CHAPTER 2

TRAINED TO MARTIAL EXERCISE:

The Virginia Colonial Militia

1773-1774

War and Virginia

The threat of war was ever-present in the colony of Virginia. As the largest, most populous and prosperous colony in North America, it both tempted the enemies of the Mother Country, and supported her with blood and treasure against rival European powers. The series of conflicts that began in 1689 and lasted well into the eighteenth century, later called “The Second Hundred Years War” by some historians, gave the colony a role in the defense as well as the expansion of the British Empire. Although involvement in the wars for empire always were a concern, the militia served to defend the colony from the more immediate threats posed by potentially hostile native peoples on its frontiers or a disaffected population, including slaves, from within. Although these dangers waxed and waned over years, the militia provided an institution that could respond when needed. Such a time came as friction between settlers and Indians turned to increasing violence in late 1773 and early 1774.

The Virginia colonial militia was as old as the Old Dominion itself. Like other European institutions transplanted in the New World, the militia reflected a well-established tradition that dated to the twelfth century. The 1181 decree by King Henry II known as the Assize of Arms obligated all adult male subjects to render military service in defense of the realm, and required that they possess certain arms and equipment according to their social class. By the sixteenth century, during the Tudor monarchies, men of property formed into volunteer train-bands (or
trained bands), and received military instruction from professional officers under the authority of their shire’s lord-lieutenant. Less expensive than maintaining a permanent standing force, the trained bands provided a source from which the nation state formed its armies in time of war. The militia remained England’s principal land force until the establishment of the national standing army during the reign of King Charles II in the seventeenth century.

In the fifth (1773) edition of his Dictionary of the English Language, Samuel Johnson defined “militia” as “that part of the community trained to martial exercise.”¹ Earlier editions also included definitions such as “the standing force of a nation” and “The Trainbands,” with the latter further explained as “a name formerly given to the militia.”² Johnson’s notes explained that he deduced the meanings principally from their usage in The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England by Edward Hyde, first earl of Clarendon. Johnson specifically cited the passage, “the militia … was so settled by law, that a sudden force, or army, could be drawn together, for the defense of the kingdom, if it should be invaded, to suppress an insurrections or rebellion, if it should be attempted.”³ When the English settlers of the several colonies established their respective militias, they all based them on this common tradition. Over time, each of the militia forces of the several English colonies in America adapted to local requirements and established new and unique traditions.

The authorizing legislation in effect during Lord Dunmore’s administration, originally enacted by the Virginia General Assembly in 1757, as well as the pertinent clauses in his commission as governor and letter instructions from the Crown, reflected Johnson’s definitions of Militia and accurately described the force at Dunmore’s command. As commander in chief, Governor Dunmore assumed responsibility for defending his Majesty’s colony and dominion of Virginia from invasions, suppressing rebellions, and pursuing enemies to the borders and out of
the province. Delegation of the king’s authority empowered the former British army captain “at all times to arm, levy, muster and command” all persons living within the boundaries of Virginia. Dunmore could call out, or issue the order to raise, as many regiments and march them anywhere within the province’s boundaries as he deemed necessary. In addition to enlisting volunteers, the governor could order the levy – or drafting – of men for active service as soldiers and artificers. This latter group, artificers, included skilled technicians, mechanics and artisans, such as wheelwrights, carpenters, and smiths, along with wagon and packhorse drivers, woodsmen, and cattle drovers. These men provided the auxiliaries who performed the necessary administrative and logistical functions that supported the militia’s fighting force during actual service. The governor could order the construction of fortifications, and impress or commandeer private property such as sloops, boats, draft animals, wagons, supplies, and provisions for military use. Finally, he held the authority to proclaim martial law and issue letters of marque and reprisal to privateers in the king’s name during wartime.

The governor’s commission, however, did not grant him absolute military power. Virginia’s General Assembly, which mirrored the British Parliament in both constitution and power, established the institutional structure of the colony’s forces in An Act for the better regulating and disciplining the militia, commonly called the Militia Law. The act defined the obligations of those who had to serve, specified their related responsibilities, and qualified the exemptions of those excused from performing service or attending training. The Militia Law also defined the colonial government’s role in supporting its military establishment, enforcing the act’s provisions, and maintaining order and discipline when its soldiers were not serving on active duty. Additional statutes, collectively known as The several Acts of Assembly for making provision against invasions and insurrections, defined to the colonial government’s
responsibilities for defense and internal security and the operational employment of the militia. Among others, the acts included provisions and procedures for raising and supporting militia forces called into “actual service” – or active duty – and enhanced military measures, such as organizing provincial standing forces, “in times of danger.” They also contained regulations that corresponded to the British Articles of War for maintaining order and discipline of colonial soldiers when serving on active duty, but not with or under command of regular British officers.7

Because the House of Burgesses controlled provincial revenue, the General Assembly’s acts for defending the colony against invasions and insurrections constrained the governor’s military power, not unlike the Mutiny Act constrained the king’s. The latter, enacted after passage of the English Bill of Rights in 1689, the Mutiny Act recognized royal control of the army but required the consent of Parliament, specifically the House of Commons, to maintain a standing army in peacetime. The act provided the constitutional monarchy a safeguard against the king using the army as an instrument of tyranny at home by administratively disbanding the force every year when the law expired. Parliament reestablished the army by passing a new act to authorize the force for the next twelve months. The Mutiny Act also gave the British army legal standing in courts of law, provided for the administration of order and discipline of troops stationed at home, and appropriated the funds necessary to cover military expenditures, including soldier pay, by consent of the governed through their representatives in the House of Commons.

By the eighteenth century, the Virginia militia differed in many respects from its counterpart in England. The law governing the English militia required all able bodied males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five to enroll, but few actually served. The anonymous author of the Preface to The Militia-Man, a handbook published in London circa 1740 for use by its members, wrote “All men of property should serve in the militia,” because they “each have something to
lose,” and “consequently… are fit persons to consider of the means of preserving it.” While individuals could volunteer, parishes selected men by ballot to fill the quotas apportioned to them by the county. After they completed a three-month period of training, militia members served the rest of their three-year terms in a unit that mustered to train periodically and responded to local alarms or augmented the regular army anywhere in England, but not overseas, in national emergencies. While Parliament recognized the king as the commander in chief of the militia, it also performed an important role as an armed safeguard against royal excesses. Reflecting the English fear of standing armies in peacetime, the militia first protected the rights and property of the citizenry from the army if the king chose to use the regulars as an instrument of domestic oppression.

Like its English counterpart, the Virginia militia looked on the king as its royal commander, but stood ready to protect the rights and property of Virginians if the monarch, or his ministers, violated the constitution and used the regular army to oppress them. The Virginia acts similarly checked the ability of the governor to use military force without the consent of the governed. As with the Mutiny Act, the colony’s military laws expired after a specific time, and required the legislature to either pass new or continue the existing legislation. Dunmore’s commission may have delegated to him the power of the sword, with authority to call out and command the militia, but only the General Assembly, specifically the House of Burgesses, held the power of the provincial purse. Like the House of Commons in Parliament, only the elected lower house could initiate bills to raise revenues, appropriate funds and approve payment from the treasury. Before doing so, however, the house appointed several of its members to serve as commissioners “to examine and state accounts of the militia ordered into actual service” and report on the validity of the claims. Only after the committee of the whole voted to accept and approve the
commissioners’ findings did the House of Burgesses authorize the colonial treasurer to pay the troops and other military expenses.\textsuperscript{10}

The terminating provisions provided the General Assembly with the opportunity to evaluate laws and incorporate amendments or changes. The process did not always prove easy. For example, when Lieutenant Governor Robert Dinwiddie addressed the General Assembly in November 1753, he reported that he found the militia “deficient in some Points.” He urged the House of Burgesses to revise the Militia Law that had been in effect without substantive changes since 1738.\textsuperscript{11} It took them another four years to pass an effective bill that addressed the problems, but not before the opening campaigns of the French and Indian War proved Dinwiddie’s observations correct.

Although the General Assembly had amended it twice and continued it four times to keep it current, the Militia Law enacted in 1757 remained in effect when Dunmore assumed office in 1771. Thomas Nelson, president of the Council, signed the most recent continuance as acting governor only two months before the earl’s arrival.\textsuperscript{12} During the February 1772 session, the first over which Dunmore presided, the Assembly “continued and amended” both of the military-related laws. The Militia Law would next expire after the 1774 session. Not due to expire until June of the following year, the Burgesses viewed it “expedient” to extend the \textit{Act for making provision against invasions and insurrections} early, for two additional years, or until 1775.\textsuperscript{13}

**Virginia’s Militia Establishment**

In contrast to the regular British army or other standing forces, an individual did not join, or enlist, in the Virginia colonial militia. It differed from the English militia of the period in that Virginia’s militia principally constituted a pool of manpower available for military service in an
emergency rather than an organized reserve of the army. The 1757 law required every free adult
white male Virginia inhabitant between eighteen and sixty years of age to enroll, which gave the
militia a nominal strength – on paper – of nearly 50,000 men during Dunmore’s tenure as
governor. To fulfill his obligation, unless otherwise specified, the law required each man to
furnish himself with “a firelock well fixed, a bayonet fitted to the same, a double cartouche-box,
and three charges of powder,” and attend all musters and training exercises so equipped. Many
of the 11,000 men enrolled in the militia of the counties west of the Blue Ridge, particularly
those in the frontier districts, armed themselves with rifles. Colonel William Preston, the county
lieutenant of Fincastle County in 1774, described the militia of his own and neighboring
Botetourt and Augusta Counties as “being mostly armed with rifle guns” instead of muskets, and
therefore substituted a powder horn and shot pouch for the cartridge box, and a tomahawk in lieu
of the bayonet to satisfy the requirements of the militia act. The law required every soldier to
keep one pound of gun powder and four pounds of lead, enough for about seventy rounds of ball
ammunition, at his home. And to keep it well maintained and ready to bring whenever directed
by his officers in the event of an actual alarm or when ordered into the field for active duty.\footnote{14}

The Militia Law did not exempt individuals if they could not afford to purchase the required
items. Each county and the corporate boroughs of Williamsburg and Norfolk maintained public
magazines with modest supplies of weapons and equipment marked as public property. If a
court inquiry verified a member’s economic need, the county issued him the necessary arms,
accoutrements and ammunition from its magazine. Once such a man had the ability to do so, he
made payments until he covered the weapon’s cost. Otherwise, as soon as the poor soldier who
required such public assistance could afford to purchase his own arms and ammunition, or had
been removed from the muster roles due to age, death, or other reasons, the captain in command
of his company retrieved the county’s property and returned it to the magazine so it could be issued to another man of limited means.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1712, during the War of the Spanish Succession, known in North America as Queen Anne’s War, the British government bestowed “a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition for the service of this colony,” in order to better equip the militia. Two years later, 1714, the General Assembly appropriated funds to erect a magazine at Williamsburg where “all arms, gunpowder, and ammunition now in the colony, belonging to the king … may be lodged and kept.” The weapons stored there were then available “to arm part of the militia, not otherwise sufficiently provided.” The Assembly also voted to appropriate funds to employ a staff of two artificers, a “keeper of the magazine” to receive, issue, and account for the weapons and ammunition, and an armorer to maintain and repair them.\textsuperscript{16} The arsenal eventually housed other classes of munitions, such as pole and edged weapons, swivel and wall guns, cannon barrels, field carriages and artillery implements, as well as equipment ranging from tents, camp kettles and entrenching tools to drums. The Assembly made it clear that the arsenal did not replace the several local facilities. The munitions and supplies available at “his majesty’s magazine and other stores within the colony” improved the province’s ability to arm either standing forces or militia ordered out on campaign by the government in Williamsburg.\textsuperscript{17}

The militia act required all free men – white, black and red – to enroll, but not everyone performed the duties of a soldier. The law traditionally exempted the clergy of the Church of England, as well as the “president, masters or professors, and students” of the College of William and Mary, from their military obligations. It exempted “Seamen and Sailors” from militia activities during periods when they served “in actual pay” on board or “belonging” to a ship or vessel. The law formally excused keepers of public jails, overseers of four or more slaves,
millers, and men who worked at iron, copper, or lead mines from attending scheduled training assemblies, but still required them to possess the necessary arms, accouterments, powder, and lead, and muster during alarms. If not actively participating as commissioned officers, those otherwise eligible men who held civil office in the provincial, county, or borough governments did not have to attend regular musters, lest they find themselves serving subordinate to someone over whom they presided in performance of their civil offices. Unless they had previously held at least a captain’s commission, the law required such excused officials to not only have their own, but “provide compleat sets of arms” for a given number of soldiers, depending on the level of their civil offices. This helped to defray the public’s expense for equipping the poorer men of their communities, in return for being excused from muster. Because other laws prohibited them from owning firearms, the Militia Act required “all such free Mulattoes, Negroes, and Indians as are or shall be inlisted” to participate and assemble without weapons. Not permitted to train as soldiers of the line, these members served as drummers, trumpeters, artificers, pioneers or “in such other servile labor as they shall be directed to perform.”

The 1766 amendments to the militia law increased the number of men “free and exempt from mustering,” but still required them to enroll and possess the necessary arms and ammunition. The newly exempted classes included physicians and surgeons, and if not holding concurrent military commissions, civil officers such as tobacco inspectors employed at public warehouses, and “all his majesty’s justices of the peace who are really and bona fide acting as justices” by regularly hearing cases. The new amendments accommodated matters of conscience and excused members of pacifist religious sects. The courts excused professed Quakers from attending military training and owning weapons if their meetings attested to their membership in good standing in the Society of Friends. In return, the law required excused Quakers to
contribute to a public fund for equipping the poorer men of the community, and still muster for alarms. If selected for active service by a draft, the government tolerated the sect’s strictures against its members rendering military service, but required them to provide or pay for substitutes to serve in their places at their own expense.\textsuperscript{19}

The General Assembly delegated to the militia the means of enforcing order and discipline in its ranks. Officers and enlisted men received no pay for attending, but faced fines of up to £5 or confinement in the county jail, plus payment of prison fees to the sheriff, for missing training assemblies without excuse, or failing to pass muster by not having the required arms and equipment.\textsuperscript{20} Soldiers who committed acts of misconduct, refused to obey the commands of their officers, or behaved “prefactorily or mutinously” during training assemblies or courts martial became subject to stiffer disciplinary action. The Militia Act allowed “the chief commanding officer then present” to summarily impose punishment that included fines of as much as “forty shillings current money” and having an offender “tied neck and heels, for any time not exceeding five minutes,” but no other corporal punishment, such as flogging on the bare back, in peace time.\textsuperscript{21} Courts Martial ordinarily convened the day immediately following a county’s general muster, provided the local inferior court had adjourned for the month, or as approved by the General Assembly. Before hearing cases, the empanelled officers swore to “do equal right and justice to all men according to the act of Assembly for the better governing and regulating of the militia.”\textsuperscript{22}

The General Assembly established rates of pay for militia soldiers when they were called to perform active service or in response to an alarm that lasted more than six days. The same per diem rates applied to provincial regulars when the Assembly authorized the raising of standing forces. In 1774, the act still reflected the following compensation:
the county lieutenant or commander in chief ten shillings per day; a colonel, lieutenant colonel each ten shillings per day; major eight shillings per day; captain six shillings per day; lieutenant three shillings per day; ensign two shillings per day; serjeant and corporal each one shilling and four-pence per day; drummer one shilling and two pence per day; [private] soldier one shilling per day.”

In addition, except for criminal charges, the law “privileged and exempted” militia members from arrest while going to, attending, or returning from musters, and protected them “from being served with any other process in any civil action or suit” while on duty. At no time could the military items the law required them to possess be “distressed” – or seized – to satisfy creditors in any judgments. When ordered to active service in the colony’s pay, the law exempted the men from paying province, county, and parish levies, including any new taxes enacted by the General Assembly during their absence on military duty, as well as “privileged” soldiers’ private estates from civil court action for indebtedness.

Although the law mandated compulsory service for all, the militia from time to time suffered a lack of citizen interest or governmental neglect, especially when no apparent or perceived threats to peace and colonial security existed. Understandably, inhabitants on the frontier took more interest in their militia participation than those in more secure regions, such as the Tidewater, “on account of the frequency of Indian atrocities.” Drummer Joseph Tennant of Captain James Parson’s company of Hampshire County militia in 1774, explained that in backcountry communities, “Every man learned the use of fire arms from necessity… and were taught a certain amount of military discipline.”

For whatever reasons, some men preferred paying the fine, or hoped that indifferent county courts would neglect to enforce the law, rather than attend training assemblies. Others refused to turn out when summoned for active service. In contrast, other Virginians viewed militia participation as an avocation. Such officers and members of the rank and file took training and
service seriously and developed military skills and prowess that exceeded that of most of their peers. More importantly, their county and colony counted on such men who volunteered at the first alarm and often served repeated tours of duty. In a land devoid of native hereditary aristocracy, most militia officers valued their commissions. Many preferred to be identified and addressed by their titles of rank in public discourse as well as correspondence for the rest of their lives, and took them to the grave by having them carved on their headstones.

While many of the colonies were similar in their militia establishments, differences could be found. Where some other colonies elected their leaders, members of Virginia’s forces did not. Commanders at various levels appointed subordinate officers and noncommissioned officers. Justices of the inferior courts could suggest candidates for consideration and members of the Council offered their advice and consent on the appointment of field officers, but only the governor had authority to sign and issue commissions. The governor, “reposing special Trust and Confidence … in the Loyalty, Courage, and Conduct” of a deserving gentleman, extended the status as an officer, with all the inherent responsibilities as well as privileges involved, in the name of his Majesty.

Each major political sub-division had a “Chief Commander of all his Majesty’s Militia, Horse and Foot” who answered to the governor. Given the title of county lieutenant in each of the sixty-one counties, or chief commanding officer in the two boroughs of Williamsburg and Norfolk, this officer held “Full power and Authority to command, levy, arm, and muster,” all those available for military service residing within the limits of his respective jurisdiction. In case of an emergency, such as a “sudden Disturbance or Invasion,” the county lieutenant could “raise, order, and march all or such part of the said Militia,” as he deemed necessary to resist and subdue the enemy.
Each chief commanding officer held the rank of colonel. According to the Militia Law, the county lieutenant’s commission took precedence before that of any other officer holding equal rank, such as a regimental commander, in the county. Otherwise, he observed and followed the orders and directions of the royal governor and “any other … superior officer” appointed over him in accordance with the “Rules and Discipline of War.”29 If the county had a second colonel, the latter often functioned as a deputy to the first. In reality, some county lieutenants treated their positions more like a civil office, and personally attended only to its administrative requirements and left purely military matters to a subordinate field officer.30

To organize Virginia forces, the Militia Act required the county lieutenants and chief commanding officers to “list all male persons within this colony (imported servants excepted)” between eighteen and sixty years of age. The county lieutenant divided the county into nine geographical catchments based on the distribution of the military-age free white male population. Each catchment constituted one company of foot, with possibly one troop of horse organized from the county at large. The county lieutenant placed the soldiers thus organized “under the command of such captains as he shall think fit” to appoint and receive a commission from the governor.31 After he consulted the subordinate field officers and captains commanding the companies, the county lieutenants appointed the necessary subaltern officers, or the lieutenants and ensigns in companies of infantry, or lieutenants and coronets in troops of cavalry.32 After an officer received his commission bearing the signature of the royal governor, he swore the necessary oaths required to affirm his loyalty and pledged his service “for the security of his majesty’s person and government.”33 Each captain appointed the noncommissioned officers and musicians in his company, as well as a clerk who kept the muster rolls and maintained the records. Soldiers could not decline an appointment to a position of increased authority or
responsibility without consequence. One who refused to serve as a sergeant, corporal, drummer or trumpeter “as required by his captain” became subject to a monetary fine imposed by the county court for every muster that he continued to refuse the appointment.  

Although designated a company and commanded by a captain, the local unit primarily functioned for administrative and training purposes only. These administrative companies were often larger than the fifty rank and file established for a company of the line in active service, and rarely took the field except when called out for alarms. For example, on being notified of an invasion or insurrection, the law required every officer to “raise the militia under his command.” dispatch express messengers to inform his immediate superior commanding officer of his actions, and “immediately proceed to oppose the enemy” until he received orders directing him to do otherwise. Similarly, on receiving word of an alarm in an adjacent county, the law obliged the chief commander of militia to “immediately raise the militia of his county,” and detach as many as two thirds of his men to engage the invaders or insurgents. The county lieutenant then organized the remaining third to remain in arms for the “defense and protection of the county,” and waited on orders from the governor.

To make the force “more serviceable,” the Militia Act held officers responsible for their men’s readiness and compliance with the law. A captain, for example, ensured that all the soldiers in his company were properly armed, equipped, and trained. In peacetime, the statute required him to conduct a “private muster” in the local neighborhood at least once every three months, or more often if he or the county lieutenant deemed it necessary. After the captain inspected his men, and took “particular Care” to see that they all possessed the necessary arms and ammunition, he trained his company according to the Manual Exercise as Ordered by His Majesty in 1764. The manual reflected the British army’s experience on European battlefields
during the Seven Years War and concentrated on the essential elements of individual and platoon drill, evolutions and maneuvers, and firings.

“POISE YOUR FIRELOCKS!”  

When they heard the first word of command echo across the muster field at their first assembly, all the company’s new members began their “material” training, or basic individual instruction, under the tutelage of an experienced soldier. They first learned the basic drill and rudiments of marching, individually at first, then in small groups without arms. They then progressed to how to properly stand with, handle, load, prime, cock and fire a musket – the army way; charge, or fix, their bayonets to their muskets; assume the various positions of a soldier under arms; and again added marching while armed. Once proficient in these basics, the new troops progressed to platoon exercise. At that stage, they trained at firing their muskets in volleys by platoons, or half-companies, arrayed in lines three ranks deep. Graduating to the “mechanical phase” of evolutions and maneuvers, the company practiced the methods and patterns for cohesive movement, changing formations and advancing and retiring across the muster field as if in battle. In the final element, “firings,” the company drilled the elaborate and precise order by which platoons delivered the volleys of musketry that characterized eighteenth-century combat.

“MAKE-READY. PRESENT. FIRE!”

In addition to observing the several private musters throughout the year, the militia law required the county lieutenant to train all the companies under his command once a year at an annual “general muster and exercise,” usually in March or April. When wartime necessitated enhanced readiness, the General Assembly often increased the frequency of company musters to
once every month, or every other month, and added a second general muster for all counties in September or October as well.\textsuperscript{40} It is arguable that British regulars posted in widely dispersed garrisons in peacetime did not receive substantially more, if not less, training in regimental-sized formations than Virginia militiamen.\textsuperscript{41}

General musters also began with the ubiquitous inspections to ensure all officers and men had the proper arms and ammunition as the law required. The companies then trained collectively and practiced the elements of the manual that applied to battalion formations. Ideally, two platoons operated in a tactical company-sized unit called a sub-division. Two sub-divisions combined to form one grand division. An entire tactical battalion organized on the regular British model consisted of four grand divisions of four platoons each, arrayed in three ranks, and trained to execute the appropriate evolutions and maneuvers with some degree of proficiency. Finally, given the limited time available, a battalion strove to master the most critical elements of all, “firings,” either by “ranks entire,” or by platoons, sub-divisions and grand divisions in the elaborate sequence and precise order of rolling volleys that enabled it to deliver a near continuous volume of musketry. Victory on the eighteenth century battlefield often went to the side that could put the most lead at its opponent in the quickest time.\textsuperscript{42} Such exercises would have been the norm in the more settled regions, as reflected in the law enacted in 1740, to “establish our Militia on such a Footing, that in case of Invasion or Attack, they may be enabled to contend with regular Troops.”\textsuperscript{43} Given the threat they would more likely face, the militia of the frontier counties spent more time practicing light infantry-style tactics adapted to the probability of fighting Indians in the woods.

As part of the plan to further enhance readiness and ensure compliance with the Militia Act, Lieutenant Governor Robert Dinwiddie eliminated the office of a single colonial adjutant general
on the eve of the French and Indian War. He divided the colony into the Northern, Southern, Middle and Frontier Military Districts, and assigned an adjutant general to each. Receiving an annual stipend of £100, and usually holding the rank of major, each adjutant general reported to the governor on compliance with the Militia Law in the counties that comprised his district.44

In performing their duties, these officers attended all the battalion general musters in their districts. To perform their duties, the adjutants general were instructed to “exercise the Officers first” in order “to qualify them to exercise each separate Company” and prepare them for their respective general musters.45 During an inspection, they ensured that all company officers had their men “properly trained up in the use of Arms,” and “more perfect and regular in the Exercise thereof.”46 Finally, performing a role similar to a brigade major or adjutant in the British army on regimental field days, they inspected “all detachments before they be sent to parade,” and saw that all “their arms be clean, their ammunition, accouterments, &c. in good order.”47

With all sixty-one counties and two independent boroughs in the colony required to conduct their general musters in March and April, the adjutants general faced challenging spring schedules. The county lieutenants therefore had to plan their annual training assemblies based on the date they expected the district officer’s presence. The counties involved in Dunmore’s War were among the fourteen that comprised the Frontier Military District, where Captain Thomas Bullitt served as adjutant general. The veteran officer had served in the 1st Virginia Regiment throughout the French and Indian War, remained active in the militia, and had actively sought the assignment before Governor Botetourt appointed him on May 10, 1769.48

Due to the remoteness and difficulty reaching some of the locations in his district, the newly appointed adjutant general used public notices, called “advertisements,” in the March 22, 1770
edition of Rind’s *Virginia Gazette* to notify the thirteen county lieutenants of his schedule – the law that erected Fincastle County was enacted in 1772. The next year, because the General Assembly had not yet voted to continue the Militia Act due to expire, Bullitt acted on his “former appointment” to announce his itinerary in the February 5, 1771, edition of Purdie and Dixon’s *Virginia Gazette*. Unless prevented by “high water” or other unforeseen circumstances, Bullitt expected to be present at their county courthouses on the dates indicated. Since they all outranked him, and considering the schedule he had to maintain, he requested that the county lieutenants “oblige him” by assembling their militia “in good Order, and accoutered as the Law directs” at that time.49

Bullitt’s responsibilities as a surveyor, which took him on an expedition to the Falls of the Ohio and the site of present Louisville Kentucky, prevented him from inspecting the district’s general musters in 1773. Fortunately, the counties of the Frontier District benefited from having a number of field officers and senior captains, as well as non-commissioned officers, who had combat experience in the French and Indian War while serving with the provincial standing forces. Colonels Adam Stephen and Andrew Lewis, the county lieutenants of Frederick and Botetourt Counties, respectively, had served as officers under Colonel Washington’s command in the Virginia Regiment, and commanded volunteer battalions in Pontiac’s War. Colonels Charles Lewis and William Preston, the respective county lieutenants of Augusta and Fincastle Counties, had served as officers in provincial ranging companies.

**Mobilization and Actual Service**

When the colony needed soldiers, such as for offensive expeditions or the garrisons of frontier forts, the governor issued a call for troops drawn from the militia to perform active
service in the colony’s pay. Addressed to one or more county lieutenants, the call either stated a
given number of soldiers, or proportion of his total, such as “one for every twentieth man,” to be
detached for “immediate service.” During the French and Indian War the House of Burgesses
appropriated funds for “Encouragement of militia to go out freely for the defence of the country
in all times of danger; with a certain assurance of being paid for their services.” Voluntary
enlistments were always preferred and sought first. If enough men did not volunteer, the General
Assembly could pass laws for drafting levies to make up any shortfall. In addition to pay, both
volunteers and drafted men were promised medical care for illnesses and injuries incurred while
on duty, pensions for disabilities that prevented them from earning a living wage after their terms
of service expired, as well as relief for their widows and orphans if they died as a result of
service. Ordinary, the governor sought the Assembly’s support in appropriating money for
soldier pay before issuing the call for men, but he could act without it, albeit temporarily, in
emergencies.

Although written for obtaining recruits to fill the ranks of the standing forces during the
French and Indian War, the March 1756 Act for frontier defense outlined a method for
conducting a draft. The law authorized and the chief militia officer to summon the field
officers and captains commanding companies of the county or borough and hold a council of war
to implement the draft procedure. The captains brought and delivered lists, derived from court
records, of all single free white men living in the precincts that comprised their respective
company catchments, as well as the company muster rolls showing the names of all those
enrolled and participating in the militia. After comparing the documents, the officers added the
names of any non-exempted able-bodied men residing in their companies’ areas who had not
been duly “inlisted and enrolled, according to the militia laws.” The county lieutenant then
selected a day and time and called a general muster at the courthouse. Militia and civil officers spread the word by giving public notice, advertising in the *Virginia Gazette*, and posted broadside announcements “at all places of public resort.”

The men assembled in their companies outside the courthouse on the appointed day. After roll call, the captains asked volunteers to step forward, and took their names. The county lieutenant then reconvened the council of war inside, where the officers prepared a number of blank pieces of paper, one for each available man in the county. The officers then wrote the words, “This obliges me immediately to enter his majesty’s service,” on the quantity of sheets that reflected the county’s quota. After withdrawing one marked paper for each man who volunteered, those who were absent from the muster became the “first pricked down” and “declared to be soldiers duly inlisted in his majesty’s service,” unless later excused. The remaining sheets were put in a box, “well shaken and the papers therein mixed,” and placed in view of all the members of the council of war.

The officers then instructed the assembled men, minus the volunteers, to come forward one at a time to draw one piece of paper from out of the box. As he did so, each man held his paper to “public view.” Anyone who displayed a sheet with the writing was “deemed and taken to be an enlisted soldier.” The officers could excuse a drafted man if someone present who had not drawn a marked paper chose to take his place. A drafted man could also find an able-bodied man who was not drafted, but willing to serve in his stead in return for a payment of money.

Officers received commissions of rank based on the required strength of the units they were to command, and expected to exert their leadership skills and powers of persuasion to recruit a sufficient numbers of volunteers. They took care not to create organizations that proved too top-
heavy and therefore inordinately costlier by having individuals serve in higher rank positions than commensurate with the size of the force actually recruited. The law specified that- the county lieutenants could “not depute any greater number of inferior officers … than one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, three sergeants or corporals, and one drummer for every fifty soldiers,” and in like proportions for greater numbers, in a company of foot.56

If the full establishment strength of fifty men for an infantry company could not be reached, the number and ranks of the leaders decreased proportionally. A company of foot that consisted of thirty men could not have more than one lieutenant, one ensign, and two sergeants, while a company of fifteen or fewer men required not more than one ensign, and one sergeant. Before being taken into pay, the names and numbers on the muster rolls had to be certified by every commanding officer and “attested upon oath” before a justice of the peace of the county where the company had been raised. While they may have been addressed by the titles of higher ranks held in the militia, officers only received the pay granted for the ranks approved by the Assembly for the command of units on campaign. Commanders who claimed greater numbers of men in order to receive higher rank with corresponding pay, or appointed more subordinate officers than the actual strength of the unit allowed, faced fines of an amount equal to the pay of such “supernumerary officers.”57

When the colony called the militia to active duty in wartime or other emergency, the county lieutenants often established a rendezvous camps for the units drawn from their jurisdictions. Drawn from one or more local administrative companies, the companies were composed of men who had voluntarily enlisted or who were drafted, and organized into ad hoc units. Similarly, the adjutants general established rendezvous camps where the units from the several counties of the district assembled. Before Dinwiddie expanded the numbers and roles of the adjutants general,
this function had been performed by the colony’s single adjutant general for the province at
large. During the French and Indian War, the rendezvous camp represented an important step in
the process of preparing militia for active service and campaigning, as well as raising provincial
regulars when the General Assembly authorized the establishment of standing forces. Where a
soldier received a modicum of training through the quarterly local company and annual general
county-wide musters, what he received in at the rendezvous camp improved upon that base and
helped transform the ad hoc companies into more cohesive tactical units better prepared for the
sustained operations in which they would participate.

As the Frontier Department’s adjutant general, twenty-one-year-old Major George
Washington conducted the rendezvous camp at Winchester for the first militia companies
embodied for provincial service in 1754. The training received at the rendezvous camp may
have resembled that which then Colonel Washington directed the officers of 1st Virginia
Regiment to institute when he assumed command. It included drilling the men in the manual
exercise and conventional linear tactics as well as in the “Indian Method of fighting,” and
practice “Shooting at Targets.” 58 Not neglecting officer training, Washington noted that “there
ought to be a time appropriated to attain this knowledge,” and insisted that they read and apply
the lessons found in “Bland’s and other treatises which will give the wished for information.” 59

As the men trained in the school of the soldier according to the 1764 drill manual, officers
studied A Treatise on Military Discipline, in which is laid down and explained the duty of the
officer and soldier, by Lieutenant General Humphrey Bland. First published in 1727, its nine
editions became – arguably – the most widely read and authoritative work on British army
tactical operations and unit leadership for much of the eighteenth century. Based on experience
gained on European battlefields, but adaptable to those in North America, the treatise provided a
valuable instructional text for regular and militia officers alike. Its pages contained valuable maxims and explanations for officers learning or practicing tactics in chapters with such descriptive titles as “General rules for Battalions of Foot, when they engage in the line,” and “for the marching of a Battalion, or a Detachment of men, where there is a possibility of meeting the enemy.” Lessons conveyed in the latter were particularly suited to the fluid environment of petite guerre, or guerrilla war, and fighting partisans in “enclosed or woody country.”

Although developed based on experience gained observing operations against the kind of skulking irregulars found in Europe, such as Pandour and Croat infantry, the methods it described were adaptable to fighting Indians in the forests of North America.

For example, Bland admonished commanders not to advance into territory controlled by the enemy without taking the proper precautions. He reminded each to “consider that the lives of those under his command depend in a great measure on his prudence.” He also cautioned that the most damaging event that could befall an officer, and tarnish his reputation, was not losing an engagement, but “in suffering himself to be surprised, either upon his post, or in marching … without being prepared to make a proper defence, and … not having taken the necessary precautions to prevent it.”

Indian warriors learned to avoid the firepower of massed musketry and artillery on which European armies relied. To achieve victory, the Indians avoided their opponent’s strength and lured them into fights on terms of their own choosing, and in which they possessed all the tactical advantages. Indian forces maximized their skill of fighting in the woods at close quarters to weaken the cohesion and disrupt the command and control of the opposing force units. The warriors then attacked from positions of advantage to inflict heavy losses, if not destroy, on their opponent. To counter the Indians’ advantage, British and colonial forces learned to maximize
their own strength by combining the strategic offense with the tactical defense. Whether on a large or small scale, they advanced in strength and used light forces to develop the situation by skirmishing until they maneuvered the enemy into having no choice but to attack against the superior firepower of cohesive and well-controlled units. In adapting European tactics to fighting in the American woods, formations opened with greater intervals than called for in the manuals, with men taking cover behind trees or logs when necessary and firing aimed shots. Maintaining control and cohesion remained important. An officer had to take particular care to see that an orderly advance did not become became a disorganized pursuit of an enemy that feigned retreat in order to lead his men into an ambush.62

The tactics in which they trained and rehearsed demonstrated an adaptation of Bland’s Treatise for fighting in the woods. Chaplain Thomas Barton described such an exercise conducted by the provincial regiment in which he served during the French and Indian War that may have likely resembled the training Washington prescribed for Virginia troops or conducted at a rendezvous camp for militia preparing for campaign:

“... the Troops are led to the Field as usual, & exercis’d in this Manner – Viz. – They [the columns] are to, and distant from, each other about 50 Yards: After marching some distance in this Position, they fall into one Rank entire forming a Line of Battle with great Ease & Expedition. The 2 Front-Men of each Column stand fast, & the 2 Next split equally to Right & Left, & so continue alternately till the whole Line is form’d. They are then divided into Platoons, each Platoon consisting of 20 Men, & fire 3 Rounds; the right-Hand Man of each Platoon beginning the Fire, and then the left-Hand Man: & so on Right and Left alternately till the Fire ends in the Center: Before it reaches this Place, the Right & Left are ready again. And by this Means an incessant Fire kept up. When they fir’d six Rounds in this manner they make a [sham] Pursuit with Shrieks & Halloos in the Indian Way, but falling into much Confusion; they are again drawn up into Line of Battle, & fire 3 Rounds as before; After this each Battalion marches in order to Camp.”63

In wartime, and periods of increased tensions between settlers and Indians, county lieutenants engaged individuals as “spies.” When the General Assembly provided the authorization and means, they also raised detachments or companies of rangers to better defend the colonial
frontier. While both services sought to accomplish related objectives, and the skills and techniques required of individuals engaged in each may in some cases have appeared the same or similar, rangers and spies differed in many ways.

The Virginia militia also had its unique units and individual specialists. In the counties of the Frontier Military District, these included rangers, scouts and Indian spies. Drawn from the ranks of the militia, these men volunteered for special missions that were mostly only needed during periods of actual emergency.

During Queen Anne’s War, for example, the government at Williamsburg authorized county lieutenants responsible for frontier defense to raise detachments to “range” – or patrol – the “large vast uninhabited grounds and woods” between settlements. Once posted, they ranged on horseback between forts and fortified houses – known as stations – to “observe, perform and keep such orders and in their several rangings and marchings” to detect approaching war parties, or to pursue those who attacked homes, and killed or captured inhabitants. Rangers routinely rode in pairs, or “two together,” along a chain of four posts. Two two-man patrols met at appointed times and places to exchange information, “report their observations, and when necessary to carry information on the appearance of the enemy to the nearest stations.”

When organizing rangers during Queen Anne’s and King George’s Wars, a county’s chief militia officer appointed a lieutenant to command the detachment. The lieutenant would “choose out and list” eleven able-bodied men with horses and accoutrements, as well as arms and ammunition, who resided conveniently near the frontier station where they were posted. If the commander could not enlist a sufficient number of volunteers for his detachment, the county lieutenant could draft the rest from the militia. Once formed, rangers only operated in their home
counties. The commander and every ranger received compensation that included pay, as well as a stipend for using his personal horse, accoutrements, arms and ammunition, based one year’s service, from the public levy collected in the county. To provide “greater encouragement” to the rangers, the law declared officers and men “free and exempted” from having to pay county and parish levies, and excused them from attending scheduled training musters during the time they remained in active service.67

During the French and Indian War, Virginia again called on the services of rangers for defense of the frontier. In May 1755, the Assembly appropriated funds and authorized the county lieutenants of Frederick, Hampshire and Augusta Counties to each raise a ranger company of fifty men, plus the proper number of officers.68 Raised and paid from the provincial treasury instead of county levies, the three ranger companies could be deployed anywhere in the colony as the governor directed from time to time. While on duty, they answered the immediate orders of the county lieutenant in whose jurisdiction they operated, and cooperated with local militia and companies of the Virginia Regiment, when the latter were posted nearby.69 Like soldiers in the common militia, rangers remained subject to the militia law for discipline, and could neither be sent out of the colony, nor operate more than five miles beyond the most distant settlements on the frontier. Furthermore, they could not be incorporated with British regulars or made subject to martial law.70 Over the course of the war, the numbers of ranging companies increased to six, and were posted to include defense of the southwestern frontier. Legislation eventually increased the authorized establishment strength of each company to 100 men plus officers. Even with the draft, the rangers never achieved full strength.71

If he thought necessary for the defense of the jurisdiction, a county lieutenant could raise and deploy rangers in the county’s pay for limited periods on his own authority.
served in one such company during Dunmore’s War. His detachment of fifteen to twenty men scouted between the Ohio and Monongahela to give the settlements early warning. Posted in a fort, they also guarded the settlements against invasion by the Indians.”

Scouts performed missions intended to inform the inhabitants of enemy activity in their area. Working in small independent detachments of two or three men, the scouts conducted area reconnaissance, paying close attention to trails and other avenues of approach to backcountry communities. Whereas a unit of rangers would seek to intercept and engage an enemy war party, scouts searched for signs of their presence or activity, and returned to a post to report what they found to an officer of the militia to provide early warning. Alexander Scott Withers, an early chronicler of frontier warfare, described scouts as typically men who “made their abode in the dense forest,” and spent most of their time hunting, an occupation he described as “mimicry of war.” Such men were adept at fighting in the wilderness, with well adept at how to resist Indian attacks and retaliate in kind. Withers believed the same skills that enabled the hunter to approach the “watchful deer in his lair” allowed the scout to avoid an Indian ambush, and frequently defeat those who waited in the ambuscade. The chronicler believed the long hunters’ knowledge and ease with which they moved about woods to any location among the settlements to warn the inhabitants of danger made them invaluable to the defense of the frontier districts.

Certain men, such as William Smith of Augusta County, volunteered to serve as Indian spies. Despite the hazards, Smith explained that he preferred “this employment” to service in the militia. More accurately described as a long-range scout in this context, Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “spy” as “one who watches another’s motions,” by attempting to “search” or “discover at a distance.” Spies did not operate in companies or detachments under the command of commissioned officers, but individually or in pairs. Men employed in this service
were not considered to be on active duty, but were excused from attending training musters without suffering fines. Traveling beyond the line of settlements, they ventured though trackless forests to observe the enemy’s activity in their own country, often in the vicinity of Indian towns.

The Virginia militia provided the colony with a force capable of defending its borders as well as taking the fight to an enemy’s home territory. It was organized and trained to fight by degrees. At the lowest level, the local companies responded to alarms that effected the immediate or neighboring communities. As the danger increased, the county lieutenant activated the county’s force, for both its own defense and to assist an adjacent county. Finally, the provincial government could call the militia into actual service to repel invasions by external enemies or suppress insurrections and other internal threats. As the likelihood of an Indian war along the Ohio increased during late 1773 and early 1774, the militia became more active at each of its levels.

1 Samuel Johnson A Dictionary of the English Language in which the words are deduced from their originals; explained in the different meanings and authorized by the names of writers in whose works they are found, Third Edition, two volumes (London: 1773), Volume 2, 412.
4 King George III to Lord Dunmore, Royal Commission and Letter Instructions as Governor of Virginia, dated Court of St. James, 7 February 1771 (hereafter Dunmore’s Commission), Aspinwall Papers, Massachusetts Historical Collection, Fourth Series, Volume 10 (Boston, Mass.: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1871), 659-60; Greene, Evarts Boutell, The Provincial Governor in the English Colonies of North America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1898), 99.
5 Dunmore’s Commission; Greene, 99.
6 William Waller Hening, ed., Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619 (hereafter Hening, Statutes), Volume 5 (Richmond, VA: Franklin Press, 1819), 16-24; Volume 6 (1819), 530-564; Volume 7 (1820), 93-106; Volume 8 (1821), 241-245, 503.

10 Hening, Statutes 8: 9.
13 Hening, Statutes, 8: 503.
14 Hening, Statutes 7: 93-94; Col. William Preston [extract] letter dated Fincastle, September 28, 1774, Virginia Gazette # 1 (Purdie and Dixon) October 13, 1774; and, J.F.D. Smyth A Tour in the United States of America...
Sometime in 1773 or 1774, Vol. 1, (Dublin: G. Perrin, 1784), Vol. 2, 115-.
15 Hening, Statutes 7: 93-94.
17 Hening Statutes, 6: 118.
18 Hening, Statutes, 7: 95; 5: 81-82; 8: 244.
19 Hening Statutes, 8: 242-244.
20 George Webb The office and authority of a justice of peace. And also the duty of sheriffs, coroners, churchwardens, surveyors of highways, constables, and officers of militia. Together with precedents of warrants, judgments, executions, and other legal process, issuable by magistrates within their respective jurisdictions, in cases civil or criminal. And the method of judicial proceedings, before justices of peace, in matters within their cognizance out of sessions. Collected from the common and statute laws of England, and acts of Assembly, now in force; and adapted to the constitution and practice of Virginia (Williamsburg, VA: Printed by William Parks, 1736), 222-223; and, Hening, Statutes, 8: 243-244.
21 Hening, Statutes 8: 244.
22 Hening, Statutes 7: 102.
23 Hening, Statutes, 7: 112.
24 Hening, Statutes 6: 530; 7: 100.
25 Joseph Tennant, quoted in Peter Haught Pension Application S6981 dated August 7, 1832, Roll 1224, National Archives (hereafter NARA).
26 Dunmore’s Commission; Greene, 99.
28 Jefferson’s Commission; Clark’s Commission; and, Hening, Statutes, 7: 106-7.
29 Hening, Statutes, 6: 541.
30 Hening, Statutes, 6: 541.
31 Hening, Statutes, 7: 93-94.
32 Jefferson’s Commission; Webb, 221.
33 Hening, Statutes, 6: 540; and 7: 102-3.
34 Hening, Statutes, 6: 536.
35 McIlwaine, JHB 1752-1755 and 1756-1758 (Richmond, VA: Library of Virginia, 1909), xxiii-iv; 297-8, 321; Hening, Statutes, 6: 527, 529-541, 530-544-5, 559-65; and, 7: 106-7.
36 Clark’s Commission; and, Hening Statutes, 6: 113-4; 7 (1820): 95-96, 106-7; 8: 244, 514; 9 (1821), 23-4. Reference to the 1764 manual is found in a resolution of the March 1775 extra-legal Virginia Convention that called for raising volunteer independent companies as agreed to in the Continental Association. One can safely assume the 1764 manual was most familiar to and also used by the colonial militia following the French and Indian War.
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 95, No. 4 (October 1971), 449–450.


Virginia Gazette #2 (Rind), Supplement, March 22, 1770.

Virginia Gazette #2 (Rind), Supplement, March 22, 1770; and Virginia Gazette #1 (Purdie & Dixon) February 21, 1771.

Hening Statutes, 7: 31.

Ibid 7: 20


Ibid 7: 14.


Ibid 7: 15–16.

Ibid 7: 17.

Ibid 7: 114; and 3: 17.


Humphrey Bland, A Treatise on Military Discipline, in which is laid down and explained the duty of the officer and soldier, hereafter Bland’s Treatise, Ninth Edition (London: W. Johnson, B. Law, and T. Caslon, 1762), Contents, 6, 8, 143.

Bland’s Treatise, 132.


Hening, Statutes, 4: 9–10

Benjamin Wilson, quoted in Leeth, David W., Pension Application S6111, dated 7 August 1832, NARA.
70 Hening, Statutes, 7: 76, 173
71 Ibid 7: 76, 173
72 Arthur Trader Pension Application S30169 dated 5 December 1833, Roll 2408, NARA.
73 Hening, Statutes, 4: 9-10; 6: 465.
73 Alexander Scott Withers Chronicles of Border Warfare: Or, a History of the Settlement by the Whites of Northwestern Virginia and of the Indian Wars and Massacres in the Section of the State (Clarksburg, WV: Joseph Israel, 1831), 102.
74 William Smith Pension Application W6094, dated 17 December 1832, NARA.