

ABSTRACT

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Organized interests do not have direct control over the fate of their policy agendas in Congress. They cannot introduce bills, vote on legislation, or serve on House committees. If organized interests want to achieve virtually any of their legislative goals they must rely on and work through members of Congress. As an interest group seeks to move its policy agenda forward in Congress, then, one of the most important challenges it faces is the recruitment of effective legislative allies. Legislative allies are members of Congress who “share the same policy objective as the group” and who use their limited time and resources to advocate for the group’s policy needs (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 76). For all the financial resources that a group can bring to bear as it competes with other interests to win policy outcomes, it will be ineffective without the help of members of Congress that are willing to expend their time and effort to advocate for its policy positions (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999).

Given the importance of legislative allies to interest group success, are some organized interests better able to recruit legislative allies than others? This question has received little attention in the literature. This dissertation offers an original theoretical

framework describing both when we should expect some types of interests to generate more legislative allies than others and how interests vary in their effectiveness at mobilizing these allies toward effective legislative advocacy. It then tests these theoretical expectations on variation in group representation during the stage in the legislative process that many scholars have argued is crucial to policy influence, interest representation on legislative committees. The dissertation uncovers pervasive evidence that interests with a presence across more congressional districts stand a better chance of having legislative allies on their key committees. It also reveals that interests with greater amounts of leverage over jobs and economic investment will be better positioned to win more allies on key committees. In addition, interests with a policy agenda that closely overlaps with the jurisdiction of just one committee in Congress are more likely to have legislative allies on their key committees than are interests that have a policy agenda divided across many committee jurisdictions. In short, how groups are distributed across districts, the leverage that interests have over local jobs and economic investment, and how committee jurisdictions align with their policy goals affects their influence in Congress.

INTEREST REPRESENTATION AS A CLASH OF UNEQUAL ALLIES

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Dedication

For Núria and little Emilia.

Acknowledgments

There are many people that I need to thank for their support and encouragement throughout this dissertation. The department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland has given me the substantive and methodological foundation to complete this project. The faculty and staff do a wonderful job of giving doctoral students a complete toolbox for rigorous academic research.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Organized interests vary in the amount of resources that they can bring to bear in any policy battle. Some groups have far more financial assets than others. Some spend more on elections than others. Some invest more in direct lobbying, grassroots organizations, and public relations. Scholars have investigated how variation in these types of resources affects the success groups have in the legislative process. Many scholars have hypothesized that interests with more resources will have greater leverage over the legislative process. Campaign contributions have been studied more than any other type of resource (see selected studies by Bronars and Lott 1997; Frensdreis and Waterman 1985; Grenzke 1989; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Stratmann 1991; Wawro 2001; Wilhite and Thielman 1987; Wright 1985). In addition to the amount of money that interests spend in elections, scholars have also examined the impact of direct lobbying, grassroots operations, as well as organizations' total assets (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hall and Wayman 1990; Wright 1990). The findings in this whole body of research, however, have been mixed at best (Baumgartner and Leech 1998a).

Yet for all the work examining variation in group influence, there is an important resource that has largely been overlooked. Organized interests also vary in the number of

legislative allies that they have in Congress. Legislative allies are members of Congress who “share the same policy objective as the group” and who use their limited time and resources to advocate for the policy needs of the group (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 76). Some interests have a large number of legislative allies, while others have very few.

Interest groups must recruit and work with legislators in order to move their policy agendas forward (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015). Groups lack the power to introduce legislation or vote for bills. They cannot sit on, make legislative decisions in, or vote on House committees. For all their monetary resources, interests without allied legislators in Congress will consistently be on the outside of the policymaking process looking in. To be effective, interest groups must rely on lawmakers who will actively push for their agenda in the legislative process. There is a rich literature which finds that groups primarily work through their legislative allies in Congress (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999). By comparison, we know almost nothing about whether some organized interests can recruit more legislative allies than others. Throughout this dissertation my aims will be to better understand the systematic factors that predict when some groups will generate more allies than others and to thereby learn more about which interests are likely to win and which are likely lose in the legislative process.

Interests with more allies in Congress possess a number of advantages. They will have access to a larger number of legislators, many who may be actively enlisted in their agenda. Groups with more allies stand in a better position to have the assistance they need at key points in the legislative process, such as on committees relevant to their

interests. Groups with more allies are also likely to be better represented in general compared to groups with fewer allies. Understanding (1) how organized interests gain legislative allies, (2) what factors predict which interests will generate more legislative allies than others, and (3) whether some interests are better able to mobilize their allies towards effectively advocating for their policy agendas may therefore offer advance our understanding about which interests have more influence over the legislative process.

Constituency Presence, Ally Generation, and Group Influence

This dissertation rests upon two key assumptions: The number of allies that interest groups have in Congress will affect the representation that they receive in the legislative process. And the number of legislative allies interest groups are able to recruit will be tied to constituency presence. The logic underlying these assumptions is simple. Members of Congress advocate strongly for the interests in their districts (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Cragg and Kahn 2009; Hall 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Welch 1982; Wright 1990). Interest groups are also constituents. Their members, employees, and firms make up important parts of the districts that legislators represent. The number of effective legislative allies that a group is able to recruit in Congress is therefore likely to be tied to constituency related factors like the number of districts where it has a constituency presence. As such, some organized interests will recruit more legislative allies than others.

While the idea that constituency presence is somehow important to group influence has rarely been directly studied, it is not new. Richard Fenno offered an insight about group influence that went largely unnoticed in subsequent scholarship. Citing

survey evidence he argued that “whatever the technique they use, the ultimate source of clientele (interest group) influence is local” (Fenno 1973, 43). The lack of empirical work in this area is glaring when one examines the basic profiles of members of Congress. *CQ Politics in America* (2016), for example, lists a handful of the most important facts about each legislator. Among these facts is their party, their state or the location of their district, a brief biography, and the major industries in their district. Despite the prominent listing of local economic interests in member profiles, political scientists have rarely investigated how the distribution of organized interests across congressional constituencies affects their prospects for legislative success in Congress.

Coming up with examples of local interests that have won strong advocacy from representatives is not particularly difficult. Constituents in and around the Seattle area are said to “bleed Boeing blue” (Robison and Ray 2013). Boeing and other defense contractors are major employers in the area. Defense industry jobs make up a substantial proportion of employment of Boeing’s former Representative Norm Dicks’s district. Dicks was the chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee in charge of defense appropriations. His alliance with the company was so strong that people started to call him “Mr. Boeing” (Song 2012). John Dingell of Michigan represented a district that houses concentrations of auto manufacturers and auto related unions. Dingell was the chairman and longtime member of Energy and Commerce Committee, which has jurisdiction over several policies of interest to both constituencies.

Congress member Anna Eshoo’s advocacy provides yet another illustration of the lengths representatives can go to represent local interests. Representative Eshoo represents major Silicon Valley companies like Facebook, Hewlett Packard, Apple, and

Google. In 2006 she was a member of an important subcommittee for Google's legislative needs, the Telecommunications Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. While a bill was being adjusted in a markup session a Republican peer proposed what became known as the "Google killer" amendment. In response to this threat to a local economic interest Representative Eshoo "leapt into the fray, on a committee that had a majority of the other party, and convinced her colleagues not to vote on what would have been a very bad piece of legislation for [Google]" (Google Policy Talks 2008).

Representative Eshoo's advocacy for the interests in her district provokes several unanswered questions that, with closer examination, could reveal evidence of systemic bias towards some interests over and above others. First, she demonstrated elevated legislative action on behalf of a salient local interest in her constituency. If Eshoo's behavior is common in Congress, then we will find that interests with a local presence in more districts will generate more legislative allies and consequently receive greater legislative advocacy. District presence could therefore predict ally generation. Second, among the many organized interests with a local presence in her district, Representative Eshoo decided to advocate particularly strongly for politically active business interests. Are some types of local interests, such as local businesses or interests that are more politically active, more likely to generate legislative allies than others? And third, Eshoo managed to gain a position on a committee with leverage over the issues of importance to an industry in her district. Are some interests better at mobilizing legislative allies like Eshoo toward winning representation on particular House committees than others? If other members of Congress are motivated to join committees in order to support local

interests, then this could lead to biased institutional representation for some interests. Moreover, some interests may be more effective at mobilizing allies like Eshoo than others. Interest groups with a policy agenda that closely aligns with one committee may, for example, be more likely to have allies on that committee than are interests with a policy agenda that is divided across many committee jurisdictions. The key question, then, is what types of interest groups will have strong congressional advocates serving on the committees that are most important to their interests.

When we start to think about groups as constituents, the list of constituencies that could receive particularly strong legislative advocacy from their representatives could go on and on. The districts of representatives from West Virginia have large concentrations of coal firms. Districts in Texas and Oklahoma are home to concentrations of oil interests that other states lack. The finance industry has a stronger presence in Connecticut and New York districts than districts in other states. The variation in constituency interests in these districts and others, and the advocacy that their representatives have the potential to demonstrate in support of their constituents' policy agendas, suggests that our knowledge of group influence would be well served by exploring the impact of various constituent related factors on who wins more allies in Congress.

The lack of scholarly attention to the importance of groups as constituencies is also surprising given the virtual kaleidoscope of variation that organized interests demonstrate in how they are distributed across the 435 House districts. Each organized interest has a unique geographic distribution as a constituency across congressional districts. Some interests will have a local presence in each of the 435 districts, while

others will have a presence in very few. Moreover, holding the overall size of any particular interest group constant, groups will also vary in how concentrated or dispersed this presence is within particular districts. Some constituencies tied to particular interests will be largely concentrated within a few districts and sparsely present in many districts. Others will be more evenly dispersed across all of the districts where they have a local presence. On the whole then, there is a dramatic amount of variation in where groups maintain a constituency presence across House districts. This variation provides a new source of empirical data that is relevant to the search for answers about which interests have more control over the fate of their policy agendas as they flow through the legislative process. With this in mind, one of the core objectives of this project will be to gain a better understanding of how interest groups generate allies in Congress via their unique spatial distribution across House districts.

Potential for Theoretical Contribution to Our Knowledge of Group Influence

There are a number of reasons why political scientists should think seriously about organized interests as constituents. The most prominent is that this approach could make a strong contribution to current theories of interest group influence. Scholars who study interest group influence on legislative behavior have offered two principal explanations for why organized interests might sway policy outcomes. The first explanation is called exchange theory. Exchange theory argues that organized interests contribute money to legislators and that this money causes legislators to advocate for their policy interests (Baumgartner and Leech 1998a; but see also Bronars and Lott 1997; Frensdreis and Waterman 1985; Grenzke 1989; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Stratmann

1991; Wawro 2001; Wilhite and Thielman 1987; Wright 1985). The normative implication of exchange theory is that the legislative process is corrupt. Organized interests who have the most money on any given policy will be more likely to win their desired outcome.

The second explanation for group influence, offered by Hall and Deardorff (2006), views the majority of lobbying as a legislative subsidy to representatives with aligned policy interests. They point out that because organized interests consistently approach legislative allies rather than trying to change the behavior of fence-sitters or opponents, exchange theory does not match the reality of how groups influence policy outcomes. Instead Hall and Deardorff argue that groups subsidize the activity of their allies in Congress by offering the legislative resources needed to advocate for the group's policy needs. For example, groups may provide information about who is voting for or against a bill, they may give evidence in support of a policy position, or they may even write entire pieces of legislation. Legislative subsidies to policy allies have the potential to increase a group's influence over policy outcomes as the participation of allies is increased as a result of the group's legislative assistance.

The normative implications of the theory of lobbying as a legislative subsidy are less clear. Policy outcomes may still be biased, but the level of bias depends on which groups can give policy-makers with similar policy goals the legislative resources necessary to advocate on their behalf. The theory of lobbying as a legislative subsidy emphasizes the dyadic relationship between interest groups and particular legislative allies in Congress. It argues that legislative participation will be increased for particular legislative allies to the extent that interest groups subsidize their effort by acting like

extended legislative staff. An important question that this project will consider that is one step removed from Hall and Deardorff's theory is, which organized interests are the most likely to gain allies in Congress prior to the act of lobbying?

If some interests can recruit more legislative allies than others, then they are likely to be better represented in Congress, they will receive greater access to legislators, and they will thus be better positioned to gain leverage over legislative policy outcomes. Expanding our knowledge about whether some interests generate more allied legislators than others therefore has the potential to shift our understanding about group influence in substantial ways. If we reconceive of organized interests as being part of each representative's constituency as well as having a varied presence across districts, then the causal story and the empirical approach to analyzing interest group influence shifts. Rather than measuring the effects of campaign contributions or lobbying behavior on legislative activity, it becomes more important to study how constituency related factors influence the recruitment and collective mobilization of legislative allies.

Group Influence Via Ally Generation and Mobilization: Three Key Research Questions

This goal of this project is to contribute to our knowledge about (1) how organized interests gain legislative allies, (2) what factors predict which interests will generate more legislative allies than others, and (3) whether some interests are better able to mobilize their allies towards effectively advocating for their policy agenda. To this end, there are three questions that motivate the following chapters.

The initial question that drives this project is whether the geographic distribution of a constituency relates to the number of allies that it is able to recruit. This question

motivates several hypotheses that may influence ally generation. First, groups may win more allies in Congress by maintaining a constituency presence in a larger number of House districts. A large body of research finds that representatives will advocate strongly for constituent interests (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Cragg and Kahn 2009; Hall 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Kingdon 1989; Welch 1982; Wright 1990). Groups that are constituents in many districts should therefore win more allies than groups that are constituents in few districts. Commercial banks are present in every district while industries involved in resource extraction (e.g., oil and gas, mining) are in substantially fewer districts. Does variation in district presence matter?

Second, the concentration or dispersion of a constituency within the districts where it is present may also affect ally recruitment. Holding constant the number of districts where an interest group has a presence, groups can still demonstrate variation in how their members or employees are dispersed. Fast food restaurants and department stores tend to be distributed fairly evenly across districts. Other interests, such as heating oil dealers, have a concentrated presence in some districts and a sparse presence across many. How does the concentration of a constituency within the districts where it has a local presence affect ally generation?

A third factor that may affect the number of constituency motivated allies that a group generates is the extent to which it is geographically concentrated or dispersed. Contemporary work by political economists indicates that legislators advocate particularly strongly for economic sectors that are geographically concentrated in particular parts of the country (Busch and Reinhardt 1999, 2000, 2005). Computer and cigarette manufacturers are located in a similar number of districts. Yet cigarette

manufacturers are largely concentrated in Mid-Atlantic states like Virginia and North Carolina while computer manufacturers are spread more randomly across districts. Does this kind of geographic concentration affect the number of allies that interests generate?

Another question that may reveal important sources of ally variation is whether some types of constituents are more effective at recruiting legislative allies than others. Business interests have often been thought to have a “privileged place in the policymaking process” (Lindblom 1977). Charles Lindblom (1977, 1982) has argued that business interests have greater leverage over policy outcomes because they control jobs and economic investment. But the empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis has been mixed (Allen and Campbell 1994; Campbell and Allen 1994; Hicks and Swank 1984; Jacobs 1988; Quinn 1988; Quinn and Shapiro 1991; Smith 1999, 2000). The methodological focus in the body of work that tests theses for business influence has been on how national economic indicators, rather than local factors, relate to business advantage. The literature has never studied business advantage through the lens of constituency representation. It may be that business interests in the district are more likely than other types of interests to generate legislative allies because businesses have control over local jobs and economic investment. This dissertation will therefore test the hypothesis that local business interests win systematically larger numbers of allies than nonbusiness interests.

Local interests that are more politically active may also win more legislative allies. Kristina Miler’s (2010) work indicates that interests in the district which actively contact their members of Congress are both more likely to be recognized by, and have their interests advocated for, by their representative. She also found that interests that

donated more political money to their representative were more likely to be seen as constituents in the district. Groups that are politically active in the district may therefore have an edge over politically disengaged local interests in ally generation. As a result, this dissertation will also examine whether politically active interests secure more allies than other interests.

The final research question that motivates this project is not concerned with the number of allies that interests generate. Once groups recruit legislative allies they will still need to communicate their policy needs in ways that mobilize them toward effective legislative action. One factor that is likely to affect how successful groups will be at mobilizing their allies is the nature of their policy agendas. The nature of group policy agendas is particularly relevant as their allies choose which committees to request to better serve constituency interests.

Committees have jurisdiction over clearly defined policy issue areas. Some organized interests will have diverse policy agendas that span several major issue areas. Their policy agendas will therefore be under the jurisdiction of, and thus fragmented across, many committees. Interests with narrow policy issue agendas, on the other hand, will focus on few major policy issue areas. As a consequence, their policy agendas will flow through fewer committees. Groups with narrow policy agendas will have clear information about the committees that they would like their legislative allies to request. They will find it much easier to provide clear and strong messages to their allies about which committees they wish them to join. With a strong message about which committees to request, and with fewer committees to choose from, their allies will win comparatively better committee representation. Thus this dissertation will also examine

how variation in the nature of organized interests' policy agendas affects how well they are able to mobilize their allies toward effective policy advocacy.

Testing a Theory of Group Influence Through Ally Generation: Unequal Allies and Interest Representation on House Committees

The final important task before setting forth with this project is to choose an effective means of testing the potential effects that variation in constituency ally generation and mobilization will have on who wins and who loses in Congress. If variation in constituency motivated legislative allies is central to the story of group influence, then we should observe evidence of its effects during the most important points in the legislative process. Groups that recruit systematically larger numbers of allied legislators may receive increased advocacy for their policy needs when their allies introduce bills, when they build coalitions, when they take roll call votes, and when they advocate for the group on legislative committees.

In selecting which point in the legislative process to analyze in this dissertation, my goal is to focus my empirical attention on the stage where interest groups will be the most likely to affect policy outcomes. The bulk of the empirical literature focused on organized interests influence on roll call voting behavior (Bronars and Lott 1997; Frenreis and Waterman 1985; Grenzke 1989; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Stratmann 1991; Wawro 2001; Wilhite and Thielman 1987; Wright 1985). However, this approach has been criticized because roll call votes take place after most of the important legislative work has already concluded (Hall 1996; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Powell 2013). This project centers its empirical attention instead on how variation in group

efficacy at recruiting and mobilizing legislative allies affects their representation on legislative committees.

Recent interest group scholarship increasingly describes legislative committees as crucial to any theoretical explanation of group influence in Congress (Hall 1996; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Powell 2013). Committees are where the majority of bills are written (Adler and Wilkerson 2008). The preponderance of bills that become law are written by members of reporting committee members (Adler and Wilkerson 2008). Committee members also have gatekeeping powers that other legislators lack (Baumgartner et al. 2009). The literature therefore suggests that groups with more allies on legislative committees will be better positioned to affect policy outcomes.

Recent empirical work has further emphasized the importance of committee level allies to which interests win and which interests lose in the legislative process. In a comprehensive study of nearly every type of resource that could affect policy outcomes Baumgartner et al. (2009) found that groups with more legislative allies on House committees were systematically more likely to win policy outcomes. This was a novel, but puzzling finding in their study. Financial resources did not have a clear relationship with policy outcomes, but groups with a larger number of allies on legislative committees did. Building on this discovery, this project seeks to fill in the theoretical and empirical gaps that explain when some interests will win greater amounts of committee representation than others.

Committee representation is, for these reasons, highly relevant to who wins and who loses in the legislative process. Committees have jurisdiction over clearly defined policy issue areas. To the extent that a group's allies can win membership on the

committees of primary importance to their its needs, the group will be more likely to gain greater control over both the content of legislation it cares about and it will have increased gatekeeping power over whether bills move forward in the legislative process. Studying the factors that predict variation in committee representation will therefore offer a strong foundation for a theory of group influence via constituency motivated ally generation and mobilization.

Overview and Organization of this Study

Do some interest groups have greater leverage over the legislative process than others? A large body of interest group scholarship has tested the hypothesis that moneyed interests buy policy outcomes. The collected findings of these studies have, however, been mixed (Baumgartner and Leech 1998a). As such, they are unable to provide a strong empirical foundation for the assertion that some groups influence the legislative process more than others. By contrast, a substantial number of studies have found that groups work primarily through their legislative allies in Congress (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999). Building on these findings, this project emphasizes the importance of legislative allies to group influence. The following chapters will set up a theoretical framework for and then test whether groups with more allies and groups that are more effective at mobilizing these allies are better represented on the committees of importance to their policy needs.

Chapter two offers a theoretical framework for when we ought to expect constituency motivated ally generation and mobilization to influence interest

representation on House committees. It begins with a review of the literature detailing what we know about interest groups and their allies in Congress. It then builds a theoretical framework that explains when we ought to expect (1) that some interests will generate more allies than others and (2) that some interests will mobilize these allies toward more effective legislative advocacy than others. And finally it lays out hypotheses that test when variation in constituency motivated ally generation and ally mobilization will affect variation in the representation organized interests receive on the committees of importance to their policy needs.

Chapter three details how the data used to test the hypotheses set forth in chapter one were created; it describes the three major policy issue areas that are the focus of this study; and it explains which committees are examined in the project. After identifying all the organized interests active in lobbying on three landmark laws in the 111th Congress (covering energy, financial regulation, and health care), I assemble an original database identifying how these interests are distributed across the 435 districts in the House of Representatives (as in, precisely where they have firms, employees, and members). I then use bill referral data to determine the committees of primary jurisdiction for each major issue area studied. Lastly, I present descriptive analysis to illuminate the variety of interests, and corresponding constituencies, examined in the analytical chapters of this study.

Chapter four explores the geography of interest representation. This chapter parses out precisely which types of constituency distributions are relevant to ally generation and its corresponding effects on interest representation on House committees. The number of districts where a group maintains a local presence, the unique

concentration of the constituency within the districts where it is located, and the geographic concentration (i.e.-spatial proximity) of the constituency are all measured against the number of allies a group generates and their corresponding effects on committee level representation.

Chapter five examines whether some types of constituents are better than others at generating legislative allies and consequently winning more representation on the committees of importance to their policy needs. This chapter, entitled *Business Advantage and Interest Representation*, offers empirical analysis testing whether business interests generate systematically more allies than nonbusiness interests. In addition, this chapter tests the hypothesis that groups who are more politically active will generate a larger number of allies, which results in them receiving better representation on committees of interest to their policy needs.

The final analytical chapter studies whether predictable variation exists in how effective groups are at mobilizing their allies toward policy advocacy. Chapter six examines how variation in the nature of group policy agendas affects the behavior of allied legislators as they request committee membership. This chapter tests whether groups with narrow policy issue agendas win more representation on committees of importance to their policy needs than interests with diverse policy agendas. As previously discussed, my expectation is that the allies of interest groups with diverse policy issue agendas will be referred to multiple committees while the policies of interest to groups with narrow policy agendas will be referred to few committees. As such, groups with narrow agendas will find it easier to communicate with their allies about

which committees to join. And these interests are therefore likely to win systematically better committee representation.

The project concludes with a chapter that summarizes the findings of this study and discusses what they mean for interest representation and the role that interests play in the legislative process. Popular accounts hold that well-financed interests are able to buy policy outcomes in Congress. The results presented here indicate that even in a world where politicians receive no contributions from moneyed interests there would still be a substantial amount of predictable bias towards some organized interests and against others. Chapter seven concludes with a detailed discussion of both the theoretical and normative implications of this research.

Chapter 2: Group Influence via Constituency Representation: Rethinking Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why.

Organized interests do not have direct control over the fate of their policy agendas in Congress. They cannot introduce bills, vote on legislation, or serve on House committees. If organized interests want to achieve virtually any of their legislative goals they must rely on and work through members of Congress. As an interest group seeks to move its policy agenda forward in Congress, then, one of the most important challenges that it faces is the recruitment of effective legislative allies. Legislative allies are members of Congress who “share the same policy objective as the group” and who use their limited time and resources to advocate for the policy needs of the group (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 76). For all the financial resources that a group can bring to bear as it competes with other interests to win policy outcomes, it will be ineffective without the help of members of Congress who are willing to expend time and effort to advocate for its policy needs.

Interest group scholarship has increasingly found that groups primarily work through their legislative allies in Congress (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999). By comparison, we know almost nothing about whether some organized interests can recruit more legislative allies than others. The following chapter lays out a theoretical framework that explains how allies are generated, when we should expect some interest groups to win more allies than others, and when some interests will be better positioned to mobilize these allies toward effective legislative action.

This chapter begins with a discussion about how the literature on group influence has evolved to emphasize the importance of legislative allies to the role that interest groups play in the legislative process. After establishing that groups predominantly work with legislators who share mutual policy interests (Hall and Deardorff 2006), I offer an original theoretical framework describing both when we should expect some types of interests to generate more legislative allies than others and how interests vary in their capacity to mobilize these allies toward effective legislative advocacy. I then set up tests of these theoretical expectations on variation in group representation during the stage in the legislative process which many scholars have argued is crucial to policy influence, legislative committees.

While there are a number of pathways for groups to find legislative allies, I argue that constituency presence ought to be a reliable predictor for when some groups will gain more legislative allies than others. The logic of constituency-motivated ally generation is simple. Members seek to serve constituency interests in ways that help them win future elections (Mayhew 1974). They have strong incentive to serve the policy needs of interests that have a local presence in their district. Groups that have a constituency presence in a greater number of congressional districts will, consequently, generate more legislative allies. And among interests that do have a presence in the constituency, interests that are more politically active or that possess greater control over local jobs and economic investment should also be more likely to generate allies.

After groups recruit their allies, some interests may be more effective at mobilizing the advocacy of their allies. When thinking through the possible causes for systematic differences in group effectiveness at ally mobilization, one key factor stands

out: variation in the nature of group policy agendas. The nature of a group's agenda is particularly important to how effective it will be at mobilizing its allies toward effective advocacy as its agenda flows through legislative committees. Committees have jurisdiction over targeted policy issue areas. And interest groups will vary in the number of major policy issue areas that are on their policy agendas. Depending on the shape of an interest group's policy issue agenda, then, its legislative priorities will be referred to many committees or few. Interests with diverse policy agendas that include many policy issue areas will find that their agenda is fragmented across many different congressional committees. As a consequence, their allies will have unclear information about which committee to join to best serve the needs of the group such they request and receive membership on many different committees. Consequently, variation in the nature of group policy agendas should therefore predict which interests are better positioned to mobilize allied legislators toward effective policy advocacy for their mutual policy goals.

The presence of interests across House districts, the fact that they have control over local jobs or are more politically active, and the nature of their policy agendas make up several testable causal factors that have the potential to affect the number of allies they will generate in Congress, as well as their allies' capacity to advance favored policy outcomes.

After reviewing the literature and building a broad theoretical framework that explains both when we should expect some interests to generate more allies than others and when some interests will be better able to mobilize the advocacy of their allies, I then apply this framework to predict variation in group representation at a key stage of the legislative process, congressional committees. While group variation in legislative allies

may affect their representation in important ways at other stages of the legislative process, the demonstrable evidence indicates that committee representation is particularly relevant to group influence (Adler and Wilkerson 2008; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hall and Wayman 1990; Miler 2010).

Committees are where bills are shaped (Hall and Wayman 1990). Committees also have gatekeeping powers such that they can restrict which bills move forward in the legislative process (Adler and Wilkerson 2008; and Baumgartner et al. 2009). Recent work also indicates that committee level allies are vital to who wins and who loses in the policymaking process. Groups with more committee level allies win systemically greater policy influence (Baumgartner et al. 2009). While recent interest group scholarship indicates that groups with more committee representation will have greater leverage over policy outcomes, we know little about the factors that might predict when some interests will gain more committee representation than others.

The final section of this chapter applies the theory of constituency motivated ally generation and ally mobilization to predict systematic variation in the amount of representation that particular groups receive on House committees. It begins by highlighting the importance of committee level representation to group influence in Congress. It then lays out detailed hypotheses for when we should expect ally generation and ally mobilization to affect the amount of representation that interests receive on the committees of importance to their policy needs.

The Importance of Legislative Allies to Our Understanding of Group Influence

The empirical work on group influence offers a mixed set of results and often counterintuitive conclusions. Popular accounts of special interests tend to highlight the

relationship between campaign contributions and legislative advocacy in Congress. The empirical work on group influence, however, tells a much different story. In parallel with the popular concern that special interests exchange money for legislative favors, the hypothesis that money buys votes in Congress has been tested by over 35 studies (Baumgartner and Leech 1998a; Smith 1995). This is an exceptionally large number of studies for a single hypothesis in any subfield of American politics. The results of these studies have been labeled as inconsistent and mixed at best (Baumgartner and Leech 1998a). Some studies conclude that political action committee (PAC) contributions affect legislative voting behavior (Frendreis and Waterman 1985; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Stratmann 1991; 1995; Wilhite and Thielman 1987), while other studies find little or no support for the vote-buying hypothesis (Bronars and Lott 1997; Grenzke 1989; Wawro 2001; Wright 1985).

Perhaps the most damning summary of the evidence against the theory that moneyed interests buy salient legislative behavior has been put forth by Richard Hall and his coauthors (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hall and Wayman 1990). Hall and his coauthors reasoned that the evidence runs contrary to the money-buys-votes hypothesis for two principal reasons. First, the total amount of money that PACs give members of Congress is too small to realistically “buy” behavior. In one study interests were found to alter voting behavior by increasing campaign contributions to legislators by a few hundred dollars (Stratmann 1998). Second, organized interests primarily donate to members of Congress who were already likely to have similar policy objectives (Brownars and Lott 1997; Grenzke 1989; Grier and Munger 1986, 1991; Hall and Wayman 1990; Witko 2006). Giving to one’s legislative allies rather than to undecided members or those with

a position adverse to one's favored policy positions does not comport well with a theory that organized interests use campaign contributions in efforts to induce legislators to change their behavior.

Reinforcing these patterns in campaign contributions, other studies have found that organized interests advance their goals primarily by working through their legislative allies. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1965) found that interests often provided assistance to legislators who were predisposed to advocate for their policy goals. Hojnacki and Kimball (1998, 1999) established that when organizations lobby committee members, they primarily target allies with mutual policy interests. Additionally, Hall and Wayman (1990) demonstrated that interests who contributed to the members of House committees with similar policy goals could affect the level of effort the legislator put into participating on a given bill. Kingdon (1989) and Denzau and Munger (1986) also point out that groups rely on their allies in Congress. More recent work finds that one of the few predictors of systematic policy success for organized interests is the number of mid-level allies (e.g.-legislators on House Committees, particularly ranking members and committee and subcommittee chairs) that they have (Baumgartner et al. 2009). The empirical work therefore offers a substantial amount of evidence that organized interests predominantly achieve their goals by working through their existing allies in Congress.

With mixed evidence for the hypothesis that campaign contributions change legislative behavior and a growing number of studies pointing out that groups work through their allies in Congress, scholars put forth and debated new explanations of the ways that groups may influence the legislative process. Organized interests are thought to work through legislators with mutual policy interests because organized interests have

policy expertise and legislators require information to make policy decisions (Austen-Smith and Wright 1992, 1994); because it is extraordinarily difficult for interest groups to get attention for most policy issues, so interests must work through motivated policy champions to build momentum for their legislative agendas (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015; DeGregorio 1997; and Hall and Deardorff 2006); and because interests can increase advocacy for allied legislators by acting as extended staff or service bureaus (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Hall and Deardorff 2006).

Interest Groups Work Through Their Legislative Allies in Congress

Extending upon a number of these explanations, Hall and Deardorff's (2006) theory of lobbying as a legislative subsidy offered a detailed model that accounts for the tangled complexity of mixed empirical findings in the interest group literature. They argue that groups sometimes attempt to persuade legislators to change their voting behavior through the exchange of contributions or information, but this behavior is relatively rare. Instead, interest groups primarily work through legislators in Congress who are the most likely to advocate for their policy needs.

Further, they emphasize that the policy agenda in Congress is not limitless. Members of Congress have a limited amount of time and resources to dedicate to a subset of issues. It is therefore exceedingly difficult for any group to get members to pay attention to their policy needs, much less to spend time advocating for their policy positions. A fruitful strategy for most groups, then, is to bolster the advocacy of legislators who have mutual policy goals. In line with Bauer, Pool, and Dexter's (1965) view that interests act as service bureaus to legislative allies, Hall and Deardorff describe

interest group lobbying behavior as an attempt to increase legislative advocacy for their policy agendas by subsidizing the effort of their allies in Congress. Groups can subsidize the effort of their natural allies in Congress by offering policy expertise, writing speeches, amendments, or entire pieces of legislation, and assisting with coalition building, among other actions.

Legislative allies are therefore clearly central to the policy endeavors of most organized interests. Recent work has even argued that “virtually all of the applications of other sorts of resources are made in an effort to increase an organization’s supply of these allies” (Leech et al. 2007). Yet for all the studies that point out the importance of allies in Congress, we know very little about (1) how organized interests recruit legislative allies, (2) whether some interests generate a larger pool of legislative allies than others, and (3) whether interests with a larger number of legislative allies receive stronger advocacy for their policy agendas than groups with fewer allies in Congress. Further, we also have little knowledge about the mobilization of allies after they are recruited. It may be that some interests will be more effective at mobilizing the advocacy of their allies than others.

One way we might gain new empirical leverage over the question of group influence is therefore to examine whether some interests are better than others at recruiting legislative allies prior to the act of lobbying. Scholars have demonstrated that legislative allies are at the center of interests’ policy endeavor, but we know little about how allies are generated before lobbying takes place. It is possible that some interests generate systematically larger numbers of legislative allies than others. If some interests consistently have greater numbers of legislative allies advocating for their policy goals in

Congress, then they may have an advantage in the legislative process over and above other groups.

Interest Groups and their Natural Allies in Congress

Hall and Deardorff (2006, 76) define legislative allies as members of Congress who “share the same policy objective as the group” and who use their limited time and resources to advocate for the policy needs of the group. They also argue that organized interests will subsidize the effort of legislators who are likely to be the strongest advocates of their policy needs. From the perspective of an organized interest, then, they should seek to recruit members of Congress who will be the most likely to take action in support of mutual policy objectives.

Building on Hall and Deardorff (2006) and Hojnacki and Kimball (1998, 1999) I expect interest groups to target potential legislative allies based on the likelihood that they will act to move the group’s policy agenda forward in Congress. Members of Congress have been found to take action in support of specific policies for three primary reasons: to support their party, to advocate for their ideological beliefs, and in support of constituents. Along with party and ideology, scholars have underscored the importance of constituency preferences to roll call voting, agenda setting, coalition building, and committee level behavior. (See selected studies by Evans 2004; Hall and Wayman 1990; Kingdon 1984; Miler 2010; Welch 1982.) Interest groups are also constituents. Given that legislators will advocate particularly strongly for their constituents, the constituency connections that groups maintain ought to be highly relevant as they seek out new legislative allies to advocate for their policy needs.

Constituency Presence, Mutual Policy Goals, and Ally Generation

Hojnacki and Kimball's (1998) work highlights the importance of constituency presence to ally generation. Their research indicates that the strongest predictor of whom interests lobby on House committees is whether the interest has ties to a member's district. Interests with ties to the district are over twice as likely as interests without a constituency connection to lobby committee members. Because constituency related factors are central to whom interest groups choose to lobby, I expect to find that district ties are particularly important to ally generation in Congress.

Constituency presence has consistently been found to increase legislative activity at varied points in the legislative process (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Cragg and Kahn 2009; Hall 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Welch 1982; Wright 1990). Given the abundance of findings that underline the effect of constituency presence on legislative behavior, when organized interests have a local presence in a district they should expect to receive stronger legislative advocacy from the district's representative. Interests with a presence in the district should therefore find it much easier to generate an ally in, and receive advocacy from, a district's representative than interests with no district presence.

Mayhew's (1974) much-cited electoral motive explains why local interests will find it easier to recruit an ally in, and receive policy advocacy from, their representatives. Mayhew reasons that legislators will work for the policy needs of constituents to ensure that they win future elections (but see also Arnold 1990; Fiorina 1974; Hall 1996; and Kingdon 1989). Legislators actively communicate work on behalf of constituency interests to future voters by taking policy positions, advertising success, avoiding blame,

and seeking out ways to claim credit (Hall 1996; and Mayhew 1974). Legislators are also thought to advocate for constituent policy needs in ways that make policy success traceable to voters in the district (Arnold 1990). Organized interests who have a presence in the district are therefore more likely to win advocacy from, and recruit an ally in, their representative because these legislators are primed by the electoral motive to attend to their policy needs.

Unequal Allies and Constituency Representation in Congress

With legislators motivated to advocate for organized interests in their districts, constituency presence is likely to be critical to the recruitment of effective legislative allies. Viewing ally generation through the lens of constituency representation therefore has the potential to offer a substantial amount of insight into the role that groups play in the legislative process. As groups gain more legislative allies as a result of having a local presence in more districts, they may also gain representational advantages in Congress. This section introduces four broad expectations that build a foundation for a number of new hypotheses about how groups gain representation in the legislative process. It begins with a discussion of precisely when we should expect some interests to generate more constituency-motivated legislative allies than others. After detailing how groups systematically vary in ally generation, it then discusses how the nature of an interest group's agenda can also affect its ability to harness the advocacy of legislative allies.

District Presence and Ally Generation. When should we expect interests to vary in the number of constituency-motivated allies that they generate? First, organized interests who have a local presence in a given district will be more likely to gain an ally

in the district's representative than interests without a local presence, all else being equal. Moreover, as the number of districts where an interest has local presence increases, we should also expect them to generate a larger pool of legislative allies. Organized interests demonstrate wide variation in how they are distributed across the 435 House districts. Some interests will have a local presence in many districts, while others will have a local presence in few districts. Interests with a local presence in more districts should, as a result, generate a larger number of allies than interests with a local presence in fewer districts.

Politically Mobilized Interests in the District and Ally Generation. Organized interests that have a local presence in more districts should generate a larger pool of legislative allies, but there is also reason to expect that some types of constituencies are more effective at winning advocacy for their policy needs from their representatives than others. Districts are not composed of monolithic constituencies (Fenno 1978; and Miler 2010). Rather, multiple constituencies (or subconstituencies) exist within each district. The amount of representation that a given subconstituency receives depends in large part on the interests that the legislator “sees” in the district (Fenno 1978; Hall 1996; and Miler 2010). Miler (2010) argues that interests who are more politically mobilized in the district will be more likely to be recognized as constituents by their representatives and their staff. She finds that within the district, interests who either contact their legislator more frequently or contribute more to their representative's campaign coffers receive systematically stronger representation than other local interests. In line with Miler's findings, I expect to find evidence that politically mobilized subconstituencies will

generate a systematically larger number of allies than interests that are less politically active.

Business Interests in the District and Ally Generation. Charles Lindblom's (1977, 1982) work offers a second hypothesis for another distinct subset of interests that may be better positioned to receive legislative advocacy from their representatives. The foundation of his argument rests on the control that business interests have over jobs and economic investment. He reasons that because voters care about the economy and representatives wish to win future elections, members of Congress are likely to work particularly hard on behalf of local business interests. Lindblom's thesis has been tested multiple times using national indicators to mixed results (Allen and Campbell 1994; Campbell and Allen 1994; Hicks and Swank 1984; Jacobs 1988; Quinn 1988; Quinn and Shapiro 1991; Smith 1999, 2000). However, no studies currently exist that have examined whether local business interests are better represented than nonbusiness interests in Congress.

Following Lindblom's hypothesis I expect to find that, within a given district, local business interests will be more likely to generate political advocacy from, and become legislative allies with, their representative than nonbusiness interests. Given business's advantages in recruiting legislative allies, I also expect to find evidence that business interests will have a systematically larger pool of legislative allies than nonbusiness interests, which will translate into better representation in Congress.

Interest Group Policy Agendas and the Effectiveness of Legislative Allies. The number of allies that an interest can generate is likely to affect how well it is represented in Congress. But once an interest's pool of legislative allies is set, other factors may

influence how effectively its allies are able to advocate for its agenda. The scope of an interest's policy agenda may be narrow with a focus on a limited number of policy issue areas. Or it could be diverse, encompassing several different types of policy. When organized interests communicate their policy needs to their legislative allies, groups with narrow policy agendas should find it easier to focus the time and resources of their legislative allies on their agenda than interests with diverse policy agendas. Legislative allies who are asked to advocate on behalf of such diverse policy issue areas as finance, taxes, trade, and healthcare policy will need to split time and resources across multiple issues. They are likely to find it more difficult to advocate effectively on any one issue by joining committees of importance to the issue, gaining expertise on the issue, building effective coalitions, and lobbying for advocacy from other allies.

In contrast, interests that have narrow policy agendas are better able to focus the time, energy, and resources of their legislative allies to more effectively advocate for the policy needs of the group. These legislators should find it easier to join the committees of primary importance to the interest's policy needs. They may also be better able to build coalitions with other legislators through their increased experience working on a limited subset of policy areas. After controlling for an interest group's number of legislative allies, I therefore expect other factors, such as the nature of the group's policy agenda, to affect the policy advocacy it receives in Congress.

Unequal Allies and Interest Representation on House Committees

The above sections outline a broad theoretical framework for when we should expect some interests to generate more allies than others. This section will apply the

same framework to explain how unequal allies can affect systematic variation in interest representation on House committees. Variation in ally generation is likely to affect interest representation at many points of the legislative process. Groups that generate systematically larger numbers of legislative allies ought to see greater advocacy than groups with fewer allies as these allies introduce bills, make speeches in Congress, participate on Committees, and build coalitions. Among these many potential points to examine the effects of unequal ally generation, it makes sense to begin with a study of the effects of unequal ally generation on interest representation on House committees for a few important reasons.

First, many interest group scholars have argued that committees need attention because they have a larger effect on policy outcomes than other stages of the legislative process (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hall and Wayman 1990, 1996; and Powell 2013). Adler and Wilkerson's (2008) work underscores this assertion. In a study of the power of committees to set agendas Adler and Wilkerson demonstrate that "a mere 1% of bills circumvent (the committee) process." And that "members of the committee of referral sponsor about 80% of the bills that their committee reports, and these bills have about an 80% chance of passing the chamber, compared to a 7% chance of passage for bills in general" (Adler and Wilkerson 2008, 33, but see also Adler et al. 2003). Committees therefore play a strong role in devising much of the final content of bills, and they also have substantial gatekeeping power over the policy agendas under their jurisdiction.

The second reason why it is important to study interest representation on House committees is that the legislative allies serving on the committees most important to an interest's agenda are more likely than other allied lawmakers to actually influence policy

outcomes (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Baumgartner et al. (2009) demonstrated that lobbying organizations with more committee level allies are more likely to win legislative benefits. Interest groups are often “not strong enough by themselves to force a proposal onto the agenda of a committee or agency” (2009, 245). Baumgartner et al. suggest that the importance of committee level allies to group leverage in the legislative process is at least partly due to the gatekeeping powers of committees. The interests in their study reported that a major obstacle to policy success was “active opposition from committee chairs, ranking members, and regular committee members” (2009, 81).

Further, Baumgartner et al. found that “having mid-level government allies (subcommittee and committee chairmen in Congress, or department-level officials in an agency) helped a side get the policy outcome it sought in three of the four types of outcome measures” (2009, 206). These findings are further bolstered by Miler’s finding that “committee membership and committee leadership significantly increase legislative participation in the policy-making debate” (2010, 128). Interest groups who gain committee level allies are therefore well-positioned to win more policy outcomes over and above interests who lack this resource.

Finally, it is important to examine the committee stage of the legislative process because there is simply no work that has directly studied whether, in a representative sample of interests that lobby an issue area, some interests are better represented than others on House committees. The literature studying the composition of committees has largely focused on a set of research questions that examine how and why the committee system was created. Within this academic debate some scholars have argued that committees are organized to subset Congress into groups of legislators who are the most

knowledgeable about a policy issue area in part to more efficiently move policy through the legislative process (Krehbiel 1990, 1992). Others have argued that committees are organized to help members get reelected and to maintain the party brand (Cox and McCubins 2007). Still others have found evidence that members of Congress often request committees in order to serve constituents such that they will be better positioned to win future elections (Adler 2000, 2002; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Shepsle 1978; Shepsle and Weingast 1987).

Within the varied explanations for the legislative organization of committees, the literature studying the importance of the electoral motive to committee organization offers the strongest foundation for an explanation of how constituency-motivated allies might influence interest representation. Adler and Lapinski (1997) argue, for example, that members often self-select onto committees that help them get elected in future elections. To this end, legislators will request and gain membership onto committees that allow them to claim credit in their districts for policy advocacy in support of local constituencies (Adler 2000, 2002; and Adler and Lapinski 1997). And this self-selection process causes some committees to be unrepresentative of the full democratically elected House membership. As such, these authors argue that these committees may skew policy away from the desires of the full House membership and towards the constituency motivated desires of a subset of legislators. This literature finds pervasive evidence that committees are often composed of “preference outliers,” meaning that committees are disproportionately composed of members with a strong constituency stake in the policies over which the committee has jurisdiction. While Adler and Lapinski and others argue that electoral motives affect the composition of House committees, this is the first study

to examine which interests win and which interests lose representation as their legislative allies self-select on to committees of interest to their policy needs.

In other words, this project looks at the composition of congressional committees from the vantage point of societal interests. Which types of interests are more likely to be overrepresented in the districts of members serving on congressional committees? To say that a committee is “overrepresented” means that the interest has a markedly stronger presence in the constituencies of a committee’s members than it does in the constituencies represented in Congress generally. Meanwhile, which interests fail to be represented in the districts of members serving on their key committees? In the analyses that follow, I am particularly interested in discovering which interests are overrepresented in the districts of members serving on important House committees, such as Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, and Natural Resources.

Predicting the Effects of Variation in Ally Generation on Interest Representation on House Committees

Members of the House request committees to gain prestige, to advance for their policy goals, and to advocate for constituency interests (Adler 2000, 2002; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Deering and Smith 1997; Fenno 1978; Maltzmann 1998). This section extends upon Adler and Lapinski’s (1997) reasoning that members often request committees to better represent constituency interests. As the constituency-motivated legislative allies of particular interests request membership on committees, I expect that some interests will be over or under-represented on committees relative to their presence in House districts more generally. This section uses the theory of constituency-motivated

ally generation to construct several hypotheses that predict when groups will demonstrate systematic variation in the committee representation they receive.

Organized interests that have a presence in more districts should generate a larger number of legislative allies than interests in fewer districts. Interests with a large number of allied legislators requesting membership on committees of importance to their policy needs will also win comparatively greater levels of committee representation.

Conversely, organized interests who generate fewer legislative allies will have fewer legislators requesting committees of importance to their policy agendas and will win fewer committee level allies. Therefore, I expect to find evidence in support of the hypothesis that as an interest's district presence increases, it is also likely to become overrepresented on key House committees compared to its presence in House constituencies generally.

Hypothesis 1: As an interest's constituency presence in the 435 Congressional districts increases, it is more likely to be overrepresented on key House committees relative to its presence in congressional districts generally.

Within the district some types of constituencies will be more likely to elicit policy advocacy from their representatives than others. Two categories of constituencies are more likely than others to generate a larger number of allies: politically active local interests and local business interests. Interests that contact their legislators in person or via the telephone, mail, or email are more likely to be salient and seen by their legislator. Interests also become more salient to their representatives by donating to their electoral campaigns or by lobbying them directly. Constituents must be perceived before their interests can be advocated for (Miler 2010). Thus, I expect to find evidence that local interests who are more politically active will, on average, generate a larger pool of

constituency-motivated allies in Congress. And with a larger pool of allies requesting membership on committees of importance to their policy needs, these interests ought to win stronger levels of committee representation.

Hypothesis 2: Politically active constituencies are more likely to be overrepresented on key House committees compared to constituencies that are not politically active.

Local business interests will also have an edge over other interests in the district at receiving advocacy from their representatives. Representatives care about jobs and economic investment in their districts. Because local business interests have leverage over local jobs and investment, congressional representatives are likely to pay special attention to and often prioritize the policy needs of local business interests.

Consequently, business interests will generate a larger pool of constituency-motivated legislative allies than nonbusiness interests. And with a larger number of allies requesting membership onto committees with jurisdiction over their policy needs, business interests should receive comparatively more representation.

Hypothesis 3: Business constituencies are more likely to be overrepresented key House committees than nonbusiness constituencies.

Lastly, after generating a pool of legislative allies in Congress, interests will vary in their effectiveness at communicating their policy agendas to allied legislators. For interests that have narrow policy agendas limited to a handful of policy issue areas, their allied legislators will have clear information about the issues where they should focus their time and resources. However, for interests that have diverse policy agendas, it will be more difficult to corral their allied legislators toward specific policy goals. Their legislative allies' time and resources may be split among several policy areas and as a result, these interests will receive less effective policy advocacy.

Committee jurisdictions structure which committees consider bills under whole policy issue areas. For interests with diverse policy agendas, then, their legislative agenda will be more likely to be fragmented across a larger number of committees. Allied legislators will thus face more complicated decisions about which committees to request. Because multiple committees are relevant to the interest's policy needs, their legislative allies will request varied committees and the interest will have fewer allies on any one committee. Interests with narrow policy agendas will therefore have a larger number of allies requesting membership on fewer committees. And, consequently, they will be more likely to receive better representation on committees of interest to their policy needs.

Hypothesis 4: Organized interests with narrow policy agendas are more likely to be overrepresented on important House committees than organized interests with diverse policy agendas.

Conclusion

This chapter offers a fresh theoretical perspective on who wins, who loses, and why in the legislative process. It has presented a new foundation for group influence that is centered on predictable variation in the number of constituency-motivated allies that groups generate. Interest groups are also constituents. Legislators advocate particularly strongly for constituent interests because they are motivated to win future elections (Mayhew 1974). Representatives will naturally ally with interest groups who have a local presence in their district. As such, as the number of districts where an interest has a constituency presence increases, the number of natural policy allies that they have in Congress who advocate for mutual policy interests should also increase. Groups that have more legislative allies in Congress will be better situated to gain advantages over

groups with fewer allies in access to legislators, in the amount of advocacy for their policy agendas that they receive in Congress, and in the amount of representation that they receive at key points in the legislative process.

With a host of new hypotheses in hand, the following chapters develop an original dataset and then systematically test whether (1) groups with a local presence in more districts win greater numbers of allies and consequently become better represented on House committees, (2) whether some types of constituencies generate more allies than others such that they are better represented on House committees, and (3) after an interest's pool of allies are set, whether groups with narrow policy agendas can more effectively focus the advocacy of their legislative allies such that they become better represented on committees of interest to their policy needs.

Chapter 3: Identifying Constituencies Relevant to Financial Policy, Healthcare Policy, and Energy Policy

Constituency representation matters to our knowledge about who wins and who loses in the legislative process because constituency presence is likely to affect the number of legislative allies that groups have in Congress. As such, knowledge about constituency representation may be an important missing piece of the group influence puzzle. This chapter takes several essential steps toward building the datasets necessary to analyze the argument that constituency motivated ally generation and mobilization causes some interests to become better represented at key points of the legislative process than others.

The following sections describe the context of the study, the issue areas examined, and how the constituencies were identified that will be used to test the hypotheses set forth in all analytical chapters in this project. The chapter begins with a discussion of the three issue areas that are the focus of this study and it explains why they offer a conservative test for the effects of constituency motivated ally generation and mobilization on variation in how groups are represented on committee representation. The second section lays out the process of creating samples of interests to study under each issue area. After the samples of interests have been identified, the third section describes the data used to measure constituency presence for these interests across House districts. In section four, I determine the committees of primary jurisdiction over each issue area studied. And lastly, I detail the substantial amount of variation in interest representation that exists for each committee studied.

A Conservative Context to Test Group Influence: Salient Issues in an Anti-Business Congress


The three bills and the corresponding issue areas analyzed in this chapter are all landmark legislation enacted by the 111th Congress (2009-10): the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173), the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590), and the American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454). Each of these bills encompasses major, highly salient policy issues. Prior scholarship has shown that as bills become more salient more groups will engage the policy debate. Group competition for policy outcomes consequently tends to become more intense (Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Caldeira et al. 2000; Collins 2007; Hansford 2004; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; 1999; Holyoke 2009; Mahoney 2008; Smith 2000; Strolovitch 2006; Witko 2006). A competitive environment thus makes it more difficult for particular groups to influence policy outcomes (Collins 2007; Mahoney 2008; Smith 2000; Witko 2006). Given the expansive number of interest groups involved in each of these bills, they collectively offer a tough proving ground for identifying advantaged and disadvantaged groups in the legislative process. Based on the prior scholarship, policy issues that are narrower and less salient would offer better opportunities for group influence than do the kind of broad, highly salient issues addressed in these three major legislative enactments.

The political environment when these bills were considered also presents a conservative context to demonstrate evidence of business influence. Following in the immediate wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the public mood, as well as that prevailing in Congress, was more skeptical of business than usual. . In *American Business and Public Power* Smith (2000) argues that business interests should be disadvantaged to the extent

that their issues are salient to the public and the public mood is against them. The issue areas examined in this chapter were highly salient and were considered during one of the strongest anti-business environments since the Great Depression.

Survey data consistently support the assertion that the 2009-2010 legislative sessions took place during a time with strong anti-business public opinion. In an annual Gallup poll Americans were asked the question, “Would you like to see major corporations have more influence in this nation, less influence, or keep their influence as it is now?” Nearly seven of ten Americans, the largest anti-business response over the eleven year period of the survey, said that major corporations should have less influence (Jones 2015). The American public has also been asked whether they trust big business in annual surveys since 1973. In 2009, the first year of the 111th Congress, public trust in big business was at its lowest point since the question was first surveyed (Jones 2015).

Figure 3.1: Percent of Public Who Think That Major Corporations Should Have Less Political Influence



Note: Each January Gallup asked respondents whether corporations should have more, less, or the same amount of influence (Saad 2011).

The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173), known simply as Dodd-Frank, was the legislative response to the financial crisis of late 2008. After the mortgage-related banking collapse, the public had less confidence in the

banking industry than at any time over the last three decades. Gallup has polled whether respondents had confidence in particular institutions since for over three decades. In the first year of the 111th Congress the public had less confidence in banks as an institution than at any point over the thirty years that the question has been polled (Jones 2015). Polling numbers are similar for institutions related to the healthcare system. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590), which came to be known as Obamacare, was highly salient and politically polarizing, and it also passed during a climate that was distinctly unfriendly to health-related economic sectors like health maintenance organizations and the health insurance industry. Consistent with the anti-business polling data above, public trust for health maintenance organizations (HMOs) as an institution were at their lowest levels since Gallup started polling HMO trust in 1999.

The financial collapse of 2008 was a key factor in the election of strong majorities of Democrats to the House and Senate. The public mood was anti-business largely as a result of the crash of the finance industry. Because the public mood was strongly anti-business during 2009 and 2010 when these bills were introduced and debated, and because Democrats won large majorities in both the House and the Senate, Smith's work indicates that we should expect no business advantage (or perhaps even business disadvantage) over other groups as these bills progressed through the policy-making process. Therefore both the context of the 111th Congress and the salience of the bills studied below are likely to provide conservative tests for any analysis of interest-group and business advantage in the legislative process.

Identifying the Constellation of Interests with Policy Concerns Before Congress Related to Each Issue Area

In this section, I explain how I identified groups active in lobbying in the issue areas addressed by these three pieces of legislation. Once all these groups were identified, I then calculated each interest's presence in all congressional districts across the United States. To clarify the process, I first lay out the steps taken to create the list of groups studied in table 3.1, and then I discuss each of these steps in greater detail below.

Table 3.1:

Process for Identifying the Interests Concerned with these Policy Areas:

- 1. Identify broad issue areas for each of the three bills and then pull all the bills introduced in the 111th Congress under each of these issue areas.**
- 2. Identify all organizations that lobbied on each bill for each issue area.**
- 3. Link these organizations to the constituency interests present in congressional constituencies and then calculate measures of the presence of these interests within each congressional district.**

Step 1. Identify broad issue areas for each of the three bills and then pull all bills introduced in the 111th Congress under each of these issue areas. The Congressional Bills Project is a relatively new source of data for Congressional scholars (Adler and Wilkerson 2013; see also Adler and Wilkerson 2008; Hillard et al. 2008; Sulkin 2011). It is a comprehensive dataset of all introduced bills, and it includes a wealth of variables describing each bill. Most importantly for this project, the Congressional Bills Project categorizes bills by issue area. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173) is listed under the issue category “1501: U.S. Banking System and Financial Institution Regulation”; the Patient Protection

and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590) is under the issue category “301: Comprehensive Health Care Reform”; and The American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454) is under the issue category “803: Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas)”. Using these categories, I was then able to identify all bills in the 111th Congress that dealt with each of these issue areas.

Step 2: Create database with all organizations that lobbied on each bill for each issue area. My next goal was to identify all the interest groups active in these three issue areas. To do so, I drew on data from the Center for Responsive Politics (<https://www.opensecrets.org/>). The Center for Responsive Politics lists every organization that filed a lobbying report on a given bill. For each of the bills in these three issue areas¹, I pulled all organizations that filed at least one lobbying report. This master dataset included 1,104 unique organizations under the issue category U.S. banking system and financial institution regulation, 724 unique organizations under the issue category comprehensive health care reform, and 770 unique organizations under the issue category natural gas and oil. A total of 2,598 organizations lobbied across the three issue areas studied during the 2009-2010 legislative session.

Step 3: Link these organizations to the types of constituencies present in the congressional constituencies and then calculate measures of the constituency presence for of each of these interests within each congressional districts. Steps 1 and 2 allowed me to identify the constellation of active/lobbying interests within each issue area. The next task was to generate measurements of local presence for all these active/lobbying interests across all House districts.

¹ There were 122 bills introduced during the 111th Congress under the category U.S. Banking System and Financial Institution Regulation, 76 bills introduced under the category Comprehensive Health Care Reform, and 108 bills introduced under the category Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas).

Of the 2,598 active/lobbying organizations identified, the overwhelming majority were business interests. To merge data for business related organizations with corresponding constituency data I first categorized them by their six-digit Census Bureau NAICS industry code. The six-digit code is the most specific industry category in the Census Bureau's survey coding scheme. The Census bureau provides annual employment data by zip code for over 1,000 different industry categories at the six-digit level.²

Using the NAICS industry codes, I was then able to develop an estimate of local employment in each industry drawing on data from the Census Bureau's County Business Patterns survey. The County Business Patterns survey provides data on business establishments, meaning firms at a specific location with one or more employees. The data is provided at the zip-code level for each NAICS industry category.³ Estimates of employment in each industry at the zip code level were then generated by taking the median of each establishment's employment estimate and then summing these estimates for all firms in that industry at the zip code level.⁴ Data for each industry code were then aggregated to the congressional district level.⁵

Nonbusiness interests were consistently active across each issue area studied, but they lobbied much less than business interests. They made up 410 of the 2,598 organizations lobbying in these issue areas. Nonbusiness organizations required a varied

² When an organization's NAICS code was not clear I referred to business directories such as Hoovers.com for NAICS information.

³ Local presence for business interests was operationalized as 2009 district level employment.

⁴ Firm employment is classified into groups: 1-4 employees, 5-9 employees, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, 500-999, and 1000 or more. Note that these estimates are precise, but imperfect. Because the final employee category is 1000 or more employees the employee estimate will usually underestimate the number of employees in zip-codes with the largest concentration of each industry.

⁵ Zip-codes were overlaid with Congressional districts using GIS. Employee estimates for zip-codes located in more than one district were multiplied by the percentage of the total population area within the zip-code that was a part of the district.

approach to calculating measurements of local presence. I was able to categorize a few organizations using NAICS codes and calculate local presence in the same manner as business interests, but most required other sources of local data. Groups with clear demographic categories (such as groups representing the elderly, African-Americans, or Hispanic/Latinos) were labeled as such. District level demographic data was collected per demographic category from the Census Bureau.⁶ These data were operationalized as total population of the demographic group per district. For data in non-demographic categories of organizations such as consumer groups or the uninsured, I calculated the most germane measurement of district presence possible given available data per category. Local presence for labor unions, for example, was operationalized using membership data aggregated from the zip code level to the district level. Local presence for interests representing the uninsured was calculated simply by determining the number of uninsured residents per district. For a complete list of all measurements of district level local presence see appendix B-1.⁷

Table 3.2 lists the total number of constituencies associated with the interest groups lobbying in each of these issue areas. I calculated the presence across 435 House districts for 875 unique constituencies. The overwhelming majority of the interests in the sample are business related constituencies.⁸ There were 267 unique group related

⁶ Examples of demographic data used include the total African-American, Hispanic/Latino, elderly, and Native-American population per district.

⁷ Appendix B-1 is available via the online supplementary materials.

I was able to categorize 94 percent of the 2598 organizations that lobbied on all issue areas studied. Data for local governments were left out of this analysis because I could not determine an accurate level of measurement for the large variation in the cities that lobbied the federal government on the issues studied.

⁸ For the analysis presented throughout this dissertation I used an expansive definition of business interests. All interests that could be categorized as having control over local jobs and economic investment were labeled as business interests. This definition is admittedly very broad. To ensure that the results presented here and in the following chapters were accurate I reran models using varied definitions for business interests and the results remained consistent despite alternative ways of operationalizing this variable. For

constituencies identified under the U.S. banking and financial institution regulation issue area; there were 296 unique group related constituencies were identified under comprehensive healthcare reform; and 312 unique group related constituencies were identified under the natural gas and oil issue area. Business constituencies made up over 90 percent of all constituencies examined.

Table 3.2: Number of Group Related Constituencies Studied by Issue Area


Issue Area	Number of Group Related Constituencies	Business Interests (% of Total)
<i>1501: U.S. Banking System and Financial Institution Regulation</i>	267	92.50%
<i>301: Comprehensive Healthcare Reform</i>	296	92.22%
<i>803: Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas)</i>	312	93.21%
<i>All Issue Areas</i>	875	93.25%

To present an overview of what types of interests were active in each issue area Figure 3.2 places each constituency into a broad two-digit NAICS industry code (with nonbusiness constituencies in a separate category). As one might expect, finance and insurance constituencies constitute one of the largest group of constituencies active on banking and finance regulation issues. Similarly, health care and social assistance constituencies are also one of the largest categories of interests active in lobbying on comprehensive health care. Oil and gas interests, utilities, construction and

example, some authors prefer to exclude healthcare sectors from business categories (Holyoke 2014). When I exclude all healthcare related economic sectors from models the results for this variable become slightly stronger.


manufacturing interests are the largest categories of constituencies active in lobbying on natural gas and oil issues. Additionally, manufacturing interests were largest category of constituencies active on each of these issue areas.⁹

Figure 3.2: Number of Unique Constituencies Studied per Two-Digit Industry Sector Code, Sorted by Frequency of Interests in Each Category




⁹ Though manufacturing interests stand out in comparison to other constituencies in each sample it is important to note that within the broad category of manufacturing there are a large variety of constituencies that differ across each issue area. For example, manufacturing of surgical tools is a part of the broader manufacturing category for the comprehensive healthcare reform sample, but it is not a part of the sample for oil and gas.

301: Comprehensive Healthcare Reform



803: Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas)



What Are the Committees of Primary Jurisdiction Over Each Issue Area?

For all bills under each issue area, the committee of primary jurisdiction was identified using the following process. First, I used the official website for federal

legislative information, Thomas.gov, to find all committees of referral for each bill. The total number of bills was then divided by the total number of referrals for each of the twenty standing committees of the House. The committee with the largest percent of referrals for all bills under the issue area was considered to be the committee of primary jurisdiction. Table 3.3 lists the top three committees of referral for all bills under each issue area for the 111th Congress. The Financial Services committee was the committee of primary jurisdiction for issue area “1501: U.S. Banking System and Financial Institution Regulation”; the Energy and Commerce committee was the committee of primary jurisdiction for issue area “301: Comprehensive health care reform”; and Natural Resources committee was the committee of primary jurisdiction for “803: Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas)”.

Table 3.3: Committees of Referral Per Issue Area

Issue Area	Committee of Referral	Number of Bills Referred	Percent of Total Bills
<i>1501: U.S. Banking System and Financial Institution Regulation</i>	Financial Services	81	66.39
	Ways and Means	26	21.31
	Small Business	17	13.93
<i>301: Comprehensive Healthcare Reform</i>	Energy and Commerce	64	84.21
	Ways and Means	49	64.47
	Education and Labor	21	27.63
<i>803: Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas)</i>	Natural Resources	48	44.44
	Energy and Commerce	38	35.19
	Ways and Means	31	28.7

Constellations of Interests, Committee Jurisdictions, and Competition Among Allied Legislators for Limited Committee Seats

It is important to make note of the differences in the jurisdictional context of the committees studied here. The fact that there are wide differences in the policy issue areas

under the jurisdictions of these committees is likely to affect the constellation of interested groups in ways that can impact group competition for committee membership. These three committees demonstrate wide differences in the policy issue areas under their respective jurisdictions. The majority of the bills that flow through the Financial Services committee are related to financial issues. Similarly, the majority of bills that flow through the Natural Resources committee are related to either natural resources or public lands. In contrast, the Energy and Commerce committee has jurisdiction over a very diverse number of major policy issues areas. The Financial Services and Natural Resources committees therefore have more narrow issue jurisdictions, while the Energy and Commerce committee has a highly diverse issue jurisdiction.

As policy issue areas under the jurisdiction of the committee become more diverse there is likely to be much more competition for limited committee seats among interested groups. To illustrate the likelihood that more group competition exists when committees have jurisdiction over diverse issue areas, assume that each issue area has a unique corresponding constellation of organized interests. When a committee has jurisdiction over multiple major issue areas, there will be competition among whole constellations of groups related to each issue area under the jurisdiction of the committee for limited committee seats. When organized interests seeking to influence policy outcomes related to healthcare reform, they will want their allied legislators to win membership on the Energy and Commerce committee. But in doing so, health care interests will also be in competition with a multitude of other interests within constellations tied to issues like energy, environmental regulation, trade, and technology. Competition for seats on the Energy and Commerce committee should be much more

intense than for committees with narrow issue jurisdictions. Thus, we should expect it to be particularly difficult for some groups to win representation on this committee than for the other committees in this study.

Do Some Interests Receive More Representation on House Committees Than Others?

Here I calculate and present measures of committee overrepresentation for all the constituencies identified above. For each interest, I compare its mean presence in the districts of committee members to its mean presence across all House districts. An interest is overrepresented on the committee when it has a larger presence in the districts of committee members than it does in House districts generally. An interest is underrepresented on the committee when it has a smaller presence in the districts of committee members than it does in House districts generally. Put differently, if the mean of the constituency group's presence in the districts of committee members is larger and statistically different from the mean in House districts generally, then the interest studied is considered to be overrepresented on the committee under examination.¹⁰

I begin by comparing the districts represented on each of these three committees with all House districts. Table 3.4 shows the number of interests that have a constituency presence in committee members' districts that is statistically different and larger than its constituency presence in House districts at large. Across all committees a substantively

¹⁰ Though the mean value is a commonly used statistic, outliers can sometimes pull it in misleading directions. I decided to stick with the mean value in this chapter because it is a simple descriptive starting point before moving on to multivariate analysis of alternative measurements of representation in the next chapter. Single sample t-tests were calculated testing the difference between mean of the House distribution for each constituency against the value of the committee mean. Single sample t-tests were calculated rather than independent samples t-tests because committee members are not an independent sample separate from House members (see Hall 1990 for similar explanation and approach). Appendix B-1 (available online with all other supplementary documents) provides comparison of committee and House distributions at their median values.

large number of the interests have a mean constituency presence that is larger than those interests' presence in House districts across the board.

Table 3.4: Number of Interests with an Average Constituency Presence for Committee Members that is Higher than the Average of the House at Large and Statistically Significant

Committee	Committee Mean Higher than House Mean	Total Number of Interests	Percent of Total Interests
<i>Financial Services</i>	123	267	46%
<i>Energy & Commerce</i>	52	296	18%
<i>Natural Resources</i>	77	312	25%
<i>All Constituencies, All Committees</i>	252	875	29%

Note: P-Values for t-tests used to calculate statistical significance were two-tailed. Committee means were considered to be statistically significant at or below a p-value of .05.

Chart Summary: Across all committees a substantively large number of interests have a mean constituency presence within districts represented on the committee that is higher than in House districts at large. This variation in representation across particular groups reveals that some types of group related constituencies are overrepresented on House committees while others are not.


Table 3.4 demonstrates that there is a substantial amount of variation among interests in committee representation. Some types of interests have larger and statistically significant mean values of local presence than what we would expect from committees randomly chosen from the House at large, while other interests do not. For all interests studied, 252 of 875 unique group related constituencies (about one-third of the sample) had mean committee values that were statistically higher than the mean for House districts. For the Financial Services committee, 123 of 267 unique interests (or 46%) had mean values that were higher than the House at large. The membership of the Energy and Commerce committee had mean values for 52 of the 296 (or 18%) unique group related constituencies studied. And 77 of the 312 interests studied (or 25%) had mean values of local presence for Natural Resources committee members that were statistically larger than the House. The following sections describe which types of interests were overrepresented for each committee studied.

Examples of Interests Who Were Overrepresented on the Financial Services Committee

To illuminate which types of interests were better able to gain heightened representation on the Financial Services committee Figure 3.3 groups the total number of interests that were overrepresented by their two-digit NAICS industry codes (with nonbusiness interests listed in a separate category). The categories of groups with the largest counts of overrepresented interests are finance and insurance, manufacturing, and professional sciences and technical services.

The economic sectors with perhaps the most to win or lose from policies under the jurisdiction of the Financial Services committee had a strikingly strong presence in the districts of committee members. Sixteen unique finance and insurance interests were overrepresented on the committee (or 58% of all finance and insurance interests studied). These findings are especially potent given the context of this study. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse public sentiment was strongly against the financial industry.

Figure 3.3: Number of Overrepresented Interests on Financial Services Committee Grouped by Two-Digit NAICS Industry Code




Commercial banks, investment banks, and mortgage lenders--all business interests that were central in the debate over the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill--were among the most disliked industries as the 2009-2010 session of Congress began. Yet even in this extremely anti-banking and finance environment, each of these industries still enjoyed overrepresentation on the financial services committee. In contrast to finance and insurance interests, only 25% (5 of 20) of nonbusiness interests active in this area were overrepresented in the districts of committee members. The nonbusiness interests that were overrepresented on the committee do not appear to be the direct result of the advocacy of group related legislative allies. Some examples of overrepresented nonbusiness constituencies are junior colleges, grantmaking foundations, religious organizations, and all other miscellaneous schools and instruction. More telling are the types of nonbusiness interests that were not found to be overrepresented. Consumers with foreclosed homes, for example, did not have a stronger presence in the districts of committee members than they did in House districts at large.

Examples of Interests Who Were Overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce Committee

The proportion of interests overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce committee within each two-digit category tells a slightly different story than the proportions for the financial services committee. As previously discussed, the Energy and Commerce committee handles a wider variety of different policy issues than the Financial Services or Natural Resources committees. Given that this committee handles many more policy issue areas, we should expect much more competition across groups for limited committee seats than on committees that have more focused policy domains.

Therefore, the proportions of interests that are overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce committee within a given issue area ought to be lower than committees with more focused policy jurisdictions. This is in fact the case. While 46 percent of the constituencies active on financial services issues were overrepresented in the districts of members on the Financial Services committee, only 18 percent of interests concerned with policies under the jurisdiction of Energy and Commerce were overrepresented in the districts of committee members.

Figure 3.4: Number of Overrepresented Interests on Energy & Commerce Committee Grouped by Two-Digit NAICS Industry Code



Though the amount of overrepresentation was not as pronounced on this committee as it was for the Financial Services committee, systematic committee overrepresentation is still taking place for nearly 20 percent of the interests that lobbied


bills related to comprehensive healthcare reform. Figure 3.4 presents the number of interests overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce committee by their two-digit NAICS codes (with nonbusiness interests in a separate category). Manufacturing, health and social assistance, and finance and insurance are among the categories with the highest counts of overrepresented interests. Examples of economic interests within these categories that have means of constituency presence in the districts of committee members that are higher than House means include pharmaceutical manufacturers, hospitals, and direct health and medical insurance providers. These results are similar to the findings for the financial services industry. Despite a very tough political climate for business interests in the 111th Congress, several interests at the center of the debate on the Affordable Care Act were overrepresented on the committee of primary importance to this bill's passage. Nonbusiness interests, on the other hand, were much less likely to gain overrepresentation on this committee. Only 2 of the 23 nonbusiness interests studied were overrepresented. Groups that were central to the debate on the Affordable Care Act such as the elderly, the poor, unions and the uninsured were not overrepresented in the districts of committee members relative to their presence in the House as a whole.

Examples of Interests Who Were Overrepresented on the Natural Resources Committee

Figure 3.5 lists the number of interests with overrepresentation on the Natural Resources committee by their two-digit codes. The types of interests that are overrepresented here include manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade, resource extraction, and construction. The industrial sector with the highest proportion of interests on the Natural Resources committee was agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting.

Several interests germane to the comprehensive energy reform bill of 2010 had means of constituency presence in the districts of committee members that were higher than the means of their presence in House districts generally. These include oil drillers, natural gas distributors, and underground coal mining interests.

Figure 3.5: Number of Overrepresented Interests on Natural Resources Committee Grouped by Two-Digit NAICS Industry Code



The major difference between the Natural Resources committee and the previous committees studied is that nonbusiness interests were more successful at joining this committee than several types of business interests. I think that natural resources committee stands out for a few reasons. First, as I discuss briefly above, the constellation of groups active in the issues under this committee's jurisdiction includes a number of economic sectors that are present in only a small number of House districts. Interests involved in resource extraction and agriculture as well as complimentary industries in

manufacturing, wholesale distribution, and construction are concentrated in and around the areas where resources like oil, coal, and natural gas, as well as agricultural commodities are located. The result is that these industries are likely to have fewer legislative allies than interests with local presence in a greater number of districts. Having a smaller pool of potential allies in Congress is likely to mean having less representation on committees.

A second reason why there is a less overrepresentation of the interests actively lobbying this committee than the other committees studied is that energy policy is often referred to three different committees. Energy bills are referred to the Ways and Means committee and the Energy and Commerce committee at roughly the same rate as they are referred to the Natural Resources committee. When issue areas are consistently referred to multiple committees, group allies will be forced to request a larger subset of committees to serve these constituents' interests. As a result, group allies become less concentrated on any one committee such that their constituents receive weaker representation on any one committee.

Do Some Interests Receive Less Representation on House Committees Than Others?

The results in the previous section indicate that some constituencies are more likely to be overrepresented on House committees, but overrepresentation is only half of the story. In order to fully explain variation in the committee representation of group related constituencies it is also important to analyze whether some constituencies are underrepresented on committees of importance to their policy concerns. Here I make the same comparisons as the previous section, but with a focus on committee means that are

lower than the average of all House members. Instead of tabulating committee means that are larger and statistically different from all districts in the House at large, I examine means of constituency presence in committee members' districts that are smaller and statistically different from the average of the House overall.

Table 3.5: Number of Interests with an Average Constituency Presence for Committee Members that is Lower than the Average of the House at Large and Statistically Significant

Committee	Committee Mean Lower than House Mean	Total Number of Interests	Percent of Total Interests
<i>Financial Services</i>	38	267	14%
<i>Energy & Commerce</i>	41	296	14%
<i>Natural Resources</i>	99	312	32%
<i>All Constituencies, All Committees</i>	178	875	20%

Note: P-Values for t-tests used to calculate statistical significance were two-tailed. Committee means were considered to be statistically significant at or below a p-value of .05.

Chart Summary: Across all committees a substantively large number of interests have a mean constituency presence within districts represented on the committee that is lower than in House districts at large. This variation in representation across particular groups reveals that some types of group related constituencies are underrepresented in the districts of the members of their key House committees while other groups are not.


Table 3.5 demonstrates that there are many constituencies that are systematically underrepresented on House committees. One in five of the constituencies across all committees studied and all constituencies studied were underrepresented. For both the Financial Services and Energy and Commerce committees 14 percent of the interests within the respective constellations of interests studied were underrepresented. And nearly one third of all interests in the sample of interests studied for the Natural Resources committee were also underrepresented. These data further substantiate the argument that there is a large amount of measurable variation that exists in the amount of committee representation that interests receive in Congress. The final sections of this

chapter briefly explain which types of interests were underrepresented on each committee studied.

Examples of Interests Who Were Underrepresented on the Financial Services Committee

Figure 3.6 aggregates the number of underrepresented constituencies to their two-digit NAICS codes with nonbusiness interests in a separate category. Nonbusiness interests were tied for the largest category of underrepresented constituencies. Examples of interests that were underrepresented on the Financial Services committee included the elderly, the poor, veterans, Native-Americans and environmental organizations. This

Figure 3.6: Number of Underrepresented Interests on Financial Services Committee Grouped by Two-Digit NAICS Industry Code




means that districts with large shares of these constituencies obtain less representation on this committee than would be expected in a committee randomly drawn from the House

as a whole. In direct contrast to nonbusiness interests, only one of the 26 finance and insurance interests (or 3 percent) was underrepresented on the committee.

Examples of Interests Who Were Underrepresented on the Energy and Commerce Committee

Figure 3.7 breaks the results for the Energy and Commerce committee down by two-digit NAICS industry codes with nonbusiness in a separate category. As previously discussed, the diversity of policy issues that this committee has under its jurisdiction should increase competition among groups and their legislative allies for limited committee membership. So we should expect to see fewer differences in representation on this committee than on committees with narrow policy jurisdictions.

Figure 3.7: Number of Underrepresented Interests on Energy & Commerce Committee Grouped by Two-Digit NAICS Industry Code




Nonbusiness interests active on issues before Energy and Commerce are among the most underrepresented types of constituencies. Examples of nonbusiness interests

that were underrepresented in the districts of committee members include universities, junior colleges, human rights organizations, civic and social organizations, and environmental organizations. Figure 3.7 also shows that constituencies classified as Healthcare and Social Assistance had a substantial amount of underrepresented interests. Examples of interests in this category included outpatient centers for mental healthcare, substance abuse centers, other outpatient care and kidney dialysis centers. Variation in political mobilization offers one explanation for why these groups received less committee representation. These interests may well be less politically mobilized than economic sectors like major hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and insurance providers.

Examples of Interests Who Were Underrepresented on the Natural Resources Committee

Nonbusiness interests were again among the most underrepresented categories of groups. Examples of nonbusiness interests active in this issue areas that were underrepresented on this committee included labor unions, universities, and African-Americans. Like the previous two committees examined, many nonbusiness constituencies represented on this committee have a lower presence of these interests than their presence in the 435 House districts at large. The economic sectors that were underrepresented on the Natural Resources committee, however, are often unlikely to benefit from committee membership. These include interests involved in finance and insurance and manufacturing interests with little identifiable connection to issues related resource extraction or public lands.

Figure 3.8: Number of Underrepresented Interests on Natural Resources Committee Grouped by Two-Digit NAICS Industry Code



Conclusion

The previous chapter presented a new theoretical approach to the study of group influence in Congress. Building on Richard Hall’s view that interest groups lobby primarily to mobilize the participation of their allies, the theory centers on the question of which types of interests are able to generate and mobilize legislative allies. I expect that groups will vary in the number of allies that they generate largely as a result of how they are distributed across congressional districts and how their interests align with the jurisdictions of congressional committees.

This chapter describes the dataset that allows me to test whether constituency motivated ally generation affects interest representation on House committees. After identifying all the organized interests active in lobbying on three landmark laws in the

111th Congress (covering energy, financial regulation, and health care), I assembled an original database identifying how these interests are distributed across the country (as in, precisely where they have employees and members). I then used this constituency data to document variation in interest representation on House committees.

This chapter has presented evidence that some constituencies are overrepresented and some constituencies are underrepresented on the committees with jurisdiction over their policy needs. Committee overrepresentation was calculated for each constituency by measuring the mean of the constituency for committee member districts against the mean of constituency in the districts of the full House membership. When the constituency's average presence in the districts of committee members was larger than its average presence in House districts at large, the constituency was considered to be overrepresented on the committee. For all constituencies and all committees studied, nearly one out of three constituencies tied to particular interests were overrepresented on committees with jurisdiction over their policy needs. Furthermore, the number of constituencies that were overrepresented varied by committee. Forty-six percent of the interests active in lobbying for bills related to financial regulation were overrepresented on the Financial Services committee. Twenty-five percent of the interests active in lobbying on energy legislation were overrepresented on the Natural Resources committee. Eighteen percent of the interests who lobbied on healthcare reform legislation were overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce committee.

A large number of interests therefore received more representation than we should expect if committee membership mirrored the House at large. But interest overrepresentation only tells part of the story. Many constituencies that are tied to

particular interests received substantially less representation on these committees than we would expect if committees were randomly selected from the full House membership. Similar to calculations for overrepresentation, when the average of the constituency presence in committee members' districts was smaller than its average presence in House districts at large, the constituency was considered to be underrepresented on the committee. For all constituencies and all committees studied, 20 percent of constituencies tied to particular interests were underrepresented on committees with jurisdiction over their policy needs. At the committee level, 14 percent of the interests active in lobbying for bills related to financial regulation were overrepresented on the Financial Services committee. Thirty-two percent of the interests active in lobbying on energy legislation were overrepresented on the Natural Resources committee. Fourteen percent of the interests who lobbied on healthcare reform legislation were overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce committee. Thus, there is plenty of evidence that interest representation varies on House committees.

The 111th session of Congress took place in a highly anti-business political environment. Public opinion was strongly against business interests and the Democratic Party held strong majorities in both the House and the Senate. Yet even in this strong anti-business climate many economic sectors that were prominent in the policy debates on financial, healthcare, and energy reform were overrepresented on the committees with primary jurisdiction over these issue areas. Fifty-eight percent of the economic sectors under the broad industry label of finance and insurance were overrepresented in the districts of the members of the Financial Services committee compared to their presence in House districts overall. These include industries that were deeply involved in the 2008

financial crisis such as commercial banks, investment banks, and mortgage lenders. Consumers who had mortgage issues, however, were not overrepresented in committee members' districts compared to their presence in House districts overall. Pharmaceutical manufacturers, hospitals, and direct health and medical insurance providers were prominent industries in the debate over healthcare reform and they were also overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce committee. Yet the elderly, the poor, unions and the uninsured did not receive comparable levels of representation. And lastly, interests on different sides of the debate over energy reform, such as industry interests like oil drillers, natural gas distributors, and underground coal mining interests as well as environmental interests, were overrepresented on the Natural Resources committee. The fact that these types of interests were overrepresented on the committees of jurisdiction to their policy needs, even during a political environment that ought to predict little group influence over legislative advocacy, leads me to think that there may be systematic factors that predict when some interests will win more committee representation than others.

Baumgartner et al.'s (2009) findings indicate that when groups have more allies on House committees they are systematically more likely to win policy outcomes. There is no research to date, however, that (1) documents whether some interests have more committee representation than others and (2) can account for when some interests will win more committee representation than others. In the preceding pages I have demonstrated that variation exists in interest representation on House committees. The remaining chapters will measure this variation against several hypotheses in order to test

whether a theory of constituency motivated ally generation and mobilization can predict interest representation on committees of importance to their policy needs.

Chapter 4: The Geography of Interest Representation

Organized interests that are similar in size and that have a similar impact on the national economy can differ dramatically in how they are distributed across the 435 congressional districts. Because the federal legislature is strongly tied to geographically defined districts, the various ways that particular interests are distributed can have a substantial impact on the amount of representation they receive in Congress. At one extreme, an interest can be wholly concentrated within the borders of a single congressional district. At the other extreme, an interest could be present in each of the 435 districts. If some interests are constituents in few districts and some are constituents in many, this could translate into significant variation in the amount of representation that they receive. Organized interests with a presence in a large number of districts, such as banks, retailers, and hospitals, could receive systematically greater representation than organized interests with a presence in a small number of districts, such as industries involved in resource extraction, agriculture (crop production) or interests tied to densely populated areas like urban transit.


In addition to being present in a greater or lesser number of districts, interests can also vary in how they are concentrated within the districts where they are constituents. Two interests could, for example, both be present within all 435 districts, but they could vary considerably in how they are concentrated or dispersed across these districts. The proportion of the total constituency tied to a particular interest can therefore vary in how it is distributed across the 435 districts for each interest. This kind of variation is henceforth described as the political concentration of constituencies. For example, one

interest could be heavily concentrated in a few districts and sparsely present in many, and the other could be more evenly spread across all districts. Wal-Mart, like many other national retail companies, offers a good illustration of a highly dispersed constituency distribution. It is present in every district, and its employment is also highly dispersed across the districts where it is located. The same is true of limited service restaurants like McDonald's, Subway, and Taco Bell. These groups have presence in a large number of districts, but their total employment is dispersed quite evenly across the districts where they have a constituency presence.

In contrast to these interests, other constituencies can be present in a large number of districts, but also be highly concentrated in a subset of congressional districts. Investment banks and public relations firms are good examples of economic sectors that have high values of concentration within a subset of particular districts, but that are also present in a large number of total districts. All else equal, does this kind of variation in the concentration of interests within the districts where they are present influence the amount of legislative advocacy they receive from members of Congress?

Finally, interests could have the same amount of district presence and the same level of political concentration, but have decidedly different amounts of geographic concentration. If two interests have a presence in the same number of districts and display the same amount of political concentration, one could be clustered spatially within districts in a similar geographic area while the other could have a spatial

Figure 4.1: Examples of Variation in Geographic Distributions of Particular Interests



distribution that is more randomly located across districts. For example, coal mining interests and the urban transit economic sector are both present in similar numbers of districts, but coal producers are geographically concentrated within particular parts of the country while urban transit is spread more randomly in densely populated areas around the country. How, if at all, does geographic concentration affect the representation of particular interests?

This study will focus on the stage of the legislative process where bias in representation can have the highest impact on policy outcomes - representation on House committees. Baumgartner et al.'s (2009) study indicates that groups with more allies on House committees are systematically more likely to win policy outcomes. Scholars of legislative behavior and interest group influence have not attempted to analyze which particular economic or societal interests are over or underrepresented on the House committees of importance to them. After controlling for alternative explanations for variation in the committee representation of particular interests, this chapter will examine the ways that variation in geographic factors such as the number of districts where an interest is present, its political concentration, and the extent of its geographic concentration or diffusion can affect its over or underrepresentation on House committees.

Geography and the Representation of Particular Interests: A Review of Relevant Literature

In an article written more than 15 years ago Wendy Schiller wrote that “the use of geography as an explanatory variable has been underutilized in theories of interest group politics... [and] this is a serious omission because geographic borders still exert a great

deal of influence in legislative democracies like the United States” (1999, 770). Scholars have demonstrated repeatedly that constituency presence is among the most prominent predictors of legislative behavior. A number of studies have emphasized the relevance that geographic borders have to the study of American politics (see Atlas et al. 1995; and Lee 1998, 1999, 2000). Even so, very little work exists on how variation in the constituency distribution of particular interests affects which interests are overrepresented and which are underrepresented in Congress.

Scholarship that studies how political geography affects legislative behavior is hard to find. The few studies that do exist suggest that the political geography of the federal system can shape representation and ultimately influence policy outcomes (Atlas et al. 1995; Lee 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003; McCubbins and Schwartz 1988). The work that has analyzed the effects of political geography on representation in Congress has largely focused on Senate apportionment. The emphasis of these studies is on the disproportionate influence of states with small population sizes on policy outcomes in the Senate (Atlas et al. 1995; Lee 1998, 1999, 2000).

Even fewer studies have examined how geographic explanatory variables influence legislative outcomes in the House. In contrast to the Senate, the House is composed of electoral districts with roughly equal population that are represented by single rather than multiple members. But even when electoral units have similar levels of population, geographic boundaries can still influence who wins and who loses in terms of representation in Congress. McCubbins and Schwartz (1988), for example, found evidence that redistricting led to the overrepresentation of metropolitan areas in the

House. Political geography has also been found to influence how coalitions are built in the House (Lee 2003).

Few studies have examined how geographic borders influence policy outcomes, but even less work parses out the effects of geography on the representation of particular interests. Outside the area of trade policy, the few studies that even tangentially study the geography of interest representation in Congress have looked at only a small subset of interests and have not utilized multivariate models (see Adler 2000; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Schiller 1999).¹¹ These studies do not attempt to parse out and explain which particular groups are advantaged or disadvantaged in committee representation.

Building on the Work of Political Economists

Most of the work that examines the effects of the spatial distribution of interests on legislative behavior focuses on one category of interests and one policy area – manufacturers and trade policy. This literature is particularly relevant to the analysis in this chapter because political economists have developed a foundation for theorizing about political geography, and they have also worked out how to accurately measure some key geographic variables.

Political economists have tested geographic hypotheses that follow from two theoretical arguments. The first argument is that manufacturing interests concentrated in particular geographic areas will find it easier to overcome Mancur Olsen's (1971) collective action problem. When groups find it easier to overcome the collective action

¹¹ The maximum number of constituencies that these studies evaluate for a particular committee, for example, is five, and the minimum number of constituencies is one.

problem they are better able to work together towards common political goals, and they therefore become more effective at winning policy outcomes in Congress. This approach is discussed in several articles and is commonly referred to as the close group hypothesis (see Busch and Reinhardt 1999; 2000; 2005; Hansen 1988; Lavergne 1983; Pincus 1975; Porter 1990; Schonhardt-Bailey 1991; Trefler 1983).

The second theoretical argument is that manufacturing interests that have a constituency distribution that is dispersed across more districts will win greater representation in Congress. Rogowski (1999) described this explanation as the dispersed group hypothesis. The dispersed group hypothesis attempts to test whether groups that are dispersed across greater numbers of electoral districts have a stronger positive effect on legislative (and/or political) behavior. Dispersed groups are “thought to receive greater [policy benefits] because of their greater political representation in Congress” (Busch and Reinhardt 1999).

A New Theoretical Perspective: Constituency Motivated Ally Generation

The view of group influence tested in this study is a logical extension of Hall and Deardorff’s theory of lobbying as a legislative subsidy. According to this theory, groups mobilize the effort of their “natural allies to assist their own coincident objectives” (Hall and Deardorff, 2006, 69). Interests subsidize the advocacy of their legislative allies toward mutual policy goals by writing legislation, building coalitions, offering information, and essentially working as an extension of their legislative ally’s staff. While Hall and Deardorff’s work emphasizes the importance of natural allies in

Congress, it does not explore variation in the number of natural allies groups have prior to the act of lobbying. To reveal the systematic factors that influence the representation of particular interests in Congress, I argue that we first need to think about which interests are better able to win legislative allies in the first place.

The logic for why constituency presence will lead to bias in ally generation for particular interests is straightforward. Organized interests either have local presence in a given district or they do not. A formidable amount of work demonstrates that legislators advocate for constituents (see for example Baldwin and Magee 2000; Cragg and Kahn 2009; Hall 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Welch 1982; Wright 1990). It follows that, for any legislator, interests that are also constituents will be a higher priority than interests that are not constituents. And further, that the greater the number of districts where a group has a local presence, the greater the number of legislative allies it will generate. Bias in representation is generated as some groups gain more natural allies than others. Viewing group influence through the lens of constituency representation therefore offers a clear hypothesis about biased representation: All else equal, organized interests with a local presence in more districts will be better represented in Congress than organized interests with a local presence in fewer districts.

Where do the Findings of Political Economists Fit in to the Theory of Ally Generation?

Geographic concentration can influence the number of allies that an interest generates, but it can also influence the strength of advocacy for a particular ally. This is a key distinction, because strong individual allies may affect legislative outcomes that do

not require House majorities (or even committee majorities). The studies that connect policy benefits to geographic concentration have focused on trade protection policy, which targets benefits to particular interests while imposing little or no direct costs on other interests. Geographically concentrated interests could have strong allies that push through some distributive policy benefits, but in a host of other contexts they will be at a disadvantage compared to other groups.

What this body of work has missed, I would argue, is that geographically concentrated interests are typically confined to particular parts of the country, and this can limit the overall representation that they receive. Examples of economic sectors that are geographically concentrated include coal, iron, petroleum, and other types of resource extractors, as well as agricultural interests like crop producers. These interests are tied to areas with specific resources or climates. The problem for these interests is that when they are clustered in specific geographic areas, they are also likely to be located in systematically fewer electoral districts than other interests. If an interest is a constituent in a smaller number of districts, it is likely to generate fewer total allies, which will influence the amount of representation it receives. This muddies the waters of previously clear findings in the political economics literature that interests who are geographically concentrated will receive greater policy benefits. For policy issue areas outside distributive trade protection policy, I do not expect to find consistent evidence for all issue areas studied that geographically concentrated interests are better represented than other interests. There are many policy battles where groups with more legislative allies will be in a better position to win be better positioned to win policy outcomes than interests with fewer allies.

Testing a Theory of Constituency Motivated Ally Generation - Methodology

Creating a Precise Measurement of Committee Representation

Chapter 3 measured over or underrepresentation on House committees using t-tests of differences in means. Constituencies that had mean values of constituency presence in committee members' districts that were larger and statistically different from their mean presence in House districts at large were considered to be overrepresented on committees. Similarly, constituencies that had mean values of constituency presence in committee members' districts that were smaller and statistically different from their mean presence in House districts generally were considered to be underrepresented on committees. Dichotomous measurements of committee representation such as those used in the previous chapter are unable to reveal the magnitude of representation, however. It may be that the uninsured and insurance companies are overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce committee, but that insurance companies have extremely high overrepresentation while the uninsured only have mild overrepresentation. In order to capture the magnitude of committee over- or under-representation for all constituencies studied I utilize the commonly used Monte Carlo experiment approach (Adler and Lapinski 1997, 2000, 2002; Groseclose 1994; Sprague 2008).

For each constituency studied I calculate the magnitude of committee over- and under-representation in the following manner. I begin with constituency data for a particular interest for all 435 House districts. Next, I randomly select districts to recreate a single hypothetical committee of the same size as the committee under examination. For this hypothetical committee I calculate the median of the constituency for the membership of the hypothetical committee. I repeat the process of randomly selecting

hypothetical committees from the House at large and calculating the median of the constituency for hypothetical committee member districts 10,000 times. This leaves me with a distribution of 10,000 hypothetical committee medians for committees randomly selected from the House membership.

The Monte Carlo experiment process allows me to calculate and compare the percentile of committee representation for each constituency studied to what we would expect if the committee was randomly selected from the House at large. Table 4.1 presents examples of this dependent variable for selected interests. As the percentile of committee representation for a particular constituency increases above the 50th percentile, the group is overrepresented compared to a committee that is similar to the distribution of the constituency in the 435 districts of the House. Constituencies such as the commercial banking industry with a percentile of committee representation in the 98th percentile on the Financial Services committee are extremely overrepresented when compared to the level of representation that would be expected from a committee that had been randomly selected from House districts. Constituencies like labor unions with committee representation in the 42nd percentile on the Energy and Commerce committee are slightly underrepresented compared to the level of representation that would be expected from a committee randomly selected from House districts.

Independent Variables

Geographic Explanatory Variables. Legislators are the natural allies of their constituents. Groups who are a part of a representative's constituency are more likely to

Table 4.1: Examples of Committee Overrepresentation for Selected Constituencies by Committee

Committee of Referral	Interest Group Type	Percentile of Committee Median	Level of Committee Representation Compared to House at Large
<i>Financial Services</i>	Commercial Banking	98th	Extremely High
	Residential Property Managers	78th	High
	Consumers (Population w/ Foreclosed Homes)	63rd	Slightly overrepresented
	General Freight Trucking, Long-Distance	47th	Slightly underrepresented
<i>Energy and Commerce</i>	Direct Health and Medical Insurance Carriers	89th	Very high
	General Medical and Surgical Hospitals	70th	Moderately high
	Medical Laboratories	62nd	Slightly overrepresented
	Labor Unions	42nd	Slightly underrepresented
<i>Natural Resources</i>	Oil and Gas Pipeline and Related Structures Construction	93rd	Very high
	Industrial Gas Manufacturing	73rd	Moderately high
	Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation	57th	Slightly overrepresented
	Electric Power Distribution	28th	Highly Underrepresented

receive advocacy from the legislator than groups with no local presence. As a group becomes present in more districts they have a greater pool of potential legislative allies. Groups with higher local presence will have more legislators seeking committee membership to as a result of being in greater numbers of districts, which will lead to heightened committee representation compared to groups with less local presence. I therefore expect to find evidence that groups with a local presence in more districts will be more likely to be overrepresented on important congressional committees than groups with a local presence in fewer districts. The first two geographic explanatory variables, described in the following section, gauge the effects that being in greater or fewer numbers of districts has on an interest’s committee representation.

High District Presence is a dichotomous variable that is labeled one for all interests with a constituency presence in 90 percent or more of the 435 House districts.¹² And *Low District Presence* is a dichotomous variable that is labeled 1 for all interests with a constituency presence in 10 percent or fewer of the 435 House districts. I expect to find that interests with a local presence in a large number of districts are better represented on House committees than interests with a presence in few districts. The first two geographic explanatory variables measure the effect that being a constituent in many or few districts has on the generation of committee level allies. But they do not capture variation in the concentration or dispersion of constituencies within the districts where groups are present.

Across the 435 districts a constituency can be highly concentrated within particular districts or it can be evenly dispersed across districts. To measure concentration within the 435 districts I included two variables: political concentration and geographic concentration. *Political Concentration*—when a larger proportion of a constituency is concentrated in few districts rather than spread more evenly across many districts—is measured for each constituency using a Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index was developed to measure market concentration for particular industries. However, it is often utilized to measure the concentration of other metrics across different units of analysis (see Reinhardt and Bush 1999, 2000, 2005). Here I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) in the same manner as Reinhardt and Busch. The HHI is used to capture the concentration of each constituency within particular districts compared to the share of the total constituency across all districts.

¹² Descriptive data for all explanatory and control variables are listed in appendix B-2 with all other online supplementary documents.

When a group has a high HHI (high political concentration) it has large amounts of the constituency in a handful of districts and little or no constituency presence in a large number of districts. In contrast, when a group has a low HHI the constituency is dispersed more evenly across districts. The formula used to calculate the HHI is the following:


$$H = \sum_{i=1}^N s_i^2$$

Where s is the share of the constituency in a particular district related to the share of the total constituency across all districts.

The Herfindahl-Hirschman index has a range of zero to one. Here I transform the measure by multiplying it by 100. This ensures that the results in the following regression models are not shockingly large as a result of moving from the minimum value of zero to the maximum value of one.

Figure 4.2 presents a map of the distribution of district level employment for a constituency with high political concentration, urban transit systems. This constituency

Figure 4.2: Economic Sector with High Political Concentration, *Urban Transit Systems*




is highly concentrated in a limited number of districts. Note that in measures of political concentration the constituency can be concentrated within a few districts irrespective of whether the districts are geographically near or far from one another (the distinction between political concentration here and geographic concentration discussed below).

Geographic concentration is distinct from political concentration because it measures the spatial proximity of the constituency across all districts where it has a local presence. *Geographic concentration* is a measurement of constituencies that are concentrated in particular parts of the country. It captures the extent to which the constituency is clustered within districts nearby one another. Geographic concentration is operationalized by calculating the weighted standard distance of the variation of each constituency across congressional districts in the contiguous United States. The standard distance is utilized by geographers to capture the compactness of a spatial distribution. Features that are concentrated in nearby units of analysis have smaller standard distances than those which are dispersed from one another across units on a map. Reinhardt and Busch's (1999, 2000, 2005) method of calculating geographic concentration for industries across counties was almost identical to using the standard distance. They measured the average distance from the weighted centroid of the industry to the weighted centroids of counties where the industry had a local presence. The weighted standard distance is used rather than Reinhardt and Busch's metric because in the years since their article was published it has been accepted within the field of geography as a standard measurement of spatial dispersion (see Mitchell 2005). The formula for weighted standard distance is as follows:

$$SD_w = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^n w_i (x_i - \bar{X})^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n w_i} + \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n w_i (y_i - \bar{Y})^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n w_i}}$$

The weighted standard distance captures how dispersed across districts a particular constituency is from its weighted spatial mean. The final calculation is the spatial standard deviation, or how far one spatial standard deviation of the constituency is from its weighted spatial mean. Spatial statistics are often made clear by their illustrations. Figure 4.3 presents the geographic distribution of the Cigarette Manufacturing economic sector. This industry is geographically concentrated within a subset of districts in North Carolina and Virginia. As a constituency is more clustered

Figure 4.3: Economic Sector with High Geographic Concentration, Cigarette Manufacturing



within a particular geographic area in this way the measurement for geographic constituency gets smaller. In contrast, when constituencies are more geographically distant from one another, the measurement of geographic concentration gets larger.


Bivariate Summary of Relationships Between District Presence and Committee Representation

The bivariate results in Figure 4.4 demonstrate preliminary evidence for the hypothesis that being a constituent in more congressional districts matters for committee representation. The direction of the correlation coefficient for nearly every geographic explanatory variable indicates that as an interest's constituency presence within a larger number of districts increases they receive more representation on these important House committees. There is a positive correlation between the number of districts where interests have a local presence and their committee representation. There is also a tendency for constituencies that are dispersed across more districts to win greater amounts of committee representation.

Control Variables

The first two control variables included in each model gauge the effects of the size of the group studied. The total size of the group is an important control variable because group size is likely to influence how many allies the group has irrespective of the number of districts where the group can claim to be a constituent. Groups could gain allies in Congress as a result of their importance to the national economy or because they make up a relatively large proportion of those affected by public policy.

Figure 4.4: Do Groups with a Constituency Presence in More Districts Receive Better Representation on House Committees? Pearson correlation coefficients of relationship between geographic explanatory variables and percentile of committee representation



The variable *Total Receipts* measures the amount of money each group received in 2008. It includes the total sales, shipments, receipts, and revenue for each group studied. *Total Receipts* is an aggregate variable that is gathered by NAICS industry code from the 2007 economic census. For constituencies that were not generated from NAICS data I calculated *Total Receipts* using data from nonprofit 990 tax forms for 2008 from

Guidestar.com. Total receipts were gathered from 990 forms for all organizations that filed at least one lobbying report per issue area studied. Then the total receipts were aggregated by constituency.

The variable *Total Membership* is the total number of members a group has nationally. For constituencies that are economic sectors, this variable is the total national employment for the group. And for groups that are not economic sectors, this variable is the total number of national constituents that fall under the group type studied. I use the term membership broadly here to indicate the number of citizens that are affiliated with the group.

The next control variable, *Business*, is labeled one for all business constituencies and zero for all nonbusiness constituencies. In this chapter I focus on geographic explanatory variables explicitly. Business interests and other types of constituencies are empirically analyzed in much greater detail in chapter 5. In this chapter, however, they are included in models as important control variables only. I expect legislators to be stronger advocates for local business interests than nonbusiness interests because business interests have control over local jobs and economic investment. Legislators should therefore, on average, make more effort to gain membership on committees to serve the policy interests of local business than nonbusiness interests. This elevated legislative effort on behalf of local business should result in business constituencies having higher levels of committee representation than nonbusiness interests, all else being equal.

The final control variable included in the model, *Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda* measures the committee's importance to the total policy agenda of a

particular interest when compared to the 20 standing committees of the House. For each interest in the dataset the committee under examination (be it the Financial Services, Energy and Commerce, or the Natural Resources committee respectively) is ranked by its proportion of jurisdiction over the total policy agenda of the group. *Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda* is labeled “1”, for example, when the committee under examination is the least important to the total policy agenda of the group (i.e.- it had jurisdiction over the smallest proportion of the group’s policy agenda compared to all other standing committees) and it is labeled “20” when it is the most important to the group’s policy agenda.

Committees, especially committees with narrow policy jurisdictions, tend to overrepresent constituencies with the highest demand for the policies that these committees oversee (Adler 2000; Adler and Lapinski 1997). Constituencies that spend the most time lobbying issues under the jurisdiction of a particular committee can send a clear message about which committee has jurisdiction over their policy concerns to their legislative allies. When legislative allies receive clear information about which committee would best serve the needs of their constituents they become more incentivized to join the committee. Therefore, groups that are high demand constituencies for the committee under examination ought to gain greater amounts of membership on the committee than groups that are not high demand constituencies. Like business interests, this variable is considered a control variable here, but is discussed in greater detail in a chapter to follow that focuses on interest group agendas and committee representation explicitly.

Models that Parse Out Effects of Variation in Constituency Distributions

The models presented in this chapter utilize linear regression. I begin with a base model that measures the impact of each independent and control variable described above on the committee over or underrepresentation of particular interests relative to their presence in House districts generally. For each issue area studied I excluded constituencies that demonstrated very little lobbying activity. All interests that filed two or fewer lobbying reports across all bills identified under each issue area described in the previous chapter were dropped from each constellation of interests studied.¹³ In the following chapter I run a model on each of these three sets of observations identified by policy subsystem. This base set of models is used to discuss results for all control variables and preliminary results for geographic explanatory variables.

The base model, however, is unable to capture the unique impact of all constituency distributions of interest. Political and geographic dispersion are correlated with district presence. To gain a more complete understanding of the role of constituency concentration and dispersion I hold high and low district presence constant using interaction terms. A separate set of models are calculated to interact high and low district presence with political and geographic concentration to test the varied effects that geographic or political concentration have on committee representation. This approach also allows me to parse out the effect of the four spatial distributions described at the outset of this chapter that may further affect who wins and who loses committee level

¹³ These interests were in the bottom 5th percentile or less in the number of lobbying reports that they filed across all bills for each issue area studied. These interests were not consistently a part of each constellation of interests per issue area studied. As such, they were less likely to demonstrate predictable behavior. Dropping these observations did not change the substantive results of the models throughout this dissertation. However, it did decrease the noise in models substantially such that the amount of variation in committee representation explained by the models (i.e. -r-squared values) was much higher.

representation (see Figure 4.1). I discuss the nature of the interaction terms prior to describing the impact of each distribution in the section detailing results for geographic explanatory variables below.

Table 4.2:
What Factors Predict Variation in Constituencies' Over- and Underrepresentation on Congressional Committees?

	<i>Models by Committee:</i>			
	All Committees	Financial Services	Energy and Commerce	Natural Resources
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High District Presence	10.556 ^{***} (2.898)	28.461 ^{***} (6.266)	5.200 ⁺ (5.049)	-1.929 (4.817)
Low District Presence	-1.231 (8.842)	-5.488 (20.142)	3.009 (16.065)	0.047 (11.946)
Political Concentration	0.163 (0.318)	2.485 ^{**} (1.337)	-2.157 ^{**} (1.278)	0.298 (0.351)
Geographic Dispersion	0.600 (0.521)	2.109 ^{**} (1.034)	-3.290 ^{***} (0.862)	2.441 ^{***} (0.786)
Business	20.677 ^{***} (6.101)	34.689 ^{***} (11.804)	27.015 ^{***} (9.096)	4.762 (9.691)
Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda	0.081 (0.246)	0.910 ^{**} (0.434)	1.035 [*] (0.650)	0.858 [*] (0.523)
Total Receipts	0.016 (0.041)	-0.076 (0.170)	-0.005 (0.039)	0.214 (0.206)
Total Membership	0.026 (0.027)	0.035 (0.055)	0.091 ^{***} (0.035)	-0.068 (0.048)
Constant	20.157 [*] (10.792)	-32.258 (20.513)	59.646 ^{***} (19.954)	0.263 (17.919)
Observations	532	143	186	203
R ²	0.054	0.255	0.145	0.080
Adjusted R ²	0.039	0.211	0.106	0.043

Note a:

^{*} p<0.1; ^{**} p<0.05; ^{***} p<0.01

Note b: One tailed significance tests used for *Local Presence*, *Business*, and *Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda*.

Note c: ⁺ *High District Presence* is substantively meaningful and statistically significant when political and geographic concentration, which are correlated with high levels of district presence, are not included in this model.

Results for Control Variables

Two variables, *Total Receipts* and *Total Membership*, measure the total size of the interest studied. If committee membership is selected based on the importance of a particular interest to the nation as a whole, then we should see evidence that these variables predict stronger committee representation. The results generated in the base model do not support this line of thinking. Large interests that are likely to be the most important to the United States as a whole are not systematically better represented on House committees. The first measure of group size, *Total Receipts*, gauged whether the amount of money that the group takes in affects the amount of committee representation it receives. Two of the three coefficients on this variable were actually negative, signifying potential for underrepresentation. Further, none of the coefficients for *Total Receipts* in the three committee models were statistically significant.

Similar results were generated for the second measurement of group size. The total number of constituents affiliated with each interest, labeled *Total Membership* in the model, was not statistically significant in two out of the three committee models. Like *Total Receipts*, the coefficient was not consistently positive. The only committee where group size had a positive and statistically significant impact was Energy and Commerce, but substantively even this result only has a slight impact on committee representation. Moving from the mean value of *Total Membership* for all interests active in the issue area examined for Energy and Commerce to the third quartile results in an increase of six percentage points of an interest's percentile of representation. Therefore, group size, measured using an interest's total receipts or its total affiliated constituents, does not tend to affect the amount of committee representation it receives.

It is rather shocking to find that the importance of an interest to the national economy has little bearing on the amount of committee representation that it receives. This finding underscores the impact of political geography to U.S. representation. Interests are not over- or underrepresented in proportion to their importance to the nation as a whole. As is revealed in the following empirical analysis, representatives advocate for the interests that are housed within the geographic borders of their districts. Legislators advocate for particular interests more strongly when interests make up a part of their local constituency. The spatial distribution of the constituency and the type of the constituency are both factors that can affect ally generation and advocacy. The next two control variables offer truncated findings (that will be discussed at much greater length in the following chapters) about how some types of constituencies are better represented than others and in support of the hypothesis that some interests will mobilize their allies toward more effective advocacy than others.

Business constituencies, for example, received greater representation than nonbusiness constituencies in two of the three House committees studied. Additionally, coefficients for all committee models were in the expected direction. These results tend to support Charles Lindblom's theory of business influence over policy outcomes. Local business interests have control over jobs and economic investment in ways that nonbusiness interests do not. This seems to translate into better representation from their representatives. These findings will be retested and analyzed in detail in the following chapter.

The final control variable, *Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda*, was also telling about the types of constituencies that are the most likely to gain membership

on House committees. The coefficients for *Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda* were in the expected direction (positive) for all committees studied. They were also statistically significant for all committee models. These results again underline the importance of viewing group influence through the lens of constituency representation. Groups that are more incentivized to join committees will win greater committee representation than groups that are less incentivized to join committees. Theories of group influence that do not consider constituency representation cannot uncover these kinds of systematic differences in group related committee representation. This variable will also be analyzed in greater detail in a separate chapter, which focuses on the relationship between interest group policy agendas and committee representation.

Results for Geographic Explanatory Variables

Do Interests With a Local Presence in More Districts Receive More Committee Representation?

Legislators work on behalf of their constituents. Groups that have a local presence within a particular district are more likely to generate a legislative ally in the district's representative than groups without a local presence. Further, when a group has a local presence in a larger number of districts it will be able to generate more legislative allies. And with more allies seeking to advocate on the group's behalf, it is more likely to receive more representation in Congress. According to this logic, the coefficients for *High District Presence* for each committee model will be positive and statistically significant.

Table 4.3: Do Groups with a Constituency Presence in More Districts Receive Better Representation on House Committees? Statistically significant effects from committee models.		
		Statistically Significant Effects
<i>High District Presence</i>	All Committees, All Groups	11***
	Financial Services	31***
	Energy & Commerce	7*
	Natural Resources	-
<i>Low District Presence</i>	All Committees, All Groups	-
	Financial Services	-
	Energy & Commerce	-
	Natural Resources	-
<i>Note a:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		
<i>Note b:</i> Energy & Commerce effects calculated from restricted model that does not include political or geographic concentration.		

The coefficients for *High District Presence* were statistically significant across two of the four full models. And they were also statistically significant in a restricted Energy & Commerce model that excludes political or geographic concentration, which correlate strongly with high levels of district presence. In contrast, I find no statistically significant findings that *Low District Presence* impacts the amount of representation that interests receive. Substantively these findings indicate that groups with a presence in larger numbers of House districts will, on average, have greater representation on House committees than groups with a local presence in fewer districts. Even the Natural Resources committee model, which failed to show statistically significant results for the coefficient measuring high district presence, is positive and significant for the coefficient measuring geographic dispersion. Geographic dispersion positively correlates with high district presence and large values of either variable are indicative of a group being present in many districts. Therefore, this model also yields evidence that suggests that

constituency presence in more districts can lead to better representation on important House committees.

Interests with a constituency presence in a large number of districts received increased levels of committee representation for three of the four committee models. In the Financial Services model, all else being equal, being an interest with high district presence increased the percentile of group representation by 31 percentage points. For the Energy and Commerce committee the effect was not significant in the full model, but it was significant after excluding from the model variables that correlate with high district presence. High district presence increased the percentile of representation for groups by 5 percentage points.

The evidence for district presence was less clear for the Natural Resources committee. The coefficient for high district presence in the Natural Resources committee model was not significant, but the coefficient for *Geographic Dispersion*, which correlates with high district presence, was positive and statistically significant. Moving from the minimum to the maximum amount of geographic dispersion for this committee increased an interest's level of committee representation by 34 percentage points. For each committee, I therefore find evidence that suggests that interests who are constituents in more districts receive better representation on committees with jurisdiction over their policy needs.¹⁴

¹⁴ Alternative measures of district presence also support this conclusion. For example if the dummy variable for high presence is set to include 80% rather than 90% of districts the results of the model are not noticeably different. The same is true when low presence is set to include 20 % of all districts. The models in the following two chapters also test whether the number of districts where a group has a constituency presence affects committee representation (e.g. -1 to a maximum of each of the 435 House districts). The results are consistently strong from models testing all groups and all committees, the Financial Services committee, and the Energy and Commerce committee. I present results for dichotomous variables here rather than counts of districts because this model allows me to more easily transition to models that parse

Which groups have high district presence and which groups have low district presence?

Groups with a local presence in more House districts will gain systematically greater committee representation than groups that have a presence in fewer districts, but the substantive impact of these results will be made clearer by a discussion of exactly which types of groups have high district presence within the context of each policy subsystem studied here.

In the policy subsystem related to *U.S. banking system and financial institution regulation* the commercial banking industry has a local presence in each of the 435 Congressional districts. Commercial banks have high district presence, but the regulation of the commercial banking industry is important to many economic sectors that are active in this policy community and have low district presence. Because the health of the commercial banking industry affects so many other economic sectors many other industries also have a stake in how banks are regulated. Yet a wide variety of economic sectors that participate in this policy subsystem are underrepresented on the committee relative to their presence in House districts generally. Examples of sectors in this policy subsystem that have a limited amount of district presence include many manufacturers, industries involved in resource extraction, and other sectors that are limited to particular geographic areas such as port and harbor operations or casino hotels. Examples of sectors with a district presence in less than half of all House districts include auto manufacturers, aircraft manufacturers, and computer manufacturers; as well as resource extractors like the coal mining industry. While these interests will have less committee

out the effects of constituency concentration for interests that have high and low district presence using interaction terms in the next sections.

representation (and therefore less impact on the shape of policies flowing through the committee of primary importance to banking and financial reform) many groups that were central players in the financial crisis have levels of district presence that lead to higher committee representation and higher leverage over this policy area.

Groups that are in many districts include several economic sectors that the majority of the public was vehemently angry with throughout the financial crisis. Groups with a district presence in the maximum number of districts include the following economic sectors: Commercial banks, Real Estate Credit, Securities Brokerage, Miscellaneous Intermediation, Portfolio Management, Investment Advice, and Lessors of Residential Buildings and Dwellings. Furthermore, other sectors involved in the crisis such as Consumer Lending and Investment Banking and Securities Dealing have a local presence in over 95 percent of House districts. In 2009 and 2010 public opinion was running strongly against many of these interests. However, in part because they were constituents in larger numbers of districts compared to other sectors that were not a part of the financial crisis, these economic sectors enjoyed greater representation on the Financial Services committee.

Having high district presence is also important for committee representation because it can give groups that face a highly competitive environment for seats on particular committees an edge over other interests in gaining committee membership. The committee of primary importance to groups that participate in the policy subsystem *Comprehensive health care reform* is the Energy and Commerce committee. This committee has jurisdiction over bills affecting a diverse number of policy issue areas. This means that groups that seek to affect policy outcomes by positioning their allies on

committees that can shape comprehensive health care reform face competition for committee representation from the allies of groups that are a part of many other policy subsystems outside of the health care sector.

With all this competition, any edge a group has to get its allies on its key committee is helpful to maximizing its policy impact. Being a constituent in a large number of districts is one way to gain this competitive edge in committee representation. Examples of business interests that are constituents in 95 percent or more districts that participated in this policy subsystem include Hospitals, Insurance agencies, Direct Life insurers, Health and Medical Insurers, Nursing Care Facilities and Law Offices. Business interests that were in fewer than half of districts in this policy area fall under similar categories to those seeking representation on the Financial Services industry. They include manufacturing interests such as auto, aircraft, defense weaponry, and computer manufacturers. They also include industries that involve resource extraction and the refining of resources such as gold mining, petroleum refining, iron foundries, aluminum production and coal mining. Other interests with policy interests before Energy and Commerce are confined to specific geographic areas and thus have limited district presence, such as urban transit systems, port and harbor operations, deep sea travel, distilleries, and motion picture and video distributors.

In this chapter I focus on a particular policy area that flows through the Energy and Commerce committee, but the effect of district presence may be stronger for other policy areas. For example, when free trade agreements are considered by this committee, the results presented here suggest that the legislative allies of industries with presence in many districts, like retailers, are likely to have enhanced committee representation, while

industries present in fewer districts presence, such as many manufacturers and resource extractors, are likely to be underrepresented. Retailers may, as a result, be better able to tilt the scales of free trade policy towards open international markets so that they can produce cheaper goods. Manufacturers and resource extractors, in contrast, may have less impact on trade restriction as a result of having less district presence and therefore less representation.

The effect of having a local presence in a large number of districts is even more relevant to the National Resources Committee, a committee with jurisdiction over policy issue areas with large numbers of interests that have a presence in only a limited number of districts. The Natural Resources committee has jurisdiction over policy areas that affect a high number of groups with a local presence in a limited number of congressional districts. Groups with limited district presence include raw materials extractors such as industries that mine metals and coal and those that drill oil and extract natural gas. Groups with limited district presence also include agricultural interests such as logging companies and many crop producers.

Examples of business interests that are constituents in 95 percent or more districts that participated in this policy subsystem include many economic sectors involved in construction, transportation of raw materials, and the sale of raw materials via retailers and wholesale distributors. Economic sectors with a local presence in nearly all 435 congressional districts include many construction-related industries such as New Single-Family Housing Construction (except Operative Builders); Residential Remodelers; Commercial and Institutional Building Construction; Highway, Street, and Bridge Construction; Architectural Services; Engineering Services; New Multifamily Housing

Construction (except Operative Builders); and Other Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction. Transportation industry interests with a large district presence included both local and long haul truckers as well as freight transportation. Economic sectors selling raw materials were also ubiquitous across districts, including Home Centers; Lumber, Plywood, Millwork, and Wood Panel Merchant Wholesalers; Supermarkets and Grocery Stores; Nursery, Garden Center, and Farm Supply Stores; and Other Building Materials Dealers. Differences in district presence could therefore bias committee representation towards distributors of raw materials and against interests that produce raw materials.

District presence is therefore an understudied, but important factor that begins to explain which types of groups are better represented on House committees. But this variable does not capture variation in a group's constituency presence within the districts where it is located. To shed more light on the effects of variation in constituency presence within the districts where a group can claim to be a constituent, the final two sections will examine how political and geographic concentration affects interest representation on House committees.

Does the Effect of Political Concentration on Committee Representation Differ for Groups with Different levels of District Presence?

Groups with a presence in a large number of districts have more committee representation than groups with a presence in a small number of districts. But if the level of district presence is held constant does variation in a interest's concentration within the districts where the group is present make any difference?

To gauge the effect of political concentration I ran two new models that interact political concentration with dummy variables that measure low and high district presence. The first model parses out the effects of concentration on groups with high district presence. In order to measure the effects of high and low political concentration on groups with a high district presence I added a dummy variable to the base model labeled “1” for groups that had a local presence in 90 percent or more of the 435 House districts. I also included an interaction term for political concentration multiplied by the dummy variable for groups with a high district presence. Predicted values were then calculated for groups with high district presence from low to high values of political concentration (all other variables were set to their average value).¹⁵

Figure 4.5 presents the results by committee for the effect of low to high values of political concentration for groups with high district presence for each committee studied. The results differ substantially for each committee studied. For groups with high levels of district presence that participated in the policy subsystem related to banking and financial reform (labeled “Financial Services” in figure 4.5), as political concentration increases the results suggest that committee representation also increases. In this policy subsystem it was better to have a concentrated constituency presence in some districts than to be perfectly dispersed across districts. These findings were suggestive, but predicted percentiles for low values were not statistically different from higher values of political concentration.

¹⁵ Full results for models with interaction terms can be found in appendix A-1. All models in the remaining sections were also tested with the dummy variables for high presence set to include 80% rather than 90% of districts and the results of the model are not noticeably different. The same is true when low presence is set to include 20 % of all districts.

Though it is difficult to see in the figure, the effect of political concentration on a group with high district presence for groups involved in the policy subsystem for healthcare reform (labeled “Energy & Commerce” in figure 4.5) was slightly weaker as political concentration increased. While the coefficient decreases at higher levels of political concentration, it is not statistically distinguishable from interests with lower levels of concentration and high district presence. The effect was less strong for groups seeking representation on this committee than the Financial Services committee. The results for the Natural Resources committee were similar. For groups with high levels of district presence, participating in the policy subsystem related to energy regulation, as political concentration grew committee representation slightly decreased.

Is it more advantageous for a group to have high district presence and higher political concentration within particular districts or to

have high district presence with a dispersed presence within districts? For groups with

Figure 4.5: Does Political Concentration Influence Committee Representation for Groups with High Levels of District presence?







Figure 4.6: Does Political Concentration Influence Committee Representation for Groups with Low Levels of District presence?



high district presence the effect of being more politically concentrated does not have a substantively relevant influence on the amount of committee representation that they receive.

The second model parses out the effects of groups with low district presence. To measure the effects of high and low political concentration on groups with a low district presence, I added a dummy variable to the base model labeled “1” for groups that had a local presence in 10 percent or fewer of the 435 House districts. In the same fashion as the models for high presence I included an interaction term for political concentration multiplied by the dummy variable for groups with a low district presence. Predicted values were calculated for groups with low district presence from low to high values of political concentration (with all other variables set to their average values).

Figure 4.6 presents the effects of different levels of political concentration on

committee representation for groups with low district presence. For groups with low




district presence higher levels of political concentration decreased committee representation for the Energy and Commerce and Natural Resources committees and it slightly increased representation on the Financial Services committee. However, these results were not statistically significant at (or near) the 95 percent level of statistical significant for any committee related model. Similar to the results for the models testing the effects of political concentration for groups with high levels of district presence, there is little evidence that variation in political concentration in a subset of the districts where they have district presence has any consistent effect on committee representation. It may be slightly better in some committees for a group to have a concentrated presence in a subset of the districts where they can claim to be a constituent, but the effects measured here are much less clear than the effect of having simply being a constituent in a large number of districts.

Does the Effect of Geographic Dispersion/Concentration on Committee Representation Vary for Groups with Different levels of District Presence?

Political concentration measures the proportion of the total constituency that is concentrated within particular districts. High values of political concentration indicate that a constituency is concentrated in particular districts rather than spread more evenly across districts. But political concentration is unable to capture how dispersed or clustered the constituency is geographically.

To gauge the effect of geographic dispersion and concentration within the districts where groups are present I ran two new models that interact geographic dispersion with dummy variables that measure low and high district presence. Note that I measure geographic concentration and dispersion using the standardized distance from the weighted spatial mean of the constituency to the weighted constituency presence within the 435 districts. Higher values of standard distance indicate geographic dispersion and lower values indicate geographic concentration. The first model parses out the effects of groups with high district presence. In order to measure the effects of high and low geographic concentration on groups with a high district presence, I added a dummy variable to the base model labeled “1” for groups that had a local presence in 90 percent or more of the 435 House districts. I also included an interaction term for geographic concentration multiplied by the dummy variable for groups with a high district presence. Predicted values were then calculated for groups

Figure 4.7: Does Geographic Concentration Influence Committee Representation for Groups with High Levels of District presence?



with high district presence from low values which indicate geographic concentration to high values which indicate geographic dispersion (all other variables were set to their average value).¹⁶

Figure 4.7 presents the results by committee for the effect of low to high values of geographic concentration/dispersion for groups with high district presence for each committee studied. The results for groups with high district presence suggest that interests that are geographically dispersed and in a high number of districts tend to win better committee representation than interests that are present in a large number of districts but also geographically concentrated. The predicted values were statistically different when geographic concentration for interests with high district presence was set to its minimum and maximum values for the Natural Resources committee, but not for other committee related models.¹⁷ Even so, the direction of the predicted values for all models suggest that groups with geographically dispersed constituency presence have higher levels of committee representation for each of the three committees studied. The first important finding here is therefore that geographic concentration does not appear to increase committee representation for interests with high levels of district presence. These results again emphasize that district presence rather than political or geographic concentration impacts committee representation.

Reinhardt and Busch's work (1999, 2000, 2001) indicates that geographically concentrated economic sectors will engage in more effective political activity because

¹⁶ For the Financial Services model the minimum value was 3.2 and the maximum value was 21.1. For the Energy and Commerce model the minimum value was 3.2 and the maximum value was 20.4. And for the Natural Resources model the minimum value was 6.4 and the maximum value was 20.4.


¹⁷ This pattern may also be related to practices that tend to limit the number of representatives from any one particular state on congressional committees.

spatial proximity makes it easier to overcome the difficulties presented by the collective action problem. Following from Reinhardt and Busch's findings, as geographically concentrated interests become more politically active, we should expect elevated levels of political advocacy from their legislative allies. While this may be true for particular districts, in the aggregate, the results from Figure 4.7 indicate no consistent effects from geographic concentration. In a given district, it may be the case that legislators make a stronger effort to win membership on committees that assist geographically concentrated constituencies. However, for all districts where a group has a district presence I do not find consistent evidence to infer that geographic concentration leads to higher levels of committee representation. While geographic concentration may elevate levels of legislative advocacy for group allies once they are on a committee relevant to the policy needs of the group, it does not lead to consistently higher committee representation for groups with high district presence.

The problem that groups face when they are geographically concentrated is that they are also more likely to be constituents in fewer congressional districts. Being a constituent in a larger number of districts expands a group's pool of potential legislative allies. The consequence is that while a group with a geographically concentrated constituency may have stronger allies, they are also more likely to have fewer total allies, which can weaken their impact on policy outcomes.

The second model parses out the effects of groups with low district presence. In order to measure the effects of high and low geographic concentration on groups with a low district presence I added a dummy variable to the base model labeled "1" for groups that had a local presence in 10 percent or fewer of the 435 House districts. I also

included an interaction term for geographic concentration multiplied by the dummy variable for groups with a high district presence. Predicted values were then calculated



for groups with low district presence from low values which indicate geographic concentration to high values which indicate geographic dispersion (all other variables were set to their average value).

Figure 4.8 presents the results by committee for the effect of low to high values of geographic dispersion for groups with low district presence for each committee studied. Similar to each of the previous analyses of political concentration, the direction of predicted values was not consistent for all committees studied. Additionally, none of the three committees studied had statistically different results at any meaningful range of predicted values. For interests with low district presence in the Financial Services and Natural Resources models, geographic concentration increases the predicted percentile of committee representation. In contrast with these findings, the direction of the predicted percentile of committee representation

for the Energy and Commerce committee indicates that groups that are more geographically dispersed receive greater representation.

Moving from the minimum value of geographic dispersion to the maximum value of geographic dispersion for interests with low district presence for each committee resulted in no statistically different predicted values of committee representation.

Therefore, the results of the models for groups with low district presence that are also more geographically concentrated indicate that these interests do not consistently win greater representation on House committees.

Conclusion: The Geography of Interest Representation, Legislative Behavior, and Group Influence

This chapter offers a new theoretical foundation and empirical evidence on the question of what groups are advantaged and disadvantaged in the legislative process in Congress. Rather than focusing on financial resources, the theory presented here centers on which interests are better able to win legislative allies on important committees in Congress. Put simply, groups vary in the number of allies that they generate largely as a result of constituency-related factors.

The results presented here, and in the two chapters that follow, illuminate how geographic representation shapes the composition of congressional committees to the advantage and disadvantage of different interests in society. Groups exhibit wide variation in the number of districts where they have a local presence. Some interests have a presence in many districts, and some have a presence in few districts. Moreover, interests can also be uniquely spread across or concentrated within the districts where they are located. They can also be geographically concentrated within particular areas of

the country. After examining the effects of variation in district presence and variation in political and geographic concentration within the districts where groups are present, the effects of constituency presence on committee representation (and sometimes the lack of effects) are now clearer.

Groups that have a local presence in a larger number of House districts generally win more committee representation on average than groups with a local presence in fewer districts. Within the districts where constituencies are present, being politically or geographically concentrated does not consistently increase or decrease a group's level of committee representation. This is true whether a group has a local presence in a large number or a small number of districts. The bottom line after extensively examining each of the above geographic explanatory variables in this chapter is therefore that being a constituent in more electoral districts is more important to committee representation than the concentration of the constituency across the districts where a group is present.

Constituency presence motivates ally generation in Congress. And organized interests that generate more allies are often likely to be better represented in the House. When groups have a local presence in more districts, they increase the pool of potential legislative allies that can advocate for their policy needs in Congress. The concentration of the total constituency within the districts where it is present did not affect committee representation in this study, but it is important to note that though geographic and political concentration are less important to committee membership, they are still likely to be important after committee membership is set. Future studies should consider whether committee members from districts with geographically and/or politically

concentrated constituencies advocate for group interests more aggressively or consistently than committee members who represent more dispersed constituencies.

Groups vary in how they are distributed geographically across electoral districts. When they are present in more districts, they systematically win greater committee representation than when they are present in fewer districts. And as the next two chapters will demonstrate, systemic bias in the legislative process does not end with variation in how geography impacts interest representation. Within a given district, some types of constituencies may have a stronger impact on constituency-motivated ally generation than others. Organized interests that have control over the local economy, for example, are likely to receive greater representation than other types of interests. The next chapter empirically examines Charles Lindblom's much debated assertion that business interests have a privileged place in the policymaking process.

Chapter 5: The Privileged Place of Business Interests in Constituency Representation

This chapter offers a fresh theoretical approach and empirical evidence that a built-in advantage exists for business interests over and above other interests in the legislative process. The source of this advantage begins at the local level. Within any given district, many different interests with varied policy agendas coexist. When members of Congress make decisions about which constituency interests to prioritize they are likely to view the policy needs of some types of interests as being more important than others. Consequently, some categories of constituents may be more likely to generate allies in, and receive greater advocacy from, their representative(s) than others. In the following pages I first detail the prominent theoretical and empirical approaches to studying systematic business influence over legislative behavior and policy outcomes in Congress. I then offer a revised theoretical perspective and empirical evidence that business advantage over legislative advocacy in Congress is related to the leverage that business interests have over jobs and economic investment in the district.

As in the previous chapter, my focus is on the stage in the legislative process where bias in legislative representation is the most likely to impact the policymaking process, legislative committees. Baumgartner et al. (2009) found that one of the few predictors of policy success for organized interests on a particular side of a policy issue debate was the number of committee level allies that they have. The focus on this chapter will therefore be on testing whether business interests have a systematic advantage over nonbusiness interests in committee representation. I expect to find

evidence that business interests are more likely than other types of groups to be overrepresented (and less likely to be underrepresented) on committees of importance to their policy goals.

I will present evidence that business advantage is derived from its role as a constituent in members' districts. Representatives will, on average, advocate for local business interests over and above other interests in the district (and all interests outside the district) because business interests have control over local jobs and economic investment. As the more detailed theoretical discussion and the evidence presented in the following pages will establish, business advantage over legislative advocacy in Congress has roots in constituency representation.

Competing Explanations for Business Advantage in Congress

The following theoretical discussion describes the two prominent explanations of business influence over policy outcomes in Congress. After describing the prominent theories of business influence, I offer a new explanation of why business interests have a built-in advantage over other interests in the policymaking process. I argue that the causal mechanism for business influence over policy outcomes is not primarily the result of business control over the national economy or businesses dominance among all the moneyed interests that donate to legislators. In key respects, business advantage in Congress begins at the local level. It is closely tied to the role business interests play as constituents in members' districts.

The principal theory of business influence is often referred to as structural dependence theory. Structural dependence theory, which is also sometimes described as “the privileged place of business, the structural source of power, or the structural

dependence of the state on capital” (Smith 1999), argues that business has a structural advantage over other interests in the policy process because it has greater leverage over the economy. Business interests are described as having more influence over policy outcomes than other interests because business controls “investment, employment, and economic growth” (Quinn and Shapiro 1991).

The foundational explanation of this theory in the political science literature was put forward by Charles Lindblom (1977)¹⁸. In *Politics and Markets*, Lindblom contends that business holds a privileged place in the policymaking process because of its leverage over jobs and economic investment. Politicians, on average, advocate for business interests over and above other interests because advocating against business initiates an “automatically punishing recoil” of economic costs (Lindblom 1982). When the economy is in trouble, Lindblom argues, politicians face the threat of losing future elections. Politicians are therefore incentivized to work harder for business interests than other categories of organizations in the interest group universe. This description of the structural dependence theory has been repeated in Bernagen and Brauning (2005), Bowles and Gintis (1986), Cohen and Rogers (1983), Dryzek (1996), Elkin (1985), Mitchell (1997), and Smith (1999, 2000).

A substantial number of authors have tested this theory, but the empirical literature does not present consistent evidence in favor of the claim that business is advantaged over other interests. One prospective reason why the evidence for business advantage is mixed is that the literature almost exclusively operationalizes business influence using national rather than local economic indicators. Lindblom’s work does not offer detailed guidance in this regard. He argues that business has a privileged place

¹⁸ But see also Block 1977 and Offe 1984 for early similar formulations of this theory.

in the political process because of its control over the economy, but he does not tie this economic leverage to the political representation of particular geographically bound areas.

Without clear theoretical guidance about which aspects of the economy are the most relevant to business advantage over policy outcomes, scholars have overwhelmingly chosen to examine the effect of national economic indicators on the policy benefits that business interests receive. Findings that support theses of business advantage have been generated when testing the effect of increased national employment on both corporate tax rates (Campbell and Allen 1994) and tax progressivity (Allen and Campbell 1994), when examining the effect of the national economy on tax incentives for business (Quinn 1988), and when studying the relationship between welfare spending and variation in national economic investment (Hicks and Swank 1984). In contrast, scholars have uncovered evidence that does not support structural dependence theory when testing the relationship between the national economy and corporate taxes (Jacobs 1988), when measuring the effect of national investment on taxes (Quinn and Shapiro 1991), and when testing the effects of diverse national economic factors such as GDP, the employment rate, the rate of investment growth, and an index combining these factors on an index of business's federal level policy success (Smith 1999, 2000).

The methodological approach that the literature examining Lindblom's thesis has therefore almost exclusively tested whether business leverage over the national economy relates to its influence over policy outcomes. Because legislative representation in Congress is tied to geography, we may find more consistent evidence that business is better positioned in the policymaking process than other interests if we examine business

through the lens of constituency representation. As I will argue after reviewing the second prominent theory of business influence below, business's advantage over other interests in Congress is more likely to begin at the local level, within the borders that legislators actually represent.

Scholarship on interest group influence offers a second theoretical explanation of business advantage in Congress. This approach, sometimes referred to as exchange theory, focuses on the effect of transactions between organizations and legislators. Exchange theory argues that money is contributed to legislators in order to buy legislative behavior. Because business interests make up the largest proportion of interests represented in the interest group universe (Schlozman and Tierney 1986), and because they are often the best financed among politically active interests that lobby in Washington (Baumgartner and Leech 2001), exchange theory suggests that they ought to gain more leverage over legislative outcomes than other interests.¹⁹ A large body of work has tested the hypothesis that moneyed interests buy legislative advocacy (See Chappell 1982; Fleisher, 1993; McCarty and Rothenberg 1996; Morton and Cameron 1992; Snyder 1992; Stratmann 1995; Welch 1982; but see also Baumgartner and Leech 1998a; and Smith 1995 for more detailed reviews of the many studies analyzing this hypothesis). However, like structural dependence theory, the evidence that moneyed interests win policy outcomes via quid pro quo transactions is mixed, at best (Baumgartner and Leech 1998a).

Recent empirical and theoretical work by Baumgartner et al. offers further evidence business does not systematically possess influence over and above other

¹⁹ Scholars testing exchange theory rarely explicitly argue that exchange theory means that there is a built in advantage for business interests. However, an advantage for business interests is often implied by these of empirical work testing this approach (Harris 2013).

interests. Baumgartner et al. (2009) argued that the models put forth by much of the work on exchange theorists were overly simplistic. In most cases, the competition among organized interests for particular policy outcomes pits multiple interests on different sides of the issues against one another. Business interests often build coalitions with nonbusiness interests to face coalitions of business and nonbusiness interests on an opposing side of an issue. The result is that well-financed interests are often counterbalanced by other well-financed interests.

Another powerful critique of exchange theory is that we should expect organized interests who desire to buy votes to contact legislators that are on the fence or in opposition to a policy, but the empirical evidence demonstrates that organized interests are much more likely to contact their legislative allies (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hall and Wayman 1992; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). Instead of buying legislative behavior money is often thought to buy access such that organized interests can make the case for their policy interests to members of Congress (Herndon 1982; Langbein 1986; and Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 246).

In addition to the prominent theories for business influence discussed in the two sections above, other scholars have argued the structural dependence of policymakers on business is conditional upon the historical context, the mobilization of other interests, or the type of issue studied (Harris 2013; Smith 2010; Vogel 1983, 1996a, 1996b, 2003). Yet others make the case that business interests may win more favorable policy outcomes by shaping public opinion (Smith 2000). But the same empirical issue remains. To date there is simply no consistent systematic evidence that business has a structural advantage in the policymaking process. To make a well substantiated argument that business

interests have greater leverage over the legislative process than other types of groups, a fresh theoretical explanation of the causal mechanism and an alternative foundation for demonstrable supporting evidence is needed. The following section offers a revised theoretical approach to the study of business advantage over policy outcomes in the legislative process.

Constituency Motivated Ally Generation and Business Advantage

Business interests have a privileged place in the policymaking process, but it is tied to their role as constituents within the geographic areas represented by legislators in Congress. Studying groups through the lens of constituency representation offers fresh opportunity in the search for business influence on the legislative process. Various types of constituencies exist within the district. However, the legislative needs of business interests are likely to be prioritized by members of Congress over other local interests because businesses have control over local economic investment, jobs, and economic growth. Legislators work on behalf of many interests in their districts, but because they care about jobs, economic investment and growth in the district, business interests' policy needs are more likely to be prioritized over nonbusiness interests. Even if the priority given to business interests is only modest, a small prioritization of local business needs can result in a substantial amount of business advantage over the levers of power in Congress. As legislators request membership on House committees, the prioritization of local business interests over and above other interests can lead to a substantial aggregate advantage for business interests over nonbusiness interests in committee representation.

With an increased likelihood of prioritizing local business interests over other constituencies, legislators will be more likely to request membership on committees that have the greatest leverage over the policy agendas of local business interests. And with a larger pool of legislators requesting committee membership to serve local business interests, we should see systematic evidence that committee representation reflects a pervasive business advantage in Congress. Small differences in a legislator's perceived importance of some types of local interests over others, namely the elevation of the policy needs of local business interests because of their control over local jobs and economic investment, can therefore lead to substantial systematic differences in committee representation for business interests.

Political Mobilization: An Alternative Explanation for Business Advantage Over Other Interests in the District

Local business interests may also receive more legislative advocacy than other interests in the district simply because they are, on average, more politically active. Miler (2010) found that local interests were more likely to both be seen by, and receive legislative advocacy from, their representatives when they contacted them via phone, email, or mail. If business interests contact their representatives more than nonbusiness interests, then they may be more likely to generate an ally in, and receive advocacy from, the members of Congress where they have a local presence.

Moreover, Mancur Olson's foundational work on collective action (1965) posited that business interests will find it easier to organize for collective political action than interests with less clearly defined incentives for member participation. This logic offers an explanation for the substantial literature that finds evidence that business is among the

most politically mobilized category of interests in the interest group universe (Schlozman and Tierney 1986), among interests that lobby Congress (Baumgartner et al. 2001), as participants in bureaucratic rule-making (Golden 1998), and among interests who file amicus briefs to the Supreme Court (Caldeira and Wright 1990). Given the abundance of evidence that business interests are effective at mobilizing for political action in varied contexts, it is possible that within the district, business interests may gain more legislative advocacy simply because they are more likely to muster more political action than other interests. To control for the possibility that business wins greater legislative representation compared to other local interests because they are more likely to participate in the political process, I include a number of variables in the below models that control for this alternative explanation.

Methodology

The dependent variable and constituency data analyzed here are identical to those used in the previous chapter (see chapter 4 for complete explanation). The dependent variable is the percentile of committee representation of constituencies. A percentile of (over or under) representation when compared to the full membership of the House was calculated for each constituency for three committees- Financial Services, Energy and Commerce, and Natural Resources. Recall that if a constituency is near the 50th percentile of committee representation, then they receive committee representation that is identical to what we should expect from a committee randomly selected from the full membership of the House. Percentiles above the 50th percentile indicate overrepresentation on the committee when compared to the entire House membership and

percentiles below the 50th percentile indicate underrepresentation when compared to the entire House membership.

Independent Variables Explained

While the dependent variable, the observations, and the committees studied are the same as the previous chapter, I include a number of new independent variables to parse out and test the varied theories of business advantage described above. To illuminate which theory of business advantage each set of variables is testing, I first list the hypothesis associated with each theory and then I describe all independent variables testing each theory.

Structural dependence theory with emphasis on national economy hypothesis:

H1: *Organized interests with more influence over the national economy will receive better representation on House committees than interests with less influence over the national economy.*

The trend in the empirical work is to use national economic indicators such as economic investment, job loss, or firm closings to test for business advantage in the policymaking process. In accordance with this literature, I include three variables testing structural dependence theory in each model. *Business Investment* measures the total amount of investment an economic sector made in 2008.²⁰ Business investment was collected from the 2008 *Annual Capital Expenditures Survey* gathered by the U.S. Census Bureau. *Employment Change* measures the change in national employment from 2008 to

²⁰ Descriptive data for all explanatory and control variables are listed in appendix B-2 with all other online supplementary documents.

2009 for each business constituency analyzed.²¹ It is measured as the total number of jobs gained or lost from 2008 to 2009. *Firm Change* measures the net number of business establishments opened and closed nationally for each business constituency studied (it is a negative number if more establishments were closed than open, for example). Data for *Employment Change* and *Firm Change* was collected using the *Statistics on U.S. Business* annual economic census survey²². If the theory of structural dependence is correct, then first, as jobs are lost and as the number of business establishments close for particular economic sectors, these sectors should receive greater amounts of representation on House committees. Second, interests that exhibit higher levels of business investment should be better represented on House committees.

Exchange theory hypothesis:

H2: *As the amount of PAC money that a particular type of organization contributes (to candidates and/or to candidates in the majority party respectively) increases, the amount of committee representation that these interests receive will also increase.*

Two variables were included in each model to test for the assertion that interests that give more money in political campaigns are better represented on House committees. The first variable testing this hypothesis is *PAC Contributions*. *PAC Contributions* measures the average of the total of all PAC contributions during the 110th session of Congress for all organizations linked to a particular constituency in the sample.²³ If the exchange theory hypothesis is true, as average PAC contributions by a particular type of

²¹ Nonbusiness interests were set to the average value of *Employment Change* for all observations per committee model.

²² The most granular level of data available was used for *Business Investment*, *Employment Change*, and *Firm Change*. Data for *Employment Change* and *Firm Change* was available at the four digit NAICS code level. And data for *Business Investment* was available at the three-digit NAICS code level.

²³ For more information on how organizations were coded per constituency studied prior to calculating this or other variables see chapter 3.

organized interest increase, these interests ought to receive greater representation on House committees.

It may also be the case, however, that interests are more likely to receive policy benefits if they contribute money to the majority party. Recent work by Gimpel, Lee, and Parrott (2014) finds that organized interests demonstrate variation in their approach to party giving. I therefore include a variable, *PAC Contributions to Majority Party* to add a further empirical test of the exchange theory hypothesis. This variable measures the average total PAC contributions for all organizations linked to a particular constituency in the sample to the majority party only. As PAC contributions to the majority party increase, exchange theory predicts that committee representation should also increase.

Constituency motivated ally generation hypothesis:

H3: *Organized interests that have more influence over local jobs, economic investment, and growth will receive better representation on House committees than interests with less influence over the local economy.*

Within the district, business constituencies are more likely to receive legislative advocacy than nonbusiness constituencies because of their control over local jobs, economic investment, and economic growth in the district. Across all districts this advantage in constituency representation should result in evidence of systematically greater representation of business interests on congressional committees, as compared to the amount of representation received by nonbusiness constituencies. Table 5.1 presents the bivariate results for this variable. The preliminary results show that business constituencies garner consistently higher levels of representation across all committees studied.²⁴ Put differently, business interests are more likely than nonbusiness interests to

²⁴ For the main analysis presented throughout this chapter I used an expansive definition to define business interests. All interests that could be categorized as having control over local jobs and economic investment

have a stronger presence in the districts of committee members than they have in House districts at large. As shown below, most nonbusiness interests, in fact, have a smaller presence in the districts of key committee members than they have in House districts generally.

Table 5.1: Average Committee Representation for Business and Nonbusiness Interests

Committee	Nonbusiness	Business
<i>Financial Services</i>	47	68
<i>Energy & Commerce</i>	42	54
<i>Natural Resources</i>	46	53
<i>All Committees</i>	45	57

Note: Dependent Variable: House median is at the 50th percentile. Values above 50 indicate overrepresentation and values below indicate underrepresentation

Control Variables Explained

Business interests in the district may receive heightened legislative advocacy because they have leverage over the local economy, but political mobilization could also explain findings that support business influence. Business interests demonstrate more political mobilization than nonbusiness interests in a variety of contexts. Legislators are likely to work harder for their most politically active constituents. This elevated advocacy could translate into greater levels of committee representation for business when compared to nonbusiness interests. To control for this alternative explanation, I

in the districts were labeled as business interests. This definition is admittedly very broad. To ensure that the results presented here were accurate I reran models using varied definitions for business interests and the results remained consistent despite alternative ways of operationalizing this variable. For example, some authors prefer to exclude healthcare sectors from business categories (Holyoke 2014). When I exclude all healthcare related economic sectors from models the results for this variable become slightly stronger.

include several variables that gauge political mobilization.²⁵ *Lobbying \$* measures the average amount all interests linked to a particular constituency spent on lobbying during the 111th Congress. *Lobbying Reports* is the average number of lobbying reports the constituency interest filed for all bills under the issue area during the 111th Congress. Finally, *Bills Lobbied* is the average number of bills in the issue area that the constituency interest lobbied during the 111th Congress. For each indicator of political mobilization, the alternative hypothesis that constituencies that are more active politically receive greater amounts of committee representation is supported if the variable demonstrates positive and statistically significant results.

The next two control variables gauge the total national size of the constituency. If constituency motivated ally generation matters, then we should see evidence that local constituencies drive committee representation. To ensure that national constituencies do not act as a confounding variable that impacts committee representation I also include two variables that control for national group size. *Total Receipts* measures the amount of money each group received in 2008. It includes the total sales, shipments, receipts, and revenue for each group studied. *Total Receipts* is an aggregate variable that is gathered by NAICS industry code from the 2007 economic census. For constituencies that were not generated from NAICS data I generated Total Receipts using data from nonprofit 990 tax forms for 2008 from guidestar.com. Total receipts were gathered from 990 forms for all organizations that filed at least one lobbying report per issue area studied. Then the total receipts were aggregated by constituency.

²⁵ Each variable was collected using data provided by the Center for Responsive Politics available at opencrets.org.

The variable *Total Membership* is the total number of members a group has nationally. For constituencies that are economic sectors, this variable is the total national employment for the group. For groups that are not economic sectors, this variable is the total number of individuals that fall into the group type. I use the term membership broadly to indicate the number of citizens that are affiliated with the group.

I also include versions of all geographic variables from the previous chapter that are likely to influence committee representation.²⁶ *Local Presence* is a count of the number of districts where the interest has a local presence. As previously discussed, legislators are the natural allies of their constituents. Groups who are a part of a representative's constituency are more likely to receive advocacy from the legislator than groups with no local presence. As a group becomes present in more districts they have a greater pool of potential legislative allies. I therefore expect to find evidence that parallels findings in the previous chapter that groups that have a local presence in more districts will gain greater committee representation than groups with a local presence in fewer districts. *Geographic Dispersion* measures the extent to which a constituency is clustered in a particular part of the country or dispersed across districts that are more distant from one another.

Lastly, *Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda* measures the committee's importance to the total policy agenda of a particular interest when compared to the 20

²⁶ I include all geographic explanatory variables that were consistently statistically significant predictors across the majority of models. A count of the districts where groups maintain a local presence is substituted for dichotomous variables that measure high or low local presence because the goal of the previous chapter's goal was to parse out how high and low district presence AND different types of concentration influence committee representation. This is not the goal in this chapter. For more details on how geographic variables were calculated see the previous chapter.

standing committees of the House.²⁷ As described in the previous chapter, constituencies inform their allies that a particular committee is the most important to their policy agenda. When legislative allies receive a clear message about which committee would best serve the needs of their constituents they become more incentivized to join the committee. Positive and statistically significant results for *Local Presence, Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda*, and *Business* offer evidence that business is advantaged via the theory of constituency motivated ally generation and mobilization.

Model Results

Table 5.2: In a Comparison of Constituencies Tied to Particular Interests, What Factors Predict Variation in Committee Representation?

	<i>Models by Committee:</i>			
	All Committees	Financial Services	Energy and Commerce	Natural Resources
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Business	18.851*** (6.178)	38.078*** (11.637)	24.601** (9.109)	-0.080 (9.905)
Change in Employment	-9.226 (6.076)	-8.539 (10.196)	-9.750 (6.846)	-9.619 (22.870)
Business Investment	1.659 (3.174)	11.995** (5.953)	-1.562 (4.971)	-1.624 (4.926)
Change in Firms	-0.764 (1.748)	6.596** (3.042)	-0.890 (2.747)	-4.173 (3.709)
PAC Contributions	-0.653 (0.543)	-1.554* (0.873)	-1.205 (0.730)	1.694 (1.222)
PAC Contributions to Maj. Party	1.152 (0.728)	1.062 (1.207)	2.337** (1.064)	-1.620 (1.465)
Avg. Lobbying Spending	0.031 (0.029)	0.040 (0.042)	0.010 (0.053)	0.047 (0.055)
Avg. Lobbying Reports	0.169	0.717	0.271	0.154

²⁷ For more details about how this variable was calculated see chapter that focuses on interest group policy agendas.

	(0.195)	(0.438)	(0.282)	(0.322)
Avg. Number of Bills Lobbied	-0.024 (0.029)	-0.046 (0.049)	-0.021 (0.043)	-0.036 (0.059)
Local Presence	.029** (3.025)	.067** (6.298)	.041* (5.125)	-.031 (5.069)
Geographic Dispersion	0.352 (0.531)	2.002* (1.023)	-3.893*** (0.880)	2.322*** (0.811)
Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda	0.041* (0.254)	0.943* (0.470)	0.916** (0.663)	0.813* (0.531)
Total Receipts	0.004 (0.043)	-0.081 (0.173)	-0.023 (0.042)	0.172 (0.221)
Total Membership	0.025 (0.027)	0.022 (0.055)	0.089** (0.035)	-0.066 (0.051)
Constant	22.985** (11.298)	-40.968* (21.391)	70.519*** (20.301)	5.499 (18.888)
Observations	532	143	186	203
R ²	0.075	0.337	0.201	0.129
Adjusted R ²	0.048	0.258	0.130	0.059

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


Note 2: One sided significance tests used for *Business*, *Local Presence*, and *Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda*.

Results Testing Systematic Business Advantage and Structural Dependence Theory

Structural dependence theory argues that business has a built-in advantage over nonbusiness interests because business largely controls economic growth, investment, and employment. The methodological trend of the empirical work testing structural dependence theory has been to examine whether economic sectors with greater leverage over the national economy receive more policy benefits. Previous work has found mixed evidence that economic sectors with greater leverage over the national economy receive more policy benefits. After retesting three commonly studied national economic factors on committee representation, I find little evidence supporting the structural dependence

hypothesis. Results were consistent for models testing all committees and all groups, for the Financial Services committee model, for the Energy and Commerce committee model, and for the Natural Resources committee model.

Figure 5.1 presents the results for the first national economic indicator studied, employment change. I find no substantively meaningful or statistically significant



evidence that the economic sectors which lost greater amounts of jobs from 2008 to 2009 received better representation on House committees.²⁸ The predicted percentile for economic sectors in the Financial Services model was 67 when employment change was set to the mean value of the dataset, and 64 when set to one standard deviation above the mean.²⁹ These point estimates were neither substantively meaningful nor statistically different from one another at the 95 percent confidence level.

The predicted percentile for economic sectors in the Energy and Commerce model was 53 when employment change was set to the mean value of the dataset and 50 when set to one standard deviation above the mean. Again, these point estimates were not statistically different from one another at the 95 percent confidence level. Finally, the predicted percentile for economic sectors in the Natural Resources model was 53 when employment change was set to the mean value of the dataset, and 52 when set to one standard deviation above the mean. These point estimates, following the pattern established by the previous models, were neither substantively meaningful nor statistically different from one another at the 95 percent confidence level.


Figure 5.2 lists the predicted percentiles and confidence intervals for each model testing the effects of the rate of national firm closings for each economic sector on committee representation.³⁰ The results for this variable again did not support the structural dependence hypothesis. Moving from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean of the rate of firm closings resulted in an increase of about five

²⁸ Figure 5.1 shows the number of jobs lost in the hundreds of thousands where “-1” indicates that one hundred thousand jobs were lost from 2008 to 2009.

²⁹ For all calculations of the predicted percentile for particular variables in this chapter, all other variables were set to their mean values.

³⁰ Figure 5.2 shows firm closings in the thousands where “-4” indicates that four thousand firms were closed from 2008 to 2009.

percentage points for the Financial Services committee model, and a decrease of one and four percentage



points, respectively, for the and Energy and Commerce and Natural Resources committee models. These differences in point estimates were neither substantively meaningful nor statistically different from one another.

Figure 5.3: Are Economic Sectors That Invest more in the National Economy Better Represented on House Committees?




Figure 5.3 lists the predicted percentiles and confidence intervals testing the effects of the final variable used to evaluate the structural dependence hypothesis, national economic investment.³¹ The results are consistent with previous findings: there are no statistically significant differences between the predicted percentile of committee representation when industry investment is set to its mean value and when it is set to the mean plus one standard deviation. Moving from the mean value of industry economic

³¹ Figure 5.3 shows the amount of money invested in the hundreds of billions where “1” indicates that one hundred billion was invested in 2008.

investment to its value at one standard deviation above the mean increased the predicted percentile in the Financial Services committee by four percentage points. In contrast, it slightly decreased the predicted percentile by less than one percentage point for the Energy and Commerce and the Natural Resources committees. Consistent with all other tests of the structural dependence hypothesis, none of the above differences in effects were substantively meaningful or statistically different from one another.


Results Testing Systematic Business Advantage and Exchange Theory

Exchange theory argues that there is a quid pro quo exchange of campaign contributions from organized interests for legislative advocacy in Congress. Because business interests are among the most well financed type of organized interests, exchange theory implies that they should win systematically greater legislative advocacy than other types of interests. After testing whether PAC contributions and/or PAC contributions to the majority party predict an increase in committee representation for organized interests, I find little evidence in support of exchange theory.

Figure 5.4 presents the results testing whether PAC contributions affect the level of committee representation that a type of organization interest receives.³² When moving from the minimum to the maximum value of PAC contributions, the results ranged from a decrease of 7 percentage points for the Financial Services committee and 5 percentage points for the Energy and Commerce committee to a 6 percentage point increase for the Natural Resources committee. None of the differences in predicted percentiles were, however, statistically different from one another. Further, the results for all groups and

³² PAC Contributions were divided by 100,000. In figure 5.4 the number “5” actually represents \$500,000.


Figure 5.4: Do Organized Interests that Contribute Comparatively larger Amounts of PAC Money Receive Better Representation on House Committees?



all committees, the Financial Services committee, and the Energy and Commerce committee were actually in the opposite direction of the exchange theory hypothesis.

When organized interests give to the majority party there is some weak, but suggestive evidence that they receive heightened levels of committee representation. The direction of the estimated percentiles supported the exchange theory hypothesis for all groups and all committees, for the Financial Services committee and for the Energy and

Figure 5.5: Do Organized Interests that Contribute Comparatively larger Amounts of PAC Money to the Majority Party Receive Better Representation on House Committees?



Commerce committee. Moving from the minimum value to the maximum value of PAC contributions to the majority party increased the percentile of representation for organized interests by 4 percentage points for the Financial Services committee, 9 percentage points for the Energy and Commerce committee, and decreased the percentile of representation by 4 percentage points for the Natural Resources committee. The effect of majority party contributions was also statistically significant in the Energy and Commerce model. The results for two of the three committees studied therefore offer weak, but suggestive data that when organized interests give to the majority party they receive better representation.³³ Alternatively, the causal arrow may run in the opposite direction. These findings might also indicate that interests contribute more when they have better committee representation. More research would be necessary to parse out the direction of any relationship along these lines.

Results Testing Systematic Business Advantage via Constituency Motivated Ally Generation


All else equal, I find a substantial amount of evidence that business constituencies receive greater amounts of representation on House committees than nonbusiness constituencies. Local business interests have control over jobs and economic investment in ways that nonbusiness interests do not. The evidence for three of four models indicates that interests with leverage over the local economy receive systematically better representation on House committees. The results were consistent for nearly every model

³³ The sample of Natural Resources interests, however, contains many economic sectors that align themselves with Republican Party (see Gimpel, Lee, and Parrott 2014). The negative effect for this committee may therefore indicate some weak evidence for a hypothesis that these interests were awarded fewer committee seats as a result of being allied with the minority party.

studied, and they offer considerable support for constituency motivated ally generation as a source of advantage for business interests in Congress.

The first model presented in the multivariate results in Table 5.2 includes all groups in the dataset irrespective of the committee studied. Across all groups and all committees the predicted percentile of committee representation for business constituencies is 18 percentage points higher than nonbusiness constituencies. The predicted percentile of committee representation for business constituencies is 58 compared to 40 for nonbusiness constituencies. For all constituencies, irrespective of the committee under examination business interests were mildly overrepresented on the committee compared to their presence in House districts generally, on average, while

Figure 5.6a:




nonbusiness interests were slightly underrepresented on committees relative to their presence in House districts at large.³⁴ However, the advantage that business interests have over nonbusiness interests also varies considerably by committee.

³⁴ Note that the confidence intervals are larger for nonbusiness constituencies for all predicted percentiles because they have a much smaller N than business constituencies in the dataset for each model studied. As discussed in chapter three, there were simply much fewer nonbusiness interests and corresponding constituencies that filed lobbying reports within each policy subsystem studied.

The second model examines variation in Financial Services committee representation for the 143 constituencies that lobbied under the issue area: “U.S. Banking System and Financial Institution Regulation.” The predicted percentile of representation generated from this model was 38 percentage points higher for business constituencies than for nonbusiness constituencies. For business constituencies the predicted percentile of committee representation was 79 compared to 41 for nonbusiness constituencies. Business interests were therefore overrepresented on the committee while nonbusiness interests were underrepresented compared to what we should expect from a committee randomly selected from the full membership of the House. Examples of business interests with strong representation on this committee include commercial banks, investment banks, savings institutions, and real estate creditors. Nonbusiness interests that received substantially lower levels of committee representation included consumers with foreclosed homes, the elderly, the young Latinos, universities, and people in poverty.


Figure 5.6b:



The difference in representation for business constituencies and nonbusiness constituencies was larger on the Financial Services committee than on the Energy and

Commerce committee or the Natural Resources committee. What explains the strength of business representation on this committee? The major reason for this disparity is that the Financial Services committee has a narrow jurisdictional focus. It does not have jurisdiction over many diverse issue areas in the same way as the Energy and Commerce committee does. When the jurisdiction of the committee is narrow, the types of groups seeking seats on the committee are less diverse and competition among group advocates for limited seats on the committee is less intense. This explanation is consistent with previous work such as Hall and Grofman (1990) and the logic presented in Shepsle’s study of committee representation, *The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle* (1978). Because competition for seats is less fierce on committees with narrow jurisdictions, legislators allied with groups concerned about policies that come before those committees are likely to have an easier pathway toward obtaining committee membership, thereby leading to greater amounts of committee representation for these interests.

Figure 5.6c:



The third model examines variation in Energy and Commerce committee representation for the 186 constituencies that lobbied under the issue area:

“comprehensive health care reform.” The predicted percentile of representation was 25

percentage points higher for business constituencies in the Energy and Commerce committee model than for nonbusiness constituencies. The predicted percentile of committee representation for business constituencies was 66 compared to 41 for nonbusiness constituencies. Business interests were therefore slightly overrepresented on the committee while nonbusiness interests were, on average, quite strongly underrepresented compared to what we should expect from a committee randomly selected from the full membership of the House. Examples of business interests that were overrepresented on this committee included many economic sectors that were central in the debate on healthcare reform such as direct health and medical insurance carriers, medical equipment and supplies wholesalers, and pharmacies. A number of business interests related to other major issue areas under the committee's jurisdiction also received strong representation such as aircraft manufacturers, auto parts manufacturers, department stores, gas stations and wireless service carriers. Examples of nonbusiness interests receiving less representation included the elderly, people in poverty, and labor unions. The uninsured received elevated representation on the committee compared its representation in the full membership of the House. However, they received substantially less representation than business interests like health insurance providers. The uninsured were in the 81st percentile of committee representation while medical insurance providers received representation at the 89th percentile.


These findings support a localized version of Lindblom's hypothesis that because business interests have leverage over local jobs and economic investment they maintain a "privileged position" in the policy-making process. Like the Financial Services

committee, there are other factors unique to the Energy and Commerce committee that impact the strength of business advantage over nonbusiness interests in committee representation.

In contrast to both the Financial Services committee and the Natural Resources committee, Energy and Commerce had jurisdiction over a diverse number of policy issue areas. Bills that flow through the Financial Services committee are overwhelmingly related to policy affecting economic sectors such as banking and finance interests. Legislation that is assigned to the Natural Resources committee is heavily weighted towards policy areas that affect both environmental advocates and economic sectors involved in resource extraction and energy production. By contrast, the Energy and Commerce committee could consider a bill that affects unions and the auto industry in one hearing, a bill that sets off policy alarms for the energy industry and environmental advocates the next, yet more bills that influence the insurance industry, drug companies, hospitals and those without insurance, and on and on. Because the policy jurisdiction of the committee is so diverse, the policies handled by the committee affect a much greater diversity of groups. As more groups signal to their legislative allies to join the committee, there is greater competition for a limited number of seats on the committee. This competition makes it difficult for any one type of group to receive high levels of representation on this committee. The result is that, in contrast to the results for group representation on the Financial Services committee, representation on the Energy and Commerce committee is substantially lower for both business and nonbusiness interests.³⁵

³⁵ It's important to note that I have not examined subcommittee representation here. It could be that while the committee as a whole does not show dramatically high levels of representation in the same fashion as

Figure 5.6d:



The fourth and final model examines variation in Natural Resources committee representation for the 203 constituencies that lobbied under the issue area: “Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas).” The theory of constituency motivated ally generation argues that business constituencies receive systematically greater representation than nonbusiness constituencies within the district. On a district by district basis it is likely that representatives are advocating more for business than nonbusiness constituencies (see Hall and Wayman 1990). The results for the Natural Resources committee model, however, demonstrate that other factors can limit the impact that elevated advocacy for business interests in particular districts can have on committee representation.

The percentile of representation was statistically the same for business constituencies as for nonbusiness constituencies on the Natural Resources committee. The predicted percentile of committee representation for business constituencies is 64.3

the Financial Services committee, when subcommittee representation is analyzed, we see even stronger levels of representation for particular types of groups.

compared to 64.2 for nonbusiness constituencies, and the difference between these values is not statistically significant. It is reasonable that business representation is not statistically larger than nonbusiness representation on this committee because nonbusiness interests under this policy issue area, primarily environmental organizations, are more politically mobilized and have a policy agenda that is focused and highly relevant to this committee. In contrast, many business interests that participate in this issue area include economic sectors with policy agendas that were referred to multiple committees and that had a limited district presence. These included sectors that are primarily involved in resource extraction.

Environmental groups, the nonbusiness interest with perhaps the most to win or lose from policy outcomes under the jurisdiction of the Natural Resources committee are highly politically mobilized and they have a focused policy agenda. Environmental groups, like labor unions, are much more politically mobilized than nonbusiness interests that represent the poor or consumer groups. Furthermore, environmental groups also have agendas that are focused on the policies that flow through the Natural Resources committee rather than being spread across several committees. The legislative allies of environmental groups are likely to receive a very clear signal from these groups about which committee they should join. The result of being politically mobilized and having a focused policy agenda that aligns well with the jurisdiction of one particular committee is that environmental organizations received extremely high levels of representation on the Natural Resources committee. Environmental organizations were in the 99th percentile of representation on the Natural Resources committee compared to what we should expect from committees randomly selected from the House at large. In other words,

environmental groups have a much stronger presence in the districts of Natural Resources committee members than they have in House districts at large.

In contrast, business interests with policy needs related to energy policy are faced with the reality that no single committee has dominant jurisdiction over this policy area. Because energy policy is often referred to the Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Natural Resources committees, legislators that are allied with groups interested in this policy area will be dispersed across committees. As a result, these interests receive less representation on any one committee when compared to interests whose policy agendas are not referred to multiple committees.

The final reason why there is a difference between business interests on this committee and business interests on the other committees analyzed in this chapter is that many businesses that participate in this issue area are constituents in a limited number of congressional districts. The average number of districts where groups seeking membership on the Natural Resources committee had a local presence was more than 45 districts fewer than the average for groups seeking membership on the Financial Services or Energy and Commerce committees. Further, 20 percent of the 203 interests in the population of groups studied for the Natural Resources committee had a local presence in less than half of the 435 Congressional districts, which is nearly twice the number of interests with similar district presence in the other committees studied. For example, each of the following economic sectors involved in resource extraction had percentiles of representation on the Natural Resources committee that were at or below the 50th percentile when compared to committees randomly selected from the House at large: Iron

Ore Mining, Uranium-Radium-Vanadium Ore Mining, Bituminous Coal Underground Mining, and Gold Ore Mining.

Results Testing Political Mobilization as an Alternative Explanation for Systematic Business Advantage

Within a given district, business interests could win greater legislative advocacy over and above other interests for two reasons. First, business interests have leverage over local jobs and economic investment and other interests do not. Second, business interests are, on average, more politically mobilized than other interests in the districts. To rule out political mobilization as an alternative explanation for business influence I tested the relationship between several indicators of political activity against the magnitude of a given interest's committee representation. Following the null findings for the effect of PAC contributions on committee representation presented above (also a proxy for political mobilization), I find no evidence in any committee level model that organized interests that exhibit higher amounts of political activity enjoy elevated levels of committee representation. Moving from the mean value of political mobilization to the mean plus one standard deviation for the average number of lobbying reports filed, the average amount of money spent on lobbying, or the number of bills lobbied had no substantively meaningful or statistically significant correlation to committee representation in Congress.


Results for All Other Control Variables

Coefficients for control variables were consistent with all results discussed in the previous chapter. Variables measuring group size (membership and receipts) were, for

the most part, statistically insignificant. For all models, the total money that groups receive nationally showed no statistically significant relationships with committee representation. Furthermore, the size of national group membership was also insignificant in all models except for that testing committee representation for interests on the Energy and Commerce committee.

The coefficients for the geographic explanatory variables in the models in this chapter were consistent with the findings in the previous chapter. Lastly, the coefficients measuring how important the committee was to an interest's policy agenda were positive, substantively meaningful and statistically significant each committee related model. I will focus on the effects of that variation in interest group policy agendas have on committee representation in detail in the following chapter. Again, these preliminary results suggest that the signal that organized interests send to their legislative allies about which committees to request can systematically impact committee representation.

Figure 5.7: Are Interests that are More Politically Mobilized Better Represented on House Committees? Predicted percentiles with variables set to their mean values and one std. deviation above the mean



Conclusion: Constituency Motivated Ally Generation and Business Advantage in Congress

This chapter offers a fresh theoretical approach and new empirical evidence that a built-in advantage exists for business interests in the legislative process. After testing two prominent explanations for business advantage, structural dependence theory with a focus on the national economy and exchange theory, I find little evidence in support of either approach. The evidence presented in this chapter points to a decidedly different story of business advantage in the legislative process. Business interests are more likely than other types of interests to be advantaged in the amount of committee representation that they receive in the House of Representatives because they have leverage over local jobs and economic investment.

Table 5.3: Summary of Findings Supporting Business Advantage by Theory:

<i>Theory Tested</i>	Were the variables that tested each theory statistically significant and substantively meaningful?			
	<i>All Groups, All Constituencies</i>	<i>Financial Services</i>	<i>Energy & Commerce</i>	<i>Natural Resources</i>
Structural Dependence w/ National Economic Focus	No	No	No	No
Exchange Theory	No	No	No	No
Constituency Motivated Ally Generation	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

The results presented in this chapter therefore support Charles Lindblom’s much cited hypothesis that business has a structural advantage in the political process because of its control over jobs and economic investment. But they reveal an important part of the theoretical story that Lindblom’s work did not explain. Business advantage in Congress is grounded in the constituencies that legislators actually represent. Our empirical and theoretical focus should therefore not solely be on the leverage that

business interests have over the national economy. Instead, it should include an understanding of the importance of the jobs and economic investment that exist inside the district (or other geographically bound politically represented areas).

Chapter 6: Interest Group Policy Agendas and Interest Representation

Committee jurisdictions have been reformed over time according to Congress's convenience (Davidson 1990; Kravitz 1990; Oleszek 1977; Wolfensberger 2013). Congressional scholars largely focused on how well jurisdictions match up with the policy decisions Congress has to make. Within this literature, scholars examine why legislators join committees and how this affects committee membership (Adler 2000, 2002; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Cox and McCubbins 2007; Krehbiel 1990, 1992; Shepsle 1978; Shepsle and Weingast 1987). But we have very little knowledge about the relationship between committee jurisdictions and interest group representation. This chapter will make the case that committee jurisdictions are also highly important for the representation of particular interests in society.

The potential for a relationship between committee policy jurisdictions and group access to, and influence on, committee members is easier to see when we start to think about differences in the policy agendas of particular groups. Committees have jurisdiction over particular policy areas (Adler and Wilkerson 2008; King 1994). Likewise, groups themselves demonstrate wide variation in the types of policies that they seek to influence in Congress. Some interests are largely focused on a single issue area while others have diverse policy agendas. Legislation tied to each issue area on a group's policy agenda will fall under the jurisdiction of a unique subset of committees. Thus,

some interest groups will have policy agendas that will be under the jurisdiction of few committees while others will have policy agendas that are referred to many committees.

The central question of this chapter, then, is how does variation in interest group policy agendas influence the amount of representation that they receive on House committees? Interest groups communicate with their legislative allies about which committee(s) to join to better serve their mutual policy goals. When a group's policy agenda is largely under the jurisdiction of a single committee, their legislative allies will have a clear understanding about which committee they should request. With many allies concentrating their requests for membership toward a single committee, the group will win stronger committee representation. Groups with policy agendas that map well onto the jurisdictions of few committees will therefore have more allies on the committees important to their policy needs than other interests. The legislative allies of groups with diverse policy agendas will, conversely, receive less clear information about which committees to join. They will request multiple committees and the interest groups they seek to represent will, consequently, receive less representation on any one committee. In this manner, interests with narrow policy agendas will be better at mobilizing allied legislators toward effectively advocating for their policy needs than interests with diverse policy agendas.

Review of Relevant Literature on Policy Agendas

When scholars think about policy agendas they have only recently considered the agendas of particular groups. The trend in the literature on agenda setting has instead been to focus on the set of issue areas that are prioritized by salient federal institutions.

Scholars have studied how groups affect the broad policy agenda in a number of ways. Baumgartner and Jones (2010) and Kingdon (1984), for example, offer explanations about how policies make it onto, and disappear from, the policy agenda of government officials in Washington. These scholars study the various factors that predict when particular policies gain attention, advocacy, and success (or failure) through the legislative process in Congress.

A second line of research has examined whether the legislative agenda in Congress mirrors public opinion or the goals of lobbying organizations. Scholars have found that organizations that lobby the federal government have a substantially different agenda from the public at large (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Kimball et al. 2012). Others find that while lobbyists have a different policy agenda than the public, there is evidence that government officials still advocate for the policy needs of average citizens (Baumgartner and Jones 2004).

Still others have examined how the dynamics of group participation within policy communities can affect their success at making it onto the legislative policy agenda. Competition among groups can increase the salience of policy issue areas to government officials (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 2010; Schattsneider 1975). A lack of competition among groups within an issue area sometimes relates to a lack of political attention (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 2010) and at other times it may signify control over the policy area by a limited number of groups (Baumgartner and Jones 2010; Lowi 1964, 1972). There has also been a large body of work that suggests that differences in the political mobilization of particular groups will affect which issues make it onto the legislative agenda. The population of interests active

in Washington is weighted towards business and occupational groups (Baumgartner and Leech 1998a, 2003; Heinz et al. 1993; Schattsneider 1975; Schlozman 1984; Schlozman et al. 2008). Recent work by Gilens and Page (2014) also suggests that biases in representation may translate into biases in the issues that are prioritized on the legislative policy agenda.

With the dominant focus on how policies make it onto the broad legislative agenda, other research questions have been given less attention. Rather than examining the role of interest groups to the broad policy agenda, we might instead attempt to study factors related to the policy agendas of particular interest groups. Scholars have just started to think about the importance of variation in the policy agendas of organized interests. As recently as 2015 Darrin Halpin's chapter in *Interest Group Politics* was entitled, "Interest Group Policy Agendas. What Are They and How Might We Study Them?" The very title of Halpin's piece underscores the lack of research in this area. We are just beginning to ask what they are and to think about where to begin with empirical research. The central contribution of this chapter will therefore be to begin to build a literature that contributes to our knowledge of interest group policy agendas.

This chapter will systematically study how variation in interest group policy agendas affects interests' committee representation. In the following sections I will argue that the subset of policy issue areas that define a group's policy goals have a substantial impact on the level of representation that the group receives on any particular committee. A number of studies have emphasized the importance of policy issue areas to the magnitude of group influence in Congress. Groups are often thought to have a better chance at winning policy outcomes when they pursue narrow or distributive policy, for

example, as opposed to redistributive or regulatory policy (Lowi 1964, 1972; Thorpe 2014; Wilson 1973). Policy issue areas are also relevant to committee representation because they determine which committee (or committees) will have jurisdiction over groups' policy goals.

Groups that have diverse policy agendas are likely to find that their policy agendas are spread across multiple committees. As such, the group's legislative allies may be spread thinly across several committees and the group will have weaker representation on any particular committees of interest. Factors related to a group's policy agenda such as (1) the number of major policy issue areas that they pursue, (2) the proportion of their total agenda that is under a single committee, and (3) the extent to which their agenda is split across multiple committees can affect the strength of representation that they receive on the committees with jurisdiction over their policy concerns in the House.

Theoretical Expectations

Some interest groups have agendas concentrated before one particular congressional committee. Others have agendas that fall under the jurisdictions of many committees. As such, interest group policy agendas differ in ways that systematically affect the amount of committee representation that groups are likely to obtain. Legislative allies of interest groups with agendas concentrated before one congressional committee are likely to have a clear understanding of which committee(s) they should request. The interests in their district will send a clear message about the committee of primary importance to their policy needs and allied representatives will have little doubt

about which committee to join in order to advocate for their mutual policy goals. But the legislative allies of interest groups with agendas that do not map well onto existing committee jurisdictions will not receive clear information about the right committee assignments to request.

The clarity of information that legislators receive from their allied interests about which committee they should join is therefore likely to affect the extent to which particular groups are over or underrepresented on key committees. The likelihood that the interest will win greater amounts of representation on the committee increases when it is clear which committee its legislative allies should request, all else being equal. Mixed information about which committee an interest's allies should request will have the opposite effect. The interest's legislative allies will be unsure about which committee to join, individual legislators will request varied committees, and, as a result, the interest will receive less representation on any one committee.

Variation in Interest Group Policy Agendas that Affect Which Committee(s) Allied Legislators Request

Variation in interest group policy agendas can systematically influence the clarity of the information that allied legislators receive to join particular committee(s) in a number of ways. First, for a given committee in the House, when the committee has greater amounts of jurisdiction over an interest's total policy agenda, we should expect the interest to give a clear message to their allied legislators to request the committee. After receiving this message, their allies should increase their requests for this committee. With more allies requesting membership on this committee, the interest is likely to win better representation on the committee.

Relatedly, the diversity of an interest's policy agenda can also influence the clarity of information their allied legislators receive about which committee to request . Some interests have policy agendas that are diverse and others have agendas that are focused. That is, some interests have policy needs that span multiple major policy areas while others have agendas that are targeted to one or two major issue areas. When interests have diverse policy agendas, the corresponding legislation in Congress is more likely to be consistently referred to multiple committees. As a result, these interests are more likely to send unclear messages to their legislative allies about which committee to join, and they therefore receive less representation on particular committees.

Lastly, even though some interests have narrow policy agendas, the few policy issue areas that they pursue are still consistently referred to multiple committees. When a group's policy agenda is referred consistently to multiple committees, their allies receive less clear information about which committee to request, and consequently the interest receives a lower amount of representation on any given committee.

In summary, I expect the following empirical analysis to demonstrate that the clarity of the information that legislative allies receive about which committees to request, and consequently the amount of committee representation that interests win, is affected by systematic variation in (1) the importance of the committee to the policy agenda of the group, (2) the extent to which the group's policy agenda is diverse or narrow, and (3) how often the group's agenda, no matter how narrow, is referred to multiple committees.

Methodology

The dependent variable and observations analyzed in this chapter are identical to those used in the previous two analytical chapters (see chapter 4 for complete explanation). The dependent variable is the percentile of committee representation of constituencies tied to particular interests. As the percentile of committee representation increases above the 50th percentile, the dependent variable shows overrepresentation for the interest studied, meaning that the interest receives more representation on the committee than one would expect if committees were assembled randomly from the House at large. Conversely, when the dependent variable is below the 50th percentile it indicates that the interest under examination is underrepresented if committees were randomly selected from the membership of the House.

Independent Variables

Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda measures the committee's importance to the total policy agenda of a particular interest when compared to the 20 standing committees of the House.³⁶ For each interest in the dataset the committee under examination (be it the Financial Services, Energy and Commerce, or the Natural Resources committee respectively) is ranked by its proportion of jurisdiction over the total policy agenda of the group. *Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda* is labeled "1", for example, when the committee under examination is the least important to the total policy agenda of the group (i.e. - it had jurisdiction over the smallest proportion

³⁶ Descriptive data for all explanatory and control variables are listed in appendix B-2 with all other online supplementary documents.

of the group’s policy agenda compared to all other standing committees) and it is labeled “20” when it is the most important to the group’s policy agenda.

To calculate the proportion of a group’s total policy agenda that was under the jurisdiction of each committee studied I began by building a database of all organizations that were tied to a particular type of constituency. For each organization, the lobbying reports that the organization filed in the 110th Congress were gathered with corresponding information for the related bill number in the House and the committee of referral. If there were multiple committees of referral they each received a single row in the database.

Committee	Interest	Cmte. Rank on Policy Agenda
<i>Financial Services</i>	Commercial Banks	20
	Drugs and Druggists' Sundries Merchant Wholesalers	13
	Gasoline Stations	4
<i>Energy & Commerce</i>	Commercial Banks	16
	Drugs and Druggists' Sundries Merchant Wholesalers	20
	Gasoline Stations	18
<i>Natural Resources</i>	Commercial Banks	9
	Drugs and Druggists' Sundries Merchant Wholesalers	10
	Gasoline Stations	20

Note: "1" indicates that the committee was ranked the lowest and "20" indicates that they were ranked the highest on the interest's policy agenda among the 20 standing committees.

The total proportion of lobby reports, bill numbers, and committee of referral observations were then tabulated by committee for each constituency. Finally, for each constituency, the committee under examination (be it the Financial Services, Energy and Commerce, or the Natural Resources committee respectively) was ranked in relation to all other standing committees of the House by its proportion of jurisdiction over the constituency's total policy agenda. For example, the commercial banking industry was active in each issue area studied. The highest proportion committee referrals for each lobbying report that organizations tied to this industry filed went to the Financial Services committee. For the Financial Services model, the data point for commercial banking interests was therefore coded as "20". The Energy and Commerce committee had the fifth largest proportion of referrals per lobbying report. In the dataset for the Energy and Commerce model the data point for commercial banking interests was coded as "16". The variable therefore serves as a measure of the relative importance of the committee to a particular constituency.

As a committee's jurisdiction over an interest's total policy agenda increases, the clarity of the information that an interest's legislative allies receive to join the committee likely increases. These legislators are thus more likely to request membership on the committee. In consequence, the interest is likely to receive better representation on the committee. The hypothesis that follows is:

H1: *As the importance of a committee to a constituency's total policy agenda increases, the amount of representation that the constituency receives on the committee also increases.*

The second independent variable in the model, ***Diverse Policy Agenda***, is a count of the total number of major policy issue areas that are important to an interest's policy

agenda. Issues are considered to be important to an interest's total policy agenda when they constitute at least 15 percent of the total policy agenda of all organizations tied to a particular type of constituency.

Table 6.2: How Many Major Policy Areas are Important to the Policy Agendas of Selected Interests...	
<i>Interest</i>	<i>Count of Major Policy Areas on Interest's Agenda</i>
Consumer Lending	5
Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation	4
Investment Banking and Securities Dealing	2
Cigarette Manufacturing	1
Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing	1

Note: Only major policy issue areas that constituted 15 percent or more of an interest's total policy agenda were included in the count. The maximum count of major policy issue areas for an interest was 5 and the minimum was 1.

For each constituency, I again started by building a database with information for all organizations tied to a particular constituency. The proportion of an interest's total policy agenda per major policy issue area was calculated by tabulating information for each lobbying report that the organization filed on a particular bill in the 110th Congress, the related bill number in the House, and the major policy issue area of the bill by constituency and major policy issue area.³⁷ The final variable was a count of the number of issue areas that comprised at least 15 percent of a group's total agenda.

³⁷ The Congressional Bills Project labels each bill by a major policy issue area. I included the top 21 major policy issue areas in the dataset. More information on major issue categories via the Policy Agendas project codebook at the following website: <http://www.policyagendas.org/page/topic-codebook>.

As an interest's policy agenda becomes more diverse across multiple policy issue areas, related legislation in the House flows through a larger number of committees and the information that the interest's legislative allies receive about which committee to join becomes less clear. Conversely, legislative allies of interests that focus on a limited number of major issue areas will receive a comparatively clearer message about which committee to request because the interest's policy agenda will be under the jurisdiction of fewer committees. My expectation is therefore that:

H2: *Interests with policy agendas that span multiple policy issue areas will receive less committee representation on any given committee important to their policy goals.*

Some policy issue areas, however, are consistently referred to multiple committees such that even if a group has a policy agenda that is focused on few major issues it may face another barrier to increased committee representation. It may be that the few issues that the group is focused on are consistently referred to multiple committees. To examine the potential effects of split referrals I included the independent variable *Policy Agenda Split Across Committees*. *Policy Agenda Split Across Committees* is a count of each standing committee that has jurisdiction over at least 15 percent of the total policy agenda of all organizations tied to a particular type of constituency. To calculate this variable for each interest in a dataset for a committee related model, I used the same tabulation of the total proportion of an interest's policy agenda per committee that I created for the variable, *Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda*. For each interest constituency in the dataset, I counted the total number of standing committees with at least 15 percent of the interest's total policy agenda.

Table 6.3 lists examples of data points for this variable. Notice that large proportions of the policy agendas of limited service restaurants (e.g.- restaurants like McDonald’s, Taco Bell, Kentucky Fried Chicken, etc.) are split across four different committees. The same is true of the agendas of department stores like Macy’s or Dillard’s. However, a large proportion of the policy agendas of economic sectors like direct health and medical insurers or credit card issuers fall under the jurisdiction of a single committee.

Table 6.3: How Many Committees Have Jurisdiction over a large portion of an Interests Policy Agenda? Data for Selected Interests...

<i>Interest</i>	<i># of Cmtes w/ Jurisdiction Over Group’s Agenda</i>
Limited-Service Restaurants	4
Department Stores	4
Automobile and Other Motor Vehicle Merchant Wholesalers	3
Direct Health and Medical Insurance Carriers	1
Credit Card Issuing	1

Note: Count limited to committees with jurisdiction over at least 15 percent of an interest’s policy agenda only. The maximum count for all interests was 5 and the minimum was 1.

Factors related to committee context make predictions of the direction of the effect for this variable more difficult. The major issue area “Energy”, for example, is referred most often to the same three committees. The proportion of referrals to each committee is similar. In this case, the legislative allies of interests seeking advocacy on energy policy can make requests to a limited subset of committees. For issues areas like energy policy, it is difficult to measure whether interests will receive slightly more or less committee representation as a result of focusing on an issue area that is consistently split

across a handful of committees. It is therefore easier to test this variable using a committee that is clearly the committee of primary jurisdiction over the issue area studied and that does not have salient jurisdiction over issue areas that are referred to multiple committees (e.g.-the Financial Services committee). The results from this committee are less likely to be muddied by policies that are consistently referred to a small number of committees.

I therefore expect to find positive substantively meaningful results for interests seeking representation on the Financial Services committee, a committee with dominant jurisdiction over the policy issue area studied. But I expect to find mixed results for committees that often share jurisdiction with a small subset of other committees on major policy issues (i.e.- the Energy and Commerce and Natural Resources committees). For the Financial Services committee model I expect to find that:

H3: *When a large proportion of an interest's policy agenda is referred to multiple committees, the interest will receive systematically less committee representation on any given committee important to its agenda.*

Control Variables

The control variables included in this model are consistent with those inserted into models testing committee representation throughout the dissertation. For more information regarding the measurement of each variable see the more detailed variable explanations in chapters 4 and 5. The models in this chapter control for variables related to constituency representation with consistent effects on committee membership in previous chapters. Positive and statistically significant results for these variables support a theory of constituency motivated ally generation. These variables include:

1. **Business**- Whether an interest tied to a particular constituency was classified as business or nonbusiness
2. **Local Presence**- The count of the total number of districts where a group had a constituency presence
3. **Geographic Concentration**- One standard deviation of distance from the center point of the spatial distribution of the constituency across districts

I also include two variables that, as in other chapters, control for the total national size of the group. These include a measurement for the total monetary receipts of the group (labeled **Total Receipts**) and the total national membership of the group (labeled **Total Membership**).

Model Results

Table 6.4: In a Comparison of Constituencies Tied to Particular Interests, Does Variation in Interest Group Policy Agendas Affect Committee Representation?

	<i>Results by Committee Model:</i>			
	All Committees (1)	Financial Services (2)	Energy and Commerce (3)	Natural Resources (4)
Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda	0.031 (0.246)	0.944** (0.445)	0.937* (0.652)	0.820* (0.554)
Diverse Policy Agenda	-3.965*** (1.611)	-6.031** (3.199)	-4.544** (2.700)	-1.485 (2.400)
Policy Agenda Split Across Committees	-1.119 (1.582)	-6.479** (3.043)	0.959 (2.283)	-0.371 (2.876)
Business	22.024*** (6.157)	33.084*** (12.025)	29.960*** (9.284)	5.070 (9.775)
Local Presence	0.031*** (0.012)	0.058** (0.025)	0.046*** (0.019)	-0.020 (0.020)
Geographic Dispersion	0.603 (0.536)	2.409** (1.083)	-3.130*** (0.858)	2.509*** (0.812)
Total Receipts	0.011	-0.011	-0.014	0.240

	(0.042)	(0.172)	(0.040)	(0.204)
Total Membership	0.035 (0.027)	0.051 (0.058)	0.100*** (0.036)	-0.065 (0.048)
Constant	24.351** (10.582)	-12.590 (20.178)	45.589** (19.897)	9.426 (17.890)
Observations	532	143	186	203
R ²	0.053	0.221	0.141	0.081
Adjusted R ²	0.038	0.174	0.102	0.043

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note 2: One tailed significance tests used for *Committee Ranking for Group's Agenda, Policy Agenda, Diverse Policy Agenda, Split Across Committees, Business, and Local Presence*.

Do Interests Receive Better Representation on Committees that Have Greater Jurisdiction Over Their Policy Agendas?

When a committee has jurisdiction over a larger proportion of the bills on an interest's agenda, the interest's allies should receive clearer information about which committee to request, and with more allies requesting a particular committee the interest should receive better representation. Figure 6.1 presents predicted percentiles from the model when the committee has jurisdiction over the lowest proportion of an interest's policy agenda (e.g.-the lowest ranked committee labeled "1") to the committee with jurisdiction over the highest proportion (e.g.-the highest ranked committee labeled "20"). The results for each committee studied indicate that interest representation increases for a group as the importance of the committee to the group's total policy agenda increases.


The direction of the coefficients was consistently positive and statistically significant for each committee model. The magnitude of the predicted effect was also strong for all models. In a comparison of committee representation on the Financial Services Committee for a sample of interests that were active on the issue of banking reform in the 111th Congress, the predicted values indicate that moving from the committee being the least important to an interest's policy agenda to the committee being

the most important to their agenda increases committee representation by 18 percentage points.³⁸ This is the difference between an interest being in 75th percentile, which indicates fairly strong overrepresentation, or the 57th percentile which indicates slight overrepresentation.

The results for the Energy and Commerce committee followed the same trend. Moving from the predicted percentile for the committee being the least important to an interest’s policy agenda to the committee being the most important to their agenda increases committee representation on this committee by 18 percentage points. This is the difference between an interest being in 54th percentile, which indicates slight overrepresentation, or the 36th percentile, which indicates fairly strong underrepresentation compared to representation on committees randomly

selected from the House at large. The Energy and Commerce committee is a committee

Figure 6.1: Do Interests Receive Better Representation on Committees that Have Greater Jurisdiction Over Their Policy Agenda?



³⁸ Predicted values throughout this chapter were calculated with all other variables set to their average value.


of jurisdiction for a substantial portion of bills within a comparatively large number of major policy issue areas. This means that a larger number of interests are likely to be competing for seats on this committee than other standing committees in the House. Given the high level of competition that groups face for representation on this committee, these findings suggest that interests need to have an extraordinarily large proportion of their policy agenda before the committee in order to receive a level of representation that is slightly higher than their representation in the House at large.

Findings for the Natural Resources committee model were also statistically significant and in the expected direction, but the magnitude of the effect was slightly lower. Moving from the committee having the least jurisdiction over bills on an interest's policy agenda to the committee having the most jurisdiction over the interest's agenda increased an interest's level of committee representation by 16 percentage points. This is the difference between an interest being in 59th percentile, which indicates slight overrepresentation, or the 43rd percentile, which indicates a level of representation that is lower than we would expect if the committee was randomly selected from the House at large.

The magnitude of the effect of the importance of the committee to the group's policy agenda on committee representation for the Natural Resources committee is somewhat lower than the other committees studied. This is likely the result of the mixed information about which committees to join that the allies of many interests that lobbied on energy issues received. The sample of interests included groups that lobbied the minor issue area "Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas)". In the 111th Congress the Natural Resources committee was the committee of primary jurisdiction

over bills related to this issue area. However, it was not the committee with jurisdiction

Figure 6.2: When a Group’s Policy Agenda is Diverse do they Receive less Committee Representation?



over the largest proportion of bills for all energy related bills. The Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means committees had jurisdiction over a larger proportion of all energy related bills than the Natural Resources committee. As a result, allies received mixed messages about which committees to join and the results for the Natural Resources committee were weaker than other committees.

When a Group’s Policy Agenda is Diverse Do They Receive Less Committee Representation?

Some interests have diverse policy agendas and others have agendas that are focused on one or two major policy areas. As an interest’s policy agenda becomes more diverse, a larger number of committees become relevant to its policy needs. When interests have policy agendas that span multiple major policy areas, their allies receive unclear information about which committee to request, which leads to requests that are split

among several committees. My expectation is therefore that interest groups with diverse policy agendas will receive less committee representation.

Figure 6.2 presents the predicted percentiles for the count of major issue areas with at least 15 percent on a group's policy agenda from the lowest count to the highest count in the data. Similar to the previous section, the results were consistently in the expected direction for each committee model. But while the coefficients were statistically significant for the Financial Services and Energy and Commerce committees, they were not significant for the Natural Resources committee. For the Financial Services committee the predicted percentile for interests with focused policy agendas (i.e. - the weight of their policy agenda fell under only one major policy issue area) was 72. Interests with diverse policy agendas (i.e.-the weight of their policy agenda fell under five major policy areas), however, received substantially lower levels of representation. These interests had a predicted percentile of 48, which was 24 percentage points lower than interests with focused issue agendas.

For the Energy and Commerce model I find that interests with focused policy agendas have a predicted percentile of 57 while interests with diverse policy agendas have a predicted percentile 19 percentage points lower at 38. In a competitive environment for committee membership, interests with focused policy agendas are more likely to win greater representation than interests whose diverse issue agendas send mixed messages to their legislative allies about which committees to request.


Finally, the results for the Natural Resources committee in this section follow a similar pattern. However, though the coefficient is in the expected direction, there is not enough data to demonstrate statistically significant findings. When interests have focused policy agendas they have a predicted percentile of representation of 55, but when interests have diverse issue agendas the predicted percentile decreases by 6 percentage

points to 49. There appears to be support for this effect, but more data appears to be needed to reach statistical significance.

When a Group’s Policy Agenda is Split Across Multiple Committees Do they Receive Less Committee Representation?

An interest’s policy agenda may be focused on a particular issue, but if that issue is under the jurisdiction of multiple committees, then the interest’s legislative allies will still receive unclear information about which committee they should request. When an interest’s policy agenda is split across committees as a result of committee jurisdiction they should therefore receive systematically lower levels of representation. However, the evidence for this thesis can be muddled depending on the varied jurisdictions of the committees studied. Figure 6.3 presents the predicted percentiles for organized interests by the number of committees that have jurisdiction over 15 percent or more of their policy agendas.

Figure 6.3: When a Group’s Policy Agenda is Split Across Multiple Committees do they Receive less Committee Representation?



When a committee’s total jurisdiction in Congress is dominant over a major policy area that is high on an interest’s agenda, the interest’s legislative allies receive a

clear message about which committee to request. Creating a model with a sample of interests in this context offers a precise test of a hypothesis of split agendas. However, as the following analysis reveals, it is difficult to generate a clear test of a hypothesis relating to committees with jurisdiction over issues that are consistently under the jurisdiction of multiple committees. For some committees, interests with split agendas are so common in the sample as a result of consistent referral of issues high on their policy agenda to multiple committees that I actually see evidence that representation slightly increases. For other committees, jurisdiction is at times dominant for one major policy area, but it is shared with other committees for different issue areas. These differences in committee context make it more difficult to parse out precisely whether interests with policy agendas that are split across multiple committees receive systematically less committee representation.

Models for committees that had clear jurisdiction over the major issue area studied demonstrated results that were substantively meaningful, statistically significant and in the expected direction. However, models studying committees that shared jurisdiction over the major policy issue area with other committees showed no statistically significant effects.

The results for the Financial Services committee model, a committee with less group competition for membership and with clear jurisdiction over the major policy issue studied (i.e.- Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce), were in the expected direction, substantively meaningful and statistically significant. The predicted percentiles for this committee indicate that moving from an interest whose policy agenda was split across the few committees to an interest whose agenda was split across the most

committees resulted in a decrease of 25 percentage points of committee representation when compared to committees randomly selected from the House at large. The model predicts that interests with agendas that were largely under the jurisdiction of a single committee (i.e. – 15 percent or more of their policy agenda was under the jurisdiction of only one committee) received representation in the 72nd percentile. Interests with the highest levels of their agendas split across several committees, however, received representation in the 47th percentile.

The results for the Energy and Commerce committee were also shaped by the committee's unique jurisdictional context. The Energy and Commerce committee has jurisdiction over several major policy categories. A number of these policy areas (such as energy, health, and technology related policy) are referred consistently to multiple committees. Many of the interests that lobby to affect these issue areas will therefore need to request the same subset of multiple committees. The sample of interests studied, then, includes a large number of interests whose allies would consistently receive clear messages to join multiple committees. The result is that interests with policy agendas that are split across the same subsets of multiple committees often gain membership on the Energy and Commerce committee. Consequently, I find a slightly positive, but statistically insignificant effect for this committee.

The predicted percentiles from the Energy and Commerce model suggest that moving from an interest whose policy agenda was split across the fewest committees to an interest whose agenda was split across the most committees resulted in an increase of 4 percentage points of committee representation when compared to committees randomly selected from the House at large. The model predicts that interests with agendas that

were largely under the jurisdiction of a single committee (i.e. – 15 percent or more of their policy agenda was under the jurisdiction of only one committee) received representation in the 52nd percentile. Interests with the highest levels of their agendas split across several committees, however, received representation in the 56th percentile.

A similar logic is true for the Natural Resources committee, but with some subtle contextual differences. This committee has clear jurisdiction over and above other committees for one major policy area but it also shares jurisdiction with other committees over another major policy area. The committee has jurisdiction over energy policy, which is consistently under the jurisdiction of, and referred to, multiple committees. However, it is also the committee of primary jurisdiction over another major policy issue area, public lands and water management. The allies of interests seeking representation to advocate for energy policy therefore receive mixed messages about which committee to join, while the allies of interests that want representation on policy related to public lands and water receive clear message about which committee to join. The Natural Resources committee results, like the predicted effect in the model for the Energy and Commerce committee, were inconclusive as a result of differences in committee context. They were in the expected direction, but were statistically insignificant.

The Natural Resources committee model predicts that moving from an interest whose policy agenda was split across the fewest committees to an interest whose agenda was split across the most committees resulted in a decrease of two percentage points of committee representation when compared to committees randomly selected from the House at large. The model predicts that interests with agendas that were largely under the jurisdiction of a single committee (i.e. – 15 percent or more of their policy agenda

was under the jurisdiction of only one committee) received representation in the 54th percentile. Interests with the highest levels of their agendas split across several committees, however, received representation in the 52nd percentile.

Results for Control Variables

The substantive meaning and statistical significance for all control variables were consistent with the results presented in the previous chapters of this project. As the number of districts where an interest has a local presence increases, the interest gains more constituency motivated legislative allies. With a larger pool of allies requesting committees of importance to their policy needs, these interests win better representation on House committees. The results for the control variable measuring local presence were positive and statistically significant for the Financial Services and Energy and Commerce Committees. The effect was not statistically significant, however, for the Natural Resources committee.

The results for the variable testing the effect of geographic concentration on committee representation are also consistent with previous chapters. Geographic concentration predicts increases in committee representation for the Energy and Commerce committee, but results for all other models showed the opposite effect. Note that while the Natural Resources committee model did not show direct evidence in support of the hypothesis for district presence, it has a positive and statistically significant result for the variable measuring geographic dispersion of an interest's membership across districts. This finding offers evidence that the power of district presence is still at work for this committee.

The effect of being a business constituency was also substantively meaningful and consistent with those presented in previous chapters. Business interests received much stronger representation than non-business interests on the Financial Services and Energy and Commerce committees. The results for the Natural Resources committee, with a sample that includes many business interests that are located in a limited number of districts, were in the expected direction, but were not statistically significant. Business interests are therefore more likely to win better representation on House committees than nonbusiness interests.

Lastly, the size of the group, whether it was measured in terms of the group's total receipts or total membership, demonstrated no substantively meaningful effects on committee representation for the Financial Services or Natural Resources committees. But the Energy and Commerce committee, which has jurisdiction over a large number of major policy areas related to the national economy, saw positive, substantively meaningful, and statistically significant effects for the variable measuring an interest's total national membership. Moving from the predicted value when group membership was set to its minimum value to the predicted value when membership was set to its maximum value increased committee representation by 7 percentage points. Though I found no support that group size affects committee representation, interests with more members or employees that sought legislative advocacy on the Energy and Commerce committee were better able to win representation.

Conclusion

Committee jurisdictions have historically been evaluated and reformed according to Congress's convenience (Davidson 1990; Kravitz 1990; Oleszek 1977; and Wolfensberger 2013). Congressional scholars usually think about how well jurisdictions match up with the policy decisions Congress has to handle. The scholarly debate has largely been about whether committees are composed of members with policy expertise (Krehbiel 1990; 1992), whether they serve the party agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2007), or whether members self-select onto committees to serve constituency interests (Adler, 2000; 2002; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Shepsle 1978; and Shepsle and Weingast 1987). But committee jurisdictions are also very important for the representation of particular interests in society.

This chapter has offered evidence that committee jurisdictions are highly relevant to our understanding of interest group access and influence. Some interests are better able to mobilize their legislative allies toward effective legislative advocacy than others. This becomes all the more apparent when we consider how interest group policy agendas intersect with committee jurisdictions. When a group's policy agenda is largely under the jurisdiction of a single committee, its legislative allies have a clear understanding about which committee they should request. With many allies concentrating their requests for membership toward a single committee, the group wins stronger committee representation. Groups with policy agendas that map well onto the jurisdictions of few committees therefore tend to have more allies on the committees important to their policy needs than other interests.

Organized interests that gain more committee-level allies in this way will receive systematically better access to congressional decision making and are thereby likely to gain increased influence in the policymaking process. As discussed at multiple points in this dissertation, committee level allies have greater control over the shape of legislation. They also have the gatekeeping power to kill bills before they ever reach the House floor for a roll call vote. Groups that win more committee level allies will, as a result, become better positioned to affect the legislation that they care about in Congress.

The findings presented in this chapter also point toward some interesting implications about the possibility that committees will be captured by a subset of interests. Membership is limited on House committees. Yet there is wide variation in the amount of competition that groups face as their legislative allies request particular committees. When committees have jurisdiction over a single major issue area the constellation of interests and their legislative allies that compete for limited committee seats is relatively low. When committees have jurisdiction over several major policy areas, however, group competition increases substantially. The Energy and Commerce committee is therefore less well designed to be “captured” by the interests that care about its jurisdiction than the Financial Services committee. Reformers worried about this issue might prefer to design congressional committees with broad, sprawling jurisdictions, rather than being focused on a single topic.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

Legislators are the primary conduit through which groups affect policy outcomes in Congress. Organized interests rely on members of Congress to prosecute their policy agenda at each point in the legislative process. Groups cannot introduce legislation, make floor speeches, participate on committees, or make roll call votes in Congress. With this in mind, legislative allies are a prized, but understudied resource among groups. Building knowledge about the number of allies that groups generate and the differences in how groups mobilize these allies toward effective legislative action is therefore highly important to our understanding about group influence in Congress.

This project has offered a simple explanation for when some groups will have more legislative allies than others. It has argued that groups generate unequal numbers of allies because they demonstrate wide variation as constituents. Constituency presence is one of the strongest predictors of legislative activity in Congress (Evans 2004; Hall and Wayman 1992; Kingdon 1989; Miler 2010; Welch 1982). Groups vary substantially as constituents in a number of ways that have rarely been directly studied. Constituency related factors are therefore likely to be tied to the number of allies that groups generate in Congress. As constituents, groups vary in (1) the number of districts where they maintain a local presence, (2) how politically active compared to other types of constituents, and (3) the amount of leverage they have over local jobs and economic investment. Each of these factors may predict systematic differences among groups in ally generation. With more allies advocating for their policy agendas in Congress, these

interests stand a better chance of gaining more leverage over legislative outcomes at the most important points of the legislative process.

In the previous chapters, this dissertation has developed a theoretical explanation for, and systematic evidence in support of, the claim that groups vary systematically in both the number of legislative allies that they have in Congress and in their ability to mobilize these allies towards effective legislative action. Ultimately, there are three conclusions that ought to be drawn from this project. First, biased interest representation in Congress at key points of the legislative process results from the clash and mobilization of legislative allies advocating for particular group interests. The first section of this concluding chapter will describe why systematic ally generation and mobilization should play a prominent role in theories of interest group influence. Moreover, it will detail the major conclusions from the analytical chapters of the dissertation. Second, this study also has important normative implications. The next section of this concluding chapter will elaborate on these implications and how reform efforts might limit biased interest representation in the legislative process. Last, this chapter will discuss how the theoretical explanation and empirical findings presented here might stimulate a variety of future research projects.

Accounting for Unequal Ally Variation and Mobilization in Theories of Group Influence

In *Basic Interests* Baumgartner and Leech (1998a) review the empirical work on group influence in the legislative process in order to evaluate the strength of theory in interest group scholarship. They find that despite decades of work, the empirical literature does not support a strong theoretical explanation for group influence in the

legislative process. Two prominent themes in the research made it particularly difficult to construct a theory that could convincingly explain how groups influence the legislative process. First, over 35 studies had been published that examined the effects that PAC contributions had on legislative behavior (see selected studies by Bronars and Lott 1997; Frensdreis and Waterman 1985; Grenzke 1989; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Stratmann 1991; Wawro 2001; Wilhite and Thielman 1987; Wright 1985). The evidence in support of this hypothesis was mixed. Second, a growing body of work began to point out that groups work predominantly through the members of Congress who are the most likely to advocate for their interests (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999). If groups primarily work through legislative allies, then it makes little sense to argue that they buy advocacy. The legislators receiving campaign largesse are already motivated to advocate for the contributing group's policy agenda. In order to build a lasting, empirically verifiable explanation of group influence in Congress scholars needed to reevaluate these puzzling themes in the literature.

Hall and Deardorff's (2006) theory of lobbying as a legislative subsidy offered an explanation that began to account for these puzzling empirical findings. They argued that the collective evidence about how groups interact with legislators tells us that if we want to explain how groups influence legislative behavior, then we must center our attention on the ways that groups work with allied legislators. Their explanation deemphasized the importance of the theory that campaign contributions buy legislative advocacy and instead focused on the relationship between groups and their allies. Hall and Deardorff argued that groups influence policymaking by subsidizing the advocacy of their mutual

policy allies in Congress. Groups act as extended legislative staff for allied lawmakers. Groups assist legislators toward mutual policy goals by helping them gather information, build coalitions, write speeches and craft laws among other activities. Their theory put legislative allies at the center of how groups operate to influence legislative outcomes, but it left a major question unanswered. Interest group scholars were still missing a theoretical explanation and an empirical foundation for the claim that some interests have more leverage over the legislative process than others.

These results are also important to our understanding of how Congress is organized. Scholars have been interested in whether committees are composed of preference outliers. But they have never analyzed the composition of congressional committees from the vantage point of the many different societal interests seeking influence over committees. This dissertation has offered new evidence for, and a new explanation of, when we should expect some organized interests to win more representation in Congress. There is considerable evidence that groups work through allied legislators in Congress (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999). But scholars have not rigorously studied whether some organized interests win more legislative allies than others prior to the act of lobbying. The major empirically supported theoretical contribution from this project is that we now have reason to believe that some interests have systematic advantages in the number of allies that they generate in Congress. The number of allies that particular interests generate in Congress increases when they have a local presence in more districts and when they have more leverage over local jobs and economic investment. Further, once the number of allies that a group has is set, interests

with narrow policy agendas will be better represented at key stages of the legislative process. These findings offer an essential building block for our empirically verifiable knowledge about how groups affect the legislative process. Some groups have more allies than others and some interests are better at mobilizing these allies toward effective legislative advocacy. These are empirical findings that future work can build on in ways that should contribute to a sustainable explanation for how groups influence the legislative process.

Several conclusions stand out from the empirical analysis in this dissertation. Chapter Four tested how different types of constituency distributions affect the amount of representation that interests receive on House committees. Organized interests demonstrate wide variation in how they are distributed as constituents across the 435 House districts. They can be present in many districts or few. They also differ in how concentrated they are as constituents within the districts where they have a local presence. The core finding of this chapter was that constituency presence affects committee representation. When organized interests have a constituency presence within a district they are more likely to win advocacy from the district's representative. As the number of districts where an interest group has a local presence grows, the group wins more constituency representation from more members of Congress. Hence, constituency representation on congressional committees is related to the number of allies that a group will have in Congress.

In addition to testing whether district presence alone influenced interest representation on House committees, Chapter Four also analyzed the relationship between constituency concentration and committee representation. Holding the number

of districts where a group is a constituent constant, constituencies can be concentrated or dispersed within districts in a variety of ways. For example, a constituency can be concentrated in few districts and sparsely present in many. Or it can be evenly dispersed across all the districts where it has a local presence. Moreover, when a constituency is concentrated within a subset of districts, these districts can also be spatially proximate (i.e.-geographically concentrated) or they can be concentrated within a subset of districts that are not spatially proximate. While it is important to parse out these relationships, constituency concentration did not consistently predict differences in committee representation. The broad takeaway from Chapter Four is therefore that being in more districts matters to the number of legislative allies groups generate irrespective of how the constituency is concentrated within these districts. Groups with more constituency presence will have more allies and this will systematically increase the amount of representation they receive on key committees.

Being a constituent in more districts matters to ally generation and committee representation, but other constituency related factors are also important. Chapter Five found that some types of constituencies, namely business interests, are more likely to be overrepresented on congressional committees than are nonbusiness interests. Members of Congress have multiple constituencies in their districts. As they decide how they will spend their limited time and resources local businesses are likely to receive priority in members' committee assignment requests. Chapter Five tested whether local businesses generally enjoyed representational advantages committee or whether those advantages were specifically focused on more politically active constituencies . The major finding was that business interests tend to win systematically greater amounts of representation

on the committees of importance to their policy needs and the degree of political mobilization made little measurable difference.

Local business interests have leverage over jobs and economic investment in the district. Business interests receive more constituency representation because members of Congress care about the state of the local economy. Business interests consequently generate more legislative allies. With more allies requesting committees to serve constituency interests, business interests become better represented on House committees. Yet Chapter Five found little evidence that politically active local interests were better represented on House committees. The frequency of lobbying contacts that particular constituencies made with members of Congress, the amount of money that they spend on lobbying, and the total amount of money they contributed to members of Congress through political action committees were not systematically related to the amount of committee representation that groups received.

Unequal allies can affect interest representation at important stages of the legislative process. Once the number of legislative allies that a group generates is set, some groups are better than others at mobilizing the advocacy of allied legislators. Chapter Six demonstrated that the nature of groups' policy agendas influences how effective they are at communicating their policy needs to legislative allies in ways that lead them toward effective advocacy. Many interest groups have diverse issue agendas that span several major policy issue areas. Many others have narrow policy issue agendas focused on a few major policy issue areas. When interest groups have policy agendas that are concentrated on a few issue areas their allies receive a much clearer message about how to effectively navigate their mutual policy goals through the

legislative process. The effects of variation in the nature of group policy agendas become more relevant as their allies choose their committee assignments. Committee jurisdictions are tied to particular issue areas. As such, groups with diverse policy agendas will find that the legislation that they care about is fragmented across many committees. By contrast, groups with narrow policy agendas will see the legislation that they care about flow through few committees. Groups with narrow policy agendas are thus better able to effectively communicate with their allies about which committee(s) to request to advance their mutual policy goals. With more allies requesting fewer committees, these interests win systematically larger amounts of representation on the committees with jurisdiction over their policy needs.

Finally, even if all groups had the same number of allies, these allies were mobilized toward effectively advocating for group interests to the same degree, and with all else equal, committee jurisdictions would still shape the amount of competition that each group's allied legislators face for limited committee seats. Scholars have given little attention to how the organization of the committee system affects group influence in the legislative process. This dissertation has found much evidence that the manner in which committees are organized affects the magnitude of representation that particular interests receive.

The Financial Services committee has jurisdiction over a narrow subset of issues largely related to financial policy. In contrast, the Energy and Commerce committee has jurisdiction over multiple diverse major policy areas, including healthcare, technology, and energy. Each issue area corresponds to a constellation of participating interests whose allies compete for committee membership. When the committee has jurisdiction

over many diverse issue areas, group allies compete for committee membership with the allies of interests with wholly different policy concerns.

The result is that the allies of interests whose policy agendas flow through the Financial Services committee have a much easier path toward committee membership than interests whose policy needs flow through the Energy and Commerce committee. Group competition therefore grows for limited committee seats as the issues under the jurisdiction of the committee diversify. Thus, even during the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the financial industry was highly overrepresented on the Financial Services committee and therefore retained considerable influence over the legislative response. In the models presented in each of the analytical chapters of this dissertation the results were consistently stronger for this committee for variables signifying that ally generation and mobilization matter to committee representation. It is therefore also important that theories of group influence pay particular attention to how variation in committee jurisdictions affects the amount of representation that particular groups receive.

Assessing the Normative Implications of Unequal Allies and Ally Mobilization

The common wisdom about how groups influence the legislative process stands in stark contrast to empirical evidence. The majority of the public, prominent politicians and many policy practitioners believe that well-financed organized interests buy policy outcomes. Recent survey data demonstrates, for example, that the public believes that their representatives advocate for special interests rather than working for constituents

(Montopoli 2011). The causal explanation in popular accounts of group influence is that campaign contributions buy legislative behavior in Congress, which biases policy outcomes towards the needs of special interests. What the results in this dissertation project underline is that even if organized interests could no longer contribute money to members of Congress, the legislative process would still be biased towards some interests and against others.

Policy practitioners who wish to ensure that policy outcomes in Congress are not biased towards some interests in this way ought to pay close attention to what the empirical evidence indicates. There is little hard evidence in support of the thesis that money buys policy outcomes. As a result, if policy advocates build reform proposals solely with the corrupting influence of money in mind, then they are likely to overlook a substantial amount of what actually causes biased representation in the legislative process. Groups require legislative allies in Congress in order to affect policy change. Some interests are better at generating legislative allies in Congress than others and some interests are also better at mobilizing these allies than others. Unequal allies and unequal ally mobilization mean unequal representation.

The results presented here emphasize that constituency representation is central to group influence in Congress. This is a counter-intuitive thought. It is common to argue that members of Congress are fulfilling their responsibilities as elected representatives when they work hard on behalf of interests in the district. Yet the collective findings of this dissertation indicate that in the aggregate, some interests are better represented than others in Congress precisely because of constituency-related factors.

In the first Congress elected after the start of the Great Recession of 2008-9, the organized interests who received systematically greater amounts of committee representation were not the interests who contributed the most money to political campaigns or who spent the most money to lobby Congress. Rather, groups need legislative allies to prosecute their legislative agendas in Congress. Without them, they will find it difficult to affect legislation. Ally generation and mobilization are therefore central to how groups affect the legislative process. Groups that were constituents in a larger number of districts generated more legislative allies. With more allies requesting the committees of importance to their policy needs, these groups won systemically enhanced representation on key committees. Groups that had more leverage over jobs and economic investment in the district also won more allies than other interests. Business interests won more legislative than nonbusiness interests. With more legislative allies requesting membership on committees with jurisdiction over their policy needs, business interests received better committee representation than nonbusiness interests. Finally, interests with narrow policy agendas were better at mobilizing their legislative allies toward effective legislative advocacy. Because the policy agendas flowed through fewer committees, these interests found it easier to communicate with their allies about which committees had jurisdiction over their policy needs. With clear information about which committees to request and fewer committees to choose from, their allies won more committee representation than the allies of other interests.

Government reform advocates need to consider how committee jurisdictions can magnify or limit the influence of organized interests on congressional policymaking. Throughout this dissertation the results emphasize that committee jurisdictions influence

group competition for committee representation. Committees with jurisdiction over a more diverse set of issue areas like the Energy and Commerce committee correspond with more competition among legislators allied with different groups for limited committee seats. With more committee requests from allies of different groups across varying issue areas competing for membership on the committee, the composition of the committee ends up being more diverse. It becomes less likely that any one interest will be highly overrepresented on the committee. Given that committees (1) are where bills are shaped and (2) are gatekeepers in ways that allow them to affect the forward movement of the policy agendas of particular groups, good government advocates might think hard about how to reorganize the committee system in ways that reduce bias in committee representation.

Suggestions for Future Research on Unequal Allies and Ally Mobilization

The theoretical framework and supporting evidence put forth in this dissertation also have the potential to be a catalyst for future research. Its findings suggest that legislative allies are the primary conduit through which groups affect the legislative process. There are several ways one could build on the results from this study. First, interest group scholars could dedicate more time towards understanding factors related to ally generation and ally mobilization throughout the legislative process. This project focused on the stage of the legislative process where many interest group scholars believe groups possess the most leverage over policy outcomes, but these findings should also be tested elsewhere. Groups who have more legislative allies may find it easier to build

legislative coalitions, to win more advocacy for their positions on roll call votes, and as members advocate for their interests in committees. All warrant further research.

The importance of issue context to who wins and who loses in Congress also stood out throughout this project. The results presented here indicate that the legislative process is essentially very different for some interests than others, given the types of issues that they are focused on. Groups that are interested in one issue area will face a much easier pathway toward moving their policy agenda forward in Congress than groups in a different issue area.

Policy issue areas affect which groups in the interest group universe participate and they dictate the level of competition that a group's legislative allies will face for limited committee membership. As issue areas change, so too does the unique constellation of participating groups. The types of interests that compete with one another for policy outcomes shift, which affects the magnitude of representation that particular interests receive. Financial reform legislation, for example, pits Wall Street interests such as commercial and investment banks against main street interests like consumers with foreclosed homes and credit unions. Business interests with focused policy agendas that tend to fall under the jurisdiction of the Financial Services committee like commercial and investment banking interests received strong representation. On the other hand, interests that lacked leverage over local jobs and investment and who tended to have policy agendas that fell under the jurisdiction of multiple committees received representation at or below what we should expect from their representation in the House at large. Financial policy consistently pits Wall Street interests against main street interests in this way with little competition from groups seeking committee representation

related to other issues under the committee's jurisdiction. The result is that financial industry interests receive extraordinarily high levels of representation on the committee compared to the consumer interests that they compete with for policy outcomes.

A different issue area, comprehensive energy reform, saw a different set of interests in competition for limited representation on the Natural Resources committee. Raw materials economic sectors had mixed levels of representation on the committee while environmental groups were highly overrepresented compared to their presence in the full membership of the House. In this issue context nonbusiness interests had a larger share of their policy agenda before a single committee, their agenda was more focused, and they had a local presence in a greater number of districts, on average, than business interests. As a result, they received representation that was competitive with business. Thus issue context can shape who participates in ways that systematically affect group competition and committee representation.

Issue context is also important because legislation flows through committees that have issue related jurisdictions. Committee jurisdictions can affect how much committee representation particular interests receive. As the number of major issue areas under a committee's jurisdiction increases, the number of group allies that compete for limited committee seats also increases. This competition can make it more difficult for the allies of particular interests to win committee representation. This effect of group competition via differences in the issue jurisdiction of particular committees was most apparent for the Energy and Commerce committee and the issue area healthcare reform. As previously discussed, this committee had jurisdiction over many major policy issue areas. Each issue area relates to a unique constellation of interests whose allies seek placement

on the committee. As the varied allies of whole constellations of interests compete for limited committee membership it becomes more difficult for any one interest to win strong representation on the committee. Scholars should therefore also pay close attention to how the jurisdictional context of committees affects group participation and competition among groups. Both can influence the magnitude of representation that groups receive in Congress.

Lastly, this project found evidence for group influence precisely when past research suggests groups should have the least leverage over legislative behavior. It studied three salient issue areas during a session of Congress with a strong anti-business political climate and a strong Democratic majority. Yet even though this project yielded strong evidence for group influence during the 111th Congress, the theory of ally generation and mobilization needs to be tested over other time periods and issue areas. It may be that legislative allies are more likely to advocate for group interests when their policy agendas face major changes in Congress. Thus, the theory of ally generation and mobilization should also be tested at different times and in different political contexts.

Concluding Thoughts

In a 2015 journal article several prolific interest group scholars were asked to describe their image of an unbiased interest system. Marie Hojnacki described an unbiased system as “one providing interests a level playing field upon which they have some say about the matters that affect them” (Lowery et al. 2015, 9). Frank Baumgartner explained that a hypothetical unbiased interest group system would “make the resources associated with each existing group be proportionate to the intensity of interest that the

group's concerns elicit in society" (2015, 2). In an unbiased interest system airline passengers and the airline industry, commercial banks and their customers, environmental interests and coal companies, and insurance companies and the insured would "each share an equal presence in the interest group world" (2015, 3). Jeffrey Berry added that interests would also receive unbiased access and representation in Congress. In the aftermath of the worst recession since the Great Depression, however, the representation of particular interests in Congress did not come close to these ideals.

This dissertation has presented an image of interest representation that is far removed from these descriptions. Commercial and investment banking interests were highly overrepresented on the committee with the most influence over their policy agendas, but consumers that had difficulty paying their mortgages were not. Medical insurance providers and companies selling medical equipment and supplies received more representation on the committee with jurisdiction over their policy concerns than the uninsured, the elderly, labor unions, and people in poverty. Electric utility companies, oil distributors, and environmental organizations all received strong representation on a committee with the power to affect legislation related to their policy agendas. These are just a few examples of the systematic variation in interest representation documented throughout this project. The evidence presents a picture of interest representation in Congress with substantial amounts of bias towards some interests and against others. Specifically, the groups most affected by the policies under the jurisdiction of a given committee, groups with focused policy agendas, business constituencies, and interests with a presence in a larger number of House districts all tend to receive better representation on House committees. Future scholarship should therefore

continue to untangle the relationship between variation in legislative allies and ally mobilization, and who wins and who loses in the legislative process.

Appendix A-1

Table A.1: Model Testing Effect of High Local Presence and Political Concentration

	<i>Models by Committee:</i>			
	All Committees	Financial Services	Energy and Commerce	Natural Resources
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Business	22.147 ^{***} (6.200)	34.598 ^{***} (12.675)	26.660 ^{***} (9.190)	9.782 (10.270)
High Local Presence	7.938 ^{**} (3.334)	23.661 ^{***} (7.289)	7.800 (6.191)	-0.867 (5.891)
High Local Presence x Political Concentration	3.450 (2.406)	3.565 (3.361)	-2.838 (5.347)	-2.367 (4.775)
Political Concentration	0.082 (0.279)	2.054 (1.276)	-1.636 (1.111)	0.229 (0.292)
Geographic Dispersion	0.443 (0.521)	2.213 ^{**} (1.031)	-3.094 ^{***} (0.874)	2.232 ^{***} (0.780)
Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda	0.795 [*] (0.440)	3.364 ^{**} (1.587)	0.709 [*] (0.442)	2.255 [*] (1.593)
Total Receipts	0.009 (0.042)	-0.128 (0.174)	-0.011 (0.040)	0.207 (0.209)
Total Membership	0.025 (0.028)	0.052 (0.056)	0.074 [*] (0.039)	-0.057 (0.049)
Constant	22.009 ^{**} (10.250)	-22.250 (21.503)	73.967 ^{***} (17.463)	9.868 (15.747)
Observations	532	143	186	203
R ²	0.064	0.261	0.143	0.079
Adjusted R ²	0.050	0.217	0.104	0.041

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table A.2: Model Testing Effect of Low Local Presence and Political Concentration

	<i>Models by Committee:</i>			
	All Committees	Financial Services	Energy and Commerce	Natural Resources
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Business	20.187*** (6.264)	28.460** (13.557)	26.624*** (9.120)	10.142 (10.217)
Low Local Presence	-5.488 (7.686)	-24.284 (48.925)	17.398 (33.213)	3.889 (10.517)
Low Local Presence x Political Concentration	0.832 (0.862)	2.591 (5.061)	-1.191 (3.669)	-0.653 (1.353)
Political Concentration	-0.741 (0.801)	0.069 (1.548)	-2.781** (1.203)	0.814 (1.322)
Geographic Dispersion	1.028** (0.512)	3.473*** (1.098)	-3.172*** (0.888)	2.106*** (0.737)
Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda	0.782* (0.445)	3.496** (1.705)	0.731* (0.443)	2.300* (1.592)
Total Receipts	0.019 (0.042)	-0.005 (0.185)	-0.009 (0.040)	0.217 (0.202)
Total Membership	0.025 (0.029)	0.056 (0.060)	0.079** (0.039)	-0.055 (0.048)
Constant	22.218** (10.600)	-16.366 (22.272)	80.664*** (17.246)	9.014 (16.223)
Observations	532	143	186	203
R ²	0.039	0.142	0.137	0.077
Adjusted R ²	0.024	0.091	0.098	0.039

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table A.3 Model Testing Effect of High Local Presence and Geographic Concentration

	<i>Models by Committee:</i>			
	All Committees	Financial Services	Energy and Commerce	Natural Resources
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Business	22.428*** (6.188)	34.962*** (12.683)	27.297*** (9.066)	12.731 (10.000)
High Local Presence	-37.294* (22.548)	-5.335 (39.495)	55.498 (37.642)	-129.660*** (36.643)
High Local Presence x Geographic Dispersion	2.939** (1.380)	2.026 (2.382)	-3.015 (2.265)	7.843*** (2.243)
Political Concentration	0.048 (0.279)	2.343* (1.204)	-1.481 (1.094)	0.069 (0.285)
Geographic Dispersion	0.069 (0.564)	1.979* (1.171)	-2.634*** (0.949)	1.143 (0.801)
Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda	0.772* (0.438)	3.293** (1.587)	0.694* (0.440)	1.718* (1.553)
Total Receipts	0.009 (0.042)	-0.126 (0.174)	-0.011 (0.040)	0.238 (0.200)
Total Membership	0.030 (0.028)	0.056 (0.056)	0.072* (0.039)	-0.022 (0.048)
Constant	27.203** (10.670)	-20.355 (23.010)	65.885*** (18.606)	22.624 (15.556)
Observations	532	143	186	203
R ²	0.068	0.259	0.150	0.132
Adjusted R ²	0.054	0.215	0.112	0.096

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table A.4: Model Testing Effect of Low Local Presence and Geographic Concentration

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	All Committees	Financial Services	Energy and Commerce	Natural Resources
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Business	20.026*** (6.253)	28.591** (13.455)	26.429*** (9.063)	11.209 (10.164)
Low Local Presence	16.048 (18.148)	46.641 (36.779)	-32.087 (29.229)	27.724 (29.054)
Low Local Presence x Geographic Dispersion	-1.457 (1.328)	-4.088 (2.795)	2.908 (1.917)	-2.054 (2.170)
Political Concentration	-0.107 (0.324)	0.133 (1.473)	-2.704** (1.154)	0.073 (0.365)
Geographic Dispersion	1.330** (0.552)	4.113*** (1.186)	-3.793*** (0.968)	2.257*** (0.757)
Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda	0.800* (0.444)	3.522** (1.693)	0.747* (0.440)	2.297* (1.590)
Total Receipts	0.020 (0.042)	-0.009 (0.184)	-0.009 (0.040)	0.177 (0.196)
Total Membership	0.027 (0.029)	0.058 (0.060)	0.078** (0.039)	-0.055 (0.048)
Constant	16.621 (11.018)	-26.805 (23.385)	90.708*** (18.341)	7.125 (16.219)
Observations	532	143	186	203
R ²	0.040	0.154	0.148	0.081
Adjusted R ²	0.025	0.103	0.109	0.043

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

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