Title of Dissertation: THE DEMOBILIZED BODY: TRANSGRESSIONS OF PERSONAL SPACE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Carla Beth Abdo, Doctor of Philosophy, 2016

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Grounded in the intersection between gender politics and electoral studies, this dissertation examines the demobilizing effects of violations of personal space (in the form of domestic violence, control over mobility, emotional abuse, and sexual harassment) on the propensity to vote. Using quantitative methods across four survey datasets concerning Lebanon, the United States, Morocco, and Yemen, this research concludes that cross-regionally, familial control over mobility reduces the propensity to vote among women. Conversely, mechanisms of empowerment such as education and employment increase the propensity to vote.
THE DEMOBILIZED BODY: TRANSGRESSIONS OF PERSONAL SPACE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

by

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2016

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my family, particularly my parents, Huda Ayyash-Abdo and Habib Abdo, and my husband, Iakovos Katsipis. My family is my primary source of inspiration and strength, and I would like to thank them not only for their support and love, but simply for being who they are.
Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the efforts of my advisor, Dr. Ernesto Calvo, and the members of my committee, Dr. Shibley Telhami, Dr. Stella Rouse, Dr. Kanisha Bond, and Dr. Philip Cohen. This dissertation would have been impossible to create without their time, effort, commitment, and skill. I would like to thank Dr. Stacy Kosko, Dr. Marwa Shalaby, Dr. Calvert Jones, Dr. Heather Oldercin, and Dr. Nichole Bauer for their insightful feedback. I would also like to thank Dr. Samira Aghacy, Ms. Roula el-Masri, Mrs. Rita el-Chemaly, Mr. Harry Crouch, Ms. Ruth Glenn, and Ms. Linda Berg for giving me their time and expertise during interviews. My gratitude also goes to friends Andrea Pham-Davenport and Peggy McWeeney, who put enormous energy into my work and defense, and Raymond Williams, whose gentle presence throughout this process meant more than he knows. Lastly, I would like to thank my husband, Iakovos Katsipis, my parents, Huda Ayyash-Abdo and Habib Abdo, and my best friend, Jennifer Crowder, for their unwavering love and support throughout the duration of this project.
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Chapter 1: Incursions on Personal Space and Political Participation

*Introducing Personal Space to Politics*

Concerned with the mechanisms of bodily integrity, personal space, and the propensity to vote, this dissertation is grounded in the intersection between gender politics, electoral studies, and institutions. Defined as the preferred distance between one’s self and others, enjoying respect for one’s personal space is key to comfortable independent functioning in social settings (Beasley and Bacchi, 2000; O’Connor et al., 1999; Lister 1997a). While this is commonly accepted in social interaction theory, the concept of personal space is not often linked to political behavior. However, this dissertation indicates that personal space is acutely relevant to the propensity to vote.

Indeed, voting was once considered a male dominated enterprise. Though more egalitarian levels of political participation are emerging, worldwide, women tend to vote less often than men do (Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Indeed, in the 2010-2014 World Values Survey Data¹, men usually (though not always) reported higher levels of voter turnout. The four cases featured in this dissertation show varying degrees of gender-based turnout.

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¹ State-provided electoral data is not publicly available from Lebanon, Morocco, or Yemen. As such, the World Values Survey was an alternative standardized metric to standard electoral reporting.
Figure 1: Gender Based Voter Turnout in the United States, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen

Note: Above is a graph depicting gender-based breakdowns of voter turnout based on figures provided by the 2010-2014 World Values Survey. It appears that three out of the four cases, men reported voting more than women did, although by small margins. However, over-reporting in survey studies is often a common problem—for example, according to state-provided data in the United States, 53% of women voted in the 2012 presidential elections, while 47% of men did (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2012).

Typically, reduced female political participation is often attributed to the fact that women often have less access to empowering socio-economic assets, such as education, employment, and property, than do men (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Inglehart and Norris, 2003a; Verba, S. Burns, N. and Schlozman, 1997). Though women have gained increased access to such resources, and their rate of political participation is increasing as a result, one dimension explaining the propensity to vote remain unexamined. The experience of violations of personal space and the inhibitory
mechanisms that they produce on potential voters is the key question which is ultimately answered in this dissertation.

Mechanisms of control over personal space are grounded in three bases of power: those related to institutions, those related to interactions in the public sphere, such as the workplace or the street), and those pertaining to the private sphere, most commonly in terms of the regulatory mechanisms of relationships salient within the home (Foucault, 1997; Turner, 2008; Morris, Silk, Steinberg, Myers, and Robinson, 2007). Domestic abuse or dominance in the home both create not only a loss of personal space, but also a loss of the individual self, making independent decision-making difficult, and harassment outside of the home creates increased levels of anxiety and withdrawal from the public sphere (Deveaux, 1994; Gruber, 1998; Sen, 2001; Nussbaum, 2005; Khader, 2011).

I posit that the effects of these mechanisms extend into political participation, as those who are alienated from the public sphere are less likely to develop social networks, secure employment, participate in associational life, make independent decisions, and thus, less likely to develop the civic skills necessary for political participation. This results in reduced levels of political agency. Ultimately, those who experience transgressions upon personal space are less likely to vote.
Theories of Subjugation and Repression

The body is an individual’s most central operational power base (Beasley and Bacchi, 2000; Lister, 1997a). By that same token, power over the body is not only asserted by the individual, but also by society (Butler, 1999; Deveaux, 1994; Foucault, 1978). Social sources often sexualize the body, leading to its domination in the form of shame, insult, neglect, or abuse (Foucault, 1978; Butler, 1997). All of these are violations of bodily integrity.

The concept of bodily integrity emphasizes the inviolability over the body, and one’s authority over it (Patosalmi, 2009; Nussbaum, 2003). Inappropriate touching, obscene gestures, and similar sexualized insults are violations of bodily integrity, and receivers of such affronts often experience annoyance, fear, and anxiety (Barling, Rogers, and Kelloway, 2001). Chronic exposure to sexual harassment creates psychological distress and leads to social withdrawal (Richman et. al., 1999; Fitzgerald et. al., 1997). Sexual harassment also functions as a form of social discrimination, and makes it more difficult for women to be taken seriously (Gruber, 1998). These findings are made in reference to the psychological impact of transgressions against bodily integrity, but none link these dynamics to political behavior and participation.

Based at the crux of social justice and human development, the capabilities approach to addressing socio-political inequity is concerned with what people are able to do and be (Sen, 2001; Nussbaum, 2003). Capability is comprised of two parts;
the first is the effective freedom to perform an action, and the second is the desire to do so (Alkire, 2002; Sen, 2009). Effective freedom is defined as the actual (as opposed to exclusively the legal) freedom a person has to perform an action which is valuable to them (Sen, 2009). This freedom is regulated by formal and informal institutions and social processes, which are poverty, education, employment, leisure time, legal rights, social status, and respect for bodily integrity (Drèze and Sen, 2002; Nussbaum, 2003; Robeyns, 2003; Sen, 2001). These form a holistic assessment of a person’s “capability space” (Nussbaum, 2003).

Social power theory indicates that men enjoy more public power in the form of social sanction and access to material resources, while women are more susceptible to societal maltreatment (Berdahl and Moore, 2006; Cortina and Wasti, 2005; Carli, 1999). The inequity of resource acquisition creates a sense of dependency on the behalf of women on men (Butler, 1997). This dependency dispossesses women of independent agency, and lulls them into maintaining a subservient gendered status quo (Deveaux, 1994; Butler, 1997; Butler, 1999). As a result, women do not realize their full social and political potential as citizens.

Outside of the public sphere, social and political behavior is often regulated within the home (Fuller and Fincham, 1995). This is salient within the family unit, where men traditionally have authority over their wives, and parents have authority over their children. To address this, this dissertation examines the effects of private regulations including intimate partner violence, emotional abuse, and control over mobility.
Intimate partner violence involves inflicting bodily injury on another within the context of marriage or a romantic relationship, and women are much more likely to experience intimate partner violence than are men (Bonomi et al., 2006). The experience of intimate partner violence creates helplessness, anxiety, social withdrawal, dependency on the dominant partner, and the inability to behave independently (Campbell, 2002; Zink, Regan, Jacobson, and Pabst, 2003). As this dynamic applies to political behavior, women who experience this have their capability space reduced, and retreat from the socio-political scene (Nussbaum, 2001; Khader, 2011).

Though non-violent, emotional abuse can be even more damaging, and is far less likely to be unrecognized and unreported (Zink et al., 2003; Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2005; O’Leary, 1999). Emotionally abusive behavior is based on the abuser’s desire to control the victimized partner (Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2005; O’Leary, 1999). Victims typically believe that the abusive words are in fact true, and start to develop negative self-affect (Kaufmann, 2009; Rosenfeld, Lennon, and White, 2005; O’Leary, 1999). This results in feelings of worthlessness, helplessness, depression, dependency, social withdrawal, and isolation (Kira, Omidy, Fawzi, Rice, Fawzi, Lewandowski, and Bujold-Bugeaud, 2015; Bevan and Higgins, 2002). The experience of emotional abuse reduces the capability space, as the abused also retreats from the public sphere; the likelihood of political participation is decreased (Khader, 2011).

While control over another’s mobility is unaddressed by the legal system, this power structure reduces the likelihood of the controlled to interact with the public
sphere, make independent decisions, and creates a dynamic of dependency on the controlling partner (Kira, et al., 2015; Khader, 2011). When one’s movements are controlled, he or she is unable to move between the private sphere and the public sphere freely. A natural consequence of this is that he or she is less likely to be able to engage in the public sphere independently. For women whose movements are being controlled, this creates a loss of the sense of self, making independent decision-making difficult (Sackett and Saunders, 1999; Kabeer, 1999). In contrast, women who are able to move between the two spheres with more ease, typically due to employment, have a stronger sense of self and can make independent decisions easily (Kabeer, 1999).

I assert that when an individual experiences violations of bodily integrity in the forms of i) domestic violence ii) familial control over mobility iii) emotional abuse iv) sexual harassment, his/her capability space decreases, thereby leading to voter demobilization. Conversely, I posit that when an individual has command over material resources, earns higher levels of income, and has experienced university-level education, that his/her capability space increases, resulting in voter mobilization.

Evidence of Violations of Personal Space Demobilizing Voters

Featured in this dissertation is the analysis of voting behavior (largely but not exclusively among women) in four countries—the United States, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen. The most commonly associated demobilizing variable linked to the concept of personal space was familial control over mobility. This is statistically and substantively significant among women in the United States, Lebanon, and Morocco.
In Yemen, where independent female mobility is legally restricted, this variable seems to propel women towards voting in heavily tribal areas. This is perhaps unsurprising, as tribal and familial control over mobility is a strong feature of Yemeni society, resulting in pressure to mobilize. Ultimately though, it appears as though the lack of independent mobility demobilizes women cross-regionally. Across all four samples, familial control over mobility is not a demobilizing factor among men, indicating that women are more likely to experience voter demobilization due to transgressions upon personal space than men are. Indeed, voter turnout was only equal in Lebanon—in the United States, Morocco, and Yemen, women were less likely to vote than men.

Though variables such as domestic violence, emotional abuse, and public sexual harassment appear to be significant in certain instances, these findings are not as generalizable as familial control over mobility. For example, the justification of domestic violence against one’s sex (used as a proxy for the experience of domestic violence) was significant only among American men. Similarly, only in Lebanon did variables pertaining either emotional abuse or public sexual harassment appear to be significant among women. Unique to Yemeni social dynamics, spousal control over the ability to seek health care demobilizes women.

Conversely, empowering factors such as university-level education, employment, and property ownership increase the propensity to vote. However, it appears as though university-level education empowers women more so than it does men, while employment empowers men more so than women.

In the context of female voting behavior, it appears as though psychological control over mobility (or in the case of Yemeni women, decision-making over health
care), demobilizes voters more so than the experience of physical violence. This serves as a reminder of the power of non-physical abuse, and the socio-political consequences that occur.

**Case Selection: The United States, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen**

For the purposes of examining the relationship between transgressions upon personal space and voter demobilization, this dissertation utilizes multiple case studies. The two primary cases are Lebanon and the United States, and there is a comparative chapter on Morocco and Yemen. At first glance, these appear to be odd cases for comparison. Interestingly though, the rate of both male-to-female domestic violence and public sexual harassment is similar in both Lebanon and the United States. Indeed, the rate of male-to-female domestic violence is 33% in the United States, while in Lebanon it is 35% (Usta, Farver, and Pashayan, 2007; National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2014). In terms of public sexual harassment, the reported aggregate rate in the United States is 65%, while in Lebanon the rate is 61% (IFES, 2010; Stop Street Harassment, 2014).

While these commonalities between the United States and Lebanon exist, there is strong variation in i) institutional composition, ii) presence of ethno-political minorities, iii) gender-based socio-political spaces, and iv) degree of violent political conflict. This strong variation allows for an examination of the relationship between violations of personal space and voting within and across multiple socio-political systems. Including Morocco and Yemen as comparative case studies allows for even richer comparisons, as this allows for a comparison within non-democracies with
varying levels of ethno-political mobilization, political violence, and gender-based socio-political space.

In addressing the dimension of gender-based socio-political space, these four countries exist upon a continuum of legal protection and public social spaces made available for women. The United States is the most accommodating in that it provides both sexes with equal legal rights and has actively enforced laws regarding the protection of bodily integrity and gender-based domestic violence. Lebanon is the second in that there are higher levels of female employment, higher education, and public circulation, and domestic violence has recently been criminalized in 2014. Morocco is the third in that it undergoing democratization, has recently reformed its family status laws in 2004, and accords women more rights than it used to. Yemen the most restrictive in that the law does not allow a woman to leave the home without the permission of either her father or husband.

When discussing religion and ethno-political minorities, the United States has defined racial minorities with particular political bases; these are most typically those who are African-American/Black or Hispanic. Moreover, the dominant religion in the United States is Christianity, and this is featured in the dataset. In the Lebanese context, minority status is defined not by race, but by religion. Lebanon is home to Christians of Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Catholic sects, as well as Muslims of Shi’ite, Sunni, and Druze origins. Unique to its own history, minority status in Morocco is based on neither race nor religion—it is based on linguistic use of the Berber language. Unlike any other country in this dissertation, Yemen’s social cleavages are defined by regional tribal status.
Lastly, these four countries differ greatly in their governmental structures. The United States is a presidential system with a long history of regularly-occurring elections. Furthermore, the last civil war to occur on American soil was between 1861-1865. This is in direct contradiction with the Lebanese and Yemeni cases, where violent political conflict has become systemic, and often leads to irregular scheduling of elections. Unlike any of the other cases, Morocco is transitioning from an absolute monarchy to that of a constitutional one, and while the kingdom has held parliamentary elections regularly since 1956, only recently has the power of the parliament increased. As such, the impact of voting on political outcomes has increased, and further empowers the citizen.

Examining the same relationship across the strong variation present in and across systems of government and socio-political dynamics makes for a heightened understanding of voter demobilization due to transgressions upon personal space. This is the basis upon which I established my case selection.

*Models, Datasets, and Data Collection*

For the purposes of testing this theory, I used natural decomposition models across four sets of survey data, and conducted expert interviews. The datasets concerning Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen were gathered the International Foundation for Electoral Systems during 2009-2010. The interviewers went door-to-door, and conducted in-person interviews based on their survey instrument, titled the Status of Women Survey in the Middle East and North Africa.
The dataset concerning the United States is original data, and I designed the survey instrument. I did so by adapting some of the critical questions from the Status of Women in the Middle East Datasets, and including questions which are grounded in American politics. The data was collected by Qualtrics, and the sampling selection was done through an online opt-in panel, with a specific 65% female quota, which over-sizes the female sample. Within the opt-in panel, Qualtrics randomizes the participants, and tries to structure the demographics such that they resemble those found in census data (Ashley McWhorter\(^2\), Written Communication with Author, August 11, 2015; Qualtrics, 2014). For the purposes of cost-effectiveness and ease of collecting data, this method was used. The median time to complete this survey was 11:23 minutes. Approved on July 2nd, 3015 by the University of Maryland Internal Review Board, the full text of this questionnaire is featured in Appendix 5.A.

Having explained the datasets, survey instruments, and data collection methods, it is appropriate to explain the utility of the models used. The use of the natural decomposition model is that it allows for the comparison of expected and real mean outcomes between groups in the context of logistic equations. Similar to standard logistic regression, the \( \beta \)-coefficients are interpreted in a logistic space, and then converted into log-odds ratios. The \( \Omega \)-coefficient indicates the differences in predicted behaviors between the two models, and indicates statistical significance. I have substantiated each of these findings with a t-test. In the context of this research question, I am examining the expected and actual propensity of men and women to vote, and explaining the differences between the two.

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\(^2\) Ms. Ashley McWhorter is a panel product manager at Qualtrics. She was responsible for managing this survey.
The key independent variables which are representative of transgressions of personal space are: familial control over mobility, domestic violence, sexual harassment, and emotional abuse. Given the inchoate nature of the Lebanese, Moroccan, and Yemeni socio-political contexts, the ability to move in public without fear is also included for these three cases. This dissertation largely focuses on the effects of these transgressions on voting behavior among women, but men are also discussed. The dependent variable I have chosen to examine as the measure of political participation is a question asking whether or not the respondent voted. In the Lebanese dataset, this question refers to the last parliamentary elections. In the American dataset, this refers to the last presidential elections. In Morocco, this refers to national municipal elections, and in Yemen, the question addresses presidential elections. In all four countries, voting is not compulsory.

Religion, Transgressions of Personal Space and Political Behavior in Lebanon:

Results

In examining the case of Lebanon, I found that not only is the relationship between transgressions upon personal space and voting behavior significant among women, but that there are religion-based variations as to the degree and type of transgression that they experience. Christian women are more likely to experience sexual harassment in the street, while Muslim women are more likely to experience reduced levels of independence within the home. The impact of restrictions of mobility on voting behavior appears to be stronger among women who are either in their mid-50s or below. Both mechanisms demobilize female voters, but neither
demobilizes men. Education and employment also enhance the female likelihood to vote, but this is not the case for men.

Among both sexes, there are also religion-based variations in the propensity to vote, with Christians being the most likely to vote. Furthermore, following the news regularly, marriage, and the progression of age also increase the likelihood to vote among both men and women. Along a similar vein, persons of Maronite Christian origin are more likely to vote than persons of any other sect. Perhaps predictably, men and women who are currently members of political parties are more likely to vote than either former members of political parties or persons who were never members of political parties.

In the Lebanese context, it appears that female voting behavior is more sensitive to both demobilizing and mobilizing social mechanisms than that of men. Women experience demobilization when confronted with control over mobility and sexual harassment, while men do not. However, their propensity to vote increases in a stronger fashion compared to men when experiencing empowering processes, such as education and employment. The demobilizing effects of control over mobility are countered by the empowering mechanisms of education and employment, resulting in nearly equal turnout rates for men and women in the Lebanese context.

*Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and Political Participation in the United States: Results*

The results of examining gendered voting behavior in the United States indicate voter demobilization due to transgressions against personal space occurs
among both sexes. For women, the factor is spousal control over mobility, and this is significant across all age groups. Among men, the demobilizing factor is the justification of female-to-male domestic violence, but this becomes significant only among men above the age of 30. Interestingly, this is also the median age for marriage among American men, indicating a relationship between the justification of female-to-male domestic violence and “locking-in” with one partner. The marital age trend is indicated in the sample, as the proportion of men aged from 18-29 whom are married is 28%, but jumps to 60% from age 30-39, and fluctuates only minimally as the age brackets increase.

Among women, both education and income increase the propensity to vote, but neither displays significant empowering effects among men. This is similar to the Lebanese context, where education and employment empower increase the likelihood of female political participation, but the same is not true for men. Women are significantly less likely to vote if they have never been members of a political party. While reduced political participation among Republicans and Independents is also only salient among men, the decreased probability to vote if one has never been a member of a political party is also applicable to men. Lastly, having an existing interest in politics is a shared mobilizing factor among both sexes.

Ultimately however, it appears as though men vote more than women do in the American context. While both sexes would be predicted to vote less given the resources that they have, it appears as though men utilize them more, thereby increasing their propensity to vote.
Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: The Cases of Morocco and Yemen:

Results

In an effort to compare the Lebanese and American results to other electorates with varying legal spaces that govern public and private personal spaces, I chose to write a comparative chapter on Morocco and Yemen. In both of these countries I found evidence of the demobilizing effect of violations of personal space upon voting, although they show in significantly different ways.

In Morocco, women who do not feel free to leave the house also experience voter demobilization, but education and employment do not empower women politically. This is likely because much of female labor in Morocco is through informal means, and often this labor is conducted at home, which reduces the mobilizing effect of employment. However, women who agree that it is acceptable for women to work outside of the home are more likely to vote than women who do not. Perhaps surprisingly, interest in politics does not impact the propensity to vote among men, but it does among women.

Berber minority status, marriage, and age play a significant role in increasing the propensity to vote among both sexes. While the empowerment factors of age and marriage are salient across electorates, minority status is a surprise, and should be addressed in its context. In this particular election, a campaign was held to make Amazigh (language of the Berbers) an official language alongside Arabic, which mobilized the Berber community, which later materialized in the form of a referendum during the 2011 parliamentary elections (Ajbali, 2009; Tourabi, 2011). As a historically oppressed community, the Berbers do not have a history of being an
exceptionally politically motivated ethno-political group. Employment also increases the propensity to vote among men.

Similar to the Moroccan context, Yemeni women are also more inclined to vote if they believe that it is socially acceptable for women to work outside of the home. Women are also more likely to vote if they are employed, have achieved university-level education, or watch the news regularly. Along a similar grain, they are more likely to vote if they feel free to express themselves.

The demobilizing factors among Yemeni women are among the most interesting, and unique in comparison to the other cases. Unlike any other case, freedom to leave the house actually reduces a woman’s probability to vote in the Yemeni context. At first glance, this appears to be odd, but it can be explained by familial tribal links governing voting choice in Yemen. Tribes hold most of the political power in the country, and tribal leaders secure votes from members of their same tribe by offering material goods or services. In this context, women are often pressured by family members to vote for a particular candidate; ~22% of Yemeni women indicated that they felt pressured by family members to vote, with the highest proportion coming from the Eastern tribal areas (IFES, 2010). Indeed, women are 2.3 times more likely to vote if they indicate that they were pressured compared to women who indicated that they were not.

The relationship between transgressions against bodily integrity in Yemen does not show in control over mobility, but rather in the form of the inability to make decisions over one’s body. Captured in the variable questioning whether or not
women can seek medical care independently, it appears as though spousal control over the ability to seek medical care reduces the probability to vote.

*Policy Implications for Women: Where to go from here?*

The policy implications for women in this context are three-step, as the policies necessary to reduce dominance in the home are often linked to increasing independent agency, which happens most often through establishing some command over social and material resources (Kosko, 2013; Khader, 2011; Anderson, 1997). The capability school of thought indicates that women who are educated and employed typically command material resources, expand their capability space, and by extension, are more likely to participate politically (Fuwa, 2004; Khader, 2011). However, other studies indicate that when women earn more than their spouses do, they are at increased risk for experiencing domestic violence (Andersen, 1997; Rocca, Rathod, Falle, Pande, and Krishnan, 2009). This being said, women who are educated and employed could be more likely to report abuse, rather than more likely to experience it.

In the context of the capability framework, creating policies that would incentivize employers to hire women and raising the wages of typically feminine jobs would reduce resource inequality, and as a result, would reduce transgressions of personal space inside the home. Policy measures within legislative branches would be to diversify the political platforms where women are discussed, and in the Lebanese, Moroccan, and Yemeni contexts, advocate for gender equitable laws.
Additional educational measures include university scholarships that target women, and creating more job opportunities whereby women can generate income. Ultimately, both education and employment increase a woman’s “capability space”, thereby increasing the chances of political participation.

*Unexplained and Outside of the Data*

At its foremost, this dissertation focuses on the relationship between violations of personal space and voter demobilization among women in a cross-regional fashion, with an emphasis on voting behavior in the Arab world. Though it manifests itself differently, the relationship between transgressions of personal space and voter demobilization is consistent across all four electorates. While this is a new lens through which gender-based voting behavior is analyzed, there is still much concerning gender-based politics that this dissertation does not address.

Firstly, the only form of political participation that is measured is that of the vote. While this is the most widespread form of citizen-based political participation, other forms of political participation have not been addressed. These include political protest, writing or signing petitions that advocate for reform, creating political literature (often in the form of online posting), and the like. These forms of political participation are activist behaviors (rather than widespread citizen behaviors), and thus, do not work as baseline measures of political activity where non-participation can be interpreted as demobilization.

Secondly, this dissertation examines voting across four very different electorates. This raises two questions: i) whether or not the same political activity is
being captured across the spectrum, and ii) whether or not voting is a baseline political activity for public political participation in all four contexts.

In the context of autocratic and democratic governance, voting may have different implications. This is even more true when ethnopolitical cleavages dominate the political landscape, as members of the electorate use ethnic affiliations as heuristic cues when determining whom to vote for (Birnir, 2007). Moreover, ethnic affiliations are typically associated with informal pork distribution, and these are salient in the Lebanese and Yemeni cases (Corstange, 2008). The promise of receiving direct material benefit in the form of food, money, or services presents different incentives for voting than those whose political interactions are framed within programmatic distribution systems. Moreover, where voters use ethno-political cues in deciding whom to vote for these mechanisms are thought to create familial-based incentives to vote rather than individual ones, thereby reducing the likelihood that voting is a measure of the individual choice to participate politically (Norris and Mattes, 2003; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco, 2013).

Additionally, these countries differ significantly in the degree of democratic governance under which their electorates operate. Though voting is considered to be a democratic enterprise, voting also occurs in autocratic settings (Magaloni, 2008). In this context, autocracies will co-opt opposition parties into the government in order to reduce popular opposition to their rule (Josua, 2011). This is salient in the Moroccan and Yemeni cases, where their respective opposition parties (Peace, Justice and Development in Morocco and Islah in Yemen) garner significant
support (Hamzawy, 2008; Binoual, 2011; Clark, 2004). Though this represents a degree of political freedom, political rights are not entirely secured under the law.

Using voting as a baseline activity for political participation across all four significantly varying political climates also warrants clarification. In all four countries, voting is the most widespread reported form of political participation; 79.5% of the Lebanese sample indicated that they voted, while 78% of the American sample indicated the sample. In the Moroccan and Yemeni cases, 47% of the Moroccan sample indicated that they voted, as did 62% of the American sample (IFES, 2010). Voting appears to be the most widespread modicum of political participation in all cases, thereby making them appropriate for comparison.

Along a continued characterization of voting behavior, this dissertation does not address non-voting as an act of political participation in the form of boycott. Though non-voting can sometimes be explained in this context, it is used to measure demobilization in this dissertation.

In addition, the only socio-political cleavage that is examined is that of the citizen, and not the politician. This dissertation does not address the propensity for women to develop a political base as potential politicians, gender-based difficulties that exist when developing a campaign, or the propensity for voters to elect female candidates. This dissertation also does not include recommendations which would allow for increased female participation in governmental positions.

Lastly, this dissertation does not provide an in-depth analysis as to the mechanisms behind voter demobilization and the justification of domestic violence
among men as a separate socio-political entity. This is particularly relevant to the American context, where results indicate that endorsing domestic violence among one’s own sex reduces political mobilization only among men.

**Directions for Future Research**

Having established that this dissertation leaves some dynamics of political participation unexplained, there are many directions for future research. The first would be to conduct an in-depth analysis as to dynamics of violations of bodily integrity and political participation among men in particular. This dissertation largely focuses on women, and another study that examines men through this lens would prove to be very insightful.

Along a similar vein, in the Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen datasets, the questions used to measure marital dynamics were asked only of women. This is limiting, as it does not allow the researcher to examine marital decision-making mechanisms as they relate to voting behavior among married men. Creating and executing a poll which incorporates these questions among both sexes, comparing the results to those found in the United States dataset, and discovering cross-cultural similarities (or culture-based differences) would be a strong contribution to electoral studies.

While this study indicates that violations upon personal space cause voter demobilization, other forms of political participation (in the form of protest, nomination for political candidacy, etc.) should be addressed. This would provide a sense as to whether or not the relationship between transgressions upon personal
space cause political demobilization only among voters, or if this relationship can also be observed in other forms of political participation.

**Organization of Dissertation**

This dissertation is organized across six chapters. Titled *Incursions on Personal Space and Political Participation*, this introduction provides an overview as to the findings and implications of the dissertation. The second chapter, *Bodily Transgressions and Political Participation in Comparative Politics*, explains the conceptual framework within which this dissertation is created.

Using analyses performed on the *Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Case of Lebanon*\(^3\) along with elite interviews which I conducted, the third chapter, *Religion, Transgressions of Personal Space, and Political Behavior in Lebanon*, addresses the relationship between voter demobilization and transgressions upon personal space. In particular, this chapter explores voter demobilization due to familial control over mobility, verbal/emotional abuse, domestic violence, and public sexual harassment. This chapter also illustrates how there is that there is ethno-political variation as to the degree to which women experience either transgression of personal space; Muslim women are more likely to experience familial control over mobility, while Christian women are more likely to experience public sexual harassment.

The fourth chapter, *Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and Political Participation in the United States*, explores the relationship between voter demobilization and transgressions upon personal space across the same axes. Having

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\(^{3}\) This data was gathered by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in 2010.
created my questionnaire\textsuperscript{4} across 1,268 adults and conducted elite interviews, I found that control over mobility causes voter demobilization among women, while the justification of domestic violence against one’s own sex causes voter demobilization among men.

In the fifth chapter \textit{Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: The Cases of Morocco and Yemen}, I use the \textit{Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa: The Case of Morocco} and the \textit{Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa: The Case of Yemen} datasets\textsuperscript{5} to provide insight as to how voter demobilization due to incursions upon personal space works. I found that in Morocco, familial control over mobility causes voter demobilization among women, while in Yemen, spousal control over the ability to seek health care demobilizes women. These two different measures of transgressions against personal space highlight how voter demobilization due to incursions upon personal space manifests itself differently across multiple political systems.

This dissertation concludes with the sixth chapter, \textit{Mobilizing Bodies: Protecting Women and Democracy}. This chapter provides policy recommendations that would increase the likelihood of female political participation, and explains that implications that such an increase could create.

\textsuperscript{4} This research was funded by the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, the Department of Government and Politics Women’s Group, a writing fellowship awarded by the graduate school, and the 2015 BSOS Dean's Research Initiative.

\textsuperscript{5} This data was gathered by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in 2010.
Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, *Incursions on Personal Space and Political Participation*, I argue that transgressions of personal space serve as a demobilizing force upon voters. Citizens are particularly less likely to vote when their mobility is controlled. In contrast, persons are more likely to vote when they experience higher levels of education, employment, and bodily independence. I also indicate what the dissertation does not explain, and provide an explanation of the dissertation chapters.

In the next chapter, *Bodily Transgressions and Political Participation in Comparative Politics*, I provide the in-depth conceptual framework concerning transgressions upon personal space, demobilization, and the resulting withdrawal from political life. I explain this relationship with foundations in the relationship between power, the body, society, and the extension of these dynamics over socio-political cleavages related to gender, minority status, socio-economic status, and age. Furthermore, I explain my particular focus on the United States and Lebanon, and describe their governmental systems and feminist histories. Lastly, I explain the research methodology used in this dissertation.
Chapter 2: Bodily Transgressions and Political Participation in Comparative Politics

In the previous chapter, *Incursions on Personal Space and Political Participation*, I argue that transgressions of personal space serve as a demobilizing force upon voters. Citizens are less likely to vote when exposed to harassment in public, when their mobility is controlled, and have lower levels of education and employment. In contrast, persons are more likely to vote when they experience higher levels of education, employment, and bodily independence. I also offer an explanation and outline of the dissertation chapters, and indicate that the United States and Lebanon are case studies in this dissertation.

In this chapter, *Bodily Transgressions and Political Participation in Comparative Politics*, I indicate the in-depth conceptual framework concerning transgressions upon personal space, demobilization, and the resulting withdrawal from political life. I explain this relationship with foundations in the relationship between power, the body, society, and the extension of these dynamics over socio-political cleavages related to gender, minority status, socio-economic status, and age. Moreover, I present a justification for using the United States and Lebanon as case-studies, with explanations as to their systems of government and the arc of feminism in both countries. Lastly, I present an overview as to the methodology used.
Introducing the Body to Voting Behavior

The study of voting behavior is hardly new to the discipline of political science. The right to vote is one of the foundations of citizenship in democratic states, and is the most common form of citizen political participation. While this is a right granted to all citizens in democratic states, studies show that citizen-rights often require resources if they are to be exercised (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995). Indeed, social empowerment mechanisms such as income, employment, and education increase political knowledge and efficacy, which in turn heighten the propensity to vote (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995; Verba, Burns, Scholzman, 1997; Bartels, 2008).

All of this being said, citizens do not enjoy such benefits equally, nor is the propensity to vote similar across socio-political cleavages. Those with reduced access to primary goods such as income, education, and employment are less likely to participate in public life (Brighouse and Robeyns, 2010; Unterhalter and Brighouse, 2014). As this extends to voting behavior, citizens with low income, low levels of education, women, racial minorities and some occupational groups tend to participate less in elections and know less about politics than other citizens (Bartels, 2008; Claibourn and Sapiro, 2000; Suzuki and Chappell, 1996). Not only do such groups participate less, but their impact on governance when they do vote is also less. It appears as though the impact of poorer voters on governance is negligible; their voices do not tend to be heard, and their needs are rarely taken into consideration (Bartels, 2008).
Group inequalities in achieved functions are often reflective of inequalities in capabilities (Sen, 2001; Robeyns, 2003; Anderson, 1999). Given that there are group inequalities in the distribution of socio-political resources such as education and income, it follows that those who have such resources are able to do more than those who do not. Ultimately, this creates a dynamic where subsets of citizens are not engaging politically not because they do not want to, but because they are unable to (Nussbaum, 2005; Hesford and Kozol, 2005; Robeyns, 2003). As this dynamic applies to gender politics, men are more likely to vote, display political knowledge, and political efficacy than are women all over the world (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Verba, Burns, Scholzman, 1997). This is often linked to resource-based characteristics, such as the increased likelihood of men to hold higher-paying jobs, secure higher education, and increased accessibility to resources that enable building civic-skills (Agarwal, 1997; Nussbaum, 2005). These resource-based factors are undoubtedly important in explaining political behavior. However, what is often ignored in this assessment is that personal capabilities related to voting behavior are inclusive of many factors outside of measurable resources.

Coined by Amartya Sen and grounded in the concepts of social justice and human development, the capability approach to addressing socio-political inequity is principally concerned with what people are able to do and be (Sen, 2001; Nussbaum, 2003). Essentially, capability is formed of two dimensions—the effective freedom to perform an action, and the desire to do so (Alkire, 2002; Sen, 2009). Effective freedom is defined as the actual (as opposed to merely on paper) freedom a person has to perform an action which a person values (Sen, 2009). This effective freedom is
regulated by formal and informal institutions and social processes (Drèze and Sen, 2002). According to the capability framework, these dimensions are: poverty, education, employment, leisure time, legal rights, social status, and respect for bodily integrity (Nussbaum, 2003; Robeyns, 2003; Sen, 2001). These form a holistic assessment of a person’s “capability space” (Nussbaum, 2003). While political scientists have paid much attention to elements of the capability space such as education, income, and social status as they related to the increased likelihood of persons to vote, little has been done to directly address the dimension of bodily integrity as it relates to voting behavior.

Thus far, the relationship between violence and political participation has been studied in the context of war or the experience of crime. In a study consisting of natural experiment examining the political behavior of ex-combatants in Northern Uganda, it appears as though those who were forcibly recruited into participating into the Lord’s Resistance Army were 27% more likely to vote than those who were not (Blattman, 2009). Yet another study indicates that experiencing crime victimization leads to increased rates of political participation, leading one to think that such an experience may turn a citizen into an activist (Bateson, 2012; Bellows and Miguel, 2006). This goes against the train of thought that those who experience political violence become alienated from the socio-political sphere; rather, an opposite trend is salient (Blattman, 2009; Baines, 2005).

However, these studies examines the effects of political violence and crime on voting behavior, not control over personal space in the context of one’s home. Moreover, in these contexts, the perpetrator is outside of one’s home. These are
different types of exposures to repressive mechanisms, and as this dissertation indicates, yield very different results.

*The Body, Repression, and Reduced Political Participation*

The body is the center of individual operations of power, it is also the object of political control in the public domain (Beasley and Bacchi, 2000; Lister, 1997a). Power is inscribed on the body not only by the individual, but also by society (Butler, 1999; Deveaux, 1994; Foucault, 1978). The sexualization of the body often leads to its repression in the form of shame, insult, neglect, or the negation of its existence by social forces (Foucault, 1978; Butler, 1997). These are transgressions upon bodily integrity.

The concept of bodily integrity emphasizes the inviolability over the body, and one’s autonomy over it (Patosalmi, 2009; Nussbaum, 2003). Incursions upon one’s bodily integrity (popular examples are receiving obscene gestures or touching that is inappropriately intimate) are violations of desired privacy, and as such, are met with annoyance, fear, anxiety, and other negative emotions (Barling, Rogers, and Kelloway, 2001). Chronic exposure to sexual harassment creates psychological distress and leads to social withdrawal (Richman et. al., 1999; Fitzgerald et. al., 1997). Indeed, sexual harassment also functions as a form of discrimination, and makes it more difficult for women to be taken seriously (Gruber, 1998). This reduces the ability of the individual to engage in the public sphere, ultimately reducing their public capabilities.
Heavily linked to the concept of bodily integrity is that of personal space. Personal space is the “invisible, variable volume of space surrounding an individual which defines that individual’s preferred distance from others” (Burgoon, 1978). This space serves as a protective space between one’s self and others (Lane, 1990; Barron, 1990; Leino-Kilpia et. al, 2001). This space is based on both biological and psychological needs (Burgoon, 1982). The propensity to experience violations of bodily integrity and/or personal space is regulated by institutional and social forces. Without control over one’s body, access to the public sphere is impaired (Beasley and Bacchi, 2000; O’Connor et al., 1999; Lister 1997a). Ultimately, those who do not have autonomous control over their bodies often experience attitudinal adaptive preference, whereby the person acquiesces their lack of autonomy, and then refrains from engage in the public sphere (Deveaux, 1994; Nussbaum, 2005; Sen, 2001; Khader, 2011). Outside of control exercised by the individual, the body is controlled by institutions and social forces.

Institutional Regulation of Bodily Capabilities

Respect for bodily integrity is intimately linked to the power of institutions (Foucault, 1977). Institutions normalize behavioral rules, create and enforce laws, and create a power structure where citizens are subject to the rules upheld by the institutions (Butler, 1997). Using the example of the Great Confinement, Michel Foucault explains institutional power over the body by discussing that the measures originally taken to curb the plague. These included quarantine, social segregation, marked doors to indicate individual exclusion, and other forms of statist disciplinary partitioning which occurred during this time changed the public and private space of
the individual (Foucault, 1977). Those who were deemed undesirable, such as the unemployed, beggars, lepers, and the mentally challenged were sent to Houses of Correction by force, independently of having the plague (Foucault, 1977). The rules under which one could exist without government interference, the amount of personal agency one had, and the independent authority an individual had over their physical body changed due to policy. Political change in the public sphere led to changes in the private realm of personal space and personal agency.

While the world has changed a great deal since the Great Confinement, the power that institutions have over the body remains. In modern times, institutional regulations (originating from both religious and secular social bodies) that concern the body include those concerning birth, death, health, marriage rights, sex, and physical security (Turner, 2008). However, the legal regulation of bodily capabilities and the social forces that surround them are not always similar.

Social Regulation of Bodily Capabilities

The body exists within a constructed cultural system, and people often regulate their behavior in response to social norms and cues (Turner, 2008; Faubion, 2000). In religious institutions, this includes moralization of the body in the form of abstinence until marriage, dietary rules, and clothing that is meant to ensure modesty (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Connell, 2014). Broader social norms dictate the definition of masculine or feminine traits, appropriate gender roles, proper sexual behavior, and sex-based division of labor (Butler, 1997; Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Risman, 2004; Connell, 2014).
Social power theory explains that society confers greater power on men in the form of social attitudes and access to resources, while women are left more vulnerable to social harm (Berdahl and Moore, 2006; Cortina and Wasti, 2005; Carli, 1999). The increased resources afforded to men create women as subjects within this power-structure and the inequity of resource acquisition creates the dependency of women on men (Butler, 1997). This sense of subordination deprives women of independent agency, and lulls them into maintaining a subservient gendered status quo (Deveaux, 1994; Butler, 1997; Butler, 1999). As a result, women do not realize their full social and political potential as citizens.

At a more intimate level, social and political behavior is often regulated by dynamics within the family and inter-personal relationships (Morris, Silk, Steinberg, Myers, and Robinson, 2007; Fuller and Fincham, 1995). This is salient in marriage and family relationships, where men traditionally have authority over their wives, and parents have authority over their children. Still, despite the evidence that bodily regulation affects political and social life of women, few quantitative studies have measured the impact of both institutional and social regulations of the body in the political sphere, particularly in the case of women. To address this, this dissertation examines the effects of private regulations including intimate partner violence, emotional abuse, and control over mobility and public regulations such as sexual harassment on the voting behavior of women.

*Whose Bodies? Women, Minority Status, Youth, and Demobilization*

The first type of regulation examined is intimate partner violence. Intimate partner violence involves inflicting bodily injury on another within the context of
marriage or a romantic relationship, and women are much more likely to experience intimate partner violence than are men (Bonomi et al., 2006). Exposure to intimate partner violence creates feelings of helplessness, anxiety, social withdrawal, dependency on the dominant partner, and overall reduced ability to behave independently (Campbell, 2002; Zink, Regan, Jacobson, and Pabst, 2003). As this dynamic applies to political behavior, women who experience this have their capability space reduced, and retreat from the socio-political scene (Nussbaum, 2001; Khader, 2011). While intimate partner violence is criminalized in many countries, including Lebanon and the United States, it often goes unreported, and is a persistent problem in present day. Owing to the fact that domestic violence was only criminalized in 2014, there are no official statistics on domestic violence in Lebanon, but multiple studies place the number at 35% (Usta, Farver, and Pashayan, 2007; United Nations Development Programme, 2009). The rate of domestic violence in the United States among women is 1 in 3, or 33% (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2014).

The second type of private regulation is emotional abuse. Largely grounded in a locus of the desire to control the victimized partner, studies indicate that the effects of emotional abuse are even more acute than those of physical abuse (Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2005; O’Leary, 1999). The reason for this is that victims internalize the abuse that they receive, believe that the abusive words are in fact true, and start to develop negative self-affect (Kaufmann, 2009; Rosenfeld, Lennon, and White, 2005; O’Leary, 1999). This results in feelings of worthlessness, helplessness, depression, dependency, social withdrawal, and isolation (Kira, Omidy, Fawzi, Rice,
Fawzi, Lewandowski, and Bujold-Bugeaud, 2015; Bevan and Higgins, 2002). When this occurs, the capability space of the abused is reduced, and the abused also retreats from the public sphere, making engagement in public activities difficult. As a consequence, the likelihood of political participation is decreased (Khader, 2011). Further, while emotional abuse is also incorporated into laws pertaining to domestic abuse, it often goes unrecognized by the abused (who after chronic exposure, normalizes the behavior and believes his/her abuser is just “being honest”) and thus, unreported (Zink et al., 2003).

Third, controlled mobility is another regulation that contributes to a reduction in social and political activities. While there are no laws that prevent control over another’s mobility, this power structure reduces the likelihood of the controlled to interact with the public sphere, make independent decisions, and fosters dependency on the controlling partner (Kira, et al., 2015; Khader, 2011). When one’s movements are controlled, he or she is unable to move between the private sphere and the public sphere freely, and are less likely to be able to engage in the public sphere independently. For women whose movements are being controlled, this creates a loss of the sense of self, making independent decision-making difficult (Sackett and Saunders, 1999; Kabeer, 1999). In contrast, women who are able to move between the two spheres with more ease, typically due to employment, have a stronger sense of self and can make independent decisions easily (Kabeer, 1999).

In all, women who experience relationship dynamics that can be characterized by these three categories of private body regulation examined, are often younger, less educated, and less affluent (Kramer, Lorenzon, and Mueller, 2003;
Andersen, 1997; Gelles, 1993, Smith, 1990). Indeed, women who choose to be in committed partner relationships at an early age tend to be less educated and are poorer, leaving them with fewer resources upon which they can rely for the purposes of social independence (Blau, Kahn, and Waldfogel, 2000; Andersen, 1997). Indicated in this study, the reduced independent agency that ensues also depresses the likelihood of political participation.

Publically and cross-regionally (Kira et al., 2015; Enns, 2004; Jaggar and Rothenger, 1993), women also face gender discrimination in the form of sexual harassment, and women are more vulnerable to this than are men (Fisk and Berdahl, 2007; Nussbaum, 2000; Agarwal, 1994). Sexual harassment also has ethno-political roots, as persons of minority targets are often at heightened risk (Cho, 1997; Berdahl and Moore, 2006). While younger women are thought to be more likely to be sexually harassed, studies indicate that harassment of women in older age cohorts (50 and above) is still prevalent, but less frequently reported (Cortina and Wasti, 2005; Pain, 1995; Ford and Donis, 1996). Ultimately, sexual harassment is geared towards those with perceived low social power (Cortina and Wasti, 2005).

Public sexual harassment is interesting in that although it occurs in the public sphere, there are no laws that protect individuals in public from cat-calling, groping, or other forms of sexual harassment. While there are laws that implemented pertaining to sexual harassment at work, the penalty for this is often sanctioned by the work institution, and not by the state. This means that those who are victimized on the street go unprotected. As these dynamics apply to the case studies featured in this dissertation, 61% of Lebanese women admitted to experiencing such harassment,
whereas 65% of American women did in private studies (IFES, 2010; Stop Street Harassment, 2014). In both countries, ethnopolitical dynamics are featured in the frequency of sexual harassment. Women of African-American or Hispanic origins are much more likely to experience sexual harassment in the United States than women of any other ethnic group, whereas Christian women in Lebanon are more likely to be sexually harassed than their Muslim counterparts (Berdahl and Moore, 2006; IFES, 2010).

The Mobilized Body

In contrast to the demobilizing effects of intimate partner violence, emotional abuse, mobility control, and sexual harassment, many factors can work to counterbalance these effects and increase political and social mobilization among women. For instance, education and employment are the two strongest predictors of social empowerment, particularly among women (Kabeer, 2005; Fuwa, 2004; Charmes and Wieringa, 2003; Kabeer, 1999). The two allow for the ability to enjoy increased personal agency, the ability to enjoy independent choice, the ability to secure resources, and the ability participate in public social networks (Kabeer, 2005, Kabeer, 1999). The ability to secure income also enables women more decision-making power within the home, and equalizes power dynamics between spouses (Fuwa, 2004; Khader, 2011).

These empowerment mechanisms extend into voting behavior. In the context of gender politics, studies suggest that female participation in the paid labor force has a significant impact on their propensity to participate politically (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Manza and Brooks, 1998; Togeby, 1994). However, on a global scale, there are
fewer women than men who are employed, and women who are in the workforce tend to hold lower-paying jobs (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Mammen and Paxson, 2000; Manza and Brooks, 1998; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman, 1997). As a result, women are less able to organize politically, and their voices and needs are not given their full due (Inglehart and Norris, 2003b).

Female disenfranchisement is a problem worldwide (Inglehart and Norris, 2003a). When the rates of female employment are low, women are less likely to mobilize politically, to lobby for expanded rights, and less likely to gain representation in government (Ross, 2008; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman, 1997). In contrast, generating independent income enables women to participate politically, delay childbirth, have fewer children, and invest in the health and education of their own children (Telhami, 2013; Schlozman, Burns, and Verba, 1999; Moghadam, 1999). It is clear here that the empowerment mechanisms behind employment drive persons to expand their capabilities, and engage in the public sphere.

Similarly, education is among the strongest predictors of voter turnout (Hillygus, 2005; Shields and Goidel, 1997; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Indeed, education increases political participation, electoral turnout, civic engagement, political knowledge, and democratic attitudes and opinions (Hillygus, 2005; Galston, 2001). Education exposes people to political issues, allows them to participate in social networks, and in turn, allows for the development of civic consciousness (Galston, 2001; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry; 1996). While this is true for both sexes, education affects the female propensity to vote more strongly than it
does men, as empowerment mechanisms are felt more strongly in groups that are disenfranchised (Kabeer, 1999; Abdo, forthcoming).

Education and employment are both linked to the reduced frequency of incursions upon bodily integrity. Indeed, women who are highly educated and who are employed are less likely to experience transgressions of personal space, both in public and particularly in their homes (Khader, 2011; Nussbaum, 2005; Cortina and Wasti, 2005; Sen, 2001). Education and employment create the space to generate income, increase access to social resources, and provided higher levels of social status. These mechanisms combined create greater levels of autonomy, allowing women to make independent decisions, including those over their bodies. These skills enable them to make political choices, and increase the likelihood of voting.

*Demobilized Bodies Within and Across Democratic Electorates*

Having explained the conceptual framework within which this dissertation is grounded, the unique case-study selection merits further explanation. Most studies concerning gender and capabilities in specific countries in the developing world, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Honduras, on the basis that gendered norms are stronger, and gender-based impairment is more acute (Drèze and Sen, 2002; Nussbaum, 2001; Rowlands, 1997). However, very little work has been done on this topic in either the Arab world or Western countries. Failing to incorporate Western countries implies that women do not experience socio-political difficulties due to gender-based reductions in their capabilities. Neglecting to incorporate women in the Arab world does not do credence to their socio-political presence in non-Western democratic contexts. This dissertation indicates that political effects that occur due to
violations of bodily integrity and personal space are so integral to individual capabilities that their impact is felt on voting behavior in spite of starkly different cultures, governmental systems, and regions.

At first glance, the United States and Lebanon seem like an odd pairing. However, Lebanon is among the very few countries in the Middle East with democratic features, making it appropriate for the investigation of voting behavior in the region. The United States, as a Western country, is widely considered to be developed, but there remains ample room to study affects of abuse and mobility on voting behavior as domestic violence rates are still comparable to less developed nations. Combined, these two fill the niche of examining questions of bodily integrity, capabilities, and voting behavior in the Arab world and the Western world.

These two countries have drastic differences and similarities. Lebanon has endured years of endemic violent political conflict on its own soil, while the United States has not. Lebanon also has gender-based laws in both its civil and religious courts, while the United States has a legally egalitarian system which is entirely incorporated under its civil courts. However, in spite of these heavy differences, the reported levels of violations of bodily integrity are similar. As indicated earlier, in the United States, the reported level of domestic abuse is 33%, while in Lebanon it is 35% (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2014; Usta, Farver, and Pashayan, 2007). The reported level of sexual harassment on the streets in the U.S. is at 65%, while in Lebanon the level is 61% (Stop Street Harassment, 2014; IFES, 2010).
Similar to the cross-national validity of empowering mechanisms of education and employment in the analysis of voting behavior, the aforementioned socio-structural similarities lead me to believe that the relationship between bodily integrity and voting behavior is valid cross-regionally and across democratic political systems. Moreover, the relationship between bodily integrity as an element of capability space and voting behavior is unexplored thus far, and I believe that doing so would shed new light on mechanisms that relate to female behavior in democratic systems.

The United States

The United States government is both presidential and federal, consisting of fifty states. The federal government is composed of three distinct institutions: Congress, which is the legislative branch, the Office of the President and the Cabinet, which is the executive branch, and the Supreme Court as the judicial branch. Citizens directly vote for their representative in Congress and for the office of the President.

The Congress is a bicameral legislative institution, consisting of The House of Representatives and the Senate. The House of Representatives currently consists of 435 voting members, and has six non-voting members. The number of representatives each state has in the House is based on each state's population as determined in the most recent United States Census. All 435 representatives serve a two-year term. The Senate is made up of two senators from each state, regardless of population. There are 100 senators, who each serve six-year terms. Approximately one-third of the Senate stands for election every two years. The last Congressional elections were conducted in November 2014.
In the United States, the president is indirectly elected through the Electoral College. Citizens who wish to vote cast ballots to indicate their choice to the members of the Electoral College of their state, who in turn cast their votes in a fashion that is representative of those in their state. These elections happen every four years, and the president is allowed two consecutive terms. The last presidential elections occurred in 2012.

Lebanon

The Lebanese political system is that of a unitary consociational democracy, whereby the governmental system is structured such that different politically significant sects share in power-holding. There are six politically significant sects that have developed political constituencies: Sunni Muslim, Shi’ite Muslim, Druze Muslim, Maronite Christian, Greek Orthodox Christian, and Catholic Christian. The uni-cameral parliament consists of 128 seats, and the consociational allocation of these seats is done according to a 6:6 ratio of Muslims to Christians (the Muslim side accommodates 2 Sunnis, 2 Shi’ites, and 1 Druze, while Christian side holds 2 Maronites, 2 Orthodox, and 1 Catholic). Parliamentarians are elected by adults aged 21 and over. There are multiple political parties in Lebanon, and these organizations are personalistic in nature. Political blocs are usually based on religious or filial allegiance. The last parliamentary elections were conducted in 2009.

As illustrated above, both of these countries have very visible mechanisms that affect voting behavior. Moreover, feminism emerged at the same time (during the 1960s-1970s) in both countries. In the United States, feminism emerged as a bi-
product of increasing feminine presence in the workforce (Keller, 1995). In Lebanon, feminism emerged as a result of the pervasive presence of communism in the 1970s, where leftist movements rejected traditional religious laws in the legal system in favor of secular ones which afforded women greater equality (Joseph, 2002). As indicated earlier, both countries have similar reported levels of sexual harassment and domestic violence are similar, making for feasible comparisons as to the mechanisms of transgressions upon bodily integrity and their relationship to voting behavior.

Methodology

In order to execute this study, I rely largely on survey data, and also conduct my own elite interviews with organizations that specialize in women’s causes. For the purposes of the United States, I created my own poll, and conducted an online survey in the United States during August 2015 using Qualtrics. The survey that I conducted was through an opt-in panel of 1,268 persons with a 65% female quota, leading to a gender breakdown of 834 women and 434 men. The time needed for completing of the survey instrument averaged at 11:23 minutes. The complete survey is featured in Appendix 5.A.

The data that I have on Lebanon was gathered by the International Foundation for Electoral Studies on the Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa. The data gathered by IFES was gathered by way of door-to-door 47-minute oral interviews in Arabic, with only one adult member of each household being interviewed. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents were from urban areas and 23 percent from rural areas, and data was gathered through multi-stage cluster sampling. There were 343 clusters, with each cluster containing 100-150 households, and 8-10
households were selected from each cluster. For the purposes of randomization, respondents within the home were selected using the Kish grid method, where adult respondents within a household are placed on a grid, and one person is randomly selected based on a pre-existing algorithm. There were 2000 women, and 750 men (IFES, 2010).

The data on Morocco and Yemen was also gathered by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. In both cases, the sample size was such that there are 2000 women and 500 men, and the sampling strategy was multi-stage, stratified, probability proportional to size (PPS). In Morocco, this was executed across all 16 governorates (LMS-CSA, 2009; Rola Abdul-Latif, phone communication with author, April 18, 2014). There were 255 primary sampling points, with 8-12 interviews per sampling point (LMS-CSA, 2009; R. Abdul-Latif, Oral Communication April 18, 2014). The households were selected in a (1+ skip number), or rather, every other house (LMS-CSA, 2009). In Yemen, the survey was set up such that there were 250 primary sampling points, with each sampling point consisting of 80-120 households (Yemen Polling Center, 2010). At each sampling point, houses were selected in a (6+1) fashion, or rather, every seventh house. 10-12 interviews were conducted per sampling point, and selection of the interviewee within the home was done by the Kish Grid method.
Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I explained the relationship between power, society, and the body. I also indicated how this relationship extends into gender, ethno-political cleavages, age brackets, and socio-economic status. I also detail how this leads to physical demobilization, the reduction in personal capabilities, and ultimately, the reduced likelihood of voting.

In the next chapter, *Religion, Transgressions of Personal Space, and Political Behavior in Lebanon*, I provide sophisticated quantitative analysis as to the three dominant trends in transgressions of personal space that demobilize voters in the Lebanese sample: i) public sexual harassment ii) spousal emotional abuse and iii) familial control over mobility. I also argue that there are religion-based trends in the type of incursions upon bodily integrity that are present. Specifically, Christian women experience more street harassment, while Muslim women are more likely to have their mobility controlled inside the home. There are also religious trends in voting behavior—Muslims are less likely to vote than their Christian counterparts. Through the use of interviews, I present the gender-based power-dynamics present within legal and political institutions in Lebanon, and indicate the challenges that Lebanese women face in these contexts.
Chapter 3: Religion, Transgressions of Personal Space, and Political Behavior in Lebanon

In Chapter II, *Bodily Transgressions and Political Participation in Comparative Politics*, I provide conceptual explanations as to how political demobilization occurs as a result of transgressions of personal space in both public and private spheres. In this chapter, *Religion, Transgressions of Personal Space, and Political Behavior in Lebanon*, I will address how different types of transgressions of personal space affect political behavior across multiple ethno-political groups. The results indicate that freedom to leave the home, freedom from sexual harassment, freedom from spousal emotional abuse, university education, employment, and regular exposure to political media increase the likelihood to vote. In this dataset, 39% of Lebanese women state that they do not feel completely free to leave the home without the permission of their parents/spouses. Of women who report these restrictions, 37% did not show up to the polls, compared to 22% among those who felt completely free.

The results also indicate that Christian women are more likely to be sexually harassed publicly, while Muslim women are more likely to have their movements controlled within the home. In this dataset, only female political participation is affected by transgressions on personal space. Moreover, freedom to leave the house impacts voting behavior among women most acutely among women below their mid-40s, indicating that younger women face significant challenges in their ability to participate politically.
Religion, Government Institutions, and Voting Behavior

The Lebanese political system is a unitary consociational democracy. There are six politically significant sects that have developed political constituencies: Sunni Muslim, Shi’ite Muslim, Druze Muslim, Maronite Christian, Greek Orthodox Christian, and Catholic Christian. The uni-cameral parliament consists of 128 seats, and the consociational allocation of these seats is done according to a 6:6 ratio of Muslims to Christians (the Muslim side accommodates 2 Sunnis, 2 Shi’ites, and 1 Druze, while Christian side holds 2 Maronites, 2 Orthodox, and 1 Catholic). Parliamentarians are elected by adults aged 21 and over. There are multiple political parties in Lebanon, and these organizations are personalistic in nature. Political blocs are usually based on religious or filial allegiance. The last parliamentary elections were conducted in 2009.

Within government itself, women are very poorly represented. Out of 128 parliamentary seats, only four are occupied by women, and there are no female ministers (Dr. Samira Aghacy, Author’s Interview, June 9, 2014; Khoury, 2013). Moreover, all women in political power are family members of male politicians. There are no female candidates who developed a political platform without an existing familial attachment to a man (Aghacy, Interview). Although 68% of the women in this sample support the introduction of gender quotas in parliament, as do 64% of men, this policy has yet to be implemented in the Lebanese political system (IFES, 2010).

6 Dr. Samira Aghacy is the director of the Institute for Women’s Studies in the Arab World at the Lebanese American University in Beirut, Lebanon.
Political participation in Lebanon is heavily based on informal pork distribution along confessional lines. As illustrated by Samir Khalaf in his book *Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon*, religious institutions and semi-feudal political leaders provide financial aid, job opportunities, and other such benefits. In fact, all institutions relevant to social welfare, such as orphanages, subsidized clinics, charities, and homes for the elderly are either religiously affiliated or run by a politician (Khalaf, 2002). At the political level, this leads to communal support for the politician who provides these services.

One of many examples is that of the late Prime Minister Rafik el-Hariri’s Future Movement and the establishment of subsidized schools in underprivileged areas (Hariri Foundation, 2011). Announced as a project for sustainable human development, these subsidized schools revitalized impoverished areas and gave students from underprivileged backgrounds improved chances of educational and professional success. However, these schools are located in predominantly Sunni areas (Hariri Foundation, 2011), and while students from all religious backgrounds are welcome to attend, the majority ethno-religious composition of students are Sunni Muslim—the same sect as the former Prime Minister. Effectively, this enhanced in-group solidarity within the Sunni community, and solidifies support for the Hariris as a political family. The Future Movement is not the only party that provides such services to the Lebanese, nor is it only the politicians who provide services to the Lebanese.

Religious institutions provide financial subsidies, schools, hospitals, universities, nursing homes, job opportunities, and similar material assets. The
provision of these assets does instigate a feeling of loyalty in those who use them, and as such, the religious institutions do have material power over their respective communities. This system of material assistance is set up on confessional lines, as political parties tend to align themselves according to religious denominations and religious institutions are explicitly pertaining to the religious sect.

The consequence of the religious domination of community organization, is that the development of secular civic citizenship where political identity is affiliated with the state is undermined (Rola el-Masri, Author’s Interview, July 14, 2014). These powerful non-state institutions take on the social welfare responsibilities of the state. As a result, powerful communal loyalty towards political leaders develops within members of the same religious community, and voters exercise their support by way of re-electing these leaders into office. This process makes the creation of new political parties very difficult, as such parties do not have the material capital necessary to attract potential voters away from more established parties.

Moreover, as a result of this communal dynamic, voting is often a familial choice as opposed to an individual one in Lebanon. Typically, the patriarch of the family decides which politician should be voted for, and then he and the other members of his family vote for the candidate (Rita el-Chemaly, Author’s Interview, August 9th, 2014). By that same token, it would be over-simplistic to assume that those within the family do not already share similar political beliefs, as across the

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7 Mrs. Roula el-Masri is the Gender Equality and Programme Manager at the Abaad Resource Center for Gender Equality. This center offers not only programs to empower women economically, but also offers full-time counseling for men who have committed crimes of domestic violence.

8 Mrs. Rita el-Chemaly is the Project Development Coordinator for the National Council of Lebanese Women, an advisory committee to the Lebanese parliament on all legislative issues related to women.
world, political orientation tends to be built within the family unit (Alozie, Simon, and Merrill, 2003). What is unique in this instance, however, is that physically going to the polls is a familial exercise (Aghacy, Interview). While voting itself is secret, going to the polls together creates a sense of familial solidarity, and makes voting collective enterprise. This regulates the behavior of voters, and may leave them less free to make independent political choices.

**Religion, Legal Institutions, and Gendered Socio-Political Marginalization**

Political behavior is not only regulated through governmental institutions, but also through social institutions such as political parties, non-governmental organizations, and places of employment. On a legal level, behavioral regulation is also done through civil and religious courts. Legal institutions are perhaps among the most important institutions for behavioral regulation, as these courts lay the foundation for gender inequitable laws and permission for the violation of female bodily integrity in Lebanon.

Religion is very relevant to the Lebanese power-structure, as the religious establishments hold considerable power over the behavior of their active congregations. Addressed in their study *Predictors of Subjective Well-Being Among College Youth in Lebanon*, Huda Ayyash-Abdo and Rayane Alamuddin assert that the religious apparatus is second only to that of the family in terms of significance, and the religiosity of the Lebanese is strong (Ayyash-Abdo & Alamuddin, 2007). The teachings of the religious institutions are internalized by most Lebanese, are thus powerful. The religious courts have authority over matters of personal status (marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance), and are considered to be sacred by their communities.
affiliated religious institutions (churches or mosques). For those who are believers, this leads to the support and endorsement of such courts. Indeed, in this sample, 65% of women are opposed to any change in how the marriage laws are structured, as are 55% of men (IFES, 2010).

The difficulty however, is that how these courts are structured increases the socio-vulnerability of women at three levels of legal obstacles: laws that explicitly discriminate against women, laws that are not enforced, and situations which the law does not address at all.

Divorce

Divorces are handled in the religious courts, and the laws pertaining to it vary across sects. Across Islamic sects, the right of divorce is that of the husband, and can only be granted to the wife with her husband’s explicit consent during the nuptial ceremony. The husband has the right to file for divorce on any grounds, and may divorce his wife against her wishes. The woman must have specific circumstances under which she can file for divorce, and her husband must approve of her wish to divorce before it is granted. The grounds for a woman to call for divorce are: the husband’s inability to provide, maltreatment, sodomy, and apostasy. Should there be other reasons for divorce, the wife must forfeit her dowry in order to request a divorce (Fatme Ramadan⁹, Author’s Interview, Beirut, Lebanon November 7, 2009). In this context, the laws pertaining to men and women are explicitly different, and grant women fewer legal rights than men.

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⁹ Counselor Ramadan is a lawyer in Beirut, Lebanon who specializes in Muslim personal status laws.
In the Catholic sects, divorce is only allowed under specific circumstances: if either party has proven that he or she did not believe in the sanctity of marriage before the nuptials, if either party does not want to have children contrary to the wishes of their spouse, if either party is mentally incompetent or psychologically unable to handle being married, or if either party is physically unable to have sex, then a divorce may be granted (Mitri Nohra, Author’s Interview, Beirut, Lebanon, March 19, 2010). Only in the Greek Orthodox sect are infidelity and domestic violence existing grounds for divorce (Nohra, Interview). In principle, the laws appear to be equitable, but they do not protect women from circumstances that they are more vulnerable to, such as spousal abuse.

Custody

If Christians of any sect or Sunni Muslims choose to divorce, male children remain with their mother until age seven, and female children remain with their mother until age nine—after these turning points, the children are turned over to their father (Nohra, Interview). In the Shi’ite sect, male children remain with their mother until age two, and female children until age seven (Ramadan, Interview). In all cases, the wife is usually provided with child support by their father until he receives custody. In all sects, should the mother choose to remarry, she forfeits the right to custody, although this does not apply to the father. These laws discourage women from filing for divorce, or re-marrying should they choose to divorce, as the result will be a loss of custody of their children.

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10 Counselor Nohra is a lawyer in Beirut, Lebanon who specializes in Christian personal status law.
There are a few exceptions where full custody would be given the mother. If the husband is proven to be mentally incompetent, unable to provide for the children financially, is proven to be an unethical or immoral influence (this usually involves evidence of alcoholism, drug abuse, child abuse, promiscuity, gambling, or apostasy), or if he chooses to grant custody to the mother (Charles Saqr\(^{11}\), Author’s Interview, Beirut, Lebanon, March 19, 2010). However, fathers are usually the preferred guardians.

Inheritance

Thus far, the laws that have been discussed govern behavior within the family, but none that relate to resources. This is a matter that is related to inheritance. Interestingly, inheritance law is governed by religious courts for Muslims, and by civil courts for Christians. The laws regarding Muslim inheritance laws are as follows. In all cases, the spouse receives one-fourth of the inherited wealth, and brothers inherit twice the estate of their sisters. One-third of the wealth can be willed freely. In the Sunni sect, if a man has no daughters, his wealth will go to his eldest paternal nephew (Ramadan, Interview). In the Shi’ite sect, the daughters will receive the full estate and divide it equally if there are no male siblings. In the Druze sect, one is free to delegate his or her wealth at will, regardless of the gender of one’s heirs (Saqr, Interview).

The justification for the uneven division of wealth between daughters and sons is based on gender roles. Islamic law states that a man is legally bound to

\(^{11}\) Counselor Saqr is a personal status lawyer in Beirut Lebanon who specializes in child custody.
support his wife and provide for her and, as previously stated, not doing so is grounds for divorce (Mahmassani, 1970). The logic follows that as it is the man’s job to provide for his family, his mother, and his unwed sisters, it makes sense for him to inherit more from his parents.

The inheritance law for all Christians is as follows. If a person has one child, he or she is entitled to half of the estate, two children are inherited to one-third each, and three children are entitled to one-fourth each. The spouse is entitled to one-fourth, and any surviving parents are entitled to one-eighth of the estate. If there is any remaining wealth, it is at the free disposal of the benefactor (Mahmassani, 1970). In principle, one must support all his or her children equally, regardless of their gender. However, many fathers will “sell” their family businesses to their sons, or place money aside in secret bank accounts that cannot be divulged owing to Lebanese banking secrecy laws (Zuhur, 2002). As such, men tend to receive more inherited wealth than daughters in Christian sects, too. While this is a behavioral tendency rather than a legal one, it also indicates that women have less access to family-related external resources than men.

It is clear that how these courts are structured leaves women at increased risk for socio-political vulnerability and marginalization. In addition discussed the legal obstacles that women face due to religious laws, civil laws also greatly increase the vulnerability of women. The relationship between civil laws and extends further than dominance over one’s personal space with rape and abuse. Rather, civil laws which do not advocate for equality or women’s rights indicate that the socio-legal contract
that women have with the state is different from that of men, and explicitly favors men over women.

**Civil Laws**

Laws that apply to all women pertain to citizenship, rape, and domestic violence. Men are allowed to grant their citizenship to foreign wives and their children, whereas women cannot (El-Khoury and Joulin, 2012). The laws pertaining to rape and domestic violence do not fully protect women from experiencing such crime, nor do they penalize their perpetrators fully. Under Lebanese law, a rapist is pardoned if he proposes marriage to his victim (Lebanese Penal Code, Art. 552). Until April 1st 2014, (which is after this IFES dataset was collected), domestic violence was not a crime in Lebanon (Human Rights Watch, 2014). While formalizing legislation about domestic violence is progress, the law falls short of protecting women from all forms of abuse. Marital rape is not criminalized, and while the law prohibits “acts that result in killing, harming,” and acts that result in “physical, psychological, sexual, or economic harm,” it does not explicitly incorporate crimes of assault or threats of this nature into the law (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Lastly, the legal space allowed to women for filing for restraining orders against abusive husbands is very narrow. The preservation of bodily integrity is not guaranteed under this law, which places women at increased risk of bodily harm, and a reduction in their capability space as a by-product.
It is critical to indicate the informal (but equally powerful) social structures at work in Lebanon when considering the different legal spaces where women are at increased risk for socio-political vulnerability and marginalization. Family is the most important social institution in Lebanese society (Ayyash-Abdo and Alamuddin, 2007). One can observe grandparents, brothers, uncles, cousins, and aunts living in close proximity to one another. Young people still maintain strong kinship ties, but these are generally based on relatedness to the nuclear family first (Khalaf, 2002). Family solidarity is hierarchical and patriarchal in nature, and as the most important social institution, governs the transmission of sociocultural values. Male births are preferred over female births in Lebanon, and many families give boys more privileges than girls (Ayyash-Abdo and Alamuddin, 2007). The father and the eldest adult son command the most respect, and are usually perceived as the decision-makers of the family.

In contrast, women are generally perceived as in need of protection and care, and often face heavy discrimination in the workplace or on the job market. Indeed, female employment is most heavily concentrated in either in business as salespersons, in education as teachers, or in medicine as nurses (El-Masri, Interview). While 54% of college graduates in Lebanon are women, many do not work after they have children (Davies, 2012). At present, 23% of Lebanese women are employed (compared to men at 70.8%), and continue to generate less money than men (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). As a social mechanism related to bodily integrity, sexual harassment is a widespread problem in Lebanon—indeed, 61% of
Lebanese women admitted to experiencing such harassment regularly (IFES, 2010). While there are no official statistics on domestic violence, private studies place the number at 35% (Usta, Farver, and Pashayan, 2007; United Nations Development Programme, 2009).

Throughout the Arab region, female public participation traditionally took the form of membership of social charities, and many aspects of this socio-political characteristic are still salient (Bayat, 2010). While Lebanon is no exception to this trend, female public participation is low—in this sample, approximately 5% of women join social organizations such as social charities or political parties (IFES, 2010). In contrast, 13% of men are members of political parties (IFES, 2010). Much of this is due to the fact that when women do join political parties, they are not granted decision-making roles (El-Chemaly, Interview; Khoury, 2013). Indeed, in Christian political parties, a separate women’s branch is set up on the basis that members will address the social aspects of party membership, but women who join are not brought on to make political decisions (Rowayheb, 2014). In Muslim parties, women’s branches are not set up, but women are welcome to join the mainstream party. However, female candidates are not nominated for key roles within the party, and are not nominated as candidates for parliamentary elections (Rowayheb, 2014).

The social and legal marginalization of women makes introducing measures that empower women and the introduction of gender-equitable laws difficult, as there are few resources from which women can draw in order to advocate for either social or legal change. Having discussed the increased socio-political vulnerability of
women due to legal and social obstacles, I now turn to investigate the mechanisms of these vulnerabilities, and examine their linkage to voting behavior.

Methodology

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems implemented a survey (conducted from 2009 to 2010) in Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen in conjunction with local survey-statistic organizations. Titled “Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa”, this survey’s purpose was to capture how women see themselves socio-politically (IFES, 2010). Structured as door-to-door interviews, the individual surveys were conducted as 47-minute oral interviews in Arabic, with only one adult member of each household being interviewed. Across countries, the samples were stratified proportionately by governorate (IFES, 2010).

77% of the respondents were from urban areas and 23% from rural areas, and data was gathered through multi-stage cluster sampling (IFES, 2010; Statistics Lebanon, 2009). There were 343 clusters, with each cluster containing 100-150 households, and 8-10 households were selected from each cluster (Statistics Lebanon, 2009). For the purposes of randomization, respondents within the home were selected using the Kish grid method, whereby adult members of the household are placed on a selection grid, and one member is selected based on a pre-existing algorithm intended to ensure accurate representation. There were 2000 women, and 750 men. The rationale for this was to have a robust sample of women. For the purposes of examining electoral behavior in Lebanon, all those under the age of 21 were dropped, as those beneath this age are ineligible to vote, leaving a total of 1,778 women and 669 men.
For the purposes of analysis, I have used general decomposition logistic models. This is done in order to compare the mechanisms that affect men and women, and to see if and how they differ. I conduct deeper analysis in a separate logistic model pertaining to women exclusively pertaining to multiple aspects of marital partnership.

Results

The general decomposition models are compartmentalized into three parts. The first is a logistic model conducted on women exclusively. The second is a logistic model conducted across the male sample exclusively. The third is an analysis comparing the results to each other. The variables included in this model link the constructs of personal space, bodily integrity, values, empowerment, interest, immersion in political networks, and demographics.

The key independent variables explaining personal space and bodily integrity are *complete freedom to leave the house; complete freedom to associate with people of one’s choosing; complete freedom to express one’s self; complete freedom to move publicly without fear; and experiencing regular public sexual harassment.* The variable indicating political interest is *watching the news regularly.* Variables related to gender-based values are *endorsing women working outside the home* and the *justification of gender-based violence.* Variables that measure empowerment are *some university education, university-level education,* and *employment.* Variables that measure demographics are *religion, marriage, natural logarithm of age,* and *family income.* The variables that measure immersion in political networks are *never a*
member of a political party and former member of a political party. The dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the 2009 parliamentary elections.

Table 1: Gendered Decomposition Models in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Harassment</td>
<td>-.400***</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income (LN)</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>-.159</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Leave</td>
<td>.257.</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (LN)</td>
<td>.387.</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>.624.</td>
<td>(.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>.284*</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>.813***</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>.321*</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News TV</td>
<td>0.405***</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>.758**</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Associate</td>
<td>-.391</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Express</td>
<td>-.234</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Move Publicly</td>
<td>-.113</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>.356</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some University Education</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>-.180</td>
<td>(.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Education</td>
<td>0.572***</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>.288</td>
<td>(.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justify Gender-based Violence</td>
<td>-.160</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
<td>.377</td>
<td>(.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorse Women Working</td>
<td>.361</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>(.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>-.761*</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>-.962**</td>
<td>(.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>-.975***</td>
<td>(.39)</td>
<td>-1.42**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2: Decomposition Differentials for Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women (Coefficient)</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>-1420.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (Characteristic)</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>1520.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (Coefficient)</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>981.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (Characteristic)</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>-1038.418%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw (Differential)</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the elections
*** p< 0.001 ** p< 0.01 * p< 0.05 • p< 0.1 (Standard Errors of the Coefficients are in Parentheses
Note 2: These are bootstrapped models, and have been run 30 times to ensure robustness and consistency.
Religion and Transgressions of Personal Space: Women

In examining the logistic model pertaining to women, the coefficient for the variable *News* is 0.405, and it is both substantively large and statistically significant at the p<.01 level. Interpreting this using log-odds ratios, we can see that women who watch the news regularly are 49% more likely to vote than those who do not (exp(0.405)=1.49). *University-level Education* has a large and statistically significant effect on voting behavior. Indeed, a woman who has a university degree is 77% more likely to vote than those who do not have a college degree (exp(.572)=1.77). The coefficient for *employment* is statistically large and significant at the p<.05 level. A woman who is employed is 37% more likely to vote than a woman who is not (exp(.321)= 1.37). *Married* women are 83% more likely to vote than women who are not married (exp(.605)=1.83), and this is significant at the p<.05 level. Women who are interested in politics are 42% more likely to vote than women who are not interested (exp(.354)=1.42).

In terms of ethno-political religious groupings, Women who are Maronite or Armenian Christians are more likely to vote than women of any other sect.

In examining the variables that pertain to bodily integrity, women who feel *completely free to leave the house without permission* are 29% more likely to vote than those who do not (exp(.257)=1.29), and the coefficient for this variable is statistically significant at the p<.1 level. Interestingly, the impact of *freedom to leave the house* upon the propensity to vote varies among age cohorts. Returning to the trend that dominated women tend be younger, it is the most acute among women aged 20-29, but decreases significantly when women reach their mid-50s.
Figure 2: The Marginal Effect of Leaving the House on Voting Across Age Brackets in Lebanon

Note: Figure 2, the above plot, describes the marginal effect of feeling free to leave the house upon voting across age brackets. It compares those who report that they feel completely free to leave the home without familial approval to those who do not. The grey areas are 95% confidence intervals.

Women who experience *regular public sexual harassment* are 33% less likely to vote \( \exp(-.400) = 0.67 \), and this is significant at the \( p<.01 \) level. Women who were *once members in a political party but are not anymore* are 76% less likely to vote than women who are currently members \( \exp(-1.41)=.24 \), and this result is statistically significant at the \( p<.05 \) level. Women who have *never joined a political party* are 70% less likely to vote than women who are party members \( \exp(-1.19)=.30 \), and this result is statistically significant at the \( p<.05 \) level. The natural logarithm of age is
statistically significant at the p<.1 level, indicating a positive relationship between the progression of age and the propensity to vote.

The implications of these results are intriguing, as it appears as though women are heavily positively influenced by mechanisms of empowerment such as education, employment, and membership in political networks, all of which are conduits to public resources. In contrast, women are negatively affected by incursions on their bodily integrity and personal space in the form of sexual harassment and restrictions upon their mobility. While mobility impacts voting behavior among younger age cohorts more strongly than women above their mid-forties, public harassment remains a problem for women across the sample. Though resource inequity is often linked to increased vulnerability to transgressions against personal space, the effect of control over mobility on voting behavior is not grounded in experiencing lower levels of income in the Lebanese context. This is illustrated in Figure 7, located in Appendix 4.

Interestingly, there is communal variation as to the types of violations of bodily integrity that women experience. Sixty percent of Sunni Muslim women surveyed said that they do not feel completely free to leave the house without permission, as did 58.5% of Shi’ite Muslim women (IFES, 2010). In contrast, 47% of Maronite Christian women said that they did not feel completely free to leave the house, as did 45% of Greek Orthodox Christian women (IFES, 2010). While these percentages are all quite high, the elevated levels in the Muslim sects could explain the reduced propensity to vote among Muslim women. In contrast, Christian women report the highest levels of sexual harassment. Thirty-one percent of Maronite
Christian women report frequent sexual harassment, as opposed to 28% of Sunni women and 22% of Shi’ite women (IFES, 2010). This could mean that the different types of violations of bodily integrity are actually concentrated within different ethno-political groups, and result in reduced voter turnout.

**Religion and Voting Behavior: Men**

In the male logistic model, there are fewer variables which affect a man’s propensity to vote. They are religion, watching the news regularly, married, and membership in political parties. Men who watch the news regularly are 2.04 times more likely to vote than men who do not, exp(.716)=2.04, and this is significant at the p<.01 level. Similarly, men who are married are 2.25 times more likely to vote than men who are not exp(.813)=2.25, and this is significant at the p<.01 level. Men who are Christians of any denomination are more likely to vote than either Muslims or other non-Christians. Men who were once members of a political party but are not any longer are 72% less likely to vote than men who are current party members exp(-1.27)=0.28, and this is statistically significant at the p<.05 level. Similarly, men who were never members of a political party are 81% less likely to vote compared to current party members exp(-1.61)=0.19.

In comparing the sexes, it appears as though the empowering effects of education, employment, and interest in politics are more salient among women, while the negative effects of violations of bodily integrity are only salient among women. However, both men and women are affected by marriage, religion, and membership in a political party. Interestingly, men are more affected by marriage and membership in a political party than women are. This likely due to the familial system of political
participation in Lebanon, where men are the primary decision-makers of political action within the family unit, and are more likely to be approached by politicians for support if they are married.

As the models compare to each other, the decomposition model provides estimates for subgroup characteristics, coefficients, and then calculates a raw differential comparing the two. Given that the Ω-characteristic value of women is -0.097, it appears as though women would be predicted to vote less given the resources that they have. In contrast, the Ω-characteristic value of men is 0.067, indicating that men would be predicted to vote more given the resources at their disposal. In terms of the Ω-coefficients, the Ω coefficient for women is 0.10, while the Ω coefficient for men is -0.06. The calculated raw differential is 0.006, which is insignificant. Ultimately, there is no difference in the rate of voting between men and women.

The possible reason for this is that although men appear to have more empowerment-tools resources than women in the form of education and employment, women tend to experience heavier empowerment effects once they are educated and employed. This dynamic creates an effect where the rates of male and female voting are nearly even in this dataset.
Since there is no statistical difference in the rate of voting between the sexes, further attention is needed to examine subgroups of women that are most vulnerable to violations of bodily integrity in the form of domestic abuse, most notably married women. This model deals with voting in relation to domestic violence, verbal/emotional abuse, the ability to support one’s self, having independent savings, having independent property ownership, and the ability to make decisions regarding visiting family members, obtaining medical treatment, making home purchases, or inviting guests to the home. These are grouped together in that the variables pertaining to abuse are indicative of disempowerment, the ability to have control over one’s economic resources implies economic empowerment, and the ability to make decisions within one’s home is indicative of power dynamics. The table below indicates the logistic coefficients for this model.
Table 3: Relationship between Marital Partnership Power Dynamics and Voting in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Married Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
<td>-.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/E Abuse</td>
<td>-.393*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Self</td>
<td>-.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Ownership</td>
<td>.534*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husb. Dec. Visit. Fam</td>
<td>-.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Visit. Fam</td>
<td>-.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husb. Dec. Med Care</td>
<td>-.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Med Care</td>
<td>.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husb. Dec. Small Home Purchases</td>
<td>-.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Small Home Purchases</td>
<td>-.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husb. Dec. Big Purchases</td>
<td>.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Big Purchases</td>
<td>-.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husb. Dec. Invite Guests</td>
<td>.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Invite Guests</td>
<td>.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=1037</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the elections
*** p< 0.001 ** p< 0.01 * p< 0.05 • p< 0.1 (Standard Errors of the Coefficients are in Parentheses)
In terms of empowerment due to resources, women who own their own property are 79% more likely than women who do not. In dealing with matters pertaining to domestic abuse, women who experience verbal/emotional abuse are less likely to vote. Indeed, the coefficient for abuse is -0.393, and it is statistically significant at the p<.05 level. Using log-odds ratios \( \exp(-0.393)=0.67 \), women who experience verbal or emotional abuse from their husbands are 33% less likely to vote than women who do not.

Interestingly, women who report verbal or emotional abuse also appear to have reduced access to public resources. Of the employed women in this study, 32% reported verbal/emotional abuse, as opposed to 68% of women who did not (IFES, 2010). Similarly, women who report such abuse are also far less likely to be members of voluntary associations, such as social charities or political parties. Of women who reported membership in social charities, 75% of women do not report abuse, while 25% do. Of women who are members of political parties, 68% do not report abuse, but 32% do. (IFES, 2010) The data infers that the control exercised upon these women through abuse deprives them of the ability to access external resources, which empower them both personally and politically.

As a proxy for experiencing domestic violence, I have taken the question “why do you think domestic violence happens” and used the response “because she deserved it” as a sign of attitudinal adaptive preference. I have done this as very few women openly admit to being beaten. This is likely a function of being interviewed in their homes where the probability of being overheard by a spouse or other family member could have unpleasant consequences. Notably, though 25% of married
women indicated that if a woman is beaten it is because she deserved it, this appears to be unrelated to voting behavior. In terms of addressing partner dominance, most decision-making processes appear to be joint as opposed to either the husband or the wife exclusively, and it appears as though home decision-making dynamics are not related to voting behavior.

Results demonstrate that different mechanisms of economic empowerment (education, employment, and ownership) mobilize women to vote, while mechanisms of physical demobilization, such as being unable to leave the house freely, and regularly experiencing sexual harassment depress the probability.
Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, the primary focus was on the relationship between transgressions upon personal space and voting behavior, and its organization among confessional lines. The relationship between transgressions on personal space and voting behavior appeared to be significant among women, with religion-based variations as to the degree and type of transgression that they experience. Christian women are more likely to experience sexual harassment in the street, while Muslim women are more likely to experience reduced levels of independence within the home. The impact of restrictions of mobility on voting behavior appears to be stronger among women who are either in their mid-50s or below. Among both sexes, there are also religion-based variations in the propensity to vote, with Christians being the most likely to vote.

In the next chapter, Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and Political Participation in the United States, results indicate that spousal control over mobility reduces the likelihood of voting among women, while the justification of female-to-male domestic violence reduces the likelihood to vote among men. Conversely, experiencing empowerment mechanisms such as higher levels of education, employment, and respect for bodily integrity increase the likelihood to vote. In both countries, transgressions upon personal results in voter demobilization.
Chapter 4: Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and Political Participation in the United States

In chapter III, the relationship between transgressions upon personal space upon voting behavior in Lebanon was discussed, and this relationship had variations among both sexes and religious sects. The relationship between transgressions on personal space and voting behavior appeared to be significant among women exclusively, with religion-based variations as to the degree and type of transgression that they experience. Christian women are more likely to experience public sexual harassment, while Muslim women are more likely to experience reduced levels of independence within the home. The impact of restrictions of mobility on voting behavior appears to be stronger among women who are either in their mid-40s or below. There are also religion-based variations on the propensity to vote, with Christians being the most likely to vote.

In this chapter, *Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and Political Participation in the United States*, results indicate that voter demobilization occurs among both sexes, though the violations of bodily integrity that cause voter demobilization are different. For women, the factor is spousal control over mobility. 37% of women indicated that they feel the need to ask for confirmation from their spouse/significant other before leaving home independently, and of those who indicated restrictions, 31% did not vote, as opposed to 19% among those who indicated that did not report restrictions. Among men, those who justify female-to-male violence are 8 percentage points less likely to vote than men who do not.
Experiencing empowerment mechanisms such as higher levels of education, income, and respect for bodily integrity increase the likelihood to vote. Moreover, membership in parties also increases the likelihood to vote.

*Gender, Government Institutions, and Voting Behavior*

The United States is a federal constitutional republic, in which the President of the United States (the head of state and head of government), Congress, and judiciary share powers reserved to the national government, and the federal government shares sovereignty with the state governments. For the purposes of this dissertation, the focus is on federal government and presidential elections (as opposed to those that take place at the state level or local levels of governance).

The executive branch is headed by the President and is independent of both the legislature and the judiciary. Legislative power is vested in the two chambers of Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The judicial branch is composed of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, exercises judicial power. The judiciary's function is to interpret the United States Constitution and federal laws and regulations. This includes resolving disputes between the executive and legislative branches. The federal government's layout is explained in the Constitution. Two political parties, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, dominate American politics, and while there are also smaller parties such as the Tea party, the Coffee party, the Libertarian Party, the Green Party, and the Constitution Party, these parties have significantly less power in the legislative branch, and have never had a presence in presidential office.
In the American context, both presidential and congressional elections take place. Presidential elections occur every four years in November. Unique to the United States is the presence of the electoral college in presidential elections. The Electoral College consists of 538 electors. A majority of 270 electoral votes is required to elect the President. Each state has an allotment of electors which is equal to the number of members in its Congressional delegation: one for each state member in the House of Representatives, and two for state senators. The electors are honor-bound to vote for their state’s candidate of choice, which is indicated by popular vote.

As gender applies to political representation, women are better represented in legislature in the United States than it is Lebanon. However, women are still underrepresented. Women constitute 19% of the delegates in the House of Representatives, and only 20% of senators are women. Historically, many women in American politics succeeded their husbands, though more female politicians are making independent entry into the political sphere in recent years.

Gender equality is improving in American politics. Indeed, turnout has been higher among women than men since the 1980s (Center for American Women and Politics, 2015). However, they are less likely than men to run for political office, and are less likely to get elected (Lawless and Fox, 2012; Krook, 2010; Jenkins, 2005). However, men are more likely to report voting than women in survey data (Dr. Heather Ondercin12, Oral Communication with Author, Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, April 10, 2016). These trends are salient in the

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12 Dr. Heather Ondercin is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Mississippi. Her foci are electoral behavior and gender politics in the United States.
dataset. 25% of women in this dataset did not vote, while only 15% of men did not vote.

By this same token, the reported levels of turnout are elevated, as this would mean that 85% of men voted, and 75% of women did. In the national data, 53% of women voted in the 2012 presidential elections, while 47% of men did (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2012). Over-reporting could be for two reasons. The first is that those who are both part of an online opt-in panel and are willing to take a survey related to politics are more politically inclined. The second is that voting is viewed as socially desirable behavior, and as such, is over-reported. Interestingly, men are more likely to over-report voting than are women in survey studies, which may explain the discrepancy in reported gender-based levels of turnout and actual levels of turnout (Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010; Dr. Heather Ondercin, Oral Communication with Author, Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, April 10, 2016). This leads to some distortion of the significance of independent variables, with inflated levels of positive magnitude for variables which are in the same direction, and exaggerated levels of negative magnitude for variables which are in opposite directions (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy, 2001). Among married men in particular over-reporting is apparent in this sample. This does have some implications for this study in the male sample; the over-reported figures for turnout and political affiliation for this are indicated in appendix 5.B.

Women are less likely to join political parties—28% of men are current members of political parties, while only 22% of women are. Traditionally, female public participation occurred in non-political social networks, such as those related to
school, church, and community organizations (Jenkins, 2005). Ultimately though, women have made great strides over time, and are starting to occupy more prestigious political positions than in prior years.

**Mechanisms Behind Voters’ Choices**

Unlike the Lebanese context, clientelism is not a factor in determining voter choice. Indeed, the dynamics of voter choice are fundamentally different in the United States, as social benefits are distributed through programmatic means. However, social networks are very important in facilitating not only voting, but also voter choice (Sokhey and McClurg, 2010; Zuckerman, Valentino, and Zuckerman, 1994).

Social networks are created through multiple intersections of socio-political cleavages, most commonly those based on ethnicity, race, religion, language, occupation, and socio-economic status (Siegel, 2009; Brown and Brown, 2003; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). These often reinforce each other, as there is a strong degree of similarity in the characteristics of one’s socio-economic status, race, and occupation among persons in a close circle, and creating a sense of common socio-political identity (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, Cook, 2001; Brown and Brown, 2003; Nieuwbeerta and Flap, 2000). The more one’s social intimates are heavily in favor of a particular party, the higher likelihood of an individual voting for that particular party (Sokhey and McClurg, 2010; Siegel, 2009; Scholz and Wang, 2006; Zuckerman, Valentino, and Zuckerman, 1994).
Emerging from the discussion of social networks is that of political affiliation. Persons who are either strong party affiliates or active members of political parties are much more likely to vote (Fowler and Kam, 2007; Holbrook and McClurg, 2005; Grofman, Owen, and Collet, 1999). This is perhaps intuitive, as those who have strong political leanings are more likely to practice civic engagement, join political parties, and thus, vote. However, it should be noted that party affiliation in the United States has strong social demographic divisions. Supporters of the democratic party tend to be young, liberal, persons of racial minority status, and are often women, while supporters of the republican party tend to be older, married, religious, and more conservative (Pew Research Center, 2015; Newport, 2014). By that same token, support for either party is often linked to economic preferences. Supporters of the democratic party tend to favor government social provision, while supporters of the republican party prefer limited government intervention regarding social welfare (De Neve, 2014; Brunner, Ross, and Washington, 2013; Manza and Brooks, 1999).

It is perhaps obvious that there are other factors involved in the decision to vote or to refrain from doing so. Persons who have higher levels of education, employment, and income are more likely to vote (Hillygus, 2005; Grafsein, 2005; Copeland and Laband, 2002). Much of this is due to the fact that circulation in the public sphere in the form of educational institutions, places of employment, and community organizations are correlated with the development of civic skills, which results in an increased likelihood to vote (Brown and Brown, 2003; Schur, 2003; Hillygus, 2005).
Social Norms and Gendered Marginalization

Unlike the Lebanese context, where social marginalization is institutionalized, both men and women have equal rights under the law in the United States. However, the accessibility of socio-legal resources and treatment within the legal system is often related to gender, race, and socio-economic status. Persons of Hispanic or African-American descent face the highest levels of difficulty within the legal system, while Caucasians who have higher levels of socio-economic status are treated more leniently (Doerner and Demuth, 2010; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998). Women of racial minority status also face legal discrimination compared to their female Caucasian counterparts, but as an aggregate group, women are treated more leniently than men are in the legal system (Doernet and Demuth, 2010; Griffin and Wooldredge, 2006). As such, while all citizens are equal under the law in principle, the legal institutions do not work in a similar fashion across social groupings.

As government intervention applies to the protection of bodily integrity, domestic violence is criminalized across all 50 states, and this has been the case since 1994 (The Violence Against Women Act, 1994). The law establishes domestic violence as a crime against the state, has a pro-arrest stance against those who perpetuate domestic violence, and allowed victims to request protection orders against their abusers (Stop Abusive and Violence Environments, 2015; Uniform Law Commission, 2015). While this law has successfully reduced the rate of domestic violence perpetrated against women, it is still a problem in many households. Another problem with the law is that it is structured such that men are assumed to be
the primary aggressors, leaving men vulnerable to arrest prematurely (Harry Crouch\textsuperscript{13}, Author’s Interview, October 19, 2015).

Perhaps as a reflection of social inequity within legal institutions, political marginalization is also intertwined across the axes of race, ethnicity, gender, and socio-economic status. Typically, women of lower socio-economic strata are the most marginalized, and are the least likely to participate politically (Ruth Glenn\textsuperscript{14}, Author’s Interview, Oct. 27\textsuperscript{th}, 2015; Wemlinger and Kropf, 2013; Kabeer, 2005). In the context of American voting behavior, poorer women are less likely to vote because they have less social capital, cannot afford to take the time off of work to go to the polls, or do not have the means to afford childcare which would leave them free to do so (Wemlinger and Kropf, 2013; Linda Berg\textsuperscript{15}, Author’s Interview, October 19\textsuperscript{th}, 2015). Moreover, women who are dominated at home or abused are also less likely to vote, as they have difficulty making independent decisions (Berg, Author’s Interview). Ultimately, women who are more vulnerable are the least likely to be represented.

\textit{Methodology}

In this chapter, I gauge the relationship between violations of personal space and voting behavior in the United States. In order to do so, I designed my own questionnaire, and conducted a 1,268 person survey through the use of Qualtrics, an online polling company. The sampling selection is done though an online opt-in panel, with a specific 65\% female quota, which oversizes the female sample. For the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{13} Mr. Harry Crouch is the President of the National Coalition for Men in San Francisco, California
\textsuperscript{14} Ms. Ruth Glenn is the Executive Director of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence in Denver, Colorado
\textsuperscript{15} Ms. Linda Berg is the Political Director of the National Organization for Women in Washington D.C.
\end{footnotesize}
purposes of cost-effectiveness and ease of collecting data, this method was used. The median time to complete this survey was 11:23 minutes. Approved on July 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 3015 by the University of Maryland Internal Review Board, the full text of this questionnaire is featured in Appendix 5.A.

Admittedly, this sampling method is different from that of the door-to-door Kish-grid, and raises concerns about the sampling frame. Members of online panels tend to be younger and wealthier than the general population, which raises concerns about accurate sampling representation (Hays, Liu, and Kapteyn, 2015). Moreover, online respondents are subject to online response conditioning, answering too fast, and satisficing with their responses (Callegaro, Baker, Bethlehem, Görick, Krosnick, and Lavrakas, 2014; Hays, Liu, and Kapteyn, 2015). Factors that mitigate the negative aspects of such a sampling frame are the fact Qualtrics drops surveys which have high levels of non-response, those who answer too quickly, randomizes its selection of participants within its panels, uses refocus questions, and tries to structure the study such that the sample has similar demographics to that of census data (Ashley McWhorter\textsuperscript{16}, Written Communication with Author, August 11, 2015; Hewson, forthcoming; Qualtrics, 2014).

In this particular study, there is an oversized proportion of women; there are 834 women and 434 men. All of those sampled are above 18, and the age range is from 18-88. In terms of geographic distribution, 30\% of this sample live in cities, 47\% live in the suburbs, and 23\% live in rural areas.

\textsuperscript{16}Ms. Ashley McWhorter is a panel product manager at Qualtrics. She was responsible for managing this survey.
For the purposes of these models in particular, those who are either married or in a relationship were those that were tested. The reason for this is that in the Lebanese sample, both those who are married and single live with family members (either spouses or parents), thus making familial control over mobility a salient feature independent of marital status. However, this living pattern was not salient in the American sample; a negligible number of single persons lived with family members. Thus, it made substantive sense to structure the models in this fashion.

Models one and two are different in that the first model makes a specific direction about domestic violence concerning men to women, while the second model specifies from women to men. All other variables are the same. The general decomposition models are compartmentalized into three parts. The first is a logistic model conducted on women exclusively. The second is a logistic model conducted across the male sample exclusively. The third is an analysis comparing the results to each other. The variables included in this model link the constructs of personal space, bodily integrity, values, empowerment, interest, immersion in political networks, and demographics.

The key independent variables explaining personal space and bodily integrity are complete freedom to leave the house; complete freedom to associate with people of one’s choosing; complete freedom to express one’s self; justification of male-to-female domestic violence, justification of female-to-male domestic violence, verbal/emotional abuse, and experiencing regular public sexual harassment. The three variables indicating political interest are watching televised news regularly, party affiliation, and a direct question asking about interest in politics. The variables
that measure empowerment are university-level education, and employment. Variables that measure demographics are *ethnicity, marriage, natural logarithm of age, region,* and *family income.* The variables that measure immersion in political networks are *never a member of a political party and former member of a political party.* The dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the 2012 presidential elections. All models are run as two-tailed tests at 95% confidence.

**Table 4: Gendered Decomposition Models for the United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women (Model 1)</th>
<th>Men (Model 1)</th>
<th>Women (Model 2)</th>
<th>Men (Model 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Harassment</td>
<td>-.102 (.33)</td>
<td>-.773 (.82)</td>
<td>-.088 (.33)</td>
<td>-.260 (.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income (LN)</td>
<td>.466* (.19)</td>
<td>.252 (.37)</td>
<td>.463* (.19)</td>
<td>.193 (.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Leave</td>
<td>.773** (.27)</td>
<td>-.144 (.54)</td>
<td>.778** (.27)</td>
<td>-.254 (.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (LN)</td>
<td>1.34** (.47)</td>
<td>1.82 (.63)</td>
<td>1.30** (.47)</td>
<td>1.12 (.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>.321 (.31)</td>
<td>1.69** (.59)</td>
<td>.325 (.31)</td>
<td>1.92** (.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>.363 (.28)</td>
<td>1.35* (.58)</td>
<td>.385 (.28)</td>
<td>1.47* (.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News TV</td>
<td>-.266 (.31)</td>
<td>-.619 (.62)</td>
<td>-.218 (.30)</td>
<td>1.92 (.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Associate</td>
<td>-.334 (.38)</td>
<td>.827 (.67)</td>
<td>-.509 (.39)</td>
<td>.671 (.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Express</td>
<td>.029 (.32)</td>
<td>-.468 (.64)</td>
<td>.064 (.32)</td>
<td>-.649 (.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Abuse</td>
<td>.046 (.45)</td>
<td>.749 (.84)</td>
<td>.083 (.44)</td>
<td>.790 (.86)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-.332 (0.31)</th>
<th>-1.67 (.69)</th>
<th>-.311 (.31)</th>
<th>-1.46* (.68)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.328 (.37)</td>
<td>-1.44 (.74)</td>
<td>.355 (.37)</td>
<td>-1.50 (.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Education</td>
<td>1.03** (.39)</td>
<td>.749 (.61)</td>
<td>.969* (.39)</td>
<td>.720 (.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification of Male to Female Violence</td>
<td>.564 (.40)</td>
<td>.932 (.64)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification of Female to Male Violence</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-.194 (.30)</td>
<td>-1.25* (.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.922- (.53)</td>
<td>.489 (1.20)</td>
<td>.947- (.53)</td>
<td>.380 (1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Race</td>
<td>-.178 (.53)</td>
<td>.170 (.99)</td>
<td>-.208 (.54)</td>
<td>.490 (1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>.296 (1.29)</td>
<td>-.035 (1.31)</td>
<td>.272 (.63)</td>
<td>.307 (1.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not answer (Hispanic)</td>
<td>-.019 (.54)</td>
<td>-.616 (.53)</td>
<td>.012 (.28)</td>
<td>-.157 (.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Party Member</td>
<td>-.780 (.44)</td>
<td>-.635 (0.78)</td>
<td>-.792- (.43)</td>
<td>-.739 (1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Pol. Party Member</td>
<td>-.778 (.81)</td>
<td>-.059 (1.40)</td>
<td>-.749 (.82)</td>
<td>-1.26 (.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>1.90*** (.27)</td>
<td>2.90*** (.65)</td>
<td>1.90*** (.27)</td>
<td>2.48*** (.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>.502 (.37)</td>
<td>-.300 (.68)</td>
<td>.472 (.36)</td>
<td>-.320 (.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>.787* (.34)</td>
<td>-.029 (.65)</td>
<td>.799* (.34)</td>
<td>.065 (.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>.130 (.46)</td>
<td>-.036 (.65)</td>
<td>.131 (.46)</td>
<td>-1.12 (.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.5.61 (.46)</td>
<td>-1.06 (.65)</td>
<td>-.5.31 (.46)</td>
<td>-3.89 (.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Sq</td>
<td>0.2772 n=530</td>
<td>0.3941 n=288</td>
<td>0.2748 n=530</td>
<td>0.4065 n=288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the elections

*** p< 0.001 ** p< 0.01 * p< 0.05 • p< 0.1 (Standard Errors of the Coefficients are in Parentheses)
Table 5: Model 1 Decomposition Differentials for the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women (Characteristic)</td>
<td>-.102</td>
<td>108.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (Coefficient)</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-8.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (Characteristic)</td>
<td>-.145</td>
<td>154.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (Coefficient)</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>-54.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw (Differential)</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Model 2 Decomposition Differentials in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women (Characteristic)</td>
<td>-.094</td>
<td>100.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (Coefficient)</td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td>-.300%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (Characteristic)</td>
<td>-.110</td>
<td>117.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (Coefficient)</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>-17.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw (Differential)</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results

Model 1: Women, Demobilization, and Control Over Mobility

Indicated in both models, men and women are mobilized and demobilized by different factors. In model 1, indicated by the natural logarithm of household income,
women are more likely to vote if they have higher levels of income, and more likely to vote as age increases. Indicated in the graph below, women who experience lower levels of income are more likely to experience the demobilizing effects of transgressions against personal space.

Figure 3: The Marginal Effect of Freedom to Leave the House on Voting Across Income Levels Among Women in the United States

Note: Figure 3, the above plot, is based on Model 1. It describes the marginal effect on leaving the house on voting across the natural logarithm of income levels, comparing those who report that they feel completely free to leave the home without familial approval to those who do not. The grey areas are 95% confidence intervals.

Also, women are 2.16 times more likely to vote if they feel completely free to leave the house than women who do not $exp(.773)=2.16$. Indicated in the graph
below, similar to the Lebanese sample, the propensity to vote decreases the most among younger women.

Figure 4: The Marginal Effect of Leaving the House on Voting Across Age Brackets Among Women in the United States

Note: Figure 4, the above plot, is also based on Model 1. It describes the marginal effect on leaving the house on voting across age brackets, comparing those who report that they feel completely free to leave the home without familial approval to those who do not. The grey areas are 95% confidence intervals.

Women who complete a university-level education are 2.80 times more likely to vote than who do not $\exp(1.03)=2.80$. Most importantly, women who express an interest in politics are over six times more likely to vote than women who do not $\exp(1.90)=6.68$. Lastly, women who are from the Midwest are over two times more likely to vote than women who are from the South $\exp(.787)=2.19$. 
In this model, men who are married are over five times more likely to vote, but this variable does not seem to significantly affect women in this sample \( \exp(1.69)=5.4 \). Men who express interest in politics are 18 times more likely to vote than men who are not \( \exp(2.90)=18.17 \). Men who are employed are 3.4 times likely to vote than men who are not \( \exp(1.35)=3.4 \).\(^{17}\)

Model 2: Men, Demobilization, and Justification of Domestic Violence

In Model 2, the results for women largely echo those in Model 1. Once again, indicated by the natural logarithm of household income, women are more likely to vote if they have higher levels of income, and with the increase of age. The significance of independent mobility is also clear, as once again, women are 2.17 times more likely to vote if they feel completely free to leave the house than women who do not \( \exp(.778)=2.17 \). Women are 2.63 times likely to vote if they have a university education \( \exp(.963)=2.63 \). A woman is over six times more likely to vote if she is interested in politics \( \exp(1.90)=6.68 \). Lastly, women who are from the Midwest are over two times more likely to vote than women from the South \( \exp(.799)=2.22 \).

There are two changes which are salient among men in Model 2. Firstly, men who believe that women hit men because men provoke the incident are 72% less likely to vote than who do not \( \exp(-1.25)=.28 \). Indicated in the graph below, this effect starts to take place when men are in their early thirties, but not earlier. This

\(^{17}\) Owing to over-reporting, the magnitude of these figures is somewhat inflated. According to the Cooperative Congressional Election Study conducted by Harvard & MIT, married men were 3 times more likely to vote than those who are unmarried in the 2012 presidential elections; 81\% of men in this poll indicated that they had voted. In the General Social Survey conducted by the University of Chicago, married men were 2.3 times more likely to vote than unmarried men in the 2012 elections; the reported turnout rate among men was 64\%.
could be related to the age bracket within which men engage in committed relationships, and are more likely to be “locked in” with a potential abuser. In this sample, the proportion of men aged from 18-29 whom are married is 28%, but jumps to 60% from age 30-39, and fluctuates minimally as the age brackets increase.

**Figure 5: The Marginal Effect of the Justification of Domestic Violence Against Men on Voting Across Age Brackets Among Men in the United States**

Note: Figure 5, the above plot, is based on Model 2. It describes the marginal effect of reporting justification of domestic violence on political participation across age brackets, comparing those who indicate justification to those who do not. The grey areas are 95% confidence intervals.

Men who identify as independent are less likely to vote than those who identify as democrats. Specifically, men who claim neither affiliation are 78% less likely to vote \( \exp(-1.46)=.22 \). All of this being said, there are other factors which
remain similar. Men who are employed are 4.4 times more likely to vote \( \exp(1.40) \). Lastly, men who are interested in politics are 12 times more likely to vote than men who do not \( \exp(2.48)=12 \).

The decomposition model provides estimates for subgroup characteristics, coefficients, and then calculates a raw differential comparing the two. In Model 1, the \( \Omega \)-characteristic value of women is -0.102, it appears as though women would be predicted to vote less given the resources that they have. The \( \Omega \)-characteristic value of men is -0.145, indicating that men would also be predicted to vote less given the resources at their disposal. In terms of the \( \Omega \)-coefficients, the \( \Omega \) coefficient for women is 0.008, while the \( \Omega \) coefficient for men is 0.051. The calculated raw differential is -0.093, indicating that women are less likely to vote than men are. This is substantiated by a t-test run at 95% significance, with a p-value of 0.0001.

In Model 2, the \( \Omega \)-characteristic value of women is -0.094, it appears as though women would be predicted to vote less given the resources that they have. The \( \Omega \)-characteristic value of men is -.110, indicating that men would also be predicted to vote less given their existing resources. In terms of the \( \Omega \)-coefficients, the \( \Omega \) coefficient for women is 0.0002, while the \( \Omega \) coefficient for men is .016. The calculated raw differential is -0.093, indicating that once again, women are less likely to vote than men are. This is also substantiated by a t-test run at 95% significance, with a p-value of 0.0001.

As these results relate to violations of personal space, it appears as though women and men are affected by violations of bodily integrity, and to differing degrees. Among women, spousal control over mobility reduces the likelihood to vote.
Indeed, dominance in the home reduces independence, thus depressing the probability of political participation (Berg, Author’s Interview). The justification of domestic violence generated from women towards men reduces the male propensity to vote. This indicates that violations of bodily integrity demobilize voters in both sexes.

The justification of domestic violence against men among men in this dataset at 35%. Interestingly, the rate of justification of violence against women by men is also higher, at 28%. One of the many explanations for this is that in cultures of patriarchy, violence is more accepted (Glenn, Author’s Interview). However, what is of particular interest is that the rate of justification of violence against men is higher than that of violence against women.

This is due to many factors, the first being that the public conceptionalization of domestic violence is based of men being the aggressors, while women are the victims (Dutton and Corvo, 2007). This has been institutionalized at the level of policy, with the result being that social welfare institutions are significantly more likely to accommodate mothers and children who are victims of abuse, but far fewer institutions address the needs of men (Crouch, Author’s Interview). Many institutions do not accommodate male victims, and as such, there are fewer resources which abused men can turn to (Glenn, Author’s Interview). Chronic exposure to domestic violence without any recourse often leads to its justification as a practice (Crouch, Author’s Interview).

These findings have important implications for the analysis of voting behavior. The experience of political demobilization due to transgressions upon personal space is again witnessed in this dataset.
Table 7: Relationship between Marital /Cohabitational Power Dynamics and Voting in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Married/Cohabitating Women</th>
<th>Married/Cohabitating Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male to Female DV</td>
<td>.098 (.38)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female to Male DV</td>
<td>--- (.972)</td>
<td>-.029 (.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/E Abuse</td>
<td>-.029 (.38)</td>
<td>1.23 (.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>.816** (.26)</td>
<td>.450 (.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Ownership</td>
<td>1.06*** (.23)</td>
<td>1.30* (.52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse/Sig. Other Dec. Vis. Fam</td>
<td>-.604 (.98)</td>
<td>-.598 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>.206 (.34)</td>
<td>.169 (.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. Vis. Fam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Med. Care</td>
<td>- .376 (.30)</td>
<td>-.026 (.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse/Sig. Other Dec. Home Purchases</td>
<td>-.325 (1.35)</td>
<td>-.787 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Home Purchases</td>
<td>-.157 (.28)</td>
<td>-.818 (.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse/Sig. Other Invite Guests</td>
<td>-.642 (.90)</td>
<td>.519 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Invite Guests</td>
<td>-.300 (.38)</td>
<td>1.18 (1.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.656</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Sq</td>
<td>0.0846</td>
<td>0.1431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=483 n=243

Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the elections

*** p< 0.001 ** p< 0.01 * p< 0.05 • p< 0.1 (Standard Errors of the Coefficients are in Parentheses)
Marital/Co-habitational Dynamics and Voting Behavior

In this sample, respondents who were either a) married or b) unmarried and cohabitating with their significant others’ were asked questions concerning power dynamics within their homes. This was done in order to gauge as to whether or not power dynamics have a demobilizing effect on voting behavior when living in the same place.

Once again, among this population, it appears as though the justification of domestic violence against one’s own sex demobilizes men, but not women. Indeed, married/cohabitating men who endorse domestic violence against their own sex are 63% less likely to vote than men who do not, and this is significant at 90% confidence levels exp(-.972)=.37. Interestingly, decision-making dynamics do not demobilize either sex politically, while mechanisms of empowerment such as property ownership increase the propensity to vote among both sexes. Indeed, women who own property are nearly three times more likely to vote than women who do not exp(1.06)=2.88, while men are nearly four times more likely to vote if they own property exp(1.30)=3.60. The empowering effect of self-sustainability is only salient among women in this sample; women who can support themselves are over two times more likely to vote than women who cannot exp(.816)=2.26.
Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and Political Participation in the United States, the results indite that voter demobilization occurs among both sexes. For women, the factor is spousal control over mobility, and this is significant across all age groups. Among men, the demobilizing factor is the justification of female-to-male domestic violence, but this becomes significant among men above the age of 30. Conversely, experiencing empowerment mechanisms such as higher levels of education, income, and respect for bodily integrity increase the likelihood to vote. Moreover, membership in parties also increases the likelihood to vote. More broadly, in comparing these two countries, it is clear that the demobilization effects of transgression of bodily integrity occur across electorates, and the empowerment mechanisms of education, employment, and higher levels of income function similarly. Lastly, having an interest in politics naturally enhances the propensity to vote.

Among married/cohabitating couples, it appears as though transgressions upon personal space only demobilize men, and not women. This is surprising and has profound implications for addressing the needs of vulnerably men, as women are often thought to be the exclusive victims of domestic violence or abuse, when this is clearly not the case.

In the next chapter, Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: The Cases of Morocco and Yemen, the results indicate significant variation in the display of political demobilization due to violations of personal space. In Morocco, women who do not feel free to leave the house also experience voter demobilization, but
education and employment do not empower women politically. However, in Yemen, a reverse trend is seen. Spousal control over mobility does not demobilize women politically, but education and employment significantly propel women into political participation.
Chapter 5: Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: The Cases of Morocco and Yemen

In the last chapter, Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and Political Participation in the United States, the results show that voter demobilization due to bodily transgressions occurs among both sexes, albeit differently. For women, the critical factor is spousal control over mobility, while the justification of female-to-male domestic violence reduces the likelihood to vote for men. Conversely, experiencing empowerment mechanisms such as higher levels of education, income, and respect for bodily integrity increase the likelihood to vote. Moreover, membership in parties also increases the likelihood to vote, as does having an interest in politics.

In this chapter, Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: The Cases of Morocco and Yemen, there is significant variation as to the degree to which violations of bodily integrity demobilize voters. In Morocco, 57% of women who said they felt restricted did not vote, compared to 50% of women said that they feel free to leave the home. In Yemen, 46% of women of women who did not feel free to leave the house did not vote, compared to 36% of women who experience freedom of mobility. In Morocco, women who do not feel free to leave the house also experience voter demobilization, but education and employment do not empower women politically. In contrast, education and employment significantly propel women into political participation in the Yemeni context.
**Introduction**

Morocco and Yemen are two countries in the Arab world that are different in many ways. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy characterized by liberal legal reform as of 2004 and onwards, while Yemen has among the heaviest restrictions imposed on women in the world. Yemen is the only country featured in this study where there are legal restrictions placed upon independent female mobility. Placed alongside the United States and Lebanon, the four create the opportunity to examine the relationship between transgressions upon personal space and voter demobilization across a spectrum of legally defined public and private freedoms accorded to women. The United States is the most liberal, while Yemen being the most conservative.

**The Moroccan Political Arena**

Moroccan society is predominately Sunni Muslim, with ethno-political cleavages between those who identify as Berber, and those who identify as Arab. Having transformed during the Arab Spring, the Moroccan system of governance is that of a constitutional monarchy. The 2011 reforms gave more power to the parliament, the office of the prime minister, and reduced the powers of the King. The Moroccan parliament is bi-cameral in nature, and the 395-seat House of Representatives is elected by popular vote, while the 270-seat House of Councillors is elected by local councils, professional chambers, and labor unions (Madani, Maghraoui, and Zerhouni 2012). Moroccan civil society allows for multiple political parties, and these are characterized as being either religious or secular (National Democratic Institute 2011).
Similar to the Lebanese context, clientelist voting is largely linked with party support for the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), as it is the dominant force in Moroccan politics (Hamzawy, 2008). An opposition movement which was later coopted into the government, the PJD functions as a provider of social services and charitable work to poorer Moroccans (Binoual 2011). Its tripartite status—an Islamist party, a local movement that emerged in opposition to the power of the monarchy, and a provider of social welfare has earned widespread support among the Moroccan electorate (García-Rivero and Kotzé 2007).

Morocco is characterized as being in democratic transition, but still patriarchal in its social character (Laskier, 2003). In the IFES dataset, 62% of Moroccan female respondents admitted that they did not feel free to leave the house independently. The personal status laws are heavily related to these characterizations. Indeed, though women and men have equal participatory rights, once again, matters pertaining to personal status are governed by the religious courts, and these courts usually favor men over women.

This being said, gender equality has gained headway in Morocco under the Moudawana law, which was passed in 2004 (Moudawana, Preamble). Women are now able to arrange their own marriages without the consent of a male guardian, and female marital age was raised to 18 (Moudawana, Art.19). In addition, men who want to engage in polygamy must have the legal consent of their existing spouses before doing so. Women can now initiate divorce on the grounds of disrespect, harm, non-maintenance, latent defect, abstinence, or abandonment (Moudawana Art.98). However, neither marital rape nor domestic violence is explicitly mentioned as
grounds for divorce in the Moudawana legal code. Indeed, neither is a crime in Morocco. Moreover, men can initiate divorce on any grounds. Brothers are entitled to twice the inheritance of sisters (Moudawana Art.174). Ultimately, men have more positive rights than do women, while women are still vulnerable to violations of their bodily integrity under law.

In terms of public sexual harassment, Morocco has laws that protect women from sexual harassment at work, but not on public streets. Ultimately, women are less protected than men in both the public and private public spheres, and have limitations on the accessibility of familial financial resources.

**Demobilizing Cultural Norms among Moroccan Women**

Patriarchy is a salient feature of Moroccan culture, as is the gendered separation between public and private spaces (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2006). The public space, defined as places of work, the market, and street, are social spaces for men, whereas the home and public bath are the primary social spaces for women (Belarbi 1997; Bourqia 1997). While this is changing as more women join the workforce, women tend to be excluded from high-paying jobs, and face discrimination when on the job market (Ennaji 2004b; Filiali-Meknassi 1994). A woman’s first responsibilities are towards her family, and employment is considered only if financially necessary (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2006).

The ratio of formally employed women in this sample is 11%, which is under-representative of the proportion of women who work in Morocco (IFES, 2010). The actual proportion is 22%, not accounting for informal labor (World Bank, 2014).
Interestingly, informal family-based employment or self-employment is very common among women in Morocco, and is particularly salient in the agricultural and textile industries (Angel-Urdinola and Tanabe, 2012). While this provides women with some income, it does not provide them with social services linked to formal employment or include them in the public sphere, as many women are working either within their homes or in very limited public circles. Moreover, while there are no legal restrictions on female mobility, the practice of not leaving the home without a male guardian is still salient, particularly in rural areas (S. Tang\textsuperscript{18}, Oral Communication with Author, Women in the Middle East Political Sphere Workshop, Project on Middle East Political Science Conference, March 11, 2016). These dynamics create an informal system whereby employment does not motivate women to participate politically in ways that are salient in Lebanon, the United States, and Yemen.

\textit{The Yemeni Political Scene}

Unlike Morocco, Yemen’s social cleavages are both tribal and religious in nature. A heavily tribal society with 66\% of its population living in rural areas, clientelism is a salient characteristic of Yemeni voting behavior (World Bank, 2014; Corstange, 2010). Unlike the United States, Lebanon, or Morocco, Yemen experienced division and reunification in tandem with the rise and fall of the Soviet Union. Northern Yemen was its own state, allied with the U.S. and Western powers, while Southern Yemen was Soviet-backed (Brehony, 2013). Shortly after the Soviet

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Union collapsed, the Republic of Yemen (ROY) was declared on 22 May 1990 as a parliamentary republic, with Ali Abdullah Saleh becoming President and Ali Salem al-Baidh Vice President. Yemen is a republic with a bicameral legislature. Under the constitution, an elected president, an elected 301-seat House of Representatives, and an appointed 111-member Shura Council share power (Constitution of Yemen, Articles 62-64, 108). The president is head of state, and the prime minister is head of government. Suffrage is universal for those over 18 (Yemeni Const. Art. 64). Unlike the Lebanese, American, or Moroccan electoral systems, Yemenis elect their president by popular vote between candidates that are endorsed by parliament (Yemeni Const., Art. 64). The last parliamentary elections were in 2003, and the last presidential and local council elections were in 2006.

Similar to the Lebanese context, armed conflict is a part of the Yemeni political scene. In 1994, armed groups in Southern Yemen attempted to split the country again, though this attempt failed (Brehony, 2013; Al-Moushky, 2013). Initiated in 2004, a Houthi insurgency is ongoing in Yemen, and has resulted in a coup in 2014 (BBC, 2015).

Tribal favoritism and paternalism are salient characteristics of Yemeni voting behavior (Saif 2000). Tribal leaders are central to Yemeni politics, and use rewards in the form of development projects, jobs, or basic goods to secure votes (Corstange, 2010; Clark, 2004). This is particularly salient when analyzing the voting behavior of those who support the opposition reform movement, the Islah party (Clark, 2004). Such rewards mobilize poorer Yemenis to the polls, as in many instances, such parties are the only avenue through which they can secure social services.
Demobilizing Cultural Norms Among Women

Yemen is described as patriarchal and traditional in nature (Manea, 2010; Badran, 1998). As patriarchy relates to personal space, Yemen, 61.84% of female respondents stated that they feel restricted when leaving the house. The country’s social sphere is characterized by tribalism (often in the context of the Northern-Southern divide) and homosociality (Meneley, 2007). Social loyalty is towards one’s family and on a political level, towards one’s tribe and kinship (Dresch and Heykel, 1995; Saif, 2000). Social gatherings tend to be gender-segregated, and women meet almost exclusively within the home. Men are more likely to enjoy social gatherings with other men in public, and political discussions often occur during qat chews, which are exclusively male (Badran, 1998; Wedeen, 2007). This is not to imply that women do not discuss politics, but rather that the only available space for them to do so is at home (Badran, 1998).

Though Yemen has elements of the Napoleonic code in its legal system, the constitution describes the Sharia as the source of law (Yemeni Const., Art. 3). While men and women are given voting rights, their legal ability to participate in the public sphere is unequal, as are their entitlements by the religious courts.

The difference in socio-legal contracts between men and women is very stark in Yemen. A woman is unable to obtain a personal identity card, a passport, or get married without the consent of either her husband or her closest male relative, although adult men do not need permission from guardians (Basha, Ghanem, and Abdulhafid, 2005; Manea, 2010). There is no legal recourse for women who experience domestic violence or marital rape (Sisters Arab Forum for Human Rights,
In terms of religious family law, wives have restricted grounds for divorce, brothers are entitled to twice the inheritance of sisters (Basha, Ghanem, and Abdulhafid, 2005). Relating to personal space, a woman cannot leave the house without the permission of either her husband or her father, and in non-urban spaces, women can be detained and arrested for being seen with a man who is not their relative (Manea, 2010).

Laws pertaining to sexual harassment fall under the broad category of disgraceful conduct with a female in public, but do not specifically define sexual harassment. In practice, women who experience sexual harassment rarely report it, as social tradition stigmatizes women experience public harassment. Ultimately, female mobility is not only unprotected in the Yemeni case, but it is also legally restricted, which has heavy implications for the ability of women to participate politically.

**Methodology**

In Yemen, the sample was 500 men and 2000 women. The sampling strategy was multi-stage, stratified, probability proportional to size (PPS). The survey was set up such that there were 250 primary sampling points, with each sampling point consisting of 80-120 households (Yemen Polling Center, 2010). At each sampling point, houses were selected in a (6+1) fashion, or rather, every seventh house. 10-12 interviews were conducted per sampling point, and selection of the interviewee within the home was done by the Kish Grid method. The gender breakdown of respondents per set of interviews was 75% female, 25% male. Owing to the social structure of the country, women were interviewed by female interviewers exclusively. All
governorates except Al-Maharah were sampled because only 0.5% of Yemen’s population resides there.

In Morocco, the sample size was such that there are 2000 women and 500 men. The sampling strategy was multi-stage, stratified, probability proportional to size (PPS) across all 16 governorates (LMS-CSA, 2009; Rola Abdul-Latif19, phone communication with author, April 18, 2014). There were 255 primary sampling points, with 8-12 interviews per sampling point (LMS-CSA, 2009; Abdul-Latif, phone communication with author). The households were selected in a (1+ skip number), or rather, every other house (LMS-CSA 2009). For the purposes of randomization, all respondents within the home were selected using the Kish grid method. 60.8% of respondents came from urban areas, while 39.2% came from rural ones (LMS-CSA, 2010).

Research Design

In this chapter, I created two natural decomposition models, intended to examine the full samples of Morocco and Yemen respectively. After this, I ran two logistic regressions across a sample of married women in each country in order to examine the mechanisms of marital partnership. All tests are two-tailed, and are run at 95% significance.

In the context of the natural decomposition models, the key independent variables linked to bodily integrity are *sexual harassment, freedom to leave the home*

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19 Ms. Rola Abdul-Latif is the Senior Research, Learning, and Evaluation Manager at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and she supervised the development of the SWMENA datasets.
without permission from family members, freedom to associate, freedom to express one’s self, and freedom to move publicly without fear. In terms of values, I chose to examine working outside of home and the justification of gender-based violence. In terms of mechanisms of empowerment, I chose to examine education and employment. For the purposes of demographics, I chose to examine age, income, and in the Moroccan context, Berber minority status. I also chose to examine interest in politics in order to test one’s existing inclinations. In the Moroccan model, the dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the last parliamentary elections. In the Yemeni model, the dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the last presidential elections.

The model built for the purposes of investigating Yemeni voting behavior accommodates for significant geographical variation. The reason for this is that unlike any other country discussed thus far, Yemen experienced division and reunification in 1990. The Southern territory used to be its own sovereign nation, and I wanted to see if residence in a part of Yemen which used to be its own state would demobilize voters. Furthermore, in the Northern region, local religious leaders have stronger influence over citizen political behavior than the existing state apparatus. In the East, there is a strong tribal presence, where loyalties to tribal leaders are often the defining mechanisms behind political behavior (Rola Abdul-Latif, Electronic Correspondence with Author, May 26, 2015). Unlike the models illustrating political behavior in Lebanon, the United States, or Morocco, there is no explicit mention of minority status in Yemeni survey instrument.
In the logistic models pertaining to married women, I chose to examine the relationship between decision-making dynamics between spouses, the experience of verbal/emotional abuse, the justification of domestic violence, and the ability to support one’s self and property ownership (i.e: command over material resources). In the Yemeni context, I also included a variable indicating as to whether or not the woman was alone while being interviewed, as Yemeni cultural norms often do not allow women to speak alone with strangers.
Table 8: Gendered Decomposition Models in Morocco and Yemen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women (Morocco)</th>
<th>Men (Morocco)</th>
<th>Women (Yemen)</th>
<th>Men (Yemen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Harassment</td>
<td>-.092 (0.11)</td>
<td>.102 (0.80)</td>
<td>.196 (1.13)</td>
<td>-.174 (.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income (LN)</td>
<td>-.014 (0.02)</td>
<td>.086 (0.06)</td>
<td>-.191* (.11)</td>
<td>.103 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Leave</td>
<td>.295* (0.14)</td>
<td>.510 (0.35)</td>
<td>-.348* (.16)</td>
<td>-.543 (.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (LN)</td>
<td>1.01*** (0.09)</td>
<td>.571** (.21)</td>
<td>.995*** (.15)</td>
<td>1.38*** (.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>.331** (0.11)</td>
<td>.588* (0.26)</td>
<td>.135 (0.14)</td>
<td>.825* (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>.023 (0.16)</td>
<td>.594** (0.22)</td>
<td>.566* (0.25)</td>
<td>.459 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some University Education</td>
<td>-.315 (0.32)</td>
<td>.523 (0.56)</td>
<td>.293 (0.34)</td>
<td>.764 (0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>-.287 (0.30)</td>
<td>-.437 (.40)</td>
<td>1.11** (.41)</td>
<td>1.36* (.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News TV</td>
<td>.141 (0.14)</td>
<td>.138 (0.25)</td>
<td>.585*** (.13)</td>
<td>.156 (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Outside of Home</td>
<td>.737* (0.35)</td>
<td>.221 (0.28)</td>
<td>.787** (.22)</td>
<td>.481 (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Associate</td>
<td>-.109 (0.38)</td>
<td>.520 (0.35)</td>
<td>.148 (0.15)</td>
<td>1.08* (.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Express</td>
<td>-.204 (0.16)</td>
<td>-.561** (.63)</td>
<td>.468** (.32)</td>
<td>-.674 (.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Move Publicly</td>
<td>-.112 (0.14)</td>
<td>.008 (0.33)</td>
<td>-.054 (0.19)</td>
<td>-.208 (.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorse GBV</td>
<td>-.134 (0.11)</td>
<td>.141 (0.20)</td>
<td>.065 (0.13)</td>
<td>-.091 (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berber</td>
<td>.343** (0.15)</td>
<td>.845** (.31)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Region (Yemen)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.597** (.21)</td>
<td>-1.62*** (.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Region (Yemen)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.00*** (.19)</td>
<td>.203 (.46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Eastern Region (Yemen)  --  --  .593**  -.138
                   (Yemen)                   (.27)    (.45)

Western Region (Yemen)  --  --  .848***  .398
                    (Yemen)                   (.18)    (.42)

Interest          .325**  .137  .288*  .608*
                   (.10)    (.21)   (.14)   (.31)

Constant         -1.91*** -1.58*** -1.75*** -.863
Pseudo R-Sq       0.0795  0.1111  0.1143  0.2342
                   n=1,898    n=491    n=1283    n=477

Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the elections
*** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 • p < 0.1 (Standard Errors of the Coefficients are in Parentheses

Table 9: Morocco Decomposition Differentials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women (Characteristic)</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>-11.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (Coefficient)</td>
<td>-.105</td>
<td>111.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (Characteristic)</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>30.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (Coefficient)</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td>-69.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw (Differential)</td>
<td>-.094</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10: Yemen Decomposition Differentials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women (Coefficient)</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>29.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women (Characteristic)</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>70.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (Coefficient)</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>11.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (Characteristic)</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
<td>88.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw (Differential)</td>
<td>-0.232</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results

Morocco

In the Moroccan context, Berber minority status, marriage, and age play a significant role in increasing the propensity to vote among both sexes. Women who identify as Berber and speak Berber at home are 40% more likely than women who identify as Arabs and speak Arabic at home \( \exp(0.343)=1.40 \). Among men, those who identify as Berber and speak Berber at home are 2.32 times more likely to vote than men who identify as Arabs and speak Arabic at home. At first glance, it would appear as though minority status in Morocco functions as an empowerment factor in the Moroccan context.

This is unlikely though, as Moroccan Berbers have a history of experiencing social and linguistic marginalization. Relevant to this particular election, a campaign held to make Amazigh (language of the Berbers) an official language alongside Arabic, (which was officially tabled by referendum at the 2011 parliamentary elections) thereby mobilizing those of Berber status to vote (Abjali, 2009; Tourabi,
2011). It appears as though the minority mobilized in response to a particular event, as opposed to being an exceptionally motivated socio-political cleavage.

Marriage increases the propensity to vote among both sexes. Indeed, women are 39% more likely to vote if they are married $\exp(.331)=1.39$, and men are 80% more likely to vote if they are married $\exp(.588)$. In both cases, an increase in age also indicates an increase in the probability to vote. Interestingly, the demobilizing effect of control over mobility is also clear in the Moroccan sample. Women who feel completely free to leave the home are 34% more likely to vote than women who do not $\exp(.295)=1.34$. The effect of this significantly decreases by the time women are in their mid-50s. Similar to the Lebanese case, the effect of freedom to leave the house on voting across age brackets is not grounded in experiencing lower levels of income. Figure 8 in Appendix 4 illustrates this.
Figure 6: Effect of Freedom to Leave the House on Voting Across Age Brackets in Morocco Among Women

Note: Figure 6, the above plot, describes the marginal effect of feeling free to leave the house on voting across age brackets, comparing those who report that they feel completely free to leave the home without familial approval to those who do not. The grey areas are 95% confidence intervals.

Moreover, women who express an interest in politics are 38% more likely to vote than women who do not $\exp(0.325)=1.38$.

Perhaps surprisingly, interest in politics does not impact the propensity to vote among men. However, employment increases the propensity to vote among men by 81%, $\exp(0.594)=1.81$, but employment does not empower women in this sample. This is likely because much of female labor in Morocco is through informal means, and often this labor is conducted at home. While this allows women to generate additional income, it does not allow them regular exposure to the public sphere, and thus the
mobilizing effects of employment is reduced. However, women who agree that it is acceptable for women to work outside of the home are more than twice as likely to vote than women who do not exp(.737)=2.08.

The model indicates that among men, those who feel free to express themselves are less likely to vote by 61%. However, this is likely a substantively insignificant result, as the inability to express one’s self freely would not mobilize one to vote more than one who is free to speak their mind.

The decomposition model provides estimates for subgroup characteristics, coefficients, and then calculates a raw differential comparing the two. Given that the Ω-characteristic value of women is 0.011, it appears as though women would be predicted to vote more given the resources that they have. In contrast, the Ω-characteristic value of men is -0.028, indicating that men would be predicted to vote less given their resources. In terms of the Ω-coefficients, the Ω coefficient for women is -0.105, while the Ω coefficient for men is -0.065. The calculated raw differential is -0.094. According to the IFES dataset, more men than women vote in Morocco. 46% of women voted in comparison to 55% of men. Substantiated by a t-test, it appears that men vote more than women do in the Moroccan context, and this is statistically significant at the p <.01 level.

Yemen

The Yemeni context is different from the Lebanese, American, or Moroccan cases. Yemen is the most restrictive environment for women, and since its last election, has undergone a coup. However, for the purpose of examining the
relationship between incursions upon personal space and bodily integrity across the spectrum of gender-based inclusive environments, Yemen is a good case study for extreme restrictions.

Among women, those who are employed are 76% more likely to vote than those who are not \(\exp(.566) = 1.76\). Women who have completed university education are three times more likely to vote than women who have not \(\exp(1.11) = 3.03\). While it is clear that the empowering mechanisms of education and employment are significant in explaining female Yemeni voting behavior, formal employment and higher education among women in Yemen are not widespread; the reported rate is 12%, while this sample underestimates the ratio at 7% (World Bank, 2010; IFES, 2010). However, unlike Morocco, informal employment is not a salient feature of female workplace dynamics, thereby allowing women who do work to experience public exposure—thereby mobilizing them.

Along the same thread of political exposure, women who watch the news regularly are 79% more likely to vote than women who do not \(\exp(.585) = 1.79\). Perhaps relatedly, women who express an interest in politics are 33% more likely to vote than women do not \(\exp(.288) = 1.33\).

Similar to the Moroccan sample, women who endorse the belief that women should work outside of the home are over two times more likely to vote than women who do not \(\exp(.787) = 2.19\). Women who feel to express themselves are 59% more likely to vote than women who do not \(\exp(.468) = 1.59\).
Delving into the topic of regional distribution, it appears as though both men and women who are from Southern Yemen are the least likely to vote. This is perhaps expected, as Southern Yemen was once its own nation, and remains in existing conflict with the Northern part. Women who live in Southern Yemen are 45% less likely to vote than women who are from the capital $\exp(-.597)=0.55$. However, women who live in the East, West, or Northern parts of Yemen are more likely to vote than women who live in the capital. Men who live in Southern Yemen in particular are 89% less likely to vote than men who live in the capital. However, men who live anywhere display no significant levels of variation.

Indicated only in the Yemeni sample, women who feel completely free to leave the house are 30% less likely to vote than women who do not $\exp(-.348)=.70$. This is likely a function of geography and a reduced connection to tribal politics and clientelist politics. Unlike many countries, in the Yemeni context, real political power is not held in the capital, but by tribal leaders, who are located outside of the capital. In these areas, tribal leaders connect with male heads of the household, who then mobilize family members of voting age to go the polls in return for social services. The regional distribution of this sentiment is uneven across Yemen, with those in the South feeling the least amount of pressure to vote at all (12%), and those in the East (the region with the strongest tribal presence) feeling the most amount of pressure to vote (29%). According to this dataset, women who indicated that they felt pressured by relatives to vote a certain way are 2.3 times more likely to vote than women who
were not. In the capital, where tribal links are reduced, the pressure to vote is less (20%), and thus, the relationship to political participation is weakened.

Among men, those who are married are over two times more likely to vote than men are not \( \exp(0.825) = 2.25 \). Men who have achieved university education are nearly four times more likely to vote than men who did not \( \exp(1.36) = 3.89 \). Men who assert an interest in politics are 83% more likely to vote than men who do not \( \exp(0.608) = 1.83 \). Among both sexes, there is a positive relationship between age and the propensity to vote.

In discussion the raw decomposition between the two models, the \( \Omega \)-characteristic value of women is -0.067; it appears as though women would be predicted to vote less given the resources that they have. Similarly, the \( \Omega \)-characteristic value of men is -0.025, indicating that men would also be predicted to vote less given their resources. In terms of the \( \Omega \)-coefficients, the \( \Omega \) coefficient for women is -0.165, while the \( \Omega \) coefficient for men is -0.206. The calculated raw differential is -0.232. In spite of the fact that both sexes vote more than they are predicted to, it appears that men vote more than women do in the Yemeni context. Indeed, 83 percent of men vote in comparison to 58 percent of women, and having performed a t-test, this is a statistically significant difference with a p-value of 0.0001.

\(^{20}\) Originally, the question pertaining to pressure to vote was asked only of women who had already indicated that they had voted. In order to obtain enough variation in the data to allow me to run binary logistic regression and test the significance, I bootstrapped this variable and ran it 25 times in order to ensure consistency and robustness.
Rather than following the trend indicated in the Lebanese, American, and Moroccan contexts, these results indicate that feeling free to leave the home actually demobilizes women. At first glance, this would appear as though violations of bodily integrity are unrelated to political demobilization in the Yemeni context. However, this is untrue. Indicated below, the demobilizing effects of incursions on personal space are displayed at a more intimate level.
Table 11: Relationship between Marital Partnership Power Dynamics and Voting in Morocco and Yemen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Married Women in Morocco</th>
<th>Married Women in Yemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
<td>.137 (.13)</td>
<td>.160 (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/E Abuse</td>
<td>.234 (.19)</td>
<td>.173 (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Self</td>
<td>-.111 (.08)</td>
<td>.206** (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Ownership</td>
<td>.427* (.25)</td>
<td>.911** (.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husb. Dec. Visit. Fam</td>
<td>-.380 (.31)</td>
<td>.293 (.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Visit. Fam</td>
<td>-.091 (.24)</td>
<td>.050 (.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husb. Dec. Med Care</td>
<td>.538* (.29)</td>
<td>-.790** (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Med Care</td>
<td>-.049 (.21)</td>
<td>-1.21*** (.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husb. Dec. Small Home Purchases</td>
<td>.242 (.28)</td>
<td>.039 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Small Home Purchases</td>
<td>-.061 (.22)</td>
<td>.077 (.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husb. Dec. Big Purchases</td>
<td>-.262 (.27)</td>
<td>.679* (.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Big Purchases</td>
<td>-.148 (.24)</td>
<td>.665 (.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husb. Dec. Invite Guests</td>
<td>-.715* (.33)</td>
<td>-.164 (.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Dec. Invite Guests</td>
<td>-.209 (.24)</td>
<td>-.105 (.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>-- (.17)</td>
<td>-.087 (.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.296 (.17)</td>
<td>.398 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Sq</td>
<td>0.0180 (.0450)</td>
<td>n=1051 n=810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the elections
*** p< 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 • p< 0.1 (Standard Errors of the Coefficients are in Parentheses)
In Yemen, the inability to control decisions over one’s body demobilizes female voting. Women are 55% less likely to vote if their husbands have absolute control over their ability to seek medical care compared to women who make this decision independently $\exp(-.790)=.450$. Similarly, when the decision is joint, women are 71% less likely to vote than women who have control over receiving medical care $\exp(-1.21)=.29$. The lack of control over one’s body, though not in the context of mobility, demobilizes women politically. Interestingly, women are 2.4 times more likely to vote if they own property compared to women who do not at 95% significance $\exp(.911)=2.4$. As discussed in other chapters, this likely due to the empowerment mechanisms behind individual command over resources.

In both of these models, it appears as though ownership over property enhances a woman’s likelihood to vote. In Morocco, women who own property are 53% more likely to vote than women who do not at 90% significance $\exp(.427)=1.53$.

Interestingly, spousal control over social interactions within the home depresses the female propensity to vote likelihood in Morocco. If the husband has exclusive control as to whether or not guests can come over, women are 52% less likely to vote than women who control social interactions within the home $\exp(-.715)=.48$. In many ways, this is the inverted side of spousal control over mobility outside of the home, as control over who comes in the home effectively controls whom the woman can interact with. Indeed, it appears as though women are less likely to vote if their mobility outside of the home is controlled, or if their social life at home is also regulated by their spouse.
Concluding Remarks

In comparing all four countries—Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, and the United States, it appears as though lacking independent control over one’s body (largely but not exclusively in the form of independent mobility) is the linking demobilizing factor among women. Interestingly, the justification of domestic violence did not prove to be statistically significant among any of the four countries, leading to the conclusion that psychological control over one’s daily routine is more demobilizing than episodes of violence. Such a lack of control results in reduced confidence, independent decision-making skills, and limited ability to interact with others, which ultimately leads to less public participation.

Ultimately, it appears that across the spectrum of legal and social spaces accorded to women, transgressions upon personal space demobilize women. In countries where women have the liberty to move freely, this in the form of control over mobility outside of the home. In heavily restrictive countries such as Yemen where control spousal control over mobility is legal and pressure to vote is high, this is obvious in the form of the ability to make decisions about one’s body, such as the ability to secure medical care. While the study conducted in the U.S. indicates that perceptions of transgressions about personal space also demobilize men, further research would include examining such social trends among men, and to see if these too are applicable cross-regionally.
Chapter 6: Mobilizing Bodies: Protecting Women and Democracy

In the last chapter, *Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: The Cases of Morocco and Yemen*, I illustrate how violations of bodily integrity demobilize voters, though these violations are different. In Morocco, women who do not feel free to leave the house experience voter demobilization. In Yemen, spousal control over mobility does not demobilize women politically in Yemen, but spousal control over the ability to seek medical attention does. Moreover, education and employment do not empower women politically in Morocco, but they do in Yemen.

In this chapter, *Mobilizing Bodies: Protecting Women and Democracy*, I discuss the theoretical and practical policy implications that these four cases present. Ultimately, it appears that violations of bodily integrity demobilize voters across regions and political structures, implying that this dimension of capability space should be more incorporated into the study of electoral behavior.

My central hypothesis is that violations of personal space result in decreased capability space, which leads to voter demobilization. I assert this to be true across regions, cultures, and political systems. As a result, I chose to examine Lebanon and the United States, with a comparative focus on Morocco and Yemen. In all four instances, the demobilizing effect of violations of bodily integrity upon voting behavior was apparent, and much more so among women than among men.

In the Lebanese context, violations of personal space demobilized female voters, across religions. However, the type of transgression varied based on religious
domination of women; Christian women were more likely to experience sexual harassment in the street, while Muslim women were more likely to have their mobility restricted by family members. Both led to political demobilization among female voters. The empowerment mechanisms of education, an interest in politics, and employment significantly increase the propensity to vote among women, as does property ownership. Among men, the most significant predictors of voting are marriage and membership in a political party. Significant for both sexes is regular exposure to political media. Ultimately though, it appears as though women are more sensitive to both violations of bodily integrity and the positive effects of education, empowerment, and an interest in politics.

Along a similar vein, American women are also demobilized politically when their mobility is restricted by their spouses/significant others, while university-level education empowers women politically. Interestingly, higher levels of total household income (rather than independent employment) empower women politically. In both countries, neither education, employment, nor higher levels of income increase the propensity to vote among men. Interestingly though, American men are also less likely to vote when due to violations of personal space, although this manifests itself through exposure to domestic violence. Moreover, non-Democratic affiliation decreases the propensity for men to vote, but partisanship does not affect women. Unlike the Lebanese context where an interest in politics increases the propensity to vote only among women, an interest in politics increases the likelihood to vote for both sexes.
Unique to Morocco, neither education nor employment empowers women to mobilize politically. This is most likely due to the fact that a significant proportion of female employment in Morocco occurs within the home, and does not afford benefits outside of direct cash payment. As such, the public circulation mechanisms that are linked to employment do not apply. However, the belief that women should work outside of the home does increase the likelihood to vote, as this concept is by definition, in support of public participation.

The factors most likely to lead women to polls are having an interest in politics, marriage, and an increase in age. Unique to this particular election, persons of Berber minority status were more likely to vote, as campaigning for legislation related to the official use of the Berber language (which would later be decided by parliamentary referendum) during this election. Similar to the Lebanese and American cases, women in Morocco are less likely to vote if they experience familial restraints on their mobility.

Among Moroccan men, an interest in politics does not increase the propensity to vote, which is a similar result to their Lebanese counterparts. However, employment increases the likelihood to vote among Moroccan men. Interestingly, education does not prove to be a significant empowering factor in the propensity to vote among either Moroccan men or women. An explanation for this could be the driving factor leading voters to the polls is not the empowering factors of education, but the mechanisms of clientelist distributive politics.

Among the four cases, Yemen is the only case where the consent of a male guardian is legally necessary for female mobility outside of the home. Surprisingly,
this is the one case where feeling free to leave the home reduces the likelihood to vote. This is likely a function of geography and pressure to vote, as most political power is held in tribal areas, where constraints on female mobility are the most severe and political participation is determined by familial choice in reward for goods or services. However, the inability to choose when to seek healthcare demobilizes women politically. This too is linked to the broader concept of bodily integrity, as the inability to choose what is best for one’s body is indicative of deprived agency.

Similar to the Lebanese case, experiencing university-level education and employment significantly propel Yemeni women into political participation, as does regular exposure to political media. The belief that women should work and the freedom to express one’s self also increases the likelihood to vote among Yemeni women. Among Yemeni men, marriage, education, and the freedom to associate with others increases the likelihood to vote. The propensity to vote increases with age among both sexes.

Unique to Yemeni history is the story of division and reunification. In order to analyze how this dynamic effects voting behavior, I broke up each region and compared it to the capital. I found that those whom are from Southern Yemen (an independent state until 1990) are the least likely to vote, while those from politically dominant areas are the most likely to vote.

It is clear that violations of personal space, largely in the form of control over mobility, demobilize voters in either democratic or democratizing settings. In autocracies such as Yemen, however, the relationship is less clear. Control over mobility actively mobilizes women to vote, as women are pressured to do so.
However, violations of bodily integrity in form of control over the ability to seek healthcare) demobilize female voters in Yemen. This could indicate that the demobilizing effects of violations of personal space present themselves differently in a space where female mobility is legally controlled, but future research on voting behavior in autocracies would provide more insight as to the relationship between violations of personal space and voting behavior.

*The Demobilized Body in Electoral Politics*

This research introduces the necessity of incorporating non-resource based elements to the analysis of voting behavior to the field of electoral politics. Political scientists have often used education, income, and employment as indicators of social resources which increase one’s public and political participation. Race and gender are often used as determinants of social cleavage while examining voting behavior. However, electoral politics has failed to acknowledge that these are subsets of a wider set of capabilities which determine what a person is able to do and become. These elements are: poverty, education, employment, leisure time, legal rights, social status, and respect for bodily integrity (Nussbaum, 2003; Robeyns, 2003; Sen, 2001). These form a holistic assessment of a person’s “capability space” (Nussbaum, 2003). The concept of one’s personal capability space is one that is largely grounded in human development.

This dissertation takes the elements of the capability space from the broader human capability framework and uses them to analyze political behavior. Using survey data and elite interviews, I have found that that transgressions of personal
space demobilize voters. Moreover, they do so in a fashion that is not only cross-regional, but across multiple varieties of governmental systems.

This relationship is salient in the United States, which has a strong history of democracy, secular governance, and equal rights between the sexes. Violations of personal space also demobilize voter in Lebanon, which has a history of political conflict, where elections are irregular, where men and women do not have equal rights, and the legal system imposes religious law in matters pertaining to family law. The same relationship is found in Morocco, which is recently transitioned from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy, and is in the process of democratization. Here too, men and women do not have equal rights, and there are elements of both secular and religious law in the Moroccan legal space. Lastly, this relationship takes on a unique flavor—but still one that is relevant—in Yemen, where an ongoing military coup directs the country towards a very uncertain future, where women face heavy legal restrictions, and democracy is not salient. Ultimately, indicates that the functions of the capability space as they affect the propensity to vote behave similarly within and across cultures, regions, and governmental structures.

*The Demobilized Body in Public Policy*

The practical implications of the findings of this dissertation intertwine around the relationship between voting behavior and policies related to education, employment and the protection of bodily integrity. It is clear that familial control over mobility decreases the ability to vote, while mechanisms of empowerment, education and employment increase the propensity for women to vote in all countries but Morocco, where informal employment within the home is heavily salient.
It appears as though these mechanisms, particularly when linked with formal institutions, increase the propensity to vote. Not only to education and employment allow for the development of civic skills, allow for increased exposure to the public sphere, more awareness about political discussions, and enhance the availability of political resources, but they also allow for increased independent agency. This limits the ability of one spouse to control the movements of another, which by extension, reduces the subservient role that inhibits independent decision-making and public participation. Ways to increase the propensity of women to experience employment and education include creating scholarship funds that particularly target women, or creating institutional policies that incentivize employers to hire women, and to raise the wages of typically feminine jobs. These policies would allow women to ease into the public sphere.

Perhaps more importantly though, violations of personal space are often grounded in resource inequality. Typically, women who are dominated in the home are often younger, have less education, and are less likely to be employed. Increasing the accessibility of such resources often translates into higher levels of respect for bodily integrity. Creating policies that would incentivize employers to hire women and would reduce resource inequality, and by extension, violations of bodily integrity.

Moreover, there needs to be an increase of female politicians in legislative branches who work on gender issues. Policy measures would be to diversify the political platforms where women are discussed, and in the Lebanese, Moroccan, and Yemeni contexts, advocate for gender equitable laws. All of these would create the
conditions for an increased likelihood in political participation, and allow for voices that were once not heard to be given their full due.

By that same token, recommendations such as these should be make within the context of the political environment of the case studies. In 2014, the Houthi insurgency took over the presidential palace, leading to the ouster of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi in early 2015 (Gasim, 2015). At this point, Yemen is experiencing violent political conflict not only between Houthi rebels and those who are loyal to the regime, but also with ISIS (Al-Mosawa, Fahim, and Schmitt, 2015).

In Lebanon, rivalry between the March 8th and March 14th coalitions has led to the failure of parliament to elect a president, as the March 8th camp continues to boycott attending presidential elections in parliament (Samaha and Chugtai, 2015). Undermining the concept of democracy, these tactics have led to a void in the presidential office for nearly two years. Lebanon is also dealing with an influx of approximately 2 million Syrian refugees, which has led to decreased provision of social services, increased levels of poverty, and increasing levels of political violence from Syrian rebels fighting from Lebanese territory (Fernandez, 2015).

In Morocco, substantial political change has occurred since 2010. In response to Moroccan protestors, Morocco transformed its style of governance from that of an absolute monarchy to that of a constitutional one (Masbah, 2015). The Islamist opposition Party of Justice and Development has a plurality in parliament, and the government has allowed Moroccan citizens increased civil freedom in the form of increased political expression (Freedom House, 2015). By that same token, it is
appropriate to characterize Morocco as a country that is transitioning into democracy, rather than one where democratic transition has been solidified.

At this point, it appears as though heavy political unrest is dominating the region in the wake of the Arab Spring, leaving existing political structures little room to accommodate for new political discourses, or create substantive reformatory policy (Abdo, 2016). Ultimately, gender-conscious politicians will not emerge without an existing space to do so. Changing the socio-political sphere such that it accommodates gender-based concerns require widespread activism, lobbying, and reform at the level of the citizen. These activities are by definition, executed by those who are mobilized politically, and such mobilization often extends beyond the propensity to vote. Indeed, increased voting may not immediately lead to increased levels of gender equality and empowerment.

Though this study does indicate that education and employment increases the propensity to vote, it does not definitively state that education and employment lead to an increase in the capability space, which reduces incursions on bodily integrity. It is entirely possible that women who have access to these resources have more freedom at home, and are less likely to experience dominance over their mobility to begin with. Directions for future research include a longitudinal study whereby women experience empowerment programs, and then report levels of incursion on bodily integrity, along with the propensity to participate politically.

Lastly, given that this dissertation is grounded in heteronormative assumptions, it would be worthwhile to see if the same dynamics exist in homosexual relationships among both sexes for future research. Often conceptualized as a silent
minority, further examination as to whether or not political demobilization comes from sexual regulations unique to the LGBTQ community or those similar to those in heterosexual relationships would be a contribution to both electoral studies and gender politics (Russell, 2002).
Appendices

Appendix 1: Coding Scheme for the Dependent and Independent Variables in the Lebanese Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>The dependent variable asking respondents if they had voted in the previous elections</td>
<td>1=Y 0=N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>The respondent’s sex</td>
<td>1=Female 0=Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Household Income)</td>
<td>Captures total income. It is logged in order to normalize the distribution.</td>
<td>Varies across datasets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Asking about the respondent’s marital status.</td>
<td>1=Married 0=Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Asking the respondent if they had done any compensated work in the past week.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News TV</td>
<td>Asking the respondent often they follow local T.V.</td>
<td>Originally an ordinal level variable, following the news once a week or more was coded as 1, and less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>Asking the respondent about their interest in politics.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Associate</td>
<td>Asking women if they feel free to associate with person of their choosing.</td>
<td>Originally coded as an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Completely free was coded as 1, and anything less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Express Thoughts</td>
<td>Asking women if they feel free to express their thoughts.</td>
<td>Originally coded as an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Completely free was coded as 1, and anything else was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of Sexual Harassment</td>
<td>Asking women how often they are sexually harassed.</td>
<td>Originally coded as an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Women who reported “Nearly all the time/Most of the time/Sometimes” were coded as one, while anything less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Free to Leave the House    | Asking women if they feel free to leave the house without the permission of family members. | Originally coded as an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Completely free was coded as 1, and anything less
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free to Move Publicly without fear</td>
<td>Asking women if they feel free to circulate without fear in public.</td>
<td>Originally coded as an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Completely free was coded as 1, and anything less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some University Education</td>
<td>Indicating whether or not the respondent has received some university education</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No University education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University-level education</td>
<td>Indicating whether or not the respondent has completed their bachelor’s degree or higher.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No University Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification of Gender-Based Violence</td>
<td>Indicating whether or not the respondent believes that gender-based violence is alright in the home</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorse Women working</td>
<td>Indicating whether or not the respondent would allow his/her daughter work outside of the home</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing different sects to the Maronite sect.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=Maronite Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing different sects to the Maronite sect.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=Maronite Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Christian</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing different sects to the Maronite sect.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=Maronite Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Minorities</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing different sects to the Maronite sect.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=Maronite Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing different sects to the Maronite sect.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=Maronite Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi’ite Muslim</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing different sects to the Maronite sect.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=Maronite Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Muslim</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing different sects to the Maronite sect.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=Maronite Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
<td>A dummied out variable in response to an open-ended question as to why the respondent thinks domestic violence occurs.</td>
<td>1=Because she deserved it 0=All other reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/E Abuse</td>
<td>A dummied out variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent experiences verbal/emotional abuse at home</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Self</td>
<td>A binary variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent can support herself</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Savings</td>
<td>A binary variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent has independent savings</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Property Ownership                                      | A binary variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent owns property | 1=Yes  
0=No |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| Decision to visit family                               | A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to visit family | 0=Self  
1=Husband  
2=Jointly |
| Decision to seek medical care                          | A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage for the respondent to receive medical care | 0=Self  
1=Husband  
2=Jointly |
| Decision to make daily home purchases                  | A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to make daily home purchases | 0=Self  
1=Husband  
2=Jointly |
| Decision to make Big Purchases                         | A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to make big purchases | 0=Self  
1=Husband  
2=Jointly |
| Decision as to whether or not to invite guests into the home | A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to invite guests over | 0=Self  
1=Husband  
2=Jointly |
### Appendix 2: Coding Scheme for the Dependent and Independent Variables in the American Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>The dependent variable asking respondents if they had voted in the previous elections</td>
<td>1=Yes, 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>The respondent’s sex</td>
<td>1=Female, 0=Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Household Income)</td>
<td>Captures total income. It is logged in order to normalize the distribution.</td>
<td>Varies across datasets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Age)</td>
<td>Captures age in years. It is logged in order to normalize the distribution.</td>
<td>Varies across datasets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Asking about the respondent’s marital status.</td>
<td>1=Married, 0=Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Asking the respondent if they had done any compensated work in the past week.</td>
<td>1=Yes, 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News TV</td>
<td>Asking the respondent often they follow local T.V.</td>
<td>Originally an ordinal level variable, following the news once a week or more was coded as 1, and less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>Asking the respondent about their interest in politics.</td>
<td>1=Yes, 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Associate</td>
<td>Asking if respondents feel free to associate with person of their choosing.</td>
<td>Originally coded an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Completely free was coded as 1, and anything less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Express Thoughts</td>
<td>Asking if respondents feel free to express their thoughts.</td>
<td>Originally coded an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Completely free was coded as 1, and anything less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Leave the House</td>
<td>Created as a vignette, the question read asked which one of these phrases is most representative of an interaction between the respondent and their spouse/significant other. The options were: a) “I am going to see my friend—see you in a bit, honey!” b) “I am going to see my friend—is that alright with you?” c) “I would like to see my friend. Is that alright with you?” d) “May I make plans to see my friend, please?”</td>
<td>Originally coded an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Option (a) was coded as 1, and all others were coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University-level education</td>
<td>Indicating whether or not the respondent has completed their bachelor’s degree or higher.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification of Male-to Female Violence</td>
<td>Indicating whether or not the respondent believes that Male-to-female violence is provoked by the Female</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorse Female-to-Male Violence</td>
<td>Indicating whether or not the respondent believes that Female-to-Male Violence is provoked by the Male</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>A nominal variable indicating the respondent’s race</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>A nominal variable indicating whether or not the respondent is Spanish, or has Hispanic ancestry.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Abuse</td>
<td>A dummyed out variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent experiences verbal/emotional abuse at home</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>A dummyed out variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent is affiliated with the Republican party</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>A dummyed out variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent is unaffiliated</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Member of a Political Party</td>
<td>A dummyed out variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent is a former member of a political party</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never a Member of a political party</td>
<td>A dummyed out variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent had never joined a political party</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Harassment</td>
<td>A dummy variable asking how often the respondent is sexually harassed in the street.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>A nominal variable indicating the regional grouping of the respondents state. These were classified according to census bureau divisions. The South included: Delaware, Washington D.C., Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee,</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property Ownership</td>
<td>A dummy variable asking whether or not the respondent owns property</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Self</td>
<td>A dummy variable asking whether or not the respondent can support themselves independently of his/her spouse or significant other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to visit family</td>
<td>A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to visit family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to seek medical care</td>
<td>A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage for the respondent to receive medical care</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to make daily home purchases</td>
<td>A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to make daily home purchases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to make Big Purchases</td>
<td>A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to make big purchases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision as to whether or not to invite guests into the home</td>
<td>A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to invite guests over</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = Yes  
0 = No
## Appendix 3: Coding Scheme for the Dependent and Independent Variables in the Moroccan and Yemeni Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>The dependent variable asking respondents if they had voted in the previous elections</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>The respondent’s sex</td>
<td>1=Female 0=Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln(Household Income)</td>
<td>Captures total income. It is logged in order to normalize the distribution.</td>
<td>Varies across datasets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Asking about the respondent’s marital status.</td>
<td>1=Married 0=Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Asking the respondent if they had done any compensated work in the past week.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News TV</td>
<td>Asking the respondent often they follow local T.V.</td>
<td>Originally an ordinal level variable, following the news once a week or more was coded as 1, and less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>Asking the respondent about their interest in politics.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Associate</td>
<td>Asking women if they feel free to associate with person of their choosing.</td>
<td>Originally coded an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Completely free was coded as 1, and anything less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Express Thoughts</td>
<td>Asking women if they feel free to express their thoughts.</td>
<td>Originally coded an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Completely free was coded as 1, and anything less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of Sexual Harassment</td>
<td>Asking how often women experience sexual harassment</td>
<td>Originally coded as an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Women who reported “Nearly all the time/Most of the time/Sometimes” were coded as one, while anything less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Leave the House</td>
<td>Asking women if they feel free to leave the house without permission from family members.</td>
<td>Originally coded an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Completely free was coded as 1, and anything less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free to Move Publicly</td>
<td>Asking women if they feel free to move around in public without fear.</td>
<td>Originally coded an ordinal level variable, this was collapsed into a binary variable. Completely free was coded as 1, and anything less was coded as 0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Coding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some University Education</td>
<td>Indicating whether or not the respondent has received some university education</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No University education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University-level education</td>
<td>Indicating whether or not the respondent has completed their bachelor’s degree or higher.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No University Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorse Women working</td>
<td>Indicating whether or not the respondent would allow his/her daughter work outside of the home</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berber</td>
<td>A dummied out variable indicating whether or not the respondent speaks Berber or Arabic at home</td>
<td>1=Berber 0=Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Region (Yemen)</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing Southern Yemen to Sana’a, the capital</td>
<td>1=Southern Region 0=Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Region (Yemen)</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing Western Yemen to Sana’a, the capital</td>
<td>1=Western Region 0=Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Region (Yemen)</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing Eastern Yemen to Sana’a, the capital</td>
<td>1=Eastern Region 0=Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Region (Yemen)</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing Northern Yemen to Sana’a, the capital</td>
<td>1=Northern Region 0=Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alone (Yemen)</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing the whether or not women in Yemen were alone during the interview or not</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=Maronite Christian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Muslim</td>
<td>A dummied out variable comparing different sects to the Maronite sect.</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification of Gender-Based Violence</td>
<td>A dummied out variable in response to an open-ended question as to why the respondent thinks domestic violence occurs.</td>
<td>1=Because she deserved it 0=All other reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/E Abuse</td>
<td>A dummied out variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent experiences verbal/emotional abuse at home</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Self</td>
<td>A binary variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent can support herself</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Ownership</td>
<td>A binary variable indicating as to whether or not the respondent owns property</td>
<td>1=Yes 0=No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to visit family</td>
<td>A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to visit family</td>
<td>0=Self 1=Husband 2=Jointly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to seek medical care</td>
<td>A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage for the respondent to receive medical care</td>
<td>0=Self 1=Husband 2=Jointly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Decision to make daily home purchases | A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to make daily home purchases | 0=Self  
1=Husband  
2=Jointly |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Decision to make Big Purchases      | A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to make big purchases | 0=Self  
1=Husband  
2=Jointly |
| Decision as to whether or not to invite guests into the home | A variable indicating whose decision it is within the marriage to invite guests over | 0=Self  
1=Husband  
2=Jointly |
Appendix 4: Graphs of the Marginal Effects of Control Over Mobility on the Propensity to Vote Across Income Levels in Lebanon and Morocco

Figure 7: Marginal Effects of Control Over Mobility on the Propensity to Vote Across Income Levels in Lebanon

Note: Figure 7 describes the marginal effect on leaving the house on voting across the natural logarithm of income levels, comparing those who report that they feel completely free to leave the home without familial approval to those who do not. The grey areas are 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 8: Marginal Effects of Control Over Mobility on the Propensity to Vote Across Income Levels in Morocco

Note: Figure 8 describes the marginal effect on leaving the house on voting across the natural logarithm of income levels, comparing those who report that they feel completely free to leave the home without familial approval to those who do not. The grey areas are 95% confidence intervals.

Introduction: You are being invited to participate in a survey concerning public policy issues in the United States. Participation in this survey is entirely voluntary—if at any point in time you would like to stop, feel free to do so.

**Screener Questions**

Q.1. Are you an American citizen?
   a) Yes
   b) No

Q.2. Are you 18 or above?
   a) Yes
   b) No

**Lifestyle**

Q.3. What is your gender?
   a) Female
   b) Male

Q.4. What is your current marital/relationship status?
   c) Married
   d) Widowed
   e) Separated
   f) Divorced
   g) Single

Q.5. (If single): Are you in a relationship?
   a) Yes
   b) No
Q.6. (If Yes to Married or In a Relationship): Is your spouse/significant other…
   a) Male
   b) Female

Q.7. What is your living arrangement?
   a) Live Alone
   b) Live with your Spouse
   c) Live with your Significant other
   d) Live with your Parents
   e) Live with Roommates
   f) Other (please specify)

Q.8. Are you employed in a job for which you receive compensation?
   a) Yes
   b) No

Q.9. (If Working only): In what type of business are you employed? (Check other survey)
   a) Agriculture
   b) Domestic services/ catering
   c) Manufacturing/processing
   d) Construction
   e) Transport
   f) Trade/selling
   g) Services
   h) Education
   i) Health
   j) Administration
   k) Banking
   l) Other: ___________________

Questions to be asked of respondents who live either with significant others or spouses
Q.10. Who in your home usually has the final say about the following decisions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Myself</th>
<th>Spouse/Significant Other</th>
<th>Me &amp; my Spouse/significant other jointly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Making household purchases for daily needs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Visits to family, friends, or relatives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Inviting guests to your home</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Taking a child to the doctor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Getting medical advice/treatment for yourself</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Whether to punish children for misbehaving</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q.11. Do you personally have…?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Financial savings in your name</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Land or real estate with the title in your name</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q.12. If you no longer were able to depend on your spouse’s/significant other’s income, would you be able to support yourself financially?
   a) Yes
   b) No
   c) Maybe

*Asked of All Respondents*

**Politics**

Q.13. How interested are you in matters of politics?
   a) Very interested
   b) Somewhat interested
   c) Not too interested
   d) Not at all interested

Q.14. Did you vote in the 2012 presidential elections?
   a) Yes
   b) No

Q. 15. (If yes): Which presidential candidate did you vote for?
   a) Barack Obama
   b) Mitt Romney

Q.16. (If no): Kindly indicate why you did not vote (please check all that apply).
   (a) Not a registered voter
   (b) Was working
   (b) Did not want to
   (c) Polls are far away
   (d) Other (please specify)
Q. 17. When voting in presidential elections, which are the top three most important factors that influence your choice? Please rank them.
   a) Candidates party identification
   b) Candidates’ platform
   c) Candidates’ earlier performance
   d) Candidates stance on economic issues
   e) Candidates’ stance on issues of importance to women
   f) Candidates’ stance on issues significant to my ethnic group
   g) My family or friends always vote for/like these candidates
   h) Other, specify………………………………………………………….

Q.18. (If respondent voted): When you voted, did you go to the polls alone, or with someone else?
   a) Alone
   b) Someone else

Q.19. (If respondent went with someone else): With whom did you go?
   a) Spouse
   b) Parent/s
   c) Other Family Member(s)
   d) Friend/s
   e) Other (please specify)
   f) N/A

Q.20. (If respondent voted): When making your decision on whom to vote for in the November 2012 Presidential elections, did you feel obliged to vote for a particular party/candidate?
   a) I felt extremely pressured to vote for a particular party/candidate
   b) I felt somewhat pressured to vote for a particular party/candidate
   c) I felt fairly free to vote for whomever I wanted
   d) I felt completely free to vote for whomever I wanted
Q.21. (If respondent voted): If you were pressured to vote, kindly indicate anyone who pressured you to vote a certain way (please check all that apply).

   a) Father
   b) Mother
   c) Husband
   d) Wife
   e) Significant Other
   f) Son
   g) Daughter
   h) Brother
   i) Sister
   j) Friend
   k) Other, specify…………………………………………….

Q. 22. Do you plan to vote in the 2016 presidential elections?

   a) Yes
   b) No.
   c) Undecided

Q.23. Are you a member or have been a member of any of the different types of organizations listed below?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Society Organization</th>
<th>Currently a member</th>
<th>Been a member</th>
<th>Never been a member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade union/Professional syndicate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charity organization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family association</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other CSO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q.24. Please indicate if you have done any of these activities to express your political views.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Have done</th>
<th>Have not done</th>
<th>Might do</th>
<th>Would never do</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contacted or visited a public official – at any level of government – to express your opinion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Called in to a radio or television talk show to express your opinion on a political or social issue</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed a written or email petition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributed to a political campaign</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributed to a blog or internet site to express your opinion on a political or social issue</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written to a newspaper or magazine to express your opinion on a political or social issue</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q.25. To what extent do you trust
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Absolutely Trust</th>
<th>Somewhat Trust</th>
<th>Limited Trust</th>
<th>Do not Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The President</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Supreme Court</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q. 26. Refocus question:

What is 3+5?

Indicate Answer:

**Personal Space**

*Asked of those who are married or in a relationship only.*

Q.27. Below are a series of phrases indicating an interaction between couples. Kindly indicate which one is most representative of you when interacting with your significant other.

a) “I am going to see my friend—see you in a bit, honey!”
b) “I am going to see my friend—is that alright with you?”
c) “I would like to see my friend. Is that alright with you?”
d) “May I make plans to see my friend, please?”

*Asked of those who are living with their parents only.*

Q.28. Below are a series of phrases indicating an interaction between parents and their adult children. Kindly indicate which one is most representative of you when interacting with your mom.

a) “I am going to see my friend—see you!”
b) “I am going to see my friend—is that alright with you?”
c) “I would like to see my friend. Is that alright with you?”
d) “May I make plans to see my friend, please?”
Q.29. Below are a series of phrases indicating an interaction between parents and their adult children. Kindly indicate which one is most representative of you when interacting with your dad.

a) “I am going to see my friend—see you!”
b) “I am going to see my friend—is that alright with you?”
c) “I would like to see my friend. Is that alright with you?”
d) “May I make plans to see my friend, please?”

*Asked of those who are married or in a relationship only.*

Q.30. Below are a series of vignettes between couples. Kindly indicate which one is most representative of an interaction in your relationship.

a. “Mark got upset with Cindy because she forgot to pay off their credit card bill. He reminded her to pay the bill on time for the next cycle.”
b. “Mark got upset with Cindy because she forgot to pay off their credit card bill. He took a tone with her, and asked her why she had to be so stupid.”
c. “Mark got upset with Cindy because she forgot to pay off their credit card bill. He slapped her.”
d. “Cindy got upset with Mark because he forgot to pay off their credit card bill. She reminded him to pay the bill on time for the next cycle.”
e. “Cindy got upset with Mark because he forgot to pay off their credit card bill. She took a tone with him, and asked him why he had to be so stupid.”
f. “Cindy got upset with Mark because he forgot to pay off their credit card bill. She slapped him.”
**Asked only of those who are married, in a relationship, or living with parents.**

**Q.31.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To what extent are you able to…</th>
<th>Completely able</th>
<th>Somewhat able</th>
<th>Somewhat unable</th>
<th>Completely unable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Associating with persons of your own choosing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Expressing your views on critical issues to family members, neighbors or friends</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Leaving your house without prior agreement with spouse/significant other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Moving about in public areas without fear or pressure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Associating with persons of your choosing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Asked of All Respondents**

**Q.32.** When you are in public spaces (local markets, walking down the street, waiting at metro stations or bus stops, etc.), how often would you say that someone makes unwanted/sexually suggestive noises, comments, or gestures toward you?

- a) Often
- b) Sometimes
- c) Once in a while
- d) Rarely
- e) Never
Q. 33. When you are in public spaces, how often would you say that someone touches, pinches, or make otherwise unwelcome physical contact with you?
   a) Often
   b) Sometimes
   c) Once in a while
   d) Rarely
   e) Never

Q. 34. When you are at work, how often would you say that someone makes unwanted/sexually suggestive noises, comments, or gestures toward you?
   a) Often
   b) Sometimes
   c) Once in a while
   d) Rarely
   e) Never
   f) N/A

Q. 35. When you are at work, how often would you say that someone touches, pinches, or make otherwise unwelcome physical contact with you?
   a) Often
   b) Sometimes
   c) Once in a while
   d) Rarely
   e) Never

Q. 36. When using public transport, how often would you say that someone touches, pinches, or make otherwise unwelcome physical contact with you?
   a) Often
   b) Sometimes
   c) Once in a while
   d) Rarely
   e) Never

Q. 37. When using public transport, how often would you say that someone makes unwanted/sexually suggestive noises, comments, or gestures toward you?
a) Often  
b) Sometimes  
c) Once in a while  
d) Rarely  
e) Never

Q. 38. Living with a spouse or significant other can be difficult, and such a lifestyle is not without its disagreements. These disagreements can lead to instances of domestic violence. When incidents of domestic violence occur, why do you think they happen?

Open ended answer:

Q. 39. Below are a list of explanations pertaining to domestic violence directed from men to women. Kindly rank them in order of your preference, 1 being the most likely explanation, 7 being the least likely.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Preference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because of poverty/financial stress</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because the wife provoked it</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of low educational levels</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of cultural reasons/ accepted in certain communities or traditions/ some people are raised this way</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because the aggressor suffers from a mental condition/psychological problem</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of substance abuse</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of lack of communication/understanding between spouses</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q. 40. Below are a list of explanations pertaining to domestic violence directed from women to men. Kindly rank them in order of your preference, 1 being the most likely explanation, 7 being the least likely.
Because of poverty/financial stress  1
Because the husband provoked the incident  2
Because of low educational levels  3
Because of cultural reasons/ accepted in certain communities or traditions/ some people are raised this way  4
Because the aggressor suffers from a mental condition/psychological problem  5
Because of substance abuse  6
Because of lack of communication/understanding between spouses  7

Q. 41. In each of these types of situations, please indicate your views on the justification of domestic violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Always justified</th>
<th>Sometimes justified</th>
<th>Never justified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. If she neglected household responsibilities?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. If she neglected the children?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. If she went out without telling her spouse/significant other?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. If she refused sex?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Media

Q.42. How often do you get news from…
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Outlet</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers (paper or online)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines (paper or online)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media Websites</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Word of mouth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q. 43. (If word of mouth is used either daily or weekly). Kindly rank the top three persons from whom you obtain such information.

  a) Father  
b) Mother  
c) Husband  
d) Wife  
e) Significant Other  
f) Son  
g) Daughter  
h) Brother  
i) Sister  
j) Friends  
k) Other (please specify)

*For those who are married/in relationships only.*

Q. 44. A Harvard study indicates that arguments about politics lead to shorter relationships. How often do you argue about politics with your spouse/significant other?

  a) Often  
b) Sometimes  
c) Once in a while  
d) Rarely
Q. 45. Imagine the scenario that you and your spouse/significant other get into a heated argument over the presidential candidate for whom you are going to vote the night before the election. On a scale of 1 to 5, what is the likelihood that you would change your voting preference?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Somewhat Likely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Highly Unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q. 46. What is the likelihood that you would abstain from voting owing to the disagreement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Somewhat Likely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Highly Unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q. 47. Imagine the scenario that you and your spouse/significant other get into a heated argument over the presidential candidate for whom you are going to vote the night before the election. On a scale of 1 to 5, what is the likelihood that your spouse/significant other would change his/her voting preference?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Somewhat Likely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Highly Unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q. 48. What is the likelihood that your spouse/significant other would abstain from voting owing to the disagreement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Somewhat Likely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Highly Unlikely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For all respondents

Q. 49. Below is a list of statements. For each one, please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. People like me can have influence on decisions made by the government.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q. 50. Please indicate to what extent you support or oppose women filling the roles indicated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Strongly support</th>
<th>Somewhat support</th>
<th>Somewhat oppose</th>
<th>Strongly oppose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Women as members of political parties</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Women serving in the Senate or the House</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Women working for a candidate during a campaign</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. A woman as president</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Women participating in political protests</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Women making their</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
own choice as to whom to vote for.

Rights/Autonomy

Q. 51. For each statement, please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Women and girls should have equal access to education as men and boys</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Women should have equal work opportunities as men</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Religiosity

Q.52. How often do you…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pray</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast for religious purposes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch or listen to religious programs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend religious services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read religious texts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q. 53. To ensure that we still have your attention, please select the option “agree to continue.”

a) Strongly Disagree

b) Disagree

c) Neither Agree nor Disagree

d) Agree

e) Strongly Agree

Political Knowledge

Q.54. Who is the current Vice-President of the United States at present?

--------------------------------- (please indicate answer)

Q.55. Who is the current governor of your state?
Q. 56. Who is the current secretary of state?

Q. 57. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

“A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.”

a) Strongly Agree
b) Somewhat Agree
c) Somewhat Disagree
d) Disagree
e) Strongly Disagree

Respondent Demographics

Q. 58. Were you born in the United States?

a) Yes
b) No

Q. 59. How old are you?

[please enter age in years]

Q. 60. In which state do you live?
Q. 61. Do you live in a:
   a) City
   b) Suburb
   c) Rural area

Q. 62. Do you identify with any particular religion?
   a) Yes
   b) No

Q. 63. If so, kindly indicate the religion you identify with.
   a) Buddhism
   b) Catholicism
   c) Evangelical
   d) Hinduism
   e) Islam
   f) Judaism
   g) Protestantism
   h) Other (please specify)

Q. 64. Do you identify with a particular ethnic group?
   a) Yes
   b) No

If Yes to Q. 64

Q. 65. Are you Spanish, or have Hispanic ancestry? (If yes, skip to Q. 67)
   a) Yes
   b) No
If Yes to Q.64 but no to Q. 65

Q. 66. Do you come from or have ancestry based in an Arabic-speaking country?
   a) Yes
   b) No

If yes to Q. 64

Q. 67. Kindly indicate which group you identify with.
   a) White
   b) Black or African American
   c) American Indian or Alaska Native
   d) Indian
   e) Chinese
   f) Filipino
   g) Japanese
   h) Korean
   i) Vietnamese
   j) Other Asian
   k) Native Hawaiian
   l) Guamanian or Chamorro
   m) Samoan
   n) Other Pacific Islander
   o) Another race (please specify)

Q.68. What is the highest educational level that you have completed and received credit for?
   a) Primary education (completed grade 6)
   b) Intermediate education (completed grade 8)
   c) High school degree
   d) Associate’s Degree
   e) Bachelor’s degree
   f) Post-graduate-level degree (such as Master’s or Ph.D.)

Q.69. What is your best estimate of how much you usually earn annually from all paid work in dollars?
Q.70. What is your best estimate of your total annual household income in dollars?

a) Below $30,000
b) $20,000-$29,999
c) $30,000-$39,999
d) $40,000-$49,999
e) $50,000-$59,999
f) $60,000-$69,999
g) $70,000-$79,999
h) $80,000-$89,999
i) $90,000-$99,999
j) $100,000 or more
Appendix 5.B: Over-Reporting Political Participation in American Sample

Table 12: Over-Reporting Voter Turnout in the American Sample Among Men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Married Men</th>
<th>Unmarried Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted</td>
<td>92.8%</td>
<td>74.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Over-Reporting Political Affiliation in the American Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>35.95%</td>
<td>41.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>26.43%</td>
<td>25.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>37.62%</td>
<td>33.38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


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