideological rhetoric in domestic media, while particular wartime events alter the content of this ideological rhetoric. However, since these leaders can choose from numerous competing ideologies when constructing their wartime rhetoric, and since this choice is shaped by contingent wartime events, ideological shifts during wartime may be reversible, such that a newly predominant wartime ideology may not remain dominant for the duration of the conflict. This finding thus demonstrates that wartime ethno-religious leaders tend to be passive and reactive in their ability to alter their group’s predominant nationalist ideology.

Second, the analytical task of tracing the evolution of wartime leaders’ official rhetoric to specific events and contexts requires precise disaggregated data. Without examining the data and media source of various speech acts, Bosnian leaders’ ideological claims would appear to be haphazard. Instead, the dissertation demonstrates that their use of specific ideologies corresponds to particular wartime events and audience contexts. Accordingly, from a methodological perspective, a large N dataset of speech acts from one case is particularly useful for pursuing this sort of analysis. Using this kind of dataset allows me to trace changes in rhetoric at a fine-grained level of time and location. It also enables comparison of the chronology of speech acts to the chronology and pattern of specific wartime variables, such as violence against civilians. Using a cross-country
large N analysis, on the other hand, could obscure shifts in the content of wartime ideological claims or hinder explanations of the reasons for the shifts.

Third, the findings show that personal beliefs matter for wartime ethno-religious leaders’ promotion of specific ideologies, but more so for domestic rhetoric than speech acts to foreign audiences. Thus, in the domestic sphere, Bosnian leaders invested in resources favoring their privately preferred form of nationalism. Overall, though, the evidence shows that instrumental considerations and cost-benefit incentives trump personal views when it comes to wartime leaders’ official rhetoric, as Bosnian wartime leaders’ ideological shifts vis-à-vis both domestic and foreign audiences were driven principally by internal political competition and the need for external support.

Fourth, the dissertation contributes to the literature on the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia by examining how and why the Bosnian government used certain ideological principles in its communications to its citizens. This effort thus comprises an initial step in answer to the need for a larger project concerning the use of propaganda by Bosnian, Serb, and Croat leaders during the war (Ramet 2005, 101-102).

Fifth, I show that periods of intense violence prompt ethno-religious political elites to emphasize political values, beliefs, and goals in their official rhetoric to their citizens. This dynamic is different from earlier work concerning the relationship between violence, identity, and rhetoric. Specifically, V.P. Gagnon showed that Serbian political leaders used violence and war in the 1990s as a way to demobilize opposition to their authority. In doing so, the use of large-scale violence helped alter the identities of Serbs in both Serbia and Bosnia (Gagnon 2004, 27). For Gagnon, rhetoric relating to ethnic
conflict and ethnicity is thus a strategic tool used by the perpetrators of violence, as it allows political leaders to create hard ethnic boundaries (Gagnon 2004, 188).

I build on this earlier work but reach a new finding, namely that instead of serving simply as a tool for its perpetrators to reshape mass identity, intense violence can impact the ideology and identity of ethno-religious group victims as they react to being its targets. In direct response to this kind of violence, the victimized group’s leaders tend to employ more ideological principles in their rhetoric. On the other hand, as seen in chapter six, more intense violence may also indirectly alter the identity of the group’s members, as it increases the likelihood that individuals within the group will be internally displaced, which in turn increases the chance that these individuals will embrace a more religious understanding of their group identity.

In terms of audiences, whether wartime political elites are speaking on domestic or foreign media shapes the process and content of any shift in nationalist ideology. Regarding process, it appears that wartime ethno-religious leaders can switch between nationalist ideologies more easily, more rapidly, and more often in foreign media (provided they are fighting in a geopolitical context that allows them to use more than one nationalist ideology to appeal for outside aid). When speaking in official domestic media, on the other hand, the process of shifting between nationalist ideologies appears to occur more slowly and happen less often, as such shifts require specific opportune events. Considering both audiences, it appears that political leaders can take advantage of the information environment during war, namely that most citizens’ access to media will likely be limited to state channel(s) and/or local newspapers. This limitation means that most ordinary people may not be aware of what their leaders are saying on other
countries’ media outlets and consequently will not be able to punish them or hold them to account for their ideological inconsistency between domestic and foreign media.

In either case, it will be difficult for those observing leaders’ ideological claims on domestic and foreign media to judge the sincerity of their beliefs in the content of the claims. What should be understood is that wartime ethno-religious leaders’ ideological content in domestic media will be driven partly by a desire to remake the polity’s identity but also by a need to avoid and/or stop internal power struggles. In contrast, ideological content in foreign media is more exclusively driven by an external power struggle, in the form of a need for aid to combat the wartime enemy. Therefore, it seems more likely that leaders will sincerely believe in the ideological principles they espouse in their official domestic rhetoric rather than their rhetoric in foreign media.

Regardless of the audience, external actors are highly influential for the content of ideological claims in both domestic and foreign media. Domestically, the principles that external actors propose as foundations for peace negotiations can shape the ideological claims that leaders espouse to local audiences. Which external actors are able to help a warring ethno-religious group also shapes the rhetorical strategies the leaders of these groups use to appeal for assistance from foreign governments. These results go against the intuitive presumption that the formation and alteration of a country’s or group’s nationalist principles should be shaped predominantly or entirely by domestic actors and variables.

Finally, the dissertation also shows that structural constraints can limit the kinds of nationalist tenets wartime leaders espouse, albeit not the sorts of domestic variables normally implied by the notion of structural constraints (e.g. economic performance,
demographics). Instead, a pre-war path dependent nationalist ideology can impose a significant constraint on the ease and speed with which wartime ethno-religious leaders can insert different types of nationalist ideological claims in their official domestic rhetoric. Furthermore, the geopolitical implications of the location of a post-Cold War internal armed conflict limit the types of nationalist ideological claims wartime ethno-religious leaders can promote in foreign media. At the same time, however, wartime leaders do retain agency in the face of these constraints in deciding how and when to promote specific alternate ideological claims.

Why Ideology?

That ideology is politically significant may seem like an uncontroversial statement, but its recent neglect as a topic of study in social science suggests that scholars have lost sight of its importance. Ideology appears passé, to the point that one sociologist has decried the notion that “the academic equivalent of a mullet is the concept of ideology” (Malešević 2006, 2). This dismissive attitude toward ideology undermines our ability to gain a complete understanding of contemporary political phenomena, particularly the motives driving many violent conflicts. It also relegates the realm of political ideas to the abstract discussion of ideological “isms.”

In contrast, this dissertation shows that careful analysis and explanation of political ideology as a dependent variable can reveal the agents and structures behind its creation and dissemination. It can illuminate how human beings exercise agency to promote certain political ideologies instead of others and thereby indicate which individuals matter most for this process. Explaining the rise and spread of political ideology as a dependent variable is a necessary foundation for understanding how
political ideology changes over time, how it helps or hinders politicians’ goals, and how it shapes the political behavior of elites and masses and the outcomes of political projects. Studying ideology thereby serves an academic purpose.

Practically speaking, ideology is also not passé, as is evident from the contemporary tension between individuals and states whose perception of society and politics is framed around individual rights and secularism and those whose perception is rooted in collective rights and religious principles. Normatively, political and intellectual elites from the United States and Western Europe should be particularly concerned with the continued clash between different forms of nationalist ideology. Most of these countries’ underlying ideals of political community are based on liberal principles, including the primacy of individual and private interests and the desirability of territorial citizenship and multiethnic tolerance.

Over the past generation, however, this civic form of nationalism has been challenged from both without and within Western countries by two principle alternatives. Both of these alternatives’ underlying ideals of political community are centered on collective entities and group rights. The difference is that one of them promotes the primacy and rights of a given ethnic group while the other does so for a specific religious group. In this dissertation, I refer to the former as ethnic nationalism and the latter as religious nationalism. Leaders of Western societies committed to the continued defense and promotion of civic nationalism thus have to understand when and why these alternative ideologies become popular. Doing so requires analysis and explanation of how and why ethnic or religious nationalism may undermine or even replace civic nationalism as the dominant form of nationalism within a society. Understanding civic
nationalism’s weaknesses and failures precedes the ability to strengthen it and make it more successful.

Accordingly, my dissertation shows the risks and challenges confronting civic nationalism during war. For the Bosnian government led by the Bosnian Muslims, civic nationalism was undermined by both ethnic and religious nationalism. How and why this occurred is instructive for those wishing to understand how armed conflict can push societies away from a liberal nationalist political order. However, the war did not lead to the destruction or abandonment of civic nationalism either, suggesting lessons for policymakers wishing to preserve liberal nationalist principles in the midst of conflict. Thus, even though it is just one case, studying wartime shifts in nationalist ideology within the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group has broader normative implications. In turn, understanding when and how this case’s lessons about civic nationalism in wartime may or may not be applicable in other circumstances could aid understanding of trends in nationalism in potential future conflicts involving ethno-religious groups, especially those in post-communist Eastern Europe or Central Asia.

**Chapter Summary**

The outline of the dissertation chapters is as follows. The first chapter provides an overview of research on ideology and nationalism, focusing principally on explanations as to how and why nationalist ideology varies across time and place. This chapter also reviews the literature regarding the impact of war on individual identity and political behavior. Chapter two delves into the history of Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the Bosnian war and connects this history to
the variation in nationalist ideology elaborated in chapter one. Chapter two also provides a series of maps of Bosnia in different historical periods.

The third chapter is the first of the dissertation’s empirical chapters. It examines the incidence of ideological rhetoric in domestic media as a dependent variable during war. Specifically, it explains why wartime leaders vary the frequency of their use of ideological rhetoric to domestic audiences. Unlike previous research which attempts to explain variation in political ideology via political structure, false consciousness, or leaders’ personal views, this chapter shows that the use of ideology in war is a dynamic process endogenous to the pattern of wartime violence. The chapter’s theory advances four novel mechanisms to explain why intense wartime violence incentivizes leaders to use ideological claims more frequently: the need to sustain and comfort the population, mobilize and shape the goals of new military recruits, appear resolute, and gain an advantage in peace negotiations. Statistical analysis of my dataset of Bosnian leaders’ speech acts during the 1990s Bosnian war demonstrates the empirical relationship between victimization by intense wartime violence and the use of ideological claims, while qualitative text analysis reveals the mechanisms at work.

Chapter four explains how and why the content of nationalist ideology in domestic media may change during internal armed conflict. My explanation is rooted in several mechanisms: to maintain social peace and order, a pre-war regime institutes a nationalist ideology which becomes path dependent. Internal armed conflict discredits this path dependent ideology and gives wartime ethno-religious leaders an opportunity to promote a new nationalist ideology.
If these leaders’ personally preferred national ideology is different from the previously dominant one but does not initially provide them with significant political benefits, they will construct grassroots ideological infrastructure which will support a shift to their favored ideology in domestic media should the political calculus change. This calculus changes through contingent wartime events. Once again using statistical, historical, and interpretive analysis of the behavior and rhetoric of the Bosnian Muslim leadership of the wartime Bosnian government, I show that these leaders’ ideological claims shifted from civic nationalism to ethnic nationalism in Bosnian domestic media in the second year of the war in response to internal threats to their power and external mediators’ promotion of ethnic partition.

The fifth chapter shifts the focus of the dissertation to nationalist claims in foreign media. Specifically, it shows how international structure and armed conflict shape the nationalist rhetoric that wartime leaders of ethno-religious groups make to foreign audiences. I argue that in the post-Cold War era, leaders of warring ethno-religious groups with little chance of receiving Western military support and aid will employ religious nationalism to obtain external support. Leaders of similar groups with a higher chance of receiving this kind of support will employ either civic or religious nationalism depending on the likelihood of the support. Analyzing my dataset of Bosnian leaders’ wartime speech acts, I demonstrate that these leaders predominantly used civic nationalist claims in Western media and religious nationalist claims in co-religionist states’ media. A supplementary analysis of the first Chechen-Russian war demonstrates Chechen leaders’ use of religious nationalist rhetoric in a context where Western military intervention was highly unlikely.
The final empirical chapter analyzes the identity and political behavior of ethno-religious group members during and after war rather than the ideology of wartime ethno-religious political elites. Building on work analyzing armed conflict’s impact on post-war political attitudes and participation, I argue that conflict-induced internal displacement mediates the relationship between wartime experiences and post-war political behavior. Specifically, I argue that individuals who become internally displaced during armed conflict are more likely to use an already well-developed religious faith to cope with the trauma of displacement, thereby strengthening their religiosity in the process. This heightened religiosity then leads them to prefer religiously oriented political parties and leaders after conflict.

Often, this kind of displacement is the result of intense violence, thus linking this chapter back to chapter three and showing that violence can have an indirect impact on ethnic identity and political behavior while simultaneously having a direct impact on political leaders’ use of ideological rhetoric. The chapter’s analysis of growing religiosity among ethno-religious group members also suggests a reason why ethno-religious leaders can credibly use religious nationalist claims in some media sources, as shown in chapter five, while utilizing ethnic and civic nationalist claims in others.

Using survey data from Bosnian Muslim respondents collected eight years after the end of the 1990s Bosnian war, I show that internally displaced respondents were more likely to vote for the ethno-religious nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA) after the war. Employing a matching technique, I then verify that these internally displaced respondents became more religious than other respondents compared to before the war. My findings therefore provide evidence that trauma and religiosity combine to shape
post-war voting behavior for ethno-religious groups. In addition, this chapter also contains one of the first empirical examinations of the political impact of internally displaced populations.

Following the empirical chapters, the conclusion to the dissertation discusses the implications of my results for studies of the Bosnian war, analyses of rhetoric and ideology during armed conflict, and theories of ethnicity, nationalism, and religion in politics. In addition, I address some of the rival hypotheses that could not be tested directly in this dissertation and offer suggestions for future research that can build on this dissertation’s findings. I end the dissertation with a discussion of how my findings might be useful to policymakers and scholars wishing to protect and bolster civic nationalism’s appeal to societies fighting internal armed conflicts, particularly those engaged in ethnic conflicts.
1. Ideology, Nationalism, and Identity as Dependent Variables

This chapter elaborates some of the key concepts I use throughout the dissertation. It then briefly reviews the literature on political ideology and the use of ideology during armed conflict, as well as the relationship between ethnic divisions and conflict. The subsequent section details the principal theories of the origins of nationalism, comparing the primordialist, perennialist, and constructivist paradigms. It then identifies the three predominant types of nationalist ideology under analysis in this dissertation before reviewing previous explanations as to why states and societies adopt different types of nationalist ideology. In doing so, the chapter notes the shortcomings of the principal paradigms of nationalism in explaining short-term and rapid fluctuations in nationalist ideology. The last section delves into the literature concerning armed conflict’s impact on individual and collective identity and political behavior, which comprises the subject of the dissertation’s sixth chapter.

1.1 Definitions

In this dissertation I make frequent use of the term “ethno-religious group.” As a subset of an ethnic group, by “ethno-religious” groups I refer specifically to ethnic groups whose ethnic and religious identity markers overlap, such that individual group members can choose to prioritize either the ethnic or religious component of their group’s identity (Ruane and Todd 2010). One example of this type of group identity is Judaism, where the adjective “Jewish” refers to both a religion and an ethnic category. Another example of this type of identity is the group under analysis in this dissertation: the “Bosnian Muslims”, also known as the “Bosniaks.”
I define ideological claims as top political leaders’ proclamations of the political values and goals that their polity stands for and/or wishes to embody in practice. This definition streamlines a view of ideology as the public expression of beliefs, ideas, and values concerning the orientation of group identity and the ordering of society and/or the state (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009). In the context of armed conflict, my concept of an ideological claim is similar to what Charles Tilly labeled a contentious identity or identity claim, in which contentious actors give collective answers to questions asking who they are, what they stand for, and who their opponents are (Tilly 2002, 6). My definition, however, focuses on the articulation of what actors stand for and deemphasizes discussion of who they and their opponents are.

By “ideological infrastructure”, I refer to what other scholars have labeled “institutional contexts” (Wuthnow 1989) and “ideological institutions” (van Dijk 1998), meaning the organizations that serve as venues and vehicles for the production of ideology and the transmission of ideological principles within society. The broad form of ideology under examination is nationalism. By “nationalism”, I refer to the normative desire for congruence between political and cultural boundaries, whereby the state and national group should be aligned (Gellner 1983, 1). Naturally, individuals, groups, and/or states may also utilize ideologies such as socialism, liberalism, and fundamentalism during war, but ethnic groups tend to use one or more types of nationalist ideology during conflict (Sanín and Wood 2014, 215).

1.2.1 Conceptualizing Ideology and Ideological Claims

My definition of ideology also entails that political leaders’ proclaimed political values and goals be an expression of or embedded within a more systematic and coherent
body of ideas. This view builds on a long line of theoretical and empirical research in the subject, which in its earliest incarnations emphasized the need to study ideology as a system of beliefs which was internally consistent, as opposed to viewing it as just a group of political attitudes or policy preferences (Barnes 1966, 514). The criteria that ideology be systematic and consistent were joined to the aspiration that knowing a person’s position on one ideological tenet would enable prediction of their position on other ideological principles (Barnes 1966, 514). On this basis, ideology is thus “a system of ideas that constitute a political or social doctrine and inspire the acts of a government or party” (Burke 1989, 303).

Several decades later, scholars still characterized ideology in terms of a coherent body of ideas which should impart a “cognitive map” to individuals’ political positions and preferences (Shimoni 1995, 3). Against this notion other scholars held that individuals’ political ideologies should be conceptualized and measured on a spectrum, ranging from highly coherent and tightly linked beliefs on one end to much more loosely connected beliefs and values on the other (Snow and Bird 2007, 123). Here, I take a middle ground, adopting the notion that different political ideologies can be distinguished from each other because they endorse coherent, distinct, and often contrasting principles, but allowing for the possibility that this coherence may not be rigid and may occasionally produce inconsistencies and contradictions.

These conceptualizations of ideology are set apart from a much older normative view within political theory, going back to Karl Marx. In this vein, ideology is a tool used by the ruling socio-economic class to gain the support and acquiescence of non-elites to the existing socio-economic order (Larrain 1979), essentially serving to connect
elite claims of the legitimacy of their rule with the masses’ acceptance of these claims to
legitimacy (Weiler 1993). This dissertation steers clear of this view of ideology, sharing
the critique that this perspective creates a selection bias against studying ideologies which
do not come to dominate society or even those which are successful in taking hold within
a section of society outside the ruling elite (Hanson 2006, 357).

Thus, while I situate myself within the growing body of research on ideology
during armed conflict, I do not share the current consensus definition within that research
program, whereby ideology identifies a group, states its grievances, lists its goals, and
articulates an agenda for achieving those goals (Sanín and Wood 2014, 215). Instead, I
view ideological claims as wartime leaders’ official proclamations of relatively coherent
sets of values and goals concerning the present and future political orientation and
policies of their community, particularly with respect to the content and scope of the
rights to be enjoyed by its members. These sets of values and goals in turn emanate from
and are part of systems of ideas which form doctrines.

Critically, different ideologies can have different consequences for popular
attitudes and behaviors, as ideology can make a “‘body hop around in certain ways; and
that same body would have hopped around in different ways had a different ideology
happened to inhabit it’” (qtd. in Wess 1996, 24). What this view entails is that ideology
cannot be studied by simply examining the material conditions of society because it is
tied to the use of symbols, principally words and rhetoric (Wess 1996, 7). Thus, I focus
on rhetoric in this dissertation because of its fundamental role in using symbolic
communication to promote specific goals to audiences that also respond and react to
symbols, in this case verbal and written speech (Burke 1989, 188). Rhetoric also has the
capability to redefine who individual actors are and what they stand for by invoking and evoking different principles, values, and goals (Marin 2007, 21). In that sense, it has important implications for elites and citizens’ political self-perception and behavior.

In this focus on the symbolic form, ideology also resembles myth, particularly as myths promote a certain set of beliefs or values on behalf of a political community (Schöpflin 1997, 19). As with ideology, political and intellectual elites are generally the main developers and promulgators of myths, typically via their control over public communication (Schöpflin 1997, 26-27). Control over myths can in turn enable elites to mobilize members of their community for a cause and increase the solidarity and cohesiveness of this community in the face of crises (Schöpflin 1997, 22-23). However, ideology is nonetheless conceptually distinct from myth.

Primarily, myths tend to be framed as emotional narratives or stories, unlike ideologies, which compromise systematic bodies of ideas linked by logical propositions (Tismaneanu 1998, 28). As such, myths may be a surrogate for ideology, offering mass publics easier access to and understanding of ideological tenets and propositions (Tismaneanu 1998, 7). Or, alternatively, they may form a non-political core at the heart of political ideology (Burke 1989, 310). My own view is that myths are a tool utilized within many, though not necessarily all, political ideologies. They are a simplification of ideological doctrine in more vivid, emotional terms. As such, elements of myth may sometimes show up in ideological rhetoric, but the mere presence of certain political values or goals in leaders’ rhetoric does not mean that myth has superseded ideology in their worldview or communications to citizens. On the contrary, the values and goals are ideological claims offering an entry point to a broader ideological doctrine.
1.2.2 Ideology and Armed Conflict

The general recent neglect of ideology in political science includes research on internal armed conflict. Much of this research has focused on explaining the onset, duration, and settlement of civil wars (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Cunningham 2006; Walter 2002; Toft 2010). For the most part, it has not focused on how ideas and ideology can shape the goals and behavior of both state and non-state actors fighting these conflicts. Exceptions to this trend include work showing that armed conflict can be dominated by a particular mobilizing ideology or ideology of resistance (Walker 2006), that a rebel organization’s ideology shapes its decision to employ selective versus indiscriminate violence (Thaler 2012), that shifting alliances between warring groups change the narratives they use to describe their allies and enemies (Christia 2012), and that warfare plays an important role in forming ethnic communities and shaping their shared history and overall sense of identity (Smith 1981). Fortunately, this pattern has started to change in the last few years, as scholars are increasingly calling for research which can help the field advance its understanding of why and how wartime state and insurgent leaders use particular ideological principles during conflict and how those principles impact armed conflicts (Sanín and Wood 2014; Staniland 2015).

On the other hand, while the budding growth of the study of ideology in armed conflict may be a relatively new focus in the civil war literature, an earlier generation of political science literature examined ideology from a mostly theoretical perspective. Although attuned to how ideology may be created by cultural and political elites, this body of work suggested that structural variables, such as economic performance, inequality, demographic makeup, and political institutions favored the rise and
dominance of particular ideologies, including nationalism, liberalism, Marxism, and fundamentalism (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Snyder 1993; Shulman 2002). Such explanations allowed for ideological change over time, but only gradually.

As regards nationalism in armed conflict specifically, a large literature has focused on the specific relationship between ethnicity, ethnic fractionalization, and armed conflict. Reviewing some of the key studies in this vein, James Fearon and David Laitin demonstrated that ethnic fractionalization and grievances more generally play a small role in the outbreak of civil wars, a finding echoed in the work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Other studies, on the other hand, indicate that both poor and wealthy ethnic groups are more likely to be involved in civil wars (Cederman, Weidman, and Gleditsch 2011), that ethnic groups excluded from state power and/or suffering a recent loss of status in political power are more likely to engage in violent rebellion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010), and that ethnic grievances do matter for the outbreak of ethnic civil wars (Sambanis 2001). However, this literature’s focus on ethnicity means that it only potentially relates to ethnically oriented forms of nationalism. In practice, though, since this work does not explore ethnicity or nationalism as either an ideology or a dependent variable, it is not as useful for explaining variation in ideology during armed conflict.

Consequently, existing approaches cannot explain rapid ideological change, as is often observed in times of societal upheaval, including revolutions and civil wars. They also cannot explain why we observe ideological change even when structural factors remain constant. Conversely, the incipient focus on ideology during armed conflict speculates that most uses of ideology reflect the strategic calculations of political leaders,
without specifying how those calculations might vary in different contexts or points in time or considering the possibility that leaders’ personal beliefs may trump the importance of strategic motives in choosing which ideological principles they promote.

1.3 Shifts in Nationalist Ideology

This dissertation focuses specifically on explaining changes and shifts within one form of ideology during armed conflict: nationalism. Traditionally, the literature on nationalism has been divided between constructivist, primordialist, and perennialist theories. The constructivist approach most often ties the rise of nationalism to structural changes in the global economy and strategies of state-building. Within the constructivist framework, the modernist interpretation of nationalism traces its origin to eighteenth and nineteenth century modernization and industrialization. Significant work in this vein includes Benedict Anderson’s analysis of how capitalism and vernacular languages interacted to foster the rise of imagined national communities, which were then reinforced by settler colonies, particularly in the Western hemisphere. In his formulation, “the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation. The potential stretch of these communities was inherently limited, and, at the same time, bore none but the most fortuitous relationship to existing political boundaries” (Anderson 1983, 46).

Conversely, Ernest Gellner’s modernist formulation attributes the rise of nationalism to newly industrializing societies’ need for an educated labor force centered on a unified culture. Per Gellner, “The level of literacy and technical competence, in a standardized medium, a common conceptual currency, which is required of members of
this society if they are to be properly employable and enjoy full and effective moral
citizenship, is so high that it simply cannot [emphasis original] be provided by the kin or
local units, such as they are. It can only be provided by something resembling a modern
‘national’ educational system” (Gellner 1983, 33). Following Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm
pointed to the ways in which states and mass populations interacted to produce different
forms of nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to him, “While
governments were plainly engaged in conscious and deliberate ideological engineering, it
would be a mistake to see these exercises as pure manipulation from above. They were,
indeed, most successful when they could build on already present unofficial nationalist
sentiments…to the extent that such sentiments were not created but only borrowed and
fostered by governments, those who did so became a kind of sorcerer’s apprentice”
(Hobsbawm 1990, 92).

More recently, newer constructivist approaches have explored whether Russian-
speaking diasporas in former Soviet-controlled states will develop a new identity as a
“Russian speaking population” (Laitin 1998). Other work points to the ways in which
national identity is created and maintained through citizens’ routine performance of
national rituals, which in turn are simultaneously created by and recreate social categories
established by organizations and groups within society (Wedeen 2008). Thus,
constructed national identities may be reinterpreted or reconstructed by both elites and
masses relatively easily and frequently.

In contrast to constructivism, primordialist approaches focus on the enduring
features of national bonds. This perspective emphasizes the fixed nature of identities
rooted in collective categories such as family, tribe, language, religion, and culture. A
more contemporary variant of this position is perennialism, which focuses on the long-running historical roots of ethnic ties. The scholar who most closely approximates this position today is Anthony Smith, though he emphasizes that his position lies between perennialism and constructivism, particularly in its focus on myths and symbols at the root of ethnicity. In his view, given that “ethnicity is largely ‘mythic’ and ‘symbolic’ in character, and because myths, symbols, memories, and values are ‘carried’ in and by forms and genres of artefacts and activities which change only very slowly, so ethnie [emphasis original], once formed, tend to be exceptionally durable under ‘normal’ vicissitudes and to persist over many generations, even centuries, forming ‘moulds’ within which all kinds of social and cultural processes can unfold and upon which all kinds of circumstances and pressures can exert an impact” (Smith 1988, 16).

Thus, Smith’s focus on the varying survival and strength of pre-modern “ethnies” as the key to explaining variation in modern nationalism means that he thinks fundamental changes in ethnic or national identity are highly unlikely or very slow to occur. The issue of the speed of identity change is particularly significant, as contemporary scholarship on nationalism is arguably more divided over how rapidly and easily group identities can change, rather than over primordialism/essentialism vs. constructivism per se (Hale 2004). Consequently, the perennialist twist on primordialism suggests that elites and masses can re-interpret or reconstruct their nationalist ideologies and identities, but that they do so rarely and slowly, to the point that these ideologies and identities will often be fixed in practical terms.

A different twist on this approach explains the enduring resonance of nationalism as a reaction to the spread of scientific rationalism and technocracy across the globe. In
this sense, nationalism is tied to power asymmetries, as relatively powerless communities use it to reclaim their dignity and autonomy in the face of humiliation and domination at the hands of more powerful actors (Berlin 1972). Alternatively, nationalism may simply be a reflection of a universal need for human beings to be part of homogenous cultural communities (Miller 2005, 117).

Unfortunately, the disagreement between these various perspectives does not shed light on some specific empirical questions regarding nationalism. First, why do we observe minor shifts in groups’ and states’ nationalist ideologies at certain times while observing significant ones at others? Second, why do we sometimes witness innovation in groups’ or states’ nationalist ideologies while observing reaction and a return to previously dominant forms of nationalism at other times?

To explain shifts in nationalist ideology, this dissertation focuses on three kinds of nationalism that leaders of ethno-religious groups can use to make nationalist claims: civic, ethnic, and religious. Civic nationalism promotes individual rights, upholds a community based on laws, and confers citizenship to all residents of a territory and state regardless of ethnic identity, whereas ethnic nationalism prioritizes collective rights based on ethnic group identity, language, and culture and emphasizes group members’ attachment and entitlement to a specific homeland based on blood (Smith 1988).

On the other hand, religious nationalism extols a group’s specifically religious rituals and traditions, calls for the involvement of religion in public life, supports governing structures found in religious texts, and demands unity with fellow religious believers across state borders (Juergensmeyer 1993). Religious nationalism is also a non-secular form of ethnic identity, as it is rooted in intrinsic religious belief and faith. This
is in contrast to civic and ethnic nationalism, both of which are secular identities which do not demand belief in spiritual or religious precepts. I use these three forms of nationalist ideology as ideal types, categorizing instances of political leaders’ nationalist rhetoric in accordance with the extent to which they accord with the ideal type.

Building on a foundation of earlier theoretical development (Kohn 1944), these forms of nationalism also dovetail with Anthony Smith’s depiction of the options an ethnic group’s intellectual elite has for constructing a nationalist ideology: assimilationist, which corresponds to the civic nationalist desire to emphasize a common humanity; traditionalist, which aligns with religious nationalism in focusing on the group’s religious customs and beliefs; and reformist, which accords with ethnic nationalism in its promotion of a group’s national spirit in place of its religion (Smith 1983).

In treating these forms of nationalist ideology as ideal types, I am aware that there are tradeoffs and limitations in doing so. Principally, a binary categorical division between civic and ethnic nationalism may be somewhat ahistorical and can underestimate how often these forms of nationalism are intertwined (Chen 2007, 27-28). In practical terms, most forms of ethnic nationalism also give due place to legal categories of citizenship as well as the process of naturalization (Roshwald 2006, 256-257). On the other hand, civic nationalism in its pure form might no longer be considered nationalism, as a political community held together only by legal bonds and strictly political loyalties might theoretically be open to universal membership (Roshwald 2006, 257).

In this sense, civic and ethnic nationalism could be placed along a spectrum, thereby allowing room for them to interact with each other to produce different variants.
in between the ideal categories (Roshwald 2006, 258). Moreover, a stark division between civic and ethnic nationalism along geographic lines ignores the widespread reality of traditional ethnic interpretations of a nation’s past, as can still be found in parts of the United Kingdom and France (Tismaneanu 1998, 75). It also slights the fact that many West European states were initially formed as ethnic nations and only later evolved into the principally civic nations they are today (Roshwald 2006, 288). Of additional significance is the notion that civic nationalism can serve as a disguise for a majority ethnic group’s attempt to enshrine its culture and group as the dominant one in political practice under a cloak of neutral civic principles. This was the case for some countries in inter-war Eastern Europe, where many groups viewed a pan-ethnic ideology of unity as an instrument for promoting the interests of one particular ethnic group over others (Roshwald 2006, 264; Kuzio 2002).

However, as ideal types the discrete categories are still more useful for my analysis because nationalist values and goals expressed in rhetoric tend to be unified around and representative of the underlying system of ideas comprising one of these forms of nationalism relative to the others. In addition, one of these forms of nationalism is still emphasized to a much greater degree or exclusively compared to the others in official state policies (Breton 1988). Moreover, in practice, the national principles and myths of various contemporary and historical countries illustrate that clear distinctions can be made between these forms of nationalism, rendering the categorization of leaders’ rhetoric into one or another of these ideal types empirically justifiable.

For example, France’s use of *jus soli* citizenship promotes civic nationalism, since anyone born on the territory of the French state is automatically a citizen, while
Germany’s use of *jus sanguinis* favors ethnic nationalism because it only grants citizenship to those whose parents are citizens (Brubaker 1992). The United States is also generally upheld as an archetype of civic nationalism. The US thus upholds and enshrines ideological forefathers rather than ethnic ones and emphasizes common sacrifice and joint blood shed on behalf of specific values for the sake of future generations rather than past generations of ethnic kin (Roshwald 2006, 271). In this context, though, and in light of the scope of this study, it is interesting to note that civil war played a major role in the victory and pre-dominance of one set of US national ideals at the expense of another, as the Northern states’ ideal vision of the American nation won out over that of the Southern (Grant 1997). This Northern ideal was a prototype of modern American civic nationalism, as expressed in an 1854 editorial in the *New York Tribune*, which asserted that the US is a “‘a thing of ideas solely, and not a thing of races. It is neither English nor Irish, nor Dutch, nor French; it is not Puritan nor Cavalier; it is not North nor South; our nationality is our self-government, our system of popular liberty and equal law’” (quoted in Grant 1997, 99).

However, civic nationalist principles can also be found in states outside of the US and Western European liberal democracies. Cheng Chen thus indicates that some communist regimes faced more constraints in merging their nation-building ideals with Leninist ideology, with the result that liberal nationalism has been able to take root in these countries more easily following the end of communism compared to communist regimes which managed to merge Leninism and nation-building (Chen 2007). On the other hand, the official state identity of the Soviet Union can also be seen as a type of civic nationalism which repressed ethnic nationalistist rights in the name of a universal
human brotherhood (Roshwald 2006, 280). This is arguably the case for communist Yugoslavia as well, which adopted an indigenous form of communism that included a strong civic nationalist disposition. However, this official identity ultimately proved incapable of suppressing ethnic nationalism, as the state’s civic ideals arguably could not provide the same kind of bonds of solidarity as ethnic ties (Schöpflin 2000, 337). Chapter two contains further discussion and elaboration of Yugoslav civic nationalism.

Liberal nationalism, an attempt to reconcile liberal principles of individual rights with the collective privileges and duties entailed in nationalism, is an alternative way of conceptualizing or labeling civic nationalism. Thus, liberal nationalism posits that liberal political goals can only be realized in a society sharing a single national identity or that national self-determination is only possible in a society that has guarantees of liberal rights and freedoms (Miller 2005, 113). The former supposition thus asserts that nationalism provides the solidarity and common purpose that modern liberalism requires to achieve its ends (Miller 2005, 119).

Yael Tamir in turn bases her liberal nationalist framework on the idea that liberals should appreciate the nationalist values of belonging, membership, and cultural identity, while nationalists should appreciate the liberal values of autonomy and individual rights, along with the need for tolerance between nations (Tamir 1993, 6). Key to this compromise between liberalism and nationalism is the idea that “nationality, which is here used to describe membership in a nation and not in its misleading yet widespread connotation of citizenship, should not be a criterion for participating in the political sphere or for the allocation of goods and services” (Tamir 1993, 10-11). In practice, this tenet is one of the core features of civic nationalism.
Furthermore, although it is possible to have different variants of both civic and ethnic nationalism (Greenfeld 1992), here I will focus on civic nationalism as a single ideology whereby residence in a common state and participation in the institutions and civil society of that state create a community based on a common civic culture (Brown 1999). I will also treat ethnic nationalism as a single ideology wherein the community is formed based on common language, culture, and ethnic descent (Kymlicka 1998). The key distinction between these two ideologies is thus not the presence of a common culture, but rather how inclusive this culture is, what its contents are, and how individuals are incorporated into it (Kymlicka 1998).

I also note here that religious nationalism is not the same as religious fundamentalism, since the former promotes the nation or state as the stronghold of religious values and the vehicle for preserving them, thereby unifying the political and religious worlds (Fox 2004). In this light, although the United States is generally seen as a paragon of civic nationalism, during the US Civil War the rebel Confederate states relied on Christianity for political legitimation, believed that the Confederacy was divinely chosen to do God’s will, and held ritual fast days (Faust 1988). Accordingly, the Confederacy extolled a religious nationalist vision of the polity.

Moreover, although distinguishing between ethnic and religious nationalism may appear to be difficult at first glance, Gideon Shimoni’s characterization of the divide among early Zionists provides some criteria for doing so. In the case of Israel, religious traditionalists thought that “this unique nation had been brought into existence by the terms of an essentially religious covenant emanating from God, whereas the secularized Jewish intelligentsia posited the natural evolution of a Jewish nation generating a culture
of which religious faith and precepts formed a part - for the major period of the nation's history a dominant part, but only one part nonetheless...religion was neither wholly coextensive with Jewish culture nor its original source; it was merely one of the ingredients of Jewish national culture” (Shimoni 1995, 269). The difference between a vision of the nation tied to religious faith and myth versus one expressed in terms of culture, memory, and custom also effectively captures the distinction between religious nationalist and ethnic nationalist ideology for the Bosnian Muslims.

Previous prominent explanations as to why certain polities adopt one or more of these types of nationalism as the foundation of their state principles, values, and myths tend to be historical and structural. Rogers Brubaker, for example, uses both political and cultural geography to explain why Germany came to favor ethnic nationalism while France favored civic nationalism (Brubaker 1992). Other scholars have argued that nationalism will contain more of a religious component the greater the influence that religion had in constructing a nation and/or the more frontiers a group shared historically with other religions (Hastings 1997).

Other explanations for top political leaders’ decision to adopt a specific type of nationalist ideology are rooted in domestic politics and economics during peacetime. Thus, lower socio-economic status is correlated with favoring ethnic nationalism, while higher status is correlated with civic nationalism (Kunovich 2009). However, socio-economic status is a variable that is slow and difficult to change, whereas political leaders can change their nationalist rhetoric quite frequently. Moreover, during armed conflict, socioeconomic status arguably declines rapidly for most warring parties, yet not all leaders employ ethnic nationalism.
Additional research posits that ethnic minorities and groups living in mature democracies are expected to favor civic nationalism, the former because this ideology increases their access to state resources and the latter because democracy is associated with the rule of law and the rights of citizens (Kunovich 2009). Scholars have also emphasized states’ demographic profiles and ethnic composition, as governments in countries containing many small ethnic groups are expected to favor civic nationalism while those with a large majority ethnic group and a few smaller groups are held to favor ethnic nationalism (Shulman 2002). The issue with these findings, though, is that, across countries, ethnic minorities and groups whose domestic ethnic composition is similar do not all adopt the same nationalist ideology over time, particularly during war. Another explanation suggests that governments and groups in newer states with weak and unstable institutions will favor ethnic nationalism (Snyder 1993). Unfortunately, during armed conflict many official institutions tend to be rendered weak and unstable, but, yet again, this does not produce homogenous nationalist ideological claims across political leaders of warring states and groups.

In contrast to civic and ethnic nationalism, previous research tends to perceive religious nationalism as an alternative to these secular ideologies. Prominent scholars see religious and secular nationalism as competing doctrines for producing public order in society, to the extent that religious nationalism becomes more popular after the continued and repeated failure of secular nationalism to produce political and economic benefits (Juergensmeyer 1993). Moreover, religious nationalism has arguably come to serve as an ideological substitute for both anti-imperialist and Marxist socialist critiques of Western countries since the end of the Cold War (Juergensmeyer 1993). Though a compelling
starting point for explaining the rise of religious nationalism, this perspective does not specify to what degree secular nationalism has to fail before religious nationalism is adopted nor does it describe the mechanisms leading from this failure to the adoption of religious nationalism. Arguably, many societies have reason to be frustrated with the failures of political orders tied to secular nationalist principles, yet only some of their leaders adopt religious nationalism in response.

Therefore, previous research does not adequately address short-term variation in the types of nationalist ideology promoted across and within states. In particular, prior research lacks compelling explanations for shifts in nationalist ideology during armed conflict. One exception to this prevailing trend is the work of Mansoor Moaddel, who explains historical societal shifts between territorial nationalism, ethnic nationalism, and religious nationalism in the Muslim Middle East as a function of intellectual elites’ production of new ideological discourses in response to a dominant ideological regime (Moaddel 2005). In addition, Nadav Shelef has proposed an evolutionary model to explain changes in the content of political movements’ nationalist ideologies, a process which is contingent and unpredictable (Shelef 2010). This dissertation shares Moaddel’s focus on explaining shifts between civic (i.e. territorial) and ethnic nationalism. It also builds on Shelef’s work by focusing on the importance of contingent events for ideological shifts while also discussing the role historical and structural factors play in establishing a path dependent nationalist ideology.

However, my approach examines a relatively shorter timeframe of ideological change than these scholars, focusing just on the four years of the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995. In addition, instead of Moaddel’s focus on intellectuals, I look at how
and why politicians produce different types of nationalist ideology. And rather than Shelef’s analysis of movements, I examine a government and the top leaders within it. Most significantly, unlike these scholars, I hone in specifically on a wartime polity, thus showing how and why official nationalist ideology may vary in content during armed conflict.

Thus, my dissertation shows why ethno-religious leaders are often motivated to maintain dominant pre-war nationalist principles in their official wartime rhetoric. Its analyses thereby indicate when the perennialist perspective can offer more leverage for explaining nationalist ideology during internal armed conflict. At the same time, I also reveal when wartime ethno-religious leaders believe they can or must alter their nationalist rhetoric in favor of an alternative type of nationalism, indicating the analytical scope of the constructivist approach in wartime. My findings show how contingent events, political constraints, and the agency of political elites interact to shape variation in the speed, degree, and originality of changes in nationalist ideology during wartime.

1.4 Shifts in Ethnic Identity

Whereas chapters three through five present my arguments and findings concerning the frequency of wartime ethno-religious leaders’ ideological claims and the content of their nationalist claims on domestic and foreign media, chapter six explores the effects of armed conflict on ordinary people, particularly with respect to their religiosity and political behavior. In doing so, chapter six makes four important contributions to the research literature concerning the relationship between armed conflict, religious identity, and political attitudes.
First, I present a new empirical relationship between wartime experiences and postwar political outcomes. A number of recent studies have examined the impact of wartime experiences on individuals and groups, with a focus on economic and political behavior. Specifically, the studies have shown that individuals experiencing wartime violence are more altruistic and risk-seeking (Voors et al. 2012) and more likely to vote and become involved in local community politics (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009). These findings extend outside the context of political violence, as victims of both violent and non-violent crime are also more likely to be politically active after the experience of victimization (Bateson 2012).

However, violent victimization does not always lead to increased political participation, leading some researchers to suggest that this relationship is mediated by kinship networks (Dorff 2015), local social capital (Rojo-Mendoza 2015), or the emotions individuals experience after being victimized (Jarstad and Höglund 2015). By showing that experiencing internal displacement during war increases the likelihood of voting for a specific type of political party, my results suggest a strong link between wartime experiences and post-war political attitudes and behavior outside of direct victimization by wartime violence.

Second, the chapter fills a gap in the existing literature by analyzing how wartime experiences shape political attitudes via trauma and religion. Within the growing number of studies examining the link between wartime experiences and postwar political participation, very few have investigated how wartime trauma can impact postwar political attitudes. One important exception to this trend has been the work of Laia Balcells, who found that victims of violence during the Spanish Civil War remained
opposed to the political identity of the perpetrators of the violence, even passing this attitude down across generations within their families (Balcells 2012). Another study found more post-war support for left-wing political parties in areas of Italy victimized by Nazi and Fascist violence during World War Two (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015), while an analysis of IDF soldiers found that combat experience led them to prefer military solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and spurred them to vote for more hawkish political parties (Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015). More broadly, it also appears that on a societal level, higher levels of violent victimization are associated with lower perceived legitimacy of political institutions and lower levels of political trust (Grosjean 2014).

Though insightful, none of these studies has examined how wartime trauma may shape religious beliefs and how religious views shaped by war may subsequently impact postwar political attitudes and behavior. This is a potentially significant omission, since experimental research indicates that individuals whose religious identity is primed instead of their ethnic identity give higher priority to social issues and moral values in politics and exhibit a preference for candidates who focus on moral issues (McCauley 2014). Furthermore, given the long-term impact of violent trauma on political ideology and political behavior in post-civil war Spain and post-World War Two Italy, heightened religiosity and religious identity resulting from wartime trauma may also have a significant effect on political preferences in postwar democratic politics.

Third, in conjunction with this contribution, one of the mechanisms outlined in chapter six bridges academic disciplines by incorporating research on the psychology of trauma and the psychology of religion into the study of armed conflict. By showing the
value of this inter-disciplinary approach, the chapter’s findings emphasize the need for a new sub-area of study within political science research on war.

Fourth, chapter six is one of the first studies to investigate the political attitudes and behaviors of IDPs. Though it is understudied in social science, internal displacement is a public policy issue that is growing in magnitude across the world, as the total number of internally displaced persons worldwide rose from 23.3 million to 38 million between 2005 and 2014, an increase of 63% (IDMC 2015). Consequently, it is important to examine whether the experiences, beliefs, and attitudes of IDP populations have a political impact. This study thus comprises a pioneering effort to trace the form and degree of political participation and agency among IDPs in postwar democratic politics.

In the conclusion to the dissertation, I discuss some of the connections between shifts in the type of nationalist ideology that predominates among a society’s elites and changes in its citizens’ conceptions of their ethnic or religious identity. In the next chapter, however, I present a historical overview of Bosnia and Yugoslavia. In reviewing the case history, I also connect this chapter’s discussion of nationalist ideology and identity to the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group. The case history thus reveals both the predominant pre-war form of nationalist ideology and identity among the Bosnian Muslims as well as the latent alternative nationalist ideologies which rose to prominence during the war in the 1990s.
2. Bosnia and the Bosnian War in Historical Context

This chapter provides historical background regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. Part of the communist state of Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1990, the Bosnian Muslims became one of the three officially recognized ethnic groups within the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1960s, joining the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. As Yugoslavia dissolved in the early 1990s, the former constituent republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia all declared independence. What remained of Yugoslavia was dominated by Serbia, which supported Bosnian Serb separatists rebelling against the central Bosnian state while independent Croatia initially did the same with Bosnian Croat separatists. Sitting atop what was left of a multiethnic central Bosnian state and bureaucracy, political leaders belonging to the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group had to decide how to construct their rhetoric to domestic and foreign audiences.

The chapter starts with a historical overview of Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims, connecting this history to the civic, ethnic, and religious nationalist ideologies described in chapter one. The second section describes the principal causes leading to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the start of the war in Bosnia. The third section briefly reviews the history of the war and the peace settlement which ended the conflict. Additional historical details are included in chapters three through six, where they are presented as evidence for the mechanisms behind Bosnian leaders’ use of different nationalist ideologies during the war.
2.1 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Muslims

Bosnia and Herzegovina is comprised of three principal ethnic groups: the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, formerly called the Bosnian Muslims and now typically referred to as Bosniaks. The Bosnian Muslims are the only one of these groups that lacks an ethnic homeland outside Bosnia. Now independent, Bosnia was successively part of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Yugoslav states for a period of over five hundred years. In this section, I show how key developments in Bosnian society since its loss of independent statehood in the Middle Ages built the foundations for Bosnian Muslim elites’ eventual ability and inclination to promote either civic, ethnic, or religious nationalism for the group and state during the 1990s war. Maps of Bosnia in each major historical period are provided in Figures 2.1 through 2.5.

The medieval history of Bosnia and Herzegovina laid the initial groundwork for both a civic and religious identity among the Bosnian Muslims. Prior to the Ottoman Empire’s conquest of Bosnia in 1463, the religious make-up of Bosnia included Catholics, Orthodox Christians, and Bosnian Christians. The latter belonged to the Bosnian Church, an indigenous, schismatic, and relatively short-lived institution (Friedman 1996, 13). Following the Ottoman conquest, conversions to Islam in Bosnia occurred gradually but steadily throughout the rest of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The conversions were most rapid and widespread in towns but occurred in rural areas as well. The principal reasons for much of the Bosnian population’s willingness to convert to Islam were that Christian churches in the country were very weakly organized as compared to the strong Islamic institutions of the Ottomans, and that converts could obtain political and economic benefits by becoming members of the
state’s favored religion (Friedman 1996, 17-19). Figure 2.1 depicts a map of the Balkans region, including Bosnia, during the Ottoman era.

**Figure 2.1: Map 1 – Bosnia and Herzegovina within the Ottoman Empire**

![Map of the Balkans region, including Bosnia, during the Ottoman era](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bosnia_Eyalet,_Central_europe_1683.png#file)

In tandem, the pre-Ottoman weakness of Christianity in Bosnia, combined with the Ottoman Empire’s maintenance of the medieval Bosnian kingdom’s administrative borders, favored a strong territorial view of Bosnian identity (Hastings 1997). Moreover, since the medieval indigenous Bosnian church never really developed strong or widespread ties to the population, organized religion generally had a weak foundation in the area (Velikonja 2003). In fact, not only was the pre-Ottoman clergy in Bosnia not well-organized, it also eschewed doctrine in favor of local mystical rituals and syncretism between Christianity and pre-existing folk customs and beliefs (Velikonja 2003). The widespread conversions to Islam following the arrival of Ottoman authority thus overlaid
Muslim beliefs and practices on top of a mostly rural society dominated by superstition, magic, and the worship of nature, meaning that strict doctrinal religious beliefs remained fairly weak among the Muslim section of the Bosnian population (Wilmer 2002). The under-developed religious infrastructure in Bosnia prior to the Ottoman conquest combined with the syncretic religious doctrines of the Bosnian Muslims thus favored a weak religious identity and a relatively strong sense of territorial identification within the group, a mindset conducive to what would later become civic nationalism.

The one exception to this pattern, and it was a major one, was that the Ottoman Empire imposed its millet system in Bosnia, which categorized the population by religion rather than language, territory, or ethnicity (Andjelić 2003, 146). Consequently, the Ottoman era also planted the seeds of Bosnian Muslims’ later potential affinity with religious nationalist ideology, notwithstanding the fact that Islamic religious infrastructure was initially underdeveloped. Moreover, this religious infrastructure became stronger over time and began to play a larger role in the life of the Bosnian Muslim community. The Ottoman era thus provided the initial resources for both civic and religious nationalist identification among the Bosnian Muslims. On the other hand, there is no evidence of strong ethnic consciousness or national identification among the Bosnian Muslims during the time of Ottoman rule (Friedman 1996, 46).

In 1878, control of Bosnia was transferred from the Ottomans to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, although the Austrians did not formally annex Bosnia until 1908. Figure 2.2 depicts Bosnia during this period.
During their rule, which lasted until the end of World War One, Austro-Hungarian officials promoted the identity of “Bosnianism” ("bošnjaštvo") within Bosnia, which denoted a single indigenous Bosnian people regardless of religion or ethnicity (Friedman 1996, 64). Thus, these officials attempted to instill a more robust form of territorial or proto-civic nationalism on the Bosnian population via central state fiat. Unfortunately for the Austrians, the policy did not work, as Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats found it completely unpersuasive and Bosnian Muslims rejected it in favor of either traditional Islamic identity (Friedman 1996, 64) or an even broader cosmopolitanism which sought closer ties with neighboring Serbia and Croatia (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007, 338).

Following World War One, Bosnia became part of the first Yugoslavia, which was known formally as the “Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” until 1929. Figure 2.3 shows Bosnia within the new state.
The country was governed under a constitutional parliamentary monarchy from 1918 until 1929 and a monarchical dictatorship from 1929 until the start of World War Two. During this period, many Bosnian Muslims were pressured to identify as Croats or Serbs. In response, some Bosnian Muslims, mostly within the landowning and urban elites, chose to identify as Muslim Croats or Muslim Serbs (i.e. as a religious minority within the Serb or Croat ethnic group), but most did not. Moreover, this pressure to identify as Serb or Croat generally spurred greater communal solidarity among Bosnian Muslims (Friedman 1996, 105). The most significant example of this solidarity occurred when a group of Bosnian Muslim elites founded the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) in 1919 to represent and defend the interests of the Bosnian Muslim community.
On the one hand, the creation of this organization indicated acceptance of the official Yugoslav government view that Bosnian Muslims were a religious community. In addition, the organization also resisted pressure to identify as an ethnic group. At the same time, a minority of Bosnian Muslims did entertain the idea of advocating for a unique and separate Bosnian Muslim nation (Friedman 1996, 97-100). This notion represented a new option for Bosnian Muslim political ideology and identity, because even though the Bosnian Muslims stood out as a separate group from Serbs and Croats during the Austrian era, they did not develop a widespread sense of ethnic identity or belonging at that time (Andjelić 2003, 11). Thus, this era saw the first stirrings of ethnic nationalism among segments of the Bosnian Muslim elite.

In part, this was also the result of the introduction of mass democratic politics in the first Yugoslav state, which encouraged each of the ethnic groups to rally around communal parties and organizations. In this context, the Bosnian Muslims were at a disadvantage, as they lacked proportional representation within the Bosnian political system. Their political strategy was thus to help balance and build coalitions with other groups and parties in Bosnia and Yugoslavia. In particular, they offered strong support for the central Yugoslav government and a muted ethnic identity in exchange for security, patronage, and tolerance of Islam (Friedman 1996, 106-109). Thus, Bosnian Muslims in the first Yugoslavia maintained a strong territorial identity centered on Bosnia while upholding religious institutions. They also developed the first stirrings of an ethnic nationalist outlook.

This period of Bosnia’s history came to an end with the Nazi take-over of Yugoslavia on April 6th, 1941. The Nazis split Croatia and Bosnia between themselves
and Fascist Italy, but left both under the administration of the Ustaše puppet regime in Croatia, which was officially known as the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). The Ustaše government’s official view of the Bosnian Muslims was that they were all Muslim Croats, thus bidding for their support by treating them as ethnic brethren of the Islamic faith (Friedman 1996, 122). In response, the most conservative members of the Bosnian Muslim religious and political elite tended to support and collaborate with the Ustaše. However, Bosnian Muslims on the whole were divided during the war, as many ended up joining the Communist Partisan resistance forces while others allied with the fascists, home guard units, or purely Muslim militias (Friedman 1996, 125).

During this time a group of Bosnian Muslims also formed an organization known as the Young Muslims ("Mladi Muslimani"). Its activities centered on charity and social work, especially with respect to Bosnian Muslim war refugees. They also organized younger members of the group into cultural, social, and religious activities (Friedman 1996, 149-150). Therefore, this organization comprised one of the first grassroots institutional carriers and promoters of practices and beliefs conducive to both ethnic and religious nationalism among the Bosnian Muslims (Friedman 1996, 149-150). One of its leaders was Alija Izetbegović, who would later become Bosnia’s first President following the demise of Communist Yugoslavia in 1990.

On the other hand, the Bosnian Muslims who joined the Partisan units came to develop an even stronger territorial or civic view of inter-ethnic relations and nationalism by the end of the war. Ultimately, the Communist Partisan forces achieved military success against both the Axis powers and rival groups and organizations within Yugoslavia. By 1945, they were the victors of the civil war that had been fought
concurrently with World War Two and had established the second Yugoslavia under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. Figure 2.4 shows the new Yugoslavia and Bosnia’s place within it.

**Figure 2.4: Map 4 – Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second Yugoslavia, 1945-1990**

Following the war, the Communist Yugoslav government imposed policies which limited the religious practices of the Bosnian Muslim population. These measures included nationalization of religious property, abolition of sharia courts, an end to religious instruction in schools, and a ban on the wearing of the veil (Bougarel and Rashid 1997, 538). The Yugoslav government also assumed the education and judicial duties previously exercised by Islamic community leaders. Many mosques damaged in the war were also not rebuilt or were used for other purposes (Friedman 1996, 150).

These policies produced a rift between more secular Bosnian Muslim leaders, most of whom had joined the Partisans during the war, versus those who were more religiously conservative and thus anti-Communist (Friedman 1996, 151). The Young
Muslims organization was in the latter camp, opposing the Yugoslav regime during this period as a result of its restrictions on the practice of Islam as well as the fact that Bosnian Muslims had not received distinction as a constituent nation within Yugoslavia (Friedman 1996, 150). In response, the Yugoslav government arrested most of the organization’s leaders and drove it underground.

The Yugoslav Communist Party (known as the League of Communists) also established a branch in Bosnia in 1949 (Friedman 1996, 153). At this time, the Bosnian Muslims had not yet received official state recognition as a separate ethnic group. On the 1948 Yugoslav census, they could identify as either “Serb-Muslims”, “Croat-Muslims”, or ethnically undeclared Muslims (Ramet 2006, 287-288). Approximately 800,000 Bosnian Muslims chose the undeclared category, while just under 100,000 chose the Serb-Muslim or Croat-Muslim options. In contrast, 83% of Muslims in Serbia identified as Serbs and 70% of Muslims in Croatia identified as Croats. These figures thus indicate that Bosnian Muslims had come to perceive themselves as a separate ethnic group by the end of World War Two (Friedman 1996, 151).

Bosnian Muslims’ options for ethnic identification changed slightly in the next two censuses, as the 1953 census provided an option to identify as “Yugoslav, nationally undetermined”, while the 1961 census created a category for “Muslims in the ethnic sense”, which fell short of labeling the group an official ethnic group within Yugoslavia like the Croats or Serbs (Waardenburg 1997, 388). In 1953, evidence suggests that nearly all of the respondents who reported Islam as their religion selected the option of undetermined Yugoslav as their ethnicity, thereby confirming the existence of a separate Bosnian Muslim collective identity (Burg 1983, 22). In 1963, Bosnia adopted a new
constitution, which deemed Bosnian Muslims a separate ethnic group just like the Serbs and Croats.

Thus, the Bosnian leadership granted official recognition of Bosnian Muslims’ unique ethnic identity (Burg 1983, 40). The Central Committee of the Bosnian Communist Party confirmed this status in February of 1968, after which the Fifth Congress of the Bosnian Communist Party proclaimed the full equality of the Muslim ethnic group with other Yugoslav ethnic groups in January of 1969. Subsequently, the option of “Muslim in the national sense” was introduced on the 1971 Yugoslav census (Ramet 2006, 287).

Figure 2.5 shows the changing demographics of Bosnia throughout the twentieth century. In particular, the figures indicate that the Bosnian Muslims gained in population relative to the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, particularly with respect to the former. However, given the larger relative increase in the Bosnian Muslim population between 1961 and 1971, a major part of this change arguably occurred as a result of the newfound option to identify officially as Bosnian Muslim.

**Figure 2.5: Historical Ethnic Composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Era</th>
<th>% Muslims</th>
<th>% Serbs</th>
<th>% Croats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Yugoslavia I</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Yugoslavia I</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Yugoslavia II</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Yugoslavia II</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Yugoslavia II</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Yugoslavia II</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yugoslavia II</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Yugoslavia II</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Burg and Shoup, *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Table 2.1, p. 27.
The reasons for granting Bosnian Muslims official status as a constituent ethnic group in Yugoslavia included promoting Bosnia’s economic development by aligning economic and ethnic interests in the state, heading off the reach of international Pan-Islamism in Yugoslavia, using the Muslims in Yugoslavia to enhance the appeal of Tito’s non-aligned foreign policy to Muslim-majority countries in the developing world, and limiting tension between Serbs and Croats regarding Bosnia (Friedman 1996, 164-167). In terms of the practical consequences of official recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a separate ethnic group, the main impact was to give the group’s members access to a greater number of public-sector jobs, particularly higher ranking ones, since these positions were allocated according to the percentage of the group’s members in the larger population, i.e. by ethnic quotas (Friedman 1996, 160-161). In terms of ideology and identity, official recognition re-ignited tensions between Bosnian Muslims who favored a secular understanding of their identity versus those who argued that religion should be the guiding principle of the new official identity (Perica 2002).

Moreover, many leaders within the Bosnian Muslim community now started to believe that Bosnia should be considered their national homeland because they comprised a plurality of the population – just as Serbia was for Serbs and Croatia for Croats (Friedman 1996, 162). Those favoring this more ethnic nationalist orientation for Bosnian Muslims thus wanted the Bosnian constitution amended so that the 'Muslim nation' would be the titular nation in Bosnia, as opposed to the prevailing wording of the Bosnian constitution, which called the republic a “socialist democratic state...of the working people, citizens, and nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Muslims, Serbs, and
Croats” (Ramet 2006, 291). They also started lobbying to have Bosnian designated as a distinct language (Ramet 2006, 291).

One of the prominent members of this wing of the Bosnian Muslim intelligentsia was Adil Zulfikarpasic, an exiled opponent of the Yugoslav regime. He championed a blend of civic and ethnic nationalism in that he promoted a “Bosniak” nation that could also be inclusive of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia (Filandra and Karić 2004, 245). He thus preferred to move away from the Bosnian Muslim label to refer to the group, as he held that retaining the religious term in the group’s name would cause confusion and undermine the group’s ability to achieve full national identity and rights (Filandra and Karić 2004, 247).

At the same time, official recognition of Bosnian Muslims’ ethnic group status also spurred a renewal of some of the official religious institutions seeking to shape Bosnian Muslim identity (Friedman 1996, 162). This represented a small but still significant change of fortune for these organizations, since during the period between 1945 and 1971 mosques had mostly been empty and many Bosnian Muslims had started giving their children non-Muslim names (Gjelten 1995, 61). Furthermore, the societal impact of more ethnically or religiously oriented activists had been minimal. Alija Izetbegović, for example, purportedly did not have any influence outside of a circle of friends centered on the mosque he attended in Sarajevo (Andjelić 2003, 46).

Now, however, the official Islamic organization in Yugoslavia changed its name from the Islamic Religious Community to the Islamic Community in 1969, aiming to become a Muslim national institution (Perica 2002, 77-78). Thus, the acknowledgment of secular Bosnian Muslim identity in the 1970s prompted increased emphasis on the
group’s religious identity on the part of some of its members and intellectual leaders (Velikonja 2003). This burgeoning awakening of religious identity included increased financial and educational connections between the official Islamic Community in Yugoslavia and Bosnia and countries such as Pakistan, Algeria, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya (Velikonja 2003). It also meant that the Islamic clergy attempted to play a more active and public role in the Bosnian Muslim community (Freidman 1996, 163). This section of the community’s cultural leadership also started a nationalist publication called Preporod (“Rebirth”), whose circulation increased from 30,000 to over 70,000 between the 1970s and 1980s (Perica 2002, 79). In addition, this renewed ethnic and religious activism included some former members of the Young Muslims (Bougare 1999, 2).

However, the influence of these leaders and activists was still severely circumscribed under the Communist regime, since religion could still not be expressed in the public sphere and religious organizations could only operate inside religious buildings (e.g. mosques) and then only for strictly religious purposes (Waardenburg 1997). Thus, although the 1970s and 1980s witnessed more openness and reform within the Yugoslav Communist system, thus contributing to the increased reconstruction and building of mosques, more opportunities for religious education, and the distribution of Islamic literature (Fazlić 2011), the regime nonetheless carefully controlled the official Islamic Community, especially via infiltration with spies and collaborators (Karčić 1997). In essence, the regime showed a grudging tolerance toward religion while still repressing more overt expressions of religion tied to politics, particularly those which aggressively promoted ethnic or religious nationalism (Cohen 1998).
More importantly, during the 1970s and 1980s, most of the Bosnian Muslim political and intellectual elite retained strong loyalty to both Communist Yugoslavia and Bosnia, such that it provided much of what support remained for the civic-oriented ideology of “Yugoslavism” (Burg and Shoup 1999, 43). In fact, although these leaders were drawn from all three of the principal Bosnian ethnic groups on an equal basis, they promoted the interests of Bosnia and created a Bosnian political identity at an elite level, rather than advancing the narrow interests of their respective ethnic groups (Andjelić 2003, 19). However, these leaders did not attempt to impose a civic Bosnian identity or nationhood on the Muslim, Serb, and Croat populations within Bosnia either (Andjelić 2003, 37). Bosnian Muslims also came to comprise a greater proportion of Bosnian Communist Party members between the 1970s and 1980s, indicating their continued faith in both the Communist system and the civic Yugoslav identity (Andjelić 2003, 38).

Organized religious and ethnic activism on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims consequently remained strictly regulated during this period. Of most significance in this regard, the Bosnian party leadership tried thirteen accused “Muslim nationalists” of anti-regime activities in April of 1983, one of whom was Izetbegović. As a result, he was jailed until 1988 (Friedman 1996, 193). On the eve of war in 1990, religiously oriented activists within the group’s intelligentsia numbered only a few hundred and were still in the minority among members of the official Islamic Community (Bougarel 1999, 3).

Accordingly, most Bosnian Muslims prior to the war stated that they were “‘Muslim only in terms of culture and tradition,’” which generally meant having Muslim names, practicing circumcision, and observing important traditional holidays and feasts (Velikonja 2003). In fact, in 1988 only 37 percent of Bosnian Muslims reported that they
were religious believers (Velikonja 2003, 261), while fewer Bosnian Muslims than Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats agreed with the notion that religion had had a very positive or mainly positive impact on the development of their ethnic group (Velikonja 2003, 231). The civil society that had emerged in Bosnia by 1989 was also supportive of civic views of Bosnian citizenship and nationhood (Andjelić 2003, 81).

The civic nationalist outlook thus predominated among both the Bosnian Muslims’ political and intellectual elite and many of its members right before the war. However, the foundation for the counter-ideologies of ethnic and religious nationalism had also been laid by the developments of the 1970s and 1980s. The producers and promoters of these alternative ideologies held a minority position within the group’s intelligentsia, while its potential adherents and carriers resided in smaller towns and rural villages (Andjelić 2003, 134-135). The competition between civic, ethnic, and religious nationalist views of Bosnian Muslim identity and Bosnian statehood would play out during the ensuing war. Chapter four elaborates more of the pre-war balance in nationalist ideology among the Bosnian Muslims and provides further historical details in support of an argument regarding elite shifts between these nationalist ideologies.

2.2 The End of Yugoslavia and the Beginning of the Bosnian War

The road to war in Bosnia runs through the collapse of the state of Yugoslavia. The following summary of the breakup of Yugoslavia is drawn from three principal sources: Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, by Laura Silber and Allan Little; The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, by Steven Burg and Paul Shoup; and Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević, by Sabrina Ramet.
Following World War Two, the Yugoslav League of Communists ran Yugoslavia as a multi-ethnic federal state comprised of six federal units. These were the republics of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. In 1974, the Yugoslav leadership under Tito issued a new constitution which gave autonomy to two provinces within Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo, and raised them to the level of federal constituent units. This constitution also essentially transformed Yugoslavia into a confederal state, as each of the republics, as well as Vojvodina and Kosovo, were given a central bank, together with their own agencies for policing, education, and justice.

Along with greater autonomy and responsibilities for each of the constituent republics, this constitution prepared the path for succession from Tito’s leadership by instituting decision-making by consensus within a collective Yugoslav presidency. Each constituent republic would have one vote within the collective presidency as well as a veto over many areas of federal legislation, with the chairmanship of the presidency rotating among the republics at fixed intervals. This institutional structure arguably incentivized aspiring politicians to promote the interests of their respective republics rather than the central Yugoslav state as a means of advancing their careers. It also made it difficult for the central state to pass significant economic and political reforms.

This institutional design had particularly harmful effects on Yugoslavia as a result of the confluence of several events in the early 1980s. First, Tito passed away in 1980. His death left Yugoslavia without a firm source of political legitimacy, a problem which became worse later in the decade as Communist governments began to unravel across the region, thereby further undermining what legitimacy the Communist party had left. It
also facilitated a great deal of competition and gridlock within federal institutions in Yugoslavia, as no single leader could now unify the state or impose decisions in the face of impasses.

Concurrently, Yugoslavia also experienced another shock in the form of a major economic crisis, which set in during 1981 and ultimately produced a decade of economic malaise marked by extreme inflation, high unemployment, stagnant wage growth, and significant public indebtedness. In 1988, for example, GDP decreased 2%, unemployment reached 16.8%, and inflation went to 160% (Ramet 2002, 50). The institutional design of the Yugoslav federal state arguably exacerbated the effects and duration of this crisis, as its governing structures inhibited its leaders’ ability to reach consensus on the economic policies needed to improve the situation and to implement major economic and political reforms. As this political gridlock continued, the Yugoslav state lost even more credibility and legitimacy.

The early 1980s, however, also offered a preview of an alternative source of political legitimacy which would come to the fore by the end of the decade. In the spring and fall of 1981, pro-independence Albanians rioted in Kosovo, leaving the region’s minority Serbs feeling threatened and aggrieved. Their plight helped spark a renaissance of Serbian nationalism and an increase in collective Serb political resentment against the Yugoslav state by the mid-1980s.

It was at this point that Slobodan Milošević began his rise to power within Serbia and Yugoslavia from his position as head of the Serbian Communist Party, which he attained in May of 1986. He did so by capitalizing on burgeoning Serb nationalism to spearhead what he labeled an “Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution” against contemporary
political elites, particularly in Kosovo and Vojvodina. Between 1987 and 1989, he
mobilized mass demonstrations of Serbs in both Serbia and Kosovo, as Serb nationalism
became an organized political movement. By 1989, he effectively controlled the
leaderships of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, which together gave him four of the
eight votes on the collective Yugoslav presidency. He then instructed his political allies
in the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina to amend their constitutions so as to eliminate
their autonomy and bring themselves back under Serbian purview.

Viewing these developments in Serbia with concern, leaders in Slovenia and
Croatia paired their frustrations over perceived economic asymmetry within Yugoslavia
with their fears and worries over Serb nationalism. Both Slovenia’s and Croatia’s
economies were stronger than those in the rest of Yugoslavia, leading their officials to
question the value and benefits of a state structure in which they believed they were
effectively subsidizing the poorer republics within the country. Moreover, while the
rebirth of Serbian nationalism had its roots in a perception that Serbs were under threat
and losing power across Yugoslavia, the reality was that Serbs still held many of the most
powerful positions within the Yugoslav army and the Yugoslav state bureaucracy. These
circumstances increased Croatian and Slovenian suspicions and anxieties in relation to
the Serbian nationalist rhetoric emanating from Milošević, especially as he secured his
dominance over Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro. On the other hand, Milošević and
his Serb nationalist allies viewed both Croatian and Slovenian critiques of the Yugoslav
state structure and their respective nationalist movements as threats to their vision of
greater Serbian power and influence within Yugoslavia.
In this context, the introduction of multi-party elections across Yugoslavia in 1990 produced resounding wins for ethnic nationalist politicians in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. In the latter, these elections led to the formation of a coalition government comprised of ethno-religious nationalist parties representing the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. Over the course of the following year, the individual Yugoslav republics experienced significant internal political tensions and impasses over whether and how to grant special protection, status, and/or degrees of autonomy for the ethnic minorities within their borders. This was especially true for Croatia and Bosnia.

Simultaneously, the republics could not come to an agreement with each other regarding the future of the Yugoslav state. Serbs led by Milošević favored the continuation of Yugoslavia, on the condition that it be re-centralized (and therefore ensure greater dominance for Serbs within the state). The Croats and Slovenes initially pushed for an even more decentralized and confederal structure but eventually chose outright independence in the summer of 1991. As a result, what was now a smaller Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia went to war with both Slovenia and Croatia.

Consequently, in the fall of 1991, the Bosnian Muslim leaders within the Bosnian government made it clear they would not stay in a smaller Yugoslavia without Croatia. In turn, Bosnian Croats started making overtures to join Croatia and began creating autonomous regions within Bosnia. Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, reiterated their desire to remain part of Yugoslavia and therefore maintain unity with the Serbs in Serbia (part of a collective Serb nationalist vision of using Yugoslavia as a vehicle for creating a “Greater Serbia”). Bosnian Serb leaders proceeded to create several autonomous regions
within Bosnia in the fall of 1991 and indicated that they would rebel against and secede from an independent Bosnia.

In March of 1992, most Serbs in Bosnia boycotted a referendum which ratified Bosnia’s independence. The international community, led by the European Community, proceeded to grant the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina official recognition. The following month, the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army attacked Bosnia in conjunction with Serb paramilitary groups from both Serbia and Bosnia. The war in Bosnia had begun.

2.3 The War in Bosnia

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which began on April 6th, 1992 and did not officially end until the ceremony marking the signing of the Dayton agreement on December 14th, 1995, was a particularly brutal one. The conflict included atrocities, mass killings, and the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war, mostly against the Bosnian Muslim population. Just under 100,000 people were killed, a little over 64,000 of them Bosnian Muslims (Toal and Dahlman 2011). A total of 1.2 million Bosnian Muslims also fled their homes, of which roughly 300,000 were IDPs. Thus, approximately 15% of the pre-war Bosnian Muslim population became internally displaced as a result of the conflict (Kukić 2001). Unless noted otherwise, the following summary of the Bosnian war is drawn from Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, by Laura Silber and Allan Little; The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, by Steven Burg and Paul Shoup; and How Bosnia Armed, by Marko Hoare.

Once the war began, Serb military forces laid siege to the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo and carried out an organized campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Bosnian
Muslim population, most of which occurred during the spring and summer of 1992. This campaign, which included the use of concentration camps, was most extensive and horrific in towns and villages in the Eastern part of Bosnia. The Bosnian government sought to protect the Bosnian Muslim population and save what remained of Bosnia by turning to various actors for military support and humanitarian relief, since this kind of aid was crucial for its survival.

One of these actors was Croatia, along with the separatist Croat forces within Bosnia. Although the government in Sarajevo was able to ally with these Croatian forces against the Serbs early in the conflict, the two sides soon went to war as well, clashing sporadically in central Bosnia in the fall of 1992 and more frequently starting in April of 1993 (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007, 346). The war between the increasingly Muslim-dominated Bosnian army and the separatist Croat state of Herceg-Bosna continued until March of 1994, when negotiations led by the United States produced the Washington Agreement. This settlement ended the intra-Bosnian conflict between the Muslims and the Croats and created both a new military coalition against the Serbs as well as a Muslim-Croat political federation which would serve as one of the foundations for the eventual peace settlement ending the entire conflict. Subsequently, a Croatian military offensive between May and August of 1995 routed Serb forces in the Krajina region spanning Croatia and Bosnia and thereby helped push the leaders of both Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs to make concessions in peace negotiations.

Aside from Croatia, the Bosnian government looked mainly to the United States, Europe, the United Nations, and NATO for help. These countries responded with support, although the Bosnian leadership viewed their assistance as insufficient and at
times counterproductive. This was especially true for military aid, as Western countries imposed an arms embargo on all parties to the Bosnian conflict, thereby effectively leaving the Bosnian government at a constant disadvantage relative to Serb and Croat forces. In these circumstances, the Bosnian government sought and received aid from Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as other Muslim-majority countries.

Thus, the Saudi government began sending some relief supplies to Bosnia in the summer of 1992, along with large private financial donations from Saudi citizens. Volunteer fighters traveled from Saudi Arabia to Bosnia as well (Karčić 1997, 525-526). Iran also sent humanitarian supplies to the Bosnian government starting in July of 1992. Later in the war, its government started supplying covert weapons shipments to Bosnia in violation of the arms embargo, as well as military advisers and intelligence agents (Karčić 1997, 529). In regards to these later weapons shipments, US President Bill Clinton secretly approved the deliveries by directing the United States to do nothing to stop them. This classified decision was not publicly disclosed until several months after the war ended (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007, 348).

The Bosnian government fared better in terms of receiving humanitarian relief from the West. United Nations’ aid convoys supplied Sarajevo as well as several other Bosnian cities intermittently throughout the war depending on the status of negotiations with the warring sides for entry and safe passage. The UN also placed a peacekeeping force in Bosnia and declared several towns to be ‘safe areas’ where citizens would be protected from attack by UN forces. However, this policy failed completely in the safe area of Srebrenica, where Serb forces committed genocide against the local Bosnian Muslim population in July of 1995.
NATO, on the other hand, continually threatened to use military force against Bosnian Serb forces committing aggression against the Bosnian government and civilian populations. Until the last year of the war, though, these threats were mostly empty, with the exception of the downing of four Bosnian Serb aircraft in February of 1994. (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007, 348). However, on August 28th, 1995, Serb forces around Sarajevo launched a mortar attack which killed thirty-nine people in the center of the city. Led by the United States, NATO responded with two sustained campaigns of airstrikes against Bosnian Serb military installations over the following two weeks. Combined with the Croatian offensive in northwest Bosnia and the Bosnian army’s own increasingly successful offensive to reclaim territory taken by Bosnian Serb forces early in the war, the NATO campaign created the conditions needed to negotiate an end to the war.

Subsequently, the warring parties in Bosnia signed a ceasefire on October 5th, 1995, which came into effect on October 11th, 1995. The peace negotiations began in Dayton, Ohio at the start of November and concluded with the Dayton Agreement three weeks later, followed by a formal signing ceremony in Paris on December 14th. The peace settlement preserved a unitary and sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina by creating a weak central state presiding over two sub-state entities of roughly equal territorial scope. One of these was called the Republika Srpska, representing the areas taken by Serb forces and populated mostly by Serbs. The other was the Muslim-Croat Federation, which was populated mostly by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Figure 2.6 provides a map of Bosnia following the signing of the Dayton Agreement.
Unlike the Serb entity, which had a unitary system of government administration, the Muslim-Croat Federation included local cantons which were more ethnically homogenous and thus granted more exclusive local political authority to either the Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats. The peace settlement also provided for ethnic power-sharing at all levels of government. Thus, the agreement ended the conflict while reinforcing Bosnia’s ethnic cleavages via the ethnic partition of Bosnian territory and the ethnic apportionment of political institutions and official positions.

Assessing the role of the international community in the conflict, it is clear that the Bosnian government did receive some measure of consistent support from leading Western countries early in the conflict, providing it with a basis for hoping for and expecting even greater help as the war progressed. Hence, although military aid from NATO and the leading Western powers may have been minimal until several years into
the conflict, the Bosnian government persisted in its attempts to lift the arms embargo and win Western military support on its behalf, knowing that it stood a reasonable chance of having the United States lead a military intervention on humanitarian grounds. The Bosnian leadership’s efforts eventually bore fruit, as US-led military action was decisive for ending the war. In the meantime, Western countries helped the Bosnian state survive via aid deliveries through the UN.

The chapters below contain further details of key trends and events within the war, including earlier peace proposals which failed to stop the conflict. Further elaboration of the history of the war in the following chapters is done in connection with Bosnian Muslim leaders’ decisions to use particular types of rhetoric when speaking to domestic and foreign audiences, as well as Bosnian Muslim citizens’ changing conceptions of their identity.
3. Ideological Claims in the Bosnian War: Violence and Rhetoric in Domestic Media

3.1 Introduction

On May 26th, 1992, Alija Izetbegović, the wartime president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, issued a statement on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina reporting on the substance of peace negotiations, which he said included:

- a permanent truce in Bosnia-Hercegovina at all points where there is fighting with, of course, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Bosnia-Hercegovina; the necessity to ensure the presence in Bosnia-Hercegovina of international forces, above all, of the United Nations, which would guarantee the maintenance of the truce and the process of calming down the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, in which respect the return of the refugees to their homes is certainly the most important thing (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1992).

The following day Izetbegović’s rhetoric on the same radio station shifted from the dry, matter of fact tone above, as he proclaimed:

I am calling on the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina at this moment, in these difficult hours, by remembering today's misfortune, to rise up as one in the struggle against these criminals who are making our lives difficult not only in Sarajevo, but also throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina. I am calling on them to defend Bosnia-Hercegovina. I am calling on them to use all means, all permissible means, all human means, as people in the struggle against those who have assaulted freedom and life, primarily the life and freedom of the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1992).

Izetbegović’s rhetoric now included a defense of ideals and values, particularly human life and freedom. And even though he was a member of the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group, Izetbegović exhorted the citizens of Bosnia to come to the country’s defense, implicitly promoting a multiethnic, tolerant, and civic foundation for the Bosnian polity, rather than one based on ethnic or religious particularism. Why did Izetbegović’s rhetoric suddenly include an ideological claim where none was present the day before?

In this chapter, I undertake a systematic examination of this political phenomenon, offering an explanation for the variation in the likelihood and frequency of top political leaders’ use of ideological claims in their official wartime domestic rhetoric.
My argument is that these leaders will generally employ ideological claims sparingly in their wartime rhetoric in domestic media. This will occur in part because citizens will have a low level of demand for political ideology, but mostly because ideological claims are relatively costly to produce. However, if wartime violence against the leaders’ polity and citizens increases to a high level, I argue that four mechanisms will increase the benefits and lower the costs for leaders to employ ideological claims in their domestic rhetoric.

First, the leaders will need to use their rhetoric to sustain and comfort the wartime population following a surge in violence against the population. Second, they will look to take advantage of a spike in violence against the polity to mobilize more citizens into the armed forces while shaping these recruits’ goals for fighting. Third, leaders in this context will be rewarded for showing conviction and resolution, qualities they can demonstrate via more ideological rhetoric. Fourth, the leaders will occupy at least a temporary moral high ground as victims of violence, giving them room to use ideological principles as a bargaining strategy to extract more concessions in peace negotiations. Accordingly, spikes in wartime violence make ideological rhetoric more useful for wartime leaders.

Using micro-level large N data from the Bosnian conflict in the 1990s, I show that high levels of wartime violence against the residents of the capital city of Sarajevo prompted the top political leaders of the Bosnian government to use ideological claims more frequently. I demonstrate this relationship empirically via quantitative analyses of 2,455 speech acts on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina, aggregated at both the level of the
speech act and the conflict month. I then use qualitative text analysis to provide evidence of the mechanisms underlying this relationship.

This chapter’s theory and results offer three main contributions to the research literature on armed conflict. First, the chapter makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to a new research program on ideology during civil war. Thus far, this research agenda has begun to explore why warring parties adopt certain ideologies during civil wars and how these ideologies shape their strategies and institutional development in conflict, including their relationships with other state and non-state actors (Sanín and Wood 2014; Staniland 2015). Rather than explaining why wartime actors use specific ideologies, I focus here on the incidence and frequency of wartime ideological claims in general, a dependent variable that has not yet been the subject of extensive analysis. Empirically, I demonstrate a correlation between patterns of wartime violence and changes in this dependent variable. Theoretically, I also contribute four new mechanisms to explain why certain patterns of violence against their polity spur wartime leaders to use ideological claims more frequently.

Second, I show that the level of violence a polity suffers during conflict shapes the frequency of its leaders’ use of ideological claims, rather than the standard view whereby ideology shapes and facilitates a group’s use of violence (Juergensmeyer 1987). In that sense, the volume of political leaders’ ideological rhetoric is an endogenous outgrowth of trends during armed conflict, much like shifts in identity during war (Kalyvas 2008). My findings also build on prior work which indicates that the use of violence can be a strategic response adopted by elites wishing to remold co-ethnics’ identities when facing a threat to their hold on power. (Gagnon 2004, 189) The
difference is that I focus on the victims of violence and the impact of violence on the victims’ ideologies, rather than the use and consequences of violence for its perpetrators.

Third, I make use of an original large N monthly dataset of speech acts by top Bosnian government leaders during the war in Bosnia, which enables me to show that a polity’s experience of violence precedes its leaders’ use of ideological claims. In doing so, my analysis offers an explanation for the incidence and frequency of ideological rhetoric during one armed conflict, but the argument and results are potentially applicable to a broader set of armed conflicts.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section briefly summarizes the theoretical argument and presents the central hypothesis tested in the chapter. The following section elaborates the research design. The fourth section presents quantitative evidence for the empirical correlation between increases in wartime violence and ideological claims in domestic media. The fifth section details a set of theoretical mechanisms to explain why higher levels of violence against residents of Sarajevo spurred Bosnia’s wartime leaders to use ideological claims more frequently when speaking to domestic audiences. It also uses qualitative text analysis to illustrate these mechanisms. The final section concludes.

3.2 The Argument in Brief: Wartime Violence and Ideological Claims

I argue that top wartime leaders will generally tend to face five disincentives against using ideological claims in their rhetoric to domestic audiences. First, the relatively greater complexity of ideological rhetoric makes it costlier to produce than non-ideological rhetoric. Second, the requirement that ideological claims be principled and consistent may limit the flexibility of leaders’ actions and policies. Third,
committing to one set of ideological claims runs the risk of alienating portions of leaders’ coalition of supporters who do not ascribe to that set of claims or do not share their interpretation of the claims. Fourth, employing a particular group of ideological claims may limit leaders’ ability to negotiate with the enemy during war, as ideological principles may constrain the bargaining range the leaders can commit to. Fifth, I argue that, in most contexts, the domestic public will exhibit a low level of demand for political ideology, meaning that ideological rhetoric will be a mostly irrelevant strategy for leaders trying to generate greater mass support.

In contrast, periods of intense wartime violence will prompt a need for top political leaders to use ideological claims to sustain and comfort their populations, as ordinary people look to their leaders to buoy their spirits and offer explanations for the chaos and destruction of intense violence. Moreover, these contexts will also provide these leaders with opportunities to use ideological claims to mobilize and shape new soldiers’ fighting ethos, appear firm and resolute, and elicit greater concessions in peace negotiations. As a result, I posit that during periods of intense wartime violence top political leaders will decide to invest in the costly time and effort required to produce ideological claims effectively. If so, wartime leaders should employ ideological claims in their domestic rhetoric sparingly when their group is experiencing low levels of violence. In contrast, these leaders should employ ideological claims much more frequently during periods when their group experiences higher levels of violence. Formally, the hypothesis I test is:
Top political leaders of ethno-religious groups involved in armed conflict will be more likely to employ ideological claims in their rhetoric to domestic audiences when the group experiences intense violence directed against it.


To measure my dependent variable, I collected and coded an original large N dataset of texts containing official wartime rhetoric by Alija Izetbegović, Haris Silajdžić, Ejup Ganić, Muhamed Sacirbey, and Rasim Delić, along with a few miscellaneous officials who worked for them. These individuals constituted the top wartime leadership of the Bosnian government. Specifically, Alija Izetbegović was the President of the collective Bosnian presidency and head of the Bosnian government. Haris Silajdžić was the foreign minister until late October 1993 and Prime Minister from that point onward. Ejup Ganić served as the second Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak member of the Bosnian collective presidency for the entire war. Muhamed Sacirbey served as Bosnia’s ambassador the United Nations until the middle of 1995, when he became foreign minister. Rasim Delić was the head of the Bosnian army from June 1992 onward. These leaders were the primary policymakers responsible for directing and guiding the Bosnian state during the conflict. Consequently, their media appearances and rhetoric were broadcast throughout Bosnian government territory, thereby shaping the information, perception, and views that Bosnian citizens held concerning the war.

I searched for these texts in BBC Monitoring, Agence-France Presse, and the New York Times between April 6th, 1992 and December 14th, 1995. These organizations provided thorough coverage of the conflicts, including transcripts of daily and weekly press conferences, speeches, statements, and interviews. BBC Monitoring was
particularly useful in this regard, since it translated, transcribed, and aggregated local media broadcasts into single stories and noted the name of the original local media source for each story. Since my focus in this chapter is on these leaders’ official rhetoric to domestic audiences, the data coded and analyzed here stem exclusively from BBC Monitoring’s transcripts of broadcasts on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Sarajevo-based media station that broadcast throughout the city and Bosnian government territory during the war.

Within each broadcast, a single speech act consisted of the following criteria: nearly all speech acts comprised direct quotations which featured at least one complete sentence. I included a small number of incomplete quotations as well, although in these instances I usually bracketed the words that seemed to have actually been used by the speaker. For interviews and press conferences, each answer to a question was a single speech act. For statements, speeches, and letters, each paragraph was a speech act, unless the source reporting the speech act sub-divided it into different subjects editorially, in which case these sub-headings represented distinct speech acts.

Since I define ideology and ideological claims as political leaders’ proclamations of the political values and goals that their polity stands for and/or wishes to embody in practice, I coded speech acts that discussed one or more of the following elements as including an ideological claim: the future political regime of Bosnia; the present or future purpose of the Bosnian state; the historical values of the Bosnian community or Bosnian state; the relative value or weight that should be accorded to ethnic identity in Bosnia; policies regarding citizenship and membership in the state; the values and ideals that should take future priority in Bosnia; discussion of the values or principles that caused
the war. I interpreted the entirety of a speech act to determine whether it included an ideological claim, including the theme of the speech act, the meaning of all of its sentences and words, and/or its central argument.

The dependent variable is thus a dichotomous indicator denoting whether or not a speech act made by a top Bosnian government leader included an ideological claim. To supplement this measure, I also coded a variable measuring the percentage of these leaders’ speech acts which included an ideological claim in each month of the conflict.

To provide a better sense of what an ideological claim looks like as opposed to a non-ideological claim, I present the following comparison of sentences spoken by Alija Izetbegović at different points in the conflict:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Ideological Claim</th>
<th>Ideological Claim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The US can help Bosnia-Hercegovina either by neutralising by force the vast military hardware used by the aggressor in the destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina or by supplying us with the arms which would enable us to face the enemy on equal terms.</td>
<td>In a crazy hope, we are trying to preserve a vision of a civilian and cosmopolitan Bosnia-Hercegovina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İn our state delegation were, with me, Dr Ljubijankic, the foreign minister, and Mr Komsic. On their side, apart from Tudjman and Dr Granic, their deputy premier and foreign minister, was also a representative of the Bosnian Croats.</td>
<td>We will win…because we will respect other people's religion, other nations, different political convictions, because we will try to be democrats in this grave situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We know that a huge force has been unleashed on Goražde but the town can and must hold out.</td>
<td>Those who are among us today, those who have been with us for two years, the Serbs who have been with us for two years on the free territory, in the state, and Sarajevo, they are our fellow-fighters against that evil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In these talks we told them about the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, they told us about their problems and the position of our expatriate community in the Federal Republic of Germany.</td>
<td>We adhere to the position that it [Bosnia] should be a democratic state in which human rights are respected - this is the main characteristic of our internal set-up of Bosnia-Hercegovina.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whereas the sentences on the left merely represent descriptions of different events in the war along with some demands and negotiating principles, the sentences on the right emphasize specific political values and goals for Bosnia. The first, third, and fifth comments in the right-hand column explicitly promote cosmopolitanism, multiethnic tolerance, and democracy, while the fourth comment implicitly promotes multiethnic coexistence around an overarching Bosnian identity.

My principal independent variable is the level of violence in Sarajevo during the conflict. My data source for this variable is a report prepared by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which contains monthly estimates of the number of people killed in Sarajevo during the war (Tabeau, Bijak, and Lončarić 2003: 561). Although using this data risks falling prey to the “urban bias” in the study of civil war (Kalyvas 2004), I argue that it is justifiable in this case because, aside from diplomatic trips abroad, these Bosnian leaders were mostly confined to Sarajevo during the war and their authority extended only nominally to other areas under Bosnian government control in the conflict. As a result, these leaders’ perceptions and knowledge of the dynamics of the war were significantly shaped by events in Sarajevo, including the level and patterns of violence in the city and their knowledge of how civilians were experiencing this violence.

In addition, the fact that the residents of Sarajevo were almost entirely on the receiving end of violence during the siege makes violence within the city a particularly effective measure for testing the hypothesized relationship, since the leaders of the Bosnian government were representing a community that was mostly a victim of violence rather than a perpetrator. Therefore, wartime violence in Sarajevo was much less likely
to have been produced by the Bosnian government leadership in response to a legitimating ideology or set of ideological claims, which helps address endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, the level of violence in Sarajevo also varied at different points in the conflict, from very high in certain periods to quite low in others, thus enabling a test of the hypothesis using large N intra-conflict data. Consequently, confirmation of the hypothesis in this case would establish its plausibility and enable future testing in other contexts.

In addition, the violence in Sarajevo is particularly well suited for this analysis because of its random pattern with respect to residents of the city. In the words of a UN report:

A review of the incidents in the chronology also indicates a random process of shelling throughout the civilian areas of the city. The shelling, which occurs at different times of the day without any apparent pattern or specific target, has a terror-inspiring effect on the civilian population. It is particularly telling that deaths, injuries and destruction have occurred in various parts of the city and in such well-known non-military settings as schools, open streets, public parks, football and athletic fields, cemeteries, hospitals, and even bread, water and relief lines in the city (United Nations 1994: 45).

This pattern of violence also addresses any endogeneity concerns that the Bosnian leadership used ideological claims because the violence was systematically biased against citizens with particular ideological views or backgrounds.

Using this report, I coded the level of violence as a categorical variable based on the median number of people killed in Sarajevo during each month of the conflict. The median was 112 killed, while the 25th centile was 29.5 and the 75th centile was 223. In order to capture the distinction between low, average, and high levels of violence, I coded months with fewer than 30 deaths as low violence months, months with 30 to 223 deaths as medium violence months, and months with more than 223 deaths as high violence months. I then appended the categories of this variable to each row of the dataset for a
given month, i.e. to each speech act that occurred in a month with a given level of violence.

I also coded two lag variables to use as controls. One lag variable captures the level of violence in the previous month, in order to account for the likelihood that the previous month’s level of violence may be related both to the current month’s violence and to the frequency of ideological claims due to a possible delay in the impact of war events on leaders’ official rhetoric. The other lag variable captures the previous month’s percentage of ideological claims, so as to account for the possibility of inertia and temporal spillover in the leaders’ use of more ideological rhetoric.

3.4 Analysis: The Correlation between Wartime Violence and Ideological Claims

Based on my data, it is clear that Bosnian leaders generally employed ideological claims sparingly in their rhetoric to domestic audiences. Out of 2,455 speech acts on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina, only 213, or 8.7%, included ideological claims. This proportion of ideological claims corroborates my theoretical expectation that top wartime leaders should generally be hesitant to utilize ideological claims in their official domestic rhetoric.

However, the following figure illustrates how the pattern of violence in Sarajevo shaped variation in Bosnian leaders’ use of ideological claims.
Figure 3.1 provides significant visual support for my hypothesis, in that the number of people killed in Sarajevo demonstrates a strong positive correlation with the monthly percentage of Bosnian leaders’ speech acts on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina that included ideological claims.

I then proceeded to test my hypothesis via a statistical model. Since my dependent variable is binary, I used a probit regression to capture the non-linear functional form of its relationship with my explanatory variables. Table 3.1 presents the results. The model indicates that the level of violence in a given month positively impacts the frequency of Bosnian leaders’ use of ideological claims in domestic media.
Moreover, this relationship is statistically significant at 99% confidence and is robust in the presence of the prior month’s level of violence.

Table 3.1: Probability of Ideological Claims vs. Violence in Sarajevo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Ideological Claim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>0.268***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0775)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence Lagged</td>
<td>0.0285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0776)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.927***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* \( p < 0.05 \), ** \( p < 0.01 \), *** \( p < 0.001 \)

However, since the coefficients from a non-linear model cannot be interpreted on their own, I calculated the substantive impact that a shift in the level of violence would have on the predicted probability that Bosnian leaders made an ideological claim in domestic media, holding the control variable at its observed values (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013). I computed both a single calculation of the predicted probability, as well as one thousand simulations of the calculation, which provided the mean effect and 95% confidence interval for the predicted probability. The results indicate that shifting from low to medium violence corresponds, on average, with a 3.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of an ideological claim, while a shift from medium to high violence corresponds with a 5.2 percentage point increase.

Consequently, shifting from low to high violence in a month corresponds to an 8.8 percentage point increase in the likelihood that Bosnian leaders made ideological
claims in their official rhetoric to domestic audiences. This is a significant effect considering that only about 9% of all speech acts in domestic media in the entire war included ideological claims. Moreover, the simulation confirms that the mean effects for these shifts are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Overall, these results show strong support for my hypothesis, since higher levels of violence are associated with a much greater likelihood of ideological claims in these leaders’ speech acts in domestic media.

To corroborate these results, I also examined the data aggregated by month. Table 3.2 presents the results of a regression model comparing the relationship between the level of violence in a given month and the percentage of ideological claims made on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina in the same month. Controlling for the previous month’s level of violence and percentage of ideological claims in domestic media, the current month’s level of violence is positively related to the percentage of Bosnian leaders’ speech acts in domestic media that included ideological claims. This relationship is also statistically significant at 95% confidence. Substantively, a shift in the level of violence increased the percentage of ideological claims made in domestic media by 4.4%. This analysis confirms the empirical plausibility of the hypothesis.
Table 3.2: Monthly Percentage of Ideological Claims vs. Violence in Sarajevo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Ideological Claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>0.0440* (0.0213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence Lagged</td>
<td>0.0127 (0.0242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ideological Claims, Lagged</td>
<td>-0.123 (0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.00155 (0.0352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

3.5.1 Theory: The Prevailing High Costs of Ideological Claims

Having used statistical analyses to demonstrate the correlation between intense wartime violence and domestic ideological claims, I now proceed to lay out my argument as to why this relationship exists. Before detailing why higher levels of violence should prompt wartime leaders to employ ideological claims more frequently to domestic audiences, I first review why ideological claims are generally costly for political leaders and should therefore be a relatively rare feature of their rhetoric. In brief, these types of claims are costly because of their complexity, their inflexibility, their potential to alienate both members of leaders’ political coalitions and wartime negotiating partners, and their low appeal to members of the public.

As regards its complexity compared to non-ideological rhetoric, long-standing research into ideology and ideological rhetoric argues that it should exhibit constraint, or
a degree of association between beliefs such that it is possible to predict a person’s political position on a range of issues given that one already knows their position on a single issue (Converse 1964; Kritzer 1978). In addition, ideological rhetoric arguably approaches the complexity of theory and philosophy in an attempt to persuade the recipients of its message of its content and position (Weiler 1993). These features of ideological rhetoric entail that political leaders or their speechwriters must give careful thought and consideration to creating and maintaining precise and consistent principles within the set of ideological claims they wish to promote. Alternatively, political leaders could circumvent the need for precision and consistency in ideological rhetoric by promoting highly persuasive and resonant images, stories, and dichotomies, but this will also require additional time and thought. Either way, ideological claims will be more costly for leaders to produce.

Aside from this cost, government leaders who commit to consistent principles and ideals within ideological claims issued to domestic audiences may limit their ability to alter both their rhetoric and policies (Krebs and Jackson 2007). Leaders of social movements with strong ideological commitments also face this concern over political flexibility, as their ideology can constrain them from making politically beneficial strategic decisions (Collins 2007). Top wartime leaders may have their political flexibility limited in a similar way because their domestic audiences may hold them accountable to their ideological rhetoric similar to the way they punish leaders for backing down in a foreign policy crisis (Fearon 1994).

Opposition movements in semi-authoritarian regimes may also make use of discrepancies in leaders’ rhetoric through a process of “rhetorical coercion”, whereby the
opposition utilizes contradictions and inconsistencies in a leader’s rhetoric to force him or her to follow through on specific policies (Lyall 2006). Other research suggests that mass publics may restrain their leaders’ ability to shift away from a specific type of nationalist ideology once the leaders have publicly promoted it (Staniland 2015). I argue that top political leaders are aware of this risk of inflexibility resulting from ideological rhetoric and will consequently hesitate to employ ideological claims to domestic audiences for fear of limiting their future policy options.

Another factor that makes ideological claims highly costly for leaders to employ in their rhetoric to domestic audiences is their potential to alienate sections of their coalition. In the context of complex organizations such as governments, research suggests that they benefit from top leaders who can serve as a focal point for coordinating the goals and behavior of other individuals in the organization, generally via informational cues (Ahlquist and Levi 2011) and more specifically through signaling in rhetoric and speeches (Batro and Mikhaylov 2013). Here, ideological claims could play an important role, as they tend to offer clear principles and prescriptions for political attitudes and action. However, if the organization in question contains different factions of elites and officials, the top leaders may need to navigate and manage these interpersonal tensions in order to maintain the viability of the organization’s political projects, especially during war (Thompson 1967). To the extent that different factions exist and have contrasting preferences regarding political ideology, the top leaders will be constrained from promoting ideological claims in order to avoid spurning one or more factions.
Ideological rhetoric also runs the risk of potentially alienating the opposing side during armed conflict in a way that undermines peace negotiations. For example, in the case of territorial armed conflict, leaders may use ideological principles to justify or legitimize their stance on a particular issue within the conflict (Goddard 2006, 40). Some of these strategies can bolster ties between a group or state and its wartime opponent, but most tend to create rigid and “indivisible” demands, so that reaching a negotiated settlement becomes very difficult (Goddard 2006, 36-37). Assuming that the leaders of a state or group wish to reach a favorable negotiated settlement to an armed conflict, it may be more useful for them to appear pragmatic and non-ideological, so that the other side cannot accuse them of intransigence and has little motive or ability to reject their wartime demands out of hand.

While these factors combine to make ideological claims highly costly for wartime leaders to include in their domestic rhetoric, citizens will also not exhibit a high demand for ideological rhetoric in most contexts. Early research on political ideology and attitudes indicated that mass publics are much less likely to subscribe to consistent and coherent political ideologies than elites are (Converse 1964). More recent research suggests that most people still tend to hold political values and ideals that contradict or conflict with one another according to the standards of a coherent and consistent ideological system (Snow and Bird 2007). These findings extend to insurgent groups in armed conflict, where the leaders tend to be motivated by ideological principles to a much greater degree than lower level recruits and followers in the organization or movement (Marks 2004). To the extent that mass publics do not relate to and are
unmotivated by ideological claims, it will generally make little sense for political leaders to use these types of claims.

However, other research suggests that even if most people do not subscribe to consistent political ideals and ideologies, they nonetheless hold a few core beliefs or values which shape their judgments of politicians and policies (Feldman 1988). The presence of these core beliefs and values arguably creates an opportunity for mass publics to demonstrate greater demand for a clear and delineated set of ideological claims in some contexts. As I argue below, periods of intense levels of violence during war constitute one of these contexts.

3.5.2 Theory: The Mechanisms behind the Violence and Ideological Claims Relationship

In contrast to the general costliness of ideological principles, I posit that four mechanisms incentivize political leaders to use ideological claims in their domestic rhetoric during periods of intense wartime violence. First, suffering intense violence, people will look to their leaders to sustain their spirits and morale and offer comforting explanations for the suffering. I argue that top political leaders’ use of political ideals and values will be one of their most effective instruments for promoting popular morale and offering consolation. Second, the leaders will be able to employ ideological claims to mobilize more recruits into the military effort and to bring these new recruits’ motives and goals for fighting into alignment with the leadership’s. Third, the process of responding to an intensification of violent attacks on their people rewards leaders who demonstrate greater conviction and resoluteness. One way to demonstrate this conviction is to employ consistent ideological principles in political rhetoric. Fourth, now enjoying
the moral high ground as the principal victim of wartime violence, political leaders will not have to worry about alienating the wartime enemy via ideological rhetoric and can use ideological claims as signs of commitment to firm negotiating principles, thereby pushing the other side to compromise. In what follows I elaborate the logic behind these mechanisms and interpret a set of Bosnian leaders’ ideological claims to provide evidence of their operation.

3.5.2.1 Mechanism 1 - Comforting the Population

In the face of intense wartime violence directed against them, ordinary people will seek to boost their spirits and find an explanation for their wartime experiences. One way for leaders to meet the public’s high demand for morale and comfort is to articulate the purpose and values for which the polity is fighting. Ideological claims are especially effective for communicating these morale-boosting values because they tend to include sharp imagery and key beliefs for the public to rally around (Carton, Murphy, and Clark 2014). Normally ambivalent and apathetic about political ideology, I argue that the public’s demoralization during periods of intense violence will leave them receptive to these types of claims emanating from its leadership, provided that the leadership focuses on a few core beliefs or values. Research in other contexts demonstrates a similar functional role for ideological claims, as insurgent fighters motivated by ideology are less likely to defect or demobilize (Oppenheim et al. 2015) and ideological political parties are more likely to achieve political success in conditions of political and social uncertainty because they attract more committed activists (Hanson 2006).

In addition to boosting the morale of their population in this context, I argue that top political leaders will need to console the public by offering an explanation as to why
it is being forced to suffer intense violence. Aside from promoting specific beliefs and values, ideological claims tend to be embedded within stories that praise or condemn specific sets of political practices or actors. Since most people tend to employ narrative structures in thinking about, perceiving, and making moral judgments about the world (Shenhav 2006), and since narratives or stories can help people come to terms with both the logical reasons for and moral meaning of everyday events (Zellman 2015), ideological rhetoric should be highly beneficial as a means of explaining why the public is experiencing the horrors of war. To do so, the ideological claims must articulate why the public is being targeted, why its cause and plight are more just than its opponents, and what it is fighting for. Such rhetoric helps prepare the civilian population for more hardship to come and galvanizes it to withstand suffering.

Alija Izetbegović utilized this type of rhetoric in the second year of the conflict, addressing Bosnians with the following message in the wake of a spike in violence following a decline in the prior month: “Dear citizens, the world has not left us much choice. I believe that I share your thoughts and feelings when I say that we are not going to bend our heads and that we shall take the risk of a struggle for freedom and dignity. Do not fear and do not doubt, a people struggling for survival and freedom, if its struggle is genuine, cannot lose” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993). Thus, he specifically urged Bosnians not to doubt in an ultimately good outcome in the war, while galvanizing their spirits by explicitly reminding them of what was at stake in the conflict and implicitly reminding them of why they were being targeted. In this case, he identified the reason for the Bosnians’ plight with specific ideals and values of the state and people.
Toward the end of the year, following another rapid increase in violence, Izetbegović celebrated the morale and the cause of the Bosnian state even while reminding listeners of the need to persevere, asserting that, “with their dignity, courage and determination, the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina, especially the Bosniak Muslim people, have surprised Europe and the entire world, who expected a quick defeat and the destruction of the political and state-creating being of our people when the war broke out. Contrary to this, our people have shown vitality and the ability to preserve their dignity” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).

3.5.2.2 Mechanism 2 - Mobilizing Recruits

Aside from enjoying greater public demand for the use of ideological claims in order to boost the public’s morale and explain why it is suffering intense violence, top political leaders can also use ideological claims to channel citizens’ frustration and anger over wartime violence to their advantage. This is because during conflict, people’s experience of intense violent victimization will produce potential pools of recruits for a state’s military or security forces, motivated by resentment against victimization and by the desire to defend the community. To help transform these potential recruits into combatants, top political leaders can benefit from communicating ideological claims which impose an overarching purpose and mission to the war effort.

This process is consistent with research which indicates that ideology can provide a set of reasons for actors to justify their actions in war (Kalyvas 2004), that rebel organizations use ideological instruction as a costly induction mechanism to screen the commitment level of potential recruits (Weinstein 2007), that social movements can increase participation by strengthening or creating new ideological commitments among
followers (Ferree and Miller 1985), and that armed organizations experiencing consistent losses on the battlefield may utilize ideological indoctrination to retain the commitment of their fighters to the cause and to offer higher benefits to fighters in the form of symbolic capital (Eck 2007). More ideological recruits have also been found to boost armed groups’ fighting capacity (Sanín and Wood 2014), enhance their internal cohesion (Ugarriza and Craig 2013), and increase the production of violence in armed conflict by transferring guilt for violent attacks from an individual to the group (Sen and Wagner 2009). In the case analyzed here, one scholar has also noted that Islamic values and principles were “expected to bolster the fighting spirit of the Bosnian army and to broaden the primarily local motivation of its soldiers” (Bougarel 2007, 172).

Although ideological claims appear to offer clear benefits to political leaders looking to increase the size and commitment of their wartime armed forces following a steep rise in violence, they offer the additional benefit of allowing the leaders to have a degree of influence and control over the motives and goals of the new combatants. Research on insurgent groups, for example, suggests that ideology offers an effective tool for socializing combatants into the organization and disciplining them (Sanín and Wood 2014), while social movement leaders can also use ideological principles to shape their followers’ identities (Collins 2007. Top political leaders can thus prevent new recruits from fighting merely because of anger or a desire to get even following a sharp increase in violence. Instead, they can use the principles and values embedded in ideological claims to give the recruits a long-term vision of the polity and community they are fighting for. By identifying themselves with specific ideological claims and getting new recruits to identify with these claims as well, top political leaders can also generate a
personal identification and bond between themselves and newly recruited combatants. This bond may in turn significantly boost these leaders’ political power.

The Bosnian leadership utilized ideological claims in this way early in the war. For example, in the days following the massacre of Sarajevo residents waiting in line for bread, Alija Izetbegović supplemented the statements quoted at the outset of the chapter by proclaiming “I am calling on all people in Bosnia-Hercegovina. After today, we should differentiate only between people and monsters. People are all those who we do not ask what they are called or what nation they are or religion. One knows where the monsters are. They are on the hills around Sarajevo” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1992). This statement is a reminder that all residents of Bosnia are part of the polity and should rise to the defense of a political community whose members do not care about each other’s religious or ethnic identity, thereby enacting a vision of a multiethnic state.

Several days later, on May 31st, 1992, Izetbegović used an interview on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina to assert that “Finally, I can say now that the world is standing behind us, now that the world has stepped on our side, it is our [sic] that we ourselves do something that is needed, that we rise as one to defend the republic and its democratic institutions” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1992). Here, Izetbegović explicitly outlined the political goal behind the mobilization of Bosnian’s war effort, namely building a democratic political order.

Following a summer of intense violence, defense minister Sefer Halilović issued another call for mobilization, stating in August of 1992 “Dear citizens of Sarajevo, the most illustrious pages of our history are being written. Join us so that we can write them
together with the best heroes of our beloved city and the youngest republic in the world” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1992). Once again, the appeal to ‘join us’ was paired to the purpose of fighting for the ‘citizens of Sarajevo’ and the ‘republic’ of Bosnia.

Bosnia’s leaders joined mobilization to ideals again in early January of 1993, after the number of people killed in Sarajevo had increased over 100% during the previous two months. Izetbegović then told Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina that “Bosnia-Hercegovina has to be an independent and sovereign state that is not divided into three ethnic units” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993), while Halilović told the same media outlet the next day that the Bosnian army was “fighting for a democratic state in which all people would be equal regardless of their nationality and religion, and the army was waging a liberation war, not an ethnic one” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993). Another telling example occurred in May of the same year, when Izetbegović sought to shape potential recruits’ views of the goals of Bosnia’s defense, stating, “We shall turn to our own people, to all citizens who love this country, who carry Bosnia-Hercegovina in their hearts. We shall appeal to them to unite and to use all permissible means to defend the independent and sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina, its integrity and freedom” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).

Moreover, in gathering support for the military defense effort and the building of the Bosnian army, the Bosnian government leadership also reminded recruits of the guiding ideological precepts of the state and how these precepts should inform the tactics and behavior of Bosnian soldiers. Thus, for example, following another sharp intensification of violence toward the end of the war, Ejup Ganić stated that, “Preventive
actions by our army are directed at preventing new terrorist actions of the same nature. As the legitimate government of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina we cannot nor will use such methods. We cannot commit massacre [sic] on civilian population because we believe that the people on the other side are also citizens of this country irrespective of their political orientation. We shall never use such methods” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1995). Thus, Ganić sought to contain any impulse toward vengeance on the part of Bosnian soldiers in response to heightened violence against Sarajevo. In doing so, he also indicated that the Bosnian government’s official ideological values constrained and shaped the Bosnian army’s military tactics.

3.5.2.3 Mechanism 3 - Appearing Resolute

Furthermore, whereas contexts of low wartime violence expose political leaders employing ideological claims to higher costs in the form of political inflexibility, contexts of high wartime violence arguably reward such inflexibility in the guise of conviction and resoluteness. After experiencing a significant increase in violence, citizens will expect their top leaders to issue clear and simple condemnations of the enemy while stating why the polity is justified in its cause. Ideological claims can thus be of significant use in creating the impression of firm and forceful leadership in this scenario, particularly if political leaders employ ideological claims that describe and illustrate stark contrasts and dichotomies between opposing values and principles, including good and evil.

Examples of this type of resolute rhetoric include Izetbegović striking a very firm tone early in 1993, asserting that, “I said here that a nation brought to a situation like this and whose existence is at stake has the right to use all means to survive and persevere
and we will use these means” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993) and following this up after a sharp rise in violence later in the year by pronouncing “They have not managed to destroy this nation, and they will not manage to do it” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993). Thus, Izetbegović found it politically advantageous, perhaps even necessary, to identify his government with the ‘nation’, meaning Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks, even at the cost of some of his earlier rhetoric about a multiethnic and civic state. On the other hand, Izetbegović also sought to preserve some flexibility in ideological principles while remaining firm on key wartime issues, arguing in May of 1993 that, “The UN Security Council ought to accept the decision of the majority of the population of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina to live in an undivided and united state which has the support of over 64% of the population and which has the right to fight for its survival and democratic prosperity by all legal means” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).

3.5.2.4 Mechanism 4 - Gaining a Negotiating Advantage

Finally, if a state’s wartime enemy has just launched severe and intense attacks against it, the state will find itself, at least temporarily, in the position of an innocent wartime victim (provided it does not respond with the same type of violence). With the moral high ground consequently in its favor, the polity’s top political leaders will not be as concerned that committing to ideological principles will undermine their ability to negotiate. In fact, abiding by clear and consistent ideological claims at the negotiating table may now be beneficial, as the leaders can use these claims to convey that their public now demands greater concessions to make up for the injustice of the intense
violence they have experienced, thus pressuring their wartime enemy to compromise (Zellman 2015; Goddard 2006).

The Bosnian leadership demonstrated this mechanism in its rhetoric early on, as Izetbegović laid down a firm negotiating position following a summer of intense violence against the residents of Sarajevo, proclaiming in September 1992, “I promised that a delegation at government level would go to Geneva, but clearly it would present the views of a democratic, secular Bosnia that will not be divided along ethnic lines” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1992). In March of 1993, after another period of sustained violence, Silajdžić again promulgated a firm negotiating stance, resting on a particular vision for Bosnia: “The delegation represents the sovereign and independent state of Bosnia -Hercegovina and all activities must be directed towards the preservation of the sovereignty, independence and political and territorial integrity of the state within the framework of the entrusted mandate” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).

Izetbegović also asserted an ideological basis for negotiations after another rise in violence in November of 1994, stating of the Bosnian Serbs that “Those there only recognize one nation, their own nation; one religion, their own religion; and one party, their own party. Everything else is supposed to be exterminated. I said that in such a situation, the secretary-general cannot and has no right to be neutral. He should clearly say to the French, English and all other forces that are hindering him in his actions from time to time that the legal authorities and this country should be protected. I told him that. I asked him to do it” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1994).
And, after another spike in violence in March of 1995, Izetbegović again felt no need to compromise his government’s stance with respect to peace negotiations, stating “Thus we adhere to the position of a unitary and sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina within its internationally-recognized borders. We adhere to the position that it should be a democratic state in which human rights are respected - this is the main characteristic of our internal set-up of Bosnia-Hercegovina” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1995). In each of these instances, Bosnia’s leaders placed renewed emphasis on the ideological foundations of their negotiating stance, namely a unitary, democratic, and multi-ethnic Bosnia organized as a civic state. Their tone indicated that they viewed their position as self-evidently just and morally superior to their opponents’ position, with no need to compromise on their views following a fresh round of intense victimization of Sarajevo’s residents at the hands of enemy forces.

3.6 Conclusion

Therefore, this chapter’s analyses demonstrate that high levels of wartime violence motivate wartime leaders to increase the use of ideological claims in their official domestic rhetoric to their citizens. Analysis of micro-level large N data of speech acts and violence in the Bosnian conflict from 1992 to 1995 provided strong evidence for the empirical plausibility of this relationship. According to my analysis, higher amounts of violence directed at the residents of Sarajevo prompted the top leaders of the Bosnian government based in Sarajevo to articulate and emphasize the political goals and values for which the war was being fought and to outline the basis for citizenship rights and political institutions in the future Bosnian state. Qualitative analysis of Bosnian leaders’ speech acts revealed the four principal mechanisms driving this empirical relationship:
the need to galvanize and comfort the wartime civilian population, mobilize military recruits while shaping their goals for fighting, demonstrate resolute leadership, and gain leverage in peace negotiations.

These results indicate that the likelihood and frequency of political leaders’ use of political ideology during war is a function of processes and circumstances within the conflict. Thus, this study is one of the first to examine political ideology as a dependent variable in armed conflict, advancing an explanation for why the incidence and volume of political ideology will vary across time within a single conflict and across political leaders in different conflicts. My explanation also indicates that the volume of leaders’ use of ideological rhetoric during war is not rooted in their personal preferences or tastes for abstract ideological principles, nor is it simply a reflection of ruling elites’ need to legitimate their power.

If the newly ascendant political leaders of the wartime Bosnian government had wanted to use political ideology as a tool of legitimation, then they would have used ideological claims in their rhetoric to domestic audiences consistently and frequently throughout the war. This was not the case. Furthermore, the top Bosnian leader, Alija Izetbegović, had written several political treatises earlier in his life, suggesting a strong interest in and facility with political theory and ideology. If he had simply acted on his personal theoretical interests and commitments, however, then his government should have produced a greater and more consistent volume of ideological rhetoric throughout the war. Instead, the top leaders of the Bosnian government tended to use ideological claims much more often when the population of Sarajevo was targeted by higher levels of violence.
This analysis has important practical implications. Knowing when top political leaders are more likely to issue ideological claims during armed conflict provides other parties to the conflict and outside observers with a signpost as to when to pay greater attention to the words of wartime leaders. In situations where the likelihood of ideological rhetoric increases, wartime leaders’ communications to domestic audiences will disclose details of their future plans for their people and country. As the leaders thus become committed to a particular set of ideological principles, other parties to the conflict may gain significant insight into the leaders’ future military strategies and negotiating demands in the conflict, since political ideologies arguably differ in their acceptance or condemnation of various military tactics and peace proposals.

Though compelling, future research should test the results described here in other contexts to determine their degree of generalizability. My analysis focused on political leaders controlling a wartime state apparatus, but the leaders of a non-state group fighting armed conflict may face somewhat different costs or benefits for using ideological rhetoric in relation to wartime violence. A first step in this extension could be to examine the frequency of ideological claims by the leaders of the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat separatist entities during the Bosnian war, neither of whom controlled the central state. Another extension would be to test whether leaders of parties to non-ethnic conflicts behave similarly with respect to the volume and pattern of ideological principles they include in their wartime rhetoric. In addition, looking at peacetime leaders would enable a systematic examination of if and how major terrorist attacks alter the likelihood and frequency of their use of ideological rhetoric to domestic audiences.
As a first extension, however, I move beyond the rate or likelihood of ideological claims as a dependent variable to investigate why the content of ideological principles in top wartime leaders’ domestic rhetoric also varies during an armed conflict. As I show, although fluctuations in violence may impact the frequency of ideological claims issued to domestic audiences, the substance of the claims changes as a result of other factors. A key point to remember here is that ideological claims still occur under conditions of low violence. They just occur with much less frequency because of the mechanisms outlined in this chapter. A shift in the type of nationalist ideology expressed in ideological claims may thus occur regardless of their frequency.

As shown in this chapter, the ideological claims issued by Bosnian political leaders early in the war tended to endorse an ideology of civic nationalism. But some of the quoted claims emphasized the ethnic identity and wartime cause of the Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks. As chapter four demonstrates, Bosnia’s wartime leaders altered the content of their ideological claims in official domestic rhetoric in the second year of the war, shifting from a more inclusive civic nationalism to a more exclusive ethnic nationalism during that year. The chapter describes this shift and explains why wartime leaders may alter the type of nationalist ideology they communicate to domestic audiences.
4. Ideological Shifts in the Bosnian War: Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Domestic Media

4.1. Introduction

In the first year of the Bosnian war, all of the ideological claims that top Bosnian government leaders made on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina endorsed a civic nationalist vision for Bosnia, emphasizing multi-ethnic coexistence, individual rights, and the Bosnian people. The following year, top Bosnian government leaders’ ideological claims in domestic media endorsed ethnic nationalism much more often compared to the previous year. In line with the ethnic background of the government’s top leaders, these principles emphasized collective rights and the primacy of the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group. The following figures provide a visual demonstration of this change in emphasis from civic nationalism to ethnic nationalism between 1992 and 1993. What explains this variation?

**Figure 4.1: Monthly Percentage of Domestic Civic Nationalist Claims, 1992 & 1993**
In this chapter, I answer this question by providing an explanation as to why the content of the nationalist ideological claims wartime ethno-religious leaders employ in their official domestic rhetoric may vary over the course of an armed conflict. My argument is that ethno-religious groups enter conflict with a path-dependent nationalist ideology, by which I mean a set of ideological claims that predominates among intellectual and political elites and resonates strongly with ordinary people. This path dependent ideology arises in the previous regime’s attempt to maintain social peace and order. The onset of internal armed conflict then discredits the path dependent nationalist ideology and provides a critical juncture in which a new nationalist ideology can become dominant.
However, although the predominant nationalist ideology has been discredited, the actual occurrence and direction of an ideological shift will depend on the interaction of the wartime leaders’ personal preferences regarding nationalist ideology, their calculation of which nationalist ideology will provide them with the greatest political benefits, and their construction of an underlying ideological infrastructure to support the spread of a new nationalist ideology. If the leaders’ preferred nationalist ideology is different from the previously dominant ideology and will confer immediate political benefits, then they will promote this new ideology in their official rhetoric in wartime domestic media. But if their preferred ideology differs from the previously dominant one without conferring such benefits, then they will have to construct new ideological infrastructure at a grassroots level to help support an eventual shift to their preferred ideology. Doing so will lay a foundation for promoting the new ideology in official rhetoric in domestic media depending on the incentives created by contingent wartime events.

The case analyzed in support of my argument provides evidence for the second scenario and illustrates how and why a polity’s leaders may shift their official domestic rhetoric from civic nationalism to ethnic nationalism during an armed conflict. In the Bosnian conflict, top wartime Bosnian government leaders saw an opportunity to move away from a pre-war path dependent ideology of civic nationalism which had been imposed in an attempt to guarantee inter-ethnic social peace but had failed to help prevent this peace from breaking down. Though these leaders’ personal ideological preferences pushed them to promote ethnic nationalism, the strategic political calculus initially confined them to the continued use of civic nationalism in domestic media.
However, by constructing grassroots ideological infrastructure supportive of ethnic nationalism, the leaders put themselves in a position to use ethnic nationalist claims in domestic media in the second year of the war in response to a challenge to the top leader’s power and to the content of externally-sponsored peace proposals. Thus, these contingent wartime events, sparked by the diplomatic intervention of external actors, led ethnic nationalism to become more useful than civic nationalism in these leaders’ communications to domestic audiences.

Empirically, I use both statistical analysis and qualitative interpretation of Bosnian leaders’ speech acts as evidence for my argument, showing how the content of these leaders’ ideological claims shifted strongly toward ethnic nationalism in July and September of 1993, while moving back away from this form of nationalism in November of 1993. July of 1993 was the month following a serious challenge to Bosnian President Izetbegović’s power, while September of 1993 followed the official unveiling of an international peace plan promoting ethnic partition. Subsequently, the Bosnian government rejected the peace plan at the end of September. In late October, Izetbegović and other top Bosnian officials executed a military operation to consolidate their power and control over the government. With both the plan for partition and any threats to Izetbegović’s political power removed, ethnic nationalism was once again de-emphasized in top Bosnian leaders’ rhetoric in Bosnian domestic media for the duration of the war.

This chapter thus advances the research literature on nationalism in several ways. First, it shows that states’ official nationalist ideologies can vary and fluctuate significantly between different forms of nationalism over short periods of time. This empirical trend is in contrast to the prevailing view that nationalism and nationalist
ideology arise and change very slowly. In addition, the chapter posits an explanation for this variation and provides evidence for this explanation. Furthermore, the analysis here demonstrates how both domestic political events, in the form of wartime power struggles, as well as international political events, in the form of peace proposals, may spur a shift in the content of ethno-religious leaders’ domestic nationalist claims, rather than either domestic or international politics or events doing so on their own. In fact, the Bosnian case suggests that external actors may play a more significant role, as informal discussion of particular principles for peace set off the internal power struggle in the first place.

Moreover, this chapter sheds light on when exactly movement away from a stable path dependent ideological equilibrium will occur, enabling an understanding of ideological change as contingent but nonetheless circumscribed within patterns that preserve the ability to predict an ideological shift. It also shows that rather than resulting from the replacement of one set of leaders by another faction promoting a different ideology, movement away from a path dependent ideology can be the result of the same leaders choosing different ideologies in reaction to contingent events. Thus, political leaders during war may alter their group’s and/or state’s nationalist ideology in a passive or reactive manner, rather than being active and instrumental manipulators of nationalism.

The chapter is structured as follows. The second section briefly elaborates the theoretical argument. The subsequent section describes the research design. The fourth section presents the results of statistical analyses showing the correlations predicted by the theory. The fifth section then provides qualitative and interpretive evidence of the mechanisms behind the correlations in the Bosnian case. The final section concludes.
4.2 Theory: Explaining Shifts in Domestic Wartime Nationalist Ideological Claims

My argument posits that internal armed conflict offers wartime ethno-religious leaders an opportunity to shift away from a dominant, or path dependent, set of nationalist ideological claims. Using the concept of path dependence is appropriate here, because even though it is generally employed to analyze political institutions and structures, it has also been applied to ideas and beliefs, as individuals’ and groups’ social interpretations and mental maps of politics are subject to high start-up costs, learning effects, and positive feedback loops (Pierson 2000).

Assuming, then, that pre-war political elites have instituted a predominant nationalist ideology in order to help maintain societal order and stability, the occurrence of internal armed conflict discredits this ideology by demonstrating its failure to help achieve this purpose. Wartime ethno-religious leaders then have an opportunity to promote a new nationalist ideology. Whether they will do so, however, depends on whether their personally preferred nationalist ideology is different from the previous path dependent ideology. Provided that it is different, they will promote their preferred ideology in their official rhetoric in domestic media unless they are limited from doing so by instrumental calculations of political benefit. If an ideology other than their preferred one is initially more politically useful to their position and goals, then the leaders will have to initiate the construction of new grassroots ideological infrastructure to aid the spread of their privately favored nationalist ideology below the level of official rhetoric. This ideological infrastructure will help support an ideological shift in domestic media should contingent wartime events later provide greater political benefits for the official use of their preferred nationalist ideology.
Focusing specifically on a transition from civic to ethnic nationalism, one wartime event which may spur this kind of shift is a power struggle within the leadership of an ethno-religious group, to the point that the authority or power of the top leader or leaders is seriously threatened. The top leader or leaders may then capitalize on any burgeoning ideological infrastructure supportive of ethnic nationalism to bolster their political support. In this scenario, nationalist ideological claims issued in official domestic rhetoric may serve as the leaders’ public affirmation of their ethnic commitment and as a call and response of support between them and their mass and elite supporters within the population and security forces.

An additional wartime event which may produce a shift from civic to ethnic nationalism in ethno-religious leaders’ official domestic rhetoric is an internationally-sponsored peace proposal. More specifically, if international mediators propose peace plans based on ethnic partition of warring parties, then the top leaders of warring ethno-religious groups will have an incentive to utilize ethnic nationalist claims in order to adapt their vision of the future political order to that called for in the peace proposals.

4.3 Research Design: Coding Nationalist Ideology in the Bosnian War

To code Bosnian leaders’ speech acts and the occurrence of ideological claims, I used the same methods described in chapter three. I then used the following criteria to code a given ideological claim as an instance of civic, ethnic, or religious nationalism. Statements that endorsed an integral or unified Bosnia, discussed the possibility of assimilation under a Bosnian identity, emphasized that Bosnia was a country based on universal citizenship and laws, promoted and defended inter-ethnic tolerance and denounced ethnic segregation and separatism, and/or focused on “Bosnians” were
categorized under civic nationalism. Statements that focused on a homeland for the
Bosnian Muslims, exclusively discussed or prioritized the Bosnian Muslims as a people
or nation, promoted the political superiority and dominance of the Bosnian Muslims
within Bosnia, extolled the virtues of separation from other ethnic groups, and/or focused
on “Bosniaks”, “Bosniak Muslims”, or “Bosnian Muslims” were categorized under ethnic
nationalism.

Statements that focused on the plight of Bosnian Muslims based mainly on their
religious identity, discussed the political problems confronting Muslims around the
world, framed the conflict in terms of a religious struggle between Muslims and
Christians, linked the Bosnian Muslims to Muslim groups experiencing war and human
rights abuses in other countries, used specifically religious language, extolled Muslim
religious myths and beliefs, and/or focused on the “Muslims” were categorized under
religious nationalism. As in chapter one, I interpreted the entirety of an ideological claim
to determine the type of nationalist ideology it espoused.

In coding the data, I constructed three dichotomous dependent variables. Civic
denotes whether an ideological claim predominantly promoted civic nationalism; Ethnic
indicates whether it predominantly advanced ethnic nationalism; and Religious captured
whether it predominantly supported religious nationalism. My independent variables are
a series of dummy variables for each month of the war, thus capturing when Bosnian
leaders made a given type of ideological claim on Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina. To
supplement this measure, I also coded a set of variables measuring the percentage of
these leaders’ ideological claims which endorsed civic, ethnic, or religious nationalism
each month.
4.4 Statistical Analysis of the Shift from Civic to Ethnic Nationalism in the Bosnian War

Statistical analysis of top Bosnian leaders’ ideological claims in different months of the war supports my theory. A comparison of means test shows that Bosnian leaders were 21% more likely to issue an ethnic nationalist claim in Bosnian domestic media in July of 1993. This was the month immediately following a major challenge to President Izetbegović’s power and authority. Another comparison of means test shows that these leaders were also 36% more likely to use an ethnic nationalist claim in Bosnian domestic media in September of 1993, which followed the official unveiling of an international peace plan rooted in ethnic partition. The first result is statistically significant at 90% confidence, while the second is significant at 95% confidence. In contrast, a comparison of means test for the month of November of 1993, following Izetbegović’s consolidation of power and the withdrawal of the peace plan, indicates only a slightly greater and statistically insignificant increase in the likelihood of ethnic nationalist claims. Probit regressions corroborate these results, with the coefficients and significance levels reported in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Probability of Domestic Ethnic Nationalist Claims vs. Contingent Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1993</td>
<td>0.555*</td>
<td>(0.327)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td>0.945***</td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.555***</td>
<td>(0.0945)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 213 213

Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In terms of actual percentages rather than probabilities, the data indicate that ethnic nationalist claims increased 25% in July of 1993 compared to June as well as 26% in September compared to August. Conversely, these types of claims decreased 38% in November compared to October. Concurrently, civic nationalist claims dropped 25% in July versus June and 32% in September versus August. They then increased 38% in November versus October. These results demonstrate that Bosnian government leaders shifted to using ethnic nationalist claims in official Bosnian domestic media in the summer and fall of 1993. The following sections develop the mechanisms underlying these correlations by analyzing the historical context of nationalist ideology prior to and during the Bosnian conflict, the impact of contingent wartime events on nationalist ideology in the summer and fall of 1993, and the text of Bosnian government leaders’ ideological claims in Bosnian domestic media during key periods of the war.

4.5.1 Social Peace: Creating a Path Dependent Nationalist Ideology

This section expands on the second chapter’s description of the Yugoslav-era ideological dispositions of the Bosnian Muslims. In that period, one of the tools with which the Communist Yugoslav regime attempted to maintain social peace between multiple ethnic groups was the use of an overarching ideology of multi-ethnic unity which conformed in many respects to civic nationalism. In particular, the regime utilized Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims as a means of promoting and cementing this civic multiethnic ideology. Regime officials termed Bosnia a mini Yugoslavia and, hewing to the World War II slogan ‘Without Bosnia there is no Yugoslavia and without Yugoslavia there is no Bosnia’, the civic ethos of Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims was meant to
demonstrate how territory did not have to be joined to a single nationality or ethnic group but could in fact accommodate multiple ethnicities and cultures (Toal and Dahlman 2011). In this way, Bosnian Muslim identity was linked most strongly to the official Communist slogan “Brotherhood and Unity”, which promoted a unified multi-ethnic Yugoslav national identity instead of individual ethnic identities.

In turn, from the 1950s to the 1970s, the Islamic Religious Community supported the Brotherhood and Unity ideology more than any other official religious institution (Perica 2002). Bosnian Muslim intellectual leaders were also highly supportive of and loyal to the Communist order and helped to promote a secular identity founded on interethnic equality, a viewpoint which was shared by most ordinary Bosnian Muslims at the time (Burg and Shoup 1999). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, just prior to the outbreak of the war, surveys demonstrated that Bosnian Muslims were still highly secular and very supportive of Yugoslavia, that Bosnia had the highest percentage of individuals refusing to identify with an ethnic identity, and that Bosnian Muslims identified with Yugoslavia more than Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats did (Fazlić 2011). Thus, at the outbreak of war, it seems fair to assert that the Yugoslav regime, seeking to keep social peace, had established a dominant path dependent ideology of multiethnic coexistence among Bosnian Muslim elites and masses, meaning that the nationalist ideological claims most familiar to this group would have aligned with civic nationalism.

Significantly, prior research on nationalist mobilization and ideology indicates that, once they are established, path dependent nationalist ideologies can impose significant constraints on the behavior of political elites, as nationalist appeals have to resonate with people’s values, cultural narratives, beliefs, and especially their “lived
experiences” in order to actually produce nationalist mobilization (Giuliano 2011, 3).

Therefore, it may be very difficult for political elites to shift to an entirely new ideology. Francisco Sanín and Elisabeth Wood note that this dynamic is present during armed conflict as well, arguing that since “ideology implies particular skills, routines, institutions, and rules of thumb, adoption of an ideology generates strongly path dependent dynamics” to the point of constraining the adoption of a new ideology (Sanín and Wood 2014, 220).

However, some groups and/or polities do change their ideological principles and the content of their ideological claims during armed conflict despite ideological path dependence. This phenomenon speaks to a critique of the historical institutionalist or path dependence approach, namely that “there appears to be no means of predicting the occurrence of…punctuations in the stable path” (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1289).

Below I elaborate how internal armed conflict provides an opportunity to shift away from a path-dependent nationalist ideology, conditional on other mechanisms.

4.5.2 Armed Conflict: Discrediting a Path Dependent Nationalist Ideology

I suggest that the shock of internal armed conflict provides political elites with a critical juncture in which to shift away from a path dependent nationalist ideology. As articulated by Ruth and David Collier, the analysis of a critical juncture involves, among other elements, baseline conditions, the crisis that produced the juncture, and the occurrence of a major change of some type (Collier and Collier 1991). Critical junctures have also been defined as “relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348). I employ a mix of these conceptualizations
here, as I analyze the previous ideology within an ethno-religious group as the baseline and internal armed conflict as the crisis which can prompt a loss of faith in older and previously dominant ideological norms. The loss of ideological morale then provides an opening for top political leaders to promote a new ideology.

In Bosnia, the demise of Communism in 1990 and the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991 indicated that the multi-ethnic ethos of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ had failed to help maintain a stable political order. At the same time, religious identity among the Bosnian Muslims was starting to resurface prior to the war, as mosque attendance began to increase (Ramet 2006), hundreds of mosques were built or renovated (Ramet 2002), and clerics sought a more active public leadership role within the group (Friedman 1996). Furthermore, anthropologist Tone Bringa’s fieldwork in Bosnia before the war indicated that Bosnian Muslims living in rural villages had stronger religious faith and traditions compared to those living in towns and cities (Bringa 1995). Therefore, although secularism predominated within the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group before the war, this was not a universal disposition, as some members expressed a more ethnic or religious interpretation of their group identity. Moreover, as chronicled in the historical overview in chapter two, both ethnic and religious nationalism had latent potential as alternative ideologies within the Bosnian Muslim community. These circumstances provided Bosnian leaders with some measure of grassroots support for initiating a wartime shift in the country’s predominant type of nationalist ideology.

4.5.3 Private Ideological Preferences: Goals for a New Nationalist Ideology

Which type of ideology top political leaders then choose to promote during the critical juncture of internal armed conflict is likely to be the result of an interaction
between their personal ideological preferences and instrumental political incentives. Based on their own political beliefs, the top leaders may have a particular set of ideological claims they would like to impose. Over time, these leaders may come to identify their ambitions and fortunes with maintaining both the integrity of their private ideological views and seeing these views spread in the public arena. Therefore, if and when these individuals achieve top positions in organizations representing their ethno-religious group and/or state, they will likely wish to promote their preferred ideology within the organization and among the group’s members.

Not only may they see the spread of this ideology as an extension of their personal political ambitions, but they may also wish to remake the polity or society in their own ideological image. These suppositions are supported by the observations that founders of insurgent groups and movements are often normatively committed to a certain ideology (Sanín and Wood 2014, 222) and that nationalist entrepreneurs may act out of conviction rather than strategic calculations, believing sincerely in the ideas and beliefs they transmit to their mass followers (Giuliano 2011).

Regarding his personal views and political background, wartime Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović’s history as a political activist went back to World War II, when he was a member of the Young Muslims in Bosnia, an organization dedicated to aiding young Bosnian Muslims’ understanding of Islam, enhancing Islamic unity, and conducting social work and charity in the Bosnian Muslim community (Friedman 1996). After the war, Yugoslavia’s government imprisoned many of the organization’s leaders, including Izetbegović, who received a six-year sentence (Friedman 1996). Izetbegović
practiced law afterward, but he also wrote two political treatises. One of these, written in 1970, was titled the *Islamic Declaration*.

This book remains the subject of controversy and varying interpretations, with some readers seeing it as a framework for organizing a state on Islamic principles and others viewing it as a call for a democratic multicultural state (Cohen 1998). Though most scholars discount and critique such polarizing interpretations, many also see at least the outlines of a greater public and political role for Islam in the book (Burg and Shoup 1999). On balance, these features of Izetbegović’s own writings suggest that his privately preferred nationalist ideology for the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnia was a mix of ethnic and religious nationalism.

Two years before the war started, Izetbegović had also formed the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) as an ethno-religious nationalist party representing the Bosnian Muslims. Cooperating with religious leaders, the party tasked imams to help establish local branches of the SDA in more remote rural areas. Islamic clergy also appeared regularly at major party meetings and promoted its policies to mosque attendees, thereby implicitly shaping the choices of voters (Andjelić 2003, 149).

The party subsequently performed very well in the 1990 elections and entered into a coalition government with other ethno-religious nationalist parties representing the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia. During the war, many of this party’s top leaders were also the top leaders of the internationally-recognized Bosnian government. From this position, they thus had an opportunity to promote policies which could enhance the primacy of Islamic traditions and ethnic customs within the identity of Bosnian Muslims.
4.5.4 Strategic Political Calculations: Limitations on a New Nationalist Ideology

However, political calculations and incentives may still trump top leaders’ personal beliefs in limiting which ideology, if any, they decide to shift the group and polity toward during armed conflict. With respect to Bosnia’s top wartime leaders, one such limiting factor was that Sarajevo remained the capital city. As one anthropologist observed, even in the midst of the conflict, many people who remained in Sarajevo continued to favor a civic-oriented Yugoslav identity. She relates that, “when it came to Sarajevans and people they knew personally, the tendency was to stress their common Sarajevan culture, where differences in national identity and ethno-religious background were not important” (Maček 2009, 187-188). This pattern may help explain why, between the 1990 multi-party Bosnian elections and the start of the war, Izetbegović, as the leader of both the SDA and the Bosnian government based in Sarajevo, promoted a vision of Bosnia centered on multiculturalism and regionalism rather than ethnicity or religion, with political legitimacy rooted in its people as individual citizens and not in its constituent nations as groups (Friedman 1996, 214).

Aside from the continued dominance of civic nationalism among key segments of the Bosnian population, Izetbegović also faced several political constraints at the elite level which restrained his ability to shift away from civic nationalism. Before the war, the SDA political party was itself divided into a conservative religious faction and a liberal one that favored a multicultural state (Burg and Shoup 1999), such that Izetbegović had to manage both sides to keep the organization afloat. And many of the new SDA officials in the conservative wing also seemed to be adopting public religiosity purely for political advancement (Maček 2009), indicating that their private views may
not have been aligned with Izetbegović’s. Izetbegović had also already toned down some of his private views during the pre-war election in order to gain support from secular Bosnian Muslims (Gjelten 1995).

In addition, when the war began on April 6th, 1992, Izetbegović was not just the head of the SDA but also the leader of a Bosnian government which still contained moderate Bosnian Serbs and Croats, as well as Bosnian Muslims who did not share his personal political views. Thus, he had to broaden his leadership of an ethno-religious political party to preside over a multi-ethnic Bosnian state and government (Hoare 2001), meaning that he had to coordinate officials whose preferences on nationalist ideology differed greatly from his own and each other’s. Both mass beliefs and elite politics thus favored the continued official dominance of civic nationalism.

4.5.5 Building New Ideological Infrastructure: Reconciling Goals and Limitations

Since the political calculus did not initially favor top wartime Bosnian leaders’ private ideological preferences, they proceeded by adhering to civic nationalism in domestic media while also beginning to construct grassroots infrastructure that would support a shift toward either or both ethnic or religious nationalism. This behavior is in line with work that suggests elites have significant opportunities to emphasize different forms of group identity during periods of political uncertainty and instability (Suny 1999/2000, 177). In fact, during times of social transformation such as armed conflict, ordinary people will have to learn new routines and modes of individual and collective action, a process which new ideological principles can facilitate (Swidler 1986, 278). The process of linking ideology to behavior, however, requires organizations (Barnes 1966, 522), which form a key element of ideological infrastructure.
The organizations within this infrastructure are of primary importance for generating and sustaining any shift in the content of ideological claims because they provide sites for the routine production and dissemination of the rhetoric and discourse containing the new ideology, with the result that this ideology will not just be created but also attain popularity, dominance, and stability during and after the critical juncture (Wuthnow 1989, 10). Aside from organizations, other components of this ideological infrastructure may include access to intellectual resources and control over evaluation and debate of the new ideology (Wuthnow 1989, 11), as well as new communications networks and social networks with which to spread and reinforce the values aligned with the new set of ideological claims (Krebs and Jackson 2007).

In Bosnia, the construction of new ideological infrastructure during the war has been characterized as a top-down project which attempted to substitute Islam for Communism as an ideological loyalty test for political recruitment (Bougarel 2007). The principal part of this new ideological infrastructure was the Bosnian army, which gradually shifted from supporting Bosnian patriotism to promoting Bosnian Muslim ethnic nationalism and, in some units, even religious nationalism (Hoare 2004; Mojzes 1998). The SDA also set up its own communal and political organizations during the war, including a cultural association, a humanitarian agency, and a central assembly of Bosnian Muslim political and cultural leaders (Bougarel 1999).

Other elements of this infrastructure included the public education system, where religion was introduced as an optional class in primary and secondary schools two years into the war (Maček 2009). This effectively meant that courses on Islam were offered mostly to the exclusion of other religions, and that the courses were only nominally
optional because children who did not want to take them during the war faced social ostracism (Maček 2009). Other components of the groundwork for a domestic ideological shift included changes in street names to favor historical Bosnian Muslim figures (Maček 2009) and public celebration of Bosnian Muslim soldiers killed during the war as religious martyrs, spread through speeches, songs, obituaries, monuments, and plaques (Bougarel 2007). Some of these measures continued after the war as well, as many mosques, Islamic centers, and schools were built while new school textbooks celebrated the Ottoman period and some Muslim-majority counties required the use of the more religious "Selaam Aleikum" greeting in specific contexts (Perica 2002, 169-170).

During this process, Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina reported very little on the new ideological infrastructure and budding ideological shift. In fact, except for a few key moments, elaborated below, the push to shift the Bosnian Muslims’ and Bosnia’s national ideology toward ethnic nationalism remained under the radar of official Bosnian domestic media during the war (Interview with Marko Hoare 2015). These circumstances suggest that simply building new ideological infrastructure will not be sufficient to produce an observable ideological shift in official rhetoric. Specific wartime events, often contingent, must occur to enable this incipient ideological shift to rise to inclusion in top leaders’ rhetoric in official domestic media.

4.5.6 Threats to Power: An Opportunity for an Ideological Shift

One contingent wartime event which may spur a shift from a broad, multi-ethnic civic nationalist vision for an ethno-religious group and polity to a narrower, exclusive ethnic nationalist agenda within official domestic rhetoric is a power struggle, to the point
that the authority or power of the top leader or leaders is seriously threatened. The top leader or leaders may then capitalize on any burgeoning ideological infrastructure supportive of ethnic nationalism to bolster their political support. In this scenario, nationalist ideological claims issued in official domestic rhetoric may serve as the leaders’ public affirmation of their ethnic commitment and as a call and response of support between them and their mass and elite supporters within the population and security forces.

In terms of rallying support from the population, ethno-religious leaders under political threat during ethnic conflict can use ethnic nationalist claims to engage in ethnic flanking or outbidding, such that they paint themselves as the most loyal and most effective defenders of the warring group (Hislope 1997; Gormley-Heenan and Macginty 2008). According to Monica Toft, outbidding usually occurs in transitional regimes under conditions of political threat to elites, ethnic or religious segmentation of the population, and elite capture of media and communication markets (Toft 2013, 10). Since armed conflict is akin to regime transition in terms of uncertainty and political instability, ethnic conflicts featuring elite and/or government domination of the media may be primed for the increasing use of ethnic nationalist claims should political elites’ power be threatened. Successful execution of this strategy may enable threatened wartime ethno-religious leaders to pre-empt and/or repress those threatening their power, much as ethnic outbidding may achieve similar outcomes during elections between rival ethnic parties (Hislope 1997, 473).

Another key resource that threatened wartime ethno-religious leaders may rally to their side via ethnic nationalist claims is the polity’s security apparatus, particularly its
armed forces. Especially during ethnic conflict, state armies may be ethnically homogenous. In fact, some research suggests that during war audiences such as the army and security forces may be more important and significant for ethnic outbidding processes than the general public (Caspersen 2008, 259). In part, this is because military forces offer leaders a more readily available tool with which to repress possible challengers during wartime (Caspersen 2004). Accordingly, domestic ethnic nationalist claims may offer top wartime ethno-religious leaders the chance to build and/or confirm their support from among the security forces. If this support is confirmed, potential challengers, who are also observing these public nationalist claims, should infer an implicit threat of repression from the call and response between the top ethno-religious leaders and military authorities and abandon their challenge to the top leaders’ power.

In Bosnia, the top wartime political leader experienced a significant threat to his power in the summer of 1993. By June of that year, the Bosnian government was run by a collective Presidency, which included three Serbs, three Croats, and four Bosnian Muslims. The head of this collective Presidency, known as the President of the Presidency, was Alija Izetbegović. This effectively meant that he was the country’s top leader. In fact, the position of President of the Presidency was supposed to have rotated among the members of the collective Presidency, but this rotation was suspended during the war.

In early June of 1993, Izetbegović had begun a plan to secure his position at the top of the government, selecting a new military leader in whose loyalty he felt more confident (Hoare 2004). However, on June 21st, the rest of the collective Presidency, minus Izetbegović and Rasim Delić, the new army chief, met in Zagreb, Croatia to
discuss the ongoing peace negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland. Regarding this meeting, international media sources reported that Izetbegović was “rumored to be on the point of being ousted”, that other members of the Presidency had accused him of being weak, and that the other members were urging the Bosnian army to be placed under the command of the entire collective Presidency rather than the President (Agence France Presse 1993).

The next day the international press reported that the collective Presidency had voted seven to one in Izetbegović’s absence to go to Geneva to discuss a peace plan Izetbegović vehemently opposed (Agence France Presse 1993). The day after that, June 23rd, Delić lent public support to Izetbegović’s position (Agence France Presse 1993). Once both Izetbegović and Ejup Ganić, another Bosnian Muslim member of the Presidency, were back in Sarajevo that day, reports stated that they tried to “drum up support from the high command of the mainly Moslem army [sic]” (Agence France Presse 1993). Other reports noted that the other members of the Bosnian Presidency “seem to lack much popular backing by Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian military” (Lewis 1993, A1). Several weeks later the crisis was resolved with an official endorsement of Izetbegović’s views on the peace negotiations (Burns 1993, A8).

Textual analysis of Izetbegović’s ideological claims in the period between the start of the challenge to his power and the resolution of the crisis demonstrates the shift to ethnic nationalist claims in domestic media in order to withstand the challenge. In the wake of the threat to his leadership, President Izetbegović initially maintained a commitment to civic nationalism. On July 9th, for example, he stated in reference to the ongoing Geneva peace negotiations that “the ethnic division of Bosnia-Hercegovina is out” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).
However, shortly thereafter, on July 18th, Izetbegović adopted the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism, stressing that “My intimate preoccupation is also the fate of the Muslim nation. I think that nobody can blame me for the fact that on some occasions I have to feel as a member of this nation. The fate of this nation is in jeopardy now. I think that the Serb and the Croat nations will somehow find a way out of this Golgotha and that at least their bare survival is not threatened” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993). Izetbegović thus made sure that members of the public listening to Bosnian domestic media would realize that he was the champion of the Bosnian Muslim cause, giving the group special priority in contrast to the other ethno-religious groups in Bosnia and dropping any mention of Bosnians or their status and rights as individuals.

He then used another ethnic nationalist claim on Bosnian media on July 26th to demonstrate his connection with the Bosnian Muslims. While initially repeating the civic nationalist tenet that “We are going to strive for a free and democratic Bosnia-Hercegovina”, he went on to say, “I hope nobody will criticize me if I say that the Muslim people will be an object of special concern for me at these negotiations because I belong to that people, because [it] remains a special target of this aggression and because it has suffered the most. I have two aims: the state and the people. This is what I am going to try to defend” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993). No longer was it enough for Izetbegović to defend the state of Bosnia and the Bosnian people. Within a month of a serious challenge to his wartime power, he had officially wrapped himself in the mantle of the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group, thereby building further support among members of that group and reminding other listeners
within the wartime political and governing elite that he had a strong public base behind him.

In addition to the public, Izetbegović also used ethnic nationalism to call out to and signal his support from the Bosnian army. On July 31st, he declared:

…the focus of our struggle, the struggle of our soldiers who managed to preserve Bosnia-Hercegovina, has slightly shifted. Our soldiers have become closer to the Bosnian Muslim nation - the target of the aggression - as the primary aim was not the destruction of Bosnia as a state, as much as the extermination, the literal extermination of the Muslim nation...I often recall now that it was due to the sacrifices of our troops during this war that Bosnia has survived as a state and will continue to survive for hundreds of years to come. It was in fact due to them that the Muslim nation has survived despite the huge losses it has suffered...Our aims remain the same: a state and a nation, but with a slight shift to pay greater attention to the nation which has recently been just out of focus but which, thank God, has remained alive, has salvaged its honour and has not lost its dignity (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).

Izetbegović officially sings the praises of the Bosnian army in this statement, underscoring the importance of its troops’ “sacrifices”, particularly with respect to ensuring the survival of the “Muslim nation.” In doing so, his implicit message is that he stands with the Bosnian army and the Bosnian Muslim people and that they stand by him. With the reminder of his firm support from the people and the military, potential opponents and challengers to Izetbegović’s authority within the government have been put on notice that they lack both the legitimacy and instruments of coercion to unseat him and would do well to avoid such challenges in the future.

4.5.7 Peace Proposals: Another Opportunity for an Ideological Shift

An additional contingent wartime event which may produce a shift from civic to ethnic nationalism at the level of ethno-religious leaders’ official domestic rhetoric is an internationally-sponsored peace proposal. More specifically, if international mediators propose peace plans based on the ethnic partition of warring parties, then the top leaders of warring ethno-religious groups will have an incentive to utilize ethnic nationalist claims in order to adapt their vision of the future political order to that called for in the
peace proposals. This relationship between peace processes originating outside a polity and domestic politics within it has been described as an example of a nested game in which warring actors are motivated to compete for advantage against both wartime enemies and internal political rivals (Pearlman 2008/2009, 83). This body of work, however, has mostly analyzed the relationship in terms of how internal factional politics may facilitate or undermine international peace processes (Pearlman 2008/2009, 82). In contrast, I argue that an international peace process can reshape internal politics and ideology.

Accordingly, if ethnic partition becomes the dominant solution for an armed conflict, then top wartime ethno-religious leaders will be incentivized to employ more ethnic nationalist rhetoric in an attempt to show their acceptance of the terms of the peace proposals. They may also wish to prepare their population for the coming settlement and the nature of the post-war political order. Moreover, using ethnic nationalist claims may enable top leaders to gain an early advantage in any jockeying for post-war political power. In this sense, adapting official domestic rhetoric to align with the language of external peace mediators offers domestic political elites an opportunity to maintain their stature and relevance for the negotiation process and future domestic politics.

In Bosnia, shortly after the height of the factional struggles within the government, the international community officially endorsed the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan on August 20th, 1993. This plan replaced the Vance-Owen proposal which had been put forth in January of that year and rejected in May. Owen-Stoltenberg called for a very loose confederation of three ethnic mini-states within Bosnia, with almost no power reserved for the central government, including over its military forces (Friedman 1996).
Essentially, the plan would have created three ethnic entities, each with its own constitution and democratic government (Burg and Shoup 1999). Thus, the international community abandoned the goal which had animated the Vance-Owen plan, namely to avoid linking ethnicity with territory (Aitken 2007).

Politically, the result of this proposal for the Bosnian government was the onset of what one historian labeled “a defeatist attitude”, with many officials increasingly coming to terms with and advocating partition in order to end the war (Hoare 2004). In fact, in August and September of 1993, many of Izetbegović’s close advisors pushed him to restrict the government’s territorial goals in the war to areas with Bosnian Muslim majorities (Hoare 2004). In turn, the ethnic nationalist faction of the SDA increased its political influence (Interview with Marko Hoare 2015). The culmination of these developments was that Izetbegović put the Owen-Stoltenberg plan to a vote before a special assembly of exclusively Bosnian Muslim political, military, cultural, and religious leaders on September 27th, 1993, with the stated intention of subsequently submitting it to the actual Bosnian wartime parliament. However, the assembly rejected the plan, effectively terminating its viability as a peace proposal (Hoare 2004).

Textual analysis indicates that Izetbegović and other Bosnian leaders employed ethnic nationalist claims in domestic media between the plan’s official unveiling and its rejection in order to advocate on behalf of its vision of ethnic territories and the corresponding promotion of specifically Bosnian Muslim definitions of citizenship and statehood. Thus, in September of 1993, Izetbegović noted, “There are some allegations that there is no longer the will or the possibility to live [together] - to build the state of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Of course, we must differentiate between living together and
building a state together. I think it is not contentious that the Muslims and the Serbs can live together: what is contentious is whether they can build a state together. People as individuals can live together, they can respect each other, they can love each other etc. However, a state is built with people, not with individuals” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993).

Though Izetbegović indicated in this response an ongoing commitment to multiethnic tolerance and coexistence, i.e. living together, the overall tenor and thrust was toward ethnic nationalism, since he explicitly mentioned both the Muslim and Serb people and noted that building a functioning state would require people to work together on a collective ethnic basis rather than as individuals. This meant that the political legitimacy of the future Bosnian state would have to rest on the ethnic nationalist foundation of ethnic groups rather than the civic nationalist foundation of individual citizens.

At the same time, he also indicated acceptance of the ethnic partitionist premises of the peace plan, lamenting, “A state cannot survive if the vast majority of its population is opposed to it. Personally, I myself would also like to resolve this dilemma: does the Serb nation want to live in this state? If it does not, it should not be forced to” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993). Again, the focus of this claim is on a nation (i.e. ethnic group) as opposed to individuals. It also implicitly accepts the notion that separation of ethnic groups is necessary to achieve peace.

The debate over the Owen-Stoltenberg plan culminated in a climax of ethnic nationalism at the Bosnian Muslim elite assembly at the end of September, whereby the leaders present adopted the use of the word “Bosniak” to officially refer to the Bosnian
Muslim group. This term served as both an ethnic nationalist alternative to the civic nationalist modifier ‘Bosnian’ and an attempt to move beyond the religious connotation and ambiguity of the ‘Bosnian Muslim’ label. The partition plan had thus galvanized those in Bosnia’s wartime elite who wanted to create a new group label and ethnic nationalist identity for the Bosnian Muslims. Izetbegović immediately incorporated this term into his rhetoric in Bosnian domestic media, responding to a break-away Bosnian Muslim faction in northwest Bosnia by declaring “This is an attack on the unity and the identity of the Muslim Bosniak people now when we need unity more than ever” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993). The unity and strength of the “Bosniak” people had thus become paramount.

4.5.8 The End of Opportune Moments: Ideological Reversion

After September of 1993 the Owen-Stoltenberg plan was no longer under consideration. And over the next month Izetbegović eliminated unofficial security forces and militias in Sarajevo and succeeded in placing loyal SDA party officials in key government positions and cabinet seats. By the end of October, the consolidation of his power, begun in the wake of the factional crisis in June, had been accomplished. No longer needing either to trumpet his support from the people and the military or to build acceptance for a peace settlement based on ethnically homogenous administrative territories, he reverted to promoting civic nationalist themes in official Bosnian domestic media. However, civic nationalism did not dominate his rhetoric on Bosnian media as exclusively as it had in the first year of the war, thereby revealing the lingering impact of the events of mid-1993 and suggesting that ideological shifts can be difficult to reverse completely once initiated.
Thus, for example, on November 14\textsuperscript{th}, 1993, Izetbegović declared that the war should continue to be fought in two phases, whereby “in phase one we should, by military means, secure the liberation of areas which used to be predominantly Muslim populated, because it is the people that suffered the hardest and they are the ones who are most interested in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the people who are surely loyal, because they do not have another homeland, and they paid the highest price in the war for Bosnia-Hercegovina” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993). Izetbegović could therefore no longer avoid mention of the special attention due to the interests of the Bosnian Muslim group in particular.

On the other hand, he also proclaimed that, “In this part of Bosnia-Hercegovina under the rule of Bosnia-Hercegovina's authorities and its army, we are going to strive, for the sake of our own principles, to achieve a level of existence, a system governed by democratic principles, human freedoms and, what I have already called a definition in negative terms - a system which will not persecute anyone affiliated to any religion, nation or political organization” (Radio Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina 1993). Izetbegović had thus returned to emphasizing rhetoric supportive of Western liberal principles and civic nationalist values of individual rights.

Figures 4.3 and 4.4 offer further evidence of this partial and compromised return to civic nationalism in Bosnian leaders’ ideological claims. The figures show that the use of civic nationalism increased during 1994 and 1995 while ethnic nationalism declined. However, both trends are modest, indicating a prevalence of civic nationalist claims rather than a renewed dominance.
Figure 4.3: Monthly Percentage of Domestic Civic Nationalist Claims, 1994 & 1995

Figure 4.4: Monthly Percentage of Domestic Ethnic Nationalist Claims, 1994 & 1995
4.5.9 Exploring an Alternative Explanation

Though the evidence thus suggests that the foregoing mechanisms spurred wartime Bosnian Muslim leaders in the Bosnian government to shift from civic to ethnic nationalist rhetoric in domestic media before mostly reverting back to the civic option, one possible alternative explanation is that these leaders’ wartime enemies, i.e. the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, may have shaped Bosnian Muslim leaders’ nationalist ideology in a dyadic process of ideological articulation and reaction. For purposes of this dissertation, I do not have the evidence needed to systematically evaluate this proposition, since my dataset covers speech acts by Bosnian Muslim government leaders and not speech acts by top Bosnian Croat or Bosnian Serb separatist leaders. However, the fact is that the latter were distinct separatist ethnic groups tied to ethnic nationalist leaders in Croatia and Serbia. As such, both the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs maintained a fairly consistent focus on ethnic nationalism in their rhetoric.

Cursory examination of the speech acts by Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić that were included in my collection of news stories indicates a constant use of ethnic nationalist values and goals. Boban thus frequently referred to the Croatian nation, the Muslim army, the Muslim republic, and called Izetbegović the president of the Muslim nation. Similarly, Karadžić extolled the Serbian nation and people and labeled the Bosnian government the Muslim government. Accordingly, since the Bosnian government leadership’s domestic ideological rhetoric varied between civic and ethnic nationalism while their wartime enemies’ ideological rhetoric remained constant, the latter is not a compelling explanation for the former in this case. However, systematic testing of the impact that wartime opponents have on
each other’s ideologies, nationalist or otherwise, will be a fruitful and important research project in the future.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter offered an explanation as to how and why the leaders of warring ethno-religious groups may try to change the dominant domestic nationalist ideology within their group and state during armed conflict. In particular, it examined when a specific type of ideological shift, from civic to ethnic nationalism, is likely to happen at the level of official wartime rhetoric. The process behind this shift on the part of Bosnian Muslim government leaders in wartime Bosnia reveals how the mechanisms described in my theory interact to produce this type of shift. The onset of internal armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia in the early 1990s discredited a path dependent Yugoslav civic nationalist ideology which had been established to help maintain social peace and order in a multiethnic society. When the war began, the top leaders of the Bosnian government, all of them belonging to the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group, personally preferred ethnic or religious nationalism over civic nationalism. This was especially true for Bosnia’s top leader, Alija Izetbegović.

However, the initial calculus of political gain at the outset of the war favored the continued official use of civic nationalism. Consequently, these leaders instituted a program of ideological infrastructure construction at other levels of Bosnian society to help spread ethnic nationalism. Thus, when Izetbegović’s power was threatened and international mediators promoted peace based on ethnic partition in the second year of the war, he and other top wartime Bosnian leaders could rely on these underlying ideological resources to derive political benefit from using ethnic nationalist claims in
Bosnian domestic media. Doing so enabled Izetbegović to maintain power and allowed the Bosnian government to temporarily adapt its post-war goals and plans to a new vision of post-war Bosnia while also spreading the tenets of Izetbegović’s favored nationalist ideology among the populace.

The interaction of these mechanisms suggests that their variation can produce different outcomes for wartime nationalist ideology. Under one counterfactual scenario, had Bosnia’s top wartime leaders personally favored civic nationalism instead of ethnic nationalism, then they would likely have continued to promote the former even though the onset of internal armed conflict had undermined its perceived societal value. Alternatively, given their personal preference for ethnic nationalism, had the war’s political calculus initially conferred greater political benefits on using this ideology, the leaders would likely have affected an immediate ideological shift in domestic media without investing in ideological infrastructure at the grassroots level. Finally, even with the construction of infrastructure favoring ethnic nationalism, absence of the wartime threat to Izetbegović’s power and/or the Owen-Stoltenberg partition plan would likely have relegated the ideological shift to unofficial segments of Bosnian society, meaning that it would not have been visible in top leaders’ rhetoric in wartime domestic media.

Instead, as a result of these events, Izetbegović had to employ ethnic nationalist claims in Bosnian domestic media in order to reinforce his support from the Bosnian Muslim people and Bosnian army while also reminding those listening of these support bases. In utilizing these claims as both a call and response to his supporters and a signal of his ability to withstand any threats to oust him, Izetbegović was also able to expose Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims more broadly to ideological principles that historical
evidence suggests he personally favored. Shortly thereafter, he had to use the same types of nationalist claims in order to take advantage of the political reality of a likely post-war settlement based on ethnic partition.

Thus, my analysis sheds light on when exactly some warring groups and countries are likely to experience a punctuation or break from a path dependent nationalist ideology. Significantly, this can occur as a result of one set of leaders or elites altering their nationalist ideology rather than a new set of leaders with a different nationalist ideology coming to power. Even so, Izetbegović’s return to predominantly civic nationalist rhetoric in Bosnian domestic media following the conclusion of the debate over the peace plan and the termination of internal factional struggles suggests that such breaks may be temporary or incomplete in the context of war, at least at the most visible levels of public rhetoric. In fact, the project to shift the Bosnian state toward an ethnic nationalist foundation based on the primacy of the Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) people continued at lower levels of official government and military authority, as further wartime events did not provide a similar opportunity or need to use ethnic nationalist claims to quite the same degree in Bosnian domestic media.

This chapter’s findings thus contribute to the growing research program on the sources and nature of ideology and ideological shifts during internal armed conflict. However, building on these findings will require moving beyond the scope of the configuration of mechanisms outlined here. Future extensions should test permutations and variations of these mechanisms, including some of the counterfactual scenarios outlined above. Other ideas for future research include examination of different types of ethnic groups besides ethno-religious ones, as well as forms of ideology besides
nationalism. These extensions will help illuminate our understanding of why certain ideologies are used in specific types of armed conflicts and during certain stages of armed conflict, potentially laying the foundation for a future research program to examine how wartime ideological shifts impact elite and mass behavior more broadly.

In addition, exploring how the dyadic interaction of enemy leaders’ rhetoric shapes both sides’ ideologies during armed conflict offers a promising area for future research. Carrying out this project, however, will require collecting and coding a systematic dataset of speech acts and ideological rhetoric for multiple parties or groups in a conflict rather than just one. Brief examination of this dynamic in the Bosnian case suggested that it did not play a major role in explaining shifts in Bosnian government leaders’ domestic wartime nationalist ideology, but closer study of this relationship in other contexts may yield different outcomes.

At this stage, however, I offer another type of extension. Whereas this chapter examined shifts in the content of ideological claims made to domestic audiences, in the next chapter I examine how armed conflict may also impact the content of the ideological claims wartime ethno-religious leaders make to foreign audiences.
5. Ideological Shifts in the Bosnian War: Civic and Religious Nationalism in Foreign Media

5.1. Introduction

On May 14th, 1994, speaking to the New York Times, Haris Silajdžić, Bosnia’s wartime Prime Minister and a member of the Bosnian Muslim ethno-religious group, asserted his view that the plan for a Muslim-Croat Federation within Bosnia “represents hope that this monument of civilization in Europe -- multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, democratic and not fascist -- will win” (Greenhouse 1994, A4). Speaking on Pakistan TV just a few months later, on September 7th, 1994, Silajdžić said of Bosnia:

I am here today to tell you that we are past that stage, we are beyond the annihilation and that we shall, by God’s will, win. Morally, we have already won, physically they cannot defeat us - we are past that stage. Thanks to God and all our friends that helped, and we hope they will continue to help. Dear brothers and sisters, dear friends…the Bosnian [sic] have remained true to their historic mission, have remained true to the best tradition of Islam and are now victors without a stain (Pakistan TV 1994).

Thus, from a view extolling a multi-ethnic state and nation, Silajdžić was now emphasizing God’s role in his country’s cause and intertwining Bosnia and Bosnians with Islam and Islamic traditions. In this chapter I examine what prompts leaders of warring ethno-religious groups to vary the content of their ideological claims to foreign audiences.

My explanation for this variation combines prior research findings concerning external support in civil wars with a novel approach based on the dynamics of international relations. Specifically, I show that ethno-religious leaders will vary the content of their ideological claims to foreign audiences during war depending on the likelihood of military intervention from leading Western countries, in particular the United States. My argument rests on the notion that the need for external aid in war will force leaders of warring ethno-religious groups to market themselves as agents to
different external state principals. This marketing will be directed to the elites and policymakers in potential external supporters in an attempt to convince them that their interests and values will benefit from supporting the ethno-religious group’s cause. At the same time, these leaders will try to increase empathy among non-elites within potential external supporters, in the hope that citizens in these countries will pressure their own leaders to support the group’s war effort and/or that these citizens will aid the war effort directly.

In order to increase the odds that this marketing and empathy generation will succeed, I argue that leaders of warring ethno-religious groups will employ nationalist ideological claims that align with the dominant values and ideological principles of potential supporter countries, so as to demonstrate that their group is similar to these countries’ leaders and citizens and holds similar values and political goals. I posit that their assumption is that creating and/or enhancing the perception of shared ideals and values between their group and external supporters will push these potential supporters’ leaders and citizens to invest in their cause in the conflict.

However, employing a novel mechanism rooted in international politics, I also argue that in the post-Cold War period, leaders of ethno-religious groups involved in armed conflicts with a low likelihood of Western military intervention will be forced to use religious nationalist claims exclusively to garner external support. Conversely, leaders of ethno-religious groups involved in armed conflicts where Western military intervention is more likely and obtainable will use civic nationalist claims in an attempt to persuade Western powers to intervene on their behalf. Concurrently, since this intervention is still uncertain, they will also use religious nationalist claims in order to
attract co-religionist support. Thus, opportunities to obtain aid from external actors will make certain kinds of ideological rhetoric more useful for some wartime ethno-religious leaders.

The likelihood of Western military intervention in the post-Cold War period may be shaped by several factors, including Western countries’ national interests, whether the ethno-religious group is a principal perpetrator or victim of one-sided violence during the conflict, and great power politics. In this chapter, I focus on the latter factor by arguing that leaders of ethno-religious groups fighting a non-Western great power will know or quickly realize that Western military intervention on their behalf will not be forthcoming owing to Western powers’ desire to avoid large-scale conflict with another great power by intervening within its borders. Consequently, groups in this situation will not use civic nationalist claims to obtain external support, focusing solely on religious nationalist appeals.

Testing the plausibility of my theory, I show that Bosnian Muslim wartime leaders demonstrated a strong tendency to use civic nationalist claims in media sources in Europe and the United States, along with an overwhelming propensity to use religious nationalist claims in media sources in Muslim-majority countries. This pattern of nationalist ideological claims fits Bosnia’s wartime circumstances as a polity which had an uncertain but increasingly likely chance of receiving Western military support. I also provide additional support for my theory through a brief historical analysis of the first Chechen-Russian war, demonstrating how Russia’s status as a non-Western great power precluded Western military support and thereby undermined Chechen leaders’ pre-war use of civic nationalist principles.
Thus, unlike the previous chapter, the ideological claims in this chapter vary between civic and religious nationalism rather than civic and ethnic nationalism. In part, this is because a particularistic and narrow Bosnian Muslim ethnic nationalism could not have had a broad external appeal. In addition, my assumption in this analysis is that war produced information constraints for citizens, such that they did not have ready access to the foreign speech acts in which Bosnian Muslim leaders veered between civic and religious nationalism. Thus, the leadership could oscillate between civic and ethnic nationalism in its domestic rhetoric in response to threats to its power and peace proposals, as demonstrated in chapter four, while getting away with shifting between civic and religious nationalism in its foreign rhetoric in response to its need for external support, as shown in this chapter.

My theory and results make three significant contributions. First, I demonstrate how international politics and a need for external support during war combine to shape the content of ethno-religious leaders’ ideological claims in foreign media. Second, I advance an innovative theoretical explanation for this relationship which rests on marketing and empathy. In doing so, I demonstrate that before principals (i.e. external states) decide which agents to offer support to in conflict, agents (i.e. parties to armed conflicts) may take the initiative and actively attempt to persuade various principals to support them.

Third, my results also suggest when leaders of ethno-religious groups in conflict will employ religious nationalist rhetoric. Since the civil war research literature posits that organizations guided by religious ideology are less willing to negotiate a settlement to a conflict (Toft 2006), more willing and able to use greater violence (Berman and
Laitin 2008), and that civil wars involving religion are longer, more intense, and more prone to recurrence than other kinds of civil wars (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2009), explaining when these leaders will use religious nationalist ideological claims during war may have beneficial implications for conflict resolution.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section two presents my theoretical argument as to how demand for external support and the likelihood of Western military intervention in the post-Cold War international system combine to shape the content of the ideological claims that leaders of warring ethno-religious groups make to foreign audiences. Section three presents the results of my quantitative analysis of Bosnian leaders’ ideological claims to foreign audiences. It also offers some qualitative analysis of their contrasting claims in foreign media. The fourth section elaborates a brief historical analysis of the first Chechen-Russian war as additional evidence for the plausibility of the theory. Section five concludes.

5.2. Theory: How External Support and International Politics Shape Ideological Claims

I restrict the scope of my theory to the post-Cold War era, thus assuming (as noted in chapter one) that religious nationalism has taken the place of Marxist communism as the primary ideological competitor to political ideologies predominant in the West, including civic nationalism. In this context, I argue that an ethno-religious group’s likelihood of obtaining Western military intervention on its behalf in an armed conflict is central to explaining which types of ideological claims its leaders will make in their official rhetoric to foreign audiences. Given that the Western great powers, particularly the United States, have possessed the most military and economic power in the
international system since the end of the Cold War, I argue that the prospect of Western military support is highly enticing for wartime ethno-religious leaders. On the other hand, Western powers still have limited resources, thereby constraining their ability and willingness to intervene militarily in foreign conflicts.

In particular, if an ethno-religious group is at war against a non-Western great power, I argue that Western powers like the United States will refrain from considering military intervention. This is because they will want to avoid a potentially large-scale military conflict with another great power. Once the ethno-religious group’s leaders realize that Western military intervention is not forthcoming, they will abandon any attempts to use civic nationalism to attract support from Western governments. Consequently, they will be forced to turn to civic nationalism’s ideological substitute in the post-Cold War international system: religious nationalism. By appealing to state and non-state actors which share their religious views, these leaders can hope to secure both military and economic aid on their behalf.

Conversely, ethno-religious groups fighting a different type of opponent know that Western military intervention is possible but uncertain. In an attempt to gain Western support, I posit that they will utilize civic nationalist claims in their official rhetoric to Western audiences depending on their perception of the likelihood of this support. However, they will also appeal to co-religionist actors in order to hedge their bets should Western intervention not materialize. As a result, these leaders may also use religious nationalist claims.

In these contexts, the likelihood of Western military intervention may be shaped by additional factors, potentially including the ethno-religious group’s behavior in the
conflict and Western powers’ national interests. For example, groups who are perceived as principal victims of wartime violence, especially one-sided violence, may be more likely to receive Western support because Western governments will feel pressure to champion liberal norms of human rights in the face of targeted violence and atrocities against a particular group. Even in this case, however, Western military intervention may only become highly likely if Western political leaders also come to view intervention as contributing to their government’s national interest, rather than solely upholding moral norms.

My theory follows in the tradition of Peter Gourevitch’s use of the concept of the “second image reversed” to describe how internal political phenomena are often derived from phenomena within the international system (Gourevitch 1978). In this chapter, I extend this concept to show how internal conflict and international actors can interact to shape leaders’ political values and ideological principles. It also expands on work that examines why leaders of secessionist groups mobilize around one identity instead of another (Saideman, Dougherty, and Jenne 2005) by shifting the analysis to ethno-religious groups and by utilizing a more comprehensive set of categories for the dependent variable.

I also build on research regarding external intervention in internal armed conflict. Though most of this work focuses on which kinds of conflicts draw more outside intervention (Regan 2000) and how outside intervention impacts conflict duration (Cunningham 2010) and onset or escalation (Gleditsch 2007), some scholars have taken an actor-specific focus similar to mine, inquiring as to which states intervene and why they intervene on behalf of a particular side (Findley and Teo 2006). Most of this work,
however, points to the link between ethnicity and external support, as outside intervention is expected to increase in the presence of co-ethnic ties between the intervener and one of the warring sides (Nome 2013; Saideman 2002). In contrast to this focus on ethnic kin, in this chapter I show how Bosnian Muslim wartime leaders, who entered conflict with few external co-ethnic ties, still attracted outside support by using other types of ideological claims at their disposal, namely civic and religious nationalism. These claims can then substitute for co-ethnic ties and offer different paths for establishing a perception of kinship or affinity between potential outside supporters and warring groups.

More recently, Idean Salehyan, Kristian Gleditsch, and David Cunningham have employed a principal-agent model to argue that possible external state supporters decide to offer aid to competent groups whose preferences match theirs (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). Similar to their work, I focus on the importance of shared preferences and values between principals and agents. However, I move beyond their emphasis on shared ethnicity or religion as effective screening mechanisms for shared preferences to include civic nationalism as a potential source of shared values and preferences in the absence of ethnic or religious ties. I also take a different angle on this relationship by analyzing the actions that leaders of warring ethno-religious groups can take as agents to motivate certain principals (e.g. external states) to offer their support in the first place.

My theory thus focuses on these leaders’ need to adopt certain types of nationalist ideological claims in their rhetoric to foreign audiences in order to market their cause to foreign policymakers and increase empathy for their plight among foreign citizens. This argument is in line with research that shows that the anticipation and/or likelihood of
third party intervention in internal armed conflict can shape belligerent groups’ behavior in regards to their military strategy and the use of violence against their opponents (Poast 2015). I extend this reasoning to argue that the hope for and anticipation of outside intervention can also shape warring parties’ rhetoric and ideological claims. Below I detail the logic driving the relationship between external support and warring ethno-religious group leaders’ decision to use specific types of nationalist ideological claims in their rhetoric in foreign media.

I start by assuming that these leaders have to obtain resources and intervention from third party actors. This assumption is highly plausible given that war tends to impair and/or destroy the effective functioning of countries’ domestic economies and infrastructure. This means that production of war material may be impaired, thereby prompting these leaders to seek military supplies and/or outright military intervention from external actors. I also assume that leaders who are able to appeal to more than one outside actor and actually do so will have a higher probability of receiving the benefit of external aid.

These leaders must therefore convince potential foreign supporters to invest in and provide resources to their war effort rather than to other conflicts. Previous work has suggested that the context of international relations when it comes to armed conflict is in fact one of many needy warring parties seeking help paired with limited transnational resources (Bob 2001). Leaders of different groups involved in armed conflicts are thus competing over many of the same possible external supporters, giving them an incentive to devise methods to enhance their appeal to foreign elites and decision makers.
One potentially effective marketing strategy ethno-religious elites can use to gain the support of foreign policymakers would be to convince these foreign leaders that investing in their conflict is in their national interest or would promote their own security needs. Along these lines, prior research indicates that many cases of successful outside intervention in civil wars have occurred when the intervening power perceived a clear national interest at stake in the intervention (Cooper and Berdal 1993). In turn, different outside states may perceive their national interests and goals in different ways.

In fact, some prominent scholars have suggested that humanitarian motives for intervention have increasingly come to be defined as part of many countries’ national interests after the Cold War, especially the United States (Finnemore 1996). However, others dispute this notion and maintain that traditional political and strategic motives still form the core of states’ motivations for intervention and aid to groups fighting civil wars (Gent 2007). Offering a different view, Patrick Regan argues that states may gain the benefit of enhanced reputational capital by intervening in humanitarian crises and winning domestic and/or international praise for doing so (Regan 1998).

Wartime leaders of ethno-religious groups thus have an incentive to convince outside powers that aiding their cause will help promote their interests. To do so, I argue that these leaders would benefit from branding and advertising themselves in the same way as the target of their aid request brands its own country’s values and goals in the international system. The logic of this kind of appeal would be to persuade the potential outside intervener that it will benefit from intervening in the conflict over the long run through its relationship with a polity that shares its values and goals and, therefore, by implication, may offer the intervener space to promote its economic, cultural, and/or
international policy objectives both during and after the conflict. This strategy may be especially helpful if a state or group is a relatively new actor on the international scene, as making certain kinds of appeals may allow it to credibly convince outside states that it is an ally (Saideman, Dougherty, and Jenne 2005).

Further support for this strategy comes from the work of Clifford Bob, who argues that localized social movements’ chances of winning support from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) depend on effectively “pitching” and “matching” themselves to specific organizations (Bob 2001). By pitching he means raising awareness for the movement’s cause, while matching requires aligning the movement’s causes and goals with the agendas of specific NGOs. The NGOs, in turn, need to observe this type of alignment owing to the risk they take in supporting a social movement which, in the long run, may or may not retain local legitimacy and/or serve the NGOs’ larger goals (Bob 2001). To match to NGOs successfully, Bob argues that local social movements have to couch their causes and goals in the language of trans-national discourse and transnational claims (Bob 2001). I argue that leaders of warring ethno-religious groups have to utilize nationalist ideological claims in much the same way in order to gain the support of policymakers in foreign countries.

In addition to security concerns and self-interest, foreign policy decision makers in potential external supporter states may also wish to spread their country’s official ideology and political beliefs to other states and areas of the world. John Owen, for example, posits that powerful states often forcibly promote their regimes abroad, such that potential intervener states may view ideology and ideas as independent components of their national interests and/or as mechanisms for gaining power internationally, rather
than just a means to obtain more security (Owen 2002). For the United States in particular, Owen notes that states whose domestic institutions and official ideals and values hew to liberal ideology are less likely to counter-balance American power (Owen 2001/2002).

This behavior should also apply to countries which are comprised mostly of an ethno-religious group’s co-religionists, particularly those with governments that lend state support to the faith, as these countries’ leaders are likely to see the religion’s principles as part of their official state ideology in a manner similar to Western leaders’ view of liberalism. Accordingly, these countries’ leaders will perceive support of warring ethno-religious group elites who use religious nationalist claims as an opportunity to enhance their international power and prestige by extending their influence to different actors in the international system. Thus, wartime ethno-religious leaders seeking support from the leaders of the United States and other powerful Western countries would have an incentive to adopt ideological rhetoric endorsing civic nationalism and political liberalism when speaking to Western media. In contrast, they would have an incentive to promote religious nationalism when speaking in media sources in co-religionist countries in order to take advantage of these states’ wish to spread the religion’s principles as a conduit of cultural and political power on the international stage.

Aside from using nationalist ideological claims as marketing tools to gain support from external elites and policymakers, I argue that wartime ethno-religious group leaders will also utilize these claims to generate empathy from citizens in foreign countries, in the hope that these citizens will put further pressure on their country’s leaders to provide
aid to their side in the conflict. In doing so, these leaders must still choose nationalist ideological claims that resonate with foreign audiences, i.e. that match the values and beliefs that specific sets of foreign citizens tend to hold. I posit that these leaders have to devise ways to increase foreign audiences’ empathy because I assume that most people’s baseline attitude toward providing support for groups in foreign conflicts is one of apathy (Käpylä and Kennedy 2014).

Research indicates that generating empathy is an important strategy for overcoming this apathetic response, as increasing empathy motivates people to support remedies for human rights violations (Harff 1987). In addition, theoretical work suggests heightened altruism among democratic citizens increases state support for foreign aid because the median democratic voter becomes more altruistic, thereby forcing democratic leaders to increase foreign aid and humanitarian relief in order to increase the utility and welfare of the median voter (Seiglie 1999). Following in this work, I posit that certain types of nationalist ideological claims during conflict may be likely to shift foreign citizens’ empathy and/or foreign median voters’ altruism for the ethno-religious group making the claims.

Nationalist ideological claims can have this effect if they make the ethno-religious group’s members appear similar to people in foreign countries. For example, one key to greater media attention for conflicts is an audience’s ability to identify and/or sympathize with the conflict (Hawkins 2011), which can be achieved through the use of narratives and stories that create a sense of familiarity and intimacy between the foreign audiences and those affected by the conflict (Käpylä and Kennedy 2014). Wartime leaders’ use of specific types of nationalist ideological claims serves this narrative purpose. Provided
the claims fit into the foreign country’s official ideological values, principles, and myths, the leaders can demonstrate that their own people are the same as the citizens in the foreign country, meaning that they think and believe in the same values, want to organize their country in the same way, and seek to realize the same principles in their society after the conflict ends. The implicit message is thus that foreign citizens will actually be helping themselves and acting in accordance with their own identity and values if they lend greater support to the group’s war effort.

Therefore, given that these leaders have to use nationalist ideological claims that resonate with foreign elites and citizens in order to market themselves and generate empathy effectively, they will need to employ different types of nationalist claims in their foreign rhetoric depending on the country from which they are seeking help. In this context, both civic and religious nationalism can potentially serve as international ideologies, in the sense that they can mobilize support from beyond the wartime ethno-religious group’s borders. Civic nationalism can do so because of its links to notions of universal citizenship, individual rights, and humanitarianism and because it is the dominant official nationalist ideology in powerful Western countries, such as the United States and France. Religious nationalism can also serve this purpose because it calls forth and extols a community which exists trans-nationally.

More specifically, civic nationalism’s focus on individual rights, a community of laws, citizenship based on residency, and multi-ethnic assimilation should resonate particularly well with leaders and citizens in Western countries. The official nationalist myth in the United States, for example, is that of the multi-ethnic melting pot, with civic ideals and laws serving as the common foundation for an American nation made up of
many different ethnic and/or immigrant groups. Civic nationalism’s focus on human and individual rights also touches on the cornerstone of American political development, harkening back to the emphasis on human equality and individual rights found in the Declaration of Independence. Similar principles can be found in official French nationalist ideology and myth, especially the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Ethno-religious group elites would thus benefit from emphasizing themes of human rights and humanitarianism within their wartime civic nationalist appeals in an attempt to demonstrate how supporting the group upholds Western nations’ human rights norms.

Conversely, religious nationalism’s promotion of a group’s religious rituals and traditions and its identification with fellow religious believers across state borders should appeal to countries in which a majority of citizens share the ethno-religious group leaders’ faith, regardless of whether or not they share their ethnicity. Ethno-religious groups fighting an armed conflict with little to no likelihood of Western military intervention on their behalf will thus be forced to use these claims predominantly or exclusively in the absence of a strategic advantage for employing civic nationalism. On the other hand, ethno-religious groups fighting an armed conflict with a relatively greater chance of Western military intervention will be able to employ both civic and religious nationalism.

My theory thus generates the following hypotheses:

**H1:** After the Cold War, leaders of ethno-religious groups fighting armed conflicts will utilize both civic nationalist and religious nationalist claims in their rhetoric to foreign audiences if their likelihood of obtaining Western military support is not low or non-existent. These leaders will predominantly use civic nationalist claims in their rhetoric to...
Western countries and religious nationalist claims in their rhetoric to countries comprised of a majority of their co-religionists.

**H2:** Leaders of ethno-religious groups fighting armed conflicts where the likelihood of obtaining Western military support is low or non-existent will use religious nationalist claims exclusively in their rhetoric to foreign audiences.

### 5.3.1 Statistical Analysis of Bosnian Leaders’ Ideological Claims in Foreign Media

In this chapter’s analysis the principal independent variables are the foreign media sources in which Bosnian government leaders made their speech acts. *Western Media* is a dummy variable coded one if the speech act occurred in a media source from either the United States or a country in Europe that was neither one of the post-Yugoslav states nor a Muslim-majority country. *Islamic Media* is a dummy variable coded one if the speech act occurred in a media source from a Muslim-majority country. The dependent variables are coded using the same methods described in chapters three and four.

To provide an illustration of what the variation in Bosnian leaders’ wartime nationalist ideological claims looked like, I constructed the following table of the top ten words used in ideological claims in the media sources under analysis. Produced in *R*, this word frequency list is based on the text of all the ideological claims made by Bosnian leaders during the war, excluding a list of commonly used stop words. The word frequencies indicate a greater emphasis on the relationship between the Bosnian “state” and “Europe” along with the civic nationalist and liberal values of “freedom” and “democracy” in Western media sources. In contrast, Bosnian leaders were much more likely to emphasize the “Islamic” faith and “God” in ideological claims made in Islamic media sources.
Table 5.1: Word Frequency – Ideological Claims by Media Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Western Media Frequency</th>
<th>Islamic Media Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>State - 15</td>
<td>Islamic - 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Europe - 11</td>
<td>God - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ethnic - 10</td>
<td>Hope - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Serbs - 8</td>
<td>International - 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>World - 8</td>
<td>State - 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Freedom - 7</td>
<td>Support - 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Government - 7</td>
<td>World - 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sarajevo - 7</td>
<td>Europe - 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Serbia - 7</td>
<td>Arms - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Democracy - 6</td>
<td>Continue - 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I then proceeded to test the hypotheses via a pair of statistical models. Model 1 in Table 2 thus includes the results of my analysis of the likelihood that Bosnian leaders made civic nationalist claims. This model indicates that these leaders were, on average, much more likely to use civic nationalist claims in Western media sources. Moreover, this relationship is statistically significant at 99% confidence. However, since the coefficients from a non-linear model cannot be interpreted on their own, I used the model results to calculate the substantive impact that Western media sources had on the predicted probability that Bosnian leaders utilized civic nationalist ideological claims. The calculation indicates that shifting from a non-Western to a Western media source corresponded, on average, with a 22 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a civic nationalist ideological claim, thereby providing strong support for the first hypothesis.

Model 2 in Table 2 also demonstrates that Bosnian leaders were, on average, much more likely to use religious nationalist claims in media sources from Muslim-majority countries, a relationship which is statistically significant at 99% confidence. Substantively, shifting from a non-Islamic to an Islamic media source corresponded, on
average, with a 55 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a religious nationalist ideological claim. These results thus provide strong additional support for the first hypothesis. In tandem, these results also support the first hypothesis’s prediction that wartime leaders of an ethno-religious group which is at least somewhat likely to receive Western military intervention will use both civic and religious nationalist claims in their official rhetoric to foreign audiences. The following section supplements the results of these statistical analyses with qualitative illustrations of the Bosnian leadership’s use of distinct nationalist claims in foreign media.

**Table 5.2: Probability of Civic and Religious Nationalist Claims vs. Media Source**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Civic Nationalism</th>
<th>Model 2: Religious Nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Media</td>
<td>0.621**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Media</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.759***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>-1.449***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0754)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

5.3.2 Qualitative Examination of Bosnian Leaders’ Ideological Claims in Foreign Media

Quoted in the *New York Times* on July 9th, 1993, Bosnian President Izetbegović informed its readers that, “You may take this statement of mine as an appeal to the American Government [sic] and people, to help preserve the multiethnic and multireligious [sic] state that Bosnia and Herzegovina has always been. Any support,
particularly in military terms, would be welcome...I think my message can be much better understood by the United States, because it represents a multicultural and multiethnic state” (Burns 1993, A6). Illustrating my theoretical argument, Izetbegović appealed to both policy makers in the US (i.e. the “American government”) and the American “people” with a specific request for military intervention on his government’s behalf. By emphasizing Bosnia’s multiethnic and multi-religious historical foundation and drawing a parallel to the multiethnic and multicultural ideals of the United States, Izetbegović sought to demonstrate the similarity between his country’s civic ethos and the American national myth rooted in cultural diversity and individual rights.

Towards the beginning of the following year, Prime Minister Silajdžić promoted liberalism and humanitarianism on German television, proclaiming, “We think that whatever is lost in Bosnia also applies to the rest of the world. Much is at stake here, democracy, human rights, humanity, in short, civilization. We believe it is time to state: better late than never. This applies to those forces in Bosnia which are fighting for democracy and against aggressive nationalism, which stand for order and do not embody chaos and dictatorship” (N-TV Berlin 1994). Here, support for Bosnia is joined with the cause of democracy and individual human rights, two of the core tenets of Western liberalism.

Though Izetbegović and Silajdžić continued to appeal to Western countries on the basis of civic nationalism, their speech acts in media sources in Islamic countries emphasized the religious identity of the Bosnian Muslims. Thus, in September of 1992 Izetbegović told the Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran media channel that, “In these dark and troubled days, the hearts of the Muslim and captive people of Bosnia-
Hercegovina are warmed and their hopes are raised when they hear that they are not alone in this world of mayhem. Muslims, freemen and free women in the Islamic Republic of Iran support our righteous struggle in the defence of our identity, ethnicity and our Islamic religion and faith” (Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1992). Unlike the appeals to the US and France, this ideological claim urges continued Iranian support for the Bosnian cause by emphasizing the religious component of Bosnia’s culture and underscoring that Bosnia’s war is in part a defense of Islam.

Three months later, Izetbegović lamented to Saudi television viewers, “Why do the world and in particular its leaders fail today to see what is extremely clear? Is it because it is not Belgrade that is being besieged and exposed to annihilation, but Sarajevo? Is it also because it is not half of Serbia that is occupied but because it is Bosnia that is occupied? Is it because the group of one million refugees who have crossed Europe are Muslims and those who oppress them while they are running from the face of oppression are Christians? Why, instead of being provided with true protection in accordance with justice and international law, are they packing up and emigrating to other lands? Is this due to any ethical weakness in today’s civilisation? Or is it because the victims have been Muslims?” (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia TV 1992). Therefore, the Bosnian leadership’s rhetoric to Muslim audiences painted the war as a religious struggle between Christians and Muslims, rather than the struggle between “aggressive nationalism” and multiethnic democracy presented to Western audiences.

Overall, these analyses demonstrate that Bosnian leaders, knowing they could potentially obtain support from either or both Western and co-religionist countries but unsure of the certainty of this support, utilized both civic and religious nationalism on a
consistent basis. In doing so, these leaders tailored their ideological claims in ways that would resonate with specific foreign leaders and citizens. Furthermore, this analysis implies a counterfactual, whereby if the Bosnian leaders had been fighting in an armed conflict where their likelihood of receiving Western military support was low to non-existent, they would not have used civic nationalist claims in foreign media, owing to the impossibility of obtaining Western support.

5.4 Historical Analysis of Chechen Leaders’ Shift Towards Religious Nationalism

Along these lines, historical analysis of the first Chechen-Russian armed conflict provides additional evidence for the theory’s predictions. During and after the Chechen government’s declaration of independence from Russia in November of 1991, its top leader, Dzhokhar Dudayev, promoted secular nationalism fairly consistently. However, once Russia initiated armed conflict with Chechnya in December of 1994, the lack of Western support owing to Russia’s status as a non-Western great power arguably contributed to Chechen leaders’ extensive reliance on external support from co-religionist actors, which in turn shifted their political rhetoric in the direction of both religious nationalism and religious fundamentalism.

Thus, although Dudayev was sworn in on the Koran in 1991, he remained a secular nationalist in his personal views (Gammer 2005). To that end, his campaign platform that year barely mentioned Islam, while its section on “The Spiritual Sphere” focused on civic nationalist principles such as human rights, pluralism, and democracy (Lieven 1998). The constitution of the separatist Chechen government written in March of 1992 also stated that, “The Chechen Republic is a sovereign and independent
democratic law-based state, founded as a result of the self-determination of the Chechen people’” (quoted in Hughes 2007, 65).

The following year, Dudayev rejected both the Iranian and Turkish views of the relationship between Islam and politics. Instead he said that, “‘The place for Islam in Chechnya will depend on the political situation in the republic and on the external pressure which will be exerted. That means exclusively on external factors. With the increase of negative external factors Islam is bound to grow’” (quoted in Hughes 2007, 66). Overall, the historical record indicates that religion and religious nationalism did not play a major role in the rhetoric or identity of the separatist Chechen state at this time (Hughes 2007; Speckhard and Akhmedova 2006). However, this pattern changed once the first war with Russia began in December of 1994, with the external factors alluded to by Dudayev playing a major role.

At this point, Dudayev reinvigorated traditional Chechen Islamic institutions and even promoted the use of mosques for the purpose of organizing the armed Chechen defense (Hughes 2007). Religious political rhetoric, specifically religious nationalist rhetoric centering on political Islam, became much more common and began to serve as a primary tool and symbol for mobilizing the Chechen resistance to the Russian forces (Lieven 1998). One major explanation for Chechen leaders’ increasing use of religious nationalism lay in the fact that their most successful military leaders were committed to Islamist principles and that the military prowess of these soldiers inspired widespread popular emulation of their personal values (Hughes 2007). However, a significant catalyst for this rhetorical shift also lay in the Chechen leadership’s connections to
external co-religionist sources of recruits and funds, particularly radical Islamist sources (Hughes 2007).

Early in the war, the Chechen leadership had also become disillusioned with Western countries’ view that the war in Chechnya was an internal matter for the Russian government to resolve (Speckhard and Akhmedova 2006). In the words of one scholar, “Realizing that Western governments, by and large, would not be of much help in the independence process, separatist fighters began to rely on any financial and technological means they could, and were only too happy to begin receiving support from Arab fighters from Afghanistan and Wahhabi charities” (Swirszcz 2009, 76). Echoing this assessment, Julie Wilhelmsen argues that in their “isolated” position, Chechen leaders decided to use the resources offered by Islamic organizations and networks in the Middle East and parts of Asia (Wilhelmsen 2005, 40). By the end of the war, Chechen leaders had come to rely on Muslim-majority countries for much of the financing needed for the war effort, particularly Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar (Hughes 2007).

Further examination of the reasons for the link between external co-religionist support for the Chechen war effort and shifts in Chechen leader rhetoric reveals the important role played by the international status of Chechnya’s opponent in the war. In one scholar’s assessment, the first Chechen-Russian conflict bore great similarity to the contemporaneous war in Bosnia in terms of the scale of the war and the violation of international laws on the use of force. However, the US government at the time saw Russian President Yeltsin as an important ally in building a new post-Cold War international order (Hughes 2007).
More to the point, “Russia was a nuclear and strong military power, with a Security Council veto. It simply could not be forced to comply with Western demands over Chechnya, even if Western governments had been proactive” (Hughes 2007, 129). Unlike the humanitarian relief effort and eventual NATO military intervention in Bosnia, the United States and other Western countries deemed Chechnya to be an internal matter for Russia to resolve, did not issue any calls for international intervention, and did not promote the idea of an international tribunal for war crimes in Chechnya (Hughes 2007). And had they tried to do so, Russia would have vetoed the effort through the UN Security Council (Hughes 2007).

At the same time, multi-lateral European institutions such as the OSCE did not possess sufficient leverage or capability to hold the Russian government accountable for its military’s actions in Chechnya (Hughes 2007). In addition, it is interesting to note that many governments in the Middle East, particularly Iran, were also reluctant to criticize the Russian government and provide military aid to the Chechens, instead upholding respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Russia (Malek 2008). Therefore, Chechen leaders faced both a non-existent chance of Western military intervention on their behalf as well as uncertain support from some co-religionist state leaders.

Nonetheless, their use of religious nationalist rhetoric still served as the most effective potential instrument for attracting the support of co-religionist state and non-state actors. In these circumstances, it would not have made strategic sense for Chechen leaders to continue using the secular civic nationalist values and principles promoted in their pre-war rhetoric, given that this form of nationalism aligned most closely with Western countries’ nationalist ideologies. With no hope for meaningful external support
from the West owing to Russia’s status and prerogatives as a great power in post-Cold War international politics and international institutions, Chechen leaders had to rely mostly on external support from co-religionist actors. The outcome was a shift toward religious nationalism. Therefore, the evidence from this case study provides strong support for the second hypothesis.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that a comprehensive explanation of ethno-religious group leaders’ adoption of specific types of nationalist rhetoric must go beyond the domestic sphere to incorporate the role of armed conflict and post-Cold War international relations. The chapter supports this finding through several important results. First, the structure of the international system helps shape the ideological claims of leaders of warring ethno-religious groups. In the midst of tremendous suffering, the Bosnian Muslim leaders of the Bosnian government held one relative advantage, namely that their country had a reasonable likelihood of receiving Western military intervention.

As a result, its leaders could appeal to Western powers for relief and military intervention, ultimately obtaining both. In contrast, Chechen leaders shifted away from civic nationalist rhetoric once war with Russia began. Western unwillingness to provide military support for a secessionist group fighting a post-Cold War great power significantly affected this rhetorical shift, as Chechen leaders turned increasingly to co-religionist external actors for support, and, consequently, to religious ideals and values.

Second, leaders of ethno-religious groups fighting armed conflicts will take the initiative as agents to actively pursue external state principals who can offer them support in the conflict. To do so, they will employ nationalist ideological claims that resonate
with the official nationalist ideologies and myths of specific foreign countries. By using these claims, these leaders are essentially marketing their cause to foreign political elites and attempting to persuade them that coming to the polity’s aid is both in their national security interests and a means of further spreading their values and principles across the international system. In addition, these leaders also use these types of claims to increase foreign citizens’ empathy for their plight, expecting that domestic public pressure on foreign elites may galvanize them to act if the elite-directed marketing strategy proves insufficient on its own.

In return, potential external supporter states receive an opportunity to extend their influence and power on the world stage by spreading their official state ideologies abroad and incurring good will and gratitude in exchange for their material support. For leading Western countries, civic nationalist claims indicate that an ethno-religious group may facilitate the spread of liberalism, particularly the principles of democracy and human rights. For co-religionist countries, religious nationalist claims indicate that they may be able to spread their society's religious precepts and thus lay the foundation for greater material influence in the future.

In terms of the implications of the results, it is important to emphasize that this chapter's analyses are limited to ethno-religious groups in armed conflict. Within that scope, however, the results suggest several concrete conclusions for other hypothetical conflicts. First, similar to the Chechen case, an ethno-religious group which pursues armed rebellion against the Chinese government is likely to resort to religious nationalist rhetoric in appealing for help from foreign audiences, given that the likelihood of Western military intervention will be very low to nonexistent.
Conversely, ethno-religious groups who go to war with opponents that are not non-Western great powers will initially enjoy a higher likelihood of Western military intervention. Thus, for example, a wartime Sunni organization in the Middle East will theoretically enter conflict with the ability to use either or both civic and religious nationalism to obtain external support. However, its likelihood of Western support may depend on its ensuing behavior. If, unlike the Bosnian Muslims, this group is a principal perpetrator of atrocities, mass killing, and/or brutal acts of violence against civilians, then Western intervention on its behalf will be very unlikely, such that it will not make sense for this group to issue civic nationalist appeals.

If, on the other hand, this group is a principal victim of violence (similar to the Bosnian Muslims), then its chances of Western support will be better, although still potentially limited by Western leaders' decision as to whether or not their national security interests are enhanced by active involvement in the conflict. Such a group would be much more likely to make civic nationalist appeals in foreign media, but it may hedge its bets by using religious nationalist claims as well. It is also likely to increase its reliance on the latter if Western military intervention on its behalf appears to become less likely over the course of the conflict.

Although this chapter thus constitutes an initial demonstration of how the combination of international politics and the need for support during armed conflict can shape and alter official ideological claims for specific types of ethnic groups, future work can expand on several facets of this chapter. For example, additional research may illuminate whether and how domestic state and rebel leaders’ ideological claims in foreign media impact and/or shape each other through a dyadic process. Future research
should also examine a variable which remained unexplored in this chapter: the size and role of ethnic diasporas. Regardless of where they are fighting, leaders of warring ethno-religious groups with large diasporas have another potential avenue of external support besides Western powers or co-religionist actors. In that case, depending on which nationalist ideology predominates among the diaspora, these leaders’ ideological appeals to foreign audiences may use ethnic nationalism instead of either civic or religious nationalism. However, since the Bosnian Muslims and Chechens both lacked large diasporas during their respective conflicts, ethnic nationalism was not a useful option for either group’s leaders in their wartime rhetoric to foreign audiences.

Finally, this chapter's findings suggest that conflict mediators seeking to prevent the spread of religious nationalism have room to maneuver in conflicts where an ethno-religious group is not fighting a non-Western great power. In cases similar to the Bosnian Muslims, these mediators must make sure that wartime ethno-religious group leaders do not have to turn to or rely on co-religionist sources of support in the first place. Instead, they must galvanize Western countries to provide extensive, immediate, and unhesitating support.
6. Identity Shifts in the Bosnian War: IDPs, Religiosity, and Post-War Politics

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I shift the focus of my analysis from ethno-religious elite ideology to ethno-religious mass identity. Specifically, I examine the effect of armed conflict on ethno-religious group members’ religiosity, along with the post-war political impact of any conflict-induced shift in religious identity. In doing so, I explore how war may push ordinary citizens away from both secular civic and ethnic nationalist conceptions of their identities toward religious nationalist ones by making religious identity more useful in coping with traumatic experiences induced by intense wartime violence.

In exploring the link between violence-induced displacement and ethno-religious identity, this chapter connects to chapter three, showing that wartime violence indirectly impacts ethno-religious group members’ identities in addition to directly affecting ethno-religious elites’ use of ideological rhetoric. The chapter’s analysis of a grassroots shift toward greater religiosity during wartime also suggests that ethno-religious elites may benefit from using rhetoric that aligns with their population’s changing sentiments. This incentive may help to explain these elites’ ability to use both ethnic and religious nationalist claims in different media sources and at different stages of armed conflict. In addition, this chapter connects to chapter two by illuminating the wartime tension and competition between religious versus civic and ethnic views of Bosnian Muslim identity.

The chapter builds on previous research that suggests that armed conflicts centered on an ethnic or religious cleavage are likely to prime the ethnic or religious identities of members of the warring groups. If such a war is followed by a democratic
regime, citizens should thus be primed to vote for political parties making appeals on the basis of ethnicity or religion. Not all citizens behave this way, however. In this chapter, I ask why this is the case. More specifically, following an ethno-religious armed conflict, why do some members of ethno-religious groups vote for political parties that use religious appeals while other members do not? Previous findings in the literature concerning armed conflict’s impact on post-war electoral politics do not address this question directly, focusing instead on how experiencing wartime violence heightens post-war political participation or how wartime victimization at the hands of specific actors shapes post-war political attitudes (Blattman 2009; Balcells 2012).

Here, I present a new relationship between wartime experiences and post-war political outcomes. I argue that ethno-religious group members who become internally displaced during armed conflict are more likely to vote for religiously oriented political parties after the conflict ends. The reasoning behind the argument is as follows. Individuals who become internally displaced during armed conflict are more likely to have had lower incomes and lived in rural areas before the war compared to those who do not become internally displaced. Given that people from lower socio-economic backgrounds and rural areas tend to be more religious than relatively wealthier individuals living in cities, the population of internally displaced persons during conflict is likely to have been more religious prior to the start of war than other members of the ethno-religious group.

Since internal displacement is a traumatic experience, internally displaced persons (IDPs) will thus be able to use their religiosity as a coping mechanism with which to deal with this trauma. In doing so, they will attach even more value to their religion, such that
their religiosity becomes even stronger during and after the war. Consequently, they will demonstrate greater affinity with and preferences for political parties whose platforms and leaders promote policies rooted in ethno-religious customs and religious beliefs, along with the group’s ethno-religious traditions and religious rhetoric in general.

In order to hold constant as many variables as possible while also selecting a difficult case for analysis, I focus on the Bosnian Muslims as my ethno-religious group of interest. Using data from an extensive survey carried out by the Norwegian Research Council in 2003-2004, I show that Bosnian Muslim respondents who were internally displaced during the 1990s Bosnian war were more likely to vote for the ethno-religious nationalist Party of Democratic Action (SDA) representing the Bosnian Muslims several years after the conflict. I also provide evidence for the mechanisms within the argument by demonstrating that internally displaced Bosnian Muslim respondents attended religious services more frequently before the war and were more likely to report becoming more religious after the war compared to non-displaced Bosnian Muslim respondents. In doing so, I employ a matching analysis to verify the latter mechanism.

I also test several alternative explanations for SDA vote choice, showing that the experience of different types of wartime violence, mistrust of other ethnic groups, lower socio-economic status, and pre-war rural residence are not significantly related to voting for the SDA after accounting for wartime IDP status. As a robustness check, I use an original set of municipal level data from Bosnia to provide an additional test of the relationship between displacement and post-war political behavior. I find that municipalities containing a much higher proportion of Bosnian Muslim IDPs after the war relative to the 1991 municipal population tended to give much greater electoral
support to the SDA in the 2004 municipal elections compared to the last pre-war election in 1990.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section two elaborates the theoretical argument. The third section describes the research design. The fourth section presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes.

6.2 Theory: Internal Displacement, Religiosity, and Post-War Political Outcomes

The scope conditions and key concepts for my theory are as follows. Contextually, a war has started in one country between two distinct ethnic groups, one of which is an ethno-religious group. At the start of the war, this ethno-religious group’s identity is predominantly secular, with relatively few members who are highly religious.

Reviewing the definition outlined in the first chapter, by “ethno-religious” groups I refer to groups whose ethnic and religious identity markers overlap, such that individual group members can choose to prioritize either the ethnic or religious component of their group’s identity (Ruane and Todd 2010). Prioritizing the ethnic component of the identity signifies that individual members identify with the group’s customs and traditions in a secular fashion. This may include observance of holidays and rituals derived from religious sources but separated from any faith in the supernatural aspects of religion and/or regular attendance at religious services. On the other hand, prioritizing the religious component of group identity signifies that individual members believe in supernatural aspects of the group’s religion, adhere to scriptural tenets and guidelines, and attend religious services regularly.

Thus, these are the set of beliefs and practices that I refer to collectively as “religious identity” in this chapter. Similarly, when I refer to “religiosity”, I build on
prior work in referring to attitudes and actions that principally include attendance at
religious services, performance of religious rituals (prayer in particular), and spiritual
beliefs and faith (Ringdal and Ringdal 2010). For internally displaced persons, I
incorporate the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
definition of IDPs, using the term to refer to people who are forced to flee their homes
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (UN OCHA 2004).
However, I limit my use of the concept to individuals displaced by armed conflict.

Despite the many public policy challenges posed by a large global population of
IDPs, political science research has thus far not devoted much attention to this issue. The
few studies that have examined the political role and impact of IDPs have produced
mixed results concerning their political agency. Thus, individuals displaced by election
violence in Kenya were more likely to reject the use of violence as an acceptable form of
political expression (Linke 2013) while displaced persons in Aceh, Indonesia were more
likely to vote in post-conflict elections than non-displaced persons (Shewfelt 2008). On
the other hand, while IDPs in Georgia successfully mobilized for collective action in both
formal and informal organizations, their success was largely predicated on assistance
from international actors in Georgia who advocated on their behalf (Røkke 2012).

In terms of the relationship between IDPs and religious identity, prior theoretical
and empirical work suggests that internal displacement is more likely to occur in
countries and regions with fewer economic opportunities and that, all else equal, people
with lower incomes are more likely to be displaced (Adhikari 2013). In turn, research on
the sociology of religion indicates that poorer individuals tend to be more religious
(Norris and Inglehart 2011). Taken together, these findings would suggest that IDPs are
more likely to be religious than non-IDPs prior to the start of armed conflict. This non-IDP group would include refugees, because even though both refugees and IDPs constitute displaced populations, leaving the country as a refugee is arguably a more dangerous, costlier, and more resource-intensive task than becoming an IDP or remaining in place during conflict (Mundt and Ferris 2008). This would suggest that refugees are more likely to have relatively higher incomes and/or greater economic resources than IDPs.

However, individuals who are internally displaced during war may also be more likely to suffer trauma. Mental health research, for example, indicates that conflict-induced IDPs have much higher rates of post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression than the general population (Thapa and Hauff 2005). This is not surprising, given that internal displacement produces significant physical and psychological loss and grief, along with a heightened risk of experiencing violence directly. If this is the case, then wartime IDPs, arguably likely to be relatively more religious than other group members prior to displacement, may become even more religious owing to the trauma tied to the experience of displacement.

The reason for this is that in a context of profound loss, as is the case during internal displacement, individuals may turn to structured mental schemas that promise to alleviate trauma. A prime candidate for this kind of schema would be a readily available religious tradition, which can offer therapy by explaining the meaning and purpose behind seemingly purposeless events while also giving individuals a renewed sense of control over their lives. In addition, continued observance of religious rituals can
substitute for lost routine and structure in other areas of life and provide a social bond to withstand the trauma of displacement.

Many studies point to the benefits that religion and religiosity may have in easing trauma. For example, some studies of Holocaust survivors have shown them to be more religious (Carmil and Breznitz 1991). Furthermore, studies in the US have revealed a correlation between a state’s religiosity and its position on an ‘index of misery’ (Gray and Wegner 2010), as well as much stronger short-term religious identity among college students in the aftermath of September 11th (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). Victims of political violence in the Peruvian highlands were also more likely to convert to evangelical Protestantism during and after the conflict there (Gamarra 2000).

Taking a longer view, Rodney Stark has argued that Christianity spread so quickly and widely in the ancient world partly because of its effectiveness at providing meaning, coherence, and purpose in the wake of vast crises and tragedy (Stark 1996). Lab experiments have also demonstrated that being more aware of death, seeing the world as random and uncertain, and perceiving a loss of control all heighten belief in God (Norenzayan and Gervais 2013). Moreover, once a religious identity is strengthened, it may lead people to go to great efforts to defend it, particularly if this identity is tied to one’s ego and protection from trauma (Hogg 2010).

In this vein, though some studies suggest that trauma may have a negative impact on religious beliefs, most research indicates that well-developed religious beliefs are resilient to trauma and become even stronger in the wake of traumatic events (e.g. Overcash et al. 1996). Furthermore, individuals who use their religiosity to cope with trauma by strengthening their spiritual beliefs are able to sustain a positive outlook on the
world (i.e. seeing it as benevolent and meaningful), which helps shield them from the psychological impact of trauma (Zukerman and Korn 2014). People with strong intrinsic religious beliefs are also more likely to maintain positive emotions and a sense of control over their lives in the face of a heightened threat of terrorism (Fischer et al. 2006). In addition, whereas individuals who experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from a single or isolated traumatic event will tend to develop weaker religious beliefs, those experiencing multiple instances of traumatic victimization independent of PTSD are likely to strengthen their intrinsic religious beliefs (Falsetti, Resick, and Davis 2003).

In line with these findings, since individuals likely to become IDPs during armed conflict are also likely to have a relatively stronger foundation of religious beliefs and practices, these beliefs and practices may grow even stronger as they experience the trauma associated with wartime displacement. Using religion as a coping mechanism may also protect them from some of the psychological symptoms of trauma or ameliorate their severity, though the intensity and duration of the trauma of displacement arguably makes it unlikely that they will be able to avoid many of these symptoms entirely. The research finding regarding multiple instances of victimization is particularly apt in this respect, as conflict-induced IDPs are more likely to experience trauma this way than as an isolated occurrence, thus increasing the chances that their religiosity will intensify. Therefore, in relying on their faith to withstand the trauma of displacement, I posit that IDPs will come to identify with it even more fervently as they practice it and reaffirm their beliefs, thus becoming even more religious than they were prior to the conflict.

Subsequently, since political science research has demonstrated that attitudes and preference shifts borne of war can have long-lasting effects on political participation and
attitudes, any strengthened religious identity among ethno-religious group members may also have significant repercussions for post-war politics, particularly if the post-war regime is a democracy. In this case, those individuals who became more religious as a result of armed conflict may be more likely to identify with and support political leaders and parties whose policies and platforms match their religious values. Accordingly, political leaders will have an incentive to signal their ethno-religious bona-fides to these potential voters through their public rhetoric, personal behavior, and/or campaign promises.

Furthermore, there may be a strong link between these individuals’ beliefs and attitudes and the act of voting for religiously oriented political parties and leaders. This link starts from the assumption that individuals who have become more religious are more likely to take an active role in religious institutions. These institutions, in turn, are likely to possess the well-developed social capital (i.e. networks, activists, leaders, monetary resources, infrastructure) needed to register individual members to vote, take them to or host political campaign events, and help them turn out to vote. Assuming that most of the leaders of these religious institutions also support more religiously oriented political parties and politicians, individual members of these organizations will not only turn out to vote in relatively greater numbers than individuals who do not belong to the organizations, but will also vote for these types of political parties.

The subsequent hypothesis is:

*Members of ethno-religious groups who were internally displaced as a result of armed conflict are more likely to vote for religiously oriented political parties following conflict than those who were not internally displaced.*
Alternative explanations for post-war vote choice stem from the experience of wartime violence, mistrust of other ethnic groups, lower socio-economic status, and pre-war voting patterns. In terms of violence, individuals who are victimized by intense violence during war experience a context where there does not appear to be a clear order or structure to victimization, leaving them helpless in trying to learn how to avoid violence. Thus, this context is also likely to produce trauma directly, potentially spurring those experiencing this kind of violence to strengthen their religiosity. Ultimately, this process may also lead them to support religiously oriented political parties following the conflict. The first rival hypothesis is thus:

*R1: Members of ethno-religious groups who experience high levels of intense violence during armed conflict are more likely to vote for religiously oriented political parties following conflict than those who do not experience this type of violence.*

On the other hand, following an ethnic conflict, it is possible that individual members of an ethno-religious group may have very low levels of trust regarding other ethnic groups in the polity. This may be especially true for IDPs, given that their displacement likely resulted from the actions of members of other ethnic groups. In the presence of lingering feelings of fear and mistrust of other ethnic groups, individual ethno-religious group members may find solace and a sense of protection by supporting politicians who represent their ethno-religious group exclusively. They may also find rhetoric and policies promoting ethno-religious nationalism to be comforting and reassuring signals that these politicians will follow through on promises of benefits and protection from future depredation and attacks by other ethnic groups. The second rival hypothesis is thus:
**R2:** *Members of ethno-religious groups who greatly mistrust other ethnic groups in the polity are more likely to vote for religiously oriented political parties following conflict than those who do not greatly mistrust other ethnic groups.*

Conversely, since IDPs tend to have fewer economic resources after armed conflict, it could be that they support political parties which promote policies that benefit individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Since lower socioeconomic status and greater religiosity are correlated, religiously oriented political parties may promote policies that benefit lower status voters not because these individuals are religious but because they are poor. In this case, IDPs’ voting preference for this type of party may not be related to heightened religiosity per se, but to class status and material needs. Thus:

**R3:** *Members of ethno-religious groups from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to vote for religiously oriented political parties following conflict than those from wealthier socioeconomic backgrounds.*

Finally, individuals who become internally displaced during armed conflict may have been more likely to vote for a religiously oriented political party before conflict, such that any tendency to vote for such a party after conflict is a reflection of pre-war attitudes and behavior instead of greater religiosity. This pattern may be particularly applicable to individuals who grow up in rural areas, as they tend to be more religious and give more support to politicians who espouse conservative and traditional ethnic and religious values. They are also more likely to be displaced during conflict. The alternative hypothesis is:
**R4:** Members of ethno-religious groups who grew up in rural areas are more likely to vote for religiously oriented political parties following conflict than those who did not grow up in rural areas.

### 6.3 Research Design: Coding Survey Data from Post-War Bosnia

To test my hypothesis, I analyzed individual-level survey data from Bosnian Muslim respondents following the Bosnian conflict. Since the Bosnian Muslims were highly secular before the war, they provide a difficult case for testing my hypothesis. If my analysis reveals that internally displaced members of the group were more likely to vote for the SDA after the war, and that this occurred because the trauma of displacement strengthened these individuals’ religiosity, then ethno-religious groups that do not enter armed conflict with as many secular members should be even more susceptible to voting for religiously oriented parties following conflict.

The survey data I analyze in this chapter come from the 2003-2004 South East European Social Survey Project, which was funded by the Research Council of Norway (Simkus 2013). Carried out in six different Balkan countries, the survey contained 21,916 respondents in total, including 6,809 from Bosnia, of which 2,559 were Bosnian Muslim. Accordingly, I only analyzed the Bosnian Muslim respondents for purposes of this chapter. The survey asked respondents to answer a wide range of questions, including items relating to voting behavior, religious practices and religiosity, and wartime experiences and displacement status. One item in particular asked respondents which political party they voted for in the last election prior to the survey. I recoded this item as a dummy variable, so that my main dependent variable, *SDA Vote*, takes the value of 1 if the respondent voted for the SDA in the 2002 elections.
As discussed in chapter four, in its outlook and many of its wartime policies, the SDA tried to appeal to all Bosnian Muslims for support by using a mixture of civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism. However, it also promoted a more religious identity for the group at a grassroots level, orienting many of its appeals on this level. In turn, many of its attempts to influence and gain allegiance from all Bosnian Muslims did not result in universal support from members of this group during the war (Maček 2009). In addition, not all Bosnian Muslims voted for it after the war ended, meaning that ethnic ties alone are insufficient to explain variation in the party’s performance in post-war elections.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the SDA also attempted to build support from the Bosnian Muslim IDP population, which included promises of significant improvements in their circumstances. They did not deliver on these promises, however, to the point that IDPs came to realize they were lying (Halilovich 2013). Since the survey data used in this chapter ask which party respondents voted for in the 2002 elections, evidence of continued strong electoral support for the SDA among Bosnian Muslim IDPs seven years after the war would suggest other sources of affinity besides empty promises of material gains.

The primary independent variable, Wartime IDP, takes the value of 1 if the respondent reported being internally displaced during the war and 0 otherwise. Another survey item asked, “Have you changed how religious you are since 1990? Would you say you have become…”, with the response options listed as “Much more religious”, “More religious”, “Stayed the same, not more religious, not less religious”, “Less religious”, and “Much less religious.” Recoding this response, the variable More Religious takes the value of 1 if respondents reported that they were either more religious
or much more religious compared to before the war and 0 otherwise. The variable *Daily Attend 1990* serves as a dichotomous proxy for respondents’ pre-war religiosity, taking the value of 1 if the respondent attended religious services either “once a day, every day” or “several times a day” in 1990.

Other items asked respondents whether they personally saw or witnessed shooting, artillery fire, and airstrikes directed at them, their family, or their community during the war. I coded these three variables, *Violence1*, *Violence2*, and *Violence3*, as dichotomous indicators taking the value of 1 if the respondents answered yes and 0 if they said no. I used just these variables as indicators of violence because I wanted to focus on highly intense experiences of wartime violence. Another question asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that “Among nations [ethnic groups] it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust.” *Ethnic Mistrust* is thus a dichotomous indicator taking the value of 1 if respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement.

I also coded several control variables. These variables included *Gender*, taking the value of 2 if respondents were female and 1 if they were male. In the context of the Bosnian conflict, women were more likely to experience internal displacement owing to their higher wartime survival rates compared to men. I also included *Age*, with the variable coded according to each respondent’s age in years, since older people may also suffer more displacement during war. To test the potential role of socioeconomic status outlined in R3, I included *Education*, coded in ascending order of the highest degree the respondent obtained, and *Income*, reflecting the respondent’s total net income per month. In the case of the Bosnian Muslims, individuals with less education were more likely to
have voted for the SDA before the conflict (Bougarel and Rashid 1997). Moreover, per R3, voters with less income, which includes many IDPs, may vote for the SDA on class lines.

To test R4, I included the variable *Rural Upbringing*, taking the value of 1 if respondents lived in a rural area when they were fourteen and 0 otherwise. This measure thus accounts for rural residents’ greater likelihood of being internally displaced during war, and, in this case, rural Bosnian Muslim residents’ greater tendency to vote for the SDA before the war. According to R4, respondents with this background may become displaced but simply maintain their pre-war voting patterns. In order to create this variable, I restricted the sample to those older than twenty-five, since respondents who were fourteen in the last year before the war (1991) would have been born, at the latest, in 1977. Since administration of the survey started in 2003, these respondents would have been at least twenty-six when the survey was conducted.

### 6.4.1 Analysis: SDA Vote Choice

To test my hypothesis against the rival explanations outlined above, I used several multivariate probit regressions. Looking at hypothesis R1, Model 1 of Table 6.1 shows that none of the forms of experiencing violent attack are significantly related to voting for the SDA. On the other hand, education and age are negatively related to voting for the SDA at the 99% level of statistical significance. The result for education conforms to pre-war voting patterns and thereby provides some support for R3, with more educated respondents less likely to vote for the SDA. However, the income variable does not demonstrate a statistically significant relationship with voting for the SDA, which undermines R3. In terms of age, it is likely that older respondents, having grown up...
under an officially atheist socialist regime, were not as willing to support a political party oriented toward religious and ethnic nationalism. In contrast, rural upbringing demonstrates a positive and statistically significant relationship with voting for the SDA, thus bolstering R4.

Incorporating the ethnic mistrust variable, Model 2 of Table 6.1 indicates that all three forms of experiencing violent attack remain statistically insignificant. Interestingly, Bosnian Muslim respondents who do not believe full trust can be established with members of other ethnic groups were more likely to vote for the SDA, a result that is statistically significant at 95% confidence. This result lends support to hypothesis R2, whereby ethno-religious group members are likely to turn to ethno-religious nationalist parties following ethnic conflict simply because they believe these parties are more trustworthy and more likely to protect them. Age and education retain the same relationship to voting for the SDA as in Model 1, but rural upbringing is no longer significant in the presence of ethnic mistrust, suggesting that attitude shifts generated by war, captured in R2, are more powerful predictors of post-war voting than pre-war residence and voting patterns.

However, once wartime IDP status is introduced in Model 3 of Table 6.1, the ethnic mistrust variable is no longer statistically significant. In turn, having been internally displaced during the war is positively related to voting for the SDA following the conflict, demonstrating statistical significance at 99% confidence. Having witnessed shooting is now also a statistically significant positive correlate of post-war SDA vote choice. This suggests that intense wartime violence may play an indirect role in enhancing religiosity, as it is linked to (and may be the cause of) internal displacement.
and the ensuing trauma resulting from displacement. Thus, whereas wartime violence may have a direct impact in shaping ethno-religious leaders’ use of ideological rhetoric, per chapter three, it may also have an indirect role in altering ethno-religious group members’ religious identity via internal displacement and trauma.

On the other hand, since this violence variable was not significant prior to the introduction of the IDP status variable, Model 3 indicates that it is the general set of traumatic experiences stemming from being an IDP which still connects most strongly with voting for religious nationalist politicians following armed conflict. These traumatic experiences may include violence, but they could also potentially extend to a broader array of traumatizing events associated with displacement from respondents’ pre-war residence. Furthermore, education, income, and rural upbringing are now statistically insignificant in the presence of wartime IDP status.

Overall, the models in Table 6.1 lend greater support to my hypothesis compared to the rival hypotheses. Having experienced wartime internal displacement is a more powerful predictor that a Bosnian Muslim respondent voted for the SDA seven years after the war than having experienced violence alone, lacking trust in other ethnic groups, having lower socioeconomic status, or growing up in an area in which most people voted for the SDA before the war.
Table 6.1: SDA Vote Choice - Bosnian Muslims in the 2002 Bosnian Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence1</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>1.184*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>(0.571)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence2</td>
<td>-0.199</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>-0.763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(0.440)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence3</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.0560</td>
<td>0.00414</td>
<td>0.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.00920*</td>
<td>-0.00985*</td>
<td>-0.0216**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00416)</td>
<td>(0.00422)</td>
<td>(0.00693)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.127*</td>
<td>-0.129*</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0504)</td>
<td>(0.0510)</td>
<td>(0.0814)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.0265</td>
<td>-0.0288</td>
<td>-0.0227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0242)</td>
<td>(0.0247)</td>
<td>(0.0480)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Upbringing</td>
<td>0.259*</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Mistrust</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.268*</td>
<td>0.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime IDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.565*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>-0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.483)</td>
<td>(0.494)</td>
<td>(0.874)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Substantively, since the coefficients from a non-linear model cannot be interpreted on their own, I used the results from Model 3 of Table 6.1 to calculate the tangible impact that having been a wartime IDP had on the predicted probability that a
Bosnian Muslim respondent voted for the SDA after the war, holding the control variables at their observed values (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013). I computed both a single calculation of the predicted probability, as well as one thousand simulations of the calculation, which provided the mean effect and 95% confidence interval for the predicted probability. The results indicate that experiencing internal displacement during the war corresponded, on average, with a nearly twenty percentage point increase in the likelihood of voting for the SDA seven years after the war. This mean effect is also statistically significant at 95% confidence. This outcome bolsters support for my hypothesis and indicates that wartime IDP status can have a major impact on post-war voting behavior.

In terms of the mechanisms linking the relationship between IDP status and SDA vote choice, a comparison of means test indicates that respondents who were internally displaced during the war were more likely to have attended religious services at least once a day before the war. This result is significant at 99% confidence, thereby confirming the premise that Bosnian Muslim IDPs had a more well-developed and stronger set of religious beliefs and practices to fall back on in the face of trauma than other members of the group. In turn, another comparison of means test indicates that Bosnian Muslim IDPs had also become more religious or much more religious than before the war.

Statistically significant at 90% confidence, this result suggests that the traumatic experience of wartime displacement led Bosnian Muslim IDPs to become even more religious than they were prior to the war, arguably as a result of the process of utilizing their religiosity to withstand their traumatic experience. Conversely, a comparison of
means tests shows no statistically significant relationship between wartime IDP status and greater mistrust of other ethnic groups in Bosnia. In combination, these results provide strong support for my argument, whereby heightened religiosity resulting from the trauma of wartime internal displacement spurs IDPs to vote for religiously oriented parties and politicians in post-war elections.

6.4.2 Matching: Greater Religiosity and IDP Status

In order to verify that the religiosity of Bosnian Muslim IDPs had increased compared to before the war, I also analyzed this relationship with a matched sample of Bosnian Muslim respondents. I used this technique in an attempt to account for the fact that IDPs likely differ from non-IDPs on other key variables related to both displacement and religiosity, i.e. that internal displacement as a result of armed conflict is not randomly assigned. Following suggested practice, the matched sample thus contained individuals who were highly similar on a set of key covariates, with the key difference being that some were internally displaced during the war while others were not (Ho et al. 2007). In this way, I created a subset of respondents who differed only in that some received the “treatment” of internal displacement. Using propensity score matching, I then analyzed whether those who received the displacement treatment were more likely to have become more religious since the start of the war.

To generate the matched sample, I used the gender, age, education, and rural upbringing variables as my key covariates. Table 6.2 shows the results of the analysis with this sample.
Table 6.2: Matched Sample – Greater Religiosity vs. IDP Status, Bosnian Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Matched Sample</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not a Wartime IDP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.173***</td>
<td>(0.0370)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wartime IDP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.306***</td>
<td>(0.0263)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Untreated</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0149</td>
<td>(0.0117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.388**</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Childhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0995</td>
<td>(0.374)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.892**</td>
<td>(1.268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treated</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0323</td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00522</td>
<td>(0.00604)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00444</td>
<td>(0.0598)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Childhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0895</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.302</td>
<td>(0.601)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>405</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01; one-tailed hypothesis tests.
Matching on these covariates, respondents who were internally displaced during the war were much more likely to have become more religious than those who had not been internally displaced. Moreover, this result is statistically significant at 99% confidence. The matching analysis thereby confirms the religiosity mechanism linking wartime IDP status with post-war voting support for the SDA.

6.4.3 Robustness Check: Bosnian Municipal Data

As an additional means of validating my hypothesis, I collected and assembled an original dataset of municipal-level variables in Bosnia. Prior to the war, the data include each municipality’s total population, municipal income, the number of rural residents in the municipality, and the number of municipal council seats the SDA won in the 1990 election. I also added data regarding the number of people killed in each municipality in each year of the war. Post-war, the data include the number of IDPs registered in each municipality as of 2005, categorized by ethnicity, as well as the number of votes cast for the SDA in the 2004 municipal elections.

The dependent variable in the municipal-level analysis is *SDA Support Increase*, coded as the difference between the proportion of the vote won by the SDA in each municipality in the 2004 local elections versus the proportion of municipal council seats it won in the 1990 election. Although the proportion of municipal council seats won in 1990 is not an ideal measure for comparison, it represents the best measure given the limitations of available data. An additional caveat is that post-war elections included votes from both inside and outside the municipality owing to the peace agreement’s stipulation that displaced residents and refugees could cast their votes in their pre-war municipality. I coded the proportion of votes cast for the SDA from both inside and outside the municipality, as well as the proportion of total votes. However, I used only the latter measure in constructing my dependent variable.

The principal independent variable in this analysis is *2005 Bosnian Muslim IDPs*, coded as the proportion of Bosnian Muslim IDPs registered as living in a municipality in 2005 relative to the total 1991 municipal population. This variable is thus meant to capture the relative influx of internally displaced Bosnian Muslims living in a municipality after the war. Control variables include *1991 Per Capita Income* and *1991 Percent Rural Population*, both measured at the municipal level. These variables were the best proxies available to measure municipal income and rural residence at the time of the survey because Bosnia did not publish any official census results between 1991 and 2016. My other control variable is *Percent Total War Victims*, which measures the percentage of a municipality’s population killed during the war relative to its 1991 population. All three of these variables may have been related to the proportion of IDPs
originating from a given municipality during the war, as well as the degree of municipal electoral support for the SDA in the 1990 elections.

As an additional note concerning this dataset, the post-war political settlement also created new municipalities in Bosnia. Where applicable, I matched data on IDPs and election results to the appropriate pre-war municipality. Thus, as confirmation of this chapter’s main hypothesis, we should observe that municipalities with a higher proportion of Bosnian Muslim IDPs after the war gave more support to the SDA in the 2004 election than prior to the war.

Table 6.3 presents regression results testing the hypothesis at the municipal level. This model demonstrates that, holding all else constant, a statistically significant relationship exists between relatively greater post-war municipal electoral support for the SDA nearly a decade after the war and the proportion of Bosnian Muslim IDPs residing in the municipality relative to its pre-war population. Interestingly, municipalities with higher proportions of wartime casualties were significantly less likely to vote for the SDA in post-war local elections. This result suggests that, on a municipal level, the experience of wartime ethnic violence may exhaust a community’s tolerance for ethnic or religious nationalist political parties after conflict. Wealthier municipalities also provided greater support for the SDA, which may indicate that IDPs tended to settle in localities with more material resources.

Substantively, the relationship between the influx of Bosnian Muslim IDPs and the increase in electoral support for the SDA at the municipal level is also significant. Holding the other variables at their observed values, municipalities with no Bosnian Muslim IDPs experienced a five percent net loss in voting support for the SDA in 2004
relative to 1990, while municipalities experiencing an influx of IDPs equal to five percent of their pre-war population experienced a five percent net gain in support. This outcome demonstrates that the individual-level relationship between the experience of conflict-induced internal displacement and post-war political support for religious nationalist politicians may have an impact on a collective level.

**Table 6.3: Municipal SDA Support vs. Influx of Bosnian Muslim IDPs, 1990-2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SDA Support</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian Muslim IDPs, 2005</td>
<td>1.052*</td>
<td>(0.491)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income, 1991</td>
<td>0.166*</td>
<td>(0.0706)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural population, 1991</td>
<td>-0.0720</td>
<td>(0.0712)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Victims</td>
<td>-1.269*</td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.434*</td>
<td>(0.613)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; one-tailed hypothesis tests.

**6.5 Conclusion**

In sum, the findings presented in this chapter indicate that traumatic wartime experiences can shape the voting behavior of individual ethno-religious group members following armed conflict. The direct mechanism linking this relationship runs through internal displacement and heightened wartime religiosity. Wartime violence may also
play an indirect role in this relationship by creating internal displacement in the first place. Once displaced, ethno-religious IDPs are likely to strengthen their religiosity as they utilize their pre-existing religious faith and practices to cope with the trauma of displacement. Following the trauma of displacement, IDPs’ increased religiosity in turn leads them to support religiously oriented parties in post-war elections. In contrast, the direct experience of wartime violence, feelings of mistrust toward ethnic groups, lower socio-economic status, and pre-war rural residence cannot explain individuals’ support for these types of parties outside the experience of internal displacement.

The results of this study thus demonstrate that wartime events can have significant post-war political consequences by heightening individual ethno-religious group members’ religious beliefs and practices. By showing a link between internal displacement, strengthened religiosity, and post-war political attitudes and behavior, my findings indicate the need to undertake a broader examination of how traumatic wartime experiences combined with shifts in religious attitudes can shape individuals’ identities and political preferences following the end of conflict.

In addition, on a collective level, the chapter shows that localities with greater numbers of IDPs relative to their pre-war population also lend greater post-war political support to the religious nationalist parties preferred by IDPs. This municipal-level analysis also addresses one limitation of the individual-level survey data, since the survey did not ask respondents which political party they voted for in the last election before the war and therefore could not capture any change in political party preferences. In tandem, the chapter’s findings thus suggest that widespread conflict-induced internal displacement is the most significant factor in whether an ethno-religious group becomes
more religious on a collective level during and after war, with greater internal
displacement corresponding to heightened religiosity.

On balance, these results indicate that IDPs are a politically significant group who
merit greater study in political science. Post-war Bosnia has seen the SDA maintain
largely monopolistic control over Bosnian Muslim politics, such that the relationship
between IDP status, heightened religious identity and values, and taking steps to apply
those values to politics has both academic and practical importance. Further study of this
relationship may yield broader findings concerning the stability and health of post-war
democratic political competition and the types of policies it is likely to produce.

In terms of generalizability, this chapter’s findings may thus be applicable to
other post-war democracies in which one or more political parties make extensive appeals
to ethno-religious group members on the basis of religious beliefs and policies. Going
forward, additional surveys and interviews could also help verify the theory’s
mechanisms, especially the unresolved question of which specific wartime experiences
stemming from internal displacement are most likely to produce trauma and heightened
religiosity. This approach would require more studies focusing on just one or a few
ethnic groups, since IDP data at the large N cross-national level is sparse and of poor
quality. It would also require political science researchers to delve deeper into the
research literature in psychology and conduct more inter-disciplinary studies.

Finally, if extended and tested further, this chapter’s findings could help mitigate
armed conflicts. Specifically, by demonstrating when and why individuals and groups
involved in armed conflict become more religious, this study and others like it could
enable outside actors to hone in on the conditions favoring the adoption of this
worldview. Policymakers can then attempt to alter these conditions so as to prevent religious identity from taking hold more broadly in the population and thereby avert a more intense and long-lasting war. The results of this chapter suggest that they should focus on staunching the number of internally displaced persons during conflict and providing extensive mental health services for those who do become internally displaced.

Combined with the results of the previous three chapters, this dissertation’s empirical analyses speak to the powerful impact that armed conflict can have on the ideas, values, and beliefs that animate both mass and elite members of ethno-religious groups. Although the ideological shifts detailed in chapters four and five appear to have been a short-lived product of the Bosnian war in terms of their appearance in official political rhetoric, the continuing non-viability of a civic nationalist political order in post-war Bosnia speaks to their legacy and relevance. In turn, this chapter’s evidence that identity shifts among non-elites can have practical political consequences in a post-war electoral environment reinforces warfare’s ability to remake a community’s self-understanding, cultural practices, and political attitudes and behavior.
Conclusions

This conclusion starts by framing the dissertation’s empirical results in terms of their implications for the Bosnian war, the study of rhetoric and ideology during armed conflict, the consequences of ideological rhetoric, and the study of ethnicity, nationalism, and religion in politics. The subsequent section lists plausible rival hypotheses that could not be addressed within the scope of the dissertation. It also proposes future research that could address some of these hypotheses as well as other extensions flowing from this dissertation’s results. The last section discusses the dissertation’s policy implications.

The Bosnian War

The results of the dissertation have two significant implications for studies of the 1990s Bosnian war. First, my analysis explains the reasons why Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović put forth a multi-faceted and at times contradictory set of ideological principles in his official wartime rhetoric. This analysis helps allay the uncertainty and hesitation that some historians have had in labeling Izetbegović and his views with a particular ideological designation, be it liberalism, civic nationalism, or religious fundamentalism (Ramet 2006; Burg and Shoup 1999). Though some of these historians have termed Izetbegović a political opportunist because of the variation in his ideological principles, they have not traced the timing or motivations for this opportunism.

My dissertation reveals the rationale behind Izetbegović’s ideological shifts, as well as the rationale behind the ideological variation in the official rhetoric of other Bosnian Muslim politicians leading the wartime Bosnian government. The lesson is that Izetbegović and other Bosnian leaders cannot really be labeled as civic, ethnic, or
religious nationalists per se based on their public rhetoric. Labels must be reserved for the content of the rhetoric.

Second, the dissertation indicates why a wartime program to change the official ideology and identity of an ethno-religious group and state in an ethnic or religious nationalist direction may not succeed or last beyond the conflict. In this case, Western countries in the NATO alliance ultimately came to Bosnia’s aid militarily, thereby obviating the need for Bosnian government leaders to keep making religious nationalist claims in media channels from Muslim-majority countries. The end of the war also meant that Bosnians would once again have greater access to a variety of media sources, which meant that their leaders’ inconsistent use of different nationalist ideological claims to domestic and foreign audiences would be more noticeable. Furthermore, the ideological infrastructure needed to support a lasting official shift to a new nationalist ideology was not completely in place by the time the war ended. Accordingly, had the war lasted significantly longer, there would have been a much higher probability that ethnic and religious nationalism would have taken permanent and dominant root within the official rhetoric of Bosnian Muslim political leaders.

The other factors that limited the rise of ethnic nationalism in the domestic sphere included the fact that the power struggle within the Bosnian government ended relatively quickly with the consolidation of Izetbegović’s authority. Also, the primary peace proposal following the Owen-Stoltenberg plan did not emphasize ethnic partition to nearly the same degree. At the same time, however, the Dayton peace agreement did create a post-war political order featuring ethnic power sharing and ethnically-based political entities within Bosnia. Combined with the war’s impact on heightening the
religiosity of ordinary people, this political structure helps to explain the post-war political success of ethnic and religious nationalist parties despite the fact that ethnic or religious nationalist ideology is not necessarily dominant within society as a whole.

**Rhetoric and Ideology in Armed Conflict**

Four implications regarding the study of rhetoric and ideology in armed conflict follow from the dissertation’s analyses. First, the period after wartime leaders’ group or state has experienced a major increase in violence against it offers observers a window in which to listen to and absorb the leaders’ more frequent use of ideological principles. Doing so should also illuminate the type of ideology dominant in these leaders’ rhetoric at the time. This knowledge could help analysts understand the demands the leaders are likely to push for in a post-war political settlement. However, observing a shift in the content of these leaders’ official ideological principles is conditional on contingent wartime events, in this case an internal power struggle and the promotion of specific peace proposals by outside mediators. Such events thus do not alter the frequency of ideological principles in leaders’ official domestic rhetoric, but rather the type of ideological principles they espouse. Observers and analysts will then have to adjust their understanding of leaders’ ideological demands and political goals accordingly.

Second, groups’ and states’ wartime ideological shifts may be rare or even nonexistent in official domestic media in the absence of the contingent events incentivizing leaders to use new ideological claims in official domestic media. At the same time, though, these leaders may still attempt to shift their citizens’ ideology and identity in a more active manner below the level of official media. Their strategies for doing so may include manipulating the content of wartime school curricula, altering the names of street
signs, and changing everyday linguistic discourse. Without reinforcement from above at an official level, however, this grassroots push may not prove sufficient to create a lasting shift in the dominant nationalist ideology within a group or state.

Third, although external actors play a major role in spurring shifts in the type of nationalist claims wartime ethno-religious leaders use in foreign and domestic media, in several ways domestic actors too may both constrain and expand leaders’ ability to use nationalist rhetoric. In the Bosnian case, the continued civic nationalist sympathies of the residents of the capital of Sarajevo limited Bosnian leaders’ attempts to make a consistent and permanent official shift toward ethnic nationalism. In addition, the presence of a religious nationalist faction within the SDA political party and its connections to religious institutions offered a ready vehicle for spreading religious nationalism among Bosnian Muslims. This, along with the growing religiosity of internally displaced members of the Bosnian Muslim population, arguably made Bosnian leaders’ dual use of religious nationalism to foreign audiences and ethnic nationalism to domestic audiences credible.

Fourth, leaders’ personal preferences for different ideologies are not decisive for determining the content of the ideological claims in their official rhetoric but they are not wholly irrelevant either. Consequently, ideology during armed conflict is not purely a reflection of political elites’ strategic calculations for maintaining and expanding their power. Instead, leaders’ personal views help inform their calculation of the benefits and costs of using a particular set of ideological claims at a particular time. If beneficial events and circumstances arise, leaders may take advantage of an opportunity to derive both personal and strategic rewards from promoting a specific ideology. In Bosnia, Izetbegović responded to a challenge to his power by wielding ethnic nationalism as a
necessary strategic tool and in the process also lent official reinforcement to his desired ideological shift for Bosnian society.

**The Consequences of Ideology**

The analysis of the Bosnian case suggests that the consequences of ideological wartime elite rhetoric may be limited in scope and duration. The chief impact of nationalist ideology may thus lie in the tangible benefits it can bring to a wartime state, especially its leaders. Its impact on the population, on the other hand, may be temporary, though this may also vary depending on the length of the conflict. In this case, a four year war did generate significant pressure among large parts of the Bosnian Muslim population to conform to more ethnic and religious customs and behaviors, including, for example, the wearing of conservative dress for women. However, many Bosnian Muslim residents of Sarajevo resisted such pressures or only gave the appearance of conforming to them in public.

Furthermore, the Bosnian Muslim leadership could not abandon civic nationalism completely. This dynamic suggests that wartime ideological principles issued in domestic media may have limited ability to persuade or really change the minds of people who are firmly opposed to a set of given principles. On the other hand, the analysis of post-war survey data indicated that many individuals whose identity leaned in a more religious direction to begin with came to embrace that identity more fully during and after the war. This finding supplements one author’s assessment that whereas only a third of young Bosnian Muslims considered themselves religious right before the war, just over three-quarters did so by the end of the 1990s (Fazlić 2011). Thus, perhaps one result of an attempted ideological shift at official levels during a relatively short conflict may be to
exacerbate divisions and tensions within an ethno-religious group between those who are more secular and those who favor ethnic or religious nationalism.

This has played out in post-war Bosnia in the form of resentments and frustrations felt by the established “native” urban Bosnian Muslim population towards those Bosnian Muslims who have arrived more recently (Maček 2009). Conversely, the heightened religiosity of IDPs since the war suggests that the SDA still has an incentive to produce more ethnic or religious nationalist rhetoric to mobilize the support of a specific constituency. Ideology thus retains a role as a bond between the party’s leaders and certain sections of the populace. Future research is thus needed to determine the degree to which ideological rhetoric is responsible for some of these postwar phenomena and whether it has similar consequences in other conflicts.

**Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Religion**

In terms of ethnicity, nationalism, and religion, the dissertation’s findings also suggest three main implications. First, although changes in domestic nationalist ideology, ethnic identity, and religiosity may be endogenous to war, they do not automatically occur in the process of armed combat between rival ethnic groups. Instead, such changes are specifically endogenous to the internal displacement of an ethnic group’s population and to contingent wartime events.

Widespread internal displacement may produce changes in a population’s religiosity, and therefore its ethnic identity in the case of an ethno-religious group, while contingent events like internal power struggles or international peace proposals may prompt a change in the nationalist ideology predominant among elites. Displacement may also indirectly shape elites’ nationalist ideology, in that a more religious identity
among an ethno-religious group’s members can arguably enhance its leaders’ incentives and credibility for using religious nationalist claims. In either instance, these shifts do not require structural changes in the level of economic inequality, number of ethnic groups, or degree of ethnic heterogeneity within society.

Second, armed conflict does provide a major critical juncture within which wartime political elites can attempt to push their society away from a previously dominant nationalist ideology. That does not mean they are guaranteed to succeed in the attempt, however. It does mean, though, that the official nationalist ideology of ethno-religious groups can resemble a punctuated equilibrium, with long periods of stability interrupted by short spurts of rapid ideological change during war. In order for internal armed conflict to induce such rapid changes, however, a given conflict must contain a specific combination of starting conditions and wartime events. In that context, the same set of leaders can effect a change in the form of nationalism predominant in official communications channels.

Third, even in the presence of a critical juncture like armed conflict, a previously dominant path dependent nationalist ideology may have significant staying power. This is particularly likely if wartime ethno-religious leaders are based in an area where they have to draw organizational personnel from a population that was highly supportive of the path dependent ideology before the war. In Bosnia, the top leaders of the wartime state experienced this constraint because many of the residents of the capital city of Sarajevo remained sympathetic to civic nationalist principles. Subsequently, these leaders had to tread carefully to avoid promoting alternate forms of nationalism too aggressively in domestic media. Ultimately, once the strategic windows of opportunity
for officially promoting ethnic nationalism had closed, the Bosnian leaders had to revert back to civic nationalist rhetoric, albeit not as exclusively as before. Had these leaders been based in a different location with a local population that had different attitudes towards civic nationalism, they might have pursued more frequent and potentially lasting shifts away from civic nationalism in their official rhetoric.

**Outstanding Rival Hypotheses and Research Extensions**

As a result of the scope and nature of this dissertation’s methodological approach to studying nationalist ideology and ethno-religious identity during armed conflict, several plausible rival explanations could not be evaluated against the empirical evidence and must await further investigation. First, a large N analysis of speech acts and survey data from one actor involved in an internal armed conflict still leaves open the possibility that some structural variables may have an important role to play in wartime ideological shifts. For example, poverty and economic deprivation may still play a part in shaping the religiosity of wartime populations relative to experiencing internal displacement.

A cross-conflict approach would enable comparison of conflicts in countries with different economic conditions at the outset of war or conflicts that resulted in different relative declines in economic performance (contingent on the availability of these data). Similarly, provided data are available, cross-conflict analysis would give greater leverage for testing the importance of the role of political institutions for wartime nationalist ideology and identity, including both the type of institutions and significant changes within the institutions.

Second, it is possible that the frequency and even the content of ideological claims may be shaped significantly by the results of wartime battles and military
engagements rather than just violence against civilian populations. Arguably, the combination of losses on the battlefield together with civilian victimization by intense violence may make the need for ideological rhetoric even greater in order to maintain fighting morale and military recruitment. Evaluating this explanation could still be done with data from a single conflict, provided precise and detailed information about battle victories can be located and validated.

Third, an ethno-religious group’s wartime identity, and ultimately its ideological attitudes, may be altered by organizations or actors working apart from or below the group’s official leaders. The combination of official ideological rhetoric combined with ideological promotion by unofficial groups or splinter organizations may also produce an inconsistent and competing set of ideological claims. In that case, top leaders’ official ideological rhetoric may increasingly come to be a response to these unofficial actors’ ideological principles, with the goal of winning back exclusive power and control over the production and content of the ideological claims made on behalf of the group and society. This explanation would require historical analysis of broader sets of documents and speech acts from one or a few cases of armed conflict.

Fourth, the empirical finding that internally displaced populations (IDPs) are much more likely to support religiously oriented politicians and parties after internal ethnic armed conflict could be explained with more specific mechanisms. In this dissertation, I presented evidence that IDPs are particularly likely to have their religiosity strengthened following the traumatic experience of displacement itself. In turn, this heightened religiosity may lead them to have more affinity with politicians whom they perceive as devout stalwarts of their religious traditions and champions of their ethno-
religious principles in politics and society. However, to evaluate which types of traumatic experiences during displacement are particularly likely to spur heightened religiosity and support for these types of politicians, future surveys or interviews with IDPs from other ethnic groups would be necessary.

Aside from the extensions proposed above, this dissertation provides a foundation for several potentially fruitful future research studies. The primary task in this vein will be to broaden the scope of this dissertation’s findings and verify their generalizability. One method for doing so, as noted earlier, is to employ a cross-country and cross-conflict research design, provided that necessary data are available and wartime ideological shifts are not obscured. In principle, the lessons from the case of the Bosnian Muslims could be extended and tested in a number of other cases, particularly armed conflicts involving ethnic groups whose identity is derived from and distinguished by a religious faith.

Setting this condition means these other cases would include groups whose leaders and members could draw upon both ethnic nationalism and religious nationalism. However, these groups would also have to possess some tradition of or exposure to liberalism and/or civic nationalism, so that its leaders would be able to utilize the same three ideal types of nationalism as the Bosnian Muslims. In addition to groups like the Armenians and Sikhs, this condition would thereby enable researchers to test lessons from the Bosnian case with a larger set of ethnic groups in regions like post-Soviet Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

The key lessons to be tested in these other cases would whether civic nationalism in other contexts is particularly vulnerable to internal power struggles and international peace proposals, whether other ethno-religious leaders can use both civic and religious
nationalism to particular foreign audiences, and whether internally-displaced ethno-religious group members become less secular and more willing to support religious nationalism over time.

Other possibilities abound however, offering an opportunity to test the generalizability of the findings in a way that may still allow researchers to conduct in-depth analysis on large N micro-data. One way to do this would be to examine the frequency and content of ideological claims for several ethno-religious groups fighting each other in the same conflict. This would also enable testing of potential dyadic hypotheses concerning shifts in wartime ideological rhetoric. In addition, other types of ethnic groups could be examined to determine whether variation in their leaders’ ideological rhetoric also follows variation in wartime violence and wartime events such as internal power struggles.

The same analysis could then be done for non-ethnic internal armed conflicts, particularly with respect to determining whether political elites in non-ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War period also mostly utilize different forms of nationalist ideology or whether they resort to different kinds of ideological principles altogether. Conversely, examining the rhetoric of rebel or insurgent group leaders in internal armed conflicts instead of just government leaders may generate insight into the degree to which access to state resources for purposes of ideological infrastructure construction shapes the likelihood and content of a wartime ideological shift. This focus can also produce dyadic analyses of rebel-state interaction in terms of ideological rhetoric. Ideally, research in this vein would eventually extend to explaining variation in political elites’ ideologies during inter-state war and after major terrorist attacks as well.
The other major research project building off this dissertation’s theories and findings would seek to connect changes in political elites’ wartime ideology with shifts in the ethnic identity or religiosity of the wartime population. Testing whether elite rhetoric actually impacts the political, ethnic, and religious identities of non-elites would reveal whether ideological rhetoric is truly effective for purposes of maintaining wartime morale and comforting the population. On the other hand, it is possible that wartime elites may alter their official ideological principles based on information they receive concerning incipient identity shifts within the wartime population. Verifying whether the relationship between elite ideology and mass identity during war is one-sided or reciprocal would also produce a much richer understanding of how nationalism and ethnicity are constructed during critical societal junctures and which segments of society play the most significant role in this process.

**Policy Connections**

This dissertation suggests three important lessons for individuals and organizations wishing to protect and uphold a civic nationalist ideology and identity for warring groups and states. Given the circumstances of the case under analysis, these lessons are limited to countries and groups entering conflict with a predominantly civic nationalist outlook. Thus, the lessons are meant to help prevent a shift away from civic nationalism but cannot necessarily aid those actors seeking a shift toward it.

In terms of the risk of a wartime shift toward ethnic nationalism by political elites, the lesson is that outside mediators must resist promoting peace proposals rooted in ethnic partition and instead find ways to incentivize continued multietnic leadership within and across warring ethnic groups, along with ethnic political integration. At the
same time, key internal and external actors favoring civic nationalism should exercise whatever influence they have to stave off internal power struggles or resolve them quickly. This may mean fostering or accepting a more centralized or hierarchical wartime power structure or state apparatus if it ensures the continued dominance of civic nationalism. In contrast, more egalitarian and decentralized power structures may have to be avoided if they increase the risk of internal squabbling and power struggles conducive to the rise of ethnic nationalism.

Regarding an elite shift to religious nationalist ideology, the lesson is that if an ethno-religious group is not at war with a non-Western post-Cold War great power, then external actors championing civic nationalism must ensure that this group receives more resources and help from Western countries than ones led by co-religionists. On the other hand, if an ethno-religious group is fighting a non-Western post-Cold War great power, then pro-civic nationalist external actors could make greater initial investments in diplomatic engagements with the great power’s government in order to try to end the conflict quickly. They could also attempt to subvert the geopolitical dynamic at play by secretly channeling aid to non-state actors sharing the group’s religious faith, with the understanding that these organizations will promote civic principles underneath a veneer of religiosity. However, this strategy arguably carries much more risk given that it may be difficult for the pro-civic nationalist external actor to monitor the actual principles espoused by the supposedly moderate non-state religious organization it is funding.

As concerns the mass of the population, the lesson is that individuals and organizations wishing to uphold civic nationalism should focus on the internally displaced population both during and after conflict. Specifically, projects and programs
seeking to promote reconciliation and greater tolerance toward out groups should give priority to inculcating these attitudes and desires among the internally displaced.

Furthermore, IDPs’ relatively stronger religiosity could be channeled toward greater support for inter-communal peace and understanding via the support of religious institutions and officials. Providing this segment of the population with greater material support and security may also undercut their need to look to co-ethnic leaders as the providers of these basic needs. The goal of all of these strategies would be to cut the link between IDPs and ethno-religious politicians, which would encourage IDPs to vote for multi-ethnic and non-religious parties and thereby bolster the power of civic nationalist leaders and principles.

Therefore, careful analysis of one case of a wartime ethno-religious group, the Bosnian Muslims, has yielded a host of new findings regarding shifts and fluctuations in the frequency of ideological rhetoric, form of nationalist ideology, interpretation of ethnic identity, and post-war political attitudes of members of ethno-religious groups in conflict. The results suggest both a number of promising new research projects and potential practical implications for international politics. In particular, when other ethno-religious groups fall into armed conflict, liberal or civic nationalism, if initially predominant within a group, may be challenged by illiberal counter-ideologies. The Bosnian Muslim case lights the initial part of the path to understanding and confronting these threats to civic nationalism, ones which may change the self-image and behavior of groups and states in ways inimical to conflict resolution and post-war peacebuilding.
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