Title of Dissertation: THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS: A FORCE FOR PEACE OR SPIRALING VIOLENCE

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Dissertation directed by: Professor Ted Robert Gurr, Department of Government and Politics

This dissertation examines how interventions by external states can influence the degree of violence of internal ethnic conflicts. We know that foreign state interventions can alter the trajectory of domestic disputes but scholars disagree about the potential effects. Outside support can increase the destructiveness and duration while potentially threatening to diffuse hostilities across states boundaries. Third parties can alternatively help promote a resolution through mediation or by ensuring the victory of one of the parties.

This project tests several hypotheses about the effects of key variables including the goals and prior political activism of ethnic groups, the regime type of host states, the impact of the Cold War, the type of state intervenor, the form of assistance supplied, the recipients of the interventions, and ethnic linkages between the parties. The cases
comprise twenty-nine ethnopolitical conflicts that emerged in the Third World in the 1980s and the 1990s.

Major findings that refine our existing knowledge include how interventions during the Cold War were most likely to occur in conflicts that escalated and that major and regional powers were the main participants. In the 1990s, or the post-Cold War era, most foreign states intervened in ethnic disputes that were either stalemated or decreased in violence. Neighboring states are now the most frequent intervenors in escalating conflicts. Further, higher levels of assistance are unexpectedly associated with internal wars that stalemate or decrease in violence.

Challenges to the conventional wisdom include the findings that groups seeking autonomy or secession are very likely to be involved in more intense disputes, neighboring state involvement does not usually exacerbate hostilities, and there is no relationship between competing interventions (support each side) and changes in domestic violence. Further, while military aid is most frequently furnished, it is economic, and secondly, mixed aid (usually economic and military) that is critical in escalating conflicts. Finally, foreign state involvement prior to the eruption of violent hostilities has been little studied. Yet, prior engagement is significantly associated with greater future violence.
THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN ETHNIC CONFLICTS: A FORCE FOR PEACE OR SPIRALING VIOLENCE

by

Deepa Khosla

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Advisory Committee:

Professor Ted Robert Gurr, Chair
Professor Ken Conca
Professor Dennis Pirages
Professor Jonathan Wilkenfeld
Professor Jerald Hage
I dedicate this dissertation to my mother Krishna Khosla
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Do third party interventions exacerbate or help ameliorate violent intrastate conflicts? While this is not a new research question, it has gained renewed relevance and importance in the post-Cold War era. Scholars and policymakers have sought to map out the various linkages between domestic, regional, and international factors and how they influence the initiation, continuation, and cessation of civil conflicts.

External actors do not usually instigate internal wars; but, they can play a critical role. Outside support for the contending parties can increase the destructiveness, scope, and duration of these conflicts while potentially threatening to diffuse the hostilities across state boundaries. This diffusion can encompass refugee outflows, the potential for genocidal reactions by an embroiled regime that perceives it is under siege, to retaliatory measures by conflict-ridden states that can range from providing support for opposition groups in the intervening country to cross-border raids and pre-emptive strikes. Tensions between a foreign state intervenor and a country hosting a domestic conflict can ratchet up to the level of interstate war. The consequences of these regional instabilities are difficult to contain and often necessitate the involvement of actors such the great powers or regional and international organizations.

The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire) that first began in the fall of 1996, but more importantly re-emerged as the second Tutsi rebellion in August 1998, illustrate the extreme consequences of outside state involvement in domestic wars. During the first Tutsi rebellion against the corrupt Mobutu Sese Seko regime, no less than eight regional states supported the rebel Tutsis while South Africa
and the United States attempted to mediate an early and orderly exit for Mobuto. The war ended in eight months. However, less than a year later a new internal conflict emerged with far more serious and destructive domestic and regional consequences. This second rebellion by the Congolese Tutsis involved seven regional states taking opposing sides. There have been more than three million casualties due to direct combat or war-related effects such as disease and famine. This highly internationalized war is now Africa’s most deadly conflict. The two decade-long civil war in the Sudan between the Arab, Islamic northern-dominated governments and the African, Christian and animist Southerners has claimed more than two million lives.

Third parties, on the other hand, can help promote a resolution through various forms of informal and formal mediation. The end of the Cold War paved the way for unprecedented cooperation between the United States and Russia/the former Soviet Union to help resolve numerous long-standing internal conflicts. It also increased the opportunities for collective security measures by both regional and international organizations. For example, between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s, the deployment of peacekeeping forces by the United Nations tripled (Doyle, 2001, 530). UN peacekeeping operations in Mozambique, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, and in support of the US-led effort in Haiti are considered as successful in halting the violence and/or helping to promote the reconstruction of state and civil society structures.

Individual or ad-hoc groups of states are also active in seeking to further peace through various conflict resolution techniques. In the late 1990s, multiple mediation efforts by New Zealand and Australia were crucial to ending the rebellion by the Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea. In the early stages of the Tuareg dispute in Mali,
efforts to reach a final agreement were furthered by the timely involvement of Algeria and Burkina Faso. An accord reached in 1992, two years after the revolt began, set the stage for the 1995 settlement that ended violent hostilities.

Another avenue by which foreign states can help conclude armed conflict is by guaranteeing the victory of one of the combatants. India’s military intervention in East Pakistan in 1970 in support of the rebel forces helped to create the new state of Bangladesh. Various state intervenors, including the superpowers -- who alternated their patronage between the rebels and the host state government based on Cold War considerations -- assisted the Eritreans in sustaining their decades-long rebellion against the Ethiopian authorities. Following the overthrow of the Mengistu regime, Eritrea became independent in 1993.

This study seeks to further our knowledge about how interventions by external states can influence the course of intrastate wars. The main question that is addressed is how foreign state interventions can influence the level of violence in the early stages of an ethnopolitical conflict. The early stages are defined as the first two years after the onset of an ethnic rebellion. One of the primary reasons for the focus on the initial years of domestic violence is outlined by Stern and Druckman who argue that “[The] longer the time between the intervention and its expected effect, the harder it is to evaluate the intervention because there is more time in which extrinsic events can occur and influence outcomes” (2000, 39).

The temporary increase in ethnopolitical conflicts that coincided with the end of the Cold War ignited greater interest among both academics and policymakers about the causes of these types of internal disputes (Marshall and Gurr, 2003; Gleditsch,
Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand, 2002). Further, the decline in interstate hostilities led many scholars to focus on the avenues through which these internal wars could impact on relations among states and the potential for international hostilities. Much more is known about the causes of ethnic conflicts in comparison to how domestic and international factors can influence their trajectories. This dissertation hopes to help toward bridging this gap by examining how outsiders can influence a conflict’s violent potential.

A number of empirical and case studies examine the role of external state interventions in domestic wars. However, much less attention has been paid to how outsiders can influence the degree of armed violence. During the Cold War, the emphasis was most often on whether interventions by major powers influenced the nature of their relationships, or alternatively on the domestic factors that led these countries to become involved in internal conflicts which were often in regions that were considered of limited strategic interest.

The general assumption is that when external states become involved in intrastate wars there is likely to be an escalation as these outside actors bolster the resources available to combatants to further their objectives. Most of the research centers on the provision of military assistance, which is usually viewed as the most common and easiest avenue by which foreign states can engage in internal wars. There has however been little focus on which of the various aspects of intervention strategies are associated with conflict escalation, a military stalemate, or a decrease in violent hostilities. For example, is the type of state intervenor the most relevant, the forms and degree of assistance that are supplied, or who are the recipients of these interventions – or are combinations of
these more important? The impact of the involvement of outsiders, whether they are states or other third party actors, is increasingly important in our post-Cold War era as we are witnessing greater opportunities for diverse and multiple international actors who attempt to influence the trajectories of domestic conflicts.

Twenty-nine ethnopolitical rebellions that either began or re-emerged after a five to ten year period of dormancy from 1980-2000 are the focus of this analysis. The geographic scope is restricted to the Third World as this is the region where the vast majority of intrastate, and specifically ethnic, conflicts have arisen in the post-World War II era. The Third World categorization refers to the traditional regions of Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. What are referred to now as the post-communist countries, or the former Second World, do share some of the features of Third World states. However, a number of common characteristics bind together the countries of the Third World including: a colonial heritage, the adoption of Western models of governance, the emphasis on internal security concerns, and extreme dependence on the world economy (Ayoob, 2002, 345; Khosla, 1999, 1144). Further, during the Cold War, the Third World was considered as the prime arena for superpower competition through proxy wars. Such wars limited the opportunities for a direct confrontation since in most cases neither superpower had enough strategic interests to ratchet up the competition. The result often was an intertwining of intrastate and interstate conflicts as witnessed in the example of Kashmir -- one of the cases that is considered in this analysis (Ayoob, 2002, 45-6).
The Organization of this Study

The following chapter presents the framework. While the main emphasis is on the different components of an intervention strategy, the framework includes the most relevant group, host state, and conflict characteristics that are reported to potentially influence the level of domestic hostilities. Some of these are an ethnopolitical group’s prior involvement in anti-state violence, the democratic-autocratic nature of the states that host these conflicts, and systemic features such as the end of the Cold War. Chapter 2 discusses these various factors in the context of presenting the eleven hypotheses that are to be tested. It also takes note of additional variables that need to be considered including the involvement of other external actors such as the United Nations, regional organizations, and ethnic kin groups in neighboring states, while recognizing that some factors that might warrant inclusion are not incorporated.

Chapter 3 begins by outlining the various criteria that were used to select the cases. A number of procedures were employed to ensure that the ethnopolitical conflicts had as many common features as possible to facilitate comparisons among them. The operationalization of the various independent variables and the dependent variable is then discussed. The dependent variable, the outcome of a conflict, is conceived of as the degree of violence of an ethnic war. It is measured by examining an ethnopolitical group’s level of rebellion, that is, the extent to which rebel groups are able to mount an effective challenge to the authorities of a host state.

A broad overview of some of the conflicts across the various Third World regions is first presented in Chapter 4. This includes a discussion of the intertwined nature of ethnic strife in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, the concentration of ethnopolitical
conflicts in South Asia, cross-border linkages between Middle Eastern groups, and the relative lack of identity disputes in Latin America. In addition, the initial results of the empirical analysis are reported. These address questions such as who and what types of states intervene the most frequently, the most common form of assistance supplied, and the recipients of these interventions.

In Chapter 5, the eleven hypotheses are subject to empirical testing through the use of cross-tabulations. The discussion relates the results to other data analyses of external state interventions and also refers to the specific conflicts in this study. Chapter 6 draws together the various empirical results to discuss the broader patterns of external state interventions and their relationships with changes in the level of domestic violence. It outlines how the results reinforce and clarify our existing knowledge, raise challenges to the conventional wisdom, and provide avenues for further research of new or understudied issues. The conflicts are utilized to further illuminate the main findings.

This study points to the need to disaggregate the components of the intervention strategies of external states in order to properly assess their consequences for internal ethnic conflicts. The key findings reveal that the type of outside state intervenor, the forms of assistance utilized, and secondarily the recipients of the interventions can influence the future course of violent hostilities. Further, the types of demands of ethnopolitical groups are significant. Groups that seek autonomy and/or secession along with those that attempt to gain a share of or desire to capture control over the power of the state apparatus are much more likely to engage in rebellions that escalate than others. Moreover, the end of the Cold War appears to have changed the nature of the patterns of external state interventions and their impact of these disputes. Major and regional power
involvement in Cold War domestic insurgencies was generally associated with conflicts that exhibited higher levels of violence. In the post-Cold War period it has been neighboring states that are more active in conflicts that escalate, indicating that outside involvement is now becoming a local or regional phenomena. Interventions that are solely on behalf of ethnopolitical groups are also much more common. Finally, in our current era, the general trend indicates that conflicts are more likely to be in a stalemate or display a reduced degree of violent hostilities.
Chapter 2: Group, Host State, Intervention, and Conflict Linkages

The myriad avenues through which domestic and international factors interact to influence intrastate, and secondarily interstate, conflicts has become a significant component of the research agendas in both comparative politics and international relations in the past decade and a half.¹ Studies have examined diverse issues such as how interventions influence the duration of civil conflicts (Regan, 2002; Luttwak, 1999; Stedman, 1993), the nature of ethnic or ideological linkages between domestic combatants and external allies (Davis, Jaggers, and Moore, 1997a), state motives for external involvement (Brown, 1996; Carment and James, 2000; David, 1997; Heraclides, 1991; Saideman, 2001), the salience of ethnicity in international crises (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997a, 1997b; Carment and James, 1998; Carment, 1993), regime type and the propensity to intervene (Kegley Jr. and Hermann, 1997; Tures, 2002), the contagion and diffusion of international and internal conflict (Caprioli and Trumbore, 2003; Gurr, 1993; Gurr and Harff, 1994; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Trumbore, 2003b; Vasquez, 1992; Zartman, 1992), and the role of outside actors in promoting and supporting negotiated agreements (Hampson, 1996; Hartzell, 1999; Stedman and Rothchild, 1997; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, 2003; Walter, 1997). This chapter draws together the main strands of theoretical and empirical research as it relates to the domestic-international nexus and in particular to the issue of intervention.²

¹ The terms conflict, war, insurgency, dispute, and rebellion are used interchangeably as are the terms internal, intrastate, civil, and domestic.
² The terms ethnic, ethnopolitical, and communal are used interchangeably. The state facing the rebellion is most commonly referred to as the host state.
The first section outlines how the concept of intervention is defined. The next analyzes the existing research on internal and interstate conflicts and outcomes, focusing on the means by which external interventions can influence these outcomes. The framework of this dissertation which encompasses group, host state, intervention, and conflict variables is then discussed along with the hypotheses that will be tested.

The Concept of Intervention

While there is no commonly-agreed upon definition of intervention, some of the general characteristics associated with such actions include the provision or withdrawal of various forms of assistance, the attempt to alter domestic-state society relations, and their convention-breaking nature. At the most general level, Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman use the term intervene “broadly to include any action undertaken to change the course of a conflict process” (2000, 37). Richard Falk argues that an intervention must have three elements: it involves a reliance on military power, it seeks some degree of political restructuring, and it only occurs when consent is not given by either the host government or the political forces in operational control of the country (1993, 756). However, this definition is overly restrictive as it not only excludes the use of other instruments such as economic sanctions but by emphasizing the lack of consent it also removes from consideration interventions where consent might be initially or supposedly given but later withdrawn.3 Herbert Tillema also adopts of a restrictive notion by

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3 For instance, India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 was reported to initially be supported by the main rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). However, shortly after the negotiation of the Indo-Lanka accord which provided for an Indian peacekeeping mission, the LTTE rejected the deployment of the
focusing exclusively on instances of foreign overt military interventions, that is, those in which an intervening country’s military forces are directly involved (1989). Again, this conception eliminates the potential influence of other forms of external assistance.

Some studies utilize the definition put forward by Oran Young and qualified by James Rosenau (e.g. Regan, 1996; Yoon, 1997). Young asserts that “intervention refers to organized and systematic activities across recognized boundaries aimed at affecting the political authorities of the target…[These activities may be] designed either to replace existing structures or to shore up structures thought to be in danger of collapse” (1968, 178). Rosenau suggests that the convention-breaking nature of these acts be noted so that distinctions can be made between regular diplomacy and intervention (1968, 170). S. Neil MacFarlane adopts a similar notion of intervention which he states “…is an engagement in the domestic affairs of a state intended to change (or to preserve) the structure of power and authority within it” (2002, 13). He qualifies this by asserting that intervention usually involves a coercive action (Ibid.). This study conceives of intervention in a similar way as discussed by Young and MacFarlane, in that these acts are meant to influence the domestic political structures of a state. A broad range of intervention strategies are examined and thus the definition employed here is not restricted to solely coercive actions, which are most often considered to be forms of military involvement.

Indian troops and proceeded to engage in armed attacks against the peacekeepers (Chadda, 1997; Premdas, 1988; Rao, 1988).
Interventions and Conflict Outcomes

Many theoretical and empirical studies examine interventions by external actors in intrastate or interstate wars. While the focus of this research is varied, there are a number of common themes. These include the role of the great powers, conflict settlement patterns, what constitutes a successful intervention, and how interventions can influence the duration and escalation of a conflict.

Major power involvement in both interstate and intrastate conflicts has generated much attention (Ayoob, 1993; Buzan, 1986; Litwak and Wells Jr., 1988; MacFarlane, 1990; Tillema, 1989, 1994; Yoon, 1997). Until the past decade, this research was largely focused on how involvement in foreign wars would impinge on the relationship between the two superpowers. During the Cold War, interventions were largely considered a preserve of the great powers, especially in their respective spheres of influence, and also an avenue through which superpower competition could be exercised without directly threatening a nuclear confrontation (Ayoob, 1993; MacFarlane, 2002, 1990). The Third World was often the favored arena as it was perceived as peripheral to superpower interests, the constraints and risks were less, and the main concerns were of credibility and prestige instead of issues of strategic interest (Ibid.). Instances of such competitive interventions abound including Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan conflicts. These internal wars were among the most destructive, protracted, and destabilizing conflicts for their respective regions as major and superpowers possessed significantly greater resources that could be utilized to support the disputants and they had the ability to project their power globally in comparison to few other actors.
Herbert Tillema’s study of 591 foreign overt military interventions in 269 interstate armed conflicts from 1945-85 seeks to determine if a power politics or a nuclear paralysis (the existence of mutual assured destruction) approach best explains the intervention patterns of the major powers. His results reveal that the power politics view is consistent with the early post-WW II years while the nuclear paralysis explanation better approximates the 1970s onward (1989, 186-187). Yoon focuses on American interventions in Third World internal wars during the Cold War (1997). She attempts to account for the various motivations behind these interventions and the only variable that explores the relationship between the domestic dispute and the interventionist action is whether one of the conflict parties professes a communist leaning (Ibid.).

The existing research on conflict settlement patterns indicates that domestic conflicts appear to be much less amenable to negotiated settlements. Only 20% of civil wars were resolved by negotiations compared to 55% of interstate wars according to a study which examined these violent disputes over a fifty-year period (1940-1990) (David, 1997, 568). Licklider’s analysis of 91 civil wars from 1945-93 indicates that of the 57 conflicts that were over, only 14 or one-fourth ended due to a negotiated settlement whereas the remaining (43) cases concluded with a military victory (1995, 684). Further, a renewal of hostilities occurred in around half of the settlement cases in comparison to only 15% of the civil wars in which one side was victorious (Ibid, 685). These results are mirrored in Stephen John Stedman’s research on 65 civil wars from 1900-1989. In this study, only 11 instances of cessation arose through negotiations (1991, 8-9). It must be noted that these analyses do not specifically address the impact of external involvement in these civil conflicts. But research by Barbara Walter, among others, indicates that
outside actors are critical in helping to ensure that a negotiated settlement is effectively implemented (1997).

Two of the quantitative studies that examine conflict settlement patterns and include the potential effect of the end of the Cold War are Marshall and Gurr (2003) and Ayres (2000). The Peace and Conflict 2003 Report notes that as of the end of 2002, there were only twelve ongoing civil conflicts worldwide, in marked contrast to the 1990s decade when fifty-four countries were affected by major societal warfare (Gurr and Marshall, 2003, 12-14). It asserts that one of the major achievements in the first decade after the Cold War has been “the containment of societal conflicts promoted by the UN and regional organizations, and reinforced by constructive engagement by the US and other powers” (Ibid., 2). When armed conflicts over self-determination issues are examined, the report reveals that since 1990 more than 70% of these disputes underway during the past 50 years have been terminated (settlements were reached or violence contained) (Quinn and Gurr, 2003, 30). Ayres also examines separatist wars. He concludes that more self-determination conflicts were settled than emerged during the 1985-96 period and comments that the post-Cold War period seems like a “new era of nationalist peace” (2000, 115).

One avenue through which scholars have sought to categorize how external interventions can influence a conflict’s outcome is by assessing whether the actions of outside actors constitute a success. Most of this research focuses on the role of the United Nations or regional organizations (Dixon, 1996; Hampson, 1996; Stedman, Rothchild, Cousens, 2003). Hampson, for instance, conceptualizes success as a continuum beginning with an end to domestic violence with ultimate success being the
effective reconstruction of civil order and civil society, and the creation of participatory political institutions (1996, 9-10). On the other hand, Patrick Regan’s examination of 196 state interventions in 85 intrastate conflicts in the 1944-94 period defines success as a cessation of hostilities for a six month period after an intervention. He discovers that only 30% of the interventions can be considered a success with those in support of a host state government rather than the rebel forces more than twice as likely to succeed (41 to 19%) (Regan, 1996, 345). When ethnic rather than ideological or religious wars are examined, military support for government forces is the most successful strategy (just under 50%) and for the rebel forces, economic assistance most often leads to success (43%) (Ibid.).

The use of the concept of success can however be problematic. Under Regan’s criteria, for instance, a state intervention can be characterized as a success but if there is another intervention by the same state that occurs after a six-month cessation and hostilities are re-ignited, the latter intervention would then qualify as unsuccessful. Regan acknowledges this problem in his later work noting that he only coded an intervention as an all or nothing event (2001, 5). He states that “[C]oding the success or failure of specific interventions can (and frankly does) lead to the awkward situation where a successful intervention in one year is followed in the next year by other interventions that may not be successful” (Ibid.). Further, as Stern and Druckman note “[S]uccess is hard to define because it has many possible meanings, and judges with different standpoints may use very different criteria to measure it” (2000, 37). Interventions also can have multiple and Competing goals (Ibid.). They suggest instead that the focus should be on particular outcomes (Ibid., 42).
It is generally assumed that external state interventions in intrastate disputes, whether they are ethnically-based or not, exacerbate these conflicts. This exacerbation has various components including an extended duration, an increase in the level of violence, the promotion of internal and cross-border refugee flows, a diffusion of the conflict across state boundaries, and the possibility of escalation to interstate warfare. The remainder of this section focuses on the issues of a conflict’s length and changes in the degree of violence, the latter of which is the dependent variable in this study. Systematically addressing issues such as refugee flows and interstate diffusion is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

A number of recent quantitative analyses seek to assess which factors are most likely to influence the duration of a civil or interstate conflict. These include Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000), Bennett and Stam (1996), Regan and Stam (2000), along with Regan (2002) who refers to these studies in his research. Regan’s survey is especially useful as it examines 150 intrastate wars from 1944-99 and it utilizes a more inclusive notion of an armed conflict than the generally used Correlates of War criteria which requires a minimum of 1000 battle-related fatalities to qualify as a civil war (Small and Singer, 1982). He includes disputes where there have been 200 or more fatalities over the course of the domestic contention. Regan finds that internal wars in which there are no interventions are fairly likely to end within the first few months, but less likely after the first few years (Regan, 2002, 67). Overall, external state interventions are not the means by which to shorten internal wars, regardless of whether military or economic means are used (Ibid., 69, 72). The relationship between external interventions and
conflict duration cannot however be assessed in this dissertation as the focus is on the early stages of ethnopoli
tical rebellions.

William Zartman’s comparative analysis of eleven protracted communal conflicts reveals that a neighboring state’s provision of support or sanctuary makes a dispute more likely to escalate and become intractable as the internal war transforms from a bilateral dispute between a host state and an ethnic group to a trilateral dispute where the new actor (the neighboring state) is usually not interested in promoting a settlement (1992, 32-33, 37-38). Research on interstate crises where ethnicity is an important issue between the two actors also indicates that external state interventions will increase the level of violence. This finding applies whether the intervenors are great powers, other Northern states, or Third World countries (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997a and 1997b; Carment, 1993).

In examining outside support for insurgencies active in the 1990s, Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan assert that timing is critical when trying to determine the influence of external state assistance (2001, 10). Aid is expected to be most effective in the early stages “…when it can prove central to establishing the insurgent group’s viability and thus enhancing its longevity”, especially as the group faces the usually superior military forces of the host state (Ibid, 10, 105). They argue that assistance from both states and non-state actors “…can make a movement far more effective, prolong the war, increase the scale and lethality of its struggle, and may even transform a civil conflict into an international war” (Ibid., 3). Regan also notes that the timing of an intervention can significantly affect the duration of an internal war. In the early stages, the government of a host state is generally more powerful in relation to the opposition
group and as a result if an intervention supports the host regime, the chances of a rebel victory are further decreased and it could lead the group to settle or have to face the militarily superior government forces (Regan, 2002, 61). On the other hand, external state support for a rebelling group can assist its organizational abilities, help further recruitment, and increase the prospects that it can achieve a victory (Ibid.). Interventions in support of both parties, Regan asserts, will likely maintain “…the status quo balance of relative capabilities, albeit at higher absolute levels” (2002, 63).

While noting that “[F]orecasting dynamic increases and decreases in the strategic use of protest and rebellion is a more difficult research task than identifying the structural risk factors that determine whether each tactic is present or absent”, Gurr and Marshall’s empirical study which utilizes the global Minorities at Risk dataset examines both of these topics (2000, 228). Of particular interest is their quantitative analysis of the structural risk factors that are likely to be associated with an escalation of violence. Their multinomial logistic regression model indicates that there are five independent variables associated with increases in a group’s rebellion level over a three year period in the mid-1990s. These are persistent past rebellion by group members in the prior decade, state repression, host state factors such as regime incoherence and instability, and support from external states during the first of the three year period (Gurr and Marshall, 2000, 304-05). Some of these findings are discussed further in the following sections but the use of dichotomous variables limits the amount of information included about the nature of the interventions by foreign states. This dissertation seeks to further this line of inquiry by expanding our knowledge about the various aspects of intervention strategies and how they are associated with changes in an ethnic conflict’s degree of violence.
Interventions can alternatively help moderate or even promote a resolution of civil wars. Most often, the focus is on the political efforts of outside actors and their provision of good offices, informal and formal mediation, observation, fact-finding missions, and the deployment of peacekeepers. Much of the research on conflict resolution emphasizes the role of international and regional organizations and secondarily non-state actors including religious and independent mediation organizations and various grassroots associations such as women’s or tribal groups (Carment, 1994a; Diehl, Druckman and Wall, 1998; Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel, 1996; Dixon, 1996; Kleiboer, 1996; Touval, 1992; Zartman, 1992). These actors are believed to be more effective mediators than external states as they are often perceived as more legitimate and/or impartial.

States that intervene in ethnopolitical conflicts sometimes utilize more than one strategy, supporting one side, often with military aid, while also seeking to mediate (Touval, 1992, 260). Some examples include South Africa’s involvement in Mozambique, Namibia, and Angola during the 1980s and Syrian intervention in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s. Zartman asserts that state intervenors can help promote a resolution if two conditions are present: when providing sanctuary for the rebels becomes too expensive and when the intervenor can guarantee the agreement of the insurgents to help ensure a balanced settlement (1992, 39). Another avenue by which outside states can promote a conclusion is through helping to ensure the military victory of one of the parties. India’s military intervention in 1970 in support of the East Pakistani secessionists, for instance, was a key factor that led to the emergence of the state of Bangladesh. Internal wars that end due to a military victory are also reported to be much less likely to re-emerge as was discussed earlier in this section.
For this study, the conflict outcome that will be considered is the level of violence of an ethnopolitical war. The dependent variable is measured by examining a communal group’s level of rebellious activities on a 7 point scale at 6 month intervals during the first two years after the onset of hostilities. Chapter 3 details the procedures used to select the conflicts, the data-gathering techniques, and the operationalization of the independent and dependent variables.

The next section presents the framework of independent variables that are expected to influence whether ethnopolitical wars in which there are external interventions increase or decrease in violence or remain at the same level. They are discussed under four categories: group, host state, intervention, and conflict variables.

**Group Characteristics**

There are five main group factors that increase the chances that an ethnopolitical group will engage in an anti-state rebellion. These variables can influence the salience of a group’s identity along with its capacities to engage in collective action (Gurr and Marshall, 2000, 228). Based on Gurr and Marshall (2000) and Dudley and Miller (1998), armed conflict is more likely when:

- groups are territorially concentrated
- there is a strong sense of group identity (cohesion)
- they are represented by one or more political organizations
- the groups have a history of prior political activism
- their goals center on autonomy/secession or capturing control of the state apparatus
When these variables are utilized to determine if they affect the degree of violence that a communal group uses against the authorities of the host state, group concentration, goals, and past political activism exert a significant influence.\(^4\)

Rebellion is a possible course of action for groups that are geographically concentrated but much harder to achieve when groups are dispersed across a state as these sub-state identities are likely weaker and it is more difficult to organize resistance to the government (Gurr, 2000, 75; Levine, 1996; 314). Dudley and Miller focus on an ethnopolitical group’s coherence and concentration to test for the presence of social networks among these groups. Their interest is in using these variables to show how the free rider problem can be overcome. They find that while territorial concentration is only marginally related to increases in a group’s rebellion level, coherence is not significant (1998, 94). David Quinn notes that as cohesive organizations are required to engage in collective action such as protest and rebellion, it does not appear to be the case that greater cohesion is needed for one type of political activity or the other (2003, 13). This study also assumes that group concentration and cohesion are preconditions for political action and therefore they are not included in the analysis of the factors that are expected to be associated with changes in a conflict’s level of violent hostilities.

Groups that seek autonomy or secession have generated much interest in both the scholarly and policy-making communities.\(^5\) Of particular interest here is whether

\[^4\text{Both studies do not examine all of these factors. Further, the cases used for the analyses include both instances in which there were ongoing rebellions along with those where there were no armed contentions. Gurr and Marshall (2000) find that interventions by foreign states are associated with both an increased chance of rebellion and increases in rebellion levels. Dudley and Miller (1998) do not examine the potential influence of external interventions.}\]
conflicts involving groups with these objectives are more or less likely to attract external involvement. International norms that promote the sanctity of territorial boundaries and state sovereignty coupled with regional security concerns and fears of setting a precedent are often referred to as inhibiting factors against foreign intervention, especially in relation to sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Heraclides, 1990, 352-53; Herbst, 1989; Saideman, 2002, 29-31; Suhrke and Noble, 1977b, 224). Heraclides, for instance, asserts that since WWII, there has been less high-level external involvement in communal or separatist conflicts in comparison to classic civil wars (1990, 352-53).

This position is challenged by scholars who argue that it is these types of groups that are most likely to be involved in highly internationalized wars that can draw in both partisan interventions and conflict management efforts (Gurr, 1992, 8). My earlier analysis of external assistance for Third World ethnopolitical groups from 1990-98 reveals that 20 of the 23 separatist groups received foreign state support and that the most common form was military aid (Khosla, 1999, 1152-53). A recent study that tests the vulnerability argument – that states who are vulnerable to ethnic and separatist claims and are active supporters of territorial norms are unlikely to support secessionist groups – finds that the influence of boundary norms may have been exaggerated (Saideman, 2002, 47). Instead, Saideman notes that “…moving from a neighborhood characterized by little separatism to one with the maximum number of actively separatist movements increases

the probability of [interveners’ providing] the strongest forms of support by approximately 45%” (2002, 42).

Analyses at the interstate level also indicate that disputes involving ethnic groups seeking territorial revisions can escalate both within and across state boundaries. John Vasquez asserts that the chances of interstate war are greater as territorial claims undermine existing borders while also potentially increasing the number of states that must realign and establish their boundaries (1995, 290). Further, international crises that involve irredentist and secondarily secessionist issues are the most violent in comparison to anti-colonial or non-ethnic crises based on an analysis of 460 international crises from 1945-81 (Carment, 1993, 140).

Groups that are seeking to capture a share or control of central power in a state are also more likely to draw in external intervenors, often on opposing sides. These ethnopolitical conflicts can further polarize societies that are already characterized by systems dominated by majority-minority or minority-majority rule or fragile intergroup coalitions. Within countries dominated by intergroup coalitions, Ted Gurr notes that relative changes in power and prosperity can instigate violent challenges by groups that fear the loss of their privileged status (1992, 8). As greater numbers of state intervenors become involved in these domestic contentions, the likelihood of an escalation to full-scale civil war increases. Lebanon in the past few decades along the two recent wars in the former Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo exhibit how foreign states supporting opposing domestic actors can ratchet up internal power struggles.
Hypothesis 1: Ethnopolitical groups that are seeking autonomy/secession or either a share of or control of state power are more likely to be involved in conflicts in which the level of violence increases.

Whether an ethnopolitical group has participated in past political activity can also influence the strategies its employs when there is a recurrence of collective action after a period of inactivity. Quinn and Gurr discover that “groups seeking self-determination that were involved in high-level rebellion with authorities for five or more years after 1985 were sixty percent (60%) more likely than other groups with self-determination grievances to resort to full-fledged rebellion in 1998-2000, holding all other factors constant” (2003, 36). The likelihood of an ethnopolitical group with a history of persistent rebellion utilizing the same strategy during the late 1990s is 77% (Ibid.). Past choices thus significantly influence current practices. It is also possible that prior experiences with rebellion can be drawn upon to refine strategies to help ensure that a group’s political activism exerts a greater impact against the authorities of a host state.

Hypothesis 2: Groups with a recent history of past rebellion are more likely to be involved in conflicts that exhibit increases in the intensity of violence.

Host State Features

How a host state responds to the grievances of a communal group can not only affect the strategies it uses to pursue collective action but also the potential outcome of a dispute (Gurr, 1993, 91). Most scholars focus on the characteristics of a host’s political
system, emphasizing the type of regime. Research by Licklider (1999, 3) and Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch (2001, 33), among others, reveals that civil wars rarely break out in either established democracies or autocracies. Democratic governments are expected to be the most likely to not only guarantee group rights in multiethnic states but also to attempt to redress inequalities due to discrimination (Gurr, 2002, 35). Further, they are expected to favor mutual agreements rather than attempting to suppress or forcibly assimilate politicized minorities (Ibid.). Instead, regimes that are incoherent, that is, they contain a mix of democratic and autocratic characteristics and/or those that are undertaking a transition are more likely to face ethnic conflicts (Brown, 1996, 16-17; Hegre, et al., 2001, 33; Licklider, 1993, 3; Gurr and Marshall, 2000, 231).

Changes in the degree of a group’s rebellious activity have also been associated with regime instability, the level of autocracy, and the use of state repression. Gurr and Marshall find that there is a statistically significant relationship between a host state’s incoherence, instability, its use of repression and increases in a group’s rebellion level (2000, 304-05). Dudley and Miller utilize the level of a host state’s autocracy as an indirect measure of the degree of repression in order to examine the interactions between repression and internal ethnic rebellion. They discover that medium levels of autocracy are significantly associated with both the onset and escalation of a rebellion (1998, 88, 92). Another study makes the opposite case. Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni, and Stanton (2002) utilize the Minorities at Risk dataset to examine the relationship between regime type and the level of a group’s rebellion. They discover that rebellions in democracies are more violent compared to those that emerge in authoritarian systems and that new
regimes might not face serious problems with ethnic conflict, as has been previously asserted (2002, 124).

All the ethnopolitical groups in this study were subject to state repression and therefore it is assumed as a constant and is indirectly measured through the democratic-autocratic characteristics of the state hosting the conflict. Further, given the small number of internal wars, regime characteristics such as whether the host state was undertaking a transition or if the regime was unstable are not included as these have been better analyzed in larger quantitative studies.

*Hypothesis 3: Higher levels of violence in ethnopolitical conflicts are expected when the host state’s regime is incoherent or autocratic.*

**Intervention and Conflict Characteristics**

There are various facets of an intervention that can potentially influence the outcome of an internal ethnic war. The following section examines the type of external state intervenor, the strategy it employs, the intensity of the aid supplied, the recipients of the intervention, potential ethnic linkages between state intervenors and conflict participants, if a state intervenor was assisting an ethnopolitical group prior to the emergence of the rebellion and the nature of the international environment as exhibited through the Cold War-Post Cold War distinction.

Motives for foreign state interventions are only addressed by examining ethnic linkages between the participants. The plethora of existing research on the motivations of
state intervenors provides us with a useful body of knowledge. The potential range of motives, which can and often do overlap, include desires to destabilize a regional rival, attempts to deflect attention from domestic problems, addressing cross-border refugee flows, preventing the spread of violence across territorial borders, and support for ethnic brethren, whether they form the regime of the host state or are the group embroiled in the dispute. Research on motivations for external involvement utilizing this study’s dataset is a possible avenue for future studies.

**Type of State Intervenor**

The type of state that becomes involved in a communal conflict can potentially influence both the strategy it uses and the outcome of an internal war. Major powers possess significantly greater resources and the ability to project their power globally relative to any other state actors in the international system. Tillema’s study of foreign overt military interventions in international armed conflicts from 1945-85 demonstrates that the superpowers alone were responsible for only 4% of the 591 interventions while seven of the top ten intervenors were Third World states. However, former colonial powers led the way as the United Kingdom was the most frequent intervenor followed by France. The US was ranked in sixth place and the Soviet Union in the twenty-second position (1989, 184-85).

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The early post-Cold War years are included in Regan’s study of 196 state interventions in 85 intrastate conflicts. He finds that major powers are responsible for nearly 40% or some 76 interventions across his 1944-94 period (1996, 345). The most frequent intervenor is the United States with 35 interventions while four other countries (USSR/Russia, Britain, China, and France) combine for a total of 41 interventions (Ibid.). When the major powers did become involved by supplying military or economic assistance, they were much more likely to succeed compared to minor powers (1996, 352). Regan’s definition of success is a cessation of hostilities for a six month period after an intervention.

David Carment tests the conventional wisdom that when “old “states, that is, superpowers, major powers, and those that became independent before 1945, become involved in interstate crises where ethnicity is a significant component the level of violence is expected to increase (1993, 142). His analysis of 460 international crises from 1945-81 supports this hypothesis as old states are associated with international crises with higher violence levels when the issues involved secession or irredentism rather than anti-colonial struggles (1993, 143). Modest increases in violent hostilities are also noted when new states (those which became independent after 1945), were the participants. New states were more likely to engage in secessionist crises (Carment, 1993, 143-44).

How the end of the Cold War was expected to influence the likelihood of interventions by the major powers has been subject to much debate. On the one hand, traditional realists did not envision significant changes as major powers still retained the global resources and interests to undertake such actions. Those in the liberal camp also
assumed that major power involvement in the Third World would be sustained, although for different reasons. These authors believe that the emergence of transborder problems such as the environment and the profusion of ethnic conflicts necessitated continued, if not greater, major power engagement to help promote stability in Third World regions. For example, in the early 1990s, an emerging doctrine described as the “new interventionism” by Stephen John Stedman sought greater United Nations and United States intervention to halt civil wars and stop human rights abuses (1993, 1-3). Arguing against the new interventionists, Stedman notes that the demise of the Cold War reduced the ability of the superpowers to pressure their former allies (1993, 8).

Writing at the end of the 1990s, Glennon also refers to an emerging new interventionism regime which favors multilateral interventions in internal conflicts “where the humanitarian costs of failing to intervene are too high” (1999, 5). The end of the US-Soviet rivalry, on the other hand, was viewed by neorealists as signaling the withdrawal of the great powers from the Third World as it was asserted that there were few areas that were of strategic interest, with the exception of rivalries that involved countries reported to overtly or covertly possess weapons of mass destruction (e.g., the Arab-Israel conflict, India-Pakistan, and the North-South Korea contention).

Among Third World states, the potential role of regional powers in a post-Cold War era remained unclear. While these countries do not possess the global reach of the major powers, their power projection capability usually encompasses the regions in which they reside and their military and economic resources are much more substantial than other countries within their backyards. During the bipolar rivalry, the activities of many of these states were often circumscribed by the superpowers, who were usually
their allies or provided them with substantial political, economic, and military support due to the ideological nature of the challenges they faced (Buzan, 1986; Klare, 1990). For instance, Cuban military interventions in Angola and Nicaragua were largely due to the wishes of its patron, the former Soviet Union. The post-Cold War era was not however expected to lessen the restrictions on the foreign policy activism of regional powers. The withdrawal or reduction of aid to the regional proxies of the major powers was seen as limiting their interventionist capability as these countries would have to generate much of the resources required locally along with also managing their own economies without the assistance of their outside patrons.

Neorealists present a different scenario. They emphasize a growing interventionist role for regional powers, asserting that they will become more active in the post-Cold War period due to a reduced major power presence. Angola’s military adventures in the former Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo provide one example. In the fall of 1996, Angola sided with the Tutsi-supported ADFL coalition which successfully overthrew the Mobutu kleptocracy. The following year Angola switched sides and chose to favor the Kinshasa government when the Tutsis launched a new revolt with the assistance of armed forces of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi.

There is no agreed upon definition in the scholarly literature on what constitutes a regional power. Barry Buzan focuses on states that exemplify the major patterns of amity or enmity within a region (1986, 8-9). These include, among others, India and Pakistan in South Asia, and Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. However, this conception could conceivably include a number of states with very limited material capabilities or influence. Simon Murden emphasizes the common characteristics among
these states including: a colonial legacy; their peripheral status in the international political and economic systems and subsequent response to Northern dominance (e.g., the formation of organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement); and the efforts of these countries to increase their economic and/or military capabilities (1995, 3-14). As he does not provide an explicit definition of what he refers to as emergent regional powers, his characteristics could thus apply to many Southern states.

Oyvind Osterud outlines four minimal criteria for his notion of a regional great power. They are: a) a state must be a part of a geographically distinct region; b) it is expected to be able to counter any coalition of other regional states; c) a state which exercises significant influence in regional affairs; and d) a state which could also be considered as a great power at the international level (1992, 12). Osterud’s second condition is too restrictive as there are likely to be only a few Third World states that could deter a coalition of regional countries.

Highly-militarized states are emphasized by Michael Klare who refers to them as regional hegemons. These states share the following characteristics: a) most have been involved in military combat at some point in the past 10-15 years; b) many are engaged in regional power struggles with other countries in his group of 18 highly-militarized states; c) these states usually rely on oil revenues or military relationships with the US or the (former) USSR; and d) their state elites believe that military power provides status and political clout in the international system (1990, 10). Klare’s emphasis on military capabilities though excludes other countries that are influential actors based on their status on economic or diplomatic prowess.
For this study, two criteria are utilized to define a regional power. First, the state has expressed through statements or actions its ambitions to a greater regional and/or international status. It will generally be influential in regional affairs (Osterud, 1992). Second, the state possesses significant military and/or economic or diplomatic resources relative to not only others in the region but also in comparison to most other Third World states.

Given their global or regional interests and their greater power capabilities relative to other states it is expected that:

_Hypothesis 4: Escalation was more likely when major and regional powers intervened in ethnic conflicts that arose during the Cold War._

The next hypothesis narrows the focus to the relationship between states that border each other. Research based on the Correlates of War data reveals that more than 80% of all interstate wars occur among neighbors (Vasquez, 1995, 279). Territorial contiguity is also expected to affect relations between countries when either or both of them are embroiled in domestic conflicts. Neighboring state involvement can arise through various avenues: cross-border refugee flows, a disruption in economic transactions, attempts by groups to seek sanctuary and obtain military supplies, willingly or unwillingly, provided by the neighboring state, cross-border raids by states who are pursuing rebel groups, and cross-border ties between ethnic kin which can pressure an intervening government to become actively involved and/or lead kin to unilaterally supply assistance to the rebelling group.
The conventional wisdom is that neighboring states find it almost impossible to avoid becoming embroiled in internal disputes on their territorial borders and that their interventions escalate hostilities and further regional instability (Brown, 1996, 26; Heraclides, 1990, 374-75; Levine, 1996, 322). Heraclides’ comparative analysis of seven secessionist conflicts reveals that only four of the 19 states that bordered the host states were able to remain neutral or unfavorable toward the secessionists (Ibid.). A recent Rand study asserts that with the end of the Cold War insurgent groups have had to look elsewhere for patrons and that most often it is neighboring countries who supply the material aid (Byman et al., 2001, 17).

Alternatively, territorial contiguity is also reported to dampen the chances of a outside state becoming involved in a neighboring ethnic conflict. Suhrke and Noble contend that states might not be willing to support ethnic kin in a neighboring country for fear that the domestic strife will diffuse into their state or lead to retaliation by the country facing the insurgency. In addition, concerns about setting a precedent can influence the propensity to intervene. Support for rebelling ethnic groups could pave the way for similar expectations by groups within the intervenor state who could actively solicit outside aid. My earlier examination of external assistance for 106 ethnopolitical groups from 1990-98 found that neighbors were only slightly more active than regional or major powers (Khosla, 1999, 1148). However, this research included both groups that were engaging in any form of anti-state activities along with those that were not politically active.

The following hypothesis tests the conventional wisdom about the impact of neighboring state interventions in ethnopolitical rebellions.
Hypothesis 5: Neighboring states are expected to be the most involved in ethnic wars that exhibit increases in the intensity of violence, regardless of the Cold War-post Cold War distinction.

Form(s) of Assistance

Most studies of external state interventions focus on the use of military instruments whether in the form of overt actions such as deploying a country’s troops directly into a conflict or indirect measures such as the provision of weapons, sanctuaries, and military advisors (Falk, 1993; Regan, 2002, 1996; Tillema, 1994, 1989). By shoring up beleaguered regimes and/or ethnopolitical groups, outside support can increase the destructiveness and duration of internal wars. The record since the end of WWII reveals that few external actors are willing to provide the resources necessary to ensure the victory of communal groups, especially if they seek autonomy or secession, while governments usually receive such aid in order to guarantee their survival (Byman et al., 2001, 91; Heraclides, 1990, 352-53; Suhrke and Noble, 1977, 224). A notable exception is India’s military intervention in East Pakistan in 1970 which led to the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. Quinn and Gurr’s quantitative analysis of foreign state military support to separatist groups during the late 1990s reveals that when groups receive this assistance from any state, they are almost 50% more likely to be involved in high-level rebellions in comparison to groups that do not receive this aid from outside states (2003, 38).
Military assistance was the most common form of aid provided to either an insurgent group or a host state according to a survey of external state interventions in intrastate conflicts during the 1944-94 period (Regan, 1996, 345). It comprised 70% of the 196 interventions. Mixed interventions that involve both military and economic instruments were utilized in 23% of the cases while economic aid was solely provided in only 7% of the interventions (Ibid.). Regan’s results indicate that if the goal is to promote a cessation of hostilities for a period of six months or more, the most effective method is a mixed strategy followed by military assistance (Ibid.). His more recent work shows that interventions by outside states that entail either military or economic aid are associated with intrastate conflicts of longer duration (2002, 69).

There is one particular avenue by which military assistance can conceivably help promote a negotiated settlement. Research by Zartman (1992) and Touval (1992), among others, indicates that while military aid will likely escalate a conflict, the result can be a “hurting stalemate” which can pave the way for negotiations. The notion is that at some point the extended duration and destructiveness of a dispute makes the costs of continuing fighting unbearable for all participants. However, this is not likely to occur until after a period of prolonged warfare (Ibid.).

_Hypothesis 6a: Military aid is expected to be the most frequent form of assistance provided by external state intervenors in ethnopolitical conflicts in which the level of violence increases._
The effectiveness of economic instruments in promoting conflict management, in the form of carrots such as aid or sticks such as sanctions, is harder to determine. Part of the problem is that measures such as economic sanctions usually require an extended time period to be effective. Sanctions or embargoes are often circumvented which limits their utility. They are also generally applied against a government, although there are some recent instances where governments such as the United States have adopted restrictive measures against groups that are considered to engage in or support terrorist acts (e.g., the LTTE in Sri Lanka). Hufbauer and Schott (1983) assert that sanctions are successful 50% of the time when the goal is to destabilize a government and 40% of the time when they are directed to disrupt a target state’s military adventures (in Regan, 1996, 340). Sanctions are expected to be most effective against states that are integrated in the global economic system and less likely to influence countries that rely on repressive measures to maintain control of their populations. Given the short time span of this study, it is assumed that the sole provision or withdrawal of economic aid or the use of sanctions will not exert a significant influence on the outcome of an ethnopolitical war.

There are a wide variety of political techniques that external actors can use to influence a country’s foreign and domestic policies.7 Four categories are utilized: the provision of good offices, fact-finding missions, the appointment of special envoys, and other formal and informal methods of mediation. These are subsumed under the broad

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7 Humanitarian forms of assistance such as hosting refugees along with provision of economic assistance by both state and non-state actors were also noted during the coding of the ethnopolitical conflicts. However, they are not included in this analysis as the variables need to be more clearly delineated. It is hoped that they can be added to future research on this topic.
category of mediation. Some authors argue that diplomatic support, such as public
declarations in favor of either a government or an ethnic group, does not constitute an
intervention as statements are a regular aspect of international diplomacy. Regan (1996)
and Tillema (1994, 1989) exclude diplomatic support while Dixon (1996), Gurr (2000,
1993), and Yoon (1997) consider verbal statements as a form of involvement. Political
statements are not considered in this analysis as they are most likely to be indirectly
linked to a conflict’s violent potential, usually serving as moral support or inspiration, the
effects of which are different to measure at an aggregate level. As a result, the focus is
on the provision or withdrawal of material assistance and concrete forms of informal and
formal mediation.

Numerous single and comparative case studies examine the efficacy of political
techniques in dispute resolution. Although their primary emphasis is on interstate
conflicts, Zartman (1992) and Touval (1992), discover that there are no fundamental
differences when these instruments are used in intrastate conflicts. A study by Diehl et
al. (1996) which analyzes United Nations’ involvement in international disputes
concludes that there is little difference in the usefulness of different political instruments.
However, others such as William Dixon (1996), present the opposing view. When
examining interventions by any actors in 688 interstate security disputes from 1945-84,
he discovers that the outcome is strongly affected by the intervention strategy and that
efforts to open or promote communication among the parties (good offices) along with
mediation are statistically significant in both diminishing the chances of escalation and
increasing the probability of achieving a peaceful settlement (1996, 667-68). The results
remain the same regardless of whether ethnic, religious, or territorial issues underlie the

dispute. Ayres’ survey of 48 violent nationalist conflicts from 1945-96 indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between a third party intervention and the duration of a domestic separatist war (1999a, 15-18). When mediation occurs not only are conflicts shorter but they are also associated with lower levels of violence. The opposite is the case when intervenors become involved on behalf of either of the domestic combatants (Ibid.).

As the emphasis is on the early stages of ethnopolitical rebellions, a full assessment of the impact of sustained mediation efforts is not possible. However, it is expected that in the short-term:

*Hypothesis 6b: Political forms of assistance by external states, regardless of whether they are part of a strategy that also employs military and/or economic means, can reduce the intensity of violence of an ethnopolitical conflict.*

The level of assistance furnished by intervenors can also influence the degree to which a rebel group is able to effectively challenge the regime of a host state. High-level aid such as cross-border bases can be essential to the continuation of a rebel movement as sanctuary provides a respite for rebels and allows for training, organizing, and recruitment without group members being constantly vulnerable to government forces (Byman et al., 2001, 84). Byman et al. note that in a number of insurgencies underway in the 1990s, a state’s provision of cross-border sanctuary was a major contributor to the group’s effectiveness. In particular, they refer to the African National Congress bases in Mozambique. Alternatively, the Syrian withdrawal of sanctuary to Turkey’s Kurdish
rebels, the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), is considered to be a major factor in the PKK’s declining ability to challenge the Turkish regime (Byman et al., 2001, 85). Another type of high-level assistance is the direct deployment of an intervenor’s armed forces which can alter the local balance of power and help promote a decisive victory. The first Tutsi rebellion in the former Zaire is representative. The armed forces of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi fought alongside the Tutsi-led ADFL coalition and within a year after the rebellion began the Mobutu regime was overthrown.

Lower forms of outside support can also contribute to the mobilization of resources and thereby a group’s violent anti-state activities. When states allow exile organizations that represent group members to operate within their borders, it provides another avenue by which a rebelling group can raise the materials required to challenge a host state’s authorities. For example, the degree to which Tamil organizations in western states such as the US, Canada, Britain, and Australia are able to both raise funds and publicize the group’s objectives are seen as significant factors in helping to ensure the continuation of the separatist conflict. Overall it is expected that:

*Hypothesis 7: Higher levels of violence in ethnic insurgencies are expected when more intense forms of assistance are supplied by external state intervenors.*

**Recipient(s) of Interventions**

There are expected to be differential impacts on an internal conflict depending on whether external assistance is provided solely to an ethnopolitical group or a host state or to both sides. In the early stages when a host government is usually the stronger party,
interventions that are favor of the rebels can alter the balance of capabilities in the
direction towards parity along with increasing the rebel group’s expectations of achieving
significant gains (Regan, 2002, 60-61). Of the 74 active insurgencies in the 1990s which
are analyzed by a Rand study, assistance that was deemed as significant or critical to
survival and success was supplied to 44 rebel groups (2001, 2). As mentioned earlier,
Quinn and Gurr’s quantitative analysis of separatist groups found that when they
received military aid from outside states they were almost 50% more likely to be
involved in high-level rebellions (2003, 38). On the other hand, assistance solely
provided to the government of a host state is expected to both increase and decrease the
duration of a domestic war. Regan’s quantitative analysis (1996, 345) reveals that
interventions on behalf of a host state are twice as likely to lead to a cessation of
hostilities for a period of at least six months whereas Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, who
examine civil war duration from 1820-1992, find that assistance to a government
increases the length of a conflict (2000, 636).

Competing interventions, in which at least one state supports the group and
another assists the host state, are generally expected to escalate the level of violence and
extend the duration of an insurgency (Ayoob, 1995; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000,
637-38; Litwak and Wells Jr., 1988; Regan, 2002, 63; Suhrke and Noble, 1977b). These
interventions increase the resources both sides have available to carry on a war and can
often lead to a military stalemate. Realists assert that states will seek to maintain a
balance of power to ensure that their rivals do not gain an upper hand. The Cold War
interventions of the US and the USSR in the Third World along with the actions of states
embroiled in regional rivalries followed this trajectory. States in hostile relations with
each other are expected to behave in a similar manner in the post-Cold War period (Ayoob, 1995; Litwak and Wells, 1988; MacFarlane, 1990). However, in arguing against the general tendency to intervene in civil conflicts, Luttwak contends that in the post-Cold War era “…neither Americans nor Russians are inclined to intervene competitively in the wars of lesser powers, so the unfortunate consequences of interrupting war persist while no greater danger is averted. It might be best for all parties to let minor wars burn themselves out” (1999, 37).

There are opposing views about how the end of the Cold War influences the potential for external state interventions in intrastate conflicts. The end of the bipolar rivalry and its expected impact on the foreign policies of major and regional powers was discussed earlier. At a more general glance, some scholars such as Cooper and Berdal (1993) assert that the bipolar rivalry restricted external involvement in foreign disputes due to a fear of escalation that could directly involve the superpowers or even ratchet up to the nuclear level. On the other hand, those in the other camp expected interventions to be more frequent during the Cold War as they argued that in the post-Cold War period there are likely to be few conflicts that generate sufficient national interests to overcome the costs associated with these actions (Regan, 1998, 767-78). Regan’s study of external state interventions from 1944-94 indicates that the “cold war increased the probability of an intervention by 25%, such that a low-intensity conflict with a relatively small number of casualties had a 75% chance of having an outside intervention if it was during the Cold War” (1998, 773).

While it does not examine interventions by foreign actors, an analysis of violent intrastate nationalist conflicts during the 1945-96 period finds that there are no significant
differences between the intensity of the fighting and the total number of deaths across these two time periods (Ayres, 2000, 114). The data focus on 18 post-Cold War cases and 59 that occurred during the bipolar rivalry (Ibid.). A Rand study of external support for insurgent groups in the 1990s contends that the dimensions and nature of aid along with the suppliers are significantly different in the post-Cold War period (Byman et al., 2001, 2). Among the key findings is that financial assistance from diasporas is more common than from state intervenors and that any form of aid is most often provided by states that border the host state which reveals the “…shift in motivations from international to local rivalries” (Ibid., 3, 17, 31). It must be noted that the Rand survey does not engage in a systematic comparison of the Cold War-post-Cold War eras which would have strengthened its claims about the major changes it reports to have emerged in the 1990s.

Hypothesis 8: Competing interventions by external states are more likely to occur in ethnopolitical wars in which the level of violence increases.

Hypothesis 9: During the Cold War, interventions by external states were more likely to occur in ethnopolitical conflicts in which violence levels escalated.

Ethnic Linkages

The role of ethnicity in influencing the foreign policy behavior of states, its potential impact on the occurrence of interstate hostilities, and how cross-border ethnicities can influence an intrastate conflict’s trajectory are some of the key areas that have
been examined in recent years as part of the broader agenda of explicating the linkages between domestic and international factors and their relationship to conflict processes. Violent interstate hostilities are reported to be higher when there is a minority at risk in one state and the group’s ethnic kin hold power in a bordering state (Davis et al., 1997, 158-60). Brecher and Wilkenfeld compare the various facets of international crises to examine if there are significant differences when ethnicity is a component. They discover key links between ethnicity and the protracted nature of international conflicts, especially the propensity of protracted ethnic crises to end in ambiguous outcomes which can set the stage for future violence (1997b, 188-192).

The existence of ethnic ties between groups that reside across state boundaries can increase the potential for external involvement, both by kin groups and the government of a neighboring state. The timing and magnitude of affective interventions, which Suhkre and Noble define as state interventions motivated mainly by ethnic ties, are expected to be directly influenced by the level of vulnerability of an embroiled group (1977a, 16-17). However, the authors assert that the assistance required to ensure a group’s victory is unlikely to materialize if ethnic considerations are the sole factor (Ibid.). An analysis which utilizes the Minorities at Risk data on international support for the 1990s determines that ethnic groups whose kin dominate a nearby state are not only more likely to receive aid but they are also the recipients of the most intense forms of assistance (Saideman, 2002, 40). Gurr and Marshall (2000, 258-59) find that transnational support from kindred groups increases the chances that an ethnopolitical group will rebel. However, this support is not one of the factors that influences an escalation in a group’s
rebellion levels. Instead, assistance from foreign states is statistically significant in both increasing the prospects that a rebellion will occur and that it will escalate.

Of the 74 insurgencies active since 1991 that Byman et al. consider, some 21 groups received significant support from refugees (usually residing in neighboring countries) and 19 insurgent movements obtained similar assistance from diaspora communities (2001, 2). The authors contend that diaspora support for ethnic kin is likely to become more common in the future (Ibid, 42). It is not clear how this study accounts for assistance provided by non-refugee ethnic kin who straddle state boundaries (live in neighboring states). The authors’ definition of diaspora support refers to “…immigrant communities established in other countries…” (Byman et al., 2001, 41). Support from refugees or diasporas are not specifically incorporated in this analysis as the focus is on the role of external states. However, to take into account any potential influence of ethnic ties, the more commonly studied relationship will be considered. Assistance from ethnic kin who reside in neighboring countries (which may include refugees) will be discussed further in the section that outlines the role of other outside actors that become involved in ethnopolitical conflicts.

_Hypothesis 10: Ethnopolitical wars in which either the regime of an external state intervenor or its domestic constituents are ethnically related to the group embroiled in an insurgency are more likely to exhibit higher levels of violence._
Prior Involvement

The final intervention factor that is considered is whether a state intervenor was involved in an ethnic dispute prior to the eruption of sustained violent hostilities. Military or economic aid, organizational support, and moral or inspirational assistance can significantly bolster the resources of fledgling movements and their ability to launch and sustain anti-state activities, especially in the early phases of a conflict. There appear to be few systematic analyses of the potential influence of outsiders prior to the emergence of intrastate wars. Gurr notes that among the international conditions that promote the mobilization of ethnopolitical groups are the existence of transnational networks, political support from external actors, and the emulation of models of resistance (1992, 4). Case studies, such as those of the Tuareg in Mali and Niger, are more likely to acknowledge the key role played by actors such as Libya in facilitating the emergence of these groups’ rebellions. These two conflicts are briefly discussed in Chapter 4.

Hypothesis 11: External state intervenors that are providing material assistance before the onset of an insurgency are more likely to be involved in ethnopolitical conflicts that display higher levels of violent hostilities.

Other Variables

There are a number of variables included in this study that focus on the role of other external actors along with taking into account any relevant features of the host state and the region in which an insurgency occurs. The involvement of the United Nations,
regional organizations, or ethnic kin in neighboring states is noted along with the forms of assistance they provided. Three other variables record the region in which the rebellion takes place, whether the host country is already contending with another domestic armed insurgency during the same time period, and if there is any internal armed conflict underway in countries that border the host state.8

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has engaged in an unprecedented number of peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions that seek to alleviate internal conflicts. These actions were severely proscribed during the bipolar rivalry due to the veto power of the members of the Security Council, and particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. As S. Neil MacFarlane notes, the United Nations only intervened in a single civil conflict in a large-scale manner during the Cold War – the ONUC deployment in the Republic of the Congo from 1960-64 (2002, 43). Regional organizations also played a minor role with most of their interventions occurring within the respective US and Soviet spheres of influence by the Organization of the American States and the former Warsaw Pact (Ibid, 44-45). There was little involvement by regional organizations in intrastate wars in Africa and Asia which can partially be attributed to the strong support of organizations such as Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for norms preserving the territorial integrity of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries.

8 There are a variety of other international actors that can become involved in violent domestic conflicts. These include non-governmental organizations, private individuals, humanitarian agencies, private military companies, and insurgent groups in neighboring states. Some of these sources of assistance for the ethnopolitical groups or host states were recorded. While a discussion about the potential role this aid can play is beyond the scope of this dissertation, this remains an area for future study.
It is asserted that regional or international organizations are viewed as more legitimate and/or impartial in comparison to individual states or groups of states and that they are therefore expected to be more effective conflict managers (Lund, 1996; Touval, 1992). The first decade of the post-Cold War era witnessed an expanded role for regional organizations or groups of regional states as well as the UN. Some of these peacebuilding/peacekeeping operations include the ECOWAS deployments in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Truce Monitoring Group led by New Zealand and Australia in support of the 1997/98 peace agreement in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, and the Australian-led and later UN supported mission in East Timor (now Timor Leste). However, the jury remains out as to whether these interventions did promote or hinder management of these conflicts and the impact of their efforts which, for instance, included continuing civilian casualties and refugee flows.

Given that this study focuses on 29 ethnopolitical conflicts, it is unlikely that there will be sufficient instances of either United Nations, regional organization, or neighboring ethnic kin involvement in order to test any hypotheses about their role in influencing the degree of violence in rebellions where there has been at least one external state intervention.

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9 There are a vast number of studies that examine the role of the United Nations and/or regional organizations in conflict management. Some of those consulted include Boutros-Ghali, (1995); Brecher and Wilkenfeld, (1997a); Carment (1994a); Carment and James, (1998a, 1998b); Cooper and Berdal (1993); Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel (1996); Dixon (1996); Doyle (2001); Esman and Telhami, (1995); Falk, (1993); Helman and Ratner, (1992-93); Gurr and Marshall (2000); Heraclides, (1990, 1991); Langford, (1999); Luttwak (1999); MacFarlane, (2002); Maynes, (1993); Peck (2001); Regan (2000); Stedman (1993); Stedman and Rothchild (1997); Thakur (2002); and Touval (1992).
Are particular regions of the Third World more likely to be subject to civil conflict and/or interventions by external states? Much of the research in the past decade has focused on sub-Saharan Africa. The proliferation of internal conflicts in this region is attributed to various factors. These include the end of the Cold War which led to reduced major power influence and interest in the region and a concomitant decrease or elimination of support for former client states (Stedman, 1996, 236; Adebajo and Landsberg, 2001). As a result, some regimes were no longer able to effectively control domestic opposition movements. Other actors within sub-Saharan Africa, especially regional powers and neighbors, were allowed greater latitude to intervene as there was less pressure from the major powers to avoid these entanglements (Ibid.). Further, efforts to institute democratic reforms in several countries threatened the power of some groups while raising the status of others (Gurr, 2000, 49). Economic conditions are also reported to have exerted a significant influence. The spread of free market ideas and the restrictive conditionalities imposed by international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank coupled with the poor economic performance of many states furthered political and economic instability and thus increased the chances of violent hostilities (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Gurr, 2000; Stedman, 1996).

When one examines in which region external state actors are most likely to become involved, my earlier analysis of outside state involvement in support of ethnic minorities during 1990-98 indicates that the greatest number of these interventions

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occurred in Asia (Khosla, 1999, 1145). Around half of the 975 interventions were taken to assist Asian minority groups while 26% arose in sub-Saharan Africa, 14% in the Middle East and 11% in Latin America (Ibid.). Forty-six out of a total of 57 Asian groups chronicled in the Minorities at Risk dataset received some external assistance in comparison to around half of the 66 African groups (Ibid.). This study includes ethnopolitical groups that were rebelling against state authorities along with those that might have engaged in protest actions or were not politically active during most of the 1990s.

Africa is also the region where the most interstate crises have taken place from 1918-1994, especially from the early 1960s onward (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997a, 764). However, these crises were largely peripheral to major power concerns and they were unlikely to escalate to full-scale warfare (Ibid.). Violent crises in the post-WII period were the next most frequent in the Middle East and Asia with a much lower crisis rate in the Americas (Ibid., 764).

Whether host states are also facing another domestic armed challenge when a rebellion erupts or if the country borders states which are engaged in armed conflict with internal contenders are also reported to have some influence on the level of violence of an ethnopolitical war (Ayoob, 1995; Adebaajo and Landsberg, 2001; Brown, 1996; Brown and Schraub, 1992; Kanet, 1998; Vasquez, 1996; Weiner, 1996). Dudley and Miller discover that another ongoing insurgency within a state appears to affect the degree of an ethnic group’s violent anti-state activities (1998, 93). But they assert that caution should be exercised as the significant relationship might not reflect the diffusion of a rebellion, as they hypothesized, but rather the weakened repressive capabilities of the host state.
(Ibid.). Seeking to examine the contagion effect of domestic strife, Gurr and Marshall find that there is a weak but significant relationship between both the existence of armed conflict in contiguous states and conflict within the broader region (residing in “bad neighborhoods”) and the likelihood that a group will engage in rebellious activities (2000, 304-05).

**Potential Relationships Not Considered**

There are some other factors that are noted in the literature on intervention and/or civil conflict initiation that are not incorporated in this study. These include the economic or social features of a host state or an external state intervenor which are usually measured by a country’s gross domestic product (GDP), its reliance on primary commodity exports, or its infant mortality rate. Previous research indicates that these economic characteristics are associated with the onset of civil wars but there are a variety of ways in which economic variables could possibly influence the dynamics of interventions and their relationship to conflict outcomes (e.g., Collier, 2003, 2000a; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000b, 1999). Future research could focus specifically on the economic component and include the above-mentioned variables along with others that examine the degree of trade interdependence between host states and intervenors along with the economic activities of rebel groups.¹¹

Debates exist as to whether the ethnic heterogeneity of a host state influences the chances that a country will face a violent ethnic challenge (e.g., Ellingsen, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 2003, Henderson, 1997; Sambanis, 2001). However, this variable was not

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¹¹ I would like to thank Ken Conca for raising this issue, especially in relation to trade interdependence between host states and intervenors.
included as the nature of ethnic ties between the conflict participants and outside states and/or neighboring ethnic kin is more relevant to the current analysis. Finally, the types of political systems of the external state intervenors are not noted as there is existing research which incorporates larger numbers of cases across a broader time period. Kegley Jr. and Hermann, for instance, find that democratic states tend to intervene against each other less than would be expected by pure chance while non-democracies were more active against each other than would be expected based on probabilities (1997, 98-99; also see Hermann and Kegley Jr., 1996; Tures, 2001, 2002).

This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework of this study along with presenting the various hypotheses that will be examined. The independent and other variables encompass group, host state, intervention, and conflict characteristics. The next chapter discusses how these variables are measured along with outlining the dependent variable, the level of violence of an ethnopolitical conflict. The criteria for the selection of the ethnopolitical conflicts are first considered.
Chapter 3: Research Design

This chapter first outlines the criteria for the selection of the ethnopolitical conflicts and the sources used to ensure that they are representative of those noted in other compilations of internal armed conflicts. The procedures by which the data were gathered are next delineated along with the operationalization of the variables. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the data will be considered at two levels of analysis – the conflict and intervention levels – and the statistical techniques that will be used to test the various hypotheses outlined in the theoretical framework.

Case Selection

The twenty-nine intrastate conflicts in this study are all instances in which there was at least one external state intervention on behalf of an ethnic group which was engaging in a rebellion against its host state in the 1980-2000 period. The selection process required numerous steps to ensure that the internal wars would share as many initial common characteristics as possible. Multiple sources were consulted including datasets on ethnopolitical groups, intrastate conflicts, and foreign interventions, along with numerous articles and books that focus on particular conflicts.

The Minorities at Risk project database was first utilized as it is the most comprehensive source of information on politicized ethnic groups. The project catalogues the political, economic, and cultural characteristics of 275 ethnopolitical groups worldwide from 1945-2000. To qualify for inclusion, the Minorities project uses either one of the following two criteria:
the group collectively suffers or benefits from, systematic differential treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society, or

- the group is the basis for political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests. (Gurr, 2000, 7-8).

In addition, two population rules were employed. Groups were only included if they resided in countries with a 1995 population of more than five hundred thousand and each group either numbered at least one hundred thousand or exceeded 1 percent of a country’s population (Gurr, 2000, 9).

Three factors were initially used to restrict the potential cases from the Minorities dataset. First, as the focus is on the early stages of a conflict, rebellions that were underway prior to 1980 and continued without a dormant period were not included. As a result, the Karen, Rohingya, and Shan rebellions in Burma, the Israeli-Palestinian and Afghan conflicts, the Kurdish revolt in Iran, the Mayan insurgency in Guatemala, and the Southerners rebellion in Chad, among others, were dropped from consideration. However, if an internal ethnic war resumed in the 1980s or 1990s after being dormant, in most cases, for a 5-10 year period, it was included and the group’s engagement in prior violent activities is taken into consideration. Second, intrastate conflicts that were intercommunal disputes – that is, among domestic ethnic groups rather than a group against the host state’s authorities – were dropped as the dynamics of these contentions are quite different. Instances of intercommunal rivalries in the late 1990s include violent clashes between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia and Nigeria along with Hindu-Christian violence in India. Finally, my interest is in ethnopolitical conflicts which were
organized revolts that were sustained for more than one consecutive year. Therefore, coup d'etats and riots along with lower levels of rebellious activity such as sporadic violent attacks and political banditry are excluded.

The threshold of violence used to decide whether to include a conflict was chosen by examining the rebellion scale utilized by the Minorities project to categorize a group’s violent anti-state activities. This scale is coded on a yearly basis since 1985. To account for insurgencies that began in the early 1980s, the author researched potential groups through various case study materials. Ethnopolitical groups whose rebellion scores were at the level of 2 (campaigns of terrorism) or above for more than one consecutive year in the 1980s or 1990s were chosen.12

A number of groups in the Minorities dataset exhibited rebellion levels greater than or equal to 2 for a single year across the twenty year time period. They include the Amazonian Indians in Brazil, Fulani and Malinka in Guinea, Kabre in Togo, Westerners in Cameroon, Tutsi in Burundi, Amhara in Ethiopia, Bakongo in Angola, Bemebe and Lozi in Zambia, Europeans and Zulus in South Africa, Merina in Madagascar, Shi'is in Bahrain, and Muslims in India. However, an inspection of the types of international support many of these groups received revealed that there were very few state interventions in support of most of these groups.13 The Minorities project codings of international support for ethnopolitical groups during the 1990s were used for this search.

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12 The rebellion scale utilized by the Minorities project is reproduced under the section that discusses how the dependent variable, the level of violence of an ethnopolitical conflict, is operationalized.

13 Regan finds that internal wars in which there are no external state interventions are fairly likely to end within the first few months (2002, 67).
Once the initial conflict list was generated, a few further exclusions were made. For example, the Mayan rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico was eliminated as only the host state received material assistance from an external state intervenor. The first basis for inclusion required that there be at least one outside state intervention on behalf of a communal group. Ethnopolitical wars in which there were no external state interventions such as the Ijaw insurrection in Nigeria were also dropped.

The rebellions and counter-rebellions by the Temne and Mende groups in Sierra Leone and the Americo-Liberians, Mano, Gios, Krahns, and Mandingoes in Liberia are not included as recent research suggests that they are not primarily ethnically based but rather involve a shifting combination of ethnic, revolutionary, political, and predatory motivations. This characterization has also been applied to the Lord’s Resistance Army which concentrates its actions in northern Uganda and forcibly draws its membership from the area’s Acholi population.\textsuperscript{14} However, the Acholi qualify as the onset of this insurgency dates back to 1986 when the Acholi were represented by elements of the former Ugandan army which was ousted by Yoweri Museveni in early 1986 and the precursor to the LRA, the Holy Spirit Movement, both of which appear to have been largely populated by voluntary Acholi members. In addition, the campaign against the abolition of apartheid in South Africa was excluded as it was not exclusively a Xhosa rebellion against the state authorities. Although the Xhosa were the main participants in

\textsuperscript{14} Personal communication from Ted Gurr, August, 2002. Also see Fearon and Laitin (2003), Muller (2000), reports by the International Crisis Group on Sierra Leone and Liberia (2002a; 20002b) along with the articles by Azam (2002); Collier (2000a); Collier and Hoeffler (2000b, 1999). The latter three articles were produced as part of the World Bank’s The Economics of Civil War, Crime and Violence Project. Some of these studies, it must be noted, focus on country level factors such as the degree of ethnic heterogeneity rather than on group variables such as the type of grievances or mobilization potential.
the African National Congress, members of the Zulu ethnic group were also active along with South African Europeans and Asians.

Compilations of armed conflicts were next consulted to ensure that the cases were represented in these studies. These include Monty Marshall’s “Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-1999” (2000), Patrick Regan’s list of intrastate conflicts with external state interventions from 1944-94, (1996), Charles King who chronicles ongoing civil wars, unresolved internal disputes and areas of major internal unrest from the end of the Second World War until the year 1997 (1997, 84-87), R. William Ayres’ dataset of 55 violent nationalist conflicts within states from 1945-96 (2000), Ted Gurr’s examination of self-determination wars for autonomy or independence, 1960-99 (2000, chapter 6), the Rand study by Byman et al. which notes various forms of external support for insurgent groups during the 1990s (2001), Roy Licklider’s analysis of 91 civil wars during the 1945-93 period (1995), the Wallensteen and Sollenberg yearly updates of instances of armed intrastate and interstate conflicts (2001) along with the most recent armed conflict dataset by Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002), and Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla (2001) who examine societal and separatist conflicts in the post-WWII era.

All of the twenty-nine rebellions listed in Table 3.1 are noted in the various compilations. A majority of the ethnopolitical conflicts are chronicled in most of these listings. In some sources, a few rebellions are subsumed under a broader civil war such as the Cabinda insurgency which is included as hostilities between the UNITA forces and the Angolan state. Four rebellions are listed by only two or three of the studies. They are
the Oromo in Ethiopia, the Mohajirs in Pakistan, the Cabindans in Angola, and the Lhotshampas (ethnic Nepalis) in Bhutan.

Questions can be raised about the lack of a control set that would have consisted of ethnopolitical conflicts in which there were no external state interventions. However, the author only discovered one rebellion that qualified in which there was no foreign state involvement. This was the Ijaw revolt that was mentioned earlier. One alternative is to extend the time period under consideration. The issue of limited information on intrastate disputes that began prior to the 1980s mitigated against this choice. Another option could have been to examine interventions by external states in ideological wars so comparisons could be made across the two conflict types. But then the main question of this dissertation would likely be different. Potential differences in patterns of interventions and conflict outcomes in ethnic and non-ethnic insurgencies is also an interesting question and an avenue for future research.

Table 3.1: Ethnopolitical Conflicts, 1980-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabindans - Angola</th>
<th>Miskito - Nicaragua</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lhotshampas - Bhutan</td>
<td>Tuareg - Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hutus - Burundi</td>
<td>Mohajirs - Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uighurs - China</td>
<td>Bougainvilleans - Papua New Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tutsis - Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Hutus - Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afars - Djibouti</td>
<td>Tutsis - Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oromos - Ethiopia</td>
<td>Diola/Casamance - Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assamese - India</td>
<td>Issaq - Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodos - India</td>
<td>Sri Lankan Tamils - Sri Lanka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kashmiris - India</td>
<td>Southerners - Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sikhs - India</td>
<td>Kurds - Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acehnese - Indonesia</td>
<td>Acholi - Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kurds - Iraq</td>
<td>Tutsis - Zaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shi is - Iraq</td>
<td>Ndebele - Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuareg - Mali</td>
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</table>
A final issue is the possible influence of noninterventions on conflict outcomes.\textsuperscript{15} The first Tutsi rebellion in the former Zaire comes to mind. What if France and the United States had chosen to actively support their domestic ally? Would the Tutsi-led ADFL coalition have been able to secure victory within such a short time? Or perhaps Mobutu Sese Seko could have prevailed with significant American and French military and economic assistance. The author has not been able to determine how to take into account instances in which states choose not to intervene in an internal war. Further, it is not clear about the degree to which information to make such determinations is available. For example, the intentions of major powers are usually publicized but it is less known what neighbors or regional states might do when encountering a conflict within their immediate area. Also, a country might choose not to intervene at one point and then decided to become involved at a later date for a variety of reasons. While acknowledging this issue, this study only addresses forms of assistance provided to either ethnopolitical groups or their host states that are documented in the media or in the academic literature.

\textbf{Data-Gathering Procedures}

A codesheet was created to classify the various facets of each conflict and outside intervention. It was revised numerous times to refine the categorizations and to ensure that all the relevant variables were represented. Existing datasets contain some of the information of interest. However, none of them includes the detailed information sought on the various aspects of an intervention strategy; a number examine particular types of

\textsuperscript{15}I would like to thank Monty G. Marshall for raising this issue, especially in the context of the first Tutsi revolt in the former Zaire, in our discussions about how to conceptualize interventions and outcomes.
ethnic disputes, while others do not concentrate on the early stages of these insurgencies which are the main focus of this project. Tillema (1989, 1994), for instance, only examines foreign overt military interventions and he includes both interstate and intrastate strife. Ayres and Saideman (2000a; 2000b) and Quinn and Gurr (2003) are interested in self-determination conflicts. Regan (1996) focuses on whether there is a cessation of hostilities within six months after an external state intervention. A Rand study of outside support for insurgent groups is limited to the 1990s and it does not systematically consider conflict outcomes (Byman et al., 2001). The Minorities dataset (1945-98 version) contains information on the various forms of international support for ethnopolitical groups but these are coded only for the 1990s, biennially for 1990-94 and yearly after that. Further, there are no codings for assistance for a host state. This variable was included in the project update for the years 1998-2000.

The information on the ethnopolitical groups and the characteristics of the interventions was collected through a wide variety of sources. Along with extensive searches in the Lexis-Nexis database, numerous scholarly quantitative and case studies were consulted. The author developed chronologies for each group which outline a group’s violent anti-state activities along with all external state interventions for a three year period, beginning a year prior to the outbreak of armed hostilities and continuing until two years after an internal war began. Interventions by other actors, in most cases, were recorded for the first two years. Any domestic and international efforts to resolve an internal conflict were also chronicled. For the 1990s decade, some of the Minorities at Risk group chronologies were utilized to supplement the main research. All the characteristics of the interventions were first researched by the author and other datasets
that included interventions were then consulted. At a minimum, two sources were required to verify the various aspects of an intervention and its potential effects on the course of a communal insurgency. In most cases, multiple sources were utilized.

Regular forms of military or economic assistance are not considered as interventions. For instance, under the terms of its defense agreements with some African states, France provides military training and equipment. Only when this assistance was explicitly supplied or increased due to an ethnopolitical conflict was it included as an intervention. The French deployment in Rwanda in response to the October 1990 invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Front is coded as an intervention as it was directly linked to the Tutsi attempt to overthrow the Hutu-dominated government. In the Papua New Guinea dispute, Australia had regularly furnished military assistance to the host government. However, shortly after the outbreak of violent hostilities in Bougainville in late 1988, Australia agreed to provide the host regime with military helicopters that were subsequently used in attacks against the Bougainvilleans.

Instances of covert aid were likely missed as even if this information becomes available it is usually many years after the onset of a domestic conflict. Further, there could be some omissions due to the differential coverage of the ethnic insurgencies. For instance, while there is more information available on the ethnopolitical wars that began or re-emerged in the 1990s, news sources are much more limited for the early years of the 1980s. There is less information available on the Lhotshampa rebellion in Bhutan while the media and scholarly sources on the Tutsis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are vast.

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16 My approach to the issue of regular military and economic assistance is similar to Regan (1996, 343).
The following sections discuss how the various independent variables are measured. The dependent variable is then outlined while the final part of this chapter focuses on the data analysis techniques that will be used.

**Group Variables**

Two variables that focus on the domestic challengers are included, the type of ethnic group and if the group had engaged in political activism in the recent past. The first variable is drawn from the Minorities at Risk dataset while the latter was coded by the author.

Ethnopolitical groups in the Minorities dataset are categorized based on various factors including their primary grievances, demands, and historical status. Six mutually exclusive distinctions are utilized (Group Type). Two broad categorizations differentiate national peoples and minority peoples. While national peoples generally seek autonomy or separation from the state, minority peoples are concerned with obtaining greater rights, access, or control within a host state. The first three types of groups described below are categorized as national peoples while the latter are defined as minority peoples.¹⁷ The types of groups most relevant to this study are ethnonationalists and disadvantaged communal contenders.

*Ethnonationalists:* Regionally concentrated peoples with a history of organized political autonomy with their own state, traditional ruler, or regional government who have supported political movements for autonomy at some time since 1945.

¹⁷ The description of the group types and categorizations is directly drawn from Gurr (2000, 16-18).
**Indigenous peoples:** Conquered descendants of earlier inhabitants of a region who live mainly in conformity with traditional social, economic, and cultural customs that are sharply distinct from those of dominant groups.

**National minorities:** Segments of a transstate people with a history of organized political autonomy whose kindred control an adjacent state but who now constitute a minority in the state in which they reside.

**Communal Contenders:** Culturally distinct peoples, tribes, or clans in heterogeneous societies who hold or seek a share in state power. Disadvantaged communal contenders are subject to some degree of political, economic, or cultural discrimination but lack offsetting advantages.

**Ethnoclasses:** Ethnically or culturally distinct peoples, usually descended from slaves or immigrants, most of whom occupy a distinct social and economic stratum or niche.

**Religious Sects:** Communal groups that differ from others principally in their religious beliefs and related cultural practices and whose political status and activities are centered on the defense of their beliefs.

Of the 29 groups, 17 are considered as national peoples. There are nine ethnonationalist groups, seven indigenous peoples, and one national minority. The remaining 12 groups are minority peoples and they are comprised of nine communal contenders, two ethnoclasses, one religious sect.

The second group variable, past political activism, records whether an ethnic group had engaged in any violent anti-state activities in the decade prior to the latest conflict episode (Prior Rebellion). If a group was involved in any rebellion at the level or
2 or above on the Minorities scale, the variable was coded as a 1. Groups with lower levels of rebellion along with those with no recent history of political activity received a score of 0.

**Host State Variables**

The Polity datasets which catalogue the institutional characteristics of countries are the most widely used in empirical studies to analyze the character of political systems. The Polity IV version (1800-1999) is utilized. A 10 point scale determines the degree of democracy or autocracy for each state in the international system. Incoherent regimes are those with a mix of both democratic and autocratic characteristics (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000a, 2000b). The coding distinctions developed by Gurr and Marshall that are outlined below are used to categorize a host state’s regime type for the year prior to the outbreak of an ethnopolitical conflict (2000, 297-98). This variable is coded for the year before the violence began to help address the potential issue of which happens first. For example, does the onset of an insurgency lead to greater restrictions and therefore a higher autocracy score for the regime, or does a host state’s autocratic nature encourage groups to engage in violent anti-state activities in pursuit of their self-interests (Dudley and Miller, 1998, 84)?

- Regimes that score 6 or higher on the democracy scale are coded as democratic
- Regimes that score 6 or higher on the autocracy scale are coded as autocratic
- Incoherent regimes are those that when their democracy level is subtracted from their autocracy score, the coding is less than 5 or more than -5
• Countries in which central authority has collapsed, usually during civil wars, are coded as state failures

**Intervention Variables**

Numerous variables seek to capture the potential influence of the different facets of an intervention strategy. They include the type of state intervenor, the form and intensity of the assistance provided, the recipient(s) of the intervention, if the state intervenor was aiding a group prior to the outbreak of violent hostilities, and the nature of any ethnic linkages between the domestic combatants and the external state intervenor. Whether the United Nations, regional organizations, or ethnic kin in neighboring states were also active participants was documented along with the types of resources that they supplied. Secondary variables were constructed to examine the length of each outside state intervention, the number of states that became involved on either side, and the total number of foreign state interventions. Some of these variables will be discussed in the following chapter which outlines the general characteristics of both the interventions and the ethnopolitical conflicts.

Five categories are used to define the type of external state that intervened: major power, regional power, neighbor, regional state, and a residual “other” category. The four major powers are the United States, the USSR/Russia, Britain, and France. While China is usually considered a major power, for this study it is defined as a regional power as its primary orientation and actions in relation to ethnic conflicts largely focus on Asia. To be considered as a regional power, two criteria must be met: the state has expressed through statements or actions its ambitions to a greater regional and/or international
status and it is generally influential in regional affairs (Osterud, 1992). Second, the state possesses significant military and/or economic or diplomatic resources relative to not only others in the region but also in comparison to most other Third World states. The fifteen regional powers are: Angola, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, and Turkey. One-third of the regional powers are located in the Middle East.¹⁸

Neighbors are defined according to the criteria used by the Correlates of War project. If a state intervenor does not directly border the host state, it has to be separated by less than 150 miles of water. Another variable notes the number of countries that are territorially contiguous to a host state. This was done to determine whether host regimes with many neighbors were more likely to be involved in conflicts that escalate as there are greater numbers of potential state intervenors in the vicinity. For descriptive purposes, a separate coding was made to account for state intervenors that are both neighbors and regional powers. The analysis, however, adopts mutually exclusive categories and therefore a state’s higher ranking as a regional power is used.

Regional state intervenors are countries that belong to the same geographic region where a conflict occurs. The regional distinctions are those used by the Minorities at Risk project. The Third World is divided into four regions: East, Southeast, and South Asia; North Africa and the Middle East; Africa south of the Sahara; and Latin America.

¹⁸ It can be argued that countries such as Mexico, Vietnam, and Indonesia warrant consideration as regional powers. Indonesia was not included due to the severe political and economic stresses it has confronted in recent years which limit its ability to project a regional presence. The same applies, albeit to a lesser degree, to Vietnam. Mexico is a potential contender for regional power status in future studies. However, Mexico’s ability to flex its regional muscles is subject to the dominant role of the United States in Latin America.
and the Caribbean (Gurr, Marshall, and Pitsch, 1999, 15). The remaining countries that intervened, such as non-major power Western countries, are included in the residual other grouping. Dichotomous variables record whether each external state was involved in the first and/or second years of an internal war.

The international support categories developed by the Minorities project were utilized to code the forms of assistance for ethnopolitical groups and/or host states. For the 1998–2000 update, the types of possible support were expanded and codings were also made to incorporate any aid provided to a host state. This author was involved in helping to generate the revised international support categories. To facilitate the analysis, I divided the raw codings into four categories: military, economic, political, and support for ceasefires and/or peace agreements. When more than one form of assistance was furnished from two or more of the above categories, it was coded as mixed forms of aid for the discussion and analyses in Chapters 4 and 5.

The following three tables outline the various types of assistance that could be provided to an ethnopolitical group, the host state, or both actors. For each state intervenor, every form of aid was recorded in the year prior to the emergence of the violent hostilities and during the first two years of a conflict. The involvement of the other external actors, the UN, regional organizations, and ethnic kin in neighboring states, was documented beginning with the onset of an internal war.
### Table 3.2: Forms of Aid for Ethnopolitical Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nonmilitary financial support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>access to external communications, markets, transport (including hosting exile organizations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic sanctions against the regime due to its policies toward the group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>withdrawal of economic aid due to regime policies toward the group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>funds for military supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of military equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>military training in exile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of advisory military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cross-border sanctuaries for armed fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cross-border raids in support of rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rescue missions in the host state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blockades, interdiction against the host regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of safe havens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>deployment of combat units in host state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>military sanctions against the regime due to its policies toward the group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>withdrawal of various forms of military aid due to regime policies toward the group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Table 3.3: Types of Assistance for Host States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nonmilitary financial support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>funds for military supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of military equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>military training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provision of advisory military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>deployment of combat units in host state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>other (e.g., intelligence cooperation in reference to group activities, air strikes against group populated areas)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.4: Forms of Support for Both Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediation (both formal and informal methods such as hosting talks, facilitation, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>observation missions, including supervision of elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonmilitary financial support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>funds for military supplies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provision of military equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provision of advisory military personnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peacekeeping observers, units in country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deployment of combat units in host state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to Support Ceasefires or Peace Agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>logistical aid (e.g., transportation, communications)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarming and demobilizing rebels and/or government forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>facilitating the return and resettlement of refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military or police retraining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>observation missions, including supervising elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebuilding of infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebuilding of civil administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting reconciliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The potential means of support for ethnic minorities are more numerous than those listed for host states. States do not require many of these forms of aid such as access to external markets, cross-border sanctuaries, and safe havens. Any direct military presence by a outside state in support of a host regime is coded under deployment of combat troops. Also, under the category of other support for a host state, intelligence cooperation in relation to group activities along with air strikes such as those by Turkey into Kurdish-populated areas of Iraq, are included. Further, no distinctions were made as
to whether either ethnopolitical groups or host states purchased military weapons and/or training or whether these were freely supplied by the external actor.\textsuperscript{19}

When examining outside support for both actors, the various types of informal and formal mediation were grouped under a single category of political assistance. This was done as it was expected that there would be too few of these forms of interventions to be able to meaningfully discuss the potential influence of different political techniques. Further, there is already a large body of existing research on mediation efforts in both interstate and domestic wars. The following chapters, along with the sketches of some of the insurgencies, will try to illustrate the most important political strategies that were employed.

There are a number of different measures by which to examine the intensity of the assistance that is provided to a domestic combatant. The Minorities dataset contains two variables that assess the extent of political and military support for ethnopolitical groups for the 1990-95 period (Gurr, Marshall, and Pitsch, 1999, 128-131). They were not used as this dissertation sought to assess the level of aid along a continuous ladder of escalating involvement. A Rand study of external aid for insurgent groups during the 1990s includes a measure that seeks to determine the potential impact of this assistance on a group’s anti-state activities. It distinguishes between minor, valuable, and critical forms (Byman et al., 2001, 83). Minor aid involves the provision of fighters, intelligence,

\footnote{Future studies can incorporate the role of recent measures taken by external states to limit the activities of insurgent groups. In particular, these actions became increasingly visible in the mid to late 1990s and were given further impetus following the September 11 attacks in the United States. They include designations of rebelling groups as terrorist organizations by the US and other Western states and subsequent restrictions on their fund-raising activities. It does not appear that any of the groups in this study were subject to these measures during the first two years of each conflict.}
organizational aid, and inspiration while valuable assistance entails military training, and
the supply of weapons and material. The provision of safe haven and transit, financial
resources, political support and propaganda, and direct military support are defined as
critical (Ibid., 84-100). This scale was also not utilized as it contains only a limited
number of the potential types of assistance that can be provided to insurgent groups
and/or a host state.

Table 3.5: Scale of Intensity of Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Minorities at Risk Labels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No Support Received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Ideological encouragement; diffuse support; other unspecified support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Nonmilitary financial support; access to external communications, markets, transport, including the hosting of exile organizations; * withdrawal of economic aid or economic sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Funds for military supplies; provision of military equipment; military training; provision of advisory military personnel; * withdrawal of military funds, equipment, training, or personnel or military sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Intense</td>
<td>Blockades, interdiction against a host regime; cross-border sanctuaries for armed fighters; rescue mission in the conflict-ridden country; cross-border raids in support of rebels; the deployment of active combat units of the intervenor in the host state; * provision of safe havens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The measure that is used was compiled by Steve Saideman (2002, 34). It collapses the forms of assistance for ethnopolitical groups as noted by the Minorities project when it first began collecting this data in the early 1990s. A modified version is reproduced above in Table 3.4. The scale not only examines external involvement along a continuum but with minor changes it can also account for support for a host state along with the inclusion of the expanded forms of assistance introduced in the 1998-2000
Minorities update. The highest level of aid provided by each state intervenor is coded regardless of whether an outside country provides multiple forms of assistance. Interventions that solely involved political means were not coded on this variable; however, when military or economic assistance was also part of the package, the most intense type was noted. The None or Low categories are not relevant for this analysis as each ethnopolitical group received some form of aid, ideological encouragement was not included, and diffuse forms of support were coded under the specific types of aid. The asterisk notes the additions I have made to include the expansion of the forms of assistance that were included in the revised Minorities codesheets.

The recipient of each external intervention was first coded in three ways: interventions only in support of the rebelling group or the host state, and those that were on behalf of both of the parties. This was then narrowed down and based on all the state interventions during the first year, a new variable was created to determine whether the interventions were solely to favor an ethnopolitical group or if there were state intervenors assisting both of the domestic combatants. This variable, Competing, was also compiled for the second year of a dispute based on the interventions that either began in year two or were still underway. To qualify as a competing intervention, at least one external state backed the group and one or more supported the host state, regardless of whether there were any outside countries that became involved to assist both parties.

There are a number of possible ethnic linkages between the domestic parties involved in violent hostilities and outside state actors. Two variables seek to account for the most relevant relationships. The first focuses on any ethnic ties between an external state intervenor and the internal combatants (Ethnic Affinity). It was coded as follows:
0  No relationship
1  The dominant ethnic group that comprises the regime of the state intervenor is ethnically related to the rebelling group
2  The dominant ethnic group that comprises the regime of the state intervenor is ethnically related to the regime of the host state.
3  A non-dominant group residing in the state intervenor is ethnically related to the rebelling group.

The second variable addresses ties between ethnic groups that straddle state boundaries. It is a binary variable that records whether ethnopolitical kin in neighboring countries furnished any form of assistance to their brethren embroiled in an intrastate conflict (Ethnic Kin). The types of aid contributed by neighboring ethnic kin were also noted.

Dichotomous variables were also used to chronicle if the United Nations or regional organizations became active participants in an ethnopolitical insurgency. The nature of their involvement was documented using the codings outlined in the tables presented earlier.

Whether an external state was engaged in an ethnic dispute before it escalated to a violent internal war is the final variable that focuses on the characteristics of interventions. Two measures were recorded. The first (Prior Involvement) is a dummy variable that is coded 0 if there is no involvement by a state intervenor in the year prior to the emergence of a conflict. Alternatively, when there was any form of assistance furnished, the variable is coded as 1. The type of aid is noted as either political, economic, military, or mixed (Prior Aid Type).
Conflict Variables

Four variables account for the region where a conflict occurred, if the
ethnopolitical war arose during the Cold War or post-Cold War period, whether the host
regime was also confronting another domestic insurgency when an ethnic conflict
emerged, and if the host state was located in a bad neighborhood, that is, there were
violent domestic hostilities ongoing in neighboring countries.

As mentioned earlier, the Minorities project’s regional divisions are employed.
The sub-regions within the Third World are: East, Southeast and South Asia; North
Africa and the Middle East; Africa south of the Sahara, and Latin America and the
Caribbean (Gurr, 2000, 12). To account for the Cold War, a binary variable is coded as 1
if the conflict onset occurred during 1980-89 and 0 if it emerged in 1990-2000 which is
defined as the post-Cold War period (Cold War). Another dichotomous variable
(Insurgency) notes if a host state was facing another insurgency during the year in which
the ethnic war under study began. Finally, the presence of violent hostilities in a country
neighboring the host state is also recorded by a dummy variable for the year in which a
conflict began.

The Dependent Variable

The outcome of a conflict, as the previous chapter discusses, can be conceived of
in a number of different manners. This study focuses on the level of violence of a
intrastate war. Among the measures that have been used to determine the degree of
violent hostilities are ordinal scales that seek to assess changes in the severity of violence,
casualty rates calculated on a yearly basis or across the whole expanse of a conflict, and measures that record an escalating ladder of anti-state activities by sub-state actors.

The International Crisis Behavior project, for instance, includes a variable that assesses the degree of violence and it ranges from no violence and minor encounters to serious clashes and full-scale interstate war (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997a, 835-848). This scale has been replicated in numerous other studies such as those by Diehl et al (1996). While this is a useful indicator of violence severity, this project’s longer-term aim is to discern which factors are associated with shorter-term changes in the degree of armed hostilities and therefore a more detailed coding scheme was required.

When seeking to assess the anti-state activities of domestic contenders, Dudley and Miller note that many empirical studies prior to the mid-1990s emphasized the natural logarithm of deaths from political violence (1998, 77). However, utilizing casualty levels can be problematic. Existing quantitative studies differ on what constitutes a conflict casualty. The Correlates at War project, for instance, chronicles only battle-related casualties, requiring 1000 of these deaths for a dispute to qualify for inclusion as a interstate or civil war (Small and Singer, 1982). A recently compiled dataset of armed conflicts adopts a minimal criterion of 25 battle casualties per year (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand, 2002, 617). However, when one considers that civilians are reported to comprise up to 90% of the victims in domestic violence, it is not clear that distinctions between civilian and military casualties are that useful or can be easily determined (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett, 2003, 189). As Monty Marshall notes, “[D]ata on war-related fatalities are highly speculative, especially in the world’s less-developed regions” (1999, 3). Further, he asserts that “[N]o accurate
estimates can ever be made of the non-lethal casualties, the disabled, the diseased, the dispossessed, and the traumatized” (Ibid.). Given the difficulties associated with determining accurate figures on military and/or civilian deaths coupled with this dissertation’s focus on a group’s political activism, casualty tolls are not utilized to determine the level of violence of an internal war.

The dependent variable measures the level of violence of an ethnopolitical conflict by examining an ethnic group’s degree of violent anti-state activities. The Minorities at Risk scale of group rebellion is used to note a group’s level of violence against the authorities of a host state at six month intervals after the month when the onset is chronicled. It is reproduced below with slight modifications (Gurr, Marshall, and Pitsch, 1999, 154). Group rebellion levels are documented yearly in the Minorities dataset from 1985 onward. However, these rebellion levels do not cover the first five years of my study and my longer-term interest is in examining more discriminating changes over six month periods. Thus I coded a group’s rebellion level at each six month interval beginning a year before and continuing until two years after a conflict began. Other empirical analyses have also utilized this scale to examine different aspects of domestic disputes including the motivations for external state interventions (Saideman, 2002), and the escalation or de-escalation of violent intrastate contentions at both the internal and interstate levels (Dudley and Miller, 1998; Gurr and Marshall, 2000; Quinn, 2003; Trumbore, 2003b).
Codings were made at the end of the first six months, the first year, at a year and a half, and finally two years after the onset of major hostilities. Given that there are only twenty-nine ethnopolitical conflicts, for the statistical analysis, the raw rebellion scores were first recoded for each six month interval into three categories: decrease in the level of rebellion, same level of rebellion, and increase in the degree of armed hostilities. These distinctions were made when comparing an ethnic group’s rebellion level at the onset to the end of each time period. For instance, if a group’s anti-state activities increased by one or more categories six months after the onset, the coding increase in rebellion was made. At the one year, one and a half year, and two year periods, the changes in rebellion levels were also noted in comparison to the degree of violence at the beginning of a conflict. After the data was first analyzed, it became evident that there were minor differences in the various independent variables in conflicts where rebellion levels either decreased or remained at the same level. Therefore, as will be discussed further in the next chapter, the analysis collapses the raw rebellion scores into two categories: same or decrease in the level of rebellion and increase in the degree of a group’s rebellion.

The author also coded rebellion levels at one year and six months before the onset of a rebellion so that future studies can utilize time-series analysis to further assess the relationship between interventions prior to a conflict’s emergence along with those that occur during the first two years of violent hostilities. In addition, changes between each six month time period can also be considered.
Table 3.6: Group Rebellion Coding Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>none reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>political banditry, sporadic terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>campaigns of terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>local rebellions: armed attempts to seize power in a locale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4     | small-scale guerrilla activity  
        -- fewer than 1000 armed fighters  
        -- sporadic armed attacks (less than 6 reported per six month period)*  
        -- attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or in one or two other locales |
| 5     | intermediate-scale guerrilla activity  
        -- this has one or two of the defining traits of small-scale activity and one or two of the traits of large-scale activity |
| 6     | large-scale guerrilla activity  
        -- more than 1000 armed fighters  
        -- frequent armed attacks (more than six reported per six month period)*  
        -- attacks affecting a large part of the area occupied by the group |
| 7     | protracted civil war, fought by rebel military units with secure base areas over time |

* this was changed from each year to each six month period to allow for the coding of six month intervals

Data Analysis Methods

Both quantitative and qualitative methods are utilized to examine the relationships between the various independent and other variables and the changes in the level of violence of an ethnopolitical conflict. The use of both types of research techniques allows for an analysis of general patterns while the brief case descriptions illuminate the broad patterns by drawing out the details of particular domestic insurgencies.

To facilitate the data analysis, two datasets are utilized. The first one focuses on the features associated with an ethnopolitical conflict and includes variables such as the region where the conflict occurs, characteristics of a host regime, the type of ethnic group, the number of intervenors involved, whether the interventions are in support of a group or on behalf of both sides, if there was any involvement by other actors, and
changes in a group’s rebellion level, among other factors. The second dataset details the various aspects of each intervention and includes variables such as the type of state intervenor, the forms of assistance furnished, the intensity of the aid, the recipients, if these state intervenors were involved prior to the emergence of an internal war and what types of support they provided, the length of the interventions, and if the state intervenors were active participants in either or both years after the onset of a conflict. There is overlap between the two datasets as some variables are included in both compilations. For example, if the ethnic war occurred during the Cold War or post-Cold War period was coded in both the conflict and the intervenor datasets along with others such as whether the interventions were undertaken solely in favor of the group or if there were interventions on behalf of both sides (competing).

The small number of ethnopolitical conflicts raises the issue of the validity of using statistical techniques such as multinomial logit regressions to test the potential relationships between the different variables. These regressions are utilized when there is a dichotomous dependent variable. However, at the bare minimum the number of cases required for such testing is 30 while in most instances a greater number is required to adequately assess statistical significance. As a result, alternative statistical methods such as cross-tabulations and frequency counts are used to draw out the associations between the independent variables and the level of violence of an ethnic war.

The next chapter takes a closer look at the nature of the ethnopolitical conflicts and their regional distribution along with some initial analyses of the different types of external state intervenors and the strategies that are most often utilized. The hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 are tested and analyzed in the following chapter.
Chapter 4: Intervention and Conflict Characteristics: An Overview

Various group, host state, intervention, and conflict variables are expected to influence a conflict’s outcome, in this study, the level of violence of an ethnopolitical war. This chapter sets the stage for the discussion of the hypotheses by presenting the main descriptive features of the insurgencies and the external state interventions. The first section details some of the ethnic rebellions in each of the four sub-regions of the Third World. Who is most likely to intervene, what are the most frequent forms of assistance supplied to the domestic contenders, and which internal party is more likely to be the recipient of this outside aid are questions that are considered in the next section.

Conflict Features

There are 29 ethnopolitical conflicts that began or reemerged from 1980-2000 that met the criteria for selection which were outlined in the previous chapter. Twelve of these insurgencies occurred during the Cold War (1980-89) while the remaining seventeen cases were underway prior to the year 2000. The regional distribution of the cases is skewed (see Table 4.1). Fifteen of the 29 rebellions arose in Africa south of the Sahara, there were ten rebellions in Asia, three in the Middle East, and the Miskito Indians are the sole Latin American representative. The potential relationship between the location of a conflict and its level of violence will be examined in Chapter 5.
Table 4.1: Regional Distribution of Ethnopolitical Conflicts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East, Southeast, and South Asia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa and the Middle East</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa south of the Sahara</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Africa South of the Sahara

One third of the fifteen African conflicts occurred in the Great Lakes region ushering in a post-Cold War decade of pervasive violence, insecurity, and outside involvement. Beginning with the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion of Rwanda from neighboring Uganda in October of 1990, the violence also enveloped neighboring Burundi and the former Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo.²¹

Assisted by the deployment of French, Belgian, and Zairean troops in Rwanda, the RPF offensive to oust the Hutu-dominated Habyarimana regime was repelled a month after it began. While Belgium withdrew its troops shortly after the invasion, both France and Zaire continued to support the government with military and economic assistance. The rebels regrouped in northwest Rwanda, under the leadership of Paul Kagame, and began to utilize guerrilla tactics against the country’s armed forces. The initial Rwandan Patriotic Front membership was largely drawn from Uganda. Tutsis who had resided in

²¹ Some of the sources consulted about these five African conflicts include Adebajo and Landsberg, (2001); Ali and Matthews, (1999); Clayton, (1999); Goureivitch, (1998); Harff, (2001); International Crisis Group, (1999, 2000); Kuperman, (2000); Lischer, (2003); Lund, Rubin and Hara, (1998); Musah and Fayemi, (2000); Prunier, (1998); Reed, (1998); Rutake and Gahama, (1998); and Turner, (1998). As is the case with all the other ethnopolitical conflicts, various news, magazine, and journal sources from the Lexis-Nexis database were also used to compile the information about group characteristics and activities.
Uganda for generations formed a significant portion of the National Resistance Army of Yoweri Museveni which had overthrown the Obote regime in Uganda in early 1986. These Tutsi NRA members were able to utilize their army links to obtain military assistance from the Ugandan regime.

Negotiations between the Rwandan government and the RPF under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 1992 led to the deployment of an OAU military observation mission to monitor a ceasefire. This force replaced an earlier OAU military team that had been sent to Rwanda in April of 1991. Although four outside states supplied the opposing parties with military assistance, violence levels at the end of both the first and second years of the conflict declined in comparison to the onset of the revolt.\textsuperscript{22} Almost three years after the insurgency began, in August of 1993, a comprehensive peace agreement was reached in Arusha, Tanzania which called for the creation of a coalition government, the integration of the RPF into the national army, and the prospect of multi-party elections in 1995. To monitor the accords, the United Nations deployed UNAMIR, a peacekeeping force of 2500 troops. However, opposition to the accord by Hutu extremists increased. The deaths of the Rwandan President Habyarimana and the Burundian President in a plane crash in Kigali in early April 1994 unleashed the genocide against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Over the next three months, between 800,000 and 1 million people were killed.

The cross-border spillover of violence followed the July 1994 victory of the RPF which halted the genocide. In one of the largest population movements, around one to two million Rwandan Hutus fled into the neighboring countries of Burundi, Tanzania, Tanzania.

\textsuperscript{22} Appendix 1 lists the conflicts in this study along with their level of violence one year and two years after an internal war began.
and the former Zaire. Among the Hutu refugees were members of the former Rwandan government, including the armed forces (ex-FAR), along with elements of the Interahamwe, a civilian Hutu militia that was a key actor in perpetrating the genocide. By January of 1995, these various Hutu forces, which were primarily residing in refugee camps in Zaire, began their cross-border attacks in an attempt to oust the RPF government in Rwanda. Their efforts were supported through the provision of military assistance from France, China, South Africa, and the Kinshasa government. The rebels also maintained cross-border sanctuaries in Burundi and Tanzania. Hutu attempts to recapture power which were bolstered by six outside state intervenors led to increased levels of violence both one and two years after the campaign began.

Within the former Zaire, Tutsis who had resided in the northeast of the country for generations became the targets of violent attacks by both Zairean and Rwandan Hutus along with the country’s armed forces. The massive migration of Rwandan Hutus into eastern Zaire in mid-1994 changed the nature of ethnic relations among the residing groups. The activities of Hutu rebels both within Zaire and Rwanda set the stage for the third ethnopolitical conflict in the Great Lakes region.

In October of 1996, the Zairean Tutsis, also referred to as the Banyamulenge, joined forces with the opposition Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) coalition led by Laurent Kabila and began a concerted campaign to overthrow the Mobutu Sese Seko regime. The rebels received widespread support from other states within the region. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi sent their own armed forces to fight alongside the ADFL coalition while Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, and Ethiopia provided various forms of military assistance. Both France and the United
States, Cold War allies of Mobutu, chose not to actively prop up the host state government. Eight months after the onset of high-level hostilities, the ADFL was victorious; the Americans and the South Africans negotiated Mobutu’s departure and Kabila took over the presidency.

However, peace was to reign for less than a year before the eruption of the second Tutsi revolt in the newly renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Kabila’s expulsion of the Rwandan and Ugandan advisors from the DRC coupled with a resurgence of violent attacks against the Banyamulenge triggered what has been referred to by numerous scholarly and media sources as Africa’s First World War. The armies of Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad lined up in support of the government forces while Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian troops fought on behalf of the Banyamulenge. Zambia and South Africa, under the auspices of the South African Development Community (SADC), led the efforts to mediate a settlement. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations assisted these peacemaking overtures. Interim agreements such as the July 1999 Lusaka accords were repeatedly violated.

With the interventions by the armed forces of seven regional countries and despite mediation efforts by both external states and regional organizations, rebellion levels in this conflict reached the highest possible level on the Minorities scale (protracted civil war) at the onset and the same degree of violence was coded at the end of the first and second years. In mid-2004, successive efforts to reach a comprehensive peace agreement between the various rebel forces (along with their external state patrons) and the

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23 The two Tutsi rebellions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire) are considered as separate ethnopolitical conflicts which is the practice adopted in most compilations of episodes of armed conflict.
Kinshasa regime (now led by Laurent Kabila’s son, Joseph) are appearing to take a hold as interim power-sharing arrangements have been successfully negotiated. It is estimated that more than three million people died as a result of either direct combat or battle-related fatalities due to famine or disease.

The final Great Lakes conflict involves the Hutus in Burundi who have sought to overthrow the Tutsi-dominated military governments that have ruled the country for much of time since independence in 1962. Relations between the two groups have been marred by the widespread use of violence and charges of ethnic cleansing have been made against the Tutsi military authorities. In 1972, and again in 1988, the military engaged in severe reprisals against both Hutu rebels and civilians, resulting in the deaths of more than 150,000 people. The latest conflict episode, which is included in this study, emerged in October 1993 and it was precipitated by a Tutsi-led military coup that led to the death of the country’s Hutu President. Within the first two years, the outcome of violent attacks by the Tutsi-dominated military against Hutu civilians, clashes between the military and Hutu rebel groups, and civilian Hutu-Tutsi violence was around 200,000, mostly civilian Hutu, casualties. Hundreds of thousands of Hutus also sought refuge in neighboring Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire. Burundian Hutu rebel groups, assisted by Rwandan Hutus based in Zairean and Tanzanian refugee camps, engaged in hit-and-run tactics in order to oust the Tutsi military government.

The rebels were militarily assisted by the Rwandan Hutu government prior to its overthrow by the Tutsi-led RPF. They also received sanctuary in both Tanzania and Zaire while Kenya hosted organizations that represented group interests. France, which has been a long-time supporter of the host state government, continued to provide it with
various types of military aid while also seeking to mediate a settlement. Violence levels escalated at both one and two years after the onset as the international intervenors largely supported the rebel groups through mixed types of assistance. The United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) launched various initiatives to reach a peaceful resolution and an OAU military observer group was deployed in 1994. A peace agreement was reached in 2000 through the mediation of Nelson Mandela. As of mid-2004, attempts to implement a comprehensive power-sharing arrangement continue along with rebel attacks against state authorities.

**East, Southeast, and South Asia**

Ten ethnopolitical conflicts emerged in Asia during 1980-2000; seven of these occurred in South Asia. India is the country that hosts the most intrastate wars overall as the Sikhs, Kashmiris, Assamese, and Bodos are/were seeking at a minimum, widespread autonomy, if not outright independence. For example, Sikh desires for greater control over the political and economic resources of the northern state of Punjab were first manifested through conventional means such as nonviolent protests and riots. However, by October of 1983, the government in New Delhi dismissed the local administration and imposed federal rule (President’s Rule) in response to growing violence against both Hindus and state officials. The fighting in Punjab continued to escalate due to both the government’s repressive actions and the violent anti-state activities of the Sikh militants.

The primary external supporter of the rebelling Sikhs was Pakistan which furnished

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military and economic aid. Western countries such as Britain, Canada, the United States, and West Germany allowed Sikh organizations to mobilize political and economic resources to assist group members.

The Indian army’s storming of the Sikh’s holiest shrine, the Golden Temple, in June 1984, marked a turning point, setting the stage for the escalation and prolongation of the secessionist conflict. Hundreds of Sikh militants who were residing in the Golden Temple were killed including their charismatic leader, Jarnail Singh Bindranwale. A few months later, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two Sikh members of her security detail and widespread anti-Sikh riots spread across India. Talks between the government and leaders of a local Sikh political party led to a temporary agreement that addressed many of the political party’s demands. It was rejected by the rebel organizations and the violence continued. At the end of each of the first two years after this violent dispute began, the degree of violent hostilities increased; all five external state intervenors supported the rebelling group through military and economic means. By the mid-1990s, the Indian government was able to contain the insurgency through widespread repression and offering incentives to local Sikh leaders, including restarting the political process by holding elections in the Punjab.

The roots of the conflict in Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir date to the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 and the region’s contested accession to India. The two countries have fought two wars over control of the historical region of Kashmir, one-third of which was captured by Pakistan during their first interstate war in 1947. The second war between the regional rivals occurred in 1965. But it was not until the late 1980s that the indigenous Kashmiri campaign for self-determination coalesced into an
effective violent challenge to Indian rule. Both the Islamabad government and ethnic kin, primarily residing in the Pakistani province of Azad Kashmir, contributed military and economic resources to the various Kashmiri rebel groups. In addition, exile organizations representing group members are/were active in both Britain and the United States.

Efforts to mediate a resolution between the various parties were undertaken within the first two years by both the United States and Britain. The Americans were particularly focused on the potential escalation of the internal conflict to the interstate level given that both countries possess a nuclear arsenal while the British sought to further the mediation process through a fact-finding mission. Despite these attempts to promote a resolution, the level of violence was ratcheted up during the first two years of the rebellion as the militant groups were significantly assisted by Pakistan. As of mid-2004, armed hostilities continue in Indian-administered Kashmir. India and Pakistan have engaged in periods of saber rattling and rapprochement; however, any solution does not appear to be imminent. One of the major obstacles in reaching a settlement is the long-standing unwillingness of both India and Pakistan to allow the Kashmiris themselves a seat at the negotiating table. However, recent efforts by India to meet with some Kashmiri separatist leaders might set the stage for a more inclusive negotiation process.

The three other South Asian cases involve the Lhotshampas (ethnic Nepalis) in Bhutan, the Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the Mohajirs in Pakistan.\(^{25}\) The

\(^{25}\) There are also Tamils of Indian descent that live in Sri Lanka. Most of them are concentrated in the central part of the country and they are predominantly involved in the tea industry. Although the Indian Tamils have been politically active utilizing conventional means to obtain citizenship rights along with better working conditions and
Mohajirs are Urdu-speaking migrants who moved to Pakistan when the subcontinent was partitioned in 1947. Mohajir resentment over the political privileges accrued by the country’s other ethnic groups, mainly the Punjabis and the Sindhis, led to the emergence of Mohajir political organizations that first utilized protest tactics to obtain greater political rights. By the mid-1990s, however, the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM), the dominant group organization, was involved in bombings, killings, and kidnappings directed at the state authorities while the Pakistani government attempted to suppress the MQM by deploying the army in Mohajir-dominant areas, especially the port city of Karachi in Sindh province.

Outside assistance to the Mohajirs came in the form of economic and military aid from neighboring rival India along with the United States and Britain which host exile group organizations. The MQM’s leader, Altaf Hussain, resides in London from where he directs the rebel campaign. Negotiations between the MQM and the Pakistani government occurred within the first two years of the conflict’s emergence but as of mid-2004 there has been no lasting settlement. While there was an increase in violence during the first year of the rebellion’s onset, armed hostilities returned to the level at the beginning after the end of the second year. In this conflict, all three external state interventions occurred on behalf of the ethnopolitical group.

wages for the tea workers, they have not been involved in the rebellion by the Sri Lankan Tamils.
North Africa and the Middle East

There are three groups in the Middle East in this study: the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the Iraqi Shi’is.26 The Kurdish campaign for an independent state spans more than eighty years and encompasses Kurds who reside in the neighboring states of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. Since the late 1940s, there have been periodic campaigns by the Kurds in these three countries to achieve their independence and/or unite with their ethnic kin in a broader state of Kurdistan. The revolt by the Iranian Kurds is not included as the rebel forces were effectively crushed by the late 1970s-early 1980s and the limited information available on opposition to the Iranian regime does not seem to indicate that they have been involved in any sustained rebellion since then. Both the Iraqi and Turkish Kurds engaged in anti-state activities during the 1970s. Their inclusion is due to the reemergence of their violent conflicts in the 1980s.

The onset of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980 provided the opportunity for the Iraqi Kurds to renew their military operations against the Baghdad government. Faced with hostilities both within and across its territorial borders, the Kurds were able to challenge Saddam Hussein’s government in northern Iraq with military assistance from Syria, and later Iran, while West Germany along with the both of these states hosted organizations that politicized and raised resources for the Kurdish claim. Iraq, on the other hand, sought to weaken the Tehran regime, by assisting the Kurds in Iranian Kurdistan in order to open up a second front that Iran would have to confront.

While countries such as France and Brazil supplied Iraq with military equipment to fight the war with Iran, this assistance was not included in the analysis as it was not

26 For the Middle East conflicts, see Byman et al., (2001); Gurr and Harff, (1994); and McDowall, (2000).
directly furnished in response to the actions of the Kurdish peshmerga (fighters). The
Iraqi Kurds were able to control parts of the northern Kurdish-dominant areas through the
first two years of the Iran-Iraq war as their anti-state activities escalated in both years
since the onset. All three external state intervenors assisted the rebels through economic
or mixed forms of assistance. The Kurdish conflict with the Baghdad government would
continue over the next two decades. The 2003 American invasion of Iraq and the
subsequent efforts to rebuild the country, while displacing the Saddam Hussein regime,
have not clearly revealed the degree to which the Kurds will be autonomous in a post-
Saddam Iraq.

There are significant overlaps between the Kurdish rebellions in Turkey and
neighboring Iraq. In response to the uprising by the Iraqi Kurds in 1980, Turkish
authorities tightened their control over Kurdish-dominant areas in eastern Turkey. In
mid-1983, with the permission of the Baghdad government, the Turkish military
periodically invaded northern Iraq in an effort to eliminate the rebels of the main Turkish
Kurdish group, the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), which sought sanctuary among the
Iraqi Kurdish population. Group members were supplied by regional powers -- Syria
provided military and economic aid and Iran allowed the rebels cross-border sanctuary.
In addition, the former West Germany and Greece permitted organizations that
represented group interests to actively mobilize political support and attempt to garner
funds to support Turkish Kurd interests. Although foreign states assisted both sides, most
of the intervenors chose to side with the rebels who were able to escalate their rebellion
against the Ankara government by the end of the first and second years. In the late
1990s, the PKK insurgency seemed to be largely contained as its leader Abdullah Ocalan
was imprisoned in Turkey and the organization had declared a unilateral ceasefire. However, in September of 2003, the PKK, now known as Kadek (Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan), declared that it would no longer adhere to the ceasefire as there had been little progress in improving the rights of the Kurdish peoples.

**Latin America and the Caribbean**

Only one conflict in Latin America during the 1980-2000 period qualified for inclusion: the Miskitos in Nicaragua.\(^{27}\) Although there was a violent revolt by Mayans in the state of Chiapas, Mexico in January 1994, this case was excluded as there were no external state intervenors that furnished assistance to group members while there was outside aid provided to the host state. As Chapter 3 outlined, all of the insurgencies chosen involved at least one external state intervention on behalf of an ethnopolitical group.

The nature of intrastate conflicts in Latin America differ in comparison to other regions of the Third World. Conventional political mobilization in the form of protests and riots are the norm and were utilized by groups such as the Native Americans in Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, and Venezuela, and Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Colombians (Gurr, 2000, 45, 257). In the post-WWII period, this region appears to have been subject to more ideologically-driven insurgencies rather than those drawn on ethnic lines.

The rebellion by the Miskito Indians, the indigenous peoples who inhabit Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast, occurred within the context of the Cold War. The 1979 revolution that brought the Sandinistas to power was followed within two years by the

\(^{27}\) On the Miskitos, see Dennis, (1993) and Gurr and Harff, (1994).
emergence of a Miskito movement which sought greater indigenous political and economic control in their primary areas of residence. Widespread protests erupted following the arrest of a key Miskito leader in February of 1981 and minor clashes with government forces led some of the rebels to flee to neighboring Honduras where their ethnic kin also reside. The Miskitos were assisted by the Honduran government which provided sanctuary, military training, and hosted exile organizations. By the second year of the conflict, rebel leaders were also based in Costa Rican sanctuaries.

The Miskito challenge coincided and at times became intertwined with the Contra campaign to oust the Marxist Sandinista government. The Contras’ anti-communist credentials drew in significant military and economic resources from the United States who also chose to materially assist the Miskitos as part of a broad anti-Sandinista alliance. Both the Soviet Union and its proxy, Cuba, increased their military assistance to the Nicaraguan government in response to the Miskito and Contra challenges. Interventions by five external states, including the superpowers, helped to ensure that the level of violence increased at the end of both the first and second years after the onset. In 1990, an autonomy agreement was reached between the indigenous peoples and the newly elected Chamorro government.

Appendix 2 and 3 provide a complete listing of the twenty-nine ethnopolitical conflicts along with some of the key variables included in this study. The general characteristics of the interventions by external states are the focus of the next section. The role of other outside actors, such as the United Nations, regional organizations, and ethnic kin that reside in countries that neighbor a conflict will be considered in the following chapter.
**Intervention Characteristics**

There were a total of 130 interventions by external states during the first two years of the 29 ethnopolitical conflicts. There is minor variation in the number of state interventions in each year. Some 89% or 116 intervenors became involved in the first year of the domestic wars while 82% (107/130) were active in the second year. Ten of the interventions that ended in the first year occurred in the first Tutsi revolt in the former Zaire as the Tutsi-led ADFL coalition successfully overthrew the Mobutu Sese Seko government. Overall, 72% (93/130) of the outside states sustained their material commitments over the entire two year period.

There is much greater variation in the number of outside states that became active participants. The average number of intervenors in each conflict is 4.5. Bhutan was the only outside state actor involved in the revolt by the indigenous Bodos in India’s northeastern state of Assam as rebel fighters sought sanctuary and trained in camps in Bhutanese territory. On the other end, there were interventions by ten states in both the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgency and the 1996 Tutsi rebellion in the former Zaire.

The Sri Lankan dispute illustrates the multi-faceted involvement of both regional powers and western states. While supplying the various Tamil rebel groups, including the dominant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), with various forms of military and economic assistance, India sought to exert its regional dominance by leading the efforts to broker a peace settlement (along with Bhutan). The United States, Israel, China, Britain, Pakistan, and Singapore furnished military aid to the Sri Lankan government. Western states such as Canada, Australia, the US, and Britain also assisted
the Tamils by hosting exile organizations that continue to raise funds and further political awareness about the separatist war.

The Most Frequent External State Intervenors

The conventional wisdom that neighbors find it difficult to avoid engagement in domestic disputes in bordering states appears to be borne out (see Table 4.2). Neighbors are the most frequent external state intervenors in these ethnopolitical conflicts as they are responsible for 36% or 47/130 of all interventions. However, when one includes neighbors that are also coded as regional powers this figure increases to 50% (65/130 interventions). As noted in Chapter 3, each state intervenor was coded overall based on its primary orientation and thus states that are both neighbors and regional powers are considered as regional powers in the tables that follow and in the discussion of the hypotheses in Chapter 5.

Regional powers are the next most active, accounting for 31/130 or 24% of all interventions while major powers are just slightly less involved at 21% (27/130). The remaining 25 interventions are undertaken either by states within the region where the insurgency occurs or by those in the residual other category. These results differ from Patrick Regan’s analysis of 196 external state interventions in 85 intrastate conflicts from 1944-94. He discovers that major powers were responsible for 40% of all interventions (1996, 345). One possible reason could be that Regan covers a 50 year period that includes the entire Cold War whereas this study only encompasses the last decade of the bipolar rivalry. Further, Regan examined both ethnic and ideological wars whereas the focus here is solely on ethnopolitical contentions. It is conceivable that major power
activity is greater in ideologically-based insurgencies. Further, as focus is restricted to
the Third World, Russian activities in its former sphere of influence are not included.

**Table 4.2: Type of State Intervenor and Frequency of Interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of State Intervenor</th>
<th>No. of Interventions</th>
<th>% of all Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Powers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Powers</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional States</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other States</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 lists the countries that are the most frequent intervenors. As is similar
with Regan’s study, the United States leads the way with ten interventions followed by
Britain and France. The Americans intervened in conflicts in all four regions of the Third
World. Britain’s interventions were mostly in its former colonial territories in South Asia
and Africa while France sought to further its influence in Francophone Africa. Russia/the
former Soviet Union accounts for only two interventions, both of which were undertaken
before the demise of the USSR. The first entailed an increase in military assistance to the
Sandinista government in Nicaragua in the early 1980s in response to a growing
insurgency by the indigenous Miskito population in the country’s Atlantic region. The
second intervention occurred in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union as the
indigenous Turkic peoples in China’s northwest Xinjiang region revolted in April 1990,
partly in response to the example of the impending freedom of their ethnic kin in the
neighboring Central Asian Republics.
Table 4.3: Most Frequent Interveners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External State Intervenor</th>
<th>Number of Interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan, Burundi, China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Kenya, Rwanda, Syria, Tanzania, Uganda, West Germany, Zambia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (21 intervenors)</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most active regional power is Libya with six interventions followed by Pakistan and South Africa with four each and China, India, Iran, and Syria with three interventions. Libyan involvement with the Tuaregs of Mali and Niger predates the emergence of their violent conflicts. After severe droughts in the 1980s threatened the livelihoods of the nomadic Malian and Niger Tuaregs, many chose to migrate to Libya. Some of them joined their ethnic kin in the Libyan army or they received military training from the government. When they returned to their home countries in the late 1980s, sustained military support from Tripoli enabled them to launch their anti-state activities in an effort to protect their culture and life-ways. The onset of the insurgency in Niger in May 1990 was followed a month later by similar actions in neighboring Mali. Libya also furnished material assistance to the Southerners in Sudan and the Oromo in Ethiopia while aiding the host state governments of Uganda against the Acholi and Somalia against the Issaq clan.

The small Himalayan state of Bhutan was responsible for three interventions. Two of these involved the Assamese and Bodos in neighboring India as militant group
members sought sanctuary and maintained training bases in the kingdom. Bhutan also hosted and facilitated peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil rebel group, the LTTE, in 1985. The former West Germany permitted exile organizations representing the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the Sikhs in India to promote group interests. Overall, the 21 state intervenors in Table 4.3 accounted for 65% of all the interventions.

**The Most Common Forms of Assistance**

When external state intervenors become involved in internal ethnic conflicts, their favored means of entry is the provision of military assistance (see Table 4.4). Ranging from the supply of equipment to training in exile, cross-border sanctuaries, and the direct insertion of the intervenor’s troops into a dispute, military aid comprises 60/130 or 46% of all interventions. Mixed support, which usually entails combinations of military and economic assistance, is the next most common comprising 28% (36/130) of all the interventions. Economic means such as financial contributions or withdrawals, along with hosting exile group organizations, are utilized in 19% of the interventions. While the percentage of mixed forms of assistance was slightly lower in Regan’s study (23%), the main difference is that Regan finds that military support is even more prevalent, comprising 70% of all interventions, and economic aid is infrequent (7% of the interventions) (1996, 345).

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28 There are a total of 36 interventions that involve mixed forms of assistance. Some 78% or 28/36 are a combination of military and economic aid. These are provided in roughly equal proportions by major powers, regional powers, and neighbors. Five interventions by major powers and neighbors involve political support along with military or economic assistance. All three types of assistance are furnished in one intervention each by major and regional powers, and neighbors.
At first glance it appears that there are few efforts to resolve these ethnopolitical conflicts in their early stages. Only nine external state intervenors solely employed political techniques, essentially various types of informal and formal mediation. However, some 22% or 8/36 mixed aid interventions also involved a political component. The insurgencies in which there were any efforts to reach a political settlement will be discussed further in the next chapter when the hypotheses are revisited.

Table 4.4: Aid Type by Type of State Intervenor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Power</td>
<td>2 (7)</td>
<td>7 (26)</td>
<td>6 (22)</td>
<td>12 (45)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Power</td>
<td>2 (6.5)</td>
<td>2 (6.5)</td>
<td>19 (61)</td>
<td>8 (26)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbor</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
<td>5 (11)</td>
<td>24 (51)</td>
<td>15 (32)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2 (8)</td>
<td>11 (44)</td>
<td>11 (44)</td>
<td>1 (4)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9 (7)</td>
<td>25 (19)</td>
<td>60 (46)</td>
<td>36 (28)</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 26.429, p-value = .002

* Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of cases of each type of assistance provided by the type of state intervenor along with the total percentages of each form of aid

The form of outside assistance bestowed seems to depend on the type of state intervenor. Table 4.4 reveals that this relationship is statistically significant. The overall number of interventions in which major powers chose to furnish only military assistance is quite low (6/27), but 10/12 instances in which they contributed mixed aid involved a military component. The result is that approximately 60% of major power interventions incorporated some form of military aid. Both regional powers and neighbors seem to prefer the military option as this was the most common avenue through which they also attempted to support any of the domestic combatants. Other state intervenors, which
include both regional states and any other countries that do not fit into the above categorizations, were equally likely to utilize either military or economic means.

Recipients of Interventions

During the first two years after the onset of the internal wars, the majority of interventions occurred in support of the ethnopolitical challengers. Group members are the recipients in 64% or 84/130 interventions. The host state is supported in 23/130 interventions (18%) which is the same number of interventions taken to assist both parties. The discrepancy in favor of the ethnic groups can be explained in several ways. First, this study only addresses ethnopolitical conflicts and it is conceivable that ideological wars are more likely to draw in patrons that assist the host state as the stakes could be considered higher especially during the Cold War rivalry. Second, some previous analyses did not take into account some of the forms of potential support that are included. For example, aside from the research on interventions that utilizes the Minorities at Risk dataset, most compilations do not consider a state intervenor’s hosting exile organizations or providing access to external communications or markets as a form of intervention. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, this form of assistance has had a significant influence on the prospects of insurgents surviving, maintaining or even escalating their anti-state activities (e.g. Byman et al., 2001). Finally, it is possible that there were undocumented instances in which aid was covertly furnished to host states -- or the author might have missed some of the interventions on behalf of the host states. It is unlikely however that this would systematically apply across the various ethnopolitical disputes.
This chapter has provided a brief introduction to the 29 ethnopolitical conflicts in this study by describing some of the key features of select conflicts within each of the four sub-regions of the Third World. Some of the major characteristics of external state interventions in these internal wars were also outlined, including the most common intervenors, the most frequent form of assistance provided, and the recipient of these interventions. In the following chapter, we return to the framework of this dissertation and examine the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 in light of the empirical data.
Chapter 5: Interventions and Outcomes: Uncovering the Key Links

Theoretical and empirical research reveals that a number of group, host state, intervention, and conflict variables can influence the degree of violence of both intrastate and interstate wars. The key aspects of these relationships were discussed in Chapter 2 which outlined the framework of this study. Chapter 3 described how the variables were measured while the previous one presented some general characteristics of the internal disputes and the nature of the external state interventions. This chapter returns to examine the hypotheses based on the data collected on ethnopolitical conflicts that either began or re-emerged in the 1980-2000 period. But first how the dependent variable is considered in the statistical analysis needs to be addressed.

The Dependent Variable

The outcome of an intrastate war, which is the dependent variable, focuses on the level of violence of a dispute. The research design chapter outlined that this variable is measured by examining changes in an ethnopolitical group’s rebellion levels following the emergence of violent hostilities. Data were collected on each group’s degree of rebellion at six month intervals from one year prior to the onset until two years after the conflict began. The 7-point rebellion scale developed by the Minorities at Risk project was used to determine the codings (see Table 3.6). For the analysis, the author chose to utilize a group’s rebellion levels two years after the violence began (REBEL2YR). The dependent variable thus compares an ethnic group’s rebellion level at the onset with its degree of violent anti-state activities two years after an insurgency started.
There were a number of reasons for making this demarcation. First, there are limited differences in the relationships between the various independent variables and the dependent variable across the different six month time periods. Further, focusing on rebellion levels two years after the onset allows us to not only take into consideration the full range of external state intervenors but also whether their material assistance was sustained across the early stages of a dispute. Third, as the focus here is not on temporary changes in assistance, which is a somewhat different area of potential future research, the author did not consider it useful or necessary to outline minor changes that are unlikely to influence the general results.

To facilitate the analysis, the raw rebellion scores for each group were first recoded into three categories that reflect the changes from the rebellion level at a conflict’s onset. The categories were: decrease in the level of rebellion, the same level of rebellion, and increase in the degree of rebellion. Exploratory analyses revealed that there are minor differences across the independent variables between the intrastate wars that were coded at the same level of rebellion in comparison to those with decreased violence levels. As a result, these two categories were grouped together. Thus, the dependent variable, the level of violent hostilities of an ethnic insurgency, is dichotomous, representing the categories of same or decrease in the level of violence and increase in violence. In the analyses that follow, the term de-escalate is also used to refer to conflicts where the level of violence decreases. When violence remains at the same level, the term stalemate is utilized and an increase in armed hostilities is characterized as an escalation.
Another reason for the grouping of the internal wars into a binary dependent variable is the requirement for sufficient cases to allow for statistical testing. The primary method used in this analysis is cross-tabulations. However, the raw data do not allow us to have a sufficient number of cases in each cell in order to have any confidence in our statistical results. Specifically, if there are more than 20-30% of cells within a cross-tabulation that do not have the minimum number of required cases, tests of significance such as the chi-square are no longer considered as reliable. Therefore, one option, where theoretically valid, is to collapse the independent and dependent variables into smaller categories, binary variables in some instances, so that the cross-tabulations can be tested for statistical significance.

Along with utilizing the Pearson chi-square test of significance, other measures of significance were included for cross-tabulations between binary variables (2 X 2 tables). These include the Yates corrected chi-square, also referred to as the continuity correction, which adjusts the regular Pearson’s chi-square for 2 X 2 tables, along with Fisher’s exact test which is used for these tables when the number of cases is below 30. While the drawback of utilizing dichotomous variables is the loss of some of the richness of the data, this was necessary to ensure that the rules of statistical analysis were properly applied. The descriptions of the ethnopolitical conflicts will hopefully bring forth the nuances of some of the insurgencies and help to illuminate the general results.

The following table details the number of ethnic wars that were included in the two categories of the dependent variable along with the number of external state interventions. Across the two years, there is very little variation in the number of disputes that belong in each category. There are 16 ethnopolitical wars that escalated at
both one and two years after the onset of hostilities (see Appendix 1 for a listing of the conflicts). The number of conflicts in which the violence remained at the same level or decreased is 12 at the end of the second year. There is one less insurgency in the dataset for Year 2 as the Tutsi revolt in the former Zaire was dropped when the ADFL coalition successfully overthrew the Mobutu regime within the first eight months. Some of these cases will be discussed in the context of the hypotheses below.

Table 5.1: Change in Rebellion Levels One and Two Years after Onset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Conflicts Same/Decrease in Rebellion</th>
<th>No. of Interventions</th>
<th>Average No. of Interventions per Rebellion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year One</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Two</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Conflicts Increase in Rebellion</th>
<th>No. of Interventions</th>
<th>Average No. of Interventions per Rebellion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year One</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Two</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Across the two years, there are also minor differences in the total number of external state interventions and the average number of interventions. This could be partially due to the fact that 72% of the interventions by outside states were sustained throughout the first two years of each intrastate war. Overall, there is a slightly higher intervention rate in disputes that escalated in both Year One and Year Two.

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29 Four of the ethnopolitical conflicts occur in India. However, by the end of the second year of these insurrections, the Indian cases are equally distributed across the two categories of the dependent variable. Only 12 of the internal wars saw an increase in violence levels at both the end of the first and second years in comparison to the intensity of violence when the dispute began.
The analyses that follow utilize both conflict and intervenor data as separate datasets were created to address the hypotheses that spanned both levels. Further, as a result of the decision to focus on an ethnic group’s rebellion level two years after an insurgency began, the number of conflicts drops to twenty-eight as the Zairean Tutsi revolt is excluded due to the rebel victory within the first year.

**Group Features**

Two characteristics of communal groups potentially can influence a group’s ability to attract outside patrons as well as the degree of its violent anti-state activities. The first variable takes into account a group’s objectives by dividing the groups according to the categories developed by the Minorities at Risk project while the second focuses on an ethnopolitical group’s political activities in the recent past. The hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 are replicated below to help clarify the analysis.

**Hypothesis 1: Ethnopolitical groups that are seeking autonomy/secession or either a share of or control of state power are more likely to be involved in conflicts in which the level of violence increases.**

As the cross-tabulation in Table 5.2 reveals, a group’s objectives matter. The statistically significant relationship between group type and changes in an internal war’s

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30 Overall, the distribution of the group types is as follows: 9 ethnonationalists and communal contenders each, 7 indigenous peoples, 2 ethnoclasses, 1 national minority, and 1 religious sect. The Tutsis in the former Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo are one group that is counted twice here as ethnoclasses. For the Year 2 analysis, only the second Tutsi rebellion in the DRC is included and thus the number of groups is 28.
degree of violence is supported by all three measures of association. Both ethnonationalists and communal contenders are more likely to be engaged in conflicts that escalated two years after hostilities began. Around 80% (13/16) of the insurgencies that exhibited higher levels of violence were undertaken by eight of the nine ethnonationalists and five of the nine communal contenders in this study. Four of the ethnonationalist groups are located in Asia. They are the Kashmiris and Sikhs in India, the Acehnese in Indonesia, and the Sri Lankan Tamils. The Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Diola in Senegal, and the Sudanese Southerners are the remaining ethnonationalists. The five communal contenders are the Hutus in Burundi and Rwanda, the Oromo in Ethiopia, the Issaq in Somalia, and the Ndebele in Zimbabwe. Most communal contenders are located in Africa (8/9 groups); the exception is the Mohajirs in Pakistan.

Table 5.2: Group Type and Level of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th>Ethnonationalists/Communal Contenders</th>
<th>Remaining Group Types</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>5 (42)*</td>
<td>7 (58)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in group type</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>13 (81)</td>
<td>3 (19)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in group type</td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18 (64)*</td>
<td>10 (36)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 4.680, p-value = .031; Yates continuity correction = 3.114, p-value = .078; Fisher’s Exact Test p-value = .050 (2-sided)

* Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of cases in each category of the dependent variable along with the total percentage for each of the two group type categories

The Lhotshampas in Bhutan are the only national minority and the Shi’is in Iraq the sole religious sect.

31 Rebellion levels by these eight ethnonationalist groups were also higher after the first year in comparison to each conflict’s onset. The remaining ethnonationalists are the Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea. Although there was an increase in violence one year after the insurgency began, efforts to reach a settlement led by New Zealand resulted in an, albeit temporary, agreement by the end of the second year.
There are seven groups characterized as indigenous peoples. Three of these groups were involved in conflicts in which their rebellion levels increased two years after the onset. They are the Uighurs in China, the Miskito in Nicaragua, and the Tuareg in Niger. The Uighurs and the Miskito are/were seeking widespread autonomy although some Uighur political organizations favor independence. Protecting their traditional customs and ways of life were central concerns of the nomadic Tuareg and they are/were secondary to the Miskito and the Uighurs. The four remaining indigenous peoples whose disputes were either at a stalemate or declined in violence are the Assamese and Bodos in India, the Afars in Djibouti, and the Tuareg in Mali.

Hypothesis 2: Groups with a recent history of past rebellion are more likely to be involved in conflicts that exhibit increases in the intensity of violence.

Whether an ethnopolitical group had engaged in any rebellious activities in the decade prior to the conflict episode included in this dataset is not statistically associated with changes in a conflict’s level of violence. Table 5.3 reveals that among the sixteen insurgencies that escalated, groups with a history of past political activism were equally represented in comparison to those that did not participate in previous anti-state activities. However, the results also indicate that two-thirds of the groups that were politically active in the recent past were involved in conflicts that escalated. The findings are therefore indeterminate and suggest the need for further consideration based on a larger number of conflicts.
Table 5.3: Prior Rebellion and Level of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th>Prior Rebellion</th>
<th>No Prior Rebellion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>4 (33)</td>
<td>8 (67)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>8 (50)</td>
<td>8 (50)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12 (43)</td>
<td>16 (57)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = .778, p-value = .378; Yates continuity correction = .246, p-value = .620; Fisher’s Exact Test p-value = .459 (2-sided)

* Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of cases in each category of the dependent variable along with the total percentage for each of the two rebellion categories

Overall, some 43% or 12/28 of the groups had recently engaged in rebellion. They include all three Middle Eastern groups, the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, and the Iraqi Shi’is, along with around half of the African challengers. Ethnic conflicts in Asia though appear to be much less likely to reemerge following recent past rebellion episodes. Only the Acehnese in Indonesia were involved in anti-state violence that was quelled by the early 1990s but erupted again in May 1999 as the rebel GAM (Free Aceh) movement resumed ambushes of security personnel in addition to violent attacks against migrants in Aceh province.

Host State Characteristics

The type of political system of the host states in which ethnopolitical groups reside is also reported to affect both the eruption of violent hostilities and their intensity. However, there is no consensus as to whether democracies, autocracies, or other types of hybrid regimes are most often associated with increases or decreases in a group’s violent anti-state activities. The following hypothesis tests the most commonly-held notions.
Hypothesis 3: Higher levels of violence in ethnopolitical conflicts are expected when the host state’s regime is incoherent or autocratic.

As the following table documents, the results are ambiguous. While all five host states that are governed by incoherent regimes encountered higher violence levels two years after a conflict’s onset, the data on autocracies is mixed. Autocratic regimes are equally likely to face internal wars that either escalate, are in a stalemate, or decrease in the level of violence. Failed states along with democracies were also just as probable in either category of the dependent variable. The chi-square is 0.20 but this is potentially misleading as there are too many cells (6 or 75% of the cells) that do not contain the minimum number of five required cases in order to properly utilize this test of association.

Table 5.4: Regime Type and Level of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Incoherent</th>
<th>Autocracy</th>
<th>Failure</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>4 (33)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (50)</td>
<td>2 (17)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>3 (19)</td>
<td>5 (31)</td>
<td>6 (38)</td>
<td>2 (12)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7 (25)</td>
<td>5 (18)</td>
<td>12 (43)</td>
<td>4 (14)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 4.667, p-value = .198

* Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of cases in each category of the dependent variable along with the total percentage for each regime type

It is interesting to note that all six insurgencies in the autocracies in which the level of violence either decreased or was at a stalemate occurred during the post-Cold War period. These disputes are the Lhotshampas in Bhutan, the Shi’is in Iraq, and four
African cases -- the Afars in Djibouti, Cabinda in Angola, Tuareg in Mali, and the Tutsi in Rwanda. A cross-tabulation of a host state’s regime type and rebellion levels, which controls for the Cold War, did not reveal any notable patterns. Further, there were too few conflicts to allow for the use of statistical significance tests.

This hypothesis could be more effectively tested if a greater number of communal wars are considered. It is hoped that future analyses that incorporate additional intrastate insurgencies can further our knowledge about the potential relationship between a host state’s regime type and the likelihood of conflict escalation or de-escalation.

**Intervention Features**

**Type of State Intervenor**

Debates continue about how the end of the Cold War influences the global activities of the major powers along with the actions of states that are dominant within their regions. There is much greater consensus about the interventionist behavior of countries that neighbor a host state embroiled in an ethnopolitical conflict. The next two hypotheses examine whether the type of external state intervenor is related to changes in an internal dispute’s level of violent hostilities.

**Hypothesis 4:** Escalation was more likely when major and regional powers intervened in ethnic conflicts that arose during the Cold War.

Interventions by major and regional powers were much more prevalent in ethnic disputes that escalated during the Cold War (see Table 5.5). Some 80% or 26/32
interventions that occurred in conflicts where the level of violence increased two years after the onset were undertaken by major or regional powers, the latter of which were sometimes proxies for the superpowers or their former colonizers. Of the total number of 7 interventions that occurred in the three Cold War insurgencies that either de-escalated or remained at the same level of violence, only 2 were by major or regional powers.

When all of the 107 interventions are considered, major and regional powers are responsible for just over half of all the interventions (32/63) in the internal wars in which anti-state violence escalated. The Miskito rebellion in Nicaragua discussed in Chapter 4 was the only conflict that drew in both the Soviet Union and the United States.

Table 5.5: Type of State Intervenor and Level of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th>Major/Regional Power</th>
<th>Neighbor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>2 (29)*</td>
<td>5 (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% in state type</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>26 (81)</td>
<td>6 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% in state type</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28 (72)*</td>
<td>11 (28)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>16 (52)*</td>
<td>15 (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% in state type</td>
<td>(73)</td>
<td>(54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>6 (32)</td>
<td>13 (68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% in state type</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22 (44)*</td>
<td>28 (56)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cold War - Chi-square = 7.871, p-value = .005; Yates continuity correction = 5.485, p-value = .019
Post-Cold War - Chi-square = 1.919, p-value = .166; Yates continuity correction = 1.192, p-value = .275

* Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of interventions in each category of the dependent variable along with the percentage of interventions taken by each category of external state actors.
In contrast, in the post-Cold War era, the involvement of major and regional powers is more likely in conflicts that either de-escalated or were at a stalemate. There are only 6 interventions by these actors in Third World insurgencies that witnessed higher levels of violence. For example, while France provided political assistance to help resolve the Diola campaign for secession from Senegal, it also militarily supported the Tutsi-dominated regime in Burundi while simultaneously trying to further the efforts to reach a power-sharing agreement. The former Soviet Union hosted exile Uighur organizations that are seeking autonomy or independence from China. Turkey also allowed Uighur representatives’ similar access while Libya supplied military aid to both the Oromo in Ethiopia and the Tuareg in Niger. The relationship between the type of state intervenor and a conflict’s level of hostilities is not however statistically significant for the post-Cold War period.

Eighteen interventions are excluded from Table 5.5. These are interventions by regional states and others, the residual category. This was done as cross-tabulations across all the types of different state intervenors and a conflict’s violence level yielded too many empty cells to allow for the use of significance tests. Further, even when a cross-tabulation was run with the other cases coded as missing values, that is, including major powers, regional powers, and neighbors in separate categories, there were still too many empty cells to allow for testing when the control Cold War variable was introduced.
Hypothesis 5: Neighboring states are expected to be the most involved in ethnic wars that exhibit increases in the intensity of violence, regardless of the Cold War-post Cold War distinction.

Neighbors are the most frequent intervenors in these ethnopolitical conflicts as the conventional wisdom suggests (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, the results in Table 5.5 do not support the contention that neighboring state involvement is usually associated with an escalation of hostilities in a host state facing a domestic insurgency. In fact, territorially continuous countries are almost equally likely to be engaged regardless of an intrastate war’s degree of violence. Overall, there are 20 interventions by neighboring states in the conflicts where hostilities de-escalated or stalemated while there are 19 interventions in insurgencies where the level of violent hostilities increased.

During the Cold War, neighbors were responsible for 5 of the 7 interventions in conflicts that either de-escalated or were stalemated while they were slightly more involved in these conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Of note, is the increase in the number of interventions by neighbors across the two time periods. There were 11 interventions by neighboring states in the 12 Cold War rebellions (average = 0.9 interventions per conflict) in comparison to the post-Cold war period where there are an average of 1.75 neighbors active in each domestic insurgency. This lends support to the arguments put forward by Byman et al. (2001, 17) that in our current era interventions in domestic disputes are more localized, involving external states within a region rather than major powers or former colonial rulers.
Further investigation reveals that the involvement of neighbors is highly dependent on both the region in which a conflict occurs and the Cold War-post-Cold War distinction. Twenty-seven of the 39 interventions by countries that border a state embroiled in ethnic strife are by African states; twenty-two of these alone occurred after the end of the bipolar rivalry. Of course, it must be noted that half of the ethnopolitical disputes occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. Two-thirds (6/9) of the interventions by neighbors in Asia also took place in the post-Cold War period while the two neighboring state interventions in the sole Latin American case, the Miskito, were largely influenced by the Cold War rivalry.

To take into account the potential role of the number of neighbors that border a host state, a separate dichotomous variable was created. Host states that had four or less neighbors were compared with those that bordered five or more countries. There was no significant relationship between a host state’s number of neighbors and the level of violence it faces from domestic insurgents.

Form(s) of Assistance

As the previous chapter outlined, military assistance to either an ethnopolitical group or a host state was the most common avenue by which external states chose to engage in domestic ethnic conflicts. Further, there is a statistically significant relationship between the type of outside state intervenor and the form of support furnished. Military means were favored by major and regional powers along with states that neighbor a host state confronting a domestic insurgency. The following hypothesis
examines if there is a relationship between the provision of military aid and the intensity of the internal wars.

_Hypothesis 6a: Military aid is expected to be the most frequent form of assistance provided by external state intervenors in ethnopolitical conflicts in which the level of violence increases._

Surprisingly, assisting either of the domestic combatants by solely providing military means does not significantly influence a conflict’s intensity (see Table 5.6). Military support was the only form of aid provided in an equal number of interventions where the conflicts either exhibited the same or decreased levels of violence along with those in which there was an escalation of violent hostilities. Overall though, the provision of military assistance accounts for around half of the total number of interventions in conflicts that were at a stalemate or experienced reduced violence in comparison to 35% (22/63 interventions) in the disputes that escalated.

Economic and mixed types of aid are almost as likely to be furnished in disputes in which the intensity of violence increases two years after the onset of an insurgency (32% and 30%, respectively). Mixed aid involves the provision of one or more of the forms of aid in two or more categories as described in Chapter 3. For example, the combination of military and economic assistance is the most frequently utilized. Of the 63 interventions in the conflicts that escalated, outside states provided military, economic, and mixed types each roughly 30% of the time. The chi-square for this cross-tabulation is significant at the less stringent 0.10 level. The Cold War-post-Cold War
variable does not influence the results. Further, there is no notable relationship between
the different types of assistance and whether the interventions were taken solely on behalf
of the ethnic group or if there were competing interventions, that is, when at least one
state intervenor assisted the group and another the host state. As discussed in Chapter 2,
studies that examine external state interventions primarily focus on the provision of
various forms of military assistance (both overt and covert) and how they usually escalate
conflicts both within the domestic country confronting the insurgency and across the
broader region.

Table 5.6: Type of External State Aid and Level of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>4 (9)</td>
<td>6 (14)</td>
<td>22 (50)</td>
<td>12 (27)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>2 (3)</td>
<td>20 (32)</td>
<td>22 (35)</td>
<td>19 (30)</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>26 (24)</td>
<td>44 (41)</td>
<td>31 (29)</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 6.621, p-value = .085

* Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of cases in each category of the dependent
variable along with the rounded off percentage for each type of external aid

There is a considerable body of literature on the effects of the various political
techniques that are available to outside actors to help alleviate the consequences of
intrastate disputes. While this study only focuses on interventions that occur within the
first two years after the emergence of violent hostilities, it was expected that:

Hypothesis 6b: Political forms of assistance by external states, regardless of whether
they are part of a strategy that also employs military and/or economic means, can reduce
the intensity of violence of an ethnopolitical conflict.
Across the two years, there are 9 interventions by external states that solely utilized political means while 8 other instances incorporated political, economic, military, or all three forms of assistance. Most of these were discussed earlier such as the US and French role in the first Tutsi revolt in the former Zaire, South African and Zambian mediation in the second Tutsi rebellion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, French assistance to further peace talks in the Hutu conflict in Burundi, British and American efforts to facilitate a solution to the Kashmir dispute, and Indian and Bhutanese mediation between the rebel Tamil LTTE organization and the Sri Lankan government.

Given the limited number of interventions that employ some forms of informal or formal mediation, it is not possible to draw any broad conclusions. Future studies that incorporate greater number of cases are more likely to shed some light on whether mediation efforts in the early stages of intrastate conflicts are likely to yield a successful resolution. The conflict management efforts that appear to be the most effective are outlined below.

Two years after these 28 conflicts began, there were five negotiated settlements reached although they were contested by some of the domestic participants. These five instances involve the Sikhs in India, the Tuareg in Mali, the Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea, the Tutsis in Rwanda, and the Acholi in Uganda. Three deals were negotiated with the assistance of outside actors. The Sikh and Acholi agreements, although temporary, were achieved through domestic initiatives.

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32 No settlements were reached by the end of the first year. However, there were a number of intrastate wars in which negotiations were underway while violent hostilities continued. These are the Cabindans in Angola, the Hutus in Burundi, the Tutsi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Bodos in India, the Acehnese in Indonesia, and the Tuareg in Mali.
The rebellion by the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was discussed earlier in Chapter 4. Rather than individual countries, it was sustained mediation efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the early stages that led to the July 1993 Arusha Accords, almost three years after the RPF invasion. The peace was short-lived. The April 1994 plane crash that claimed the lives of the Rwandan and Burundian Presidents signaled the onset of the genocide against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Successful mediation efforts by outside states occurred in the intrastate wars in Papua New Guinea and Mali. The rebellion by the nomadic Tuaregs in Mali emerged in June 1990 and it was precipitated by the return of group members who had spent part of the past decade residing in Libya. Along with their ethnic kin from neighboring Niger, the Malian Tuaregs had crossed into Libya to escape the massive droughts that had severely affected the region. Libyan assistance, in the form of military training and the provision of weapons, was critical in allowing the Tuaregs of both these countries to challenge the state authorities. Group members were seeking to protect their traditional cultural and lifeways. Six months after the violent hostilities began in Mali, Algerian mediation led to a temporary cessation. However, efforts to reach a permanent settlement were overshadowed by the events in Mali where demonstrations in support of the adoption of a multi-party system resulted in a regime change. Attacks against the Tuaregs continued during the period when a transitional regime was in power.

At the end of 1991, an agreement was brokered between the government and the Tuareg under the auspices of Algeria and Burkina Faso. It called for an independent commission to examine the violent acts between the two sides. While domestic efforts to hold free, multiparty elections continued, the main Tuareg organization, the Unified
Movements and Fronts of Azawad (MFUA), and the transitional government signed another agreement in April of 1992 with Algerian facilitation. Along with an exchange of prisoners, the rebels were to be integrated into the army and long-promised development projects to be implemented in Tuareg areas. Two years after the conflict began, a tenuous ceasefire held. The lack of implementation of the agreements did subsequently precipitate the re-emergence of the rebellion. Sustained Algerian mediation led to a final settlement in 1995 and the return of the refugees who had fled to Mauritania, Algeria, and Burkina Faso.

The conflict in Papua New Guinea arose in December 1988 when the violent actions of the Bougainvilleans resulted in the closure of one of the main sources of the country’s export earnings— the Australian copper mining concession, the Panguna mine, on the island of Bougainville. The Bougainvilleans were disgruntled with the limited economic benefits they were receiving from the mine coupled with their concerns over the resulting environmental degradation. They demanded independence and issued a formal declaration to this effect. The Port Morseby government responded in quick and brutal fashion. The government’s efforts were bolstered by Australia which provided military aid that was used to suppress the rebels. Further, an economic blockade was instituted against the island and this was to result in many casualties over the next few years. The rebel group, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, was able to obtain sanctuary, and likely weapons, in the neighboring Solomon Islands which is populated by ethnic kindred.

In mid-1990, New Zealand offered to host talks between the two warring parties. Negotiations continued until the end of the year and an agreement was formally signed in
January 1991. It called for the disarmament of the rebel forces, but it did not address the future status of the island and violence soon resumed. It was not until 1997 when the next major peace initiatives were launched. New Zealand again was the key mediator, with Australia assisting, and following a number of rounds of negotiations an agreement was reached in early 1998. Unarmed peacekeepers from New Zealand, Australia, Tonga, Fiji, and Vanuatu have monitored the ceasefire. The accord is expected to provide broad autonomy for Bougainville although implementation is proceeding at a slow pace. While a minority rebel faction is still seeking independence, there have not been violent hostilities in recent years.

**Hypothesis 7: Higher levels of violence in ethnic insurgencies are expected when more intense forms of assistance are supplied by external state intervenors.**

The results presented in Table 5.7 run counter to the hypothesized relationship. Instead of more intense forms of aid being associated with ethnopolitical conflicts that escalated, this support was far more common in insurgencies where the level of violence either remained at the same level or decreased. In these latter instances, some 70% of the state intervenors furnished the most intense forms of assistance. Blockades, interdiction against a host regime, cross-border sanctuaries, rescue missions and cross-border raids into a host state, the provision of safe havens, and the direct deployment of an intervenor’s troops are categorized as intense forms of aid. Seventeen interventions in which solely political measures were used or both sides were assisted are excluded from this table.
Table 5.7: Intensity of External State Assistance and Level of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Intense</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>6 (16)*</td>
<td>5 (14)</td>
<td>26 (70)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in intensity</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>20 (38)</td>
<td>17 (32)</td>
<td>16 (30)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in intensity</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26 (29)*</td>
<td>22 (24)</td>
<td>42 (47)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 14.065, p-value = .001

* Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of cases in each category of the dependent variable along with the total percentage of each intensity level

One possible reason for this unexpected finding could be that intense aid is more likely to be provided in disputes where there are competing interventions as external states might ratchet up their assistance to counter the patronage dispensed to the opposing domestic party. However, when we examine the recipients of the intense forms of assistance, the cross-tabulation, while close to statistical significance, does not shed any further light on this issue. Interventions in which intense aid was supplied were just as likely when the conflicts were characterized by competing interventions or when only the ethnopolitical group was assisted. Some distinctions are apparent when we compare moderate and strong forms of assistance. Interventions that are coded as moderate most often occur in conflicts where only the ethnic group is the recipient of any foreign state support. Strong types of aid are more common in internal wars where outside states support opposing parties. Another potential explanation could be that the Cold War rivalry led external states to provide higher forms of assistance to their proxies or those who belonged to their ideological camp. However, when controlling for the Cold War, the results of the cross-tabulation do not reveal any discernable patterns.
An examination of some of the specific insurgencies might help to illuminate the relationship between the intensity of the outside aid and the degree of an internal war’s violence. Outside state intervenors are almost as likely to provide cross-border sanctuaries regardless of the level of violence (34% of the intense interventions in the same/decrease in violence category and 38% in the increase in violence category). The major difference appears when countries choose to deploy their armed forces to fight alongside one of the domestic combatants. All of these interventions occurred in conflicts that were either stalemated or decreased in violence two years after an insurgency’s onset. The armed forces of six states clashed in the second Tutsi rebellion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which erupted in August 1998. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi assisted the rebels while Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe fought alongside the government forces. While Chad also sent troops these were withdrawn within the first year. In addition, French and Zairean troops were inserted in Rwanda in response to the October 1990 invasion by the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front and following the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent uprising by the Iraqi Shi’is, the United States, Britain, and France declared a safe haven in the south in August of 1992 and utilized air power to militarily patrol the region to limit Saddam Hussein’s counterinsurgency tactics.

**Recipient(s) of Interventions**

It is generally assumed that when external countries take opposing sides in an internal conflict there is likely to an expansion of violent hostilities as the outside patrons, at a minimum, attempt to ensure that their favored domestic party is able to hold its own,
if not being able to achieve victory. This hypothesis, as outlined below, is tested in Table 5.8.

**Hypothesis 8:** Competing interventions by external states are more likely to occur in ethnopolitical wars in which the level of violence increases.

**Table 5.8: Group or Competing Interventions and Level of Violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th>Group Only</th>
<th>Competing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>21 (48)</td>
<td>23 (52)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>29 (46)</td>
<td>34 (54)</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50 (47)</td>
<td>57 (53)</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = .030, p-value = .863; Yates continuity correction = .000, p-value = 1.000

* Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of cases in each category of the dependent variable along with the total percentage for each intervention type

The relationship between group only or competing interventions and the degree of an ethnic dispute’s violence is completely non-significant. It appears that whether an outside state intervenes solely on behalf of a group or if there are state interventions that support each of the opposing parties, there is virtually no impact on the level of intrastate hostilities. Of the insurgencies that exhibited higher violence levels two years after the onset, 9 are coded as group only while 7 are categorized as competing wars. There are twelve conflicts that were either in a stalemate or de-escalated by the end of the second year; seven of these are defined as group only and five as competing. The potential role that group only or competing interventions plays emerges when we next consider the influence of the Cold War-post-Cold War division.
Many theoretical and empirical studies assert that domestic disputes during the Cold War, especially if there was any ideological component, were likely to draw in the superpowers on opposing sides. The litany of conflicts infused by the bipolar rivalry is numerous and includes Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Israel-Palestine, and India-Pakistan. How the post-Cold War era is expected to impinge on the interventionist activities of the major powers and other state actors is still not clear. The following hypothesis examines the potential relationship between the change in the nature of superpower relations and the degree of violence in domestic ethnic wars.

**Hypothesis 9:** During the Cold War, interventions by external states were more likely to occur in ethnopolitical conflicts in which violence levels escalated.

*Table 5.9: Cold War and Level of Violence*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th>Cold War</th>
<th>Post-Cold War</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>9 (21)*</td>
<td>35 (79)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in CW/Post-CW</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>41 (65)</td>
<td>22 (35)</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in CW/Post-CW</td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50 (47)*</td>
<td>57 (53)</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 20.725, p-value = .000; Yates continuity correction = 18.971, p-value = .000

* Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of cases in each category of the dependent variable along with the total percentage for each time period

There is a highly significant relationship between the likelihood that an internal ethnic conflict will escalate and the time period in which an insurgency emerges. Some 65% (41/63) of the interventions in disputes that exhibited an increased level of violence...
two years after they began were undertaken during the Cold War. The post-Cold War era presents the opposite case. Almost 80% of the outside state interventions during the 1990-2000 decade took place in the internal wars where there was either no change or a decrease in the intensity of violent hostilities.

Nine of the twelve ethnopolitical disputes that escalated took place during the Cold War. The figures are more balanced in the post-Cold War era which witnessed 7/16 conflicts where the level of violence increased. Across the two time periods when one considers who the recipients are in these interventions, there is a marked and statistically significant division. Eight of the twelve conflicts coded as competing began in the Cold War period while twelve of the sixteen post-Cold War insurgencies involved interventions solely in favor of the ethnic groups.

**Ethnic Linkages**

Relationships among ethnic kin that straddle state boundaries have garnered much attention in the past decade especially following the increase in the number of ethnically-based domestic conflicts in the early years of the post-Cold War era. Empirical studies reveal that these ethnic links can and do influence the levels of violence both within countries and at the interstate level. The following hypothesis examines the potential influence of ethnic links between a state intervenor and a group engaging in a rebellion against a host state.
**Hypothesis 10:** Ethnopolitical wars in which either the regime of an external state intervenor or its domestic constituents are ethnically related to the group embroiled in an insurgency are more likely to exhibit higher levels of violence.

**Table 5.10: Ethnic Linkages and Level of Violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th>No Relationship</th>
<th>Ethnic Tie</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>30 (68)</td>
<td>14 (32)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>43 (69)</td>
<td>19 (31)</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73 (69)</td>
<td>33 (31)</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 0.017, p-value = .898; Yates continuity correction = 0.00, p-value = 1.000;

* Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of cases in each category of the dependent variable along with the total percentage of interventions in the ethnic ties categories

** There is one missing intervention where it could not be determined if there were any ethnic links

The regimes of external state intervenors or their domestic constituents were ethnically related to a rebelling group in 30% of the interventions (32/106). However, whether these ethnic links are present or not makes no difference to the ability of these groups to violently challenge the state authorities of a host state. As Table 5.10 indicates, all the statistical tests are highly non-significant. All of the nineteen interventions associated with conflicts that increased in violence are by outside states populated by nondominant ethnic groups who are the ethnic kin of the rebelling group. For instance, neighboring Syria and Iran, both of which contain Kurdish minorities, militarily and/or economically assisted the Iraqi and Turkish Kurds. There are minority Uighur populations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey; these three countries allowed organizations that represent Uighur interests to mobilize resources in support of their kin
in China. On the other hand, South Africa supported the Ndebele insurrection in the newly-independent Zimbabwe in 1983-1984 as part of its campaign to destabilize the front-line states in the anti-apartheid struggle. The fact that there were Ndebeles living in South Africa is unlikely to have had any influence on the motives of the apartheid regime.

There were only five interventions where the dominant ethnic group that comprised the regime of the intervenor state was ethnically linked with the rebelling group. However, all of these interventions are associated with conflicts that were either at a stalemate or decreased in violence. The five interventions were by Rwanda and Burundi in the second Tutsi revolt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nepal’s involvement in the Lhotshampa conflict in Bhutan, Iran’s support of the Shi’is in Iraq and the Solomon Islands’ assistance to the Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea.33

**Prior Involvement**

Most analyses of external state interventions pay relatively little attention to the potential role that these actors can play prior to the eruption of violent hostilities. Various case studies recognize how outside states can facilitate the mobilization and organizational capabilities of ethnopolitical groups through the provision of military and economic assistance. To this author’s knowledge, however, no quantitative studies have examined if material assistance from foreign states before a conflict emerges can influence the degree of an ethnopolitical group’s anti-state violence.

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33 The regimes in Rwanda and Burundi are also coded as ethnically related to the Tutsis in the first insurgency in the former Zaire. They are excluded from this analysis as the focus is only on the second year after a conflict began and the first Tutsi rebellion ended within the same year in which it emerged.
Hypothesis 11: External state intervenors that are providing material assistance before the onset of an insurgency are more likely to be involved in ethnopolitical conflicts that display higher levels of violent hostilities.

Table 5.11: Prior Involvement and Level of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th>Prior Involvement</th>
<th>No Prior Involvement</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>17 (39)*</td>
<td>27 (61)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in prior/no prior</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>36 (59)</td>
<td>25 (41)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in prior/no prior</td>
<td>(68)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 4.247, p-value = .039; Yates continuity correction = 3.471, p-value = .062

* Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of cases in each category of the dependent variable

** There are two missing cases where it could not be determined if the external state intervenor was involved prior to the onset of the violent conflict

Becoming involved before violent hostilities erupt can significantly influence the degree to which an ethnopolitical group can challenge the authorities of a host state. Around 60% of the outside state intervenors that supplied material assistance to ethnic groups prior to the onset of their insurgencies were involved in conflicts that escalated. The opposite is the case in disputes that were stalemated or saw declining violence two years after their emergence. The forms of aid furnished to the groups were not statistically related to a conflict’s level of violence.

The most common type of support was economic, comprising 26/53 or around 50% of the state interventions that occurred prior to an insurgency’s onset. This was most often in the guise of hosting segments of group organizations which can facilitate
greater political attention as well as raise funds to support group activities. Both military and mixed assistance were each provided in roughly 25% of the other instances of prior involvement. India, for example, along with ethnic kin located in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, furnished both military and economic means to the Tamils in Sri Lanka in the year before the revolt broke out in July 1983. The trigger for the Sri Lankan Tamil conflict was an attack against the army by the dominant LTTE rebel group that led to widespread anti-Tamil riots by the majority Sinhalese community. Further, as discussed in the previous chapter, Libyan military aid, in the form of training in exile, equipment, and cross-border sanctuary was vital to the launching and continuation of the Tuareg insurgencies in both Niger and Mali.

Other Variables

This section first focuses on the involvement of other external actors in the ethnopolitical wars included in the dataset. Along with ethnic kin located in neighboring states, the United Nations and regional organizations can also potentially influence the level of violence of a domestic conflict. Factors relating to the geographic location of an insurgency are next examined in addition to the domestic conditions prevailing during a conflict’s onset and the degree to which violence is endemic in the immediate neighborhood.

Whether and the degree to which ethnic kin located in states that neighbor an intrastate war can exert a significant impact has been the subject of much academic and
media attention, especially since the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{34} These affective ties that transcend state boundaries are expected to increase the chances that an ethnopolitical group will be able to achieve some of its objectives by posing a major challenge to the authorities of a host state. For the twenty-eight conflicts considered two years after violent hostilities began, assistance from ethnic kin in neighboring states is not associated with any changes in the intensity of violence. Rather, material aid from kindred groups is almost as probable in internal wars that escalate or those that are stalemated or de-escalate.

There are fourteen conflicts in which neighboring ethnic kin sought to tilt the balance in favor of their domestic relatives. Of these, only four occurred during the Cold War while around 60\% of the post-Cold War insurgencies entailed some outside assistance from ethnic kin. This general result supports the assertions by Byman et al. who argue that support from kindred groups, whether they reside in neighboring states or are diasporas, has increased in the post-Cold War era (2001, 41). But when one controls for the Cold War, as Table 5.12 reveals, there are no marked differences between whether this aid was provided and the degree of a conflict’s level of violence. Statistical measures of significance are not included as there are not enough internal wars in most of the categories to allow for the use of these tests.

\textsuperscript{34} There is an overlap between the insurgencies in which external state intervenors had some ethnic ties with the rebelling group and if there was support provided by ethnic kin residing in neighboring countries. The links with outside states could be either in the form of ethnic commonalities between the dominant ethnic group that comprises the regime of the intervenor state and the rebel group or indirectly through both the host state and the external state intervenor being populated by the same nondominant kin. However, at least one-third of the conflicts involved only either support from neighboring ethnic kin or one or more state intervenors with ethnic ties to the domestic challenger.
Table 5.12: Ethnic Kin Aid and Level of Violence Controlling for the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REB2YR</th>
<th>Kin Aid</th>
<th>No Kin Aid</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same/decrease</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| REB2YR          |         |            |       |
| Post-Cold War   |         |            |       |
| Same/decrease   | 5       | 4          | 9     |
| Increase        | 5       | 2          | 7     |
| Total           | 10      | 6          | 16    |

The role of the United Nations and regional organizations was circumscribed in the ethnopolitical conflicts under study. Across the two years, the UN engaged in six domestic wars while regional organizations became involved in four insurgencies. These organizations were almost as likely to be drawn into internal disputes in either category of the dependent variable: an increase in violence or those that remained at the same level or decreased in violence.

Given the focus on the initial two years of an ethnopolitical conflict coupled with the small number of instances of UN or regional organization involvement, it is not really possible to draw any conclusions about the conflict management role of these organizations. A discussion of the strategies they employed might help to illuminate the nature of their involvement.

Most of the interventions by either of these organizations occurred in Africa south of the Sahara and in particular in the Great Lakes Region. While the Americans and South Africa helped to facilitate the transition to a post-Mobutu era during the first Tutsi rebellion in the former Zaire in 1997, the United Nations attempted to address the
growing humanitarian crisis due to the presence of one to two million Rwandan Hutus
who were residing in refugee camps in the country. Some Rwandan Hutus were assisting
the Mobutu government against the Tutsi rebels. A UN envoy was dispatched to the
region and the Security Council endorsed a resolution for the deployment of an
international force to secure aid for the Rwandan refugees. The resolution proved
unnecessary. By November of 1996, one month after the revolt began, a majority of the
refugees had forcibly or voluntarily left the camps with many returning to Rwanda.

Both the UN and South African Development Community (SADC) undertook
various efforts to reach a negotiated settlement among the warring parties and their
external state proxies in the second Tutsi revolt that emerged the following year (see
Chapter 4 for further details). Various agreements that were reached including the 1999
Lusaka accords, through the active efforts of Zambian and South African mediation
under SADC auspices, set the stage for further deals as part of a comprehensive
settlement. A United Nations force was deployed in 1999 to support of the various peace
efforts.

In the initial phases of the Hutu campaign to oust the Tutsi-dominated military
regime in Burundi (1993-95), the UN’s special representative sought to mediate between
the various Hutu and Tutsi political and rebel organizations, but the deployment of a
peacekeeping force was rejected due to unfavorable conditions. The Organization of
African Unity (OAU) did send a military observer group to Burundi in 1994 with
representatives from Tunisia, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Mali. In addition, the OAU’s
Secretary-General made a number of visits to the country to help promote a power-
sharing arrangement. However, within the first two years there were no long-lasting agreements and efforts still continue as of mid-2003 to implement a final arrangement.

In the early 1990s, the OAU was also active in trying to broker a deal between the Hutu-dominated government in Rwanda and the rebel Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front. As Chapter 4 notes, while the 1993 Arusha accord, which outlined power-sharing agreements and pending elections was reached, it became obsolete shortly afterward as the April 1994 deaths of the Rwandan and Burundian Presidents and the resulting genocide. The deployment of UN peacekeepers (UNAMIR) in support of the Arusha accord occurred after the first two years of this rebellion, which is the time period under study. Hutu efforts to recapture power, largely from refugee camps in neighboring Tanzania and the former Zaire, launched the second rebellion in Rwanda in the past five years. A much-smaller contingent of UNAMIR remained in the country and political efforts by the United Nations focused on ensuring the return of the refugees.

The remaining three instances of UN or regional organization involvement occurred in Asia and the Middle East. Shortly after the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the Shi’i uprising in Iraq, the United Nations sent a number of fact-finding missions to the main combat areas in southern Iraq along with a small force to help resettle the refugees who were mainly returning from neighboring Iran. This force remained during the second year of violent hostilities and additional missions were sent to investigate human right abuses in the Shi’i-dominant areas. The UN role however was secondary to the Iranian, US, British, and French interventions; the latter three began enforcing a no-fly zone in the south in August of 1992. Iran provided cross-border sanctuary, military equipment and hosted exile Shi’i organizations while Syria also allowed segments of
group organizations to mobilize political and economic resources to further the Shi’i campaign.

United Nations engagement in the Kashmir insurgency predates the latest conflict episode which erupted in December of 1989. Since the late 1940s, a UN Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) has been stationed on the India-Pakistan border in Kashmir to monitor a ceasefire line that emerged in 1947 after the first interstate war between the regional rivals. As discussed in Chapter 4, within the first two years of violent hostilities, both the United States and Britain sought to promote a negotiated settlement. However, to date this conflict continues to be impervious to sustained mediation by any outside actors. In the other Asian dispute, a Commonwealth Observer and Monitoring Group was deployed in Papua New Guinea in March of 1990 to help monitor a ceasefire between the Port Moresby government and the rebelling Bougainvilleans. The sketch of the Bougainville conflict outlines the details of this insurgency and the political efforts, led by New Zealand, that led to a temporary settlement two years after the violence began.

Does the region in which an ethnopolitical war occur influence the degree of violent hostilities? As discussed in Chapter 2, much of the focus in the past decade has been on sub-Saharan Africa and the increased incidence and destructiveness of the region’s internal disputes. Around half of the insurgencies in this study occurred in sub-Saharan Africa.
As the table above strongly outlines, although there are relatively more conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in relation to other Third World regions, where an insurgency arises is not related to the degree of violent hostilities. Internal wars that increased in violence are equally likely in sub-Saharan Africa in comparison to the other Third World Regions (Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America). Of more interest is the number of external state interventions in these areas of the South. While around 25 outside states intervened in African disputes in each category of the dependent variable in the second year of a rebellion, in the rest of the Third World the rate of intervention is much higher in the insurgencies that escalated. Of the total number of 56 interventions in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, 38 or close to 70% occurred in intrastate conflicts in which the degree of violence increased. Therefore, a conflict’s geographic region alone appears insufficient to explain the potential relationships between outside state involvement and conflict escalation, stalemate, or de-escalation.

The final two variables focus on the environment both within a state hosting an ethnopolitical insurgency and its immediate neighborhood. Some empirical analyses reveal that when a host state is also contending with other domestic armed hostilities during the same period that a rebellion emerges, the level of anti-state violence by the
ethnopolitical contender is expected to be higher. Based on the 28 internal wars that were underway two years after the dispute began, cross-tabulations indicate that there is no notable relationship. Eleven of the host states were also dealing with other domestic challenges. Seven of these countries faced an increase in violence by the rebelling ethnopolitical groups. When there was no ongoing violence in a host state, the ethnic wars were equally likely to de-escalate, stalemate, or escalate.

Turmoil in a host state’s immediate neighborhood is also reported to influence relationships both within that country and between it and its territorially contiguous states. The relationship between the occurrence of armed conflict in neighboring states and the degree of violent hostilities in a host state cannot be examined with the cases in this dissertation. All of the 29 ethnopolitical disputes began when there was ongoing domestic violence in neighboring countries. Future studies that expand the universe of conflicts might be able to assess the potential influence of this variable.

This chapter examined the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 in light of the data gathered on the 29 ethnopolitical conflicts that either emerged or re-ignited in the 1980-2000 period. Among the significant findings are that a group’s objectives matter; the type of state intervenor and its influence on a conflict’s level of violence is contingent on the Cold War-Post-Cold War distinction; military assistance is not necessarily associated with increases in the intensity of violent hostilities; more intense forms of aid are more common in disputes that are at a stalemate or decrease in violence; Cold War insurgencies were highly likely to escalate in comparison to their counterparts in the past decade; ethnic ties between a host state and the external state intervenor do not usually
result in greater levels of violence; and involvement by outside states prior to the eruption of an internal war is associated with conflicts that escalate.

The concluding chapter draws together the various factors that are associated with changes in the level of violence of an ethnopolitical conflict. It also discusses the changes in the nature of interventions between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. The contributions of this study and future avenues of research are also addressed.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

This dissertation has sought to help further our knowledge about how the various facets of external state interventions can influence the course of internal ethnopolitical conflicts. There is an existing body of knowledge that focuses on the different aspects of interventions including the propensity of major powers to become involved in internal disputes and how their actions impinge on great power relations, the motivations that guide foreign state interventions, and how outside involvement affects the likelihood of interstate hostilities. Those that focus on the domestic impact of outside involvement examine issues such as conflict escalation and duration, the spread of violence within host countries and across regions, and how external actors can help promote and implement negotiated settlements. The general assumption is that external state interventions in ethnic or ideological disputes are likely to exacerbate tensions. Various resulting outcomes include an extended duration, higher violence levels, and the diffusion of the conflict both within the country and across state borders through mechanisms such as refugee flows and rebel efforts to seek cross-border sanctuaries. The objective of this research has been to determine which aspects of an intervention strategy are associated with changes in the degree of domestic armed violence.

The conflicts in this study comprise 29 ethnopolitical disputes that began or emerged after a period of dormancy in the Third World in the 1980s and 1990s. Rebellions that ended within the year in which they began were excluded as the focus was on sustained anti-state activities. The author coded data on each specific intervention undertaken by external states, the UN, regional organizations, and ethnic kin in
neighboring states for the first two years after the onset of a violent dispute. The focus was limited to the first two years to help ensure that other potential intervening variables are less likely to influence the results. Additional information was drawn from existing data compilations such as the Minorities at Risk and Polity datasets. The dependent variable, a conflict’s level of violence, was operationalized utilizing the rebellion scale developed by the Minorities project. The 7-point scale measures increases in a group’s anti-state activities ranging from sporadic terrorism and small-scale guerrilla activity to protracted civil war. The author coded each conflict’s rebellion level at six-month intervals after violent hostilities first erupted. The statistical analysis compares the level of rebellion at the onset with degree of violence two years after the internal war began. A number of group, host state, and conflict characteristics are also incorporated in the dataset to examine their potential influence.

Some of the initial results of the data analysis were presented in Chapter 4 while the eleven hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 were subject to statistical testing in Chapter 5. This chapter draws together the various empirical results to discuss the broader patterns of external state interventions and their relationships with changes in the level of domestic violence. The next section outlines how the results relate to our existing body of knowledge about the role of outside intervenors and the violent potential of intrastate conflicts.
Conflict Dynamics: Escalation, Stalemate, or De-Escalation

Of the 28 conflicts considered at the end of the second year after an ethnopolitical conflict began, some 16 or 60% exhibited a greater degree of violence in comparison to the onset. The other 12 internal wars either remained at the same level of armed hostilities or there was a decrease in violence. There were minor differences in the total number of external state interventions across the two categories of the dependent variable. As Table 5.1 noted, the average number of intervenors ranged from 3.7 to 4.1. The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 revealed that the inclusion of group and conflict factors enhances our understanding of the relationships between the various components of an intervention strategy and changes in the degree of violent hostilities. The following table first outlines the results in the context of what we already know; it then points to challenges to the conventional wisdom, raises new or understudied issues, and lists areas for future research.

Table 6.1: Key Linkages Between Group, Host State, Conflict, and Intervention Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reinforces the Conventional Wisdom</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- military assistance is the most common form of support from outside states</td>
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<tr>
<td>- neighbors are the most frequent intervenors in internal ethnic conflicts</td>
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<tr>
<th>Clarifications Of Existing Research</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- the end of the Cold War has reduced the escalatory potential of external state interventions in domestic ethnic conflicts (Hypothesis 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- major and regional power involvement in more violent conflicts usually occurred during the Cold War (Hypothesis 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- more intense forms of assistance are not necessarily associated with escalating rebellions (Hypothesis 7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Challenges to the Conventional Wisdom**

- groups that seek either autonomy or secession are more likely to be involved in ethnic wars that exhibit greater violence (Hypothesis 1)
- interventions by neighboring states do not usually lead to an exacerbation of violent hostilities (Hypothesis 5)
- military aid is not the most common form of aid provided in conflicts that escalate (Hypothesis 6a)
- when foreign states competitively intervene in domestic ethnic conflicts, escalation is not the expected result (Hypothesis 8)

**New or Understudied Issues**

- the involvement of external states prior to the onset of ethnic conflicts is significantly associated with greater future violence (Hypothesis 11)
- economic, and secondarily, military assistance increases the chances that the degree of violence will increase

**Areas for Future Research**

- the degree and avenues by which prior political activism by ethnopolitical groups can influence their subsequent political actions (Hypothesis 2)
- the relationship between the type of regime of a host state and the prospects of conflict escalation (Hypothesis 3)
- the role of political aid, such as informal and formal mediation, in influencing the degree of violent hostilities (Hypothesis 6b)
- the potential impact of ethnic ties between outside state intervenors and the domestic combatants (Hypothesis 10) and ethnic linkages between groups that straddle state boundaries.

**Reinforces Conventional Wisdom**

Military assistance to either of the contending parties is usually favored as the means by which to become involved in domestic ethnic conflicts. Many studies of external state interventions focus either exclusively on this form of aid or they consider both military and economic support (e.g. Falk, 1993; Regan, 2002, 1996; Tillema, 1994, 1989). It was thus expected that various types of military assistance would be the most
common means utilized by foreign state intervenors. As Chapter 4 indicates, the supply of military equipment, training in exile, cross-border sanctuaries, and the direct deployment of an intervenor’s troops in an internal dispute comprised some 60/130 or 46% of all the interventions across the first two years of the conflicts. Mixed aid, which entails a combination of political, military, or economic support, was the next most frequent at 28% and the sole provision of economic means comprised 19% of the interventions. These results differ from those found by Regan who discovers that military aid is even more prevalent as it was provided by 70% of the external state intervenors in his 50 year study (1996, 345). Economic assistance was also infrequent – it only accounted for 7% of the interventions he examined (Ibid.).

Another finding that is commonly accepted is the significant interventionist role of states that border a country hosting an ethnic conflict. The conventional wisdom is that neighboring states find it almost impossible to avoid entanglements in disputes that occur on their territorial borders (Brown, 1996; Heraclides, 1990; Levine, 1996). This study supports this view, as overall neighbors were responsible for 36% or 47/130 of the interventions in the early stages of ethnic conflicts. The result is based on exclusive designations of types of state intervenors. For example, if a neighboring state is also a regional power, the higher category of regional power was coded. But when all neighbors were included, regardless of whether they are regional powers, the percentage of interventions by states that border a host state increases to 50%.

Internal conflicts thus appear to quite easily spread across territorial boundaries. Neighbors might choose to become involved for a variety of motives such as exploiting a rival’s weaknesses or deflecting attention from domestic problems to more reactive
concerns such as limiting cross-border refugee flows. Alternatively, bordering states might not have the resources necessary to be able to prevent rebel movements from utilizing their territory to seek sanctuary, training, and engage in cross-border attacks.

### Clarifications Of Existing Research

#### The Cold War

There are contending views about how the end of the Cold War would influence the nature of both intrastate and interstate conflicts. Some authors such as Cooper and Berdal expected that the lifting of the bipolar rivalry would increase outside involvement in domestic disputes as the fears of superpower competition and the potential escalation to the nuclear level were no longer present (1993). Others such as Patrick Regan presented the opposite scenario. They asserted that the end of the Cold War meant that there were few conflicts that were of significant interest to generate foreign interventions. The implication was thus that the potential for escalation would be reduced in the post-bipolar era as superpower interventions during the Cold War were viewed as increasing the degree of violent hostilities.

This study supports the views put forward by the latter group of scholars as nine out of the twelve conflicts that emerged during the Cold War escalated two years after they began. In contrast, only some 44% or 7/16 post-Cold War insurgencies witnessed higher levels of violence. The Miskito rebellion in Nicaragua in the early 1980s is the only conflict that brought in the superpowers on opposing sides as the Soviet Union sought to bolster the new Sandinista government while the Americans assisted the
indigenous Miskitos as part of their broader anti-Communist Contra campaign. Further, some 65% of the 63 external state interventions during the Cold War occurred in disputes with greater violence levels two years after they began. The reverse situation prevails in the post-Cold War era. Some 80% of these interventions were in conflicts that either were at a stalemate or decreased in violence. The Cold War thus exerted a significant impact on how foreign state interventions are related to domestic conflict dynamics.

One reason why conflicts in the post-Cold War era are less likely to escalate is the change in both domestic and international approaches to conflict management. Numerous studies document the increase in United Nations peacekeeping missions and mediation efforts. For example, between 1987 and 1994, the number of peacekeeping operations tripled, the size of the military forces deployed in these operations increased from less than 10,000 to more than 70,000, and the peacekeeping budget rose from $230 million to $3.6 billion (Doyle, 2001, 530). Regional organizations are also more active – the OAU mediated in Rwanda and Burundi, SADC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and ECOWAS deployed troops in Liberia and Sierra Leone. There were only six instances of UN involvement and four by regional organizations in this study. Most of these arose in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. However, the limited nature of UN and regional organization involvement in the early stages of a conflict does not allow for the assessment of any potential patterns of conflict management.

Domestic efforts to manage ethnic disputes also appear to have increased in frequency during the 1990s. For example, the two-decade long rebellion by the indigenous Chakma peoples in southeast Bangladesh ended in 1997 after a peace agreement was negotiated between the Dhaka government and the main rebel group, the
Shanti Bahini. There were no outside actors involved in reaching this settlement but through much of insurgency India was reported to be militarily assisting the rebels. Domestic initiatives were also responsible for a partial, albeit temporary, settlement in the Acholi conflict in Uganda. In August 1986, a few months after the National Resistance Army led by Yoweri Museveni consolidated its hold on power after ousting the remnants of the Milton Obote government, members of the former Ugandan army attempted to overthrow the new regime. Many of the rebels were Acholis as was much of the membership of the Holy Spirit Movement which was also waging war against the new Museveni government. Agreements were reached with two of the organizations comprised of former soldiers within the first two years and a military campaign crushed the Holy Spirit Movement. However, this movement reemerged and coalesced as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). As Chapter 3 notes, the LRA insurgency is qualitatively different. It represents a combination of changing ethnic, revolutionary, political, and predatory motivations. Further, the rebels, rather than representing the northern Acholi peoples, instead prey on this vulnerable population to forcibly draw their membership.

**Major and Regional Power Involvement**

It is generally assumed that when major powers choose to become involved in an internal conflict, there will be marked change in the nature of hostilities as these actors possess significant resources that can be put toward achieving the goals of whichever side they seek to support. To a lesser extent, regional powers also possess similar resources in relation to other countries in their neighborhood. The Cold War period was characterized by competing interventions by the superpowers in Latin America, the Middle East, Asia,
and Africa. Hypothesis 4 sought to test whether the end of the Cold War is associated with changes in the impact of major and regional power interventions on domestic conflict levels. It revealed that there is a marked difference. Some 80% of Cold War interventions by major and regional powers occurred in internal wars that escalated whereas in the post-Cold War era, the situation was reversed. In the 1990s, it is neighboring states that are most actively involved in conflicts that have a higher degree of armed hostilities.

The number of great and/or regional power interventions per conflict also declined across the two time periods. During the bipolar rivalry, there was an average of 2.3 interventions per conflict whereas the post-Cold War era witnessed a mean of 1.4 interventions. This evidence does not fit clearly into any of the expected views of the major schools in international relations. Both realists and liberals did not anticipate a significant decline in great power activity in the Third World, albeit for different reasons. Realists argued that the great powers still maintained their global interests while liberals asserted that transnational concerns such as the proliferation of ethnic conflicts would require major power involvement to promote stability. Neorealists, on the other hand, predicted that while the major powers would withdraw due to the limited nature of their strategic interests, regional powers would fill the void.

There are a number of reasons why major power interventions appear to be less likely to exacerbate hostilities in the post-Cold War era. Neorealists point to the end of competition for influence in the Third World and the limited nature of great power interests in these regions. Further, liberal concerns about addressing serious humanitarian crises have promoted cooperation rather than competition which has
resulted in neutral interventions, that is, those on behalf of both sides that usually incorporate both mediation and humanitarian efforts. The emphasis on multilateral mechanisms also led to a greater role for both the United Nations and regional organizations which provided a greater degree of legitimacy while also spreading the resource requirements across a number of states.

While neorealist beliefs about a decline in major power involvement appear to be borne out, expectations about more interventionist strategies by regional powers were not apparent in the first post-Cold decade. The number of regional power interventions actually declined in the 1990s to an average of 0.7 per conflict in comparison to a Cold War rate of 1.25 per dispute. This finding might be due to a few factors. Some regional powers saw their foreign military and economic assistance decline or even be eliminated as the end of the bipolar rivalry reduced great power interest in these countries. Further, states such as Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, India, and Pakistan undertook political and/or economic restructuring programs during the 1990s which might have influenced their abilities and interests in becoming involved in potentially costly foreign endeavors.

**The Intensity of Outside Aid**

Another surprising result presented in Chapter 5 was that the most intense forms of assistance are not usually associated with conflict escalation. Intense types of aid include blockades, the provision of cross-border sanctuaries, cross-border raids by an intervenor state in support of the rebels, the deployment of an intervenor’s troops into a conflict, and the provision of safe havens. It appears that when intervenors chose to insert their own armed forces to fight alongside one of the domestic parties, these
conflicts were either at a stalemate or decreased in violence. The second Tutsi rebellion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was discussed in Chapter 4, is an example. Seven regional states deployed their armies to fight on opposing sides. This conflict became stalemated at the highest possible level, protracted civil war.

Byman et al. assert that during the 1990s the provision of cross-border sanctuaries significantly contributed to the ability of insurgent groups to effectively challenge the authorities of host states (2001, 84). Although this analysis also includes the 1980s decade, the results indicate that when external state intervenors voluntarily or involuntarily allow ethnopolitical groups a base for training, recruitment, and respite, there is no significant impact on the future degree of violent hostilities.

To delve further into the contrary finding about more intense forms of assistance, controls were employed for the existence of the Cold War and the possible role of competing interventions (those where at least one state supports each of the domestic parties). But despite these controls, the cross-tabulations of aid intensity and the degree of violent hostilities did not reveal any discernable differences.

The results suggest that we need to disaggregate and reconceptualize what are viewed as intense forms of assistance so that their potential impact can be adequately assessed. The scale developed by Saideman that was used to examine the intensity of outside aid lists all forms of economic assistance in the moderate category (2002). The higher-level strong and intense categories are comprised of various types of military measures. As will be discussed further, economic support was provided in about 30% of the interventions in conflicts that escalated; these were all coded as moderate. What are
perhaps required are a re-evaluation of this scale and the development of new scales to take into account the importance of economic assistance.

Challenges to the Conventional Wisdom

Ethnonationalists and Communal Contenders

The role of international norms that protect the sanctity of territorial borders and state sovereignty, fears of setting a precedent, and state vulnerability to separatist claims are some of the arguments that have been put forward to assert that groups seeking autonomy or secession are unlikely to attract outside patrons (Heraclides, 1990; Herbst, 1989; Saideman, 2002; Suhrke and Noble, 1977a). These arguments are often made in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa where decolonization codified the haphazard nature of the borders drawn during the colonial era. The Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), fearing the disintegrative potential of boundary changes, supported the status quo thereby adding impetus to the belief that the international community would reject efforts by sub-state actors to achieve self-rule. An assumption therefore could be that these would be low-level conflicts as the limited potential for outside involvement is unlikely to result in escalation.

Opponents of this position assert that separatist groups are more likely to be involved in highly internationalized conflicts as their chances of attracting international patrons are greater. A study by Steve Saideman reveals that the chances of external state interventions increase by almost 50% when conflicts occur in neighborhoods where there are a large number of ongoing separatist disputes (2002, 42). John Vasquez finds that the prospects of interstate war are greater when territorial claims are involved (1995).
Eight of the nine ethnonationalist groups in this study were engaged in rebellions that increased in violence two years after the onset. This result favors a rejection of the conventional wisdom and lends support to the minority opinion which asserts that it is conflicts involving these types of groups that are the most likely to be highly internationalized (Gurr, 1992; Khosla, 1999; Saideman, 2002). Secondly, groups that are referred to as communal contenders, that is, those who want a share or control of state power, are also expected to draw in outsiders that support opposing factions which can lead to greater hostilities. Changes in relative power among domestic groups can result in preemptive actions by ethnic contenders who fear a potential loss of their privileged positions (Gurr, 1992, 8). Five of the nine communal contenders in the dataset were involved in insurgencies that escalated – all of these conflicts occurred in Africa. The Hutus in Burundi and Rwanda are examples that were discussed in Chapter 4. Others include the Oromo in Ethiopia, the Issaq in Somalia, and the Ndebele in Zimbabwe.

The Involvement of Neighboring States

As discussed earlier, neighbors are the most frequent intervenors in internal wars as the conventional wisdom suggests, but their impact appears to be dependent on the Cold War-post-Cold War division. Few neighbors intervened in conflicts that escalated during the bipolar rivalry but in the 1990s around 70% of all neighboring state interventions occurred in more violent disputes. This result is in line with the research by Byman et al who argue that in the post-Cold War era, conflicts are more localized and that outside patrons are most often found among states that border the country hosting a conflict (2001, 17). In January 1999, the Oromo Liberation Front sought to take
advantage of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war by resuming its violent campaign against the Addis Ababa government. The rebels often sought sanctuary from Ethiopian army attacks by crossing into neighboring Kenya. Eritrea supplied the Oromo with various forms of military assistance in order to weaken Ethiopia’s military capability. Libya is also reported to have funneled military aid to the rebels through Eritrea.

Greater involvement by neighboring states in the post-Cold War era could be partially attributed to the negative consequences that can arise when a conflict emerges on a country’s borders. Some of these include economic dislocations, cross-border refugee flows, rebel attempts to seek sanctuary or material assistance, and the potential diffusion across borders and the broader region. Therefore, neighbors might choose to undertake preemptive interventions in an effort to forestall regional instability. On the other hand, reduced major power involvement in the Third World in our current era has provided greater latitude for regional actors. Security concerns coupled with economic motives were reported to have been at the forefront of Rwanda’s agenda when it chose to support the Tutsi rebellions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

To facilitate preventive and conflict management strategies, these results suggest the need for greater regional and international monitoring of states that border a country facing an insurgency. Where possible, the international community can seek to limit the involvement of neighbors while also addressing the military and economic concerns that encourage preemption. Further, given the potential for regional instability, efforts to reach a negotiated settlement would benefit from the involvement of countries that border host states.
Military Assistance

When states intervene it is usually expected that they will supply some form of military aid whether in the form of arms, training, advisory personnel, or in the extreme, the deployment of their own troops. Quantitative and case study research largely emphasizes the provision of military instruments (e.g., Falk, 1993, Tillema, 1994, 1989). Military assistance was the most common form of support furnished to the domestic combatants which mirrors the results of earlier studies. However, the commonly held view that military means usually exacerbate internal wars by increasing their destructiveness was not met. Around 35% of the state intervenors in conflicts that escalated provided military aid; however, this was the sole form of assistance in half of the interventions in disputes that were either at a stalemate or decreased in violence (Table 5.6). It has been argued that when outsiders support opposing parties, there is a likelihood that the conflict will stalemate. However, there were no discernable patterns when the forms of assistance were compared to the recipients of the interventions. What seems to make a difference? It appears to be first the supply of economic and secondarily mixed forms of aid. These will be discussed further in the next section that considers new or understudied issues.

Competing Interventions

Competing interventions, where at least one state supports each side, are generally expected to increase the level of domestic violence as both sides have greater resources to prosecute a war (Ayoob, 1995; Litwak and Wells Jr., 1988; Suhrke and Noble, 1977b). Interventions by the US and the USSR during the Cold War often followed this pattern as
did those of states engaged in regional rivalries. Some authors argue that the post-bipolar era would not change such competitive actions especially when states seek to maintain a regional balance of power (Ayoob, 1995; MacFarlane, 1990). However, as Hypothesis 8 reveals, the results run contrary to the accepted wisdom. The relationship between the recipient of an intervention (group only or competing) is completely non-significant.

While there are no notable statistical results, in the post-Cold War era there appears to have been a shift away from competing interventions in favor of those that solely assist an ethnopolitical group. Declining great power interest in the Third World is a partial explanation. During the 1990s, we have also seen greater international attention and mobilization around the status and treatment of minority groups. Of particular relevance here is the growing role played by diaspora communities and their ability to fundraise and draw political attention to the status of their kindred in their former homelands. States that host these communities also often allow segments of group organizations to operate even when they might be declared as illegal in the country hosting the conflict. The Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Sikhs and Kashmiris in India significantly increased their capabilities by which to challenge host states through their ability to mobilize and generate funds in countries such as the US, Canada, Britain, and Australia.

New or Understudied Issues

Prior Involvement

The involvement of outsiders in potentially violent domestic situations is an issue addressed in the case study literature on ethnic conflicts. However, there do not appear to
be any empirical studies that test whether there is a relationship between the prior engagement of foreign states and the subsequent level of violence once rebellions arise. The provision of military, economic, and political forms of assistance can significantly influence the mobilization potential of nascent political movements along with their ability to mount a challenge to the authorities of a host state. The role of transnational networks among groups with kinship or religious ties is especially relevant. For instance, links between indigenous communities world-wide are an important factor in the emergence and continuation of movements that seek to preserve traditional cultures and land rights along with those that seek broader reforms of the political and economic structures of the states in which they are located (Gurr, 1992, 4). There is also the demonstration effect where political activism by ethnopolitical groups in one country can inspire similar actions in other states (Ibid.).

In this analysis, military or economic assistance provided by outside states within the year prior to the emergence of an ethnic rebellion was documented. The results reveal that 60% of the foreign states that furnished material assistance to ethnopolitical groups before their rebellions began were subsequently involved in conflicts that escalated. While the type of aid provided was not statistically significant, the most common form was economic which comprised roughly half of these interventions. This usually entailed hosting segments of group organizations that seek to raise financial resources and generate political attention for their campaigns.

Libyan involvement with the Tuaregs of Mali and Niger predates the emergence of their rebellions (see Chapter 4). Nomadic Tuaregs from these countries migrated to Libya in the 1980s to escape massive droughts. Some joined the Libyan army while
others received military training from the government. Military support from the Tripoli regime was vital in allowing the Tuaregs to challenge the authorities of their host states and for hostilities to increase in the Niger conflict. A settlement negotiated under the auspices of Algeria and Burkina Faso did temporarily halt the violence in Mali two years after the rebellion arose. In Indian-held Kashmir, various forms of military and economic assistance from the Pakistani government, including the provision of training camps in Pakistan-administered Azad Kashmir, facilitated the mobilization of various rebel groups that subsequently launched violent attacks against the Indian authorities. During the first two years, the challenge posed by the Kashmiri militants resulted in a more widespread and destructive conflict.

Further study is required to confirm the findings of this hypothesis and to map out the various implications for both conflict prevention and management. For example, the forms of assistance provided to the participants in potentially conflictual situations could be expanded to include political measures that seek to support a specific party or attempt to avert overt violence. In addition, greater monitoring of these actors by the international community can help limit, if not eliminate, outside support that can further fuel potentially explosive situations. Active measures by regional and international organizations or other state actors might be required to convince these potential intervenors to curtail their activities.

**Economic and Mixed Assistance**

It was hypothesized that economic support would not exert a significant influence as traditional measures such as sanctions and the provision of financial aid usually
require an extended time period in order to be effective. Governments can often circumvent sanctions and they are also viewed as being most effective against countries that are integrated in the global economic system. It is also only in recent years that economic restrictions are being applied against insurgent groups; the US designation against organizations that are reported to engage in or support terrorist activities is one example. However, this study reveals that around 30% (20/63) of the foreign state interventions in conflicts that escalated utilized economic means.

The most likely reason is that the main form of economic assistance was a category that is not typically included in most studies but which is gaining increasing attention since the early 1990s – the hosting of exile organizations and/or the provision of access to external markets and communications. A Rand study draws attention to this aspect of international involvement by noting that diasporas, which are often based in western countries, are increasingly becoming the most active international supporters of insurgent groups through their provision of financial resources and/or their ability to publicize a group’s causes (Byman et al., 2001).

The separatist rebellions by the Uighurs in China and the Acehnese in Indonesia escalated two years after they began. In both of these disputes, the only type of outside state assistance was in the form of access to external markets and the hosting of group organizations. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey contain minority Uighur populations and group organizations have actively sought to further the goals of their kindred in northwestern China. The Acehnese have kin in neighboring Malaysia and the organization’s headquarters in-exile is based in Sweden where the Free Aceh (GAM) leader Hasan Tiro resides.
Mixed forms of assistance involve the supply of various combinations of military, economic, and political assistance. Overall, they also account for around 30% of the interventions in conflicts where we witnessed a greater degree of armed violence. In contrast, Regan’s analysis of 196 interventions in 85 intrastate conflicts from 1944-94 reveals that a mixed strategy that employs military and economic measures is the most successful in reaching at least a temporary cessation of hostilities. As with his study, this research also discovers that the most frequent form of mixed aid was a combination of military and economic assistance. The Kurdish rebellion in Iraq in 1980 is an example where Syria and Iran, both of whom are regional powers, utilized military and economic means to assist the rebels whose anti-state violence increased across the first two years.

The contradictory nature of the findings on the impact of mixed types of aid warrants more research. This study associates its provision with conflict escalation whereas Regan finds that it facilitates resolution efforts. In addition, the linkages between economic, and secondarily, mixed forms of assistance and conflict escalation need to be made more explicit. For example, the Uighurs and the Acehnese were able to escalate their violence against what are considered to be large and powerful Third World states. There is a need for greater distinctions between the different types of economic aid, especially some of the less studied forms such as hosting exile organizations. More discriminating scales that take into account the varying levels of economic assistance will also help further our knowledge.
Areas for Future Research

Past Political Activism

Prior activism by ethnopolitical groups is reported to potentially influence their future political activities. For instance, self-determination groups that have previously resorted to violence against the authorities of a state are 60% more likely to utilize this same tactic if hostilities resume (Quinn and Gurr, 2003, 36). Earlier experiences can also refine the strategies used in the most recent phase in an effort to achieve the greatest possible impact. The results of this analysis were inconclusive. The crosstabulation of a group’s earlier history of rebellion and the degree of violent hostilities in its most recent conflict does not meet statistical standards. However, some two-thirds of ethnic groups that were politically active in the recent past were engaged in conflicts that escalated.

The findings suggest the need for further studies based on a larger number of internal wars. It would also be useful to clarify whether prior activism is more relevant in relation to separatist conflicts or internal power struggles or whether a history of rebellion can sow the seeds for future rebellion, regardless of the issues involved.

Regime Type

The relationships between regime type and the propensity for both intrastate and interstate conflict have received much attention from scholars and policymakers. Most of the focus is on democratic political systems and how interstate wars among these countries are largely nonexistent. Established democratic and autocratic regimes are also expected to be less likely to suffer from outbreaks of civil war (Licklider, 1993; Hegre et
al., 2001). However, when internal rebellions occur, they are more violent in democratic rather than in authoritarian systems (Saideman et al., 2002). The potential impact of state repression was not included as in all of the twenty-nine conflicts these measures were utilized. Thus, it was assumed to be a constant.

Whether democratic, authoritarian, incoherent, or failed states are more likely to witness higher levels of domestic violence cannot be adequately addressed. One issue is the small number of conflicts which limits the ability to generalize any results. But there are some features that warrant further consideration. For example, autocracies were equally likely to be involved in disputes that escalated, stalemated, or decreased in violence. Also, all five of the incoherent regimes – those that include a mix of both democratic and autocratic characteristics – were associated with conflicts that exhibited greater levels of violence.

**Ethnic Linkages**

Given the number of recent studies that address the nature of ethnic linkages between outsiders and domestic combatants and their potential impact on foreign policy, and intrastate and interstate conflict, it was expected that ethnic ties would matter. The existence of ethnic groups that straddle state boundaries is reported to increase the chances of intervention by neighboring states – these are referred to as affective interventions by Suhrke and Noble (1977a). Further, interstate hostilities are higher when an ethnic group holds power in a state that borders a country facing an insurgency by the same ethnopolitical group (Davis et al., 1997).
Two types of ethnic linkages were considered. The first examined ethnic commonalities between the dominant group that comprises the regime of an intervenor state or nondominant groups in the intervenor state and the domestic combatants. The second looked at whether support was provided from ethnic kin in neighboring states. Cross-tabulations of both of these relationships and a conflict’s degree of violence were highly non-significant. Some secondary patterns were however evident. Of the nineteen interventions that occurred in conflicts that escalated, the intervenor states were all populated by nondominant groups that were related to the rebelling group. Both Syria and Iran, for instance, contain significant Kurdish minorities. Military and/or economic assistance was supplied by these two countries to the Iraqi and Turkish Kurds. Further, assistance from ethnic kin is largely a post-Cold War phenomenon, but controlling for the bipolar rivalry does not reveal any relationship between this aid and changes in the degree of violent hostilities.

These results point in a number of directions. First, the non-results about the impact of kindred group support are in line with a study by Gurr and Marshall which finds that while support from kindred groups increases the chances that there will be a rebellion, it is not related to the subsequent escalation of a conflict (2000, 258-59). Second, further research is needed to determine why the expected effect of affective ties between intervenor states and the domestic parties was not associated with conflict escalation.
Political Assistance

The potential impact of political forms of assistance – conceived of as various forms of informal and formal mediation – was also not able to be properly considered as during the first two years of each ethnopolitical conflict, there were only nine interventions that solely utilized political means while another eight incorporated various combinations of political, military, and economic types of aid. Five negotiated settlements were reached two years after the disputes began. These include the Sikhs in India, the Tuareg in Mali, the Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea, the Tutsis in Rwanda, and the Acholi in Uganda. Some of these were contested by rebels who rejected the agreements. Chapter 5 discussed the temporary settlements in Mali and Papua New Guinea, which did set the stage for future comprehensive agreements that halted violent hostilities.

Geographic Location

Half of the conflicts in this study arose in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the location where a dispute occurs does not appear to influence its violent potential. The frequency and destructiveness of rebellions in Africa in the 1990s has generated much attention from scholars and likely not enough from policymakers. But conflicts that escalated two years after the onset were just as probable in Africa as in the remaining regions of the Third World. Instead, what is more interesting is that the majority of interventions in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America occurred in insurgencies that escalated. In Africa, we appear to have a pattern of outside involvement that results in a stalemate or lower levels of violence. A closer analysis of the specific conflicts could
help to draw out some case specific or regional features that can be used to explain the above pattern.

Limitations Of This Study

As with any other study, there are limitations that need to be acknowledged. The first relates to the number of conflicts that were examined. Various criteria were utilized to ensure that the disputes had as many common characteristics as possible so that the effects of the independent variables could be considered. Numerous databases and compilations of armed conflict were also consulted to confirm that the internal wars were representative of those documented in other sources. Conflicts that were sustained for more than two years were included along with new episodes of rebellions, where in most instances, there had been a 5-10 year hiatus. Further, as the focus was on disputes in which there was at least one external state intervening on behalf of the ethnopolitical group, insurgencies in which there were no interventions or those where outside states only assisted the host state were excluded. Surprisingly, there were so few of these instances. The Mayan rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico in mid-1994 met the criteria but only the government received foreign state support. The Ijaw insurrection in Nigeria in the 1990s did not engage any external countries. This finding highlights the prevalence of outside state involvement in domestic insurgencies in the past two decades. The vast majority of ethnopolitical conflicts appear to be internationalized.

Violent disputes that ended within the first year of their emergence were excluded. It must be noted however, as Chapter 3 discusses, an examination indicated that there was minor outside involvement in only a few of these short-lived contentions.
In addition, the geographic scope was limited to the traditional notion of the Third World. Again, the rationale was to ensure enough commonalities among these states to facilitate comparisons. The result was however that the proliferation of ethnic conflicts in Russia and the post-communist states during the 1990s was excluded. The drawbacks are that the results of certain hypotheses are conditional on the number of internal wars and the use of more refined statistical techniques such as logistic regressions was not feasible.

Further, as the focus was on the first two years after violent hostilities arose, there was not an adequate assessment of management efforts as many of these occur years after a dispute begins, often when the high casualty tolls attract international attention. In particular, the role of international and regional organizations could not be considered as there were too few instances of their involvement. Across the first two years, the United Nations engaged in six ethnopolitical conflicts while regional organizations such as the OAU (now African Union), SADC, and a Commonwealth Observer and Monitoring Group were involved in four disputes. Most of these instances were concentrated in Africa, especially in the Great Lakes region, and involved the countries of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Future studies that incorporate a longer time horizon can hopefully assess the relative impact of external state interventions and management efforts by regional or international organizations.

The role of nonstate actors in conflict management was also not examined. This appears to be a more important issue in the post-Cold War era as various types of nongovernmental organizations along with prominent individuals are attempting to help settle intrastate disputes. In the Acehnese rebellion in Indonesia, an NGO, the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Center, has been critical in trying to mediate an agreement. In the
latter part of the 1990s, Nelson Mandela took an active role in trying to promote a settlement among the Hutus and the Tutsis in Burundi.

**Contributions and Future Research Agenda**

Despite these limitations, this study has furthered our knowledge about the impact of external state interventions on the trajectory of internal conflicts. While there are numerous empirical and case studies that examine foreign state interventions, many do not emphasize how these actions influence domestic dynamics. This dissertation attempts to redress this imbalance by looking how the involvement of outsiders influences the degree of violence of ethnopolitical conflicts. The framework accounts for the most relevant group, host state, and conflict characteristics that can also potentially impact on the level of violent hostilities.

This study’s contributions draw attention to several key issues (see Table 6.1). It confirms our existing expectations about the prevalence of the provision of military assistance and the assumption that states that border a country facing an insurgency are the most frequent intervenors. The potential impact of systemic change could be analyzed given the inclusion of both the 1980s and 1990s decades. During the Cold War, conflicts were much more likely to escalate and major and regional powers were the primary intervenors. In contrast, our current era is characterized by disputes that are either in a stalemate or de-escalate. The main actors in escalating conflicts are now neighbors which brings forth the localized nature of these disputes. And contrary to some expectations, when outside states ratchet up their assistance, a higher level of hostilities is not the usual outcome.
The conventional wisdom about some aspects of interventions and domestic dynamics is called into question. The type of groups involved in internal disputes can influence both the degree of outside support they receive and their ability to violently challenge the authorities of a host state. Groups that want autonomy or independence (ethnonationalists) were highly likely to be involved in insurgencies that escalated, despite the views of many scholars that territorial claims would dampen external assistance and thereby limit an ethnonationalist group’s mobilization and activism. The impact of neighboring state interventions was discussed above – it must be noted that the results, while they are contingent on the Cold War variable – also raise questions about general claims that these actors usually exacerbate conflicts in their immediate vicinities.

There were differential impacts depending on the types of assistance provided by external states. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, military aid is not associated with conflicts that escalate. Rather, economic and mixed forms of support are more common in disputes with higher levels of violence. This finding, as discussed earlier, raises a number of areas for future research. Finally, engagement by outside states prior to the emergence of a rebellion facilitates greater future violence. This little-studied aspect suggests not only that further research of these various aspects is required but also that the international community needs to increase its monitoring and involvement with regards to the activities of states in the neighborhood of potentially conflictual areas.

My plan is to extend this study to further refine and test some of the results and to also expand its scope to create a more comprehensive database on ethnopolitical conflicts and external interventions. The involvement of nonstate actors is particularly relevant. While various humanitarian and other nongovernmental organizations and prominent
individuals are increasingly active in conflict zones, the impact of their actions remains hotly debated. Further, conflict management efforts by the UN and regional organizations can be more adequately addressed across a larger number of cases. Towards this end, there are at least two options. The first would be an inclusion of internal wars that occurred in the West and in the post-communist states during the 1980-2000 period. This would allow for a global analysis while also facilitating comparisons between the nature and dynamics of interventions across different regions. Another possibility would be to expand the types of intrastate conflicts that are considered. The inclusion of violent ideologically based conflicts could allow for an examination of potential differences in the patterns of intervention and the effects on a conflict’s level of violence across the two types of internal disputes. It is my hope that gaining greater knowledge about the intricacies of external state interventions and their varied effects will further our work towards both conflict prevention and management.
### Appendix 1: Conflict Status One and Two Years After Onset

#### Status of Conflict One Year After Onset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase In Rebellion</th>
<th>Same/Decrease in Rebellion</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hutus - Burundi</td>
<td>Cabindans - Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kashmiris - India</td>
<td>Lhotshampas - Bhutan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikhs - India</td>
<td>Uighurs - China</td>
</tr>
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<td>Acehnese - Indonesia</td>
<td>Tutsis - Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurds - Iraq</td>
<td>Afars - Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuareg - Mali</td>
<td>Oromo - Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Assamese - India</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohajirs - Pakistan</td>
<td>Bodos - India</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Hutus - Rwanda</td>
<td>Tuareg - Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diola/Casamance - Senegal</td>
<td>Tutsis - Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sri Lankan Tamils - Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Tutsis - Rwanda</td>
</tr>
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<td>Southerners - Sudan</td>
<td>Issaq - Somalia</td>
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<td>Acholi - Uganda</td>
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#### Status of Conflict Two Years After Onset

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### Status of Conflict Both One and Two Years After Onset

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### Appendix 2: Key Intervention Features

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<th>Intervenor Type</th>
<th>Year 2 Aid</th>
<th>Year 2 Intensity</th>
<th>Year 2 Recipient</th>
<th>Prior Involvement</th>
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<th>Year 2 Recipient</th>
<th>Prior Involvement</th>
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** Interventions that solely utilize political measures are not coded on the intensity variable as the scale does not include any political techniques. Further, interventions that employ mixed means that include a political component are also not coded for this variable.
### Appendix 3: Group, Host State, and Conflict Characteristics

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<td>Assamese</td>
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<td>Post-CW</td>
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<td>Feb. 1989</td>
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<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Same/Decrease</td>
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<td>Dec. 1989</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Increase</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Group Type</td>
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<td>Prior Rebellion</td>
<td>Host Regime Type</td>
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<td>Rebellion Level Year Two</td>
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<td>Oct. 1983</td>
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<td>Kurds</td>
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<td>Tuareg</td>
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<td>Miskito</td>
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<td>Increase</td>
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<td>Post-CW</td>
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<td>Issaq</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Group Type</td>
<td>Rebellion Start Date</td>
<td>Prior Rebellion</td>
<td>Host Regime Type</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Rebellion Level Year Two</td>
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<td>Southerners</td>
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<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Aug. 1984</td>
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<td>Democracy</td>
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<td>Increase</td>
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<td>Acholi</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Communal Contender</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<td>Same/Decrease</td>
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<td>Ndebele</td>
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<td>Feb. 1982</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Incoherent</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Increase</td>
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Appendix 4: Ethnopolitical Conflicts and Interventions Codesheet

A. General Information

V. 1 COW Country Code ___________
V. 2 Date Coded ________________
V.3 Brief Description of Intervention __________________________________________
V.4 Region Where Conflict Occurs _________

B. Group Characteristics

V.5 Group Name ________________________
V.6 Group Type ____________
V.7 When did rebellion first break out (reb>1): ___________________ (month/year)
V.7a MAR Rebellion score for year it began:__________
V.8 When did rebellion end (reb = or < 1): ________________ (note if ongoing)
V.9 Status of conflict 2 to 2 years after rebellion began:
V10 Was a peace agreement reached with a significant faction of the group between 1985-mid-2001? If so when (month/year) and did it hold: __________

C. Host State Characteristics (year rebellion starts)

V.11 Name of Host State ______________________________
V.12 Polity Democracy Score ______
V.13a Polity Autocracy Score _______
V.13b Polity Score ______
V.14 Note if there were any major regime changes one year prior to the outbreak of violence and up to 2 years after violence began
V.15 Power of State:
Regional Power ________
0 No
1 Yes

V.16 Number of Contiguous States ________

D. Conflict Characteristics

V.17 Protracted Conflict ________
(1945>, conflicts in which groups undertake anti-state terrorism or rebellion to promote or defend their collective interests in three successive five-year periods (Gurr 1992:5) (rebellion 2 and above).
0 No
1 Yes

V.18 Any Previous Episodes of Armed Conflict (post-1945): _____
0 No
1 Yes

V.19 Dates of Latest Previous Episode of Armed Conflict: ________

V.20 Duration of Latest Previous Episode of Armed Conflict: ________ years

V.21 Prior External State Interventions: ________
(in the one year prior to the outbreak of rebellion)
0 None
1 Bilateral, one intervenor
2 Bilateral, more than one intervenor
3 Bilateral and multilateral

V.21a Note intervenors and dates of involvement, form(s) of aid, and if one-time or sustained:
E. Bilateral Intervention Characteristics (for the year of the first intervention after the rebellion is underway. If the first intervention is underway prior to the outbreak of violence, note above in prior interventions and date on this sheet to month/year rebellion began) * Separate Pages Required for Each Intervenor

V.22 Date of First Interventionary Action(s) (month/year) __________

V.23 Date of Last Interventionary Action(s) (month/year) __________
(If prior to end of two years after rebellion began)

V.24 Name of Intervenor State ___________________________

V.24a Note if this intervenor state was previously providing regular military or economic aid to the host state in the year prior to the outbreak of the rebellion

V.24b Did the state intervene prior to the outbreak of the rebellion:______
0 No
1 Yes

V.25 Type of Intervenor State: __________
1 Major Power
2 Regional Power
3 Neighbor (COW defines neighbors as contiguous states or those separated by water by 150 miles or less)
4 Regional State
5 Other State (note type)

V.26 Neighbor and Regional Power ______
0 No
1 Yes

V.27 Non-TW Middle Power ______
0 No
1 Yes

V.28 Region in Which Intervenor is Located: __________

V.29 Number of Contiguous States to Intervenor __________
V.30a Polity Democracy Score (year of first intervention) _______

V.30b Polity Autocracy Score (year of first intervention) _______

V.31 Democ-Autoc Score (Polity):__________

V.32 Note if there were any major regime changes in the intervenor state one year prior to the outbreak of violence and up to 2 years after violence began.

V.33 Ethnic Affinity Link: _______
0 No relationship
1 Dominant group of intervenor regime is ethnically related to group embroiled in conflict
2 Regime of intervenor state is ethnically related to regime in embroiled state
3 Non-dominant group in intervenor state is ethnically related to group in embroiled state

V.34-5 MAR Rebellion Score _______ (year of first intervention for each intervenor)
International/Regional Organization Involvement:
(1 year prior to and up to 2 years after rebellion began)

V.37 UN Involvement: _________
0 No
1 Yes

Month/Year of first involvement:_______

Month/Year of end of involvement (if prior to 2 years after rebellion began):_______

(Specifics are noted on transnational support pages)

V.38 Regional Organization Involvement: _________
0 No
1 Yes

Name of Organization: ________________________________

(Specifics are noted on transnational support pages)

Year of first involvement:_______

Year of end of involvement (if prior to 2 years after rebellion starts):_______
Transnational Support for Communal Group (list sources, years, types of aid)

A. Exile organizations. Give name and country(ies) in which based:

B. Organized kindred groups in neighboring country(ies). Identify countries:

C. Nongovernmental organizations other than those identified above. Identify:

D. Regional and international organizations. Identify:

E. Foreign governments:

Transnational Support for Host State

B. Organized kindred groups in neighboring country(ies). Identify countries:

C. Nongovernmental organizations other than those identified above. Identify:

D. Regional and international organizations. Identify:

E. Foreign governments:
F. Outcome of Interventionary Action(s) Variables

Variable 1: Level of Rebellion

1 year before rebellion starts: ______
6 months before rebellion starts: ______
When rebellion starts: ______
6 months after rebellion began: ______
1 year after rebellion began: ______
1 years after rebellion began: ______
2 years after rebellion began: ______

Variable 2: Management of Conflict

0 No management efforts
1 Unilateral ceasefires announced
2 Joint ceasefires announced
3 Offers to open negotiations
4 Negotiations initiated/restarted
5 Negotiated settlement reached

When rebellion starts: ______
6 months after rebellion began: ______
1 year after rebellion began: ______
1 years after rebellion began: ______
2 years after rebellion began: ______
### Variable 3: Strategic Outcomes of Armed Conflict: Government Side

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Strategic outcome indeterminate</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near-victory by government, limited armed opposition continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strategic victory by government, armed opposition ceases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When rebellion starts: ______
6 months after rebellion began: _____
1 year after rebellion began: _____
1 years after rebellion began: _____
2 years after rebellion began: __________

### Variable 4: Strategic Outcomes of Armed Conflict: Group Side

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Strategic outcome indeterminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near-victory by group, government remains in power but makes major concessions to group (e.g. regional control, autonomy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strategic victory by group, group gains independence (de facto or recognized) or captures control of the central government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When rebellion starts: ______
6 months after rebellion began: _____
1 year after rebellion began: _____
1 years after rebellion began: _____
2 years after rebellion began: __________
### Types of Intervention and Assistance on behalf of Minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>ideological encouragement (diplomatic and political statements, propaganda campaigns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>nonmilitary financial support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>access to external communications, markets, transport (including hosting nonviolent exile organizations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>funds for military supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>cross-border sanctuaries for armed fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>military training in exile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>military equipment, supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>advisory military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>peacekeeping observers, units in country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>blockades, interdiction against regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>rescue missions in country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>active combat units in country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>cross-border raids in support of dissidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>sanctions against the regime because of its policies towards the group (specify if military or economic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>mediation (specify if formal and informal including hosting talks, facilitation, provision of good offices, observer missions, special envoys)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>provision of safe havens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>hosting refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>other (specify, e.g. withdrawal of economic aid, if separate from economic sanctions)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Types of Intervention and Assistance on behalf of the Host State

32 = nonmilitary financial support
34 = funds for military supplies
36 = military training
37 = military equipment, supplies
38 = advisory military personnel
40 = peacekeeping observers, units in country
42 = active combat units in country
47 = mediation (formal and informal, including hosting talks, facilitation)
50 = humanitarian aid
51 = common border security measures (e.g. initiating or increasing joint border patrols)
55 = other (specify)
Types of Intervention and Assistance on behalf of both the Minority and the Host State

61 = ideological encouragement (diplomatic and political statements, propaganda campaigns)
62 = nonmilitary financial support
64 = funds for military supplies
66 = military training
67 = military equipment, supplies
68 = advisory military personnel
70 = peacekeeping observers, units in country
72 = active combat units in country
77 = mediation (formal and informal including hosting talks, facilitation)
79 = hosting refugees
80 = humanitarian aid
82 = logistical support (e.g. transportation, communications)
83 = disarming and demobilizing forces
84 = facilitating return and resettlement of refugees
85 = military or police retraining
86 = observation missions, including supervising elections
87 = rebuilding of infrastructure
88 = rebuilding civil administration (includes assistance in drafting new laws, constitution, training of the judiciary)
89 = promoting reconciliation between parties (e.g. truth commissions, community-level meetings, education)
95 = other (specify)
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