ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: HOLDING HANDS WHILE PARTING WAYS: EXAMINING ALLIANCE TREATY RENEGOTIATION

Ping-Kuei Chen, Doctor of Philosophy, 2016

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This study investigates the renegotiation of security alliances, specifically the structural conditions surrounding their revision. Although the field of international relations offers a rich discussion of the formation and violation of alliance treaties, few scholars have addressed the reasons why alliance members amend security obligations. After the formation of an alliance, a member may become dissatisfied owing to changes in the external and domestic security environments. A failure to address this discontent increases the risk of alliance breakdown. Members manage their alliance relationship through a negotiation process or intra-alliance bargaining in the search for a new arrangement that can endure. Factors that help to show commitment to the alliance and communicate a set of feasible solutions are crucial if members are to find a mutually acceptable arrangement. By taking these factors into account, allies are more likely to revise an existing treaty. Examining a set of bilateral alliances dating from 1945 to 2001, this research demonstrates that public requests for renegotiation compel allies to
change the status quo. It is found that alliance-related fixed assets and the formation of external alliances increase the likelihood of treaty revision, though institutionalization of an alliance does not help to resolve interest divergence. In addition, this study examines the strategy of delay in intra-alliance bargaining. Allies may postpone a dispute by ignoring it while working to maintain the alliance. Tension among allies thus increases, but the alliance endures.

I examine three alliances in order to illustrate this renegotiation process. Among these, the Anglo-Japanese alliance demonstrates two successful renegotiations that prolonged a wavering alliance relationship; the Sino-Soviet alliance is an example of failure owing to the lack of substantive cooperation; and the US-Taiwan alliance during the 1970s demonstrates successful use of a strategy of delay that appeases a dissatisfied member.
HOLDING HANDS WHILE PARTING WAYS: EXAMINING ALLIANCE TREATY RENEGOTIATION

by

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Dedication

To my wife, Tz-rou Huang
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Chapter 1 Introduction

In September 2012, the Japanese government decided to take a step forward in the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by nationalizing them.\(^1\) Japan’s move immediately raised diplomatic tensions with China and Taiwan, which also claimed sovereignty over these islands. The pressure from China was particularly intense. Beijing blamed Japan for “stealing” the islands and vowed to take action to defend its own claim.\(^2\) Chinese research vessels sailed past Japanese patrols and attempted to approach the islands, and in February 2013 a Chinese naval vessel locked on to a Japanese patrol boat with its targeting radar.\(^3\)

Being Japan’s most important ally, the US was also drawn into this dispute. In fact, Japan’s insistence on nationalization placed the US in a difficult position. The US-Japan alliance treaty did not specify a defense obligation regarding the Senkaku Islands. While it was in its interest to stand by Japan, the US was reluctant to intervene in any militarized conflict between China and Japan. In other words, Japan initiated a diplomatic move that was inconsistent with the interests of its ally, which meant that the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute constituted an unexpected occurrence in an otherwise solid

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1 The Japanese government’s decision was prompted by right-wing politician Shintaro Ishihara, then the governor of Tokyo, who called for the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to purchase the disputed Senkaku Islands. The Japanese government, fearing that Ishihara’s initiative would further antagonize neighboring countries, decided to act first by nationalizing the islands.


alliance relationship. So it was that the US quickly became involved and was forced to mediate between Japan and China.

Events like the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute occur from time to time in all alliance relationship. Changes in a member’s security needs can create dissatisfaction with the security benefits provided for in the alliance treaty, as a result of which the member may take actions that affect the interests of other members, so that the allies must find a way to manage their disagreements. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, for example, Britain and France supported Israel’s invasion of Egypt, but quickly called off military operations under pressure from the US, and Israel withdrew from Sinai after few months, thus restoring the status quo. The US was able to make a clear demand of its allies, one that kept them from provoking Nasser and his key ally, the Soviet Union. As in the Senkaku dispute, the members of the alliance were able to coordinate their interests successfully: Britain and France understood that the US would not support their overseas expansion. In these cases, alliance relationships were maintained or even strengthened during periods of discord between allies.4

An alliance treaty is a commitment to mutual cooperation; alliance institutions may also provide channels to reconcile differences. In theory, allies should be able to resolve their disputes by seeking ways to accommodate dissatisfaction and adjusting existing security cooperation to meet the evolving security interests of members (T. Kim, 2011). Renegotiating an alliance treaty is thus an important way for allies to respond to tensions that arise in regard to such issues as security cooperation. The

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4 Similar cases include: the collapse after only three months of an agreement between Syria and Libya owing to disagreement about the design of a “single state” and the alliance among Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador that was disrupted when El Salvador started the Football War.
Russo-Japanese War, for instance, was on the verge of ending when Britain and Japan decided to renew their alliance in 1905. Japan’s impending victory eliminated Britain’s concern over a Russian advance in Manchuria while at the same time increasing British apprehension about Japan’s intentions in China. As a result, Britain and Japan agreed to place greater restrictions on their defense commitment. While in this example Britain and Japan scaled back their treaty obligations, other revisions to treaties expand alliance functions. For instance, when the defense treaty between East Germany and Czechoslovakia that was signed in 1967 was expanded ten years later, comprehensive defense provisions and a new consultation provision helped to consolidate the alliance between the two states.

Renegotiation among allies, however, is not always successful. A member that distrusts the reliability of one or more other members may decide to withdraw from an alliance. The shared security interest during the formation of an alliance does not necessarily help to prevent or ameliorate the divergence of interests. Even alliance members that want to maintain an alliance may fail. Early in the Cold War, for example, the Soviet Union tried to constrain China’s aggression toward Taiwan by limiting its access to high-tech weaponry at a time when China was eager to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weaponry. In this case, the Soviets’ efforts did not strengthen alliance cohesion but rather aggravated distrust between the fellow communist nations.

These examples illustrate that security cooperation between allies is potentially unstable when circumstances change, and that successful renegotiation is not a given. Although alliance members often share very similar security goals, differences may
emerge when external or domestic political conditions change or when differences that have been set aside later become impossible to ignore.

This dissertation explores the reasons why some allies successfully renegotiate their differences and others do not or, more specifically, why some treaties are able to be revised but others fall apart. The Soviets’ concern regarding China’s ambitions in the Taiwan Strait was similar to the US’s concern about the ambitions of Britain and France regarding the Suez Canal. China might have provoked a conflict with the US; Britain and France might have entrapped the US in a conflict with the Soviets. In the course of both crises, alliance members tried to persuade their partners not to alter the status quo, but the outcomes were quite different. One explanation could be that Mao was ideologically radicalized and that Eden faced strong domestic pressure to halt military operations, but alliance politics certainly played a key role. The Soviets and the US both wanted to restrain their allies. This dissertation addresses reasons why these efforts had completely different outcomes, and in particular what the Soviets could have done to halt Mao’s military adventure in Taiwan Strait and whether they missed the opportunity to build an enduring Sino-Soviet relationship.

Further, even though a provocative action may compromise an alliance relationship, states sometimes repeatedly make such actions. North Korea is an obvious example, provoking nuclear crises as it does again and again despite China’s concerns.\(^5\) Recently, China has become impatient with Kim Jong-un’s nuclear adventures, but the latter seems unconcerned about whether this loyal ally will continue to support his regime in

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\(^5\) China did not criticize the nuclear program in public until late 2015, after North Korea’s third nuclear test, when the Chinese foreign minister summoned the DPRK representative and expressed discontent.
the face of more provocative moves. The DPRK might be expected to wonder whether China’s 2016 decision to cooperate with the US in drafting a new UN sanction regarding North Korea means that China’s commitment to the alliance is becoming unreliable, and under what conditions China would change its position and turn against Kim’s nuclear diplomacy.

In order to answer these questions, I will investigate how alliance members manage their disagreements through renegotiation. An exploration of renegotiation clarifies how alliance members manage their quarrels, a process that involves give–and–take bargaining over a range of solutions and that I term “intra-alliance bargaining.” Highlighting this dynamic illuminates the alliance relationship. Members of an alliance may want to uphold it, or they may find that their friendship is less solid than they had thought it to be. Failure to reach a bargain increases the risk of alliance termination.

Alliance treaty revision is a typical means through which members resolve their differences. A successful renegotiation establishes a formal arrangement to regulate the new security obligations. This achievement requires that members revisit the existing treaty and revise its content. Treaty revision is, however, a relatively unexplored question in the field of alliance politics. As shown in Table 1.1, in their investigation of alliance termination, Leeds and Savun (2007) find that about 25% of bilateral alliance treaties have terminated through treaty revision. The fact that many treaties are revised, some multiple times, suggests that alliance members frequently reevaluate

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6 Another curious case is North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, which is occupied by South Korea, in 2010, which might have provoked war between the Koreas. It is commonly assumed that North Korea initiated the crisis for domestic reasons, but such an action might have been expected to raise China’s concern about finding itself entrapped, which raises the question of why the North Korean leadership was so confident that its friendship with China would remain unaffected.
their relationships and revise their treaties accordingly. Alliance members thus do not abandon an alliance immediately when they become dissatisfied with a treaty, particularly when it fails to meet their security needs; rather, they negotiate with their allies and modify their treaty to accommodate mutual interests.

Table 1.1: Alliance Termination for Bilateral Alliances Formed 1816–1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
<th>Violation/Abrogation</th>
<th>Fulfillment</th>
<th>Exogenous Loss of Independence</th>
<th>Renegotiation</th>
<th>Censored</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(% of total)</td>
<td>(34%)</td>
<td>(16%)</td>
<td>(11%)</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td>(15%)</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Duration in Days (Years)</td>
<td>3227</td>
<td>2900</td>
<td>4071</td>
<td>5237</td>
<td>excluded from 3389</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.8)</td>
<td>(7.9)</td>
<td>(11.2)</td>
<td>(14.3)</td>
<td>calculation (9.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In sum, alliances are born in different ways. Alliance treaties regulate several different types of security relationship, but how a treaty is written does not necessarily determine its fate, since provisions can be subject to revision when necessary. This dissertation will advance the understanding of alliance renegotiation by investigating how members manage their differences. In the following chapters, I make clear the conditions under which alliance members renegotiate their relationships.

Plan of the dissertation

Chapter 2 elaborates the theory of alliance renegotiation. I review the literature on alliance politics and discuss the lack of attention to alliance management. I then examine the renegotiation dynamic among allies, a process that I have termed “intra-alliance bargaining,” and introduce the concepts that facilitate renegotiation and present

7 This table reports only bilateral alliance treaties. The ATOP dataset records a total of 105 out of 648 alliance treaties that terminated as a result of renegotiation, or about 16% of all treaties.
relevant hypotheses. Chapter 3 presents a large-N empirical test designed to examine bilateral alliance treaties from 1945 to 2001 using statistical techniques. I then explore the implications of the statistical results. The following three chapters discuss three cases that demonstrate the mechanisms presented in the preceding chapter. Chapter 4 examines the two successful treaty revisions of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Chapter 5 discusses the Sino-Soviet alliance and its failure from the perspective of alliance renegotiation. Chapter 6 focuses on the last 10 years of the US-Taiwan alliance in order to illustrate the strategy of delay as an alternative means to preserve an alliance by avoiding a clear resolution of interest divergence between allies. Chapter 7 summarizes the conclusions suggested by my findings and discusses possible paths for future research.
Chapter 2 Theory of Alliance Renegotiation

In this chapter, I develop a theory to explain the causes and consequences of alliance renegotiation. Alliance renegotiation is a process whereby allies discuss and negotiate their differences. This chapter starts with a discussion of alliance formation because the reasons for changing the alliance relationship are of course deeply connected to the original purpose of an alliance. Not all alliances are able to undergo the changes necessary for prolonging the alliance relationship. I accordingly clarify the definition of the success and failure of alliance renegotiation and examine options open to member states during negotiation. I then explain the risk of miscommunication that can result in a failed renegotiation. I propose structural variables that help allies to send credible commitment to the alliance, which facilitates treaty revision.

Alliance Formation, Decay, and Management

The security alliance is a long-standing phenomenon in international politics, one that occurs when two or more states join together, write a pact, and commit to defend common security interests. The degree of commitments entered into through such alliances differs: some treaties require defensive or offensive military actions, while others merely promise neutrality or military support should certain circumstances arise. Alliance treaties aim to fulfill the interests of member states, and must continue to serve this founding purpose; otherwise the members will abandon them. Any change in the alliance relationship is thus closely connected to the reason why the alliance formed in the first place.
The literature on the formation of alliances is abundant. An alliance treaty is, to begin with, formed after careful consideration. Classic works see alliances as a tool in the balance of power. Alliances are formed when aggregating capability helps to maintain the status quo and prevent the dominance of a single power (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985; Snyder, 1997; Waltz, 1979). Some suggest that the ultimate goal of an alliance is to ensure survival in anarchic system. Most alliances confront external threats by establishing security institutions. Walt (1987) argues, the presence of a shared external threat leads to the formation of alliances, while the disappearance of such a threat leads to their dissolution. Treaties build communication channels and encourage military coordination, thereby deterring third party aggression as well as defection (Leeds & Anac, 2005).

The function of alliance pacts has grown more sophisticated in modern international relations. Alliance treaties not only guarantee the security of members during conflicts, but also regulate such specific peacetime actions as arms transfer, economic assistance, and joint military exercises, serving to constrain members’ behavior and prevent opportunistic actions (Benson, 2011; Benson, Bentley, & Ray, 2013; Gerzhoy, 2015). The incentives for entering into a security treaty are, then, not limited to survival or maintaining the balance of power. Some studies suggest that alliance treaties and their associated institutions help to decrease internal aggression and maintain peace among allies (Ke, Konrad, & Morath, 2015; Long, Nordstrom, & Baek, 2007; Weitsman, 2004). For instance, the Holy Alliance of 1815 served to
restrain Russia “through and within the alliance of Eastern powers.” Rivals may join an alliance in order to restrain one another in accordance with the non-aggression principle that underlies any security alliance (Pressman, 2008; Weitsman, 2004).

In addition to states’ motives for seeking alliances, scholars are also dedicated to understanding how states select their security partners. Choosing an ally is a delicate decision. States tend to select reliable partners based on their past reputations (Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg, & Wood, 2012; Miller, 2003; Reiter, 1994). Previous records of treaty violation reveal an untrustworthy state and a less than ideal partner. Allying with such a partner makes the alliance less reliable when it comes to deterring an external aggressor (Gibler, 2008). Since reputation cost is at stake, states cautiously select the alliance pacts in which they participate. Morrow (2000) suggests that writing a treaty down is itself a credible signal of future commitment. States tend to abide by treaty obligations because of reputation cost. The literature accordingly suggests that treaty alliances tend to be generally reliable and durable (Holsti, Hopmann, & Sullivan, 1973; Johnson & Leeds, 2011; Leeds, Long, & Mitchell, 2000). Treaties are designed and formed with careful consideration.

The erosion of alliance cohesion

An alliance treaty is an opportunity to address and resolve disputes among members, or at least to set aside those disputes. Signing treaties creates the expectation among members of a commitment to future security cooperation. Since members have substantive interests in forming an alliance and some faith in its reliability, major

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8 Paul Schroeder provides an in depth discussion on the constraining power of alliance pacts; see (Knorr, 1976, pp. 227–62)
disagreements are unlikely to arise immediately after alliance formation. Alliance cohesion is strong at this point, but may erode after the treaty is signed. Previous studies find that alliance cohesion fluctuates in response to external threats (Weitsman, 2004), capability preponderance (Bearce, Flanagan, & Floros, 2006), or the size of an alliance portfolio (Grant, 2013). This research suggests that alliance cohesion weakens when changes occur in the external or internal security environments, under which circumstances members find that their treaty no longer fits their needs or that its implementation is difficult. For example, in the run up to World War I, the loyalty of Italy to the Triple Alliance became questionable as its tension with Austria-Hungary increased, so that Germany and Austria-Hungary came to believe that Italy would be an unreliable ally in a conflict.

External changes in the international system naturally alter the security interests of states and their expectations regarding the utility of an alliance. Allies may no longer share security interests under a new security environment. The end of a major war, for example, rearranges relations among powerful states. Wars may redistribute territory or resources in a way that weakens the function of an alliance. Wars may also eliminate old rivalries or create new ones. On the other hand, domestic political turnover, through either peaceful or violent transition, may introduce new parties and leaders that view the alliance differently from their predecessors. The rise of Bolshevism after World War I, for example, made Britain uncertain about its friendship with Russia, and the newly established Soviet Union had little interest forming alliances with capitalist states.
External or internal changes may create interest divergence that engenders suspicion among alliance members regarding the utility of an alliance relationship or the credibility of various partners, a situation that leads to dissatisfaction with the existing security cooperation agreement. In order ensure continuous cooperation, allies must therefore constantly manage their relationship, a process that involves a series of diplomatic interactions whereby allies negotiate the specific implementation of security cooperation. Snyder (1997) thus argues that alliance management is a struggle between entrapment and abandonment.⁹ Alliance members use foreign policy to reassure or to restrain each other in the effort to maintain a stable relationship. Some studies have found that domestic political changes have significant impact on the longevity of an alliance relationship (T. Kim, 2011; Siverson & Starr, 1994). Not surprisingly, well-institutionalized alliances are more likely to create and sustain a peaceful relationship among allies (Haftendorn, Keohane, & Wallander, 1999; Long et al., 2007). These studies focus on the stability of alliances, examining factors that promote the disruption and termination of an alliance relationship, but while they are informative with regard to alliance duration, they do not address the process whereby allies negotiate their differences.

Managing differences

A typical agenda of alliance management engages with the issue of burden-sharing. An alliance is a club good exclusively shared by members. Each member contributes resources with an expectation that other members will do so as well according to the

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⁹ On the struggle of allies fulfilling their obligation, see (Christensen & Snyder, 1990; Tierney, 2011).
terms of the treaty. Since all members share a mutual security benefit, each has the opportunity to shirk its responsibilities. Members have incentives to contribute less while encouraging others to contribute more. More powerful states usually make relatively greater contributions to an alliance relationship (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966). Powerful hegemons can create a hierarchy to ensure cooperation and can control the distribution of burdens (Lake, 1999). Even under such a relationship, though, alliance members negotiate to distribute burdens. States revisit the current distribution when they believe that changes are necessary to generate more effective cooperation. Another problem related to burden sharing occurs during military mobilization against external enemies, when members may pledge resources, the exact amount of which depends on compromises among themselves.10

Morrow (1991) argues that contributing to an alliance is essentially a trade-off between autonomy and security: states restrain their policy autonomy in exchange for protection or some other benefit. Because committing to more obligations places additional strain on a member’s resources and narrows its policy flexibility, alliance members generally, except in the case of hierarchical relationships in which a powerful member distributes burdens unilaterally, seek to minimize limits on their policy autonomy while at the same time maximizing their security returns. The result is a collective action problem, since each member wants the others to bear greater burdens and yet itself wants to enjoy greater policy autonomy. The problem of burden-sharing is not uncommon. The tendency of members to contribute less to security cooperation

10 For more literature concerning burden-sharing, see (A. Bennett, Lepgold, & Unger, 1994; Hartley & Sandler, 1999; Oneal, 1990; Sandler & Hartley, 2001; Thies, 1987).
while urging others to take greater responsibility is one factor that complicates the implementation of a treaty. Fulfilling treaty obligations often requires extensive coordination, which becomes more difficult when the security environment changes.

Studies of alliance politics usually rely on treaty provisions to examine alliance behavior. Alliance treaties, however, are often not designed to cope with later disagreements. The shifting nature of interstate relations constantly alters the security interests of members: new adversaries rise; old adversaries falter; states compete for newly discovered natural resources; members come into conflict with a third party; technological advancement enhances a state’s defense/offense capability; an economic crisis diminishes a state’s ability to contribute to defense. Changes like these create three distinct problems when it comes to understanding alliance management using treaty provisions alone.

First, treaty provisions regulate general principles; they do not address every aspect of alliance relationships. The provisions usually do not specify burden-sharing details, nor do they provide solutions to disagreements that may arise in the future. Most alliance treaties do not contain guidelines for a dispute resolution mechanism among the allies, which must discuss possible solutions to their disagreements via diplomatic channels. More institutionalized alliances may include obligations about treaty implementation, but the specific details still require discussion between members.

Second, treaties are more flexible than the current literature generally assumes. Treaties are subject to change once members agree to revise them, at which time the entire treaty may be rewritten or only part of it. Members also frequently sign auxiliary agreements that specify additional obligations. The existing literature assumes that
treaty provisions are static and difficult to alter or revise, but the fact is that treaty revision is not uncommon.

Third, treaty provisions are usually ambiguous and inclusive, and do not guarantee effective implementation, which members must work out among themselves. In the course of doing so, they may realize that they their differences are such that the treaty might not be feasible. Ambiguous provisions may sow contention among allies during the implementation of a treaty.

Allies can certainly design provisions to cope with future changes based on their current expectations of how international politics will develop. Most alliances after World War II have been designed to foster an enduring relationship (Leeds & Mattes, 2007). These prior beliefs, however, have limitations. Allies cannot anticipate all future points of disagreement, which may cause the alliance to become unsatisfactory, inadequate, or obsolete.

In sum, alliance management has a significant influence on the development and cohesion of alliances, directly affecting alliance duration and termination. The key to successful alliance management is to address changes in members’ security interests. In the following sections, I theorize alliance renegotiation, the effort to manage policy differences among allies in order to maintain an alliance relationship when an alliance becomes obsolete. Some alliance members successfully resolve their differences, but others are unable to make the necessary changes.

*Intra-alliance Bargaining: actors, means, and results*

The shifts in security interests create divergence that requires that allies engage with each other and exchange their views on the future alliance relationship. Allies
present their claims and try to push the final arrangement toward their ideal conception of it, attempting to persuade other members to concede. This process involves bargaining over a set of possible solutions, so I have termed it “intra-alliance bargaining.” To theorize intra-alliance bargaining, I make the following assumptions. I assume that two states form an alliance and expect their cooperation to endure. When both states are satisfied with the alliance, cooperation continues and no bargaining is needed. Bargaining occurs when one or both members grow dissatisfied with the current alliance relationship and initiate a renegotiation request. This member is the challenger, which brings forward its concerns to the other member and asks for a solution. The other member is the partner, which evaluates the challenger’s claim and decides whether it wants to engage with the issue.

The challenger may demand that the partner take certain actions to advance its security interests, such as providing military aid or financial compensation, or asking the partner to clarify treaty provisions. The partner can choose to negotiate with the challenger and deal with the problem, or it can reject the challenger and leave the alliance immediately. The partner can also avoid a direct response by setting the matter aside. The partner’s willingness to respond suggests awareness of the interest divergence, at which point the allies begin to search for a more satisfactory arrangement.

Successful bargaining means that members are able to resolve their differences by agreeing to a new arrangement that restructures the alliance in a way that honestly reflects the security interests of both sides. Such bargaining thus involves treaty revision. To be specific, successful bargaining may restructure the alliance by (1) expanding or narrowing down the obligations in a revised treaty; (2) adding an auxiliary
treaty or protocol; (3) building a multilateral alliance that includes the previous alliance members; or (4) building a bilateral alliance within the context of a multilateral alliance that specifies security cooperation uncovered by the latter. Failed bargaining occurs when members are unable to resolve the interest divergence, and a typical outcome is abrogation of an alliance. This decision occurs when one or both members realize that there is no solution to a major problem or when any member fails to show commitment to the future alliance relationship.

It is also possible, however, for alliance members to agree to maintain the status quo. The challenger remains dissatisfied, but nevertheless reaches a temporary arrangement with the partner and agrees to preserve the alliance. Such an arrangement usually mandates additional commitments or benefits not specified in the treaty. The challenger agrees to leave the dispute unresolved until a later date, at which point the issue may be raised again, but the alliance relationship maintains. I will elaborate on the use of strategy of delay in the last section.

Figure 2.1 shows how bargaining progresses. The change in the security environment prompts a challenger to request renegotiation. The partner can either engage the challenger, abrogate the alliance, or refuse to respond. If the partner is willing to discuss the matter, the renegotiation ends with either treaty revision, abrogation of alliance, or maintenance of the status quo. The partner can of course ignore the challenger’s request, at which point it is up to the latter to decide whether to

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11 For instance, Japan and the US passed “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” in 1978 in order to define the specific security cooperation between two countries, and these guidelines were subsequently revised in 1997 and again in 2015; both countries have agreed to review them regularly.
remain in the alliance. A successful strategy of delay induces the challenger to maintain the status quo.

**Figure 2.1: A Simple Decision Tree of Alliance Management**

During bargaining, alliance members interact and communicate their demands for future security cooperation. Allies not only try to determine a set of mutually acceptable solutions, but also evaluate whether the alliance is worth preserving. In the attempt to
find a solution to their differences, members may encounter difficulties during negotiation, since their interests are unlikely to overlap completely.

Morrow (1994) suggests that two problems may hinder coordination in alliance politics. First, a distributional problem occurs when members have different preferences among all available solutions. The other problem is informational problem. Allies may conceal available options from each other in order to advance their own interests. These two problems intertwine. As Morrow argues, “Distributional interests prevent the honest sharing of information.” This dictum applies to intra-alliance bargaining because, even in a security alliance, members are not fully aware of each other’s intentions. Members sometimes have an incentive to misrepresent or hide their true intent in terms of maximizing their own security benefit, and so may withhold information regarding their security interests or falling short of their commitments in order to achieve unexpressed policy goals.

These distributional and informational problems give rise to three predicaments during intra-alliance bargaining: alliance members may (1) be unaware that they have an interest divergence; (2) acknowledge the existence of interest divergence, but be uncertain about a mutually acceptable solution; or (3) be unsure whether other members will keep their commitments in the future.

To overcome these difficulties, allies rely on information revealed during intra-alliance bargaining when deciding on the future of an alliance. First, both sides need to recognize the existence of interest divergence and the need for a solution. Bargaining needs to focus on clarifying the problem when one or more partners fail even to see it,
and sometimes this act of clarification can in fact be the most difficult discussion involved in bargaining.

Second, if both members recognize the interest divergence, they can move on to negotiate an arrangement. Successful bargaining requires allies to agree on one among a set of mutually acceptable options. A distributional problem may occur, however, when allies have uncertainties regarding each other’s updated security interests and hence regarding what arrangements might satisfy these interests. Dialogue can clarify matters, but a member may become suspicious about the claims that an ally makes if these claims differ from its own reading of the situation. Since an alliance relationship allows allies to interact more frequently, each ally is confident of its own understanding of the evolving security needs of its partners. When there is a perception gap among members concerning the security benefit that one or another enjoys or about the kind of cooperation that best furthers the alliance’s common interests, agreement may be difficult to reach. Allies must genuinely communicate their own preferences and be able to verify each other’s claims.

Finally, members naturally want to know the extent to which the other members value and are committed to the alliance. When their security interests have changed, they will not agree to negotiate unless they still consider each other reliable. When members agree to revise a treaty, a major goal is to ensure that any new obligations will induce sustained cooperation. An alliance will soon fall apart if bargaining reveals that a member has no interest in maintaining it.

When allies are consistently candid during renegotiation, their differences are likely to be resolved. However, as mentioned in the context of studies of burden sharing,
allies have incentives to take advantage of their partners that are founded on the assumption that the interests of the latter in maintaining the alliance will lead them to grant concessions during negotiations as a means to salvage the imperiled relationship. In other words, some members may enter into renegotiation with the belief that abrogation would be too costly for the other members. In addition, an uncommitted partner is unlikely to engage in negotiation and more likely simply to abandon the alliance immediately. A member that is willing to renegotiate, by contrast, still values and therefore seeks to preserve the alliance. Each member thus starts bargaining under the assumption that the others are unlikely to give up easily, a situation that leaves rooms for allies to misrepresent their security interests and levels of commitment.

Even in an alliance relationship, a member’s commitment to the alliance is private information. Both the challenger and the partner have an incentive to misrepresent their true intentions in the pursuit of leverage during bargaining. Expressing discontent may gain concessions from other allies as well as testing the loyalty of each. A challenger may, in the course of renegotiation, threaten to withdraw from the alliance when it is in fact willing to accept an arrangement; a partner may misjudge a challenger’s resolve and fail to accommodate its needs; a challenger may misperceive its partner as dissatisfied and decide to withdraw from the alliance preemptively. Therefore, even though intra-alliance bargaining stands a good chance, and may represent the only chance, of resolving disagreement among members, there is no guarantee that this process will succeed.
Credible Commitment in Intra-alliance Bargaining

The above discussion makes clear that bargaining provides only an opportunity for allies to exchange their views and reveal their opinions. Their positions, however, may be distorted. Such distortion occurs mainly when allies are unable to make clear their true security interests and commitment to the alliance, a situation that makes members uncertain about each other’s claims. Since all states have the incentive to misrepresent their needs, any communication may include misinformation, and every demand and counteroffer may deliver unintended messages. This problem is more acute when allies have different perceptions of the security environment.

Successful bargaining, therefore, rests on whether allies can make credible commitments during intra-alliance bargaining. Once members are certain that claims made during bargaining are genuine, they can credibly communicate their own security interests and expectations for the alliance going forward. To be sure, credible commitment does not always lead to treaty revision. Allies can decide to abandon an alliance even after careful discussion; but this outcome is rather rare, since the main purpose of intra-alliance bargaining is to resolve interest divergence and sustain the alliance. When members are able communicate their interests with certainty, they should endeavor to find an agreeable arrangement, since it is usually more costly to terminate an alliance than to maintain it. Allies tend to prioritize alliance ties. On the other hand, making a credible commitment significantly increases the chance of treaty revision, as allies thus find it easier to reach a negotiated arrangement.

There is a rich literature on how states signal their reliability to their partners. Fearon (1997) argues that they may either use “tying hands” or “sinking costs” to
communicate their true intentions. In alliance cooperation, credible commitment determines whether allies will be able to uphold the new arrangement and remain committed to the alliance in the future. As Powell (2006) points out, bargaining failure is usually the result of a state’s inability to make a credible commitment. The problem here is whether members have confidence in the prospects for the alliance in the future.

An alliance only endures when members value the benefit of long-term cooperation: the benefits in the future are sufficiently attractive to make abrogation an unfavorable option. This is the “shadow of future” discussed in the literature (J. D. Fearon, 1998; Powell, 1999). A long shadow of future increases allies’ willingness to sustain an alliance, making them more eager to seek a new arrangement for their differences. Conversely, allies are less interested in finding a solution when the shadow of future is short.

The length of the shadow of future depends on the security benefit provided by the alliance in the short and long run. Members tend to stay in an alliance when they gain security benefits in the future. In other words, because leaving the alliance means the loss of a future benefit, the cost of abrogation is considered high and the shadow of future in cooperation is extended. Therefore, members have more confidence in the prospects for an alliance relationship and are able to make a more credible commitment to it when there are relatively higher stakes involved. Moreover, members will under these circumstances be more accommodating during renegotiation and more likely to refrain from concealing information. In other words, the longer the shadow of future

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12 Future benefit is closely related to the short-term cost of abrogation. As Leeds (2003) argues, a relatively lower cost of treaty violation diminishes the reliability of an alliance.
recognized by allies, the more likely they are to believe each other’s claims. As a result, allies can credibly communicate their positions during bargaining.

Credible commitment alone only ensures a candid exchange of views and allies’ faith in the alliance. Treaty revision involves a discussion of what arrangement allies want to adopt in order to continue their alliance relationship and best resolve their differences. To find the most appropriate arrangement, allies need to understand each other’s current security interests. These interests are likely to have changed over the period since alliance formation. As a consequence, obtaining information regarding updated security interests helps allies to choose a suitable new arrangement and to facilitate treaty revision. The challenger may propose a new arrangement that the partner finds acceptable; the partner may make a counteroffer that satisfies the challenger. As discussed, the exchange of views regarding security interests is most effective when communication is credible, for when allies have doubts about each other’s claims, they have a hard time understanding the updated security interests.

In sum, allies seek to clarify two pieces of information during bargaining: (1) whether all members will remain committed to the alliance in the future and (2) each other’s updated security interests. These pieces of information naturally depend on observable factors in the security environment for verification.

**Factors Leading to Bargaining Success**

The above discussion shows that conditions in which there is a heavy cost for alliance abrogation and in which the updated security interests of alliance members are well understood help them to reach an arrangement. I argue that the following variables facilitate credible commitment during bargaining: (1) a public request to renegotiate a
security relationship; (2) a large amount of fixed assets invested in the alliance relationship; (3) an institutional design that maintains regular contacts; and (4) the formation of external alliances. These variables raise the cost of alliance breakdown and strengthen members’ confidence in the alliance, so that members are both more certain that the alliance will continue and better able to find the solution that best serves their updated interests. In what follows, I will specify the mechanisms behind each factor.

All other things being equal, these variables describe ways in which allies demonstrate commitment to an alliance and to resolve their disputes, though they can potentially affect the decision to abrogate. Thus, for instance, bargaining may reveal that a member has become unreliable or that there is no real solution to the interest divergence. But the variables proposed here are of greater importance in the context of successful bargaining. To begin with, the purpose of disclosing classified information is to prevent misunderstanding. For instance, a challenger may misperceive a hesitant partner as being uncommitted. An uncommitted member, however, is less likely to entangle itself in bargaining than to abrogate quickly as internal tension rises. Variables that facilitate credible commitment do not contribute to this decision since this member has already decided to leave the alliance. Second, the decision to abrogate sometimes results from a false belief that a proper solution does not exist. In theory, there must be multiple solutions, but members’ distributive interests hinder identification of them. Once members learn more about the available options, they are more likely to reach an arrangement. The following discussion accordingly focuses on the impact of these variables on renegotiation success.
A public request occurs when one or more members reveal their intention to renegotiate a bilateral security relationship, and it facilitates renegotiation by signaling resolve. First, a public request openly addresses the interest divergence and compels the partner to acknowledge it despite any earlier denials. Second, a public request discloses the challenger’s proposal, clarifying the options acceptable to all members, delivering updated security interests, and narrowing down policy choices. Third, a public announcement creates costs with regard to the domestic audience, in effect tying the hands of governments on all sides, since the general public can monitor the progress of the renegotiation. The government, under pressure from the public, takes into account the opinion of the domestic audience during the negotiations and bargains accordingly (Fearon, 1997; Putnam, 1988). Since the interest of the audience is public, members can better access each other’s positions.

A public request may encourage all members to seek a mutually agreeable resolution of their differences. Since termination of an alliance impacts national security negatively, governments are likely to bear the blame if negotiation fails. Member governments can therefore be expected to avoid provocative or deceptive behavior, as these actions are likely to be called out by the domestic audience, and this scrutiny favors the candid communication of members’ security interests. In addition, once a renegotiation process is revealed, a hostile third party may assess the reliability of the alliance based on the extent and depth of disagreement during talks. Members thus have a greater incentive to reach an arrangement in order to avoid communicating
an ambiguous message to a third party. In such cases, allies are likely to revise their treaties successfully to fit their interests.

A public request can, however, alternatively lead to bargaining failure. The domestic audience can make its government less accommodating in the bargaining process, effectively constraining the government’s policy choices and at times even compelling it to make proposals that are unlikely to be deemed unacceptable. Such domestic pressure renders concession very difficult, since the government may be punished for ignoring public opinion, even when the bargain itself seems to be fair. For this reason, a public request can sometimes lead to alliance abrogation instead of treaty revision: it impels members to alter the status quo, but the direction of the change is undetermined.

To be sure, member governments often keep disputes from the public and renegotiate in secret, but this procedure creates an endogeneity problem. Specifically, such closed-doors negotiations raise the question of whether allies make public requests only when they feel confident about the chance of success (or failure), and choose only to reveal the renegotiation to the public when the hoped-for outcome is imminent. The answer to this question is that this is not necessarily the case. Although members may have expectations regarding the progress of renegotiation when they initiate renegotiation by a public request, they can be certain neither about each other’s reactions nor about the outcome.

\[H1:\text{A public request for renegotiation is likely to change the alliance relationship.}\]
Alliance-specific assets

Alliance-specific assets are fixed assets that members invest in an alliance relationship. These assets represent a non-exclusive investment that is intended to produce security benefits shared by all members. Since these are fixed assets, they are not easily removed and translate into a net loss in the event a treaty is abolished. Some such assets are created under the provisions of an alliance treaty, but most of them are not regulated by treaty. They are usually efforts to facilitate or maintain security cooperation and ultimately to increase mutual security benefits.

There are two types of investment that a member can create in an alliance relationship. First, there are individual efforts that promote shared security interests. An alliance pact allows members to carry out a division of labor in regard to defense. Lake (1999) argues that “polities can improve their welfare, or reduce the factors they must employ in producing security, by specializing in production of defense and exchanging one form of effort for another.” The individual efforts of members generate shared security benefit. The more specialized the alliance is, the more members need each other and the less likely is the risk of alliance breakdown.

Another type of asset is the expense necessary to maintain the alliance tie. Members will not spend on these fixed assets in the absence of an alliance relationship. For example, allies may have to adjust their weapons systems, deployment, communication systems, or military strategy plans in order to coordinate with their combat capabilities. Allies sometimes need to invest in fixed assets in order to fulfill

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13 For example, France specializes in developing its army while Britain develops its navy. Together, these countries can maximize their production of benefit by relying on each other to provide the defense capability in which it does not specialize.
obligations listed in the alliance treaty, such as airports or harbors. These are efforts driven by the alliance relationship, and allies would not otherwise expend them were it not for the alliance.

Typical examples of alliance-specific assets include military bases, outposts, weapons transfers, military-oriented leases of territory and ports, labor and services related to military training, exercises and operations, defense technology transfers, and joint forces. These assets represent the stakes that members invest in an alliance. And the more assets a member invests in an alliance, the more costly it is for that member to withdraw from it; hence, the member will have greater incentive to avoid a bargaining failure. The cost of alliance-specific assets does not apply only to the patron: because such an investment produces security benefits for all alliance members, any member not taking part in it also needs to fear the loss of the security benefits that these assets bring. Alliance-specific assets therefore raise the costs of alliance dissolution for all members; they provide members with greater certainty that all of the allies are committed to the alliance.

The benefit of the assets invested is well known to alliance members, as is the cost of losing them. When a challenger is dissatisfied with prevailing security cooperation, alliance-specific assets help in evaluating the alliance benefit for the long run. A challenger will not exaggerate its dissatisfaction because it does not want to endanger future gains. These assets also encourage the partner to negotiate and increase its willingness to make concessions because the alliance relationship ensures security benefits in the future.
Alliance-specific assets create a long shadow of future. The greater cost of alliance breakup helps allies to reach a successful bargain, since members value the security benefit brought by the assets invested. They will thus be more confident of the commitment of their allies.

Alliance-specific assets are distinct from the degree of institutionalization. Not all alliance institutions require members to invest physical assets. For example, annual meetings between defense ministers do not require much in the way of resources, while a joint military exercise is quite costly. A significant instance of an alliance-specific asset is a military establishment on one ally’s territory. Deploying a military force on foreign soil is a very costly investment: not only is there the cost of establishing and maintaining military bases, but it is very expensive to transfer military staff and equipment to a foreign location and to maintain the military installation. For example, the US deployed strategic nuclear weapons to Europe during the Cold War, resulting in an expenditure that Fuhrmann and Sechser (2014) describe as “wastefully expensive.” More importantly, once members establish a military installation, the removal of that establishment becomes difficult. Precisely because these assets cannot be easily redeployed, alliance members, those who make the investment and those who only enjoy the benefit, have an incentive to maintain a stable and enduring security partnership. An alliance treaty is, therefore, more likely to be successful when more assets are invested in the alliance relationship.

_H2: When alliance members renegotiate their alliance, they are more likely to change their security relationship through treaty revision when alliance-specific assets are invested in their relationship._
Alliance institution

Regulatory or organizational institutions established under alliance treaties are created to facilitate cooperation rather than to resolve disputes. Some institutional designs, however, do help members to achieve bargaining success. An alliance treaty, for example, may specify regular meetings among ranking diplomatic and military officials, thereby expanding communication channels. To be sure, more channels of interaction do not guarantee more accurate information flow; but the function of these channels is to build trust in repeated strategic interactions in which allies can better verify the information delivered in the course of bargaining based on past experience (Snidal 1985; Abbott and Snidal 1998). Regular communication also reveals problems in allies’ security cooperation, making it easier for them to recognize complications in their relationship.

Communicative institutions also create a focal point (Martin, 1992). Allies naturally turn to these institutions when a dispute occurs and expect the matter to be taken seriously. Members also observe whether their allies are committed to the alliance relationship through these institutions. The choice by a member not to go through these institutions to discuss a dispute may suggest that this member is no longer interested in the alliance.

**H3:** When members renegotiate their alliance relationship, alliances that require regular governmental interactions will make them more likely to change their security relationship through treaty revision.
Alliance with a third party

Forming another alliance with a third party also affects bargaining behavior. Members establish external alliances for various reasons, including building a better relationship with a third party, seeking additional security protection, or at the suggestion of an ally. An external alliance usually has a different purpose from the existing alliance, but sometimes substitutes for its functions. Maintaining both the current alliance and the external alliance is usually the preferable option because members thus have a security surplus from the combination of the two.

A new external alliance can facilitate bargaining by showing the updated security interests of a member. The new external alliance demonstrates a member’s security priorities, including toward which coalition camp this member is leaning, or which country will become its key security partner in the future. An external alliance indirectly delivers information about a member’s expectations for its current alliance, which information in turn facilitates the communication of security needs during bargaining. External alliances also allow members to evaluate a state’s reliability. If a member finds that its ally is collaborating with its enemy, the reliability of this ally is revealed as questionable and the current alliance is jeopardized. Conversely, if both members receive benefits from an external alliance, its formation will strengthen the existing alliance tie.

\[14\] To be sure, members may choose not to reveal external alliance to its allies, especially when the external alliance is agreed to in secret. In this case, the information regarding the external alliance becomes completely private and loses its function of clarifying updated security interests.
**H4a:** When members renegotiate their alliance relationship, allies are more likely to revise their treaty if any member forms a new alliance with a third party.

On the other hand, an external alliance may lead to alliance breakdown. First, if one ally aligns with the common enemy of its other allies, the external alliance poses a threat to the existing alliance. Second, the formation of an external alliance may suggest that an ally is switching its security partner, perhaps because the existing alliance is no longer attractive and the ally no longer wants to contribute resources to it. When security cooperation wanes owing to an external alliance, allies lose interest in the existing alliance, thus encourages allies to abandon the existing alliance.

**H4b:** When members renegotiate their alliance relationship, allies are more likely to abrogate the alliance if any member forms a new alliance with a third party.

**Strategy of Delay and Entangling Alliance Relationship**

Figure 2.1 shows two situations in which allies decide not to change their security relationship. This may occur when the partner decides not to engage with the challenger, or when discussions regarding the dispute fail to reach any solution. Allies then maintain the status quo: the dispute remains and the challenger is still discontented but does not abrogate the alliance. While interest divergence persists, the partner attempts to place the dispute on hold, again, maintaining the status quo. These considerations raise the question of why such an alliance continues when the challenger’s concern remains unaddressed.

In these cases, then, the dispute is postponed to a later time through the partner’s deliberate delay. The variables discussed above are therefore less relevant because there is no back-and-forth bargaining once the dispute is delayed. The partner is likely
to adopt this strategy when changing the alliance relationship involves greater cost than the status quo and no better option presents itself. The partner wants to delay the renegotiation either because it wants the challenger to offer other alternatives or because solving the interest divergence would be too costly at this point. The partner is satisfied with the current security cooperation, and does not want the challenger to misunderstand its resolve to maintain the alliance when it hesitates to entertain the challenger’s demand.

The benefit of this strategy is that, if it succeeds, the challenger is unlikely to abandon the alliance immediately because the partner may still entertain an alternative solution later. Since the challenger is unsure about the partner’s attitude, it needs more information to determine whether to preserve the alliance. Other proposals might be acceptable for the partner, so it would be costly for the challenger to break away without further negotiation.

The partner needs to make a credible show of its intent to maintain the alliance tie. The alliance persists under the condition that the partner regularly sends signals to demonstrate its commitment and the challenger correctly perceives these signals. What becomes important is whether the challenger is satisfied with the partner’s effort. If the partner fails to convince the challenger that the dispute will receive proper attention in the future, the challenger is likely to consider the alliance unsalvageable and to abrogate. On the other hand, successful delay temporarily appeases the challenger, preventing it from abandoning the alliance.

To be sure, the delay does not solve the dispute. The challenger will repeatedly raise its demands in pursuit of a final solution to the problem. The strategy of delay
prolongs the alliance at the cost of an “entangled relationship.” Disputes between allies occur more often, as the challenger tends to increase diplomatic pressure on the partner in order to probe the latter’s intention and may also consider building security ties with a third party. As a result, the relationship seems tense and unstable and alliance cohesion appears weak. However, such a relationship does not necessarily point to an upcoming breakdown, for both allies have the expectation that the alliance relationship will sustain.

\textit{H5: Alliance members will attempt to delay the dispute if the cost of changing the status quo is high.}

\textit{H6: Using the strategy of delay increases quarrels between alliance members.}

The deployment of the strategy of delay shows that intra-alliance bargaining is fundamentally different from crisis bargaining. First, alliance members can always return to the status quo, and because the alliance treaty still brings a security benefit to members, its loss would bring an unwanted cost. The challenger does not defect from the alliance unless it has completely lost faith in the reliability of the alliance. Second, alliance members have the option to table an issue indefinitely, while in a crisis bargaining states have to reach decisions in a short period of time and any hesitation may lead to an unfavorable outcome. Alliance members have the luxury of negotiating their interests for a long time without jeopardizing their relationship. They can choose to set aside their differences until a more propitious moment. This flexibility explains why alliance relationships, once established, are easier to maintain despite internal

\footnote{For further discussion of the concept of alliance entanglement, see (Beckley, 2015; T. Kim, 2011, 2014; Lake, 1999)}
quarrels. More importantly, it explains why potential enemies have an incentive to establish an alliance, since they can use it to prevent or at least to delay military confrontation.

The next chapter employs a time series cross section statistical model to test H1 to H4. I will demonstrate the mechanism of H5 and H6 in chapter 6.

Case Studies and Selection of Cases

I include three cases to test the theoretical mechanism described in this chapter. First, the Anglo-Japanese alliance from 1902 to 1921 shows two successful treaty revisions. Britain and Japan managed to revise their treaty to fulfill their security interests. This alliance lasted for nearly two decades during which both countries maintained a close military and diplomatic partnership.

The second case is the Sino-Soviet alliance, which shows a failed renegotiation between Beijing and Moscow. Their friendship had been solid in the years following the Korean War, and western analysts had believed that their alliance would endure despite differences that had emerged since Khrushchev became the leader of the Soviet Union. However, their inability to resolve or set aside their policy disputes led to hostility and militarized conflict.

Finally, I choose the US-Taiwan alliance during the 1970s to demonstrate the successful use of a strategy of delay. The relationship between Washington and Taipei was very tense during this period. The US kept Taipei satisfied enough to stay with the alliance while it developed a relationship with Taiwan’s most lethal enemy.

There are rich original and secondary materials on these alliances. Most of the official documents related to them are publicly available. Discussions in internal
government meetings help clarify the positions of governments and their judgement on the value of the alliance tie. Important politicians and diplomats also wrote memoirs to discuss the bilateral relations in these alliances, providing an opportunity for cross-reference. The depth of available historic records allow me to show the full picture of these alliance relationships.

Another reason behind case selection is that these alliances all experienced changes in the security environment that required allies to renegotiate. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was meant to deter the Russian threat, but this threat significantly decreased after Russia lost the land battles in Russo-Japanese War, and almost disappeared after Japan and Russia divided their interests in Manchuria. The destructive nature of the nuclear arms race made the Soviets change their policy with the US. This created a series of disputes between Mao and Khrushchev. Nixon’s China policy made leaders in Taipei very concerned; in turn, they sought ways to resist the negative impact of Sino-American rapprochement. In each case, the original purpose of the alliance eroded and the alliance relationship was at risk of breaking down. In addition, allies established these alliances with an expectation that their security relationship would continue for a long period of time. These were not alliances established for short-term security purposes, so the allies had interests in maintaining their alliance ties. However, their renegotiation outcomes varied.

Finally, these cases represent hard cases for my theory. The Anglo-Japanese alliance could have broken down but endured. Beijing and Moscow could have managed their differences but failed. Taiwan should have sought other security guarantees, but it chose to rely on the security tie with the US. These alliance
relationships developed in ways contrary to the popular thinking at their time. I will explore these cases and explain the reasons behind these developments using the theoretical framework I have discussed.
Chapter 3 Quantitative Test of Alliance Revision

This chapter uses a large-N model to examine the hypotheses developed above regarding the revision of alliance treaties, and it proceeds as follows. I first describe the data used in this empirical test, discuss the selection effect in examining alliance renegotiation, and propose solutions using a statistical technique. I then explain the choice of model specification, arguing that the multinomial logit is the model that best coheres with my theoretical assumptions. I then introduce the variables used in the empirical model. Each concept that forms part of my hypotheses is operationalized in terms of measurable variables. Finally, I present the results and discuss the substantive meaning of my findings.\footnote{Please refer to the appendix for details on data collection, coding scheme of variables, summary statistics, and robustness check.}

\textit{Research Design}

\textit{Data}

The dataset used in this research is based on Leeds and Savun’s (2007) alliance dyad-year data, which includes all bilateral alliances from 1816 to 2001.\footnote{The reason for not including multilateral alliances is because doing so in a dyad-year design would significantly increase observations that do not have theoretical value. Take NATO, for example; France may have an argument with the US over the security cooperation under NATO, but Portugal and Iceland do not. The theoretical implication of variables can also change. I will elaborate the possible ways of analyzing multilateral alliances in the conclusion of this chapter.} I merge their data with ATOP’s alliance-level data and then merge this with Correlate of War and PolityIV datasets using EUGENE (S. Bennett & Stam, 2000; Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2002). I also merge the data with the 2012 Cross-National Time Series archive, or
CNTS (Banks & Wilson, 2015). My data covers bilateral alliances from 1945 to 2001. The alliances related to Czechoslovakia’s split are omitted, as are treaties that have been fulfilled or that include any member that has lost statehood. Although theoretically these treaties could have been renegotiated before termination, they ended for reasons beyond the control of members that simply could not have maintained the alliances even if they had entered into successful renegotiations. Including these treaties would unnecessarily complicate the comparison between abrogation and revision. This selection leaves 125 bilateral alliance treaties in my dataset. Furthermore, Leeds and Suvan provide alliance-dyad data. There are overlapping observations for pairs of countries that terminated an alliance treaty and started a new one in the same year. Because the purpose of this project is to understand the continuation of alliance relationships, I have omitted these overlapping observations in order to make dyad-year data. The total number of observations is 2255.

*The Selection Problem in Alliance Renegotiation*

Changes in the security environment encourage members to renegotiate their alliance relationship, but it is uncertain whether they actually initiate intra-alliance bargaining. Obviously, if no one initiates renegotiation, no bargaining will occur. Although it seems reasonable to assume that allies discuss their differences regularly, this assumption cannot be taken for granted. The lack of data on whether bargaining

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18 Among these fulfilled/loss of independence treaties, only one case has issued in successful treaty revision: the US and Israel expanded their treaty obligation in a Memorandum of Understanding in 1983.

19 The ATOP dataset records different “phases” of an alliance. A new phase means that a treaty has changed in a way that affects the obligations of members. However, in the post-World War II period there were no additional ATOP phases (excluding those related to the split of Czechoslovakia).
takes place presents a challenge when trying to understand the outcome of renegotiation. Whether allies try to fix their divergences is of course central to this research. So again, if a member does not even try to engage its partner, there is no chance of renegotiation. However, allies sometimes do reveal to the public that they are renegotiating. To test the theory of intra-alliance bargaining, it is possible to observe renegotiation requests made by allies, and this process will in turn identify dyads that underwent bargaining.

I therefore code a variable indicating whether any alliance member requests renegotiation. This variable is coded 1 if the ruling government of any member expresses the desire to review or revise the security cooperation covered by the alliance agreement in a given year, and 0 if no such request is made. These requests can include a formal declaration that renegotiation is underway, a unilateral request to change the treaty, or a news report that identifies the start of renegotiation. There are 85 total requests in this data.

Although this variable helps to identify whether allies initiate intra-alliance bargaining, it is still difficult to acquire information on requests that are completely secret and not yet declassified. For example, I cannot confirm prior requests for 22 alliance treaties that have been successfully renegotiated. This suggests that the data is either classified or that no records are available.

Furthermore, there is a selection problem in observing the success of alliance renegotiation. In fact, a renegotiation request may itself be related to the success of the renegotiation. Allies may be hesitant to request renegotiation if they believe that

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20 Information of requests is collected from books, journal articles, Keesings World News Archive, and the LexisNexis database.
interest divergence will be difficult to resolve, and more likely to renegotiate an alliance when they perceive a high probability of success. If such thinking indeed takes place, renegotiation successes are biased toward less complicated cases. Alliance treaties may be successfully renegotiated either because interest divergence is limited or because members are confident of success. By contrast, secret renegotiation has a higher risk of failure. Therefore, it is possible that a selection bias may plague the empirical analysis. Using the available information on renegotiation requests, I will minimize the impact of the selection problem by means of the predicted probability of a renegotiation request. This two-stage estimation is intended to control for the selection effect.

**Model**

I adopt a multinomial logit model to estimate treaty revision. The reason for using this model instead of a simple binary response one is that intra-alliance bargaining leads to three types of outcomes: status quo, revision, and abrogation. Allies choose between these three outcomes as they bargain. The multinomial logit model estimates different outcomes while measuring the covariation between them. The baseline of the main model is the status quo, so the coefficients indicate the positive or negative effect on the decision of moving from the status quo to either revision or abrogation. I will also report the comparison between revision and abrogation. The output table includes six models. The first four use the status quo as the base category. Models 5 and 6 use abrogation as the base category. The statistical results report three pairs of comparisons: revision vs. status quo, revision vs. abrogation, and abrogation vs. status quo. There are two models for each pair of comparison: the full model and the selection model. The
full model includes all independent variables and controls. The selection model controls for the selection effect.

Specifically, in order to control for the control selection effect, I first estimate a logit model on the renegotiation request variable, and then predict the probability of making a request for each observation and include it in the multinomial model.\textsuperscript{21} This method is designed to capture intra-alliance bargaining that was not made public or could not be retrieved from historical sources. The public request variable needs to be removed from this model owing to the risk of multicollinearity.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is the change in an alliance relationship, which I capture by recoding the renegotiation variable. I first examine all coding sheets in ATOP; then, based on the reason for the termination of the alliance, I regroup them into three categories as follows.

First, if no change occurred in a given year and the status quo was maintained, the coding is 0. If an alliance was still in effect in 2001, this dyad is considered status quo in 2001. As discussed, allies may request renegotiation but then decide to maintain the status quo, a situation that differs theoretically from that in which no action is taken at all. Nevertheless, the two situations can be treated the same here because their impacts on the alliance relationship in a given year are the same.\textsuperscript{22} Theoretically speaking, in any given year, allies may choose to maintain the status quo or to move away from it.

\textsuperscript{21} The logit model contains independent variables of changes of domestic and international security environment, please see Appendix .

\textsuperscript{22} This does not impact the statistical result. Please refer to Appendix for more detailed discussion.
and the former represents a deliberate choice even in the absence of a renegotiation request.

Second, I define a revision as either (1) the amendment of an old treaty, (2) the establishment of a new treaty, or (3) the signing of protocols, guidelines, or memorandums as an auxiliary document to a treaty. These incidences receive a coding of 1. Automatic renewal is not considered a renegotiation. In my coding, an alliance treaty may experience multiple revisions throughout the period in which it is in effect. Renegotiation success can take place at points other than in the last year of an alliance. To return to an example mentioned in the first chapter, Japan underwent two successful renegotiations, in 1978 and again in 1997, when the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation were signed and revised. There are 55 incidences of treaty revision in the dataset, 52 of which resulted in the replacement of an old treaty with a new one. Two renegotiation cases maintained the treaties in question but established auxiliary agreements, namely the US-Philippines and US-Japan alliances.

The third outcome is abrogation of a treaty, which includes (1) intentional violation of it and (2) intentional refusal to renew it. Abrogation means the termination of an alliance relationship. Should any party choose abrogation, no chance remains for further renegotiation. A very rare exception occurs when a member is reluctant to continue an alliance but does not break away immediately, so that the alliance treaty remains in effect while substantive security cooperation ceases. For example, Bangladesh made the decision not to renew its treaty with India in 1977, even though the treaty did not expire until 1997. During this 20-year period, neither India nor Bangladesh abrogated the treaty, but neither did they ever mention or discuss it. In such
cases, the alliance is coded as having ended in its expiration year because, theoretically, these allies might have resumed their cooperation at any time before their treaty expired.

Table 3.1 shows the distribution of dependent variables in my dataset. Among 125 alliance treaties, there are 55 incidences of successful renegotiation and 47 incidences of abrogation. Among the 26 treaties that were still in effect in 2001, eight underwent negotiation without any agreement being reached to change their respective alliances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Renegotiation</th>
<th>Abrogation</th>
<th>SQ with renegotiation request</th>
<th>SQ effect with no renegotiation request</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>128*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note that some alliances experienced more than one renegotiation.

**Independent Variables**

To test H1, I reexamine the renegotiation request variable and code a new variable, public request. A public request is defined as an announcement at the start of a round of negotiations between members. I exclude incidences that are revealed to the public at a later time. Some negotiations continue for several years, so only if new progress is reported does a revelation count as another public request. The total number of public requests is 70. Most public requests resulted in treaty revision, but some of them led to abrogation.

H2 posits that the investment of alliance-specific assets increases the likelihood of treaty revision. Military installations represent long-term and costly investments in an alliance relationship. The binary variable military installation indicates whether allies agree to such construction projects on the territory of one or both members.
H3 argues that institutionalization facilitates communication. The variable military/political organization is coded 1 if the alliance treaty establishes a formal organization for a military or political purpose. These organizations will require regular contact between government officials and high-ranking officers.

The variable of external alliance tests H4. This variable is drawn from data used in Leeds and Savun (2007). It is coded 1 if any member of an alliance establishes another alliance with a third party during the original alliance relationship. I cross-examine these alliances to ensure that no allies have colluded with an adversary.

I expect a public request to have a positive effect on both treaty revision and abrogation, since it compels members to renegotiate. Military projects and institutionalization have positive coefficients. The direction of the effect of external alliance is yet to be determined.

**Control Variables**

Several variables are included as controls. First, the variable of executive turnover is coded 1 if any member installed new executives who were independent from their predecessors, 0 otherwise. This variable is drawn from the CNTS Data Archive. I lag this variable for 1 year because a new executive may require some time to stabilize domestic political power.

Next, power parity is measured as the ratio of the capability of the weaker member in the dyad to that of the stronger member. This capability measure is based on COW’s CINC index (4.0), and ranges from 0 to 1 (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972). Power parity is an indicator of bargaining power. As the capability balance becomes closer to parity, both members have the incentive and the capacity to coerce each other into
readjusting burden-sharing or other obligations. On the contrary, in a preponderance alliance dyad, the stronger side is less motivated to change the status quo and the weaker side lacks the bargaining leverage to do so. I also include the squared term of power parity to test the non-linear effect.

Some alliance treaties specify a dispute resolution mechanism when allies have disagreements. It is expected that these alliances are less likely to be renegotiated because major disputes are apt to be resolved without revisiting the treaty. I include a variable from ATOP indicating whether or not such a mechanism is established in a given treaty.

The external security environment has a direct impact on the alliance relationship. Involvement in a militarized dispute (MID) represents the security threats that a state faces. Using MID 4.0 data (Ghosn and Bennett 2003), I create two variables to capture changes in the security environment. The first variable indicates whether any member is a target of an MID, and the second whether any member initiates an MID against a third party. Since the MID data contain many low-intensity disputes, I include only MIDs that produced fatalities.

I include two self-coded dispute variables. A diplomatic dispute occurs when a member expresses discontent or concerns through diplomatic channels. These disputes focus on such political or security issues in a bilateral relationship as border or foreign policy disputes, while such issues as trade or human rights are not included. Another variable records disputes over alliances that are directly related to alliance obligations or complaints about the alliance relationship. These variables represent serious political disagreements between allies. Next, I include a variable of distance, which is the
numeric distance between the capitals of member states. Finally, I control for temporal dependence using suggestions from Carter and Signorino (2010). The statistical results are tabulated in Table 3.2.

### Table 3.2: Multinomial Logit on Alliance Treaty Revision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) full (R vs. SQ)</th>
<th>(2) selection (R vs. SQ)</th>
<th>(3) full (A vs. SQ)</th>
<th>(4) selection (A vs. SQ)</th>
<th>(5) full (R vs. A)</th>
<th>(6) selection (R vs. A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public request</td>
<td>1.729**</td>
<td>1.561*</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted probability of request</td>
<td>8.489**</td>
<td>3.415</td>
<td>5.074</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
<td>(2.84)</td>
<td>(4.09)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance-specific assets</td>
<td>1.978**</td>
<td>1.950**</td>
<td>0.864+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military/political organization</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External alliance</td>
<td>2.213**</td>
<td>2.269**</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag executive turnover</td>
<td>0.866**</td>
<td>0.611*</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power parity</td>
<td>3.900*</td>
<td>4.759*</td>
<td>4.655</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.56)</td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
<td>(2.94)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power parity squared</td>
<td>-2.611</td>
<td>-3.555</td>
<td>-7.773+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.74)</td>
<td>(2.20)</td>
<td>(4.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty has measures to resolve disputes</td>
<td>-1.720**</td>
<td>-1.843**</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any member targeted by a fatal MID</td>
<td>-0.479</td>
<td>-0.568</td>
<td>1.006**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any member initiates a fatal MID</td>
<td>1.300**</td>
<td>1.051*</td>
<td>1.193**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic dispute</td>
<td>-14.603**</td>
<td>-14.394**</td>
<td>1.937**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Result and Data Analysis

The public request variable is positive and statistically significant in models 1 and 3. This variable receives support in the revision equation, but it also affects the decision to abrogate. The result is consistent with H1. It is unclear whether a public request is more likely to lead to revision or abrogation, but members are in either case compelled to change the status quo. A public request signals the intent to renegotiate, but it does not signal the preference of allies. In this case, a public request may either drive allies to reach a new arrangement or may force an uncommitted member to reveal its intention prematurely. The data for comparison may also affect this result; there are only 55 incidences of revision and 47 of abrogation in the data, and the multinomial model simply cannot distinguish the effects of a public request on revision from the effect on abrogation using so small a number of cases. Nevertheless, the coefficients show the expected direction in both the revision and the abrogation equations and are statistically significant.
Alliance-specific assets, represented by military installations, has a positive and significant effect in models 1 and 2, which lends support to H2. This variable does not predict abrogation well, since it loses significance in model 3, but is significant in the selection model. The variables show no statistically meaningful impact in models 5 and 6. Although the direction of coefficient is expected, it is not statistically significant, suggesting that the variable does not cause allies to prefer revision to abrogation.

The institutionalization variable is not statistically significant in any model. I operationalize institutionalization with two other variables, namely regular contacts between militaries from ATOP and the level of military integration during peacetime from Leeds and Anac (2005), and both fail to show statistical relevance. Thus, H3 is not supported. This negative result is of interest because previous literature suggests that institutionalization tends to facilitate bargaining. Perhaps, once allies feel dissatisfied, the institutional design established at the time of alliance formation becomes obsolete and can no longer help allies to resolve their differences. This outcome also suggests that allies are unlikely to quarrel when institutions are still effective. Serious disputes among allies may signal a failing alliance institution.

The variable of external alliance shows a positive sign. It receives consistent support from the first 2 models but no support from models 3 and 4, a finding that strongly supports H4a. This result is still robust with a one-year lag. Establishing a new alliance reflects updated security interests and allows members to reach a solution with greater ease. Models 5 and 6 further strengthen this impression: building an external alliance helps members to choose revision over abrogation.
Most of the control variables show the expected effect. The lagged executive turnover variable also has a positive and significant effect in the first two models. An alliance treaty is likely to be subjected to change after a new government takes power. The coefficient for power parity is positive and significant. A balance of power directly translates into bargaining effectiveness and fosters treaty revision, though there is no U-shaped effect. The results for external threat variables are noteworthy: being targeted by an MID that results in casualties has no significant effect on revision, but a positive effect on abrogation. This result holds even with a one-year lag. Increasing tension with a third party, therefore, makes allies more likely, not to revise their treaty, but to abandon the alliance. This is perhaps because allies do not want to send a signal of weak alliance cohesion to external rivals that would diminish the deterrence effect of the alliance.

Additionally, being a challenger in an MID increases the likelihood of revision as well as abrogation, a result that may suggest concern about entrapment. This result echoes the findings regarding moral hazard in alliance politics (Yuen 2009; Benson, Bentley, Ray 2013). Members are more likely to change their alliance relationship when a member provokes a conflict, and such conflicts are associated with renegotiations that weaken the treaty or maintain the same degree of defense commitment, which suggests that an entrapment concern arises when one ally provokes a third party, in which case the other partner will try to limit its commitment to the alliance.23

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23 The author thanks Ashley Leeds for sharing unpublished data on treaty revision. This variable shows a positive and statistically significant effect in simple logit models designed to predict the strength of the
Diplomatic disputes and those in particular relating to alliances show a negative effect. The large coefficients suggest that these variables are closely related to renegotiation failure. Indeed, a prior dispute may cause renegotiation to fail and therefore potentially presents a multicollinearity problem. However, dropping these variables does not change the effect of other variables.

To understand the substantive effect, I adopt the observed value approach developed by Hanmer and Kalkan (2008). Their method is very similar to the CLARIFY program, with which the researcher manipulates the variable of interest while holding other variables at their means or specific values (Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 2001). Hanmer and Kalkan recommend randomly drawing the actual values from the dataset and calculating the predicted probability. The effects of each variable and their confidence intervals are listed in Table 3.3. The calculation is based on model 1, 3, and 5.

Table 3.3: Predicted Probability of Effects (base: status quo)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Predicted prob. (No)</th>
<th>Predicted prob. (Yes)</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Confidence interval of difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revision vs. Status quo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public request</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>[.022~.141]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance-specific assets+</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>[.012~.162]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization+</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>[-.013~.055]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External alliance</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>[.040~.081]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abrogation vs. Status quo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public request</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>[.001~.013]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance-specific assets+</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>[-.006~.052]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization+</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>[-.012~.043]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External alliance+</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>[-.004~.023]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revision vs. Abrogation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public request+</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>[.020~.137]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance-specific assets+</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>[.005~.054]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization+</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>[-.014~.063]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

newly renegotiated treaty. More rigorous research design is needed, but preliminary analysis suggests that being a challenger in an MID correlates with a weakened or largely unaltered treaty.
The predicted probability rises from .026 to .095 if any ally makes a public renegotiation request, so that the probability of treaty revision increases by roughly 7 percentage points. This means that making a public request makes allies 3 times more likely to achieve treaty revision. At the same time, a public request increases the chance of abrogating an alliance by 0.4 percentage points, an effect that is rather small compared with the effect on treaty revision.

Allies with fixed assets invested in their alliance relationship are 3.5 times more likely to revise their treaty compared with those who have no such investment. Finally, the effect of an external alliance is particularly large: if a state builds an alliance with a third party, the probability of treaty revision increases from .011 to .069, meaning that the probability of success is five times greater than in cases where no external alliance is entered into.

All of the variables show the expected effects in the revision vs. abrogation equation, but few of them are statistically significant. The only exception is external alliance, where the effect is .009, meaning a quite small impact.

In sum, all hypotheses are confirmed except for the one regarding alliance institutionalization. The variables proposed show the expected effect and are statistically significant. A public request tends to change the alliance relationship, and alliance-specific assets and external alliance show a large impact.

**Conclusion**

This chapter provides empirical tests of hypotheses H1-H4, which were introduced in the previous chapter. These hypotheses describe general conditions that
lead to alliance treaty revision. Testing of these hypotheses using a large-N model resulted in empirical support for all except H3. I confirm that public requests for renegotiation, construction of a military installation on the territory of one or another ally, and building external alliances all have positive effects on treaty revision. Only alliance institutionalization fails to show any impact.

The statistical results presented above prove the theory presented in chapter 2. Alliance members need information to confirm their allies’ commitment to a treaty and their mutual security needs. This chapter enhances our understanding of renegotiation behavior in alliance politics. Alliance treaties do not always bring stable, long-term cooperation, which requires a constant management effort in order to eliminate concerns, misinterpretation, and distrust. More importantly, the commitments that have been made during the formation of the alliance will be of little help if any member believes that the treaty has become obsolete.

The empirical test here is limited to bilateral alliances. There are reasons to believe that the variables proposed may also be relevant to renegotiation in multilateral alliances, but the effect is more complicated. For example, the fixed assets invested in a multilateral alliance may affect one member more than others. Each member receives a different security externality from the fixed assets. Thus, members value the alliance-specific assets differently, and their desire to reach an agreement subsequently varies.

Multilateral alliance renegotiation is inherently more complex because all members need to consent, while the threat perception of each varies based on its geolocation, contribution, and military strength. The incoherent interests among allies affects their willingness to reach a bargain. Renegotiation of multilateral alliances is
accordingly quite uncommon. Only 22 treaties were renegotiated among all ATOP alliances from 1815 to 2003, compared to 115 renegotiated bilateral treaties.\textsuperscript{24} This disparity shows that renegotiation in a multilateral setting is more difficult on account of the sheer number of actors. In addition, a multilateral alliance usually has one or more “principal members” that dominate the decision making in an alliance. The interests of the principal members are essential because the security benefit they provide is vital to other members. Their support for a change in the alliance relationship will attract followers within the alliance. If the challenger is not such a principal member, bargaining can be simplified into a bilateral scheme in which other members merely choose sides. If, on the other hand, a principal member wants to renegotiate the alliance, the question is whether it can credibly communicate its commitment and avoid raising concern about abandonment concern among the less powerful members. Again, the variables proposed in this chapter have theoretical implications for such alliances.

\textsuperscript{24} Number calculated using the ATOP phase dataset.
Chapter 4 The Anglo-Japanese alliance: a relationship salvaged by renegotiation

Overview of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902-1921

The Anglo-Japanese alliance was formed in 1902 and had been revised twice, in 1905 and 1911. These revisions were a joint effort in response to the changing international security environment, particularly in East Asia. Relations between Britain and Japan had been lukewarm since the Meiji Restoration. Britain helped Japan to train its modern navy and, at Japan’s request, had given up its right of extra-territorial jurisdiction. Britain was Japan’s largest trade partner, taking into account the trade flow from British India and Hong Kong. The Sino-Japanese War in 1895 was a turning point for Anglo-Japanese relations. Japan’s victory granted it the status of a regional power and it joined the competition of interests in China with other Great Powers.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance started with a shared external threat. At the dawn of the 20th century, Britain and Japan found a mutual interest in deterring Russia’s expansion in northeast China. Russia had deployed five battleships in the Far East.

25 For more on Anglo-Japanese relations during the Meiji era, see (Checkland, 1989).

26 For the treaty ports that the Great Powers forced Japan to open after 1858 and its effort to eliminate the unequal treaties, see (Hoare, 1994; Hosoya, Nish, & Kibata, 2000, Chapters 5–6; Perez, 1999).

27 Trade statistics are compiled by Nish (1985, p. 8).

28 The War started as Japan tried to gain control over the Yi court of Choson. For Japan’s expedition in Korea, see (Conroy, 1960, Chapter 6). For the Sino-Japanese War, see (Lone, 1994; Mutsu & Berger, 1982; Paine, 2003)
following the Sino-Japanese War. Its naval force in the region surpassed that of the Royal Navy, and a Franco-Russian coalition would outmatch the British China Fleet.\(^{29}\)

Britain tried to balance Russian expansion using diplomatic means. In a Railway Agreement signed in 1899, Russia promised not to extend its influence south of the Great Wall. However, Russia dispatched land forces to Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion that remained after the crisis. Russia also significantly increased its deployment of troops in Manchuria.\(^ {30}\)

Since Britain did not have a large force in Asia, the increase in Russian forces constituted a potential threat to British possessions, the vulnerability of which had become evident during the Boxer Rebellion. Given that most of the forces went to Beijing, Lord Walter Kerr admitted that it was impossible to defend British treaty ports along the Yangtze River against Chinese attack.\(^ {31}\)

The Russian presence in Manchuria posed a direct threat to Japan’s position in Korea, as Russia competed with Japan for the influence over the Chosen court. Emperor Gojong was eager to introduce Russia in order to counterbalance Japan.\(^ {32}\) Russia also opposed Japan’s plan to build a railway in Korea. The expansion of Russian military strength was therefore concerning to both Britain and Japan.\(^ {33}\)

\(^{29}\) See (Hosoya et al., 2000, vol. 3 p.38). In 1902 the British China Fleet consisted of five battleships and 16 cruisers based in Singapore, Hong Kong and Weihei Wei (Redford & Grove, 2014, Chapter 1).

\(^{30}\) For the Anglo-Russia Railway Agreement and Russia’s violation of it, see (Hosoya et al., 2000, vol. 3 p.153; Papastratigakis, 2011, Chapter 6).

\(^{31}\) For Kerr’s response to the request for military aid from Shanghai, see (G. Kennedy, 2005, p. 52)

\(^{32}\) For the effort to introduce Russian influence to Korean Peninsula, see (Lee, 1997, pt. III).

\(^{33}\) For Japan’s and Britain’s concern about Russian expansion, see (Nish, 1985, Chapters 3, 5, 6).
To be sure, an Anglo-Japanese alliance was not the only available option for Britain and Japan, each of which considered allying with Germany.\(^{34}\) Germany, however, had a smaller naval force in the region and, seeing that its naval expansion might cause friction with Britain, was reluctant to confront a Russian land force in the service of British interests.\(^{35}\) Japan stood out as an ideal candidate because it was a naval power and had a direct conflict of interests with Russia. On the other hand, it was Japan’s priority to find a European ally in order to advance its interests in Korea.\(^{36}\)

Britain and Japan entered into negotiations on the formation of an alliance in late 1901, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance agreement became operative in January 1902. With the neutrality commitment from Britain and its military support in the event of third party intervention, Japan had greater confidence about confronting Russia militarily. The Russo-Japanese War two years later put the alliance on the test, and Britain proved to be a reliable ally.

Japan’s victory ensured the expansion of its influence in Northeast Asia, especially Korea. Japan also took possession of Manchuria in place of Russia. As Britain’s security concerns eased, it was left with a significant strategic interest in renewing the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japan also wanted to revise the treaty in order to protect its newly acquired territories. So while the first Anglo-Japanese Treaty was not set to expire until 1907, changes in the security environment compelled both

\(^{34}\) For Japan’s internal meeting and Britain’s negotiation with Germany, see (Hosoya et al., 2000, vol. 3 p.165-7; Massie & Rogers D. Spotswood Collection, 1991).

\(^{35}\) For a detailed discussion of the relevant history accounts, see (P. M. Kennedy, 1973).

\(^{36}\) This policy was forged by Prime Minister Katsura himself, who had been a keen advocate of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; see (Hosoya et al., 2000, vol. 3 p. 166)
members to revisit it ahead of the scheduled renewal. The renewal in 1905 is thus an example of a situation in which allies intend to continue security cooperation after the original purpose of the alliance recedes or no longer exists. Britain and Japan renegotiated their treaty and revised some obligations in order to continue their security partnership.

Early renewal occurred again in 1911, as the second treaty was not scheduled to be renewed until 1915, but internal preparation for renegotiation was underway by 1910. Japan was eager to reconfirm the alliance as its expansion in East Asia had created uncertainty regarding Britain’s commitment to the alliance. Russo-Japanese reconciliation and the growing role of the US in East Asia impacted the founding purpose of the alliance. The interest divergence between allies had increased dramatically since the first renewal. Prospects for the alliance relationship were therefore dim, but the allies nevertheless reached an agreement to revise their treaty further. The alliance was thus able to endure despite the differences between the allies.

These treaty revisions in fact prolonged the Anglo-Japanese alliance for nearly two decades. In the end, the demise of the alliance was due to the intervention of the US, which placed great pressure on Britain to abandon it. Britain, however, did not give up the alliance tie easily, and was still seeking ways to maintain it on the eve of the Washington Naval Conference. Likewise Japan, despite its growing suspicion, maintained the hope of continuing the alliance.

The three Anglo-Japanese treaties established no formal institutions. All security cooperation was conducted by professional diplomats and military officers. Notably, the revisions of 1905 and 1911 took place covertly, with the contents of the resulting
treaties being revealed to other countries via diplomatic channels only after negotiations had been completed.

The following sections of this chapter discuss the main reasons for the success of the renegotiations in 1905 and 1911, as well as the failure to maintain the alliance in 1920. A close examination of the discussions between the British and the Japanese governments shows that their interests with regard to their overseas territories played a key role in their decision to renew the alliance. The following table summarizes the reasons behind the treaty revisions, which mainly correspond to the variables of alliance-specific assets and alliance with third parties proposed in chapter 2.

**Table 4.1: Interests of Britain and Japan in Anglo-Japanese Alliance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reason for Britain</th>
<th>Reason for Japan</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>The German threat increased in continental Europe. Britain needed to divert its overseas forces back closer to home, leaving its overseas territory in Asia vulnerable.</td>
<td>Japan needed a European power to vouch for its territorial gains in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War.</td>
<td>Alliance-specific assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain feared that competition between Russian and Japan would force it to invest in more military capability in the Far East.</td>
<td>Katsura faced pressure from Rikken Seiyukai to step down at the end of Russo-Japanese War.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Liberal Party was likely to take over government in early 1906.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Britain decided to sign an Arbitration Treaty with the US. The German threat continued to increase, while</td>
<td>The second cabinet of Katsura persistently supported the alliance.</td>
<td>Alliance-specific assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>External alliance between</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
British defense in the Far East further weakened.
- Russian threat from Manchuria and Central Asia decreased.
- The pressure from the US increased. Japan was reluctant to fight Britain if conflict erupted between Japan and the US.
- Japan needed British approval of its annexation of Korea.
- Japan needed Britain to support its investment in Manchuria Railway.
- Japan replaced German and Russian as a competitor with Britain in China.
- Members of the Commonwealth expressed opposition to renewal.
- The US forced Britain to terminate the alliance.
- Japan’s conflict of interests with the US increased.
- Japan believed that Britain would abandon the alliance to keep its security tie with the US.
- Weakened protection of alliance-specific assets
- External alliance between Britain and the US

1920 renewal (failed)

First Renewal: 1905

As discussed, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was established by a treaty in 1902 to counter the expansion of Russia in East Asia as Japan and Russia competed for influence over Korea.\(^{37}\) Japan wanted to ensure Britain’s neutrality if its competition with Russia in Northeast China were to lead to military conflict. The alliance was a precursor of the Russo-Japanese War, and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty had a large

\(^{37}\) For the competition between Russia and Japan for influence in the Korean court and the origin of Russo-Japanese War, see (Asakawa, 1904; Cowen, 1904).
impact on Japan’s decision to enter that conflict. After a failed attempt to negotiate with Russia over Korea and Manchuria, Japan made preparations for a war against Russia immediately after signing the Treaty.

Britain proved to be a reliable ally, assisting in Japan’s military modernization by sending military officers to advise the Japanese army and selling to the Japanese navy two new battleships that were very useful during the war. In fact, Japan deliberately delayed declaring war against Russia until these new ships safely arrived in East Asia (O’Brien, 2004, pp. 67–69). British assistance continued to play a role in the battles during the Russo-Japanese War, deterring potential intervention from France so that Japan could proceed without concern over French involvement. After Russia’s land campaign failed and it sent its Baltic Fleet from Europe, Britain provided intelligence concerning the whereabouts of the Russian ships and refused to provide supplies. This

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38 Okamoto (1970, pp. 96–7) argues that some of the Japanese officials were optimistic about entering into peace negotiations over the Russian presence in Korea and therefore prevented war. However, Prime Minister Katsura and Foreign Minister Komura were both, to the contrary, pessimistic about the prospects for negotiations and prepared for war by appointing Kodama Gentaro as the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff.

39 For the negotiation between Japan and Russia, see (Kajima, 1976, vol. 2 ch. 3).

40 These battleships were built for Chile, but the Chilean government was unable complete the purchase after it agreed to an arms control treaty with Argentina. Russia, Germany, and Japan showed interest in purchasing these battleships. However, Japan was unable to secure the necessary funds from the Imperial Diet. The British government decided to buy the ships to prevent Russia from doing so, and then a few months later Japan, having secured emergency funding, approached Britain, which sold it the ships. This was a clear sign of Britain’s determination to deter Russia in the Far East. The battleships provided a tactical advantage to the Japanese fleet in various sea battles and the siege of Port Arthur (Towle, 2006, pp. 19–22).

41 France and Russia issued a declaration after they learned the content of the 1902 Treaty that hinted at the use of force should the Anglo-Japanese alliance disrupt their interests in China. For the full text of the declaration, see (Rockhill, 1904).
indirect assistance gave Japan a tactical advantage in the Battle of Tsushima, where it decisively defeated the Russian Fleet.\footnote{Japan also managed to secure the neutrality of the US; see (White, 1964, Chapter 9).}

The Russian Revolution in early 1905 and the defeat of the Russian army significantly weakened Russia’s strength overseas. Japan filled the power void in Northeast China. For Britain, the Russian threat to India and Arabia greatly diminished, and it therefore had fewer security concerns about Russian aggression. The alliance with Japan had successfully served its purpose, and the security interests of both alliance members had changed significantly during the Russo-Japanese War. Since Britain had achieved its objective, Japan worried that the alliance would dissolve and that it would lose its strongest ally. Therefore, Japan formally proposed renegotiating the treaty in December 1904, requesting to “strengthen and extend” the alliance “should the [Russo-Japanese] war end successfully for Japan” (BDOW, 1927, vol. 4). The renegotiations accordingly started in January.

The timing of the proposal was unusual, as the War was not yet settled and the future balance of power in the Far East remained undecided. It should be noted that Britain’s coming election in January 1906 was one reason that the Japanese pushed for early renegotiation. The split within Britain’s Conservative government and its declining popularity decreased the party’s political strength, and Japan was concerned that a Liberal government might oppose the renegotiation of the alliance. The Japanese Cabinet decided that the alliance should be concluded quickly “while…her [Britain’s] present Government does not go out of office, and while the conditions inside and outside our country do not change” (Kajima, 1976, vol. 4 pp. 410, 418). In Japan,
Katsura faced such strong pressure from members of the Rikken Seiyukai (Constitutional Association of Political Friendship) that he had to appoint its leader, Saionji Kinmochi, as his successor (McClain, 2002, p. 325). The possible government turnover in the future, both in Britain and in Japan, would create uncertainty regarding treaty renewal. If Japan had to negotiate the alliance with a Liberal government, the talks would have been more difficult, or the new treaty, if ever achieved, would have favored the British position.

The renegotiation was concluded with a new treaty that was signed during the negotiation of the peace between Russia and Japan, which timing indicated that Japan and Britain had already planned their relationship before the order of Far East had been settled. Both governments conducted internal discussions on the utility of the alliance and considered carefully the design of the treaty. Japan wanted to keep a powerful ally and to secure its interests after the impending naval battle with the Russian Baltic Fleet, since, regardless of the outcome of the battle, Britain would thus continue to stand with Japan. For this reason, Japan wished to prolong the treaty as far as possible. It initially requested to extend the treaty period, but Britain had no interests in obligations similar to those specified in the 1902 agreement (BDOW, 1927, vol. 4). The allies later exchanged their demands and negotiated new obligations.

The alliance-specific assets were among the most important reasons that the allies agreed to renegotiate. Although the 1902 Treaty did not specify any military installations or building fixed assets, both countries had substantial investments in the Far East. The primary purpose of this alliance was to protect these assets from the threat of Russia and Germany.
Britain signed the 1902 Treaty to protect its interests in the Far East. The end of the Boer War alarmed Whitehall regarding its inability to defend its overseas territories effectively. The cost of the war significantly increased the financial burden of British defense. As a result, Britain found it difficult to defend its interests in East Asia. This concern persisted despite the defeat of Russia in the Far East, for the Russians still posed a threat to British India from Caspian Sea after the Tsar managed to calm the domestic unrest. The challenge from German Reich likewise continued unabated. Although Britain was confident of its ability to secure India, its most important overseas territory, it worried about military threats in Europe and Asia. In addition to India, Britain had several territories in the Far East, including the Yangtze River Valley, Hong Kong, Tibet, British Malaya, Singapore, Burma, British Borneo, and the Strait Settlements. Hong Kong and Singapore were among the most important strategic possessions, since they hosted the command of the British China Squadron. Britain had governed these territories for decades, investing heavily in infrastructure and defense. These territories were also strategic points along Britain’s trade routes. However, the German naval bases in Tsingtao (Kiaochow Bay) and the North Pacific, along with the Russian presence in Northeast China, constituted a genuine threat to these territories. In the event of conflict between Britain and a German-Russo coalition, British overseas territories would become vulnerable targets. In addition, the Russo-Japanese War changed the strategic interest with regard to retaining Weihei Wei, a military post

43 For the impact of the Boer War, see (Carter, 1900; Wilson, 2001). For the impact on British defense budget, see (Redford & Grove, 2014, fig. 1.8).

44 Despite Russia’s defeat, British military leaders believed that Japan’s strength might be exaggerated. (Towle 2006, 81).
meant to counter Russian forces in Port Arthur, though its defense infrastructure was poor and its commercial potential was unclear. Whether Weihei Wei would be a strategic asset after Russian withdrawal from Port Arthur was a matter for debate in Whitehall.\textsuperscript{45}

The rising threat from Germany forced Britain to redirect its deployment back to Europe, leaving its overseas territory isolated and vulnerable.\textsuperscript{46} Britain needed a regional security partner in East Asia that could respond quickly to a military crisis, a trustworthy ally that would help defend the British belongings in the Far East.\textsuperscript{47} Japan was a fine candidate given its military power after the Russo-Japanese War; it would become the largest naval power if the Russian Fleet were to fail in the coming naval battle. An Anglo-Japanese alliance would provide Britain with a powerful ally with the support of which the Royal Navy would be able to redirect its attention to threats in Continental Europe (Best, 2002, p. 15).

Britain had no concerns that Japan would violate the treaty and attack British territories because there was no conflict of interests between Britain and Japan in the Far East, at least in 1905. Britain had no interests in Korea, nor did Japan have any intention to impinge on British interests in China or South Asia. On the other hand, Britain worried that the competition between Russia and Japan would persist after the war, and that Russia would maintain a large naval force in the Far East to seek revenge.

\textsuperscript{45} For internal debate on maintaining the base at Weihei Wei, see (G. Kennedy, 2005, Chapter 1).

\textsuperscript{46} Germany’s naval development started in 1898, when Britain began to see the German navy as a rival that could cripple the Royal Navy as the Royal Army had been crippled during the Boer War (March & Olsen, 1989, vol. 1 p. 11-2).

\textsuperscript{47} For British strategic thinking on the Far East, see (G. Kennedy, 2005, Chapters 1–2).
This being the case, Britain needed to establish a strong presence in the region to counterbalance Russia, which would dilute its effort in order to concentrate on Europe (BDOW, 1927, vol. 4). As Britain planned to redeploy its fleet and concentrate on home waters, it was reluctant to maintain a large military force in the Far East.48

Britain’s concern regarding its overseas territories was evident during the negotiations for renewal of the Treaty. Whitehall recognized that mere renewal would not advance British interests, and Japan had little to contribute to the defense in Europe. Since Britain needed to counterbalance Germany at home, its defense in South and East Asia would inevitably be weakened. Furthermore, a simple renewal of the 1902 Treaty might intensify competition between Japan and Russia, leading to a naval arms race in the Far East. A new treaty would not be attractive to Britain unless Japan were to pledge to protect its overseas interests, particularly India (O’Brien, 2004, pp. 56–57).

Britain therefore proposed a defense obligation in the new treaty. During the latter phase of the negotiations, Britain asked Japan to pledge a specific number of troops dedicated to the defense of India in the event of a conflict. Japan quickly rejected this draft clause and insisted that such an obligation would be inappropriate when the nature of the conflict remained unknown (BDOW, 1927, vol. 4). Japan for its part was reluctant to become involved in armed conflict outside the Far East. Britain eventually accepted Japan’s position and made the clause more general. Article IV of the 1905 Treaty specifically mentioned Britain’s interests in India and Japan’s obligation to safeguard them.

48 For Lord Fisher’s redistribution plan, see (Marder, 1961, vol. 1 p. 40-3)
Britain was able to communicate credibly to Japan its interests in its overseas assets, and Japan understood Britain’s security concern because Russia was still powerful and posed a direct threat to India via Afghanistan (Williams, 1966, p. 362). Japan well knew how threatening Russia could be from the tremendous cost that it had suffered in order to achieve victory in the Russo-Japanese War. Japan also recognized that France might join in aggression against British territories in the Far East owing to the Franco-Russian coalition, and the rising German Reich posed still another threat. These threats were well known to the public. Britain’s possessions were highly exposed to military attacks by potential rivals. Its forward military post in Weihai Wei was very close to Port Arthur and the German treaty port in Shandong. Britain indeed needed a security partner to ensure its territorial interests.

Japan was more concerned about its overseas territories than Britain because it was expected to increase its influence in Northeast Asia after the Russo-Japanese War. Japan deeply worried that the kind of intervention undertaken by the Great Powers after the 1895 Sino-Japanese War would reoccur. After the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Russia, Germany, and France forced Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China. This diplomatic defeat significantly communicated to Japan that European powers might intervene to secure their own interests, for which reason it wanted a supporter among them. Britain was the best candidate since it was a Great Power by capability and

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49 Weihei Wei had been a forward military base intended to counter the Russian military establishment in Port Arthur since late 1897. Germany acquired a treaty port in Kiaochow in 1898 and in Tienjin in 1895. Russian and German possessions in these places were a result of China’s effort to introduce the Great Powers into the Liaotung Peninsula in order to counterbalance Japan. For the acquisition of treaty ports, see (Abend, 1944; Knoll & Hiery, 2010, 2010, pp. 52–56; Tai, 1976).

50 For the diplomatic records on the triple intervention and Japan’s reaction to the loss of the Liaotung Peninsula, see (Asakawa, 1904; Mutsu & Berger, 1982; White, 1964, Chapters 1–7).
reputation, and cooperation under the alliance had been smooth before and during the Russo-Japanese War. British approval would help secure the benefits that Japan hoped to enjoy after the War.

Japan was eager to obtain British support for its position as a great regional power. Korea was already under the influence of Japan as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, and Japan later eradicated the pro-China factions in Korea in the Eulmi Incident. Japanese migrants, including soldiers, businessmen, and workers, flooded into the Korean Peninsula. Between 1890 and 1900, the Japanese population in Korea doubled. A few years later, Japan’s influence expanded greatly as a consequence of its 1905 agreement with the Korean Empire, according to the terms of which Korea transferred the responsibility for post, telegraph, and telephone services into the hands of Imperial Japan. As Japan gained control over Korea, it faced challenges from Russia. Part of the reason for the Russo-Japanese War was Emperor Gojong’s reliance on Russia to counterbalance the influence of Japan.

China was another place where Japan had invested a great amount of capital and labor to develop its newly acquired islands, Taiwan and the Pescadores. Before the establishment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japan secured special rights in Fujian and a lease on the port of Foochow from the Qing court. At the end of Russo-Japanese War, Japan was expected to take over Russian rights and possessions in Manchuria,

51 For more detail on the Eulmi Incident, see (Duus, 1995, Chapter 3; C. I. E. Kim & Kim, 1967; Lone & McCormack, 1993, Chapter 1).

52 For number of Japanese residents in Korea, see (Duus, 1995, p. 290)

53 For Japan’s acquisition of this treaty port in China, see (Brooks, 2000).
and it was eager to secure the fixed such assets as Port Arthur, the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the coal mines along in Manchuria.

For Imperial Japan, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was the best option to introduce a European power into the region and to endorse the new order that had formed after the Russo-Japanese War. Although Britain would not offer to defend Japan’s overseas territories, its involvement would deter Germany and the US from intervening in the post-War order in Manchuria and Korea.\textsuperscript{54} As British foreign minister Lansdowne warned Japan, Russia could seek a chance for revenge even if Japan were to prevail in the impending naval battle.\textsuperscript{55} This concern suggests that Russia would still pose threats to Japan’s territorial interests after the War. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was the ideal security guarantee to keep Japan from finding itself in diplomatic isolation. Japan therefore asked Britain to recognize its rights in Korea, which became Article III of the 1905 Treaty. In return, Japan agreed to expand the scope of the treaty beyond the Far East and pledged to defend India.

Britain ended its “splendid isolation” mainly because of Russian expansion in Manchuria,\textsuperscript{56} and it welcomed the rise of Japan since this would weaken Russian influence in Northeast China. Japan needed support from Britain in order to deter Russia in the region. Britain recognized that Japan needed this renewal in order to secure its war gains. Britain was not concerned that helping Japan to acquire Korea and

\textsuperscript{54} Whitehall anticipated that the US might intervene and asked its embassy in the US to convey the British position of upholding the Treaty of Portsmouth.

\textsuperscript{55} This worry was apparent in a report to Komura from Ambassador Hayashi, and the Japanese cabinet agreed with him on this point (Nish, 1985, pp. 390–1).

\textsuperscript{56} Another important reason was the failure of Anglo-German agreement in 1900; see (Monger, 1963)
Manchuria would make Japan into a threat, since it was still weak compared to the European Great Powers. Japan’s request for renewal was reasonable to Britain since it could clearly observe Japan’s territorial interests. On the other hand, despite Japan’s inferior military capability, Britain believed that Japan would help defend its overseas territories, which again was crucial because it could not spare more military strength to be scattered throughout East Asia.

Japan also knew that the alliance would not add much to its military strength given that Britain aimed to pass the burden of defense in the Far East on to Japan. Japan had a reasonable fear that hostilities in northern India would drag it into an unwanted conflict with other Great Powers. Nevertheless, the alliance was the ideal solution to guarantee its investments in Korea and Manchuria, since no other European power would provide such support.

Britain and Japan showed resolve to maintain their alliance because of the desire of each to protect its own overseas territories in the Far East, in which respect each supported the other after the War ended. Britain supported Japan’s efforts to secure Korea and the Russian properties in South Manchuria, while Japan supported the continuing British military presence in Weihai Wei (BDFA, 1989, vols. 8, 10).

As George Clark, the secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defense, said “I cannot see that a mere renewal would be of great advantage to us” (O’Brien, 2004, p. 56). If Japan insisted on renewal without revision, the alliance would probably have broken down. Again, the overseas possessions of both countries informed the core interests of each and allowed them to find mutually acceptable terms to revise their treaty. Britain was confident that Japan’s growing navy would contribute to its defense
in the Far East, freeing up time and resources for the Royal Navy to redeploy its forces and update obsolete vessels.57

A few months later, Japan defeated Russia in the Battle of Tsushima, and the need for a new treaty became more obvious. The Second Anglo-Japanese alliance was settled in July while Russia and Japan were negotiating peace. Renewal of the alliance renewal facilitated these negotiations to some degree because it boosted Japan’s confidence in the post-War order. Russian delegates sought ways to assure Japan that their country would not seek retaliation or start an arms race in the future. When they heard the news of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, the Russians were more confident that their offer could settle the peace with Japan (Korostovets, 1920, pp. 57, 99).

Second Renewal: 1911

The international security environment changed quickly after the Treaty of Portsmouth. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty successfully prevented Russia from rebuilding a large Far East fleet. It also deterred Russia from launching a revenge attack. The threat along the Indian frontiers proved to be exaggerated. In addition, the Russian threat decreased after the 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente, as a result of which Russia recognized Tibet and Afghanistan as buffer territories and Britain’s concerns about the security of India were assuaged.58 Meanwhile, Germany increasingly became seen as

57 In the following years, the vulnerability of the British China Squadron was discussed in the Colonial Defense Committee, which pointed out that Japan could contribute to the defense of Far East, and that Britain did not need to reinforce the China fleet until the alliance was close to expiration (G. Kennedy, Neilson, & Schurman, 1997, pp. 58–61).

58 For details of Anglo-Russian rapprochement after Russo-Japanese War, see (Massie & Rogers D. Spotswood Collection, 1991, Chapter 32).
Britain’s major threat. The German navy was the world’s second largest by 1906, and after the HMS *Dreadnought* began service in 1907, Germany started building its own Dreadnought-class battleships. The British government had a grave concern about home security as its naval race with Germany intensified.\(^{59}\) Whitehall therefore again had a pressing need to concentrate its defense activities in Europe to the detriment of its defense in the Far East.

In that arena, Japan and Russia reached reconciliation and the former successfully secured its war gains. The Treaty of Portsmouth divided their spheres of influence in Manchuria. The Chinese Eastern Railways was divided into two parts. Russians controlled the northern portion, still called the Chinese Eastern Railways, and Japan the southern part, which was renamed the South Manchurian Railway. In the following years, tension between Russia and Japan cooled down, and the nations reached two agreements in 1907 and 1910. It was in a secret part of the 1907 agreement that they defined their spheres of influence in Manchuria.\(^{60}\)

The 1910 Russo-Japanese agreement was a joint response to an American proposal. At the end of 1909, American Secretary of State Knox requested that Russia and Japan place their share of the railways in Manchuria under international control by allowing the Chinese government to buy them back (LaFeber, 1998, pp. 92–98). Russia and Japan adamantly opposed Knox’s plan. Their agreement, like the 1907 agreement, included a public convention and a secret one. The public part again pledged friendly

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\(^{59}\) For the naval race between Britain and Germany, see for example (P. M. Kennedy, 1980; Marder, 1961; Massie & Rogers D. Spotswood Collection, 1991; Padfield, 1974; Sondhaus, 2001).

\(^{60}\) This part of the agreement was secret but was communicated to France and Britain via their allies.
cooperation in regard to Manchuria Railway. The secret convention again confirmed their exclusive rights in Manchuria, and Russia also approved the Japanese influence in Korea (Berton, 2012, pp. 2–6). The two Russo-Japanese agreements showed a convergence of interest between the former rivals. As the Russian threat diminished, the confrontation between Japan and the US became more intense. Another concern was the Franco-Russian alliance, which no longer existed following the Entente Cordiale. Japan’s outright rejection of the Knox plan was one of the events showing that Japan was on a collision course with the US.\footnote{Japan’s growing naval force made it a potential rival to the US. For the US’s assessment of Japanese threat, see (Braisted, 1971, Chapter 32).}

Facing challenges from the German Reich, Britain found itself increasingly reliant on the US in world politics, and the disputes between the US and Japan suggested that the Anglo-Japanese Treaty might become a burden in the Anglo-American friendship. In addition, the expansion of Japan to the south of the Great Wall created a conflict of interests between the allies because the Yangtze River Valley had long been part of the British sphere of influence.

The changing course of Japanese foreign policy was an indirect result of the Russo-Japanese War. Japan, as mentioned, paid a significant price for its victory. Its deteriorating financial situation forced the Japanese government to accelerate its expansion in China and Korea after the second cabinet of Katsura Taro in 1908 (O’Brien, 2004, p. 102). There were complaints inside the Imperial Japanese government that British policy regarding China, especially its support for the Open Door policy, had become an obstacle to Japanese interests. Criticism also arose from
the general public in Japan and Britain that the alliance hampered the national interests of their respective countries. The increasing divergence between allies was no secret to either government. There was a growing sense in Japan that, despite the lack of confirmation from London, Britain would not renew the alliance when it expired in 1915 (Nish, 1972, p. 47). However, it was not in Japan’s interest to enter into a rivalry with Britain. Japan wanted to sustain the alliance as a way to hedge its conflict of interests with Britain. Japan thus searched for opportunities to continue the alliance. After all, Britain had been a firm supporter of Japanese interests in the Far East. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was very important to Japan, and the government believed that, at this point, it was deriving greater benefit from the alliance than its ally.

The renegotiation of the third Anglo-Japanese alliance was not prompted by either ally but by the action of a third party. Relations between the US and Japan were tense in 1910. The diplomatic frustration over the Manchurian Railway caused discontent in the White House as well as among the American public. The US blamed Britain for not using its position as an ally to pressure Japan. Furthermore, the defense obligation in the alliance treaty suggested that Britain might become a hostile party if conflict erupted between Japan and the US. With this concern in mind, the US approached Britain to propose a general arbitration treaty that would deal with disputes between the US and Britain. Britain gladly entertained President Taft’s proposal because it would strengthen bilateral security ties. Owing to the good relationship between the US and Britain, the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty was signed in early 1911. This treaty, however, created a conflict with the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, since that alliance required Britain to fight, defensively and offensively, against any country that engaged
in conflict with Japan. Britain would have to fight against the US instead of using the arbitration procedure. It was, therefore, necessary to revise the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

When the proposal for an arbitration treaty was circulated within the British cabinet, Britain consulted Japan about it. Britain originally planned to revise the Anglo-Japanese Treaty when it expired in 1915, but Japan took the opportunity to request an early revision and extension of the treaty after it learned about the proposal (Nish, 1972, p. 49).

Japan knew well that the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty was an important security agreement that Britain would not deny. Japan also knew that Britain was unlikely to join in a conflict against the US because it saw the US as a potential ally against Germany. It would be impractical to ask Britain to drop the Arbitration Treaty or to make an exception in the Treaty for Japan. Japan believed, however, that this might be a good opportunity to revisit the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Its goal was to reconfirm the security partnership and, more importantly, extend the period of the alliance in order to keep Britain and Japan on the same side as long as possible.

The Anglo-American relationship played an important role in shaping Japan’s attitude during the renegotiation. Throughout the negotiation of the third agreement, Japan did not ask Britain to change the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, nor did it complain that its security interests might be hurt as a result. On the contrary, Japan reiterated its support for Anglo-American cooperation and emphasized the need to revise the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, voicing the opinion that

It is obvious that with respect to Anglo-American relations, Britain would avoid fighting the US under any circumstances because of her
economic needs as well as the close relations between Canada and the United States. If a conflict between Japan and the United States were to arise, Britain would avoid being involved by all means, notwithstanding the stipulations of the Alliance. Consequently, it is inevitable that the Alliance would have no practical value at all if Japan were to fight against the United States. (Kajima, 1976, vol. 2 p. 464)

Despite some opposition, the mainstream view in the Japanese cabinet was that the alliance was valuable, even vital, to Japanese interests. Foreign Minister Komura was among its strongest advocates. The internal discussion in the Japanese government showed that Korea was again the major concern in extending the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. As discussed, Korea had been under Japanese influence since the Russo-Japanese War drove the Russians out of the peninsula. After an unsuccessful attempt by the Emperor Gojong to seek assistance from Russia, Japan forced him to relinquish his political authority in 1907 and then formally annexed Korea in early 1910, and so was eager to get recognition from other powers.62 Japan recognized that Britain had important role in supporting its expansion in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia (Kajima, 1976, vol. 2 p. 460).

Compared to the situation five years earlier, Japan now had a more urgent need to obtain British support for its plans in the Far East. Its fixed investment increased significantly in Korea and Manchuria. Japan retained regular military bases in Korea after the Russo-Japanese War. Under the 1907 Japan-Korea Treaty, Korea reduced its

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62 The US recognized Japan’s influence in Korea in exchange for Japan’s recognition of the US position in Philippines as a result of the Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905. Though not a formally written agreement, the US and Japan renewed their positions in 1907; see (Art, 1996, pp. 12–3).
military to only a garrison of Imperial Guards. The Japanese Garrison Army in Korea and Kempeitai (military police) assumed control over defense affairs. The military force in Korea, along with the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and the Formosan garrison, were Imperial Japan’s most important overseas military bases.

Japan also invested heavily in constructing railways in Korea to connect the Peninsula with Manchuria. To shorten the transportation distance between Seoul and the Japanese mainland, the Japanese government raised a large amount of capital, more than 12 million yen, to construct a railway between Seoul and Fusan (Myers & Peattie, 1984, Chapter 3).

Korea was Imperial Japan’s major source of primary products and minerals even before the annexation, and it invested vast resources to develop agriculture sectors there and in Taiwan. Japan had started surveying uncultivated lands in Korea as early as 1904 (Gragert, 1994, Chapter 4). Agriculture imports, primarily rice, from these places resolved a shortage of food in Japan. The Japanese government established the Oriental Development Company to modernize the agriculture sector and systematically moved Japanese settlers to Korea. As a result, the Japanese population in Korea grew from 15,891 in 1900 to 126,168 in 1908. By 1910, the Oriental Development Company owned 8,500 hectares of lands (Beasley, 1987, p. 151; Moskowitz, 1974). These Japanese-owned lands supplied agricultural goods to the Empire. To facilitate trade and investment, Japan established the Bank of Korea and charged it with reconstructing the financial order in Korea (Kimura, 1986, 1995). The bank funneled funds into

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63 For more on the impact of these Japanese settlers, see (Uchida, Harvard University, & Asia Center, 2011).
investment in local agriculture, and these efforts significantly increased the productivity of the agriculture sector in Korea.

For these reasons, recognition of its annexation of Korea was very important to Japan: it had made significant investment in the fixed assets on the Korean Peninsula, and feared that other powers would intervene and stop its plan for annexation. This is why Japan requested that Britain recognize the annexation, and had made a similar proposal during the negotiation of the 1905 Treaty when it asked Britain to pledge support if Korea became a Japanese protectorate. Britain had rejected that proposal, which made Japan unsure of British support for the annexation, so it felt the need to secure British approval as part of the revision of the treaty. Japan knew that British support would help it to resist pressure from other powers, particularly the US.

During the negotiation of the Third Anglo-Japanese Treaty, Japan used similar rhetoric to that which Britain had used in 1905. It emphasized that Korea was part of Japanese territory, making its importance comparable to that of British India. If the allies decided to keep the article concerning India, it was argued, there should be a similar article related to Korea (Kajima, 1976, p. 474).

On the other hand, Japan was also making an increasingly deep investment in Manchuria, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance guaranteed Japan’s expansion in Northeast China. Through the operation of the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR), the Japanese government monopolized a 700 mile long transportation corridor in Manchuria. The total revenue from transportation increased from 9 million Japanese yen in 1907 to 15 million in 1910. SMR owned various properties along the railway lines, including tunnels, bridges, schools, buildings, hospitals, libraries, storehouses,
mines, and factories, giving it a total asset value in 1911 of 246 million yen. In addition to the economic profit that it reaped, the SMR also owned extensive lands along the railway lines. It in effect governed 106 cities in Manchuria, and the population in the SMR-controlled area, including Chinese and Japanese immigrants, as discussed, doubled between 1907 and 1911. Manchuria thus constituted an important part of Japan’s economic development.

The SMR received loans from British investors with a value of close to 150 million yen (O’Brien, 2004, p. 179). Although Whitehall did not oversee these loans, they helped to shape the British position of maintaining the status quo in Manchuria. Britain believed that a strong Japan in Asia served its interests. Unlike the US, Britain did not see Japan as a competitor in the region and therefore had no interest in changing the status quo of Japan’s status in Northeast Asia. For example, Britain in 1909 rejected a US proposal to help China construct the Jinzhou-Qiqihar Railway on the grounds that it would undercut the SMR. In addition, Britain refused to provide loans for China to buy back the SMR when Knox proposed internationalizing it.

From Britain’s point of view, the alliance still had the important function of reducing its military deployment in the Far East, though this was not as pressing an issue as it had been in 1905. Despite public anger at Japan, the Liberal cabinet valued the alliance relationship and believed that it was in Britain’s interest to keep an ally in the Far East (Nish, 1972, p. 62). The primary objective of Whitehall remained

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64 The Japanese referred these areas as a “leased zone,” but neither Russia nor Imperial China had agreed to lease these lands to Japan. SMR ownership was based on China’s inability to govern the Manchuria.

65 For more on Japan’s economic colonialism in Korea, see (Myers & Peattie, 1984, Chapters 3, 9–11).
concluding the Arbitrary Treaty with the US, but it was reluctant to sacrifice the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the process.

Whitehall understood that such a treaty might cause concern for Japan. From the beginning of the renegotiation, British officials tried to convince the Japanese government that the Arbitration Treaty would not sabotage the Anglo-Japanese friendship. Britain repeatedly assured Japan that the alliance would be renewed. For instance, British Foreign Minister Edward Grey told the British Ambassador in Japan, “I am anxious that nothing should happen which would give the impression that the Alliance was weakening, or was not going to be renewed” (BDOW, 1927, vol. 8 no. 411).

To be sure, Britain had a problem communicating its commitment to the alliance credibly, since the Arbitration Treaty suggested a change in Britain’s main security partner in Asia. In order to minimize Japan’s concern, Britain kept the Japanese well informed about the progress of the Arbitration Treaty and agreed that the alliance renewal should take place around the same time that the Arbitration Treaty was signed. The British cabinet also agreed that extending the period of alliance would send a signal of friendship (BDOW 1927, vol. 8 no 420). During the negotiations with Japan, the British government used unanimous consent in the Imperial Conference to demonstrate its resolve to maintain the alliance. Several British dominions raised objections to the renewal, citing the potential threat posed by Japanese expansion, but Britain
nevertheless managed to secure unanimous agreement. This move showed that Britain indeed wanted to extend the alliance.

More importantly, Britain recognized the annexation of Korea in the early stages of renegotiation, which boosted Japan’s confidence in the alliance. The two allies did differ on the wording of the arbitration clause. Britain encouraged Japan to become part of the Arbitration Treaty with the US, but Japan rejected this and was anxious to clarify the condition that the Arbitration Treaty would nullify the defense obligation in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japan was very careful to reiterate that a conflict with the US would be improbable and indeed avoided even mentioning the US in the Treaty (BDOW, 1927, sec. 8 no 429). It was eager to clarify the British military commitment because it wanted to know whether Britain would intervene in a conflict between Japan and the US. Britain gave a clear explanation of the application of the Arbitrary Treaty, though it rejected Japan’s original desire for a secret memorandum to illustrate the contingencies (Kajima, 1976, p. 486).

The British intention to protect Japanese interests in Korea earned Japan’s trust, but Japan failed to secure British recognition of its sphere of influence in China. Grey was concerned that Japanese expansion in Asia would eventually threaten British interests in China. Nevertheless, Britain was able to signal its commitment to the alliance by candidly revealing information about the Arbitration Treaty with the US, agreeing to support Japan’s annexation of Korea, and marshaling support from British dominions. The rapprochement between the US and Britain clearly signaled the latter’s

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66 Japanese immigration was the most acute issue for these dominions, but they nevertheless agreed that extension of the alliance would restrain the behavior of Imperial Japan (Nish 1972, 62; BDOW 1927, vol. 8 no 427).
updated security interests. Japan did not insist on a secret memorandum because it understood that Britain was reluctant to engage in secret diplomacy without informing the US about it. The alliance-specific assets and external alliance were thus the main causes for successful renegotiation.

The 1911 renewal fulfilled the interests of both Japan and Britain. With Japan’s help in defense, Britain transferred the majority of its Far East naval capability back to Europe. The Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, however, failed to be ratified by the US Congress. Despite this unsuccessful alignment effort, Whitehall still maintained a close relationship with the US government. Japan continued its colonization in Korea with no interference from the Great Powers. Its influence in Manchuria remained unchallenged, and its expansion in China was more active after the Chinese Revolution opened an era of conflict among Chinese warlords.

The End of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance

The Anglo-Japanese alliance in the following years turned into a “hollow friendship,” in the words of Nish. A few years after the alliance was renewed, Britain took notice of the Japanese intelligence operation in India and suspected that Japan had secretly aided the Indian nationalist movement. The alliance nevertheless survived

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67 Churchill decreased the battleship fleet in the Far East from five to two and replaced other ships with cruisers (Saxon, 2000, p. 65).

68 Although the Taft administration strenuously supported the Arbitration Treaty that it had signed with Britain, the US Senate refused to ratify the treaty and suggested revision, and Taft refused to alter it. The treaty thus did not go into force. For the struggle between the Taft administration and the Congress, see (Noyes, 2011). To some extent, the Senate’s rejection of that treaty defeated the purpose for the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but this did not impact Anglo-Japanese relations.

69 For the survey of British intelligence on Japanese movement in India, see (Best, 2002).
the First World War, for Japan joined the Triple Entente and occupied the German territories in China and Pacific Islands. During the War, Japan deployed its fleet to the Mediterranean to assist the Royal Navy, and it also helped Britain to defend its Far East dominions and colonies.\textsuperscript{70}

World War I significantly hampered the development of British military strength, while Japanese military power, by contrast, increased significantly.\textsuperscript{71} The rise of Japan in the Far East after the Great War eroded British interests, particularly in China. Moreover, the antagonistic relationship between the US and Japan and Britain’s coalition with the US made Japan believe that the alliance was becoming unreliable. In such an uncertain atmosphere, both Britain and Japan worried about the future of their friendship after the Agreement expired in 1921.

In order to avoid diplomatic isolation and in particular to maintain amicable relations with Britain and the US, Japan expressed its intention to renew the alliance in 1920. Britain replied that this matter should be discussed in the summer Imperial Conference.\textsuperscript{72} The allies came to an agreement to issue a joint declaration of their intention to continue the alliance. Japan felt reassured by Britain’s gesture, but was still unsure whether it actually would keep its word. In fact, the British cabinet supported

\textsuperscript{70}Britain originally planned to acquire destroyers from Japan to replace vessels lost in the War. For Anglo-Japanese cooperation during the Great War, see (Field, 2004, p. 19; Saxon, 2000). For Japan’s interest in joining the Great War, see (Kajima, 1976, vol. 3 Ch. 4-5).

\textsuperscript{71}Despite Japan’s rise, its naval power still could not compare with that of Britain in the 1920s.

\textsuperscript{72}Britain was reluctant to renegotiate the terms of the treaty until it had canvassed opinions in the US and British dominions in Asia; see (Braisted, 1971, p. 557). Japan was aware of this, and feared that abrogation of the alliance would create a British-American coalition against it. The Japanese cabinet decided to maintain the alliance, or at least to sign a new agreement among the three; see (Kajima, 1976, vol. 3 p. 434-6)
renewal, and wanted to include the US in the alliance. With the proper revisions, Britain could draw the US into the treaty and create a tripartite alliance to ensure the members’ territories and special rights in the Far East.\(^7\) This was the reason that Britain repeatedly requested a preliminary meeting among the three nations before the Washington Naval Conference. Britain wished to deal with the Anglo-Japanese alliance in tri-party talks, but this proposal was rejected by the US.\(^7\) As a result, Britain found it hard to communicate its benign intentions toward Japan. The Imperial Conference in the summer of 1921 further weakened Japan’s confidence, as it was informed that Canada, one of the most important dominions in the Commonwealth, firmly opposed another renewal.\(^7\)

At the invitation of the US, the Washington Naval Conference opened in 1921. Japan was full of dismay and suspicion when it attended the Conference, believing that Britain had dragged it to an arena in which the US planned to constrain its military power. The US wanted to link the disarmament with the Pacific naval issue, which Japan opposed, and Britain did not speak up in its defense.\(^7\) Although the Anglo-Japanese alliance was not an official part of the conference proceedings, the US was

\(^7\) Britain still saw in Japan a strong protector of its overseas interests such as Hong Kong and India. It was also concerned that Japan might ally with Germany if the alliance were to be terminated (Nish, 1972, p. 310).

\(^7\) Britain asked the US three times to open a preliminary meeting, continuing this effort until the end of August; see (Vinson, 1955, pp. 121–2).

\(^7\) Canada threatened to leave the Commonwealth if Britain renewed the Anglo-Japanese alliance (Brebner, 1935; Nish, 1972, p. 339).

\(^7\) For US policy regarding the Washington Conference, see (Buckley, 1970; Vinson, 1955). The hostility between the US and Japan had been manifest; public discussions were taking place on whether the two countries would soon come into open military conflict; see, for example, (Pitkin, 1921).
determined to terminate it from the beginning, despite several attempts by Britain to convince its allies that the Anglo-Japanese alliance could coexist with Anglo-American friendship.

Britain’s effort to preserve the alliance eventually failed because there were no more common territorial interests that Britain could endorse for Japan, which sensed Britain’s reluctance to support its adventures in China. For Britain, the informal coalition with the US superseded the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The external alliance with the US sent a negative signal to Japan, contrary to what Britain had hoped. Britain wanted to preserve the Anglo-Japanese alliance while weakening the Japanese threat to the US by limiting its navy; this was the main reason it invited Japan to the Conference. The US, however, had a different plan: it was adamant about ending the Anglo-Japanese alliance regardless of the British desire to maintain it. Britain found it difficult to navigate between its allies, and reluctantly accepted the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which confirmed Japan’s suspicion that Britain was willing to abandon the Anglo-Japanese alliance in order to strengthen its friendship with the US. Japan made the decision to terminate an alliance that no longer protected its territorial interests.

**Conclusion**

The renewals of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty showed that these allies consolidated their alliance relationship by treaty revision when their alliance was in danger of collapsing. The general historical account for such success builds on the shared interests between allies. The British and Japanese interests in the Far East were quite coherent before the Great War. A closer look at the bargaining process between Britain
and Japan suggests that these allies had different security needs, and that each tried to persuade the other to commit to obligations that were favorable to their own. For example, in the 1905 renegotiation, Britain tried to stipulate the type and amount of Japanese military support for the defense of India, but Japan resisted and a bargain was made in the final text of the treaty. Britain and Japan both genuinely pushed for the best possible distribution of treaty obligations. If any party had decided to be unyielding during the negotiations, it would have been difficult to reach the final bargain.

The allies needed to ensure that their partners were still committed to the alliance and that renewal of the treaty would create a sustained cooperative relationship. In the 1905 renewal, the alliance-specific assets affected the allies’ bargaining behavior, since they both recognized that their investments in China (and Korea) should be protected by the agreement. Britain and Japan were cooperative during the bargaining because they recognized that some demands regarding obligations, such as specific requirements for Japanese support for Britain in India, were in effect not feasible or distracted from the overall purpose of the alliance.

Britain and Japan were aware of each other’s main interests in Asia, and it was clear that the alliance would provide each with the necessary security benefit. They realized that the fate of their own territorial possessions highly depended on the security of the other’s territory. This understanding generated credible commitment to future alliance relationship. Because each ally was confident that the other had a substantial interest in maintaining the alliance, both were able to communicate their demands credibly and to appear more accommodating during the renegotiation. Even after their proposals were rejected, neither saw this as a sign of weakened commitment. Britain
accepted the Japanese objection to specifying military assistance to India because it realized that Japan’s ability to project military power was limited. Japan accepted the British refusal to recognize Korea as a Japanese protectorate because such a status was not yet justified in 1905, and no schedule for progress toward it was set.

Moreover, Japan and Britain understood that further delay in announcing the renewal might impact the pending Russo-Japanese peace negotiations. The renewal would continue to signal a cohesive alliance and deter Russia from attempting revenge. Further, were the alliance not to be renewed in 1905, the British election the following year might elect a Liberal government that would oppose extension of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, in which case the window of opportunity for renewal would have been lost.

In 1911, the need to revise the treaty was more urgent because the interest divergence between allies enlarged. The alliance-specific assets took on a larger role, since Japan needed British recognition of its annexation of Korea, and the British navy needed to concentrate on the German threat in Europe. The Russo-Japanese rapprochement and Anglo-American friendship signaled updated security interests for both Japan and Britain. Again, the allies discussed the fate of their alliance. The British recognition of the annexation of Korea from the start increased Japan’s confidence in Britain’s commitment. Realizing that Japan had become a strong military power that could significantly contribute to the security of its overseas possessions, Britain used its prestige to protect Japan’s interests in Korea and Manchuria in order to secure the colonies in the Far East. Not only did Britain and Japan recognize each other’s strategic interests in holding these overseas territories, each was also aware that the other had
made significant investment in those territories and could not afford the security risk were the alliance not to be renewed.

The 1920-21 renegotiation, by contrast, failed. Despite Britain’s efforts to signal its friendly intentions, Japan became increasingly uncertain about the British position regarding renewal. During the Washington Naval Conference, Japan had the impression that Britain was joining hands with the US to suppress the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Britain was aware of Japan’s frustration, but the unbending attitude of the US and its growing importance in maintaining peace in the Far East made Britain unable to propose an effective alternative. Japan realized that the US would force Britain to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese alliance even against British wishes.

In the case discussed in this chapter, successful renegotiation depended on the ability of each ally to verify its partner’s commitment to their alliance. Each ally relied on public information regarding military deployment, military strength, and the balance of power in international politics in order to understand the other’s core interests in relation to the alliance. These core interests only matter when they cannot be easily ignored and are threatened when not protected by the alliance. In the case of Britain and Japan, territorial interests in the Far East, along with large investments in those territories, were evidence of their sustained loyalty to the alliance. As these interests faded during the interwar period, Britain found it increasingly difficult to communicate to Japan its intention to maintain the alliance, as was evident during the Washington Naval Conference. Japan also found it difficult to convince Britain that it did not intend to infringe on the latter’s exclusive interests in China. Although Japan had no plans to expand into Hong Kong or Singapore at the time, its move south of the Great Wall was
a cause of concern to Whitehall. Japan’s rising ambition made Britain unable to verify its true intentions regarding British territories and dominions.
Chapter 5 The Sino-Soviet alliance: a lost opportunity

*Overview of the Sino-Soviet split 1950-1969*

In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the People’s Republic of China. The CCP’s victory in the Chinese Civil War largely depended on the support of the Soviet Union. With Chiang Kai-shek’s retreat to Taiwan, the main security agenda of the CCP was to eliminate the remaining Nationalist (KMT) forces in Southern China and Taiwan, and this required Soviet support. The CCP and Moscow maintained a close relationship. As the PRC inherited the international status of the Nationalist regime, so the “Treaty of Friendship and Alliance” signed by the KMT and the Soviets in 1945 was still effective. The Soviets wanted the PRC to continue this treaty, but the CCP refused owing to provisions regarding Manchuria and Mongolia. Moscow then agreed to write a new treaty with the PRC and made several concessions regarding Manchuria. In 1950, Zhou Enlai and Andrzej Wyszyński signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, which provided for a defense obligation and economic assistance from the Soviets. This treaty formally established the Sino-Soviet alliance.

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77 For Soviet assistance to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War, see (Westad, 1993, 2003).

78 These concessions included the withdrawal of the Soviet force from Port Arthur, privileges in Dalian, and the ownership of the Manchuria Railway, benefits that Stalin acquired from his treaty with KMT. See (Radchenko, 2009, p. 8).

79 See (Z. Shen, Li, & Stiffler, 2010, pp. 395–7). For detailed background on the formation of the alliance, see (Li, 2002, pp. 116–38). The alliance was soon tested during the Korean War; for the discussion between Mao and Stalin during this conflict, see (Goncharov, Lewis, Xue, & Rogers D. Spotswood Collection, 1993, Chapters 5–6).
The relations between the two fellow communist nations reached their apex when Mao voiced support for the Soviets during the Polish-Hungarian Crisis, but dissatisfaction gradually grew. After Stalin died and Khrushchev assumed leadership, the Soviet Union altered its Stalinist policy and the divergence between the allies became salient. Mao Zedong confronted Khrushchev openly, denouncing him and his followers of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as “revisionists.” Irritated by China’s disobedience and challenges, Khrushchev ceased all economic and military assistance to its ostensible ally.

Efforts were made to remedy the broken friendship. In 1963, delegates met for negotiations that eventually fell apart. In October of the next year, Khrushchev was forced to step down, after which the Soviets stopped criticizing the CCP and an opportunity for reconciliation emerged. Mao seized this opportunity and sent a Chinese delegation to meet with the new Soviet leaders, but this did not mend the broken relationship. The Soviet Union and China resumed criticizing each other in party publications, but in the spring of 1965, despite Brezhnev’s pessimism, Kosygin made two visits to Beijing to seek friendship; these trips proved to be a disappointment, however, and no further attempt was made to maintain the alliance.

When the US intervened in Vietnam in 1965, China and the Soviet Union competed with each other in sending support to the Vietcong, and China went so far as to sabotage the Soviet effort to bring an end to the war. In 1967 and 1968, skirmishes between forces from the two sides took place along the Sino-Soviet border in Northeast

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80 When Mao and his delegation visited Moscow, they stayed in the Kremlin, an honor offored to no other foreign delegation. Compared with Mao’s visit in 1949, the Soviets treated the Chinese with the highest degree of hospitality. See (Zhongguo Zhong E Guanxishi Yanjiuhui, 1997, pp. 72–6).
China, and these disputes quickly escalated. In the spring of 1969, a military conflict erupted over Zhenbao (Damanskii) Island, an uninhabited island on the Ussuri River.\textsuperscript{81} Although neither China nor the Soviets formally abrogated the Sino-Soviet alliance, its obligations no longer bound either party, and neither evoked their treaty in reference to their relationship in this period until it expired 11 years later. The relationship had remained tense, and both side prepared for a large-scale conflict.\textsuperscript{82}

There has been a tremendous amount of literature on the Sino-Soviet split published in the post-Cold War era. With the partial declassification of primary documents in China and Russia, scholars are able to piece together the opinions of leadership circles in the period between 1956 and 1969. In this chapter, I do not intend to make any new claims regarding the reasons behind the Sino-Soviet split. The aim is instead to investigate Sino-Soviet relations from the perspective of reasons why China and the Soviet Union could not maintain their alliance through renegotiation. Not only did they fail to show continuous commitment to a common course, but they also had little evidence of each other’s sincerity. The following discussion takes into account the Soviet specialists assigned to China, Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program and ballistic missile development, the issues of a joint submarine force and long-wave radar, the negotiation in 1964-5, competition during Vietnam War, and the Soviet alliance with Mongolia. I will discuss the relevant variables and shed light on the two sides’ failure to renegotiate. Table 5.1 lists important developments in the Sino-Soviet relationship and a brief summary of the reason for their renegotiation failure.

\textsuperscript{81} For the origin and result of the 1969 border clash, see (Kuisong, 2000; Wich, 1980).

\textsuperscript{82} For a detailed list of events on Sino-Soviet relations, see (Jones, Kevill, & Day, 1985).
Table 5.1: Summary of Sino-Soviet Split

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Consequence</th>
<th>Variable</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 1958 | • Dispute on long-range radar and joint submarine fleet  
      • Second Taiwan Strait Crisis | • Disagreements emerged between communist partners.  
   • The Soviets saw China an unrestrained partner that might entrap them in a conflict with the US.  
   • China became dissatisfied regarding Soviet intervention on the question of Taiwan and Sino-India border conflict. |  |
| 1960 | • Withdrawal of Soviet specialists  
      • Ceased nuclear and missile assistance.  
      • The polemic between CCP and CPSU began. | • The Soviets withdrew their most important investment in bilateral relations.  
   • The Soviets’ reservations regarding defense technology transfer made China doubt its ally’s willingness to cooperate.  
   • The security benefit of the alliance weakened as China was uncertain about the Soviet commitment.  
   • China managed to develop its economy and weaponry without the Soviet help. Its reliance on the alliance decreased. |  |
| 1964 | • Khrushchev stepped down.  
      • Sino-Soviet negotiation | • China was unsure of the attitude of the new Soviet leaders toward the alliance.  
   • The Soviets were too optimistic about China’s change of policy.  
   • The Soviet leaders failed to provide substantive cooperation that satisfied China’s security interest. |  |
| 1966 | • The formation of Soviet-Mongolian alliance | • The alliance signaled the Soviet’s determination to counter China on northern Chinese border.  
   • Chinese leader believed that the Soviet Union would attack and redirected its military strength to its northern border. |  |

It is widely recognized that the personalities of Mao and Khrushchev and their divergence on ideological grounds were crucial to the Sino-Soviet split. Mao’s insistence on Stalinism and world revolution created a rift with the Soviet leadership that continued to shape the Sino-Soviet relationship during the Brezhnev era. Personal characteristics pushed Sino-Soviet relations to a bitter end, but that was only part of the
story. These allies’ lack of confidence in each other was not based on prejudice but on the lack of dedicated commitment on the part of either. The Sino-Soviet alliance resulted in the investment of a very limited amount of fixed assets in the relationship, which made it difficult to guarantee a long-term partnership. When the allies’ interest divergence grew larger over the issue of Taiwan or India (Tibet), it became more difficult to coordinate common security goals, since neither felt the need to make concessions in a process of intra-alliance bargaining.

As this chapter will show, the ten years of polemics over Marxism did not fully represent how the leaders viewed their relationship or each other’s ideology, but were rather a bargaining tool in a struggle in which each side tried to compel the other to concede. Some concessions were offered after Khrushchev stepped down, but not enough to constitute a credible signal that their divergence could be resolved. Later on, the Soviet alliance with Mongolia confronted Beijing with the prospect of a Soviet presence on China’s northern border and signaled the Soviets’ new strategic interests. These moves reinforced Beijing’s fear of a pending Soviet attack and foreclosed any hope of restoring friendship between the two communist nations.

**Sovereignty above All**

The Sino-Soviet alliance treaty did not mandate any military installation on either party’s territory; any talk of doing so was thought to impede rather than to promote their relationship. The Treaty with the KMT did allow for a Soviet military presence in Manchuria. Most of the Soviet troops withdrew when the CCP established the PRC, but the Soviet military continued to occupy Port Arthur, which became a bone of
contention during the negotiation of the 1950 Treaty.\textsuperscript{83} China insisted on the return of Port Arthur, and Stalin eventually conceded, though the Soviet troops did not completely withdraw from the city until five years later. This act alerted the Chinese leaders that the Soviet Union, like Tsarist Russia, still wanted to maintain an influence over China. The “hundred-year humiliation” created a strong aversion to military cooperation in the form of troops or equipment on Chinese soil.\textsuperscript{84} To prevent any Soviet control over China’s internal affairs, Zhou Enlai signed a supplemental document along with the alliance treaty in which China declared that no treaty ports or foreign investment would be allowed in Manchuria or Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{85} Beijing meant to consolidate its sovereignty and to counter Soviet influence in these regions.

An event in summer of 1958 showed the difficulty of Sino-Soviet military cooperation in the context of China’s fear of infringement on its sovereignty. The Soviet military had no ballistic missiles that could strike the western coast of the US. The military suggested deploying a submarine fleet on the eastern coast of China. To do so, the Soviets would need a long-wave radio station in Asia for communication

\textsuperscript{83} For negotiation of the new Sino-Soviet treaty and China’s concerns, see (Goncharov et al., 1993, Chapters 3–4; Wei, 1956, Chapter 13).

\textsuperscript{84} The modern diplomatic history of China is marked by frustration over the encroachment of the Great Powers. These humiliating concessions inspired modern Chinese nationalism. For a discussion of Chinese diplomatic history and nationalism, see (Robinson & Shambaugh, 1994; Scott, 2008; Spence & Rogers D. Spotswood Collection, 1990, Chapters 9–11; Zhao, 2004)

\textsuperscript{85} The Soviets gained privileges in Manchuria through their treaty with the KMT. In Xinjiang, the Soviets gained privileges including mines and settlements from local warlord Sheng Shicai. See (Zhongguo Zhong E Guanxishi Yanjiuhui, 1997, pp. 129–46).
with the fleet. The Soviets had already been helping the Chinese to build several radio stations upon the establishment of the PLA’s submarine fleet, but China needed a high power, long wave radio station to command deep sea submarine operations. Given the high cost of building such a station, the Soviets proposed sharing expenses; return, they would have access to the station for ten years. At the same time, Soviet Ambassador Yudin proposed joint construction of a submarine fleet in his offer of Soviet naval assistance to Mao. Mao, however, was immediately on guard against the proposal and suspected that the Soviets intended to use the joint fleet as a prerequisite for future navy assistance.

The proposal touched a sensitive nerve in China. The Soviet Union simply wanted to build a submarine fleet in concert with its allies and jointly defend against the US. China, however, believed that this was an attempt to exert control over the PLA navy. The next day, Yudin was summoned to meet Mao again, who lamented that:

You do not trust the Chinese at all, only the Russians. Russians are superior while the Chinese are inferior and careless. So you want a joint venture? Since you want a joint venture, let us discuss everything—army, navy, air force. Industry, agriculture, culture, and education. Is this okay? Maybe we should give you the entire Chinese coastline of over then thousand kilometers, while we only keep a guerrilla army. You possess only a little nuclear power, yet you want to control and lease. (Z. Shen & Xia, 2015, pp. 311–14)

86 Li, Beijing yu Mosike, 469. The Soviet National Defense Committee proposed India or China as locations to build a long-wave radio station; Khrushchev rejected the Indian plan in anticipation of objections by Nehru (Z. Shen & Xia, 2015, p. 308).
Mao believed that the long-wave radio and joint fleet proposals violated Chinese sovereignty. These proposals recalled painful memories of the European powers establishing settlements in China. To be sure, the Soviets did not plan to take advantage of China. The CPSU was concerned about its struggle with the US and wanted Chinese help for the sake of Chinese interests. From the Chinese perspective, however, any joint security cooperation would fall under the suspicion of foreign control. This incident was not a simple miscommunication or mistranslation between Yudin and Mao. Claiming that a cooperative fleet would be a means of “control and lease” showed that China was deeply concerned about Soviet involvement in its military affairs.

The Soviet relationship with the Eastern bloc countries was mostly hierarchical. The Sino-Soviet alliance was an exception. China feared any sign of dependence on the Soviets in bilateral cooperation, and the Soviets usually tolerated this concern. Mao’s rage quickly got back to the Kremlin. Khrushchev immediately arranged a secret visit to meet Mao in person. He blamed the Soviet military for the manner in which they had presented the two proposals and claimed that Yudin sent the wrong message. He guaranteed that the CPSU had never considered a joint command or joint possession of the Chinese fleet. Mao and Khrushchev agreed to scrap the joint fleet proposal. As for the long-wave radio station, China insisted on paying for the construction but agreed to allow the Soviets access to it.

A similar interaction occurred in 1957, when the US deployed tactical missiles (MGMs) on Taiwan. This significantly increased Taiwan’s deterrence capability, further strengthened Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, and dimmed Beijing’s hope to take control of Taiwan. China protested vehemently, and the Soviets took the initiative to
ask if they should issue a similar statement. Ambassador Yudin then proposed to help China build its missile defense. It was not clear whether the missiles would be operated by the Soviet military or the PLA, but Zhou declined the proposal without further clarification (Z. Shen, Li, & Stiffler, 2010, p. 222). China believed that the US was deploying the MGM missiles to restrain Chiang. Mao and his leadership circle feared that direct Soviet intervention in the Taiwan Strait would bring similar Soviet influence in China. China was resolute about preventing any foreign encroachment on its autonomy.

These events demonstrate why Sino-Soviet security cooperation was limited to financial and technical assistance. Owing to sovereignty concerns, the Sino-Soviet militaries had no joint exercise or operation. The Soviet Union helped China to build up its military strength, but it seldom asked China to defend its security interests. Most of the alliance relationship was handled through the foreign services, and there were no regular communication channels between leaders or high-ranking officers. Leaders in Beijing and Moscow were therefore often unsure about the attitude of their counterparts. The lack of substantive cooperation brought with it a lack of trust and room for suspicion.

Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the leaders knew clearly that their security interests were parallel and they made attempts to reach reconciliation. The problem was that neither could convince the other to concede or to join in crafting a solution that would transcend their differences. Beijing and Moscow relied on a fragile

prospect of cooperation and empty promises when evaluating their alliance relationship, and it gradually lost its function.

**Nuclear and Missile Assistance**

Nuclear cooperation and ballistic missile technology transfer were of great importance for the Sino-Soviet alliance. Both sides saw this kind of cooperation as key to their friendship and symbolic of their commitment to the alliance. The withdrawal of the Soviet specialists was part of the larger program of Soviet military assistance to China. The struggle between Mao and Khrushchev ended the Soviet specialists program and with it Soviet assistance with nuclear and ballistic missiles.

The CCP showed interest in developing nuclear weapons before 1950. Stalin was willing to extend the Soviet nuclear umbrella to include China, but was hesitant to share nuclear technology with it. In the draft alliance treaty proposed by the Soviets, the Soviet Foreign Ministry wrote that the defense obligation included “military and other assistance with all the means.” This implies that the Soviets would use nuclear weapons to defend an ally. Mao, however, was not satisfied with the treaty. He asked the Soviets to help China to obtain its own nuclear capability, but Stalin refused.

After Stalin had died, Mao asked Khrushchev in 1954 whether the Soviet Union would provide assistance with the development of atomic energy and nuclear weapons. Although the Sino-Soviet relationship was then at its height, Khrushchev only went so far as to promise to help China build a prototype reactor for research purposes. A few months later, the two reached an agreement in accordance with which the Soviets dispatched experts to help China build the research reactor and promises were made to help survey and excavate uranium ore in China. China’s nuclear research advanced
quickly under Soviet guidance. The team of a dozen Soviet nuclear specialists was behind the design and construction of China’s first nuclear reactor and cyclotron. It also brought teaching curriculums to train Chinese scientists and engineers, and supervised experiments with the nuclear reactor. In 1956, the Soviet Union and China jointly established a nuclear research institute in Dubna that housed a physics laboratory with the most advanced equipment and was focused on scientific research and training. Many Chinese nuclear physicists received instruction during their visits and went on to form the core advisors for China’s nuclear weapon program (Z. Shen et al., 2010, pp. 213–6).

Between 1955 and 1957, Soviet nuclear assistance was forthright and prompt. China had a very limited technological foundation in terms of nuclear science. The Soviets not only delivered necessary equipment and fissile materials, but also offered the most advanced training to Chinese experts, so that China was able to establish its own nuclear industry within just a single decade.

Despite their generous assistance, the Soviets did not want China to produce a nuclear weapon. Their assistance focused on civilian rather than military use of nuclear energy, with the goal of helping China to build the basic infrastructure that was severely lacking. Starting in 1956, the Soviets tried to negotiate a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the US and Britain, and it would have been inappropriate to allow China to build a nuclear bomb while asking other nuclear states to stop nuclear tests.

This attitude became clear with regard to the technological transfer of ballistic missiles. The Soviets had been unwilling to respond directly to China’s requests, and cooperation did not begin until late 1957. The Soviets agreed to provide two R-2
(PAKETA-2) missiles, related training equipment, and a team of 102 rocket engineers and technicians. These missiles were an outdated model, first tested in 1946 and retired in 1953. It was clear that the Soviets wanted to limit the development of ballistic missiles in China. Nevertheless, with the help of the Soviets Chinese missile technology progressed significantly. In 1958, China established its first missile unit and a ballistic missile training facility. The Soviets provided five SAM missiles for deployment and research. China was able to test its first short-range ballistic missile in 1960.

The Soviets were very careful, however, not to release the latest military technology to China. For example, before his trip to China, the Soviet missile expert Major General Aleksandr Savel’ev was summoned to Moscow and instructed not to reveal information related to equipment other than what that had already been delivered to China. Were he to become unsure about whether to discuss a certain subject, Savel’ev was to ask for instructions from Moscow through the Soviet embassy. The Soviets refused to provide the key parts, materials, and specialized equipment necessary to produce advanced weaponry. China was aware of Soviet reservations. Nie Rongzhen, the head of China’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, commented that “Soviet aid was with reservation and limitations … They wanted us to copy their third line or outdated equipment, but did not give us the latest first or second line products” (Nie, 1983, p. 805).88

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88 Nie also recommended that Mao decrease the number of graduate students being sent to the Soviet Union because the Soviets set limitations on what these students could study (Nie, 1983, p. 808).
The Soviet Union gradually reduced its nuclear assistance to China in late 1950s. Khrushchev purposefully delayed the delivery of a nuclear bomb sample and blueprints in 1959 (Z. Shen et al., 2010, p. 239). To alleviate China’s security concerns, the Soviets reemphasized their security guarantee, including the nuclear umbrella, on various occasions (Jersild, 2014, p. 148). All the same, they recalled some of their nuclear specialists the next year, stopped sending the specialists who were essential to China’s ballistic missile research, and tightened control over those specialists who still worked in China. The Soviets ignored China’s requests for specialists and equipment. When, in 1960, Moscow terminated all nuclear and ballistic missile assistance to China, only seven of 30 nuclear projects were complete.

The Soviets thus cut off the most important, if not the only, cooperative venture in the Sino-Soviet alliance, a move that suggested that they no longer believed China’s support to be vital for advancing their own security interests. Indeed, Mao’s radical ideology made China seem more like a saboteur rather than an ally in the Soviets’ attempts to reconcile with the US. Recalling their specialists was a strong signal that the Soviets might back away from their alliance commitment. The most important problem was, however, the ease with which the Soviets were able to withdraw all their assistance. The withdrawal of specialists and halt on equipment supply had an immediate impact to China’s industrialization and weapons development. China struggled to complete the work that had been begun jointly on its own and realized that it had relied too much on aid that the Soviets might cease at any moment if China misbehaved; the same might be the case with the nuclear umbrella written into the alliance treaty. China began to doubt the Soviets’ determination to use nuclear weapons
were its security to be subject to the US nuclear threat. Fear of abandonment by the Soviets drove China from relying on the alliance and motivated it to continue its nuclear weapons program, since Soviet aid in the first few years had given China the capability to produce a nuclear bomb and ballistic missiles.

Withdrawing specialists was meant to punish China and coerce it to cooperate with the Soviet Union in foreign policy. The Soviets also bore some cost since they had invested a significant amount of equipment and human resources in the Sino-Soviet relationship. But their loss was not permanent. The specialists went home to serve the Soviet Union and could be dispatched again should the program be resumed, in which case they would still have influence over China’s industrialization or weapon development. So it was during the temporary thaw in Sino-Soviet relations in 1961, when the failure of the Great Leap Forward brought pressure to bear on Mao’s leadership in CCP.89 The Soviet Union quickly restored its assistance, offering China equipment necessary for its nuclear industry and several nuclear specialists.90 The next year, when Sino-Soviet tension rose owing to the Cuba Crisis, the Soviets again put an end to the assistance. The mercurial nature of Soviet assistance was a problem that contributed to the lack of trust in the Sino-Soviet alliance.

*The Soviet Specialist Program*

The Sino-Soviet alliance did not have any fixed assets on the part of either side at any point during the alliance relationship, or at least no military establishment that was

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89 (Luthi, 2008, pp. 194–7). As Mao’s power weakened in the party, the criticism toward the Soviets decreased.

90 See Shen’s interview on An Chun-xiang (Z. Shen, 2004, p. 131 endnote 1). An was one of the senior engineer in nuclear program.
meant to protect the security of the allies. The closest the Soviets came to investment in the alliance relationship was the specialist program. The Soviets sent thousands of experts in various fields to assist China who contributed to China’s technological development in industry, agriculture, higher education, and national defense. The Kremlin made a friendly gesture by allowing these experts to share technology and scientific research. The program was intended to show that the Soviets treated China with respect and as an equal, unlike the imperialists of the previous era.

Between 1950 and 1956, 5092 Soviet experts worked in China, most of whom were engineers and factory chiefs. Some worked for the universities in fields including philosophy, economics, engineering, and languages. The assistance of Soviet experts and the equipment was crucial to the establishment of industries in the new China. The Chinese media reported that about a quarter of newly founded enterprises received the Soviet support, but the actual number was higher.\textsuperscript{91} Before the Soviet specialists withdrew, they helped build 265 enterprises in China. Goncharenko estimates that the Soviet Union spent about 100 billion rubles on construction enterprises in China (in terms of the domestic price), representing about 7% of the Soviet annual national income in 1959.\textsuperscript{92}

This type of assistance, however, failed to signal commitment in the Sino-Soviet relationship. The specialists were short-term contractors, and the Soviet government

\textsuperscript{91} Li, \textit{Beijing yu Mosike}, 262.

\textsuperscript{92} (Westad, 1998, p. 160) The Soviet ruble had an export price and a domestic price. In 1959, the export price was about ten times the domestic price. The sum of assistance in terms of the export price was 9.4 billion.
took a passive role in the process. Beijing made the demand for specialists and the
Kremlin selected suitable candidates. When the specialists came to China, the
institutions for which they worked would sign contracts with them. China paid for the
specialists’ salary, housing, part of their living expenses, and sometimes airline tickets.
If the specialists wanted to bring family with them or their family wished to visit, the
Chinese government covered the expense. China also paid compensation to the
institutions at which these experts originally worked (Z. Shen, 2003, pp. 219–26). The
Soviet specialists themselves enjoyed extraterritoriality: Chinese courts could not
convict Soviet citizens.\textsuperscript{93} The true burden of the specialist program was therefore
mostly on the Chinese government, which, when the program became an increasing
financial burden, reduced the number of specialists to the minimum possible level and
paid the expenses with loans from the Soviets (Z. Shen, 2003, p. 227).

The Soviets did not pay a large cost in this relationship. Moreover, they had full
control over the knowledge that the specialists shared with China, and were careful not
to release sensitive technology. The specialist program soon became a problem when
the Chinese found that the specialists could not meet their demands. China complained
about the working discipline of some of the specialists. A report submitted to the CCP
Central Committee in 1957 claimed that the Soviet instructors and educators were free
to contribute their knowledge, but other specialists were usually unwilling to pass along
key technological information for fear of punishment by their home government. The
report also complained that the Soviets sent incompetent workers to China: some
specialists had no preparation for their job, some were undisciplined, and one violated

\textsuperscript{93} Li, \textit{Beijing yu Mosike}, 223.
local law. Although most of these complaints were due to the heavy workload demanded by the Chinese, they showed that the specialist program gradually had become an unwelcome part of the Sino-Soviet cooperation. China still appreciated the Soviet help, but it began to feel that the Soviet Union did not put enough in the relationship.

To make matters worse, the Chinese believed, perhaps mistakenly, that these problems were evidence that the Soviets were not treating China as an equal partner and were not sincere about helping China to modernize. This discontent had long existed in the Sino-Soviet relationship. In a reply to Khrushchev’s request to supply workers for logging projects in Siberia, Mao sharply commented: “You know, Comrade Khrushchev, for years it’s been a widely held view that because China is an underdeveloped and overpopulated country, with widespread unemployment, it represents a good source of cheap labor. But you know, we Chinese find this attitude very offensive” (Kissinger, 2011, p. 163).

The Soviets, however, had no intention of using the specialist program to impede China’s development. In an internal meeting before he departed for a visit to China, Khrushchev told his comrades, “If we do not help China to develop the foundation of its socialist industrialization in the next five years, we will miss the historical moment to establish and consolidate friendship with China.” Nevertheless, the Soviets did see China as an underdeveloped country in need of help, and the Chinese felt offended when the Soviet government or its specialists occasionally showed this attitude.

When it became clear that Khrushchev’s foreign policy collided with Mao’s, the specialist program became a tool that the Soviet Union used to gain advantage in intra-
alliance bargaining. The Sino-Indian border clashes and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis stunned the Kremlin.\(^9^4\) Differences began to increase in the course of these events in 1958 and 1959. During the Sino-Indian clash, Khrushchev’s suggestion of settling the border issue with India displeased Mao, and his criticism of China’s policy in Tibet also irritated the leaders in Beijing.\(^9^5\)

During the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Soviet Union was upset that China did not consult Moscow before the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu. At that time, the US already deployed tactical nuclear weapons on Taiwan. A surprise attack on the Nationalist-occupied off-shore islands might drag the Soviet Union into a nuclear standoff. The Soviets had also heard that the US seemed to believe that Beijing’s military move had happened with Moscow’s acquiescence.\(^9^6\) Mao made the situation worse by openly advocating the use of nuclear force against the US. His provocative rhetoric suggested that Beijing might risk war with the US over Taiwan.\(^9^7\) Not knowing how Chiang Kai-shek or the US would respond to the shelling, the Soviet Union had a grave concern about entrapment. Khrushchev believed that it was necessary to rein in China.

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\(^9^4\) The Soviets had been reluctant to become involved in conflict with Taiwan. For the background of Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, see (Christensen, 1996, Chapter 5; Elleman, 2015, Chapter 7)

\(^9^5\) For the background of the Sino-Indian (Elleman, 2015, sec. 7) border clash that eventually led to the Sino-Indian War in 1962, see (Eekelen, 1964; Garver, 2001; Vertzberger, 1984). The dispute with India was closely related to China’s rule in Tibet. Tension increased significantly after the Dalai Lama was exiled to Dalansala in 1959. For the exchange of opinions between China and the Soviets over policy toward India, see (Li & Xia, 2008).

\(^9^6\) China had already planned to shell the islands before Khrushchev’s visit. Mao delayed the shelling and deliberately concealed the attack plan from his Soviet counterpart because he intended to use the Sino-Soviet alliance to deter American intervention when the shelling began (Z. Shen & Xia, 2015, pp. 322–4).

\(^9^7\) Mao’s provocative claim that socialism would prevail in a nuclear war is usually quoted as evidence that he was willing to risk a nuclear war with the West, even dragging the Soviets along (Kissinger, 2011, pp. 175–6). For a complete quote, see (Z. Shen & Xia, 2015, p. 268).
In addition to the unnerving military conflicts with a third party, the Soviet-American rapprochement increased the rifts between China and the Soviets. Khrushchev’s visit to the US in 1959 was his first step to seek reconciliation with the US, and although this trip did not settle bilateral disputes, it nevertheless opened the window for “peaceful coexistence” and a series of disarmament talks. Khrushchev’s new direction, however, went against Chinese foreign policy interests. Mao had advocated the struggle against capitalist countries, mainly the US. His radical views on the West were partly the result of political tensions within the CCP, but they inevitably impacted the Sino-Soviet relationship. Mao alleged that Khrushchev “betrayed the Marxist, proletarian undertakings; he had changed into a revisionist” (Luthi, 2008, p. 151). The CCP-controlled media then started to attack the Soviets and targeted Khrushchev personally. The Soviets responded with the same criticism of China. A grand polemic between allies began.\footnote{See (Luthi, 2008, pp. 160–74). For detailed discussion on the polemic, see (Wu, 1999).}

Khrushchev decided to punish the aggressive and reckless attitude of Mao. The Soviets recalled all of their specialists in the summer of 1960 without prior warning. Even the specialists themselves were unprepared for the withdrawal.\footnote{It is unclear whether this was Khrushchev’s personal decision or a collective conclusion of high-level party members (Luthi, 2008, pp. 175–6).} The Soviets claimed that increasing friction between the specialists and their Chinese co-workers led to the decision to the withdrawal. According to the available records, each side held the other responsible for the tense relations that characterized the specialist program. The Soviets claimed that the Chinese deliberately provoked the specialists into
arguments and that China’s disrespect of and suspicion toward the specialists violated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (Z. Shen, 2003, p. 384). The Chinese complained that the Soviet military specialists became cold and unresponsive to Chinese hospitality (Jersild, 2014, pp. 162–3). It is difficult to judge which side was initially responsible for the tension. In any case, both the Soviet specialists and the Chinese had transferred the fraught state of relations between their governments to their daily interactions.

After the specialists returned to the Soviet Union, the CPSU issued a statement blaming China for not cooperating with them and purposely disrupting their work. The Soviets did not hint at any possibility that the specialist programs might resume should China improve its attitude. The withdrawal had an immediate impact on the Chinese economy, which was already on the verge of collapse owing to the disastrous Great Leap Forward. The sudden withdrawal meant that most of the specialists had not completed their work. According to the Chinese government, the Soviets scrapped 600 contracts, withdrew 1390 experts, cancelled sending 900 experts that were slated to come to China, and halted the delivery of equipment vital for construction projects (Xin, 1989, p. 461).

The Soviet Union had had no substantive investment in the alliance relationship since the withdrawal of the specialists. More importantly, the Soviets refused to discuss how or when the specialist program would resume. The connection between the allies had already been weak. Withdrawing the experts sent China a strong signal that the Soviets would no longer invest resources in their relationship. Furthermore, this event, along with the start of polemical exchanges, impacted China’s trade dependency on the Soviet Union soon after 1950. Bilateral trade shrank 20 percent in 1960 (Luthi, 2008,
p. 179). Losing a major trade partner, China enforced a “self-reliance” policy and purchased the equipment needed for industrial enterprises from West European countries. As China slowly decreased its dependence on the Soviet Union, it became reluctant to negotiate with its ally.

A Change in the Wind

In 1964, the Kremlin underwent a quiet revolution. While Khrushchev was on vacation in Abkhazia, his colleagues conspired to remove him from power. On October 13, Khrushchev was back to Moscow to attend a Presidium meeting, only to find other Presidium members attacking him for policy failures. Khrushchev resigned the next day. The news of leadership change reached Beijing soon after the Presidium meeting.100

The leadership change seemed to offer a good opportunity for Sino-Soviet reconciliation. The Chinese and the Soviets had criticized each other openly for the past few years. Many of these criticisms targeted the leaders, Khrushchev and Mao. It was true that Khrushchev’s crotchety temper caused a feud with Mao, and that his foreign policy since the 20th Congress of the CPSU had been the main source of strife between the two communist nations. The removal of Khrushchev suggested that cardinal members of CPSU might reverse his policies and treat China differently, respecting its foreign policy goals and the Chinese leader.

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100 The Soviets did not inform the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow until two days later, but the Chinese politburo had already begun the discussion of the Soviet leadership change on the day following the Presidium meeting. See (Z. Shen et al., 2010, p. 397).
To be sure, Mao and his colleagues were unclear about what had happened in Moscow. They did not know who had assumed leadership or what the new leader thought about relations with China. Judging from the information brought to the embassy in Moscow, Khrushchev had been criticized for the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship and the new regime was expressing the desire to resume a friendly relationship with China. But an op-ed in Pravda showed that the Soviets would maintain the policy guidelines after the 20th Congress of CPSU. This corresponded with public statements by Brezhnev on October 19. Despite the mixed signals, Mao decided to probe the Soviets’ position. China suspended all its attacks on the Soviet Union in its media and released a message of reconciliation. Then Mao proposed sending a high-level delegation to participate in the 47th Anniversary of the Russian Revolution, led by Zou En-lai and He Long. The appointment of such high-ranking delegates showed that the Chinese leader valued this opportunity highly. According to Mao, the mission of the delegation was to establish contacts, probe the Soviets’ intentions, and determine the proper response (Radchenko, 2009, p. 130).

Although the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing remained doubtful about Mao’s intentions, the leadership circle in Moscow was optimistic about the visit of the Chinese delegation.101 They believed that China was ready to mend the bilateral relationship. Moscow carefully prepared for the delegation’s arrival. Before the Chinese delegation departed for Moscow, the Soviet embassy in China was informed that all the events involving the Chinese delegates “will proceed in a friendly and relaxed atmosphere.

101 For Ambassador Chervonenko’s suspicion, see (Radchenko, 2009, p. 131)
The Chinese comrades should clearly feel that we are ready to contact and discuss subjects in which we are mutually interested” (Z. Shen et al., 2010, pp. 379–80).

The Soviet leaders may have been too optimistic about China’s signal. Although Mao wanted to seize the opportunity to improve Sino-Soviet relations, he was not ready to abandon the ideological polemics or the competition for leadership of the communist world with the Soviets. Appointing Zhou as the head of delegation was a friendly gesture to signal China’s good will, but Zhou was not authorized to discuss substantive cooperation with the Soviets. The delegation went to Moscow to reestablish communication, not to negotiate. The Chinese also overestimated the impact of the leadership change on the Soviets. The removal of Khrushchev did not mean that the Soviet leaders would embrace China’s position; they wanted a compromise, or at least to set the policy disagreements aside.

In this uncertain atmosphere, an event at a Kremlin banquet aggravated the tension. Soviet Marshall Rodion Malinovskii, apparently drunk at that time, made a provocative speech. He first attacked the US, and then told Zhou that “we should not allow the devils to hamper our relationship, Khrushchev or Mao alike.” Since Khrushchev had stepped down, this statement implied that China should remove Mao.102 The Chinese delegates angrily protested and left the cocktail party. Zhou held a long meeting that night and concluded that Malinovskii’s statement was not merely a reckless move under the influence of alcohol but a feeling shared among the Soviet leadership.

102 Different sources record the exact wording that Malinovskii used differently, but the meanings are similar and equally insulting. See (Luthi, 2008, p. 290; Radchenko, 2009, p. 133; Z. Shen, 2011, p. 403).
As a result, the official meeting between the Soviets and the Chinese delegation two days later did not go well. The Soviet leaders knew that Malinovskii had made a grave mistake. They offered an apology and insisted that Malinovskii’s remark did not represent the overall opinion of the Soviet leaders. The Chinese delegates disagreed and claimed that “truth lies in wine” (Luthi, 2008, p. 291). The Soviets would have liked to move on to the practical issues, but were disappointed when Zhou avoided those matters by claiming that he had no authority to negotiate. Since Mao was not ready to change the Chinese stance and did not authorize negotiation, Zhou’s hands were tied and he had to avoid discussions on resuming bilateral cooperation. The meeting ended with no substantive conclusion. The public polemics resumed and Sino-Soviet relations remained tense.

The removal of Khrushchev was indeed a chance for reconciliation. The Soviet leaders were determined to earn Mao’s friendship again. Unlike during the Khrushchev period, the new Soviet leaders were more willing to grant concessions to China and to continue the alliance relationship despite differences. The incident sparked by Malinovskii was unexpected. The Soviet leaders made it clear that they had no intention of disrespecting Mao in front of his loyal ministers. Zhou and Mao were also aware of this, but Mao decided to use this incident to pressure the Soviets, forcing them to grant greater concessions and perhaps to join with China in fomenting world revolution. This bluff caused more suspicion on the part of the Soviets as they began to question whether Mao really wanted to reconcile.

With or without Malinovskii’s drunken speech, prospects for Sino-Soviet reconciliation looked grim in 1964. Mao did not fully understand the attitude of the
new leaders in the Kremlin and was unsure whether they would follow China’s idea for world revolution. He may have mistakenly believed that he had played a role in Khrushchev’s ouster, since China had openly pointed out Khrushchev’s wrongdoing.\textsuperscript{103}

The Soviet leadership, however, never abandoned Khrushchev’s foreign policy and recognized that disagreement still existed with China, but hoped that reconciliation might decrease the polemics and lead to the resumption of a partnership similar to the one enjoyed in the 1950s. While the Soviets were candid, their message failed to convince their Chinese counterparts because the Soviets refused to make a substantive commitment. The same applies to China. The Chinese delegation offered no substantive contribution to the bilateral security relationship, and Zhou’s claim that he was “not authorized to negotiate” disappointed the Soviet leaders, obstructing further discussion on improving the relationship.

China and the Soviet Union each probed the other’s attitude, looking for signs of policy change. They failed to recognize the significance of the fact that their alliance relationship had involved no substantive cost to either side. China’s reliance on the Soviet defense decreased significantly after 1960, and the Soviet Union would not provide China the technology it most desired, namely nuclear weapons. The Soviets had little strategic interest in China, which did not provide any unique strategic value in the Soviets’ conflict with the US. Soviet investment in the alliance relationship during the Khrushchev era was already minimal, and the new Soviet leadership had no plans to increase it. To resume a friendly relationship, each ally needed to show its

\textsuperscript{103} Chinese propaganda claimed that Khrushchev fell because China opposed his policies, and while it is unclear whether Mao actually believed this argument, it was part of his rhetoric.
commitment by supporting the other in defense matters or political goals, but neither did so during the closed-door meetings.

After the failed meetings with Zhou, the Soviets did not give up all hope. In 1965, Kosygin visited Beijing twice to seek reconciliation. Mao received him with coldness,¹⁰⁴ and the meeting failed to repair the Sino-Soviet relationship. Kosygin intended to use diplomatic connections to mend the relationship. He did not offer substantive security cooperation that interested China, but mildly persuaded Mao to abandon public polemics and encouraged unity among the fellow communist states.¹⁰⁵ Kosygin’s gentle diplomatic language failed to move Mao. The meeting showed that neither the Soviets nor China entertained the idea of investing more resources in their relationship and that each intended the other to make the first contribution. Both sides failed to see the potential future gains from their cooperation because they did not observe any alliance-specific assets in their current alliance relationship.

_An Ally at the Doorstep_

The Sino-Soviet disharmony naturally affected both countries’ relations with other communist governments. Research on the Sino-Soviet split often examines the triangular relationship with Vietnam to illustrate the rivalry between China and the Soviets. Christensen, for example, has drawn attention to how the two powers competed for the loyalties of the Vietnamese communists (Christensen, 2011, p. 181). This rivalry did not contribute to the suspension of the Sino-Soviet alliance, but was

¹⁰⁴ For Mao’s meeting with Kosygin, see (Wu, 1999, pp. 914–21)

¹⁰⁵ For a complete transcript of their meeting, see (Rashchenko, 2009, pp. 227–234)
rather the result of hostility between the allies. Sino-Soviet cooperation on assisting the Vietcong would have been the most effective way to influence the war in Indochina in a way that would benefit both China and the Soviets, so their inability to cooperate over Vietnam is an example of failed alliance management. Both allies tried to gain the upper hand in intra-alliance bargaining by earning the friendship of a third party.

Immediately after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the US escalated its intervention in the Vietnam War. The Soviets decided to supply military aid to North Vietnam while seeking a negotiated resolution with the US. China, by contrast, opposed any form of negotiated settlement regarding Vietnam. When the Soviets proposed a conference on Indochina, China refused to participate and persuaded Vietnam to back out of Moscow’s peace initiative (Radchenko, 2009, pp. 148–50). Moscow and Beijing then became mired in quarrels over the transfer of Soviet supplies to Vietnam. The Soviets claimed that China deliberately delayed the shipments; China responded that the delay was due to bureaucratic procedure and Soviet failure to abide by the rules (Z. Shen, 2011, pp. 422–8). Meanwhile, China massively increased its assistance to Vietnam, encouraging the Vietcong to escalate military activities against the South.

These disputes between Moscow and Beijing again showed that their interests failed to cohere and, more importantly, that the allies were unwilling to accommodate each other over the course of an enduring relationship. China was eager to show other communist governments that the Soviet Union was an unsuitable leader that colluded with the US. The Soviets accused China of sabotaging Soviet assistance to a fellow communist nation. The allies shared the same goal, but instead of coordinating their policy each blamed the other in order to highlight its own contribution to the Vietnam
War. This struggle was a follow-up to Zhou’s Moscow visit. Both sides were reluctant to contribute resources directed at sustaining a mutual relationship, but instead each expected the other to make the necessary effort.106

Another key event that further deteriorated bilateral relationship was the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the Soviets and Mongolia in 1966. This defense treaty aggravated Beijing’s concern regarding border security in the north. The border issue between the Soviets and China was nothing new, being largely based on treaties between Tsarist Russia and Qing China. For a very long period of time, China found it hard to control and monitor the border effectively. Even after the establishment of the People’s Republic, China took a passive stance on the border issue and was reluctant to contest it with the Soviets. In 1951, China did manage to resolve part of the dispute regarding border territories in Northeast through an agreement with the Soviets.

The border issue was not mentioned until the Sino-Soviet tension increased, and it continued to foster disputes. According to the Chinese government, the Soviets provoked 1674 border disputes from 1960 to 1964. The Soviet Union also claimed that Chinese citizens and soldiers frequently violated its border (Z. Shen, 2011, p. 389). At China’s request, the Soviets started border negotiations in 1964, but the negotiations ended with no formal agreement because the ownership of Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island remained unsettled (Chou, 2007, p. 48).

The stalled border discussions and the increased number of disputes led to an increased Soviet military presence along the Sino-Soviet border. Beginning in 1960,

106 China and the Soviets continued to compete until the end of the Vietnam War. For their struggle from mid 1960s to late 1970s, see (Khoo, 2011)
China replaced the US as the main target of Soviet military deployment in the Far East. The Soviets increased their infantry divisions in East Asia to the point that their deployment in the region accounted for about 27% of their total forces.\(^{107}\)

China’s worry was not unwarranted. The Soviet Union had a well-known record of invading communist nations that drifted away from its leadership. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was a recent example. China had become a renegade state, in the Soviets’ eyes, with the increased military tension along the Sino-Soviet border and China’s open challenges to Soviet leadership, making it the likely target of Soviet military intervention.

The Soviet-Mongolian alliance made the Soviet threat more prominent because it decreased the distance for Soviet military projection. The closest point between the Sino-Mongolian border and Beijing was 560 kilometers, which meant that the Soviet mechanized force could advance to the Chinese capital within just two weeks (Kirby, Ross, & Gong, 2005, p. 150).

As early as 1964, Chinese leaders received reports of Soviet military activities in Mongolia, including the deployment of mechanized forces. In February of 1964, Mao told Kim Il-Sung that the Soviets had exhausted all means of coercion, and “the only thing [they] had not tried was a war.”\(^{108}\) This security threat significantly altered the strategic thinking of Chinese leaders. The CCP Central Committee ordered three northern theater commands to strengthen their defense in preparation for a Soviet

\(^{107}\) Kirby, Ross, & Gong, 2005, p. 150; the number is estimated by Wang Zhongchun using Chinese sources in early 1980.

\(^{108}\) This was the first time Mao expressed his concern about conflict with the Soviets to a foreign leader, see (Z. Shen, 2011, p. 378).
invasion as China abandoned the strategy of “holding fast in the north, while retreating in the south” (bei ding nan fang).\textsuperscript{109} For the first time since 1949, China included the northern theaters in its main strategic build-up. Major cities in the north were reinforced for war (Z. Wang, 2002, p. 51).

The Soviet-Mongolian treaty was established at the request of Ulaanbaatar. Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal, the Prime Minister of Mongolia, was concerned about the threat posed by China. Although the treaty specified no aggression toward China, it inevitably aggravated China’s security concerns because it called for the permanent stationing of a large number of advanced Soviet troops along the Sino-Mongolian border. The treaty sent a simple message: the Soviets deemed China a threat and were prepared to engage in a large-scale conflict if circumstances so demanded.

The external alliance in this case served a different purpose. China originally did not see Mongolia as either a threat or a target of military attack. It was Tsedenbal who had persistent fear of Chinese economic and political control. Once Mongolia allied with the Soviets, however, the threat from the north increased significantly. The Soviet-Mongolian alliance gave the Soviets a tactical advantage in launching a military attack and thus directly threatened Beijing. China could not ignore the security threat posed by the Soviet-Mongolian coalition.

At this point, when the political dispute had escalated to military confrontation along the northern border, China realized that the Sino-Soviet alliance no longer protected its security. The Soviet-Mongolian alliance made clear the Soviets’ updated

\textsuperscript{109} The core of this strategy was to rely on Soviet help to retain full control over the north. Since the Soviet Union was unlikely to be a defender, the PLA was unlikely to hold the north and needed to divert military resources there.
security interests: they had no plan to ease the tension with China but rather were choosing military containment. Under such circumstances, China had no interest in reopening negotiations with the Soviets. It deployed heavy force to respond to the Soviet threat. The alliance treaty thus became obsolete with the establishment of the Soviet-Mongolian alliance, and the tension eventually pushed China and the Soviets into armed conflict.

**Conclusion**

The question raised in this chapter is whether Sino-Soviet relations could have been salvaged by renegotiation. China and the Soviets had several chances to renegotiate their relationship, but every attempt to reconcile ended in arguments and mistrust. The Sino-Soviet alliance lacked the kind of cooperation that could sustain a long-term commitment or could guarantee the core security interests for each side. Unlike the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Sino-Soviet alliance lacked territorial interests that helped the allies to confirm their future commitment to each other. Although China depended on the Soviets to extend deterrence in the first half of 1950s, the security cooperation between the communist nations remained weak. Besides the defense commitment written into the treaty, the relationship was maintained on the basis of one-sided assistance provided by the Soviets.

To be sure, the asymmetric contribution did not necessarily cause the alliance to break down. The main problem was that the military and economic assistance failed to

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110 The Soviets maintained close military partnerships with India and Vietnam, which contributed the encirclement of communist China. For further analysis of the Soviet military strategy regarding China, see (Stuart & Tow, 1982, Chapter 12).
create alliance-specific assets for both parties. Even during the Korean War, the arms and diplomatic support provided by the Soviets did not include combat troops but only military consultants. The cost of the war was almost entirely on the shoulders of the Chinese. The allies had no joint military operation, no regular exercises, no joint defense strategy, and no channels for sharing intelligence vital to their territorial interests. On the contrary, both sides kept a wary eye on each other. The Soviet Union was concerned about the use of force against Taiwan; it also refrained from supporting China in its border dispute with India. China was unwilling to provide ports or bases that would have allowed the Soviets to extend their military strength to counter the US. The alliance failed to promote the security benefits that both members were pursuing.

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the alliance relationship was maintained by the specialist program, which the Soviet Union could start or stop at any time. Soviet assistance created two problems. First, despite tight control and monitoring by the Soviet embassy, the Soviets could not guarantee that their experts would meet the demands of the Chinese institutions that they served. Specialists in defense technology were constrained by confidentiality, which was a source of great dissatisfaction for the Chinese. In addition, the burden of hiring the Soviet specialists should not be underestimated; even before the Sino-Soviet relationship became tense, the Chinese leaders lowered the number of specialists being brought in owing to financial constraints. Subsequently, the Chinese leadership was suspicious regarding the intentions behind the Soviet aid. The Soviets, on the other hand, believed that the Chinese failed to appreciate their forthright efforts. The specialist program by its nature increased the difficulty of resolving differences.
Second, the importance of Soviet specialists dwindled after two five-year programs. With the help of Soviet experts, China gradually gained the ability to develop its own heavy industries, especially in the areas of nuclear weaponry and ballistic missiles. These weapon programs were the priority of the Chinese government. Recalling the specialists did not have as much impact as the Soviets expected; the main repercussion for China was that it would take few more years to complete the weapons programs. As China became less dependent on the Soviet specialist program, the value of the alliance decreased. When Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the specialists, the first concern the Chinese leaders had was not the suspension of industrial development but the reliability of the Soviets as an ally. Contrary to Khrushchev’s intention of sending a warning, the withdrawal of the specialists was taken as a strong signal of abandonment.

The specialist program represented the closest thing to fixed assets in the Sino-Soviet alliance, but it failed to constitute an alliance-specific assets. The tension might have been relieved when Khrushchev was ousted. However, the allies failed to improve their relationship during Zhou’s visit to Moscow because neither was willing to put forward substantive plans for mending the alliance relationship. The Soviet leadership did not intend to capitulate to China. Apart from good will, it offered no proposal that would enable China to soften its provocative attitude.

The cooperation between allies was thus suspended, and the chances for resuming their relationship looked grim. Foreign policy disputes intensified territorial disputes. After 1965, the Sino-Soviet treaty completely lost its function. It did not encourage the allies to negotiate their territorial dispute, nor could it constrain the allies in terms of
respecting existing borders. The Soviet Union derived no security benefit from China.
In fact, China had become a challenger with regard to Soviet territorial interests, an unlikely role for an ally. As a result of the worsening security dilemma, both sides reinforced the border. The Soviet-Mongolian defense treaty in 1966 signaled that the Soviet Union deemed China a threat. China realized that a military clash with the Soviets might be imminent and increased its counterbalancing effort. In the end, the alliance relationship became unsalvageable.

In the aftermath of the 1969 border conflict, the Soviets twice proposed a non-aggression treaty, in 1971 and 1973. China rejected these overtures and argued that the Treaty of Friendship already served such a purpose. The 1950 Treaty was, however, obsolete and incapable of reconciling the differences between the allies. This response only showed that China had no interest repairing the bilateral relationship. It was not until 1979, with the expiration of the 1950 Treaty and the normalization of the Sino-American relationship, that China proposed terminating the Treaty and negotiating a new bilateral relationship (Z. Shen, 2011, pp. 459–63). Although both sides were willing to improve their relationship, it was clear that China would not join an alliance with the Soviets on account of the newly established Sino-American relationship. Negotiations stalled on the issue of the Soviet military presence in the Far East, and then completely stopped when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

None of the Western countries anticipated this change. Even after the Soviets withdrew all the specialists, US intelligence still believed that policy differences would
The US analysis neglected to give sufficient weight to the fact that the alliance cooperation did not require members to invest resources in order to protect vital interests, nor did allies intend to build such cooperation after alliance formation. The foundation of the alliance was in fact very weak. The Treaty had been written to cope with the security environment during the 1950s, and it no longer served the security interests of the signatories.

As a result, bilateral disputes made the allies concerned about each other’s continued commitment to the alliance. Both China and the Soviet Union made attempts to bridge their differences, but the nature of their alliance relationship prevented them from making concessions because both allies paid a relatively small cost for suspending the alliance, and the renegotiation failed quickly. This outcome is quite different from the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Britain and Japan bargained with each other knowing that each would remain committed to the alliance. There was no back-and-forth exchange of benefits in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Whenever one member made a demand, the other started to question its loyalty. In addition, neither side offered to stabilize the alliance relationship, nor did either think that it had anything to offer by way of furthering joint security interests. In the end, the Sino-Soviet alliance reached a dead end. Each side believed that it had been forced into an aggressive stance. The Sino-Soviet split readjusted alliance politics in East Asia. China reconciled with the US and assisted in the containment of the Soviet Union. The chance for renegotiation never

\[111\] For the US intelligence report on Sino-Soviet relations during early 1960s, see (National Intelligence Council (U.S.), 2004, pp. 218, 227–32)
resurfaced. It was not until the Gorbachev era that Sino-Soviet relations began to warm up.
Chapter 6 The US-Taiwan Alliance: a strenuous decade

*The Strategy of Delay*

This chapter examines the strategy of delay in intra-alliance bargaining. This strategy occurs when a partner evades or ignores the challenger’s demand. Instead of seeking a solution to a bilateral dispute, the partner insists on maintaining the status quo. To keep the challenger interested in the alliance, the partner reiterates its commitment to the current alliance by granting additional benefits. This chapter presents the US-Taiwan alliance as an example of the strategy of delay. From 1969 to 1978, the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) and the US experienced a tense relationship. Taiwan kept asking the US to strengthen bilateral security ties, whereas the US endeavored to channel its commitment in different ways. The US found it necessary to delay its dispute with Taiwan for two reasons. First, strengthening the security relationship would inevitably be detrimental to the developing relations between the US and the PRC, which were a priority for the US government. The US would not upset Beijing by placating Taipei. Maintaining the status quo prevented Taiwan from sabotaging the negotiation between the US and PRC because the US had the leverage to restrain Taiwan. Second, any sign of abandoning Taiwan would impose a serious audience cost in domestic politics. The ROC had strong support within the Republican Party in the US, so the administration faced pressure from the Congress to maintain its security tie to Taiwan. The US was also concerned about the reputation cost to other allies in Asia. If the US had gone back on its promises to Taiwan, Korea and Japan would have become concerned about the US’s commitment to themselves. In other words, any changes to US-Taiwan security relations would impose significant
costs. The strategy of delay maintained the balanced relationship between Taipei and Beijing: it stabilized the tense US-ROC relationship and left room for the US-PRC relationship while also allowing the US government to respond to its pro-ROC domestic audience.

The promises made by the US hardly eliminated Taiwan’s security concerns, and it therefore sought ways to decrease its dependence on the US for military protection. For nearly a decade, then, the relationship between Washington and Taipei was uncertain and quite tense. But the alliance managed to continue right up to the moment the US established a formal relationship with the PRC. The US provided credible signals about its future commitment to the security of Taiwan, which for its part was dissatisfied with the US-PRC reconciliation, but remained passive. Taiwan did not attempt to sabotage the US-PRC relationship, nor did it seriously consider dropping the alliance.

An Overview of the US-Taiwan Alliance

Since the establishment of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the ROC regime of Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) in 1954, the US maintained a close security partnership with CKS and helped him to repel military threats from the PRC. The ROC was one of the closest allies of the US during the Cold War. Bilateral security cooperation was close and stable throughout the 50s and 60s. Taiwan played an auxiliary role in spying on the communist world and in the Vietnam War. The ROC air force carried out reconnaissance operations using U–2 spy planes, collecting
intelligence on Soviet territory and Northern Vietnam. The US had maintained a significant ground force on Taiwan since 1951. MGM missiles were deployed after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Later on, these missiles were equipped with nuclear warheads. In 1960, the US deployed strategic nuclear weapons on the island. By 1968, the number of US military personnel assigned to Taiwan had reached 9,800 (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 216).

CKS was eager to reinstate his control over Mainland China. When the Mainland suffered famine as a consequence of the catastrophic Great Leap Forward in 1962, CKS believed the time for counterattack was ripe. The US, however, forcibly intervened and stopped CKS’s military mobilization. Despite CKS’s repeated requests, the US rejected his proposals to launch a large-scale military operation. In 1964, seeing that Taiwan had become vulnerable after the PLA successfully tested a nuclear bomb, CKS became more anxious to launch a military invasion. His counterattack plan became impracticable when the ROC navy lost two surface ships in a battle in 1965. After that time, the ROC government abandoned plans to return to the Mainland and focused on economic development. For the next 30 years, the ROC government maintained its plan to return to Mainland China, but it focused on repelling a PLA invasion.

112 For a detailed discussion of U–2 program, see (L. Shen, 2010).

113 Some studies refer to the counterattack preparation as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, despite the lack of open military conflict. See (Elleman, 2015, pp. 104–5; Lin, 2015, Chapter 5).

114 For the history of invasion plan and its suspension, see (Peng, 2005). The US closely monitored CKS’s moves; according to a retired ROC general, the US government had a working group stationed on Quemoy to report on his military activities.
Staring in the early 60s, CKS arranged for his eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK), to be his successor. CCK assumed various senior positions in the ROC government and became the core decision-maker in Taipei. CKS still retained the title of President, but CCK had effective control over the ROC government. CCK maintained very close relations with the US. Thus he visited the US five times during the 1950s and 1960s as an ROC official. The US diplomats in Taipei always discussed important matters with CCK, and knew that he was the most effective channel to reach CKS.

The Sino-Soviet split naturally caught the attention of the US. The isolation of the PRC during its open conflict with the Soviet Union created an opportunity for a US-PRC coalition against it. After Nixon took office and appointed Kissinger as his National Security Advisor, the US government began to explore the possibility of building a relationship with Mao’s China. Taiwan was an important consideration in this matter since Beijing refused to establish relations with countries that recognized the ROC, so the US government accordingly explored options that would allow rapprochement with the PRC and maintenance of its tie with Taiwan.\textsuperscript{115}

On the other hand, Taipei anticipated what was for it an unwelcome change. The Nationalist elites were aware of Nixon’s article on foreign policy, which urged reconciliation with the PRC. CCK was informed about the change in the US policy after Nixon’s inauguration. He received promises that the US defense commitment to

\textsuperscript{115} The internal memo suggests that the US began to reexamine its China policy in February of 1969, which was before the Sino-Soviet border dispute escalated to armed conflict. See (FRUS XVII 2006 Doc. 4)
Taiwan would remain unaffected in the future. However, Kissinger’s secret visit to China in 1971 stunned Taipei, which received no notice or hint prior to the trip.

Meanwhile, the change in the US policy weakened the ROC’s already fragile diplomatic relations with other countries. In December 1971, the ROC lost its United Nations (UN) seat to the PRC. The US made an effort to maintain a Taiwanese representative at the UN, but the ROC government rejected the US’s dual-representation proposal and withdrew from UN. Many free world allies subsequently cut off diplomatic relations with the ROC and recognized the PRC. Although the US still stood by CKS during the ROC’s diplomatic isolation, this friendship became unstable as Nixon accelerated contact with China and visited the Mainland in 1972.

The US-ROC alliance relationship became rocky after the Sino-American rapprochement began. Taiwan felt the US’s security promise no longer to be solid. Being excluded from the Sino-American talks, Taiwan seized every opportunity to gather information about the progress of normalization. The Nationalist elites feared that the US would withdraw from the island and leave the Nationalist army to face the PLA threat alone. This fear was immense, as the ROC had discovered that its ally was not being entirely honest about the progress of reconciliation with Beijing. The relationship was therefore full of suspicion and distrust during the 1970s. The US was unable to assuage Taiwan’s security fear; after all, it was seeking reconciliation with Taiwan’s archenemy.

As a result, Taiwan sought other ways to ensure its security. I discuss two examples in this chapter. First, Taipei once seriously considered rebuilding relations with the Soviet Union. Although the approach to the Soviets never led to substantive
cooperation, Taiwan was using this tie to pressure the US not to abandon their alliance. Second, Taiwan started a covert nuclear weapons program in 1965 and had made significant progress by around 1973. Despite Taiwan’s denial of such a program, the US was deeply concerned about its potential to disrupt the effort to build relations with Beijing. The US repeatedly inspected nuclear facilities in Taiwan and even threatened to end all nuclear assistance, but Taiwan managed to continue its nuclear program in secret, and did not terminate it officially until 1988.

Throughout the 1970s, Taipei constantly lodged complaints against Washington. The US, however, delayed pursuing any substantive solution to Taiwan’s concerns. Instead, it tried to calm its ally with verbal commitments and minor favors. As demonstrated in the following sections, US officials used various means to signal their country’s resolve to defend Taiwan. These efforts did not fully meet the demands of Taiwan, but boosted Taiwan’s confidence in continued US involvement in the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan was a key topic during US-PRC talks. Not only did the State Department use the issue of Taiwan to elicit cooperation from Beijing, but it even promised a gradual withdrawal from the island. The State Department was aware that any policy guaranteeing US military intervention in the Taiwan Strait would harm the US-PRC relationship and close the door for Sino-American normalization. The Nixon administration thus chose to act ambiguously on the Taiwan issue. It refrained from any clear response to Taiwan’s concerns and repeatedly claimed that the US would abide by the defense treaty. At the same time, it told Beijing that the US needed to stand by its commitment to Taiwan, but that concessions could be made if Beijing promised
peace in the Taiwan Strait. The Johnson and Ford administrations adopted the same policy. The US kept Taipei at a distance, but issued constant reassurances of its commitment to the alliance.

Despite this tense relationship between Washington and Taipei, the alliance did not reach the brink of dissolution. The US military installation on Taiwan decreased in size, but military cooperation remained unchanged. According to the US Department of State, Taiwan received 933.5 million dollars’ worth of US arms from 1974 to 1978 (Kirby et al., 2005, p. 249), and the arms transfer increased each year. The alliance relationship thus endured for nearly a decade, with Taiwan neither abrogating nor seeking other security allies. At the same time, the US proceeded to negotiate normalization with Beijing.

The US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty remained in force until the US established a formal diplomatic relationship with the PRC during the Carter administration. The formal alliance with Taiwan ended owing to US abrogation in 1979, but the US maintained security cooperation with its former ally under more ambiguous terms according to the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.

The following paragraphs review several important incidences in the US-ROC alliance relationship. In addition to pointing out the mutual suspicion and distrust, I will discuss the US response to problems in the alliance relationship. The US consistently tried to avoid providing quick and clear responses to Taiwan’s security concerns. It tirelessly repeated its allegiance to the alliance and obscured the impact of US-PRC rapprochement on Taiwan. Moreover, the US offered military assistance to calm Taipei’s concern.
Upon Nixon’s inauguration, there was suspicion that the US would change its China policy. As early as August 1969, Chou Shu-kai, the ROC Ambassador to the US, cautiously inquired of Kissinger, then Nixon’s National Security Advisor, if the US government had had any secret contact with Communist China (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 21). Although Kissinger replied that there had not been any such contact, Nixon had in fact decided to establish relations with Beijing. The change in the US policy quickly affected the US-ROC alliance. In order to send a positive signal to Beijing and open dialogue, the US announced that the Seventh Fleet would suspend its regular patrol of the Taiwan Strait starting in November 1969. The level of its naval force in the region was also reduced. A mix of combat and auxiliary units replaced two destroyer escorts. Taiwan immediately protested this decision. US Ambassador McConaughy attributed the decision to budget constraints and ensured CKS that more American ships would be passing through the Taiwan Strait and that the nature of the patrol remain unchanged (Elleman, 2015, pp. 112–3). CKS was not fully convinced, but nevertheless accepted the explanation. He then requested that the US review the “plan of Rochester,” a military coordination plan established in 1955 that would be enforced in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait (Garver, 1997, p. 213). CKS wanted to strengthen security ties with the US, which was showing signs of attenuating its military assistance.

The suspension of the patrol was only a beginning. In the next few months, the US sought direct contact with Beijing. In January, it reopened the Ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw and made a secret concession on the Taiwan issue, agreeing to reduce its military presence on the island. Taipei, initially unaware of the US’s
exchange with the PRC, learned about the Warsaw talks afterward and immediately expressed “vehement objection.” CKS sent a personal letter to Nixon to express his deep concern about the implications of this meeting. With a slight tone of warning, CKS said that he hoped that Nixon “will carefully consider the consequences and take timely measures to prevent any distortion of your well-meaning policy during its implementation” (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 71).

In order to calm Taipei, the US government invited CCK to visit the US and meet with Nixon.\textsuperscript{116} The President emphasized that the US would provide more military assistance to its allies under the so-called “Nixon Doctrine,” but allowed that the government might be unable to secure the necessary funding from Congress. He then offered reassurances about Taiwan’s security by saying that “under no circumstances will we abandon this commitment [to Taiwan]” (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 76). The next day, CCK received a similar response from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird when he formally requested F–4 aircraft and submarines. Laird then gave CCK a more concrete prospect; he anticipated that the ROC might be able to acquire the military equipment in next two years (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 78).

In the following years Taiwan secured several arms packages, but these amounted to far less than what CCK had requested. The US agreed to sell to Taiwan two Guppy II-class submarines in 1971, but these vessels were incapable of actual combat since the US refused to sell torpedoes to go with them. On the other hand, Taiwan never acquired F–4 aircraft, since the US was unwilling to sell an advanced fighter with a

\textsuperscript{116} According to Chou Shu-kai, the Nationalist elites were aware that this was a move to placate Taipei. CCK was reluctant to visit the US, but CKS made the final decision, see (Jin, 2005, p. 77).
combat radius over 400 miles. Instead, the US authorized Taiwan to produce the F–5E, a less advanced aircraft with a shorter range. The US had no interest in fulfilling the entirety of Taiwan’s request for fear that the weaponry might be used for an offensive purpose. Nixon and Laird may have promised military aid simply as a diplomatic courtesy. It was clear that, behind their diplomatic language, they intended to reassure Taiwan regarding its security concerns with a substantive proposal, even though the government might not carry it out in the end.

1971 was a difficult year for the ROC government. Without any consultation in advance or any notice afterward, Kissinger made a secret mission to Beijing in July and arranged for Nixon’s visit the following year. The news shocked Taipei when Nixon announced his coming trip to China on television. The newly appointed ROC Ambassador James Shen met Assistant Secretary Green the next day and strongly protested, saying that the trip could “hardly be described as a friendly act.” He then warned that the action “would have consequences not only for both our countries, but for the whole free world” (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 145). Later, when Shen spoke to the press, he railed against Nixon’s new China policy: “What do we get out of this shabby deal?” The higher authorities in Taipei shared Shen’s rage. They had expected to be informed about such an important decision. Moreover, the details of Kissinger’s talk with Zhou En-lai were uncertain and the US government refused to clarify how the Taiwan issue was discussed in their meeting.

117 Shen received the notice twenty minutes before Nixon’s broadcast (J. C. Shen, 1983, p. 69).

118 Recalled by senior journalist Fu Jian-zhong, see http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/5187
Kissinger’s visit realized Taipei’s deepest fear: that the US was not being entirely honest regarding its engagement with the PRC. The fact that Taipei was excluded in the rapprochement caused extreme uncertainty. Even when Taiwan received an explanation from the US, it could not verify whether the State Department was being truthful. The Nationalist elites knew well that Beijing would ask the US to cut off diplomatic relations with the ROC if the US wished to establish a formal relationship with the PRC. If Beijing could not convince the US to break with Taiwan, it would at least demand that the US stay out of the Taiwan Strait, which would make Taiwan vulnerable to a PLA invasion. Another concern was UN membership. The ROC seat on the Security Council faced great pressure from the PRC and its allies in a diplomatic battle that had gone for years. Taiwan worried that the change in the US policy would cause more UN members to support the PRC’s accession.

A few days after his TV announcement, Nixon sent a personal letter to CKS to express his “deep regret” that the ROC had not been informed beforehand. His letter had a limited effect in repairing the relationship. Taiwan had received verbal commitments before, and the US had nevertheless arranged Nixon’s visit to China in secret. Kissinger understood well that verbal assurances were not enough to calm Taipei. When he met with Shen in late July, he declared that “assurances were cheap” and voiced his desire to “express his sentiments in terms which would be more valuable than formal assurances” (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 152). When their discussion was finished, Kissinger stated that he had many friends in the ROC and that it pained him to visit Beijing, but that he had to arrange another trip in order to discuss Nixon’s visit next spring. Kissinger’s adviser Holdridge also made similar statements. Kissinger and
Holdridge obviously tried to show friendship, but their over-enthusiasm only heightened Shen’s suspicions.\textsuperscript{119}

The Sino-American rapprochement had a greater impact on the ROC’s foreign relations than the administration anticipated. In late October, when Kissinger made another trip to Beijing, the ROC delegation at the UN fought a strenuous diplomatic battle to keep its UN seat.\textsuperscript{120} After a protracted war of attrition and the US’s reconciliation with the PRC, though, many countries decided to support the PRC accession. It was doubtful that the ROC could keep its China seat on the Security Council. The ROC and its diplomatic allies failed to make the Albania Resolution an important question that would require a higher threshold of affirmative votes. The Resolution was scheduled for a vote and its passage was almost certain. The PRC would assume all the rights that the ROC had enjoyed as the representative of China, and the ROC delegates would be expelled from the UN. The US tried to keep the ROC in the General Assembly, but the ROC representative was pessimistic about the US proposal and decided to withdraw from UN.\textsuperscript{121} After the UN withdrawal, Taiwan again received a guarantee that the US would maintain a diplomatic relationship with the ROC. To strengthen diplomatic ties between two countries, the US allowed the ROC government to open new consulates in Atlanta and Kansas City.

\textsuperscript{119} Holdridge’s words are not documented, but he apparently told Shen that he found it uncomfortable to visit Beijing so soon after he had escorted Shen out of the State Department, see (J. C. Shen, 1983).

\textsuperscript{120} The UN vote took place earlier than the State Department anticipated. Nixon requested that Kissinger delay his return from China to avoid any impact on the UN vote. Kissinger objected at first, but agreed to delay his return by one night.

\textsuperscript{121} For the ROC government’s view of the UN withdrawal, see (J. C. Shen, 1983). For a detailed description on PRC’s accession, see (Garver, 1997, Chapter 14).
These new consulates seemed to suggest a thaw in bilateral relations, but in fact the relationship with Taiwan increasingly became an obstacle to US foreign policy. Nixon’s visit to China was an important achievement during his presidency, and Taiwan was an inconvenient ally in this atmosphere. The State Department worried that the Nationalists might attempt to sabotage Nixon’s visit by provoking crises in the Taiwan Strait or along the coast of the Mainland. As a precaution, Kissinger agreed to monitor Taiwan’s armed forces and prepared to respond if Taipei made any move that might jeopardize Nixon’s visit. He also requested that the ROC government not to issue any public comments on Nixon’s visit. Moreover, Nixon sent a personal letter to CKS in which he reiterated that it was US policy to honor the treaty with the ROC. He also stressed that he would not discuss the establishment of a formal relationship with the PRC. Taipei remained deeply concerned about the prospect of Nixon’s trip, but he acted to prove that his promise was not empty, reaffirming the US commitment to the ROC on his way back from the PRC. Kissinger made a similar comment earlier during the press conference held in Shanghai.122

Despite Nixon and Kissinger’s public statements, the ROC suffered a serious blow when the Shanghai Communiqué was announced. In the Communiqué, the US declared its goal eventually to withdraw all of its armed forces from Taiwan. Taipei worried that this might affect security cooperation between the allies. When Ambassador Shen inquired about this, Kissinger repeatedly promised that Taiwan would continue to receive military assistance. He contended that the delay or apprehensions Shen observed might be more of a bureaucratic problem than a change in US policy, and that

122 See (FRUS, 2006 Doc 205) and http://adst.org/2013/02/nixon-goes-to-china/.
some of the troop redeployment decisions had been made before the Shanghai Communiqué. Kissinger also tried to alleviate Taiwan’s concern about its vulnerability, arguing that the PLA was unlikely to invade because it lacked amphibious capability (FRUS, 2006 Doc 206).

The US continued to make reassuring gestures. After Kissinger’s first visit to China, the U.S.S. Oklahoma City, flagship of the Seventh Fleet, visited Taiwan, as did the Navy’s air demonstration squadron. The militaries of Taiwan and the US also held annual joint exercises as usual (Garver, 1997, pp. 276–77).

The ROC did not know that the US had already planned to decrease its military presence on Taiwan significantly. In an internal meeting in March 1972, the administration decided to withdraw 2,540 personnel, about one-fourth of its total deployment, from Taiwan within two years. In addition, the CIA shut down all of the radio broadcasts of propaganda to the Mainland (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 216, 257). In the following years, the US withdrew more troops; it removed F–4 Phantom squadrons, terminated the U–2 reconnaissance project, and transferred all MGM missiles and tactical nuclear weapon (FRUS, 2008 Doc. 56). The Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Taiwan underwent a significant reduction in personnel. By the end of 1976, there were less than 1,400 US armed personnel stationed in Taiwan (FRUS, 2008 Doc. 155). The US also lowered the rank of the senior officers sent to Taiwan. All of these moves suggested a total withdrawal of US armed forces was coming and deeply troubled the ROC government.

Ever since the Warsaw ambassadorial meeting, the US had been unwilling to share the details of its interactions with the PRC. Ambassador Shen always arranged
meetings with Kissinger after his trips to China and tried to pry information from him on various topics. Kissinger’s answers were always ambiguous and evasive; he usually repeated the US’s commitment to Taiwan and claimed that he too speculated about the direction of US-PRC relations. Shen felt that Kissinger was trying to alienate him, and even refused to meet with him (J. C. Shen, 1983, p. 181). Frustrated by the cold reception in Washington, Shen submitted his resignation, but the US refused to approve a successor (FRUS, 2008 Doc. 101). This incident alarmed Taipei. The refusal to receive a new diplomatic representative from the ROC reinforced the belief among ROC officials that the US would take the initiative to normalize relations with Beijing in the near future.123 Washington again tried to restore Taipei’s confidence by arranging a meeting between Shen and Kissinger.124

Contrary to Taipei’s opinion that the US would eventually abandon the Mutual Defense Treaty in exchange for friendship with the PRC, the US government had been resolute about its commitment to Taiwan during internal discussions. Kissinger himself carried this basic stance from the Nixon to the Ford administration. At a minimum, the US would not hand over Taiwan to the PRC, nor would it allow a PLA military invasion. Taipei remained continually in doubt because all of the developments since 1971 suggested the opposite. To make matters worse, Kissinger kept suggesting that the Nationalist government negotiate with Beijing to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully.

123 The State Department observed and reported this concern, and the authority in Taipei also expressed it when Laird visited in 1975; see (Jin, 2005, pp. 102–3).

124 Shen originally requested to meet with Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, probably because Rockefeller had been an old friend of Madam Chiang Kai-shek and was considered more sympathetic to the ROC.
This only intensified Taipei’s fear, since a negotiated unification was against its policy toward the Mainland regime. If such negotiations had taken place, the result would likely have favored Beijing.

In the meantime, Taipei constantly received promises that the alliance relationship would be maintained no matter how US-PRC relations developed. Kissinger subtly maneuvered between the PRC and ROC by sending favors to Taiwan. These favors were sufficient to quiet down the ROC, but small enough to avoid provoking the PRC. Substantive and protracted military cooperation strengthened Taipei’s confidence, preventing it from abrogating the alliance despite deep suspicions. The alliance managed to survive the Nixon and Ford administrations without a major split.

In the first few months of the Carter administration, Taipei was relieved by the US’s hesitation regarding normalization of relations with the PRC. Ambassador Shen in Washington, however, was worried because he was denied meetings with high-ranking officials in the Carter administration (J. C. Shen, 1983, pp. 205–7). The US decided to proceed with the normalization not long afterward, in late 1976. The ROC government, including CCK himself, repeatedly urged the US not to abandon Taiwan.

In the next section, I describe efforts by the ROC to seek security assurance outside the US-ROC alliance. The ROC eventually abandoned these attempts and turned back to the US for its security. It still had hope that the US would support Taiwan even after its relationship with PRC was normalized. The strategy of delay was effective in this case. The US managed to postpone a clear solution to Taiwan’s security concerns by giving Taiwan reasons to persist in its alliance with the US.
Although the US kept fulfilling its commitments to the alliance, Taipei was not entirely reassured. One of the options it sought was, as mentioned, resuming contact with the Soviet Union. To be sure, Soviet-ROC contact during this period was limited, and it did not expand into any form of alignment. Although the historical evidence for this interaction is quite limited, it suggests that, beginning in 1968, the ROC and the Soviets did approach each other and establish contacts based on their common interests in opposition to the PRC. The relationship was meant to keep the option open for both sides. From Taipei’s perspective, rumors about a Taiwanese-Soviet connection could put pressure on the US. If it could not halt US-PRC reconciliation, it might at least slow down the process or make the US more prudent when discussing the Taiwan issue with Beijing.

ROC-Soviet relations had been very hostile since the Chinese Civil War. CKS never forgot how the Soviets forced the ROC to hand over Manchuria and Outer Mongolia after World War II, and Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists was the main reason that the Nationalists lost the Mainland. CKS even wrote a book condemning Soviet encroachment on China.125 Owing to this history and ideological differences, the ROC and the Soviet Union were the most unlikely friends. The intensified Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-American rapprochement, however, changed the situation. The Soviets and the Nationalists shared a common enemy. The Sino-American reconciliation brought heavy pressure to bear on the Soviets. As early

125 See (Chiang, 1957).
as late 1968, the Soviets warned the US government that the formation of a US-PRC alliance would be “extremely dangerous” (FRUS, 1998 Doc. 334).

From the Soviets’ point of view, establishing a relationship with Taiwan could benefit both sides. The Soviet Union could be an alternative protector of Taiwan’s security. Taiwan was a strategic asset that could be useful in a military conflict with Beijing.

The Soviets took the initiative to approach Taipei. In 1968, a Moscow reporter, Victor Louis (Vitaui Yevgenyevich Loui), contacted the ROC embassy in Tokyo and expressed interest in visiting Taiwan. He traveled to Taipei in October, where he met with CCK, then the Defense Minister. The substance of the discussion between Louis and the ROC officials is still unclear. According to Wei Jing-meng’s diary (1995),126 Louis carried a friendly message from Moscow inquiring about the possibility of establishing informal relations. Louis represented the Brezhnev faction, which supported a more hardline attitude toward Beijing. In the following years, Louis paid several visits to Taipei, and Wei had face-to-face meetings with Louis in Vienna twice.127 They discussed potential military coordination if the ROC were to launch a military operation against the Mainland. The Soviets pledged to remain neutral in a conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists. They exchanged intelligence on

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126 Wei was the director of the Bureau of Government Information, and his English-language diary is the only firsthand account of Louis’s interaction with Taipei available today. However, this diary only records events from 1968 to 1970. Part of the content is unrecognizable due to bad handwriting, and records of Louis’s visits after 1970 are unavailable.

127 Louis cancelled a meeting in late 1969 because the dove faction in Moscow, represented by Kosygin, believed that such a meeting would impede negotiations with Beijing about the border scheduled for October 20. However, the negotiation ended with no reconciliation between Moscow and Beijing. This might be the reason that Moscow asked Louis to approach Taipei again.
the political situation and nuclear weapons development in Mainland. Taipei and Moscow agreed to establish regular communication channels through unofficial liaisons. The Soviets also agreed to provide weaponry to Taiwan, but a specific list of arms was never made.

After the second Vienna meeting in 1970, Taiwan released the crew of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse*, which it had held in custody since 1954. There is no direct evidence of a connection between two events, but the sudden change in Taipei’s attitude toward the Soviet hostages is suggestive, since there was no pressure on Taiwan to release the crew. Louis might have affected the decision. At the end of their talk in Vienna, Louis asked Wei whether he might visit the crew of the *Tuapse* and whether it might be released (Wei, 1995, p. 87). Taipei clearly intended to make a gesture of good will by freeing the crew.

It is not clear how Taipei perceived Louis’s proposal of cooperation. The only thing can be sure is that his message was delivered to the highest-ranking officials in the ROC government. Even if Taiwan entertained the proposal, it probably had many reservations. There were no substantive interactions between 1968 and 1971 other than the visit of an ROC education delegation (Garver, 1978, p. 756). In the 1971 UN voting, the Soviets supported the PRC on the question of China representation, a position that in effect forestalled any practical possibility of ROC-Soviet alignment. However, Louis continued to visit Taiwan, traveling there four times between 1969 and 1975.

There is no doubt that Taipei’s contact with the Soviets put pressure on the US. For example, CKS deliberately told the CIA about his meeting with a Russian reporter; the US was alerted and immediately tried to determine the content of their discussion.
The Soviets also wanted to use their contact with Taipei to pressure Beijing. Louis kept a low profile on his trip to Taiwan, but after his visit he went to Hong Kong and gave an interview in which he discussed his experience in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{128} In November, \textit{The Washington Post} revealed his visit to public. The same news again appeared on \textit{Bangkok Post} few weeks later (Tubilewicz, 2005, p. 80). These reports raised public worries that Taiwan might be leaning toward the Soviets, but Taipei denied such claims.

Taiwan sometimes sent unclear messages about its interactions with the Eastern bloc. After the ROC withdrew from the UN, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai spoke to the press and claimed that the ROC was willing to develop a relationship with any country. He mentioned that Taiwan was “prepared to trade with communist countries aside from Communist China” (Garver, 1978, p. 756). There were several rumors in news reports that the Soviets showed interest in constructing a naval base on the Pescadores Islands in the middle of Taiwan Strait, and these caught the attention of the US. When Kissinger confronted Shen about the rumors in March 1973, Shen abruptly denied them and ensured him that the ROC government had made no contact with the Soviets (FRUS, 2008, p. Doc. 46).

The ambassador’s promise may not have been entirely ingenuous, since two months later an unusual event occurred that could suggest a concerted move by the ROC and the Soviets. Several Soviet warships, including destroyers and submarines, passed through the Taiwan Strait and circumnavigated Taiwan. This was the first time that Soviet naval vessels had ventured into the vicinity of Taiwan since 1949. The

\textsuperscript{128} These claims come from Ro Chi, who picked up Louis at the airport when he first visited Taiwan. Although corroboration is needed to verify his claims, they represent the most relevant evidence about the impact of Louis’s visit. For his oral history, see (Wei, 1995, pp. 114–6).
timing was interesting because just a few days later David Bruce, the first director of the US Liaison Office in the PRC, departed for Beijing. Again, there is no evidence connecting these two events, but it is curious that the ROC government said nothing about the passage of the Soviet ships, about which it was very likely aware, nor did it express concerns after this unusual naval activity was reported in the news.

ROC-Soviet relations during the 1970s were rife with unsubstantiated rumors. Partly because of the limited availability of archival material, it is unclear whether the ROC government seriously considered rapprochement with the Soviets, although many considered it a strong possibility given CCK’s personal connection with the Soviets. But it is curious that the ROC government said nothing about the passage of the Soviet ships, about which it was very likely aware, nor did it express concerns after this unusual naval activity was reported in the news.

Another view is that the rapprochement was merely a diplomatic tactic designed to intimidate the US and other ROC allies. Chou Shu-kai was particularly interested in counterbalancing the US-PRC friendship by engaging with the Soviets, but he stepped down from the Foreign Minister post in 1972 and left the decision-making cadre. Chou’s departure might explain why Taiwan ceased to approach the Soviets openly in the following years. Whether or not the ROC ever decided to cooperate with the Soviets, it never considered the Soviets a viable substitute to the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. This does not diminish the fact that Taiwan intended to use the alleged relations with the Soviets to pressure the US, and may even have wanted to sabotage the US-PRC rapprochement. In public, the ROC firmly denied any contact with the Soviets and claimed loyalty to the US-ROC treaty.

129 CCK spent a considerable amount of time in Moscow during his youth as part of terms of cooperation between CKS and the Soviets; he spoke fluent Russian and was married to a Russian woman.

130 After the UN withdrawal, Chou proposed “flexible diplomacy”; see (Jin, 2005, pp. 99–100; Kirby et al., 2005, pp. 238–405).
Taiwan eventually chose to stay with the US and to pin all its hopes on Washington. This result is not surprising, since the Soviets could not easily replace the US role. The US had tremendous influence over the ROC military and economy: it helped the ROC to build and train military professionals, provided weapons systems and logistics, and shared intelligence, while US economic assistance contributed to CCK’s development policy and was the key to its success. Taiwan relied heavily on trade with free world nations, and had very little commerce with the communist bloc. Moreover, Japan, another important military and economic partner of Taiwan, had interests in a stable US-ROC relationship. Since Japan deemed the Soviets an external threat, it also exerted pressure in opposition to Taiwan’s rapprochement with the Soviets. Finally, it was unclear that Sino-Soviet tension would persist. Taiwan could not rely on an ally with which it shared only a short-term common interest. Since the US still showed its intention to protect Taiwan, the ROC government had no compelling reason to switch allegiances in the first half of the 1970s.

The Secret Nuclear Weapons Program

In 1964, the PRC successfully tested its first nuclear weapon. The news shocked the political elites in Taipei. CKS was aware of the PRC’s nuclear program, but Beijing had acquired its nuclear capability earlier than Taipei and Washington anticipated.\textsuperscript{131} This ultimate deterrence made the Nationalists’ return to the Mainland practically

\textsuperscript{131} The US intelligence believed that China would complete its nuclear weapon program around 1963 with the Soviets’ continued assistance. Since the Soviets withdrew this assistance, the intelligence was less optimistic than its original assessment. Even when the US uncovered China’s nuclear test site in 1964, the intelligence apparatus still maintained that China had insufficient fuel to detonate a nuclear device (National Intelligence Council (U.S.), 2004, pp. 292, 369–71).
impossible. The nuclear test significantly boosted the PRC’s reputation and strengthened its rule on the Mainland. A grave pessimism thereupon clouded the Nationalist regime and military, which CKS felt undermined morale (Lin, 2015, p. 316). He was further frustrated by the US attitude. The US rejected a plan to destroy the PRC’s nuclear facilities and decided to contain its nuclear capability through international institutions.

Although Taiwan was covered under a nuclear umbrella by US weapons stored at Tainan Air Station, uncertainty about the US’s willingness to carry out nuclear retaliation encouraged CKS to try to build an independent nuclear capability.¹³² Taiwan’s nuclear technology was, however, still in a nascent stage. In 1955, the ROC government and the US signed an agreement on the civilian use of atomic energy. As Fuhrmann (2009) argues, these agreements are likely the precursor of a nuclear weapons program because they allowed for access to professional training, relevant equipment, and nuclear fuel. Taiwan was a fine example. Under the agreement, the US helped Taiwan to build its first research reactor in 1961, which was fully operational four years later.

The ROC government began systematically sending officers abroad to study defense technology. A few years later, the ROC military established the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science & Technology (NCSIST), which was responsible for weapons systems R&D. Taiwan secretly invited Ernst Bergmann, the father of the Israeli nuclear program, to Taiwan, and consulted the NCSIST. In the second half of the 1960s, Taiwan negotiated the purchase of a reactor from Siemens, but this deal was

¹³² For Taipei’s concern about the use of nuclear weapons, see (FRUS, 1998 Doc. 62).
eventually cancelled because some in the Nationalist government opposed the nuclear weapons program.

The US adamantly opposed its ally’s development of nuclear weapons and made it clear that its assistance with Taiwan’s nuclear projects was strictly for civilian purposes. The US kept close surveillance on the nuclear program in Taiwan just as it monitored CKS’s invasion plan. In 1965, for example, the US received intelligence that two nuclear specialists from Taiwan had secretly visited Israel and been received by Bergmann. More visits to Israel were reported in 1966. The US immediately instructed its embassy in Tel Aviv to look into the matter.\textsuperscript{133}

Nixon’s inauguration highlighted the need to continue the nuclear weapons program. Starting in 1969, Taiwan secretly acquired the equipment and parts necessary to continue its nuclear weapons program, and a heavy water reactor became operational in 1973. In 1972, Taiwan secretly contacted the West German company UHDE to purchase a reprocessing facility. Taiwan had attempted to purchase such a facility from the US a few years earlier, but the sale was rejected by the Nixon administration. The State Department intervened after learning of Taipei’s deal with UHDE.\textsuperscript{134} US Ambassador McConaughy delivered warnings from Washington and threatened to cut off the supply of nuclear fuel and equipment,\textsuperscript{135} so the ROC and UHDE were forced to

\textsuperscript{133} \url{http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/docs/doc21.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{134} The State Department learned about this from its scientific attaché in the West German Embassy, but the Embassy in Tel Aviv was unable to secure detailed information about their visit. See \url{http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/docs/doc16.pdf}; \url{http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/docs/doc17.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{135} For McConaughy’s report on their meeting, see \url{http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/docs/doc02.pdf}.
abandon the deal. A few months later, Washington learned again that Taiwan was seeking reprocessing technology from companies in Belgium and France, and the State Department sent a study team to inspect the nuclear facilities Taiwan. Though the team did not find evidence of nuclear weapons (Lin, 2015, pp. 333–334), the US was still suspicious.

Taiwan continued to develop its nuclear program in secret. In 1976, the IAEA found suspicious activities in the heavy water reactor at the NCSIST. The State Department also found that Taiwan had not abandoned its hopes of acquiring reprocessing equipment. US Ambassador Leonard Unger delivered a very strong statement to the ROC Foreign Ministry, stating that the US “[does] not accept the argument that a reprocessing facility is required to support the ROC’s nuclear power program.”¹³⁶ A few days later, CCK summoned Ambassador Unger and reassured him that Taiwan would not attempt to acquire reprocessing technology in the future. The ROC government also made a public statement in this regard. CCK proposed that the US send scientists to stay in Taiwan and monitor all nuclear facilities. This generous offer was quite unusual. It allowed for close monitoring by the IAEA and the US. CCK thus tried to assure the US with substantive action.¹³⁷

The US further tightened its inspection regime regarding the nuclear facilities in Taiwan. The next year, the US took a more coercive measure as the IAEA found more evidence of Taiwan’s determination to develop nuclear weapons. At this point, the

¹³⁶ For the complete statement, see http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb221/T-7a.pdf.

¹³⁷ The US considered the proposal but never sent its scientists, since the State Department did not want to discredit the IAEA inspection (Lin, 2015, p. 338).
Carter administration was convinced that Taiwan was indeed building a nuclear weapon and was determined to stop it by any means necessary. Unger delivered the US government’s demands that the ROC government dispose of all spent fuel, the deactivated reactor, and facilities related to enrichment and heavy water production, and turn all of its plutonium over to the US (FRUS, 2013, p. Doc. 22). These demands were quite harsh. The US essentially cut off the means to continue nuclear research, including even civilian use of nuclear technology. Despite its resentment, the ROC government accepted these terms, and its cooperative attitude eased the concerns of the Carter administration to the extent that the US agreed to reactivate the heavy water reactor the following summer.

In 1978, when Unger again inquired into the connection between Taiwan’s nuclear research and the alleged weapons program, CCK expressed rare anger. He complained that the ROC government had fully cooperated with US demands and had tolerated all the inspections. He then stressed that the ROC government avoided discussing the US’s attitude and actions in public in order to curb anti-American sentiment. CCK even made a latent threat to the US ambassador, showing how dissatisfied the Nationalist regime was.

The US-ROC relationship in 1978 was very tense. The Carter administration would establish formal relations with PRC at any time, but Taipei had no way to anticipate precisely when. Taiwan thus still clung to US support despite the fact that the formal relationship might break off soon and the future US-ROC ties remained

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138 For Unger’s report on his meeting with CCK, see [http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb221/T-21a.pdf](http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb221/T-21a.pdf).
unclear. The ROC government became impatient with the US’s suspicions and coercive demands, especially after CCK had made extensive concessions.

The US’s concern was not unsubstantiated, for the NCSIST in fact continued with the nuclear weapons program for another decade after 1978. At that point, the deputy director of the NCSIST, Chang Hsien-yi, had defected to the US and revealed the details of Taiwan’s nuclear program, and Reagan then forced Taiwan to terminate it completely.

From 1965 to 1977, Taiwan struggled to obtain nuclear capability as an alternative to the wavering US security guarantee. The ROC government consistently denied the US’s charges and reiterated its position that it was not developing nuclear weapons. CCK personally made multiple assurances in public. Some studies have expressed the suspicion that the ROC military secretly developed the weapons program without CCK’s approval, especially after 1976, and, so far, no archival records show his direct involvement in the nuclear program. It is, however, difficult to imagine that the program could continue without his approval. The NCSIST was a military institution, and CCK had the highest authority over the military until his death. In addition, according to Chang’s statement in 1998, he and his colleague had “completed the mission given by President CKS and President CCK: we have the nuclear capability, but we will not develop a nuclear weapon.”¹³⁹ This suggested that CCK was aware of the nuclear weapons program, at least during the 1970s when his health condition was good and his rule solid.

¹³⁹ The full text of Chang’s fax was revealed by a reporter in 2004. See (J. Wang, 2004).
The nuclear weapons program was a back-up plan that Taiwan wished to retain. The ROC might also want to use the nuclear weapons program as leverage during the negotiations over Taiwan’s security status after US-PRC normalization. Although Taipei never used the nuclear program to coerce the US, it did not shy away from showing its capability to develop nuclear weapons. For example, after Carter’s inauguration in January of 1977, CCK declared openly that “We consistently support the peaceful use of atomic energy. We have the capability to develop a nuclear weapon, but we will not produce one.” His words, according to the ROC government, were meant to support Carter’s nuclear arms reduction policy, but one could interpret them as a latent threat that Taiwan might choose the nuclear option if the US were to prove unwilling to protect its security. The US was alarmed by CCK’s statement and immediately sent Ambassador Unger to reaffirm the US position on anti-proliferation (FRUS, 2013 Doc. 11). The ROC seemed to signal the US that it was not currently seeking to develop nuclear weapons only because the US remained a reliable ally, but would do otherwise if the US planned on leaving Taiwan vulnerable.

In any event, the nuclear weapons program was a result of US-PRC rapprochement. It started in response to fears about the PRC’s nuclear capability, but the ROC government seriously pursued the program only when the US began to alienate Taiwan. Throughout the 1970s, the nuclear question disturbed US-ROC relations. The US took harsh measures to limit Taiwan’s nuclear capability, and Taiwan responded with extremely cooperative gestures. Looking back from the present, it is clear that Taiwan was not entirely honest regarding its nuclear weapons program. Its worry about abandonment always cast a shadow on US-ROC relations and nuclear
weapons were seen as an insurance policy. Nevertheless, Taiwan always considered its relationship with the US as its priority. It cooperated with US demands because it wanted to maintain the US-ROC security tie.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examines the US-Taiwan alliance in an effort to understand the strategy of delay in intra-alliance relationship. Serious interest divergence emerged when the Nixon administration decided to approach Beijing, creating in Taiwan the constant fear of abandonment. As the US decreased its military installations on the island, Taiwan felt threatened and suggested extending bilateral military cooperation. Reviewing the Rochester Plan is an example of this. Taiwan understood that the wind was with Beijing and that, under these circumstances, it was in its own interest to force the US to reconfirm the US-ROC alliance in public or during its negotiations with Beijing. The ROC embassy tirelessly pursued this goal by inquiring into the US attitude regarding the Mutual Defense Treaty and the progress of US-PRC normalization. Sometimes these inquiries were overly sharp and caused displeasure among US officials.

Despite much turbulence and uncertainty, the alliance relationship endured, and neither ally seriously considered abandoning it. Although Taipei had always believed that the US was accommodating during its negotiations with Beijing, Kissinger and his colleagues were actually quite tough on the issue of Taiwan. The Taiwan question was the most difficult one throughout the US-PRC negotiations. The US did not concede in the face of Beijing’s tough stance; on the contrary, it sent a clear signal that it would stand by its defense commitment to Taiwan. The US sent the same signal to Taipei,
though it was less than compelling to the Nationalist elites. Having at least some evidence of the US commitment, though, Taiwan chose to continue relying on US security protection.

One might argue that Taipei’s submissiveness was due to the large capability asymmetry in the alliance relationship, but Taiwan was not without alternatives. If the US seemed unreliable and potentially willing to hand Taiwan over to Beijing during Sino-American rapprochement, Taiwan would seek other means of guaranteeing its security. Building security ties with the Soviets and its own nuclear weapons program were the most obvious and practical objectives. However, Taiwan in the end remained loyal to its alliance. After all of the so-called “treacherous” acts that the US had pursued, the ROC government still pinned its hopes on the US. All of the challenges, public declarations, and sharp inquiries during closed-door meetings during the 1970s were meant to force the US to show its resolve to defend Taiwan.

Indeed, Taiwan used the contacts with Louis to pressure the US rather than to establish a new military partnership. This overture thus had no significant impact on US-ROC relations. The nuclear weapons program served a similar purpose. Given the difficulty of obtaining the fuel necessary to produce a plutonium bomb, it was difficult for Taiwan to commence production of a nuclear weapon without being detected. The plan of CKS and CCK was to acquire the capability to produce the bomb. Taipei could use this capability as a warning to the US not to abandon Taiwan. Taiwan hoped to slow the pace of US-PRC normalization, or at least to make sure that it was well informed about its progress so that it could prepare a proper response.
Internally, CCK faced tremendous pressure. Nixon’s policy undermined morale in Taiwanese society. For years, the Nationalist regime had claimed that it would return to China, so the fact that the Nationalists could no longer hope to fulfill this promise greatly affected the support for the KMT regime. The rise of the PRC’s international status and the ROC’s withdrawal from the UN bolstered the Taiwan independence movement. CCK for his part relied heavily on the alliance to stabilize Taiwanese society.

The US, however, needed to demonstrate its commitment to the US-ROC alliance constantly because its rapprochement with the PRC signaled otherwise. The US could not take an active role in strengthening the US-ROC treaty since this would damage relations with Beijing. The US government, especially Kissinger, knew well the political risk of a demoralized Taiwan. The conservative politicians, who were usually faithful allies of the ROC, would create a tense relationship between the White House and Congress. The American public would blame the administration for abandoning an ally. The US allies in Asia, especially Japan, would be very concerned. Obviously, Taiwan was not satisfied with repeated claims by the US that its defense commitment remained unchanged. In addition to verbal commitments, the US granted security benefits such as arms transfers and high level visits and meetings. During 1950s and 1960s, such exchanges were part of normal interactions between military allies. When the dispute with Washington became acute, though, these gestures became valuable signs to Taiwan. It was the goal of the US government to avoid sending a confusing or worrisome signal during its interactions with Taiwan. The US continued to invest resources in Taiwan’s defense, though the amount was decreasing. These moves helped
To limit misperceptions by Taipei, strengthened its confidence in the alliance, and kept it from abandoning the alliance out of disappointment.

To be sure, the strategy of delay sends mixed signals to allies. The internal tension among them still exists, while there is hope that a dispute may be resolved in the future. It is a difficult task to maintain a workable balance. If the security benefit is insufficient to induce the dissatisfied ally to table the dispute, the alliance is still likely to dissolve. In the case of the US-Taiwan alliance, the cost of abrogation was very high. Taiwan was not about to leave the alliance without being absolutely sure about US’s attitude. The relatively limited capability of Taiwan was also a reason that the US needed to provide security benefits. With the cancellation of the U-2 missions, Taiwan had a very limited contribution to make to the alliance. As the strategic value of the alliance decreased, the US abandonment became more likely, at least from Taipei’s perspective. It therefore became necessary for the US to signal that Taiwan was still valuable to Washington.

The strategy of delay was effective. The US successfully avoided any substantive solution to the dispute within the US-Taiwan alliance. It kept Taiwan from seeking other options but maintained the alliance until the last moment. The US boosted the confidence of Taiwan while pursuing its own strategic interests. The tension in their relationship did not cause a split like the one that ended the Sino-Soviet alliance, nor did the allies anticipate the dissolution of their pact before the Carter administration initiated the normalization process. The US made effective assurances through action, not words. Taiwan also contributed to sustaining the relationship with self-restraint and a cooperative attitude: it did not sabotage the negotiations between the US and the PRC,
nor did it seek alliances with Japan or the Soviets. When the US coerced Taiwan to halt its suspected nuclear weapons program, Taiwan fully cooperated with the US’s harsh demands. Taiwan was willing to show a good deal of self-restraint because it believed that these cooperative gestures would keep the US as a faithful ally in the future.

The strategy of delay is an alternative in intra-alliance bargaining in situations in which no other solutions seem viable and the cost of leaving the alliance is prohibitively high. The successful use of this strategy suggests that alliance management is in fact very flexible. Unlike disputes between rivals, disputes between allies can be put off to a later time if both sides can credibly communicate their allegiance to the alliance. The dissatisfied ally is likely to challenge the alliance relationship from time to time, and alliance cohesion may appear strained, but such developments do not mean that the alliance is falling. The turbulence, on the contrary, is intended to make clear the challenger’s position, that is, to serve as a reminder that the dispute still exists. The disputes in the Sino-Soviet alliance, however, were different. Neither the Soviets nor the PRC delivered side benefits as a sign of commitment. On the contrary, the Soviets withdrew all the security benefits they had provided as punishment for Beijing’s disobedience. This act made Beijing nervous, so that it decided to develop nuclear weapons without Soviet help. Had the US used similar punishment regarding Taiwan, it would have strengthened Taipei’s determination to produce nuclear weapons.

The US-ROC alliance ended with the US’s abrogation in 1979. In 1977, the US evaluated the impacts of normalization on Taiwan and concluded that CCK would be able to stabilize Taiwanese society, and that Taiwan would be able to deter Beijing’s military aggression if the US provided arms (FRUS, 2013 Doc. 38). The US then
proceeded to begin normalization negotiations with the PRC. The security relationship between the US and Taiwan was sustained after 1979 by the Taiwan Relations Act. This ambiguous security partnership provided a de facto defense commitment, the reliability of which was tested in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The US managed the alliance relationship to serve its major interests. The strategy of delay kept the alliance together after the Nixon era. Taiwan, though resentful at the US’s betrayal, chose to remain US’s faithful security partner. The dispute between Taiwan and the US that began in 1969 never received a definitive resolution, but neither of the allies ever pushed the alliance to the brink of dissolution.
Chapter 7 Conclusion

The preceding chapters explore the question of alliance renegotiation and how alliance members sustain their relationship by renegotiating their security obligations when the alliance no longer serves its purpose. Successful renegotiation leads to alliance treaty revision, while failure increases the risk of alliance breakdown. I present a theory of intra-alliance bargaining to explain the give-and-take of negotiation. I test relevant hypotheses regarding treaty revision with quantitative statistical models, and then present three case studies.

I identify four structural factors that facilitate the establishment of a credible commitment and recognition of updated security interests. I find that a public request incurs audience cost on members and encourages them to change the existing alliance relationship. Alliance-specific assets increase stakes in the alliance relationship and help members to communicate their security needs credibly. The formation of external alliances delivers information regarding updated security interests. These two variables increase the likelihood of treaty revision. Alliance institutionalization does not, however, impact the decision to revise a treaty.

The findings in chapter 3 correspond to the case studies in the following chapters. The evolution of the Anglo-Japanese and Sino-Soviet alliances shows that a sustainable alliance relationship requires the investment of observable assets. In the former case, Japan and Britain were able to observe the importance of Far East territorial possessions to their partners. Each was assured of the other’s commitment to the alliance in the future. The Sino-Soviet relationship, on the contrary, lacked the kind of incentives that foster continued devotion to an alliance. Beijing was uninterested in the Soviet proposal.
to rebuild the relationship because it no longer counted on Soviet support. The foundation of these two states’ bilateral cooperation was in fact weak.

Chapter 6 examines the US-Taiwan alliance in order to demonstrate how allies maintain the status quo despite differences. The use of the strategy of delay requires a qualitative examination since changes in such alliance relationships are lacking. The chapter shows that the US was able to table its dispute with Taipei by granting additional security benefits when it was developing relations with the PRC. Taipei repeatedly asked the US to demonstrate its commitment and quarreled with the US over several issues, but the latter managed to sustain the alliance by granting security benefits.

Table 7.1 lists the attributes of the three cases using variables in a quantitative analysis. I add coding information for the Anglo-Japanese alliance. These attributes are not completely in line with the hypotheses, but a closer look at the cases shows the theoretical mechanism to be present. The renegotiations regarding the Anglo-Japanese alliance were conducted through secret diplomatic channels. Other great powers learned about the renegotiation, but the public was not aware of it. By contrast, the Soviets expressed their intention to rebuild Sino-Soviet relations through official media channels after Khrushchev stepped down, and although the Soviet leaders were not under public pressure to improve Sino-Soviet relations, their gesture attracted Mao’s interest, and he decided to probe the Soviets’ intention. The renegotiation did not proceed as both sides had hoped, but the public request did push both countries toward the negotiation table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.1: Case variation</th>
<th>Anglo-Japanese</th>
<th>Sino-Soviet</th>
<th>US-Taiwan</th>
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The Anglo-Japanese alliance regulated no military installation. The alliance-specific assets were the fixed investment that Britain and Japan had made in the Far East. Although they did not own these possessions jointly, the fate of their territories was tightly connected. Their collective assets could only be secured if each partner’s territories were protected. Meanwhile, the heavy investment in these territories signaled the importance of the alliance to both members. The Sino-Soviet alliance, by contrast, had neither the military installations nor the coherent interests in territorial possessions that Britain and Japan did. In addition, the Soviets refused to endorse Beijing’s territorial ambitions concerning Taiwan. The alliance cooperation was based on assistance that could easily be withdrawn.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance established solid cooperation between the respective militaries. These institutions were effective during the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, as they facilitated joint military operation and intelligence sharing, but the role of the military was minimal when the allies negotiated revisions. To a certain extent, military cooperation provided transparent information for decision makers, allowing them to assess the tactical advantage of securing territorial possessions. The Sino-Soviet alliance, on the other hand, had institutionalized contacts. Allies relied on diplomatic channels to coordinate their security cooperation.
External alliances affected both the Anglo-Japanese alliance and Sino-Soviet alliances. The formation of an external alliance was a warning that the existing alliance had become obsolete. The realignment in the Far East after the Russo-Japanese War was the important reference point for Britain and Japan to adjust their relationship. In the Sino-Soviet relationship, the Soviet-Mongolian alliance was a result rather than a cause of the Sino-Soviet split, for the relationship had already foundered before the Soviet Union allied with Mongolia.

The variables in Table 7.1 have a limited impact in the third case, for the US consistently avoided bargaining with Taiwan. The US military installation on the island provided a source of credible commitment. As the US withdrew most of its combat units stationed in Taiwan, the latter quickly became concerned. Alliance institutions did not mediate this concern, so the US thus had constantly reassured to Taiwan by means of substantive benefits.

**Future Prospects**

The findings presented in this dissertation explicate the dynamic of intra-alliance bargaining and the motivations behind treaty revision. The aim here is to make generalizable claims, but the mechanism is reduced to a model of two actors in order to maintain the simplicity of the theory, while the empirical test is constrained by available data and observable interactions between allies. The scope of empirical research is limited to alliances in the period after World War II. This is, of course, not the full picture of alliance renegotiation; there is considerably more to be explored in intra-alliance bargaining.
First, the theory elaborated in this dissertation is mainly monadic. I focus on structural factors that influence decision-making for both actors. However, the interest calculation may vary between the challenger and the partner. Some variables may only affect the bargaining behavior of specific members based on their perception of the utility of the alliance. The important variables may vary from case to case because members have different security priorities in different security environments, and the challenger and the partner each respond to structural variables differently based on their distinct roles. Causal mechanism may vary between these two actors. To uncover this dynamic, one needs to differentiate clearly the challenger and the partner in a dyad. The records of renegotiation requests in my data help in this regard, since they identify which party initiates the request to change the alliance relationship.

In general, detailed case studies are better suited to detecting the effect of structural variables on each member (challenger or partner). The problem is that a number of cases may be required in order to generate a universal argument. A directed-dyad design can test a relevant theory under a large-N scenario. The same structural variables proposed in chapter 2 may have different meanings for each actor, and their effects may be more informative. For example, such a design can differentiate the effect of external alliance formation by the challenger state from the effect caused by the partner state. The challenger has the incentive to form an alliance to replace the existing one, whereas an external alliance established by the partner is less likely to have the same purpose. Moreover, the direct-dyad design can better capture such individual characteristics as domestic politics. The general public in the challenger state may be
more eager to change the alliance, whereas people in the partner state may prevent its government from making concessions.

The time frame of this dissertation focuses on alliances from 1945 to 2001. There are reasons to believe that alliances during the Cold War were systematically different from those prior to World War II, beginning with the fact that almost all of them were linked either to the US or to the Soviets. Given the large capability and nuclear umbrella of these superpowers, states were less likely to change their alignment policies, which suggests that earlier alliances may have been subject to change more frequently. Alliance institution design after World War II aimed at maintaining a stable and long-term security partnership. The case of the Anglo-Japanese alliance shows that the security interests of the allies changed quickly during the pre-war period. Inter-state wars were more frequent and states altered their alignments every few years, so intra-alliance bargaining may have been more common. It is thus important to extend this research to earlier alliances and investigate whether bargaining behavior differed significantly in the post-war period.

Extending the timeframe to the period after September 11 provides clues about renegotiation in recent years. ATOP is going to release its 4.0 version, adding the record of alliances after 2010. With two more decades of data, it will be possible to investigate renegotiation behavior during the period of US primacy for comparison with the pre-war and Cold War periods.

Also, as discussed in the end of chapter 3, the renegotiation of multilateral alliances is another important dynamic not covered in this dissertation. Multilateral alliances are particularly prevalent in post-Cold War period, and, in the context of
bargaining among multiple actors, the mechanism of treaty revision is likely to differ from the one described here. Existing research on multilateral negotiation over trade, immigration, or environment issues may help to clarify the nature of multilateral security treaty revision.

Implications

The theory presented in this research can be applied to the field of governance and organizational behavior. To be sure, a security alliance involves core interests of states and therefore receives much more attention from its members. But the dynamics of intra-alliance bargaining are more likely to occur in the context of other issues, such as trade, international health, or production of extractive resources. Once the original treaty or regulation becomes obsolete, states revisit their relationship and renegotiate a new arrangement. In the case of these non-security issues, members have greater incentive to capitalize on the existing cooperation because breaking cooperation does not directly violate the survival of a state. States expect more bluffing and misrepresentation of information regarding the ability to fulfill obligations.

For example, states may underreport their ability to contain an epidemic in order to seek external financial help, or energy exporting countries may exaggerate their energy reserves to earn a more lucrative contract. Cooperation may break down when states find it hard to coordinate their divergent positions. The theory proposed in this dissertation explains why some cooperation is more likely to endure in some situations than in others. Members assess the costs that are already invested in the relationship and the future benefit of cooperation. They also try to learn the interests of other members. When members value future cooperation, they are more accommodating in
bargaining and their differences are more likely to be resolved through a negotiated agreement.

More importantly, my theory explains why some cooperation simply stagnates. States that refuse to change the status quo, usually because of a combination of heavy costs and little return in the future, are likely to leave the problem unresolved and to wait until future gains become more promising. Cooperation does not terminate the alliance, which continues to function, albeit inefficiently, until members decide to revisit the problems with it.

Alliance renegotiation is a management effort that helps to reveal how alliance members resolve their differences and sustain their security cooperation. The empirical evidence shows that allies will try to salvage their relationship, sometimes with multiple attempts, before they believe abrogation is inevitable. This means that alliance termination is a complex process. It takes a long time before an ally makes the final decision. The reasons behind termination do not rest on the disputes between allies but on their inability to reach a new arrangement.

On the other hand, bargaining between allies creates friction. It may appear that allies are struggling with their relationship and that alliance cohesion is low. This research shows that quarrels between allies do not necessarily suggest a broken relationship. One needs to observe the scope of substantive cooperation to understand how allies value the alliance tie. The cohesion between allies may be still solid if they both have an incentive to maintain the alliance. A challenge launched by a third party only strengthens alliance ties and encourages allies to resolve or temporarily suspend their dispute.
There is more to explore in alliance renegotiation behavior. The answers presented here are not complete, but this dissertation provides original data that facilitates the analysis of renegotiation. It also points out useful directions for future research. The theory and empirical evidence thus pave the way for future research in alliance cooperation.
Chapter 8 Appendix

Data Construction

The data in my analysis was constructed by taking the following steps: First, I used EUGENE to create a dyadic dataset with a timeframe from 1945 to 2001. I include the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) score of the Correlates of War (COW), distance between capitals, alliance ID from Alliance Treaty Obligation and Provisions (ATOP), coup data from Powell and Thyne (2011), and the polity scores from PolityIV. This data contains all of the state dyads, and I then merge it with Leeds and Savun’s (2007) data (hereafter L&S), keeping only bilateral alliance dyads and limiting the timeframe from 1945 to 2001. This creates a bilateral alliance-dyad dataset. I merge this data with the 2012 Cross-National Time Series archive (CNTS), ATOP alliance-level data, Militarized Interstate Disputes 4.0 (MID 4.0) data, and the variables I code.

Next, I omit treaties related to the Czechoslovakia split because those renegotiations did not address any disagreement between members but were meant to continue the same alliance relationship with the Czech Republic and Slovakia separately. Members knew that the security benefits were unlikely to change and that renegotiation would succeed with no objections. I also omit treaties that were fulfilled and those that ended because a member state lost independence, for the reason that these alliances concluded under circumstances that were beyond the control of the allies. They could not renegotiate to prevent the termination of the alliances.

The ATOP data records the “phases” of an alliance. A new phase means that treaty obligations are changed. In the post-World War II period, however, there were no
ATOP phases after omitting the treaties related to the Czechoslovakia split. All revisions are coded as new treaties in ATOP.

I convert the data to fit the purpose of this research. The dataset based on L&S has overlapping observations. For instance, Hungary and East Germany established a treaty in 1967 and renegotiated a new one in 1977, but these are separate treaties in the ATOP dataset. In a bilateral alliance dyad dataset, there will be two overlapping observations in 1977. This applies to almost all renegotiated treaties. These overlaps were suitable for the study of L&S because the intent of that study is to understand the termination of each treaty. My purpose, however, is to find out how two states sustain their alliance relationship. Overlapping observations increase the number of “non-events” in the statistical analysis. I therefore omit these overlaps, keeping observations that record the final years of the earlier treaties (those that are renegotiated). This creates dyad-year data. Finally, I create a unique dyad ID for each pair of countries. The final data contains 2255 observations, 105 dyads, and 125 bilateral treaty alliances.

Self-coded Variables

I code three binary variables. The coding is based on such secondary resources as books, journal articles, and news reports in Keesings World News Archive and the LexisNexis databases. First, a variable indicates whether allies make a renegotiation request. Such a request is defined as any member asking to discuss, reexamine, or revise the security cooperation covered by a treaty to which it is a signatory. If a negotiation continued for several years, these years receive a coding of 1. I find a total of 85 renegotiation requests. One is a secret request, the details of which were not revealed until decades after the treaty was revised. Another 14 requests were revealed after the
negotiations were concluded or represent continuous negotiations that did not reveal new information. There is thus a total of 70 requests made in public.

Second, a diplomatic dispute is coded 1 if any member expresses discontent to its ally over matters unrelated to alliances. Such discontent includes statements expressing anger or frustration, disagreement over the ally’s foreign policy, and concerns about the ally’s domestic politics. Only political disputes between states count for the analysis. Disputes on trade, human rights, immigrants, extradition, NGO activities, or minor border violations such as those involving fishing do not count as diplomatic disputes in this variable. Some disputes may continue for more than a year, and these years also receive the same coding.

Third, a variable for dispute over alliance indicates whether any member shows concerns about the enforcement of an alliance treaty. These disputes are directly related to security cooperation under the treaty and are different from renegotiation requests, in which the former complains about the alliance relationship and the latter shows intent to resolve the problems.

It is important to note that the two above-mentioned variables describe different types of disputes; otherwise there would be a multicollinearity problem when including both variables in the same model. The correlation between the two variables is 0.1, and a t-test shows that they are statistically different.

I find 105 diplomatic disputes among allies and 58 disputes over an alliance. In addition, I examine territorial disputes between allies, but find only nine cases. Also, the dataset by Huth & Allee (2002) yields only three cases of territorial disputes between allies. Owing to this small number of cases, I exclude this variable from all
statistical analysis. This small number of disputes confirms Huth & Allee’s finding that alliances help members to resolve their territorial disputes and prevent future disputes.

Table 8.1 shows the variables in my statistical analysis and their definitions. Table 8.2 shows descriptive statistics.

**Table 8.1: Variables and Definition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Coding Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>renegml</td>
<td>Change of alliance relationship</td>
<td>ATOP; author recode</td>
<td>An alliance is revised if allies decide to change treaty provisions or establish a protocol or memorandum to do so. An alliance is considered abrogated if any member decides to withdraw from the treaty or refuses to renew the treaty automatically. The variable is coded 0 if no changes take place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reng_request</td>
<td>Any member requests a renegotiation</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>One or both members want to discuss the security cooperation covered by their treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pubquest</td>
<td>Public request</td>
<td>Author recode from reneg_request</td>
<td>Any member makes a public request to discuss the alliance relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>basein</td>
<td>Alliance-specific assets</td>
<td>Recode from BASE in ATOP</td>
<td>Members agree to station troops in the territories of one or both.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milpur</td>
<td>Military/political organization</td>
<td>Recode from ORGPURP1 in ATOP</td>
<td>A treaty specifies the creation of a formal organization, the primary purpose of which involves military or political coordination.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

140 I cross-examine allies that form external alliances to check whether alliance members collaborated with the specified threat mentioned in their original treaty. Germany, Japan, and Italy are the most common specified threat, as countries feared their renewed aggression immediately after WWII. Such a threat was virtually absent during the Cold War owing to the division of Germany and occupation of Japan. Most of the Soviet bloc countries signed alliance treaties with East Germany; similarly, many Eastern bloc alliances specified West Germany as an adversary. Beginning in 1969, however, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik reconciled the tension between the FRG and GDR. Some Eastern bloc countries signed nonaggression treaties with West Germany. Since their actions were intended to ease tension with
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Coding Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>exechang</td>
<td>Executive turnover</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>The control of executive power changes hands for any member. The absolute difference of polity scores between members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demdiff</td>
<td>Regime similarity</td>
<td>PolityIV</td>
<td>The ratio of the capability of the weaker power to the stronger one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>powp</td>
<td>Power parity</td>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Power parity squared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>powp2</td>
<td>Power parity squared</td>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>A treaty mandates how to handle disputes regarding the interpretation of the provisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conwtind</td>
<td>Treaty has measures to resolve dispute</td>
<td>Recode from CONWTIN in ATOP</td>
<td>Any member is a target in an MID initiated by a third party during the year, and the MID fatality level is ≥1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fataltar</td>
<td>Any member targeted by a fatal MID</td>
<td>MID 4.0</td>
<td>Any member initiates an MID against a third party during the year, and the MID fatality level is ≥1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fatalcha</td>
<td>Any member initiates a fatal MID</td>
<td>MID 4.0</td>
<td>Any member initiates an MID against a third party during the year, and the MID fatality level is ≥1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_diplom</td>
<td>Diplomatic dispute</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Allies have a diplomatic dispute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_alliance</td>
<td>Dispute on alliance</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Allies have a dispute over the implementation of their treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distance</td>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>COW</td>
<td>Numeric distance between two capitals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>Time since last revision</td>
<td></td>
<td>Time variance control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t2</td>
<td>T squared</td>
<td></td>
<td>Time variance control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t3</td>
<td>T cubed</td>
<td></td>
<td>Time variance control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dpowp</td>
<td>Change of power parity from last year</td>
<td>COW</td>
<td>Change of power parity from the previous year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coupatt</td>
<td>Coup attempt</td>
<td>Powell and Thyne 2011</td>
<td>There is a coup attempt in any member state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demdiff_beg</td>
<td>Regime type distance since formation</td>
<td>PolityIV</td>
<td>Regime type difference compared to the first year in the dyad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>majb</td>
<td>Both major power</td>
<td>COW</td>
<td>Both members are major powers in the international system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, almost all European countries signed the Helsinki Pact, a non-aggression alliance, in 1975. Given the nature of the Pact, signing it did not suggest that the Eastern bloc countries wanted to abandon their allies. After examining all cases, I do not find allies colluding with an external threat that was specified in the treaty.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Coding Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>maj1</td>
<td>One major power</td>
<td>COW</td>
<td>One member is a major power in the international system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wartime</td>
<td>Wartime alliance</td>
<td>ATOP</td>
<td>An alliance is formed during a war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonagg</td>
<td>Non-aggression pact</td>
<td>ATOP</td>
<td>The treaty has a nonaggression obligation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peaceyrs</td>
<td>Time since last renegotiation request</td>
<td></td>
<td>Time variance control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peayrsq</td>
<td>Peaceyrs squared</td>
<td></td>
<td>Time variance control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peayrcub</td>
<td>Peaceyrs cubed</td>
<td></td>
<td>Time variance control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
<th>count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>renegml</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pubquest</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>basein</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milpur</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alform</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exechang</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demdiff</td>
<td>5.482</td>
<td>6.472</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>powp</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>powp2</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conwtind</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fataltar</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fatalcha</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_diplom</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d_alliance</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distance</td>
<td>2524.875</td>
<td>2420.752</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>8570</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>12.106</td>
<td>9.804</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t2</td>
<td>242.614</td>
<td>355.394</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2304</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t3</td>
<td>6203.345</td>
<td>13348.850</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>110592</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reneg_request</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dpowp</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>-0.280</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>2148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coupatt</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demdiff_beg</td>
<td>2.407</td>
<td>3.668</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>majb</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maj1</td>
<td>0.567</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wartime</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonagg</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peaceyrs</td>
<td>11.891</td>
<td>10.390</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peayrsq</td>
<td>249.299</td>
<td>376.327</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2025</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peayrcub</td>
<td>6649.538</td>
<td>14014.599</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91125</td>
<td>2255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Predicting Renegotiation Requests

The main part of the paper uses the predicted probability of renegotiation requests to control for selection bias. I include this variable because it is unclear how changes in domestic and international politics increase the likelihood of members to initiate intra-alliance bargaining. There may be some requests missing because the bargaining remains secret or when such a process is unable to be verified in the resources on which I rely. Predicting renegotiation requests helps to determine which dyads are more likely to engage in bargaining in a given year. The logit model is reported in Table 8.3. I include variables that capture the changes in domestic and international politics, such as power balance, coup d’état, regime type change, and major power status. I then use the “predict” command in Stata to calculate the predicted probability for each dyad-year observation.

Table 8.3: Logit on Renegotiation Request

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in power parity</td>
<td>5.576*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from last year</td>
<td>(2.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute on alliance</td>
<td>1.780**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coup attempt</td>
<td>1.927**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime type distance</td>
<td>0.064+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>since formation</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both major powers</td>
<td>1.530**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One major power</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime alliance</td>
<td>1.471**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonaggression obligation</td>
<td>-0.462+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.215**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Coefficient reported. Robust standard error in the parenthesis. Cubic splines are omitted. Models are clustered by dyads.

Level of significance
+ 0.10
* 0.05
** 0.01

Two Types of Status Quo

Figure 1.1 suggests that two types of status quo (SQ) may occur at the end of renegotiation. The first is an SQ in which no member wants to change the alliance. The second is an SQ in which members enter into intra-alliance bargaining and reach an agreement not to change their alliance. This latter SQ occurs when members table their disagreement by ignoring the challenger’s demands, or when both members agree on certain arrangements without changing the treaty content. Using the renegotiation request variable, I confirm eight cases in which an ally requested reexamination of the alliance, but the members decided to maintain the status quo. When I drop these cases and run the models represented in table 3.2, the result remains the same. A closer look at these cases shows that allies tend to delay bargaining when they are reluctant to make changes. For instance, Togo requested that France revisit their defense treaty in 1973, but was not able to convince the latter country, which saw no interests in increasing its defense commitment to Togo, to address the issue. Yet Togo did not negate the alliance, since it needed French military support; no other state was willing to provide the security guarantee France promised. In other cases, negotiations were interrupted by domestic politics. For example, the US and Liberia decided to renegotiate their consultation pact by adding non-aggression and mutual defense provisions in 1978, but the negotiations were suspended when Samuel Doe launched a coup d’état and assassinated President Tolbert and his cabinet members.
Alternative Models

An event history model is an alternative model specification for this paper. A hazard model estimates the likelihood that an alliance treaty will survive, explaining how soon treaty revision will happen after the independent variables are present. It is not clear, however, whether the intervening variables specified in my theory actually accelerate the bargaining process and produce an outcome in a shorter (or longer) period of time. This is the main reason I use multinomial logit in chapter 3. The presence of these variables facilitates communication between members rather than pushing them to decide the fate of their treaty in a short period of time. The only exception is in the case of public requests, as the domestic audience could pressure the government to make its decision as quickly as possible.

Nevertheless, a duration model can examine whether revision is easier to achieve. A Cox proportional hazard model estimates the hazard rate of treaty revision; the results are reported in models 1 and 2 of table 8.3. A Cox model only estimates the survivability of an event, in this case, treaty revision. Yet my theory suggests that competing choices exist beyond maintaining the status quo, abrogating, and revising the treaty. The competing risk model developed by Fine & Gray (1999) can address this dynamic in a duration model. The basic assumptions of this model are similar to those of a Cox model; it is a semi-parametric model with no baseline assumption regarding the hazard ratio of an event. The main difference is that the competing risk model estimates proportional sub-hazards of each outcome when estimating the incidence of interest. In other words, the coefficients take other outcomes into account. The competing risk model is shown in models 3 and 4 of table 8.4. The interpretation
of the coefficients is the same in these models. A positive coefficient means an increasing cumulative probability of revision, while a negative coefficient suggests that revision is likely to occur in a longer period of time. Models 2 and 4 replace the public request variable with the probability of a renegotiation request in order to control for selection effect.

**Table 8.4: Duration models on revision**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Cox</th>
<th>(2) Cox (selection)</th>
<th>(3) Competing risk</th>
<th>(4) Competing risk (selection)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public request</td>
<td>1.123**</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted probability of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>renegotiation request</td>
<td>6.463**</td>
<td>(2.04)</td>
<td>1.597</td>
<td>(3.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance-specific assets</td>
<td>1.228**</td>
<td>1.105*</td>
<td>1.257**</td>
<td>1.079*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military/political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External alliance</td>
<td>1.904**</td>
<td>2.074**</td>
<td>2.103**</td>
<td>2.232**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag executive turnover</td>
<td>0.537+</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.555+</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power parity</td>
<td>2.605+</td>
<td>3.592*</td>
<td>1.775</td>
<td>2.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power parity squared</td>
<td>-1.105</td>
<td>-2.140</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>-0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty has measures</td>
<td>-1.816**</td>
<td>-2.104**</td>
<td>-2.399**</td>
<td>-2.503**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to resolve disputes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any member targeted by</td>
<td>-0.487</td>
<td>-0.497</td>
<td>-0.469</td>
<td>-0.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a fatal MID</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any member initiates</td>
<td>1.141**</td>
<td>0.875*</td>
<td>1.230**</td>
<td>1.020*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a fatal MID</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic dispute</td>
<td>-44.591</td>
<td>-43.512**</td>
<td>-17.145**</td>
<td>-23.128**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute on alliance</td>
<td>-43.549</td>
<td>-43.768**</td>
<td>-16.837**</td>
<td>-22.676**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficient reported. Robust standard error in the parenthesis. Models are clustered by ATOP ID.

Level of significance
+ 0.10
* 0.05
The result in Table 8.4 shows that the public request variable reaches a conventional level of significance, but loses statistical significance in a competing risk model. The military installation variable received good support; the coefficient is positive and $p < .05$ across all models. Alliance institutions do not have an effect on revision, a result that is consistent with the previous analysis. The external alliance variable, like the models in chapter 3, has performed well across all models, with $p < .01$. In sum, the independent variables received support in the alternative models. H1, H2, and H4a are supported. There is still no evidence for H3. The overall result is consistent with multinomial logit models.
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