DUNMORE’S WAR:
NO OTHER MOTIVE THAN THE TRUE INTEREST of THIS COUNTRY

Glenn F. Williams

Introduction

Dunmore’s War, named for the last royal governor of Virginia, John Murray, fourth Earl of Dunmore, was the final Indian conflict of America’s colonial era. Set mostly in the mountains, valleys and farmlands of the Virginia backcountry and Ohio River Valley from April to November 1774, the conflict started when Indian war parties initiated an aggressive campaign of vengeance with small-scale attacks and raids against homes and settlements on Virginia’s frontier. By June 10, after passive defensive measures on the part of local militia failed to stem the violence, Governor Dunmore directed the county lieutenants to respond more vigorously, including with limited offensive action. On July 12, the governor took the field to assume personal command. He planned a coordinated response with the combined forces of the three most affected counties to take the war to the Shawnee and Mingo towns. About 2,500 militia soldiers, not counting those who remained behind to guard the settlements, marched against approximately 1,000 defending Indian warriors, mostly Shawnees, not counting those raiding the backcountry at large. The campaign resulted in only one, but decisive, large engagement in October. By November the Indian leaders sued for peace and accepted the terms that Lord Dunmore proposed in order to spare their towns from destruction.

This dissertation is in the main a campaign history that will examine the military operations of Lord Dunmore’s War, but also takes into account diplomatic efforts and political factors. It will show that Virginia called on its colonial militia to achieve strategic objectives consistent with the justified defense of the province and provisions of its royal charter. Furthermore, the
narrative will demonstrate that the colonial Virginia militia was a more competent military organization than is often portrayed.

Relying almost exclusively on primary sources, the narrative places the 1774 conflict in the context of pre-Revolutionary War Virginia, and addresses several themes. First, Governor Dunmore acted in what colonists perceived were the best interests of the colony. As a result, his policies were generally popular and earned him the admiration of those he governed. At times, however, they conflicted with those of the British government and put him at odds with the Secretariat of State for the Colonies, also called the Colonial Office, the ministerial department to which he reported and from which he received his orders and instructions. Second, an Indian war in the Ohio country had become inevitable in early 1774, and the Shawnees represented the nation with the most hostility toward the British and colonial westward expansion. While Lord Dunmore received at least nominal support from the British Indian Department, he took an active and direct role in diplomacy with the various native peoples living in the Ohio Valley and bordering his colony. Third, the Virginia governor led his colony’s forces in defense of what they viewed as legally acquired territory, and demanded no further land concessions from those they defeated. Fourth, the narrative presents a detained examination of the organization, training, tactical doctrine and operations of Virginia’s colonial militia, which will challenge many popularly-held beliefs. Fifth, and finally, Virginia’s victory in Dunmore’s War held important implications for both sides in the War for American Independence, especially with regard to Indian participation.

Dunmore’s War proved to be the last Indian conflict of America’s colonial era. Overshadowed by the American War for Independence, which began six months after it ended, Dunmore’s War remains under-studied and largely misunderstood. Many historians have either
relegated it to the status of a footnote, or briefly summarized the episode as a prelude to the Revolutionary War. This is unfortunate because the war is an intrinsically interesting subject with significance in its own right. Furthermore, its namesake, John Murray, the fourth Earl of Dunmore and last royal governor of the colony of Virginia, was a major historical figure.

Many of the currently available histories explain the conflict as little more than an attempt to wrest land from aboriginal inhabitants, and vilify Virginia settlers in general and Lord Dunmore in particular. Others describe it as either a relatively unimportant preliminary to, or an intentional diversion of attention from, events occurring at the same time in Boston and Philadelphia that signaled the approaching revolution. In contrast, this project will show that Virginia called on the colonial militia to defend its border from invasion and secure strategic objectives consistent with the legal acquisition of land and its royal charter. The causes and conduct of the Indian war were not connected to origins of the struggle for American independence. However, the results of Dunmore’s War held important consequences, which manifested themselves early and throughout the latter conflict.

Various histories of the period that mention of Dunmore’s War, especially if written since the late twentieth century, almost universally characterize Virginia as the aggressor and its soldiers as land-hungry opportunists at best or lawless and racist banditti at worst. For example, in his book, *The Indian Wars of Pennsylvania*, author C. Hale Sipe, described the conflict between the Virginians and the Shawnees as “an altogether unjustifiable war.” The primary sources cited to support that conclusion reflect the less than objective perspective of participants who favored the interests of Pennsylvania in its 1774 boundary dispute and dominance of the Indian trade. As a result, they vilified Virginians in general and Lord Dunmore in particular. The different views
found in Virginia records and the writings of Virginia participants have been largely ignored, marginalized or dismissed as “triumphalist” in much of the recent scholarship.

Without ignoring the evidence that has provided the basis of opposing interpretations, this dissertation will study the situation as Virginians recorded them. The documentary evidence from Virginia sources shows that the colony’s government did not base its policies only on self-serving aggression. Virginia’s acquisition of Indian land between 1768 and 1772 met the established legal requirements, but conformed to the restrictions set forth in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 as well, and were ratified by the British Crown. Virginia’s expansion into the newly ceded land was allowed by law, as contemporary Virginians and government officials viewed it, but reflected the tenets of Enlightenment philosophy on the settlement of new land.

Similarly, many authors cast the Shawnees in the role of innocent victims. In Forced Founders, Woody Holton argued that the Shawnees had resisted the urge to take the warpath until “Virginia land dealers made one last effort to obtain Kentucky in 1774.” Holton further asserted that the Virginians conspired to provoke hostilities that would provide the “‘pretense’ for attacking Indians.” He maintained that they found their casus belli when “a half-French Mingo named John Logan raided Virginia and Pennsylvania settlements in retaliation for the murder of his family by a group of Virginians.” While the statement contains a basis in fact, it appears that Holton did not consider the hostile actions committed against Virginians by bands of Shawnee warriors that preceded or precipitated it. The statement also raises a question about Holton’s sources, as those consulted for this study show that Logan was not a “half-French Mingo,” but the son of an Oneida father and Cayuga mother.
In *The Unknown American Revolution,* Gary Nash similarly blamed the war on Virginia aggression when he described the Shawnees as “trying to protect their homeland in the face of unauthorized white encroachment.” Put another way, perhaps without realizing it, Nash’s statement affirms that the Shawnees acted in their own national interests, as any polity would—including the Virginia colony. He, like other authors that present similar interpretations, fails to mention that the Six Nations ceded Shawnee hunting ground to the British. The omission maintains the focus on the dispute between the Shawnees and Virginians without an explanation of the Iroquois Confederacy’s involvement in creating the contentious situation. The significance of Six Nations suzerainty over other native peoples is essential to a complete understanding of the situation on the frontier in 1774 and the causes of Dunmore’s War, and is addressed in detail in this dissertation.

Some historians argue that Virginia sought to fight a war of conquest against Indians, and it mattered little which nation or tribe, in order to take their land. In *The Shawnees and the War for America,* Colin G. Calloway wrote “the governor [Dunmore] … and his associates seized on the Indian raids” by Logan’s Mingo war party “to drum up a war against the Shawnees.” This dissertation, in contrast, will show that Logan’s faction of Mingoes had already allied themselves with that of Shawnees who were predisposed to war. Patrick Griffin asserted in *American Leviathan* that after Virginians “understood that [defeating] the Cherokees would serve neither their purpose nor Dunmore’s,” they “began changing their story about Cherokee hostility” and provoked the Shawnees into a war instead. The review of primary sources for this study reflects the error in Griffin’s interpretation. It will show that Shawnee war parties had not only raided backcountry settlements before some infamous Virginia ruffians – not organized as militia –
massacred Logan’s family, but continued to do so as the Mingo retaliated, while Virginia and Cherokee leaders attempted to resolve their separate dispute peacefully at the same time.

Careful analysis of the comprehensive survey of sources cited in this narrative supports the position that Virginia’s soldiers primarily fought a defensive war against unprovoked Shawnee and Mingo attacks on the south bank of the Ohio. Governor Dunmore resorted to conducting an offensive operation only after it appeared to offer the most militarily and cost effective means to end the war and secure the frontier as soon as possible. It was for this reason that he ordered the militia into the colony’s service in July 1774. This dissertation will also show that interpretations such as Griffin’s statement that “Volunteers intent on booty and land made up Dunmore’s force,” does not accurately characterize average soldiers’ or officers’ motivation.6 The taking of what Griffin described as “booty” referred to the possibility of taking Indian horses as an enticement for recruits to join the expedition. Horses represented military resources and therefore legitimate spoils of war, or “plunder,” to which the victor was entitled according to the conventions of eighteenth century warfare. Indian raiders certainly sought every opportunity to acquire horses by seizing them from Virginians. While the two terms are often used interchangeably today, historians should consider eighteenth century usage by consulting Samuel Johnson’s or other period dictionaries. Griffin chose the more pejorative “booty,” connoting goods taken by robbery, rather than “plunder,” for spoils taken in war. Although possibly unintentional, the choice of “booty” further casts Virginia soldiers in the role of the aggressor.

Thomas A. Lewis draws a similar inference of the soldiers’ motivation in West from Shenandoah when he quoted from a poem Lieutenant James Newell wrote in his journal. Lewis stated that “Even the private soldiers seemed to understand exactly what was at stake,” which is true, but he then took Newell’s statement “Each will have his part” out of context.7 Newell’s
verse continued, “The Ohio once ours, we’ll live at our ease,” which referred to securing the boundary between the Virginians and Shawnees, not seizing the latter’s homeland. Both authors mentioned above characterized looting and land hunger, not defending home and family, as the principal motives for individual Virginia soldiers to serve. In the pages that follow, one will read what actually motivated the volunteers in their own words, as recorded on their pension applications or correspondence and Newell’s cited poem as transcribed in its entirety.

When the expedition proved successful in bringing the hostile Indians to negotiate terms, the war-ending Treaty of Camp Charlotte proved far less draconian than one would expect from an aggressor bent on land acquisition through conquest and genocidal extermination. Although Dunmore demanded that the Shawnees and Mingoes return all captives, including those they had never repatriated at the end of Pontiac’s War a decade earlier, he required no cession or encroachment of their homeland. The peace terms affirmed the Ohio River as the boundary between the Virginia colony and the land reserved to the Shawnees according to the treaties Crown authorities had negotiated with the Iroquois in 1768 and the Cherokees in 1768 and 1770, but no demand for “deeds to Kentucky” from the Shawnees as Holton argues. The surrender of several chiefs or leading warriors to serve as hostages represented the sternest measure Lord Dunmore demanded. A common practice in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, hostages served as security that the Shawnees would honor their promise to release all of their white and black prisoners, as well as guarantee that their headmen would meet Virginia commissioners to sign the final treaty at Pittsburgh the following spring. The defeated party met the condition to demonstrate a sincere desire to negotiate a lasting peace treaty and show the victor that it was not using an armistice in order to disengage from a losing battle so it could renew hostilities later.
Previous treatments of the military institutional aspects of Dunmore’s War have been no less unsatisfactory. Like the explanations of the causes and precipitating events, the available literature includes many inaccurate, albeit oft-repeated or broadly interpreted general descriptions of the Virginia forces. More often, they focus on the social and cultural composition rather than the tactics employed and how the armies fought. With nearly forty pages on the events that led to and including the 1774 Indian conflict, James Corbett David’s excellent biography *Dunmore’s New World* offers a notable exception to the usual cursory treatment. However, his focuses more on political and diplomatic maneuvers than military operations. When they appear at all, the typical battle description reads like, “McDonald encountered resistance on the outskirts of Wakatomica. In the ensuing skirmish, two Virginians lost their lives and three Indians were scalped.” In contrast, the pages that follow will present a complete and detailed operational account with due consideration of military practice and organization.

The authors who do address the tactical operations attribute any success Virginia militiamen enjoyed to their adopting the tactics of their Indian adversaries, an over simplification. In *Point Pleasant 1774: Prelude to the American Revolution*, for example, John F. Winkler argues that Dunmore, who “had not seen the massacres of British regulars” in the backcountry battles of the French and Indian War, and therefore did not know that “Battles in the western woods were not for men skilled in fighting in regular formations.” He continued his argument by stating, “They [the battles] were for men who could fight as irregulars.” Winkler described that “if attacked” the militiamen “would scatter and find cover behind trees and logs. Then, in a contest of firearms at a distance of about 100yd … demonstrate their superior skill with their weapons.”
The reader of this dissertation will see the militia’s success resulted more from adapting British tactical doctrine to “bush fighting” in North America than “adopting” Indian fighting methods. Both of Dunmore’s principal subordinates, Colonels Andrew Lewis and Adam Stephen, as well as a number of the other officers, had served in Colonel George Washington’s 1st Virginia Regiment during the French and Indian War. Stephen, like Washington, had survived Braddock’s Defeat on the Monongahela in 1755. Such officers learned that victory over Indian enemies came by combining regular and irregular tactics, and they trained their men accordingly. In contrast to Winkler’s description, the evidence related in the narrative that follows shows that under the tutelage of veteran officers, colonial militiamen had read instructional texts such as Humphrey Bland’s Treatise on Military Discipline and applied the lessons about fighting irregulars in Europe to their own experiences fighting Indians. It is important to note, however, that Bland’s instructions could not simply be used as written, but had to be modified and adapted to the conditions and enemies encountered in North America.

This thesis is supported in at least two under-appreciated works that are not often cited in academic or popular treatments on the topic of eighteenth century warfare in North America. In Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast, Guy Chet cautioned against accepting the “romantic belief that in America, irregular terrain and the irregular tactics of the enemy rendered the scientific principles of European warfare invalid.” He argued that British and colonial American forces could not have achieved their objectives by simply adopting the Indian mode of petite guerre, or guerrilla warfare, “a tactical doctrine that is predicated on abandoning territory in exchange for enemy lives.” Instead, the British and colonial Americans acted on the combination of strategic offense and tactical defense. In the narrative that follows, the reader will note that Dunmore’s plan of
campaign reflected this concept. Light troops on scouting and flanking missions “usually employed defensive tactics in battle situations … rather than employing the tactics of Indian war bands.” Although the light troops’ tactics may have at times, or first glance, appeared similar to those of their Indian opponents, they did so to draw an enemy into a fight in order for the main force units “to bring their full firepower to bear in any engagement.” The reader will note that the course of the battle of Point Pleasant generally conforms to this model.  

In Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763, Stephen Brumwell concentrates on the experience of the British regulars, and similarly attributes British and colonial American victories over Indian opponents to the “mixture of regular and irregular warfare.” For example, one should not construe adding the order “tree all” to the battle drill in which troops practiced and rehearsed their counter-ambush techniques with adopting Indian tactics. Brumwell explains that fighting an indigenous enemy in the American wilderness “demanded diverse combat skills; the resulting fusion of Old and New World techniques.” Troops deployed to act as flank guards for a marching column taking advantage of the cover offered by trees, logs and rocks when attacked by a concealed enemy represents such a fusion, not an abandonment of one style in favor of the other. The employment of skirmishing tactics, in which detachments moving in open order sought to initiate contact with an unseen enemy with a series of small fire-fights, provides yet another example of blended tactics. As the very description implies, skirmishing offered a means of locating and drawing an enemy force into battle where the superior fire of cohesive units determined the outcome of a general engagement. When using the term “Indian fighting” in reading the narrative of this dissertation, the reader should do so in the context of the Virginians fighting against, not like, their opponents.
Building on Chet’s and Brumwell’s foundation, this dissertation will show that the Virginians adapted conventional European tactics to the American woods and blended them with techniques learned from their native allies and adversaries. Virginia’s colonial soldiers achieved success in battle against Indian enemies by adhering to a modified British doctrine, which emphasized unit cohesion and fire superiority, although not necessarily by fighting in compact ranks and shunning natural cover. Similarly, Indian warriors nearly abandoned their traditional tactical doctrine at the Battle of Point Pleasant. Their general practice usually dictated fighting a battle of annihilation rather than one of attrition. Cornstalk’s plan to advance en masse seeking to surprise, overwhelm and destroy their opponent in a quick victory was in keeping with this practice. When the attack failed to achieve the desired outcome, Indian forces surprisingly conducted a battle of attrition for several hours before the Shawnees finally disengaged and retired. In addition, the reader will recognize Virginia’s colonial militia as a much more efficient military organization than it has been often portrayed. The forces involved in 1774 campaign likewise effectively followed British – or European – logistical procedures, appropriately adapted to operations in North America with the “protected advance” to sustain its forces in the field throughout the campaign.

If they examine the conduct and course of the campaign at all, many treatments of Dunmore’s War share a common weakness in characterizing the Virginia colony’s military organization and operations as amateurish. In the critically acclaimed Council Fires on the Upper Ohio, Randolph C. Downes wrote “Each of the commandants was therefore directed” by Dunmore “to adopt offensive tactics whenever possible,” but never provided an explanation of what offensive tactics he meant.15 Griffin, for example, argues that the men selected “their own captains” and determined “where they would range” and dispatched “their own scouts.”16 Based
on an analysis of personal and government records, the following narrative will inform the reader how the colony chose its military leaders and demonstrate that the Virginia militia conducted well-planned and competently executed operations that closely followed the British army’s established doctrine and logistical procedures.

Similarly, much of the currently available literature does not present a completely accurate portrayal of the composition, organization and training of Virginia’s colonial militia. Winkler, for example, explains “the militias of Virginia counties were organized like those of English counties.”17 Although accurate in a very general sense, the statement omits the very important distinctions that existed between the Virginia and English militias despite their common heritage. For example, an English parish filled its portion of the county’s quota by ballot, or draft, after which the selected men served terms of three years. Following a period of initial training, the militia man joined a unit that mustered periodically and could respond to local alarms or augment the regular British army for homeland defense during emergencies. In contrast, the reader will see that unless exempt by law, all free white male Virginians between the ages of eighteen and forty-five had an obligation to serve. They all trained periodically and served whenever the county or colony called them for military service.

Winkler also stated that in each jurisdiction the “militiamen constituted the county regiment, which at full strength had ten companies with 500 men.”18 The reader of the following narrative will note that the administrative groupings of the Virginia militia actually bore less resemblance to such a regular organization. Lewis’ book likewise reflected another general misconception about the raising of militia forces when he wrote “apparently, there were no recruiting problems.”19 The reader of this dissertation will not only gain a more accurate understanding of
service in the Virginia colonial militia in general, but also note the difficulty encountered by officials when raising forces needed for active duty, specifically in 1774.

The evidence presented in the following pages will show that the county lieutenants followed the requirements of the colony’s militia law and the procedures established for defending their own and assisting neighboring communities, as well as the province at large. It will further establish that the militia of the Virginia colony existed as a pool of available manpower that county, independent borough, or provincial governments could mobilize for military service. In addition, contrary to Winkler’s description, the local companies and county regiments constituted administrative – not tactical – units organized according to regional population densities and not mission-oriented considerations. The governor appointed all company officers based on the recommendations of their respective county lieutenants. The governor also signed and issued commissions to the men who the county officials recommended to raise and lead tactical units and authorized them to recruit volunteers and draft individuals to fill their ranks. Ideally, a company embodied for actual service was organized with fifty rank and file men, plus officers, sergeants and musicians, along lines similar to, but not exactly like, those in the British army. When in actual service, these tactical companies executed missions as determined by the established chain of command, and not autonomously as Griffin described. While not on a level equal to that found in the regular British army, the men of the Virginia militia nevertheless submitted to a level of discipline often not reflected in the popular view of frontier Americans. Officers exercised military authority under which men who committed acts of misconduct were held accountable.

Many of the available interpretations depict the Virginia General Assembly as unwilling to support Lord Dunmore with an appropriation of funds and authorization for military action
against the hostile Indians. Downes, for example, wrote, “The legislature of Virginia had failed to accept the governor’s proposals to assume the financial obligations necessary” for offensive operations, “and it also refused to make any appropriations or to pass additional legislation to facilitate [any] defensive measures.”

Griffin similarly stated that since the legislators “would not act. So Dunmore would” on his own.

Primary evidence found only in the Pennsylvania records would tend to support such conclusions. The Virginia records contain contradictory testimony. This dissertation will demonstrate that although the General Assembly did not agree with Dunmore that the situation warranted the appropriation of funds and authorization to raise an army of provincial regulars to deal with the situation, Peyton Randolph, Speaker of the House of Burgesses, offered a more appropriate recommendation. Randolph informed the governor that the Several Acts for Repelling Invasions and Suppressing Insurrections already empowered him with the authority to call militia into service and employ them in this kind of emergency without additional legislation. Perhaps Downes mistook the speaker’s explanation that the Invasion and Insurrection Acts constituted a more appropriate application of the governor’s war powers for dealing with the emergency for a refusal to act. The reader will also learn that according to the law, the colony’s General Assembly normally appropriated the money after the emergency ended and reimbursed military expenses and paid militia soldiers for their service in arrears, not in advance. The record shows that the Virginia government followed the established procedure when it paid its soldiers and the related expenses for the Indian campaign in July 1775, albeit after the Revolutionary War began and Dunmore had fled Williamsburg.

The events related in the following pages occurred during a period in Colonial America when resistance to certain British imperial policies had not yet risen to a struggle for independence.
Although the Revolutionary War is not the subject of this dissertation, Dunmore’s War influenced the events of latter conflict. As long as both sides adhered to the terms of the Treaty of Camp Charlotte and the subsequent councils held at Fort Pitt in 1775 and 1776, the Ohio frontier remained relatively peaceful. Combined with the respite from fighting that ensued in the east between the British evacuation of Boston and the invasion of New York in 1776, the Americans sufficient time to decide in favor of and declare their independence. When Cornstalk announced that Shawnees’ decision to enter the war as British allies and resume hostilities in November 1777, it presented Virginia the motive and opportunity to invade the north bank as a component of the greater struggle. American success in that theater resulted in Britain’s recognition of the Northwest Territory, encompassing the present states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Michigan as within the territorial boundaries of the United States in the 1783 Treaty of Paris.

Numbers of officers and soldiers became veterans and gained valuable combat experience in the Indian conflict. The available pension records reveal the service of many common soldiers and officers later served in the Revolutionary War. The notable veterans of Dunmore’s War who fought in the American War for Independence included Daniel Morgan, Michael Cresap, George Rogers Clark, Isaac Shelby and Daniel Boone on the Patriot side, John Connolly, Alexander McKee and Simon Girty on the Loyalist, as well as Cornstalk, Pluggy, Blue Jacket, White Eyes, and Guyasota among the participating Indians.

This dissertation will employ historical narrative, organized chronologically, to present a view of the related events on the Virginia frontier in 1774 without reference to the later events of the Revolutionary War. Furthermore, this study examines the subject matter in the context of its own time and place, and not distorted through the prism of ours. It therefore relies almost exclusively on primary source evidence, published as well as un-published. The sources include
archival documents, period newspapers, and the writings of participants, which are critically examined and interpreted with consideration for eighteenth-century grammar, definitions and word usage, as well as context.

When I first became intrigued with the subject, and long before initiating any serious research, I surveyed the available literature. Every treatment, regardless of medium, included a citation to one monumental work, the Documentary History of Dunmore’s War 1774, or DHDW, edited by Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps. Published in 1905, it is an anthology transcribed from the pertinent documents found in the files of the Lyman Copeland Draper manuscript collection at the Wisconsin Historical Society. The publication provides a researcher with easily accessible and notated compilation of relevant documents.22

I used the Thwaites and Kellogg book as a guide to review the microfilm publications of the appropriate volumes of original records in the Draper collection in their entirety. The latter also includes images of documents not found in the anthology, as well as the full documents of which Thwaites and Kellogg only transcribed excerpts. For example, the printed publication lacks the documentary evidence of how Virginia and Cherokee leaders resolved their differences without war, but which are in the collection of papers. To differentiate between the two sources, documents found only in the collection of originals carry the citation of the Draper Manuscript identification number, whereas the transcriptions also cited the page numbers from the DHDW in parentheses.

The amount of primary source material examined differentiates this study from others and went far beyond reviews of document collections. I surveyed government documents from Virginia, as well as neighboring Pennsylvania. Both offer first-person accounts of the same
events from different perspectives, albeit often prejudiced by the writer’s partisan position on the inter-colonial boundary dispute, which adds another layer of complexity as well as detail. Likewise, period newspapers, particularly the two versions of the Virginia Gazette, not only include government proclamations and other official information, contemporary reportage on the Indian war and the inter-colonial border dispute, but the latest news and rumors concerning political and commercial activity from throughout the colonies and the British Empire at large. Even more interesting, both Gazettes have letters to the editors, some of them with highly opinionated commentary on the news-making events of the day.

The records of the British government, mostly from the Colonial Office, show the involvement of a distant authority attempting to resolve conflicts between the two colonies as well as managing the involvement of the respective Crown superintendents of Indian affairs and the commander in chief of his Majesties forces in North America. The papers of Sir William Johnson, the Crown’s superintendent of Indian affairs for the Northern Department, records the efforts of the Indian Department to mediate inter-tribal as well as Indian-colonial disputes, and its actions to preserve and promote the favored status of the Six Nations of Iroquois in British-Indian diplomacy.

While the Thwaites and Kellogg anthology addresses military operations, it concentrates almost exclusively on those in Augusta, Botetourt, and Fincastle Counties of Virginia. The manuscript collections found at the Filson Historical Society, such as the Bullitt Family Papers, complements the published transcriptions for the military events in those areas. The equally important West Augusta District, also known as the Forks of the Ohio region or Pittsburgh and its environs, remained largely uncovered in the Thwaites and Kellogg material. This research project therefore made extensive use of documents transcribed in the published Pennsylvania
Archives Colonial Series and other sources to fill this void. The George Chalmers Manuscript Collection at the New York Public Library, for example, contains the personal journal maintained by Major John Connolly, the Virginia militia commander in the district, and that of the resident deputy Indian superintendent, Alexander McKee. As Johnson’s deputy for the Indians of the Ohio country, McKee’s journal complements the correspondence found in Sir William’s papers. The journals of both men contain reflections on the military situation as well as their own records of the negotiations conducted in the Indian councils held at Pittsburgh. These records likewise helped to fill gaps in the Thwaites and Kellogg publication and Pennsylvania colonial records.

A number of sources contributed to the better understanding of time and place, apart from its military aspects. In an area I believe remains largely unexplored in treatments on Dunmore’s War or westward expansion, the writings of Adam Smith, John Locke and Benjamin Franklin add the dimension of Enlightenment philosophy to the acquisition Indian land. The observations of non-military participants, such as the travel narratives of Nicholas Cresswell and John Ferdinand Dalziel Smyth, two visitors from Great Britain, add much to the narrative. In addition to what they offer to the story of their view as non-participating witnesses to the conflict, their commentary on colonial American culture in 1774, particularly on what Virginians found too ordinary to consider remarkable in their own writing, helped to add some “color” to several descriptions. Similarly, the journal of Lieutenant Augustine Prevost, a British regular officer who visited Pittsburgh as Dunmore’s expedition made ready to march in September 1774, offers a critical witness of Virginia’s military preparations through the eyes of a professional soldier.

As this dissertation is primarily a military history, in addition to official reports and the personal records and correspondence of officers, I sought to include the voices of enlisted
soldiers as well. Many Virginia veterans of the Revolutionary War also served in Dunmore’s War, and several of their pension applications include descriptions of their experience in the earlier conflict. In an effort to verify their information, as well as to place them in the correct units or garrisons, I relied on published transcripts of unit muster rolls and public service claims. To aid in this effort, I found three sources very helpful. These include William A. Crozier’s *Virginia Colonial Militia 1651 – 1776*, Lloyd DeWitt Bockstruck’s *Virginia’s Colonial Soldiers* and Warren Skidmore and Donna Kaminsky’s *Lord Dunmore’s Little War of 1774*. Although its title suggests an operational history, the Skidmore-Kaminsky book offers a compendium of military muster and pay records, as well as public service claims, transcribed from collections of the Library of Virginia. It proved a most comprehensive and useful resource for the study of Dunmore’s War for its focus on company-sized units and individual participants.

This dissertation will put the reader in the skirmish lines with the militia. To that end, the descriptions of the engagements will not only include the recollections of certain participants, but apply them to the tactical doctrine found in contemporary military manuals and treatises known to have been used in colonial America. I will show that *A Treatise on Military Discipline* by Humphrey Bland, arguably the most widely read text of its kind in the British army for much of the eighteenth century, formed the doctrinal basis for the Virginia militia’s tactical operations in 1774.

For studying the experiences of the Shawnees, Mingoes and Delawares first hand, I relied mainly on records from several reputable and mostly sympathetic, albeit mostly white, witnesses. These include the published accounts and correspondence of the Moravian Missionary Rev. John Heckwelder and the itinerant Baptist preacher Rev. David Jones, both of whom lived and travelled among the Indians of the Ohio area in 1774. I also relied on the minutes of conferences
and councils in which British and colonial officials or third parties transcribed the speeches of, and conversations with, Indian participants. In some cases, multiple witnesses recorded their observations of the same event from contrasting perspectives. Not only did the records kept by representatives of different colonial governments and the Indian Department sometimes differ, but the Quakers of the Friendly Association assumed responsibility for insuring the others did not take unfair advantage of the Indians and therefore kept records to corroborate the Indians’ oral traditions and wampum documents.

A number of captivity narratives add insight about the Ohio Indians’ tribal politics, military practices and the treatment of prisoners in the mid- to latter-eighteenth century. While neither related events that occurred in 1774, the oft-cited narratives of Mary Jemison and James Smith present vivid accounts how the Ohio Indians took and treated captives, especially those cases in which they adopted and assimilated prisoners into their societies. Smith further described the Indian way of war from a first-person perspective gained when he accompanied war parties in combat. The narrative of John Leith, a youth who worked at a trading post in the Delaware town of Standing Stone, offers the unique view of the conflict from life in a native community. A local headman adopted Leith soon after the war started in April 1774 to preserve him from harm at the hands of vengeful Mingo es who were then roaming the neighborhood. The benevolent chief gave the youth his liberty when word reached them in November that hostilities had ended with the Treaty of Camp Charlotte.

The research conducted for this dissertation included visiting museum collections that offered opportunities to study material culture related to Dunmore’s War. The Fort Pitt Museum and Senator John Heinz History Center in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for example, both had exhibits featuring objects with provenance from the French and Indian War and Pontiac’s
Rebellion, such as a war club and human scalp, but which are also appropriate for Dunmore’s War. The Dewitt Wallace Decorative Arts and Abby Aldrich Rockefeller Folk Art Museums at Colonial Williamsburg, Virginia, not only have relevant artifacts on exhibit, but members of the curatorial staff invited me to examine related objects in the collection not usually on display. Among latter, for example, the staff allowed me to see and hold objects related to Lord Dunmore, including his sword and brace of saddle pistols, as well as the fusée – or carbine – he carried as his personal weapon on the campaign.

Research for this dissertation also included visits to several historical sites. Walking the terrain on a historic battlefield is especially useful – whenever possible – in military history. In 1903, noted British historian George Trevelyan Macaulay wrote about visiting battlefields in “Clio, A Muse and Other Essays Literary and Pedestrian.” He described the practice of what he called “Battlefield hunting” as “one of the joys that history can afford” a professional historian, avocational researcher or casual visitor who can “stir himself to get to see the country.”23 Following Macaulay’s advice, I conducted a military terrain analysis at the site of the Battle of Point Pleasant. The “charm” of a historic battlefield rests in its “fortuitous character” of being the location where a significant battle event occurred.24 Even amid modern development, comparing the inherent military probability of significant terrain features to the written accounts of participants enabled me to follow the course of the engagement with a higher degree of accuracy than found only in written accounts. Walking the terrain also allowed a way to better experience the battle, albeit without the threat of personal harm, than possible only by researching in an archive, reading a book, or sitting at a computer. Furthermore, I agree with Macaulay in believing that visiting a battlefield “is almost the greatest of outdoor intellectual pleasures.”25
Visiting sites other than battlefields also offer valuable opportunities to study history not possible elsewhere. The sites of Forts Dunmore [Pitt], Fincastle [Henry], Blair [Randolph] and Gower, as well the reconstructed Prickett’s Fort, provided a perspective on the use of military posts for the defense of backcountry settlements and their inhabitants, as well as those used as forward supply magazines that supported offensive operations. In addition to the different functions of fortifications, visits to the sites of historic forts also provided the opportunity to compare and contrast those constructed as military posts with fortified private homes the owners built to shelter their own and their neighbors’ families. The sites of the militia rendezvous at Camp Union and the fortified bivouac of Camp Charlotte, where the Shawnee chief Cornstalk and Governor Dunmore negotiated the war ending treaty, are appropriately marked. The site where Logan, the Mingo leader who refused to participate in the formal negotiations, recited his famous “Lament” is preserves as an appropriately interpreted park.

Other than those with only military significance, several other sites contributed to conveying an understanding of other aspects of Dunmore’s War. Johnson Hall, the preserved baronial manor of Sir William Johnson in the Mohawk Valley near Johnstown, New York, is the location of the Pan-Indian council held in July 1774. Visiting the site and observing the artifacts on exhibit there can give the researcher a better understanding of the crucial diplomatic roles played by the British Indian Department in general and Johnson in particular, as well as that of the principal chiefs of the Six Nations, or Iroquois Confederacy. It was on these grounds that the Six Nations exerted its dominion over dependent and allied nations and tribes of the Ohio country, which effectively isolated the Shawnee from potential allies and ensured that Dunmore’s War remained a limited conflict.
Colonial Williamsburg, Virginia’s eighteenth century colonial capital, offers a wealth of material culture, both original as well as faithfully reproduced, which provides insight on the political leadership of Lord Dunmore. The restored magazine, from which the governor requisitioned weapons and ammunition to equip and supply some of the militia who participated in his campaign, is particularly noteworthy. Visualizing the magazine in Williamsburg at one end and Camp Charlotte at the other, with intermediate storehouses along the route of the expedition’s protected advance – e.g., Camp Union, Elk River and Point Pleasant for the Left Wing, or Southern Division, and Winchester, Fort Pitt, Fort Fincastle and Fort Gower for the Right Wing, or Northern Division – allows one to better understand the complexity and enormity of the campaign’s logistical support. One can also compare the eighteenth century colonial metropolis and Tidewater plantations exhibited at and near Colonial Williamsburg with the austerity of the colony’s backcountry settlements and farmsteads by visiting the Frontier Culture Museum in Staunton, Virginia. The interpretation also allows the researcher or visitor to observe the similarities and differences between the communities of colonial Virginia settlers and the Indian towns of the Ohio area. Visiting the site of the restored and rebuilt buildings and stockade at the 1773 Westmoreland County courthouse at Hanna’s Town – and its associated exhibits – near Greenburg, Pennsylvania, enhanced my archival research about the Virginia and Pennsylvania boundary dispute and the latter colony’s position in the Indian conflict and frontier society. Similarly, a visit to the preserved Irvin Allen / Michael Cresap House Museum in Oldtown, Maryland, provided a better understanding of Captain Michael Cresap, the man who is often and erroneously blamed for the murder of Logan’s relatives and thereby causing Dunmore’s War. Located along the march route of the Right Wing from its rendezvous at
Winchester to Fort Pitt, the Cresap House was the scene of the council of war at which Lord Dunmore changed his original plan of campaign.

While some historians do not add the study of material culture to their research designs, I integrated and embraced it with regard to Dunmore’s War. Visiting museums and historic sites yielded information which enhanced what I found in the archival sources. By using all of the senses, I had the opportunity to not only see, but in cases touch, feel and hold the primary source represented by the artifact in the context of its own time and place. Visiting historic sites associated with the conflict similarly added the sense of time and place to my study of Dunmore’s War. Applying military terrain analysis to the accounts of the Battle of Point Pleasant allowed me to put them into a more realistic context. Museums and historic sites associated with Dunmore’s War further enhanced my understanding and feeling of personal connection with this period of history.

In conclusion, the dissertation that follows is the most comprehensive and detached study of Lord Dunmore’s War and its implications completed to date. While it is focused on military operations, it also addresses the political and diplomatic aspects that precipitated and continued during the conflict, and explains the causes to which both sides attributed the hostilities in 1774. In addition, it presents a more detailed study of the Virginia colonial militia than found available elsewhere. Finally, it should stand as the most complete and readable account of the last Indian conflict of America’s colonial era.

1 C. Hale Sipe The Indian Wars of Pennsylvania (Butler, Pa.: Wennawoods Publishing 1931, reprinted Lewisburg, Pa., 1999), 494.
6 Griffin, 117.
8 James Newell, Orderly Book and Journal entry dated Camp on Point Pleasant, October 17, 1774, Virginia Papers 11ZZ1-12, Lyman C. Draper Manuscript Collection; and transcribed in Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds. *Documentary History of Dunmore’s War 1774* (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1905), 361.
9 Holton, 33.
10 James Corbett David *Dunmore’s New World* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013), 85.
12 Winkler, 36.
16 Griffin, 112.
17 Winkler, 25.
18 Ibid.
19 Lewis, 199.
20 Downes, 175.
21 Griffin, 114.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.