

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: **TURKISH SECURITY POLICYMAKING
ON NUCLEAR ISSUES:
CONCEPTUALIZING ADVANCED
COOPERATIVE SECURITY STRATEGIES**

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Turkey is a non-nuclear member of a nuclear alliance in a region where nuclear proliferation is of particular concern. As the only North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member that has a border with the Middle East, Turkish officials argue that Turkey cannot solely rely on NATO guarantees in addressing the regional security challenges. However, Turkey has not been able to formulate a security policy that reconciles its quest for independence, its NATO membership, the bilateral relationship with the United States, and regional engagement in the Middle East.

This dissertation assesses the strategic implications of Turkey's perceptions of the U.S./NATO nuclear and conventional deterrence on nuclear issues. It explores three case studies by the process tracing of Turkish policymakers' nuclear-related decisions on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, national air and missile

defense, and Iran's nuclear program. The study finds that the principles of Turkish security policymaking do not incorporate a fundamentally different reasoning on nuclear issues than conventional deterrence. Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems do not have a defining role in Turkish security and defense strategy. The decisions are mainly guided by non-nuclear considerations such as Alliance politics, modernization of the domestic defense industry, and regional influence. The dissertation argues that Turkey could formulate more effective and less risky security policies on nuclear issues by emphasizing the cooperative security approaches within the NATO Alliance over confrontational measures.

The findings of this dissertation reveal that a major transformation of Turkish security policymaking is required to end the crisis of confidence with NATO, redefinition of the strategic partnership with the US, and a more cautious approach toward the Middle East. The dissertation argues that Turkey should promote proactive measures to reduce, contain, and counter risks before they develop into real threats, as well as contribute to developing consensual confidence-building measures to reduce uncertainty.

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Preface

A large portion of this dissertation relies on field interviews conducted in Turkey in Winter 2015 and empirical evidence until the end of 2015. I defended the dissertation in May 2016. Hence this document doesn't include an analysis of the failed coup attempt against the Turkish government in July 2016 and the consequent events at the Incirlik Air Base.

Dedication

To my angel mother, Nilgun Yeginsu Goren.

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List of Abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ACRS	Arms Control and Regional Security
AKP	Justice and Development Party
ALTBMD	Active Layered Ballistic Missile Defense
ASCM	anti-ship cruise missile
AWACS	airborne warning and control system
BMD	ballistic missile defense
CFE	Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DCA	dual-capable aircraft
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
EPAA	European Phased Adaptive Approach
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GMD	ground-based midcourse defense
IAMD	integrated air and missile defense
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JDAM	Joint Direct Attack Munitions

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

KRG Kurdish Regional Government

LEP Life Extension Program

MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System

MDA U.S. Missile Defense Agency

MEWMDFZ Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

MRBM medium-range ballistic missile

MUNSS United States Air Force Munitions Support Squadron

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NNSA U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration

NNWS non-nuclear weapon states

NPT The Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PAC Patriot Advanced Capability

PfP NATO Partnership for Peace Program

PKK Kurdistan Workers' Party

PNI Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

PYD Kurdish Democratic Union Party (Syria)

SEAD suppression of enemy defenses

SM Standard Missile

SRBM short-range ballistic missile

SSM Turkish Undersecretariat for Defense Industries

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TGS Turkish General Staff

THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

TLORAMIDS Turkish long-range air and missile defense project

TNW tactical nuclear weapons

TSK Turkish Armed Forces

TUAF Turkish Air Force

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Chapter 1: Introduction

In “The Clash of Civilizations,” Samuel Huntington categorized Turkey as a “torn” state between the West and Islam.¹ While this categorization is overly simplistic, it points to Turkey’s problematic identity that is reflected in its foreign and security policymaking: Turkey has not as yet been able to formulate an external security policy that reconciles its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership, its political and military relations with the US, and its regional engagement in the Middle East.

Turkey has historically had difficulty balancing its role as a member of NATO with its interests in regional security. These general challenges to Turkey’s security policy are exacerbated on a range of nuclear-related decisions facing Turkish policymakers today because of the mismatch between its objectives and the means to achieve these goals. At the core of the problem lies the fact that Turkey is a non-nuclear member of a nuclear alliance in a region where nuclear proliferation is of particular concern. Turkey’s security policies have responded to changing circumstances, with little explicit emphasis on nuclear weapons and without careful consideration of policy implications particular to nuclear-related decisions.

In Turkey’s formative history, there has been little public debate on national security. The latest defense white paper that the Turkish Ministry of Defense published, known

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, p. 42.

as the “White Book” in Turkish, dates back to 2000.² Meanwhile, the Turkish Council of Ministers adopted the “National Security Policy Document,” (*Milli Guvenlik Siyaset Belgesi* in Turkish) known as the “red book,” in November 2010.³ This document became known as the “secret constitution” and remains top secret.⁴ Both this document and Turkey’s “Strategy Paper” get revised every five years defining internal and external threats.⁵ Yet, there are no unclassified versions of these documents. Hence it is not clear if these documents carefully assess Turkey’s security objectives, real and lasting threats, both internal and external. Despite being frequently mentioned in reference to nuclear weapons, Turkish officials have not published a white paper on Turkey’s nuclear weapons policy.⁶

A key impediment to public national security debate is the lack of transparency in the Turkish security culture due to the incomplete transformation of civilian oversight of the military. Turkey has been increasing its defense and security budget in line with its economic growth.⁷ Despite hitting stagnancy in the defense industry turnover and exports, Turkey has signed 233 supply projects worth 85 million TL (approximately

² This paper broadly defines the Turkish policies on international security organizations such as NATO and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); regional security, and national defense policy.

³ “Milli Guvenlik Siyaset Belgesi kabul edildi,” *Yeni Safak*, November 22, 2010.

⁴ “Milli Guvenlik Siyaset Belgesi hakkında bilgi verilemez,” *T24*, November 27, 2013.

⁵ “Paralel Yapi ‘Kirmizi Kitap’ta yer alacak,” *CNNTurk*, July 21, 2014.

⁶ Turkey is often named to become part of a “proliferation cascade” scenario in the Middle East, in response to the possible weaponization of Iran’s nuclear capabilities. See: Mustafa Kibaroglu, *Nuclearization of the Middle East and Turkey’s Possible Responses*, *EDAM Discussion Paper Series*, November 2012, 2012/5, Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), Istanbul.

⁷ Lale Kemal, “Turkey’s Defense Budget in Line with Growth Rate,” *Today’s Zaman*, February 27, 2014.

\$30 million) in 2015.⁸ Yet, parts of the defense budget remains outside parliamentary oversight and there are discrepancies between the Turkish Finance Ministry and NATO figures that exclude non-deployable elements and arms procurement by the Under-secretariat for the Defense Industry (SSM).⁹ The scope of the military modernization projects require scrutiny for both economic and security consequences of making these decisions.

The motivation of this dissertation is identifying the fundamental Turkish security objectives on nuclear issues and proposing guiding operational principles that meet the security role Turkey plays as a member of NATO and its region. These principles should minimize the costs and threats arising from its neighborhood, mainly the Middle East. Making effective security policy decisions on nuclear issues requires the clear identification of credible threats, both in terms of capabilities and intentions, as well as the cost-benefit analyses of policy options in search of the most effective and least costly alternatives.

Thesis

The state of affairs between Turkey and the West reflect a test of solidarity, as there are increasing concerns over Turkey being an “unreliable” ally that is no longer

⁸ “Savunma Sanayii Mustesarligi, Faaliyet Raporu 2015,” March 21, 2016, at: <http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Faaliyet%20Raporlar/2015%20Yılı%20Faaliyet%20Raporu.pdf>

⁹ Kemal, “Turkey’s Defense Budget in Line with Growth Rate,” 2014.

dependable, given the divergence of interests on a number of regional challenges in the Middle East, especially in Syria.¹⁰

While Turkey's distrust of NATO guarantees have historically shaped its security policies, particularly on nuclear issues, the Turkish quest for independence and regional gain have in turn made Turkey's commitment to NATO questionable. The tensions between loyalty to the Alliance and pursuit of other national interests refer to a dichotomy: Turkey being unreliable versus NATO being unreliable. Is NATO's commitment to Turkey weak or is it Turkey that does not want to be reassured?

This dissertation aims to answer two central questions: (1) How has Turkey's perception of the U.S. nuclear and conventional deterrence evolved throughout the Cold War, post-Cold War, and the AKP government? What are the strategic implications of these perceptions on Turkish decision making on nuclear issues? (2) Do Turkey's current policies on nuclear issues serve its broadly defined security objectives?, Could the principles of cooperative security be used to reformulate Turkish nuclear-related policies in ways that better serve its full range of interests at a more affordable cost?

These questions help understand how unique Turkey's concerns and security needs are within the Alliance, how urgent the threats are, and what the useful strategies to address these threats would entail.

¹⁰ "Turkey: An Increasingly Undependable Ally," Bipartisan Policy Center, April 23, 2015, at: <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/turkey-an-increasingly-undependable-ally/>

In order to answer these questions, the dissertation analyzes three interrelated cases of Turkey's positions on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, NATO air and ballistic missile defense, and Iran's nuclear program. The first two issues focus on Turkey's expectations from NATO nuclear and security guarantees and the impact of these expectations on national decisions. The Iranian nuclear program functions as a test case of how Turkey perceives nuclear weapons beyond its reassurance expectations from NATO.

Each case corresponds to what many assume are main objectives in Turkish security policymaking on nuclear issues:

1. Maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent by keeping U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at the Incirlik Airbase,
2. Eliminating Turkey's vulnerability in air and missile defense against aerial threats arising from the Middle East,
3. Preventing a nuclear-armed Iran from altering the balance of power in the region.

The thesis of this dissertation is that Turkish decision making on nuclear issues is not guided by these indicated nuclear objectives, but is instead guided by non-nuclear considerations, i.e. Alliance politics, modernization of the defense industry, and regional influence. These goals are;

1. Maintaining stability and continuity in the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership and NATO as the ultimate guarantor of Turkish security,
2. Developing sophisticated indigenous defense technologies to increase autonomy,
3. Increasing regional influence by alternative partnerships to counter security concerns unique to Turkish interests outside of NATO.

I argue that, in the post-Cold War era and AKP administration in particular, the Turkish security policies have become reactionary and ineffective in responding to evolving threats. Interestingly, Turkey has only applied the principles of cooperative security to its decision making on Iran's nuclear program, i.e. opposing coercive measures, promoting a diplomatic solution, and improving conditions for regional stability, and not its policies on other nuclear issues. This inconsistency and the lack of a clearly formulated nuclear policy leads to the questioning of Turkey's intentions: Does Turkey have a genuine concern about NATO security guarantees and the aims to adopt indigenous defensive capabilities to minimize vulnerability? Or will Erdogan's political ambitions and desire to acquire more offensive capabilities to become a regional hegemon shape Turkey's future? It is clear that such offensive capabilities would create a counter-reaction, particularly in its region, and Turkey would need capabilities to deal with future threats that it has created itself.

In consideration of these unintended consequences, I argue that the AKP government has not been prudent enough on nuclear-related decisions as nuclear policy is not a Turkish priority. While Turkish officials at the foreign ministry argue that not having

a written nuclear policy provides flexibility, it instead creates signaling problems and concerns about Turkey's actions and intentions. While security policy should be formulated and studied in light of other policy goals, i.e. foreign, economic, and domestic, the AKP government has reflected difficulty in handling this complexity. The current security policymaking does not originate from the right institutions that will consider the complex balancing of multiple objectives, but rather a top down decision making.

While nuclear weapons are not central to Turkish thinking, the guiding principles behind nuclear-related issues reflect the central principles of Turkish security policymaking. However, Turkish security policymaking needs to incorporate a fundamentally different reasoning on nuclear issues than conventional deterrence. The Turkish thinking on nuclear weapons should be formulated on carefully-considered principles that are not subsidiary to other policy concerns. In each of these cases, Turkish decision makers can pursue a coercive or cooperative path, or maintain the status quo, which indicates a less clear mix of coercion and cooperation. I argue that Turkey could formulate more effective and less costly security policies and achieve better outcomes on nuclear issues, such as the future deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defense, by following a set of cooperative security principles, rather than investing in coercive measures to counter threats that are not against Turkish security and security risks that are better prevented through cooperation than fully developed into threats.

Methodology

This research is an embedded, multiple case study with domestic, regional, and international units of analysis and applies the qualitative approach of process tracing within each case. Bennett and George define a case study as the “detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” on the underlying causal mechanisms.¹¹ Yin emphasizes that the case study is “an empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon, set with its real-world context- especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”¹² Multiple case design provides more data points and greater confidence that the findings can be replicated.¹³

Process tracing offers the possibility of identifying different causal paths leading to the same outcome, meaning equifinality. Falleti argues that process tracing has been proposed to incorporate the historical narratives within theory in social sciences.¹⁴ State or individual behavior that is connected to hypothesized causes and outcomes can be analyzed to reduce the uncertainties associated with unobserved contextual variables. A more recent formulation was George and Bennett’s formulation of the

¹¹ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, *Bcsia Studies in International Security*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 5.

¹² Robert K. Yin, “A (Very) Brief Refresher on the Case Study Method,” Applications of Case Study Research, Sage Publishing, 3rd Edition, 2012, p. 4.

¹³ Yin, 2012, pp. 7-8.

¹⁴ Tulia G Falleti, “Theory-Guided Process-Tracing in Comparative Politics: Something Old, Something New,” *APSA Newsletter 2006*, at: <http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~falleti/Falleti-CP-APSANewsletter06-TGPT.pdf>

causal chain and causal mechanism.¹⁵ These causal mechanisms only operate under specific contexts or conditions. Another approach to this method has been the transformed “theory-guided process tracing,” which deals with theoretically explicit narratives and comparison of sequences of events. The direct policy consequence of causal inference can be addressed by process tracing. Based on this point, George and Bennett argue that process tracing is not just a good historical explanation, but an assertion of a causal sequence into an analytical explanation.¹⁶

The main sources of case study data in this study are quantitative and qualitative data from government documents, articles, books, policy reports, newspaper articles, email correspondence with experts, and in-person interviews.

Between December 17, 2015 and February 16, 2015, I conducted interviews with 17 Turkish experts in Ankara and Istanbul on nuclear weapons, missile defense, NATO, and Middle East security.¹⁷ While the interviewees were all Turkish “elite,” they held different positions: I interviewed four officials from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two executives from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industry (SSM), a Turkish military commander, two heads of think tanks, one member of Turkish Parliament (former Turkish ambassador to the US), one defense consultant, and six academicians. I also met with a defense industry company owner and visited the

¹⁵ Andrew Bennett, Alexander L. George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research,” MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, October 17-19, 1997, at: <http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/teaching/ps816/ProcessTracing.htm>

¹⁶ Bennett, George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research,” 1997.

¹⁷ Field research funded by Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA) Research Grant.

Turkish missile manufacturer Roketsan's factory for informal conversations with its purchasing executives.

In selecting the interviewees, I was particularly interested in talking to civilian decision makers at the Turkish Ministry of Defense. I was already advised by fellow Ph.D. students that requesting any information from the Turkish military's area commands, e.g. the Eskisehir Combat Air Force and Air-Missile Defense Command, would be subject to approval from the Turkish Chief of Staff and could take up to ten years. However, the organization chart at the defense ministry was very opaque, except the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), which is the procurement agency. I reached out to SSM and foreign ministry officials and some of them agreed to an interview with me on the condition of anonymity, either by indirect attribution or not for attribution or background. I was advised not to push for interviews, as it would be perceived as "suspicious." I was also advised to talk to retired officials and academicians instead, as there is "already enough published material and no need for further interviews" on nuclear issues. Meanwhile, I contacted members of the parliament from the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP), who hold leadership positions in the foreign affairs and defense committees. While their teams were very responsive to my emails, they refused to conduct interviews when they heard it was on nuclear issues.

I used the RAND National Defense Research Institute training manual in preparation of my interviews.¹⁸ The interviews were qualitative, in-depth, semi-structured and lasted between one to two hours on average. However, a few of the interviews transitioned into open-ended interviews and assumed a lengthier conversational mode over the course of a day. The questions were geared toward gathering the experts' opinions and perceptions of the policy process by following a funnel protocol, i.e. broad questions leading to more focused questions. This approach proved very useful since most of the interviewees felt more comfortable talking first about Turkish security role in NATO and the Middle East in broad terms rather than particular nuclear issues.

The interview questions were a variation of the case study protocol, i.e. the set of question to be addressed in each case in mostly a chronological pattern, depending on the interviewee's expertise. These questions were:

1. What is the policy issue? Why is it important for Turkey?
2. What are the policy debates?
3. What are Turkey's policy objectives in the short and long term?
4. What are the problems in the current policy formulation to serve these objectives?
5. How does the logic of cooperative security help resolve these issues?
6. What are Turkey's policy options?

¹⁸ Margaret C. Harrell, Melissa A. Bradley, Data Collection Methods: Semi-Structured Interviews and Focus Groups, RAND Corporation, 2009.

7. What policy change is recommended to harmonize Turkey's NATO membership with regional interests?

Significance and Contribution

“A harmonious balance between the main course of Turkey’s policies and its regional policies will not only be in the best interests of regional peace and stability, but also be in the best interests of Turkey as well as those of our Western Allies.”¹⁹

Ambassador (Ret.) Taner Baytok

Former Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz once argued that Turkey has a “national security syndrome,” that the conceptualization of national security was too broad and defined behind closed doors.²⁰ The traditional discourse has focused on survival against constant threats in a hostile neighborhood by having robust military capabilities and fighting against loss of territory.²¹ However, this approach has proven ineffective against changing circumstances and asymmetrical threats. Turkey increasingly needs to re-evaluate its external security problems and policy options in

¹⁹ Taner Baytok, "Recent Developments in the Middle East and South West Asia: Impacts on Western Security," *NATO Review*, August 1981, p. 12.

²⁰ Pinar Bilgin, “Turkey’s Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalization,” *European Journal of Political Research*,” 44: 175-201, 2005.

²¹ According to Davutoğlu: “...what I tried to do is to make a transformation of mentality, because throughout the Cold War the basic teaching we learned in our schools were Turkey has three sides of seas, four sides of enemies. All this was around us -- were taught to us as enemy. Russians, because we had so many wars in the past, Greece they are archenemy; Bulgarians, enemy; Arabs, of course, ideological enemy; Iran is historical rivalry. As if you are living in a neighborhood and you are being isolated. Now we had to make a transformation.” in “Perspectives on Turkish Foreign Policy: An Address By H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister Of Foreign Affairs Of Turkey,” Washington, D.C., November 29, 2010, p. 9, at:

http://www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2010/11/29%20turkey/20101129_turkey.pdf

order to address unconventional security threats arising from the Middle East, i.e. terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and civil conflict, and to better allocate its limited resources. Turkey also needs to contribute to the NATO nuclear policy debates with a better-informed understanding of these issues. Turkey should answer these policy questions now, given President Erdogan's military modernization agenda toward the centennial of the Turkish Republic in 2023.

Turkey has struggled with the real world implementation of its "zero problems with neighbors" policy under the AKP government. However, a cooperative security approach would instead suggest the prevention of these problems from arising when possible and minimizing the risks when they cannot be prevented.

This dissertation constitutes a rare comprehensive study on Turkish security decision-making involving nuclear issues. Unlike Turkish foreign policy, a widely studied area, literature on Turkish perceptions of nuclear weapons and missile defense is limited. However, these nuclear cases in fact open to a broader window into the guiding principles of Turkish security policymaking, particularly under the AKP government. Turkey has a bridging role in NATO and the Middle East and can provide unique contributions to the broader security debates on nuclear issues with careful consideration of the policy problems. The findings will inform Turkey's civilian policymakers, and contribute to other countries' understanding of Turkish threat perceptions and power aspirations, as well as Turkey's future positions in NATO and regional security frameworks. If Turkey's declaratory policy shifted from

coercive measures to preventive engagement, it could contribute to the broader debate on NATO's "nuclear sharing" strategy and the next round of nuclear reductions between United States and Russia concerning the non-strategic nuclear arsenals. Turkey could also more credibly shape the next round of arms control and regional security talks in the Middle East, as well as the process towards establishing a WMD free zone in the region, by incorporating cooperative security strategies.

Outline of Dissertation

Chapter 2 provides a survey of Turkish perceptions of U.S./NATO nuclear deterrence and security guarantees that reflect on the challenges of Turkish security policymaking on nuclear issues over three periods: Cold War, first decade of post-Cold War, and the AKP administrations.

Chapter 3 explores the theoretical frameworks in the literature that have been applied to explain Turkish security policymaking, addressing why Turkey became a member of the NATO alliance in particular. These frameworks fall under rationalistic and ideological camps in international relations theory.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 provide analyses of three interrelated case studies. These cases define the nature of the security problems that Turkey faces in making decisions on nuclear issues and the implications for Turkey's larger security relationships with NATO and its neighborhood. These problems include generating security value by

cost-effective solutions, maintaining a favorable regional balance of power, and political acceptability. The analyses reveal that the guiding principles in decision making on these issues are not nuclear-related.

Chapter 4 focuses on the Turkish position on the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployment in Europe. Chapter 5 examines the Turkish role in NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense and quest for a national air and missile defense system. Chapter 6 presents the Turkish position on Iran's nuclear program.

Chapter 7 summarizes the key findings of the dissertation and their policy implications, as well as policy recommendations for Turkish policymakers on nuclear issues.

Chapter 2: A Historical Survey of Turkey's Attitudes toward U.S./NATO Conventional and Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Turkey prioritized NATO collective defense over regional engagement throughout the Cold War. In order to pursue a subtle foreign policy in the region, Turkey made it clear that it would not make any formal strategic commitment outside the NATO framework.

The following section presents the cornerstones in Turkey's perception of NATO guarantees that shape the decision makers' thinking today, paving the way to policy formulation issues. These formative events have functioned as solidarity tests and mutual "trust-breaking" incidents, leading to the Turkish conclusion that Turkey has different security needs than the rest of the Alliance. The main challenge in formulation of Turkey's security policies on nuclear issues are the widened gap among the U.S.-NATO-Turkish strategic interests in the region. This gap originates from Turkey's quest for a stronger domestic defense industry under the AKP administration. The situation is worsened by AKP leaders' ideological and value-driven orientation toward the Middle East, seeking influence beyond security, as well as Erdogan's leadership style and escalatory rhetoric.

These incidents also prove that Turkey's special relationship with the US is different and prioritized over its relationship with NATO. Interestingly, it has been the United States that approved Turkey's membership to NATO, and not NATO itself,

reinforcing this point.

Turkey Enters the NATO Alliance: The Cuban Missile Crisis (1952-1962)

In 1949, NATO emerged as a covenant against Soviet expansionism and a collective security organization brought together by U.S. leadership. The NATO alliance was established on an amalgamation of principles of reactive, collective defense and preventive, cooperative security. Yet, as a traditional defense pact, Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty dominated the security rationale throughout the Cold War.²²

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”²³

²² Despite this focus on collective defense, the real accomplishment of NATO was not just the prevention of the Soviet threat, but also the internal reassurance framework that transformed the French-German and Turkish-Greek conflicts.

²³ Edmond Seay, “NATO’s Incredible Nuclear Strategy: Why U.S. Weapons in Europe Deter No one,” *Arms Control Today*, November 2011, at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_11/NATO_Incredible_Nuclear_Strategy_Why_US_Weapons_in_Europe_Deter_No_One

Turkey shared a 610-km-long common border with the Soviet Union.²⁴ Confronted with the Soviet attempt to control the Straits and eastern provinces in Anatolia, Turkish security policy was centered on the main objective of deterring the Soviets, but it was not an original member of NATO.²⁵

In late 1948 and early 1949, the Turkish Ambassador to the US Feridun Erkin had conveyed to the U.S. Department of State Turkey's desire to be included in the North Atlantic Pact that was being formulated.²⁶ The physical proximity to the Soviet Union increased the risk of Turkey's involvement in a possible military confrontation involving the superpowers. Turkey had the only non-Warsaw Pact coastline on the Black Sea, in addition to controlling the entry and exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Since Turkey was not included among the initial participants, Ambassador Erkin then informed his government the U.S. proposal to group Turkey, Greece, Spain and Italy with U.S. participation.²⁷ Yet Turkey insisted on NATO membership and submitted its first application for membership in August 1950, which was turned down by the Alliance, as the US, at the time, was cautious to

²⁴ Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," Adelphi Papers No. 164, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1981, LSG, London.

²⁵ In 1945, the Soviet Union revoked the 1925 friendship pact with Turkey and demanded the Kars and Ardahan provinces in Eastern Turkey, as well as the military bases along the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, connecting the Black Sea to the Aegean. Mufti, 1998, p. 41. Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey's Security and the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 62, No. 1, Fall 1983, pp. 157-175.

²⁶ "Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee), Subject: Turkish Proposal that the US Adhere to British-French-Turkish Mutual Defense Pact;" Near Eastern Affairs at the United States Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1951, v. 5, p. 1110, retrieved at: <http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1951v05/reference/frus.frus1951v05.i0019.pdf>

²⁷ "Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee), Subject: Turkish Proposal that the US Adhere to British-French-Turkish Mutual Defense Pact."

extend robust security guarantees to the Mediterranean countries under NATO.²⁸

Turkey turned down both the initial U.S. proposal to create a separate regional security organization for Mediterranean countries and its offer to extend associate membership in NATO to Greece and Turkey, as it considered these offers as “second class citizenship.”²⁹

Turkey’s vulnerability to a Soviet attack due to Turkish military weakness and Turkey’s insistence on getting a formal security guarantee from the US led to a change in the U.S. evaluation of Turkey’s strategic role in containing the Soviets.³⁰ In 1951, an American National Security study stated that:

“Turkey controls the strategically important Turkish Straits, the denial of which the Soviet control is vital to the security interests of the United States...It not only controls the important land, sea, and air routes (including the Turkish straits, which Russia has coveted for some two hundred years) from the USSR to the Cairo-Suez area and the Middle East oil fields, but it offers bases from which the USSR could launch operations against the islands of Crete, Rhodes, and Cyprus and against communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.”³¹

²⁸ William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, Third Edition, Routledge, 2010, p. 82.

²⁹ Hale, 2010, p. 85.

³⁰ According to a secret National Intelligence Estimate about Turkey in 1951, “Turkey is determined to resist Soviet expansion. It is solidly aligned with the West because this alignment offers Turkey its only hope of effectively resisting Soviet pressures. At present one of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy is to secure a clear-cut US commitment to come to Turkey’s defense in the event of an attack...The commitment of Turkish troops or the provision of Turkish bases would, however, be contingent upon a firm assurance of US armed support in event of Soviet attack.” “Turkey’s Position in the East-West Struggle,” National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-9, February 26, 1951, Central Intelligence Agency, p.1, retrieved at:

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000010850.pdf

³¹ “Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council: Turkey,” Near Eastern Affairs at the United States Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1951, v. 5, Washington, undated, S/S-NSC

In 1951, Turkey sought to establish itself as a trustworthy ally and decided to deploy troops to Korea to support the US led military operation against communist forces. Hence, United States extended an invitation to Greece and Turkey to become full members of NATO at the September 1951 Ottawa session, admitting both by a protocol signed on October 17, 1951.³²

Turkish membership to NATO in 1952 integrated its defense planning and command structure into the Alliance. In strategic matters such as defense procurement, most decisions were led by the U.S. and NATO planners, as Turkey based its security policy entirely on the defense ties with United States. Turkey also sought immunity from escalation of local conflicts in its neighborhood by the Soviets. The historical enmity with Russia shaped the Turkish threat perceptions and rationalization behind the defense planning in this period, largely aligned with NATO policies. Hence, the bipolar power structure of the Cold War brought a level of certainty and stability to the Turkish security relations, entirely under the guardianship of the Turkish military.

Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 109 Series, pp. 1149, 1151-52, retrieved at:

<http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1951v05/reference/frus.frus1951v05.i0019.pdf> This view can also be seen in a memorandum to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff Nitze by his staffer Villard: "Since we have found that the security of Turkey is vital to the security of the US it would seem logical to give effect to this decision by some sort of formal commitment. Furthermore, we have staked so much on our program of military aid for Turkey and our prestige has been so much involved in the process that it would be unthinkable if we should fail to act in case of Soviet aggression against Turkey." "Memorandum by Henry S. Villard to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), Subject: Security Commitment to Turkey," Foreign Relations, 1951, v. 5, Washington, February 5, 1951, PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563, p. 1117, retrieved at:

<http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1951v05/reference/frus.frus1951v05.i0019.pdf>

³² "Official text: Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey," October 22, 1951, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17245.htm?

The decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey was taken at NATO's December 1957 Paris Summit. Then Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was said to be "lukewarm" to the idea due to possible consequences on Soviet relations, but he could not have much impact on the weapons deployment issues as he and members of his cabinet were executed after the 1960 military coup.³³ On September 16, 1959, then Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu concluded a bilateral agreement with the US on "Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes" allowing the deployment U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey with a dual-key arrangement that required U.S. authorization for any use.³⁴ In 1960s, Turkey hosted U.S. nuclear weapons at Ankara, Eskisehir, Balikesir, and Malatya air bases, as well as squadrons of jet fighters assigned to NATO contingency planning nuclear strike missions.³⁵

Covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Turkey perceived that NATO's nuclear sharing principle was materialized by the forward deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish soil and the Turkish nuclear policies were entirely covered by the U.S. guarantees. However, this perception was interrupted during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

³³ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey, NATO, and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects after NATO's Lisbon Summit," in Paul Ingram and Oliver Meier, eds, Reducing the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Perspectives and Proposals on the NATO Policy Debate, May 2011, *Arms Control Association and British American Security Information Council Report*, p. 33.

³⁴ Aaron Stein, "Turkey and the Backpack Bomb," *WMD Junction*, February 6, 2014, at: http://wmdjunction.com/140206_turkey_and_adms.htm

³⁵ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Acceptance and Anxiety: Turkey (Mostly) Embraces Obama's Nuclear Posture," *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 18, No. 1, March 2011, p. 203.

In 1962, the US secretly decided to withdraw the medium-range Jupiter missiles, without consultation with Turkish officials, in exchange for the Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba. This led to Turkish frustration of being equated to a non-Warsaw Pact country as a NATO member and doubts of U.S. commitment to Turkish security.³⁶ General Haig would argue later that: “The loss of Jupiters represented a significant reduction in Turkish national security- not only in terms of the missiles themselves, but because their disassembly symbolized a loss of American will to defend a NATO ally. The removal of the Jupiters was already sending a shudder through the whole Western alliance, particularly since the US had agreed to take out its Jupiters without consulting its allies. If we would not defend Turkey, would we defend West Germany or France?”³⁷ The opposing view is that the U.S. policymakers had made clear to their Turkish counterparts that the Jupiter missiles were obsolete, and Turkish officials still preferred the missile deployment over reliance on the Polaris missile submarines on patrol in the Eastern Mediterranean, as a symbol of U.S. commitment to use nuclear weapons for Turkish defense.³⁸

As a response, in September 1967, the Turkish Defense Minister Ahmet Topaloglu put forward a plan at the Ankara meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group, calling on the US to pre-delegate the control over Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs), i.e. nuclear mines, in eastern Turkey.³⁹ Then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert

³⁶ Eric Alterman, When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and its Consequences, “Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Penguin Books, 2004, p. 129.

³⁷ Alterman, 2004, p. 129.

³⁸ Aaron Stein, “Turkey’s NATO Nuclear Weapons History,” *EDAM Nonproliferation Policy Briefs*, 2012/6, p. 3.

³⁹ Aaron Stein, “Turkey and the Backpack Bomb.”

McNamara welcomed the idea, supporting the allies to create “concrete operational plans for specific nuclear weapons in defined contingencies and geographical areas.”⁴⁰ It is clear that Turkey was particularly concerned about the delay in receiving permission to use nuclear weapons in case of crisis, leading to the Turkish inquiry about whether the 1968 Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) would permit the US to pre-delegate the authority to use nuclear weapons to the Turkish military. This concern about tactical nuclear weapons prevented Turkish ratification of the NPT until 1980.⁴¹

This concern addressed by the December 1969 NATO political guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons, promising to shorten the time to agree on use for Turkish defenses in responding to a Soviet first strike.⁴² Stein argues that although the plans remain classified, in case of war Turkish aircraft would have targeted Soviet oil resources in Romania, Azerbaijan, and the Caucasus, in addition to attempting to block Soviet invasion of the Middle East and oil fields.⁴³ Although NATO would have responded to any attack on Turkey by the Soviets, Turkey’s uneasiness with the command and control of nuclear weapons reflects the legacy of discomfort with verbal U.S. commitment and seeking tangible security guarantees, to be reflected on following decades’ security policies.

⁴⁰ Aaron Stein, “Turkey and the Backpack Bomb.”

⁴¹ Aaron Stein, “Turkey and the Backpack Bomb.” Despite the initial plans to forward deploy 72 ADMs in Turkey, Stein reports that the US never deployed them. On Turkey’s late NPT ratification, Kibaroglu argues that the traditional influence of the Turkish military on national security policy might be the factor that delayed ratification, as the country went through civil chaos that led to military intervention in 1980 and NPT ratification was not a priority. Kibaroglu, December 2005, p. 446.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

The U.S. Arms Embargo on Turkey (1974-1978)

In June 1964, President Johnson sent a warning letter to Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus and threatened that the US would not protect Turkey if the Soviets became entangled.⁴⁴ While Turkish-Greek relations improved for a while, armed violence on the island did not stop until the Turkish military intervention in July 1974.⁴⁵ Turkish forces were stationed in 40 percent of the island in a unilateral offensive.⁴⁶ Since there was a conflict of interest between NATO and Turkey, for the first time, TGS carried out the threat assessment entirely on their own intelligence in the “National Military Strategic Concept,” in which Greece was Turkey’s top security concern.⁴⁷ Greece reciprocated by naming Turkey as the major threat in its 1986 “New Defense Doctrine.”⁴⁸ While the bilateral allied coordination between Turkey and Greece halted, NATO required Greek and Turkish participation and coordination in military exercises and air defense in the region.⁴⁹

Following the Turkish intervention, the US imposed an arms embargo that lasted until September 1978.⁵⁰ The embargo decreased the credibility of the Western alliance for Turkish policymakers and the public. The U.S. embargo also harmed Turkish armed forces by dropping arms imports and leading to out of date and deteriorating equipment. Since dependence on the US had proved disadvantageous, Turkey decided

⁴⁴ Mufti, 1998, p. 41.

⁴⁵ Heraclides, “From Lausanne to the 1974 Cyprus Crisis,” 2010, p. 71.

⁴⁶ Moustakis, 2003, p. 70.

⁴⁷ Mufti, 1998, p. 34.

⁴⁸ Mufti, 1998, p. 34.

⁴⁹ Sezer, 1991, p. 117.

⁵⁰ Mufti, 1998, p. 42.

to pursue a more independent course. Prime Minister Ecevit announced that Turkey would adapt a new national security concept that did not position the Soviet Union as a threat.⁵¹ Turkey also stationed its Aegean Army that was not assigned to NATO along the western coast facing Greek islands.

As the U.S. arms embargo ended in September 1978, Turkish security relations improved significantly with the US. The Turkish military government of 1980-1983 initiated the REMO (Reorganization-Modernization) project.⁵² Turkey and the US signed the “Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy,” on March 29, 1980.⁵³ The agreement stated that obligations arising out of NATO were the limits of U.S.-Turkish security cooperation. A high-level joint military group was established to improve defense cooperation. The cooperation entailed improving NATO’s military posture in the region and U.S. assistance in modernizing Turkish armed forces as well as implementation of new weapons projects.⁵⁴ The two countries finalized a “Memorandum of Understanding” in November 1982, announcing the construction, improvement, and joint use of airfields in NATO missions mainly in eastern Turkey.⁵⁵

Despite these developments, the U.S. arms embargo has remained defining moment in Turkey’s history in NATO eroding trust in NATO guarantees. Both the embargo

⁵¹ Mufti, 1998, p. 42.

⁵² Mayall, 1997, p. 29.

⁵³ Karaosmanoglu, 1983, p. 160.

⁵⁴ Karaosmanoglu, 1983, p. 160.

⁵⁵ Karaosmanoglu, 1983, p. 160.

and Turkey's military vulnerability during the Cyprus intervention shape the mindset of Turkish policymakers.

Turkey's Response to the Collapse of the Soviet Union

While the dissolution of the Soviet Union eliminated Turkey's common border with Russia, Turkey perceived the Russian transition as risky due to uncertainty, potential domestic instability, and rise of ultra-nationalism. The collective memory of the Turkish elite anticipated that Russian armed forces would reorganize and modernize to recapture superpower status, and that Russia would seek involvement in newly independent states by reasserting its influence. Both the physical proximity and the special ties Turkey had with some of its neighbors, such as Azerbaijan, precluded Turkish immunity to tensions in its backyard.

Turkey did not come out of the Cold War with a sense of enhanced security. In 1993, Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin stated that "because of its geopolitical and geostrategic location places Turkey in the neighborhood of the most unstable, uncertain, and unpredictable region of the world, it has turned into a frontline state faced with multiple fronts."⁵⁶ Similarly, diplomat Sukru Elekdag argued in 1996 that "Turkey is besieged by a veritable ring of evil."⁵⁷ In this period, Turkey also expressed concern over the safety and security of Russia's formidable nuclear stockpile; despite the START I and unilateral cuts to the arsenal Russia suffered

⁵⁶ Mufti, 1998, p. 33.

⁵⁷ Mufti, 1998, p. 33.

severe budget constraints to reliably maintain the weapons against theft, leakage, and unauthorized access. Turkey did not anticipate a nuclear attack from Russia, but considered the possibility of nuclear blackmail, especially to intimidate weaker neighbors if the weapons fell into the wrong hands.⁵⁸ Some Turks argued that with a complete democratic transition, Russia would be less reliant on nuclear weapons, whereas others believed that Russia maintained authoritarian and imperial impulses. The latter view was strengthened by Russia's new military doctrine, which repudiated the Soviet no-first-use of nuclear weapons, to expand the Russian nuclear umbrella in defense of the member countries of the Collective Security Treaty, i.e. former Soviet republics, which Turkey evaluated as a "veiled warning" given the Turkish interest in promoting ties in the southern Caucasus and Central Asia.⁵⁹ The Russian dissatisfaction with the force ceilings established by the CFE Treaty not meeting the Russian needs in the Caucasus became a test case for Russian intentions, i.e. expansionism, in the Turkish minds.⁶⁰

Meanwhile, Russia was not Turkey's only strategic concern in the post-Cold war era. There was near-consensus on in diplomatic circles that Turkish strategic planners considered territorial disputes with Greece and Syria as the primary sources of external threat, and denied hostility to Russia and Iran, as Turkey could not afford enmity with either of those former rivals. In line with this threat perception, Turkish armed forces went through a massive modernization program throughout the 1990s to

⁵⁸ Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons, and Proliferation," *Comparative Strategy*, 14:2, April-June 1995, p. 155.

⁵⁹ Sezer, "1995, p. 155.

⁶⁰ Sezer, 1995, p. 152.

neutralize external threats by military capability, especially in air force. In March 1991, President Ozal signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation with Russia, as well as a trade agreement.⁶¹ Yet, Russia cooperated with Turkey's adversaries as well. In November 1995, Russia signed an Agreement on Military and Technical Cooperation with Greece.⁶² Russia also remained Syria's main military supplier and ally.

Revisions in NATO Strategy and Turkey's New Role

“(NATO's) main security front has swung away from Central Europe to its southern flank.”⁶³

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, September 1994

NATO went through a crisis of relevance in the aftermath of the Cold War and had an imperative to design a new political and security strategy to address the massive force-restructuring program. The 1990 London Declaration reaffirmed the *raison d'être* of NATO alliance by underlining that the essential purpose of the alliance to guarantee the security of its allies and its values of democracy, human rights, and rule of law remained unchanged.⁶⁴ The Cold War collective defense framework had a particular focus on Article V, i.e. attack on one, attack on all; whereas the intricate

⁶¹ Mufti, 1998, p. 36.

⁶² Mufti, 1998, p. 40.

⁶³ Moustakis, 2003, p. 10.

⁶⁴ “20 years ago: London Declaration marks birth of new NATO,” July 5-6, 2010, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/eu/natolive/news_64790.htm

nature of security relations after 1991 increased an emphasis on Article IV, i.e. that alliance members would consult and act politically on security issues beyond territorial defense.⁶⁵ Hence, NATO's dominant principle shifted from confrontation to cooperative security.

NATO intensified efforts to strengthen regional stability in the southern flank, where growth of threats such as instability, terrorism, and proliferation required attention. Increasingly scarce resources and reluctance of the allies to engage in non-traditional military operations brought along the broader question of credibility of NATO to address these emerging contingencies effectively.

By the 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO defined a broader approach to security in a multi-polar system that required consideration of new operations such as peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and anti-piracy.⁶⁶ The revised NATO concept captured the multi-directional nature of security threats and the challenge of predicting and assessing those threats. NATO would aim at maintaining non-adversarial relations with its neighborhood, especially the Middle East, as the alliance considered the region as key to stability, proved by the Gulf Wars. In coordinating alliance efforts to mitigate global risks, the alliance would not only focus on Article V

⁶⁵ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., April 4, 1949, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

⁶⁶ "Backgrounder: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)," Council on Foreign Relations, at: <http://www.cfr.org/nato/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato/p28287#p2>

and VI guarantees, but also Article IV.⁶⁷ This alteration was a reflection of a broader approach to security through dialogue and cooperation.

The 1991 concept defined cooperation based on the principles of the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe.”⁶⁸ The alliance would seek to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation to prevent crises and to ensure effective management in case prevention failed. The military approach to security remained essential but would be supported by a political approach to security. In doing so, the alliance would maintain an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces in the European theater, though at a significantly reduced level.⁶⁹ The fundamental purpose of maintaining the force was preventing war and preserving peace. With respect to the nuclear forces, the strategic forces of United States, United Kingdom, and France would provide the supreme guarantee to the alliance. The European allies, including Turkey, would continue to base nuclear forces to demonstrate solidarity, i.e. nuclear sharing.

The new role of NATO was put to test in out-of-area contingencies, especially in response to civil conflict. In the aftermath of the Cold War, NATO expanded its realm of influence by anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and peacekeeping operations, particularly in the Balkans and Afghanistan. These operations included non-allies’ participation to Article 5 naval military arrangements such as Operation Active

⁶⁷ “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 1991, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm

⁶⁸ “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” 1991.

⁶⁹ “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” 1991.

Endeavour against terrorism in the Mediterranean.⁷⁰ The new operations also showed a mixture of military and non-military operations. But the legacy of collective security based on presupposed strong state organization proved to be problematic for sub-state threats and emerging actors such as non-state players and ethnic groups.

These complexities brought questions regarding the coherence of the alliance and the credibility of extended deterrence. As regional security concerns became increasingly pressing and independent of global issues, policy choices of regional states diversified, usually away from U.S. interest. Another shift was increasing U.S. interest in Asia rather than Europe, as China became a foreign security policy priority.

Since NATO was the backbone of Turkish security policy, this transition proved problematic for Turkey. When the bipolar security configuration of the Cold War collapsed, Turkey perceived that it lost its defining role in the Alliance to contain Soviet expansion. Proving its commitment to the Alliance, Turkey contributed to new NATO missions required by the new security problems arising from civil conflicts.

Turkish views on the credibility of U.S. and NATO extended deterrence in the aftermath of the Cold War were diverse: Many in the official establishment believed that Turkish security remained intact as a NATO interest. A minority argued that once Russia participated in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, NATO lost its

⁷⁰ Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "A Review of NATO's changing security environment," *Dis Politika*, Issue 1/2010, pp. 20-22

raison d'être.⁷¹ Aybet asserts that the inter-linkages between the security community and the international institutions based on free markets and democracy explain why NATO survived into the post-Cold War era, i.e. that NATO doesn't just define what it is "against" but what it is "for."⁷² Hence, NATO remained the core of Turkish security planning and Turkey contributed to NATO's new operations to prove its commitment.

Although Turkey was historically very reluctant to accept any extension of NATO's area of responsibility or take sides in local conflicts in the Middle East, under Turgut Ozal's leadership, it became involved in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Ozal saw the war as an opportunity to show Turkey's continued importance for American interests in the Middle East, as well as role in NATO. Turkey contributed to Allied operations by granting permission of airbases, deploying 150000 troops along the Iraqi border, and participating to NATO naval operations to maintain the security of the sea lines of communications in the Mediterranean.⁷³

Turkey participated to NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, the U.N. operation in Somalia, and the International Stability Force in Afghanistan. It had a lead in the formation of the Southeastern Europe Multinational Peace Force and Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group for the purpose of achieving interoperability in naval

⁷¹ Sezer, 1995, pp. 149-172.

⁷² Gulnur Aybet, "The Evolution of NATO's Three Phases and Turkey's Transatlantic Relationship," *Perceptions*, Spring 2012, Volume XVII, Number 1, p. 21.

⁷³ Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 2000, 54, 1, p. 199.

operations for search and rescue, humanitarian aid, and peace operations.⁷⁴ Within NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs, Turkey established a training center in Ankara and led educational programs in Azerbaijan and Georgia to project stability through cooperation rather than balance-of-power politics.⁷⁵ Turkish activism in NATO was a reflection of its vision to enhance its position in the Alliance and utilizing its intercultural identity to promote Western values to the newly independent states in the Caucasus.

NATO's Hesitance in Regional Contingencies: The First Gulf War (1990-1991)

Historically, Turkey has preferred bilateral relations with each player in the Middle East to bypass interstate disputes and to maximize trade relations.⁷⁶ Yet, this balancing approach was destroyed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Gulf crisis bolstered Ozal administration's ties to the US by Turkish involvement in the U.S.-led intervention, but broke ties with the traditional elite's view of Turkish foreign policy in the region and the army, leading to the resignation of the chief of Turkish armed forces, Necip Torumtay.⁷⁷ The general criticized the government for excluding the military from the decision-making and crisis management process during the Gulf

⁷⁴ Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "Globalization and its Impact on Turkey's Security," *Foreign Policy (Dis Politika)*, Issue 1/2009, p. 421.

⁷⁵ Karaosmanoglu, 2009, p. 421.

⁷⁶ Philip Robins, "Foreign Policy Principles and the Gulf Crisis," *Turkey and the Middle East*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Pinter Publishers, 1991, pp. 65-7.

⁷⁷ Robins, 1991, p. 72.

crisis, as well as not providing a clearly defined political objective for involvement and breaking “historic neutrality.”⁷⁸

President Ozal joined the First Gulf War coalition against Iraq, allowing the US to use Turkish and NATO air bases to launch air attacks on Iraq. While proving the Turkish role in the alliance, the war cost Turkey approximately \$5.6 billion in revenues lost from trade with Iraq, the oil pipeline pumping Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean, and war expenditures.⁷⁹ During the Gulf War, Turkey lacked defenses against tactical ballistic missiles, thus the US provided two Patriot interceptor missiles near the Turkish-Iraqi border against possible retaliation by Iraqi Scuds.⁸⁰

Beyond the Turkish vulnerability in air and missile defense, what was worrisome to Turkish officials was the Belgian and German reluctance to deploy their national contingent of the “Allied Mobile Force” (AMF) to Turkey, and the Belgian declaration that they would only consider sending the equipment after an Iraqi attack.⁸¹ Turkey’s active role in the Gulf War coalition could have made Turkey a target for retaliatory attack. Turkey faced Saddam Hussein’s missile inventory, i.e. the two modified Scud-variants al-Hussein (600-650 km range) and al-Abbas (750-900 km range) with a launch cycle even reduced to 30 minutes, that could hit Turkish cities and military strategic targets, in addition to the biological and chemical

⁷⁸ Cameron S. Brown, “Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003,” *Turkish Studies*, vol. 8, no.1, Spring 2007, pp. 86-87.

⁷⁹ Sezer, 1995, p. 162.

⁸⁰ Sezer, 1995, p. 166.

⁸¹ Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO,” *Security Studies*, vol. 3, no.1, Autumn 1993, p. 41.

weapons arsenal, i.e. WMD warheads.⁸² There were accounts of southeastern Turkey that some citizens “duct taped” plastic covers over their homes to protect from a potential Iraqi chemical attack.⁸³ Overall, NATO’s slow response to Ankara’s request for air defense reinforcements had a negative impact on Turkish military planners’ confidence in the NATO guarantees in out-of-area contingencies.

In the 1990s, Turkey’s isolationist Middle East policies began to be replaced by policies of greater engagement. Turkey found itself drawn into Middle East affairs due to its Kurdish issue, water conflict with Syria and Iraq, need for expansion of economic ties, and the window of opportunity Turkey saw in the Arab-Israeli peace process to have an active role as a balancer or intermediary in the region’s new configuration.⁸⁴ Barkey argues that Turkey had the historic opportunity to be the strongest regional military and economic power as an emerging market, but its activism had a price in each surrounding region, i.e. the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus, in addition to the Middle East.⁸⁵

⁸² Kasapoglu, 2014, p. 7.

⁸³ Aaron Stein, “Turkey Embraces Missile Defense,” *EDAM Nonproliferation Policy Briefs*, November 2012/5, p. 2.

⁸⁴ Henri J. Barkey, “Turkey and the New Middle East: A Geopolitical Exploration,” in Henri J. Barkey ed., *Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East*, Chapter 16, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996, pp. 25-6.

⁸⁵ Barkey, 1996, pp. 25-6.

The AKP Governments: 2003 U.S. Invasion of Iraq, Mavi Marmara, and the Syrian War

During the initial years of the AKP government, Turkey pursued a cooperative-preventive security strategy that was consistent with the shift in NATO policies. When President Obama visited Turkey in April 2010, he referred to a “model strategic partnership,” entailing additional instruments for regional stability to strengthen the NATO alliance through multilateralism.⁸⁶ However, over time, the divergence between Turkey’s and US/NATO’s threat definitions increased by Turkey’s economic and political ambitions in the Middle East. The untraditional shifts in AKP’s foreign and security policymaking, in addition to Erdogan’s escalatory rhetoric in leadership, paved the way to a reciprocal concern on security commitment between NATO and Turkey.

Under AKP, Turkish foreign policy was initially formulated as the improvement of its regional relations, coined as “zero problems with neighbors.” Altunisik and Martin argue that, at the domestic level, the AKP administration, political transformation of Turkey, and economic liberalization have been the determinants of foreign policy change.⁸⁷ This shift was defined as ‘turning its back on the West’ by some, and ‘broadening its reach’ by others.⁸⁸ The early AKP administration aimed to broaden Turkey’s reach and not turn its back on the West, modeled after the Ozal

⁸⁶ Namik Tan, “Turkish-US strategic partnership,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, December 1, 2011.

⁸⁷ Meliha B. Altunisik and Lenore G. Martin, “Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP,” *Turkish Studies*, vol. 12, no. 4, December 2011, p. 577.

⁸⁸ Emiliano Alessandri, “Commentary on Ulgen’s Article: Yet NATO remains central to Turkey’s wider regional role,” *Europe’s World*, Summer 2011.

administration's center-right approach to politics and economic liberalism. Yet, the divergence between U.S. and Turkish security interests has been reflected on the expansion of Turkish attention to areas formerly neglected and quest for 'diplomatic flexibility,'⁸⁹ i.e. enhancing Turkish clout in its neighborhood. Hence, Turkish security policymaking no longer reflects the isolationism from the Middle East and promotes engagement outside the traditional NATO alliance to enhance Turkish strategic interest. Turkey has also engaged in strategic dialogue with Russia and China, what Aybet calls as "outside the transatlantic box" by compartmentalizing its relations.⁹⁰ Yet, limitations of Turkish power and the uncertainties and complexities of political and security dilemmas in the Middle East, especially in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings and the Syrian civil war, have raised the price of Turkish engagement. AKP foreign policy has sent mixed signals to the region by its unsustainable "zero problems" policy and undermined Ankara's role as a credible mediator. Hence, Turkey has reemphasized its NATO commitment to manage risks arising from the region.

It is important to note that AKP's foreign and security policies have not been monolithic in all three administrations, i.e. 2002-2007, 2007-2011, and 2011-today. Ankara was initially able to reduce hard security issues in favor of economic opportunities and soft power, in line with the "de-securitization" of Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East. Hence, Barkey argues that between 2002-2007, AKP

⁸⁹ F. Stephen Larrabee, "Turkey as a U.S. Security Partner," RAND Project Air Force, RAND Corporation, 2009.

⁹⁰ Gulnur Aybet, "Transatlantic Security, NATO, and Turkey," *Turkey Papers*, Wilson Center, March 2015, p. 15.

played a conciliatory role in Middle Eastern conflicts.⁹¹ Between 2007-2011, Turkey attempted to be more forceful player in the region by balancing Israel.⁹² This anti-Israel stance intensified problems with the US. Since 2011, Turkey has reprioritized its NATO commitment, despite the differences on the Syrian conflict and the fight against ISIS, and focused on its domestic struggle with democratization. These policies have proven ineffective so far. It is now NATO's turn to question Turkey's commitment to the Alliance.

During the first phase of the AKP administration, Turkey underlined the importance of cooperation over confrontation. As official policy, AKP's Turkey has remained committed to NATO in its main security policymaking, despite the attempts to diversify its security relations. Davutoglu argues that NATO has proven to be the most capable organization by adding soft power tools such as enlargement and partnership mechanisms to military capabilities.⁹³ He defines the guiding principles of Turkish position in NATO as consensus-based decision-making and legitimacy based on international law.⁹⁴ Turkey significantly contributed to NATO missions in civil conflict management in noncombatant status; The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)⁹⁵ in Afghanistan in particular.

⁹¹ Henri J. Barkey, "The Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East," TESEV Foreign Policy Program, July 2012, at: http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/e9461835-7524-4d67-85cd-9f72a425f684/Henri%20Barkey_final.pdf

⁹² Barkey, 2012.

⁹³ Davutoglu, 2012, p. 9.

⁹⁴ Davutoglu, 2012, p. 16. Turkey's position on Operation Unified Protector in Libya, i.e. aiming for a principled approach to demonstrate the need, a clear legal basis, and support from the region to justify military action to protect citizens, was informed by this approach.

⁹⁵ ISAF was created at the 2001 Bonn Conference under the UNSC resolution 1386 to support the Afghan transitional government established after the U.S.-led "Enduring Freedom Operation." Turkey assumed ISAF leadership between June-December 2002, contributing to security in and around Kabul

However Turkey-NATO relations have been under scrutiny due to the axis shift argument, i.e. that Turkey is turning its back on the West.⁹⁶ Such a defining, unprecedented moment in the Turkey-U.S. strategic relationship was the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq: The Turkish parliament refused to allow U.S. troops cross into northern Iraq through Turkey.⁹⁷ During the same year, France, Germany, and Belgium blocked the deployment of NATO equipment to Turkey, including Patriot missile batteries and *Airborne Warning and Control System* (AWACS) surveillance planes, during the run-up to the 2003 American invasion of Iraq.⁹⁸ The three countries were concerned that the defensive measures would lead to a “premature” decision for NATO to be involved in the Iraq crisis.⁹⁹ Yet, later on during Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. and Dutch Patriot batteries, AWACS early-warning assets, and NATO early-warning aircraft came to Turkey’s defense.¹⁰⁰

While many Europeans applauded Turkey’s parliament for its democratic decision, the Bush administration responded by rebuffing Turkish request for military assistance to fight Kurdish terrorism. As a result, Turkey got closer to Iran to control

as well as reconstruction efforts in the Afghan society through Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) projects. In January 2004, NATO appointed former Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Cetin to Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. , Turkey took rotational control on operations in central Afghanistan, including Kabul, and the lead of ISAF between February-August 2005 with 1400 troops. Nursin Atesoglu-Guney, “The New Security Environment and Turkey’s ISAF experience,” in *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey*, Chapter 12, 2013, pp. 178, 182, 187.

⁹⁶ Sergul Tasdemir, “Rethinking NATO in Turkey,” Institute for European Policy, 2012.

⁹⁷ United States offered a \$15 billion grant and loan package in return for pre-positioning the 4th Armed Division in Turkey and an agreement that 20000 Turkish soldiers could enter northern Iraq. Taspinar, 2008, p. 18.

⁹⁸ “Three countries delay NATO’s decision over Iraq measures,” *The New York Times*, February 7, 2003.

⁹⁹ “Three countries delay NATO’s decision over Iraq measures,”

¹⁰⁰ Kasapoglu, 2014, p. 12.

the PKK and its Iranian branch PJAK.¹⁰¹ Turkey also signed a Memorandum of Understanding to announce “strategic partnership” in economic, political, and security matters, as well as military agreements with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.¹⁰² Another case where Turkey pursued divergence and selective engagement in NATO operations according to its own terms was the 2011 Operation Unified Protector following the uprisings in Libya: Since Turkey had a large number of Turkish contractors in construction projects in Libya, it refused to take a combat role.¹⁰³

Between 2007 and 2011, United States had concerns about the shift of Turkey’s regional priorities from Europe to the Middle East, especially Turkey’s diplomatic crisis with Israel in the aftermath of the Gaza flotilla incident and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s “one minute” intervention in Davos.¹⁰⁴

While Turkey has been trying to turn back to its prioritization of NATO since 2011 over being forceful in the region, in this last phase, the distance between Turkey and

¹⁰¹ Altunisik and Martin, 2011, p. 576.

¹⁰² Altunisik and Martin, 2011, p. 576.

¹⁰³ Turkey initially opposed any intervention, in Erdogan’s words: “What has NATO to do in Libya? NATO’s intervention in Libya is out of the question. We are against such a thing.” “PM rules out NATO intervention in Libya,” *Today’s Zaman*, February 28, 2011. Turkey did not participate to the military aerial campaign conducted by France and United Kingdom, supported by US using NATO assets. Aybet, 2012, p. 33.

¹⁰⁴ On May 31, 2010, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted six vessels on high seas, including the lead vessel Mavi Marmara, known as the “Free Gaza Flotilla” organized by the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), claiming to bring humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. An armed conflict between Israeli commandos and civilian protestors took place, leading to the death of nine flotilla passengers and injury of seven Israeli soldiers and several others. Although Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu apologized to Turkey upon President Obama’s visit to Israel in March 2013, the Turkish-Israeli relations have not been normalized yet. On a separate note, at the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, Prime Minister Erdogan walked off the stage after the moderator cut off his remarks in response to President Peres’ defense of the Israeli offensive against Gaza and he furiously requested one minute to finish his speech.

NATO has grown. The most recent and problematic case where NATO and Turkey have been in disagreement is the Syrian crisis and the fight against the Islamic State. A unique concern within NATO, Turkish security has been directly threatened by bordering Syria. In June 2012, Syrian forces shot down a Turkish F-4 jet near the Turkish coast bordering the Syrian province of Latakia, killing two crewmembers due to airspace violation, where two sides produced contradicting maps of flight route.¹⁰⁵ In October 2012, a shell launched by the Syrian military against rebels hit a Turkish border town and killed five civilians.¹⁰⁶ The Turkish military struck back and NATO issued a statement to express the danger, but Turkey couldn't generate a more forceful international response, despite speculations of Turkey calling for Article V guarantees.

While Turkey has consistently called for a no-fly zone and ground operations throughout the conflict; its entanglement in the Kurdish conflict, sectarian politics in supporting Sunni groups, and prioritization of the removal of the Assad regime over the fight against ISIS have led to major differences with the U.S. priorities in the region. The main test case of these differences was in Kobani in October 2014, when ISIS attacked the Syrian Kurdish border town and the US helped save the town despite Turkey's concerns over U.S. cooperation with Syrian Kurds.¹⁰⁷ Since then, the regional security environment has quickly deteriorated for Turkey following the Russian involvement in the Syrian war, the rekindled war with PKK, and divergence

¹⁰⁵ "Syria Shoots Down Turkish Warplane, Fraying Ties Further," *The New York Times*, June 22, 2012,

¹⁰⁶ "Turkey strikes back at Syria after shell kills at least 5 Turkish civilians," *The Washington Post*, October 3, 2012.

¹⁰⁷ Henri J. Barkey, "The Raqqa Imperative," *The American Interest*, April 8, 2016. An angry Erdogan asked: "Why is America interested in Kobani, oil, gold, diamonds?" Barkey, 2016, p. 29.

of interests with the US over PYD in fighting ISIS. In Syria, Turkey insists on the PKK-PYD affiliation and watches the U.S. cooperation with PYD carefully. Erdogan has even been pushing the US to choose between its NATO ally, Turkey and A Syrian Kurdish militia, the People's Defense Units (YPG).¹⁰⁸ In Iraq, Turkey partners with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), while the US is concerned about Turkey's moves such as training the *peshmerga* to fight ISIS and sending armor without consultation with Baghdad, as Washington partners with Baghdad.¹⁰⁹ Barkey calls the impact of the Syrian conflict as the "dark shadow over US-Turkey relations," as the longer the stalemate remains, the deeper the disagreements in the bilateral relations will get.¹¹⁰

The Syrian conflict remains as the showcase of security policy decisions Turkish policymakers have to make in order to formulate clear, non-sectarian regional measures to minimize threats by radical forces, while utilizing the NATO resources to maximize the Turkish interests in a complex web of relations in its neighborhood. Beyond Syria, all the cornerstones in Turkey's perception of the U.S./NATO nuclear and extended deterrence as well as security guarantees reflect the importance of mutual trust, hence continued trust-building and reassurance.

¹⁰⁸ Amberin Zaman, "Mission Impossible? Triangulating U.S.-Turkish Relations with Syria's Kurds," *Viewpoints*, Wilson Center, April 2016.

¹⁰⁹ Barkey, 2016, pp. 32-36.

¹¹⁰ Henri J. Barkey, "Syria's Dark Shadow over US-Turkey Relations," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No: 4, Winter 2016, pp. 25-36.

Conclusion

Since the day Turkish officials conveyed to their American counterparts of Turkey's desire to become a member of NATO, its fit into the Alliance has been challenged and questioned. Realizing these geographical, political, and cultural differences, in return, Turkish officials have been wary of any U.S./NATO security guarantees and reassurances in absence of deployments on their soil or concrete military agreements. These concerns on NATO's commitment to Turkish security have shaped Turkish policymakers' decisions through the aforementioned series of events, which have functioned as solidarity tests and mutual confidence-breaking incidents.

The following chapter aims to explore the theoretical explanations behind these incidents, leading to a broader understanding of Turkey's Alliance behavior, alignment of security policies with NATO, challenges in formulation of these policies, and the debate initiated by the proponents of Turkey's regional engagement outside of NATO.

Chapter 3: Literature Review

Turkish security policymaking is traditionally explained as the “tug of war” between traditional forces of the military and bureaucratic elite, known for their concern for Turkey’s Western and secular orientation adopting defensive realist policies, versus politicians that had nontraditional aspirations outside the elites’ vision, especially in terms of involvement in the Middle East, pursuing neoliberal or ideological paths.

These explanations can be categorized under the two camps of international relations (IR) theory: The rationalistic approaches, i.e. neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, versus the sociological (or reflective) approaches, i.e. constructivism and its derivatives. The broader debate in IR theory entails the dichotomy between materialism and idealism.

This chapter first provides an overview of mainstream IR theories, namely neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism, and their great debate as it relates to Turkish security policy, Alliance behavior in particular. Neorealists would argue that Turkey joined NATO due to the military and economic power imbalances in addressing the Soviet threat and defensive *realpolitik* tradition that minimized Turkish involvement in the Middle East. Neoliberal institutionalists would focus on promotion of Turkish welfare and security by reducing costs and increasing transparency through international cooperation, as a tool to maximize interest. Constructivists would assert that Turkey’s alignment with the NATO alliance was a continuation of its aspiration to westernize since the last centuries of the Ottoman

Empire and concern for its identity as an “accepted” state; and current activism in the Middle East originates from ideological and cultural motivations of political agents.

The chapter then identifies the limitations of each theory in explaining Turkish security policy decisions. The complexities in Turkey’s history and geopolitical location require an analysis that amalgamates all three sets of explanations to explain policy behavior. I argue that the cooperative security framework provides a better set of guiding principles that integrate external factors, such as security and economic driven interests, and internal factors, such as security culture. Turkey’s experience with cooperative security arrangements in Europe, through the Helsinki process and NATO, and in the Middle East, through the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group, show times when Turkey has attempted to adopt cooperative security measures in the past and suggest that Turkey could pursue this path in formulating the guiding principles of its security policies on nuclear issues, both within NATO and in its neighborhood.

The Rationalistic Camp

Rational decision making is based on cost-benefit analysis, in which rational actors determine their objectives, specify alternatives, and make policy choices. Applying this principle to three levels of analyses, i.e. three images of IR; the individual, the state, and the international system, the rationalist camp of IR focuses on material interests through the conceptualization of relative power in the neorealist tradition

and the role of transnational processes and maximizing absolute interests in neoliberalism.

The traditional explanation of Turkey's alignment with NATO alliance in the aftermath of World War II remains largely within a rationalistic framework; Turkish elite's defensive realism against the Soviet and Greek threats, and absolute gains from institutionalized collective defense. Hence the following sections define the principles and limitations of the two rival rationalistic theories: Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism.

Realism and Neorealism

Realists assume that the system is anarchic and that states are unitary. They believe that anarchy results from absence of central authority, i.e. world government. Security issues dominate non-security issues such as identity or welfare.¹¹¹ States should always act in a way that maximizes their relative power, even if that behavior contradicts national identity or costs more. Morgenthau argues that states go through a rational decision making process to enhance national security and guarantee physical survival.¹¹² Deterrence necessitates rationality, minimization of costs and threats, and maximization of benefits and opportunities. One's achieving his own

¹¹¹ Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, Ch.2., Prentice Hall, Third Edition, October 1998, p. 68.

¹¹² Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Macgraw Hill, pp. 1-17.

objectives hinders another actor, i.e. a zero-sum game, leading to conflict of interest, anarchy, and uncertainty.

Classical realism draws a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics by isolating foreign policy making from domestic interests. In order to pursue security interests, foreign policy objectives should enhance territorial integrity and military power. These objectives can be altered under changing circumstances, as a function of interests, threats, and opportunities. How to achieve these interests depends on relative power, i.e. the right strategic choice is the one that maximizes the relative power vis-à-vis potential adversaries. Since there is no legitimate authority at the international level, power is the only instrument to implement the necessary actions to fulfill the interests. In order to enhance relative power, a state may seek alliance formation or armament. Within the realm of international politics, power is defined as the ability to make a player perform an action that he would not otherwise do, left on his own devices. Kenneth Waltz argues that an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him.¹¹³ Hence, maintaining the power balance in global politics is the only tool to pursue self-interest. When conflicting interests lead to confrontation, the relative power of a player determines the outcome of the conflict.

Realists define operationalization of power through capabilities. In the case of military capabilities, power can be measured based on military army size, budget, weapons, military technology and intelligence. These tangible capabilities and the

¹¹³ Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979.

will to use them still depend on the power and capabilities of other actors on stage. Due to changes in the security environment, an actor may have to adjust to the nature of changing warfare, i.e. the post 9/11 era that necessitates enhanced intelligence and precision wars in urban settings. Economic capabilities might also be transformed into military capabilities by political will. Fluctuations in the balance of power might occur due to the perceived projection of capabilities.

Building on top of classical realism, neorealists argue that collective defense is balancing power against a common adversary and a reflection of the distribution of power. According to this framework, alliances are formed due to military and economic power imbalances and struggle for survival, i.e. against the Soviets, and since alliances are foreign policy tools they can be dissolved. Mearsheimer defines NATO as a reflection of the bipolar distribution of power in the Cold War international system, where self-interested calculations of the two great powers defined the rules of the game. He rejects collective security and critical theories as being flawed in causal logic, as states only choose to cooperate when it is in their interest to do so. Yet, despite Waltz's 1993 claim that "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are,"¹¹⁴ NATO has survived in the absence of a mutual threat, as seen in the post-Cold War era. In response, realists would argue that NATO's survival shows that members still think of the alliance as the best way to maximize relative power vis-à-vis potential adversaries, despite the absence of the Soviet Union.

¹¹⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Autumn 1993, p. 76.

Realist/Neorealist Explanations of Turkish Security Policymaking

The late Ottomans pursued a defensive *realpolitik* and balance of power diplomacy inherited by the Turkish republican elite, who sought an outside power to balance the threat from another.¹¹⁵ During the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922), Turkey received economic, diplomatic, and financial support from the Soviet Union against occupying Western powers.¹¹⁶ In the aftermath of World War II, when the Soviets threatened Turkey, it sought assistance from United States and Britain, which was formally established by the Marshall Plan according to the Truman Doctrine.

Throughout the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, security policymakers in Turkey adopted defensive realist principles, i.e. maximizing relative security rather than relative power.

Turkey's quest for NATO membership is traditionally explained by Stalin's demand for the Straits and the Soviet threat as the main determinant of physical survival. Neorealists would perceive this policy decision as a tool to maximize Turkey's relative power and security vis-à-vis adversaries, i.e. USSR and Greece. As President Inonu said in 1968, Turkey "should refrain from making enemies as much as possible... not to take any hasty step that might lead to incurring the enmity of any

¹¹⁵ Ali Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey's Alignment with NATO, Identity, and Power Politics," Greenwood Paper 26, Center for European Security Studies (CESS), 2011, p. 38.

¹¹⁶ Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey's Alignment with NATO, Identity, and Power Politics," 2011, p. 39.

great state.”¹¹⁷ Military force was considered the guarantor of national security, i.e. territorial integrity, pegged to NATO in the bipolar order.

Turkish politics in this period is often explained by the clash between the “center,” i.e. the traditional urban elite, intelligentsia, and the military and civilian bureaucracies, vs. the “periphery,” i.e. the populist, religious, rural, middle and lower class mass movement.¹¹⁸ The Center had a Westernization agenda and a “rational” cautionary security policy, i.e. defensive realism, whereas the periphery, i.e. politicians elected by popular vote, pushed for an outward-looking foreign policy, considered “irrational,” radical, and marginalized by the center. The digression from the “rational” policies led to the military coups.

Mufti argues that Turkish foreign and security policy reflects a struggle between the proponents of boldness, best represented by the Ozal administration (1983-1993), and advocates of cautionary realism, i.e. the military and civilian bureaucracies.¹¹⁹ He argues that competing values of “daring” and “caution” shaped the Turkish strategic orientation.¹²⁰ Critics of cautionary realism argued that Turkey was chained to a counter-productive NATO-oriented policy that caused Turkey to miss out on opportunities by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The government was criticized to

¹¹⁷ Mufti, 1998, p. 45.

¹¹⁸ Serif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?” *Daedalus*, Vol. 102, No. 1, Post-Traditional Societies, Winter 1973, pp. 169-190.

¹¹⁹ Mufti, 1998, pp. 32-50.

¹²⁰ “Caution” is based on the historic legacy of inward-looking, Kemalist statement of “peace at home, peace in the world.” “Daring” is the structural and normative transformations in Turkey’s strategic culture to adapt a more assertive approach.

be a “paper tiger” that had to learn to act more boldly and say no to the West when necessary, leading to a shift to a region-based, independent approach.¹²¹

Turkey witnessed the total transformation of the traditional elites’ and military’s upper hand in “rational” security policymaking when AKP came to power as the single party in 2002 and gradually replaced and challenged traditional Turkish diplomacy and military by the “counter elite.” Kemalists argue that this transformation is ideologically-driven, i.e. irrational, eastern-looking, and Islamist, especially in terms of the costs and benefits of Turkish policies toward the Middle East.

Limitations of Realist/Neorealist Explanations

The main weaknesses of the realist approach originate from its core assumptions: Realists assume that states are unitary, rational actors. They further assume that there is no interaction or linkage between the domestic and international realms. However, Turkish domestic politics, transition to pluralist democracy in particular, and security culture have impacted foreign policy decisions in alliance formation and regional behavior.

Focusing on why Turkey joined NATO, Karaosmanoglu argues that understanding Turkish alliance behavior requires a multi-perspective approach that combines

¹²¹ Mufti, 1998, pp. 46-7.

neorealist and culturalist explanations.¹²² Turkish national security culture is deep-rooted in both the defensive *realpolitik* tradition and a problematic identity. The republic inherited the imperial bureaucratic and military elite, who maintained a certain level of mistrust towards the West due to their bargain over Ottoman territory, due to the decline in relative power. This history contributed to the “self vs. other” interaction in terms of identity, security interests, and threat formation. The *realpolitik* defined Ankara’s perception of the Soviet threat, but it was supplemented by Turkey’s Westernization agenda, which prevented Turkey from joining the communist bloc and reinforced the incentive and ideational justification to institutionalize its Western orientation in foreign policy and defense planning. As the Soviet demands were weakened five years before joining NATO, it was more the fear of abandonment and strategic vulnerability that led Turkey to pursue inclusion into the West. Considering the alternative policy, Karaosmanoglu argues that neutrality would have increased isolation and would not have prevented trespassing due to Turkey’s geostrategic position.¹²³ In this sense, Turkey’s membership to NATO added an institutionalized transatlantic and European dimension to its security policy.

As for the Middle East and regional behavior, Turkey considered regional involvement as part of its imperial past and an obstacle toward its Western identity, not just in terms of the security risks and costs of involvement. Turkey refused the British idea of having it join the Middle East Command as a condition of NATO

¹²² Karaosmanoglu, “Turkey’s Alignment with NATO, Identity, and Power Politics,” 2011, pp. 37-49.

¹²³ Karaosmanoglu, “Turkey’s Alignment with NATO, Identity, and Power Politics,” 2011, pp. 42-4.

membership and joined the European Command for the same reason.¹²⁴ Turkey did not support extension of NATO's responsibility over the Middle East, but joined Middle East security organizations such as the Baghdad Pact and CENTO separately.

Neoliberal Institutionalism

Belonging to the rationalist camp of IR theory, both neorealism and neoliberalism assume that the international system is one of anarchy. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that institutions keep states away from war and promote world peace. States can establish cooperative institutions to achieve mutual gains compared to what each would get from pure competition. Neoliberals consider creation of international regimes and institutions as tools to regulate state behavior, thus to deal with anarchy in the absence of central authority. Unlike neorealists, some neoliberals argue that there is a connection between domestic interests and foreign policymaking. Yet, they claim that the interdependency of states and the role of transnational processes, i.e. international norms and institutions, outweigh the significance of domestic variables in explaining international behavior.

Neoliberal institutionalists consider alliances as institutions that create issue linkage and transparency. They point to the institutions reflecting shared interest, i.e. rules based on interest in minimizing costs and sustained cooperation. Keohane compares rationalistic and reflective approaches to understand when international cooperation takes place under an institutional context, by measuring the difference in outcomes

¹²⁴ Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey's Alignment with NATO, Identity, and Power Politics," 2011, p. 43.

with and without cooperation.¹²⁵ He defines institutions as a general pattern or categorization of activities for particular, constructed agreements, and concludes that both approaches have relative merit in explaining the potential gains from mutual agreements and should be synthesized. From a rationalistic viewpoint, i.e. rational calculation of interest, institutions are created if transaction costs of communication, monitoring, and enforcement are low and cooperation is not easy without these regimes. Institutions also alter payoff structures either by norms internalized by the states or by the altered understanding of interests.

Neoliberal Explanations of Turkish Security Policymaking

Neoliberal institutionalist principles have been applied to both the Turkish membership to NATO, i.e. the transformation of the Greek disputes under the NATO umbrella, and activism in the Middle East under the Ozal and AKP administrations; i.e. Davutoglu's "soft power" formulation.

In explaining the Turkish membership in NATO, neoliberals would focus on the relative gains of defensive cooperation. Thanks to NATO, the Turkish-Greek war has been avoided and the relations have been transformed due to the interdependence, transparency, and issue linkages that gradually reduced the sources of the conflictual relationship; territorial disputes in particular. Turkey has also benefited from NATO membership in preventing the escalation of conflicts with the Soviet Union.

¹²⁵ Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.32, no.4, 1988, pp. 379-96.

During the late 1980s President Ozal introduced trade liberalization and neoliberal restructuring away from state capitalism to the oligarchic capitalism of the center-right in Turkish politics, to be led by AKP in the 2000s.¹²⁶ The neoliberal transformation of the Turkish economy was interrupted during the 1990s due to perceived security threats to territorial integrity, i.e. the Kardak islet crisis with Greece and PKK conflict with Syria.¹²⁷ However, following the official Turkish candidacy to the European Union at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey undertook democratization reforms and liberal international policies in the 2000s. Neoliberal institutionalists would argue that the economic-oriented activism prevailed over security issues, creating complex interdependence among Turkey and its neighbors. Keohane and Nye's emphasis on "soft power," i.e. political persuasion and cultural and social attraction, has been a key component of Davutoglu's Middle East policies.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Karadag argues that the liberalization did not create an entirely liberal economic order due to the political constraints, the military's influence, and trade unions. Roy Karadag, "Neoliberal Restructuring in Turkey: From State to Oligarchic Capitalism," Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Discussion Paper 10/7, July 2010, p. 17

¹²⁷ Renda calls the foreign policy in this era as "an extremely cautious, if not paranoid, foreign policy that favored a security-oriented heavy-handed approach over a welfare-oriented cooperative approach." Kadri Kaan Renda, "Turkey's Neighborhood Policy: An Emerging Complex Interdependence?" *Insight Turkey*, vol. 13, no.1, 2011, pp. 90-94.

¹²⁸ Renda, 2011, p. 91.

Limitations of Neoliberal Explanations

Critiques of neoliberal institutionalism focus on the rationality and unitary actor assumptions, lack of consideration for relative gains, the role of security identities, and the limits to interdependence.

First, international cooperation occurs more on economic and environmental issues than security issues, as the latter usually have conflictual payoff structures.¹²⁹

Differences in payoff structures are vast among political economy, energy, environment, and security regimes, making security cooperation more difficult in cases where the payoffs reflect the prisoners' dilemma.¹³⁰ Complex interdependence explanation is heavily economy-oriented. However, Grieco argues that neoliberal institutionalists ignore the impact of relative gains and cannot properly address the uncertainties and costs of cheating.¹³¹

Elaborating on relative gains, Krebs argues that while neoliberal institutionalists focus on the relative gains of states collectively in defensive cooperation against others, they ignore the distributional consequences among themselves.¹³²

Institutionalized multilateral alliances such as NATO greatly improve military

¹²⁹ R. Axelrod and R. O. Keohane. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1, 1985, pp. 226-254.

¹³⁰ Ronald R. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict," *International Organization*, 53, 2, Spring 1999, p. 350.

¹³¹ Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in David A. Baldwin ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, Columbia University, 1993, p. 309.

¹³² Krebs, 1999, p. 349.

capability and can deteriorate the security dilemma, intensifying the conflict among its members. He also argues that treating all institutions as identical is erroneous, as each alliance has a different level of “institutionalization” leading to different levels of transparency and issue linkage.¹³³

Finally, economic interdependence ignores ideological factors. Turkish activism in its neighborhood is argued by many to have a cultural and religious motivation.¹³⁴ There are impediments to complete complex interdependence in the region; political instability is a major roadblock to regional cooperation, as seen in the Syrian and Iraqi cases. Moreover, Turkey’s attempts to promote peace has been welcome by few regional states.

Due to the limitations of this approach, there have been hybrid theory suggestions such as Krebs’ “realist institutionalism” in the alliance literature and security studies, focusing on small powers such as Greece and Turkey, on the security guarantee, improved military capability and transparency, and the potential struggle and rivalry to impact the distribution of the benefits within the alliance.¹³⁵ Krebs argues that small states join alliances as they can achieve their aims by the credibility and capabilities of their patrons, i.e. more powerful allies.¹³⁶ However, as Oguzlu states,

¹³³ Krebs, 1999, p. 350.

¹³⁴ Renda, 2011, p. 105.

¹³⁵ Krebs, 1999, pp. 344-345.

¹³⁶ Krebs, 1999, p. 350.

this instrumental approach does not mean that those small states develop a *non-realpolitik* security relationship from an ideational perspective.¹³⁷

The Sociological Camp

In the sociological camp of IR, social interactions dominate behavior as mechanisms through which state identities can be transformed. As the main critique of rationalistic IR theories, the constructivist theory focuses on identity and adherence to norms, rather than on material interests and the maximization of absolute or relative gains. Constructivists point to the values and norms that define alliances, such as democracy and liberal economy as a collective identity in the case of NATO. Derivatives of constructivism such as culturalism have been applied to Turkish security policies, NATO membership in particular.

Constructivism

In the 1990s, constructivist IR theory appeared as a critique to the rationalistic IR theories' assumption that anarchy and distribution of power are the main determinants of behavior by unitary state actors in world politics.¹³⁸ Constructivists argue that state behavior is impacted by ideas, agency, norms, and identities. This knowledge shapes

¹³⁷ H. Tarik Oguzlu, "The Role of International Institutions in Identity Transformation: The Case of Turkish-Greek Conflict within the European Union and NATO Frameworks," Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, September 2003, p. v.

¹³⁸ Bozdaglioglu, 2007, pp. 121-144.

the formation of “self” and the “other.”¹³⁹ Through constructivist lenses, state behavior within the international arena is determined by identity and internalized norms.

A prominent figure in constructivist theory, Wendt defines anarchy as a creation of the states that can be transformed by altering the distribution of state identities.¹⁴⁰ By stating that “anarchy is what states make of it,” he argues that “self-help” systems are socially constructed by actors, i.e. constituting the idea and situation of power politics. Hence, the identity of an actor determines what he makes of anarchy. Within the realm of ideational politics, identities as well as ideational interests designate how an actor perceives rational and material interests. Borrowing Waltzian understanding of the structure determining unit behavior, and applying this to state identity Wendt claims that whether or not the state structure is anarchic is not the defining point. Rather, the distribution of identities, i.e. similarities or differences of who the actors are, constitutes the basis of the system. In this sense, systems are not exogenous variables that influence unit behavior, as the neorealist Waltzian analysis puts forward.¹⁴¹ The states have the capacity to transform a system of competition into a system of cooperation. Thus, unlike the neorealist assumption of a competitive system from which analysts deduce into state behavior, Wendt argues that constructed identities determine state behavior; i.e. self-help and power politics are socially

¹³⁹ In the modern Turkish context, the “self” is traditionally aligned with the West, along with the historical legacy of Westernization in the national security culture.

¹⁴⁰ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization*, vol. 46, no. 2, Spring 2002, pp. 391-425.

¹⁴¹ Wendt, 2002, p. 395.

constructed under anarchy. Wendt focuses on culture in the construction of state identity based on what he calls as the “socially shared knowledge.”¹⁴²

Wendt explains structural change as a result of functions of units and distribution of identities. State identities can be defined as liberal, hegemonic, passivist, communist, hegemonic and so on and so forth. If the states only identify with themselves, anarchy is the outcome. If the states identify with one another through collective identity formation, they have the capability to transform competition into cooperation. Wendt says; “an unchanging Hobbesian man has provided the powerful efficient cause necessary for a relentless pessimism about world politics that anarchic structure alone can not supply.”¹⁴³ He believes that constructivist explanations are able to depict systemic interaction as a result of state identities and interests in flux, and these explanations have inspired variants of constructivism, i.e. culturalism.

Culturalism

Building on the critique of realism by constructivism, Krause and Williams argue that the agenda of security studies should be broadened to meet the intellectual and practical challenges of the post-Cold War era.¹⁴⁴ This revision implies challenging the prevailing neorealist approach to states and military conflicts, i.e. state security, threat of military force, assumption of anarchy, and the security dilemma; as seen in

¹⁴² Bozdaglioglu, 2007, p. 127.

¹⁴³ Wendt, 2002, p. 409.

¹⁴⁴ Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,” *Mershon International Studies Review*, (1996) 40, pp. 229-254.

Stephen Walt's definition of security studies as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force."¹⁴⁵ One such approach is culturalism in explaining how culture impacts the states' calculation of how to realize their security goals, according to their relative threat perceptions.

Scholars such as Katzenstein, Desch, Hopf, and Wendt argue that national security policies require cultural explanations for state behavior, i.e. states define their security interests by defining themselves as "self" vs. "other" in terms of security interests, threats, and roles.¹⁴⁶ These scholars pointed to the interplay of realism and culture, i.e. that culture and identity supplement realist explanations, especially in alliance theory. The culturalist approach explains alliance formation as a result of similar identities rather than material balance of power.

Focusing on the post-Cold War wave of culturalism in security studies resulting from the limitations of realist explanations, Desch provides an overview of the organizational, political, strategic, and global strands of cultural theories in determining state behavior.¹⁴⁷ Although culture is hard to define in a testable formulation of general theories for all states' behavior, cultural variables unique to each state can explain that particular state's behavior over time.¹⁴⁸ Cultural theories

¹⁴⁵ Krause and Williams, 1996, p. 230.

¹⁴⁶ Karaosmanoglu, "Turkey's Alignment with NATO, Identity, and Power Politics," 2011, p. 37.

¹⁴⁷ Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security*, vol. 23, no. 1, Summer 1998, p. 142.

¹⁴⁸ Desch, 1998, p. 155.

can also “supplant” realist theories by explaining the lags between structural change and state behavior.¹⁴⁹

Constructivist Explanations of Turkish Security Policymaking

Various constructivist theories have been applied to Turkish security policies, for Turkey’s NATO membership and role in the Middle East in particular. These theories include culturalism and ideology-based explanations such as Kemalism vs. neo-Ottomanism.

Built on the historical legacies in Turkish security culture, constructivists and culturalists would argue that NATO represented Western values and institutions as a long-lasting functional link with the West and the membership corresponded with Turkey’s long-term goals, i.e. quest for modernization, strengthening its Western identity, and avoiding diplomatic and military isolation.¹⁵⁰ Hence, Turkey became a NATO member and defined its security interests along the Western alliance, constructing its state identity as a liberal and secular democracy. However, there have been ideological challenges by political actors to this constructed, Western-oriented security identity that promoted isolation from the Middle East.

The AKP initially argued for engagement outside the traditional NATO alliance to enhance Turkish strategic interest. As Davutoglu pursued a value-driven policy in the

¹⁴⁹ Desch, 1998, p. 169.

¹⁵⁰ Karaosmanoglu, “Turkey’s Alignment with NATO, Identity, and Power Politics,” 2011, p. 41.

Middle East, this engagement quickly appeared to be geared toward soft power and influence in the region, dubbed “neo-Ottomanism.” AKP aimed to alter traditional threat definitions by emphasis on historical and cultural ties. But AKP governments have been criticized to follow sectarian policies for Sunni unity, whereas the Kemalist principles were non-sectarian.

Limitations of Constructivist Explanations

As a natural limitation, constructivist theories do not capture the hierarchy of security and economic interests in explaining the Turkish perceptions of NATO and regional engagement. Beyond cultural explanations, Altunisik and Martin argue that the transformation of the international system in the post-Cold War period has given middle powers such as Turkey to play a more independent role in their regions.¹⁵¹

There are also contending views on the role of identity, i.e. Western or Islamist, in shaping AKP’s security policies in the last decade. In order to explain Turkey’s quest for regional engagement, Kosebalan argues that AKP has followed a realist policy toward the Middle East rather than ideology, but has used idealism, i.e. Islam and democracy, to maximize Turkish national interests.¹⁵² He asserts that Turkey’s liberal policy is based on *realpolitik* calculations of national interest rather than idealist dreams. As Turkey has begun to seek a multi-faceted foreign policy, Oguzlu argues

¹⁵¹ Altunisik and Martin, 2011, p. 595.

¹⁵² Hasan Kosebalan, “Turkey and the New Middle East: Between Liberalism and Realism,” *Perceptions*, Autumn 2011, Volume XVI, Number 3, pp. 93-112.

that Turkey no longer views NATO as part of its identity formation, but as a force multiplier that strengthens its national interests.¹⁵³

As Hedley Bull once said, “I know of no model that has assisted our understanding of international relations that could not just as well have been expressed as an empirical generalization.”¹⁵⁴ Each IR theory has its own advantages and limitations in explaining the rationale behind states’ actions and providing policy recommendations to achieve better outcomes, such as more relative power, more absolute gains at lower costs, or sustaining the state identity.

As Turkey has become more powerful and independent, its reliance on NATO has naturally decreased. It is clear that Turkish security policymaking reflects a mix of neorealist principles, neoliberal institutionalism,¹⁵³ and constructivism. However, given the fluid nature of post-Cold War security problems, applying the principles of cooperative security can lead to more effective and less costly policy practices that Turkey can adopt to prevent and address security threats.

Cooperative Security

This section provides an overview of the cooperative security principles and their interpretation in the Turkish security literature. While cooperative security is not an

¹⁵³ Tarik Oguzlu, “Turkey’s Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 35:3, p. 161.

¹⁵⁴ Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach,” *World Politics*, vol. 18, no.3, April 1966, p. 370.

IR theory, it is a set of principles for security policy that can help reconcile the different concerns that realists, liberal institutionalist theorists, and constructivists highlight. It also illustrates the cooperative security experience in Europe and the Middle East, both of which inspired Turkish policymakers.

Turkey's main experience with cooperative security throughout the Cold War was the containment of the Greek disputes under the NATO alliance. This idea was subordinate to collective defense against the Soviet Union, and flourished by its collapse.

Post-Cold War security threats no longer required massive military confrontation, but usable and effective cooperative strategies that could be utilized against security contingencies. These cooperative strategies required the international regulation of the size, technical composition, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit.¹⁵⁵ The preventive management of sustainable security had to be a simultaneous effort along deep reduction in active deployments, and the transition could not be achieved nor sustained by coercive diplomacy.

These principles successfully transformed the security configuration in Europe through the systematic exchange of sensitive information by the arms control treaties between United States and Russia and the separation of technical measures from political disagreements. Yet, the Middle East continues to suffer from the lack of a

¹⁵⁵ Janne Nolan ed. Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st century, "Foreword," The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1994.

cooperative security framework given the political turmoil in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, high level of mistrust, civil violence, trans-border terrorism, and economic inequalities. Bordering these threats directly, Turkey needs to formulate preventive security policies to counter the challenges before they turn into fully-developed threats.

Logic of Cooperative Security

Cooperative security theory entails proactive measures through which states reduce, contain, or counter perceived and real risks.¹⁵⁶ It differs from collective security and collective defense by the inclusion of individual security and the active promotion and projection of stability through rules and institutions in addressing defense needs with lower costs and minimal use of force. States cooperate toward managing conflicts before they develop into real threats due to deterrence failure. The confidence-building process entails activities and measures to exchange reassuring information to communicate the “credible evidence of the absence of feared threats.”¹⁵⁷ Reassurance reduces uncertainty and the risk of miscalculations leading to provocation or use of force. This idea is based on the Grotian ideal¹⁵⁸ that improving security can be achieved by cooperation on equitable terms for mutual security

¹⁵⁶ The logic of cooperative security was developed by John D. Steinbruner and the members of the Cooperative Security consortium he led in early 1990s. Their core arguments were published in a 1992 Brookings Institute occasional paper by Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, and elaborated further in a *Global Engagement* volume, edited by Nolan and published by Brookings in 1994.

¹⁵⁷ Johan Jorgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, “European Security and Confidence-Building Measures,” *Survival*, 19:4, July/August 1977, p. 147

¹⁵⁸ Nancy W. Gallagher, “Re-thinking the Unthinkable: Arms Control in the Twenty-First Century,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, April 2016, p. 19

benefit, and not investing unilaterally to increase the relative power of one country in a zero-sum game. Unlike the realist, neoliberal, and constructivist explanations, which focus on relative power, institutions and interdependence, and norms; cooperative security focuses on mutually acceptable terms.

Cooperative engagement can work through institutionalized consent, whenever physical coercion is not a viable strategy.¹⁵⁹ As economic considerations have become instrumental in the global era, collaboration and reassurance are less costly and more likely to be successful than confrontation. Prevention reduces or obliterates the need for individual states to make counter-preparations. Cooperative engagement does not mean that there will not be any conflicts, but that disputes will occur within the limits of established procedures and norms, and mass, deliberate, organized aggression will be prevented. Cooperative security doesn't suggest establishment of an international government, to eliminate all weapons, or to prevent/resolve all forms of violence, but attempts to prevent deliberate aggression through global security engagement.

The main purpose of cooperative security is prevention of successful aggression and war through comprehensive, transparent, and consensual measures. Unlike collective security, which is defined as an arrangement for deterring of aggression through counter-threat or defeating it, cooperative security is a set of mutual principles and constraints. Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner argue that in the aftermath of the Cold

¹⁵⁹ Janne Nolan ed. Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st century, Chapter 1, "The Concept of Cooperative Security," pp. 3-19.

War, regional conflicts are less likely to lead to global war, but new security principles are needed, as smaller scale conflicts are less likely to be forestalled or moderated.¹⁶⁰ They see cooperative engagement as the result of a new strategic imperative that will require a commitment to regulate all military forces. The new security environment requires more constructive and sophisticated forms of influence, as there is more concentration on the preparation of military forces than the final decision to deploy them. Safe management of nuclear weapons has become a more urgent challenge than doing even more to enhance deterrence stability

The idea that current or former adversaries can engage in mutually beneficial cooperation to reduce nuclear risks is also found in the neo-liberal institutionalist tradition and global agreements, such as the arms control and nonproliferation regimes.¹⁶¹ But, Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner propose much more ambitious forms of cooperation to reduce the costs and risks of deterrence to the lowest possible level and to prevent additional state or non-state actors from acquiring or using nuclear weapons. Cooperative restraints for bilateral stability that they suggest include new alerting procedures, modern technical safeguards, and an international surveillance system composed of ground-based radars, international inspectors, and satellite and space reconnaissance systems.¹⁶² At the international level, multilateral proliferation controls are fragmented and poorly coordinated, as there is no international registry

¹⁶⁰ Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, "A New Concept of Cooperative Security," Brookings Occasional Paper, 1992.

¹⁶¹ Kelleher argues that in early 1990s, the prerequisites for cooperative security were present in Europe through the offensive force limitations, defense restructuring, and operational measures of confidence building, through institutional frameworks such as CFE, CFE 1A, and CSCE. Catherine Kelleher, "Cooperative Security in Europe," Chapter 8, in Janne Nolan ed. Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st century, pp. 293-342.

¹⁶² Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 1992.

and there are new suppliers and increased access to weapons technology. The authors believe that a comprehensive and global security regime should be structured around common benefit and reasonable equity as a norm, and supported by regional cooperative security arrangements, as seen in the principles of the Paris Charter and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. (CSCE) However, they recognize the limitations of generating a new consensus due to practical politics and transforming the relationship, and acknowledge these constraints to outline practical policy action over time.

Cooperative security can be built on a set of overlapping, mutually reinforcing agreements, many of which are already in force, such as the nonproliferation treaties. The authors of the project identify the following principles as being primary in the transition from a confrontational to a collaborative configuration, i.e. from deterrence to reassurance and a stronger sense of society:¹⁶³

1. Establishment of controls and measures for nuclear forces, in order to transition from securing core deterrence to safe management of nuclear weapons,
2. Conversion of defense industries with excess capability that could potentially lead to proliferation,
3. Cooperative agreements regulating the size and composition of forces, and restricting the flow of dangerous technology,

¹⁶³ Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 1992, p. 10.

4. Establishing an internationally-accepted concept of effective and legitimate intervention that uses multilateral force as last resort,
5. Promotion of transparency and mutual interest.

A key concept in cooperative security is the priority and legitimacy of territorial defense, assuming that there would be standards of regime behavior to preclude coercion. Use of military capabilities is legitimate for self-defense, collective defense, or UNSC-authorized action on behalf of international community, but not for territorial aggression, intervention, or coercion for national gain. Under a fully developed cooperative security arrangement, mutual reassurance would be attained by the reduction of threat perception and consensual and comprehensive collaboration on all military capability and establishments. Perry argues that the central objective of global engagement is not only reassuring states that they will not be threatened by other countries' large military establishments, but also making a collective, credible force threat against potential aggressors in case of a crisis.¹⁶⁴ Since projection of military power cannot be the sole instrument of policy, mutual restraint measures such as verified reassurances, transparency in force deployment and operations, national intelligence sharing, and establishing international means of monitoring are necessary. The ultimate goal is to show that states taking part in a cooperative security arrangement will be threatened less and will gain access to valuable security information, advanced technology, collective security guarantees and penalties for violators.

¹⁶⁴ Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, 1992, p. 12.

The authors argue that given the diffusion of technology, high volume of global economic activity, and dispersed threats such as civil conflict, the new context for international security provides an imperative for cooperative engagement. In the age of globalization, the volume of international flow of transactions and information makes it very costly and difficult for states to invest in security. Integration of states' efforts through efficient verification and transparency measures reduces defense spending by establishing a system of international security cooperation. The main caveat is that this system requires flexible and decentralized control.

Building on the principles of cooperative security, what Steinbruner and Gallagher call a "constructive transformation" in global security refers to the need of states to protect fundamental interests that cannot be protected by only coercive means, but require collaboration where possible.¹⁶⁵ They define transformation of security relations from ones based on deterrent threats and contingency responses to ones based on agreed rules, mutual reassurance, and cooperative prevention.¹⁶⁶ Similarly, Finaud argues that the world is already moving towards a new paradigm of cooperative security due to interdependence, which means "success by one or a few benefits all, and failure by some endangers many."¹⁶⁷ This paradigm bridges the gap

¹⁶⁵ John Steinbruner and Nancy Gallagher, "Constructive Transformation: An Alternative Vision of Global Security," *Daedalus*, Vol. 133, No. 3, On Progress, Summer 2004, pp. 83-103.

¹⁶⁶ Steinbruner and Gallagher, 2004, p. 98.

¹⁶⁷ Marc Finaud, "Cooperative Security: A New Paradigm for a World without Nuclear Weapons?" The Berlin Framework Forum: Creating the Conditions and Building the Framework for a Nuclear-Weapon Free World, Berlin, Germany, February 21-22, 2013, p. 7, at: <http://www.gcsp.ch/Resources-Publications/Publications/Staff-Publications/Working-Papers/Cooperative-Security-A-New-Paradigm-for-a-World-Without-Nuclear-Weapons>

between realist premises of national interest and multilateralist approach to achieving the common good by a cost-effective, win-win solution.¹⁶⁸

Cooperative Security and Turkey

Some Turkish policymakers and academicians have realized this shift in the fundamental approach to global security. Yet, these analyses in the following section are fragmented, they are not policy issue-specific, and most define multilateralism and regional cooperation rather than cooperative security.

While there were precursors of cooperative security in the Turkey-Greece interaction under NATO, Turkey started to move towards cooperative security arrangements in its neighborhood, i.e. the arms control and regional security talks in the Middle East, in the post-Cold War era. Yet, there has been very little debate in Turkey on cooperative security principles. Efforts have been fragmented, as the challenge is defining the geographical limits of Turkish interests, i.e. Euro-Atlantic, Euro-Mediterranean, Eurasia, Caspian/Black Sea, and the Middle East.

In late 1990s, Turkey's Deputy Chief of Staff Cevik Bir referred to the United States being responsible for the new security architecture as the sole superpower and the need for prompt resolve for intervening to regional conflicts, as seen in the Bosnian crisis, and Turkey being the epicenter of the conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus, and

¹⁶⁸ Finaud, "Cooperative Security: A New Paradigm for a World without Nuclear Weapons?" 2013.

the Middle East.¹⁶⁹ Aiming to define this shift in global security, Karaosmanoglu referred to globalization in security affairs as “going beyond the national security framework” that necessitated the transition from confrontation to multilateral cooperation.¹⁷⁰ This process exposes the nation-state to untraditional risks of instability such as non-state actors with transnational links. As national security becomes more dependent on the security of the international system, consideration of the security of others and non-territorial threats such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction require a cooperative security framework. States remain as the main actors that have the monopoly of organized armed forces, law-making at the national and international level, but their security framework goes beyond national borders. Although the globalization process curtails state sovereignty, territorial integrity of the state continues to be a major security concern, as the state faces the risk of cross-border attacks that require transnational cooperation.

Most Turkish interpretations of cooperative security have been associated with NATO and the active role Turkey wants to play within the Alliance. For instance, Ambassador Huseyin Dirioz, former Assistant Secretary-General for Defense Policy and Planning, NATO, argues that: “The Strategic Concept sets out the alliance’s three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. Turkey lies at the heart of all three tasks.”¹⁷¹ The AKP government interprets this role as soft

¹⁶⁹ Cevik Bir, “Turkey’s Role in the New World Order,” Number 135, February 1998, at: <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps496/Strforum/sf135/forum135.html>

¹⁷⁰ Karaosmanoglu, 2009, p. 414.

¹⁷¹ “A valued partnership: OBG talks to Huseyin Dirioz, Ambassador and Assistant Secretary-General for Defense Policy and Planning, NATO,” Oxford Business Group, [The Report: Turkey 2013 Country](#)

power: According to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Naci Korum, “cooperative security is a theoretical manifestation of Alliance’s soft power. Partnership relations fostered by NATO are one of the primary tools for application of soft power and promotion of cooperative security. Whilst we support the notion of cooperative security, our Alliance and solidarity among Allies must continue to prevail over the potential of partnerships.”¹⁷² Turkish Minister of Defense Ismet Yilmaz states that NATO is the primary forum for strategic debate and supports the enlargement of the Alliance for enhanced security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.¹⁷³ He defines cooperative security as “security for everyone,” meaning inclusive and mutually-beneficial, as opposed to “security for one nation or one organization” and argues that Turkey should establish dialogue and consensus to solve problems in the Middle East.¹⁷⁴ But, how Turkey is going to cooperate with its partners to address the transformation in the MENA region through rule-based institutions for crisis management and prevention is not clarified.

Karaosmanoglu and Kibaroglu argue that Turkey’s interest in cooperative security results from participation in peace support operations and initiation of regional

Profile, at: <http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/valued-partnership-obg-talks-huseyin-diriöz-ambassador-and-assistant-secretary-general->

¹⁷² “Opening Remarks By Mr. Naci Korum, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the Antalya International Security and Cooperation Conference by the Atlantic Council of Turkey, 14-15 December 2012, Antalya,” at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/opening-remarks-by-mr_-naci-korum_-deputy-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey-at-the-antalya-international-security-and-coop.en.mfa

¹⁷³ Ismet Yilmaz, “Turkey and NATO’s Approach to Cooperative Security,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 10, Number 3, Fall 2011, pp. 19-23.

¹⁷⁴ Yilmaz, 2011, p. 20.

security arrangements.¹⁷⁵ However, in some Turkish security analyses, cooperative security has been defined as “multilateral approaches rather than unilateral activities,” such as “conflict-mediation tools, multilateral diplomacy and economic interdependence used as instruments in Turkish foreign policy,” which fit neoliberal institutionalist explanations.¹⁷⁶ It has also been defined as a vision of conflict resolution, promotion of win-win relations, and a “cooperative attitude.”¹⁷⁷ Kardas argues that Turkey’s foreign policy toolkit emphasizes cooperative security to address security threats by prioritizing multilateral approaches to institution building, conflict mediation, and economic interdependence.¹⁷⁸ He asserts that, simultaneously, Turkey has sought a more assertive role to expand the Western security architecture to its neighborhood through cooperative security, i.e. to realize its regional ambitions and limits of its power as a function of *realpolitik*.¹⁷⁹ In his analysis of the transformation of Turkey’s regional policy, he argues that cooperative security practices will “bring calm” to the region.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁵ Ali L. Karaosmanoglu and Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Defense Reform in Turkey,” Chapter 8, in eds. Istvan Gyarmati, Theodor Winkler, Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States, Potomac Books, p. 145.

¹⁷⁶ Selcen Oner, “Continuity and Change,” in ed. Ebru Canan-Sokullu, Debating Security in Turkey: Challenges and Changes in the Twenty-First Century, Rowman and Littlefield, 2013, p. 69.

¹⁷⁷ Bilgehan Ozturk, “Analysis: Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: A Manifestation of Neo-Ottomanism?” *Euro Asia News*, September 20, 2013.

¹⁷⁸ Saban Kardas, “Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles?” Middle East Policy Archives, Spring 2010, Volume XVII, Number 1, at: <http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/turkey-redrawing-middle-east-map-or-building-sandcastles>

¹⁷⁹ Kardas, 2010.

¹⁸⁰ Saban Kardas, “From zero problems to leading the change: making sense of transformation in Turkey’s regional policy,” TEPAV International Policy and Leadership Institute, 2012-Fifth Edition, Turkey Policy Brief Series, p. 8.

Others have tried to analyze the transformation of Turkey's security policy by principles of "good neighborliness," i.e. identity.¹⁸¹ Ozcan defines this neighborhood policy as the amelioration of relations with former rivals such as Russia, Syria, and Iran, and establishment of trust, engagement, and dialogue, as opposed to confrontation and containment.¹⁸² He argues that crucial outstanding policy issues include democratization, EU membership, the Syrian conflict, reconciliation in Iraq, engagement to prevent a nuclear Iran, and reopening dialogue on Cyprus.¹⁸³

The following sections summarize the development and applications of cooperative security principles in Europe and the Middle East, both of which have influenced but not systematically guided Turkish security policymakers to this date. One particular reason is how, unlike other members of NATO, who had a more transformative approach to cooperative security, Turkey perceived these institutional settings as tools to achieve its foreign policy goals from an instrumental perspective, rather than transforming its security relations with attending parties. Another explanation is Turkey's partial role and limited participation to these frameworks, as the security problems addressed have not been Turkey's main concerns.

¹⁸¹ Gencer Ozcan, "Turkey's Changing Neighborhood Policy," *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Briefing Paper*, September 2004, pp. 1-8.

¹⁸² Ozcan, 2004, p. 1.

¹⁸³ Ozcan, 2004, pp. 10-12.

Turkey's Experience with Cooperative Security in Europe

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was originally established as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the early 1970s to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between the Soviet Bloc and the U.S.-led Western alliance.¹⁸⁴ The final stage of CSCE was the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in the Finnish capital in August 1975.¹⁸⁵ Although this act was politically binding and not legally binding, it was a significant commitment that surpassed the initial aim to avert crises due to unannounced large military exercises. The act became known as the Helsinki Process and was essentially a set of key commitments on political, military, economic, environmental, and human rights issues. As a major accomplishment, it established ten fundamental principles (the 'Decalogue') governing the behavior of states towards their citizens, as well as towards each other.¹⁸⁶ These principles showed that external security and internal security are meaningfully related. The 1975 principles defined global governance as a multi-actor, multi-level interaction between local, national, regional, and global political players who exist side by side and not in hierarchical order.¹⁸⁷ The Helsinki process brought together government representatives, international organizations, civil society groups, private sector entities, religious institutions, as well as representatives of the academic and media communities to enhance cooperation in: 1)

¹⁸⁴ "History," Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, at: <http://www.osce.org/who/87>

¹⁸⁵ "Signing of the Helsinki Final Act," Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, at: <http://www.osce.org/who/43960>

¹⁸⁶ "Signing of the Helsinki Final Act."

¹⁸⁷ Martti Antola ed., "Final Report of the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy: A Case for Multi stakeholder Cooperation," Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, September 2008.

Confidence building; 2) idea-shaping or innovation and; 3) implementation or adding scale by introducing non-state actors to leverage all public and private resources to decrease the time between decision and action.¹⁸⁸ Overall, the CSCE experience was a gradual process toward establishing norms and institutional measures on European security.¹⁸⁹

Turkey has been a member of the OSCE since its inception in 1975. Turkey has also shared its observations in OSCE with its Middle East counterparts to justify its expertise to mediate a similar process in the region, utilizing its dual identity. However, Turkish leadership throughout this process has been rather limited: Turkey hosted the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, where the Charter for European Security and the Agreement on Adaptation of CFE were signed and adopted; in addition to the Turkish contribution to OSCE work by technical and financial assistance to projects in the Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans to strengthen military security and stability.¹⁹⁰ In April 2014, Turkish diplomat Ertugrul Apakan was appointed as the head of the OSCE monitoring mission in Ukraine.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ Antola ed., 2008.

¹⁸⁹ These principles have been carried onto the Vienna CSCE documents of 1990 and 1992 that expanded on Stockholm agreement, 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) to limit rapid assault weapons and CFE 1A to limit personnel, the 1990 “Charter of Paris for a New Europe” that introduced “preventive diplomacy” and “constructive intervention” to the Helsinki principles, and the 1992 Open Skies Treaty. Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, “Piecing together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the ‘Construction’ of Security in Post-Cold War Europe,” *International Organization* 53:3, Summer 1999, pp. 505–35.

¹⁹⁰ “The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),” Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-and-the-organization-for-security-and-cooperation-in-europe-osce.en.mfa>

¹⁹¹ “Turkish diplomat heads OSCE mission in Ukraine,” *SE Times*, April 15, 2014.

Turkey's Experience with Cooperative Security in the Middle East

Building conceptually on top of the Helsinki model, the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference was centered on enhancing relations between Arab states and Israel, and moving forward with multilateral talks on environment, water, refugees, arms control and regional security (ACRS), and economic development. Within the ACRS working group, Russia and the United States led the talks that included 16 parties.¹⁹² One of the strategic objectives behind ACRS was the establishment of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -free zone in the Middle East. The ACRS talks went on for four years but ultimately collapsed in November 1995 because of the sharp disagreement between Egypt and Israel over the nuclear issue, leading to the non-implementation of agreed confidence-building measures.¹⁹³

Although Turkey participated to the ACRS talks as a “mentor,” it decided not to be party to any confidence and security building measures in the region.¹⁹⁴ This decision reflects Turkey’s official position that it is not part of the Middle East. During ACRS, official talks were interrupted intermittently, but in unofficial meetings, officials in Track I meetings would represent their individual opinions to continue the dialogue

¹⁹² Syria and Lebanon did not attend due to the bilateral conflict with Israel, and Iran, Iraq, and Libya were not invited as they were not party to the peace process. Michael D. Yaffe, “Promoting Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East,” *Disarmament Forum*, 2001, pp. 9-25.

¹⁹³ These measures included the establishment of a regional security center in Jordan, an emergency communications network based on the CSCE example, the procedures for the pre-notification of certain military activities, and a number of maritime CSBMs such as search and rescue, and prevention of incidents at sea.

¹⁹⁴ Yaffe, 2001, pp. 9-25.

between Arab countries and Israel. Turkey was given special status by the U.S. as mentor in exchange for military information and pre-notification of certain military activities.¹⁹⁵ Under the operational basket, Turkey hosted two meetings in 1993 and 1994 in Antalya and led the way to what became the Track 2 process. During the two meetings, decisions were made on confidence-building measures in communications networks, military information exchanges, and maritime security measures.¹⁹⁶ Specifically, pre-notification of certain military exercises, the exchanges of unclassified military publications and military training were agreed upon. Moreover, the Antalya meetings generated a proposal to hold a joint rescue-at-sea exercise in which Israel, a number of Arab states, and the U.S. Sixth Fleet would participate, and called for the establishment of a regional communication center in Cairo.¹⁹⁷ This proposal was implemented by Turkey, the United States, Israel, and Jordan as the SAR- Search and Rescue Reliant Mermaid in 1998.¹⁹⁸

Turkey was a major contributor in preparation and promotion of almost every document on confidence-building measures and conflict prevention, and the promotion of the key principle of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”¹⁹⁹

ACRS remains the most comprehensive arms control and regional security

¹⁹⁵ Canada was a mentor on maritime measures, the Netherlands on communications, the United States and Russia were co-mentors on long-term objectives and declaratory measures and for verification.

¹⁹⁶ “The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group—A Chronology,” Foundation for Middle East Peace, Settlement Report, Vol.6 No.7, November 1996, at: <http://www.fmep.org/reports/special-reports/arms-control-proliferation-in-the-middle-east/the-arms-control-regional-security-working-group-a-chronology>

¹⁹⁷ Shai Feldman, *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East*, The MIT Press, 1997.

¹⁹⁸ “Reliant Mermaid,” Global Security, at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/reliant-mermaid.htm>

¹⁹⁹ Author’s email correspondence with Suha Umar, Ambassador (Rtd), the Turkish ambassador to Jordan between 1995-1998, July 25, 2012.

framework that the region has experienced. Yet, the current social and political transformation, along with the decreasing influence of Turkey in the region brings about several unknowns about applying these principles to a Middle East security architecture in the near future.

Turkey's Experience with Cooperative Security in Asia

Under AKP, the geographical limits of Turkish involvement in politics have been expanded to Asia, in addition to the Middle East. Erdogan even mentioned Turkish interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)²⁰⁰ led by Russia and China.²⁰¹ Between 2010 and 2014, Turkey chaired the “Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia” (CICA).²⁰² In its concept paper, the Turkish government defined cooperative security as follows:

“Cooperative security does not require a specific adversary. It is a sincere effort at dispelling misunderstandings and misinterpretations through dialogue mechanisms. It

²⁰⁰ SCO, originally called the Shanghai Five and renamed in 2001, was established in 1996 to demilitarize the border between China and the Former Soviet Union. SCO serves as a forum to discuss economic and security issues such as counterterrorism and illicit trafficking, stability in Afghanistan, as well as greater energy cooperation. Andrew Scheineson, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” *Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder*, March 24, 2009, at: <http://www.cfr.org/china/shanghai-cooperation-organization/p10883>

²⁰¹ Ihsan Dagi, “Turkey’s quest for a Eurasian Union,” *Today’s Zaman*, January 27, 2013.

²⁰² CICA is a multinational forum for cooperation, promotion of peace, security, and stability in Asia. . It currently has 26 member states: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Japan, Malaysia, Ukraine and USA, as well as the UN, OSCE, and League of Arab States are observers. CICA Summit brings the heads of state and government every 4 years, as well as the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs every 2 years. CICA deals with a broad range of security issues and has similarities with OSCE in Europe, but does not have such a robust security structure. It currently has 26 member states. See: http://www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&lang=1

is neither collective security nor collective defense. It essentially implies an attitude of good faith towards others.

Cooperative security is not an oxymoron. Cooperation is not attained at the expense of security, nor is security attained at the expense of cooperation. Cooperative approach to security rests on the underlying premise that security is indivisible. In fact, cooperative security is a non-zero-sum game.”²⁰³

This definition assumes underlying harmony of interest on security issues and does not address the preventive principles of cooperative security. In this document, the Turkish government also referred to the policy tools for cooperative security to eliminate coercive elements and to increase transparency and predictability to eliminate misunderstandings and avoid conflicts: Focusing on the traditional confidence building measures in the “politico-military field” and striking a balance with other confidence building measures in economic, environmental, human dimensions, and new challenges and threats such as terrorism and illicit trafficking.²⁰⁴ Turkey named political will and strong leadership and vision as musts to achieve “indivisible, comprehensive, and cooperative security.”²⁰⁵

²⁰³ “Concept Paper on the Vision of the Turkish CICA Chairmanship 2010-2012,” Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Turkish Chairmanship, at: <http://www.cicaistanbul.org/belgeler-2.tr.mfa>

²⁰⁴ “Concept Paper on the Vision of the Turkish CICA Chairmanship 2010-2012.”

²⁰⁵ “Concept Paper on the Vision of the Turkish CICA Chairmanship 2010-2012.”

Under the Turkish Chairmanship, on January 15, 2013, CICA agreed on the adoption (on a voluntary basis) of four fundamental confidence building measures in the military-political dimension.²⁰⁶

1. “Mutual visits by the military authorities and representatives of defense colleges;
2. Mutual invitations among armed forces for participation in national holidays, cultural and sport events;
3. Information exchange on CV’s of top military personnel;
4. Exchange of information on the status of their accession to or ratification of multilateral instruments on arms control and disarmament as well as conventions on the outer space.”²⁰⁷

While these measures have possibly been proposed as signs of “good will,” they are very symbolic and do not really address any of the major sources of insecurity among CICA states.

Another area where Turkey has considered cooperative security policies is the Black Sea.²⁰⁸ This region, particularly the Northern Caucasus, suffers from unresolved ethnic conflicts, terrorism and illicit trafficking connecting to Afghanistan and Iran. Since the end of the Cold War, main conflicts have been between Georgia-South

²⁰⁶ “Statement by his Excellency Ahmet Davutoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey,” World Expo Center, Shanghai, May 21, 2014, at: <http://www.cicaistanbul.org/belgeler-35.tr.mfa>

²⁰⁷ “Military-Political Dimension,” Secretariat of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, January 15, 2013, at: http://www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=24&lang=1

²⁰⁸ Turkey is also a member to multiple initiatives to foster interdependency for enhanced Black Sea regional cooperation, such as The European Union’s Black Sea Synergy Initiative, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States’ Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation.

Ossetia, Georgia-Abkhazia, Chechnya-Russia, Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia; and have heavily involved Russia, and Turkey to a lesser extent. One major security concern for Russia and Turkey is the energy security of Caspian oil and gas.

The main regional cooperative security initiatives in the Black Sea include the Organization for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), founded by Turkey in 1992 to promote security and stability through economic cooperation among 11 member states without any military agenda;²⁰⁹ and the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR), which was established by littoral states²¹⁰ and introduced CSBMs on naval activities, search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, and environmental protection by a 2001 agreement signed in Istanbul.²¹¹

However, the current suspension of relations between NATO and Russia over the Crimea crisis, and the deterioration of the Turkish-Russian strategic relationship overshadow near future improvement in the region.

Conclusion

A review of the literature on Turkish security, Alliance behavior in particular, reveals

²⁰⁹ BSEC members are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, at: <http://www.bsec-organization.org/member/Pages/member.aspx>

²¹⁰ Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

²¹¹ "Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group Agreement," April 2, 2001, at: http://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/icerik.php?icerik_id=248&dil=eng&blackseafor=1

that both rationalistic and sociological theories have strength and limitations in explaining the formulation of Turkish security policies within NATO and the region.

While during the 1990s, principles of cooperative security were nascent in Turkish thinking, these principles eluded policymakers under the AKP administration.

Turkish policymaking has been more cooperative than confrontational, when the guiding principle is economic interest, i.e. economic interdependence. However, when strategic interests clash, economic relations are easily forsaken. Turkey needs to formulate a sustainable regional policy that realistically addresses its security interests and minimizes risks arising from political instability, sectarian conflict, and extremism. In the broader framework, Turkey needs to harmonize its role in NATO, the bilateral relationship with the US, and regional engagement. For a sustainable, overarching security policy, the guiding principle should be preventive engagement and cooperative security.

In the following chapters, this dissertation dwells on three test cases of Turkish decision making on nuclear issues: the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in nuclear and extended deterrence, air and ballistic missile defense, and Iran's nuclear program. Each case analyzes what reassurances Turkey seeks from NATO; what the political, military, and technical challenges are on both ends to fulfill these tasks; the mismatch between threats and tools to address them; and the mechanisms to resolve these problems. In order to do so, each case defines the security problem from Turkey's perspective, the broader debate within the Alliance, why the current state of

the Turkish policy is inadequate or problematic, and explores how applying the principles of cooperative security could resolve these issues. The first two cases reflect Turkey's perceptions and demands from Alliance unity, burden sharing, and need for reassurances on extended deterrence. The Iran chapter serves as a test case of Turkey's perceptions of nuclear weapons and regional interests outside of the NATO framework.

While all three cases are nuclear-related, I conclude that Turkish thinking on these issues is guided by non-nuclear principles: While being a member of a nuclear alliance, the characteristics peculiar to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are secondary to conventional deterrence in Turkish security decision making.

Chapter 4: Turkish Position on Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)

Throughout the Cold War, non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons deployed in Europe were considered a symbol of the U.S. commitment to the European security. In the recent years, debate within NATO and the US on maintaining or eliminating the tactical nuclear arsenals has been primarily a political and conceptual, rather than a military one.²¹² Central and Eastern European countries and Turkey perceive the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on their soil as a concrete security guarantee and privileged status within the Alliance, while others such as Germany and Belgium strongly advocate for their removal to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in NATO posture and for nuclear-weapon states to fulfill disarmament requirements of the NPT regime. While Turkey has been rather silent on this issue, the Turkish decision on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons deployment in Europe constitutes a crucial piece in understanding Turkey's nuclear policies.

This chapter first provides an overview of evolution of the TNW mission and the ongoing U.S./NATO debates on tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) deployment in Europe with a focus on Turkish views, i.e. whether these systems should be removed as part of the next round of nuclear reductions between the US and Russia, or kept and modernized as symbols of alliance cohesion, as long as the allies are willing to host them. These debates fall under three categories, as each debate informs Turkey's position on TNW: 1) The opposing views in the US, Europe, and Turkey on the

²¹² Catherine M. Kelleher and Scott L. Warren, "Getting to Zero Starts Here: Tactical Nuclear Weapons," *Arms Control Today*, October 2009, available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_10/Kelleher

future of nuclear sharing within NATO; 2) The U.S. Department of Energy life extension programs (LEP) required to upgrade the gravity bombs deployed in Europe, i.e. B61-12 LEP, to maintain the allied capability to deliver them by the next generation NATO fighter, F-35; and 3) Evaluation of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program and allies', including Turkey's, positions on purchasing new nuclear-capable aircraft.

The chapter then focuses on the analyses of the official Turkish position on TNW, explaining Turkey's policy objectives and inadequacies in the current formulation. It concludes with Turkey's policy options and conditions under which Turkish policymakers would seek to support the dismantlement of the B-61 gravity nuclear bombs at the Incirlik Airbase.

I argue that lack of confidence in US/NATO guarantees and fear of abandonment are still prominent concerns in Turkish policymakers' minds. Hence Turkish perceptions of TNW are geared by non-nuclear thinking, i.e. conventional deterrence and U.S. political commitment to Turkish security. In addition, there is no domestic constituent that holds the AKP government accountable for the existence of U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil.

Despite these challenges and the fact that Turkey is comfortable with the nuclear status quo, it is likely to follow an Alliance decision under the U.S. lead, as long as Turkey is given concrete security guarantees, i.e. enhanced U.S.-Turkey defense

cooperation and reassurances for multilateral defense against Russia. These conventional military guarantees should address Turkey's most immediate security concerns regarding the ongoing war in Syria and Iraq, Turkish border security, and the fight against ISIS. Such concrete guarantees would serve the continuity with the U.S.-Turkey partnership and alleviate Turkey's concern for abandonment.

I conclude that Turkey should detach the political role from these weapons, since TNW have no meaningful military mission, remain under U.S. command and control, and do not serve the Turkish objective of maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent. From a cooperative security perspective, eliminating the NATO strategic commitment to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons would have negative consequences: It would complicate the relations with Russia and could fuel an arms race in the region. In addition, an increased role for TNW and increasing the readiness of the dual-capable aircraft would increase the political pressures on the host countries in Europe.

Issue for Analysis

While Turkey does not have its own nuclear weapons, it is a nonnuclear member of a nuclear alliance and hosts U.S. tactical nuclear weapons towards the NATO principle of burden sharing. Turkey's decision regarding TNW involve several components, including whether or not to keep the remaining U.S. TNW on its soil in Incirlik, and whether or not to have fighters that are either nuclear-capable or nuclear-certified. However, Turkey does not have a clearly stated policy on tactical nuclear weapons,

beyond its commitment to the global nonproliferation regime and eventual “global zero.”

Nonstrategic nuclear weapons have shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield nuclear warheads when compared to strategic nuclear weapons.²¹³ They are frequently called tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) for “use ... by land, sea, or air forces against opposing forces, supporting installations or facilities, in support of operations that contribute to the accomplishment of a military mission of limited scope, usually limited to the area of military operations.”²¹⁴ Woolf also defines TNW by exclusion, meaning all weapons currently not covered by strategic arms control treaties.²¹⁵

Today, U.S. TNW in Europe refer to the 180 forward-deployed B61 gravity bombs hosted by five European states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey.

²¹³ This definition covers nuclear mines, artillery, ballistic and cruise missiles, and gravity bombs. Amy F. Woolf, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 7-5700, May 29, 2012, Summary page.

²¹⁴ “As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are designed to have a long-range rather than immediate effect on the enemy and its military forces.” Ibid, p. 5.

²¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 6-7.

Table 1: U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe²¹⁶

Host Country	Vaults	B61s	Base	Platform	Custodian
Belgium	11	20	Kleine Brogel	Belgian F-16s	USAF 701 st MUNNS*
Germany	11	20	Buchel	German Tornados	USAF. 702 st MUNNS
Italy	18/11	50/20	Aviano/ Ghedi Torre	U.S. F-16s/ Italian Tornados	USAF 31 st Fighter Wing/ USAF 704 st MUNNS
Netherlands	11	20	Volkel	Dutch F-16s	USAF 703 st MUNNS
Turkey	25	50	Incirlik	Rotating U.S. aircraft from other wings	USAF 39 th Air Base Wing

* United States Air Force Munitions Support Squadron

In peacetime, U.S. soldiers guard nuclear weapons stored in non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), and the codes for detonation are under U.S. authority. Since these weapons are within the Supreme Allied Commander Europe's (SACEUR) operational authority, they would be used by forces assigned to him as the NATO commander.²¹⁷ In case of war, NATO's main operating bases would take over the command and control of the tactical B-61 gravity nuclear bombs.

NATO and Russia have an asymmetry in the size of the TNW arsenals: Russia has an estimated 2000 deliverable non-strategic nuclear warheads, including cruise missiles, gravity bombs, torpedoes, and depth charges, and all non-strategic weapons are in central storage operated by the 12th Main Directorate of MOD, i.e. not deployed with

²¹⁶ Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 67 (1), 2010, pp. 68-9, and Hans M. Kristensen, "NATO Nuclear Weapons Security Costs Expected to Double," *FAS Strategic Security*, March 11, 2014, at: <http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/03/nato-nuclear-costs/>

²¹⁷ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "Managing NATO's tactical nuclear operations," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 1988, 30:1, 59-78, p. 62.

delivery vehicles.²¹⁸ Most Russian TNW are planned to be used in the “Eastern Military District,” as Russian forces are outnumbered in the Far East in case of armed conflict and military buildup with China’s People’s Liberation Army.²¹⁹ The *Zapad-09* military exercise that Russia conducted in September 2009, simulating a nuclear attack against Poland, and SS-26 deployment in the Kaliningrad region also reflect the Russian posture on TNW in Eastern Europe.²²⁰

In leading to the analysis of the Turkish position, which is primarily guided by the broader NATO debate, the following sections first introduce Turkey’s TNW mission and analyze the debate on the role of TNW in NATO burden sharing, extended deterrence, and Turkish perspectives on maintaining or dismantling these weapons. It then provides an overview of two modernization programs and Turkey’s involvement; B-61 life extension and F-35 JSF programs, analyzing the costs, benefits, and strategic implications.

²¹⁸ “Workshop Summary: Track II Dialogue on Limiting Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Vienna, October 6-7, 2014, pp. 16-17.

²¹⁹ Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey’s National Security Strategy and NATO Nuclear Weapons,” in George Perkovich and Sinan Ulgen eds. *Turkey’s Nuclear Future*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United Book Press, Washington D.C., 2015, p. 90.

²²⁰ “Immense Russian-Belarusian Military Exercise (Possibly Focused on Neutralizing an Ethnic Unrest) Taking Place in Eastern Europe,” *The Aviationist*, September 22, 2013.

The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Mission in Europe and Turkey's Role

In 1957, NATO agreed at the Paris Summit “to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need.”²²¹ The mix of types and ranges in the NATO nuclear force were designed for strategic flexibility against the Soviets’ military options. In 1967, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was established as a forum for consultation, information sharing, and planning.²²²

The TNW deployment decisions were made by secret nuclear agreements between each host and the United States falling under the following categories, i.e. the Atomic Stockpile Agreement, the Atomic Cooperation Agreement, the Service-Level Agreement, and “Third party” stockpile agreements for use by NATO-committed forces of a signatory user nation.²²³ These secret agreements, at a minimum, included a statement of classified information about the weapons, specified number and types of warheads earmarked by the US for allied forces, and a stockpile agreement for national, NATO, and U.S. use; mostly making the allied role a “passive recipient.”²²⁴

²²¹ Final Communiqué, Chairman: Mr. P.H. Spaak, Secretary General of NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 1957, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c571219a.htm>.

²²² Karl-Heinz Kamp, Robertus C.N. Remkes, “Chapter Four: Options for NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements,” in Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams eds, *Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe*, The Nuclear Threat Reduction Initiative, November 17, 2011, p. 79, at: <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/options-nato-nuclear-sharing-arrangements/>

²²³ Hans M. Kristensen, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning*, Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005, Washington D.C., p. 12.

²²⁴ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “Managing NATO’s tactical nuclear operations,” *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 1988, 30:1, 59-78, pp. 62-63.

During the 1980s, the US had 300 nuclear bombs for aircraft with yields up to couple of hundred kilotons, stored at four airbases in Turkey; Eskisehir, Murted, Erhac, and Balikesir.²²⁵ These weapons could be deployed on F-104, F-4, and F-100 fixed wing assets, as the Turkish military posture was ready to conduct nuclear missions.²²⁶

In the post-Cold War era, the fundamental strategic calculations and the conventional balance of power between Russia and NATO changed drastically. In 1991-1992, the US eliminated all ground-launched short-range nuclear weapons with a range less than 300 miles and removed TNW from all naval combatant vessels through President George H.W. Bush's Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI).²²⁷ The U.S. moves were reciprocated by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's PNI to "eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear warheads for tactical missiles, and nuclear mines; remove all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and multipurpose submarines... separate nuclear warheads from air defense missiles and put warheads in central storage."²²⁸ By PNIs, some 7200 TNW deployed in Europe during the Cold War went down to an estimated 4000 in its aftermath, leading to an approximately 90% reduction.²²⁹

²²⁵ Kibaroglu, May 2011, pp. 31-32.

²²⁶ Can Kasapoglu, "Turkey's National Security Strategy and NATO Nuclear Weapons," in George Perkovich and Sinan Ulgen eds. Turkey's Nuclear Future, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United Book Press, Washington D.C., 2015, p. 97.

²²⁷ "The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on Tactical Nuclear Weapons at a Glance," *Fact Sheets and Briefs*, Arms Control Association, August 2012, at: <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pniglance>

²²⁸ Richard Weitz, "Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Current Policies and Future Trends," Chapter 8, in Stephen J. Blank ed, Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2011, p. 368.

²²⁹ Steven Pifer, "The Next Round: The United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions after new START," *Brookings Arms Control Series*, Paper 4, December 2010, p. 17. There are different figures

Accordingly, Turkey's nuclear readiness and aircraft status changed from full alert to "nuclear-capable."²³⁰ According to Stein, Ankara decertified the nuclear fighter wings and decreased the readiness of its F-16s in return for a "very strong nuclear guarantee" from the US.²³¹ In April 1995, along with the Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC), the U.S. Air Forces in Europe announced that the 39th MUNSS at Balıkesir Air Force Detachment and the 739th MUNSS at Akinci Air Force Detachment were no longer required as any future support could be provided by the Incirlik AB.²³²

In 1997, NATO members assured Russia in the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security Between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" that it had "no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members," and that it had no need "to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear policy-and do not foresee any future need to do so."²³³

The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept emphasized that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance so long as nuclear weapons exist. It also stated that "the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance,

on the retaining weapons, depending on type: Larson argues that approximately 2000 air-delivered TNW remained in Europe by the end of 1991. Larson, 2006, pp. 13-14.

²³⁰ Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 67 (1), 2010, p. 70.

²³¹ Aaron Stein, "Turkey's Airplane-less Nuclear Weapons: A Classic Crisis Stability Problem?" *Turkey Wonk*, April 15, 2014, at: <https://turkeywonk.wordpress.com/2014/04/15/turkeys-airplane-less-nuclear-weapons-a-classic-crisis-stability-problem/>

²³² "United States Air Forces in Europe- Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS), *Global Security*, July 24, 2011, at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/agency/usafe-munss.htm>

²³³ Woolf, 2012, p. 12.

particularly those of the United States...²³⁴ Although the document had an open-ended role for TNW and didn't mention TNW weapons in Europe, the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review had specified the following:

“The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons – combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons – contribute to Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats . . . Any changes in NATO’s nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review within – and decision by – the Alliance.”²³⁵

Both the 2010 Strategic Concept and 2012 *Deterrence and Defense Posture Review* (DDPR) emphasized reciprocity with Russia: “...with any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range (tactical) nuclear weapons.”²³⁶ DDPR stated that “NATO is

²³⁴ “Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 2010, at: <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.

²³⁵ Nuclear Posture Review Report, Department of Defense, April 2010, at: <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.

²³⁶ “Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept For the Defense and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”

prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia.”²³⁷

Currently, NATO nuclear sharing involves information sharing, nuclear consultations, common nuclear planning, and common execution.²³⁸ Moreover, through a program called “Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics” (SNOWCAT), NATO members participate in nuclear strike missions with their conventional forces if they don’t have nuclear weapons or aircraft assigned to deliver the U.S. nuclear weapons.²³⁹ Currently, there are 15 NATO member states involved in nuclear burden sharing (US, UK, France, B-61 hosts and SNOWCAT participants), 27 in nuclear planning (all but France based on its own decision, while being against any change to NATO nuclear policy), and 28 in nuclear policy.²⁴⁰ Nuclear sharing policy decisions are made by the consensus of all 28 members and communicated in the Strategic Concept for the alliance as a whole. However, there are national differences in decisions regarding the implementation of these policies, as well as views on the future of nuclear sharing and its impact on alliance solidarity.

²³⁷ “Official Text: Deterrence and Defense Posture Review,” NATO, May 20, 2012, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm

²³⁸ Kamp, Remkes, 2011, p. 77.

²³⁹ Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 67 (1), 2010, p. 68.

²⁴⁰ Larry D. Welch, John C. Harvey et al., “Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise,” June 2, 2014, pp. 43-4, at: <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Independent-Nuclear-Enterprise-Review-Report-30-June-2014.pdf> President de Gaulle stressed the national character of the forces under NATO command and created a nuclear *force de frappe*, i.e. national nuclear striking force, for “the security of the French nation rest in French hands.” C.E. Zoppo, “France as a Nuclear Power,” The RAND Corporation, April 1962, pp. 1-2, at: <http://www.prgs.edu/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2006/P2485.pdf>

Turkey does not have a clearly-stated NATO nuclear mission that is publically agreed upon by American and Turkish officials. Turkey has a unique nuclear posture among NATO hosts by no fighter wing. However there are contradictory explanations of Turkish nuclear mission: Turkish officials state that no Turkish planes will deliver nuclear weapons, while U.S. officials claim that Turkey could deliver 10-20 bombs if necessary. According to Norris and Kristensen' sources at the Pentagon, despite the Turkish officials' denial, an estimated 10-20 weapons are earmarked for delivery by Turkish F-16s, which are going to be gradually replaced by the F-35 JSF.²⁴¹ In contrast, Kibaroglu's interview with former commander of the Turkish Air Force (until 2001) Gen. Ergin Celasin suggests that Turkey's role in NATO nuclear strike mission ended with the withdrawal of weapons from national Turkish bases in the 1990s.²⁴² Turkey's F-104s have been retired in 1994 and F-4s are in service after the 1997 modernization by Israeli Aerospace Industries of 54 aircraft.²⁴³ However, only the Turkish F-16s, known as "Fighting Falcons" participate as non-nuclear air defense escort in NATO's "Steadfast Noon" nuclear strike exercises to train in loading, unloading, and employing B61s, and Strike Evaluation (STRIKEVAL) inspections and nuclear certifications.²⁴⁴ These planes contribute to the nuclear deployment by providing "Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses" (SEAD.)²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ Norris and Kristensen, 2010, p. 70.

²⁴² Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey, NATO, and Nuclear Sharing: Prospects after NATO's Lisbon Summit," p. 2.

²⁴³ Kibaroglu, May 2011, p. 32.

²⁴⁴ Kibaroglu, May 2011, p. 32. In October 2015, Turkish aircraft participated to NATO's annual nuclear strike exercise at Buchel Air Base in Germany, along with Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the US. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "United States nuclear forces," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 72, No:2, 2016, p. 71. In October 2014, the Ghedi airbase in Northern Italy hosted the Steadfast Noon 2014 NATO nuclear exercise, in which the Polish Air Force participated with F-16 Block 52+ jets, although they are not believed to be assigned a nuclear strike mission under NATO. Hans M. Kristensen, "Polish F-16s in NATO Nuclear Exercise in Italy," *Strategic Security*,

Policy Debates on Tactical Nuclear Weapons

With the exception of the 1987 intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement, which still allowed nuclear weapons with ranges under 500 km, the US and Russia have not negotiated on TNW, a critique of the new START Treaty posed during the U.S. Senate 2010 ratification hearings.²⁴⁶ In 2010, then Secretary Clinton said: “In any future reductions [of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe], our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, relocate those weapons away from the territory of NATO members, and include non-strategic nuclear weapons in the next round of U.S.-Russian arms control discussions.”²⁴⁷

Prior to the Ukrainian crises, some nonproliferation analysts argued that TNW should be eliminated unilaterally if necessary. However, the common understanding in the arms control community is that a unilateral decision post-Ukraine is politically more challenging. In the opposite camp, leading to the 2016 Warsaw NATO Summit, there

Federation of American Scientists, October 24, 2014, at: <http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/10/steadfastnoon/> Turkey also participated to the Steadfast Noon exercise in September 2011 in Volkel AB, Netherlands with “several transport aircraft” and May 2010 at Aviano AB, Italy, along with Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and the US. The nuclear exercises include generation of aircraft, simulation of takeoff in strike formation with air-defense aircraft, and a simulated strike at a bombing range. Hans M. Kristensen, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists, *Special Report*, No:3, May 2012, pp. 22-23.

²⁴⁵ SEAD is “any action taken to deter enemy surface-to-air missiles or anti-aircraft artillery. The objective is not the destruction of the ground-based threats but to subdue those threats until an air mission is complete.” Turkish and U.S. air forces conduct joint exercises to combine air assets and share tactics with SEAD teams. Turkey hosted the NATO Exercise Anatolian Falcon in March 2012 in Konya by employing the F-16 Fighting Falcon and the 480th Fighter Squadron pilots from Spangdahlem AB, Germany shared their specialty SEAD tactics with their Turkish counterparts. Staff Sgt. Daryl Knee, “U.S. Pilots plant SEAD with Turkish counterparts,” *Anatolian Falcon 2012 Public Affairs*, March 10, 2012.

²⁴⁶ Pifer, 2010, p. 17.

²⁴⁷ “U.S. Signals its Nuclear Arms May Stay in Europe for Now,” Reuters, April 22, 2010.

has been steady drumbeat by proponents of enhancing NATO's conventional and nuclear capabilities against threats by "little green men," i.e. responding to the Baltic and Eastern European allies' calls to enhance defense capabilities against Russian aggression.²⁴⁸

While Turkey is reticent on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, its policies and thinking are largely shaped by the broader NATO debate on the role of nuclear sharing in Alliance unity. This position is reflected in Turkish officials' statements that Turkey will support an Alliance decision on TNW.

The NATO Nuclear Sharing Debate

Among the NATO countries, there are nuclear-weapon states, i.e. USA, Britain, and France, states that support the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, such as Central and Eastern European Allies, and anti-nuclear states such as Germany and Belgium. France strongly prefers maintaining the nuclear status quo, while the UK is more ambivalent.

Main Points of Argument by the Proponents of TNW Deployment in Europe

Central and Eastern European members of NATO, i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic states, i.e. Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, are particularly

²⁴⁸ See, Franklin C. Miller, "Adjusting NATO's Nuclear Policies: A Five Step Program," *NATO Source*, March 23, 2016.

concerned about the role of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Russia's military doctrine, in the aftermath of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the ongoing Ukraine crisis. While Turkey and Italy are ambivalent on TNW, Italy is "willing to slow down or postpone the complete elimination of TNW from Europe and its own territory" arguing for solidarity and indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security.²⁴⁹

Defenders of continued deployment of TNW argue that the U.S. B61 gravity bombs are an essential political and military link between the United States and Europe.²⁵⁰ These weapons "anchor the US to the Continent" against isolationism and disengagement that would weaken the transatlantic ties.²⁵¹ They ask how NATO members would continue to share nuclear responsibilities and how the US would share information with nonnuclear allies without deployed nuclear weapons in Europe.²⁵² Arguing that removal is too risky, proponents of TNW believe these weapons discourage proliferation by allies and create uncertainty in the minds of potential adversaries.²⁵³

²⁴⁹ Paolo Foradori, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Italy: Striking a Balance between Disarmament Aspirations and Alliance Obligations," *Nonproliferation Review*, February 17, 2012, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 14.

²⁵⁰ Oliver Meier, "Belgium, Germany Question U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe," *Arms Control Today*, June 1, 2005, at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Belgium_Germany_Tactical

²⁵¹ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Isn't it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?" *European Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 450, December 2005.

²⁵² Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp and Major General Robertus C. N. Remkes (USAF, ret.), "Options for NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements," Chapter 4, in Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams eds, *Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 17, 2011, at: http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_Framework_Chpt4.pdf?_id=1322701823

²⁵³ Welch, Harvey et al., 2014, p. 44.

In explaining the symbolic significance of TNW in Allies' perception, Bunn compares TNW deployed in Europe to wearing a wedding ring: "...there are those in cultures that don't wear wedding rings who are perfectly committed to their spouses, and others who wear them who don't really have much of a commitment at all. But once you start wearing one, it means something entirely different to be seen without it than it does for someone who never wore one."²⁵⁴

Defenders of U.S. TNW in Europe put forward Russian TNW as one of the biggest barriers to removal. They point to the Russian unwillingness to reduce the TNW arsenal as a replacement for conventional capabilities, both as deterrent and for battlefield operations, and the large asymmetry in the size of the tactical arsenals. There is "no guarantee that unilateral withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe would lead Moscow to change its position."²⁵⁵ They argue that TNW elimination would make the disparity with Russia a "non-issue" and a contradiction to creating the conditions for further reductions.²⁵⁶ Beyond numbers, they also refer to the Russian operational diversity in TNW delivery means: Aircraft capable of deploying air-to-surface missiles and gravity bombs, i.e. TU-22 and SU-24, surface-to-air missiles (SA-10), submarine assets (SS-N-9 and SS-N-12), and ballistic missiles (SS-26 Iskander.)²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ Chris Jones, "Process over Politics: NATO's TNW Decision," May 7, 2010, at:

<http://csis.org/blog/process-over-politics-nato's-tnw-decision>

²⁵⁵ Andrew Futter, "NATO, ballistic missile defense, and the future of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe," *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2011, p. 557.

²⁵⁶ Hans M. Kristensen, "B61 LEP: Increasing NATO Nuclear Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes." *Strategic Security*, Federation of American Scientists, June 15, 2011, at: <http://fas.org/blogs/security/2011/06/b61-12/>

²⁵⁷ Can Kasapoglu, "Turkey's National Security Strategy and NATO Nuclear Weapons," in George Perkovich and Sinan Ulgen eds. Turkey's Nuclear Future, Carnegie Endowment for International

Flaws in Arguments for Continued TNW Deployment

Consistent with the principles of cooperative security, the opposing camp argues that TNW deployment in Europe is a Cold War legacy and it lacks operational function: These weapons lack battlefield utility due to short range and location, hence, from a military perspective TNW are obsolete. Moreover, TNW deployment has operational and security costs, i.e. “king’s ransom.”²⁵⁸

Although proponents of TNW refer to the allies’ needs and perceptions as a monolithic justification, there are drastic differences among allies on NATO’s nuclear posture and continued TNW deployment in Europe: Germany and Belgium have been vocal about having NATO work toward the withdrawal of U.S. TNW.

In 2005, the Free Democratic Party introduced a resolution to the German parliament to “urge the American allies to withdraw tactical weapons deployed in Germany... in order to strengthen the credibility of the nonproliferation regime and as a sign that disarmament obligations of the nuclear-weapon states are being taken seriously as

Peace, United Book Press, Washington D.C., 2015, p. 97. The SS-26 has become crucial in Crimea, as Russia moved these anti-air and anti-surface missile systems onto the peninsula after the annexation. “NATO Commander Breedlove: Imported Russian missiles have turned Crimea into a Black Sea ‘Power Projection’ Platform,” *USNI News*, February 25, 2015, at: <http://news.usni.org/2015/02/25/nato-commander-breedlove-imported-russian-missiles-have-turned-crimea-into-a-black-sea-power-projection-platform>

²⁵⁸ General Sir Hugh Beach, “‘Tactical’ Nuclear Weapons: A dangerous anachronism,” *NPT Briefings: 2010 and Beyond*, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, p. 2.

integral parts of the NPT and being pursued rigorously.”²⁵⁹ In April 2005, the Belgian parliament unanimously passed a resolution coordinated by the Liberal and Democratic Citizens Party for the withdrawal of TNW, questioning NATO nuclear sharing.²⁶⁰ In May 2014, the Flemish socialists in Belgium announced at the party congress that they would not enter a Belgian government if U.S. TNW remained in Belgium or got modernized.²⁶¹

Keeping TNW to enhance deterrence does less for net security in Europe than removing them to promote arms control and nonproliferation would. Prior to the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, the foreign ministers of the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and Norway wrote a letter, i.e. the *Strasbourg Declaration on Alliance Security*, to then NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen about the role of nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, and arms control in NATO’s overall strategy.²⁶² They argued for striving “towards substantial reductions in strategic armaments, and to move towards reducing the role of nuclear weapons and seek peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons... discuss what we can do to move closer to this overall political objective.”²⁶³

²⁵⁹ “Only the conservative Christian Democrats openly supported the continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany.” Meier, 2005.

²⁶⁰ Meier, 2005.

²⁶¹ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey and Nuclear Weapons: Can This Be Real?” in George Perkovich and Sinan Ulgen eds. *Turkey’s Nuclear Future*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United Book Press, Washington D.C., 2015, p. 164.

²⁶² “Letter to Secretary General NATO,” Government of the Netherlands, February 20, 2010, at: <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/letters/2010/02/26/letter-to-sg-nato-rasmussen.html>

²⁶³ “Letter to Secretary General NATO,” Government of the Netherlands.

TNW serve a political and symbolic role rather than providing an actual military benefit. On the argument that removal of TNW would lead to allies' reaction and possible proliferation; Gallagher points that during the arms control and nonproliferation community's discussions on the road to "global zero," alliance relations, i.e. preservation of NATO cohesion and extended deterrence, are often an area of ambivalence.²⁶⁴ She asserts that the arguments against deep U.S. nuclear cuts on the basis of the allies' confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and the "allied propensity to proliferate" are not supported by strong evidence.²⁶⁵ Based on the symbolic role of nuclear weapons in Cold War alliances, some Allies do refer to a potentially negative political effect that could impact their security policies, leading to an "altruistic" reasoning by the opponents of deep cuts in the US without an objective justification of how these weapons could plausibly address nuclear threats.²⁶⁶

Similarly, having interviewed all 28 national delegations at NATO prior to the 2010 Strategic Concept, Snyder and Zeijden argue that, prior to the Ukraine crisis, there was sufficient political will within NATO to end U.S. TNW deployment in Europe: Fourteen member states actively support ending TNW deployment as it is "militarily and politically redundant or obsolete," ten members say they will not block that decision, and only three members oppose ending it.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Nancy W. Gallagher, "International Security on the Road to Zero," *The Nonproliferation Review*, 18:2, July 2011, p. 432.

²⁶⁵ Gallagher, 2011, p. 435.

²⁶⁶ Gallagher, 2011, p. 435.

²⁶⁷ Snyder and Zeijden interviewed representatives from all national delegations at the NATO headquarters, as well as high-ranking NATO HQ staff. They argue that the HQ staff were more supportive of continued deployment of TNW. Susi Snyder and Wilbert van der Zeijden, "Withdrawal Issues: What NATO countries say about the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe," *IKV Pax Christi Report*, Utrecht, March 2011, pp. 1-28.

On Russia, Adamsky argues that, contrary to expectations, until 2010 Russia had no meaningful defined mission for TNW and no clear strategic framework for regional nuclear deterrence.²⁶⁸ He adds that there is no consensual Russian definition of tactical nuclear weapons, and the size and status of the arsenal are considered secret.²⁶⁹ According to Adamsky, until the 2014 Military Doctrine, there was no doctrine on the role of TNW in nuclear deterrence of conventional aggression.²⁷⁰

Following the December 2014 revision, there is very limited role for TNW: Kremlin stated that Russia “shall reserve for itself the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to the use against it and/or its allies of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with use of conventional weapons when the state’s very existence has been threatened.”²⁷¹ According to Kristensen, although Russia is modernizing some of its non-strategic nuclear forces and delivery systems, it is likely that the size of the arsenal will decrease over the next decade, with or without an arms control agreement.²⁷²

²⁶⁸ Dmitry Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy,” *Proliferation Papers*, no. 54, November 2015, p. 13.

²⁶⁹ Adamsky, 2015, p. 15.

²⁷⁰ Adamsky, 2015, p. 15.

²⁷¹ “Russia revises military doctrine to name NATO as chief threat,” *LA Times*, December 26, 2014.

²⁷² Hans M. Kristensen, “New Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces 2015,” *Strategic Security*, Federation of American Scientists, April 21, 2015, at: <http://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/04/russiannotebook/> Russia’s military is the largest in the region but it isn’t the same force as in Soviet times,” *The Washington Post*, March 10, 2014.

From a military planning perspective, TNW do not change neither NATO's nor Russia's calculations. According to a 2011 GAO report, "neither NATO nor U.S. European Command, in accordance with the NATO Strategic concept, have prepared standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans or identified targets involving nuclear weapons," as unlike the Cold War, today's strike plans will be adaptive.²⁷³ The report thus suggests that the weapons are redundant and are not coupled with possible targets. In peacetime basing, the readiness of these weapons have been decreased to weeks or months since the end of the Cold War. According to the former U.S. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Cartwright, there isn't "any military mission performed by B-61 aircraft-delivered weapons that cannot be performed by either U.S. strategic forces or U.S. conventional forces."²⁷⁴ In terms of strike planning, since the current B-61s don't have guidance systems, accuracy of delivery would depend on the crew.²⁷⁵ The nuclear task could more plausibly be fulfilled by a cruise missile, a strategic bomber, or ICBM, while it would still lead to a full-spectrum nuclear exchange.²⁷⁶ A 2008 review of the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise similarly suggests that, although the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) used to be the "principal advocate for nuclear weapons in Europe," they no longer are as they argue that "over-the-horizon" capability, i.e. weapons deployed outside of Europe, provide credible deterrent to any attack on NATO in military terms.²⁷⁷ Even in case

²⁷³ "Nuclear Weapons: DOD and NNSA Need to Better Manage Scope of Future Refurbishments and Risks to Maintaining U.S. Commitments to NATO," United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters, May 2, 2011, GAO-11-387, p. 5.

²⁷⁴ Susi Snyder and Wilbert van der Zeijden, "Withdrawal Issues: What NATO countries say about the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe," *IKV Pax Christi Report*, Utrecht, March 2011, p. 14.

²⁷⁵ Kamp and Remkes, 2011, p. 82.

²⁷⁶ Kamp and Remkes, 2011, p. 83.

²⁷⁷ "Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II: Review of the DOD Nuclear Missions," Washington, DC, December 2008, p. 59.

of a Russian invasion of a Baltic state, radioactive fallout of any TNW use could damage a NATO member.²⁷⁸

Some nonproliferation experts argue that the continued deployment of dual-capable aircraft and U.S. TNW in Europe are obstacles to strengthening the NPT regime.²⁷⁹ They refer to nuclear sharing as a strategic miscommunication, which undermines NATO's credibility in nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives.²⁸⁰ Aiming to redefine NATO's burden-sharing, Kamp and Remkes define credible nuclear sharing as the "readiness of the US to keep the Allies informed about nuclear issues and the willingness of the Allies to contribute to the common deterrence effort," rather than forward deployment of weapons.²⁸¹ The US has extended the nuclear umbrella to Japan, South Korea, and Australia without forward deployment of nuclear weapons, proving that extended deterrence can function in the absence of TNW.

Another concern is nuclear security, i.e. theft or unauthorized access. Nuclear security of the tactical nuclear weapons arsenal in Europe has historically been a concern. Only few years after the TNW deployment, in December 1960 a special ad hoc nuclear weapons security subcommittee of the U.S. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy traveled to nuclear installations in eight countries including Germany, Italy,

²⁷⁸ Tom Sauer, "Just Leave It: NATO's Nuclear Weapons Policy at the Warsaw Summit," *Arms Control Today*, June 2016.

²⁷⁹ Malcolm Chalmers and Simon Lunn. "NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma". Royal United Services Institute, March 2010, available at: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf

²⁸⁰ Michael Byrne et al. "A Nuclear Weapons Free NATO". *American Diplomacy*, April 2010, available at: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0406/comm/byrneetal_natonuke.html

²⁸¹ Kamp, Remkes, 2011, p. 77.

and Turkey.²⁸² At one of these bases, they saw an aircraft on quick reaction alert under the control of a foreign pilot, and the aircraft was armed with fully operational U.S. nuclear weapons.²⁸³ In the 1961 summary report, the JCAE suggested recommendations for improving security of the custody system at NATO bases in Italy and Turkey, pointing to the discrepancy between “presumed vs. actual” security measures.²⁸⁴ Surprisingly, several years after, in the aftermath of the Cold War these concerns were still valid. Both U.S. Air Force in Europe and NATO tactical evaluations were eroding, despite the fact that 5 out of 12 units were found “unsatisfactory” in nuclear surety in 1993.²⁸⁵ In addition, personnel security was a serious concern as the evaluations revealed that maintenance officers lacked the nuclear training, the new nuclear technicians were not familiar with the B61 procedures, and several employees lacked security clearances and the certification under the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).²⁸⁶

Today, since the Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNNS) are isolated on host nation bases, they lack the support elements and security measures on U.S. bases.²⁸⁷

²⁸² Created by an act of legislation by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the JCAE was composed of 9 members from the House of Representatives and 9 members from the Senate. Between 1947 and 1953, the committee maintained near total control over the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and enjoyed a privileged status until it was dismantled in 1977. Stephen I. Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight of U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 1, 2008, at: <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/congressional-oversight-nuclear-weapons/> Stephen I. Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight of the Bomb,” in Stephen I. Schwarz, *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons since 1940*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1998, pp. 514-515.

²⁸³ Schwartz, 1998, p. 514.

²⁸⁴ Schwartz, 1998, p. 515.

²⁸⁵ Hans M. Kristensen, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning*, Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005, Washington D.C., p. 35.

²⁸⁶ Kristensen, 2005, p. 35.

²⁸⁷ Welch, Harvey et al., 2014, p. 44.

According to the 2008 U.S. Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures, “several European nuclear storage sites require additional resources to meet security standards.”²⁸⁸ Proving this point, in April 2010, Belgian peace activists were able to enter the Belgian Kleine Brogel Airbase and “walk undisturbed among the bunkers for hours” among twenty U.S. B-61 warheads and F-16 jets.²⁸⁹

Maintaining the TNW arsenal is expensive: NATO spends \$154 million to meet new U.S. standards, on top of the \$100 million per year that the US spends to maintain the arsenal, and the \$10 billion required to modernize the B-61s.²⁹⁰ These modernization costs will be discussed in the following sections on the B-61 modernization and F-35 fighter programs.

²⁸⁸ “2008 USAF Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures,” U.S. Air Force, February 12, 2008, at www.airforce-magazine.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/TheDocumentFile/Current%20Operations/BRR020808ExecSummary.pdf

²⁸⁹ Synder and Zeijden provide the link to the activists’ video footage at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a1fnDhwWm-U> The peace group called “Vredesactie” (Peace Action) organized a “Bombspotting” campaign by climbing the fences and inspecting 15 of the 26 aircraft shelters before getting arrested. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 67 (1), 2010, p. 68.

²⁹⁰ Hans M. Kristensen, “NATO Nuclear Weapons Security Costs Expected to Double,” *Strategic Security*, Federation of American Scientists, March 11, 2014, at: <http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/03/nato-nuclear-costs/>

The Turkish Debate on TNW

Unlike Belgium and Germany, Turkey has not had extensive parliamentary debate on the existence of or removal of U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil.²⁹¹ While the antinuclear movement is weak, the national security implications of TNW are absent from discussion. Accordingly, unlike its European allies, Turkey has not faced domestic pressure to push for TNW removal. A debate on the delivery platform and whether Turkey should maintain DCA is nonexistent.

Proponents of TNW in Turkey

Proponents of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish soil argue that they are the symbol of Turkey's privileged status in NATO, and they fear that withdrawal of these weapons would weaken the Turkish position within the Alliance. Ergun argues that, as a non-nuclear member of the Alliance, Turkey has enjoyed having a role in the NATO nuclear deterrent and influencing the nuclear posture.²⁹² Turkey perceives TNW as a symbol of regional superiority beyond conventional forces and privileged status/ distinguishing factor in the Middle East.²⁹³ From a *realpolitik* perspective, this superiority is what an executive in the defense administration calls "staying strong in

²⁹¹ Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey's Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament," in Barry Blechman ed, Unblocking the Road to Zero: Perspectives of Advanced Nuclear Nations (Turkey, Japan, Brazil.) *Stimson Nuclear Security Series*, Vol. VI, Washington D.C., 2009, p. 72.

²⁹² Doruk Ergun, "The Origins of Turkey's Nuclear Policy," in George Perkovich and Sinan Ulgen eds. Turkey's Nuclear Future, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United Book Press, Washington D.C., 2015, p. 68.

²⁹³ Author's interview with Assist. Prof. Sebnem Udum, Hacettepe University, January 30, 2015, Ankara.

defense.”²⁹⁴ These weapons are considered as immediate guarantees on Turkish soil and they contribute to the “psychological sense of security.”²⁹⁵ They argue that the ongoing instability near Turkey’s borders makes Turkey a frontline state, with different perceptions than the rest of the Alliance, i.e. how Turkey’s policy priorities would entirely be different if it were located in Scandinavia.

In responding to the NATO allies such as Germany, who advocate for the removal of TNW, Turkish officials have argued that the attitude would damage solidarity and burden sharing.²⁹⁶ In a 1997 interview, then Turkish Ambassador to Ottawa, Ersun stated that “NATO without the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey would mean nothing to the Turks.”²⁹⁷ Kibaroglu explains the Turkish reluctance for TNW removal by the officials’ perception of an “uncertain international security environment,” given that a world free of nuclear weapons is not possible in the foreseeable future.²⁹⁸ He adds that many in the Turkish decision making elite fear that removal of TNW would weaken the Turkish-American strategic partnership, since as a rare policy issue, U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey have never been subject to any serious dispute between the two countries.²⁹⁹ This fear results from Turkish officials’ lack of confidence in the US that, without U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil, there would be guaranteed U.S. involvement to protect Turkish security in future

²⁹⁴ Author’s interview with an executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey and Nuclear Weapons: Can This Be Real?” in George Perkovich and Sinan Ulgen eds. Turkey’s Nuclear Future, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United Book Press, Washington D.C., 2015, p. 163.

²⁹⁷ Kibaroglu, December 2005, endnote 26,

²⁹⁸ Kibaroglu, 2011, p. 209.

²⁹⁹ Kibaroglu, 2011, p. 210.

contingencies.³⁰⁰ Hence, TNW appeal to Turkish officials as a “tangible” support and remedy to the legacy of fear of abandonment.

Although TNW are typically considered to be obsolete, Karaosmanoglu asserts that it is hard to argue that TNW would never be used, e.g. last resort in case of a crisis involving NATO.³⁰¹ He argues that the command and control of the TNW transferring to NATO in case of a crisis is not entirely clear.³⁰² It has been argued that taking these weapons “off the table” in some contingencies could allow some adversaries to threaten U.S. allies without fear of “overwhelming response.”³⁰³ Kasapoglu examines this question and Turkey’s “nuclear taboo,” arguing that the Turkish security academia and strategic community have considered these weapons highly symbolic, without questioning their military value and complex rationale to Ankara, in absence of a viable missile defense against weapons capabilities of its problematic neighbors, Iran and Syria.³⁰⁴ He argues that the official silence by Turkish decision makers is to avoid fostering discussion of the complicated WMD proliferation issues in the region.³⁰⁵ From the capabilities perspective, the Turkish military takes into consideration the fact that Turkey remains under the missile range of potential adversaries in the Middle East, with existing or suspected WMD arsenals in absence of a comprehensive arms control and nonproliferation regime and failed

³⁰⁰ Kibaroglu, 2015, p. 164. Kibaroglu points to the peculiarities of U.S.-Turkish relations as “unfulfilled expectations” during the 2003 invasion of Iraq and Turkish rejection of the stationing of U.S. troops in Turkey. p. 165.

³⁰¹ Author’s interview with Emeritus Professor Ali Karaosmanoglu, January 28, 2015, Istanbul.

³⁰² Author’s interview with Emeritus Professor Ali Karaosmanoglu, January 28, 2015, Istanbul.

³⁰³ Woolf, 2012, p. 25.

³⁰⁴ Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey’s National Security Strategy and NATO Nuclear Weapons,” in George Perkovich and Sinan Ulgen eds. *Turkey’s Nuclear Future*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United Book Press, Washington D.C., 2015, p. 88.

³⁰⁵ Kasapoglu, 2015, p. 103.

states.³⁰⁶ Hence, he argues that, from a military perspective, Turkey has seen TNW as an instrument altering the combat calculus and providing “intra-war deterrence” to keep military parity with its rivals that possess chemical and biological weapons.³⁰⁷ Turkey has clear conventional military superiority over its neighbors, and the NATO TNW deployment does not constitute national nuclear capability.

Flaws in Arguments for Continued TNW Deployment

Opposition to TNW in Turkey is much weaker than in Europe and even in the US. For instance, there has been criticism in the US of Turkey’s unique nuclear posture, calling it “largely just halfhearted posturing”: In a letter to the Pentagon, Project on Government Oversight Director Danielle Brian argued that the TNW at the Incirlik AB were too costly to modernize and redundant as the base lacked a fighter wing.³⁰⁸

Anti-nuclear groups and “green” movements have been politically insignificant in Turkish politics. The newly emerging anti-nuclear movements have focused more on the construction of the nuclear power reactors in Akkuyu, Mersin and Sinop rather than the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey.³⁰⁹ There are smaller ideological

³⁰⁶ Kasapoglu, 2015, p. 102.

³⁰⁷ Kasapoglu, 2015, p. 96. Terrill explains intra-war deterrence as “the effort to control substantial military escalation during an ongoing war through the threat of large-scale and usually nuclear retaliation should the adversary escalate a conflict beyond a particularly important threshold.” Kasapoglu, 2015, pp. 90-91.

³⁰⁸ “POGO Asks Panetta to Stop Funding B61 Nuclear Bombs in Europe,” Project on Government Oversight, February 12, 2012, at: <http://www.pogo.org/blog/2012/02/pogo-asks-panetta-to-stop-funding-b61-nuclear-bombs-in-europe.html>

³⁰⁹ The anti-nuclear platform in Turkey, *Nukleer Karsiti Platform* (NKP), includes 50 civil society groups, including regional environment platforms, chambers of engineers, and ecological collectives, aiming to raise public awareness on the dangers of nuclear power plants, especially in Mersin and

groups with anti-American sentiments. But it has only been Greenpeace activists that have mentioned TNW: “These U.S.-owned nuclear weapons in Incirlik are unwanted guests. We are working to get them out of Turkey back to USA for decommissioning.”³¹⁰ In some cases, the anti-nuclear groups have referred to the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons use, coupled with nuclear power plants, calling for a nuclear-free world.³¹¹

The Turkish public fears nuclear energy and public opinion in Turkey is generally against the acquisition of nuclear technology.³¹² However, public awareness of TNW deployment in Turkey is very limited and does not generate political pressure on the AKP government for withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Incirlik AB. There is intermittent national media coverage on the issue, generally describing the TNW in reference to international reports indicating the number of weapons deployed in Turkey and not an analytical account of the debate.³¹³ Fewer Turkish media outlets

Sinop, where Turkey’s first nuclear reactors will be built. They have signed declarations and petitions against nuclear energy and submitted to the Turkish Parliament. See:

<http://portal.nukleerkarsitiplatform.org>

Only a small cadre of nuclear engineers and academics, organized as the Nuclear Technology Information Platform (NUKTE), favor the establishment of the nuclear power plants.

³¹⁰ “Local Solutions- our national campaigns,” Greenpeace, April 10, 2006, at:

<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/peace/solutions/local-solutions/>

³¹¹ “Nukleer Silahlara ve Santrallere Hayir,” *Elektrik Muhendisligi*, vol. 443, October 2011, Turkish Chamber of Electrical Engineers (TMMOB), at:

http://www.emo.org.tr/ekler/d6e31c3b1dfc0d2_ek.pdf?dergi=669

³¹² According to an April 2011 Greenpeace opinion poll, when asked how they would vote if the government organized a referendum on whether to proceed with the construction of nuclear plants in Turkey, 64 percent of survey participants said they would vote “no.” “Turkiye’nin %64’u nukleere hayir diyor,” *Greenpeace*, April 29, 2011, at: <http://www.greenpeace.org/turkey/tr/news/turkiyenin-yuzde-64u-nukleere-hayir-diyor-290411/>

³¹³ Some articles in the Turkish media on U.S. TNW in Turkey and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists reports by Hans Kristensen: “Turkiye’de 60’tan fazla nukleer bomba var,” *Hurriyet*, December 1, 2011. “Turkiye’de cok sayida ABD’nin atom bombasi var,” *T24*, November 17, 2014. “Turkiye’deki nukleer silahlar,” *Al-Jazeera Turk*, December 22, 2011.

have covered improvements to the security of TNW at the Incirlik AB.³¹⁴ Karagul points to the lack of political debate on nuclear weapons in Turkey, even at the height of the discussions to call for withdrawal in Europe.³¹⁵ He argues that while these issues are omnipresent in the Western media, military reports, and political statements, Turkish people are unaware of the dangers of nuclear weapons in their own country, as Turkish authorities do not respond to questions on their deployment.³¹⁶ Calling this reticence as the “three monkeys policy,” Gurbuz argues that the existence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey is illegal, given the NPT requirement not to share with non-nuclear weapon states.³¹⁷ He adds that Turkey should have the political willpower like the European allies to call for their removal and not remain silent on the issue.³¹⁸

While the proponents of keeping U.S. TNW on Turkish soil consider these weapons as a nuclear “deterrent” and Turkey’s influence on NATO nuclear policy, the sole launch authority of TNW rests with U.S. decision makers.

Kibaroglu argues that the views among the civilian and military elite on retaining U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil have not changed since the Cold War, despite

³¹⁴ See: “Incirlik Ussu’nde hareketlilik,” *Cumhuriyet*, March 2, 2014.

³¹⁵ Ibrahim Karagul, “Kozmik oda’nin sirri: ‘Turk Milli Nukleer Vurucu Gucu,’” *Yeni Safak*, April 22, 2010.

³¹⁶ Ibrahim Karagul, “Turk Milli Nukleer Vurucu Misyonu!” *Yeni Safak*, July 4, 2008.

³¹⁷ Ozgur Gurbuz, “Nukleer Silahlar Turkiye’nin Olamaz!” *Bianet*, August 6, 2009. Bergen states that some of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors view the current situation as a violation of the NPT as well. Johan Bergen, “Bombs Away: Removing Tactical Nukes from Europe,” *World Politics Review*, March 2, 2010.

³¹⁸ Ozgur Gurbuz, “Nukleer Silahlar Turkiye’nin Olamaz!”

the absence of an imminent nuclear threat.³¹⁹ Turkish security elites have not switched to a “no-first-use” strategy from their endorsement of the “first-use” strategy in the Cold War, and they have implicitly supported first-use as part of NATO deterrent.³²⁰ They define first-use as NATO’s option to initiate use of nuclear weapons during an aggression if no other option can provide a better defense of the allies.³²¹

Proponents of TNW deployment refer to Turkey’s concerns over political stability, terrorist takeover, extremism, sectarian conflict, and WMD in the Middle East. However, there is no meaningful military scenario in which the use nuclear weapons would be justified in response to these threats. Moreover, most these concerns are not unique to Turkey, given the borderless nature of security issues in the 21st century. Compared to the Baltic states’ concerns, Turkey’s need for defense against military aggression is lower.

On the military utility of TNW for Turkey; there is again little evidence that these bombs would be useful to deter or address below-Article V threats such as hybrid warfare. They have also antagonized Iran and Egypt, who have argued that having U.S. nuclear weapons makes Turkey a “nuclear weapon state.”³²²

³¹⁹ Kibaroglu, 2011, p. 209.

³²⁰ Kibaroglu, May 2011, p. 34.

³²¹ Kibaroglu, December 2005, p. 448.

³²² Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey,” *Arms Control Today*, June 4, 2010.

Other voices against TNW are limited to a small cadre of politicians and academicians. Logoglu argues that TNW do not provide any value added to Turkish security and makes the Incirlik AB a high-value military target for potential adversaries, as well as vulnerable to inadvertent access and theft.³²³ The increased role of coalition airstrikes launching from the Incirlik AB in the fight against ISIS has made the base a more prominent target, leading to an emergency response exercise and voluntary family member evacuation in October 2015. Kristensen argues that the ongoing upgrades to improve physical protection of nuclear weapons at the Incirlik AB in Turkey and Aviano AB in Italy indirectly acknowledge that the measures were “inadequate” for more than two decades.³²⁴ These measures include double-fence security perimeters with sensors and a sealed-off area to shoot intruders, manned vehicles to patrol between the fences and around the nuclear weapons vaults, improvements to the trucks that service the warheads, improved lighting, cameras, and intrusion-detection devices.³²⁵

Responding to the argument that TNW provide deterrence, Kibaroglu argues that the “golden age” of deterrence based on NATO nuclear weapons is over.³²⁶ What Turkey values is the privilege and deterrence of the NATO alliance, and not the U.S. nuclear

³²³ Author’s interview with Osman Faruk Logoglu, former Turkish Ambassador to the US, Member of the Parliament, Republican People’s Party (CHP), February 6, 2015, Ankara.

³²⁴ Hans M. Kristensen, “Upgrades at U.S. Nuclear Bases in Europe Acknowledge Security Risk,” *Strategic Security*, Federation of American Scientists, September 10, 2015, at: <http://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/09/nuclear-insecurity/>

³²⁵ Elisabeth Braw, “US Upgrades Security at Nuclear Bases Near Syria,” *World Affairs*, October 28, 2015, at: <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elisabeth-braw/us-upgrades-security-nuclear-bases-near-syria>

³²⁶ Author’s interview with Prof. Mustafa Kibaroglu, MEF University, February 2, 2015, Istanbul

weapons themselves.³²⁷ He asserts that NATO's extended deterrence is far more comprehensive than a small number of TNW and local deployment can still be achieved by temporary deployment of U.S. nuclear submarines in the eastern Mediterranean and port visits to Turkey.³²⁸

Turkish opponents of continued TNW deployment also point out that these weapons weaken Turkish influence in the region, i.e. diplomatic efforts to oppose nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. They argue that Turkey needs to change its declaratory policy to delegitimize nuclear weapons in the Middle East. According to Weitz, it is an irony that Erdogan raises the Israeli nuclear program as an issue, while Turkey has dozens of nuclear weapons stored on its territory.³²⁹ Kibaroglu argues that there is a clear discomfort with the inconsistency of retaining the deployment and promoting nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation in the Middle East.³³⁰

Moreover, approaching nuclear weapons only from the perspective of the balance of power and deterrence is missing the catastrophic consequences of a decision to use nuclear weapons, as they have become more and more irrelevant to use against new security threats.³³¹ Hence, he asserts that Turkey should take the initiative to ask the US to remove the TNW from its soil for Turkey's security interests and alliance cohesion, as well as setting a valuable precedent for the region to avoid a nuclear

³²⁷ Author's interview with Prof. Mustafa Kibaroglu, MEF University, February 2, 2015, Istanbul

³²⁸ Kibaroglu, May 2011, p. 36.

³²⁹ Richard Weitz, "The Future of NATO's Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil," *The Turkey Analyst*, vol.3, no. 7, April 12, 2010, at: <http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/208-the-future-of-natos-nuclear-weapons-on-turkish-soil.html>

³³⁰ Kibaroglu, May 2011, p. 35.

³³¹ Kibaroglu, December 2005, p. 450.

catastrophe in the future.³³² Kibaroglu and Gurzel argue that Turkey can be an important player in strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime by removing the U.S. TNW, a necessary building block towards convincing the Middle Eastern neighbors to establish a MEWMDFZ by showing that Turkey shares their security concerns.³³³ They add that this step would make Turkey an important regional player, i.e. a cornerstone of transformation in the Middle East.³³⁴

The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP)

U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) defines the life extension program (LEP) as a “program to repair/replace components of nuclear weapons to ensure the ability to meet military requirements,” to establish a smaller yet effective deterrent; an agenda set by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).³³⁵ LEP aims to reduce the number of warhead types and the stockpile size by interoperable warheads deployed across various delivery platforms: Currently B61-3 and B61-4 are tactical versions to be delivered by fighter planes, and B61-7 and B61-11 are the strategic versions to be delivered by long-range bombers.³³⁶ The B61-12 LEP aims to

³³² Kibaroglu, April 2011, p. 1.

³³³ Mustafa Kibaroglu and Aylin Gurzel, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey: Yankee Go Home?” *Security Index*, No.1 (83), Vol. 14, April 25, 2012, p. 77.

³³⁴ Kibaroglu and Gurzel, 2012, p. 79.

³³⁵ “Life Extension Programs,” National Nuclear Security Administration, at:

<http://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/managingthestockpile/lifeextensionprograms>

³³⁶ “The B61 Life Extension Program: The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” *Union of Concerned Scientists Fact Sheet*, p. 1. at:

<http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/B61-life-extension-program-FS.pdf>

consolidate these four B61 mods and replace aging components.³³⁷ The B61-12 will be based on the B61-4, to be deliverable by both fighter planes and long-range bombers, thus functioning both as a strategic and tactical weapon.³³⁸ The \$8 billion upgrade project involves the replacement of vacuum tubes and other older technologies by a newly designed circuit board in the bomb's radar system.³³⁹ The updates also replace the analog-only interface with an interface compatible with digital aircraft, such as the F-35.³⁴⁰ The integration of the B61-12 on F-16s (to be replaced later by F-35s) and Tornado will be completed by 2017-2018.³⁴¹ In October 2015, NNSA and U.S. Air Force completed the last of the three development flight tests with non-nuclear components only, and they expect the production to be complete by 2024.³⁴²

Proponents of the life extension programs argue that modernization will ensure an effective deterrent at lower numbers, contributing to the arms reduction goals while maintaining alliance unity. Karako argues that the opposition to the B61-12 LEP threatens the "road to a sustainable deterrent" by a consolidated stockpile, i.e. the

³³⁷ "Life Extension Programs," National Nuclear Security Administration.

³³⁸ "The B61 Life Extension Program: The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile," *Union of Concerned Scientists Fact Sheet*, p. 1.

³³⁹ Dan Sagalyn, "Photos: What an \$8B nuclear bomb upgrade looks like," *PBS News Hour*, November 5, 2015.

³⁴⁰ Thomas Karako, "Opposition to B61 threatens nuclear reductions, deterrence," *The Hill*, January 3, 2014, at: <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/194310-opposition-to-b61-threatens-nuclear-reductions>

³⁴¹ "Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget Estimates: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Air Force, Vol-II" Department of the Air Force, March 2014, pp. 3-5, 10, at: <http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-140310-047.pdf>

³⁴² "NNSA, Air Force Complete Successful B61-12 Life Extension Program Development Flight Test at Tonopah Test Range," *NNSA Press Release*, November 16, 2015.

“3+2” force consisting of three missile warheads, one B-61 gravity bomb, and one cruise missile.³⁴³

One of the major critiques to the B61-12 LEP is its price tag, in relation to its limited national security value to the US and the estimated cost of \$25 million per bomb, “a nuclear bomb that costs more than its weight in solid gold.”³⁴⁴ In FY 2015, its budget went up to \$643 million, almost triple of the \$222.9 million enacted in FY 2012.³⁴⁵

Beyond the budget, the biggest criticism of the B61-12 LEP is on the new capabilities that it will introduce beyond life extension; its guided tail kit in particular. New capabilities contradict the U.S. President’s pledge to “no new nuclear weapons” in 2010. Adapted from the conventional Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), the new guidance kit replaces the parachute, making the B61-12 the first guided standoff nuclear bomb.³⁴⁶ JDAM uses a Global Positioning System (GPS)-aided Internal Navigation System (INS) with circular error probable (CEP) of 5 meters, which increases targeting capability.³⁴⁷ In addition, Kristensen and McKinzie argue that the

³⁴³ Thomas Karako, “Opposition to B61 threatens nuclear reductions, deterrence.”

³⁴⁴ Jeffrey Lewis, “A Steal at \$10 Billion,” *Foreign Policy*, September 5, 2012.

³⁴⁵ “National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)- FY 2015 Budget Request for Warhead Life Extension Programs, Infrastructure Modernization, and Replacement Nuclear Delivery System Support,” Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, March 2014, p.1, at: <http://armscontrolcenter.org/assets/pdfs/FY15NNSANukePrograms.pdf>

³⁴⁶ “B61 Bombs in Europe and the U.S. Life Extension Program,” *British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Briefing*, February 2014, p. 2, at:

http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/basicfinalb61_fact_sheetfeb2014.pdf Thomas Karako, “Opposition to B61 threatens nuclear reductions, deterrence.” Lewis states that, due to the change from a parachute to a modern tail kit, NNSA had to redesign the packaging, filling the extra space by new safety features, but “modernizing” without building a “new” nuclear weapon. Jeffrey Lewis, “A Steal at \$10 Billion,” *Foreign Policy*, September 5, 2012.

³⁴⁷ Hans M. Kristensen, “B61 LEP: Increasing NATO Nuclear Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes,” *Strategic Security*, Federation of American Scientists, June 15, 2011, at: <http://fas.org/blogs/security/2011/06/b61-12/>

B61-12 has earth-penetrating capability to destroy underground targets.³⁴⁸ The NNSA explanation is that the tail kit is a nonnuclear component that is intended for increased survivability and safer and more accurate delivery with a smaller circular error, hence less collateral damage.³⁴⁹

Another critique to the program is the uncertainty of deployment for some 180 tactical versions of these weapons in the next 10 years, given that not all allies will choose to receive the B61-12 and purchase the F-35 fighter, to be discussed in the next section.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program

Allies' views on modernization of nuclear-capable fighter aircraft reflect their TNW position, i.e. Germany and Belgium critical, Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey favorable to the purchase of the next generation fighters.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁸ Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew McKinzie, "Video Shows Earth-Penetrating Capability of B61-12 Nuclear Bomb," *Strategic Security*, Federation of American Scientists, January 14, 2016.

³⁴⁹ "Nuclear Weapons: DOD and NNSA Need to Better Manage Scope of Future Refurbishments and Risks to Maintaining U.S. Commitments to NATO," United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters, May 2, 2011, GAO-11-387, p. 13.

³⁵⁰ Germany has extended the service life of its Tornados until 2030 by replacing the dual-capable aircraft with the Eurofighter Typhoon, which is not capable of delivering the B61-12. Belgium has not indicated a quest for nuclear mission if they choose the F-35. Oliver Meier, "Belgium, Germany Question U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe," *Arms Control Today*, June 1, 2005, at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Belgium_Germany_Tactical The Dutch parliament approved an order for eight F-35A Lightning IIs to be delivered in 2019. Anno Gravemaker, "Dutch parliament approves first F-35 production order," *Flight Global*, March 3, 2015. Italy has reduced defense spending by one billion euros per year and cut the initial plan to buy 131 F-35s to 90 because of financial constraints, but remains committed to the program in which it already invested 2 billion euros. Giovanni de Briganti, "Italy to Cut F-35 Buy, But not Pull out: Prime Minister," *Defense-Aerospace*, March 17, 2014.

Currently, B-61s in Europe are certified for delivery via the F-16, F-15E, or Tornado aircraft. As indicated by the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, these aircraft will be gradually replaced by the F-35s for the nuclear mission: “The Air Force will retain a dual-capable fighter as it replaces F-16s with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF.)”³⁵¹ The F-35 JSF is “a fifth-generation multi-role fighter aircraft designed to conduct an array of ground attack, reconnaissance, and air defense missions with stealth capability due to its low profile radar cross-section.”³⁵²

The multinational F-35 JSF program, based on the collective partnership among United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway, with its \$400 billion budget, is one of the largest defense programs in history.³⁵³ The fighter has three variants: F-35A conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) version for the U.S. and allied air forces, F-35B short takeoff, vertical landing (STOVL) fighter for the U.S. Marine Corps and the Royal Navy, and the F-35C conventional carrier-launched version for the U.S. Navy.³⁵⁴

The biggest controversies regarding the F-35 fighter have been its high costs, combat effectiveness, and delivery times.³⁵⁵ With a price tag of \$100 million per plane, the project has been branded as the “trillion-dollar black hole” and the “plane that ate the

³⁵¹ Nuclear Posture Review Report, Department of Defense, April 2010, at:

<http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.

³⁵² “Turkey set to order two F-35 joint strike fighters,” *Air Force Technology*, May 9, 2014.

³⁵³ Srdjan Vucetic and Kim Richard Nossal, The International Politics of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter,” *International Journal*, Winter 2012-13, p. 1.

³⁵⁴ “Program,” *Joint Strike Fighter*, at: http://www.jsf.mil/program/prog_intl.htm . “Lightning Rod: F-35 Fighter Family Capabilities and Controversies,” *Defense Industry Daily*, April 23, 2015.

³⁵⁵ “Bogdan: F-35 Costs Down, Despite Worries.” Bogdan, however, notes that the figures could be “masked” by inflation.

Pentagon.”³⁵⁶ In addition to the financial risks, technical concerns over the fighter’s design dominate the F-35 debate. Main deficiencies and delays are the autonomic logistics information system (ALIS), which is the internal diagnostic system for the entire fleet, software stability, and the reprogramming laboratories that will build mission data files (MDF) that will make the F-35 smart in recognizing the radar signature.³⁵⁷

Not every NATO member is formally committed to upgrade its dual-capable aircraft to remain capable of delivering U.S. nuclear bombs. Since the US is the only NATO country with the current military capacity to deploy nuclear-capable multi-role jets, i.e. F-16s and F-15E, based in Italy, Germany, and the UK, Kristensen argues that the US could take on the NATO B-61 air delivery mission in opt out cases.³⁵⁸

In terms of the delivery platforms; since Turkish pilots are not NATO-certified, in case of any use for the gravity bombs at Incirlik AB, dual-capable aircraft would have to come from another NATO air base and might be escorted by Turkish fighters. Turkey’s dual capable aircraft, i.e. the Block 40 and 50 F-16C/Ds are stationed at the 142nd fighter/bomber squadron at the 1st Tactical Air Command, 4th Main Jet Base near Ankara.³⁵⁹ Turkey does not face an immediate decision to renew the dual-

³⁵⁶ “Bogdan: F-35 Costs Down, Despite Worries,” *Defense News*, March 25, 2015.

³⁵⁷ “F-35 Chief Lays Out Biggest Development Risks,” *Defense News*, February 10, 2016.

³⁵⁸ Rachel Oswald, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Arms Mission Could Shift among NATO Jets,” *Global Security Newswire*, March 26, 2014.

³⁵⁹ “‘Turk nukleer bombalari’ Ceylan tasiyacak,” *Vatan*, December 1, 2011. Turkey has 270 F-16C/D Block 30/40/50 jets at Konya, Akinci, Merzifon, Bandirma, Diyarbakir, and Balikesir AB. “F-16 Units: Turkish Air Force,” at: http://www.f-16.net/f-16_users_article21.html Turkey is one of the five countries that has built F-16s locally (along with USA, Belgium, Netherlands, South Korea), yet it

capable aircraft as its F-16s are expected to be in service until mid-2030s.³⁶⁰

Approximately 30 F-16C/D Block 50s will receive a “stop-gap” upgrade to make them capable of carrying the B61-12 that will replace the B61-3/4 beginning 2019, until Turkey gets enough F-35s.³⁶¹

Turkey is more interested in having access to advanced military technologies than nuclear weapons. Turkey is a signatory member of the F-35 JSF consortium since June 2002 and has been involved since 1999 as a “foreign military sales major participant.”³⁶² Turkish officials consider the JSF project as a milestone in domestic defense industry to enhance capacity and reduce costs while modernizing by collaborative programs.³⁶³ Turkey and Israel are the only countries in the region that will fly F-35s, giving them “aerial supremacy,” considered by the Turkish air force as a “prestigious project” that is a “concrete step to space.”³⁶⁴ Turkish officials, both military and diplomatic, have also named the project as the first concrete step and the “real-life reflection” of the Turkish-U.S. strategic partnership, joining the most superior aircraft project at the engineering and manufacturing phase as a cooperative

cannot produce the aircraft’s engine. “Turkey Orders 30 F-16C Block 50s etc. for \$2.9 B,” *Defense Industry Daily*, December 18, 2012.

³⁶⁰ Sinan Ulgen, “Turkey and the Bomb,” *The Carnegie Papers*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nuclear Policy, February 2012, p. 13.

³⁶¹ Norris and Kristensen, 2010, p. 70.

³⁶² “Turkish involvement in JSF reflects first concrete step in Turkish-US strategic partnership,” *Turkish Daily News*, May 4, 2000.

³⁶³ Dr. Celal Sami Tufekci, Deputy Undersecretary for Defense Industries, “Defense Industrial Cooperation: Creating New Perspectives for the Alliance,” Defense and Security Affairs Panel, 34th Annual U.S.-Turkey Relations Conference, American Turkish Council, September 28, 2015.

³⁶⁴ Metin Gurcan, “Will the F-35 change Middle East warfare?” *Al-Monitor*, April 29, 2015, at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/turkey-how-will-f-35-change-middle-east-security-environment.html#>

partner, and not just a buyer.³⁶⁵ U.S. Department of Defense also assigned maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) responsibilities for the F-35s' airframe and engine to Italy and Turkey.³⁶⁶ Lockheed Martin and Turkish missile manufacturer Roketsan also signed an agreement to produce and sell Turkey's SOM-J air-launched cruise missile for the F-35 JSF.³⁶⁷ According to Turkish officials, the partnership reflects the U.S. perspective of Turkey as a "desirable interoperable partner."³⁶⁸ Since the maintenance program is neither part of a foreign military sales (FMS) or offset strategy, it reflects a turning point in the U.S.-Turkish defense industrial cooperation.³⁶⁹

So far, Turkey has officially ordered six F-35s from the multinational JSF consortium and eventually plans to buy 100 F-35s for \$16 billion as part of the "System Development and Demonstration" (SDD) with a work-share valued at \$6 billion, including offset accords.³⁷⁰ There are also reports that the \$1.2 billion Turkish Navy's

³⁶⁵ "Turkish involvement in JSF reflects first concrete step in Turkish-US strategic partnership," *Turkish Daily News*, May 4, 2000. However, this step would be overshadowed by the Turkish parliament's decision not to allow U.S. troops in Turkey for the Iraqi occupation in March 2003. The crisis was followed by Turkey's interest in the Eurofighter Typhoon option in 2005 as it offered 100% offset and equal rights to Turkey, to raise the stakes for Lockheed Martin, and the AKP government was interested in harmonization with the EU. Guvenc and Yanik, 2013, pp. 121-122.

³⁶⁶ "Pentagon picks Italy, Turkey for F-35 heavy maintenance hubs in Europe," *IHS Jane's Defense Weekly*, December 11, 2014.

³⁶⁷ "Lockheed Martin and Turkey's Roketsan sign F-35 missile deal," *Today's Zaman*, October 22, 2014.

³⁶⁸ Guvenc and Yanik, 2013, p. 120.

³⁶⁹ Keith B. Webster, Director, International Cooperation for the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, "Defense Industrial Cooperation: Creating New Perspectives for the Alliance," Defense and Security Affairs Panel, 34th Annual U.S.-Turkey Relations Conference, American Turkish Council, September 28, 2015.

³⁷⁰ Ibid. "Turkey to Order 4 More F-35s, 5 more Chinooks," *Defense News*, January 7, 2015. There are also several Turkish companies (TAI, Havelsan, Mikes/Aselsan, Kale) involved in the F-35 production: Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) is producing one of the most complex structural section of the aircraft, the center fuselage, as well as composite components, air inlet ducts and air-to-ground alternate mission equipment pylon manufacturing. Turkish Aerospace Industries, JSF/F-35 Program, at: <https://www.tai.com.tr/en/project/jsf-f-35-program> Turkey's Kale Aviation company

amphibious assault warship *TCG Levent* will be capable of supporting the F-35Bs, signaling that Turkey would be ordering 16-20 F-35Bs for short takeoff, vertical landing (STOVL) and be able to deploy F-35s from the sea in the Aegean, Black and Mediterranean Seas, Indian and Atlantic Oceans when needed.³⁷¹ However, the procurement of the delivery platforms are not related to the decisions on TNW deployment.

As a separate project, Turkey has plans to develop its first indigenous fighter: Named as Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) TF-X, the conceptual design of the national fighter project was completed in September 2013.³⁷² Turkish Undersecretariat for Defense Industries describes the purpose of the project as the indigenous design and production of prototypes of the training and fighter jets that could replace the T-38s and F-16s in the 2020s.³⁷³ The Turkish government plans to allocate \$1 billion for the second phase of the fighter project and fly it by 2023.³⁷⁴ However, this is an overly ambitious plan, which will encounter both financial and technical challenges.

manufactures high pressure compressor subsystems and motor exhaust winglets for the motor program of the F-35. Kale Group, at: <http://www.kalegrubu.com.tr/en-us/our-companies/kale-aerospace>

³⁷¹ “Lockheed Martin and Turkey’s Roketsan sign F-35 missile deal,” “En buyuk gemiye 1.2 milyar dolar kaynak,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 22, 2014. While the project’s name was initially Landing Platform Dock (LPD), the *Juan Carlos 1-class* is actually an aircraft carrier substitute that was finally named as a multipurpose amphibious assault ship, i.e. landing helicopter dock (LHD), that can “embark a battalion-level marine force with some 150 armored vehicles, as well as rotary and suitable fixed-wing aircrafts as an *aproyeccion de fuerza* (force projection) asset. Can Kasapoglu, “The Military Strategic Rationale of Turkey’s T-Loramids Project and the Eurosam Offer,” *Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique (FRS), Recherches and Documents*, No. 1, 2014, p. 16

³⁷² “Jet Egitim Ucagi ve Muharip Ucak Kavramsal Tasarim Projesi,” Savunma Sanayii Mustesarligi, <http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/projeler/Sayfalar/proje.aspx?projeID=147>

³⁷³ “Jet Egitim Ucagi ve Muharip Ucak Kavramsal Tasarim Projesi,”

³⁷⁴ “At IDEF, a Renewed Quest for Turkish Exports,” *Defense News*, May 3, 2015.

The following section aims to decipher the Turkish position on the future of TNW deployment, while addressing the problems in policy formulation and mismatch in its stated and actual objectives in maintaining them on Turkish soil.

Turkey's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Policy: Objectives and Problems

Since 1995, despite the official reticence on the issue, the common perception is that Turkey has been supportive of retaining approximately 50 U.S. TNW at the Incirlik AB near Adana. Norris and Kristensen argue that the Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3) vaults at the 4th and 9th Wing of the Akinci and Balikesir bases, each having six empty WS3s with a capacity to hold 24 bombs, are possibly in caretaker status, while the weapons are stored at the 39th Air Base Wing in Incirlik, decreased to 70 from 90 in 2001, rotating U.S. aircraft from other wings as needed, with 25 WS3 that could hold up to 100 bombs, i.e. four bombs per vault.³⁷⁵ In April 2003, the 39th Security Force Squadron at Incirlik AB held a nuclear weapons “recapture and recovery exercise” at a Protective Aircraft Shelter (PAS).³⁷⁶ In addition, there were nuclear inspections at the Incirlik AB in 2006 and 2008, indicating no aircraft generation at the base and no permanent fighter wing, as in 2005, Turkey rejected a

³⁷⁵ Norris and Kristensen, 2010, p. 66. Weapon Storage and Security System (WS3) is a nuclear weapons storage capability unique to the European theater and enables underground storage in Weapons Storage Vaults (WSV) in individual Protective Aircraft Shelters (PAS) rather than a centralized Weapons Storage Area (WSA.) Hans M. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning, Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005, Washington D.C., p. 13.

³⁷⁶ Kristensen, February 2005, p. 64.

U.S. request to deploy a fighter wing at Incirlik.³⁷⁷ While the aircraft is in rotation, there is no unclassified information on the rotation of TNW.

It is not clear whether the Turkish Air Force will take on NATO nuclear missions in the future, regardless of the future of TNW deployment in Turkey. Kristensen argues that the U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe are extensively integrated into the military structure of the host countries and that there are nuclear cooperation agreements in place to enable their national air forces to deliver these nuclear weapons in times of war.³⁷⁸ Yet so far, Turkish authorities have expressed more interest in participating to a prestigious, multinational consortium with the F-35 project than a combatant role for the Turkish Air Force. However, Kasapoglu argues that Turkey's F-35 JSF acquisition will bring more than offensive counter-air and air-ground role to the Turkish Air Force: Together with the B61-12 LEP, the F-35 squadrons can provide military options and flexible deterrence, especially if the Turkish F-35 tactical wing got nuclear certified or nuclear mission ready.³⁷⁹ Stein adds that any future scenario involving the re-certification of Turkish dual-capable aircraft to carry out NATO nuclear strikes would be an important signal to a potential adversary.³⁸⁰ However, neither Turkish Armed Forces nor the AKP government have signaled an intent to take on a nuclear mission with the modernization of the aircraft.

³⁷⁷ Norris and Kristensen, 2010, p. 67.

³⁷⁸ Kristensen, 2005, p. 71.

³⁷⁹ Kasapoglu, 2015, p. 98.

³⁸⁰ Aaron Stein, "Turkey and Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Political Love Affair," *EDAM Nonproliferation Policy Briefs*, 2012/1, p. 4.

Turkey's Official Policy and Objectives

In a rare incident, in June 2013, opposition's Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) parliamentarian Lutfu Turkkan posed a parliamentary question for written answer to then Prime Minister Erdogan: Referring to a New York Times article on the U.S. B-61 bombs in Europe and a 2012 Washington Institute for Near East Policy report showing "past and present" U.S. nuclear weapons storage sites in Turkey, Turkkan asked Erdogan if Turkey in fact hosted these bombs and whether there were plans to upgrade the TNW.³⁸¹ Then Foreign Minister Davutoglu addressed his question by stating that Turkey is party to all international regimes on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, supports existing international cooperation mechanisms toward this end, and does not have national nuclear capabilities.³⁸² Davutoglu added that as a NATO ally Turkey supports NATO's nuclear policy according to the 2010 Strategic Concept, which stated that NATO would remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist.³⁸³ However, Turkish officials have not referred to the possibility of NATO remaining as a nuclear alliance without forward deployment of TNW. During the negotiations, one Turkish official noted:

³⁸¹ Lutfu Turkkan, "Soru Onergeleri: ABD'nin Turkiye'nin de icinde bulundugu bazi Avrupa ulkelerinde 180 kadar B61 tipi nukleer bomba bulundurdugu iddiasi hakkında Basbakan'a soru onergesi ve Disisleri Bakani'nin cevabi," June 4, 2013, at: <http://lutfuturkkan.com.tr/parliamentaryquestionsdetails.asp?id=631> The map that Turkkan referred to as the 7 U.S. nuclear weapons storage sites in Turkey was in: Richard Outzen, "From Crisis to Cooperation: Turkey's Relations with Washington and NATO," *Policy Notes*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, No. 12, June 2012, p. 3. Outzen refers to the map and the custodial units while talking about the Cold War, i.e. 1974-1975. He later argues that Turkey still hosts a small number of NATO nuclear weapons and therefore does not have an incentive to develop its own nuclear arsenal. p. 9.

³⁸² Turkkan, 2013.

³⁸³ Turkkan, 2013.

“Nuclear weapons continue to preserve their critical importance for the security of the [North Atlantic] alliance, yet they are regarded more as political weapons. Our country is committed to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and thus we support every effort in that direction. . . . Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that attaining such a goal will not be possible any time soon, and that more time and patience will be needed to realize this objective. Hence, so long as these weapons do still exist in other parts of the world, it is indispensable for NATO to preserve a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal that will be capable of deterring all sorts of enemies in order to ensure the security of all of its allies. . . . [In NATO’s new Strategic Concept] our country want[ed] to see an explicit confirmation of the commitment [of the alliance] to the preservation of an effective and credible deterrent by way of maintaining a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons capability.”³⁸⁴

Turkish officials have signaled at international diplomatic fora that if there was consensus in the NATO alliance on TNW removal, Turkey would not block the decision.³⁸⁵ The former chief policy advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister and current spokesman for President Erdogan, Ibrahim Kalin argued in 2009 that the withdrawal of TNW is up to the US and it is a conversation that would occur within NATO, but Turkey “would not insist” that NATO retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons as “conventional forces are sufficient to meet Turkish security needs.”³⁸⁶ Turkey would

³⁸⁴ Kibaroglu, 2011, p. 32.

³⁸⁵ Author’s interview with high level official on nonproliferation and disarmament at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6, 2015, Ankara.

³⁸⁶ Jeffrey Lewis, “Official: Ankara Doesn’t Need NATO Nukes,” *Arms Control Wonk*, December 8, 2009, at: <http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2561/official-ankara-would-not-insist-on-nato-nukes>.

not want to stand out as the only country in NATO to host U.S. nuclear weapons, either.³⁸⁷

While Turkey ultimately supports complete nuclear disarmament, given the current status of affairs with Russia after the Ukraine crisis, Turkish officials argue that it is not considered realistically achievable in the near future.³⁸⁸ Hence, Turkey wants to maintain a minimum TNW deterrent that does not directly target or threaten any country and addresses potential threats.³⁸⁹ If NATO and Russia took verifiable, reciprocal steps towards TNW removal within a legal framework, Turkey would support the decision.³⁹⁰ At this stage, Turkey supports negative security assurances and transparency measures toward disarmament. However, Turkey would not take a unilateral decision to call for removal without exchanging TNW for another capability.³⁹¹

Geographically and as a member of a nuclear alliance, Turkey states that it is outside the definition of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (MEWMDFZ). However, Turkish officials underscore the importance of working to establish the zone, as seen in then President Abdullah Gul's statement that "establishing a credible global non-proliferation regime would not be achievable, while ignoring de facto existence of nuclear weapons of certain countries at the heart

³⁸⁷ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "The Future of Extended Deterrence: The Case of Turkey," in Perspectives on Extended Deterrence, Recherches & Documents, No. 3, 2010, p. 92.

³⁸⁸ Author's interview with high level official on nonproliferation and disarmament at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6, 2015, Ankara.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

of most delicate regions.”³⁹² Turkey is also a member of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), established after the 2010 NPT Review Conference toward the implementation of the consensus outcomes, including the convening of a WMDFZ in the Middle East conference.³⁹³ Turkey, along with the rest of the NPDI members, argues that the discussion of a MEWMDFZ is a decision countries in the Middle East have to make for themselves and it cannot be imposed on the region by external players beyond facilitating dialogue among regional actors and supporting the idea.³⁹⁴

Turkey does not perceive a contradiction in promoting the MEWMDFZ and maintaining the U.S. TNW on Turkish soil.³⁹⁵ In responding to questions on what will happen to the nuclear warheads in Turkey when the region is freed of WMD, former President Gul argued “those are very different, they constitute a very different category than those of Israel and Iran, i.e. producing one’s new and own nuclear weapons.”³⁹⁶ When asked about the destiny of the nuclear warheads at Incirlik AB,

³⁹² H.E. Abdullah Gül’s Address at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), April 18, 2012, <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/speeches-statements/344/82688/he-abdullah-guls-addrb-at-the-organization-for-the-prohibition-of-chemical-weapons-opcw.html>

³⁹³ NPDI has 11 members: Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. The priorities of the group are greater transparency toward nuclear disarmament, strengthening the IAEA safeguards regime, and the establishment of NWFZs. NPDI states that: “...the challenges that must be overcome to create a WMDFZ in the Middle East are difficult, but not insurmountable. If all countries in the region display the required political will and work in a spirit of cooperation, progress can be made.” Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East,” March 14, 2014, p. 2, at: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom14/documents/WP7.pdf>

³⁹⁴ Author’s interview with high level official on nonproliferation and disarmament at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6, 2015, Ankara.

³⁹⁵ Author’s interview with high level official on nonproliferation and disarmament at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6, 2015, Ankara.

³⁹⁶ Sedat Ergin, “Gul, Turkiye’deki atom bombalarını hesap dışı tutuyor,” *Hurriyet*, April 14, 2010.

then Prime Minister Erdogan's response was that there were "developments at Incirlik, unlike the previous administrations."³⁹⁷ Interestingly, then Foreign Minister Davutoglu approached the issue "lamenting" that Turkey has been "doomed with this (nuclear) legacy," yet that Turkey perceives threats from the uncertain strategic security environment as a reason to retain these weapons.³⁹⁸ Davutoglu declared a "desire" for a nuclear-weapons-free world, but argued that the transition "cannot be used by others to create new imbalances."³⁹⁹

In the Synder-Zeijden study on national delegations' views on TNW at NATO headquarters, Turkey is categorized as a host country that would not block withdrawal. The Turkish delegation in their Brussels interview was "less outspoken on the subject" and indicated that "they would not block consensus on removal," much like Italy.⁴⁰⁰ While no NATO delegation stated that Turkey could develop a nuclear arsenal in violation of the NPT following the withdrawal of TNW, Synder and Zeijden point that "Turkey appeared slightly offended by the suggestion" as the Turkish government has been consistently denying any reconsideration of their NPT commitment.⁴⁰¹

Turkish officials find the proliferation cascade scenarios and claims that Turkey will pursue nuclear weapons "offensive."⁴⁰² They argue that the lack of confidence in

³⁹⁷ "Incirlik onceki gibi degil," *Milliyet*, April 13, 2010.

³⁹⁸ Kibaroglu, 2011, p. 35.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ Synder and Zeijden, 2011, pp. 16-17.

⁴⁰¹ Synder and Zeijden, 2011, p. 23.

⁴⁰² Author's interview with high level official on nonproliferation and disarmament at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6, 2015, Ankara.

Turkey and the credibility of NATO's Article V commitment are "worrisome."⁴⁰³ Given its membership and commitment to the NATO Alliance and global nonproliferation regimes, while it is not rational for Turkey to burn its bridges with NATO and Europe. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as long as there is a functioning NPT regime and alliance system, the only way Turkey would consider "going nuclear" would be pursuing peaceful nuclear energy for energy security and self-sufficiency.⁴⁰⁴ However, the lack of a clearly defined policy on nuclear weapons leads to confusion about Turkey's intentions and whether Turkey will pursue its own nuclear weapons based on the nuclear energy program.

Problems in Formulation and Implications

While in principle, Turkey welcomes a global zero and a WMD free zone in the Middle East in the long term, it remains rather ambivalent on its own nuclear policies in the medium term. Barkey argues that the absence of a clearly articulated Turkish national policy on nuclear weapons can be explained by two main factors: Being a direct beneficiary of the U.S. nuclear umbrella under NATO, and unclear demarcation of authority between civilian and military leaders on national defense.⁴⁰⁵ To this end, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that although there have been some

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ Nilvana Darama, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey, "Side Meeting II- Book Launch: Turkey's Nuclear Future," 2015 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, March 24, 2015, Washington, D.C.

⁴⁰⁵ Barkey, 2009, p. 67.

national, classified studies, as a NATO member, Turkey has not felt the need to explain itself with a declaratory nuclear policy.⁴⁰⁶

Turkish attitudes toward TNW has always been instrumental vis-à-vis other objectives, not just since the AKP government. While the Turkish government has adopted the principle of ambiguity in its official statements on NATO's future nuclear posture involving TNW, there is ongoing debate on the potential political and military consequences of withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey. The reasoning to maintain the TNW is largely pegged to strategic partnership with the US and the asymmetric strategic weapons capabilities in the Middle East, while the opposition to TNW focuses on Turkey's interest to promote nonproliferation in its neighborhood with a coherent policy against nuclear weapons on its own soil. This unresolved debate and the ambiguity about nuclear weapons pave the way to a major concern about the possibility of Turkey developing its own nuclear weapons.

Will Turkey develop nuclear weapons?

Some proponents of keeping TNW in Turkey, especially in the US, argue that their dismantlement would lead to a nuclear-armed Turkey. There have even been claims in the German media that Turkey is “secretly” building nuclear weapons.⁴⁰⁷ As Ulgen

⁴⁰⁶ Author's interview with high level official on nonproliferation and disarmament at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁴⁰⁷ In a controversial article, a former German Department of Defense official, Hans Ruhle argued that the German intelligence services are targeting Turkey as there are signs of plans to develop a “plutonium bomb” using the spent fuel from the civilian nuclear power plants and that Turkey has a significant number of centrifuges from Pakistan, linked to the A.Q. Khan network. He asserted that the Turkish missile program is a further indication of the weapons program, which is a response to Iran.

puts it, “Turkey’s embedding in the Western Alliance is not viewed by many analysts as an insurmountable obstacle for Turkey to develop nuclear weapons.”⁴⁰⁸ The vagueness of Turkish national nuclear policy causes debate about whether Turkey would consider developing its own nuclear weapons, especially if there were changes in NATO’s nuclear policy, leading to degraded U.S. extended deterrence.⁴⁰⁹ The common view is that TNW in Europe give Turkey reassurance of maintaining a credible NATO deterrent against possible adversaries and removal would weaken those reassurances.⁴¹⁰ However, some have argued that the Turkish hard-liners’ push for a domestic nuclear arsenal may not be changed by the absence or presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey.⁴¹¹

A factor frequently named as a motivation for Turkey to develop its own nuclear weapons is a nuclear-armed Iran leading to a “nuclear domino” or “proliferation cascade” in the region involving Saudi Arabia, which has allegedly invested in the Pakistani nuclear program; Egypt, which is suspected of maintaining chemical

Hans Ruhle, “Arbeitet die Türkei heimlich an der Atombombe?” *Die Welt*, September 22, 2014, at: <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article132446686/Arbeitet-die-Tuerkei-heimlich-an-der-Atombombe.html> The Turkish Foreign Ministry responded to the allegation that it has “no basis in reality whatsoever... Moreover, it is surprising that such reports have been published by the press of a country which, like Turkey, is a NATO member and part of NATO’s collective defense system.” “QA-32, 25 September 2014, Statement of the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tanju Bilgiç in response to a Question regarding the Reports Published in the German Press Asserting that Turkey Works on Nuclear Weapon Production,” at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/qa_32_-25-september-2014_-statement-of-the-spokesman-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-tanju-bilgiç-in-response-to-a-question-regarding-the-reports-published-in-the-german-press-asserting-that-turkey-works-on-nuclear-weapon-production.en.mfa

⁴⁰⁸ Sinan Ulgen, “Preventing the Weapons of Mass Destruction : What Role for Turkey?” *Transatlantic Academy Paper Series*, June 2010, p. 9.

⁴⁰⁹ Steven Pifer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon, Kenneth M. Pollack, “Extended Deterrence and NATO Europe,” in *US and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges*, *Arms Control Series*, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Paper 3, May 2010, p. 18.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 26.

⁴¹¹ Bob van der Zwaan and Tom Sauer, “Time to reconsider U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 23, 2009.

warfare capability, and Turkey to deter Iran from “aggressive unconventional warfare and the threat of nuclear extortion” using a nuclear monopoly.⁴¹² Former U.S. official John Bolton told the United States House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs, “If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, then almost certainly Saudi Arabia will do the same, as will Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others in the region, and we risk this widespread proliferation even if it is a democratic Iran that possesses nuclear weapons.”⁴¹³

Different from Saudi Arabia or Egypt, Turkey is already covered by NATO’s nuclear umbrella. However, in a 2012 EDAM survey, when asked about whether Turkey should develop its own nuclear weapons or rely on NATO guarantees should Iran have nuclear weapons, 53.9% of the Turkish respondents said NATO defense would be insufficient and Turkey should get its nuclear weapons, while 34.8% said Turkey should not develop nuclear weapons under any circumstance, and only 8.2% said NATO defense would be sufficient to counter a nuclear-armed Iran.⁴¹⁴ These views are likely to change in the aftermath of the nuclear deal with Iran.

A decrease in the effectiveness and credibility of the U.S./NATO umbrella is hence named as another factor that could motivate Turkey to acquire nuclear weapons, as

⁴¹² Steven Pifer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin S. Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon, Kenneth M. Pollack, “Extended Deterrence and the Middle East,” in US and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges, *Arms Control Series*, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Paper 3, May 2010, p. 40. “Pakistan Has Complicated Nuclear Relationship with Saudi Arabia, Iran,” *Voice of America*, April 7, 2015.

⁴¹³ Sinan Ulgen, “Turkey and the Bomb,” *The Carnegie Papers*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nuclear Policy, February 2012, p. 3.

⁴¹⁴ “Nukleer Silahlanmaya Sartli Destek,” *Turkiye’de Dis Politika ve Kamuoyu Anketleri*, EDAM, 2012/1, at: <http://edam.org.tr/document/Edam2012Anket1.pdf>

Turkey has to rely on this guarantee to counter threats from nuclear-armed adversaries. Lack of Turkish confidence in Western security guarantees have originated in the aftermath of the Gulf Wars, i.e. the reluctance of some NATO allies to deploy reinforcements in response to Turkey's request after the 1991 war and for its fight against the PKK, and growing anti-Americanism after the 2003 invasion.⁴¹⁵ However, Barkey points that the Turkish military owes its primary deterrence and potency to its NATO links, making it very costly to forsake its alliance pledge.⁴¹⁶ He adds that Turkey lacks independent capabilities to "collect, analyze, and assess" intelligence on nuclear issues.⁴¹⁷ He nevertheless considers the possibility of a regional nuclear arms race, triggered by a nuclear-armed Iran, coinciding with the removal of U.S. TNW as a factor that could encourage Turkey to develop nuclear weapons capability.⁴¹⁸ Another factor he puts forward is domestic politics, i.e. a strong nationalist backlash to a regional nuclear arms race, especially if Turkey does not join the EU.⁴¹⁹ On that note, Gottemoeller argues that it is the European NATO capitals' attention to continuing the integration of Turkey into Europe and the U.S. reassuring role that are needed to address Turkey's security concerns.⁴²⁰ Weitz also suggests that "the most profitable nonproliferation tool in Turkey's case" is assuring an essential Turkish role in NATO's nuclear policies by reflecting Turkey's preferences in the decisions: Two such interests are Turkey's concern with the

⁴¹⁵ Barkey, 2009, pp. 68-9.

⁴¹⁶ Barkey, 2009, p. 69.

⁴¹⁷ Barkey, 2009, pp. 70-1.

⁴¹⁸ Barkey, 2009, pp. 73-4.

⁴¹⁹ Barkey, 2009, p. 74.

⁴²⁰ Rose Gottemoeller, "Eliminating Short-Range Nuclear Weapons Designed to be Forward Deployed," Chapter 3, in George Pratt Schultz ed., Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons: Complete Report of the 2007 Hoover Institution Conference, Hoover Press, 2008, p. 135.

Russian nuclear forces nearby and the nuclear deal with Iran potentially sacrificing Turkish security interests.⁴²¹

However, since the checks and balances mechanisms in the Turkish government are eroding, President Erdogan may take the decision to have nuclear weapons for symbolic reasons and to consolidate his power towards the executive presidency that he has been seeking. Another consideration to pursue nuclear weapons is national prestige in continuity of the glorious, imperial past towards becoming a regional hegemon. Ilter Turkmen, former foreign minister, argues that Turkey's lack of expertise in nuclear technology is "incompatible with Turkey's geopolitical standing and economic potential: If neighbors were intent on developing nuclear weapon technology, it behooved Turkey, at the very least, to acquire peaceful forms of nuclear technology."⁴²² Similarly, Karaosmanoglu argues that it would be controversial to state that there would be no political and military ambition toward having nuclear weapons in Turkey in case of TNW withdrawal.⁴²³ He asserts that the military might compromise efficiency for effectiveness in arguing for Turkish acquisition of nuclear weapons.⁴²⁴

A nuclear-armed Turkey outside of NATO would have high political and economic costs and bring isolation. Acknowledging that there could be some interest within the state bureaucracy, Kibaroglu argues for the awareness of consequences at the state

⁴²¹ Weitz, 2010.

⁴²² Barkey, 2009, pp. 76-77.

⁴²³ Author's interview with Emeritus Professor Ali Karaosmanoglu, January 28, 2015, Istanbul.

⁴²⁴ Author's interview with Emeritus Professor Ali Karaosmanoglu, January 28, 2015, Istanbul.

level beyond individual ambitions.⁴²⁵ Even considering a speculative scenario, for the foreseeable future, Turkish nuclear weapons would have no meaningful value added for Turkish security, e.g. against Kurdish terrorism or ISIS as the top threats. So far, Turkey has projected neither the desire nor the acquisition of capabilities toward nuclear weapons development. Given Turkey's historical Western orientation since 1800s, the inhibitions to this decision from a rationality perspective are the EU membership prospects, economic stability, and becoming a "rogue" state, i.e. breaking away from the acceptance of the international community as a responsible state.⁴²⁶ Udum argues that given Turkey's membership to the NPT and other nonproliferation regimes, keeping the NNWS status is a political and legal commitment, but more importantly Turkey perceives the image of a "dedicated member of the regime" as a norm of being an "accepted" state.⁴²⁷ Similarly, Barkey argues that even a diplomatic attempt to isolate a nuclear-armed state is not appealing to Turkey and the best outcome is prevention of nuclearization.⁴²⁸

Given its record of nonproliferation regime participation and compliance, the only scenario that could give a "degree of likelihood" to a Turkish decision to proliferate would be a "breakdown" in U.S.-Turkish security relationship.⁴²⁹ If there were a nuclear "trigger," i.e. a nuclear-armed Iran, given its international standing with the NATO alliance, Turkey would be more likely to strengthen ties with the "traditional

⁴²⁵ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Side Meeting II- Book Launch: Turkey's Nuclear Future," 2015 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, March 24, 2015, Washington, D.C.

⁴²⁶ Author's not-for-attribution interviews, January 30, 2015, Ankara.

⁴²⁷ Sebnem Udum, "Turkey's non-nuclear weapon status: A theoretical assessment," *Journal on Science and World Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, p. 59.

⁴²⁸ Barkey, 2009, p. 75.

⁴²⁹ Ulgen, 2012, p. 1.

guarantors of its security.”⁴³⁰ Moreover, there is no possibility of Turkey building the indigenous breakout capability through a quick, clandestine weapons program without being detected under a nuclear energy program.

Turkey's Nuclear Energy Program

Even though some express concern regarding the weapons-potential of the Turkish nuclear energy, in its current configuration, it does not provide Turkey with capabilities, material or expertise needed for nuclear weapons, since the program is entirely designed and operated by Russia.

The real intentions behind Turkey's nuclear energy program, which Gottemoeller states “can in some circumstances be the precursor to a military nuclear program,”⁴³¹ are frequently questioned as a sign of a future nuclear-armed Turkey. Turkey's quest for nuclear energy and renewed bids for the construction of nuclear power plants have coincided with an increasing interest in nuclear power projects in several Middle Eastern states, i.e. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Not surprisingly, these developments brought up the question of “nuclearization” and its security implications the Middle East.

The main motivation behind the Turkish decision to pursue nuclear power is its energy deficit, i.e. the increasing demand for electricity, resulting from economic

⁴³⁰ Ibid.

⁴³¹ Rose Gottemoeller, “Eliminating Short-Range Nuclear Weapons Designed to be Forward Deployed.”

growth. According to the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources estimates, in 2012-2013, Turkish import dependency in energy was 73 percent on average; 98 percent in natural gas, 92 percent in fuel-oil, and 30 percent in coal.⁴³² The peaceful use of nuclear energy is a national strategy for Turkey to diversify its primary sources of energy, to decrease its vulnerability and dependency on foreign sources of oil and natural gas, i.e. Russia and Iran, and to support other sources of energy, i.e. water, coal, geothermal, wind, and solar.

A careful look at the intergovernmental agreement that Turkey signed with Russia in 2010 reveals that if the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is ever built, it will be a reactor built, owned, and operated by the Russians. Turkey has implemented this model due to a lack of financing and operation know-how: Russia will finance 100 percent of the construction cost, retrieve its investment from the guaranteed electricity sales, and operate the plants.

Turkey does not have a functioning nuclear power reactor or commercial fuel cycle capabilities. It has two research reactors in Istanbul in Cekmece (CNAEM) and at Istanbul Technical University (ITU), producing radioisotopes for medical and industrial purposes. CNAEM's fuel pilot plant conducts small-scale "uranium purification, conversion to uranium oxide 2, and production of fuel pellets," which

⁴³² Salih Sari, "Current Nuclear Power Situation in Turkey," IAEA Technical Meeting on CNPP, Vienna, Austria, March 18-21, 2013, at: <http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2013/2013-03-18-03-21-TM-NPE/22.sari.pdf>

can be used in nuclear fuel production.⁴³³ The radioactive waste processing and storage facility at the Cekmece facility, which provides interim storage for the waste from the two research reactors, does not have reprocessing capability.⁴³⁴ Turkey has no plans to pursue enrichment or reprocessing: In terms of the nuclear fuel cycle, Turkey will source nuclear fuel from the suppliers on the basis of long-term agreements between the project company and suppliers.⁴³⁵ A separate agreement will be required for spent nuclear fuel of Russian origin for reprocessing in Russia.⁴³⁶

Turkish authorities argue that given the Article IV of the NPT regime, Turkey asserts full rights to peaceful applications of nuclear energy. However, the biggest concern regarding Turkey's nuclear energy plans is not its peaceful nature; it is the lack of Turkish regulatory oversight and the financial model, which gives Russia incentives to lower costs by sacrificing safety and security. A key challenge to Turkish human resource development in the nuclear sector is the "regulator-operator information asymmetry."⁴³⁷ The current impasse in Turkey-Russia relations also proves that the

⁴³³ "Turkey: Power-Balance Concerns," in *Nuclear Programs in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran*, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008, p. 64.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ "NNSA Announces Highly Enriched Uranium Removed from Turkey," National Nuclear Security Administration, Press Release, January 12, 2010, at:

<http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/01.12.10>

⁴³⁶ Serhat Kose, "Recent Status of Nuclear Program in Turkey," Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, Workshop on Introduction of Nuclear Power Program Management and Evaluation of a National Nuclear Infrastructure, February 8-11, 2011, Vienna, at:

http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2011/2011-02-TM-WS-Vienna/Day-1/Kose_Turkey.pdf

⁴³⁷ John Banks and Kevin Massy, Charles Ebinger ed. "Human Resource Development in New Nuclear Energy States: Case Studies from the Middle East," *Energy Security Initiative at Brookings*, November 2012, Policy Brief 12-02, p. 29, at:

<http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2012/11/nuclear%20energy%20middle%20east%20banks%20massy%20ebinger/nuclear%20energy%20middle%20east%20esi.pdf>

energy diversification argument contradicts the potential dependency on Russia for nuclear technology and fuel in addition to natural gas.

The problems in Turkey's formulation of a nuclear weapons policy prove that confidence building is required to avoid misunderstandings that could lead to escalation.

Turkey's Policy Options

Since Turkey does not possess the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, Turkish policymakers can choose to maintain the status quo, which reflects an inconsistent mix of coercive and cooperative stance by hosting the weapons and promoting nuclear nonproliferation in the region; move towards a more coercive and confrontational stance toward becoming a regional hegemon by developing its own nuclear weapons to have its own deterrent; or choose to promote the dismantlement of TNW in Europe in line with the principles of cooperative security.

At the core of the TNW debate are two moving targets: US/NATO deferral to allies' needs and allies' deferral to the US-Russia impasse on the next round of nuclear reductions. However, the crises in Crimea and Ukraine have eliminated both sides' interest in moving forward with reductions and TNW are pushed off the agenda due to the lack of political confidence.

While the US is the key actor, it is clear that any change to TNW policy will be taken in consultation with the allies. Based on NATO's nuclear burden-sharing principle, any policy change regarding TNW involves a NATO consensus in decision making, i.e. Central and Eastern European members and Germany alike.

If NATO chose to maintain status quo, maintaining the current status of deployment would not mean "do nothing" due to the shelf life of the weapons and the need for the life extension program. In this case, it would either mean phase out or replace the TNW with same, upgraded capabilities at same locations. However, there is no consensus among allies to maintain the weapons nor upgrade the dual-capable aircraft.

The second option would be replacing the B61s with modern, precision-guided bombs or cruise missiles. While the current TNW could theoretically be modernized by new weapons systems instead of the life extension programs, introduction of new capabilities remain politically challenging and maintain the need for delivery capacity.

A third option would be consolidating the TNW down to a certain number of locations. This option would decrease the costs of storage and security upgrades, and would continue the burden-sharing for DCA nations that choose to participate.⁴³⁸ However, , this option could lead to political problems within the Alliance, as those countries that opt to host would play a key strategic role and pay a larger political

⁴³⁸ Kamp, Remkes, 2011, p. 83.

price by being singled out despite the “burden sharing” principle.⁴³⁹ Despite being ambivalent on TNW deployment, Turkey or Italy would not want to take on this responsibility.

In order to deal with this political challenge, a fourth option would be moving the weapons to other NATO members, such as the Central and Eastern European members who favor continued deployment as a signal to Russia. Yet, it is politically challenging for NATO, as the NATO foreign ministers declared in 1996 the “three no’s,” that “the Alliance had no intention, no reason, no plan to station nuclear forces on the territory of new members.”⁴⁴⁰ No interpretation is that NATO’s commitment to the “three no’s” is based on the current policy situation.⁴⁴¹ However, the violation of this principle would further escalate the tensions with Russia through provocation, potentially destabilizing political consequences and would be against the NATO assurance to Russia. In addition, from a military point of view, TNW deployment in Eastern Europe is irrelevant to enhancing NATO capability and would make the stockpile only more vulnerable to Russian strike.⁴⁴²

An alternative proposition for NATO burden sharing has been the European Phased Adaptive Approach to theater ballistic missile defense in Europe. However, NATO

⁴³⁹ Andrew Futter, “NATO, ballistic missile defense, and the future of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe,” *European Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2011, p. 553.

⁴⁴⁰ Warren Christopher, U.S. Secretary of State, Press Conference, December 10, 1996, at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961210r.htm>

⁴⁴¹ Guy Roberts, “Limiting Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Results of a Track II Dialogue,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., September 4, 2015.

⁴⁴² Roberts, “Limiting Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Results of a Track II Dialogue,”

missile defense has its unique problems that will be discussed in the next chapter and has an entirely different defensive military mission than offensive TNW.

If European allies asked for removal of U.S. TNW from their territory, Turkey would have two options: carry the burden by retaining the weapons or reverse the long-standing policy and send them back. Despite Turkey's declaratory policy, it is not clear whether Turkish officials would see a high value in keeping them, given their concern for a setback on U.S.-Turkey strategic relations. However, such a decision would alienate Turkey from its allies and create tensions in the Middle East.

There have been debates on the conditions under which Turkish security policy makers would be more inclined to support a NATO decision to remove the TNW, i.e. what systems and security guarantees Turkey would seek from the US as a substitute to forward deployed nuclear weapons. Some alternatives include standoff conventional weapons, U.S. sea-based forces, i.e. destroyers patrolling in the Mediterranean sea, and precision strike to strengthen multilateral defense under NATO. It is likely that Turkish officials would seek such concrete security guarantees from the US, particularly towards the security of the Syrian border and fight against ISIS, since they value the bargaining power that TNW gives them more than the military value of nuclear weapons.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

There is near universal consensus on the main obstacle to any progress on TNW reductions, and the lack of political dialogue between NATO and Russia. However, beyond this obstacle, the TNW debate points to a problematic aspect of Turkish security policymaking and that is naming nuclear weapons as a tool for security guarantees from the US and NATO. This coupling shows that, while Turkish officials see little to no military value in TNW, they consider them useful for U.S. commitment to Turkish security. Instead of considering nuclear weapons as political tools, the real objective in Turkish nuclear policy should be maximizing Turkish security and minimizing the risks arising from miscalculation that could lead to escalation and deteriorate Turkey's security.

Turkey has been historically comfortable with the TNW status quo. In fact, the status quo does not serve Turkey's security objectives in any way. Unlike most European countries, AKP government does not face any political pressures to change its policy preference for continued TNW deployment. However, Turkish officials have stated that Turkey would not argue against a NATO-wide decision to remove TNW. The lack of a strategic role for nuclear weapons in Turkish thinking is an opportunity for moving forward with TNW dismantlement. Meanwhile, had Turkey been one of the European allies that promoted the removal of TNW, it would have preempted concerns regarding Turkey's intentions to build its own nuclear weapons in fear of removal

Future reductions of TNW depend on whether NATO, the US, and Russia can develop a mechanism that reaffirms the principles of inclusive cooperative security, i.e. transparency and accountability in an institutionalized arrangement, to strengthen assurance.⁴⁴³ Binnendijk and Kelleher argue that the task for NATO is finding the right mix of reassurance for the Allies and reset with Russia to create the conditions for further TNW reductions on both sides.⁴⁴⁴ They suggest seven sets of measures to enhance confidence in the Article V guarantees:

1. Building confidence through operational success and declaratory statements, i.e. the Alliance “can and will” deliver its commitments,
2. Enhancing conventional plans, exercises, and decision making procedures, i.e. contingency plans, especially for Central and Eastern European allies,
3. Strengthening conventional forces and the Article V mission, given the budget cuts to defense spending,
4. Enhancing support for training and installations,
5. Broadening deterrence to meet new challenges, e.g. ballistic missiles, cyber attacks, and energy security,
6. Maximizing deterrent capabilities of remaining U.S. nuclear weapons,

⁴⁴³ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “Interlinked: Assurance, Russia, and Further Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Chapter Six, in Steve Andreasen and Isabelle Williams eds, Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for Action, Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 17, 2011, p. 119.

⁴⁴⁴ Hans Binnendijk and Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “NATO Reassurance and Nuclear Reductions: Creating the Conditions,” *Transatlantic Current*, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, January 2012, no. 2, p. 1.

7. Modifying Russian deployments and doctrine.⁴⁴⁵

In addition to these cooperative security principles that Turkey should promote, according to a Polish Institute of International Studies study, there are three types of transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) on TNW:

1. “Low-hanging fruit” options that seem relatively easy for both sides, e.g. regular seminars on nuclear doctrines for greater communication and joint accident response exercises,
2. “Challenging” options that require strong political will on both ends, e.g. collaboration on development of verification techniques, information exchanges on numbers of historical and current stockpiles, NATO reaffirmation of the “Three No’s” pledge, U.S.-Russian statements reaffirming their commitment to the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI), and pledges of transparent modernization of TNW.
3. “Dead-end” options that seem unrealistic for the foreseeable future due to the Ukraine crisis, e.g. information exchanges on former TNW storage facilities, notifications about movements of TNW, removal of TNW from NATO-Russia borders, mil-to-mil exchanges, and pledges not to modernize existing nuclear warheads and develop new delivery systems.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid, pp. 5-11.

⁴⁴⁶ Jacek Durkalec and Andrei Zagorski, Options for Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures Related to Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Cost-Benefit Matrix, The Polish Institute of International Studies, *PISM-IMEMO Ran Workshop Report*, July 2014, Warsaw, pp. 6, 8-9.

Turkey should actively contribute to this debate towards the generation of realistic and attainable steps toward building confidence.

Turkey should change its declaratory policy on the tactical nuclear weapons and detach them from being a symbol of NATO commitment to protect Turkey, which is already provided under Article V by the strategic arsenals. U.S. strategic forces are the 'supreme guarantor' of NATO security and non-nuclear capabilities in addition to U.S. strategic nuclear forces have a role in providing credible extended deterrence to Turkey. Under U.S. command and control, they do not serve the Turkish declared objective of maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent. Hence, Turkey should take a more active stance, and based on the logic of cooperative security: It is in Turkey's best interest to promote creating the conditions for further TNW reductions both in NATO and Russia.

Chapter 5: Turkey's Quest for Air and Missile Defense

As the only NATO ally that directly borders the Middle East and remains in the range of aerial and missile threats originating from the region, Turkish policymakers have struggled to define their security objectives and meet their defense needs entirely by NATO. Reflecting the lack of trust in the U.S./Alliance commitment to Turkish security, in the realm of air and missile defense, AKP officials have been considering the indigenous development of technically challenging and expensive technologies without taking into consideration the strategic implications of these systems. Turkey needs to better understand its defense needs in terms of the missile trends in the region, how urgent these threats are, and whether the technologies that the policymakers are considering to procure would be effective in addressing aerial threats.

Evaluating Turkey's policy objectives on air and missile defense, I argue that the Turkish government focuses more on the technological know-how aspect of air and missile defense and military modernization, rather than the added security value of the proposed systems, i.e. whether those particular systems address Turkey's security vulnerabilities. The quest for Turkish military modernization is not communicated as a contribution to NATO, but as an act of independence due to lack of confidence in NATO guarantees.

Ballistic missile defense is a leap for the Turkish defense industry, in which decision makers set unrealistic procurement goals. There is also little discussion of whether these systems are effective in addressing the pronounced threats, how immediate these threats are, and the security dilemma that ballistic missile defense systems create, i.e. promoting horizontal missile proliferation, incentivizing countries that have a small inventory. Meanwhile, the latest statements by Turkish officials point to the need for offensive missiles for deterrence and these statements raise questions about Turkey's intentions.

Turkey's current policy stance on air and missile defense has severe strategic implications on its regional security relationships as well as commitment to NATO collective defense, as the issue is handled as a matter of advance in defense technology and independence from NATO. I argue that Turkey should detach conventional air defense from ballistic missile defense, and rely on the rotation of NATO defense assets as needed on the latter without investing in indigenous capability; recognizing the technological limitations, high costs, and political implications of missile defense. Turkey can better achieve its objective of decreasing vulnerability against short-range aerial threats arising from the Middle East by short-range air defense solutions, rather than pursuing ballistic missile defense against threats that are not of immediate danger and targeted against Turkey. I argue that pursuing offensive systems would deteriorate Turkish security and that pursuing defensive systems as well as cooperative security principles to minimize the sources of threats targeting Turkey would decrease vulnerability against aerial threats.

From a cooperative security perspective, missile defense is too provocative, expensive, and ineffective, since it can be bypassed by multiple missiles and countermeasures, and does not meaningfully enhance Turkish security. The most immediate aerial threats to Turkish territory from Syria and Iraq, such as rockets and shells, are better prevented from launching than intercepted. Unlike for missiles, comprehensive coverage along the border should be done by real-time surveillance, rather than aiming to create a defense “shield.”

This chapter first introduces the NATO-wide air and missile defense debate, led by the U.S. decisions on the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and the evolution of the NATO Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) Program established in 2005, and the opposing views on its capabilities and limitations. It then provides an overview of Turkey’s participation to ALTBMD as host of an early-warning radar, and Ankara’s politico-military concerns regarding NATO that led to Turkey’s quest for a national long-range air and missile defense system. The chapter identifies the main aerial threats that shape Ankara’s decisions, including missile threats, both conventional and nuclear, arising from Syria and Iran. It then analyses Turkey’s objectives and both technical and political problems in finalizing the tender, dubbed the T-LORAMIDS project.

Issue for Analysis

Given NATO's hesitance to be involved in out-of-area operations, Turkey considers lack of air and missile defense systems as a strategic weakness that leave its security policies dependent on the U.S. and allies' guarantees in every crisis. In the latest cases of Syrian shells, projectiles and rockets causing civilian casualties in the border provinces of Turkey, Germany, Netherlands, and Spain provided Patriot missiles for the protection of the Turkish-Syrian border. Yet, these systems have missed rockets and artillery, in addition to not providing comprehensive coverage in southeast Turkey. Considering that Patriot systems are combat-tested, indigenous capabilities are initially expected to be even less effective. Given the constant turmoil in the region and the urgency of addressing evolving asymmetric threats, Turkey has been considering solutions in and out of NATO to minimize vulnerability. However, the decision to choose a long-range air and missile defense system has proven to be very difficult so far. Turkey's demands for low cost, co-production, and technology transfer to enhance its domestic defense industry and reduce dependence almost led to a controversial decision to pursue Chinese systems, generating NATO-wide concerns regarding both Turkey's political orientation away from the Alliance and interoperability.

After the T-LORAMIDS tender was extended several times, Ankara cancelled the tender but not the project.⁴⁴⁷ Now, Turkish policymakers need to carefully consider

⁴⁴⁷ See Appendix 3: Turkey's Journey with Air and Missile Defense: A Timeline.

their policy options on national air and missile defense and the financial, military, and political implications of these options. Turkey's national procurement decision will also be shaped by the U.S. decision regarding the future of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to theater missile defense in Europe. However, the missile defense discussion in Turkey is not well-informed by these larger debates, recognizing the technical and financial limitations, and strategic implications of these technologies.

The NATO/U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Debate

Given its complex military, economic, and political nature, policy decisions about NATO air and missile defense are highly controversial in the US and within the Alliance. Missile defense has always been an issue for political debate for the United States, the same way as TNW have been a political debate for NATO countries that have hosted them.

Proponents of BMD argue that it undermines the value of offensive ballistic missiles and discourages their use by adversaries, hence it strengthens regional stability for U.S. allies. Opponents of BMD state that it is expensive, ineffective against most threats, and can be overwhelmed by a greater number of less expensive offensive missiles, while leading to missile proliferation and undermining regional stability.

The debate is centered on the role of ballistic missile defense (BMD) in NATO's overall security strategy, i.e. whether BMD stabilizes or destabilizes deterrence by leading to missile proliferation. The debate continues on the technological and economic feasibility of the current systems and development in the near future, in terms of the high costs in a tight budgetary environment and limited capabilities against countermeasures. There is disagreement on the impact on overall strategic relations, especially with Russia and China. Analyses of how urgent the missile threats to the Alliance also differ drastically.

NATO's Active Layered Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) Plan and the U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)

U.S. ballistic missile defense systems go back to 1950s to counter the Soviet threat, followed by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that limited the number of ground-based missile defense sites and prohibited the other from missile defense. During the Reagan administration, the US launched the "Strategic Defense Initiative," known as "Star Wars" to develop space and ground-based hit-to-kill defensive systems within the framework of extended range interceptor – ERINT program and Brilliant Pebbles.⁴⁴⁸ The idea evolved into a more modest vision of Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system including theater missile defenses, proposed by the Bush administration in January 1991; Clinton administration's "2+2" years system followed by the "3+3" deployment plan, and the upper-tier theater

⁴⁴⁸ Jonathan Masters, "Ballistic Missile Defense," *CFR Backgrounders*, August 15, 2014, at: <http://www.cfr.org/missile-defense/ballistic-missile-defense/p30607>

missile defense known as Navy Theater Wide (NTW) in the 2000s.⁴⁴⁹ In the 1990s, the missile threat definition shifted from the Soviet Union to “regional threats,” i.e. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.

In June 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty and established the U.S. Missile Defense Agency in order to deploy a nationwide defense against long-range ballistic missiles.⁴⁵⁰ In the aftermath of the ABM withdrawal, as there were no more limitations, the Bush administration combined national and theatre ballistic missile defense with controversial and ambitious hit-to-kill interceptors, with plans to station a radar facility in Czech Republic and ground-based interceptors in Poland. In 2004, the first ground-based missile (GMD) interceptor was deployed in Alaska, followed by California.⁴⁵¹

As an attempt to revise the George H. W. Bush administration policies, in 2009 the Obama administration adopted a new regional missile defense policy, while the retaining the U.S. long-range national missile defense system.

NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD), which was initially formulated at the 2004 Istanbul summit, was reformulated at the NATO Lisbon Summit in December 2010. The U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is the U.S. national contribution to the NATO missile defense system.

⁴⁴⁹ David Mosher, “Understanding the Extraordinary Cost of Missile Defense,” *Arms Control Today*, December 2000.

⁴⁵⁰ “U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance,” *Fact Sheet*, Arms Control Association, October 2011, at: <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/usmissiledefense>

⁴⁵¹ Jonathan Masters, “Ballistic Missile Defense,”

Announcing the EPAA, President Obama stated:

“As I said during the campaign, President Bush was right that Iran's ballistic missile program poses a significant threat... we have updated our intelligence assessment of Iran's missile programs, which emphasizes the threat posed by Iran's short- and medium-range missiles, which are capable of reaching Europe. There's no substitute for Iran complying with its international obligations regarding its nuclear program, and we, along with our allies and partners, will continue to pursue strong diplomacy to ensure that Iran lives up to these international obligations. But this new ballistic missile defense program will best address the threat posed by Iran's ongoing ballistic missile defense program.”⁴⁵²

The Allies welcomed the EPAA's contribution to ALTBMD, to which the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark directly contribute to, in addition to Turkey, Spain, Romania, and Poland.⁴⁵³ EPAA initially consisted of deployments in four main phases from 2011 to 2025, with a possible extension due to delays in implementation, centered on the sea-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor and further models to be upgraded and integrated to land and space-based sensors at later stages. Since Phase 4 caused great objections from Russia that it would pose a threat to Russian strategic missiles, in March 2013, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced that the US effectively cancelled it.⁴⁵⁴ The United States will not deploy the SM-3 Block II-B,

⁴⁵² “Remarks by the President on Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, September 17, 2009, at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-strengthening-missile-defense-europe>

⁴⁵³ “Ballistic missile defense,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm

⁴⁵⁴ “U.S. Cancels Part of Missile Defense that Russia Opposed,” *The New York Times*, March 16, 2013.

which was expected to be faster and have a more advanced kill vehicle than the version currently deployed. Hence, the system will be deployed in three main phases:

In Phase 1, which is completed, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) has been the core of EPAA to counter short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, with the NATO command and control in Ramstein, Germany, i.e. Air Command and Control Systems (ACCS) as part of the NATO Integrated Air Defense System (NATINADS).⁴⁵⁵ The initial system consisted of 4 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, 15 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and an X-band early-warning radar in Kurecik, Turkey that became operational in 2012.⁴⁵⁶ Beginning with USS Monterey, which was armed with SM-3 Block 1A and deployed in March 2011, U.S. ships equipped with Aegis have been making regular patrols in the Mediterranean, and four destroyers (USS Cook, USS Ross, USS Porter, and USS Carney) have been moved to Rota, Spain for the BMD mission.⁴⁵⁷

As of March 2016, there were 33 Aegis BMD combatants, i.e. 5 Ticonderoga-class cruisers (CGs) and 28 Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), in the U.S. Navy; 16 in the Pacific Fleet and 17 in the Atlantic Fleet.⁴⁵⁸ The Aegis Baseline 9 combat system includes the Mark-41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) that can

⁴⁵⁵ Luc Dini, "Air and missile defense in Europe: Building a consensus," *Europe's World*, April 1, 2015.

⁴⁵⁶ "Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense," Missile Defense Agency at the U.S. Department of Defense, at: http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html

⁴⁵⁷ "Navy to commission missile defense base in Romania," *Stars and Stripes*, October 9, 2014.

⁴⁵⁸ "Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense," Missile Defense Agency at the U.S. Department of Defense, at: http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html and Ronald O'Rourke, "Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues," Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2016, p. 7.

employ multiple types of guided missiles for offensive and defensive operations against aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, surface ships, submarines and shore targets.⁴⁵⁹

In Phase 2, the first Aegis Ashore facility is operational as of May 2016 in Deveselu, Romania, to be operated by 200 U.S. service members, government civilians, and support contractors. It includes an Aegis AN/SPY-1 Radar, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) system, and will be armed with 24 SM-3 Block IB interceptors (velocity of 3 km/s, cost between \$12-15 million per unit) for the ballistic missile coverage of Southern Europe.⁴⁶⁰

In Phase 3, by 2018, the second site of the Aegis Ashore is scheduled to become operational in Redzikowo, Poland, and will be armed with SM-3 IIA interceptors (4.5 km/s) for supporting the defense of Northern Europe.⁴⁶¹ MDA has started to implement the arrangements in Spring 2016.⁴⁶²

⁴⁵⁹ Lance M. Bacon, "BMD mission demands outstrip fleet's capabilities," *Navy Times*, April 13, 2015.

⁴⁶⁰ "Aegis Ashore," Missile Defense Agency at the U.S. Department of Defense, at: http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_ashore.html "The European Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance," Arms Control Association.

⁴⁶¹ "BMD mission demands outstrip fleet's capabilities," *Navy Times*, April 13, 2015. Beardsley, "Navy to commission missile defense base in Romania." "Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report," February 2010, U.S. Department of Defense, p. 24.

⁴⁶² Vice Admiral James D. Syring, "Ballistic Missile Defense System Update," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., January 19, 2016.

Debate on Technical and Economic Feasibility

ALTBMD has been challenged in academia and policy circles for its technical capacity, big budget, and security value-added of its mission, in countering ballistic missile threats effectively. While the Obama administration called for change, opponents of ballistic missile defense have argued that the new layered BMD system is not significantly different from the Bush administration program as it is still costly and more challenging in terms of shared command and control.

Coyle and Samson refer to the following criteria of the Clinton administration for missile defense deployment decision:

1. Whether the threat is materializing,
2. Status of technology based on flight tests and operational effectiveness,
3. Whether the system is affordable,
4. Implications on overall strategic environment and arms control objectives.⁴⁶³

ALTBMD has been criticized based on every one of these decision criteria, leading to a NATO-wide debate on the feasibility and sustainability of the EPAA:

⁴⁶³ Philip Coyle and Victoria Samson, "Missile Defense Malfunction: Why the Proposed U.S. Missile Defense in Europe Will Not Work," *Ethics and International Affairs* (Spring 2008), http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/journal/22_1/special_report/001.html

Are the missile threats to NATO near-term?

Back in 2010, the U.S. ballistic missile defense review and NATO documents identified both quantitatively and qualitatively growing, ballistic missile threats from all ranges to U.S. homeland and NATO territory from several states, particularly North Korea and Iran.⁴⁶⁴ While the homeland and regional systems are not competitive, according to recent statements by MDA officials, the emerging threat perceptions have shifted from the theater to U.S. homeland within the last couple years.⁴⁶⁵

Proponents of BMD argue that there are “too many missiles and too much uncertainty to forego defenses against them.”⁴⁶⁶ According to Ambassador Douglas Lute, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, the current missile defense deployment protects NATO territory by approximately ten fold in comparison to the interim BMD capability declared at the 2012 Chicago summit.⁴⁶⁷ He argues that with 30 countries developing ballistic missiles of increasing sophistication, NATO needs real defense that also demonstrates its ability to adapt to new security challenges.⁴⁶⁸ Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose argues that missile defense is a “hedge” against current

⁴⁶⁴ See “Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010. The ballistic missile threats were also highlighted in the December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015,” at: <http://fas.org/irp/nic/bmthreat-2015.htm>

⁴⁶⁵ Richard Matlock, Program Executive, Advanced Technology, MDA, “Future Ballistic Missile Defense Systems,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, Congressional Roundtable Discussion Series, July 28, 2015, Washington D.C.

⁴⁶⁶ Thomas Karako, “Missile Defense and Deterrence,” *Global Forecast 2016*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, pp. 99-100.

⁴⁶⁷ “Ambassador Lute’s op-ed on NATO Ballistic Missile Defense,” Embassy of the United States, Bucharest, Romania, April 28, 2015, at: <http://romania.usembassy.gov/usnato-ambassador-lute-04282015.html>

⁴⁶⁸ “Ambassador Lute’s op-ed on NATO Ballistic Missile Defense,”

and future ballistic missile threats that confront the US and its allies, and supports several other defense strategic goals.⁴⁶⁹ Ivo Daalder points to the shift from “theater” to “territorial” missile defense, as now NATO not only protects deployed forces in theater, but also populations and territory as part of collective defense.⁴⁷⁰ Hence, the role of BMD in extended deterrence is emphasized as part of a defensive system, as seen by NATO’s burden-sharing principle and US-Japan cooperation on Aegis platforms.⁴⁷¹ U.S. officials also point to US-GCC cooperation as a strategic imperative to create a Middle East-wide BMD early warning architecture to enhance the NATO system.⁴⁷² However, there is no announced command and control structure that connects the GCC BMD architecture to the NATO grid.

NATO policy highlights that “the proliferation of these (*missile*) capabilities does not necessarily mean an immediate intent to attack NATO, but it does mean that the Alliance has a responsibility to take this into account as part of its core task of collective defense.”⁴⁷³ Although there is still no consensus on how immediate the missile threats are, Luc Dini argues that the Syria crisis demonstrates the missile threat on a daily basis, showing that there is no “taboo” in using them, i.e. more than

⁴⁶⁹ Frank A. Rose, “Missile Defense as a Hedge,” Remarks at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs Conference on Reviving Nuclear Disarmament, Berlin, Germany, June 16, 2016.

⁴⁷⁰ Ivo Daalder, “Missile Defense: The NATO Perspective,” Year 2011 Multinational BMD Conference and Exhibition (AIAA), September 5, 2011, Copenhagen, Denmark, at: <http://nato.usmission.gov/daaldermda9-5-2011.html>

⁴⁷¹ James E. Cartwright, Former Vice Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Keynote Remarks: U.S. Missile Defense Plans and Priorities,” The US and Global Missile Defense 2015 Conference, Atlantic Council, June 25, 2015, Washington, D.C.

⁴⁷² Frank A. Rose, Assist. Sec, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, “Transatlantic Missile Defense Architecture” Defining the Right Threat Set,” The US and Global Missile Defense 2015 Conference, Atlantic Council, June 25, 2015, Washington, D.C.

⁴⁷³ “Ballistic missile defense,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 13, 2015.

500 short-range ballistic missiles and rockets have been fired inside Syria against opposition fighters, the regime, as well as the population.⁴⁷⁴

Meanwhile, opponents of these threat assessments argue that “the threat against which the European missile defense system is intended to provide protection is not immediate and that in any event the system currently proposed would not be effective against it.”⁴⁷⁵

Does the BMD technology work?: Technical Challenges

Both in U.S. homeland and regional ballistic missile defense, the main technical challenges are decreasing the number shots per threat while increasing the credibility and reliability of the interceptors, continuous tracking and better discrimination of the lethal objects from decoys and countermeasures. Flight tests are the best available indicators of whether interceptors can effectively engage the targets. However, there are inherent difficulties with testing, as seen in GMD and EPAA: First of all, tests are not conducted under operational conditions that are as challenging as the real world or against realistic countermeasures. Second, Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Gilmore argues that live flight tests need to be supported by ground testing and modeling simulations, as each test costs approximately \$400 million and generates terabytes of data to be analyzed, leading to

⁴⁷⁴ Luc Dini, “Air and missile defense in Europe: Building a consensus,” *Europe’s World*, April 1, 2015.

⁴⁷⁵ “Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical Experts,” East West Institute, May 2009, p. 3.

one test on average per year.⁴⁷⁶ He suggests that tests should use continuous metrics instead of binary metrics and probabilities, until there is a decrease in the number of failures and the failures are not correlated.⁴⁷⁷ In case of GMD, only 9 intercepts out of 17 attempts were successful.⁴⁷⁸ For Aegis BMD flight tests, DOD states 28 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts out of 35 attempts since January 2002.⁴⁷⁹

In October 2015, USS Ross (DDG-71), an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer deployed to Rota, Spain, carried out the first live intercept of a ballistic missile target by launching an SM-3 Block IA against a short-range Terrier Orion ballistic missile launched from northwest of Scotland, using tracking and cueing information from Dutch and Spanish frigates, while USS Sullivans, in its air defense role, launched SM-2 missiles against two inbound anti-ship cruise missiles.⁴⁸⁰ The aim of the live-fire exercise by the Maritime Theater Missile Defense Forum (US, UK, Spain, Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia) was to show the ability to conduct coalition sea-based defense against anti-ship and ballistic missile threats in an operational scenario.⁴⁸¹ While this exercise was the first exo-atmospheric intercept of a ballistic missile in European theater and first SM-3 fire outside U.S. range using non-US BMD cues on a US BMD destroyer, there remain several questions regarding the effectiveness of the integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) by EPAA.

⁴⁷⁶ Michael Gilmore, "Ballistic Missile Defense Test and Evaluation," Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) Forum, University of Maryland, November 19, 2015.

⁴⁷⁷ Michael Gilmore, "Ballistic Missile Defense Test and Evaluation,"

⁴⁷⁸ Michael Gilmore, "Ballistic Missile Defense Test and Evaluation,"

⁴⁷⁹ Ronald O'Rourke, "Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues," Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2016, p. 28.

⁴⁸⁰ "US Carries Out First Live BMD Intercept in Europe," *Defense News*, October 23, 2015.

⁴⁸¹ "US Carries Out First Live BMD Intercept in Europe,"

Shorter-range interceptors in EPAA, i.e. the SM-3, PAC-3, and THAAD have greater success than longer range interception.⁴⁸² However, in BMD, interception altitude is more crucial than range for kinetic engagement: As the range increases, the altitude that missile reaches and its speed in descent phase increase, too. Kinematic reach does not mean operational intercept capability in the real world, as the successful interception of a missile is contingent on early-warning satellite and missile tracking by radars, launch from the nearest interceptor location, and maneuver with sufficient speed to hit the target missile.⁴⁸³

Proponents of BMD argue that missile defense can never be a comprehensive and credible shield, but it changes the calculus of the potential adversaries.⁴⁸⁴ Some also argue that technological development, i.e. directed energy such as electromagnetic pulse and rail gun, could push for cost-effective manufacturing of modular, sensor-fire weapons with competitive advantage.⁴⁸⁵ While rail guns are cheaper to produce, they require tremendous amount of power per fire, and their current reliability is questionable.

From a technical perspective, Jaganath Sankaran argues that the restructured EPAA system, i.e. the cancellation of Phase 4 deployment of SM-3 IIB at Redzikowo,

⁴⁸² Steven Pifer, "The Limits of U.S. Missile Defense," *The National Interest*, March 30, 2015.

⁴⁸³ Sankaran, 2015, p. 15.

⁴⁸⁴ James E. Cartwright, Former Vice Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Keynote Remarks: U.S. Missile Defense Plans and Priorities," The US and Global Missile Defense 2015 Conference, Atlantic Council, June 25, 2015, Washington, D.C.

⁴⁸⁵ Cartwright, "Keynote Remarks: U.S. Missile Defense Plans and Priorities,"

Poland, does not impact Russia's deterrent and the system can still kinematically reach and intercept Iranian missiles.⁴⁸⁶ In his analysis, the SM-3 IB missiles deployed in Aegis ships in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegis Ashore land site at Deveselu, Romania, at 3.5 km/s burnout velocity (EPAA Phase 2) and SM-3 IIA at Redzikowo, Poland, at 4.5 km/s burnout velocity (EPAA Phase 3) can defend against most current Iranian missiles, including the Shahab-3 and future intermediate range ballistic missiles, e.g. based on the Safir space-launch vehicle, without any capability against Russian ICBMs.⁴⁸⁷

Persistent problems with the BMD systems, according to an Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense Program Overview, include an “ambiguous air picture, i.e. lack of a single integrated air picture (SIAP), and unacceptable level of confidence in Classification, Identification, and Discrimination of Aerial Objects, lower level soldiers making critical decisions without adequate information, and limited sensor/shooter choices.”⁴⁸⁸ The report also suggests that there is little coordination by the Missile Defense Agency in the “Mission Command Stovepipes.”⁴⁸⁹

There are also categorical limitations to early warning: X-band radars only have limited capability to distinguish warheads from pieces of debris or decoys. The

⁴⁸⁶ Sankaran defines kinematic reach as the ability of the interceptor to reach the same region in space at the same time as the missile. His calculation is based on *burnout velocity*, i.e. the maximum speed acquired by the interceptor indicating how far it can go, thus a strong indicator of the missile defense capability. Jaganath Sankaran, [The United States' European Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System: Defending Against Iranian Threats Without Diluting the Russian Deterrent](#), The RAND Corporation, 2015, pp. xi-xiii.

⁴⁸⁷ Sankaran, 2015, p. xii.

⁴⁸⁸ “Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense Program Overview,” Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, at: <http://www.msl.army.mil/Documents/Briefings/IAMD/AIAMD%20Web%20Brief.pdf>

⁴⁸⁹ Philip Coyle, “A New Approach for U.S. Missile Defense?” *Breaking Defense*, March 25, 2015.

current BMD sensors cannot track and identify land-attack cruise missiles due to their “low trajectories, terrain-masking capabilities, and 360 degrees of attack.”⁴⁹⁰

However, Brig. Gen. Todorov argues that the missile defense system is not a “fly catcher” that can stop every incoming missile, but it is part of a “warfighter” toolkit to outpace missile threats.⁴⁹¹

Is BMD affordable?: Financial Concerns

Another divisive aspect of BMD is the cost: In adjusted terms, U.S. appropriations since 1996 on missile defense add up to \$274 billion.⁴⁹² Critics of missile defense argue that the proclaimed budgets do not include all costs associated with the development, procurement, operation, and the maintenance of the systems, and are based on constant dollars rather than inflated dollars.⁴⁹³ Some factors contributing to the cost growth, 20-30% on average, are system integration, proper testing, i.e. extensive simulations, ground and flight tests using realistic targets and decoys.⁴⁹⁴

Another consideration is the costs of offensive ballistic missiles vs. missile defense:

In Commander of Northern American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S.

Northern Command Adm. Bill Gortney’s words; “... we are on the wrong side of the

⁴⁹⁰ Aaron Stein, “Turkey in quandary over missile threat” *Southeastern European Times*, July 5, 2011.

⁴⁹¹ Constance Baroudos, “CSIS Event: Washington Must Continue to Outpace Missile Threats,” Lexington Institute, April 13, 2015, at: <http://lexingtoninstitute.org/csis-event-washington-must-continue-to-outpace-missile-threats/>

⁴⁹² Stephen I. Schwartz, “The Real Price of Ballistic Missile Defenses,” *WMD Junction*, April 13, 2012. See also: Edward-Isaac Dove, “Missile Defense Debate Reignites,” *Politico*, April 13, 2012.

⁴⁹³ David Mosher, “Understanding the Extraordinary Cost of Missile Defense,” *Arms Control Today*, December 2000, at: http://www.rand.org/natsec_area/products/missiledefense.html

⁴⁹⁴ Mosher, 2000

cost curve. We are shooting down not very expensive rockets with very expensive rockets...”⁴⁹⁵

Since 2006, 150 to 250 million Euros (approximately \$321 million) have been spent on theater missile defense, and an additional 850 million euros will be needed to expand the system in the next decade.⁴⁹⁶ According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose, European allies plan to contribute more than \$1 billion to develop the missile shield.⁴⁹⁷ However, Menke argues that there is no tangible evidence that the allies will pay for the increasing bill in a sustained, long-term fashion, as it is based on voluntary national contributions.⁴⁹⁸ Moreover, according to a 2014 GAO study, DoD has estimated “some but not all” BMD elements in Europe for their long-term operation and support; the estimates will change for THAAD, the forward-based radar in Turkey, and for *Aegis Ashore*.⁴⁹⁹

In November 2014, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert and Army Chief of Staff Raymond Odierno wrote a letter to the then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel about the weaknesses of the BMD architecture and the necessity of a BMD strategic

⁴⁹⁵ “Department of Defense Press Briefing by Admiral Gortney in the Pentagon Briefing Room,” U.S. Department of Defense, News Transcript, April 7, 2015, at: <http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/607034>

⁴⁹⁶ “Ballistic Missile Defense,” *Media Backgrounder*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May 20, 2012, at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120520_media-backgrounder_NATO_ballistic_missile_defence_en.pdf and Gustav Lindstrom, “Europe and Missile Defense,” in *Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective* eds. Catherine M. Kelleher and Peter Dombrowski, Stanford University Press, 2015, p. 114.

⁴⁹⁷ Rachel Oswald, “Next Phases of European Missile Shield on Track: DOD,” *Global Security Newswire*, March 13, 2013, available at: <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/next-phases-european-missile-shield-track-pentagon/>

⁴⁹⁸ Harrison Menke, “Passing the Buck on Missile Defense,” *US News*, November 12, 2013.

⁴⁹⁹ “Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Address Implementation Issues and Estimate Long-term Costs for European Capabilities,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 2014.

assessment given the long-term budgetary pressures.⁵⁰⁰ “Our present strategy is unsustainable in the current environment and favors forward deployment of assets in lieu of deterrence-based options to meet contingency demands,” they wrote.⁵⁰¹ Meanwhile, under the budget pressure, the U.S. Air Force aims to balance the current production mode, lower the costs, and improve strategic communications for survivability through integrated target tactical warning, i.e. Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC), that has a price tag of \$2.2 billion.⁵⁰²

U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) aims at cost reduction in inventory, i.e. reducing the number of interceptors and credible objects to deploy interceptors against.⁵⁰³ This issue refers to the offense-defense trade in the number of interceptors per re-entry vehicle, i.e. how to move to the right side of the kinetic cost curve.

The former head of U.S. Central Command Gen. Lloyd Austin argues that the global demand for BMD far exceeds supply.⁵⁰⁴ Although the U.S. Navy’s Aegis platforms are the backbone of the EPAA, i.e. 311 SM-3 interceptors and 35 ships by 2017, the Pentagon missile defense budgets have revealed that the Navy has different prioritized given the tight budgetary atmosphere: The Missile Defense Agency is

⁵⁰⁰ “SecDef Carter: Do Missile Defense Review Urged by Greenert, Odierno,” *Breaking Defense*, May 5, 2015.

⁵⁰¹ Philip Coyle, “A New Approach for U.S. Missile Defense?” *Breaking Defense*, March 25, 2015.

⁵⁰² Samuel A. Greaves, L. Gen. USAF, Commander, Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, “Future Ballistic Missile Defense Systems,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, Congressional Roundtable Discussion Series, July 28, 2015, Washington D.C.

⁵⁰³ Richard Matlock, Program Executive, Advanced Technology, MDA, “Future Ballistic Missile Defense Systems,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, Congressional Roundtable Discussion Series, July 28, 2015, Washington D.C.

⁵⁰⁴ “BMD mission demands outstrip fleet’s capabilities,” *Navy Times*, April 13, 2015.

paying \$42.2 million over 5 years for Aegis operations and maintenance, while the U.S. Navy is not paying anything.⁵⁰⁵

Meanwhile, the missile defense vessels are in short supply. Combatant commanders requested 44 ships to meet BMD missions in 2015 and the number is supposed to go up to 77 in FY2016. According to former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jon Greenert, the Navy will not meet the gap for 33 ships, given the funding and budget cuts to eliminate \$500 million for upgrades to the Arleigh Burke destroyers, i.e. these ships will not be BMD capable and will not use the new Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air technology anytime soon.⁵⁰⁶

According to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency's Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 budget estimates, MDA requested \$559 million for procurement of 40 SM3 Block IB missiles, \$148 million for future buys between 2017-2019, \$46 million for operation and maintenance, \$173 million for SM-3 Block IIA cooperative development program with Japan, \$169 million for military construction of the Aegis Ashore site in Poland, \$464 million for THAAD procurement, \$500 million to develop, deploy, and sustain early warning radars, \$450 million to integrate additional space sensors.⁵⁰⁷ According to the President's Budget (PB) FY 2016 appropriation summary, the total amount for national and theater ballistic missile defense is \$8.1

⁵⁰⁵ Ben Loehrke, "Why the Navy is not Paying for Missile Defense," *Ploughshares Fund Issue Analysis*, August 27, 2012.

⁵⁰⁶ "BMD mission demands outstrip fleet's capabilities."

⁵⁰⁷ "Overview: Missile Defense Agency, Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Budget Estimates," January 26, 2015, at: <http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budgetfy16.pdf>

billion for FY 2016, and \$37.9 billion for FY 2016-2020.⁵⁰⁸ The completion of the Aegis Ashore in Poland will require \$630 million in FY2017 to achieve technical capability in 2018.⁵⁰⁹

It is also crucial to note that not every nation agrees on what constitutes an “expensive” defense system, demonstrated by the Polish decision to pursue a national missile defense system with a price tag of 33.6 billion Euros (approximately \$43.2 billion) over the next decade.⁵¹⁰ Proponents of the US expanding BMD to protect its allies from Russian aggression argue that costs of theater BMD for MDA is much smaller than consequences of possible escalation.⁵¹¹ Responding to the Ukraine crisis, the Polish efforts prove that BMD investments have implications on the strategic balance beyond Europe.

Implications on Strategic Relations with Russia and China

In addition to cancelling the Phase IV of EPAA, U.S. officials have adamantly opposed claims that the system will threaten Russian strategic deterrent. In reassuring Russia, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates argued that NATO would not need a

⁵⁰⁸ “PB 2016 Summary,” Missile Defense Agency, at:

http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/budgetfy16_summary.pdf

⁵⁰⁹ “MDA Request Preserves Priorities, Targets Laser Tech Development,” *Defense News*, February 11, 2016.

⁵¹⁰ Lindstrom, 2015, p. 116. The \$42.4 billion military modernization program is dubbed the “Polish Claws,” which includes a \$9 billion air and missile defense system called “Polish Shield.” “Poland Pouring Billions into Missile Systems to Challenge Balance of Power,” *Sputnik News*, February 23, 2015. Poland chose the Patriot for the system.

⁵¹¹ Michaela Dodge, “U.S. Missile Defense Policy after Russia’s Actions in Ukraine,” *Issue Brief 4177*, The Heritage Foundation, March 21, 2014, at: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/us-missile-defense-policy-after-russias-actions-in-ukraine>

BMD system if Iran didn't have a missile program.⁵¹² However, mutual mistrust remains the biggest roadblock to the strategic relationship.

Prior to the Ukraine crisis, NATO was fully committed to BMD cooperation with Russia. The NATO-Russia Council worked on a technical framework for missile defense cooperation to find a configuration that satisfied both sides' security needs against threats coming from outside of Europe.⁵¹³ In April 2012, NATO and Russia held a computer-assisted missile defense exercise, but all cooperation was suspended in the aftermath of April 2014.⁵¹⁴

Defenders of BMD argue that Russia's bellicose actions in Crimea and Ukraine have demonstrated a threat that requires the U.S. to protect itself and its allies by expanding missile defense.⁵¹⁵ However, opponents of NATO BMD argue that it undermines security assurances in security relations. For Russia and China, ballistic missile defense is a symbolic issue. They also believe that the US is unlikely to utilize these systems in a stand-alone mission, but that they could be supplements to a preemptive attack. Engdahl called the NATO BMD deployment at the frontline as "an atomic version of Russian Roulette" that provoked Moscow and also led to the Russian deployment of Iskander missiles among other reasons.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹² Jim Garamone, "Ballistic Missile Defense Efforts Tied to Iran, Gates Says," February 19, 2009, at: <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=53158>

⁵¹³ Ivo Daalder, "Missile Defense: The NATO Perspective,"

⁵¹⁴ "Ballistic missile defense," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 13, 2015.

⁵¹⁵ Michaela Dodge, "U.S. Missile Defense Policy After Russia's Actions in Ukraine," *Issue Brief*, The Heritage Foundation, March 21, 2014, no. 4177, pp. 1-2.

⁵¹⁶ William Engdahl, "Washington plays Russian roulette with missile defense," *RT*, December 26, 2013.

Selection of Romania and Poland are of special concern to Russia due to geographical proximity. In response, Russia has announced that its strategic missile program has the capability to neutralize the new missile shields.⁵¹⁷ Thus, missile defense is criticized to be adversarial and against strategic arms control cooperation and destabilizing deterrence. Sea-based interceptors have been considered to be less threatening and less problematic for Russian Strategic Rocket Forces than ground and air-based capabilities. But Wright and Gronlund argue that using the ship-based missile defense system can still be of concern to Russia and China.⁵¹⁸

The Russian officials have continuously stated that the new missile defense system is a signal of continued lack of progress in Russia-NATO dialogue and not taking Russian interests and concerns into consideration as an equal partner in protection of Europe from missile threats.⁵¹⁹ Russia has emphasized that there is need for a legally-binding assurance that the missile defense system will not be directed at Russian strategic nuclear forces, a suggestion not welcome by the US and remains as an outstanding issue.

Beyond the US-Russia strategic dynamics, regional BMD capabilities alter regional deterrence architectures, as well as the political and military goals of both sides’

⁵¹⁷ “U.S. missile defense site in Romania starts up, angering Russia,” *Defense News*, December 17, 2015.

⁵¹⁸ David Wright and Lisbeth Gronlund, “Technical flaws in the Obama missile defense plan,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 23, 2009.

⁵¹⁹ “Russian Foreign Ministry Comments on Turkey’s Announcement to Host a US-Designed Radar for US and NATO Missile Defense,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, September 2, 2011, at: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/4D551208C76CDB36C325790000403D14

respective allies.⁵²⁰ As Woolf argues, tensions arise when there is a discrepancy among the technologies needed to defend the theater, war-fighting needs of the allied commanders, and the political needs of allies and partners.⁵²¹ Moreover, some European nations have expressed concerns over unintended consequences of the BMD debate on European security, i.e. failure of international treaties, Russian countermeasures, and greater arsenals of short to intermediate-range missiles.⁵²² It is also not clear whether bilateral negotiations with the US, such as the U.S.-Romanian BMD Agreement of 2011, create a discrepancy with the NATO framework and European foreign policies not to alienate Russia.⁵²³

While the US aims to reassure the allies that effective NATO BMD will protect their territory against regional ballistic missile threats, under some circumstances additional systems such as the THAAD batteries are required for coverage. Such a case that has unique requirements due to geographical proximity and military-political considerations is Turkey. The following section will expand on Turkey's ongoing debate on national air and missile defense, as well as its role in NATO theater missile defense.

⁵²⁰ Amy F. Woolf, "Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Concepts," in Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective eds. Catherine M. Kelleher and Peter Dombrowski, Stanford University Press, 2015, p. 49.

⁵²¹ Woolf, 2015, p. 49.

⁵²² Lindstrom, 2015, pp. 111-112.

⁵²³ Lindstrom, 2015, p. 115.

Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Debate

Turkish decision makers and security experts consider air and missile defense as a test case of the credibility of NATO's commitment to Turkish security, since they define Turkey's security needs as unique in the Alliance due to its geopolitical setting. Turkish quest for air and missile defense dates back to the 1991 Gulf War, when Turkey faced Scud threats from Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Due to disagreements within NATO over the urgency of threats, in each crisis there have been serious delays in the dispatch of Patriot systems for Turkish use. These delays have led to claim that Turkey can not entirely depend on NATO and needs to develop its national air and missile defense capabilities.

This section first defines Turkey's role in ALTBMD and concerns regarding the NATO architecture, both in technical and political terms. It identifies the missile threats to Turkey from the Middle East, namely Syria and Iran, both in terms of capabilities and intentions. It then focuses on the Turkish long-range air and missile defense project (T-LORAMIDS) by analyzing the tender process; Turkey's major objectives, i.e. air and missile defense of entire Turkey, independence, and military modernization; and technical/political problems encountered in achieving these objectives, i.e. interoperability with NATO systems.

Turkish Role in NATO Air and Missile Defense

Turkey's direct role in the EPAA began in the completed Phase I by hosting the X-band early-warning radar in Kurecik. Turkey perceives being one of the few host countries in the NATO air and missile defense architecture as a privilege, i.e. a sign of adopting high technology, advanced military organization, and a strong deterrent.⁵²⁴ However, this role has been debated within Turkey in terms of the security value-added and the risks both for the Turkish decision to host an early-warning radar and the political/technical reliability of NATO guarantees for Turkey's defense against missile threats from the Middle East.

Turkish Decision to Host the Early-Warning Radar

In September 2011, Turkey agreed to station a U.S. early-warning radar system in the southeastern city of Kurecik, Malatya, which is 450 miles away from the Turkish-Iranian border. "The Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2)" is an X-band, high-resolution radar designed for ballistic missile defense that can be "coupled with layered sensors, give the BMDs a continuous tracking and discrimination capability."⁵²⁵ The radar is exclusively operated by U.S. personnel, and has a twin system at the Nevatim Air Force Base in the Negev desert in Israel.⁵²⁶ The radar transitioned into NATO operational control with NATO's declaration of

⁵²⁴ Author's interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu, MEF University, February 2, 2015, Istanbul.

⁵²⁵ Missile Defense Agency, Fact Sheet, 07/2011, at http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/an_tpy2.pdf

⁵²⁶ "US Maintains full control of the Turkish-based radar," *Defense News*, January 30, 2012.

interim capability in 2012. The US will also have an early-warning facility in Qatar as part of the Air and Missile Defense Operations Center (ADOC) that will integrate the Patriot systems, early- warning systems, and THAAD systems with Qatar's Air Operation Center.⁵²⁷

“Turkey's decision will significantly contribute to NATO's capability to provide protection for its European territory, populations and [armed] forces,” said then-NATO Secretary General Rasmussen.⁵²⁸ “Turkey's hosting of early warning radar will constitute our country's contribution to the defense system being developed in the framework of NATO's new strategic concept,” added then-Foreign Minister Davutoglu.⁵²⁹ However, it is evident that Turkey hopes to gain broader security cooperation by hosting the radar. Egeli and Guvenc argue that Turkey's participation to the NATO BMD architecture is an indicator of Turkey's future in the Western security community, i.e. continuation of valuing NATO membership despite “relentless pursuit of autonomy” especially at the regional level.⁵³⁰

The role of the X-band radar in Kurecik is detecting the launch of a ballistic missile from the Middle East, transferring the information to the U.S. SM-3 interceptors to hit the missile mid-flight. For robust defense, forward-based large radars in proximity to the origin of the missile are required, as the sea-based and land-based interceptors

⁵²⁷ “Raytheon awarded \$2.4 billion contract to provide the State of Qatar with Patriot Air and Missile Defense System,” Raytheon, December 22, 2014, at:

<http://investor.raytheon.com/mobile.view?c=84193&v=203&d=1&id=2001514>

⁵²⁸ “Turkey's role in NATO missile-defense annoys Iran,” *Today's Zaman*, September 5, 2011.

⁵²⁹ “Turkey's role in NATO missile-defense annoys Iran,”

⁵³⁰ Sitki Egeli and Serhat Guvenc, “NATO'nun Fuze Savunma Sistemi ve Turkiye,” *Ortadogu Analiz*, Nisan 2012, Vol. 4, No. 40, p. 19.

launch 100 seconds after the ballistic missile detection by the sensors.⁵³¹ The X-band radar is the first chain loop in the system to transfer information to the interceptors, and has to be located at an optimum distance from the target. Proximity of Kurecik to the Middle East provides an advantage to the NATO system in a triangulation of assets with the Israeli and GCC radars. Interestingly, both Turkey and Israel deny that they are part of the Middle East, while insisting that they are key to the security architecture in the region.

Establishing each radar system costs approximately \$200 million to the US.⁵³² In addition to hosting the radar, Turkey's ASELSAN provides system engineering to the improvement of NATO ballistic missile defense and contributes to air defense projects in Poland and Romania.⁵³³ However, despite Turkish demands, the future role of Turkey within the missile defense system is uncertain and a Turkish role for the command and control of the radar have not been addressed.

The main concerns that Turkey had with hosting the radar were naming Iran as a threat, the U.S. command and control not allowing any Turkish influence, whether the missile shield would cover entire Turkish territory, and data sharing with non-NATO countries, i.e. Israel.⁵³⁴ While there are contradictory reports on whether the US has

⁵³¹ "Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Science and Technology Issues of Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility," September 2011, at: <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA552472.pdf>

⁵³² "Raytheon's Tippy Two Radar Gets Back in the Budget," *Breaking Defense*, March 15, 2013.

⁵³³ "ASELSAN Contributes to Air Defense of Europe," ASELSAN, *Press Room*, August 13, 2015, at: <http://www.aselsan.com.tr/en-us/press-room/news/Pages/ASELSANContributestoAirDefenceofEurope20150813.aspx>

⁵³⁴ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "NATO'nun Balistik Fuze Savunma Sistemi ve Turkiye," *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, vol. 9, no. 34, Summer 2012, pp. 193-195. "Erdogan: Fuze kalkani butonuna kim basacak?" *Vatan*, November 11, 2010.

agreed not to share data with Israel, then NATO General Secretary Rasmussen had stated that data would not be shared with third countries directly.⁵³⁵ Meanwhile, Kibaroglu argues that the degree of divergence between Turkey and NATO was not as wide as it was reflected in the media coverage.⁵³⁶ Turkish authorities considered the radar as a sophisticated NATO defense capability that would be a strategic asset for Turkey's protection against "actual and potential" threats from its neighborhood.⁵³⁷ While they put the decision to host the radar as the only "sacrifice" Turkey made for defensive purposes, Egeli and Guvenc argue that in the future phases of the EPAA, Turkey might face strategic choices, especially in terms of the relations with Russia if there were a decision to deploy BMD systems in the Black Sea.⁵³⁸ In particular, if deployment of a THAAD system in southeast Turkey, where there are uncovered areas, becomes a necessity, Turkish government's former explanations for the Kurecik radar becomes void.⁵³⁹

Skeptics of Turkish involvement in the missile defense system argued about deterioration of security cooperation with Russia in the Black Sea and warned about naming Turkey's neighbors, i.e. Iran and Syria, as threats.⁵⁴⁰ The missile shield was perceived as a U.S. project disguised under NATO for political acceptability and

⁵³⁵ Aaron Stein, "Turkey Embraces Missile Defense," *EDAM Nonproliferation Policy Briefs*, November 2012/5, p. 6.

⁵³⁶ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Between Allies and Rivals: Turkey, Nuclear Weapons, and BMD," *Proliferation Papers*, no. 49, 2014, p. 28.

⁵³⁷ Kibaroglu, 2014, p. 30.

⁵³⁸ Sitki Egeli and Serhat Guvenc, "NATO'nun Fuze Savunma Sistemi ve Turkiye," *Ortadogu Analiz*, Nisan 2012, Vol. 4, No. 40, p. 28.

⁵³⁹ Sitki Egeli, "Fuze Tehdidi ve NATO Fuze Kalkani: Turkiye Acisindan Bir Degerlendirme", *Uluslararası Iliskiler*, Vol.10, No. 40 (Winter 2014), pp. 39-73.

⁵⁴⁰ Kuloglu, 2010, p. 62.

reduced costs.⁵⁴¹ Then main opposition party CHP criticized the decision by arguing that the radar would make Turkey a target and party to a serious polarization, as it was not clear whether this compromise in foreign policy would be matched by comprehensive coverage under the missile shield.⁵⁴² However, no further discussion took place: In response to a parliamentary question for written answer regarding the status of the radar in Kurecik in November 2012, then foreign minister Davutoglu stated that the technical specifications of the radar and the missile shield agreement with NATO were matters of national security, hence secret.⁵⁴³

Despite the Turkish government's reticence, there is open source information on the radar through U.S. sources. The radar is commanded from Ramstein Air Base in Germany, including a Turkish general and his team at the Geilenkirchen base in Germany that manages the whole BMD system, and the local control is at the 2nd Tactical Air Command in Diyarbakir, Turkey.⁵⁴⁴ The U.S. Army established and operates the Kurecik radar, allocating roughly \$21 million per year.⁵⁴⁵ The U.S. army personnel stated that, since the Turkish military had abandoned the site in the

⁵⁴¹ Serdar Erdurmaz, "Fuze Kalkani Sistemi ve Turkiye: ABD Tek Basina Gerceklestiremedigi Zorlamayi NATO Kanaliyla mi Kabul Ettirecek?" *Guvenlik Arastirmalari*, October 13, 2010, at: <http://www.turksam.org/tr/makale-detay/356-fuze-kalkani-sistemi-ve-turkiye-abd-tek-basina-gerceklestiremedigi-zorlamayi-nato-kanaliyla-mi-kabul-ettirecek>. Armagan Kuloglu, "Fuze Savunma Sistemi Projesi ve Turkiye," *Ortadogu Analiz*, November 2010, Vol. 2, No. 23, p. 62.

⁵⁴² Author's interview with Osman Faruk Logoglu, Member of the Parliament, Republican People's Party (CHP), former Turkish Ambassador to the US, February 6, 2015, Ankara. "The missile defense system is coming to the General Assembly," in Turkish *CNNTurk*, October 11, 2011.

⁵⁴³ "Mersin Milletvekili Sayin Ali Riza Ozturk'un 7/8604 Sayili Yazili Soru Onergesi," T.C. Disisleri Bakanligi, NATO ve Avrupa-Atlantik Guvenlik ve Savunma Isleri Genel Mudur Yardimciligi, November 2, 2012.

⁵⁴⁴ "Malatya Radar System to be Commanded from Ramstein," *Hurriyet Daily News*, February 4, 2012.

⁵⁴⁵ Steven J. Whitmore and John R. Deni, NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach: The Implications of Burden Sharing and the Underappreciated Role of the U.S. Army, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, October 2013, pp. 29,31.

“desolate expanse,” they had to build the systems in “deplorable conditions” with nonfunctional infrastructure and inadequate electrical lines. According to a U.S. Department of Defense civilian advisory panel, the Defense Science Board, the TPY-2 land-based radar’s tracking range is not adequate for a robust defense of Alliance territory and increase in sensitivity is required, as well as extremely high speed data sharing among multiple sensors in effective discrimination.⁵⁴⁶ The authors argue that the AN/TPY-2 radar system was chosen in part because it has limited ability to see into the Russian airspace.⁵⁴⁷

Can Turkey Rely on NATO for Air and Missile Defense? Expectations vs. Reality

As the lead U.S. negotiator for missile defense basing agreements in Turkey, Romania, and Poland, Assistant Secretary Frank Rose states, NATO encourages the Allies to develop and contribute their own national capabilities, i.e. early-warning missile defense capable radars, in addition to basing support.⁵⁴⁸ However, the key to regional missile defense cooperation is interoperability to complement and supplement U.S. systems. While the US is working toward a region-wide BMD capability, one of its key allies, Turkey is questioning its national air and missile

⁵⁴⁶ Whitmore and Deni, 2013, p. 12.

⁵⁴⁷ Whitmore and Deni, 2013, p. 43. The forward based X-band (FBX) radar has a 9.2 m² antenna, much smaller than the European midcourse radar (EMR) in Czech Republic (105 m² antenna) and the low-frequency (UHF) early warning radar at Fylingdales, England (750 m² antenna.) “Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical Experts,” East West Institute, May 2009, p. 12.

⁵⁴⁸ “Multinational Ballistic Missile Defense Conference,” Prepared Remarks by Frank A. Rose, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, Seville, Spain, October 6, 2015, at: <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/248035.htm>

defense and role in the NATO architecture. Turkey has political and technical concerns about NATO guarantees against missile threats from the Middle East, leading some to argue that Turkey needs to develop indigenous air and missile defense capability beyond NATO in response to contingencies.

Technical Problems with Coverage

In Turkey, there is very little attention paid to the technical limitations of air and ballistic missile defense in terms of reliability and effectiveness. The discussion has focused instead on Turkey's inclusion in NATO's plans, meaning whether the Alliance is entirely committed to Turkish security.

As official policy, Ankara has been negotiating concrete security guarantees that all of Turkey will be protected by the NATO missile shield. Perceiving NATO first as a political organization then a military alliance, for Turkish policymakers, it is "unacceptable" that the entire Turkish territory is not covered.⁵⁴⁹ However, given the trajectory of ballistic missiles and Turkey's geographical proximity to the region, the existing architecture doesn't provide defense to entire Turkish territory, i.e. the eastern provinces.⁵⁵⁰ Toward this end, U.S., German, Dutch, and Spanish Patriot surface-to-air missile defense systems have been deployed in Kahramanmaraş,

⁵⁴⁹ Author's interview with an executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015.

⁵⁵⁰ M.K. Kaya, "How much security will NATO's missile defense shield provide for Turkey?" *Turkey Analyst*, vol. 5, no.2, January 23, 2012, available at: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120123A.html>

Gaziantep, and Adana through NATO force generation.⁵⁵¹ The batteries are modular and highly mobile, their radar can discriminate within an approximately 100 km-range, and most importantly the systems have operational history in the battlefield. However, Patriot systems have limited range of protection against missile threats up to 600 km range and with a low intercept altitude. One PAC battery can protect approximately 20 km along the 822 km-long Turkey-Syria border, leading to a Turkish concern about the number of NATO batteries deployed.⁵⁵² The PAC-3 does not provide any defense against artillery shells or short-range rockets. Hence, the southern provinces of Hatay have been constantly hit by Syrian forces throughout the conflict. Another major Turkish critique is that the selection of sites shows a priority in protection of Incirlik and Kurecik, rather than Turkish cities.⁵⁵³

According to the National Academies of Sciences study on ballistic missile defense, Turkey needs a separate defense against shorter-range threats through Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) or equivalent systems.⁵⁵⁴ The SM-3 interceptor engages the target midcourse – at the aperture of the missile’s ballistic flight in space – and in the terminal phase – atmospheric reentry – and cannot engage the missile launched from the Middle East if it targets eastern Turkey due to the very short attack trajectory.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵¹ See Appendix 3 for the timeline and maps.

⁵⁵² Author’s interview with a former executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015, Ankara.

⁵⁵³ “Patriotlar neyi koruyor?” *Al Jazeera Turk*, March 26, 2015.

⁵⁵⁴ “Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (2012)” The National Academies Press, at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13189

⁵⁵⁵ “A System of Elements,” Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, at: <http://www.mda.mil/system/elements.html>

As an alternative coverage scenario, a February 2009 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report explored having 10 SM-3 Block IIA land-based interceptors at the Incirlik AB and Ramstein AB in Germany each, using the same Vertical Launch System that is used to launch interceptors on Aegis ships and two transportable forward-based radars in Azerbaijan and Qatar.⁵⁵⁶ Authors of the study argued that for approximately same costs as the current plan, this option would provide “nearly complete coverage of the parts of Europe within range of near-term Iranian threats.”⁵⁵⁷ However MDA’s plan to choose Romania and Poland instead left parts of southeastern Europe and Turkey uncovered, unless additional resources, e.g. THAAD or MEADS batteries, were added to expand coverage and area defense.

Addressing these coverage issues, Sankaran simulates an Iranian missile attack with current capabilities against two U.S. bases in Turkey: First is the Incirlik AB at a 964-km distance to the launch site of a *Shahab-3* in Tabriz, reached by the EPAA SM-3 IB interceptors (3.5 km/s burnout velocity) launched from the Eastern Mediterranean Sea with a time delay of 100 seconds needed for tracking the target missile and pinpointing the location for intercept.⁵⁵⁸ Second is the Izmir AB at a 16700-km distance to Tabriz, reached by the EPAA SM-3 IB interceptors launched from Deveselu, Romania with 100 seconds delay.⁵⁵⁹ Sankaran concludes that, in both cases, assuming perfect information, minimum energy trajectory, and no

⁵⁵⁶ “Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe,” Congressional Budget Office, February 2009, p. 19.

⁵⁵⁷ “Options for Deploying Missile Defenses in Europe,”

⁵⁵⁸ Sankaran, 2015, p. 16.

⁵⁵⁹ Sankaran, 2015, p. 17.

countermeasures, intercept is kinematically possible.⁵⁶⁰ However, relaxing these assumptions would lead to questionable success in intercepts. Meanwhile, an EPAA SM-3 IB interceptor launched from Deveselu would not be able to defend against a missile attack on Incirlik AB, even with no time delay; whereas an Aegis ship in the Eastern Mediterranean would reach the *Shahab-3* targeting Izmir AB with 100 seconds delay.⁵⁶¹

For Turkey's entire southeastern border, approximately 4 THAAD systems would be required.⁵⁶² Phase II in EPAA suggests that THAAD is going to be introduced as "potential surge" for enhanced medium-range missile defense for areas out of coverage.⁵⁶³ However, as the US has many more critical strategic assets, i.e. military bases in the Gulf countries, and can protect the Incirlik AB from the sea, it is unlikely that a THAAD system would be permanently stationed in Eastern Turkey.⁵⁶⁴ THAAD could be temporarily deployed, as it was the case in UAE. If the deployment of BMD systems is a matter of urgency, it could be done in as short as 48 hours.⁵⁶⁵ However, if NATO provides the systems to Turkey, there is concern in Ankara that there can be

⁵⁶⁰ Sankaran, 2015, pp. 19-20.

⁵⁶¹ Sankaran, 2015, pp. 21-22.

⁵⁶² Author's interview with a former executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015, Ankara.

⁵⁶³ RDML Randall M. Hendrickson, "European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Ballistic Missile Defense: A Technical Overview, Missile Defense Agency, May 3-4, 2012, at: <http://photos.state.gov/libraries/russia/231771/PDFs/EPAA%20Technical%20Overview%20ENG.pdf>

⁵⁶⁴ The US has a THAAD system in Guam against threats from North Korea, one in the Gulf, and three in strategic reserve. Author's interview with a former executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM)

⁵⁶⁵ Author's interview with a former executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM),

“strings attached,” i.e. making political demands from Turkey, leading to the independence argument.⁵⁶⁶

Political Concerns

There have been concerns in Turkey, relating the Patriot deployment at the Turkish-Syrian border and recent divergences of interest between the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS and Turkey. While there is no concrete evidence and U.S. officials have underlined their commitment to Turkish security, not having the national missile defense capability, the withdrawal of U.S. and German Patriots has led to Turkish perception of “imposed” political messages on Turkey that ISIS is the number one threat in Syria and Turkey should be prepared for all forms of cooperation, including with the Assad regime.⁵⁶⁷

Initially, Turkey requested the deployment of NATO missile defenses after Syria shot down a Turkish RF-4E in June 2012 and a stray artillery shell killed 5 civilians in the border town of Akcakale later that year.⁵⁶⁸ NATO’s Active Fence mission began in January-February 2013 in Turkish cities of Gaziantep, Kahramanmaras, and Adana.⁵⁶⁹ The US, Germany, Netherlands, and most recently Spain provided the

⁵⁶⁶ Author’s interview with a former executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM),

⁵⁶⁷ Metin Gurcan, “Patriot’lerin Turkiye’den cekilisi bize ne soyluyor?” *Al Jazeera Turk*, August 26, 2015.

⁵⁶⁸ Metin Gurcan, “Patriot’lerin Turkiye’den cekilisi bize ne soyluyor?”

⁵⁶⁹ Metin Gurcan, “Patriot’lerin Turkiye’den cekilisi bize ne soyluyor?”

Patriot missiles for protection of the Turkish-Syrian border, but the deployment was criticized due to the delays in the arrival of the batteries.

In August 2015, the German and U.S. governments announced that the Patriot batteries and soldiers deployed in Turkey would not be renewed by the end of their mandate in 2016.⁵⁷⁰ The joint Turkish-U.S. statement underlined the U.S. commitment to support Turkish air and missile defense, and the need for “critical modernization upgrades” to the Patriot assets, prepared to return “within one week if needed.”⁵⁷¹ While Spain is the only country left in the NATO mission in Turkey, the U.S. decision to withdraw surprised both Turkish and Spanish officials.⁵⁷² In fact, Spanish Ministry of Defense stated that they were given no “forewarning” of the U.S. and German decision and would approach NATO for further clarification.⁵⁷³ By the end of 2015, Spain decided to extend its participation in the Active Fence mission until December 2016 with a PAC-2 unit consisting of six launchers of 4 missiles near the Adana airport.⁵⁷⁴

Opponents of reliance on NATO argue that in the Middle East conflicts that Turkey requested NATO air and missile defense systems, the dependency functioned as a solidarity test.⁵⁷⁵ Turkey faced political hesitation leading to delay in the decision to

⁵⁷⁰ “US, Germany to Withdraw Patriots from Turkey,” *Defense News*, August 17, 2015.

⁵⁷¹ “US to Withdraw Patriot Missiles from Turkey,” *Defense News*, August 17, 2015.

⁵⁷² “NATO in consultation, no replacement of German Patriots in Turkey yet,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, August 17, 2015.

⁵⁷³ “Spain surprised by US/German Patriot withdrawal from Turkey,” *IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly*, August 17, 2015.

⁵⁷⁴ “Spain to Stay with Patriots in Turkey, Italy Could Deploy Samp/T Missiles,” *Defense News*, December 28, 2015.

⁵⁷⁵ Author’s interview with Emeritus Professor Ali Karaosmanoglu, January 28, 2015, Istanbul.

send these systems, leading to loss of trust.⁵⁷⁶ Egeli argues that, beyond air power, Turkey's complete reliance on external sources for air and missile defense against various threats such as cruise and ballistic missiles, UAVs, and aircraft is unacceptable.⁵⁷⁷ The alternatives, i.e. the national procurement of these systems, will be discussed in the following section on Turkey's pursuit of air and missile defense.

Proponents of reliance on NATO argue that Turkey would not be left alone in case of a missile attack. Under the NATO umbrella, Turkey is part of collective defense. As long as NATO is involved and committed to deployment of air and missile defenses, the common mechanism handles the force generation, i.e. if PAC systems will be sent to Turkey. Spain or Netherlands do not decide themselves to provide the systems because they have close relations with Turkey, but because it is a common NATO decision.⁵⁷⁸ While planning is joint, pre-delegation issues remain on the operational side.

To this end, both NATO and the US have been trying to reassure Turkey. Following the Russian military buildup in Syria, Turkish officials once again urged NATO not to withdraw the Patriot batteries from southeastern Turkey.⁵⁷⁹ However, the US withdrawal of the Patriot batteries deployed at the Gaziantep 5th Armored Brigade

⁵⁷⁶ Author's interview with Assist. Prof. Sebnem Udum, Hacettepe University, January 30, 2015, Ankara.

⁵⁷⁷ Dr. Sitki Egeli, "Stratejik Hava Savunma Sistemleri ve Turkiye'nin Yol Haritasi," SETA Ankara, October 25, 2015.

⁵⁷⁸ Author's interview with a high ranking military officer at the NATO Rapid Deployable Turkish Corps Headquarters at 3rd Turkish Corps, February 10, 2015, Istanbul.

⁵⁷⁹ "Turkey urges NATO to keep up its Patriot defenses," *Hurriyet Daily News*, October 8, 2015.

Command began early October 2015.⁵⁸⁰ According to B. Gen. Marc Sasseville, U.S. Defense Attaché to Turkey, the Patriot mission will be taken over by the Aegis naval assets in the Mediterranean and Turkey's war reserves will be expanded in the anti-ISIS fight.⁵⁸¹ In order to prove this commitment, the US and Turkish Naval Forces held a joint training called the "Eastern Mediterranean Sea Exercise" in November 2015, including BMD-equipped USS Donald Cook, submarines, surface and air defense units.⁵⁸² In addition, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) approved of 1000 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) worth \$70 million export to Turkey to be used on guidance kits and hard target penetrator warheads.⁵⁸³ In November 2015, the US deployed six F-15C air-to-air combat aircraft to the Incirlik AB, to join other U.S. aerial assets, i.e. A-10 attack aircraft, deployed at the base to fight against ISIS.⁵⁸⁴ While these deployments were temporary and were withdrawn in December 2015, the U.S. intention was to demonstrate to Turkish officials that their requests for air-to-air support can be fulfilled on short notice, when need be, i.e. no capability gap.

Following the airspace conflict between Turkey and Russia in November 2015, explained in the following section, the NATO foreign ministers agreed on a Turkish air defense package to enhance air and naval presence, including maritime patrol aircraft, and an AWACS platform in the eastern Mediterranean provided by German

⁵⁸⁰ "US Begins Removing Patriot Missiles from Turkey," *Defense News*, October 11, 2015.

⁵⁸¹ Brigadier General Marc H. Sasseville, "Alliance and Standing Together Against Regional Threats," Defense and Security Affairs Panel, 34th Annual U.S.-Turkey Relations Conference, American Turkish Council, Washington D.C., September 28, 2015.

⁵⁸² "US destroyer completes exercise with Turkish Navy," *Hurriyet Daily News*, November 8, 2015.

⁵⁸³ "US approves JDAM export to Turkey," *IHS Jane's Defense Weekly*, October 29, 2015.

⁵⁸⁴ "US Deploys Six F-15Cs to Turkish Base," *Defense News*, November 9, 2015.

and Danish ships.⁵⁸⁵ The new anti-missile defense NATO architecture is expected to include an extra deployment of Italian SAMP/T in Turkey and an Arleigh Burke class U.S. ship to be deployed in the Black Sea.⁵⁸⁶

While NATO underlines its commitment to Turkish security by readily-deployable forces, it is clear that there is disagreement between NATO and Turkey on the types of threats and their urgency, such as PKK terrorism vs. ISIS, Russian jets or missiles flying from Syria, as well as on the measures to address these threats. The disagreement is a reflection of the discrepancy between Turkey's objectives and problems in pursuit of national air and missile defense, to be explored in the next section.

Evaluating the Aerial and Missile Threats: Capabilities and Intentions

Aerial threats arising from delivery systems cover a broad spectrum of ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced guided rockets, artillery and mortars, anti-ship missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles, to be addressed by kinetic and non-kinetic, i.e. directed energy, means.⁵⁸⁷ The complexity of the wide range of systems require an integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) approach than BMD. However, from a stability-instability paradox point of view; missile defense incentivizes adversaries to build

⁵⁸⁵ "NATO agrees Turkey air defense package, seeks 'predictability,'" *Reuters*, December 18, 2015.

⁵⁸⁶ "Spain to Stay with Patriots in Turkey, Italy Could Deploy Samp/T Missiles," *Defense News*, December 28, 2015.

⁵⁸⁷ Thomas Karako, "Missile Defense and Deterrence," *Global Forecast 2016*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, pp. 99-100.

more missiles: To overcome interceptors, states would expand their arsenal and attack with multiple missiles.

Turkey's calculus on missile threats is based on the wide range of capabilities state and non-state actors have in the Middle East. Some of these threats, such as the Iraqi arsenal of Scud missiles, have been dismantled following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Turkey's definition of the T-LORAMIDS project as 70% air defense and 30% ballistic missile defense reflects Turkey's perceptions in response to missile capabilities in its neighborhood: The system is only intended to address Turkey's regional competitors' systems, and not Israeli or Russian missiles.

Russia constitutes a special case, since Turkey would not try to or be able to counter Russia's huge nuclear arsenal with a national missile defense system. The current NATO ballistic missile defense architecture is not intended to counter Russian missiles, either. However, it is worth mentioning that Russia deployed SS-26 Iskander missiles in Gyumri, Armenia in 2013, threatening eastern provinces of Turkey within the 400 km range.⁵⁸⁸ The Russian nuclear posture, military modernization, and aggression in Ukraine all contribute to Turkey's increased threat perception of Russia.⁵⁸⁹ The height of these concerns have been brought along with the November 2015 Turkish downing of a Russian Su-24 bomber along the Syrian-Turkish border due to airspace violation, the major disagreements in the fight against ISIS and the future of Syria, and the dramatic deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations. In the

⁵⁸⁸ Kasapoglu, 2014, p. 9.

⁵⁸⁹ Kasapoglu, 2014, p. 10.

case of the downing of the Russian jet, Turkish F-16s performing air combat patrolling shot down the Russian Su-24 by air-to-air missiles. While the Turkish side insisted that they repeatedly warned the plane on the emergency channel, the Russian side claimed that the jet was over Syrian territory when it was hit. As a response, Russia deployed S-400 anti-aircraft missiles at the Hmeimim airbase in Syria and suspended the reciprocal visa-free regime with Turkey, in addition to banning imports from Turkey.⁵⁹⁰ In February 2016, Turkey barred a Russian spy plane from performing an Open Skies Treaty over-flight.⁵⁹¹ Turkish officials have been insisting that Russia has consistently violated Turkish airspace despite their repeated warnings. However, it is clear that the downing of the jet significantly deteriorated Turkish security in Syria and destabilized its relations with Russia.

While the threat evaluation requires the consideration of both capabilities and intentions, heavy involvement of external actors such as Russia and the complexity of regional political relations make these “intentions” less predictable. Hence, Turkish decision makers prioritize a capabilities approach in their threat calculus, particularly toward Iranian and Syrian missile capabilities.

Iran's Missile Program

Iran has the largest and most diverse range of missile capabilities in the Middle East that can virtually target any critical asset in Turkey, including Istanbul, Ankara, U.S.

⁵⁹⁰ “Turkey’s downing of Russian warplane- what we know,” *BBC News*, December 1, 2015.

⁵⁹¹ “Dangerous precedent: Turkey denies Russian observation flight along Syrian border,” *RT*, February 3, 2016.

and NATO bases. These capabilities include short-range artillery rockets, which can be used in irregular warfare, transferred to non-state or proxy actors such as Hezbollah, and have strategic impact to support ground forces without close air support.⁵⁹²

The main missile threats from Iran to Turkey are the SRBMSs and MRBMs. Iran has around 100 SRBM launchers that can be reloaded and fewer than 50 silo and mobile MRBM launchers.⁵⁹³ The Iranian inventory in the short range missiles includes the Zelzal family (150-250 km), Fateh-110 (200-300 km), the Scud-B based Shahab-1 (350 km), Scud-C based Shahab-2 (750 km) and its upgrade Qiam-1 (700-800 km).⁵⁹⁴ Iran's tactical ballistic missiles could be effective in an engagement with Turkish land forces close to the border; yet the launches would be convenient targets for the Turkish Air Force.⁵⁹⁵

In the medium to longer range, the Iranian inventory includes the modifications of the North Korean No Dong missiles, i.e. silo-based and road-mobile Shahab-3 (around 1300 km), flight tests of its modification, i.e. a longer range Ghadir-1 (around 1600 km, also referred as Kavoshgar or Shahab-3M), and the solid-propellant two-stage

⁵⁹² Key types are *Oghab* (35-45 km), *Fajr 3* (43 km), and *Fajr 5* (75-80 km). Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran's Rocket and Missile Forces and Strategic Options, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), October 7, 2014, pp. ii-iii.

⁵⁹³ Paul K. Kerr, Steven A. Hildreth, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, "Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile Nuclear Cooperation," Congressional Research Service, May 11, 2015, pp. 2-3.

⁵⁹⁴ Cordesman, 2014, pp. ii.

⁵⁹⁵ Kasapoglu, 2014, p. 19.

Sajjill-2, or Ashura that may deliver a 750 kg warhead to a range about 2000 km.⁵⁹⁶ Iran is estimated to have 50 operational Shahab-3 launchers.⁵⁹⁷ Developmental systems include the Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 (3000-5000 km).⁵⁹⁸ Iran is estimated to have 50 operational Shahab-3 launchers.⁵⁹⁹ By 2020s, Tehran could have the capability to relocate the road-mobile Sajjill-2 for preventive targeting and its reduced launch-cycle would undermine early-warning measures.⁶⁰⁰

Iran also reversed engineered and manufactured copies of the Chinese C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs,) and led to concerns that it could convert the HY-2 Silkworm ASCMs into longer-range land attack systems.⁶⁰¹ As the threat of land-attack cruise missiles is on the rise, Turkey cannot defend against the Iranian cruise missiles without a more sophisticated system with airborne sensors. In March 2015, there were media reports that Iran domestically produced the long-range land-attack cruise missile dubbed Soumar, based on the Russian Kh-55 with a 2000 km range.⁶⁰²

Iran conducts regular flight tests and exercises to demonstrate its missile capabilities.

In July 2011, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) conducted a ten-day live-

⁵⁹⁶ John Chipman, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment-Press Statement," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 10, 2010, at:

<http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/irans-ballistic-missile-capabilities/press-statement/>

⁵⁹⁷ "Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat," National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2013, pp. 6-17.

⁵⁹⁸ Cordesman, 2014, p. iv.

⁵⁹⁹ "Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat," National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2013, pp. 6-17.

⁶⁰⁰ Kasapoglu, 2014, p. 19.

⁶⁰¹ Dennis M. Gormley, "Dealing with the Threat of Cruise Missiles," *Adelphi* Paper 339, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, September 13, 2013, p. 27.

⁶⁰² "Iran Produces First Long-Range Cruise Missile," *Aerospace Daily & Defense Report*, March 14, 2015.

fire missile exercise dubbed “Great Prophet 6,” showcasing the solid-fuel Fateh-110, the Tondar, and Khalije Fars anti-ship ballistic missile, as well as the liquid-fuel Shahab-3.⁶⁰³ Iran successfully launched a liquid-propellant, two-stage Safir space launch vehicle that can be used as an intermediate-range ballistic missile, in addition to plans for a larger vehicle called Simorgh.⁶⁰⁴ During the February 2015 “Great Prophet 9” exercise, the naval wing of the IRGC implied that Iran had launched a missile from a submerged submarine.⁶⁰⁵ In August 2015, Iran unveiled Fateh-330, the upgraded, 500 km version of the Fateh-110.⁶⁰⁶ Following the formal adoption of the nuclear deal with P5+1 in October 2015, Iran test-fired a new, precision-guided ballistic missile dubbed Emad, leading to U.S. concern of violation of UNSCR 1929 and the nuclear deal.⁶⁰⁷ While the US was expecting that Iran would be launching a Simorgh space rocket into orbit, in March 2016, Iran test-fired two missiles that were thought to be the Qiam-1 and Shahab-1.⁶⁰⁸

On the air and ballistic missile defense front, in August 2015, Iran and Russia finalized a contract for early 2016 delivery of four S-300 surface-to-air missile batteries, which were initially ordered for \$800 million in 2007 but cancelled by

⁶⁰³ “Iranian Missile Messages: Reading Between the Lines of ‘Great Prophet 6,’” *Issue Briefs*, Arms Control Association, vol. 2, Issue 10, July 12, 2011.

⁶⁰⁴ Jaganath Sankaran, [The United States’ European Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense System: Defending Against Iranian Threats Without Diluting the Russian Deterrent](#), The RAND Corporation, 2015, p. 10.

⁶⁰⁵ “Iran claims to have tested ‘very special weapon’” *IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly*, March 5, 2015.

⁶⁰⁶ “Iran unveils extended range Fateh ballistic missile,” *IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly*, August 25, 2015.

⁶⁰⁷ “US to raise Iranian missile test at UN Security Council,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, October 14, 2015. The UNSC Resolution 1929, adopted in 2010, stated that “Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities.”

⁶⁰⁸ “Russia says Iran missile tests do not violate UN resolution,” *RT News*, March 30, 2016.

Moscow due to the U.N. Security Council arms embargo on Iran.⁶⁰⁹ The S-300 transfer has military implications for the region, both in terms of Iranian capability to intercept cruise and short to medium-range ballistic missiles and potential transfer to Damascus.⁶¹⁰

However, there are also technical limitations to Iran's missile capabilities. First of all, Sankaran argues that estimates of Iranian missile capabilities are very speculative, as Iran has been alleged to "mislead and misinform" regarding their missile and space launch tests to "bluster."⁶¹¹ According to Chipman, these missiles require several years of flight tests so that Iran could achieve a rapid-launch missile capable of hitting Western Europe.⁶¹² The systems lack advanced precision guidance and accuracy in GPS.⁶¹³ Elleman argues that the successful destruction of a fixed military target would require Iran to utilize a significant portion of its missile inventory.⁶¹⁴ He interprets this problem as an indicator that Iran's priority is enhancing accuracy and lethality over longer range.⁶¹⁵

While Turkey and Iran have historically had "neighborly" relations, prior to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the P5+1, Iran threatened to hit the

⁶⁰⁹ "Iran S-300 contract ready to be signed," *IHS Jane's Defense Weekly*, August 19, 2015.

⁶¹⁰ Michael Eisenstadt and Brenda Shaffer, "Russian S-300 Missiles to Iran: Groundhog Day or Game-Changer?" *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 2482*, September 4, 2015.

⁶¹¹ Sankaran, 2015, p. 13.

⁶¹² John Chipman, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment-Press Statement,"

⁶¹³ Cordesman, 2014, p. vi.

⁶¹⁴ Michael Elleman, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," *The Iran Primer*, United States Institute of Peace, at: <http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missile-program>

⁶¹⁵ "Iran Test-Fires a New, Precision-Guided Ballistic Missile," *NPR*, October 11, 2015.

Kurecik radar as a response to Turkish help to the “Zionist” regime.⁶¹⁶ In Iranian Brigadier General Hacizade’s words: “If there is an attack on Iran, our first target will be the missile shield systems in Turkey, and then we’ll turn to other targets.”⁶¹⁷ While Turkey welcomes the JCPOA, a major consideration for Turkish decision makers is the exclusion of ballistic missiles from the nuclear deal. The sanctions on the Iranian ballistic missile program are expected to be lifted within the next 8 years. The latest Iranian fire tests have led to new U.S. sanctions on the country’s ballistic missile program.

However, if Iran hit Turkey, it would be an attack on NATO and it would be against Iran’s strategic interests in regional competition. Hence, NATO membership deters a missile attack from Iran, in addition to the historical ties between the two countries, to be discussed in the next chapter. It should also be considered that Iranian missile capabilities have not developed as rapidly and successfully as once anticipated by the international community. Additionally, the Iranian commitment to impose limitations on its nuclear program by the JCPOA makes nuclear warheads much less of a concern for Turkey.

⁶¹⁶ “Iran says deployment of NATO shield in Turkey ‘inefficient’,” *ISNA*, September 22, 2011, at: <http://www.isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1853212&Lang=E>

⁶¹⁷ Karen Kaya, “Turkey-Iran Relations after the Arab Spring,” Foreign Military Studies Office, Joint Reserve Intelligence Center, September 2012, p. 8.

Syrian Rocket and Missile Capabilities

Today, Turkey's most immediate security concerns originate from both state and non-state actors along its Syrian border. Historically, Syrian acquisition of Scud missiles from the Soviet Union, their use against Israel, and the Syrian development of warheads capable of delivering chemical weapons shaped the Turkish threat perception. In 1998, Syria threatened to hit Turkey with ballistic missiles during the conflict, when Turkey demanded that Damascus expel the PKK leader Ocalan, who took refuge in Syria, and deployed armored divisions along the border.⁶¹⁸

Prior to the civil war, the Syrian regime was capable of producing approximately 30 Scud B/Cs per year. It possessed several hundred missiles with fewer than 50 launchers per each system, but was dependent on foreign assistance, i.e. Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, for the components and technology.⁶¹⁹ Assad's Syrian Arab Army has three surface-to-surface missile brigades, with a concentration of Scud variants at the 4th Armored Division for regime survival.⁶²⁰ With the SS-21 (120 km range) and M-600 (250 km range), Syria can hit the Turkish cities near the border.⁶²¹ With the Scud-C (500-650 km range) and Scud-D (600-700 km range), Damascus could hit Turkey's southeastern cities, while it could reach Ankara from Aleppo.⁶²² It also has less than 100 road-mobile SRBM launchers and solid-fuel SS-

⁶¹⁸ Sitki Egeli, "Fuze Tehdidi ve NATO Fuze Kalkani: Turkiye Acisindan Bir Degerlendirme", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. 10, No. 40 Winter 2014, p. 45.

⁶¹⁹ "Syria: Missile," Country Profiles, NTI, August 2014, at: <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/syria/delivery-systems/>

⁶²⁰ Kasapoglu, 2014, p. 21.

⁶²¹ Kasapoglu, 2014, pp. 10-11.

⁶²² Kasapoglu, 2014, pp. 21-22.

21 SRBMs and M-600 Tishreen ballistic missiles, which is the domestic version of the Iranian Fateh-110.⁶²³ Syria also possesses Russian Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) for coastal defense.⁶²⁴ However, the civil war has brought uncertainty to the location and status of the missile arsenal, e.g. 2014 media reports that Hezbollah moved long-range Scud D missiles, Iranian Fateh-110 and Fajr-5 rockets, and the Russian ASCM into Lebanon.⁶²⁵ In the current situation, the presence of Russian assets in support of the Syrian regime complicate the situation. For instance, in March 2016, Russia deployed at least one Iskander missile to carry two tactical ballistic missiles to the Humaymim Air Base in Syria, as well as the K-300P Bastion-P anti-ship missile system that can accommodate the Yakhont missiles.⁶²⁶

Throughout the conflict, Turkish cities have been hit by stray artillery shells coming from Syria. On March 24, 2015, a Scud variant Fateh-110 missile fired by the Syrian army from the Tartus Russian naval base against the rebels exploded in the Reyhanli district of Hatay in Turkey, leaving a 15-meter wide crater and injuring five Turkish civilians.⁶²⁷ The area was reported to be outside the radar range of the Patriot batteries, leading to the critiques that the batteries should protect the riskiest area, i.e.

⁶²³ Paul K. Kerr, Steven A. Hildreth, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, "Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile Nuclear Cooperation," Congressional Research Service, May 11, 2015, pp. 3, 5.

⁶²⁴ "Syria: Missile," Country Profiles, NTI, August 2014, at: <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/syria/delivery-systems/> "Russia Sends More Advanced Missiles to Aid Assad," *The New York Times*, May 16, 2013.

⁶²⁵ "Hezbollah Moving Long-Range Missiles from Syria to Lebanon, an Analyst Says," *The New York Times*, January 2, 2014.

⁶²⁶ "Iskander missile launcher spotted in Syria," *IHS Jane's 360*, March 30, 2016.

⁶²⁷ "NATO's Patriots fail to stop Syrian missiles hitting Turkey," *Hurriyet Daily News*, March 26, 2015.

Hatay, instead of the Kurecik radar or the U.S. airbase in Incirlik.⁶²⁸ This conflict pointed to yet another divergence between Turkey and NATO on coverage.

ISIS capabilities also threaten Turkey. ISIS fighters have been seen with Chinese-made FN-6 man-portable air defense systems or shoulder-fired heat-seeking MANDPADS.⁶²⁹ According to U.S. intelligence estimates, it is also probable that ISIS fighters acquired the shoulder-fired Stinger missiles in Iraq.⁶³⁰ In 2016, ISIS began hitting Turkish cities, especially Kilis, with Katyusha rockets.⁶³¹ These multiple-launch rockets, captured from Syrian and Iraqi governments, can carry a range of warheads and have a range of 20 km.

Turkey has also kept a close eye on Russian military buildup in Syria, before and after the Turkish shooting down of the Russian jet in November 2015. Russia has deployed S-400 air defense systems in northern Syria with ranges extending into Turkish airspace. Russia has deployed at least one Iskander missile variant to its Hmeimim Air Base according to satellite imagery.⁶³² Turkey has also heavily criticized both the Assad regime's and Russia's continued missile and rocket attacks in rebel-held towns near Damascus and Aleppo, and hitting Turkmen villages near

⁶²⁸ "NATO's Patriots fail to stop Syrian missiles hitting Turkey,"

⁶²⁹ "ISIS fighters seen with advanced anti-aircraft missiles," *Al Arabiya*, October 28, 2014, at: <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/10/28/ISIS-fighters-seen-with-sophisticated-antiaircraft-missiles-.html> "Missiles of ISIS may pose peril for aircrews in Iraq," *The New York Times*, October 26, 2014.

⁶³⁰ "US-made Stinger missiles have likely fallen into ISIS hands, officials say," *Fox News*, June 16, 2014.

⁶³¹ "TSK, Kilis'teki Patlama Sonrasi Suriye'deki ISID Mevzilerini Vurdu," *Haberler.com*, January 18, 2016, and "ISID fuzeleri Kilis'i vurdu: Bir kadin bir cocuk oldu, uc yarali," *A24*, March 8, 2016.

⁶³² "Iskander missile launcher spotted in Syria," *IHS Jane's 360*, March 30, 2016.

Latakia in November 2015 instead of ISIS targets.⁶³³ In November-December 2015, Russian warships and submarines in the Caspian Fleet and Mediterranean Sea launched sea-based Kalibr cruise missiles, the first use of the 3M-14 submarine variant, at ISIS targets in Syria, but deviations in their flight paths crashed some of the cruise missiles in Iran and the Arctic.⁶³⁴

In August 2015, Pentagon officials argued that the risk of Syrian missile attacks had decreased, air defenses aboard American warships could cover the security mission over Turkey, and the U.S. Patriot assets deployed in Turkey would be withdrawn.⁶³⁵ While Pentagon perceives Patriot deployment as a symbolic gesture, for Turkey, the existence of the systems matter more than the fact that they have not had a successful intercept.

In response to the intensified rocket attacks by ISIS, Turkey has utilized its Firtina howitzers with a range of 40 km, linked with AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radars that can detect rockets in 24 km range.⁶³⁶ The US is also deploying the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) that can reach targets 55 miles away along the

⁶³³ “Missiles in Syria kill 50 as schools, hospitals hit, Turkey accuses Russia,” *Reuters*, February 16, 2016. “Esed ve Rusya IHH’nin yardim depolarini vurdu,” *TRT Haber*, January 10, 2016. “At least 65 Syrians Killed in Government Attack,” *The Wall Street Journal*, October 30, 2015. “Turkey condemns attack on Syrian Turkmen village, summons Russian envoy,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, November 20, 2015.

⁶³⁴ See “Russian cruise missiles hit ISIS from Mediterranean and Caspian, 600 killed in one strike,” *RT*, November 20, 2015, “Russian Submarine Hits Targets in Syria,” *Defense News*, December 9, 2015. “Pentagon: Some Russian cruise missiles crashed in Iran,” *The Washington Post*, October 8, 2015, “Russian cruise missile ‘deviates from flight path,’ accidentally hits Russian village,” *The Independent*, December 15, 2015.

⁶³⁵ “After Delicate Negotiations, U.S. Says It will Pull Patriot Missiles from Turkey,” *The New York Times*, August 16, 2015.

⁶³⁶ Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey’s War of Attrition with the Islamic State: The Rocket Threat,” *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, May 17, 2016.

Turkish-Syrian border.⁶³⁷ The Turkish military is testing and installing its counter-mortar radar system “Serhat” and its self-propelled air-defense gun “Korkut” in Kilis, in addition to mini zeppelins for surveillance.⁶³⁸ In addition, Turkish officials have requested the use of U.S. Predators armed with Hellfire missiles deployed at Incirlik to end the rocket hits on Kilis, by pushing ISIS targets south out of the rocket range, as well as more frequent use of NATO early warning and monitoring systems in the region.⁶³⁹ Mevlutoglu argues that the small size of the Katyusha rockets, their short range, high speed, and multiple rockets since they are very easy and cheap to produce, make an effective air defense very difficult and expensive.⁶⁴⁰ According to Undersecretary for Defense Industries Ismail Demir, the solution against what he calls “primitive systems” is armed UAVs to hit the mobile targets.⁶⁴¹ Prevention of these incoming aerial threats is significantly more effective than investing to intercept them. Hence Turkey is seeking a “Persistent Threat Detection System” similar to that of Lockheed Martin’s for 24/7 border monitoring, particularly along the 70 km border near Kilis, Gaziantep, Hatay, Sanliurfa, and Mardin.⁶⁴² However, Turkey’s shelling response to targets in Syria is worrisome to Russia.

⁶³⁷ “Turkish official: U.S. deploying rocket launchers near Syria,” *Defense News*, April 26, 2016.

⁶³⁸ “Turkey to Install New Air Defense Systems on Syrian Border,” *Defense News*, June 21, 2016.

⁶³⁹ “Turkey demands more effective use of Hellfire missiles in ISIL Fight,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, April 26, 2016.

⁶⁴⁰ Metin Gurcan, “Turkiye’nin Katyusha’larla sinavi,” *Al Monitor*, April 26, 2016.

⁶⁴¹ “Kilis’e dusen fuzelere karsi en dogru yontem, tehdidi silahlı IHA’larla vurmak,” *T24*, April 25, 2016.

⁶⁴² “Turkey to Install New Air Defense Systems on Syrian Border.”

Pursuit of National Air and Missile Defense: Objectives and Problems

Since the 1990s, Turkey has had several attempts to reduce its vulnerability in air and missile defense through foreign acquisition, co-production, and finally indigenous development of low to medium altitude, short to medium range systems.⁶⁴³ Turkey wants to replace the “vintage” MIM-14 Nike-Hercules batteries, designed in the 1950s deployed at the 15th Missile Base Group Command in Alemdag, Istanbul, that are being put out of service.⁶⁴⁴

Following the 1991 Gulf War, Turkish Armed Forces Air Defense Master Plan prioritized the acquisition of low-altitude air defense systems.⁶⁴⁵ The plan focused on the need for a strong deterrent in air force and prioritized air defense over missile defense. Turkish officials argued that the project would have to be developed under the NATO umbrella.⁶⁴⁶

Turkey took significant steps toward a national system in the 2000s. In March 2002, the Turkish Air Force underwent a doctrinal shift from the “Turkish Armed Forces

⁶⁴³ See Appendix 3: Turkey’s Journey with Air and Missile Defense: A Timeline

⁶⁴⁴ Author’s interview with a senior executive at the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), February 6, 2015, Ankara. Ebru Aydın, “ABD Fuze Anlasmasından Neden Endiseleniyor?” *Ankara Strateji Enstitüsü*, October 29, 2013, at: <http://www.ankarastrateji.org/print/haber/abd-fuze-anlasmasindan-neden-endiseleniyor-886/>

⁶⁴⁵ Sitki Egeli and Serhat Guvenc, “NATO’nun Fuze Savunma Sistemi ve Turkiye,” *Ortadogu Analiz*, Nisan 2012, Vol. 4, No. 40, p. 22.

⁶⁴⁶ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “NATO’nun Balistik Fuze Savunma Sistemi ve Turkiye,” *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, vol. 9, no. 34, Summer 2012, p. 192.

Air Concept” to “Aerospace and Missile Defense Concept,” assigning the missile defense command to Turkish Air Force.”⁶⁴⁷

In April 2009, the Turkish Undersecretariat for the Defense Industry (SSM) issued a proposal for the purchase of a long-range air and missile defense system to be installed in four regions, including Ankara, Istanbul, and two confidential locations. This project was postponed due to the expectation that the NATO missile defense system would be extended to include entire Turkish territory. Yet, at the Lisbon Summit, NATO revealed plans to install only a radar system, leading to the Turkish plan to establish its own missile defense system.⁶⁴⁸

The companies initially filed a bid with the following systems in the \$4 billion dollar Turkish Long Range Air and Missile Defense System (T-LORAMIDS) tender:

- U.S. partnership between Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, offering PAC-3s that can be integrated to the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft,
- Russian Rosoboronexport, offering the S-300,
- China Precision Machinery Export Import Corp (CPMIEC), offering FD-2000 (export version of HQ-9)
- Italian-French joint venture Eurosam, offering the SAMP/T Aster 30, with an additional proposal for technology transfer and to support Turkish full

⁶⁴⁷ Kasapoglu, 2014, p. 15.

⁶⁴⁸ “Defense giants compete in Turkish tender for long-range missiles,” *Today’s Zaman*, January 2, 2011.

membership to the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR,) one of the most influential organizations in weapons procurement and sales.⁶⁴⁹

Since December 2009, Turkey has extended the deadline for bid submission several times.⁶⁵⁰ While the aim was to get better offers, the mixed signals have led to confusion and frustration about Turkey's intentions, leading to political and technical concerns within NATO. Turkey first announced the decision to purchase the Chinese system in Summer 2013 and faced criticism from NATO ambassadors. In November 2015, Turkey entirely dropped the tentative agreement with China's CPMIEC, a decision finalized by the Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSIK) led by Prime Minister Davutoglu on November 13, 2015, based on technology transfer concerns.⁶⁵¹

Following the cancellation of the deal, Turkish officials began to argue for an off-the-shelf, "stopgap" acquisition from the West until Turkey develops an indigenous system.⁶⁵² Turkish officials consider the combination of domestic and foreign acquisition efforts as a sign of determination, design capabilities and product adoption beyond off-the-shelf purchase.⁶⁵³ In terms of the technological roadmap, they have adopted the U.S. phased adaptive approach to sustain development projects with sub-systems and advanced blocks to address evolving threats and technologies.⁶⁵⁴ The

⁶⁴⁹ "Defense giants compete in Turkish tender for long-range missiles," Umit Enginsoy, "NATO warns Turkey against buying Chinese, Russian air defense systems," *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 25, 2011.

⁶⁵⁰ See Appendix 3: Turkey's Journey with Air and Missile Defense: A Timeline.

⁶⁵¹ "Turkey abandons decision to purchase Chinese missile defense system," *Hurriyet Daily News*, November 15, 2015.

⁶⁵² "Turkey Mulls Stopgap Air Defense Acquisition," *Defense News*, December 12, 2015.

⁶⁵³ Dr. Sartuk Karasoy, Vice President, ROKETSAN, "Stratejik Hava Savunma Sistemleri ve Turkiye'nin Yol Haritasi," SETA Ankara, October 25, 2015.

⁶⁵⁴ Dr. Sartuk Karasoy, Vice President, ROKETSAN, "Stratejik Hava Savunma Sistemleri ve Turkiye'nin Yol Haritasi,"

Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) has a vision to complete the radar requirements of the long-range, high-altitude air and missile defense systems, i.e. early warning radar and the “CAFRAD” Multifunction Phased Array Radar System, within the next four years.⁶⁵⁵

The following section provides an overview of Turkey’s main policy objectives, i.e. strengthening the domestic defense industry and military modernization. It then identifies the main political and technical problems of meeting these policy objectives with the current air and missile systems that are being considered. I argue that, while aiming to adopt advanced technologies, Turkish policymakers set unrealistic goals in procurement, and ignore the strategic implications and technological limitations of ballistic missile defense.

Turkey’s Objectives in National Air and Missile Defense

"If Turkey opts for direct purchase of the system then it will be obliged to make new off-the-shelf purchases 15 or 20 years later. We will not settle for this. Our target is to gain national technological capability in the missile project," stated SSM Undersecretary Ismail Demir.⁶⁵⁶ He added that "If the finalization of the project has appeared to have been taking longer this is because Turkey wants to obtain technological capabilities as high as possible."⁶⁵⁷

⁶⁵⁵ “SSM to Form 2020’s Defense Industry Policy,” *Defense Turkey, Issue 63*, September 14, 2015.

⁶⁵⁶ Zachary Keck, “NATO Beware: Turkey May Buy Russia’s S-300 Air Defense System,” *The National Interest*, May 6, 2015.

⁶⁵⁷ “Turkey’s T-Loramids technology transfer troubles,” *IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly*, March 4, 2015.

The strong emphasis on Turkey's two objectives, i.e. independence in Turkish defense industry and military modernization, brought along technology transfer as a prerequisite to any deal. However, U.S. firms like Raytheon and Lockheed Martin have been unwilling to transfer design information to Turkey, whose technological demands are unlikely to be satisfied.⁶⁵⁸ The Turkish government has set the criteria on air and missile defense systems as the possibility of coproduction, cost, and delivery date, instead of the technical specifications and track record of the systems in effectively addressing the range of air and missile threats, and the political/security implications of the decision.

“Partner, not a Market”

Prior to the June 2015 general elections, then Prime Minister Davutoglu announced the “New Turkey Contract,” declaring the hundred targets AKP formulated for 2023, the centennial of the Turkish Republic.⁶⁵⁹ The document highlighted the domestic defense industry as the intersection of economic power and national security, pinpointing the need for reducing dependency for national unity, and maintaining an “island of stability” in a region of security crises.⁶⁶⁰ According to the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), Turkey aspires to

⁶⁵⁸ Aaron Stein, “Turkey Wants Missile Defenses and the Accompanying Design Information,” *Nukes of Hazard*, November 16, 2012, at: <http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2012/11/16/75538/919>

⁶⁵⁹ “Iste ‘Yeni Turkiye Sozlesmesi 2023’ un ekonomi maddeleri,” *Hurriyet*, April 15, 2015.

⁶⁶⁰ Iste ‘Yeni Turkiye Sozlesmesi 2023’ un ekonomi maddeleri,” *Hurriyet*, April 15, 2015, articles 81 and 82.

become one of the top 10 countries in the defense industry.⁶⁶¹ The plan reports that under the AKP government, 90% of the \$22 billion military modernization projects have been conducted by domestic companies, reflecting the defense policy priority for enhanced domestic design and production.⁶⁶² Turkish defense producers target \$25 billion in exports by 2023.⁶⁶³ This goal is extremely unrealistic, since this figure was barely \$1.6 billion in 2015.⁶⁶⁴

AKP sees defense cooperation as an instrument of foreign policy, in Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz's words, to become a country that others want to cooperate with, as seen in military training, technical and cooperation agreements with 67 countries.⁶⁶⁵ Success in national defense projects is also a source of national pride. Hence, SSM follows the "equal partner" principle that Turkey should initially utilize its national capacities and be a partner, and not only a market for international defense projects. However, Turkey needs to create the defense projects first, train the work force, and apply the know-how to various fields as it doesn't have enough researchers and engineers.⁶⁶⁶

⁶⁶¹ "2012-2016 Savunma Sanayii Mustesarligi Stratejik Plani," p. 5, at:

http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/kurumsal/Documents/SP/Sp2012_2016/index.html

⁶⁶² "2012-2016 Savunma Sanayii Mustesarligi Stratejik Plani," p. 4.

⁶⁶³ "Turkey wants to increase defense exports to \$25 billion," *Hurriyet Daily News*, November 28, 2014.

⁶⁶⁴ "Turkish defense exports valued at USD 1.6 billion in 2015," IHS Jane's Defense Weekly, April 14, 2016.

⁶⁶⁵ "Turkey uses defense industry as political instrument," Turkey Pulse, *Al-Monitor*, October 16, 2014.

⁶⁶⁶ Dr. Celal Sami Tufekci, Deputy Undersecretary for Defense Industries, "Defense Industrial Cooperation: Creating New Perspectives for the Alliance," Defense and Security Affairs Panel, 34th Annual U.S.-Turkey Relations Conference, American Turkish Council, Washington D.C., September 28, 2015.

On air and missile defense, according to the Turkish decision makers, Turkey cannot rely solely on the NATO alliance for its security needs and it is rational to develop indigenous capabilities.⁶⁶⁷ However, they acknowledge that when the armed forces cannot wait for the delivery times from the domestic defense industry, there will be continued foreign purchase.⁶⁶⁸ They accept that, initially, Turkey's national solutions might bring lower performance, longer production times, and higher costs. However, they argue that the measures that technology-providing countries impose to protect their competitive advantage require Turkey to eventually develop the technology itself beyond transfer agreements in the procurement plan.⁶⁶⁹

Turkish officials argue that when Turkey is dependent on a foreign system, it cannot control the entire maintenance process and transfers sensitive/secret usage information to receive supports.⁶⁷⁰ There can be political barriers to defense exports, leading to vulnerability. These difficulties function as an "embargo," where Turkey faces critical costs and receives expensive and low-performing products.⁶⁷¹

Maintenance and support are equally important, and delays can lead to operational disruptions. Since firms don't share the command and control systems, all algorithms have to be re-written for each new weapon entering the inventory.⁶⁷² Hence, Turkey

⁶⁶⁷ Author's interview with senior official at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Research (SAM), February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁶⁶⁸ Author's interview with an executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015.

⁶⁶⁹ Dr. Sartuk Karasoy, Vice President, ROKETSAN, "Stratejik Hava Savunma Sistemleri ve Turkiye'nin Yol Haritasi," SETA Ankara, October 25, 2015.

⁶⁷⁰ Author's interview with an executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015.

⁶⁷¹ Author's interview with a former high level Turkish defense official, January 30, 2015, Ankara.

⁶⁷² Mustafa Kaval, Vice President, ASELSAN, "Stratejik Hava Savunma Sistemleri ve Turkiye'nin Yol Haritasi," SETA Ankara, October 25, 2015. Kaval states that the Hisar command and control

remains dependent on the system providers, as long as it doesn't co-develop the technology. L. Gen. Salih Ulusoy, president of Turkish General Staff planning and principles, states that this effort toward independence should not be interpreted as a threat to the U.S. defense industry, but as Turkey becoming a stable partner in the Middle East to cooperate more with.⁶⁷³ In fact, Undersecretary Demir ironically thanks the United States for projects that have not been approved or have been delayed, as these difficulties have pushed Turkey to develop domestic systems such as the armed drones.⁶⁷⁴

According to the former Turkish Undersecretary for Defense Industries Bayar, Turkey's increasing military exports are a product of cooperation between Turkey and its allies, and that cooperation will continue, especially in aerospace where Turkey doesn't have the domestic industrial base for product development.⁶⁷⁵ Currently, Turkey exports armored vehicles, light tanks, military electronics, rocket launchers, and various arms and ammunitions.

There is also a national pride factor that Turkish defense officials have faced "condescending attitudes" at international meetings as to how Turkey will be able to

system has approximately 2 million lines of code, which has to be upgraded by 10-15 fold for longer range systems.

⁶⁷³ Lieutenant General Salih Ulusoy, "Alliance and Standing Together Against Regional Threats," Defense and Security Affairs Panel, 34th Annual U.S.-Turkey Relations Conference, American Turkish Council, Washington D.C., September 28, 2015.

⁶⁷⁴ "Turkish Defense-Industrial Policy with Dr. Ismail Demir," Atlantic Council, May 26, 2016, Washington, D.C.

⁶⁷⁵ Robert K. Ackerman, "Turkey's Defense Industry Matures," *Signal Magazine*, The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, September 2010, at: <http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=turkeys-defense-industry-matures>

develop high technology systems.⁶⁷⁶ Bagci calls not having a national missile defense system as a “humiliation.”⁶⁷⁷ Hence, high level officials argue that Turkey’s defense modernization is not just geared toward autonomy, but also keeping up with the rest of the Alliance in military technology and advancing the economy.⁶⁷⁸ They add that by competition of systems for the Turkish defense market, Turkey can reach a caliber of defense technologies comparable to South Korea and Israel.⁶⁷⁹

Based on this reasoning, Aselsan, the Turkish military electronics producer, and the missile contractor Roketsan have signed an agreement with the Under-secretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) and have started to manufacture low and mid-altitude air defense systems worth approximately 200 million Euros and 130 million Euros respectively.⁶⁸⁰ According to Roketsan officials, Hisar systems have a dual pulse (or stage), solid-propellant rocket engine, i.e. the timing for the firing of the second stroke is optimized into the guidance algorithm, creating a surprise element and uncertainty in maneuvers.⁶⁸¹ Not surprisingly, Roketsan officials rarely refer to

⁶⁷⁶ Author’s interview with an executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015.

⁶⁷⁷ “Turkey feels humiliated not having its own missile defense system,” *RT*, February 20, 2015.

⁶⁷⁸ Author’s interview with a senior executive at the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁶⁷⁹ Author’s interview with a senior executive at the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM),

⁶⁸⁰ On Turkish Armed Forces’ defense systems manufacturer ASELSAN’s national defense missile deal, see: “Aselsan’dan dev milli fuze anlasmasi,” *Bugun*, June 22, 2011, and “Milli fuze uretecegiz,” *Sabah*, June 21, 2011.

⁶⁸¹ Dr. Sartuk Karasoy, Vice President, ROKETSAN, “Stratejik Hava Savunma Sistemleri ve Turkiye’nin Yol Haritasi,” SETA Ankara, October 25, 2015. The Roketsan design divides the combustion chamber into two with a barrier, allowing the firing of fuel in each chamber at different times, providing a tactical advantage in air defense against high speed targets by increased speed and high maneuverability. Omer Cakir, “Cok Darbeli Motor Teknolojileri ile Itki Kontrolu,” *Roketsan Dergisi*, February 2013, pp. 16-17, at: <http://www.roketsan.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/RoketsanDergisi-Ocak2013-2.pdf>

technological limitations, costs, and possible problems that they will encounter in delivering on the ambitious timetable.

Military Modernization

Turkish military modernization is primarily led by the prime minister, as the Executive Committee of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) is chaired by him. Turkey increased the budgets of the defense ministry and SSM by \$958 million in 2015, corresponding to the 11% of the country's total budget.⁶⁸² This ratio is very high comparable to the rest of NATO. While Turkey's military modernization project is multi-faceted, special attention should be paid to Turkey's ambitions regarding missiles, air and space projects.⁶⁸³

Turkish officials frequently refer to tactical ballistic missile development as part of the deterrent to threats in its neighborhood, being surrounded by almost all countries that deploy ballistic missiles.⁶⁸⁴ However, given their lower cost, better accuracy, and deployment flexibility, Turkish defense industry has prioritized cruise missile development, as an offensive deterrent capability. Turkey's membership to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) requirements, i.e. 300 km/500 kg range/payload set the restraint.

⁶⁸² "Turkey eyes advanced missile and space technologies," *Al Arabiya News*, April 1, 2015.

⁶⁸³ See Appendix 4: Turkey's Defense Industry and Military Modernization Projects

⁶⁸⁴ Mustafa Kaval, Vice President, ASELSAN, "Stratejik Hava Savunma Sistemleri ve Turkiye'nin Yol Haritasi, SETA Ankara, October 25, 2015.

Surprisingly, in December 2011, then-Prime Minister Erdogan inquired about the range comparison of Iranian and Turkish missiles, i.e. around 1600 km to 150 km, at the Supreme Military Council (YAS).⁶⁸⁵ Based on this huge discrepancy, Erdogan ordered the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), its Defense Industries Research and Development Institute (SAGE) in particular, to develop national missile projects.⁶⁸⁶ This discussion resurfaced following the conflict with Russia over airspace violations, leading to SSM Undersecretary Demir to argue that “it is difficult for a country to be deterrent with defensive missiles only. This is why offensive missiles systems too should be developed.”⁶⁸⁷

Egeli argues that since the pronounced 2500 km range does not meet Turkey’s geopolitical, geostrategic, and military conditions and needs, i.e. the capitals in its region being in the 750 km range, high costs and accuracy problems of long-range missiles with conventional warheads; in the absence of a radical change in policy to acquire nuclear weapons, “2500” merely seems as a “competition reflex” to surpass Iran’s 2200-km-range Sajjil.⁶⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the current Turkish tendency to couple defensive and offensive missiles cast doubt on Turkey’s intentions. This new formulation implies that Turkey will not only pursue missile defense for deterrence but as part of a war-fighting capability. If pursued seriously and consistently, this rhetoric can deteriorate Turkish security and damage its strategic interests in the region.

⁶⁸⁵ “Turk fuzesi: Hedef menzil 2500 km,” *Haberturk*, December 29, 2011.

⁶⁸⁶ “Turk fuzesi: Hedef menzil 2500 km,”

⁶⁸⁷ “Turkey Eyes Offensive Missiles,” *Defense News*, January 16, 2016.

⁶⁸⁸ Egeli, 2013, p. 34.

Another surprising and ambitious element in military modernization is the Turkish space concept. In the 2000 Defense White Paper, Turkey announced plans to carry its offensive, defensive, reconnaissance, surveillance, and early warning resources and capabilities into space within the next ten years.⁶⁸⁹ While it had some progress in the 15 years, it didn't obtain the objective set. The Turkish Air Force is establishing a Space Group Command, i.e. an aerospace force unit that will specialize in satellite launches, reconnaissance space-based imagery, early warning, satellites, and satellite communications.⁶⁹⁰ The early concept design of a proposed satellite launch vehicle (SLV) has been commissioned to Roketsan, the national missile manufacturer. Turkey plans to invest \$100 million to develop the SLV, dubbed the Turkish Satellite Launching System (UFS). Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) will develop the synthetic aperture radar (SAR) Gokturk-3; with support from ASELSAN and TUBITAK Uzay, to provide radar imagery for the command and control network. In March 2015, ASELSAN launched a Radar and Electronic Warfare Technology Center at Golbasi, Ankara, which will design, produce, and test these radars, i.e. Gokturk-3 SAR, "CAFRAD" Multifunction Phased Array Radar System, and the Turkish Fighter Jet Radar T-FX.⁶⁹¹ In May 2015, TAI's \$112 million Spacecraft Assembly, Integration, and Test (USET in Turkish) Center was established to conduct the test and integration of Gokturk-1 to reduce dependence on foreign facilities.⁶⁹²

⁶⁸⁹ "Turkey: Defense White Paper 2000," at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=154907>

⁶⁹⁰ "Turkey plots path toward space command," *Defense News*, April 9, 2013.

⁶⁹¹ "SSM to Form 2020's Defense Industry Policy," *Defense Turkey, Issue 63*, September 14, 2015.

⁶⁹² "SSM to Form 2020's Defense Industry Policy,"

While Turkey eventually aims to integrate its air and missile defense systems with its future space assets, it is clear that Turkey's technological and financial resources are insufficient to conduct space operations that only few countries in the world are able to perform. Hence, these projects do not enhance Turkish security against credible threats, and only signal confusing and potentially offensive intentions.

Problems in Procurement Strategy

Turkey's top decision maker in defense procurement admits that Turkey's air and missile defense system assessment is not based on the international security situation and the political implications of adapting this system, but enhancing the domestic defense sector and technology development.⁶⁹³ Not surprisingly, this attitude has generated both political concerns within NATO and technical problems with the procurement strategy.

Strategic Concerns

TLORAMIDS is one of the most intricate defense tenders in Turkish history. The Chinese system became a front runner in TLORAMIDS due to Turkey's insistence on technology transfer.⁶⁹⁴ China offered co-production and 30% domestic production for

⁶⁹³ Ismail Demir, Undersecretary, SSM, "Stratejik Hava Savunma Sistemleri ve Türkiye'nin Yol Haritasi," SETA Ankara, October 25, 2015.

⁶⁹⁴ Author's interview with an executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015.

the \$3.5 billion project, where Turkey would produce and modify the Turkish BMC trucks for the transportation of missile defense systems.⁶⁹⁵

The possibility of Turkish acquisition of a Chinese system was questioned by diplomats from NATO countries, as one of them stated that: “Turkey has every right to choose its own air defense system but we do not quite understand the logic of opting for a Chinese system with no interoperability with the existing [NATO] assets.”⁶⁹⁶ The United States was particularly concerned with the choice of the Chinese company: CPMIEC has been sanctioned by the US under a number of nonproliferation sanctions of the U.S. Department of State.⁶⁹⁷ A group of U.S. Congressional members wrote to Secretary of State Kerry and then Defense Secretary Hagel; “We strongly urge you to exert all available diplomatic pressure to prevent Turkish procurement of a [China Precision Military Import and Export Corp.] missile defense system and ensure NATO will never allow such a system to be integrated into NATO’s security architecture.”⁶⁹⁸ Hence, Turkey’s insistence on acquiring a Chinese system would have had negative ramifications on U.S.-Turkey relations.

A conservative Turkish view suggested that Turkey was pressured into making a strategic decision that was not in its national interests, in the name of alliance unity.⁶⁹⁹

Others argued that it was rational for Turkey to maintain the bargaining chip in the

⁶⁹⁵ “Fuze ihalesinde kritik gelisme,” *Haber 7*, October 28, 2013.

⁶⁹⁶ “Ankara’s move to Chinese air systems appals NATO allies,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 3, 2013.

⁶⁹⁷ “Nonproliferation Sanctions,” U.S. Department of State, April 2, 2015, at:

<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/226423.htm>

⁶⁹⁸ Christina Lin, “China-Turkey Missile Defense Deal: Implications for East Asian Regional Security,” *Transatlantic Academy*, October 30, 2013, at:

<http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/node/617>

⁶⁹⁹ Merve Seren, “Turkiye’nin Fuze Savunma Sistemi,” *SETA*, 2015 p. 85

tender by negotiating with China, but it didn't mean that the Chinese system would have been selected.⁷⁰⁰ China saw the deal as a victory, i.e. showcasing the system at international expos, and a step toward enhanced bilateral relations. But it was also displeased by Turkey's extension of the tender for improved bids five times following NATO's negative response.⁷⁰¹ Politically, Turkish officials' management of the tender process left all parties unhappy with the results. This struggle has dire implications on Turkey's regional and transatlantic relations, generating concern about Turkey's strategic orientation.

Technical Issues

There are two main technical issues with the T-LORAMIDS tender: First, Turkish authorities have not set their technical criteria on choosing the most capable and reliable system in countering the missile threats. Second, the NATO interoperability or isolation of the Turkish system, given the contradictory statements by Turkish officials, has generated a NATO-wide debate.

The actual needs of the Turkish military, according to the project definition document for T-LORAMIDS from 2002 and the request for proposal (RFP), is significantly different than the tender results so far.⁷⁰² After the initial decision to go with the Chinese system, then Undersecretary for Defense Industries Murat Bayar declared

⁷⁰⁰ Author's interview with Assoc. Prof. Atilla Sandikli, *BILGESAM*, February 2, 2015, Istanbul.

⁷⁰¹ "Cin ordusu: Turkiye'nin hava savunma fuze sistemi ihalesini Cin kazandi," *Zaman*, March 19, 2015.

⁷⁰² Author's interview with a former executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015, Ankara.

that the decision formula was based on the following coefficients: 75% air defense and 25% missile defense.⁷⁰³ For air defense, the Turkish military described the need as a 3 radar-4 missile launcher Patriot system with 120-km range, without specifying the altitudes or further details, and not including missile threats.⁷⁰⁴ However this definition did not fit with all the systems in the T-LORAMIDS tender, i.e. the Eurosam's Aster and the Chinese system have a different launch control mechanism than the PAC-3. Hence, the costs went up for the non-PAC systems as the number of batteries required increased. Since the ballistic missile defense coefficient was low, the technical points went to the Chinese and European systems rather than more capable systems such as the Russian S-300.⁷⁰⁵

Kasapoglu argues that none of the systems in the T-LORAMIDS offers effective coverage possibly against the Syrian Scud-Ds (700 km range) and certainly the Iranian Qiyam-1 (750 km), Ghadir-1 (1600 km) and Shahab-3 (1300 km) that could together go up to 400 in the inventory, and the solid propellant Sajjil-2 (2000 km.)⁷⁰⁶ There hasn't been any debate in Turkey on the technical limitations and vulnerabilities of these systems, i.e. intercepting countermeasures and decoys, lack of realistic battlefield tests, and inability to intercept low-flying cruise missiles. Kemal also argues that the military necessity of these systems and the informed public

⁷⁰³ Ibid. According to another source, the coefficients were 70% for air defense and 30% for ballistic missile defense. "Fuze ihalesinde kritik gelisme," *Haber 7*, October 28, 2013.

⁷⁰⁴ Author's interview with a former executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015, Ankara.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁶ Kasapoglu, 2014, p. 14.

opinion on the rationale behind this arms procurement have not been thoroughly questioned, besides the focus on the high costs.⁷⁰⁷

Another major concern with the Chinese system was interoperability. Turkish officials gave contradictory accounts of whether the national air and missile defense system would be integrated into the NATO grid: While Defense Minister Yilmaz argued that it would be a national system, President Erdogan's spokesperson Kalin said the Turkish system would be integrated to the NATO architecture.⁷⁰⁸ Turkish officials initially did not pay attention to possible problems that would arise in terms of NATO interoperability if a Chinese missile defense system was chosen. According to a former official, the Turkish government didn't initially involve the military officials in this process, either.⁷⁰⁹ For several months, SSM officials insisted that Turkey could address the concerns regarding information sharing between Chinese and NATO systems with an interphase, i.e. a filter produced by the Turkish AYESAS that provides one-sided information.⁷¹⁰ However, the common view in the Alliance was that integrating a Chinese asset into the Alliance infrastructure would be "equivalent of inserting a virus into NATO's command and control system."⁷¹¹ By non-integration, the Turkish system would be denied NATO satellites, radars, and,

⁷⁰⁷ Lale Kemal, "Turkey's costly missile project draws close attention," *Today's Zaman*, February 6, 2012.

⁷⁰⁸ "Turkey's T-Loramids technology transfer troubles," *IHS Jane's Defense Weekly*, March 4, 2015.

⁷⁰⁹ Author's interview with a former executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015, Ankara.

⁷¹⁰ Author's interview with a senior executive at the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁷¹¹ Kibaroglu, 2014, p. 32.

higher altitude-longer range interceptors under the Aegis architecture.⁷¹² In such a scenario, Turkey would need to invest in its planned space program.

Beyond the TLORAMIDS tender, there is a mismatch between the aerial threats that Turkey is facing and the proposed urgency of a ballistic missile defense system: In the case of ISIS rockets, the Turkish military needs to conduct “counter rocket artillery mortar” (C-RAM) operations, and not ballistic missile defense operations.⁷¹³ The shorter-range trajectory of these threats only allow a shorter reaction time and require robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, which Turkey lacks.

Domestic Constraints

Currently, Turkey has internal security concerns that complicate the decisions regarding its defense spending and priorities. These concerns make it harder to justify spending on space programs and long-range ballistic missile defense, since the threats against Turkish security have not materialized and the financial and technological risks are too high. Turkey has gone back to conducting military operations in its counterinsurgency efforts against PKK, despite the ineffectiveness of air strikes. Major Turkish cities have also been targeted by ISIS. In addition to the high costs of the war against terror, the Turkish economy no longer enjoys the high growth rate it

⁷¹² Ahmet Han and Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey’s New Missiles of October: Defense Modernization or Political Statement?” *On Turkey*, The German Marshall Fund (GMF), March 12, 2015, p. 3.

⁷¹³ Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey’s War of Attrition with the Islamic State: The Rocket Threat,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 17, 2016.

had during the 2000s and has reached a plateau. Moreover, Turkey has spent \$10 billion for approximately 3 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey. Despite the financial aid agreement with the EU for 3 billion Euros, the future costs of hosting these refugees remain to be seen.

Turkey's Policy Options

In finalizing the decision on a national air and missile defense system, Turkey could:

1. Maintain status quo, settle for a marginal role in EPAA by hosting the radar, and rely on the rotation of NATO systems when necessary, which reflects a mix of coercive and cooperative measures.

The benefit of this option is continuity with NATO strategy, and benefiting from combat-tested, layered NATO systems, i.e. Aegis ships in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, Aegis Ashore, THAAD, PAC-3, interoperability with the U.S. C2BMC (command and control, battle management, and communications system) and Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP). In addition, Turkey doesn't pay for the costs of installing, operating, and maintaining these expensive systems.

The disadvantage of this option is Turkey's historical concern with being ignored in case of a conflict, e.g. to protect core Europe vs. periphery in eastern Turkey. Turkey

doesn't have any leverage in the command and control of Aegis systems and is restricted from the technology. In addition, these systems do not provide any coverage against artillery shells and short-range rockets.

2. Pursue an indigenous system while acquiring “stop-gap” capability from a foreign partner.

This is the option that the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries is currently considering. As in previous cases with Western partners, Turkey is likely to run into problems with co-development plans if it insists on technology transfer. According to a Raytheon official, Turkey and US cannot agree on the 1% of the technology transfer of PAC-3 systems.⁷¹⁴ Moreover, Raytheon has not been able to convince Turkey to purchase the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System- NASAMS, a mid-range air defense system.⁷¹⁵ It is evident that a Turkish decision to adopt a non-Western air and missile defense system that offers technology transfer would lead to another round of technical and political conflicts with NATO.

One of the off-the-shelf systems that is currently being considered is the “Medium Extended Air Defense System,” (MEADS) jointly developed by the US, Germany, and Italy.⁷¹⁶ The system uses a phase-array radar that provides 360-degree coverage

⁷¹⁴ Author's conversation with Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems official, Washington D.C., September 28, 2015.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid.

⁷¹⁶ Michael Kaplan, “Turkey Weighs New Defense Technology Amid Growing Regional Tensions,” *International Business Times*, February 24, 2016.

that appeals to the Turkish decision makers.⁷¹⁷ While this system was initially intended to replace the Patriot systems, the US decided to discontinue funding the program, and neither Italy nor Germany initially signaled that they would fund the procurement of the system.⁷¹⁸ In 2015, Germany announced that it chose MEADS over the Patriot system, and Lockheed Martin and Europe's MBDA are expected to finalize the \$4.5 billion deal by the end of 2016.⁷¹⁹ The funding issue casts doubt on the feasibility of this option, unless Germany gives Turkey financial guarantees.

One other system that Turkey could consider is Israel's Iron Dome. While the system has worldwide recognition for its 90 percent interception rate against rockets, it has not been exported yet as few countries face similar rocket threats as Israel does. Given its interception success and short range, this system would be very effective on the Syrian border but Turkey's insistence on technology transfer is likely to impede cooperation. Turkish domestication of the technology and exporting it is also not realistic.

The biggest problem with the pursuit of national procurement is that an indigenous system that is not combat tested cannot be effective against air and missile threats without sufficient number of batteries and accompanying radar and early warning systems, i.e. tracking information. Turkey is likely to spend a lot of money and run into several technical difficulties, as it hasn't mastered shorter range systems and

⁷¹⁷ "Confusion over Turkey's air defense system," *Hurriyet Daily News*, March 1, 2016.

⁷¹⁸ Lindstrom, 2015, p. 114.

⁷¹⁹ "Lockheed, MBDA eye German contract for MEADS by year-end," *Reuters*, June 2, 2016.

hasn't taken the technological jump in detection, exo-atmospheric missile interception or space technologies.

3. Pursue both offensive and defensive systems with a more confrontational stance for regional deterrence and nuclear latency towards becoming a regional hegemon:

Following the cancellation of the China deal, President Erdogan argued that a national system would be domestically produced and have both defensive and offensive elements.⁷²⁰ Such a decision would alter Turkey's defense posture significantly. However, considering Turkey's air power as a NATO ally with strategic and tactical superiority over its neighbors such as Syria and Iran, ballistic missiles would not provide any advantage in establishing a deterrent.

Given Turkey's membership to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a costly ballistic missile program would face acquisition restrictions and harm the defense industry in terms of the allocation of resources away from more critical projects for Turkish security. It would also be too costly considering Turkey's institutional commitment to the global nonproliferation regimes. A long-range ballistic missile program would feed suspicions of a Turkish nuclear weapons program. However, given its highly problematic civilian nuclear energy program that will be completely reliant on Russia, if it ever comes into being, that would be another technological leap.

⁷²⁰ "Erdogan'dan faiz aciklamasi," *Milliyet*, November 19, 2015.

4. Applying the principles of cooperative security, focus on the immediate prevention of aerial threats such as artillery shells and rockets, enhance air defense through NATO assets, and contribute to the NATO-wide debate on the technological and financial limitations of ballistic missile defense. If Turkey does not follow a cooperative security approach, its investment in missile defense can lead to great economic cost, regional missile proliferation, further destabilization of relations with its neighbors, and mistrust that can cause miscalculations.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

In the early stages of the missile defense debate, Turkish officials focused on vulnerability to aerial threats from its neighbors due to NATO reluctance to provide assistance. However, the current phase of the discussion shows that by national missile defense, Turkey actually aims to develop sophisticated indigenous defense technologies to increase autonomy. Missile defense does not have a clear role in defense planning, either. Given the high costs and technological challenges of ballistic missile defense, this posture is not likely to succeed. Hence Turkey should not invest in an indigenous system without a clear definition of materialized threats that can be deterred with a reliable and cost-effective technology, which is beyond Turkish capabilities in the near future. Instead of setting the objective as military modernization and adoption of sophisticated technologies, Turkey's security objective should be minimizing risks arising from aerial and missile threats.

Focusing on Turkey's regional threat perceptions, the landscape consists of irregular warfare and violent extremism. Investing in a defensive or offensive national air and missile defense system is not likely to address these concerns. It could actually contribute to them by promoting missile proliferation in the region and further destabilizing Turkey's relationships with its neighbors. From the logic of cooperative security, Turkey's aim should be making states choose not to build or launch longer-range missiles, instead of trying to defend against capabilities that do not directly target Turkish security, in the case of ballistic missiles, or cannot be intercepted effectively, in the case of artillery shells and rockets. Turkey's conventional superiority over its neighbors and NATO security guarantees beyond EPAA provide a more credible deterrent than an ineffective national missile defense system would. Had Turkey invested its energy to reducing its short-range air defense vulnerabilities rather than pursuing an indigenous long-range ballistic missile defense system, it would have prevented the civilian casualties repeatedly caused by ISIS rockets.

Turkish officials should also acknowledge the debate on the technical limitations of NATO missile defense. While Turkey currently enjoys not paying for the command and control of these systems, in order to have a stronger say in Alliance politics, Turkish officials should contribute to the NATO-wide debate on missile defense.

Realizing that the future of the EPAA architecture remains to be seen following the 2016 Warsaw Summit and the new U.S. presidency, pursuing missile defense only as a component of NATO deterrence under U.S. guarantees is a less risky decision for

Turkish policymakers than investing in disconnected, ineffective platforms of their own.

Chapter 6: Turkey's Position on Iran's Nuclear Program

How Turkey formulates a security strategy toward Iran's nuclear program constitutes a test case of coercive vs. cooperative and preventive approaches and of Turkey's NATO vs. regional identity. Turkey and Iran have a long history of friendly diplomatic relations, yet they have different sets of allies given Turkey's NATO membership, in addition to their Sunni-Shi'a division. Both countries pursue clout and operate in a region dominated by Arab states in number, with ingrained sectarian divides, mistrust, and ongoing civil conflict as well as cross-border terrorism.

In the last decade, Erdogan's Turkey put forward ideological and pragmatic motives to establish better ties with Iran. Turkey is a strategic partner for Iran, contributing to the moderates' political position in Tehran and building a bridge to the West by reducing Iran's isolation from the international system, both during and after the gradual lifting of economic sanctions following the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement with the P5+1. Iran is a strategic partner for Turkey, fulfilling its energy needs, and security interests in Syria and Iraq against terrorism and regional instability; the fight against the Islamic State in particular. Turkey supports Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy. Energy dependency in oil and natural gas pushes Turkey to pursue a constructive engagement policy with Iran. Yet, Turkey does not want a nuclear-armed Iran in the Middle East due to several strategic reasons. Hence, Turkey has consistently emphasized the importance of prevention during the nuclear negotiations with Iran.

This chapter first provides a brief background to the two countries' strategic relations, pointing to cycles of tension due to ideological differences and rapprochement given common interests, namely economic cooperation and regional stability. It then identifies both sides' key security concerns and differences in threat perceptions, arising from political rivalries between the blocs that Turkey and Iran have aligned themselves with, to explore whether economic interdependence can lead to strategic partnership. The chapter then focuses on Turkey's involvement in nuclear negotiations with Iran, the Turkish threat perceptions by officials, the elite, and the Turkish public, and their response to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Within this dissertation, the Iranian nuclear program functions as a test case of how Turkey has actually perceived potential nuclear weapons by a potential rival in its neighborhood, beyond its reassurance expectations from NATO. In this case, Turkish officials have evaluated the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran in actual nuclear terms, and not as an instrument for non-nuclear considerations. However the entire relationship is shaped by Turkey's treatment of Iran as a neighbor, and not as a potential nuclear-armed state. The Turkish government has not been particularly concerned with a nuclear-armed Iran because of its historical ties and economic interdependence, and perception that Iran wants to acquire dual-use capabilities without actually pursuing nuclear weapons.

It is also interesting that Turkey has chosen to deal with Iran in bilateral terms, without needing U.S./NATO guarantees, and even assumed a role of interlocutor between Iran and the rest of the Alliance. While being suspicious of each other's sincerity and intentions, Turkey and Iran have historically prioritized friendly relations over confrontation for pragmatic reasons.

I argue that Turkey's policy objective to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran that would alter the regional balance through diplomacy is mostly consistent with its objective to maintain Turkish regional influence by creating economic interdependence. However, this stability is likely to be challenged by the prolonged conflict in Syria, i.e. Russian-Iranian involvement to help the Assad regime, and Turkey's strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia, which Iran perceives as a "Sunni axis." Given that economic interdependence by itself has not transformed the Turkish-Russian relationship into a strategic one, Turkey should reformulate its Iran policy carefully and emphasize the prevention of risks turning into threats, rather than solely avoiding conflict. Turkish policymakers should also recognize the impact of their decision making on other nuclear issues, e.g. tactical nuclear weapons, missile defense, strategic partners, on Iran's perception of Turkish security and defense posture. I argue that Turkey can serve its security interests in the Middle East by applying the principles of cooperative security to its special partnership with Iran to security issues, beyond economic cooperation. A consistent security policy that is synced to Iran's improved relations with the West is Turkey's chance to retrieve its facilitator/mediator role on pressing regional issues such as stability in Iraq and Syria, and the fight against ISIS.

Issue for Analysis

A major objective in Turkish security policymaking is ensuring regional engagement to address security concerns unique to Turkish interests outside of NATO. This goal was visible in the transformation of Turkey's relations with Middle Eastern neighbors during the initial AKP administration by political normalization and commercial activism. Hence AKP leaders have continuously referred to the rationalistic and ideological explanations, i.e. economic, political, and cultural, of the Turkish-Iranian bilateral relationship.

The emphasis on shared history and cultural similarities between Turkey and Iran poses an important dilemma for Turkish security policies: Is Turkey solely a NATO member that would be threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran? Could Turkey maintain a sustainable policy towards Iran by balancing regional cooperation and defensive measures against its possible nuclear attempts and their delivery systems? Since Turkish risk perception of proliferation in the region is based on both capabilities and intentions, there has been heavy emphasis on the negative implications of a possible nuclear-armed Iran for Turkish security include heightened regional competition, military strike against Iran by the US and Israel, and increased costs to defense such as enhanced missile defenses. However, Turkey does not have a clear roadmap following the JCPOA on how to formulate a security policy toward Iran, given the stark differences in their sets of allies in the Syrian conflict.

Turkish-Iranian Strategic Relations

The history of Turkish-Iranian strategic relations shows cycles of political disagreement and suspicion, followed by rapprochement motivated by cultural and economic ties. Overall, peaceful competition has outweighed confrontation.

The rationale behind Turkish-Iranian cooperation is explained by both rationalistic and reflectivist viewpoints; e.g. trade benefits, minimizing security risks vs. Muslim identity and common culture. Both sides have prioritized economic and cultural cooperation over security cooperation. Separation of political disagreements from these ties have shown a compartmentalization of issues toward generating economic interdependence. However, the current state of Turkish security policies toward the region, especially the coupling of the removal of the Assad regime, the fight against PKK, and the anti-IS coalition complicate the strategic relations with Iran.

The Bilateral Relationship

Historically, Turkey and Iran have utilized their economic and cultural ties to maintain peaceful competition, despite cyclical political crises due to ideological frictions, disagreements, and suspicion of each other. The evolving state of bilateral relations shows that these historical legacies and political disagreements do not overshadow maintaining good relations and the current agreements to enhance Turkish-Iranian strategic relationship.

Turkey-Iran relations go back to the sixteenth-century Ottoman-Safavid rivalry, i.e. the power struggle in Azerbaijan and Iraq over minorities, gaining Kurdish tribes' allegiance in particular.⁷²¹ The topography between Iran and Turkey does not allow a clear winner in case of a conflict.⁷²² However, Turkish officials acknowledge that Iran does not like the 1639 reference to the border demarcation with Turkey because they lost the Ottoman-Safavid War that was ended with the Qasr-e Shirin Treaty.⁷²³

Despite Iran's aspiration to adopt the Ottomans' 19th century *Tanzimat* reforms to modernize and establish diplomatic ties, the Ottoman statesmen perceived Iran as a potential military threat that could cooperate with Russia, as it was the case during the 1878 Russo-Turkish war.⁷²⁴ Meanwhile, pan-Islamists in both countries argued for the unity of Muslims, i.e. Sunni-Shi'a rapprochement against external threats.⁷²⁵ Moreover, Turkey and Iran were both descendants of hegemonic empires that regressed in the turn of the century.⁷²⁶ In the aftermath of World War I, Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk introduced similar reforms, leading to rapprochement. Yet, Turkey continued to watch Iran for alignment with its enemies.⁷²⁷

⁷²¹ Gokhan Cetinsaya, "Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: The Historical Roots of Turkish-Iranian Relations," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol. 7, no. 3, September 2003, pp. 116-117.

⁷²² Author's interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu, MEF University, February 2, 2015, Istanbul.

⁷²³ Author's interview with senior official at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Research, February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁷²⁴ Cetinsaya, 2003, p. 117.

⁷²⁵ Cetinsaya, 2003, p. 118.

⁷²⁶ Henri J. Barkey, "Iran and Turkey," *United States Institute of Peace Resources*, October 21, 2010, p. 1, at: <http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-turkey>

⁷²⁷ Cetinsaya, 2003, p. 123.

Throughout the Cold War, Turkey was concerned about the Soviet support to separatist groups in Iran, and Iran was dissatisfied with Turkey's NATO membership. The Shah once said, "America treats Turkey as a wife and Iran as a concubine."⁷²⁸

In 1964, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan established a new organization called Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which led to the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).⁷²⁹ However, the oil crisis of 1973 changed the regional power equilibrium in Iran's favor, leading to Turkish resentment due to financial difficulties.

In the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the main tension between Ankara and Tehran arose from the Islamist regional order Iran promoted and secular Turkey's alliance with the West. Hence, the two countries became "two opposite poles" in the Islamic world.⁷³⁰ The Iranian threat to regime change through Islamism and promotion of *Sharia*, the Islamic rule of law, remained in the Turkish national security strategy documents until recent years. Similarly, Iran was dubious of Turkey's intentions as a NATO ally and strategic partner of the US.

Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Turkey chose to remain neutral, providing basic goods to both countries.⁷³¹ By the end of the war, both Turkey and Iran aimed at enhancing their influence and utilizing economic opportunities in the post-Soviet space and their

⁷²⁸ Cetinsaya, 2003, p. 126.

⁷²⁹ Cetinsaya, 2003, p. 127.

⁷³⁰ Barkey, 2010, p. 1.

⁷³¹ Barkey, 2010, p. 2.

ideological differences became more confrontational.⁷³² Both sides suspected each other of interference, i.e. Iranian aid to Kurdish insurgents and Turkish ties to the Azeri populations.⁷³³ Both sides also competed for influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, given the power vacuum there. The Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership threatened Iran, who partnered with Syria on security issues, yet avoided direct confrontation with Turkey. In 1997, the countries mutually withdrew their ambassadors following the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey Baqeri's speech that "those who sign agreements with the United States and Israel will, sooner or later, be penalized."⁷³⁴ Baqeri was labeled as terrorist, declared personae *non grata*, and expelled from Turkey.⁷³⁵ This diplomatic crisis was resolved with the new governments in 1998 and appointment of new ambassadors.⁷³⁶

In the last decade, despite some political disagreements, Turkish cooperation with Iran flourished, in accordance with the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) "zero problems with neighbors" policy. 2009 was the Iran-Turkey Cultural Year and the countries signed a visa waiver agreement.

Following the election of Hassan Rouhani as the Iranian President in June 2013, the Iranian parliamentary group had meetings with high-ranking Turkish officials to

⁷³² Henri J. Barkey, "Turkish-Iranian Competition after the Arab Spring," *Survival*, vol. 54, no. 6, December 2012–January 2013, p. 142.

⁷³³ Barkey, 2010, p. 2.

⁷³⁴ Bülent Aras, "Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran: Ideology and Foreign Policy in Flux," *Journal of Third World Studies*, Vol.18, No.1, 2001, p. 107. Following this speech, the Turkish armed forces sent tanks and military vehicles through the Sincan area.

⁷³⁵ Anoushiravan Etheshami, Suleyman Elik, "Turkey's Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East," *Turkish Studies*, vol. 12, no.4, December 2011, p. 645.

⁷³⁶ Bayram Sinkaya, "Rationalization of Turkey-Iran Relations: Prospects and Limits," *Insight Turkey*, vol. 14, no. 2, 2012, p. 139.

discuss mutual interests and expanding bilateral ties, followed by Turkish officials' visit to Iran, including the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.⁷³⁷ The two countries have burgeoning ties and recently signed several bilateral agreements in energy, trade, tourism, culture, and transportation.⁷³⁸ Both Rouhani and Erdogan underline the importance of promoting economic cooperation, ending violence in Iraq and Syria under the principles of Islam, fighting Islamophobia together, and strengthening political dialogue,⁷³⁹ to be explored in the following section.

Mutual Interests

Turkish-Iranian relations show the pragmatic aspect of regional cooperation with a clear emphasis on economic interdependence. Although Turkey and Iran are on opposite sides of the civil war in Syria and seek influence on the Sunni-Shi'a, Arab-Kurdish divisions of Iraq, Barkey argues that their rivalry is exaggerated as both parties are pragmatic in acting carefully to "agree to disagree."⁷⁴⁰ Interdependence is evident in economic relations, i.e. commerce and energy trade, and the mutual need for regional stability and elimination of terrorist threats in the Middle East.

⁷³⁷ Suleyman Elik, "Iran-Turkey Relations at Hasan Rouhani Era: A Special Reference to Iran-US Nuclear Negotiations," *Bilgesam Analysis/Middle East*, No: 1108, December 2013, p. 2.

⁷³⁸ "Rouhani's Visit Marks Beginning of New Era in Turkey, Iran Relations," *Daily Sabah*, June 9, 2014.

⁷³⁹ The two leaders met at the sidelines of the 2016 Istanbul Organization of Islamic Cooperation and held the third Turkish-Iranian High-Level Cooperation Council meeting. "Erdogan: Iran, Turkey should work together," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, April 16, 2016.

⁷⁴⁰ Barkey, December 2012–January 2013, pp. 139–140.

Commerce

With the exception of the 2009 global economic crisis, the bilateral trade between Turkey and Iran has steadily increased since 2001, when Iranian natural gas exports to Turkey began.⁷⁴¹ In November 2001, the Turkish-Iranian Business Council was established to promote commercial ties.⁷⁴² In terms of enhancing trade relations, AKP has followed Turgut Ozal's model to increase exports in the region for economic growth. Turkey and Iran have a Joint Economic Commission (JEC) and a Joint Border Trade Commission, in addition to taxation and investment agreements and trade delegations.⁷⁴³

According to the Turkish Ministry of Economy, the trade volume increased from \$1.05 billion in 2000 to \$10.2 billion in 2010 and \$21.8 billion in 2012, with crude oil and natural gas dominating Iranian exports to Turkey by 90%.⁷⁴⁴ Yet, these numbers dropped to \$14.5 billion in 2013 due to the economic sanctions imposed on Iran.⁷⁴⁵ In 2012, Iran was Turkey's third largest goods export market, where \$6.52 billion out of \$9.9 billion was gold and golden plated silver because of the monetary sanctions on Iran.⁷⁴⁶

⁷⁴¹ "Turkey-Iran Economic and Trade Relations," *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-iran.en.mfa

⁷⁴² Sinkaya, 2012, p. 141.

⁷⁴³ "Countries and Regions- Middle East- Iran," *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy*, at: <http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&country=IR®ion=4>

⁷⁴⁴ "Iran Islam Cumhuriyeti'ne Iliskin Temel Bilgiler," *T.C. Ekonomi Bakanligi*, 2013, at: <http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/upload/C74985FF-D8D3-8566-4520E92CB063EEF8/İran-son.pdf>

⁷⁴⁵ "Turkey, Iran Agree to Boost Burgeoning Trade Ties," *Daily Sabah*, June 10, 2014.

⁷⁴⁶ "Countries and Regions- Middle East- Iran," *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy*, at: <http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&country=IR®ion=4>

In January 2014, Turkey signed a preferential trade agreement with Iran for tariff reductions, forming a High Council of Strategic Cooperation, and setting the goal to increase bilateral trade to \$30 billion by 2016.⁷⁴⁷ Despite this ambition, Hentov argues that while Iran offers great economic opportunities, the bilateral relationship lacks the “potential glue” for deeper political partnership.⁷⁴⁸ For Turkey, energy dependency is a stronger incentive to advance strategic relations with Iran.⁷⁴⁹

In terms of the impact of the nuclear deal, when Iran faced economic sanctions, Turkey enjoyed exemptions, which are likely to dissipate as Iran diversifies its trade partners. However, Iran’s former ambassador to Ankara Bikdeli states that Iran will not forget Turkey’s support to Iran, i.e. the \$23 billion trade volume during the sanctions, and will enhance trade ties despite disagreements in Syria.⁷⁵⁰ President Rouhani also communicated this message to the new ambassador Taharyan to strengthen the relationship.⁷⁵¹ However, both Akgun and Ersoy argue that it is too soon to picture the post-sanctions economy in Iran and Turkey’s role in it, given the unresolved Syrian conflict and Iran’s caution in economic policies.⁷⁵²

Energy

Energy imports are arguably Turkey’s strongest motivation for strategic partnership

⁷⁴⁷ “Turkiye-Iran arasinda cok kritik anlasma,” *Sabah*, January 29, 2014.

⁷⁴⁸ Elliot Hentov, “Turkey and Iran,” in *Turkey’s Global Strategy*, London School of Economics IDEAS Report, May 2011, p. 33, at:

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR007/iran.pdf>

⁷⁴⁹ Babali, 2012.

⁷⁵⁰ “Turkiye’nin Iran hamlesi basliyor,” *Milliyet*, February 14, 2016.

⁷⁵¹ “Iran: Turkiye ile iliskiler gelistirilmeli,” *Sabah*, February 17, 2016.

⁷⁵² “Turkiye-Iran ticareti Suriye’ye bagli,” *DW*, January 19, 2016.

with Iran. As Davutoglu argues, “a growing economy and surrounded by energy resources, Turkey needs Iranian energy as a natural extension of its national interests. Therefore, Turkey’s energy arrangements with Iran cannot be dependent upon its relationships with other countries.”⁷⁵³

Turkey has maintained economic partnership with Iran in order to diversify its energy sources, i.e. an alternative to dependence on Russia.⁷⁵⁴ The Iranian sources also give Turkey leverage on Russia to demand lower prices. However, the Turkish demand on Iranian gas increases substantially during the winter, leading to disruptions due to high domestic demand in Iran and cold weather damaging the pipelines. Hence, Turkey aims to formulate solutions to guarantee the energy supply and decrease vulnerability as its national strategy.⁷⁵⁵

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Iran utilized its geopolitical location to expand energy trade with oil and gas rich Central Asian countries. In August 1996, despite the U.S. sanctions on investments in Libya and Iran, Turkey’s Islamist Prime Minister Erbakan signed a \$20 billion agreement with Iran to transport the Turkmen and Iranian gas to Turkey, making the country Turkey’s second largest natural gas

⁷⁵³ Serdar Poyraz, “Turkish-Iranian Relations: A Wider Perspective,” *SETA Policy Brief*, no. 37, November 2009.

⁷⁵⁴ Ali Karaosmanoglu, “Turkey’s objectives in the Caspian region,” *The Security of the Caspian Sea Region*, ed. Gennady Chufrin, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press: 2001, p. 154.

⁷⁵⁵ According to the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources estimates in 2012-2013, Turkish import dependency in energy is 73 percent on average; 98 percent in natural gas, 92 percent in fuel-oil, and 30 percent in coal. The Ministry projects that electricity demand will increase by 7 percent per year on average, i.e. from 239 terawatt-hour per year (TWh/yr) in 2012 to 500 TWh/yr in 2023, in line with the targeted economic growth and the 2023 vision announced in 2007. Salih Sari, “Current Nuclear Power Situation in Turkey,” IAEA Technical Meeting on CNPP, Vienna, Austria, March 18-21, 2013, <http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/Meetings/2013/2013-03-18-03-21-TM-NPE/22.sari.pdf>

supplier after Russia.⁷⁵⁶ According to the agreement, Iran would sell 140 billion cubic feet of gas per year for 22 years beginning in 1998.⁷⁵⁷ By this agreement's "take-or-pay" clause, Turkey committed to paying for a "minimum of 87 percent of the annual contracted volume regardless of how much it actually consumed."⁷⁵⁸ Despite Erbakan's ownership of the deal by reference to the Muslim brotherhood between Turkey and Iran, this deal was in fact drafted by his predecessor, Tansu Ciller, pointing to the economic need for energy cooperation with Iran rather than ideological reasons.⁷⁵⁹

In July 2007, Turkey and Iran signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" to transport Turkmen and Iranian gas via a new pipeline through Turkey and Turkish investment in South Pars natural gas fields in Iran.⁷⁶⁰ This agreement was expanded in November 2008, when the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and the Iranian State Company signed a preliminary agreement, but by July 2010 Turkey gave up on the South Pars project, possibly due to the U.S. Congress' renewal of sanctions and warnings to Turkey.⁷⁶¹

According to the Turkish Energy Minister Yildiz, "Turkey purchases the most

⁷⁵⁶ Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 52, no. 1, Winter 1998, p. 36.

Erbakan also established the Developing 8 (D8), an organization of eight Muslim countries: Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, and Iran, but never became a significant alternative to the Western G7. Barkey, December 2012–January 2013, pp. 142–143.

⁷⁵⁷ "Defying U.S., Turkey to Sign Gas Deal in Iran," *The New York Times*, August 11, 1996.

⁷⁵⁸ Gareth Jenkins, "Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran," *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program*, Washington DC, 2012, p. 54.

⁷⁵⁹ Calabrese, 1998, p. 83.

⁷⁶⁰ Dost-Niyego and Taner, 2014, p. 2.

⁷⁶¹ Dost-Niyego and Taner, 2014, p. 2.

expensive natural gas from Iran among other suppliers.”⁷⁶² In March 2012, Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) filed an arbitration case against Iran, demanding a retroactive return to discounted prices due to poor quality.⁷⁶³ Ankara and Tehran failed to reach an agreement on the pricing and the court case has not been finalized.⁷⁶⁴ Turkey argues that it would double the gas imports if Iran reduced the price, bringing a scenario that Turkey could consider storing or reselling the gas that it cannot consume.⁷⁶⁵ Turkey maintains the transport of Turkmen gas as an unchanging condition, which is not favorable to Iran as it imports and resells Turkmen gas for higher prices.⁷⁶⁶ However, Turkey wants to transfer Turkmen, Kazakh, and Azeri gas to Europe through the Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Project.⁷⁶⁷ Babali argues that Turkey perceives energy as a tool to re-emerge as a regional player and become an “east-west and north-south energy bridge.”⁷⁶⁸ Given its energy deficit due to economic growth, Turkey aims to have good political relations with Iran to improve energy cooperation to its advantage.

In February 2016, Iran accepted the International Court of Arbitration decision to offer more gas or make cash payments to Turkey, in response to the cases Turkey

⁷⁶² “Turkey, Iran fail to get has price deal. Agree further talks,” *Tehran Times*, June 11, 2014. While the price of the imports is a “state secret,” leaked documents suggest \$330 for Azerbaijani gas, \$400 for Russian gas, and \$505 for Iranian gas, all prices per cubic meter. Dost-Niyego and Taner estimate that in early 2012, it is likely that Turkey was paying \$423 for Iranian gas, and the arbitration case might be more political than commercial. Dost-Niyego, Taner, 2014, p. 2.

⁷⁶³ “Turkey, Iran fail to get has price deal, agree further talks,” *Tehran Times*.

⁷⁶⁴ Turkey, Iran fail to get has price deal, agree further talks,” *Tehran Times*

⁷⁶⁵ Olgu Okumus, “Why is Turkey buying more gas than it needs from Iran?” *Al-Monitor*, Turkey Pulse, February 28, 2014: at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/turkey-iran-gas-import-consumption-erdogan-price.html#>

⁷⁶⁶ Dost-Niyego, Taner, 2014, p. 2.

⁷⁶⁷ Babali, 2012, p. 9.

⁷⁶⁸ Babali, 2012, p. 2.

brought to the court on higher gas prices and deficiencies in distribution.⁷⁶⁹ President Rouhani explicitly stated that Iran could meet all of Turkey's energy needs in petrol, natural gas, and petrochemicals in return for enhanced economic cooperation.⁷⁷⁰

Regional Stability

Despite their differences in allies, both Turkey and Iran are concerned about maintaining regional order. Calabrese argues that Turkey and Iran have managed their differences around the common perception of being surrounded by unfriendly neighbors and maintained peaceful and cordial relations as crucial actors for regional stability.⁷⁷¹ To this end, utilizing their cultural similarities, Turkey and Iran adopted identical positions in promoting an active role for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Islamic states' affairs and regional politics.⁷⁷² They promoted the "Dialogue among Civilizations" initiative, first coined by Khatami, followed by Turkey's "Alliance of Civilizations" platform under the UN.⁷⁷³

Turkey and Iran's mutual security concerns include terrorist development leading to political instability and violence in the neighborhood, the imminent issue being the spillover of the Syrian conflict into Iraq. According to the Iranian ambassador to Ankara Bıkdeli, "We won't be happy seeing Turkey get hurt in Syria. Turkey should also not feel happy when we get hurt in Syria, because if one gets hurt the other will

⁷⁶⁹ "Iran to fulfill arbitration decision on gas discount: Senior official," *Hurriyet Daily News*, February 12, 2016.

⁷⁷⁰ "Iran'dan enerji teklifi: Tum ihtiyacinizi gideririz," *Hurriyet*, April 16, 2016.

⁷⁷¹ Calabrese, 1998, p. 76.

⁷⁷² Sinkaya, 2012, p. 145.

⁷⁷³ Sinkaya, 2012, p. 146.

inevitably get hurt, too. We are two countries where our destinies are tied together.”⁷⁷⁴ Hence, both parties are interested in advancing security cooperation for mutual benefit.

Turkey’s popularity in the Middle East increased as it voiced criticism of the US and Israel. However, Turkey tried to strike a balance between Islamism and secularism, as “being too close to Iran is problematic for the West; being too close to the West is not good for bilateral relations.”⁷⁷⁵ Turkey needed to maintain a “middle position” to be close enough to both sides to exert influence.⁷⁷⁶ Kirdemir argues that rivalry on vital regional issues and Tehran’s strategic agenda challenge deepened cooperation; however compartmentalization of relations allows continued dialogue.⁷⁷⁷

Counterterrorism

Initially, regional terrorism brought the two countries together to cooperate on security issues. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq led to a rapprochement between Turkey and Iran on the Kurdish insurgency, as both countries worried about the U.S. actions and Kurdish separatism. However, Kurdish independence was not as crucial for Iran as it was for Turkey. For Iran, cooperation with Turkey was instrumental in

⁷⁷⁴ Tulin Daloglu, “Iran and Turkey Have Differences on Syria, But not a Crisis,” *Al-Monitor*, September 30, 2013, at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/iran-turkey-syria-policy-differences.html>

⁷⁷⁵ Hanna Ojanen, Barbara Zanchetta, “Turkey and the Iranian Nuclear Program: A Key to Progress in Regional Disarmament,” The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, *Briefing Paper 107*, May 31, 2012, p. 8.

⁷⁷⁶ Ojanen and Zanchetta, 2012, p. 10.

⁷⁷⁷ Baris Kirdemir, “Can Turkey Continue to Compartmentalize its Relations with Tehran?” *Second Line of Defense*, February 7, 2014.

avoiding international isolation, both economic and political.

Following Erdogan's 2004 visit to Iran, being confronted with Kurdish separatism led by the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), Iran listed PKK as a terrorist organization.⁷⁷⁸ In July 2004, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on security cooperation to hold joint military operations and share intelligence against Kurdish militants.⁷⁷⁹ After the Turkish support to President Ahmadinejad following the disputed 2009 elections and attacks to Iranian security forces by PJAK, Iran launched artillery strikes against PKK and PJAK in northern Iraq and shared intelligence with Turkey.⁷⁸⁰

As a result of the terrorist development in the power vacuum created by the Syrian civil war, the US and its allies, including Turkey, indirectly collaborate with Iran against the Sunni extremists united under ISIS, through the Iraqi army and Kurdish security forces.⁷⁸¹ The Islamic State's territorial gains in 2014 and the declaration of a "caliphate" in the region threaten all state parties in the region, as the jihadi group remains unaffiliated with state sponsors. Although they do not collaborate directly and have different motivations to eliminate the Islamic State, the alarming situation in Iraq and Syria has led to common concern of a sectarian war and chance for security cooperation.

⁷⁷⁸ Bas, 2013, p. 118.

⁷⁷⁹ Ayman, 2014, p. 11.

⁷⁸⁰ Barkey, 2010, p. 3.

⁷⁸¹ "U.S. and Iran Unlikely Allies in Iraq Battle," *The New York Times*, August 31, 2014.

Divergent Security Concerns

Given their geography and strategic culture, Turkey and Iran were historically “essential friends and natural enemies.”⁷⁸² A distinctive feature of Turkish-Iranian relations is continuity and stability, i.e. mutual realization that neither side could eradicate the other and acceptance of the demarcation line by the Kasr-i Sirin Treaty of 1639.⁷⁸³ At the same time, two countries have been opportunistic and used external powers’ involvement for regional influence, aiming to advance their own interests at the other’s expense.⁷⁸⁴

In Turkish-Iranian economic cooperation, ideological rivalry has been replaced with pragmatism. Recently, the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war have demonstrated the fragility of security relations and rival visions for the future of the Middle East in the political realm.⁷⁸⁵ Security concerns have concentrated on regional clout, the Iranian nuclear program, and divergence of interests and allies in response to the arising security threats.

⁷⁸² Cetinsaya, 2003, pp. 116-132.

⁷⁸³ S. Gulden Ayman, “Turkey and Iran: Between Friendly Competition and Fierce Rivalry,” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. 36, no. 1, Winter 2014, p. 7.

⁷⁸⁴ Ayman, 2014, p. 7.

⁷⁸⁵ Safak Bas, “Pragmatism and Rivalry: The Nature of Turkey-Iran Relations,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, vol. 12, no. 3, Fall 2013, pp. 113-124.

Regional Influence and Domestic Interference

Competition and rivalry are sometimes used interchangeably to explain Turkish-Iranian relations. While competition can be friendly and non-zero sum, i.e. maximizing absolute gains, though, rivalry in international relations is a balancing act between two states that perceive a threat due to each other's strength, proximity, and offensive capabilities, i.e. maximizing relative power.⁷⁸⁶ Competition better describes the quality of the Turkish-Iranian bilateral relationship as both countries have aimed at maximizing gain without perceiving an existential threat. Iran and Turkey have competed for both political and economic influence in the region, particularly in Iraq. Elements of this competition include concerns over interference in domestic affairs through minorities, support to terrorist or separatist groups, and sectarian politics.

Historically, Turkey has shown sensitivity on the rights of the Turkmens concentrated in northern Iraq and Iranian influence on Kurdish populations, while Iran has worried about Turkish interference with the Azeri populations.⁷⁸⁷ Turkey and Iran were also in rivalry to gain the loyalty of tribes on the border. To address these concerns, in November 1984, Turkey signed an agreement with Iran prohibiting detrimental activity to the security of the other within their borders.⁷⁸⁸ Yet, the Kurdistan

⁷⁸⁶ Ayman, 2014, 7.

⁷⁸⁷ Turkey also wants to mediate the Azeri-Iranian disagreement on the Nagorn-Karabakh conflict between Armenia, who is allied with Iran, and Azerbaijan. Pinar Dost-Niyego, Orhan Taner, "Turkish-Iranian Rapprochement and the Future of European and Asian Energy," Atlantic Council, *Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center Issue Brief*, April 2014, p. 4.

⁷⁸⁸ Ayman, 2014, p. 8.

Workers' Party (PKK) operated in Iran until the late 1990s, and the two countries were in proxy war through the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), backed by Ankara, and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), aligned with PKK and supported by Tehran.⁷⁸⁹ Turkey heavily criticized the Iranian support for the PKK, i.e. logistics support and harboring, and Islamist groups in Turkey.

The radical fundamentalist forces in Turkey were believed to be strengthened by the Rafsanjani government.⁷⁹⁰ A report by the "Parliamentary Investigation Commission for Unsolved Political Murders" led by Prime Minister Ciller concluded that "a group in Iran is training and assisting members of every organization with destructive or separatist aims in our country."⁷⁹¹ Turkey claimed that the 1990s assassinations of Kemalist journalists and academicians such as Bahriye Uçok, Ugur Mumcu, and Ahmet Taner Kislali were tied to Hezbollah militants trained in Iran in a Kurdish-led Islamist organization.⁷⁹² Some captured Hezbollah militants alleged that they had received political and military training from Iran's Revolutionary Guard Command.⁷⁹³ Yet, the allegations and the trials remained inconclusive. These concerns were reciprocated on the Iranian end by Turkey's alliance with the West. Denying the allegations of terrorist attacks, Iran accused Turkey of hosting Iranian

⁷⁸⁹ Ayman, 2014, p. 8.

⁷⁹⁰ Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons, and Proliferation," *Comparative Strategy*, 14:2, 1995, pp. 149-172.

⁷⁹¹ John Calabrese, "Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 25, no. 1, May 1998, p. 85.

⁷⁹² Kenan Evren, former Turkish president, asserted that: "Hezbollah is the work of Iran. Iran has always been a problem for us... Hezbollah grew and became powerful in the 1980s. I warned of the danger, but the politicians were worried about votes, hence the Hezbollah grew, as did others." Robert Olson, "Turkey-Iran relations, 1997 to 2000: the Kurdish and Islamist questions," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 21, no. 5, 2000, p. 880.

⁷⁹³ Olson, 2000, p. 882.

oppositions groups such as the Mujahedeen-e Khalq Organization.⁷⁹⁴ Iran also arrested members of a “Turkish espionage ring” in West Azerbaijan.⁷⁹⁵

The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the incomplete reconstruction in its aftermath to this day disturbed both Turkey and Iran: Turkey worried about the breakup of Iraq, spillover of civil conflict, and the U.S.-Kurdish alliance leading to an independent Kurdish state. Iran perceived the invasion as a U.S. attempt to use Iraq as a base to eliminate Iran.⁷⁹⁶ Both countries’ concerns were economic as well: Following the Sunni-Shi’a divide, Iran was more influential in the south and prioritized trade relations with the Basra region in particular, reaching \$8 billion in volume in 2010.⁷⁹⁷ While Iran had good economic relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), following the democratization reforms with its Kurdish opening, Turkey joined as a competitor with a series of Turkish investment in northern Iraq and Basra, trade volume reaching \$11.9 billion on 2013.⁷⁹⁸ In 2012, 48 percent of the foreign companies in Iraq were Turkish.⁷⁹⁹ Nevertheless, Iran benefited from the electoral democracy in Iraq due to the Shi’a majority.⁸⁰⁰ Turkey criticized al-Maliki for sectarian rule with Iran’s support and the US for withdrawing its troops from Iraq

⁷⁹⁴ Bayram Sinkaya, “Turkey-Iran Relations in the 1990s and the Role of Ideology,” *Perceptions*, Vol.10, No.1, Spring 2005, p. 9.

⁷⁹⁵ Calabrese, 1998, p. 85.

⁷⁹⁶ Ayman, 2014, p. 11.

⁷⁹⁷ Ayman, 2014, p. 13.

⁷⁹⁸ Mehmet Cetingulec, “Iraq crisis hits Turkish economy,” *Al-Monitor*, Turkey Pulse, June 18, 2014, at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/cetingulec-isis-turkey-exports-mosul-consulate-iraq-baghdad.html>

⁷⁹⁹ Ayman, 2014, p. 13.

⁸⁰⁰ Ayman, 2014, p. 14.

without complete reconstruction, as then Prime Minister Erdogan told President Obama: “You [US] left Iraq in the hands of Iran once you withdrew.”⁸⁰¹

Since 2012, Turkey intensified its trade relations with the KRG, particularly in form of energy deals with Erbil to decrease dependency on Russia and Iran, and become an energy hub by a series of new pipelines.⁸⁰² Yet, this connection deteriorated Ankara’s relations with Baghdad as a perceived interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, along with Ankara’s critique of the al-Maliki government for sectarianism, so far unresolved under Iraq’s new central government. Turkey’s trade relations with KRG have also been interrupted by the occupation of several cities by ISIS.

As Syria and Iraq share a common border with both Turkey and Iran, security developments in these countries have “immediate and direct” impact regional security.⁸⁰³ Although Turkey has stronger conventional military power and economic capabilities than its neighbors, unconventional threats such as Jihadi terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threaten all states in the region.

Competing Alliances

Turkey and Iran define their security orientations with opposing sets of allies:

Turkey’s relations with the West are institutionalized by its NATO membership,

⁸⁰¹ Lale Kemal, “Erdogan to Obama: You left Iraq in Iran’s hands,” *Today’s Zaman*, March 21, 2012.

⁸⁰² KRG is estimated to have reserves of 40-50 billion barrels of oil and 3-6 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Ayman, 2014, p. 17.

⁸⁰³ H. Sonmez Atesoglu, “Security of Turkey with Respect to the Middle East,” *Perceptions*, vol. XVI, no. 2, Summer 2011, p. 99.

while Iran prioritizes non-Western powers such as Russia and China in its alliance strategy, despite being a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Given the NATO resources and its conventional force structure, Turkey's military capabilities surpass Iran's. Meanwhile, Iran has expressed anxiety and criticism over Turkish-U.S.-Israeli security cooperation. These divergences have implications on the recent developments in the regional security scene, i.e. Turkish participation to the NATO ballistic missile defense architecture, the Arab uprisings and the civil conflict in Syria.

Turkey openly criticized Iran's regional policies. Erdogan argues that Iran's attempt to dominate the region by its military operations in Yemen disturb both the Gulf countries and Turkey.⁸⁰⁴ Similarly, Erdogan's spokesperson Kalin welcomes Rouhani's "prudent moderation" foreign policy, while criticizing its support for the Assad regime and "Shiite geopolitics."⁸⁰⁵ In order to resolve their differences, Rouhani and Erdogan have focused on border security, regional instability, extremism and terrorism in their strategic dialogue. Both sides have also agreed to cooperate on peace and stability in Yemen by ceasefire and humanitarian aid.⁸⁰⁶

Most importantly, Turkey's increasing strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia is likely to put pressure on relations with Iran. Turkey has taken concrete steps to deepen bilateral relations with Riyadh. In an unprecedented case, in February 2016, Saudi warplanes have been deployed to the Incirlik AB as part of the anti-ISIS

⁸⁰⁴ "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'dan İran'a doğalgaz sitemi," *Hurriyet*, April 7, 2015.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibrahim Kalin, "Iran between engagement and confrontation," *Turkey Agenda*, June 10, 2014.

⁸⁰⁶ "Türkiye ve İran'dan flas anlaşma," *Haber10*, [October 17, 2015](#).

coalition. Through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Saudi Arabia has been aiming to promote a rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey to strengthen its Islamic Alliance.⁸⁰⁷ These attempts result from the Arab Spring and the Syrian war, to be explored in the following section.

The Arab Spring

Throughout the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa since December 2010, Iran sided with the masses in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and especially in Bahrain, due to its large Shi'a population, but continued to support the Assad regime in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon.⁸⁰⁸ Iran defined the Arab uprisings as an "Islamic awakening," while Turkey's AKP government and its "zero problems with neighbors" policy were caught unprepared for the regime changes.⁸⁰⁹ In particular, Turkey's diplomatic relations with Egypt have been suspended, following the 2013 coup by General Sisi that toppled down the Mursi government. AKP officials have adamantly supported the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to criticism in the region of Turkey's interference into their domestic affairs.

In order to enhance its regional stance, Turkey initiated strategic cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, challenging its relations with Iran. The trade volume between the GCC and Turkey increased from \$2.1 billion in 2002 to \$8 billion in 2009 as well as the declaration of

⁸⁰⁷ "Kral'in en onemli gundemi Islam Ordusu," *Sabah*, April 10, 2016.

⁸⁰⁸ Bas, 2013, 120.

⁸⁰⁹ Ayman, 2014, 16.

Turkey as a strategic partner of GCC in 2008.⁸¹⁰

Oktav summarizes the interest blocs that appeared on the Syria issue as Russia-China-Iran-Syria vs. US-EU-Israel-Turkey-Saudi Arabia-Qatar, but there have been disagreement within blocs as well.⁸¹¹ She argues that the lack of Western action has paved the way to increased Turkish-GCC security cooperation against Assad and creation of a Sunni-Shi'a axis.⁸¹² In return, GCC countries have supported investments in Turkey, and Turkish activism in the international arena, i.e. 2015-16 Turkish membership to the U.N. Security Council and presidency in the Organization of the Islamic Conference.⁸¹³

Iran has been following these developments as well as the 2005 security cooperation agreement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia as a potential Sunni opposition bloc that would cooperate with NATO for Gulf security against Iran's interests.⁸¹⁴ Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu aimed at alleviating Iran's concerns by stating that the enhanced relations were toward regional integration rather than quest for a Sunni bloc against Iran, and by increasing trade ties with Iran, largely due to its dependence on Iranian gas and oil imports.⁸¹⁵ Yet, Turkey has not been able to sustain its relations with Syria, Iran, and the GCC throughout the Arab uprisings, given Iran's support to

⁸¹⁰ Ozden Zeynep Oktav, "Arap Bahari ve Turkiye-Korfez Devletleri Iliskileri," *Ortadogu Analiz*, Vol. 5, No:51, March 2013, p. 72.

⁸¹¹ Oktay, 2013, p. 75.

⁸¹² Oktay, 2013, pp. 75-6.

⁸¹³ Oktay, 2013, p. 76.

⁸¹⁴ Oktay, 2013, p. 76

⁸¹⁵ Oktay, 2013, p. 76

opposing groups in Yemen, Bahrain, and for the Assad regime.⁸¹⁶

The main difference between Turkey and Iran from the perspective of the Turkish foreign ministry is simple: As a foreign policy tool, Turkey has used diplomacy and soft power towards the rivalry with Iran, whereas Iran uses proxy organizations, which has led to divergence of interests after the Arab Spring.⁸¹⁷

The Syrian Conflict

Syria and Iran have been allies since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Throughout the Syrian civil conflict, the Iranian priority has been protecting the Assad government to maintain Iran's influence in the region, preserve the Islamic regime, and strengthen Hezbollah in Lebanon.⁸¹⁸ Meanwhile, the Assad-Erdogan friendship that initially represented Turkey's "zero problems with neighbors" policy has been replaced by Turkey's unmet expectation of overthrowing the Syrian regime despite crossing of U.S. "red lines."⁸¹⁹

Both Iran and the Shi'a leaders in Iraq are wary of a potential Sunni awakening that would challenge regional dynamics. Hence, Ayman argues that the Syrian crisis has

⁸¹⁶ Oktay, 2013, p. 73.

⁸¹⁷ Author's interview with senior official at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Research, February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁸¹⁸ Ayman, 2014, p. 18.

⁸¹⁹ Henri J. Barkey, "Syria's Dark Shadow over US-Turkey Relations," *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No: 4, Winter 2016, p. 28.

transformed Turkish-Iranian competition into rivalry.⁸²⁰ Both sides have verbally expressed frustration with each other's stance on Syria, i.e. Iran's support of Assad and Turkey's alignment with Saudi Arabia and Qatar and push for regime change.

As the conflict remains unresolved, it has had spillover effects on the Turkish-Iranian relationship: Iran has blamed Turkey for supporting Sunni terrorists and sectarian policies.⁸²¹ Iranians increasingly view Turkey's involvement in the Syrian conflict unfavorably (70%), along with Saudi Arabia (87%).⁸²² The public opinion poll also shows that 65% think Turkey is insincere in countering ISIS.⁸²³

In the latest stage of the conflict, the Russia-Iran cooperation to support the Assad regime has altered Turkey's calculations in Syria. Yet, as the civil conflict in Syria remains unresolved, deteriorated by ISIS, with repercussions on political stability in Iraq; Turkey and Iran share a common strategic interest to address the security threats in their neighborhood through cooperation.

Overall, Ayman argues that both Turkey and Iran have taken "temporary strategic alignments" instead of long-term, multi-dimensional cooperation due to the

⁸²⁰ Ayman, 2014, p. 18.

⁸²¹ Bas, 2013, p. 121.

⁸²² Ebrahim Mohseni, Nancy Gallagher, and Clay Ramsay, "Iranian Attitudes in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections: Economics, Politics, and Foreign Affairs" *CISSM-PPC Public Opinion study*, January 2016, p. 29, at: <http://cisssm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/Iranian%20Attitudes%20in%20Advance%20of%20the%20Parliamentary%20Elections%20-%202016%20-%20FINAL%20-%20sm.pdf>

⁸²³ "Iranian Attitudes in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections: Economics, Politics, and Foreign Affairs"

ideological differences and Turkey's close ties with the United States.⁸²⁴ Iran has primarily perceived Turkey as a US ally, limiting cooperation as seen in the impact of sanctions on economic relations. Aydin and Tekbiyik argue that Turkey's strategic partnership with the US could damage its ties with Iran, causing Turkey to choose a side in case diplomacy failed on the nuclear issue.⁸²⁵ This risk has led to the Turkish decision to pursue a cautious policy to remain neutral, as Turkey could not maintain a high-level relationship with Iran as a NATO member.⁸²⁶ Turan calls this delicate balance as "politics on a knife edge," i.e. dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons by diplomacy, while enhancing its deterrence against Iran's ballistic missiles.⁸²⁷ The following section dwells on these challenges.

Turkey's Views on Iran's Nuclear Program

While the common view would suggest that it would be "highly unlikely" for Iran to use nuclear weapons or conduct conventional attacks against Turkey, Turkish perceptions of the Iranian nuclear program have not been monolithic. These views have been shaped by both Iran's regional power projection and possible rivalry with Turkey, more than its disagreements with the IAEA over violations of the safeguards regime. Overall, Turkey has tried to keep friendly relations with Iran while minimizing the chances of both a nuclear-armed Iran and a U.S./Israeli military strike

⁸²⁴ Ayman, 2014, p. 10.

⁸²⁵ Dilek Aydin and Arif Tekbiyik, "Iran Nukleer Programinin Turkiye'nin Guvenligine Etkileri," *Guvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, No. 5, June 2007, p. 105.

⁸²⁶ Hasan Urkut, Gokhan Sari, "Iran Nukleer Programinin Turk Dis Politikasina Etkisi," *Guvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, October 2014, No: 20, p. 224.

⁸²⁷ Kemal Turan, "Iran Nukleer Krizinde Bicak Sirtinda Siyaset," *Guvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, 2008, No: 7, p. 39.

on Iran. This section provides an overview of Turkey's official and unofficial involvement in nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran, the differences in threat perceptions defined by the Turkish officials, the elite, and the public, and Turkey's response to JCPOA.

Turkish Threat Perceptions of a “Nuclear-armed” Iran

Throughout the nuclear impasse, Turkey supported Iran's declarations that it does not intend to have nuclear weapons, despite being dissatisfied by the Iranian nuclear program.⁸²⁸ But Turkey also kept a close eye on the undeclared nuclear facilities and questioned Iran's sincerity.

As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, international alarmists of a regional proliferation cascade in the Middle East have constantly referred to a nuclear-armed Iran leading to security concerns in Turkey, who would in return develop nuclear weapons. As John Bolton argued, “if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, then almost certainly Saudi Arabia will do the same, as will Egypt, Turkey, and perhaps others in the region, and we risk this widespread proliferation even it is a democratic Iran that possesses nuclear weapons.”⁸²⁹ A NATO Defense College report argued that there have been isolated calls for a Turkish nuclear weapon, as in the case of two former

⁸²⁸ Author's interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu,

⁸²⁹ Sinan Ulgen, “Turkey and the Bomb,” *The Carnegie Papers*, Nuclear Policy, February 2012, p. 3.

Turkish Air Force commanders Halis Burhan and Ergin Celasin, calling for Turkey to develop nuclear weapons to preserve the balance of power if Iran has them.⁸³⁰

Assumptions made on Turkey deciding to build nuclear weapons have even referred to the aftermath of the nuclear deal with Iran. However, Perkovich argues that these alarming calls of a nuclear-armed Turkey ignore the fact that Turkey is a NATO member.⁸³¹

Despite being friendly neighbors, Turkey has feared a nuclear-armed, nuclear-izing, or nuclear-ready Iran. However, naturally, there have been differences in perception on how immediate the threats to Turkish security from a nuclear-armed Iran are among the officials, the elite, and the public. While the government and the public generally do not perceive the Iranian nuclear program as a threat, Turkey's traditional security establishment composed of the military officials and the diplomatic elite have expressed concerns.⁸³² Meanwhile, despite the economic and cultural ties, the pursuit of Iranian foreign policy objectives in the region are concerning Ankara.⁸³³

⁸³⁰ Christopher Hobbs; Matthew Moran, Exploring Regional Responses to a Nuclear Iran : Nuclear Dominoes?, "Chapter 5: Turkey: Non-proliferation and International Integration," Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 74. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-eger-iran-nukleer-silah-yaparsa-turkiye-de-yapar-/dunya/dunyadetay/02.02.2012/1496812/default.htm>

⁸³¹ George Perkovich, "Side Meeting II- Book Launch: Turkey's Nuclear Future," 2015 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, March 24, 2015, Washington, D.C.

⁸³² Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey's Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament," in Barry Blechman ed, Unblocking the Road to Zero: Perspectives of Advanced Nuclear Nations (Turkey, Japan, Brazil,) *Stimson Nuclear Security Series*, Vol. VI, Washington D.C., 2009, pp. 70-72.

⁸³³ Sinan Ulgen, "Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Role for Turkey?" *Transatlantic Academy Paper Series*, June 2010, p. 13.

Until AKP came to power, Ankara was “reserved and deliberate” on the Iranian nuclear issue.⁸³⁴ Officials adopted a cautious approach, arguing that the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran was not definite. In absence of an imminent nuclear threat, Turkey argued for negotiations rather than a sanctions-led coercive strategy.

Initially, the AKP government was sympathetic to Tehran and accused the West of treating Iran unfairly, especially in terms of its right to peaceful nuclear energy.

Davutoglu aimed for a “theoretical balance between geographical/historical determinants and cyclical/systemic attributes” in re-evaluating Turkey’s Iran policy.⁸³⁵ Responding to a question on why Turkey didn’t seem worried about Iran’s nuclear program, then Prime Minister Erdogan stated that: “Our Iranian colleagues tell us that they want nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to satisfy their energy needs, not for weapons.”⁸³⁶

Turkish leaders consistently underlined Iran’s right to enrichment and peaceful nuclear energy, opposed any military action and financial sanctions. However, they also criticized Iran for the lack of transparency in compliance with its IAEA obligations. Whether the Iranian missile program contained nuclear warheads has also been a Turkish concern.

Hence, Turkey has nuclear red lines and expectations from Iran:

⁸³⁴ Caman and Dagci, 2013, p. 6.

⁸³⁵ Caman and Dagci, 2013, p. 7.

⁸³⁶ Mustafa Kibaroglu & Baris Caglar "Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey," *Middle East Policy*, Winter 2008, Vol. XV, No. 4, Middle East Policy Council, Washington, D.C., p. 65.

- Ensuring adherence to all three pillars of the NPT, i.e. supporting Iran’s right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology.
- Opposing the “black-box” approach to ban transfer of sensitive nuclear technology under the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, which could deny Turkey enrichment and reprocessing technology due to its proximity to Iran.
- Ensuring that Iran ratifies and implements the Additional Protocol.⁸³⁷

Underlining the importance of commitment to the global nonproliferation regime and peaceful use of nuclear energy, Turkey promoted a “stable region free from conflict, extremism, and weapons of mass destruction,” in which neither Iran nor any other country should acquire or possess nuclear weapons.⁸³⁸ Turkish officials also argued for an engagement and dialogue-based approach based on mutual trust and confidence, hence put forward that a diplomatic solution on the nuclear issue was the only viable option.

Turkish security policymakers do not consider Iran’s nuclear activities in a vacuum, i.e. in isolation from broader regional dynamics. Turkey didn’t want to avoid a confrontational posture that would be detrimental to regional stability, particularly in

⁸³⁷ Aaron Stein, “Understanding Turkey’s Position on the Iranian Nuclear Program,” *WMD Junction*, January 12, 2012, at: http://wmdjunction.com/120112_turkey_iran_nuclear.htm

⁸³⁸ “Iran’s Nuclear Program: The Turkish Perspective,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, June 2010, at: <http://www.chicago.cg.mfa.gov.tr/images/localCache/1/b15prjzpaplfysi5nz31z4qmIrans%20Nuclear%20Program.pdf>

Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan.⁸³⁹ Hence, Turkish nuclear diplomacy toward Iran has been based on opposing sanctions that impact the Turkish economy and strengthen Iranian hard-liners by encouraging “rash behavior.”⁸⁴⁰

While Turkish government officials maintained friendly relations with Iran, the Turkish military has had a different perspective: A 2002 national security analysis named Iran as the chief threat to Turkish security given its WMD and missile programs.⁸⁴¹ Following the Iranian test of the *Shahab 3* in June 2002, the Turkish General Staff prepared a wish list of missile defense equipment toward a regional system and discussed the plans with American experts.⁸⁴² In a press report on the classified 2005 Turkish National Security Policy Document, the Iranian nuclear program was acknowledged as a potential threat of nuclear weapons capability, stating that Turkey does not want any nuclear weapons in its region.⁸⁴³

AKP officials have frequently expressed concern against double standards with respect to countries that are known to have nuclear weapons, i.e. Israel.⁸⁴⁴

Meanwhile, Turkish policy elite believe that Israeli nuclear weapons are not enough reasoning for an Iranian nuclear weapons program, but such a program would mean

⁸³⁹ “Iran’s Nuclear Program: The Turkish Perspective,”

⁸⁴⁰ Sinan Ulgen, “Turkey and the Bomb,” *The Carnegie Papers*, Nuclear Policy, February 2012, p. 7.

⁸⁴¹ Sebnem Udum, “Turkey’s Response to Proliferation in the Middle East: Implications on Integration with Europe,” 2003 EUSA Conference, p. 4.

⁸⁴² Udum, 2003, p. 7.

⁸⁴³ “12 mil artik savas nedeni degil,” *Sabah*, August 23, 2010.

⁸⁴⁴ Author’s interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu, MEF University, February 2, 2015, Istanbul.

Iran's hegemonic tendencies in the Gulf.⁸⁴⁵ The security elite have focused on the impact of a nuclear-armed Iran on the regional balance of power.

Kibaroglu and Caglar argue that the consensus among the Turkish political and security elite is contrary to the official stance, expressing concern on Iran's nuclear program.⁸⁴⁶ Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities clearly disturb Turkey, as threats are formulated by both capabilities and intentions.⁸⁴⁷ Kibaroglu adds that this threat perception of Turkey would not differ from administration to administration, as Iran is in Turkey's neighborhood.⁸⁴⁸ However, no administration would support a military strike on Iran, either. According to Kibaroglu, the last chapter in the Iranian nuclear program has not been written yet.⁸⁴⁹

Even though Turkish officials constantly refer to Iran as a friendly neighbor, Kibaroglu argues that a state's discourse does not necessarily reflect the reality and cannot be reliable.⁸⁵⁰ He states that foreign policy is not static; it is like a control tower that watches other countries' moves.⁸⁵¹ Hence, today's good relations do not keep a country from planning for the future, based on the capabilities of the potential adversary. Karaosmanoglu argues that Turkey does not perceive a big threat from

⁸⁴⁵ Author's interview with Osman Faruk Logoglu, former Turkish diplomat and Member of the Parliament, Republican People's Party (CHP), February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁸⁴⁶ Mustafa Kibaroglu and Baris Caglar "Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey," *Middle East Policy*, Winter 2008, Vol. XV, No. 4, Middle East Policy Council, Washington, D.C., p. 65.

⁸⁴⁷ Author's interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu,

⁸⁴⁸ Author's interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu,

⁸⁴⁹ Author's interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu,

⁸⁵⁰ Author's interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu,

⁸⁵¹ Author's interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu,

Iran, but keeps an eye on security risks.⁸⁵² However he does mention the disruption in the Kurdish peace process, and socio-economic instability due to increased refugee flows as potential challenges to the regional balance for Turkey.⁸⁵³ This view is shared by a senior foreign policy official, who argues that the popular agenda on Iran's nuclear capabilities has never alarmed Turkish policymakers; however, the chaos in Syria and Iraq have been a major concern.⁸⁵⁴ According to the AKP official, Iran's disarmament has not been a Turkish policy priority.⁸⁵⁵ The AKP administration also recognizes that regional stability will take several years.⁸⁵⁶ Although there is no direct rational threat from Iran to Turkey, the Iranian support to Shi'a military groups throughout the region and Iranian missile capabilities are under Turkey's radar.⁸⁵⁷

Recognizing the erosion of Turkey's role in regional security, Logoglu argues that a nuclear-armed Iran is a threat Turkey has to avoid through diplomatic dissuasion.⁸⁵⁸ Recognizing its limitations in power, he adds that Turkey should aim for a positive yet modest contribution to the nuclear agreement with Iran and support the diplomatic solution to curb the nuclear program.⁸⁵⁹

⁸⁵² Author's interview with Emeritus Professor Ali Karaosmanoglu, January 28, 2015, Istanbul.

⁸⁵³ Author's interview with Emeritus Professor Ali Karaosmanoglu,

⁸⁵⁴ Author's interview with senior official at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Research, February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁸⁵⁵ Author's interview with senior official at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Research,

⁸⁵⁶ Author's interview with senior official at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Research,

⁸⁵⁷ Author's interview with senior official at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Center for Strategic Research,

⁸⁵⁸ Author's interview with Osman Faruk Logoglu, former Turkish diplomat and Member of the Parliament, Republican People's Party (CHP), February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁸⁵⁹ Author's interview with Osman Faruk Logoglu,

While the Turkish security elite would argue that a nuclear-armed Iran would deteriorate regional balances, in their view, the overall Turkish public perception would reflect that Iran would not threaten Turkey. The two societies are interconnected and share some anti-U.S. sentiments. Moreover, on a possible military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, the Turkish public opinion is heavily impacted by the WMD issues leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, that is not clearly the case according to survey data:

According to a 2013 Pew Global Attitudes survey, 68% of the Turkish respondents had an unfavorable view of Iran, and only 19% were favorable.⁸⁶⁰ 69% opposed a nuclear-armed Iran, while 17% favored it.⁸⁶¹

Also in 2013, EDAM conducted a public opinion survey, comparing the views of the electorate for each political party and the experts on what they consider to be the biggest threat against Turkish security. According to the 36.1% of the public, the biggest threat was the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the south of Turkey.⁸⁶² According to the 47.4% of the elite, the biggest threat was a radical Islamist takeover of Syria. 16.1% of the public said “a U.S./Israeli military strike to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran,” while 10.6% said a nuclear-armed Iran.⁸⁶³ Among the

⁸⁶⁰ “Global Views of Iran Overwhelmingly Negative,” Pew Research Center, June 11, 2013, p. 3.

⁸⁶¹ “Global Views of Iran Overwhelmingly Negative,” Pew Research Center, June 11, 2013, at: <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-Iran-Report-FINAL-June-11-2013.pdf> p. 6.

⁸⁶² “Turkiye’ye yonelik en buyuk tehdit nedir?” *Turkiye’de Dis Politika ve Kamuoyu Anketleri* 2013/3, EDAM.

⁸⁶³ “Turkiye’ye yonelik en buyuk tehdit nedir?” EDAM.

experts, these percentages were 27.1% and 12.5% respectively, pointing that the elite's threat perceptions were slightly stronger than the public.⁸⁶⁴

Throughout the nuclear conflict, Turkey's Islamist media focused on U.S. "double standards", i.e. turning a blind eye to Israeli nuclear weapons, and seeking regime change, following the Saddam Hussein case, i.e. using the nuclear program as an excuse to attack Iran. Building on the anti-American sentiments in Turkey, they have called for Muslim unity to maintain the Turkey-Iran friendship and Iran's right to even acquire nuclear weapons.⁸⁶⁵ The secular Turkish media focused on threats posed by a nuclear-armed Iran, while still promoting a diplomatic solution.

Turkish Involvement in Nuclear Negotiations with Iran

Turkey remained indifferent toward the Iranian nuclear issue, until 2005 when the AKP government voiced its support for Iran's right to develop peaceful nuclear technology.⁸⁶⁶ Factors leading to AKP's support for Iran's nuclear program include bilateral trade, energy ties, and AKP's religious roots. As Turkey's role was favorable to Iran's position, Iranian policymakers welcomed Turkey as a facilitator. However, Turkey did still stand against the militarization of Iran's nuclear program.

⁸⁶⁴ "Turkiye'ye yönelik en büyük tehdit nedir?" EDAM.

⁸⁶⁵ See the media analysis in Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Nilsu Goren, "Turkish Perceptions and Nuclear Proliferation," *Strategic Insights*, 2009/4, pp. 5-9.

⁸⁶⁶ Gurlzel and Ersoy, 2012, p. 2.

In late 2008, after an official visit to the US, Erdogan proclaimed a mediator role for Turkey between Iran and the US, which he said was welcomed by the then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei.⁸⁶⁷ Being asked by the US to provide diplomatic support to the negotiations, Turkey began its efforts to bring Iran on board with the uranium fuel-swap agreement between the P5+1 countries and Iran by October 2009.⁸⁶⁸ The deal proposed to place Iran's LEU in Turkey's custody in exchange for the Vienna Group's supply of 20-percent enriched nuclear fuel to Iran for electricity production.⁸⁶⁹

In May 2010, Turkey and Brazil- then non-permanent members of the UN Security Council- negotiated an agreement that became known as the Turkey-Brazil deal or Tehran Declaration with Iran. According to the joint declaration, nuclear fuel exchange would be the starting point to nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes; and Iran would, within one month, “deposit 1200 kg (2600 lb) LEU (low-enriched uranium) in Turkey, and while in Turkey, this LEU would continue to be the property of Iran.”⁸⁷⁰ Meanwhile, the Vienna Group, i.e. P5+1 composed of the United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France, plus Germany, would commit to delivering 120 kg of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) in no later than one year.⁸⁷¹

⁸⁶⁷ Gurzel and Ersoy, 2012, p. 3.

⁸⁶⁸ Gurzel and Ersoy, 2012, p. 3.

⁸⁶⁹ Gurzel and Ersoy, 2012, p. 3.

⁸⁷⁰ “Nuclear fuel declaration by Iran, Turkey, and Brazil,” *BBC News*, May 17, 2010.

⁸⁷¹ “Nuclear fuel declaration by Iran, Turkey, and Brazil,”

Iran agreed to this deal only in May 2010, leading to Security Council's disapproval as Iran now had a higher amount of LEU produced since October 2009. While the deal was proclaimed a diplomatic victory in Turkey, the agreement was dismissed by the P5+1 as Iran had rejected the same swap deal in 2009 when it had a smaller stockpile.⁸⁷² To much of Turkey's and Brazil's disappointment, following the deal in June 2010, the U.N. Security Council approved new sanctions against "military purchases, trade and financial transactions carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps" controlling the nuclear program and the Iranian economy.⁸⁷³ According to the Turkish foreign ministry officials, the momentum brought by the 2010 Tehran Declaration by Turkey, Brazil, and Iran was sacrificed by the U.N. sanctions.⁸⁷⁴ Then Turkish foreign Minister argued that the rejection of the deal denied Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy, while the US continued to ignore Israeli nuclear arsenal. However, Logoglu argues that the Turkey-Brazil initiative did not have enough background to be successful.⁸⁷⁵

In April 2011, Turkey tried to mediate another round of multilateral talks on an updated uranium swap deal. Iran had two preconditions: Lifting of the U.N. sanctions before the negotiation process started and U.N. acknowledgement of Iran's right to LEU production on its territory under the Article IV of the NPT.⁸⁷⁶ However, Iran's

⁸⁷² James Reinl, "US rejects Iran nuclear deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil and sets up new sanctions," *The National*, May 20, 2010, at: <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/us-rejects-iran-nuclear-deal-brokered-by-turkey-and-brazil-and-sets-up-new-sanctions#page2>

⁸⁷³ "U.N. Approves New Sanctions to Deter Iran," *The New York Times*, June 9, 2010.

⁸⁷⁴ Author's interview with high level official on nonproliferation and disarmament at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁸⁷⁵ Author's interview with Osman Faruk Logoglu, former Turkish diplomat and Member of the Parliament, Republican People's Party (CHP), February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁸⁷⁶ Gurzel and Ersoy, 2012, p. 3.

undeclared nuclear activities reported by the IAEA led to the international community's suspicions of Iran's sincerity and Turkish perception that Iran was exploiting Turkey's "good will" to buy time.⁸⁷⁷

Turkey wanted to host the P5+1 talks with Iran in Istanbul in April 2012. Yet, the Turkish position to host the Syrian opposition meetings lost its credibility in Iran's view of an objective actor and a strategic ally, leading to Iranian desire to host the talks in Baghdad, Damascus, or Beijing instead.⁸⁷⁸ Although the April 2012 meeting eventually took place in Istanbul, the following talks were held in Baghdad and Moscow.⁸⁷⁹

According to the Turkish foreign ministry officials, Turkey aimed to maintain its neutrality in the nuclear talks by providing external support and not putting much weight.⁸⁸⁰ Turkey contributed to trust building, which was needed more at certain times than others, based on U.S. demands.⁸⁸¹ Turkey never changed its position on the need to address the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomacy and justified the grounds through consultations rather than just passing Iran's message.⁸⁸²

⁸⁷⁷ Gurzel and Ersoy, 2012, p. 4.

⁸⁷⁸ Karen Kaya, "Turkey-Iran Relations after the Arab Spring," Foreign Military Studies Office, Joint Reserve Intelligence Center, September 2012, pp. 12-13.

⁸⁷⁹ "History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue," *Fact Sheets and Briefs*, Arms Control Association, January 2014, at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals

⁸⁸⁰ Author's interview with high level official on nonproliferation and disarmament at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 6, 2015, Ankara.

⁸⁸¹ Author's interview with high level official on nonproliferation and disarmament at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁸² Author's interview with high level official on nonproliferation and disarmament at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Although Turkey lost the interlocutor role in the last round of P5+1 talks with Iran on the 2013 Geneva interim nuclear deal, it continued to support the negotiations.

According to Prime Minister Davutoglu, “the easing of sanctions on Iran to curb some of its nuclear activities was an important step and positive development, which will create a positive atmosphere in the region while there may be those who are not content with it.”⁸⁸³ He also argues that “sanctions on Iran had also damaged Turkey’s economy, and therefore easing sanctions would also have a positive impact on Turkey as well as creating a constructive atmosphere whereby tensions would be reduced in the region.”⁸⁸⁴

Divergence of Interests with the West

From a security point, Turkey was primarily concerned with a possible U.S./Israeli preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. But, Turkey also aimed at protecting its economic interests that became vulnerable by the nuclear dispute. Hence, Turkey repeatedly argued that its concerns are different than the “West,” i.e. to maintain trade relations with Iran through gold trade. “Sanctions are a Western approach. They don’t work.” said a Turkish diplomat.⁸⁸⁵

⁸⁸³ Elik, 2013, 1.

⁸⁸⁴ “Turkey expresses support for Iran nuclear deal: ‘Iran’s nuclear activities will create a positive atmosphere in the region,” *Haber Turk*, November 25, 2013.

⁸⁸⁵ “In Heavy Waters: Iran’s Nuclear Program, the Risk of War, and Lessons from Turkey,” International Crisis Group, *Middle East and Europe Report*, Number 116, February 23, 2012, p. 28.

On December 18, 2011, Turkey and Iran established an inter-parliamentary friendship group to develop close relations and cooperation, as well as exchange views in reciprocal official visits.⁸⁸⁶ However this friendship caused a lot of trouble for the Turkish state-owned bank, Halkbank: U.S. Congressmen expressed concerns over Turkey-Iran economic cooperation to evade sanctions, i.e. using gold to pay for natural gas and oil purchases through Turkey's state-owned bank Halkbank, leading to tighter U.S. sanctions in July 2013, under the Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act of 2012, eventually diverting the Turkey-Iran "gold for gas" trade.⁸⁸⁷ The involvement of Turkish individuals and government officials in the evasion of sanctions has also been part of the December 17, 2013 corruption scandal in Turkey.⁸⁸⁸

There was also a divide on whether Turkey feared a nuclear-armed Iran or didn't perceive it as an existential threat, shifting away from U.S. strategic interests. Turkish government downplayed the dangers of the Iranian nuclear program in its declaratory policy and opposed financial sanctions to promote a diplomatic solution. Yet, according to former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Ross Wilson, despite Washington's

⁸⁸⁶ "Turkiye-Iran Parlamentolar Arasi Dostluk Grubu," at:

http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/dostluk_gruplari.grup

⁸⁸⁷ See the U.S. debate in "Preventing a Nuclear Iran," Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, May 15, 2013, Serial No: 113-34, pp. 39, 41, and "Iran Sanctions: Ensuring Robust Enforcement and Assessing Next Steps," Hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session on Examining the Current State of Implementation and Enforcement of U.S. and Multilateral Sanctions Programs, June 4, 2013, p. 54.

⁸⁸⁸ One of the implicated individuals, Reza Zarrab is currently under custody, waiting for trial in the US.

disappointment in Turkey's lack of support, U.S. information sharing on Iran's nuclear program and engagement of Turkey was very limited until 2006-2007.⁸⁸⁹

Turkey's Response to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

Following the agreement on a framework with P5+1, President Rouhani thanked President Erdogan for Turkey's support and stated that the agreement would contribute to the economic ties between Iran and Turkey.⁸⁹⁰ Turkey welcomed the deal as a contribution to regional peace and trade relations, issuing a statement that emphasized cooperation to put the deal into practice with full transparency.⁸⁹¹

According Foreign Minister Cavusoglu, Turkey has actively supported a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran to have them facilitate other regional problems through inclusive political solutions.⁸⁹² Cavusoglu argues that the achievement of the nuclear deal in postponing the breakout time by 10 years should not be underestimated.⁸⁹³

However, there is no consensus on the impact of JCPOA on Iran's role in regional stability. There is a common view that Turkey would enhance cooperation and partnership with Saudi Arabia to deal with Iran's expanding influence. Often referred

⁸⁸⁹ "Turkey's New Foreign Policy Direction: Implications for U.S.-Turkish Relations," House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 28, 2010, p. 15.

⁸⁹⁰ "Erdogan: En pahali dogalgazi Iran'dan aliyoruz," *BBC Turkce*, April 7, 2015.

⁸⁹¹ "Turkey welcomes Iran's deal with West," *Today's Zaman*, July 14, 2015.

⁸⁹² Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Role in a Turbulent Middle East," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 20, 2015, Washington, D.C.

⁸⁹³ Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Role in a Turbulent Middle East," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

as the “Sunni axis” against Shia Iran, the conflicts in Syria and Yemen seemed to align Turkish and Saudi strategic interests in the region. However, unlike Saudi Arabia, Turkey favored the JCPOA despite Iran’s improved international stance, as a discontinuity of its Sunni ideology in foreign policy.

Supporters

There are more supporters of JCPOA in Turkey than opponents. This is possibly due to Turkey’s continuous involvement in nuclear diplomacy. Although Turkey did not directly participate to the P5+1 talks with Iran, it supported the nuclear deal at the NPT Review Conference and other international fora. It influenced both sides to address its economic interests by easing of sanctions on trade with Iran.⁸⁹⁴ Taha Dagli argues that the architect of the P5+1 nuclear framework agreement with Iran was Erdogan, as it was originally his idea in the road map from 5 years ago, i.e. the May 2010 Tehran Declaration.⁸⁹⁵ Similarly, Yetkin argues that, while Davutoglu as prime minister is happy about the deal, he still sees the failed attempt of Turkish mediation as a missed opportunity when he was the foreign minister.⁸⁹⁶ It is relevant to argue that AKP leaders have been personally involved in advocating a diplomatic solution with Iran and disappointed to be excluded from the final deal.

⁸⁹⁴ “Iran Nuclear Talks: How Turkey is Quietly Influencing Both Sides,” *International Business Times*, November 14, 2014.

⁸⁹⁵ “Iran-ABD anlasmasının mimarı Erdogan,” *Haber 7*, April 3, 2015.

⁸⁹⁶ Murat Yetkin, “Turkey and Obama’s difference on Iran deal,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 15, 2015.

Turkey expects to improve economic and trade relations with a constructive Iran, especially in energy, following the JCPOA and lifting of the economic sanctions. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry's Deputy Undersecretary Yalcin, Turkey and Iran have reached consensus to increase high-level dialogue despite the disagreements in Syria over Russian involvement and the future of the Assad regime.⁸⁹⁷ The nuclear deal is expected to drop the market prices and increase the gas and oil imports to Turkey, boosting bilateral trade along with lifting of sanctions and potentially leading to gas discounts that Turkey has been demanding for years.⁸⁹⁸ Decrease in energy prices benefits a slowed down Turkish economy with energy deficit, and releases sanctions pressure on Turkish state-owned banks and financial institutions.⁸⁹⁹ However, since the sanctions will be gradually lifted, there will not be sudden fund flows into Iran in the short term.⁹⁰⁰

As a member the NPT regime, Turkey is against any restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Turkish officials have emphasized that any limitations on peaceful nuclear energy generation would create dependence on technology providers and would give these countries leverage in political relations.⁹⁰¹ The Iran nuclear deal is overall a positive development for Turkey, both by lifting of sanctions on foreign trade and energy, as well as granting Iran its right to peaceful nuclear energy and

⁸⁹⁷ "Ankara, Tehran to improve dialogue, vows Turkish diplomat amid tension over Syria," *Hurriyet Daily News*, February 12, 2016.

⁸⁹⁸ "Iran accord to 'fuel up' Turkey's energy sector," *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 15, 2015.

⁸⁹⁹ Emre Kizilkaya, "Four potential effects of the Iran nuclear deal on Turkey," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, July 20, 2015.

⁹⁰⁰ Iran accord to 'fuel up' Turkey's energy sector,"

⁹⁰¹ Author's interview with Assist. Prof. Sebnem Udum, Hacettepe University, January 30, 2015, Ankara.

uranium enrichment under the NPT and IAEA inspections.⁹⁰² However, Ulgen adds Turkey's potential concerns over Iran pursuing more assertive regional policies and deepened sectarian crises along the Iran-Saudi axis in Yemen.⁹⁰³

As a keen supporter of the JPCOA, Kibaroglu argues that the nuclear deal with Iran would not be detrimental to Turkey's interests; on the contrary, it would be beneficial for Turkey to put international control and verification mechanisms on the Iranian nuclear program to restraint it to peaceful purposes.⁹⁰⁴ Following the deal, having actual nuclear weapons would be against Iran's interests in gaining prestige.⁹⁰⁵ In addition, the nuclear deal does not address all of Iran's issues with the U.S.-led alliance: Beyond the nuclear issue, Iran-U.S. relations are problematic on political issues, i.e. Israel, Shi'a politics, and Syria.⁹⁰⁶

On regional stability, Colakoglu argues that the Iran deal serves Turkey's two main interests toward a more stable security environment; deeper economic integration and increasing transparency of the Iranian nuclear program.⁹⁰⁷ Reminding that the actual implementation of the deal is crucial, he emphasizes the role of verification for reassurance of the international community.⁹⁰⁸

⁹⁰² Sinan Ulgen, "Iran ile Nukleer Anlasma ve Turkiye icin Sonuclar," *Ekonomik ve Dis Politika Arastirmalar Merkezi*, 2015, p. 4.

⁹⁰³ Ulgen, 2015, p. 4.

⁹⁰⁴ Author's interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu,

⁹⁰⁵ Author's interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu,

⁹⁰⁶ Author's interview with Professor Mustafa Kibaroglu, MEF University, February 2, 2015, Istanbul.

⁹⁰⁷ "Prof. Colakoglu: Turkey supports the Iranian Nuclear Deal," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, April 6, 2015.

⁹⁰⁸ "Prof. Colakoglu: Turkey supports the Iranian Nuclear Deal," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*.

Ulgen et al. argue that the Iran deal is in Turkey's national security interests, i.e. preventing a military intervention on Iran that would lead to further instability in the region.⁹⁰⁹ Without a deal, Turkey would continue to face allegations that a nuclear-armed Iran would trigger Ankara to pursue nuclear weapons.⁹¹⁰ They argue that Turkey does not perceive the enhancement of Iran's diplomatic relations with the West as a decline in Turkish influence, as a nuclear deal does not reconcile Iran's foreign policy goals and regional influence with the U.S. interests.⁹¹¹ As an alternative to the view that Iran's increased clout replaces Turkey's, they assert that Turkey sees a regional role in addressing the GCC's and Israel's concerns by containing Iranian political hegemony and re-establishing the influence Turkey lost in the region.⁹¹²

Meanwhile, in order to benefit from the new security environment, Turkey needs to recalibrate its regional policies. Oguzlu argues that Turkey will benefit from Iran's reintegration into the global community through not developing nuclear weapons and gradual lifting of sanctions, if Turkish decision makers readjust their Middle East policies in response to the emerging security environment.⁹¹³ The US-led alliance has realized the importance of Iran's strategic partnership against ISIS in Iraq and Syria,

⁹⁰⁹ Sinan Ulgen, Mustafa Kibaroglu, Doruk Ergun, "Ankara Neden Iran ile Imzalanen Anlasmayi Memnuniyetle Karsilamali?" *EDAM Tartisma Kagitlari Serisi* 2015/3, July 15, 2015, p. 1.

⁹¹⁰ Ulgen, Kibaroglu, and Ergun, 2015, p. 1.

⁹¹¹ Ulgen, Kibaroglu, and Ergun, 2015, p. 3. As President Obama said, "This is an adversary. They are anti-American, anti-Semitic, they sponsor terrorist organizations like Hezbollah... As has been said frequently, you don't make peace with your friends. The issue here is, do we want them having a nuclear weapon? The answer is no." "Obama pitches Iran deal to vets, Daily Show's Stewart," *Reuters*, July 21, 2015.

⁹¹² Ulgen, Kibaroglu, and Ergun, 2015, p. 3.

⁹¹³ Tarik Oguzlu, "Turkey-Iran Relations following the Nuclear Framework Agreement with Iran," *SEPAM Policy Brief*, No: 17, April 2015, p. 2.

Lebanon, and Yemen to play a facilitator role in region-wide security challenges.⁹¹⁴ Along with this optimistic view that Iranian leaders would not risk strategic gains from the nuclear deal, the softening of Iran's hardline positions is a positive development for Turkey's national interests in a collective security order and stability.⁹¹⁵ However, Oguzlu argues for a readjustment in Turkish policies toward the region away from ideology and sectarianism leading to further regional polarization.⁹¹⁶

Skeptics

Skeptics of the Iranian nuclear deal in Turkey have focused on the potential impact of Iran's regional clout on a reduced regional role for Turkey. One such view suggests that if Iran normalizes its relations with the West, Turkey's regional leadership aspirations would be challenged.⁹¹⁷ Karaosmanoglu argues that, given the developments in Iran's dialogue with the P5+1, i.e. lack of isolation brought by JCPOA, the situation is less likely to give Turkey leverage and economic advantage in bilateral relations with Iran, as was the case during the years of nuclear impasse.⁹¹⁸

Others have mentioned Iran's intentions in the region. Cagaptay argues that: "Ankara will view a U.S.-Iran nuclear deal, coupled with a negotiated settlement in Syria, as

⁹¹⁴ Oguzlu, 2015, p. 5.

⁹¹⁵ Oguzlu, 2015, p. 11.

⁹¹⁶ Oguzlu, 2015, p. 13.

⁹¹⁷ Kemal Kirisci, Rob Keane, "Is a Deal with Iran Bad for Turkey?" *The National Interest*, January 21, 2014, at: <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/deal-iran-bad-turkey-9740>

⁹¹⁸ Author's interview with Emeritus Professor Ali Karaosmanoglu, January 28, 2015, Istanbul.

Washington turning a blind eye to Iran creating a Shiite axis along Turkey's southern border."⁹¹⁹ There is even discussion on whether, following the deal, Iran could mirror the Turkish transformation from an insular state to a regional power.⁹²⁰ Iran's newly gained status as an accepted state is concerning to some audiences in Turkey.

One major concern in Turkey following the JCPOA is the exclusion of the Iranian missile program from the nuclear talks and eventual lifting of the economic sanctions on the missile program. Disagreements over the missile issue were one of the final obstacles to reaching a comprehensive deal during the negotiations in Summer 2015. Iran argues that its missile program fits into the context of self-sufficiency in the indigenous defense industry and is defensive in nature.⁹²¹ Moreover, the sanctions limiting Iran's missile acquisition involve both nuclear and non-nuclear provisions. However, the North Koreans' help to establish the largest missile program in the Middle East, both in number and diversity of missiles, the space launch vehicles that can be used to develop ICBMs, and Iran's assistance to its regional proxies such as Hezbollah are of particular concern to the US and its allies.⁹²²

Despite these critiques, it is clear that Turkey has achieved its main policy objective to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran by JCPOA and benefits from one less item in the region's threat library.

⁹¹⁹ Soner Cagaptay, "In U.S.-Iran Deal, Turkey Fears a Shiite Alliance," *The New York Times*, November 25, 2013.

⁹²⁰ Rami G. Khouri, "Iran deal could prod a regional political reconfiguration," in Payam Mohseni ed, Iran and the Arab World after the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry and Engagement in a New Era, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, The Iran Project, August 2015, p. 64.

⁹²¹ Ariane Tabatabai, "The missile impasse," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July 11, 2015.

⁹²² Tabatabai, "The missile impasse,"

Turkey's Options and Policy Recommendations

Turkey and Iran have historically compartmentalized their cooperation on issues of mutual benefit. Turkey has chosen to “manage rather than confront” Iran.⁹²³

However, Turkey should carefully consider the implications of its policy decisions on other nuclear issues such as missile defense on its strategic relations with Iran.

Turkish security policymakers can seek to:

1. Maintain the status quo in its relations with Iran, constituting a mix of coercive and cooperative measures by continuing to emphasize economic interdependence and yet limited spillover into security issues,
2. Pursue both defensive and offensive military systems towards becoming a regional hegemon in increasing competition with Iran, in addition to strengthening its ties with Iran's competitors, Saudi Arabia in particular.
3. Follow a cooperative security path towards taking proactive measures in Turkey's security relations with Iran to reduce and contain or counter risks before they arise, particularly in Syria and Iraq.

⁹²³ Serdar Poyraz, “Turkish-Iranian Relations: A Wider Perspective,” *SETA Policy Brief*, no. 37, November 2009, p. 3.

A negotiated, diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear impasse was Ankara's best outcome. Prior to JCPOA, all exercises involving policy options included "if Iran gets nuclear weapons." Following the deal, these options became "if there is a diplomatic collapse." In such scenarios, a more credible option for Turkey would be seek to bolster the NATO security guarantee rather than decoupling from the alliance in case of Iranian nuclearization.⁹²⁴

Following the JCPOA, Turkey should welcome Iran as a responsible and legitimate player, rather than being isolated and punished by the sanctions regime. For Turkey, the nuclear deal opens up cooperation opportunities in security, economy, and energy.

Beyond economic relations, Turkey should engage with Iran constructively as a responsible player in diplomatic resolution of conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The post-Arab Spring atmosphere in the Middle East provides challenges and opportunities to reconfigure the Turkish-Iranian bilateral relations and their impact on the regional security order, where cooperation should outweigh competition for effective prevention and management of mutual security threats. Instead of setting the objective as maintaining peaceful relations through economic interdependence, Turkey's objective should be formulating its security relations with Iran in a way that minimizes risks arising from the region against Turkey.

Given the complexity of the security threats in the Middle East, identifying a set of

⁹²⁴ Nursin Atesoglu-Guney, "Turkish Nuclear Security after Iranian Nuclearization," *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 33, no. 3, December 2012, p. 526.

gradual steps would be the most effective way to transform the Turkish-Iranian strategic partnership in a cooperative security framework. The two countries have experience in collaborating on security issues, mainly counterterrorism. Based on their common interest in regional security formation, they could further transform their security relations by constructive engagement. The burgeoning relations between Turkey and Iran are likely to shape the future regional security framework. Yet, in order to generate equitable solutions for mutual security benefit, both sides should increase transparency and provide verified reassurances, while protecting their core interests by collaboration within a regional security framework rather than coercion to prevent risks from turning into fully-developed threats. Had Turkey taken proactive steps towards risk reduction, it would not have been as deeply involved in the Syrian conflict and ISIS terrorism as it currently is.

Finally, building on the momentum brought along by JCPOA, the international community should seek diplomatic ways to limit Iran's strategic offensive missile delivery systems to complement the nonproliferation objectives of the deal.⁹²⁵ Any confidence building measure on the missile issue would significantly assuage Turkish decision makers' threat calculus.

⁹²⁵ William Luers, Thomas Pickering, Greg Thielmann, "Dealing with Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," *The National Interest*, February 8, 2016.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This dissertation provides insight into Turkey's perceptions of the NATO Alliance; problem areas in its security partnership with United States; Turkey's involvement in the Middle East conflicts; Turkish defense reform and military modernization; which has led to concerns regarding its strategic orientation away from NATO; and Turkey's security policies on nuclear issues, which are informed by these debates.

There are two main conclusions of this research:

First; Turkey's perception of U.S./NATO security guarantees has historically shaped policy decisions regarding whether to prioritize collective defense or seek solutions elsewhere, either indigenous or regional. However, the gap between Turkey's expectations from the Alliance and what NATO is willing to provide has widened over time. This gap is largely a result of political differences and security priorities. Turkey's domestic political transformation has made its complete reliance on NATO guarantees less likely and has deteriorated its bilateral relations with the US.

Second; nuclear weapons do not occupy a compelling function in Turkish policymakers' thinking, beyond the commitment to NATO nuclear policy. Turkey has an asymmetrical advantage of conventional forces in its neighborhood, thanks to its military capabilities and NATO membership. Therefore, nuclear deterrence is secondary to conventional deterrence. Hence, characteristics peculiar to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems do not have defining role in Turkish security and

defense strategy. As a result, Turkey's policies on nuclear issues are dominantly shaped by non-nuclear considerations.

This final chapter explores these conclusions and suggests specific recommendations for Turkish, U.S., and other NATO policymakers.

Turkey in the NATO Alliance

Turkey and NATO are in a mutual crisis of confidence. Lack of Turkish confidence in NATO guarantees and fear of abandonment have been historically prominent concerns in policymakers' minds. Yet, this time, there are concerns in the Alliance regarding Turkey's intentions and future strategic orientation.

An increasing number of people in the West question whether Turkey still belongs in the Alliance: Those who answer "no" argue that Turkey has been "reckless, repressive, and unreliable,"⁹²⁶ violating NATO values of democracy and human rights. Others argue that NATO still needs Turkey militarily. On the other side of the coin, there are concerns in Turkey that NATO is not doing enough to support Turkish security in response to the Syrian and Russian conflicts. Turkey's geographical location brings different threat perceptions into NATO. However, it is not clear how unique Turkey's security concerns are within the Alliance, particularly considering the Baltic and Eastern European countries.

⁹²⁶ "Does Turkey Still Belong in NATO?" Room for Debate, *The New York Times*, March 29, 2016.

Leading to the 2016 Warsaw Summit, there are stronger voices calling for strengthening European defense in response to the immediate risks that the Alliance faces; namely Russian territorial aggression in Eastern Europe, ISIS in the southern flank, and terror attacks in Europe. Proposed revisions by proponents of bolstering NATO deterrence include boosting NATO's nuclear posture and sending more U.S. military equipment to Eastern Europe. However, it is clear that the traditional forces of the military are not sufficient to have an effective deterrent in the 21st century. NATO's core tasks now have to address hybrid warfare, cyber threats, and instability in the landscape surrounding the Alliance.

Burden sharing debate is beyond the arrangements to host nuclear weapons. As NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg mentions, Europeans have been historically concerned that the US will not support Europe in ensuring security, and yet NATO has survived as the strongest alliance that delivers operations everyday.⁹²⁷ Meanwhile, U.S. officials have complaint that Europe does not contribute enough to NATO collective defense.

According to the Turkish military, NATO has brought an international culture to Turkish Armed Forces: Even at the height of political crises, officers from all countries work together at the corps in lessons learned teams and exercises.⁹²⁸

⁹²⁷ "A Conversation with NATO Secretary General H. E. Jens Stoltenberg," Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., April 6, 2016.

⁹²⁸ Author's interview with a high ranking military officer at the NATO Rapid Deployable Turkish Corps Headquarters at 3rd Turkish Corps, February 10, 2015, Istanbul.

However, it is worrisome that in proposals to restructure alliance relationships to encourage greater cooperation, less and less role has been attached to political dialogue, despite the emphasis on stronger defenses. This political dialogue is direly needed among the Allies to reemphasize commitments, as in the case of Turkey and NATO. It is also needed with Russia to eliminate the risk of miscalculations and inadvertent escalation.

Turkish-U.S. Strategic Partnership

Beyond serving U.S. strategic and geopolitical interests throughout the Cold War and its aftermath, the Incirlik AB near Adana has been a symbol of the U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership beyond military operations. This political meaning implies that Turkey's granting access to the air base has been a mechanism to gain concessions from the US. This relationship cannot be reduced down to the existence of U.S. TNW at Incirlik.

Besides Incirlik, Turkey aims to maintain high level military dialogue with the US through defense partnerships. However, the common view among Turkish authorities is that the U.S. barriers to defense exports, oversensitivity about technology transfer, and administrative delays are detrimental to the strategic relationship. In this sense, Turkey wants to be seen as not just a valuable ally, but a good partner worthy of working on joint defense projects.

However, currently, the political pressures on the bilateral relationship are concentrated on Turkey's concern with the U.S. support to the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in the anti-ISIS coalition, Turkey's prioritization of the fight against PKK rather than ISIS, Ankara's support to the Kurdish Regional Government against Baghdad, and U.S. officials' increasing concern with freedom of speech and media in Turkey.

On the domestic front, the main challenges on Turkish security policymaking include the erosion of institutions, the incomplete transformation of the civilian-military relations, and President Erdogan's insistence on constitutional reform toward executive presidency to consolidate his power even further. The authoritarian tendencies in Erdogan's leadership style and escalatory rhetoric generate a fundamental mistrust in domestic and international audiences.

In Kirisci's words, Turkey is in a "downward spiral" fed by politics of fear in a very complex neighborhood.⁹²⁹ Yet, as he also suggests, it is time for Turkey to be self-critical and self-reflective to improve national security. Such a repositioning is direly needed for the improvement of US-Turkey relations, both in bilateral terms and toward the future of Syria and Iraq.

⁹²⁹ Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey's downward spiral and the scuffles at Erdogan's Brookings speech," Brookings Institute, April 4, 2016.

Turkey in the Middle East

While Turkey has initially been named as a model Muslim nation for the region with a democratic government, its involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts has been unwelcome by several of its neighbors over the recent years. AKP governments have pursued more ideological, value-driven, and sectarian security policies toward the Middle East.

Turning points in Turkey's involvement in Middle East politics have been the Arab Spring, Syrian conflict, and the interruption of the Kurdish peace process following Erdogan's quest for executive presidency. Turkey's miscalculation about the future of the Assad regime has led to conflicts of interest with its traditional allies, such as the US. Instead, Turkey should aim for a more realistic assessment of power, a more rational and less philosophical regional policy, and avoid alienation in an unstable region.

Turkish Defense Reform and Military Modernization

Turkish security policymaking became more problematic within NATO following Turkey's quest for autonomy, self-sufficiency, independence, military modernization, and the shift from military to civilian decision makers under the AKP government.

According to AKP officials, the strength of the national defense industry determines Turkey's power in its region.⁹³⁰ They refer to the 1974 intervention and the U.S. arms embargo, which portrayed Turkey's vulnerability to disagreements with NATO, and created a mindset of suspicion on risks of absolute dependency. However, in some issue areas, Turkey seeks influence beyond national security. Current Turkish officials consider the defense industry exports as a political tool to turn markets into strategic partnerships.

Beyond expensive national projects and prototypes, Turkish defense industry needs a long-term strategy, which involves research and development, human resources, and innovation in design. These projects are dependent on financial and political stability, and should contribute to and not contradict Turkey's overall security strategy. In order to have a sustainable growth plan for the defense industry, security planning has to be comprehensive; involving technical, political, and economic considerations of procurement.

In the aerospace industry, Turkey faces a technological leap in developing complex platforms and their subsystems. Turkish decision makers should acknowledge the technical challenges and financial risks to these projects in a realistic manner.

⁹³⁰ Author's interview with an executive from the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), January 30, 2015.

Turkish Security Policymaking

Turkish security policymaking has been historically driven by both rationalistic and ideological reasons. When economic interest was the guiding principle, Turkish security policies were more cooperative than confrontational; based on economic interdependence more than preventive engagement. However, as seen in the recent Turkey-Russia crisis, when strategic interests clash, economic relations are forsaken.

There are two outstanding issues with Turkey's overall security policymaking:

First, under President Erdogan, the shift from Turkey's traditional "cautious" attitude toward national security to "daring" has brought escalatory rhetoric. This rhetoric increases the risks and unintended consequences of possible military confrontation with adversaries, and makes Turkey's stance on security issues less predictable.

Second, the big issue in Turkey's defense structure is the fact that the defense ministry functions more like a "procurement agency" than a "planning agency."

Unlike in the allied countries, the Turkish Ministry of Defense does not identify and implement Turkey's security policies and does not have the staff and establishment to generate security policies.⁹³¹ The ministry leaves the defense administration to the Turkish General Staff and defense policies and diplomacy to the Turkish Ministry of

⁹³¹ "Executive Summary," Defense Reform Report, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, August 22, 2014, p. 17.

Foreign Affairs.⁹³² There are no civilian executives in the defense ministry, and the military executives rank lower than the general staff.⁹³³ According to AKP's plans, the new defense ministry, and not the foreign ministry, will plan, develop, and execute defense policies, rather than being a procurement agency for weapons systems.⁹³⁴ However, this defense reform has not even begun to take place.

Turkish Security Policies on Nuclear Issues

A close look at Turkey's policies on nuclear issues reveals that the state's policy objectives do not match the current and proposed policy tools. Turkish decision making is instead guided by non-nuclear considerations, such as Alliance politics, modernization of the defense industry, and regional influence.

In case of TNW, U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil do not provide a minimum nuclear deterrent to Turkey, since they don't have any operational, military value in any given scenario. Instead, Turkish decision makers are likely to follow a NATO decision to dismantle the TNW arsenal in Europe, as long as they are given concrete security guarantees and reassurances. Turkey values stability in its relations with the US/NATO than the nuclear weapons themselves.

⁹³² "Executive Summary," Defense Reform Report, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, August 22, 2014, pp. 17-18.

⁹³³ In June 2013, then President Abdullah Gul issued an executive order to create a working group consisting of six security experts (three high ranking commanders, two high ranking bureaucrats led by a professor of international security) to generate a comprehensive report on the Turkish defense reform toward restructuring in the defense administration. However, it has not been complete.

⁹³⁴ Author's interview with a senior executive at the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), February 6, 2015, Ankara.

With respect to air and ballistic missile defense, Turkey's main objective is achieving a partner role by access to sophisticated technology, not just making the rotation of NATO assets more reliable. However, space capabilities required for long-range air and ballistic missile defense constitute a large technology leap for the Turkish defense industry. Defense planning on BMD doesn't reflect a clear roadmap of materialized threats against Turkish security and reliable systems to address them. Hence, increasing autonomy in this sector does not clearly lead to eliminating vulnerability in air and missile defense against aerial threats arising from the Middle East.

While Turkey's policy to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran through diplomacy has been consistent, its security concerns in the region are not limited to a change in the balance of power due to nuclear weapons. Hence, its security planning toward Iran has to include strategic elements beyond economic interdependence. In order to be sustainable, Turkey needs to reconsider its position in the Syrian conflict and its security commitments to Saudi Arabia.

The absence of nuclear weapons in Turkish strategic thinking constitutes an opportunity for future arms control agreements. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that, as the role of nuclear weapons is reduced, the US will rely more on non-nuclear elements to strengthen regional security architectures, especially forward conventional presence. Hence, future research in Turkish security studies on conventional vs. nuclear deterrence is needed.

Future Research

Strategic deterrence and cooperative security both incorporate nuclear, conventional, diplomatic, economic, and informational tools. While NATO's military posture includes both conventional and nuclear elements, the impact of reducing the role of nuclear weapons on strategic stability and regional security is a point of contention.

There are theoretical accounts in security literature arguing that a conceptual framework that is appropriate for conventional weapons would be flawed for nuclear weapons. Morgenthau (1976), in "The Fallacy of Thinking Conventionally about Nuclear Weapons," argued that there is a tendency to deal with nuclear weapons by traditional military and political means, as this allows the use of well-known concepts applied successfully in the past. Jervis (1994) called this tendency to "conventionalize" nuclear weapons, while it is misleading as any meaningful military victory is impossible in nuclear war.⁹³⁵ Nichols (2013) would add that geography is the enemy of small-scale and retaliation would be disproportionate.

However, in the European case, Mearsheimer (1985) argued that relying on conventional force has been interpreted as decoupling of U.S. nuclear deterrent from Europe. While the role of U.S. conventional forces in extended deterrence is frequently mentioned, it has not been systematically analyzed in relation to the

⁹³⁵ Deterrence fails if the attacker thinks it is possible to win decisive victory.

tactical nuclear weapons deployment.⁹³⁶ Hence, a current evaluation of conventional vs. nuclear deterrence in Europe, with respect to the NATO-Russia balance, and its impact on Turkish defense planning is needed.

Policy Recommendations

The motivation of this dissertation has been identifying guiding principles for Turkish security policymaking on nuclear issues; ensuring that these principles do not contradict Turkey's commitment to the NATO Alliance and they help minimize threats arising from the Middle East. The research has revealed that Turkish decision makers have applied an incoherent mix of coercive and cooperative principles that have been explained by realist, liberal, and constructivist theories on a case-by-case basis. However, looking toward the future, I have proposed that they should rely more heavily on principles of cooperative security as a logic to shape Turkey's security policies on nuclear issues to better serve Turkish interests and minimize risks.

The current security challenges that Turkey faces arise from below-Article V conflicts that are hard to predict. The arms buildup in the region increases the likelihood of escalation, given the security dilemma, also known as Jervis' "spiral model," in which each state's defensive actions are misinterpreted as offensive by

⁹³⁶ President Kennedy's Flexible Response Strategy, calling for mutual deterrence at strategic, tactical, and conventional levels has been discussed within the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Turkish politicians argued that U.S. security guarantees for Turkey's protection from a possible Soviet attack decreased by the flexible response strategy. Sedat Laciner, "Turkish Foreign Policy between 1960-1971: Neo-Kemalism vs. Neo-Democrats?" in Laciner, Ozcan, Bal, Bahar eds, USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law, Volume 3, International Strategic Research Organization (USAK), Ankara, Turkey, 2010, p. 203.

others.⁹³⁷ As a result, each side overestimates the hostility of the other, possibly leading to inadvertent consequences.

Currently, Turkey's security policies follow a binary configuration: antagonism vs. economic and political cooperation. Economic interdependence in absence of cooperative engagement does not lead to strategic partnerships. In addition, the new security partners such as Saudi Arabia hurt Turkey's existing relations, as in the case of Iran.

In addressing Turkey's overarching security objectives, Turkey could formulate more effective and less costly policies by applying the following principles of cooperative security:

- taking proactive measures to reduce, contain, and counter risks before they develop into real threats,
- managing conflicts by setting mutual principles and constraints to deter aggression,
- developing consensual confidence-building measures to reduce uncertainty and the risk of miscalculation by increased transparency.

The main limitation to such a regional cooperative security framework is generating consensus among all regional and external actors in transitioning from confrontation to collaboration. However, there are unilateral steps that Turkey can take.

⁹³⁷ Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Chapter 3, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary," Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 58-113.

First, Turkey should reassure regional and international audiences of its non-aggressiveness by increasing transparency to avoid provocation and miscommunication. In order to do so, Turkish policymakers should clarify their objectives and intentions in an unclassified defense white paper, which would be more comprehensive than a defense industry strategic document.⁹³⁸

Second, Turkish defense policymakers should carefully assess and communicate which security threats are immediate and real, which risks can be mitigated. They should only procure defensive systems that are not effective for aggression, and when it is imperative for national security. The procurement strategy should be based on careful consideration of financial, technical, and political risks, and not just costs, delivery schedules, and technology transfer opportunities.

Finally, Turkey and NATO, along with Central and Eastern European allies, should come up with mutual reassurance mechanisms to reduce threat perceptions by NATO collective defense, which poses a credible force against potential aggressors.

In conclusion, NATO collective defense and cooperative security are not obsolete for Turkish security. They remain as the backbone of Turkish defense planning. Any policy decision that Turkey takes toward enhancing its national security should

⁹³⁸ This recommendation was also put forward by the authors of the defense reform committee and called as a “white book.” Executive Summary,” Defense Reform Report, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, August 22, 2014, p. 20.

complement, and not contradict its commitment to the Alliance. These decisions should reflect careful consideration of political, economic, and strategic implications to prevent threats, based on a technological and financial calculus to minimize risks.

Appendix A: Historical Legacies in Turkish Security Culture

The central legacy of Turkey's foreign and security policy is its quest to join the West through alliances and the strong role of the military establishment in policymaking. Yet, this orientation is not solely a product of the Turkish Revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Despite the radical social and political reforms of 1920s that distinguished Modern Turkey drastically from the Ottoman state, the Turkish Republic inherited the dominant features of Ottoman security culture, i.e. the modernization movement led by the military that started in the second half of the 18th century.⁹³⁹

Karaosmanoglu argues that the role of the military in Turkish security policy is overemphasized and the evolution of the security culture is overlooked in explaining the policy decisions of the Turkish Republic.⁹⁴⁰ Turkish national security culture also evolved around two factors that characterize the continuity in security culture from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic: the late Ottoman defensive *realpolitik* and the Westernization agenda.

⁹³⁹ The official break from the empire is represented by the six arrows in the symbol of Republican People's Party (CHP), nationalism, secularism, republicanism, populism, statism, and reformism.

⁹⁴⁰ Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 2000, 54, 1, p. 199.

Realpolitik

The Ottoman policy of “offensive *realpolitik*” to maximize power by acquiring territory, population, and wealth changed into “defensive *realpolitik*” by the end of the 17th century, when the military balance between the Empire and the European powers was altered at the expense of the Ottomans. 19th century onwards, fear of loss of territory and fear of abandonment became the central elements of Turkish security culture. Mufti argues that Turkish perception of external threats, i.e. fears inherited by the Turkish Republic’s elite and public opinion, originates from the attempts to maintain the Ottoman Empire during World War I and fighting the partition envisioned by the 1920 Treaty of Sevres among European powers.⁹⁴¹ The Ottoman legacy of relations with Greece and Russia also greatly influenced the Turkish Republic’s approach to security issues.⁹⁴²

The prevailing concerns were Russian expansionism, territorial ambitions of Greeks and Armenians, Syria’s claim of the Hatay Province in southern Turkey, and Iraq’s successful claim of Mosul.⁹⁴³ Turkey suspected that Western powers would sacrifice Turkey to pursue their strategic objectives. This legacy became known as “Sevres-phobia,” that external forces were conspiring to divide up Turkey. Ataturk set the

⁹⁴¹ Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution,” *Middle East Journal*, vol. 52, no. 1, Winter 1998, p. 41.

⁹⁴² In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Greece pursued an irredentist policy called the “Megali Idea,” i.e. “the Great Idea,” to unify all Greeks and resurrect the Byzantine Empire by territorial claims on the Ottoman Empire. Between 1919 and 1922, Greeks failed to invade Anatolia, but the use of force and massive relocations of peoples created mutual distrust between the two nations. The traditional enmity between the Ottoman Empire and Russia was punctuated by 13 wars between the two nations. Russians perceived Turkey as a gateway to the Mediterranean through the Straits and a possible invasion route to Russia through the Black Sea basin and the Caucasus. Karaosmanoglu, 2000, pp. 202-4.

⁹⁴³ Mufti, “Daring and Caution,” 1998, p. 41.

foreign policy principle of the Turkish Republic as “peace at home, peace abroad” to maintain status quo and survival of the Turkish nation-state.

Mayall argues that there are also geopolitical factors behind the state foundations of Turkish security policy:⁹⁴⁴ Anatolia, i.e. the section of Turkey in Asia, is highly defensible being surrounded by three seas and high mountains. But the Straits, European Thrace, and the Syrian border have been vulnerable to attack in Turkish strategic planning. Due to its geopolitical position, Turkey has been encircled with water-related security issues, including Greek control of the majority of Aegean islands, the status of Cyprus, and the need to share the Tigris and Euphrates with Iraq and Syria.

Westernization

18th century onwards, the process of Turkey’s Westernization was led by the military elite. Known as the *Tanzimat* (reorganization) movement, this process caused a Turkish identity problem between the East and West.⁹⁴⁵ Ataturk’s mission to align modern Turkey to European “civilization” was a continuation of late Ottoman policies: The superiority of European military organization brought along Westernized military schools, where Ataturk was also educated. Having the Western

⁹⁴⁴ S. V. Mayall, Turkey: Thwarted Ambition, Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, 1997, pp. 21–33.

⁹⁴⁵ Whether Turkey belongs in Europe is a historical debate. The Ottoman Empire officially entered the European state system, i.e. the Concert of Europe, in 1856 with the Treaty of Paris that ended the Crimean War. Karaosmanoglu, 2000, p. 205.

education, the military became the admired guardian of ideals and the pioneers of Westernizing force in the Ottoman state, followed by administrative and political reforms throughout the constitutional monarchies of 1876 and 1908.⁹⁴⁶ These reforms were tools to show commitment to modernization, seek support against Russia, and avoid European interference in domestic affairs. The Turkish War of Independence demonstrated the latter, as the objective was to remove European occupation and create a Western nation-state. After World War II, Turkey's Western orientation took on strong military and security dimensions under The Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*- CHP) single party regime, distancing itself from Middle Eastern politics.

Role of the Military

The stronghold of the military in security policymaking is a defining characteristic of the Turkish strategic culture. Influenced by the French Revolution, Kemalism promotes state-enforced secularism and a "Turkish" nationalism against the *ancien regime*, i.e. the Islamic establishment and multinational cosmopolitanism in the case of the Ottoman state.⁹⁴⁷

In 1931, Ataturk stated that "The Turkish nation has always seen its army... as the permanent vanguard in movements to achieve lofty national ideals.. to be the

⁹⁴⁶ Karaosmanoglu, 2000, p. 206.

⁹⁴⁷ Taspinar, 2008, p. 7.

guardian of its ideals.”⁹⁴⁸ In 1935, the Army Internal Service Law spelled out that “the duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic, as determined in the Constitution.”⁹⁴⁹

Turkish military were traditionally the “armed guardians of Turkish democracy” against Islamists and other separatist threats.⁹⁵⁰ Until 1960, foreign policy was accepted as national policy, determined by the president and the elite, with unanimous support of the parliament on security matters. Yet, the Democratic Party under Prime Minister Menderes polarized politics by using popular support against the state tradition represented by the bureaucratic elite, pointing to a major tension between the civilian policymakers and the military that would define Turkish security dilemmas for decades. Based on the legacies of defensive *realpolitik* and Westernization, along with the vanguard role to protect the republic from separatism and Islamism, the Turkish military intervened in politics by three coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980.⁹⁵¹ During the 1980 intervention, General Kenan Evren stated that: “... The sole *raison d’etre* of the Turkish Armed Forces is to defend the country as an indivisible whole

⁹⁴⁸ Mayall, 1997, p. 28.

⁹⁴⁹ Mayall, 1997, p. 28.

⁹⁵⁰ Aylin Guney and Petek Karatekelioğlu, “Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects,” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 31, No. 3, Spring 2005, pp. 439–462.

⁹⁵¹ In 1960, the military intervened on the basis of “national mission.” 1960 intervention led to a new constitution that formalized the military role in the formulation of security policy. The 1961 Constitution established the National Security Council (NSC), to be headed by the President and to contain the chief of staff and service chiefs. NSC was charged with preparing national security plans and programs, coordinating national security activities and consulting the council of ministers. The Chief of Turkish General Staff (TGS) was appointed by the president and reported to the prime minister, not to the minister of defense. At NSC, certain key decisions such as peace and war required the military’s consent.

against its internal as well as external enemies...”⁹⁵² This view would only be challenged in the 2000s along with the democratization reforms toward EU membership.

⁹⁵² Under the 1982 Constitution, the council of ministers was obliged to consider “with priority, the decisions of the NSC concerning necessary measures for the protection and independence of the state, the unity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society.” Mayall, 1997, p. 33.

Appendix B: A Chronological Survey of Turkish Foreign and Security Policy

Initial Phase: NATO Membership to the End of the Cold War (1952-1990)

In 1952, Turkey joined the NATO alliance along with Greece against the Soviet threat, while struggling with the transition from single-party rule to a multi-party parliamentary system. While the cooperation brought along by the Alliance helped stabilize the conflict and reduce mistrust, the biggest Turkish security dilemma was the Greek dispute. Throughout the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy prioritized NATO membership over involvement in the Middle East to minimize security risks. Turkey supported, but did not become a party to any security arrangements in the Middle East to purposefully disassociate itself from the conflicts and the Ottomans' imperial past.

Throughout the Cold War, Turkey defined its position within three interacting strategic environments: the international system dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, bilateral relations with Greece over the Aegean and Cyprus, and thirdly the Middle East. In line with the historical legacies in its security culture, Turkey anchored its security policies to the NATO alliance and committed to the Western ideology. However, the nature of security disputes between Greece and Turkey was more intricate and required long-term cooperative security transformation within the alliance.

Turkey and Greece

Throughout the Cold War, the Turkish-Greek dispute complicated Turkish defense planning and constituted a major problem for NATO command and control, as well as force deployment difficulties. Turkey preferred inter-communal talks, whereas Greece wanted to internationalize the conflict and bring in superpowers to reach settlement. Turkey opted for bilateral negotiations on Aegean disputes, i.e. continental shelf case, territorial waters, airspace, and remilitarization of Greek islands, to formulate a mutually acceptable and equitable solution, whereas Greece preferred unilateral decision and action.

In the Turkish-Greek conflict, the history of hostility has dominated perceptions and behavior. While contentious areas still have not been entirely addressed, they have been stabilized by NATO membership. The disputed issues have focused on the following four areas:

1. Control of air space:

In the aftermath of World War II, Flight Information Region (FIR) of 1952 was created under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to facilitate and safeguard flights by air traffic control.⁹⁵³ Upon the Turkish and Greek admission to

⁹⁵³ Alexis Heraclides, "Flight Information Regions and NATO Operational Control," in The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 214.

NATO, the control of Aegean airspace was given to Greek technical responsibility.⁹⁵⁴ Turkey argued against this “responsibility” and declared a “security zone” following the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974.⁹⁵⁵ This zone divided the Aegean airspace into two.⁹⁵⁶ In response, Greece declared a “danger zone” to close Aegean airspace to all non-Greek air traffic.

In the Aegean sea, Greece has the “Athina FIR” and Turkey has the “Istanbul FIR” according to their respective territorial waters. The FIR dispute began in August 1974, as the two countries came to the brink of war due to the Cyprus conflict. This dispute paved the way to the suspension of all international flights over the Aegean for six years.⁹⁵⁷ Turkey argued that Greece had set up control zones and air corridors unilaterally, without any consultation or agreement, and required Turkish military aircraft to submit flight plans as if the entire Aegean were Greek national airspace.⁹⁵⁸ Greece rejected any attempt to revise FIR boundaries as they claimed sovereign territory along the islands in the eastern Aegean. According to the 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation, military aircraft was exempt from FIR, but Greece argued that they needed the flight plans to safeguard international navigation, with no support from ICAO and NATO.⁹⁵⁹

⁹⁵⁴ Sezer, 1981, p.16.

⁹⁵⁵ Sezer, 1981, , p.16.

⁹⁵⁶ Sezer, 1981, p.16.

⁹⁵⁷ Heraclides, 2010, p. 214.

⁹⁵⁸ Heraclides, 2010, p. 215.

⁹⁵⁹ Heraclides, 2010, pp. 216-7.

In February 1980, Turkey withdrew from its claim of controlling Eastern Aegean air traffic, and Greece responded by allowing direct air links.⁹⁶⁰

2. Continental Shelf:

The Geneva 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf defines a continental shelf as the sea-bed and submarine areas adjacent to a coast or island (with the exception of small islets and rocks) and outside the area of the territorial sea.⁹⁶¹ The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea defines the area as a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline.⁹⁶² Continental shelves enjoy sovereign rights but not sovereign control, i.e. above waters remain open seas, but the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine and its natural resources are exclusive to the coastal state.⁹⁶³

In response to the increase in oil prices in 1974, Turkey and Greece got in a dispute over oil exploration in the Aegean. Turkey reacted to the Greek plan to seek oil in international waters, east of Thasos Island.⁹⁶⁴ Greece argued that Turkey's state-owned petroleum company TPAO violated the Greek continental shelf. According to the 1958 Geneva Convention, islands have continental shelves and in the absence of an agreement the median line applies, i.e. equal distance between the Greek islands in

⁹⁶⁰ Sezer, 1981, p.16.

⁹⁶¹ Alexis Heraclides, "The Legal Dimension of the Aegean Conflict," in The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 167.

⁹⁶² Heraclides, 2010, p. 167.

⁹⁶³ Heraclides, 2010, p. 167.

⁹⁶⁴ Sezer, 1981, p.16.

the eastern Aegean and the Turkish coastline.⁹⁶⁵ Turkey, not being party to the Geneva Convention, argued for a special political solution to the Aegean on equity principle and suggested joint exploration and exploitation of resources by an international oil consortium.⁹⁶⁶ Turkey also asserted that Greek islands of the eastern Aegean were not entitled to a continental shelf, as they were natural prolongations of the Turkish coastline with shallow waters.⁹⁶⁷

Turkey perceived the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands by Greece, as a response to the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus, as a direct military threat to Turkey.⁹⁶⁸ While Greece kept the Lemnos island armed for NATO defense, Turkey insisted on demilitarization, which kept disagreement on NATO High-Level Task Force.⁹⁶⁹

3. Territorial Waters:

The Treaty of Lausanne, which defined the borders of the Turkish Republic in the aftermath of World War I, set the limit of territorial waters as 3 nautical miles.⁹⁷⁰ The UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allowed 12 nautical miles.⁹⁷¹ Due

⁹⁶⁵ Heraclides, 2010, p. 168.

⁹⁶⁶ Sezer, 1981, p.16

⁹⁶⁷ Heraclides, 2010, p. 168.

⁹⁶⁸ Fotios Moustakis, "Turkish Security Challenges and its Relationship with NATO," in The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO, Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, Oregon, 2003, p. 83.

⁹⁶⁹ Duygu Sezer, "The Strategic Matrix of the Southeast Mediterranean: A Turkish Perspective," in The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences, ed. Dimitri Conostas, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991, p. 117.

⁹⁷⁰ Sezer, 1981, p.16

⁹⁷¹ Sezer, 1981, p.16

to this extension, Turkey did not sign this convention. Turkey considered territorial waters as the central issue in the Aegean and argued that the coastline and semi-closed sea had special circumstances that should not allow unilateral extension by Greece, which would turn the Aegean into a “Greek lake.”⁹⁷² Turkey regarded a unilateral extension as a cause of war, i.e. *casus belli*, that would possibly be met by military action.⁹⁷³ Greece counter-argued that rights arising from the Convention on the Law of the Sea were absolute and unalienable, leading to no obligation to consult Turkey or no special circumstances.⁹⁷⁴

4. The Cyprus Conflict

During the 1950s, Prime Minister Menderes argued that Greek nationalists were trying to alter the balance of power in the region by Greek terrorism against Turkish-Cypriots.⁹⁷⁵ Between 1954-1974, Greek Cypriots called for union with Greece and Turkish Cypriots called for partition. Both sides considered Cyprus as a national issue and blamed each other for “irredentism” and “aggrandizement.”⁹⁷⁶ In February 1959, two states decided to resolve the issue by establishing an independent Cypriot state, not by union or partition. In 1960, Cyprus became an independent state by the

⁹⁷² Heraclides, 2010, p. 182.

⁹⁷³ Heraclides, 2010, p. 185.

⁹⁷⁴ Alexis Heraclides, “The Legal Dimension of the Aegean Conflict,” 2010, p. 183.

⁹⁷⁵ Moustakis, 2003, p. 69.

⁹⁷⁶ Alexis Heraclides, “From Lausanne to the 1974 Cyprus Crisis,” in The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 70.

settlement agreement signed by Cyprus, Greece, Britain, and Turkey, giving Turkey a stake on the island and entitlement to protect the Turkish-Cypriot minority.⁹⁷⁷

Following the July 1974 intervention and the US-imposed arms embargo that lasted until September 1978, 1983 onwards, Turgut Ozal's leadership transformed the Turkish economy by neoliberal reforms, privatization, and opening the Turkish economy. The Davos process of 1988, where the Ozal administration extended an olive branch by reducing military flights and increasing commercial activity in Davos and Brussels meetings, brought optimism on the Turkish-Greek disputes, although there was no agreement on confidence-building measures between the Turkish and Greek military delegations.⁹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, the Davos initiative reduced tensions and declaratory policies on threat of war.

Overall, security threats arising from Greek disputes, rather than threats from the Soviets and the Middle East, dominated Turkish security policymaking throughout the Cold War, as the crux of the Turkish-Greek conflicts was sovereignty and mutual fears. This threat perception explains why Turkey and Greece still have high military spending-to-GDP ratios.⁹⁷⁹

⁹⁷⁷ "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Background," at:

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unficyp/background.shtml>

⁹⁷⁸ Mehmet Ali Birand, "Turkey and the Davos Process: Experiences and Prospects," in The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences, ed. Dimitri Conostas, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991, p. 34.

⁹⁷⁹ According to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Turkey and Greece are in top 15 countries with the highest military spending. 2013 Dataset available at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database By looking at this data, Paris and Cambas predict that the military expenditures in Greece and Turkey will continue to increase between 2013-2022. See: Anastasia Paris and Panagiotis Cambas, "World Military Expenditure, Turkey and

Turkish Foreign and Security Policy toward the Middle East

During the initial stages of the Cold War, the Republic of Turkey sought to disconnect itself from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire in the region and to maintain friendly relations with neighbors. Turkey maintained a policy of “benign neglect” toward the Middle East.⁹⁸⁰ The main Turkish security interests in the region were minimizing threats, i.e. Soviet intrusion, instability, and radicalization, and maintaining economic relations. The Saadabad Pact of 1937, i.e. the nonaggression agreement with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, loosely addressed the security of Turkey’s eastern borders.⁹⁸¹ The countries “pledged to respect each other’s frontiers, not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs, and to consult on issues of shared interest.”⁹⁸² However, this pact could not survive the turmoil in the Middle East due to World War II.

In the 1970s, due to changing domestic political circumstances and the increasing Soviet threat, Turkey looked for a more balanced and complex foreign policy toward the Middle East. Like all its allies, the Turkish vital interest in the Persian Gulf was the security of the oil flow for Turkish economic stability and containing Soviet power in the region. The main reason for regional engagement was economic and related to Turkish dependence on oil imports, mainly with Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia,

Greece,” *Global Business and Management Research: An International Journal*, vol. 6, no. 2, 2014, p. 91.

⁹⁸⁰ Omer Taspinar, “Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism,” *Carnegie Papers*, Number 10, September 2008, p. 6.

⁹⁸¹ Karaosmanoglu, 1983, p. 163.

⁹⁸² Gareth Jenkins, “Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey’s Relations with Iran,” *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program*, (Washington DC: 2012): 13-14.

and Gulf states. The strategic aspects of oil were equally important in the military sector for viable conventional defense. Turkey sought to develop cooperative military training programs with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Tunisia.⁹⁸³ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Turkey allowed Soviet flights over its airspace, whereas it denied U.S. refueling and reconnaissance activities for the American airlift to Israel.⁹⁸⁴ Turkey also recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1976 and PLO opened an office in Ankara in 1979.⁹⁸⁵ Yet, Turkey never completely cut relations with Israel, and maintained a low-key policy.

During the 1980s, in the aftermath of the military coup and transition to Ozal administration's liberal economic policies, the number of Turkish contractors in the region steadily increased, i.e. in Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, providing rapid infrastructure to oil-rich countries for regional economic cooperation.⁹⁸⁶ Turkish interest in the region grew due to the increase in the number of Turkish workers and export earnings from the Middle East. Still, Turkey would not partake in local disputes nor interfere in internal affairs of regional states, except acting as a mediator when invited, i.e. seeking settlement during the Iraq- Iran war. Turkey also preferred bilateral relations with Arab states and made sure its defense cooperation with the West would not damage Arab interests.

⁹⁸³ Karaosmanoglu, 1983, p. 163.

⁹⁸⁴ Karaosmanoglu, 1983, p. 163.

⁹⁸⁵ Karaosmanoglu, 1983, p. 163.

⁹⁸⁶ Karaosmanoglu, 1983, p. 165.

Second Phase: End of the Cold War to the Election of AKP (1990-2002)

During the 1990s, the Turkish National Security Policy Document was modified twice, in 1992 and 1997, to identify major threats to Turkish security as Kurdish separatism and Islamism.⁹⁸⁷ These modifications proved that Turkey saw internal threats against the territorial integrity of the state as more of a problem than external threats. But the globalized nature of security threats, i.e. terrorism, made it impossible to fully impose state control over transnational networks.

Turkey's relations with the Middle East were problematic, as the Soviet threat had been replaced by concerns about Syria, Iraq, and Iran, who ideologically belonged to different camps.⁹⁸⁸ The most important security challenge that Turkey faced in 1990s was the terrorist attacks by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*-PKK.) Tensions with Iran and Syria due to the Kurdish issue further intensified Turkish security problems in the region.

⁹⁸⁷ Pinar Bilgin, "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalization," *European Journal of Political Research*, 44, 2005, pp. 175-201. One of the main threats named in this document was *irtica*: It means "regressive Islamism" in Turkish, and means that the rule of Islam should be restored as secularism denies religion.

⁹⁸⁸ Ozlem Tur, "Turkey's Changing Relations with the Middle East: New Challenges and Opportunities in the 2000s," in Debating Security in Turkey: Challenges and Changes in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Ebru Canan Sokullu, Rowman and Littlefield, 2013, pp. 123-141.

Turkish Relations with Greece: The Rapprochement

For NATO, the tensions between Turkey and Greece constituted one of the main threats to coherence in the extended region.

In this decade, Turkish relations with Greece remained relatively static and anchored to NATO (with the exception of the Kardak crisis, to be explained later in this section.) The post-Cold War atmosphere of uncertainty and change in the Balkans led to caution on both ends. Turkish and Greek foreign ministers issued a joint statement in April 1993 that "...Turkey and Greece agree on the establishment of peace and stability in the Balkans as soon as possible, but differ on the means and the methods."⁹⁸⁹ The US slowly reduced its military assistance in the region, e.g. for Turkey, from \$1005.7 million in 1984 to \$545.2 million in 1988.⁹⁹⁰ Both Greece and Turkey argued for higher levels of U.S. military assistance, but Washington questioned the need in the larger framework, while considering the turmoil in the Middle East.

In June 1995, Greece ratified the International Law of the Sea Treaty, leading to an extension of territorial waters from six to 12 miles.⁹⁹¹ Turkey warned that it could "whip Greece" and both President Suleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu Ciller threatened war in case Greece implemented the 12 miles.⁹⁹² Furthering the

⁹⁸⁹ Moustakis, 2003, p. 83.

⁹⁹⁰ Sezer, 1991, p. 115.

⁹⁹¹ Mufti, 1998, p. 34.

⁹⁹² Mufti, 1998, p. 34.

crisis, in January 1996, a Turkish vessel ran aground on an islet called Imia (Kardak in Turkish). The Greek Defense Minister Arsenis called for the construction of an anti-Turkish bloc including Armenia, Bulgaria, Iran, Iraq, Russia, and Syria.⁹⁹³ To this end, Greece signed military agreements with Syria, Russia, and Armenia in 1995 and 1996.⁹⁹⁴

The Kardak crisis brought the two countries to the brink of war, and was finally resolved by U.S. mediation for mutual troop withdrawal. Yet, Greece pursued a military pact with Syria, securing landing rights for its war planes. In order to attain regional balance of power, Turkey signed an air and naval forces cooperation agreement with Israel in February 1996, followed by Suleyman Demirel's visit to Israel, the first visit ever by a Turkish president.⁹⁹⁵ Later that year, Greek Cypriots acquired S-300 air defense missile systems from Russia.

Ker-Lindsay argues that in 1999, Turkish-Greek relations underwent transformation, thanks to the former Davos process, direct communication between the new foreign ministers, and natural disasters, from the hostility arising from the PKK leader Ocalan being captured at the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, to anti-terrorism and earthquake disaster management and rescue cooperation between the two neighbors.⁹⁹⁶ The rapprochement also opened Turkey's way to official EU membership. Under the leadership of the Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and

⁹⁹³ Mufti, 1998, p. 35.

⁹⁹⁴ Mufti, 1998, p. 35.

⁹⁹⁵ Mufti, 1998, p. 34.

⁹⁹⁶ James Ker-Lindsay, Crisis and Conciliation: A year of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, I.B. Tauris&Co, London, New York, 2007, pp. 44- 56.

Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, the neighbors started to communicate, and in January 2000 they signed four bilateral agreements covering tourism, environmental protection, citizens' security, and investment safeguards, followed by five more agreements on education, science and technology, customs cooperation, maritime transport, and bilateral economic relations.⁹⁹⁷ Following this dialogue, both countries announced reduced military spending and level of threat, as well as personnel in armed personnel. In May 2000, Turkish military aircraft landed in Greece in a joint NATO exercise.⁹⁹⁸

Since the early 2000s, bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece have been stable, yet there has been standstill on the Cyprus issue. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's comprehensive blueprint for reunification, known as the Annan Plan, was rejected by the Greek Cypriots and supported by Turkish Cypriots in simultaneous referenda in April 2004.⁹⁹⁹ The Cyprus problem constitutes one of the major problems behind Turkey's standstill with the European Union.

The Turkish membership to NATO, the Council of Europe, the European Customs Union, and its candidacy to the European Union have been the cornerstones of Turkey's integration process to the West. Following the rapprochement with Greece, Turkey became an official candidate to the EU at the December 1999 Helsinki Summit and formal accession talks on the chapters of the EU *acquis communautaire*

⁹⁹⁷ Ker-Lindsay, 2007, p. 102.

⁹⁹⁸ Ker-Lindsay, 2007, p. 106.

⁹⁹⁹ Ker-Lindsay, 2007, pp. 44- 56.

began in October 2005.¹⁰⁰⁰ Turkish-Greek relations was frequently put forward as a barrier to full Turkish membership to the EU, in addition to various socioeconomic factors, i.e. size of the population, inflation, unemployment, level of development and democratization, and cultural differences, especially Turkey being a Muslim country trying to join a “Christian Club.” Turkey argued that, along with EU’s enlargement policy, EU’s military deficit could be addressed by Turkish membership, due to Turkey’s NATO membership, geostrategic position, i.e. stabilizer in the Middle East, Balkans, and the Caucasus, and advanced military capabilities.¹⁰⁰¹ Critics argued that Turkish accession would bring new challenges to European security by unstable neighbors, the Cyprus issue, and Islamic fundamentalism.¹⁰⁰² Other domestic risks included strong political role of the Turkish armed forces and the Kurdish question.¹⁰⁰³ Overall, the discussions on joining the European Union brought along the redefinition of Turkish ‘national security,’ as Turkey and some European Union members had opposing views on outstanding security issues such as Cyprus and Kurdish terrorism. This discussion ties back to the historic question of whether Turkey belongs in Europe or in the Middle East; a perception Turkey’s foreign and security policymakers aimed to break by their Western orientation and isolating policies toward the region that eventually evolved into selective engagement in this period.

¹⁰⁰⁰ “EU-Turkey Relations,” European Commission Enlargement, at:

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm

¹⁰⁰¹ Meltem Muftuler-Bac, “Turkey’s role in the European Union’s Security and Foreign Policies,” *Security Dialogue*, vol.31, no.4, December 2000, pp. 489-502.

¹⁰⁰² Muftuler-Bac, 2000, pp. 489-502.

¹⁰⁰³ Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, “The European Union and Turkey”, *Survival*, vol.41, 1999, pp. 41-57.

Turkish Foreign and Security Policy in the Middle East

The major Turkish security concern in the Middle East after the Gulf Wars was the conflict of interest with Syria, Iraq, and Iran on the Kurdish question. These countries used their support to the Kurdish separatist armed movement as leverage in their bilateral relations on contentious issues. A weakened Iraqi central authority in Northern Iraq turned the area into a safe haven for PKK terrorists, attacking civilian and military targets in Turkey. Turkey was left alone, with the exception of United States, in its struggle against the PKK, as the organization was openly supported by some of the regional and European governments. Turkey conducted at least seventy cross-border operations in the region.¹⁰⁰⁴ The PKK leadership took refuge in Damascus, receiving financial and military support since the 1980s, and Turkey could not persuade Syria to cut off its support and expel the PKK leader, Ocalan, until it deployed its armored divisions to the Syrian border in October 1998.¹⁰⁰⁵ The Turkish public perceived that the Turkish unilateral military action in the low intensity conflicts proved powerful in fighting against terrorism when Syria expelled Ocalan. Yet, this endeavor cost approximately five billion US dollars per year and did not resolve the Kurdish question.¹⁰⁰⁶ Turkish ground troops and air force were continuously involved in cross-border operations, disrupting its relations with neighbors.¹⁰⁰⁷

¹⁰⁰⁴ Karaosmanoglu, 2009, pp. 414-433.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Karaosmanoglu, 2009, p. 424.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Karaosmanoglu, 2009, p. 426.

¹⁰⁰⁷ The Kurdish question had regional repercussions as Turkey was the only state militarily engaged in the conflict. The autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Iraq infused separatist concerns for Turkey regarding its Kurdish population. The human rights issues surrounded Turkey's treatment of the

Iraq and Syria supported the PKK in retaliation for the water they lost from Euphrates upon Turkey's construction of the huge Ataturk Dam. Arab states resented Turkey for its water dispute with Syria over the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.¹⁰⁰⁸ Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project, known by the Turkish acronym GAP, was a grand socio-economic undertaking to transform the region that directly impacted the availability of water to Syria and Iraq. Although Turkey claimed that it honored the pledge to release the agreed minimum amount of water in 1987 and didn't use water as a political weapon, these countries argued that Turkey obstructed the flow of water by intentionally withholding water from the downstream neighbors.¹⁰⁰⁹

Turkey bundled the water question with Syrian support to PKK, leading to further isolation by the Arab world. Hence, Turkey turned to Israel for balance of power in the region, a maneuver unwelcome by the Arab states, and close ties with the US. Turkey and Israel concluded their first military cooperation agreement in April 1992. Although the agreement did not entail mutual defense commitments, it comprised joint military exercises, joint training programs, intelligence sharing, use of respective air spaces, and defense industrial projects.¹⁰¹⁰

Kurdish minorities and internationalized its domestic problems, i.e. tensions with Europe and the US. Meanwhile, the unemployment, social and political violence in southeast Turkey empowered the PKK struggle.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Barkey, 1996, p. 37.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Sezer, 1995, pp. 149-172.

¹⁰¹⁰ Karaosmanoglu, 2009, p. 425.

On another front, Iran challenged Turkey by supporting PKK and Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. The radical forces in Turkey were believed to be strengthened by the Rafsanjani government.¹⁰¹¹ These concerns were reciprocated on the Iranian end by Turkey's alliance with the West. Nevertheless, in August 1996, Turkey's Islamist Prime Minister Erbakan signed a \$20 billion agreement with Iran, making the country Turkey's second largest natural gas supplier after Russia.¹⁰¹²

AKP has its roots in the *Milli Gorus*, i.e. "National View," school of Turkish Islamist thought, dominated by the Sunni Islam Sufist order Naqshbandiya,¹⁰¹³ The "National View" became a political force in the 1960s under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan and promoted the rule of Sharia, i.e. Islamic law, and distancing Turkey from the "imperialist" West.¹⁰¹⁴ Erbakan argued for an Islamic alliance among Muslim countries as an explicit alternative to the Western alliance. Erbakan's Refah (Welfare) Party won the local and general elections in 1994 and 1995, leading to worries by the Kemalists that political Islam, along with Kurdish separatism, threatened the regime. On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu-MGK) issued a memorandum, which became known as the post-modern coup, to force Erbakan to resign, followed by a military operation in northern

¹⁰¹¹ Sezer, 1995, pp. 149-172.

¹⁰¹² Mufti, 1998, p. 36.

¹⁰¹³ The Naqshbandiya opposed westernizing reforms in Turkey since mid-nineteenth century. Svante E. Cornell, "What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?" *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2012, pp. 13-24.

¹⁰¹⁴ Due to military coups and party closures, the name of the political parties changed in time, from National Order to National Salvation, Welfare, Virtue, and Felicity Parties, but all promoted Islamic unity. Cornell, 2012, p. 18.

Iraq.¹⁰¹⁵ Taspinar argues that this process has led to “soul searching” by Turkish Islamists, mostly led by generational differences.¹⁰¹⁶

When the Virtue Party was shut down by the military in 2001, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul left the National View movement as reformists and founded AKP as a mainstream conservative party that would embrace EU membership and market economy.¹⁰¹⁷ Unlike Erbakan, they declared that ties with the Middle East would not be an alternative, but a complement to the Western alliance.

These increased trade relations with Middle Eastern states and the rise of Islamist governments in Turkey were to shape the following decade of Turkish foreign and security policy.

Third Phase: The AKP Governments (2002-Today)

In November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi- AKP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan won the Turkish national elections with 34.2 percent of the popular vote and 363 of 550 parliamentary seats.¹⁰¹⁸ Erdogan opened up a new era in Turkish politics by his single party rule, increasing

¹⁰¹⁵ Taspinar, 2008, p. 12.

¹⁰¹⁶ Taspinar, 2008, p. 12.

¹⁰¹⁷ They refused to name AKP as Islamist, but rather as conservative democrat. The base of the party was pro-capitalist, entrepreneurial Muslim bourgeoisie known as “Anatolian tigers,” created by the socio-economic transformation led by Ozal in the 1980s. Cornell, 2012, p. 18.

¹⁰¹⁸ Soner Cagaptay, “The November 2002 Elections and Turkey’s New Political Era,” *MERIA Journal*, Volume 06, Number 04 (December 2002), at: <http://www.gloria-center.org/2002/12/cagaptay-2002-12-04/>

share of votes in each election since 2002, and critiques of his Islamism and authoritarianism.

Turkey went through radical transformation in the early 2000s by liberalizing and reforms in law, politics, and economy, in order to meet the EU criteria for Turkish accession. In line with the democratization agenda, Turkey banned the death penalty, recognized the Kurdish language, and made constitutional reforms to reduce the military's influence on decision making. The political stability and economic growth led to Turkey being named as a "model" for the Islamic world.¹⁰¹⁹ Meanwhile, critics of Erdogan have argued against the deterioration of freedom of speech and media on various occasions, symbolized starkly by the 2013 Gezi Park protests. Nevertheless, AKP has been in power as the single party government by three consecutive general electoral victories, as well as municipal elections and constitutional referenda, and by increasing its vote share: 34.3 percent in 2002, 46.6 percent in 2007, and 49.8 percent in 2011, followed by the country's first popular presidential election in August 2014, when Erdogan became the president by 52% of the votes, polarizing the country as pro-AKP and anti-AKP.¹⁰²⁰

¹⁰¹⁹ In a 2012 poll conducted by Professor Shibley Telhami of University of Maryland, 54 percent of the Egyptian voters chose Turkish model in applying the role Islam should play in the Egyptian political system. Shibley Telhami, "What do Egyptians want?" *Politico*, May 21, 2012, at: http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76590_Page2.html

¹⁰²⁰ Ali Carkoglu, "Turkey's 2011 General Elections: Towards a Dominant Party System?" *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 13, No.3, 2011, pp. 43-62.

The New Foreign and Security Policy Outlook and Limitations

Over the last decade, there has been arguably an “axis shift” in the Turkish politics, emphasizing religious identity and conservatism under the AKP government under Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian leadership. Taspinar calls the resurgent self-confidence as “Turkish Gaullism,” i.e. nationalist and defiant, that seeks influence.¹⁰²¹ Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, former foreign minister, who is also a professor of international relations (IR), has identified the guiding principles and led Turkish foreign and security policies under AKP rule.

AKP’s “zero problems” policy entailed Turkey to act as a mediator in regional conflicts, as well as attempt to increase economic interdependence within the region.¹⁰²² The AKP government defines this policy as an extension of ‘strategic depth,’ i.e. a theory developed by Davutoglu, indicating a multi-faceted foreign policy and proactive peace diplomacy in Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, West and Central Asia.¹⁰²³ This new role Turkey is trying to play has been reflected on its efforts to mediate in the Arab-Israeli conflict, to contribute to solving the Iranian nuclear impasse, attendance at the Arab League conferences, as well as its contribution to the U.N. and NATO forces in

¹⁰²¹ Omer Taspinar, “The Rise of Turkish Gaullism: Getting Turkish-American Relations Right,” *Insight Turkey*, January-March 2011.

¹⁰²² “Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy,” Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa>

¹⁰²³ Muharrem Ahmetoglu, “Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position,” in Turkish, *Akademik Perspektif*, December 17, 2012, at: <http://akademikperspektif.com/2012/12/17/stratejik-derinlik-turkiyenin-uluslararası-konumu/>

Lebanon and Afghanistan, and finally its assumed leadership in the Organization of Islamic Conference.¹⁰²⁴

The AKP government has consistently been a vocal critique of Israel, in favor of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Yet, in terms of regional politics, in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, traditional relations between the AKP government and the former Arab one-man or one-party governments are nonexistent, as in the cases of Syria and Egypt. Given its entanglement in the Syrian conflict, deterioration of relations with Egypt, and power struggles in Iraq, the ‘zero problems with neighbors’ policy has been rephrased by critics that ‘Turkey has zero neighbors without problems.’

AKP’s Foreign and Security Policies in the Middle East

Over the last decade under AKP rule, Turkey has pursued a foreign and security policy toward the Middle East by managing relations with four blocs; Israel, Iran, the Arab world within Iran’s realm of influence, i.e. Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and Arab countries opposing Iranian influence, i.e. the Sunni Arab bloc led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia.¹⁰²⁵ The Turkish policy toward the region has drastically shifted from isolation to activism by establishing economic, political, and cultural ties. Yet, Turkish involvement in Middle East politics has not been welcome, especially by the newly-

¹⁰²⁴ Taspinar, 2008.

¹⁰²⁵ Hasan Kosebalan, “Turkey and the New Middle East: Between Liberalism and Realism,” *Perceptions*, Autumn 2011, Volume XVI, Number 3, p. 94.

established governments in the region such as Egypt, once the authoritarian regimes that AKP had established close ties with have been removed by public uprisings.¹⁰²⁶ Despite Davutoglu's vision for Turkey as a moderator of dialogue, it is no longer possible as Turkey is far from its historic neutralism and has many stakes, domestic and international, in the future political configuration of the Middle East: the Syrian conflict, Kurdish issue, regional terrorism, and power struggles in Iraq among others.

Under Davutoglu, Turkish foreign policy has been defined by active agency, popular legitimacy, and values, i.e. assuming the responsibility in regional and global conflict prevention, mediation, and resolution.¹⁰²⁷ Towards the region, Turkey would balance between the promotion of democracy and defense of its national interests.¹⁰²⁸ Despite the historical and religious ties to the Middle East, Turkey had chosen to alienate itself from the Middle East, and Foreign Minister Davutoglu aimed at eliminating these prejudices in foreign policy. The top echelons of AKP glorified the Ottoman past and had personal ties with Islamist movements in the region. Along with economic interdependency, Turkey also sought to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) and energy cooperation, especially with Iran. Turkey's trade with the Arab world increased by five-fold.¹⁰²⁹

¹⁰²⁶ Ahmet Davutoglu, "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring," *Vision Papers*, Center for Strategic Research, No. 3, April 2012, p. 12.

¹⁰²⁷ Davutoglu, 2012, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰²⁸ Davutoglu, 2012, p. 6.

¹⁰²⁹ Kosebalan, 2011, p. 111.

However, this policy was not sustainable. Altunisik and Martin argue that while AKP was engaged in promoting economic and political reform in the Middle East during their first term through initiatives such as Democracy Assistance Dialogue, close relations with Iran, Syria, and Sudan and AKP's reaction to the Arab Spring contradicted these goals in their current term.¹⁰³⁰

As Turkey's role in the Middle East shifted from a "model Muslim democracy" to "interloper," two countries pose the outstanding policy issues that are imminent for Turkish security; first the future of Iraq and the Kurdish question, and second the resolution of the Syrian crisis.

1. Turkish-Iraqi Relations under AKP

Turkey maintained an independent foreign policy during the U.S. operation in Iraq in March 2003. The Turkish parliament refused allowing U.S. forces to use Turkish territory to enter Iraq. This war has been a defining point, both in US-Turkey relations and Turkey's Kurdish question. Turkey took unilateral military action across the border and was heavily criticized both domestically and internationally for concerns related to discrimination of civilian targets.¹⁰³¹

¹⁰³⁰ Altunisik and Martin, 2011, p. 574.

¹⁰³¹ Historically, border problems between Turkey and Iraq goes back to the Mosul case following the Turkish War of Independence in 1923, when Turkey lost the province to the British due to Kurdish rebellion and lost rights on Mosul oil.

Since military means did not succeed in eliminating the PKK threat nor resolve the Kurdish problem, in 2009, AKP launched the “Democratic Initiative Process” to improve human rights of ethnic minorities, including the Kurdish initiative, which became known as the Kurdish opening. This initiative, also geared toward non-Muslims and non-Sunni groups such as the Alawites, included constitutional amendments, political and cultural reforms, and measures to improve freedom of expression in Kurdish language. The economic relations between Ankara and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq based on oil and gas have an important role in the Kurdish peace process, and KRG continues to influence PKK.¹⁰³² Meanwhile, Ankara’s relations with Baghdad significantly deteriorated, since AKP accused the Maliki administration of leading sectarian Shiite policies against the Iraqi Sunnis. The situation in Iraq has been further complicated by the civil war in Syria and rise of jihadist groups in the power vacuum, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in particular. Following the ISIS raid to the Turkish consulate in Mosul and the hostage crisis in June 2014, Turkey has been directly brought into the conflict, in addition to the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis.

In the recent years, Turkey has maintained steady, close ties with the KRG, which has extended from commerce, oil exports to training the Kurdish *peshmerga* forces to combat ISIS, which has led to Iraqi concerns of intervention into sovereignty issues.¹⁰³³

¹⁰³² Henri J. Barkey, “The Turkey-Iran-Iraq Nexus,” Fourth Annual Conference on Turkey, Middle East Institute, June 14, 2013.

¹⁰³³ Henri J. Barkey, “Syria’s Dark Shadow over US-Turkey Relations,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No: 4, Winter 2016, p. 32.

2. The Syrian Conflict

As a showcase of the “zero problems with neighbors” policy, Erdogan initially cultivated close relations with Bashar al-Assad. Bilateral trade was increased as a continuation of the trade policy enacted in the aftermath of the Syrian decision to force the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to leave Syria in 1999. In 2009, visa restrictions were waived reciprocally and Syria was named as a strategic partner, only until Turkey and AKP policymakers were caught unprepared for the Arab Spring and the civil conflict in Syria.

The Syrian uprising was initially characterized by the overwhelming response that the repressive security forces of the Assad regime imposed on civilian protestors.

Multiple factors have complicated the resolution of the conflict: The religious composition of Syria that could lead to sectarian violence, i.e. Christian, Shi’a and Sunni Muslim, Alawite, Druze; foreign involvement in the region, i.e. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iran; divided nature of the Syrian opposition, and Assad’s use of chemical weapons dismantlement as a guarantor of regime survival. Meanwhile, the Syrian conflict had multiple destabilizing impacts in the Middle East, i.e. terrorist development of groups such as Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS, refugee flows into Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, and humanitarian emergencies.

Turkey initially responded by calling for political reform in Syria, but expressed criticism of the regime's violence against its own citizens as the conflict intensified. The unrest in northern areas has had direct implications for Turkish border security. According to the 2014 Syrian Regional Response Plan Strategic Overview, the Turkish government received 1.5 million Syrians, 600,000 of whom have been registered by February 2014, by the end of 2014.¹⁰³⁴ Erdogan has been calling for a humanitarian corridor for the Syrian victims and demanded further international attention: "I am addressing the entire world, and countries that remain silent and indifferent and ignore or tolerate the massacre in Syria. I am also addressing international organizations, which cannot produce solutions to this crisis and which encourage its continuation."¹⁰³⁵ However, Turkey's expectation of the overthrow of the Assad regime has still not been met after six years, and the security conditions have deteriorated for Turkey significantly.

In addition to the ongoing refugee crisis, Turkey has been directly hit by ISIS terrorism. Following the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State in June 2014, 49 Turks, including the council general and diplomats, were seized from the Turkish consulate in Mosul, along with 32 Turkish truck drivers.¹⁰³⁶ These hostages were freed in September 2014. Since 2015, ISIS has been conducting attacks in Turkish cities, Diyarbakir, Suruc, and Ankara, along with the attacks in European capitals.

¹⁰³⁴ Kemal Kirisci, "Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Bracing for the Long Haul," The Brookings Institute, *Up Front*, February 20, 2014, at: <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/02/20-syrian-refugees-turkey-bracing-for-long-haul>

¹⁰³⁵ "Turkey struggles in the role of Mideast power during Syria crisis," *Los Angeles Times*, March 11, 2012.

¹⁰³⁶ "Turkish hostages held by ISIS have been freed and returned home, PM says," *The Guardian*, September 20, 2014.

In October 2014, the Turkish Parliament voted to allow operations launched from its territory in Iraq and Syria. While Turkey joined the anti-ISIS coalition, it has been criticized by many that it did “too little, too late” being preoccupied with domestic politics, i.e. Erdogan’s quest for presidency and conflict with the Kurdish party (HDP), and the rekindled war against PKK.

Appendix C: Turkey’s Journey with Air and Missile Defense: A Timeline and Maps

1990s: Turkish Armed Forces issues a supply plan requesting 12 batteries of the U.S. I-HAWK systems, followed by unsuccessful attempts by the Netherlands, Belgium, and France to sell Turkey their retired I-HAWK systems.¹⁰³⁷

1991: Turkey purchases 80 F-16C/D fighters with the Turkish Defense Fund established by the US, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE in return for Turkey’s contribution to the Coalition in the Gulf War.¹⁰³⁸

1997: Turkey begins the negotiations for the co-production of the Arrow air and missile defense system and the accompanying Green Pine radar system with Israel, who offers the technology transfer option unlike the Western suppliers, yet refuses Turkey’s demands on critical know-how transfer.¹⁰³⁹ (The Arrow deal failed due to the 2001 financial crisis in Turkey, followed by the deterioration of Israeli-Turkish bilateral relations.)

2000: US authorizes the sale of 8 HAWK batteries for \$240 million and signs agreement with Turkey in January 2001, upgrading the systems to HAWK XXI with 24 launchers, eight MPQ-64 Sentinel 3D air defense radar systems, and 175 MIM-23B HAWK missiles.¹⁰⁴⁰ (The delivery of these systems began in 2005 and was

¹⁰³⁷ Muhammet Metin, “Turkiye’nin orta menzil hava savunma sistemi,” *Kokpit Aero*.

¹⁰³⁸ Egeli and Guvenc, 2012, , p. 22.

¹⁰³⁹ Aaron Stein, “Turkey Embraces Missile Defense,” *EDAM Nonproliferation Policy Briefs*, November 2012/5, p. 2.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Muhammet Metin, “Turkiye’nin orta menzil hava savunma sistemi,”

complete in 2007, existing of 2 fleets on Istanbul's Asian and European sides.¹⁰⁴¹

Following the 2012 downing of the Turkish RF-4ETM discovery jet by the Syrian air defense system, the rules of engagement of the Turkish Air Force changed and the MIM-23 I-HAWK XXI system was placed at the Syria border.¹⁰⁴²)

2008: The Turkish Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) announces the decision to buy elements of the S-300 and Tor systems from Ukraine and Belarus, for training purposes only, to deploy them in the Electronic Warfare Training Field (EHTS) to test on F-16 fighters' Electronic Air Test System at the Konya air combat training center and evaluate their air defense capabilities.¹⁰⁴³

2009: The Obama administration notifies the Congress of a potential \$7.8 billion sale to Turkey, including 13 Patriot fire units, 72 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missiles, 197 MIM-104E Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missiles (GEM-T) and 4 validation missiles, and hardware for ground-based air defense; stating that: "It is vital to the U.S. national interest to assist our North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally in developing and maintaining a strong and ready self-defense capability that will

¹⁰⁴¹ Each fleet consists of two batteries, four fire units, and 12 launchers. Each fire unit has one AN/MPQ-61 HPIR and one LASHE antenna, one AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel 3D radar, one AN/MPQ-62 CWAR search radar, and three M192 launchers. The system also has an TV/IR optic system for SEAD. The MIM-23B missile weighs 74 kg and is effective at 60 m-20 km altitude and 1.5 km-40 km range. Muhammet Metin, "Turkiye'nin orta menzil hava savunma sistemi,"

¹⁰⁴² This deployment allegedly disturbed Israel as providing support to Hezbollah. Ziya Akova, "Iskenderun Korfezi'nde Neler Oluyor?" *Savunma Sanayi*, June 20, 2010.

¹⁰⁴³ The Electronic Air Test System was manufactured by Turkish Havelsan, but the training center was equipped by the Israeli firm *LML* that provided the air warfare exercise technologies. "Turkiye test icin S-300 fuzeleri aliyor," *Zaman*, August 25, 2008.

contribute to an acceptable military balance in the area.”¹⁰⁴⁴ Turkey’s SSM sends a letter of request (LOR) to the US to possibly purchase the missiles under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits.¹⁰⁴⁵

January 2013: Turkey announces that it is seeking to co-develop a surface-to-air missile (SAM) program and has cancelled the long-range air and missile defense system tender.¹⁰⁴⁶

March 2013: Turkey finalizes the acquisition model for the missile defense program and announced that it would be acquiring twelve missile-firing units in a co-development model.¹⁰⁴⁷

Summer 2013: Reports in the Turkish media suggest that Turkey is leaning toward choosing the Chinese long-range air and missile defense system, as it allows technology transfer and is economically more feasible.¹⁰⁴⁸

2014: The U.S. Department of State approves the possible FMS sale of 145 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), 10 missile guidance sections, and 40 LAU-129 launchers and equipment at an estimated cost of

¹⁰⁴⁴ “US to sell Turkey Patriot missiles in \$7.8 billion deal,” *Sunday’s Zaman*, September 14, 2009. Piotr Zalewski, “Missile Defense: A View from Turkey,” *Foreign Security Policy*, Center for European Policy Studies Commentaries, October 8, 2009, at: <http://www.ceps.eu/book/missile-defence-view-turkey>

¹⁰⁴⁵ “US to sell Turkey Patriot missiles in \$7.8 billion deal,”

¹⁰⁴⁶ “Turkey abandons USD 4 billion T-Loramids SAM system buy,” *IHS Jane’s*, January 24, 2013.

¹⁰⁴⁷ “Turkey to buy and co-develop T-Loramids SAM,” *IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly*, March 21, 2013.

¹⁰⁴⁸ “Turkey may adopt Chinese Air Defense System,” *Defense News*, Jun. 23, 2013.

\$320 million to the Turkish Air Force, to be used on the F-16s and eventually the F-35s for air defense.¹⁰⁴⁹

2014: The Turkish Supreme Military Council¹⁰⁵⁰ calls for the establishment of a new “Combat Air Force and Air-Missile Defense Command” in Eskisehir, responsible for missile defense control, strategic air assets, intelligence, and space activities under one C2.¹⁰⁵¹

January 2015: Turkey extends the deadline for TLORAMIDS bids until July 2015 for the sixth time to open parallel talks with the European Eurosam and U.S. Raytheon/Lockheed Martin.¹⁰⁵²

May 2015: Russian arms exporter Rosoboronexport declares that Turkey is interested in purchasing the Antey-2500 missile defense system.¹⁰⁵³ The S-300V/Antey 2500 (NATO reporting name SA-12 Gladiator/Giant) includes a new command vehicle, advanced radars, and up to six loader vehicles per launcher.¹⁰⁵⁴ Ismail Demir, the

¹⁰⁴⁹ “Turkey-AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM Missiles,” *News Release*, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, August 12, 2014, at: <http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/turkey-aim-120c-7-amraam-missiles>

¹⁰⁵⁰ The Supreme Military Council is composed of the prime minister and four-star generals from all branches, and it is the main military decision-making body. It is called “Yuksekeri Sura” (YAS) in Turkish.

¹⁰⁵¹ Kasapoglu, 2014, p. 15.

¹⁰⁵² “Turkey won’t link air defense system to NATO,” *Defense News*, February 19, 2015.

¹⁰⁵³ “Rosoboronexport: Turkiye Rus Fuze Savunma Sistemleri ile ilgileniyor,” *Haberler.com*, May 8, 2015.

¹⁰⁵⁴ “Turkey shows interest in Russian air defense systems- Russia’s arms exporter,” *TASS Russian News Agency*, May 6, 2015.

Undersecretary for Defense Industries (SSM) denies that Turkey is not conducting formal talks with Russia.¹⁰⁵⁵

November 2015: Turkey cancels the TLORAMIDS tender and the initial agreement with China's CPMIEC.

February 2016: Aiming for better coverage of the airspace for early warning missions, Turkey purchases four Peace Eagle airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft from Boeing, after 7 years of delay.¹⁰⁵⁶

¹⁰⁵⁵ "Turkey's T-Loramids technology transfer troubles,"

¹⁰⁵⁶ "Turkey Mulling Purchase of two more AEW&C aircraft," *Defense News*, February 4, 2016.

Figure 1 NATO Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe

Missile defence: Further Nato capabilities, due by 2018




Source: "NATO's Missile Defense Shield 'up and running'," BBC News Europe, May 19, 2012

Figure 2 Patriot Deployment in Turkey as of 2016




Modified from: "Patriot Deployment," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Fact Sheet*, May 2015.

Figure 3 Locations of Turkish airbases




Source: "Turkey signs deal to open air bases to US-coalition against ISIS: Foreign Ministry," *Daily Sabah*, July 29, 2015.

Figure 4 EPAA Coverage Achievable with Fast Missile and Netted Local Surveillance and Tracking



Source: Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Science and Technology Issues of Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility, September 2011

Figure 5 Iranian ballistic missile ranges on the Middle East map



Source: "Pentagon Bulks up Defenses in the Gulf," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 17, 2012

Appendix D: Turkey's Defense Industry and Military Modernization Projects

At the macro level, the Turkish defense industry went through four periods: Before 1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2010, and 2010 onwards. Until the 1990s, the Turkish defense industry was based on direct purchases from the US, France, and UK. SSM was established in 1985 to develop a modern national defense industry and modernize the armed forces in a way that would make Turkish cooperation with NATO members more even and would eliminate Turkey's position only as a buyer. The Turkish Armed Forces established the ASELSAN (initially military communication) and HAVELSAN companies in the 1970s and early 1980s to fulfill Turkey's military needs by national means. Between 1990s-2000s, beginning with assembly capacity, the domestic industry gained confidence in armored combat vehicles, electronic warfare, command, control, and communications systems.

Between 2000-2010, the Turkish defense industry reached co-production capability. After 2010, the industry began the design phase, as seen in the Anka unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and the national warship *MILGEM*. The UAV program is an example of the parallel process of domestic design and foreign purchase, i.e. Turkish Anka and Israeli Heron. In the latest period, the needs of the armed forces led to the production of more technology-intensive systems and generated know-how in microchip technology.

AKP's "New Turkey" formulation relies on a powerful government, strong army, and strong national defense industry, i.e. adding "muscle" to the aspiration to become a regional and global leader.¹⁰⁵⁷

According to Turkey's Defense and Aerospace Industry Exporters' Association, in 2013, Turkish defense industry exports reached \$1.4 billion, an all-time high and a 10% increase from 2012, when defense exports had increased 43% from 2008.¹⁰⁵⁸ 39% of all defense exports is attributed to Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) producing attack helicopters, trainer aircraft, and drones.¹⁰⁵⁹ Other export items on the top list include armored land vehicles, missiles, rockets, launching platforms, command-and-control systems, and sensors.¹⁰⁶⁰ In 2013, 39% of Turkey's defense exports went to the US, followed by Saudi Arabia (9.2%), Gulf countries, and Europe.¹⁰⁶¹ Turkish defense industry is targeting South America, Southeast Asia, and Africa next.¹⁰⁶²

Most of these exports count for the Turkey's offset agreements with the parties. SSM's major responsibilities include the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces, the development of Turkish defense industry, and the management of offset and export defense industry products as the single offset authority for defense

¹⁰⁵⁷ "Turkey uses defense industry as political instrument," Turkey Pulse, *Al-Monitor*, October 16, 2014.

¹⁰⁵⁸ "Turkish Defense Exports Hit \$1.4B Record in 2013," *Defense News*, January 13, 2014.

¹⁰⁵⁹ "Turkish Defense Exports Hit \$1.4B Record in 2013,"

¹⁰⁶⁰ "Turkish Defense Exports Hit \$1.4B Record in 2013,"

¹⁰⁶¹ "Turkey uses defense industry as political instrument," Turkey Pulse, *Al-Monitor*, October 16, 2014.

¹⁰⁶² "Turkey Targets \$1.6 Billion in Arms Exports," *Defense News*, August 4, 2014.

procurement.¹⁰⁶³ With the United States, the offset threshold is \$10 million, with an obligation of 50% of the contract value, and 2-year fulfillment period.¹⁰⁶⁴ While these offset agreements might include Turkish companies' exports of hardware, and not always technology-intensive products, they are necessary to maintain the domestic defense industry and finance research and development for platforms, which will then be exported along with weapons systems.¹⁰⁶⁵

According to the SSM Deputy Undersecretary for Systems Projects and Logistics Mustafa Seker, Turkey prioritized delivery platforms over systems development.¹⁰⁶⁶ The SSM procurement priorities are more domestic added value in the cooperative projects, creating an infrastructure and ecosystem beyond product development, and more collaboration on fundamental research.¹⁰⁶⁷ This research cooperation strategy is also a way to bypass the defense export licensing and re-sell issues.¹⁰⁶⁸

In 2014, Turkey assembled 60% of the defense equipment of its armed forces valued at \$1.5 billion, while the US (15%) and Spain (9%) were the next largest sources.¹⁰⁶⁹ However, ASELSAN dedicates only 6% of its turnover to domestic R&D projects,

¹⁰⁶³ A. Guzin Oduncuoglu, "Turkish Industrial Participation-Offset Policy," 3rd International Seminar on Offset and Industrial Participation, May 7-9, 2007, Jerusalem, slide 4.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Oduncuoglu, 2007, slide 8.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Author's Skype interview with Dr. Can Kasapoglu, March 12, 2015.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Seker argues that the public follows the platform projects as concrete products, yet is unaware of the systems and sub-systems that are required to "truly" own the delivery platforms. "SSM to Form 2020's Defense Industry Policy," *Defense Turkey, Issue 63*, September 14, 2015.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Dr. Celal Sami Tufekci, Deputy Undersecretary for Defense Industries, "Defense Industrial Cooperation: Creating New Perspectives for the Alliance," Defense and Security Affairs Panel, 34th Annual U.S.-Turkey Relations Conference, American Turkish Council, Washington D.C., September 28, 2015.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁹ "IDEF 2015: Turkey aims for defense industrial independence by 2023,"

financed by shareholders' equity.¹⁰⁷⁰ In 2013, ASELSAN spent \$383 million on R&D, and only \$76 million came from internal resources.¹⁰⁷¹

Turkey's Missile Programs

Turkish Armed Forces first acquired ballistic missile capability by the purchase of 72 MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) with a range of 165 km from the US in 1996, used as deterrent against Syria along the border.¹⁰⁷² In the second half of the 1990s, a "master plan" by Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) set 500 and 1000 km as the range of ballistic missiles Turkey should have.¹⁰⁷³

Turkey's missiles include the J600-T Yildirim (250 km range to be upgraded to 600), Jaguar (Chinese technology, 150 km range), Toros (100 km), Attack-MS (U.S. origin, 165 km), and Kasirga (4 multiple rocket launcher, 150 kg warhead, 100 km range).¹⁰⁷⁴ Turkish Roketsan is known to be working on the integration of global positioning (GPS) and inertial navigation systems (INS) to improve the guidance and accuracy of Kasirga.¹⁰⁷⁵

¹⁰⁷⁰ Mustafa Kaval, Vice President, ASELSAN, "Stratejik Hava Savunma Sistemleri ve Turkiye'nin Yol Haritasi, SETA Ankara, October 25, 2015.

¹⁰⁷¹ "ASELSAN Annual Report 2013," p. 10, at: http://www.aselsan.com.tr/en-us/InvestorRelations/Documents/Annual%20Reports/Aselsan_FaaliyetRaporu_ENG2013.pdf

¹⁰⁷² Sitki Egeli, "Turkiye'nin Balistik Fuze Programi," *Ortadogu Analiz*, October 2013, Vol. 5, No. 58, p. 31.

¹⁰⁷³ Egeli, 2013, p. 33.

¹⁰⁷⁴ "Turk fuzesi: Hedef menzil 2500 km," *Haberturk*, December 29, 2011. *Kasirga* is based on the domestic production of the *WS-I* purchased from China in 1997 for a \$250 million contract. Egeli, 2013, p. 31. *Yildirim* was also based on the domestic production by technology transfer from China, in a separate \$300 million deal in 1998. Ibid, p. 32.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Egeli, 2013, p. 32.

With respect to cruise missiles; Turkey signed an agreement with Israel to co-produce the Popeye-II cruise missile (150 km range) in 1997, and received 46 AGM - 142A/Popeye-I cruise missiles from Israel to be deployed on Turkish F-4s in 2002.¹⁰⁷⁶ At the Turkish Air Force, these standoff attack missiles were replaced by the standoff missile (SOM), which was initially designed to strike land targets within 180-250 km range by TUBITAK SAGE and enhanced versions are in development offering extended range, i.e. 500, 1500, and up to 2500 km.¹⁰⁷⁷ Currently, Turkey domestically develops and manufactures the SOM-J air-launched cruise missiles, more compact and equipped with folding control surfaces and a rocket booster to be integrated on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Lightning II.¹⁰⁷⁸ In September 2015, Lockheed Martin and Roketsan signed a contract to develop the SOM-J for the U.S. Air Force and Navy versions of the F-35 and enable exchange of technical data.

Turkey's main anti-ship cruise missile is the U.S. Harpoon Block II that has GPS-INS, which is currently improved by Roketsan's Atmaca (120 mile range) planned to enter the inventory by 2016, given the foreign procurement difficulties faced for the MILGEM national corvette project.¹⁰⁷⁹ Roketsan also manufactures the Cirit laser-guided rocket system for Turkish attack helicopters.¹⁰⁸⁰

¹⁰⁷⁶ Aaron Stein, "Turkey's Missile Programs: A Work in Progress," *EDAM Nonproliferation Policy Briefs*, 2013/1, p. 4.

¹⁰⁷⁷ "Turkey, US to modify the SOM cruise missile for use with F-35," *Defense Update*, October 24, 2014.

¹⁰⁷⁸ "Turkey, US to modify the SOM cruise missile for use with F-35,"

¹⁰⁷⁹ "Atmaca fuzesi ne zaman envantere girecek?," *Kokpit Aero*, March 17, 2014.

¹⁰⁸⁰ "Turkey eyes advanced missile and space technologies," *Al Arabiya News*, April 1, 2015.

The Turkish Land Forces aim to boost their air-land mechanized warfare, close-air support, and air-cavalry operational capabilities by a rapid, multi-battalion deployment framework by 2020s.¹⁰⁸¹ Other major modernization efforts in the Turkish Armed Forces for air support include the national battle tank Altay, 155mm howitzers Firtina, attack and reconnaissance helicopter Atak T-129, new generation basic trainer aircraft Hurkus, amphibious assault ship Juan Carlos 1-class as an aircraft carrier substitute, and anti-air warfare frigates TF-2000 projects based on the MILGEM national corvette project to be integrated with Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles for local area air defense.¹⁰⁸²

Meanwhile, the Turkish space program is intended to achieve interoperability between aerial and space assets. Turkey intends to network its future space-based assets with manned and unmanned systems. Turkey plans to use its recently procured AWACS early-warning planes, as well as unmanned remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs, commonly known as drones), to augment Turkey's imagery and communications, as well as to help cue missile defense interceptors. The ambitious national air and space project also includes the country's first national fighter jet F-X, advanced unmanned combat aerial vehicles – dubbed the Anka, and building a missile with a range of 2,500 kilometers.¹⁰⁸³ The Turkish drone Anka-S, which is considered as an important export item for the domestic defense industry, will have satellite capacity (SATCOM)

¹⁰⁸¹ Kasapoglu, 2014, p. 15.

¹⁰⁸² Can Kasapoglu, "The Military Strategic Rationale of Turkey's T-Loramids Project and the Eurosam Offer," *Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, Recherches and Documents*, No. 1, 2014, pp. 15-16.

¹⁰⁸³ "Ambitious Turkey seeking to sync national air and space firepower," *Space News*, July 1, 2013.

yet no SAR useful load.¹⁰⁸⁴ There has also been some speculation that the SLV could be used as a platform for Ankara to develop the proposed 2,500 km ballistic missile.¹⁰⁸⁵

¹⁰⁸⁴ “SSM to Form 2020’s Defense Industry Policy,” *Defense Turkey, Issue 63*, September 14, 2015.

¹⁰⁸⁵ “Turkey’s Sat-Launcher Plans Raise Concerns,” *Defense News*, July 28, 2013.

Appendix E: NATO Interoperability

At the 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO introduced the “Connected Forces Initiative (CFI)” to enhance training, exercises, and the interoperability of evolving technological systems.¹⁰⁸⁶ NATO’s electronic warfare security codes require interoperability of the systems that will be plugged onto NATO systems, unless it is a “stand-alone” system. NATO defines interoperability as “the ability for Allies to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.¹⁰⁸⁷ Specifically, it enables forces, units, and/or systems to operate together and allows them to share common doctrine and procedures, each others’ infrastructure and bases, and to be able to communicate.”¹⁰⁸⁸ It does not mean using common military equipment but sharing common facilities, exchanging data and services through interaction, connection, and communication by implementing NATO’s “smart defense and connected forces” initiatives.¹⁰⁸⁹

Another issue is “tactical digital information links (TADIL), facilitating the exchange of information and intelligence between the US and Allied Commands, i.e. fighter-to-fighter, surface-to-air, air-to-surface, air-to-air tactical communication, as well as Link-16 (TADIL J), which is the primary tactical data link for C3-I to transmit air surveillance and ballistic missile information near-real time in theater operations.”¹⁰⁹⁰

¹⁰⁸⁶ “Connected Forces Initiative,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 16, 2014, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_98527.htm

¹⁰⁸⁷ “Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces,” *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, May 11, 2012, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84112.htm

¹⁰⁸⁸ “Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces,”

¹⁰⁸⁹ “Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces,”

¹⁰⁹⁰ “Tactical Digital Information Links (TADIL),” *Federation of American Scientists*, April 23, 2000, at: <http://fas.org/irp/program/disseminate/tadil.htm>

Allies commit to Link-16 by NATO's Standardization Agreement STANAG 5516.¹⁰⁹¹ NATO also has the airborne air surveillance and control systems (AWACS), i.e. NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEFW), headquartered at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium.¹⁰⁹² The original mission of NAEWF is to augment ground-based radar systems to counter low-level threats from aircraft, with a limited C2 function to address air sovereignty concerns of allies; with more airborne control for allies with less capable fighters, i.e. Turkey.¹⁰⁹³ However, even if allies have similar systems, it doesn't guarantee interoperability in absence of electronic support measures (ESM), compliance with the latest standards in Link 16, and special agreements to share tactical intelligence.¹⁰⁹⁴

¹⁰⁹¹ "Tactical Data Links," in Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, et al. Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations, RAND Corporation, 2000, p. 113.

¹⁰⁹² Turkey is a full member to the NATO AWACS acquisition organization. "Air Surveillance and Control," in Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, et al. Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations, RAND Corporation, 2000, pp. 77-78.

¹⁰⁹³ "Air Surveillance and Control," in Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, et al. Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations, RAND Corporation, 2000, p. 83.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Hura, McLeod, et al., 2000, pp. 81-82.

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<http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/valued-partnership-obg-talks-huseyin-diriöz-ambassador-and-assistant-secretary-general>
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