THE PROBLEM OF TUNISIA IN FRANCO-ITALIAN RELATIONS, 1835-1938

By

Helen Broughall Metcalf

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

1942
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Preface** .......................................................... 1

## I Introduction - A Backward Glance

**Geographical considerations**
- Location .......................................................... 2
- Natural divisions and agricultural products ................. 3
- The Djerid ........................................................... 4
- Mineral resources .................................................. 6

**Population**
- Berbers and Arabs .................................................. 7
  - Kroumirs ................................................................ 12
  - Tuaregs .................................................................. 13
  - Troglodytes of Douira ........................................... 14
  - Troglodytes of Médénine ......................................... 17
  - Troglodytes of Matmata .......................................... 18
- Jews ........................................................................ 19
- Europeans ................................................................... 20

## History
- Foundation of Utica and Carthage ................................ 22
- Roman and Greco-Roman period .................................... 23
- Arab invasions of Seventh Century ................................. 26
- Louis IX and the Seventh Crusade ................................ 27
- Turkish conquest of 1534 ........................................... 28
- Spanish rule under Charles V ...................................... 29
- Turkish reconquest in 1574 ......................................... 29
- 1705 establishment of the Husseinite dynasty .................. 31

**Generalizations** ....................................................... 35

## III Franco-Italian Rivalry Develops

- Early relations with French and Italian cities ............... 37
- Seventeenth century rivalry ........................................ 38
- Eighteenth century rivalry ......................................... 40
- U.S. consular reports on Tunisian war with France ........ 43
- Suppression of slavery .............................................. 46
- French conquest of Algeria ........................................ 47
- Firman of 1337 ......................................................... 49
- Ahmed Bey (1357-55) ................................................ 49
- Conflict with English consul, Read ................................ 51
- Mohammed Bey (1355-59) ........................................... 55
- Coming of Leon Roche .............................................. 56
- Conditions in Tunisia - taxations, courts, etc. ............... 57
- Pacte Fondamentale, 1357 .......................................... 59
- Concession to Britain of Tunis-La Goulette road ............ 60
- Mohammed es-Saddok Bey (1359-82) ............................. 62
III. Italy Secures International Recognition
In the Regency

Arrival of Luigi Pinna .............................................. 64
Attitude of Napoleon III towards Tunisia ...................... 65
Financial conditions in 1861 ..................................... 70
Revolt of 1864 ......................................................... 71
Loan of 1865 .................................................................. 82
Revolts of 1867 ................................................................ 85
Establishment of International Financial Com-
mmission of 1869 .......................................................... 89

IV Reaction to the Franco-Prussian War

French position on International Financial
Commission ........................................................................ 94
Italian-Tunisian Treaty of 1869 ....................................... 96
Threat of Italian intervention in 1871 ................................. 98
Inauguration of Tunis-La Goulette railroad ......................... 104
Firman of 1871 .................................................................. 105
Rise of Mustapha-ben-Ismail ............................................ 110
Fall of Mustapha Khaznadar .............................................. 113
Arrival of Roustan as French consul .................................. 115

V The Eastern Broth Begins to Brew

Roustan's problems on arrival .......................................... 116
Sadi-Tabet or de Sancy affair ............................................ 116
Border warfare between Algeria and Tunisia ...................... 118
Tunis-Ghardimaou or Medjerda line railroad
concession ........................................................................ 122
Outbreak of the Balkan crisis ............................................ 124
Constantinople Conference .............................................. 127
Outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war .................................. 129
Request for Tunisian cooperation ..................................... 131
Fall of Khéréddine ............................................................ 137
Treaty of San Stefano ....................................................... 139
Salisbury Circular ............................................................. 144
Anglo-Russian secret agreements ..................................... 145
Anglo-Austrian agreement ............................................... 146

VI The Men Who Went to Berlin and What They Sought

Franco-German relations, 1870-78 ..................................... 147
French attitude towards a proposed Congress ...................... 151
French plenipotentiaries ............................................... 154
Russian plenipotentiaries ............................................... 156
Political changes in Italy prior to opening
of Congress ........................................................................ 159
Italian plenipotentiaries ............................................... 161
Turkish aims and plenipotentiaries ................................... 162
Austrian aspirations and plenipotentiaries ......................... 163
British aspirations and plenipotentiaries ............................ 165
Germany's aims and plenipotentiaries ............................... 168
## VII  What Was Done at Berlin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening of Congress of Berlin</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian question</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of British interest in Cyprus</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation for Cyprus Convention</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus Convention revealed</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waddington and the Cyprus Convention</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French press reaction to the Convention</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian reaction to the Cyprus Convention</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion of the Congress of Berlin</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## VIII  The Reaction to the Cyprus Convention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gladstone's criticism of the work of the Congress</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of Corti</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waddington-Salisbury correspondence</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Vallier at Friedrichsruhe</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musai in Tunisia</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waddington's consideration of a protectorate in 1978</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French fear of English consul, Wood</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French warnings to Italy</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignation of Corti</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment of Macciò</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## IX  The Beginning of the Roustan-Macciò Duel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revival of the de Sacy affair</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrival of Macciò</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French ultimatum of 1879 over the de Sacy affair</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French attempt at reestablishment of a protectorate in 1879</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall of Wood, the English consul</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian cable concession</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempts to secure French protectorate in 1880</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubattino affair</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concession struggle, 1880-81</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## X  Diplomatic Maneuvers and Fears

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European attitude to Tunisian situation</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cairoli-Cialdini policy</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisian-Italian delegation goes to Sicily</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostakel controversy</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lévy or Enfida affair</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>The Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical movement in France</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Vallier's pleas for action</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other advocates of intervention</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern of French bond holders</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kroumir incident</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry's request for credits</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes of foreign governments</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position and attitude of Italy</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of factors underlying intervention</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Casr-ed-Said</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XII</th>
<th>The Aftermath of the Treaty of Bardo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign reaction to the protectorate</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratification of Treaty of Bardo</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second campaign in Tunisia</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpellation of Perry, November 1881</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition of Tunisia</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseilles incident</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of the Triple Alliance</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death of Mohammed-es-Saddok Bey</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accession of Ali Bey</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolition of consular jurisdiction</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolition of International Financial Commission</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XIII</th>
<th>Reorganization and Reform Under the Protectorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of a protectorate</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of Tunisia under the Bey</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powers of Minister-Resident, later Resident-General</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to the Ministry of Colonies</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal organization</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Conférence-Consultative</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforms of 1922:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Conseil</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Councils</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councils of the Caidats</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration of justice</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration of finance</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of means of and facilities for transportation</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social reform</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>XIV</th>
<th>Organization of the Protectorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French repressive measures</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of Young Tunisian party and publication of Le Tunisien</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909 demands</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
XIV (Continued)

Case for judicial reform .................................. 385
1910 demands for educational reform .................... 387
International complications of 1911 ..................... 389
Djellez riots of 1911 ......................................... 392
Streetcar boycott of 1912 .................................... 396
Exile of Ali Pach Hamba, Guellaty, and Taalbi ........ 397
La Tunisie Martyre ............................................ 400
Destour movement organized ................................ 402
Disturbance over habous ..................................... 404
Taalbi trial ..................................................... 408
Reforms of Lucien Saint ...................................... 411
Crisis of 1922 .................................................. 414
Accession and reforms of Mohammed-el-Habib ........ 418

XV Italy Seeks Compensation

Mancini protocol of 1884 .................................... 420
Beylical decrees of 1888 ..................................... 421
Italian fears of 1890 ......................................... 427
Third Treaty of the Triple Alliance ..................... 434
Demarcation of 1868 treaty .................................. 438
Discussion of 1896 conventions ............................ 439
Franco-Italian détente ....................................... 441
Accord of 1900 and 1902 ..................................... 448

XVI The "Final" Settlement of the Tunisian Question

Increased Italian activity in Tripoli ..................... 451
Italo-Turkish war ............................................. 454
Carthage and Manouba affairs ............................. 454
Treaty of London, 1915 ...................................... 458
Tunisian-Tripolitanian boundary question ............... 459
Nationality question ........................................ 468
Other sources of conflict ................................... 477
Mussolini-Laval agreements, 1935 ......................... 480

XVII The Unsolved Problem

Reasons for dislike of the Italians in the Regency .. 485
Contrasts between French and Italian colonists ........ 486
French efforts to increase colonization ................ 489
French efforts to settle indigenes on the land ....... 492
Relation between naturalization and coloniza-
  tion .......................................................... 495
Situation concerning schools in the Regency .......... 506
Emergence of the Néo-Destour ............................. 513
Disturbance of 1925 ........................................... 515
Effects of the depression on the Destourian movement ........................................ 516
Effects of the French Popular Front on Tunisia ....................................................... 517
Fascist outbreak of 1937 ........................................... 528
Disturbances of 1938 ........................................... 528
1938 demonstration in the Italian Chamber of Deputies ........................................... 530
Denunciation of the 1935 agreements ................................................................. 531

Bibliography ....................................................... 535

Maps--
1. Map of Tunisia (indicating all place names mentioned in the text) ........................................ 36
2. Map of Tunisia, showing railroad development ....................................................... 372
3. Map of Tunisia, showing health centers ....................................................... 373
4. Sketch map, showing Tunisian-Libyan boundary settlements ........................................ 467
5. Map of Tunisia, showing school establishments ....................................................... 512

Figures--
1. Scene in the oasis of Nefta ........................................... 5
2. Plans of troglodyte dwellings ........................................... 15
3. View of ghorfas at Médenine and of the troglodyte village of Matmata ........................................... 16
4a. Ruins of Carthage ........................................... 24
4b. Ruins of Roman colosseum at El Djem ............................... 24-a
5. Aqueduct of Zaghouan ........................................... 61
6. View of an olive forest at Sfax ........................................... 490
7. Graph of school population in Tunisia in 1931 ........................................... 505
Tables--

1. Composition of the Regional Councils ..... 361
2. Occupational distribution of French and Italian colonies in 1914 ..... 493
3. Comparison of exports and imports of Tunisia, 1922-31 ..... 496
4. Population figures for Tunisia, 1931 ..... 499
4a. European population
4b. Mohammedan population
4c. Jewish population
5. Population figures according to 1936 census ..... 500
6. Comparative European population figures for years 1881-1936 ..... 501
7. Italian passports issued for non-trans- Oceanic passage for years 1922-27 ..... 503
8. Naturalization figures for Regency 1891-1931 ..... 504
9. Comparative figures for the origins of French nationality ..... 506
10. Pupil distribution in years 1932 and 1936 ..... 507
11. Distribution of boys and girls enrolled in school in Regency, public and private, 1885-1931 ..... 508
12. Distribution according to nationality of boys and girls in schools in the Regency in 1930 and 1931 ..... 509
13. Budgets for education in the Regency, comparative table 1884-1931 ..... 511

Appendix--

A. List of the Beys of Tunisia (1705-1940) ..... 575
B. Family tree of Husseinites ..... 576
C. List of the Residents-General of Tunisia (1831-1940) ..... 577
D. Excerpts from Miers Fisher Wright, Operations of the French Navy During the Recent War with Tunisia ..... 578
F. Treaty of the Marsa ..... 584
G. Decree of June 9, 1881 ..... 587
H. Denunciation of the Italo-Tunisian treaty of 1868 ..... 588
PREFACE

Today France continues to maintain her protectorate over Tunisia, which she successfully established in 1381. But in the light of the present international situation it is patently clear that the whole story is not yet written -- that the last Punic War has not yet been fought. Tunisia's geographic position continues to be of strategic importance, and her exceedingly rich land continues to stir national cupidity. Great Britain, Italy, and France all have conflicting interests in the Mediterranean, and with the war still to be won, Tunisia remains a rich and highly sought prize.

While the question as to the future of Tunisia still waxes hot, its capital city remains comparatively unperturbed. If a city may be endowed with a personality, then Tunis is the personification of Oriental calm. Knee-deep in water she stands, so low is she built in some places, but her citadel and her minarets rise to the heights. They outline themselves against the sky like so many beacons guiding the traveler towards the fascinating scene over which they cast their slender shadows. Her sidewalks swarm with Turks, Bedouins, and Arabs of every degree, from the beggar in ragged sacking to the cafid in spotless djellerba and immaculate bornous of corded silk. The French merchant chats with the Italian tradesman; the Arab saddle maker in the souk watches the Jewish and Maltese children playing at his feet.
Tunis is more cosmopolitan than any of the other Tunisian cities; in consequence it has attracted men of all countries. Like the Tunisian island of Djerba, which charmed the sailors of Ulysses, it has a fascination for the traveler which he can never forget. The Arabs call this white city the "Bornous of the Prophet," and say that it is especially loved of Fatima, daughter of Mohammed.

Grateful acknowledgement is made to Dr. Herbert I. Priestley, of the University of California, in whose seminar this study was begun, and thanks to whose encouragement a prosaic dissertation led to a pilgrimage to North Africa in search of material. Sincere appreciation also is due to the late Mgr. Lacombe of Paris, to M. E.-F. Gautier, professor at the University of Algiers, to Sig. Comm. Enrico Bombieri, Italian consul at Tunis, to the archivists of the cities of Marseilles and Oran, to His Excellency the Caid of Gabès; to M. Gau, Director of Education, to M. Bercher, of the Department of the Interior in the Regency, to M. Pignon of the Lycée Carnot, to M. André Seémama, attorney, all of the city of Tunis. Particular acknowledgement is made to M. Pierre Grandchamp, archivist of the Residency of Tunis, for his friendliness and help in securing materials, and to M. Barbeau, director and archivist at the Bibliothèque Souk-el-Attarine in the city of Tunis. To attempt to make acknowledgement for the courtesy and never-failing help offered by the staff of the Library of Congress would be an endless matter. And last of all should sincere appreciation be expressed for
the help of Dr. Leonid I. Strakhovsky, of the University of Maryland, under whose direction this dissertation was written. His careful checking and high standards of scholarship have been a stimulation and a challenge.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A Backward Glance

Properly speaking, perhaps, one is not correct in referring to rivalry in Tunisia between France and Italy until after the final unification of the latter state in 1870. However, rivalry had existed between French cities and Italian cities as far back as we have records of their relations. No account, therefore, of the modern rivalry between the two Latin states in the present French protectorate is adequate which does not, at least briefly, take into consideration the intricate pattern of past relations. Nor does it seem adequate either to undertake a discussion of such rivalry without some consideration of the physical, ethnic, and historical threads which are also woven into the pattern. It is for these reasons, therefore, that the brief introductory sketch is given in a form which differs considerably from the later presentation of material.

---

1. In order to make distinctions clear "Tunisia" will be used in reference to the country and "Tunis" only when the city is indicated. The exception to this rule, of course, will be when material is directly quoted.
Geographical Considerations

Location: The importance of Tunisia, past and present, has been out of all proportion to her physical size. The total area of the country is only 48,300 square miles, of which more than 21,000 square miles are Saharan territory. It is Tunisia's strategic geographical position which largely accounts for this importance. Placed in the center of the Mediterranean, which was the axis of the ancient world, Tunisia lies just about half way between the Straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. She forms, with Sicily, from which she is separated by some eighty miles, the barrier between the eastern and western Mediterranean. Tunisia occupied, consequently, from the time of her foundation a key position, and no less today does her location make her important. Some nine hundred miles of coastline, deeply indented by numerous bays and some exceptionally fine harbors, from her earliest history, have invited lively commercial activity and have caused her participation, voluntarily or involuntarily, in the ebb and flow of civilization.

5. Pellegrin, loc. cit.
Natural divisions and agricultural products: Not only was Tunisia strategically located but she was also fortunate in her natural resources. Although in reality a prolongation of Algeria, there are no natural boundaries dividing the two regions and the land becomes increasingly fertile as one moves east. Writers from Pliny the Younger through the nineteenth century Valbert were prodigal in their enthusiasm over the richness of Tunisia. The country may be divided into five districts: 1) the north, characterized by its mountainous formation, where the Medjerda River offers easy access to the fertile grain and grape producing valleys which lie between the slopes of the northeastern Atlas Mountains; 2) the north-east, including the peninsula of Cap Bon, where the soil is particularly suited to the cultivation of citrus fruits; 3) the center, the wind-swept and semi-arid plateau lying south of the Medjerda, which afford excellent grazing for the famous Tunisian herds;


8. With the exception of a few names, commonly Anglicized (such as Tunisia), the spelling of place names is in accordance with the Atlas, historique, géographique économique, et touristique (Paris, 1936), published under the auspices of Ahmed Pacha Bey, the Resident-General of Tunisia, etc.

4) the Sahel, the eastern littoral, where the great olive orchards furnish one of the riches of the country; and 5) the south, where along the chotts between the plateau and the desert lies the Djerid, or "palm-grove" where dates grow in profusion in the oases.

The Djerid: The chotts are former salt lakes, which at the present time are shallow depressions in the ground, but at one time no doubt were bodies of water of considerable extent. There is seldom water in them now, and the soil is covered with a bright saline efflorescence. Around the chotts are numerous springs, furnishing an abundant supply of warm water which maintains oases of extraordinary luxuriance. According to an old Arabian proverb, the date palm must have its foot in water and its head in fire. In each oasis such as Nefta or Tozeur where the sun blazes down and abundant water is at hand the truth of the proverb is proved by the six or seven thousand acres of slender palm trees, sometimes a hundred feet high, whose undergrowth is corn and roses, vines and pomegranates, banana trees and


SCENE IN THE OASIS OF NEFTA.
orange trees. The deep shade within the oases, contrasting with the glare of the desert, the damp ground covered with luxuriant, verdant growth contrasting with the barren stretches just beyond, the over-flowing rivers and gurgling streams, in which native women do their washing and naked lads swim with sure strokes, contrasted with the endless sand wastes in which the parched traveller vainly pursues a mirage of trees and water -- these are memories that southern Tunisia will always conjure up for him who has once been fortunate enough to experience them. Then below the chotts south to the southern boundary lie thousands of miles of desert, unproductive save for a few very small and widely scattered oases.

**Mineral resources:** In addition to the agricultural wealth of the country there are mineral resources of considerable value. To the modern world the greatest mineral richness is the extensive phosphate deposits of the Gafsa region. From the interior in the Shemtu region, near the Algerian border, comes the far-famed "Numidian marble," veined beautifully with pink, yellow, green, and even purple, which the Roman emperors used largely in decorating their palaces and from which the "golden cities" of Tunisia were fashioned. The country also possesses considerable

---


14. de Lanesan, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34; B. K. de Prorok, "An Archeological Expedition to the Ruins of Southern
Population

Berbers and Arabs: Almost as varied as its regions and its resources are the inhabitants of Tunisia. Of the two and one-half million inhabitants of the country, according to the 1936 census, some 200,000 only were Europeans; of the remainder some two and a third millions are listed by the French as Musulmen, and some sixty thousand as Jews. It is the usual custom to include all the indigenes of Tunisia, save the Jews, in the blanket appellation "Arabs," but this is ethnically incorrect. For two distinct racial groups, the Berbers and the Arabs, make up the Mohammedan population of Tunisia.

It is exceedingly difficult today, however, to trace the "evolution of the present divisions of the Muslim population in Tunisia." The elements are varied and intermingled, while the "constitution of the great tribes, clearly individualized at different periods in the history of that country, is far from being clear."

---

18. Ibid.
The first inhabitants of Tunisia were the Berbers, a white race whose origin is obscure, although they seem to have occupied the tract between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic "since the dawn of history." 19 The Greek and Latin historians called them Libyans, Numidians, etc., though it was the Arabs who gave to the indigenous tribes they met when they came into Africa the name of Berber, 20 from the Latin barbarus.

At first after the Arab invasions of the seventh century there were not enough Arabs to effect a "real change in the old Berber bloc." 21 Then after the eleventh century they came into the country in great numbers, "frequently fusing with bodies of natives so that it is impossible today to discriminate at all between Arab and Berber tribes. One can only say that of all North Africa Tunisia is on the whole the most arabicized region." 22

Certain distinctions between the two groups have been drawn by writers seeking to differentiate between the Arabs and the Berbers: the Arabs were usually dark-haired, the

---


Berbers either fair or dark; the Arabs had considerable imagination and artistic feeling, while the Berbers were without much originality and appear to have had little capacity for self-development; the Arabs were fanatical Mohammedans, the great propagators of Islamism in Africa, while the Berbers were much more apathetic towards their religion, and for the most part were docile and unwarlike; the Arabs were generally nomadic, while the Berbers were much more interested in a settled life in which they could till the soil and follow agricultural pursuits.

Today even the last distinction cannot be made, because nomadism is dying out everywhere in Tunisia, largely because of the efforts and land program of the protectorate. "There are no longer migrations of considerable extent nor in large bodies, except in very bad years. Usually the tribe remains stationary and a few herdsmen take the flocks away. It is the flocks only which move..."

---

28. Ibid.
remains the chief exception to this rule.

Nor will the matter of language serve to make a conclusive distinction between Berber and Arab. Berber dialects have almost entirely disappeared from Tunisia. Berber is spoken "only in the kaidate of Gafsa . . . among the Matmata, the Tuaregs, and on the island of Djerba, where women in particular preserve the old idiom. . . . The linguistic arabicisation of Tunisia is practically complete."

However, in a few instances it is possible to pick out regions in which either Arab or Berber predominate. In the mountains of the north, west, and center it is possible to "meet distinct groups, some Arab and some Berber, . . . and along side these two ethnic groups . . . people of mixed blood."

The Kroumiris of the north, for example, are examples of almost pure Berber stock; in the east, the great invasion route of the Arabs, Arab stock is to be found almost exclusively; in the southwest in the Djerid are Arabs, in the region of Nefzaoua are Berbers; in the southeast all of Arad, save Matmata, is Arab, while Ourghamma and the adjoining regions are largely Berber. And everywhere will be found people of mixed blood, as the Zlass of Kairouan.

29. Ibid., p. 367.
31. Ibid.
They have now become united by religion as well. The Berbers of the seventh century, after the first Arab invasion, easily relinquished their belief in Christianity and accepted Islam. The term Musulman, applied by the Mohammedans to themselves and meaning "resigned to the will of God," fitted in well with the general character of the Berber tribes and suggested a philosophy which was easy for them to accept. Today, though there are religious antagonisms between them because they "represent different sects or degrees of the Moslem faith," they claim a religious kinship because "Moslems everywhere have a strong tendency to claim direct descent from the prophet or his family."

It is a curious fact that it is the Berber tribes, those few which can be picked out as being almost assuredly of pure Berber stock, who are either the most significant from an historical standpoint to our present consideration or are sufficiently unusual in their manner of life to

---


justify, at this point, a brief survey. Illustrative of the first group are the Kroumirs of the north, who served as an excuse for the French intervention in 1881. Illustrative of the second are the Tuaregs and the troglodytes of the south, whose manner of life has created definite problems for France in her administration of the indigenous population since the establishment of the protectorate.

The Kroumirs, the most distinctive of the northern Berber tribes, were those tribes on the Tunisian-Algerian frontier, who, at the time of the intervention of France, were joined in a loose federation under the nominal authority of the Bey. They were reported as being predatory, and having as their principal goal the defense of the entry into their own territory. In general they were without fixed homes, stopping wherever they might be in the mountains or in the forests, and making tents of branches covered with loosely-woven woolen cloth. The Kroumirs were the wildest and most independent of the various tribes in the confederation, so that their names came to be attached to the entire group. No study of them has been done in detail, and most of the information concerning them was made available at the time of the intervention; consequently it may be highly colored. However, they presented a problem for France sometime after the nominal protectorate was established.

In the Tunisian Sahara dwell the Tuaregs, who are also of pure Berber stock. They are as fierce as the desert they inhabit, haughtily styling themselves the "Noble People." It is possible that these nomadic Tuaregs, wearing the litham or veil and mounted either on racing camels or fiery horses, who were driven into the desert by the great Arab invasions, still possess the great vigor of the Berbers who were described by Sallust. They have a "world-wide notoriety . . . which is certainly in a measure due to the remarkable aggressiveness which characterizes them and the exceptional originality that distinguishes them as an unusual human type."

The Tuaregs are perhaps better explained by E. F. Gautier, the great French historian at the University of Algiers, than by any other scholar.

The Tuaregs, isolated for centuries in a lost corner of the world, are still closely linked to primitive humanity in an astonishing degree. They still make arm bands of polished stone and their ax shafts are of Neolithic construction. The litham [the Saharan veil which masks the entire face except for the eyes and is never removed] has no hygienic purpose among them, but is a pure survival of animism, being worn not as a veil to protect the respiratory tracts against the desert wind, but to keep the 'bad spirits' out of the nose and the mouth which are the gateways of the breath and thus of the soul . . . Their language of course is Berber, but, what is more they are the only ones in the world to write it. Among them and nowhere else the


38. Gautier, op. cit., p. 201.
ancient Libyan alphabet, . . . is still in use.

Gautier points out that of all their Berber heritage the one thing they have most faithfully preserved is "an undying hatred of the Arab invader," a fact which has added to the French problem of native administration. Warfare between the two groups has been an almost uninterrupted one, though the Tuareg, "... without access to the outside world, had only his primitive traditional weapons . . . still equipped with the lance, the great shield of antelope hide, and the huge right-handed sword." They possess a "militancy all the more remarkable because in actual numbers they are so few."

The second group of southern Berbers to cause trouble for the French administration, because of their own strong tribal ties and unusual social pattern were the troglodytes, or dwellers in caves. There are two general groups of these people, the climbing troglodytes and those who live underground, each of them living as they did two thousand years ago.

In the mesa-like hillsides of the Matmata plateau (Douirat, for example), the climbing troglodytes have dug

39. Ibid., pp. 203-04.
40. Ibid., p. 205.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
PLANS OF TROGLODYTE DWELLINGS.

Taken from Augustin Bernard, Enquête sur l'habitation rurale des indigènes de la Tunisie. pp. 53-54.
CHORFAS AT MEDENINE.

A SURFACE VIEW OF THE TROGLODYTE VILLAGE OF MATHATA.

Figure #3.
into the comparatively soft marl and made good-sized chambers for themselves. The effect looks rather like a giant conical honey-comb. The dwellings are rather more extensive than the ones of the cave-dwellers in France and Spain, both in size and plan, and to ascend them one has to be as agile as a monkey and as fearless as a goat. At Médenine and Metameur, however, another branch of the climbing troglodytes have established themselves in types of dwellings which are unique. On the level plain several thousand houses have been built in the shape of loaves of French bread, from which the front "heel" has been cut and from which the inside has been removed. Some of these buildings, called ghorfas or rhorfas, are of one story only, while some may be four, five or even six stories in height, with the only ascent by means of occasional small projecting stones, worn smooth with centuries of use. They are all built with the outer walls touching, and are arranged in horseshoe groups for better protection. They are used today both as storehouses and residences; closed by a thick door they may be locked with a heavy wooden key which would defy the ingenuity of the cleverest safe breaker -- the type of key mentioned in the Bible. Anachronistic are the two or three French homes, and the modern little

43. C. Sallustius Crispus, Conspiracy of Cataline and the Jugurthine War (N. Y., 1931, trans. by J. S. Watson), Vol. XVIII, pp. 105-6. Here Sallust refers to the ghorfas: "Their dwellings today are of an oblong shape, with curved roofs, resembling the hulls of ships."
French school house at the edge of the village of Médenine.

At Matamata, some sixty miles west, live the troglodytes who have built their homes underground. Their dwellings are huge circular wells, some fifty to sixty feet in diameter and thirty feet deep. They dot the valley as far as the eye can see. These strange subterranean homes are entered through dark sloping tunnels, sometimes two hundred feet in length. Usually they branch off to small storerooms and "bedrooms" for the chickens, goats, sheep, donkeys, etc., and open into a circular courtyard about thirty feet below ground level, which serves as the patio of the house. Around the vertical sides of this courtyard are dug the rooms of the occupants; usually they are of good size, their walls whitewashed. The scanty furniture -- tables, beds and divans -- are made of hard clay or of the rocky sub-surface itself, and the chief objects of decoration are clocks, of which there may be as many as twenty in a room -- none of them running. The Arab proverb: "Time is not: when one is bored the minutes pass like hours; when one is happy the hours pass like minutes" may account for the latter eccentricity.

---

The Tunisian Arab tribes, on the other hand, even those who have maintained their tribal integrity, have presented no such striking personality characteristics nor patterns of living as the Berber groups which we have just pointed out. They have proved easier for the French to amalgamate and assimilate. In the Djerid region they live as did their ancestors, dwelling in small villages in mud-houses (gourbis), and cultivating patches of ground in the oasis, either as owner or share-cropper. The Bedouins of the desert, who live in their tents, as well as the urban Arabs have been able to conform with comparative ease under a French administration.

Jews: Also of considerable importance in the Tunisian indigenous population are the Hebrews. Many of them are descendants of the Jews who were settled in the country before the conquest by the Arabs; some are Jews who were driven out of Spain and Portugal; and many have migrated within the last few hundred years, a large percentage of whom came from Leghorn, "the principal market of the Jews expelled from the Iberian peninsula." The Jews of Tunis

45. Reclus, op. cit., Vol. XI, p. 199; Robert Scémama, La Tunisie agricole et rurale et l'œuvre de la France; étude historique, législative, et économique, contribuant à l'idée d'une politique d'Empire concertée, et harmonisée (Paris, 1933), p. 23. Since citations will be given from volumes written by several members of the Scémama family, the first name of the author will always be given, in order to assure easy and sure identification of the material.
are pacific by nature, but they were ambitious and seized every opportunity to make profit for themselves from the apathy of the more sluggish Mohammedans. Having overflowed the ghettos (or hara) to which they were originally restricted, they have spread today throughout all quarters of the towns. Their presence is greatly resented in the souks, or bazaars, because of the competition which they offer to the Mohammedan merchants and artisans. Jewish natives are to be found today, no longer forced to dress in a distinctive fashion, in all walks of Tunisian life, although there is rather high feeling against them.

**Europeans:** In addition to the native population, there are a considerable number of Europeans in Tunisia -- French, Italians, and English being the preponderant groups. In numbers, however, the Europeans constitute less than 10 per cent of the total population. Today they live apart from the indigenes, save in the case of a few rich and politically powerful native families. The relations of the Europeans with the native population is a part of the story which is to be developed in the following chapters.

---

46. Reclus, loc. cit. The author also points out that the Jewish tendency to corpulence makes them especially noticeable; "till quite recently young girls were subjected to a special fattening process, art stepping in to assist nature in making them 'substantial members of society'." See also A. d'Anthourard, Réflexions sur notre politique coloniale en Tunisie (Paris, 1914), p. 4.
Forming a class apart, and yet always included as Europeans, are the Maltese, who are accepted willingly by neither the Tunisian Europeans nor the indigenes. Tunisian reaction to them is rather well characterized by Reclus who wrote of them, "... if however the name of European can be applied to these Arab Catholics." Due to England's occupation of Malta in 1800 they are of British nationality, although the inhabitants of the island are ethnically Italian. In fact many of the Maltese families of Tunisia today emigrated there when Malta was still independent and 47 Italian.

History

Robert Scémama, one of the family of Tunisian lawyers and jurists who has played an important part in the administrative life of Tunisia since the establishment of the protectorate, has written, with the sensitive feeling of the native for his country, that Tunisia has had a "passé tourmenté... that it has been the melting pot where sundry civilizations have been... mingled."

The history of the region began with the founding of Utica, a Phoenician colony, at the mouth of the Medjerda River in the twelfth century B.C. Nearby, legend tells us, Dido built her city; historians place the date of its founding on the basis of a "treatise, wrongly attributed to Aristotle," in which Utica was supposed to have been founded 287 years before Carthage -- or in 814-813 B.C. Carthago is a Latin translation of the Phoenician form Quart hadast, or new city. Since that time the country


51. Idem.
has passed through numerous periods both of advanced civilization and decay. For centuries it was the seat of the Punic power, a glory which was to be shorn in 146 B.C. by Rome. "Carthage sank in ruins before the malevolence of the Elder Cato, to rise again at the touch of Augustus" and become the second city in the western Roman world. One of the greatest of Rome's granaries and storehouses, a stronghold of Christianity it remained in Roman hands for five centuries. The Roman ruins to be found at Carthage, Sbeitla, El-Djem and Dougga -- the fora with their great arches and temples, the imposing amphitheatres and baths which are rivals in size and magnificence to those of Rome itself -- bear witness to the brilliance of the civilization which was achieved under Roman domination. Mute testimony to the power of the Empire of the Caesars is borne by the grandeur and vastness of the ruins of the colosseum at El-Djem, "colossus of the desert which seemed to equal the Pyramids in its gigantic size and solitude, certainly the most astounding edifice of North Africa and one of its most mysterious." But Rome left her mark not only in such


RUINS OF CARTHAGE.
THE RUINS OF THE ROMAN COLOSSEUM AT EL DJEM.
great cities as those whose skeletons remain to us today. Great names of the Church -- Tertullian, Cyprian, and Augustine -- will forever tell of the power of the Church in North Africa.

Then in 428 A. D. when imperial power was weak under Valentinian III came Genseric (Geiserich) and his Vandals from Spain. They were followed in a little more than a hundred years (534) by the invasion of Belisarius, a general of the Byzantine emperor Justinian, who brought the province back under Greco-Latin rule. The conquest of Justinian "though triumphal in appearance was in reality mediocre and precarious" with the result that the pristine brilliance and prosperity of the country was not again achieved. In 642 came the beginning of the Mohammedan invasions; at first they were raids only. "The conquest of what is now Tunisia cost the Arab invaders who came from the southwest at least half a century of fierce fighting with the native Berbers and the Byzantine governors." The real occupation of the Maghrib only dates from the period of 669-775 and was marked by the victories of Ukba ben Nafī, and the foundation of Kairouan. The Berbers accepted Islam and Christianity


ceased to exist. Under the new rule much of the old Carthaginian importance was restored, however, and Tunis received its autonomy as capital of the Kingdom of Kairouan. These first Arabs were not without culture and left some fine examples of Saracen art. They gave Tunisia its faith, its language, and its literature, and left Kairouan, the second "Holy City" of the Moslems, as the one city built by them, the countless minarets and domes of its white mosques to testify to its religious importance in the midst of the silent desert which surrounds it on all sides.

But peace was still not yet to come to Tunisia. As one Tunisian historian, with a feeling like that of Scémama's, said: "her history is a great fresco where are mingled, not without glory, the successive efforts of races and of peoples." In the years after 1130 the Norman king, Roger II of Sicily, conquered Tunis and with the consent of the Pope took the title of King of Africa. It was a period of sound

58. Hardy, op. cit., p. 346; Pellegrin, op. cit., pp. 95-91; "Ukba ben Nafi at the head of a new army of invasion . . . founded Kairouan in 670 . . . 'I wish to found a city which we will make our retreat and our fortress (kairouane) and which will be a bulwark for Islam for all time.' Such were the words of the conquering Arab which were the prelude to the founding of Kairouan in the midst of an immense desert waste." Ibid., p. 34.


60. Pellegrin, op. cit., p. 11.
administration but was short-lived for within twenty years the Normans were driven out by the Arabs, who in increased numbers and inspired by renewed fanaticism, had been coming into the country since the eleventh century.

In the following century commercial activities of the Marseilles merchants were much in evidence. A prosperous Tunisian government under the independent Hafsid dynasty tolerated the Christian traders. In the statutes of the city of Marseilles for the year 1228, for example, one finds articles having to do with the wine trade of that city with Tunis. And in the same statutes in 1255 an authorization is given to French merchants established in Tunis to choose one of their own number to act as consular agent to represent France in its dealings with the local authorities. But this tolerance did not make Louis IX feel more friendly to the enemies of Christianity, for in 1270 he made an attack upon Tunis the primary object of his ill-fated Seventh Crusade. At a time when the original crusading fervor was a thing of the past, the pious ruler, urged probably by his brother, Charles of Anjou, launched a crusade to convert the


"roi de Thunes" and to use his territory as a base of operations for the conquest of the infidels of Egypt and Syria, hoping to make thereby the highway to Jerusalem safe for pilgrims. Unfortunately for French plans, before the arrival of his brother from Sicily, Louis died of dysentery and fever.

In the century and a half immediately thereafter frequent hostilities developed between France and Tunis, largely as a result of the activities of Tunisian pirates. The Hafsid rulers, as they grew financially and politically weaker, practically sanctioned piracy as an aid to retaining their power. Nevertheless real war was prevented from breaking out between the two countries.

In 1534 a Turkish squadron arrived at LaGoulette, the harbor of the city of Tunis, and with the aid of Khair-al-Din, the famous pirate who was already installed on the island of Djerba with the consent of the weak Hafsid ruler, the fall of the Hafsid dynasty was proclaimed and Tunisia was declared to be Turkish territory. Emperor Charles V

64. Hardy, op. cit., p. 349; Pellegrin, op. cit., pp. 119-20.


of Spain felt he could not sit idly by to watch Tunisia fall under the yoke of Turkey, particularly when appealed to by the dethroned prince, Moula Hassen. He therefore moved against the Turks, obliging them in July 1535 to abandon their conquest. Moula Hassen regained his throne, placing Tunisia, however, under the suzerainty of Spain, agreeing as a vassal to pay tribute, as well as to permit the occupation and fortification of La Goulette by Spanish soldiers. The Spanish rule was never a secure one and in 1571 after the victory at Lepanto, Don John of Austria, brother of Philip II of Spain, attempted to reseat the Hafsids ruler on the unsteady throne. Finally in 1574 the era of Spanish rule was definitely ended by the Turkish reconquest of Tunisia by Ottoman troops brought from Constantinople on Sinan Pasha's fleet. "This marked the end of the old Tunisian state and the reduction of Tunisia to a Turkish province."


The new conquerors checked anarchy with organized brutality and established a semblance of government. Its authority did not extend into the mountainous districts where tribal independence, anarchy, and violence persisted even to the time of the French occupation. Even though government was somewhat stabilized, however, piracy continued and under Turkish rule became a "national industry." With the other Barbary states, Tripoli, Algeria, and Morocco, Tunisia became a nest of sea-rovers whose ships spread terror throughout the Mediterranean. The actual power of this new government was placed by Sinân, before his return to Constantinople, in the hands of a Turkish pasha at first under the jurisdiction of the ruler of Algeria but from 1587, since the first arrangement was so very unsatisfactory, directly under the Forte. An agha was in command of the janissaries, an army of occupation of some 4,000 men, each hundred of whom was under a dey, and the higher officers of whom constituted the diwan, or governing council. At the head of all, nominally, was the pasha. However because the power was divided between the pasha and the diwan trouble ensued. In 1590 the extreme tyranny and excesses of the latter body provoked a bloody palace revolution, which cost the life of virtually every one of its members.

The new government was destined to sail through waters very little smoother than those through which its predecessors had passed. Turmoil and anarchy were also to be its lot. At the head of the government the janissaries placed one of the forty devş, subordinating to him very shortly (1593) a bey who was charged specifically with the administration of finances and the overlordship of the tribes. Between 1590 and 1705 some thirty devşs ruled, *"a majority were deposed, while others suffered violent and in some cases horrible death at the hands of their subjects."

Piracy continued and Tunisian corsairs held practically all Europe at bay.

From this time on the relations of Tunisia to the Porte were somewhat those of a military protectorate. Moral and political influence, however, continued to be exercised in a permanent fashion in Tunisia by Turkey. The particular episodes in which the latter attempted to draw Tunisia more closely to her, in the years between 1574 and 1881, are of much importance considering the degree in which European powers were also involved; the positions adopted by them in respect to Tunisia's relationship to the Sublime Porte took on especial significance at the time of the occupation in 1881.

---


From 1631-1702 the office of Bey was hereditary in the descendents of Murad, a "Corsican renegade" who increased the prestige of his office. The growing rivalry between the deys and the beys kept the country in a state of constant turmoil. Civil war, almost continuous war with Algeria, trouble with the European powers over piracy, and trouble with Turkey were only the order of the day. In the thirteen years, 1686 to 1699, seven deys held office, one of whom, Mohammed Tatar had the "rare distinction of being eaten by his subjects" in 1695.

Little wonder then that in 1700 another civil war began, instigated by Ibrahim-es-Cheirif, who succeeded in overthrowing the deylical power and putting to death all the members of the family of Murad. Five years of near-chaos followed during which the offices of bey, dey, and pasha were combined


77. Broadley cites an unnamed French priest who visited the Regency in 1700 and in a series of letters addressed to his Superior, "Etat des Rayaumes de Barbarie, Tripoli, Tunis, et Alger," gives an account of his travels. He says this event was described to him by an eyewitness thus: "'Mehemet Bey accepted his surrender, but the people who were excited to madness no sooner saw him than, in spite of the efforts of the Bey, they fell upon him, tore him to pieces, and by an excess of cruelty belonging to these Barbarians eat [ate] his flesh.'" He adds that the widow of Tatar, who regarded Mehemet as the cause of her husband's death, took a piece of his flesh in her hand and rushed into the Bey's presence. Upbraiding him with Tatar's death, she prayed to God that she might live to see him devoured as her husband had been and, to emphasize her words, actually ate the morsel she carried." Broadley, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 66.

in the one person of Ibrahim. Taken prisoner on an expedition against Algeria he was replaced by Hussein ben Ali, a Cretan of energy but of little better character or standing than Murad had been. The new bey founded the dynasty of Husselinites, based on the hereditary principle, the dynasty which still rules nominally in Tunisia today.

It was greatly hoped, of course, that the advent of the new line would bring order out of the chaos. But unfortunately little good was accomplished by the change. "The piracy of the Deyas became the privateering of the Beys, and civil discord continued as rife as ever, with the sole difference that it was more or less confined to one family."

The period from 1705 to 1837 was one of absolute power for the beys, but with the advent of the French in Algeria a new element was interjected into the situation. While the Bey of Tunis was relieved to be rid of his hereditary enemy, the Dey of Algiers, the proximity of France imposed new obligations. "They could not become our neighbors and re-

It was at this time that the term Regency came to be applied to Tunisia and to signify the political relationship which existed between the Porte and the North African region: that its princes acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan and ruled in his name as "Bey" or Regent.


main barbarians ... and we had need of seeing order and prosperity in the Regency." It was at this time also that the boundary line between Algeria and Tunisia was finally settled. During the earlier period the Tunisian rulers had claimed varying lines, sometimes even as far west as Bône. Finally in May, 1833, Cap Roux was recognized by HusseIn-Bey as the delimitation of his legal claim.

Pressure came on the internal administration also from the French and English consuls, and certain liberal ideas were introduced by the Bey. The period which followed, from 1837 to 1881, might well be called the period of the liberal monarchy, but it was especially marked by the increase in the influence of European powers in the internal affairs of the country and was climaxed by the French invasion and the establishment of the protectorate.


Generalizations

A survey, thus, of various geographical considerations, and of the ethnography, and history of Tunisia suggests certain pertinent generalizations:

1. Tunisia is a country so rich and desirable as to have been coveted by others.

2. From the first Tunisia has been a conquered land.

3. The Tunisians have never successfully resisted invasion, nor have they ever succeeded in throwing off the yoke of a conquerer.

4. Throughout Tunisian history internal dissent has made difficult the problems of both the conquering and the indigenous governments.
MAP OF TUNISIA
WITH PLACES MENTIONED IN THE TEXT
COMPILED BY HELEN BROUGHLAND METCALF 1942
SCALE OF KILOMETERS
CHAPTER II

FRANCO-ITALIAN RIVALRY DEVELOPS

It has been pointed out relations between Tunisia and the French and Italian merchant cities has a long history. The jostling for positions of preponderance, however, did not go beyond a struggle for fishing rights and establishments, or for certain commercial privileges until the time of Charles X.

Apparently the Italians were established first, and by 1157 the even had assigned to them a special quarter of Tunis. Treaties of peace and commerce were signed frequently, as they were with certain of the French cities, Marseille in particular.

By the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries active rivalry had developed between the merchants of the two nationalities. Sometime between 1478 and 1550 the French were first given the important coral fishing concession at apex Nègre, located about eight kilometers northeast of Tabarka, and the French company Concessions d'Afrique.


came into existence. Soon afterwards concessions were given to French merchants at the Bastion de France and at La Calle. At approximately the same time an Italian concession was granted to the Lomellini family of Genoa for the coral fishing rights on the island of Tabarka, and strong establishments were made there by the Italians.

Intense rivalry and jealous covetousness developed concerning this establishment. Soon the ambitious French residing at Cap Nègre sought to force the Genoese from Tabarka. But here disaster befell them. Sanson Napolion, the ablest and most energetic of the negotiators in the Barbary in the seventeenth century, was killed and the attempt failed. In 1637, because of a Tunisian change of policy, the establishment had to be abandoned altogether, although French interest in it did not cease. In truth French influence and prestige in Tunisia had sunk at this period to a discouragingly low point. In 1613, 1618, 1623, 1631 the Bey even forbade commerce with France.


Richelieu, however, became interested in the region, possibly looking forward to exploitation other than that of coral fishing and he entered into repeated negotiations to regain the Cap Nègre concession. In 1665 Louis XIV, through the Duc de Beaufort, obtained formal recognition of the preeminence of the French consul over all other consuls, and in the following year the French were again put in possession of Cap Nègre. In 1681 the English crowded out the French for a matter of some three years until pressure from the French, supported by the threatening appearance of the fleet off the coast of La Goulette, resulted in the treaty of 1685 with the Bey, favorable to France and giving possession once again of Cap Nègre; this time it was finally ceded in perpetuity to France, under certain limiting stipulations.

Thus it is true to say that despite the treaties of 1665 and 1685 the French position in Tunisia at the end of the seventeenth century was relatively insecure. Many

9. Jean Dumont, Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens (Amsterdam, 1728), Vol. VI, pt. III, pp. 57-9; Paul Masson, Marseille et la colonisation française, essai d'histoire coloniale (Marseille, 1906), p. 140; hereafter cited as Masson, Marseille. The French consul was officially instituted in 1577, but was not installed until 1582. The English consul was instituted in 1599, and the Dutch in 1612.


factors contributed to this situation. Invasions of Tunisia from Tripoli and Algeria endangered French trade; the dynastic rivalries and civil wars already referred to created a situation harmful to trade and security of position; the coral fishing frequently proved to be poor; the private traders were jealous of the monopolies granted to the privileged companies and intrigued against them to the general harm of the French nationals; piracy continued unhampered by the Tunisian government; and last and among the most important items, the jealousy of other European powers tended naturally to restrict the development of French influence.

The eighteenth century witnessed a slow but considerable improvement in the French position under the Housseinite dynasty, in spite of repeated trouble between the Bey and successive French consuls. But in spite of government subsidies, the companies of exploitation were not a great financial success. In 1706 the establishments at Cap Nègre and the Bastion de France were merged into the Compagnie des Concessions d'Afrique and again in 1719 into the Compagnie perpetuelle des Indes. It was during this

13. Ibid., pp. 109 ff.
period that the Genoese intrigues against the French establishments disturbed France, and although the maintenance of the companies seemed to be a somewhat expensive luxury, the French were unwilling to let go, for fear of losing their holdings to their rivals. The uncertain and unde- pendable policy of the Tunisian government only aggravated the matter. Then by a royal decree of February 22, 1741, there was still another change in respect to the French holdings in Tunisia. At that time the concessions were transferred to the Compagnie Royale d'AFrique. Directed by representatives of both the royal French government and the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce, the new company attained real prosperity despite numerous difficult periods.

French imports into Tunisia increased from a value of 137,671 fr. in 1762 to 1,079,567 fr. in 1773; Tunisian exports to France increased proportionally. By 1792 the imports had risen in value to 5,373,031 fr. At the same time the commerce of other powers amounted to only one half that of France. In the meantime the French residents or traders grew in number. An ordinance of 1716 removed the prohibition which had made it impossible for women to join the male members of their family who might be in Tunisia, and by the

17. Sport, op. cit., pp. 139-42.
end of the eighteenth century a little French colony of
more than a hundred persons was established there.

The Italian cities continued their attempt to establish
their influence at the same time. By 1716 the Genoese had
20 a consul in Tunis. In December 1725 the French representa-
tive wrote complaining of the activities of four Italian
priests in the Regency, whom he accused of stirring up
feeling against the French in Tunisia even to the point of
excluding the French consul and merchants from attending
formal ceremonies and exciting slaves to oppose their en-
trace into Church services.

The hold of the Genoese on Tabarka was a source of
irritation and jealousy to the French, whose attempts to
secure the concession aroused the nervousness of the Bey.
Between 1741 and 1731, after having captured the island
at a time when most of the inhabitants were out coral fishing, the Bey could not make up his mind whether to cede it
to France, allow the Genoese to keep it, or keep it for
22 himself. In 1781, in spite of Genoese protests, the
French were given the right to fish for coral from Tabarka
to Tripoli. Venice, who in 1763 had hoped that she might

22. Rousseau, op. cit., pp. 125-27; Masson, Marseille,
   pp. 147, 400-02.
secure Tabarka, became involved in a war with the Bey in 1734 which lasted for eight years. Sfax, Sousse, and Bizerte were nearly destroyed; all Venetians, consequently, were expelled from Tunisia, and in the end, the Venetian Republic was forced to pay a considerable indemnity. France, of course, was pleased at whatever discomfiture came to the Italian cities.

The French Revolution temporarily ended the rising French prosperity in the Regency. To begin with, the Compagnie Royale d'Afrique was dissolved. Then in the warfare which ensued between France and England, English sea power played havoc with French commerce; moreover Bonaparte's conquest of Egypt antagonized the Tunisian Moslems against France.

Interesting sidelights on this troubled period in Franco-Tunisian relations come to us from the despatches of the consuls of the United States in Algiers and Tunis at the time. In April, 1801, William Eaton, Consul in Tunis since 1797, wrote to the Secretary of State:

... This Highwayman [the Bey] is much the most gentlemanlike of the three. He seldom robs a man without first creating a pretext. He has some ideas of justice and not wholly destitute

---


of a sense of shame. He is vain of the notions of integrity and honour which he imagines the nations accord to him -- and in this point is vulnerable -- I state these observations that the President may form an answer on them. While we are in difficulties with Tripoli it seems to me a good policy to be on good terms with Tunis; but, if the Government should think differently; and, in lieu of a ship with presents, will consign to me a transport with one thousand marines, between 20 and 35 years of age, native American, and properly officered, under convoy of a frigate, I pledge myself to surprise Porto Farina and destroy the Bey's arsenal. 27

At the end of December, 1793, Richard O'Brien, the Consul General in Algiers sent to David Humphreys, the U.S. Minister to Madrid, information to be forwarded to the Secretary of State on how war came to be declared against France.

The Tunician Gov., in obedience to the Grand Signiors Orders, observed that the would act as the Algerians would. The Dey has sent Orders to Tunis to declare war and secure the French. The number of French at Tunis is 250. They all will be made Slaves of, and of Course Tripolia will adopt the same plan. 28

Two later reports add further light on the treatment of the French by the Bey. Both were sent by the American consuls in Tunis to the Department of State. The first was sent by James L. Cathcart in February:


... You will be inform'd before the receipt of this that Algiers and Tunis has declared war against the great Republic. It was occasioned by the Grand Segnior sending a Chaoux in the character of Ambassador from the Port to said Regency's with a positive order so to do ... The Ambassador arrived here on the 19th of last December and war was declared on the 21st. The whole French legation were immediately put in chains and sent to the severest labour where they remained 46 days. They are now permitted to remain in their houses to wait the result of Buonaparte's expedition who at present is fortified at Grand Cairo and possesses 15 of the principal villages in Egypt, this is the current report of this City ... 29

In June William Eaton confirmed the imprisonment of the French in Tunis.

When war was declared against France the consul and all his countrymen were confined in close prison and their property sequestered, notwithstanding a treaty stipulation that the consul and others of his nation should be allowed one year after declaration of war to adjust their affairs and depart the Kingdom ... 30

In 1802, however, Napoleon I was able to negotiate a treaty renewing friendly relations with Tunisia. French aid to the Bey on the occasion of a military revolt in 1811 brought the two powers even closer together, and in spite of other pressure French influence became preponderant in Tunisia by the end of the Napoleonic era. Naples, however, in 1814 secured the joint right with the French of

fishing in Tunisian waters; in May, 1316, the first
Sardinian consul arrived to take up his duties; and late
in December of the same year the Neapolitan flag flew in
the city of Tunis for the first time.

After the Congress of Vienna, Europe in alliance forced
the new Bey, Mahmoud, (1815-24) to agree to suppress for-
ever the slavery of Christians in his possessions and to
promise not to arm ships for piracy. As a pirate state
Tunisia had become a nuisance to the citizens of all
nations who had business on the Mediterranean, but the
Powers in general had found it more convenient and pro-
fitable to buy immunity than to chastise the criminals. By
the treaty signed in 1316, it was hoped to put an end to
the nearly impossible situation. But as might have been
expected, the Bey did not fulfill his promises; in 1319,
consequently, Lord Exmouth, commander-in-chief of the
British Mediterranean squadron, accompanied by French
vessels, presented the joint note of the Powers assembled
at Aix-la-Chapelle. Mahmoud yielded to pressure and
agreed to "cause privateering in his States to cease, and
in the future to respect scrupulously the existing treaties

32. Rousseau, op. cit., p. 325.

33. Great Britain, Foreign Office, British and
Foreign State Papers (London, 1835, eds. Sir Edward Hertslet
and Sir Edward Cecil Hertslet), Vol. III, pp. 182-85; here-
after cited as BFSP.
Then in the reign of the succeeding bey, Hussein, (1824-35) began the new and significant era in the relations of Tunisia with other powers -- particularly with France. It was at this point that the struggle for preponderance began to take on a serious aspect and began to develop into the "Tunisian question." The French conquest of Algeria in 1830 was the significant episode marking the beginning of this new period. It was Jules Ferry who later in his attempt to justify his Tunisian policy pointed out that "The Tunisian question is as old as the Algerian." The French conquest of Algeria gave France a motive for seeking the acquisition of the Regency -- that of securing her existing possessions. The preservation of Algeria later demanded the absorption of Tunisia and incidentally that of Morocco. The intervention in Tunisia fifty years later, therefore, was the inevitable consequence of the conquest of Algeria. From this date we find France increasingly sensitive to other foreign influence in the Regency. Not only did she endeavor more vigorously to solidify her own position, but she tried as well to remove all other foreign influence from the Regency, until such events should develop as would justify more positive action.


The energies of the consuls in behalf of their countries became increasingly noticeable. Like his colleagues, Mattieu de Lesseps was zealous in his efforts for France. A lucky accident in 1829 by which he was able to save the life of the Bey during a palace revolution sufficiently increased French prestige so as to make possible the negotiations of the treaty of 1830. Feeling himself indebted to the French consul and decidedly pleased with seeing his Algerian neighbor and enemy chastised, the Bey declared

I throw myself with confidence into the arms of France certain that she will not abandon me in the day of peril, and I desire nothing as much as the exemplary punishment of the unjust aggressor. 36

Furthermore, his actions were in keeping with his words, for he aided France in various ways during the conquest of Algeria. By the terms of the new treaty, urged by Polignac and secured by de Lesseps, certain English fishing rights on the Tunisian littoral were abrogated and ceded in perpetuity to France. Especially important however was the secret article providing France with a site on the Byrsa of


37. At Tafna, May 30, 1837, the treaty was concluded between Bugeaud and Abd-el-Kader, recognizing French sovereignty in Algeria. Text is given in French in Alexandre de Clercq, Recueil des traités de la France (Paris, 1865), Vol. IV, pp. 375-77.
Carthage, on which France might erect a religious monument in honor of Louis IX, "on the spot where that Prince died." When time came for the erection of the monument so sanctioned, foreign opposition was registered.

The Forte in 1837 made one of its periodic attempts to reassert its suzerainty over Tunis. The July monarchy pursued a consistent course of opposition to such action and in his Mémoires, Guizot points out the attitude of his government in this respect.

The Forte had for a long time nourished the desire . . . of taking from the Regency all it had acquired of hereditary independence, and of reducing the Bey of Tunis to a simple pacha. A Turkish squadron came nearly every year from the Sea of Marmora to make a demonstration, more or less threatening, off the Tunisian coast . . . . We had not the slightest wish to conquer the Regency, but we wished to maintain the status quo; and as often as a Turkish squadron approached or threatened to approach Tunis, our vessels advanced towards the coast with the order to protect the Bey against any enterprise of the Turks.

The attitude of the Beys toward this more vigorous French policy varied. Hussein favored the French for the most part, and though French ambitions did not go unnoticed, the attempts of the Ottoman Empire to reassert its authority were also feared. Under Ahmed (1837-1855) the menace of the Sublime Forte to Tunisian independence tended to throw Tunisia into the arms of France. Desirous of

maintaining his independence of the Porte, Ahmed found both France and England willing to aid him. The policy of the two powers was based on opposing political theories, however. France openly affirmed that the Bey of Tunis was an hereditary sovereign who was politically dependent on no foreign authority. England held the contrary view and announced her policy to be the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, of which she considered Tunisia an integral part.

In 1844, as in 1837, the Sultan sent an officer to the Regency as the bearer of a firman of investiture. The Bey, reputedly at the instigation of the French consul, replied, "that he held the sovereignty of Tunis freely from his ancestors and that he had no need whatever of investiture." As might be expected, Ahmed drew closer to France; and French influence so increased after 1841 that de Lagau, the Consul in Tunis, could write in 1845 "I can state that in this part of North Africa we now have all the advantages of possession with none of the inconveniences." De Lagau had "feathered his nest" by marrying into the family of de Lesseps, former consul, whose three sons were among the most influential men in the Regency.


42. Julien, loc. cit.
In the spring of this same year the purport of the secret article of the 1830 treaty was revealed, for at that time the French began building their memorial chapel to St. Louis. The Byrsa had been the first point fortified by the Carthaginians, and as the last spur of a natural range of hills which extend inward from Sidi-Bou-Bared and the bay of Tunis, the position is a commanding one. For a time, so extensive were the buildings, that the Bey, as well as the consuls of other powers, protested their similarity to fortifications. With some modification, however, the work was completed.

In 1845 the King sent his son, the duc de Montpensier, to Tunis and finally in November of the following year, Ahmed made a trip to France where he was received as an independent sovereign and accorded high honors. He is said to have given up plans to extend his trip to London because the Queen would receive him only in the company of the Turkish Ambassador. The July Monarchy, with its policy of maintaining the status quo in Tunisia, was forging strong links between France and the Regency.

Neither England nor Italy looked favorably upon this policy of France. Reade, who was English consul at Tunis

---

from the accession of Hussein (1824) until 1841, pursued a
course which, if not actually hostile to France, at least
was designed to check her activities in the Regency. In
reporting the death of Hussein to his own government, he
wrote:

The poor Bey sent for me yesterday to offer
his last adieu; but when I arrived, although he
recognized me instantly, he was unable to speak.
I was the only consul he sent for. Upon several
occasions latterly when I called upon him he
never omitted expressing his most anxious wishes
for the continuation of that good harmony which
has latterly so happily subsisted between his
Government and England. 46

In 1844 Reade came to loggerheads with all the consuls in
Tunis, save with John Howard Payne, the American consul.
Reade became involved especially with de Lagau, the French
agent at that period. The matter was one which concerned
the trial of three Maltese involved in the murder of Reade’s
valet and dragoman. The British Foreign Office permitted
the trial to be held in the beylical courts under the juris-


47. Payne was twice consul in Tunis, in 1845 and again
in 1851. He died in the consulate in Tunis, April 9, 1852.
Amos Perry, An Official Tour Along the Eastern Coast of the
Regency of Tunis (Providence, R. I., 1891), pp. 15, 106.
This work will be later cited as An Official Tour. Perry is
one of our most valuable sources of information concerning
this period. He published two works on Tunisia after his
tour of duty was ended, and his frequent reports to the
State Department, to be cited frequently somewhat later,
give us the fullest and most unbiased information of the
contemporary Tunisian picture to be found anywhere.
diction of the Bey himself, while the other consuls were bitter in their protests to and condemnation of Reade for not claiming Consular jurisdiction for the case.

Popular excitement, according to Reade's report, was probably instigated by the vociferous French Consul. Placards such as the following appeared mysteriously on walls in Tunis.

Maltese Brethren!
The Mahometans, enemies of the Cross, must not imbrue their sacrilegious hands in the blood of Christians; no, never! Unite all under the sacred banner of the Cross; arm yourselves with courage, and with steady courage extricate your three countrymen from the hands of your blood-thirsty Consul, and from his perfidious Jewish counsellor (who is well known to you). If you fail to do this, your three countrymen will be victims, and you will have the disgrace to behold the Mussulmans in a very few hours joyfully drink your blood; which God forbid.
Long live Religion!

Two British warships came into the harbor, both as a threat and to aid British nationals should the necessity arise.

There was some continuation of the popular excitement and then, after the passing of the death sentence by the court, the situation simmered down again.

Though French domestic affairs, during and immediately following the revolutions of 1848, aroused more interest than foreign policy, the French position in Tunisia was not

43. Great Britain, Accounts and Papers, State Papers and Sessional Papers, Correspondence relating to the Trial of a Maltese in the Court of the Bey of Tunis (London, 1844), Vol. LI, pp. 1-43.

49. Ibid., p. 18.
damaged. French influence continued to be marked, particu-
larly after Ahmed's return from Paris. He thought to do
much for Tunisia by modernizing and *Gallicizing* the coun-
try. He built a polytechnical school; he built also a complete
military and naval establishment in the hope of developing
a strong regular army and a navy capable of defending it-
self; he built a great palace at Mohammedia, after the
fashion of Versailles, some fifteen kilometers from Tunis.
He borrowed certain liberal ideas as well. Slavery was of-
ficially abolished; certain exceptional laws against the
Jews were abrogated; and certain strictly Turkish taxes
were abolished.

Ahmed's borrowed ideas, however, were in no way prac-
tical for his own country. The only desire of the peaceful
farmers whom he tried to draft into his army was to desert;
their weapons were of greater danger to themselves than to
any potential enemy. The students whom he hoped to enroll
in his polytechnical school for the most part could not even
read nor write their own names. But at every step he was
aided and abetted in his grandiose notions by his minister,
Mustapha Khaznadar, who was to be the evil genius of the
next two reigns as well. Originally a Greek slave, he had
risen by devious and rapid means to the position of
Khaznadar or treasurer. Once established he had but two
goals: one to enrich himself and the other to satisfy the

50. *Fitoussi et Bénazet, op. cit.*, pp. 54-59; *Pellegrin,
wishes of his masters. Ahmed could see no recklessness in his own vain extravagances; Mustapha certainly made no effort to point them out, and the European powers saw them without questioning since certain of their nationals were being enriched thereby.

On the death of Ahmed-Bey, in 1855 his cousin Mohammed, the eldest son of Hussein, succeeded to the throne. Along with the debts of Ahmed, Mohammed also inherited Mustapha Khaznadar, who had lost none of his taste for luxury with the years and in whose hands the Bey was a docile instrument. The picture of Mohammed is not a pretty one, and without possessing any of the strength of Mustapha Kemal, he seems to come to his end for approximately the same reasons. His harem was the most famous in modern history; to house it adequately he built a new and costly palace at the Bardo, the building today occupied by the Alaouli museum. There he kept his forty favorites, Caucasian, Jewish, Greek, Italian, Arab, and Abyle, in the utmost of luxury, each with her particular household: hairdressers, seamstresses, bathers, laundresses, cooks, etc. Sickly, frequently indulging in violent fits of passion, "his vitality wore itself out in the arms of his captivating idols."

———


It was a situation of which the foreign consuls were easily able to take advantage and, as might have been anticipated, they did so. In the year of Mohammed's accession, the new French Consul-general, Léon Roches, took over his post. He had been secretary both to Abd-el-Kader, and to Marshall Bugeaud and had served as interpreter-in-chief to the African army. Speaking perfectly, as he did, Arabic and many of the dialects, and being thoroughly familiar with the customs of intrigues of the indigenes of North Africa, he was a valuable man in his post. Roches was an interesting character. The Bey said he was the most brilliant man who had ever spoken in the Bardo in the name of France, and even condescended to make personal calls on the consul.

However, Amos Perry, American Consul in Tunis in 1860 writes scathingly of Roches as follows:

Of all the diplomatic representatives residing at Tunis, no one appeared to better advantage on state occasions or in social circles than Léon Roches, who was there for eight years as Consul-General and Minister to France. This man rose to his high position as minister at Tunis, minister at Japan, etc., by means of a series of marvelous adventures. As a Muslim convert he married a daughter of Abdel Kader, the famous Algerian chieftain. After he had obtained from his wife and father-in-law all the state secrets relating to the war then in progress, he suddenly became a Christian convert, treacherously exposing all the secrets that had been entrusted to him. He was then rewarded by the French government for his

---

services rendered by means of falsehood and treachery. He thus became a diplomatist, so called, and his style of diplomacy was sanctioned by the French Government to the disparagement of honest and fair dealing in the settlement of international questions. 54

Able and talented, liked by the people, he was able to win the trust and friendship of the Bey in an intimacy heretofore unknown between a Tunisian ruler and the representative of a foreign power. The English were not slow to follow the French lead, and Sir Richard Wood who arrived in Tunis the year after Roches was another able and energetic man. Like his colleague "with less influence but more finesse" he also urged "progress" on Mohammed-Bey. Rivalry between the two men for favors from the Bey was keen.

Conditions in Tunisia were growing steadily worse. Beylical extravagances demanded new sources of income. Already there were oppressive taxes; among them were: (1) a dime (tithe) on grain, known by the name of achour, was a Koranic duty payable either in kind or in cash; (2) a dime on oils (the kanoun) was scandalously abused by the Ghaba which had been entrusted with olive revenues since its creation in 1730; (3) the mradjas, a tax on the garden and fruit products of the Calids of Cap Bon and Sfax; (4) the


khodar, a special land tax levied only on the island of Djerba, and dating from 1845. The taxes on the harvest, ranged from 10% and upward, depending on the energy of the tax collectors, and the taxes on the olive trees and production of olive oil were so onerous that where they were enforced the olive-growing industry was ruined as if by a blight.

Without any seeming realization of the seriousness of the situation a new tax, the mediba, was created in 1856. It was a poll tax of thirty-six piastres, from which the towns of Tunis, Soussa, Monastir, Sfax, and Kairouan were exempted. Heavy at the outset and destined to be increased in 1863, it was to be the source of frequent and sometimes grave troubles.

Abuse in collecting all of these taxes was the rule. Bloody lessons to tax evaders were taught by actual armed expeditions, called m'hala, under the direction of a caïd who, among his varied duties, was a general of the beylical army.

Justice likewise was something of a travesty on the name.


58. Ibid., p. 39; The Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. IV, p. 953; Pellegrin, op. cit., p. 159; a pîstre equaled about fifteen cents (U. S.). The mediba was suppressed by the decree of December 29, 1913, and was replaced by a personal tax, the ada-el-istman. Fitoussi et Bénazet, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 61.

In 1844 Reade and the British Foreign Office had been content to permit the trial of British proteges in the beylical court and had considered justice done. In spite of violent French protests, they had followed their own course. But in 1857 there was a scandalous case of a Jew who, after having been illtreated by certain Mohammedans, had cursed the Bey, his government, and the Moslem faith. The victim was condemned by a Beylical court to be put to death by having molten lead poured down his throat; his head was likewise cut off, to hasten matters, and then kicked about by boys in the street. When he saw this actual occurrence, Wood joined with Roches to urge reform on the Bey and in a demand for equalization of justice.

Though decidedly reluctant to grant a constitution, Mohammed-Bey on September 9, 1857, issued the Facte Fondamentale. There was nothing original in the document, for it rather consistently reproduced the provisions of the Turkish charter called the Gulkhané which the European Powers at the Congress of Paris had imposed on the Ottoman Empire.

The essential provisions were as follows:

1. Complete security of person, property, and honor of all persons in the Regency, regardless of race, religion, or nationality.
2. Equality of all before the law.

3. Equal taxation.
4. Freedom of commerce and industry and denial of special privilege, monopolies, etc.
5. Freedom of conscience and work.
6. Right of foreigners to acquire real property.  

These innovations were not fully appreciated by the Tunisians who were appalled by such revolutionary ideas as equality between Moslem and "unbeliever." Vigorous opposition to the Constitution developed, and the Bey was accused of having sold his soul to the foreigners. Most of the liberal measures consequently did not actually go into effect.

Certain concessions, forerunners of those which were to be demanded in the next decade, were granted at this time, largely as a result, also, of consular pressure. For France, Roches secured the monopolies for restoring the old aqueduct from Zaghouan to Tunis, and for a telegraph line, and in addition was guaranteed a new consulate which would be more worthy of French prestige. Likewise Wood was successful; he received the first of the railroad concessions, the right to build the line from Tunis to La Goulette. The proposed

63. Pellegrin, loc. cit.
THE AQUEDUCT OF ZACHOAH.
line was for a matter of something less than twelve miles, 
but in the struggle to gain control of it in 1880 is to be 
found one of the principal causes of French occupation.

On September 23, 1859, Mohammed died and was succeeded 
by his younger brother Mohammed-es-Saddok. Mohammed had 
"reigned only four years, but the people remember his 66 
exorbitant taxes and his avarice as well as if he had ruled 
half a century."

The new heir had been educated by a "fanatical priest," 
Ismail Sufi, who had a cordial hatred of both European 
culture and civilization, and who had done everything possi-
ble to keep from the son the father's predilection for things 67 
European, especially those things French. Mohammed-es-
Saddok as a consequence was not well equipped to cope with 
the European entanglements which were to occupy his atten-
tion from the very moment of his accession to the French 68 
intervention in 1881. His reign was to be marked by the 
intensification of rivalry between France and Italy, and 
was to end in the loss of Tunisian independence.


67. Ibid.

68. Hesse-Wartegg, op. cit., pp. 19-32, gives a 
picturesque description of the bey and his courtiers. 
Perhaps one of the most interesting items about Mohammed-es- 
Saddok was his cordial dislike of women, in contrast to his 
brother's extreme fondness for them.
CHAPTER III

ITALY SECURES INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION IN THE REGENCY

When the partial unification of the Italian nation was achieved in 1861, Italian aspirations in Tunisia began to be felt.

While Italy was still broken up into several minor states there could be no talk of colonial expansion, but with the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy, the attention of the Italian government was immediately directed to the creation of closer relations with the Beydom. Although the task of reaching complete national unity . . . lay ahead of the newly formed Italian nation its statesmen displayed keen interest in the future of Tunisia. 1

Garibaldi knew Tunisia at first hand. After making his escape from the ill-fated Roman Republic in the summer of 1849, he reached Piedmont; thence he sailed to Tunis, and eventually to New York City. In Tunis he stayed at the Casa Greco which is still a rendezvous for young Italian men, and is dear to them because of the memories of Garibaldi's visit there.

A French journalist of Le Siècle at the time of the occupation wrote a number of articles on Tunisia and pub-

1. Italian Library of Information, op. cit., p. 5.

lished a small volume on the basis of that material. He pointed out this increased Italian interest in the Regency, quoting from the press of the young kingdom in which Tunisia had been designated as a "future Italian Algeria," and stressing that the papers of Genoa, Florence, and Naples . . . "liked to point out relative French and Italian population figures in Tunisia" and that "to enlarge the figure they added the Maltese emigrés, even though they were English subjects." The following is illustrative of that trend:

The Italian colony of Tunisia is, perhaps, the largest of all the European colonies, and the population is equal to one of our second-rate cities in Lombardy and Tuscany. Claim was made also, in spite of the inaccuracies and exaggerations of the 1861 Italian census, that the Italian colony in Tunisia consisted of more than six thousand persons, many times that of France at the same period.

As a part of its new interests a new Italian consul, Luigi Pinna, was sent to the Regency, to match his wits and his demands with those of the skillful diplomatists, Roches and Wood. He sought to work towards the realization of the


rosy dreams of the new Italy. For example Mazzini saw Italy in control of a new Mediterranean empire, and Pinna considered himself as a means to bringing about that end.

Just what the attitude of Napoleon III was towards these rising Italian ambitions is a subject over which there has been considerable controversy. Darcy takes the attitude that Napoleon never changed from the policy of the July Monarchy, which consistently sought to deny and repel Turkish sovereignty over Tunisia. In support of his attitude he cites the instance of 1854, when the Porte was trying to reestablish its control of Tunisia, at which time Drouyn de Lhuys insisted that de Moustier, French Ambassador to Constantinople, oppose the Turkish move. Darcy quotes de Moustier as saying: "Some trouble between the Porte and ourselves had to be; if Tunisia had not existed it would have been necessary to invent it." At the same time it must be remembered that the Bey had sent some eight thousand troops from his new army to aid the Sultan in the Crimean War. Fitoussi suggests that this was upon "the pressing invitation of the French government, but upon the condition that this cooperation would not be considered as the act of a vassal." Priestley does not coincide with this view,

6. vide supra, p. 49.
8. Fitoussi, op. cit., p. 66.
even granting the limitations suggested by the Tunisian historian, and believes that it "helped to turn Tunisia away from France and so proved a military and diplomatic error."

On the other hand numerous writers, French and Italian, hold that Napoleon III was completely disinterested in Tunisia even to the point of offering it to Italy. Various reasons for such an attitude on the part of the French Emperor are advanced. "Napoleon III in 1862 was disposed to abandon it [Tunis] to Italy as compensation for Rome which she claimed and which they did not wish her to take."

Another Frenchman, writing in 1877, said:

Before and shortly after the rebellion of 1864 Victor-Emmanuel II had the opportunity of considering the advantages of acquiring Tunis. Napoleon III had offered to abandon it to him, so that no such rebellion would take place again.

A modern Fascist gives still another interpretation:

However in 1857 it seemed as if Napoleon III wished to recognize our sacrifices in the Crimean War and proposed to England that the

9. Priestley, op. cit., p. 164; see also d'Estourelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 1, who holds that this gave grounds consequently for the Porte to insist later upon its overlordship.


heroes of Cernaja should be rewarded by the gift of Tunis to Italy. . . . Lord Palmerston [replied] that the handing over of Tunis to Italy would be repugnant to the moral feelings of humanity.

In 1864 with the approval of Napoleon an Italian landing in Tunis appeared imminent. "Investigators went to study the problems involved, and the expeditionary force under Longoni was ready. Indiscretions and hesitations caused the project . . . to be abandoned." 12

And last of all Lebon comments that Pepoli, Italian senator, asked Napoleon III in 1864 if he would oppose Tunisia's becoming an Italian colony, and that the Emperor had replied that "he could not see save with confidence an Italian colony in Africa." 13

If these moves of the Emperor be true, they are in absolute contradiction to the policy of the Quai d'Orsay. Illustrative of the latter is the dispatch of Drouyn de Lhuys, Minister of Foreign Affairs, affirming that "the maintenance of the status quo in the Regency has become one of the traditional principles of our policy," and that "we could not admit the preponderance there, whatever might be its kind, of any other power." 14


14. Drouyn de Lhuys to Tour d'Auvergne, ambassador of France to London, Dec. 19, 1864, France, Ministère des affaires étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques, 1864 (Paris, 1865), p. 112. A number of volumes of this series are cited later as DD, with the volume number and date of publication also given as a means of distinguishing them from the various
To be sure this was the period of the French adventure in Mexico and Napoleon's primary interests lay elsewhere. It is also true that during this period the Tunisian government was carrying on a systematic policy of cultivating French preponderance. From 1861 to 1864 exchanges of gifts and decorations were made between the Bey and the European sovereigns of Spain, Italy, France, England, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Prussia, Russia, and Austria. The American consul in Tunis even suggested that a full-sized portrait of Washington or Lincoln, handsomely framed, be sent "to compare with the portraits of European sovereigns hanging around the hall of state at the Bardo Palace." 

Regardless of his flirtations with other powers the Bey paid his respects to Napoleon III in September 1860, other diplomatic items from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which will be cited also. Langer maintains both that Napoleon encouraged the Bey to send troops to the aid of the Forte and that he also made the offer to Italy. He concludes significantly, "Evidently there was a difference between the official French attitude and the personal view of the Emperor." Cf. William L. Langer, "The European Powers and the French Occupation of Tunis, 1878-81," American Historical Review, Oct. 1925 and Jan. 1926. The article will be cited hereafter as The European Powers, and the Roman numeral I will refer to the October issue, the Roman numeral II to the January issue.

15. Perry to Seward, Ap. 9, 1864, U. S. Dept. of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U. S. (Washington, 1864), 1864, pt. IV, pp. 438-49. This series in the future will be cited as For. Rel. The date of the despatch will indicate the year of publication of the volume. The early volumes appear in varying numbers of parts; a Roman following the citation For. Rel. will indicate the part.
when the Emperor visited Algiers. At this time Mohammed-

Saddok presented to Napoleon a copy both of his revised

constitution and revised code of laws, and was received

with much ceremonial and exchange of gifts and decorations.

Certain concessions: for road construction, for a lighthouse, an arsenal at La Goulette, and an armament works at

Tunis seem to have resulted shortly for the French. In

October of 1859 and April 1861 the important telegraph con-

ventions were signed with France. And when Sheref-el

Hasan ("the Damascene") attempted to excite a jehad, or

religious war, against the French, the trouble maker was

promptly arrested and executed by the Bey as a sign of the

beylical friendship for and loyalty to France.

But the time for the intervention of some foreign power

was fast on its way. The financial débacle could not long

be avoided. Despite his notorious expenditures, Ahmed-Bey

at his death left more than two hundred million piastres in

16. A. Bernard, "L'Algerie" in Histoire des colonies

françaises et de l'expansion de la France dans le monde,

Gabriel Hanotaux et Alfred Martineau, eds. (Paris, 1930),


17. Fitoussi, op. cit., p. 76.

18. Julien, op. cit., p. 698; L'Illustration, Feb. 13,

1960, pp. 97-98.

19. de Clercq, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 640-642, and


the treasury, but Mohammed and his satellites engorged it and left a deficit in addition. The repair of the Zaghouan aqueduct added to the strain, and a crisis was nearly brought on by the financing incidental to sending the expeditionary force to the Crimean War, for which Mustapha Khaznadar collected taxes several years in advance.

By 1361 the Tunisian government, then, found itself with an indebtedness of about 11,375,000 francs. Numerous temporary measures were resorted to by Mustapha to try to stem the tide. He issued teşkérés or treasury notes, based on future harvests, which when due were paid with further teşkérés in a vicious circle of compounded debt. He further conceived another method of economy—of not paying the government officials their salaries. It was hoped thus to keep them bound, but succeeded only in alienating their fickle loyalty. By 1362 the debt had reached 28,000,000 francs. Mustapha next contracted a foreign loan of 35,000,-000 francs, of which only 5,640,914 francs ever reached the hands of the Bey. Rather than being out of trouble as a result of this financial transaction, the bewildered ruler

who had leaped from the proverbial frying pan into the fire, found himself committed to repay a sum of some 63,000,000 francs, upon which the bankers levied the unbelievable and usurious new commission of 13,000,000. As Langer pointed out, "no Oriental state had ever been able to save itself once these measures were resorted to." 

With 1864 came the real outbreak among the indigences, which had long been threatening, and which had appeared in isolated instances in the previous few years. Famine and disease, dislike of the entire constitutional regime, especially of the new constitutional courts provided by Mohammed-es- Saddok's constitutions, and accumulated irritation against foreign preponderance were contributory causes. But the spark which really set off the rebellion was the doubling of the medjba by Mustapha Khaznadar in his effort to solve his financial riddle. He likewise abrogated the exemption which inhabitants of the five privileged cities of the Regency had previously enjoyed. Revolt broke out almost at once on the announcement of these measures and spread quickly throughout the Regency.


28. Perry gives the American equivalent of the medjba as $4.50, involving a raise to $9.00 per head, Perry to Seward, April 23, 1864, For. Rel. IV, p. 440. Cf. also Fitzoussi et Bénazet, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 94. Amos Perry speaks of certain of the Bey's extravagances as follows: "... he undertook to raise and maintain an expensive army and navy. To obtain the requisite number of soldiers and sailors he forced many young men to enter his service merely
The *Gazetta di Genova* reported the uprising without any undue excitement:

... Arabs are in open revolt, refuse to pay the new poll-tax of 72 piastres, and demand the abolition of the Constitution and the dismissal of Prime Minister Mustapha Khaznadar and other officials.

Four months ago the bey was induced to issue an edict doubling the tax and making it 144 piastres, and decreeing that anyone who was possessed of oxen or horses should pay 103. ... They immediately abandoned their fields and crops and began to prepare for war. 29

With the claim that foreign residents of Tunis were endangered, vessels of the Powers began to appear on the scene. Within forty-eight hours after the news of the revolt reached Toulon, three French ships of the line appeared. England, Italy, and Turkey sent ships also, though France made it clear to the Sultan that she would not brook his interference. Colonel Campenon, of the French military

on nominal pay. He thus caused dissatisfaction among his subjects, and some parents were led to adopt clandestine methods to prevent the degradation of their sons. He went on taxing and pillaging his subjects and contracting debts until his credit was lost and his resources were exhausted. ...

On the 26th of June 1862, the writer having just arrived at that port, spent more than an hour (while the mercury was at 120° F.) in looking over the model of the Monitor. ... the Bey had set his heart on having at Coletta powerful engines of warfare like the Monitor." Amos Perry, *An Official Tour*, p. 73.


mission resident in Tunis and former military instructor of
the Tunisian army, urged the use of French troops to put
down the insurrection. The Bey found himself unable to
bring an end to the revolt with his own resources and con-
sequently was faced with two alternatives: either call for
European aid, or yield to the demand of the revolutionaries.
Though the European aid was at hand, the Bey chose what
seemed to him the lesser of two evils. He suspended the
functioning of the constitutional tribunals and restored the
medjiba to 36 pistres. Fitoussi deplores the fact that "with
a stroke of the pen" the constitutional benefits granted in
1860 and 1861 should have been obliterated and that so much
evil should have been imputed to the constitution, when the
causes of Tunisia's difficulties were obviously so much
deeper seated.

This conciliatory action won back some of the tribes,
but others remained recalcitrant. Rebel governments were
set up at Kef and Kairouan under a rival Bey, and predictions
were rife of a "collusion between his forces and French
troops on the Algerian frontier who would rejoice to find
some pretext for a quarrel. At the same time the new

34. Perry to Seward, April 30, 1864, For. Rel. IV, pp. 441-443.
French consul, de Beauval, was bringing pressure to bear on Mohammed-es-Saddok to dismiss the Khaznadar and General Khéréddine and to abolish the constitution altogether "in order to restore tranquility." The Bey is said to have replied that "as he had made a constitution to please England and France, he had no objection to unmake it, provided that the two governments were agreed on the subject."

However, the Bey refused to dismiss either of his two ministers.

Khéréddine as well as Mustapha were becoming indispensable to the Bey. Perry in 1864 wrote:

The Bey shows good sense rather than much intelligence. He is rarely seen except at the side of his prime minister, who, though subordinate in office is vastly superior in ability. Sidi Mustapha is worthy of his Greek origin; shrewd and persevering, he is characterized as a manager rather than as a statesman. His efforts have been more affectual for his personal aggrandizement than for the prosperity and well-being of the state. He has become rich, while the country has become poor; his tactics, however, have of late been particularly serviceable to the Bey . . . . he has wearied the rebels with delays, amused them with promises, bribed them with money, and frightened them to death with

---

35. Roches had been recalled in 1863. Perry speaks of de Beauval as follows: "who though an accomplished man, understands neither the Arabic language nor oriental life and manners." Perry to Seward, Aug. 27, 1864, For. Rel., Vol. IV, p. 456.


the show of arms, and especially with the fear of foreign intervention, so that they have become weak and divided.

General Khéréddine was born in the Caucasus and was decidedly Turkophile in his leanings. He spoke French, but fearing French domination endeavored to involve the Bey as much as possible with the Sultan. He became Minister of Marine and was President of the Grand Council from 1858-1863. He was easily able to persuade the Bey of the danger of further European interference in handling the revolt, and as the Bey's forces were gradually getting the situation under control his advice seemed sound. He stressed the wisdom of drawing nearer to the sympathetic Porte. French protests were conveyed by de Beauval, but the Bey refused to pay heed either to the protests or to the threats of French action were her advice to be disregarded. General Khéréddine, thus, in complete defiance of France, was ordered to leave on the Bey's steamer, the Rachty, for Constantinople.

41. Interesting details of de Beauval's interview with the bey are given in Perry to Seward, Nov. 17, 1864, For. Rel., IV, pp. 460-61, and Dec. 17, 1864, For. Rel., 1865, III, p. 343. In the first he tells how the French consul, irritated by the interview of the 12th of November, in which the Bey refused to give up his plan to send Khéréddine to Constantinople, refused at the end of the interview the Bey's proffered hand and "scornfully drew back from the Bey, giving an unmistakable expression of disrespect." In the second dispatch Perry speaks of a visit of de Beauval on Dec. 10th.
Still using measures of pressure, the Invincible a French vessel, was ordered to get up steam and try to prevent the departure of the Bechir the night of November twelfth. The Tunisian vessel, faster and manned by officers with better knowledge of the intricacies of the channel, escaped to de Beauval's chagrin. Perry commenting upon this undignified procedure wrote that "the French officials here are wanting in tact and good sense" and that "their folly is causing to their government trouble and loss of influence." The fact that de Beauval was shortly thereafter recalled would seem to indicate that the government had not been pleased with the activities of its consular agent. Broadley adds interesting sidelights on the actions of de Beauval by quoting the texts, in translation, of three letters sent by the French consul to Ali-ben-Chadoum, the leader of the Tunisian rebels. They show that de Beauval was playing a considerable part in stimulating the rebellion, and that he was encouraging Chadoum to make demands which would benefit French interest. Broadley states likewise that "the French naval and military officers were entirely ignorant of these or any similar communications" and that "their authenticity never

to the Bey, . . ."and as he held out his hand to the Bey the latter kept his hands in his sidepocket, as if not seeing the consul's movement. This was done probably as a return for the consul's previous act of disrespect to the Bey."

42. Perry to Seward, Nov. 17, 1864, For. Rel., IV, pp. 460-61.
appears to have been denied."

The motives of the Bey in sending Khérédidine to Constantinople are attributed by various writers to different factors. According both to Perry and Broadley, he wanted to thank the Sultan for having sent an envoy to Tunisia during the course of the rebellion. Broadley seems to feel further that a basis for future relations was sought, and that such arrangements were actually concluded:

The conditions which were to govern their future regulations were agreed on and were embodied in the confidential vizirial letter, which contained a distinct assurance that upon the Bey's application a regular firman would be granted. It was, however, decided that the whole matter should be for the present kept a profound secret. 45

According to Perry, "The proposition of the Sultan strikes him [the Bey] favorably, and may yet be adopted as the best means of extricating himself from difficulty and danger." The Bey's position indeed was not a happy one. At all times

44. Idem.
46. Perry to Seward, July 3, 1865, U. S. Department of State, Consular Dispatches, Tunis, Vol. IX. The consular dispatches from Tunisia are in the National Archives in Washington, and will be cited hereafter as Cons. Disp. Since the pages are unnumbered, only the date and volume will be given in the citations.
the example of Algeria served as a warning of what French ambitions might bring to Tunisia; at the same time, to yield too much to the blandishments of the Sublime Porte might mean being reduced to a status similar to that of the Dey of Tripoli."

France and Turkey are to him like Scylla and Charybdis. He is obliged to sail his ship of state through the difficult straits, and how to prevent its being swallowed in the whirlpool or dashed upon the rocks is his constant study. 47

Before his recall de Beauval in a note to Perry contradicted the allegation that France had designs on Tunisia; the same information was given to the other consuls in a circular dated May 24, 1864:

I have learned that reports are circulated with much persistence that France has designed to seize Tunisia. I pray you to do justice to these reports, which the constantly disinterested policy of France in respect to the regency disavows and continues to contradict; but at the same time you are authorized frankly to declare that the exigencies of our position in Algeria would never permit us to close our eyes, if there should be manifested, from any quarter, any tendency to modify a state of things in Tunis, consecrated by time, by general assent, and by that of the Divan in particular. 48

Perry, however, almost from the time of his arrival, reported that French consular activity was such as to make one suspicious of the motives of the Quai d'Orsay. In his

47. Perry to Seward, July 3, 1865, Cons. Disp., Vol. IX.

48. de Beauval to Perry, May 24, 1864, For. Rel., Vol. IV, p. 449.
despatch to Seward of November 26, 1864, Perry tells of a visit to the Bardo in which he definitely demanded a clarification of the political relations of Tunisia with France and Turkey. The Prime Minister replied to him as follows:

We claim to be politically independent. The Beys of Tunis have been for centuries untrammelled in their foreign relations and in their domestic administration. They have made treaties with foreign powers and foreign representatives have been accredited directly to them, and the representatives of our government have been in most cases received with the same courtesy that we have shown. The actual Bey of Tunis is de facto independent, though in form he is yet subordinate to the Grand Sultan; but this form we maintain to be religious, not political in character. The Sultan is the chief of the Moslem hierarchy, and as such he is recognized and honored by the Bey. . . . The Bey regards the Grand Sultan as his religious superior, and desires to maintain towards him the most grateful relation.

Perry speaks further of his understanding of the Bey's reasons for wishing to be recognized as an independent sovereign.

At present the jealousies between France, England, and Italy are such as to embarrass the government at every step. Whatever one consul wants, the other two consuls are almost sure to oppose and defeat. Thus no railroad can be built from here to Goletta, and improvements are checked on every hand.

While the consuls fought one another in Tunis, the new Kingdom of Italy made the best of her opportunity in sending

---


50. Idem.
ships and men to stand by in the event that foreign intervention were deemed necessary. Jealousy between France, England, and Turkey led the governments to agree on leaving the task of intervention to Italy with the stipulation that she would "withdraw her forces immediately on the reestablishment of order." Perry reported on this to Washington:

Already Italy is preparing for the work of intervention. Her engineers are here, and many of her troops are in the harbor, and others are ready to be transported from Cagliari and Genoa to the African shore. The number of vessels-of-war in our harbors is now 22, 14 of which are Italian. . . . The premier of Italy has lately announced in Parliament that the Italian policy is in favor of the independence of the Bey. I am satisfied that France is not yet prepared to take Tunis, and hold it as a province. The experiment in Algeria is not favorable to such an undertaking. . . . It is, I believe, the French policy to have a weak independent power established here either through the Bey or the King of Italy. 52

There was pride and pleasure in Italy at the part played by the new kingdom along side the stronger Powers.

One illustration from the press is cited:

Hence our government deserves the highest praise for having attended to the matter so promptly, and having sent a sufficient force and taken an attitude before Tunis which will protect the various important interests which the Kingdom of Italy has at stake on the African coasts of the Mediterranean. . . . We congratulate ourselves with the Ministry that it has this time put Italy in a diplomatic position worthy of our traditions and our future. 53


52. Idem.

By 1865 Perry reports that "the cabinets of England, Austria, and Italy have expressed to the French cabinet the desire to come to a full understanding in the status of Tunis." And the American consul further adds that in each case the French cabinet "replied that this was an unfavorable time to discuss the Tunisian question." French refusal to come to an understanding over Tunis may be indicative of various attitudes: a feeling of assurance, of hesitation, of weakness. The arrival of the new French consul, de Botmiliau, eased much of the strain which de Beauval's belligerence had engendered. "He continues to pursue a conciliatory course towards the Tunisian government," and he claimed that his government had disavowed several of the violent acts of his predecessors. In June Perry reported that "the Bey sent a delegation to felicitate Napoleon III at Bône, week before last; and there again a lot of decorations were exchanged and reports were brought back of most cordial relations." The financial chaos into which the country was falling was shortly to bring on the foreign intervention which the


55. Idem.

56. Perry to Seward, April 29, 1865, Cons. Disp., IX.

Bey had succeeded in averting during the 1364 rebellion.

In 1865 Perry wrote:

The army of the Bey, commanded by the presumptive successor to the throne of Tunisia [the Bey de Camp] which left here last autumn to make a tour of the Regency has this week returned to the capital, enriched, it is said, with some millions in gold, and loaded with the products of the country, taken from the various tribes. While the Bey's treasury will be replenished by this act, his future resources will be diminished and the industry of the country discouraged. . . . It is an accepted maxim here that the masses can be controlled only by keeping them poor. 58

In 1865 a new loan of 25,000,000 francs was negotiated in Paris, most of which vanished before reaching the hands of the Bey. Unfortunately this loan was guaranteed by the Tunisian customs and the duty on the olive trees. As a result the tax strain on the individual Tunisian was increased. The years 1365, 1366, and 1867 were troubled ones indeed.

The crops, due largely to the absence of rain, failed for the three years. A grain panic ensued; at first the shortage was laid at the doors of the indigenes of the interior who were unwilling, it was alleged, "to bring their grain to market on account of the depreciated copper cur-

60. The Economist, March 25, 1865, p. 343.
62. Perry to Seward, Oct. 11, 1866, Cons. Disp., IX.


Gwynne Harris Heap succeeded Amos Perry as American Consul in Tunis.
of death "for 175 of them."

Famine went hand in hand with ravaging epidemic. 67

Typhus, cholera, and typhus again came to Tunisia. Perry made his first report on the cholera in June 1867, at which time the daily death total was still under thirty. On September 3 he gave the total deaths for the Regency up to that time as 38,000. As bodies were not carefully buried and other proper sanitary measures not taken, a second and more virulent epidemic of typhus broke out. Reports of it were sent to the United States by the new American Consul in Tunis, Geynne Harris Heap, in the spring of 1868.

I regret to say that the Bey has done nothing to mitigate the suffering among his people; on the contrary when we the consuls of the Powers complained to him of his neglect, he gave orders to collect all the wretched creatures found wandering in the streets and drive them to distant points in the country, where they die by hundreds, monthly, from hunger and disease. 70

In 1867 Perry had expressed himself strongly on conditions in Tunisia generally. His comments on the financial situation are especially revealing.

67. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 44.
To describe the financial condition of the government is a task from which we voluntarily shrink. . . . Nothing can be more irregular and confused than the mode of collecting the revenues, unless we except the mode of spending them. . . . Of the sums collected probably not half reaches the public treasury, and not half of that is expended for the legitimate purposes of government. . . . The revenues are variously estimated from $3,000,000 to $6,000,000 dollars. Under a judicious system fairly administered, we think the revenue might be tripled with much less hardship than is now experienced. At present there is no proof that the money collected is appropriately applied. Collectors, clerks, cashiers, treasurers of all grades are not only looked after and controlled. All these officers of the government are either badly paid or not paid at all, and yet they acquire in a little time great riches, which, however, do not prevent their having debts after the example of the government, and like it also, neglecting to pay them. The government is overwhelmed with debts and appears scarcely to concern itself about them. . . .

The Tunisian army was so weak as to be of little use in an emergency. It was "so demoralized that it could hardly stand fire in the face of a single battalion of efficient soldiers." Nevertheless it boasted in 1867 twenty-eight major-generals and twenty-six brigadiers, with proportionally fewer colonels.

Quite naturally these hardships, famine, disease, unjust and unequal taxation, plus the lack of restraint suggested by a weak army, drove the Tunisian people into rebellion again. Revolts against local authorities and

71. Perry, Carthage and Tunis, pp. 477-3.
72. Ibid., pp. 472-3.
73. Perry to Seward, May 11, 1867, Cons. Disp., Vol. IX.
shocking murders were commonplace; caravans in the provinces were pillaged; the tribes began to join in castigation of the Khaznadar; even the youngest brother of the Bey joined the civil war, only to die under mysterious circumstances, with poison suspected, after his imprisonment.

Though the rebellion was put down, the tottering structure was becoming weaker and weaker. The Tunisian debt had reached the grand total of nearly 160,000,000 francs, representing the loans of 1863, 1865, the debt conversions of 1867 and 1868, and other claims against the government — about ten and one half times what it had been in 1861.

Mustapha Khaznadar and Ponzi were cut from much the same pattern. The "four conversions" involved a kind of financial slight-of-hand which defies belief and which was climaxed not only by a guarantee of the conversion bonds with revenues which had already been assigned as security for the foreign loans, but also with permission to the local creditors to collect the taxes themselves. Foreign intervention and

74. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 46.


77. Heap to Fish, July 20, 1869, Cons. Disp., Vol. X.
administration offered almost the only hope for restoration of order in the Tunisian financial system.

The Regency had two classes of bondholders: 1) the Paris financiers of the 1863 and 1865 loans, and 2) the French, British, (Maltese largely), and Italian concessionnaires, whose loans to the Bey had no such guarantees as those granted to the state loans, and whose pooled interests were concerned in the "four conversions." The foreign bondholders were deeply resentful of the Bey's pledge to the local creditors of revenues already guaranteed to them.

From August 1867 to April 1868 plans and counter plans for settlement of the problem were proposed. Finally by the decrees of March 16 and April 4, 1868, a commission composed of a majority of Frenchmen was created, but with no representation provided for the interests of the English and Italian creditors.

The consuls of the latter two governments immediately protested to the Bey "that the acceptance of this project would be virtually equivalent to delivering his government into the hands of Frenchmen." The Bey was persuaded as a


result of these protests to reconsider, much to the rage of de Botmiliau, who in a "violent and unbecoming manner" severed diplomatic relations with the Regency, "intimating that she [France] would occupy it [Tunisia] militarily." France maintained that the Bey was breaking agreements which were binding; the Bey maintained that the Khasnadar's proposals to Paris were unofficial and that he was not bound by them. In the meantime the Italian and English governments had been exerting as much pressure as possible in Paris.

France bowed, therefore, to what was inevitable under the circumstances and agreed to modify the financial commission, so as to give Italy and Great Britain direct representation. Negotiations, to determine the exact details of the new arrangement, however, were slow and in the meantime France professed herself to be greatly alarmed because the Bey decreed the collection of the kanoun, the duty on olive trees, in midsummer instead of in the late fall as was customary. Since the revenue from the kanoun was pledged for payments on the 1865 loan, France carried on a campaign of active protest to the Bey over his actions. So con-

31. Heap to Seward, April 24, 1868, ibid., p. 183.
33. From July throughout October there is a voluminous correspondence on the subject between Moustier and de Botmiliau. See same to same July 5, 1868 and ff. D.D., Vol. XI, pp. 179-197.
tinuous and persistent were these protests that one is led to suspect that France may have been laying the ground-work for later action -- emphasizing the hopelessness and nefariousness of the Tunisian financial situation in order to prepare the way for French intervention.

Throughout the summer of 1868 and into the following spring dragged the discussions concerning the financial commission. Finally on June 24, 1869, de la Valette, the new minister for Foreign Affairs notified de Botmiliau that European arrangements had been concluded, and after two long conversations with Mustapha, the French consul at last secured the Bey's signature on July 5, 1869 to the International Financial Commission. It was constituted as follows:

A. The Executive Committee

1. Composition

   a. Two functionaries of the Tunisian government.
   b. French inspector general of finance named by the Bey on the designation of the French government.

2. Competency


---


b. Ascertain total indebtedness of Regency and resources available with which debts might be paid.
c. Establish fair means for distributing public revenue.
d. Increasing revenues used to guarantee the Bey's debts.
e. Collect, without exception, all revenues of state, with Bey prohibited from contracting a loan or issuing securities without the consent of the commission.

B. Committee of Control

1. Composition

   a. Two French members representing the bondholders of the 1863 and 1865 loans.
   b. Two English and two Italian members representing the holders of the internal debt.
   c. All six members to be chosen directly by holders of those debts.

2. Competency

   a. Verify and approve, if necessary, actions of the executive committee.
   b. Approval required to give "an executive character" to the measures of general interest deliberated by the executive committee.

The appointment to the Executive Committee were: as Tunisian representatives, General Khéréddine and General Mohammed Khasnadar, Minister of Marine, with Villet as inspector general of finance. The English and Italian

---

37. de Botmiliau to de la Valette, July 10, 1869, ibid., p. 163.
38. de la Tour d'Auvergne to de Botmiliau, July 30, 1869, ibid., p. 167.
members to the Committee of Control were selected in Tunis on August 5th: Santillana and Lévy for England, and Pedriani and Guitiérès for Italy. Because of the wide scattering of the French bondholders, the election of Commander Bonfils and Albert Dubois did not take place until November 22.

Several observations appear pertinent, therefore, in respect to the financial commission:

1. The transition from the French Commission of 1863 to the International Commission of 1869 marked a distinct set-back to French influence in the Regency.

2. The very numerous French holders of the internal debt received no direct representation.

3. In practice the committee of control, with its English and Italian majority, considered itself the real head of the commission, with trouble bound to result therefrom.

At once the commission set to work on its difficult task. The original claims of the creditors ran to fantastic sums, not substantiated by the securities they held. When the more or less just claims of the local creditors were arrived at and were added to the state loans of 1863 and 1865, exclusive of the unpaid interest, the total figure


90. de la Tour d'Auvergne to de Botmiliau, Nov. 23, 1869, ibid., p. 171.
reached was 160,000,000 francs. The beylical government was declared bankrupt, since it could not possibly meet principal and interest sums, and a settlement for 125,000,-
000 francs at 5% interest was declared fair and equitable.
New bonds, to be exchanged at a set scale of equivalence, were issued and the revenues of the Regency were taken over to guarantee them. On March 23, 1370, the full plan concerning debt payments was announced by the Financial Com-
mission.

The Bey and his government did not find themselves in a happy position as a result. They could not, of course, have escaped from their financial morass without aid. But even with aid the situation was still bad. Though the plan of
the commission was designed to restore solvency, little money was left for current expenses, and even that was not sure of being collected. By some the commission was accused of petty squabbling and jealousies, of maladministration, and of per-
mitting corruption to continue even under its protecting

92. de Clercq, op. cit., Vol. XV, pp. 540-47. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1873 de Botmiliau sent rather lengthy and detailed reports concerning the work of the Financial Commission, as well as a brief survey of the reasons for its institution. They are of consider-
able interest. D.D., 1873, pp. 115-125.
cloak. Others grant that it did as well as it could have against overwhelming odds. Certain it is that the task was huge, and that the Powers themselves had both contributed to it and stood ready to profit from it.


94. d’Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
CHAPTER IV

REACTION TO THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

That France was forced to yield to the English and Italian pressures, giving up the purely French financial commission and consenting to an International Commission, did mean a set-back to French ambitions and was something of a blow to French pride. De la Tour d'Auvergne was only too well aware of this when he warned de Botmilliau in the future to work in "perfect agreement" with the other consuls in Tunis. However, the International Commission at the same time provided certain beneficial results for France, which were not calculated at the moment of its institution. The France whose prestige was weakened by the Franco-Prussian War and its aftermath was actually safeguarded in Tunisia by the commission from whatever scheming there might have been against her influence. Under its protection, like a fighter between rounds, she was able to "recover her breath" and gradually to extend her influence in the Regency once more.

The strained relations between French and Italian consuls in Tunisia during the 1860's may have only reflected

---


2. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 34.
the attitudes of the governments at Paris and Turin, which were not altogether happy. The withdrawal of Napoleon's armies in 1859 after the Villafranca agreement was not soon forgotten by the Italian nationalists, and so long as a French force sustained Papal power, it remained an effective barrier to the complete and longed-for unification. A press comment of 1868 indicates the feeling that was current in a part of Italy, at least, as a consequence.

... it is not possible to ignore it: France is detested in Italy. The government for special reasons or acting contrary to public opinion, may make an appearance of friendship, or, what is worse, live in royal servitude; but the country does not endorse such a policy, and, when necessary, will show this. ... It is one thing to be the ally of the Government, and another thing to be the ally of the whole country. 3

After the acquisition of Venetia in 1867, the new Italian kingdom began to cast glances of increasing envy towards the Regency. Visconti-Venosta, during his first ministry (1869-73) said that "no important event in Tunisia can remain extraneous to the interest of Italian policy." 4 One French writer speaks of the pointed statements of the Italian press and quotes Il Diritto of January 5, 1867 as saying; "not to act in Tunisia is to display a lack of interest in the future." 5 Thus Italian aspirations were


5. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 47.
increasingly finding expression as strength came to the new kingdom.

Italy had secured a place for herself at the time of the threatened intervention in 1864 and by pressing that advantage won a place, equal to that of powerful Britain, on the Financial Commission of 1869.

The Italian Consul also succeeded, during the prolonged negotiations over the commission in obtaining from the Bey on September 3, 1863, a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation to last for twenty-eight years. Certain articles, kept secret for the time being, were added also by which the Bey agreed: 1) to seek the time and means of reacquiring the Tunisian coral fisheries, 2) to grant no further coral fishing monopolies to any one nation, and 3) to transfer a grant of land to Italy for the cultivation and export of tobacco. Pinna, the Italian consul, likewise, was successful in obtaining the right to exploit the lead deposits of Djebel Reqas, some twenty-five kilometers from Tunisia.

It is a surprising thing to note that on May 10, 1869,

6. Italia, Ministero per gli Affari Esteri, Raccolta dei trattati e delle convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia ed i governi esteri (Rome, 1869), Vol. III, pp. 183-95; this treaty incorporated the previous agreements existing between Tunisia and the various independent Italian states.


at the very time France seemed to be doing everything in
her power to combat Italian influence in the Regency, she
would have sanctioned article 5 of the protocol of the
Three Power Treaty between France, Austria-Hungary and
Italy as follows:

... Italy shall have the right to create, in
the interest of her commerce, a maritime estab-
lishment upon the isles of Barbanie [Barbarie]
in the Regency of Tunis.

Fascist Italy explains this seemingly inconsistent act on
the basis of the growing fear of Austria in France. A
contemporary writer suggests that France

... tried to create an Italo-French-Austrian
alliance, and to obtain Italian adherence, re-
peated the offer [of Napoleon III] of Tunis.
While this was being discussed, Sedan put an end
to the French scheme and the Ley of Tunis once
again slept peacefully in his bed. 9

These successes gained during the 1860's might have
encouraged Italy to go much further had not the Financial
Commission stood as a kind of barrier to overly energetic
action, signifying as it did a community of European in-
terest in the Regency. For with the withdrawal of French
troops from Rome in 1870 and the defeat of France at the
hands of Prussia, Italy continued to press her claims in
Tunisia with greater assurance, and in a fashion that
boded little good for French aspirations. The pretext

for her first action was a claim for damages made by an Italian concessionaire, the Societa Commerciale Industriale ed Agricola to whom, in 1864, the Bey had granted an estate at Djedeida on the Medjerda. The colony at once demanded jurisdiction over the inhabitants, quarrelled with the indigenes, and withdrawing its agents presented the Bey with an elaborate claim for "... damages on account of unreaped harvests, unborn herds, and even unhatched eggs." The Italian press began to clamor for a military expedition. On January 13, 1871, Pinna lowered the consular flag, thereby breaking off diplomatic relations, on the basis of "the failure of the Bey to fulfill a promise, three times solemnly pledged, and as often violated, to render satisfaction." Pinna, following the frequently used French method, further declared that an Italian fleet would probably be sent to support the Italian position.

Heap reported that the situation was viewed with marked alarm in Tunis, where it was generally held:

"... that the Italian government will seize the first plausible pretext to occupy a portion of Tunisian territory and that they have cast their eyes on the province of Bizerte... which contains a port susceptible of being made one of the best in the Mediterranean."  

He added further that it was believed that Russia and Germany knew and approved the Italian aims, since that action might be such as to woo Italy from any possible alliance with England and France, should there be a rupture over the Eastern question.

As was almost always the case in such situations the Bey yielded. When he came to make the settlement with Pinna, however, he was presented with demands which went considerably beyond those originally asked for. Italy demanded 1) that all real property held by Italians in the Regency be placed "virtually under the jurisdiction of the Italian Consul General" and 2) that no arrest, even of a Tunisian subject, could be made on any Italian owned property without the consent of the Italian Consul General.

Heap reported the reaction which was rather general in respect to the character of these new Italian demands:

It is apparent that if Italy insists on these demands, she has views not in harmony with a fair and equitable settlement of the present difficulty. A desire to possess a colony on their [the] Tunisian coast has long been attributed to that Government, which it was unable to gratify as long as France was in a condition to oppose it . . . . and this looks like an attempt to occupy the country without the expense and risk of a military expedition. 17

Heap, a little later, reported that by the unfairness of

15. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
her attitude Italy had forfeited the support of public opinion which previously had been hers, losing what had been "the hearty support and approval of the entire foreign community, as well as of not a small number of the native population." D'Estournelles de Constant, however, does not indicate such unanimity of support from the foreign colony. He points out especially that the Italian demands were opposed by the Financial Commission since, according to the proposed terms, it would not have been able to collect the taxes on Italian properties, a right which came within its competency.

In the emergency England and Turkey supported France and the Bey in resisting the Italian demands. England's motives in respect to her Tunisian policy have been given a number of interpretations, and, while determining them is not a part of our problem, comments on them are of interest. A Viennese correspondent at the time of the 1864 insurrection wrote:

Slowly but persistently France has been striving . . . . to gain greater and greater influence in the Mediterranean. Who does not know the expression, "The Mediterranean will be a French lake"? But at the same time, England with equal persistency does her utmost to thwart these efforts of France. . . . . Whenever something is demanded in the name of civilization, England always takes care that her flag waves beside that of France before Tunis,

In appearance to support the claims of France, but in truth to prevent her influence from becoming dominant. 20

In the 1871 crisis Langer and Faucon both explain English support of France on the grounds of English fear for her Mediterranean route were both Tunisia and Sicily to be in the hands of Italy. Under any circumstances France welcomed British support against the energetic Italian policy.

A Tunisian envoy was sent to Italy to make clear the reasons for the Bey's unwillingness to come to an agreement over Italian demands. The most galling of the stipulations were withdrawn in the course of the discussion which followed, with certain substitutions offered to Italy as compensation by the beylical representative, including the right to export tobacco. The latter was a former government monopoly which had been granted to the creditors as one of the guarantees of the loans. The King of Italy actually signed the protocol on March 15, 1871.

But before the signature of the Bey could be secured, certain of the secret articles of the 1868 treaty came to light and prompt protests were made by the French and


23. Heap to Hunter, March 7, 1871, and March 18, 1871, ibid.
British consuls. Italy stood her ground, nevertheless, refusing to concede further. Visconti-Venosta in the Chamber of Deputies on February 7, 1871, said in reply to an interpellation of Macchi:

The Italian government approved the conduct of its consul. ... the government of Tunisia has received proofs of the goodwill on the part of the Italian government. We demand nothing but the fulfillment of the treaty which exists between us and the Regency. 24

At the last moment permitted by the terms of the Italian agreement, the Bey signed both protocols. The first, as well as making certain commercial concessions, required that the Italian consul be notified whenever any Tunisian subject employed by an Italian should be prosecuted, and the second dealt with the damages which were to be paid to the Djedeida concessionaries, after the just sum had been decided upon by an arbitral commission.

That Italy was not entirely successful in her efforts in 1871 is attributed by various writers to various causes. D'Estournelles de Constant credits the work of Rothen, the French minister at Florence, before the removal of the capital to Rome, with preventing the Italian naval demonstration and the serious trouble with Italy which would have eventuated from such action. Rothen sees the matter with the

25. Heap to Hunter, Mar. 21, 1871, Cons. Disp., Vol. X.
same eyes and in his memoirs says that he has made no effort to reproduce the voluminous correspondence on the Tunisian affair, for, with the matter which had aroused such a furor scarcely settled, it would have been unwise to "reawaken it prematurely." He does, however, give three telegrams exchanged between him and Jules Favre, which show the belief that Rothen had been responsible for the settlement of the trouble.

This evening I received your despatches of the 27th. I am happy that the Tunisian affair is over. I can but give my approval to what you have done. You have . . . . taken care of the interests of our nationals, the creditors of the Regency . . . . you have proceeded wisely. . . . you have stopped the departure of the Italian squadron for La Goulette, and thanks to your intervention, French interests have been safeguarded. I reiterate to you in the name of the department, the expression of my gratitude for your firm and intelligent conduct.

In a later wire to Rothen, Favre speaks of the explanation given in parliament by Visconti-Venosta, and adds:

Thanks to your firm attitude we have full satisfaction. Not only Visconti-Venosta by his dispatch of March 21 is bound to submit to France and to England the decisions taken by Italy and the Regency, but he had formally agreed that the protocols, outlining our rights and those of the commission be required as annexes to the treaty . . . .

---


And then finally on April 11, 1871, Rothan telegraphed to Favre: "I have signed the protocol relative to the Tunisian affair; I will send you the official document by way of Livourne." On the other hand, as might be expected, Broadley credits Wood with having achieved the tour de force. Whoever may have been responsible, Italy seems thus to have been impeded if not prevented from going at her own pace.

Her gains during this period of French weakness, as has been pointed out, were not inconsiderable. In the same period other powers, likewise, tried either to strengthen their own positions in the Regency or to weaken that of France. England, as a reward for her part in the anti-Italian action in the 1871 crisis, received a confirmation of the concession to build the Tunis-La Goulette railroad, originally made in 1857, but which had been allowed to lapse. The line was formally inaugurated on August 31, 1872, the first line in the Regency. Nor was England interested merely in English gains; she was entirely willing to obstruct any other preponderance. When the Bey in 1871 saw again a situation akin to that of the foreign pretensions of 1864 and learned of the rumor that the Sultan was pre-

32. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 27.
paring to reassert his sovereignty over Tunisia, he decided that it might be well to seek another firman, based on the terms of that of 1864. Wood, the English consul, encouraged him in this decision, in line with the British policy of obstruction, and seems to have been supported in this by Pinna, as a device for weakening the French position.

Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that though up to this point England's influence in the Regency had been strong, from now on her influence was to be increasingly supplanted by that of Italy.

Again Kérreddine was sent to Constantinople and was successful in his mission; the firman was signed October 23, 1871. France protested of course and was told by the Bey that "the pressure of friendly powers" compelled the action. Though France refused to recognize the firman,

34. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 62.


37. Circular of Saint-Hilaire, May 9, 1861, France, Ministère des affaires étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires de Tunisie, 1870-81 et supplément (Paris, 1881), p. xxii. Cited hereafter as DDT when reference is being made to the main part of the collection and as DDS when reference is being made to the supplement. de Rémuat to de Botmiliau, Jan. 10, 1872, fn. 1, tells that on Oct. 29, 1871 de Rémuat had told Constantinople and Tunis "that the firman could have no force in our eyes." France, Ministère des affaires étrangères, Commission pour la
there were to develop from it results affecting France: 1) French prestige was somewhat weakened, since the firman was secured contrary to French approval, 2) the view of Tunisia as an integral part of the Ottoman Empire was strengthened, and 3) France felt even less kindly than before towards Italy because of her part in forcing the action of the Bey.

France suffered, thus, a number of checks and set-backs in Tunisia. However, as she began to recover in Europe, her increased strength was destined to permit her to recover her former prestige in the Regency.

The continued and increased financial difficulties of the Bey aided the French cause. The communications from De Botmiliau to the Minister of Foreign Affairs became increasingly hectic as he wrote of the financial chaos; blacker and blacker were the pictures he painted. In March 1870 the French consul wrote: "... it is not only bankruptcy which threatens the Regency, but anarchy." If the final attempt of the Financial Commission should fail "we shall be forced to occupy Tunisia." And finally he is quoted by Darcy as saying on December 23, 1871, "I do not believe that

---

publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre de 1914-18, Documents diplomatiques français, 1871-1914, 1st. ser. (Paris, 1929), Vol. I, p. 123,#106. Hereafter cited as DDOO. In the citations, so far as is possible, the page number of the reference will be given first, followed by the number of the document as a means of further identifications.

38. Botmiliau to Daru, Mar. 16, 1870, DDT., p. 3, #3.
the occupation of the Regency may henceforth be avoided.\footnote{39} The Foreign Minister was quick to make clear to De Botmilliau that his thinking was out of line with that of the Quai d'Orsay and that he was to confine his activities solely to the maintenance of the status quo in the Regency.

The close of the year 1873 was to mark a new stage in the relations of France with Tunisia. Rumors were afloat that French occupation of the Regency was not a far-distant event. In December, apparently, England became nervous about the situation. Décazes, Minister for Foreign Affairs, reported that at the home of the Austrian Ambassador the previous evening Lord Lyons had questioned him on French intentions regarding the establishment of a protectorate over Tunisia. "I replied that I could give him freely and without hesitation the most formal and categorical assurances in order to dispel such ideas." That the German Empire was also beginning to interest itself in the Tunisian problem is borne out by the fact that Count Arnim, German

\footnote{39. Darcy, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 197-8. This despatch is not printed in any of the collections of the Tunisian diplomatic material, although it is referred to by several secondary writers, and the tenor of it is made clear by the despatch from the Quai d'Orsay which was evidently in reply.}

\footnote{40. De Rémusat to de Broglie, Fr. Amb. to London, Oct. 9, 1871, \textit{DDOQ.}, Vol. I, pp. 82-84, #65. This is repeated and made even more pointed in De Rémusat to de Botmilliau, Jan. 10, 1872, \textit{DDOQ.}, Vol. I, p. 123, #106.}

Ambassador to Paris, warned Decazes about the same time that the "German government would not tolerate a Protectorate."

In his memoirs Hohenlohe, who succeeded Arnim as Ambassador to Paris, told the story. A few evenings previously he had called on Decazes, who told him of certain of his relations with Count Arnim. He wrote on August 27, 1876:

One day they had been speaking quite cheerfully about things of no importance, till at last Arnim got up and went to the door, then turned round once more and said: "J'ai oublié de vous dire une chose. Rappellez-vous bien que je vous défends de vous emparer de la Tunisie?" Decazes wanted to turn the matter into a joke, and made a few jesting remarks, upon which Arnim once more repeated impressively: "Oui, je vous le défends."

I have looked up the records in reference to this utterance of Arnim's. According to them, Arnim was certainly in some measure authorized to express himself as he did. But the orders of December, 1873, relating to the matter are in direct contradiction to Prince Bismarck's opinion expressed to me by word of mouth, according to which it would be in no way disadvantageous to us for France to become further involved in Tunis.

The British, for the moment seem to have taken the French declarations at face value. In February of 1874 Lyons wrote to Derby: "I suppose we may lay aside all apprehension of attempts of France to change the frontier or bring the Regency into more complete dependency upon her at the present moment."

---


One of the reasons for suspicion in respect to French motives was the change in the Tunisian ministry which had occurred in October, 1873, and in the effecting of which it was fairly obvious that the French had a hand. For some thirty-five years the generally anti-French Mustapha Khaznadar had been the evil genius of Tunisian finances, but his devious schemes, plus the jealousy of his rival Khéréddine at last caused his downfall; he was succeeded by Khéréddine. Mustapha Khaznadar, since he had come into power with Ahmed-Bey, had played a sinister and unprincipled game. Nor had the institution of the financial commission succeeded in putting an end to those activities. On the contrary the Khaznadar had even encouraged rivalries within the commission itself, "favored European adventures to the detriment of the creditors," granting them lands and mines and even exemption from taxation when they protested that the insecurity of the country did not make possible the completion of their concession agreements.

The financial Commission naturally opposed such concessions and it was supported by Villet, the inspector-general of finances. The exact role played by Villet is a little hard to determine. It is easy, however, to set up a

---


145. Julien, op. cit.; d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit.
satisfactory working hypothesis, even though it cannot be supported by documentary evidence. Villet, when he took over his duties and tried to bring order out of the Tunisian financial chaos, found his task made infinitely harder because of the Khaznadar's actions. Protests to the Bey availed nothing, for Mohammed-es-Saddok could see no evil in the work of his favorite. Even when Villet presented the proof of the Khaznadar's peculations, which de Botmiliau had been only too glad to get together, the Bey "saw nothing." Having failed in the direct approach Villet apparently tried another method -- he made use of the rivalry between Mustapha Khaznadar, Khéréddine, and the young Mustapha-ben-Ismail, who was aspiring to the position of favorite.

The Khaznadar had recruited Mustapha-ben-Ismail for the Bey's harem, hoping to distract his master from political affairs and thereby make himself more indispensable. The background of the handsome youth is given variously by different authors. He is spoken of as "a street gamin who sold flowers," "a little boy in a tattered shirt and battered red cap often cuffed for too obtrusively picking up cigar butts in the European cafes of Tunis," and as

46. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 66.
47. Pellegrin, op. cit., p. 164.
the office boy of a certain Hadj Zouihre, by whose name

he went.

Whatever may have been his origin he soon became be-
loved by Mohammed-es-Saddok -- "jeune premier qui avait à
repondre aux ordres du bey non seulement pendant la jour
mais aussi pendant la nuit." A beylical decree was issued
that henceforth he was to be called Mustapha-ben-Ismaïl; he
was legally adopted, heaped with honors, titles, etc., and
given the daughter of the Bey in marriage. It was only a
short time before an open struggle broke out between him
and the man who had first introduced him to such dazzling
heights. Mustapha-ben-Ismaïl was ready for any scheme which
would dispose of his rival.

General Khérédîne likewise fitted easily into the
plot. Probably offered the bait of the premiership, he
abandoned his pro-Turkish, anti-French policy and "went over
temporarily to the French party;" he furnished Mustapha-

49. Marcel Gandolphe, "Une figure tunisienne, Mustapha-
This account, says the author, is based on unpublished notes
of M. Karouï, archivist of the Tunisian government, who knew
Mustapha-ben-Ismaïl personally; however in many instances
it is a verbatim repetition of the account of d'Estournelles
de Constant, pp. 67-69, published 20 years previously, and
to whom no credit is given. If d'Estournelles de Constant
used the same "unpublished notes of M. Karouï" it is curi-
os that he does not refer to that source.

50. Ibid.

ben-Ismail with the proofs of Mustapha Khaznadar's corruption which had been collected by Villet. When these were then presented to the Bey by the new favorite, he was willing not only to listen but also to see punished the man who had so long been his right hand. Mustapha Khaznadar fell on October 21, 1873, and, brought before a special court, was ordered to restore 30,000,000 francs to the government.

That Italian opposition and French planning underlay the entire scheme was suggested by the contemporary, Broadley, who, it must be remembered, however, was always ready to see French "spooks" at the windows:

... a new energetic Chargé d'affaires replaced M. de Botmilian [41] to put the plan into execution. On the 16th September M. de Vallat arrived in Tunis and on the 3rd November General Kheir-ed-Din became Prime Minister ... the fallen minister was despoiled of his property, and he probably owed his life to the strong representations of the Italian Government. 54

Khéreddine had been minister of Marine, President of the Grand Council, and President of the Financial Commission; 52

52. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 68.

53. Fitoussi et Bénazet, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 93; he turned over actually only about 100,000 francs; some of his jewels and plate were sold at auction, and some of his land forfeited. The American consul reported that rumor placed Mustapha's personal fortune at about 100,000,000 francs. Heap to Hunter, Nov. 10, 1873, Cons. Disp., Vol. XI. After his disgrace Mustapha never again appeared in public. Broadley, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 152.

he had also secured both the firman of 1364 and that of 1371, earning thereby the enmity of France. For the time being, however, it suited his purposes to be the friend of France and he was treated as such. Fitoussi and Bénazet speak of him as a kind of "man of the hour." That he was a man of considerable ability is borne out by most writers. "Endowed with remarkable intelligence, versed in political science . . . aware of the importance of his task, General KhéRéDDine vigorously undertook the work of reorganization." "Intelligent and methodical . . . he attempted to put the situation to right and to regenerate Tunis." Roustan, French consul after 1874 wrote of him "... of whose perspicacity and great political sense Your Excellency knows well." Even our own American consul spoke well of him, and five years before the change of ministry, expressed the hope that KhéRéDDine might replace Mustapha Khaznadar. General KhéRéDDine, he wrote:

... is beyond comparison the most enlightened person in this government . . . . he lives at present in elegant retirement at his country seat, surrounded with books, and in a style differing entirely from that of slothful indulgence of mind and body to which these people are so prone to give themselves up. If he is called to take charge of

56. Idem.
58. Roustan to Decazes, May 9, 1876, DDG. (Paris, 1930), Vol. II, p. 50, #49.
the helm, there is every reason to hope that this unfortunate country will be rescued from its present degraded condition. 59

Peace and security, unfortunately though, were not easily to be secured in Tunisia, not by the removal of even so pernicious an official as Mustapha Khaznadar, nor by the succession of the well-meaning Khéréddine. The new minister was awaited by heavy tasks and political complexities. Mustapha-ben-Ismaïl, for example, was content for the immediate present with the post of Minister of Marine, but was looking for larger worlds to conquer. Although in retirement, Mustapha was intriguing for a return to power. Because of Khéréddine's pro-French leanings the consuls of England and Italy opposed him; Wood and Pinna were even believed to be aiding in the intrigues of the fallen treasurer. "The Turkish party in the Cabinet accused him of being too French and the French themselves denounced him as being fanatically Turkish." His path, thus, was not strewed with roses.

The French were changing officials, likewise, perhaps with a view to strengthening their position in the Regency.

60. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 72.
61. Ibid., pp. 69 and 73.
62. Ibid., p. 70; Julien, op. cit., p. 794.
Villet, who had no sympathy with the political struggles of the foreign consuls and believed his function properly to be purely a fiscal one, was recalled and replaced in February, 1874, by M. Leblant. De Vallat, who had replaced the zealous de Botmiliau, was very shortly followed by de Billing, who in turn was to be succeeded on December 22, 1874, by Théodore Roustan. Formerly consul at Beyrouth, his whole career had been spent in the Oriental countries of the Mediterranean. He was just forty when he arrived in Tunis; "he was what is termed in diplomatic circles an 'agent d'Orient', surprised by nothing, self-restrained, yet full of enterprise." His was the firm hand which was to guide French policies in the Regency through the increasing conflicts with Italy which led to the intervention of 1881.

CHAPTER V

THE EASTERN BROTH BEGINS TO BREW

The coming of Houstan meant an intensification of French activity in the Regency. The new consul arrived in Tunis with a number of clearly defined tasks ahead of him: 1) of finding the solution to a somewhat delicate situation in respect to concessions which had been, if not actually brought about by his predecessors, at least allowed by them to develop, 2) of dealing with the continuous border strife between Algeria and Tunisia, and 3) of again restoring the influence of France which, under the short administrations of de Vallat and de Billon, had been appreciably weakened.

The first problem to be solved was the problem of a French concessionaire, the matter which is known as the Sidi-Tabet or de Sancy affair. It merits attention because of its serious implications rather than because the matter itself was of real importance. At about the same time that the Bey had granted the Djedeida tract to the Italian agricultural colony, he made to a French concessionaire a similar grant, also on the Medjerda River, but about fifteen to twenty kilometers to the north-east of the Djedeida property. This grant of very fertile land and of consider-

able extent was made to the Count de Sancy, a resident of Tunis who had interested himself in breeding fine stock. He was, under terms of the grant, to start a stud-farm; however, lacking the capital necessary for the size of the project as envisaged by himself and the Bey, he interested a Mrs. Mary Frances Ronalds, an American woman then living in Paris, in going into the scheme with him as a partner.

When de Sancy ceded his rights in the project to Lieutenant Lucien Napoléon Bonaparte Wyse things ceased to go well with the enterprise, and trouble between the various owners dragged the case into court. The French consul, de Vallat, conspicuously backed Wyse, but unfortunately for him appeals to certain prominent persons in France by Mrs. Ronalds and de Sancy resulted in his recall. De Billing, on his arrival, tended to side against Wyse, who by a reversal of verdict was imprisoned, but whose friends likewise put on heavy pressure in high places. Shortly thereafter, and without ceremony, de Billing also was recalled.

With Toustan's arrival Wyse was released from prison. Mrs. Ronalds went back to Paris, and for a time the matter died down. However, the case was to be revived again with increasing intensity, and, as in the Italian claims of 1871, a French intervention in the Regency was threatened. However, to make the story comprehensible, other events of

---

international importance with which the case was linked, must be sketched in before the concluding chapters of the de Saney affair can properly be given. The story will be resumed then in its proper place in a later chapter.

The border warfare, between Algeria and Tunisia, the second of Roustan’s major problems, had for years been an almost continuous one. From the time of the conquest of Algeria, French consuls in Tunisia maintained a firm attitude whenever such disturbances could be construed as injurious to Algeria. The reason alleged for the French intervention of 1831 was a culmination of these incidents. The rather lengthy Livre Jaune of 1831, which justified French intervention and which covers relations with and concerning the Regency from 1870, goes into marked detail in respect to the border disturbances. De Botmiliau is shown as eager to take decisive action against the Bey and having to be repeatedly restrained by the Quai d’Orsay, and told that the views of the Governor General of Algeria did not at all coincide with his desire for action against the Bey.


4. de Botmiliau to de Rémusat, Jan. 5, 1872, DDT., pp. 18-19, #12; de Rémusat to vice-Admiral de Gueydon, Governor General of Algeria, Jan. 26, 1872, ibid., pp. 20-21, #13; de Rémusat to de Botmiliau, Feb. 21, 1872, ibid., pp. 22-23, #14.
De Vallat, likewise, found himself to be concerned with border problems. Curbing the smuggling of powder and arms through Tunisia into Algeria and the prevention of emigration of Algerians into Tunisia were his main concerns. De Billing seems to have found the situation much the same as his predecessors. He was concerned with unlawful passage of both Algerians and Tunisians over the border, with smuggling of arms, and with the danger of religious fanaticism.

Roustan seems to have come into Tunisia determined to handle these matters with as much diplomatic skill as possible. His long years of experience with Mohammedan officialdom had doubtless given him insight into the problem and the kind of men with whom he was dealing. The very short tenure of office of his two immediate predecessors may have served to point the way of caution and emphasize the thinking of the Quai d'Orsay. Certain it was that he did not, in the first few years he was in Tunisia, pursue the aggressive attitude in respect to these matters that he was to


adopt in 1830 to 1881.

It is possible also that these matters loomed less large to him at first than they had to his predecessors and than they were to be interpreted later by both Roustan and the Quai d'Orsay. In 1372 certainly General de Gueydon had differed pointedly with the somewhat excited de Botmiliau, holding, contrary to the view of the French consul, that the attitude of the Tunisian tribes "toward us is in general satisfactory." At the same time also that the consuls in Tunis were sending home reports which exhibited strain and uneasiness in respect to the border disturbances, the Journal Officiel was consistent in reporting almost the opposite. Illustrative excerpts are given from reports which were made currently on the Algerian scene. "The Tunisian frontier has not been disturbed at all," read one in April. In June this appeared, "... reports indicate the political situation on the border to be excellent;" and in respect to a marauding incident at the close of 1872, the journal said, "This aggressive act is an isolated incident, for the officials of the Bey's government continue to deal strictly with the perpetrators of the depredations committed on our territory. ..."

7. de Rémusat to de Botmiliau, Feb. 21, 1872, DDT., pp. 22-23, #14.


9. Ibid., June 7, 1872, p. 3802.

At any rate, Roustan seems to have been able to handle the situation without serious difficulty, securing satisfaction of French demands. He was vigilant, prompt with his protests, and less provocative, perhaps, in his methods than his predecessors had been. Saint-Hilaire was to lay considerable stress in 1881 on the pacific and cooperative attitude which Roustan had maintained.

In respect to the third part of his program, that of restoring French influence, he was increasingly successful. His first marked success was in securing from the Bey an important railroad concession, at the expense and discomfort of Wood and of England. During the de Billing interlude and the Franco-Tunisian détente, Wood had procured on September 23, 1874, a concession for a railway from Tunis to Algeria, extending the already established Tunis-La-Coulette line westward to the Algerian border. Later on Jules Ferry characterized it as "a concession for what must inevitably become, according to the hands into which it fell, a line of penetration into our possessions, or a line of defense." A stipulation in the grant was that the con-


cession should be exploited within a year or the grant be annulled. When this stipulation was not fulfilled, Roustan promptly set about to secure the concession for France, aided in his efforts by the officials of the Bône-Guelma line, which was already established in Algeria. On May 9, 1876, he notified the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the previous day he had been successful in getting the contract signed. He pointed out further what a triumph the concession really was for France, for only when the new grant was made did he learn how exceedingly favorable had been the terms accorded the English. And he also was able before very long to get the Bey to acquiesce in the joining of the new Tunisian line, Tunis-Béja-Ghardimaou, then under construction, to the already established Bône-Guelma-Souk-Arhas line. Soon a single company was formed to exploit the two lines and Ferry's "line of penetration or line of defense" was a reality. Within four years the line was pushed to within a few miles of the frontier, with the actual link made after the establishment of the protectorate. Wood's protests against the transferring of the concession to France

14. Fiquet, op. cit., p. 310; Roustan to Decazes, May 9, 1876, DDOG, Vol. II, pp. 56-58, #49.

15. Idem.


were without effect. Roustan saw in the grant not only the intrinsic gain for his country, but also the implication that Khéreddine was becoming less susceptible to English influence and to the vassalage to the Porte which had been encouraged by Wood. He quotes his final interview with the Prime Minister before the convention was signed; the words are significant:

I give into your hands the industrial, commercial, and even the political future of this country, for you will understand that there can no longer seriously be a question of English nor Italians. I hope that your government will see in this fact an undeniable proof of the sincerity of my sentiments and of the integrity of my conduct in its regard.

However, during those first years that Roustan was in Tunisia the Italians, usually linking their policy with that of England, were making little progress in the Regency, though they were not wanting in interest. At the close of 1876 there were even rumors afloat concerning Italian designs on Tunisia. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to Roustan to tell him that though the rumors were doubtless exaggerated they could not be ignored, but that de Noailles had received assurances from Melegari that:

... the Italian government had not thought of a territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Tunisia and projected no annexation of its coast. All assertions to the contrary which have found

18. Roustan to Decazes, May 9, 1876, DDOG., Vol. II, p. 58, #49.
expression in the papers should, . . . . be considered as without foundation. 19

And Decazes added that the Italian press seemed to be conforming.

By 1877, then, French influence in the Regency was becoming stronger. International complications, however, were developing which were destined to involve Tunisia, with unfortunate results for her. The sands of Tunisian independence were fast running out, though it is doubtful if many of the persons most intimately concerned in the diplomatic struggle were really aware of the changes which were taking place.

In the summer of 1875 an insurrection broke out in Herzegovina; the Balkan Crisis of 1875-78 had begun. D. C. Somervell wrote of it: "Dozens of historians, scores of biographers, have trembled as they drew near and saw it blocking the pathway of their narrative." To treat it with any degree of adequacy in a few pages at most is nearly hopeless. However, since it forms the background necessary for the Congress of Berlin the attempt is made.

The insurrection quickly spread throughout Bosnia, threatened to spread still further into the Balkans, and


even into a general European conflict. In an effort to localize the outbreak, and in accordance with agreements reached in 1872 when the Three Emperors' League had come into existence, a project drawn up by Count Andrássy was issued on December 30, 1875, in which the Porte was pledged to reforms in its treatment of the Balkan regions. Though the Porte accepted most of the terms of the Andrássy note the insurgents did not give up, and the movement of revolt continued. Again the three Emperors met at Berlin and drew up on May 13, 1876 a memorandum, proposing a two months armistice and an attempt to adjust the differences.

This was never presented because the Turkish Revolution of May, 1876, gave promise of a better order of things in the administration of the Ottoman Empire. The Bulgarian villages next became restless and an attack was made upon Turkish officials. As an answer both an army of regular


22. Edward Hertself, The Map of Europe by Treaty, Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814 (London, 1891), Vol. IV, pp. 2418-29, #456. This work will be cited hereafter as Map of Europe in order to distinguish it from the Map of Africa by Treaty which also will be referred to later.

23. Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 2459-63, #461.

24. David W. C. Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis 1857-8, The First Year (Stanford University, 1936), pp. 334-35.
troops and of Bashi-Basoucks (irregular soldiers under lax
discipline) were sent into Bulgaria by the Sultan to put
down the uprising. A slaughter resulted. The English am-
bassador, Sir Henry Elliott, protested against the use of
the irregular troops, but to his home government he reported
the rumors of atrocities as greatly exaggerated. Disraeli
was content to accept this view of the case, and took no
steps until the stirring up of public opinion by the news-
papers and a fervid campaign by Gladstone forced him into
action. While the Bulgarian massacres were proceeding,
Serbia and Montenegro had declared war -- the former on
June 30, and the latter on July 2, 1876. By the autumn
of 1876 it appeared that the Turkish forces would capture
Belgrade; Russia according to the terms of the Reichstadt
Agreement with Austria, intervened and demanded that an
armistice be granted Serbia within forty-eight hours.

Fearing a Russian war on Turkey to be inevitable unless

27. Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 2475-77, #463.
28. Stephen P. H. Duggan, The Eastern Question, a
Study in Diplomacy (N. Y., 1902), p. 135; Otto von Bismarck,
The Man and the Statesman. Being the Reflections and Reminis-
cences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck, Written and Dictated by
Himself After his Retirement from Office (London, 1898, trans.
by A. J. Butler), Vol. II, p. 232; David Harris, op. cit.,
pp. 432-38; for a full discussion of the Reichstadt agree-
ment see Serge Gorlaiinov, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles
the situation were halted, England invited the powers to a conference to be held at Constantinople, with a view to discovering conditions for a general settlement of the Balkan problems. The invitation of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Derby, was accepted by all. As Russia objected to the representation of Turkey and as Great Britain insisted on it, preliminary sessions without the Turkish representatives were held from December 11 to 22, 1876, at which certain protocols were agreed upon. As might be expected these were materially modified when the Turkish representatives joined the sessions from the 23rd of December to the 20th of January. The affront implied by the two separate sessions was galling to Turkish sensibilities and was almost foredoomed not to be productive of satisfactory results.

On the first day of the formal joint sessions as a surprise move a new constitution was proclaimed by the Sultan, and Abdul Hamid announced that because of its terms no further meetings of the Conference should be necessary. The


delegates, however, did not agree with him and continued in their work only to have it rejected in the end. The Sultan gave as his chief reason for final rejection of the protocols that they failed to observe "the limits laid down by the English program and to conform to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, as regards the non-intervention of the powers in the internal affairs of the Empire."

The delegates withdrew at this deadlock, leaving the embassies with the chargés d'affaires. "Lord Salisbury, the English delegate, going home in despair declared that 'all had tried to save Turkey, but that she would not allow them to save her.'" Within two weeks Abdul Hamid II dismissed the author of the new constitution. Peace was made with Serbia and negotiations were begun with Montenegro. The conference:

. . . . had had the result of strengthening Russia's position, just in proportion as that of Turkey had


34. Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha, Jan. 25, 1877, Hertslet, Map of Europe, Vol. IV, p. 2545.

35. Hall and Davis, op. cit., p. 470; for the instructions of the Marquis of Salisbury concerning the Conference of Constantinople, see BFSP, Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 1064-80.


weakened by her obstinacy and shortsightedness. In spite of the suspicion under which she had entered the Conference, it was admitted that Russia had honestly and temperately striven for a modus vivendi, and for the failure to discover one no blame was attached to her. Cleared to that extent, in the eyes of Europe, she now endeavored to induce the Powers to acknowledge her as their mandatory in a further attempt to bring the Porte to reason. Wisely or not their consent was withheld. 38

Russia sent a special mission to London to discuss measures by which her demobilization and that of Turkey might be achieved, and the result of this mission was a protocol signed March 31, 1877. It recognized the progress already made by Turkey, but threatened joint action if the Porte did not at once begin full measures of pacification, putting into execution the long-promised reforms, and placing its forces on a peace footing.

On April 9 the Porte refused to accept the protocol. European opinion was divided, and feeling was running high in Russia. She decided to act alone. Therefore, on April 23, 1877, she severed diplomatic relations with the Porte, and on the following day declared war on Turkey.

Writing of the "total revolution in European interna-


tional relations" thus created Langer says:

Bismarck, anxious to keep aloof and preserve peace in Central Europe saw the situation change with kaleidoscopic rapidity. There were secret agreements between Russia and Austria which called up the nightmare of a coalition à la Kaunitz. Then there were disputes between Austria and Russia, threats by the latter to the former, Russian appeals to Germany for support in a war against Austria, which Bismarck could not permit, and finally the total smash-up of the Three Emperors' League, that "rempart triangulaire" which Bismarck would fain have made the basis of his policy. To be sure, France and Italy played only very minor parts in these developments, but they interested European statesmen because both might at any time join the enemy. 42

England protested against the breach of the Treaty of Paris, but on April 30, 1877, issued a declaration of neutrality. French neutrality was proclaimed May 6, 1877 and that of Austria May 11. France regarded the Russo-Turkish War with some indifference, being too much preoccupied with domestic difficulties. Depretis walked warily.

43. BFPSP., Vol. LXVIII, p. 357.
44. Ibid., p. 732.
45. Ibid., p. 467.
46. This was the period of the struggle between royalists and republicans over the supremacy of the Chamber as a governmental organ; on May 16, 1877, President MacVesen dismissed the Simon ministry, which had been appointed as a compromise and which still had the confidence of the Chamber. In the elections which resulted the republicans triumphed. C. D. Hazen, Modern European History (N. Y., 1937), p. 391.
horizon, I open my umbrella and wait until it passes," he is quoted as saying. As he was Prime Minister from 1876-8, a negative Italian policy only was to be expected, then, from him.

The outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War created new diplomatic complications in Tunisia as well as in Europe. It was not long before the Sultan called on Mohammed-es-Saddok for aid in conformance with the firman of 1871. A letter to that effect, asking for an expeditionary force of 5,000 was read in public with many enthusiastic young Tunisians volunteering eagerly to go to the assistance of the Sultan.

France, of course, opposed such aid, holding that by granting the Sultan's request, the Bey would be acknowledging Turkish sovereignty. On the eighth of November, Cassas, temporarily in charge of the consulate, telegraphed from Tunis that the Bey had been forced to agree to send 3,000 men, but hoped to delay and perhaps escape altogether, "with our help and the course of events."

In seeking through the French ambassador in London to secure English aid in preventing the sending of Tunisian

---


49. Ibid.
troops, France stressed the serious financial condition of Tunisia and the mutual desire of England and France "to maintain the status quo on this part of the African littoral," a sentiment not cherished by all powers. The ambassador's reply indicated Derby's approval that the Bey should go to the aid of the Porte, but that if Wood had actually urged the Bey to do so, he had gone beyond his instructions. However, in respect to the hint that France had given relative to foreign aspirations as to the Regency, Derby is quoted as saying:

You wished to speak of Italy. I know that she is disturbed; one attributes ideas concerning Tunis to her; if these ambitions to which you have made reference manifest themselves, you may be assured that I will place all the obstacles in my power in their way.

Exactly what Italy's position in this respect was is not clear. There are no public statements from her statesmen available in Italian sources; the French foreign minister was suspicious and believed Italy to be encouraging the Bey. On the other hand Broadley writes that Italy joined


51. d'Harcourt to de Banville, Dec. 10, 1877, DDOG., p. 221, #217.


53. Ibid.

in the French protest to the Bey, but that the Italian consul, "even while contradicting a report that Italian troops were being assembled at Naples with a view to a possible descent on Tunis," warned the Bey to be careful lest "Italy assert her rights over the Regency." 55

The words of Mazzini, given in the Green Book of 1877, which Melegari, Minister of Foreign Affairs, presented to the parliament could scarcely have been reassuring either in Paris or in Tunis. Speaking of the "mission of civilization prescribed by the times" Italy was led, he said, to an alliance with the South Slavs and the Greeks, and:

... to a colonizing invasion, to be undertaken at the first opportunity, to the shores of Tunis.

In the inevitable movement which calls Europe to civilize Africa, in the same fashion that Morocco belongs to Spain, and Algeria to France, Tunisia, key to the Central Mediterranean, attached to the Sicilian-Sardinian system, obviously belongs to Italy. 

The Roman flag floated over Mount Atlas after the defeat of Carthage; and up to the fifth century, we were masters of all that region. Today, the French covet it and will have it ... if we do not hurry. 56.

Uncertainty as to Russia's position also entered into the picture. As early as July, 1877, rumors that Russian war vessels were about to descend on Tunisia caused considerable general nervousness. In December, Waddington


in a dispatch to Noailles, Ambassador to the Quirinal,
wrote:

... The Russian Consul in Tunis received, near
the first of the month, the order to cease his
functions, because in the eyes of the cabinet in
St. Petersburg, the Regency places itself 'on the
footing of a dependent province of Turkey' in fur-
nishing troops [to the Porte]. 58

And Luigi Chiala, whose book sheds much light on the Italian
interpretation of the Tunisian question, further complicates
the Russian picture by writing that "Ignatiev, [the Russian
ambassador to Turkey from 1864 to 1877] in the course of his
famous trip to the west is reported to have offered Tunisia
to Italy in January, 1877." 59

As a result of these varied factors Khérédidine was faced
with a difficult decision in the matter. The attitude of the
foreign consuls doubtless had considerable weight with him.
The Tunisian financial problem, as France rightly pointed
out, was likewise a serious one. Khérédidine had the disas-
trous example of how Tunisia's participation in the Crimean
war had helped to bring on the Rebellion of 1864. His

58. Waddington to de Noailles, Dec. 20, 1877, DDOO.,

59. Luigi Chiala, Pagine di storia contemporaneadeal
1353 al 1892 (Turin, 1892), Vol. II, p. 107. Chiala who had
been a Deputy since 1882, was elected to the Senate in 1892.
As a young man he had contributed to military reviews; later
he set himself to writing about the men and ideas of the
Risorgimento. His work is valuable not only for the presenta-
tion of the Italian point of view, but also because he
used official documents which were difficult of access at
that time. Enciclopedia Italiano (Rome, 1931), Vol. IX,
p. 989.

60. Vide supra, pp. 65 and 70.
position demanded that he safeguard Tunisian finances to the utmost. He was aware of how much he was the debtor to France, for his position as Prime Minister. But he was a Moslem above all else; his loyalties to the Sultan were of much longer standing than his loyalty to the French Republic. And the promise of the 3,000 troops, reported by Cassas, was made consequently. His joining in Turkish efforts, say Fitoussi and Bénazet:

... is explained by religious consideration, the Koran prescribing complete solidarity in case of a war against non-believers. It would be excessive, according to our lights, to attribute any political importance whatsoever to the cooperation of Tunisia in the Russo-Turkish War.

The Bey set about fulfilling his promise, although it must be observed that the preparations were made with no great show of urgency. Troops were assembled, horses and mules were sent to supply needs of the Turkish army, and funds were raised by popular subscription to aid the cause. However, the war came to an end before the expeditionary force could be made ready to leave. Whether the device hinted at by Cassas, delay in the hope of avoiding the main issue, was actually a part of Khéreddine's planning we can only speculate upon.


63. Fitoussi et Bénazet, op. cit., p. 112.

64. Vide supra, p. 131.
During the controversies which surrounded the entrance of Tunisia into the Russo-Turkish War, "palace intrigues" brought about the downfall of General Khéreddine. Various reasons are attributed for the ministerial change. Pellegrin says:

... the unbending and imperious manner he had adopted to his colleagues, his habit of telling in plain language wholesome truths to the Bey, and the silly ambition of the minion Mustapha-ben-Ismail.  66

Broadley sees other reasons for his fall:

... vassalage to Turkey ... during the Russo-Turkish War instituted forced contributions in silver, food stuffs, and men, which struck hard a population already impoverished by a year of poor harvest.  65

And d'Estournelles de Constant sees in the fall primarily the self interest of Mohammed-es-Saddok, himself. When Khéreddine reduced certain sensitive items on the Bey's civil list, the pensions of the princes, in particular, he brought on himself the anger of a man with whom he had never been a real favorite.

Khéreddine in his memoirs, however, tells that popular or not with the Bey, he had received as beylical gifts for his services three beautiful palaces, an olive forest, a

67. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 75.
68. Idem.
large house and the thermal springs at Hamman-Lif, and the
great Enfida domain of some twenty-two thousand hectares,
the disposal of which was later to embroil relations between
England, France, and Italy. Pressure for his dismissal
was strong, and on July 21, 1377, he fell from power. Leave-
ing Tunis he went to France, and then on to Constantinople.
Shortly after his arrival there he was named Grand Vizier of
the Ottoman Empire, that is President of the Council of the
Turkish government.

Khéreddine was succeeded by General Mohammed Khazndadar,
an old mameluke who will be remembered as one of the two
Tunisian members of the Executive Committee of the Financial
Commission. France was not at all pleased by this turn of
events, for the new minister was devoted to the English con-

71 Hostility between Roustan and Wood continued to
be intense and was indicated in almost every despatch sent
to the Quai d'Orsay. Illustrative of this attitude are the
words of Roustan to Decazes:

69 Cited by Pellegrin, op. cit., p. 167; the Memoirs
edited by Mzaí and Pignon, were published in 1934-37 in the
Revue Tunisienne, issues of which, at the time of writing,
are unfortunately not available in the United States.

70 Pellegrin, op. cit., fn. 165. Galignani's Messenger,
June 17, 1878, speaks of the arrival of Khéreddine and
a numerous suite "at Marseille from the country on Saturday,
on his way to Auvergne, where he purposes taking the waters;
then he will come to Paris to the Exposition." He died in
Constantinople in 1890.

71 d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 76.
... this agent, in whom seems to be incarnated the hatred of Lord Palmerston against France, marked today the thirty-third year of a career, which, he himself warmly says, has been almost entirely spent in combatting French influence in the different Eastern countries. 72

It is little to be wondered at that Roustan, consequently, believing Mustapha-ben-Ismail to be the really powerful agent in the Regency, sought to win his support and favor. Broadley caustically remarks that the interests of France would be best furthered by having as Tunisian Prime Minister "a fool and a puppet. Khéréddine was neither one nor the other; Mustapha-ben-Ismail was a combination of both." 73

Roustan seems to have succeeded in his scheme, for Mustapha-ben-Ismail "continued for a time, the policy of Khéréddine." 74 As a sign of this friendly attitude towards France, he attended the Paris Exposition of 1878, passing through Algeria en route. Roustan, however, was subjected to censure at home for having employed certain unscrupulous agents in achieving his ends.

In the meantime, of course, the Russo-Turkish War had run its course and in so doing had involved the Powers in diplomatic situations which were to have a profound effect

---

74. d’Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 77.
75. Ibid., p. 76; Julien, op. cit., p. 706.
upon the Regency. Tunisia was shortly, as a consequence, to become a pawn or the chessboard of Europe and must henceforth be considered in her relationship to European diplomacy.

Though checked for months at Plevna, Russia eventually won a series of victories which brought her armies to the outskirts of Constantinople and forced Turkey to accept the Treaty of San Stefano, on March 3, 1878. The treaty, however, was not generally acceptable to the Powers who had signed the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The terms of San Stefano dealt principally with territorial adjustments:

1. Montenegro and Serbia to be independent and their territory increased.

2. Roumania to be independent; to cede Bessarabia to Russia and receive Dobrudja, including Constanza, as compensation from Turkey.

3. Bulgaria to become an autonomous tributary Christian principality, with great increase in territory.

There were in addition provisions respecting indemnities, freedom of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to neutral shipping in time of war, etc.

There was immediate protest from the Powers; the Balkan countries objected because the Greater Bulgaria which had been proposed by the treaty terms was projected as much more powerful than any one of themselves, and

76. Fay, op. cit., p. 66.

... it was objected to by Austria and England who feared the greatly enlarged Bulgaria would be virtually a vassal state under Russian control; Austria did not like to see such an increase of Russia's power near her border, and England feared for the safety of the Suez Canal. 78

A congress of the Powers signatory to the treaty of 1856 seemed a possible solution. On January 15, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg had already handed to Prince Gortchakov an opinion of the British government that any treaty between Russia and Turkey affecting the settlements of 1856 and 1871 must be an European treaty in order to be valid. On February 5, 1878, the Austrian government proposed a conference at Vienna of the Powers who had signed the previous treaty.

Bismarck at first apparently had no great liking for the project which Andrásy formally proposed in January 1878.

It is clear that we cannot hold aloof from the Conference so urgently demanded by Austria, if it actually takes place, and particularly so, supposing Russia has accepted it. But at this stage we can form no further opinion. I do not understand the reason for the move, unless it is that Austria intends this Conference to be a bridge to bring her nearer to England. 82

80. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 2668; for the considerable correspondence evoked by the Austrian invitation see Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, 1878, cmd. 1977 (London, 1878), Vol. XXIV, nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Russia had little liking for the European interference with what she considered her own affairs. Several telegrams in this connection are significant. On February 1, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg wired the Wilhelmstrasse: "Prince Gortschakov spoke to me on the subject of a Conference and said 'If either Vienna or London is chosen, we shall not take part. I have no objection at all to Berlin.'" Four days later he elaborated with the following message:

In my opinion the real reasons for Russia's decided refusal to accept Vienna as the seat of the Conference are the following: There is an objection to the choice of M. Novikov [Russian ambassador in Vienna] because he is too much under the influence of Count Andrassy. Also Count Andrassy is disliked as Chairman and Sir Henry Elliot would be unwelcome as British representative. Prince Gortschakov would prefer a town in a small state, and his suggestion of Berlin, which must have cost him no small effort, proves how strong is his objection to Vienna.

Bismarck, after considerable advance publicity, made a speech in the Reichstag on February 19, 1878, in which he assumed, so he said, the role of "honest broker" -- erlicher Makler.

I do not look upon the mediation for peace as if we were assuming the role of umpire between conflicting views and were to say: 'So must it be, and behind it stands the power of the German Empire.' But I consider myself more modest -- not to make invidious comparisons, to give you an

example from common life — in the role of an honest broker, who desires to bring the affair to a favorable end.

The American minister to Berlin in a dispatch only a few days following gave an interesting current reaction to the now-famous "honest broker" speech.

The feeling generally in regard to it seems to be one of disappointment — first that it did not correspond with what had been put in his mouth in advance by the press, and, secondly that it seems to indicate a greater disposition to keep the peace between Austria and Russia than between Russia and England.

During this time, while negotiations for a conference hung suspended, European peace underwent a strain as severe as any recorded in the long and agitated history of the eastern question. Russia, contrary to Britain's demand, hoped both to avoid submitting the entire treaty to a conference, and to secure, somehow, German support in "containing Austria," so that if necessary her own efforts need only be directed at England. Swords rattled in Great Britain and

35. Text of the speech is given in full in the Kölnische Zeitung and the Allegemeine Zeitung (Munich), both under date of Feb. 20, 1878.


for a time it seemed that war could not be averted between
Russia and England. When Bismarck gave his approval to the
plan of laying the entire treaty before the proposed Congress,
and it was suggested on March 7 that a congress, not a con-
ference, be held in Berlin, Beaconsfield felt justified in
defying Russia. On March 28 he allowed Lord Derby to resign
from the Foreign Office and replaced him with Lord Salisbury.
He then reinforced the British fleet before Con-

38. Hertslet, Map of Europe, Vol. IV, pp. 2646, 2656;
Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, 1878, end. 1949 and 1951, as
well as DGFz, Vol. II, pp. 62-65, 4246, give much of the
diplomatic correspondence and reveal the increasing tension.


90. Duggan, op. cit., pp. 141-43; Disraeli had been
raised to the peerage as Lord Beaconsfield in Aug., 1876,
G. E. Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd ser.
in the otherwise tense situation. The first is the discrep-
ancy between Beaconsfield's public and private utterances as
to Derby's resignation. An excerpt from his speech at that
time is as follows: "My lords -- your Lordships have heard
that the Queen has lost the services of one of the ablest of
her counsellors. Those only who have served with my noble
friend can sufficiently appreciate his capacity for affairs,
the penetrating power of his intelligence and the judicial
impartiality of his general conduct." Das Staatsarchiv,
Sammlung der offiziellen Astenstuske zur Geschichte der
Gegenwart, (Leipsig, 1878), Vol. XXXIV, pp. 66-69. The
speech was in marked contrast to his letter to the Queen the
evening of the resignation: "The Queen must own that she
feels Lord Derby's resignation an unmixed blessing . . .
his name had suffered and was doing great harm to us abroad
. . . . and the very fact of his becoming a cypher and put-
ing his name to things he disapproved was very anomalous and
damaging." W. P. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle, op. cit.,
Vol. VI, p. 265. The second light note is the observation
in Beaconsfield's diary of March 27 that though Derby had
resigned, it could not be made public even to his colleagues
until the next day, because of a reception which was being
given that evening at the Foreign Office, and "were the
stantinople and on April 1, 1878 Lord Salisbury issued his famous circular note, of which Beaconsfield wrote: "I think the circular has put the country on its legs again." It proposed modifications of the Treaty of San Stefano which would both remove exclusive Russian privilege and protect British interests without impairing Turkish sovereignty. Russia at this point yielded; her last hope of Germany had gone on March 30, when Bülow notified Lord Odo Russell:

Prince Bismarck desires me to inform your Lordship that Germany will not take part in the Conference without Great Britain, and that he cannot conceive how a Congress to discuss a revision of the International Law of Europe can take place failing the presence of one of the High Contracting Parties, namely Great Britain.

On April 9 then Gorchakov addressed a note to London asking for the modifications which England would require in the treaty. Negotiations were then undertaken by Salisbury and Count Schouvalov. The latter made a trip to St. Petersburg, received the Czar's sanction, and returned to sign the resignation known their position would be painfully ludicrous." *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 262.


secret agreements of March 30 and 31.

94. For texts see Adolf d'Avril, Négociations relatives au traité de Berlin et aux arrangements qui ont suivi 1875-86 (Paris, 1886), pp. 345-46; Staatsarchiv, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 97-100. An interesting ramification of these agreements was the way in which they were made public. On May 31, a summary of the first memorandum appeared in the Globe, but was declared by Salisbury, in reply to a question by Grey in the House of Lords, to be "wholly unauthentic and not deserving of the confidence of your Lordship." Then on the 14th of June publication of the agreements in full was made. Russia was suspected of revealing the texts prematurely in order to complicate matters for Britain. Marvin, a copyist in the British Foreign Office, who supplemented his income by contributions to newspapers, was accused and tried. He claimed to have memorized one of the agreements as he copied it in the performance of his duty, and the other through having heard it read in an adjoining room. "Believing it was going to be read in the House that night and given to the Times next day or day after," and since he was "not bound to any secrecy" and was strong in his complaints of underpay, he sent the information to the Globe. Beaconsfield was wrathy when he learned of the proceedings against Marvin. "...What in the name of Heaven, or rather Hell, and all the infernal regions of all religions, could have induced you all to arrest, and prosecute that poor wretched Marvin? This is the dirtiest linen that was ever washed in public by any family on record. You will probably not be able to punish him, and, if you do, he will have general sympathy -- this sad wretch, entrusted with the secrets of State with a salary of 3d. an hour! Before we were supposed to be the not contemptible victims of an imperial misfortune; now we are ridiculous. I never was so astonished in my life as when P. Gortchakov gave me his telegram from London with the police examination..." Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 303. Letter to Northcote, Chancellor of the Exchequer, July 2, 1878. And the matter ended much as Lord Beaconsfield prophesied: "The end of the persecution is well known. I was acquitted. The magistrate in his decision wholly exonerated me of any blame in regard to the disclosure of the Summary, but condemned the divulging of the FULL Text." Charles Marvin, Our Public Officers: Embodying an Account of the Disclosure of the Anglo-Russian Agreement and the Unrevealed Treaty of May 31, 1878 (London, 1880), p. 311. The story is told in many sources; it is given in full in Marvin, op. cit., pp. 199-312. Cf. Lady Gwendolyn Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury (London, 1921), Vol. II, p. 209; Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 302; E. L. Woodward, The Congress of Berlin London, 1920), p. 15; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd. ser. (London, 1873), Vol. CCXL, pp. 1061, 1493-94, and 1614; hereafter cited as 3 Hansard.
In the meantime, England had on June 6 concluded a supplementary agreement with Austria, by which "England and Austria were to support each other in their respective views concerning Bulgaria and Bosnia." The English had little confidence in Andrásy, but on May 27 Sir Henry Elliott, who had been transferred from Constantinople to Vienna, received orders to sign:

... It was as nearly as possible a transcript in translation of your telegraphic instructions, but it was more in the nature of a general agreement between gentlemen, upon which any further explanation of understanding which might be required could be obtained at Berlin.  96


CHAPTER VI

THE MEN WHO WENT TO BERLIN
AND WHAT THEY SOUGHT

The Powers accepted the invitation to the Berlin conference with diverse motives and emotions. And because most of them are concerned with the Tunisian story, either directly or indirectly, an attempt will be made to summarize those bearing particularly on the topic. To be clear in respect to them, a sketchy review of the diplomatic history of the period is also essential.

In the years from 1870 to 1878 there had been a vast change in the relations between France and Germany. From 1870 to 1875 the cry for revenge was sounding in France, and from Germany came the threat of preventive war. But in the midst of the war scare of 1875, when Europe was momentarily expecting the outbreak of hostilities, the two countries were discussing academically the question of a common policy. From 1870 to 1880 there was a distinct détente in their relations. It was a period of friendly gestures, exchange of courtesies, and occasional cooperation.

After the war scare of 1875 relations between France and Germany began to improve. Bismarck began to consider that it would be a good idea to divert the minds of the French

---

1. Pearl Boring Mitchell, The Bismarckian Policy of Conciliation with France (Philadelphia, 1935), pp. 1-2; for a full discussion of the war scare of 1875, Ch. II of William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments (N. Y., 1931), pp. 31-55, is probably the best authoritative exposition. Hereafter this volume will be cited in full in order to distinguish it from the other Langer references.
from "the hole in the Vosges" with ideas concerning French activity in the Mediterranean and the Near East, where Germany was disinterested.

The French elections of 1877 were a welcome relief to Bismarck, removing as they did the fear of a monarchical restoration, and eliminating the Duc Decazes, "a notorious proponent of a Franco-Russian alliance." The appointment of Waddington, a Protestant, as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the place of Decazes, also was well received by Bismarck. A still better impression was created by the recall of Catholic Contaut-Biron, the Ambassador to Berlin, for whom Bismarck had felt a violent animosity ever since the war scare of 1875, accusing him of having intrigued with Russia in order to gain a diplomatic victory over Germany. Since he had been urging this recall for years, Bismarck was gratified when the change was made.

The new ambassador, Comte Saint-Vallier, arrived in Berlin late in January and presented his credentials on February 3, 1878; the occasion was "utilized to give mutual


assurance as to the peaceful intentions of the two governments." The day after the arrival of the new ambassador, Bülow called on him to welcome him to his new post, to express relief at the changes which had just taken place in the government of France, and to say that "with Waddington and Saint-Vallier in power we feel ourselves on sure ground." Like his chief, Saint-Vallier was a "firm advocate of good understanding, not only with England but also with Germany." His opposition to Napoleon's war policy in 1870, and the tact with which he had acted while attached as diplomatic agent to the German army of occupation in France made him, naturally, acceptable to Bismarck.

There were a number of straws in the wind after 1875 pointing to the improved relations between the two countries. In 1876 the German government had refused to participate in the proposed French exposition of 1878, but in March of 1878 it reversed itself and agreed to send a rather extensive art exhibit, even though Germany was not participating officially.


The leaders of the French government, as well, saw the necessity for France to find her place again in the polity of nations, even though it meant forgetting revanche. Even Gambetta, the man behind the throne, who in 1871 as the "apostle of revenge" talked to a delegation of Alsace-Lorrainers of the impiety of putting away the image of bleeding and mutilated Alsace had come gradually to agree that friendship with Germany was the safest course for France. On April 23, 1878, thinking had so completely altered that he accepted an invitation to Berlin to meet Bismarck, "the monster." However, the next day he seems to have regretted on the basis of the "press of parliamentary business," probably because "public opinion in France was not yet ready for so definite a retraction of his former policy." Bismarck wrote to the German Ambassador in Paris several months later, regretting that the interview had had to be cancelled "because of my illness," and saying that he would


12. Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 61-66; one of his staunchest admirers, until he abandoned the thought of revenge, was Mme. Juliette Adam. Her house became the center of resistance to "German intrigues." She finally founded the monthly journal, Le Nouvelle Revue, about the effectiveness of which as a molder of public opinion authorities differ. Its purpose was to fight the Bismarckian policy, promote the alliance with Russia, and keep alive the spirit of revenge.

be glad to see Gambetta later if the opportunity presented itself.

Though France thus was increasingly willing to listen to pleasing words from the mouth of Bismarck, she was not at all sure about the wisdom of attending the Congress of Berlin. During the preliminary negotiations the French Ambassador to Berlin kept in close touch with Bismarck, but when the actual invitation arrived, the government found itself on the horns of a dilemma.

In his memoirs de Freycinet explains the reasons for this hesitation:

1. France feared that at the Congress of Berlin she would not occupy a position worthy of the role she had played in the past.

2. She feared that in such a conference, aimed largely at Russian ambitions, she would risk "alienating herself from that power with whom at that moment the eventuality of an alliance was being considered."

And he further pointed out that at the same time France hesitated over refusing to participate for fear that "our absence would be interpreted as a voluntary abdication." 15

Gambetta was at first opposed to French participation in the Congress. Then after reading the February speech of Bismarck to the Reichstag, he said: It is for us at


16. The "honest broker" speech.
present to profit by these circumstances and dispositions and rival ambitions to set forth neatly our legitimate claims and in accord with them to defend the new order. He discussed the proposed participation of France with de Freycinet and Waddington apparently, on the bases set forth by de Freycinet. The long interview of March 6 seems to have changed his mind completely, so that with them he concluded that France, having signed the treaties of 1856 and 1871, could not permit them to be modified without her consent.

Consequently when Waddington proposed to the Cabinet that France accept the invitation, approval was prompt and unreserved. In sending the tentative acceptance of France, however, Waddington made the reservation that the Congress include in its discussions only the problems growing "naturally and directly from the war" and exclude not only "affairs of the west" but also "Egypt, Syria, and the Holy Places."

In a circular of March 7 to the French ambassadors in the capitals most concerned with the problem, he explained the conditional acceptance and stated:

20. Ibid.
I said that I understood that to mean the exclusion . . . of those questions in the East which have not been raised by recent events, and I stated my meaning precisely by citing Egypt. Although I spoke only of Egypt, it goes without saying that the exclusion applies also to analogous questions, such as those of Syria and the Holy Places. 21

It seems somewhat significant that in the official communications no mention was made of Tunisia, and yet it has been generally considered to have been of major importance in French thinking.

The reason for France's reservation of topics was to exclude certain outlying provinces of Turkey, such as Syria, Tunis, etc., whose status France did not desire to see altered at that time. 22

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs had a somewhat different interpretation:

Prince Bismarck is of the opinion, moreover, that the French proposals to exclude Syria, the Holy Sepulchre, and Tunis from discussion are merely a cloak to cover the central question of Egypt. M. Waddington's remark that the question of the Holy Places was the cause of the Crimean War is easily answered by reference to the facts of history, for the dispute about the Holy Sepulchre and the Church keys was but the pretext for political action, inspired by very different motives. 23


On March 15 Waddington notified the ambassadors of the agreement of the foreign cabinets to his reservations. On June 3 the formal invitations were issued and on June 4, France sent her formal acceptance.

On June 7, 1878, during an interpellation on the Congress of Berlin a full account of French policy was given by Waddington, who was sustained by a unanimous vote of 485. The delegates selected then for France were M. Waddington, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Compte de Saint-Vallier, the Ambassador to Germany, and M. Després, the Director of Political Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay. The post of Editor of Protocols went to France by virtue of French being the language spoken at the Congress; Comte de Moly, first secretary of the Embassy, was chosen to act in that capacity. Furthermore, Bismarck's interest in cooperation with France

---

led him even to offer to the head of the French delegation
the Presidency of the Congress, an honor which was refused
by Waddington as being fraught with too much danger.

These French representatives were able men. Waddington
was "not a professional diplomatist, but he knew the issues
at stake and his judgment was good." He was born in Nor-
mandy in 1826; his grandfather was an Englishman who had es-
tablished cotton factories in France and had become a
naturalized French citizen. The grandson was educated first
at Rugby and later at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he
took first honors in Classics. He had entered public life
in 1871 as a representative from Aisne, rapidly becoming
Senator, Minister of Public Instruction, and then in December
of 1877, Minister for Foreign Affairs. His wife whom he
married in 1874, was an American, granddaughter of Rufus
King, second Ambassador to England after the adoption of the
Constitution. Beaconsfield, with his love of turning a
clever phrase to the disparagement of another, characterized
Waddington rather caustically as a "blend of archaeologist
and statesman," as speaking English like an American and
French like an Englishman, and describing him as looking
like an "épicier . . . . and I think his looks do not belie

30. Waddington to Saint-Vallier, Mar. 19, 1878, ibid.,
his mind and his intelligence."

Saint-Vallier and Desprès played less important parts, of course, but Saint-Vallier's high standing in the eyes of Bismarck was of material assistance to his country's policies.

According to Madame Waddington, her husband went to the Congress full of hope:

... started on the 10th day of June in the best conditions possible ... not an instruction of any kind from M. Dufaure ... very complimentary to him certainly, but the ministers taking no responsibility themselves, leaving the door open in case he made any mistakes. It was evident that the Parliament and Government were nervous.

The policies underlying the cooperation in the Congress of the other Powers are likewise of prime importance to the developments which eventuated, and the delegates sent by each are significant to the understanding of what took place and why. These then are sketched in briefly.

Russia sent Prince Gorchakov and Count Schouvalov.

Gorchakov:

... bent, thin, so feeble that he had to be carried into the hall of sessions, but still preserving the courage and dexterity, the exquisite grace and distinction, the command of

32. Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 310, 326.

33. Mary King Alsop Waddington, "My First Years as a Frenchwoman," Scribners', Feb. 1914, p. 210. The material appeared in three issues of the magazine, Jan, Feb., and March. Hereafter the Roman numerals I, II, and III, will be used to refer to the section in which the story appeared.
polished and sonorous phrases, the high-flown and somewhat theatrical eloquence, to which he owed his great reputation. 34

When von Schweinitz, German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, reported to the Wilhelmstrasse that Gortchakov himself had decided to come, he commented that the Russian Chancellor had regretted that Russia had no one the equal of Beaconsfield to send. Then he quoted Gortchakov as saying further:

Myself . . . my feet are still swollen and painful, but perhaps I may be able to travel. I think my presence would be useful at the Congress, for it is well known that I have never told an untruth. (In the margin Prince Bismarck wrote "!"). We are witnessing one of the most critical moments in history. 35

The ambassador then added: "It would have been cruel to contradict the Prince. It is clear that he is looking forward to appearing on the same stage with Prince Bismarck and Disraeli and then to retiring with a nunc plaudite." 36

Beaconsfield characterized his adversary as "the dear old fox, who seems melting with the milk of human kindness" and "the wily Chancellor suffering now from the infirmities of age, and jealous of his brilliant second, Schouvaloff." 37

Count Peter Schouvalov had been Ambassador to London since 1874. Later Madame Waddington wrote of him as "a

36. Ibid.
polished courtier, extremely intelligent. He and Waddington were colleagues at the Congress of Berlin and W. often told me how brilliantly he defended his cause." Bismarck also formed a high opinion of him for he wrote: "Peter Schouvalov had the most far-seeing brain with which I came into contact there, a man who only needed industry to play a leading part."

Russia had struggled up to the last to avoid submitting all of the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano to a conference. Having lost in that diplomatic encounter, she had sent, therefore, two of her ablest men to defend in so far as was still possible, after the limiting pre-Congress agreements were signed, what she had "sacrificed millions of lives and spent millions of rubles to achieve."

Like France, Italy had not up to this time been deeply concerned either over the Eastern question nor over the Russo-Turkish War. Her problems during that period were largely internal, the problems incidental to the transition from "geographical expression" to "nation." However, she had been wooed while Depretis was in power by various of the Powers:


Derby tried his best to effect a Mediterranean League in which Italy was to play a prominent role. Andrásy was all too anxious to gain the consent of the Italians to the annexation, or at least the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he did not hesitate to renew his offers of Tunisia as compensation. As for the Russians they too had done their utmost to secure the support of Italy.

But important political changes took place in the months just before the Congress and were largely to determine her policy there. On January 9, 1878, Victor-Emmanuel II died and his son, Humbert I, succeeded him. In March of that year a short-lived Depretis cabinet fell, and Benedetto Cairoli, from a family of Pavian patriots, came into power.

From 1848 until the completion of Italian unity his whole activity had been devoted to the Risorgimento. He had been a Caribaldian officer, a political refugee, an anti-Austrian conspirator, and deputy to Parliament. When the Left came into power in 1876 he became parliamentary leader of the party and his first cabinet was strongly tinged with

---


Irredentism. "Married to a lady from Trent . . . . filled
with a deep hatred for the Danube monarchy," he naturally won
Bismarck's disfavor when under him Irredentism "assumed un-
heard of dimensions." Though the following statement to
Saint-Vallier was not made by the Chancellor until 1879, the
sentiments were equally true in 1873:

My sentiments for Austria must make you
understand how I look at the schemes of Italia
Irredenta; I have let the Quirinal know that
Germany will never permit Italy to lay a hand on
the Trentino or on Istria, nor even more on
Trieste; the Germans of the North will not ever
let it be taken away from their brothers from
the south.

For his minister of Foreign Affairs, Cairoli chose
Count Corti -- "a small ugly man, who looked like a Japan-
ese," Hohenlohe called him. As a representative of old
aristocracy, Corti did not fit easily into a Leftist Cabinet.
What was more, his political philosophy was the antithesis
of the Prime Minister's: he felt that consolidation of
Italy's position was of primary importance to her and that
to accomplish this, friendly relations with Austria were
essential. A cousin of Corti's, writing on the basis of a
private collection of family papers, stresses Corti's

---

233-39.


46. Saint-Vallier to Waddington, June 27, 1879, Émile
Bourgeois et Georges Pagès, Les origines et les responsabilités

47. Chlodwig Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Memoirs (N. Y.,
cited as Hohenlohe, Memoirs.
reluctance to enter the Cairoli cabinet because of his
disapproval of the foreign policy of the government. He
finally consented only on the stipulation of his "firm
intention of maintaining relations with Austria upon a
footing of frank and honorable cordiality." To the king,
Corti said later in explaining his position:

We were very close to a European war: Italy
had every reason to avoid one . . . . Our relations
with Austria constituted truly at that time the
most serious foreign question for Italy. I was
firmly convinced that the only policy in con-
formity with the best interests of Italy was the
policy of peace with all powers, and especially
with Austria. 48

And yet it was this man, whose policies were so at
variance with those of the government, who was sent to
Berlin as the Italian delegate-in-chief. He was supported
by de Launay, the Italian ambassador to Berlin, "dean of the
diplomatic corps there, a Piedmontese, developed in the
school of Cavour." 49 Corti forced through the cabinet,
before departing for Berlin, its consent to allow him the
latitude of "clean hands" should he attend the Congress.
Not believing in the policy of compensation, because of his
fear of international complications, his instructions

48. Conte Egone Cesare Corti, "Il Conte Corti al
352. This article is based on previously unused documents
in the collection of Marquis Gaspare Corti in Taino.

49. M. Coriolis, "La Conference de Berlin," Nouvelle
Revue, Aug. 1, 1830; Camera dei Deputati, 1878-79,
finally were so drawn that he was to demand compensation
only if Austria, at the Congress, were to annex Bosnia and
Herzegovina outright. He was to do all in his power to
assure that "it have really the character of a mere temporary
occupation and that, as far as possible, it should be limited
both as respect to length and as to the number of occupying
forces." He said categorically concerning the probable
occupation of the provinces:

I did not believe it fatal to Italian in-
terests, and that in any case it had been ir-
revocably decided in the councils of Europe and
hence would be vain and perilous for Italy to
oppose it. 51

And realizing how strong was the feeling at home for Italia
Irredenta he thus was resolved, if possible, to avoid the
consequences which such a compensatory demand would unques-
tionably involve. Thus, the "clean hands" policy, plus
Cairoli's Austrian phobia left Italy in a state of isolation
at the Congress.

The country to whose wishes and representatives even
less attention was paid was Turkey. Her only hope was to
save at the Congress as much of her structure as she could.
She sent as her plenipotentiaries Carathéodory Pasha,
Turkish ambassador to London, Mehemet Ali Pasha, the former
commander-in-chief of the army of Bulgaria and highest

51. Ibid., pp. 352-54.
military authority of the Turks, and Sadoullad Bey, Turkish Ambassador to Berlin. Carathéodory was a Greek, both by race and religion. He was chosen for two reasons: 1) Turkey thought a Christian would be more acceptable to the other Powers, and 2) since the negotiations would almost assuredly mean lessened prestige for Islam, it would be better not to have any high Moslems take part in them. The Christian powers, however, knew that an "unbeliever's" acts could easily be repudiated by any Mohammedan government, and were in no way deceived by this move of the Sultan. Bismarck's wrath was heavy against the second Turkish delegate, who, a native-born Prussian, of Huguenot ancestry, had deserted from the Prussian army and become a Moslem. In that wrath the Chancellor spoke: "And I am forced to place a German sentry at the door of a deserter and a renegade, just as I do at the doors of the other plenipotentiaries." Bismarck lost no opportunity to snub the Turkish delegates, and to imply by his treatment that they should be grateful "for every modification of the treaty of San Stefano and should not make trouble by asking more."

Austria had several aspirations in the Balkans, at least some of which she hoped to achieve at the Congress:

53. Ibid., p. 108.
l) she was desirous of annexation or at least occupation, of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2) she hoped eventually for a "suitable port on the Aegean," a hope which "seemed blocked by the creation of a big Bulgaria." With such aspirations and feeling that the Czar had violated the Reichstadt Agreement, Austria was exceedingly anxious to revise the treaty of San Stefano.

As her representatives she sent Andrásy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1871-79, Károlyi, ambassador to Berlin from 1871-78, and Baron Haymerlé, the ambassador to Rome, who in 1879 was to succeed Andrásy. The chief delegate, whose exotic appearance and brilliant uniforms were to make him a center of interest, was described by de Moby as a striking figure in scarlet and gold uniform, whose sparkling black eyes, curly hair, upturned mustache gave him the appearance of a typical hussar; at the same time he was an eloquent speaker, a clever tactician, and a diplomat par excellence. Of the other two a modern writer says:

"Count Károlyi and Baron Haymerlé represented, one social éolat, the other the technical experience necessary for their Empire's success."

55. Benns, op. cit., p. 249.
56. de Moby, op. cit., pp. 102-03.
Great Britain, according to Disraeli, had several points to achieve at Berlin: 1) that Russia should neither occupy Constantinople nor destroy Turkey, 2) that neither Britain's predominance in the eastern Mediterranean nor her route to India should be menaced by Russia, 3) that whatever changes were made should be made by Europe as a whole, and 4) that Russia, Austria, and Germany should not alone attempt to dictate the policy of Europe, but should recognize that British interests in these matters were as great as theirs.

There was considerable discussion in the House of Commons as to the suitable delegates to be sent to Berlin. Feeling in some quarters ran high over permitting Beaconsfield to act, because it meant sending the head of the government out of the country. In March while the discussions were still waxing hot, the situation was reported from London to the Wilhelmsstrasse by Count Münster. An excerpt from his despatch reveals in the British capital:

... the fear that Great Britain cannot find representatives capable of meeting on equal terms the talent and ability that will be gathered at Berlin. The fact that there is no Cabinet Minister fully qualified to represent England abroad is a very sore point. Lord Beaconsfield speaks very little French; Lord Salisbury was


59. Hansard, June 3, 1878, Vol. CCXL, pp. 1056-60; Earl Grey considered it a violation of the parliamentary and cabinet system of government.
unnerved by the experience of his first Conference and reaped neither gratitude nor thanks from his fellow countrymen. The most natural representative of England, Lord Derby, is entirely unfitted by his personality. He no longer enjoys the confidence of his own country and his colleagues, and has declared that he will in no circumstances leave the Foreign Office as long as Parliament is assembled. 60

In spite of the reluctance of the House of Commons, the Prince of Wales was exceedingly eager to have Beaconsfield attend. On May 28 he wrote to his mother:

I said of course Lord Beaconsfield was the only man who could go -- as however clever Lord Salisbury undoubtedly was, still after his fiasco at Constantinople he really would not do. Lord Lyons is not a Cabinet Minister and if he went it would be almost an affront to Lord Odo Russell -- and then he would refer everything home. I understand that Prince Bismarck particularly begs that there should be no ad referendum. Under these circumstances it strikes me more forcibly than ever that the Prime Minister is not only the right man to represent us at a Congress, but the only man who can go -- as he would show Russia and the other Powers that we were really in earnest. 61

The Queen, however, was not so enthusiastic about it, largely because of Lord Beaconsfield's advanced age, his poor health and his heavy duties at home. Furthermore, she had little hope for the outcome of the conference under any circumstances. "I don't believe that without fighting and giving those detestable Russians a good beating any arrange-

60. Münster to Bülow, Mar. 9, 1878, DGPz, Vol. II, pp. 210-12, #337.


62. He was seventy-three and a half years of age at this time.
When it was finally decided that Lord Beaconsfield was to go as the first plenipotentiary, Münster communicated the news at once to the Chancellor. Then shortly afterwards he wrote:

Your Highness will find it very difficult to keep up a serious conversation with this very vain man, who is already showing the weakness of age. At the same time he frequently expresses witty and illuminating ideas, but fails in the higher concepts of a moral nature. His private secretary, Mr. Montagu Corry, is devoted to his chief. He is a very pleasant man, but is vain, and spoiled by Society. He has great influence with Lord Beaconsfield. He uses every bit of gossip to retain his influence with his aged chief, and is therefore to be handled with great caution. . . .


64. Münster to Bismarck, June 10, 1878, DGP., Vol. II, pp. 334-36, #431; Corry's devotion to Lord Beaconsfield is illustrated by one amusing incident. "Dizzy's" French was of such very poor quality that Corry was extremely nervous lest his chief become the laughing stock of Europe were he to use it at the Congress. Corry, consequently, persuaded the Ambassador to do something about the matter. Lord Russell, consequently, suggested that a rumor had reached him that Beaconsfield would address the Congress in French the next day. "That would be a great disappointment to the Plenipotentiaries," said the Ambassador. "They know that they have here in you the greatest living master of English oratory and are looking forward to your speech as the intellectual treat of their lives." Corry and Lord Odo never were sure whether Beaconsfield "took the hint or accepted the compliment." However with nothing more said about the matter, Beaconsfield followed the practice throughout the Congress of addressing all the sessions in his native English. konypenny and Buckle, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 312; Redesdale, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 56.
Bismarck formed his own estimate of Lord Beaconsfield, as might be expected of the Chancellor. That estimate, like so many other of Bismarck's utterances, became historic: "Der alte Jude, das ist der Mann!"

Two other English delegates also represented England at Berlin, Lord Salisbury, who had become Foreign Secretary on Derby's resignation, and Lord Odo Russell, the British Ambassador to Berlin. "Salisbury's role at the congress was by no means so spectacular as the Prime Minister's, though in reality he did most of the work on the English side and was largely responsible for the settlement." 66

And last of all, though far from least, to be considered are Germany's motives and her delegates. Bismarck, of course, said that Germany had no purpose at the Congress and that he himself was merely acting as the "honest broker."

To set forth with any degree of accuracy all the motives of any one individual is difficult; the task becomes immensely more difficult when one is dealing with a person whose motives and scheming were as involved as were Bismarck's. The difficulty is even greater when one takes into consideration the paucity of German documents available concerning

65. McNyffeney and Buckle, loc. cit.; Redesdale, loc. cit.

66. Russell became Baron Ampthill in Dec. 1830, and died just three months later.

67. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. 151.
the Congress of Berlin. Even the editors of one of the collections says that "in spite of the fact that the Congress sat in Berlin and of the leading part played by prominent German statesmen in negotiations and oral discussions, scarcely any of the documents of the Congress are to be found in the Foreign Office."  

One motif, however, is always present in the foreign policy of Bismarck -- his primary aim to preserve peace, to ensure a situation in which the German nation he had established might remain unmenaced and secure. One method of securing that peace was to satisfy the ambitions of other powers with pieces of the Ottoman Empire.

Elected President of the Congress he became the central figure. Lord gives an interesting summary of his part there:

Guiding the discussions with rare skill and tact, and with a certain good humored but compelling brusqueness, holding in his hands the threads of all the secret negotiations that went on behind the scenes, he did, to a large extent, earn the beatitude of the peacemakers and his chosen title of 'the honest broker' by his constant efforts to mediate, to reconcile opposing standpoints, and to ensure the success of the Congress. On the other hand, it must be said that owing to his extreme impatience to finish quickly, an impatience largely justified by the shattered state of his health -- he himself has related that he was obliged to drink a jug of port before every session, in order to keep up at all -- he insisted on hastening matters too precipitately. He drove the Congress along by strokes of the whip. . . .

At all events, Bismarck held such a position at

this Congress as can be paralleled, perhaps, only by that of Metternich at the Congress of Vienna. Not without reason is he said to have jested: "Le Congrès, c'est moi." 69

He was supported by two other able men, Bülow, the Foreign Minister, and Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, the German Ambassador to Paris. De Molly, whose pen pictures have added much to the vivification of the details of the Congress, wrote of them as follows:

Prince Hohenlohe, slender and cold, with angular face, eyes sunken in his head and dilated, his nose like an eagle's beak, with even a somber smile, his words dry and pointed. M. Bülow, . . . suggested by his corpulence and the round placid lines of his smooth-shaven face, by his long white curls, by the gentleness of his expression and his unctuous words, the good-natured aspect of certain ecclesiastical dignitaries. But underneath this benign exterior the clever, expert diplomat, like his colleague, reproduced without deviating a hair's breadth, the imperious thinking of the Chancellor. 70

These were the motives, then, as nearly as can be determined, of the governments represented at the Congress. And these were the men sent to carry them out, who met in Berlin for the first time in formal session on June 13, 1878, in the celebrated Radziwill Palace. Though most of the essential

70. De Molly, op. cit., p. 102.
71. Ibid., p. 98; it seemed the irony of fate that the two ranking Turkish plenipotentiaries should be late, when their ship was delayed by storms on the Black Sea. Staatsarchiv, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 107 ff; the minutes in full of all the sessions are also given here.
points had been settled before the Congress met, there was still much work to be done by the plenipotentiaries both in sessions and out. Not nearly so brilliant socially as had been the Congress of Vienna there still was endless entertainment, or so it seemed to tired old men like Cortchakov and Beaconsfield, who in his diary ten days after the opening complained:

It is absolutely necessary to go to these receptions, but the late hours try me. I begin to die at ten o'clock, and should like to be buried before midnight. But in a Congress, absence from any influential assembly of human beings is a mistake. So much more than the world imagines is done by personal influence. 72

Beaconsfield's words were especially true of this Congress. With the state thus set, what transpired?

CHAPTER VII

WHAT WAS DONE AT BERLIN

"The opening meeting on the afternoon of the thirteenth at two o'clock in the ballroom of Bismarck's palace, commenced pleasantly enough, with port wine and biscuits served while the guests were assembling;" so wrote Hohenlohe afterwards. But this Congress which opened so auspiciously will be remembered always not only because of the document which it fashioned, and which served virtually as the Constitution of the Balkan Peninsula for the following thirty years, but also because of the unsatisfactory settlement of the great questions brought before it. There was not one of the interested parties who did not return from the Congress with "some discontent, some disquiet, some new germ of hatred or of strife." Corti later said, "At that time everyone was telling everyone else to take something which belonged to someone else."

Langer, full well recognizing the weaknesses of the Treaty of Berlin, nevertheless has pertinent conclusions for its justification:


With the advantage of hindsight, it is always easy for posterity to pick the flaws and defects in the work of statesmen of the past. But in justice to them one must view the situation as it presented itself in their own time. . . . The Berlin Treaty was framed to meet a particular and very dangerous situation and was designed to keep the peace between the great powers. . . . After all an ideal territorial settlement is a chimera, and the Balkan settlement of the present day is in many ways not much better than that laid down in the Treaty of Berlin. 4

It has often been said that the Congress of Berlin was at bottom a "farce," because all the decisions had been made beforehand and the delegates merely signed their names to earlier agreements. Bismarck himself would have been glad had this proved true for he was exceedingly anxious to get away for his regularly scheduled trip "to take the waters." 5 However, there were numerous difficult questions left to the Congress to decide and more than once all of Bismarck's skill as a diplomatist was required to hold things together and to prevent the delegates from returning home.

For example, on June 17 the real business of the Congress began, and in two days Beaconsfield had ordered his special train made ready to take him home should Russia not

4. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, pp. 165-166.

5. The Journal des Débats of July 18, 1878, reported that on July 17, the first possible moment after the conclusion of the Congress, Bismarck left for Kissingen.

yield on the Bulgarian matter. This, being in most minds
the most important item to be considered by the Congress,
had been placed first on the agenda by Bismarck; it proved
to be a thorny problem. Beaconsfield said of it: it is
"the real point for which the Congress is assembled. . . .
Upon its treatment depends whether there shall be a Turkey-
in-Europe or not."

The Anglo-Russian Agreements had only
laid down general lines of settlement, with details of
boundaries, etc., to be arranged at the Congress. The pre-
mature revelations of the Salisbury-Schouvalov settlement
aroused considerable stir in England, complicating the
settlement of the matter, for with the increasing tension at
home Beaconsfield became more rigid in his attitude towards
Russia. Rather triumphantly "the old Jew" wrote in his
diary of his "ultimatum" to Russia, issued through Bismarck,
and concludes: "he was convinced that the ultimatum was not
a sham, and before I went to bed I had the satisfaction of
knowing that St. Petersburg had surrendered."

At the after-


8. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. 154; for details of the revelation of the agreement vide supra,
  of Berlin, A Talk with Lord Rowton," The Nineteenth Century,
  July 1905, pp. 83-90. Lord Rowton was the former Montague
  Cory; in this article several incidents and anecdotes of
  Disraeli at the Congress make interesting reading.

9. Diary entry, June 21, 1878, Monypenny and Buckle,
  op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 324.
noon meeting on the 22nd the Russian "surrender" was set on record. "Beaconsfield obviously enjoyed what he evidently regarded as a personal triumph; Bismarck celebrated the event by shaving off his beard, and Gorchkov by staying at home."

Lord, in commenting on this and other of Lord Beaconsfield's activities at the Congress said:

"Dizzy" was, indeed, the stormy petrel of this Congress. If he did not, as Punch prophesied, arrive at Berlin with a large military escort, keep an ironclad on the Spree, attend the Congress with a cooked hat, a brass band, and revolvers, enter singing "We don't want to fight, but by Jingo if we do," draw caricatures of the emperor of Russia on the blotting paper, and wave the Union Jack continually over the head of the president; at least he provided most of the sensations of the Congress: he assumed from the start a defiant, irritating, and uncompromising tone, threatened that if he did not get what he wanted he would go home, and kept the assembly down to the last, in constant uneasiness lest he should stagger them by some new and unexpected theatrical stoke. 11

Bismarck, however, was greatly impressed by Beaconsfield and paid him much attention. He recognized both the finesse and the directness of the statesman. Disraeli, for his part, knowing the dangerous maxim of Bismarck's statescraft, "Divide et impera" and following many private interviews with the President, was convinced that a good understanding with Bismarck and Germany was good policy for England. And by and large they worked well together.

In the next major problem to come up for discussion, the disposition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, England remained true to her agreement of June 6 with Austria, which had been elaborated by Andrásy during the early days of the conference. Austria had promised her support to England in respect to Bulgaria "in return for which the English were to propose the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria."

Corti, of course, was opposed to the proposal, although there was nothing final about the Austrian occupation of the provinces; in fact, the sovereignty of Turkey was explicitly recognized. With reluctance, therefore, but in accordance with his instructions, Corti voted approval.

As might have been expected his actions aroused a storm of protest in Italy. He was, however, firmly convinced of the rectitude of what he had done. Early in July he wrote to Bruzzo, the Minister of War: "Italy had no way and even no interests in preventing the occupation of Bosnia. How can Italy prevent a thing which is willed by all of Europe?" Bruzzo apparently was in hearty agreement, because he replied a week later:

> When I read in those dirty newspapers how lightly they speak of demands for compensation, my hair stands on end, as I think of what France gained by the demands for compensation which she


made in 1866 and which led her to the war of 1870: Would Italy like to tread the same path? 14

Cairoli's attitude was much more compromising; he promised with the aid of the king to attempt to calm the agitation, "which I see shared by the most moderate men of all parties," explaining that his policy would be to stress that the occupation of Bosnia by Austria was "absolutely provisory, no more no less than the Russian occupation in Bulgaria." 15

On the seventh, Corti, who felt that the Prime Minister's telegram showed a lack of confidence, sent a rather sharp reply to Cairoli, pointing out that "if future ministers want to oppose a prolonged occupation they will always have the opportunity to do it, because the legal character of the deliberations does not admit of annexation." He repeated once more that by acquiescing in a fait accompli he believed he had avoided a war for Italy, which could only have had disastrous consequences for her.

But the seventh of July held still more trouble in store for Count Corti. It was on that day that Salisbury revealed to Waddington the convention by which Turkey turned over Cyprus to England, an agreement which had been kept secret up to that time. In so far as the Tunisian story is con-

15. Telegram Cairoli to Corti, June 30, 1878, ibid., p. 357.
cerned, the Cyprus Convention is probably the most important business negotiated at the Congress of Berlin, for Tunisia would seem to have been the prize which France gained for acquiescence in the British-Turkish convention.

Like most of the other agreements, it was negotiated before the Congress met, and formed an integral part of Disraeli's eastern policy, an attempt to safeguard and develop British interests. The opening of the Suez Canal and Britain's increasing use of it, the changed international situation as a result of the unifications of Germany and Italy, England's helplessness in face of the Dreikaiserbund, as well as the increasing British interest in Egypt made Disraeli peculiarly sensitive to Turkey and her possessions.

As early as the Constantinople Conference, however, the mission of Colonel Robert Home, of the British Intelligence Department, was in Turkey looking for "such information as may enable Her Majesty's Government to seek for and select suitable compensation should extensive territorial changes take place in the East." Home recommended strongly that Britain should establish herself in the Near East: 1) from a political point of view, the effect "produced by observing the rapid development of a country under English rule . . . . would be of incalculable value and would do more to maintain

18. Ibid., p. 37.
English prestige than half a dozen campaigns; 2) from a military point of view it should give England "potentially the keys of Asia Minor" and serve as a base from which an army could check any moves on "either the Persian Gulf or the Suez Canal;" and 3) from a commercial point of view a clearing house for the Levant would be provided.

Sir Austen Henry Layard, "an eminent liberal" who was called from his post in Madrid to replace Sir Henry Elliot, as Ambassador to Turkey, after the Constantinople Conference was likewise in accord. It was Layard, "more than any other single individual at home or in the Foreign Service," who brought to the attention of the government and the British public the subject of Asia Minor and its relation to British interests, especially in relationship to the route to India.

Some time before May 10, 1878, Britain had decided to try to get a concession for the occupation of Cyprus. On the fifth Beaconsfield wrote about it to Victoria:

If Cyprus be conceded to Your Majesty by the Porte, and England, at the same time, enters into a defensive alliance with Turkey, guaranteeing Asiatic Turkey from Russian invasion, the power of

19. Ibid., pp. 77-78.


21. Dwight E. Lee, op. cit., p. 44.
England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely increased in that region and Your Majesty's Indian Empire immensely strengthened. Cyprus is the key of Western Asia. 22

On the tenth Layard was told by Salisbury that he might be asked to negotiate, and a telegram of considerable length was sent on May 24, giving him the authority to go ahead with the negotiations along the lines set forth. A formally drafted convention was sent to him from the Foreign Office on May 30, but without waiting for it, lest the disposition of the Sultan change, a convention was drafted at Constantinople, embodying the terms stipulated in the previous messages from the Foreign Office; this was signed June 4, 1878.

The convention was short. It contained actually just one operative clause, which provided that if Russia retained Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them, the British Government would defend the Sultan's Asiatic dominions by force of arms against attack from Russia. In order to be in a position to execute this engagement the English were to be allowed to occupy and administer the island of Cyprus, paying annually

to the Sultan the excess of income over expenditure in the island, with the sum to be calculated on the basis of a five year experience. Furthermore the Sultan promised England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later, into the government of Cyprus and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects in the Asiatic territories.

Since the convention supplemented the Schouvalov-Salisbury agreements and was "entirely dependent on Russia's retention of Kars, Ardahan, or Batoum" it naturally had to be kept secret until after the Congress had settled Turkey's Asiatic boundaries. After the premature globe revelation of the Schouvalov-Salisbury agreements, the necessity for secrecy was even greater. There apparently were leaks, however, and the British plenipotentiaries became nervous about the possibilities of continued secrecy. Andrassy learned of the convention from Zichy, Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople, as early as June 9, and Bismarck "was informed by Lord Beaconsfield himself." But there were other powers whose reactions had to be taken into consideration, as well.

Nevertheless, the granting by the Porte of the firman


necessary for England's actual occupation of Cyprus was postponed from day to day as the Sultan became increasingly suspicious of Great Britain. On July 6, however, the question of the Asiatic territories at last came before the Congress, and it became apparent that Russia would retain Ardahan and Kars, at least. This was sufficient to indicate that the essential conditions upon which the Cyprus Convention depended had ceased to be hypothetical. Finally when late on the same day word reached Salisbury and Beaconsfield that the firman was actually being prepared, Salisbury "resolved to avoid trouble by telling Waddington confidentially."

The way had been prepared in England for the announcement of the convention. On July 6 Salisbury had sent to Sir Stafford Northcote, leader of the House of Commons, a "copy of the despatch which was to be presented to the House when the time for enlightenment came." Along with it went a unique and flippant "course of events," which Salisbury's imagination saw to be the result of the revelation. "Waddington tears his hair and telegraphs wildly to Toulon," and "the Daily News conclusively proves that the idea of taking Cyprus could only have occurred to the Semitic instincts of the Prime Minister" are two examples.


It was to anticipate the agitation of France that Salisbury was inspired to notify Waddington on July 6 of the convention, enclosing a copy of it, "... which is purely conditional in its tenour." At the same time a note was sent to Bismarck, who had presumably already been apprised of the situation. France was another matter altogether, and, as Dwight Lee observed, "the desire to square Waddington played as large a part in Salisbury's plans as did the Asiatic settlement.

Salisbury's move was fortunately timed for, on the morning of July 3, news of the convention appeared in the Daily Telegraph, and the Government had to reply to questions in both houses of Parliament; Mr. Aston Cross communicated the terms of the treaty to the House of Commons and the Duke of Richmond and Gordon to the Lords.

Salisbury was more nervous over the French reaction to the Cyprus Convention than over that of any other power.

---

34. Salisbury to Waddington, July 7, 1878, BFSP., Vol. XLIX, p. 1345; there has been some question about the date of this communication. Both BFSP. and Cecil, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 294, give the date as July 7. But Dwight E. Lee, op. cit., fn. 100, says "but the copy in the Foreign Office, 365 4, is dated July 6, and it appears from other sources to be the correct one." See also Waddington to Dufaure, July 8, 1878, DDOG., Vol. II, pp. 352-53, #325.

35. Dwight E. Lee, op. cit., p. 100.


Inasmuch as France had accepted the invitation to the Congress only after it had been thoroughly understood that Egypt, Syria, and the Holy Places were to be excluded from the discussions and as France had great interests in the Mediterranean, it was not to be expected that she would approve of the English agreement with Turkey.

However, Bismarck who for so long had been urging a settlement of the Eastern question on a basis of compensation at the expense of Turkey apparently suggested that the English might offer compensation to France in Tunisia. "There is some evidence that this mode of procedure was decided on by the Chancellor and the English delegates during the early days of the Congress." The French had been well treated with "special kindliness and courtesy" by Bismarck, although, as Bülow said, they "played the most modest part at the Congress." But exactly what was said by Salisbury and perhaps confirmed by Bismarck has been greatly debated. It does not appear anywhere in documentary form. Langer speaks of a call of Salisbury on Waddington on the evening of the 6th:

---


39. Ibid., p. 160.

The French minister appeared to be very much upset, but was soon calmed when Salisbury indicated to him that England would not raise obstacles in the way of a French occupation of Tunis. "You cannot leave Carthage in the hands of the barbarians," he is reputed to have said. Bismarck, too, said to the French minister, "Why do you not go to Carthage?" and Waddington was evidently prepared to take the English and the Germans at their word. 41

Waddington in his telegram of the 8th to Dufaure speaks of receiving the letter on the 6th and of seeing Salisbury on the 7th -- "j'ai vu dès hier Lord Salisbury." Lee explains the discrepancies and questions about the dates as follows:

In view of the excitement in France it was fortunate that England had a man of Waddington's stolid "bourgeois" temperament to deal with. His only immediate move was to ask Salisbury to put his private letter of July 6 into the form of a despatch which could be published. This was done with slight alterations of wording and the changing of the date to the 7th, after Waddington's approval had been secured on July 20th. 43

Madame Waddington wrote her version of the affair later. The value of it justifies the length of the excerpt:

I will not go into details except to say that the French protectorate of Tunis (now one of our most flourishing colonies) was entirely arranged by Waddington in a long confidential conversation with Lord Salisbury. The cession of the Island of


42. Waddington to Dufaure, July 8, 1878, DDOG., Vol. II, p. 352, #325.

Cyprus by Turkey to the English was a most unexpected and disagreeable surprise to Waddington. However, he went instantly to Lord Salisbury, who was a little embarrassed as that negotiation had been kept secret, which didn't seem quite fair -- everything else having been openly discussed around the council table. He quite understood W's feelings in the matter and was perfectly willing to make an arrangement about Tunis. The thing was neither understood nor approved at first by the French Government. W returned to Paris, "les mains vides; seulement à chercher dans sa poche on y a trouvé les clés de la Tunisie" -- as one of his friends defined the situation some years ago. He was almost disavowed by his Government. The ministers were timid and unwilling that France should take any initiative -- even his friend Léon Say, then Minister of Finance, a very clever man and brilliant politician, said: "Our colleague, Waddington, contrary to his nature, has quite lost his head this time over the Tunis question." I think the course of events has fully justified his action, and, now that it has proved such a success, everyone claims to have taken the initiative of the French Protectorate of Tunis. All honours have been paid to those who carried out the project, and very little is said of the man who originated the scheme in spite of great difficulties at home and abroad. Some of W's friends know the truth.

Waddington and Saint-Vallier realized the grave importance to France of these suggestions which had been made regarding Tunisia. French acceptance of them would result in a drastic departure from the continental policy which France, by and large, had pursued since 1870. They drew up a motion, to be placed before the Congress with a view to securing its sanction of the proposition. This they sent to Paris by a special messenger for the approval of MacMahon and the Cabinet. Two versions of the President's reactions are given by Hanotaux: one, an eyewitness account, that he

---

flew into a rage exclaiming, "They want to set Italy on us. I will countenance nothing of the sort;" and the other of Emile de Marcère, the minister of the Interior:

I had long considered, and General Chanzy agreed with me, that the possession of Tunisia was indispensable to the security of our African colony. Marshal MacMahon shared this view. He was very decided about it and would willingly have entered on the matter which appealed to his patriotism and would have cast a halo of glory on his presidency. The Cabinet Council, however, did not consider the time ripe for the matter.

In the end the French plenipotentiaries were instructed by telegram to do nothing formal about the offer. It was, indeed, hardly possible for the French Government to act otherwise. Having insisted specifically on discussion of only those matters growing directly out of the treaty of San Stefano, it would have "been an inconsistent and hopelessly undignified course" to have opened up the discussion of Tunisia "merely because of hints dropped by Salisbury and Bismarck at the last minutes." Waddington seems to have become increasingly pleased with the idea of Tunisia. The legend is told that "at the moment of stepping into the carriage of his train he gaily clapped his hand over his pocket, 'And here, my dear friend, I am carrying home Tunis'."


46. Medlicott, op. cit., p. 113.

In the meantime no word of the suggested compensation seemed to have reached the French press, which was generally unfavorable to the Cyprus Convention. The République Française, Gambetta's organ, urged that the Convention be submitted to the Congress and if not, "the plenipotentiaries of France should consider whether or not they could sign the final acts of the Congress with safety," and questioned whether "if all the members of the Congress . . . . when they met at Berlin had known that ten days before England had concluded a separate treaty with the Porte, some of them would not perhaps have remained at home . . . ." The Soleil, an Orléanist paper, commented that:

\[\text{England was not so disinterested as she appeared to be. . . . We do not say she was wrong; we only see that France was made to draw the chestnuts from the fire for Greece who will perhaps not be more grateful than Italy for the service rendered to her, and has obtained for herself nothing in this partition of Turkey.} \]

At first the Journal des Débats was very critical of the Convention; Beaconsfield and his policy were condemned as being Semitic. But the following day the Débats suggested, "even at the risk of being censured for such a heresy", that Austria should assume in Europe the same role

\[\text{48. Journal des Débats, July 10, 1878.} \]

\[\text{49. Calignani's Messenger, July 11, 1878, citing the République Française of the previous day.} \]

\[\text{50. Calignani's Messenger, July 10, 1878, citing the Soleil of 9th.} \]
England was assuming in Asia. The paper cautioned that France could not possibly assume such a role, for she still had the task of restoration ahead of her, and advised consequently "wise, prudence, and coolness." The Siècle, which tended usually to follow along the same path as the Débats was very guarded; it had feared that Beaconsfield might do something such as he had done, but it sagely concluded that the future alone would tell the tale.

Galignani's Messenger on the 11th, in referring to the cautious statement of the Débats that it would wait before expressing positive opinions "until informed of the details" had this to say: "This silence considering the relations between that journal and one of the chief members of the Cabinet is very significant; the Government is evidently undecided yet as to the conduct to be followed."

The "relations" between the Journal des Débats and the Government to which the previous excerpt refers was a rather conclusive one. The Journal des Débats had been founded by the Bertin family and had remained in their possession throughout the succeeding fortunes of France. At the time which concerns this narrative, M. Léon Say had married a Mlle. Bertin, and through various ministries he was Minister

---

51. Ibid., July 11, 1878.
52. Le Siècle, July 10, 1878.
of Finance. He was a close personal friend of Waddington, and apparently as a result of his connection with the paper, it came to be looked upon as a semi-official publication.

Lyons, however, was so alarmed by the tone of the press that he telegraphed Salisbury on July 10 to hurry the signature of the final act, lest Waddington be instructed to return home without having signed for France. "In answer to a question from Salisbury, Lyons reported that such a proposal was likely to come from Gambetta, but that MacMahon and the ministers were disposed to let Waddington act on his own initiative." Lyons, likewise, wrote the Prince of Wales, who was planning to come again to Paris in mid-July to visit the Exposition, that public irritation was so great that it would be better for him not to carry out his plan. The Prince decided to come nevertheless. He had Gambetta to luncheon with him at the Café des Anglais and Lyons reported afterwards to Salisbury, "Gambetta declared himself more or less reconciled to the Convention of June fourth."

Lyons had reported on the 9th, 11th, and 13th of July that the French press showed irritation at the Convention. On July 16 Waddington returned to Paris. Then, reported

56. Ibid., pp. 156-57.
Dilke, "the row in the French press suddenly subsided." Excerpts immediately thereafter are of interest. On July 17 the *Journal des Débats* commented editorially that the Anglo-Turkish convention had done more for the peace of Europe than the Congress itself. Three days later the same journal said that Waddington had conducted himself at Berlin as he should have done. On the same day also mention was made of the rumor that "England invited us formally to seek for an establishment in some part of the Mediterranean," but that Waddington, wishing to return with clean hands, had refused.

If that is true we cannot sufficiently congratulate the Minister of Foreign Affairs on his attitude and his language. . . . We require no compensation for what the English have done, because we feel no jealousy nor inquietude for it.

And by July 22 it reported that the first bad impression had disappeared, and pointed out that the attitude of the English statesmen had contributed to it, that they wished to do everything possible to maintain good relations with France.

If the *Journal des Débats* can be used as a gauge of the thinking of the Quai d'Orsay then Waddington had been successful, within four days of his return, regardless of what had

---

been the first reaction of the Government to the news of the Cyprus Convention and the offer of Tunisia, in converting his colleagues to his point of view. Other papers apparently followed suit. The Siècle almost always followed the lead of the Débats; the Constitutionnel frequently, however, although also a moderate Republican paper, expressed its own opinions. On July 18 it openly advocated the annexation of Tunisia, as a means of healing the wound to French national pride caused by the recent settlement of Eastern affairs. "Everyone is aware that Tunisia is an admirable country. .. . It is a splendid jewel, and we have only to lay hands on it to become and remain masters of it." There may have been some "leak" from the Quai d'Orsay concerning the agreement between Salisbury and Waddington at Berlin; if so the Constitutionnel was the only paper to profit from it, and none of the others followed suit.

The country most disturbed by the announcement of the Cyprus Convention was Italy. Salisbury did not notify Count Corti at the same time he notified Waddington: "I was sorry it came out on Monday, as I had just had the copies made out to send to him -- when I heard of the Telegraph's indiscretion. Fortunately . . . Waddington had been squared the day before." But poor Corti had been ignored in this, as he had been ignored throughout the Congress, and it was left

61. Le Constitutionnel, July 13, 1878.
for him to get the news through the papers. As Medlicott points out, however, inasmuch as Italy had already acquiesced without demand for compensation in a "greater advance by a nearer power, it is not surprising that no one considered seriously the need for offering her compensation for the British occupation of Cyprus."

Then what was said to Corti becomes a matter for conjecture and dispute. Chiala tells of Corti going to Bülow on the 8th of July, of Bülow saying, "Pourquoi ne prendriez-vous pas Tunis en vous arrangeant avec l'Angleterre?" and of Corti replying "Vous voulez donc nous brouiller avec la France?" Madame Adam tells that she talked to Corti in Rome and to Gambetta in Paris, and that each repeated to her "the same phrase which Bismarck had personally uttered to Waddington and Bülow to the Italian plenipotentiary, 'England has Cyprus, why do you not take Tunis, making arrangements for it with England?'." Bülow, however, made no mention whatsoever of a conversation between himself and the Italian plenipotentiary. Instead he indicated that the conversation took place between Bismarck and Corti; it is to be noted that he used the same words, in citing that conversation, which others put in his mouth.

63. Medlicott, op. cit., p. 115.
The Italian delegate in Berlin, Corti, made a big mistake through being over-clever. In the course of a long conversation, Bismarck made the remark that the propitious moment had now come for Italy to lay her hand upon Tunis. Corti thought he was being very cunning when he replied, 'Vous voulez donc nous brouiller avec la France?' If Corti had seized the opportunity, Italy would today possess the best and most promising piece of land on the North African coast. 66

De Launay likewise made a report concerning an alleged "offer" from Lord Salisbury for Tunisia, also, in which one is apt to feel that his wishful thinking led him to read more than was justified under the circumstances. He spoke of:

... the conversation I had had with Lord Salisbury during the last days of the Congress, and said that I had expressed my regret to him that the English government should not, at least, have spared us the surprise of learning through the newspapers of the convention concerning the occupation of the island of Cyprus. The head of the Foreign Office did his best to explain the circumstances, and allowed me to infer from his veiled utterances, that Italy might dream of expansion in the direction of Tripoli or Tunisia. I was not authorized to enter upon a discussion of this point. 67

Chiala refers to a conversation of Salisbury with Corti. He quotes the speech of Baccarini at Pavia on May 26, 1890, in which the deputy said: "The Marquis of Salisbury observed to Count Corti, who spoke to him about affairs in the Mediterranean, that 'the coast was long enough so that both France and Italy could find compensation'." If this is the

67. Francesco Crispi, Politica Estera, p. 94.
accurate report of the conversation, then certainly Salisbury's "utterances" were "veiled;" it is possible, of course, that to de Launay he spoke otherwise. The conduct of the English Foreign Secretary at the Congress would leave grave doubt, however, about such a course.

Considering how much has been said and written about what was or was not offered to France and Italy at the Congress, the written testimony of Corti himself becomes exceedingly interesting. Corti's cousin, Count Egon Corti, flatly states that, "At Berlin Bismarck said nothing significant to Corti." But he adds, "Billow did give a hint," and to prove it cites a letter from Corti to the King. "Does Your Majesty recall how Herr Billow said to me at Berlin, evidently on behalf of Prince Bismarck, 'Pourquoi ne prendriez-vous pas la Tunisie?'," and adds that "At the same time the easy prophets, Lord Salisbury and Lord Russell, in conversations with Count de Launay, advised him to 'be on the alert in those regions'."

Still another aspect to the story was added some years later. On May 22 or 23, 1881, an English paper, the Standard, printed a diplomatic document in which it was declared that, as a result of a three-cornered conversation between Corti, Salisbury, and Waddington, it had been agreed that Italy was

69. Corti to the King, Aug. 15, 1878, Corti, op. cit., p. 354.
to seek compensation in Tripoli if France were to annex Tunis. Corti, then ambassador to Constantinople, made haste to deny the published story. "Such a conversation," he wrote on May 24, "never took place either at Berlin or elsewhere... The diplomatic note to which this despatch alludes is, therefore, either entirely apocryphal, or contains an account of a conversation which never took place." Menabrea, the Italian ambassador in London, wired that the published denial in the Times had given rise to an interpellation, in the course of which Dilke said no such correspondence existed. Menabrea added significantly, however, that he talked subsequently with Granville and believed:

... from his guarded replies that there was some information at the Foreign Office concerning this, or that at the Foreign Office they believe the question of the cession of Tripoli to Italy was aired in the course of conversation at the Congress of Berlin.  

However, Granville wrote that, "In 1883 it was still a matter of constantly recurring controversy whether at Berlin some indirect encouragement had not been given to Italy by Bismarck to take Tunisia." He pointed out that this belief was compromising Corti's influence at Constantinople.

---

70. Crispi, Politica Estera, p. 91.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
and consequently had been denied. And yet at the time the Standard story was published, Corti entered into correspondence with Dilke about it. Later the "discussion was renewed in conversation" wrote Dilke, who quoted Corti as follows:

At that time everybody was telling somebody else to take something which belonged to somebody else. One more powerful than Lord Salisbury, more powerful than Lord Beaconsfield, advised me to take Tunis. Lord Salisbury advised me to take an island, and Lord Salisbury may have advised me to take Tripoli. 74

Hanotaux adds one further possible interpretation to the story. "Rumours were circulated, not apparently without intention, that Prince Bismarck had offered Tunisia to Corti. . . . Perhaps the Italian government did not regret what might possibly cover the check they had suffered in the Adriatic." What, if anything, actually was said to Corti at Berlin, would seem thus to be left suspended in air, in so far as any consistent documentary evidence is at present available.

That Corti's plight, as the Congress drew to a close, was an unhappy one was generally recognized. Salisbury wrote to Cross, the Home Secretary, on July 12: "The Italians are unhappy -- not because we have got Cyprus, but because they

have got nothing. I fear poor Corti will lose his place for his moderation." The Tenterden papers also reveal the same thought: "The Italians are more sore than the French about Cyprus, and Corti expects to be turned out on his return if he does not anticipate his dismissal by his resignation." Only Italy got nothing; Corti's policy of "clean hands" had truly become the policy of "empty hands."

André Lebon who also edited the Année politique under the pseudonym of André Daniel, points out in an article on the preliminaries of the Treaty of Bardo that "for the first time since her birth, unified Italy saw a territorial partition effected following a European war, without her receiving the smallest bit." He adds, significantly, also that in 1860, 1866, and 1870 "victorious, vanquished, or neutral" she had been able to make gain for herself "from the quarrels of others."

The Congress met for the last time on the afternoon of July 13 in order to sign the treaty. No one was fully

77. Medlicott, op. cit., fn. 115, citing private Tenterden papers.
78. Lebon, op. cit., p. 398.
79. Ibid.
satisfied with its provisions, but certain powers accepted it more happily than others. Turkey felt that she had been despoiled by her enemy and deserted by her friends. Though Russia had acquired the part of Bessarabia lost in 1856 and valuable territories between the Black and the Caspian Seas, the gains seemed slight rewards for her military successes and the loss of men and money sustained in the war. Gortchakov left the Congress with particularly bitter feelings for Bismarck, whom he felt "had betrayed Russian interests and been guilty of unpardonable ingratitude in view of Russia's benevolent attitude during the Franco-Russian War." The Balkan states were dissatisfied: Rumania because of the loss of Bessarabia, Serbia and Montenegro because of the disposal of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria because her great dreams failed of realization, and Greece because of "the scant attention paid to the aspirations cherished by her people." Austria and England on the whole were pleased with their successes; and Beaconsfield

31. L'Année politique (Paris, 1878), pp. 154-96, gives an interesting contemporary summary of the reactions of all the powers to the terms of the treaty, written from the French approach.

32. Fay, op. cit., p. 67; Fay points out that though Bismarck had supported Austria and England on many points, he had also done Russia a real service, getting far more for her at the Congress than she could have secured for herself. He thought that Russia should be pleased with the real gains she had made.

33. Duggan, op. cit., p. 146.
showed no qualms of conscience because of the inconsistency of the Cyprus Convention with the principles for which both he and England stood -- the integrity of Turkey and the inviolability of the Sultan's sovereignty. France returned from the Congress much stronger than she had gone. "She had entered into closer relations with all the powers, and had laid the bases for her future colonial expansion." Italy complained that she had not even been given the crumbs that fell from the banquet table.

The completely uninvolved American comment on the Treaty of Berlin was given by the American minister in Berlin:

I may add that while the prevalent impression here is one of relief, especially since a general peace, although of uncertain duration, is assured, the solution of the question is more or less unsatisfactory to all persons concerned. 36

According to the epigram suggested by their own words:

Beaconsfield and Salisbury brought home "peace with honour;" Waddington brought home "Tunisia in his pocket;" but Corti returned with "clean hands and empty pockets." These negotiations at Berlin made possible the last act in the

34. Debidour, op. cit., p. 530; Beaconsfield for his work at the Congress was made a knight of the Garter, and at his urgent solicitation Salisbury received the same honor. Beaconsfield had previously refused the decoration in Jan. 1873; in July 1878, he refused the Queen's offer of a Marquisate or a Dukedom for himself and of a Barony or Viscounty for his brother and nephew. Monypenny and Buckle, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 347, and Buckle, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 597.

35. Wienefeld, op. cit., p. 54.

drama of the struggle for Tunisia, and just as there the
"honest broker" played an important role, so in the final
negotiations his part will not be one to be overlooked.
CHAPTER VIII

THE REACTION TO THE CYPRUS CONVENTION

As might have been anticipated the plenipotentiaries on their return to their own countries had severe criticism, as well as approbation, to face. Gladstone was one of Beaconsfield's most violent critics. In the House of Commons he denounced the Treaty of Berlin in general and the Cyprus Convention in particular. He called it a "mad undertaking," and regretted that the British plenipotentiary instead of leaning "towards the side of freedom and away from the side of servitude" followed the reverse plan. And in his speech to the Southwark Liberal Association Gladstone declaimed the fact that of all the statesmen he had known from the Duke of Wellington to Lord Landsdowne not one of them would have been induced to put his name to such an arrangement, so insane a covenant. The secret Anglo-Russian conventions he denounced as "an act of duplicity not surpassed, and I believe rarely equalled, in the history of nations."

Corti, infinitely more, was excoriated. He barely escaped being stoned in the streets of Milan; the Crispi

group was responsible for a press campaign against him, and he had a difficult time defending his policy. Rumors of his resignation were current at once, even before his return to Rome, which was delayed because he joined the King and Queen in a tour through Northern Italy. The American Minister in Rome on July 23 wrote discrediting the rumor of resignation, however:

I have little reason to believe this rumor to be well founded, nor did I infer from the language of Mr. Cairoli, with whom I had an interview at the foreign office yesterday, that he expected the minister of foreign affairs to take this step. Count Corti’s action at the congress is not only approved by the ministry, but was in conformity with his instructions and with the settled policy of the present administration. Indeed it is certain that any movement on the part of the Italian plenipotentiaries at Berlin, looking to a claim of additional territory as a set-off to the occupation of Bosnia by Austria, would have met with no support from the congress, but would have been resented by Austria in a manner that would infallibly have led to grave results, if not to immediate hostilities between that country and Italy. It is true that there is a certain amount of popular agitation on this subject, but the public excitement . . . . has been greatly misrepresented . . . . and exaggerated in amount by the European press.

The German Ambassador in Rome came to the defense of Corti on the advice of Berlin, as the agitation continued. He was told to stress “the strong and painful impression” which was being created in Berlin by the attacks on Corti

and that, "it is wrong that Italy instead of thanking him, receives with such odious attacks a minister who knew how to inspire in other Powers full confidence in Italian policy." Unfortunately for Corti this helped not at all, but served rather to discredit him still further in the eyes of his countrymen.

By October the Irredentist movement was in full swing. The people were demanding greater freedom of speech and of assembly "for the very purpose of strengthening the movement against the disillusionments which followed the Congress of Berlin." On the fifteenth of October, Cairoli made an important speech at Pavia, in which he supported the work of the Italian plenipotentiaries at the Congress, in words, however, which seemed almost to damn with faint praise. He commented, first, that the work of the Italian plenipotentiaries had not prejudiced the interests of Italy, and then he further spoke approvingly of the demands of the people for freedom of speech and assembly; this was equivalent to an open toleration of the demonstrations against the results of the Congress.

As a consequence Corti, who was becoming increasingly unwilling to associate himself with the new outburst of

6. Ibid., p. 360.
Irredentism which the Cairoli ministry was making no effort to suppress, seized upon the latter statements in the Favia speech as meaning lack of ministerial support for his policy at Berlin. He, therefore, offered his resignation.

Criticism of the Cairoli-Corti policy at Berlin is still being offered by Italian writers. As an example one of the more moderate ones is given here:

Whatever effort one may make to understand the policy of the Cairoli-Corti Cabinet of 1878, one remains perplexed. There is no shade, no aspect which can justify it. That ostentation of passiveness, of inertia towards the active will-power of the other Governments represents the culminating movements of our international disorientation.

Cairoli was left to solve the rest of the riddle of Italian policy in respect to France, Germany, England, and Tunisia himself. If it be true that his favorite maxim was, \"We may be unskilled, but above all else we wish to be honest,\" (Saremo inabile, ma soprattutto vogliamo essere oneste,) one is struck by the sardonic note. It would be hard to find a man less skilled for the high post he held, with brief intervals, until after the French occupation of Tunisia. "The really decisive factor in the occupation was, after all, the policy of Cairoli, though this in turn was

8. Langer, The European Powers, Part I, p. 72; Corti, op. cit., p. 301; the Ministers of War and Navy resigned with Corti in protest to the policy of the government.


largely conditioned by the arrangements made between France and England, under German auspices, at Berlin.

In France, on the other hand, the pattern was being woven in a different fashion. Waddington immediately set about to strengthen the French position in respect to Tunisia. On July 16, the same day that he returned to Paris, he sought out Lord Lyons, the British ambassador, to discuss with him the conversation he had had in Berlin with Salisbury. Dilke reported on this later:

I wrote to Lord Granville to say that I was sorry that there had not been included in the papers [the Blue Book of 1871 on Tunisia] Lord Lyons' dispatch of the 16th of July. . . . . Waddington said that he had pointed out . . . . that Italy would object, and that Lord Salisbury had replied that she must 'seek compensation in Tripoli'. . . . Lord Salisbury undoubtedly and even by his own admission, has used most impolitic language, giving up that which was contrary to British interests and which was not ours to give. 13

It is somewhat regrettable that the Blue Book does not contain Lyons' report of that interview. However, Dwight E. Lee, who has made such valuable use of Foreign Office documents, does refer to it in some detail. Waddington, apparently, told Lyons that if the French Chambers had been in session when the news of the Cyprus Convention first reached

Paris, he thought the news might well have led to war or something like war. But significantly he seems to have pointed out that there remained still another three months and "if the proper steps" were taken before the opening of the sessions, the difficult situation might be quickly and happily cleared. "One of the steps which he proposed was the placing of Salisbury's assurances in regard to Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria in a written, official and binding form, so that they could be produced if necessary."

Salisbury was alarmed to hear from Lyons that Waddington intended to get the matter down in black and white. He replied to the ambassador in Paris:

What W. Waddington said to you is much what he said to me at Berlin, though the lurid touches about war have been filled in afterwards. The precise answer to be given to his promised despatch must, of course, depend very much on the terms in which it is framed. . . . . If France occupied Tunis tomorrow, we should not even remonstrate. But to promise that publicly would be a little difficult. . . . . I am a little anxious as to the form he gives his despatch, for if he makes it too peremptory, he may produce the very appearance of estrangement which it is our common object to avoid.

On July 21, Waddington sent two despatches to London, in one of which he covered the English suggestions concerning

14. Dwight E. Lee, op. cit., p. 107. Dilke reported that Lyons had written on the 9, 11, and 13 of July in an alarmed fashion of French irritation with the Cyprus Convention, but that it had subsided after Waddington's return to the capital.

Tunisia and in the other he referred to the English assurances concerning the maintenance of the status quo in Egypt and Syria and the respect for French traditions and interests in both regions which would be continued. The tenor of Waddington's despatches relieved Salisbury's mind, although he was not entirely satisfied with the wording. He wrote to Lyons the day after he received them: "They are very friendly in tone and will not I think be difficult to answer. . . . The general tenor is quite accurate, but his vivacious French by no means renders the tone of my communication." The French Foreign Minister accordingly modified the wording of his communication, but requested that his original despatch be left in the hands of the English Cabinet as a confidential procès-verbal to establish his "intimate and cordial but perfectly official conversations with the Ministers of the Queen at Berlin."

Salisbury then complied with the wishes of the French government by confirming the despatch concerning Egypt and Syria, but replied guardedly concerning Tunisia. He refused to be held accountable for direct quotations from his conver-


sations, but took "great pleasure in bearing witness to the general justice of his recollections." He pointed out that Her Majesty's Government had "no counter-claims to advance" in that region, and then he added:

On the future destinies of this province it is unnecessary to speculate. I think M. Waddington must have misconceived me in understanding that I foreboded an early fall to the existing government of Tunis. My information would rather lead me to expect... it may last for a considerable time... There is one consideration to which I drew the attention of M. Waddington in conversation... France is not the only country which lies in proximity to Tunis. I have no means of knowing the exact views of the Italian government upon this question, but I have grounds for believing that it is one to which their attention has been drawn. Her Majesty's Government must not be understood as having arrived at any opinion upon the position which Italy may take up in respect to the region under discussion. 19

Salisbury further set Waddington's mind at rest when early in September in private conversations the French indicated that they would make no claim on Asiatic Turkey and would support English policy there.

Salisbury found his position a little difficult, not only in respect to Waddington and the demands of the government in Paris, but also in respect to the situation in Tunisia proper. On July 23, 1878, Wood communicated with Salisbury from Tunis. He sent an item which appeared on the


sixteenth in the French _La Liberté_ and was reproduced on the following day in the _Berlin Montagblatt_ which read "that there is no longer a matter of doubt that England offered the annexation of the Regency to France, but that Waddington declined the offer, stating that he desired to return to France with clean hands."

On August 7, the day of the reply to Waddington, Salisbury made the flat statement to the consul in Tunis: "With reference to the statement, I have to inform you that no offer of the annexation of Tunis to France has ever been made by Her Majesty's Government." Like most diplomats Salisbury was adept at splitting hairs. And in Parliament the very day of the Waddington-Lyons talk, Mr. Bourke, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on a question from General Balfour denied that there were any grounds "for the rumours about the changes in the Mohammedan territories of Tunis and Tripoli, as respects their transfer to Italy and France."

France was endeavoring to make very sure of the ground under her feet before she was to set out on this new path. The English hazard seemed to be well eliminated after the Salisbury assurances had been received. There was another

---


which needed to be well sounded out -- Germany.

The deference which Bismarck had shown to the French delegates at the Congress had done much to bring about a feeling of good will between the two countries. The Bismarckian policy of conciliation was being used consistently towards France.

Bismarck's motive is clear: to compensate France, to divert her attention from the Rhine and scatter her energies in distant places. The motive of the Republican ministers is equally plain: to restore France to her place in European and world politics, to cease unprofitable thoughts of revenge and grow strong and powerful. 24

Expediency and opportunism were gaining strength in both France and Germany.

There was considerable opposition in France, however. The factor of revanche was still a powerful one in many circles. Déroulède even accused Ferry of offering twenty domestics to the France who had lost two children. 25 The conservative and radical press criticized the government for its attitude towards Germany, and such "die-hards" as 26 Madame Adam complained, for example, of the République Française that "its glorious air of courage is now sung in a minor key."

26. Vide supra, Ch. VI, fn. 12.
However, Saint-Vallier was prompt to accept the invitation of the Chancellor to spend several days at Friedrichsrude with him early in January of 1879. It was a move of general expediency, of course, but it was dictated as well by a situation of increasing tenseness in Tunisia, which will be discussed in detail shortly and on which Waddington was most anxious to know German reaction. It was at this meeting at Friedrichsrude that Bismarck spoke the much quoted words: "I believe the Tunisian pear is ripe, and that the time has come for you to pick it.”

In his despatch to Waddington, after his return to Berlin, Saint-Vallier reported the much-to-be-repeated phrase, as well as many more statements of definite Bismarckian policy.

I believe the French people should have some satisfaction for their amour propre and I desire keenly to have them obtain it in the Mediterranean basin, their sphere of natural expansion. The more success they have in that sphere, the less they will seek compensation for their grief, the legitimacy of which I do not dispute, but which it is not in our power to appease. 29

Bismarck was anything but flattering in respect to Italy, calling her, among other epithets, "a nation rotten before she comes of age;" the French ambassador added that it would take him another page to relate all the many ways in which the Chancellor had "flayed Italian pretentions and

29. Idem.
inconsistency." It is interesting to note also the reserve with which Saint-Vallier received this renunciation of Italy, speculating upon Bismarck's motives and wondering if it might be merely a method of embroiling France with her Latin neighbor.

Bismarck at this time indicated also that he was making no secret of his backing of possible French moves in Tunisia, and that he specifically had so informed the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I charged Kaudall to say to M. Depretis, and Bihow to de Launay that in my eyes Tunisia is included in the French orbit and that I find France so firmly established as not to permit other Powers to move against her or to search to restrain her influence with the Bey, her neighbor, and her protégé. 30

Furthermore, Saint-Vallier was told to convey definitely to Waddington the assurance that these statements were official and that "if at a later time he needs a more formal statement of these opinions, I will renew them in written and official diplomatic form." 31

France could have asked for no clearer "green light" than this. Mitchell's summary is valuable at this point:

It would hardly have been possible for the Chancellor of Germany to have stated more clearly that though he admitted the justice of the French grievance, he could not redress it but he would try to find compensation for it. He was honest

30. *Idem.*
31. *Idem.*
enough not to make any pretense of chivalry. His motive, like that of Gambetta, was expediency, frank and unashamed.

Even though Bismarck may have been brutally frank to Italy about his attitude concerning France and Tunisia, the French government was not equally frank, if the documents cited by Chiala may be accepted as valid. Chiala says that in August, 1878, Cialdini, Italian ambassador in Paris since 1876, received orders from Corti to ask Waddington about the Tunisian situation. Waddington said that should the interests of France in the future demand occupation of the Regency, the move would not be made without giving Italy suitable warning and arranging with her suitable compensation. On the day following, Chiala further reports, Gambetta came to Cialdini and spoke even more strongly, pointing out that France had many internal concerns at the moment, the Exposition, electoral reform, etc., and that she was not thinking and would never think of the occupation of Tunisia, "not wishing to make of Italy an irreconcilable enemy." How seriously the Italian government took or should have taken these assurances is debatable.

32. Mitchell, op. cit., p. 89.


In the meantime both France and Italy had been busy in Tunisia. In August of 1873 Luigi Pinna, who had fought valiantly for Italian interests for some seventeen years, was retired and on the seventeenth of October Macciò was appointed. In the meantime, however, Giovanni Mussi, a deputy, was sent on a temporary "explorative" mission, as Cairoli explained in answer to questions in the Chamber on February 3, 1879. The former Prime Minister added that, "Honorable Mussi's task consisted in verifying the state of affairs and proposing opportune suggestions" concerning that region "in which our legitimate influence has been neglected." There was considerable speculation concerning the real purpose of Mussi's mission and the delay in Macciò's arrival. Mussi was variously reported as having proposed either a treaty of friendship between the two governments which would recognize Italy's preponderant influence, or the establishment of Bizerte as a free port under the joint guarantee of Italy, England, and France. There were some even who believed that he had attempted to secure the session of Bizerte to Italy.

35. *Vide supra*, p. 44.
37. *Cataluccio, loc. cit.*
Estimates of the ability of Mussi cause some speculation as to the reasons for his selection as an envoy. Carlolli praised the choice, and spoke of him as one "learned in Arabian affairs" and "who knew the Musulman atmosphere." Broadley, on the other hand, is scathing in his comments, and says that because of a previous attempt at financial extortion, Mussi was persona non grata in Tunis and that he was so blunt and undiplomatic in his dealings with the Bey and in his attempt to check French preponderance in the Regency that he had "almost thrown down the gauntlet to France." Mussi wrote so positively of "French plotting" in the Regency that Menabrea reported both in January and in February of 1879 that he had sought English aid, only to be put off by Salisbury with assurances of English neutrality in the matter. Mussi did not accomplish what was

---

40. Catàluccio, loc. cit.
42. Giacomo Emilio Curâtulo, Francia e Italia, Pagine di Storia, 1849-1914 (Turin, 1914), p. 96. Curâtulo gives in full an article by Andrea Torre, published in the Rivista di Roma of 1889, entitled "Come la Francia s'impadronì de Tunisi," which is exceedingly valuable. Curâtulo's own material, also, will be cited frequently. Hereafter when the Torre article is referred to the citation will read: Curâtulo, Torre; when reference is made to the text proper, citation will read: Curâtulo, Francia e Italia. Andrea Torre has been one of the most active of Italian journalists. He began his work on the Diritto; on the formation of the second Crispi ministry he directed the Riforma. He wrote on politics, foreign policy, and religion in the Rivista di Roma, and was among the founders of the Giornale d'Italia. He has been four times president of the press association, a Deputy, and has held several ministerial posts. Chi è (Rome, 1931), p. 934. Curâtulo is a Senator and also a historian of the Risorgimento.
hoped of him, but Macciò arrived in December of that year (1878) to intensify the Italian campaign.

On the other hand the French had been pursuing in the Regency an even more vigorous policy with greater success than that which was the lot of their Italian rivals. Waddington acted at once, just as he had in the case of the Salisbury confirmations. Just three days after his return to Paris from Berlin, he sent the somewhat startling telegram to Roustan in Tunis:

France may soon be lead to affirm her protectorate over Tunisia. Before opening up any negotiations whatever, I wish to know your opinion on the following points: could the Bey be brought to sign a limited alliance with France, recognizing our exclusive protectorate, with occupation of certain points, such as Bizerte, La Goulette, etc., and the right to create military establishments there? . . . . In case an accord could not be secured, what resistance would the Bey offer, and what forces would be necessary to conquer him? You may consider that England and Germany have agreed.

Waddington recognized the probable opposition of Italy and then demanded finally, "Do you see danger in permitting Italy to establish herself in Tripoli?"

Roustan's reply was sent the following day. He feared that it would be hard to get the Bey to yield for:

. . . . he has been brought up in the terror of just this eventuality. Perhaps he would give in for monetary considerations and in the desire to

---


44. Ibid.
get rid of the Financial Commission. . . . In case of resistance . . . I can testify that an inconsiderable force would be needed.

Furthermore, he saw no danger "in the occupation of Tripoli, provided we are occupying Tunisia."

The French Foreign Minister then instructed Roustan to work out and send by the first diplomatic pouch a draft of a possible convention with the Bey, along the lines already suggested. On the first of August he telegraphed the consul to leave Tunis for Paris five days later for a personal discussion of the matter. This Roustan did, apparently, returning to Tunis some three weeks later. Just what was discussed during Roustan's visit is unknown.

Then something seems to have transpired to slow up the plan which was being considered; either Waddington or the government appeared to blow colder on the idea of a protectorate. On the first of September the Minister of Foreign Affairs telegraphed Roustan that there might be a delay in respect to the project, and on the fifth, "As I anticipated


47. *Ibid.*, fn. 2. The editors of *DDOG* likewise point out that neither the discussed mémoire nor the project of the convention are to be found in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

the matter of the protectorate may have to wait some time."

Waddington’s despatches began at this time to show increasing fear of the actions of Wood, the English consul. "Above all we must neutralize the action of M. Wood" he telegraphed Roustan on September 5, and on the seventh he said that he had received from Salisbury’s own lips assurance that "Wood has been exceeding his authority." He indicated also that he believed Salisbury would "second" France in respect to the compensation to be offered to Italy, but that it would be a matter requiring considerable time to work out. Exactly what the English position was, naturally was of grave concern not only to France but to Italy as well. Waddington felt relatively sure of the Foreign Office, but was afraid possibly the actions of the English consul foreboded evil, or even possibly a secret change in the governmental policy in respect to the promises which had been made at Berlin. On the other hand, at the same time, the Italian, de Gubernatis, a man who had held various consular offices, in a mémoire to his own government, reported that he believed the English to have given up opposing the French in the Regency.

49. Waddington to Roustan, Sept. 5, 1878, ibid., p. 376, #340.

50. Idem.

The examination that I have made in my voyage through these countries has made me understand that no European power at this moment impedes the triumph of the traditional French policy. 52

The government of France, at this time, apparently decided to be sure that there should be no misunderstanding in Italy in respect to French aspirations in Tunisia. About the middle of October, Waddington sent a secret despatch to de Noailles in Rome, giving him his instructions, in considerable detail, as to what he was to do and say in the event that Corti, who of course was still in office, were to bring up the subject, but warning the French ambassador not to bring up the matter himself. He was first of all to point out the traditional French policy of considering the Bey an independent sovereign. And then he was to indicate that:

France for a host of reasons, which it is not necessary to enumerate, has no desire today to annex the states of the Bey; but she has a duty to see that the Prince maintains tranquillity, administers his finances well, and does nothing which will compromise the security of our Algerian possessions. 53

Waddington went on to stress the fact that no other power could look to forming establishments in the Regency nor to occupying territory without meeting French armed forces.

... and it is absolutely necessary that the Italian government understand clearly that Italy

52. Curatulo, Torre, p. 95.

may not cherish dreams of conquest in Tunisia, without running up against the wishes of France, and risking a conflict with her. 54

Waddington, in the same despatch, raised the suggestion of compensation for Italy, "... the district of Barka with the magnificent port of Tobruk," "the port of Avlona in Albania," etc., and then concluded:

Finally if Corti presses you on the subject of the agreement which exists between England and us, and of the engagement which they have taken to leave us carte blanche in Tunisia, you must not indicate more than the generalities previously given; for the English despatch is secret, and I do not have the right to make use of it for the present. 55

Whether the opportunity to deliver this strong warning actually came to de Noailles, documentary evidence gives us no clue. It is rather probable that it did, for Italian concern regarding the Regency was considerable at this time. There is even some evidence that Cairoli was contemplating sending an expedition to Tripoli or possibly to Tunis at this very time; and the resignation of the ministers of war and navy, along with Corti, shortly after the October fifteenth speech of Cairoli showed their lack of agreement with the plan. Since those resignations did not serve as a deterrent to the persistently vigorous policy of Cairoli, a

54. Idem.
55. Idem.
warning from France would not have accomplished much more. It was just at this time, October 17, 1873, that Maccio, known for his anti-French sentiments, was appointed to the post in Tunis. This seems, likewise to be another straw in the wind.

The fear of Wood and this obvious policy on the part of Italy, plus a development of the de Sancy affair, already referred to, which had serious implications, were among the reasons why Waddington was so anxious to have Saint-Vallier sound out Bismarck during the Friedrichsruhe visit. Those assurances, as we have noted, were positive. Left to himself Waddington would probably have pressed hard in the Regency. Situations, however, beyond his control served as deterrents.

58. vide supra, p. 118.
CHAPTER IX

THE BEGINNING OF THE
ROUSTAN-MACCIO DUEL

The de Sancy affair, which had become temporarily quiet after the arrival of Roustan, began to be a source of irritation between the French and Tunisian governments again with the fall of Khérédidine. One of the Prime Minister’s last official acts had been to sign, on July 9, 1377, another deed of concession in favor of the Comte de Sancy, formerly of the de Sancy-Ronalds partnership and then one of the French members of the Committee of Control of the Financial Commission. The new decree redefined and renewed the concession on the condition that if by July, 1878, a specified number of horses and cattle were not installed on the property, the concession would be considered cancelled and the land was to revert to the Bey. For various reasons de Sancy failed to comply with the prescribed conditions and the Bey demanded that the land be forfeited.

De Sancy at once appealed to Roustan, who proposed arbitration of the matter. This was refused, and the notice of eviction which was sent to de Sancy was ignored on the advice of Roustan. In reports to Waddington, the French


2. Fish to Hunter, Jan. 21, 1879, Cons. Disp., Vol. XII.
consul accused the Bey and Mustapha ben Ismail of trying through the de Sancy concession to find compensation for some of the rich estates of Khéreddine which had escaped them. On December 9, 1878, the Tunisian government attempted to take possession of the Sidi-Tabet concession, although Houstan had warned that there would be a French janissary on the property to protect the rights of a French citizen. The following day Houstan notified Waddington of the new difficulty, telling how he had refused entrance to the estate to the Bey's commission, made up both of Tunisians and foreigners, and that he intended to yield only to force. He told the Foreign Minister also of the rumor that Mohammed-es-Saddok was planning to appeal to all the Powers, so as to remove himself from under French influence by placing himself under the collective protection of Europe.

Houstan, ever zealous in the interests of his country, complained loudly about the unprincipled and illegal acts of the Bey in trespassing on the private domain of a French citizen. He was also quite sure that the English and Italian consuls were adding to his troubles by assuring the Bey that France was only threatening him, and had no intention of really backing up her demands. His distrust of Wood and

his bitter and repeated complaints against the English consul, as well as their effect upon Waddington's thinking, have already been noted. Certainly there was now no sign of improved relations between the two men. Roustan, likewise, looked forward with no pleasure to the long-announced arrival of Macciò. They had been colleagues and rivals before; the French consul, consequently, knew the mettle of the man with whom he was to compete.

In a despatch, not given in full in any of the French collections, Roustan suggested that his return from France at the end of August on board a French warship seemed to have awakened many fears concerning French motives. Then he added:

The arrival of M. Macciò, which is expected daily, is presented as the signal for a sharper intervention in Tunisian affairs by the Cabinet of Rome, in the sense of resistance to French influence. This idea has been propagated not only in Tunis, but also throughout the entire country — so our agents report.  

Perhaps hoping to get Wood out of the way before the arrival of Macciò, Waddington again protested to Lord Lyons concerning "the embarrassment and trouble which M. Wood continues to stir up for us." However, he was to have to continue to protest for some months more before he was

5. Sarfatti adds a new note to the Roustan-Macciò duel by saying that both had been "rivals for the hand of the same young lady. Macciò lost out all around." Margherita G. Sarfatti, Tunisiaca (Milan, Rome, 1924), p. 4.


successful in achieving the desired end -- the recall of
Wood.

On December 20, 1878, Macciò "made a dramatic entry on
board a warship, the Rapido." With his arrival began the
famous Roustan-Macciò "duel," which was to enliven and em-
bitter the relations between their two countries for the
next two years. Shortly after the arrival of the new
Italian consul a situation developed which greatly disturbed
Roustan. On the day that Macciò was to be received by the
Bey, a landing party from the Italian warship of some fifty
persons, fully armed, took stations outside the Consulate,
where they remained throughout the day. Roustan was the
more incensed by the situation, because only two months be-
fore the Bey had refused a similar request to permit a party
from a French ship to come ashore.

Roustan immediately began to feel that the situation
was turning against the French. The de Sancy affair was
becoming harder to handle, and he felt a change of attitude
on the part of the Bey, which he believed was due to foreign
influence. We can but conjecture as to how much of this
was real and how much was due to the distrust Roustan felt


9. Waddington to Saint-Vallier, Dec. 23, 1878, DDOG.,

10. Idem.
both for Wood and Macciò.

Waddington, however, took Roustan's alarm seriously. In his despatch of December 29, to Saint-Vallier, he speculated as to whether the Italians were merely obeying motives of self-interest or "if they are encouraged to lay stress on their policy through the secret support of some foreign Power?" The time for Saint-Vallier's visit to Friedrichsruhe was almost at hand; the Foreign Minister, therefore, asked the Ambassador to sound out Bismarck in this respect also.

In your interview with the Chancellor attempt to learn if he is still disposed to discourage the Italian views on Tunisia. ... Will Berlin approve a French protectorate in Tunisia. ... A telegram from Vogüé tells me that the Austrian government has disapproved the conduct of its agents in Tunis and lets us know of the official reproof. 12

On January 2, Saint-Vallier saw von Bülow, whom he told that the de Sancy affair was rapidly approaching a point where France was going to be forced to issue an ultimatum and eventually to send an expedition to occupy several points along the coast. He gave voice to the suspicion that Italian intrigues were behind the actions of the Bey, and indicated that France was desirous, at the proper time, of blocking Italy. The following day Herbert Bismarck, Secretary of the Legation, assured the French ambassador that Germany

11. Idem.


considered the French claims as justifiable and would support them as far as possible. Von Bülow also reassured Saint-Vallier, who quoted the minister as indicating that "in the eyes of the German government Tunisia is in the orbit of our Mediterranean possessions and we are entirely justified in making our influence and our authority there respected, without any Power being able to contest it." 15

Saint-Vallier, following the Friedrichsruhe talk, also asked the Chancellor if he would bring pressure to bear on Italy. Bismarck indicated his willingness even to tell Italy of the folly of placing her hope on an appeal to Germany because "the intervention of the French Government in Tunisia seems demanded by circumstances, and that in our opinion France is within her rights." 16 The Chancellor was thorough-going in this support of French policy, for in a despatch from Herbert Bismarck to von Bülow on the third, he was asked to speak to Lord Odo Russell concerning the activities of Wood in the Regency and to indicate to the English ambassador that Germany considered the French claims to be just. 17


Chancellor did not hesitate, either, to offer a diplomatic slight to the Italian ambassador to Austria. "Count Robilant was the only ambassador on whom Bismarck did not call when he was in Vienna in September, 1879." Furthermore, when Andrásy at the same time proposed the reconquest of the Italian provinces, Bismarck acquiesced saying, "Italy is not one of our friends." Nevertheless, there remained a lingering suspicion in the minds of the French statesmen as to Bismarck's motives.

Had it not been possibly because of this suspicion of Germany and certainly because of certain of France's domestic problems, the strong move against Tunisia might have been made during this period of Franco-Tunisian strain. De Freycinet later regretted that the Regency was not occupied then. "The resentment of Italy would have been less violent and we would have spared ourselves the appearances of deception." However, in January came Senatorial elections and there was the possibility of Waddington being replaced if there were a partial or total change of Ministry. The Foreign Minister consequently moderated his tone somewhat in conformity with discretion.


19. de Freycinet, op. cit., p. 34.

On January 3, he notified the French ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna that a forty-eight hour ultimatum had been presented to the Bey demanding, on threat of severance of diplomatic relations, 1) an inquiry into the de Sancy affair, 2) official apologies for the way the matter had been handled, and 3) recognition of the responsibility of the Tunisian officials who were to blame for the incident and their removal from office should it be requested. In two telegrams, not given in toto in the collections, Roustan indicated the full acceptance of the ultimatum by the Bey, and that the Prime Minister had paid a visit of apology; but that though he had received the felicitations of the German, Spanish and Austrian consuls, "Wood and Macciò remained in solitude." The committee which was appointed to investigate de Sancy's claim, confirmed the concessionaire in all his rights. The following year he turned over his grant to the French Société Marsillaise, and by an ampa of July 1930 the Bey accepted the substitution.

With the de Sancy affair thus disposed of for the time being Waddington returned again to his first preoccupation -- the idea of a French protectorate over the Regency. The middle of January he asked Roustan if a strong defensive alliance with the Bey might not be a better idea than a

protectorate, and as he had just asked Salisbury to recall Wood, he speculated on the possibility of putting the matter through before the departure of the English consul.

Roustan thought the plan feasible, that it offered the Tunisian ruler "magnificent and unhoped for propositions," and that there seemed to him no reason why the matter could not be approached at once as Wood, he said, was "at this moment entirely discredited in the mind of the Bey, and it will take him some time before he can make himself heard again."

Waddington, consequently, on the eleventh of the following month sent Roustan a draft of the proposed treaty, warning him, however, to approach the matter with the Bey in an entirely personal manner, as Roustan himself had suggested earlier, so that later if necessary the government could deny all knowledge of the affair. That the proposition was being seriously considered at the time is borne out by the fact that the notes of the despatch in the archives are in the "handwriting of Despréz, Director of Political Affairs in the Foreign Office."

This "defensive alliance" differed in very slight degree


from a thorough-going protectorate. The main points which it covered were:

1) the Bey was to promise not to cede nor permit the occupation of any Tunisian territory by any other foreign power; should any such suggestion be made to him, he was immediately to inform the French government of it; and France could occupy any points deemed necessary were the security of the Regency threatened.

2) the Bey was to conclude no international agreements without the consent of the French government.

3) the diplomatic and consular agents of France were to protect the interests of Tunisian nationals in foreign countries.

4) a customs agreement between Tunisia and Algeria was to be concluded.

5) the French government was to be represented by a Minister Resident, who was to be the intermediary in the relations between the French and Tunisian governments for all "administrative affairs common to the two countries."

For the next few months there is a break in the published documents and we do not know the progress of Houstan's negotiations. On July 22, Waddington indicated that he would be

27. Ibid.
willing to "reassure the Bey on the points which disturb him," or even "make certain changes." But on the twenty-eighth, Roustan wrote:

He [the Bey] depends absolutely on France to maintain the status quo, but he does not wish to believe that this support must be bought by a reciprocity of good offices. . . . All his efforts tended to the avoidance of speaking of the Treaty, and I did not insist, seeing that I should get nowhere and that to upset him would result in nothing. 29

In the meantime the political situation in France had been undergoing changes. In February, MacMahon resigned and Grévy, a moderate Liberal, was elected in his place. Waddington retained his portfolio and was to hold it through December, 1879; but Gambetta, who took over the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, began increasingly to be the power behind the throne. Waddington and Gambetta were not overly friendly. Bismarck added certain fuel to the flames by declaring that because of his great fondness for Waddington, the French Ambassador to Berlin would not be required to present new credentials. Lyons says of this, "a proceeding which infuriated Gambetta and disposed him to upset Waddington at an early date. . . . . Gambetta

29. Ibid., fn. 534.
does not like either Grévy or Waddington."

Since the English no longer seemed to be occupying a part of the attention of France by their activities, as they had in the past, the Italians apparently felt that pressure must be increased. By the middle of the summer Cairoli was back in power. His ministry, which had fallen in December 1878, was succeeded by one headed by Depretis, during which time a more moderate policy was followed. Then Depretis fell and on July 17, 1879, the new Cairoli ministry was announced, with Cairoli also taking the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. Lebon suggests that he reentered the Quirinal "greatly irritated with having been accused so frequently of incapacity, and greatly desirous of providing some startling demonstration of his cleverness." If so it would explain his supporting the ambitious Tunisian policy which he was to undertake almost at once.

Just four days after the formation of the ministry, Depretis and Damiani, a strong supporter of a vigorous Tunisian policy, interpellated Cairoli about France's "preponderance" in Tunisia and the "humiliations" which she had inflicted on Italy.

34. Lebon, op. cit., p. 399.
... so as to soothe our dolorous trepidation over the future of our influence in that part of Africa, where the last doors remain open to us, doors reserved for us by nature and by the unquestionable rights of history.

Damiani inveighed against French credit and banking institutions, and was supported by Depretis in deplored the lack of Italian capital invested in the Regency, and succeeded in pushing through a measure subsidizing Italian schools in the Regency. Cairoli was in approval on the score of attracting Italian investments to Tunisia, for he said, "It is indeed certain that the Tunisian Regency is fertile ground for whoever wants to invest his money usefully." The way for State subsidies in Tunisia was thus being prepared.

One other interesting idea developed from this same long Depretis-Damiani interpellation. "England lets things take their course," Damiani said, "and already she has freed France from the surveillance of an English agent, leaving her sole ruler." Considering Italy's loud protests later, it is interesting to note that this fact had been faced in the Chamber as early as July 1879.

Italian writers were advancing theories as to the possible solution of the Tunisian problem, and a number of

journals were writing on various aspects of it. The *Avvenire di Sardegna*, published by Giovanni De Franceschi, was one of the most prolific in its articles on the subject; likewise the organ of the Italian colony in Tunis *La Riforma*, had a good deal to say, especially on the de Sancy affair.

One Italian writer in 1879 cited the much-quoted words of Visconti-Venosta "Italy cannot afford the luxury of an Algeria," but at the same time pointed out that "whoever is master of Tunisia is master of the Mediterranean, and above all is master of Italy." Carta proposed recognition of the absolute independence of Egypt, Tripoli, and Tunisia and the creation thereby for the Regency of a "position identical to that given Switzerland, by the treaty of Vienna in 1815, and Belgium by the treaty of London in 1831."

But while governments evolved their policies and writers speculated and offered solutions, Macchi and Roustan wasted no time in such idle pursuits. Early in 1830 the Italian consul tried to secure a concession for an undersea cable between Tunisia and Sicily, only to have the French consul protest vigorously that according to the telegraph conven-

---


tions of 1859 and 1861 France possessed a monopoly of all telegraph projects in the Regency. Several months of acrimonious dispute followed, and then the Bey yielded before the French protests. He was, however, reluctant to offend Italy altogether, and his compromise was typical of beylical hedging. He would grant Italy the right to lay the cable, provided it were connected to the Tunisian end of the line and became a part of the Tunisian telegraph organization, which was administered by France. Inasmuch as Maccio had desired to create a rival company this was tantamount to a complete refusal.

Roustan was not satisfied, however, first, because Mustapha-ben-Ismail had written a letter which Roustan considered to be in "complete contradiction" to the Tunisian refusal of the Italian concessions as requested, and secondly, because the Prime Minister pointed out correctly that by the terms of the 1861 convention the Bey had reserved the right to grant the same authorization to any government. In spite of this, France had gained

43. de Freycinet to de Noailles, May 28, 1830, DDOG., Vol. III, pp. 119-120, #136.

44. See ibid., pp. 146, 120-23, 125-27, and 130, #137, 139, 130, 143.

45. Roustan to de Freycinet, May 24, 1830, DDT., p. 217, #154.

46. Mustapha-ben-Ismail to Roustan, enclosed in Roustan to de Freycinet, May 24, 1830, ibid., p. 217-21; de Freycinet replaced Waddington on Dec. 27,
point, but the attitude of the Tunisian government left Roustan uneasy.

Macciò protested the decision, denied the French claim of monopoly, and requested the Bey to state that he had arrived at his decision only because of French pressure. He was not successful in this request and actually made things worse for himself, for, contrary to his usual diplomatic methods, he entered into "a bitter quarrel with the Prime Minister" over the conclusion of the affair.

While this matter had been in progress, the Quai d'Orsay, troubled by Italian aggression, returned in May to Waddington's project of 1879. On the fifth de Freycinet, who had replaced Waddington the previous December, telegraphed Roustan that the moment seemed propitious to take up again the treaty project previously presented to the Bey, and again to approach it from a personal point of view. The terms were somewhat altered, more closely approaching those of a protectorate, even, than those of the 1879 proposal. Though Roustan on the seventh had found Mustapha-ben-Ismaïl "personally well disposed" to the idea, he telegraphed on the eighth that he had encountered a more emphatic refusal from the Bey than he had anticipated:

47. Roustan to de Freycinet, May 30, 1880, DDT, p. 221, #155.


His Highness refuses not only to accept, but also to discuss the project. He pretends that it is contrary to his religious sentiments, and that it would inflict shame on his people. 50

And so again the idea of the protectorate was shelved.

It was not long before another and much more important conflict arose as the French and Italian consuls struggled to advance the interests of their respective countries. The English company, which had for some time been operating their Tunis-La Goulette railway line at a loss, was desirous of selling it. That the little eighteen kilometer road, when operated as a single unit, was almost bound to lose money was brought out by the Journal Officiel.

In the summer when the Bey takes up residence in his palace at La Goulette, or when the rich Tunisians go to bathe on this beautiful beach, travellers are rather numerous; but from the time when the Bey returns to Chebou Said (the Bardo Palace) and when autumn arrives, the four or five daily trains are patronized by but rate passengers. 51

The French Bône-Guelma company, having commenced the exploitation of their concession through the Medjerda valley in June of 1878 and having completed it to Ghardimaou in March of 1880 looked upon this English line as a normal


51. Journal Officiel, May 2, 1881, p. 2427, citing an article in the Revue de Géographie (date not given) by Ludovic Drapeyron.

completion of their own. Joined to their own network it would not need to be run at a loss, and it would furnish the outlet to the sea which, to the directors of the company, seemed a necessity. A price was made to the Bône-Guelma company, who refused it, however, hoping to bargain for a better price.

In the meantime, unknown to the French, the Italian Rubattino company had entered into conversations in London for the acquisition of the road. A preliminary contract was drawn up on March 22. Rubattino himself in a letter to the Corriere Mercantile of May 8, 1880, gives interesting and little known details of the transaction. The negotiator, a Mr. John Charles Hodges who had been in charge of the preliminary negotiations in London, arrived in Rome April first to conclude the deal:

It was easy . . . . to be aware from the first symptoms that the English company was seeking to avoid its obligations and that Mr. Hodges had come with the desire, even with the instructions, to find a way to get out of and not to confirm the contract. 54

Rubattino reports that he yielded to every concession and request that was made, but that finally after a week of negotiation, Hodges was ordered back to London.

53. This was an important mercantile line in the Mediterranean. Rubattino, the owner, was the brother-in-law of Crispi. Paul Deschanel, Gambetta (N. Y., 1920), p. 292.

... while Mr. Hodges was in Rome, playing his ignoble comedy, Messrs Webster and Barker, directors of the Tunisian railroad, were in Paris and concluded the sale of the line (perhaps on better terms) to M. Gény, director of the French Bône-Guelma line. 55

However, the Italians were not to be flouted so easily. An English law required that no English railroad in the Orient could be sold without the consent of the court. This the French had overlooked. It was discovered and pointed out by Rubattino, and so on June 16, 1830, the High Court in London declared the sale void, and decided that the line should be put up for auction on July seventh.

Here, according to Jules Ferry, the two governments agreed to let the rival companies settle the matter for themselves. According to the French version, the French were thus duped, for when their representative arrived he found his adversary to be the Italian consul, armed with guarantees of government aid, and being unable to reach his government at that late date, the French representative had to permit himself to be outbid. Cataluccio is frank about the matter:

55. Idem. The original French offer had been 1,000,000 francs. The Rubattino figure of March was 2,500,000 fr. The sale to the French was concluded at 2,650,000 fr. Fouche, op. cit., p. 78.


In the auction which took place in London on July 7th, the Rubattino company, strong in the guarantee of the Government, won the award of the line with the offer of £165,000 sterling. (4,125,000 lire.) The representative of the Bône-Guelma, M. Gery, went up to £160,000. This was a good deal for the English company, for the line was not worth more than 500,000 lire. 53

One is strongly tempted, however, to doubt that the French were either "duped" or that they had any more intention than the Italians of permitting the rival companies to "fight it out between themselves." For while on the twenty-ninth of June, de Freycinet had warned de Noailles that "any intervention of the Italian government, hidden or apparent," would have fatal results, he also telegraphed Roustan to indicate to the Bey that France would not countenance his auctioning the transfer of the Tunis-La Goulette line to "foreign hands." 59 On July 13, the Italian Chamber of Deputies approved by a vote of 226 to 130 the planned legislation in favor of the Rubattino line, granting a substantial annual subsidy.

Maccio immediately expressed the delight of the Italians in Tunisia:

58. Cataluccio, op. cit., p. 26; the real value of the line is set lower here than the figure set by most writers on the subject -- 1,000,000 francs.


60. Camera dei deputati, pp. 1330-32, Discussioni, Vol. IV, July 12, 1880, p. 1366, and July 14, 1880, p. 1515; see also stampato, #109A.
The Italian colony, happy over the gain of the railroad, express, together with the personnel of the Consulate, the most lively gratitude to the government of the King for the most energetic support given to Rubattino, support which has had as a result a legitimate success. 61

At the same time there would seem to have been a concerted Italian movement to create bad blood between Germany and France, perhaps in order to get the Chancellor to withdraw his support of the French advance in Tunisia. On August 14 the chargé d'affaires in Rome notified the Quai d'Orsay of certain quotations from a speech by Gambetta, which had been maliciously taken out of context and misinterpreted so as to seem to cast reflection on Germany and indicate a belligerent attitude on the part of the French statesman. They had appeared in both "Il Diritto, the official journal, and La Riforma, the Crispi organ, as well as in other Italian sheets." But if so designed little was accomplished.

Bismarck's policy of supporting the French in Africa had endured throughout the Morocco Conference, which met in Madrid from May until July of that year, and his repeated statements showed him to be little affected by Italian efforts or blandishments.

61. Cataluccio, op. cit., p. 27; see also Michele Rosi, I Cairoli (Bologna, 1929), Vol. II, p. 43.


The French were as much upset by the result of the London auction as the Italians and Tunisian Italians were pleased. Jules Ferry later declared that the origin of the French expedition to Tunisia developed out of the Rubattino purchase. It is interesting in this connection to note that the Italian Chamber passed the guarantee of subsidy on July 13, and on August 2, just twenty days later, Roustan began to write of the presence in the Regency again of Cheikh Kablouti and of his stirring up trouble on the border. This was the first despatch dealing with border troubles, according to the printed collections of documents, since October 26, 1879. Its appearance at this moment may be purely coincidental; on the other hand it may be significant.

Cialdini, Italian Ambassador in Paris, had specifically warned Cairoli that the French might react to the Rubattino matter in an aggressive fashion. On July 9, 1880, just two days after the auction Cialdini wrote of a conversation with de Freycinet.

France will see willingly any sort of private initiative of Italian citizens in Tunisia, but likewise would not permit anything there which might indicate the initiative of the Italian government, or which might lead to the pretense of

64. d'Estourmelles de Constant, op. cit., pp. 94-95; Langer, The European Powers, Part II, p. 255, also expresses this view.

65. He had been exiled by Khéreddine, at Roustan's insistence, and sent to Brousses, but had escaped. Roustan to de Freycinet, Aug. 2, 1830, DDT., p. 139, #91.
exercising a political influence. . . . The impressions I have gathered . . . . lead me to fear that whatever on our part should assume the appearance of provocation would do nothing less than decide France to hasten the occupation of Tunisia, which otherwise might be delayed for some years. 66

But Cairoli paid very little more attention to this warning from the Italian ambassador than he had paid to those in the past, nor than he was to pay to those in the future.

De Freycinet, after issuing his warning to Cialdini, also wrote asking de Noailles to reiterate it to Cairoli. The ambassador in Rome reported that Cairoli declared he did not want to rival French political influence in Tunisia, and would concern himself only with maintaining Italy's commercial interests. But it was only a short time before Cairoli had forgotten his words.

Roustan, as would be expected, put all possible pressure on the Bey to nullify in so far as he could the Italian advantage. The French consul insisted that the French railroad must secure an outlet to the sea, and requested a concession either 1) to Carthage, or 2) for a line paralleling the Rubattino line to Rhadès, on the other side of the bay of Tunis. There was considerable vigorous action on the

66. Curàtulo, Torre, p. 100.
68. Roustan to the Bey, July 16, 1830, DDT., pp. 222-24, #153.
part of both French and Italian consuls and a volume of correspondence with their governments. Dilke commented on the proportions which the matter was assuming:

The trouble developed rapidly. By August 14, 1880, Italy was threatening to withdraw her Ambassador from Paris, 'on account of the receipt of information showing that the French intended to occupy Tunis under Lord Salisbury's permission'.

At last the Bey offered the French certain compensatory concessions: 1) the right to construct a harbor in the lake of Tunis, 2) a concession for a railroad from Tunis to Bizerte, and 3) a railroad concession for a line to Sousse in the Sahel. The French for their part gave up their demand for the road to Rhadès, but stipulated that no other railroad concession should be made without previous agreement with the French.

The fall of 1880 was thus a high point in the rivalry between the French and the Italian consuls. There was praise as well as criticism of both and exaggerated stories of the lengths to which their rivalry extended. Roustan wrote to de Noailles rather engagingly of his relations with Macciò,


72. Roustan to the Bey, Aug. 15, 1880, DDT., p. 223, #165.
at this moment when the recall of both was being rumored:

... not only have I never wished to see my Italian colleague leave, but I would see him go with regret, for I am convinced that no other Italian agent, whosoever it might be, could succeed in making himself so disliked by the Bey. My personal relations with Macciò have always been perfectly correct... Behind my back he attacks me in every fashion possible, but to my face he is always very polite, even attentive. 73

Roustan indignantly denied that he was an italophile, insisting that the French rather than the Italians had cause for complaint because his "doctor, pharmacist, veterinarian, tradesmen, and valet" were all Italians.

The concession struggle was not to end quickly, however. One of the reasons advanced by the Bey for his refusal of the railroad line to Rhadès to the French was that in 1872 he had granted that concession to an Italian contractor, Mancardi. Since no attempt had been made in eight years to exploit it, Roustan maintained the grant to be invalidated. Nevertheless, the question of the Italian grant was quickly revived by Macciò, as soon as the new concessions for France had been agreed upon in August. He announced that Rubattino had bought the 1872 concession from Mancardi, and intended to begin work at once on a road


74. Idem.

75. Roustan to de Freycinet, Aug. 4, 1880, DDT., pp. 225-26, #161.
to Hammam-Lif, an important thermal springs. To the French this was inadmissible because Hammam-Lif was planned as the first station of the newly granted French line to the Sahel. Again there was acrimonious dispute between the consuls of France and Italy and the Bey, and to Roustan's fury, Macciò seemed able to get closer to Mohammed-es-Saddok and to exert more influence than he could. Finally on April 6, Roustan notified Saint-Hilaire that the Tunisian government definitely refused to sanction the Sahel line because it passed near Rhadès.

There had been trouble at this time as well between Macciò and Roustan over the telegraph convention which had been a previous source of conflict between them. In January 1831, the Rubattino company began the construction of telegraph lines along side its Tunis-La Goulette tracks, an act which was construed by the French government as a violation of what it still considered a telegraph monopoly. After a month of struggle Roustan received assurance that the telegraph lines would be used only for the business of the

76. Roustan to de Freycinet, Aug. 27, 1880, DDT., p. 230, #167.


78. Roustan to Saint-Hilaire, Apr. 6, 1831, DDT., p. 298, #214. Saint-Hilaire became Minister for Foreign Affairs in September, 1880.

79. Saint-Hilaire to Roustan, Jan. 6, 1831, DDT., p. 247, #177.
road and would not go beyond the stations. This agreement was violated, and as late as March 31, 1881, Roustan was still protesting and receiving empty excuses from the Bey.

With an Italian vice-consul established at La Goulette who was able to send out uncensored telegrams, Roustan saw more than Italian financial interests involved in these concession struggles in the Regency. Nor did rebuffs come singly to him. When the Italian phosphate company at Djebel-Rejas wished a special permission to build a "temporary wooden bridge for the purpose of loading its minerals" at Hammam-Lif, Roustan's cry was loud that "within the space of a few days" France had had three of her monopolies "attacked"; that of the telegraph, of railroad construction, and of the port.

On the last day of March, General Oamont reported the violation of the Algerian frontier by the Kroumirs. One wonders little that, since Roustan had suffered such frustrations in the game for concessions, the Kroumir raid spelled

---

80. Roustan to Saint-Hillaire, Feb. 4, 1881, DDT., p. 266, #189.
81. Roustan to Saint-Hillaire, Mar. 31, 1881, DDT., pp. 290-93, #208.
82. Roustan to Saint-Hillaire, Feb. 15, 1881, DDT., pp. 276-77, #194.
83. Idem.
"grave trouble" and that the death of "one soldier of the 59th . . . ." and the "serious wounding of a corporal" assumed mountainous proportions.

---

34. Osment to Min. of War, Apr. 3, 1881, DUT, p. 301, #216.
CHAPTER X

DIPLOMATIC MANOEUVRES AND FEARS

Throughout the period of the Roustan-Macciò "duel" in the Regency, the diplomatic representatives of the two countries were sparring on the Continent as well. And each in turn was attempting from time to time to feel out the pulse of the other Powers.

With the change of ministry in England in March of 1880, France felt unsure of her status. The position of Beaconsfield and Salisbury had been clear, but France had no assurance that the Liberals, Gladstone and Granville, would consider themselves bound by the promises and policy of their predecessors. De Freycinet, therefore, in June sent Léon Say, the Ambassador in London, to sound out the situation. Granville's attitude, though not in agreement with the policy of the Beaconsfield government, at least was not hostile. He told the French ambassador who thus approached him regarding Tunisia:

... that in the view of Her Majesty's Government, Tunis was a portion of the Ottoman Empire, to dispose of which Great Britain had no moral or international right. But Her Majesty's Government had no jealousy of the influence which France, with her greater power and her high civilization, exercised and is likely to exercise over Tunis. 2

1. Say was very close to the government. He had been Minister of Finance, and in May, 1880, was to become President of the Senate, Journal des Débats, May 26, 1880.

2. Granville to Lyons, June 17, 1880, BFSP., Vol. LXXIII, pp. 441-42; Langer feels that the Cabinet change in
Likewise with a change in the English ministry there was always the possibility that Bismarck might alter his previous policy. In April, however, the Chancellor told Hohenlohe officially that he was willing to see France extend her political operations and that she could count on German support so long as she did not conflict with German interests.

It was at this point that General Cialdini returned to his post in Paris. He had resigned on November 14, 1879, but again took it over on June 17, 1880. He also began to sound out the French statesmen about the Tunisian situation, which because of the trouble over the Tunis-La Goulette road was rather tense. Our report of these conversations comes from Crispi, not always a reliable source.

On June 26, 1880 President Grévy in conversing with General Cialdini deplored the possibility that Tunis, which, in his opinion, was not worth a cheap cigar, might become a source of dissention, and Minister Freycinet expressed his hope of being

---


4. de Freycinet to de Noailles, Apr. 30, 1880, DDOG, Vol. III, p. 92, fn. 2, #104; "he saw the sterility of his work; the atmosphere and the men in power being what they were, he saw catastrophes ahead and did not want to be a part of it." Curatulo, Torre, p. 98.

5. de Noailles to de Freycinet, June 17, 1880, DDOG, Vol. III, p. 149, #172.
able to reconcile Italy's wishes with the interests of France. But Léon Gambetta who was perhaps more frank and certainly more clear, said that Italy was wrong in opposing French influence in Tunisia. Could she refuse to appreciate the prudence and moderation of which France had given proof by refraining from taking possession of a country which the powers had been unanimous in offering her?  

On July 22 Cairoli telegraphed Cialdini "to watch carefully in order not to be surprised by any unexpected coup," but also advised him to set about assuring France of Italian friendship. Cialdini called then on de Freycinet a few days later, and reported promptly to the Prime Minister. It is the famous conversation in which the French Minister of Foreign Affairs asked why Italy did not "turn her eyes on Tripoli," and then repeating his frequently used phrase, "the future is in the hands of God," said, "and it might be that one day, no doubt far away, France might be brought by the force of events to occupy and annex the Regency of Tunis." He added that should this event, which "might possibly happen sooner or later," actually transpire "Italy would be informed as long beforehand as possible, and would receive our most cordial support in obtaining adequate and worthy compensation" in the Mediterranean basin.

8. Ibid. p. 102, citing the despatch of Cialdini to Cairoli, July 25, 1880.
Cialdini commented to Cairolì that two alternatives appeared to be open to Italy: she should either make war on France to keep her from taking Tunisia or "draw ourselves together in an alliance or semi-alliance with her in order to obtain fair terms and equal compensation." Considering both alternatives as wrong for Italy, Cialdini cautioned: "Therefore we must move cautiously and not draw down a calamity upon ourselves, but seek other combinations which may save us from the danger of the two aforementioned eventualities."

Italy sounded out England as well as France in order to see what the attitude of Her Majesty's Government was to the reported promises to France of the previous Conservative government. On July 10, 1880, Menabrea went to the Foreign Office. Lord Granville "hedged" apparently, again taking refuge in the convenient thesis that since Tunisia was an independent state, save for the long-recognized rights of the Porte, "England could not intervene in questions which dealt with her internal government," and added that as there were so many other questions which preoccupied Europe, it seemed to him "inopportune to wish to create a Tunisian question." During this conversation, which Menabrea reported at length, the Ambassador complained bitterly about

10. Curátulo, Torre, pp. 102-03.
the attitude of France who "since the Congress of Berlin
. . . . considered herself the legitimate owner of Tunis;"
He commented in his report that it seemed to him that "Lord
Granville appeared to receive these considerations with
benevolence." However, on the twenty-eighth when Menabrea
reported to Granville the notification from Cairoli concern-
ing the subsidizing of the Tunis-La Goulette line, "the noble
Lord said . . . . that the high price paid for the recent
acquisition, along with the government guarantee of the
Tunisian railroad, awoke grave suspicion in regard to the
true intentions of Italy." None of this was couched in
the language which would guarantee the English support for
which somehow Cairoli continued to hope.

Cialdini did his best to moderate Cairoli's policy.
At the time of the Rubattino affair he had warned that such
action might evoke difficulties with France. Again late
in August, deciding that he might be able to accomplish more
by a personal interview, he went to Belgirate, on Lake
Maggiore, where Cairoli was taking a holiday. Here, we
learn the Ambassador urged Cairoli to draw closer to Austria
and Germany, and failing that persuaded the premier to
follow a new policy with France.

12. Ibid., p. 49.
13. Ibid., p. 50.
14. Vide supra, p. 244.
that would not seem to be provocative, but at the same time a reserved attitude which might make the French believe that Italy had an accord with the Central Powers.  

Cialdini, apparently, did not have the greatest of faith in his own proposal, but was hopeful at least that it would not precipitate matters.

Cairoli soon forgot his agreement with Cialdini at Belgrate and was again urging the Italian Ambassador to take up the question of the cable between Tunisia and Sicily with the French. On November 13, Cialdini protested this order on three scores:

1) we shall gain nothing,
2) from the present calm we shall return to the harsh polemics of two or three months ago, and
3) we shall even more completely persuade the government and politicians of France that our pretended rapprochement towards Germany and Austria has failed and that through despair we are coming back to settle things with France.

He added that the policy of coolness which he had adopted, following the Belgrate agreement, had seemed to have an effect on Gambetta, and that only because he believed Cairoli had yielded on this point had he agreed to return to Paris.

15. Curátulo, Torre, p. 104.
Almost before Cialdini's moderating words could take effect, however, Cairoli was attacked in the Chamber by both the Left and the Right for being too retiring and not sufficiently aggressive over the Tunisian question, his chief critics being Savini and Damiani, who had just returned from a trip to the Regency. Savini, after demanding the reason for the exclusion of Italy in "the immensity of Africa where there is a place for all peoples of courage and initiative" concluded, to the vigorously expressed applause of the Chamber, "the Mediterranean was a Roman lake; today it must and cannot be an Italian lake; but also it must not be a French lake." Damiani, prolix as always, covered various phases of the question. He stressed, however, how "the solemn vote of last July," when the subsidy was granted to Rubattino for the Tunis-La Goulette line, should have encouraged the Chamber to more active measures, but how apprehension of a war with France "helped by other states" made the Chamber at "the moment of being threatened" lose "all inner convictions about the great interest which Italy has on that coast . . . . you only obeyed the feeling of fear."

18. Ibid., pp. 1892-93.
19. Ibid., p. 1896.
Cairoli defended his policy as one in which he was "neither subservient nor committing acts of boldness," and pointed to the Rubattino success as proof that he had not followed too timid a policy.

Encouraged, evidently, by such parliamentary action, Cairoli continued both to ignore Cialdini's continued urging towards closer relations with Germany and Austria, and to the pursuance of a policy not calculated to excite France.

The first few months of 1881, consequently, were ones in which this forward policy was at its height. The concession pressure put on by Italy has already been mentioned. Then at the end of December, 1880, a Tunisian press announcement was made that "The Italian colony here will send a deputation to the King and Queen of Italy on their arrival in Sicily; the deputation will be headed by the Italian Consul General." At Palermo when the delegation paid its respects to the Italian sovereigns, Maccio made a speech which was greatly to disturb the French:

The Italians of Tunis ... second to none in their affection for the mother country and the dynasty, jealous of that national

20. Ibid., p. 1902.

21. Germany was but little impressed with this idea of Cialdini's, feeling that "Italian statescraft does not express itself according to convictions, but following the variable needs of the moment..." Limburg-Stirum to von Berchem, Nov. 8, 1880, DGP, Vol. III, pp. 187-89, #535.

prestige which they have maintained for centuries and hope to be able to increase in these hospitable regions send to their Majesties a reverent and enthusiastic greeting.  

The fact that the Bey also sent a delegation on the same boat with the Italians made the matter assume even larger proportions in the eyes of the French. With some exaggeration, but illustrative of the alarm caused in Paris by these events the Italian Curâtulo wrote: "Even politicians in France, such as Gambetta and Grévy, who favored the status quo, were willing to get Tunisia after the demonstration at Palermo which was regarded in France as a 'threat'." Throughout the first month of the year, such journals as the semi-official Journal des Débats wrote frequently of the threat by Italy to French aspirations.

France was becoming sensitive also to certain Italian newspapers which were appearing throughout the Regency and carrying reputed anti-French propaganda. La Riforma, the organ of the Italian colony in Tunis, dealt of course with Tunisian problems, but it did not pursue a definitely hostile policy. However, the Avvenire di Sardegna and

23. Chiala, op. cit., p. 226; the italics are Chiala's.

24. Curâtulo, op. cit., p. 111; the telegram of Saint-Hilaire to de Noailles of Jan. 4, 1931, DDOG., Vol. III, pp. 301-02, #327, indicates the French nervousness over the visit of the Tunisian Italians and Macciò to Sicily, and asks that the Italian Cabinet be warned "in a friendly fashion" of the danger inherent in such a situation.

25. Carta, op. cit., p. 5.
the Mostakel (the Independent), both published by Giovanni Defrancesco, were according to French sources, out and out anti-French. Both papers were printed in Cagliari in Sardinia for distribution in the Regency. The Mostakel, first appeared in March 1880 and was published in Arabic, came in for the burden of French abuse. Claims were made that it was subsidised by the Italian government, that its principle articles came from the Italian consulate in Tunis, and that it was designed to "inflame the native population against the French." Roustan, shortly after its appearance, warned Grévy of the danger inherent in its "anti-French propaganda." A news despatch from Tunis in April 1881 further indicates the kind of claims made by the French:

Today after the arrival of the mail steamer from Italy, Signor Maccìà ... despatched to the frontier and to the central provinces parcels of the Arab journal, Mostakel, in which war is preached against the French.

Charges and denials flew back and forth. Peruzzi, a deputy and former minister of Italy, in July and August of 1881, wrote indignantly about the claims which the French


29. Roustan to de Freycinet, Aug. 2, 1880, DDT., p. 139, #91.

had made. "It has been proved that it was a private enter-
prise, encouraged and aided by persons interested in
countering the action of France in Tunisia." \(^{31}\) But what
the proof was, he and other writers fail to state. His
conclusion is naive -- "and it [the Mostakel] could not have
been suppressed without violating the freedom of the press." \(^{32}\)

The French journalist, La Berge, gives still another
interpretation of the Mostakel matter. He believed the for-
mer Khedive of Egypt to be allied in intrigues with the
Italian government, and made his point as follows:

Finally Italy found in the former Khedive
of Egypt, retired in Naples, a powerful ally
against France. This Mussulman Prince had not
forgiven us at all for his fall, and we have no
more active enemy among the native peoples and
authorities in North Africa. It is this former
Khedive who furnished a part of the funds for
the Italo-Arab journal, Mostakel, and it is he
more than any other person who, by his anti-French
intrigues, brought things where they were before
our expedition. \(^{33}\)

The editor of the Revue politique et littéraire made a
somewhat curious reply to the Peruzzi article, in publishing
a letter written to him on May 11, 1881, by a former editor
of the Journal Officiel. The letter attested that what had
been proved was that "an important official of the Italian

---

31. Ubaldino Peruzzi, "Tunis et l'Italie -- la ques-
tion de Tunisie au point de vue Italien," Revue politique et

32. Idem.

consulate in Tunisia has not been at all a stranger to the editing of the Mostakel." 34 Henry Aron, the writer of the letter, concluded by saying that for "various reasons" he did not wish to publish the proofs, but hoped rather that his letter would suffice.

Peruzzi, in turn, denied the Yung allegation. He had translated for him the fifty-seven issues of the Mostakel which had appeared up to that time, and after "considering them carefully" insisted that rather than "exciting revolt" or "preaching murder" they taught "sentiments of love of liberty and independence of country." 35

In the controversy the Journal des Débats in speculating editorially on the source of the money which backed the Mostakel spoke of "perpetual exchange" between Italian papers and the journal under discussion "of articles and malevolent insinuations," and deplored the danger to French interests. The previous day it had given considerable space to an unsigned article from Tunis which had dealt at some length with the matter of the Mostakel, and which added certain ramifications to the previous charges.

There exists in Italy a committee . . . . whose role is to arouse the Italian press against


us . . . . and to spread injurious and defamatory
material against the French both in the Regency
and in Algeria. . . . . The Committee receives a
subsidy from the ex-Khedive, Ismail Pacha, who
lives in Naples. It has founded the Mostakel,
whose incendiary articles call the natives to
arms. 37

On the other hand, just before the Treaty of Bardo was signed
the Italian government issued an official denial of the
various charges. Galignani's Messenger carried the report as
it appeared in a Florence paper:

The Italian government gives formal denial
to the imputations cast on Sig. Maccio, and as-
serts that he would never have taken part in such
intrigues as those ascribed to him against a
friendly Government. . . . . The Italian Govern-
ment have not suppressed the Mostakel, but it is
stated that the journal has ceased to appear owing
to the departure of an Arab member of the editorial
staff. 38

Whether the Mostakel actually was subsidised by the
Italian government remains open to question. It would seem
that under any circumstances Maccio was not without certain
complicity in its publication. And assuredly by its ap-
pearance fuel was added to the fire which was already burning.

The policy of Cairoli is a difficult one to understand.
Maccio's government-supported concession hunt, the Palermo
demonstration, which could not be considered save with politi-
cal implications, and the newspaper campaign were all cer-
tain to alarm and excite France. Only Rosi defends Cairoli's
policy; he writes:

37. Ibid., Mar. 20, 1881.
The Tunisian question is that one most often used in condemnation of Cairoli, even by people who though admiring the glorious patriot accepted the legend which made of him a scape-goat ... a victim of a painful situation, which had been developing for a long time. 39

Other writers are rather generally agreed that "patriot though he was, Cairoli was utterly unfit for his position and that he constantly allowed his feelings and desires to gain the mastery over common-sense." 40

Italy continued in almost as great isolation as had been hers at the Congress of Berlin. England and Germany had been estranged by the pro-Russian leanings of the Italian government, while Austria, and indirectly Germany, were outraged by Cairoli's leniency towards the Irredentist agitation. Cialdini's suggestion of advances to Germany and Austria were overlooked and his warnings regarding French policy were ignored. Cialdini was not alone in this for Menabrea had indicated also consistently that the British statesmen were non-committal in their statements. And yet Cairoli was apparently so misguided in his interpretation of facts that he maintained before the Chamber in April, just as the crisis was developing:

I declare that as Italy and England were and are in cordial communication in regard to the present questions, so we can be certain of identity

of ideas in weighing the question of Tunisia. And let this be a response to those who affirm imaginary isolation.

Crispi commented rather bitterly in his condemnation of Cairoli's belief in English support:

> It is impossible to understand how a man of Cairoli's integrity could have made a declaration that was so far beside the truth. We are forced to conclude that he did not read the official documents at the Consulta, or that if he did, he immediately forgot.

France, however, in one instance did identify certain English interests as being common with those of Italy. It was another of the concession quarrels, and it is possible that the heated Anglo-French controversy which developed may have temporarily delayed the French intervention.

The occasion for the quarrel arose when the fallen Khéréddine attempted to dispose of the Tunisian properties which he had accumulated during the years he had been in the favor of the Bey. In order to recoup the losses suffered through his disgrace, he offered in the fall of 1880 to sell to the Société Marseillaise his extensive holdings in the Regency, including the Enfida domain of some 80,000 hectares.

---


2. Crispi, Politica Esteria, pp. 111-12; the palace called della Consulta was the seat of the ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome.

3. L'Année politique, 1881, p. 82.
 Certain details of the acquisition of this property are essential to an understanding of later legal technicalities. As a reward for getting the firman of 1871, the Bey had promised Khéredéenne an annuity of 30,000 piastres. But with his increasing financial difficulties about 1874-75 Mohammed-es-Saddok could not meet that obligation, and, with the consent of the Financial Commission, instead gave his minister title to the Enfida lands.

Khéredéenne at first merely wished to borrow on his Tunisian holdings, and then fearing confiscation, offered them outright for four million francs to the Société Marseillaise. To exploit the Enfida domain the Compagnie Franco-Africaine, with M. Albert Rey as President, was organized in 1880. Italian opposition to such extension of French interests developed; an Italian firm offered to buy out the new French company, and when Roustan attempted to have the sale approved in formal fashion in the Tunisian courts, the Bey opposed the completion of the transaction. This likewise was laid to Italian instigation and encourage-

44. Gaston Loth, op. cit., p. 65.
45. Ibid., p. 66.
47. Loth, op. cit., pp. 65-68; Rey, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
ment in the hope of foreign assistance.

Then a rather mysterious figure appeared in the case, Joseph Lévy, a Maltese, whose brother was an English member of the International Financial Commission. Under Mohammedan law Lévy claimed the right of *cheffaa*, and was represented in court by Broadley, the English attorney, to whose book we have referred in some of the previous chapters.

Mohammedan law is involved and among its intricacies is the right of *cheffaa* or preemption. By this right when a land-owner sells his land, any neighboring landowner can appeal for and obtain the right of substituting himself for the buyer, on condition that he will carry out certain formalities and will pay the exact price agreed upon by the purchaser of the property.

It may well be supposed that the introduction of the right of *cheffaa* into Mohammedan law had for its purpose not only facilitation of the extension of agricultural areas, but especially the making difficult, if not impossible, the acquisition of land by strangers.

There were two methods by which the right of *cheffaa* might be avoided: 1) by the establishment, by the seller, of a neutral band of land, whether a meter or a mile the effect was the same, all around the inside boundary of the property.

---


51. de Lanessan, op. cit., p. 111.
which he had sold, so as to become the sole neighbor of the
buyer, or 2) by means of kemtcha madjouba, which consisted
of adding to the set price a handful of small money — gold,
silver, or brass of undetermined value — of which the buyer
did not himself know the exact value, so that anyone who
might wish to exercise the right of cheffâa would be balked
by not knowing how much to offer in order to meet the exact
price, one of the essential conditions of cheffâa. Kemtcha
madjouba had to be agreed upon by the buyer and the seller,
and the clause agreeing to it had to be specially authorized
by the Cadi before it might be inserted in the contract.

Mohammedan law is in reality all in the Koran, "since
law is only a commentary of the Koran." The system of law
was established according to the authority of the four Imans,
or priests, whose commentaries form the four great orthodox
rites of the Mohammedan countries. Tunisia simultaneously
employed two of these: that of the Iran Maleki and that of
the Iman Hanesfi. The Malekite form admitted cheffâa only in
favor of a joint proprietor, while the Hanesfi extended it
to apply as well to the neighboring owners.

In defending itself against the Lévy attempt to exercise
the right of cheffâa the Société Marseillaise won its case

52. Rey, op. cit., p. 8; Loth, op. cit., pp. 66-67;
kemtcha madjouba freely translated means "closed fist."

53. Loth, op. cit., p. 68.

in the Malekite court. Khéréddine, who was well versed in
the law of his country, had attempted to make use of all the
means at his legal disposal to avoid just the kind of con-
troversy which developed. He had been prevented by the Cadi,
"for feeble reasons," from inserting in the acts of sale the
clause of kemtcha madjouba, but he had been able to reserve
a band of land about a meter in width all about the Enfida
estate. It was this latter reservation which won, therefore,
the first favorable decision for the French company
which was taking over his interests. Invoking, however, the
conflicting form of law brought a favorable verdict for the
Lévy claims. The Hanefite judge reversed the Malekite de-
cision, declaring that the establishment of a neutral zone
did not prevent the exercise of the right of cheffas.

In reply to the decisions of the courts as to the
legality of his title, Khéréddine wrote from Constantinople
to Clot-Bey, his representative in Tunis, pointing out that
it was unthinkable that the courts should presume to pass
judgment on an act of the Bey's, whose word had always been
final. Thecession to Khéréddine indeed was not the act
of an ordinary attorney, on which a judge might hand down an
opinion, but it was instead "a solemn act of the Bey, ef-

55. Loth, op. cit., pp. 68.
56. Ibid., pp. 66-67.
57. Ibid., p. 68.
58. de Lanessan, op. cit., pp. 242-43.
fected in full and lawful exercise of his sovereignty, invested with his seal, and approved by the Executive Committee of the Financial Commission." Roustan in protesting against the acts of the court, pointed out that such action amounted to virtual confiscation. The Tunisian reply was lengthy and involved as might be expected, and went back to the motives for the Bey's original gift:

The fault in the title (of the Enfida property) consists in the ignorance of the price of transfer; for the transfer of this domain was agreed to in exchange for a life annuity created for Khéreddine, and one cannot determine the figure to which this income would mount, since it is not possible to determine the length of human life. Now when the price is not known, the sale becomes void.

The Bey seems to have based his opposition on his reluctance to have the land pass into the hands of foreigners, contrary to the original purpose of the grant. France insisted that Lévy's claim was only a scheme of Mustapha-ben-Isma'il's; on the other hand Broadley maintained that Lévy had already opened negotiations for the purchase of the Khéreddine property "when the news suddenly reached

59. Ibid., p. 236; Rey, op. cit., p. 13.
60. de Lanessan, op. cit., p. 237.
64. Idem.
Tunis that Kheir-ed-Din had sold his estate."

The matter began to assume international proportions. Granville instructed the British consul, Reade, to support Lévy "if you are satisfied that he has a bona fide claim and that his proceedings are not simply vexatious." The case received a great deal of newspaper publicity both in England and on the continent, with France holding the attorney Broadley responsible for the very considerable unfavorable public opinion which was manifested. The matter came up repeatedly in the Houses of Parliament in the fall of 1830 and the spring of 1831, and because the question had created so much stir, Great Britain even published a Blue Book on it. Moses Lévy, however, did not seem to be impressed by his brother's claims, but rather was embarrassed by them, as was indicated by a letter written in the fall of 1830:

M. Rey is not aware of the friendship that I have for him . . . . and as for my brother, Joseph, he is a stubborn man, who will not allow himself to be convinced. From the beginning of the Enfida affair I have reproached him for getting mixed up with Ben Ayet, who promised him 200,000 francs if he would fight the Société Marseillaise. I have been mortified by the affair and I have exchanged very sharp words with Joseph.


67. Rey, op. cit., p. 49.
In both Houses of Parliament in February it was stated that "the British and French governments were agreed that the question should be dealt with by local tribunals, under whose jurisdiction the matter properly comes," and that it was a "matter in which political influence ought not to be used." Both France and England sent ships of war which, however, were shortly withdrawn. As Sir Charles Dilke wrote: "We did not want to keep the French out of Tunis, but we could not have ironclads used to force the Tunisian lawcourts to give decisions hostile to British subjects." Suspicion was voiced that a new threat of a French protectorate was present, and question again developed as to British promises to France at Berlin.

Before the Enfida case could be settled Ferry had asked the French Chamber on April 7th for the funds necessary for the "punitive" expedition against the Khroumirs and the question of the British "promises" had to be settled. On April 11th the Salisbury-Waddington correspondence was published in the London Times and included in the Blue Book on the Tunisian question. In a letter to Victoria, who had


been urging a strong stand on the Lévy matter, Earl Granville indicated the horns of the dilemma on which he found himself impaled. "The whole question," he pointed out to his Queen, "is difficult and delicate and made more so by the impulsive declarations of Lord Salisbury at Berlin." He went over certain of the points relative to the Berlin conversations and then concluded, with particular reference to the Waddington-Salisbury correspondence:

... It is unfortunate that it is impossible to reconcile the different statements in these despatches with one another, or with the categorical denial given in the House of Commons by Mr. Bourke, by Lord Salisbury's desire, or with the positive assurance given to the Bey. ... Your Majesty will know whether it is true, what Lord Granville has been told, that Prince Bismarck advised Your Majesty's late Government to take Egypt, and the French to take Tunis. 73

The affair was not concluded until 1882. By that time the Treaty of Bardo had been signed and Lévy was dead. In the meantime, also, an appeal had been made to the Cheikh-ul-Islam in Constantinople, the highest Islamic authority in the world, who sent a fetwa which confirmed the rights of the Société Marseillaise. The Tunisian tribunal, denying the claims of Lévy's widow, upheld the French view of the matter and ruled that Lévy had never "been a land-owner, even in the neighborhood of the Enfida." 75

74. Loth, op. cit., p. 71.
75. Idem.; Despagnet, op. cit., p. 223.
Just what part the Enfida affair played in the French intervention is debatable. As has been pointed out, it may have temporarily postponed French action; the Italians apparently hoped that such would be the case. French sources maintained that Macciò and Italian capital were backing Lévy. The contemporary, LaBerge, wrote that it had been a quarrel "for the benefit of a Jew, an English protégé, but with Italian financiers as sleeping-partners."

To the French it was another instance in the recurrent and increasing interference with French rights by the government of the Bey, and in all such cases Roustian had come to suspect Italian machinations. As the culmination of the particularly heated series of conflicts of 1830 and the spring of 1831, the Enfida affair may have been the "straw" that broke the proverbial "camel's back." With the report of the outrages of the Khroumirs by General Osmont on March 30 and Ferry's appearance in the Chamber on April 7th, the curtain went up on the last act of the drama of the Bey's struggle to maintain his independence.

76. Loth, op. cit., p. 69; d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 105, fn.
77. LaBerge, op. cit., p. 13.
78. Journal des Débats, Feb. 2, p. 20, Mar. 10, p. 188, expressed this attitude concerning the Enfida affair. As the Journal des Débats was somewhat cautious in expressing attitudes on foreign affairs, one may believe it was not too far from the opinion held in the Quai d'Orsay.
CHAPTER XI

THE OCCUPATION

Why France actually intervened in Tunisia in 1881 has been a subject of much controversy. No one cause, however, would seem to be the adequate answer.

Traditionally France is supposed to have been primarily interested in the years following 1870 in the "hole in the Vosges" and in revanche. That the government attitude had changed considerably before 1878 has already been pointed out, and the policy of the cabinets which followed the Congress of Berlin have likewise been shown as not to have been motivated solely by a continental policy. Bismarck's urging through Saint-Vallier to seek compensation elsewhere, so as to restore the French amour propre, undoubtedly added weight to the decision against revanche and towards colonialism.

There were other forces at work as well. One, especially, is to be noted. During the 70's a lively development of interest in geography and allied topics took place and there was a great increase both in the number of geographical societies and in their membership. This movement was destined to be rather definitely concerned with the matter of French colonial expansion.

1. In 1877 "Gambetta told a friend that the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine by force of arms would solve nothing." Carroll, French Public Opinion, p. 73.
The Paris Society of Geography was the first of its kind. It was organized in 1821 with a membership of some two hundred persons. In 1873 appeared the Society of Commercial Geography, which had for its main function the application of geographical studies to the general interests of commerce and industry. It was to reconcile the interests of the Society of Geography and the syndical chambers of commerce which were likewise on the increase in this period.

Other societies of geography were established in the 70's -- Lyon, 1873, Bordeaux, 1874, Toulouse, 1875, Marseille, 1876, etc. Membership in the societies increased rapidly. For the first half of the nineteenth century France had only one geographical society, with a small membership. Yet at the beginning of 1881 there were ten major societies with a membership of some 9500 members. That this has a particular significance in the story of the French movement for colonial expansion may be inferred from the comparative figures for the membership in similar societies in other countries:


5. Depping, loc. cit.


Germany  
Great Britain  
Italy  
Belgium  
Russia  

5,300  
3,71  
1,385  
1,255  
1,057  

It is interesting and perhaps significant that the geographical movement had connected with it a number of names of persons in government posts. For example, M. Meurand, the Director of Consulates and Commercial Affairs in the French Foreign Office was also Honorary President of the Society of Geography. Later we find M. Georges Perin, a deputy and member of the Commission on Missions and Voyages in the Ministry of Public Instruction, as a vice-president of the same group, while Baron de La Roncière Le Noury of the Senate was President.

At the same time it may be wise to note the support given the movement by prominent newspapers, such as Le Siècle and Le Constitutionnel, moderate Republican papers, and semi-official Journal des Débats and the official organ of the French government, the Journal Officiel. The relationship between the Journal des Débats and the government has already been pointed out. Illustrations of this sup-

10. The Journal des Débats had been founded by the Bertin family. When Léon Say married Mlle. Bertin, the relation between the Débats and government policy became rather close. He was Minister of Finance in five cabinets, Ambassador to London, in 1880, and President of the Senate from May 1880 to January 1882.
11. Vide supra, p. 139.
port are revealed by a casual glance through the Journal Officiel for the decade of 1370-1381. In one month in 1873, there were sixteen articles dealing with some phase of geographical or colonial interest. In 1880 the Index lists fifty-two articles on geographical societies and in 1881 there were forty-nine on the Paris Society of Geography alone. A tie-up between the Journal Officiel and the geographic societies may be indicated in that M. Charles Hertz, one of the most prominent and active members of the new movement, was also one of the writers of the Journal Officiel staff.

Further government support of the movement is indicated in other instances likewise. In 1875 there was a Congress of Geographic Societies held in Paris with considerable publicity given both in the Journal des Débats and the Journal Officiel, and with the place of meeting supplied by the government. In 1873 Le Siècle stressed the important part played by geography in the Paris Exposition of 1878, the geographical exhibits occupying "no less than three large rooms." And in the same year a substantial grant was made

13. See index volumes for the years mentioned.
17. Le Siècle, June 13, 1873.
to the Ministry of Public Instruction for the publication of documents concerning travels and scientific missions.

That there was a nationalist character to the French geographical movement was apparent early in 1871, when the Paris Society stated "we cannot forget that our former preponderance was challenged from the day we ceased to compete . . . . in the conquests over barbarism." And by 1877 the President of the society openly declared that it was the wish of the organization to pursue its work "in order to enable France to recover her position of prestige and superiority."

It would appear then that the government-encouraged geographic societies helped to prepare a public opinion which would readily accept an occupation of the Regency. This opinion is even expressed by one of the geographic journals. The *Revue de géographie* was convinced of the efficacy of its work and expressed its pride in the aid it had been able to give to the French policy in Tunisia.

Other agents were at work also, urging France to turn her eyes to distant lands. Probably the most indefatigable was Paul Leroy-Beaulieu. He became the editor-in-chief of

20. Ibid., Apr. 3, 1877, p. 2626.
L'Économiste français when it was established in 1873 as the organ of French industry and commerce, and was likewise a frequent contributor to the Journal des Débats. From his earliest writings he stressed the importance of the French position in North Africa and urged colonization in Algeria.

He deplored the mistakes of the government in the past as to its colonial policy. "Never has a people lost so rapidly and with such insouciance such vast territorial possessions," he wrote as he regretted the "narrow continental policy" under which France lost Canada, India, Santo Domingo, and Louisiana. He berated the government of Louis Philippe for nearly giving up Algeria and for allowing New Zealand to slip through its fingers; he condemned his own government for "its deplorable pusillanimity" in its failure to annex Tonkin and the New Hebrides. But at the same time he wrote: "We can be patient in Tunisia and need not hurry, for time works there for us." And he was likewise not


23. He followed an anti-protectionist, anti-collectivist policy. He tried unsuccessfully and repeatedly to be elected to the Paris municipal council and the Chamber of Deputies as a candidate of the Center Right.


26. Ibid., p. 250.
unaware either of the proximity of Tunisia to Italy as well as to Algeria, nor of the ambition of Italy, "that ambition of the adolescents who wish to snatch everything at once;" therefore, as a solution he offered the same compensation which had been so frequently mentioned in the diplomatic correspondence -- Tripoli.

On the Mediterranean there is another country equally a neighbor to Italy and which will one day fall to some European people; it is the Regency of Tripoli. Why do the Italians not cast their eyes upon this beautiful and extensive territory? 27

By August 1880 he was not so content with the situation and began to be fearful that there would never be peace or security for France in Africa "until our flag floats over the Bardo." Thus the same man who in April 1880 had been content to wait in Tunisia wrote in March 1881, still some days before General Osmont's report from Algeria: "For about a year the attitude of our government as to Tunisia has been deplorably weak, and each of its concessions after a brief delay provokes a new affront." He urged that a French protectorate be established to protest French interests, concluding that such an act "would be of great benefit to all the civilized nations." He stated finally that France should definitely determine the attitude of

27. Idem.
Italy before a proposed loan be granted, so that "French capitalists should know if their six hundred millions in part might be used against our national interests." 30

It was only two weeks later that he was urging a still more vigorous plan, the "total annexation of the Regency." 31 Public opinion and government statements did not, however, keep pace with him apparently. For even throughout the period of crisis, from April through May, the leading newspapers do not speak of annexation, nor yet even of a protectorate. Little was written about Tunisia until after the intervention.

Reassured by the revival of French colonial interest, reassured by the attitude of Germany and Great Britain, and both irritated and alarmed by the Italian aggression and pretensions concerning Tunisia, the Ferry government was preparing to take the step which had been twice contemplated before, but of which better had been thought before the actual move was made. Although France maintained that the Bey was an independent sovereign, Tunisia was considered by powers other than France to be a part of the Turkish empire, whose territorial integrity they had guaranteed as early as 1356.

30. Idem.
31. Ibid., Apr. 9, 1881, pp. 437-40.
32. A study of Le Siècle, Journal des Débats, plus Galligani's Messenger and the English Public Opinion, both of which cite the foreign press fully, for the years 1878-81 is the basis for this statement.
International complications consequently must be weighed seriously.

However, from Berlin came repeated pleas from Saint-Vallier to Saint-Hilaire, urging action in Tunisia. With the coming of the new year 1831 the French Ambassador became increasingly emphatic. He stressed the fact that French lack of resistance had encouraged the Italians to become "bolder and more aggressive," and feared that France had both weakened her position in Tunisia and was less secure in respect to the attitudes of England and Austria because of her delay since the Congress of Berlin. When Saint-Hilaire replied that the approaching French election would delay matters, Saint-Vallier sent back a passionate protest that it was a matter of urgency, that to postpone it might involve "a European international question." A delay of six months, he wrote between exclamation marks, might mean an Italian protectorate. He appealed in the name of patriotism to Saint-Hilaire and Gambetta to act at once and said that he was so desperately disturbed over the matter that, left to his own wishes, he would depart at once for a forty-eight hour visit to Paris, there to implore Gambetta, Ferry, Grévy, the entire Chamber, as well as Saint Hilaire "to do what the honor and interest of our country so imperiously

33. Saint-Vallier to Saint-Hilaire, Jan. 22, 1831

demand." 34 A fortnight later he again wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the hope of stirring the French government to adopt a vigorous French policy in Tunisia, and referring to the old idea of compensation for Italy in Tripoli.

On February 15, Saint-Vallier's hopes were for the moment dashed by Saint-Hilaire's despatch, agreeing in principle with the Ambassador's ideas but stating firmly that "motives of a higher order oblige the Government of the Republic at this time" to use no means other than diplomatic for maintaining the status quo in the Regency. Saint-Vallier was stirred deeply by this disappointment:

It is the loss of our influence, of our situation, of our Algerian possessions, perhaps, where the Italians emboldened by our pusillanimity will not long delay in coming to attack us. . . . it is deplorable to think that that which disarms us, that which makes us incapable . . . of making our honour respected is the anxiety for miserable electoral interests. 37

But Saint-Vallier was not the only diplomatic representative urging intervention, by any means. In Rome, de Noailles was taking nearly as strong a position as the Ambassador in

35. Same to same, Feb. 10, 1831, ibid., pp. 351-52, #369.
Berlin. He, like Saint-Vallier, pointed out how the Italians were advancing in the Regency and attempting both to blot out French influence and to substitute their own. And like Leroy-Beaulieu he urged that the Government sound out the Italians as to their Tunisian intentions "before granting the loan then being considered." When action was not taken, and when he knew from Saint-Vallier of the excuses offered for continued delay, he wrote again imploring action in order to prevent Italy's supplanting France in the Mediterranean.

Tissot, French Ambassador in Constantinople, was an advocate of a firm policy with regard to the maintenance of the French position in the Regency. Challemel-Lacour, French Ambassador to London, in the printed documents, strongly supported the policy of the government in the Enfida case, which was his primary concern, of course, though he did not urge intervention as did the ambassadors in Rome and Berlin. He did, however, make this somewhat revealing statement:

I have told you and I repeat that the English government is our adversary in Tunisia, either through compliance for Italy, whose servility flatters her, and whose hostility in our direction


40. Saint-Hilaire to Tissot, Jan. 14, 1881, ibid., pp. 312-13, #334.
does not displease her, or through jealousy for us of which England will never be cured.

And sympathetic also to the maintenance of French prestige in the Regency was General Chanzy, Ambassador in St. Petersburg. His interest in the French position was quite to be expected, for he had been "superior commandant of the land and sea forces" of Algeria from 1873-1879.

But perhaps the most indefatigable of all the exponents of intervention among the diplomatic representatives was Roustan. Since the suggestion of a protectorate was first made after the Congress of Berlin, he repeatedly urged or expressed himself to be in favor of such a move. It is perhaps with this end in view that he so scrupulously reported every "incident" concerning trouble with the Tunisian tribesmen after 1878. That he may have been laying the foundations on which France might later justify intervention is suggested by a letter from Roustan to Albert Grévy, the Governor-General of Algeria:

You recognize besides that we may be led eventually to forego the caution we have maintained up to this time... I will add to this list of [previously incurred] just claims all those which will arise in the future, and the


42. de Coursel to General Chanzy, Jan. 15, 1881, ibid., pp. 313-14, #335; Priestley, op. cit., p. 132.
orders which you have been willing to issue, that unlawful acts committed on our border be reported at once, will assist me considerably in this task. 43

In the Quai d'Orsay, after 1880, Baron de Courcel, Director of Political Affairs, was another advocate of intervention. And when the Cabinet in February refused Saint-Hilaire's request for action, he wrote "it seems to me that it [the Cabinet] assumed a grave responsibility before France and the future the day it refused M. Saint-Hilaire the prompt and energetic action on the Tunisian frontiers which were necessary to insure our rights..." 45 That the attitude of de Courcel was of more than considerable importance in bringing to a head the move for intervention was brought out by Hanotaux, who credits him with having converted Gambetta from opposition to the support of the plan. 46

General Farre, Minister of War, apparently was likewise in favor of intervention. In March he made suggestions to Saint-Hilaire as to methods of procedure, while just a

43. Roustan to Grévy, Feb. 11, 1881, DDT., pp. 147-49, #100.


45. de Courcel to de Noailles, Feb. 10, 1881, ibid., pp. 353-54, #371.


47. Farre to Saint-Hilaire, Mar. 13, 1881, DDT., pp. 163-71, #112.
little later it appears that he sent a secret mission to
North Africa to investigate the situation.

Support for intervention came from many other sources, also. It is not surprising to find that among them was
Monseigneur Lavigerie, Archbishop of Algiers, who was de-
sirous of seeing the French in Tunisia; his approach is sur-
prisingly realistic, albeit secular. Lavigerie and the
White Fathers dreamed of a North Africa under French Catholic
domination. As early as January 1881 the archbishop wrote
Roustan concerning the rumors of a possible French protec-
torate, and indicated that one of the greatest obstacles to
French "progressive assimilation of the European population"
would be the Italian diocesan clergy in the Regency. He
therefore urged that France should put pressure on the Holy
See to prevent the nomination of a coadjutor to the aged
apostolic vicar then in Tunisia, in the hope that were France
to establish a protectorate, she could then demand an ap-
pointee who would "safeguard her political interests." Several months later, still worried over the situation of the
Church in Tunisia and suggesting strongly that he be per-
mitted to supervise the Regency until the anticipated death
of the archbishop there, he asked Father Charmetant, a

48. Mgr. Lavigerie to Père Charmetant speaks of "hav-
ing seen at considerable length the secret representative
of the Minister of War," Apr. 11, 1831, DDOG., Vol. III,
pp. 426-23, #449.

49. Mgr. Lavigerie to Roustan, Jan. 15, 1881, DDOG.,
Vol. III, pp. 315-16, #337.
Parisian priest close to both men, to convey to de Courcel if the opportunity arose, certain of his views on the Tunisian situation. Among them were the somewhat secular conclusions that an official protectorate should be at once imposed in anticipation of eventual annexation and that in addition a plan for the abdication of the bey should be worked out.

On March 20, the Tunisian colony raised its voice on the occasion of the presentation of a silver cup to Roustan, in recognition of his long and earnest service in behalf of the French in the Regency, a "sweeping line of indictment against the Bey of Tunis," and in reply to which Roustan spoke of "the threatened flag of France." Reade, the English consul, of course, was disturbed by this situation and sent word of it to his government and spoke of "the revival of rumours which, three months ago were so rife, respecting an alleged intention on the part of France to invade the country militarily."

The preservation of the interests of the French creditors likewise was a factor which contributed on the side of intervention in the Regency. An interesting survey of the

bond quotations between January 1880 and May 1881 has been 
made by a contemporary student of the French occupation of 
the Regency; his figures are derived from those published 
almost daily in the Journal Officiel. He suggests that "they 
varied in relation to the extent of political activities in 
Tunisia." A summary of his figures and conclusions is given 
below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan.</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>Jan.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>243</td>
<td></td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>261</td>
<td></td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>270</td>
<td></td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
<td></td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>278</td>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>309</td>
<td></td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>317</td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>337</td>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sharp rise in August and September of 1880 
was doubtless due to the reputed plan of de Frey-
cinet to intervene just as his ministry was over-
thrown. And when the Ferry ministry did not see 
fit to 'pick the Tunisian fruit' immediately, the 
bonds fell back again. The tremendous rise to 485 
in June 1881, was, of course, the result of the 
occupation of Tunis by the French troops and the 
establishment of the protectorate. It is not, 
therefore, difficult to imagine that the bond-
holders were favorable to the extension of French 
influence in the Regency.

Commonly Jules Ferry is credited with having conceived 
the idea of intervention and of having forced it upon a 
reluctant Cabinet and Chamber. The evidence previously 
cited would seem to disprove that notion rather conclusively.

---

53. Donald Vernon McKay, The French Acquisition of 
Albert Billot, who after serving as French Ambassador to Rome, wrote of Franco-Italian relations between 1831 and 1899, adds weight to this contention:

In 1831 I was in the Quai d'Orsay, well placed to follow the deliberations occasioned by Tunisian affairs in the government councils. I can attest that at the beginning of this same year, neither the president of the Council, Jules Ferry, nor the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saint-Hilaire, had in prospect the occupation of Tunis.  

Furthermore if we may credit de Courcel's reports, as cited by Hanotaux, then Ferry was converted to the idea even later than Gambetta, holding back partially, as Saint-Hilaire pointed out to Saint-Vallier, for political reasons. Political strategy would seem to have been taken carefully into consideration. As will be shown, the military campaign was not begun until just before the parliament recessed for the Eastern holiday, and the capitulation of the Bey was formally arranged on the very day of parliament's return. This type of timing lends credence to de Courcel's quotation of a conversation with Saint-Hilaire: "... a Tunisian incident, in an election year -- you would not consider it."

Then on March 30 came the convenient Kroumir "incident" which was to serve the government with the necessary pretext


55. Vide supra, p. 2 54.

for intervention. Ferry's opponents claimed there were no such people as the Kroumiras. The Journal Officiel and L'Economiste français on the other hand, supporting the government policy, published several articles on the Kroumiras, identifying them as men of some eighteen independent tribes, collectively called Kroumiras, after the most aggressive of the group, who occupied the region between Cap Roux and Cap Nègre. Nominally subject to the Bey, the Kroumiras were a marauding group; when their raids had destroyed life or property in Algeria the French had, of course, protested. In the ten years immediately preceding 1881 some 2,379 of such "incidents" were reported. Broadley has his own interpretation of the March 30 raid -- that it was deliberately incited by Roustan with the aid both of a renegade Italian trader who had "linked his fortunes" with France and of the pro-French Tunisian consul in Bône. René Valet suggests still another version of the intervention: that from Maccio's mistress Roustan learned of an Italian plan for moving on the Regency, and was thus able to forestall the Italian


move. There is no evidence to determine whether the raid was the "straw that broke the camel's back" or a deliberately planned move to serve the predetermined purposes of the government.

Nevertheless, on April 7 Ferry appeared in the Chamber to ask for extraordinary credits of some 5,695,000 francs for the ministries of War and Marine for the punishment of the marauding tribes; his request was granted by a unanimous vote of 439. And on the following day General Parre presented to the Senate the Government's desire for extraordinary credits and stressed the urgency of the matter. The finance commission was ordered into immediate session. Its president was de Freycinet, who as premier it will be remembered, had tried to follow a strong Tunisian policy, and had even sought a protectorate. It is little to be wondered at, then, that his committee reported the matter favorably and that the last act of the session that day was to vote unanimously on the bill granting the credits for the "punitive expedition."

So far it must be observed there was no mention of

---

64. Vide supra, pp. 238-9
either protectorate or annexation; the expedition was presented as being undertaken purely for "punitive purposes."
And it must likewise be noted that at the outset Ferry had the unanimous approval of both Senate and Chamber of Deputies for his action.

As soon as the news of the proposed French expedition was known generally there were foreign repercussions. France, herself, was most deeply concerned with the attitudes to be taken by England and Germany. Bismarck remained firm in his previous and repeatedly stated policy of encouragement.
Saint-Vallier on April 3, 1881, wired that Bismarck believed French long-suffering to be responsible for the present situation and that it would not change unless France were to act "immediately and energetically." Two days later he wrote that again Bismarck had assured him that France could "count on his approval and upon his most sympathetic moral support," adding that Italy already knew his "sentiment in this respect." The day following Ferry's request for credits General Pittié, chief of the military cabinet of the President, was in Berlin on his way back to Paris from St. Petersburg. He and Saint-Vallier talked with Bismarck on various topics; then he reported the Chancellor's admonition

66. Saint-Vallier to Saint-Hilaire, Apr. 1, 1881, ibid., p. 399, #422.
to the French to go ahead in Tunisia and not trouble themselves about the Italians. "It was, in fact, Bismarck's support which prevented active opposition to France's policy by Italy . . . . and by Turkey."

Both of the English houses of Parliament had much to say concerning the intervention and there was much diplomatic correspondence between London and Paris in the six weeks following the March 30 raid. Granville and Dilke maintained a carefully neutral course. They repeated Saint-Hilaire's assurances that the "operations were to be confined to the neighborhood of the frontier and to the punishment of the lawless frontier tribes." Reade was advised to recommend to the Bey, were he asked, "to take all necessary measures to cooperate with the French authorities in the punishment of any recent outrages committed by the frontier tribes." Virtually the same tone was taken toward Italy and no encouragement was offered her. And Granville again repeated


70. BFP., Vol. LXXIII, p. 449.

71. Ibid., pp. 449-50; Rosi, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 70.
the established British position "that this country has always maintained the doctrine that the Regency of Tunis is under the suzerainty of the Porte, and forms a part of the Ottoman Empire."

On April 6, 1881 a stormy session began in the Italian Chamber of Deputies when Cairoli was interpellated by Massari, de Rudini, and Damiani. It is almost incredible that in spite of Cialdini's frequent warnings, Cairoli should have dared in those sessions not to give any indication of the warnings and to present the picture consistently in rosy tints.

A summary of Cialdini's telegrams in the few days before the interpellation seems pertinent. On the third he telegraphed Cairoli as follows:

They are greatly excited here regarding the development in Tunis. The press is unanimous in pushing the Government to take energetic stryures. Strengthened by public opinion, the Mini: act would well seize the pretext of the moment and vigorously to force the Bey to knuckle.

On the fifth he sent two telegrams. The first told of the parliamentary action regarding Tunisia and of the interview he had just had with Saint-Bilaire in which he had been as


sured that for the moment the French fleet was not being sent into action, that punishment of the border tribes and protection of the railroad from Bône to Tunis seemed to be the only object of the expedition. In the second he reported a highly excited public opinion and suggested that the French move might "be the beginning of a military occupation which would be followed by the protectorate which they have hoped to establish for some time. Only England [in such a case] would be able to stop France." On the sixth Cialdini telegraphed that Saint-Hilaire had reiterated that France had "no thought of a permanent military occupation and less still of the annexation of Tunisia." On the seventh, however, he reported that in spite of continuing to maintain that France had only the announced goal in mind Saint-Hilaire had said significantly that "once the fight is struck it is impossible to see where it will lead . . . that the French Government would take council according to the developments." In the interim before the next message, Cairoli came before the Chamber of Deputies, and did not report the full tenor of Cialdini's despatches. The telegram from Cialdini on the
ninth took Cairoli to task for having omitted the Saint-Hilaire statement "once the fight is struck it is impossible to see where it will lead," and seeming thereby to establish an agreement with France not to change her plans.

On the sixth Cairoli had firmly said in the Chamber, "We are in the presence of an unexpected and unforeseen event." Little wonder that the fiery Damiani declared himself unsatisfied with the interpellation, requested that a vote of censure be given, and concluded: "Honorable Cairoli, you did not have foresight; the representative in Paris did not have foresight." Considering the suspicions frequently voiced by Cialdini and suppressed by Cairoli, one understands Cialdini's resentment of the censure of his conduct so openly expressed by the deputies. Though Depretis, Minister of the Interior, tried to stave off Damiani's request as inopportune, the vote was taken the following day. A combination of Right and Center, plus the Crispi and Miottera groups, condemned the government's policy; 192 voted against the

78. Cialdini to Cairoli, Apr. 9, 1881, ibid., p. 116.


80. Ibid. It is interesting to note, however, that throughout the strong Italian challenges of Apr. 6, 7, 8, 1881, there was no reviling of France. They spoke of French bones left on Italian soil, and even Crispi said that a war between France and Italy would be a civil war.
ministry and 171 for it, with 3 abstaining. Cairoli offered his resignation to the King, who for various reasons did not accept it. On the eighth Cairoli appeared before the Senate and said:

I have the honor to announce to the Senate that as a result of the vote of yesterday in the Chamber of Deputies the Ministry has handed over its resignation to His Majesty the King, who has reserved the right to take the resignations. The Ministry, meanwhile, remains at its post to keep order and to take care of state affairs.

Senator Mamiani at once endeavored to interpellate Cairoli, who managed to put it off from day to day until it was avoided altogether. There were no sessions again until May 11. The pressure on the government came, therefore, as might be expected, from the Chamber of Deputies.

De Noailles telegraphed to Saint-Hilaire on April 13 that the King had refused to accept the resignation of the Cairoli ministry. Although Cairoli thus remained in power until the announcement of the French treaty with Tunisia was made in the Chamber of Deputies, he had to face a vote of

---

33. Ibid.
34. Curátulo, op. cit., p. 117; Ro:1, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 73.
confidence on April 30, the results of which showed how negative a support he had -- 262 for, 1 against, and 146 who abstained from voting.

The adverse vote of April 7 was followed by a definite modification of Italian policy in Tunisia. On April 19 Cairoli recommended to Macciò that he follow closely the example of the English consul, that he advise the Bey to follow a course of moderation, and that Italian war ships would be sent only in case of danger to the colonials. Thus would be avoided the supposition "that we want to encourage the Bey to shut himself up in an attitude of absolute resistance," as well as perhaps "those contingencies which Italy would like to avoid." Moreover the publication of the Mostakel ceased soon after Macciò ceased to be a frequent visitor at the Bardo Palace, just before the intervention of France, which in the eyes of French writers further substantiated the Italian relations to the paper. Coincidental with this withdrawal was Italy's futile attempt "to enlist the

86. de Noailles to Saint-Hilaire, Apr. 18, 1881, DDOG, Vol. III, p. 443, #468; cf. ibid., fn. 2 for telegrams of the 14 and 15 which show the progress of the King's efforts to get someone other than Cairoli to form a ministry.
88. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 134.
support not only of England and the Porte, but even of Austria and Germany.

Charges of grave duplicity have been laid at the door of France in respect to her failure to warn Italy of her plan or to offer the frequently discussed compensation. Langer points out that though Saint-Hilaire "repeatedly assured the Italian ambassador that no . . . . annexation was intended, he carefully avoided the mention of a protectorate and stated that France would be compelled to regulate her conduct by the events." De Freycinet wrote with surprising frankness of his promise to Cairoli to make no move without forewarning Italy and of Cairoli's later complaints about French duplicity. He added:

M. Ferry had not willingly entretenu une erreur, but not being bound by my words of 1880, he had not felt that he had to take the Italian government into his confidence. He had been able to say then in all sincerity, 'Cairoli was disappointed and astonished, but he was not deceived'.

Some years later an indigent joint denial of having lied to Italy was made by Saint-Hilaire and Jules Ferry. It was published in L'Estaffe of Paris, October 22, 1892, and, in the form of a letter to the editor, it read in part as follows:

---


91. de Freycinet, op. cit., p. 169.
As a result of the preface written by M. Ferry to a recently published book on Tunisia by Narcisse Faucon, the papers of Rome and Naples have affirmed that at the moment of the occupation of the Regency by the French troops, Cialdini, Ambassador of Italy, received from M. Saint-Hilaire formal assurance that France would not take possession of Tunisia, that also as soon as the Bey would consent to a rectification of the frontiers of the Algerian coast the military occupation would cease entirely, even including that of Bizerte. They assert also that these statements could be confirmed by a telegram dictated at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the presence of the ambassador of Italy in the Cabinet of the President of the Republic. And one adds to this that the rough draft of this telegram, in the hand of Saint-Hilaire, should be found in the papers left by General Cialdini.

All of this was indignantly denied. "This tale does not contain one word of truth; it is pure invention, to which we give the most absolute lie." The letter continued that when such assertions are made one should be able to substantiate them, and demanded that proof be produced. The signatures of both Saint-Hilaire and Ferry were appended. However, no reply seems ever to have been made; if so the contents of it were not made public.

In summary then the situation was as follows. For various reasons in April 1881, France moved to take advantage of the proposals which had been made to her in Berlin in 1873. Certain of the factors underlying the intervention, major or minor, are:

93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
1. The general policy of Cairoli.
2. The Rubattino affair.
3. The publication of the Mostakel.
4. The concessions struggle: the cable, Tunis-Rhadès line, the port, etc.
5. The Palermo demonstrations.
6. The Enfida or Lévy affair.
7. The geographic movement.
8. The interest of the bond holders.
9. The urging of Bismarck.
10. The imperialistic yearnings of France.
11. The border raids which affected Algerian property.
12. The security of Algeria.
13. The raid of the Kroumirs on March 30, 1881.

Ferry has been charged with duplicity in concealing his motives from the Chamber. However, he was by no means the originator of the idea of a protectorate. Both Waddington and de Freycinet had drawn up and presented to the Bey treaties of protectorate. These plans must have been known somewhat widely. Since de Freycinet was the head of the Senate financial commission and since it acted with the utmost speed concerning the granting of credits, one cannot but assume that de Freycinet believed that more than a punitive expedition was being contemplated. Furthermore, though Ferry did ask for limited credits, he clearly pointed out that he intended not only to punish the Kroumirs but also to secure guarantees for the future as well. And when questioned as to
his exact meaning regarding the latter statement, he refused to disclose what he had in mind. In spite of such a stand and of his refusal also to sanction the orders of the day which he considered unsatisfactory, strong approval (339 to 131) was voted for his plan. It is difficult to believe then that an entirely unsuspecting Chamber was being lead along blind alleys by a scheming premier.

Foreign support was largely with France as the campaign progressed into the month of May. Most important of all was Bismarck's continued staunch support. When Granville sent Lord Dufferin, British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, on a special mission to the Chancellor with a suggestion of mediation, the latter refused and said at the same time in respect to Italy: "She does not count." As late as May 7, also, he urged the Sultan to drop his opposition to France. Austria had already indicated her acquiescence; her primary concern was the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and she probably was pleased to have Italian attention diverted from Italia Irradenta. Though Granville was not in favor of French action in Tunisia, Salisbury's conversations made opposition virtually impossible. English irritation

95. Journal des Débats, Apr. 12, 1881.


against the French had been marked during the progress of the Enfida affair, but with the publication on April 11 of the Salisbury-Waddington correspondence, serious opposition was blocked. Though the French continued to maintain the punitive character of the expedition, suspicion was evidently strong in England since the question was asked specifically concerning plans for the protection of English interests and privileges under the new conditions. But as late as May 10 Saint-Hilaire in a talk with Lord Lyons gave him assurance

... in the most formal and explicit manner
... that the French Government did not intend to annex Tunis. If it should be found necessary to occupy for a time certain points in the Regency with French troops, the occupation would, his Excellency said, be of an essentially provisional character and would cease as soon as sufficient security had been obtained for the punctual execution by the Bey of the new arrangements which would be effected by the Treaty which he would be required to make.

99

In Tunisia armed opposition to the French was not great. With no appreciable obstacles, diplomatic or military, placed in the way the French moved steadily on toward their goal. The irresolute Bey saw troops coming closer and closer to his capital and could not decide whether to flee to the holy city of Kairouan or to stay on at the Bardo. On the night of April 11 French troops were encamped outside the capital. And on the following morning General Bréart, who had been in


charge of the French military forces, accompanied by Roustan came to present to the Bey the treaty to be known as the treaty of Casr-es-Said, or the Bardo, with some eight hours 100 only allowed for its consideration. Fearing the Bey might refuse to sign, Roustan had persuaded Taib, one of Mohammed-
es-Saddok's brothers, in the event of such an emergency, to 101 accept the throne. Consequently, so Broadley reports, Roustan was enabled to threaten the Bey: "Your Highness has nothing to do but sign, and if you decline to do so it does not matter, for there is another who will." Two hours 102 before the deadline the Bey signed.

According to the French interpretation France had been entirely honorable; she had not projected the conquest nor annexation of the Regency, nor had she carried out either. She had punished the Kroumirs for the depredations and at-
tacks against French property; she had secured from the Bey

100. Broadley, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 316. Broadley, pp. 286-319, gives a most interesting picture of the Bey's panic during the intervention, his indecision, his projected flight to Kairouan, and his relations during this period of stress with the English and Italian consuls. Margherita Sarfatti is quoted in the Bolletino della Emigrazione (Rome, 1923), Aug.-Sept., 1923, p. 647, in relating how the Bey implored the Italian consul to "tell your country that Garibaldi should come here for his soldiers."


the assurance necessary for the future. The Treaty of Casr-es-Saîd made no reference to a protectorate, even though it gave to France management of the Bey's foreign relations and finances and established a French military control over the Regency. Not until 1885, when a supplementary treaty -- the Treaty of Marsa -- was signed, was the word protectorate officially used. France continued to maintain that she had broken no promises of good faith; she had merely carried out her two original projects. Despagnet, the well-known professor of and writer on international law, has summed up the traditional French attitude when he wrote: "The expedition of 1881 and the establishment of the protectorate were the results of an intervention justified by the legitimate defense of our rights."

104. Saint-Hilaire to the diplomatic agents of the French Republic, May 13, 1881, DDTS., pp. 45-46, #276.

CHAPTER XII

THE AFTERMATH OF THE TREATY OF BARDO

With the fait accompli France at once began to set her house right with the Powers. The day after the signature of the Treaty of Bardo, Saint-Hilaire sent a note, along with the text of the treaty, to the various European capitals calling attention to the article of the treaty which guaranteed the treaty relations of the Bey with foreign powers. The announcement of the French success in Tunisia evoked, however, varied responses from the interested parties.

The Porte protested violently and appealed generally to the European governments, who either discouraged or ignored both the protest and the appeal. Helpless under such circumstances, Turkey was forced to content herself with attempts to create trouble for France in southern Tunisia by stirring up certain political and religious fanaticism in Tripoli.

Italy, likewise, was vehement in her protests.

1. Saint-Hilaire to the diplomatic agents of France, May 13, 1881, DDTs., p. 56, #234.


3. DDOG., May 18, 29, 1881, pp. 13-14, 23-24; #15, 27.
out the country there was profound dismay even among the Francophiles like Garibaldi. 4 A despatch from Rome, quoted in a Paris paper, makes the attitude of the Italian patriot clear:

A second letter from Garibaldi on the Tunisian question is published by the Riforma of Rome, in which the General says that the French treaty with the Bey effaces his good opinion of the French Republic, which he has served. The writer reminds France of the sacrifice made by Italy in giving up Nice, and says that the conduct of France may compel the Italians to remind her that Nice and Corsica are as much French as he, Garibaldi, is a Tartar. 5

The press reaction is fairly well illustrated by the excerpt from an article in La Perseveranza:

As the reader will see, France sits in the house of the Bey as master, and therefore the Treaty of the 12th of May might have been condensed into this one article: The Regency of Tunisia is annexed to Algeria. 6

On May 14 the Cairoli ministry resigned, "as soon as it became aware of the impression produced throughout Italy by the news of the Treaty of Bardo." 7 His government had been in a precarious position ever since the adverse vote of April 7, and he now made no attempt to defend his policy be-


fore either the Chamber or the Senate. Crispi had hoped to succeed to power, but his gallophobia probably kept the Left from countenancing such a course. Instead Depretis took over the government for the fourth time, with Mancini assuming the portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Zanardelli that of Justice.

The British press almost unanimously denounced the French move. But the British official attitude coincided with the pattern which it had followed previously. When the Porte made two appeals, Granville replied:

With regard to the second despatch, in which Assim Pasha states that Her Majesty's Government had declared that they would not consent to a modification of the status quo in Tunis, I have the honor to point out to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have only said that they were favorable to it's maintenance, but they have never stated that they would not consent to any change in it. . . .

And then he concluded that he would have been willing to mediate if he had thought anyone would have accepted such a

---


meral plan. However, to the French government he wrote in rather a different tone.

Her Majesty's Government are happy to receive and to reciprocate these expressions of friendly feeling. It would be difficult to overrate the importance they attach to the excellent relations which exist between this country and France, the value of which is not confined to the respective nations; but they would be wanting in frankness if they allowed M. Saint-Hilaire to remain under the impression that the proceedings of the French in Tunis have produced a favorable effect on public opinion in this country.

Her Majesty's Government do not wish to lay too much stress on the inconsistencies of language in conversation, or on the various reasons which have been given at Paris and at Tunis for French intervention . . . . but it can hardly be doubted that the Treaty with Tunis goes far beyond any question of the security of the frontier, and amounts practically to a Protectorate, which they understood to have been disclaimed. 12

Germany, on the other hand, was well satisfied with prepared to continue her policy of support for France. When Cairo, sent out a circular after the Treaty of Bardo, describing the past as a repetition of the Treaty of San-Stefano, which Europe therefore, as the guardian and guarantor of the inviolability of the Ottoman Empire, should revise in a general Congress, Bismarck was quick in his opposition to the plan. His reply to the German minister at Rome in response to the circular is quoted as being:

11. Ibid.


Tell the Italian government that I am altogether averse to any interference of the Powers in the Franco-Tunisian question, seeing that, having been settled by common agreement, such a question no longer exists. I know not how the other Powers that signed the Treaty of Berlin will look at the matter; but you can already declare to the Italian government that Germany will not attend a Congress having for its object the undoing or diminishing of concessions already acquired by France in a regular manner.

In this connection it is interesting to note the denial of Italy that any such proposal was made. Menabrea, the Italian Ambassador to London, wrote an official letter to the editor of the London Standard which was published over his signature; it asked for a refutation of a statement previously made by that paper, concerning an Italian circular, and it denied without equivocation that Italy had ever sent out such a document.

The rapprochement of France and Germany over the Tunisian matter is further made plain by Herbert Bismarck, Secretary of the Legation. He told of seeing a private letter from Saint-Hilaire to Saint-Vallier, expressing the thanks of the French government for the part played by Germany during the Tunisian crisis. The letter was so confidential in nature that Saint-Vallier could make no copy of it, but instead permitted Count Bismarck to read it. In it Saint-Hilaire gave Germany credit for having quieted both Italy and the Porte, and


concluded apparently with the now-famous phrase: "C'est la cuisine intérieure de la régence que nous avons à faire."

But before setting about the matter of the cuisine intérieure of the Regency there was the matter of the ratification of the Treaty of Bardo by the French parliament to be gotten out of the way. In spite of such attacks as those of Rochefort in L'Intransigeant, openly accusing the Cabinet of taking Tunisia in order to raise the price of Tunisian bonds and naming Roustan as the agent of the operation, public opinion, as has already been pointed out, seemed to remain with Ferry throughout the period of the intervention. He likewise had been able to maintain a parliamentary majority throughout this trying period. On the very day that Parliament returned from its vacation the Treaty of Bardo was signed, and on May 13 the announcement concerning it was made to both Chambers. In spite of some opposition from Clémenton, Cunéo d'Ornano, and Contaut-Biron, the treaty was overwhelmingly ratified in the Chamber on May 23, 1831, by a vote of 453 to 1, and in the Senate


17. Schuman, op. cit., p. 73; Le Siècle, Apr. 13, 14, 19, 24, 27, 23, 29, May 4, 1881; Journal des Débats, Apr. 10, 12, 14, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 29, 1881; the reaction of the Bourse also indicated favorable response.


on May 27 unanimously.

It is interesting to note in this connection, also, Gambetta's reaction to the treaty, inasmuch as he was to become so important a factor in securing the later vote of confidence for Ferry's Tunisian policy. As soon as the news that the treaty had been signed reached him in Paris he wrote to Ferry as follows:

My dear friend:

I thank you for your note and congratulate you with all my heart upon this speedy and admirable result. Our carping critics will have to recognize it now, with the best grace they can, -- France is rising again to her old rank as a Great Power. Once more, my heartfelt congratulations. Friday, the 15th (do you believe in omens?)

Early in June began the movement to bring back the troops. Certain sections of the Paris press, especially Rochefort, found it laughable that more than 30,000 trained soldiers should have been sent against a handful of rude tribesmen. Some 10,000 were returned to France and about 8,000 to Algeria, leaving under 15,000 in the Regency, all told, with none stationed in the South. In many ways this was unfortunate. Partly because of the withdrawal of French forces, partly as a result of Turkish intrigues emanating from Tripoli, insurrection broke out in the south and "large

20. Ibid., May 28, 1881, p. 2935.
contingents of the Bey's troops deserted to the rebels."

Energetic measures had to be taken; new credits had to be granted. Then the insurrection spread to Algeria. With a parliamentary election scheduled for September 13, Ferry's position was not a happy one, even when the plan was concocted of having the elections moved up to August 21 "to enhance the government's chance of success."

Naval operations in Tunisia were begun at once, but military action was postponed, ostensibly because of the extreme heat of the season. Even Hanotaux comments that "before elections not a man was moved, a course that was justified by the season." The three main ports on the east coast, Sfax, Gabès, and Sousse were occupied by September. In that same month the military campaign was undertaken, with the main column in the south under the command of General Forgemol. By October 10 Tunis was en-

24. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
26. Sfax was captured July 15, Gabès July 24, and Sousse Sept. 11, 1881. Miers Fisher Wright, Operations of the French Navy During the Recent War with Tunisia (Washington, D. C., 1883, trans. from L'Année maritime), pp. 15-30. Extremely interesting details of the capture of these ports is given by Lieut. Wright, U.S.N., who was an observer on the spot. Excerpts from several of his despatches are included in the appendix of this work because of their particular and current interest; see appendix D. Cf. Broadley, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1-198 for the story of the Second Tunisian campaign; it contains a number of eyewitness reports.
tered, and on October 26 the holy city of Kairouan surrendered.

In the meantime, of course, the French election had taken place, with the Republican majority somewhat increased as a result. The former Chamber had consisted of 394 republicans in the total membership of 555 members; the new Chamber was made up of 457 republicans and 90 conservatives, of whom 45 were Bonapartists. Ferry deferred discussion of the North African situation as long as possible, postponing the opening of the new parliamentary session until October 28, when the insurrection was nearly at an end and reports of a successful campaign could be made. However, the coincidence of the fall of Kairouan and the reopening of parliament on October 23, 1881 followed a pattern very similar to that of the signature of the Treaty of Bardo and the reopening of the former parliament after its Easter recess and could not but be observed. Certain incredulous deputies refused to believe that the timing had not been worked out by government design.


30. Schuman, op. cit., p. 73.

Three demands for interpellation were made at once, with Ferry agreeing, even asking, that an early date be set for the discussion. On November 5, consequently, began the stormy four-day session in which Ferry was to demand a vindication of his policy. At the end of the debate Ferry resigned. He was not overthrown, as is rather commonly asserted, but instead resigned voluntarily, as he announced at the outset of the interpellation was his intention, regardless of the issue of the debate. In a long exposition, he justified the policy of the government on the basis of the threatened security of Algeria and pointed out that the government had gone ahead on the authority of the former Chamber.

Some of the most violent charges were made by Clémenceau and the Leftists on November 3; they maintained that economic imperialism had been the motive for French intervention. Clémenceau condemned the de Saucy affair, the Bône-Guelma railroad monopoly, as well as the part played by the Société Marseillaise in the Enfida affair. He claimed ministerial deception, as well, and that war had been waged without the authorization of Parliament. In fact he demanded a parliamentary inquiry, in order to determine the truth.

Ferry denied Clémenceau's charges. He maintained that Clémenceau had misread the despatches, and consequently mis-


judged the actions of the government. Ferry found the Société Marseillaise "honest and straightforward" rather than "rotten and troublesome;" the Bône-Guelma road had been a patriotic acquisition -- a "coup de fortune" rather than a "coup de bourse," for, "according to the hands into which it fell, it was essentially a line of penetration into our possessions or a line of defense." Ferry denied all charges of deception or that the government had ever acted in defense of private interests. He did admit, that, because of the interests of the French treasury, which paid the 6 per cent guarantee of the railroad company and would consequently lose if competing lines cut down the profit, the French government had done what it could to prevent competing lines from coming into the Regency. At the same time, however, he stressed that though private financial interests were laudable and served patriotic purposes, the intervention in Tunisia had not been taken to support them, but rather it had been undertaken in defense of Algerian security.

Then came the test of the ministry; it was a period of

36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 59; and 72-73.
near-chaos, in which Gambetta finally saved the day after a session which lasted until nearly half past eight in the evening, long past the usual hour of adjournment. During those hectic hours two demands for impeachment and three requests for a parliamentary inquest were made; about sixty orders of the day were presented by the highly agitated deputies. Finally Gambetta stepped to the tribune and, expressing his regret at the scene then being enacted, proposed the order of the day: "The Chamber, determined that the treaty endorsed by the French nation on May 12, 1881, shall be faithfully carried into effect, passes to the order of the day." In what must have been near exhaustion, the Chamber accepted this solution and passed it 379 to 71, with a considerable number abstaining.

The night of November 9, the same night he spoke in the Chamber, Gambetta wrote an interesting entry in his journal:

At last we have settled that interminable Tunisian affair. About nine o'clock all was over, thanks to a fit of indignation which drove me to the rostrum after eighteen successive resolutions had been mooted. I felt unable to endure that France should humble herself in the dust before the whole of Europe, and that is why I interfered. I made them ratify a policy in which the national honor was involved. But my intervention pledges me up to the hilt; I am now compelled to have an

---

40. Ibid., Vol. V, p. 96; Schuman, op. cit., p. 75.


interview with the President of the Republic; if he is willing to submit to the dictatorship, since dictatorship it is.

With the French acquisition of Tunisia secure, Jules Ferry on November 10 tendered the resignation of his ministry to the President, according to his announced intention at the beginning of the debate. And, as was to be expected, Gambetta was called upon to take over the power.

He was immediately faced with the problem of completing the Tunisian occupation; new credits had to be voted and the final flames of the insurrection had to be extinguished. On the eve of leaving his office, Ferry had requested 23,900,000 fr. additional credits. When the request for this sum was renewed by Allain-Targé, the new finance minister, Gambetta had to reply on December 1 to an interpellation on the policy of his ministry in respect to Tunisia. He was supported, however, in the Chamber on December 2, 1881, by a vote of 395 to 49, in response to his plea for the execution of a treaty which would permit "neither the annexation nor the abandonment of Tunisia." The Senate also complied unani-

43. Deschanel, op. cit., p. 296.

44. Journal Officiel, Nov. 15, 1881, p. 6315; Deschanel, loc. cit.


During the brief grand ministère Gambetta was able as well to bring to a conclusion the Roustan-Rochefort trial, in which Roustan had sued the editor for the attacks made on him in L'Intransigeant. Though the charges against Roustan were not sustained, Rochefort was acquitted on December 15, 1881, having pleaded "sincerity of conviction." Gambetta then, expressing, like Ferry, approval and support of Roustan, gave him orders to return to his post, as though nothing had happened. By the end of the year the insurrection was almost entirely suppressed; Ali-ben-Khalifa, the chief of the rebel leaders in the south, fled, and the resistance collapsed of its own weight.

The Tunisia with which Gambetta and his successor, de Freycinet, were faced was certainly neither a happy nor a progressive country. Once the insurrection was broken the mass of the people accepted the new regime with "bovine placidity." The nature and the character of the Tunisians...


48. It lasted only from Nov. 14, 1881, until Jan. 27, 1882, when Gambetta was replaced by de Freycinet.


52. N. D. Harris, loc. cit.
doubtless is the explanation. Amos Perry, the American consul in Tunis whose work has been previously cited, gives an interesting analysis of the population as he knew it; granted the analysis to be true, explanation is found for the ready acceptance of French domination:

The inhabitants are indolent and apathetic, benumbing their intellect and blinding their vision by laziness and inactivity, and allowing themselves to be overpowered and enervated more and more without any effort to withstand or counteract the enfeebling influence of the climate. . . . They are ignorant and superstitious fatalists . . . . they have acquired a kind of stupid resignation, submitting themselves to the will of God and the powers that be without thinking that neither the powers that be nor God himself could, humanly speaking, make them prosperous and happy without their own cooperation. 53

The native government was exceedingly corrupt and inefficient, as has been previously pointed out. Paul Cambon, who served as Minister-Resident and Resident-General from 1832 to 1836, described Tunisia as an "administrative marsh." From the Bey to the humblest official, money was the principal instrument of government; offices were sold regularly to the highest bidder. Though the International


54. The Times (London), Nov. 17, 1886. Cambon further recalled that the Tunisian government had been defined as "a despotism tempered by insurrection." Girault, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 75, and Robert Scémama, op. cit., p. 40 fn.

Financial Commission had maintained the service of the foreign debt, little had been done to correct internal abuses arising from the irrational system of taxation and the unbusinesslike methods of expenditure.

Inefficiency was everywhere present. The army after long neglect was so weak and disorganized that it was unfit either to maintain order within the country, or to protect it against raiders from the desert. Legal matters fared no better. The administration of justice was typical of that to be found in most independent Mohammedan countries. Two courts existed, the Chaâra, the religious tribunal, which dealt with matters of personal status, such as marriage, on the basis of Koranic prescriptions, and the ouzara touching all matters, civil and penal not provided for by the Koran. It was more like a bureau of a ministry than a court. To one accustomed to the practices of western Europe or America the operation of a Mohammedan system of justice is likely to appear barbarous, but to the Mohammedans

56. Idem.


58. The Jews of Tunisia were subject in matters touching their personal status to Rabbinical courts, but in all other affairs they, like the Mohammedans, were under the jurisdiction of the ouzara. Girault, op. cit. (Paris, 1923), Vol. V, p. 129.

of Tunisia it was the only possible system. Its great faults lay 1) in the ignorance of the administrators, 2) in their extreme corruptibility, 3) in the fact that, aside from the rules of the Koran, the laws had not been codified, and 4) in a cumbersome confusion of administrative and judicial powers which made it impossible to dispose of legal business promptly. Certain of these deficiencies have become apparent in our consideration of the de Sancy and Lévy affairs.

The literacy level of the country was low as well. With the exception of Sadiki College, modern education did not exist under the Regency. However, every mosque had its school in which little boys learned to recite the Koran mechanically. Higher schools, and a few universities existed, notably at Kairouan, but in all of them the Koran was the basis of instruction. Whatever value such training may have had, it was obviously not designed to fit the Tunisian population to deal with the problems of modern life according to the standards of the western Europeans.

Lack of education was largely to blame for the physical condition of the country as well. The frequency of epidemics has been referred to, and that much of such a condition was


due to filth has been pointed out. The cities were unbelievably dirty. The main streets occasionally were cleaned when the bay or a high official were to pass that way, but refuse and excrement of all kinds ordinarily were simply thrown into the narrow side streets to accumulate for years. That the health conditions were not worse is remarkable.

Life in the rural areas was no better, due largely to the steady decline of agriculture. Great areas that had once been fertile were now waste. Even in the best agricultural areas, the natives lived only in rude huts of branches or in tents. Their method of farming was to scratch the ground with a primitive plow after the first rains of autumn, sow their crop, and then pay no more attention to it until the following June when they returned to the harvest. They knew nothing of the use of fertilizer while irrigation, which had been highly developed under the Romans, was practically forgotten.

Moreover large areas of agricultural property in Tunisia were in the form of habous, a kind of mortmain, or "endowment for some pious purpose with the proviso that the descendants of the giver should enjoy large property rights therein

62. Ibid., pp. 10-12.
63. de Lanessan, op. cit., p. 43.
forever." Because this particular form of land holding
is to be referred to frequently later on, explanation of
its somewhat complicated character is justified at this
point.

Habous literally translated means "sequestered," and
its application has the French sense of "inalienable,"
"sacred," or "taboo." Thus protected by religion, the
habou land was in less danger of confiscation by the greedy
government; in fact, such a grant was the only safe means
of providing for posterity, but it had this disadvantage,
that as the number of descendents increased, the size of
the individual holdings decreased until a point was reached
where no one held enough land to make it worth while to
cultivate. "Thus many of the lands were allowed to lie idle
because they had too many claimants." Hence it is not sur-
prising that famine was a frequent visitor to Tunis. Before
the coming of the French, famine meant inevitable death by
starvation to a certain portion of the population. When
there were many heirs to habous the common interest, however,

64. Rodd Balek, "La Tunisie après la guerre,"
L'Afrique française, Dec. 1928, p. 228; Herbert Vivian,
Tunisia and the Modern Barbary Pirates (N. Y., 1899), p. 265;
for a discussion of the historical origins, religious signi-
ficance, etc. of habous see Raoul Darmon, La situation des

65. Eugène Jung, Les réformes en Tunisie (Paris, 1926),
p. 56.

66. Rodd-Balek, loc. cit.
was supposed to be handled by a makaddem, or administrator, among them. Nevertheless that did not make the properties any more productive, nor did it improve the state of the individual land holder of miniscule habous.

The fact that the habous were inalienable served to remove them from "the supposed rapacity of the Bey who would draw back from committing a sacrilege," but at the same time they caused such great inconvenience that the beys were forced to decree that habous might be exchanged for other land or might even be let for long leases, so long as there was no actual sale. The leases, or enzels, were the "detours by which habous could be used for commercial purposes." By the terms of the enzel the owner

... of them is held to pay every year a sum of money to the owner of the habou. He is not a tenant, for his title is perpetual; he is not an owner, for the habous are inalienable. 71

Because of this particular system of land holding, as well as because of unscientific methods of cultivation and the natural indolence of the population, poverty was the usual lot of the indigene. And by the same token Tunisia

---

67. Jung, op. cit., p. 57; in 1974 Khéreddine had instituted the body variously called the Djemaia or Administration des Cultes. Darmon, op. cit., p. 70.

68. Jung, loc. cit.


70. Darmon, op. cit., p. 73.

produced only a fraction of its potential yield.

Last but not least at the time of the occupation was the problem of transportation. The only rail lines in the Regency were from La Goulette to Tunis, and from Tunis to Chardimaou, a total of less than 200 kilometers. 72 "As for carriage roads there was not even one." 73 More or less regular paths were made by travellers between the principal centers of population, and shifting as the need developed. During the summer months these routes were distinguishable, but in the winter they were lost in a sea of mud. For that matter during the rainy months circulation of traffic frequently was interrupted by streams, rivers, etc., for at the time of the occupation "in all Tunisia there were not more than a dozen bridges." 74 In the same fashion there was an equal lack of adequate harbor facilities. The naturally good ports along the eastern coast had been allowed to fill up with sand and silt until they were practically unfit for use.

Therefore, in an age in which the European powers were, martyr-like "assuming the white man's burden" France saw, in Tunisia's backwardness another excuse for her assumption of

73. de Lanesan, op. cit., p. 240.
74. Idem.
75. Ibid., pp. 242-43.
power there. Saint-Hilaire piously stated this thesis in his circular of May 9, 1831, when he wrote of the desire of the French government to do good for the natives of Tunisia in the interest of all the world; "it is a sacred duty which a superior civilization owes to less advanced peoples." That rationalization has been further elaborated by Lewis Aguesse in his doctoral thesis on nationality problems arising under the protectorate. He boldly asserted that in the nineteenth century when she acted in North Africa, France

... was the only European power capable of a powerful current of organization and civilization, and who possessed in the eyes of the indigenes the prestige of a great past, a civilization at the same time Mediterranean and Nordic, and traditions of justice and tolerance. ... . In 1837 [at the time France acted in Algeria] Italy was only a geographical expression. ... . In 1881 she was busy completing her unification; she had neither the capital nor the authority necessary to establish in Tunisia a fruitful peace. 77

The delicate task of establishing a civil government which would be capable of dealing with the social needs of the country, arising on one hand out of the presence of a Mohammedan population naturally enough not over friendly to the newcomers and wedded to the ancient forms of government, and on the other hand to the anticipated influx of French colonists was no small undertaking. It was necessary further

76. Saint-Hilaire to the diplomatic agents of the French Republic, May 9, 1881, DDT, p. xxiv.

that the projected government should be the effective instrument for the loudly proclaimed development of the country; and lastly French interests and prestige should be made predominant by it.

"In the beginning, the existence of several treaties which limited the sovereignty of the beylical government threatened to make the French position an inferior one." 78

By the terms of the Treaty of Bardo, the Bey gave consent to whatever steps the French military authorities might take to occupy the positions they considered necessary to the re-establishment of order along the frontier and littoral. In return the French government agreed to give him constant support against all danger which might menace his person or dynasty, and guaranteed the execution of the existing treaties between the government of the Regency and the various foreign governments. France inherited, therefore, and was bound to respect the treaties which had been negotiated previously. The ancient Capitulations -- the heritage from the Ottoman Empire -- were eliminated in time by negotiations with the European powers. But as might be expected, the treaty agreements destined to cause the greatest grief to France were those with Italy. By the very favorable terms of the 1368 treaty between Italy and Tunisia, which Pinna had negotiated, 79

78. Priestley, op. cit., p. 171.
79. Vide infra, appendix E.
and by virtue of the "most favored nation" clause which was
therein contained, Italy continued to claim in Tunisia pri-

80

vileges equal to those of France.

Relations between France and Italy, strained by the Treaty
of Bardo, had become much more tense in the month following
as a result of the "Marseilles incident." On June 17, 1881,
when the troops were being brought back to France and one of
the first contingents was being paraded triumphantly through
the streets of Marseilles, hisses were heard among the ap-

81

plause; "these were unjustly attributed to Italian workers."
Whether correctly or incorrectly, it was immediately con-
clued that the Italians were responsible, and bloody riots
broke out as a consequence. "For three days not an Italian's
life was safe in Marseilles," Broadley wrote critically.
Demonstrations followed in a number of Italian cities in
protest.

The press of both countries became greatly excited over
the rioting in which both French and Italians were killed.
Garibaldi thundered forth again that "the love and veneration


81. Curátulo, Francia e Italia, p. 123.

82. Broadley, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 353; Broadley fur-
ther asserted that the Italian hisses were "as imaginary as
the Khamir raids."

83. Despagnet, op. cit., p. 237; Curátulo, op. cit.,
p. 128; d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 195.
which we had for France has turned into scorn." There
were even interpellations in the Italian Chamber, from
Massari, Billia, and Nicotera. Though the governments of
the two countries sought to calm the wrath of the press,
their efforts were without much effect, and although friendly
relations were officially maintained, the ambassadors in
Paris and Rome were replaced by chargés d'affaires, "a sign
of diplomatic coldness." Nevertheless a new treaty of com-
merce and navigation was signed between the two countries on
November 3, 1881, indicating that the official attitude was
not so concerned by the incident as was popular opinion.

The "Marseilles incident" only strengthened the Italian
conviction that a new foreign policy should be initiated,
one which would lead to an improved international position.
Feeling that she had been duped by France and that her faith
in Great Britain had been woefully misplaced, Italy turned
then naturally to Germany and Austria. But as Bismarck had

34. Curàtulo, Francia e Italia, p. 123.
IV, June 20, 21, 25, 1881, pp. 6316-17, 6346-50, 6558-61.
37. Curàtulo, Francia e Italia, p. 129.
38. Camera dei Deputati, 1880-82, Raccolta degli atti
Vol. VIII, p. 525, gives the text.
repeatedly told Saint-Vallier, ever since Crispi's mission in 1877 he had lost faith in the Italians. When Italy turned to Germany after the Tunisian occupation "and made fresh approaches for an alliance, she was met with the frank answer that the way to Berlin lay through Vienna." Bismarck still had little faith in the reliability either of Italy or of Italian ministries.

As a result of Bismarck's advice, King Humbert, at the end of October 1881, made a visit to Austria, even though the visit to Victor Emmanuel II in 1873 had never been officially returned by Franz Joseph "on account of his relations with the papacy." Though political discussions were avoided during the four-day visit of the King, who was accompanied by Depretis and Mancini, the Premier and Minister of the Foreign Affairs, respectively, a favorable atmosphere for later discussions was created.

The advent to power of Gambetta in November caused an increase of uneasiness in Italy, for he was looked upon


"as the embodiment of French nationalism and republicanism."

In December 1881 formal negotiations were opened in Berlin and Vienna by the Italian ambassadors, de Launay and Robilant. From a decidedly lukewarm attitude at first Bismarck came by May 1882 to the point where he pressed to have the negotiations concluded, saying that, "in an alliance with Italy the form of the agreement was of relatively little importance. The main thing was to have the agreement and to secure Italian neutrality."

At last on May 20, 1882, the treaty known as the Triple Alliance was signed. "The purposes were explicitly defensive in every respect. It was intended to secure the allied sovereigns and their states against any disturbance of the peace from without or within." Italy had hoped to secure 1) a guarantee of her territorial integrity and 2) support for her position and ambitions in the Mediterranean. The former was achieved only with limitations, and the second not at all. But Italy did gain much by the alliance, in spite of the criticism of its opponents.

94. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. 231.
96. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. 244.
Italy must have realized with considerable complacency that she, the state which had been humiliated at the Congress of Berlin, treated with scorn and contempt as the least of the nations of Europe, now freed from her perilous isolation, was taking her stand as a great power, with equal rights beside the two Central Powers. Italy's greatest political advantage, however, lay in the fact that she was guaranteed against any attack by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and had won the additional assurance of being supported by the full strength of her allies in case she were attacked by France, the only country whose menace was immediate. 99

Though "several months elapsed before the rumors as to the existence of the agreement were fully confirmed and it was officially admitted to the world," the feeling of tenseness heightened between France and Italy during the period in which the negotiations were in progress. In Tunis Roustan found that this made his somewhat awkward position even less comfortable than it had been in the interim following the Treaty of Bardo.

The Roustan-Macciò duel was, of course, known to everyone. By Tunisian Italians, the former consul-general who had been made Minister-Resident at the outset of the protectorate, was held largely responsible for the French occupation of the

99. Pribram, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 40; Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, p. 246; contends that danger of attack from France was nil, citing the signing of a new commercial treaty between France and Italy only five days before the conclusion of the Triple Alliance as the reason for his conclusion.

100. Coolidge, op. cit., p. 213; Langer, loc. cit., points out that its actual terms were not known until after the World War.
country. His position was also complicated by the attitude of the Tunisians themselves, as might be expected. There was considerable feeling among them that he was a kind of traitor to the Bey; furthermore both Ferry and Gambetta, who had staunchly supported him, were out of office, and his prestige as a consequence suffered markedly. Therefore, when de Freycinet came into power in January 1882 one of his first moves was to send Roustan on February 18, 1882, as Minister Plenipotentiary to Washington, D. C., and to replace him in Tunis with Paul Cambon, a man who had never been in Africa, who was considered somewhat young for his task, but who had made a good reputation as an administrator while serving as prefect in the department of the North.

After studying the situation for about a month, Cambon returned to Paris in May 1882, to secure approval of his plan for the administration of Tunisia, which was given by both houses on July 17. He proposed first of all to free Tunisia from foreign pressures, especially those exerted by the Capitulations and the financial commission; he planned the institution of a French civil court and six justices of

103. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 320; Pellegrin, op. cit., pp. 174-75.
the peace, the creation of six mixed bodies, composed of Europeans and indigenes, and the construction of a French school in Tunis.

The death of Mohammed-es-Saddok on October 27, 1832, was of considerable help to Cambon. According to the Sunnite law, the Tunisian crown passed from eldest to eldest, from brother to brother for instance, rather than from father to son; the heir presumptive bears the title of Bey de Camp and acts as commander-in-chief of the army of the Regency. Ali Bey, the second brother of Mohammed-es-Saddok and Bey de Camp, therefore, succeeded to the throne. And by contrast with Mohammed-es-Saddok and Mohammed Khasnadar both Ali and his Prime Minister, Asiz-ben-Atour, proved themselves willing collaborators in Cambon's plan of reorganization.


106. The Sunna is a kind of summary of the acts of the Prophet Mohammed, which serves as a corollary to the Koran, and covers cases which were not covered by the prophetic revelation. Henri Massé, L'Isam (Paris, 1930), p. 86.

107. Galignani's Messenger, Apr. 25-26, 1881. Muhammed Taib, the third brother, was the one whom Roustan had persuaded to take the throne should Mohammed-es-Saddok refuse to sign the treaty offered him on May 12, 1881. Taib appears to have been a morphine addict and a somewhat vicious person. He and Mustapha-ben-Imail, the former Tunisian minister, whom the French government had forced Mohammed-es-Saddok to renounce, despite his tears of protest, were in Paris together in 1882, Taib taking a narcotic cure and Mustapha-ben-Imail with his current favorite, a cabaret girl, "with whom he lived riotously and disgracefully." Gandolphe, op. cit., p. 86, L'Année politique, 1881, pp. 241-42.

108. Gandolphe, op. cit., p. 85; Pellegrin, loc. cit.; Mohammed-Khasnadar who had succeeded Mustapha-ben-Imail as
That something stronger than the Treaty of Bardo was necessary, were France really to become secure in her new position, was well recognized in administrative circles. Before such a document could be drawn up, however, the French ministry changed once more, and on February 21, 1883, Jules Ferry again became premier. The policy advocated by Cambon, which had already secured parliamentary support, immediately went into effect and the situations especially troublesome to France were altered.

On March 27, 1883, French courts were established in Tunisia. On May 5, 1883, the beylical decree was issued providing that the nationals of the powers whose consular courts were thus suppressed could be tried in the French courts under the same terms as the French themselves. Then on June 3, 1883 was signed the convention known as the

Prime Minister was "one of the leaders of the Old Muslim party, sometimes secretly, sometimes openly, hostile to western influence." L'Année politique, 1881, pp. 241-42.

109. The usually accurate Priestley, whose France Overseas is an authoritative work on French colonial expansion, confused his dates in this respect. De Freycinet served as premier from Jan. 30 to Aug. 7, 1882, Duclère Aug. 7, 1882 to Jan. 29, 1883, Fallières Jan. 29, 1883 to Feb. 21, 1883, and Jules Ferry Feb. 21, 1883 to Apr. 6, 1885. Schuman, op. cit., p. 428. Priestley, op. cit., p. 171, writes: "Then Ferry 'came back' in 1882 and reaffirmed his intention of reforming the Regency government by sending out Paul Cambon as Minister Plenipotentiary." Actually Cambon had been at his post for a year when Ferry formed his new ministry.


111. Ibid., Vol. XV, pp. 698-99.
Treaty of Marsa, in which the word protectorate was officially applied to Tunisia for the first time:

In order to facilitate the French government in carrying out its protectorate His Highness the Bey of Tunisia, agrees to originate whatever administrative, judicial, and financial reforms the French government shall deem necessary. 112

In addition to recognizing the existence of a protectorate and agreeing to whatever reforms the French considered expedient, the terms of the treaty of Marsa granted to the French government the entire financial control of the Tunisian government. The International Financial Commission, which had limited Cambon's freedom of action then could come to an end also on October 2, 1884, as a result of the specific financial guarantees of the convention. With a system of French courts established, Cambon had accomplished his major purpose.

Great Britain fell into line and on December 21, 1883, yielding the privileges and prerogatives guaranteed by the general convention of 1875, abolished British consular jurisdiction in all such cases as came within the province of the French courts. Italy continued to refuse to


recognize the French protectorate, and finally after long conferences, agreed on January 25, 1894, not to suppress but merely to suspend consular jurisdiction; all other immunities and prerogatives were to remain intact. And Italy was to continue to maintain this position for more than a decade.

Nevertheless, though she was not content with such a compromise with Italy, enough of France's problems were ironed out by the early part of 1894 that without further loss of time she could give considerable attention to the actual organization of the protectorate.

CHAPTER XIII

REORGANIZATION AND REFORM

UNDER THE PROTECTORATE

The government of Tunisia under the protectorate, to the eye of the casual observer, was very little different from that which had existed under the Regency, which, while exceedingly corrupt and inefficient, was nominally obeyed throughout the realms of the Bey. It was this rather feeble native structure which the French used as the basis of their new edifice. As Ferry pointed out, the use of the native official personnel "would not cost the French treasury one sou."

The establishment of the protectorate in Tunisia presupposed the existence of Tunisia as an independent state and presupposed as well that the power of the Bey was absolute. The Bey, therefore acting as an autocrat, by the treaty of the Bardo and the convention of Marsa, transferred to the French government the complete authority which it afterwards exercised. In name, the Bey continued to remain an autocrat; his decrees were law; they were made effective

1. Priestley, op. cit., p. 171.
3. "Beylical decrees are actual law; they must not then be considered merely as executive acts." Ibid., Vol. I, p. 173 fn. 1.
through his ancient organization of caïds, khalifas, and sheiks. In actual practice the concealed government of France was the power. True that the decrees of the Bey were law, but he issued only those decrees which it pleased the French to have him issue. He became, therefore, little more than a marionette.

In order that the duality of government under the Tunisian protectorate may be understood, it would seem necessary to 1) consider the general nature of the protectorate, and 2) to present a somewhat brief analysis of both the old and the new political institutions in the country.

The practice of the protectorate was not a new one when it was introduced in Tunisia by the French. For example, it was used by the Romans in North Africa, and it was also the tool of Dupleix in India. It was a convenient device, actually, by which most of the advantages of a direct annexation were achieved, at the same time that the worst of the disadvantages were avoided.

Frantz Despagnet, in his *Essai sur les protectorats*, defined a protectorate as follows:

The protectorate is the contractual bond established between two states, by virtue of which the one, while preserving its existence as a sovereign power grants to the other the exercise

---

of certain of its rights of internal sovereignty or of external independence, upon condition that the other will defend it against the internal or external attacks to which it may be subject, and to assist it in the development of its institutions and the safeguarding of its interests.

On the basis of that definition and its implications, Fitoussi and Bénazet, who are the foremost authorities on the nature of the Tunisian state, have formulated the following propositions:

1. The protected state does not disappear from the community of nations; it preserves its legal personality, in spite of the powers assigned to the protecting state.

2. The territory of the protected state is not lost in that of the protecting state. Two sovereignties are exercised in the area included in the treaty of protectorate: that of the protected state and that of the protecting state.

3. The subjects of the protected state retain their own nationality.

Though generalizations may be made concerning protectorates, each one becomes a law unto itself, dependent on the degree of assumption of power by the protecting state and the degree to which native institutions are altered and


The development of the new institutions of this dual government, as it appeared in Tunisia, become increasingly significant, therefore, as we note their origins.

At the time of the intervention, the Bey exercised personally both legislative and judicial powers; he was limited only by the International Financial Commission as to fiscal matters, and by the Capitulations and the Koran as to certain aspects of legal matters. Executive power was exercised with the aid of his ministers, a body called the Ouzara El-Koubra. This body varied in size and in the distribution of its administrative responsibilities, according to the wishes of individual beys and their prime ministers. In general, however, the Ouzara consisted of four posts. First in rank was Prime Minister, who also held portfolios corresponding to Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Finance; the Minister of the Pen was concerned with the ministry of State, under the direction of the Prime Minister; and then came the Ministers of War and Marine, whose uniforms and titles ordinarily were more decorative than their services were useful.


With the advent of the protectorate the real head of the Tunisian government became the Minister-Resident, who by article 5 of the treaty of May 12, 1881, was charged with carrying out the terms of the treaty and who became the intermediary in the relations of France with the Tunisian authorities in all matters common to the two states. His powers were quickly extended and defined. The beylical decree of June 9, 1881, invested him with the functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Tunisian government and made him the official intermediary in the relations of the Bey with other states. A presidential decree of April 22, 1882, specified distinctly the powers of the Minister-Resident and his relations to the French government, while that of June 22, 1885, changed his title to Resident-General, and charged him with presiding over the Tunisian Council of Ministers.

By virtue of these various acts, and one passed subsequently, his duties then were as follows:

1. As Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Bey he is the intermediary between the French and Tunisian

10. Vide infra appendix E.

11. Fitoussi et Bénazet, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 172 and xlvi, doc. no. 3; vide infra appendix G, for a copy of this decree.


governments and controls the relations of the
Regency with other states.

2. He presides over the Council of Ministers
and chiefs of departments.

3. He has under his orders the commanders of
the army and navy.

4. He is the intermediary through which de-
partments placed under the direct action of the
French government communicate with their respective
ministers.

5. He promulgates and sees to the execution
of Tunisian law (beylical decrees).

6. He presides over the Grand Council and
presents to this body the annual budget.

7. Through him only may demands be made on
the Bey for reform.

8. In matters concerning the French colony he
issues, on his own account, decrees, known as arrêtés,
which have the force of law.

14. The decrees of March 12 and Dec. 19, 1883, gave
Tunisia an annual published budget. L.-G. Guénée, Les finances
tunisiennes (Algiers, 1932), p. 4. The franc replaced the
piastre as the monetary unit in 1891. Public accounting of
the expenditures proposed and actual was not instituted until


cording to a decree of Jan. 27, 1893, all decrees, after
being approved by the Resident General must be published in
both French and Arabic editions of the Journal Officiel
The Resident-General was originally assisted by an official of the French ministry of Foreign Affairs, who bore the title Secretary-General (Délégué à la Résidence-Générale). He was charged with supervision of the various administrative services and of the department of Civil Control. He occupied the same position in relation to the Tunisian Prime Minister that the Resident-General bore to the Bey. In the absence of the Resident-General he presided over the Council of Ministers and acted for him in the conduct of current business. This office was suppressed in 1922 and in its place were created the Director-General of the Interior and the Director of Justice.

One point must be noted at this time. The affairs of Tunisia, as it may thus be seen, are not administered through the French Colonial Office; but in accord with the quasi-international character of the relation between France and Tunisia, the ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as intermediary between the French government and the protected state. The foregoing observations have pertained to the highest administrative officers under both regimes, to the Bey and his

__________________________


ministers and to the officials of the Residency. Below them, however, is the structure of lesser administrative offices and officials, whose importance must not be overlooked.

The former beylical indigenous organization was based on tribes and parts of tribes, in recognition, not of territorial location, but of personal connection. Some tribes were widely dispersed, still others were nomadic, while again some tribesmen had gone to live in cities remote from their place of birth. As a general rule, however, in all these cases the members retained their original tribal connection. For example the tribe of Dride was attached to the Bey de Camp, but its members were scattered throughout the Regency; a special tribe, the Barania (foreigners) included all the Mohammedan non-Tunisians, Moroccan, Tripolitanian, Soudanese, etc. There were great differences in the sizes of the groups, as well; some had as many as 20,000 members and some no more than 2,000.

Each tribe had a caïd named by the Bey, while the sheikas were lesser officials who were chosen by their own people. To increase his power the Bey had set caïds over parts of tribes, thereby increasing the number of officials directly

---

responsible to him; at the time of the occupation there were over eighty caïdats. The caïdats were chosen usually from the most influential families in the various administrative districts into which Tunisia was divided. They possessed administrative and judicial authority. The khālifas were the assistants of the caïdats, and their authority overlapped to a certain extent that of the sheikhs, who were petty administrators, with duties including those of directing the local native police forces (spahis), and collecting taxes.

At the outset of the protectorate this organization was maintained intact, so that there might be no abrupt change in the time-honored method to create disturbances among the indigenes. It was checked, however, by officers of the army of occupation whose task of carrying out the orders of the French government and at the same time remaining on friendly terms with the Tunisians was a delicate one. Then by a presidential decree of October 4, 1884, a body of French civil superintendents (contrôleurs civils) was set over the native administrative machinery.

These men had the double task of serving as the eyes and ears of the Resident-General, keeping him informed at all

times of conditions in the districts to which they were assigned, and of advising the native leaders, the caïds, khalifas, and sheikhs. They kept themselves strictly in the background, never directly interfering in the management of affairs, for to have done so would have disturbed the delicate balance in respect to the native organization which France sincerely endeavored to maintain. Nevertheless their authority in their limited sphere was as genuine as that of the Resident-General over the Bey. But so tactfully did they use it that friction, such as occurred between the French and native authorities in Algeria, did not appear in Tunisia.

Gradually the form of the protectorate and the general functions of its officials underwent changes. For example veritable ministries, under the name of Directions (Offices) were added to the existing structure:

1. Office of Public Works, 1882
2. Office of Finance, 1882
3. Office of Education, 1893
4. Office of Agriculture and Commerce, 1890


27. Picquet, La colonisation française, p. 334.
In 1885 was created the Chamber of Commerce, a representative body based on the theory of economic rather than political representation. Its origin lay in the Assemblée du Corps de la Nation, the organ since 1577 of the French merchants resident in Tunis, and which had continued as an elective body in the first year of the protectorate. In 1892 the new Chamber of Commerce was divided into two sections, North and South, and a Chamber of Agriculture was added. By 1902 there were five of these chambers in all. Their members were required to be at least thirty years of age, and they were elected for a six year term by French men and women at least twenty-five years old, who were actually interested in agriculture, industry, or commerce in Tunisia. The women could elect but were not eligible for office.

So far then the Chambers of Commerce were instruments by which the French citizens might make their influence felt in certain public affairs. The indigenes, however, were barred from participation. As a result of increasing pressure from the native groups, similar chambers of Commerce and Agriculture were organized in 1920 for the indigenes, with members appointed by the Resident-General from lists presented to him by the notables among the natives in each

Coincident with the development of a native party in 1912 came the cry for increased indigenous representation elsewhere, as well as for reform in government. Though the development of the native story and that of reform in government are closely linked, it has seemed more nearly to conform to a clear pattern of organization to handle the two movements separately, even at the loss of chronological sequence. Therefore, the changes in the structure of the government of the protectorate will be developed without reference to the causes for the reform. The indigenous movement will then be presented in a fashion as nearly parallel as possible in a following chapter.

The development of the Conférence-Consultative was probably the most important step towards achieving for the autochthones the two goals of representation and reform, although there was no such idea in mind when it made its first appearance. It was destined to become the most powerful instrument of the French colonists, and later, to a more limited degree, of the Tunisians in making their will effective in the direction of public affairs. Though related to such institutions as the Chambers of Commerce, it developed from a different stem.

As early as 1890 Massicault, the Resident-General, was
accustomed to call upon the leaders of the French colony for advice on certain matters of state. At first these gatherings were informal. By successive arrêts dated February 22 and 23, 1896, however, the Conférence Consultative took form. At first the heads of the French service of the Tunisian government, the members of the bureaus of the Chambers of Commerce and of Agriculture were members; it was representative, thus, only of French interests, and was consulted only when the Resident-General so wished. It was an advisory body exclusively, with no power of decision.

By the arrêté of January 2, 1905, it was reorganized on a more liberal basis, with the introduction of a system of direct election. It still had exclusively a French membership, which at this time was divided for purposes of election into three groups in each of the ten electoral districts: 1) representatives of the agricultural proprietors, 2) representatives of those engaged in commerce and industry, and 3) representatives of all those Frenchmen who were not included in the first two groups. The members were chosen from each group by an electorate composed of every French male in that group who was over twenty-one years of age, and

34. Idem.
who had lived in Tunisia for two years or more. The term of office was for six years, with the provision that a certain number were replaced every three years. Regular meetings were held twice a year, at which the Resident-General or his representative presided. The Conférence-Consultative remained an advisory body, although the Resident-General was inclined to adhere strictly to its recommendations.

Then on February 2, 1907, an indigenous section was added, composed of sixteen members, named by the Resident-General from the notables of the different regions; one member, it is interesting to note, was to be a Jew. At the same time that the membership was changed, the Conférence was given the right to consider and discuss the budget, although, because the body was still a consultative one, it did not have the right to vote on or reject undesirable features.

At first the French and native sections sat together, carrying on discussion each in its own tongue with the aid of interpreters. This Tower of Babel endured until 1910 when, by the decree of April 27, in the interests of efficiency, it was decided that the two sections should meet

37. Piquet, La Colonisation française, p. 343.
separately. In order to avoid a deadlock which might conceivably arise between the two sections, the Conseil supérieur du gouvernement was established at the same time, the principal function of which was to cast the deciding vote. Its membership consisted of ten high administrative officers, and three delegates elected from each of the two sections, either French or indigenous.

This arrangement continued until after the World War, when the Conférence-Consultative was abolished, and a new and more liberal organization took its place; this will be discussed in detail as a part of the reforms effected in 1922. It should be noted here, however, that the Conférence-Consultative touched the great mass of Tunisians scarcely at all, for the native members were appointed by the Resident-General and held office at his pleasure. But even so, it was a distinct step forward, both towards education in government for the Tunisian leaders, and towards the ideal, which certain far-sighted and sincere statesmen had projected, of Frenchmen and natives cooperating for the common good.

In 1922, under the residency of Lucien Saint, a general reform program was undertaken. By the decree of July 13, 1922, the Conférence-Consultative was abolished, as not being truly representative nor responsive to the needs of the country.

38. Ibid., Girault, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 50.

As a consequence there was a "complete revamping of the representative system." Three grades of assemblies were set up at this time: 1) the Grand Council (Grand Conseil), 2) 5 Regional Councils, and 3) 36 Councils of Caïdatas. With almost no change, the organization thus set up in 1922 is the same as that which prevails today.

In place of the Conférence-Consultative we find the Grand Conseil. It is composed of two sections, one French and the other autochthonous. The French section is composed of 52 members:

1. 22 representatives of the great economic interests: agriculture, industry, and commerce.
   Chamber of Agriculture of the North -- 6 representatives
   Chamber of Commerce of Bizerte ------- 2 representatives
   Chamber of Commerce of Tunis ------- 4 representatives
   Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture of the Center ------------------ 4 representatives
   Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture of the South ------------------ 4 representatives

22 total

---

2. 30 representatives of the French colony
Region of Bizerte -------------- 6 representatives
Region of Tunis -------------- 10 representatives
Region of Kef -------------- 4 representatives
Region of Sousse -------------- 5 representatives
Region of Sfax -------------- 5 representatives

30 total
The indigenous section, on the other hand, is composed of only 26 members. They are selected as follows:

1. 2 representatives from each of the 5 regions.
2. 3 representatives of the territories of the South, named by the Prime Minister with the approval of the Resident-General.
3. 4 representatives of the indigenous Chamber of Commerce of the North, of which 1 was to be chosen from among the members of the section of économie générale.
4. 4 representatives from the indigenous Chamber of Agriculture, of the North, of which 1 was to be chosen from the section of économie rurale.
5. 2 representatives from each of the mixed Chambers of the Center and South.
6. 1 representative of the Jewish community of Tunis.

26 total

Even with this wider representation the competence of the Council is limited, for it continues to remain an advisory body. Its particular function is to examine the budget. Though it cannot initiate legislation, it can express its wishes concerning modifications of economic or financial plans or of the items included in the budget; however, subjects for discussion first have to be examined and approved by the appropriate commission: e.g., public works, general administration, or finance. It can be asked to give its advice on questions submitted to it by the government. No loan can be contracted by the state without the favorable action of both sections. And lastly, members of the Grand Council have been granted the right to interpellate the government, provided that the questions pertain to the matters developing out of the deliberations of the Council and legally within its competence.

The Council meets in an annual session, for a period not to exceed twenty days. It can be called into extraordinary session by special decree.

The *Conseil supérieur du gouvernement* was replaced, by


the decree of November 28, 1922, with an arbitral commission designed to function much as its predecessor had. It was reorganized by the decree of March 23, 1928, which enlarged its membership. It serves also, in the interval between sessions, as the recipient of communications from the government to the Grand Council. It is composed of seven French and seven indigenous members who deliberate together under the presidency of the Resident-General.

Below this somewhat complicated structure are the other two sets of councils; they were instituted by the beylical decree of July 13, 1922, and reorganized by the decree of March 27, 1928. The Regional Councils were centered at the chief cities of the five regions: Bizerte, Tunis, Le Kef, Sousse, and Sfax; they do not concern the military territory of the south. Their competence is not great. Primarily they discuss and advise on the measures proposed by the Councils of the Caïdots, and consider as well the economic needs of the region; they may be asked to advise on questions concerning the region. Since the regions have no civil personality and their expenses are included in the Tunisian state budget, the councils are not concerned directly with a

45. Girault, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 64; Fitoussi et Bénazet, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 265. Because this volume of Girault was published in 1923 Fitoussi et Bénazet must be consulted for all developments after 1927.

tax problem. However, if they chose, they may add to re-
sources available for their regions, by suggesting additional
sources of revenue.

Meetings are held twice annually for a maximum period
for each session of six days; the dissolution of a session
may be pronounced by decree on the advice of the council of
ministers. The Regional Councils are composed of delegates
from three regular groups and two social groups:

Regular

1. representative from the Councils of the

Caidats.

2. representatives of both the French and indi-
genous municipal councils.

3. representatives from the chambers of commerce,
chambers of agriculture, and mixed chamber, and of
the chambers of mining interests.

Special

1. 1 of the vice-presidents of the municipality
of Tunis, named by the Prime Minister, and the vice-

president of the other chief cities of each of the
regions, who always were French.

2. the delegates to the Grand Council elected by
universal suffrage who are not already a part of the
regional councils.

In the following chart the entire membership is indicated.

---

48. Fitoussi et Bénazet, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 276,
279-81.
**Table #1**

Composition of Regional Councils

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Region Bizerte</th>
<th>2nd Region Tunis</th>
<th>3rd Region Le Kef</th>
<th>4th Region Sousse</th>
<th>5th Region Sfax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Indigènes</td>
<td>French Indigènes</td>
<td>French Indigènes</td>
<td>French Indigènes</td>
<td>French Indigènes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6**</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6**</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Counsils of Caïdats ...........

Municipalities ............... 

Chamber of Agriculture ...... 

Chamber of Commerce .......... 

Mixed Chamber ............... 

Chamber of Mining Interests.

Vice-presidents of the munici-
palities of the chief cities
of the regions.

**Total ***

* Of which 1 was to be a Jew

** 3 merchants and 3 interested in agriculture

*** Plus the members of the Grand Council who are not already members
of their own regional council; number varies.
Last and least of this hierarchy of councils are the
Councils of the Caïdats, which are essentially indigene in
composition. Like the regional councils they are not to be
found in military territory, and operate outside the communes.
They have as their function:

1. to discuss the economic needs of the caïdat,
and to assign them an order of urgency.

2. to give advice on all matters which the Prime
Minister may consider useful to submit to the Resident-
General.

3. to elect their representatives to the Regional
Councils.

The Council of the Caïdat is presided over by the caïd.
Its members are chosen from notables, thirty years of age or
over, in the sheikats; their names are presented to a com-
mmission composed of the civil controller, the caïd, and the
cadi (judge-priest of the Chaâra). In principle each sheikat
is represented by two delegates; but as the number of dele-
gates composing each council may not exceed fifty, a variant
enters in those caïdats composed of more than twenty-five
sheikats. The Resident-General also nominates one or two
Frenchmen who have lived in each caïdat for more than three
years to be members. They meet at least four times a year
in two-day sessions; but they submit their findings to the
civil controller, who makes any observations he deems
appropriate.

Excluded from all the other administrative divisions is the military zone in southern Tunisia, an area bounded on the west by the Chott-Djerid and Algeria, on the north by the civil controls of Bagès and Gafsa, on the south by the Sahara, and on the east by Libya. From the administrative point of view it includes the four caidats of Ourghamma, Matmata, Nefzaoua, and Ouderna. Its capital is Médenine, and it is governed by a service des affaires indigènes, consisting of twenty-three officers, and eight military interpreters, all of whom are paid out of the French budget. Their functions are especially important because of the proximity to the Italian interests in Libya.

There is considerable truth in the observation made by Priestley in respect to the system of councils thus established:

This elaborate reform of the councils was a serious attempt to associate French and native elements in a framework of self-government; at a distance it looks like a timorous plan for busy work; it was intended to provide an outlet for pseudo-political activity, but it has been so closely guarded at every step that it falls short of its own purpose. 51


51. Priestley, op. cit., p. 177.
In the same plan of reform in 1922 another change was made. By a decree of July 14, the office of the Secretary-General, as has already been indicated, was suppressed and replaced by those of Director-General of the Interior and Director-of-Justice. Each of these new officials was French.

So far we have considered the development of the legislative and administrative reorganization of the Regency under the protectorate. Two additional departments remain to be discussed in some detail: financial and judicial.

The same duality characterized the administration of justice as those other aspects of government already considered; however, in legal matters there was not as great a telescoping, as of necessity there was in governmental matters. There is a French justice and a Tunisian, quite as though there were two different countries. A number of interesting consequences evolve therefrom:

1. Judgments by Tunisian courts are executed by the local authorities if they concern Tunisian subjects, the French courts having no jurisdiction.

2. Judgments of Tunisian courts against Frenchmen, foreigners, or diplomatic protégés persons who enjoy protection by reason of a secular tradition or privileged position, such as a Tunisian policeman whose

duties concern Europeans as well as Tunisians are handled through demand for an *æquatur*, the same as any foreign judgment.

3. Judgments of foreign courts may be executed only through an *æquatur*.

4. Judgments of any French court -- of France, Algeria, etc. -- are executed by French courts, Tunisian courts having no right of intervention.

The first point of departure from the ancient legal system of the Regency, to which reference has already been made, was the suppression of the consular courts, and the replacement of them in 1833 with a court of first instance and six justices of the peace. The French system was then further developed and elaborated as follows: courts of first instance were established at Tunis and at Sousse, supplemented by fourteen justices of the peace, and a variable number of circuit judges (*juges forains*); appeals from their judgments had to be made to the court of appeal in Algiers, for Tunisia was not provided with a higher court.

These French courts were competent in all civil and commercial matters in which a European is involved; originally they were competent in cases involving mixed nationalities when the European was the defendant but not when he was the


plaintiff. In cases involving registered and unregistered real estate, there is some difference as to jurisdiction: 1) French tribunals are competent in all cases concerning registered real estate, even if the case involves only indigenes; 2) when an indigene is involved in a case concerning unregistered land, whether he be plaintiff or defendant, the Tunisian courts are competent.

Criminal cases are handled by the justices of the peace, the correctional courts in Tunis and Sousse, and two other special courts, composed of three judges from the courts of first instance, and six French or native assessors, drawn by lot annually from a prepared list. There are no juries and the nationality of the accused determines that of the assessor.

Native justice has always had two main divisions: 1) secular and 2) religious; these have been guarded under the protectorate. As has been pointed out secular justice before the protectorate was exercised by the courts of the

55. Registered real estate must be verified and a copy of the agreement or bill of sale remains in the hands of the land commission, Giuseppe Morpurgo, Italia, Francia, Tunisia, la condizione giuridica degli italiani in Tunisia (Livorno, 1938), p. 19.


57. Not. gén., 1921, p. 82.
ouzara in Tunis, and by the caids elsewhere; the religious justice was headed by the grand court of the chafra in Tunis and was exercised in other districts by the cadis. It was anything but a satisfactory system for various reasons: 1) litigants were granted few guarantees, 2) there was little codification of customs and laws dealing either with civil or criminal cases, 3) the judges were usually ignorant and frequently corrupt.

Pursuant with their course of disturbing established institutions as little as possible, the French endeavored to improve the judicial situation, while still not instituting radical changes. The ouzara was placed under a French jurisconsult; then a civil code was put into effect in 1907 and supplemented in 1910; a penal code was instituted in 1914. The entire system was reorganized in 1921 and 1922 when the ministry of Tunisian justice was created and the

58. The word ouzara is used to refer both to the group which constituted the cabinet, and to the courts. Since before the protectorate the Minister of the Pen was concerned with matters of State, his functions extending to those of justice, and since the Bey was directly concerned, likewise, with legal matters, the double use of the term seems to have developed. None of the authorities seem to be able to determine exactly why this synonymy developed, however.


60. Priestley, op. cit., p. 178.

Director of Justice instituted. Hearings of cases are now public, judgments are discussed before being handed down, and are accompanied by comment on their legal bearing.

There is still a further ramification to the matter of religious cases, that which concerns the native Jewish Tunisian. Cases having to do with the personal status or matters of inheritance of Israelites are within the competence of the rabbinical courts. The hearings are also public; judges are Hebrew, and judgments are rendered in Hebrew, but their execution is entrusted to the administrative authorities.

The problem of nationality, its relation to the matter of legal jurisdiction, and the complicated juridical problems which it invokes are not being discussed at this point. Because the problem of nationality is so much involved in diplomatic negotiations between France and Italy, it will be considered in that connection in a later chapter.

The question of financial reform in Tunisia was one of the greatest of French problems after the establishment of the protectorate, and certainly one of the most immediate. From the Residency comes this explanation of the French attitude:

The financial organization of Tunisia... stems from this primary idea that Tunisia, who has

maintained the right to govern herself under the tutelage and control of France, has also conserved her financial autonomy. Without doubt, France who guaranteed a part of the Tunisian debt in the convention of Marsa is as a consequence interested that good use shall be made of the beylical finances. . . . But this right of control has not taken away from the Regency its financial autonomy. Tunisia is mistress of her resources; she is the sole owner of them, and she alone enjoys them. 64

With the guarantee of the Tunisian debt and the suppression of the International Financial Commission, resulting thereby in the removal of British and Italian intervention in the financial affairs of the Regency, France established the Direction générale des finances. The French Director-General is theoretically named by beylical decree, becoming thereby the veritable Minister of Finance of the Regency. Actually, of course, the beylical nomination is only the seconding of the French choice.

The financial system was reorganized on a budget basis, the operation of which has been improved by various innovations since its institution in 1883. The French colonists who at first had been exempt from taxation were put on a footing of financial equality with all other inhabitants of the Regency. Certain of the taxes under the old regime were done away with or made more equitable. For example, the much-hated medjba, which was a special tax applicable only to

Tunisians, was replaced in 1913 by the istitan, a head tax, applying to all males, regardless of nationality, over twenty years of age, who had been resident in the Regency for more than ninety days.

Likewise the old direct taxes, the ashour, tax on cereals, kanoun, tax on the olive industry, mradijas, tax on orchards and irrigated lands, save those of Djerba, khodor, special tax on the cultivated land on the island of Djerba, though retained as a part of the non-disturbance plan of France, were supervised carefully with special care given to honesty in assessment and collection. Other new direct taxes were added: in 1913 a tax was levied on cattle, to replace the old sakkat, which had occasionally been levied; in 1919 a tax on the vines was instituted, and in 1927 a tax on the rentable value and on the rentals of urban and suburban estates; there were others as well, less important, and reaching a smaller percentage of the population. Certain of the old indirect taxes such as customs, the mahulsat, or duties on the manufacture and sale of various products, etc., were retained under French supervision, while new ones, such as stamp and registration duties, were added in order to increase the revenues.

These measures, because of their wider spread, resulted

67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
not only in a considerable lowering of the tax burden to which the natives had been subjected, but also in an income adequate to meet the needs of the government and to assure the service of the public debt. As early as 1896 Tunisia, consequently, was the only French dependency that was self-supporting.

Priestley makes the following comment on the Tunisian financial situation:

Tunisia has paid its own way without recourse to help from France. But the 'balanced budget' is fictitious, a very considerable expense of the protectorate being borne by the French taxpayers. Until 1921, the guarantee of the interest on the Béne-Guelma railway system was a French liability, though borne by Tunisia after 1903; a regularly decreasing subvention was to have continued until 1957, but in 1923 France shifted it to the protectorate. The military occupation expense is joined with that of Algeria; until 1906 this item included cost of operation of the southern military territory which is not borne by the protectorate government. 70

It probably is wise, furthermore, to point out that Tunisia has been seriously involved in the world financial depression. The problems which have developed out of that situation, however, have not affected the structure of government, but belong rather to the indigenous and diplomatic developments, and therefore are being reserved for later discussion.

In addition to the administrative, financial, and judicial

69. The Times (London), May 21, 1896, speech of René Millet.

70. Priestley, op. cit., p. 177.
reforms which became a part of the governmental structure of the Regency, France also endeavored to effect other reforms in conformance with her concept of "civilizing mission." She did undertake to build up the country, to develop the resources of the Regency, both material and human.

First of all she attacked the matter of transportation and communications. With energy she set herself to the task of developing the railway system, with the result that by 1931 the country was bound together with a network of lines, whose total extent was more than 2,000 kilometers. One bulletin of the Department of Overseas Trade of Great Britain speaks of this as a "network of excellent lines." In defense of truth, however, anyone who has ever ridden on either the line from Tozeur to Kairouan, or on that from Sfax to Kairouan will have to set down those words either as gross exaggeration or the result of fevered imagination. All things being comparative, however, the 2,000 kilometers of any kind of railroad are an achievement. Similarly from the one 4-kilometer carriage road, from Tunis to the Bardo Palace, which existed in 1881, there were in 1931 more than 5,500


CARTE DE LA MÉDECINE DE COLONISATION

RAPPORT sur l'ASSISTANCE à l'HYGIÈNE

LEGENDE
Carte Schématique des postes des Médecins de colonisation et des tournées périodiques.

- Infirmerie - Dispensaire

ECHELLE 1:1000000
kilometers of reasonably good roads, many of which had been made usable for automobile traffic. A postal system, as well as telegraph and telephone lines were developed.

In addition the harbors, the natural gateways to the outside world with which Tunisia was abundantly blessed, were restored to usefulness. A ship canal was dredged through the harbor of Tunis, which for years had been so filled up as to be scarcely navigable; Sfax in 1884 was made ready for large steamers also; and in 1895, after nearly a decade of work, the harbor of Bizerte, which like Tunis had been almost useless, was opened to commerce. It became one of the finest anchorages on the Mediterranean, and, of course, is one of the pawns today in the diplomatic game being played between the Axis, the United Nations, and the Vichy government. In 1931 there were actually 22 ports in the Regency open to commerce.

In every way an attempt was made to develop natural resources. Work was done on aqueducts and wells in order to improve conditions of health, and increase productivity of land previously non-arable. The area under cultivation in 1881 was 650,000 hectares; in 1932 it was 1,594,000

73. Rapports d'études écon., Vol. II, pp. 91, 47.
74. Ibid., pp. 301-22.
75. Ibid., pp. 144-45.
76. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 144.
hectares. The phosphate deposits were developed into a major industry with an average annual production of 2,600,000 tons, while the production at the time of the occupation had been "insignificant." 79

France tried to teach French ideals to the Tunisians and fit them for living under conditions of modern western civilization, to save them from what she considered the consequences of their own ignorance and incompetence. She tried to teach them modern agricultural methods to guard against the old danger of famine. She tried to prevent disease as well as famine, organizing a sanitary service charged with cleaning up the cities and villages, trying to teach methods of hygiene, building hospitals, opening clinics, and giving attention to the problem of infant mortality. 80

France, intent on her "civilizing mission," opened schools and entered on an extensive program of increasing educational facilities. But here she blundered in much the same fashion that Britain blundered in India and Egypt. She attempted at first to give the natives an education which was largely classical and which was but little adapted either to their own background or to the life which they were to lead

79. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 11, 270.
after the completion of their schooling. It resulted, unfortunately, in a large number of superficially educated indigenes filled with a contempt for their fellow-countrymen. Seldom were they able to compete with the French in their professions; they struggled for badly paid clerkships or eked out a scanty living by writing for the native press. Disillusioned, disdainful of labor their class came to be a soil in which discontent bred readily.

As early as 1895 there were some far-minded individuals who could see the error of French ways. In the Chamber at that time Albin Rozet, who was a staunch supporter of the cause of the North African indigenes, pleaded for adequate primary schools; the 1931 report of the sous-commission d'études économiques stresses the same need. Only too true has been the fact that the child of the indigene who attended French schools emerged with "no notion of its religion, nor of its own tongue, nor of its past... The French school gallicized the child too quickly." Such teaching was naturally enough opposed by the parents, so that French efforts to raise the educational level were marked with only moderate success.


85. Picquet, La colonisation française, p. 385.
Steps were taken to educate the native women, and non-denominational schools under women teachers were established. With much persuasion parents at first were induced to send their girls. That some progress has been made is indicated by comparative figures: in 1889 there were 9 Moslem girls reported in school attendance; in 1931 there were 1,000.

In the same way comparative figures will tell a little of the actual extent of the French effort in the field of education. In 1889, when the Office of Education was instituted, the budget for education was set up as 1800 francs; in 1930 it was 59,714,958 francs, "without including the credits for the construction of new schools which had already been granted."

With greater experience in Tunisia France developed a greater understanding of the problems. Technical training of various kinds was presently made available to all classes of the population. The technical subject most important was agriculture. Elements of scientific farming were taught in connection with the primary schools, while more advanced courses were given in separate agricultural institutions. They began to learn too from example when they saw their French and Italian neighbors reaping a better harvest than they did. Many French officers in out-of-the-way places

86. Accounts and Papers, CIII, cmd. 9044, p. 12.
used spare time to teach the Berber farmers how to improve olive trees, breed better cattle or horses, or raise more barley on their soil. Technical training was given in special localities, also; for example, at Gafsa there was a school to train workers in the phosphate plants; at Sfax a school for navigation and fishing was established; carpet weaving, leather work, bookbinding, and other native industries, were taught in the Ecole professionnelle Emile Loubet in Tunis.

That not all of these changes were happily received will be developed in later chapters, when consideration will be given to the discontent of the Bey, of the indigenes, of the French colonists, and of the Italians. However, Tunisia is usually considered the most successful of French experiments in colonization, and her plan of reorganization and reform has been directed toward the assimilation of the native Tunisians as well as toward the improvement of their general condition, while at the same time French interests have been well safeguarded and advanced.

90. Journal des Débats, Jan. 27, 1912.
CHAPTER XIV

ORGANIZATIONS AND DEMANDS OF THE INDIGENES

With the establishment of the protectorate, as has been pointed out, the greater part of the Mohammedan population accepted the new rule easily. There was an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, however, and France began to find herself anxious.

This anxiety manifested itself on the part of the protectorate, in a number of repressive measures, the first of which was directed against the freedom of the press. France here was proceeding on the theory that as Tunisia was an independent state the French law guaranteeing such freedom was not mandatory, as in Algeria, which was a part of France. Therefore, by the decree on October 14, 1884, it was declared unlawful in the Regency to cry, sell, or distribute in public places, without a permit, pictures, emblems, or writings in any form. Furthermore, newspapers were required to give bond for publishing only such material as was acceptable to the authorities. And from this time on are to be noted periods in which France declared a state of emergency and used repressive measures on the pretext of preserving the peace.

Then by the decree of September 15, 1888, France struck

also at the freedom of assembly. By this decree it was made unlawful to form a society of any kind, including professional and labor organizations, without authorization from the government, such authority being revocable at any time.

There was on the part of the French authorities as well a general suspicion of strangers. In 1835 an Arab was imprisoned because he was believed to be the famous Sheik el-Senousssi, head of the mysterious and powerful brotherhood which at this time was opposing the French advance into the Sahara. With the passage of time this attitude both on the part of the government and of the French colonists developed in intensity. On June 6, 1900, an English officer on leave from Malta was arrested as a spy while driving in the vicinity of Bizerte.

In 1892 there was another attack on the press; by the order of the Resident-General in November of that year the police seized the Arabic section of the Messager Tunisien, edited by Auguste Prax, a Frenchman in sympathy with the native elements. The provocation for this seizure was a series of inflammatory articles against the French adminis-


The French suspicion of the indigens is indicated by the fact that only the Arabic section of the paper was seized.

It is only reasonable to suppose that such measures by the protecting state would have aroused native discontent. But reliable evidence as to these conditions is lacking for this particular period. Few credible visitors wrote on that phase of the situation. Herbert Vivian, for example, travelled in the Regency in 1898. He speaks of the great feeling of unrest prevalent among the natives and suggests that in a wave of religious enthusiasm they might become sufficiently aroused to "drive the French into the sea." However, when one reads in the preface to his book, *Tunisia and the Modern Barbary Pirates*, statements such as the following one, one discards whatever judgments he may have formed as to the success or failure of the French administration:

"Until I had travelled into the interior of Tunisia, I was disposed to believe that the French might be doing a work fully analogous to our own in India and Egypt, . . . . but I have now seen enough to convince me that the administration of Tunisia is as rotten as that of the French Republic."  

Unfortunately, also, the United States consular reports by this time, following a policy established in 1877 and 1878, were published only in abbreviated form and the manuscript copies are not available, so that a possible valuable source of unbiased information is lacking. And the French, of course, once established, had as little as possible to say of native discontent during these early years.

From evidence available, therefore, we may say that during the first quarter century of French occupation there was no semblance of organized opposition to the government among the indigenes. What there was apparently was only local in character. But between 1900 and 1910 a change became manifest throughout North Africa as sporadic outbursts of a religious anti-Christian movement took place; it is quite likely that the effect of the situation brewing in Turkey may have been felt throughout the Moslem world.

In 1907 Le Tunisien appeared in Tunis for the first time, edited by Ali Bach-Hamba, a lawyer, who was to become one of the most active of the native leaders; the paper was backed by a group of young intellectuals who created the journal "as the organ of defense of the native interests."^9

---


This group which came to be known as the Young Tunisians as distinct from the Old Tunisians or Old Turbans, the Musulman party of long standing, used the appearance of Le Tunisien as the signal that the Young Tunisians "felt themselves ready to enter the political arena." The group apparently was small and closely knit; its members were intelligent young Mohammedans, most of whom were the products of post-protec-
torate education; and its leaders were men of superior ability and high academic achievement. Their degrees were from French institutions and their use of French and Arabic was, if one may judge from written evidence, equally fluent.

Gradually their voices rose in a louder chorus; their cause was not popular with the French authorities, needless to say. Their clamor did result, however, in the addition of the native section to the Conférence-Consultative, in spite of the opposition of many of the French colonists. The leader of this new native section was Abdeljelil Zaouche, who combined his zeal for the cause of his people with a surprisingly steadfast loyalty to France. He wrote not only for Le Tunisien but also for such periodicals as the Revue

10. Idem.
11. de Lanessan, op. cit., pp. 294-95; Hardy, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 457, says that in 1920 there were in their ranks 6 doctors, 13 attorneys, 1 pharmacist, 1 engineer -- a feeble general staff for a population of 2,000,000.
In 1908 he published a vigorous article on the need of better education for the indigene:

What impels the Musulmen to demand schools is the recognition of their economic inferiority; it is the distress which they see each day driving them further into a place from which there is no escape as a result of the increasing immigration of foreigners -- Spanish on one hand and Sicilians on the other -- who quickly find employment in a country where the indigene continues to stagnate in ignorance. Little by little our industries . . . . are being ruined by the development of machinery . . . . The farmer . . . . with his archaic implements cannot get the superior yield that . . . . the scientific methods of the European can produce. . . . . We greatly hope one day to see a parliamentarian advocate . . . . for the inhabitants of North Africa, with discrimination of creed, the principle of . . . . equal instruction for all.

By 1909 the Young Tunisians had formulated a multiplicity of demands. Certain of those which were uppermost in their minds, in addition to educational equality, were 1) the lightening of the native tax burden, the medîba being the particular object of criticism, 2) the formation of native chambers of commerce and agriculture, 3) occupational equality of the indigene with the Frenchman, 4) the right of the indigene to hold public office, and 5) wide-spread judicial reform.

The attitude of the indigenes towards the need of legal


reform was set forth during the year 1909 in both pamphlet and newspaper form by a number of the vigorous young leaders. Zaouche, Guellat, and Ali Bach Hamba all wrote on this phase of the native problem. In broad outline they demanded: 1) separation of judicial and administrative powers, 2) promulgation of complete civil and criminal codes, 3) formation of a capable personnel, suitably remunerated, 4) courts of appeal and cassation, and 5) creation of courts which would permit collaboration of French career judges with native judges.

The case for judicial reform was somewhat complicated by a movement of the Jewish indigenes in October of 1909. On the third of that month, the Jews held a mass meeting in the hippodrome in Tunis, attended by some 5,000 people with another 2,000 turned away because there were no seats. The demand formulated at this meeting was that in the future the Jews should be held responsible only to French courts, on the basis that they were victims of the fanaticism of Mohammedan law and justice.

Ali Bach Hamba wrote eloquently of and to the Jews as a result of their movement and mass meeting. His thesis was that the indigenous Jew suffered no more at the hands of the courts than the indigenous Musulman, and that since they


were all Tunisians they should all work together for a common cause. He also pointed out what was true of both Jew and Musulman, that the natives saw a high and developed French code functioning under their very eyes, took note of the high probity of the judges, the respect for individual liberty, while beside them were the native tribunals, whose unjustive and lack of codified law, as well as the evil situation in respect to the selection of judges became the more apparent by the contrast. Zaouche, likewise, made an appeal to the Jews, asking them to join in an outcry for general reform, rather than to stir up trouble by citing merely Musulman injustice.

Guellaty who had been practicing in the Tunisian courts since 1903, and was both able and astute, called the attention of France to what England had done in 1883 for Egypt, that without concerning herself with questioning if the fellah was ripe for this reform, gave the Egyptians a modern and complete judiciary. He urged republican France to do the same for Tunisia.

It is not enough to cover the soil of the Regency with roads and railroads; it is necessary, in order to ensure the everlasting thanks of the

20. Bach Hamba, op. cit., p. 73.
indigenous population, that there shall be realized in the moral order the same progress as in the material order. 21

In April 1910 there were violent demonstrations for additional educational facilities, which indicated the increasing split in ideology between the Young Tunisians and the Old Turbans. The latter, who were conservative and did not approve of innovations, by and large, particularly those which would upset the old methods of Koranic teaching in the schools or Koranic traditions in the Musulman courts, were quite willing to cooperate with the French.

The Young Tunisians, however, wanted to take increased advantage of western civilization. On April 22, 1910, some 2,000 students met in the Grand Mosque of Tunis demanding reform in education; there they were met by one of their professors who typified the very past they wished to break with by threatening them with the Musulman law which would sanction the execution of one-third of their number for the expression of such heresy. Ali Bach Hamba also met them that day, and again the next, urging moderation. Granted full power by the students to act for them, he promised to urge reform on the government.


23. Akhbar, Apr. 24, 1910. Appeared in Algiers in 1908; published irregularly, averaged about once in two weeks; it had the support of General Lyautey and the French officials, and was rarely censored.
Such demonstrations, though isolated, were sporadic; they did not as yet, however, concern the mass of the population. The leaders nevertheless continued to hammer for increased privileges. In July 1910 Zaouche published a reasoned but strong article in which he cited statistics to prove that of the annual direct state taxes of 12,121,800 francs, the indigenes paid 11,730,400 francs, or 96.74 percent; he was firm in his demand that the medjiba be abolished and that taxation be levied more equably. Granting that higher indirect taxes were imposed on the European than on the indigene, he pointed out the difference in the economic status of the two groups as well as the unfairness of occupational opportunity and remuneration. He cited the wages of the average indigenous agricultural day worker as 1 franc to 1 franc 20 centimes and those of the man employed as Khammâa (who received a fifth of the yield by way of compensation) as between 150 and 200 francs annually. In November Zaouche demanded that the native members of the Conférence-Consultative be elected rather than appointed, in the hope that granting this right to those natives who could read and write either French or Arabic would stir the lethargic masses to greater interest in their own cause.

25. Ibid., p. 137.
It is significant that the appeals made at this period for reform were not anti-French. *L'étandard algérien* appeared late in November, 1910, as an instrument of the Algerian indigenes, somewhat similar in character to *Le Tunisien*. As its statement of policy it enunciated: "Our journal is the standard for the forces of evolution. We wish to group about us all those who have the same love of progress, in order that our country, which was the granary of Rome shall become that of France." France seemingly recognized this fact. Perhaps, however, it was only a matter of policy. Nevertheless when President Fallières visited Tunisia in April 1911, accompanied by Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs, he decorated Zaouche, and declared that the purpose of France was to effect a closer association and forge stronger links between the French and the Tunisians, which would result in the common good.

In 1911 the native problem was complicated by international events, which will be further discussed when the full diplomatic implications are considered. For our purposes at this time, however, two points must be noted: 1) that in September 1911 the Italo-Turkish War was undertaken and 2) that in November 1911 Germany recognized the French protectorate over Morocco.

---


Because of the secret accords of 1900 and 1902 between France and Italy, France was obligated to maintain a position of neutrality throughout the Italo-Turkish War. This naturally enough was disturbing to the indigenous element in Tunisia, whose sympathies were with the indigenes of Tripoli. The population of Tripoli, like that of Tunisia, was almost entirely Moslem, which explained the bond between the two countries. It is a curious fact that the Tunisian masses had for the most part remained indifferent to the activities of their educated leaders in the cry for reform. To the pleas of the latter for a lightening of the tax burden, better schools, reform of the administration of native justice, or occupational equality with the French, they had shrugged their shoulders. But when war was made on Turkey by Italy, with the evident intention of seizing Tripoli, thus bringing another Moslem land under Christian domination, they were stirred to anger. Islam is more than a religious faith. To a far greater extent than Christianity it prescribes a definite rule of life, inculcates a distinctive habit of mind, and binds its members with a stronger bond. The Tunisians, consequently, approved the resistance of the Tripolitanians to the Italians.


The resistance was as strong as the inequality of the fighting machine would permit. Not only was the indigenous population fanatically opposed to losing its territory to the Italians, but its resistance had been stirred by other factors as well: the Young Turkish movement, the agitation of the Senoussi, and the opposition to the French kept active by the Sultan after 1881 were elements to be reckoned with. Every possible obstacle was set in the path of the Italian penetration, therefore, and all were championed by the Tunisian indigene.

Early in November rumors concerning the Moroccan crisis were afloat. There was already suspicion in Moslem minds that not only had the French not tried to block the Italian move into Tripoli, but that they even had sanctioned it. Now the situation appeared even worse, as the rumors grew that, like the Italians, the French were about to extend their control over still another Moslem land. Native feeling increased in intensity.

The Young Tunisians, contrary to their previously loyal position as to France, strongly condemned the attitude of the government during the Turko-Italian War. At this time, unfortunately, the municipal government of Tunis made a move, which, considering the emotional tension of the times, seems

32. de Lanessan, op. cit., p. 295.
The day following the declaration of war upon Turkey by Italy began the action on the part of the authorities to secure possession of a portion of the Moslem cemetery of Djellez in the city of Tunis.

France had several motives apparently in the plan to alienate a part of the cemetery. For some time French writers, such as d'Estournelles de Constant, had written that the:

..indifference of the Arabs in matters of hygiene only equalled their ignorance. ..Their cemeteries were without control, burials were made hurriedly and under the most dangerous of conditions. ..dogs could easily expose ..the corpses ..there was danger always of cholera. ..

But in the interpellation of January 1912, when Alapetite, the Resident-General of Tunisia, was asked to justify the government's policy in the Regency he did not cite hygiene as a cause. One of the critics of Alapetite and his administration, Auguste Bouge, suggested that the reason was the proximity of the new goods depot to the cemetery and the need of the land for a thoroughfare. This Alapetite denied, maintaining that the desire had been merely to take over a rocky portion of the hillside, where burials manifestly were impossible, with a view to securing stone necessary for street repairs in Tunis.

33. d'Estournelles de Constant, op. cit., p. 440.
34. Ch. des Dép., Débats, Jan. 26, 1912, p. 85.
35. Ibid., Jan. 29, 1912, p. 106.
Whatever may have been the official reason for desiring to take over the cemetery, the matter at any rate was taken up in the meeting of the municipal council of November 2, where Zaouche, one of the native members, protested indignantly against the action. Placards, nevertheless, were put up announcing that on November 7 a survey of the land would take place, for a later alienation of certain portions. The indignation of the indigenous population was enormous; over 3,000 protests were made to the authorities in three days. As a consequence the plan was given up. The matter doubtless would have ended there had the municipal officials not overlooked one significant detail -- they neglected to tell the surveyor. On November 7, then, according to schedule, and just three days after the Franco-German agreement concerning Morocco had heightened the resentment against all Europeans, he appeared to carry out his task.

Having feared that there might be some acts of violence even though the alienation was not to be carried out, 130 police had been stationed at the gates of the Djellez ceme-

36. Ibid., Jan. 26, 1912, pp. 38-39; Bouge stated that the plan was merely postponed, while Alapetite said it was abandoned. The details of the story are given in full by Comte Edouard de Warren, "Lettre de Tunisie," L'Afrique française, Jan. 1912, pp. 6-11; hereafter cited as de Warren, "Lettre de Tunisie."

ery as protection should trouble break out. Then, according
to the Alapetite version, when a crowd of natives entered the
city armed with pikes and stone, some Italians who had be-
come greatly excited during the progress of the entire
Djellez situation, "believing their last day had come,
fired; and that was the beginning of extremely bloody scenes,
which we have deplored."

Riots followed which really were not serious and yet
which had rather grave repercussions for the indigenous
movement. Violence continued against the Italians, and
Alapetite who was in Paris on an official visit, appealed
for reinforcements. Over 1000 indigenous were arrested, of
whom some 60 were brought to trial, with 1 sentenced to death
and 1 to life imprisonment. During this period, also, the
Arab press expressed itself strongly against the government.
As a result, on November 8, nearly all the native journals
were suppressed, including not only Le Tunisien but also
another of Bach Hamba's papers, L'Union Islamique, which
had been especially active in enlisting Tunisian support


39. L'Islam, Nov. 20, 1911; however L'Afrique française,
July 1912, p. 276, reports that the trial has just been con-
cluded and gives quite different figures for the convictions:
7 condemned to death, 1 to life imprisonment at hard labor,
1 to 20 years at hard labor, 3 to 5 years at hard labor, 9
to 5 years in prison, 2 to 3 months in prison, and 3 to 6
months in prison.
for the cause against the Italians in Tripoli. The Young Tunisians were accused of having instigated the riots, although they stoutly denied any responsibility. When coincident with the funeral of a certain Colonel Vanel, who lost his life in the rioting, anti-native demonstrations were led by a group of French colonists, the Young Tunisians expressed the view that the whole affair had merely been a government plot against their organization. There would seem actually to be little evidence to connect them with the riots, in spite of their political prominence. Alapetite, however, continued to feel that their influence was at the root of the whole matter.

On November 11 he arrived in Tunis, after a hurried trip back from Paris to find conditions tense, and as he considered it, serious. Therefore on November 13 a state of siege was declared, and La dépêche tunisienne was as condemnatory of the Arabs as the native press had been of the government. Zaouche, at the head of a delegation, and the Sheik-ul-Islam, accompanied by all the personnel of the

41. L'Islam, Nov. 20, 1911.
42. The Times, London, July 1, 1912.
43. Ch. des Dép., Débats, Jan. 29, 1912, p. 103.
Chaira, called officially on the Resident-General to protest their loyalty and to offer regret for the native part in the unhappy events which had transpired. Alapetite accepted their assurances of loyalty, but the state of siege, once applied, was not to be raised for nine long years.

As soon as he felt he had the situation in hand Alapetite returned to Paris, where he was shortly called upon to help justify the policy of the administration in the Regency. In the course of the six-day interpellation of late January and early February 1912 his policy was sharply attacked, as were the wide powers he possessed as Resident-General, the inability of the Tunisians to make their wishes known, and lastly his own frequent absences from Tunis — "You were not there: [at the time of the Djellez affair]; you are never there." However, as the result of the moderating words of Poincaré, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of Jaurès, a deputy, the Chamber accepted Albin Rozet's order of the day and endorsed the government.

In March of 1912 came the streetcar boycott in which, however, it would seem quite certain that the Young Tunisians were involved. The boycott grew out of the Arab resentment for the discriminatory wage scale in Tunisia, and in this

45. Ibid., pp. 788.
47. Ibid., Feb. 2, 1912, p. 168.
particular instance was directed more at the Italian workers than at the French administration. The Italians claimed that they were receiving lower wages even than the natives, that they were subject to dismissal without redress, and that they were subject to every form of indignity and humiliation. On the other hand the Moslems claimed that the Italians were paid higher wages than the native employees and were frequently brutal and overbearing to native passengers. In an accident in which the indigenes claimed Italian negligence, an Arab child was killed. The Arabs consequently protested by means of the boycott of the streetcars. Having learned a bitter lesson from the martial law imposed by the French the previous November, this protest was orderly. It was carried out without any bloodshed and with perfect order.

Convinced of the part of the Young Tunisians in the riots of November 1911 and irritated by the persistent boycott, Alapetite decided to exile seven of the most prominent personalities in the party, among whom were Ali Bach Hamba, Guellaty, and Sheik Taalbi, who was destined to play an important part later in the movement of the indigene group, particularly through the publication in 1920 of *La Tunisie*

---


50. Ibid., Mar. 15, 1912.
Mohammed Bach Hamba was quick to come to the defense of his brother, denying that Ali had been either the leader of a Pan Islamic movement or that he had been disloyal to France. Furthermore he challenged the government to publish the compromising material supposedly found in the office of Le Tunisien. Ali Bach Hamba, though pardoned about a year and a half later, never returned to Tunisia, but instead went to Constantinople where he was placed in a high position.

For a time after the exile of these outstanding native leaders there was a lull in the native activity. On July 9, 1913, the Tunisian penal code was promulgated, to go into effect on the first of the following January. The native press, which at first denounced it, soon apparently was reconciled to the lack of certain provisions for which they had been eager. It was at this time, also, that the op-
pressive medjba was replaced by the istitan, which it will be remembered bore equally on all the male inhabitants of the Regency. Certain of the demands of the indigenes, thus, had been met.

Then came the World War, in which Tunisia fought alongside France, even though there might well have been an Islamic pull towards Turkey, fighting on the side of the Central Powers. In the Chamber of Deputies on July 5, 1922, Poincaré paid tribute to "the admirable loyalty of the natives, the magnificent conduct of their armies, . . . ."

All was not well, however, and about this time the breach between the French and the Tunisians began to widen. On November 7, 1918, the Chamber granted to the Algerians rights

56. For details of Tunisian participation in the war vide L’Afrique française, May-June, 1919, pp. 34-37, 90-91.

57. Ch. des Dép., Débats, July 5, 1922, p. 2325. The Italian writer, Tumedei presents quite a different picture of the Italian reaction to the war from that of the French. His is a consistently anti-French picture. "The natives who have always yielded with ill-will to what they call the 'blood-tax', were annoyed with the Bey, who did not succeed in preventing the despatch of well-known Tunisian contingents to the continent during the war. They were the more irritated because the despatch of troops was badly managed. I allude in particular to the exemption of Jews, which could not but annoy the Arabs, because the exempted Jews managed to make fat profits by lending at usurious prices to the natives the money necessary to escape conscription. Hence the rise of an anti-Semitic movement, to which up to that time Tunisia had remained immune, . . . ." Cesare Tumedei, La questione tunisina e l’Italia (Bologna, 1922), p. 191.
almost equivalent to those of the French, a relatively simple task in Algeria which was legally an integral part of France. But in spite of the mutual rejoicing at the war's end the Tunisians felt that they had been very badly treated by the French -- the Tunisians had made sacrifices equal to those of the Algerians, but they had in no way received equal reward. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Italy, by a royal decree of June 1, 1919, gave the Tripolitanian indigenes full rights of Italian citizenship with extensive control of their own government. The native press commented that "the indigenes say to themselves that France will not refuse them what Italy is about to grant so generously in Tripoli."

Early in 1920 in France there appeared anonymously a little volume entitled La Tunisie martyr, the purpose of which was to bring to the attention of all France the woes of Tunisia and her demands. It was divided into brief chapters dealing with such subjects as organization of powers, education, justice, finance, etc., in each of which


60. L'Ikdam, May 17, 1919; L'Ikdam was an Algerian weekly which appeared in March 1919; it combined the former L'Islam with another paper, which also disappeared during the war.

the happy picture of the indigene before the protectorate was contrasted with the sorry state to which he had been reduced under French government. According to the author, Tunisia had been safe and secure under a constitutional government which had guaranteed the natives full possession of their rights and their culture. Under the protectorate the liberties were gone, the lands of the indigene had been expropriated, his educational system had been ruined, and his native tongue outlawed.

The last chapter, Our Demands, however, is significant because it came to be a recognized delineation of Tunisian demands. The most important of them are listed below:

1. To be considered as Tunisians and to enjoy the full rights and privileges of Tunisian citizens.

2. Guarantees of individual liberties: work, association, press, petition, etc.

3. Wide government reorganization, which would actually do away with French domination.

62. Ibid., pp. 6-17.
63. Ibid., pp. 33-35, 72-73, 155.
64. Ibid., p. 9.
65. Ibid., pp. 81, 83, 99, 107, 201.
67. Ibid., p. 45.
4. That the actual administrative districts be endowed with legal personality and function as such.

5. Independent judicial power.

6. Freedom of education; Arab language to be used in primary schools, etc.

7. Laws protecting children, women, old people, etc.

Within the year 1920 the movement of the Tunisian indigene liberals had crystallized into a party known as the Destour (meaning constitution), and whose outstanding objective was to be granted a constitution. They had been stirred by the enunciation of President Wilson's "Fourteen Points." In fact Poincaré, in the Chamber during an interpellation on the suppression of the freedom of the press in the Regency, attributed the foundation of the Destour party to the influence of President Wilson. He spoke of the eighteen point program of the Destourians with "more points, you note, than President Wilson had." The statement of Le Tunisie martyrse would seem to indicate that the voice of Wilson had not been without effect:

We have resolute confidence in the happy destiny which must be opened to us by the triumph

68. Ibid., pp. 208-11.


70. Ch. des. Dép., Débats, July 5, 1922, p. 2325.
of Law and Justice in international affairs, in accordance with the principle of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves, which the most highly qualified statesmen have promised most solemnly before God and the civilized world. This confidence has made us perceive clearly that it is our . . . . duty to participate vigorously and without reserve. . . . .

It is not certain that all of those supporting the Destour party knew what a constitution really was. Nor is it certain that all of the disturbances in Tunis in the next two years can legitimately be laid at the doors of the Destourians, for the Tunisian Socialists also had begun to clamor for a constitution, and a Communist organization was developing.

71. Taalbi, op. cit., p. 196. The Italian writer, Tumedel, also has a good deal to say about the influence of Wilson on the Tunisians: "It is true that Wilsonian doctrines and the peace conferences stirred up in the Regency proposals and hopes which were not even dreamed of up to that time. . . . . The following public manifestations are worthy of being noted: 1) a telegram sent to Wilson, Jan. 2, 1919, to the Quirinal in Rome, where Wilson was at that time as the guest of His Majesty, (reproduced in Evolution Nord-Afrique, July 12, 1919); p. 2) a mémoire directed to the Peace Congress by the Algerian-Tunisian committee (Evolution Nord-Afrique, July 12, 1919); p. 3) another mémoire to the Peace Congress, distinct from the preceding one (of which an extract was published in Populaire, Longuet's newspaper, March 27, 1919); it seems to me that this mémoire arrived at its destination through the collusion of the American consulate at Tunis; 4) an appeal from the French Socialist party (published in L'Humanité, June 9, 1919)." Tumedel, op. cit., p. 192.

72. Ch. des Dép., Débats, July 5, 1922, p. 2324. Tumedel, op. cit., p. 195, gives as one of the reasons for the development of Tunisian socialism that "... it was presented to many Tunisians during their stay in France, either as soldiers or workers during the war."
In the spring of 1920, however, the Old Turbans and the Young Tunisians, who had usually been of opposed political minds, were brought together because of their fear over the habous. In the meeting of the Conférence-Consultative, which opened within a few days after the election of May 2, Flandin, the Resident-General, discussed the problem of the great uncultivated lands of the Regency and of ways of possibly making them more productive; he spoke of the private habous, lying idle because of there being too many heirs to make cultivation profitable for any of them. The rumor was soon afloat, as a result of this discussion, that the government intended to dispossess the indigenes of their habous. As in the case of the Italo-Turkish War the various Moslem factions forgot the differences which previously had separated them and drew together in a common defense of their Islamic ideas and ideals.

A delegation called on May 14 on Flandin, who did his best to reassure the notables of the honorable intention of the government. But less than two weeks later, the French Chamber of Commerce opened its session in Tunis. Without discussing the matter with the Residency first, and over-


74. The native Chamber of Agriculture and Chamber of Commerce of the North had been instituted by the decree of Jan. 21, 1920. Fitoussi to Bénazet, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 701.
looking the fact that it was the month of the Ramadan:

. . . . the month of fasting when the indigenes are the most excitable, they discussed at length the utilization of the private habous, as if the bear were already dead, and one were selling the pelt. . . . . 75

The indigenes were stirred to immediate activity. A subscription was taken up and a group of notables went to Paris to lay their pleas both for a constitution as well as for protection for the habous before the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "who could not but refuse to see this group who came without legal authority." 76

However, it gave Taalbi, as a French writer put it caustically, "the opportunity to recite passages of La Tunisie martyre and to recall the Tripolitanian statute, forgetting that it was still-born." The demands which the group had drawn up and which they wished to present were as follows; they were made public in a letter to Le Temps:

1. A deliberative assembly composed of Tunisians and Frenchmen, elected by universal suffrage, with full competence in financial matters, and with full responsibility for its own proceedings.

75. Rodd-Balek, "La Tunisie après la guerre," L'Afrique française, July-Aug. 1920, p. 229; this is the first of a long series which appeared in almost every issue for well over a year; it dealt with all phases of Tunisia after the war.

76. Ibid., p. 229.

77. Idem.
2. A government responsible to that assembly.

3. Complete separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

4. Equal opportunity on equal terms for Tunisians and Frenchmen for all administrative positions.

5. Equality of pay for such work.

6. Reorganization of municipal governments, on the basis of universal suffrage at all important centers.

7. Full liberty to Tunisians in the purchase of land for farming and home sites.

8. Freedom of the press, of assembly, and to form associations.

Unable to see M. Millerand with their petition, they were received on July 30 by Beaumarchais, Assistant Director of Foreign Affairs for Africa, who assured them that "the Minister of Foreign Affairs, together with the key, would go into the wishes of the Tunisians with their usual goodwill." The following day the five delegates returned to Tunis, "having expended on propaganda about 150,000 francs in two months," as Rodd-Balek wrote.

Meanwhile the agitation had continued in Tunis; a dele-


79. Idem.

80. Idem.
igation had gone out to the Marsa palace to petition the Bey for a constitution; the Depêche tunisienne, the official organ of the Regency, published the draft of a letter to the Resident-General, supposedly from the Young Tunisians and indicating the strong feeling of the group:

"This intolerable existence cannot last. Guarantees must be imposed. . . . A constitution is the only sure way of assuring a raising of the moral and material levels, and assuring present and future prosperity as well."

The administration warned the Tunisians not to attempt to take over the initiative in legislation, and suspended those delegates who had gone to the Marsa who were also officials, for periods of from three to six months. At the same time it pointed out its consistent "policy of progress."

These were days marked with events of considerable significance for the Regency. With one hand the French government was handing out favors; with the other it was signing decrees, which to the Young Tunisians, signified increased repression.

For example, on July 30 the Chamber of Deputies passed the bill requested by Flandin, authorizing the loan of 300,000,000 francs for expansion of railroad lines in the Regency, the laying of a new cable between France and Tunisia,

32. Ibid., p. 230.
work on ports, docks, improvement of water supplies, assistance to native agriculture, etc. Likewise on July 30, the same day on which the delegation had been received by Beaumarchais, Taalbi was arrested in Paris; he was charged with violating the Tunisian penal code, which made it a crime, punishable by a fine of 3,000 francs and imprisonment of five years, to bring the Bey, the government, or the administration into contempt or hatred. Taalbi was suspected of having written *Le Tunisie martyr*, and therefore of having violated this statute, with his criticism of the Tunisian government. Following his arrest, he was quickly sent to Tunis to stand trial. Though defended stoutly by André Berthon, the Socialist deputy from Paris, he was convicted and sent to prison, where he remained until May 1921, when he was released by a proclamation of amnesty. Two years later, July 26, 1923, he was to leave Tunisia again, "abandoned by all his partisans."

---


85. Ibid., p. 283; *Le Temps*, May 20, 1921; a number of writers maintain that *La Tunisie martyr* was written by a group of collaborators. Jung, *op. cit.*, p. 43, lends some credence to this story by speaking of Taalbi as "... a man of sense ... speaks a little French, but is known as a scholar and able speaker in his own tongue. ..."

Exhausted by the stormy days he had gone through as Resident-General, Flandin asked to be relieved of an appointment, which had been made as a temporary one originally, and to be returned to his seat in the Senate. Lucien Saint, prefect of the Aisne, was appointed on November 23, 1920, as successor, and took over his post on January 6, 1921. It was an assignment which was going to demand all manner of tact and ability, for since the Taalbi trial the situation in the Regency had been uneasy.

On October 30, 1920, three other Young Tunisians had also been arrested, linked to an extensive organization supposedly on the basis of papers seized in Taalbi's possession. It was maintained that this organization, as well as its program of activity, was definitely linked with Berlin. Mohammed Bach Hamba, the brother of the exiled Ali, was supposed to be the intermediary through which the dealings took place. Mohammed Bach Hamba had lived for a time in Geneva, where he had taken an active part in the activities of the North African indigene and where he had edited a paper devoted to their interests. Then, for financial reasons, it was asserted he had gone to Berlin to live, where he was

---

88. Pellegrin, loc. cit.
able to benefit from the exchange.

It is easier to substantiate his activities in the cause of the Moslems than to link him positively with pro-German anti-French dealings. In 1916, for example, he attracted some attention by championing the cause and appearing as the spokesman of the Algerian and Tunisian indigenes at the third Conference of Nationalities which met in a two-day session in Lausanne in June. His demands for them then were: 1) a charter guaranteeing the rights of person and property, 2) compulsory Arab schools on the primary level, and the organization of secondary and higher education as well, 3) reform financial, and political equality before the law, 4) reform and lightening of the forest laws. "In a word, we demand the common right of all peoples, justice and liberty." On the other hand the claim of French writers and statesmen is the basis of the anti-French charges against Bach Hamba; for example in the Chamber of Deputies on July 5, 1922, Poincaré asserted without equivocation that throughout the war Bach Hamba, in Berlin, had kept up an active anti-French propaganda.


92. Ch. des Dép., *Débats*, July 5, 1922, p. 2325, during debate on the Tunisian policy. It is surprising, however, to find that Tumedel also seems to associate Mohammed Bach Hamba with Berlin. He writes: "Mohammed Ali Baso Hamba, brother of the lawyer and himself formerly a judge in Tunis, retired to Switzerland and Berlin, in order to be in contact through Berlin with the group 'Union and Progress' of Constantinople.
When Lucien Saint took over, then, there was marked resentment of the indigenes, and at the same time the administration was fearful that deeper motives might underlie the movement of the constitutional parties than appeared on the surface. Nevertheless, one of the first moves of the new Resident-General was the separation of judicial and administrative authority and the creation of the ministry of justice by the decree of April 26, 1921. This remedied one of the greatest of the native grievances, bringing about some easing of the tension. Akhbar wrote as follows:

The reform of the Tunisian courts of justice has been well received everywhere. It shows liberal intentions, a new spirit. It puts an end to the attempt to use the authority of the Bey in questions on which he could not be informed. The Bey will lose nothing, and justice will benefit.

But there was an even more pressing matter to be considered, one which had been the cause of much discontent in the Regency and which had been the subject of a somewhat stormy discussion in the Chamber of Deputies the previous November. Martial law still prevailed in Tunis as a result

---

94. Akhbar, May 24, 1921.
of the Djeliez riot — a matter of some nine years. On March 29, 1921, the state of siege was lifted. But the same decree reserved to the military tribunals the authority to complete the actions already begun against Taalbi and his associates.

The new Resident-General also undertook a general tour of the Regency to learn conditions for himself. He did not have much to say about the reforms which he had in mind after that trip; he went immediately to Paris to report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, he is quoted directly by Akhbar, how accurately of course we do not know, as projecting some phase of reform of the contrôles-civils:

I am thinking of restoring to the controllers, powers which will make them direct representatives of the Resident-General in each region of control, so that they will be dependent on the chiefs of bureaus in Tunis from the purely technical point of view only.

The rumor was afloat that, though the Conférence-Consultative in 1920 had refused to grant further funds and support to the Services Économiques Indigènes, which had done much to encourage and teach better farming methods, Lucien Saint planned to increase its work and scope. This plan, says Akhbar, was opposed by the French colonists on the grounds that further

96. Le Temps, Apr. 1, 2, 1921; Pellegrin, op. cit., p. 207.

97. Akhbar, May 24, 1921.
training would make the indigenes too independent and would serve to increase political dangers for the French administration. In much the same fashion it was reported that the French colonists were protesting against any attempt to give the natives any voice in public affairs. But French sources have nothing to say at this time about what Saint recommended.

The French government since the days of Flandin apparently had been considering reform in the Regency in some guise, however. In 1919 Flandin had suggested a change in the manner of representation to the Conférence-Consultative to one based for the French population on occupational bases and for the indigenes on lists, made up by the natives themselves, from which the administration would choose its candidates.

Early in 1921 Lucien Saint did make the suggestion of liberalizing the representative body of the Regency, though at the same time he pointed out that because the protectorate was based on the treaty of Bardo, that body could never perform more than an advisory function.

Likewise in December 1920 Rodd-Balek, who wrote under

98. Ibid., July 20, 1921.
99. Ibid., June 29, 1921.
this pseudonym, as well as that of Cavé, in place of his own name, Charles Monchicourt, even advocated a ten-point reform program in the Regency. He had been a civil controller in Tunisia, and was by no means favorable to the demands of the Young Tunisians. That he, a former French official, would propose such ideas as the ending of martial law, the complete reform of native justice, increased educational facilities, especially along technical lines, election of indigene representatives to the Conférence-Consultative, as well as a move towards occupational equality of Frenchmen and native, must have indicated that the attitude of the administration was becoming more liberal to Tunisia.

But the outburst of 1920 had seemed to make such plans of questionable practicality. The administration found itself on the horns of a dilemma. Would an increase of privilege to the indigenes bring an end to or an increase in the native disturbances?

Throughout 1921 the demand for a constitution lay dormant, and then early in 1922 the matter again sprang to the fore. On January rigid restrictions, therefore, were put once more on the press, Arab and Hebrew alike this time, and any paper suspect of being Communist was rigorously suppressed.


103. Tumedei, op. cit., p. 2; Ch. des Dép., Débats, Feb. 2, 1922, p. 227
In April 1922 came the "crisis" which "made" at least page two of the New York Times, the London Times, as well as the Paris Temps for a good many days, although normally the Regency was completely and totally ignored by the foreign press. The fact that President Millerand, in the month of April, was to visit Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, apparently aroused the Tunisian Destouriane and Communists to increased activity. Excerpts from certain of the foreign newspaper reports will indicate the various interpretations given to the disturbance. The New York Times wrote as follows:

The Nationalist agitation in Tunisia on the eve of the visit of Millerand is attracting considerable attention, although up to the present it has not developed any great force. The Communists have joined the Nationalists in the agitation, but it is said in official circles that the number of persons engaged in it does not exceed 600. The abdication of the Bey has been reported and denied several times. It is now reaffirmed by a Frenchman, M. Fabre, who was expelled from Tunisia and who says the partisans of the Bey presented 21 demands for reforms to the French authorities, the Bey abdicating when no satisfaction was given. 104

The London Times, however, attributed all the trouble to the Communists. On April 27 it wrote:

For some time past the Tunis police have been watching closely the zones of the anti-French local Communists. The authorities have discovered a plot to create trouble during the President's visit and they have taken prompt measures to counter it by issuing warrants for the arrest of

104. New York Times, Apr. 15, 1922. That Antoine Fabre was expelled from the Regency was confirmed later in the Chamber of Deputies. He was a French citizen, and the editor of the paper of the Cri du Soir, a Communist organ. Ch. des Dép., Débats, July 5, 1922, p. 2324.
the five ringleaders, four of whom have already
been lodged in gaol. They are the editor of a
local Arab journal, a Moslem schoolmaster, an
expelled collegian, a dismissed Spahi, and the
secretary of the railway men's union. The last
named has disappeared. 105

The Temps carried the official denial of the government that

the Bey had planned to abdicate.

It is especially interesting, therefore, to find that
Pellegrin, who has for years been connected officially with
the administration in Tunisia and whose book was published
in 1933, should admit the Bey's attempt at abdication. Be-
cause of the points at which it contradicts and supports the
other reports on the "crisis", it has seemed worth while to
reproduce the Pellegrin statement in full. He explained
that though Saint had pursued a liberal policy in the
Regency, it had not been appreciated by the indigenes.

The Destourian chiefs fostered intrigues at
the Beylical court. They had persuaded certain
princes to put pressure on the Bey to bring him
to an attitude of systematic opposition to the
Resident-General in the effort thus to force the
French government to yield to the principal points
of their program.

Sidi Mohammed-en-Naceur Bey, of rather weak
character, permitted himself to be influenced by
the members of his family, who were drawn in the
wake of the Destourian opposition. The result was
that early in 1922 his relations with the Resident-
General were strained. . . . . The announcement of
the presidential visit . . . . had greatly excited
the Destourian opposition which obviously sought
to make Millerand's visit coincide with some sensa-


106. Le Temps, Apr. 6, 1922.
tional event. This coup d'état failed to ma-
terialize, for the Bey, worn out by the pressure
of his entourage, in particular of his sons, let
the Resident-General know that he had decided to
abdicate. . . . It was then that Saint decided
to go to seek the Bey at the Marsa, followed by
a squadron of light infantry. . . . He reached
the presence of the Bey and begged him for the
good of his people and the prestige of the dynasty
to take up his crown again. The Bey promised to
be faithful thereafter to the treaties, and as a
witness to his kindly feelings he at once design-
nated his eldest son, the prince Moncef, to re-
ceive the President at the Tunisian frontier. 107

The tempest died down, and Millerand was warmly received.

His speech upon stepping foot upon Tunisian soil at Souk-el-
Arba on April 27, 1922, was a rather typical sample of French
diplomatic speech-making.

Under the sovereignty of His Highness the
Bey, whose sentiments of loyalty have long been
known, France will continue the work which she
has pursued without intermission. She wishes to
initiate and accomplish necessary reforms of all
kinds: economic, social, political, but . . . .
one must go neither too slowly, nor too fast. 108

107. Pellegrin, op. cit., pp. 203-09; Poincaré in the
debate in the Chamber, July 5, 1922, asserted that some of
the Bey's sons were linked with the Destourian movement.
Ch. des Dép., Débats, July 5, 1922, p. 2325. The Italian,
Tumedei, adds another fact to the story. He writes: "On
the 6 April the Dépêche tunisienne published a declaration
of the Bey -- either apocryphal or extorted by violence --
which denied the affair [the abdication]. We believe we
are doing something useful to the reader by reproducing the
article of the Cri du Soir, which we have reason to believe
corresponds entirely with the truth and which is taken from
one of the very few copies which escaped sequestration. . .
Mediterranean and Its Problems (London, 1927), pp. 207-08,
presents a view somewhat similar to that of Tumedei, and
quotes Taalbi as the authority for the statements.

Then, with typical French thoroughness, after the departure of the president, the administration attempted completely to destroy the Communist threat at least, by ordering the dissolution of their organization. This brought on a stormy three day debate in the Chamber of Deputies, led by Lafont and Berthon, both Socialists, in which Poincaré maintained that the Communist activity in the Regency had its origin in Berlin and Moscow. His policy was endorsed by the overwhelming majority of 507 to 64.

On July 3, 1922, Mohammed-en-Naceur Bey, who had been critically ill for some time, died and was succeeded by his cousin, Mohammed-el-Habib Bey, who brought to his task "a most kindly spirit of collaboration." On July 13, 1922, just three days after Mohammed-el-Habib ascended the throne of the Beys, were promulgated in his name the reforms which France had determined to grant to the Regency -- the council-lier system: Grand Council, Regional Councils, and Councils of the Caidats. Though the Communists denounced the reforms, the inhabitants of Tunisia for the most part seemed to approve them and felt that France had conceded many of their demands.

110. Ch. des Dép., Détats, July 5, 1922, pp. 2326-23.
111. Pellegrin, op. cit., p. 212.
The cry for a constitution did not die out altogether by any means. Cleavage, as has been noted, had appeared in the group advocating liberal reforms: on the one side were the extreme Young Tunisians, who had begun to advocate nothing less than the complete independence of Tunisia from France, while on the other side were those who desired a constitutional regime which would still be dominated, however, by France. The Communists were naturally attracted to the side of the extremists. But with the reforms of 1922 the intensity of opposition disappeared for a time. The matter was to continue to smoulder, and from time to time to burst into flame. The really active movement again developed in 1935-33, and forms a part of our final chapter.
CHAPTER XV

ITALY SEEKS COMPENSATION

Relations between France and Italy, following the establishment of the protectorate over Tunisia, were anything but happy. The decade of 1836-96 especially was one of ill-feeling of such pronounced proportions that it became a factor of international importance. In the background as an ever present element, whether in office or out, was Francesco Crispi:

• • • The most potent personality in Italy. His intense animosity toward France, a thing of earlier origin, was accentuated by his enthusiasm for the recently developed connection with Germany. . . . . Crispi's influence, always active against France, was of great power in intensifying the ill-feeling in Italy against France. 1

It has already been pointed out that following Great Britain's agreement in 1833 to give up consular jurisdiction in the Regency, Italy also reluctantly fell in line on January 24, 1834, agreeing to suspend, but not to suppress it. When Mancini, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Decrais, the French Ambassador, concluded that protocol in Rome, France pledged herself to respect all previous

---

treaties; this laid the foundation for the serious difficulties which arose between the two powers in 1888.

There were other major reasons for the 1888 disagreements also. To the ill-feeling engendered by the matter of the consular courts was added that which developed as a result of conflict between the two powers outside the Regency as well. In 1886 the French Chamber of Deputies refused to accept a new commercial treaty which it had under consideration; in retaliation Italy denounced the commercial treaty of 1881, and a tariff war was on between the two countries. Then on May 30, 1888, in Massawa, which Italy had occupied in 1885, Italy ordered a tax ranging from two to seven lira a month to be levied on all householders and tradesmen, both Italians and foreigners. When two French residents protested, a lively dispute developed, with the French invoking the Capitulations. Italy maintained throughout that they no longer applied, since a Moslem country had come into the possession of a Christian country.

Then on September 15, 1888, in the name of Ali Bey, were issued decrees concerning public instruction and associations


in Tunisia. By these two decrees 1) all schools in the Regency became subject to French inspection, certification and regulation of teachers was required, and French was rendered obligatory in both elementary and secondary schools, and 2) any association not already authorized was forbidden. These decrees were considered by Italy as having been designed especially to affect her and to diminish her prestige and preponderance in the Regency, although France insisted that they were designed for general application. Crispi flatly stated that he believed them to have been issued by France solely as retaliatory measures because of the Massawa incident.

It has been pointed out, however, that these and similar measures formed a part of the general early repression exerted by France after the establishment of the protectorate, when she was equally suspicious of the indigènes and all foreigners. Furthermore certain measures, promulgated by Crispi and which had direct application to the Regency, would seem to have precipitated the action of the French. In that year he reorganized the Italian schools in foreign countries, and put those in Tunisia under the effective authority of the Italian government. Thus, they became virtually state institutions supported by the Italian government. "Placed


7. Crispi, Politica Esterà, p. 293.
under the direct authority of the Italian government, administered on the spot by a committee of local patronage, inspected by an officer attached to the Italian consulate, they were entirely outside French administrative authority."

Nevertheless Crispi protested the beylical decrees of 1888 in a vigorous fashion, notifying Berlin, Vienna, and London, as well as the administration in Tunis, on September 23 that the new laws could not be applied to Italians because of previous treaty agreements. He based his position on the following legal position: 1) In 1868 the treaty between Italy and Tunisia confirmed the Italians in the Regency "in the enjoyment of all rights, privileges, or immunities which they had acquired either by usage or by treaty;" 2) at the time of the treaty of Bardo it was declared that the government of the French Republic would guarantee the execution of the treaties already existing between the government of the Regency and those of the different states of Europe; and 3) through the adjustment in 1831 concerning consular jurisdiction it was stipulated in the protocol that


10. BFSP., Vol. LXIX, pp. 1230-90, gives the English translation; it is given in Italian in Raccolta dei trattati e delle convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia ed i governi sterei (Florence, 1872), Vol. III, p. 133-95, #27; the French version is in Documents Diplomatiques, Revision des traités Tunisiens, 1831-97 (Paris, 1897), pp. 25-30; hereafter cited as DDRT.

11. Vide Art. 1, appendix E.
"all other immunities, privileges and guarantees assured by the Capitulations, by usage, and by treaty should remain in force."

On September 28 Crispi telegraphed to Menabrea, the Italian Ambassador to Paris:

If the Bey of Tunis were an independent Prince, I should know what to do. But as he is under the protection of France, like a ward under his guardian, I am obliged to apply to the protecting power for an explanation of this very serious matter. There are 23,000 Italians in Tunisia. . . . We cannot relinquish our privileges. . . . It must not be forgotten that consular jurisdiction in Tunisia is suspended not abolished. 13

Goblet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, insisted that Italy should wait to see how the laws were applied, assuring Menabrea that they would not work adversely against Italy, but Crispi was not easily to be put off. On October 21 he again sent word to the ambassador in Paris that:

. . . . no other power has schools in the Regency and a colony so numerous, for whom the means of education must be provided. By accepting the Bey's decrees without protest, the other powers are yielding nothing to France, for no right of theirs is being assailed. To them it is merely a question of principle. 14

French public opinion had likewise become inflamed, and war between the two powers was considerably in Crispi's mind.

12. Italy, Ministero degli affari esteri, Trattati e convenzione tra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati (Rome, 1886), Vol. X, art. 11, p. 10.


On July 16, 1889 he notified Catalani, the chargé d'affaires in London, who was to relay the information to Lord Salisbury, that if war were to come, "I shall have been driven to it." Throughout the months from September 1883 to November 1890 the diplomatic correspondence and conversations were hectic. Germany, whose relations with France began in 1885 to be less friendly, and Austria tended to support Crispi in this matter, while England tended to support France. Res- sman, the German chargé d'affaires in Vienna, reported also that he had been informed that "Lord Salisbury himself has declared he sees no objection to the application of the Bey's decrees to English schools in Tunisia;" he received his information from Count Münster, the German Ambassador to London, who in turn had got it from Roblet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Floquet cabinet. Salisbury's own attitude towards the entire situation is made rather clear by a statement he made in July 1888, regarding the Franco-Italian situation in Tunisia:

I think the fault is mainly on the side of Italy, which assumes an unfriendly attitude on

15. Ibid., p. 326
one petty question after another. But whether it is in pursuance of a fixed design or only represents Crispi's liability to lumbago, I am not at present in a condition to say. I incline to the latter hypothesis. 19

The tempest died down as France did not seem to be disturbing either the already established schools or associations of the Italians. There were a number of both in the Regency.

In addition to the political implications involved, the Italians were resentful of the French assumption of authority in respect to the schools by the new decrees, partly because they were proud of the seal with which they had always maintained schools in the past for the Italian colony and partly because of the obligatory use of the French tongue on both elementary and secondary levels which was now to be required. In 1331 the first Italian school had been established by a political refugee, Salema. Elementary and then secondary schools had been opened, and eventually in 1364 the Collegio Italiano; in 1370 the Scuola Tecnica and in 1887 the Conveto Italiano came into existence.

In 1385, in order to protect Italian interests threatened under the French protectorate, there had been founded an association which was soon known as the Camera di commercio ed arti. It began to publish a monthly bulletin telling of

its activities, provided financial help for the needy, and acted as the "connecting link between the Italian colony and the consulate." In 1886 the newspaper, L'Unione, began to be published and became soon a powerful organ of the government in Rome. In 1890 the Italian colonial hospital was opened, and in 1891 a society for the encouragement and diffusion of Italian instruction was instituted.

In respect to Tunisia Italy still felt thwarted in the accomplishment of what she considered her normal colonial aspirations. But as her citizens continued to cross to the Regency she was challenged to preserve their Italianità. The establishment of the protectorate gave a great impetus to Italian immigration. The construction of the railroad from Tunis to the Algerian border in 1873 had begun the influx of laborers from Sicily, and had started the change in nature of immigrants from the earlier class of merchants and small businessmen, who had come chiefly from Leghorn. By 1881 the number of Italians in Tunisia was variously estimated from the French figure of 11,206 to that given by the Italian consul-general of 30,000. However, the construction of


22. Cataluccion, op. cit., p. 44.

23. Villari, The Expansion of Italy, p. 57; it must be noted that the official Italian figures correspond with the French, save for the notation "incomplete." Cf. Italia, Dirizione generale della statistica, Censimento degli Italiani all'estero, dicembre, 1881 (Rome, 1904), xxxiv, xlii, lxxiv, and passim.
roads, ports, barracks, schools, hospitals, and other public works undertaken by the French government produced a materially increased demand for cheap labor, which Italian workers were ready to supply.

By 1896, therefore, the Italian population was five times as great as it had been at the time of the occupation -- 55,572, according to French figures. It was to preserve the Italianità of these sons of hers, and their brothers, uncles, and cousins, who continued to swell the numbers of Tunisian colonists, that caused Italy to struggle so fiercely with France in the subsequent years.

Then in July 1890, just when the school and association conflict seemed to be subsiding, another source of difficulty developed. On July 14, 1890, Crispi was warned by the Italian consul at Tunis, C. B. Machiavelli, that he believed that France and the Bey had signed a treaty by which the Bey's family would cease to rule on the death of Ali; France would also guarantee the Bey's civil list forever, and would undertake to pay 2,000,000 francs annually to the Bey de Camp, were he to renounce his right to the throne.

Two days later Machiavelli in a new despatch gave further details, which he said had been communicated to him by the English consul, and which bore the imprint of credibility too real to seem to be rumor or coincidence:


25. Crispi, Politica Estera, pp. 359-60; Cataluccio, op. cit., p. 50.
On Wednesday, the ninth, the Prince Talib and Hussein, met with His Highness [the Bey] along with M. Regnauld, representing the Resident-General, and with the procurator of the Republic, M. Fabry, and Commander Catroux, as interpreter; it seems to have been agreed that the Bey's family would cease to rule after the death of the present Bey and that France could guarantee the civil list of the Princes, fixing in perpetuity 2,000,000 francs for the one of them to whom the throne would have come in the order of succession, were it not for the abdication of Ali Bey and of the two nearest heirs. . . .

From the way in which Mr. Drummond spoke to me I suspected that the news came from the Bey himself or another Tunisian Prince, knowing that if they lack the courage to resist openly, they would, however, see with joy other European powers intervene to put up dikes against the constantly increasing invasion on the part of France in Tunisia.

Again Crispi called on England, Austria, and Germany for support. Though Crispi was notified that "M. Ribot unhesitatingly declared that the report . . . concerning the arrangement between the French and the Bey, including an annuity of 2,000,000 francs to his heirs, is absolutely false," the Italian premier was far from convinced. On July 23, he wrote to Salisbury that French denials must be accepted warily, reiterating the Italian position that Italy had been grossly deceived by the false assurances of Saint-Hilaire as late as April 6, 1891; he commented somewhat bitterly, "If [the denial] has a relative importance, but does not reassure us when we think of the previous conduct


27. Prince Bismarck had retired on Mar. 19, 1890, and had been succeeded by Caprivi.

of the government of the Republic." It is interesting to note that the editors of the French diplomatic documents concerning the origins of the war state that in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is to be found no trace of this supposed accord between France and the Bey, the report of which so disturbed Crispi and which was formally denied by Ribot. True or not, it served to stir up muddy waters.

The position of Germany in the event of trouble between France and Italy was carefully considered by Caprivi and his ministers, just as there was deep speculation by him and an attempt to determine the part England would play in such an event. In the somewhat considerable number of documents published in Die Grosse Politik after May 1890 on the Tunisian-Tripolitanian question, Caprivi repeatedly went into the problem of whether Germany was bound by article III of the secret accord of February 20, 1887, protocol attached to the second treaty of the Triple Alliance, to take up arms against

---


30. Waddington to Ribot, July 22, 1890, DDOG. (Paris, 1933), Vol. VIII, p. 176 fn., #127. In a telegram the next day however, it was averred that "Crispi . . . says that the news of the treaty with the French comes from the court of the Bey and has been confirmed by the youngest brother of the latter." Solms-Sonnenwalde to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 23, 1890, DGF. (Berlin, 1923), Vol. VIII, pp. 256-57, #1881.
France in the event of Franco-Italian conflict over Tunisia, a move which he was obviously reluctant to undertake.

It was at this point that Crispi's colonial aspirations began to emerge more clearly, that he was seen to be motivated by more than frustration and chagrin over the losing of Tunisia.

He continued to keep alive with the English cabinet the discussion of Mediterranean problems, wrote personally to Salisbury, pointed out the necessity for Italy to occupy Tripolitania and gave instructions to Menabrea to express clearly the firm resolve of the Italian government to oppose any kind of attempt to change the situation in the Regency.

Crispi began to stress the fact that he feared the turn of Tripoli would come next as France pursued her policy of expansion, a peril which Italy could not possibly permit. Italy "would be permanently menaced by France, and Malta and Egypt would not suffice to ensure the possessions of Great Britain. . . . We are your necessary allies, and our union guarantees your domination in Malta and Egypt," Crispi wrote in July to Lord Salisbury. In spite of Crispi's continued urging of some definite action on the part of Great Britain, Salisbury gave no specific promises; instead


he urged circumspection and patience.

On July 31, after an interview with Salisbury, Catalani, chargé d'affaires in London telegraphed to Crispi: "... "

His last words were, 'The Italian government will have Tripoli in the end, but the huntsman does not fire until the stag is within the range of his rifle, in order that it may not escape him, even if he only succeeds in wounding it'. 34

Salisbury himself replied to Crispi as follows:

I am entirely of Your Excellency's opinion as regards the probable future of Tunisia. That country is destined, sooner or later, to become French, but I believe this issue is still distant, I also share your views concerning the danger of further advance on the part of France. The political interests of Great Britain, as well as those of Italy, cannot allow Tripoli to share the fate of Tunis. When such an event becomes imminent, it must be provided against. But I do not believe it to be near at hand. France has a long road to travel before reaching that point. 35

Meanwhile, of course, Italy was attempting to secure promises or guarantees from France as to Tripoli and Tunisia. In Paris Menabrea, the Italian Ambassador, was handling the negotiations. On August 1, 1890, he sent the following dispatch to Crispi concerning the interview which he had had the previous day with de Freycinet, who had become premier in March:

I reminded him that several of the French ministers, Ferry himself among others, had

34. Catalani to Crispi, July 31, 1890, Politica Estera, p. 370.

recognized the necessity for this adjustment, and that Ferry had promised me the support of the French government in bringing about our occupation of Tripoli, in exchange for Tunisia.

... Owing to ministerial changes both in France and Italy this arrangement did not come about... I proceeded to inform de Freycinet that it was now his place to discover a means of satisfying Italy and reestablishing an honest understanding... In reply de Freycinet said that he fully recognized the gravity of the Tunisian question and that he had already advised his colleagues at the ministry of Foreign Affairs to avoid any action which might provoke the Italians... He promised me to consult with Ribot as to the best way of solving this difficult problem.

Crispi replied to Menabrea the following day that if France really wished to facilitate the peaceful acquisition of Tripoli by Italy, she should exert her influence both at St. Petersburg and Constantinople, "... for the consent of France alone is not sufficient to enable us to occupy the above-named territory."

During the course of the conversations between France and Italy on this matter, Menabrea left Paris on his holiday and negotiations were continued by Commander Ressman, the chargé d'affaires. On August 21, Ressman reported a meeting with Ribot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course


37. Crispi to Menabrea, Aug. 2, 1890, Crispi, Politica Estera, p. 339; for the French version of these conversations, documentation on which is not so full as reported by Crispi, see Ribot to Montebello, French Ambassador at Constantinople, Aug. 26, 1890, DDOG., Vol. VIII, pp. 230-32, #163.

of which the French minister suggested Italy's withdrawal from the Triple Alliance as the only possible basis on which France and Italy could ever arrive at mutually agreeable solutions to their problems. Ressman quoted Ribot as follows:

Until the Triple Alliance, which constitutes an even greater offense to the Czar than to the French Republic, has been denounced, no intimacy will ever be possible between Russia and Germany any more than between ourselves and the Italians. We may not be openly hostile, but we can never be true friends. 39

Crispi's reply on September 2 was a strong one, as might have been anticipated, for this was a subject dear to his heart:

It is well to remember the reasons which obliged Mancini to seek an alliance with Austria and Germany. From 1879 until 1883 Italy was not only the much abused victim of the government of the Republic, but was threatened by the Austrians and was despised at Berlin as well . . . Today everything is altered to our advantage and I will never allow Italy to return to that stage of humiliation to which her isolation condemned her up to the year 1881. 40

Crispi went on to say that before Ribot suggested the withdrawal of Italy from the alliance which had restored to her a place in the policy of nations, France should offer guarantees that she "would not renew her Tunisian venture in other regions, and that she would never betray us in our own peninsula by means of the Vatican." 41


40. Crispi to Ressman, Sept. 2, 1890, Crispi, Politica Esteria, pp. 335-34.

41. Idem.
Austria in the meantime was standing back of Crispi in his effort to prevent any possible change in the status quo in Tunisia. Nigra, the Italian Ambassador to Vienna, was charged to assure Crispi:

... that the Tunisian question, although it does not interest Austria-Hungary to any appreciable extent, is being most carefully considered here, and that, for its part, the royal and imperial government is disposed to participate in any action that may be deemed advisable in cooperation with England and Italy, in order to prevent the altering of the status quo in a manner detrimental to the general interests. 42

Austria's attitude in respect to the Italian aspirations in Tripoli was a tolerant one. Kálnoky, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared to Nigra that the Austro-Hungarian government "should an opportunity occur, has no objections to Italy's obtaining compensations on the African coast," 43 but reminded Italy at the same time that it was of major importance not to drive Turkey into the arms of Russia and France. Austria also indicated that she could not guarantee to furnish "material support" in such an eventuality.

Throughout Crispi's somewhat excited diplomacy Germany's attitude was deliberate. In July 1890 Caprivi telegraphed to Count Salm-Sonnenwalde, Ambassador to Rome: "We have sought, since our alliance, on each occasion which presented itself, to furnish Italy with the proof of the goodwill with

42. Ibid., p. 376.
43. Idem.
44. Idem.
which we are disposed to favor her interests." But at the same time on a telegram from the ambassador in Rome, in which was offered Crispi's suggestion that when Italy took Tripoli Turkey might be indemnified with a cash settlement, Caprivi wrote a marginal note: "We will be right in this affair . . . . according to the desire of Lord Salisbury . . . . to gain time; we ourselves have still need of more time in pessimum eventum." At the end of the month Holstein, Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs expressed Germany's attitude rather clearly:

As for Tripoli . . . . the principle prevails always that the reinforcement of Italy would be a direct advantage for the powers friendly to Italy, especially to Germany and England, who must desire in their own interests that Italy shall become strong enough to maintain equilibrium with the French in the Mediterranean. . . . Turkey is still a factor to be considered. Italy will be surer of her future if in all Mediterranean and Oriental questions she aligns her policy with that of England. 47

The final attitude of the allies, however, was made clear when the third treaty of the Triple Alliance was signed on May 6, 1891, for at that time Italy's special interests in the Mediterranean were particularly protected. There were special stipulations in respect to Tunisia, Cyrenaica, and

---


47. Holstein to Solms-Sonnenwalde, July 29, 1890, DPG., Vol. VIII, pp. 269-60, #1834.
On August 17, 1895, the French charge d'affaires at Rome stated that the old conditions were maintained into frame. The treaties were renewed, revised, and the old boundaries were understood as they had been, but in 1894 conditions so endangered Austria as to set her in motion to undertake a war, and she was succeeded by another, a leader of the Right.

During the Austrian ministries, French plans were not so strenuously opposed as they had been, but in 1894 conditions were understood as they had been.

Then to help Franco-Italian relations somewhat, Crisp was again returned to power and German help would be given to Italy.

If France attempted to extend her occupation of or even her pro-

rects over her sovereignty under any form whatsoever, it

view to the interests of equilibrium and compensation was

enforced to support Italy in any action taken with a

the appearance of a state of war would exist between France and Germany.

It was understood to support Italy in any action taken with a

position in the Mediterranean should feel that she must

and in consequence she did not in order to safeguard

a state of war would exist between France and

heightened, or her sovereignty under any form whatsoever,

It was understood to support Italy in any action taken with a

compensation of the

result of the mature examination of the
Rome sent to the Consulta a note bearing the denunciation of the Italo-Tunisian treaty of 1863, to take effect on September 23 of the following year. And then almost before Italy had an opportunity to attempt to solve the problems which were thus created, she had suffered her defeat at Adowa on March 1, 1896. Overwhelmed by the wave of national grief and indignation, Crispi resigned. The Marchese di Rudini was again asked to form a cabinet, in which Visconti-Venosta took the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and promptly set himself to the task of working out a solution to Italy's position in respect to the Regency.

Both the new premier and foreign minister moved warily, however, lest, as Bülow, German Ambassador to Rome, explained to Prince Hohenlohe, the Chancellor, France should "do as she did recently at Madagascar, that is to say annex the Regency." To Bülow Visconti-Venosta explained his position personally: "In this affair I do not wish either to make concessions to France for which I shall be reproached in my own country nor to set up an uproar which I believe

52. Billêt, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 156; Tumedei, op.cit., p. 4. The document of the denunciation as given in Tumedei has been included as appendix H in this work. The treaty of 1863 had been signed for a 25 year period, with the stipulation that if it were not denounced by one of the contracting parties at least one full year before its expiration, it was to remain in force for another similar term of years.


dangerous and harmful." Actually Visconti-Venosta, in
the eyes of most Italians, conducted the negotiations with
a good deal of cleverness under the circumstances, and on
September 28, 1896, the new set of conventions were signed.
They were to remain in force until October 1, 1905.

It was galling to Italy that in signing these conventions
concerning Tunisia with the protecting country, France, she
was forced actually to recognize the protectorate, which up
to this time she had officially ignored. But this was not
the only sacrifice which she had to make: the most favored
nation clause was renounced, the autonomous Italian post-
ofices were suppressed, and the Tunis-La Goulette railroad
was ceded to the French Bône-Guelma company.

Visconti-Venosta did not reveal all of the concessions
in the debate in the Chamber of Deputies, which began on

55. Bulow to Hohenlohe, July 22, 1896, ibid., Vol. XI,
pp. 296-97, #2821.

56. Texts are given in Italian in Raccolta dei trattati
e convenzione fra il regno d'Italia ed i governi esteri, Vol.
XIV, p. 315 ff.; and in French in DDR., 47-72, #6, 7, 8, 9,
10.

57. Cataluccio, op.cit., p. 54 and Tumedei, op. cit.,
p. 19, give conflicting Italian interpretations of the ser-
iousness of Italy's concessions. Manlio Minozzi, Sulla
questione tunisina (Rome, 1935), pp. 73-81, postulates an
elaborate thesis that Italy "did not intend to give even
tacit recognition of the French protectorate" at this time.
Among the reasons he puts forth is that in the official
Italian acts the word protectorate is never used: e.g. "the
Italian-Tunisian treaty" is referred to, when the presidents
of the Chamber and the Senate spoke of opening "the discussion
on the commercial and maritime conventions between Italy
and Tunisia," etc.
December 15, 1896. Tumedei who is highly critical of Visconti-Venosta's policy said of the conventions:

... it is obvious that the reservation ... on this point in Parliament cannot be interpreted but by the fear that the Chambers would have refused the proposals if they had known the whole truth about the sacrifices which had been imposed upon us. 59

Replying to the criticisms of the deputies Saporito and Salandra during the debate, Visconti-Venosta pointed out that to have abandoned the treaty of 1868 without trying to find a substitute for it would have resulted in serious trouble for Italy "... would had had as a certain result that of making the French administration irreconcilably hostile to the Italian element in Tunisia."

In some detail he explained why the same questions as to the validity of the French protectorate, which had been raised by Italy in 1881, had not formed a basis of the negotiations:

... if we wanted to negotiate, the only possible method was not to permit the interven-

58. See especially Tumedei, op. cit., pp. 4-8, where he maintains that Italy was legally in sound position, that even with the end of the treaty of 1868 all the usages, and customs, as well as the other treaties should have remained alive anyway and that therefore Italy did not have to make new agreements.

59. Ibid., p. 19.

tion of those questions of principle around which a preliminary discussion would have had no effect, so to speak, except to obstruct the beginning of negotiations. 61

Visconti-Venosta considered that he had made the best of a bad situation, and he was upheld by the vote of the Chamber in the approval of the conventions.

The agreements signed in 1896 consisted of three conventions: 1) a convention of commerce and navigation, 2) a consular convention, and 3) a convention of extradition. Each of them pertained to one of the disputes which had previously disturbed Franco-Italian relations.

Italy had been particularly anxious over the commercial relations and tariff arrangements with the Regency. On the basis of the treaty of 1868 and the "most favored nation" clause, Italy had been accustomed to demand special rights in the matter of customs duties. At the time of the protectorate, Tunisian goods entering France, however, were subject to the general tariff, while French goods entering Tunis were taxed 3 per cent ad valorem; but the products of six foreign powers, because of favorable agreements with the Bey, which France had to recognize, entered at lower rates. France naturally was resentful that other nations were more favored than she in the country now under her protectorate.


By an agreement of July 19, 1890, certain changes in this situation, which from the French point of view had been highly adverse to her interests, were effected: a certain quantity of the principal Tunisian agricultural products were exempted from any taxation in Algeria and France. But French producers still did not feel that they were receiving in the Regency the kind of privileged treatment which they considered legitimately theirs. Then, at the time of the signing of the conventions, ministerial support was definitely with the French producers; Jules Méline, head of the French agrarian protectionist movement, was premier from April 1896 to June 1898.

Italy was fully aware of the jealousy of the French over her highly favorable situation in the Regency, and naturally had striven to maintain it. But as France felt increasingly secure of her protectorate, she had dared to denounce the 1863 treaty and with it Italy's satisfactory economic status therein. By the conventions of 1896, therefore, Italy was forced to yield her privileged position. French and Italian writers differ markedly on the results of this arrangement in respect to Italian commerce. Tumedei wrote:

As a result Italian commerce had to experience for a few years a serious crisis, effect a painful work of transformation, and go through a period of delay which still has repercussions and

---

63. Tumedei, op. cit., p. 16.
64. Ibid., p. 8; Schumann, op. cit., p. 429.
which has harmed enormously its relations to French commerce. 65

Loth, on the other hand, grants it to be true that Italian commerce went through a temporary depression, but claimed that by 1903 it had again reached the level of 1897. Of course in that interim the Italian population had increased materially and Tumedei bemoans the fact that Italian commercial advantages did not increase in proportion.

The conventions of 1896 incidentally clarified certain problems which had developed after 1884 from the denunciation of the consular courts. First of the difficulties was the matter of discrimination. It was stipulated first of all (Art. I), that the Italians in Tunisia were to be treated on the same basis and enjoy the same rights and privileges as the French. Secondly there was the matter of the protégés of the Italians. In Tunisia at the time of the establishment of the protectorate the native employed by consuls or merchants of Christian states came under consular protection, thus enjoying certain privileges. After the Treaty of Bardo the problem arose of what to do with these individuals. By the protocol of January 25, 1884, it was stipulated that they would come under the jurisdiction of the newly instituted French courts, but that they would continue to benefit from

65. Tumedei, op. cit., p. 17.
67. DDRT., art. I, p. 52, #7.
the privileges and immunities and advantages assured by the capitulations, usages, and conventions. This virtually amounted to the assimilation of these dependents by the nationals, and much as France would have liked to do so, she feared to upset the status quo in this respect. Under the new agreement, it was provided that the indigences registered at the Italian Consulate General in Tunisia should enjoy the same rights as the Italians themselves. Thirdly there was the matter of schools and associations. By an annexed protocol in the 1896 agreements, the Italian associations and establishments already existing in the Regency were considered as in possession of legal authorization, and for the Italian schools and the hospital already opened the status quo would be maintained, under the conditions under which they were formerly operated.

And likewise of prime importance to the Italians in respect to the problem of nationality was the stipulation that "persons who shall have retained Italian or Tunisian nationality, according to the laws of their country shall be regarded as Italian subjects in Tunisia and Tunisian subjects in Italy." Since the nationality conflict between France and Italy was to be the basis of the critical problems which developed between France and Italy in later years, this agreement should be

68. Ibid., protocol, art. II, p. 64, #8.
69. DDRT., protocol, art. III, p. 64, #8.
70. Ibid., art. XIII, p. 55, #7
particularly noted at this time. Because France's colonial policy was not well defined at the time, she did not realize the full import of this clause of the convention. In order to gain a free hand commercially and to induce Italy to relinquish her rights of trade-priority, France made concessions to Italy's desire of safeguarding her nationals in Tunisia. That she was throwing out the bone of contention for the years to come she evidently did not see. An immunity was thereby "conferred on the Italians from all attempts to assimilate them to the society in which they live; and thus France, to gain a purely temporary trade-advantage, forever closed the door on the achievement of social unity in her possession."

It is interesting, considering the criticisms of Tumedei and certain of the deputies, that the reaction of the Italian colony in the Regency to the 1896 settlement seems to have been favorable. Cataluccio quotes an unpublished letter of the Italian consul in Tunis, Machiavelli, as follows:

The great majority of our colony shows itself to be satisfied with the agreements made at Paris, since it is seen that the schools are preserved in the fullness of their teaching autonomy and that other important moral and material interests are protected. 72

In the same vein L'Unione, which was the organ of the Italian

72. Machiavelli to di San Guliano, Oct. 8, 1896, Cataluccio, op. cit., p. 54 n.
interests in the Regency, and as a consequence had been deeply concerned with the status of the colony following the denunciation of the 1868 treaty, is quoted from the issue of December 20, 1896, as saying: "Though L'Unione has fought conditions in Tunisia which it did not recognize, now that Italy has accepted it (these agreements) it would be childish to continue antagonism." And the same article concluded that there was no point in playing the part of a Don Quixote, tilting at windmills, and piously hoped for better relations between the French and Italian colonists in Tunisia.

The formation of the Rudini ministry and the signing of the 1896 conventions marked the beginning of improved relations between France and Italy. In 1897 the crown prince, Victor Emmanuel visited Paris with his bride, "and the fêtes in their honor tended to draw the two Latin nations together." The arrival of Camille Barrère, one of the most accomplished of French diplomats, as the French Ambassador, at the end of 1897 fostered the renewal of Franco-Italian harmony also. Then in 1899 came two developments which assisted in the rapprochement. After Dupuy became premier the tariff war which had embittered relations and seriously


74. Fay, op. cit., p. 144.

affected the trade between the two countries was ended with a new commercial treaty. Likewise by a convention of March 21, 1899,

Delcassé came to an agreement with England in regard to the delimitation of spheres of influence in the regions between the Congo and the Upper Nile, and at the same time quieted Italian apprehensions by indicating that the French had no aspirations to the east of Tunis, in the Tripoli region coveted by Italy.

With the way thus opened, in December 1900 after a year and a half of long and drawn-out negotiations, Barrère and Visconti-Venosta arrived at a secret agreement, drawn up in the form of letters mutually exchanged. By the terms of the agreement, France reiterated that she did not intend either to extend the Tunisian frontier nor her own sphere of influence at the expense of Tripoli. She agreed in addition to respect the caravan routes from Tripoli to French territory. She did not, however, recognize the right of Italy to extend its influence in the Tripolitanian province without French consent. On the other hand, the Italian government recognized the right of France to extend its influence in Morocco in any way chosen, with the reservation that if modification of the Cherifian empire were made, to the political or territorial advantage of France, Italy might seek

76. Fay, op. cit., pp. 134-135; Tummede, op. cit., p. 8; Dupuy was premier from Nov. 1, 1898 to June 22, 1899, Schuman, op. cit., p. 429.

77. Fay, op. cit., p. 145; Cooch, loc. cit.

78. DDA, pp. 1-2, #1.
equivalent compensation in Tripoli.

"The growing intimacy between France and Italy was now emphasized outwardly in every way possible." The Grand Cross of the French Legion of Honor was bestowed upon Victor Emmanuel; the Italian fleet visited Toulon, and every possible friendly demonstration was made during that visit; in both countries the tone of the press changed. And the accords of 1900 were no sooner signed than further conversations were undertaken concerning the Triple Alliance and the possible effect its provisions might have on the relations between France and Italy. These negotiations, as had been those of 1900, were slow of conclusion. Although Bülow on January 3, 1902, in a speech in the Reichstag, warned Italy that the Triple Alliance "was not a business concern for making profit, but an insurance company," Italy did not heed the warning. Even though she carried on negotiations for the renewal of the Triple Alliance, protesting meanwhile her loyalty to Germany and Austria, she continued the negotiations also with France.

79. Ibid., pp. 3-4, annex #1 and 2 to #1.
81. Ibid.
82. DDGG, 2nd ser. (Paris, 1931), Vol. II, passim, contains some 150 items pertaining to the diplomacy and negotiations of this period; likewise DDP. (Berlin, 1924), Vol. XVIII, pt. II, passim has a smaller number of documents which pertain to the Franco-Italian and Franco-German communications of the same negotiations. See also Gooch, op. cit., p. 346.
On June 4, 1902, just a little more than three weeks before the renewal of the Triple Alliance, Delcassé secured from Court Tornielli, the Italian Ambassador to Paris, a copy of a telegram from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs in which it was stated that: "in the renewing of the Triple Alliance there is nothing either directly or indirectly aggressive against France... no stipulation which menaces the security and tranquillity of France." France, therefore, continued the conversations, which resulted on November 1, 1902, in a second interchange of letters, the contents of which were to be secret, signed by Barrère and Primetti, as Minister of Foreign Affairs for Italy. With the Italian membership in the Triple Alliance rendered innocuous, France was quite willing to sign the accord of mutual disinterest, which permitted Italy unquestioned rights in Tripoli and Cyrenaica in exchange for similar rights in Morocco. Henceforth, comments Fay, "Italy had a foot in both camps and could jump in either direction, though she was not wholly trusted by either her old ally or her new

33. DDA., pp. 5-6, #4. The Franco-Italian accords were not made public until 1920 when the Minister of Foreign Affairs published a special volume of the Livres Jaunes containing them and some of the correspondence concerning them. The new treaty of the Triple Alliance was signed June 28, 1902; see Bullow to Wedel, June 28, 1902, DDP., Vol. XVIII, pt. II, pp. 609-10, #5774.

34. DDA., pp. 6-10, #6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
friend." But Italy saw her way clearing at last for her hope for colonial possessions, towards her colonial aspirations in Tripoli.

85. Fay, op. cit., p. 149; Gooch, op. cit., p. 347.
CHAPTER XVI

THE "FINAL" SETTLEMENT
OF THE TUNISIAN QUESTION

Though there was a détente in Franco-Italian relations as a result of the 1896 conventions and the 1900 and 1902 secret accords, trouble between the two countries over Tunisia was by no means at an end. Slowly the claims and counter claims over the Regency were to increase and be magnified up to the time of what was believed to be the mutually satisfactory final settlement of 1935. In the main, however, the controversies can be divided into two major categories: 1) the questions which concerned Italian expansion into Libya, and 2) those which concerned the efforts of the Rome government to maintain and foster Italianità within the Regency -- e.g. the matters pertaining to schools, to associations, to the practice of the liberal professions, and to the civil status of Italians resident in Tunisia. There is, unfortunately from the point of view of clear exposition, considerable interweaving of these two categories, but in so far as it is possible they will be related separately.

With the beginning of the twentieth century, Italy bided her time until the appropriate moment should arise for the seizure of Tripoli and the realization of the colonial aspirations conceived by Crispi. However, from the time of the signing of the 1900 accord, Italian activity in Tripoli was intensified. In 1900 the Rubattino Company, which had been so
active in the negotiations for the Tunis-La Goulette road, established in Tripoli a steamship line connecting with its other Mediterranean services; in 1907 the Banco di Roma established branch banks; Italian capital was invested in the Turkish vilayet; and other lines of navigation, as well as Italian schools were established. By 1908 Tripoli, except for its political status, was virtually an Italian province.

Then in 1911 Italy at last saw her opportunity. Although Austria-Hungary had seized Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria had declared her complete independence in 1908, there had been no successful opposition on the part of Turkey or any of the Great powers. However, these very incidents blocked Italy's hope of a peaceable, economic conquest, for the Young Turks, after their revolution in 1908, determined not to lose Tripoli as they had Bosnia and the Balkan countries, attempted to block every Italian move. The Moroccan crisis of 1911 precipitated events and the alleged repeated attacks of the Tripolitanian indigenes against certain Italian citizens furnished Italy with the necessary pretext -- a pattern not unlike that of the French use of the Kroumir raids as justification for the intervention in Tunisia. Italy declared war on September 29, 1911. On October 3 the Benedetto Brin fired the first canon shot against the fort of the city of Tripoli, and by October 5 the city and the oasis were occupied.


Italian sentiment was not entirely in favor of the expedition in spite of a long, careful press campaign of preparation. Many of the elder statesmen were still aware of the weakness of Italy which had been proved by the defeat at Adowa. Giolitti, for example, who had again become premier in 1911, "had undertaken the war, not so much because he was enthusiastic about it, as because he needed it to strengthen his internal political position. He and his colleagues evidently sighed with relief when it was all happily over." Among the newer spokesmen was Benito Mussolini, then editing La Lotta di Classe at Forli, who was so violently opposed to the campaign in Tripoli that he reputedly "successfully organized a general strike of protest against the war, for which he spent several months in jail." Though he stoutly denied that he had incited the strike, he defended his anti-war speeches and articles as follows:

... therefore, in my capacity as a good Italian citizen, I expressed, on the basis of economic and geographical facts, my opinion that this enterprise was calculated to injure gravely the interests of the nation, with which are bound up indissolubly the interests of the proletariat. 5

It is possible that this lack of unanimity of opinion at home helped to make the Italians more suspicious of the atti-

---


tude and conduct of the French. During the war there was serious discord between the two countries. As has been indicated, as a result of the secret accords of 1902, France was obligated to maintain a neutral position throughout the Italo-Turkish war. Perhaps, also, because the progress of conquest seemed slow, Italian criticism of French neutrality was considerable. France was accused of permitting contraband from Tunisia to reach the Turks, and was reproached for failure to prevent the departure of caravans from the Tunisian frontier. The Italian press was free with such censure as the following:

At Tunis cartridges are made secretly and then sent to the Turkish camp by sea in great barges, or over the land route. According to reliable information over 400,000 liras worth have been ordered. . . . The customs service at El Biban has been given over to an Arab and a Frenchman. 7

This type of criticism set the stage for the controversy over the French steamers Carthage and Manouba which were charged with neutrality violation. The former, en route to Tunis from Marseilles, was boarded on January 16, 1912, and convoyed to Sardinia. On board was an airplane which according to the testimony of Poincaré in the Chamber of Deputies was being sent by M. Duval, a resident of Paris, to himself in Tunis, where his son intended to use the ship for pleasure flying in the Regency and up. On January 13, the Manouba

6. Schneider, op. cit., p. 3.
also was boarded and taken to Cagliari.

Over the second incident French feeling ran very high, because of a situation which seemed inexcusable to her. Italy had learned that on the Manouba, when she sailed, would be a party of members of the Red Crescent Mission, but that among them would be several Turkish officers. She protested to France, and was assured that the matter would be thoroughly investigated on the arrival of the steamer, and that only bona fide members of the Mission group would be allowed to continue their journey. Unfortunately the Italian official message, countermanding the order to stop the Manouba at sea, did not reach the proper authorities in time to prevent action. France was aroused, feeling that an official promise had been mistrusted, and that Italy's action was totally uncalled for. The French press began to rattle swords. The Journal des Débats proclaimed that "it is now up to the French government to speak loudly and strongly enough to obtain the necessary reparations." The Siècle hoped that "the rather grave character of the situation will be understood at Rome, and that there will not be another twenty-four hours' delay in disavowing the ill-inspired functionaries."


11. Le Siècle, Jan. 19, 1912.
Italy apologized, in respect to both incidents, but recriminations were not silenced. Though Poincaré, in response to an interpellation on January 22, spoke in very mild terms and expressed the continuance of the traditional friendship between the two countries, several Italian writers censured him severely for expressing himself in a "form full of proud emphasis, not at all necessary, and certainly not opportune in one who at the same time proclaims himself a friend in words of great courtesy."

Likewise in articles by Rastignac (Vincenzo Morello), and Vittorio Vettori, both prominent Italian journalists, Italy was cautioned not to place too much confidence in French friendship, and counselled concerning future Italian policy, "... in the future ... an exact calculation of our interests, and ours alone, shall determine ... our [foreign policy] ..." Vittorio Vettori wrote in the same vein: "Let us remain ... friends of France only up to the point to which our dignity and our interests counsel us to do so ... ."

Though the incidents concerning the Manouba and the Carthage officially were closed, the hard feelings which had been

---


engendered lingered to complicate later Franco-Italian relations. In the meantime, the campaign in North Africa had not gone according to the Italian time schedule. Because of the stubborn resistance in Tripoli, with groups of Young Turks and Senoussi leading, it was a long time before Italy became actually mistress of Tripoli. However, continuous fighting for a year and pressure applied on the Dardanelles, finally brought the war to an end. In a protocol to the provisional treaty of peace signed at Lausanne-Ouchy on October 15, 1912, and confirmed by a decree issued at Constantinople the next day Turkey conceded autonomy to Tripoli and Cyrenaica and recognized Italy's sovereignty over them. In a decree promulgated October 17, King Victor Emmanuel III confirmed Italy's annexation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, now to be called Italian Libya.

Though the war, with its incidental sources of irritation was at an end, two major issues between France and Italy emerged from their adjoining interests in Tunisia and Libya: 1) the problem of the nationality of the indigenes, and 2) the boundaries between the two regions. Both were intensified and settled, for a time at least, as a result of the war of 1914 to 1918.

On the strength of the defensive character of the Triple

Alliance, Italy at first kept out of the struggle. The fact that Austria-Hungary had responded unfavorably to her approach concerning Trentino and Trieste and certain other Austrian lands which she wished to have ceded to her, certainly influenced Italy's action. In the meantime she had been approached by Great Britain, France, and Russia, and on April 26, 1915 the Treaty of London was signed, by which Italy entered an offensive alliance with the Allies and in return for her assistance was assured, at the victorious conclusion of the war, certain territory in Europe and on the Adriatic and Aegean seas. Article XIII, furthermore, read as follows:

. . . . In the event that France and Great Britain increase their colonial domains in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great Britain recognize in principle that Italy may claim equitable compensation, notably in the settlement in her favor of the questions concerning the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland, and Libya, and of the neighboring colonies of France and Great Britain. 20

On May 3, 1915, Italy declared her right to independent action and annulled her treaty with Austria-Hungary. On May 23, 1915 she declared war on Austria, August 22 on Turkey, October 19 on Bulgaria, and on August 27, 1916 on Germany.

20. Ibid., p. 9.
At the peace conference in Paris, therefore, Italy, invoking article XIII of the Treaty of London, claimed from France rectification of the western frontier of Libya, to the west and the south as far as Tibesti, Ennendi, and Borku, and the cession of France of Djibouti and the French railroad from Djibouti to Addis-Ababa. There were certain claims also against Britain, all of which however were in eastern Africa and therefore do not concern this study.

The Tunisian-Tripolitanian boundary question was an old one, which as a result of Italy's claims against France, thus became of extreme diplomatic importance. Consequently, in order that Italy's demands in respect to the frontier, may be clear, a review of the question and the regions involved seems advisable. Likewise a sketch map appears on page 467, which will show the boundary lines as drawn according to the various settlements.

After the establishment of the protectorate, the frontier between Tunisia and Tripoli had not been clearly defined. Crispi was at all times nervous about French expansion eastward, and as a consequence found himself deeply concerned with the question. In 1890 he had General Luchino Dal Verme prepare the following memorandum.

I. Apart from all those arguments to be deduced from diplomatic documents the examination alone of the maps of this region plainly demonstrates the fact that the historical boundary line between Tunisia and Tripolitania is not the one claimed by France,

22. Vera Michele Dean, "Italy's African Claims Against France," p. 64.
but another some thirty kilometers west. This moreover gives Tripolitania a desert of her own to the South of the Algerian Suf.

II. The usurpation of the territory between the old and the new boundary lines is disadvantageous to the power holding sway in Tripoli, both because of the occupation already accomplished and because of the danger of future usurpation to which the first point has opened a way.

III. The Anglo-French agreement of August 5, 1890, while appearing to respect the Tripolitanian Hinterland, in reality leaves France free to act as she may see fit in the regions of the east, and this to the serious detriment of the power which rules in Tripolitania. 23

And in the years which immediately followed, the subject of the boundary was the cause of much diplomatic correspondence and conversation between the two powers, in the course of which also England and Germany were involved. That the conversations were frequently strained is indicated by a dispatch of Menabrea, the Italian Ambassador to Paris, to Crisi:

My last interview with M. Ribot, which took place at his weekly reception on December 30, was a heated not to say violent one . . . . M. Ribot finally ended with a request that Your Excellency refrain from further accusations of this sort warning England and other powers of the French intention to annex Tripoli which might lead to parliamentary interpellations and other unpleasant incidents. 24

As France encouraged exploration into the Tripolitanian hinterland and began to show an interest in the Lake Tchad

23. Francesco Crisi, Questioni Internazionali (Milan, 1913), p. 28.

region, her motives were suspected in spite of her protests of political disinterestedness. The Turkish government as well as the Italian was disturbed, and when on August 5, 1890 there was an exchange of notes between France and Britain concerning the rights of Turkey in regions on the frontier of Tripoli, the Sultan's government addressed notes to both powers on October 30, 1890,

... in which it attempted to fix the limits of Libya to the south. On the basis of the hinterland doctrine the Sublime Porte asserted a claim to the territories of Tibesti, Borka and Bornou, and declared that the settlement of Barrowa, on Lake Chad, was to remain within the sphere of Turkish influence.

And at this time France did not see fit to deny the Ottoman claims, though in 1893 she made an effort to settle the boundary question by means of a series of conversations with the Porte. The French effort came to nothing, however. The delegates assembled on March 9, 1893, but when no settle-


26. Despagnet explains this as follows: "a state already occupying a portion of African territory sometimes lays claim that the hinterland is included within its sphere of influence. If this claim hangs on the clauses of a treaty there exists a traditional hinterland; if it does not derive from the clauses of a treaty there exists a moral hinterland." Rouard de Card, Traité de délimitation concernant l'Afrique française (Paris, 1910), p. 175, citing Frantz Despagnet, "Les occupations de territoires et le procédé de l'hinterland," Revue générale de droit international public, 1894, pp. 103 ff.

ment of the matters under discussion had been arrived at by May 24, the negotiations were given up.

After the Fashoda incident in 1898, the French zone of influence was unofficially extended as far as Tibesti. Though the European states previously had shown little interest in the development of the interior it now seemed advisable to France and Great Britain to agree upon their respective spheres of influence, so as to safeguard future relations. By a Franco-British convention of June 14, 1898, and a joint declaration of March 21, 1899, the matter was settled to their satisfaction, and by the map which accompanied the agreements Tibesti, Borkou, and Ennedi were included within the French sphere of influence. Both the Porte and Italy


29. In that year a French exploring expedition entered the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which Great Britain regarded as her sphere of influence. The British government sent Kitchener from Khartoum to expel the invaders. War was in the air, until the French gave way and renounced their claim to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.


32. Rouard de Card, Traité de délimitation concernant l'Afrique française, p. 115, gives the map; cf. sketch map in this study, p. 467.
protested against this as a violation of the rights of the 

Ottoman Empire.

With the signing of the accords of 1900 and 1902 France 

had indicated the limit of her pretensions, and Italy accepted 

these limits of French expansion as set forth by the map 

annexed to the Franco-British declaration of March 21, 1899. 

This was the cause of conflict later when Italy deeply re­ 
gretted a statement of policy which could be used so much to 

her disadvantage. One Italian writer expressed himself on 

the subject as follows:

By accepting the limits assigned by France to 
the vilayet of Tripoli and its hinterland, with 
the map annexed to the Declaration of 1899, the 
Italian Minister added his own consent to that 
previously given by Great Britain with regard to 
a purely arbitrary delimitation, contrary to the 
traditional Ottoman rights in that region, thus 
antescedently depriving the future Italian occupa­ 
tion of Tripoli of the two most important ... 
sectors of the frontier zones. Moreover, as a 
result of such recognition by Minister Prinetti, 
Italy formally renounced all the rights which the 
latter, during the entire period of her domination 
in Tripoli, had always asserted and effectively 
exercised -- over all the zone situated south of 
the line Ghat-Tummo, as far as the shores of Lake 
Tchad. 35

When in days to come the French pointed to the Prinetti– 
Barrère accord of 1902 as debarring Italy from making further 

---

33. Rouard de Card, Traité de délimitation concernant 
l’Afrique française, p. 115, gives the map; cf. sketch.

34. DDA., pp. 7, 9.

35. Cesare Salvati, Italië e Francia nel Sahara Orientale 
claims to the Libyan hinterland, the Italians insisted that in 1902 they had recognized, "not a settled frontier, but merely the confines of a zone of influence."

In 1910, with questions still arising as to the precise boundary line, a mixed commission from the French and Ottoman governments met again to try to iron out the question. On May 19, a convention was signed fixing the frontier from the sea to Chadamès. Behbat was assigned to Tunisia, and Ouezzan to Turkey. South of Djeneïen, the route ending the outskirts of Chadamès was assured to Tunisia, as well as certain of the strategic oases. France was well satisfied, and between the years 1910 and 1912 she successfully occupied Borkou and in 1915 to 1917 Tibesti, "alleging the necessity of policing these regions, which served as a base for incursions into Algeria by desert raiders." During the World War the Italians, whose occupation did not extend beyond Fezzan at


37. Rouard de Card, Traités de délimitation concernant l'Afrique française, supplement 1910-13 (Paris, 1913), pp. 123-214 and map on 127. Hereafter cited as Traités de délimitation, 1910-13; de Martens, op. cit., 3rd ser., Vol. VII, p. 91. Cf. Crispi, Questioni Internazionali, pp. 69-70. It is interesting to note in this connection that the preamble to the Franco-Turkish convention was not officially published, so as to humor the exceptionness of the Porte, which had never been willing to recognize the protectorate over Tunisia. Recognition was not given until the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres, Aug. 10, 1920 in which it was acknowledged as from May 12, 1881.

38. Dean, "Italy and France," p. 6.
that time, were driven back to the coast by the natives who still were opposed to the Italian occupation, while at the same time the French were solidifying their positions in Tibesti and Borkou.

Then on the day following the armistice Italy began to come forth with claims on the basis of Article XIII of the treaty of London, especially for a rectification of the Libyan frontier. The Italian demands for concessions in Africa were regarded by both France and England as excessive. Both countries maintained first of all that Article XIII referred only to the rectification of existing colonial frontiers and did not involve cession of territory, while Italy contended that it provided for "equitable" — in the sense of equivalent — compensation for such territories as France and Britain might acquire at Germany's expense. Furthermore France maintained that she could not seriously consider the cession of Tibesti and Borkou unless Italy would occupy and police them effectively. "Italy was not in a position, at that time, to give the necessary guarantees." At a later time, but while there was still considerable discussion of how badly Italy had fared at the treaty of Versailles, Tittoni who had become Minister of Foreign Affairs in June 1919 pointed out that:

41. Dean, "France and Italy," p. 6.
We might have had Tibesti and Borkou, but our Minister of Colonies was definitely opposed to it. At the beginning of the Libyan War there was one cry only: we had at any price to exact Tibesti and Borkou, which formed the necessary hinterland of Libya. Today, as soon as it was known that we were to have them the opposite cry was raised against an acquisition now denounced as burdensome.

However, by an agreement of September 12, 1919, between Bonin, Italian Ambassador to Paris, and Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, France did concede some points. The Bonin-Pichon notes, while leaving certain matters to be examined later, rectified the boundary between Libya and Tunisia by assigning to Italy the oases of El-Barkat and Fehout and the region comprising the caravan routes between Chat, Chadâmès, and Tummo. The result of the territorial rectification was to straighten out the three Italian salients ending in Chat, Chadâmès, and Tummo by taking away the two intervening French salients. The practical upshot was to put the chain of wells connecting these three places inside the Italian frontier, and thus to bring under unbroken Italian control this section of the caravan route between Lake Tchad and the Mediterranean.


44. Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., p. 69.
By this settlement, according to the French, all pledges and obligations implied by the treaty of London were fulfilled, but Italy considered it only a partial fulfillment since the preamble to the Bonin-Pichon notes spoke of reserving other points for future examination. The Italian cries for further sessions, especially for Tibesti, Borkou and the area extending to Lake Tchad, continued until they were silenced in 1935 by the Mussolini-Laval agreements, which will be discussed later.

The other major issue which developed out of the Italian conquest of Tripoli was the matter of nationality. But because it forms a part of the entire problem of the civil status of Italian nationals and of French efforts at naturalization, it will be considered in that connection instead of at this point in the study.

It has been indicated that, following the establishment of the protectorate, French moves to Gallicize Tunisia had been blocked in numerous instances by the desire of the Rome government to preserve the Italianità of its nationals. In the matter of naturalization, of course, the issue was a sharp one, as France increasingly attempted to impose French citizenship in the Regency.

From a legal point of view the matter was a difficult one, involving as it did the question of the existence of an independent Tunisian state, the power of the Bey and the actual

meaning of protectorate. Italy, of course, maintained the position that Tunisia remained a sovereign state and that, therefore, France had no legal right to impose French nationality.

After 1897, however, it was decreed that any Tunisian could legally become a Frenchman upon request, "providing he had distinguished himself for outstanding service to the Republic, or by the winning of high academic honors, and was willing to forego his status as a Mohammedan." The Jew was glad to take advantage of this opportunity, in order to escape the involved jurisdiction of the Tunisian courts and to be able to profit from clearly codified laws. The Mohammedan, on the other hand, became an outcast with his own people if he so acted, for he was forced to give up age-long customs pertaining to marriage and inheritance, etc. Hence in the first forty years of the protectorate, "only a few hundred Musulmen availed themselves of this opportunity." Though decrees again were passed in 1910


47. Minozzi, op. cit., pp. 9-20 gives one of the best legal defenses of the Italian position.


49. Idem.
and 1914 to facilitate the acquisition of nationality by indigenez France was seriously disappointed in the few who took advantage of it.

Each of the moves of the French, however, went a little further than the previous ones. The decree of June 19, 1914, provided that Tunisian citizenship should be attributed to any individual born in the Regency of parents, one or both of whom had been born there. By it Italians were exempted "by the conventions and treaties which bind the Tunisian government." Therefore, so long as the 1896 conventions were in force Italy felt safe about her nationals. But when on September 9, 1918, the convention of commerce and navigation and the consular convention were denounced by France, to be renewed at three month intervals, all feeling of protective security was gone. As the war was nearly over and the victory of the Allies then practically a certainty, Italy felt that France had committed this unfriendly act as soon as she no longer needed Italian help, and was consequently even more bitter. Ambassador Barrère, on communicating the denunciation to the Italian government justified it on the basis of the necessity of adapting the economic regime

52. Cataluccio, op. cit., p. 58.
of France to the necessities of the after-war period. The decision was of an "economic and commercial character, and contained no subterfuge." But that the new situation, thus set up, was highly unsatisfactory was stressed by many Italians, chief among them Mussolini who in the Italian Chamber of Deputies several years later said:

"...The tragic reality of the Tunisian question can be summed up thus: over the heads of the 130,000 Italians is suspended, by three month intervals, a veritable sword of Damocles. The question has been the object of negotiations which up to the present have come to naught. ... One cannot play with the future of 130,000 Italians to whom Tunisia owes its richness and prosperity."

Then on November 8, 1921 the long-feared blow fell on the Italians, when decrees were enacted attempting to put the French civil code into effect in Tunisia and providing for automatic naturalization. The decree of the Bey declared that every individual born in Tunisia, one of whose parents had also been born there, was to be considered a Tunisian, "under reservation of the dispositions of conventions or treaties binding the Tunisian government," while that of the President of the French Republic stated that every individual born in Tunisia of parents, one of whom, a foreigner within the jurisdiction of the French courts, had himself been born in the Regency, was to be considered a French citizen.

55. Le Temps, Nov. 14, 1924.
Italy claimed exemption on the basis of the conventions of 1896, but because of the tri-monthly renewal period perceived the extreme weakness of her position.

She was supported in her protests by Great Britain, who was disturbed by the position in which the decrees placed her considerable Maltese colony in the Regency. The Maltese "by the old statutes of George II and George III I received English nationality *jure sanguinis* if their grandfathers had been born in the kingdom." When the French refused to accept the British proposal that the case be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice the British placed the matter before the Council of the League which then requested the Permanent Court to give an advisory opinion, on whether the matter of nationality decrees was or was not, by International Law, solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

After considering the rights of a state to enact nationality legislation within a state under its protection the Court came to the conclusion that, in view of existing treaties between France and Great Britain concerning both Tunisia and Morocco, the dispute could not be considered "solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction."

---


As a result of this opinion France compromised with Great Britain on the Tunisian matter on May 24, 1923. By their agreement residents of British nationality in the Regency were permitted to retain that nationality or opt for French nationality, according to choice, provided their children born after November 1921, were considered French nationals.

On the whole the Italians rejoiced over the decision of the Court, seeing in it protection for their own nationals. However, as one Italian writer phrased it: "An opinion is not a sentence." On December 20, 1923, a law was passed by the French government regarding the acquisition of nationality in Tunisia, which abrogated and replaced the decrees of November 3, 1921. It was made applicable to all Europeans in Tunisia, with the exception of the Italians, who were still protected by article 13 of the convention of 1896. According to its terms every individual born in the Regency of parents, at least one of whom had been born in the Regency, automatically became a French citizen, though it was possible according to the specifications of the law to decline this citizenship at the age of eighteen. The Italians at home and in the Regency were aroused.

61. Ibid., p. 59.


Then commenced the intensive campaign for and against naturalization. Italy spoke of her martyrdom in Tunisia and France of the Italian peril. "It happened that the intensified French naturalization campaign coincided with the birth of Fracism, and consequently with an intensified development of Italian national feeling." Hot words were spoken by both sides. In a long speech in the Chamber of Deputies, Paolo Orano, who had just returned from a visit of investigation in Tunisia, said:

... Therefore the Italians of Tunisia who range from the chief millionaire, from the greatest person in the whole colony and in all Tunisia, ... to the miners in the smallest mine -- they have one feeling: preserve their nationality. ... 65

In an article in L'Unione in May 1925 the Italian editor was free in his criticism of France. After accusing the French government of temporizing and attempting the actual annexation of Tunisia, he wrote condemning the French insinuations against the "Italian peril." He continued thus: "All these little games are developed ad nauseam in the monthly bulletin of the Comité de l'Afrique française, which is very often hard and insolent in that which concerns us." 66

Such statements were followed by visits and propaganda from Rome. Among other official visitors, Cornelia di Marzo,

64. Villari, The Expansion of Italy, p. 64.
67. Ibid., p. 64.
Secretary for Fascism in Foreign Lands, came twice to the Regency to speak against naturalization. On March 27, 1928, he spoke at Bizerte to a group of children: "If you cannot prevent your parents from becoming naturalized you, at least, must remain Italians and enlist in the Italian Army." Then some hours later on the same day he spoke at Ferrypville saying that "those who become naturalized are traitors to their country." And we read also of an Italian father who, unable to resist the economic pressure brought to bear on him, was preparing to apply for naturalization papers, when his ten year old son expressed himself so vigorously and indignantly that the father tore up his application.

On the other hand France was as eager to force naturalization as Italy was to avoid it. Her press advocated it, her representatives preached it, and she in turn was resentful of Italy's attitude in respect to the whole matter.

... Each time that one utters on this side of the Alps the words 'France - Italy', the echo replies 'Tunisia - Calvary - martyred brothers' ... On the slightest pretext ... the Italian press, like a carefully directed orchestra, strikes up the hymn of persecution. Thus nurtured in Italy the Tunisian question poisons the existence of two great nations who have more to do than defend themselves from pin-pricks.  

---

68. Ibid., pp. 132-83.
69. Idem.
70. Ibid., p. 27.
71. Ibid., p. 25.
The greatest single exponent of increased naturalization was Charles Monchicourt, writing under the pseudonym of Rodd-Balek and later of Cavé, who had been deeply concerned with the problems of Tunisia. One of his chief sources of complaint about the Italians in the Regency was their irreducibility, that they formed a veritable state within a state, that they could run through a complete life cycle "from birth to death . . . . without having to deal with us, save in those matters which concern security and the courts."  

Another aspect of the nationality question was that which developed out of the Italian acquisition of Tripoli. Italy claimed that Italian Tripolitanians in Tunisia should enjoy the same rights and privileges as Italian citizens. This obviously would have created in the Regency a group of foreign Arabs privileged beyond the Tunisians themselves. Fears were expressed that the situation, from the point of view both of labor and prestige, might be serious were France forced to yield. By an agreement of May 29, 1914, the matter was settled in favor of France for a five year period. Then as though to coincide with the expiration


73. L'Afrique française, June 1914, pp. 269-70.

74. BFSP., Vol. CVII, pp. 796-97; de Martens, op. cit., 3rd. ser., Vol. IX, p. 21
of the previous agreement, on June 1, 1919 King Victor Emmanuel promulgated the fundamental law of Tripoli, which gave the indigenes full rights of Italian citizenship. This only added to the complication of the problem, and made its eventual solution the more difficult.

This problem of nationality, like that of the Tunisian-Tripolitian boundaries, was to remain a source of irritation between the two countries until 1935, when what was believed to be a permanent settlement was arrived at. In the meantime, press and population continued to be disturbed.

This same period was concerned also with other problems which were grouped together, along with that of nationality, under the heading of Italianità. The keynote of this Italian effort might well have been sounded by Minozzi, when he wrote:

Let us keep alive the spiritual contacts with the Italian colony in Tunisia. It is a national duty to give to these our brothers every form of aid, first of all moral assistance while they . . . tenaciously fight a daily insidious struggle. . . . . Let us multiply and intensify the forms of aid. . . . Today we have in power in Italy men who are more capable than those in the past -- we must put our faith in Fascist Italy. 76

Chief among the concerns of Italy in this connection was its schools in the Regency.

A French writer in the late nineteenth century, from whom Hitler might well seem to have borrowed, when seeking


the answer to the old question of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*, postulated the thesis that it is on education that nationality is founded. He concluded that the one who directs the education at the outset gives to the child his first nationality, because he gives him his first ideas.

The jealousy with which the Italians guarded their schools found its source in this same spring. Especially after the advent of Fascism were the schools important as a means of inculcating nationalistic teachings.

In spite of the agreements of 1896 France struck a blow on May 16, 1901 against the Italian schools. That decree stipulated that

- - - for admission to French universities no recognition was given to the Italian secondary schools in the Regency. This meant that Italians in Tunisia who might have wanted to study law would have had to give up going to their own secondary schools. 78

The Italians, of course, protested and after considerable discussion the Ministry of Public Instruction on November 16, 1915, finally gave equal recognition to diplomas equivalent to a French baccalauréat, but as these diplomas had to be given in the country of origin of the student, those from the Italian schools were still unrecognized.

Then by the decree of February 20, 1919 the new Resident-General Flandin, who had come to his post the preceding

78. Cataluccio, op. cit., p. 57
79. Idem.
October, made the opening of new private schools, which since 1896 had been reluctantly tolerated, dependent on the will of the Resident-General. This move was so frankly anti-Italian that a storm of protest broke out at once. Minozzi illustrated the Italian position when he protested the interpretation of the article of the 1896 protocol regarding schools which read: "the status quo will be maintained," as a freezing of the school situation. He insisted that autonomy in the broadest sense had been meant, that Visconti-Venosta had said: "I preferred this word status quo because it is the most comprehensive and because it could not be diminished by any attempt to be precise."

In the Bonin-Pichon accord of September 12, 1919, a clause was included which provided for equality of treatment to French and Italian schools. On January 24, 1920, another decree was issued which provided that though French had to be taught, it could be taught by a foreign instructor with a French diploma. Concession though this was, it still set up a very distinct barrier as far as Italy was concerned. And another chapter remained to be written along


31. Minozzi, op. cit., p. 15.

32. Rouard de Card, Traité de délimitation, 1913-19 pp. 77-32.

with the others in 1935.

Flandin issued other decrees as well which irritated the Italians. On January 10, 1919, he ruled that the category of courtiers inscrits, i.e., skilled mediators in private affairs, auctions of merchandise, etc., was open only to French and indigenes, thus excluding the Italians. And on February 22, 1919, there was issued a decree concerning the buying and selling of goods, which put a special tax on the purchase of land by foreigners. The latter, because of diplomatic protests, was abrogated.

Throughout the years, between 1896 and 1935, then, there were repeated incidents of wrangling and discord between France and Italy in respect to their North African possessions. Though settlements and agreements were made as to the different issues, they were palliatives of varying duration and value. When Pierre Laval succeeded Barthou as Minister of Foreign Affairs, he took advantage of the rapprochement between France and Italy which had come about as a result of Hitler's Austrian putsch of 1934, and immediately after the new year of 1935 went to Rome to discuss with Mussolini the points at issue between them.

84. Cataluccio, op. cit., p. 61.
85. Minozzi, op. cit., p. 32.
86. Morpurgo, op. cit., p. 18.
Finally on January 7, 1935, at eight o'clock in the evening were signed in the Palazzo Venezia several accords, only some of which have been published, which it was hoped brought to an end the many sources of trouble. Though an agreement was signed concerning European problems, and east African problems, our primary interest lies in respect to the African settlements which concerned Tripoli and Tunisia. Concerning them, while he was still in Rome, Laval said in a speech to the Italian journalists:

The conventions which we have signed on the African questions are just and will be, I hope favorably received. . . . We have neither of us sacrificed any of our essential interests. We avoided on both sides obstacles which might tie up the necessary collaboration of our Governments.

The various settlements had to do with 1) the boundary between Tunisia and Tripoli, 2) the Djibouti - Addis Ababa railroad, 3) the nationality of Italians in Tunisia, 4) Italian schools in Tunisia, 5) the continuance of rights previously guaranteed under the conventions of 1896. Not all of the agreements were published; and at the same time there is good reason to believe that there were secret accords in addition, particularly as concerns France's agree-


90. Giornale d'Italia, Jan. 9, 1935.
ment to permit Italy to go ahead in Abyssinia, which have not yet come to light. We are concerned, however, only with those which appear to have a direct bearing on this study.

By these accords the region south of Tripoli in Tibesti, variously claimed as hinterland by Tunisia, Tripoli, and French Africa, was definitely assigned to Libya. This, supposedly, was in settlement of the grievances against France which had existed on the basis of Article XIII of the Treaty of London, and gave Italy an additional area of some 114,000 square miles. The nationality agreement consisted of various points: 1) all children born in Tunisia of Italian parents up to March 28, 1914 shall be considered Italians; 2) between March 26, 1915 shall be considered Italians; but may in the year following their majority opt French citizenship; 3) after March 28, 1865 all children born in Tunisia shall be considered French citizens.

In respect to the school controversy it was provided that up to March 28, 1955 the royal Italian schools should continue to operate as previously. After that date they were to become Italian private schools under French jurisdiction. And finally in regard to the other questions which con-

---

91. For Laval's denial that he had given Italy a free hand in Abyssinia, vide Ch. des dép., Débats, Dec. 28, 1935, pp. 2863-65.


93. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

94. Idem.
cerned rights formerly enjoyed under the conventions of 1896, it was provided that the conventions should be prolonged until 1945, after which date a gradual return to common law was to be made in accordance with a convention to be stipulated later. Independently of the regime thus established under this new agreement, it was stipulated that any Italians who should have been admitted before 1945 to the right to practice the liberal professions would preserve this right during their lifetime.

With the signing of these accords a general relief was felt not only in France and Italy, but everywhere that lovers of peace anxiously watched danger spots in international relations. It seemed as though the Tunisian cauldron were about to simmer down, and that another potential source of serious trouble had been obviated. In three years, however, the pot again had come to boil; and men were once more talking of war between France and Italy over the Tunisian question.

95. Ibid., p. 23; Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., p. 128.
CHAPTER XVII
THE UNSOLVED PROBLEM

It would seem that one always writes the last chapter of such a study as this with some reluctance and dissatisfaction. In this instance those sentiments are strong indeed. Because of the conditions incidental the present world war, materials necessary for a thoroughly adequate conclusion are lacking. Limited, therefore, by these conditions, this last chapter is written almost as an epilogue rather than as a conclusion. Three goals are in mind:

1) to survey rapidly the conditions in Tunisia from the time of the 1922 reforms through 1938, 2) to indicate the trends of the Destourian movement through the disorders of 1938, and 3) to indicate the implications in Franco-Italian relations of the denunciation by Italy of the Laval-Mussolini agreement.

Although the primary concern of this study has been the one of the international relations which were involved, we cannot write finis without suggesting the interrelationship of social and economic conditions with the diplomatic situation in the upset of what was supposed to be the "final settlement" of the Tunisian question. Because of the paucity of material available in this country, unfortunately, the survey must of need be both brief, and to the writer, at least, unsatisfactory because of lack of documentation.
Among the major French dilemmas after the establishment of the protectorate was the matter of colonization and the issues which developed from it. To make the Regency produce to capacity France needed a large supply of men there who were willing to work and to learn scientific methods. The perplexities of immigration, of relations of the European workers with the native, of education, of world economic conditions are but a few of the phases of this problem.

In the survey of the question thus far two points have been stressed repeatedly: 1) the preponderance of Italian colonists over French, at least until the 1921 naturalization began to take effect, and 2) the retarded state of Tunisia, according to western standards, at the time of the intervention. Now these are to be fitted into a mise en valeur, and their relationship to the whole French problem of colonization and development are to be indicated. Certain steps taken before 1922, therefore, must be reviewed.

Because of the backward condition of the Regency it has been noted that France at first welcomed Italian workers, especially those who came in great numbers from Sicily, to assist in the rebuilding of the country, as envisaged by the French. Native labor was hard to get and French labor was practically non-existent; furthermore the Italians "were

better prepared than the French to endure the rigors of work under the African sun." Comparatively few French came to the Regency as laborers, and the occasional one who did, came, as one writer comments:

... sadly because his country can hold him no more. He cultivates his little patch of ground with one eye on la Belle France and the other on his potatoes, and when he has scraped together enough to allow him to live in comfort in the land of his forefathers, returns and strives to forget that he has ever left.  

By contrast the Italian came gladly, and anxious to stay. We have indicated previously the irreducibility of the Italians; it has been summarized as follows:

... it is possible for an Italian in Tunisia to live his whole civil life from birth to death in an exclusively Italian environment. He marries at the Italian consulate, declares his children there, places them in Italian schools, is cared for at the Italian hospital by Italian doctors, reads Italian papers, and is a member of Italian societies; and his descendants remain forever Italians. 

Thus did the Italians form a state within a state, or as is sometimes said, "Tunisia became an Italian colony guarded by French soldiers." The Italians for these same

---


reasons came into serious conflict with the native workers, creating thereby embarrassing issues for the government of the protectorate to solve. For of all the European powers, Italy appealed least to the Tunisians. To begin with the defeat of Adowa dulled her prestige, and the inglorious conquest of Tripoli did little to brighten it. But more personal was the social and economic situation within the Regency, where, because the Italians were better and more persistent workmen, they consistently displaced the indigenes in many occupations, received better wages, raised better crops, and pushed down even lower the generally low native standard of living.

... An immense proportion of the Italians ... in North Africa are engaged in menial trades—and, incidentally herein lies the secret of their relative failure as colonists. Coming into backward countries as direct competitors to the natives, they arouse hostility and injure their prestige. ... 6

Moreover it became obvious to the indigenes that were the Italians masters of the Regency, they would because of their vast swarming power, enter upon the land and possess it in actual fact, pushing the indigenes back to the desert. In the French the Arabs saw no such danger. As a result there were incidents repeated through the years similar to those of the Djellez riots in which the active native resent-

ment and dislike for the Italians was manifested.

The Italian government was well aware of the weakness of the French spirit for emigration in its labor elements. Margherita Sarfatti might well have spoken for the Palazzo Chigi when she wrote:

> Our emigration into Tunisia, just as into Morocco, is necessary to France and will always be welcome to her provided it becomes for us a colony in which we lose our population and our nationality, and provided that we consent to send there our surplus population in order to lose it . . . . 9

Even Lucien Saint, as Resident-General, was willing to grant the value of Italian labor, while at the same time he was careful to point out the gains that had come to the colony under the French administration:

> Tell your fellow nationals . . . . that I know how precious has been the work of the Italian laborers in Tunisia . . . . I am the first to recognize their merits and am happy over their progress in the territory of the Regency. How many emigrants, who have come to Tunisia full of courage although poor in every other means, are now prosperous on small plots of their own land. 10

---


8. The building housing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the coming of the Fascists; it replaced della Consulta.


Thus the social pattern was set early. The French were the large land owners, the concessionaires, as well as the political administrators, with the Italians and the indigenes relegated to the labor groups. But that more French must come was soon discovered by the government in Paris. And that they must come from the proletariat was likewise apparent.

During the early period of the protectorate the efforts to induce French colonization was limited to private initiative -- to the concessionaires of such large estates as that of Sidi-Tabet and the Enfida domain. The low price of land and the unlimited possibilities of development in this fertile land, encouraged rich, absentee capitalists to undertake exploitation. "But the number of French colonists 11 was reduced to the minimum."

To introduce small operators with means, the great Siala estate near Sfax was bought in 1892. On this a French concessionnaire would grant land to anyone who would agree to plant it with olives, and share the crop after ten years. 12 This process built up the great olive forest of Sfax.

But any question involving the acquisition of native lands ran into conflict with the Moslem system of land

---

11. Régence de Tunis, Direction des domaines et de la colonisation, La colonisation en Tunisie (Bourg, 1931), p. 54; hereafter cited as La colonisation en Tunisie.

AN OLIVE FOREST AT Sfax.
holding, certain aspects of which have already been briefly surveyed. It was only after the promulgation of the Pacte Fondamentale in 1857 that it was possible for anyone but a Musulman to acquire land. The Moslem theory was that land was the exclusive property of God, represented by the ruling prince. The latter possessed, by virtue of his sovereign rights, the authority to dispose of "dead land", so called because it had not yet been brought to life by the hand of man. By cultivating, or bringing to life such property, man might claim possession, and then according to his own wish it might be melk (free), or habou, under the elaborate provisions already discussed. At the time of the establishment of the protectorate, also, France found a well recognized indigenous aristocracy, with extensive holdings -- the enchir or domain, where the indigene aristocrat lived the life of a feudal lord, surrounded by serfs, who under the khammèsat, were bound to the soil, his wealth judged by the size of his harem. He also, naturally, resented the French landholder, large or small.


14. Ibid., p. 155. In an interview with the writer in Algiers in May 1933, E. F. Gautier, the North African historian whose work has been previously cited, said that he considered the formerly powerful landed and political classes of Tunisia to be France's greatest problem in the Regency. He considered that there was no such problem in Algeria, "... because there were, at the time of the French conquest, no large cities, and the people were used to being peasants, asking for nothing better."
By the decrees of November 13, 1898, and January 31, 1899, two solutions to the land problem were evolved: 1) a piece of property could be exchanged for another, the second thereby becoming habou; or as a variant of the plan, the first could be sold for money, with the specification that the sum received should be used for the purchase of a second piece of property which automatically took on habou qualities; 2) the Diemaia of the habous, established by Khérediddle in 1874, was authorized to put at the disposition of the Office of Agriculture annually not less than 2,000 hectares of land, acquired in one of the above mentioned fashions.

With the turn of the century more energetic means were undertaken by the French administration to bring small operators into the Regency. By decree of December 16, 1903, there was established a wider program of colonization, which was revised on July 12, 1910. But even the effect of this combined official and private attack on the problem was not brilliant. By 1909 only one-quarter of the French immigrants who had been induced to come to Tunisia remained, and many of their villages were deserted.

16. La colonisation en Tunisie, pp. 54-55.
It took six years to settle 242 families, because they were put where they would check Italians rather than where they could raise good crops. The Italian small farmers had meanwhile voluntarily put under cultivation 30,000 hectares. 19

Certain Italian figures on the relative occupational distribution of the French and Italian colony at the beginning of the 1914-18 war are both pertinent and significant:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>French % of colony</th>
<th>Italian % of colony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation work</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal professions</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial workers</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>88.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public officials</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heirs</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The productive classes therefore make up some 60% of the French colony only, while they constitute 89% of the Italian. 20

If these figures be true, then it will be observed that the most important factors in the French colony were the government officials and "white collar worker," and not the labor groups.

When France still found the results of her program un-


20. Tomedei, op. cit., p. 159. The figures quoted are exactly as the author gives them, even though those concerning the French are obviously incorrect.
satisfactory, other revisions were promulgated by the decree of January 24, 1914, to serve as the basis of a scheme for intensification of French immigration. Greater facilities were provided, larger credits were guaranteed, and fathers of large families were given marked preference. The advent of the war slowed up this new program, and made the situation even more critical than it had been previously. Though Italian immigration slackened during this period it returned to normal immediately after the signing of the peace.

This new period coincided with the coming of Flandin as Resident-General, and the issuance of his numerous decrees aimed at destroying Italian preponderance, among which was that of February 22, 1919, putting a special tax on the purchase of land by foreigners. This it will be remembered was later revoked because of diplomatic pressure. Attacking the problem both from a negative and a positive point of view, a ten-year program was undertaken of installing in the Regency at least a hundred families annually. By the end of the period 1200 new plots totalling some 150,000 hectares had been granted, as well as 122 plots for olive culture.


23. Minozzi, op. cit., p. 32; Morpurgo, op. cit., p. 18.

24. La colonisation en Tunisie, p. 55.
However, during the shorter term, 1914-21, 81,000 hectares had been sold to Italians, many of the lots being those of Frenchmen who had become discouraged and gave up to the benefit of their harder Latin rivals.

Land continued to remain largely in the hands of the large concessionaires, for according to official French figures of 1914 at that time 100 persons held at least two-thirds of the 737,000 hectares then alienated to French settlers.

Pursuant with its aggressive colonization plan, France continued to make revisions in the provisions and assistance offered. Decrees of July 2, 1923, July 1, 1924, and April 25, 1927, offered encouragement to French immigrants. By a decree of March 19, 1924, the DjiemaTa of the habous was reorganized. Then Tunisia was hit by the world economic depression and heroic measures had to be taken to maintain any kind of equilibrium. Sir Harold Satow, British Consul-General in Tunis, in his report on economic conditions in 1935, made several interesting comments. After pointing out that in a country of which the economic development is


27. La colonisation en Tunisie, p. 56.

rudimentary and where agriculture is of prime importance, much depends on weather conditions, and that the ideal Resident-General would be an unfailing meteorologist.

Then he summed up the situation as follows:

As sketched by the Resident-General in his speech before this conference, the economic history of Tunisia during the last twenty-six years falls into three periods. From 1903-19 the commercial balance was stable, there was steady prosperity and the budgetary increases were reasonable. From 1919-31 there was an era of specious prosperity. Money was plentiful, capital flowed in and the taxes were easily collected. As a result salaries were increased, new works were undertaken, and new services created. From 1931 to the present date there has existed a condition of crisis, of which the effects have become more and more evident. Taxes have become increasingly difficult to collect, unpaid arrears have accumulated, and the yield from indirect taxes has fallen in ratios varying from 12 per cent to 17 per cent.

Coupled with a collapse of prices there were harvests which were, owing to unfavorable climatic conditions, at the best, poor. The supply of credit which in the time of false prosperity had been too easily granted was increasingly restricted, and forced sales of mortgaged property increased alarmingly. It is easy to realize that in these circumstances an atmosphere of resignation soon changed to one of despair.

A comparison of the importation and exportation figures for certain of these years is of some interest:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table # 3</th>
<th>4-year averages</th>
<th>Average for entire period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importations</td>
<td>1922-26</td>
<td>1927-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21,236,965</td>
<td>53,333,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exportations</td>
<td>3,612,523</td>
<td>12,192,927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


30. Régence de Tunis, Direction générale de l'Agriculture,
At the same time that it had been attempting to bring
in French colonists, the administration of the protectorate
had been attempting to stamp out nomadism among the indi-
genies. We have seen that a great part of the Moslem popula-
tion is composed of numerous nomadic or settled groups
living in tribes. The custom of the country permitted these
groups to occupy gratuitously the deseminal lands belonging
to the state. Here they could sow crops, pasture their
animals, gather dead wood, or otherwise provide for their
own needs without questions of ownership or land taxation.
Under the protectorate, and by laws of 1918, 1925, and 1935
in particular, definite efforts were made to settle these
people on land registered under a system somewhat similar to
the English Torrens Act. A special commission was estab-
lished under Guillon to try in a fifteen-year program to
assist the indigenes to increase their production, remedy
native misery in general, and assist in the prevention of
nomadism and famine.

In summing up the entire colonization question a French
student of the problem said:


32. Robert Scérama, op. cit., pp. 181-85; cf. The
It has been correctly said that our insufficient birthrate is at the bottom of the Tunisian question. Even more than this, the mother country has not sent enough people into the Regency. Numbers are of prime importance in the diffusion of nationality. . . . The French colonists form a bourgeoisie, rich with conspicuous technicians, but small in number and completely lacking that indispensable support, that nursery which a French proletariat attached to the earth constitutes, like that which has made the power of the Algerian colonization.

A survey of certain population figures therefore seems pertinent. The latest complete census returns are those for the period ending March 22, 1931; incomplete statistics are available for the next five-year term, and none for the 1941 census, if indeed, one was taken. Table #4 breaks down the total population figures for 1931, into European, Mohammedan, and Jewish, with country of origin indicated. They appear on page 499, as #4a, #4b, and #4c. Table #5 gives the total population figures for 1936, although those for the native population are not broken down. Table #6 gives the French estimates of the European population for the years 1831-1936.

34. Compiled from Regence de Tunis, Direction générale de l'Interieur, Dénombrement de la population civile européenne et indigène en Tunisie, au 22 mars, 1931 (Tunis, 1931), p.153.
### Table 4(b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mohammedan population</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisians</td>
<td>2,056,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerians</td>
<td>40,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>2,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrians</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripolitians</td>
<td>28,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nationalities</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,159,161</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4(c)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jewish population</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisians</td>
<td>55,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerians</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrians</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripolitians</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nationalities</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,248</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total European population in 1931........195,293
Total Mohammedan population in 1931........2,159,161
Total Jewish population in 1931...........56,248
Total..........................2,410,692
Table #5

Total population figures according to 1936 census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European population</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>108,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>94,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maltese</td>
<td>4,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Europeans</td>
<td>2,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>213,205</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Exclusive of the army of occupation and the navy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Native population</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arabs and Bedouins</td>
<td>2,335,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>59,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,395,108</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total                           | 2,608,313 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities</th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1926</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Population of Tunisia (1861-1926)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>7,138</td>
<td>24,210</td>
<td>54,610</td>
<td>44,044</td>
<td>54,476</td>
<td>91,427</td>
<td>108,068</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>11,206</td>
<td>21,016</td>
<td>55,572</td>
<td>62,156</td>
<td>88,082</td>
<td>94,799</td>
<td>91,278</td>
<td>94,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maltese</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>10,258</td>
<td>12,566</td>
<td>12,580</td>
<td>11,800</td>
<td>8,643</td>
<td>4,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>18,914</td>
<td>29,263</td>
<td>42,295</td>
<td>52,028</td>
<td>52,253</td>
<td>111,101</td>
<td>128,895</td>
<td>148,476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All of these statistics, unfortunately, are open to question. In his *History of French Colonial Policy*, for example, Roberts comments:

... both French and Italian critics have demonstrated the falsity of the various census returns. ... The census of 1906 was useless, because it neglected the illiterates who did not trouble to fill in their papers; and that of 1911 was still worse, because although the Italians were admittedly more than twice as numerous, they increased only by 6,296 according to the census, whereas the French had gone up by 11,434, and immigration could not account for the difference. 37

He indicates further that the *Bolletino dell'Emigrazione* in 1909 held conservatively that there were at least 100,000 Italians resident in Tunisia, and that though the census report of 1921 gave better than 84,000 Italians and 54,000 French in Tunisia, a compiler in charge of the census-report stated in an interview that the real numbers were 130,000 Italians and 40,000 French. 38 These latter figures would tally with those which Mussolini used in his statement before the Chamber of Deputies on November 12, 1924, and would relieve him of the charge, which has been made in this connection, of gross exaggeration. 39

---


38. *Idem.*

Although they do not prove a point, certain Italian figures are of interest in respect to the movement of Italians, from the homeland. They have been compiled from the issues of the *Bolletino dell'Emigrazione* from 1922 to 1927, and show the passports issued by Italy for non-trans-oceanic passage. It is to be noted that travel to Tunisia is heavier than to either Algeria or Morocco. What the destination of the other considerable numbers of Italians was is not stated, but is is to be assumed that in large measure it was Libya.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1st 6 mo.</td>
<td>112,409</td>
<td>2,706</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd 6 mo.</td>
<td>88,343</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200,752</td>
<td>4,410</td>
<td>1,329</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1st 6 mo.</td>
<td>39,355</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd 6 mo.</td>
<td>44,473</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>84,328</td>
<td>2,377</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>12 mo.</td>
<td>123,030</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>10 mo.</td>
<td>176,740</td>
<td>2,526</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>12 mo.</td>
<td>178,208</td>
<td>3,663</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>12 mo.</td>
<td>141,314</td>
<td>3,291</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40. *Bolletino dell'Emigrazione*, 1922, p. 112; 1923, pp. 171, 955; 1926, p. 54; 1927, p. 96.
Significant also is the compilation of naturalization figures for the period from 1391-1931, which appears as Table #8. The jump after French pressure for naturalization began should be noted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>From 1391-92</th>
<th>From 1399-1910</th>
<th>From 1911-23</th>
<th>From 1915-24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>1456</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musulmen</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table #10 likewise shows some figures of interest in this respect, indicating as it does the origins of French nationality.


42. Dénombrement de la population civile, p. 100. The best discussion of the relation of marriage to nationality in the Tunisian problem has been done by one of the Scémama family. It is André Scémama, De l'influence du mariage sur la nationalité tunisienne (Paris, 1931), passim.
Figure 47

EUROPEAN SCHOOL POPULATION OF TUNISIA

on basis of 1931 census.

- Total number of pupils (Boys and Girls)
- Total number of pupils (Public Schools)
- Total number of pupils (Private Schools)

Table #9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results of the census of</th>
<th>French by birth</th>
<th>French by naturalization, option, or marriage.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901 ............</td>
<td>22,215</td>
<td>91.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906 ............</td>
<td>32,453</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911 ............</td>
<td>41,878</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921 ............</td>
<td>51,303</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926 ............</td>
<td>56,158</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931 ............</td>
<td>65,577</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is regrettable that it is not possible, because of inadequate statistics, to bring the question of schools in the Regency into clear focus, for it has formed so definite a part of the conflict between the French and the Italians. In 1931 a complete survey was made from the French point of view. At that time it was estimated that there were about 400,000 boys and girls of school age (six to thirteen or fourteen), and that only about one-fifth of these children were then in school. Most of the European boys and girls were in attendance, but for various reasons the Muslim children were not. Figure #7 shows in graph form the school distribution in the years 1885-1936, while that of


Tables #10 and #11 show the distribution of pupils according to nationality.

Table #10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total public schools</strong></td>
<td>434</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total private schools</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pupils</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>20,762</td>
<td>23,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musulman</td>
<td>37,995</td>
<td>42,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>9,151</td>
<td>12,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>9,528</td>
<td>9,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maltese</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>1,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8,034</td>
<td>2,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>86,554</td>
<td>92,025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures from the Department of Public Instruction in December 1938 give the total number of pupils enrolled at that time in Tunisian schools as 98,500, an increase in two years of some 5,475 persons, or almost exactly the same increase as that which took place in the previous four years.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of public academic schools <em>(1)</em></td>
<td>4,714</td>
<td>4,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of public primary schools</td>
<td>4,641</td>
<td>4,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of private schools</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUPILS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>8,297</td>
<td>9,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>7,501</td>
<td>7,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mussulman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>31,480</td>
<td>32,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>3,466</td>
<td>3,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>4,164</td>
<td>4,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>4,633</td>
<td>4,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>4,369</td>
<td>4,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>4,070</td>
<td>4,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maltese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditors of adult courses</td>
<td>2,956</td>
<td>2,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of pupils in public education</td>
<td>72,374</td>
<td>75,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of pupils in private schools</td>
<td>7,334</td>
<td>7,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General total of pupils</td>
<td>69,708</td>
<td>83,459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(1) Does not include the School of Music and the Arab Secondary Schools of Language and Literature.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>BOYS</th>
<th>GIRLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public education</td>
<td>Private education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>1,803</td>
<td>1,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>5,567</td>
<td>1,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>7,625</td>
<td>1,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>8,907</td>
<td>1,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>10,999</td>
<td>2,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>17,371</td>
<td>3,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>21,176</td>
<td>3,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>23,636</td>
<td>3,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>36,185</td>
<td>3,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>49,048</td>
<td>3,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>61,557</td>
<td>3,628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Because we have no detailed statistics, it is impossible to distribute these figures according to nationalities as has been done in previous cases.

Table #12 indicates the distribution of boys and girls according to French figures in public and private institutions. Again the validity of these figures is seriously in question, because of the strong claims of the Italians. Inasmuch as the Italian schools were still considered private at the time of this compilation, the relatively small number of children in such institutions cannot but be striking, especially when the Italian claim is that at approximately the same period they had 15,000 children in their schools.

And as our final set of figures we present as Table #13 the budgets for education in the Regency from 1834 through 1930. The expenses for public education have been estimated for the period through October 13, 1888, for the first budgetary period was for the year October 13, 1888 to October 13, 1889. These figures represent an increase of 33,176 percent in the expenditures for education between 1834 and 1930. The last budget figures available were those of December 1939, and the estimated sum to be allocated for education

---

for 1940 was 31,234,700 francs, or an increase of 40 per cent over the 1930 expenditures. That there is much yet to be done in the field of education in the Regency is frankly admitted, but that much has already been done cannot be denied either.

Table #13 -- School Budgets in Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget (Fr.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>1,800,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>1,200,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>1,82,000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>2,34,100,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>3,48,000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>4,35,522,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>5,50,016,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>7,25,526,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>6,37,016,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>7,06,193,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>7,61,793,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>7,71,004,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>8,34,483,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>9,20,392,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>9,71,600,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>9,95,000,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1,011,500,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1,042,711,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1,069,911,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>1,216,391,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1,246,991,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1,365,556,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1,510,250,40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>1,780,046,63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second point to be considered in this chapter is that of the Destourian movement after 1922. As has been

indicated, in spite of the considerable concessions made in 1922, the unrest did not cease. The party split into two sections at about this time -- the liberal constitutional group, the extremists, known simply as the Destour, and the reformist or moderate group, which is usually called for purposes of differentiation, the Néo-Destour. Heading the former were Ahmed-es-Safi and Salah Farhat, both lawyers. Conspicuously associated with them were Taïb Djemaïl, secretary of the party for the French, and Tewfik-el-Madani, an Algerian Communist, who served both as secretary of the party for the Arabs, and as editor of the Communist paper, Ifrikiia. Heading the Néo-Destour was Hassan Guellaty, who had long been prominent in both the Young Tunisian and Destourian movements. Shortly to be associated with him was Bechir-el-Annabi, who resigned as vice-president of the indigenous section of the Grand Council, and Habib Bourguiba, assistant chief of the division of accounts of the Department of the Interior. Their organ was En Nahdha (the Renaissance).

It is difficult indeed to follow the ramifications of the party and press movements among the indigènes, and it is curious that though they claimed to stand for quite different goals their published programs were singularly alike.

52. Ibid., pp. 333-34.
53. For an itemized list of the demands of the two groups vide Ibid., pp. 257-58.
In its essence both desired greater, if not full participation in government, universal suffrage, equality, and the opportunity for Tunisians to hold any administrative post.

Though from 1922 on there was agitation from both groups, trouble did not break out seriously until 1925 when the Destour undertook a violent anti-French campaign. As a result Tewfik-el-Madani was expelled from the Regency on June 7, 1925. And to the surprise of many persons Mahdha supported the move. Under ordinary circumstances Moslem differences heal quickly when any Mohammedan group seems to be subject to European oppression.

Then in November matters came to a head in a rather surprising fashion. From November 15-22 a great celebration was held in the Regency in memory of Cardinal Lavigerie. Important Church officials were present for the ecclesiastical ceremonies, which were to be climaxd by the dedication of a statue of the great leader of the White Fathers. Inasmuch as the indigenes had raised a furor, some time previously, at the project of placing a statue of Jules Ferry in front of the Residency, this one was placed in the Place de la Bourse. No trouble developed until Tunis Socialiste published a series of inflammatory articles about the affront to the Moslems implied in the fact that in the hands of the sculptured Cardinal was placed a cross. As a result of the

54. Ibid., pp. 315-17.
demonstration which developed on November 28, there were 55 arrests made and strong press recriminations followed.

On December 5, 1925, the indigenes staged a violent protest against the arrests, as well as against the events which were transpiring at that time in Syria, under the 56 French aegis, and against the high cost of living and the new taxes which were being considered by the Grand Council. The souks and most of the shops in the Arab section of the city closed as a part of the demonstration. As the fifth was a Saturday when Jewish shops were not open, this worked a considerable hardship on the natives generally. But like most of these disturbances this one of 1925 died down when the official hand of France was shown, though the natives themselves continued to fulminate.

After 1929 the first effects of the depression, coupled with bad harvests and consistent drought made the situation even more troubled. Although various palliatives had been given, not only to the rural dweller but to the urban and industrial worker as well -- such as wide latitude as to 58 loans, rest periods, workingmen's compensation, the

55. Ibid., pp. 263-64.
56. J. W. Swain, Beginning the Twentieth Century (N. Y., 1940), pp. 715-16.
59. Bolletino dell'Emigrazione, 1921, p. 316.
60. Ibid., 1923, p. 251.
the lot of the indigènes in the Regency was not a happy one.

Manceron, Resident-General, hoping to stop the discontent, issued several further important reforms. On November 16, 1932 he recognized the legality of corporative syndicates, and on June 23, 1933 he promulgated the eight-hour day.

By this time, however, two new figures had risen to a place of importance in the Destourian movement, Chadli Khâirallah, extremist, and Dr. Matéri, reformist. Little accurate information, unfortunately, has been available about the background of either man.

Chadli Khâirallah was the editor of the fiery Voix du Tunisien, popular with the young intellectuals, and Dr. Matéri, according to the one prejudiced writer who gives us details about him, appears as a kind of legendary figure, whose nobility of character and apostle like life set him apart from other men. Having returned to Tunis, after having obtained his degree in Paris while working at every kind of trade, "... he dedicated his efforts and science to the poor. He cared for their souls as well as their bodies, struggling to lift them from their physical and moral misery."


He seems to have shared the leadership of the Néo-Destour party with Habib Bourguiba, for first one and then the other is mentioned in contemporary accounts as president of the party.

Taking advantage of the natural unrest, misery, and increasing nomadism which developed as the effects of the depression became more oppressive, a violent campaign against the administration was again set afoot under the leadership of Bourguiba and Dr. Matéri. So serious was the situation that on July 29, 1933 Manceron was sent as Minister to Copenhagen and was replaced by Marcel Peyrouton, who had been serving as Secretary-General of the government of Algeria. It was hoped that with his superior knowledge of North African affairs, he would be better able to handle the upset conditions of the Regency than Manceron had been.

The Italians naturally, because their economic status differed little from that of the indigènes, were suffering as well. That the depression was world-wide or that its

64. It is greatly to be regretted that two recent works by Destourian leaders do not seem to be available in the United States, although an earnest search of possible repositories has been made. Those two works are noted, however: Chedli Kha'irallah, Le mouvement évolutioniste tunisien (Tunis, 1938), and Habib Bourguiba, Le Destour et la France (Tunis, 1937).

65. Pellegrin, op. cit., p. 213; Occhipinti, op. cit., p. 12. Occhipinti's reports are of considerable value in giving the attitude of the Tunisian Italian, respecting this phase of the story. Born in the Regency of Italian parents, he was on the staff of L'Unione until his expulsion.
roots were deep-seated and twisted was speciously overlooked. Occhipintì, writing for L'Unione sang the theme-song: Peyrouton can accomplish nothing, it is necessary to change completely the French policy towards the Regency; economically the Arabs are worse off than they were before the protectorate, because France is carrying on a sort of eighteenth century policy, considering the Regency as a market to be exploited; her preoccupation is to fortify it against the Italians in particular, in defiance of the Treaty of Bardo.

La Charte Tunisienne, an Arab weekly which had sprung up after the war, featured the fable of the Bedouin girl riding on a donkey who asked an old woman to mount and ride with her. After several increasingly possessive comments, the old woman gleefully said: "Isn't it comfortable riding on our donkey?" In consternation the girl cried, "Get down before it becomes your donkey!" Again the native fears of total annexation were being stirred.

But Peyrouton did act forcefully. His problems were great, however, for 1934 marked the bottom of the curve of the depression in Tunisia. By decrees of October 2 and November 16 he declared a moratorium on foreclosures against rural agriculturists who could not meet their obligations, and created arbitral commissions to handle the cases which

67. Ibid., p. 34.
eventuated therefrom; by the decree of December 10, 1934 he extended similar terms to urban proprietors; mutual credit associations were reorganized and new agricultural credit associations were created; the colonization administration was reorganized and the changes previously mentioned in connection with that program were a part of Peyrouton's plan. A Tunisian office of standardization (O.T.U.S.) was created in the hope of assisting in the sale of native products, finding new markets, organizing propaganda, etc. At the Imperial Conference in Paris, held in 1934-35, Peyrouton and the Tunisian delegation secured large tariff concessions for Tunisian wines.

Nevertheless Destourian activities continued, press attacks, protest parades, closing of shops, riots, anti-Jewish demonstrations formed a part of the pattern. As a result several Arab papers were suspended. Likewise, Bourguiba, Dr. Matéri and six other Destourian leaders were put in prison, along with a number of suspected Communists, in the hope that with certain of the ring-leaders out of the way, more peaceful times would come. In protest Kafrallah is reported as having gone into voluntary exile,

69. Ibid., p. 219.
70. Pellegrin, op. cit., p. 221; The Times (London), Jan. 5, 1935. Violis, op. cit., p. 53, speaks of the Destourian leaders being "kept in prison for two years without a trial."
71. Occhipinti, op. cit., p. 79.
although one might be tempted to suspect that the exile was not entirely voluntary.

Certain local characteristics made these disturbances peculiarly Tunisian. There is an old Arab proverb which says: "The Moroccan is a lion; the Algerian is a man; the Tunisian is a woman." Commenting on the proverb, a contemporary writer said rather sagely:

... and the Tunisian displays his femininity chiefly in his virulent tongue. He devotes his lively intelligence to grumbling, at which he is a past master. He seldom puts forth a constructive idea, but his brain seems to thrive on discontent.

The coming into power in France of the Popular Front government was the signal for further disturbances in the Regency. Armand Guillou, a Blum man, who replaced Peyrouton on April 17, 1936 as Resident-General was faced with a series of strikes and uprisings, some of which were of some degree of seriousness. At Metlaoui, for example, there were 19 killed and 27 wounded. It began to seem as though the Tunisian, perhaps, were not after all "a woman."

Entering into a program of appeasement, however, Guillou's first move was to seek collaboration with the


73. Idem.

Destourian leaders. The imprisoned men, including Bourguiba and Dr. Matéri, were released from their internment at Djerba and Gabès, and Khaïrallah returned from his "voluntary exile." The political amnesty was followed by the restoration of the freedom of press and association, as well as the application to Tunisia of certain liberal social legislation: paid holidays, and the promise of the forty-hour week -- "this in a country accustomed to a 12-14 hour work day."  

In an interview several years later Dr. Matéri related that he had indicated to Guillon his own uncertainty over the wisdom of these acts of the Resident-General, that he had said: "Are you sure that you are not putting the cart before the horse? If reforms are delayed we will inevitably abuse the liberties you give us and it will end badly for us and you."

Among other Destourian leaders to come back to the Regency at this time was Taalbi, who, apparently discredited by his followers, had left in 1923. He had been in Italy, where Mussolini was reported to have welcomed him. Most


76. Violis, op. cit., p. 65.

77. L'Afrique française, Dec. 1923, p. 412. Whether his exile was voluntary or official seems open to question. Pellegrin, op. cit., p. 223, who is rather consistently accurate, speaks of Taalbi's having been expelled from the Regency for having written Tunisia Martyre, but inasmuch as he was imprisoned on that score and then released, a later exile on the same charge does not seem consistent. L'Afrique française, Aug. 1923, comments favorably on the diplomacy of
of the time, however, he had been in Egypt and had "served pan-
Arabism from Arabia to India." On his return to Tunis on
July 8, 1937, he received a great ovation. His mission, he
declared, was to achieve the liberation of Tunisia from
France. For this he recommended the union of the Destour
and Néo-Destour parties, implying his own fitness to head the
coalition group. This was stoutly opposed by the Néo-Destour,
especially by Bourguiba, who in Nahda is reported to have
called Taalbi a "mad old fool."

When Chautemps replaced Blum in June 1937, Albert
Sarraut was appointed the following October to act as co-
ordinator of the three North African countries. When it
became apparent that under this revision of the popular
Front the Destourians were likely to be put under closer
check, hostility to Taalbi who was in "retirement" at La
Goulette diminished as a greater danger threatened. However,
the feeling which had already developed over Taalbi, plus
the divided opinions on how to meet the new policy of the
French government began seriously to split the Néo-Destour-
ians, even including their leaders. The Tunisians were both

the Resident-General, who had created a split in the party
and separated Taalbi from his adherents. No mention is made
of an exile though full details of the date of departure
from the Regency, July 26, 1923, the steamer, Città di Catania,
destination Rome, are given.

78. Oochipinti, op. cit., p. 90.
79. Ibid., p. 91.
baffled and angered by the reversals in policy which frequently followed the general elections in France:

... in the last three years the Tunisian has witnessed a violent swing from the iron-handed rule of Peyrouton, a nominee of the French Right, who banned the Destour’s newspapers and exiled its leaders to the Sahara, to the sweet reasonableness of M. Guillon, ... appointed by the Front Populaire, who bustles around the territory, haranguing illiterate Arab strikers as if their mentality were that of the workers of his home town. No wonder the Tunisian is puzzled and disturbed. 81

Bourguiba, up to this time had lived up to his promise of collaboration with the government, in anticipation of certain of the reforms which were the goal of the party, but now he changed his attitude. If we can believe Dr. Matéri’s own account, he did everything in his power to persuade Bourguiba to continue that course of collaboration, to be patient, to lower the tone of l’Action Tunisienne, which he was then editing, and to restrain certain violent elements in the party. Especially did Dr. Matéri have in mind Sliman ben Sliman, who had been in exile with him and Bourguiba in the south, and Ali Belahouane, a liberal young professor in Sadiki College in Tunis. When in November 1937, during an absence of Guillon, Bourguiba suddenly called a general strike of sympathy for certain Moroccans arrested for political reasons, Dr. Matéri broke entirely with Bourguiba. With that restraining hand gone, the Néo-Destour gave way to in-

82. Viollis, op. cit., p. 68.
creased violence, "flinging itself into a policy of direct action, preaching the rejection of taxation, and indulging in acts of sabotage."

Professor Belahouane continued to lecture in such inflammatory terms as: "The country is rich; all of it is yours, and if you have a little daring, you will be able to regain it." As a result of a particularly violent lecture, Sadiki College was closed on March 28, 1938. Street riots ensued, and the cries of "Give us a Tunisian parliament" were raised. The early days of April were hectic ones. Bourguiba was ill, and the radical elements took the reins. On April 8, when a crowd was demonstrating in front of the Residency, Dr. Matéri tried to disperse them, to no avail, and on April 9 Sliman ben Sliman and Belahouane were arrested. Collecting before the Palais de Justice, where the men were being interrogated, the crowd broke into open violence, "attacked the guards, killing a policeman, and stoning the soldiers. The troops opened fire, and twenty persons were killed."

---

85. Idem.
Guillon, the Resident-General, at once proclaimed a state of siege, and the following day between 1000 and 1500 Destourians of all colors as to party attitude, were arrested, among them Bourguiba. The only leaders not taken in and sentenced to prison terms were Taalbi and Dr. Matéri, who obviously had not been involved in the disturbances. And in order to try to avoid a repetition of the incident the decree was issued ordering the dissolution of the Néo-Destour party.

The disturbances of April led to a series of decrees which again restricted the liberty of the press, the right of assembly, and the freedom of association. The trade unions and the extreme Left elements, whose support of the Residency had contributed to the failure of the rising, now denounced the criminal decrees. Guillon, violently attacked by the agriculturalists and the Right Wing parties as well, was recalled. He was replaced on October 24, by Erik Lebonne, Ambassador to Barcelona, and former Secretary-General at the Residency in Morocco.

This brings us to the third point to be considered in this chapter. As usual the economic, social, and native

87. Violis, op. cit., pp. 85-86, who interviewed Bourguiba in prison gives a most interesting pen picture of the leader, then a man of thirty-five to thirty-eight, of "magnificent eloquence, impeccably dressed even in prison, the kind of gentleman one sees on Regent Street or the Avenue de l’Opéra."

situations in Tunisia were complicated both by governmental policy and by international events. Just about the time of the Néo-Destour riots in Tunis, Blum again went out of office and was succeeded by Daladier. Hitler was just seizing Austria, and inasmuch as "the new ministers disapproved of the social reforms of the two preceding years, . . . . the international situation now enabled them to dispense with most of them." This change of policy on the Continent helped to intensify the conviction of the Tunisian indigenes that the radical reforms for which they hoped were not likely to be achieved under the Daladier government.

Furthermore as a result of international complications, relations between France and Italy were tense, with the consequence that the delicate balance in the Regency as to French, Italians, and indigenes was seriously jeopardized once more. Of a number of unknowns, perhaps the pivotal one is this: exactly what promises did Laval make to Mussolini in 1935 concerning Ethiopia. Known factors were: 1) the anti-Italian emotions aroused in the Regency among the indigenes during both the Ethiopian campaign and the Spanish Civil War, and 2) the fears engendered by the Rome-Berlin axis. The threads of these various warps become so interwoven that to trace the pattern is difficult. Limiting our consideration of these complex situations as closely as is possible to those matters particularly concerning the Regency,

---

89. Swain, op. cit., p. 719.
several incidents are of special importance in developing the final break between France and Italy in Tunisia. For the sake of clarity a straight chronological method will be employed in tracing them.

In December 1936 Mussolini still officially appeared content with the 1935 agreements. On December 18 he made a press statement, widely quoted and much relied upon at the time: "All African accounts have been settled to the last farthing." On December 31, 1936, in an exchange of notes with Sir Eric Drummond, British Ambassador to Rome, Ciano, Minister of Foreign Affairs, further put him on record by stating formally that the

... Italian government had not, either before or since the revolution in Spain, engaged in any negotiations with General Franco, whereby the status quo in the western Mediterranean would be altered, nor would they engage in any such negotiation in the future.

But despite these assurances, officially given, the situation was not a settled one.

---

90. The Times, London, Dec. 12, 1938. It is especially significant that in an interview with Dr. Leonid I. Strakhovsky, then Professor of Modern European History at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and now Professor of History at the University of Maryland, on June 27, 1935, Mussolini said: "Italy's future is in Africa; here in Rome we breathe the very air of Africa."

On September 20, 1937 a serious incident took place in Tunis when some twenty naval cadets from an Italian training-ship came ashore. Putting themselves at the head of a group of Tunisian Fascists, they stormed the local offices of the anti-Fascist Italian League for the Rights of Man and killed Micelli, the head of the organization. Considerable feeling resulted in Tunis, and diplomatic protests were sent to Rome, while the Italian press was loud in its approval of the act. Tension was heighted, although no diplomatic action resulted.

Throughout 1938 the Italian press in the Regency struck up a louder and louder chorus. Enrico di Santa Maria, the editor of the Unione was the leader. In an interview in 1933 he said of his paper:

You see the Unione is more than just a paper. It is a Bible. For the Tunisian Italians most of whom are illiterate it is the word of the Gospel. Tomorrow we need only give the word and all of them will follow as one man.

The press was supported by the radio. Broadcasts from Radio-Bari were aimed especially at stirring up the indigenes; those from Rome at arousing the Tunisian Italians. The following is an example of the latter:

It is impossible to describe to you what we have suffered since the ardent cries of the Italian

---


Chamber of Deputies came to us over the radio. We are now being persecuted — we who alone have transformed with our sweat and our blood the arid land of Tunisia into a land of olive-trees. . . . We have had to face the violent hatred of the French and of the Bolshevized natives. But the Italians of Tunisia will never be French subjects. \textsuperscript{94}

When the native disturbances of April broke out, they were accompanied by anti-Italian demonstrations as well. Italian policy towards the unions was not popular with the Tunisians, who hoped through the unions of the Regency to gain certain of the wage and labor equalizations for which they were agitating. Likewise the anti-Semitic measures taken in Italy were unpopular, and had the further effect of weakening the powerful Fascist organization in the Regency, by alienating some of its wealthiest Jewish-Italian members, many of whom changed camps and immediately sought French citizenship. The French administration even suspected that Italy had been financing the Destourian agitation, to further its own ends by fostering disunity, while as rebuttal the Unione claimed that the Destourians were all Communists and that the disturbances had been supported by Moscow. \textsuperscript{97}


\textsuperscript{95} Pegolotti, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 141.

\textsuperscript{96} Julien, "Tunisia," p. 674.

\textsuperscript{97} Simonesco, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 509; Ochipinti, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 96.
Then on November 30, 1933 the matter broke into the open when, following a speech by Count Ciano, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Chamber of Deputies in which he recalled "the natural aspirations of the Italian people," the cry broke out in the galleries for "Corsica, Tunisia, and Djibouti."

The press of both nations became aroused. Virginio Gayda wrote editorially on December 2 of Italy's full solidarity with Germany, as proved in the Czecho-Slovak crisis, and concluded pointedly: "The Italian nation, solidly with its government, is today ready for anything. It is ready to march if necessary, even against France.

The diplomatic situation became tense. The French Ambassador, M. François Poncet called on Count Ciano for an explanation of the demonstration in the Chamber of Deputies, and those which had followed in the streets. The government disclaimed responsibility for the "spontaneous demonstrations." Protests and avowals of loyalty to France were made both in Tunisia and Corsica, and there was some anti-Italian feeling shown in the Regency, as a result of which, according to the Italians, only Italians were arrested.

102. Idem.
103. Ibid., Dec. 17, 1938.
On December 17, 1938 the climax was reached when Rome informed Paris that the Laval-Mussolini accord of 1935 could no longer be construed as binding.

France must give more. Daladier breathed feeble defiance. Bonnet intrigued obscurely through his secret agents -- Fernand deBrion in Berlin and Paul Boudouin in Rome -- to give away additional French territory, but he failed. 104

In justification of the Italian denunciation, Ciano said first that it had been agreed that the accords of 1935 were not to go into effect until they had been ratified, that as for those which concerned Tunisia negotiations had never been begun, and second that France furthermore had herself abrogated certain of the implied agreements as to Italian action in Ethiopia by invoking sanctions against Italy. In respect to the matter of ratification The Times commented that:

... soon after the drafting of the 1935 agreement the Italian chamber expressed its approval by 238 votes to 7; that as recently as the spring of this year Ciano indicated to M. Blondel, then French chargé d'affaires in Rome, that Italy was not averse to an exchange of ratifications at an opportune moment; that in short, acceptance of the agreement in the past implied a promise, which now is being broken. 106


Virginio Gayda insisted that it was not Italy who was trying to change the status quo, but France, who was endeavoring to change "Italian colonists into Frenchmen and a protectorate into French territory."

For some three weeks there was much press activity and the war-cry of Tunisia, Corsica, Djibouti was frequently to be heard. Indicating that official England may not have considered all this entirely spontaneous, The Times quoted Giovanni Ansaldo, editor of Il Telegrafo of Leghorn, "who is regarded as the mouthpiece of Count Ciano" as follows:

> How can one fail to see that there will be no real peace in the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea so long as Corsica remains an air base, equipped to attack Italy, so long as Tunisia remains a country where Italians are condemned to deny their country, and so long as Djibouti remains not merely a carbuncle but a suppurating ulcer in the very body of the Empire?"

Daladier's visits to Corsica and Tunisia early in January 1959 provoked waves of enthusiasm from the French and storms of protest from the Italians. Of particular importance were his visit to the harbor of Bizerte and its magnificent airport and his trip into the south to inspect the Mareth Line (the Little Maginot Line), the strong fortifications along the Tunisian-Libyan border. Perhaps

---


the widely disseminated propaganda concerning the military strength of Tunisia and the repeated demonstrations of loyalty to France, which seemed spontaneous rather than staged, deterred Mussolini from further sword-rattling. More likely is it, though, that trouble over the Regency was not in the plan of war strategy of the Axis.

And there for the time being rests the problem of Tunisia. Earlier in this study the Regency was referred to as a pawn on the chessboard of European politics. Today it assuredly merits that appellation. The strength of the fortifications at Bizerte, the power of the Karouba air base, the well trained desert fighters are chessmen of which London, Vichy, Rome, and Berlin have been only too well aware. Since the belief in the strength of the Maginot and Siegfried Lines has been proved to be so ill-founded, doubtless less confidence is placed in the Mareth Line. Use of it by the Axis, however, could make England’s position in Egypt infinitely more dangerous than it is at this moment of writing.

To leave a story, thus, with the ending unwritten is most unsatisfactory. Even to hazard a guess, however, as to the future part to be played by Tunisia in Franco-Italian relations is to assume the role not of a scientific historian but rather that of a sooth-sayer. Pre-war Italy claimed that it needed opportunities in Tunisia as an outlet for her surplus population, as a source of the raw materials (grain, phosphates, olive oil, etc.) without which she could not prosper, and as a source of pride in the lofty aspirations
of Fascism. She demanded collaboration with the French in Tunisia so as to insure: 1) equal political participation with France, 2) adequate Italian schools, 3) tariff equality with France, 4) equality with respect to the acquisition of land, 5) maintenance of Italian citizenship. Pre-war France felt she could not yield to this demand for collaboration and maintain her position and prestige in Tunisia at the same time. Her man-power was considerably outnumbered by other European powers (Italy and Germany, for example), and in the case of an eventual war it would have to be supplemented from her North African territories. Furthermore in the event of such a war, France would have to be sure of her control of Tunisia, lest she suffer a rear or flank attack. In all of these considerations Tunisia, the harbor of Bizerte, and the Kebubba air base were vital links in the chain of communications and security of France.

Granted a post-war Italy, a post-war France, and a post-war Tunisia one can be certain of one thing only: the years of mutual distrust and conflict which have marked Franco-Italian relations will make the problem no easier to solve at that time than it was in 1896, 1921, 1935, or 1938.

Le Journal Officiel de la République française.
Ministero degli affari esteri. *Bolletino*

Ministero degli affari esteri. *Bolletino dell'immigrazione*.


Ministero per gli affari esteri. Raccolta dei Trattati e Convenzioni fra il Regno d'Italia ed i governi esteri. The title varies, sometimes appearing as Trattati e Convenzioni tra il Regno d'Italia e gli altri stati - Raccolti.


Parlamentare. Camera dei deputati. Trattato de Berlino, del 13 luglio 1878, presentato dal presidente del consiglio, ministro degli affari esteri (Carioli) nella tornata del 9 dicembre, 1878.

*Bolletino Consolare*.


All of these Italian Library of Information volumes are sturdy little works, consisting of as many as 150 pages each. The research for them is supposed to have been objective, with free use of English, French, and German authors. However, objectivity was never obtained and each proves the thesis of Fascist infallibility. The bibliographies for the Tunisian works were really valuable, giving clues to some materials otherwise not located.
TUNISIA


Journal officiel tunisien.
UNITED STATES

Department of State. Consular Dispatches. Tunis. 13 vol. These reports are available in manuscript form, bound, in the National Archives in Washington. They are very helpful in securing an unprejudiced view on the period prior to the intervention.

Department of State. Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President. Washington, 1861. Very full and helpful up until 1878, and after that period because so much less material was printed in the series each year, the value to this study is materially reduced.


GERMANY

GREAT BRITAIN


Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. Third series, commencing with the accession of William IV. London.

Accounts and papers, State Papers. London.


II. Treaty sources, semi-official publications, and publications containing
documentary material.

Albin, P.  *Les grands traités politiques depuis 1815 jusqu'à
nos jours.* Paris: Alcan, 1911.

Annual Register.  London: Revingtons, 1799--
These books of this kind contain speeches, and contempor-
ary material which may be very helpful.

Daniel, André ed.  *L'Année politique.* Paris: Charpentier,
1875 -- Similar to the Annual Register, and useful in
the same fashion for chronology, current opinion, etc.

Dubois, Marcel et Auguste Terrier.  *Les colonies françaises:
un siècle d'expansion coloniale, 1800-1900.* Paris:
This was prepared under the Ministry of Colonies. In-
cludes many documents which add to its value.

Clercq, Alexandre Jean de.  *Recueil de traités de la France
(publiés sous les auspices du Ministre des affaires
étrangères).* Paris: Durand et Pedone-Lawll, 1864-
1917. 23 vol.

Dumont, Jean.  *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens.
Amsterdam: Brunel, Wetstein, etc., 1726-51.  9 vol.

Gibbons, Herbert A.  *The New Map of Africa.* N. Y.: Century,
1917.

Gorisinow, Serge.  *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles.* Paris:
Flon-Nourrit, 1910.
The author was the director of the imperial Russian
archives and bases his work upon sources not generally
known.

Hertsel, Sir Edward.  *Map of Europe by Treaty: showing the
various political and territorial changes which have
taken place since the General Peace of 1814.* London:
H. M. Stationer's Office.  1875-91.  4 vol.

Stationer's Office, 1896-1909.  3 vol.

Latey, William.  "The Anglo-French Tunis Dispute," in Trans-
actions of the Grotius Society, Vol. IX. London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 1924.
This work gives the rulings of the Permanent Court of
International Justice on the 1921 nationality decrees
of the French in Tunisia.


Maslatrie served as an official in the archives and consequently was in a position to prepare documentary material well. This volume carries its survey through 1515.


Many of the acts concerning the Regency do not appear in standard treaty collections, but are to be found here.


This is one of the most valuable sources for the France-Tunisian relations of the early period. An immense number of texts is here collected from the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Marine, and from the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, from the Chamber of Commerce in Marseilles, and from the archives of the French Consulate and the Beylical palace in Tunis.


This work is fundamental. It contains the texts of the negotiation and renewal of each treaty.


Solar de Marguerite, Clemente. *Traité publics de la royale maison de Savoie avec les puissances étrangères depuis la paix de Château-Cambresis jusqu'à nos jours.* Turin: Imprimerie royale, 1861. 8 vol.


Tunisie, atlas historique, géographique, économique, et touristique. Paris: Horizons de France, 1936. This atlas was prepared under the supervision and direction of the Resident-General.

III. Biography, Memoirs, Letters, Speeches, etc.


The author was the well-known Paris correspondent for The Times. His writing is egocentric, entertaining, and unreliable. Mme. Waddington wrote of him, "He was absolutely unscrupulous and did not hesitate to put into the mouths of people what he wished them to say."


Very valuable for correspondence concerning the background of the Congress of Berlin.


Of very considerable interest for the pictures of diplomatic life and society, but as he kept no diary or journal, the accuracy of the statements is frequently questioned.


As a confidential press agent of Bismarck, who kept a diary during the twenty-five years of private and official intercourse with the Chancellor Busch has given us a work of value.


This is the speech as a result of which Count Corti offered his resignation.


These volumes written by Salisbury's daughter are helpful for the negotiations concerning the Cyprus Convention and the secret offer of Tunisia to the French.


Though Crispi himself is unreliable, this volume is rich with material of importance.
Deals with the period after 1890, and though containing some material useful to this study was not of so much value as *Politics Evera.*


This volume is based on sound scholarship, and is very helpful in understanding Gambetta's change in attitude towards Germany. There is some attention paid to Gambetta's role in regard to the occupation of Tunisia.

Edwards, Henry Sutherland. *Sir William White, for Six Years Ambassador at Constantinople; His Life and Correspondence.* London: J. Murray, 1902.


Granville's correspondence indicates his dislike of allowing France to take Tunisia.

Interesting in giving a French point of view; written however thirty years after the events described.


Valuable for the frequent notes on German foreign policy and the attitude towards French colonial expansion. As this material was set down almost immediately after the event took place its value is large.


This is Marvin's own description of his career as a civil servant. It is full of bitterness, but as he tells his own version of the revelation of the Salisbury-Schouvalov agreements it is significant in connection with the negotiations of the Congress of Berlin.


This was excellent for the details of personalities and events of the Congress of Berlin, written by an eyewitness.


As British Ambassador to Paris 1867-87 Lord Lyons was in a position to report the situation concerning the occupation of Tunisia. His letters reflect public opinion as well as official reactions.


This memoir is valuable for the comments made on contemporary events by a neutral observer, a former American consul in Tunis. The tour of which he wrote was taken in 1866, just a year before his retirement.
The biography is detailed and scholarly, though the author, a friend and admirer of Ferry and his policies, has a tendency to lose his objectivity.


This is a very valuable collection of Ferry's speeches in parliament and elsewhere, well annotated and correlated by Robiquet. Because the parliamentary papers are printed so very badly, it is an immense help to have the same material in easily handled form in clear type. Vols. IV and V deal especially with the Tunisian question.

The only biography of Cairoli and the Cairoli family. The Italian Encyclopaedia praises it highly. The author had access to Cairoli's papers, but in spite of this there is little new in fact or in interpretation. It is definitely a defense of Cairoli's policy, and is anti-English. The style is poor and involved, and the print and paper are both miserable.

Vol. II is of considerable interest and value in respect to the 1871 crisis. Not all of the available material is published; the author comments that he plans later to do a full volume on the situation, but feels that the time of writing is not opportune. One regrets that this was not done.


IV. SECONDARY SOURCES


With emphasis on the legal aspects of nationality, Aguesse, after considering the general aspects of nationality, deals with Tunisian nationality and the extension of French citizenship in the Regency. He relies heavily on the writings of Rodd-Balek, who was one of the most ardent advocates of the extension of French citizenship under pressure in the Regency.


One of the Italian sources which has been most heavily relied upon by writers on the Tunisian question.


This is a useful volume for a quick check on international relations; however, because it was printed in 1918 it must be used with care, because of course it does not reflect in its interpretations any of the recent documentary evidence.


As a former official at the Residency in Tunis, he presents a traditional French point of view.


d'Avril, Adolphe. *Négociations relatives au traité de Berlin et aux arrangements qui ont suivi, 1875-78.* Paris: Leoux, 1886.

Well documented, and as it was written by a diplomat it is an interesting account; favorable to Russia.

Bash-Hamba, A. Les Israélites tunisiens. Tunis: Imprimerie Rapide, 1909. Of extreme value and interest because it presents the views of one of the leaders of the Young Tunisian movement.

Baily, John Cann. Some Political Ideas and Persons. London: John Murray, 1921. The material included in this volume appeared originally as articles in the literary supplement of The Times, and concern Victoria, Disraeli, Grey, Fox, etc.


Billot was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1881, and the first chapter of vol. I throws some light on the origins of the expedition to Tunisia. It is a detailed and useful study, although it adds little new.

Bismuth, Victor. La nationalité des sociétés en Tunisie: étude de leur régime, commercial et fiscal. Dijon: Bernigaud et Privat, 1927. Largely a discussion of corporation law in Tunisia, and lays considerable stress on the vexing problem of nationality in a protectorate. The question of nationality of persons is discussed in chapter I, followed by the problem of the nationality of corporations, etc.

Of little value to this study.

Bourgeois and Pagès were appointed by the Senatorial Commission on Inquiry of the Facts of the War to make this investigation and were given access to the documents preserved in the Quai d'Orsay. Their report appeared in the *Journal Officiel*, January 9, 1921. Many of the documents are partially incorporated in the text and others are printed in full in an appendix entitled *Documents Secrets*. The authors have a thesis to prove, and the work is somewhat difficult to use because there is no index and no table of contents.

A scholarly study with considerable information on the activities of early French commercial companies in Tunis. It is especially good on the Bastion de France, Cap Nègre, Sanson Napolon, etc. The study is based on archives, but makes considerable use of Plantet as well.


Broadley was a resident of Tunis for many years, an attorney there. His English bias is very apparent, so that as a consequence his volumes must be read with some caution. His judgments are frequently unsound. Nevertheless his account is valuable both as a primary and a secondary source. It is interesting because of the wealth of information and detail which only a spectator on the scene is able to furnish.


A standard Italian account presented by a professor of Constitutional Law and Counsellor of State at the time when Italy began to be interested in the question of colonies.

Caniglia, Renato. **Il dramma di Tunisi.** Naples, Chiurazzi e Figlio, 1930.
Caniglia began his career in 1922, when he became editor of *Corriere and Popolo di Roma.* He is a rabid Fascist, and consistently maintains the thesis that France is a decadent power with a rapidly declining population. That bias is most apparent as he discusses the Tunisian question. He tells a traditional story from the Italian point of view, and is frequently cited by Italian writers.


A scholarly analysis of the difficult subject of public opinion. He is not interested especially in the forces working towards colonization before 1881.

Carta is both an editor and the director of several libraries in Italy. He is an ardent imperialist, and has maintained that thesis in his approach to the Tunisian problem.

The work is well documented; it presents a more or less moderate Italian point of view. It is good on diplomatic affairs all the way through, especially in the earlier sections dealing with the actual occupation.

Cavé was one of the pseudonyms of Charles Monchicourt, a former French official in Tunisia, who wrote widely on the question. Valuable for the French presentation of the nationality problem.

Chiala, Luigi. **Pagine di storia contemporanea dal 1858 al 1892.** Turin and Rome: Roux, 1892-93. 3 vol.
This is probably the most widely used of the older Italian sources. Chiala had served both in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The work contains much valuable press comment, texts of speeches, extracts from Italian documents, etc.

Cilibrizzi, Saverio. **Storia parlamentare politica e diplomatica d'Italia.** Milan: Albrighi, Segat, 1925-34. 4 vol.
This work is very helpful in tracing Italian parliamentary policies and in checking on the events of the various ministries.


Curatulo, Giacomo Emilio. *Francia e Italia; pagine di storia 1849-1914*. Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1915. Written about the time of Italy's entry into the World War. It has a strong anti-English bias, and shows strong nationalist feeling as well. It is valuable not only because of its own approach, but also for the excellent article, cited in full, by Andrea Torre, a journalist who wrote for the Diritto, and during the second Crispi ministry directed the Riforma. Torre's article, written originally for the *Rivista di Roma* in 1889 is entitled *Come la Francia s'impadroni di Tunisi*.

Dacry, Jean. *France et Angleterre: cent années de rivalité coloniale*. Paris: Perrin, 1904. The thesis of this work is the natural rivalry of England and France as a result of their diametrically opposed interests. It is a good and complete account, but is definitely biased, especially in favor of Ferry and his policies.

Darmon, Raoul. *La situation des cultes en Tunisie*. Paris: Rousseau, 1930. The author, a Jew, was born and brought up in the Regency. He came of Italian parents; he studied law in Paris, and became a practicing attorney in Tunis. His discussion deals with all religions and their problems in the Regency.


Dean, Vera Michele. *Italy's African Claims Against France.* N. Y.: Foreign Policy Assn. Information Service, June 1, 1939.


A somewhat philosophical consideration of the state of the Italians in Tunisia. He concerns himself largely with the agricultural worker who came from Sicily to Tunisia, although there is some consideration of Italian colonization centers.


A brief study, interesting for its discussion of finances. It was published in November, 1877, to prove the thesis that the Bey should not give assistance to Turkey. He was in favor of Mustapha Khasnadar and in very much against Khédidine.

Although this is presented in popular form, it contains much very excellent information.

A discussion of political theory and policy respecting the French colonies from the time of Richelieu. The author held a post in the Ministry of the Colonies.

Duggan has served as director of the Institute of International Education, and also has been on the Advisory Board of Foreign Affairs. This is an excellent study, and there is a very clear chapter on the Congress of Berlin and the events which precipitated it. It is carefully documented.

d'Estournelles de Constant, Paul Henri Benjamin. *La politique française en Tunisie; le protectorat et ses origines, 1854-1891.* Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1891. This is the best single volume on the Tunisian question, even though it is imperialist in approach and presents a strong French bias.


Faucon, Narcisse. *La Tunisie, avant et depuis l'occupation française.* Paris: A. Challamel, 1893. 2 vol. This study relies heavily on d'Estournelles de Constant, but frequently supplements in a valuable fashion.


Picaya, Pierre. *Le peuplement italien en Tunisie.* Paris: Les Presses Modernes, 1931. This work is based largely on standard French sources: de Lassass, Rodd-Balek, Leroy-Beaulieu, Saurin, etc. It is written with an imperialistic, anti-Italian bias. The bibliography is meagre and there is no use of documents.


Fitoussi, Elie. *L'état tunisien, son origine, son développement et son organisation actuelle, 1525-1901.* Tunis: Picard, 1901. This study has been superceded by the one done in collaboration with Bénazet some 30 years later.

Fitoussi, Elie, and Aristide Bénazet. *L'état tunisien et le protectorat français; histoire et organisation, 1525-1931.* Paris: Rousseau, 1931. This is an invaluable aid, both for the historical aspects of the Tunisian question as well as for an understanding of the present organization of the Regency.

This study was written as a doctoral thesis, and emphasizes the economic and financial factors which contributed to French intervention.


Emphasizes the French view that the security of Algeria justified the intervention.

This study was published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Gautier is probably the greatest North African historian, with the possible exception of Julian. This study was particularly helpful for its information concerning the indigenes.

Much use of Tunisian archives has been made, and the study is very carefully documented.

A very helpful summary of the subject.

A scholarly study, with a good sketch of the Tunisian question.


Grandchamp was the archivist in Tunis up to the outbreak of the present war. He has been there for many years, and has done a monumental work on the early sources available in the Tunisian archives. This work which deals with current problems, is very helpful.


Helpful because it presents the ideas of an indigene long powerful in the affairs of the Regency.


Hanotaux, Gabriel. Histoire de la France contemporaine. Paris:


This is a helpful analysis, though general in scope.

Harris, David W. C. A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-78: The First Year. Stanford University, Stanford University Press, 1935.

A scholarly and exceptionally able presentation, and very valuable for the period in question.


Through the efforts of Ephraim Douglas Adams, a number of letters and much newspaper material from Tunisia were put into the Hoover War Library. These have been carefully used by Hepburn.


This volume deals largely with geography, customs, etc., but is interesting, though prejudiced, as it is the result of several months' visit in the Regency at an exceedingly important period.


A brief, accurate, but general summary of the occupation of the Regency. One of the volumes of the series "Berkshire Studies in European History."


Grandchamp considers this the best book yet published on the subject. It has a very fine bibliography, and excellent illustrations. It was most usable for the period prior to the intervention.


A former official in the French Residency in Tonkin. His thesis is the fear that Tunisia will slip out of the hands of the French. This volume consists of reports and letters written by the author to a parliamentary commission appointed under Herriot to consider a reform program for the Regency.


Written by a journalist of *Le Siècle*, but based on material which had already been published during the time of the Tunisian campaign. He was impressed with the size of his library of these materials; it consisted of some 40 books and 30 articles. Apparently he had never been in Tunisia.


A good authoritative account; it is very useful for the Enfida and Sidi-Tabet affairs, although he depends a great deal on other secondary writers. Nevertheless, as many of the sources he cites are to be found in the United States in only a few private collections, his study is valuable. He has a distinctly anti-indigene bias.

A scholarly treatise by one of the judges of the Hague Court.

This study is especially helpful because he has used much unpublished material, especially Foreign Office papers in the Public Record Office and the memoirs and papers of Sir Austen Henry Layard, who was British Ambassador at Constantinople at the period of the negotiations in question.

Gives the French point of view on Italian colonization.

The work of the leading French imperialist.

Gives the Italian version of the history to 1837; lightly treated.


Valuable, because it is a detailed study of a subject on which there is very little published information.


McKay was especially interested in the position of Ferry in respect to the matter of intervention. It is a carefully done piece of work.


Both of these works of Masson's are valuable for the period of the very early relations with the Regency.


Helpful for early relations with the Regency.


He has attempted an objective study, and has succeeded far better than most Italians. Reviewing the problem entirely, he touches only lightly on the question of occupation by France, contrary to the emphasis laid by most of his compatriots; he lays considerable stress on international law. It is well documented.


A typical Fascist presentation.


This study has been very carefully done. Full use has been made of the documentary sources available in this country, and has checked against contemporary accounts such as letters, etc. The author speaks of work done in the British Museum and Bibliothèque Nationale, but the research done there is not apparent in the material cited. The bibliography is helpful and critical.

The author, who has done considerable writing on Tunisia, has a post with the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. This study was done on a Rockefeller grant. By intention she elected not to document the study, which from the point of view of the serious scholar impairs its otherwise considerable value.


Morpurgo is a specialist in international law. He was born and grew up in Tunisia, where he filled an important post in the Italian colony there. It is intended to be an impartial study not based on political ideas, and is designed "to promote the same relations of friendship between France and Italy as the Rome agreements of 1935."


A journalist and former editor of L'Unione of Tunis, who was expelled for his unfriendly attitude to France. Marked anti-Semitic tinge to his writing; something of a swaggering young Fascist.


A newspaper man, who evidently spent some time in the Regency. Made a most interesting trip to the Mareth Line. Is very helpful for certain details of the very recent period.


Extremely valuable. It is almost unbelievable that so much accurate information could be crowded into so small a volume. Useful for this entire study. Pellegrin is a member of the Grand Council of Tunis, was born in the Regency, and has always lived there. He has done considerable writing also on the folklore of the country, etc., and like Fitoussi has made much use of the best Arabic writers. Very pro-French in his attitude.


Perry was the consul for the United States just prior to the writing of this volume. It is an interesting popular survey and contains a great deal of contemporary information.


Priestley, Herbert Ingram. *France Overseas: A study of Modern Imperialism.* N. Y.: D. Appleton-Century, 1933. The best volume of its kind. The chapter on Tunisia is an excellent general survey. The work for this dissertation was begun when the writer was a student in Dr. Priestley's seminars at the University of California.

Rankin, Sir Reginald. *Tunisia.* London: John Lane, 1930. Of no serious value, but interesting because of its local color.


Rey, Albert. *Mémoire sur l'affaire de l'Enfida, propriété acquise de S. A. Khéréddine Pacha.* Paris: A. Chaix, 1881. Rey was the president of the company which took over Khéréddine's holdings in the Regency. The account naturally is presented from the French point of view, but is valuable because of the close connection of the author with the subject.

Roberts, Stephen H. *History of French Colonial Policy, 1870-1925.* London: P. S. King and Son, 1929. 2 vol. Roberts has to be used with some caution, because he frequently overemphasises certain factors, e.g., the role of Ferry in the acquisition of Tunisia. It is comprehensive, valuable, and suggestive, however.


Rodd-Balek. *La Tunisie après la guerre, 1919-1921.* Paris: Comité de l'Afrique française, 1923. This, like Cavé, is the pseudonym of Charles Monchicourt, who wrote widely on the Tunisian question. This was issued first in serial form in the monthly bulletin of l'Afrique française and then later as a separate volume. It is a most useful source.
Although a part of a travel series it has some light to shed on the Destour point of view.

This was written by a French consular official in Tunisia in Algeria, and for a long time was the only standard summary of the earlier history of the Regency. It is of considerable value, covering the period from 1555-1830, has some good chronological lists, etc. The appended source material is useful.

One of the best documented and most carefully edited of the Italian works.

Salvatorelli, Luigi. A Concise History of Italy. N. Y.: Oxford Press, 1940.
A good general survey of Italian history in one volume.


Written by the official biographer of Mussolini this is not as anti-French a presentation as one would anticipate. Though it is done in popular form it has some value for certain of the later parts of this study. There is, however, nothing new or original in it.

Written by a man intimately concerned with the problem of settling the French on land in Tunisia.


Written by an attorney in Tunis; the only thorough study of the subject.

An attorney in Tunis, and former member of the Grand Council. Though he is very sympathetic to the French cause in Tunisia, he sees certain evils which need
remedy. He considers all aspects of the agricultural problem, and adequately discusses the depression and its effects on the Regency.


Despite slight factual inaccuracies which usually appear in Schuman's work, a complete analysis of the Tunisian question is given. Up to the time of the appearance of the Priestly work, it was the best summary in English.


General, but helpful. Considerable documentation, and a full bibliography.


Swain, J. W. *Beginning the Twentieth Century*. N. Y.: W. W. Norton, 1940.

A key volume for the study of the indigene movement.

Lord's section on the Congress of Berlin is valuable.

Written by one of the staff of the School of Islamics at Lahore.

Begins his discussion with the denunciation of the treaty of 1868 and carries it through 1922. Though widely quoted, he cannot be relied upon for accuracy.
Has some material on Rochefort and L'Intransigeant articles not to be found elsewhere.

Up to the study made under administration auspices and published in 1931, this was the only work dealing with this particular phase of the Tunisian question.

Villari, Luigi. The expansion of Italy. London: Faber and Faber, 1930.
As Fascist propaganda emissary in London, he naturally defends the Fascist policies.

Villari, Luigi. Italy. N. Y.: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1929.

Viollis is the pseudonym for André Françoise Caroline Ardenne de Tizac. It has been used a great deal for the very recent details it gives of Destourian leaders, disturbances in Tunisia, etc., which because of war conditions are not available otherwise. It is extremely sympathetic to the indigenes, although it is distinctly anti-Italian, and somewhat emotional.

Interesting details of the Bey, his court, etc. presented with an anti-French bias.


Written originally as a doctoral dissertation. The citations are shockingly inaccurate, and the author has failed repeatedly to give credit to authors whose work is cited. Relies heavily on secondary sources, when unnecessary.


This is a record of public opinion and makes careful use of newspapers.


V. Periodical articles and Periodicals

A. Periodical articles


This was useful for certain details of contemporary figures which it furnished.


Furnishes interesting contemporary pictures.


Gives a picture of Enrico di Santa Maria, the recent energetic editor of the Italian L'Unione of Tunis.


This was an exceedingly valuable aid. Langer's analysis of the policies of Bismarck and Cairoli and his careful use of documentary evidence available at the time of his writing were a helpful guide.

Lebon supports the French thesis that France was not guilty of deception in the intervention in Tunisia. The article is based on original materials in the Quai d'Orsay. There is considerable reference to Chiala, since he is refuting the Italian claims of deception, and since Chiala was the leading exponent of that theme. Lebon also, under the pseudonym André Daniel was the editor of L'Année politique.

Le Neveu, C. A. "France and Italy in North Africa," Foreign Affairs, October 1928.


On the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the writer has contributed considerably to recent years to a clear analysis of the problems of North Africa.


Passamonti, Eugenio. "La questione tunisina, il domani del trattato del Bardo e la politica europea contemporanea," Revista storica italiane, 1933 and 1935, vol. L and LII. Detailed, well documented and pro-Italian. Condemns Cairoli's foreign policy and tries to prove that Bismarck offered Tunisia at the Congress of Berlin to Italy. There is little new in the approach, and in a number of instances is definitely unreliable.


Spont, Alfred, "Les français à Tunis, de 1600 à 1789," Revue des questions historiques, January 1900. This was a useful supplementary article.

Rodd-Balek. "La Tunisie après la guerre," L'Afrique française, April 1920-March 1922. This was a series of articles dealing of all phases of Tunisian life after the war, and is to be found in almost every issue of the period mentioned.
A light article with some interest for the very recent problems with which it deals.

Tittoni, Thommaso. "Tunisia, Tripolitania e Italia," Nuova Antologia, April 1, 1924.
This is a defense of his policy in respect to the Tunisian question.

Valbert, G. "La France et l'Italie à Tunis," Revue des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1881.

Waddington, Mary King Alsop. "My Prist Years as a Frenchwoman," Scribners, January, February and March 1914. This was later published in book form, also. It is valuable for Mme. Waddington's interesting and relevant comments about the policies of and the persons attending the Congress of Berlin.


Zaouche, Abdeljelil. "Questions tunisiennes," Revue politique et parlementaire, July 10, 1910. Zaouche was a member of the Conférence-Consultative, and his comments at a time when the indigènes were pressing for reform, are very useful.

B. Periodicals

The monthly bulletin of the Comité de l'Afrique française.

The Economist. London.

This was especially useful for the period before the intervention when Leroy-Beaulieu was the leading exponent for overseas expansion.

Helpful for filling in the contemporary picture.

Mlle. Gambetta, one-time ardent admirer of Gambetta. Neither Mme. Adam nor her journal ever ceased to denounce Bismarck.
VI. Newspapers

It is especially to be noted that complete files of Tunisian and Algerian papers are non-existent in this country. What few there are are scattered widely through the United States. The frequent appearance and suppressions of these journals adds to the difficulty of any consistent use of them.

A.

L'Akhbar (fortnightly). Algiers.

Algemeine Zeitung. Munich.


La Dépêche Tunisienne. Tunis.

L'Etandard Algérien. Algiers.


L'Ikdam (weekly). Algiers.

L'Islam (weekly). Algiers.


Kölische Zeitung. Cologne.


Il Secola La Sera. Milan.


The Times. London.

Le Tunisien. Tunis.

L'Unione. Tunis.
B.

Public Opinion: a Comprehensive Survey of the Press Throughout the World on all Important Current Topics (weekly), London.
Valuable because it gave press summaries for periods in which files of foreign newspapers were not available.
VII. General Reference Works.

Chi R. Rome: Cenacolo. 
An annual volume; useful for identifying certain less well-known Italian personalities.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th ed.) 1939 issue.

The Encyclopaedia of Islam. London: Luzac, 1934. 4 vol.


An annual volume.
APPENDIX A

BEYS OF TUNISIA

First Period (1705-1837) Absolute power.

1. Hussein ben Ali 1705-1740
2. Ali-Pacha 1740-1756
3. Mohammed-Bey 1756-1759
4. Ali-Bey 1759-1782
5. Hammouda-Bey 1782-1814
6. Othman-Bey Sept. 14 - Dec. 29, 1814
7. Mahmoud-Bey 1814-1824
8. Hussein-Bey 1824-1835
9. Mustapha-Bey 1835-1837

Second Period (1837-1881) The liberal monarchy.

1. Ahmed-Bey 1837-1855
2. Mohammed-Bey 1855-1859
3. Mohammed-es-Saddok-Bey 1859-1881

Third Period (1881-1942) The French protectorate

1. Ali-Bey 1881-1902
2. Mohammed-el-Hadi-Bey 1902-1906
3. Mohammed-en-Naceur-Pacha-Bey 1906-1922
4. Mohammed-el-Habib-Bey 1922-1929
5. Ahmed-Bey 1929

Bey de Camp: Tahar Bey
APPENDIX B

Ali-Pacha (1740-56)  Hussein-ben-Ali (1705-40)

Mohammed (1756-59)  Mahmoud

Mahmoud  Ismail

Hammouda (1782-1814)  Othman (Sept. 14-Dec. 20, 1814)

Hussein


Mohammed-el-Habib (1922-29)  Tahar  Mohammed-al-Bachir

BEYS OF TUNISIA
Husseinite Dynasty
(1705 - 1942)
Based on Fitoussi et Bénazet, Julien, and Almanac de Gotha, 1941.
APPENDIX C

RESIDENTS-GENERAL OF TUNISIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>for original negotiations</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roustan</td>
<td></td>
<td>March, 1832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambon</td>
<td></td>
<td>November, 1836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massiacult</td>
<td></td>
<td>November, 1892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rouvier</td>
<td></td>
<td>November, 1894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td></td>
<td>April, 1901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pichon</td>
<td></td>
<td>December, 1906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alapetite</td>
<td></td>
<td>October, 1918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flandin</td>
<td></td>
<td>November, 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint</td>
<td></td>
<td>June, 1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manceron</td>
<td></td>
<td>July, 1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peyrouton</td>
<td></td>
<td>March, 1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guillon</td>
<td></td>
<td>October, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labonne</td>
<td></td>
<td>June, 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peyrouton</td>
<td></td>
<td>July, 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esteva</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of the impossibility of getting detailed information on the Regency since 1939 this is as nearly complete and accurate as it is possible to make it with the resources available in this country at this time.
Excerpts from Miers Fisher Wright, Operations of the French Navy During the Recent War with Tunisia. Washington: 1883.


"As the water shoaled very gradually, there was but one point where the boats could approach the beach, and this point was exposed to the fire of the town batteries. The Admiral had also ordered a sort of floating landing-stage to be made by using the topsail-yeards of the various iron-clads. ... The squadron had furnished a detachment of torpedo boats to blow up any obstacles and the whale boats were reserved to tow the floating stage and to facilitate afterwards the landing of the boats carrying the troops. ... Between 2:30 and 3 a.m. operations began; on one hand the squadron bombed the town; the whale boats and a stem-launch took the floating stage intow, and the armed boats formed in a line of battle five hundred meters to the eastward of the water battery. The landing-stage was hauled in very easily after the anchor had been carried ashore by which to warp it in."

p. 16.

Occupation of Gabès, July 24, 1881

"Through landing at Gabès presented no difficulties comparable with those at the capture of Sfax, it nevertheless was conducted with boldness and skill. The nature of the beach was such that the men could not land dry-shod, and they were obliged to jump into the water. The sea being smooth just then, the inconvenience was not very great. ..."

p. 27.
Occupation of Sousse, September 11, 1881.

"It was expected that resistance would be made, but there was none... The commander of the town was, on the contrary, of a very accommodating disposition. He voluntarily gave up the Casbah and all the strategic points of the town... The last operation of the Navy was thus confined to a simple taking possession." p. 30.
APPENDIX E

Traité d'amitié et de bon voisinage signé à Casr-Said, le 12 mai 1881.

Traité conclu entre le gouvernement de la République française et le gouvernement de Son Altesse le bey de Tunis.

Le Gouvernement de la République française et celui de Son Altesse le bey de Tunis, voulant empêcher à jamais le renouvellement des désordres qui se sont produits récemment sur les frontières des deux états et sur le littoral de la Tunisie, et désireux de resserrer leurs anciennes relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage, ont résolu de conclure une Convention à cette fin, dans l'intérêt des deux Hautes Parties contractantes.

En conséquence, le Président de la République française a nommé pour son Plénipotentiaire M. le général Bréart, qui est tombé d'accord avec Son Altesse le Bey sur les stipulations suivantes:

Art. 1. Les traités de paix, d'amitié et de commerce, et toutes autres conventions existant actuellement entre le République française et son Altesse le bey de Tunis, sont

1. This is the treaty commonly referred to as that of "the Bardo" from the palace in which it was signed.

expressément confirmés et renouvelés.

Art. 2. En vue de faciliter au Gouvernement de la République française l'accomplissement des mesures qu'il doit prendre pour atteindre le but que se proposent les Hautes Parties contractantes, Son Altesse le bey de Tunis consent à ce que l'autorité militaire française fasse occuper les pointes qu'elle jugera nécessaires pour assurer le rétablissement de l'ordre et la sécurité de la frontière et du littoral. Cette occupation cessera lorsque les autorités militaires françaises et tunisiennes auront reconnu, d'un commun accord, que l'administration locale est en état de garantir le maintien de l'ordre.

Art. 3. Le Gouvernement de la République française prend l'engagement de prêter un constant appui à Son Altesse le bey de Tunis contre tout danger qui menacerait la personne ou la dynastie de Son Altesse ou qui compromettrait la tranquillité de ses états.

Art. 41. Le Gouvernement de la République française se porte garant de l'exécution des traités actuellement existant entre le Gouvernement de la Régance et les diverses Puissances européennes.

Art. 5. Le Gouvernement de la République française sera représenté auprès de Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis par un ministre résident qui veillera à l'exécution du présent Acte et qui sera l'intermédiaire des rapports du Gouvernement français avec les autorités tunisiennes pour toutes les affaires communes aux deux Pays.
Art. 6. Les agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France en pays étrangers seront chargés de la protection des intérêts tunisiens et des nationaux de la Régence.

En retour, Son Altesse le Bey s'engage à ne conclure aucune acte ayant un caractère international sans en avoir donné connaissance au Gouvernement de la République française et sans s'être entendu préalablement avec lui.

Art. 7. Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis se réservent de fixer, d'un commun accord, les bases d'une organisation financière de la Régence, qui soit de nature à assurer le service de la dette publique et à garantir les droits de créanciers de la Tunisie.

Art. 8. Une contribution de guerre sera imposée aux tribus insoumises de la frontière et du littoral.

Une convention ultérieure en déterminera le chiffre et le mode de recouvrement, dont le Gouvernement de Son Altesse le Bey se porte responsable.

Art. 9. Afin de protéger contre le contrebande des armes et des munitions de guerre, les possessions algériennes de la République française, le Gouvernement de Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis s'engage à prohiber toute introduction d'armes ou de munitions de guerre par l'île de Djerba, le port de Gabes ou les autres ports du Sud de la Tunisie.

Art. 10. Le présent traité sera soumis à la ratification du Gouvernement de la République française et l'instrument de ratification sera soumis à Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis dans
le plus bref délai possible.

Cасr SaId, le 12 mai 1831

Mohammedes Sadog Bey
(Cachet de Bey)
APPENDIX F

Convention pour régler les rapports respectifs des deux pays, France, Tunis; signée à la Marsa, le 8 juin, 1883; ratifiée par la loi française du 9 avril, 1884.

S. A. le bey de Tunis, prenant en considération la nécessité d'améliorer la situation intérieure de la Tunisie, dans les conditions prévues par le traité du 12 mai 1881, et le Gouvernement de la République ayant à coeur de répondre à ce désir et de consolider ainsi les relations d'amitié heureusement existantes entre les deux pays, sont convenus de conclure une convention spéciale à cet effet: en conséquence, le Président de la République Française a nommé pour son plénipotentiaire, M. Pierre-Paul Cambon, son ministre-résident à Tunis, officier de la Légion d'honneur, décoré de l'Haïd et grand'croix du Nichau Iftikar, etc. etc., lequel, après avoir communiqué ses pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, a arrêté, avec S. A. le Bey de Tunis, les dispositions suivantes:

Art. 1er. — Afin de faciliter au Gouvernement français l'accomplissement de son protectorat, S. A. le bey de Tunis s'engage à procéder aux réformes administratives judiciaires et financières que le Gouvernement français jugera utiles.

Art. 2 — Le Gouvernement français garantira, à l'époque et sous les conditions qui lui paraîtront les meilleures, un emprunt à émettre par S. A. le bey, pour la conversion ou le remboursement de la dette consolidée s'élevant à la somme de
120 millions de francs et de la dette flottante jusqu'à concurrence d'un maximum de 17,550,000 fr.

S. A. le bey s'interdit de contracter, à l'avenir, aucun emprunt pour le compte de la Régence sans l'autorisation du Gouvernement français.

Art. 3. — Sur les revenus de la Régence, S. A. le Bey prélevera: 1° les sommes nécessaires pour assurer le service de l'emprunt garanti par la France; 2° la somme de deux millions de piastres (1,200,000 fr.) montant de sa liste civile, le surplus des revenus devant être affecté aux dépenses d'administration de la Régence et au remboursement des charges du protectorat.

Art. 4. — Le présent arrangement confirme et complète, en tant que de besoin, le traité du 12 mai 1881. Il ne modifiera pas les dispositions précédemment intervenues pour le règlement des contributions de guerre.

Art. 5. — La Présente convention sera soumise à la ratification du Gouvernement de la République française et l'instrument de ladite ratification sera remis à S. A. le bey de Tunis dans le plus bref délai possible.

En foi de quoi les soussignés ont dressé le présent acte et l'ont revêtu de leurs cachets.

Fait à la Marsa, le 8 juin 1883.

Paul Cambon

Ali, bey de Tunis


Note: the treaty has been copied exactly as it appeared in
de Martens. The inconsistencies in capitalization and punctuation have not been altered or corrected.
APPENDIX G

DECRET du 9 juin 1881 chargeant le Ministre-Résident de France des fonctions de Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement tunisien.

Les articles 4, 5, et 6 du traité conclu entre notre Gouvernement et celui de la République française (12 mai 1881) nécessitant l'intervention du Ministre de la République dans nos rapports avec les représentants des puissances amies:

En vue de faciliter et de hâter la solution des affaires, Nous chargeons le Ministre-Résident de France à Tunis du rôle d'intermédiaire officiel et unique dans les rapports que les représentants des puissances amies, accrédités auprès de Nous, entretiendront à l'avenir avec Nous.

Le présent décret sera notifié, par les soins du Ministre-Résident de France, au Gouvernement de la République française et aux représentants des puissances amies à Tunis.

APPENDIX H

Denunciation of the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation of September 3, 1363; between Italy and Tunisia.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Bey of Tunisia to the Royal Agent and Consul General of Italy in Tunisia.

le 17 août

Tunis, 1895.

Monsieur l'Agent et Consul général,

Le traité d'amitié, de commerce et de navigation conclu le 3 septembre 1368 entre l'Italie et la Régence de Tunis, dispose, dans son article 25, que cet acte restera en vigueur pendant 23 années, à dater du jour de l'échange des ratifications, mais que si douze mois avant l'expiration du dit délai, il n'est pas dénoncé par une des deux hautes Parties contractantes, il se trouvera renouvelé pour un temps égal.

Le Gouvernement de S. A. le Bey de Tunis ayant résolu d'user de la faculté qu'il s'était ainsi réservée de faire cesser les effets du dit acte à la expiration de la période de 23 ans, qui prendra fin le 29 septembre 1896, j'ai l'honneur de Vous notifier la dénonciation du traité susmentionné du 3 septembre 1863.

Je vous serais obligé de vouloir bien me donner acte de la présente notification.

Agréez, etc.

A. Riffault

Giver in Cesare Tumedei, La questione tunisina e l'Italia, pp. 229-30.