THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL PARTY CHAIRMAN

FROM HANNA TO FARLEY

by

Marie Chatham

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

1953
Marie Chatham, Ph. D., 1953,
"The Role of the National Party Chairman From Hanna to Farley,"
Approved:

Franklin L. Burdette,
Professor and Head,
Department of Government and Politics,
University of Maryland.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL PARTY CHAIRMAN</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE SELECTION OF THE NATIONAL PARTY CHAIRMAN</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AND THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATION IN THE FIELD</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AND PARTY FINANCE</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. THE PROBLEMS OF CAMPAIGNING</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AS PATRONAGE DISPENSER</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AND THE CANDIDATE</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN BETWEEN NATIONAL CONVENTIONS</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AND THE NATIONAL CONVENTION</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CHAIRMAN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX I</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX II</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX III</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX IV</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL PARTY CHAIRMAN

Some years ago Charles F. Taft issued this invitation to Archie Butt: "Sometime when you are in Cincinnati come to the third floor of my home and I will show you how Presidents are made." How many interesting speculations this intriguing offer arouses! What would Charles Taft have shown the president's secretary? Would it have been an ideal organization plan? Would it have been a shaft of receipts? Would it have been Teddy's "Big Stick"? Or would the two men have looked upon the usual attic scene, a medley of many things.

Whatever it was that the third floor of the Taft home contained, one thing can be sure, if it had to do with the making of a Republican president, the national chairman of the Republican party had had an important, if not a leading part in it. In a federal form of government, it is necessary to find a solution to the problem of coordinating the efforts of the constituent states for the extra-constitutional features, no less than for the constitutional features of governing. Within the political party, the coordinating medium is the chairman of the National Committee. His headquarters are to the party what the communication center is to the army.

The role of the national chairman developed slowly and uncertainly in the United States. It was formalized strangely late in the history of political parties, not appearing in the Democratic party, where it was introduced, until sixteen years after that party had held its first National Convention. However, prototypes of the national chairman must have existed in the United States early in the nineteenth century. Henry Minor traced a nation-wide political committee for the purpose of coordinating campaign activities in the presidential elections as far back as 1804. A fair claim to the title of precursor of the national chairman might be made for Charles Willing Hare, who on June 2, 1808 wrote a letter which has the ring of a call to a national committee preparatory meeting:

whether you determine to nominate a federalist or to support General Clinton the time has nearly arrived, at which in the event of its being determined to support a federal candidate, some previous arrangements should be made.

The caucuses had supplied the coordinating mechanism during their existence. After they came into ill repute, it was discovered that some other similar agency needed to be created. Attempting to fulfill the popular demand for the democratization of the party, the Democratic-Republican caucus in 1808 appointed

---


a committee of correspondence composed of one member from each state. The chairman of that committee, whoever he might have been, like the chairman of former correspondence committees, had to fulfill functions which were later allotted to the national chairman.

Another early claimant for the precursor to the national chairman might be found in the chairmen of the central committees which developed at the national level around 1830. These committees were similar to the caucus, except in name. They were unformalized at first. Andrew Jackson's Kitchen Cabinet of Amos Kendall, Isaac Hill, Martin Van Buren, and William J. Lewis constituted such a committee, with Lewis filling the role of campaign manager now filled by the national chairman.

Apparently slow to come to the realization that a committee appointed by the National Convention would not have the onus that a caucus committee would have, the party leaders moved cautiously toward the formalization of the central committee. Such a committee was, however, an accepted fact by 1844. James A. Farley, chairman of the National Committee of the Democratic party from 1932 to 1940 tells of a letter he possesses indicating that such a committee was created during the campaign

---


of James K. Polk. Written by Robert J. Walker, "the Wizard of Mississippi," and the leader of the pro-annexation faction within the party, this letter informed a friend that Walker had been appointed chairman of the Central Committee. Walker, however, cannot be credited with being the first national chairman, for the Central Committee of 1844 was not a national committee inasmuch as it was comprised of only fifteen members, not all of the states of that day being represented.

Probably because a central committee had proved its worth, Benjamin Hallett of Massachusetts made a motion at the 1848 Democratic convention that another central committee of fifteen be formed, in order "to promote the democratic cause." With the thought of greater western participation in the party councils, undoubtedly, a western delegate to the National Convention, Senator Jesse Bright, suggested that the motion be amended to include one member from each state. The National Committee had come into being. To the Democrat, Benjamin Hallett, the chairman of that committee, then, goes the honor of being the first holder of the title of national chairman.

---

6 Interview with James A. Farley, July 7, 1952. See also James A. Farley "History and Functions of the National Committee," an address given before the American Political Science Association in Philadelphia, Penna. on December 29, 1933. Reprint in Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.


8 Official Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention, Baltimore, June 1-5, 1852, p. 4.

Four years later, the Whig party, close to the end of its short existence, also appointed a National Committee and a national chairman. For the role of chairman, they chose Samuel Vinton. Benefiting from the experiences of the Democratic party and of the Whig party, the Republicans appointed a National Committee and a national chairman at their Philadelphia convention on June 17, 1856. The younger party reversed the procedure usual among the Democrats and appointed an executive committee before it appointed a national committee. Edwin D. Morgan, the chairman of the Executive Committee, became also chairman of the National Committee and therefore the first Republican to have this honor.

Even while national committees were being created, the dissension which was later to culminate in the Civil War was splitting the parties into many factions. But, apparently, party control remained with one faction in each party, for in both parties there was much greater continuity in the role of

---


national chairman than has been the case in the twentieth cen­
tury. August Belmont, for example, was elected chairman of
the Democratic National Committee in 1860 and headed the
party hierarchy for three successive terms. He was followed
by William H. Barnum who was elected in 1876 and served for
four consecutive terms. The Republican record of continuity
did not extend over so long a period, but Edwin D. Morgan, the
first Republican national chairman, served for three consecutive
terms and returned after an absence of eight years to serve a
fourth term in 1872.

Not to this day has the role of the national chairman
been clearly defined. A comparative analysis of the operations
of the various chairmen indicates that their role is dependent
upon the concept of the individual chairman in respect to the
role. Definite functions are, of course, anticipated of the
national headquarters of the National Committee. These functions
are similar in both parties. In connection with the campaigns,
the headquarters direct and supervise the presidential campaigns
and assist in the congressional campaigns. In connection with
the convention, they issue the call of the convention, they
set the time and place of the convention, and they make all
necessary physical arrangements for it. They also prepare a
temporary roll of delegates for the use of the Credentials
Committee of the National Convention and provide a roster of

14Smith, op. cit., p. 11. See also Official Proceedings
of the Republican National Convention, Chicago, 1860. (Albany:
 Weed Parsons & Co.), p. 143.
temporary officers for the use of the Committee on Organization of the National Convention.

Nevertheless, among these functions, it is the national chairman, himself, who determines just what role he will play in executing them. Conceptions of their individual roles have varied to a great extent. The only generalizations that may be made in respect to the execution of the functions of the national headquarters by the chairman are that the national chairman performs: (1) those functions expected of national headquarters which he prefers to perform; (2) those functions expected of national headquarters which he must perform, either because they require the prestige of the national chairman for their effective performance, or because they have been incorrectly or unwisely performed by some of his subordinates. As Jesse Macy pointed out years ago "a large part of the National committee's work is of such a nature that it can be done only by one man acting on individual initiative." In the last analysis, the responsibility for all the functions of the National Committee and of the national headquarters lies with the national chairman.

Relatively simple were the tasks of the chairmen in the early days. A strong resemblance can be noted between the functions of these early chairmen and their predecessors, the chairmen of the correspondence committees; but this fact is not strange in view of the still limited transportation facilities

---

in the middle of the past century. There were no permanent headquarters until well into the twentieth century, and the chairmen of the earlier period remained for the most part in their home states—Hallett in Massachusetts, Robert McLean in Maryland, and David Smalley in Vermont. Matters that needed to be handled from a central point were handled in Washington by a residence committee, another second cousin to the caucus.

The functions that the early national chairman are recorded as fulfilling are more closely related to the convention than to the campaign. This situation is understandable when it is reflected that two of the main reasons for the creation of the National Committee had to do with the convention: (1) to solve the problem of the calling of the convention; and (2) to make the necessary preparations for it. The first three Democratic conventions were called together by the New Hampshire legislature. This arrangement resembled too closely that of the caucus. Furthermore, the electorate was enlarging, and the physical arrangements for the convention were becoming more of a burden. There was, therefore, a need for greater advance planning. What the first conventions must have been without a National Committee and a national chairman can be judged only by the confusion that existed in 1852 despite the preparatory


work of the national chairman. Signitaries without seats of honor, and delegates without any seats milled around the harassed national chairman.

Sub-committees had come to the national level as heritages of the state committees. There were within the early National Committees such committees as the Committee of the Convention, the Citizens' Committee, composed as the name implies, of hometown folk of the convention city, a Committee on Superintendence, and what was probably the forerunner of the Committee on Arrangements, a committee "on the place of holding and the mode of constituting and calling the next Democratic National Convention." There was also a Committee on Platforms which turned out to be just that—a committee to strengthen the dais.

One of the perpetual headaches of the national chairman, lasting to this day, is the fact that the states continue to send more delegates and alternates to the National Convention than are anticipated. Whatever time the national chairmen of those days had for the manipulation incidental to the role of coordinator must have been found before or after the convention.

Throughout the nineteenth century there were not only the usual factional disputes over political and economic matters, such as the disputes between the reformers and the non-reformers,

---

18 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1862, op. cit., pp. 3, 70.
19 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1862, op. cit., p. 69.
and between the hard-money and the soft-money men, but there were constantly present the undercurrent disputes remaining from the Civil War. Tracing the national chairmen in and out of these many factional fights comprises a large volume in itself as Ralph Goldman's research has proved.

Partly as a result of this factional competition and partly as a result of the pressure of public opinion controls over political parties began to develop late in the nineteenth century. Among the first controls to affect the national chairman were the Pendleton Act and the first state laws governing campaign contributions. For the most part, however, controls at the national level are a story of the twentieth century.

A notable development that did occur in the past century was the change in the relationship between the candidate and the chairman. This new relationship greatly increased the power and the responsibilities of the national chairman. In the early days of party history, the appointment of the chairman was more likely to be made with the view of conciliating opposing factions than of pleasing presidential candidates. The appointment of Robert McClane, the second Democratic national

---

20 In 1860 the Democratic party was so divided that it split into two conventions. See Jesse Macy, Political Parties in the United States, 1646-51 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1900), p. 396.

chairman, is a case in point. His father had been a member of the Jackson cabinet and it was believed that the appointment of the son would make for greater party harmony. Seniority was also a factor in both parties. Smalley, the third democratic national chairman, was the senior national committeeman returned in 1856. In 1864, the Republican party national chairman, Henry Jarvis Raymond, was selected not with the purpose of having as campaign manager a friend of the presidential candidate, but with the purpose of honoring a representative of the party actively associated with it from its birth.

The close relationship which now, ordinarily, exists between the candidate for the presidency and the chairman was not as manifest as it has been in the present century. Frequently, there would be little contact between these two men. The candidates would continue to work with their pre-convention campaign managers who were often men unaffiliated formally with the National Committee. James K. Polk, Democratic presidential candidate in 1844, had for his political adviser and campaign manager Cave Johnson, as the many letters in the Polk Papers will show. Yet, as has been seen, it was Robert Walker who


25Library of Congress, Polk MSS.
was chairman of the Central Committee. Similarly, a man who never became national chairman, David Davis, was Abraham Lincoln's campaign manager.

Abraham Hewitt was elected chairman of the Democratic National Committee "by acclamation" in 1876, but Allan Nevins, the biographer of Hewitt, claims that Samuel Tilden not only seldom consulted the party's national chairman, but that he and Hewitt often worked at cross purposes. Nor was the Hewitt-Tilden relationship peculiar to the Democratic party, for in that same election, 1876, the relationship between Rutherford B. Hayes and the Republican chairman, Zachariah Chandler, was likewise one of incomplete confidence. Governor Noyes was Hayes' personal choice for the national chairmanship, but the Stalwarts, Zachariah Chandler and James D. Cameron, boss of Pennsylvania, refused to surrender control of the party machinery and Hayes conceded the selection of Chandler. It was Noyes, however, who represented Hayes in the field as was brought out later in

---


28 *Official Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention, St. Louis, 1876* (Woodward, Tiernan & Hale, 1876), p. 175.


30 Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
Nevertheless, the detachment between the national chairman and the candidate was breaking down. Two factors were responsible: (1) federal patronage was growing and with it the potential political prestige and power of the presidential candidate, with the result that the party leaders were willing to give the candidate a part in the selection of the national chairman; and (2) the National Committee was increasing in size, and there was, naturally, more factionalism within it. It was essential for the success of the party that the candidate and the chairman work together. A letter from Stephen Douglas to August Belmont, Democratic national chairman, 1860 to 1872, is very revealing of such a change: "Your conduct toward me has been so honorable and noble that I shall have no political secrets from you in the future."

By 1880, James Garfield, the Republican candidate of that year, could write:

I understand that it has been the custom of the Committee to consult the candidate on the National ticket with reference to the selection of the Chairman and Secretary because of the somewhat close and confidential relation which must exist between these officers and the candidate in the conduct of the campaign. 33


32 August Belmont, Letters, Speeches and Addresses of August Belmont (Privately printed, 1890), p. 106.

The concession on the part of the party leaders, however, did not necessarily free the candidate to select a man of his choice. For by tradition the national chairman had always been a member of the National Committee. In 1884, the National Committee of the Democratic party went so far as to entertain the following motion:

That the National Democratic Committee do hereby recommend the National Democratic Convention to authorize and empower the National Committee to elect a chairman for that Committee from outside of such Committee, if such Committee shall consider it advantageous to do so. 34

Despite the failure of this motion to pass, it was not long before both parties conceded the necessity of going outside the committee for a chairman. In 1892, the Republicans chose Thomas Carter for their national chairman. He was the first man so honored who was not a member of the National Committee. Four years later, the Democratic party followed suit, for James K. Jones, too, was an "outsider."

Late in the nineteenth century, then, it was acknowledged by both parties, although more grudgingly by the Democrats than by the Republicans, that the candidates for the presidency and


35 Fowler, op. cit., p. 221.

the vice-presidency should have a major part in the selection of the national chairman. It was further conceded that the men selected need not necessarily be members of the National Committee. Two extraneous factors had a bearing on this decision. One was the difficulty, generally, in getting men to fill the position, and the other was the accepted practice of including within the Executive Committee men who were not members of the National Committee.

Of the twenty-eight men considered in this paper, that is from Mark Hanna of the Republican party and James K. Jones of the Democratic party to John D. Hamilton of the Republican party and James A. Farley of the Democratic party, only three have been elected, strictly speaking, by the National Committee.

37 The Democratic Manual copyrighted 1943 does not include the names of two men who served as chairman. These men were George White (see *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1920*) and Homer Cummings (see *Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1916*).

The Republican Fact-Book, 1951-52 includes the name of Henry G. Payne as national chairman in 1904. If Payne were chairman, and his biographer W. W. White (see *Henry Clay Payne A Life*, Milwaukee: Burdick and Allen, 1907), claims that he was, it must have been only for a day. For he had an attack of apoplexy only six days before the convention opened, and he returned to the committee meetings only a few days before the convention. He could not have been chairman of the committee after the convention, for Cortelyou had been selected as Hanna's successor in May, 1904, and Payne died in October, 1904. (Library of Congress, Theodore Roosevelt MSS, F.F.T.). The minutes of the meetings of the Republican National Committee are not available, but the *Official Proceedings of the Thirteenth Republican National Convention, 1904*, note Payne only as vice-chairman.
These chairmen were Cordell Hull (1921-24) of the Democratic party and Will Hays (1918-1921) and Henry P. Fletcher (1934-1936) of the Republican party. All of these men were selected while their party was out of power, and all of them accepted the chairmanship during the interim between conventions.

While the differentiation between the chairmen chosen by the candidates and the chairmen chosen by the National Committee does not have too much to do with the functions of the chairman—except that ordinarily a chairman appointed between conventions does not participate as chairman in the post-conventions campaigns—it does have an effect, as will be seen in the next chapter, on the selection of the national chairman.

---

38 Hays, having been reelected as national Chairman in 1920, was an exception to this generality.
CHAPTER II

THE SELECTION OF THE NATIONAL PARTY CHAIRMAN

When Benjamin Hallett was selected as chairman of the first National Committee one hundred and four years ago, it was by a very simple process. He was the man who suggested the need of a committee, and as has happened in committees from time immemorial, he suddenly found himself chairman.

Today, the process is much more complicated. The statement frequently seen that the national chairman is elected by the National Committee is a generalization that has many exceptions and many qualifications.

Actually, the process of selection varies. It is dependent upon the time of the selection and upon the power position of the party at the time of the selection. Chairmen chosen at or near convention time are nominated by the candidate and ratified by the National Committee, as are chairman chosen by the party in power in the interim between conventions. Interim chairman chosen by the party out of power are chosen by the National Committee, a reversion to the system of selection for the national chairman when the office was first created.

Many factors enter into the selection of the national chairman. Certain of these factors are constant, that is they prevail whether the selection of the national chairman is by the candidate

---

or by the National Committee. Such factors as factionalism, political experience, and wealth are important in any event. Other factors enter into the decision, depending upon the occasion of the selection. Certain factors have more bearing in the selection of the national chairmen chosen by the candidates, while some others have more bearing in the selection of the national chairmen chosen by the National Committee. Still other factors which on the surface would seem to be significant are found upon examination to have little or no effect upon the choice.

Factions have always existed within the parties and have, therefore, always existed within the National Committee. At the end of the nineteenth century the division within both parties was between the gold and silver men. Around 1912, the division—an extension of the Populist movement—was between the progressives and the conservatives. Still later the cleavage was between the "wets" and the "drys." When the United States became a world power, a new element of factionalism was introduced and a division developed between the isolationists and the non-isolationists. Always there has been in both parties a division, now undercurrent, now surfaced, between the liberals and the conservatives. All of these factional differences have been reflected within the National Committee.

Factionalism plays a part in the selection of the national chairman both directly and indirectly. It plays a part directly in the instances where the candidate chooses one of his own faction for national chairman—the more usual case in
the present century. In such instances, the factional fight has been won or lost, at least temporarily, by the nomination of the candidate. It plays a part indirectly when the candidate chooses a chairman from an outside faction with the thought of wooing that faction to his support. Such a factor was partially responsible for the selection of Jones (1896-1904) by William Jennings Bryan. Jones had been a supporter of the candidacy of Richard P. Bland in the pre-convention days and had served as Bland’s campaign manager. His selection by Bryan for the national chairmanship had as one of its purposes the welding of the Bryan silver men and the Bland silver men into a cohesive working force for the campaign.

However, the introduction of the custom whereby the candidates chose their own pre-convention managers as national chairmen interfered somewhat with the former procedure of using the chairmanship as a means of soothing the ruffled tempers of any defeated factions. As a result, factional dissatisfaction can be noted throughout the history of both parties over the selection of the national chairman.

Dissent was particularly notable at the time of Theodore Roosevelt’s selection of George B. Cortelyou (1904-1907) as head of the party hierarchy. Similarly in 1912, Charles D. Hilles

---


(1912-1916), the choice of William Howard Taft, was unacceptable to the congressional clique of Boies Penrose and Joseph G. Cannon. These party leaders preferred William Barnum, an organization man. In 1918 George Perkins and his Progressive followers fought the selection of John T. Adams (1921-1924) who was the first choice of a dominant group within the National Committee.

Nor are the factions within the Democratic party any more amenable. For instance, the eastern faction within the Democratic National Committee accepted Thomas Taggart (1904-1908) as national chairman only reluctantly. Neither of Woodrow Wilson's selections was acceptable to important groups within the National Committee. In fact, in 1916 Wilson deliberately went outside the committee to pick Vance McCormick (1916-1919) in order to free himself from the factional entanglements within the committee. The end result was that Wilson succeeded in


5Interview with Will Hays, October 16, 1951.


annoying many of the committee members by the choice of an outsider. Not one, but many factions within the Democratic National Committee worked almost continuously to induce another chairman, George White (1920-1921), to resign.

In the interim between conventions when the party is out of power there is more opportunity for the national committee-men to fight for their choice, particularly in view of the fact that in the United States the defeated candidate is rarely successful in his efforts to be considered the leader of the party. It is on these occasions that compromise candidates for the chairmanship have their opportunity. Will Hays (1918-1921) was such a candidate chosen over John T. Adams, the original organization choice, when William Wilcox (1916-1918) resigned. Cordell Hull (1921-1924) of the Democratic party was another compromise selection chosen after White's resignation.

Political experience has been another important factor in the selection of the national chairman in the twentieth century. Most of the men who have served in the chairmanship have had previous party experience at some level, either local, state, or national. Hanna (1896-1904) was chairman of the Ohio State

---


11 Interview with Will Hays, October 15, 1951.

Finance Committee and a member of the National Committee Advisory Board before his selection as chairman by William McKinley. Harry S. New (1907-1908) was a precinct committeeman and a delegate to the 1896 convention. He and his father, John New, formed one of the few father and son teams of delegates in the history of the United States. Even before he was old enough to vote, Hays was a precinct committeeman. Hubert Work (1923-1929) was chairman of the Colorado State Committee and played an important part in the election of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge. Claudius Huston (1929-1930) was chairman of the Indiana State Committee and chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of the National Committee for one year prior to his selection as chairman. Before his selection to the chairmanship John D. Hamilton (1936-1940) had been chairman of the State Committee for Kansas for two years and had been an assistant to the national chairman.

Others among the Republican chairmen had their experience predominantly at the national level, as for example, Frank Hitchcock (1908-1909) who had been assistant secretary to the

13 Letter from Jessica Hannon, Library Secretary, Butler University to writer, March 13, 1952 containing information sent by Hilton U. Brown, a life-long friend of New's. See also Hilton U. Brown, A Book of Memories (Indianapolis: Butler University, 1951), p. 149.

14 Interview with Will Hays, October 15, 1951.


16 See Appendixes III and IV for sources for this information.
National Committee in 1904. John Hill (1909-1912) was vice-chairman of the National Committee for one year and acting chairman for two years before his appointment to head the party hierarchy. In 1912, the Republicans chose a former member of the Executive Committee and a former vice-chairman, Victor Rosewater (1912). For four years before he replaced Hayes, Adams had been a member of both the national Executive Committee and the Campaign Committee and a vice-chairman of the National Committee. The experience of Senator Fess (1930-1932) had been in the legislative sector of campaign activities, for he had served as chairman of the Congressional Campaign Committee from 1918 to 1922. Everett Sanders' (1933-1934) prior experience had been with the Speakers' Bureau of the National Committee.

Among the Democrats the same record of political experience can be found. Thomas Taggart, the Indiana state boss, had been a district and state chairman and a member of the National Executive Committee before his selection as chairman. His successor, Norman Mack (1908-1912), was a member of the Advisory and Executive Committees of the central committee and a member of the National Committee itself for eight years before his promotion to the head of the committee. Before he

17 Ibid.
18 This gentleman was referred to as the Nestor of the National Committee. He served on it continuously from 1900 until his death in 1932 and was made member emeritus shortly before his death.
relieved McCormick as chairman in 1819, Homer Cummings (1919-1920) had behind him five years' experience as vice-chairman. Clem Shaver (1924-1928) was chairman of local committees for eight years before he moved to the national scene.

One of the most important factors in the selection of the national chairman in the period after the Civil War was wealth, for the wherewithal with which to conduct the campaigns came, in those days, from the chairmen and their friends. Many millionaires can be cited in the rolls of national chairman of the nineteenth century—August Belmont, Abram Hewitt, and B. F. Jones to mention only a few. In the present century, the financial burden of a presidential campaign has been too great even for a millionaire and his friends to carry; the experience of John Raskob (1928-1932) is evidence of this fact. Moreover, the public is keeping a more wary eye upon party financing, and it resents the millionaire in the role of national chairman. However, the modern chairman is expected normally to be able, at least, to support himself during his incumbency.

The chairmen have reached this state of financial security

---

19 Interview with Clem Shaver, February 27, 1952. Shaver is apparently sensitive on the point of experience. He commented that he might have been from the country but he was not politically inexperienced.


21 Hamilton was an exception; he received a salary from the committee. Letter from John D. Hamilton to writer, October 10, 1952.
through various channels. Of the twenty-eight chairmen under consideration, fourteen of them were business men, seven in each party. Five of these men were publishers, New, Hill, and Rosewater in the Republican party, and Mack and McCormick in the Democratic party. Only one of the chairmen had a record of business failure. This experience befell Jones as a result of the Civil War; he was a native of Arkansas. In every case but one, that of Baskob, these men were full owners or partners in the business enterprises with which they were affiliated.

Several of the chairmen received law degrees, but only nine chairmen practiced law for any length of time; six of the practicing lawyers were chairman of the Republican party and three of them were chairmen of the Democratic party. Fess was an educator by profession, and he became, eventually, president of Antioch College. Work and Hill both held medical degrees, but Hill practiced for only one year. Work followed his profession, specializing in mental and nervous disorders.

---

22 Hanna, New, Rosewater, Hilles, Hill, Adams, and Butler among the Republican chairmen, and Jones, Taggart, Mack, McCormick, White, Baskob, and Farley among the Democratic chairmen.


24 Willcox, Hays, Butler, Sanders, Fletcher, and Hamilton among the Republican chairmen, and Cummings, Hull, and Shaver among the Democratic chairmen. It will be noted that there is an overlap in the occupational field. Some of the chairmen had both manufacturing experience and legal experience. Hill was a medical doctor who went into the publishing business, and New had interests both in publishing and in manufacturing.
The remainder of the chairmen spent most of their careers in government service.

Additional factors to those recorded above enter into the choice of chairmen when they are chosen by the candidates. Friendship, gratitude, participation as campaign managers in the pre-convention struggle, former professional association, and above all, loyalty to the candidate on the part of the prospective chairman have all been factors in the choice of the chairmen by the candidates.

Theodore Roosevelt expressed the idea behind the desire for a friend as campaign manager and national chairman in a letter to the Clapp Committee in which he said:

I was not willing to have any man whom I did not personally know and in whose probity I did not have complete confidence at the head of the committee. 25

Roosevelt maintained his position on this issue in spite of much criticism from party leaders. A letter he wrote to Henry C. Payne is very significant of the attitude of a strong candidate toward the selection of the national chairman:

People may as well understand that if I am to run for President, Cortelyou is to be the Chairman of the National Committee. I will not have it any other way. Please give me the name of people opposed to him....I regard opposition or disloyalty to Mr. Cortelyou as being simply disloyalty to the Republican party. 27

---

25 See Appendixes III and IV.
Gratitude, both to individuals and to combinations of particular state leaders, is frequently a factor in the selection of the chairman. Personal gratitude was one of the factors in the selection of Jones by Bryan. In his Memoirs, Bryan declares that the decision to name Jones as chairman was entirely his own. He explained that he did it because of the past efforts of Jones on the part of the silver issue, and because of Jones' part in giving Bryan the opportunity to defend the silver platform at the convention. Without this opportunity, posterity would have been deprived, for better or for worse, of the Cross of Gold Speech, without which Bryan would not have received the nomination.

This factor of gratitude is one that cannot be easily overlooked. Politicians are a loyal and, in some respects, a surprisingly sensitive group. There was, for example, much opposition to the appointment of William McCombs (1912-1916) as chairman in 1912. It seems that the roads to Sea Girt, where Woodrow Wilson had his official summer home, were a bit crowded after the convention, with the supporters of McCombs and the supporters of William McAdoo who were trying to get their man appointed as chairman. Josephus Daniels reports that he and others visited Sea Girt a few days after the convention in order to confer with Wilson about the conduct of the campaign. Recalling this visit, Daniels says:

---

Mr. Wilson evidently doubted his ability
to do teamwork and hesitated to see him in command.
And yet he held him in esteem and was appreciative of
all he had done. 29

As McCombs, himself, tells the story, Robert S. Hudspeth, the
national committeeman from New Jersey, beat the MoAdoo supporters
to Sea Girt and assured the appointment of McCombs as chairman.

There was, undoubtedly, much opposition to McCombs within
the inner circle. Some of it was caused by the ambitions of
others, and some of it resulted from a sincere belief that the
unfavorable condition of McCombs' health precluded the possibility
of his carrying on an efficient campaign. An extraneous
factor of gratitude entered into this decision, too. Many people
felt that Wilson had already shown ingratitude to State Senator
Smith of New Jersey, whom he had been accused of discarding
when he no longer needed him. As a result, the old timers in
the party recommended against any action on Wilson's part which
might indicate ingratitude as a pattern of action.

Many of the chairmen have been chosen by the candidates
partly out of gratitude for their work as pre-convention managers
and partly because of the experience they had gained and the

---

29 Josephus Daniels, *The Life of Woodrow Wilson 1856-1924*
(Chicago: The John C. Winston Company, 1924), p. 117. McCombs,
a former student of Wilson's at Princeton had been one of the
most active of the original Wilson boosters.


31 Maurice F. Lyons, *William F. McCombs: The President Maker*
(Cincinnati: The Bancroft Company, 1922), p. 144. See also
James Kerney, *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson* (New York:
friendships they had made in that position. Hanna, Cortelyou, Hitchcock, Hillas, Butler, Sanders, and Hamilton for the Republicans, and Jones (in 1900), McCombs, McCormick, Shaver, Raskob, and Farley for the Democrats, all served as campaign managers for the candidate in the pre-convention fight. Farley had already demonstrated his prowess as campaign manager at the local level, inasmuch as he had held such a position in the gubernatorial campaigns of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

So strong is the influence of the candidate in the choice of the chairman at times, that the prospective candidate for the chairmanship often takes over the office several weeks before the National Committee meets to "elect" him. Hull tells of asking Shaver to relieve him of the duties of national chairman before his election so that Hull might take a needed rest. Cortelyou, although not formally elected chairman until July, 1904, was selected by Roosevelt as early as May. Butler assumed the role of chairman long before his "election."

Despite the apparent disregard of the National Committee, the formality of an election is, nevertheless, abided by. The

32 Hoover says that he never appointed a pre-convention campaign manager, but Work was among the men "who gradually came together" and took over the pre-convention campaign. See Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), Vol. 1, p. 191.
35 Lodge, op. cit., p. 79.
usual procedure is for the national committeeman from the native state of the prospective chairman—or some friend, in the event that the future chairman happens to be the national committeeman from the state—to nominate the presidential choice for chairman. Another member seconds his nomination, after which act the sole nominee is almost always unanimously elected.

Normally, the presidential candidate's name is not mentioned, but in the case of the election of Shaver in 1924, an over-optimistic gentleman by the name of W.C. Osetton, committeeman from West Virginia, the home state of the presidential candidate and of the national chairman, presented Shaver for chairman "in behalf of the next President of the United States." That these elections are frequently carried out with "tongue in cheek" is evident from the reading of the minutes of the committee meetings. There have been two instances: one during the election of Cummings in 1919 and one during the election of Farley in 1932, where facetious remarks about the "surprise"

---


at their election were made.

Nevertheless, the selection of the chairman by the candidate is usually made after the situation in the party as a whole is taken into consideration and after consultation with the party leaders. The Bryan selection of Jones was an exception. Nevertheless, the selection of the chairman by the candidate is usually made after the situation in the party as a whole is taken into consideration and after consultation with the party leaders. The Bryan selection of Jones was an exception.

For all of his apparent dogmatism in the choice of Cortelyou for chairman, even Theodore Roosevelt was glad to have the support for the selection of Murray Crane, a power in politics at that time. There is a telegram in the Theodore Roosevelt files which throws some light on the manner of this particular selection: Cortelyou telegraphed Roosevelt as follows:

Have just been unanimously elected chairman of the National Committee and everything arranged in accordance with my wishes.

The role of the chairman in the appointment of his successor has never been defined. Cooptation was attempted by the Republican chairman during the Taft administration. Upon the resignation of Hitchcock after he became Postmaster General in 1909, the functions of the national chairman passed, as was usual, to the vice-chairman John F. Hill. Hill later became chairman. The newly selected chairman was ill at the time of his appointment—he died while still holding the office of chairman—and he appointed Rosewater as acting chairman with

---

41 Bryan, Memoirs, op. cit., p. 110.
42 Lodge, op. cit., p. 79.
the understanding with Rosewater that he was to relieve Hill of some of his burdens when the convention met. This appointment was reduced to writing and was filed with the secretary of the National Committee. In connection with this appointment, Rosewater stated:

Of course, the new chairman did not act wholly on his own motion, it was part of the understanding with Hitchcock who had made Hill vice-chairman that this contingent authority be kept within the group that had cooperated all along. That Rosewater feared that the committee, as a whole, would not approve of this manoeuvre is indicated by the fact that at the next meeting of the National Committee, Rosewater, although acting chairman by designation of Hill, did not take the chair, but let the secretary of the committee do so, until there was an opportunity for Rosewater to be elected chairman by the committee. When it assembled the committee questioned Hitchcock's appointment of Hill and Hill's appointment of Rosewater and were outspoken in their determination that such a procedure was not to be permitted to establish a precedent.

In the Democratic party, the role of the chairman in the appointment of his successor was still troubling the incumbent chairman as late as 1920. Cummings in his introductory remarks to the National Committee members at the meeting of July 5, 1920...
commented:

Normally the first meeting of the new committee would involve the election of a new chairman of the committee and other officers of the committee, and for myself I am not prepared to make any suggestions on that subject, as I have not made up my mind where my duty lies in that respect....and we have had no opportunity to consult with our candidate for President. 47

At times, sub-committees of the National Committee have been appointed formally for the purpose of conferring with the candidates on the selection of the national chairman. Hull's biographer, Harold B. Hinton, states that Hull was a member of a committee appointed to consult with James M. Cox, the presidential candidate, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, at that time the vice-presidential candidate, and that the consultants brought back with them the name of George White. Farley also appointed a committee to confer with Roosevelt on the appointment of Farley's successor as chairman in 1940. Reporting to the National Committee on this subject, Farley said:

I am going to appoint a committee who will consult with the President about the selection of my successor. I will see the President when I go to Washington next week and I will pass on to him whatever thought I have, as I have already passed on to him my views as to someone who might take the burden. 49


Farley might have been talking for general publication or for Roosevelt's ears alone. Certainly, his committee, which included himself and Flynn, did not seem to have much to say about who the next chairman was to be. For Farley states that after some effort on Roosevelt's part to get Farley to change his mind about accepting the chairmanship again, Roosevelt designated Flynn as the next national chairman. Farley said he believed that the choice of Flynn was a complete surprise to everyone present except Roosevelt and Flynn.

Whether or not the desired chairman was a member of the committee has not bothered the twentieth century candidates too much. Only eleven of the twenty-eight chairmen under consideration have been members of the National Committee at the time of their appointment; five of these men were Democrats and six of them were Republicans.

Of these eleven men three were chosen as members of the National Committee only for the term concurrent with their term as chairman. In fact, in the case of one prospective chairman, White, the election to the committee was made simply in order to remove any objections to his selection as chairman.


51 The Democratic chairmen who were members of the Committee when they were selected as chairmen were: Tughart, Mack, Cummings, White, and Hull. The Republicans who were members of the committee when they were selected as chairmen were: New, Hill, Rosewater, Adams, Butler, and Hamilton. Work was not a committee-man when he was appointed but had been from 1916 to 1920. Hill was not a committee-man when appointed, but became one in 1920 and served until 1940.
For the Democratic National Committee did not always concede in the selection of a chairman not a member of the committee. In 1916, for instance, Judge E. H. Moore put up quite a fight against McCormick, Wilson's choice for that year, solely on the grounds that he was not a member of the National Committee. Moore offered a resolution to the effect that the chairman be a member of the committee and that the candidate select a campaign committee and a campaign manager, other than the chairman, as he saw fit. The Ohio judge argued for at least "the form of consultation and conference" in the selection of the chairman, because "the self-esteem, the just dignity of the committee" should be preserved. He insisted that the president had no more interest in who the chairman of the National Committee was than did any other citizen. Moore was arguing for a cause that had been lost in the nineteenth century. The nomination of McCormick was ratified.

His position on this issue came back to haunt Moore four years later, when he and Governor Cox wanted George White for chairman, for like McCormick, White was not a member of the National Committee. The situation was handled through the resignation of Moore from the committee and the appointment of White in his place. As Henry Morgenthau expressed it, Moore had "beat the devil around the stump" to get White.


53 Ibid., p. 291.
Humorous cynicism creeps occasionally into some of these proceedings. In retelling this story, for instance, the report stated that "by a quaint and very happy coincidence, the State Committee of Ohio was here in session and promptly elected Mr. George White as a member of the Democratic National Committee."

These incidents were not isolated instances of the sensibility of the Democratic National Committee on this point. Just prior to the election of Cummings to take the place of the retiring McCormick in 1919, Mack offered a resolution providing for the election of a chairman from among the committee membership. Furthermore, a later story will show that one of the factors in the selection of Hull was his membership on the committee.

As the story of McCombs' selection indicated, the candidate cannot always act in as high-handed a manner as Roosevelt did in the selection of Cortelyou. Pressure is frequently brought upon the candidate by the various factions within the party and within the committee. A letter among the Theodore Roosevelt manuscripts indicates that William Howard Taft had contemplated something less than the top place in the party hierarchy for

---

56 Ibid., p. 460.
57 Infra, p. 39.
Hitchcock, but that Hitchcock had declared that he had pledged himself to twenty-six members of the National Committee—that he would accept nothing less than first place. In connection with this same selection, Rosewater describes a conference in the Congress Hotel in Chicago where a round robin was composed pressing upon Taft the idea of Hitchcock for chairman. Hitchcock got what he wanted, first place.

Among the twenty-eight chairman under consideration in this paper, ten were chosen in the interim between conventions. Two of these interim chairmen were Democrats and eight of them were Republicans. Seven of these men, one Democrat and six Republicans, were chosen while their party was still in power.

There is little difference in the pattern of selection between the interim chairmen chosen by the party in power and the chairmen chosen at convention time, except that the men chosen are likely to reflect greater congressional influence. Cummings, the lone interim chairman chosen by the Democratic party while it was in power, had been acting chairman for a long period and his promotion to chairman was more or less a matter of course.

58 Roosevelt MSS., loc. cit., P.F.F. Box 128, Taft to Roosevelt, July 4, 1908.

59 Rosewater, op. cit., p. 18.

60 Interim Chairmen: Democrats, Cummings and Hull; Republicans: Hill, Rosewater, Hays, Adams, Huston, Fess, and Fletcher. Those chairmen whose names are underlined were selected while their party was in power.
Of the six Republican chairmen appointed between conventions while the party was in power, one, New, was appointed by Roosevelt to relieve Sorelyou when he became Secretary of the Treasury, and two, Hill and Rosewater, were selected by Hitchcock, the former chairman, during the Taft administration. John T. Adams, vice-chairman under Hays, replaced Hays when he accepted a position from the motion picture producers.

Two of the interim chairmen chosen while the Republicans were in power were selected by Hoover: Huston to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Work and Fess to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Huston. Huston's appointment to succeed Work probably grew out of the friendship that developed between Huston and Hoover when the former was an assistant to Hoover in the Department of Commerce. When Huston resigned under pressure, the former congressional campaign chairman, Fess, was thrown into the breach.

There have been so few chairmen chosen between conventions while their party was out of power that it is not possible to establish a scheme of factors. The need to pacify dissident factions had an important bearing in two of the cases, those of Hays and of Hull. In Hull's case the Democratic National Committee was badly shaken by the results of the 1920 election and it was divided between two opposing factions. Clark Howell,

---

61 Hoover, op. cit., p. 42.
62 Infra, Chapter IX, p. 274.
one of the committeemen at the time, told later of a committee
meeting at St. Louis which had been held "to bring about the
conflicting elements that were contending at that meeting and
effect the organization of the National Committee." The con-
test for the chairmanship on this occasion was between Hull
and Breckinridge Long, but the latter was not a member of the
National Committee, and the members were still sensitive on
that point. Supporters of Long tried to emulate Moore's
strategy of 1920, but to no avail; for Ed Goltra, the committee-
man from Missouri who would have to resign to permit Long to
be appointed chairman was not as interested in Long's selection
as Moore had been in White's, and he refused to resign. Hull
proudly states that without any solicitation on his part,
both factions looked to him to fill the job. He had been on
the Executive Committee of the National Committee for many
years and, as he says, knew the inside conditions of the party
in detail.

Hays was the first interim chairman elected by the Republican
party in the present century while the party was out of power.
William Wilcox, chosen by Charles Hughes for chairman in 1916,
resigned in 1918, requiring that the National Committee fill
the vacancy. Hays claims to have been actually elected by the

64 *Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1924*, op. cit.,
p. 1190.
66 *Hull, op. cit.*, p. 113.
67 Interview with Will Hays, October 16, 1951.
National Committee. As Hays explains it, there was a split in the party between the liberals and the conservatives, and he represented the younger group which believed in the rejuvenation of the party on a more democratic basis. Hays had the unusual distinction of being re-elected after a convention which chose a new candidate. The usual procedure in such a case in the past had been to select a new chairman, but although Hays had not been Harding's campaign manager—he could not possibly have been and maintained the myth of neutrality—he was the choice of Harding, or to be more realistic, the choice of the men who did Harding's choosing.

He was not, however, the first choice to succeed Wilcox, for senators Penrose and Aldrich, at that time powers within the party organization, had decided that the vice-chairman, John I. Adams, would be moved up to the chairmanship. Unfortunately for the senatorial plans, the progressives on the committee were not in favor of Adams's candidacy, and George Perkins and the newspapers became interested and active in this minority movement. The leaders within the committee apparently thought that Adams' election was a foregone conclusion. Henry Stoddard tells of Murray Crane, another of the important senators of the period, inviting him to breakfast and asking him why Perkins was "kicking up such a fuss" when he knew that he could not defeat Adams. Stoddard goes on to say that Perkins had "a pair of deuces in the hole." The deuces were a series of letters

---

68 Interview with Will Hays, October, 16, 1961.
written by Adams from Germany in the summer of 1914 which indicated strong German sympathies. These letters had been printed in the home-town papers of Adams in Iowa. Perkins sent for them and they arrived just in time to be read to the committee before the election. Adams candidacy was withdrawn. Faced with the problem of finding a man who neither Crane nor Penrose would believe to be the other man's man, the committee chose Hays.

Fletcher came into the chairmanship as the result of the resignation of Sanders after a disagreement with the congressional campaign committees over the solicitation of funds. At this time, Hillis, the former national chairman and a power in New York politics, and his faction held a majority within the committee and elected the former ambassador to fill the role of chairman. An unexpected element is to be found in the selection of Hays and of Fletcher, for neither of these men was a member of the National Committee. Hays had, however, a record of party activity in his home state, Indiana. The biographical records of Fletcher indicate no party work other than the chairmanship, but these contributions are an important form of party activity.

One of the factors that might be expected to be significant in the choice of the national chairman has not been so in any category, that is the use of sectionalism as a balancing device.

---

Frequently both the national chairman and the candidate have been from east of the Mississippi, and quite often they have been from the same state. This situation is understandable when it is reflected that the national chairmen have frequently been pre-convention managers for the candidates. But even in the cases where the national chairman has not been the pre-convention manager for the candidate, there has still been no effort, to use the chairmanship as a counter-poise, sectionally speaking. From 1888 to 1940 in the Republican party, the chairmen have been natives of the residence state of the candidate on seven occasions. In the Democratic party, the chairman was a native of the candidate's residence state on only four occasions.

No west coast man has ever been appointed national chairman by either party. None has been native of a state farther west than Nebraska. Sorek was established in Colorado at the time of his appointment, but he had been born in Pennsylvania. Oddly enough, the man who appointed him, Hoover, also had his residence in the west.

Religion has been a factor only in the Democratic party and then only in recent years. Of the chairmen whose religious affiliations are available, none of the Republicans has been a Catholic in this century, and only one, Rosewater, has been

71 Hanna, Cortelyou, Hitchcock, Hilles, Wilcox, and Butler among the Republicans, and among the Democrats Shaver, Raskob, and Farley. Only the chairmen selected at convention time were considered in this compilation, and Hanna and Farley were included once each for each of their terms.
section would accord to some extent, this anomalous situation.

Apart from being a candidate against a chance in the method of
within the National Committee on the other hand, if the candidate
relation to the candidates on one hand and to the functions
position. For it is pleasant to an American station in
of one of the major parties that correspond the men who accept
factor in the choice of the national chairman at the base
of the National Chairman uninterested, it will be seen that the
in the selection of the chairman, as the result of the functions
action in the cases where the candidate has had the primary vote
personal loyalty to the candidates has been the major consideration.
will been factors in the selection of the national chairman.
while political experience, weight, and relation have
presumably whose political attributes are expected.

The Congressmen and Presidents have predominated among the
what a candidate will be chosen for the role by the Democrats.
been characterized. It now seems to be an understandable practice
and all committees beginning again in the reformed in 1928 have
support the party instead of the Jewish people, no J德拉
strong precedent of the Jewish people in the strong precedent
of the Jewish role. Among the Democrats in the century.
CHAPTER III

THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AND THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The national chairman is responsible for the management of the campaign and the operations of the staffs at the headquarters and in the field. He is the head of the various groups with which he works—the staff of the National Committee, the sub-committees within the National Committee, the operating divisions and bureaus at the central office and at the branch offices, and the National Committee itself.

Originally, the National Committee staff consisted of: the chairman; the secretary, who handled the routine affairs of the office; the treasurer, who handled all of the accounting; and the sergeant-at-arms. With the growth of the country has come, naturally, the growth of the staff of the national chairman. Gradually, for instance, the number of vice chairmen has been increased from one to four as regional demands for representation have become greater, and as the need for a representative of the women voters at the higher level became evident. These assistants aid the national chairman either as regional campaign

---

1In the early part of the present century, the secretary of the Republican National Committee also handled the publicity. See the McKinley MSS, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., Perry Heath to Cortelyou, Aug. 29, 1900; Sept. 27, 1900.

2The Democratic National Committee in 1928 appointed five vice-chairmen. See Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1928, op. cit., p. 443, but the more usual number in both parties has been four.
managers or as division heads; sometimes they serve in both capacities. Likewise the number of assistants to the secretary and to the treasurer were also increased as time went on, and from among the secretaries, the role of executive secretary developed. Finally, in 1930, Simeon Fess introduced the office of Executive Director. In the field of finance, too, there has been expansion, and to the lone treasurer of years ago has been added a director of finance, an auditor, a purchasing agent, and other assistants. More recently, three new officials have been added to the chairman's staff—the general counsel, the assistant chairman, and the research director.

In most cases, the need for the increased staff was real. There have been instances, however, when the title and the function fulfilled have had little or no relation. For example, the treasurer of the Democratic National Committee in 1904 testified before a congressional investigating committee that his relation to the committee was purely perfunctory. He explained that his

---


4 From information supplied by Miss Marjorie Savage who was secretary to Simeon Fess at that time. See also Republican National Committee News Letter, No. 12 (Washington, D. C. Republican National Committee), August 15, 1930.

5 The office of general counsel and of assistant chairman are first recorded by the Republican National Convention Proceedings in 1932. It is difficult to trace the development of the roles of the assistants to the national chairman, for the reason that the functions develop and are handled by someone in the office before the titles develop.
name appeared as treasurer simply because for "certain political reasons it was thought desirable in the interest of harmony" that it so appear. In a similar fashion, members of the sub-committees of the National Committee are appointed frequently either to honor the appointee or to give the sub-committee prestige.

Theoretically, the officers of the National Committee are elected by the committee members. Actually, although the method of selection has varied even within one party, the officers are rarely elected, and when an election is held it is only pro forma; one candidate is nominated, and he is unanimously elected. Usually, the sub-committee which meets with the candidates to consider the choice of the national chairman also considers the selection of the secretary. For the selection of officers other than the secretary, a variety of methods of selection has been used—appointment by the Executive Committee, appointment by some other sub-committee, and


appointment by the chairman. In fact, Raskob in a letter to the Clerk of the House of Representatives speaks of having "employed" the treasurer.

The degree to which the candidates and the national chairman share in these decisions depends upon the conditions within the party. At times, the power behind the throne is very obvious. Commenting on the choice of Urey Woodson as secretary of the National Committee of the Democratic party in 1900, Bryan said:

He is now secretary of the national committee, or was until day before yesterday, because I permitted him to be. There were protests against his reappointment four years ago, and I had some misgivings myself, but I gave him the benefit of the doubt. In fact, in both parties there is an odd mixture of oligarchy and democracy, of formality and informality in the selection of officers and officials of the national committees, growing, very likely, out of the twin problems of getting satisfactory men to fill the roles and of maintaining at least the semblance of participation by the National Committee in the selection.

In 1908, for example, William Howard Taft, William Nelson Cromwell, Frank Hitchcock, and other party leaders were obviously


engineering the decisions of the sub-committee appointed to consider the nomination of officers of the National Committee. Yet, Cromwell reminded Taft of the limitations on the power of the sub-committee. A similar caution is noted in Hill's appointment of Rosewater as vice-chairman in 1912. Hill, although assuming the power to select a vice-chairman, felt that the appointment had to be "reduced" to writing and that the notice of the appointment had to be filed with the secretary of the National Committee. Another such situation is noted in 1915 when Wilson, for some reason, tried to extend to McCombs the power to appoint a new secretary for the National Committee, even though on the original appointments to the staff and to the Executive Committee in 1912, Wilson's own hand was very evident. Writing to Wilson on this subject declining this interpretation of the power of the chairman, McCombs stated:

To make sure, I looked through the resolutions of the Committee of such meetings as have been held, as far as available, further I consulted with two of the ranking members of the Committee, one of them having been on the committee of rules and they tell me that I have no power to appoint and that the office is purely elective.

---

13 Taft MSS, Pre-Inaugural Series, Box 3, loc. cit., Cromwell to Taft, July 7, 1908.


White in testifying before the Kenyon Committee suggests a similar regard for rules and regulations and speaks of his lack of authority to fill the position of director of finance. On the other hand, Farley seemed to dispense with formality. At a meeting on January 9, 1936, he simply informed the assembled members of the National Committee that W. Forbes Morgan had been appointed secretary and that Walter J. Cummings had been treasurer since March 17, 1934.

As a normal procedure, the national chairman is less circumscribed in his appointments to the sub-committees of the National Committee than he is in his appointments to the staff; although here, too, the selection of the committeemen is a rather "fluid affair" to use the words of one of the earlier chairmen. Usually, the power to select these committees is delegated to the national chairman, but the degree of power he has is dependent upon his position in relation to the National Committee. In the Republican party in Hanna's day, it was Hanna

---

17 U. S. 66th Congress, 2d sess., Senate Hearings before sub-committee of Committee on Privileges and Elections, pursuant to Sen. Res. 397, pp. 1389, 1390. This reference will be hereinafter referred to as the Kenyon Committee.

18 Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1932, pp. 344 to 350. It should be recalled however, that a nominating committee had been designated for nomination of officers other than the national chairman and secretary at the July 2, 1932 meeting of the Democratic National Committee. See Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1932, op. cit., p. 346.

19 Interview with Homer Cummings, Democratic National Chairman, 1919 to 1920, on June 26, 1952.
who determined the membership of the Executive Committee; in Hamilton's day, there was actual election to the Executive Committee.

The number, size, and title of the sub-committees have varied under the different chairmen, depending upon the needs of the occasion and possibly upon the organizational experience of the incumbent chairman. One of the oldest of the National Committee sub-committees is the Executive Committee. It is an extremely important committee, as a rule, and one with which the national chairman is likely to deal frequently. This committee "handles matters considered insufficient to justify a meeting of the whole committee." As Rosewater explains in his "The National Committee and Its Work,"

The actual planning and execution of campaign plans really goes to a still smaller body consisting of the Chairman, and his executive committee, and the other members of the committee confine their labors to their own States for which each is usually the medium of communication and interrelation for the national body with the State organization.

The National Convention generally prescribes the number of members to be appointed to the Executive Committee, but the instructions have been ignored. The membership of this committee

---

20 McKinley MSS, loc. cit., Hanna to McKinley, June 25, 1900.
24 McKinley MSS, loc. cit., Hanna to McKinley, June 25, 1900.
has not been increased progressively as the burdens of the chairmen have increased, as might have been anticipated. On the contrary, the number has fluctuated, apparently as the party leaders have seen fit or as the situation within the party has required. Anywhere from five to twenty-five men have been appointed to this committee. Normally, the top officers of the National Committee are ex-officio members of the Executive Committee. Since 1920, the Republican party has kept the number on this committee at a constant figure. The Republican national chairmen, therefore, have had in recent years an Executive Committee consisting of fifteen members in addition to the top staff officers who also serve on the committee. At times, the Executive Committee is incorporated within the Campaign Committee, but Hitchcock in 1908 appointed two completely independent committees. Raskob had an unusual family duplication in his committee system in 1906, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt served on the Executive Committee, and Mrs. Franklin Delano Roosevelt served on the Advisory Committee.


26 Republican Campaign Text-Book, 1908 (Republican National Committee).

Members of the campaign committees are chosen by the national chairman with the help of his advisers. The prominence of the men, their affiliations, and the possibility of reconciling factions within the party are some of the factors taken into consideration by the leaders in choosing the membership of these committees. As a rule, the chairmen are not limited to the National Committee for the selection of the campaign committees, but they have not been entirely without restrictions on this score. Some of these restrictions have been self-imposed. Cortelyou, for example, had very definite ideas about the membership of the Executive Committee. He believed that no cabinet member should serve upon it and that in choosing the committee the national chairman should choose as many as possible of the members from among the national committee men.

Sentiment has arisen from time to time within the national committees against the practice of choosing men from outside having been shown to be jealous of its prerogatives, the Democratic National Committee in 1912 addressed itself to this problem having been shown to be jealous of its prerogatives, the Democratic National Committee in 1912 addressed itself to this problem and placed a limitation on the appointive power of the national chairman to the extent that he had to appoint the majority of his Executive Committee from the National Committee. This

---

28 Interview with Homer Cummings, October 25, 1962.
29 Theodore Roosevelt MSS, Box 24, loc. cit., Cortelyou to President Roosevelt's secretary, July 15, 1904.
restriction did not, however, set a precedent.

In his capacity as an officer of the National Committee, the national chairman is an ex officio member of the Executive Committee. Some of the chairmen have appointed themselves chairman of the Executive Committee, others have delegated the role to an assistant. Whether chairman of the committee or not, it is, of course, the prerogative of the national chairman to seek its assistance, and he may call upon the committee to aid him in matters of finance, to consider publicity matters, or to give counsel on an efficient organization or some other matter, or to approve a program outlined by the chairman.

The real reason for the meeting, of course, may never be publicized. There seems to be no set rule for the use of this committee, some chairmen have sought its assistance often, McCormick in the Democratic party and Hamilton in the Republican party are cases in point. Other chairmen have used it, apparently, very little. Charlie Michelson, "the Ghost," states that he "...never saw even a pretended list...." of the members

31 Hanna, Hilles, and Cortelyou were chairman of their Executive Committees; on the other hand, Taggart, a Democratic national chairman of the same era was not.


of the Democratic Executive Committee. Farley supports this statement, at least for the period when he and Michelson were associates at Democratic party headquarters, for he makes no secret of the fact that he, and as he readily acknowledges, Franklin Delano Roosevelt "ran the show."

In addition to the Executive Committee, the national chairman also appoints larger campaign groups for advisory purposes. These committees have sometimes been known as Campaign Committees and sometimes as Advisory Committees; at other times a group under each committee title has been appointed. As a rule, these committees are larger than the Executive Committee and contain some or all of the members of the smaller committees. Hays had probably the largest advisory group in the history of political parties in his Committee on Policy and Platform which numbered one hundred and seventy-one members. Haskob had one of the smallest advisory groups consisting as it did of only eight members. Still another committee, the appointments for which the chairman is responsible, is the Committee on


36 In this case, too, the nomenclature of the committees is confused, the term "campaign committee" being used to cover both the over-all campaign organization and smaller advisory groups.

37 Interview with Will Hays, Republican National Chairman from 1918 to 1921, on October 17, 1951.

Arrangements. As is sometimes the case with the Executive Committee, the chairmen occasionally constitute themselves as chairman of this committee also. The political importance of the functions of this committee make the power to appoint it a very significant one.

More and more many of the duties enumerated as those of the National Committee must be fulfilled by party workers who give all of their time to the work. Years ago the members of the Executive Committee were always more than mere advisers to the national chairman, they were working assistants as well and were frequently in charge of divisions of the headquarters organization. In fact, Cummings was chosen as chairman of the Democratic National Committee in 1919 because of his devotion to duty as a division leader in previous campaigns. In recent times, it is much less likely that the members of the Executive Committee act as directors of divisions. Today in both parties, with the exception of the officers of the National Committee who are ex officio members of the Executive Committee, none of the members of the Executive Committee is head of a staff

39 The relationship of the national chairman to this committee will be discussed more fully in Chapter X.

40 See Appendix V for the duties of the National Committee.


It devolves, then, upon the modern chairman to fill these positions also. As in every other area of assistance provided for the national chairman, there has been a great increase in the number of his headquarters staff. Hanna, whose business acumen is credited with modernizing party organization, would be lost today in the hierarchy of divisions and bureaus which are necessary to assist the modern chairman. The major development has been relatively recent. Even as late as Shaver's period as national chairman, the overhead for the whole force cost only slightly more than did the services of Charlie Michelson, Director of Publicity under Raskob and Farley. The Literary Bureau of the early twentieth century has been expanded by successive national chairmen until today there is a Publicity Division in each party with sub-divisions covering every possible outlet for communication.

To Hanna, the all important organizational problem was the organization of the businessmen of the nation. Subsequently, organization has developed to the point that the modern national chairman has supervision over divisions covering every significant

---

43 Interview with Mr. Floyd McCaffree, Research Director of the Republican National Committee, on May 9, 1951; Interview with Mr. Grey Leslie, Assistant Chairman for Policy, Strategy, and Research, Democratic National Committee, on July 9, 1951.

44 Interview with Clem Shaver, Democratic National Chairman from 1924 to 1928, on February 27, 1952.

45 Typewritten release from Democratic National Committee and information supplied by Mr. McCaffree.
group of voters imaginable: labor, farmer, business, veteran, negro, ethnic groups, churches, volunteers, and one of the most recent, the bureau with the intriguing and comprehensive title of the Bureau of the healing arts. Each chairman has had, of course, his own ideas of organizational structure with the result that divisions and bureaus make their appearance under various titles and come and go. Daniels says that never did a Democratic Campaign Committee have so many bureaus, subcommittees, and auxiliary committees as did that for Bryan's third campaign, yet he mentions only a few of the divisions over which the more current chairmen have had supervision.

Very few executives in the business world have the personnel problems that confront the national chairman. For one thing, the chief party officer is not in a position to make his personnel decisions alone, but must consult with the candidates and the other party leaders, if only for the sake of harmony. To add to his problems, he and the candidates do not always see eye to eye on the matter. Divergence in views on this

Typewritten release from Democratic National Committee, n.d.


Taft MSS, Pre-Inaugural Series I, loc. cit., Taft to Hitchcock, Sept. 22, 1908. See also McCombs, op. cit., p. 182.
subject is often encountered. The candidate, looking beyond
the campaign, wants assurance that no one selected as a cam-
aign aid will embarrass the administration in the future.
Hitchcock had difficulty with his candidate, William Howard Taft,
on this matter, and McCombs had similar trouble with Woodrow
Wilson. Like Caesar's wife these aides should be without
blemish, otherwise the candidate and the national chairman may
be placed in an awkward situation.

Public opinion in general and the opposition in particular
are not likely to overlook the business connections of the
chairman's aides. The Democrats were forced to dispense with
the services of two of their officers, Robert Jackson and L.W.
"Chip" Roberts, Jr., the former because he had too many clients
interested in legislation and the latter because he had too
many war contracts, as Michelson expressed it, "....to fit
in with political window dressing." Congressional leaders
also wish to be consulted by the national chairman in the
selection of party officers and officials. One of the criticisms
of William H. Butler as national chairman was his disregard of
the advice and opinion from The Hill in his choice of members
of the National Committee sub-committees.

50 Taft HSS, Pre-Inaugural Series I, loc. cit., Taft to
Hitchcock, Sept. 22, 1908. See also McCombs, op. cit., p. 182.
51 Michelson, op. cit., p. 36. See also James A. Farley,
Jim Farley's Story, The Roosevelt Years Book, (New York: Mcgraw-
To add to the personnel problems of the chairman, not everyone wants to take on the strenuous duties attached to the work of a political campaign. One of the major tasks of the national chairman is that of inducing the right type of men to accept these jobs. Especially acute is the chairman's situation in seeking aids in the field of party finance. Political mendicants of any kind are not nearly so plentiful as are patronage seekers. Yet great care must be taken in selecting these men. They should be, of course, men of personal honesty, and they should be imbued with party loyalty. Furthermore, not only must they know the right men, but they must know them in the right way; that is, the contributors must have faith in the men who seek the contributions. A report of a sub-committee of the Republican National Committee indicates the dilemma with which those who attempt to develop an organization are faced. This committee labored diligently to get men to accept positions in the party hierarchy; yet, no sooner had they selected George Sheldon as treasurer of the National Committee, than George Perkins, one of the leaders at the time in the Republican party, telephoned Taft objecting to the appointment on the grounds of his connection with Wall St. Perkins' complaint was that "they" did not care to make a contribution to a man of "that sort" who was

53 Taft MSS, Box 3, loc. cit., George Sheldon to William Cromwell, July 7, 1908.
subject to the New York law.

Then, too, the national chairman must frequently accept as his aides, not his own first choice, nor, in fact, at times, not the first choice of the candidates, but, for the sake of harmony within the party, men representing opposing factions. Several instances of such appointments are on record. The compromise achieved between the Hitchcock faction and the Taft faction within the Republican party in 1912 in the appointment of the Committee on Arrangements is an instance. The former national chairman, New, had been selected as chairman of the Committee on Arrangements on this occasion, but because Hitchcock and New had had some disagreements in the course of the previous campaign, Hitchcock objected to the appointment. To pacify Hitchcock, New was required to take several of the Hitchcock faction upon the Committee of Arrangements. McAdoo's appointment as vice-chairman of the National Committee is another case in point. McCombs, the national chairman, would definitely not have chosen McAdoo as one of his first assistants. Another instance was Haskob's acceptance of Robert Jackson, one of the supporters of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, as secretary of the Democratic National Committee in 1932.

---

95 Theodore Roosevelt MSS, Box 126, Taft to Roosevelt, July 9, 1908. The reference was to the New York state law requiring that political committees file reports of their campaign finances.

96 Rosewater, Backstage in 1912, op. cit., p. 35.

97 McCombs, op. cit., p. 182.

The result is that the national chairman begins with a group of executive assistants not necessarily of his own choosing, and even possibly from actively opposing factions. Further complicating the problems of the chairman is the fact that many of these party workers have other interests, and all of their time is not available to the chairman. Many of them are volunteers and like all volunteers they need to be treated with a degree of finesse not necessary with the salaried employee. Farley says that there are more prima donnas in politics than there are in the grand opera. Even where the executives are salaried, the chances are very great that the assignment will be short-lived; which fact makes for something less than the ideal organizational set-up. Many of the rank and file, too, are volunteers—again with the virtues and the disadvantages of the volunteer worker.

It can be seen that coordinating and supervising the efforts of the party headquarters under such circumstances can be trying. In fact, coordination of the various branches and their bureaus and divisions is becoming a progressively greater burden upon the chairman's time. Formal and informal conferences, telephonic communication, and written reports are the methods of intercourse employed. The need for almost constant travel on the part of the chairman requires that the management of headquarters devolves upon one of his assistants, yet the chairman remains responsible. Finally, he has to operate with constant interference from all sides, from the candidates, from Congress, and in the case
of Barley, even from the candidate's wife.

Problem that the choice of the National Committee officers and officials is for the national chairman, it must be a problem that he sometimes wishes he had in respect to the membership of the National Committee. With this group of sides he is presented—factions always included. Initially, the National Committee was created for the purpose of coordinating the efforts of the individual states in the campaign. It was the original campaign committee, small in number and capable of discussion and action because it was small. The principle of having one representative from each state naturally expanded the committee as the nation grew; the introduction of the women as voters doubled its size. By the third decade of the present century the national chairmen had to deal with a committee of over one hundred.

It is the duty of the national chairman to complete the organization of the National Committee, to issue the calls for its meetings, and to preside over such meetings as are held. One of the first tasks that confronts the chairmen in the organization of the new committee after the National Convention is the determination of contests for seats within the committee.

59 Hyde Park, N. Y., Democratic National Committee MSS, Molly Dewson Patronage File, 1933.

60 After the introduction of the woman-voter, the Republican National Committee had one hundred and six members; the Democratic National Committee, one hundred and eight. The difference in number was brought about by the fact that the older party granted seats to the Canal Zone.
These contests are as dynamite to the harmony which is necessary for the operation of a successful campaign, inasmuch as they grow out of local factional fights. If the chairman attempts to make the decision between the contestants himself, as Jones did in 1900, he finds himself in the middle between two opposing factions. Early in the present century, in the Democratic party, these contests were carried out on the floor of the committee meetings, usually in executive session. The more recent Democratic chairmen have formalized the handling of these contests, and the contestants now take their cases to a sub-committee appointed by the chairman. In the Republican party the matter is sometimes transferred to the Executive Committee. Where a special sub-committee of the National Committee handles the contests, it does so only to the "extent of preparing the material" for the National Committee to act upon.

Filling existing vacancies in the National Committee presents the national chairman with another organizational problem. In the early days, such determinations were left primarily in the

---

65. Letter from Perry Howard, October 2, 1962.
hands of the national chairman and his close advisers. Some
of the party leaders resented this practice as usurpation of
power and argued, as Bryan of the Democratic party did in 1912,
against the power of the chairman to accept the choice of the
states for national committeemen without putting the question
67 to the National Committee. Eventually, both parties formalized
the procedure on vacancies and they now provide that vacancies
occurring during the interval between conventions shall be filled
by the National Committee upon the nomination by the central
committee of the state, territory, or district involved. As
Hamilton has explained, however, the action of the National
Committee in ratifying the choice of the local organization
is pro forma.

As his title role implies, the national chairman presides
over the business conducted by the National Committee. The task
is not one for the inexperienced; it has required, until recently,
a personal knowledge of parliamentary law. The presence or absence
of such knowledge is notable among the Democratic chairmen.

66 *Official Proceedings of the Thirteenth Republican National
Convention*, p. 140. *Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1904*,
on. cit., p. 538.
67 *Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1912*, on. cit.,
p. 447.
70 The minutes of the meetings of the Republican National Committee
are not available. Guy Gabrielson, Republican national chairman in
1951, explained in a letter to the writer that the minutes of the
executive and of the open sessions were still "intermingled," and
that until such time as the minutes are edited they will continue
Some of the chairmen handle their meetings expeditiously. Cummings was one of the better parliamentarians. Raskob, while a political amateur seemed to be no amateur as a presiding officer. On the other hand, McCombs was obviously in distress as a parliamentarian, permitting as he did, "a jumble of resolutions" to be presented simultaneously. Shaver was another chairman who had difficulty as a parliamentarian; only Senator Glass kept him from becoming lost in a maze of pending motions.

But the national chairmen have learned; in both parties it has become the practice to appoint a parliamentarian to assist the national chairmen at the National Committee meetings.

The Democratic chairmen have solved the problem of harmonious dispatch of business by the appointment of a Committee on Resolutions for each National Committee. This sub-committee considers the proposals before they come to the floor for general discussion. During the debate on these matters, most of the chairmen tend to act as moderators; although there is an obvious difference in the way the various chairmen conduct the meetings. Farley handled

73 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1912, op. cit., p. 508.
74 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1928, op. cit., p. 382.
75 Letter from Perry Howard, October 2, 1952. See also Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1936, op. cit., p. 344.
the meetings over which he presided with a great deal of dis-
patch. By contrast, Raskob was much more careful to maintain, at
least on the surface, the position of moderator.

Resolutions in the Republican party are handled on the floor of
the committee, but are sometimes referred to a sub-committee
which then makes recommendations to the full committee. Al-
though the Republican National Committee "passes upon all major
matters" according to one of its experienced committeewomen, most
of the business of the committee seems to be carried on by
the Executive Committee, which acts, as John Hamilton explains,
as "sort of a Board of Directors for the full committee."

The national committees meet no less than once a year. On
occasion they meet three or four times a year; the more
frequent meetings are more likely during the year prior to the
convention. Certain meetings of the committee have become
standard. An organization meeting is held shortly after the

76 Ibid., pp. 344 to 445.
77 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1932, op. cit.,
pp. 397 to 598; note particularly p. 449.
78 Letter from Ferry Howard, October 2, 1952.
79 Letter from Gladys E. Knowles, National Committee-woman
80 Letter from John D. Hamilton, October 10, 1952.
81 Note all proceedings of the Democratic National Convention
since 1900. The information for the Republican party was
supplied in the letters from John D. Hamilton, Gladys E. Knowles,
and Ferry Howard.
adjournment of the convention. Another standard meeting is the one held about six months prior to the National Convention, usually in January. This meeting is called for the purpose of issuing the call to the convention and of discussing the time and the site of the convention. Just prior to the convention, another meeting is called by the national chairman, and at this time the National Committee ratifies the choice of the temporary officers for the convention and the role of delegates, both of which have been considered previously by the Committee on Arrangements. In addition, incidental meetings may be called by the chairman for notification ceremonies, for social visits to the White House, and, occasionally, for purposes of policy consideration.

In the past century, the national committeemen were dependent upon the desires of the national chairman in so far as a call to meet was concerned; with the result, that the National Committee met very infrequently during the four years of its term. The usual procedure was for the committee to meet shortly after the convention for the purpose of organization and ratification of the chairman's nomination, and then as Rosewater expressed it, it lapsed "into a state of inanition for almost four years."

The old-time chairmen were quite conscious of the power they held in being the authority upon whom devolved the duty of calling the National Committee into being. More than one questioned the legality of a meeting unless such meeting was called by the national chairman. Jones, for instance, in a

82 *Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1932*, op. cit., March 5, 1931 meeting.
statement to the press indicated his concept of his function in this respect:

The National Convention, by specific resolution adopted last night, authorized me—in fact, instructed me—to call the first meeting of the new committee in New York City. Until I call it the new committee cannot organize, and meetings they have are unauthorized. Rosewater, a Republican national chairman, also was aware of this power, for when the members of the National Committee were questioning his appointment as acting chairman by national chairman Hill, he countered with the argument that he had called the meeting which they were attending, and that if he were not, in fact acting for the national chairman, then the meeting itself was illegal.

Today, in both parties, rules govern the chairman's power to call the National Committee meetings. The Republican chairmen are now required to call the first meeting of the new committee within ten days after the adjournment of the National Convention. They are also required to issue the call to the meeting ten days prior to the date of the meeting. Furthermore, when sixteen members of the National Committee representing sixteen states sign a petition for the purpose, the Republican chairman is required to issue a call to meet.

---

84 *Rosewater, Backstage in 1912*, op. cit., p. 88.
85 *Republican Fact-Book, 1931-32*, p. 56. Rule No. 31. See also "Republican Renovation," *The Commonwealth*, Vol. 20, No. 3, May 13, 1934, p. 73 for an example of the use of this device by a faction within the Republican National Committee for the purpose of securing the resignation of Sanders.
The Democratic Manual provides that the National Committee meets not later than March 1 of each year. "Otherwise the Committee has no stated time or place of meeting but convenes on the call of the Chairman who designates the time and place of each session as called. Nor is the Democratic chairman free from the fear of a petition. This device was used, without immediate success to be sure, but attempted nevertheless, on the Democratic national chairman, White, in 1921, when a faction within the committee was seeking his removal.

As in any group of its size, there are always factions within the National Committee. It has already been noted that the division of power among these factions is a factor in the choice of the chairman. The national chairman, then, must not only maintain harmony within the committee, but he must also maintain his power. To fulfill this role requires effort because there are practices within the committee which can be used so as to advance or retard the aims of the chairman depending upon their application. One of these practices is the acceptance of proxies at the committee meetings as substitutes for the regular committee members. As the result of the use—really abuse—of the proxy, attendance at the National Committee meetings

---


88 Supra, Chapter II, p. 18, 19.
is by no means exclusive in either party. A study of the Democratic national Committee meetings made by this student indicates that only rarely are there no proxy holders in attendance at the meetings. On an average, the meetings are composed of approximately forty-five per cent substitute membership. One meeting on December 12, 1907 had more proxy holders present than regular members. In the Republican party, the practice got out of hand as early as 1912, when Rosewater complained that some of the National Committee members regarded their positions as committee men as merely "voting rights" to be transferred at pleasure.

It is readily seen that the control of the disposition of these proxies can be a factor in decisions within the committee. There have been occasions when the out-going national committee men—that is, those members who had already been repudiated as state representatives in the National Committee—have attended the meetings. On another occasion, members of the strategy board of a third party sat in the Republican National Committee meetings through the use of the proxy, much to the discomfiture of the regular Republicans.

---

Control of a sufficient number of proxies can, of course, also add to the power of the chairman. Farley tells of having enough proxies in his pocket at the meeting of the Democratic National Committee to determine the site of the National Convention in 1940, that, had he so desired, he could have switched the convention from Philadelphia, which city Franklin Delano Roosevelt desired, to Chicago.

The number of old-timers on the National Committee is another factor in its control. Many of the states send the same man back to represent them on the committee year after year. Norman MacVicker served on the Democratic National Committee from 1906 to 1933. Cummings was a member continuously for twenty-four years; Clark Howell was a member for twenty years; Josephus Daniels and Benjamin Tillman, for sixteen years. In addition, several committeemen have served tenures of twelve years. The Republicans tend to change their national committeemen more often; although they have had their Nestors, too. Ralph E. Williams of Oregon served on the Republican National Committee for thirty-two years. In fact, he died in harness, completing the arrangements for the convention in 1940. Perry Howard is now in his thirteenth term as a national committeeman.

S. F. Polkaday represented the Republicans in the District of Columbia on the committee for twenty years. Oliver B. Streit

---

Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 311.
men. That of the organization of sub-committees with these experienced
so that the new problem presented to the new committee to
a section of the national executive, by the National Committee at the
in 1966. In these cases, however,
In the National Committee's coordination of the two parties, coordination of the
cooperate in the National Committee, as recorded in the coordination
of the National Committee, were recorded in the constitution of the
56 form a constitution made by the members of the

very excellent or any show of power by any other faction.
66 have the only solution to future victory, and each group in
these occasions, each faction to project its plans to
be great after a defeat. Further still after a series of losses of the
national organization as a harmonized. Information seems to depend
upon the General政协委员 situation and the 56 situation
the amount of attention. The interest of the immediate importance of the
of the attention at the floor. The amount of
attention. The interest of the immediate importance of the
56 men seem to solve the problem of harmony within the meeting, to
considered. Much preliminary work to be done to accomplish
the decision and within the party. These other members must be
in order to maintain control and harmony within the National
75 because of mutual influence or parliamentary procedure and
because of the decision by the National Committee, it only
can be quite a power within the National Committee, to only
these other members. These other members...
Rifts within the party organization are, generally, glossed over as much as possible. A comparison of the published letter of Wilson to McCombs over the latter's declination of the French ambassadorship with McComb's *Making Woodrow Wilson* President and with letters among the Wilson manuscripts shows that the picture the public received of this affair was not the complete picture. However, now and then, admissions of disagreements are made. Rosewater speaks of a Republican National Committee meeting at which he presided in 1912 as being "long" and "acrimonious" and one in which, as this scholar expressed it, "near fisticuffs" occurred. McCombs tells of the dissension within the Democratic National Committee during his chairmanship. Speaking of his policy meetings, Haskob admits that these, too, were at times "acrimonious." Apparently, acrimonious was the polite word for what Michelson, also speaking of the Haskob policy meetings, termed "the finest rough and tumble no holds barred oratory in the history of National Committee meetings."

100 *Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1932*, p. 449.
Individual Democratic committee men want to have a greater share in the decisions of the National Committee. They rebel against the innocuous role that the committee member is permitted to fulfill; they wonder why they "have no particular duties to perform" in aiding and assisting the work of the chairman. Raskob seemed unusually aware of this sentiment within his committee and denied emphatically that there was "a little oligarchy within the committee." On the other hand, the national committeemen do not fulfill the expectations of the national chairman and the other party officials in assisting the workers at headquarters. Raskob reported complaints of insufficient cooperation on the part of the national committeemen. And Farley complained about having "to go back" at the committee members more than once in order "to get information" promptly. Obviously, the role that the national committeemen expect to play and the role that the national chairman anticipate of them

102 There is no tangible evidence available as to the reaction of the Republican national committeemen and women on this question of their role in party deliberations; but there is a rather quick defense of the system of sub-committees that indicates that the device is not always entirely acceptable. Interview with Will Hays. Letters from John D. Hamilton, Ferry Howard, Mrs. Gladys E. Knowles.

103 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1932, or. cit., p. 450. See also Ibid., 1912, p. 505.


105 Ibid., p. 468.

106 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1936, or. cit., p. 443.
are not the same.

One of the causes of friction within the National Committee arises over the choice of chairmen for the sub-committees. Undoubtedly, the right to select the chairmen of the sub-committees, gives to the national chairman and his clique a tremendous power. Particularly is this the case in the appointment of the chairman of the Committee on Arrangements. The power to appoint the chairman of that committee may be the power to appoint the temporary chairman of the National Convention, which power in turn may mean the control of the National Convention. It was for this reason that Hitchcock fought to have his faction represented on the Committee of Arrangements in 1912. It was for this reason that the Raskob-Shouse faction and the Roosevelt-Farley faction fought between 1930 and 1932 for control of the National Committee.

Theoretically, the national chairman is supposed to be neutral among the factions within the committee and within the party. The fiction is—to extend the remarks of Henry Fletcher—that all Republicans look alike to the Republican national chairman and that all Democrats look alike to the Democratic national chairman. Seldom, if ever, is this

---

107 Infra, Chapter IV, p. 74.
108 Rosewater, Backstage in 1912, op. cit., p. 35. See also infra, Chapter III, p. 50.
ideal achieved; though protestations of neutrality are enunciated time and again by the national chairmen. Rosewater quotes proudly a letter commenting on his fairness in conducting the affairs of the National Committee. Hays insists that he kept an open office and that all had access to it and to the services of the committee on an equal basis. He is a great phrase-maker, and one of his favorites is: "Remember, successful politics is a matter of assimilation, not elimination."

According to his own statement, Hull "....consistently pursued the policy of absolute neutrality for his headquarters as to elements, factions, groups, and candidates in his party." Fletcher also protested neutrality and assured the public that he was "....not identified with, or subservient to, any group or faction or any financial or sectional interest." Raskob declaimed that he and Shouse would "....refuse to be connected with any candidacy of any man for any nomination within the party.

---

111 Rosewater, Backstage In 1912, op. cit., p. 75.
112 Interview with Will Hays, October 17, 1952.
113 Hays file, No. 172.
114 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1924, op. cit., p. 1190.
The men chosen for the chairmanship are generally men who have "...a passion for arbitrating a row," to steal a phrase from one of Hanna's biographers. If they had not this quality, they would not have reached the higher echelons of their party. The real test of their neutrality, however, comes late in their period as national chairmen, that is at the time of the preparation for the convention; and, as will be seen, they are not always equal to reconciling the dichotomies of their position. The problem is aggravated by the fact that loyalty ranks high in the list of attributes for the politician.

The problems of the party in connection with the central organization are: (1) the problem of efficient personnel in view of the limitations that lack of money and the requirements of inter-party patronage place upon the chairman; and (2) the problem of democratic action within the National Committee.

More money would, of course, help to solve the first problem, for with the wherewithal to employ more administrative help over a longer period, the work of the organization could be improved, particularly in the field of research. In the absence of such money, a solution might be some arrangement with propinquent universities whereby political science students might get scholastic credit for work with the National Committee of their choice. The idea in mind is something in the nature of the arrangements that the technical schools make with industries. This plan would have the advantage of giving the students an

---

opportunity to become familiar with the problems of practical politics. On the other hand, it would give the party organization a better understanding of the academic approach to research and the preparation of material. It would also be a stepping-stone for the political scientist into practical politics.

As to the National Committee, democracy would be better served if the committee were smaller. It is entirely too large to be an effective organization. A reversion to the plan of one representative from each state, territory, or district would improve the situation. Such a scheme of representation would, undoubtedly, decrease the proportionate number of women within the committee, but in the smaller body the women who were selected—and all of them could hardly be ignored—could then have a greater say in the deliberations. The abuse of proxies should also be stopped, so that the people who are supposed to be representatives of a state within the National Committee are actually the ones representing it. Members should not be permitted to transfer their voting privileges themselves. Either arrangements should be made in advance for alternates, or the right to appoint a substitute should rest with the state organization. This change would be one step toward better communication between the national chairman and the state organizations.

118 This problem has disturbed national chairman in both parties from Rosewater ("The National Committee and Its Work," op. cit., p. 1156) who suggested overlapping terms for the committeemen to Raskob (Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1932, p. 469) who appointed a committee to study means by which the National Committee could function more efficiently.
CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATION IN THE FIELD

One of the primary tasks of the national chairman is the development of a loyal field organization. As Abbot stated years ago, the man who can inspire the party worker two thousand miles away to work is the man who makes the ideal campaign manager. In no country has the head of a political party the problem in field organization that confronts the national chairman in the United States. In the first place, the expanse of the area to be coordinated is greater than that which faces any other party chairman in a multi-party system. Then, too, the federal nature of the structure of the party with the corollary states' rights feeling, which exists as well within the party organization in the states as it does within the governments in the states, tends to complicate the continuity of communication and coordination which the chairman must achieve.

In so far as national-level politics is concerned, the party organization in the United States is simply a loose confederation with only potential federal patronage and the prestige of the national chairman as the right hand man to the aspiring candidate as controlling factors. Unlike in the situation in the British party system, the national chairman in this country

---

is not at the apex of a hierarchy extending into the local units of organization. There is in this country no direct line of descent between the national chairman and the precinct workers. The chairman cannot, with immunity, send orders to the rank and file of the party. Herbert Agar points out that the chairman's strength lies in his friendships; he is in charge of a "ramshackle alliance held together by prayers and promises." Furthermore, the local organization through which the chairman has to operate for the national elections is the same organization through which the local and state leaders maintain their power. This situation makes intricate the functioning of the national chairman in his main objective of electing his party's candidate to the presidency.

Despite all of these complications, the national chairman must find means to coordinate the work of the headquarters divisions with the work of the local party organizations and the work of the independent organizations with both of the other groups. In addition, he must see to it that the whole pattern represents as consistent a picture to the public, especially in these days of radio and television, as is possible in a nation of divergent interests. In fulfilling this function of field organization, as in fulfilling most of his other functions, the national chairman's position in relation to the local leaders varies depending upon whether his party is in or out of power, and if in power, whether its record has enabled

---

it to take an offensive position or required it to take a defensive position.

The first duty of the chairman in relation to field organization is, naturally, to see to it that it is developed or activated, as the need requires. Responsibility for organization lies with the chairman and a good part of his time is absorbed in this work, but he has, of course, the assistance of the regional campaign managers and his Bureau of Organization. Some national chairmen have designated special chairmen for this work alone, but other have delegated the headship of this bureau to the chairman of the Executive Committee. The most urgent problem of organization is to locate the men in the counties and in the states with local organizations intact, or to find men capable of developing an organization where it is non-existent, or where the current power-holders are too refractory for efficient cooperation. The organization developed, the organizers must, then, set up a pattern of communication so that assistance may go out to the field from the headquarters organizations and information may come in from field sources to headquarters. Channels must also be available in order that the local leaders may have access to the national chairman, for he is one of the national leaders to whom they look for policy concessions and other favors with which to pacify their constituents with the hope of holding them in line. As field organizer, the chairman must also, as always, be the peace-maker.

---

the trouble-shooter who maintains unity within the organization. It is, in short, the duty of the national chairman to see to it that the vote-getting activities of the lower party committees are operating at maximum efficiency.

The ideal organization, as Cortelyou declared, is an organization reaching "...into every village and hamlet." Sufficient men and women should be provided in every precinct to keep the pollbooks, to report the weak spots, to keep the check books, and to see to it that all of the voters, including the undecided, are brought to the polls to vote "the right ticket." An alert chairman will check with his state leaders to see to it that party clubs and committees have been organized, and that the assistance from headquarters, such as posters, photographs, literature, and speakers has been utilized efficiently.

In a major political organization, the committees are the superintendents. The recorders, sheriffs, auditors, clerks, treasurers, and employees in City Hall and State House are the foremen.

Ultimately ideal, from the viewpoint of efficiency, would be a permanently functioning organization with a precinct committee in every precinct directed from central headquarters. Such an ideal is never achieved—money, its corollary, leisure, and the fears and jealousies of local leaders being three of the

---


5Hugh Huntington, "The Republican National Committee and 1944," Privately printed. Huntington was a member of the publicity division of the Republican National Committee, p. 21.
chief factors which prevent its realization. As a matter of fact, until very recently, and to an important extent even yet, an organization for national elections must be built up practically anew every four years. Rarely in this country has the chairman been retained through more than one presidential campaign. Hanna is the exception in the Republican party, and Jones and Farley are the exceptions in the Democratic party in so far as the present century is concerned.

Moreover, even the temporary organizations achieved are not under the direct control of the national chairman, with a resultant lack of authority which can mitigate against the objectives of the party nationally. State bosses are more likely to have a state rather than a national viewpoint. Penrose, for example, is credited with advising his men that when it was a question of losing an election or losing control of the party within the state to lose the election. When the interests of blocs of states run counter to the party's view of the national interest, the national chairman must necessarily attempt to build a national organization. Such a situation lay behind Hanna's desire to build an organization centrally controlled. Many of the western states were in control of the

---


silver faction of the Republican party. Hanna could not, therefore, trust the work within the states to these men, and his headquarters necessarily became the general staff with the state committees carrying out its orders, rather than becoming the central agency for the state committees.

Nor is Hanna the only chairman who has attempted to build a national organization with a national structure. There was one such effort in 1912, when a group of Democratic party leaders tried to develop a Federation of Precinct Clubs to be used throughout the nation and to be chartered under the laws of the District of Columbia. These clubs were to be auxiliaries to the regular party organization. A resolution to create such clubs was claimed to have the support of three of the main contestants for the presidency at the time, Woodrow Wilson, William Jennings Bryan, and Speaker of the House of Representatives Clark. There is no record in the minutes of this meeting of the position of the presiding national chairman, Mack, on this resolution. But it is inconceivable that such a strong party man as Mack would not have been sympathetic to the objectives behind the formation of these clubs, for their purpose was to "take part in a permanent nation-wide, uniform movement for unifying and strengthening the Democratic Party."

---


10 Ibid., p. 456.
propaganda parlance, the aim was to establish "the rule of
the people from the precincts up."

This venture into a more centralized organization brought
out, as it always has, one of the deterrents to a national
structure, that is, the jealousy of the state leaders as to
their rights and prerogatives. In this case, the fight against
a centralized organization was led by R. C. Sullivan, a national
committeeman, and what was more important, a power in Illinois
state politics. To the development of precinct clubs per se,
he had no objections, but to have "some unknown people from
some other State Committee come into Illinois and start an
independent organization...." that was "....a different thing."
The impasse in this instance was one usually found in such
cases. The group behind the resolution was supporting a different
set of local candidates than was the state organization under
Sullivan. Local leaders are very loathe to see their power
transferred to national headquarters. They will not, as they
declared on this occasion, "....surrender the right of the
regular organization to any inferior or subordinate institution
to carry on the work of the Democracy....." in their state.

Another attempt to build up a precinct organization con-
trolled centrally was made by Cummings when he was national

11 Ibid.
12 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1912, op. cit.,
p. 464.
13 Ibid., p. 465.
chairman. In his report to the National Committee on February 26, 1918, Cummings, who had recently taken over the chairmanship from McCormick, tells of the efforts of his Organization Bureau at headquarters to secure precinct representatives of the National Committee in the states west of Ohio. As in 1912, some of the state leaders objected, terming the work "....inopportune for various reasons." Through tact, patience, and good will, however, Cummings was successful in developing precinct representatives of the National Committee to the number of 47,372 in twenty states.

Like their predecessor, Hanna, the modern chairman of the Republican party have also hoped for an organizational set-up of national coverage. During a speech before the Republican National Committee, Work, Hoover's first national chairman, extolled the advantage of such an organizational structure. What he had in mind was a "....State unit system...." which would, somehow or other—he did not expatiates—provide "....centralized authority with decentralized responsibility." He contended that the three and one-half million dollars that the Republican National Committee had spent on the last campaign could have been cut in two had a permanent organization been functioning.


15Ibid. In his recollections of this experience, Cummings thought of only time and money as deterrents, although he admitted that states rights feelings were a factor.

16Hubert Work, Speech before the Republican National Committee as reported in the New York Times, March 6, 1922, p. 5, col. 2.
In view of the states rights feeling, the most the chairman can do, normally, is to build up lists of active workers available for election work within the various states. Organization bureaus and committees are created at the headquarters, and party workers are kept busy maintaining files of people in the field able and willing to help. The names of these individuals are card-indexed and arranged by states, congressional districts, counties, and precincts. They are further classified by profession or occupation, and public speakers and other key men are particularly noted. Cummings did an especially fine job in this respect and proudly declared that he was turning over to the next national chairman "...the most effective, complete, and vital working organization which the Democratic party ever had in its history." The Farley files boasted the names of over 140,000 precinct committeemen as well as a file of all Democratic office-holders.

Still, no national chairman has ever been able to control a national organization from the grass roots up. Hanna is credited with being the nearest thing to a national boss that the United States has produced. He had citizens in every field of endeavor touring the country and preaching the doctrine of prosperity to college professors, steel workers, clergymen,

---


19 Interview with James A. Farley, July 7, 1952.
coal miners, investment bankers, and dirt farmers. Yet in
his own mind he was not the national boss, for he feared that
McKinley would not ask him to run his second campaign!

The chairman's endeavor to build up a national organization
succeeds only at certain times in states where the accord be-
tween the national organization and the state organization is
so close that it really does not matter whether there is a
direct line of descent or not. Where a direct line is really
needed, it is thwarted by fears of a diminution of their power
on the part of the party leaders within the state. Hackob who
spent so much money in an effort to build a national organization
conceded that the "organization must first be perfected in the
states and through the state agencies in the counties and through
the county agencies in the precincts; and all the National Head-
quarters could hope to do was to suggest, to cooperate, and to
inspire if possible, in the organization work." 21

Eventually, a *modus operandi* is worked out between the
national chairman and the state leaders. The following letter
sent out by Farley to various party workers throughout the
country gives a good idea of the methods of party organization:

> Here is what I am asking you to do. It is to select
> without delay a prominent Democrat of your community to
> act as chairman of the Roosevelt Nominators for your
> community, secure his acceptance, and wire me, care of
> the Democratic National Committee, Hotel Biltmore his
> name and address.

---

20 Groly, op. cit., p. 320.

National Convention, 1932, p. 400.
Please hand him the organized material enclosed in this letter so that he can begin organizing immediately. He will be sent at once an official certificate of appointment as chairman of the finance division of the Democratic National Committee for the community, and will be supplied with additional material and enrollment posters."

The cooperation between the national headquarters force and the state leaders operates more or less successfully depending upon the personalities involved and the situations encountered. Best results are obtained if the chairman activates the state leaders and leaves with them the task of activating the state workers, keeping a weather eye always to the national advantage. To achieve these results the chairman spends a good part of his time travelling around the country endeavoring to keep the grass roots active and harmonious.

Pre-convention campaigns are helpful to the national chairman to the extent that they aid in activating many of the precincts; they also serve to show wherein weaknesses lie.

On his trips around the country, the chairman will find three general situations: (1) a strong organization in sympathy with the aims and policies of the party nationally; (2) a strong organization not in sympathy with all of the aims of the party; an example is the situation in the South in the Democratic party today; (3) a situation in which little or no organization exists. Philadelphia in the twenties for the Democratic party, and the

---


of the third condition. The fewest problems are, naturally, presented by the first situation. In the second case, a rapprochement must be made with the state leaders, or a new organization must be developed to oppose them—an extremely hazardous undertaking, for the state leaders have their own weapons of power and patronage, as witness Farley's fight with the O'Connell brothers in his own state, New York.

Where the organization has become moribund and needs reactivation the chairman, on the advice of state officials will pick the most likely man as a new leader and will support him with funds, speakers, literature, and actual or promissory federal patronage. A necessity for reactivation faces every chairman who takes over after a major defeat, or after a long period out of power. McComb, Hays, Haskob, Farley, and all of the Republican chairmen since 1932 have faced a serious task of regeneration within their parties.

Even where there is a well-functioning state organization, the national chairman has the ticklish problem of deciding with whom to deal in his efforts to coordinate the work of the national headquarters and the local organizations. The lines of communication and responsibility are not clearly drawn. There is usually some power within the state and it behooves the chairman to work with that power, if possible. The power

---


may lie with the national committeemen, or with the chairman of the state central committee, or with a state boss or some other power behind the throne, depending upon the conditions within the state and the power of the men holding the national committee membership or the state chairmanship at the time in question.

Although the National Committee developed out of the need for coordination of the political activities within the states, there are many instances where the national committeemen are not the liaison between the chairman and the state leaders. In fact, there have been times when the national committeemen and women have been leaders of insurgent groups within their states. On such occasions, it is necessary for the chairman, very likely with the advice of the Executive Committee, to replace these rebels with men and women loyal to the party candidate.

Occasionally, the matter is simplified for the chairman in so far as communication is concerned, but not necessarily in so far as harmony is concerned, in that the state chairman or party boss and the national committeeman are one and the same person. There are many such instances in the history of both parties. Taggart, for example, was for many years both a national committeeman and the boss of Indiana. J.H. Horaback, national committeeman from Connecticut, was an example of the same situation in the Republican party. Another well-known instance is the dual capacity of Mayor Hague of Jersey City; he was not only a city boss but also a national committeeman. The chairman's problems are also likely to be less difficult

26See New York Times, March 6, 1929, p. 5, col. 2 for the report of the election by the Executive Committee of the Republican party of two new committeemen from Wisconsin to replace the previous members who had allied themselves with the LaFollette faction.
within his own state. They were definitely so for Farley, while he was state chairman and national chairman simultaneously.

As previously noted, the state leaders are very jealous of their prerogatives and even where the feeling between them and the administration is cordial, they expect communication to come through the channels they desire. A letter from Ed Kelly of Chicago to Farley is indicative of this feeling:

I would suggest that when you desire to hold any meetings in this county, or wish any speakers here, you contact Fat Nash and the organization rather than the national committee woman who, in our state, is really part of the organization. Your chairlady has been making arrangement with Mrs. ....rather than taking it up with the local organization.

Though some of the living chairmen seem loathe to say so, this letter supports other indications that the contacts with the states are more likely to be through state or county chairmen than through the National Committee members. Shaver admitted that local contacts during his regime as national chairman were more likely to be made through "someone other than the national committee members." Hays, on the other hand, insisted that he made great use of the National Committee and called upon its members frequently for advice. In a Declaration of Party Principles, Work held that:

27 Interview with James A. Farley, July 7, 1952.
28 Democratic National Committee MSS, loc. cit., Illinois Box, Sept. 12, 1956.
29 Interview with Clem Shaver, February 27, 1952.
30 Interview with Will Hays, October 16, 1952.
The first essentials of field organization rest in the members of the national committee of each State, for through them, the activities in the States could be stimulated, in close cooperation with State chairmen and their lieutenants. Through such correlation of effort the party organization will be complete, from the national committeemen down through the State and county chairmen to the precinct. Nevertheless, more than one national chairman has admitted that the modern national committeemen and committeewomen are often honorary. One chairman even went so far as to say, off the record, that they were merely "window dressing." Supporting this view is a statement by E. S. Rochester in his Coolidge-Hoover-Hork that the national committee members are "...allowed to stumble off stage and become lost in the scenery."

The question of the person with whom the chairman will deal is important not only to the chairman but to the local leaders as well. A local party leader often places his future in the hands of a national candidate, as did Edward J. Flynn, chairman of Bronx County, New York, in 1932, and he wants to know that he will be as important to the national leaders when the time comes for rewards as he was when his help was needed. It behooves the chairman, then, to build up a reputation for gratitude.

McCombs, in explaining his way out of the criticism that he had committed Wilson to a considerable extent in the matter

---

32 Ibid., pp. 28, 29.
of patronage, made obvious the fact that some assurances are expected of the national chairman. Wilson's first chairman tells of a local leader asking him who would have the weight within the state if and when Wilson was elected. The response was: "Naturally, the National Committeeman, the chairman of the State Committee and such Democratic members of the Lower House as there might be, should have consideration." Whether McCombs' succession of authority within the state would have been different had he not been talking to a national committeeman is, of course, conjectural. The only fact that is sure about this whole question of communication between the national headquarters and the local leaders is that if everything between the national headquarters and the local leaders is running smoothly, the chances are that the chairman is dealing with the right man in the state.

Having settled the problem of whom to deal with, the national chairman must then settle the problem of how to deal with the people in the field. There is in the Hitchcock file of the Taft manuscripts a bit of advice on this topic. It states that:

No matter how able a chairman may be his effectiveness will be increased if he counsels freely with his associates. Together they know more than he does. His companions are not traitors who leak. They are friends to aid.34


34 Taft MSS, Pre-Inaugural Series, loc. cit., Box 4. This statement is unsigned and undated.
The difficulty is that in a nation as large as the United States working out effective methods of communication and coordination is no easy task. Years ago the problem was so relatively simple that much of the communication was by mail. The earlier twentieth century chairmen could spend much of their time at the main headquarters with only occasional trips to the branch headquarters. The modern chairman spends a good part of his time in an airplane. He is truly what Farley calls him, the national party salesman. Some of the trips of the modern chairman make the one-night stands of stock companies sound like leisure tours. During his term as national chairman, Cummings travelled twenty-four thousand miles. He visited fifty-four cities in twenty-nine states from coast to coast. Hull had a double stint of travelling to do when he was chairman, for in addition to the trips he had to take in connection with the chairmanship, he had to make campaign forays into Tennessee to recapture his seat in the House of Representatives. Some idea of the pressure under which these men work can be gained from reports of these trips. On one of his barnstorming trips, Farley went into eighteen states in nineteen days. His Republican counterpart of the same period, Hamilton, did nearly as well; according to one of his

35 Clapp Committee, op. cit., Vol. I, Cortelyou testimony, pp. 15 to 18.


assistants, he covered eight states in ten days, travelling by motor, rail, and air as if his life depended on it.

A diary kept by Hays on one of his trips depicts the activities of an alert chairman on these political jaunts. For one trip lasting from April 2 to April 21, 1918, and covering eleven states, the secretarial account fills sixty-eight typewritten pages. The notes on the trip contain details of the itinerary, a record of every appointment, a recital of every event, the names of the people seen, even including scores who attended the dinners, a record of opinions gathered and expressed, with recommendations for future action based on new discoveries made en route. Records of receptions and mass meetings are also included. Memos to see this leader or that candidate about a senatorial matter or some other issue dot the report. Notations are made to follow up this or that situation in areas where the organization is insufficiently active, or where factions need harmonizing.

This diary bears out Farley's concept of the role of the national chairman in the states; he is "a combination political drummer and listening post." Usually, the chairman carries representatives of his headquarters divisions with him, and they supervise and confer on the matters in their own area of the campaign work. Problems of a serious or unusual nature


39 Summary from Hays Files.

are brought to the attention of the chairman. Where there are major factional splits within the state, it takes an extremely alert and tactful man to assure that his trip will be beneficial to the party interests rather than detrimental, because both sides will take the occasion of the trip to make "a hot fight for recognition." Cummings tells of a visit he made to a western state for the purpose of bringing harmony between two factions, only to find that the pressing contention of the moment between them had as its source the entertainment of Cummings.

North Americans being a peculiar sort who want their politics carried on without politicians or political action, it is always well if the national chairman can find some excuse other than politics for taking these trips. Just as the president has his inspection trips, so has the chairman alibis of his own. Hays seems to have doubled in his patriotic duty to his country by combining his tours around the country in support of the Liberty Loan drive with visits to the local leaders on the political situation. Farley attended Elks' conventions and dedicated post-offices, and frankly admits that it was impossible for him to dissociate his various roles on these trips. Fortunately, like the areas that needed presidential inspection, the Elks' convention that needed

41 Taft MSS, Pre-inaugural Series, Box 4, loc.cit., Sylvester C. Williams to Wm. H. Williams, July 20, 1908.
42 Interview with Homer Cummings, June 26, 1952.
attending and the post-offices that needed dedicating were very often in doubtful states.

In addition to these trips of the national chairman into the field, the state chairman and the national committeemen come into headquarters on individual trips to confer with the chairman. Some of the party heads have encouraged this procedure rather than taking the trips into the local areas themselves. Shaver was one of this group. He was a great advocate of bringing the local leaders into headquarters for harmony dinners.

All chairmen, of course, keep in touch with the party leaders by correspondence. Cummings reported that two hundred thousand personal letters were sent from his headquarters from August 1 to November 1, 1920. Farley was another great believer in letter-writing as a coordinating medium; his green signature travelled about the nation even more than he did. That letter writing was an effective means of developing interest and loyalty is proved by a response received by Farley from a West Virginia delegate who was obviously pleased with Farley's request for his advice and reflections on campaign matters in his community.

44 Interview with Clem Shaver, April 10, 1952.
46 Democratic National Committee MSS, loc. cit., West Virginia Box, Charles R. Wilson to Farley.
This method does not always prove of assistance to the chairman, however, for the local leaders do not always see the picture clearly. Stoddard claims that the failure of the western leaders to understand the attitude of the people toward war was responsible for the defeat of Charles Evans Hughes in 1916. This editor and party worker claims that in his work at party headquarters he had received many of the reports that had come in from the west and that they gave no indication of the real interests of the people in the west.

Another defect in dependence upon the local viewpoint is the tendency of the local leaders to be over optimistic. To overcome these deficiencies of the local reports, most of the national chairmen have scouts of their own in the field. The task of these men is to verify or to reject the sanguinary claims of the local leaders. Reports from local men, interested but not too closely allied, are also helpful. There are twelve boxes of letters in the Hyde Park collection which were written to Farley reporting and analyzing local political conditions. There are letters from newspaper publishers, bankers, federal administrators, circuit court judges, municipal bosses, doctors, lawyers, in fact from everyone but the Indian Chief.

As time has gone on the chairmen have become more aware that the problems of the local leaders, especially in the matter of government policy, are likely to spill over the state boundaries.


48 Democratic National Committee MSS., _loc. cit._, State Boxes.
As a result of this realization, a great saving in time and energy has been accomplished through the inauguration of regional conferences. More than one claimant has been put forward as the originator of the regional conference. Hamilton is credited with having held the first Republican Cornfield Conference. A recent member of the Democratic National Committee policy staff claims the honor of the origination of the regional conference for J. Howard McGrath, former Democratic national chairman (1943-1944). Really, the idea is an old one. Hitchcock held an ad hoc regional conference with the national committeemen and state chairmen of the mountain states as long ago as 1908. Adams carried on regional conferences throughout the country in 1923. 

Farley perfected the system of regional conferences. He would bring into headquarters ten or twelve chairmen from contiguous states at the same time. These local leaders met with the national chairman and the division heads, reported conditions as they found them in their areas and informed the chairman of the problems that they were encountering. Leading

---


50 Interview with Grey Leslie, Assistant for Policy, Strategy, and Research at the Democratic National Committee in 1951, on May 6, 1951.


Local party men were also called into headquarters for periods of work at the national level, and conversely national headquarters assistants were sent into the field regularly so that they could keep in touch with the local situation at first hand. As Peter H. Odegard and E. Allen Helms have so aptly expressed it, Farley constructed "...a political seismograph to register every shock and every opinion shift in the most remote sections of the country." National Committee meetings, Executive Committee meetings, and the fund-raising dinners, especially the national dinners also serve as media of communication.

Fitting the independent organization into this pattern presents a challenge to the chairman. Every campaign brings a new blossoming of such organizations. There have been gold Democrats working with Hanna, silver Republicans working with Bryan, wet Republicans with Smith, and dry Democrats with Hoover. There have been Democrats for Willkie and Republicans for Roosevelt and like mongrel associations.

Some of these organizations are independent of the national headquarters in name only. They are actually groups created by the national chairman with the hope of engaging the support of the voter who, normally an adherent to the opposition party, is loathe to join the regular organization for one reason or another.

---


another. Examples of these types are the Woodrow Wilson Independent League developed by McCormick, and the Good Neighbor League developed during the Farley regime. Understandably, the part played by the party in the development of these associations is not always publicized, but congressional investigations occasionally bring out the connection. James W. Good, western manager for the Hoover campaign, for example, sent to a prospective generous donor the following telegram:

Bassom Slemp is working on a plan for independent organization, and we are anxious to carry out this plan.... Please give him all assistance possible. 57

Well-known men in their respective fields are chosen to foster these organizations. Farley, for instance, had the help of Jesse Straus of R. H. Macy Company in the organization of the Roosevelt Business and Professional Men's League.

The truly independent organizations often present the national chairman with particular problems in organizations. In the first place, they are harder to supervise than the


57 U. S. 72d Congress, 1st sess. Senate, Select Committee on Campaign Expenditures, 1939), p. 124. That some of these independent organizations are, on occasion, only shadow groups is brought out in the Michelson memoirs. In speaking of the Republicans For Roosevelt he says that instead of being "....a mere gesture to scare the enemy," the usual measure of such bodies, that this body was an actual fighting force. Michelson, op. cit., p. 44.
regular organizations; secondly, they are frequently in the hands of amateurs, who, in their ignorance, cause embarrassment at times to the candidate. Then, too, the chairman must guard against the possibility of the development of local groups of less than good intent; groups which, as Farley says, simply want to "hitch a ride." Such a dilemma confronted McCombs in 1912 with the Non-Partisan League in Texas. Of the aim of this group, Wilson remarked that it was "politics pure and simple, or rather impure and simple...." It is the duty of the party chairmen to see to it that the name of his party's candidate is not used by unrepresentative groups, anxious to borrow prestige for a local factional fight.

By way of these organizations and through other local contacts, representations come to the national chairman seeking policy concessions. Local leaders present, or pretend to present, the position of the people on local and national issues to the national chairman, and the chairman presents the administration position to the state leaders. Requests come to the national chairmen for the payment of government subsidies,

---

59 Baker, op. cit., Vol. 8, p. 75.
61 McKinley MSS, loc. cit. See letter from Hanna to Cortelyou, Aug. 29, 1900 for an example of how the communication system operates.
62 Ibid., Hanna to McKinley, July 10, 1900.
for the postponement of embarrassing trials, for delays of other unfavorable governmental processes, such as foreclosures by the Home Owners Loan Corporation, for tax intercessions, and for other favors.

In the matter of governmental subsidies already provided for, it is probably always as Hanna explained the matter to McKinley in an individual case, "...simply a question of expediency as to when it shall be paid...." Postponement of trials presents more of a problem, as both work and Hilles discovered. A letter from President Taft to his chairman on such a matter is very revealing. The letter relates to the case of William H. Cooper who was charged with using the mails to defraud. In replying to Hilles about this case, Taft encloses a copy of a letter from the Attorney General and an "accompanying enclosure," and comments that "it seems to make anything but a trial impossible." These requests present the national chairmen with some of their most awkward situations.

---


64 Democratic National Committee MSS, *loc. cit.*, Indiana-Illinois Box, Senator Minton to Farley, Aug. 10, 1912.

65 Farley, *Jim Farley's Story*, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

66 McKinley MSS, *loc. cit.*, Hanna to McKinley, July 10, 1900.


Hanna, in requesting the postponement of a case until after the election, describes the position of the national chairman in such situations. Writing to President McKinley, Hanna said:

I may be making a nuisance of myself to again refer to it—but you know I cannot refuse such applications when we are playing politics....I know nothing about the merits but—if there is nothing to be lost—by the Government in postponement the results might justify the delay. 69

Questions of policy concessions or other political favors are particularly troublesome to the chairman of the party in power, because they are in power. But, apparently, there is a point of intercession beyond which the wise chairman will not go.

Farley tells of a young man who was relayed to him from a local leader by Harry Truman, then a senator, in the matter of tax intercession. Farley says that when Truman discovered what the man's mission was he apologized to Farley. Farley told the interceder that he could do nothing, even if he were disposed to.

An example of the dilemma that sometimes faces the chairman in relation to policy questions is presented in the dispute in the southwest between Arizona, Nevada, and California over the proper irrigation policy for the administration to pursue. Pacifying the state leader in all of these states on this matter takes a Castiglione. Nor is domestic policy the only one that needs explaining, now that this nation has become a world leader. The Democratic party's support of international trade agreements,

69 McKinley MSS, loc. cit., Hanna to McKinley, July 17, 1900.
70 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 185.
for example, has made it necessary for the national chairman of that party to explain the administration position to those whose interests are thereby affected.

Another problem affecting organizational harmony at the local level develops around the choice of state and local candidates. As in other cases, the national chairman acts in the case of the choice of local candidates as the political spokesman for the presidential candidate or for the president as the case may be. Theodore Roosevelt used Cortelyou's services in order to get Hughes nominated for governor of New York and again for the same purpose with the reluctant Nicholas Murray Butler as the prospective candidate. (This business of getting the right candidate in New York runs all through the history of both parties.) Hitchcock in 1908 telegraphed Elihu Root advising him that Republican leaders from a dozen Mississippi Valley and western states believed that the failure to renominate Hughes (for governor of New York) would seriously reduce the chances of Republican success. The pleas of Haskob and

---

71 Interview with Grey Leslie, Assistant for Policy and Research, Democratic National Committee.
his offer of financial support were factors in the decision of Roosevelt to run for governor of New York in 1928. The fact that Governor Lehman ran for reelection can be attributed, at least in part, to Farley's efforts. In fact, Roosevelt tried to use Farley, himself, as gubernatorial bait to assure the New York electoral vote.

At times the chairman is also used to direct the campaign strategy of state candidates, as for instance, the injection of Farley into the Upton Sinclair campaign in California in the hope of toning down the more Utopian aspects of Sinclair's Epic Program. The chairman must estimate carefully the chances of the local candidates. The defeat of a candidate supported strongly by the national party or the success of a candidate ignored can have repercussions upon the national elections. Federal administrators seeking elective office have long been a problem, because even when they do not intimate federal support, it is often implied by the voter.

Yet, the chairman must avoid wherever possible any part in a factional row within the states, whether it be over the

---

75 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., pp. 59, 60.
76 Ibid., p. 147.
77 Ibid., pp. 112, 113.
seating of a national committee member, over the selection of delegates and alternates to the National Convention, or over the support of one rival candidate over another. Hamilton explained the position of the national chairman on one such occasion in a letter to the chairman of one of the local committees:

Both the governor and I feel that it is not within our responsibilities nor within the proprieties of our relationship with state organizations that we undertake to dictate or even to suggest who shall lead a state ticket. For that reason, we have, all stories to the contrary notwithstanding, kept out of local problems of this type. 82

The introduction of primaries has added to the chairman's burdens as a harmonizer. States are often lost as a result of party differences growing out of primary contests. These contests are, as Frank Kent has said, contest among the party leaders and not among the voters. Cummings claims that disagreements resulting from the primary contests cost the Democratic party the state of Colorado in the congressional elections in 1918. As a usual rule the national chairmen will advise the presidents not to write letters supporting one candidate

---

82. New York Times, Sept. 28, 1936, p. 8, col. 2. The governor referred to was Governor Landon.
against another in the primary elections. For after the primaries are over, it is the chairman who must bring the opposing factions within the state into a cohesive force.

Cortelyou urged Roosevelt against an open endorsement of Hughes for governor of New York. Taft, himself, saw the danger of involving his chairman in local factional fights, and in his efforts to defeat the Cummins-Dolliver faction in Iowa, he wisely decided that it would be best to make the fight look as if it were one entirely within the state.

McCormick did not approve of Wilson's appeal to the people for a Democratic Congress and did what he could to tone down the original draft of the Wilson appeal. The recollection of Farley's efforts to dissuade Roosevelt against his purge of non-New Deal congressmen is still fresh in political memory.

Most awkward for the chairman is a condition where two strong leaders are at loggerheads. Wilcox was in this situation in the case of the Crocker-Johnson feud in California in 1916. Farley had many such splits to deal with; as for

---

88 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., pp. 121, 122.
example, the situation in Minnesota in 1938 when Joseph Wolf, who was supported by the powerful Farmer-Labor party, was feuding with Joseph Moosan, chairman of the state central committee. Another such incident in which Farley was involved was the fight between the Kelly-Nash group in Illinois on the one hand and Governor Horner and his supporters on the other.

When feuds develop between strong party factions within the state, the smart chairman gets to the area, especially if it is a key state, or he sends one of his assistants who has a special appeal within the area. In connection with the Kelly-Nash versus Horner dispute cited above, there is an interesting note among the Democratic National Committee manuscripts at Hyde Park. It is a memo from Roosevelt to Farley suggesting that Farley get in touch with Ed Kelly over some appointments that Kelly had in mind which Roosevelt feared would create further dissidents within the state and would, therefore, widen the gap between the two Democratic groups in the state. Roosevelt admonished Farley, however, not to bring him into it.


91 *Democratic National Committee MSS, Illinois Box, loc. cit*, Bruce A. Campbell to Farley, Oct. 3, 1936.


A return to the original intent of the function of the national committeemen for all of the members of the National Committee would be a help to the national chairman in the matter of communication and harmony. If the need for title to dispense to party contributors or to party workers is great---and, apparently, the hope of Hays that enough people will work for the party without any return is dim---then, associate memberships could be created. These members would have the privilege of attending the meetings, but would be excluded from the executive sessions and would not have the privilege of voting.

The whole problem of communication and harmony would, it seems, be improved if the national committee member was always the state chairman, or possibly the vice-chairman, so that there would be some female representation in the committee. Any change such as this one encounters, in the United States, the same barrier that has arisen in many other areas of politics, that is, the difficulty in securing uniform laws in all the states. The only hope for such a change lies in educating the voter to its advantages.

94 The proposed change presumes that the selection of the state chairman will be conducted in a democratic manner.
CHAPTER V

THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AND PARTY FINANCE

In the nineteenth century the national chairman was the chief contributor, the chief solicitor, the chief custodian, the chief accountant, and the chief auditor for the National Committee. In fact, one of the important factors in the choice of a national chairman in the past century was his ability to finance the campaign either by himself or through his friends. The national chairman of today, by contrast, has ample assistance in handling the finances of the party. It is that he does have, too, for managing a political party through national campaign is big business. Furthermore, it is big business under the most trying of circumstances.

A congressional committee reviewing the receipts and expenditures of political committees in 1930 estimated that the total expenditures of the two political parties reached a figure of over ten and a quarter million dollars. Only a few had the chairman in this century collected under one million dollars. In 1936, the last full year prior to the Hatch Act controls,


3The Hatch Act controls were effective for only part of the 1940 campaign.
the total receipts of the Democratic party were $5,183,157.52 and the disbursements were $5,050,848.41; the total receipts of the Republican party were $7,761,038.64 and the disbursements were $8,892,971.53. When it is realized that a good part of these sums is collected and expended over less than a half year, it becomes evident that the assertion that the management of national politics is big business, at least for a short period, is not too far awry.

In the field of party finance, public attention seems to focus on the contributions and the solicitations of them, but this task is only one phase of the work. Party finance involves: the organization of finance committees, the selection of finance officers, and the decisions on sources of contributions, on methods of solicitation, on the allocation or distribution of funds, and on provisions for custody and accounting. It involves also reports to the Clerk of the House of Representatives in compliance with federal law. The national chairman has a function to perform in each of these cases, if it is only in some instances that function of selecting the key personnel for the tasks enumerated.

Possibly because the contributions to political parties are the phase of the work that attracts most newspaper attention there is a tendency to think of the national chairman as, primarily, a fund-raiser. Many years ago, Cortelyou claimed

\[4U. S. 75th Congress, 1st sess., Senate Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, Report No. 151, p. 24.\]
that this "popular idea" was false. Actually, it is neither wholly false nor wholly true, for the national chairmen differ in their conception of their function in this connection as they do in their conception of some of their other functions. Some chairmen have solicited funds—many probably have had to do so against their true concept of their role—others have not.

It is known from Croly's study of Hanna that he solicited funds from the business corporations of his day. It is also known that Mack, the Democratic party chairman in 1904, solicited funds, for he tells of the last-minute bills coming in and of the necessity of getting money "the best way he could by asking men who he thought would contribute." 7 A letter from Taft to his chairman, Hilles, indicates that the latter engaged in fund solicitation:

My heart goes out to you in sympathy in the dreadful effort to collect money, but you have been so successful in creating the impression that Roosevelt is going to be third, and that there is some real chance for me, that I feel confident the money will begin to come in more freely than it has heretofore. As soon as I get a blank check I will send you my check for $7,500. I have already sent you $2,500 for the Ohio fund. It is not much but it may help some. 8

---

5 U. S. 62d Congress 2d sess., Senate, Hearings before Sub-Committee of Committee on Privileges and Elections pursuant to S. Res. 76, Vol. 1, p. 19, Cortelyou testimony. (Clapp Committee).


7 Clapp Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 98, 99, Mack testimony.

The diary of McCombs' secretary, Maurice Lyons, is dotted with evidence that McCombs kept close tab on contributions. Notations about the procurement of funds are found jotted down here and there in the little book. Nor was solicitation considered beneath the dignity of Cordell Hull, who knocked at the doors of "prominent Democrats" in his drive to liquidate a deficit, even though, as he opined, he was received in most cases "...as if he had the small-pox."

Many of the chairmen, however, claim to have taken little part in the actual solicitation of funds. Cortelyou appearing before a congressional committee gives a picture of the chairman's relation to finance which seems to be a rather general public position. All the chairman knew of finance, according to Roosevelt's national chairman, was whether it would "warrant any action." Only when "contribution was tendered, or some special feature invited" his attention to one "...attached to which there might be any matter of question" would he occasionally give instructions. Knowledge of contributions came to him, normally, only when he was required to endorse a check and very few were made out to the national chairman.

---

12. Ibid., pp. 19, 20.
On only one occasion did he personally solicit a contribution and that was from Andrew Carnegie. He acknowledged that he was pressed on several occasions to call upon certain individuals but that his invariable reply was that he would see everybody who wanted to see him in his office—and he specified that he was referring to his office at the party headquarters—and that it was not necessary that he call upon anybody in regard to campaign matters, for the treasurer represented the campaign committee just as he did.

Testifying before the same committee, Taggart, the Democratic chairman of 1908, also claimed that he took no part in fund solicitation. In fact, he stated that he had no idea what the total contributions or receipts of the campaign were and that he never did have. According to his testimony, he had only hearsay knowledge that Thomas Fortune Ryan, August Belmont, and other wealthy New Yorkers were supplying the Democratic party with the sinews during his regime as national chairman. In a similar vein, the Republican chairman of 1908, Hitchcock, claimed that he did not solicit funds, although he admitted that contributions were frequently sent to him.

The treasurer's report of the 1920 Democratic National
Committee gives no credit to the chairman as a fund raiser, and Cummings, acting chairman and chairman, during the period of the report supports the report by testifying before a congressional committee that he paid practically no attention to the raising of funds. Spending money, not collecting it, was Hays' conception of the financial role of the national chairman, and according to Daugherty, Hays' colleague in the election campaign of Harding, this chairman was quite adept in the financial sector he had set out for himself. Nevertheless, as he admitted before the Ladd Committee, Hays did "...at different intervals" suggest to "...friends that they contribute." Furthermore, his testimony before the Kenyon Committee indicates that he had a very good idea of the budget and collection plans in use during his tenure as national chairman. According to the New York Times, Butler interested himself in party financing to the extent of conferring with


19 Interview with Will Hays, Oct. 16, 1951.


21 U. S. 68th Congress, 1st sess. Senate, Hearings of Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Vol. 3, p. 2308, Hays testimony. This reference will be referred to later as the Ladd Committee.

22 Kenyon Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 1080 to 1153, Hays testimony.
Pennsylvania financiers on collection and distribution plans.

The truth of the matter seems to be that the national chairmen solicit when they must, and that large contributors often prefer to contribute to them. However, so heavy have become the burdens of the national chairmen in recent years that it would be almost impossible for them to spend much time in solicitation. As early as 1912, McCombs complained to Wilson, even before the presidential campaign had started, that the gathering of funds and the handling of the campaign were too much for one man. At any rate, there is a reluctance on the part of the national chairmen to associate themselves directly with the solicitation of party funds—and in fairness to them, it is a reluctance that is apparent on occasions other than before investigating committees. While they definitely do not come out and say so, there is a feeling when discussing the matter with them that they believe that actual solicitation is beneath the dignity of the position of the chairmanship.

There is also great caution to differentiate any part that the chairman does take in finance from any other official position he may have.


25. Interviews.

But whether the chairmen solicit funds themselves or not, they must, of course, see to it that some arrangement for the solicitation and collection of funds is made. Staff officers must be selected for the collection, custody, disbursement, accounting, and auditing of the funds, and committees must be created to develop collection organizations. The chairman's earliest assistant in the handling of funds was the treasurer. This office is a very old one; it has been continuously in existence since the turn of the present century and has been mandatory since the passage of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. At the end of the second decade a new finance officer, a Director of Finance, was introduced, further separating the financial from the general organizational functions of the party. Today, the national chairmen in both parties have large staffs to handle the details relating to party finance.

In addition to the headquarters staff, the chairman has also the assistance of a finance committee. As a rule, he appoints, at least, the chairman of this committee, again, of course, with the advice of the candidates and other party leaders. Sometimes he takes the responsibility of gathering the membership of the whole committee. Many of the chairmen could probably echo Mack's statement that he "....organized the finance committee....the first thing...." when he came into the chairmanship. Other chairmen have claimed that they

27 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925 (U. S. Stat. Vol. 43, Sec. 303 (a)).
have had little to do with the establishment of these committees. Cortelyou, for example, stated that he participated in the make-up of the collection committee only in an informal way; that is, he may have occasionally suggested a good individual for it. Cummings, in the Democratic party, testified much to the same effect, claiming that the financial plans were "practically under the control of the Treasurer."

As in many other areas of his work, the role of the national chairman in this sector of party management is that of general manager. He holds conferences with the party leaders and division heads on matters of major tactics of fund raising, such as the search for acceptable sources and the avoidance of unacceptable ones. He also takes part in devising effective methods of solicitation and in working out collection schemes within the states. He also makes the top-level decisions, generally, on the allocation and distribution of funds among the states and among the departments within the headquarters structure. In addition, he keeps an eye on the financial practices of the opposition.

Throughout the years, the political parties have had to tap every conceivable source of funds: the candidate, the friends and sponsors of the candidates, the chairman and his friends, the finance and executive committees and their friends, big business, little business, public office holders, labor

---

20 Clapp Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 23, Cortelyou testimony.
30 Kenyon Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 1155, Cummings testimony.
unions, and the individual small donor. But as fast as a new source is found or a new method of getting funds from an old source is discovered, some opposition to the source develops, or some weakness in the method becomes apparent. With the exception of the voluntary small contributions, every source that the chairmen and their financial assistants have attempted to tap has been suspected.

Out of these suspicions have developed controls which, while undoubtedly necessary, have added further to the problems of the national chairmen. Restrictions upon national party finances began in the nineteenth century; at the national level they took the form of legislation forbidding the solicitation of assessments from federal employees. By comparison with the twentieth century chairmen, the nineteenth century chairmen really never knew what restrictions were, for they had relatively little of the control placed upon them by federal law that the chairman of the present century have had.

In the nineteenth century controls have been added, in the present century; such new restrictions on source of campaign funds as the prohibition against solicitation from corporations and from labor unions; such new restrictions on methods of financing as the law prohibiting the sale of campaign books or of advertising in them; and such limitations

---

31 This law was originally passed in 1907 but was subsequently incorporated in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, (U. S. Stat., Vol. 43, Sec. 315, 610).


33 Hatch Act, 1939, as amended, (U. S. Stat., Vol. 54, Sec. (15), 608 (b)).
upon the amount of contribution as the law limiting the sum from individuals, and upon the amount expended as the law limiting any political committee to a total expenditure of three million dollars. Supplementing these federal laws, and in many cases prior to them, have been state laws which have had to be considered in accepting a source of income or in devising a method to procure income.

One of the first of these controls to affect the twentieth century chairman was the law passed in 1907 prohibiting contributions from corporations. Inasmuch as it was the Republican party which was in power at this time, it was they who were more on the defensive. As in the virtuous wont of the opposition, the Democratic party clamored for publicity for campaign funds and for restrictions upon their source. Bryan and his chairman, Jones, swelled the chorus of voices crying against campaign contributions from corporations. Theodore Roosevelt, by contrast, supported his chairman in his financial arrangements with the interesting concept expressed in a letter to Cortelyou:

---

34 Ibid., Sec. (13), 608 (a).
35 Ibid., Sec. (20), 609.
It is entirely legitimate to accept contributions, no matter how large they are, from individuals and corporations on the terms which I happen to know you have accepted them that is, with the explicit understanding that they are given and received with no thought of any more obligation on the part of the National Committee or the National Administration than is implied in the statement that every man will receive a square deal, no more and no less.

Added to the protestations of the opposition were the complaints of the public arising out of the revelations that had come out in the life insurance investigation in New York. This investigation revealed that in 1904 forty to fifty percent of the funds that Cortelyou had expended had come from the life insurance companies. As a result of the mounting criticism, both parties by 1908 had gone on record as favoring publicity for campaign contributions. Louise Overacker says that public opinion made the 1908 campaign "...a contest in political purity." By 1910, a federal law was passed providing for a degree of publicity for campaign finances, but the publicity achieved has been of limited value.

38 Clapp Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 28.
41 See Barry Belmont, "The Abolition of the Secrecy of Party Funds," U. S. 62d Congress, 2d sess., Senate Document 485 for the development of this law, pp. 27 to 44.
With the opposition and public opinion in general watching carefully, the chairmen have always had to be cautious as to the sources of their contributions. The suspicion behind the criticisms is that there is a quid pro quo arrangement between the receiver and the donor of campaign contributions. Chairmen have, therefore, as a rule, tried to avoid any contributions from corporations that are in difficulties of any sort with the government. There are many instances recorded of rejected contributions. Cortelyou had orders by telegraph and by mail from Roosevelt to refuse any contributions from the Standard Oil Company. On his own initiative, Cortelyou issued an order against contributions from the tobacco industry because of a decision that had been rendered by the Treasury Department touching upon the branding of Cuban tobacco.

Because the government had a suit pending against the Du Pont Corporation, Hitchcock turned down a large contribution from Coleman du Pont, a member of his Executive Committee, and ordered the treasurer to return the money, but it was not without travail as letters among the Taft manuscripts will show. McCombs, the Democratic national chairman, had

---

42 Theodore Roosevelt MSS, loc. cit., F. L. Box 148, Roosevelt to Cortelyou, Oct. 29, 1904. It was brought out in a later investigation that a contribution had been received from the Standard Oil Company, apparently without the knowledge of either Roosevelt or Cortelyou. See Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1920), Vol. 1, p. 350, 331.


44 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 52, Hitchcock testimony.

45 Taft MSS, Pre-Inaugural Series, Box 1, loc. cit., Taft to Hitchcock, Sept. 22, 1908.
to refuse the help of Josiah Quincy, a supporter of Wilson's cause, because, although acquitted later, at the time of the contemplated support he was under indictment for fraudulent use of the mail. McCombs was also deprived of one of his propaganda outlets, Harper's Weekly, when Wilson repudiated the support of George Harvey, the publisher of the magazine, as a result of criticism which connected Harvey and Wall Street. White testified to his feeling of personal responsibility in regards to campaign contributions and declared that he "... would examine and would refuse any check carrying any obligation, implied or direct."

While the law prohibiting contributions from corporations made fund-raising more trying for the national chairman, it left him with the wealthy donor, but he still had to be wary not only of the corporate tie-up of the contributor, but also of any appearance of a quid pro quo in respect to a political assignment, for here again the chairman is bound, through his candidate, by law. At every campaign the contributor with a diplomatic post in mind appears. As Stoddard expresses it, cash and carry friends stand around check book in hand with some office or honor in mind. Cortelyou tells of returning

46 McCombs, op. cit., pp. 68 to 70.
47 Ibid., pp. 54, 55, 56.
a preferred $20,000 contribution after his caller had made reference to himself as a potential candidate for a position in the foreign service. One of the biographers of Coolidge tells of a similar incident during the Coolidge regime. Michelson tells of a man offering to contribute $200,000 which the party had to turn down because the man was a candidate for a diplomatic post.

At times, the concessions demanded of the chairman are not ones of position but ones of policy. Morgenthau, chairman of the Finance Committee under both McCombs and McCormick, reports on a conference which he and McCormick had with Henry Ford on the subject of funds. Ford, according to Morgenthau, was agreeable to a contribution, but he hedged his offer with stipulations. He wanted terms that would advertise himself, and he wanted a guarantee of the privilege of calling on the president to lay a labor policy before him. During the Farley regime, a donor offered a large contribution to the Democratic party, according to Michelson, with the proviso that the government would relax its restrictions upon immigration so as to admit some unnamed wealthy Jewish refugees from Germany.

54 Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 243, 244.
55 Michelson, op. cit., p. 63.
That policy complicates party financing is testified to further by Farley's statement that he did not know where the money to run the 1940 campaign was coming from with Henry Wallace on the ticket.

It is conceded by most of the living chairmen willing to comment on the subject that personal solicitation is the best method of collecting campaign funds. Many ingenious schemes have been worked out in an endeavor to make such solicitation effectual. It will be noted that most of these schemes have had as their basis the desire to get many small contributions rather than a few large ones. The hindrance is that it takes a great deal longer to get $100,000 from 100,000 people than it does to get $100,000 from a few persons, provided, of course, that the right persons are approached. Furthermore, it takes money to collect money from many people as the Democratic party with its Jamieson Plan discovered.

Nevertheless, this hope of financing a campaign through small contributions has been the hope of almost every national chairman. It was an important feature of such widely separated campaigns as those of Hitchcock, of Cummings, of Hays, and of


57 *Infra, Chapter V, p. 129.*

Nor is fear of publicity the only reason that prompts this desire, for as Cummings pointed out "a man who contributed even though the amount of the contribution was small, felt a renewed interest in the party welfare and was, therefore, stimulating the party activity."

It is a sad commentary on the sense of duty that the American has as a citizen, to note the psychological ruses the chairmen have had to invent to enlist the contributions and services of the people. Bryan and Jones inaugurated an "honor list" with the hope of enticing the small donor. A similar psychology was behind Raskob's Minute Men, a "select" but not a "snobbish" group who could either "...give or get two thousand dollars toward the Victory Campaign." It was also behind Farley's Roosevelt Nominators, and behind Hamilton's personally signed membership cards. The idea that the chairmen try to create is a sense of belonging, a feeling of being on the inside.

The early twentieth century chairmen used newspapers effectively for the collection of small sums. Bryan tells of the use of subscriptions by the New York Journal which enabled


60 Kenyon Committee, op. cit., p. 1104, Cummings testimony.


him to turn over more than $40,000 to Jones. Both Hack and Taggart, successors to Jones, also testified to the efficiency of this method of solicitation. It, too, however, had its weaknesses. In the first place, its publicity value as a democratic procedure was nullified to some extent by the fact that the newspapers would publish either only the large contributions or lump sums, and the desired effect of support by the rank and file was thus lost. Moreover, from the reformer's viewpoint, there was a defect in that in the lump sums turned over by the newspapers, the sum contributed by the paper, itself, could be lost sight of.

Direct systematic collections from the small donor were inaugurated by the democrats under the chairmanship of Cummings. This system became known as the Jamieson Plan. It was a scheme of collection by letter-writing, and it produced $20,000 a month. In this innovation, the defect was that the overhead necessary to write the original and the follow-up letters was more expensive than the returns justified. Needless to say, the plan was relatively short-lived.

64 Clapp Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 59, Hack testimony. See also Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1908, p. 360.
66 It was brought out in the Kenyon Committee hearings that the Democratic National Committee had had to rent three floors of the Bond Building and had had to use one hundred and fifty electric typewriters at $700 a piece to keep the plan operating. Kenyon Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 1158.
On the Republican side at about this time, the concentration was also on the small donor. Hays had been very active in the Liberty Loan drives during World War I, and it was his hope that the patriotic urge which had prompted men to solicit and to give for the war effort might be kept alive and transferred to the political field so that democracy could be supported by the people. It was his hope to limit the individual donations to $1,000 and to collect two million dollars from as many people. He formed a National Ways and Means Committee with branches—wherever feasible—in the states and counties, after the fashion of the Red Cross. He engaged salaried "money diggers" in the hope of avoiding the problems of the patronage system. When Hays said that he was going to concentrate on getting the "little money," he meant it. He sent out pasteboard elephants into which quarters and dimes might be placed for mailing purposes. How effective was his plan? The party ended with a deficit, big business again stepped into the breach, and as will be seen later, Hays stepped into a hornet's nest.

The Jamieson Plan having proved too expensive for the Democratic party, Hull returned to the old device of the political club for his method of attracting sums from the little man. Hull called his clubs Victory Clubs; they were composed of ten or more persons in every precinct who paid $500 into the party

---

68 Kenyon Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 1081 to 1083.
69 U. S. 70th Congress, 1st sess., Senate, Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Report No. 1326.
treasury. Hull had much faith in these clubs—he collected $80,000 by this means in 1924—and deplored the fact that Shaver permitted them to die. Again a systematized plan was installed under Haskob, who brought in an outside agency to develop a plan for continuous giving after the fashion of the charity organizations.

Under Farley’s chairmanship, the Democratic party was very inventive of effective money-making schemes. One of these schemes, the sale of an elaborate campaign book and of advertising in the book, nearly died aborn for the passage of the Hatch Act made the life of this lucrative device very short. But Farley took an older propaganda device—the party dinner—and started it on its way to being one of the Democratic party’s most effective sources of income. Political dinners are by no means new. Cusenbe claims that Jefferson Day dinners were held as early as 1830, and Edward Flynn feels that they are the old clambakes brought up-to-date. However, the purpose of the national chairman in gathering the clan in the old days

---

71 ibid., p. 1111.
73 Hatch Act, 1939 (U.S. Stat., Vol. 54, sec. 13, 603, (b)).
was not that of immediate or direct revenue returns. The pre-Farley dinners were simply devices by which the chairmen incited the enthusiasm of the potential contributors. To the degree that the men present were sufficiently impressed with the candidates' and the party's chances to that degree contributions would be forthcoming later. Apparently, the method was effective, too. McCombs tells of a dinner at which Wilson gave a stirring speech, after which a dinner guest handed McCombs an envelope containing two checks for $5,000 each. Of course, Colonel Watterson and the aforementioned Josiah Quincy had already "softened" the donor up by talking over with him the virtues of Wilson as a candidate.

Shaver reminiscing about the Jackson Day dinner in 1928 says that the $5.00 charge per plate for the dinner did not cover the cost of the dinner—and was not necessarily intended to do so—let alone bring in any surplus. The purpose was to acquaint "the twenty-two hundred some odd people" present with the candidate and the principles of the party. It took seventeen speeches to extol these principles and either the principles or the speeches must have been good, for according to the former chairman who engineered the dinner, they "caused the money to pour into headquarters."

---

76 McCombs, op. cit., pp. 67, 69.
77 Ibid.
78 Interview with Clem Shaver, May 10, 1952.
Often credited with inaugurating the $100 dinner, Farley disclaims the honor. What he originated was the dinner for revenue. When he suggested his scheme to put the dinner to work as a direct money-making device, he suggested $25.00 per plate as the price, and "they" thought it was "terrible."

The even more "terrible" price of $100, however, has been very successful. In 1940, Oliver Quayle, the treasurer of the Democratic National Committee, to whom, incidentally, Farley graciously gives most of the credit for the success of the scheme, reported that over $400,000 had been collected through the device of the campaign dinners. At first the dinner tickets seemed to be control-proof inasmuch as the purchase of the ticket was voluntary, at least on the surface. However, after the passage of the Hatch Act, the plan had to be changed somewhat. No longer were tickets sold at $100 a-piece, but the guests were "invited" to the dinner, the $100 donation being the understood price.

Hamilton in 1936 attempted to place fund raising on the laymen of the party, rather than on the office-holder, a very understandable objective for the party out of power. His plan was similar to the Hays plan in that committees were to be placed in the various cities and towns for the purposes of

---

79 Interview with James A. Farley, July 7, 1952.


81 Michelson, op. cit., p. 60.
solicitation. However, it was not a drive in the sense that the liberty loan drives were, but was conceived as a year in and year out plan. It was a membership plan, and each of the members was to receive a national membership card signed by Hamilton.

In addition to finding sources and devising methods of contributions, the chairmen are also expected to be generous donors to the party treasuries. Nor does this expectation die with the end of their tenure as chairman, but as the financial reports from the national headquarters to the Clerk of the House of Representatives show, the chairmen continue to be sources of income long after they have left the chairmanship.

With all their ingenuity and with all their efforts, the chairmen, in their party capacity, live a hand to mouth existence, as a general rule. They work under financial handicaps that would defeat many a management expert; in fact, did defeat a management expert, John J. Raskob. Their problem can be likened, with apologies, to that of the sell-and-run "entrepreneur" who sets up headquarters under a temporary lease to sell a product for a very short time, with the difference that the problems are multiplied a hundred-fold for the national chairman. For one thing, the opposition and public opinion

---


in general is much more likely to have its eyes on the temporary headquarters of the chairman than on the temporary headquarters of the short-term "entrepreneur." The national chairman cannot sell and run.

The point is that strict budgeting is out of the question for the chairman, because he cannot know definitely either what his income or his outgo will be. Former campaigns seldom supply a yardstick; as Cortelyou lamented, every campaign brings new problems. Many chairmen have tried to make budgets. One of the first budgets was inaugurated by Morgenthau. He tells of calling in a budget expert and of working out with him and with McCombs and McAdoo, a system of allotments which was to regulate the expenditures of their funds. Still, in the last frantic days of the campaign, even the most budget conscious chairmen lose sight of all except the desire for victory.

Long term contracts are out of the question for those in charge of campaign finances, and the result is unnecessary costs. Cummings, testifying before a congressional committee, commented that some advertising that he had placed in 1916 in the last few days of the campaign which cost between six and seven hundred thousand dollars could have been placed earlier.

---

64 Clapp Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 31.


at less than half the cost. No such advantage accrues to the chairman as does accrue to the business man who can take advantage of a slack season to order supplies at reduced prices. Nor are all chairmen as lucky as Hays in having the photographer happen to choose the likeness of the nominated candidate for samples of his work. Then, too, contracts cannot be placed with the lowest bidders, but must be placed with the faithful.

Yet the amounts expended are so great that long-term planning, competitive bidding, and contracts are the usual procedure in business in dealing with such expenditures. In addition to the overhead expense, the national chairmen must provide for the expense of preparing and distributing letters, clippings, reprints, mats, plates, photographs, and micrographs; and the cost of postage, express, telephone, telegraph, travelling expenses, honorarium for speakers, posters, buttons, convention costs (including liability costs), billboards, etc. Some idea of the cost of political advertising can be gleaned from the fact that Haskob estimated that it would cost $4,000,000 to send only four "very modest" pieces of campaign literature by mail to the forty million potential voters in the United States.

---


88 Taft MSS, L. B. Box 40, loc. cit., Taft to Hilles, July 16, 1912.

Michelson claims that the radio bills alone for the Democratic party were sometimes as high as a half million dollars. For all of these disbursements, the national chairman is held responsible by the party. Needless to say, he does not have time to dole out money for petty expenditures, but one of his most serious problems in so far as headquarters' management is concerned is the allocation of the money collected. His problem is two-fold. There are decisions to be made as to what amount to allot to what departments within the campaign set-up, and decisions to be made as to what medium of propaganda within the publicity division. William M. Butler was probably correct when he said that it was ".....not a particular pleasure to expend a large amount of money upon a political campaign." Decisions as to whether to circulate a certain piece of literature, adopt a certain idea, or a certain new medium of expression press upon the national chairman. Technological development has not been exactly a boon to the national chairman; it has increased both his costs and his problems. To contract for hour or half-hour hook-ups and when to do so, or to divide the money into small allotments for short local speeches—such questions as these come to the modern national chairman for final determination.

Complicating all of these allotment decisions is the fact that the various divisions keep "crowding" the chairman for

90 Michelson, op. cit., p. 207.
their share of the budget, and he has the task of resolving the differences between the conflicting demands. Not only is each division head anxious to get a large sum for his department, but he is also very careful to see to it that nothing is charged to him that he feels should not be. Such matters also come to the national chairman, as a letter from Molly Benson to Farley testifies. Furthermore as in any pressure period in any business, department heads are prone to incur expenditures without authorization. This condition is further exaggerated in political party financing, because of the number of volunteers engaged in the work. McCombs, for example, felt called upon to issue an order that anyone incurring obligations on behalf of the National Committee should approve the accounts for such obligations before they were sent to him for approval. Farley had to advise the broadcasting stations that all arrangements for broadcasting in the future would have to come through one source, his executive secretary.

Another important question of allocation which confronts the chairman for determination is the decision as to which states to fight for. As Cummings pointed out, the type of campaign that can be waged is, of course, dependent upon the resources that the chairman has to work with. In any event, as has been


93 Democratic National Committee MSS, loc. cit., Women's Division, Box 8, Dewson to Farley, Aug. 8, 1936.


seen, they are generally limited, and the chairman cannot afford to pour money down the drain. He, in conference with his financial assistants, must make the decisions as to how much money to expend in each state. He must also make spot decisions on requests for additional funds from the various areas. Such choices are not easy to make, for the local leaders with one eye on their local candidates continue to give glowing pictures of the possibilities if only they had just a little more money. It is traditional, for example, at Democratic headquarters to receive a plea from Maine a few weeks before the election in that state to the effect that just a little more money will turn the tide in the direction of the Democrats.

In some cases, of course, the need for more money is very real, and it is practically obligatory for the chairman to find extra money to respond to it. Money for payrolls for state committee workers in significant states or funds for some necessary last minute propaganda effort are demands that must be met.

Their best collection systems and their most careful disbursement efforts often leave the chairman with deficits. It

is rare that the national political headquarters stay in the "black" for long. This statement applied particularly to the Democratic party throughout most of the period covered by this study. With few exceptions, from Jones to Farley, the chairmen have often presided over empty treasuries. The Republicans, too, have often been embarrassed by the absence of ready cash. Over-optimism on the part of William H. Butler created such a situation in 1934, and so limited were the Republican funds in 1936 that Hamilton and his treasurer decided that unless another two million were forthcoming important last minute plans would have to be scuttled. Such situations create credit problems for the chairmen and involve the need for borrowing funds on many occasions.

McCombs tells of frightening his Finance Chairman Morgenthau into finding more funds by threatening to sign four notes for $200,000. Out of an effort to liquidate a deficit came one of Hayes' most trying experiences. In 1920, Cummings was in such desperate financial straits that he had to turn over the fund donated by the convention city—usually reserved for convention expenses—to the treasurer for general commitments.

---

100 Newberry, op. cit., pp. 213, 214. See also Clapp Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 98, Mack testimony; McCombs, op. cit., pp. 23, 238; and Hull, op. cit., p. 114.


103 McCombs, op. cit., pp. 233, 239.

104 U. S. 70th Congress, 1st sess. Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys, Report No. 1328. See also infra, Chap. V, p. 142.

105 Kenyon Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 1161.
During Hull's period as chairman, his office operated on such a low margin that there were insufficient funds to pay even the modest overhead of his headquarters set-up, and in order to carry on it was necessary for him to put up several thousands of dollars of his own funds as collateral for a bank loan. Even wealthy chairmen, such as Raskob, have had to succumb to borrowing, and bankers are just as loathe to back a loser in the political business as they are in the commercial business. Farley had difficulty in reestablishing credit. In order to do so, he and his treasurer had to enter into agreement that out of each dollar seventy-five cents would be put aside to liquidate the old debts. All of this financial management must be carried on with an awareness that there are many watch-dogs sitting by waiting to pounce upon any infringement of the controls that have been set up. Checking on the chairmen are his own candidates, Congress, the opposition, and even on occasions factions within his own party. Most troublesome to the chairmen are the congressional investigations. In fact, in the early part of the twentieth century when there was so much agitation for reform of financial campaign practices, the chairmen must have had to allow time for appearance before


committees investigating campaign contributions and expenditures, so much interest was there in Congress on the subject. Another active period was 1928, when there were five different congressional committees investigating the financial practices of the political parties. Cortelyou, Hitchcock, New, Hilles, Hays, Fess in the Republican party, and Taggart, Mack, McCombs, Cummings, White, and Hull (as presidential candidate, not as chairman) in the Democratic party—have all appeared before congressional committees investigating campaign funds. These investigations make the task of fund solicitation much more difficult for the party chairman and his financial aides. For one thing, they bring, as Taft complained to his chairman, Hilles, ".... a greater disclosure of the party's resources than is desirable for those who have contributed." For another thing, they have, on occasion, caused embarrassment to the party.

An instance of such embarrassment was the revelation before the Walsh Committee in 1928 that Hays, the Republican national chairman, had received from Harry Sinclair in 1923 some liberty


bonds belonging to the Continental Trading Company, a temporary subsidiary of the Sinclair interests. Hays had been called before the Ladd Committee in 1924 because of a rumor that certain bonds of the Sinclair Consolidated Company had been delivered to him. Hays admitted that Sinclair had contributed around $75,000, but testified that the story that he had received bonds of the Sinclair Consolidated Company was "....as false in content as it was libelous in purpose." In 1928 when the investigation was reopened, Hays asked to appear before the new committee and admitted that Sinclair had turned over $185,000 in Continental Trading Company bonds in the nature of a loan. Some of this money was returned to Sinclair.

At the time of the transaction with Sinclair, Hays was no longer national chairman. He contended before the Ladd Committee that he knew nothing about the oil leases at the time he received the help. Of this affair, the Walsh Committee report said that the "synchrony" of the whole bond transaction and the investigation of oil leases suggested

....at once that the extraordinary sum yielded up at that critical time by Sinclair was not altogether voluntarily donated, and that either hope or fear, if not gratitude, stimulated his generosity and accentuated his devotion to the principles of the Republican Party. 115


115 Walsh Committee, Report No. 1326, op. cit., p. 11.
Constant check is also made upon the party in power by Congress and by the opposition for infringement of the law prohibiting assessments from government employees. Hays was a particularly alert opposition chairman in this respect. In fact, he used his opportunity before the Senate committee investigating campaign expenditures to publicize his criticisms of the Democrats for soliciting funds from postmasters. One of the few occasions on which McCormick got into the headlines as a national chairman resulted from an accusation that he had telegraphed members of a local exemption board for the purposes of raising funds. During the Farley chairmanship, accusations of bribery of voters with relief and public works funds became so virulent that Farley, at one time, considered libel action. On another occasion, letters were introduced in Congress in an effort to prove Farley's solicitation of funds from federal employees, and it was necessary for Farley to issue a statement denying that he had either signed or authorized or countenanced the use of his signature for such a letter. Demands for investigation of Farley's stewardship as national chairman, however, never materialized.

---

116 Kenyon Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 1121, 1087 to 1089, Hays testimony.
118 Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 312.
120 infra, Chapter IX, p. 274, 275.
The party in power, of course, has a degree of protection in these demands for investigation, as a general rule. Conversely, there is a great possibility of bias in the investigation of the chairman of the party out of power. It is, therefore, difficult to determine whether or not there was guilt. It is particularly difficult in the case of assessments. What is an assessment? Refinements in the art of assessing have become so clever that assessments are becoming harder to determine.

It would seem, however, that Professor Pollock is correct in his contention that national headquarters do not receive assessments, at least not in the old-fashioned sense of the term. The criticism of this practice has been so great that both candidates and chairmen are careful to keep their hands clean of any connection with assessments from government employees that may be going on. For instance, when rumors spread in 1904 that Senator Dick was soliciting funds from government employees, Theodore Roosevelt wrote his chairman, Cortelyou, advising him to warn the senator to desist. The criticisms about solicitations aimed at Farley in Congress were, undoubtedly, responsible for a memo found among the Democratic party papers. It is marked "To Heads of Each Department" and states:

121 Pollock, *Party Campaign Funds*, op. cit., p. 117.


Whenever a letter, telegram or memorandum is prepared in your department for my signature, or is sent over my signature you are to make certain that same has in fact been approved by me or by one of my own staff whom I may authorize to do so. After approval has been given, will you please see to it that a copy of all work prepared for me is sent to Mrs. Duffy.  

One of the crying needs in the area of party finance is the need to center responsibility for both the source and the expenditures of party campaign funds; and responsibility for the source, at least, could lie with the national chairman. Testimony of chairmen who claim to know nothing about large sums of money contributed by corporations or by wealthy individual donors leads to the suspicion that one of the less overt functions of the national chairman is to be looking the other way at times. Adding further to doubts as to the purity of their financial methods is the spectacle of the chairmen and the treasurer tossing the need for explanations on party financing back and forth before congressional committees.

It must be remembered, however, that some of the fear in explaining the details of party finance is the result, not of

124 Democratic National Committee MSS, Women's Division, Box 8, n.d., loc. cit.  
125 Clapp Committee, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 936, Cortelyou testimony. See also ibid., p. 12; Taggart testimony.  
126 Ibid. See also U. S. 77th Congress, 1st sess. Senate Hearings Before Special Committee Investigating Campaign Expenditures in 1940, Vol. 8, pp. 695 to 721 for a similar situation, in this case, however between the treasurer and one of his state chairmen for finance.
any misfeasance on the part of the chairmen, but of the attitude of the public which frowns on any but the small contribution and yet, except in a very few cases, refuses to give that small contribution. Anyone who contributes to a political party, be that contribution $1.00 or $100,000, does so because he or she feels that that party will further his or her welfare. The difficulty lies in the power of large sums of money in the hands of a few people. Some way must be found to get the money from the small donor. Perhaps, the parties should revive Hays' idea of a drive and a Civic Day or a Civic week should be inaugurated in which the citizen could be importuned to support the party of his choice. There has never been a chairman who would not have been happier to receive a large sum of money from many people than a large sum from a few. Their efforts to do just that is proof of this statement.

CHAPTER VI

THE PROBLEMS OF CAMPAIGNING

All of the functions of the national chairman of a political party are either prologue or epilogue to the campaign. The gathering of a staff, the perfecting of an organization, and the raising of funds are simply the accumulation of the tools with which to conduct the campaign. The effective use of these tools in presenting to the people the candidates and the issues constitutes a successful campaign.

One of the first tasks of the national chairman after the convention is the establishment of campaign headquarters. This task has become progressively more difficult with the expansion of the United States. Originally, there was only one headquarters, but with the growth of the nation one office became inadequate to take care of the campaign needs of the party. Therefore, the modern chairman has had to provide not only for new or enlarged central headquarters but also for branch headquarters. At times the central headquarters have been in Chicago, at other times, they have been in Washington, but more frequently the choice of both parties has been New York City, the city which has continued to be the financial center of the parties. A small force always continues at Washington to handle the publicity emanating from the capital. In view of the limited amount of money available, only so many headquarters can be set up, and the decisions as to where to place them must be weighed carefully, for they can be decisive.

\[1\text{Infra, Chapter VI, p. 155.}\]
Since the introduction of permanent offices, the task of creating a campaign organization is not quite so difficult as it was for the earlier chairmen, inasmuch as a nucleus organization is available to help with the enlargement of office space and the expansion of the staff. Preliminary work is done in advance wherever possible; options upon quarters are obtained, staffs are lined up, equipment is located, estimates are sought and contract information is obtained. Most of the chairmen have given their personal attention to the setting up of the central headquarters, because the location of this office within the nation and within the city chosen is important. Moreover, the proper lay-out of the offices is particularly important for any organization which has much to do in a short period of time. At the best, communication within the office is likely to become hectic before the campaign is over. Then, too, the chairman must provide for protection from the importunate.

In conference with other party leaders, the national chairman must also arrange for managers for the branch offices. When there was only one branch office and one vice-chairman, the solution was relatively simple, the vice-chairman was delegated to manage the affairs of the branch; but as the number

---


of branch offices outstripped the number of vice-chairmen, other plans had to be made. This need for a choice of regional managers presents the national chairman with a delicate task in view of the remarkable sensitivity of politically minded men. As a matter of fact, Farley, in 1932, decided to operate with only one headquarters in order to eliminate not only the expense of branches, but also the jealousies that were sometimes engendered in the choice of heads for these offices. As a rule, however, there have been, in both parties, several headquarters—New York, Chicago, Washington, D. C., and San Francisco are standard choices.

Assembling the tools of the campaign and providing a space in which they can operate are, however, only the beginning of the myriad of tasks that go to make up a campaign. Utilization of these tools—the strategy and tactics of the campaign—is even more important. Unless correct decisions are arrived at as to the geographical areas on which to concentrate, as to the timing of the campaign, as to the issues to be stressed, as to the type of campaign to be conducted, and as to the tactics to be employed, the tools of organization and finance will be wasted.

Obviously, the man responsible for the conduct of the campaign, the general campaign manager, the national chairman, should have an important part in these decisions, and he is, usually, a key man in the advisory groups on strategy and tactics. The composition of these groups varies somewhat from campaign to campaign, but, generally speaking, there will be in the group,
in addition to the chairman and the candidates, confidants
of the candidates, in and out of the party circle, other party
leaders, and more and more in recent years, the division leaders
at headquarters. In modern times, the board is likely to vary
with the subject under discussion, but a comparison between a
strategy conference during the chairmanship of Mack with that
of one during the chairmanship of Farley shows that the pattern
has not changed a great deal. Among Bryan's advisers for his
third campaign were his national chairman, Mack; the secretary
of the Democratic National Committee, Urey Woodson, an important
party leader, Senator David B. Hill; and Josephus Daniels of
the publicity staff of the Democratic National Committee. One
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's boards consisted of Roosevelt;
his national chairman, Farley; the secretary of the Democratic
National Committee, "Chip" Roberts; two of the presidential
assistants, Steve Early and Marvin McIntyre; and Charlie Michelson,
the Publicity Director of the Democratic National Committee.

The degree of control of the management of the campaign
that lies with the national chairman has varied considerably.
There is little that is out and dried in the area of political
management; all is, and must necessarily be, flexible. Any
attempt to place the national chairmen in categories in respect
to their authority as campaign managers leads to two realizations:

---

4 Josephus Daniels, "Mr. Bryan's Third Campaign," Review of

5 James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story The Roosevelt Years (New
(1) that it is not easy to find wherein the real power lies—there are many Warwicks in the United States, some real, some self-constituted; (2) that there are nearly as many categories as there are chairmen who participated in a presidential campaign.

Hanna was one chairman who was definitely in a class by himself. He seems to have been truly the campaign manager, the master of strategy and tactics, the Boss, that his personal and National Committee secretary, Elmer Dover, claimed he was. What few letters are extant between him and his President-Candidate, McKinley, and between him and President Theodore Roosevelt show that he told them what he wanted done, rather than vice versa. This situation is in contrast to many others where, in varying degrees, the national chairman was the political assistant to the candidate or president for campaign management serving as the activator and supervisor of strategy and tactics laid out for him. Such a relationship is noticeable in the instances where the chairmen have been former presidential secretaries, as had been Cortelyou, Hilles, and Sanders. Despite the testimony of Cortelyou and the statement of Roosevelt to the contrary, Roosevelt did interfere in the management of the

---


7 McKinley MSS, _loc. cit._ Note letters from Hanna to McKinley, July 8, 1896 and Jan. 29, 1900. See also Theodore Roosevelt MSS, _loc. cit._ Note letters from Hanna to Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1901 and Oct. 12, 1901.

campaign as the many letters of advice among the Roosevelt manuscripts show. Possibly because of his experience with Hitchcock and Rosewater, Taft seems to have kept a closer rein on his second campaign. In fact, Taft's conception of the role of the national chairman was that this official was primarily a fund-raiser. Although there is no documentary evidence to support it, the frequent conferences between Sanders and Hoover indicate that the former secretary to Coolidge was not the chief strategist of the second Hoover campaign. Roy V. Peel, who made a study of both of the Hoover campaigns, claims that Hoover had to assume virtual direction of the 1932 campaign. As a matter of fact, the Peel studies indicate that Hoover deliberately chose Work as national chairman in 1928 so that he, the candidate, could maintain control of the campaign strategy.

Still other chairmen seem to have been, in so far as general management of the campaign was concerned, merely fronts who were pushed forward either for the sake of harmony as in the case of Taggart, or because the real campaign manager preferred

9 Theodore Roosevelt MSS, P.D.F. Box 34, loc. cit., Roosevelt to Cortelyou, Aug. 12, 13; Sept. 13, 29; Oct. 1, 4, 6, 21, 36, 1904.

10 Taft MSS, L. B. Box 46, loc. cit., letter from Taft to his brother Horace, Nov. 1, 1912.


to remain in the background, as House did during the Wilson campaigns.

The situation in 1904 in the Democratic party when Taggart and Sheehan were splitting the honors as campaign manager, the situation in 1920 in the Republican party when the reelected national chairman, Hays, and the pre-convention manager for Harding, Daugherty, were doing likewise, and the Butler-Stearns combination in the Coolidge campaign were all forerunners of a trend that seems to be developing; that is, a trend toward the separation of the national chairmanship and the campaign management proper. At times, the personal friend of the presidential candidate seems to have more to say about the conduct of the campaign than does the chairman.

In all cases urgent decisions must be made by the national chairman alone, but generally speaking campaign management is not a one man job. This statement applies especially to the cases where the candidate is already president. Normally, however, any control exerted on the national chairman, either by the candidates themselves or by the sponsors of the candidates, is exercised discreetly, but on occasions the candidate has been forced to take over the management of the campaign because of dissension over division of authority at national headquarters.

14 Ibid.
This condition existed late in the Parker campaign in 1904, when Sheehan, who had been pre-convention manager for Parker and who was still active as a campaign manager, and Taggart, the national chairman, were working at cross purposes. A similar condition existed in the 1912 Democratic campaign, this time between HoAdoo and McGoba, but because of the able assistance of House, Wilson was able to remain in the background.

Certainly, the national chairman would have a stupendous task if he had to make all decisions alone; many of them are beyond the compass of one man, unadvised. One such problem, particularly to the chairman new to the national field, is the choice of the correct area in which to concentrate his campaign efforts. Campaign costs and the scarcity of sufficient volunteers with the required leisure make it mandatory on the chairman to delimit his campaign area. Preparatory to such determinations, the chairman arranges for accurate canvassing and good scouting in the field, after which effort it is his task to analyze the reports and deploy his forces for the greatest effect. Where to concentrate, where to abandon to the enemy, and where to avoid campaigning are the decisions that must be made. Political experts feel that the ability to make correct decisions in this area often means the difference between a successful and an unsuccessful national campaign.


Nicholas Murray Butler holds that Hanna took the election away from Bryan in 1896 with his determination to concentrate on Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and Iowa. Hays' advice to emphasize the campaign in the east and in the areas west of the Mississippi where the possibility of covering the ground lost in 1916 was best is credited with putting Harding into the White House. Knowing that area to abandon to the enemy is equally important. In 1916, McCormick was able to delimit his campaign area and concentrate his strength as the result of the advice of House that the best strategy to pursue was to donate the east to the Republicans. Hamilton's failure to recognize potential defeat in the Farm Belt and his consequent neglect of the eastern states with larger electoral votes were believed by Arthur Krock to have shown the amateurish touch.

Knowing when to avoid an area is also one of the important decisions that must be made by the strategists. There are occasions when the local candidates are strong enough in their own right to carry the elections, while the people in the area are touchy on some policy of the national administration. On these occasions, the less the national leaders are brought into the picture the better. Sanders was faced with the dilemma

---


in 1932 that his candidate, President Hoover, was a liability which the state leaders, in some states, felt they would have difficulty in overcoming. A similar situation existed for Farley in Maine, where in 1934 the public power policy of the New Dealers was under criticism.

Census changes are important to the national chairman. Shifts of populations from one area of the country to another, or shifts of populations from rural to urban areas are significant facts to the national chairman, for different types of audiences require different types of campaign. Cummins, for example, feels that his awareness of the need for a Speakers' Bureau in California in 1916, was responsible for the victory of Wilson in that all important state.

National chairmen, too, must be constantly on guard for weak spots, as Theodore Roosevelt often warned his chairman, Cortelyou. Correct judgments as to the amount of money and the number of speakers to send into critical areas at crucial moments are part of the pattern of successful campaigning. It is decisions such as these that the national chairman must frequently make without the advice of the other strategists.

22 Peel, The 1932 Campaign, op. cit., p. 110.
23 Democratic National Committee MSS, Women's Division, Box 8, loc. cit., Lewson to Farley, Sept. 22, 1935.
24 Interview with Homer Cummins, June 26, 1952.
The chairman who will gamble on sending in extra funds in such instances, as Farley did in Maine in 1932, may be criticised when he does so, but bringing such states into his winning column is part of the generalship that marks the outstanding chairman. Reports from the field and statistical aid in analyzing these reports are helpful to the chairman here, also.

An equally important determination to be made by the national chairman and his strategical advisers is the decision as to the timing of the campaign. While in a sense the campaign is always going on, particularly where there is a carry-over chairman, decisions must be made as to when the most active phase of it should begin. In the days following the convention, the national chairman is busy organizing the committee, choosing staff assistants, and binding up the wounds of the deposed rival candidates and their supporters. In any event, therefore, the active part of the campaign cannot begin when the convention ends. Furthermore, such other factors as money and the physical stamina of the contestants and their campaign aides must be taken into consideration. The result is that the campaign proper usually does not move into high gear until September.

A political campaign is a drama with a vast impressionable audience and it is very important for the chairman's objective


especially in a close fight, that the drama reach its cres-
cendo at the right moment. As Theodore Roosevelt advised one
of the party chairmen, "nine-tenths of wisdom is being wise
in time." From Hanna to Farley successful chairmen have
planned their campaigns so that the efforts expended through-
out the campaign are cumulative in effect, achieving their ul-
timate force a few days before the election. Chairmen who
place their speakers on the road too early, as Cortelyou did
in 1904, come into the home-stretch of the campaign with men
too tired to give their best efforts.

Needless to say, a quick get-away in the campaign is much
more likely with a carry-over chairman. In 1920, for example,
the first lot of five million lithographs of Harding was ready
for distribution within a week after the convention. Hays ex-
plained that the paper was bought and cut several weeks
before the convention, and that pictures and autographs of all
candidates had been obtained in preparation for the moment when
the lithographs would be needed. "By a strange coincidence"
the printer who won the contract chose Harding's picture to
demonstrate his work. Fortunate is the chairman who is in
a position to outline his program of activities in advance;
it gives him a decided advantage over his opponent, as Farley

28 Taft MSS, Pre-Inaugural Series 1, loc. cit., Roosevelt
to Hitchcock, Sept. 26, 1908, a copy.
29 Uroly, op. cit., p. 322. See also Farley, Behind the
Ballots, op. cit., p. 88.
Another important question which the national chairman and his strategists must resolve is that of the choice of issues. Of this duty, Farley states:

One of the most responsible tasks in the drive to win a presidential election is the process of determining what issues are to be stressed and what pushed aside, and what arguments are to be used in meeting the propaganda bombshells of the enemy. 33 Decisions as to issues are to be made only after the most careful and searching inquiry into the state of public opinion, into the attitude of industry, labor, and other vital groups; into the question of whether an issue has national or only local appeal, and above all others, into the question of guessing just where the foe should prove most vulnerable. 34

The chairmen, very likely, have all too much advice on this point. The general pattern followed by the chairman is to stress the strength of his own party and candidate and the weakness of the enemy's. Under certain conditions, the national chairman will be wise to stress the national issues; under other circumstances, he may be wise to refrain from emphasis on such issues. Some issues may be ignored completely, others must be stressed. On the advice of Lodge, the Roosevelt-Cortelyou

32 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 158.
33 Ibid., p. 162.
34 Ibid.
strategy in 1904 was to emphasize the gold standard and currency questions and thus force Parker into an emphasis of an issue that was already dividing his party. In 1916 McCormick, Wilson's second national chairman, used Theodore Roosevelt's belligerency in the face of the eternal desire for peace as a weapon with which to beleaguer Hughes.

Some issues the national chairman may leave for the opposition themselves to become entangled in. The Republicans used this plan effectively, by Farley's own admission, in their handling of the court reorganization fight within the Democratic party. Where the election is fairly sure, as it was for Roosevelt in 1932, issues need be no great problem for the chairman, for the candidate simply shadow boxes with them, taking no chances on an election practically won.

Naturally, the particular strategy, whether in relation to area, timing, or issues, for any given campaign must be decided with the conditions existing at the time of the campaign in mind. The current situation has a special bearing on another important decision required of the national chairman and his advisers—that is, the selection of the type of campaign to conduct, a technical political question that plagues all campaign managers. The chairman's decisions on the type of campaign


38 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 75.
depends upon many factors—the personality and oratorical ability of the candidate, the issues to be stressed, the money available, the political situation, the conditions in the country, and finally, but of great importance the strategy and tactics of the opposition. There are many choices before the chairman. He and his advisers may decide on a passive campaign or on an aggressive one, on a personal or on an impersonal campaign, on a front-porch or on a tour campaign, and on combinations of these types. He may decide to ignore the enemy or to do battle with him. Roosevelt and Farley must have planned the former type of strategy for the campaign against Landon, because a memorandum from Roosevelt to Farley reminded the latter that they "...had decided that any reference to Landon or any other Republican was inadvisable."

The national chairman attempting to reelect a president must outline a different type of campaign than the chairman attempting to elect a candidate not already in the presidency. Chairmen such as Hanna, McCormick, Butler, and Farley have had the advantage of the "non-political" trips during which the president-candidate could talk on such "non-political" subjects as drought and soil erosion to a group of farmers, for example! On the other hand, these chairmen suffer a dis-

38 An influenza epidemic with its ban on large assemblies made abortive many of the propaganda schemes that Cummings had planned for the 1920 Democratic campaign. Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1920, op. cit., p. 479.

40 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 62.
advantage in the fact that the people have not always taken too kindly to political campaigning by the president. Furthermore, presidential dignity requires a certain amount of circumspection which does not handicap the campaign of the candidate not in the White House. These limitations on the president-candidate were more noticeable earlier in the present century than they have been more recently. Lodge in a letter to Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 commiserates with him upon being the only man in the country who could not take part in the campaign for the presidency.

Advice to the candidate as to when a presidential tour is advisable and when it is not is frequently encountered in the records. Being in touch with the leaders throughout the nation, the chairman is in a position to feel the pulse of the people and to report to the candidate that which is and that which is not an acceptable pattern of behavior in the light of present conditions. The decision to tour or not to tour is part of a greater decision that the national chairman must make, that is, how best to exploit the personality of the candidate. Successful campaign managers are those who have found ways to keep the best features of their candidates before the people, while keeping the undesirable features obscure. Work, for example, using to advantage a concept already half-formed as a result of Hoover's Belgium relief work, was able to get

41 Lodge, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 86.

over to the people the great humanitarian qualities that his
candidate possessed. Smith's east side nasal twang, really a
disadvantage, was built into an advantage by presenting him
as the common man "from the side-walks of New York." In fact,
the front-porch campaign developed out of Hanna's need to acquaint
the public with the ingratiating personality of McKinley and
yet keep both the "silver" Republicans and the "gold" Republicans
convincing that McKinley was their man. National chairmen
will be forever grateful to Hanna for the introduction of the
rehearsed spontaneous reply.

The Hays-Daugherty front-porch campaign for Harding had
in some respects a similar basis. As did Hanna before him,
Hays had to reconcile two divergent groups within the Republican
party, the regular Republicans and the Progressives who had
split from the party in 1912; and it was decided that under
the circumstances the best way to acquaint the public with
Harding's charming personality and his oratorical ability was
through the front-porch device.

The strategy decided, the chairman and his staff must
device tactics to implement it. The object is to attract public
good will, that ephemeral something which as Farley's realism
describes it is "as difficult to capture and hang on to as a

\[45\] Hanna took no chances on the presentation of embarrassing
questions to his candidate, or on slips of the tongue by the
candidate. When the various citizen groups would visit McKinley's
home, the candidate would have already had a preview of the
visiting chairman's questions. Groly, op. cit., p. 216.

\[44\] Interview with Will Hays, Oct. 16, 1962.
Developing the correct tactics for the purpose requires experience and forethought.

In politics you can speak too often or not often enough, you can speak too loud or too soft, you can start too soon or too late, you can be too polite or not polite enough, or again you can be too friendly or not friendly enough.

Tactics have not varied too much throughout the years. Certain tactics such as associating the party with national patriotism and prosperity are sempiternal and have been used by all chairmen. From Hanna's suggestion that all who believed in gold should display the American flag to the current campaign buttons, all national chairmen have played upon the patriotic theme. Just as from Hanna's "prosperity wagons" to the Roosevelt Caravans the chairmen have preached the gospel of prosperity. Nor are the "wise-cracking" Hollywood masters of ceremonies really anything new. Ballyhoo has always been a part of the chairman's plans; the pattern has simply become more sophisticated.

One of the problems of the national chairman in this area

---

45 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 8.
46 Ibid.
48 The "prosperity wagons" were vehicles which made tours of the factories in the large cities for the purpose of having "heart to heart" talks with the laborers. See "How the Republican National Committee Works for Votes," op. cit., p. 555.
50 Ballyhoo artists are apparently always at hand to tempt the chairmen. A letter in the Taft files contains an offer from a hippodrome suggesting the use of their elephants in the Republican campaign.
is that the job has become too big today even for such a dynamo as Hanna to supervise. For that reason, assistant campaign managers and division and bureau heads at headquarters must handle a good part of this work. The chairman tries to be left free to consider decisions of a major nature and to straighten out some strategy or tactic that has gone awry. He has, too, the task of warding off crack-brain ideas which might get the party into trouble and of curbing ideas that will be too expensive for the returns rendered.

Racial and religious appeals often require high-level decisions, because they must be handled with finesse. Religious questions have haunted many chairmen. Hanna, for example, had the problem of pacifying the growing Catholic population on the question of the handling of the Catholic church properties in the islands which fell to the United States as a result of the Spanish-American War. There is an interesting letter in the McKinley files on this subject which would probably have cost the Republicans many a Catholic vote had it ever become public at the time. Referring to this question of church property, Hanna writes to McKinley as follows:

My promise is redeemed when I ask you to give it [the problem] your early consideration. My suggestion is not to decide unfavorably until sometime in November.

It was not the Catholics but the Methodists who perturbed McKinley's successor, Roosevelt. Cortelyou was ordered by Roosevelt to "coordinate" this sect, for the Rough Rider had heard that the Methodists were lukewarm toward him. Hilles, Taft's chairman,

51 McKinley MSS, loc. cit., Hanna to McKinley, Oct. 14, 1900.
also had a religious dilemma to resolve. Taft had the reputation among some groups of being pro-Catholic, possibly because of his close friendship with Archbishop Ireland. Hilles had the problem of quieting this rumor without offending the Catholic Republicans. It was Raskob, however, who had the real problem in so far as the religious question was concerned. His problem was to elect in a predominantly Protestant nation not only a Catholic but a Catholic who was not acceptable even to all of his co-religionists.

Another problem that the national chairman and his advisers must cope with at the higher level is the question of what tactics to take in response to the strategy and tactics of the opponent. Criticism of the opposition is a legitimate part of the role of the national chairman. Such attacks as those by Hays against Wilson’s treaty plans, by Fletcher upon the New Deal, by Michelson upon Hoover, and by Hamilton upon the Works Projects Administration are a generally accepted part

53 Taft MSS, L. B. Box 41, loc. cit., Taft to Hilles, Aug. 8, 1912; Aug. 9, 1912; Aug. 2, 1912.
54 It was Hays who, with the help of Henry Stimson, initiated the thought of Elihu Root’s letter analyzing the first draft of the proposed Covenant of the League of Nations. A copy of Hays’ letter to Root and Root’s response is in the Hays’ file, as yet unnumbered.
55 New York Times, Oct. 6, 1934, p. 6, col. 6 for an interview with Fletcher.
56 Democratic National Committee MSS, loc. cit. Michelson file.
57 New York Times, Aug. 11, 1936, p. 6, col. 6 for an address by Hamilton.
of politics. The decision for the opposing chairman is—which challenge to take and which to ignore. Statements which are easily proved untrue, or attacks which are in bad taste can usually be left to public reaction to take care of, but certain attacks take root in the public consciousness, whether in good or bad taste, and must be answered.

Personal attacks are in this category. Such attacks are more frequently aimed at the candidate, but they have been directed at the chairman, too. As in the congressional investigations of the chairmen, there is a noticeable correlation between the attacks and the moral problems which are at the time attracting the attention of the public.

Judge Parker, the Democratic candidate in 1904, for example, apparently in desperation in the late stages of the campaign picked up a criticism, which had originated in the New York World, implying that there was some connection between the selection of Cortelyou as national chairman and his former position as head of the Department of Commerce and Labor. The Bureau of Corporations was in this department. According to Bishop, Parker went a step further than the New York World and intimated that the contact between Cortelyou and the corporations was one of blackmail. Letters between Lodge and Roosevelt frequently refer to whether, and, if so, when Cortelyou should answer the attack, which Roosevelt termed "...an assault which by sheer impudent mendacity may carry a

---

Cortelyou debated personal action, but it was Roosevelt, himself, who finally took up the gauntlet for his chairman and denied all of the accusations of Parker and the intimations of the New York World.

National chairmen are often attacked because of their business connections. Taggart, who was proprietor of a hotel in French Lick Springs, was accused of having connections with a gambling house in the same town. Huey Long's attack on Farley for his part in the letting of government building contracts had as its basis Farley's connection with the building supply business. The association of Hays and Hays, the law firm in which Will Hays was a partner, with the Sinclair Company of Indiana was, of course, a target during the investigations into the Teapot Dome leases.

In addition to the attacks upon himself, the national chairman has also to meet the attacks upon his candidate, for as Taft declared, part of the cost of campaigning for the presidency of the United States is, unfortunately, the possibility of "....being slandered or maligned." A few of these attacks

59 Lodge, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 102, Roosevelt to Lodge.
See also Bishop, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 333.


63 Taft MSS, loc. cit., L. B. Box 38, Taft to Hitchcock, June 25, 1912.
have been serious. McCormick, Wilson's second national chairman, had, for example, the problem of curbing a slanderous campaign against Wilson. It was a whispering campaign which had originated in the mid-west by telephone. This canard was based on the correspondence between Wilson and a woman friend. So serious did the threat of this attack become that it was necessary for the democratic strategists to get Wilson's brother-in-law, Professor Stockton Axson to write an article, "The Private Life of President Wilson," and to have it published in the newspapers and circulated in pamphlet form.

Attacks which the candidate feels are beneath his dignity to notice may still be effective enough to thwart the best efforts of his chairman and his aides, and such attacks may have to be answered by the national chairman or someone designated by him. Hays had such a condition to meet in an attack upon Harding. What made the position of the national chairman difficult was the determination of Harding to ignore the rumor that he had Negro blood in his veins. This story had hounded Harding on previous occasions and the party was prepared. A family tree of the Hardings had been traced through the records of the Wyoming, Pennsylvania, Historical Society, and by this method the story that was circulated was disproved. The corrected story was published at a time when Harding and Daugherty were on tour, and Daugherty tells of his surprise at its publication and of Harding's ire that any attention had been paid to the

---

scandalous canard.

These attacks can be very far-fetched and can cause the party anxious hours and additional expense. Hoover, for instance, during his pre-convention campaign was accused of robbing a Chinaman in England some twenty-six years before, and it was necessary for his campaign managers to send Laurence Richey to England in order to get the true facts and straighten the matter out. This fact, however, did not prevent a revival of the rumor from haunting Work during the post-convention campaign.

Such tactics are deplored publicly by the chairmen and very likely, equally sincerely, privately as well. It is notable that they are resorted to more frequently by the fringe organizations than by national headquarters, and that they are more likely to occur late in the campaign when pressure is high. The 1928 campaign was a particularly vicious one. So deplorable did the attacks upon the Democratic candidate become that Work, the Republican national chairman, felt called upon to try to stem them. Of the tactics used by some of the organizations on the Republican side he said:

We do not want to win votes on tactics that are opposed to every standard and tradition of our party....once and for all, I denounce all such activities as vicious and beyond the pale of decent political campaigning. 67


There is a ring of sincerity, too, in a later statement by
the same chairman on the same subject:

The country is in a sorry state when two men contending
for the highest office in the gift of the people, whose
private lives are above reproach, have got to be
subjected to the indignities of slander, lies, and
charges which have not even the slightest
foundation of truth. 68

The chairman is in an awkward position in handling this
aspect of his work, for while he is held responsible for the
campaign, he is physically unable to supervise all of the
campaign activities. Over-zealous members of independent
organizations, or even of sub-divisions of the regular or­
ganization can embarrass the candidate with their tactics.
For this reason, the chairmen must keep his finger on all
phases of the campaign touching directly upon the public, such
as propaganda, whether by the written or the spoken word.
In the earlier days, the supervision of publicity was not
the burden it has become today. Frequently, the chairmen had
experienced, libel-conscious newspapermen who volunteered to
handle this part of their work. Then, too, in those days,
the chairmen had time to write some of their own material. Hilles,
for instance, wrote some of his own articles. Hull was prac­
tically forced to do so, for his publicity staff consisted of
Hull, his secretary, Miss Will Harris, and Richard Buchanan,
a 35.00 a week newspaper man. Another chairman who participated

68 Ibid., pp. 85, 86.
69 Infra, Chapter VI, p. 174.
70 Taft MSS, L. B. Box 41, loc. cit., Taft to Hilles, Aug. 7, 1912.
71 Harold B. Hinton, Cordell Hull A Biography (New York: Double­
day, Doran and Company, Inc., 1942), p. 168. See also New York Times,
March 2, 1912, sec. II, p. 1, col. 5.
personally in the publicity sphere of his role was Hays, who ran a syndicated column under his own by-line. Today, it is unusual for the national chairmen to write even their own speeches. Beginning with Shouse's appointment of Michelson to head the Democratic Publicity Bureau, national political publicity moved into the "big time." An elaborate publicity bureau divided into sections for moving pictures, radio, and other media of propaganda handles the detail problems of publicity for the modern chairman. He comes into the picture only to sign contracts, to confer on costs and choice of media, and in times of crisis when his prestige is needed to straighten out a situation that has got out of hand.

Publicity decisions as to quantity and quality are, naturally, dependent upon the funds available, and the amount of publicity the chairman is able to issue is small or large in relation thereto. However, as early as Hanna, publicity had become a major problem. Eighty million copies of seventy different campaign documents were issued in the Republican campaign of 1900. Four thousand newspapers published Hanna's planted propaganda. Such advertising costs money and national chairmen, are, therefore, always on the lookout for free outlets for their publicity.

---

72 Interview with Will Hays, October 17, 1952.
74 Ibid.
It is no accident that many of the early chairmen were associated, at one time or another, with newspapers. Hanna was, at one time, owner of the Cleveland Herald. The father of Harry New was the owner of the Indianapolis Journal, the outlet for the Indiana State Republican organization. Tom Taggart purchased and owned the Indianapolis Sentinel at one time during his career. Norman Mack was the owner and publisher of the Buffalo Times and donated the services of a magazine, the National Monthly, which he also published, to the Democratic party. In fact, the Democratic campaign of 1908 was thought of as the campaign of the editors, so strong was the influence of newspaper men throughout that campaign. The Trenton True American was purchased by McCormick in 1911 purely for dissemination to other papers for clipping purposes. Wilson's second national chairman, McCormick, was also a newspaper publisher.

Where purchase is out of the question, and big-scale newspaper publishing has made it more and more difficult, the chairmen

75 Croly, op. cit., pp. 56, 57.
77 Ibid., p. 195.
78 Woodrow Wilson MSS, loc. cit., File No. 484, Mack to Cummings, May 19, 1913.
79 Daniels, "Mr. Bryan's Third Campaign," op. cit., p. 423.
have striven to make contacts with the publishers and owners.
McCombs tells of trips to Washington to stir up newspaper
support. His strenuous, but abortive, efforts to prevent the
split between Wilson and the publisher of Harper's Weekly also
testify to the importance that the chairman gives to publicity
outlets. Hays' diary of his western trips notes that the
newspaper support within the area was checked upon. Conferences
with groups of editors and talks before members of the press
associations are important functions for the national chairman.

Another publicity problem of the national chairman has to
do with the distribution of literature. The fact that the
local organizations are not at times wholeheartedly in support
of the national issues creates a problem for the chairman,
in this case, too, and it behooves him to arrange for his
publicity department to be watchful in this matter. State
leaders sometimes deliberately thwart the circulation of campaign
literature. Molly Dawson claims that Governor Brann of Maine
did so in 1934. At other times, simple lethargy is at the base
of the neglect. Abbot speaks of the indolence of county chairmen

\[81\] Ibid., pp. 56, 57.

\[82\] Hays' diary. Governor Cox accused Hays of going farther
than a mere check on outlets; he claimed that the Republican
chairman sent scouts into the southwest to suppress news of
the Cox tours. See New York Times, Sept. 24, 1920, p. 3, col. 3;
Sept. 25, 1920, p. 15, col. 3.

\[83\] New York Times, Sept. 7, 1904, p. 5, col. 2; Ibid., Feb. 8,
1921, p. 6, col. 2; Ibid., Sept. 20, 1932, p. 4, col. 2.

\[84\] Democratic National Committee MSS, Women's Division, Box 8,
in distributing documents, and Hanna tells of finding carloads of material still unloaded in the freight yards after the campaign should have been well under way. A survey made by Farley shows that Hanna's trouble at the turn of the present century could not be attributed to antiquated transportation, for in 1932 it was estimated that less than ten per cent of the literature printed got into the hands of the voters. It was for this reason, as well as for the psychological value, that Farley inaugurated a more decentralized plan of distribution, whereby in addition to the material sent to the state chairmen, small batches of campaign literature were sent direct to every one of the 140,000 precinct committees.

The Speakers' Bureau takes care of the recruiting, training, and scheduling of the speakers. Nevertheless, there are many problems which come to the chairman for final decisions from this bureau, too. For one thing, he must confer with the chairman of the Speakers' Bureau about the speaking programs. He must see to it that there is no conflict between the national schedules and the local schedules which regulate the speaking engagements of the less important speakers. Attention to this detail is important in maintaining the good will of the local leaders. He must see to it, particularly since the introduction of airwave campaigning, that the speakers are kept on their schedules.

86 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 159.
87 Interview with Homer Cummings, Oct. 26, 1952.
Over-time on the air cannot be solved by the simple expedient of a coat-tail puller by which Jones solved the problem of Bryan's verbosity. Finally, the chairman must see to it that the speakers are sent to locales where they will be most effective and that they confine themselves to subjects with which they are most familiar.

Activating the more important speakers is a task that generally falls to the national chairman personally. Even a few of the candidates have been a problem in this respect. McCormick, for instance, could not induce Wilson to stump until the man who had nominated Wilson for President in 1912, John W. Wescott, had been defeated, in the New Jersey Primary, and even then Wilson insisted upon limiting his talks to public questions before non-partisan groups. As to the other speakers, the significant ones are very scarce, and talking them into the strenuous chore of campaigning takes the master's touch. Sanders, although a close friend of Coolidge's, had a great deal of difficulty in getting him to speak at all in the campaign to elect Hoover.

---

89 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 57.
A letter from Roosevelt to Farley in the Hyde Park collection asks the chairman to “beg Wheeler to start on a speaking tour.”

To add to the burdens of the chairmen, they are bombarded with requests for the more outstanding orators, many of the pleas coming from areas where their presence is really not needed.

Speakers willing to accept an honorarium are not too difficult to obtain. Abbot, who assisted Hanna in this phase of the chairman’s work, bemoaned the fact that:

> The speakers who cannot speak and the pamphleteer who cannot write, or who, writing, confuses the dimensions of a pamphlet with those of an unabridged dictionary, form the twin horrors of the national headquarters.

Fortunately, for the incoming chairman, he is sometimes supplied with a list of available speakers by the outgoing officials. These lists note the names, addresses, salaries required, if any, the quality of the speakers, and other pertinent information.

There is a sample of one of these lists in the Hyde Park collection of manuscripts. In addition to the names and addresses of the speakers, it also lists the best type of audience for the individual recommended and under “Remarks” it contains some very frank comments such as “Needs editing.”

---

92 Democratic National Committee MSS, _loc. cit._, President’s Secretary’s File, Post-Office Department, Box 62, Roosevelt to Farley, Sept. 17, 1936.

93 Abbot, _op. cit._, p. 558.

94 _Taft MSS, L. B. Box 40, loc. cit._, Taft to Hilles, July 17, 1912.

95 Democratic National Committee MSS, _loc. cit._, Dewson Files, 1929-1940.
While the fireside chat was a great boon to Farley with his candidate with the mellifluous voice and the intimate manner, radio has not been an unmixed blessing for the national chairman by any means. For, in addition to increasing the cost of campaigning tremendously, it has aggravated the problem of presenting a consistent, yet universally acceptable policy position. Solving the problem of appealing to everyone and losing no one in the process was hard enough in a country as vast as the United States even before the advent of national audiences. One of the still unsolved problems of campaign publicity is the reconciliation of the efficiency and consistency of central control with the need for the local viewpoint and with the ever present resistance to speech control.

Control of speakers, therefore, still continues to be a delicate task, especially where the more important speakers are involved. Stokes claims that in 1932 it was necessary for the political strategists to keep John Garner, "the radical," under "wraps," and that a New York World reporter, Charles S. Bond, was assigned to accompany the vice-presidential candidate to keep the tenor of his speeches in accord with what the audiences wanted to hear. Farley had still other difficulties with over-sympathetic speakers who spoke of Roosevelt's infirmity and prayed that he would stand up under the strain of the presidency.


88 Democratic National Committee MSS, Women's Division, Box 8, loc. cit., Dewson to Farley, April 7, 1936.
In 1924, William M. Butler attempted to solve the problem of publicity control by appointing an advisory publicity board before which every campaign statement had to pass before issuance. Such censorship has its dangers, however, as Butler soon discovered. Dawes, the vice-presidential candidate in that campaign, refused to comply with the Butler ruling and castigated the "cowardly politicians" who wanted him to say one thing in one place and something else in another. 99

Yet, just let a speaker say something that makes it more difficult for the local leaders and the national chairman will soon hear of it. When an Aubrey Williams addresses a group of lawyers with the declaration that there is going to be a fight to the finish between the "haves" and the "have nots," some local leader is bound to complain. There are several letters of this sort among the Farley files at Hyde Park. One of them requests the national chairman to "muzzle" Ruth Bryan Owen.

When the slip has been made by the candidate, it can be serious, for, of course, the opposition makes the most of it. For example, Roosevelt's *ad libitum* in a speech on March 4, 1939, caused consternation in Democratic headquarters. The candidate extended a prepared remark as to the control by the Republican party

99 *New York Times*, Nov. 9, 1924, Sec. 2, p. 1, col. 3.

100 Democratic National Committee MSS, West Virginia Box, *loc. cit.* from Herman Bennett, President of The Young Democratic Club of Charleston to Farley, Sept. 19, 1936.

101 *Ibid.* Women's Division, Box 8, Hugh Kelly to Farley, Aug. 3, 1936. See also letter to Farley from Mississippi State Committee, Mississippi Box, Nov. 23, 1935.
of all branches of the federal government by saying, "...and, I might add for good measure the Supreme Court as well." This statement gave Farley some anxious moments. A similar careless reference by the chairman, himself, created a problem for work, when in one of his interviews he associated Hoover's aides in the Food Administration with the political campaign. There are times, then, when it would seem that what Farley has said is true; that is, that "there is no business on earth where a man's words are held against him to the same extent as in politics."

Yet, the words of the politicians are not held against them to the extent that they should be. If party organization is to be effective it must gain a greater degree of respect than it has yet achieved in the United States. One of the ways in which it could achieve added prestige would be by conducting election campaigns with higher standards as to election appeals. Emotional appeals will probably always be used, because they will always be effective so long as human beings remain human. It is to be hoped that no such excuse can be validly given for the "smear" campaign. Certainly, many intelligent people have wondered with Cortelyou whether or not "...the exigencies of politics required such a style of campaign."

102 Michelson, op. cit., p. 45.
103 Rochester, op. cit., pp. 60, 61.
104 Farley, Behind The Ballots, op. cit., p. 306.
105 Theodore Roosevelt MSS, box 34, loc. cit., Cortelyou to Roosevelt, Nov. 8, 1904.
Bemoaning the existence of "smear" campaigns is not enough, the national chairman should find some means by which the tone of the campaign could be raised. Were sufficient money available, a program of education on the importance of issues as against irrelevant personal items could be carried on in the interim between elections. With proper research enough material for valid criticisms of the opponents could be found in most administrations without having to descend to lies or slander in order to attract attention. A further step could be a program of education for the party speakers and other workers as to the need for such an advisory board as Butler created. The presentation of a consistent and nation-wide approach to matters affecting the welfare of the country requires such a body, if nothing else does. Harwood L. Childs in his An Introduction to Public Opinion suggests a commission similar to the Federal Trade Commission or the Securities Exchange Commission to make periodic audits of unfair propaganda practices. Such a commission would be helpful in reviewing campaign propaganda, if the commission could be kept non-political. A supplementary device—and perhaps a better method for a political party—would be to take care of the

106 The educators are doing an excellent job in this respect, but they do not have the opportunity to reach the mature voter who most needs this type of education.

107 Supra, Chapter VI, p. 130.

cleansing of party propaganda through an advisory board within the party structure. Inasmuch as sanctions would be difficult to apply, the only hope for improvement in this area is that which lies in education.
CHAPTER VII

THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AS PATRONAGE DISPENSER

"When Jackson nipped in the bud our federal bureaucracy, he sowed the seeds of party organization over the land and fertilized them with the bones of patronage." He also initiated one of the biggest problems that confronts the national chairman—that of representing the party workers in their efforts to seek rewards for party services. Patronage dispensing existed, of course, before the role of national chairman was created, but since there has been a national chairman, the task of handling the patronage has, usually, been assigned to that official.

The modern citizen tends to associate the role of the national chairman with the Post Office Department, probably for two reasons: (1) postmasters have often been the political leaders in their areas; and (2) two of the national chairmen who were simultaneously postmaster general and national chairmen—Hayes and Farley—were much in the public eye. Actually, however, the facts in the present century do not warrant such close association of the two offices. While, as the very title of Dorothy Fowler's book—The Cabinet Politician The Postmaster General—indicates, the postmasters general have often been

---


2 The National Intelligencer, April 17, 1829.

political advisers to the presidents, the practice of appointing the national chairman to the postmaster generalship is a relatively recent one. Cortelyou was the first national chairman to be simultaneously postmaster general and national chairman; and up until 1953, he and Hays were the only two who served at the same time in both roles. The association between the two offices has always been open to criticism, and the second man to hold the chairmanship after Cortelyou, Hitchcock, felt called upon to resign the chairmanship before assuming the role of postmaster general. In fact, Cortelyou, himself, resigned the chairmanship upon his appointment to be Secretary of the Treasury.

Whether postmaster general or not, however, the national chairman is usually the patronage dispenser for his party. He is the party arbiter on patronage matters, and he is the man who places party recommendations before the president. The national chairmen think of themselves as representatives of the national committee members and the party workers in general, with the duty of laying their claims before the successful candidate. McCombs speaks of being "commissioned" by the National Committee to ask Wilson that the party workers be rewarded. Work seems to have had a similar idea of the part

---

4 Postal Statistics of the United States, (Post-Office Department, Form 3021).

that the national chairman and the committee members should play in the distribution of patronage.

Naturally, only the chairmen of the party in power have the privilege of bestowing federal patronage, and among them the opportunity to dispense assignments is not as great for the interim chairman as it is for the chairman selected just after the convention. Only those positions vacated by resignation or death, or new exempt openings are available to the interim chairmen. The story of patronage, then, revolves primarily around Hanna, Cortelyou, Hitchcock, McComb, McCormick, Nays, Butler, Work, and Farley. Their patronage power has varied.

Hanna seems to have handled the patronage of the McKinley administration with very little interference from the president. As a matter of fact, one message in the McKinley files gives cause for wonder as to who was the chief and who the assistant in this relationship. In this message Hanna informs the president that the national chairman favored a given man for a post-office position and advised McKinley not to discuss the matter with someone else who was arranging to talk with him on the subject. It is necessary to remember, however, in considering the relationship between Hanna and McKinley that

---


8 McKinley MSS, loc. cit., Hanna to McKinley, Jan. 29, 1900. This message is one of the typically cautiously worded ones that pass—when any do—between the national chairman and the candidate.
McAdoo, Burleson, and Morgenthau had more to do with patronage than did the national chairman.

According to Hays, it was Daugherty, and not Hays, the national chairman, who was the King-maker and the man to whom the president assigned the patronage distribution. Both Daugherty and Nicholas Murray Butler support this statement and indicate that they both had much to do with the more important assignments. Further testimony can be found in the General Letter Books of the Postmasters General; Hays' General Letter Books contain definitely fewer letters in relation to patronage than do many of the other General Letter Books.

William H. Butler is another chairman who had fewer patronage problems than the usual successful chairman. There were two reasons for this condition: (1) his candidate had already been office for some time; and (2) the candidate for the presidency had already notified the party workers that there would be no other returns for their campaign efforts than the reward of a job well done. Contrast with the situation during Hays'...


16Interview with Will Hays, October 17, 1951.


18Post-Office Department Library, Postmasters' General Letter Book.

Hanna’s position as Senate leader was also a factor in his power position.

Hanna’s patronage control was apparently not as great under Theodore Roosevelt as under McKinley, as witness Roosevelt’s appointment of liberal Democrats without consultation with his chairman. But even Roosevelt could not ignore his organization man, particularly when that man was a power in himself, and he conferred with Hanna on several appointments. The relationship between Cortelyou and Roosevelt and between Hilles and Taft followed the normal pattern. On the more important assignments, the national chairman recommended and the president considered and determined. Differences of opinion over patronage, however, developed early between Taft and his first national chairman, Hitchcock, and continued after Hitchcock had left the chairmanship.

Differences also developed between Wilson and his first national chairman, McCombs. By his own admission, McCombs’ power was so negligible that he could not get a man appointed to a village postmaster; not that he did not try. Certainly


10 Theodore Roosevelt MSS, loc. cit., P. L. B. Box 142, Roosevelt to Hanna, Oct. 8, 1901. See also P. L. B. Box 144, Roosevelt to Hanna, Feb. 3, 1903.

11 Ibid., Box 34, Cortelyou to Roosevelt, Aug. 26, 1904; Jan. 2 and 5, 1905. See also Taft MSS, L. B. Box 37, loc. cit., Taft to Hilles, July 30, 1912.

12 Ibid., Pringle Copies, Taft to Hitchcock, June 16, 1906.

13 McCombs, op. cit., p. 335.

tenure as national chairman, during the Hoover administration, it was Walter F. Brown, the postmaster general and not work, the chairman, who was the chief patronage dispenser.

For the most part, the pattern returned to that of an earlier era with Franklin Delano Roosevelt's appointment of Farley as postmaster general. According to Farley, the Roosevelt appointments, with few exceptions, passed through the hands of the national chairman during most of his seven and one-half years in the chairmanship. The appointment of Senator Hugo Black to the Supreme Court was the first instance in which Farley had not been advised in advance of a significant appointment.

This business of handling the patronage has been done, at least in the present century, in a surprisingly methodical manner. Lists are made of the contributors and party workers with the jobs they desire or are recommended for and the salary involved. The list found among the Taft manuscripts also include the names of the endorsers. These lists are indexed


22 Ibid., pp. 97, 98.

23 Taft MSS, loc. cit., Cabinet Recommendations Box.
and filed. As McCombs explained, they cover some of the most desirable offices within the gift of the party. Since the inclusion of women among the voters, the lists are understandably longer and the national chairman's patronage difficulties are thereby increased. The list found in the Women's Division file at Hyde Park had a noteworthy improvement over the older lists inasmuch as they also included the qualifications of the prospective appointee.

One of the interesting facts about these lists is the attention paid to those who contributed their services before the nomination. If nothing else points up the heartaches and the cares of the pre-convention manager his loyalty to those who worked with him before the nomination does. McCombs' list was divided into two sections, one for those who had helped before the convention and one for the Johnny-come-latelies. Farley's FRBC list (For Roosevelt Before Chicago) became famous. Apparently, a close watch is kept on the delegates' actions at the conventions. Taft in discussing patronage with his postmaster general speaks of "a vacillating" delegate at the convention and the need for loyal party referees. Farley tells of having arranged before the convention for a series of confidential

---

26 Taft MSS, L. B. Box 43, loc. cit., Taft to the postmaster general, n.d.
reports of what went on in the various delegations at Chicago. Often "on a cold winter evening" he went over these reports "to brush up on party history." Many an undeserving applicant probably never knew where the cold blast that hit him came from.

These lists are presented to the president, and the final decision lies, theoretically at least, with him. Major appointments are, of course, determined by the president. Frequently, the chairman who handles the presidential campaign is made a member of the president's cabinet. Among the Republicans from Hanna to Work every successful national chairman could have had, had he so desired, a cabinet appointment. Hanna refused, preferring to serve in the Senate. Butler also served in the Senate, and Work returned to the practice of medicine. Gortelyou, Hitchcock, and Hays became postmasters general. Among the Democratic chairmen during the period under discussion, there were three national chairmen who conducted successful campaigns for their candidates—Mocomb, McCormick, and Farley. Only one of these, Farley, became a member of the

28 ibid., p. 229.
31 Post-Office Department Library, Postmaster General List.
president's cabinet. Although he coveted the position of Secretary of the Treasury or of Attorney General, McCombs was offered no cabinet position. McCormick refused an appointment to the cabinet, but became a member of the "war" cabinet in his role of chairman of the War Trade Board.

Just what part the national chairman plays in the final decision about the other cabinet posts is particularly difficult to determine. There is great prestige value in helping to form a cabinet, and the chairmen seem proud of their relationship with the president on such matters. Hays is especially proud of his contribution to the Harding cabinet—Andrew Mellon. He tells of the trip that he and Senator Knox made to Harding in relation to this subject and how they arrived in the knick of time for their purpose. Harding was just about to appoint Dawes. Farley tells of discussing cabinet appointments with Roosevelt and obviously enjoyed the role of informing Hull of his appointment to the Roosevelt cabinet.

---

32 McCombs, op. cit., p. 213. McCombs claims that Wilson refused him a cabinet position because he did not wish to appoint a politician to the cabinet.


34 Interview with Bill Hays, Oct. 17, 1952.

35 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., pp. 33, 80. See also Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 233. Cf. Moley, After Seven Years, p. 108, where Moley states that Farley not only did not sit in on the cabinet making conferences, but was not even invited to put in a list of his own.
To the patronage chief, himself, goes the task of filling the lesser jobs. The burden must be a frightful physical one to say nothing of the psychological and political undertones attached to it. Farley's telephone was not the first upon which the applicants did a "Swiss bell-ringer act," House claims that the office seekers drove McGolmb crazy. An unusually pressing burden faced Farley as a job dispenser, because the depression had caused the ranks of job-seekers to enlarge. Farley's description of the interviews shows that this one phase of patronage alone can be most troublesome. In an effort to keep his two roles, that of postmaster general and that of national chairman, separate, he at first arranged that the job seekers would apply at the party headquarters, but he had not counted on two conditions that developed: (1) the space proved inadequate for the droves that descended upon the office; and (2) everyone wanted to talk to Farley himself. Farley tells rather feelingly of some of these interviews. Having largess to dispose of has its unhappy moments, too.

The next step for the national chairman is the reference of these applicants to the president or to the heads of the

36 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 33.
38 Interview with James A. Farley, July 7, 1952. See also Farley, "Passing Out the Patronage," op. cit., p. 22.
departments. Very often the reference of the suppliants and their requests is perfunctory in character. It is not the letter or memorandum that the applicant sees nor the telephone call that he hears that counts, it is the follow-up. Groly claims that Hanna in transferring requests for a position to a department would always use a postscript in his own handwriting advising the department head that if the request was in any way injurious to the departmental discipline or efficiency that it should be ignored. According to Hanna's biographer, many of the requests were ignored. Farley makes the same assertion. Frequently, the national chairman simply transmits the recommendation of other sponsors; he knows nothing of the applicants and frankly says so.

The handling of the applicants and recommendations from sponsors, while trying, is only one of the ticklish situations with which the chairman has to contend in his role of job-dispenser. The really big job is to find the openings into which to place the applicants. In the first place, there are always more seekers than openings. In the second place, there has been a constant struggle at the beginning of each administration between the patronage dispensers and the civil service reformers. Keeping soft patronage spots available has never

39 Croly, op. cit., p. 298.
40 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 232.
41 Ibid., See Also Woodrow Wilson MSS, loc. cit., File 107, McCombs to Wilson, March 19, 1913.
been an easy assignment. Taft complained to his chairman, Hilles, that anyone would think elections were carried by navy yards for the yells that were heard when repair work was curtailed.

The growth of the federal services has been a boon to the patronage dispenser, if not to the taxpayer. Congress, generally amenable on the subject of patronage, will often exempt positions from civil service wherever possible. Instances of such party cooperation were given in the Wagner Labor Disputes Act, the National Security Exchange Act, the Railroad Retirement Act, and the Maritime Commission Act of relatively recent memory. Or they will provide for Senatorial consultation as they did on the Work Relief appropriation. Robert E. Sherwood said that after the passage of this act, Hopkins knew that he would have to heed Farley's suggestions on patronage. As the National Civil Service League reported "it was not by chance that the phrase 'may appoint without regard to the provisions of the civil service law' was inserted in nearly every bill passed to initiate the new agencies under Roosevelt." Farley acknowledged that from 1932 to 1933 the number of merit positions fell off approximately fourteen per cent.

---

42 Taft MSS, L. B. Box 43, loc. cit., Taft to Hilles, Oct. 4, 1912.
43 Fifty-Second Proceedings of the National Civil Service League, p. 11.
45 Proceedings, National Civil Service League, op. cit., p. 10.
46 Interview with James A. Farley, July 7, 1952.
Nevertheless, the number of positions exempt from civil service and available to the chairman has grown less and less. The chairman's dilemma is that as fast as new positions are developed just so fast are they moved into classified service, often with the blessing of the chairman after he has put his party's men into the positions. Still, as rural free delivery and the forestry service moved into the competitive field, prohibition, income tax, and finally the New Deal agencies came along to supply, if only temporarily in some cases, new vacancies.

Fortunately for the national chairman, he does not have to depend solely on the positions exempt by congressional acts. He has more than one way to achieve his purpose. He finds quite helpful, for example, the power of the president to include or to exempt by executive order all positions not provided for by statute. Through this means, new non-exempt positions can be opened up or exempt positions can be gathered into the protection of the Civil Service. For example, in 1933, Roosevelt by executive order gave Farley, as postmaster general,

---

47 Farley supported Senator O'Mahoney's bill which placed first, second, and third class postmasters within the Civil Service. See New York Times, Feb. 7, 1933, p. 4, col. 2.


the power to disqualify any candidate at will. The Internal Revenue Bureau has been in and out of Civil Service more than once by the route of the executive order. Or by executive order, the president can make openings for his chairman's use by the elimination of agencies and by the transfer of their functions to new exempt agencies. Then, there is the rule of one in three for those who pass the civil service examinations. According to the National Civil Service League these examinations do not prove too awkward for the patronage dispenser. The League speaks of them as "a mere cloak for the spoils system."

The Postmasters General General Letter Books, however, indicate that this rule has been helpful to the postmasters general in the pacification of congressmen.

From time to time, what might be called "adaptability tests" are injected into the situation. Men are deprived of their opportunities because they are "temperamentally unsuited." Add to the above ways of getting around merit appointments the possibilities opened through reclassification of postoffices and through temporary appointments, and it is seen that the


51 Thomas A. Campbell, "Patronage Positions," (Washington, D.C., Civil Service Commission Library, n.d.) Campbell was at the time a Civil Service Commissioner.

52 U.S. Congress, Record, Vol. 80, Part 5, p. 4818.


54 Postmasters General General Letter Books.

55 Ibid., Hays to Congressman C. F. Curry, March 19, 1921.
national chairman has quite a little leeway in his desire to take care of those who have assisted him in the campaign.

On the other side of the picture are the many watch-dogs, official and unofficial, who check the national chairman's attempts to avoid the barriers set up by the Civil Service Commission. The National Civil Service League is the most potent critic, but an unorganized public opinion has exerted its influence from time to time. Other controls can be found in the Civil Service rules and in the Civil Service Commission, itself, unless it has been "wisely" chosen, and the opposition can always be depended upon to keep a watchful eye, of course, on the use of patronage by the party in power. At times, the remonstrance or restraint comes from inside the organization. Below is an excerpt of a letter from the vice-chairman of the Michigan State Central Committee:

The eligible registers, as they are coming through right now are one big laugh. You in Washington, Mr. Farley and our National Committee men can talk about Civil service and ratings in the registers all you wish, but even the lay people know better. It is too

56 Woodrow Wilson MSS, loc. cit., File 311, National Civil Service Reform League, March 11, 1914; File 310, Jan. 8, 1915. The name of this organization was later changed, and the word "Reform" deleted from the title.

57 Taft MSS, Pre-Inaugural Series, Box 4, loc. cit., R. W. Knott to Taft, July 3, 1908.

58 See Good Government, September-October, 1951 for a criticism of the selection of the Civil Service Commission.

59 U. S. Congress, Record, Vol. 80, Part 5, p. 4817.
When a fine man in Ann Arbor receives a notification that he is not on the eligible register because of educational qualifications and lack of business experience, and he is a graduate of the University of Michigan, my confidence in the examination is entirely gone. The same condition prevails in every one of the eligible registers with which I am familiar....I hope never again to have anyone say to me that qualifications are the measure and nothing can be done about it. I am hoping that Mr. Farley will call for new examinations. 60

With the vacancies found, the job is only half done. The national chairman and the party leaders still have the onerous task of allotting them. Apparently, the decisions are sometimes made even before the election. Hanna, for instance, wrote to local political leaders known to favor McKinley telling them that if they would organize their districts in his favor, they would be consulted after the election in respect to appointments.

There are many factors for the national chairman to consider in assigning positions. In the first place, the vacancies must be carefully apportioned territorially, not only because the state leaders expect to get their share of the federal patronage, but because it is good politics to have the party's men spread around the nation. This matter is worked out very carefully; a list in the Woodrow Wilson files notes the total compensation of the positions allotted to each state with a breakdown of the number and salary of the positions assigned.

60 Democratic National Committee MSS, Women's Division, Box 8, loc. cit. This excerpt was attached to a letter from Farley to Mrs. James H. Wolfe, head of the Women's Division, April 6, 1926.

61 Groly, op. cit., p. 186.

The party leaders must also watch group representation for the minorities keep a very close watch, not only on how many positions they get, but on the quality of them. Morgenthau proved recalcitrant on this point. The best assignment that McCombs could get for his money-raiser was the ambassadorship to Turkey, which Morgenthau declined with the statement that his "People" were "strongly opposed to having any position made a distinctly Jewish one or having the impression continued that Turkey was the only country where a Jew could be received as our Country's representative."

Often the difficulty in assignment is purely a personal one, but then, too, it is the chairman who is called upon to straighten the matter out. Party workers cannot be ignored without the administration and the national chairman hearing about it. Like Morgenthau, many of the aides of the national chairman during the campaign have ideas of their own as to what assignment they want. Some create situations because of their pecuniary interests, or as Taft expressed it in a letter to his chairman because they insist "...upon their pound of flesh." Some create situations because of their desire for personal prestige. Farley had an unpleasant emergency develop

63 Ibid., File 254, Morgenthau to Wilson, June 12, 1913.
64 Ibid., File 107, House to Wilson May 3, 1913.
with one of his Texas donors who desired to be a member of the
World Economic and Monetary Conference. Assigned as a mere
advisor, the wealthy contributor refused, on the eve of the
departure of the mission, to leave until he was made a member
of the conference.

Taking care of personal friends of the president is also
part of the task of the patronage dispenser. Wilson and his
college professors and Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his
Harvard classmates were cases in point. In fact, Farley
had double the patronage burden of chairmen who preceded
him. First, he had a very large Women's Division to pacify,
and secondly, he had the president's wife, Eleanor, to satisfy.
In referring to an assignment to be made to a commission, Molly
Dewson wrote to Farley communicating to him the wishes of the
president's wife in regard to this position. The note ends
with this remark: "She is the Great Chief. So be it!"

Then, too, all too often, two deserving men, important to party
success, will covet the same position. Curtailment or consolidation

63 Roney, After Seven Years, op. cit., p. 218.
67 James Kerney, The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson
68 Farley also tells of being pressed for a judicial appoint-
ment by Charles Harwood, the man who loaned Elliot Roosevelt
some money. See Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 169.
69 Democratic National Committee MSS, Women's Division,
loc. cit., Patronage File, Dewson to Farley, Aug. 10, 1933.
70 Taft MSS, L. B. Box 49, loc. cit., Taft to Hillses, July
16, 1913. See also Woodrow Wilson MSS, loc. cit., File 207, to
Adoo to Tumulty March 28, 1913.
of exempt positions also adds to the burdens of the chairman. Probably for every friend made through patronage, dozens are lost.

Whether these patronage matters are handled directly between the party patronage dispenser and the department, as is sometimes done, or with a congressman or senator acting as middle-man, the job-master is likely to run into difficulties, at least in some of the departments. Department heads do not always understand the position of the national chairman in the matter of rewards to the faithful. Farley, for example, had disagreements with three of Roosevelt's cabinet—Henry Wallace, Harold Iokes, and Mrs. Perkins. And even Farley himself claims to have had one area in his own department, the Postal Inspection Service, which he demanded be conducted without patronage considerations.

Sometimes the departmental reasons for not cooperating with the national chairman are not so virtuous as to be termed "non-political." The bureaucrats may be grinding their own axes. National chairmen must be wary of such procedures. Many friends of Taft thought this situation to be the case with Hitchcock when he was postmaster general. Harry M. Daugherty, then chairman of the Ohio State Executive Committee, wrote to Taft complaining that the "railway clerks are cutting the life out of us" and suggesting that Hitchcock be dismissed. An

---

71 Taft MSS, L. B. Box 43, _loc. cit._, Taft to Hilles, Sept. 18, 1912.
72 Farley, _Jim Farley's Story, op. cit._, p. 187.
73 Taft MSS, _loc. cit._, Box 7-22 H. M. Daugherty to C. Thompson, secretary to the president, Aug. 28, 1912.
unsigned letter to Hilles also indicates that Hitchcock was certainly not trying to help his successor in the role of national chairman. The letter refers to an order from Hitchcock prohibiting railway clerks from using their passes to dead-head home to vote. Complaints came into Farley from the Minnesota chairman that the Republican hold-overs in Wallace's Farm Credit Administration were driving most of the influential farmers into the Republican party. It was, undoubtedly, for checking purposes that Farley placed one of his own men in each department for the express purpose of spotting jobs and of seeing to it that they were preserved for the faithful.

At other times, the differences between the department and the chairmen arise out of the fact that some of the party workers most helpful to the national chairman in the rough and tumble of the political arena may not at all fit the requirements that the departments have for the positions the politicians aspire to. Farley had a disagreement with the State Department on such a problem. Bailey Phillips of that department showed a preference, as Moley expressed it, for "cookie pushers"—career diplomats—and was hesitant about sending

---
74 Ibid., Box 7-22, an unsigned letter to Hilles, Oct. 28, 1912.
75 Elliot Roosevelt, op. cit., quoting a letter from his father to Henry Wallace, June 3, 1939.
76 Fiftieth Proceedings of the National Civil Service League, pp. 19, 20.
Jim Curley as Ambassador to Rome, even though Curley presented "unimpeachable claims to the job in the shape of a record of early, energetic, and powerful support of the Roosevelt candidacy." The State Department felt that Curley would fit better in some other post, and suggested Poland. Farley raised the roof about Philip's requirements, and it was arranged that Moley would see to it that the campaign contributors' desires were not forgotten.

Just as the national chairman acts as liaison between the party and the administration in placing the party workers, so he acts, on the other hand, as liaison between the administration and the local leaders—the representatives, the senators, the state chairmen, and the national committeemen in placing the party worker. Harmony is seriously affected if the president fills important positions without consultation with the state representatives concerned. Appointment recommendations come from the lower echelons up, depending upon the importance of the position. Control at the level of the national chairman is greater in times of party stress.

The man or men with whom the national chairman will deal on questions of patronage will vary with the situation. Usually, where the representative of the state in the Senate or of the district in the House of Representatives is of the same party as the national chairman, the senator or representative, as

77 Moley, After Seven Years, op. cit., p. 132.
78 Ibid., p. 129.
the case may be, will be consulted. Where the party does not
have representation in the federal legislature from the area
of the vacancy, as is the usual case with the Republican party
in the South, or where the congressman, as happens on occasion,
is not the power within the district, then the national chair-
man deals with the local man who is the power, or with some
referee designated by him. It is an unrewarding task to try
to find much evidence on this subject. As McComb stated "patron-
age as such is a very oral affair." 80 It seems, however, that
the national committees do not often have too much to say
on patronage matters, except on the occasions when they are
the real powers within the state. Rosewater's description of
the relationship between the national chairman and the national
committees in handling patronage just about describes the
situation:

"...in some instances notably in the South, wherever
official party representatives are wanting, they serve
as advisers to the President in the distribution of
patronage. Such consultation, however, is by courtesy,
and not by right. Whatever may have been done in
years gone by, the committee as such does not now
undertake to award patronage or exert the slightest
pressure upon the candidates after they enter office. 81

The development of federal services within the states
has supplied the party organization with local referees, and
commissioners of Internal Revenue or deputy marshals are fre-
quently used as referees.

79 Taft MSS, L. B. Box 42, loc. cit., Taft to Hilles, Sept. 17, 1912
See also Rochester, op. cit., p. 48.
80 Woodrow Wilson MSS, File 107, loc. cit., McComb to Wilson,
April 11, 1913.
81 Rosewater, Backstage in 1912, op. cit., p. 155.
82 U. S. 71st Congress, 1st sess., Hearings of Senate Sub-
committee of the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, Part I,
p. 1929—Testimony of Harry New.
Where the congressmen are not consulted, or when they
do not receive the attention or the courtesy which is due them,
it is to the national chairman that the complaints come.
McCombs reported to Wilson that party applicants and their
sponsors were being "unceremoniously treated in the departments."
In October, 1929, a luncheon ostensibly given to honor the
new chairman, Claudio Huston, turned out to be a protest
meeting against the tendency of Hoover to ignore Congress in
his appointments. On these occasions, it is up to the
national chairman to pour oil in the troubled waters by represent-
ing the congressional viewpoint to the president. Most of the
chairmen have delegated an assistant as liaison between the
hill and the party organization, as Farley did when he placed
William J. Braly, a former page-boy, in this capacity.

Local leaders not in Congress also pour their patronage
troubles into the ears of the national chairman. As a result,
the chairman is often put in an embarrassing position. The
tasks of being both patronage dispenser and party harmonizer
are difficult to reconcile. There are two main factors which
act as deterrents to harmony. One such factor is the tendency
of the various leaders within the states, as has been seen in

---

85 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 231.
86 Democratic National Committee MSS, Women's Division,
Box 8, from C. M. Brown to Farley, Sept. 14, 1938. See also
Taft MSS, L. B. Box 40, loc. cit., Taft to Hilles, July 18, 1912.
Chapter III, to head opposing factions; and each group is
trying to build its own organization. Particularly awkward
is the position of the national chairman, when the patronage
available is given to some power in the state other than the
faction which supported the nominee in the pre-convention
fight. The ideal situation, of course, is that in which
the national committeemen and the state chairmen and other
party leaders are in accord. Seldom is the chairman's burden
eased by such unanimity.

The other factor which places the national chairman in
an undesirable position is his need to reconcile the desires
of the party workers and contributors for positions with the
administration's need to have an efficient government. No
national chairman has yet had the courage to test whether or
not it is necessary to pay party workers with assignments.

Most of the men who have contributed money or services expect
some recognition for these efforts after the candidate has
assumed office. On the other hand, the president and the de­
partment heads responsible for the administration of the govern­
ment hope that the national chairman will press upon them no
one whose affiliations are unsavory or whose lack of ability
is so noticeable as to embarrass the administration. Letters
of explanation from the postmasters general to the congress­
men about prospective appointees in whom they are interested
point up the middle position of the national chairman, especially

---

Woodrow Wilson MSS, File 107, loc. cit., McGombs to
Wilson, April 19, 1913, brief.
All of the national chairmen have practiced patronage. As Farley retaliated when he was dubbed the "job-master," the only difference between him and his Republican predecessors in the role of national chairman was that he admitted his allegiance to the principle of party patronage. One or two of the more courageous chairmen have defended the practice of rewarding the faithful. Hanna was one of these men. According to Croly, he objected to the civil service reforms as much from the viewpoint of a business man as from that of a politician; he argued that any private business that made the subordinate independent of the chief would be ruined. Furthermore, Hanna's first interest, like that of most national chairmen, was the maintenance of party harmony, and any reform that tended to interfere with the accord of the party was a reform to be avoided. A letter to McKinley indicates Hanna's general position. This letter which discusses the pros and cons of filling a certain position contains the comment that "...everything else being equal there is more politics in giving it to

Postmasters General General Letter Book of Will Hays. See also ibid., of James A. Farley. These letter books will also show that what Alfred E. Smith said of the civil service laws is true: "...civil service is a great buffer between a new administration representing a party long out of power and the horde of the faithful who are clamoring for jobs...." Alfred E. Smith, "Democratic Leadership at the Crossroads," New Outlook, Vol. 181, No. 6, p. 9.


Croly, op. cit., p. 300.
Senator Fritchard's man." MoCombs is another chairman who contended, at least within the inner party circles, that patronage jobs should go to party workers. He maintained that such rewards were the only way to build and to hold a party together.

In discussing the dual problem of efficient government and patronage, Hays said that one of the country's greatest needs is more "men and women in politics for what they can give and not what they can get." The question as he sees it is, in addition to the need expressed above, the proper determination of the point in the governmental hierarchy where policy decisions must be made. Men who support the administration principles are a necessity here. Hays admits, however, that until we educate the citizen to his duty to his party, patronage will be necessary.

On the other hand, Farley, who was criticized for his patronage largesse, believes that "with the help of a few simple ingredients like time, patience, and hard work" it would be possible to build a major political party without "the aid of a single job to hand out to deserving partisans." Yet, in

91 McKinley MSS, loc. cit., Hanna to McKinley, Feb. 17, 1900.
93 From a talk at the Indiana State Convention, May 12, 1930, Hays File No. 132.
94 Interview with Will Hays, Oct. 16, 1952.
95 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 237.
practice this chairman was one of the strongest and frankest
defenders of the patronage system. He firmly believes that
the party in power should reward its own. The sight of men
driving to work in Bear Mountain Park under a Democratic state
administration with "Vote for Hoover" signs on their cars was
too much for Farley. He contends that "on the whole....the
people who come in through political endorsement stand up
better under the hard test of performance in office." To him, the appointment of federal employees through Congress
is the most democratic method. He holds also that the residents
of smaller states have a better chance at federal positions
under the patronage system. Furthermore, he argues that men
such as Dr. Arthur Morgan, who think they are "pursuing the
only pure course" by refusing to accept recommendations from
representatives and senators, end up by appointing their friends
and confidants, a method which Farley believes to be the worst
kind of spoilsmanship.

The views of the chairmen, at least those expressed pub-
licly, do not overlook the question of efficiency. It is their
contention that the mere fact that a man is a party worker or
a party contributor does not preclude the possibility that he
may also have ability. While they are accused of putting patronage
before policy, they argue that rather than there being an

96 Ibid., p. 225.
97 Ibid., pp. 235, 236.
98 Ibid., p. 233.
inconsistency between their position on patronage and the fulfillment of party policy, there is a direct and valuable connection. McCombs expressed this view in this way:

Of course the measures are the important things. I think as an auxiliary matter, however, that friends should be put on guard and in office so as to be of assistance and as a further assurance that these measures will receive all possible support.

Farley's position on this subject is that:

There are thousands of jobs in Uncle Sam's service that touch very closely the daily lives of the American people, and the way in which those jobs are administered has a deep influence in determining the attitude of the public toward the administration in power.

Farley, however, warned that "when political organizations begin thinking about jobs and nothing else, when they forget that the public business should come first, they have commenced their own death chant without realizing it."

The cynical might think of this last statement as insincere. Actually, the really intelligent chairmen believe this way. They are foresighted enough to see: (1) that over the long range the administration must stand on the record of its administrative leaders and that when they prove corrupt or even only inefficient, the chances are that such maladministration will be reflected in the party vote; and (2) that efficient

---

99 Woodrow Wilson MSS, File 107, loc. cit., McCombs to Wilson, April 11, 1913.

100 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 229. See also Farley, "Passing Out the Patronage," op. cit., p. 77.

101 ibid., p. 236.
men can be found, with effort, within the party organization. The weakness in the chairman's patronage position arises out of the fact that there is a tendency for a strong party man to confuse party welfare and the nation's welfare as one and the same thing.

Conclusions about patronage are difficult to arrive at, for the simple reason that the true state of affairs is hard to determine. As V.O. Key has said, "the distribution of patronage is not a matter neatly set out in the statutes for the convenience of monograph writers." Somewhere in the middle of the controversy, probably, lies the truth. National chairmen are neither so callous about patronage as is often concluded, nor is the civil service advocate so pure and altruistic as is sometimes indicated. The National Civil Service League has called patronage "the hog call of Politics." In all fairness, it is something more than that. It is a very difficult assignment. Not yet have the leaders found what Cummings plaintively sought over twenty years ago—"some just grounds upon which to base the proper relationship between the party organization and democratic public officials."

---


103 Fifty-third Proceedings of the National Civil Service League, p. 19.

Whether the organization is called a party or whatever it is called, the body which manages the formulation and collection of political expression needs workers to make it effective. The national chairman, or whoever is in charge of such an organization, cannot be held responsible unless he is somehow or other supplied with these workers. At the policy level, almost everyone concedes that the administration must have men who are sympathetic to the concepts of government held by the chief executive. It is, then, at the lower levels of the governmental hierarchy that the question of patronage presents the greatest problem. Cummings claims that many people give their support to a political party for the excitement in it; but, apparently, there are not enough people to whom it is an excitement. In a nation where it is difficult to get the people interested enough even to vote, except at times when they are particularly disturbed, it would seem that Farley's belief that a party can be maintained without some reward is over-optimistic. No such onus attaches to neglect of the citizen's duty to support the political aspect of his government as does attach to his neglect of his duty to support the military aspect, unfortunately.

The solution of the problem seems to be to find some reward which would give to the political organization the workers it needs with a minimum of deleterious effect upon the government.

---

106 Interview with Homer Cummings, June 26, 1952.
106 Supra, Chapter VII, p. 209.
A possible solution is to grant the party worker some credit toward his merit rating in the civil service examinations as is done with the man who has given military service. This system, of course, would be a long way from perfection. In the first place, in view of the large number of ex-military people the United States now holds, no one who was not a party worker or an ex-military person could hope to aspire to a government position. Then, too, it would, as has the credit arrangement for the ex-military, decrease, very likely, the quality of expertness in government administration. But as Alger Hiss should have taught the nation, brilliance is not everything. Furthermore, with the controls of party participation as enumerated in the Hatch Act, it would mean recruitment of new party workers once the old ones had moved into the government service. It should, however, improve the quality of those now appointed purely on the basis of patronage; and with more positive incentive, it is possible that sufficient new recruits would be available from year to year. The least it would do for the national chairman would be to relieve him of the burden of the selection and the allocation of party workers within the governmental structure.
CHAPTER VIII

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AND THE CANDIDATE

There are several sets of relationships to be considered when studying the contact between the candidate and the national chairman. Among the more important ones are: the relationship between the campaign national chairman and the candidate he helped to elect; the relationship between the interim national chairman and the president; the relationship between the campaign national chairman and the candidate of the defeated party; and the relationship between the interim chairman of the party out of power and the defeated candidate.

As has been stated in Chapter II, the candidate has the primary voice in the selection of the national chairman in the first three cases. The relationship, in these instances, then, begins at least as early as this selection. Once it was established that the candidate should have the privilege of selecting the national chairman, it was natural that he choose his pre-convention manager for the chairmanship. Many of the candidates did so. There were, however, some exceptions. Jones had not been the pre-convention manager for Bryan, but had been instead an ardent supporter of one of Bryan's opponents for the nomination. Another exception, again among the Democrats, was the selection

---

1Eureka, Chapter II, p. 15.

of Taggart in 1904. In fact, this choice marked a reversion to the nineteenth century pattern, for the chairman in this case was not the choice of Parker and his faction, but of a dominant faction within the National Committee.

The third Democratic national chairman in the present century, Norman Mack, acted more in the capacity of party harmonizer of dissident groups than as a pre-convention manager for Bryan in 1908. It was, therefore, not until 1912 when the Democratic candidate, Woodrow Wilson, rather reluctantly settled on McCombs as national chairman that a pre-convention manager became a national chairman in the party. From then on, the campaign national chairman of the Democratic party was either one of the pre-convention campaign managers or was the choice of the man who had been a pre-convention manager, as was the case when White was chosen in 1920.

In the Republican party, there was only one occasion from 1900 to 1940 when the national chairman selected after the convention was not one of the campaign managers for the candidate; that occasion was when Hays, already national chairman, was reelected to the chairmanship. A similar situation occurred


5 supra, Chapter II, p. 35.

in the case of the selection of Butler among the Republicans as occurred in the selection of White among the Democrats, for the leading pre-convention manager—in this instance, Frank Stearns—did not want the national chairmanship.

In several instances the friendship went beyond the pre-convention campaign. Hanna was a "...devoted ally and follower...." and a close and intimate friend of McKinley's for years. Their friendship and political association dated back to the early seventies. The Cortelyou-Roosevelt relationship was well founded before Cortelyou's selection as national chairman, for Cortelyou had been secretary to the president—and later, a member of his cabinet—before his selection as national chairman. Hilles had also been the secretary to the president under whom he served as national chairman. Wilcox and Hughes had been associated in government work in New York, when Hughes as governor of that state had appointed Wilcox as chairman of the Utilities Commission. The friendship between Butler and Coolidge went back to their days in Massachusetts politics and was, apparently, a very close one. Hoover in his The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover refers to Butler and Coolidge as "....

---


most intimate friends." Work and Hoover were close associates in the Coolidge cabinet, in fact, they were so close that they ate many of their meals together either in Hoover's home or in either of their offices. The pre-convention contact between Hoover and Sanders developed when the latter was secretary to President Coolidge. Paradoxically, Hamilton and Landon became friends at a time when they were serving in reverse positions to that in which they served as national chairman and candidate; that is, when Hamilton was the candidate, for governor of Kansas, and Landon was the campaign manager for Hamilton's opponent.

On the Democratic side, many of the friendships were also of some standing before the association as campaign manager and nominee. The Jones-Bryan friendship developed out of their mutual interest in silver and existed from the time that Jones and Bryan were in Congress together late in the nineteenth century. McCombs, a Princeton graduate, had his first contact with Wilson at that university. White and Cox and Shaver and Davis had been associated in the politics of their home states prior to the selection of Cox and Davis as presidential candidates.

---

11 Hoover, op. cit., p. 194.
12 Post-Office Library, "Biographical Sketches of the Postmasters General."
14 Dewberry, op. cit., p. 323 to 327.
15 Letter from George White, October 16, 1951. Interview with Shaver, February 16, 1952.
Raskob had known Al Smith for some time before Raskob assumed the national chairmanship; according to Raskob, the relationship between the two friends was "most intimate."

There is a surprising amount of sentiment in some of these relationships, as for instance in that between Hilles and Taft. Letters among the Taft manuscripts indicate that Hilles always cherished the thought of the return of Taft to the presidency. The national chairman never stopped referring to Taft as the president even after he left the presidency, and the letters in the Hilles files show that he tried to keep Taft before the public eye. A letter written from the Republican National Committee headquarters to the president after the election—a very rare specimen—indicates that a very close relationship existed between these two men. The letter is written to one of Hilles' successors as secretary to the president asking him to write a letter for the president to sign. In this letter Hilles states that he believes that the president will be agreeable to this procedure, if the secretary tells him that Hilles absolutely guarantees the accuracy of the statement.


A similarly close bond existed between Butler and Coolidge. Fuess, one of Coolidge's biographers, tells of Butler's waiting to walk out of the State House with Coolidge at the end of his term as governor, because he did not want to have happen to his friend, Coolidge, what had happened to the previous governor who had had to leave alone and unattended.

It is in the cases where there was no previous close bond, however, that the official relationship between the candidate and the national chairman is best examined. Cummings defines the relationship between the national chairman and the president as one of "...cooperating in a common purpose," and not a situation where orders are given or received. There is, nonetheless, notable, at times, in the early relationship between the president and the national chairman a surprising humility on the part of the chairman toward the presidential office. The top office that the country and the party can bestow upon a citizen loses no prestige with propinquity. This respectful attitude is apparent even with Hanna, who was as nearly a Kingmaker as the present century has to offer. Beer refers to Hanna as McKinley's "...adoring and diffident friend," and Solon Lauer says that Hanna became deferential and considerate.

---

19 Fuess, op. cit., p. 280 fn.
of the president almost to an unnecessary degree. There is this same early deference notable in Farley's attitude toward the presidency.

The association between Theodore Roosevelt and Hanna was unusual in that it did not follow this pattern. Hanna treated Roosevelt as a junior partner, as he probably felt he was. Witness to this fact is the following letter written by Hanna to Roosevelt in response to a request by the president for a conference:

I will see you at the earliest time possible consistent with my duties here....Meantime 'go slow'. You will be besieged from all sides and I fear in some cases will get the wrong impression. Hear them all politely but reserve your decisions--unless in cases which may require immediate attention. Then, if my advice is important Courtelyou can reach me on the 'long distance'.

That Roosevelt came to resent this attitude is obvious from a letter written by him to his confidant, Henry Cabot Lodge, after the controversy between Roosevelt and Hanna over the latter's refusal at the Ohio State Convention to endorse Roosevelt as the next presidential candidate. In this letter Roosevelt said that he decided that it was time "....to stop shilly shallying, and let Hanna know definitely that he

---


24Theodore Roosevelt MSS, *loc. cit.*, FFF, Box 38, Hanna to Roosevelt, Oct. 12, 1901.
did not intend to assume the position, at least passively, of a suppliant to whom he might give the nomination as a boon...."

When the relationship remains good, and it does in most cases, at least throughout the campaign, it is a very close one with intense loyalty, as a rule, on the part of the national chairman and sincere appreciation on the part of the candidate. Many of the points of contact between the national chairman and the candidate have already been touched upon. During the campaign there are numerous conferences between them on strategy and tactics, and there are reports by the national chairman to the candidate on the happenings in the grass roots, on the strategy and tactics of the opposition, and on the polls and other information coming in from the field.

The letters of appreciation which the candidates send to the national chairman mark the point at which the similarity between the relationship of the national chairman and the successful candidate, and the national chairman and the defeated candidate tends to end. After the inauguration, the most frequent contacts are, naturally, between the national chairman and the successful candidate, now the president. Many matters

---


26. An exception to this rule appears in the relationship between Hitchcock and Taft; these two men were not too friendly even in pre-convention days, for Taft refers to Hitchcock as having a "swelled" head. Theodore Roosevelt MSS, loc. cit., TFF, Box 138, Taft to Roosevelt, July 4, 1908.
bring these two officials together—conferences are held on
the maintenance of party harmony, on the choice of local can-
didates, on the fulfillment of party promises in the matter
of legislation, and on patronage. Furthermore, the national
chairman will often hold some important position in the govern-
ment in addition to his party position, and he and the president
will also have contacts in this connection. Such contacts
were available to Hanna and McKinley, Hanna and Theodore Roosevelt,
Cortelyou and Theodore Roosevelt, McCormick and Wilson, Hays
and Harding, Butler and Coolidge, Fess and Hoover, and Farley
and Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Understandably, the relationship between the national
chairman and the president varies with the men. There was,
for example, a close relationship between Hanna and McKinley,
between Butler and Coolidge, between Hoover and Work, and be-
tween Farley and Roosevelt, if only in the last case in the

---

27 Infra, Chapter IX, pp. 254-257.
28 Supra, Chapter VII.
29 It is important to keep in mind the dual role, where it
occurs, in any consideration of the president-national chairman
relationship, for it is not always easy to determine which re-
relationship is operating in these contacts.
30 Beer, op. cit., p. 276.
31 Fess, op. cit., p. 280fn.
32 Post-Office Department Library, "Biographical Sketches of the
Postmasters General," (typewritten), op. cit.
33 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 69.
earlier days of the Roosevelt presidency. By contrast, Wilson
and McCombs had little contact after the election. Where
the president's faith in the judgment of the chairman remains
unimpaired, one of the more personal contacts between them
occurs as a result of the president's desire to have the poli-
tician's viewpoint in the formulation of public messages, such
as acceptance speeches, messages to Congress, replies to
opposition attacks, and appeals to the people. It is possible
that on occasions these requests for advice are only courtesy
requests; but there are, undoubtedly, many instances where the
advice of the chairman has been taken in the matter of policy
messages. There are a few instances on record.

It is the chairman's role in these cases to interpret
the messages as they might be reflected in votes. Hanna, for
instance, reminding Roosevelt that labor was not opposed to
combinations of capital, advised him to modify his first message
to Congress on the subjects of trusts and over capitalization,
and Roosevelt followed his chairman's advice to some extent.
Wilson accepted the advice of McCormick to modify his appeal
to the people for a Democratic Congress in 1918. It was un-
fortunate for the Democratic party that the chairman's influence

MSS, File 107, Wilson to McCombs, July 20, 1916. See also
McCombs, op. cit., pp. 284, 285. See also ibid., McCombs to
Wilson, June 21, 1915.

MSS, loc. cit., P.P., Box 32, Hanna to Roosevelt, Nov. 10, 1901.
See also Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 244, and
Bishop, op. cit., p. 169.
on this occasion was not sufficiently effective, for judging from a letter from McCormick to Wilson's biographer. Ray Stannard Baker, in McCormick's opinion, the message should never have been sent at all.

President Harding requested the help of his national chairman at the time he had under consideration the rejection of the bonus bill. Fearing that he might by such a rejection be breaking a pledge that he had made in his political speeches, the president looked to his chairman to check him for such an inconsistency. Franklin Delano Roosevelt also accepted the advice of his chairman, Farley, among others, when planning communication with Congress.

Another contact that creates a personal relationship between the national chairman and the president is that which is occasioned through the handling of patronage. One of the accomplishments that the national chairmen most pride themselves upon in their association with the candidate is their completion of the campaign without having committed their candidate in matters of policy concessions or appointments. Practically all of the chairmen are on record as not having committed their candidate to anything. It would seem that a necessary attribute of a national chairman would be the ability to handle

---

38Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 130.
men so as to get their services and contributions either without any promises at all, or with the promises so subtly implied as to be unembarrassing to the candidate or his party. It requires a sensitive touch, a restrained approach, and the faculty of creating hopefulness without any overt indication of a reason for it.

Groly states that there is no evidence in Hanna's correspondence—as if a national chairman ever left any evidence that might supply his critics with a weapon—or "...in the testimony of his associates that specific pledges were made to bestow particular offices on particular men." Louis Coolidge, Cortelyou's assistant for literary and press matters, testifies that Cortelyou, when chairman, warned his associates against "...making a single pledge or promise to anybody as to the course of the administration either in regard to appointment to office or to carrying out a policy." There seems to be a sincere appreciation on the part of the chairman of the position of the candidate in this matter. Here is such an appreciation as expressed by Mack, national chairman in 1906:

"...I made up my mind that I would not do anything that would put me in position after the election, if Mr. Bryan should be elected, of placing the man under obligation to them...." 41

40 Groly, op. cit., p. 185. Note the limiting adjectives.
42 Ibid., p. 100, Mack testimony.
Butler consoled Coolidge and the public with the thought that the campaign was "...being closed with absolute knowledge that no promise of patronage or favors has been made."

Nevertheless, all has not been sweetness and light between the national chairmen and their presidents. Differences have occurred from time to time. A few of them have ended in serious breaches of friendship, as in the case of Wilson and McCombs and of Farley and Roosevelt. There are various causes for these disagreements, but one cause which develops early in the relationship rises out of this question of commitments, despite the pride of the chairmen in their ability not to involve the candidates. Cortelyou and Theodore Roosevelt had the nearest thing to a disagreement in their chairman-president association over this matter of commitments. The president had written to Cortelyou warning him not to do anything that would embarrass the administration in the Northern Securities case. Cortelyou wrote back, taking Roosevelt to task for his lack of faith in the chairman's integrity and judgment and saying that:

"...the campaign management would easily become a matter of some stress to me if I should have to feel that you believe it necessary when each emergency arises to admonish me as to my duty." 43

In this matter as in others, there was disagreement also between Taft and Hitchcock. Taft complained that Hitchcock

43 Theodore Roosevelt MSS, loc. cit., PPF, Box 34, Cortelyou to Roosevelt, Aug. 12, 1904.
did not understand him or his aims, and that the national chairman was always looking to the future for some petty advantage to be gained. According to House, Wilson also lacked faith in the matter of commitments on the part of his first chairman, McCombs, even though McCombs was emphatic in his denial that he had committed Wilson to any agreements. Naturally, Wilson's refusal to appoint McCombs to his cabinet added nothing to the good will between the men. McCombs' recollections in *Making Woodrow Wilson President* are full of the bitterness he came to feel toward Wilson.

President Coolidge in his usually cautious manner avoided any misunderstanding on the subject of patronage by advising the party workers directly that they were working for nothing but love and glory. W. V. Hodges, treasurer of the Republican National Committee under William M. Butler, has made public a memorandum from Coolidge to the committee which insisted that those working for or contributing to the party had to be made to understand that the president would not consider that such services entailed any right or preference to presidential appointments.

---


46 William F. McCombs, *Making Woodrow Wilson President* ed. by Louis Jay Lane (New York: Fairview Publishing Co., 1921), p. 300. In denying these accusations, McCombs said that he challenged "...any of the lickspittles who have infested Washington for the last few years to prove anything else."

47 McCombs, *op. cit., passim.*
favor. During the chairmanship of Work there was a rumor that he had endorsed Mrs. Alvin T. Hert, who had served as vice-chairman of the Republican National Committee under him, for secretary of the Department of the Interior. The following statement issued to the press by Work has all the indications of a requested clarification: "Certainly, no party official would publicly express his views of wishes as to Presidential appointments, and not at all, unless requested to do so by the appointing power...."

Unfortunately for the maintenance of harmony between the president and the national chairman, there is a different approach to the matter of patronage on the part of the two officials. The presidents, like the department heads with a record of efficiency to uphold, are likely to look at the matter differently from the men who are trying to place faithful party workers who made their tasks as chairmen easier. The comparison that Farley made between himself and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, that is, that Farley was more of a party man than the president, might justly be made between most of the national chairmen and their candidates. The position of the chairman is explained in a nutshell in a telegram from Hanna to Theodore Roosevelt:

48 Fuess, op. cit., p. 480.
50 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 354.
I have your telegram concerning the Alabama judgship, and assure you that I had no desire or intention of interfering with your decision or prerogatives in the matter, but was forced to recognize the demands of the organization in that state. 51

Such chairmen who have had to act as job dispensers for presidents who had had previous connections with civil service reforms had an especially delicate situation to meet in the matter of patronage. In this category fell Cortelyou and McCombs, Cortelyou because Roosevelt had been a civil service commissioner, and McCombs because Wilson had been an officer of the National Civil Service Reform League before his ascendancy to the presidency.

As in other areas of politics, something less than interest in the public welfare enters, at times, into what seems, at first glance, nobility in this patronage picture. Patronage is the plasma of party organization and the man who controls it can build the organization for whomever he pleases. Therefore, personal disinterestedness is considered a necessary attribute of the national chairman. As a matter of fact, there seems to be an unwritten code, occasionally lived up to, that no action of the national chairman will be taken for personal advantage. Cortelyou, for example, leaned over backwards to avoid nepotism and Farley did the same. In fact, one of the compliments that Roosevelt paid Farley was that while he was in the chairmanship, the party never had to worry about the possibility of his using the office for his own benefit.

51 Theodore Roosevelt MSS, loc. cit., PPF, Box 38, Hanna to Roosevelt, Oct. 9, 1901.

One of the main difficulties in the relationship between
the president and the national chairman is that the president's
case of disinterestedness is likely to be a very personal
one. The chairman is to be disinterested in himself or any
other candidate other than the president. It is at the point
where the chairman's disinterestedness breaks down, or at the
point the president believes it to have broken down that the
association becomes strained. When the president suspects
that the chairman has the presidential bee in his bonnet, the
matter of patronage becomes an even more serious source of
disagreement, particularly if the president is looking in the
mirror for the next candidate. A national chairman who becomes
too popular with Congress or with the people becomes a victim,
justly or unjustly, of suspicions that he is building a machine
of his own. Farley was conscious of being in this position in
1938, for he says that he did not want to press his list of
appointments at that time for fear Roosevelt would believe
that he was trying to gather delegates and voters.

In the public eye as he is, and popular with many of the
local party leaders as he must be, the national chairman is a
natural presidential possibility. Many of them have been so
considered. This statement holds true, not only for the chairman
of the party in power, but also for the chairman of the party
out of power. There was a boom for Jones as a presidential

---

Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 163.
nominee in 1896. As previously noted, Hanna was considered as a possible rival for Theodore Roosevelt in 1904. Also mentioned as a possible Republican candidate for the presidency was Roosevelt's second chairman, Cortelyou. He withdrew early in the 1908 pre-convention struggle, and wisely, for he did not have the support of Roosevelt. George Harvey, the perennial would-be King-maker hoped to promote Hays as a presidential candidate in 1920. In the same year, the Democratic national chairman, Cummings, received twenty votes at his party's convention, and in 1934, Hull had to quiet a potential boom for himself. Farley's forlorn hope was presented to the Democratic National Convention in 1940.

Not all of these presidential booms reached proportions sufficiently great to engage the interest of the incumbent, but

55 Lodge, op. cit., Vol. 2, Lodge to Roosevelt, May 1, 1903; Roosevelt to Lodge, May 27, 1903.
58 Interview with Homer Cummings, June 26, 1952.
60 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., pp. 286, 287.
a few of them did. One of these occasions was the boom for
Hanna in 1904. Hanna had become very popular, and when he
refused to endorse Roosevelt at the Ohio State Convention he
aroused suspicions that he might be a candidate himself. As
a result of his refusal to support this endorsement, Hanna
found himself in an awkward position in relation to the president.

It was Hanna's contention that as head of the party, it was
necessary for him to remain aloof from such an endorsement,
and he so expressed himself to the newsmen. Roosevelt acknowledged
Hanna's right to his own judgment, but claimed that what annoyed
him was the interview that Hanna had given to the papers on
the subject. What really annoyed Roosevelt was expressed by
him in a letter to Lodge in which he speaks of the national
chairman as "...his only formidable opponent so far as the
nomination is concerned."

Another presidential boom for a national chairman which
reached proportions serious enough to disturb the relationship
between the chairman and the candidate was that of Farley's.
The once close political association between Farley and Roosevelt
began to deteriorate, according to both Farley and Michelson,
about the time that Roosevelt attempted to purge the senators
who had fought him on his court plan. Farley seems to have felt

61 Lodge, op. cit., Vol. 2, Telegram from Hanna to Roosevelt,
May 23, 1903; telegram from Roosevelt to Hanna, May 25, 1903; and
telegram from Hanna to Roosevelt, May 26, 1903.

62 Ibid., Roosevelt to Lodge, May 27, 1903.

63 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., pp. 68 to 72.
See also Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 362, and
Michelson, op. cit., pp. 151, 152.
that Roosevelt was jealous of the chairman's popularity with the people. He tells of the president's secretary coming to him with the suggestion that Farley no longer join the president's group on the observation platforms at the whistle stops, and of the president, himself, complaining to Farley about the number of press conferences that were being held by Roosevelt's subordinates. For his part, Farley began to feel unappreciated, although there is much evidence that Roosevelt did express appreciation of Farley's efforts. Furthermore, it was Roosevelt who sponsored Farley's membership for the exclusive Jefferson Island Club. But at the best the original relationship between Farley and Roosevelt was a difficult one to maintain. Mrs. Farley did not like or trust Roosevelt and told her husband so very early in the Farley-Roosevelt friendship. In addition, as Roosevelt moved closer and closer to his New Deal advisers,

68 Interview with James A. Farley, July 7, 1952.
he moved farther and farther away from the old line Democrats like Farley. Then, too, John Garner seems to have been more interested in furthering the breach than in cementing it, judging from comments in Farley's latest book.

Farley holds that his objection to Roosevelt's nomination for the third term was on the principle that the third term tradition should not be broken, and in this objection he was sincere. But Farley also had aspirations for the presidency himself, although he speaks now as if his original idea was Hull for president and himself for vice-president. No one reading his elation at the mere presentation of his name at the convention can doubt that he had ambitions in this direction. Farley did not think of his religion as a handicap. As a matter of fact, he did not believe that it was religion that defeated Al Smith, but rather Smith's choice of a former Republican for his national chairman and that chairman's poor management of the campaign. Farley felt that the Democrats would win in 1940, and he expressed his reasons for his optimism as to his own candidacy in these words:

---

69 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 172. See also pp. 64, 70.

70 Interview with James A. Farley, July 7, 1952.


72 Interview with James A. Farley, July 7, 1952.
there are hundreds of thousands of Democrats on the government pay rolls and whether or not they like the name Farley, they would not vote themselves out of office just because the candidate happens to be a Roman Catholic. 73

To say the least, a president loathes to lay down power and a national chairman who was a potential candidate were in an awkward relationship.

It would seem that the ideal situation would be that a national chairman with aspirations for the presidency would resign his position as head of the National Committee. He can hardly remain neutral toward his own objectives, to say nothing of the position in which he places the National Committee and its staff. Hays saw this situation clearly, and he never succumbed to the plans of those who wanted to promote his candidacy. Hull was equally wise and turned down a favorite son resolution presented in 1924 in the Tennessee legislature, stating his position as follows:

My first and highest duty is to so conduct the affairs of the Democratic national organization as will best safeguard and advance the interests and welfare of the Democratic party....To this end I have constantly pursued the policy of making the party organization an agency in fact, as well as in name, for the entire party membership and of keeping it strictly aloof from elements, groups, factions, and individual contests for party nominations....the Democratic National Headquarters must not even be suspected though it be from the expression of home folks in terms of a personal compliment, of the slightest participation in individual rivalries for such an important party nomination as that referred to in the resolution. 75

73Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 176.

74A glimpse at the other side of this picture may be had from a marginal note in the Molly Dawson copy of Jim Farley's Story to be found among the Democratic National Committee MSS. This note, typically feminine, states that Mary Norton had told Molly that Al Smith had said to her (Mary Norton) in 1932 that Jim Farley had betrayed him, and that he would betray Roosevelt, too. "You wait and see."

President Taft had an unusual situation to deal with in his relationship with Hitchcock and the latter's successors. Hitchcock, a protege of Cortelyou's, had been chairman of the Republican National Committee during the campaign that elected Taft in 1908. After the new administration began he became postmaster general, a formidable position for party organization, and resigned his chairmanship. But, apparently, he continued to control the National Committee through his successors, Hill and Rosewater. Archie Butt in his *Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Archie Butt* quotes Charles Taft, the brother of the president, as saying that there was not a member of the National Committee who was not sitting back, in 1912, and letting Taft fight alone.

Evidence to support the contention that Taft was not the true leader of the Hitchcock faction is found in Rosewater's acknowledgement that most of the members of the National Committee were "tied in" more by their adherence to Roosevelt and the Roosevelt policies than by personal obligation or allegiance to the new standard bearer. Taft was not unaware of the situation, and he questioned the loyalty of Rosewater—at that time only acting chairman of the National Committee—in a letter to Hitchcock. Rosewater's eventual rebuttal to Taft's doubt

---

76 It will be remembered that it was on this occasion that cooptation was attempted in the Republican National Committee. See supra, Chapter II, p. 31.


is very revealing as to the relations between the two men:

I had had what I felt were rather shabby deals in several matters during the Taft administration which I did not particularly relish nor believe I merited but was careful not to let personal considerations influence my judgment in questions of public or party interest. 79

The Taft-Rosewater situation, however, was unusual. Generally, the interim chairmen have given their full allegiance to the president of their party. Still, the relationship seems never to have been so close as it has been between the national chairman who served during the campaign and the president. For one thing, their contacts have been fewer; the absence of party activity between conventions in the early part of the present century and the diminution of party activity between conventions in any event make the need for contact less. Matters of reorganization are not so pressing as they are for the party out of power, and most of the patronage problems have been taken care of by the first chairman or by someone else before the interim chairman takes over. Another factor in the lack of contacts is the fact that the interim chairmen have rarely held any other position during their chairmanship of sufficient importance to bring them into intimate contact with the president. Then, too, the interim chairmen have not, as a rule, served as long in the chairmanship as most of the chairmen appointed after the convention. Of the six interim chairmen who served

79 Ibid., p. 76.

80 Senator Fess was an exception in this case.
the Republican party while it was in power, four of them served for less than a year—New, Hill, Rosewater, and Huston. In fact, Hill hardly served at all, for, because of ill health, he turned his duties over to Rosewater almost immediately. Fees and Adams, however, served for relatively long periods, Fees serving for twenty-two months and Adams serving for close to three years. Adams, who served as chairman of the National Committee under both President Harding and President Coolidge, joins Hanna in the distinction of having served under two presidents.

Very little is known of the relationship between the presidents and these interim chairmen, and what little is known is neither too interesting nor too well documented. Of the Harding-Adams relationship, William Hard, presently roving editor of The Reader's Digest and, at one time, an assistant to Adams when he was in the chairmanship, recalls that Adams was not Harding's first choice for the chairmanship, but that Adams had the majority of the committee pledged to him and that he "...did the bold and manly thing and defied the President and held his followers in the Committee to their pledges and was duly elected chairman." According to the New York Times, Harding was also behind efforts to force him out of the chairmanship in 1923. Still, Adams fought loyally...

---

81 Rosewater, Backstage in 1912, op. cit., p. 37.
to defend the Harding administration. He was accused in the Senate of bringing to the support of Attorney General Daugherty—at that time being investigated—"all the influences and agencies of the Republican National Committee...."

President Hoover should be the authority on the relationship between national chairmen and the presidents, for he participated in the selection of four national chairmen—Work, Huston, Fess, and Sanders. Two of these men were interim chairman—Huston and Fess. His first interim chairman, Huston, served as Hoover's assistant when Hoover was secretary of the Department of Commerce, but Hoover, probably, wished later that the association had stopped there, for an investigation into lobbying activities brought out the fact that Huston had, before his accession to the chairmanship, acted as a lobbyist for the Tennessee River Improvement Association. As a result of this investigation Hoover was deluged with demands for Huston's resignation. Huston, however, refused to resign under the pressure of criticism. The Young Guard in the Senate went so far as to draft a request to the Executive Committee of the Republican National Committee demanding either that Huston resign or that the office of chairman of the National Committee be declared vacant. It was reported that

his eventual resignation was engineered from the White House.

The only interim chairman chosen by the Democratic party while it was in power was Cummings. He was no stranger either to the role or to the president, as he had served as acting chairman for many months prior to his selection as national chairman because of McCormick's absorption with his duties on the War Trade Board. It was of Cummings' relations with Wilson that this chairman used the phrase "cooperating in a common purpose" to describe the relationship between the president and the national chairman.

The post-election contact between the national chairman and the candidate of the defeated party varies with the situation. Where the candidate of the defeated party is the accepted candidate of the party leaders for the next presidential contest, as Bryan was in 1900, the candidate—chairman relationship continues. In fact, such a relationship seemed to continue at least in the minds of the two chief actors in the situation in the case of Taft and Hilles, and of Haskob and Smith, even though the daydream of another nomination never

---

87 ibid., June 23, 1930, p. 2, col. 4. See also June 30, 1930, p. 4, col. 3.


89 Taft MSS, loc. cit., L. B. Box 44, Taft to his brother, Horace, Oct. 28, 1912. Many letters in the Hilles file among the Taft MSS show the effort of Hilles to keep Taft before the public after his defeat.

90 Roosevelt, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 154, 155. See also Michelson, op. cit., p. 35 where he states that "...the Governor of New York remained non-existent in the output of the Democratic National Committee." At this time, Michelson was serving under Haskob's chairmanship.
materialized. Normally, however, the candidate-chairman relationship vanishes with the defeat, once the campaign debris is cleaned up, and becomes simply the relationship among any party leaders.

The reason for this fact is that in the United States a defeated candidate has never been generally accepted as the titular head of the party. In no case during the period under discussion, with the possible exception of that of Bryan, has the defeated candidate been able to establish himself as the head of the party; and even in the case of Bryan the leadership was challenged. A defeated party needs reorganization and the hold of the defeated candidate upon the party control must be indeed tenuous to withstand a defeat. A new faction or a faction previously thwarted is bound to rise to challenge the supremacy of the defeated candidate, as the eastern faction did to the Bryan faction in the Democratic party in 1904, and as the Roosevelt faction did to the Baskob-Smith faction in the Democratic party in 1932. Or a new group may rise to challenge the control of previously successful leaders, as the Crane faction did to the Lodge faction in the Republican party in 1924.

As a result of these upheavals, the national chairman, himself, has not always been able to sustain his position as

---

91 In reference to the Taft-Hilles hopes for the future were to 1916.

92 It is of particular interest that the man who challenged Bryan's supremacy was the former national chairman, Taggart. See Bryan, A Tale of Two Conventions, op. cit., p. 171.
head of the party organization. Prior to the resignation of Wilcoxon in 1918, the chairman of the defeated party had continued on as national chairman—Jones from 1896 to 1904, Taggart from 1904 to 1908, and Mack from 1908 to 1912 in the Democratic party, and Hiller from 1912 to 1916 in the Republican party. It is possible that time will show that a new pattern began to develop slowly after 1918. For, although defeated chairmen have always had to face criticisms, it was not until 1918 that the criticism was sufficiently effective to result in a change in the chairmanship. In other words, the practice of waiting four years for a new start was breaking down. Party factions were beginning at an earlier date to agitate for the replacement of unsuccessful chairmen. There were two important reasons for this change: (1) the growing realization of the need for a permanent organization; and (2) a developing awareness of the need for more help from the national organization in the congressional elections. Just as Wilcoxon gave way to Hays in 1918, the next defeated Republican national chairman, Sanders, gave way to Fletcher in 1934. Hamilton, however, though defeated, was able to maintain his position.

The Democratic party followed this example in 1921 when White was forced out of the chairmanship and a compromise candidate for the position, Hull, was brought in to take his place. Attempts to follow the same procedure during the 1924 to 1928 and the 1928 to 1932 period in the party history, however, proved unsuccessful.

because Shaver and Raskob were able to fend off the efforts to displace them. Up to 1940 only three interim chairmen had served for the party out of power—Hull for the Democratic party during the Harding administration, and Hays and Fletcher for the Republican party, the former during the second Wilson administration and the latter during the first Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration.

To whom do these interim chairmen of the party out of power look for guidance? Inasmuch as all three of these men took over the chairmanship prior to the off-year congressional elections, their first contacts were with the congressional and senatorial committees. But former candidates and former presidents were among those with whom they conferred. Hull speaks of conferring with Bryan and of reporting to Wilson, who, though ill, tried to resume the reins of leadership after the defeat of Cox in 1920. The association between Hull and Wilson seems to have been close. Deference, courtesy, proximity, and factional and personal sympathy were probably all factors in their relationship.

Hays, too, had the help and advice of a former candidate and a former president, while he was serving as interim chairman

---

94 [Ibid., Nov. 7, 1924, p. 1, col. 5. Shaver says that this effort was prompted by personal animosity. Interview with Clem Shaver, February 16, 1952.]
95 [New York Times, March 8, 1929, p. 25, col. 2.]
96 [Hull, op. cit., pp. 117 to 121.]
97 From the files of Will Hays.
for his party when it was out of power. One of the most cherished possessions in the Hays' file is a note which was found beside the bedside of Theodore Roosevelt the morning after he had died. For a man who had once split his party, it was a revealing last word to a national chairman:

**HAYS**
see him; he must go to Washington for 10 days; see Senate and House; prevent split on domestic policies.

While Fletcher spoke of his plans to consult with Senator Borah and Senator McNary he seems to have looked more to the conservatives in Congress for his guidance.

While a few of the friendships between the national chairman and the candidate stood the test of the candidate-chairman relationship with the bond between the men unimpaired—as for example, the friendship between Hilles and Taft and that between Butler and Coolidge—all in all the relationship is one likely to test a friendship severely. The over-worked national chairman is bound to be conscious of the fact that at least in so far as the campaign is concerned, there is an imparity of glory and work in the relationship, with the chairman getting the greater share of the work and blame, and the candidate getting the greater share of the glory.

---


There is little documentary evidence of bad feeling between the candidates and the chairmen, except in the case of Taft and Hitchcock, but some such feeling as that expressed above seems to lie behind the disappointment evident in MoCombs' *Making Woodrow Wilson President* and in Farley's *Jim Farley's Story*. According to newspapermen, even the close friendship of Hoover and Work suffered as a result of their relationship as candidate and chairman. The role that the national chairman has to play requires him to be unselfish, unambitious, and humble. These are all virtues hard to sustain over a long period of time.

---

101 *Taft MSS, Pre-Inaugural Series, Box 1*. Several letters in this file will bear out this statement.

102 *MoCombs, op. cit., passim*.

103 *Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., passim*.

Chapter IX

The Role of the National Chairman Between National Conventions

Until a few decades ago quiescent would have been the adjective best fitted to describe the role of the national chairman between conventions. For in the nineteenth century and in the first decade of the present century, once the elections were over the campaign committees disbanded and national headquarters were, as the saying goes, in the national chairman's hat. There were, of course, last minute bills to pay and debts to be liquidated, but this matter was taken care of by solicitation from the previous group of "angels" or by the chairman's dipping into his own pocket. Some of the earlier twentieth century chairmen remained in Washington in other capacities, as for instance, Hanna in the Senate, and Cortelyou and Hitchcock in the cabinet, and they naturally kept an open eye to the next election, but there were no permanent headquarters offices for the national chairman as such.

More and more, however, the need for permanent headquarters became evident. McCombs was one of the first with the hope of keeping the National Committee headquarters "...an active force in promulgating the interests of the Party..." but

---


2 Hitchcock resigned as national chairman when he became postmaster general, but he retained his power in the National Committee. See supra, Chapter II, p. 31.
apparently, his poor health interfered with the carrying out of his plan. At any rate, it was not until the second Wilson administration that inter-convention activities of any proportions developed. These activities grew out of Wilson's objective of bringing to Congress men who were amenable to his plans for United States participation in the League of Nations. A contributory cause for the Democratic energy was the presence in the Republican chairmanship of Hays, a very active interim chairman.

The feeling for a permanent organization was strong as the two parties moved into the third decade of the present century. In fact, one of the criticisms of George White as a Democratic chairman was that he was not able to give full time to his tasks at national headquarters. When White gave way to the demands for his resignation, Hull established permanent quarters at Washington and gave his full time to the problems of the chairmanship, at least until his return to the House of Representatives in March 1923. Both parties, however, let the practice of permanent political activity at the national level become dormant, and it was not until 1929 that a permanent organization really came into its own under Raskob, the national chairman of the Democratic party. Al Smith is credited with the introduction of the idea of permanent headquarters for his party at this time. His thought was that the minority party should develop an educational function. He criticised the

---

tendency of the opposition party in this country to "...sit by and adopt a policy of inaction with the hope of profiting solely by the mistakes or failures of the opposition." All that was needed was Heskob's money, and fortunately for the Democratic party that was available. In due time, the success of the Democratic party's augmented propaganda activities made necessary the expansion of the interconvention activities of the Republican party and the formation by it of a Research Division.

The educational feature for which Al Smith advocated permanent headquarters was not, however, the only reason that necessitated a full time party organization. Actually, there were many areas of party activity that were spilling over at either end of the time cycle between conventions to fill in the inter-convention period. For example, at the post-election end of the cycle, financing was becoming a more continuous process, not only as a result of the necessity for refinancing loans, but also because of the pledge system of financing that had been introduced. At the pre-convention end of the cycle, interest in policy matters kept moving back into the inter-convention period as the political leaders became more cognizant of the connection between policy fulfillment and election returns. In between, were growing demands upon the time of the national

---


chairman as party harmonizer and as liaison between the party workers and voters, and between the legislature and the administrative branch of the government.

The immediate post-election functions of the national chairmen have not changed a great deal. There are the usual administrative duties in connection with getting the swollen national headquarters back into their pre-convention bounds and with closing out the branch headquarters. This task has involved, at times, the renegotiation of leases. In every instance, it has necessitated the discharge of employees with that task's attendant problem of selectivity. In the financial area, there are the problems of the payment of last minute bills, and of preparations for the handling of the omnipresent deficit, such as arrangements for paying off loans or renewing notes and provisions for interest payments. With the introduction of the pledge system of financing, there has also been the necessity for making administrative arrangements for keeping the system operative. Administrative provisions must also be made for the financial reports to the Clerk of the House of Representatives in accordance with federal law. The other important immediate post-election function of the national chairman—the handling of patronage—has not changed to any extent, as has been seen, except that like the problem of financing


Another anticipated function of the national chairman that is not new and which also involved inter-convention activity for him is the function of assisting the congressional campaign committees in their efforts to place their party's legislators in Congress. The assistance expected by the congressional committees includes financial help, aid in publicity, and such administrative cooperation as the supplying of lists of party workers and party voters. This help is, of course, anticipated not only for the off-year elections but also for the congressional elections held concurrently with the presidential elections.

Although there is evidence of conferences between the national chairmen and the chairmen of the congressional committees, the actual cooperation has been variable and, at times, desultory. Some of the chairmen cooperated personally and directly; as in the case of Hanna who says that in 1900 he "...milked the country and turned over all of the funds to Chairman Babcock."; as in

8_Supra, Chapter VII.
12_Croly, op. cit., p. 293.
the case of Hays, who really reactivated Congress for its 13
1910 drive; and as in the case of Hull who, at the request
of Congress, managed both the work of the National Committee
and of the Congressional Committee. Sub-committees of the
National Committee have also been created for the purpose
of assisting the congressional campaign committees.

The earlier chairmen in the present century, that is,
those who served in the chairmanship prior to the passage of
the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution had only one
congressional campaign committee to deal with. Unlike Hanna
and the other early twentieth century chairmen, the modern chair-
men need not work with the state legislatures in an effort
to get the man their party prefers elected to the Senate,
but the introduction of a third committee, has, of course,
complicated the problem of cooperation somewhat. This state-
ment is especially applicable to the financial arrangements
between the three committees, for it is in this area that most

13 Interview with Will Hays, October 17, 1952.
14 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. (New York: The
15 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1920, op. cit.,
p. 473. For other instances of cooperation see: Theodore
Roosevelt MSS, P&F, 1901-1909, loc. cit., Cortelyou to Roosevelt,
Aug. 17, 1904; Rosewater, Backstage in 1912, op. cit., p. 122.
Woodrow Wilson MSS, loc. cit., File 107, Wilson to McCombs,
Jan. 31, 1914; Kenyon Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 1092;
Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1920, op. cit.,
pp. 475, 476, 489; Proceedings, Democratic National Convention,
1924, op. cit., pp. 1091, 1092, 1100; New York Times, July 17, 1924,
p. 4, col. 4.
of the grievances arise. Not all of the chairmen can claim, as did Cortelyou, that their relations with the congressional campaign committees have been "most cordial." The problem has been that, in operating independently, the committees not only duplicate the expense of collecting contributions but are also inclined to encroach on each other's favorite contributors. In order to obviate these difficulties, Hays inaugurated within the Republican party a combined collection system for all three committees. About the same time, that is, in the period between 1918 and 1920, the Democratic party also pooled its collection efforts.

While improving the situation somewhat, this system did not eliminate all of the financial grievances between the campaign committees. In fact, one of the executives associated with the Democratic National Committee in 1951 said that these committees often fight like "cats and dogs" over funds. Nor is all the disagreement in the Democratic party, for in 1934, Sanders, then Republican national chairman, and the congressional campaign committee came to a parting of the ways over the matter of campaign financing. So intense was the feeling at this time

18 Interview with Will Hays, October 17, 1952. See also Kenyon Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 1301, 1302.
19 ibid., p. 1156.
20 Interview with Grey Leslie at the Democratic National Committee headquarters, July 9, 1951.
that the Republican congressional campaign committee reverted 21

to a separate collection system, Sanders resigned, and
Fletcher was chosen in his place. In fact, the desire for greater

cooperation on the part of the national chairman in the off-

year congressional campaigns has been a factor in the appointment

of others of the interim chairman.

Still another inter-convention activity of the national

chairman centers around his interest in legislation. As a

rule, the national chairmen have little to do with policy form-

ation other than their part in the preparation of presidential

messages, which has already been discussed, and their part

in the preparation of the party platform, which will be con-

sidered later. But in the field of policy fulfillment they

have always had an interest. In the early twentieth century,

to be sure, the chief legislative concern of the chairmen seemed

to revolve around pensions and other modes of individual relief,

but particularly since the second decade of the present century

they have concerned themselves to a greater extent in the

efforts to put the party's platform promises into effect.

Hays, while acknowledging that the national chairman had

21 New York Times, June 7, 1934, p. 1, col. 4. See also
22 Supra, Chapter XI, p. 10.
23 Supra, Chapter VIII, p. 224.
24 U. S. Congress, Record, Vol. 36, p. 134 for Hanna's
efforts and Vol. 36, p. 132 for Jones' efforts.
no influence other than a "persuasive" one in the field of policy, was still very active in this field, for he felt that if the party had made a promise, the national chairman had a duty to see to it, if possible, that the promise was fulfilled. Hays certainly practiced what he preached. In fact, one of his opponents maintains that he went so far as to "order" the vocational rehabilitation bill passed. It is on record that he took part in the effort to insure the passage of the suffrage amendment, as did his Democratic counterpart, White. Hays also took an energetic part in furthering Republican policy in the international field and urged the Republican congressmen to study the position of their constituents on the peace treaty. It was he, along with Henry Stimson, who appealed to Elihu Root to urge the latter to make a statement on the amendments to the Versailles Peace Treaty which the Republicans were seeking to have passed.

Cummings, the Democratic chairman contemporary for a period with Hays, also injected himself into the policy field by sending a telegram to the Tennessee legislature urging them to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

25 Interview with Will Hays, October 17, 1951.
28 Letter from Hays to Root, March 24, 1919 in the Hays files, not yet numbered.
Adams and Hull both interested themselves in the tariff questions, although, to be sure, on opposite sides of the controversy. Hull directed the campaign on the issue of the tariff during the Fordney-McCumber Tariff discussion, although he was not in Congress at the time. Farley and Shouse also extended their operations into the policy field through a letter to President Hoover, again on the tariff question. Farley took to the road to urge the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution in accord with his party's promise on that score. He was also one of the conference in a meeting called by Roosevelt on methods whereby the Roosevelt court plan might be pushed through Congress. Farley also helped in the defeat of the Ludlow Resolution for a national referendum before a declaration of war. He tells of getting in touch with Mayor Hague and Ed Kelly in order to get them to line up their delegations against the amendment and of calling seventy-eight men on the Hill in one morning in his efforts to defeat this resolution.

When the national chairman is a member of the policy committee of his party, as both Hanna and Butler were during their tenures as national chairman, the policy position is, of course, for them a dual one. William Allen White said that when word came from Butler to Congress that the World Court was to be endorsed, the World Court was endorsed.

The question of the national chairman’s role in policy touches, naturally, upon another of his inter-convention functions; that is, his role in the formulation of the party platform. It is and always has been an acknowledged function of the national chairman as part of the preparatory work for the convention to make the preliminary arrangements for the original draft of the party platform. The usual procedure is for the chairman to seek the views of the leaders of the nation and then to assign someone to prepare a preliminary draft of the platform. What variation there has been in the process has consisted of the number of opinions solicited.

Nicholas Murray Butler, who wrote the first drafts for the Republican party platforms for several conventions, describes the method used by his party on one of these occasions. Butler explains that Hillis, at that time national chairman, wrote to twelve or fifteen prominent Republicans asking them for suggestions:


35 The method of preparing the platform varied even during the years, 1908 to 1916, that Butler wrote the draft. Compare Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years, op. cit., pp. 255, 285.
first, as to the importance and order of treatment of topics, and secondly, as to the specific paragraphs dealing with particular subjects. Butler then took this material and digested it and classified it. When this task was completed Hilles arranged for a group of men, almost all of whom were to be delegates to the convention, to meet Butler for a confidential conference. This conference over, Butler wrote the preliminary draft of the platform to be presented to the Committee on Resolutions of the National Convention.

Hays, in an effort to achieve a broader viewpoint on policy questions and thereby get away from the criticism of oligarchic control over platform drafting, created an Advisory Committee on Policies and Platforms. The purpose of this committee was "...to investigate the existing needs and conditions affecting specific problems that would have to be considered by the National Convention, to gather facts and data, and to invite full expression of opinion of the leading Republicans." It was a large committee, comprising as it did over one hundred and seventy members. This group was divided into sections each with its own chairman, and each with the duty of considering a specific policy question. There were sub-committees on Civil Service and Retirement, on Banking and Currency, on Federal Taxation, on Railroad Problems, on

36 Ibid., p. 255.
37 Interview with Will Hays, October 16, 1951.
38 Republican Campaign Text-Book, 1920, pp. 483, 484.
Invited to participate in the work of the committee were men from the field of education, from government administration, from industry, from labor, and from Congress. In addition, one hundred thousand letters were sent out from the Hays' office in an effort to solicit the views of the public on party policies.

Fletcher followed a similar pattern, except that he looked to some twenty-five hundred county chairmen to transmit the views of the Republican voters. With all their efforts, the platforms that came out of the Committee on Resolutions at the national convention, both in the case of the platform discussion initiated by Hilles and the platform discussion initiated by Hays, were not the platforms that had been arrived at by the advisory groups—such is the work of political compromise.

In addition to their administrative function in arranging for the preliminary draft of the party platform, some chairmen have taken an active part in the actual policy determination in connection with the platform. James K. Jones with his namesake, Charles H. Jones, editor of the Saint Louis Post-Dispatch,

---

40 Interview with Will Hays, October 16, 1961.
had much to do with the preparation of the 1896 Democratic platform. Hanna and Payne, chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, in 1900, are credited with the inclusion of the gold plank in the 1896 Republican platform, and Hanna is credited with the trust plank in the 1900 policy deliberations. As noted previously, Hull was the adviser for his party on tariff matters both while he was chairman and later.

Despite this activity on the part of some of the chairmen in the field of policy, there has been no general agreement among them as to whether or not it is a function of the head of the party organization to attempt to affect policy. The old master, Hanna, apparently felt that he had an important responsibility as national chairman in this area. In a letter to Roosevelt explaining his position in relation to candidates in the presidential campaign, he wrote: "I am Chairman of the National Committee....I am supposed to have influence to control the convention as to its policy." On the other hand, Hays believed that it was not a primary function of the chairman to determine policy or to force or lobby for legislation—and yet, he certainly attempted the latter role. Possibly, because he believed that it was "...the supreme duty of the party when entrusted...

45 Supra, Chapter IX, p. 256
46 Croly, op. cit., p. 426 quoting a letter from Hanna to George B. Cox, May 23, 1903.
with power..., to square its performances with its promises." Fletcher felt that neither the Republican National Committee nor its officials had the right or authority to write a party platform.

There is a similar divergence of views on this subject among the Democratic chairman. Cummings, in declining a request from the National Federation of Federal Employees for the National Committee to take a position on legislation in which they were interested, held that the National Committee had no rights in respect to policy. Furthermore, when he sent the message to the Tennessee legislature endorsing the Nineteenth Amendment, he hesitated to do it "...without the unanimous accord...." of the National Committee. On the other hand, in the following quotation, there is more than an inference that Hull, a chairman of the same party, believed that the chairman had a policy function:

"...whoever occupied the office of chairman of the National Committee was in the highest position of the Democratic party leadership in the nation. This post, which at all times ranks near the top in a Party hierarchy, is at the very top when a party is in the minority. It was also in the Democratic party that the most virulent

---

51 Hull, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 113.
controversy took place over the question of the function of
the national chairman and the National Committee in relation
to governmental policy. Ruskob, whose interest in the abo-
lation of the prohibition amendment was a factor in his accept-
ance of the national chairmanship, had evolved that he called
the home Rule Plan as a solution to the federal-state pro-
hibition situation. It was his hope to have the National
Committee take a stand on this plan. He called a meeting of
the committee on March 5, 1932, and asked the membership to
study his proposal, to measure public reaction and opinion with
regard to it, and to transmit to the National Convention such
recommendations as seemed important.

Immediately, the factions within the party took sides. The
Roosevelt-Farley group felt that Ruskob's injection of the
prohibition issue into a National Committee meeting was simply
a device to embarrass them in the South by forcing them to take
a position on the wet versus dry issue. Both sides quoted
Clarence Cannon, to support their position as to the national
chairman's rights in respect to policy formulation. Roosevelt

National Convention, 1932, p. 409.
53 Ibid., pp. 397 to 452. Note particularly pp. 408, 409.
See also Michelon, op. cit., p. 137.
54 Ibid.
55 Elliot Roosevelt (ed.), F.D.R.: His Personal Letters
Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1932, p. 448.
held that:

Historically, the National Committee has always recognized that in between Conventions, the spokesmen on policy matters are primarily, the Democratic members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, together with individuals high in the Party Councils, who, however, speak as individuals. 56

Cannon, himself, supported the Roosevelt-Farley position that the National Committee, being a creature of the convention, had no authority to go on record concerning the national party policy.

Raskob did not drop the idea, but on November 26, 1932, he announced that he was polling the party's eight thousand contributors on the wet and dry issue. By the time of the January 9, 1932, meeting of the Democratic National Committee the forces of the Roosevelt faction within the committee had been strengthened, and according to Michelson, the committee decided that it was no part of the function of the National Committee to formulate party policy.

---

57 Ibid., p. 339.
58 Ibid., p. 240.
60 Charles Michelson, The Ghost Talks (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944), p. 135. There is no record of this action in the minutes of the meeting.
The objection to the participation of the national chairman or the National Committee in the formulation of policy is two-fold. One objection stems from those critics who believe that control of policy by the National Committee is oligarchic. The other objection stems from those critics who fear that any injection of the policy question into the National Committee meetings will create irreparable friction within the party. The attitude taken seems to be to let sleeping dogs lie. McCombs, for instance, had the idea of calling a meeting in Washington of the Democratic forces in order to ward off "...the Party dissension and disintegration..." which he believed occurred during the "stress years," the last two years of any administration. Wilson did not support him in the idea. In later years Wilson, no longer president, also advised Hull against a rumored policy conference, fearing that it would be likely to cause friction within the party. Roosevelt's fears of the Maskob policy meeting had something of this idea in it, too, in addition to personal interest.

61 Maskob denies just such an accusation at the meeting of the Democratic National Committee on January 9, 1932. See Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1932, op. cit., p. 458.
62 Hull, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 120.
64 Hull, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 120.
A relatively recent inter-convention addition to the functions of the national chairman has centered around the need for research. In the past research consisted of the efforts of the opposition to exhume the past errors of the past promises, still unfulfilled, of the party in power. It was relatively superficial and involved little more in the way of research than the perusal of party platforms and of campaign speeches.

A review of a successful or an unsuccessful campaign, and especially the latter, has, undoubtedly, occurred after every campaign. Cummings in an informal report to the National Committee produces an example of just such an informal analysis. There is no record of an attempt at a scientific approach to the problem of defeat in the Democratic party, however, until later. In the Republican party, possibly as a result of the Hays Advisory Committee on Policies and Platforms, record consciousness had come to the point by 1920 of a resolution adopted at that party's convention that year directing the National Committee "...to collect, digest, and report to the Committee on Resolutions...such data, records of Republican achievements, and suggestions with respect to policies and platforms."

66 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1920, op. cit., pp. 481, 482.

J. Bennet Gordon carried on this function until his death in February, 1936. Fletcher, formalizing a work already begun, created a Research Division in April of the same year, and Dr. O. Glenn Saxon, Professor of Economics at Yale, carried on the work begun by Gordon. Under Hamilton the work of this division was expanded and an educational program was developed.

In the Democratic party, Hull was one of the first to attempt a scientific accumulation of data, and despite an inadequate staff, he gathered much pertinent statistical material for use in the next elections. His report of what he left in the files is indicative of the inter-convention work that is possible even with a small staff. When he left the chairmanship, he left behind records showing: (1) the number of naturalized citizens in the United States and the country of their nativity; (2) the number of Democratic officeholders under Wilson; (3) a table of votes for each election since and including 1912 in each state and congressional district by counties; and (4) a digest of election laws of each state in relation to registrations, primaries, conventions, election dates, and election procedures. Raskob and Shouse contemplated

---

68 (Ibid.
70 Thompson, op. cit., p. 309.
a Research Division in 1928, but it never materialized. 72 Michelson says that they never missed it. Farley's organization was more scientifically minded, and one of Farley's assistants was Emil Hurja, a statistician, examples of whose efforts may be found among the Hyde Park manuscripts.

Another interim task that the modern national chairman has taken on lies in the field of polling. Not only do the national chairmen examine the polls taken by private organizations, but they also have turned pollsters themselves at times. A letter among the McKinley manuscripts indicates that this device might have been used as far back as the Hanna regime as national chairman. This fact would really not be too surprising, for surveys such as the one William M. Butler took in 1927 should be very helpful to the party organization in spotting the areas where special efforts must be made in the forthcoming elections. Fletcher used this device in 1934 for a poll of the National Committee on the subject of the reorganization of the Republican party. Senator Borah was pleading for greater liberalism in the party and he proposed to reorganize it in order to achieve this purpose. The Fletcher poll indicated

72 Michelson, op. cit., p. 21.

73 Hyde Park, Democratic National Committee MSS, President's Secretary's File, James A. Farley, Box 4, loc. cit.

74 McKinley MSS, loc. cit., Hanna to a member of his Executive Committee named Manley, Oct. 3, 1900.

75 New York Times, April 3, 1927, p. 26, col. 2. Butler had a country wide opinion survey made of the leaders in the Republican party with a view to perfecting the party organization.
insufficient sympathy for the Borah proposals.

In the Democratic party, Farley was particularly active in this area of inter-convention activities. An inter-office memorandum in the Hyde Park files indicates that he even had polls taken on ships at sea in order to determine the strength or weakness of his party's position. When the power of Huey Long seemed to be threatening, Farley took advantage of this new technique and had a poll made of the popularity of the Louisiana governor, to be better prepared to arrest the rise of this growing power.

Most of the statistical data collected and some of the research engaged in is for the use of the inner circles of the party. But there are areas of research which are delved into solely for propaganda purposes. Hull, for instance, during the Teapot Dome investigation, which he, incidentally, referred to as a "windfall" for the Democratic party, supplied the investigating committee with material on the matter, which reflected, undoubtedly, on the opposition party. In May, 1929, the Democratic party engaged the services of Charlie Michelson and what he and his propaganda efforts did to the Hoover administration will long be remembered, at least by those interested in the power of propaganda. As a belated counter-attack,

77 Democratic National Committee MSS, loc. cit., Women's Division, Box 8, Dawson to Farley.
78 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 249.
80 Michelson, an old newspaperman, was able to get at least one statement a day before the public. See Barclay, op. cit., p. 69.
the Republican party under Hamilton inaugurated a series of booklets—The Reporter—each of which covered a specific topic, such as Social Welfare, Government Organization, and so forth.

As in the case of campaign propaganda, the preparation and dissemination of this material is a much more difficult task, generally, for the party out of power than it is for the administration party. In the first place, the research must be done by the staff of the chairman when the party is out of power, for he has no supply of bureaucrats to call upon for material. In the second place, the chairman of the opposition party does not have the publicity value—especially, once the election is over—of the chairman of the party in power. Given the same flair for publicity, the chairman in power will get more free footage in the press than the chairman of the party out of power, and this fact adds to the publicity costs of the latter. Still, much depends upon the individual chairman. A letter from Calvin Coolidge to Sanders, for instance, indicates that in the opinion of the former president, one of the defects of the second Hoover campaign was the failure of the national chairman to keep himself before the public eye.

---


82 Rosskob's money was a salvation to the Democratic party from 1929 to 1932 for this reason.

83 The index, alone, of the New York Times is proof of this statement.

Not all of the inter-convention "educational" efforts of the national chairman have been centered on printed matter. Fess, a former college professor, held a series of lectures during his chairmanship. These talks were intended for the Young Republicans, but Fess was "...such a wonderful teacher and lecturer that the news spread around and the nights of his appearance were always the big nights at the Young Republican Club." Following the footsteps of Fess, Hamilton also arranged for a series of talks. The Hamilton series were for the congressmen; the purpose of them was to achieve in speeches and other public statements a consistent approach to the various issues before the government. Week-end conferences were held at which specific problems of legislation were discussed in an effort to help the over-worked Republican legislators with committee assignments. To these conferences were invited not only the Republican congressmen interested in the particular topic, but also selected members of the National Committee, and experts on the topics under discussion. In preparation for each of these conferences, the research staff of the Republican National Committee would prepare a syllabus containing background matter pertinent to the subject to be discussed, an analysis of the extant legislation proposed in the field, a statement of the issues, and a suggestion for

25 Reminiscences of Marjorie Savage, secretary to Senator Fess while he was national chairman. This information, undated, was sent to the writer by the son of Simeon Fess, parliamentarian for the Republican party at its 1962 National Convention.
constructive policies in relation to them.

In addition to these tasks, there is the never ending need for the national chairman in his capacity as party harmonizer. Practically, every local election leaves some scars, and the national chairman must remain alert to the effect of these factional differences upon his organization. It is for that reason that he continues, even though on a slackened pace, to get around the country to keep his organization intact or to revitalize it. Another fairly permanent duty of the chairman is the liaison function which he performs between the voter on one hand and the administrative and legislative branches of the government on the other hand. Of the few evidences of requests for concessions that have any documentary support, most of them are dated during the periods of the campaigns. However, if the experience of Hays and Farley is any criterion, the chairman's work, like the housewife's, is never done. Requests for information and for aid come to the party headquarters constantly. Farley tells of requests ranging all the way from the serious, such as aid to immigrants who desire to enter the United States regardless of quotas, to the ridiculous, such as requests for the fixing of parking violation tickets.

---

86 Thompson, op. cit., p. 309.
88 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., pp. 333, 367.
In the discussion of the national chairman as party financier, it was noted that one of the unscheduled inter-convention time consumers for the chairmen was the necessity for appearing before congressional committees investigating party finances. Unfortunately for the chairmen's time schedules, and possibly also unfortunately for their peace of mind, these investigations into the party financing are not the only occasions upon which the chairmen are called before investigating committees, for they have been called before such committees on diverse matters. Among the chairmen brought before the congressional committees for investigations other than those relating to party finance can be found Butler, work, and Hamilton among the Republicans and Raskob and Huston among the Democrats. Hanna and Farley missed the experience, each on one occasion, because the accusations against them were not substantiated.

Hanna's near brush with an investigating committee resulted from an accusation of bribery in connection with Hanna's election to the Senate. Not too surprisingly, in view of Hanna's power, the investigation never materialized. The substance of the majority report of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, as recorded in the Congressional Record, was that no one had appeared from Ohio to press the charges. William H. Butler was interrogated in connection with the Teapot Dome scandal, although he was in no way implicated.

89 Quora, Chapter V, pp. 142, 143.
Work was called before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, because it was at his instance that the Department of Justice had halted the presentation of evidence to a grand jury against Charles H. Burke, Commissioner of Indian Affairs and a former subordinate of Work's when the latter was Secretary of the Interior. Work testified that he had requested delay in this matter for two reasons: one reason was that Burke's wife was ill, and the other was that he wanted some "open-minded person" to review the case. During the hearings Senator Wheeler suggested that another possible reason might have been the forthcoming elections—the request had been made in June, 1928.

Hamilton's stint was before the Un-American Activities Committee in response to a complaint that he was anti-semitic. Hamilton appeared before this committee voluntarily to deny that he was aware that a requested list of the names of the National Committee members was to be used by General Mosely's supporters to send to the committee members anti-semitic material.

Both Haskob and Huston were called before the Caraway Committee investigating lobbying activities, the former for his connection with the Association Against Prohibition Amendments and Huston for his association with the Tennessee River Valley Association. Nothing of importance developed out of Raskob's

---


appearance before this committee, but the information that was brought out in connection with Huston's associations with his principal caused a commotion within the Republican party.

Huston before he became chairman had had affiliations with the Tennessee River Valley Association for years and, at the time of the incident under investigation, he was president of the organization. The charges revolved around the use of the association's money by Huston for the purpose of marginal trading in the stock market. The chairman's contention was that the money had only been borrowed for a short period of time and had been repaid. Furthermore, he had, he claimed, on previous occasions used his own funds for association purposes without reimbursement. It was this investigation which brought about the demands for his resignation. He was obdurate about resigning but eventually submitted to the pressure.

A member of his own party, Huey Long, attempted to initiate an investigation of Farley's practices during his chairmanship. In his resolution requesting the investigation of Farley, Long was nothing if not comprehensive. He accused Farley of conducting a private business for the selling of materials to persons engaged in doing public construction work for the United States government, of disqualifying low bidders in letting some of the contracts, of having stamps printed "...for the purpose of gratifying personal whims and caprices of personal

95. Ibid., pp. 3434 to 3429.
96. supra, Chapter VIII, p. 240.
and political friends," of being implicated in a wire service leading into the gambling houses in the United States from the race tracks, and finally of using his position to pursue these activities. After examination of the evidence behind the charges, the Senate found that further investigation was unwarranted.

As was suggested in the discussion of the investigation into the financial affairs of the political parties, there is more to some of these investigations than a sincere desire for information. The criticism of Raskob's connection with the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment grew almost directly out of the investigation into the lobbying activities of Huston. Likewise, both the criticism which led to Hamilton's appearance before an investigating committee and the appearance of Hamilton before that committee had political undertones. On the other hand, like the investigation into Hay's part in the contributions of the Sinclair interests to the Republican party, some of these non-financial investigations were matters that really needed investigation. In this category would certainly come work's interference in a judiciary process.

It is obvious from a review of this chapter that "quiescent" is no longer a fitting word to describe the state of the national

98 Ibid., pp. 1942, 1943, 7386, 7384.
99 S. 5, 71st Congress 2d sess., Senate, Hearings before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Judiciary pursuant to S. Res. 20, Vol. 4, p. 3721. See also U. S. Congress, Record, Vol. 72, Part 9, p. 9270.
chairman between conventions. The problems of financing, of policy fulfillment, and of policy formation are continuous enough in modern times to require much of the chairman's time during this interim period. In addition, more and more the modern chairmen are appreciating the need for constant work in the field of organization and in the fields of research and education. The role of the national chairman is becoming a full-time four year job.
CHAPTER X

THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN AND THE NATIONAL CONVENTION

The National Convention supplies the stage for the adult song of the national chairman. Still, not all of the chairmen have had the privilege of such a formal exit. Of the twenty-eight chairmen under consideration in this study, only nineteen have had the task of preparing for and opening a national convention. Among this group have been ten Republicans—Hanna, New, Rosewater, Hiller, Hayes, Adams, Butler, Peas, Fletcher, and Hamilton, and nine Democrats—Jones, Raggart, Mack, McCormick, Cuddings, Hull, Shaver, Rackob, and Farley.

In reading the proceedings of the conventions, the impression would be created that the role of the chairman at the conventions was little more than a "walk-on" role; and as far as their public function at the convention is concerned, the impression would be a correct one, for their formal role is limited and routine, usually consuming only a very short time. The National chairman opens the convention, introduces the man to offer the invocation, has the secretary read the call for the Convention, presents the name of the temporary chairman for ratification by the delegates, appoints a committee to escort the temporary chairman to the platform, and turns over the gavel to him. He disappears, then, in so far as the reports of the proceedings

---

1 An exception to this rule was the experience of Rosewater, who remained in the chair for several hours. See infra, Chapter X, p. 291.
indicate, until he returns, sometimes, to pronounce the adjourn-
ment of the convention.

Actually, he plays a more important role, not only publicly
in the physical arrangements for the convention, but also
behind the scenes both before and during the convention. His
role in connection with the convention commences months before
that body meets and it has both administrative and political
aspects to it. For it is the function of the national chairman
and his assistants on the Committee on Arrangements to
organize the convention to insure the expeditious handling
of the convention business. Precedent plays an important
part in this area of the chairman's role.

Normally, the national chairman calls a meeting of the
National Committee for purposes of convention preparation some-
time between early December and early February. But the work
of the national chairman in preparation for the convention
commences even before this meeting, because prior to these
full meetings, there have been meetings of the Executive Committee
and conferences with other party leaders. The date of these
smaller meetings depends upon the activities of the opposition
and upon conditions surrounding the inter-party struggle. The
Executive Committee of the Democratic party, for example, dis-
turbed in 1919 over the activity of Hays, held a meeting in

2 Official Report of the Proceedings of the Seventeenth Republican
See also Official Report of the Proceedings of the Nineteenth
Republican National Convention, 1928 (New York: The Tenny Press),
Republican National Convention, 1940 (Washington: Judd & Detweiler,
Inc.), p. 355.

3 The more usual date is in January, but early in the present
century these meetings were held in December, and in 1940 Farley
called this preparatory meeting for early February.
Atlantic City as early as September, 1919 for a discussion of plans for the next convention. At these meetings, sometimes held in the White House for the party in power, the preliminary decisions are made preparatory to the full meeting of the National Committee. It is not, however, until the full meeting of the National Committee has been held that the final decisions on the time and site of the convention are determined.

In addition to calling this meeting into being and presiding over it, the national chairman has other duties to perform in connection with it. In the first place, he acts as moderator, as in other meetings, in discussions which reach the floor of the meeting, and he appoints sub-committees both for the business of the meeting, where necessary, and for the business of the convention. The big question to be ratified, or in some cases to be actually settled, at this meeting is the time and site of the convention. Little discussion is wasted on the date, as within a week or two one way or the other, the time for each of the parties to have its convention seems pretty well established. As a matter of fact at the 1940 Democratic meeting, the question of the date was not discussed at all, as Farley asked the group to leave that decision to him, and it was so done without debate.

---


5 Up until 1916, the party in power held its convention first, but since that time the Republicans have held theirs first.

The question of the site is not so easily settled, because there are political undertones in the decision. It is probably for this reason that the procedure for determining the site has varied. As a rule, the cities interested in having the convention send a representative or representatives to this meeting of the National Committee to extol the virtues of their cities as convention sites. Other cities bid by letter or telegram to the national chairman. At times, the decision about the city is arrived at in executive session; at times, the committee goes into executive session only for a discussion of the financial guarantees given by the cities; at other times the chairman will appoint a sub-committee for final determination; and at times the discussion is carried out on the floor of the convention. When the matter comes to the floor, the occasion at times becomes exciting and even amusing. At the 1936 preparatory meeting of the Democratic National Committee, for example there was much gayety. Farley declared against poker bidding for the cities, but in an exchange of light-hearted


reporter, he was convinced that if poker bidding were permitted
the "ante" could be raised and the "kitty" would thereby be
larger, and poker bidding it was.

In the early part of the present century, Benjamin Tillman,
one of the early twentieth century committee members, stated
that money and facilities were the determination in the decision
as to the site, but in more recent years, the political aspects
of the choice have tended to be, at least, of equal importance.
There are times when the members of the committee are, apparently,
simply being allowed to let off steam in discussing this sub-
ject, for the decision has been made before the meeting started.
Farley claims that in 1940 Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared
against New York, San Francisco, or Philadelphia regardless
of the amount of money with which those cities tempted the
committee. Further proof that the decision is made, at
times, before the full National Committee meets is given in
Farley's assurance to the national committeemen and women assembled
in 1956 that he wanted them to feel that they could vote for
whatever city they felt best, based on the bids and proposals
that were presented by the representatives of the cities.

11 Ibid., pp. 376, 377.
Convention, 1908, p. 330.
13 James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, The Roosevelt Years
14 Proceedings, Democratic National Convention, 1936, op. cit.,
p. 415.
In other words, the prize was in the bag already, and the convention site did not matter.

This question of site is one of the first of the political questions that face the chairman in his preparations for the convention. The ideal convention city is one in which the citizens are neutral in respect to all candidates. What the campaign managers and other supporters of each candidate want is a city favorable to their candidate; that is, a city in a native state, or a city accessible to a large bloc of advocates of their candidate—preferably vociferous ones. Each campaign manager enters the struggle to achieve a city favorable to his candidate. McCombs, for instance, fought for Baltimore in 1912, because he could transport supporters of Wilson to that city easily from New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. William M. Butler and Stearns spent a week of seventeen hour days in their effort to secure Cleveland rather than Chicago as a convention site for the Republican party in 1924. Farley claims that one of the reasons that Franklin Delano Roosevelt chose Chicago in 1940 was that Mayor Kelly could control the galleries.

---

15 Bryan charged that in 1904 a crowd was brought down from Chicago and stationed near the platform to prevent any interference with the program that had been outlined by those in charge. See William Jennings Bryan and Mary Baird Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan (Chicago: The John C. Winston Co., 1935), p. 147.

16 McCombs, op. cit., p. 86.


18 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 224.
behaves the chairman, then, to be alert, if for any reason he wants to control the convention.

The next problem to face the national chairman in the preparation for the convention is the choice of the Committee on Arrangements. This committee, as its name implies, is the committee that makes the necessary preparations for the convention meeting. The membership of it is very important, because the sub-committee or sub-committees on organization of the Committee on Arrangements will be entrusted with the consideration of the choice of temporary chairman and of the temporary slate of delegates for the convention. The various national chairmen have appointed varying numbers to the Committee on Arrangements, but the number usually runs between eleven and sixteen members. The national chairman, an ex officio member of the committee, also acts, sometimes, as chairman of it. The Committee on Arrangements has its own secretary as well as its own treasurer and it also has many sub-committees: moving pictures, badges, music, broadcasts, tickets, hall, contracts, concessions, decorations, housing, organization and others. Every four years new ones seem to be added. It is assisted by a local group sometimes referred to as the Local Committee and sometimes as the Citizens' Committee. A vice-chairman and the national committeeman from the state act as liaison between the city and the national chairman. At times the national chairman appoints the Committee on Arrangements and they appoint the

---

sub-committees; at other times, the national chairman, himself, takes on the tasks of appointing the sub-committees.

The duties of the Committee on Arrangements are divided into two main categories, administrative and political, and whether the national chairman is chairman of the Committee on Arrangements or not, he has a part in many of the problems of the committee. The administrative problems, as can well be imagined, consist of a myriad of details relative to transportation, housing, tickets, lighting, communication, decorating, fire and police protection, first aid, and other necessities to assure a smoothly operating meeting. Years ago the physical preparations for the convention began in May, but the work has increased so tremendously as the present century has progressed that Farley began his preparation in January of 1936.

Major decisions, such as the letting of important contracts and the custody and disbursement of the funds from the convention city, naturally, come to the national chairmen for final decision. Past experience has also taught them, obviously, to keep an eye on some of the more important details, and throughout the records the interest of the national chairmen in press arrangements,


22 Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 58.


in building safety and its attendant problems of municipal ordinances and liability insurance, and in seating problems will be noted. In fact, the last problem has pursued the national chairman from 1852 to the present.

One of the most annoying of the administrative duties of the national chairman is that of the distribution of convention tickets. Because of his position as national chairman, he receives an extra allotment of tickets over and above the amount given to the other national committee members, but with these tickets he is supposed to take care of all of the political leaders who have no specific claim on any delegation. As a result, the chairman are deluged with requests for tickets. Rosewater says that his secretary did nothing for days but respond to such requests. The New York Times tells of the office of Adams being swamped by ticket seekers. While it may seem routine task, it is one that needs careful supervision, as both Hayes and Hull could testify, for a batch of tickets


Ibid., p. 134.


Ibid., June 7, 1924, p. 2, col. 4.

Ibid., June 16, 1931, p. 7, col. 3.
that have been mislaid or lost can lead to charges of partiality
in their distribution. Furthermore, any complaints about
tickets from disgruntled people of importance find their way
to the shoulders of the national chairman.

In fact, any matter over which a party leader becomes
upset falls finally into the lap of the national chairman, it
seems. Such a matter as the poor handling of hotel accommodations
can add one more group to the many groups that the national
chairman must mollify after the convention. A letter to Farley
among the Hyde Park manuscripts indicates the problems of the
chairman in such cases. In this letter the chairman of a group
of delegates complains of the "one-horse" hotel to which they
were relegated and to the lack of attention that was paid to
them during the convention.

In connection with the convention itself, the chairman
has still another personnel function to perform, for it is
his prerogative to appoint the doorkeepers, the deputy sergeants-
at-arms, and the other assistants necessary to keep the convention
running smoothly. As Farley has pointed out, a convention can
get out of hand very easily and dependable ushers and deputies
on the floor can be very important. An improperly managed cam-
paign can be stampeded and the desires of the men in control
can be overruled, as was William M. Butler's desire to choose
the vice-presidential candidate in 1924.

52 Democratic National Committee MSS, loc. cit.,West
Virginia Box, Herman Bennett to Farley, Sept. 19, 1923.

Like the physical arrangements for the convention, the political arrangements also start well in advance of the convention. These matters are finally decided upon, as a rule, by the Committee on Arrangements at its last meeting before the convention "usually two or three weeks before the Convention begins." But they, too, require a lot of preliminary effort, and the national chairman is, naturally, involved.

The political circumstances leading up to the convention make for varying conditions surrounding the preparation for the convention and, therefore, result in varying duties for the national chairman. Where the party is in power and the president is amenable to re-election, as was the case in 1900, 1904, 1912, 1924, and 1932 in the Republican party, and in 1916, 1936, 1940, and 1944 in the Democratic party everything is cut and dried, usually, because the party cannot, even if it so desires, repudiate its leader. In these cases, the president, the national chairman, and the other party leaders in conference decide upon the temporary and the permanent officers for the convention, and they are ratified by the Committee on Arrangements, the National Committee, and the National Convention in order. There may be, of course, problems growing out of local factional fights over delegates, but the strong position of the national party

---


35 Taft MSS, loc. cit., Roosevelt to Lodge, June 8, 1908, a copy. See also Butler, op. cit., pp. 318, 319; and Farley, Behind the Ballots, pp. 106, 107.
leaders makes adjustment of these cases relatively easy for the national chairman. A letter in the Hyde Park files from Farley to Franklin Delano Roosevelt reports on just such an adjustment by the usual practice of splitting the delegation vote and thereby making everyone happy. But, on the whole, on these occasions the path of the national chairman is relatively smooth.

Where the incumbent national chairman is not in agreement with the presidential plans for re-election, as in the case of McCombs with Wilson's plans for re-election in 1916 and Farley's for Roosevelt's plans for re-election in 1940, other leaders are brought in to take over the task of convention preparations, and an attempt is made to relegate the chairman to the background. In fact, this situation has happened even where there was no open break in the party's ranks. Theodore Roosevelt, for instance, appointed Cortelyou as national chairman in May, 1904, and Coolidge appointed William M. Butler in May, 1924, and left Adams, as the newspaper men noted, with

36 Hyde Park, Democratic National Committee MSS, President's Secretary's Files—James A. Farley, 1936, Farley to Roosevelt, June 19, 1936.
only the distribution of tickets as a function.

Normally, however, in the cases of renomination of the president, the preparations for the convention and the convention itself are comparatively routine. Farley says that the 1936 Democratic Convention was "hum-drum"—a harmony meeting that could have been finished in a few days except that it was a pity to waste the free radio time. Will Rogers, speaking of the Coolidge nomination in 1924, said that they could have done it by telephone and saved a lot of money. The renomination of Taft, however, was an exception, giving Rosewater the distinction of being the national chairman whose tasks in connection with a convention were the most arduous. Rosewater's time of trouble resulted from the fact that the renomination of the president, William Howard Taft, was being challenged by a very worthy foe—his predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt. The struggle for political position in such cases begins with the appointment of the Committee on Arrangements. It began in this case, while Rosewater was still acting chairman of the Republican National Committee, with the previously mentioned battle between the Hitchcock and the Taft factions within the National Committee over the appointment of Harry New as chairman of the Committee on Arrangements. This fight, as has been seen, ended in a

41 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 306.
42 Suara, Chapter III, p. 60.
drawn battle in so far as the composition of the Committee on Arrangements was concerned, but the compromise did not settle the contest between the opposing factions.

As a result of the friction between these two factions, Rosewater, who was also on the Committee on Arrangements, had a battle on his hands in getting the committee's decisions on the choice of temporary chairman and on the slate of delegates accepted at the convention. According to Rosewater, the eligibles for temporary chairmen were canvassed without distinction of factional affiliation and with the thought in mind of competence, prominence in public affairs, and service in the party councils, and as a result of such deliberations, Elihu Root was chosen. Nevertheless, so bitter was the fight between the two factions that Rosewater finally had to bring the matter to the floor of the convention for a roll-call before it was settled.

Rosewater had an even more difficult time over the question of contested delegates. He had sensed the fight that was developing from the mad scramble of the contenders for delegates, and he wrote to the National Committee membership in April warning them of what was ahead. With the hope of smoothing the operations of the convention, he arranged, prior to the opening, for interviews with Senator Dixon (Roosevelt's campaign manager) and others of the Roosevelt faction, and with Congressman William B. McKinley, Taft's campaign manager, in order to

---

44 Ibid., p. 96.
organize the work of the Convention so as to insure expeditious handling and to enable the convention to get down to business on scheduled time. Rosewater also had a midnight conference with Roosevelt, himself; this meeting was arranged by a mutual friend who intimated that a personal interview with the former president would help in reaching an agreement on convention procedure. At this conference, it was arranged that Rosewater as presiding officer of the National Convention prior to the ratification of the choice of the temporary chairman would recognize Roosevelt's floor manager, Governor Hadley of Missouri, on any matter properly before the convention and debatable. As soon as the reading of the Call of the Convention was completed and before Rosewater was able to announce the choice for temporary chairman, Hadley obtained recognition and moved to substitute the names of approximately eighty delegates favorable to Roosevelt for those on the list approved by the Committee on Arrangements. Rosewater held that it was the duty of the national chairman to call to order the delegates named on the temporary roll and to preside until a temporary chairman was chosen and that up to that point the meeting was an unorganized assemblage, and it was not yet within its province to pass upon the list of delegates.

46 Ibid., pp. 83, 84.
While it is unusual for the national chairman of the party in power to have the difficulties at the convention that Rosewater did, it is not unusual for the national chairman of the party out of power to be required to do a great deal of conferring and maneuvering in order, not only to get the convention off to a smooth start, but, in some cases, to keep it in motion. The ideal role for the chairman where there are several potential candidates with a chance of receiving the nomination is that of moderator between the opposing factions within the party, and the truly neutral chairman will attempt to have a man chosen for temporary chairman who is acceptable to all of the leading contenders. As a matter of fact, Rosewater claims that he thought that the Committee on Arrangements had done just that in the choice of Elihu Root, and he was surprised at Roosevelt's objection to the selection.

Conferences on convention procedures and plans take place long before the convention, and nothing is decided on the floor of the convention that has not been previously discussed among the leaders. Bryan, for example, tells of Mack, the national chairman of the Democratic party in 1912, assuring him weeks before the convention that the members of the Committee on Arrangements would support him for temporary chairman. Another important inter-party struggle, the Raskob-House-Smith versus the Farley-Roosevelt factional fight, began early in the year

50 Rosewater, Backstage in 1912, op. cit., p. 141.
before the convention with the introduction of Raskob's Home
Rule Plan and continued until the meeting of the Committee on
Arrangements on April 4, 1932. Farley, although not a member
of this committee, went to Chicago to attend the meeting and
to keep an eye on things and put over the Roosevelt program.
The Raskob faction wanted Shouse as keynoter for the convention,
but the Roosevelt forces opposed this plan and Senator Byrd
suggested a compromise whereby Shouse would suspend his fight
to be the keynoter and the Roosevelt forces would not oppose
him for permanent chairman of the convention. Shouse agreed
to this plan, provided that Roosevelt would give him his per­
sonal assurances. Robert Jackson, the secretary of the Dem­
ocratic National Committee, telephoned the proposed compromise
to Roosevelt, who, according to the Farley version of the
story, pointed out that the National Committee had no author­
ity to recommend a permanent chairman, but suggested that he
had no objection to the Committee on Arrangements recommending
Senator Barkley, the Roosevelt choice, for keynoter and
"commending'" Shouse for permanent chairman. Later, the
Roosevelt forces, according to Farley, decided to carry out
their original intention of supporting another candidate for
permanent chairman and Senator Walsh was decided upon.

52 Farley, Behind the Ballot, on. cit., p. 104.
53 ibid., p. 104.
54 ibid., p. 106.
Michelson's story varies a little from the Farley version. He claims that the Committee on Arrangements recognizing the long and tireless service of Shouse commended him to the consideration of the convention for permanent chairman, and that there was never a word of contradiction or correction of this commendation until the Committee on Permanent Organization sprang the fact that its majority favored Senator Walsh as permanent chairman. Michelson says that Raskob and Shouse cannot have doubted that Roosevelt had committed himself in his telephone conversation with Jackson, or else the Raskob-Shouse faction would have gone through with the fight in the Committee on Arrangements where they had a majority for Shouse as temporary chairman. Obviously, the Raskob forces were outsmarted.

At the convention itself, the national chairman fills various roles behind the scenes, but it is, not surprisingly, very difficult to find much evidence of his operations in the "smoke-filled" rooms. As chairmen elect they appear at the convention as emissaries for the president, sometimes to ward off renomination for the president and sometimes to represent the presidential view to the Committee on Rules and Order of Business, but at the convention at the end of their

55 Michelson, op. cit., p. 5.
56 Lodge, op. cit., Roosevelt to Lodge enclosing a letter of which Hitchcock was given a copy, June 1, 1908, p. 295.
57 Taft MSS, Pringle Copies, 1902-1908, loc. cit., Taft to Hitchcock, June 16, 1908.
terms there is little record of their activities. In the first place, they are obviously self-conscious about the appearances of making deals, and in the second place what conferences are held are held very cautiously. Private wires with imported trusted men at the controls see to it that little that the party leaders do not want known is known about the behind the scenes conferences. Nicholas Murray Butler tells of one of these convention conferences between him and Theodore Roosevelt at Oyster Bay in 1915 over a private wire installed in a closet in the room of George Perkins in the Blackstone Hotel at Chicago.

Still, occasional news of such gatherings comes to light from time to time. In fact, at a time when their party is deadlocked or about to deadlock, it seems to be the accepted pattern for the national chairmen to attempt to break the deadlock by gathering representatives of the opposing forces together. McCombs tells of a conference held by Mack at the 1912 Democratic National Convention in his rooms at the Belvedere Hotel in Baltimore. To this conference, Mack had invited all of the campaign managers for the various nominees and a few of the state chairmen. The national chairman explained that the purpose of the meeting was to find a candidate for the party. The idea of the conference was obviously to achieve a compromise of some sort among the contending candidates. McCombs, at that time pre-convention manager for Wilson, spoke

of the meeting as "a set-up" game; needless to say, it was abortive.

Hull played the same role in the 1924 Democratic debacle, also without success for his party. As ballot after ballot failed to determine the candidate, the party leaders came to Hull in the hope that he might break the deadlock. Hull appointed a committee, on which he served, in the hope of finding a way out of the impasse. There was no announcement as to the outcome of the meeting, but shortly thereafter McAdoo released his delegates. According to Harold B. Hinton, Hull's biographer, the national chairman maintained his role of impartial chairman throughout the deadlock.

Hilles, the Republican national chairman, had a problem in 1916 similar to that of his predecessor, Rosewater. Actually, his difficulties grew out of his endeavors to bring back into the fold the warring factions which had split off from the Republican party in 1912 to form the Progressive party. On this occasion, the leaders of the two parties decided to have a conference consisting of five representatives from each side in the hope of ironing out their differences and reaching some compromise on the matters of platform and candidates. Before these conferences were over Hill was included in them.

The two groups came to a meeting of the minds on the platform, but the Republicans refused to accept Roosevelt as a candidate and the conferences failed. According to Nicholas Murray Butler, Hills himself favored Elihu Root as the party's nominee, and he and William Barnes, the New York political power of the day, worked "...like Trojans... all through that long Friday night... to build up a sufficient bloc of votes to nominate Root."  

As this report of Hills' action indicates, it is at this point in their term that the national chairmen find themselves very often in an anomalous situation. The chances are that every national chairman has had his favorite candidate. As a matter of fact, he could have and still have the interest of the party or even of the nation more at heart than the interest of any one faction; that is, he could sincerely feel that regardless of factional affiliation one man would be superior to another as a presidential candidate. Probably, with the psychological tendency of the human being to rationalize his actions, the national chairman could excuse his partiality in any case. Still, as national chairman he should remain neutral.

The national chairmen in the most awkward situation are those who completing a full term, find themselves preparing for a convention in which one of the leading candidates is the man who appointed the chairman to his office. If disaffection has occurred, as it did in the case of McCombs and Wilson and in the case of Farley and Roosevelt, neutrality is

---

64 Ibid., p. 346.
out of the question because of prejudice against the candidate. If the good relationship between the candidate and the chairman continues, as for instance in the case of Raskob and Smith, it is very difficult to see how the vaunted neutrality of the national chairman can be sustained. Certainly, Raskob and Shouse had difficulty in convincing Roosevelt of their neutral position, as a letter written by Roosevelt to Shouse proves. Very typically Rooseveltian, this letter warns Shouse that some of Roosevelt's friends—not Roosevelt, himself, of course—thought that:

....While you and John have very properly not come in favor of any candidate....you are going into different states seeking to 'block Roosevelt' by encouraging uninstructed delegations or favorite sons. 65

Nor was this instance the first in which doubts as to the neutrality of the national chairman existed. Obviously, Theodore Roosevelt did not believe that it was neutrality that prompted Hanna's refusal to endorse him at the Ohio State Convention. Moreover, it has been seen that of the three national chairmen with whom I had contact, Taft seemed to trust only Hillen, and Hillen was so close to Taft as to seem to preclude anything but partiality for the national chairman where his former boss was concerned. 66

67 It is not necessary even to read between the lines to note that Rosewater was not too enthusiastic about his party's choice in 1912. He admitted that many of the party workers present at the December, 1911 meeting of the Republican National Committee felt that Taft was a "dead horse." Rosewater, *Backstage in 1912, op. cit.* p. 35.
Farley enunciated a "guiding principle" for national chairmen to pursue in this matter of allegiance. It was that "the Democratic National Committee is for the candidates selected by the National Convention, unqualifiedly, enthusiastically, and militantly." But this principle is helpful only to the post-convention national chairman, who rarely needs it, inasmuch as he is usually the choice of the candidate. It is the pre-convention national chairman who needs a principle to guide him between the Charybdis of disloyalty to a friend and impartiality in his role as head of the party organization.

---

CHAPTER XI

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CHAIRMAN

The role of the national chairman is not one to be coveted. It is and has always been a difficult job. Rosewater, who served in the chairmanship as long ago as 1912 commented that:

In the early days President choosing...was as simple compared to modern methods as kindergarten exercises beside a course in four-dimensional mathematics.¹

Imagine what it must be today, for it involves the organization of thousands of workers with enough energy and enthusiasm to affect the votes of millions of people dispersed over thousand of miles. The campaign period alone covers a myriad of details, decisions upon which must be made in a relatively short time and under pressure. Moreover, the national chairman must work a good part of the time with new and inexperienced help. In addition, he must work with the constant fear of inadequate means and through inadequate channels. To add to his burdens, throughout the whole experience he is subjected to constant criticism, not only from the opposition, but frequently from people within his own party.

The national chairman's role is one with great responsibility and with little or no real power. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, speaking

¹Victor Rosewater, Backstage in 1912 The Inside Story of the Split Republican Convention (Phila: Dorrance and Company, 1932), p. 211

²Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1932, p. 598. An interesting reaction to this remark is noted in the meeting at which it was made. Although the report of the proceedings included such asides as "Laughter" on other occasions, there was no such aside after this remark.
before the National Committee on the occasion of his recommenda-
tion of Farley for the chairmanship, very likely described the
awkward position of some other national chairmen when he said:
"If the National Committee does something that I don't like
I shall disavow Jim Farley and it." In other words, if the
political manipulations of the chairman turn out right, the
candidate gets the credit; if they turn out wrong, the national
chairman bears the onus.

Many of the past chairmen must read McCombs' statement that
in accepting the chairmanship "...he sailed into a sea upon which
he hoped no other man would ever have the misfortune to launch his
bark" with a little more sympathy for the dramatic outburst than
would those people unfamiliar with the role. Dotted throughout
the pages of the story of the national chairman can be found
remarks—some in private letters that do not sound like posterity
letters—such as Cortelyou's about "...working a few weeks at
white heat....", as Farley's about "...working almost literally
night and day...." which testify to the physical burden that the
role imposes. A very good description of the hectic life of the
chairman in the midst of a campaign is given by Cortelyou in a
letter to Theodore Roosevelt. In this letter explaining how busy

---

3William F. McCombs, Making Woodrow Wilson President, ed. by

4Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Theodore Roosevelt MSS,
PFP, Box 34, Cortelyou to Roosevelt, Oct. 2, 1904.

5James A. Farley, Behind the Ballots The Personal History of a
Politician (New York: HARCOURT, BRACE and Co., 1936), p. 188.
he is, Cortelyou speaks of having a meeting with the Executive Committee in one room, with two senators in another, and with a cabinet officer or two in a third—all of them looking for immediate attention. It is no wonder that William M. Butler spoke of political leadership as "...at the best a weary task and one in which the rebuffs too often outweigh the rewards." It is also no wonder that many are called to the chairmanship who never respond. In fact, it is quite possible that some of the chairmen have had to be drafted, so to speak, for the role. Cortelyou seems to have been one of this group. For judging from a letter from Roosevelt to Lodge, before the chairmanship had been offered to Cortelyou, Elihu Root and Murray Crane had been considered for the role and could not accept, and judging from Cortelyou's testimony before the Clapp Committee he took the role reluctantly, for he speaks of himself as having been "...not a seeker for the place....." Taft's first chairman, Hitchcock, pleaded ill health in order to avoid the role at one point in the involved negotiations surrounding the choice of the Republican national chairman in 1908.

6 Theodore Roosevelt MSS, loc. cit., PPF, Box 34, Cortelyou to Roosevelt, Oct. 2, 1904.


9 U.S. 62d Congress 2d sess., Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, pursuant to H. Res. 79, Vol. 1, p. 25, 26, Cortelyou testimony.

10 Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Taft MSS, Pre-Inaugural
According to Nicholas Murray Butler, several men, among whom were Cornelius Bliss and Senator Penrose, were considered for the chairmanship before Taft chose his secretary, Hillis, in 1912. Wilson, in 1912, considered Newton D. Baker for the role, according to Wilson’s biographer, Bay Stannard Baker; Wilson actually offered it to Colonel House before finally settling on McCormick as his choice. Harry M. Daugherty, Harding’s pre-convention manager refused the chairmanship and recommended Hays for the position; and a biographical sketch of Hays, which Hays authenticates, speaks of Hays as “not anxious” to accept the burdens of the chairmanship. In a letter to his son, Frank Stearns explains that he felt that it would be better if he were not the national chairman and that he had so advised President Coolidge.


15 Claude Fuesse, Calvin Coolidge The Man From Vermont (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1940), pp. 334, 335, quoting a letter from Stearns to his son, Nov. 30, 1933.
These refusals are not surprising. Men intelligent enough to fill the role are intelligent enough to see the burdens in it. Why, then do intelligent men accept? It does not seem to be for immediate monetary gain, for as a general rule, there is no monetary recompense other than that given to the chairmen for expenses. Many of them probably come to the end of their terms as chairmen in a worse financial situation than when they entered upon their duties. A careful reading of the letters in the Wilson files on McCombs' refusal of the ambassadorship to France shows that while this office was not McCombs' first choice, he would have accepted it, if it had not been for monetary reasons. His vacillation was the result of his awaiting the passage of a pending bill to increase the emoluments of ambassadors. The role of national chairman is a great time consumer; it leaves little time for the holder of it to pursue his normal business endeavors. While it is difficult to believe, as Farley claims, that the chairman's private business diminishes because he is in the chairmanship, it is possible that four years away from their regular pursuits might result in

---

16 Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Woodrow Wilson MSS, File 107, McCombs to "Dear Joe," apparently Joseph Tumulty, April 15, 1913. See also McCombs to Wilson, April 1, 1913.

17 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 369.
financial sacrifice for the chairman.

The contention that it is not immediate monetary gain that prompts the chairmen to accept the role does not imply that monetary rewards do not come to some of them—particularly the successful ones—as they do to the bureaucrats, that is, as a result of their government connections. Probably, Hays would never have come to the attention of the moving picture industry had he not been national chairman and postmaster general. It is equally likely that Farley would never have had the opportunity to become an executive with the Coca Cola Export Corporation had he never served in the chairmanship. Similarly, it is very probable that the chairmen who went into or resumed law practices returned to larger clientele as a result of their chairmanship. Furthermore, as in the case of the bureaucrats, these opportunities, no doubt, came to the chairmen more for whom they knew than for what they knew. Nevertheless, unlike some of the bureaucrats who become so much more valuable after their government service than they were before it, most of the chairmen were successful men before their acceptance of the chairmanship. As a matter of fact, in at least one case, that of Raskob, the chairman was chosen because he was representative of the successful business group.

18 Ibid., pp. 363, 364, 371.

Prestige is, undoubtedly, a factor in the acceptance of the role, especially for the men who have worked up from the party ranks. The chairmanship of the party is at the top of the ladder within the party organization, and it must mean a great deal for the man who has started as a precinct worker to reach that pinnacle. The attention and deference paid to Shaver and Farley at a recent postal convention gathering indicates that in the eyes of the rank and file political worker, the national chairman ranks high indeed. It has already been seen that the role had great prestige value for Hull.

The prestige, of course, can be short-lived. As James M. Cox warned Farley a few days before the 1932 election, if the candidate wins the chairman is regarded "...as a sort of political king..." if he loses, "...as a king's hostler." Then, too, the chairmanship is for most of the chairmen the last step on the ladder of political success. Certainly, the last big step on the political ladder—the presidency—has never come to any of them. In fact, with the fear of the politician as ripe as it is in the United States, the acceptance of the chairmanship may be one sure way not to reach the presidency.

---


21 Farley, Behind the Ballots, op. cit., p. 189.

22 There is rather a pathetic touch in this connection in a comment that Farley made about the attitude of the newsmen toward him at the convention in 1940. He said: "I found myself looked upon as a statesman rather than as a politician." See Farley, Jim Farley's Story, op. cit., p. 305.
Cummings says that men go into the chairmanship for the same reason that they go into politics in the first place, that is, because they like the excitement of it. It is obvious in talking to the former chairmen that excitement is a factor. Even old Clem Shaver's eyes light up with a revived glint when he gets to talking about his "harmony" dinners. The undercurrent of excitement in the role for Farley pervades both of his books.

A sense of duty, possibly even to the public, but certainly to the party is also a very likely factor. The fact that so many men took on the burden although they were reluctant to do so is proof of this fact. Moreover, probably no one is more aware of the absence of a sense of political duty in the citizen at large than is the man closely allied to politics. The lethargy of the public in general must arouse a sense of political duty in anyone politically minded.

Whatever the reason for the acceptance of the role, some very capable men have accepted it. To say which was the most capable,

---

23 Interview with Homer Cummings, June 26, 1952.
24 Interview with Clem Shaver, February 27, 1952; April 10, 1952.
25 Farley, Behind the Ballots, passim., and Farley, Jim Farley's Story, passim.
even of those who weathered the campaign successfully, would be an almost impossible task. While there has been throughout the period under discussion a persistent pattern of traditional procedures in the role—alike, generally speaking, in both parties—there has also been modification in the fulfillment of the role as a result of political conditions, and of the abilities and experience of the chairmen, of the candidates, and of the opponents, to the extent that it has been rare for any one chairman to fill the various functions of the role exactly as his fellow chairman has.

Even if a scientific comparative evaluation were possible—and the problem of weighting the many factors involved makes such a project unlikely—it is very possible that the result would prove that there was no one best chairman, but rather that some chairmen were better in one aspect of the multi-faceted role and some in another. Hanna would probably get the accolade for financing, Hays and Farley for organization, and Cummings for his democratic handling of the National Committee. On the negative side, such a study would certainly show that some chairmen were not as temperamentally well-fitted for the role as were others; 27 McCombs would, without doubt, lead in this dubious distinction.

27 It will take no scientific study to determine this fact. The lack of restraint in McCombs' book Making Woodrow Wilson President proves it.
The study would probably show that some chairmen were less 28 politically acute than were others; here Raskob comes to mind.

Actually, the men who filled the role from 1900 to 1940 were neither all sinner nor all saint. Undoubtedly, in the stress of battle and pressed by party loyalty, the public welfare has been 29 lost sight of, at times, but the role has been filled, on the whole, by hard-working, loyal party men—better men than the lethargy of the voters deserved. The muck-rakers would have the student believe that all politicians are venal, and certainly in the lower echelons of the party venal men can be found, but they rarely get to the top. The party cannot afford them at the top.

None of the chairmen has been the ideal chairman, for it is a role which requires a very rare combination of talents. To be ideal, a chairman would have to be an organizer of the first quality, a financier of rare ability, a peacemaker of unusual charm, and a diplomat par excellence. He would need to be a man of strong party loyalty, and yet with the courage to rise above the party's needs when the public welfare required it. He would need to be a man who could inspire all of the people to fill their duties as citizens, not only as voters, but also as party workers and contributors.

---

28 Any man who would accept an implied promise relayed over a telephone in a fight for power is a little naive for the political world. Then, too, Raskob's trips to see the Pope in Rome at a time when he was attempting to further the chances of a Catholic for the presidency in a predominantly Protestant country indicate a lack of political knowledge. See New York Times, April 30, 1930, p. 10, col. 8; April 11, 1928, p. 15, col. 2.

29 Supra, Chapter V, p. 142, and Chapter IX, p. 273.
He would need to be sensitive enough to understand people, and yet insensitive enough to take their criticisms philosophically. He would need to be human enough to understand the motivations of people, and yet tough enough to handle money in a business-like way.

However, even were two paragons with such attributes available every four years, all of the problems of leadership within the party organization would not be solved. As has been suggested before, one of the major difficulties in the role of national chairman is its duality. The two roles, that of head of the party organization and that of campaign manager, are incompatible. One requires loyalty to an individual who is the chosen leader of a faction within the party; the other requires impartiality toward all factions within the party. The problem is to reconcile the need for sympathy between the candidate and the campaign manager with the need for neutrality on the part of the chairman of the National Committee.

The defect in the present arrangement has been recognized for a long time. In 1912, the Democratic party, according to Bryan, considered the possibility of selection of the National Committee by popular vote prior to the convention. The thought behind this change was the hope of avoiding control of the convention preparations by a National Committee out of sympathy with the current political mood.

There are two main weaknesses to the above plan: (1) the president, himself, is not directly chosen by popular vote; and (2) at what point other than the one now used could this election of the National Committee be held that would guarantee a National Committee sympathetic to the candidate? A shorter term for the national chairman such as this 1912 plan would suggest is not the answer, if only for the reason that greater continuity in party organization rather than less is needed, at least for administrative purposes. Nor will a simple division of the administrative and political aspects of the role of the national chairman as presently constituted solve the problem. Such a simple division can be achieved by a permanent administrative assistant; in fact, William Donald has served in such a role for the Republican party for some 31 years. This plan does not, however, solve the basic problem, for it still may leave possible the situation in which the political decisions leading to the convention are made by a national chairman who was chosen originally by one of the contestants for the presidential candidacy.

Judge E.H. Moore, a Democratic national committeeman of some years ago, suggested that the chairman and secretary of the National Committee be elected by the National Committee, and that the nominee for president select a Campaign Committee and a campaign chairman as he saw fit. It was Moore's idea that this campaign chairman would "...be empowered to have, subject to the supervision of such nominee, sole and exclusive control, conduct, and direction of the ensuing campaign; that no officer or member of the National Committee

---

31 Donald had no formal title at the time this writer interviewed him at the Republican National headquarters in May, 1951, but had been an administrative assistant with the Republican party for years.
shall have or exercise any authority, direction, control, or
management of the said campaign except as such authority be
derived from such Campaign Committee."

Up to a point this plan is good. Its weakness is that it
would reduce the chairman to the role of an administrative assistant
to the campaign manager during the campaign, and would thus lessen
the prestige that the chairman would need in the political aspects
of his position after the campaign had come and gone. Moreover, it
would relieve the national chairman of all responsibility in connection
with the conduct of the campaign. What is needed is a greater
centering of responsibility upon someone available over a longer
period than a campaign.

No solution is ever perfect, and this axiom never applied
more truly than it does to a solution to a problem in a field such
as politics, where the human equation is such an important factor.
But it would seem that a modification of Judge Moore's plan might
result in better party management. The Moore plan would be better
if it were modified so that the national chairman as the permanent
head of the party organization could continue after the campaign
with undiminished dignity and with a sense of responsibility. To
achieve this objective, the two roles—that of head of the party
hierarchy and that of campaign manager—could be dissociated, as
in Judge Moore's plan, but the national chairman would not be made

Convention, 1916, p. 290.
subordinate to the campaign manager as he was in the Moore plan.

The national chairman would continue to have complete charge of the permanent headquarters of the party and of its permanent personnel. He would be a truly permanent official, that is, he would have no other commitments. He would, therefore, have to be salaried. He would choose his own officers for the National Committee, as he would choose other members of his staff. The national chairman, himself, would be nominated and elected by the National Committee for a four year term. He would have charge of the activation and maintenance of party organization. He would continue to be the party harmonizer. He would be solely responsible for the method and for the source of party funds. He would supervise the research and the educational efforts of the party between conventions. He would be responsible for the convention preparations with a Committee on Arrangements on which would be represented, proportionately to their strength in the National Committee, all of the factions within the committee. He would not be a member of the president's cabinet.

During the campaign periods, both for the presidential and for the off-year congressional campaign, he would be co-chairman with the campaign manager or managers on a Committee for Disbursement of Party Funds. He would also be a co-chairman with these same official on an Advisory Board for Strategy and Tactics. The divided responsibility in the latter part of this plan is not satisfactory—divide responsibility never is—but the national chairman cannot be charged with the collection of party funds without having some authority in the disbursement of those funds.
Nor can he be charged with responsibility, as he should be, for the tenor of the campaign, unless he has some control over strategy and tactics.

It is acknowledged that control is less effective when responsibility is divided, but the above plan would be an improvement over a condition where there is no center of responsibility. This plan might avoid the defect made obvious, for example, in the investigations into campaign contributions in the Democratic party in 1940. On this occasion, Oliver Quayle, the treasurer of the National Committee and R.J. Reynolds, the Director of Finance of the National Committee for North Carolina, tossed responsibility for the handling of party funds back and forth between them.

As to control over the national chairman and the campaign manager, no new controls are necessary. What is necessary is better application of the existing controls: that is, a more alert and more morally sensitive public opinion; truly effective publicity for campaign sources and disbursements; and more impartially conducted investigations of party conduct. Within the party, the control over the national chairman might be achieved through the procedure of recall. The procedure could be made operative only after a two-thirds vote of the National Committee. The latter provision would be necessary in order to avoid constant changes resulting from factional fights.

---

37 U.S. 77th Congress, 1st sess., Senate, Hearings of Special Committee Investigating Campaign Expenditures, 1940, Vol. 8, p. 592 to 597. Farley has not called by this committee to testify according to a letter to the writer from Farley, dated December 15, 1952.
Such a general plan as outlined above would have the advantage of more continuous management; and more continuous management would, very likely, mean a savings in cost, not only because of the possibility of long-range contracts for materials and long-range credit arrangements, but also because it would avoid wasted effort in the organization work. The history of both parties shows that organizations have been developed and allowed to disintegrate on more than one occasion. This plan would also eliminate, at least to some extent, the anomalous situation in which a national chairman finds himself during the pre-convention period of his tenure when the past candidate—whether the president or the candidate of the defeated party—who selected him as national chairman is again a potential candidate of the party. Such a plan would also supply the party with a more permanent harmonizer who might not only keep the factions within the National Committee operating toward a common goal, but might also act as a party harmonizer in policy deadlocks between his party in the legislature and his party in the administrative branch of the government.

The role would be one of organizer, moderator, educator, and harmonizer. The present short-term promotional aspects of the role would be transferred to the campaign manager. The ideal psychological attitude for the chairman in this role would be, in relation to the factions within his party, the attitude presumably achieved by the Speaker of the House of Commons in the British Parliament toward the opposing parties. The role of national chairman under this plan might lose some of its excitement, but it would gain in stature and in over-all power.
## APPENDIX I

### THE NATIONAL CHAIRMEN AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1896-1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1896-1900</td>
<td>James K. Jones</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>William Jennings Bryan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1904</td>
<td>James K. Jones</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>William Jennings Bryan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904-1908</td>
<td>Thomas Taggart</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Alton B. Parker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908-1912</td>
<td>Norman Mack</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>William Jennings Bryan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-1916</td>
<td>William F. McCombs</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Woodrow Wilson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-1919</td>
<td>Vance McCormick</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Woodrow Wilson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1920</td>
<td>Homer Cummings</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>James M. Cox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-1921</td>
<td>George White</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>James M. Cox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1924</td>
<td>Cordell Hull</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>John W. Davis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-1928</td>
<td>Clem Shaver</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Alfred E. Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-1932</td>
<td>John J. Raskob</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Franklin Delano Roosevelt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-1936</td>
<td>James A. Farley</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Franklin Delano Roosevelt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-1940</td>
<td>James A. Farley</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Franklin Delano Roosevelt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX II

### THE NATIONAL CHAIRMEN AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

**IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1896-1940**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>THE NATIONAL CHAIRMEN</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1896-1900 Marcus Alonzo Hanna</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>William McKinley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1904 Marcus Alonzo Hanna</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>William McKinley</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904-1907 George B. Cortelyou</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Theodore Roosevelt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907-1908 Mary S. New</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>William Howard Taft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908-1909 Frank H. Hitchcock</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>William Howard Taft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1912 John F. Hill</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>William Howard Taft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-1912 Victor Rosewater</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>William Howard Taft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-1916 Charles D. Hilles</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Charles Evans Hughes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-1918 William R. Willcox</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Charles Evans Hughes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-1921 Will Hays</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Warren G. Harding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1924 John T. Adams</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Calvin Coolidge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-1928 William M. Butler</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Herbert Hoover</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-1929 Hubert Work</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Herbert Hoover</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-1930 Claudius Huston</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Herbert Hoover</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1932 Simeon Fess</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Herbert Hoover</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-1934 Everett Sanders</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Alfred Landon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-1936 Henry P. Fletcher</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Alfred Landon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX III

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CHAIRMEN

Jones, James K., was born in Marshall County, Mississippi on September 29, 1839. He received a classical education, but went into the mercantile field upon completion of his education. He was elected to the State Senate in 1873 and reelected in 1877. In 1880, he was elected to the United States House of Representatives and was returned in 1882, but he was elected to the United States Senate before he resumed his second term in the House of Representatives. He was chairman of the Committee on Platforms and Resolutions at the Democratic National Convention in 1896. From June 11, 1896 to July 7, 1904 he served as national chairman of the Democratic National Committee. He died May 31, 1908.


He was a hotel proprietor by occupation, and he eventually became president of the French Lick Springs Hotel Company. He was elected auditor of Marion County, Indiana, in 1886 and reelected in 1890. From 1892 to 1894 he was chairman of the Democratic State Committee. He served as mayor of Indianapolis for three terms from 1895 to 1901. From 1902 to 1916 he represented Indiana on the Democratic National Committee and in 1904 was selected as chairman of that body. He was appointed to the United States Senate.
to fill a vacancy caused by death in March of 1916. Taggart died March 6, 1929.


Mack, Norman, was born July 24, 1858. In 1879 he established The Sunday Times in Buffalo, New York; in 1883 he added The Daily Times. He continued as editor and publisher of these papers until his retirement in 1929. He became a member of the Democratic National Committee in 1900 and served in that capacity until 1932, when he was made chairman emeritus. From July 14, 1908, until July 15, 1912 he was chairman of the Democratic National Committee. He died December 25, 1932.


McCombs, William F., was born December 26, 1875 at Hamburg, Arkansas. He received his A.B. at Princeton University in 1898 and his LL.B. at Harvard University in 1901. He practiced law in New York city. He was one of the original supporters of Woodrow Wilson for the presidency of the United States, and he served as campaign manager for Wilson in the pre-convention period. On July 12, 1912 he was selected as national chairman and served the full term. In 1914 he was elected chairman of the New York State Committee, and two years later he was the nominee of his party for a seat in the United States Senate. He was defeated. In 1919 he toured the United States to solidify the anti-Wilson
forces. Woodrow Wilson tendered him an appointment as ambassador to France in 1913, but he declined it. His health was poor most of his adult life, and he died on February 22, 1921 at the age of forty-five.


McCormick, Vance, was born on July 19, 1872, at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.B. at Yale University in 1893, his M.A. at the same school in 1907, and an honorary LL.D. at Dickinson College in 1934. He published The Patriot, a morning paper, and The Evening News of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. From 1900 to 1902, he was a member of the City Council of his native city, and from 1902 to 1905 he served as mayor. In 1914, he was the candidate for the Democratic party for governor of Pennsylvania, but he was defeated. He acted as chairman of the Democratic National Committee from June 16, 1916, until his resignation in February, 1919. From 1917 to 1919, he was chairman of the War Trade Board. He was also a member of the American War Mission. He attended the Presbyterian church. McCormick died on June 16, 1946.

Cummings, Homer, was born on August 30, 1870. He was educated at the Heathcote School in Buffalo and at Yale College and Law School and was admitted to the bar of Connecticut in 1893. At the age of thirty he was elected mayor of Stamford, Connecticut; he was reelected to this position twice. He also served as State's Attorney for Connecticut for a decade. From 1900 to 1925 he was a member of the Democratic National Committee. In 1912 he was director of the Speakers' Bureau of the Democratic National Committee, and in 1913 he was selected as vice-chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Again in 1916 he was director of the Speakers' Bureau for his party. On February 25, 1919 he was selected as chairman of the Democratic National Committee and served until July 20, 1920. He was United States Attorney General from 1933 to 1939. By religious preference he is a Congregationalist. Cummings is still living and makes his home in Washington, D.C.


White, George W., was born in Elmira, New York, on August 21, 1872. He was graduated from Princeton University in 1895. He was a member of the Ohio General Assembly from 1915 to 1918 and a member of the United States House of Representatives from 1911 to 1919. On July 20, 1920 he was selected as national chairman of the Democratic National Committee and served in that capacity until his resignation on November 1, 1921. From 1930 to 1933, he served as governor of Ohio. He had many business interests in his long career. He is still living in his home at Marietta, Ohio.

Hull, Cordell, was born in Overton County, Tennessee, October 1, 1871. He attended the National Normal University of Lebanon, Ohio, and received a B.L. from Cumberland University Law School in 1891. In 1892 and again in 1894, he was elected to the state legislature of his native state. In 1903 he was appointed judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit to fill an unexpired term. He was a member of the United States Congress as a representative from 1907 to 1921 and from 1923 to 1931, and as a senator from 1931 to 1933 when he resigned to become Secretary of State. From Nov. 1, 1921 to July 22, 1924 he was chairman of the Democratic National Committee. He resigned as head of the Department of State in 1944 and was appointed to the United Nations Conference in 1945. He is still living in Washington, D.C.


Shaver, Elm, was born on a farm in West Virginia on January 22, 1867. He practiced as an attorney in Fairmont, West Virginia, for years. For over twenty-five years he served as a precinct committeeman in his native state. In 1912 he was elected to the West Virginia legislature and served with that body for two terms. He was selected as national chairman of the Democratic National Committee on August 11, 1924, and completed his full term. In 1944, he was one of Jesse Jones' assistants in the Reconstruction Finance
Raskob, John J., was born March 19, 1879, in Lockport, New York. He was educated in the public schools and at a business college. He entered the business field at an early age and rose to the position of Chairman of the Finance Committee of the General Motors Corporation. He was also associated with the DuPont Corporation. His record shows no political experience at the time he was selected to head the Democratic National Committee in 1928. He was an independent in politics and was at one time a member of the Union League Club of Philadelphia, a Republican organization. Appointed national chairman in 1928, he served a full term. He was a Catholic and a member of the Knights of Columbus. In 1928 he was appointed as a Papal Chamberlain. He died at the age of seventy-one on October 15, 1950. 


Farley, James A., was born at Grassy Point, New York, on May 30, 1888. He is a graduate of the Packard Commercial School of New York. Entering the business field as a bookkeeper, he prospered and in 1926 was in a position to organize his own company, James A. Farley & Company. In 1929, this company merged with five other firms to form the General Building Supply Corporation. Farley was a president of this concern until 1933. His political experience began early with his election as town clerk at Stony Point
in 1912. He was Port Warden of New York, from 1918 to 1919. In 1922 he was elected to the New York State Assembly, but he served for only one term, being defeated in his bid for reelection. He was selected as secretary of the New York State Democratic Committee in 1919 and served in this capacity until 1929. In 1930, he became chairman of the New York State Democratic Committee. On July 2, 1932 his selection as national chairman of the Democratic National Committee was confirmed by the membership of that committee, and he remained in this position through the Democratic National Convention of 1940. He was appointed Postmaster General of the United States in 1933 and served in that capacity until August, 1940. Since his retirement from official connection with the national party he has been chairman of the board and director of the Coca Cola Export Corporation. He is a Catholic and a member of the Knights of Columbus. He lives in New York City.

Hanna, Marcus Alonzo was born in New Lisbon, Ohio, on September 24, 1937. He was educated at Western Reserve College and received an LL.D. at Kenyon College in 1900. He entered the business world as an employee of a wholesale grocery house where he remained until 1867. Later, he founded the H. Hanna & Company, dealers in coal and iron. He was also a director in several other Cleveland enterprises. In 1884 he became a member of the State Finance Committee for Ohio; and in 1885 he served on the Executive Campaign Committee for the election of the Ohio governor. He became national chairman of the Republican party after the 1896 convention and served in the chairmanship until his death. Appointed to the United States Senate in 1897, he served in that body until his death on February 15, 1904.

Cortelyou, George B., was born in New York City, on July 26, 1862. He was a graduate of the State Normal School, Westfield, Connecticut. He received an LL.B at Georgetown University, and an LL.M at George Washington University (Columbia College). He returned to Georgetown to receive his LL.D. In 1889, he entered public service, and in 1895 he was selected as stenographer to President Cleveland. He became an assistant secretary to President McKinley in 1896 and was promoted to secretary in 1900. President Theodore Roosevelt reappointed him to the same post in 1901. When the Department of Commerce and Labor was created, he became its first secretary. On June 23, 1904, he was selected as chairman of the Republican National Committee, and he served in that capacity until 1907 when he was appointed Secretary of the Treasury. From March 1905 to March 1907 he was Postmaster General of the United States. He died October 23, 1910.

Sources: Who Was Who in America, 1897-1942, Vol. 1; NCAB; Louis Coolidge, "George B. Cortelyou," Review of Reviews, Vol. 70; U.S. 62d Congress, 2d sess., Senate, Hearings before Sub-Committee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, pursuant to S. Res. 20, Cortelyou Testimony.

New, Harry, was born in Indianapolis, December 31, 1858. He was educated in the public schools and at Butler University, which university gave him an honorary LL.D. in 1927. As a newspaper editor and publisher, he was associated with the Indianapolis Journal for twenty-five years. He was also president of the Bedford Stone and Construction Company. From 1896 to 1900 he
Hitchcock, Frank H., was born October 5, 1869, at Amherst, Ohio. He received his A.B. at Harvard University in 1891, his LL.B. at Columbia in 1894, and his LL.M. at the same school the following year. He was an employee of the Department of Agriculture for many years, serving as Chief of the Division of Foreign Markets for six years. When the Department of Commerce and Labor was created, he moved over to that department and served as Chief Clerk for George B. Cortelyou. In 1904, he became assistant secretary of the Republican National Committee. Appointed first assistant postmaster general in 1905, he served in that capacity until 1908. He was pre-convention campaign manager for William Howard Taft and was elected as national chairman of the Republican National Committee on July 4, 1908. He resigned from the chairmanship in March, 1909,
to become Postmaster General. He died August 15, 1935.

Sources: Information supplied the writer by the Harvard College Library; Post-Office Department Library, "Biographical Sketches of the Postmasters General;" U.S. 62d Congress, 2d sess., Senate, hearings before Sub-Committee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, pursuant to S.Res. 20, Hitchcock testimony.

Hill, John F., was born in Eliot, Maine on October 29, 1855. He was graduated from the Maine Medical School in 1877 and practiced medicine for one year. In 1879, he moved to Augusta, Maine and joined the Vickery Publishing Company, which company later became the Vickery-Hill Publishing Company. He was elected to the Maine legislature in 1889, reelected in 1891, and elected to the upper house in 1892, where he served until 1897. From 1900 to 1904 he served as governor of Maine. He acted as vice-chairman of the Republican National Committee from March 4, 1909 to December 12, 1911, when he was selected as chairman. He died still holding the office, March 16, 1912. He was a member of the Universalist church.

Sources: National Cyclopaedia of American Biography.

Hosewater, Victor, was born in Omaha, Nebraska on February 13, 1871. He received his education at Johns Hopkins and at Columbia University. From the latter school, he received a Ph.B. in 1891 and an M.A. in 1892. He held the first university fellowship in Political Science at Columbia from 1892 to 1893. It was Columbia University which also granted him his Ph.D.

He was a newspaper reporter, writer, and editor. Eventually, he became vice-president of the Bee Publishing Company, publishers
of the Omaha Daily Bee. He lectured on municipal finance at several universities and was the author of many articles among which was the article on "laissez faire" in Palgrave's *Dictionary of Political Economy*. From 1895-1897 he was a regent at the University of Nebraska. He was a member of the Republican National Committee from 1908 to 1912 and was acting chairman of the committee until his appointment as full chairman shortly before the National Convention of 1912. He was a member of the Jewish faith.


Hilles, Charles D., was born in Belmont County, Ohio, on June 23, 1867. He graduated from the Barnesville, Ohio, high school in 1885 and attended an academy at Oxford, Maryland, from 1885 to 1887. From 1890 to 1902 he was financial officer and superintendent of the Boys Industrial School at Lancaster, Ohio; from 1902 to 1909 he was managing director of the Children's Village at Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. In 1909 he was appointed assistant secretary of the United States Treasury, and in 1911 he became secretary to President Taft. On June 24, 1912, he was selected as national chairman of the Republican National Committee, and he served for the full term. His religious beliefs were Presbyterian. After he left the chairmanship he became an associate in the insurance business. He died August 27, 1949.

Wilcox, William R., was born in Smyrna, New York on April 11, 1863. From 1882 to 1885 he was principal of the Webster, New York Academy, but in 1887 he moved to New York City to practice law. From 1902 to 1903 he was Commissioner of Parks for the boroughs of Manhattan and Richmond. He was also president of the Park Board. In 1905 he was appointed postmaster of New York City. In 1907 he was appointed to serve on the Utilities Commission by Governor Hughes. He received an LL.D. from New York University in 1909. For nineteen months he served as national chairman of the Republican National Committee; he resigned as chairman January 19, 1918. He died April 9, 1940.


Hays, Will H., was born in Sullivan, Indiana, on November 5, 1879. He received an A.B. from Wabash College in 1900 and an A.M. in 1904. Admitted to the bar in Indiana in 1900, he became one of the members of Hays & Hays, attorneys. His experience at National Conventions started at the age of 16, when he attended his first convention with his father. He was a precinct committee­ man before he was old enough to vote, and he worked his way up gradually from chairman of the County Committee to chairman of the District Committee, and thence to chairman of the State Committee. On February 22, 1918, he was elected as chairman of the Republican National Committee. In March, 1921, he was appointed Postmaster General. He resigned as national chairman in June, 1921. After his resignation as Postmaster General, he joined the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America.

1The acting Postmaster General took over the office on December 17, 1921. See Postmasters General General Letter Book.
He is Presbyterian by religion and taught Sunday-school for fifteen years.


Adams, John T., was born in Dubuque, Iowa, on December 22, 1862. He was a member of Carr, Adams and Collier Company, manufacturer of doors and sashes. For twelve years, he served his native state as a representative on the Republican National Committee. In 1908 he managed the campaign for Senator William B. Allison; in 1912 he conducted the primary campaign in his home state for William Howard Taft for president. The western Republican headquarters were under his charge in 1920, when he held the position of vice-chairman of the Republican National Committee. In June, 1921, he was promoted to the chairmanship, and he remained in that position until the Republican National Convention of 1924. His religious beliefs were those of the Congregationalists. He died October 28, 1939.

Sources: The Adams Papers supplied to the writer by Paul Adams, son of John T. Adams; Who's Who in Government, 1932-33; NCAP.

Butler, William M., was born in New Bedford, Massachusetts, on January 29, 1861. He received an LL.B. from Boston University in 1884 and practiced law in New Bedford and in Boston. He was also associated with the manufacturing of textiles and was an executive in several mills including the Butler, Prentice Company, Inc. In 1924 he was appointed to the United States Senate for the term
ending in 1927 but was defeated for reelection. He had been a member of the Massachusetts State Senate from 1892-1895, being president of that body for the last two years of his tenure. He was a member of the fraternal order of the Masons. He died March 29, 1937.

Sources: MGAB, Claude Fuess, Calvin Coolidge (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1940).

Hubert, was born in Marion Center, Pennsylvania, on July 3, 1860. He did his undergraduate work at the University of Michigan and received his M.D. at the University of Pennsylvania in 1885. He practiced medicine in Colorado, specializing in mental and nervous disorders. His association with national politics began in 1908 when he was a delegate-at-large from Colorado to the Republican National Convention. In 1912, he was elected chairman of the Colorado Republican State Central Committee. He served as a member of the Republican National Committee from 1916 to 1920. In 1921 he was appointed first assistant postmaster general, was promoted to Postmaster General in March, 1922, and became Secretary of the Interior in March, 1923. He served in this last capacity for five years. Herbert Hoover chose him to be chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1928, and he remained in that office for fifteen months before he resigned. He died December 14, 1942.

Huston, Claudius, was born in Harrison County, Indiana, on February 15, 1876. He attended Valparaiso University and the Chattanooga Normal School. At one time in his career he operated a small business college. He was a director in a score of large Chattanooga business interests, being chairman of the Transcontinental Oil Company and of the Associated Bond and Shares Corporation. Huston was at one time president of the Chattanooga Manufacturers Association. In the political field, he was chairman of the Campaign Committee and of the Advisory Committee of the Republican State Committee in Tennessee in 1920. From 1921 to 1923 he served as an assistant to the Secretary of the Department of Commerce, Herbert Hoover. Prior to his selection as chairman of the Republican National Committee in September, 1929, he had served as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of that body. He was a Presbyterian and a Mason. He died August 15, 1952.


Simeon, Simeon, was born in Allen County, Iowa, on December 11, 1861. He received an A.B. from Ohio Northern University in 1889, an A.M. in 1891, an LL.B. in 1896, and an LL.D. in 1900. By profession he was an educator and an author. He was professor of History at Ohio Northern University from 1889-1897, Dean of the College of Law from 1897-1900, and vice-president of Ohio Northern University from 1900-1902. From 1907-1917 he was president of Antioch College. In 1913 he was elected to the
United States House of Representative where he remained until his election to the Senate in 1922. He was chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee from 1918 to 1922. In 1928, he was the temporary chairman of the Republican National Convention; and in August, 1930, he became chairman of the Republican National Committee in which office he served until the end of the term in 1932. He continued on in the United States Senate until 1935. He was a Methodist and a Mason. He died December 23, 1936.


Sanders, Everett, was born in Clay County, Indiana, on March 8, 1882. From 1900 to 1902 he was a student at the Indiana State Normal School. He received an LL.B. from Indiana University in 1907 and began the practice of law in Terre Haute, Indiana. Elected to the United States House of Representative in 1917, he served there until 1925. In 1925, he became secretary to President Coolidge, and he remained in that capacity until 1929. He was a member of the Executive Committee of the Republican National Committee under the chairmanship of Charles D. Hilles. President Hoover selected him as chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1932, and he resigned from that office in 1932. He was a member of the Missionary Baptists.

Fletcher Henry P., was born in Green Castle, Pennsylvania, on April 10, 1873. He was educated at Chambersburg Academy, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, and he received an LL.B. from Juniata College. He was admitted to the bar in 1894. In 1902, he entered the diplomatic service, serving in turn as legation secretary, charge d'affaires, minister, and ambassador. He was appointed an Under Secretary in the Department of State in 1921. In June, 1934, he was elected chairman of the Republican National Committee and served until June, 1936, when he became general counsel for that committee. He served in this last position until 1944. He is a member of the Scotch-Irish Association of Pennsylvania. He is still living in Green Castle, Pennsylvania.


Hamilton John D., was born at Madison, Iowa, on March 2, 1892. He was graduated from Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts, in 1913. He received an LL.B. from Northwestern University in 1916 and practiced law in Kansas City, Kansas and in Topeka, Kansas, for many years. He was elected to the Kansas House of Representatives in 1925 and served as Speaker of that body from 1927 to 1928. In 1928, he was an unsuccessful candidate for governor of Kansas. The Republican State Central Committee of Kansas chose him as chairman of that committee in 1930. In 1935, he was appointed as special counsel to the Republican National Committee. He resigned this position to be the pre-convention campaign manager for Alfred Landon. He was chosen as chairman of the Republican National Committee in June, 1936, and he
remained on the staff of the committee at the end of his term as chairman to serve as executive director under the chairmanship of Joseph Martin. He is presently a member of Pepper, Bodine, Stokes, and Hamilton, a Philadelphia law firm. He is a Mason.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscripts

Hyde Park, N.Y. Democratic National Committee MSS: Dewson Files, 1929-40; Michelson Files; Molly Dewson Patronage Files, 1933; President's Secretary's Files; F.D.R., P.P.F., Box 309; State Files; Women's Division Files, Box 5.

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., William McKinley MSS.


Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., James K. Polk MSS.

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Theodore Roosevelt MSS:

Boxes 34, 48, 142, 148, 218.


Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., William Howard Taft MSS:

Pre-Inaugural Series, Boxes 1, and 3; Pringle Copies;

Boxes, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 46; Cabinet Recommendations Box 7-22.


Princeton University Library, Rare Book Room: Diary of Maurice Lyons.

Public Documents


Vol. 36, Index.
Vol. 56, Part 3.
Vol. 72, Part 9.
Vol. 80, Parts 3, 5, 9, 10.


Sub-Committee of Committee on Appropriations. Hearings on Emergency Relief Appropriations for 1929 and PWA Appropriations. 75th Congress, 3rd sess.


Record. Vol. 36, Index.


Record. Vol. 80, Parts 3, 5, 9, 10.


Reports


Logansport, Ind: Wilson, Humphreys & Co., 1896.


of the Democratic National Convention, 1912. Chicago:
The Peterson Lithotyping Co., n.d.

Convention, 1916.

Convention, 1920. Indianapolis: Bookwalter-Ball Printing
Co., 1920.

Convention, 1924. Indianapolis: Bookwalter-Ball-Greathouse
Printing Co., 1924.

Convention, 1928. Indianapolis: Bookwalter-Ball-Greathouse
Printing Co., 1928.

Convention, 1932.

Convention, 1936.


National Civil Service League. Fiftieth Proceedings of the National

Fifty-second Proceedings of the National Civil Service League.
New York: National Civil Service League.

Official Proceedings of the Eleventh Republican National Convention, 1876.


United States Civil Service Commission. Thirty-first Report of the
United States Civil Service Commission. Washington: Government

Books

Adams, Samuel Hopkins. Incredible Era. The Life and Times of Warren


Bates, Ernest Sutherland. The Story of Congress 1789-1935. New York:
Harper & Bros., 1936.


Belmont, August. Letters, Speeches and Addresses of August Belmont.
Privately printed, 1890.

Belmont, Perry. The Abolition of the Secrecy of Party Funds. Washington:


Binkley, Wilfred E. American Political Parties: Their Natural History.

Bishop, Joseph Bucklin. Presidential Nominations and Elections. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1916.

Theodore Roosevelt and His Time. 2 vols. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1920.


---


Articles


Vol. 54, August, 16, 1916, p. 143.


Pamphlets


Washington: Republican National Committee.


Newspapers


The Washington National Intelligencer, June 2, 1852.

Unpublished Materials


Letters

Farley, James A., to writer, December 17, 1952.


Knowles, Gladys E., to writer, Oct. 8, 1952.

Mannon, Jessica (Butler University Library secretary) to writer, March 13, 1952.

Savage, Marjorie. Reminiscences sent to Lehr Fess in response to request from the writer and forwarded to the writer by Lehr Fess, Oct. 29, 1952.

White, George, to writer, Oct. 16, 1951.
Interviews

With Will H. Hays, October 16, 17, 1951.


With Clem Shaver, February 27, March 10, 1952.

With Homer Cummings, June 26, 1952.
Arie Chatham
Doctor of Philosophy.
February 16, 1898.
Kallahahn Catholic High School.
William and Mary College
Hunter College
University of Hawaii
University of California, Berkeley
University of California, Los Angeles
George Washington University, A.B., 1948
George Washington University, A.M., 1949


Instructor at Norfolk College, Norfolk, Virginia.