THE CIO'S ROLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1936-1948

by

Delbert D. Arnold

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

1952
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONTRIBUTIONS TO LABOR'S NON-PARTISAN LEAGUE IN 1936</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTRIBUTIONS OF CIO UNIONS TO THE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE IN 1944</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC CANDIDATES FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN 1944</td>
<td>195-201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VOTE IN THOSE STATES IN WHICH PAC Elected Members of the House of Representatives</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENATORIAL ELECTIONS, 1944</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPARATIVE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL STRENGTH IN STATES IN WHICH THE PAC WON ELECTIONS</td>
<td>215-220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP AND SECTIONAL BEHAVIOR IN THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE</td>
<td>222-223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES IN 1944</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESULTS OF FORTUNE POLL ON PUBLIC REACTION TO PAC</td>
<td>267-268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATES IN WHICH THE COMPOSITION OF THE VOTE AND PAC SUCCESSES IN THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS POINT TO A MAJOR ROLE FOR THE CIO IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1948</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATES IN WHICH THE COMPOSITION OF THE VOTE AND PAC SUCCESSES IN THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS POINT TO A SECONDARY OR MINOR ROLE FOR THE CIO IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, 1948</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECORD OF THE CIO-PAC IN THE 1948 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I  WHY UNIONS TURNED TO POLITICS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II CIO POLITICAL DIFFERENCES UNSEAT LEWIS</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III WAR THREATENS LABOR GAINS AND PAC IS FORMED</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV LABOR DRAFTS A PROGRAM</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V  PAC PLANS STRATEGY AND BECOMES A POLITICAL ISSUE</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI PAC IN THE 1944 CAMPAIGN</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII THE PAC'S CONTRIBUTION IN THE 1944 ELECTION</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII POSTWAR STRIKES UNDERMINE PAC'S POSITION</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX  THE PAC FIGHTS FOR POLITICAL SURVIVAL</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X  LABOR IN THE 1948 CAMPAIGN</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI POST-MORTEM ON THE 1948 ELECTION</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII THE CIO AFTER TWELVE YEARS IN POLITICS</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
WHY UNIONS TURNED TO POLITICS

The influence of the American Federation of Labor upon trade unionism in the United States has been so profound that it has become common practice to identify an emphasis on craft rather than class, restrictive rather than mass membership, and collective bargaining rather than politics as peculiarly American, and to view appeals to working class solidarity or political aspiration as alien imports. Yet political activity and a strong spirit of reform have been as persistent characteristics of the American labor movement as the modern emphasis upon the wage contract. Distrust of monopolies and big business, and demands for labor reforms and social legislation have been major elements in labor's thinking from Thomas Skidmore's Workingmen's Party to the Congress of Industrial Organization's Political Action Committee. Immediately following the Civil War, the Labor Reform Party and the Greenback-Labor Party fought for currency inflation, regulation of the railroads, and a Civil Service merit system. A decade later the Knights of Labor joined with the farm groups in engineering the Populist revolt. Under the banner of the Progressive movement and of the New Deal, labor consistently raised its voice to demand stricter regulation of monopolies, a public program of unemployment relief, and many other social reforms.

In devising methods for implementing those views, it wavered between aggressive group action and the policy of leaving political matters to the
between participants and practice did not change the official position of all

Freese indicate, Robert M. Lappettite. But the recurrent conflict

parties led the Executive Council to make a formal endorsement of the pro-

the Federation's support to Byman. Again in 1929, the requests of the major

sent to the result. When in 1930, the Republicans ignored the AF's

more ardent defenders of the non-union policy have not been entirely

However, union members have not responded to a voting bloc, and even the

or the rank of open political participation. When left to their own devices,

an influence upon the major parties without accepting the responsibility

our sources and defeat them. The AFL always expected to exercise

the membership to stand faithfully by our friends and� they opposed

politics. In practicing the voters record of candidates, and encouraging

more satisfactorily because unions were never genuinely indifferent to

alternative course of evolving formal committees, however, the proved no

loyalties as soon as their expectations over immediate issues shrank. The

However, because union members tended to revert back to their party

those of the regular parties. But such ventures usually proved short-lived,

been frequent enough to indicate an underlying discontent with the pro-

need. Labor parties and union cooperation with third-party coalitions have

distortion of individual members' without ever achieving real effectiv-e.
As the Twentieth Century progressed many of the factors which originally conditioned the AFL's political thinking had changed. Urbanism and industrialism had developed so rapidly that the population was no longer predominately rural. Class lines were by no means fixed, but certainly the worker was becoming more pessimistic concerning his prospects of social and economic advancement, and more inclined to identify himself with the wage-earning class. Nevertheless, by the end of the decade following World War I, there was still no perceptible change in the AFL's political position. Basically the non-partisan policy reflected a prudence born of labor's recognition of its own weakness. The increase in the number of industrial workers actually did little to change that weakness, for the craft unions were in no position to speak for them. Moreover, the open shop drive, welfare capitalism, the yellow-dog contract reduced the Federation's membership from 1,078,740 in 1920 to 2,961,096 ten years later. These developments intensified the Union's sense of struggling for survival, and in that frame of mind the venture into the 1924 election served merely to confirm their preconceptions concerning political action. They were more impressed with the fact that LaFollette failed to win the election than that he had—with only make-shift support—succeeded in winning sixteen percent of the total presidential vote.

The non-partisan policy was, in fact, a contradiction of terms. In essence it did not reject partisanship, but merely substituted a narrower, more irresponsible brand of partisanship. By rejecting political action, the AFL in effect renounced all responsibility in matters affecting the general welfare. Only measures affecting the immediate security of unions

---

(AFL Convention Proceedings, 1931, op. cit., p. 49.)
were recognized as a legitimate cause for group action. In informing the membership regarding the voting record of candidates, for example, the sole criterion was their stand on labor legislation. Whatever they might have done or left undone concerning the general welfare mattered little. By abdicating from general political responsibility, the AFL had placed class above nation as surely as the advocates of class struggle. When depression finally struck, the AFL had succeeded so well in adopting the protective coloring of prevailing beliefs, and in suppressing its own political instincts and beliefs, that it was not only unwilling but unable to make constructive suggestions for dealing with the broader economic problems.

The AFL leaders were as shocked as their business counterparts at the sudden collapse of the new prosperity. Their first responses were mechanical expressions of economic orthodoxy. William Green in the pages of the American Federationist assured his readers that "business was fundamentally sound." At President Hoover's conference "to organize against panic," in November of 1929, the Federation readily reached an agreement with the business representatives to call a moratorium upon wage cuts and wage demands. Acceptance of the principle of voluntary action was not made skeptically, but in full faith.

Make-shift measures, however, did not suffice and the economic consequences of the depression were too harsh to be passively endured. Relief

---


and positive action to hasten recovery were clearly the most pressing needs of the workers. But a reorientation of labor's viewpoint was necessary before it could be able to think constructively in terms of these matters, for the laissez-faire influence was strong. In the AFL, the leadership lagged well behind the membership in its willingness to compromise the principle of noninterference with the economic process. Yet the Federation's official explanations of the depression and proposals for dealing with unemployment soon led it into contradictions.

During the late 1920's, its wage demands had rested upon the contention that the stability of real wages, in face of increased efficiency and rising profits, made it impossible for the consumers to buy the goods produced, and thus disrupted employment and the stability of the economy. Consequently, in explaining the crash, it ranked technological unemployment high as a fundamental cause. The AFL Executive Council compiled impressive statistical evidence of worker displacement during the decade of prosperity. According to its findings, industries employing 40 percent of the total wage earners had 900,000 fewer workers in 1929 than in 1919, despite an increased volume of business. In manufacturing, 42 percent more goods had been produced with 546,000 fewer employees. In coal mining, production had increased 23 percent, but employment had declined by 100,000. The Council's estimates placed the increase in the total number of job seekers, between 1919 and 1929, at 7,000,000. The initial conclusion drawn from these facts was that the health of the economy depended upon maintaining and increasing the purchasing power of the workers. The attempt to reach an agreement with business, to maintain wage levels, was clearly in that spirit. Share-the-work schemes also fitted in well with the belief that technological

6 Ibid.
displacement had made wages and hour adjustments the key to restoring economic balance. Demands for a thirty-hour work week became common.

There were other implications in this line of reasoning which the Executive Council did not squarely face. If the competitive drive for profits diverted an unhealthy proportion of the national income to management so that the consumer could not buy the goods produced, and depression resulted, then the concept of technological unemployment was basically a criticism of the economic system. It meant that the forces of the market had failed to assure economic balance, and that businessmen as a group had failed to realize their responsibility to society and to the workers. The exponents of "business unionism" did not at first carry their criticisms that far. They conceived their position as that of demanding a right to share more fully in the benefits of capitalism, rather than of criticizing the capitalistic system.

Later as economic hardship increased the discontent of the membership, the Federation became more critical of management's failure to use the means at its disposal for controlling the business cycle. Blame was attached to management because its sense of social responsibility had not kept pace with the increase in economic interdependence. The Executive Council pointed out in its 1930 report that little progress had been made in preventing unemployment due to seasonal, technological, and cyclical causes.

---

8 AFL Convention Proceedings, 1930, op. cit., p. 47.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 52.
were not yet available, and, therefore, that the authority of any national

Federation warned that the facts necessary for successful economic planning

mean the national possibility of planning. In the following year, the

that was new for the AFL. little effort was made, however, to elaborate the

works program, in particular, turned to an emphasis upon economic planning

governmental action. The demands for a national economic council and a public

meant to immediately some degree of

in all trades or occupations. It is most of the proposals involved not only in the trades but

unrelated opportunity for vocational preparation not only in the trades but

(4) a careful study of retail proposals, and (10)

related unemployment, (6) a study of the trade-

tions, (7) voca-

exchanges, (6) a public works program to assist the unemployed, (7) voca-

in production and sales management, (5) a national system of employment

at the expense of employment. (3) a national economic council, (4) greater efficiency

duction of working hours, (2) advance planning to regulate the production and

1930, and offered a ten-point program which included demands for (1) a re-

interpretation of purpose and activity. "To

in order to change all planning for progress from conflict to interest to

We need knowledge of the facts and predictions of coordination in

were need knowledge of the facts and predictions of coordination in

considering when planning the affairs."

structured as "inventive." It concerned, with industry and a responsibility

the welfare of public charity. The personal contribution of the worker con-

stockbrokers had no hesitancy in lending the security of their workers to

and that companies which carefully planned their affairs to protect the
economic council should be limited to fact finding. 14

The suspicion of government which continued to characterize the craft union hierarchy in the AFL was clearly revealed by its stand on all brands of social insurance. At the 1930 convention, the membership vigorously supported resolutions favoring compulsory unemployment insurance. The Executive Council blocked immediate action, and reluctantly agreed to study the matter further. Its report in the following year rejected the whole principle on the grounds that unemployment insurance was a dole, which would subject the worker to the evils of governmental interference and control. 15 It was not until 1932 that the open opposition of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, the International Association of Machinists, the Teamster's Union, the Holders' Union, and several of the printing unions forced a reversal of that stand. 16 Thus, after the depression was well underway the AFL leadership clung to views that were very similar to those of their business counterparts.

A number of unions—especially in the clothing industry— which had been less subject to the Gompers influence took the lead in advocating a governmental solution to the problem of unemployment. At the Progressive Conference, which Senators George W. Norris and Robert LaFollette, Jr., called in 1931, 17 Sidney Hillman, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, bluntly demanded "national social economic planning with teeth in it." 18 Later, when the Senate Committee on Manufacturers heard testimony

14 Lorwin, op. cit., p. 296.
15 Ibid., pp. 292-3.
16 Ibid., p. 293.
17 President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.
18 Proceedings of Amalgamated Clothing Workers Convention, 1931, op. cit., p. 16.
on LaFollette's bill to set up a national economic planning council, Hillman appeared to urge the adoption of the plan. As a concession to the mounting sentiment in favor of more aggressive action, the AFL Executive Council declared in 1932, "We believe that national economic planning should aim at raising standard of living for lagging groups and not a program of production with price fixing." It also summarized labor's aspirations in any such program with the statement:

What every worker wants is a job and the sense of security that comes from having a dependable source of income. We want to earn our way and to have commensurate rewards that will enable us to participate in those activities that will bring us opportunities for development.

In accepting the principle of planning the AFL leaders were careful not to commit themselves to any particular plan.

By 1932 one of the realities which organized labor had to face was that workers without jobs have little need for a bargaining agent. If the unions could not protect the security of their members, they had to turn to some agency which could. If a solution to unemployment was not immediately forthcoming, relief would have to be provided in the interval. The alternative was dwindling membership and organizational extinction.

Although reserving judgment on many of the broader issues, the AFL faced the necessity of turning to government for the relief which its members needed. In the spring of 1932 it sponsored a Washington Conference of International Unions for the purpose of lobbying on behalf of relief legislation. A delegation from that conference visited the leaders of the House

---

19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
and Senate on behalf of the LaFollette-Costigan bill, which proposed appropriations totaling $375,000,000 for direct unemployment relief. Despite this visitation the Senate defeated the bill by a vote of forty-eight to thirty-five. William Green next testified on behalf of LaFollette's subsequent bill calling for a relief program financed to the amount of $5,500,000,000, and Senator Robert Wagner's proposals for federal loans to State public works and relief programs. Eventually, in July of 1932, Congress passed a $2,122,000,000 relief appropriation, which was to be spent in accord with Wagner's suggestion.

At the conference of union leaders, called by Frances Perkins shortly after the Roosevelt Administration took office, Hillman suggested the creation of a labor board with broad powers over employment and working conditions. Green advanced his pet scheme, the thirty-hour work week. The outcome was the appointment of a committee consisting of Green, A. F. Whitney of the Railway Brotherhood, Hillman, and Miss Rose Schneiderman, President of the Women's Trade Union League, to devise an overall program of industrial recovery based on the principle of work sharing. The Black-Connery Bill was the outcome, but Congress shelved it in favor of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Thus, few of Labor's specific proposal were accepted. Most of the measures actually adopted for the relief of the working man were

---

22 Ibid., p. 40.
23 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
24 Ibid., p. 41.
25 Proceedings of Amalgamated Clothing Workers Convention, 1934, op. cit., p. 27.
26 Ibid.
initiated by groups outside of the union movement. Their character, however, was in accord with the concessions to emergency thinking which had carried labor a step away from its traditional economic and political moorings.

Paradoxically, although the AFL—along with other union groups—had turned to the government for a solution of its immediate economic difficulties, it clung stubbornly to its non-partisan position in politics. At the 1930 convention, the Federation declared:27

...If there be weakness in our present non-partisan political methods, it is not in its structure, but in the attitude and response of those indifferent or hostile to this plan of action.

Its attitude was due not so much to any scruple against exercising political influence as to a tenacious belief that a partisan bid for power by labor must always prove unsuccessful in the American environment. The federal character of the American government, Green explained to a visiting delegation of British trade-unionists in 1931, made a legislative solution of labor's problems particularly difficult.28 With one national and forty-eight state governments to contend with, to secure adequate protection for labor in even the simplest matter involved bewilderingly protracted and complicated political processes. He cited as an example the fact that it had required years of intensive agitation by labor to persuade a majority of the states to pass adequate workmen's compensation laws, and that four still had none at all.29

28 Ibid., 1931, p. 252.
29 Ibid.
Non-partisan propriety permitted the Federation, annually, to appoint a committee charged to, "Stand faithfully by our friends and elect them. Oppose our enemies and defeat them, whether they be candidates for President, for Congress, or other offices, whether executive, legislative or judicial." The committee could compile information concerning pending legislation and the voting record of Congress, urge local groups to interview candidates, get out the vote, and at election time submit suggestions to the party conventions. It was likewise considered proper for it to lobby on behalf of legislation of interest to labor. But it was strictly forbidden to endorse or to campaign on behalf of specific candidates.

The perennial strategy was for the Committee to concentrate on one or two key measures rather than upon a whole program of legislation. During the early 1930's, securing the passage of an anti-injunction law, and blocking the Supreme Court appointment of Justice John J. Parker, who had incurred labor's wrath by upholding the "yellow-dog" contracts, were the chief objectives of AFL political policy. Later, relief measures began to receive a greater share of its attention. In the case of Parker, the Federation was not content merely to block the appointment, but violated precedent by conducting a campaign to defeat all senators who voted for the appointment. It claimed success in ten elections. Ordinarily, however, the Committee

30 Ibid., 1933, p. 112.
31 Ibid., 1931, pp. 121-3; 1933, p.112, etc.
32 Ibid., 1931, p. 119.
33 Senators Allan, Blease, Grundy, McCulloch, Ramsdell, and Steck were defeated, and Senators Baird, Gillette, Geoff, and Gould refused to run.
operated on a budget that rarely exceeded $14,000, the greater part of which was spent for postage and office expenses. \(^{31}\) Recognizing the limited scope of its operations, the regular parties customarily ignored its suggestions. In 1932, for example, eight of the twenty-six planks which the Non-Partisan Committee submitted were ignored by both party conventions and the remainder were passed over with slight consideration. \(^{35}\)

Despite the strong sense of importance which most union members attached to the 1932 election, the Federation adamantly refused to become involved. William Green wrote, "Let every trade-unionist vote in the coming election for the advancement of human welfare and responsible government," \(^{36}\) but he left it to each individual member to decide what these terms meant.

The advent of the New Deal programs intensified the pressures to which the AFL's political, economic, and organizational preconceptions were subjected. When the National Recovery Administration was set up many of the basic decisions affecting wages, hours, and working conditions were withdrawn from the realm of economic bargaining, and became matters of law backed by governmental sanction. Yet labor's role in the development of the fair practices codes was only advisory, and the dominant voice was that of management. Under such an arrangement the major responsibility for safeguarding the interests of the worker was shifted increasingly from the unions to the government. Consequently, organized labor became more conscious of its inability to influence basic political decisions.

By bringing the producers into industry-wide groups and temporarily suspending the anti-trust laws, the NRA also confronted unions with more

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 1934, p. 261.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., 1932, p. 159.
\(^{36}\) Madison, op. cit., p. 119.
powerful economic combinations than they had faced before. As long as these arrangements remained under federal supervision, organised labor would not suffer, for the immediate environment was one of regulation rather than of collective bargaining. If, as seemed likely, more powerful industrial groupings continued after the need for emergency measures had passed, labor's bargaining position would be definitely weaker, unless the increase in its organisational strength had kept pace with that of business combinations. 37

Section 7-A of the NRA legally guaranteed labor's right to organize, but placed management under no obligation to recognize or to deal with legitimate unions, and did not specifically forbid the company union. 38 The established unions, thus, were confronted with both the opportunity and the necessity of expanding their membership, for management quickly manifested a willingness to take the lead in organising the unskilled workers into the "right kind of unions." 39 Furthermore, powerful independent unions, such as the Amalgamated Clothing workers, joined the AFL during this period for the specific purpose of sharing in the organizational drives in the mass production industries, 40 and they were impatient of delays.

The same jurisdictional problems which had disrupted previous attempts to organize the mass production industries continued to block effective action. The established unions absolutely refused to permit new charters to be issued until craft prerogatives had been fully protected. 41 As a compromise measure...

37 Proceedings of Amalgamated Clothing Workers Convention, 1934, op. cit., p. 28.
38 Ibid., p. 47.
40 Proceedings of Amalgamated Clothing Workers Convention, 1934, op. cit., p. 47.
the AFL decided to admit the unskilled workers into so-called "Federal" unions. Under this arrangement, the workers of a given industry were to be brought into a temporary industrial union with the understanding that as soon as collective bargaining was established the membership was to be distributed among the crafts having appropriate jurisdiction. The Federal unions were considered wards of the Federation without voice or status in its affairs. As an additional guarantee of craft union interests, the AFL Executive Council also retained the right to set policy and to appoint or dismiss officers in the new unions. Despite these precautions jurisdictional squabbles forced a frequent postponement of organizational plans, and disrupted many promising local beginnings.

Under these conditions the unskilled workers tended to turn to either independent action or to company unionism. Far from growing in strength, the Federation had considerable difficulty in maintaining its own membership. AFL strength actually declined between 1932 and 1933 from 2,532,261 to 2,126,796, and by 1934 had only risen to 2,608,011. The more progressive unions grew increasingly dissatisfied with these results, and at the 1934 convention attempted to win acceptance of the principle of industrial unionism. In the committee appointed to consider the matter, John L. Lewis, of the United Mine Workers, led the fight, but he was overruled by the craft union majority. He then carried the issue to the

---

42 Ibid., p. 261
43 Ibid., 1935, p. 524.
44 Ibid., p. 21.
45 Ibid., p. 562
46 Ibid., p. 29.
convention floor, where he blamed the methods of craft unionism for the AFL’s failure in the mass production industries. 47 Enough delegates were impressed with his views to force a compromise. The Convention authorised the Executive Council to charter new unions of the vertical type in appropriate industries, and to set the terms of their admission to the Federation. 48 During the following year, however, the Council failed to use its new authority, and continued to handle the unskilled workers in the old manner. 49

A showdown was in the making when the convention assembled in the following year. The trends in union membership during the interval had served to sharpen the differences between the opposing groups. In the AFL, the membership had risen from 2,608,011 to 3,045,347 between 1934 and 1935, or in effect had reached a point slightly above the 2,961,096 membership of 1930. 50 But the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported a 6% percent increase in company unionism between the advent of the NRA and 1935. 51 There had been a similar rise of independent unions. To the advocates of industrial unionism these facts clearly proved two things; the eagerness of the unorganised workers for unionism, and the inadequacy of the craft union approach.

In 1935, twenty-one resolutions favoring industrial unionism indicated the AFL convention’s intense preoccupation with organizational problems. Equally significant was the fact that the attack was led by Lewis, Charles

47 Ibid., 1934, p. 587.
48 Ibid., p. 588.
49 Ibid., 1935, p. 562.
50 Ibid., p. 29.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 521.
Howard of the Typographical Union, and other top flight leaders. The craft unionists first adopted the strategy of trying to prevent the question from reaching the convention floor. By a one vote majority Chairman Matthew Woll put the powerful Resolutions Committee on record as favoring the continued use of Federal unions. But seven of the fifteen-man committee filed a minority report in which they declared that obsolete craft charters which failed to keep pace with the changes in industrial techniques had become an intolerable hindrance to the progress of the labor movement. For the AFL to have a membership of only 3,000,000 after fifty-five years of trying to organize the American workers, they contended, was the clearest proof of its failure.

Once the committee squabble was brought before the whole convention, both factions quickly mobilized all possible support. In a spirit of pure Compermisism, which had clearly remained wholly unaffected by the events of the depression, Matthew Woll predicted that industrial unionism would invite bureaucratic regulation. His reasoning was that even if labor succeeded in its demands for industry-wide bargaining, its very success in the economic sphere would lead employers and the public to retaliate by resorting to the political regulation of unions.

Using slightly different tack, Federation Secretary John Frey quite correctly pointed out that the AFL had always included both the craft and the industrial union, and that in their accomplishments neither type had shown a manifest superiority. He refused to recognize, however, that his

---

53 Ibid., pp. 521-2.
54 Ibid., pp. 523-4.
55 Ibid., pp. 528-33.
56 Ibid., p. 554.
basic premise was as much an argument for admitting as for excluding the vertical type of union. Instead, in his eagerness to prove that the industrial union was no panacea, he passed over such a conspicuous success as the United Mine Workers and cited the historic failure of the Knights of Labor, Debs's American Railway Union, and the Western Federation of Miners.57

Actually, these arguments skirted the real issue. The majority report of the Resolutions Committee had suggested that as the founding and sustaining elements of the Federation, the crafts were entitled to have their interests considered as paramount in all basic policy decisions.58 As the debate continued, it became more evident that the real objection to industrial unionism was the fear that the unrestricted admission of the unskilled workers to the union movement would undermine the basis of the craftsman's favored economic position. As interpreted by Woll and other Federation Spokesmen, the skilled worker recognized no obligation to the labor movement, but only to his own self interest.59

Charles Howard shrewdly pointed out that the passage of the Wagner Act had eliminated any necessity for unskilled workers to tolerate shabby treatment at the hands of the Federation.60 Continued disregard of their interests, he predicted, would encourage a fragmentation of the labor movement which could only prove harmful to all unions.61

57 Ibid., p. 557.
58 Ibid., p. 522.
59 Ibid., pp. 528-33.
60 Ibid., p. 525.
61 Ibid., pp. 525-7.
In a more belligerent tone, Lewis accused the national officers of the AFL with falsifying the record in order to hide the extent of their failure. Masterfully, he demonstrated that the 1935 progress report concealed an exodus of Federal unions, and an actual decline of AFL membership in the mass production industries. Philip Murray, of the Miners, ably supported his chief by citing specific examples of craft bungling which had disrupted promising drives in the automotive, rubber, and steel industries. The main attack, thus, stressed the inadequacy of craft union methods in dealing with modern industrial problems. The historical distinction between the skilled and unskilled, it was argued, had become largely artificial, and the interstate character of corporations had made it doubly important for collective bargaining to be placed on a broader, more all inclusive basis.

Ambition was mixed with altruism as the advocates of industrial unionism called upon the Federation to accept its responsibility to "organize the unorganized." But the question which they raised was valid. They asked the convention to decide whether a belief in the common purpose of all workers, or an emphasis upon job distinctions, was to guide the labor movement? Whether the aspiring must always be subordinated to the established? Whether the Federation should make a bold bid to win greater security for a greater number, or safeguard the advantages of the few? The majority of the delegates refused to yield to the demand for change. The dissenting minority was just as adamant in refusing to be bound by that decision, and eight of the international unions called a separate meeting to establish the Committee for Industrial Organization.

---

62 Ibid., pp. 534-5.
63 Ibid., pp. 535, 540-2.
64 Proceedings of Amalgamated Clothing Workers Convention, 1936, op. cit., p. 75.
workers had organically developed under the influence of socialist philosophies. The Americanized clothing workers and the International Ladies Garment

interest of a different nature began to develop. Important unions such as the early years of the Roosevelt administration a political

which were just as regularly sheathed without distribution
due to political reorganization embodying these aims at the AFL conventions.

M. E. Ryden of the Portland Iron Sheet, and the workers, regularly into

the American environment, Congress rently, it never won a large following.

the example of European labor parties more than the immediate circumstances

the growth marked the time of Reaction as doctrinaire, and reflected

seen the basic economic and political right.

power was necessary in order for the workers man to secure

that labor could expect no more than minor economic goals, and that labor

Johnson Keddie, Owen D. Young, and Andrew Mellon in the major parties meant

their prowess with impunity, that the role of the money men such as

that labor's lack of political discipline emboldened politicians to tolerate

The demand was usually supported by the Republicans.

determined element in the unions, which penetrated demanded the establishment

the Compo's influence there had always been a small but

also found the political preconceptions under fire in the early days of the

In much the same manner, and for much of the same reasons the AFL
had engaged in the bitter struggle with the Communists following World War I, and had only at a comparatively late state donned the ideological trappings of business unionism. Consequently, they never fully shared the Goepers prejudice against politics. While serving in an advisory capacity in the New Deal programs, their leaders—men such as Hillman and David Dubinsky—grew rapidly in political experience and perspective. They came to understand better the value of political influence, and how it could be used not only to achieve relief but permanent social gains for the workers.

Sharp reversals also occurred in the political thinking of some of the more conservative union leaders. Lewis, for example, had favored the re-election of Hoover in 1932, but he was quick to see the opportunity which the New Deal offered for rebuilding his seriously weakened Miners' union. By a prodigious organizing drive he succeeded in raising its membership from less than 150,000 to 515,000 in a single year (1933). Once his own union was again on a secure footing his ambitions broadened to include the whole labor movement. He saw no reason why the membership of American unions could not be expanded to an impregnable strength. Quick to learn from personal experience he made the creation of a proper political climate a basic consideration in his organizational plans. In 1934, as an initial step toward preparing for a projected drive in the steel industry, he threw the full weight of the Miners' union behind George Earle for Governor and Thomas Kennedy (a UMW official) for Lieutenant Governor in the Pennsylvania primary. Restraining the conservatism of a life-time, he also faced the necessity for more

69 Madison, op. cit., p. 182.
political regulation in the economic sphere and urged the labor movement
to take full advantage of opportunities for achieving economic and social
reform.

Another important stimulus to political interest was the attacks
which reviving conservatism began to direct against the relief and recovery
program of the New Deal. When the Supreme Court nullified the NRA, the AFL
sponsored a conference, which met in Washington on May 16-17, 1935, to make
plans for a campaign on behalf of a new industrial recovery act and the
Wagner Labor Disputes Bill. Parades and mass meetings were subsequently
staged in most of the major cities. On May 23, in New York City, 250,000
union members left work for half a day as a gesture of protest against the
Court's action, and an estimated 50,000 jammed Madison Square Garden to hear
William Green, Sidney Hillman, John L. Lewis, David Dubinsky, Max Zaritsky,
and others demand a continuation of the recovery program.

Under these influences the discussions of political policy in the
AFL began to take on a renewed vitality. Each year the number of resolutions
favoring political action increased, and in both the 1934 and 1935 conven-
tions full scale debates occurred. The die-hard advocates of a labor party
mistook this interest for a re-enforcement of their own position. Delegate
Ernst, in 1934, dwelt upon the theme that the freedom of individual members
to oppose the policies of the unions was a fatal political weakness. He
eagerly looked forward to the day when an independent party would tighten

71 Madison, op. cit., p. 18h.
72 Proceedings Amalgamated Clothing Workers Convention, 1934,
    op. cit., p. 33.
73 Ibid., p. 34.
the lines of discipline, and force union members either to support labor's position or withdraw from its ranks. In 1935, Delegateorman, of the Textile workers, declared, "There can be no equitable distribution of wealth, no curbing of the concentration of the nation's income until we have a workers' government." 75

The more realistic leaders rejected this view of labor's proper political role. Sidney Hillman told his Clothing workers in 1934 that:

The men and women in our organization have combined for economic action. In political action all we can do is act as an educational force. You cannot force people to vote, on a secret ballot, as you will instruct them. The best you can do and the only thing you can do is to educate them.

In the 1935 debate at the AFL convention, Thomas Kennedy, of the Miners, warned that a third party would merely unseat a friendly Administration without replacing it with anything better. 77 He cited the Guffey-Snyder Coal Stabilisation Bill and other evidences of the President's liberal intent, and suggested that the proper course was to organize strong labor support within the Democratic Party in order to free the Administration from its dependence upon conservative backers. Howard, of the Typographical Union, strongly supported that position. 79 Thus, a responsible body of union opinion was developing in favor of a middle course between strict non-partisanship and a labor party.

---

74 Ibid., 1934, p. 563.
75 Ibid., 1935, p. 765.
76 Proceedings of Amalgamated Clothing workers Convention, 1934, op. cit., p. 397.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., p. 775.
In considering alternatives, the thinking of men like Hillman and Kennedy was closer to that of Combes than to the more radical social philosophies. Their willingness to leave the exercise of political power in the hands of the regular parties indicated a basic acceptance of the existing political system. That acceptance included the realization that party leaders would necessarily sacrifice some of labor's interests to political expediency. Unions were, therefore, urged to enter politics in order to command greater consideration in the bargains between the diverse elements comprising the parties. But the willingness to bargain, which characterized the suggestion, was clearly in the tradition of business unionism rather than of class struggle. In the scope of their ambitions, however, they differed fundamentally from the defenders of the non-partisan policy. Far from being suspicious of political gains, they optimistically believed that the New Deal environment provided an opportunity for labor to make permanent political gains without running serious risk. Events proved that difference to be irreconcilable.

William Green prefaced the political discussion at the 1935 convention, with the declaration that although the Federation remained willing at the appropriate time to consider any feasible course of political action, he felt that the resolutions under consideration were Communistically inspired. The craft union majority followed his lead and identified as Communist both the suggestion for a labor party, and for open support of the New Deal. This deliberate refusal to recognize a distinction between the two proposals reflected a basic suspicion of governmental action, which five years of depression had failed to abate. Woll epitomized that attitude, when he decried the illusion of political benefits, with the warning that labor legislation...
enforced by governmental agencies would only lead to regimentation. For that matter, Lewis, who at the moment was in the camp of the Liberals, had opposed the Wagner Act because it involved an enforcement agency. As the discussion developed, it also became evident that the demand for a more aggressive political policy was predicated upon a willingness to seek governmental solutions, a belief in the necessity for more public planning, and the conviction that it was possible to establish legal precedents and safeguards which would prevent a reversion to previous conditions once political fortunes changed. The craft union majority refused to yield on these points, and the convention reaffirmed the non-partisan policy.

As in the case of industrial unionism, the minority refused to abide by that decision. After canvassing most influential union groups on their willingness to participate in an organized venture into politics, the CIO leaders, in the spring of 1936, announced the establishment of Labor's Non-Partisan League, and called a convention for August. Major George L. Berry, who served as the League's first chairman, announced that it would work within the Democratic Party to assure Roosevelt's re-election, and invited all unions to participate. But Green rejected the invitation and warned the unions under his jurisdiction against becoming involved. Political action as well as industrial unionism, thus, became primarily identified with the CIO.

---

81 Interview with Robert E. Howe of Labor's Non-Partisan League, Washington, D.C., September 11, 1951
The method proposed by the CIO leaders involved an emphasis upon: political influence rather than control, legislation rather than patronage, and worker benefits rather than political power as an end. It was little more than an aggressive application, to the Democratic Party, of the policy of "rewarding friends and punishing enemies." The Republican Party had simply been rejected as an acceptable alternative. But to the extent that the CIO succeeded in achieving a distinct political identity at the polls, it would place officeholders from industrial districts in a position of having to choose between party and the labor vote on many issues. Because no radical purpose was intended, the CIO simply did not consider the possible implications of that situation.

The act of encouraging independent voting among the workers—even as a bloc—was not necessarily socially undesirable. If labor achieved a social rather than a class orientation in its thinking, the effect of its political acts was apt to be at least as socially and democratically wholesome as that of the political machines. Unfortunately, the realism which had led CIO leaders to organize as a pressure group rather than as a party produced an unconscious attitude of political irresponsibility. By rejecting a labor party they, in effect, rejected class struggle, and recognized the right of the regular parties to direct political affairs. What they failed to realize was that by setting in motion forces which could undermine party discipline, their own political responsibility would have to increase. By setting a criterion based on issues rather than party considerations, labor—to the extent that it was effective—would be exercising a political discipline apart from that of party. The officeholders who followed party leadership in defiance of labor's wishes would face possible defeat at the polls, and those who succeeded in pleasing labor would be able to flout party discipline.
with comparative impunity. The result could hardly be other than a decline in the ability of those nominally having political responsibility to exercise initiative and leadership.

As the recent experience of the Truman Administration with the Southern Democrats has demonstrated, a party leader who is dependent upon supporters whose first loyalties belong to a class or regional bloc is in no position to make responsible commitments to the voters. He faces the choice of seeing fundamental parts of his program defeated, or of coming to terms with the opposition party in order to get measures through the legislative process. But the latter procedure involves the risk of either forcing a party split or of making party distinctions absolutely meaningless.

The self-conscious voting blocs, of which labor is but one, have been remarkably reluctant to accept a more responsible role in political affairs. The LMPL, for example, offered no candidates, faced no responsibility for effecting workable political compromises, was under no compulsion to provide constructive alternatives to the measures which it opposed, and was in no position to implement the suggestions which it did make. Yet, by virtue of organizing an important element of the labor vote, it greatly increased its potential power of life and death over the political plans and tenure of others. The essentially negative power which this confirmed made it particularly difficult for labor to overcome a psychology of political dependence, and to achieve a creative political maturity.

In 1936, however, the mere establishment of the LMPL did not make a labor bloc a reality. Far from constituting a disciplined political group,

85

Except the American Labor Party in New York.
most workers did not vote at all. Consequently, the CIO had some justifica-
cation for concentrating upon the immediate task of helping to re-elect
Roosevelt, and of leaving it to time and experience to determine the politi-
cal role it should undertake.
CHAPTER II  
CIO POLITICAL DIFFERENCES UNSEAT LEWIS

Lewis, Hillman, and the other leaders in open revolt against the AFL policies, had originally justified the establishment of the LMFL on the grounds that the New Deal social legislation was in serious jeopardy. On that basis union members of all shades of political opinion flocked to the banner of the new organization. Even a number of unions from the AFL and the Railroad Brotherhood defied their national leadership in order to cooperate. There was little unanimity in the thinking of these groups except that all agreed on the necessity for more aggressive political participation.

At the union convention in the early summer of 1936, it became evident that breaking with the AFL had by no means resolved all basic political issues. Both traditionalists and the labor party advocates resented the attempts of New Deal liberals to mold labor's political development to the needs of the Democratic Party. They objected to becoming too dependent upon the Administration. Sandor Genis, of the Clothing Workers, expressed this doubt when he questioned the wisdom of making labor's whole future dependent upon President Roosevelt. Sentiment in favor of an independent party became so strong that on May 24, one hundred different unions sent delegates to a meeting called in New York City for the purpose of setting up a permanent committee to plan for the establishment of a labor


2Ibid., p. 396.
party. In New York, the American Labor Party, which had as one of its purposes the development of a labor slate of candidates, organized as the League's state representative. Even the founders of the ALP, however, recognized the danger of undermining the Administration, and included Roosevelt and most of the liberals of both parties on their ticket.

The majority of those participating in the League probably agreed with Hillman when he chided the third-party advocates in his own union saying, "This resolution is a child of idealism, not of 'Practical Politics'," for they had little doubt but that labor's interests would best be served by continued support of the New Deal. The Miners' recalled that in 1922, five of their members had been killed and twenty-six shot (fourteen on the picket line) at the Gates Mine of the H. C. Frick Coke Co., but that under Roosevelt they had been able to organize without fear of violence. Josephine Branagan, of the Clothing Workers, expressed another common fear, by pointing out that after the protection of the NRA had been removed, an organizing drive in the shirt industry in Bloomfield, Pennsylvania, had resulted in wages being cut from a minimum of $13 per week to as low as $1.99 for eleven days. Protection against immediate hardships, thus, usually meant more than political ideology.

4 Amalgamated Clothing Workers Convention, op. cit., 1936, p. 403.
5 United Mine Workers Journal, November 1, 1936, p. 23.
6 Amalgamated Clothing Workers Convention, op. cit., 1936, p. 393.
Murray Weinstein, of the Clothing Workers, probably summed up the prevailing attitude when he declared: 7

We are practical people. We represent tens of thousands of members. They cannot live on traditions of thirty or forty years ago. They are looking for wages and for conditions. They are looking for the right to bargain collectively. They are looking for a chance to educate their children. They are looking for a chance to have a better life. If FDR's administration is going to give us what they have given us in the past four years, we are for him.

In most states the unions cooperating in the LNPL indicated their intention of functioning within the framework of the Democratic Party.

Differences between the various elements supporting LNPL did not reach serious proportions in 1936, but were enough in evidence to cause the leaders of the movement to avoid pressing for agreement on many basic questions concerning its future. Instead, they concentrated upon the day-to-day task of creating an effective organization, and confined their statements to enthusiastic generalizations. At the LNPL Convention in Washington, D. C., on August 10, only two objectives were specifically agreed to: First, that the organization of Labor's Non-Partisan League had for its sole objective, in 1936, the re-election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and secondly, that Labor's Non-Partisan League should be continued after the election as an instrumentality for the furtherance of liberalism in the United States. 8 Nevertheless, the mere fact of taking action stimulated discussion, and caused labor to explore its motives more carefully. One result was that certain characteristic views began to be manifested.

7 Ibid.
In its 1936 Report, for example, the General Executive Board of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers declared: 9

The truth with which unions are now confronted is that there is no complete security in economic accomplishments without the support of favorable legislation. There arises at this time the urgent need of utilizing to the fullest possible extent both means at our disposal. We must use and expend our economic strength, and together with the other workers of the nation, we must mobilize labor's might in politics, to the end of achieving desired legislation.

It was a thoughtful summary of what many other union groups were thinking.

The declaration of purpose adopted by the first convention of LNFL declared: 10

The welfare of American Labor, however, is inseparable from that of the nation as a whole. . . The last fifty years of developing industrialism have made of the United States one single, integrated economic unit. The problems of that industrialism must therefore be met through national action, whether on the political or industrial field. Regulation of labor and other industrial conditions can best be undertaken by the Federal government, and no program of regulation can be successful unless it is based upon Federal action.

Such statements articulated a labor philosophy born of, but not necessarily confined to, the New Deal environment.

The statements of Lewis and Hillman, who soon emerged as the dominant personalities of the movement, reflected a kindling aspiration which looked beyond the practical, subordinate role which labor had marked out for itself in political affairs.

At the LNFL convention Lewis declared: 11

Labor's Non-Partisan League is born of the stress of necessity; it comes from the heart and mind of labor which has been oppressed,

---

9 Amalgamated Clothing workers Convention: op. cit., 1936, p. 82.
11 Ibid., p. 4.
which has been beset, which has been exploited, and which has been
apprehensive not only for its own future but for the future of our
country and its institutions. ... The organisation of Labor's
Non-Partisan League and the overwhelming and enthusiastic unanimity
of the response which labor has given to the suggestion should cause
the adversaries and exploiters of labor in America to pause and take
note. ... 

Labor's Non-Partisan League is opening the door of opportunity
not alone to the workers of America, but to all good citizens of
America who are concerned with the uncertainties of present-day
existence, who are concerned with the instability of existing govern-
ments in the Old World and here, and who desire to safeguard them-
selves in an individual and a collective sense for the future.

There was a challenge in his words and a memory of the struggles out of which
the union movement had grown. There was a promise, too, which envisioned
a role of political leadership for labor.

Hillman predicted, to the same convention, that the formation of
the League had hastened the day when "sweatshops" would be outlawed, and
liberty no longer conceived, "only in terms of the liberty for those who
own the economic power to exploit labor." 12 In the forces already set in
motion by the depression he saw a redress of the vested inequalities in the
exercise of political power. Resolutely he declared: 13

In the great re-alignment which will mean liberal forces on
one side opposed to the forces of reaction, labor should take its
place in an organised manner, and I do hope that you and the men
and women you represent will see the wisdom and the duty and the
responsibility of making Labor's Non-Partisan Leagues permanent,
effective instrumentality for labor to fight for a constructive
political program in the years to come.

Thus, he combined the hope of fundamental change with the more immediate
goal of legislative benefit.

---

12 Ibid., p. 5.
13 Ibid., p. 5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1970-218</th>
<th>1164,000</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>All Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,894</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Preneed Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Craftsmen, Shopmen, and Helpers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International Brotherhood of Teamsters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employees and Retiree Pension Operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69,736</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International Ladies Garment Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61,652</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amalgamated Clothing Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>869,670</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

United Mine Workers

The total number of different unions that provided a contribution to the political interests of different unions in 1975 was 85,000. The list of contributors provided a total of $15,270,218, over 60 percent of which came from the following year's contributions. In 1974, the Internal Revenue and spent $770,218, over 60 percent of which came from the Internal Revenue. In 1976, the Internal Revenue and spent $895,000, for example, the AFL-CIO made contributions to the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Party's political committee did not fully report.

In 1975, the campaign to re-elect Roosevelt overpowered all other
The allocation of these funds included $254,961 to the Democratic National Committee, $227,393 to the LMPL, $180,558 to the ALP (in New York), and the remainder to miscellaneous organizations supporting Democratic candidates.  

Money was not the only important contribution which the League made. In many areas it was in a position to call upon the staffs of trained organizers of the participating unions, and in addition made good use of part-time volunteers. Units were set up on a state, county, city, ward, and precinct basis in the more industrialized areas, and they sponsored political rallies, conducted house-to-house canvasses, distributed literature, and exploited facilities for publicity.  

In Ohio, for example, the League had active units in thirty-seven counties. During the campaign they held 34 rallies, kept seventy speakers busy, and sponsored a half-hour daily radio broadcast in the five largest cities. In Illinois, the League held 109 rallies in Chicago, sent speakers into every ward in the city, and held at least one rally in every down-state county.  

Active units were set up in fifty-one counties in Pennsylvania, and in the steel and mining districts almost nightly meetings were held. West Virginia, likewise, had active units in fifty counties.  

The American Labor Party in New York, which was one of the most active labor

---

17 Putney, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
18 Ibid., p. 15.
20 Ibid., also Labor's Non-Partisan League, op. cit., p. 6.
21 Taft, op. cit., p. 642.
22 Putney, op. cit., p. 15.
groups in the campaign, employed 200 paid workers and 3,500 volunteers, used 250 speakers, sponsored 524 meetings, and opened 101 campaign offices (eighty-five in New York City and sixteen up-state). 23

The professional politicians were quite respectful of these manifestations of strength. when 200,000 attended a League rally in Pittsburgh, both Governor George Earle and Senator Joseph Guffey appeared to proclaim their friendship for the working man. 24 Democratic candidates elsewhere, also, showed a keen awareness of the importance of cultivating the labor vote.

The actual contribution which the League made toward re-electing the President and the Democratic ticket was by no means clear. Roosevelt's strength was not confined to the industrial areas. He carried all but two states, had a popular majority in all but three, 25 and carried an overwhelming majority of the counties in all sections of the nation except New England and the Middle Atlantic states. 26 Accurate analysis was made difficult by the fact that with the exception of the ALP in New York, which polled 225,000 votes for Roosevelt and 263,000 votes for Governor Herbert Lehman, the League's vote was not distinguishable from that of the Democratic Party. 27 The LMPL claimed to have played an important part in the election of thirty-four governors (twenty-five Democrats, six Republicans, one Farm-Labor, one

---

26 Ibid., p. 53.
27 Putney, op. cit., p. 16.
Progressive, one Democrat-ALP), but it was by no means clear that the claim was warranted. Even in New York, the ALP vote—which, of course, may not have been the whole labor vote—was not large enough to have changed the outcome of the election in either of the cases cited. The League could at best say that it had helped to re-elect the President.

But after the generous expenditure of its funds and energies, labor was in no mood for humility. The letter of congratulations which LMFL Chairman Berry sent to the President included a request to be consulted upon the appointment of a Secretary of Labor, and other matters affecting the interests of unions. Almost without exception union journals hailed Roosevelt's re-election as an opportunity to push through desired legislation.

In addition, the CIO was entering crucial drives to expand its membership, and it showed every intention of using political influence as an organizational weapon. Soon after the election such captions as "A Message to You From the President," and "The President Wants You to Join the Union," began to appear on the literature of the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee.

---


29Robinson, op. cit., pp. 130-3.

30Letter George L. Berry to Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 11, 1936, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, File PPF 3585. Reference to materials in the Roosevelt Library will hereafter be cited as FDR plus appropriate file numbers.

31United Mine Workers Journal, November 15, 1936, pp. 8-9, and Amalgamated Clothing Workers Convention, op. cit., 1936, p. 82.

32Putney, op. cit., p. 12. It's membership was actually to expand from 1,500,000 to 3,800,000 between the end of 1936 and October 1937.

33Letters Marvin M. McIntyre to Post Master General James Farley, January 29, 1936, and Senator Harry Moore (N.J.) to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 22, 1936, FDR File OF 407, Box 1. Protest letters on the subject are to be found in FDR File OF 407, Box 1, January-February, 1937.
reaction caused the President to put a stop to that particular tactic.\textsuperscript{34} Labor's attitude, however, reflected the firm conviction that its contributions to the campaign had placed the Administration under obligation.

Lewis was in accord with that view of the relationship between the CIO and the Administration. Although during the campaign the Miners' Union and the LMPL had—against his advice—failed to exact specific commitments as the price of their donations to the Democratic National Committee,\textsuperscript{35} he insisted that the Administration could not honorably refuse payment for political services rendered. Frances Perkins reported that, in a conversation with her in January 1937, he expressed great bitterness at not having been consulted by the President. When she suggested that the major policy decisions had been settled by the party platform and campaign pledges, he allegededly reported:\textsuperscript{36}

Ah but when J. P. Morgan was the principal contribution to the Republican Party he certainly had constant access to the President and told him exactly what he wanted done. The tables are reversed now, and I expect to be consulted in the same way.

By the same logic, Lewis—as a matter of right—demanded the Administration's open support in the controversial General Motors "sit-down" strike, and in the CIO's brutal struggle with "Little Steel."\textsuperscript{37} His deep offense at the President's irritated refusal to take sides stemmed from what he conceived to be a refusal to acknowledge the New Deal's political

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., McIntyre.

\textsuperscript{35} Interview with Robert E. Howe of Labor's Non-Partisan League, Washington, D. C., September 14, 1951.


debt to the CIO. Other elements in the CIO shared some of his resentment but it did not cause them to doubt seriously the President's good faith. Lewis publicly expressed his sense of betrayal in the much quoted statement from his 1937 Labor Day speech:

It ill behooves one who has supped at labor's table and who has been sheltered in labor's house to curse with equal fervor and fine impartiality both labor and its adversaries when they become locked in deadly embrace.

But a number of CIO members privately assured the President that they did not share the views of their chief.

Nevertheless, it was against this background of Lewis's mounting disillusionment that the CIO attempted to plan its political future. The lessons he had learned in negotiating with the powerful and uncompromising mine operators conditioned his approach to politics. He was distrustful of promises that could not be reduced to enforceable contractual terms, and grew increasingly critical of those who would pin labor's hopes upon faith in the liberal character of the New Deal. He was convinced that an independent bargaining position was as essential in politics as in economics. In collective bargaining it was axiomatic that a company union usually had difficulty in protecting the rights of the workers, and Lewis applied the same rule to labor's relationship with the political parties.

It had been the experience of the Miners' that little relief was to be expected from the courts, and they had come to look to the strike rather than the lawsuit as the final arbiter in enforcing agreements. Similarly,

---


39 Letter N. E. N. Landis to FDR, September 6, 1937, FDR File 2546, Box 1, etc.
Lewis believed that in the final analysis the quasi-sovereign political parties could be held to their commitments only if labor retained the power and the freedom to take punitive action at the polls. He believed that unless the CIO was actually willing to withhold its support from the Administration when its demands were not met, the labor vote would be taken largely for granted.

Despite Lewis's power and popularity, his views met resistance. Many did not believe that the N AFL had any real alternative to cooperation with the New Deal. They were convinced that even if the Roosevelt Administration ignored many of the specific union demands its continuance in office would serve the interests of the workers, and just as surely that if the Republican Party regained power labor's interests would suffer.

Hillman became the spokesman of those who insisted that the CIO should accommodate itself to the political realities. He was no less ambitious than Lewis, but approached politics in a more pragmatic and conciliatory spirit. In part, this attitude, too, was a result of his trade union experience. After the initial stage the Clothing workers had resorted to the strike only with reluctance, relying instead upon a peaceful settlement of differences. With considerable shrewdness Hillman had learned to make the best possible settlement at any given moment, and then to continue to build his strength against the day when the question could be reopened. He proposed to apply the same tactics to the CIO's relationship with the Roosevelt Administration.

Unlike Lewis, he suffered under no delusion that the Administration could be held to specific commitments, for he recognized that the preponderance of power would always rest with the President. Consequently, he did
not consider extreme measures. He felt sure that as a matter of practical politics the President would not deliberately attack labor's interests, and that his inclination would be to support them. The proper course for the CIO, he believed, was to work closely with the Democratic Party, capitalize on any benefits that it might offer, and to be prepared to press for additional advantages as the opportunity arose.

By skilful maneuvering behind the scenes Hillman secured the appointment of E. L. Oliver, Research Director of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, as Executive Vice President of the permanent LNPL. It was an important step toward holding the CIO to a course of moderation, at least, in its formal political actions.

Since 1937 was an off-year in national politics, the LNPL prepared to take an active part in local elections. The move was prompted in part by the hostile treatment which the CIO had received from local authorities during its organizing drives. In addition, the second LNPL Convention, in March 1937, had endorsed the policy of building closer relations with farm organizations and other progressive groups. Cooperation in local elections was one of the most convenient means. In Detroit, Akron and Canton, Ohio, and several other industrial cities, the LNPL experimented with labor candidates, but with no great success. In terms of actual accomplishment the LNPL's performance in local elections was not too impressive.

---

41 Interview with Robert E. Howe, op. cit., and Labor's Non-Partisan League, op. cit., p. 12.

42 Labor's Non-Partisan League, op. cit., p. 12

although in New York, the ALP rolled up 482,459 votes for LaGuardia, and CIO mayorality candidates were elected in Pittsburgh, Bridgeport, Boston, and Buffalo.\footnote{Ibid.}

Nevertheless, by participating in local elections the units of the LNPL gained in experience, and local action also served the useful purpose of diverting attention from differences on national policy. By using mutual campaign activities as an entree, the LNPL was able, on December 12, 1937, to negotiate a formal compact with the National Officers of the Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union at St. Paul, Minnesota. Both parties agreed to provide:

Mutual legislative support, both at Washington and at state capitols and for cooperation in election campaigns. Labor undertakes also to promote among the industrial workers a better understanding of the problems of the farmers, and particularly of the cooperative movement; the farm organization undertakes similarly to bring to its membership information upon the needs of industrial workers, to the end that the efforts of financiers and industrialists to keep these two great groups of producers apart, might be defeated.

In 1931, the LNPL also functioned actively as a lobby, and was particularly interested in securing minimum wage and hour legislation. A combination of Republicans and conservative Democrats had succeeded in recommitting the Fair Labor Standards Bill to the House Rules Committee and in blocking most of the other reforms in which the CIO was interested. Consequently, in spite of the signs of discontent which he had manifested in his Labor Day speech and on other occasions, Lewis, who succeeded Berry \footnote{Ibid.}
as LNFL chairman—Hillman had been Treasurer from the first—maintained a
close working relationship with the Administration. During the recess fol-
lowing the 1937 legislative session, local units of the LNFL organized letter
writing campaigns, sent delegates to call on members of Congress and exploi-
ted every local political contact in an effort to assure a favorable attitude
toward reform. Due in part to these pressures the wage and hour bill was
passed at the next session. Lewis was unwilling to jeopardize the measures
at stake.

The strong fight which the Administration made on behalf of its
reform program did not cause Lewis to forget the Automotive and Steel strikes.
As head of both the CIO and LNFL, he continued to be formally friendly, but
personally remained distrustful. Hillman, meanwhile, had been careful to
maintain close personal relations with the President and his advisers. In
labor circles he was regarded as the "fair haired boy" as far as the Admin-
istration was concerned. Frequently, it was through him rather than the
titular head of the CIO that the Administration's intentions were first
revealed. Lewis did not overlook the slight, and became increasingly reluc-
tant to trust either Roosevelt or Hillman.

After his Labor Day speech it had been evident that Lewis was not
going to be politically tractable. The fine calculation that went into the
attentions showered upon Hillman suggests that the President may have been
deliberately trying to create a counterbalance in the CIO. Presidential
aides such as Anna Rosenberg made a particular point of reminding their
chief to take note of occasions requiring personal attention. When Hillman
entered a hospital in the fall of 1937, for example, the President in


response to such a reminder sent a warm personal note in which he declared:

To be deprived of your counsel even very briefly at a time like this is a serious loss to the labor movement and to the people of our country. I do hope that you will be well again soon.

A short time later Hillman's return to work was handled in the same manner.

These attentions could well have been nothing more than an indication of the efficiency of the presidential staff, but the element of personal flattery and of "handling" seemed more pronounced than in the case of Lewis and other labor leaders. There was always deliberations in the pains taken to set at rest any misgivings he might feel in regard to the Administration's intention. After the Supreme Court had upheld the Wagner Act, for example, business groups, the AFL, and members of Congress had initiated a violent campaign against the "pro-CIO bias" of the NLRB. The object was to discredit the Board and to force a revision of the law. Labor was fearful of the possible consequences of these pressures in an election year. In that circumstance Presidential assistants made apoint of making sure that Hillman received the necessary reassurance. A memo to the President on June 3, 1938 was suggestive. It read:

Tom Corcoran has Sidney Hillman over at the Carlton. Hillman is a little unnerved about the NLRB stories--also wants to talk about four candidates he has been helping out financially on some. [sic]

Tom thinks it would be a good idea to give him an appointment this morning.

Notations such as "President to lunch with Sidney Hillman, preferably alone," were common on the appointments which Hillman made with the Chief Executive.

---

48 Letter Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sidney Hillman, November 15, 1937, FDR File PPF 3585.
49 Unsigned memo to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 3, 1938, FDR File PPF 3585.
50 White House Memos, July 2, 1938, August 6, 1939, etc., FDR File PPF 3585.
In 1938, Lewis agreed to use the LNPL as an instrument of chastisement against the Democrats who had failed to support the Presidential program. But he made it plain that he had not forgotten his basic grievances. When the Democratic National Committee refused to finance Roosevelt's proposed "purge" of recalcitrant Democrats in Congress, for example, Lewis was asked to provide the necessary support. As a matter of practical politics he agreed to supply funds from the treasury of the Miners' Union, and also to contribute heavily to the campaign fund of Senator Alban Barkley who was hard pressed in Kentucky. As a condition for granting aid, he demanded and received a personal request from the President so that there could be no future equivocation concerning services rendered.

At the CIO's Convention of that year, Lewis set forth what he considered to be the proper scope of labor's political interests:

> It is no longer simply a question of asking legislatures to pass a few laws which are favorable to labor or stopping a few laws which are hostile to labor. On the contrary, the entire legislative program both federal and state in all its important aspects, has become a matter vitally affecting the interests of organized labor.

But the results of the campaign did not indicate that the LNPL was an adequate instrument for achieving his objectives. In the Pennsylvania primary, the League made an all-out effort to secure the gubernatorial nomination for

---

51 The CIO News, October 1, 1938, p. 1.
53 Ibid., p. 169.
54 Ibid., pp. 168-9.
Thomas Kennedy—AUMW official—, but despite polling an impressive 500,000 votes he failed to win the election. Its successes in other primaries were not outstanding. It opposed seven members of Congress, and one governor, who were defeated, and supported nine senators, eleven representatives and three governors who were successful. Maury Maverick of Texas and Harry Joelson of New Jersey failed to be nominated for Congress even with CIO support. The General Election revealed the flimsiness of the Leagues’s alliance with the farm organizations. The rural vote defeated a number of candidates who had strong CIO support, including: Senator Bulkley of Ohio, Representative O’Connell of Montana, and Governors Murphy of Michigan, Benson of Minnesota, LaFallette of Wisconsin, and Sawyer of Ohio. The strong showing of Senator Wagner (D., N. Y.), Smith and Norton (D., Ill.), and Governors Lehman (D., N. Y.) and Olson (D., Calif.), however, was in some measure attributable to the LNPL.

Moreover, the showing of the ALP confirmed a decline in labor’s political effectiveness. In 1937, it had polled 483,000 votes for LaGuardia, but in 1938 its total vote for the State was 420,000 and it received only 341,000 votes in New York City. All five of the State Assemblymen whom it had elected the previous year were defeated, and only one new member was

56 *New Republic* (June 1, 1938), p. 101.
57 *The CIO News*, August 29, 1938, p. 5; and October 8, 1938, p. 3.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., August 20, 1938, p. 5; and October 1, 1938, p. 8.
60 Ibid., November 14, 1938, p. 3.
61 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
62 Putney, op. cit., p. 17.
elected to counterbalance the loss. Representative Vito Marcantonio and Governor Herbert Lehman once again had its support, but their margins of victory were smaller than before. By the following year the ALP's vote in municipal elections was to drop to less than half of its 1936 strength. The rumor of Communist domination helped to undermine the ALP, but in all sections of the country the LNPL's strength declined in 1938.

At its 1937 convention, the AFL had adopted a resolution urging the member unions to oppose any candidate for public office, "who would in any way favor, encourage or support the CIO." A number of AFL unions had ignored Green's earlier warning against cooperation with the "CIO dominated" LNPL. In January of 1938, he threatened them with immediate expulsion if they did not withdraw. The elections found the AFL and the CIO deliberately trying to undermine each other's candidates. In a three-way mayoralty primary in Seattle, the two labor groups endorsed different candidates. When the AFL's choice was defeated it joined with the third candidate in defeating the man endorsed by the CIO. In Detroit and other key industrial cities similar situations developed. A number of Federation groups in California, Pennsylvania and even Michigan, however, refused to follow the instructions of the AFL Executive Council, and continued to cooperate with the LNPL and the CIO.

The division in the labor movement had long been a source of anxiety to the President and he had repeatedly offered his good offices in bringing about a reconciliation. When Berry was LNPL Chairman, he had been

---

63 Ibid.
64 CIO News, August 20, p. 5, and October 1, 1938, p. 8.
65 Ibid., November 14, 1933, pp. 3-4.
66 Ibid.
67 Putney, op. cit., p. 16.
68 Letters by FDR, July 7, 1937, etc., FDR File Off 2546, Box 1, are typical.
particularly aware of the political dangers inherent in the situation and had tried diligently to work out an acceptable peace formula. In December 1936, the AFL and the CIO had appointed a four-man committee to consider his proposal that the CIO should become a permanent committee within the AFL entrusted with the task of industrial organization and guaranteed against jurisdictional squabbles. The two CIO negotiators, Lewis and Hillman, and George Harrison, head of the AFL delegation, quickly accepted the plan, but William Hutcheson, of the Carpenter's Union, reportedly blocked agreement. Even after leaving the LNPL in order to finish out the term of the deceased Senator Bachman of Tennessee, Berry continued his efforts to keep the unity talks alive, but in October 1937 he admitted to the President that there was little chance for settlement.

The mounting jealousies of the two groups proved a serious embarrassment to the President in the 1933 election. Dan Tobin, President of the AFL Teamsters Union and a strong Administration supporter, for example, warned Jim Farley that the AFL would consider over-friendliness to the CIO as a hostile act, and questioned whether the Administration could afford to alienate the stronger of the two labor organizations. The CIO was no less sensitive. The election results indicated rather clearly that this rivalry

---

69 Letter George L. Berry to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 29, 1937, FDR File OF 407, Box 1, and White House Memo to the Secretary of Labor, October 29, 1937, File OFF 2546, Box 1.

70 Ibid.

71 Letter Senator George L. Berry to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 29, 1937, FDR File OF 407, Box 1.

72 Letter Daniel Tobin (President of AFL Teamster's Union) to James Farley, November 3, 1937, FDR File OFF 2546, Box 1.
had undermined labor's ability to provide effective political support for the New Deal.

On November 12, immediately following the election, the President personally appealed to Lewis to leave the door open for a settlement of outstanding differences within the labor movement. Early in 1939, Secretary of Labor Perkins quietly began preliminary arrangements for a peace conference between the rival union groups. At the invitation of the President, representatives of the AFL and the CIO met in Washington with Secretary Perkins on March 7, 1939. Roosevelt personally addressed the opening session and urged them to accept the responsibility for working out an acceptable plan for re-establishing labor unity.

Lewis immediately suggested that as a measure of good faith both he and Green should disqualify themselves for office in any new labor organization that might develop. In addition, he demanded that the Railroad Brotherhood should be brought into the merger, and relied upon to provide a president. His reasoning was that the jealousies between the AFL and the CIO were so intense that they could be resolved only by permitting some neutral party to assume the leadership of the labor movement. The proposal met strenuous objection from the AFL, and Lewis was inclined to feel that it had not been considered in good faith. The Conference next bogged down in its preliminary discussion of the question of how to dispose

---

73 Draft of Letter Franklin D. Roosevelt to John L. Lewis, November 12, 1938, FDR File PPF 5640.
74 Letter Frances Perkins to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 16, 1939, FDR File OFF 2546, Box 1.
76 Ibid.
of rival unions in the same industry. The CIO took the position that its efforts had been directed toward the unorganized workers, and that it was the AFL which had resorted to punitive rival unions. The AFL just as vehemently insisted upon its own prior interests in the industries where dual unions existed, and with heated charges and countercharges the conference broke up.

After roundly damning the AFL for disrupting the peace talks, Lewis seemed quite content to let unification die a natural death. He was convinced that the CIO was still too weak to win favorable concessions from the AFL, and was unwilling to sacrifice its interests to the political considerations which had brought the President into the unification picture.

Hillman was more optimistic concerning the prospects of a settlement and was particularly concerned over the political consequences of permitting the labor dispute to carry over into the presidential election of the following year. Along with Tobin, of the AFL, he was reportedly behind Roosevelt’s continued efforts to prod Lewis into making peace. Due in some measure to this influence, the 1939 convention of the CIO decided to continue negotiations with the AFL, but Lewis warned the President that he foresaw many stumbling blocks in the road to success.

77Ibid., April 1, 1939, p. 1.


79Letter John L. Lewis to Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 13, 1939, FDR File 51F 5640.
By the end of the year the problem had become involved in the broader questions raised by the beginning of the war in Europe. Responsible decisions needed to be made concerning labor's proper role in the defense program that lay ahead. But Lewis as an opponent of the "war policy" of the Administration, was unwilling to subordinate the CIO's interests or freedom of action to the necessities of economic mobilization. Hillman and other labor leaders in closer agreement with the President's policies feared that continued jurisdictional strife would not only weaken defense preparations, but also jeopardize the whole labor movement in the emergency ahead.

In 1940, Hillman put the Amalgamated Clothing Workers on record as favoring an early settlement of the issues between the AFL and the CIO. As guest speaker at the Clothing Workers' convention Lewis maintained a semblance of public harmony, by expressing disappointment that AFL "unreasonableness" had balked reunion. Nevertheless, differences within the CIO over unification had become irreconcilable, and were a symbol of support for, or hostility to, the policies of the Administration.

Another prolonged controversy between Lewis and Roosevelt grew out of federal contracting policies. As early as 1938, the LNF had charged that governmental agencies consistently gave a majority of their contracts to labor law violators, or in effect subsidized the enemies of labor. It

---


81 Amalgamated Clothing Workers Convention, op. cit., 1940, p. 581.

82 Ibid., pp. 394-5.
campaigned unsuccessfully on behalf of corrective legislation. In January 1939, Lewis demanded an executive order denying federal contracts to all violators of the National Labor Relations Act. After consulting the Comptroller General the President replied that he lacked the legal power to issue such an order, and suggested a legislative remedy. In view of the House Rules Committee's repeated refusals to release the appropriate legislation, the latter suggestion struck Lewis as somewhat facetious. Moreover, he was convinced that the legal opinions cited were questionable, and had no other purpose than to provide Roosevelt with an alibi. Angrily he repeated his demand. When executive intervention was still denied after three successive bills had passed the Senate, only to be blocked in the House, he took it as another sign of the insincerity of the President's protestations of friendship for labor.

83 Letter Gardner Jackson (LNPL) to James Rowe (Presidential Assistant), June 7, 1938, FDR File OFF 2546, Box 1.
84 Letter John L. Lewis to Franklin D. Roosevelt, January 21, 1939, FDR File OFF 2546, Box 1.
85 Letter Franklin D. Roosevelt to John L. Lewis, January 30, 1939, FDR File OFF 2546, Box 1.
86 Letter Gardner Jackson (LNPL) to James Rowe (Presidential Assistant), June 7, 1938, FDR File OFF 2546, Box 1.
87 Letter John L. Lewis to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 2, 1939, FDR File OFF 2546, Box 1.
88 Letter John L. Lewis to Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 2, 1939, and succeeding letters on subject, FDR File OFF 2546, Box 1, also CIO News, 1940, p. 5.
89 Letters John L. Lewis to Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 9, 16, 20, 1939, etc., throughout the remainder of the year, FDR File OFF 2546, Box 1.
90 The CIO News, July 29, 1940, p. 3.
The beginning of large-scale rearmament gave the matter an added importance and caused Lewis to harbor the suspicion that the emergency was to be made an excuse for sacrificing labor's rights. In July, 1940, he urged Hillman to use his position as a member of the National Defense Advisory Council to persuade the President to disregard the opinion of his legal advisors. Hillman's firm refusal was clearly governed by political considerations, for as a member of the Council he was to make demands in regard to contracting procedures that were very similar to those of Lewis. But Lewis's approach seemed at times deliberately impolitic, and Hillman refused to be associated with any scheme to embarrass the President politically.

Other sides of Lewis's estrangement were in evidence. Even after rearmament spending began, the miners continued to be plagued with seasonal unemployment. In May of 1939, Lewis charged that the President had defaulted on a promise to allocate more federal relief funds to the miners in exchange for their political support. Harry Hopkins made hasty inquiries at the White House to make sure that there had been no such commitment, and then quickly issued a denial. But Lewis's exploitation of the issue embarrassed the Administration with union members and the public.

There was a petulance about many of Lewis's complaints as though he were deliberately picking a quarrel. Reasons other than the ones publicly advanced did, in fact, motivate his increasing discontent. Repugnance against war and further involvement in Europe's affairs, a strong personal distrust of

91 Letter Sidney Hillman to John L. Lewis, July 30, 1940, FDR File OF 2516, Box 2.
92 Memo James Rowe, Jr., to Miss Grace LeHand, May 11, 1939, FDR File OF 407-B, Box 2-b.


To demonstrate the importance of benefits which labor had reaped, and warned
which leaves had made at Columbus. He recognized the New Deal record in order
which leaves had made at Columbus. He recognized the New Deal record in order
On January 27, Hitlmann publicly attempted to refute the charges
the administration's foreign policy may have provoked the attack.

The administration's speech suggests that the internationalist tendencies of
the administration with which he had departed for Senator Burton's. Wherever that prior
He predicted that the President would be defeated, if he ran for a third term.
that the CIO would jeopardise its own future if it attempted to undermine the Administration. AFL leaders David Dubinsky, of the Ladies Garment Workers, and Max Zaritsky, of the Hatters, supported Hillman's position.

Lewis was not easily deterred from the course which he had chosen. He was determined to exert an influence over national policy commensurate with the importance of the CIO or to abandon the alliance with the New Deal. At Monogah, West Virginia, in April, 1940, he charged that 11,000,000 were still unemployed and loftily declared:

In event that the Democratic Party does not nominate a candidate for president, or adopt a platform, satisfactory to labor and the Common People of this country, I shall, after the conventions of the Democratic and Republican party, espouse and urge upon these various organisations the assembling of a great delegate convention, to be composed of delegates from the Congress of Industrial Organizations, Labor's Non-Partisan League, the old age pension movements, the national Negro organisation, and liberal farmers organizations to meet in some central city and present their views, crystallise their judgment into a program that each and every American can support, and we will see whether mere machine politics in this country is going to be more powerful and more controlling than the voice of the citizens of the land.

But these ominous tones did not presage a final severance of relations. During the primaries and up through convention time, the ILWU, of which Lewis was chairman, stressed the importance of electing a liberal Congress and continued to work largely within the Democratic Party. But Lewis continued his criticisms of the Administration, a fact that suggests that

99 Ibid., p. 2.
100 United Mine Workers Journal, April 15, 1940, p. 6.
101 The CIO News, May 13, 1940, p. 6; and July 29, 1940, p. 3.
his real quarrel was with the President and not the party.

There was some attempt to attribute his devious game of bluster to personal ambitions. Secretary Perkins reported that at an informal meeting in the spring of 1940, also attended by Dan Tobin, the President said:

'I want to tell you two a very interesting thing,' . . . About two months ago John Lewis came to see me one evening. He was in a most amiable mood, and he talked about the third term, too, Dan [Tobin], just the way you have, only much smoother.' Roosevelt could not resist teasing a friend. 'When I told him what I told you, that the people wouldn't like a third term and that it would be very hard going politically, what do you think he said, Dan?' He said 'Mr. President, I have thought of all that and I have a suggestion to make for you to consider. If the vice-presidential candidate on your ticket should happen to be John L. Lewis, those objections would disappear. A strong labor man would insure full support, not only of all the labor people but of all the liberals who worry about such things as third terms, . . . He didn't press me. He just asked me to think it over and give it consideration.'

Years later in an interview with Saul Alinsky, Lewis categorically denied that the incident had occurred, declaring:

If this happened as Madame Perkins stated it, and mind I emphasize if, then the President used his office to give credence to a fantastic cock-and-bull tale he himself manufactured out of the whole cloth. That would be a typical Roosevelt maneuver to stir the antagonism of others against one whom he opposed, or else typical Madame Perkins gossip.

Whatever the merits of the case, by his actions Lewis moved consistently nearer a final break. In his formal policy statements as chairman of the LMPL, he cited Roosevelt's behavior after the 1936 election as an object lesson in the futility of basing labor's hopes upon the pledges and goodwill of politicians. Repeatedly, he charged that the Administration was making

---

103 Alinsky, op. cit., p. 194.
104 The CIO News, July 29, 1940, p. 3.
the emergency an excuse for reneging on labor's rights.105

On June 22, 1940, Eli Oliver, Executive Vice Chairman of the LNPL, quit as a gesture of protest against Lewis's attacks upon the Administration. In a letter of resignation which was released to the press before it was sent to Lewis, Oliver declared that an overwhelming majority of CIO members gave every indication of strongly favoring Roosevelt. He identified the opponents of the Third Term as an "infinitesimally" small group of "extremists" who acted upon the instructions of foreign powers. By his public utterances, he charged, Lewis had identified the LNPL with those extremists against the wishes of the majority.107 Lewis was highly incensed at the political character of the resignation, and personally visited the LNPL offices to make sure that Oliver "cleared out" immediately.108 Within a few days he brought John T. Jones in from the Miners Union to run the League.109

These developments in the LNPL closely paralleled a formal endorsement of the "third term" by the Clothing Workers and other unions under Hillman's direct influence.110 Many other groups and individuals in the CIO followed suit. In the Miners' Union, Murray, Kennedy, and Bittner strongly endorsed the President.111 With the LNPL completely under Lewis's domination

105 Ibid.
106 Interview (telephone) with John T. Jones, Director of Labor's Non-Partisan League, November 27, 1951.
108 Interview with John T. Jones, op. cit.
109 Ibid.
110 New York Times, June 22, 1940, p. 34.
111 Ibid.
Hillman worked to win predominant influence in the state and local units of the CIO. In New York he won control of the State Industrial Union Council, but in most areas the CIO President was too strongly entrenched to be successfully challenged. Many groups which remained loyal to Lewis, however, did not share his views toward the Administration, and Hillman capitalized on their uneasiness. As a member of the National Defense Advisory Council he also made every effort to promote policies that would belie the charge that labor's interests were being sacrificed to the emergency.

In the last month of the campaign, rumors came back to the President that as a surprise move Lewis intended to swing his support to Wilkie. Through Bishop Bernard J. Sheil of Chicago, Roosevelt hastily arranged a personal meeting with the CIO president for October 17. Lewis's description of the encounter was:

The President seemed to be quite uncomfortable. His face had an unhealthy pallor, and he seemed to be laboring under a great deal of tension. After greeting me, he said, 'John, sit down over here by my side.' I sat down. After a moment's silence, he said, 'John, I want your support.'

I said, 'You mean, Mr. President, you want the CIO's support. If you want the CIO's support what assurance can you give to the CIO?'

The President became irritated and snapped at me, 'Well, what do you mean? Haven't I always been friendly to the CIO?' I didn't answer. He continued, and his voice rose angrily, 'Haven't I always been a friend of labor, John?'


114 Alinsky, op. cit., p. 176.

115 Ibid., pp. 186-7.
I said, 'Well, Mr. President, if you are a friend of labor, why is the FBI tapping all my phones, both my home and my office, and why do they have instructions to follow me about?'

The President said, 'That's not true!'

I said, 'I say it is true!'

The President said, "That's a damn lie."

I got up and looked down at him and said, 'Nobody can call John L. Lewis a liar and least of all Franklin Delano Roosevelt!' Then I started walking out and got my hat and coat. Just as I got to the door, the President called out, 'Come back, John. I want to talk to you!' I walked back and I said, 'My phones are tapped, and they are, and everything I said is true, and whatever I said I know because I can prove it by Frank Murphy, who told me so and who knows about it because he has seen your order to the FBI to do so.

The President changed the subject. I stood there with my hat in my hand and my coat on my back. We engaged in small talk about minor and different things for about ten minutes. Finally I stretched out my hand and said, 'Good-by, Mr. President.' The President was quite upset and nervous. I guess I wasn't feeling too game myself. His face became quite hard, and he turned it away from me, and even when we shook hands he was looking the other way. I walked out. Roosevelt and I are done.

On Monday, October 21, the CIO president announced that he would make a political broadcast over the major networks on the following Friday. The New York Times estimated that from 25,000,000 to 30,000,000 were at their radios when he went on the air. With all the pent up bitterness that had produced the break he charged that Roosevelt was leading the nation into war:

Those who hear these words, and who have studied the public addresses of the President, from his Chicago 'quarantine speech' to his Charlottesville 'stab in the back' address, and thence to Dayton and Philadelphia, will understand his motivation. It is war. His every act leads one to this inescapable conclusion.


117 United Mine Workers Journal, November 1, 1940, p. 5.
The President has said that he hates war and will work for peace, but his acts do not match his words.

Lewis's isolationism was too consistent to doubt that the issue was real. But it was also a point of attack for grievances that were not strictly matters of foreign policy. It signified his fear that war was merely an excuse for reneging on reform. It reflected his conviction that Roosevelt was insincere and a liar. The fact that internationalism was identified with the President made it that much easier for Lewis to be sincerely convinced that it was wrong.

Turning to the record of the President's political relations with labor, he said in a tone of long suffering indignation:

In the last three years, labor has not been given representation in the Cabinet, nor in the Administration or policy making agencies of the government. The current administration has not sought nor seriously entertained the advice or views of labor upon the question of national employment or lesser questions affecting domestic economy, internal taxation, foreign trade, military and naval expansion, relations with foreign nations or the issues of war or Peace. Labor today has no point of contact with the Democratic Administration in power, except for casual and occasional interviews which are granted its individual leaders. In Congress, the unrestrained baiting and defaming of labor by the Democratic majority has become a pastime never subject to rebuke by the titular or actual leaders of the Party.

With his usual acute sense of dramatic timing, Lewis coupled his endorsement of Wilkie with a declaration that he would accept Roosevelt's re-election as a vote of no confidence.

The Wilkie endorsement brought into the open the political schism that had been developing in the CIO. Transcending the immediate effect of
the Roosevelt personality, and the emotions provoked by the war issue, was the question of what labor's role in economic and political affairs should be. For reasons that were not too different from those of the business entrepreneur, Lewis was as suspicious of governmental domination as of that of management. In the economic sphere he consistently defended labor's right to work out its own destiny. Politically, he stood for a similar independence. The form of his protest against the Administration emphasized independence of bargaining position rather than of party, but it stemmed from the conviction that labor had to look to its own resources for political leadership and fulfillment. Just as sincerely, Hillman and those in the CIO who shared his views believed that the New Deal provided the most satisfactory vehicle for achieving labor's ends, and that ill-considered assertions of independence would merely jeopardize the gains already made. They looked upon government as a creative force for bringing better balance and greater justice into the relations of the major groups of the economy, and were willing to subordinate some of labor's immediate freedom of action.

In the few days between Lewis's speech and the election, all pretense of cordial relations between Lewis and the Pro-Administration forces was dropped. John T. Jones abruptly dismissed Gardner Jackson from the LNFL when he criticized the Wilkie endorsement. Meanwhile, the ALP chairman of New York and local, state and national units in thirteen of the CIO's international unions privately repudiated Lewis's action and reassured

120 Interview with John T. Jones, op. cit.
the President of their continued support. Several local units of the
LNPL followed suit, and there was even a smattering of protest from
locals of the United Mine Workers. In many cases the repudiations seemed
to represent spontaneous local assertions of political independence. But
the concerted protest of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the United Textile
workers, the United Automobile Workers and to some extent of the Steel
Workers Organizing Committee had more the character of an organized opposi-
tion, and probably reflected Hillman's influence.

One point which the election demonstrated was that Lewis's break
was with the President and not the Democratic Party. At the polls the rank
and file CIO members supported the LNPL's congressional endorsements most

---

121 FDR File OF 2546, Boxes 5, 6, 7, Letter ALP State Chairman to
Franklin D. Roosevelt, October 26, 1940, FDR, OF 2546, Box 5. The thirteen
international unions were: Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Steel Workers
Organizing Committee, United Automobile workers, United Textile Workers,
United Electrical Workers, United Oil Workers, United Rubber Workers,
Government Workers Union, Retail Clerks Union, Journeymen Taylor's Union,
American Communication Association, United Mine Workers and the News Paper
Guild.

122 Scattered Letters to Franklin D. Roosevelt from Local LNPL
Units, October 26, 1940, FDR OF 2546, Box 5.

123 Scattered Letters to FDR from United Mine Workers locals, Ibid.,
Box 5, October 25, 26, 1940.

124 Ibid., Boxes 5-7, October 25, 26, 1940.
of which were Democrats, but in the choice between Roosevelt and Lewis they followed Roosevelt.

The personalities and emotions involved, and the fact that Lewis relied upon personal prestige and a bold dramatic stroke rather than upon careful preparations, influenced the outcome as much as the underlying issues. But the fact that the workers followed Roosevelt rather than Lewis demonstrated that they still looked to the regular parties rather than to their unions for political leadership.

The election did not quite end the struggle, for although Lewis had experienced a political defeat it was by no means certain that he would lose control of the CIO. His committee appointments for the 1940 Convention made it clear that he still firmly controlled union machinery. Frank Blumberg and Murray Weinstein, Vice President of the Clothing Workers, refused to serve upon the Lewis "dominated" committees, and attacked the "stacked" representation system in the CIO.

The hour long ovation which

---


127 Ibid.
Lewis received when he appeared before the convention did not reassure his opponents. The Clothing Workers took the initiative by sharply criticizing the bias which the CIO News had shown during the campaign. The text of Lewis's endorsement of Wilkie, for instance, had been printed in full, but neither Roosevelt's name nor picture was printed in announcing the election results. Lewis met the attack head-on by accepting full personal responsibility for the policy of the News, and inviting charges.

The sparring then shifted to the issue of unification with the AFL, and once again Hillman's Clothing Workers took the lead in criticizing the official policy of the CIO. Lewis answered in terms that left no doubt that he welcomed a showdown. Scornfully citing the example of Dubinsky and Zaritsky, who had returned to the AFL on its terms he cried out, "and now above all the clamor comes the piercing wail and the laments of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. And they say, 'Peace, it is wonderful.' And there is no Peace." Reiterating his basic argument that there could be no re-union until the CIO was strong enough to command honorable terms, he ridiculed the proponents of unity in melodramatic phrases:

129 Pearson and Allen, CIO Convention, op. cit., 1940, p. 123.
130 Ibid., pp. 123-4.
131 Ibid., pp. 159-162.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
I have great concern for those who are possessed of little faith and whose courage is waning. If they find the night too dark, if they find the way too rough, let them sit by the wayside. Let them foregather in the shadow of some friendly tree while those other valiant spirits go on in this great movement. They will carry on! They will carry on! And those who prefer to be a follower of the army rather than in the vanguard of its enterprise, so be it!

Turning squarely to Hillman, he declared, "Dubinsky took the easy way out. Zaritsky took the easy way. If there is anybody else in the CIO who wants to take the easy way, let them go. . . ."

But Hillman had no intention of permitting himself to be driven from the CIO. In tones of chastened humility he declared that the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and the Textile Workers Organizing Committee would abide by majority rule. 135

As counter-strategy, Hillman supported a resolution condemning Communism, Nazism and Fascism, and demanding the expulsion of fellow-travelers. 136 Prior to the German invasion of Russia, the left-wing elements strongly supported Lewis in his isolationism, as did the large union element which clung stubbornly to the quite honorable American tradition of avoiding foreign entanglements. Hillman hoped to place Lewis in the position of defending or rejecting his radical followers, because either course seemed likely to split his support. 137 When the convention voted down the resolution, Hillman demanded a limitation of the CIO president's powers, and an endorsement of

134 Ibid., p. 162.
135 Ibid., pp. 162-3.
136 Ibid., p. 192, and, Report to Eleanor Roosevelt by Federal Reserve Board research and identified only as Nunn, December 5, 1940, FDR File of 2546, Box 2.
the Administration's policies. Lewis parried these attacks and forced through an anti-war resolution which was in accord with his views. But he was not powerful enough to dictate the election of an obviously subservient successor.

A key figure in this deadlock was Philip Murray, for he was the only man whom both factions would accept as Lewis's successor. He had been closely associated with Lewis in the Miners' Union for over twenty-five years, and reaffirmed their friendship at the convention. "Personally, I disagreed with the President of the National Organization in the recent election," he said, "But I did not disagree with him on some fundamental issues, nor did he disagree with me upon fundamental questions. Nevertheless, it was becoming difficult for him to divide his political and economic loyalties between Lewis and Roosevelt. He was one of the firmest advocates of close labor cooperation with the defense program, and a strong supporter of the Administration's foreign policy. These issues were fundamental, and the disagreement between Murray and his Chief was becoming fundamental.

At the Convention there were signs of his changing outlook. He joined Hillman's maneuver against Lewis's radical support by threatening to refuse the presidential nomination unless some action was taken against Communism. Close associates were surprised by his frequent assertions

138 Report to Eleanor Roosevelt by Nunn, op. cit.
139 CIO Convention, op. cit., 1940, p. 227.
140 Ibid., p. 134.
that he intended to be his own man. His remarks, upon being unanimously 
elected to the presidency of the CIO, on November 22, 1940, also served 
notice of his emergence as a leader in his own right. He told the 
delegates:

I am conscious that under ordinary circumstances this con-
vention would have elected to its presidency the man we all love, 
John L. Lewis, and I would have supported him. . . .I find that 
many of the news organs in this country observed and suggested 
that if this terrible man Lewis were pushed out of the way, this 
mild man Murray, this moderate, vacillating, weak individual 
would immediately rush somewhere to perfect an agreement with the 
American Federation of Labor. Well, I just want you to know, my 
friends, as I told you the other day, I think I am a man. I think 
I have conviction, I think I have a soul and a heart and a mind. 
And I want to let you in on something; they—with the exception, 
of course, of my soul—they all belong to me every one of them.

As the reference to unification indicated, the election of Murray was not a 
complete triumph for Hillman's views, but it did mean that the CIO would 
remain in the political orbit of the New Deal.

When the convention ended Lewis was still the most powerful figure in 
the CIO, but the balance of power had shifted. His downfall had come from 
his political actions rather than from any failure in the realm of collec-
tive bargaining. That fact alone signified somewhat the extent to which 
politics had become union business. What he had failed to face realisti-
cally was the nature of "practical party politics," and the question of 
labor's actual political effectiveness. Rather naively he had insisted 
that when labor put up the money it should have the say, and had refused 
to accommodate himself to political considerations. He also did not 
realistically consider that the heavier labor vote might be a tribute to 
the President's popularity rather than the LNNPL's activities. Because of

\[142\] CIO Convention, op. cit., 1940, p. 247.
these mistakes in judgment he failed in his attempt to operate as a political "free-agent." The CIO also paid a serious price for that failure. By making the LNPL a personal instrument, he had caused the union membership to lose confidence in it. But as long as he remained in the CIO he was powerful enough to retain his chairmanship of the League. Thus, his presence prevented the resurrection of organizational effectiveness in the political sphere.
CHAPTER III

WAR THREATENS LABOR GAINS AND PAC IS FORMED

In America the union member has looked upon the wage contract as an important economic asset. Consequently, once possessed of it, he has instinctively turned to leaders possessing the qualities of the skilled administrator, and away from those tempered to industrial war, but not to peace. The steel workers' union, for example, eventually ousted the militant leaders, who had been the heroes of the organizational drives, because they became troublemakers once contracts were signed. Management played an important role in the development of this attitude, for in coming to terms with unions, employers expected to be freed of the problem of industrial strife. They were more willing, therefore, to make concessions to labor leaders, who could be relied upon to hold the workers to the terms of wage contracts and other standards of "business" arrangements.

The CIO's relationship with the Administration followed a similar pattern. In the political sphere, Roosevelt approached labor in much the same spirit that enlightened management approached the collective bargaining contract. He was willing to push through measures of interest to labor even at the cost of sharp clashes with the conservative elements in his own party, but in return expected unions to provide him with political security as far as the labor vote was concerned. But the early misunderstandings with Lewis destroyed the mutual trust necessary for close cooperation. Moreover, Lewis

considered New Deal social legislation only half a loaf, and for that reason was reluctant to restrict the CIO's freedom of action. In that circumstance the Administration attempted to bypass Lewis and to deal with men who, for its purposes, were more reliable. The CIO membership also eventually turned away from Lewis, in the final analysis, because of an unwillingness to jeopardize newly won social advantages or the working arrangement with the Administration which had made them possible.

Hillsan succeeded in satisfying the demands of both groups, primarily because of his realism in assessing the bargaining position of the CIO. As an organization without political power in its own right, he believed that it could not afford to endanger the advantages won under the New Deal. Ill conceived bartering between the parties, he believed, was as apt to harm as to serve its interest. But he also realized that it was important to the Administration to keep the CIO politically and economically in line, and that the President, as a politician and an outsider, would be at a serious disadvantage in any direct attempt to interfere in internal union affairs. He saw that his own usefulness in performing that service was a sound basis for political bargaining. In effect, he undertook to provide a responsible and responsive relationship between the CIO and the Administration in exchange for a favorable political consideration of labor's interests.

In the months following the beginning of war in Europe the problems which the Administration faced in its relations with labor were economic as well as political. The President was eager to promote greater military preparedness, but in a nation still at peace, and in which public sentiment was strong against involvement in war, it was difficult to divert production into the proper channels. Lewis was not alone in declaring that the emergency
was being made an excuse for reneging on labor's rights, and industry was no more willing to sacrifice its profitable civilian production. The necessary economic restraints met strong resistance, and in an election year it was particularly inexpedient for the government to resort to compulsion. To meet this problem the National Defense Advisory Council was established, in May, 1940, and Hillman was appointed as the labor representative. It was in keeping with Hillman's whole approach to politics that from the beginning he recognized that one of his primary functions would be to persuade labor to accept decisions once they were made.

There was considerable protest when it was first announced that he would be in charge of manpower, the industrial training program, and labor relations in the Defense Program. In Congress, Representative Eugene Cox, of Georgia, raised an impassioned cry against placing the training of the nation's sons and daughters in the hands of the "Reds." Taking the cue, an excited public flooded the President with reminders of Hillman's previous association with the Garland Fund, the Russian American Export Company and other "radical" enterprises. Fearing a CIO bias, the AFL protested that his lack of experience in heavy industry disqualified him for the post.

---

2. The CIO News, July 29, 1940, p. 3.
With his customary alertness in human relations, Hillman immediately set out to break down this distrust. By carefully consulting Owen D. Young, who had given considerable study to the matter of a training program, and by appointing Floyd B. Reeves—a protege of Young's—as his administrative assistant, he quickly removed the "taint of radicalism." To reassure the labor movement, he set up a labor advisory council upon which the AFL, the Railroad Brotherhood, and the CIO were all represented. This group was given the task of disciplining irresponsible elements from within; thus, there was little question of unions being subjected to attacks by outsiders. By these tactics he soon won the confidence of the public and the labor movement.

In the NDAC, Hillman considered it his duty to educate the industrial members to labor's viewpoint. At the early meetings he tried stubbornly to persuade the Council to announce publicly its acceptance of the principle that the emergency production program should not be used to undermine social legislation. In keeping with this view, he demanded the denial of contracts to all firms violating the federal labor laws.

---

7 Letter of Owen D. Young to Sidney Hillman, July 10, 1940, FDR President's Secretary's File, 1940, Box 67.
9 Radway, op. cit., p. 163.
12 Radway, op. cit., p. 154.
did not take kindly to this suggestion and simply refused to deal with his labor division. Other members of the Council, notably William Knudsen in charge of industrial contracts, and Donald Nelson, who handled quartermaster contracts, strenuously resisted any attempt to interfere in contracting procedures. In Mid-September, 1940, the President intervened by emphasizing that the labor laws were to be observed in defense contracts. The NDAC, in response to this pressure, dutifully announced that it would try to prevent the undermining of labor standards.

Pious statements of principle, however, did not satisfy the unions, and Hillman continued his efforts to win concrete, enforceable policies. By early October 1940, he had persuaded the Council to agree that violators of the Walsh-Healy Act (which had established minimum wages on government jobs) were not entitled to contracts. In response to a query from Hillman, Attorney General Robert Jackson concurred in the opinion that the federal labor laws were applicable to all defense contracts, and informally ruled that in such cases the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board were binding even prior to appeals to the courts. These steps seemed to achieve Hillman's major objectives.

---

13 Minutes NDAC, op. cit., July 24, 1940, p. 36.
14 Hadaway, op. cit., p. 155.
16 Cleveland Ohio Steel, September 1940, ibid., VIII, p. 27.
17 San Francisco Chronicle, October 6, 1940, Hillman Redbook, op. cit., VIII, p. 222.
18 Washington Star, October 6, 1940, ibid., VIII, p. 220.
Representative Howard Smith (D., Va.) and other members of Congress raised the cry that the Defense Program was being used to enforce an industrial blacklist. These critics were encouraged by Assistant Secretary of War Robert Patterson, who testified before the Committee on Wagner Act revision that for his department labor complaints were not the determining factor in letting contracts. Thus, by implication, at least, he supported the view that the Jackson Ruling might prove an embarrassment to defense preparations. Under pressure, Jackson conceded that his ruling did not impair the right of the War and Navy Departments to deal with whomever they chose. This turn of events threatened the safeguards which Hillman had tried to build up for labor.

Knudsen promptly gave a loose interpretation to the Jackson ruling and negotiated a War Department contract with the Ford Motor Company, which still had several NLRB complaints against it. Hillman's position was moderate. He accepted the principle that contracts should not be withheld unless alternative facilities were available, and on that basis had earlier approved the $122,000,000 aircraft order to Ford. But in the $2,000,000 contract which the War Department negotiated after the Attorney General's ruling there was no such extenuating circumstance. Furthermore, the strong

22 Business Week, December 21, 1940, ibid., VIII, p. 240.
resistance which the Ford Company was just then offering to the UAW subjected Hillman to the sniping of Lewis at a very critical time in the Presidential campaign. He, therefore, filed a sharp protest against the new War Department contract, and demanded assurances against similar actions in the future. He feared that to yield in the case of Ford would justify other companies in demanding exceptions to the labor laws. On January 31, 1941, the War Department grudgingly announced that it had recently awarded a $10,000,000 contract to Chrysler rather than to Ford, who had submitted the lowest bid, because of the latter's labor practices. A few days later Assistant Secretary Patterson announced that the labor clause would be inserted in the Department's future contracts, and credited Hillman with the change.

Hillman's stubborn fight on behalf of labor law enforcement, and the timely support which he received from the President, did much to strengthen his position in the political showdown with Lewis. By his actions he largely disproved the contention that close cooperation with the Administration led to a subversion of labor's interests. The decision to make an example of Ford was particularly astute, for although he did not carry his point until after the election was over, action against the motor magnate had a particular appeal for union members. Hillman's eventual success in handling a matter which had thwarted Lewis also tended to verify the effectiveness of his political methods.

---

25 Ibid.
Less spectacularly, Hillman from the beginning insisted that there was no real reason why the defense program should not also serve social objectives. He believed, for example, that with proper planning the alleviation of unemployment was not incompatible with the objective of achieving a more efficient use of the nation's productive capacity. In July of 1940, he sharply criticized the Navy Department for working unskilled labor fifty-six hours per week in areas where workers were plentiful. As manpower problems became more acute he was able to persuade the NDAC to plan its subcontracting in such a manner as to create job-opportunities and to utilize local pools of idle workers.

A similar awareness of the social aspects of the industrial process was reflected in his approach to the problem of protecting defense production against strikes and other forms of industrial strife. He insisted that in asking workers to give up their bargaining rights voluntarily, the government was obligated to assume greater responsibility for protecting their basic welfare. In keeping with this philosophy, the government, under his direction, embarked upon a program of attempting to provide adequate housing near defense plants. Hillman also urged additional appropriations for maintaining a

---


33 Radway, op. cit., p. 155.
current cost of living survey, to be used in settling wage disputes.  

Racial discrimination became one of the delicate issues with which the Council had to deal, and there was some question of whether production might not be affected if the matter was pressed. But once again Hillman carried the fight through to the President, and secured an order declaring that defense jobs were to be open to all.  

Hillman's success in winning concessions to labor's viewpoint stemmed in no small part from the firm support which he received from the President. But his position was precarious, for he was exposed to the constant jockeying for advantage which went on between members of the Council and others involved in the defense policy. Deyous maneuvers were executed in an attempt to ease him out of the program without provoking presidential intervention on his behalf. At the end of 1940, when plans were being made to reorganize NDAC into the Office of Production Management, Hillman had gone to Florida to recuperate from a serious illness with full assurances that his position would not be affected by the change. But Secretaries Frank Knox and Henry Stimson had not forgiven him for the changes which he had forced in Army-Navy procurement policies, and were determined to weaken his influence in the new organization. John Biggers and William Eaton were equally 


35 Chicago News, October 29, 1940; Amsterdam/N.Y. / News, April 19, 1941; Kansas City/Kansas/ Plaindealer, May 2, 1941; N. Y. Daily Worker, May 1, 1941; and Washington Tribune, Hillman Redbook, op. cit., VIII, pp. 219, 251, 255.  

36 Earnest C. Mossner, Administrative History of the Office of Production Management, January to December 1941; Prepared for: The Committee on Records of War Administration, Division of Administrative Management (Bureau of the Budget, December 1, 1945), pp. 26-28.
determined to increase the power of their chief, William Knudsen, at Hillman's expense. Joining forces they prevailed upon Budget Director Harold Smith to rewrite the executive directive establishing OPM in such a way as to relegate Hillman to an advisory position. Learning of the change, Hillman's legal adviser, William Brandwen, moved to head off the threat, and demanded that all major decisions in the program should require the joint approval of Hillman and Knudsen. In the ensuing controversy the details of the Smith draft of the OPM directive leaked out to the press. Oddly enough, The Wall Street Journal was the first newspaper to carry the story. Union groups were immediately aroused by what they considered to be an attempt to ease labor out of the defense picture. At this point the President personally intervened to announce that Knudsen and Hillman would be Director General and Associate Director, respectively, in the new agency, and that both would exercise identical powers.

Almost as soon as Hillman took over his duties as Associate Director, ugly rumors began to be circulated that he was using his new authority to throw business to the New York firms holding contracts with his union. Soon Henry Morgenthau and Donald Nelson tried to push through changes in the OPM's contract letting procedure, which would have required consultation of the

---

37 Moss, Ibid., p. 29.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 31.
40 Ibid., p. 32.
41 Letter Becker to Donald Nelson, February 21, 1941, OPM File 591.10bac (National Archives, Washington, D. C.)
Labor Division only in the cases of known labor-law violators. Knudsen and Hillman blocked the proposal by writing a joint letter of protest to the President, but it was not long before Eli Oliver, whom Hillman had brought in from the LNPL to head the Labor Priorities Branch of OPM, bitterly complained that contracts were being released without the advice or consent of the Labor Division.

Under these constant pressures, Hillman's power over defense policies was secure only so long as he retained the confidence of the President. That confidence rested squarely upon his ability to provide assurances that labor would accept the decisions which were made, and that condition was not easy to fulfill. During the 1940 presidential campaign, while Lewis was still in control, Hillman's influence over the CIO rested largely upon his ability to provide the policies which the membership demanded. The successful fight for labor law enforcement, his emphasis upon the program to alleviate unemployment, and the evidence of presidential favor which the declaration on racial discrimination provided were the key to his eventual triumph over Lewis. It was not a relationship in which he could exercise a strict discipline over unions, and the Administration was aware of that fact. But after Lewis's downfall more was expected of Hillman.

---


43 Ibid.

In the months following the 1940 convention, the unsettled state of the internal affairs of the CIO tended to strengthen Hillman's personal pre-eminence in political matters. Lewis had lost contact with the Administration, and in the process had made the UMFL an instrument of the Miners' Union rather than of the whole CIO. Murray was preoccupied with the problem of establishing his control over the union. The stories of how local leaders would respectfully call on the new president, and then drop downstairs to ask Lewis's advice on the questions bothering them illustrate the nature of the problem. Out of deference to their long friendship Lewis reportedly discouraged the practice, but the question of who was to be the real leader of the CIO had not yet been resolved. Because the attention of the other major leaders was diverted into trade union channels, the CIO members looked increasingly to Hillman for leadership in the political sphere. With the collapse of the CIO's organized participation in politics, the solutions which he provided became more dependent upon his personal skill in conciliating differences between the Administration and labor.

But as the economic pressures caused by the defense program increased, his function tended to become one of persuading the workers to make the necessary sacrifices, rather than of satisfying their demands. Consequently, techniques for encouraging voluntary self-discipline were not always adequate. Early in 1941, major strikes occurred in a number of essential industries. Hillman realized that he was faced with a crucial political test. Failure to act impartially or to achieve a prompt settlement—even at the price of force—would cost him the confidence of the President and the public. Discipline

---

45 Alinsky, op. cit., p. 227.
46 Ibid.
was the price of the influence which labor, through him, was permitted to exercise over the economic policies of the defense program. Furthermore, he had testified against the anti-strike measures under consideration in Congress and knew that his words would be meaningless unless he could demonstrate that it was possible to provide industrial peace without resorting to punitive legislation.47

His firm action, as labor representative in the defense program, dismayed and outraged the unions involved. In the Allis-Chalmers strike he ordered both company and union back to work before a settlement had been reached.48 When the North American Aviation strike was prolonged by the intransigence of the local leaders, he acquiesced to the President's decision to use troops.49 These acts caused considerable excitement in the CIO, and made his political leadership a major issue in the factional deadlock which had lingered on after the 1940 election. Lewis blamed Hillman for bringing the Military into the North American Aviation strike, and bitterly denounced him for sacrificing labor to the "ruthless ambitions" of the Administration.50

The leftwing element in the CIO strongly supported these attacks upon the "Imperialistic" policies of Roosevelt and Hillman's "betrayal" of labor. Their vehemence was in part inspired by the fact that the charge of Communist instigation had been one of the original justifications behind the use of troops


in the North American Aviation strike. But it was not the full explanation, for after signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact they had consistently encouraged Lewis in his determination not to sacrifice labor's rights to the "Roosevelt created" emergency.

Murray's stand became the key to the situation. Without breaking with Lewis he had quietly built his own disciplined following in the ranks of the CIU, and had manifested signs of increasing independence. When officials of the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee filed a formal protest against their chairman, Van A. Bittner, who during the 1940 campaign had transferred them to distant parts of the country because they supported Lewis's endorsement of Wilkie, Murray took no action, or in effect backed Bittner. As Murray's strength increased, his supporters, men such as James E. Carey, grew much bolder in attacking the isolationism of the Miners' chief. Nevertheless, Murray was personally reluctant to offend his old friend, and made many concessions to his views. In the North American Aviation strike, for example, he joined with Lewis in condemning Hillman's behavior, although he personally had not condoned the behavior of the local leaders, and generally did not favor strikes in essential industries. The use of troops, of course, was too much a symbol of former repressions of union rights to be accepted with equanimity by even the most moderate unionist.

In spite of occasionally wavering, Murray became increasingly steadfast in his determination to prevent irresponsible union acts which might

---

51 Alinsky, op. cit., p. 229.
prove harmful to defense preparations, and to labor's own interest. In the
Timber strike which broke out in the Northwest during the late spring of
1941, he took prompt action against the responsible leaders. 53 He was not
really sure of his disciplinary powers, however, until the German invasion
of Russia had driven a wedge between Lewis and the leftwing elements, who for
somewhat different motives were supporting his isolationism.

The sudden change in the foreign situation threw these groups into
considerable confusion. To embrace collective security meant breaking with
Lewis and facing the uncertain welcome of the Murray-Hillman faction in the
CIO. Consequently, many continued for several weeks to respond to their
instincts as union leaders rather than to the change in the party line. When
the press questioned Joseph Curran, of the National Maritime Union, on his
reaction to the Russian invasion, he said, "What the hell's that got to do
with wages and hours?" 54 He had made concessions to party sympathizers less
from conviction than the desire to retain control of his union. Later he
changed his view. Harry Bridges of the Longshoremen, O. M. Orton of the
Woodworkers Unions, Reid Robinson of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union,
and several of the others commonly branded as leftwingers, continued for
several weeks to oppose war and to attack Roosevelt's foreign policy. 55

It was difficult for them to make common cause with Lewis, however,
for he relentlessly followed his own set course. Early in August he joined
with fourteen prominent Republicans, including Herbert Hoover, in signing a

53 "Terrible Week," Time, June 23, 1941, p. 141.
54 "CIO Leftist March," Newsweek, July 21, 1941, p. 36.
statement attacking aid to Russia and the United States foreign policy.\textsuperscript{56}

Such acts rapidly brought him into isolation in the CIO by forcing the holdouts to come to terms with Murray. In describing his own withdrawal from the Lewis camp, Lee Pressman said: \textsuperscript{57}

I went in to see him and said to him, 'John, I can't go along with you when the logic of the situation puts you in the kind of company that you're in when you sign that document.' Lewis didn't say anything and I walked out and I just never came back. I went with Murray.

Thus, by late summer of 1941 Murray had won full control of the CIO.

When Murray first began to show signs of independence, the Administration had done all that it could to bolster his prestige in the labor movement. The President promptly announced, for example, his appointment of Murray to the National Defense Mediation Board. \textsuperscript{58} As the new CIO president's influence increased, Roosevelt made a special effort to establish personal rapport, Murray became the recipient of the same type of warm friendly note to which Hillman was accustomed. \textsuperscript{59} The presidential staff also took special pains in drafting replies to the many suggestions which he made on defense production, and on many occasions he was called to the White House for personal consultation. \textsuperscript{60} In part, these attentions were merely proper deference to his position

\textsuperscript{56} PM, August 8, 1941, Hillman Redbook, op. cit., VIII, p. 316.
\textsuperscript{57} Alinsky, op. cit., p. 231.
\textsuperscript{58} White House Memo, February 27, 1941, etc., FDR File PPF 5640.
\textsuperscript{59} Letters FDR to Philip Murray, November 25, 1940, August 21, 1940, November 28, 1941, March 23, 1942, April 3, 1942, etc., FDR File PPF 5640.
\textsuperscript{60} Letters Philip Murray to FDR, December 18, 1940, December 26, 1940, January 25, 1941, FDR File 2546, Box 2, and Memo Sidney Hillman to Rudolph Foster (Presidential Assistant) August 29, 1941, FDR File PPF 5640.
\textsuperscript{61} White House Memo, February 27, 1941, FDR File PPF 5640.
as president of the CIO, but they were also based on the recognition that he had become a key figure in providing the discipline over labor, which the Administration's program required.

Hillman continued to be the political insider. The President customarily asked him to draft the replies to Murray's complaints or suggestions. But as Murray's leadership became more firmly established, a subtle change occurred in Hillman's relationship to the Administration and to the Union. There was in the President's attitude toward the two men the recognition that in some matters Murray was the man to rely on to get results. As Hillman became more preoccupied with disciplinary matters, there was a slight tendency among CIO members to feel that he had become primarily a spokesman for the Administration rather than for labor. In July, 1941, for example, R. J. Thomas, of the UA&W, resigned from the OPM's labor advisory council charging that it had become merely a window dressing for a management-run program. Hillman was by no means oblivious to the repeated attempts to nullify labor's influence in the defense program, but was not always able to control the situation and, therefore, had to bear a part of the responsibility.

Even after the balance of power had shifted away from him, Lewis was still able to keep the CIO in a wrought-up state. When his erstwhile radical

---

62 Letters Philip Murray to FDR, December 18, 1940, December 26, 1940, January 25, 1941, FDR File OP 2546, Box 2, and Memo Sidney Hillman to Rudolph Foster (Presidential Assistant), August 29, 1941, FDR File PPF 5640, etc.


supporters opened a more vehement attack upon his failure to cooperate with the defense effort, he attempted to persuade Murray to join with him in a counterattack upon the Communist elements. Murray suffered a heart attack which delayed a personal meeting between the two men until October 18, and by that time the gulf between them was too great to be reconciled. Nevertheless, Murray continued for some time to manifest his loyalty to the Miners' although opposing many of Lewis's maneuvers. When Lewis demanded a closed-shop agreement in the "captive coal mines" and entered a showdown struggle with the steel companies, the case was referred to the National Defense Mediation Board, which refused to grant his demand. Out of loyalty to the Miners, Murray promptly resigned from the Board.

At the CIO's 1941 Convention, Denny Lewis, brother of John L., and Chairman of the CIO's Construction Workers Organizing Committee, once again revived the charge that Hillman was betraying the CIO. As labor member of OPM, Hillman had decided that in the interests of industrial peace the paramount interest of AFL unions in the building trades should be recognized. In pursuance of that policy a contractor named Currier was denied a contract on

67 Alinsky, op. cit., p. 236.
69 Ibid.
70 As a means of avoiding jurisdictional disputes, Hillman had ruled that the AFL unions had the paramount interest in the construction industry, and had passed over the lowest bid, made by contractor Currier, who employed CIO workers, in order to throw the job to the AFL unions.
on which he had made the lowest bid because his employment agreement was with the CIO construction workers union. At the Convention, Denny Lewis used the Currier incident to arouse hostility to Hillman, and demanded his resignation from OPM. Murray headed off the attack at the Convention, but privately filed a sharp protest with the President against the OPM policies for the building trades.72

Eventually, after surprise demands for "accouplement,"73 and other ingenious tactics, Lewis ousted Murray and his supporters from the United Mine Workers,74 and withdrew from the CIO to form the predatory District.50.75

Paralleling the pressures upon Hillman from within the CIO were a series of reorganizations in the Defense program which threatened his influence over basic policy decisions. In the summer of 1941, the OPM was reorganized into industry and commodity sections, and in the process labor lost its representation on the industrial councils.76 By August, the Supply and Allocations Priorities Board had taken over many of the functions of the OPM, and thus another important phase of the program was removed from the jurisdiction of Hillman's labor division.77 Lewis's strug-

72 Letter Philip Murray to FDR December 3, 1941. FDR File of 2546, Box 2, and letter Philip Murray to FDR, December 3, 1941, Amalgamated Clothing Workers' White House File.
75 Alinsky, op. cit., pp. 267, 275.
76 New York Post, June 26, 1941, Ibid., VIII, p. 52.
77 New York Sun, August 29, 1941, Ibid., VIII, p. 65.
gle with the steel companies, and other strikes during the autumn months led to renewed demands for a labor draft, and brought Hillman's labor policies under fire. During these developments, he very definitely felt that he was not receiving the full support of the Administration.

In January of 1942, when the War Production Board was in the offing, he repeatedly sought an opportunity to review the whole labor situation with the President, but his days of ready access had passed. Because the nation was at war, he voluntarily stayed on under Donald Nelson when the WPB was set up, but his Labor Division was largely ignored. Consequently, he became impatient at his lack of authority to deal with the manpower problem in the manner which the situation required. Repeatedly he urged the creation of an agency with definite authority in that area. Rumors were prevalent in Washington that he had threatened to resign unless given the opportunity to head such an organization.

Once the President was convinced of the necessity of establishing a War Manpower Commission, he appointed a four-man committee consisting of William O. Douglas, Samuel Rosenmann, Budget Director Harold Smith, and Anna Rosenberg to select a man to head the new organization. Two members

---

78. Interoffice White House Memo, January 9, 1942, FDR File of 407, Box 2.
79. Ibid.
82. PM, February 5, 1942, Hillman Redbook, op. cit., IX, p. 86.
83. Washington Times Herald, April 17, 1942, Ibid., IX, p. 86.
of the Committee were generally considered to be hostile to Hillman. Smith had been involved in the effort to relegate Hillman to an advisory role in the OPM, and Mrs. Rosenberg was an old rival from the New York labor scene. Due largely to the influence of these two, Paul V. McNutt, rather than Hillman, was given the new post. Hillman was on recuperative leave, and by the time he returned to Washington the Labor Division of the WPB had been transferred to the new agency, and his post was abolished.

Roosevelt immediately offered him an appointment as Special Assistant to the President in labor matters. To the press the White House intimated that he would hold a position similar to that of Harry Hopkins on Lend Lease.

Hillman was ill, and felt that the offer was little more than a face-saving gesture, so he decided to return to his union.

Hillman's departure from government was due primarily to the fact that he had ceased to be useful to the Administration. He had been brought into the Defense program because the public temper did not permit an overt use of coercive governmental powers. The successful exercise of his office had depended as much upon his personal influence in the labor movement as the authority granted him. For this reason he was able to fulfill a function which the Administration could not perform for itself. The fact that the Defense post would strengthen his power to offer political resistance to

---

84 Ibid.
86 Letter FDR to Sidney Hillman, April 18, 1942, FDR File of 4910.
88 Letter FDR to Sidney Hillman, May 1, 1942, FDR File PPF 3585.
Lewis had also been a consideration in the original appointment. But the political threat had been successfully met. The beginning of the war had also changed the nature of the problem in the economic sphere. The spadework of the Defense agencies, and the patriotism of the workers made it relatively certain that organized labor would voluntarily accept the necessary sacrifices. Furthermore, the public temper made it feasible for the President to exercise whatever coercive powers were necessary. Under these circumstances the Administration felt free to eliminate the unsatisfactory features of the dual control that had been set up in OPM. To some extent the vigor with which Hillman had defended the Administration's interests had undermined his usefulness in dealing with the labor movement.

Hillman's fall from power was a milestone in the political life of the CIO. Murray and other leaders continued to have contact with the Administration as advisors on various phases of the war production program, but in the full meaning of the term it was not a political relationship. The CIO's organized political strength had been permitted to lapse with the problems created by war. They made little effort to rebuild a real basis for exerting an influence over political decisions. By his bargaining skill Hillman had continued to bridge the gap between union and political concerns, more on the strength of the CIO's supposed strength, going into the 1940 election, than its actual political potential at any given moment thereafter. His compliant realism, just as surely as Lewis's bid for greater independence ended by underscoring the fact that in the CIO's relations with the Administration, the political initiative always rested with the Administration.

In disposing of Hillman, Roosevelt had had no desire to force a final break of relations such as had occurred in the case of Lewis. During the
summer of 1942, while Hillman was hospitalized by a serious illness, he received flowers from the President as in previous years. There were also encouraging notes urging him to get well quickly so that his services would be available in the nation's hour of need. When he was well and ready for work again, Hillman phoned Marvin McIntyre, for the President had asked to be informed. He met politeness, but there was no place for him. During the following weeks he tried to arrange an appointment with the President, but each time met with refusal. Hillman would have been less than human if he did not at times feel a bitter resentment.

As the 1942 Congressional election campaign began in earnest, the White House suddenly became concerned over the CIO's political apathy. Presidential Secretary Marvin McIntyre warned his chief of the importance of prodding Murray into getting union members registered. One result was that Roosevelt saw the advisability of restoring Hillman to full political grace. On October 9, 1942, he reaffirmed his endorsement of John J. Bennett for the governorship of New York by means of a personal letter to Hillman. The latter showed signs of pique. Much to the surprise of the other New York unions which were solidly behind the ALP's Dean Alfange, he supported

---

89 Memo Marvin McIntyre to FDR September 11, 1942, File FDR PPF 8173.
90 Memos September 14, 1942, October 3, 1942, October 7, 9, 1942, FDR PPF 8172.
91 Memo Marvin McIntyre to FDR, September 19, 1942, FDR File Of 2586.
92 Letter FDR to Sidney Hillman, October 9, 1942, FDR File PPF 8172.
Bennett, but it was several weeks before he made the letter public.\textsuperscript{94}

The results of the Congressional elections, however, quickly resolved petty differences. Due primarily to the failure of war workers to reregister, the total vote was only 28,000,000 and the Administration suffered serious reverses.\textsuperscript{95} The prospect of a decline of the New Deal had a decidedly sobering effect upon the delegates to the CIO's 1942 Convention, and they gave considerable attention to the problem of rebuilding political strength. In a spirit of candid self-examination, the delegates pointed out that past conventions had drafted many political resolutions and plans, but had made little provision for carrying them out at the local level.\textsuperscript{96} Then in a spirit of high resolve, they, too, adopted a resolution urging that more attention be given to political issues and leaders, and promptly adjourned.\textsuperscript{97}

Nevertheless, in the months following the Convention a persistent effort was made to arouse political interest among the membership. This emphasis was especially apparent in the CIO union journals. Murray was careful to keep the rank-and-file informed on current legislation, and on several occasions made sharp attacks on the behavior of the Dies Committee.\textsuperscript{98}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[94]{Proceedings of the CIO Convention, op. cit., 1942, pp. 210-211.}
\footnotetext[95]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[96]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[97]{CIO News, January 11, 1943, p. 5; January 18, 1943, p. 3, and February 15, 1943, p. 3.}
\footnotetext[98]{Ibid., January 18, 1943, pp. 3-5.}
\end{footnotes}
At first the emphasis was upon stronger support for rationing and price control, more effective industrial mobilisation, and problems related to the war. The Smith-Connally Act, the Hobbes Anti-Labor Racketeering Bill, and other hostile legislation, soon aroused the fear that 1942 had marked the beginning of a war engendered reactionary trend. On April 15, 1943, in a speech at Philadelphia, Hillman raised the specter of economic dislocations in the postwar reconversion period, and the political emphasis became one of preparing to defend labor's rights and security in the difficult days ahead.

Hillman, in particular, threw himself into the task of educating the CIO membership to the need for a permanent political organization. He had become restless in his old job as President of the Clothing workers. An indirect recognition of the leadership which he achieved was provided in April of 1943, when political boss Frank Hague asked the President to see if he could arrange for Hillman's assistance in quelling the political revolt, which Governor Edison and CIO unionists Carl Holderman and Irving

---

99 Ibid., p. 5; Advance, July 1, 1943, p. 4; "Opposition to the Hobbes Bill," Congressional Digest, June 1943, pp. 190-2.
101 Advance, May 1, 1943, p. 15.
103 Interview with Ted Dudley, Assistant Chairman of CIO-PAC, September 17, 1941. Proceedings Newspaper Guild Convention, op. cit., p. 4.
104 Memo summarizing Letter Frank Hague to Grace Tully, acknowledged April 10, 1943, FDR File OF 43110.
Abrahamson were engineering in New Jersey. By early summer the months of political conditioning had had their effect, and on July 7, 1943, the CIO General Executive Board announced the establishment of a Political Action Committee, with Hillman as its head. Murray justified the step on the grounds that political apathy in 1942 had clearly indicated the dangers of a postwar letdown, and a resurgence of reaction.

The Executive Board's mandate to the Political Action Committee was actually a tentative authorization to explore the sentiments of local unions on the subject of political methods, and to prepare specific plans for the future consideration of the Board and of the Convention. But Hillman immediately scheduled a series of preliminary conferences in all of the major industrial centers which served as organizational rallies. On July 17, 1943, in Philadelphia, he charged that the Smith-Connelly Act and other restrictive measures clearly proved that the reactionaries were putting their private war on labor above the struggle with Germany and Japan. In graphic terms he pictured the probable consequences if labor

105 Advance, February 15, p. 3; May 1, pp. 1-5; June 15, pp. 3, 11; and July 1, pp. 3-4.

106 Philip Murray, Labor's Political Aims (CIO Publication No. 102), p. 4. Other members of the Committee included: Van A. Bittner, Vice Chairman; R. J. Thomas, President of UAW, as Secretary; Sherman Dalrymple of the United Rubber Workers and Albert Fitzgerald, of the United Electrical Workers.

107 Ibid., pp. 1-4.

108 Dudley interview, op. cit.


111 Ibid.
Many committees and groups participated in the local elections. Many committees and groups participated in the local elections.

By the time the election had concluded, the national, regional, and local PACs had worked to ensure that the elected officials were the best qualified candidates for the PAC's support. The elected officials were the best qualified candidates for the PAC's support. At a conference in Seattle, a letter expressing the importance of making effective use of the letter-writing campaign, the elected officials were the best qualified candidates for the PAC's support.

At a conference in Seattle, a letter expressing the importance of making effective use of the letter-writing campaign, the elected officials were the best qualified candidates for the PAC's support.

In meetings at different, immediate, so, Paul, and during the election planning for poster recognition, a Chicago, where you decided fair to mobilize the strength on behalf of interaction, control, and intent.
of that year. In Toledo, Ohio, five of the seven councilmen were elected with the support of a joint CIO-AFL political action group, and in Cleveland, Mayor Frank J. Lausche and eight new councilmen were elected with assistance from the local PAC. Voter registration drives, and letter writing campaigns to Congressmen were common in many sections. Hillman, thus, returned to confront the Executive Board with an established, functioning political organization. The Board promptly gave its endorsement, and referred his action to the CIO Convention for final approval.

The AFL rejected the invitations for joint action, which both Murray and Hillman extended, on the grounds that the PAC was too closely tied to the Democratic Party, and too ambitious beyond the special interests of labor. The Railroad Brotherhood, and the United Mine Workers were equally cool. Nevertheless, these groups informally supported objectives very similar to those of the PAC. The AFL made preparations to assure that its members would register and vote in the Presidential elections, and the suggestions on postwar planning which Green submitted to

119 Ibid., November 15, 1943, p. 2.
120 Ibid., September 6, pp. 1-3.
121 Ibid.
122 Dudley interview, op. cit.
the President closely paralleled the thinking of the CIO. A number of groups in both the AFL and Railroad Brotherhood eventually established working arrangements with the PAC. A. F. Whitney, for example, joined the National Citizens-PAC (a subsidiary of the CIO-PAC which was formed later), and Tobin of the AFL Teamsters, publicly declared his admiration for Hillman's organization. Eleven of the AFL international unions, also, established programs which closely paralleled that of the PAC.

Prior to the Convention many of the individual CIO unions took a strong pro-Roosevelt stand. In September, the United Electrical workers endorsed a "Fourth Term." Early in October, the Missouri State Industrial Union Council, and the United Automobile Workers took a similar stand. Consequently, Hillman had little difficulty in winning the strong support of the delegates to the CIO Convention. With little discord they adopted a resolution pledging full support to the PAC, declaring:

Our primary task in the political field today is to weld the unity of all workers, farmers, and other progressives behind candidates, regardless of party affiliation, who are committed to our policy of total victory and who fully support the measures necessary to achieve it and to lay the basis for a secure, peaceful, decent and abundant postwar world.

The Presidential election of the following year was the real focal point of

---

128 Letter from William Green to FDR, February 23, 1944, FDR File of 112, 1944, Box 4.
129 Gaar, op. cit., p. 255.
130 Ibid.
131 CIO News, September 20, 1943, p. 3.
132 Ibid., October 4, 1943, p. 2; October 11, 1943, p. 3.
interest, and the Convention strongly endorsed continued support for Roosevelt. 133

Perhaps the most impressive indication of the temper of the Convention was the financial support which it gave the PAC. Hillman had contacted all of the unions in time for them to instruct their delegates and the initial contributions included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum Workers</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amalgamated Clothing workers</td>
<td>100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Federation of Hosiery Workers</td>
<td>2,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. local union</td>
<td>1,255.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Communication Association</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Newspaper Guild</td>
<td>1,631.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
<td>100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Glass, Ceramic, Silica and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand Workers</td>
<td>5,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Union of Shipyard Workers</td>
<td>50,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Fisherman and Allied Workers</td>
<td>222.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Fur and Leather Workers</td>
<td>25,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Longshoremen and Warehouse</td>
<td>10,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers of America</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers</td>
<td>10,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Maritime Union</td>
<td>10,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Workers</td>
<td>10,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State, County and Municipal Workers</td>
<td>2,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile Workers</td>
<td>25,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Workers</td>
<td>10,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Automobile Workers</td>
<td>100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Automobile Workers, local</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Cannery, Agriculture, Packing and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Workers</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers</td>
<td>2,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Electrical Workers</td>
<td>100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Office and Professional Workers</td>
<td>5,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Packinghouse Workers</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Rubber Workers</td>
<td>20,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Shoe Workers</td>
<td>1,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Steel Workers</td>
<td>100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Steel Workers, local</td>
<td>40.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$697,749.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the support given the national organization, the CIO unions agreed to organize and finance the local units necessary to make the program a success.\footnote{Proceedings of CIO Convention, op. cit., 1943, pp. 246-7.} Murray's Steel workers, for example, had appointed fourteen full-time staff members to work with the PAC, and announced that it would spend $100,000 on its local political units in addition to the gift to the national committee.\footnote{Proceedings of the First United Steel Workers Convention (Washington, D. C., 1943), p. 83.} It was an auspicious beginning.

Yet, as Hillman well understood, the PAC was a speculative political enterprise based on the assumption that the mobilization of the labor vote, which the interests of both the CIO and the Administration required, could best be achieved through the union. But as he quickly learned it was not an assumption that would be taken on faith. At first he had expected to work closely with the President in setting up the PAC. On July 27, 1943, he had forwarded to the President an account of the preliminary meetings in Philadelphia and Chicago.\footnote{Letter from Sidney Hillman to FDR, July 27, 1943, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, White House File.} Early in August he had asked for an appointment to discuss in detail the political role which the PAC should undertake.\footnote{Memo David K. Miles to General Watson, August 10, 1943, FDR File OF 4910.} But although deeply interested in its progress, Roosevelt refused to discuss or to be in any way associated with the venture\footnote{Ibid.} until it had proved its political worth.
CHAPTER IV

LABOR DRAFTS A PROGRAM

After coping with the initial organizational and financial problems, Hillman next turned to the task of getting the PAC on a sounder ideological footing. There was no very clear notion of what the PAC was expected to accomplish. In its name the participating CIO unions enthusiastically repeated patriotic slogans about winning the war and the peace.\(^1\) With vague but determinedly liberal intent a rapid succession of individual measures before Congress were supported or opposed. The Anti-Poll Tax Bill, \(^2\) for example, was strongly supported, and with equal vigor Hillman ordered local PAC units to bring all possible pressure upon members of the Senate after they had killed the Green-Lucas Soldiers' Vote Bill.\(^3\) But in any real sense of the term a labor program had not been formulated.

Because of the general apprehension concerning reconversion, the PAC called a conference on full employment, which met in New York on January 14-15, 1944. Spokesmen from the Democratic Party, businessmen, economic experts from both the Federal agencies and private life, representatives from the farm organizations, university deans, social workers, and a wide

\(^1\)CIO News, July 21, 1943, p. 1; United Automobile Workers, December 1, 1943, p. 5; Pilot, February 11, 1944, p. 2.


\(^3\)United Automobile Workers, December 15, 1943, p. 3.
variety of others were invited to join with labor in assessing the nation's expected postwar needs. The desire to develop a program with the widest possible appeal prompted Hillman's decision to bring these groups together. By promoting a freer exchange of ideas between the CIO and other "Liberals," he was also making an important innovation. Unlike politically minded unionists in Europe, the American worker had always before resisted the influence of outside intellectuals. But now, the PAC deliberately invited a closer working alliance.

During the conference the CIO leaders were indebted to these outsiders, especially Administration spokesmen, for many of the basic ideas which they endorsed in the realm of political and economic policy. In keynoting the discussion, Murray paraphrased the President's "Economic Bill of Rights," by declaring that "full employment" meant to every American Citizen a job at union wages on a farm, business or profession that paid, a well built home decently furnished, good schooling for children with an equal chance for health and happy growth, and an income through social insurance in event of unemployment, sickness, old age or early death of the wage earner. In its more technical aspects, "full employment" was closely identified with the ideas advanced by Henry Wallace. He advocated a goal of 60,000,000 jobs and a national income of at least $170,000,000,000. The PAC readily accepted that criteria.

4 Philip Murray, Labor's Political Aims (CIO Publication No. 102), p. 5.

One of the basic characteristics of its interpretation of the concept was a strong emphasis upon the underlying harmony between the economic interests of labor, business, farmers, and other economic groups. Hillman declared:

"Full employment states our objective in terms of jobs for workers. But its realization is essential to the well-being of every other group and section of our population. Only full employment can assure farmers a market for their produce and business—big and small—customers for their products. Anything less than full employment will spell a stagnating economy of idle men and idle machines, farm surpluses and hunger, insecurity and desperation. This is the very breeding ground of fascism..."

Thus, theoretically, at least, the orientation of the PAC's thinking was social rather than class.

"Paralleling this ideal was the equally strong conviction that "die-hards" of the National Association of Manufacturers were not ready to accept proper social responsibility. The failure of the stabilization program and the abolition of the National Resources Planning Board were taken as signs of the business mind's lack of perception in meeting the broader needs of the economy." Murray charged that the "big monopolistic industrialists," who dominated the war agencies, had failed to achieve real planning in the war effort, and were already jockeying for advantage in civilian production.

---

6 Ibid., p. 3.
7 Ibid., pp. 16, 17.
8 Ibid., p. 9.
The CIO felt that in such planning as had been undertaken, the interests of the workers had been ignored. Industry had been granted tax rebates, the farmers price supports, but Congress had voted down the Killgore Emergency Unemployment Compensation Bill, which would have assisted the workers in making the transition from war to peacetime employment.

Because of this distrust, the labor representatives at the Full-Employment Conference were highly critical of estimates of postwar needs which differed from their own or, more accurately, those popularized by Wallace. In a study prepared by the National Association of Manufacturers, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., had insisted that an annual national income of $100,000,000,000 was the feasible goal for the postwar economy. Hillman contended that production geared to that level would leave from ten to fifteen million unemployed. Grant Oakes, of the Farm Equipment Workers, insisted that labor's interests had been deliberately ignored. To support the charge, he called attention to the statement of Paul Hoffman, Chairman of the NAM Committee for Economic Development, to the effect that there never had and never would be full employment.

James G. Patton, of the National Farmers Union, quoted a later statement by Marion B. Folsom, Treasurer of the Eastman Kodak Company, that

---

9 The Peoples' Plan For Reconversion (CIO-PAC Pamphlet of the Month No. 2, 1944), p. 9.
10 Don't Let Our Workers Starve (CIO-PAC Miscellaneous Pamphlet No. 10, 1944), p. 3.
11 Four Men Speak, op. cit., p. 4.
12 Ibid., p. 34.
"Job for every person willing and able to work is absolutely incompatible with the free-enterprise system," in order to prove that Hoffman's views had been a mild exposition of NAM policy. In terms of the farmers' interests, he insisted, production at the level suggested by Sloan would mean a reduction in gross farm income from $23,000,000,000 to $14,000,000,000 per year, and in new farm income from $12,000,000,000 to $7,000,000,000 per year. In human terms such a curtailment would drive half a million families from the land into the labor market.

As the criticisms of business reasoning indicate, consolidating wartime gains was an integral part of labor's idea of full employment. Because business accepted a prewar standard for prosperity, labor turned increasingly to government for the fulfillment of its aspirations. Walter Reuther, of the UAW, declared:

I think that we must insist that at this time the national government, both the Administration and Congress, announce as a matter of national policy, that in the postwar period we will permit free private enterprise that degree of freedom necessary to make its maximum contribution in terms of employment, but if Free Enterprise fails to meet the requirements of our nation in terms of the standard of full employment, then the government will not hesitate to take those steps necessary to insure and maintain those levels of full employment for our people.

In regard to government's proper role, the CIO frankly accepted the principle of economic planning.17

14 Four Men Speak, op. cit., p. 34.
15 Ibid., p. 30.
16 F-B Conference, op. cit., p. 15.
17 Murray, Labor's Political Aims, op. cit., p. 6.
Murray recommended the establishment of a national planning board upon which representatives from agriculture, labor, business, and government would jointly exercise the policy making powers. But implicit in the proposed structure of the agency was a vaguely defined notion of sovereign economic groups getting together to work out basic economic decisions. Government seemed to fit into all of this as a sort of senior partner, or "chairman of the board." The tendency to view economic solutions as primarily a matter of the "leaders" of the various groups getting together gave an interesting insight into Murray's picture of the economic process. The "business unionist's" strong belief in the underlying harmony of class interests was clearly the cornerstone. Economics became something of a moral science in which good will and cooperativeness on the part of the "leaders" were the essential elements.

Hillman and the other CIO leaders also stressed the community of interests between the economic classes. Planning as they conceived it was prompted by many of the same motives that led to the establishment of cartels. Experience in the wartime agencies had clearly shaped their practical image of what economic planning involved. Many times in the literature of the PAC, the industrial accomplishments during the war were to be held up as an example of effective national action.

Moving from the general to the specific, Alvin Hansen, Adviser to the Governors of the Federal Reserve System, explained some of the complications.

---

18 Ibid.
involved in successful economic planning. The $165,000,000,000 outstanding government bonds was popularly looked upon as a backlog of civilian demand which would provide some assurance of continued prosperity. But he broke the figure down for the PAC leaders to show that only $25,000,000,000 of that amount represented individual savings bonds, a third of which were in the hands of the fairly well-to-do. Thus, effective demand was apt to be much lower than predicted. Leon Henderson concurred with Hansen in the opinion that saving rather than spending might characterise reconversion if mismanagement undermined public confidence. Failure to meet demand promptly involved the alternative danger, inflation. Timing—especially achieving a partial demobilisation during the period between the surrender of Germany and the final defeat of Japan—was, in Hansen's opinion, the key to effective action.

Such counsel was taken to heart by the CIO leaders, for their apprehensions had already been aroused by the economic danger signs that were beginning to appear. In a speech before the National Retail Dry Goods Association, Senator Harry Truman (D., Mo.) had called attention to the cutbacks that were already being ordered in some phases of war production. Contract cancellations amounting to fourteen or fifteen billion dollars were expected

---

21 F-E Conference, op. cit., p. 7.
23 Ibid., p. 8.
24 Ibid., p. 6.
before the end of the year. Moreover, in some industries unemployment had already begun to appear. These developments merely served to remind labor that with victory 10,000,000 servicemen would be returned to the labor market, and from 20,000,000 to 25,000,000 war workers released from their jobs.

Walter Reuther warned the Full-Employment Conference that maximum job opportunities depended largely upon successfully utilizing the increased industrial capacity represented by the government-built warplants. He suggested that the idle aircraft plants might be turned to the production of pre-fabricated homes, household fixtures, heating and air-conditioning units, and other items for which there was a pressing need. George Addes, also of the UAW, called for immediate research to determine how best to integrate into the economy the tools and plants carried over from the war program.

Murray raised the equally difficult question of who was to operate the more than $20,000,000,000 worth of industrial plants built by the government. He insisted that they were a valuable part of the public domain, and should be used for the benefit of all. With uncompromising determination he set out to block all plans for turning the war plants over to private

26 Ibid., p. 14
27 Ibid., p. 8.
28 Ibid., p. 3.
29 F-E Conference, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
30 Ibid., p. 19.
31 Ibid.
companies at sacrifice prices.\textsuperscript{33} The PAC eventually came to the conclusion that they should be operated as part of the public works program, which it advocated for bolstering employment.\textsuperscript{34}

In keeping with its insistence upon thinking in terms of the economy as a whole, the PAC, also, proposed that the government should provide extensive assistance to business. Murray urged that the government should be prepared to supply working capital to firms having difficulty in financing the reconversion of their plants.\textsuperscript{35} Later, in its campaign literature, the PAC proposed a direct subsidy to manufacturers if postwar production lagged.\textsuperscript{36} Programs of world rehabilitation were also considered a desirable form of indirect subsidy. Grant Oakes recommended a peacetime lend-lease as a means of creating a market for industrial and agricultural products.\textsuperscript{37} As an indication of the CIO's economic motivation, the fact that federal action was demanded was much less significant than the purposes for which it was intended. By demanding loans and subsidies for business, Murray and the others clearly demonstrated that greater "business" prosperity was still their ultimate economic goal. Paradoxically, they turned to government to promote that end because they did not trust business to be sufficiently enterprising.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34} Four Men Speak, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

\textsuperscript{35} Murray, Labor's Political Aims, op. cit., p. 6.

\textsuperscript{36} The Peoples' Plan for Reconversion (CIO-PAC Pamphlet of the Month No. 2, 1944), p. 9.

\textsuperscript{37} F-E Conference, op. cit., p. 39.
Clinton S. Golden, of the Steel workers, commented upon management's reluctance to accept the normal risks necessary to develop new opportunities. In his own industry, the prevailing view was that rapid technological advances during the war would lead to an early saturation of civilian demand. Surplus scrap iron and steel further complicated the picture. Consequently, managerial energies were directed toward getting the industry into a position to operate at a fraction of capacity without losing money.

This and similar examples created an uneasy feeling in CIO circles that business had lost its initiative and was more concerned with a cautious protection of investments than with expanding its markets and profits.

Labor was convinced that its own hopes depended upon an expanding economy. Two major considerations influenced that conclusion. One was the simple recognition that a low volume of profits would not provide the means for fully satisfying the claims of both labor and business. Implicit in this line of reasoning was the belief that to sacrifice legitimate profits would harm the economy, without fulfilling labor's aspirations. But the PAC was also convinced that, in view of the 25 percent increase in industrial efficiency during the war, failure to increase mass purchasing power would lead to market gluts and economic instability. It reasoned that maximum production and a greater volume of profits would permit management's

---

38 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
39 Ibid., p. 25.
40 Ibid., p. 30.
41 Ibid., p. 25.
42 Joseph Gaer, Road to Freedom (CIO-PAC Pamphlet of the Month No. 5, 1944), p. 16.
legitimate demands to be met by a lower rate of return, and would at the same time make it economically feasible to increase both the actual and proportional purchasing power of the workers. \(^{43}\) Hence, a larger output, low profit rates and increased consumer purchasing power became the PAC's basic formula for assuring economic prosperity and security.

It called specifically for a twenty percent increase in basic wage rates, a minimum wage of sixty-five cents per hour, more adequate unemployment compensation, and termination pay for war workers. \(^{45}\) These were looked upon as emergency measures necessary to offset the loss of overtime pay, the shift of war workers to poorer paying jobs and other factors that might cause a slump in the demand for goods. \(^{46}\) In order to draw war profits back into the nation's economic life, the PAC considered it essential that management should meet these increases without raising prices. \(^{47}\) Price and rent controls, and tax adjustments to ease the burden on low income groups were also vital to that purpose. \(^{48}\)

---


\(^{44}\) Murray, Labor's Political Aims, op. cit., p. 6.

\(^{45}\) The Peoples' Plan for Reconversion, op. cit., pp. 2-4.


\(^{47}\) Let Our People Live, op. cit., p. 19; Road to Freedom, op. cit., p. 16, and F-E Conference, op. cit., p. 38.

\(^{48}\) The Peoples' Program for 1944," in Gaer, The First Round, op. cit., p. 204.
Most important of the permanent reforms demanded was a guaranteed annual wage.* Public work programs and assistance to business were expected to underwrite a high level of employment, but the PAC was also determined that the worker should be guaranteed a standard of living commensurate with the economy's potential productivity. **Emil Rieve, of the Textile workers, estimated that increases in industrial efficiency had made it possible to provide an annual wage of at least $2,500 for every worker in America. The demand was justified on the grounds that creating greater mass purchasing power was the key to the nation's economic health.***

A maximum use of material and human resources was basic in the PAC's concept of full employment. **Agricultural surpluses in the midst of low nutritional standards was contrary to that purpose.*** Labor was also very conscious of the effect of low farm income upon the stability of the economy. **Hard times for the farmer meant not only a shrinking market for industrial goods, but a possible rural invasion of the labor market. Economic, as well as political considerations, thus, caused the PAC to give considerable attention to agricultural policy.**

---

*The CIO and the Community,* Economic Outlook, November 1944, p. 3; *New York Times,* May 9, 1944, p. 14; *F-E Conference,* op. cit., pp. 29, 48.  
**Ibid.*  
***F-E Conference,* op. cit., pp. 42, 43.  
****Four Men Speak,* op. cit., p. 29.  
*****Ibid.*  
******F-E Conference,* op. cit., pp. 83, 84.
After consulting with the various farm organizations, the CIO took the position that raising farmers to a position of economic quality was a necessary part of the process of learning to live with abundance. As an agricultural spokesman at the Full-Employment Conference, James G. Patten expressed strong agreement:

...Many spokesmen for agriculture, business and industry do not yet accept this fact. Their reluctance, I believe, is based on a sincere doubt that capitalism, accustomed to working for profits based on scarcity, real or synthetic, can be adjusted to production for abundance and survive. I agree with those who insist that such an adjustment is the prime condition for the survival of capitalism. ...

Finding domestic and foreign markets for farm products was the first big problem. The CIO favored a continuation of price supports, and federal aid in developing new markets. But both labor and the farm organizations were convinced that a balanced diet for the nation would go far toward providing a real solution to farm surpluses.

From labor's standpoint the problem was not merely one of assuring a market for farm products, but also one of creating a better market for industrial goods. The PAC insisted that until farm families enjoyed material comforts, social benefits, and economic security comparable to that of the urban classes, there could be no real security for the rest of society. As measures for promoting greater economic well-being among rural groups, it proposed that: (1) The government should recognize the

---

56. Four Men Speak, op. cit., p. 31.
57. F-E Conference, op. cit., p. 84.
58. Four Men Speak, op. cit., p. 29.
family farm as the basic agricultural unit, and assist the family proprietor in resisting the tendency toward larger agricultural units, (2) Commercialized farms should be subjected to a heavier rate of taxation, (3) Social security benefits should be extended to farm labor and self-employed operators, (4) An agricultural "RFC" should be created for the benefit of operators of family farms, (5) The rural electrification program should be expanded to include the 4,000,000 farms not served by power lines, (6) Governmental assistance should be provided in financing and supervising cooperatives, (7) The Federal government should continue to provide an integrated program of soil conservation, irrigation and reforestation, (8) A large scale expansion and improvement of the nation's farm-to-market road system should be undertaken, and (9) Federal assistance should be provided in improving the school system, so that the rural population would have equal educational opportunities.

Many of the specific features of the program were borrowed directly from the National Farmers Union. In many cases the political consideration of demonstrating the CIO's good will toward the farm population was more governing, than faith in their economic efficacy. Nevertheless, the conviction that labor's hopes for a better life rested upon a higher standard of living for all was fundamental in the PAC's thinking.

For reasons that were both political and economic, the PAC also gave attention to the problems confronting the small businessman. At the

---

60 Four Men Speak, op. cit., pp. 35-37.
Full-Employment Conference, Morris L. Cooke, a consulting engineer from Philadelphia, warned that the wartime moratorium on anti-trust suits had fostered larger capital combinations, thereby weakening the competitive position of the small producer. He demanded greater federal vigilance on behalf of small enterprises, and more stringent action by the Federal Trade Commission against monopolies. Father Benjamin L. Masse, S. J., Editor of the Catholic Mind and America, turned the discussion into another channel by questioning whether punitive action would solve the small businessman's dilemma. The small operator's perennial difficulty in getting low interest risk capital, and his inability to support adequate research were a part of the economics of his decline. Masse recommended that the government should fulfill both needs, and explore tax revision with a view to encouraging new enterprises and to protecting the small operator. The PAC incorporated the ideas of both men into its program with very little change.

The "full employment" objective was next examined in terms of the problem of racial discrimination. Judge William H. Hastie, Dean of the Howard University Law School, reminded labor that the low purchasing power of the Negro constituted a drag on the whole economy. With disconcerting frankness he called attention to the fact that unions were among the organizations guilty of discrimination, and raised the question of whether labor

---

62 Ibid.
63 Full-Employment Conference, op. cit., pp. 87, 90.
64 Ibid., p. 91.
65 Ibid., p. 92.
66 Ibid.
was capable of reforming its own house. Ferdinand Smith, Secretary of the National Maritime Union, and himself colored, cited the achievements of his own organization as an example of what unions could accomplish. Other CIO leaders were inclined to feel that their approach had been more enlightened than that of the AFL, but readily agreed that much remained to be done.

They interpreted discrimination as primarily a matter of job competition. Willard S. Townsend, of the Transportation Service workers, pointed out that during the war Negroes had been admitted to many industries traditionally closed to them. R. J. Thomas, President of the UAW, likewise noted that the rapid rate of expansion of employment in the automobile industry had increased the opportunities for Negro workers. Thus, "full employment" was expected to break down many of the racial barriers. The PAC recognized, however, that the transition would be slow, and, although supporting anti-poll tax laws and other legal safeguards of civil rights, as a matter of practical politics it urged Negroes to pay the poll tax in order to protect their franchise.

The returning veterans were another class which received the PAC's special attention. The success or failure of the reconversion program largely depended upon being able to reabsorb them into the nation's economic

67 Ibid., p. 123.
68 Ibid., pp. 124-126.
69 Ibid., p. 117.
70 Ibid., p. 118.
71 Ibid., p. 11.
72 Ibid., p. 127.
life without serious dislocation. Labor was uneasy in regard to the possible effect of lurid newspaper accounts of wartime strikes on their political attitude and behavior. James B. Carey, Secretary of the CIO, was critical of the idea that veterans were a separate and potentially dangerous class politically. And it was as a father with sons in service that the CIO's Legislative Representative, Nathan Cowan, attacked the lack of preparation for handling returning servicemen. Yet, it was with a recognition of the probable political consequences of that failure, that the FAC outlined a program of veterans benefits that included: educational and vocational training opportunities, free hospitalization and medical care for service-connected disabilities, guarantees that the veteran would be re-employed on his former job, federal farm and home ownership loans, and liberal muster-out pay. In making these suggestions the PAC emphasized that it was not attempting to create a system of privilege, but merely to implement sound reconversion and full employment for all.

The influx of women into war plants created a similar problem. Before April of 1940, thirteen million had been employed in industry, but by 1944 that number had risen to seventeen million. On the assumption that many would continue to work after the war, the PAC endorsed the principle of guaranteeing women's right to work, and to equal pay for equal service. It

73 Ibid., p. 97.
74 Ibid., p. 99.
75 Ibid., pp. 95, 105, 107; The Peoples Program For 1944, op. cit., p. 209.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 112.
78 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
also recommended a federal program to provide more adequate child care facilities for employed mothers, and pensions for war widows. 79

In addition to the problems related to particular economic groups, the PAC made recommendations for dealing with matters of a more general concern. One such area was that of social security, for it recognized that even full employment would not enable the individual to save for illness, old age, and many of the other unexpected hazards of life. 80 Van A. Bittner, of the CIO, sharply criticized the unrealistic level of social security payments, which were, he contended, still based on the principle of discouraging the shiftless, rather than of serving the needs of the responsible majority. 81 Senator James E. Murray, co-sponsor of the Wagner-Murray-Dingel Bill, insisted that the very minimum reforms included: an extension of social security coverage to the farmers, farm workers, small businessmen, domestic servants, members of professions, and employees of non-profit institutions; retirement for permanent disability cases as well as those who had reached the prescribed age; and a schedule of payments for hospitalization and medical care. 82 The PAC endorsed these policies and urged substantial increases in the benefit schedules. 83

Housing was also high on the PAC’s critical list. The middle and upper income emphasis in the building boom during the 1920’s, 84 curtailment of construction during the depression years, the disruption of the federal

79 Ibid., p. 113.
80 Ibid., p. 114.
81 Ibid., pp. 133, 134.
82 Ibid., pp. 137-138.
84 Ibid., p. 114.
slum clearance projects by the war, \(^{85}\) drastic populations shifts, \(^{86}\) and the strong incentives for the construction industry to concentrate upon the more expensive units, it contended, made public action imperative. Consequently, the CIO demanded a federal building program aimed at the price and rental levels for which private construction proved inadequate. \(^{87}\) Quite apart from the social motives involved in the program, the employment which such expenditures would provide was no small consideration. \(^{88}\)

Thus, "Full-Employment" as the PAC used the term to summarize its domestic policy was a very flexible and all-inclusive concept.

War had also made labor more conscious of foreign affairs. As a matter of principle, the CIO insisted that any decision affecting the nation affected labor. Consequently, the PAC attempted to chart a postwar course in that area. \(^{89}\) Its thinking was uncomplicated and recognized few distinctions between the character of domestic and international problems. War was the great destroyer of all that labor hoped to achieve. Without peace and good will between nations foreign trade suffered, and without foreign trade full employment and a rising standard of living became unattainable. \(^{90}\) For that reason the CIO strongly favored the establishment

---

\(^{85}\) Ibid., p. 149.

\(^{86}\) Ibid., p. 157.

\(^{87}\) Ibid., p. 155; and The Peoples' Program for 1944, op. cit., p. 206.


\(^{89}\) A Congress to Win the War and Peace (CIO-PAC Pamphlet No. 8, 1944), pp. 2, 3. Cited hereafter, A Congress to Win.

\(^{90}\) F-E Employment, op. cit., pp. 22, 19.
of an international organization to hold the forces of lawlessness in check. 91

It felt that the emphasis in international cooperation should be upon economic reform rather than law enforcement. War was explained as a rather simple economic phenomenon. Imperialism and international cartels created poverty and tensions by restricting access to world markets and raw materials. 92 Militarism was one of the by-products. By providing the means for fulfilling the legitimate economic needs of the nations of the world, the PAC confidently expected to achieve peace. Consequently, one of its chief concerns was that the proposed international organization should immediately set up facilities for extending developmental loans to backward nations, and sponsor other measures to promote greater world economic stability. 93 One of the principles upon which the PAC insisted was that labor and business groups, as well as government, should be represented in setting up the economic programs. 94 As emergency measures, it strongly urged adequate support for the United Nation's Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and laws granting right of asylum to persecuted minorities. 95 Thus, in effect, the PAC merely extended the principle of "full-employment" to the international scene.

Like most declarations of political intent the PAC's program was consciously conceived in terms of probable effect upon the voters. But it

91 The Peoples' Program for 1944, op. cit., p. 122; Advance, March 15, 1944, p. 7.
92 A Congress to Win, op. cit., pp. 2, 3.
93 The Peoples' Program for 1944, op. cit., p. 195; Advance, March 15, 1944, p. 7.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
also revealed a good deal about the CIO's basic political activation. The interests of the worker were identified with those of the whole society. Labor insisted, therefore, upon its right to take part in all economic decisions, however remote from the questions of wages and working conditions, when demanding consideration for its own special interests the justification was always the relationship of such measures to the economic health of the nation. Yet, by its actions the PAC tacitly recognized spheres of influence as far as economic policy was concerned. In dealing with farm policy, the problems of small business, and other matters not directly related to union affairs, it consulted with and accepted the ideas of the groups directly involved. That procedure envisioned a "live and let live" bargaining between economic classes, which was more in keeping with the precepts of business unionism than those of the more radical social philosophies. It also suggests that many policies may have been endorsed solely for the purpose of currying political favor with other groups.

The eclectic borrowing of ideas gave the PAC's thinking an inconclusive, uncoordinated quality. In spite of the detailed attention which it gave to the problem of full employment, what it achieved was listing of some of the proper objectives of postwar planning, and not a blueprint for achieving those objectives. Most of its goals were short-run. It was determined to safeguard the security of the workers during the conversion to peacetime production, and had a rather clear notion of the steps that should be taken. But beyond that it had no clear picture of the changes that might take place in the character of American society.

As a slogan, however, the term "Full-Employment" served notice that CIO members would no longer be satisfied with workmen's compensation laws,
guarantees of the right to organize or even social security benefits. They demanded a balanced and expanding economy.
CHAPTER V

PAC PLANS STRATEGY AND BECOMES A POLITICAL ISSUE

When Lewis severed relations with the CIO, he made the LNFL a part of his District 50 and it largely disintegrated except in the mining districts. But in some localities experienced units continued to function independently on a local basis. Perhaps the outstanding example was the American Labor Party in New York. Hillman determined to make full use of these groups wherever possible.

As early as July 26, 1943, he called a meeting in New York to explore the possibility of making the ALP the PAC's outlet in that area.¹ He was particularly eager to broaden the base of the party to include more of the AFL and Railroad Brotherhood unions.² That suggestion projected him into a bitter factional strubble. The "right wingers" in the ALP under the leadership of David Dubinsky³ had been making a determined effort to oust the "communistic" elements. Being in a slight minority they were suspicious of any attempt to alter the balance of power and demanded acceptance of the principle that Communists had no place in the party. Hillman was more concerned with avoiding a labor split in the next year's presidential election.

¹Advance, August 1, 1943, p. 5.
³President of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union.
than with undertaking an immediate and politically disastrous showdown. He urged all unions in the state to submit to a per capita political assessment, and that representation in the Labor Party be based upon the paid-up membership. Such a procedure was democratic, he argued, and would enable trade unions to resist domination by the Communists or any other outside group. The Dubinsky faction branded the proposal as a form of appeasement to the Communists.

Hillman denied that the proposal gave the "left wingers" any cause for satisfaction, and refused to take sides in what he regarded as essentially a factional fight for power. But, under the circumstances, impartiality was not regarded as a virtue. As a gesture of neutrality the clothing workers accepted the full AFL slate in the 1943 elections. Because candidates "forced" on the party by the "left wingers" were included in the list, the Dubinsky faction viewed this as a hostile act. Consequently, the charge of communistic sympathies was repeated and elaborated upon. Because of Hillman's prominence in the newly created CIO-PAC it all made good copy for the press.

As applied to Hillman the charge was primarily a point of attack. Actually his political outlook differed little from that of Dubinsky. Each had strongly resisted the infiltration of Communists into his union. Both had been long-time supporters of the New Deal. Neither questioned the necessity of continuing to support Roosevelt in 1944. But as leaders of

---

6 Ibid., also PM, July 28, 1943, Hillman Redbook, op. cit., IX, p. 142.
7 Advance, November 1, 1943, p. 3.
rival unions in the clothing industry both were vitally concerned over who exercised political leadership over labor in the New York area. Political power meant a definite advantage in union affairs. More importantly, it also meant greater prestige in the eyes of the whole labor movement and of the Administration. Hillman's assumption that the chairmanship of the PAC made him spokesman for the pro-New Deal labor elements was deeply resented by Dubinsky, who was proud of his own influence in national affairs.

President Roosevelt watched closely the developments in the struggle between Hillman and Dubinsky, but was careful not to get involved. Both men were staunch supporters, whom he could not afford to alienate. The Communist issue also made the situation particularly dangerous politically. Hillman was eager to discuss the ALP fight and other political matters with the President, and even enlisted the aid of David K. Niles and other White House Assistants in an effort to arrange an appointment. But he encountered a variety of excuses. In January 1944, Roosevelt sent Judge Samuel Rosenmann to make a discreet on-the-scene inquiry into the ALP split, and he reported that the situation was politically explosive and would require careful handling.

Meanwhile Hillman increased his efforts to effect a workable compromise. On January 28, 1944, he made a written appeal to Alex Rose, ALP Secretary and a Dubinsky lieutenant, to accept the principle of broad and

---

8 White House Office Memo, September 27, 1943, FDR File OF 4910.
9 White House Memos, August 10, 1943, September 27, 1943, October 18, 1943, FDR File OF 4910.
10 Ibid.
unrestricted representation in the ALP. He argued that mobilizing adequate support for the Administration in 1944 was of paramount importance, and expressed the fear that the expulsion of unions tainted with radicalism would place labor's political participation on too narrow a basis. Implicit in that line of reasoning was his belief that Communists constituted a small percentage of the total membership in those unions. Hillman also repeated the argument that broader representation in the councils of the ALP would actually make it easier for non-communist elements to win control.

Rose and George S. Counts drafted a reply in which they accused Hillman of circulating nominating petitions bearing the names of Communists. They reiterated that his acceptance of the principle that Communists had no place in the ALP was the pre-requisite for cooperation. Hillman replied that Counts had deliberately distorted his relationship with the Communists, and questioned whether the whole issue did not camouflage political ambition to seize control of the Party. Patiently, he reasserted faith in the principle that all participating unions should be represented on the ALP council.

---

12 Letter from Sidney Hillman to Alex Rose, January 22, 1944, FDR File OF 4910.


14 Letter from Sidney Hillman to Alex Rose, January 22, 1944, FDR File OF 4910, also Freda Kirchwey, "American Labor Power," Nation, April 8, 1944, p. 409.

15 Letter from George S. Counts and Alex Rose to Sidney Hillman, January 25, 1944, FDR File OF 4910.

16 Letter from Sidney Hillman to George S. Counts, February 2, 1944, FDR File OF 4910.
Late in January, 1944, Roosevelt on his own initiative arranged separate meetings with Dubinsky and Hillman, but the stalemate was not broken.

Hillman next tried to win acceptance of the formula that the expulsion of the "left-wing" elements, and not necessarily the unions to which they belonged, was the issue. To facilitate a settlement on that basis, he persuaded the individuals to whom the Dubinsky faction objected to withdraw their candidacy for office and to resign from the State ALP Executive Council. But Rose rejected the invitation to back a joint slate of candidates in the New York primary election. Hillman then repeated the accusation that the whole communist issue was political, and prepared for a showdown at the polls.

At the height of the ensuing election fight, Representative Martin Dies reactivated the Un-American Activities Committee and began a covert inquiry into the affairs of the CIO-PAC. Without directly approaching the PAC, he attempted to gain access to its banking records. Hillman promptly served notice that its records would not be submitted to an unauthorized inquiry. He declared his willingness to cooperate with the FBI or any legitimate investigating committee, but challenged the jurisdiction of the

---

17 White House Memos, January 21, 1944, February 1, 1944, FDR File of 4910.
18 Advance, February 1, 1944, p. 1.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 6.
21 Advance, March 1, 1944, p. 5.
22 Ibid.
Dies Committee. There was strong suspicion in Hillman's union that someone in the Dubinsky camp had invited Dies to intervene. Rumor singled out Alex Rose. Consequently, intense bitterness marked the remainder of the campaign.

Hillman continued to appeal for ALP unity. But such appeals seemed merely to provide occasion for sharp attacks upon the "exclusivist," non-democratic character of the "right-wing" faction. Just prior to the election he arranged an appointment to give the President his version of the New York political situation. Dubinsky became very upset when he learned of the meeting. White House Assistant David K. Niles warned Roosevelt that the ILGW president was near the point of alienation and urged that he be given some kind of an appointment. But the President did not act upon that advice.

In the ALP primary, the Hillman forces elected 620 out of 720 state committeemen, and captured all five boroughs in New York City. Hillman immediately urged the defeated minority to forget animosities and to cooperate in the coming campaign, but Dubinsky led his followers out of the ALP and established the Liberal Party.

---

23 CIO News, February 27, 1944, pp. 4, 5.
24 Advance, March 15, 1944, p. 3.
25 Ibid.
26 Memo from David K. Niles to General Watson, March 22, 1944, FOR File of 1910.
27 Advance, April 1, 1944, p. 7.
28 Ibid.
29 Kirchwey, op. cit., pp. 409-10.
Just two days before the ALP primary the Dies Committee issued a two hundred and fifteen page report charging that the PAC was Communist dominated. No hearings were held and the report showed signs of being a hasty assemblying of file materials. The timing suggested the deliberate intention of influencing the New York Primary. The report had the effect of raising the partisan charges of the ALP primary to a national prominence, and supplied critics of the PAC with ammunition for the remainder of the 1944 campaign.

The Committee's case rested upon a series of circumstantial inferences purporting to show a parallel between the ideas and the membership of the PAC and the Communist Party.

Harry Bridges' statement, during the preliminary conferences of the PAC, that there were, "More Hitler's agents per square foot in Congress than per square mile of Detroit," was interpreted as an attack upon Congress as an institution. A similar contempt was read into the wire which Martin Fried, PAC representative of UAW Local 669, sent to his congressmen:

Hundreds and hundreds of men and women come into our office, here, and have demanded that you be instructed to oppose the Conference Report and support the original Green-Lucas Soldier Vote Bill, whether or not you favor it. We favor it—you vote for it!

From these and equally inconclusive examples Dies reasoned that the PAC was determined to discredit Congress. Since the Communist Party had traditionally

---

31 Ibid., p. 3.
advocated the destruction of the parliamentary form of government, it con-
cluded that the PAC was also communist. 32

Frank Yrlick's pamphlet Congress and You and articles by Earl
Browder and Eugene Dennis in the July 1943 issue of The Communist had stressed
the importance of political action by unions. Since the PAC brought unions
into politics, the Dies Committee assumed that it had acted at the behest
of these known Communists. 33 Not content with this feeble syllogism, it
also asserted that the Communist Party had disbanded in order to throw its
full weight behind the CIO-PAC. 34 But little supporting evidence was offered.
The checklist of legislative measures which the PAC selected as the criteria
for judging incumbent Congressmen was used in similar fashion to draw a
parallel between its interests and acts, and those of the Communist Party.
The twenty key votes selected by both organizations were approximately the
same. 35 The measures themselves were major points in the Administration's
legislation program. 36 The CIO-PAC's support of them most logically indicated
Democratic influence, unless the untenable position was taken that all

32 Ibid., p. 2.
33 Ibid., pp. 3, 8.
34 Ibid., pp. 22-24.
35 Ibid., pp. 35-36. The measures were: (1) the Hobbes Anti-Racketeering
Bill, (2) The Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Bill, (3) Overriding the Resident's
veto of the Smith-Connally Bill, (4) the Ramspeck Federal Pay Bill, (5) Lift-
ing the President's $25,000 ceiling on wages, (6) the Federal Income Tax Bill,
(7) Denying incentive pay for farmers, (8) Increasing payments to farmers,
(9) Denying increased payments for farmers, (10) Refusing Funds for Crop Insurance,
(11) Support for the Rural Electrification Administration, (12) Liquidation of
the Home Owner's Loan Corporation, (13) Refusal to appropriate funds for the
roll-back of prices, (14) Reduction of funds for OPA enforcement, (15) Putting
"Big Business" in charge of OPA, (16) Abolition of the domestic Office of War
Information, (17) The creation of the Smith Committee, (18) The continuation
of the Dies Committee, (19) The dismissal of Watson, Dodd and Lovett, and
(20) The Anti-Poll Tax Bill.
36 Ibid., p. 36.
Democrats who had supported them were under Communist domination. Even the Dies Committee was not prepared to go that far. It argued, however, that the language and arguments which the PAC and the Communist Party used to justify their stands were nearly identical, and could not have been the result of coincidence. These attempts to draw ideological parallels were at best rather strained.

The Dies Committee employed a similar line of reasoning in its efforts to show an overlapping of personnel between the Communist Party and the PAC. The essential elements of its charge were that: (1) there were Communists in the CIO, (2) the CIO, therefore, was Communist dominated, and (3) the PAC as an instrumentality of the CIO was also Communist dominated.

In the period 1939 through 1941 the Communist Party line had made a series of sharp reversals. Up to the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact "collective security" and internationalism had been the theme. There was then an abrupt shift to isolationism and bitter attacks upon the "imperialistic" character of the war in Europe. The German invasion of Russia in June of 1941 completed the cycle by swinging the Party line back to internationalism with an emphasis upon intervention and aid to Russia. The criterion set by the Committee for identifying individual Communists was that of having followed the party line through two or more changes in this key period at the beginning of the war. 37

Since there was seldom an adequate record of the past views of individual union members, participation in Communist "Front" organizations became the Committee's principal means of establishing adherence to the party line. 38

37 Ibid., p. 12.
38 Ibid., pp. 37-72.
The American League for Peace and Democracy, which advocated the General
Collective Security until the Russo-German Pact, then advocated the General
League for Peace and Democracy, which advocated

In the second part of the forward, but for most of the participation in a front
the Party line. Over five hundred CIO members were listed as participants
in New York—which presumably represented successful steps to the industrial
question and economic interest, Communist/Government candidate in

The case against the CIO was built around seven such groups, and

pattern of behavior.

obstacles. These, membership in successful organizations would constitute a
obstacle. Thus, membership in successful organizations could constitute
promotions, the Party line, or as instruments for orches-terized
any. As in the case that "facts of participation" tend to rise in response
take into account degree of participation. The validity of that approach---

The approach assumed that the victory of the participating movements were

131
organization was an isolated experience. Only a small fraction of that number moved from organization to organization in anything resembling a consistent pattern of behavior. By the Committee's own criterion—that of following the party line through two or more changes—the great majority of those listed were not proved to be Communists or Communist sympathizers. Their inclusion seemed designed to exaggerate the number of really logical suspects.

It was typical of the report that detailed case studies—many highly circumstantial—were presented against only thirty-six of the many CIO members accused.

The conclusion that those suspected of communist tendencies were in a position to dominate the affairs of the CIO was by no means self-evident. But the only proof attempted by the Committee was: (1) to accuse eighteen of the forty-nine members of the CIO Executive Board of participation in "Front" organisations, (2) to quote John L. Lewis's statement to the New York Times:

---

40 HR 1311, op. cit., pp. 37-72. American League for Peace and Democracy—45 (including 15 presidents of international unions); National Federation for Constitutional Liberty—110; Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder—513; Congratulation of The Daily Worker on its 20th Anniversary—144; Endorsement of Israel Averb (Communist gubernatorial candidate in N. Y.)—28; Fund-raising drive of the "People's world"—28; International Labor Defense campaign on behalf of Irene Browder—21; and the Schappe Defense Committee—21.

41 H. R. 1311, pp. 37-72.

42 Ibid., pp. 72-183.

43 Ibid., pp. 14, 73-182.


Philip Murray is today the prisoner of Communists in his own union. They control him and the CIO through their seats on the Executive Council and there isn't a blessed thing he can do about it.

Sidney Hillman is just as badly off. Both of them have got to play ball with the Communists now, or die.

and, (3) to list nine strikes in defense industries which had been led by "Communists." The defense strikes, in particular, did not all support the conclusion that the whole CIO was under Communist domination. To cite two examples, in the Pacific Coast Lumber strike Philip Murray intervened to force a settlement, and in the North American Aviation strike the national officers of the UAW took disciplinary action against the local leaders. 47

The Report's attempt to demonstrate Communist domination in the PAC was even more tenuous. It made detailed case studies of twenty-two CIO leaders linked with the PAC. 48 Only two, Hillman and Lee Pressman, held positions at the national level. Hillman was conceded not to be a Communist, but in language reminiscent of the New York primary he was accused of being too willing to use radical groups. 49 Regardless of the possible merits of the case against Pressman, his position as general counsel to the CIO and the PAC did not give him policy making powers. Yet, no attempt was made to demonstrate that he had in fact succeeded in dominating Hillman and the other members of the PAC.

46 Ibid., pp. 13-14. Strikes and alleged communist leaders: Allis Chalmers--Harold Christoffel; Harvil Plant (Los Angeles)--Kenneth Eggert; Vultee Aircraft--Mortimer Wyndham; International Harvester--Grant W. Oakes; Alcoa (Cleveland)--Alex Balint; North American Aviation--Elmer J. Freitag; New York Transport--Michael J. Quill; Lumber (Pacific Northwest)--Q. A. Orton; Trona (Calif.)--Reid Robinson.

47 "Terrible Week," Time, June 23, 1941, p. 141.
48 H. R. 1311, op. cit., pp. 72-82.
49 Ibid., pp. 73-78.
50 Ibid.
Nine presidents of CIO unions, who had supported the PAC, were accused of being Communists or fellow travelers. The case against them was not conclusive. But the real point was that in regard to the charge against the PAC their inclusion was simply irrelevant. During the organizational conferences, at least seven had made speeches favoring the establishment of PAC. An equal number had spoken at the Full-Employment Conference. All had pledged the support of their unions to the PAC. But their only direct influence over PAC policy was as members of the CIO Executive Board upon which they were a minority group.

Former Democratic Congressman Jerry J. O'Connell, one of the PAC's fourteen regional directors, was shown to have had associations with several of the front organizations. As Regional Director he coordinated the activities of local groups along lines laid down by the National Committee. The National group had absolute control over his tenure and there were no sanctions which he could invoke against local groups which defied him.

Proof of dominance required more than suspicion of Leftist sympathies.

---

51 Harry Bridges, the Longshoremen's Union; Donald Henderson, Cannery Workers; Grant W. Oakes, Farm-Equipment Workers; Joseph Curran, Maritime Union; Lewis Merrill, Office and Professional Workers; Reid Robinson, Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers; Lewis Alan Berne, Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Technician's Union; Frank R. McGrath, Shoe workers; Michael J. Quill, Transportation Workers.

52 H. R. 1311, op. cit., p. 5.


55 Ibid., pp. 146-7.
Similarly, the records of ten lesser union officials at the national, state, and local levels in the various unions were closely scrutinized. Most of them had shown signs of leftist tendencies. Two were shown to be directly in control of local PAC units. But the fact remained that the whole group was not in a position to control the PAC or any major part of its organizational machinery.

The Dies Report did provide evidence that there were some communists in the CIO, a fact that neither Hillman nor other labor spokesmen seriously denied. But its findings were, for the most part, irrelevant as far as the charge of communist domination of the CIO and the PAC was concerned. It simply assumed that, given the presence of Communists, domination was such a self-evident fact that it needed no proof.

Hillman promptly declared:

Martin Dies is a liar. He has investigated nothing in connection with the CIO Political Action Committee. . . . His attack on the five and a half million men and women in the fighting ranks of the CIO is based on fear. He fears the militant mobilization of the American working men and women for political action in this crucial year.

But the denial had little effect. Suspicion has been planted in the public's mind. The exaggeration in the reasoning of the Report was repeated throughout

---

56 Ibid., pp. 178, 89-3, 113-4, 122-3, 130-1, 134-5, 179-80, 175-7, 168-9, 183. Seymour Siporin, National Legislative Director of the Farm-Equipment Workers and Chicago Chairman of the PAC; Herbert March, of the United Packing House Workers; Lew Hickener, West Coast Director of the UAW; Wyndham Mortimer of the State, County and Municipal Workers in California; Ferdinand C. Smith, Secretary of the National Maritime Union; William Sentner, Vice President of the UE; Harry Sacher, General Counsel of the Transportation Workers; Ruth Young of the UE; John T. Bernard, former Minnesota Congressman and organizer for the UE; and Eleanor Fowler, Secretary-Treasurer of the Woman's Auxiliary of the CIO.

57 Ibid.

the campaign with telling effect.

In April, 1944, Representative Howard Smith (D., Va.) repeatedly 59 accused the PAC of Hatch Act violations. At his request, Attorney General Francis Biddle sent FBI agents James P. McGrannery and Maynard Smith 60 to investigate the financial practices of the PAC. Hillman made a special point of being cooperative. When Biddle gave the PAC a clean bill of health, Smith charged that there had been an Administration "whitewash." He demanded the Attorney General's impeachment unless legal action was initiated. On April 13, 1944, the New York Times reported that the Justice Department had reopened its inquiry into the CIO's political funds, 63 but during the next two months no further action was announced.

While defending itself against the charges raised by Dies and Smith, the PAC worked diligently to perfect its campaign organization and tactics. Because of the disastrously low vote in 1942, great importance was attached to registration. 64 Excellent posters and pamphlets were prepared to educate the workers to the importance of the election. At the factory gate, union hall, and other points of access, union members were confronted with such questions as:

62 Huddle, op. cit., p. 181.
65 Ibid., Pt. I, p. 11.
Do you want to keep the cost of living from going higher?
Do you want to bring wages in line with the cost of living?
Do you want higher taxes on the greedy and lower on the needy?
Do you want price and rent control and an end of blackmarkets?
Do you want the war won quickly and completely?
Do you want to make sure that there will be jobs for all after the war?
Do you want more social security?
Do you want to keep your union strong?

The 1944 elections will decide whether you are going to get what you want.

Wide publicity was given to the peculiarities of local election laws, and registration buttons were distributed to those who had taken the necessary steps to qualify.

Each CIO unit was urged to establish a registration committee. Its chief function was to check union membership lists against the election rolls. From the data thus obtained, master files were set up for cities and other political jurisdictions. Volunteers were then recruited to pay a personal visit to every worker who had not qualified to vote. In Detroit registration data was available on over 450,000 CIO members by early July. Arrangements were also made for additional registration booths in factories and other convenient locations.

---

68 Ibid., Pt. I, pp. 8, 9.
Wherever possible the local committees placed the registration drive on a non-partisan basis, and the cooperation of other civic groups was enlisted. The PAC firmly believed that a heavy vote would be favorable to the Administration.

The Registration Committees provided the nucleus of a ward and precinct organization paralleling that of the political parties. After their initial job was done the PAC planned to use the volunteer workers to make a regular canvass of each neighborhood on behalf of the candidates and measures which it supported. One of the difficulties in such an undertaking was the inexperience of the volunteers. To overcome this problem the staff at National PAC Headquarters prepared excellent instructional materials for both the Committees and the volunteer workers. It suggested that canvassers should first be assigned to call on friends and relatives. As they gained in experience and confidence, their regular calls were to be increased to twelve to fifteen per man, with twenty-five to thirty as an absolute maximum. Women were recommended as likely prospects for the job because they spent more time at home and usually had more contact with the neighbors.

Canvassers were urged to have their facts straight and to relate them to the interests of the individual being visited, to be brief and to

---

71 *Every Worker a Voter; Part II, Organizing Your Community*, op. cit., pp. 2-7.
avoid argument, and above all not to give an impression of attempting to dictate how to vote or what to think. Even such elemental things as keeping a notebook in which to enter correct names and addresses, useful personal data, and the date of the last visit were mentioned.

The PAC had to perform a similar educational function in training its members to conduct political rallies, and to make effective use of press and radio.

Few union members had made a public speech, led a discussion, participated in a radio broadcast or prepared a press release. Yet many of them would have to do one or all of those things before the campaign was over. In some areas it was possible to assemble key personnel from the local committees for a brief but intensive course in political techniques. They in turn were expected to instruct their co-workers. But in most cases instructional materials plus experience had to suffice. The national staff rose to the occasion admirably and turned out a series of simply written, cleverly illustrated manuals on radio, public speaking, and other pertinent subjects. Speakers, for example, were imbued with the importance of conviction, preparation and tact. In addition, the national organization provided background materials on major issues, with suggestions for their

75 Ibid., Pt. III, pp. 6, 8.
76 Ibid., Pt. III, pp. 10, 11.
77
most effective use in speeches and discussions. Local union groups were also urged to develop timely materials.

The radio, more than elemental microphone techniques were involved. The PAG carefully explained the legal limits upon a station's right of censorship. It explained that, by their franchise, stations are required to provide an opportunity for both sides to be heard when controversial questions are discussed on the air, and outlined the proper procedures for demanding free time in which to answer attacks upon labor. It also stressed the importance of placing labor spokesmen on forums, and of preparing effective materials which program managers would be willing to present as public service features. To that end the national staff assisted local groups in preparing scripts and in developing other program ideas.

Critics were prone to view the ambitious plans of the PAG as accomplished facts, and the vigor of their attacks increased accordingly. Abetted by such columnists as Arthur Krock of the New York Times, Representative Smith continued to charge that the Attorney General was, for political reasons, closing his eyes to the PAG's illegal expenditures. Harrison Spangler, Republican National Committeeman, joined the attack and in a statement to the press sarcastically asked if small businessmen and the farmers could

---

80 Ibid., pp. 373-402.
82 Ibid., p. 318.
83 Ibid., pp. 318-9.
84 Ibid., pp. 336-8.
count on a similar exemption from the penalties of the Corrupt Practices Act. Failing to win support for his proposed impeachment of Biddle, Smith sponsored the creation of a Special House Committee to investigate campaign expenditures. His intention was that it should be used primarily against the PAC, but under Clinton P. Anderson it was to prove more impartial than he had desired.

In the Senate, Hugh Butler (R, Neb.) attempted to initiate an investigation of both Biddle and the PAC. At the request of Senator Moore, of Oklahoma, the FBI, in June, made a follow-up study of the PAC's activities after April 7. Once more no evidence of illegal expenditures was reported, but that only served to intensify the attacks.

Hillman was particularly eager to counteract the possible effect of these developments on the public mind. On June 7, he addressed a letter to Theodore F. Green, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections, which he said, in part:

It has been reported in the press that several requests have been made upon your Committee for an investigation of the affairs and activities of the CIO-Political Action Committee.

Our Committee has repeatedly stated that we would welcome in investigation by any authorized committee of the Congress. I should, therefore, like to take this opportunity of advising you that, as Chairman of the CIO Political Action Committee, I should be happy to appear before your committee.

86 Ibid., May 31, 1945, p. 1: 2, 10.
87 Ibid., May 18, 1944, p. 12: 1, 2.
88 Ibid., June 1, 1944, p. 1: 2.
90 Huddle, op. cit., p. 181.
It was arranged that he should testify on June 13. 92

Senator Joseph Ball of Minnesota immediately plunged into the question of political expenditures. As a preface, he voiced the opinion that it was contrary to the principles of democracy for workers—who had in many cases been legally forced to join unions—to have the dues which they paid used on behalf of candidates of whom they might not approve. 93 His legal point of attack was that section of the Smith-Connally Act reading, "It is unlawful for any . . . labor organization to make a contribution in connection with any election at which Presidential or Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative . . . in Congress are to be voted for . . ." 94 Later at the hearings of the Special House Committee, Representative Clarence Brown (R., Ohio) made the slightly different legal point that the Hatch Act prevented any individual or organization from making contributions on behalf of Federal candidates, which aggregated more than $5,000. 95

In conjunction with PAC Attorney John J. Abt, Hillman offered a two-fold defense against these charges. First, that as defined in the federal laws the financial restrictions applied only to general elections. Hence, funds raised and spent prior to the party conventions were not subject to the provision of the law. Second, that the activities of the national

---


93 Ibid., I, p. 27.

94 Huddle, op. cit., p. 181.

95 Ibid.
PAC were confined to political education and, therefore, were not subject to either the Smith-Connally or the Hatch Act.\footnote{Senate Hearings, 1944, \textit{op. cit.}, I, p. 26. U. S. 78th Congress, 2nd Session, Special House Committee on Campaign Expenditures. \textit{Hearings} (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1944), I, pp. 26, 71-2; U. S. 78th Congress, 2nd Session, Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures for the House of Representatives, 1944, \textit{House Report} 2093 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 10.} Abt insisted that it would be perfectly legal to spend trade-union funds for political education purposes even during the period of the General Election.\footnote{House \textit{Hearings on Campaign Expenditures}, 1944, \textit{op. cit.}, I, p. 7.} Hillman was not willing to risk alienating public opinion. He told the Senate investigators that at the end of the Primary Election the PAC would make whatever policy adjustments were necessary to demonstrate that it had no intention of evading the intent of the law.

The contention that the national PAC was not engaged in political campaigning brought the PAC's chain-of-command and organizational structure under close scrutiny.\footnote{Ibid., I, pp. 21-2, 51.} Hillman described the PAC as a loose confederation in which sole authority to endorse candidates, or to initiate campaign activities on their behalf, rested with the individual local units.\footnote{Ibid., I, p. 19.} At times they might exercise that power through state or municipal endorsement conferences, but the decision was always their own.\footnote{Ibid., I, pp. 21-2.} Furthermore, the national PAC had endorsed only one candidate—Franklin D. Roosevelt and
at the behest of the local organizations, and kept no record of endorsements or of the number of local PAC groups. Thus, the national committee was described as functioning primarily as a service organization, which prepared pamphlets and posters, publicised the voting records of candidates, encouraged local units to undertake registrational drives, and suggested suitable political techniques for trade unions, but did not actually campaign on behalf of specific candidates. If sole authority and responsibility rested with the local units, then the political activities of the CIO would not fall under federal jurisdiction.

Even Ball conceded that as described by Hillman the PAC was a proper organization, and operating within the law. But he refused to believe that the national committee did not in fact direct and command the local units. He attempted throughout the Senate Hearings to establish that a chain-of-command from top to bottom existed in the PAC. Hillman readily admitted that the national committee appointed the fourteen Regional Directors and paid their salaries except for one or two arrangements, with local groups, for sharing expenses. But he insisted that the Directors performed a

101 Ibid., I, pp. 11, 12.
102 Ibid., I, pp. 22, 48.
103 Ibid., I, pp. 11, 12.
104 Senate Hearings, op. cit., I, pp. 27.
105 Ibid., and House Hearings on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, op. cit., I, pp. 21, 22, 51.
106 House Hearings on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, op. cit., I, pp. 21, 48, 51.
107 Senate Hearings, op. cit., I, pp. 40, 41.
coordinate function and had no authority over local units. The skeptical members of the Committee were unable to shake his testimony or to establish a link of authority between the Regional Directors and the local committees.

Later in the summer Anderson's House Committee attempted to find a more satisfactory answer to the same question by calling in some of the regional directors and a number of state and local officials in the FAC. This testimony did not change too much the picture which Hillman had drawn. Regional Directors such as Raymond S. MeKeough, and George B. Roberts insisted that their principal job was to assist in devising political procedures suited to local conditions and to arouse interest in political participation. They denied having any control over the state and local units under their general jurisdiction. Representatives from the state and local committees corroborated this view. They recognized responsibility only to the International or local unions, which had appointed them, and were very definite in asserting the right of the units directly involved to determine which candidates and issues were to be supported.

Some contradictory evidence was turned up. MeKeough was confronted with a letter which he had sent to the state chairman in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Illinois, declaring:

---

108 Ibid.
110 Ibid., IX, pp. 707-9, 89t-8, 193-6.
111 Ibid., IX, pp. 714-8.
112 Ibid., IX, pp. 717.
113 Ibid., IX, pp. 978-84, 940-43.
114 Ibid., IX, pp. 727.
Please immediately notify all locals and Political Action Committees throughout your state to positively make no political endorsements until approved by regional and national offices of the Congress of Industrial Organization's Political Action Committee.

Rather lamely he explained that the note referred to the date of announcement rather than to specific candidates. Telegrams which Hillman had sent to demand that unions live up to their financial commitments, also, had a tone of command rather than of request.

Nevertheless, the bulk of the testimony by local participants indicated that it was usually the international union rather than the PAC which maintained direct contact with local units. Consequently, aside from persuasion, any disciplinary power which the PAC exercised was necessarily indirect. It could request that the CIO Executive Board ask an international union to take action against one of its local unions. More frequently it would probably informally approach the international union. But the firmness of the Executive Board, the attitude of the international toward political action, and the support which local officials received from the members of their union all entered into the question of whether real discipline could be affected. Local sovereignty was enough of a reality to make persuasion the PAC's principal instrument of control.

115 Ibid., II, pp. 710, 728.


117 Democracy in Action: How to Attain It, Miscellaneous Pamphlet 14 (New York: CIO-PAC--Originally published jointly by the 6th CIO-PAC Region, August Scholle, Director, and the Michigan CIO Council, John W. Gibson, President, 1944), pp. 5-10; also House Hearings on Campaign Expenditures, 1944, op. cit., IX, p. 780.

118 Ibid.
The investigating committees were not fully convinced that the PAC was engaged merely in political education, but neither turned up enough evidence to warrant legal action of any kind. Nevertheless, shortly after the Senate hearing, Hillman announced that the trade-union funds of the PAC would be frozen as of July 23, the last day of the party conventions. After that date political action on both the national and local level was to be financed by the voluntary political contributions of union members. He made plans for a drive to persuade each CIO member to contribute one dollar for political purposes. 119

Emulating the conventions of the regular parties, the CIO-PAC scheduled a two-day conference in Washington, D. C., for June 16-17. The main purpose of the meeting was to ratify a formal statement of political policy. 121 The CIO Executive Board submitted a platform, which was in line with the thinking of the Full-Employment Conference. 122 After working over the phrasing to clarify points of misunderstanding, the three hundred delegates gave their unanimous approval. 123 Copies of the conference statement were sent to 12,000 CIO locals for discussion and approval. 124 The PAC also published it in pamphlet form under the title The People's Program for 1944. The endorsement of Roosevelt was also reaffirmed, and the delegates approved

a resolution by R. J. Thomas to support Wallace for the vice presidency. Forceful notice of CIO unity, thus, was served on the major parties as they prepared for their conventions.

At the conclusion of the Conference, Hillman announced his decision to establish a National Citizens'-Political Action Committee. The purpose of the new organization was to be the political mobilization of non-union liberals, who shared the economic and political objectives of the CIO. The initial plan was that it should be financed by voluntary contributions and should adopt procedures very similar to those of the CIO-PAC. Since it could not count on a mass membership, emphasis was placed on the function of political education, although contributions and other campaign measures were to be undertaken wherever feasible. The venerable George W. Norris was Honorary Chairman of the National Citizens' Group although Hillman took over the active chairmanship. The Executive Board and other offices were filled

125 CIO News, June 17, 1944, p. 3.
126 Huddle, op. cit., p. 182.
prominent liberals from all walks of life. A drive was immediately started to recruit distinguished authors, editors, civic and religious leaders, businessmen, professors, lawyers, labor leaders, movie stars, actors, singers, musicians, judges, and others, who would bring prestige to the movement. By September, one hundred and forty-one prominent citizens had agreed to act as sponsors, and by October the number had risen to 4,205.

The establishment of special divisions in the CIO-PAC to work with Negroes, women, Religious organizations, and other special groups, also, served notice of Hillman's determination to make an appeal to the general voter and not just to union members.

By early summer the PAC had achieved an impressive mobilization of the CIO membership. The major lines of attack against which it would have to defend itself had been defined. The formation of the NC-PAC had served notice of the possible scope of its ambition. As they prepared for their conventions, the leaders of both major parties realized that it was a political force to contend with.

130 Ibid., I, p. 9. Vice Chairmen were: James O. Patton, President, National Farmers' Union; Freda Kirkwey, publisher of The Nation; Bishop R. R. Wright, Jr. Other officers included R. J. Thomas, President of the UAW, Treasurer; James H. McGill, of McGill Mfg. Co. of Indiana, Comptroller; and Clark Foreman, President of Southern Conference for Human Welfare, Secretary. NC-PAC executive committee consisted of: Verda W. Barnes of the CIO-PAC, Elmer A. Benson, ex-Farm-Laborite Governor of Minnesota; Van A. Bittner, United Steel workers; Mrs. Emmore Blaine, James Loeb, Union for Democratic Action; Lucy Randolph Mason, of Atlanta Georgia; Philip Murray, Gifford Pinchot, ex-Governor of Pa.; Dr. Robert C. Weaver, and A. F. Whitney, President of the Bro. of Railroad Trainmen, also the executive officers listed above.


132 Ibid., p. 218.
CHAPTER VI

PAC IN THE 1944 CAMPAIGN

Demands for a Congressional investigation of its affairs and the general intransigence of critics had the effect of projecting the PAC overnight into a position of prominence on the national political scene. Yet there was no adequate basis for more than a speculative estimate of its actual strength. Consequently, the 1944 primary elections were followed with more than usual interest. Party leaders preparing for the conventions were eager for some indication of how much consideration should be given to the demands of the PAC. CIO leaders were anxious to check the actual performance of the political units which they had established, and to correct weaknesses.

The failure of the national PAC to keep a record of endorsements added to the suspense and confusion. Local reports of labor victories were frequent, but it was difficult for the public to get an over-all picture of the PAC's performance. The defeat of several prominent political leaders, whom the PAC had opposed, however, made a profound impression.

Three members of the Un-American Activities Committee, for instance, failed to win renomination. When war workers swelled the registration by twenty-five percent in Martin Dies's home district, he abruptly announced

---

1The Guild Reporter, May 15, 1944, p. 1. Also see other issues for May and June of 1944.

2Martin Dies, Joseph Costello, and Joseph Starnes.

that a throat ailment would prevent him from running for re-election, and to the accompaniment of PAC jeers withdrew from the campaign. In the Fifteenth Congressional District of California, both the CIO and the AFL fought to block the renomination of Dies Committee man John Costello. The PAC focused its attack upon his performance in the House, and made particularly effective use of damaging statements by Costello as reported in The Congressional Record. The contribution of Dave Beck's AFL Teamsters was also outstanding in bringing about Costello's defeat. Likewise, in Alabama Committee man Joe Starne was defeated by PAC-endorsed Albert Rains (a former union legal representative). The PAC's delay in getting its registration underway in Starne's district left reasonable doubt that it was actually responsible, but its vigorous publicity campaign somewhat obscured that fact as far as the public was concerned. The defeat of such Senate stalwarts as Ellison "Cotton Ed" Smith of South Carolina, Rufus J. Holman of Oregon, Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri, D. Worth Clark of Idaho, and Hattie Carraway of Arkansas by PAC endorsed candidates also added tremendously to the political prestige of the CIO.

\[5\] Ibid., and CIO News, July 3, 1944, p. 3.
\[6\] CIO News, May 22, 1944, pp. 1-2. The PAC's California organization was particularly strong. In the local elections it was able to nominate fifty-nine of the seventy-two candidates whom it endorsed.
\[8\] "Labor at the Polls," Time, XLIII (May 29, 1944), p. 20.
\[9\] Ibid.
\[10\] CIO News, September 25, 1944, p. 4.
In terms of the over-all Congressional picture the PAC's accomplishments in the primaries were in fact quite modest. It endorsed and elected twenty-two candidates to the House of Representatives, and defeated ten of the nineteen incumbents whom it opposed. But a number of its successes were in isolated districts of states in which organized labor simply was not a major element. Among the industrial states it showed strength primarily in New York, Michigan, California and Washington and in the latter two was


12 Ibid. Luther Patrick, and Albert Rains of Alabama, and Hal Styles of California actually represented elections in which the PAC's role was primarily one of opposition to the incumbent officeholder.

13 CIO News, July 31, 1944, p. 3, July 17, 1944, p. 3.
forced to share credit for labor's showing with the AFL. In none of the four states did its successes represent a majority of the Congressional candidates. The senatorial primaries followed a very similar pattern. The PAC participated in sixteen of the thirty-two states in which there were elections, defeating six of the ten incumbents whom it opposed, and defeating six of the ten incumbents whom it opposed.

In spite of their small number these victories were a great morale booster for the volunteer workers whom the PAC had brought into its program. The defeat of a Bennett Clark or a Martin Kennedy made them aware of the potential power of the movement with which they had become associated. The public, too, was impressed with the fact that these scattered successes might conceivably be repeated on a much greater scale.

Among Republicans Wendell Willkie was particularly aware of the necessity of making concessions to the PAC's views. He urged his party to consider labor's rights in terms of modern industrial conditions. The worker's foremost need, he declared, was for adequate guarantees against the economic uncertainties which the post-war world would hold. Even the more conservative members of his party recognized the necessity of counteracting the appeal of the PAC's "Full Employment" program, but were inclined to rely on political maneuver rather than on constructive counter proposal. The Republican Convention at Chicago emphasized a policy of freeing industry from governmental interference, and for that reason was unwilling to support the economic guarantees which labor felt that its interests required. Instead, the Republican leaders toyed with the idea of nominating William Hutcheson, of the AFL Carpenters, for the vice-presidency as a device for splitting the labor vote. After deciding against placing a union man on the ticket they continued to rely on the basic strategy of trying to create dissension in the ranks of labor. At the Convention and throughout the campaign, concentrated upon convincing the AFL that Roosevelt's re-election would put Hillman in a position to dictate to the whole labor movement.

18. Ibid., July 12, 1944, p. 12: 1; *Advance*, July 15, 1944, p. 5.
The PAC had not really expected a favorable reception of its views by the GOP. As a gesture of open-mindedness, it had sent Van A. Bittner to the Republican Convention to present the CIO's views on "full employment" and international cooperation. But his execution of the mission was passive and not too hopeful. At the conclusion of the convention, Hillman dismissed the GOP platform as a return to "Hooverism," and prepared to operate primarily within the Democratic sphere.

The PAC's strategy at the Democratic Convention was entirely different. There, it was prepared to make a show of strength. Several days before the scheduled opening Hillman arrived in Chicago to set up his Convention headquarters. On July 17 he held a strategy meeting with CIO leaders, and subsequently told reporters that the PAC would make an all-out fight on behalf of Henry Wallace. His announcement excited considerable discussion, for the Vice-President had become increasingly unpopular with many important elements in the party. Mayor Frank Hague and most of the other party bosses had made it clear from the outset that they had written Wallace off as a political liability.

---

what was not generally known at the time was that Roosevelt also had already decided that a fight to renominate Wallace might split the party and jeopardize the whole election. First through intermediaries and then personally he had told the Vice-President that he would make no fight on his behalf at Chicago. Determined to make a bid for renomination on his own, Wallace did persuade the President to send a personal letter to the Convention on his behalf. When made public at Chicago, however, the letter had the effect of throwing the vice-presidency wide open. It read:

"Hyde Park, N. Y.
July 14, 1944

"My Dear Senator Jackson:

"In the light of the probability that you will be chosen as permanent chairman of the convention, and because I know that many rumors accompany all conventions, I am wholly willing to give you my own personal thought in regard to the selection of a candidate for Vice-President. I do this at this time because I expect to be away from Washington for the next few days.

"The easiest way of putting it is this: I have been associated with Henry Wallace during his past four years as Vice-President, for eight years earlier while he was Secretary of Agriculture, and well before that. I like him and I respect him and he is my personal friend. For these reasons I personally would vote for his renomination if I were a delegate to the convention.

"At the same time I do not wish to appear in any way as dictating to the convention. Obviously the convention must do the deciding. And it should—and I am sure it will—give great consideration to the pros and cons of its choice.

"Very sincerely yours,
"Franklin D. Roosevelt."

27. Ibid., pp. 114-115.
28. Ibid., p. 115.
29. Ibid., p. 116.
The press aptly dubbed it a "kiss of death" as far as Wallace was concerned. Nevertheless, the PAC continued its fight, and the CIO leaders who were at the Convention as regular party delegates exploited every resource on his behalf. Murray, for instance, succeeded in putting the whole Pennsylvania delegation on record as favoring the renomination of Wallace. But after a strong showing on the first ballot his strength began to wane.

James F. Byrnes and Senator Harry Byrd (D., Va.) became the strong early contenders for the vice-presidency. Byrnes in particular had officially projected himself into the race at just about the time that word of the Roosevelt letter reached the delegates. Observers immediately concluded that Roosevelt had cut Wallace adrift in order to clear the way for Byrnes. They were convinced that Byrnes would not have sought the nomination without the President's prior approval, but his reception did not indicate that a fight was to be made on his behalf. Both the AFL and the CIO held him responsible for the federal wage policy, and by their bitter opposition forced him to withdraw his name. Labor played a similar role in the defeat of Harry Byrd.

31 CIO News, July 24, 1944, p. 3.
33 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
37 Kirchway, op. cit., p. 120.
Arthur Krock of The New York Times interpreted Byrnes' withdrawal as, in effect, a FAC veto of the President's first choice for a running mate. Immediately after Byrnes had been eliminated Democratic Chairman Robert Hannegan had circulated a second letter from Roosevelt. It read:

"July 19

"Dear Bob:

"You have written me about Harry Truman and Bill Douglas. I should, of course, be very glad to run with either of them and believe that either one of them would bring real strength to the ticket.

"Always sincerely,

"Franklin D. Roosevelt."

Krock reported that this message had been accompanied by a confidential letter to Hannegan which included the instructions, "Clear everything with Sidney." what he did not know was that on July 11 a conference of party leaders at the White House had selected Senator Harry S. Truman (D., Mo.) for the vice-presidential nomination, and that on that occasion Roosevelt had told Frank Walker to "... go over tomorrow, and tell Jimmy [Byrnes] that it's Truman, and that I'm sorry it has to be that way." The letter

---

42 Ibid., p. 116.
which Hannegan circulated at the Convention was actually written on that occasion and dated ahead to July 19 when it would be needed. William O. Douglas's name was included merely to avoid the impression that the President was trying to dictate to the Convention. Thus, Krock's whole "Clear it with Sidney" story was based on the false assumption that Byrnes had Roosevelt's backing. The fact that the PAC led the fight for Wallace long after the President and party leaders had made their choice proved that the PAC was not acting upon instructions from the Administration and did not even know its plans.

The phrase "Clear it with Sidney," however, caught the slogan conscious American ear and plagued the PAC throughout the whole 1944 campaign. Later Hannegan tried to repair the damage by repudiating Krock's story of a secret letter from the President and repeatedly demanding a retraction. But the columnist hedged, asserting that whether or not the phrase "Clear it with Sidney" was specifically used Hillman had exercised a veto in the vice-presidential nomination.

After the shift to Harry S. Truman had begun to make headway at the Convention a bid was made for the PAC's approval. The Missouri Senator's

---

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
supporters arranged for him to have breakfast with Hillman. At first the PAC President was non-committal concerning the meeting, and continued to work for Wallace. But when it became overwhelmingly evident that he was fighting for a lost cause he announced that he was willing to accept Truman, and the vice-presidential nomination was settled without further incident.

One interesting sidelight to the nomination was the AFL's efforts on behalf of Truman. Because of Hutcheson and other prominent Republicans among its membership, the Federation had made no formal endorsement. Fifty of its members, however, were official delegates at the Democratic Convention and indirectly they made their weight felt. Early in the convention, for example, William Green had made a point of permitting reporters to photograph him with his arm across Truman's shoulders. To the observant it was tantamount to a personal endorsement.

The presidential nomination was much less dramatic. Roosevelt was renominated with only the Texas delegation seriously dissenting. Because the real facts of the vice-presidential struggle were not generally known an impression was created that the PAC had dominated the nomination. It had the effect of alienating many elements in the Democratic Party. Senator

---

50 Braunthal, op. cit., p. 6.
51 Ibid., p. 6.
Josiah Bailey (D., N.C.) threatened to secede from the party if the PAC continued to "dominate the campaign," and many other old-line Democrats echoed his sentiments. The jealousy went deeper than the incidents of the convention. The PAC's aggressive tactics had underscored the fact that it was determined not merely to influence union members but the general voter as well. Its program, special divisions, and establishment of the WCPAC all pointed to the same conclusion. Leaders in control of the party machinery looked upon this as an encroachment upon their special province. When Hillman attempted to seize the initiative at the Convention it intensified the feeling that he was a potential competitor for control of the party.

Critics of the PAC skillfully played upon such fears. In a widely publicized article in the Saturday Evening Post, Louis Waldman, who had had wide experience as a labor lawyer, charged that the PAC was out to capture the Democratic Party. Such a development, he contended, would drive the regular members from the party and invite "Communist" infiltration. He conceded that neither Hillman nor Murray were Communists, but stated that the danger of infiltration would be so great as to place the whole liberal movement in jeopardy. As a Labor insider, Waldman's words carried considerable weight with the public.

54 Waldman, op. cit., p. 99.
55 Ibid., pp. 22, 99.
56 Ibid., p. 99.
Former "Brain Truster" Raymond Moley embroidered the theme by "revealing" that Hillman had been trying since 1936 to put "left-wingers" in control of the Democratic Party. As he used the term, "left-winger" and CIO member were synonymous. The PAC represented a single class of people, he warned, and if Hillman succeeded in his plan it would mean a minority domination of the party.

More sensationally, Representative Clare Booth Luce (R., Conn.) charged that Hillman and the PAC were engaged in a "Communist" plot to take over the Democratic Party. R. J. Thomas, of the PAC, quickly retorted that it had been scarcely two months since Mrs. Luce had asked for the support of his organisation. She insisted that she had done no more than remark that if the PAC really supported progressives it would want to support her. Then with a flippant slur she added, "If my head rolls in the basket at the election, surely it's a more American head than Mr. Hillman's." By such tactics the Republican strategists were manifestly using the PAC as a point of attack for spreading dissension among Administration supporters outside of the labor movement.

---

58 Ibid.
60 Ibid., October 18, 1944, p. 16: 3.
61 Ibid., and October 20, 1944, p. 12: 2.
62 Ibid., October 20, 1944, p. 12: 2.
63 *New York Times*, September 6, 1944, p. 36: 5.
The initiation of an intensified drive by the CIO to collect voluntary contributions provided an occasion for reviving the question of PAC expenditures. Since there was no real legal question involved critics dwelt upon the "sinister" effect of labor's political spending. Vice Presidential candidate John Bricker repeatedly made the fantastic assertion that the PAC had a "$5,000,000 political slush fund" with which it and "its Communist adherents, proposes to buy this election from money extracted from the honest and patriotic workers of this country." The fact was that as of September 10, 1944, the CIO-PAC's voluntary contributions account showed receipts of only $63,074.12, and expenditures of $86,451.71. when a negotiating committee of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers asked the operators with whom they dealt to contribute to the NC-PAC, Republican Committee-man Herbert Brownell raised a cry of political blackmail. Bricker's charges in particular were obviously made for the benefit of the general public. The CIO member would most likely have some knowledge of the amounts being spent and, thus, recognize the lie. If he did not, he would be as likely to feel pride as apprehension at the thought of his union having such great resources at its command.

In some cases the PAC met charge with counter-charge. While defending the PAC's political expenditures on "Town Meeting of the Air," Max Lerner

called attention to Robert Gaylord's admission before the Special House Committee that the NAM's expenditures on "political education" were three times as great as those of the PAC. To bring perspective to the magnitude of political spending, he also cited the fact that in 1940 five individuals contributed more to the Republican campaign fund than the PAC's total budget up to September, 1944. On the same occasion Walter Reuther demonstrated the parallel between the activities of the PAC and the NAM—including the support of candidates—and suggested that it was labor's entry into politics and not the legality of its methods that caused the excitement.

The PAC recognized that its first task was to convince the public of labor's right to take a more active part in politics. There was a corresponding need to develop in the workers a confidence in their right to take part in political decisions. Consequently, it made a special effort to identify its methods and objectives with the traditions of American Democracy.

To counteract that undercurrent of prejudice in the public mind which caused union members to be viewed as radicals, and lately arrived foreigners who were not quite "real Americans," the PAC stressed the contri-

68 "Is the PAC an Asset or Liability to Democracy?", Town Meeting of the Air (September 21, 1944), p. 8.
69 Lamont Dupont, Edgar Queeny, Joseph Pew, John D. Rockefeller, and Alfred Sloan.
70 "Is the PAC an Asset or Liability to Democracy?", op. cit., p. 8.
bution of workers of all origins to the cultural and material development of the nation. Typical was the statement in the pamphlet, *This is Your America*:

> All the strangers in this country those who came long ago and those who came not so long ago have been working hard together. They built the railroads. They built the highways. They built the factories. They built the cities. They brought to America books and music, songs and paintings. They made America. . . .

The purpose was to establish that labor had earned the right to full political responsibility.

The counterpart to that line of reasoning was that labor had not only the right but the obligation to exercise its full political rights and privileges. In its campaign literature, the PAC declared:

> An American has duties as well as rights, one of the most important of which is to find out what is right and what is wrong in the way his government is conducted—and to help right every wrong through the use of the ballot.

Naturally, there could be little real objection to the general propositions that the workers were entitled to full political privileges or that responsible citizenship was desirable.

It was more difficult to square with tradition the decision of a single class to organize independently of the established parties. The PAC's response to this difficult question was to insist that when democratic practice in America was analyzed in terms of the reality, group action was and

---

72 *This is Your America* (CIO-PAC Publication, New York, 1944), pp. 22, 39.
73 Ibid.
always had been one of the essential features. To substantiate this view it called attention to the fact that the political parties are comprised of various distinct and somewhat incompatible interests groups, which by informal dickering achieve enough unity to gain political power and to carry on the necessary governmental functions. "Politics is the science of how who gets what, when and why," the PAC declared. The point of all this was that it was not the structure of the party system which was responsible for the nation's democratic achievements, but the ability of the various groups to resolve conflicts peacefully, and to make intelligent compromises on important differences. The PAC insisted that it had done no more than to formalize the established political practice. It believed that in terms of democracy the important fact was not whether it operated within or outside of the party groupings, but that it did not believe class differences were irreconcilable, and was willing to deal with other groups.

Another aspect of the question of democracy as it pertained to the PAC centered around the question of how much influence the workers themselves exerted over its affairs. Throughout the campaign Hillman repeatedly emphasized that the ultimate effectiveness of the PAC's campaign rested on the voluntary efforts of union members and not upon political "slush funds" or special influence with the Administration. In appealing to the Negroes, women, and other special groups of voters the PAC leaders also emphasized

76 Ibid.
the voluntary, non-partisan character of its activities. But these self-justifications did not appease the PAC's critics, and they were to be found in both parties. Consequently, variations on the theme that it was a sinister, unwholesome influence in American political life continued to dominate the campaign.

In August, Martin Dies appointed a three-man subcommittee (two of whom had met defeat in the primaries mainly through the CIO's efforts) to hold open hearings on the affairs of the PAC. One of the pre-occupations of the subcommittee was the link between the Administration and the PAC. 

It started with the tentative hypothesis that the PAC was merely the tool of the Administration. As supporting evidence it took up the cases of some nine or ten individuals who had resigned from federal agencies in order to accept positions with the PAC. All but one of those cited had had no previous labor connection.

Heading the list was C. B. Baldwin, who had resigned as Farm Security Administrator in order to become the Assistant Chairman of the CIO-PAC. George S. Mitchell, Assistant Farm Security Administrator, had also resigned to become the PAC's Regional Director for the South. Joseph Gaer, who

---

79FDR File OF 4910, Memos General Watson to FDR, August 29, 1944, and FDR to General Watson August 29, 1944, and September 8, 1944. Two of the three members had been defeated in the Primary elections, due in some measure to the efforts of the PAC.
82Ibid., p. 10220.
83Ibid., p. 10222.
became one of the PAC's most effective pamphleteers, left a $6,500 per year job as a consulting expert in the War Bonds Division of the Treasury Department. The pattern was similar for the others mentioned, although in most cases they had neither left nor gone to jobs of such importance as Baldwin and Mitchell. In a letter to the Attorney General, Robert Stripling, Counsel for the Subcommittee, suggested that this transfer of personnel proved "that the CIO-PAC is in reality not so much a labor political committee as it is the political arm of the New Deal Administration." He also predicted that these individuals would return to their respective governmental agencies once the campaign was over, though that bit of crystal gazing hardly supported his basic contention. Such records as are available on their subsequent behavior hardly bear out his prophecy. Baldwin served in succession as Assistant Chairman of the PAC, the NC-PAC and the Progressive Party. Gaer spent more than a year with the PAC after 1944 and then did not go back into Federal Service.

Recognizing the need for more convincing evidence, the Subcommittee subpoenaed the records of the telephone and telegraph companies serving the PAC. From the telephone records it was able to show that there had been

---

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Dies Committee Hearings on H.R. 262, op. cit., p. 10213.
87 Ibid. The Dies Subcommittee made a great effort to show that Baldwin had remained upon the FSA payroll for three months after joining the PAC. But further investigation by the House Campaign Expenditures Committee definitely established that although he had been paid for the ninety days back leave to which he was entitled, Baldwin had severed all connections with the government before joining the PAC.
88 Ibid., p. 10212.
telephone calls between the PAC and some seventy-seven officials of twenty-six different federal agencies, including the White House staff. There was no indication, however, of what the purpose of these conversations had been. The telegrams were more specific, but only two offered any support for the Committee's basic contention. One was a wire from C. B. Baldwin to P. O. Beck, of the FSA's Indianapolis office, asking him to run an errand for the PAC. The other was a similar message from Hillman to C. P. McPeak of the War Production Board's Dallas office. At the time, McPeak was preparing to resign his federal position in order to become the PAC's Regional Director for that area. The tone of both messages was that of a request for a personal favor rather than of command. Nevertheless, the Subcommittee made them a basis for concluding that a chain of command existed between the Administration and the PAC. Even if the Committee's interpretation of the wires were to be taken at its face value, the fact remains that they were "commands" from the PAC to relatively minor government officials, and not from the Administration to the PAC.

The whole charge was actually the second step in an ingenious syllogism which the Dies Committee had been preparing. In essence it was (a) that the PAC was dominated by Communists, (b) that the Roosevelt Administration directed the affairs of the PAC, and (c) therefore, that the New Deal Administration was Communist. Thus, it was clear that one of the strong motives

---

89 David K. Niles received 17 calls, Jonathan Daniels 6, Samuel Rosenmann 1, Lowell Mellett 1, and Ben Cohen 1.
90 Dies Committee Hearings on H. R. 282, op. cit., p. 10217.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., pp. 10213-4.
for the attack upon the PAC was the desire to discredit the Roosevelt Administration.

On Northwestern University's Radio Program "The Reviewing Stand" Maynard Krueger sought to arouse resentment among CIO members by developing the variation that the PAC was merely the tool of the President, and that Labor was being duped into bearing the cost of his campaign for a fourth term. 93

The actual relationship of the PAC with the Administration was intimate, but much less formal and binding than critics suspected. The President had avoided contact or identification with the movement until it had proved its political worth in the primary elections in New York and elsewhere. After that point he became more cordial, but Hillman's opportunities to talk over political matters with the President were by no means frequent. 94 The PAC's stubborn fight for Wallace at the Democratic Convention, likewise, was clearly not the behavior of a puppet organization. The whole atmosphere of the relationship seemed to cast Hillman in the role of a political entrepreneur rather than a subordinate. Nevertheless, attacks upon the PAC continued to be a major tactic for discrediting the Administration.

Throughout the campaign there were periodic revivals of the charge of Communist domination. Walter Cenerazzo, of the AFL Watch Workers, told a radio audience that the PAC was fomenting a class struggle which was alien

93 "Labor's Role in Politics," The Reviewing Stand: A Round Table Discussion Program (Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, December 10, 1944), IV, No. 5, p. 7, and Waldman, op. cit., p. 100.

94 FDR File of 1910, Memos General Watson to FDR August 26, 1944, and FDR to General Watson August 29, 1944, and September 6, 1944.
to the traditions of "American" unionism. By its aggressive tactics, he declared, it had already created antagonisms which had blocked desirable labor legislation. Life informed its readers that while the PAC was not a Communist organization it had no scruples against capitalizing upon the political skill of Party members. On "Town Meeting of the Air," Benjamin Stolberg, a critical student of CIO affairs, asserted that in his eagerness to "use" the Communists, Hillman had admitted so many into the PAC that he could no longer control them. To support the charge he quoted the U. S. Civil Service Commission to the effect that one hundred and ten of the one hundred and forty-one original sponsors of the NC-PAC were allied with Communist front organizations. The Civil Service Commission promptly repudiated his statement, but the denial, of course, did not reach as large an audience as the original charge. Such candidates as Governors Martin (R., Pa.), Schoeppel (R., Kan.), and Thye (R., Minn.), were impatient of subtle distinctions between collaboration and domination. They insisted that membership in the PAC was synonymous with being a Communist, and treated the matter as though it was a self-evident fact.

---

95 "Is the PAC an Asset or Liability," Town Meeting, op. cit., p. 11.
96 Ibid., p. 12.
97 "CIO's PAC Raises a Storm," Life (September 11, 1944), p. 97.
98 "Is the PAC an Asset or Liability," Town Meeting, op. cit., p. 7.
99 Ibid.
Thomas Dewey was at first somewhat circumspect in regard to the more sensational charges against the PAC. But on October 1, at Boston, he, too, advanced the theory that the "reds" were using the PAC as a front for seizing control of the government.

Under this constant pressure, much of the PAC's energies were necessarily devoted to combating the charge of Communist domination. Hillman repeatedly demanded an opportunity to testify before the Dies Subcommittee, and sharply protested at the "smear" tactics of his opponents. He was frank in admitting that there were probably a few Communists in the CIO, but insisted that they were in no position to influence or to dominate the policies of the PAC. At Pittsburgh, for instance, he declared that, "As the percentage of Communists in the PAC is just about the same as the percentage in the country, possibly a little higher, to say that PAC is dominated by them is a lie." But since sensational charges make better "copy" than rebuttals, Hillman's views seldom reached the general public.

Biased treatment was often so obvious that in some cases individuals who had no connection with the PAC came to its defense. John Cort of the Catholic magazine Commonweal, for example, noted that the Russian birth and

102 Ibid., September 13, 1944, p. 14: 3, 4.


Jewish origin of Hillman were a dominant theme in branding him a Communist. In addition, he called attention to the fact that although only one member of the seven-man Political Action Committee, and few of the regional directors or other key officials had a background that was in any way suspect, they were all called Communists without any pretense of real proof. The Anderson Committee questioned Earl Browder under oath at considerable length, and he steadfastly denied that there was any connection between his party and the PAC.

The leaders of the Democratic Party also recognized the political necessity of combating the charges made against the PAC. National Chairman Robert Hannegan angrily declared that the strategy used against the PAC was "the simple and outworn approach of raising false issues and repeating them often enough in the hope that they will be mistaken for the facts." Ickes and other Administration leaders also defended the PAC, and made a point of publicly demonstrating their friendship for Hillman in order to counteract rumors of dissension. Nevertheless, PAC field representatives reported that they faced constant suspicion in the communities to which their work took them.

106 Albert Fitzgerald of the United Electrical Workers.
111 Interview with Field Representative Anne Masson at PAC Headquarters, Washington, D. C., December 21, 1948.
One of the ironic features of the campaign was that the very critics who expressed alarm at the sinister power of the PAC, lost no opportunity to belittle its effectiveness. After the Maine election, Arthur Krock suddenly decided that Hillman was a political liability to the Administration. With obvious relish the Boston Herald concluded that the endorsement of the PAC was a political "Kiss of Death." Republican Chairman Herbert Brownell jubilantly repeated the phrase in an effort to fan the apprehensions of the Democrats. In an editorial entitled "Sidney Hillman May Become Dewey's Secret Weapon," the Saturday Evening Post also belatedly re-examined the PAC's performance in the primaries and decided that it had ridden on the coat tails of the New Deal without displaying any real strength. Thus, simultaneously the PAC was accused of political failure, and of being a menace capable of delivering the Democratic Party to the Communists.

Hillman bitterly charged that the GOP had evaded the real issues of the campaign, and was resorting to "red-baiting," "Jew-baiting," and other "smear tactics" of the Nazis and Fascists. "It is quite understandable,"

---

113 Boston Herald, September 13, 1944, Editorial Page.
116 U-S News, October 7, 1944, p. 3.
117 Ibid.
he said, "that Republican politicians should use any means that come to hand to attack and belittle a force which they recognize as a potent barrier to the realization of their ambitions."  

The PAG attempted to make Dewey's views and qualifications the issue of the campaign. Hillman accused him of evading the problem of post-war security, and of currying favor with both the isolationists and the internationalists in his eagerness for office. He also stressed that Dewey's political commitments bound him to the principles of "Hooverism." As evidence of the Republican Candidate's incompetence in international affairs, R. J. Thomas quoted the earlier predictions of Dewey and John Foster Dulles that Germany and Japan would never attack the United States. Thus, Dewey's conservative commitments on the home front and unproven worth in foreign affairs became the PAG's main points of attack. Before the Anderson Committee, Hillman stressed that he felt no personal antagonism toward the Republican Candidate and respected his record at the State level, but simply did not feel that he was competent to direct the affairs of the nation. The PAC argued that in the troubled years ahead the nation could not do without Roosevelt's proven ability.

118 Huddle, op. cit., p. 173.
120 Advance, September 15, 1944, p. 16.
The Republicans made little attempt to reply to these criticisms but instead continued to play upon the public's apprehensions concerning the PAC's character and intentions. Before the campaign had progressed very far, it was evident that the strategy had exerted a strong influence on a number of important groups. The AFL, for example, despite the open campaigning of Tobin and Hutcheson had formally reaffirmed its non-partisan policy. It had rejected the overtures of the PAC, and had been somewhat critical of its sensationalism and partisanship, but at first had not joined the more extreme attacks. As the campaign progressed, however, its leaders began to repeat the charges that the PAC was under Communist influence and was by its radicalism jeopardizing the whole labor movement.

In a release by the AFL Weekly News Service, Philip Pearl accused the PAC of being organized labor’s biggest enemy because it had smeared the whole movement with the "red brush" of Communism. At the time of the hearings of the Dies Subcommittee, Matthew Woll warned that by attempting to make labor an auxiliary of a political party, the PAC had weakened labor's chances of checking the post-war trend toward reaction. Robert J. Watt, Counsel for the AFL, charged that the advocates of political action were fomenting class struggle. He challenged the notion that union members had interests exclusive of those of the nation or that there could be a single political voice for labor and asserted that if workers wanted to parti-

cipate in politics it should be as individuals in the regular parties. Watt's supporting arguments were essentially a restatement of the traditional AFL views. They included the ideas that political success only brought governmental intervention while failure led to destructive retaliation. Unions, so the argument went, should not interfere in matters beyond the direct interest of their members. "We must concentrate on economic functions and seek government action only to the extent necessary to protect basic standards." The fact that he supplemented these views with the charge that the PAC was fomenting class struggle also reflected the temper of the campaign. The determined effort which the PAC had made, to win the support of the lower ranks of the AFL membership, was in part responsible for these attacks, but in the main they were a tribute to the Republican Party's success in exploiting dissensions within the labor movement.

Some criticism of the PAC also developed within the CIO. The Newspaper Guild, for example, was so torn by dissension that it could not agree upon a Presidential endorsement. In September one of its members, William E. Mullins, Chief Political Editor of the Boston Herald, wrote an article for the Reader's Digest entitled, "I Object to My Union in Politics."

---

127 Robert J. Watt, "Labor and Politics," American Federationist (September, 1944), p. 5.
128 Ibid., p. 7.
130 Ibid.
In even stronger terms than the AFL leaders had employed, he asserted that by involving labor in broad controversial issues, and in attempting a "purge" of "reactionaries" the PAC was creating mortal enemies in both parties. He insisted that CIO members had given no mandate for such a program, and that it was being imposed upon them by the PAC leaders. Thus, by political indiscretions of which they had not approved, the workers were presumably faced with the destruction of the economic effectiveness of their unions.

The crowning humiliation, Mullins declared, was that they were being "forced" to contribute a dollar toward that end. Needless to say, his views received wide attention. The charge that CIO union members were being coerced was, thus, revived and skillfully exploited. Any such incident immediately became front page news. One of the most thoroughly investigated cases involved Chicago's Local 25 of the Packinghouse Union. Its former president, Doch Williams, asserted that he had been removed from office because he had resisted a $1,500 assessment by the International Union. The Dies Subcommittee immediately gave him an opportunity to air his grievances. The substance of his story was that when he had objected to the depletion of his union's resources for partisan campaign activities, the International Union had suspended him from office and his supporters from office and had called

132 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
133 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
134 Ibid.
an election at which PAC partisans won control. Under this new leadership Local 25 had adopted the policy of paying one-half of the tuition of union members who attended the Abraham Lincoln School for training in political techniques (Williams insisted that the school was Communist). In addition, he charged that union members who were PAC ward captains were reimbursed for time spent on political activities—usually under the pretense that their time had been spent in settling grievances—and that union employees were used to compile registration lists and to perform other PAC tasks. Williams specifically cited the case of Florice Ross, who had spent two months breaking down the union membership lists for the PAC, and regularly distributed campaign literature during work hours. He also mentioned several other Local 25 staff members who were similarly engaged. Union members who did not make campaign contributions were allegedly subjected to vilification and discrimination. These activities of his successors, he concluded, had brought Local 25 to the verge of bankruptcy.

One striking aspect of Williams' appearance before the Dies Subcommittee was that his testimony was at no time challenged, and no effort was made to confront him with the individuals against whom he had made charges.

When the Anderson Committee held hearings in Chicago, however, and called in the other members of the Local the complexion of the case was changed.

---

137 Ibid., XVII, pp. 10268-10274.
139 Ibid., Pt. 9, pp. 750-1, 761, 885-6, and Dies Committee Hearings on H. R. 282, op. cit., XVII, pp. 10273-5.
140 Anderson Committee Hearings, op. cit., Pt. 9, p. 751.
141 Ibid., Pt. 9, p. 800.
Members of both the International and the Local union testified that in the face of management hostility Local 25 had declined in strength, as a result of which bitter internal difference over policy had developed. Critics of Williams claimed that he had used repressive tactics against the elements which demanded more vigorous policies. Furthermore, they charged that he had retained office by calling an election without properly notifying the membership. The International had suspended Williams and had called another election, they insisted, because of this violation of union bylaws rather than because of his stand on political action. Sam Parks, his successor, told of being deliberately run down during the recall election by a truck driven by members of the Williams faction. He also testified—and in this he was supported by other witnesses—that the meeting at which the former president had secured a vote against political action had been attended by only seventy out of a total union membership of 3,700.

At the hearings Joseph Zabritski, Financial Secretary of Local 25, brought in his account books to prove that Parks and other union officials had been reimbursed for wage losses only while actually engaged in settling grievances. He also insisted that during his term of office he had

---

142 Ibid., Pt. 9, p. 890.
143 Ibid., Pt. 9, p. 830-31.
144 Ibid., Pt. 9, p. 829-31.
145 Ibid., Pt. 9, pp. 830-31.
146 Ibid., Pt. 9, pp. 872-6.
never been approached for a contribution to the PAC from trade union funds. All funds for that purpose had been raised by voluntary donations.\(^{148}\)

Concerning the use of union employees for political purposes there was some conflict in the testimony. Mary L. Smith, Financial Secretary under Williams, said that she had been instructed by the district office to prepare a registration list from the membership rolls and to send a copy to Raymond McKeough, Regional Director for the PAC.\(^{149}\) Florice Ross, whom Williams had specifically accused, categorically denied having had anything to do with the distribution of campaign literature.\(^{150}\) Hilda Diamond, another Local 25 employee, who had been singled out as a "chore girl" for the PAC, admitted distributing literature. But she insisted that it had been on her own time, and that the material had been provided by the International's representative without cost to the Local.\(^{151}\) All of the witnesses, including Mary Smith, agreed that they knew of no incident involving coercion in the collection of the voluntary contributions.\(^{152}\)

Under questioning, Williams admitted that there had been no actual coercion but that he felt that the individual who did not contribute was placed in an awkward position by being subjected to ridicule.\(^{153}\) He also admitted that his differences with the International officials and many of the members of his own union extended back to 1942 (prior to the establishment

\(^{148}\) Ibid., Pt. 9, p. 880.

\(^{149}\) Ibid., Pt. 9, p. 887.

\(^{150}\) Ibid., Pt. 9, pp. 850-1.

\(^{151}\) Ibid., Pt. 9, pp. 768-773.

\(^{152}\) Ibid., Pt. 9, pp. 851, 871, 886, etc.

\(^{153}\) Ibid., Pt. 9, p. 800.
Extreme bitterness marked the testimony of both factions. Williams seemed bent upon discrediting his successors, and they in turn went out of their way to cast reflections upon his competence while in office. The suspicion that differences over political policy had played a part in the squabble in Local 25, or that union employees had been used for political purposes was not entirely dispelled. But there was no real substantiation for the charge that PAC supporters had rifled the union treasury, or that the majority of its members had been reluctant to support political action.

As the campaign progressed, similar incidents had their day in the headlines. In San Francisco, L. K. Hyde momentarily received national attention, when Westbrook Pegler reported that he had been expelled from the Longshoremen's Union because he had announced his intention of giving five dollars to Dewey for every dollar that he had to contribute to the PAC. With typical lack of restraint the columnist asserted that the longshoremen who refused to contribute to the PAC were faced with expulsion from the union. Testimony at the hearing which the Anderson Committee called gave the direct lie to his generalisation by demonstrating that less than half of the members in Hyde's local had contributed a dollar to the PAC, yet none had been expelled. It also developed that the contributions campaign had

155 Anderson Committee Hearings, op. cit., Pt. 9, pp. 875-6.
157 Anderson Committee Hearings, op. cit., Pt. 9, p. 1036.
158 Ibid., Pt. 9, p. 1038.
been carried out by means of posters rather than an individual canvass, and that the Local had no record of who had or had not contributed. 159

The fact remained that Hyde had been expelled from the Union. Union officials cited his long record as a trouble maker as the cause of his expulsion. They said that the immediate circumstance of the incident had been that when assigned to a job, he had spent his time heckling other workers on the question of unionism and of the PAC, and had neglected his duties to such an extent that the company had required his removal. The superintendent of the cargo loading operation had resisted that demand, but had given Hyde the choice of correcting the errors of his work and of ceasing to interfere with other workers or of being referred to the Union Local for disciplinary action. When Hyde defied the superintendent the Executive Council of the Local had, with the full concurrence of the membership, decided that in view of the long history of similar incidents he should be expelled. 160

Hyde testified under oath that his failure to contribute to the PAC or to pay the assessment for the defense of Harry Bridges was the reason for the action taken against him. 161 Subsequently, the Committee investigators were able to prove that Hyde was no longer a member of the union when the assessment for Bridges was made. 162 Nevertheless, the press took Hyde's charge at its face value in reporting the affair to the public.

159 Ibid., Pt. 9, pp. 1035, 1038.
161 Ibid., Pt. 9, pp. 1036-8.
162 Ibid., Pt. 9, p. 1038.
Many of the cases of coercion reported were supported only by the original news story because the Congressional committees did not get a chance to investigate. A regrettable effect was that all too frequently the desire for a headline prevailed over accurate reporting. There was also a strong element of bias in the investigations conducted by the Dies Subcommittee. Its customary procedure was to call the individuals making accusations against the PAC, but not to hear the testimony of the individuals who had been accused. Thus, the effect was to accept as an established fact any charge that was made against the PAC. By contrast, the Anderson Committee was more thorough and balanced in its treatment—possibly also from political motive—but at least it turned up enough evidence to provide some basis for judging the merits of the various incidents.

The press showed a reluctance to print statements which did not presuppose that the PAC was guilty of coercion. When Anderson, after his committee had investigated a "coercion" incident in Indiana, issued a statement exonerating the PAC neither the United News Service nor the United Press carried the story although both had released full details of the original charge. The news services also proved very reluctant to print retractions.

---

163 Dies Committee Hearings on H.R. 282, op. cit., XVII, pp. 10235-10245, 10351-10375. Coercion incidents were reported in Baltimore; Toole, Utah; and in Chicago where Harry Morgan, Chief Steward of the UEW claimed that he was ousted because he had refused to distribute campaign literature.


when they had released erroneous or distorted information concerning the PAC. On one occasion, the Associated Press quoted President Belline of the UAW local in Plainfield, New Jersey, to the effect that 1,000 of the members in his union were opposed to the PAC. 166 He promptly denied the statement, but the AP was evasive and never did make a retraction. 167 In Woonsocket, Rhode Island, the press had a field day with the charge of PAC coercion when Edwin C. Brown acted as spokesman for twenty-one members of the Trades Council who had resigned in protest against political action by unions. 168 It was, of course, much less newsworthy when Brown's attack proved to be directed against the Political Education Committee, which the local AFL unions had formed, and not the CIO-PAC.

Many elements of the press distorted even the most routine stories concerning the PAC. When Hillman, in a speech at Atlantic City, challenged Dies to permit him to testify before the Un-American Activities Committee, The New York Journal American reported, "Sidney Hillman today publicly defied any one 'to prove' that Roosevelt is 'backed by the Communists,' and at the same time warned the combined membership of the Communist dominated unions they faced disaster unless Roosevelt is re-elected." 170 In handling the same story, The New York Times said, "Sidney Hillman, Chairman of the Political Action Committee of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, today challenged Martin Dies of the House Committee for the Investigation of Un-American Activities to bring him before the Committee to answer charges

166 Ibid., pp. 747-8.
167 Ibid.
170 Maguire, op. cit., p. 559.
of Communist domination of the PAC and alleged illegal financing of the organization.\textsuperscript{171} The Saturday Evening Post refused to print Hillman's reply to the Waldman article.\textsuperscript{172}

The Hearst Syndicate, Scripps-Howard, Frank Gannett and other powerful publishing combines were not only hostile to the PAC, but also engaged in a bitter campaign against Hillman personally. Hearst sponsored a fifty dollar a day "Sidney Limerick Contest." The winning verses invariably stressed the "Jew, foreigner, Un-American, Communist" theme. A sample was:\textsuperscript{173}

\begin{verbatim}
Clear it with Sidney, you Yanks
Then, offer Joe Stalin your Thanks
You'll bow to Sid's Rule
No matter how Cruel
For that's a directive of Frank's
\end{verbatim}

Organizations such as Frank Gannett's Committee for Constitutional Government and Joseph Kamp's Constitutional Educational League—the chairmen of both were indicted for illegal political expenditures by the Anderson Committee—far exceeded the press in the viciousness of their personal attacks. In a pamphlet entitled \textit{Vote CIO and Get a Soviet America} Kamp dwelt with great bitterness upon the fact that Hillman was a Jew—a Russian Jew at that—and that others in the PAC had a similar background.\textsuperscript{174} His main thesis was that it was really Earl Browder who had engineered the establishment of the PAC. He pictured Hillman as merely the puppet through which the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{172} Ibid., p. 562.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Louise Overacker, "Labor Rides the Political Waves," \textit{Current History} (December, 1944), p. 468.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Joseph Kamp, \textit{Vote CIO and Get a Soviet America} (Constitutional Educational League, Inc., New York: 1944), pp. 5-6.
\end{itemize}
Communist chief hoped to win control of the Administration. The idea was essentially the same as that advanced in the original Dies Report. But Kamp was exceptional in his willingness to use the direct lie as a means of linking Browder and Hillman. He asserted, for example, that Browder started the Fourth Term draft in a speech on April 7, 1944—shortly after Russia had been given six warships—and that on the following day Hillman had for the first time made a similar demand. The fact was that, as early as July 1943, Hillman had declared that one of the major purposes of the newly formed PAC would be to re-elect Roosevelt, and by September 1943 many of the CIO unions had formally endorsed a Fourth Term.

Kamp's sheer malice was so great that at times it seemed to cloud his reason. He went to great lengths to show that Hillman had been associated with the Russian-American Industrial Corporation, The Brookwood Labor College, and other radical movements in the early 1920's, which presumably proved that he was Communist, or at least a "Fellow Traveler." But in his eagerness to portray Hillman as completely vicious, he also accused him of employing gangsters to terrorize and murder the Communists in his own

175 Ibid., pp. 6, 11.
176 Ibid., p. 6.
178 CIO News, September 29, 1943, p. 3; October 4, 1943, p. 2; October 11, 1943, p. 3.
union when they became troublesome. Apparently Kamp failed to recognize that the two charges largely cancelled each other out.

Kamp's criterion was even better illustrated in his attacks on the other members of the PAC staff. He branded C. B. Baldwin a Communist because he had headed the Farm Security Administration, "a scheme to collectivize the American farmer." Past association with Hull House was the basis of his charge against Charlotte Carr, the PAC Director in New York. Verda Barnes, Director of the PAC's Woman's Division, had worked with the National Youth Administration and, therefore, "automatically" became a "Red." In commenting upon pamphleteer Joseph Gaer, Kamp triumphantly mentioned that he had formerly headed the Federal Writers' Project of the W.P.A., which was "known" to be the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Communist Party.

Some elements of the press such as the Catholic journals America, Commonweal, and The Liguorian protested at the prejudice and distortion which characterized the attacks upon the officials of the PAC. but they were exceptional. In most cases the fact that Kamp and Edward Romely, of Gannett's Committee for Constitutional Government, had been indicted by the Anderson Committee was ignored, and their statements treated as responsible criticism.

---

180 Ibid., pp. 21-2.
181 Ibid., p. 39.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
Although continuing to emphasize candidates and issues, the PAC demonstrated that it was quite capable of meeting smear with smear. On election eve Hillman released a picture of Dewey in the company of Louis Weinstock, of the Painters Union, a self-admitted Communist. Accompanying the picture was a letter from Weinstock stating that in 1937 Dewey had made a bid for Communist support in his campaign for District Attorney. Yet accompanying the bitterness which climaxd the campaign was the realization that slogans, plans, and election eve coups were not enough. Consequently, the PAC continued to make thoughtful replies to Henry S. Commager and other serious students, who questioned whether its pressure group tactics did not threaten the party system with fragmentation and class bitterness. In line with its previous thinking the PAC pointed out that labor had become more production conscious as collective bargaining increased, and suggested that union members could best be taught political democracy by taking more responsibility for the formulation of national policy.

When the polls closed, even those who had been most closely associated with the campaign were not certain as to what the PAC's influence had been. It had energetically performed the task of registering union members,

however, and had by the breadth of its program, the formation of MC-PAC, and its efforts to resolve the misgivings of the public made a strong bid for liberal leadership. By the nature of their attack, its critics had also tacitly recognized that the vote of groups outside of the CIO was the real stake in the campaign. Although the charges of New Deal domination and of coercion might be expected to have some effect upon union members, the accusations that the PAC was dominated by Communists, Jews, and undesirable aliens were made for the benefit of the general public. And, it was against these attacks that the PAC had the most difficulty in defending itself.
CHAPTER VII

THE PAC'S CONTRIBUTION IN THE 1944 ELECTION

One unforeseen result of the sensationalism of the 1944 campaign
came apparent after the results of the election were known. Critics had
succeeded so well in creating the myth of the CIO's all-pervasive political
power that the public had little doubt but that the PAC was responsible for
the Democratic victory. A preliminary survey of the election statistics led
the mass circulation news magazines to inform their readers that the CIO had
impressively demonstrated its political strength. Newsweek concluded that
the PAC's mobilization of the labor vote in Boston, New York, Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, San Francisco, Los
Angeles and in a few other important urban areas was the key to Roosevelt's
re-election. Time called particular attention to the fact that despite a
decreasing rural vote the industrial centers had retained or even increased
their vote. It attributed this phenomenon to the excellent registration
work of the PAC and cited the example of Detroit, in which there was an
increase of 100,000 in the number of registered voters. The heavy urban
turnout was the major explanation which Time offered for the Democratic
victory.

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 20.
Immediately after the election Roosevelt sent a wire to Hillman in which he said, "I cannot delay longer telling you how deeply I appreciate the splendid job which you did from start to finish." In the weeks that followed, James P. Warburg and other Democrats who had worked with the PAC in the field filed confidential reports which strengthened the President's favorable first impression. The press reported signs of jealousy among local Democratic leaders because of the credit which the PAC was receiving, but at first little of that sentiment reached the White House. On November 25, 1944, the President sent an even stronger letter of appreciation to Hillman in which he said:

One thing I want to make perfectly clear to you is my appreciation. It was a great campaign and nobody knows better than I do how much you contributed to its success. I was glad to learn that the CIO in Chicago authorized the continuation of the PAC. I can think of nothing more important than the continuing political education and political energy of the people, who do the jobs of this land, in determining that the American nation shall do the great job it can for all. I send you no condolences for the licks you took in the campaign. You and I and Fala have seen what happened to the people who gave them.

Flattering though it was, such praise did not provide an answer to the question of how effective the PAC had actually been.

Because the labor vote was but a part of the total Democratic vote, a precise measurement of its influence in the Presidential election was largely

---

5FDR Papers File PPF 8172, Telegram FDR to Sidney Hillman, November 8, 1944.
6FDR Papers File OF 2546, Letter James Warburg to FDR, November 9, 1944.
7New York Times, November 13, 1944, IV, p. 3: 1, 2.
8FDR Papers File OF 4910, Letter FDR to Sidney Hillman, November 25, 1944.
out of the question. Even arriving at a prudent approximation presented peculiar difficulties. Although by means of press and radio the PAC's arguments on behalf of Roosevelt and Truman found a hearing in most parts of the country, its greatest strength was concentrated in those areas in which union membership was high. Its principal available means for offsetting the prevailing bias of the mass communication media were the registration drives and the direct contacts which its volunteer workers were able to make with the voters. It could not be classed as a major factor in those localities where union membership was not sufficient to permit the establishment of active political units capable of endorsing candidates and of actively campaigning on their behalf.

One relatively accurate index to the effective scope of the PAC's organization was its record of participation in the Congressional elections. As a criterion for judging the Presidential contest that record was not without shortcomings. Conceivably, the PAC may have influenced the Presidential vote in districts where it made no Congressional endorsements. And failure to carry a Congressional district did not necessarily mean failure in the Presidential election. Nevertheless, by its pattern of endorsements the PAC indirectly designated the districts in which it deemed itself capable of influencing the outcome of the election.

It endorsed one hundred forty-five candidates for seats in the House of Representatives, five of which were Republicans. September 9, 1934. One hundred nine of

9Augustus Bennett who defeated Hamilton Fish was an Independent Republican who also had Democratic and ALP support, and Vito Marcantonio and Adam Powell won the nomination of the Republicans, Democrats and the ALP.
its candidates—three Republicans and one hundred six Democrats—were elected to office. In many districts it was not clear that PAC endorsement was the deciding factor. Sixty-six of its successful candidates were Democratic incumbents who might be presumed to have shown strength in their own right before the PAC was ever formed. The PAC was consistently strong, however, in the marginal districts of industrial areas. It replaced twenty-eight Republicans, while the Republicans were able to take six seats from Democrats who had PAC support. Twenty-two of the PAC victories involving a change of party were in districts which the Republicans had carried by less than six percent in 1942. Moreover, forty-four of its total victories came in marginal districts where six percent of the vote or less determined the outcome. Thus, in the districts which it carried the PAC was frequently in a position to hold the actual balance of power.

Although the PAC claimed Congressional victories in twenty-eight states, many of these represented isolated successes in areas that were not centers of labor strength. A quick glance at the population composition of these states is sufficient to indicate that in a number of them the urban group was clearly not the dominant element.

10 See Table "A" of this Chapter. The CIO News, November 13, 1944, pp. 6-11, claimed 120, but they announced endorsements of the local PAC groups totaled only 109.

11 See Table "A" of this Chapter. Vito Marcantonio of New York also received Republican and American Labor Party endorsement.

12 See 1941 and 1942 voting percentages in Table "A" of this Chapter.

13 See Table "A" of this Chapter.
### TABLE A

**PAC CANDIDATES FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN 1944**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Won</th>
<th>Lost</th>
<th>Democrat's Percentage of the Vote</th>
<th>Total Vote Cast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alabama Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Albert Rains</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>25,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Luther Patrick</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>30,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arizona Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Richard F. Harless</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.9%</td>
<td>125,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>John R. Murdock</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.9%</td>
<td>125,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>California Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Clair Engle</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>75,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Franck R. Havenner</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>146,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Richard J. Welch</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>112,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>George P. Miller</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>200,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>John H. Tolan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>114,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>George B. Outland</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>56.0%</td>
<td>93,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Jerry Voorhis</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>139,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Ned Healy</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>121,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Helen G. Douglas</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>127,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Hal Styles</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>177,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Clyde Doyle</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.7%</td>
<td>170,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Chet Holifield</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>71.0%</td>
<td>91,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Eduard V.A. Isac</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>157,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Ellis Patterson</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>195,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colorado Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Charles Graham</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>174,202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) No Republican. Major Party candidate received over 90% of the vote.

---

CIO News, November 13, 1944, pp. 6-10; Proceedings of Seventh CIO Convention, op. cit., 1944, p. 42
F-E News, October 20, 1944, p. 2; Gaer, First Round, op. cit., p. 267; New York Times, November 11, 1944, p. 2; November 1, pp. 2, 4-5, 1944.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Won</th>
<th>Lost</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>Total Vote Cast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>At Large</td>
<td>J. A. Hyder</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>827,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Mrs. C. U. Woodhouse</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>222,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>H. Koppelman</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>122,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>J. Geelan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>160,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>At Large</td>
<td>P. A. Traynor</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>126,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Compton White</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>87,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Phil Evans</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>118,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>At Large</td>
<td>Emily Taft Douglas</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>3,882,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>Ed Kelley</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>305,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>A. J. Resa</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>115,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>Adolph J. Sabath</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>50,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22nd</td>
<td>Melvin Price</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>163,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Ray J. Madden</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>123,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>Louis L. Ludlow</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>223,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Nobje J. Gregory</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>74,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>Earle C. Clements</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>101,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>E. A. O'Neal</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>139,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Frank L. Chelf</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>89,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>Brent Spence</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>77,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>E. E. Gabbards</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>63,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>Andrew J. May</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>90,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Democrat's Percentage of the Vote</td>
<td>Total Vote Cast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maryland Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) Thomas D'Alesandro</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>146,462</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>*(PAC,R.) Daniel Ellison</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>79,504</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Massachusetts Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) Thomas J. Lane</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>114,897</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) John W. McCormack</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>114,993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Michigan Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) George G. Sadowski</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>128,796</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>106,386</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) Frank Hook</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>82,054</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) George O'Brien</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>139,135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) Louis C. Rabaut</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>175,587</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) John D. Dingell</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>158,317</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) John Lesinski</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>155,469</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minnesota Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) W. P. Gallagher</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>141,133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.0(18.1)</td>
<td>141,428</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missouri Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) Edward M. Jayne</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>121,455</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) John Sullivan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>117,823</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Montana Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) Michael Mansfield</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>83,990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) James F. O'Connor</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>113,227</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Jersey Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) Mary T. Norton</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>128,324</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>*(PAC,D.) Edward J. Hart</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>125,234</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE A—Continued

PAC CANDIDATES FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Won</th>
<th>Lost</th>
<th>Democrat's Percentage of the Vote</th>
<th>Total Vote Cast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico Districts:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At *(PAC,D)</td>
<td>Clinton F. Anderson</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large *(PAC,D)</td>
<td>Antonio M. Fernandez</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Districts:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>Edward Hudson</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>John S. Thorp</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>G. H. Bruns</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>wa. B. Barry</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>James A. Roe</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>James J. Delaney</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>John J. Delaney</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>Joseph L. Pfeifer</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th *(ALP)</td>
<td>J. A. Slazman</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>Andrew L. Somers</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>James Heffernan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th *(ALP, Lib.D)</td>
<td>John J. Rooney</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th *(ALP, Lib.D)</td>
<td>Donald L. O'Toole</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th *(ALP)</td>
<td>J. V. King</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th *(ALP, Lib.D)</td>
<td>Emanuel Celler</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>R. L. Egbert</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th *(ALP)</td>
<td>Leon Feshin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th *(R.D., ALP)</td>
<td>Vito Marcantonio</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>82,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>Samuel Dickstein</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>Sol Bloom</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>123,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st *(ALP,D)</td>
<td>James H. Torrens</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>66.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd *(R.D., ALP)</td>
<td>Adam C. Powell</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>83,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States</td>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>won</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Districts (cont'd):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd *(ALP, Lib.D.)</td>
<td>Walter A. Lynch</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>79.5%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th *(ALP, Lib.D.)</td>
<td>Benjamin Rabin</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th *(ALP, Lib.D.)</td>
<td>Charles Buckley</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td>Peter A. Quinn</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td>Joseph E. Vemuri</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td>John H. Jackson</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th *(ALP,Lib. Ind.,R.D.)</td>
<td>Augustus W. Bennet</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th * (0,ALP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td>William T. Byrne</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd *(ALP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38th *(ALP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39th *(ALP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td>George F. Bobers</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42nd *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43rd *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th *(ALP,D.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

North Carolina Districts:
- 5th *(PAC,D.) John H. Folger x 66.5 67.5 64,651 30,500

North Dakota District:
- At Large *(PAC,R.) Ushur L. Burdick x 31.6 34.4 169,884 139,916
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Won</th>
<th>Lost</th>
<th>1941 (%)</th>
<th>1942 (%)</th>
<th>Total Vote Cast 1941</th>
<th>Total Vote Cast 1942</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Districts:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Edward J. Gardner</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>198,311</td>
<td>99,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Walter E. Huber</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>232,915</td>
<td>118,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>William R. Thom</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>162,852</td>
<td>96,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Michael J. Kirwan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>189,594</td>
<td>106,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Michael A. Feighan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>99,163</td>
<td>55,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Robert Crosser</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>99,813</td>
<td>51,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Districts:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>William A. Barrett</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>125,448</td>
<td>83,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>William T. Granahan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>155,200</td>
<td>71,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Michael J. Bradley</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>138,776</td>
<td>92,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>John E. Sheridan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>121,385</td>
<td>81,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Wm. J. Green, Jr.</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>137,829</td>
<td>95,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Herbert Molinchey</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>154,062</td>
<td>96,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Daniel J. Flood</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>137,765</td>
<td>78,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Daniel K. Hoch</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>79,974</td>
<td>87,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Francis E. Walter</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>90,054</td>
<td>58,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Herman Eberharter</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>116,945</td>
<td>81,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island Districts:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Alme J. Forand</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>142,514</td>
<td>115,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>John E. Fogarty</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>150,967</td>
<td>120,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee District:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Estes Kefauver</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>47,932</td>
<td>19,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah Districts:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Walter K. Granger</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>103,397</td>
<td>72,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>J. W. Robinson</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>144,284</td>
<td>78,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Districts:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Ralph H. Daughton</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>36,879</td>
<td>5,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th (PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Elizabeth C. Murray</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>60,317</td>
<td>26,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>Won</td>
<td>Lost</td>
<td>Democrat's Percentage of the Vote</td>
<td>Total Vote Case</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Washington Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Hugh De Lacy</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
<td>222,956</td>
<td>105,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Henry M. Jackson</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>60.4%</td>
<td>59.9%</td>
<td>123,674</td>
<td>66,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Charles R. Savage</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>111,445</td>
<td>60,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>John H. Coffee</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>131,798</td>
<td>66,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Virginia Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Matthew M. Neely</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>115,676</td>
<td>78,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Cleveland Bailey</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
<td>110,369</td>
<td>69,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>John Kee</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>106,031</td>
<td>64,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>E. H. Medrick</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td>141,626</td>
<td>89,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wisconsin Districts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Thad Wasielewski</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>65.2%</td>
<td>50.1(18.7)</td>
<td>163,162</td>
<td>95,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>Andrew Bieniller</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>47.1(16.6)</td>
<td>174,354</td>
<td>102,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wyoming District:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At</td>
<td>Large *(PAC,D.)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>96,102</td>
<td>74,855</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Results include only candidates who won or lost in the district.*
TABLE B

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VOTE IN THOSE STATES IN WHICH THE PAC ELECTED MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Est. Pop. in 1945</th>
<th>In Cities of 100,000 or Over</th>
<th>In Cities of 2,500 to 100,000</th>
<th>Percent of Total Pop. Electoral Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>2,728,000</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>589,000</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>8,120,000</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>1,769,000</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>277,000</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>7,548,000</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>3,387,000</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>2,521,000</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>2,018,000</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>4,086,000</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>5,435,000</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>2,185,000</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>3,182,000</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>4,53,000</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>4,104,000</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>490,000</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>12,343,000</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(in NYC)(outside (outside NYC)
NYC)

25%
(outside NYC)

North Carolina 3,334,000 3% 24% 73% 24% 14
Ohio 6,623,000 39% 25% 33% 46% 25
Pennsylvania 9,143,000 30% 37% 33% 42% 35
Rhode Island 6,99,000 36% 56% 8% 43% 4
Tennessee 2,032,000 21% 11% 65% 18% 12
Utah 592,000 27% 26% 45% 42% 4
Virginia 2,810,000 31% 23% 64% 14% 11
Washington 1,95,000 31% 14% 67% 7% 8
West Virginia 1,717,000 none 28% 72% 42% 8
Wisconsin 2,934,000 19% 35% 46% 46% 12

---

15 Gallup Almanac, 1946, op. cit., pp. 12, 14, 22, 28, 31, 45, 50, 54, 68, 77, 80, 84, 89, 98, 101, 111, 117, 125, 130, 139, 153, 156, 166, 180, 188, 191, 194, 199.
When the general distribution of the vote in these states was correlated with the specific characteristics of the Congressional Districts in which the PAC achieved success, it became evident that in fully seventeen of the twenty-eight states the CIO was something less than a major influence. Taken regionally, five of the southern states clearly fell into this category. In Alabama, with a population seventy-one percent rural, the PAC claimed victories in only two—the Fifth and the Ninth—of the State’s nine Congressional Districts. In the Fifth District a total vote of 25,317 was rather evenly distributed among eight counties, which suggests a predominately rural population. In the Ninth District, which included Jefferson County and Birmingham, the urban vote was clearly decisive, although that did not necessarily mean a labor vote. Thus, the PAC’s total potential influence was confined to an area which included 459,930 out of a total State population of 2,832,961. In Kentucky the pattern was very similar. Seventy percent of the population was rural and, of the six Congressional Districts carried by PAC endorsees, only the Third—which included Jefferson County and Louisville—could be considered an urban area. Three of the four counties ranging next in total vote—within the range of 15,000 to 25,000—were also carried by PAC candidates, but in no district did they

16. See Table "B" of this Chapter.
17. See Table "A" of this Chapter.
20. Ibid., 1944, pp. 3, 6.
represent a majority of the vote. Except for the Third District, the rural counties were in a position to dominate the voting. The PAC's actual influence was considerably less than its endorsement of six of Kentucky's nine Representatives would indicate. The Fifth Congressional District in North Carolina, the Third in Tennessee, and the Second in Virginia also represented isolated victories in localities that were not primarily urban. Only in North Carolina, in which three counties (each with a total vote within the range of from 10,000 to 27,000) dominated the seven-county Fifth District, was there any indication that the town and city vote played the decisive role. Thus, although assisting in the election of several relatively liberal candidates in the South, the PAC exerted no profound influence upon the political behavior of that region.

Union membership was relatively high in the Middle Atlantic states, but in Maryland and New Jersey the PAC did not show to particular advantage. In Maryland it supported candidates—one Democrat and one Republican—in two of the three Baltimore Districts, and only the Democrat was elected. The fact that the PAC won when it cooperated with the Democratic organization in Baltimore and lost when it opposed it, suggests that the party rather than labor held the political initiative. In New Jersey the PAC backed successful

22 See Tables "A" and "B" of this Chapter.
23 See Tables "A" and "B" of this Chapter.
24 See Table "A" of this Chapter.
Democratic candidates in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congressional Districts. Both were situated in Hudson County and Jersey City where the union vote was 25 heavy. In spite of an increase in the voter turn-out in the state, the successful candidates—both were incumbents—experienced a decline in their margin of victory, thus suggesting that it was the Republicans who had best succeeded in getting their supporters to the polls. The fact that Roosevelt carried New Jersey also made the PAC's feat of electing two of its fourteen Representatives seem somewhat unimpressive.

In several of the North Central states the PAC showed considerable strength in the principal cities, but was not active enough to exert major political influence in the States as a whole. The PAC supported Democratic incumbents in Indianapolis and Gary, Indiana, who won a larger percentage of the vote than in previous elections. But those districts did not constitute the major part of the State's representation, and did not account for a majority of Roosevelt's vote in his unsuccessful bid for Indiana in the Presidential election. In Wisconsin and Minnesota the CIO's candidates carried both of the Milwaukee districts, and two of the three Congressional districts in the Minneapolis--St. Paul area. These victories were a respectable showing, but the urban centers in which the CIO's strength was concentrated were in no position to dominate either state. In Missouri the PAC did not even succeed in carrying the major cities. Its candidate was elected in one of the three St. Louis districts, but it did not support a single successful candidate in Kansas City.

---

26 See Table "A" of this Chapter.
27 See Tables "A" and "D" of this Chapter, also Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1944, p.53.
29 See Tables "A", "B", and "D" of this Chapter.
The PAC's victories in the Mountain States of the Far West were very tenuously based. It supported all four of the successful Representatives-At-Large elected in Arizona and New Mexico, the populations of which were respectively 65 percent and 67 percent rural. Likewise, in the Idaho and Montana Districts carried by PAC-endorsed candidates the most heavily populated counties accounted for only a small fraction of the vote. Only in the Second Congressional District of Utah did an urban area clearly dominate the election. Even there the union membership was not great enough to have directly held the balance of power.

The industrial states of New England were, however, generally quite responsive to the appeal of the PAC. Massachusetts was a notable exception. Eight-nine percent of its population was rural, yet the PAC elected only two of the seven candidates whom it endorsed. The fact that Roosevelt carried the state with 52.9 percent of the vote, and two additional Democratic representatives were elected without PAC support indicates that Democratic strength rested with the Party rather than the PAC.

Thus, in approximately seventeen of the states in which it actively campaigned in the Congressional elections, the PAC was clearly not the major political influence. The remaining eleven industrial states were the only areas in which the PAC was potentially a major or decisive political influence.

---

30 See Tables "A" and "B" of this Chapter.
32 See Tables "A" and "B" of this Chapter, also Gallup Almanac, op.cit., 1946, pp. 78-9.
In the Pacific Coast region the PAC was very strong, and in both California and Washington endorsed a majority of the successful Congressional candidates. It was very influential in the three big population centers of California—San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego—and for that reason had a hand in the election of thirteen of the State's twenty-three Representatives. But the PAC was not able to dominate the urban areas completely. In Los Angeles it carried only six of the ten Congressional Districts, and in Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Mateo and several other heavily populated counties it did not feel that its strength was sufficient to warrant making an endorsement. The pattern of PAC successes in Washington was very similar. By dominating the urban areas it helped to carry four of the six Congressional Districts for its candidates.

Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio were the chief centers of PAC strength in the East-North Central region. In Illinois, Chicago and Cook County accounted for more than half of the Presidential vote and for ten of the State's twenty-five Congressional Districts. In spite of having a very active organization in the metropolitan areas, however, the PAC was able to elect only three of the ten Chicago Representatives to Congress, and only

33 See Tables "A", "B", and "D" of this Chapter, also Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, pp. 19-21.
34 Congressional Directory, op. cit., 1944, pp. 9-11, see also Table "A" of this Chapter.
35 Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, pp. 189-191, also see Table "A" of this Chapter.
36 See Tables "A" and "D" of this Chapter.
five of the eleven Democratic Representatives elected from the whole state. The exceptional heavy urban turn-out in Illinois suggests that the PAC's performance in the Congressional election may not have been an accurate indication of its contribution in the Presidential election. But if the labor vote did carry Chicago for Roosevelt but not for the PAC's Congressional candidates then it was obviously not fully under the PAC's control. In Michigan and Ohio the PAC dominated the urban areas, and was more definitely the decisive element in both the Congressional and Presidential elections. The only Democratic Representatives elected in either state were those who had PAC support. Likewise, the heavy labor vote in Detroit largely accounted for Roosevelt's margin of victory in Michigan, and in losing Ohio he showed little strength outside of the urban areas in which the PAC had demonstrated its effectiveness.

In the two New England states, Connecticut and Rhode Island, the strategic importance of the labor vote was strikingly evident. Four of the six Republican incumbents in Connecticut—two of whom had served at least two terms in the House—were defeated by PAC endorsed Democrats, chiefly by the vote of Hartford, New Haven and the other towns in which the CIO membership

37 See Table "A" of this Chapter, also Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, pp. 46-9.
38 See Tables "A", "B", and "D" of this Chapter, also Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, pp. 19-21.
39 See Tables "A" and "B" of this Chapter, also Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, pp. 81-3, 133-137.
was greatest, and most effectively mobilized. Both of the Democratic candidates whom the PAC supported in Rhode Island were incumbents, but because of the heavy labor vote in the urban areas they were able to increase their percentage of the total vote. There was a close correlation between the votes received by the PAC's Democratic Congressional candidates and the President in both states.

The remaining states in which the PAC was a potentially major influence—New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and West Virginia—all fell in the Middle Atlantic region. In New York, PAC candidates carried seventeen of the twenty-two Metropolitan Congressional Districts and twenty-two of the forty-five in the State. There were also six additional Districts in which the ALP supported independent Congressional candidates who were defeated by Democrats, but in which it actively campaigned on behalf of Roosevelt in the Presidential election. Furthermore, the total vote of the ALP in New York more than accounted for the President's margin of victory in that state.

The PAC achieved a less impressive mobilization of the labor-vote in Pennsylvania. Although its candidates made a clean sweep of the six

40 See Tables "A" and "B" of this Chapter, also Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, pp. 26-7.
41 See Table "A" of this Chapter.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
Philadelphia Congressional Districts, it elected only one of the five Representatives from Pittsburgh and Allegheny County, and carried only ten of the thirty-three Districts in the state. By electing fifteen Representatives, and carrying the state for Roosevelt, however, the Democrats underscored the fact that the PAC was but one element of their strength.

Delaware presented a more simple problem. The PAC's candidate for the State's lone Congressional seat defeated the Republican incumbent chiefly because the increase in the number of votes cast was greater in Wilmington than in the rest of the state. Since the PAC had conducted energetic registrational drives in that city, it was clearly entitled to some credit.

In West Virginia the probable relationship between PAC endorsement and the election results was more complex. It campaigned on behalf of four of the State's six successful candidates for the House of Representatives. But seventy-two percent of the population was rural, and only in the Sixth Congressional District was a heavily populated industrial county the decisive factor. In a state in which miners constitute the principal union group, urban concentrations were obviously not too reliable as a key to labor's strength. To make the rationalization that the vote of the miners

---

47 See Tables "A" and "D" of this Chapter, also Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, pp. 148-51.
48 Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1948, p. 44.
49 See Table "B" of this Chapter.
offset the apparently rural character of the population contributes little toward clarifying the PAC's role. The question of whether the PAC's campaign activities or Roosevelt's personal appeal had overcome John L. Lewis's continued hostility to the Administration would still remain. In view of the President's performance in 1940 the answer could hardly be favorable to the PAC.

The eleven states in which the PAC's strength was principally centered included one hundred seventy-seven Congressional seats. One hundred three Democratic and ALP candidates—seventy-seven of whom were PAC endorsed—were elected. The PAC's victories were not all clear cut. Nevertheless, the general political pattern was that the PAC was clearly the major element of Democratic strength, although it influenced under half of the total districts in those states. In the Nation as a whole its strength was more than proportionately less in both spheres. 50

Percentage-wise the PAC did very well in the 1944 Senatorial elections. It endorsed twenty-one candidates and elected seventeen—fifteen Democrats and two Republicans. 51

---

50 See Table "A" of this Chapter.
51 See Table "C" of this Chapter.
TABLE C
SENATORIAL ELECTIONS, 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Endorsement</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>Democratic Percentage of Major Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Lister Hill</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Carl Hayden</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>69.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>J. W. Fulbright</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Sheridan Downey</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Claude A. Pepper</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Glen R. Taylor</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Scott Lucas</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Samuel Jackson</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Alban Barkley</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Roy Mckittrick</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Elmer Wene</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Robert Wagner</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>John Moses</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Robert A. Taft</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>Elmer Thomas</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Wayne Morse</td>
<td>R., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>F. J. Meyers</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>Olin D. Johnston</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Elbert D. Thomas</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>George Aiken</td>
<td>R., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Warren G. Magnuson</td>
<td>D., PAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In states where the PAC had participated in the elections for the House of Representatives its Senatorial endorsements merely provided an additional, somewhat more generalized indication of its political strength. But seven of the PAC's successful Senatorial candidates came from states in which it participated in no other national elections except the Presidential. Five were so predominately rural in population—Arkansas 78 percent, North Dakota 79 percent, Oklahoma 62 percent, South Carolina 75 percent, and Vermont 66 percent—that there was little question of crediting the results to the labor vote. For somewhat different reasons it was also evident that the PAC endorsement meant little in Florida. Although the CIO had consistently favored Senator Claude Pepper, the PAC's failure in the primary election and general inability to get effective political units into operation in that state gave little weight to its endorsement. In the remaining state, Oregon, the PAC endorsed Republican Wayne Morse. The heavy labor vote in Portland and Multnomah County was important. The very size of Morse's majority, though, indicated that a very respectable part of his support came from the percent of the State's population, which was rural. The general effect of its record in the Senatorial elections was merely to re-identify the areas in which the PAC had a functioning political organization.

The results which the PAC achieved in the Congressional elections provide a useful indication of its contribution to the re-election of Roosevelt, but do not provide an absolute parallel. Organizationally, there


\[54\] Ibiu., 1946, pp. 145-7. See Table "C" of this Chapter.
was little difference between the resources at the command of the PAC in either election, for it concurrently endorsed Congressional candidates and campaigned on behalf of the President in all localities in which it was capable of making an organized effort. Roosevelt, however, had greater political appeal than many of its local candidates and carried districts in which they failed. The President had a stiffer fight than in previous years, however, so that strategically the PAC's efforts assumed considerable importance in many of the industrial centers.

Fewer votes were cast in 1914 than in 1910, and in spite of the fact that the number employed outside of agriculture rose from 30,403,000 to 38,695,000, that the number working in manufacturing industries increased from 10,435,000 to 15,585,000, and that the number in government service rose from 3,879,000 to 5,946,000, Roosevelt's vote dropped both in terms of the vote received and in percentage of the total. New York was the only industrial state in which the President's vote exceeded the 1910 level. The problems of registration and voting created by the heavy migration of workers into the war industries partially explained the decline. It also called attention to the extreme importance of the PAC's efforts to get out the urban vote. But the President's strength in areas away from the urban centers clearly indicates the danger of making the PAC's contribution in the registrational sphere the sole explanation of his re-election.

56 Ibid.
## Table D

### Comparative Presidential and Congressional Strength in States In Which the PAC Won Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Counties That went Democratic</th>
<th>Percent of State Vote in Those Counties*</th>
<th>President's Percent of Total State Vote</th>
<th>PAC Showing in Key Areas Carried by the President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>2 9</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>* 2</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td># 1 **51.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>* 1</td>
<td>**50.5</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>1 12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Congressman at Large.

**Percentage of total state vote.

***The percentage of the total state vote represented by the total vote of the counties carried by the President, but not by successful PAC candidates.


## Table D—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>PAC Cong. Districts</th>
<th>Total Counties</th>
<th>Counties Carried by the President</th>
<th>PAC Vote in Those Counties</th>
<th>President's Percent of Total State Vote</th>
<th>PAC Showing in Key Areas Carried by the President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Illinois | 1 | **52.5** | 2-1/3 | 17 | 43.3 | 51.7 | The President carried Cook County and Chicago, but the PAC won in only 3 of the 10 Congressional Districts in that area.  
60Congressman at Large.  
**Percentage of total state vote.**  
**The percentage of the total state vote represented by the total vote of the counties carried by the President, but not by successful PAC candidates.**  
| Indiana | 2 | 1 | 16 | 15 | 23 | 47.1 | The PAC candidate carried Marion County with a vote of 222,802 with 51.2%, whereas the President got only 47.7% of its vote.  
61 |
| Kentucky | 6 | 59 | 78 | 19 | 18.2 | 54.6 |  

62Congressional Directory, op. cit., 1944, p. 34; Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, pp. 51-3.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>PAC Cong. Districts</th>
<th>Total Counties</th>
<th>Counties That Went Democratic</th>
<th>President's Percent of Total State Vote</th>
<th>PAC Showing in Key Areas Carried by the President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The PAC carried one of four districts in Essex County, and one of four districts in Suffolk County, whereas the President carried the two counties by 51.4% and 62.7%, respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8-5/6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAC candidates won in five of the six districts in Detroit and Wayne County, which the President carried by 63.7%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3-1/2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The PAC won one of two districts in Hennepin County, which the President carried by 56%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The President carried the 3 St. Louis districts, and the 2 Kansas City districts, but the PAC carried only 1 St. Louis district.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The percentage of the total state vote represented by the total vote of the counties carried by the President, but not by successful PAC candidates.

63 Congressional Directory, op. cit., 1944, pp. 46-50; Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, pp. 81-3
64 Congressional Directory, op. cit., 1944, pp. 51-4; Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1945, pp. 85-7
65 Congressional Directory, op. cit., 1944, pp. 55-6; Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1945, pp. 85-7
66 Congressional Directory, op. cit., 1944, pp. 60-63; Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, pp. 94-6
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Counties Carried by PAC</th>
<th>Counties Carried by President</th>
<th>PAC Showing in Key Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4-7/9</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4-7/9</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The PAC carried two of the three districts in Hudson County (Jersey City) which the President carried by 62%.67

The ALP polled 499,575 in the Congressional elections, or 6.3% of the total vote. The distribution of the ALP vote was 1,08,568 in NYC, 91,007 outside NYC. The Democratic Congressional vote was 63.6% in NYC, 36.3% in the rest of the state. The Presidential vote was 58.9% in NYC, 41.1% in the rest of the state.68

*Congressman at Large.
**Percentage of total state vote.
***The percentage of the total state vote represented by the total vote of the counties carried by the President, but not by successful PAC candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>PAC</th>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Total Dis-</th>
<th>Counties That Went Democratic</th>
<th>Percent of State Vote in Those Counties</th>
<th>President’s Percent of Total State Vote</th>
<th>PAC Showing in Key Areas Carried by the President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N. C.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>19 79</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9-2/3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4-1/3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>The PAC and the President showed comparable strength in the industrial areas of Ohio, except that the President carried Cuyahoga County with 60.3% of the vote, whereas the PAC succeeded in capturing only 2 of its 3 Congressional districts. 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5-1/5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10-4/5 31.0</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>PAC candidates carried all 6 Congressional Districts in Philadelphia, but only 1 of the 5 districts in Pittsburgh. 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>The Congressional candidates carried the state by an average of 59.8%. 71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***The percentage of the total state vote represented by the total vote of the counties carried by the President, but not by successful PAC candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>PAC Cong. Districts</th>
<th>Total Counties</th>
<th>Counties That Went Democratic PAC</th>
<th>Presidential Vote in Counties</th>
<th>Excess of PAC</th>
<th>PAC Showing in Key Areas Carried by the President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***The percentage of the total state vote represented by the total vote of the counties carried by the President, but not by successful PAC candidates.

One indication of the importance of the President's personal appeal as a factor in the election was that in most districts where a comparison was possible he ran well ahead of the PAC's Congressional candidates. Frequently this margin was accounted for by counties with a low or moderate population. Analysis of the Presidential vote also revealed the importance of the rural vote. Roosevelt also demonstrated strength that was independent of the labor vote in many of the major urban centers. In Los Angeles, Chicago, Baltimore, Boston, St. Louis, Kansas City, and Pittsburgh, for example, his total vote was significantly larger than that of the PAC's Congressional candidates. Likewise, he was as strong in the AFL dominated states as in those in which the CIO was the most important union group. These facts indicate that the CIO was but one of several important elements of the Presidential vote.

As the following characteristics of voter behavior indicate, however, the PAC's efforts were strategically important.

---

73 See Table "D" of this Chapter; also Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, pp. 9-10, 13, 19-20, 26, 29, 43-4, 46-8, 51-3, 64-7, 75-6, 79-9, 11-3, 85-7, 91-6, 99-100, 111-12, 115-16, 118-21, 128-9, 135-7, 148-50, 154, 161-6, 178-9, 183-6, 189-90, 192-3, 195-7.

74 See Table "B" of this Chapter.

75 See Table "D" of this Chapter.

76 Braunthal, op. cit., p. 17.
### Democratic Vote by Sections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New England</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. North Central</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. North Central</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total United States</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Democratic Vote by Size of Town

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Town</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500,000 or more</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 to 500,000</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns under 10,000 (excluding farm)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Residents</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Democratic Vote by Occupation Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation Group</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Business</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Farmers</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Democratic Labor Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Union Members</th>
<th>Non-Union Labor</th>
<th>AFL</th>
<th>CIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

77 Gallup Almanac, op. cit., 1946, p. 203.
78 Ibid., p. 204.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., pp. 205-6.
### TABLE E—Continued

Distribution of Seats in the House of Representatives of the 79th Congress, by party and by Type of Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Area</th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>American Labor</th>
<th>Progressive</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Big City**</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Rural***</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Seats</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Mixed District****</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All districts in the 13 Southern states.

**Districts (out of the South) in which at least one-half of the residents lived in a city of 100,000 or more.

***Non-Southern districts in which less than 40% of the population lived in incorporated places of more than 2,500.

****Non-Southern districts in which neither the rural or urban population was markedly predominant. Eighty-three of the 133 districts included some residents of the suburban areas of cities with 100,000 or more population.

81 Ibid., p. 251.
Labor was clearly the group which most enthusiastically supported Roosevelt for the Fourth Term, and among labor groups the CIO displayed the greatest singlesness of purpose. 82 This fact alone was an indication that the PAC had done its job well. It was equally suggestive that Roosevelt showed his greatest strength in cities of more than 500,000 population. 83 The distribution of Congressional seats was also an indication that although the South was still the backbone of Democratic strength, the big Northern cities held the balance of power. 84 Nevertheless, there was an increase in the number of farm residents who voted Democratic, and New England—where the PAC was not uniformly successful—was the only region in which Roosevelt's proportion of the vote did not decline. The facts call attention to the contribution of non-labor groups.

Another measure of the PAC's assistance to the Democratic Party was its political expenditures. They were grossly exaggerated during the campaign, and by the standard of political parties were comparatively modest. However, by the previous standards of the American labor movement, its financial contribution was substantial.

82 See Table "E" of this Chapter.
84 See Table "E" of this Chapter.
TABLE F
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES IN 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Receipts</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIO-PAC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trade-Union Accounts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 1944 Balance</td>
<td>$ 546,297.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#Total contributions January 1, 1944 to December 31, 1944</td>
<td>101,606.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in Account</td>
<td>$ 646,093.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditures reported September 10, 1944</td>
<td>354,398.64</td>
<td>$ 24,194.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures reported October 27, 1944</td>
<td>191,639.40</td>
<td>15,303.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures reported November 2, 1944</td>
<td>30,442.23</td>
<td>$ 393,997.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total to November 2</td>
<td>81,156.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures reported December 31, 1944</td>
<td>92,751.02</td>
<td>83,152.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total to December 31</td>
<td>$ 376,910.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Contributions Account:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions reported to September 19, 1944</td>
<td>$ 62,075.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions reported October 27, 1944</td>
<td>191,639.40</td>
<td>30,442.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions reported November 2, 1944</td>
<td>30,442.23</td>
<td>$ 371,198.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total to November 2</td>
<td>81,156.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions reported December 31, 1944</td>
<td>92,751.02</td>
<td>83,152.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total to December 31</td>
<td>$ 376,910.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures reported September 10, 1944</td>
<td>354,398.64</td>
<td>$ 24,194.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures reported October 27, 1944</td>
<td>191,639.40</td>
<td>15,303.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures reported November 2, 1944</td>
<td>30,442.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total to November 2</td>
<td>81,156.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures reported December 31, 1944</td>
<td>92,751.02</td>
<td>83,152.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total to December 31</td>
<td>$ 376,910.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No trade union contributions were reported after September of 1944.

### TABLE F—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIO-PAC (Continued)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Contributions Account (cont'd)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monies from other sources to Nov. 2, 1944</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total receipts to Nov. 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monies from other sources to Dec. 31, 1944</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Receipts to December 31</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenditures to Nov. 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenditures to Dec. 31</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total loans outstanding as of December 31, 1944</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total bills outstanding as of Dec. 31, 1944</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenditures, loans and bills as of December 31, 1944</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NC-PAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Receipts to December 31, 1944</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditures to December 31, 1944</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total CIO-PAC and NC-PAC Jan. 1, to December 31, 1944</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Monies from other sources included receipts for the sale of pamphlets and literature, and discounts and refunds on expenditures.**
With the exception of a few minor items clearly not connected with the election, the PAC's expenses were paid from the individual contributions account during the whole period of the active campaign. One indication that that account actually consisted of the "Dollars" of union members was the complete absence of large contributions. The sharp increase in receipts and expenditures in the weeks immediately preceding the election graphically portrayed the relative interest of the rank and file, and the intensity of campaign activities. The heavy expenditures for December were clearly a part of that pattern. Another indication of the character of the PAC's campaign activities was that nearly three-fourths of its funds went for office overhead, salaries, travel expenses, publication and publicity. It made a vigorous effort on behalf of its chosen candidates, but rarely made direct political contributions.

The NC-PAC and the CIO-PAC together provided approximately $1,474,665 of the total of $7,441,000 which the various units of the Democratic Party and like-minded independent groups spent to influence the Presidential election. The over-all Republican total amounted to $13,196,000, thus, bringing total campaign expenditures in the Presidential election to $20,637,000. Thus, the charge that the PAC was literally in a position "to buy the election" was rather farfetched. It must, also, be understood

---

88 Ibid.
89 See Table "P" of this Chapter; also Overacker, Campaign Funds, op. cit., p. 34.
90 Ibid.
that the financial reports of the National-PAC did not provide a complete financial picture of the CIO's political resources. The funds which local Political Action Committees, and the national and local unions independently raised and spent under state and local legal jurisdictions were not included. In addition to strictly monetary considerations the staff members and facilities provided, an important indirect contribution which was not always credited to political expenses.

By election day of 1944, the PAC had distributed more than 85,000,000 pieces of campaign literature. These included posters, billboard displays, leaflets, pamphlets, and instructional manuals for the political novice, and were prepared with a skill that aroused the admiration of the professional politicians of both parties. The effect of this prodigious output was not easy to assess. The vigor of the attacks upon the PAC suggest that its efforts were having some effect, otherwise the professional politicians would not have bothered. It probably would be equally logical, however, to assume that the attacks upon the PAC were merely a means of getting at the Administration. Thus, a number of imponderables are necessarily involved in any judgment concerning the contribution of the PAC to the Democratic victory in 1944. In broad terms the candidates it supported carried 34.8 percent of the Congressional districts of the twenty-eight states in which it was active. Its major contribution, however, was confined to eleven states controlling one hundred seventy-seven Congressional seats. In those states the Democratic and American Labor Party candidates carried 58.2 percent of the districts, and PAC endorsees accounted for 74.8 percent of their victories, and carried

---

43.5 percent of all the districts. By any criterion the PAC was a major political force in the industrial centers. But in the remaining seventeen states its candidates carried only 23.5 percent of the total seats, and because of the composition of the population many of those victories were doubtful. The PAC's contribution in the Presidential election followed a similar pattern. Thus, although it made a creditable showing in mobilizing the labor vote, it was clear that the PAC was but one element in the total Democratic strength. Although its efforts were strategically important, it was only in conjunction with the rural and non-union voters that it was able to determine the outcome of the election.
CHAPTER VIII
POSTWAR STRIKES UNDERMINE PAC'S POSITION

When Hillman appeared before the delegates at the CIO's 1944 Convention, they gave him an ovation which lasted for nearly an hour. At first it was impossible for him to proceed with his prepared address. Extemporaneously he began to recount the victories, which the PAC had achieved. There was an enthusiastic outburst of cheering when he commented upon the sudden political obscurity which had descended upon the members of the Dies Committee, and again when he read the list of AFL endorsed "Reactionaries" whom the PAC had defeated. He seemed unexpectedly jealous of the AFL and made a point of belittling its political accomplishments. It became evident as he proceeded, however, that his purpose was to emphasize the correctness of the CIO's decision to enter politics, for his attack ultimately centered upon Green's refusal to admit that labor had a stake in political decisions. He argued that by preventing the "Old Guard" Republicans from winning control of the government the PAC had provided the worker with the best assurance that some effort would be made to cope with his

3 Ibid., 1944, pp. 33-4. The PAC had defeated Representatives Martin Dies (D., Tex.), Senator James J. Davis (Rep., Pa.), and Senator Gerald P. Nye (Rep., N. Dak.), whom the AFL had endorsed, and had secured the re-election of Senator Robert Wagner (D., N.Y.) in spite of the AFL's endorsement of his opponent.
4 Ibid., 1944, p. 33.
5 Ibid.
future economic security. There was some sentiment at the Convention in
favor of a labor party, but Hillman refused to give it any encouragement.
He firmly rejected the notion that the PAC was capable of founding a third
party or of capturing one of the existing parties. It had been successful
in 1944 because it had conducted a well organized campaign, and had advanced
a program which was not restricted to trade union interests, but he insisted
that it was not sufficiently well organized to make an independent bid for
political power. He suggested that the CIO's political plans should recognize
that the excitement of the campaign would be followed by a general let-
down among union members, and that the fundamental task of the PAC was
still that of expanding and strengthening its local machinery, and of making
a concerted effort to establish a sounder working relationship with other
community groups.

The political resolution which the CIO Convention finally adopted
specified that the PAC's activities should continue to be on a non-partisan
basis. The delegates were in effect content to instruct the PAC to build

---

6 Ibid., 1944, p. 34.
7 Joseph North, "Focus on the CIO," New Masses (December 5, 1944), p. 5.
8 Proceedings of CIO Convention, op. cit., 1944, p. 36.
9 Ibid., 1944, pp. 33-5.
10 Ibid., 1944, p. 35.
11 Ibid., 1944, p. 33, and Helen Fuller, "PAC and the Future," New
Republic (November 27, 1944), p. 690.
13 Ibid., 1944, p. 38.
14 Ibid., 1944, p. 37.
a more effective political machine. Remarkably little thought was given to the question of what political role the PAC should undertake once it had achieved greater power. Experience was expected to indicate the most effective means of deploying labor’s strength and to provide the surest test of feasible objectives.

There was also an element of deliberateness in the CIO’s failure to clarify its political objectives. During the campaign it had of necessity endorsed many candidates who were not fully in accord with its views. On occasions it had rationalized close cooperation with political machines. In New Jersey, for example, a PAC spokesman bluntly explained that Hague had been supported against the New Constitution Reform Coalition because: In Politics there are no voids once you smash the Hague machine, something has to replace it. The CIO doesn’t want to smash it now because the CIO is afraid the replacement wouldn’t go down the Roosevelt line on national and international issues.

With a similar candor CIO Secretary James B. Carey explained that a continuation of nominal non-partisanship was necessary because an open manifestation of political ambition or power by the CIO would alienate farmers and other non-union groups whose cooperation was essential to its interests.

The months immediately following the 1944 election proved rather disconcerting for the CIO. In spite of Murray’s strong feelings on the subject, the President turned the disposal of surplus war properties over to

---

16 Ibid.
18 Carey, op. cit., p. 419; and Proceedings of CIO Convention, op. cit., 1944, pp. 36, 38.
a board dominated by Jesse Jones and Will Clayton, both of whom were friendly to big business.\textsuperscript{19} The new 79th Congress proved no more amenable. Over the CIO's protests it stripped Henry Wallace—whom Labor regarded as the outstanding champion of "Full Employment"—of all control over the lending agencies before confirming his appointment as Secretary of Commerce.\textsuperscript{20}

The Murray-Wagner-Thomas Full Employment Bill faced many delays and eventual emasculation.\textsuperscript{21} The Kilgore-Wagner Manpower Bill, which the PAC strongly favored, was blocked and demands for a labor draft and other drastic measures became disturbingly frequent. As the Congressional session progressed the PAC's first optimism was dampened. The rash of anti-union measures in the state legislatures added to its growing sense of apprehension.\textsuperscript{22}

To cope with this situation the CIO established a special committee in its Legislative Department to lobby on behalf of measures which would implement the PAC's program.\textsuperscript{23} Murray tried to persuade William Green that the CIO and AFL should act jointly in legislative matters,\textsuperscript{24} but the AFL President insisted that the differences which prevented organic unity also made political cooperation impossible.\textsuperscript{25} Murray also urged the CIO locals

\begin{enumerate}
\item I. F. Stone, "The Future of the PAC," \textit{Nation} (November 18, 1944), pp. 607, 627-8. The CIO immediately started a campaign to amend the Surplus Property Act in order to assure the right of veterans, farmers and small businessmen to make purchases.

\item \textit{Advance}, February 1, 1945, p. 3; \textit{U-E News}, February 3, 1945, p. 7; and \textit{CIO News}, February 12, 1945, p. 5.

\item \textit{Advance}, January 11, 1945, p. 1; and \textit{U-E News}, April 7, 1945, p. 2.

\item \textit{CIO News}, March 12, 1945, p. 1, 12.

\item \textit{Ibid.}, December 18, 1944, p. 7.

\item \textit{Ibid.}, December 24, 1944, p. 3.

\item \textit{Ibid.}, December 25, 1944, p. 8.
\end{enumerate}
to make a special effort to win the cooperation of union and non-union groups outside of the CIO. 26

The PAC, meanwhile, concentrated primarily upon the task of political education. Financially it relied upon the Trade Union Account, which had been frozen during the actual campaign, 27 and found staff reductions and other economies necessary. 28 But it produced a steady stream of leaflets and pamphlets, and also used the regular union journals to keep union members interested and informed on current political affairs. 29 It suggested techniques for enlisting the aid of local non-union groups, 30 on behalf of measures which the CIO considered important. From the tone of such literature it was evident that the act of cooperation was as important as the objectives toward which it was directed. The national leaders repeatedly emphasized the importance of being realistic in political matters and warned the local committees to be very careful in judging public temper and interests before taking a public stand on any issue, no matter how important to the CIO. 31

In spite of this interest in winning the cooperation of non-union groups, the orientation of the CIO-PAC in some respects became more exclusively that of an instrument of organized labor. Dispensing with the legal fiction of a political organization paralleling that of the union, on

26 Ibid., February 12, 1945, p. 5, and March 1, 1945, p. 7.
28 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 3.
April 12, 1945 the CIO General Executive Board directed all Political Action Committees to merge with the appropriate Industrial Union Councils. One important reason for this step was the desire to eliminate all duplication of personnel and facilities. It also had the effect of supporting the PAC’s activities with the full trade union machinery and authority.

Roosevelt’s death caused considerable uneasiness in the CIO, for it associated its greatest social gains with his Administration. Murray hopefully called attention to Harry Truman’s liberal record in the Senate, and pledged the new Administration the CIO’s support. But he made it clear that that support was based on the presumption that the New Deal policies would be continued. Union journals were at first very cordial to the new President and predicted great promise for his term of office. That goodwill began to dissipate, however, after the end of the war in Europe, for union members suddenly became very conscious of the economic uncertainties which the future held. By autumn they had become openly critical of the Truman Administration. One very direct result of this period of readjustment was that the CIO felt doubly responsible for rallying the forces of liberalism.

---

33 CIO News, April 23, 1945, pp. 2-3.
34 Ibid., p. 3.
35 Ibid.
Gradually the NC-PAC began to undertake a bigger role in the CIO's dealings with non-union groups. After the election Hillman had stepped down as its chairman, and Elmer Benson, former governor of Minnesota, had become its active head. In May, there was a transfer of key personnel between the two PAC organizations. C. B. Baldwin resigned from the CIO-PAC in order to become Assistant Chairman and Executive Director of the NC-PAC. At approximately the same time Verda Barnes moved over from the CIO-PAC to take over the Woman's Division of the National Citizen's group. After this transfusion the NC-PAC became more active. In New York, it took the lead in developing a PAC organization, which was independent of the American Labor Party. In June it announced a nation-wide tour, which included political rallies in nineteen major cities. The NC-PAC revealed a remarkably flexible and realistic attitude at its rallies. In New York, for example, Senator Charles W. Tobey (R., N.H.), whom it had opposed in 1944, was one of the principal speakers. Although still disagreeing with Tobey on many issues, the NC-PAC had decided to effect a reconciliation because of his firm support for the principle of world cooperation and blunt

---

42 *Ibid.*, June 18, 1945, p. 21: 2, and July 20, 1945, p. 11: 5. The cities were New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Denver, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, Sacramento, Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle, Spokane, Helena, Bismarck, Sioux Falls, Minneapolis, Milwaukee, Omaha, Kansas City, and Des Moines.
damnation of "red baiting." Thus the NC-PAC in effect served notice that it did expect a full acceptance of its program by other groups, but was willing to bargain as to the basis of collaboration.

Late in June, Hillman asked Eleanor Roosevelt to accept the Chairmanship of the NC-PAC, for he was convinced that her presence would be very helpful in attracting Liberals. Mrs. Roosevelt readily agreed to discuss the matter with the Executive Board of the NC-PAC. She made it clear from the beginning, however, that she would be no figurehead, but on the contrary would expect to appoint her own assistants and actually to administer its affairs. She also made a point of asking for full details concerning the financing of the NC-PAC program. After nearly a month of consultations, Mrs. Roosevelt decided not to accept the offer. In a letter to Hillman on July 27, 1945, she explained her reasons:

Needless to say I am deeply interested in the possibilities of NC-PAC, and in the program of work which I feel would not achieve its maximum influence if I became its chairman. I would bring additional difficulties and no great strength. . . . I think that if I speak for you and am available for consultation unofficially at any time, when any of your workers feel I can be of use, I will be doing you more service than if I actually undertake to give you part of my time as your chairman.

---

45 Ibid.
47 Undated letter Eleanor Roosevelt to C. B. Baldwin, Ibid., 1945.
She also commented upon the difficulties which her acceptance of the position would impose upon the NC-PAC's relations with the Democratic Party:

I have decided that if I became Chairman instead of being helpful with the Democratic Party, it would alienate the Democratic Party, and I think it is important to keep the Democratic Party close to both the CIO-PAC and NC-PAC.

Hillman did not quarrel with her decision, but expressed deep interest in discussing, "the particular ways and means of utilizing your most generous offer to be of service to the work we are undertaking." Later she made several speeches under the auspices of the NC-PAC, including a strong endorsement of William O'Dwyer for Mayor of New York City. On those occasions she customarily commended the PAC as a forward step in democracy.

During the summer of 1945, the NC-PAC succeeded in establishing active units in fourteen states. It also developed a working relationship with the Independent Committee of Arts, Sciences and Professions, The Southern Conference on Human Welfare, and various other "liberal"

---

50 Ibid.
51 Letter Sidney Hillman to Eleanor Roosevelt, July 30, 1945, Ibid., 1945.
53 Ibid.
54 U. S. 79th Congress. First Session. Hearings of Special House Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, 1945 (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1945), Pt. I, pp. 11-12, 72, 77-81. The states were California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Colorado, and Washington. These local units had considerable local autonomy, and theoretically the National Committee had little more than advisory powers.
organizations, with a limited and somewhat intellectual membership. By reaching those capable of providing intellectual leadership in political matters, it hoped to influence liberal-minded citizens in general. But it was doubtful that the NC-PAC succeeded in reaching the unorganized mass of independent voters.

When Elmer Benson returned from his nation-wide organizing tour he reported some of his impressions to Hillman, and they were on the whole somewhat pessimistic. He had found that the NC-PAC merely basked in the reflected glory of the CIO-PAC. He further concluded that the CIO-PAC's grass-roots organization was weak. Moreover, he had found the attitude of the various state and local Democratic leaders somewhat disturbing. They had been friendly, but inclined to avoid all major issues. He warned Hillman that the Democratic leaders preferred to let the CIO-PAC and NC-PAC bear the brunt of marshalling support for controversial issues, and could be expected to provide little courageous support for the PAC's economic program.

A number of the CIO leaders had independently arrived at similar conclusions, and showed a renewed interest in developing political leaders from the ranks of labor. But the National PAC was convinced that few

---

56 Benson had continued as NC-PAC Chairman after Mrs. Roosevelt declined the position.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
union members had the political experience or stature to win elections. It warned the local committees against running labor candidates in localities in which there was a danger of splitting the vote or of unnecessarily arousing community hostility. It preferred that they should confine themselves to registration drives and political activities of a general nature.

In spite of this caution at the top, local political action committees supported a number of union members for public office in the local elections of 1945. Frequently the candidacy of union members merely served to reveal the dissensions in the CIO unions. In Detroit, for example, UAW Vice President Richard Frankensteen announced on his own initiative that he planned to be a candidate for mayor. Rival elements in his own union—including the Reuther faction—immediately suspected that his political ambition was coupled with the desire to magnify his intra-union strength. Consequently, the CIO unions in the area endorsed him only with reluctance. Frankensteen lost the election primarily because labor was not sufficiently united to make an effective campaign in his behalf. In local elections elsewhere the PAC's candidates—both union and party—achieved some success in Cleveland, Cincinnati, New York, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, Birmingham, and Los Angeles, and were badly beaten in Philadelphia, Buffalo, Syracuse and a number of cities in Connecticut.

63 Ibid., pp. 274-5.
64 United Automobile Work, March 1, 1945, p. 8.
65 "No PAC Test," op. cit., p. 103.
66 Ibid.
The end of the war in Europe reminded union members of the uncertainties which the future held. The scattered termination of war contracts led almost immediately to a decline in opportunities for overtime, and to spot unemployment in some localities. In the first period of uneasiness the Administration failed to provide the leadership for which the workers had hoped. Instead, there was delay and indecision. In June, Mobilization Director Fred Vinson's support for the Wagner Full Employment Bill momentarily aroused some hope. But by July many of the CIO unions had become openly critical of the stabilization policies of Vinson and Krug and were rapidly losing confidence in the Truman Administration. Hillman was particularly concerned over the failure to take advantage of the period of demobilization preceding the end of the war with Japan.

Ambition as well as fear played a part in the uneasiness of the war workers. They had become accustomed to the higher wartime wages and entertained hopes for a "brave new world" after the war was over. Reconversion did not mean for them a return to "normalcy" by the standards of 1939. The leaders of the CIO understood very well the mood of the rank-and-file members. Consequently, their thinking in regard to reconversion centered around the idea of increasing mass purchasing power without increasing prices. This

---

69 *Advance*, August 15, 1945, p. 5; September 1, 1945, p. 4.
70 *The Road to Freedom* (CIO PAC Pamphlet of the Month No. 5), p. 11; and *CIO News*, May 14, 1945, p. 3.
viewpoint was reflected in the CIO's Seven Point Reconversion Program, which called for:

1. A 20% increase in basic wage rates, and a 65¢ hourly minimum.
2. Measures to protect take-home pay.
3. A continuance of price controls.
4. An increase in unemployment compensation payments to $25 per week for twenty-six weeks.
5. Expanded United States Employment Services operations to give war workers greater economic mobility.
6. A state and federal program of public works to be achieved by authorizing such projects as a Missouri Valley Authority.
7. The establishment of a National Production Council under the joint control of representatives from Labor, Management, and Government.

The end of the War with Japan relieved the CIO of the "no-strike pledge" and other restrictions upon its freedom of action in the economic sphere. Because they no longer trusted the Truman Administration to provide a solution to their reconversion problems, the CIO unions were inclined to rely upon their own bargaining power. The views which their leaders expressed on economic policy tended to lose their social orientation and to become rationalizations for pending wage demands.

In September 1945, Truman finally urged Congress to adopt a comprehensive reconversion program. Many of his specific suggestions were in

73. Ibid.
accord with the CIO's principles. There was a feeling in labor circles, however, that the President had already missed the opportunity for preventive measures and that his leadership was not sufficiently vigorous to cope with the problems that had already arisen. Both the AFL and the CIO criticized the Administration for not being more aggressive in demanding authority to increase unemployment compensation payments and the minimum wage rates. Neither slackened their preparations for an all-out collective bargaining campaign.

The initial phase of the skirmish was largely statistical and theoretical. Both labor and management felt compelled to justify before the public the policies which they had decided to follow. The business position was that unless price ceilings were removed an increase in wages would reduce profits and cripple the ability of the economy to undertake peace-time production. The CIO contended that management was able to pay higher wages without sacrificing the stabilization program. By way of proof it cited the Department of Commerce estimates that business would enter the post-war period with $52,000,000,000 in accumulated war profits and an additional $30,000,000,000 in tax rebates, and that corporation profits after taxes would reach $11,800,000,000 in 1946 as compared with the 1936-1939 average of $3,900,000,000. The PAC's contribution to the

74. The Road to Freedom, op. cit., pp. 14-16.
76. The Road to Freedom, op. cit., pp. 14-16.
debate. was a refinement of the argument that management was capable of paying higher wages and therefore should. It carefully related union wage demand to industry's need for new markets to replace war-time governmental spending, and attempted to prove that increased mass purchasing power was the key to rapid recovery. This line of reasoning brought it to the conclusion that the public interest demanded that management should increase wages within the existing price structure.

Action soon replaced argument, and the impetus came as much from the union membership as from their national leaders. Within a month after V-J Day almost 500,000 workers had become involved in local strikes, and by October the number had risen to 853,000, which was 3.15 percent of the total number employed in industry. These work stoppages preceded the strikes of the major unions. In October President Truman called a Labor-Management Conference in an effort to prevent prolonged struggles in the various segments of the economy. He made a special point of asking Hillman to represent the CIO, apparently in the hope that he would be a conciliatory influence. But representatives of both labor and management were convinced that to yield on any basic question would be to lose the initiative.

80 Ibid.
81 Letter Harry S. Truman to Sidney Hillman, October 20, 1945 (ACW White House File, 1945).
in the whole reconversion period.

On November 21, 1945, the first of the major strikes began between the UAW and the General Motors Corporation. It was destined to last for one hundred thirteen days. The actual act of striking had been preceded by a long series of maneuvers and negotiations which helped to set the temper of strikes in other industries. On June 30, 1945, UAW Vice President Walter Reuther had presented to the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the War Labor Board and the Office of Price Administration a detailed economic brief which developed the thesis that sustained post-war production required a pronounced increase in public consumption of goods. At the time, the federal stabilization authorities did not accept his arguments as a justification for changing their wage policies. On August 16, 1945, two days after the surrender of Japan, Truman set forth the policy that wage increases would be permitted if they did not lead to price increases. The President intended the order as a reaffirmation of his determination to combat inflation. But Reuther quickly capitalized upon this concession. Two days later he submitted preliminary demands to the General Motors Corporation in which he asked for a 30 percent wage increase without any change in the price of automobiles. On October 3, GM President Charles Wilson made a formal reply to the UAW in which he flatly rejected its wage demands.

---

82 Howe and Widick, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
84 *Ibid*. The UAW made similar demands upon Ford and Chrysler, but on September 22, the General Executive board of the Union adopted the strategy of concentrating upon one company at a time, and decided to make General Motors the test case.
The negotiating sessions between the company and the union then began in earnest.

Reuther was eager to win public support for his strategy of tying wages to prices, and invited reporters to attend his meetings with the GM representatives. When the Company refused to negotiate in open sessions, he made a point of releasing transcripts of the negotiations so that the public would be fully informed as to the real character of his demands.

Reuther's major arguments were the same. He insisted that at its current automobile prices the company could increase wages by 30 percent and still earn an annual profit that was double the pre-war rate. When GM negotiators countered by offering a 10 percent wage increase and a forty-five hour week, he offered to scale down his plans if the company books actually disproved his estimate of the company's financial position. Thus, the Union's case centered around the question of the Company's ability to pay, and labor's right to insist that wages should be related to prices.

The General Motors' representatives insisted that on both counts the UAW was attempting to invade the prerogatives of management. They rejected the notion that ability to pay was an important factor and that labor could as a matter of right demand the maximum wages that the Company was capable of paying. GM Vice President Harry Anderson declared,

---

85 Ibid., p. 132.
87 Howe and Bidick, op. cit., p. 135.
"That is really up to us to decide, Walter, whether we are willing to pay it or not." The Company rejected with equal vigor the notion that the prices which it charged for its products were a proper subject for collective bargaining.

It was only after prolonged deadlock over the implications of these questions that the strike began. The picket lines were quiet, but the struggle proceeded heatedly at the conference table and in the press. The UAW repeatedly said, "Let's open the books, and get at the facts." The Company countered by full-page advertisements which asked, "Is the Union Seeking Facts or New Economic Power?" "A Look at the Books, or a Finger in the Pie?"

The UAW then persuaded a group of prominent citizens, which included Leon Henderson, Bishop William Scarlet, Professor John Hahna, Professor Harry Overstreet and others, to hold hearings upon the issues involved in the conflict. General Motors refused to cooperate. Nevertheless, the group published a report in which they substantially agreed with the Union's contention.

The Administration's behavior outraged the unionists. The President declared that the General Motors strike was seriously hindering reconversion, and urged the strikers to go back to work immediately. Both the UAW

88 Ibid., p. 134.
89 Ibid., pp. 135-6.
91 Howe and Widick, op. cit., p. 137.
92 Ibid., p. 138.
and the CIO strongly protested such prejudicial statements. The President next appointed a three-man fact-finding board to investigate the issues of the strike. This step was more in accord with the Union's views, but the fact that it was coupled with the suggestion that there should be a sixty-day cooling off period in strikes made the Union leaders somewhat suspicious. The Company boycotted the fact-finding board because Truman had decided that "ability to pay" was a legitimate question for it to consider.93

On January 10, 1946 the Board reported that the Company was able to grant a nineteen and a half cents per hour wage increase—approximately 17 percent—without raising the price of its automobiles.94 The Company immediately rejected the recommendations of the Board. The UAW, however, promptly agreed to accept the report as a basis of settlement, and criticized the Company for prolonging the strike.95 But more than sixty additional days passed before a settlement was reached.

The General Motors strike was extremely important because it illustrated with exceptional clarity the broader social issues which lay behind union wage demands. Though it was but one of the many great strikes which rocked the economy during the last months of 1945 and the early part of 1946, over 75 percent of the strikes in 1945 occurred in the four and a half months following the end of the war.96 The list of the strikes—general

---

93 Ibid., p. 139.
94 House Hearings on the Causes of Labor Disputes, op. cit., Pt. II, pp. 223, 226. Final settlement was reached March 13, 1946, with a contract calling for an increase of 18 1/2 cents per hour and liberal vacation allowances.
95 Ibid.
96 Crowther, op. cit., pp. 780-783.
Electric, Westinghouse, International Harvester Corporation, the meat packing industry, and steel—was virtually a roster of the nation's basic industries. The magnitude of the strikes gave them a tremendous influence over the whole economy. At the beginning of 1946, thirty-one strikes took more than 2,925,000 workers from their jobs, and accounted for nearly two-thirds of the 116,000,000 man days lost in work stoppages during the year.97

The first round of strikes had been preceded by a number of attempts in Congress to curtail some of the legal safeguards, which the unions had built up. In June 1945, a bill to place a six-months statute of limitation on labor law violations had been under serious consideration,98 as was the Rankin Amendment, which would have exempted veterans from all union shop agreements.99 The Ball-Burton-Hatch Bill had sought a drastic revision of the Wagner Act, which would have included these and many other changes.100 In November 1945, the House Military Affairs Committee adopted a resolution calling for severe penalties for strikers and a complete ban on political contributions by unions, even in primary elections.101 The Hobbes Anti-Labor Racketeering Bill was adopted.102 The support which these measures received indicated a considerable degree of latent anti-labor sentiment in the Seventy-Ninth Congress. As the prolonged industrial struggle reached

99 Ibid., July 16, 1945, p. 12.
100 Ibid., July 2, 1945, p. 12; and United Automobile Worker, August 1, 1945, p. 3.
102 Ibid., November 5, 1945, p. 12.
its climax in early 1946, that sentiment was strengthened. The signs of legislative hostility made unions unusually suspicious and unresponsive to any suggestion for altering the labor laws.

In the strikes the negotiations invariably broke down on the question of prices. Few unions tied wages to prices as definitely as the UAW had in its demands upon General Motors. Nevertheless, most of them strongly supported a continuation of price controls. Moreover, the Administration's efforts to preserve its stabilization program prevented a settlement on any other basis. The President insisted that wage increases would have to be within the existing price structure. Management in turn refused to make wage adjustments until the Federal Price and Stabilization authorities provided some assurance of price relief. When the General Motors Fact Finding Board made its report, the President had seemed determined to stand fast. But under the pressure of public opinion he began to waver.

The Steel strike was the turning point. As spokesman for the whole industry Benjamin F. Fairless refused to consider the wage demands of the steel workers unless the Government permitted a $7 per ton increase in the price of steel. After the deadlock had continued for several weeks, Truman announced the formula of permitting wage increases to match the rise in the cost of living after 1941, and of permitting price increases to those companies whose earnings were forced below the pre-war level by that step.


104 Ibid.
The Steel strike was settled upon the basis of a five dollar per ton in-
crease in the price of steel and an eighteen and a half cents per hour pay
raise. In a number of other industries a similar formula was accepted.
These settlements eased tension somewhat, but the public temper was still
very short. The prolonged deadlocks had taken on the character of tests of
strength rather than of bargaining. Because the public has been seriously
inconvenienced, it was very susceptible to the views of those labor critics
who insisted that the real interests of the workers had been sacrificed to
the ambitions of their leaders and that the Wagner Act had become a bulwark
of special privilege for unions. The CIO was frankly afraid that public
resentment might lead to the passage of the Case Bill, or other punitive
measures under consideration in Congress.

There was to be no respite. On March 31, 1946 the contract between
the coal operators and the United Mine Workers was to expire. In the pre-
liminary discussions Lewis refused to discuss wages until some agreement
had been reached on his demands for a union-administered health and welfare
fund, and for stricter safety regulations. Consequently, stalemate developed
and on April 1, 1946 the miners left the pits. For the next six weeks the
nation's vital industries experienced a slow paralysis as the question of the
welfare fund was debated. On May 13, just as the temper of the public and of
the federal officials was reaching a breaking point, Lewis suddenly announced
a twelve-day truce and the miners resumed work.

106 Ibid.; also December 20, 1945, p. 13.
108 "The Strategy of Mr. Lewis and Where it Failed Him," United States
News (December 13, 1945), p. 15.
The Trainmen and Engineers of the Railroad Brotherhood chose this moment to force the Administration's hand, and as a result reaped the resentment which Lewis had aroused. Their complaint was an old one. As early as July, 1945 the entire Brotherhood had expressed serious discontent at the backlog of cases before the Railroad Mediation Board. They demanded a wage increase of $2.50 per day, and a revision of working rules. Eventually eighteen of the railroad unions had agreed to submit their case to arbitration. But the Trainmen and Engineers issued a strike call for March 11, 1946. The President averted an immediate tie-up of rail transportation by appointing a fact finding board. On April 18, the Board recommended several basic changes in the work rules, and a sixteen cents per hour wage increase. The Railroad Brotherhoods' refusal to accept the Board's recommendations led to Federal seizure of the railroads. Eventually most of the railroad unions accepted a settlement calling for an eighteen and a half cents per hour pay raise. The Trainmen and Engineers, however, refused to sign such an agreement, and continued to demand changes in the working rules. On May 23 they carried out their long threatened strike. By calling in the Army and persuading the non-striking railroad unions to continue to operate the trains, the President was able to break the strike.

Meanwhile Lewis's truce with the Operators had drawn to a close, so the President ordered Federal seizure of the mines. Dealing with the

---

110 *Ibid.;* also *Barck and Blacke, op. cit.,* p. 748.
111 "The Strategy of Mr. Lewis, etc.," *op. cit.,* p. 15.
Federal administrators actually proved to be advantageous for the miners. Lewis reached a settlement with Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug, which provided for stricter safety regulations and an eighteen and a half cents per hour wage increase, but left the question of the Welfare Fund open for future discussions with the mine operators. 112

The willful acts of Lewis, and of A. F. Whitney and Alvane Johnson of the striking railroad unions, brought the "First Round" of strikes to a bitter climax. At the height of these controversies Truman went before Congress to demand temporary legislation giving him drastic powers to force union members to return to work in industries which were placed under Federal administrators. 113 He also recommended that permanent steps should be taken to provide adequate peace-time authority for coping with national emergency strikes. His tentative suggestions were that the President should be given the power to invoke a sixty-day cooling off period in major strikes and to appointment of a fact finding board whose recommendations would be supported by legal authority. 114 The President's expression of these views greatly strengthened the position of those who contended that labor was becoming too powerful, and should be curbed. One very direct result was that the Case Bill was finally pushed through Congress, largely on the strength of Truman's appeal for greater powers. 115 The general feeling in CIO circles was that

112 Ibid.
113 Crowther, op. cit., p. 788.
the President had tipped the scale to favor the "enemies of labor" at a very critical moment. They held him responsible for the passage of the Case Bill, even though he eventually vetoed it.\textsuperscript{116} Thereafter the CIO felt compelled to defend itself against the Administration as much as against any of the other groups who were attacking its fundamental legal guarantees.

When the House Committee on Labor opened hearings on the causes of industrial unrest in June 1916, the spokesmen for Labor seemed almost to be suffering from a persecution complex. Murray insisted that the nation had just witnessed a "big business plot" to undermine unions. In essence his contention was that management had deliberately fostered and prolonged strikes in order to create a public demand for anti-labor legislation.\textsuperscript{117}

In support of that charge he pointed out that in each case it had been management and not labor that refused to accept the recommendations of the President's fact finding boards. His chief explanation of management's ability to hold out centered around the rebates upon war-time excess profits payments, which the 1912 Tax Law granted to corporations whose incomes fell below a specified level. Specifically, he cited the example of the J. I. Case Company, and Allis Chalmers, which had drawn tax rebates over a period of several months while consistently rejecting all terms even after the union was more than willing to scale down its demands.\textsuperscript{118} Secretary of Labor Lewis B. Schwellenbach concurred in the opinion that management had

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., Pt. II, p. 232.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., Pt. II, p. 234.
deliberately avoided an early settlement of wage contracts. 119

The "Big Business Plot" theory of industrial disputes was rather skeptically received by those who demanded more stringent labor laws. But they created their own counterpart which rested upon the conviction that the "irresponsible acts of arrogant union leaders" was the primary cause of strikes. They assumed that the strikes had been personal rather than economic in character. Eventually the whole debate began to revolve around the merits of the union wage demands. Not merely the CIO but all other labor groups insisted that the loss of overtime pay, transfer to lower paying jobs plus serious inflationary tendencies had subjected the worker to an intolerable economic situation. In his appearance before the House Labor Committee, William Green argued that the simple fact that wages had been the major factor in only 26.5 percent of the strikes in 1939, but that the proportion had risen to 42.4 percent in 1945, and to 75 percent in the first quarter of 1946 was a good indication that the "First Round" of strikes had been a normal adjustment to a period of great economic uncertainty. 120 On behalf of the CIO, Murray presented abundant statistical evidence which was designed to show that the workers' standard of living had been at stake in the post-war strikes. In addition, he refused to countenance the notion that unions were irresponsible or that strikes had reached the proportions of a national emergency. To support his contention he called attention to the general effectiveness of conciliation, and to the fact that strikes were


more numerous among unorganized workers than among those who belonged to unions.  

One of the most interesting aspects of the testimony of the CIO spokesmen was the extent to which it revealed the deterioration in their relations with the Administration. Murray sharply attacked the President's proposal that a sixty-day cooling off period in strikes and compulsory fact finding should be written into law. He contended that there was no need for a cooling off period, because most wage contracts already required thirty to sixty days of negotiation prior to expiration, and that compulsory fact finding would establish a dangerous precedent of Federal interference in the collective bargaining process. The feeling that the welfare of the workers was being sacrificed to political expediency was evident in much that he said. Jealously the CIO spokesmen pointed out that business had been provided with carry-back tax rebates, easy amortization of war facilities, the repeal of excess profits taxes and other assistance in meeting post-war economic adjustments, but that labor had been denied more adequate social security coverage, the continuation of the United States Employment Service, an increase in minimum wage standards, adequate housing or any of the other measures necessary for a decent standard of security. Dan Tobin, of the AFL Teamsters, expressed their feelings exactly when he warned the Democratic Party that it had lost the confidence of labor and would face defeat in both 1946 and 1948, unless it changed its course.

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., Pt. II, p. 226.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., Pt. II, p. 212.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., Pt. II, p. 93.}\]
\[\text{New York Times, July 10, 1946, p. 18: 1.}\]
Thus, the "First Round" of strikes largely destroyed the mutual trust between the CIO and the Truman Administration. The President's patience was completely exhausted, and he came to believe that Labor would have to be brought under firmer control. The CIO, in turn, had become suspicious of the Administration's intention and had lost confidence in its ability to provide a solution to economic problems. The PAC's efforts to win the good will of the independent voter were sacrificed to wages, and labor faced a more hostile public opinion than it had at any time since the beginning of the New Deal. These changes put the CIO politically on the defensive. It became preoccupied merely with preserving the social gains which labor had won under the Roosevelt Administration.
CHAPTER IX

THE CIO FIGHTS FOR POLITICAL SURVIVAL

During the "First Round" of strikes Hillman's behavior was in marked contrast to that of other CIO leaders. He feared the political consequences of the jealousies and distrust which were being permitted to grow up between the CIO and the public and between the CIO and the Democratic Party. His efforts were directed toward preventing a complete break with the Truman Administration. At the time of the steel strike he sent a wire to the President praising the fairness of his attempts to work out a solution. Likewise, when the Case Bill was passed his statements were in such marked contrast to the rash accusations of most CIO leaders that President Truman sent him a personal letter of appreciation. Nevertheless, the PAC faced a difficult political situation in 1946, and proceeded with caution.

More than seventy reporters turned out for the press conference which Hillman held in April to discuss the PAC's plans for 1946. But he provided them with little that was sensational. Instead, without reference to parties and personalities he clarified and reaffirmed the principles for which the PAC stood. The domestic program which he outlined stressed the

---

1 Undated telegram Sidney Hillman to Harry S. Truman, ACW White House File, 1946.


importance of creating an economy of abundance for all. The specific poli-
cies which it encompassed were essentially the same as those of the PAC's
1944 "Full Employment" program. They included: a continuation of price
controls, a federal housing program, compulsory health insurance, expanded
benefits for veterans, federal aid to education, continued farm price
supports, federal measures to encourage the small businessman, and tax
adjustments in favor of the low income groups. 4 In foreign policy he pro-
tested the tendency of the United States to by-pass the United Nations and
to become involved in diplomatic power blocs. 5 But the PAC's thinking
still centered around such ideas as: equal access to raw materials, self-
determination for colonial peoples, quarantining fascism, the continuation
of UNRRA, and U. S. atomic control until such time as the UN could reason-
ably sponsor disarmament talks. 6 Hillman's presentation was manifestly de-
signed to allay the public's fears concerning the future actions of the
CIO unions. When the reporters pressed him on the questions of strikes, he
defended the unions' actions as a necessary last resort for preserving mass
purchasing power. 7 He assured them, however, that in the future the CIO
would turn to the political arena for a solution of economic problems. 8

---

4 Ibid.
5 CIO News, April 22, 1946, p. 12.
6 Ibid.
7 "Unions in Politics," op. cit., p. 598; and CIO News, April 22,
1946, p. 12.
8 Ibid.
In May, Hillman discussed the CIO-PAC's program in an article for the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Again the tone was conciliatory. He went to great lengths to identify PAC's policies with the broader traditions of Americanism, and to deny any radical or irresponsible intent.

The PAC's activities in the 1946 primary elections were in keeping with the prudence which Hillman had shown in other matters. It adopted the strategy of concentrating on those districts in which a few hundred votes had spelled the difference in the previous election. Another criterion which it established was that of "bailing out" friendly incumbents who were in jeopardy. By either standard, however, its participation was not impressive. In all, the PAC gave its full support to only twenty-three Representatives and twelve Senators, and made a major effort to defeat some twenty Representatives and eleven Senators. In sharp contrast with 1944, little fanfare accompanied the PAC's activities in the primaries. A general timidity

---


10 Ibid.

11 Advance, April 15, 1946, p. 13.

12 Ibid.


marked its literature and public statements. The routine accusation that
the PAC had prepared a national purge list brought frantic protestations
from the National Committee that the Congressional endorsements were entirely
the responsibility of the local PAC groups. The excuse was not new, but
the PAC had never before seemed quite so determined to convince the public
that it was not a major political force. The election results were in keep­ing
with the character of the PAC’s campaign. It was able to take credit
for defeating sixteen Representatives, and four Senators, and for nomi­
nating seventeen Representatives and five Senators. The PAC’s “victories,”
however, included industrial and non-industrial districts alike, so that it
was by no means certain that they were legitimate. In no state did they
constitute a major element in the Congressional elections.

The primary elections revealed not only weakness but the beginnings
of political disunity within the CIO. Repeated clashes with the Truman
Administration during the strike had led many unionists to question Labor’s
alliance with the Democratic Party. Walter Reuther and John Green of the
CIO, and Philip Randolph and David Dubinsky of the AFL led a movement to
reopen the question of a third party, and attempted to work out some basis
for political cooperation between their respective organizations. In the

17 Ibid., May 12, 1946, p. 9: 1; and “Purge and Primaries,” op. cit.,
p. 31.
18 House Hearings on Campaign Expenditures, 1946, op. cit., Pt. II,
19 House Hearings on Campaign Expenditures, 1946, op. cit., Pt. II,
pp. 155-6.
20 New York Times, August 11, 1946, p. 3: 1; U-E News, August 2,
1946, p. 4.
21 J. C. Cort, “Politics: AFL and CIO,” Commonweal (May 10, 1946,
CIO only the prompt opposition of Murray and Hillman prevented a strong challenge to the policies of the PAC. 22 Even after the formation of a labor party had been officially rejected, the sentiment was slow to die. 23 Among those unionists who believed that continued cooperation with the Democratic Party was necessary the suspicion that the Truman Administration was becoming conservatively inclined to produce a general apathy. 24 One of the best proofs of this state of mind was the disappointing response to the PAC's voluntary contributions to campaigns during the primaries. 25 All too frequently CIO members dutifully went through the motions of political participation but without real enthusiasm.

On July 10, 1946, Hillman died of a heart attack, and his passing was a severe blow to the PAC. First because it caused delay in overcoming the political problems which the primaries had revealed. More fundamentally it increased the uncertainties of CIO members at a very critical point in the campaign. Hillman had earned national stature as a political prime mover of the CIO and one of its most influential contacts with the Democratic Party. His prestige gave him a decided advantage in resolving internal differences, and in winning the support of the CIO unions for the PAC's policies.

23 Ibid.
24 Advance, June 1, 1946, p. 13.
Picking a successor was difficult. There was for a time a movement to draft Murray as the PAC chairman for the remainder of the campaign. Proponents of the idea argued that he alone had the prestige to carry through the plans of the PAC. Murray, however, felt that it would be a mistake for him to try to divide his time between the CIO and the PAC. After considerable discussion the CIO General Executive Board decided to name Jack Kroll, an Amalgamated Clothing Workers' vice-president, as Hillman's successor.

Kroll was an old timer in the labor movement. Like Hillman he had virtually grown up with the Clothing Worker's Union, and had participated in the political activities of the CIO since the early days of Labor's Non-Partisan League. In Ohio he had developed one of the PAC's outstanding state organizations during the 1944 campaign. Largely on the basis of that performance he was made Assistant National Chairman of the PAC in 1945. Outwardly his assumption of the full chairmanship caused little break in the continuity of PAC Policy. Upon taking office Kroll immediately declared his opposition to the Third Party movement—at least as an immediate goal—and insisted that the PAC's maximum efforts should be directed toward electing the progressive candidates of the established parties. Nevertheless, there was a subtle difference. Although able and well respected in the labor movement, he was not the national figure that Hillman had been, and could not employ the same tactics. He had not

---

been a confidant of presidents and had fewer illusions about being able to rally the non-union liberals around the PAC. Because of his extensive experience in CIO political life at the state and local level, Kroll also clearly understood that the PAC still had not succeeded in mobilizing the labor vote. He was convinced that it should not undertake ambitious plans for influencing non-union groups until it had overcome the apathy and disunity among CIO members. For this reason, under Kroll there was a tendency for the PAC to become exclusively a union instrument. Its spokesmen more frequently emphasized that they had no policy making powers, but merely carried out the instructions of the CIO. They laid no claim to the semi-independent status which Hillman had achieved in 1941 by virtue of his influence with the Administration and in liberal circles.

The development of the 1946 campaign justified Kroll's belief that the CIO's primary political task was still internal. Most union members agreed with him when he warned that labor faced a rising tide of reaction which might very well engulf its legal safeguards. The behavior of the Southern bloc and other conservatives, however, made them dubious of their alliance with the Democratic Party. Kroll was not entirely immune to the same fears. He was very critical of the growing tendency for Democrats and Republicans to join forces in blocking social legislation, and frequently

28 Interview with Ted Dudley, Assistant Director CIO-PAC, September 17, 1951.


expressed the fear that short sightedness in foreign affairs might lead to another war. Nevertheless, as a practical politician he saw no alternative to a continuation of labor's alliance with the Democratic Party. He summed up his position with the declaration:  

The PAC believes in independent political action, and we do not consider ourselves a 'kite' to any political party. We will support progressive candidates of both parties in all elections. However, in 1946, the main forces of reaction are behind the Republican Party and it is against them that we must mobilize.

It was upon the basis of expediency that he attempted to overcome the doubts of CIO members. He insisted that there was no reasonable prospect that a Third party could succeed, and that CIO members had to face the fact that they had no choice but to continue the PAC's policy of striking the best possible bargain with the established parties.

The PAC's campaign tactics were adapted to the changes which Roosevelt's death and more hostile public temper had brought about. Careful attention to organization and to personal contact techniques replaced the emphasis upon publicity which had characterized 1944. The philosophy of the new tactics was succinctly set forth in the NC-PAC's Manual of Practical Politics which declared:

The ultimate effectiveness of any political organization is measured not by the noise it makes, not by the vision alone of its program, but by the number of candidates it can elect to office. That is the brutal premise, which must be accepted by all progressives. The ballot . . . is the payoff.

The PAC's publicity staff was kept at a minimum, but there was an increase in the number of representatives which it sent into the field. First, priority was given to the task of recruiting volunteers to ring doorbells, do favors and to exploit all of the other techniques of personal contact, which had been so successfully used by the political parties. The PAC had decided that it still had much to learn from the professional politicians.

In order to insure maximum effectiveness in the use of its resources, the PAC carefully studied each district in which it intended to make a major stand. Its research staff analyzed Congressional Districts as to racial composition, population shifts, apportionment, voting laws and other matters that might be useful in planning strategy. Such surveys revealed, for example, that the Negro vote held the potential balance of power in approximately one hundred Congressional Districts. Subsequently, the PAC supplied the appropriate local canvassers with the voting record of incumbents on the Fair Employment Practices and similar measures. It employed similar techniques in the other strategic labor districts.

The after-effects of the first round of strikes, however, overshadowed the PAC's careful calculations. Throughout the campaign it had to struggle against the political apathy of CIO members. Union newspapers paid much less attention to candidates and issues than in 1944. The national staff of the PAC frequently complained that it had difficulty in even finding out what the

---

37 Frank and Shikes, op. cit., pp. 2-4, R-114, 0-13.
38 Frank and Shikes, op. cit., pp. 2-4, R-114, 0-13.
local groups were doing. It used a variety of tactics to reach the union membership, but few of them were fully successful. Schools in political techniques were set up as much to give union members a sense of responsibility and prestige as to instruct. Frequent rallies were held in the more important industrial cities. Few opportunities were lost to appeal to the fears and resentments of the workers. The insistence of Senator Ed Johnson's Campaign Expenditures Committee upon probing the PAC's campaign in Montana against Senator Burton K. Wheeler, and its refusal to act upon the PAC's request for an inquiry into the affairs of Senator Bilbo of Mississippi were built up as a sign of anti-labor discrimination. The PAC also hammered at the indifference of Congress to the interests of labor in such matters as price control, housing, and the implementation of a satisfactory post-war recovery program. Arousing the fears and resentments of union members was not a problem, but converting them into positive action was more difficult. The workers had little faith in the intentions of either party. The PAC tried to meet this problem by carefully distinguishing between the Administration, and the actions of the conservative Democratic Congressmen. But the President's record provided little inspiration.


The PAC also made overtures to the general voter, for it realized that the labor vote alone could not assure the election of a suitable Congress. Its change in campaign tactics and stress upon speaking only for the CIO were in part concessions to the sensitiveness of public opinion. It also made full use of the NC-PAC's political contacts. But the response to Fortune's November 1, 1946, poll rather clearly indicated that it had little success in conciliating public opinion. The response by economic classes to the question, "Is the Pac the kind of organization you would like to see continued?" was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Salaried Executives</th>
<th>Professional Men</th>
<th>Wage Earners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continued</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Continued</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When broken down according to political or union affiliation the response to the question "Which do you think American Labor Unions should do, support candidates put up by one of the present parties, form their own labor party and run their own candidates, or keep out of politics altogether?" was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Roosevelt Supporters in 1944</th>
<th>Dewey Supporters in 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support Major parties</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form own Labor Party</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep out of Politics</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47 Ibid.
All Union Members | AFL | CIO
---|---|---
Support Major parties | 29.9% | 29.0% | 31.6%
Form own Labor Party | 22.6% | 19.4% | 26.4%
Keep out of politics | 37.7% | 42.6% | 30.9%
Don't Know | 9.8% | 9.0% | 9.1%

Thus, the public was definitely hostile to the PAC, and although favorable to the idea of political participation labor was disunited on the question of method.

Many of the attacks upon the PAC closely paralleled those of 1944. Republican National Committeeman Carroll Reece insisted that it was prepared to spend $6,000,000 to buy the election. In October a Moscow English language broadcast praising the liberal character of the PAC's candidates led to a revival of the charge that the PAC was Communist dominated. The PAC registered vigorous denials. There was, in addition, an increase in criticisms of a more thoughtful character.

An article in Barron's by C. H. Gratton exemplified some of the objections that were raised. He readily conceded that the broader objectives of the PAC's program had considerable merit, but found an objectionable dogmatism in many of its acts and statements. As examples he cited:

1. The PAC's refusal to consider any suggestions but its own for implementing its social objectives,
2. Its calamitous predictions that the rejection

---

49 Ibid.
of a single point of its program would lead to war and depression, and (3) its habit of indiscriminately branding as a reactionary, anyone who questioned its proposals, no matter how pertinently. He also discerned in its reasoning an unwholesome oversimplification of issues, and an insistence upon making a bread and butter appeal to the voters even at the expense of real understanding. There was more than a little truth in these criticisms. These signs of political immaturity he attributed to the PAC's pretensions of non-partisanship, and reluctance to accept the responsibility of forming an independent party.

Historian Henry S. Commager refused to give serious consideration to the broader objectives of the PAC's program. He insisted that it was a class organization, which actually judged candidates on narrow labor issues rather than their whole record, and that its pretensions of social consciousness were mere window dressing. The danger which he saw in this situation was that if organized minorities became the arbiters of national policy they would substitute class standards for the social compromise represented by the major political parties in the American political system.

---

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 69.
He concluded that the PAC was introducing the instability of the European multi-party system into the Nation's political life, and was for that reason a threat to genuine Americanism. Thus, the points which both Gratton and Commager raised were that the PAC was a class organization and that it had not demonstrated real social responsibility.

Kroll promptly challenged the notion that the two major parties had a monopoly on American democracy. He argued that they were merely convenient instruments by which citizens exercised their rights of self-govern- ment, but that if proved ineffective they could be altered or abandoned without impairing the democratic character of the nation's political life. Although denying that the CIO had any such intention, he insisted that the formation of a third party by Labor would not be undemocratic or contrary to the basic values of the nation. In keeping with that thesis, his conclusion was that the corruption of the major parties and not the desire to promote class interests had forced labor and other groups to undertake a more active political role, and that any decline of the two party system would be due to that corruption.

Arguments on questions of political philosophy, however, did not get at the roots of the public's hostility to the PAC. The strikes had been a serious economic inconvenience and had aroused fear of the increasing power of unions. The PAC as a manifestation of the scope of union

---

58 Ibid., p. 69-70.
60 Ibid., p. 68.
ambition became the focal point of that resentment during the political campaign. Fully realizing the difficulty which it faced, the PAC rigidly confined its endorsements to those districts in which there was at least a reasonable chance of success. In all, it endorsed sixty-five candidates for the House of Representatives, and formally opposed the re-election of sixteen incumbents. But even on that modest scale its efforts were not

---


notably successful, for only thirty-one of its candidates won seats in the House and only four in the Senate. Virtually all of its successes were in the hard fought marginal districts.

The strength which the Republican Party showed in Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago and the other major industrial centers was indicative of the setback which the PAC had suffered. In Wayne County, Michigan, for example, which included over 250,000 UAW members, the Republicans carried four of the seven Congressional seats including two previously held by Democrats. In the over-all picture forty-two of the seventy-eight Congressmen who had a perfect voting record by PAC standards were defeated, and one hundred eight of the one hundred thirty-two who had voted wrong every time were re-elected. The

CIO News, November 11, 1946, p. 2; New York Times, November 7, 1946, pp. 6, 12; "Crestfallen," Newsweek, November 18, 1946, p. 35. Included among the candidates elected by the PAC were Marcantonic (ALP) and Powell (D.). New York: Havenner, Holifield, Isaac, King, Miller, Sheppard, Douglas (D.), California; Monroney (D.), Oklahoma; Dawson, Sabath, O'Brien, Gorski, Gordon and Price (D.), Illinois; Donohue, Lane, McCormick (D.), Massachusetts; Ludlow (D.), Indiana; Kelley (D.), Pennsylvania; Sadowski and Lesinski (D.), Michigan; Fogarty and Forand (D.), Rhode Island; Jackson (D.), Washington; Huber and Feighan (D.), Ohio; Mansfield (D.), Montana; Carroll (D.), Colorado; Blotnick (D.), Minnesota. In California Representatives Delacy and Coffee (D., Wash.), Hook (D., Mich.), Bradley and Sheridan (D., Pa.), Voorhis, and Outland (D., Calif.), Biemiller (D., Wis.), Koppelman and Geelan (D., Conn.), Neely and Bailey (D., W. Va.), and Traynor (D., Del.).

Senators Kilgore (D., W. Va.), Flanders (R., Vt.), Chavez (D., New Mex.), and McGrath (D., R. I.), won with PAC endorsement, but Senators Guffey (D., Pa.), Briggs (D., Mo.), Mitchell (D., Wash.), Tunnell (D., Del.), Murdock (D., Utah), and Mead (D., N. Y.) were defeated.


"Crestfallen," op. cit., p. 35.
press quickly termed the election a Republican landslide, and interpreted it as a mandate for restrictive measures against unions. 68

Kroll did not deny that labor had suffered a serious setback, but strenuously objected to the notion that the election had been either a landslide or a mandate for a particular course of action. Ninety-three of the Republican members of the Eightieth Congress, for example, had been elected by margins of five percent or less. 69 Thirty-four of the new Republican members received fewer votes in victory than they had in defeat in 1944. He argued that a low vote and the normal post-war letdown, rather than the popularity of Republican principles was the proper explanation of the election results. As supporting evidence he cited the fact that in 1946 the total vote had dropped to thirty-five million with the Democrats receiving sixteen million as compared with twenty-five and a half million in 1944, and the Republicans receiving nineteen million as compared with twenty-two million in 1944. 71 But such arguments were largely academic, for the fact remained that Congress was firmly under Republican control—a situation which would have serious repercussions on unions.

When the CIO's 1946 Convention assembled in Atlantic City, therefore, the delegates were in an apprehensive mood, and signs of political disunity became more evident. The National Maritime Union attacked the PAC as too much of a paper organization to meet the future political needs of the CIO. 72

---

69 *CIO Convention, op. cit.*, 1946, p. 294.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
Local labor leaders were critical of the lack of cooperation which they had received from the Democratic Party and were receptive to the idea of a third party. There was greater than usual support for the suggestion labor and other progressives should unite behind candidates of their own. The national leaders checked the movement only with difficulty. Kroll's position was that there was no practical alternative to the PAC's non-partisan course of action. He argued that labor's hopes for redress against the pending attacks of the Eightieth Congress lay in strengthening its political organization, but in conjunction with the Democratic Party. Without much enthusiasm the delegates authorized the PAC to continue its established policies. In an effort to strengthen the PAC's authority and to give union members a greater sense of responsibility for its success its Executive Committee was expanded to include all CIO vice-presidents and individual representatives from the five largest unions. Nevertheless, there were still many political undercurrents in the CIO when the convention adjourned.

Shortly after the election Lewis destroyed any hope that labor might have had of conciliating public opinion. On October 21, 1946 he had requested a negotiating conference with the Federal administrators. He based his action upon the assumption that the Krug-Lewis Agreement and the provisions of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1945 permitted either

---

74 Ibid., p. 292, 295.
75 Ibid., p. 94.
party to demand a conference within ten days after formal notice was given, and to terminate the contract if an agreement was not reached within fifteen days after the conference had begun. 76 Answering for Secretary Krug, N. H. Colliison, the Federal Administrator, insisted that the agreement was binding "for the period of government possession," but agreed to discuss matters affecting the operation of the mines. 77 In the ensuing conferences Lewis demanded a pay raise for the miners. Krug refused to consider this, but suggested that he open negotiations with the mine owners. 78 Lewis, however, served notice that he was terminating the contract as of midnight on November 20. The government immediately filed a complaint against Lewis and the union in the District Court for the District of Columbia, and on November 18 secured a temporary restraining order. 79 Nevertheless, Lewis circulated a copy of his termination notice among the miners, and they started a gradual walkout which reached the proportions of a full-scale strike by November 20. The government then filed contempt proceedings against Lewis, and on December 4 Federal Judge T. Alan Goldsborough entered a judgment assessing a personal fine of $10,000 against Lewis and a fine of $3,500,000 against the union. 80 Reluctantly Lewis ordered the miners back to work until March 31, 1947, and appealed the fines. The court reduced the fine against the union

76 The United States V. John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid.  
81 Ibid.
to $700,000, but otherwise sustained the decision. The arrogance which Lewis had displayed in defying the government completely outraged public opinion. Demands for punitive action against unions were renewed. Even before the Eightieth Congress had convened its leaders had met to lay plans for revising the Wagner Act.

In his State of the Union Message President Truman attempted to forestall extreme measures by presenting a four-point program for labor law revision, which called for:

1. The curtailment of undesirable practices by unions such as the use of the sympathy strike or secondary boycott in jurisdictional disputes in which a collective bargaining agent had been certified. He opposed blanket prohibitions, however, contending that in certain circumstances the use of both practices might be warranted.

2. An expansion of the conciliation facilities at the command of the Labor Department.

3. Legislation to cope with housing, inflation, potential unemployment and other problems creating a sense of insecurity among workers.

4. The appointment of a joint Congressional committee to investigate the whole problem thoroughly and to provide the information necessary for working out a permanent solution.

The Administration's program rested on the principle that labor unrest stemmed from economic and social causes, and the President stressed that the responsibility of employers as well as unions should be considered in assessing blame. He also warned Congress that a permanent solution to the problem would have to strengthen and not destroy effective collective bargaining.

82 *The United States v. John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers.*
84 Ibid.
The leaders of the Eightieth Congress, however, had no intention of losing the initiative on the labor question. On January 4, 1947, the Republican conference in the Senate rejected the President's program and interpretation of the causes of strikes. It blamed industrial unrest on the arrogance of labor leaders and the legal inequalities created by the Wagner Act. Conveniently overlooking the tremendous increase in union members between 1935 and 1947, it cited the fact that under the Wagner Act strikes had increased. It insisted that there was no longer any real disparity in the bargaining power of employers and unions, and that only by establishing legal equality could competition be restored to the labor market. As a working principle, it announced that the urgency of the problem would not permit thorough study before drafting a new law.

In the House there was a rash of new bills. Representatives Case, Hoffman and Landis introduced measures calling for the use of the injunction in strikes affecting the public welfare, the legal prohibition of the closed shop, industry-wide bargaining, jurisdictional strikes, sympathy strikes, secondary boycotts and picketing of a coercive nature, full legal liability for unions and similar restrictions. Under the chairmanship of

86 Ibid., pp. 117-118.
87 Ibid., p. 117.
Representative Fred Hartley the House Committee on Education and Labor undertook the task of fashioning such proposals into a suitable bill. Its approach to the problem was clearly reflected in the opening sentences of its majority report to the full House, which declared:

For the last fourteen years as a result of labor laws ill conceived and disastrously executed the American working man has been deprived of his dignity as an individual. He has been cajoled, coerced, intimidated, and beaten up, in the name of the splendid aims set forth in Section I of the National Labor Relations Act. His whole economic life has been subjected to the complete domination and control of unregulated monopolists.

One of the standards which the committee set for judging what was normal and desirable in the wage relationship was the worker's right to deal individually with his employer. But its concept of the proper limits of individual rights was somewhat strange. It criticized the certification of majority unions by the National Labor Relations Board on the grounds that it interfered with the individual's right to join the minority union of his choice. In its concern over the plight of the employer under the Wagner Act, it tended to regard collective bargaining as an improper invasion of management's prerogatives. Its conclusion was that by being forced to deal with workers through their unions rather than individually the employer, "has been compelled by the laws of the greatest democratic country in the world—or at least by their administrator—to treat his employees as if they belong to a different

91 Ibid., p. 4.
92 Ibid., p. 2-4.
93 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
class or caste of society." So conceived, the whole problem became merely a matter of curbing the powers of unions.

The bill which the Committee reported to the full House attempted to do just that. In the name of protecting individual rights it limited the expulsion of union members to failure to pay dues, provided guarantees against coercion, outlawed the closed shop, members should be given the right to vote by secret ballot on management's offers during wage negotiations, made unions financially accountable, and imposed a non-communist oath on union officials. On behalf of the employer the secondary boycott, the jurisdictional strike and other "coercive" tactics were outlawed, unions were made legally liable, all statements by employers except direct threats were excluded as legal evidence, exempted employers from responsibility for the words and deeds of foremen and supervisors unless they acted upon direct orders, and permitted the hiring of regular replacements for strikers. As general restraints, industry-wide bargaining was prohibited, and unions were made subject to the anti-trust laws. In short, it was a decidedly "tough" labor bill.

94 Ibid., p. 5.
95 Ibid., p. 6.
96 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
97 Ibid., p. 5.
98 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
99 Ibid., p. 82.
100 Ibid., p. 68.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., pp. 7-9.
103 Ibid.
Senator Robert Taft's Committee on Labor was somewhat more moderate in tone, but its proposals were no less stringent. It declared that it had no intention of robbing labor of its social gains under the National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but the bill which it prepared contained most of the features of the House counterpart. Among its distinctive features were a number of measures designed to protect the worker's freedom of choice, especially if he did not want to be represented by a collective bargaining agent. Professional and highly skilled workers were exempted from the requirement to enter general collective bargaining arrangements. Individual workers and employers were given an unrestricted right of appeal to the National Labor Relations Board. The Taft Bill also attempted to correct the "pro-labor bias" of the N.L.R.B. by separating its judicial and prosecuting functions, and by raising the membership to four. The differences between the House and Senate measure, however, were great enough to require the appointment of a conference committee.

All elements of the labor movement were alarmed at the implications of both bills and exhausted every resource to block them during the Conference Committee. The CIO and AFL intensified their lobbying activities and

---

105 Ibid., Pt. I, p. 3.
106 Ibid.
advertising campaign in the press. Union members conducted large-scale letter-writing campaigns in an effort to sway Congressional opinion. During the secret sessions of the Conference Committee, Senator Robert Taft gave newsmen the impression that the Senate group was battling to overcome the extremes of the House measure, but the results did not bear him out, for the compromise reflected primarily the spirit of the original House Bill. Although, as ultimately passed, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 dropped the ban on industry-wide bargaining and a few minor regulations, it included most of the major features of the two original bills, including:

1. Detailed regulation of the internal affairs of unions.
2. Broad guarantees of the privileges of individual workers and employers in the matter of appeals, freedom of speech, etc.
3. The legal definition of unfair labor practices on the part of unions. Unfair labor practices included failure to bargain in good faith, coercion or restraint of any employee in the exercise of his bargaining rights, restraint of employers from dealing with duly certified bargaining agents, discrimination or the attempt to force an employer to discriminate against any employee, and the use of prohibited strikes or boycotts.
4. The establishment of full legal and financial responsibility for unions.
5. The reorganization of the NLRB in order to separate judicial and prosecutive functions.
6. The establishment of procedures for handling national emergency strikes.

There was a Presidential veto, but it was easily overridden in Congress.

From the moment of its passage the Taft-Hartley Bill became the emotional symbol of the most bitter controversy between the liberal and conservative elements of the nation. The real issue was not the specific provisions of the new law, but the whole approach to industrial relations which it represented. Its authors had blithely brushed aside the complexities of social and economic causation, and had explained post-war economic unrest solely in terms of the deliberate wrongdoing of one group—the trade unionists. Inflation, the cancellation of war contracts and similar influences had no place in their thinking. They concluded that the only solution needed was to impose greater restrictions upon organized labor. Their concern with increasing the worker's right to bargain individually, protecting management's prerogatives, limiting the employer's responsibility for the acts of his supervisory help, and upon restricting the union shop and the other membership-sustaining devices of unions also tended to belie the lip service which they gave to the principle of collective bargaining. Apparently it was acceptable only if not fully effective. With some justice, unions felt that the Taft-Hartley law was not intended to regulate, but to destroy their right to function.

In the CIO the desire to repeal the new law acted as a powerful political stimulant. It provided a sense of common purpose which transcended petty differences. The General Executive Board made strengthening the PAC

---

the first order of the day. By July, 1947, representatives of the various CIO unions had already convened in Pittsburgh to discuss strategy for the 1948 election. With little dissent they agreed that the PAC should concentrate upon electing Congressmen and Senators who would reverse the labor policies of the Eightieth Congress. The PAC immediately began its preliminary preparations and the response from local groups was remarkably good.

Kroll's basic strategy did not change. He still considered the primary task to be that of increasing the magnitude of the PAC's activities rather than of changing their character. On July 15, 1947 he urged all local groups to begin recruiting block workers for 1948, and set the goal at one million volunteers. In November when the CIO Convention met he stated that 100,000 block workers were already active, and by February 1948 the number had risen to 200,000. In addition to volunteers, many of the regular staff members of the CIO unions were assigned to the work of preparing for the coming election. The United Steel Workers' Union reported that fifty-one of its fulltime employees concentrated primarily upon political matters during 1947. A goal of 75,000,000 registrations and 60,000,000 voters was set for 1948. The PAC was so encouraged by the response to its

---

113 Ibid.
116 CIO News, February 2,1948, p.3.
preliminary preparations that in some states it made plans for sending block workers among the farmers and small businessmen.119 But it was careful to avoid a feeling of overconfidence among its followers. Kroll never let them forget that the PAC still had only a fraction of the active workers necessary for success.120 By being deliberately candid in admitting weakness and in estimating financial requirements the PAC attempted to appeal to the individual union member's sense of responsibility.121

One of the most difficult problems which the PAC faced was that in spite of their opposition to the Eightieth Congress many CIO members had not overcome their suspicions of the Administration. At the CIO's 1947 Convention Ernest DeMiao, of the UEW, vigorously criticized the dominant role of "Big-City Machines" and "Southern Conservatives" in the Democratic Party.122 He questioned whether the PAC could afford to be too closely identified with one party.123 Delegate Bryson of the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union urged the CIO to accept the responsibility for presenting acceptable candidates to the public,124 and hopefully cited the California Unions' plans for establishing an independent party. Neither viewpoint was new, for from the beginning of the CIO there had always been some

123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., pp. 317-8.
resentment because labor found it necessary to rely on the regular parties. But when Michael Quill, of the Transportation workers, seized the opportunity to make an appeal for an endorsement of Henry Wallace, the discussion almost developed into an attack upon the policies of the PAC. The national leadership of the CIO succeeded in avoiding a showdown on the question of Wallace, and secured the Convention's approval of the policies of the PAC. As a sop to the discontent, however, the political resolution included the declaration:

The fullest contribution of the CIO and of the Labor Movement to success in the fight cannot be made by any subservience to any political party. We have in our ranks and in our own integrity the strength and resources to make heard the voice of labor, and of the people whose interests are allied with ours, and to elect candidates to public office who will be responsive to the needs of the people.

When Henry Wallace broke with the Administration over foreign policy it crystallized the third party sentiment, which had been evident at the CIO's convention. He was popular among union members as a symbol of New Deal liberalism, and had considerable appeal for those who felt uneasy concerning the aggressive post-war diplomacy. A number of CIO unions tried to create a Wallace boom. The attempt to promote the candidacy of Wallace necessarily involved a demand for the establishment of a third party, for all concerned clearly understood that there was little chance of his being able to wrest control of the Democratic Party from Truman. The UFW was particularly

---

125 Ibid., p. 313.
126 Ibid., p. 304.
insistent that Labor should provide a political vehicle for the former
Vice President, and was in no small measure responsible for forcing a show-
down in the CIO. In late January, 1948, the CIO's General Executive Board
officially refused to take part in the "Wallace Boom" and condemned any
attempt to initiate a third party movement.129 The action was reached only
at the price of serious internal controversy. Eleven of the forty-four mem-
ers of the Board strongly opposed the majority decision.130 The most explo-
sive aspect of the situation was that the minority refused to submit to the
Board's decision. Albert Fitzgerald and Julius Emspak of the UEW, for
example, fought adoption of the resolution,131 and failing in that challenged
the CIO's authority.132 They insisted that each union was sovereign in politi-
cal matters, and on February 7, 1948 convened a special session of the UEW
Executive Board to ratify that principle.133

Definite acts of defiance
followed. On March 15, 1948, Fitzgerald and Emspak charged that UEW repre-
sentatives were being eased out of the local Political Action Committees,
and abruptly resigned from the Executive Council of the PAC.134 Their

130 Ibid. Included among the dissenters were the UEW Representatives
Albert Fitzgerald and Julius Emspak, Grant Oakes of the Farm Equipment Workers,
Donald Henderson of the Food and Tobacco Workers, Ben Gold of the Fur Workers
Union, Morris Pizer of the Furniture Workers, Harry Bridges of the Longshore-
men's Union, Hugh Branson of the Marine Cooks and Stewards, Ferdinand Smith
of the National Maritime Union (President Joseph Curran of the NMU voted for
the resolution), James Kurkan of the Office Workers, and Michael Quill of the
Transportation Workers.  ?
133 Ibid., January 28, 1948, p. 3; February 7, 1948, p. 1.
resignation was accompanied by a joint public statement in which they declared that the PAC was wholly ineffective and had become merely an appendage of the Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{135} The UEW's Executive Board then severed all relations with the PAC and established an independent system of political committees.\textsuperscript{136} After a quick poll purporting to show that Wallace was the overwhelming choice of the members of his union, Fitzgerald accepted the post of labor chairman in the newly formed Progressive Party.\textsuperscript{137}

Several other CIO unions also flouted national policy. In February the Farm Equipment Workers called a special convention for the specific purpose of endorsing Henry Wallace for the Presidency.\textsuperscript{138} They did not formally sever relations with the PAC, but the effect was the same. In April the CIO Industrial Union Council for Greater New York adopted a resolution rejecting the CIO's ban on third party action.\textsuperscript{139} Michael Quill, one of the dissenters in the original vote of CIO Executive Board, reversed his stand and resigned from the New York Counsel in protest. In a letter to Philip Murray he issued a call for harmony within the CIO, and warned of the consequences of political disunity.\textsuperscript{140} But his gesture had no effect. The CIO lost control of its established machinery in New York City, the whole state of California, and a number of other key areas,\textsuperscript{141} and was forced to

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., February 7, 1948, p. 11, April 17, 1948, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., March 20, 1948, pp. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{138} CIO News, February 16, 1948, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., April 5, 1948, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., June 28, 1948, pp. 8-9.
charter new councils in those areas in order to provide an organizational basis for PAC operations. The dual Councils exercising duplicate powers engaged in a desperate struggle for the loyalty of the rank-and-file union members.

Once the split in the CIO was out in the open many of the complex animosities between its "left-wing" and "right-wing" elements became associated with the question of support for Wallace. The UEW, for example, raised the charge that CIO Secretary James B. Carey was leading jurisdictional raids on the plants with which it had contracts. Carey, who had been ousted as President of the UEW by the "left-wing" element, had been one of the first to insist that the Wallace Progressive movement was Communist inspired, and to advocate an official stand against it by the CIO. By questioning his good faith his successors raised the question as to whether the political issue was not merely part of a broader design for crushing the "left-wing" unions in the CIO. Murray made no attempt at appeasement. He insisted that a reading of the policy statements of the Daily Worker made it clear that the Communist Party had engineered the "Wallace Boom" and the establishment of the Progressive Party. Such charges and counter-charges merely served to harden the lines of conflict.

142 Ibid., 8-9.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid., March 27, 1948, p. 3.
Kroll was more inclined to leave the way open for conciliation. He adamantly insisted that the PAC was not subservient to the Democratic Party, and that the voluntary response of local unions proved that the CIO Executive Board's stand on a third party was in accord with the wishes of the majority of CIO members. But he explained his opposition to the candidacy of Henry Wallace in terms of practical political considerations and usually avoided the more sensational charges of Communist domination. In the early days of the "Wallace Boom," he declared that opposition to a premature endorsement of Henry Wallace did not mean that Truman would automatically receive the endorsement of the PAC. Later, after the Progressive Party had become a reality, he repeatedly commented upon its failure to inspire a grass-roots movement, and concluded that it was too weak a vessel upon which to pin labor's hopes. Its own indecision in the matter of a presidential endorsement, however, placed the PAC at a serious disadvantage. Kroll, himself, showed keen interest in General Dwight Eisenhower as a prospective Democratic candidate, and was reluctant to commit the PAC to Truman. Consequently, no restoration of CIO unity, and throughout the campaign the PAC was to be faced with the most damaging kind of factionalism. In Illinois, for instance, Grant Oakes, President of the Farm Equipment Workers, accepted the Progressive gubernatorial nomination in spite of the PAC's endorsement of the popular

1146 Ibid., February 16, 1948, p. 10.
1147 Ibid.
1148 Ibid., June 10, 1948, p. 7.
1149 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
Adlai Stevenson, and thereby created a potential split in the liberal vote. Similar situations developed in many other crucial localities.

In spite of the Wallace schism the PAC's position was in some respect quite promising. In 1946 the AFL had established a Political Education League. The League's staff had discreetly approached the PAC for advice and assistance in meeting the problems thrust upon it, and in time an informal working relationship developed between the two organizations. The Railroad Brotherhood made a similar venture into politics and the old quarrel over political participation largely died out. The Taft-Hartley Act also proved a stimulus to cooperation. At the local level political organizations of the CIO, AFL and the Railroad Brotherhood frequently worked through a joint committee. Consequently, the CIO's political relations with the labor movement as a whole were more cordial than at any time in its history. As far as public relations were concerned the Wallace split had a rather fortunate effect. The PAC ceased to be the chief target of the charge of Communist domination. Its field representatives reported that they encountered much less suspicion and hostility than in any previous election.

The PAC also encountered fewer difficulties than it had expected from the political restrictions of the Taft-Hartley Act. One of the most

150 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
151 Interview with Ted Dudley, Assistant Director of CIO-PAC, September 17, 1951.
154 Interviews with Ann Mason, John Summers and Henry Murray, op. cit.
serious legal questions was whether union newspapers could attempt to influence an election. Murray created a test case by deliberately using a Maryland union paper to make political endorsement. He was convicted of a Taft-Hartley violation in the lower court, and there was considerable anxiety in labor circles while his appeal was in progress. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that the restrictions of the law did not apply to indirect political expenditures for regular union newspapers. Justices Rutledge, Murphy, Douglas and Black even filed a minority decision which expressed the opinion that the political expenditures clause of the Act unduly interfered with Labor's political rights, and should be declared unconstitutional. Thus, the PAC entered the 1948 campaign with its freedom of action unimpaired.

During the primaries the PAC ignored question of a presidential endorsement, and focused its attention upon the Congressional elections. It hammered relentlessly at the Eightieth Congress's record in dealing with prices, housing, social security, civil rights, and labor relations. As a yardstick for judging the worth of individual legislators it tabulated the

155 CIO News, June 28, 1948, p. 3.
156 Ibid.
record of each incumbent on sixteen key votes pertaining to those matters.

By that criterion twenty-one Democrats and two Republicans in the Senate, and fifty-nine Democrats, two Republicans and one member of the American Labor Party in the House had most consistently worked for labor's objectives. Its most consistent enemies included twenty-two Republicans and four Democrats in the Senate, and one hundred forty Republicans and one Democrat in the House. In states with a Senator from each party (thus presumably reducing the differences to the matter of party) the Democrats were found to be right on an average of eleven issues and wrong on two, whereas the Republicans voted right on an average of two measures and wrong on twelve. These and similar devices were used by the PAC to justify the conclusion that its primary task was to break the Republican control of Congress. When the 1948 campaign

---

158 CIO News, July 19, 1946, pp. 6-11. The PAC's list of crucial votes in the House of Representatives included: (1) President Truman's veto of the Taft-Hartley Bill (PAC supported the veto), (2) Wage-Hour Amendments (PAC opposed Amendment 345—the Ball Amendment), (3) Veto of the rider transferring USES from the Labor Department to FSA (PAC opposed the transfer), (4) A deficiency appropriation of $300,000,000 for REA (PAC supported it), (5) The Rayburn Amendment to the Knutson Tax Bill, increasing profits taxes and lifting the personal exemption for low income groups, (6) The veto of the Knutson Tax Bill (PAC supported the veto), (7) Repeal of Oleomargarine Tax, (8) Rent Control Amendment requiring Federal administrators to accept local recommendations without change (PAC opposed), (9) The Gearhart Resolution to Reduce Social Security Coverage (PAC opposed), (10) Veto of the Reese-Bulwinkle Bill weakening the Anti-Trust laws (PAC supported the veto), (11) Bill to outlaw the Poll Tax (PAC supported), (12) Mundt-Nixon Anti-Subversive Bill (PAC opposed), (13) Bill to approve Southern segregated schools (PAC opposed), (14) European Recovery Program (PAC favored), (15) Authorization of a $4,000,000 steam plant for TVA (PAC favored), (16) Doughton Bill extending the authority to make reciprocal trade agreements for a three-year period (PAC favored).

The key votes in the Senate included in addition to the above: (1) The Barkley Amendment to restore the President's authority over prices (PAC favored), (2) The Cain Amendment to remove the Public Housing Section of the Taft-Ellender-Wagner Bill (PAC opposed), (3) $300,000,000 Federal Aid to Education Bill (PAC favored), (4) The Ferguson Amendment to the Displaced Persons Bill removing the clauses which discriminated against Jewish refugees (PAC favored), (5) Ratification of the 1941 executive agreement with Canada for the St. Lawrence Seaway (PAC favored).

159 CIO News, July 19, 1946, p. 6-11.

160 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
opened the PAC was well prepared, but it was also confronted with the most serious internal difficulties that it had ever faced.
CHAPTER X

LABOR IN THE 1948 CAMPAIGN

The dissension in the Democratic Party caused the PAC to postpone
a presidential endorsement much longer than it had intended. With Dixie-
crats and Wallacites resorting to secession and party regulars plotting to
sidetrack Harry Truman for a more appealing candidate, it was afraid to
become identified with any faction until the situation in the party had
stabilized. Moreover, there was considerable indecision in its own ranks
even among those who had firmly opposed an alliance with the Progressive
movement. Consequently, it built its campaign around issues rather than
personalities, and avoided either rejecting or defending the Truman Admin-
istration. Until well after the party conventions the PAC was against the
policies of the Republican Eightieth Congress rather than any particular
presidential candidate.

One of the most difficult problems which it faced was that of over-
coming the public fear of unions which had originally brought the Republicans
into control of Congress. With that purpose in mind the PAC made inflation
rather than Taft-Hartley Repeal the principal issue of the campaign. In
terms of political exploitation the choice could scarcely have been better.
Every citizen had in his own daily experience convincing proof that the
rising cost of living had not been checked by the policy of decontrolling
prices. That fact alone lent weight to the PAC's contention that the policies
of the Republican Congress held no solution for post-war economic problems.
The research departments of the CIO and of the CIO-PAC showed considerable ingenuity in developing dramatic evidence that failure to extend price controls beyond June 30, 1946 had opened the door to inflation. Careful analysis of the Department of Labor's Retail Price Index enabled them to show a startling contrast in the behavior of prices before and after the end of OPA. Food prices, for example, increased 6 percent in the eighteen months preceding June 30, 1946, but had risen 46 percent in the succeeding eighteen months' period. In the same period the cost of clothing had increased 10 percent under price controls, as compared with 22 percent after their removal. Rents also had increased in direct proportion to the gradual easing of controls. According to CIO calculations, by the summer of 1948 food prices were up 50 percent and the over-all cost of living was 30 percent higher than in 1946.

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
One embarrassing aspect of this line of attack was the fact that a Democratic Congress had been responsible for the original decision to abandon price controls. The PAC made a special effort, therefore, to demonstrate that the leadership of the organized campaign against OPA had come from conservative groups holding a strategic position in the Republican Party. It capitalized upon the admission of the NAM’s Director of Public Relations that his organization had spent $3,000,000 to kill OPA, and publicized damaging quotes from the NAM’s nationwide campaign against controls. An example was the prediction:

If OPA is permanently discontinued, the production of goods will mount rapidly, and through free competition, prices will quickly adjust themselves to levels that consumers are willing to pay.

As proof that the NAM view was the Republican view, the CIO cited the Eightieth Congress’s refusal to adopt adequate anti-inflation measures even after six months of competition had led to a 19 percent increase in consumer prices. The Eightieth Congress’s rejection of the President’s repeated demands for additional authority over prices, credit and rationing was also interpreted as a positive defense of the policy of decontrolling prices.

This line of reasoning, however, did not settle the question of who was responsible for inflation. Statistics of general price movements

---


7 Ibid.
did not explain why the forces of competition had failed to produce a satisfactory economic adjustment, and spokesmen for all political factions were quick to advance convenient explanations. Opponents of controls argued that the natural balance of the economy had been disrupted by the wage increases which unions had secured by strikes or other coercive means. They argued that for this reason failure to permit price increases would have hampered business's ability to expand production and employment. The PAC's response to this view was the same that it had advanced at the collective bargaining table. It insisted that price increases had not merely compensated for the increase in labor costs, but had also provided business with a substantial increase in profits. To support that position it cited the example of the steel industry in which wage increases adding $160,000,000 to $175,000,000 to total costs for 1946 had been made an excuse for price increases which had added additional revenues of $610,000,000. Similarly, the coal industry had used a $150,000,000 increase in annual labor costs to justify price increases which had increased their income for the year by $500,000,000. Upon the basis of wage increases, which increased annual costs by $152,000,000, the "Big Five" of the automobile industry had set prices at a level which would yield $580,000,000 in additional income.  

---

9 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
10 Ibid., p. 1.
In the textile industry prices had been boosted without any pretense at raising wages. The CIO also suspected that business was deliberately curtailing production in order to maintain high prices. Thus labor had no doubt but that industry's insistence upon ever higher margins of profits was the root cause of inflation. But it was too much of a self-interested argument to convince the public, so the debate proceeded through many intricate convolutions.

The most common response to the charge that profits were too high was that the "cost of doing business" had increased so much that a higher return was necessary in order for industry to maintain and expand its level of production. So the CIO prepared an elaborate rebuttal of the notion that current profits should be high enough to provide for capital expansion as well as dividends. It pointed out that under the accepted economic theories profits were a reward for investment and that expansions of working capital were normally provided by bank loans, stocks, bonds and other forms of savings. Any attempt to provide new capital from current earnings before profits had been divided, it argued, necessarily held the danger of higher prices and lower consumer demand. The CIO attacked the notion

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
14 Ibid.
that a shortage of investment capital warranted unusual business procedures.
It used Federal statistics to prove that savings available for investment
were at an all time high. The Federal Reserve Board, for example, had esti-

mated that in 1947 individuals held more than $150,000,000,000 in liquid
assets, business an additional $65,000,000,000, and that several hundreds
of billions in lending power were in the hands of the banks. 16 In the same
year corporate stocks, bonds and notes had increased by $6,000,000,000 and
business investment in the United States had amounted to approximately
$200,000,000,000. 17 Thus, the general circumstances of the economy were
very favorable. The CIO was also able to cite many statements in the Re-
ports of Federal Financial Agencies which verified the fact that credit and
capital had in fact been made available at reasonable interest rates. 18
The inevitable corollary of contention that "exorbitant profits" had caused
inflation was that business gains had been at the expense of other economic
groups. One device which the CIO used to demonstrate the shift in the rela-
tive economic well-being of the different classes was to compare their pro-
portional share of the national income in each of the years following 1945.
Business profits after taxes had risen from $8.9 billions in 1945 to $18.1
billions in 1947—the estimate for 1948 was $20 billions—, farm income had
risen from $13.5 billions to $18.3 billions by 1947, and wages (including
the salaries of corporation executives) had increased from $82.1 billions to

16 "What's Behind the NAM Smoke Screen," op. cit., p. 2.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
$105 billions. When stated as percentages the totals revealed that between the fourth quarter of 1945 and the fourth quarter of 1947 wages increased 28.3 percent, farm income 35.6 percent, prices 60.8 percent and profits 116.1 percent. The Department of Commerce estimated that between 1945 and 1947 the share of the national income going to wages had declined from 66.2 percent to 61.5 percent of the total national income, while the share going to profits rose from 12.7 percent to 13.8 percent, and that going to proprietors and rental income increased from 19.4 percent to 22.9 percent. Commenting upon the implications of these trends the June issue of the CIO's Economic Outlook declared:

The problem is very simple. It is a question of whether once the people have attained a decided improvement in real wages, as they did by 1945, they should ever turn the clock back... the CIO says 'No.'

In taking that stand the CIO insisted that not only the workers' self-interest but the stability of the whole economy was at stake. The Federal Reserve Board had estimated, for example, that those with incomes of under $3,000 per year had held 15 percent of total net savings in 1945 but only 3 percent in 1946, that after 1945 redemptions exceeded sales of all United States savings bonds of $100 denomination or less, and that outstanding

20 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
21 "Backward With NAM or Forward to a Prosperous U. S.," Economic Outlook (CIO Research and Education Department, Washington, D. C.), June 1948, p. 2.
22 Ibid., p. 2.
consumer credit rose from $6.6 billions in 1945 to $10.2 billions in 1946 and $13.3 billions in 1947. Thus, savings had cushioned the widening gap between effective consumer demand and production. Labor insisted that if the trend was permitted to continue until savings were completely exhausted depression would result. In line with its belief that placing greater purchasing power in the hands of the consumer was the key to inflation control, the CIO specifically advocated:

(1) The enactment of an excess profits tax.
(2) Price control of basic commodities.
(3) That the Federal government should be given the authority to allocate and ration commodities in short supply.
(4) The control of bank and consumer credit.

Once the CIO had carefully defined its position on inflation the PAC repeated and elaborated its basic arguments. It also consistently related other issues to public concern over the rising cost of living. In demanding 75 cents hourly minimum and broader coverage for the Wage Hour law one of its most effective points of attack was the utter ridiculousness of expecting a 40-cent hourly minimum to act as a safeguard against sub-standard living conditions. Similarly, it was not difficult to convince

---

24 Recommendations of the Executive Officers on Inflation, op. cit., p. 5; "Backward with NAM or Forward to a Prosperous U. S.," op. cit., p. 6.
25 Recommendations of the Executive Officers on Inflation, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
27 "Raise Wage-Hour Act Minimum to 75¢," Economic Outlook (CIO Research and Education Department, Washington, D. C.), April 1948, p. 3.
the voters of the inadequacy of old-age and survivors insurance payments averaging twenty-five dollars for a single worker, thirty-nine dollars for a retired couple and forty-nine dollars for a widow with two children. 28 The PAC demanded at least a 50 percent increase in old-age benefits. It also advocated an expansion of social security coverage, a program of sickness and disability insurance, and a nationwide system of unemployment insurance. 29 The questions of rent control and tax policy also lent themselves to an exploitation of the issue of inflation. The PAC hammered at the Eightieth Congress's favoritism to the higher income groups in tax matters, at its failure to adjust wage minimums or social security benefits, and at such overt acts as removing nearly a million people from social security coverage. Transcending all other criticisms, however, was the assertion that the Republicans were responsible for continued inflation and, therefore, that the privations of the aged, the widow and the orphan rested upon their heads.

The broader social objectives set forth by the PAC in 1948 were squarely in line with its 1944 Full Employment program. It demanded national health insurance, slum clearance, an adequate public housing program, federal aid for education, additional resource development plans on the model of the TVA, and the adoption of the Truman civil rights program. 30

29 Ibid., pp. 4-5; and Here's How They Stack Up, op. cit., pp. 1-2.
30 Recommendations on Political Action; Report of the Legislative and Publicity Department to the General Executive Board of the CIO, August 30-31, 1948 (Congress of Industrial Organization, Washington, D. C., 1948); "Brother What A Congress," op. cit., pp. 4-7; and Here's How They Stack Up, op. cit., pp. 1-2.
Its insistence that these goals were not only feasible but necessary to the balance of the whole economy was based on essentially the same considerations as in 1944.

In spite of supporting policies which paralleled the "Fair Deal" program, and endorsing Congressional candidates who were predominately Democrats, the PAC continued to be reluctant to accept Truman as its presidential candidate. In June when the President set out on his "non-political" tour of the nation, it was frankly expected that union members would be unresponsive. Until well after the conventions it seemed overwhelmed by the daily predictions of press and radio that:

The Republican ticket looks like a sure winner in November. 31

In the larger sense, however, the stop Truman movement has been successful. They can't stop him in July but they have made it certain that Dewey will stop him in November. 32

Mr. Truman will go before the people as a nominee that the party openly does not want and thinks will surely be beaten. 33

We are seeing the disintegration of a once major party here this week, and that is the story of this convention. 34

In brief, this is the end of the Roosevelt era, the winning era for the Democrats. 35

Unhappily the PAC contemplated the dilemma of having no place to turn except to a "sure loser." A faint hope began to stir, however, when Truman aroused

---


32 Elmer Davis in Radio Broadcast of July 9, 1948, quoted in Ernst and Loth, ibid., p. 106.

33 Arthur Krock, July 11, 1948, quoted in Ernst and Loth, Ibid., p. 79

34 Samuel Grafton, July 13, 1948, quoted in Ibid., p. 78.

35 Drew Pearson, July 15, 1948, quoted in Ibid., p. 87.
the tired and disunited Democratic Convention with the declaration:

I am therefore calling this Congress back into session July 26th. On the 26th of July, I am going to call Congress back and ask them to pass laws to halt rising prices, to meet the housing crisis—which they are saying they are for in their platform... Now, what that worst 60th Congress does in this special session will be the test.

The PAC had no qualms about the special session being "cheap politics." On the contrary it welcomed the opportunity to put parties and candidates on record on the questions of inflation and housing. Union members were generally responsive to the President's declaration to the reassembled Congress that, "Positive action by this government is long overdue. It must be taken now."

CIO leaders were heartened by his willingness to carry the fight to the Republicans. Nevertheless, it was not until the end of August that the CIO Executive Board formally endorsed Truman for the presidency. By that time there was enough unity among the CIO unions still cooperating with the PAC for the endorsement to carry considerable weight.

The delay in making an endorsement cost the PAC valuable time, but nearly two years of preparation had provided it with sound organization which was capable of rising to the occasion. The local PAC units


38. Recommendations of the Executive Officers on Political Action to the Meeting of the CIO Executive Board held in Washington, D. C., August 30-31, 1948 (Mimeographed Copy obtained from the CIO Publicity Department, Washington, D. C.), pp. 5-6.
had been active in the Congressional elections, and had conducted their affairs with real professional skill. In Philadelphia, for example, the CIO Industrial Union Council set up a smoothly functioning political organization which was capable of bringing labor's influence to bear upon virtually every voting district in the city. At the top was a central committee upon which all CIO internationals were represented. This group planned overall strategy and took the responsibility for integrating all phases of the campaign. A chain of command extended down from the Central Committee to each Congressional district, ward, precinct and voting district. At each level the union whose membership was predominant took the lead in planning and carrying out the necessary details of the campaign. In the First, Second and Fourth Congressional Districts the Amalgamated Clothing Workers formed the nucleus of the PAC organization. In the Fifth District the Textile and Hosiery Workers were pre-eminent. The minority unions, however, were not without a voice. In each voting jurisdiction a Political Action Committee was organized to maintain a close liaison between all participating unions and to coordinate the activities of the local units with the strategy laid down by the Central Committee. The useful experience of one unit was immediately channeled to all others. In the whole arrangement there was a healthy balance between initiative at the lowest level and constructive direction from the top.

39 Interview with John Summers and Henry Murray at the office of the Philadelphia Industrial Union Council, January 31, 1949, also Interview with PAC Field Representative Anne Mason at PAC Headquarters in Washington, D. C., December 21, 1949.
In terms of over-all effectiveness the PAC's organization compared very favorably with those of the regular parties. The Democrats, for example, were in such straits that they were represented in only 800 of the 1343 voting districts.\footnote{Ibid.} In the interest of the Democratic candidates which it had endorsed the Philadelphia PAC supplied the party with precinct workers for five hundred forty-three districts and arranged to pay a part of their salary.\footnote{Ibid.} In addition, it made a loan to the Democratic organization to tide it through the campaign, and in return its representatives were permitted to sit in on the party caucuses. The labor leaders of the city were interested in providing an opportunity for union members to gain practical political experience, for it was hoped that unions might be able to develop political leaders who were capable of winning public office in their own right. Consequently, the PAC used its rather substantial favors to force a tacit understanding from the Democrats that the CIO would be given the right to name a certain proportion of the party leaders at the voting district and precinct level.\footnote{Ibid.}

The strength of the PAC organization in Philadelphia enabled it to develop campaign literature specifically designed to exploit issues of particular local interest. A number of its efforts of this nature were directed toward the potential 335,000 Negro voters in the city.\footnote{The Real Issues Today (Philadelphia Industrial Union Council, 1948), and Labor Wake Up! (Philadelphia Industrial Union Council, 1948).} As with

\footnote{Ibid.} The Party paid $10 per day per worker, but the CIO supplemented that with an additional $5 per day in order to prevent undue financial sacrifices by its volunteers.\footnote{Ibid.}
most PAC units, however, personal contact techniques were its mainstay in the campaign. Its political contribution depended more on the number of campaign workers at its command than upon the money which it spent. Volunteers constituted the majority, but in addition the International unions assigned full-time workers to the campaign. Because of the restrictions which Pennsylvania's Farrell Law placed upon political activity by unions, records were seldom kept of the latter arrangements. The Central PAC Committee did not know and did not want to know the full details of the expenditures of manpower and money made by its subordinate units. The Industrial Union Council reported expenditures of $14,000 for the campaign, $11,860 of which was listed as street expenses, i.e., the expense of transporting voters to the polls, hiring poll watchers and other full-time activities in the last days of the campaign. But the magnitude of the PAC's contribution was probably much greater than this figure would indicate.

In many areas circumstances did not permit such an elaborate organization as that in Philadelphia. But the PAC showed considerable flexibility in adapting its tactics to local situations. In West Virginia, for example, the CIO membership was limited, so the PAC subordinated its activities to those of the Democratic Party. Its representatives spoke at party rallies, and actively engaged in campaign activities, but did not strive to establish a separate identity.45 In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where the Harvey Taylor

44 Interview with Sumners and Murray, op. cit.
45 Interview with Anne Mason, op. cit.
Republican machine had long been in control the PAC concentrated upon enlisting the newspapers and civic groups in a non-partisan "good-government" drive. By turning the bright light of publicity upon corruption this coalition checked many of the more flagrant abuses during the campaign. It also engaged in a constant search for evidence that would serve as a basis for legal action. On election day the Citizens Committee kept a well marked fleet of taxicabs in a central pool to rush investigators to the scene of reported vote steals. These investigators had no legal power but by drawing attention to irregularities they acted as a restraining influence. In spite of the combined effort of the PAC and the other civic groups the Taylor machine retained power, but for the first time in many years the Democrats made a creditable showing in their so-called "zero" wards. Consequently, the PAC felt that it had at least won a moral victory.

In broad totals the PAC brought a force of 300,000 volunteers into the campaign. The National Committee prepared 423 records for radio use, made numerous films available, and distributed 10,000,000 pieces of literature. The total expenditures of the national organization were $487,989.24. One of the most important assets which the PAC had in the campaign was the fact that both the AFL and the Railroad Brotherhood had also established a system of political committees. There was little formal cooperation at the

46 Ibid.
national level, although relations were cordial. But many of the local units established satisfactory working relations. More important than organizational arrangements, however, was the fact that all three labor groups took essentially the same stand on candidates and issues. Of the two hundred fifteen candidates whom the PAC endorsed for the House of Representatives, one hundred eight also had the support of the AFL, and eighty-nine that of the Railroad unions. Thus, the labor vote was a powerful well organized force in the election.

Without Truman's aggressive stumpinng, however, the efforts of the labor groups probably would not have been enough to carry the election.

The New York Sun might sneer, "Evidently he has yet to learn that an intelligent public long ago wearied of this type of campaigning," but his 30,000 mile speech campaign against "That do-nothing Eightieth Congress" had much to do with reversing the strong Republican trend. Much that he said was strictly campaign bombast, and not very original bombast at that. Hoover was once again set up as a straw man for the Democratic attack. The President reminded a New York crowd:

Over in Central Park men and women were living in little groups of shacks made of cardboard and old boxes. They were known as 'Hoovervilles.' Out here on Eighth Avenue veterans were selling apples. Ragged Individualism, I suppose that's what you would call it.

49 Results of the November 2, 1948 Election, op. cit.
50 New York Sun, October 8, 1948, quoted in Ernst and Loth, op. cit., p. 58.
In North Carolina, he described a "'Hoover Cart'... the remains of the old tin lizzie being pulled by a mule because you can't afford to buy a new car or gas for the old one."  

When Truman attempted to draw the broad social issues of the campaign his vocabulary was reminiscent of the Populists and Bryanites. He told an Iowa audience:

The Republican strategy is to divide the farmer and the industrial workers—to get them to squabbling with each other—so that big business can grasp the balance of power and take the country over, lock, stock and barrel.

and concluded with the melodramatic warning:

These Republican gluttons of privilege are cold men. They are cunning men. And it is their constant aim to put the Government of the United States under the control of men like themselves. They want a return of the Wall Street economic dictatorship.

At times he was more than a little demagogic. In Boston he declared:

You can fight Communism with a clear-cut vote to defeat Republican reaction.

Reactionary Republican policies invited Communism in 1932. We were saved then, but we cannot afford to take the risk again.

A total of over 12,000,000 people turned out to hear him speak. Curiosity, and the prospect of political sensationalism may have accounted for the presence of many. But the speeches had more substance than the

53 Truman's Speech in Raleigh, North Carolina, October 18, 1948, Ibid., p. 113.
54 Truman's Speech in Dexter, Iowa, September 18, 1948, Ibid., p. 96.
55 Ibid., p. 98.
56 Truman's Speech in Boston, October 27, 1948, Ibid., p. 242.
57 Daniels, op. cit., p. 357.
political name-calling which made the headlines; and before the end of the campaign the listeners had become quite responsive. Most observers, however, failed to realize the changing temper of the crowds and to understand the significance of their number.

Truman was most effective in discussing specific policies affecting the interests of the various classes. Long before they had reached a decision on the candidates, many of those listening in the whistle stops of the farm states must have felt an uneasy concern as he reminded them that:

In 1948, the Republican 80th Congress refused to grant funds for the Commodity Credit Corporation to provide storage space for grains. This means that farmers will have to sell their grain at dump prices or let it rot in improper storage. 58

In 1948, the Republicans killed the International Wheat Agreement. This agreement would have provided world markets for wheat surpluses for the next five years. It would have promised American farmers a stable price for 185 million bushels of wheat a year for five years. 59

They have been telling you how strong they were for soil conservation. . . . But remember this: The Republicans cut the Agricultural Conservation program exactly in half. 60

and that the Republican House Appropriations Committee:

Heeded by one of the worst old moss-backs in Congress, John Taber of New York, said, 'To hell with the farmers out west.' . . . And they voted to cut the funds of the Department of Agriculture by 37%.

58 Truman's Speech at Tipton, Indiana, October 15, 1948, Schnapper, op. cit., pp. 103-4.
59 Ibid., p. 104.
61 Truman's Speech in Shawnee, Oklahoma, September 22, 1948, ibid., p. 108.
Capitalizing upon the farm elements concern over the future price supports, he declared, "Parity must be our continuing goal." He warned, however, that the Republicans would not continue farm aid, and quoted the prediction of Senator Capper (R., Kansas), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, "... that there would be a drive in the next Congress to reduce the support price levels in 1948," and the blunt statement of Representative Gavin (R., Pa.), "I'm telling you right now that sooner or later you'll have to discontinue the price support program, and you may as well start reconciling yourself to that fact. The sooner you stop it the better off the country will be." His attack along this line was hitting home.

In industrial centers Truman followed the lead of the unions, and concentrated upon the questions of inflation, and the labor policies of the Eightieth Congress. "Make no mistake," he declared in Detroit, "You are face to face with a struggle to preserve the very foundations of your rights and your standards of living." Frequently he cited Senator Kenneth Wherry's (R., Neb.) statement:

I do not need to remind the membership of this association that it was the Republican leadership in the Senate and the House that was responsible for ending OPA.

---

63 Ibid., p. 106.
64 Ibid., p. 109.
65 Ibid., p. 118.
66 Ibid., p. 85.
as proof that: 67

The forces of big business, operating through the Republican Party, tore down the protection against high prices which had built up for our people.

With equal effectiveness he played upon labor's fear that a Republican victory would lead to renewed attacks upon the rights of unions. At Pittsfield, Massachusetts, he asked:

Do you want to carry the Taft-Hartley law to its full implication and enslave totally the working man, white collar and union man alike?

In Akron, Ohio, he discerned his answer in the statements from Representative Fred Hartley's book Our New National Labor Policy: 69

I am well aware... of the political difficulties of eliminating the New Deal social legislation. It cannot be repealed at a single strike.

and:

No sooner had the Taft-Hartley Law been enacted over the Truman veto than the Republican leaders of both House and Senate... decided that no more legislation to which organized labor could object would be passed until after the presidential election of 1948.

Such statements kept alive the apprehensions of the union members and gave a needed sense of urgency to their political activities. But calculated appeals to class fears were not the whole story.

67 Ibid.
68 Truman's Speech in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, October 26, 1948, ibid., p. 141.
69 Truman's Speech in Akron, Ohio, October 11, 1948, ibid., p. 138-139.
Truman was apparently correct in his analysis of the character of the public's aspirations. He believed that a majority of the voters were motivated more by the hope of a better and more secure life, than by the fear of too much governmental intervention. For that reason he took an unequivocal stand in favor of broader social benefits, in such declarations as:

I am proud of our record on Social Security. But it is not enough. Millions of workers are not yet covered by its benefits, and those benefits are not nearly high enough to meet today's excessive prices.\(^70\)

A great, rich country like ours can afford decent housing for its citizens. We must do three things: we must build more homes, we must build homes that people--particularly young people--can afford, and we must clear out and rebuild the slums.\(^71\)

The best health facilities and the finest doctors in the world are not much help to the people who cannot afford to use them. I proposed a national system of health insurance in 1946 and I have urged it repeatedly since that time. There is no other way to assure that the average American family has a decent chance for adequate medical attention.\(^72\)

When every American knows that his rights and his opportunities are fully protected and respected by the federal, state, and local governments, then we will have the kind of unity that really means something.\(^73\)

He also offered the simple reassurance: \(^74\)

I do not believe that war is inevitable and I shall make use of every honorable means of preventing it.

Such declarations had great appeal for the voters. After covering one leg of the President's campaign trip, Richard Rovere wittily remarked in The

\(^70\) Truman's Speech in Indianapolis, October 15, 1948, \textit{ibid.}, p. 159.
\(^71\) Truman's Speech in Buffalo, N. Y., October 8, 1948, \textit{ibid.}, p. 190.
\(^72\) Truman's Speech in Indianapolis, October 15, 1948, \textit{ibid.}, p. 172.
\(^73\) Truman's Speech in New York City, October 29, 1948, \textit{ibid.}, p. 149.
\(^74\) \textit{Ibid.}
New Yorker that the people of the United States were willing to give Harry Truman anything but the presidency. Time proved that they were willing to give him even that.

The behavior of the PAC in 1948, however, illustrates the fact that the outcome of the election was as much a triumph of principle as of personality. Labor turned to Truman only because he had indicated that he would defend the liberal tradition of the party, and not because of any particular faith in his ability. Only after his unpredictable vigor in the campaign did it show any satisfaction with the bargain. The position of many of the other groups who supported him was very similar.

75 Daniels, op. cit., p. 362.
CHAPTER XI

POST-MORTEMS ON THE 1948 ELECTION

Truman's victory in 1948 caused a bumper crop of election post-mortems. Neither the public nor the "experts" had been prepared for the outcome, and both were eager to find out what had produced the upset.

The pollsters immediately initiated post-election surveys to find out what had gone wrong with their earlier predictions. Upon the basis of such investigations both Gallup and Roper eventually concluded that there had been a pronounced last minute shift to Truman. They reported that 14 percent of the voters interviewed claimed to have made their decision within the two-weeks period immediately preceding the election. 1 Seventy-four percent of that group said that they had voted for Truman. 2 The Michigan Survey Research Center, and Panel studies in Massachusetts, Washington and Elmira, New York, achieved very similar results. 3 The data which Roper gathered on the late-deciders indicated that in the final two weeks of the campaign 4.3 percent of the voters had shifted to Truman from Dewey, 1.2 percent had swung over from Wallace, and 4.3 percent from the undecided and


2. Ibid., p. 257.

3. Ibid., p. 256, 259.
other groups. In the same period 1.8 percent of the voters had shifted to Dewey from Truman, and 2 percent had shifted to Dewey from all other groups. Thus, in the final two weeks of the campaign Truman picked up 9.8 percent and lost 1.8 percent of the total vote for a net gain of 8 percent. Dewey's gains of 3.8 percent, however, were more than offset by the 4.3 percent loss which he suffered.

The post-election surveys also gave some indication of the type of voter who had produced the upset. Among late-deciders four out of five of those with only an elementary education decided in favor of Truman as compared with fifty percent among those who had been to college. The late-decider was also more apt to be a resident of a metropolitan area. Eighty percent of those living in cities of 100,000 or more voted for Truman, while the proportion was only sixty percent for those from farms or towns of less than 2,500. Those who considered themselves Democrats or Independents showed the greatest tendency to decide ultimately in favor of the Democratic ticket. Four out of five of the Democrats and three out of four Independents decided in favor of Truman. But among those who considered themselves Republicans the proportion was only three out of five. One of the most significant characteristics of the vote of the late-deciders was that the heaviest shift to Truman came in the Northeast states, with the

---

4 Ibid., p. 255.
5 Ibid., pp. 253-4.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast areas running a fairly close second. These were precisely the regions in which the President had the greatest difficulty in mobilizing adequate support, and in which a slight change in the character of the vote was most crucial.

The difficulty of compensating for the tendency of those interviewed to understate or overstate a previous state of mind caused the data on the behavior of late-deciders to be closely scrutinized. There was in fact no real reason for assuming that it was any more precise than the pre-election surveys had been. But after being appropriately critical most observers were forced to accept the conclusion that the strong Republican trend was reversed only in the final stages of the campaign.

The question of who had been responsible for the Democratic victory assumed considerable importance in the discussions of the election, for it promised to hold the key to the future alignment of the influence in the Party. After an intensive study of the election returns, Louis H. Bean advanced the thesis that, "Farmers with the aid of labor elected the President. . . ." He pointed out that in 1948 Truman had lost one hundred

---

8 Ibid., p. 253.

9 Louis H. Bean, The Mid-Term Battle (Washington, D.C., Cantillion Books, 1950), p. 6. In these areas he either lost states which Roosevelt had carried in 1944 or retained them by a narrower margin.

eighty-five of the four hundred thirty-two electoral votes which Roosevelt
had carried in 1944. Without compensating gains elsewhere that loss would
have reduced the Democratic electoral total to two hundred forty-seven votes,
or just nineteen short of the two hundred sixty-six required to win. 

But Truman carried five new states in 1948 and the fifty-six electoral votes
which they provided spelled the difference between defeat and victory.

Bean classified all five states as predominantly rural, and on that basis
concluded that the farm vote had been decisive.

The over-all pattern of Democratic gains and losses served to
strengthen his conviction. A comparison of Truman's percentage of the major
party vote in 1948 with that of Roosevelt in 1944 revealed that Truman had
made a substantial gain—three percent or more—in only sixteen states,
twelve of which he carried. 

With the exception of Massachusetts, West Virginia and Kentucky, the sixteen states formed almost a solid bloc of midwestern farm states. The states in which he lost ground were primarily in
the Far West and Northeast, and those in which his gains or losses were

---

11 Ibid.
12 Bean, op. cit., p. 7.
14 Ibid., pp. 6-7. The states which he carried were: Massachusetts, West Virginia, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Colorado and New Mexico. The states which he lost were: Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska and South Dakota.
15 Ibid., p. 8.
16 Ibid., pp. 6-7. Exceptions were Texas, Florida and Virginia.
held below two percent were chiefly in the South. Clearly, the implication of these facts was that only unexpected vitality in the farm-belt had saved the Democrats from defeat. Another indication of a "Green Uprising" in the Central states which Bean cited was the fact that in Illinois and Ohio a decline in Democratic strength in Chicago and Cleveland had obscured pronounced gains in the rural areas, and that in Kentucky, Missouri, Minnesota and Wisconsin impressive Democratic gains in the rural areas had concealed one to five percent losses in the typical urban centers.

There were, however, some serious over-simplifications in this line of reasoning. Statistics on the population composition do not in themselves prove that the lines of political influence follow exactly the same pattern. When the balance is very close, as it was in several of the new "farm states" which Truman carried, arbitrary distinctions between the political influence of farm and city tend to be somewhat misleading. In at least three of the five states, which in 1948 provided the fifty-six electoral votes necessary for victory, the PAC and other labor groups played an important role. Truman won in Ohio, for instance, by carrying twenty-two out of a total of eighty-eight counties, which was rough indication of an urban vote. As the PAC's presidential candidate he received the support of an organization which was able to elect ten of the state's twenty-three members of

17 Ibid. Exceptions were Montana, North Dakota, Illinois and Ohio.
18 Ibid., p. 8.
19 Abstract of the Vote Cast in Ohio, by Counties, for Republican and Democratic Candidates for President and Governor at the General Election Held November 2, 1948 (Prepared by the Secretary of State, Columbus, Ohio, 1948), pp. 1-4, and Statistics Compiled by Ralph R. Roberts, op. cit., p. 17.
The PAC and the AFL together carried twelve Congressional districts, or over half of the total. Five of the PAC's victories were in districts held by Republicans in the previous term—three by fifty-five percent or more of the vote—and three had been held by Republicans in the previous three terms. Thus, labor's endorsement was no mere formality.

The fact that Wallace's strength in Ohio reduced Truman's vote to a plurality was also a clue to the importance of labor's contribution. The Progressive Party's strength was concentrated primarily in the urban areas, and was offset only by the strong showing of organized labor.

In Colorado, PAC candidates won three of the four Congressional seats. Two of the Republicans whom they retired had held office for at least three terms and had carried their districts in 1946. Since the CIO had only 17,000 members in the state, however, its record of successful candidates manifestly exaggerated its real strength. The fact that Truman received

---


21 Ibid.

22 Hosteller, op. cit., p. 234.

23 Abstract of Ohio Vote, op. cit., pp. 1–4, and Statistics compiled by Ralph R. Roberts, op. cit., p. 17. There was also a close correlation between the twenty-two counties carried by Truman, and the 18 counties which the PAC carried for its successful Congressional candidates, and the twenty-five counties which it carried for all of its Congressional endorsees.

24 Hosteller, op. cit., p. 234.

25 Letter from Eugene Rosati, Secretary Treasurer of Colorado State Industrial Union Council, Denver, Colorado, August 19, 1949. There were 5,686 CIO members in Denver and 5,450 in Pueblo.
267,288 votes in the state underscored that fact. Nevertheless the PAC was well organized and did make effective use of personal contact and publicity techniques. In Wisconsin, PAC candidates won four of the ten Congressional seats—two involving a change of party. Thus, the balance between rural and urban vote was relatively close in several of the "farm states" which supposedly gave Truman his margin of victory.

One of greatest weaknesses of the theory that the five new states in the Democratic column had elected Truman was that it assumed that the situation of the Party was static elsewhere. That assumption simply was not true. The defection of the Progressives and the Dixiecrats subjected the Democratic Party to intense pressures in the urban centers and the South. In 1948 the loss of Maryland, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina indicated the struggle which the Democrats faced in retaining control of their former strongholds. In California, Ohio, Florida, Tennessee and Virginia the combined votes of Dewey and Wallace, and Dewey and Thurman exceeded that of Truman so that he carried those states only by pluralities. Even after omitting Ohio, which was a new addition to the Democratic column, they controlled fifty-four electoral votes, or more than enough to have caused Truman's defeat. Except in California, Labor was probably not the decisive factor. But the result clearly indicated that retaining the support of these states was no less of an accomplishment than winning five new states.

---


When considered in its totality, one of the striking characteris-
tics of the Democratic vote was that there was no consistent pattern of
behavior among the rural groups of the nation. In the South and West the
Party's strength remained stable or declined. Yet these regions were as
typically agricultural in character as the Central states where Truman sur-
passed Roosevelt's performance in 1944.28 In the South, in particular, the
Civil Rights issue was clearly more important than the fact that the states
were predominantly rural. In 1948 Truman received a total of three hundred
three electoral votes. Eighty-six of those votes came from states in which
he lost strength, 29 one hundred two from states in which the Democratic vote
remained stable, 30 and one hundred fifteen came from states in which his
performance exceeded that of Roosevelt in 1944. 31 In each category centers
of both rural and urban states were involved.

The states in which Democratic strength increased—for example,
Massachusetts, West Virginia, Missouri and Minnesota—reflected strong labor
and urban influences. In Massachusetts, which was predominantly urban, PAC
candidates won six of the fourteen Congressional seats and the governorship. 32

28Ibid.
29Virginia, Florida, Texas, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, California, and
Washington.
30Rhode Island, Ohio, Illinois, North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia,
Montana, Idaho.
31Massachusetts, West Virginia, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa,
Missouri, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Colorado and New Mexico. Bean, op. cit.,
32Bean, op. cit., p. 8; and Results of November 2, 1948 Elections,
op. cit., p. 7. The PAC-endorsed candidates in 13 of the 14 Congressional
Districts and was successful in 6. The AFL was equally active in the campaign.
In West Virginia PAC candidates were elected in five of the six Congressional districts, and the PAC, AFL, Railroad Brotherhood and the United Mine Workers together elected all six of the Representatives and the Governor as well.\(^{33}\) In Missouri the heavily populated counties and cities accounted for over half of the total Presidential vote.\(^{34}\) The PAC elected eight of the state's Congressional Representatives,\(^{35}\) and the PAC, AFL and Railroad Brotherhood together elected a total of twelve.\(^{36}\) The fact that seven of these victories involved a change of party—four in districts which had been held by Republicans in the previous three terms—gave an impressive indication of the magnitude of labor's victory.\(^{37}\) In the Presidential election Truman carried approximately the same counties as the PAC's Congressional candidates, but they ran ahead of him in the popular vote.\(^{38}\)

In Minnesota PAC-endorsed candidates were elected in four of the nine Congressional districts.\(^{39}\) A clear indication of the significance of the

---

\(^{33}\) Results of November 2, 1946 Elections, op. cit., p. 7. The combined endorsements of the PAC, AFL, Railroad Brotherhood and United Mine Workers includes the successful candidates for all six Congressional seats and the Governorship as well.

\(^{34}\) Roster of the State, District and County Officers of the State of Missouri, 1949-1950 (compiled by Edgar C. Nelson, Secretary of State), pp. 15-16.

\(^{35}\) Results of the November 2, 1946 Elections, op. cit., p. 9.

\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) Ibid.

\(^{38}\) Roster of Officers of Missouri, op. cit., pp. 15, 33-35.

\(^{39}\) Results of November 2, 1946 Elections, op. cit., p. 9.
urban vote in the Presidential election was that although Truman carried seventy-seven of the state's eighty-seven counties, the five most populous counties— all carried by PAC-endorsed Congressional candidates— accounted for 605,510 out of a total presidential vote of 1,176,583, and for 330,749 out of Truman's total of 692,966. Thus, Democratic gains were by no means a rural phenomenon, and conversely waning urban interest was not the full explanation of its losses.

Regional peculiarities, social and economic class interests, specific issues, and the personalities of the candidates entered into the motivation of the voters in all sections of the country. In Massachusetts, for example, a heavy urban vote overwhelmingly defeated anti-labor referendum measures, gave Truman a margin of 242,419 votes, and elected a Democratic governor. Yet those same voters elected a Republican to the Senate, and to eight of the state's fourteen Congressional seats. In the House election eleven of the Democrats had had PAC support, and six that of the AFL as well. Many other states provided similar examples of contradictory tendencies. Thus, broad

40 Report of State Canvassing Board General Election November 2, 1948, Minnesota (compiled by Mike Holm, Secretary of State), pp. 10-11
41 Hennepin, Ramsey, St. Louis, Stearns and Dakota.
43 Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., p. 5.
44 Statistics Compiled by Ralph R. Roberts, op. cit., p. 16.
45 Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., p. 8.
47 Results of November 2, 1948 Election, op. cit., p. 8.
distinctions between the "rural" vote and the "urban" vote tended to create a misleading impression of the behavior of the voters in the regions that went Democratic.

Labor's influence also varied considerably from state to state even in urban areas. Of the twenty-eight states which Truman carried, labor exerted a major influence in only seven (comprising one hundred twenty-one electoral votes), and in those its influence was not always decisive. A comparison of Truman's popular vote with the performance of the PAC's candidates in the Congressional elections revealed the following facts:

---

48 California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.

49 Statistics Compiled by Ralph R. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 3-4, 9-10, 16-17, 21-22, 32-33, 37, and 44; San Francisco Examiner, November 4, 1948, p. 5; Votes Cast in Illinois in the November 2, 1948 Election (compiled by Illinois Secretary of State), pp. 8-9; The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Votes Cast for Electors of President and Vice President (compiled by Frederic W. Cook, Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1948), p. 1; Roster of Officers in Missouri, op. cit., pp. 15-16; Abstract of Votes Cast in Ohio, op. cit., pp. 1-2; Abstract of Votes Cast in West Virginia in November 2, 1948 Elections (compiled by Secretary of State), pp. 3-4; Official Count of the Ballots Cast at the Election Tuesday, November 2, 1948 (Prepared by the Board of Elections, State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 1948), pp. 40-41, and Hosteller, op. cit., pp. 322-4.
### States in Which the Composition of the Vote and PAC Successes in Congressional Elections Point to a Major Role for the CIO in the Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Presidential Vote</strong></td>
<td>4,021,538</td>
<td>3,984,026</td>
<td>2,155,317</td>
<td>1,578,628</td>
<td>2,936,071</td>
<td>326,098</td>
<td>748,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dewey's Vote</strong></td>
<td>1,895,269</td>
<td>1,961,103</td>
<td>909,370</td>
<td>655,039</td>
<td>1,445,684</td>
<td>134,892</td>
<td>316,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wallace's Vote</strong></td>
<td>190,381</td>
<td>38,157</td>
<td>3,998</td>
<td>37,296</td>
<td>2,587</td>
<td>3,311</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Truman's Vote:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>1,913,134</td>
<td>1,994,715</td>
<td>1,151,768</td>
<td>917,315</td>
<td>1,452,791</td>
<td>188,619</td>
<td>429,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In cities providing 50,000</td>
<td>1,021,347</td>
<td>1,270,636</td>
<td>359,840</td>
<td>695,497</td>
<td>67,515</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>votes or more (carried by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In counties providing 10,000</td>
<td>1,139,777</td>
<td>1,410,405</td>
<td>458,889</td>
<td>943,891</td>
<td>149,254</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>votes or more (carried by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the 5 most populous counties</td>
<td>948,608</td>
<td>1,356,822</td>
<td>428,981</td>
<td>633,938</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(carried by Truman)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of counties carried</strong></td>
<td>25 of 56</td>
<td>24 of 103</td>
<td>72 of 115</td>
<td>22 of 88</td>
<td>1 of 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Congressional Districts in the</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC Endorsements</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic vote of PAC</td>
<td>1,139,334</td>
<td>1,798,939</td>
<td>917,585</td>
<td>605,256</td>
<td>939,473</td>
<td>176,695</td>
<td>370,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>endorsers elected</td>
<td>7(D)</td>
<td>1(R)</td>
<td>12(D)</td>
<td>3(R)</td>
<td>6(D)</td>
<td>8(D)</td>
<td>10(D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC endorsees won by</td>
<td>992,565</td>
<td>1,131,540</td>
<td>601,244</td>
<td>605,256</td>
<td>790,561</td>
<td>176,695</td>
<td>370,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC endorsees held by another Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the previous term</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the previous 3 terms</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which received 55% or more of the</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Party vote in 1946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In California the urban vote was manifestly the most important element of Democratic strength in the president race, but it was not equally clear that the PAC was responsible. Its candidates carried three of the four Congressional districts in San Francisco and Alameda County, but were successful in only four of the ten districts in the crucial metropolitan area of Los Angeles. The Progressives were active in Los Angeles, but the votes received by the third party congressional candidates were not great enough to explain the PAC's failures. Nevertheless, in Los Angeles County, which gave Truman 486,160 votes, Dewey 462,388 and Wallace 61,638, the PAC's four successful candidates received a total of 462,950 votes which indicates that the PAC may well have held the balance of power in the Presidential election. In the state as a whole the eight Congressional districts which the PAC carried occupied a somewhat similar position. In Massachusetts, as has already been indicated, the PAC's influence was important but probably not the decisive element in the Democratic victory. In Missouri its success in the Congressional election more than compensated

---

50 AFL victories brought the total to 5 in the Los Angeles area, and 10 for the state.

51 Statistics Compiled by Ralph R. Roberts, op. cit., p. 4; and Results of the November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., p. 4. The fact that the PAC and AFL together carried six of the ten districts suggests that even if the PAC was not clearly dominant, labor was.

52 Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., pp. 1-2; and Statistics Compiled by Ralph R. Roberts, op. cit., p. 4.

53 The additional district carried by the AFL gave labor in a clear majority.

54 Bean, op. cit., p. 8; Abstract of Massachusetts Vote, op. cit., pp. 59-64; and Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., p. 8.
for a slight rural predominance in the population, but Truman's margin of victory pointed to general strength in all sections of the state.

Labor was definitely one of the major influences in Illinois. In Cook County the PAC—with assistance from the AFL and Railroad Brotherhood—elected eleven (ten Democrats and one Republican) of the thirteen Congressmen, and in the state as a whole carried fifteen districts (twelve by Democrats and three by Republicans). In the Presidential election Truman carried the state because his 200,836 vote majority in Cook County offset a down-state deficit of 167,224 votes. Providence County—a center of PAC strength—occupied a somewhat similar position in the political life of Rhode Island. In addition to providing 149,250 of Truman's total vote of 183,736, it elected the state's two representatives—both Democrats and PAC-endorsed. In Ohio in which the PAC, AFL, Railroad Brotherhood together elected twelve of the state's twenty-three representatives, and West Virginia in which the labor groups elected all six of the Congressional representatives, the labor vote was probably decisive in the Presidential

55 The AFL victories raised labor's total to twelve of the thirteen Congressional seats in the state.
56 Roster of Officers in Missouri, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
57 Memo from PAC, op. cit., November 22, 1948, p. 4, Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., p. 5.
58 Abstract of the Illinois Vote, op. cit., pp. 9, 11, 13. The senatorial and gubernatorial margins of Paul Douglas and Adlai Stevenson, respectively, 407,728 and 572,067 both of which far exceeded that of the President suggest that a strong Democratic slate was another important factor in placing Illinois in the Truman column. Both men, however, had the full support of the major labor groups, and were elected by the Cook County vote.
59 Official Count of Rhode Island Vote, op. cit., pp. 40-41; and Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., p. 5.
60 Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., p. 13.
election, but it encompassed more than just the CIO. A similar conclusion was in order for the PAC's role in this whole bloc of states.

There was a second group of approximately six states in which the PAC's record of endorsements in the Congressional elections was good, but in which its actual influence was secondary or even minor. 61

In Colorado, Utah and Montana the sparseness of union members largely cancelled out its apparent manifestations of strength. It would be stretching a point to credit the 17,000 CIO members in Colorado with the election of three of the state's four representatives or with carrying the state for Truman. Likewise, the CIO's 11,000 members in Utah were in no position to dominate the election even though they were concentrated primarily in the three counties which provided 100,000 out of Truman's total of 149,151 votes in the state. Montana's vote in both the Presidential and Congressional elections was unquestionably rural.


62 Letter from Eugene Rosati, op. cit.

63 Letter from Clarence L. Palmer, President, Utah State Industrial Union Council, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 15, 1949.

64 Abstract of Utah Vote, op. cit., p. 1.
## States in Which the Composition of the Vote and PAC Successes in Congressional Elections Point to a Secondary or Minor Role for the CIO in the Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Presidential Vote</td>
<td>515,237</td>
<td>822,658</td>
<td>1,212,226</td>
<td>224,278</td>
<td>276,305</td>
<td>1,276,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewey's Vote</td>
<td>239,714</td>
<td>341,210</td>
<td>403,627</td>
<td>96,770</td>
<td>124,402</td>
<td>590,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace's Vote</td>
<td>6,115</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>27,666</td>
<td>7,313</td>
<td>2,679</td>
<td>25,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman's Vote:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>267,238</td>
<td>466,756</td>
<td>692,966</td>
<td>119,071</td>
<td>149,151</td>
<td>647,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In cities providing 50,000 votes or more (carried by Truman)</td>
<td>89,489</td>
<td>70,755</td>
<td>303,001</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>62,957</td>
<td>187,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In counties providing 10,000 or more (carried by Truman)</td>
<td>111,126</td>
<td>138,490</td>
<td>330,749</td>
<td>24,797</td>
<td>100,009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the 5 most populous counties (carried by Truman)</td>
<td>135,753</td>
<td>127,307</td>
<td>330,749</td>
<td>39,210</td>
<td>112,789</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of counties carried by Truman</td>
<td>29 of 63</td>
<td>97 of 120</td>
<td>76 of 87</td>
<td>35 of 56</td>
<td>15 of 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Congressional Districts in the State

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAC endorsements</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic vote of PAC endorsees</td>
<td>271,484</td>
<td>279,968</td>
<td>500,619</td>
<td>122,687</td>
<td>159,411</td>
<td>406,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC endorsees elected</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5(D)</td>
<td>1(R)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic vote in districts won by PAC endorsees</td>
<td>204,905</td>
<td>279,988</td>
<td>320,749</td>
<td>64,276</td>
<td>159,411</td>
<td>262,825</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PAC candidates winning seats held by another Party:

- In the previous term: 2
- In the previous 3 terms: 0
- Which received 55% or more of the Major Party vote in 1946: 1
In Kentucky the fact that the PAC's only failure in the Congres­sional elections was in Louisville and Jefferson County where its strength was potentially the greatest tended to undermine its claims elsewhere in the state. Barkley's presence on the ticket rather than labor support was probably the real explanation of the Democratic gain of three percent in the Presidential vote. In Minnesota and Wisconsin the PAC's contribution to the Democratic cause were more substantial. It carried all of Minnesota's most heavily populated counties for its Congressional candidates. In the Presidential election the five most populous of those counties provided 330,749 of Truman's 692,966 votes. In Wisconsin PAC-endorsed candidates won four Congressional seats, but they were evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans so the CIO's weight in the Presidential election may not have been correspondingly important. The PAC's effective contribution was confined to Milwaukee, which provided 187,337 of Truman's 647,310 votes, and in which the CIO retired two Republican Congressmen.

Among the remaining states carried by the Democrats in the Presi­dential election, the PAC failed to endorse Congressional candidates in seven. In the remainder it won only isolated victories. Its candidates

66 Ibid., and Bean, op. cit., p. 6.
67 Abstract of Minnesota Vote, op. cit., p. 10.
68 Abstract of Wisconsin Vote, op. cit., p. 2. In the two Republican districts claimed by the PAC its claim to having played a decisive role was dubious.
69 Its only endorsements of any kind on the state or national level were Fuller Warren for Governor in Florida and Lester Hunt for the Senate in Wyoming.
carried the Seventh District in Georgia, the First District of Idaho, the Third District of Iowa (Republican, hence adding nothing to Truman's strength in any case), the Seventh District of North Carolina, the First and Seventh Districts of Tennessee, the Sixth District of Oklahoma, the First and Second Districts of Texas which were predominantly rural in each case. 70 In the Eighth District of Texas (dominated by Houston) and the First District of Oklahoma (which included Tulsa) the PAC's effective strength was greater but not clearly decisive.

Any final assessment of the PAC's contribution to the re-election of Truman must also include the industrial states which it lost. In 1948 one hundred thirty-five of Dewey's electoral votes came from Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan, Maryland, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania, each of which had a heavy union membership. In terms of the total vote these were more important than the seven industrial states which labor helped to carry for the Democrats. 71

70 Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., pp. 3, 6, 12, 14, 16; Abstract of Votes Cast at the General Election August 10, 1948, State of Idaho (issued by J. D. "Gy" Price, Secretary of State), p. 1; Official Canvass of Votes Cast in Iowa at the General Election November 2, 1948 (compiled Secretary of State), p. 1; 1948 North Carolina General Election Vote for President (compiled by Secretary of State), p. 1; Official Returns of General Election, Held November 2, 1948, State of Oklahoma (compiled by Secretary of State), p. 1; General Election November 2, 1948, Tennessee (compiled by Secretary of State), pp. 1-2; and Official Vote Tabulation for Texas, November 2, 1948 (compiled by Secretary of State), pp. 1-2.

### The Composition of the Vote and the Record of the PAC's Performance in the Congressional Election in the Industrial State Which Truman Failed to Carry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Presidential Vote</td>
<td>883,518</td>
<td>139,073</td>
<td>596,735</td>
<td>2,109,609</td>
<td>1,949,555</td>
<td>6,274,527</td>
<td>3,735,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewey's popular vote</td>
<td>437,754</td>
<td>69,588</td>
<td>294,814</td>
<td>1,038,595</td>
<td>981,124</td>
<td>2,811,163</td>
<td>1,902,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace's Popular Vote</td>
<td>13,713</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>9,983</td>
<td>46,515</td>
<td>42,613</td>
<td>509,559</td>
<td>55,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman's Vote</td>
<td>423,297</td>
<td>67,813</td>
<td>286,521</td>
<td>1,003,448</td>
<td>895,455</td>
<td>2,780,204</td>
<td>1,752,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities (carried by Truman)</td>
<td>134,615</td>
<td>489,654</td>
<td>381,148</td>
<td>885,398</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties (carried by Truman)</td>
<td>163,887</td>
<td>604,934</td>
<td>430,838</td>
<td>1,144,462</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five most populous counties</td>
<td>173,807</td>
<td>594,931</td>
<td>430,838</td>
<td>931,725</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of counties carried by Truman</td>
<td>0 of 3</td>
<td>8 of 22</td>
<td>11 of 83</td>
<td>6 of 21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional Districts</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC endorsed candidates</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC endorsees (Dem. vote of)</td>
<td>456,538</td>
<td>68,909</td>
<td>153,368</td>
<td>751,963</td>
<td>390,355</td>
<td>1,907,352</td>
<td>1,177,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC candidates elected</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5(D) 1(R)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20(D) 1(R)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic vote of successful PAC candidates</td>
<td>305,620</td>
<td>78,040</td>
<td>468,533</td>
<td>272,307</td>
<td>1,567,140</td>
<td>915,401</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO membership in 1948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Seats won by PAC candidates which had been held by another Party:
  - During previous term: 3 0 0 2 3 9 9
  - During previous 3 terms: 0 0 0 0 0 3 4
  - Which had received 55% or more of the major party vote in 1946: 2 0 0 0 1 4 2
The Wallace split very definitely gave Dewey his victory in New York, Michigan, and Maryland, for in each case he won by a plurality rather than a majority. In New York the PAC's candidates won twenty-one of the state's forty-five Congressional seats. The AFL, Railroad Brotherhood and PAC together carried a total of twenty-seven seats, including nine which involved a change of party. The fact that labor carried a majority of New York's Congressional districts but failed in the Presidential election demonstrated the importance of the personalities of the candidates involved. In Michigan the PAC's failure was less excusable. There were 600,000 CIO members in the state, and approximately 311,000 were concentrated in Detroit. In Wayne County and Detroit the heavy labor vote gave Truman a 167,881 vote margin and elected five of the six Congressional representatives, but the PAC enjoyed little success elsewhere in the state. The 289,000 CIO members outside of Detroit simply failed in the task of creating an effective

---


73 Mosteller, op. cit., pp. 233-4; and Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., pp. 11-12. Twenty-five of labor's successful candidates were Democrats. Registration in New York City was 234,585 below 1944 (the period when the members of the armed forces were absent), and 68,678 below 1940, despite population trends which would indicate an increase of 400,000 voters every four years, which does not speak too well for labor's ability to mobilize its membership. Ellen Brennan, "Vote Shift in N.Y.C.," Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer, 1949, p. 290.

74 Letter from Al Barbour, Secretary-Treasurer of Detroit and Wayne County Industrial Union Council, February 22, 1950.

75 Letter from Barney Hopkins, Secretary-Treasurer of the Michigan State Industrial Union Council, Detroit, Michigan, March 31, 1940. With the exception of election of Gerald R. Ford, Jr. (Rep.) in the Fifth Congressional District—and that was by no means a clear-cut labor victory—they showed little effectiveness.
political organization. In Maryland the CIO's membership of 80,910 did not
give the actual power to dominate the voting. They did, however constitute
a strategically important bloc which was potentially capable of holding the
balance of power. Consequently, in providing Truman with a margin of only
23,735 votes in Baltimore and carrying only two Congressional districts, the
PAC did not show to particular advantage, especially in view of the state's
consistent support for Roosevelt in the previous four elections.77 The
Wallace split was an important cause of its setback, but it was not the sole
cause, for personal jealousies impaired the effectiveness of the local PAC
organization. As one national official privately commented, "In Baltimore
everyone wants to be a leader and no one wants to work."

From 1936 on the pattern of political behavior in Connecticut, Dela­
ware and Pennsylvania had been to elect a Democratic congressional majority
and to support the Democratic nominee in Presidential election years, and
then to revert to a slight Republican majority in their Congressional dele-
gations in the off years.78 In 1948, however, Truman lost all three states
and the Democrats failed to elect a majority of their Congressional dele-
gations, in spite of the fact that the PAC made a maximum effort in each. In
Connecticut the PAC's Congressional candidates regained three of the Congres-
sional seats which the Democrats lost in 1946, but fell one seat short of

76 Letter from John Lauzenberg, Secretary-Treasurer of the Maryland
and District of Columbia Industrial Union Council, Baltimore, Maryland,
August 30, 1949; and Abstract of the Maryland Vote, op. cit., p. 1.

77Bean, op. cit., p. 8.

78Ibid.
their 1944 total. The PAC also failed to elect a Democratic Representative from Delaware. In both states the PAC's Congressional candidates ran ahead of Truman, which would seem to indicate that his shortcomings as a candidate was one of the factors involved. In Pennsylvania the PAC simply did not live up to the potentialities of the organization at its command. In Philadelphia it gave the President a margin of only 6,049 votes and failed to carry the Sixth Congressional District. In Pittsburgh it lost the Thirtieth and Thirty-First Districts and made a correspondingly weak showing in the Presidential election. The Wallace split was not the explanation, for Dewey's popular vote exceeded the combined total of Truman and Wallace by 94,610. In the PAC's favor was the fact that its Congressional candidates won nine seats which Republicans had held in 1946, and that the combined victories of all labor groups gave the Democrats one more seat than they had held in 1944, but it fell short in the Presidential election. In some respects New Jersey presented a more difficult problem for labor. It had been carried by Roosevelt in all four elections, but did not return a Democratic majority to Congress after 1936. It rejected Truman in 1948 and elected only five Democratic representatives—four of whom were PAC endorsees.

Thus, the Wallace split was a partial explanation of the setbacks which the Democrats met in major industrial states. But the Congressional

---

79 Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., p. 2; and Memo From PAC, op. cit., November 22, 1948, p. 4.
80 Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., p. 3; and Memo From PAC, op. cit., November 22, 1948, p. 4.
82 Results of November 2, 1948 Elections, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
83 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
candidates of the PAC and other labor groups ran ahead of the President, so
at least part of the blame must also be attributed to Truman's own weakness
as a candidate. In the over-all picture labor's principal contribution to
the re-election of Truman lay in checking the inroads of the Progressive
movement. Its failure to hold the line in Michigan, New York and Maryland
should not obscure the fact that it was almost inconceivable that Truman
could have carried Ohio and California without the support which he received
from the major elements of the labor movement. Apathy on the part of labor,
or even a slackening of the determination that sustained its drive in the
final stages of the campaign would almost certainly have tipped the delicate
balance in those states in favor of Dewey. It was not the achievement of
the CIO alone, for without the efforts of its counterparts in the AFL and
the Railroad Brotherhood, the PAC would also have failed, although it was
probably the most effective political organization in the labor movement.
It was equally true that without a farm uprising in the Central states, and
the eighty-seven electoral votes provided by the seven Southern states which
remained loyal to the Party, labor could not have prevented Truman's defeat.
The Democratic victory was the work of all the groups in the incongruous
coalition comprising the Party, and no single group could lay a legitimate
claim to having played the decisive role.

Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia.
Kroll declared in his victory message:

_We have plenty of reason to shout!_

As long as we shout, WE HELPED do it! we shall be on solid ground. When we start shouting, WE did it! we are borrowing trouble. This victory could not have been won without labor. That is true. It could not have been won without the farmers, either. Again this year the farmers and the small business men in millions saw that they shared an essentially common interest with labor and the unions. And on election day both they and we were able to smash the wedge that our common enemies always seek to drive between us. From that lesson we both can—and we must—profit in the years to come.

In the Congressional elections both the PAC and the Democratic Party showed greater strength than they had in the Presidential. The Democrats gained twenty-one more seats in the House than they had held in 1944—the last Presidential year, and seventy-seven more than they had won in 1946. At least fifty-five of the seventy-seven new seats were in areas that were unquestionably industrial. In New York, for example, the eight new Democratic seats included five in New York City, two in Utica and one in Buffalo. Four of the eleven new districts in Pennsylvania were in Philadelphia, and the remainder were scattered among Scranton, Wilkes-Barre, Reading, York, Connelsville-Uniontown, Johnstown and Pittsburgh, all of which were mining or industrial centers. In Ohio six of the eight new Democratic districts fell in Cincinnati, Dayton, Portsmouth, Toledo, Marietta and Zanesville, and Canton and Steubenville. The PAC's list of victories closely paralleled these changes.

---

86 Bean, op. cit., p. 11.
87 Ibid.
In 1948 the PAC endorsed two hundred fifteen candidates for the House, and elected one hundred forty-four (one hundred thirty-three Democrats and eleven Republicans). Sixty-four of its successful candidates were carry-overs from the Eightieth Congress. Among this group fifty-seven had voted to sustain the President's veto of the Taft-Hartley vote and five had been absent for the vote, but two opposed the veto and still received the PAC's endorsement because their record was liberal in regard to other policies. Eighty of the PAC's successful candidates were new in the House. Exclusive of Illinois, which had been redistricted in 1946, sixty-one of the new seats involved a change of party. When the obviously rural districts (two in Colorado, and one each in Idaho, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Utah) are eliminated the PAC victories involving a change of party totaled fifty-five, or approximately the total gains of the Democrats in industrial areas.

The PAC also enjoyed some success in districts that were marginal as far as the composition of their population was concerned. In all, it backed successful candidates in a total of thirty-six states. Obviously its endorsement was not the decisive factor in many of the isolated districts of the South and West. It was significant, however, that one hundred fourteen

---

90 Ibid.
91 Mosteller, op. cit., p. 232. Illinois returned six new Democratic Congressmen in 1948, which would probably also reflect the PAC influence if accurate comparisons with 1946 were possible.
93 Ibid.
of its victories fell in districts in which the margin between victory and defeat was five percent of the vote or less. Thus, labor held the potential balance of power, and its victories suggest that it succeeded in capitalizing on that fact.

Another measure of the PAC's effectiveness in the Congressional elections was its success in retiring supporters of the Taft-Hartley Act. One hundred eight of the three hundred one members of the House who voted to override the President's veto of the Bill did not return to the Eighty-First Congress. Sixty-five were defeated in the general election, fifteen were defeated in the Congressional primaries, sixteen did not run, four died, four were elected to the Senate, one was defeated for a gubernatorial nomination, one received a court appointment, one was defeated for a Senatorial nomination, and one was defeated in a bid for the Senate. The PAC was active in approximately seventy-two of the cases in which an election was involved. The eighty new members whom the PAC elected to the House replaced seventy-four who had voted for the Taft-Hartley Act (including one who died before the end of his term), four who had voted against it, and two who had been absent at the time of the vote. At least two hundred twenty-three of those who had voted for the Taft-Hartley Act, however, kept their seats, so in spite of gratifying statistics on successful reprisals the PAC had won no guarantee that the legal restraint on unions would not be continued.

108 Congressmen Who Voted to Override the Taft-Hartley Veto Will Not Be in the 81st Congress (CIO-PAC Research Department, Washington, D.C., November 12, 1948).


Hosteller, op. cit., p. 232.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
<th>House of Reps</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Number of Endorsed Candidates Winning Seats held by Another Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAC Candidates</td>
<td>PAC Candidates</td>
<td>During Preceding Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Endorsed</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td>Endorsed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ala.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calif.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colo.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conn.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Del.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ga.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ky.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Md.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mich.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minn.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mo.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mont.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neb.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. J.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Y.</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. C.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okla.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ore.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pa.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. I.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. C.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenn.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wash.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Va.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wis.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|          | 20 | 13 | 13 | 4 | 12 | 17 | 9 | 26 | 22 | 7 |
The PAC's record in the Senatorial elections was excellent, but shed no additional light on its real strength. In all, it endorsed twenty-one candidates, seventeen of whom were elected. Nineteen of the seats which it carried involved a change of party—seven in states which the incumbents had carried by fifty-five percent of the vote or more in the previous election. In addition, ten of the seventeen Taft-Hartley supporters in the Senate who failed to be re-elected were defeated by PAC candidates. But at least half of the PAC's senatorial victories were in states in which organized labor was clearly in the minority.

Thus, the PAC showed considerable strength in the elections for the House of Representatives, and made at least a creditable showing in the Senatorial and Presidential elections.

The 1948 elections provided some interesting insights into the character and direction of the CIO's political development. It had felt

Memo From PAC, op. cit., November 22, 1948, pp. 4-6. The successful senatorial candidates were Sparkman (D, Ala.), Johnson (D., Colo), Bowles (D., Conn.), Freer (D., Del.), Miller (D., Idaho), Douglas (D., Ill.), Gillette (D., Ia.), Chapman (D., Ky.), Long (D., La.), Smith (R., Me.), Humphrey (D., Minn.), Murray (D., Mont.), Broughton (D., N.C.), Kerr (D., Okla.), Green (D., R. I.), Kefauver (D., Tenn.), Neeley (D., W. Va.), and Hunt (D., Wyo.).


Ibid.

The Senate and the PAC (CIO-PAC Research Department, Washington, D. C., November 12, 1948). Included were Buck (R., Dela.), Dworskaz (R., Ida.), Brooks (R., Ill.), Wilson (R., Iowa), Cooper (R., Ky.), Ball (R., Minn.), Umstead (D., N. C., defeated in the Primary), Reverbicb (R., W. Va.), Stewart (D., Tenn., defeated in Primary), and Robertson (R., Wyo.).
that labor's gains under the New Deal and hopes for the future were at stake. The PAC's bargaining position and whole claim to political influence depended upon its ability to achieve a maximum mobilization of the labor vote in reversing the conservative trend started by the election of the Eightieth Congress. It faced that task with few of the advantages which collaboration with Roosevelt had provided in the past. As the Wallace split well illustrated Truman's popularity was not great enough to assure that he would automatically receive the vote of union members. The PAC had to convince union members that he was worthy of their support and it was no easy task. For that very reason the PAC was forced to abandon all immediate hope of being able to assume the leadership of liberal groups outside of the labor movement. Instead, it had to concentrate on its own membership. It lost somewhat the crusading spirit of a reform movement and in temper and methods began to develop the characteristics of the professional political machines. Like their counterparts in the regular party organizations the CIO came to realize that their power to influence governmental policy was in direct proportion to their ability to get out the vote. Getting liberals in office was the prerequisite upon which their whole program depended. The position which the PAC achieved in 1948 was one of strategic rather than absolute political power. By its contribution to the election of Truman and of a Democratic Congress it achieved some assurance of being able to block unfavorable legislation and the hope of securing the adoption of some policies which it favored. The fulfillment of even that possibility, however, depended upon its success in bargaining and of striking suitable compromises with the other groups comprising the Democratic bloc. It was a mode of political action in which cooperation between classes as such was a more important element than class
conflict. To a greater extent than in previous years the public in 1948 accepted the CIO's right to participate in politics on that basis. The AFL and the Railroad Brotherhood paid it the compliment of emulating its methods.
THE CIO AFTER TWELVE YEARS IN POLITICS

The existence of various ideologies dealing with labor's "predestined" role in politics has obscured some of the unique aspects of the CIO's political experience. It has caused a general tendency to use the adjectives communistic and socialistic loosely, and to assume that class action must necessarily lead to Marxian class struggle. The CIO's motives, ideas and methods, however, have not fallen neatly into the established categories. Neither the LNPL nor the PAC were products of theoretical preconception. They were formed in response to specific threats to labor's interests. In 1936 when setbacks in the courts and Congress seemed to endanger New Deal reforms the CIO formed the LNPL and worked vigorously to re-elect Roosevelt. But by 1940 it had lapsed into political disunity primarily because it could not sustain the crisis psychology which had provided the initial political impulse. It took the Democratic congressional reverses in 1942 to jolt it into forming another permanent organization—the PAC. Once again union members were responsive as long as their social gains seemed in immediate danger. But victory in 1944 gave them a sense of having met the problem, and in spite of the PAC's efforts they drifted back into complacency in 1946. Similarly, the election of the Eightieth Congress provided the stimulus that sustained the PAC's successful drive in 1948. Clearly, the CIO has not indulged in the self-conscious behavior of an organization motivated by a sense of class destiny.
In similar fashion the CIO's political objectives have evolved out of its experience in dealing with immediate situations. The economic disruptions created by depression and war have provided the principal stimulus. In the 1930s it turned to politics because traditional collective bargaining held no solution for the problems of the economic crisis. Labor's demands were no different than those of the farmers, businessmen and other groups confronted with the emergency. It demanded relief, and greater Federal responsibility in the economic sphere. As the immediate needs of union members were met the CIO leaders began to show an interest in permanent reforms such as social security, and in using politics as an aid in developing greater organization strength. The principal reason for their increased ambition was that the Roosevelt Administration had created a political environment in which the prospect of achieving reform seemed particularly good. The CIO's thinking was essentially opportunistic in character, and concerned with capitalizing upon immediate opportunities. Throughout the late thirties it was content to endorse the policies of the New Deal, and made little attempt to develop a labor program as such.

A more distinct set of social objectives emerged in the PAC's 1944 reconversion program. By that time the CIO had matured somewhat politically. The fact that its attention was focused on future problems also tended to free its thinking from the immediate pressure of events. What emerged as its guiding principles were: (1) A belief that a considerable measure of governmental planning was essential to the economic stability of the nation, (2) the belief that the proper objectives of Federal economic policy was to assure each citizen of the highest standard of living that the economy was capable of providing, and (3) the conviction that a more equitable distribution
of purchasing power was the key to a balanced economy. The policies stem-
ming from those principles, however, were not exclusive in character. Farm
price supports and loans for business were considered as essential to the
realization of full-employment as the guaranteed annual wage and a public
works program. It was noteworthy, too, that concessions to labor's self-
interest were justified on the grounds that they would stimulate a greater
demand for the products of agriculture and industry, and, hence, contribute
to the general prosperity. It was not an assertion of exclusive class
interests. On the contrary, a belief in the essential harmony of class
interests was discernible in much of the CIO's thinking. The Full-Employment
Program was not a social blueprint, but a plan for dealing with immediate
problems. Each of its suggestions was a logical outgrowth of recent American
experience and thought.

The CIO's political methods also evolved out of a trial and error
experimentation. Upon first entering politics in 1936 it confined its efforts
to getting out the labor vote for Roosevelt. The reasons for the decision
to function primarily within the orbit of the Democratic Party were simple.
The CIO leaders felt that a labor party would have little chance of success,
and were unwilling to jeopardize a liberal administration. It was, in effect,
an indication that their primary concern was with policies rather than politi-
cal power for its own sake. By subordinating union considerations to those of
party, they voluntarily remained dependent upon the professional politicians
to initiate and carry out favorable policies. Labor could influence but never
decide.

Sometimes it grew restless with such limitations and showed an inter-
est in expanding its sphere of influence. The PAC displayed such symptoms in
By organizing special divisions to work with non-union groups, forming the National Citizens-PAC, and conducting an intensive campaign to sell its reconversion program to the public, it manifested a keen interest in creating a new liberal bloc in American politics. But when the results of subsequent elections revealed the limitations of labor's effective strength, and the rise of the Eightieth Congress revived the threat of reaction it abandoned immediate hope of exerting a direct influence over non-union groups.

Under Kroll the PAC reverted to the more limited objective of assuring the election of friendly candidates. It was an approach which provided labor with little hope of being able to achieve a balance of power between the parties, for in recent years the Republican Party has not been a political alternative which union members would accept. Within the existing party system the PAC had an actual choice of either actively supporting the Democrats or of registering protest by remaining inactive. Yet it deliberately chose to base its future upon the hope of being able to retain party favor, and has consistently rejected the more hazardous course of attempting to create a liberal alternative to the Democratic Party. The CIO's political methods, thus, have constituted a judgment of what was possible, and revealed the extent to which its behavior was governed by the immediate circumstances of the American political environment. More fundamentally it reflected a belief that labor's purposes could be achieved through the established parties.

The political ideas and behavior of the CIO have, thus, reflected the same peculiarities of temper that have characterized the American labor movement in collective bargaining. The emphasis has been on the practical rather than on the ideal. It has favored reform, but has not challenged the basis of the existing system in either the economic or political sphere. Although
engaged in class action, it has operated upon the assumption that it was
possible for classes to work out their differences by means of give-and-
take political bartering. It has developed an approach for dealing with
specific problems, but no more than the rudiments of a social philosophy.
These characteristics owe more to the influence of business unionism than
to the politically active union groups elsewhere in the world.

Even though the intent of the CIO has not been revolutionary, its
entry into politics has set in motion that which may eventually subject the
two party system to severe pressures. Its tactical objective has been to
organize union members into a voting bloc in order to increase their influ­
ence in the affairs of the regular parties. If it is fully successful,
labor may eventually hold a power of political life and death over the
representatives from industrial districts. On controversial issues such
officials will have a strong incentive to side with labor rather than their
party. Although in America party discipline has never been absolute, its
complete negation would make it increasingly difficult for party leaders to
take responsibility for dealing with matters of general concern. Especially
since in vetoing the proposals of others, labor would be under no obligation
and in no position to accept responsibility for working out politically
feasible alternatives. The CIO did not originate pressure group tactics,
but its successful use of them has certainly provided a powerful stimulus
for other groups to follow its example.

Actually the inherent danger to the existing party system is more
theoretical than real. Although the CIO has been relatively successful in
stimulating the political interest of its members, they have continued to
respond to the personality of candidates, party loyalties and the other factors which influence voters of all affiliation. They do not constitute a docile bloc of votes which can be delivered to the highest bidder. Within the labor movement the AFL, the Railroad Brotherhood and such independents as the United Mine Workers have had frequent political differences with the CIO. On the national scene the American voters have manifested complex class and regional loyalties. There has been little prospect of a simple division between capital and labor which would produce social conflict or political stalemate such as Austria suffered after World War I. Instead the elections of the period from 1936 to 1948 have revealed various and fluctuating political blocs of which the CIO was but one. Because its position has definitely been that of a minority faction it has had to rely rather heavily upon political bargaining. Hence, it has realized that too rigid an assertion of class prerogatives in the marginal industrial districts where its power was paramount would alienate groups elsewhere whose consent was necessary to the realization of labor's own demands. There is no real reason for believing that the political circumstances which have encouraged such flexibility will change in the immediately foreseeable future.

For the reasons already indicated, judgments concerning the CIO's ultimate effect upon American democracy must necessarily be provisional. But during the first twelve years of its political existence the effects of labor's activities have not warranted the alarm which they aroused. Entering politics upon a class basis was a departure from American traditions. Although professing and showing a considerable degree of social responsibility, its demands have not been entirely free from class self-interest. Thus, there has been a potential and perhaps real danger that political action by
unions might cause a tightening of class lines and a reduction in the flexibility of American democracy. The CIO, however, has also stimulated democracy in many ways. Under its influence more workers have consistently voted and taken an interest in being informed on issues and the record of candidates than at any previous time in American history. In election years as many as three or four hundred thousand CIO members have personally rung doorbells, debated issues, and assisted in the organization of registration drives. These are an exercise of the basic functions of self-government.

In a nation in which it is not uncommon for two-thirds of the voters to stay at home in off-year Congressional elections and for no more than half to vote in Presidential elections, bloc voting may well prove less of a threat to democracy than the apathy which has left control of the government in the hands of the professional political machines.

One possibility which should not be overlooked is that the CIO may not have attained its ultimate form of political expression. Its tactics and the circumstances under which it operates are both subject to change. A depression, the election of a reactionary administration or serious ineptness on the part of the government in dealing with matters of vital concern to union members would probably bring fundamental changes. Whether such changes would include the formation of a labor party, however, clearly falls in the realm of speculation. For the present it can be said that organized labor is definitely in politics to stay. As long as existing institutions prove adequate for dealing with the labor problems which arise there is no real reason for believing that it will become the instrument of fundamental changes in the existing standard of values.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


———. *This is My Story.* New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937.


Public Documents

Abstract of the returns of an election held in the State of Utah, Tuesday, November 2, 1948, A.D. ... As determined by the official ascertainment of the Board of State Canvassers, on Monday, November 22, 1948.

Abstract of Vote at the General Election in Indiana, in 1940: State and Congressional Candidates. Compiled by Department of Research, Indiana Republican State Committee, December, 1940.

Abstract of Votes Cast at the Nominating Election, August 10, 1948, State of Idaho. Issued by J. D. "Cy" Price, Secretary of State.

Abstract of Votes Cast in the Several Counties in the State of Oregon at the Regular General Election Held on the Second Day of November, A.D. 1948 ... Compiled by Earl T. Newby, Secretary of State, from the official canvass made December 2, 1948.
Abstract of Votes, State General Election November 2, 1948. Published by Earl Coe, Secretary of State, Olympia, Washington.

Alabama General Election November 2, 1948; Presidential Electors. Prepared by Secretary of State, Montgomery, Alabama.


Canvass of Voters for Presidential election, November 2, 1948. Prepared by Secretary of State, Montpelier, Vermont.


Election Returns for Electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, State Times, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, November 20, 1948. Prepared by Secretary of State, Nashville, Tennessee.


General Election Abstract of Votes in the Several Counties of the State of Idaho, November 2, 1948. Issued by J. D. "Cy" Price, Secretary of State.


Minutes of the War Production Board. Historical Reports on War Administration:


1948 North Carolina General Election Vote for President. Prepared by Secretary of State, Raleigh, North Carolina.


Official Canvass of Votes Cast at the General Election, November 2, 1948. Prepared by Secretary of State, Des Moines, Iowa.


Official Returns for General Election Held November 2, 1948. Prepared by Secretary of State, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Official Tabulation of Votes Cast at the General Election in Kentucky on November 2, 1948. Certified by George Glenn Hatcher, Secretary of State, Commonwealth of Kentucky.


Official Vote Tabulation, November 2, 1948. Prepared by Secretary of State, Austin, Texas.


Roster: State, County, City and Township Officials of the State of California, Also Federal Officials for California. Compiled by Frank A. Jordan, Secretary of State, 1950.


*Labor and Manpower Administration in War Production. Report # 1, May 1, 1943, Policy Analysis and Records Branch Office of the Executive Secretary of the War Production Board. Washington: National Archives, War Production Board Division.

State Manual Containing Official List of Officers, Boards, Commissions and County Officers, 1947. Published by Secretary of State, Dover, Delaware.
Statement, by County, Showing Votes Cast at General Election Held November 2nd, 1948, For Office of Representative in Congress From the Seventh Congressional District. Compiled by Secretary of State, Atlanta, Georgia.


Statement of the Whole Number of Votes Cast in the Counties and Cities of Virginia for Electors for President and Vice-President, at the Election Held on November 2, 1948. State Board of Elections, Richmond, Virginia.


Supplemental Report of the Secretary of State to the General Assembly of South Carolina on the Election November 2, 1948. Printed Under the Direction of the Joint Committee on Printing, General Assembly of South Carolina.

Tabulation of Official Vote in Florida Primary Elections. Compiled from Official Canvass by R. A. Gray, Secretary of State and Chairman of the State Canvassing Board.


Vote Cast, by Counties. . . At the General Election Held November 2, 1948. Prepared by the Secretary of State, Columbus, Ohio.

Vote Cast for Presidential Electors of President and Vice President on November 2, 1948. Prepared by the Secretary of State, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Votes Cast in General Election, November 2, 1948. Compiled by Secretary of State, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Votes Cast in Wisconsin November 2, 1948 for President, State Officers, and Members of the House of Representatives. Published by Fred R. Zimmerman, Secretary of State, Madison, Wisconsin.

Vote for Representatives in Congress in General Election, November 2, 1948. Prepared by Secretary of State, Montgomery, Alabama.

Votes Cast for Representatives in Congress on November 2, 1948. Prepared by the Secretary of State, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

Vote for United States Senator in General Election, November 2, 1948. Prepared by Secretary of State, Montgomery, Alabama.


Reports


Articles


"Amend the Constitution," Nation, 142 (June 2, 1946), 696-8.

Amidon, B. "Labor at the Ballot Box," Survey Graphic, 27(October, 1946), 185-8.


"Another Bloc Crashes the Political Gate," Saturday Evening Post, 217(July 15, 1944), 104.

"Attacking the P.A.C.," New Republic, 111(August 7, 1944), 149.


"Backward with NAM or Forward to a "Prosperous U.S.," Economic Outlook, CIO Department of Education and Research, IX(June, 1945).


"Benjamin Stolberg in the Saturday Evening Post Pounces on Hillman Senator James Eastman of Mississippi in Senate on June 19, 1944," New York World


"Brother, what a Congress!" Economic Outlook. CIO Department of Education and Research. IX, No. 8 (August, 1948).


"CIO and the State," Commonweal, 35(November 21, 1941), 108.


"CIO Collective Bargaining Drive Gives Old-Line Politicians Jitters," Newsweek, 23(June 12, 1944), 30-1.

"CIO Faces Severe Test," Business Week, November 20, 1946, p. 79.


"C.I.O. Internal Conflict Brings This Great Revolutionary Movement to Crossroad," Life, 11(August 25, 1941), 64-71.


"C.I.O. Leftist March," Newsweek, 18(July 21, 1941), 36.


"CIO's 1948 Wage Case," Economic Outlook, CIO Department of Education and Research, IX, No. 2(February, 1948).

"CIO Politicians Test Their Hopes in Detroit," Newweek, 10(October 3, 1937), 12-13.


Cook, S. E. "Exploring the PAC," Scholastic, 46(May 21, 1945), 5.


378

_____. "Labor and the Election," Commonweal, 45(November 22, 1946), 146-7.
_____. "Third Party?" Commonweal, 44(July 26, 1946), 350-3. Discussion,
44(August 16, 30, 1946), 432, 478.
_____. "Wallace and the Unions," Commonweal, 47(January 16, 1948), 351.

Crawford, K. G. "A.F. of L. into GOP: Proposed Amendment to the Wagner Act,"
Nation, 113(March 11, 1939), 283-4.

"Crestfallen," Newweek, 29(November 10, 1946), 35.


Crowther, L. Q. and Others. "Work Stoppages Caused by Labor Management Disputes,"
Monthly Labor Review, 64(May, 1946), 750-500.


Davenport, E. "No Team; Farmer-Worker Alliance," Saturday Evening Post, 209
(February 28, 1946), 31.

_____. "Ruddy Rodeo," Colliers, 117(June 1, 1946), 14.

David, Henry. "Labor and Political Action After World War I," Labor and Nation,
February, 1946, pp. 27-32.

Deming, E. E. "Good Statistical Surveys are not Accidents, and there are no
Bargains," Printer's Ink, 226(February 4, 1949), 34-5.

"Democracies Seeking Formula for Cutting Down Strike Losses," World Report,

"Democrats and CIO-PAC, New Power Took a Setback at Chicago," Life, 17(July 31,
1944), 20.


Deutsch, Gertrude, "Productivity and Labor Cost Trends," Conference Board
Business Record, 4(May, 1947), 121-184.
Dilke, M. G., "Revise the N.L.R.A. (Membership in Unions Should be Voluntary)," *Current History*, 12 (February, 1917), 117-122.


"$2,000,000 Drive of Unions," *United States News*, 25 (October 29, 1948), 44-5.


"Failure of Forecast Polls Laid to Faulty Methods," *Printer's Ink*, 225 (December 31, 1948), 68.

"Farce in Albany," *Nation*, 141 (September 4, 1936), 258.


"$5,000,000 For Term Laid on the Line by CIO," Time, 42 (November 15, 1943), 18-19.

"For and Against Truman," Newsweek, 32 (October 18, 1948), 38.


"Frankie and Johnny," New Republic, 102 (February 5, 1940), 181.


________. "Now Listen Mr. Congressman," New Masses, May 6, 1947, pp.3-6.


Gerson, S. W. "ALP Primary: Primary Issues," New Masses, August 10, 1933, pp.15-17.


"Governor Dewey Defends His Legislative Program," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Section 2, 165 (April 24, 1947), 2249.


________. "PAC Policies Follow Gompers Line; Lacking a Political Program of its Own, It Functions Merely as a Pressure Group," Barron's, March 12, 1947, p.3.


________. "Objectives of the A.F. of L." Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 166 (October 17, 1946), 133.


"Something Has to be Done," Fortune, November 1946, pp. 132-3.


High, Stanley. "We Are Being Invaded," Reader's Digest, 23(July, 1941), 122.


"Is the P.A.C. Beneficial to Labor and the Country?" Reader's Digest, 166(November, 1946), 77-81.


"Is the PAC an Assett or Liability to Democracy," Town Meeting of the Air, September 21, 1914.


"Key to Control of Senate: Seats Republicans May Lose," United States News, October 1, 1918, pp. 11-13.


______. "Battle of Chicago," Nation, 159(July 29, 1944), 118-20.


Klein, M. "Lewis Loses the CIO," New Republic, 105(December 1, 1941), 722-4.


"Kroll, John Jacob:
Portrait," Time, 52(November 15, 1948), 2h.
Portrait," United States News, 26(March 10, 1950, 2h.


"Labor and the Use of Business Information," Business Literature, April, 1942, pp. 1-2.

"Labor at the Polls," Time, 43 (May 29, 1944), 20.


"Labor Honeymoon," Commonweal, 49 (December 3, 1948), 189.

"Labor Kicks Up," Life, 23 (September 15, 1947), 44-5.


"Labor Measure Sets Union Workers Free," Barron's, 27 (June 16, 1947).

"Labor Movement Moves," New Republic, 103 (December 2, 1940), 742-3.


"Labor Stays in Politics," Survey, 80 (December, 1944), 35.


"Labor's Defense Role," Nation, 151 (September 21, 1940), 233-4.


"Labor's Role in Politics," The Reviewing Stand: A Round Table Discussion Program, Northwestern University, December 10, 1944.


Lasher, G. S. "Now's The Time to End Guesswork Journalism," Editor and Publisher, 81(November 20, 1948), 67-8.


"Third Party for 1940?" *Nation*, 145 (September 4, 1937), 234-5.


"Lewis Breaks with Roosevelt," *Current History*, 17 (October, 1937), 14-15.

"Lewis for Willkie, C.I.O. Leaders Split on Stand," *Newsweek*, 16 (November 4, 1940), 17-19.

"Lewis in a China Shop," *Nation*, 150 (February 3, 1940), 115-16.


"Next Four Years For Labor," *New Republic*, 89 (December 23, 1940), 234-6.


"Lewis to His Countrymen," *Time*, 36 (November 4, 1940), 18.


"We Back America: Our Country is First with Us. Can the C.I.O. Say the Same?" American Federationist, July 1946, pp.3-6.


Moley, Raymond. "Clearing It With Sidney," Newsweek, 2d(September 25, 1944),104.

"Labor's Retreat From Politics," Newsweek, 11(April 18, 1938),44.

"Maybe Compers Was Right," Newsweek, 26(November 19, 1946),120.


Morrow, H. "CIO's Political Hot Shot," Saturday Evening Post, 221(March 5, 1949), 29.


Mr. Lewis' Baby: Political Power and Organized Labor," Collier's, 100(September 11, 1937), 82.

"Mr. Lewis Shows His Spleen," New Republic, 103(November 14, 1940), 615.

"Mr. Roosevelt's Non-Partisans Combat a Whisper and Prepare to Launch a New Party in 1940," Newsweek, 8(August 22, 1938), 7.


Mullins, W. E. "I Object to My Union in Politics," Reader's Digest, 49(September, 1944), 1-12.


"Non-Conformist Welshman," New Republic, 103(November 4, 1940), 627.


North, Joseph, "Focus on the C.I.O.," New Masses, December 5, 1944, pp. 3-6.


"Opposition to the Hobbs Bill," Congressional Digest, 22 (June, 1943), 190-2.


Overacker, Louise, "Labor Rides the Political Wages," Current History, 7 (December, 1944), 460-73.

——. "Labor's Political Contributions," Political Science Quarterly, 51 (March, 1939), 56-68.


"PAG Raises a Storm," Life, 17 (September 11, 1944), 91-9.


Padway, Joseph A. "Fascism Comes to America," The International Teamster, 44, #1 (July, 1947), 2-4.


"Partisan League," Time, 28(August 24, 1936), 17.


"Picture of Confusion: Labor and the President," Nation, 142(February 12, 1936), 172.


"Political Action Committee," Commonweal, 40(September 8, 1944), 481.


"Political Line Up of Union Leaders," United States News, 24(June 25, 1940), 50.


"Political Straws," Newsweek, 11(March 7, 1948), 14-16.


"President Making in America's Year of Opportunity; Mr. Dewey Get His Chance; Big Tasks Ahead at Home and Abroad," Capitol, 120(June 30, 1946), 1125-6.


"Raise Wage-Hour Act Minimum to 75¢," Economic Outlook, CIO Department of Education and Research, #4(April, 1946).


"Re: Labor Legislation (Case Bill)," Government Affairs, February 25, 1946, pp. 1-5.


Reston, J. "Why Forecasts Erred," Editor and Publisher, 81(November 6, 1948), 5.


Rising, F. W. "Whose Government Is it?" Saturday Evening Post, 220 (July 5, 1947), 120.


"Roosevelt's Salesman," Literary Digest, 121 (April 11, 1936), 33-4.

Rosenfeld, Joseph, "Labor Laws Must Tend Toward Compulsory Arbitration," Barron's, July 15, 1946, p. 3.

"Labor's Role in the Election," Public Opinion Quarterly, 8 (Fall 1944), 376-90.


"Shall We Have a Labor Movement?" New Republic, 85 (December 11, 1935), 116-17.


"Should the House-Passed Case Labor Control Bill Become Law?" Congressional Digest, 25 (June, July, 1946), 180-1.

"Sidney Hillman May Become Dewey's Secret Weapon," Saturday Evening Post, 217 (September 16, 1944), 112.


"Spotlight on CIO-PAC," *Scholastic*, 45(September 18, 1944), 14.


Stein, Rose M. "Lewis and the Communists," *Nation*, 153(August 16, 1941), 140-2.


"Lewis-Willkie Pact," *Nation*, 151(October 2, 1940), 413-14.

"P.A.C. at Work," *Nation*, 159(October 11, 1944), 425-7.

"Storm Over the CIO-PAC," *Scholastic*, 45(October 9, 1944), 3-4.


"Terrible Week," Time, 37(June 23, 1941), 14.


Trott, H. "How Solid is the Labor Vote," Christian Science Monitor Magazine, August 14, 1918, p.3.


Tugwell, Rexford G. "Is a Farmer-Labor Alliance Possible?" Harper's, 174 (May, 1937), 651-61.


"Unions as Political Pros?" Fortune, 38 (November, 1918), 203-6.

"Unions Begin '18 Campaign," Business Week, October 25, 1917, p.94.


"Union Chiefs Present Bill for Campaign Services," Newsweek, 8 (November 21, 1936), 10.


"Victory But No Test," Business Week, July 26, 1917, p.84.


Walsh, J. R. and Others. "Is the Political Action Committee an Asset or Liability to Democracy," Town Meeting of the Air, September 21, 1944, pp. 1-23.

"War on Reds in Labor Speeded by New Movers in Washington," Newsweek, 17 (June 23, 1941), 37.


"Washington Notes: CIO Drive as Political Touchstone," New Republic, 87 (July 22, 1936), 323.


Watt, R. J. "Labor and Politics," American Federationist, September, 1944, pp. 5-7.


--------- "We Hold Fast to Principle," American Federationist, March, 1945, pp. 9-10.


"What's Behind the NAM Smoke Screen?" Economic Outlook. CIO Department of Education and Research. IX, #5 (May, 1948).


"Which Candidate is Labor Voting For?" Business Week, August 28, 1948, pp. 70-1.

"Who Owns Corporations?" Economic Outlook. CIO Department of Education and Research. IX, #7 (July, 1948).


"Workers and the Farmers Prepare to Link Arms," New Republic, 93 (January 12, 1938), 281.


Leaflets and Pamphlets


As a Unionist I hereby Pledge. San Francisco: Published by Technical Engineers, Architects and Draftsmen Local, AFL, 1944.


Dewey, Thomas E. Speech Accepting the Nomination as Republican Candidate for President of the United States (Philadelphia) June 24, 1940. Republican National Committee, 1940. Pp. 3.


Everything We Have. Washington: CIO Political Action Committee.


For Roses 'Round Your Door-A Buck for PAC. Washington: CIO Political Action Committee.


Guaranteed Wages the Year Round. Washington: CIO Department of Research and Education.


Here We Stand. Washington: CIO Political Action Committee, 1943.


Labor and Education. Pub. #99. Washington: CIO Department of Research and Education.

Labor and Religion. Pub. #111. Washington: CIO Department of Research and Education.


Miscellaneous Publications. #1, #4, #8 and #10. New York: CIO Political Action Committee, 1944.


The Record! Indianapolis: Indiana CIO Political Action Committee.


To the Farmer From His Customers. Pamphlet #161. Washington: Congress of Industrial Organizations.


This is PAC. Washington: CIO Political Action Committee.

This is Your America. New York: CIO Political Action Committee, 1945.


A Turning Point in History. New York: Executive Committee of the National Citizens' Political Action Committee, August 5, 1944.

"Turnover" Talk For Fair Practices. Sponsored by the CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination. Published by the CIO Department of Research and Education, Washington, D. C.


Voting Restrictions in 13 Southern States. A Report by the Committee of Editors and Writers of the South, 1944.


What is the Law: A Legal Information Guide to State Civil Rights Statutes and FEPC Legislation, and Procedures for Processing Court Cases. Material Prepared by CIO Legal Department. Published by CIO Department of Research and Education, Washington D. C.


Newspapers and Journals

General


Atlanta (Ga.) Constitution, 1944-1948.

Atlanta (Ga.) Journal, 1944-1948.

Baltimore (Md.) News-Post, 1943-1948.

Baltimore (Md.) Sun, 1935-1948.


Bridgeport (Conn.) Post, 1936, 1938, 1940, 1944-1948.


Charleston (W. Va.) Gazette, 1936, 1940, 1944-1948.


Chicago (Ill.) Herald-American, 1936, 1940, 1944-1948.


Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City), 1944-1948.


Denver (Colo.) Post, 1944-1948.

Des Moines (Iowa) Register, 1944, 1946, 1948.


Hartford (Conn.) Times, 1940, 1944-1948.

Houston (Tex.) Chronicle, 1944, 1946, 1948.
Indianapolis (Ind.) Star, 1940, 1941-1948.


Jackson (Miss.) Clarion-Ledger, 1944, 1948.


Kansas City (Kan.) Kansan, 1944, 1946, 1948.


Los Angeles (Calif.) Herald and Express, 1936, 1948, 1940, 1944-1948.


Louisville (Ky.) Times, 1944, 1946, 1948.


Miami (Fla.) Herald, 1944, 1948.

Milwaukee (Wis.) Journal, 1944-1948.


New Hampshire News (Manchester), 1944, 1948.

New Orleans (La.) Times-Picayune, 1944, 1948.


Omaha (Neb.) World, 1944, 1948.
Richmond (Va.) Times-Dispatch, 1944, 1946, 1948.
Salt Lake City (Utah) Tribune, 1944, 1946, 1948.
San Diego (Calif.) Tribune-Sun, 1940, 1944, 1946, 1948.
San Francisco (Calif.) Examiner, 1936, 1938, 1940, 1944-1948.
Seattle (Wash.) Post Intelligencer, 1940, 1944-1948.
St. Louis (Mo.) Globe Democrat, 1940, 1944-1948.
St. Louis (Mo.) Post Dispatch, 1936, 1940, 1944-1948.
Virginian Pilot (Norfolk), 1944, 1946, 1948.
Wilmington (Del.) Journal, 1940, 1944, 1946, 1948.

Labor


ILWU Dispatcher. San Francisco: International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 1938-1948. CIO.


The Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Employees. New York: Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Employees of America, United, CIO, 1941-1948.


United Rubber Worker. Akron: United Rubber Workers of America, 1937-1948, CIO.


Unpublished Materials

CIO Library, Department of Education and Research. Washington, D. C.

File 1657.4533 PAC and Politics.
Folder 1201-0557 Housing, Taxation, Education.

Clerk of the House of Representatives. Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

CIO-PAC Financial Reports to the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

Report # C-1133: Political Expenditures for the Period ending December 31, 1944.


Report # C-1290: Political Expenditures for the period ending November 1, 1946.

Report # C-1431: Political Expenditures for the period ending December 31, 1946.


Report # C-1926: Political Expenditures for the period ending December 31, 1948.
Financial Statement of the National Citizens Political Action Committee.
CIO Library, File 1657.4533. Department of Research, Washington, D.C.

Division of Office of Production Management and War Production Board Records,
National Archives, Washington, D.C.


File 014.2. OPM—Administrative Office Services.
File 014.3. OPM Files and Records.
File 014.73. Office of Production Management Re-organization.
File 013.22 Labor Division, NDAC.

File 081. Manpower Requirements, Vice Chairman and Office.
File 081.2 Manpower Requirements Committee.
File 081.4 Manpower Advisory Division.
File 081.5 Manpower Advisory Committee.

File 082.001 Labor Production, Vice Chairman—Administration.
File 082.002 Labor Policy Committee.
File 082.4 Industrial Relations Division.
File 082.51 Industrial Relations Branch.

File 116.02 Production Requirements—Programs.
File 116.17 Production Requirements—Jurisdiction.

File 117.04 Controlled Materials Plan—Operations and Explanations.
File 117.06 Controlled Materials Plan—Implementation.

File 240.3 Labor Policy and Programs—1940-1942.
File 242 Labor Control and Adjustment of Disputes.

Boxes 1024-1025.

File 242.1 Strikes and Disputes Mediation.
File 242.2 Labor Strikes—Effect on War Effort.
File 242.11 Referrals in Labor Disputes.
File 242.3 Strike Breaking.

File 242.4 Congressional Action.
File 245 Labor Relations.

File 245.11 Unions.
File 245.12 Contractual Relations.


File 261.242 Contracts—Farming Out Methods, 1940-41.
File 262.11 Contracts—Negotiation Procedures.
File 591.104h Canned Foods, Labor.
File 711 The President.

File 811.3 Cost of Living in Civilian Economy, 1940-1941.

File OF 112 American Federation of Labor, Boxes 1-4.
File OF 107 Labor and Strikes, Boxes 1-9.
In April 1948 a request for information concerning the endorsements and activities of local PAC units during the period 1944-1947 was sent to each of the CIO's Industrial Union Councils. The replies are in the possession of the Author.

In May 1949 a request was sent to each CIO Industrial Union Council for a breakdown of the distribution of their memberships by city, county and state. The replies are in the possession of the Author.

Recommendations of the Executive Officers of the CIO on Inflation to the meeting of the CIO Executive Board held in Washington, D.C., August 30-31, 1948. Washington: Congress of Industrial Organizations.


Recommendations of the Executive Officers to the meeting of the CIO Executive Board held in Washington, D.C., on August 30-31, 1948. The Southern Organizing Drive. Washington: Congress of Industrial Organizations.


Interviews

Interview with John Brophy, CIO Department of Industrial Union Councils, May, 1949.

Interview with Nathan Cowan, CIO Legislative Representative, October, 1948, Washington, D.C.

Interview with Ted Dudley, Assistant Director of CIO-PAC, September 17, 1951, Washington, D.C.

Interview with George Guernsey, CIO Educational Director, October 1948, Washington, D.C.

Interview with Robert E. Howe, Labor's Non-Partisan League, September 14, 1951, Washington, D.C.

Interview (telephone) with John T. Jones, Director of Labor's Non-Partisan League, November 27, 1951, Washington, D.C.

Interview with Anne Mason, PAC Field Representative, December 21, 1948, Washington, D.C.

Interview with Henry Murray, PAC Regional Director for the Middle Atlantic States, January 31, 1949, Philadelphia.

Interview with Dillard Stokes, of CIO-PAC National Headquarters Staff, December 21, 1948, Washington, D.C.

Interview with John Summers, Philadelphia Industrial Union Council, January 31, 1949, Philadelphia.
Delbert Donald Arnold

Permanent Address: 110 Lynnwood Street, Apt. 202, Alexandria, Virginia

Degree to be Conferred: Ph.D.

Date of Birth: August 24, 1920.

Secondary Education: Horace Mann High School, Alva, Oklahoma, 1937.

Collegiate Institutions attended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Date of Degree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern State College, Alva, Oklahoma</td>
<td>1937-1940</td>
<td>A.B.</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Maryland</td>
<td>1946-1949</td>
<td>M.A.</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Publications: None.

Positions Held:

Production Expeditor, Consolidated Aircraft Corporation.

Production Expeditor, Glenn L. Martin Company.

Graduate Assistant, History Department, University of Maryland.

Assistant Professor of Social Science, Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa.