ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation: THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION AND THE SOCIAL POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT, 1938-1969

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From the ashes of the First World War, the ILO emerged to address the plight of industrial workers. Yet, by 1952, the organization had embarked upon an ambitious multilateral enterprise aimed at peasants in the Andes Mountains, known as the Andean Indian Program (AIP). My dissertation confronts the paradox of the ILO’s postwar turn toward rural “development.” Tracing the formation of an international technocracy (ITC), I argue that this group became the principal foot soldiers of the International Labor Organization’s Andean Indian Program and propelled it to the center of postwar discussions of social and economic “development.” I examine the intellectual history of the AIP, as the international experts who managed the program encountered the apparatus of regional states and the Andean communities targeted for “reform” in order to decompose the strategies and practices deployed by the ILO and the AIP. I argue that despite the deployment of a “universal” model of development by the ILO, the Andean Program was a “zone of contact” between the ITC’s universalizing discourse and a social politics of development. Brining into focus the pivotal actions of particular individuals,
institutions, and states, I argue that the logic defining the Andean Program cannot be
found only in the adherence of powerful actors to a shared universalizing “discourse,”
but also in the relationship of that discourse to United States’ hegemony during the
Cold War. My work reveals that the international technocracy’s efforts to de-
 politicize development provided an important avenue for the exportation of U.S.
models of social and economic organization.
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION AND THE SOCIAL POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT, 1938-1969

By

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Preface

It may even seem paradoxical that the ILO, which has devoted so much effort to enlarging the scope and effectiveness of international action, should at the same time be giving priority to strengthening the nation state in the developing world. But the paradox is more apparent than real. We are strengthening the nation state because it is still the only viable framework within which economic and social progress can take place. And it is only if each developing nation can become independent in fact as well as in law that each can play its full part in the institutions of the wider international community.

-David A. Morse, Director General, International Labor Organization, 1969
Dedication

For Jacqui.

And for my parents, James and Rebecca.
Acknowledgements

I alone am responsible for its faults and shortcomings, but a number of institutions and individuals helped to make this project possible. During my time at Villanova University, Professors Seth Koven and Marc Gallichio provided valuable guidance and encouragement on the subjects of international social politics and international relations respectively. Their approach to historical scholarship and the discussions that took place in their graduate seminars, no doubt, shaped the transnational ambitions of this project.

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knowledgeable archivists and staff at the International Labor Organization Archives in Geneva, who generously shared their expertise and intimate knowledge of the ILO and Andean Indian Program records.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

My dissertation explores the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) management of the Andean Indian Program (AIP) as a case study in the formation of international social policy norms after World War II. Two main themes define my approach and my contribution to the existing literature. First, I argue that the push to establish programs for social and economic development at the ILO and other international bodies occurred at a critical moment, as transnational networks and institutions were being redefined and their importance reevaluated. The failure of the League of Nations to prevent the calamity of World War II left the existing international system in ruins and raised the question of how to rebuild. The consolidation of the Bretton Woods agreement in July 1944 followed by the adoption of the United Nations charter a year later established rules under which such a system could operate. However, this foundation was hardly adequate given the likelihood of increasing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. My dissertation argues that a group of reformers at the ILO and who formed part of a growing international network saw the need to go further and replace the failed and largely discredited internationalism of the interwar years with a more robust and active liberal internationalism. My work is an intellectual history of the effort to promote a new internationalism rooted in a universalist concept of modernity and “development.” The new internationalism promoted by the ILO was fueled in no small part by a particular brand of American exceptionalism, which infused the application of technical expertise with a missionary-like zeal. The guiding principle of this internationalism was, as described below, a “gospel of production” in which the reformers at the ILO actively promoted the link between social and economic
development and global peace and stability through technical assistance and social integration programs across the developing world. It is within this broader milieu, I argue, that the Andean Program must be understood. The AIP was many things: a bulwark against communist infiltration into rural communities, a mechanism for transforming Latin American states in the image of western welfare-capitalist governments, and a means of raising living standards and promoting full employment. But perhaps above all, it was a test case for how the ILO would engage and help build the basis for a new internationalism that depoliticized “development” and bolstered United States hegemony after the Second World War.

The second major theme of my dissertation is more specifically concerned with the ways in which international institutions are written about and commonly understood. To this end, my work reorients the study of international organizations around spaces of conflict, resistance, and negotiation. I explore international organizations as nodes within a larger reform network that shaped postwar social policy norms, not as the mere accomplices of powerful state actors. If the AIP was a vehicle for acting on a broad international agenda that supported the extension of American hegemony, then I argue that this fact requires examination of the wider context that informed that agenda as well as close examination of the specific constraints and opportunities that it imposed on the ILO and its work with indigenous peoples. I therefore argue that the AIP was a social arena in which international experts, government officials, and indigenous peoples negotiated ideas about “modernity,” “expertise,” and national identity that contributed to a new internationalism. Because this negotiation occurred on multiple levels, from high level policy debates to the day-to-day encounters between indigenous peoples and AIP
experts, it is not always easy to identify winners and losers. The sources consulted for this study were drawn from archives in the United States, various published sources, and most especially from the ILO archival records of the AIP. While the ILO field records for the AIP provided much rich content, particularly about the program’s development and operations in Bolivia, the perspective revealed by these records is necessarily limited to that of the experts and officials responsible for administering the program. Despite this limitation, paying attention to the intellectual and discursive frameworks that structured interactions between ILO project managers, AIP experts, government officials and indigenous peoples yields definite rewards. It exposes the making of international social policy norms after World War II as the transnational clash of ideas and interests that it truly was and demonstrates the ways in which the goals of the AIP could be openly subverted and channeled toward other ends, despite the best efforts of the ILO or other players to predetermine the outcome.

The AIP is treated throughout this dissertation as a nexus for multiple, competing ideas about the nature of modernity, development, race, and nation. The primary setting for the technical assistance work that constituted the AIP encompassed the countries and indigenous communities of Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia. While Chapter 5 touches on the program’s operations in Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia to examine the AIP from a regional perspective, a full accounting of the AIP’s efforts across the region is beyond the scope of this study. As the first and most well-developed component of the AIP, the country of Bolivia is the primary focus of the analysis that follows.
The remainder of this introductory chapter delves deeper into the themes examined throughout the dissertation, including the role of American exceptionalism in shaping postwar technical assistance efforts at the ILO and elsewhere. It provides background regarding the history of the ILO to articulate more precisely how the AIP diverged from the previous history of the organization since its formation after the First World War. It concludes with an examination of the historiographic traditions directly confronted and intersected by my work on the AIP. Most importantly, this introductory chapter examines the history of U.S. interactions with Latin America to explore why and how the Second Bolivian Revolution.
World War created new spaces for the exportation of American exceptionalism and the conception of a new internationalism that privileged expertise and helped established a new “social infrastructure” for enforcing international norms.

The ability to influence ideas and shape technical assistance discourse is, of course, not the same thing as being able to control events. Chapter Two examines the “foot soldiers” of international development, a network of individuals that I term the International Technocracy (ITC). I explore why individuals, such as the ILO’s Director General David Morse, coalesced around a belief in the power of technical assistance and became part of a broader network for international reform. Using the ILO and Andean Indian Program as a use case, Chapter Two considers some of the ways in which World War II and the Cold War made the ITC possible and established its potential as a force for international reform and regulation. Perhaps most important in the case of Morse and others, was the Anti-Totalitarianism generated by their participation in the war effort. I then discuss how the ITC helped push the ILO away from its traditional focus on establishing international labor standards toward a greater emphasis on field operations that provided technical assistance and promoted development. Chapter Two also sets the stage for the encounters that resulted from the ILO’s decision to pursue the Andean Indian Program.

Chapter Three looks more closely at the ILO’s work with indigenous peoples and particularly the initiation of AIP operations in Bolivia. Nominally concerned with the rights and conditions affecting industrial workers, by 1952 the ILO nevertheless could trace an interest in the problems affecting indigenous groups that dated back to its inception at the end of World War I. This alone does not explain the ILO’s decision to
make the AIP into its primary, experimental effort in support of international development. Chapter Three examines the ILO’s actions in the context of a field of forces involving several divergent elements, including Bolivian history and geography, transnational discourses of economic rationalization and social integration, a traditional “Indigenist” discourse that sought to define the indigenous “problem” in terms of racial and ethnic assimilation, national identity, and the demands of modernization.

In Chapter Four, the ILO’s “integral” method for promoting development in Bolivia and across the Andes region is explored as a vector for encounters between international experts, state officials, and local communities. The ILO program in Bolivia was intended as a way to accelerate economic production and lay down the seeds of an indigenous middle class across the region. However, as the chapter illustrates, despite the overarching goals of the program’s designers inspired by the vision of a new internationalism, the AIP was a contested space in which issues ranging from the establishment of agricultural cooperatives to programs for colonization and resettlement defined the social politics of development.

The timing of the program’s launch and the size of its indigenous population arguably made Bolivia the model for the AIP in Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. Nevertheless, it is essential to consider the larger regional and international ambitions of the program. Chapter Five moves away from the particular use case of 1950s and 1960s Bolivia to examine the AIP as a regional program. The analysis largely substantiates my argument that the lineaments of the program persisted across national borders, but also illustrates how national variations complicated achievement of the goals articulated by ILO leadership and the AIP’s technical experts deployed to the field. Following Chapter
Five, a brief conclusion summarizes key findings and emphasizes the AIP’s significance as a subject of historical analysis.

*Technical Assistance and American Exceptionalism*

After the Second World War “development” became practically synonymous with the disbursal of western technologies and technical “know-how” to societies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. One member of the initial survey mission that led to the establishment of the AIP and a member of the ILO’s senior staff, David Bleloch, defined this need in terms of the global expansion of the welfare state. “The whole economic development even of the already highly developed countries,” Bleloch wrote in 1952, “depends on the extension of the concept of the Welfare State to cover all the economically significant portions of the earth’s surface.”¹ Bleloch along with many others of the same generation saw the movement in favor of “technical assistance” as vital to the future. The immediate context for his remarks on technical assistance was the decline of the Western colonial empires and the beginnings of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, by emphasizing the “dependent” relationship existing between the “already highly developed countries” and the “under-developed” nations of the world, he also pointed to the ways in which the expansion of global capitalism and the unfolding of history itself blurred the lines between national and supranational concerns.² Conceived in this way, as a panacea for injustice and conflict, technical assistance was not just as a solution to the economic and social problems of a particular nation, state, or society, but a plan for achieving putatively

² Ibid.
universal economic and social goals. For Bleloch, as for other supporters of
“modernization” and “development,” this technocratic approach represented a pathway to
the creation of a more equitable world. In this way, just as the welfare state could
represent an augmentation of the regulatory powers of domestic governments for the
purpose of expanding the social and economic rights of its citizens, so too could
“development” represent the enhancement and expansion of international governance in
the name of social justice.

The process of decolonization and the beginnings of the Cold war ultimately
configured much of the geopolitical terrain upon which postwar developmentalism
operated, but I would argue that the impetus behind this halecyon view of technical
assistance can be traced to the Second World War and to the successful exportation of a
particular brand of American exceptionalism. This particular exceptionalism had
informed the New Deal programs of the 1930s and continued to support the expansion of
technical assistance and the application of administrative expertise during and after the
war. Indeed, in what could be regarded as a speech that anticipated the postwar consensus
on development, Franklin Roosevelt explained to an assembly of ILO delegates in 1941
that, “social problems and economic [were] not separate water-tight compartments in the
international any more than in the national sphere.” “In international, as in national
affairs,” he urged his audience, “economic policy can no longer be an end in itself.”
Instead, policy and the institutions created for its execution must act “[as] a means for
achieving social objectives.” Roosevelt urged a larger international commitment “to bring
about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of
securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.”
To be sure, the goal of providing “a decent standard of living” for the “many millions of people in this world who have never been adequately fed and clothed and housed,” was seemingly limitless in scope. And yet, governed by the dictum that “enlightened social policies” could effectively do the work of building a new world order that promoted the social and economic welfare of all, the speech mirrored the faith in modern technology and technocratic management that characterized much of the New Deal and foreshadowed the coming age of “modernization” and “development.”3 It is in this way that Roosevelt’s speech anticipated the more complete fusion of social and economic goals found in the discourse of postwar developmentalism and in the technical assistance/foreign aid programs operated by the U.S. government and international institutions such as the ILO. By the 1950s, the ascendancy of “technical assistance” captured this synthesis and added modernization and development policy to the arsenal of overt and covert techniques used to fight the Cold War.

After the Second World War the United States was not the only available source of ideas about international development, foreign aid, and technical assistance. Nevertheless, with the benefits of American capitalism internationally up for grabs, the U.S. signified and projected an especially powerful model of economic and social development. For many New Deal liberals, the move to the global stage seemed a logical extension of work during the 1930s to create jobs for unemployed Americans, to tame unbridled capitalism, to ensure protections for the rights of American workers, to modernize the American South and raise living standards in rural areas, to create a social

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safety net for older Americans, and to stimulate economic recovery and growth by promoting consumption. In fact, in the late 1930s and 1940s, scores of U.S. citizens found the pull of international problems irresistible. Thus, recalling his leadership of a World Bank mission to Colombia in 1949, for example, former New Deal economist Lauchlin Currie insisted that ignorance of Colombia’s history or present circumstances did not “dull for a moment [his] enthusiasm or shake [his] conviction that if only the [World] Bank and the country would listen,” he would “come up with a solution of sorts” to the country’s many problems. For Currie, Colombia was an “an economic missionary’s paradise,” posing a “marvelous number of practically insoluble problems,” which he wished to “do something about.” This reformer’s zeal was, he concluded, largely the result of his “baptism [by] fire in the Great Depression,” during which he “had played some role in working out the economic recovery program in the New Deal for the worst depression the United States had ever experienced,” and of his participation in the Second World War. As one of the contributing authors of the International Monetary Fund’s founding charter, Currie had a direct hand in the construction of the postwar international system. In this way, the former Treasury Department official and White House economic advisor became the development economist.

Currie’s experience, I would argue, was not exceptional. Indeed, as political

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6 Beside their involvement the United Nations and its specialized agencies, some of the more prominent examples of the deployment of U.S. citizens and personnel include the
institutions such as the United Nations, Americans who supported and helped institute the reforms of the New Deal at home deployed their considerable skills and attention abroad.

To be sure, the mere presence of U.S.-Americans internationally can hardly be seen as a unique to the period following the Second World War. The work of historian Daniel Rodgers and others illustrates, for example, that transnational exchanges between progressive reformers were an integral part of the intellectual milieu of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Atlantic world. In this way, Rodgers shows that Progressive Era reformers in the United States and Europe did not limit themselves to the resources of their home nations, but instead drew inspiration from a transatlantic palette of ideas and policies—he traces the infusion of information and knowledge from Europe into the United States and describes the epistemic communities that colored progressive efforts on both sides of the Atlantic.\(^8\) If, however, as Rodgers suggests, the New Deal represented the fruition of early twentieth-century progressive exchanges, then the Second World War just as certainly marked an important shift in the flows of knowledge, power, and culture internationally. As a result of World War II and the exigencies of the Cold War, American reformers were ubiquitous on the international stage, while in their capacity as technical experts, policy makers, and international officials such individuals transposed domestic social policy models and economic development solutions onto a new international context. Put somewhat differently, just as the exchanges of the Progressive Era “Atlantic crossings” tended to stream out of Europe and into the United States and the rest of the world, the new postwar era of “development” and “modernization” (born

in the crucible of World War II) found the general current of ideas reversed, diverted by new circumstances and new realities into different channels than those traveled before.

We need to know more about the mechanisms and relationships that governed this flood of people, culture, knowledge, policy, and technology from the United States to other parts of the world. At the same time, my dissertation demonstrates that it is a mistake to view these flows as moving only in one direction and exposes the folly of supposing only that history’s most powerful actors have the wherewithal to shape events and outcomes. The subject of postwar developmentalism is a worthy topic of historical analysis for many reasons, not the least of which includes aspects of Cold War history, the social and cultural history of international institutions, and the ways in which such institutions (institutions such as the International Labor Organization) have sought to shape international norms. The focus of the following chapters is on the liberal internationalism that propelled the ILO toward a program of social and economic integration for rural peasants in the Andes. This internationalism was made up of many parts, some of which coexisted rather uncomfortably together in the same package.

My dissertation argues that the internationalism that informed the ILO’s Andean Indian Program and its postwar turn toward developmentalism owed much to the brand of American exceptionalism described above. Nevertheless, to understand why “development” became such a central part of the history of the postwar period, we must also look beyond the influence of any particular nation or state, to the new international system constructed during and immediately after the war. Indeed, if the enhanced global position of the United States facilitated the deployment of domestic social and economic models abroad and helped to promote the value of technical assistance as a technique of
power, then the creation of the United Nations and its specialized institutions consolidated and institutionalized the circulation of ideas, technologies, and “know-how” upon which the dispersal of “enlightened social policy” depended. 9 As historian Akira Iriye argues, “[a]lthough [after World War II] states and governments would be the primary agencies for defining economic policies or implementing social programs, ultimately the rights and interests of ‘peoples’ would have to be safeguarded through cooperative international action.” The League of Nations and its specialized institutions implemented the rudiments of such a system in the 1920s, but the absence of U.S. participation, the onset of a world depression, and other limitations on its ability to act seriously circumscribed the League’s capacities. 11 Clearly the post-World War II

9 The role of international organizations in the postwar international system has been especially neglected until relatively recently. As historian Akira Iriye concludes, although historians and scholars “have written volumes on the history of the contemporary world, or more specifically on modern international relations” rather few “contain more than a passing reference, if at all, to international organizations,” such as the ILO. Iriye himself writes of the role of international organizations (interstate and non-state) both as promoting globalization and as the repositories of “global consciousness.” Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 4. See also Akira Iriye and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), Global Interdependence: The World After 1945 (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014) and Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock (eds.), The Human Rights Revolution: An International History (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012).

10 Iriye, Global Community, 42.

11 Political scientist Inis Claude located one of the most important sources of difference between the League and the United Nations in the changes that had occurred within the political philosophy of liberalism: “if the liberalism which inspired the League was essentially a nineteenth-century phenomenon, the doctrinal foundation of the night-
international system constituted an intricate, complex, and altogether more expansive system that integrated the actions of individual states, intergovernmental organizations, and international nongovernmental organizations in ways scarcely imaginable before.\textsuperscript{12}

Understanding the nature of these networks and their connection to the project of postwar “development” is a central focus of this dissertation. I show the ways in which “development” was the product of a postcolonial order that replicated, even as it altered, the structures of the American welfare state abroad and that combined the unilateral and bilateral action of sovereign states with an institutional matrix of multilateral programs yoked to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{13} The ILO’s Andean Indian Program was one of the first watchman state, the liberalism which underlay the new system was the twentieth-century version, the theoretical support of the welfare state.” Inis Claude, \textit{Swords and Plowshares} (New York, NY: Random House, 1956), 87-88. See also Burley, “Regulating the World.”

\textsuperscript{12} For two very different perspectives on the consequences of this new system see Elizabeth Borgwardt, \textit{A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights} (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2005) and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, \textit{Empire} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). For Borgwardt, the new international institutions created in the wake of the Second World War ushered in a new era of multilateral institutionalism. Tracing this new institutionalism primarily to the New Deal and the Atlantic Charter, Borgwardt argues that it represented “one expression of [a] transition toward a more pluralistic vision of modernity,” the creation of a world in which universal human rights could be protected via the exercised will of an international community “capable of reaching through a nation’s so-called veil of sovereignty.” Borgwardt, \textit{New Deal for the World}, 73 & 75. In contrast, Hardt and Negri associate the post-World War II era with the emergence of a new kind of \textit{imperial sovereignty}, “composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule” and structured by the globalization of production and the weakening of nation states. Lacking definite territorial or temporal boundaries, for the Hardt and Negri the new global system should be seen in a much more sinister light than the one presented by Borgwardt, i.e. as a hegemonic form of “biopower” that seeks to define all aspects of human existence for the purpose of establishing a system of perpetual order. I would argue that a more accurate and realistic description of the postwar international system occupies a middle ground between these two extremes.

\textsuperscript{13} Besides bilateral and multilateral aid, which functioned through the participation of states either individually or via institutions such as the United Nations, the activities of so called non-governmental organizations or NGOs (such as multinational corporations and not-for-profit philanthropic organizations) constitute another arm of development. While
postwar attempts to support multilateral economic and social development through the auspices of the United Nations.

*The International Labor Organization in Historical Perspective*

The idea of creating an international forum for discussing labor and social policy dates back (at least) to the International Workingmen’s Association or First International. Formed in 1864, the First International drew attention to the problems faced by the working classes of Europe, especially the need for an international system of labor standards. Similar efforts by a transnational cadre of labor organizations and social reformers followed: including the Second International (1889), the International Bureau for the Protection of Labor (late 1890s), the International Association for Labor Legislation or IALL (established at the Paris World’s Fair in 1900), and the International
Federation of Trade Unions (1913). Between 1900 and the First World War, the IALL became the most important international mechanism for the promotion of labor standards. In the United States, while the organized labor movement (dominated by the AFL) rejected the strategy of government legislation advocated by the IALL, by the time of the St. Louis exposition of 1904, reformers such as social scientist Richard Ely (president), labor economist John R. Commons (executive secretary), and Hull House founder Jane Addams helped form the first American chapter of the IALL.

Two main circumstances limited the impact of the IALL, and it was not until after the First World War that substantial international support emerged for the creation of an international labor commission along the lines of the ILO. First, the International Association for Labor Legislation lacked the imprimatur of an official intergovernmental body, which left it dependent on cooperation between national chapters, such as the one organized by Ely, Commons, Addams and others in the U.S. Perhaps more importantly, the First World War effectively circumvented the kind of voluntary international cooperation required by the IALL. Indeed, unlike the IALL and its predecessors, under the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, the ILO was formally recognized as the international labor commission.

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14 Edward C. Lorenz, *Defining Global Justice: The History of U.S. International Labor Standards Policy* (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 42. Lorenz’s study examines the capacity of different interests groups situated within the United States to shape international labor standards, especially through the ILO. For Lorenz, the most important groups include consumers, churches and religious organizations, labor organizations, business groups, academics, and other elements of civil society. Although the issue of labor standards is not ignored, I focus specifically on the ways in which the ILO attempted to translate a general orientation toward the promotion of social justice into a set of concrete practices and strategies for social and economic development.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid, 48. The efforts of the IALL paralleled and overlapped the national efforts of other organizations in the United States, such as the National Consumers League. See Lorenz, *Defining Global Justice*, especially Chapter 2 and Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*, 236-237.
“permanent machinery” for executing the “General Principles” embodied by Article 427 of the treaty, which insisted that “there are methods and principles for regulating labor conditions which all industrial communities should endeavor to apply.” Although the ILO did not require membership in the League of Nations from its members, membership in the League did “carry with it” membership in the International Labor Organization. With the sanction of the Versailles Treaty and the newly configured international community represented by the League, throughout the 1920s and 1930s the ILO developed a reputation as a vocal defender of workers’ rights and a promoter of labor standards.

From its origins in the contentious peace settlements that ended World War I, what made the ILO unique among international institutions was its tripartite governing structure, an administrative and policymaking apparatus that (at least in theory) gave equal representation to national governments, organized labor, and business. Along

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17 The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, “The Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919,” http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/partxiii.htm (accessed October 30, 2012). Among the nine principles specifically identified in Article 427 were the belief that labor is not “a commodity or article of commerce,” the right of free association by workers and employers, the payment of a living wage, support for the eight hour day and forty-eight hour week, the abolition of child labor, and equal pay for equal work between men and women.

18 Despite this provision, the United States did not become a member of the ILO until 1934. For a discussion of the events surrounding the U.S. decision see Gary B. Ostrower, “The American Decision to Join the International Labor Organization,” Labor History 16, no. 4 (1975): 495-504.


20 As the administrative structure of the ILO charter was negotiated in 1918 and ratified in 1919, the ILO General Conference had a different voting system than the more specialized committees created to address specific problems by the organization. In the General Conference, member governments possessed two votes, and employers and labor
with more direct support and involvement from the United States’ government, it was this pluralist approach to institutional governance that enabled the ILO to survive the tumultuous years of World War II and rejuvenate itself in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. The ILO offered a readymade, already established structure for supporting postwar development in a forum for international exchange that promised something for everyone. Governments in the “developing” world could seek international expertise to promote their own agendas and projects, while business leaders sought to limit the restrictions that the organization’s resolutions could place on international trade. Labor sought ILO expertise and resources to offset limitations in their domestic markets. Yet, the survival of the ILO as an institution was not certain. With Europe under siege after 1939, the organization entered a turbulent and uncertain period. U.S. support of the organization was critical to the organization’s future, and, indeed, American John Winant took up the task of steering the organization as its new Director-General, from 1939 until his appointment as the U.S. ambassador to London in 1941.21 It was under Winant’s leadership that the ILO evacuated and abandoned its headquarters in Geneva for the duration of the war. In this context, Franklin Roosevelt’s address to the organization in 1941 (cited above) came at a crucial moment in the organization’s future, as the ILO struggled for survival and sought to make the case for its own continued relevance.

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21 Anthony Alcock notes that upon his resignation as the ILO’s Director-General in 1938, Harold Butler told the press that his resignation and Winant’s ascension as the new head of the ILO marked a “shift in the ILO’s center of gravity away from Europe and toward the United States.” Butler’s comments originally appeared in the April 28 and 29 editions of the New York Times. Alcock, History, 156. Winant previously helped to establish the U.S. Social Security System.
Convening its Annual Conference at Philadelphia three years later, in 1944, the organization charted a course for a new era and simultaneously reaffirmed a set of core principles established at its creation, including the belief that “Labor is not a commodity,” that “freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained progress,” and that “poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere.”22 These were ideals that reflected the (primarily European) social democratic roots of the organization—its willingness to combine socialist critiques of capitalism with the liberal concern for liberty and individual rights. Equally striking, in 1944 the ILO delegates for the first time committed the organization to “full employment and the raising of standards of living,” to “the effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining,” to “the cooperation of management and Labor in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency,” and to “the collaboration of workers and employers in the preparation and application of social and economic measures.”23 These measures reflected the influence, I would argue, of a U.S. model of industrial relations that emphasized the development of institutional mechanisms for the neutralization of social and economic conflict.24

23 Ibid.
Incorporated within the United Nations (U.N.) umbrella in 1946, the International Labor Organization became an important component of the new system of international order crafted after the Second World War. Under the agreement, the ILO remained an autonomous organization; the UN General Assembly possessed “no power of the purse” with which it could control ILO policy. Yet, as with other intergovernmental institutions, the ILO was limited by the boundaries of its mandate. Under the formal agreement ratified by the UN General Assembly and the ILO’s General Conference, the International Labor Organization was required to consult the UN on matters of policy and agreed to cooperate on “measures to co-ordinate the activities of the Specialised [sic] Agencies.” It could pass resolutions and it could exercise indirect pressure for compliance, but the organization still lacked the wherewithal to directly enforce the standards ratified by its General Conference.

The machinery of technical assistance and development suggested one way around these limitations. Indeed, after the launching of the U.N’s Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (UNEPTA) in 1949 and under the leadership of its new Director-General, American David A. Morse, the ILO became an active agent and purveyor of development strategies and practices. UNEPTA provided the financial wherewithal and Morse provided the strategic framework that pushed the ILO to expand its field operations. As historian Anthony Alcock noted the change, “from being an organization devoted, before the Second World War, to protecting the worker in industrial life through Labor legislation, it would now turn to preparing the worker for participation in industrial life. From working, before the Second World War, mainly with the highly industrialized

25 Alcock, History, 202-203.
countries, it would now give the wealth of its experience to the rest of the world.” 26 A believer in the promise of “technical assistance” and “development” in general, in his capacity as Director-General, Morse brought a wealth of experience and connections to the ILO. Following a larger pattern of Americans who transferred their homegrown skills and reputations to the international setting, Morse began his career working for the U.S. Department of the Interior and then as a Special Assistant to the United States Attorney General, before becoming an attorney for the National Labor Relations Board in the 1936. His work for the NLRB began a long career as an expert in policy matters relating to labor and industrial relations. During World War II, he was stationed in Europe and appointed Chief of the Labor Division of the Allied Military Government. Morse put in place the labor policy of the U.S. military in the occupied territories of Italy and Germany. In 1946, he became Assistant Secretary of Labor, then Under Secretary of Labor, and finally served a brief stint as acting Secretary. In the Labor Department, Morse continued to engage in work that required his attention to international conditions, serving as Deputy Chairman of the International Social Policy Committee. In 1948, he was elected as the new Director-General of the ILO.

Although Morse adopted an internationalist perspective when it came to labor and social policy, he also believed that the United States had a special role to play in the international system. Drawing on his experiences during the war and believing domestic and international social conditions to be part of a seamless web of relations, Morse

argued that the means by which the United States could best fulfill its long list of postwar obligations was the diffusion of American technical knowledge.27 No advocate of American unilateralism, Morse argued that via its membership in the ILO the U.S. was “a part of the economic and social machinery for world collaboration in the development of labor standards and the promotion of justice.”28 Even so, Morse espoused a version of American exceptionalism that pre-positioned the United States as a universal model of development. Armed with the vision of a postwar world order in which the spread of American technology and “know-how” was essential to the achievement of peace, stability, and social justice, Morse, I would argue, viewed the ILO as an important mechanism for the transmission of U.S. influence “throughout the world.”29

Although supportive of the ILO’s traditional role as an arbiter of international labor standards—Morse likened the organization to a university, in which governments, employers, and labor could learn “the thinking and experience of their colleagues in other countries”—he pushed for an expanded view of the International Labor Organization as a kind of international “laboratory through which experiments [in social and economic development] can be accessed and evaluated.”30 When he announced a new and unprecedented venture into technical assistance by the ILO in 1948, Morse labeled the organization’s plans “the most important program of its kind that has ever been attempted on a coordinated, universal basis.”31 Looking backward from the 1960s, he wrote that the

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28 Ibid, 10.
29 Ibid, 8.
30 Ibid, 12.
31 “ILO to Push Plan to Utilize Labor,” New York Times, November 30, 1948. Anthony Alcock describes Morse’s speech outlining the new program before the ILO’s governing
organization’s traditional function, as a clearinghouse for the development of universal labor standards, was “not enough.” “It seemed to me,” he explained, “that one of the major issues in the world was the problem of underdevelopment, and that the traditional methods of ILO action were inadequate to deal with that problem.” “[T]o have the impact it should have on social policy in the world,” Morse continued, “[the ILO] would have to become an operational organization.”

Promoting an ambitious expansion of the ILO’s activities from the 1940s until his retirement in 1970, Morse was instrumental in reshaping it into a paragon of postwar developmentalism and sought to use the organization as a tool of international reform.

*Development and The Andean Program*

“A gradual transformation has been working in the mind of the Indians. They know now that it is not inevitable that a newly-born baby dies in a short time; they demand schools for their children; the alphabet is no longer a murky mystery to them; they have learned that the crops will be better if they use proper techniques, and that wages are higher for those with a profession or trade. They know that they can assimilate like the rest of the world the lessons of modern technology. They are within reach of a situation hitherto inconceivable. The word ‘possible’ has entered their lives.

This evolution is not only inevitable; it is desirable.”

-International Labor Office Report (1958)

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Several factors recommend the ILO’s Andean program as a case study for illustrating the possible ways in which a transnational development discourse that evolved after the Second World War could be translated into practice and just how David Morse and others sought to turn the ILO into a conduit for a new liberal internationalism. While during the 1940s and 1950s the ILO helped to internationalize a social and economic model that emanated primarily from the United States, beginning in 1952, the ILO’s Andean Indian Program targeted the indigenous populations of the Andes region with the stated goal of promoting their social “integration” and of supporting regional economic development. With the focus of increasing production and efficiency in the region, the Andean Program sought to address practically every aspect of daily life, including regulation of health and hygiene, vocational education, road construction, housing, agricultural development, and industrial and technical training. Even more ambitious, the colonization project at Cotoca in the Santa Cruz region of Bolivia (and at Puno, Peru) relocated hundreds of individuals and families from their homes in the Andean highlands with the goal of establishing entirely new communities “from scratch” in the plains near the Amazon basin. Moreover, the ILO’s “mission to the Andes” represented one of the earliest programs of its kind executed by the ILO and the United Nations, and thus was a benchmark for later multilateral development initiatives; the extent of the project’s influence as a model for future efforts remains to be studied. The breadth, diversity, and longevity of the program (1952-1972) make it possible to observe change over time, particularly the effect of shifting local and international circumstances, such as the 1952 Bolivian Revolution and the exigencies of the Cold War. Finally, the

ILO’s focus on the rural peasants of the Andean region stretched the capacities and flexibility of an organization (and a development model) primarily focused on industrial relations.

The expansion of ILO activities into the area of technical assistance illustrates the circulation of “development” ideas and models from the United States through a process of translation. But, as the history of the ILO itself suggests, the International Labor Organization was never a blank canvass upon which U.S. policy or American influence could simply be inscribed, no matter how strong the currents in that direction. Likewise, no matter how “inevitable” or “desirable” a particular project may have seemed, the nations and communities targeted by the ILO and by the larger postwar development apparatus possessed reasons of their own for supporting or opposing such programs; these must be considered as well. In order to assess the impact of development strategies “on the ground,” the focus of the dissertation moves from consideration Depression era and wartime influences on ILO reform efforts to the deployment of technical assistance and community development programs during the Cold War. The bilateral and multilateral programs aimed at the indigenous populations of the Andes Mountains in South America were among the first attempts to implement these plans after the Second World War. Indeed, among a handful of early efforts at international collaboration in the field of social and economic development, one of the most audacious but least well known was the ILO administered Andean Indian Program.

Described by Morse as “one of the most exciting developments imaginable,” the ILO’s “mission” to the Andes involved participation from other United Nations’ organizations as well, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.), the
United Nation’s Education, Science, and Culture Organization (U.N.E.S.C.O.), and the World Health Organization (W.H.O).35 Although the ILO’s Andean program was inaugurated in 1952, the impetus for such a program appeared earlier. In 1936, for example, the first regional conference of ILO members from the American States was held in Santiago, Chile. One of the topics discussed at the conference was the need to study the situation of the indigenous peoples who resided in the Andean region of several Latin American nations. The relocation of the ILO offices from Geneva, Switzerland to Montreal, Canada during the war and the strategic importance of the Latin American states to the war effort may have encouraged further interest in the region and its problems. In 1943, the International Labor Organization and the Bolivian and United States governments conducted a joint study of Bolivia’s economy and social structure. Although the study produced few concrete results, its authors recommended that the ILO constitute a central component of a new “far-reaching program in the Labor field,” a program that would especially address the integration of Bolivia’s indigenous population.36 Yet, despite the active involvement of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the Institute of Social Anthropology (both U.S. government agencies) in the region during the 1940s, no direct action was taken by the ILO until the 1950s. In 1952,  

the UN’s Technical Assistance Board authorized a survey mission to the Andes region for the purposes of gathering information and outlining proposals for a more permanent program. The resulting report became the basis for ILO and UN action in the Andes.

The ILO’s interest in rural economic and social development in the Andes, not to mention the ambitious scale of the program, is not easily reconciled with the goals of an organization otherwise focused on industrial relations. Why would the ILO become involved in a multilateral enterprise aimed at rural peasants, let alone take primary responsibility for its overall execution? Undoubtedly, part of the explanation must consider the dynamics of the Cold War and the international social politics that grew into the postwar “development apparatus.” The more precise ways in which the Cold War mattered in the case of the ILO and the project of development in the Andes are elaborated through this study. The Cold War was a global struggle, and it was in this sense that technical assistance and liberal economic development came to be seen as a weapon in the arsenal of the United States and its European allies (both of which figured prominently in the membership of the United Nations and the ILO). However, an explanation emphasizing the impact of the Cold War has its limitations. It can suffice only if we ignore the earlier chronology of developmentalism and minimize the direct importance of World War II as the catalyst for a new international social politics.

Equally important is the fact that, from very early in its history, the ILO had laid claim to the problems of “indigenous workers.” As international legal scholar Luis Rodriguez-Piñero points out, dating back to the 1920s the ILO’s interest in matters affecting non-industrial workers was reflected in the “Colonial Code” adopted by the organization, and through which the ILO drew up “a different set of international labor
standards specifically aimed at disciplining the conditions of exploitation of ‘indigenous workers.’” 37 “From its very inception,” he writes, “the organization considered ‘native labor’ according to notions of trusteeship prevailing in the international law of the time in its relations with [non-Western] societies.” 38 In the period before the Second World War, Rodriguez-Pinéro explains, the term “indigenous worker” referred almost exclusively to “the legal status of populations subjected to formal colonial domination.” 39 The modern use of the term “indigenous” would take on a different meaning, referring specifically to “culturally distinct groups living within the borders of independent states that are the descendants of the peoples that inhabited the region prior to colonization and the subsequent establishment of postcolonial states.” 40 Even so, he contends, that modern definition evolved from the ILO’s own “colonial history.” For Rodriguez-Pinero, this colonial lineage factored heavily in the construction of international law targeting indigenous peoples after the Second World War, explaining (at least in part) why the ILO “became the first international body concerned with indigenous issues, and eventually ended up drafting the international standards in the field of indigenous peoples’ rights.” 41 If one adds to this reality the internationalization and standardization of development discourse that occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War, the desire of David Morse and others to turn the ILO into an “operational” organization, and the Cold War emphasis on stopping the spread of communism in the “Third World,” the sources of ILO interest in the Andean region can be more clearly understood.

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, 333.
40 Ibid, 40.
41 Ibid, 332.
In the case of Latin America as a whole and the Andes Mountain region in particular, the history of “development” is very much tied to the history of United States involvement in the region. Indeed, the Andean program administered by the ILO paralleled similar efforts undertaken by missionary and private philanthropic organizations as well as agencies of the United States government in Latin American and elsewhere, dating back to the late 1930s and continuing into the 1960s with the Kennedy sponsored Alliance for Progress.\(^{42}\) Beginning in the 1930s, as a result of growing concern with the threat of Nazis influence in Latin America and in order to secure the raw materials needed for the war against the Axis Powers, individual U.S. government agencies such as the Departments of Agriculture and Labor fashioned programs aimed at the United State’s strategic allies in Latin America.\(^{43}\) In 1939, the coordination of the

\(^{42}\) For example, under the auspices of the Institute for Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) and the Point Four program, documents located in the National Archives demonstrate that the U.S. government considered a settlement program along the lines of those implemented by the ILO at Cotoca, Bolivia and Puno, Peru. The proposed initiative was named the “Montero Project.” In a memorandum dated June 14, 1950, the Associated Chief of Field Party for the IIAA in Bolivia, John Hanlon, discussed the “movement of altiplano Indians to the more productive lowlands” of the Santa Cruz region. Ultimately, Hanlon concluded, “it would be best for the future of the country if the altiplano people did not populate the lowlands” and that any attempt on this score “would be inadvisable, impractical, dangerous, and doomed to failure.” His reasoning seems to have hinged on an evaluation of the Aymara people “physically and physiologically,” as well as perceptions about their cultural adaptability. “They are not the kind of people to make a success of it,” Hanlon surmised. “If those lands [in the Santa Cruz area] are to have a real future,” he continued, “I feel that it must preferably be in the hands of other types of people, probably new people from the outside.” John J. Hanlon, M.D. to Paul S. Fox, “La Paz, June 14 1950,” file “Bolivia Montero Project,” Box 5 “Bolivia: Livestock- Public Administration,” RG 469 “Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961,” National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

\(^{43}\) In addition to the self-interested character of such activities, I would argue that (for good or ill) the increasing focus on government sponsored programs of technical
individual departmental programs was brought under a single administrative umbrella, the Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics or IDC. Together with the newly created Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs directed by Nelson Rockefeller, the IDC represented a new attempt on the part of the United States government to deploy American expertise and technology abroad, in such areas as public health and administration, rural education, child care, labor relations, and agricultural development, among others. This effort was intensified after 1949, when President Harry Truman announced the creation of a new program, dubbed “Point Four,” which accelerated the institutionalization and expansion of the international assistance overseas also betrayed a growing faith in the wider efficacy of domestic models and constituted a temporary departure from the recurrent military occupations that historically characterized U.S. relations with Latin America.

This committee went through numerous name changes over the years reflecting the widening scope of U.S. development programs from the 1930s onward. It began in 1938 as an interdepartmental committee concerned solely with U.S.-Latin American relations, but subsequently expanded its purview, becoming the Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation and finally the Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance. Some of these bilateral programs are discussed generally in Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1982), 202-228; David Green, The Containment of Latin America: A History of Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1971) 37-58; Curti and Birr, Prelude to Point Four; and Edward O. Guerrant, Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy (Albuquerque, NM: The University of New Mexico Press, 1950), 128-134. In addition, the National Planning Association sponsored the publication of a series of books and pamphlets on the subject of technical cooperation in Latin America in the 1950s, which describe the U.S. programs in more detail. See Phillip M. Glick, The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Arthur T. Mosher, Technical Cooperation in Latin American Agriculture (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957); James Gray Maddox, Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1956). The pamphlets include NPA Special Policy Committee on Technical Cooperation, Organization of the U.S. Government for Technical Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1955) and NPA Special Committee on Technical Cooperation, Technical Cooperation in Latin America—Recommendations for the Future (Washington, D.C.: NPA, 1956).
“development apparatus.” Simultaneously declaring that the “old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans,” Truman described the initiative as “a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.” Point Four, he said, would become “a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.” The U.S. government’s interest in countering the spread of communism in the “Third World” also constituted a principal motivation for the program.

46 Labeled the “Point Four” program because it was introduced as a fourth “point” in Truman’s January inaugural address, the stated goal was to provide financial and technical assistance to the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Passage of the Act for International Development (1950) to carry out the objectives of Point Four continued the process of centralizing U.S. government aid and assistance programs under the umbrella of a single executive agency. Numerous reorganizations and legislative addendums transformed the original legislation over the next decade—as policymakers, congress, and the President fought to reshape the program—culminating in the creation of the U.S. Agency for International Development under the auspices of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961. Despite the torturous uncertainty of this policy trajectory, at least one author has explained the expansion of U.S. aid and assistance programs as a product of a timeless “liberal tradition” in America. See Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).

47 Harry S. Truman, “Truman’s Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949,” President Truman Museum and Library, www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inaugural 20jan1949.htm (accessed April 21, 2012). In contrast to this favorable description, critics of development such as Gilbert Rist have gone so far as to describe the Point Four paradigm as little more than an updated version of imperialism or what he describes as “anti-colonial imperialism.” While not unsympathetic to this view, I believe that it over simplifies the relationship between the United States and the postwar international development regime. The concept of hegemony more accurately describes the influence of the United States over development programs such as the AIP. See Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (London, UK: Zed Books, 1997), 75. On hegemony see for example Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London, UK: Verso, 2001) and Slavoj Zizek, Ernesto Laclau, and Judith Butler (Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. London, UK: Verso, 2000).
In stark contrast to the assertions of President Truman and other U.S. officials over the years, much of the historiography on the nature of U.S.-Latin American relations emphasizes the exploitative and expansionist nature of U.S. policy. A great deal of this literature draws upon the work of so-called revisionist historians, such as William Appleman Williams. In what is perhaps his best know book, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, Williams argued that the history of American foreign relations reflected the dominance of the policy of the “Open Door.” Referring specifically to a series of “notes” written by U.S. Secretary of State John Hay to the European powers regarding the creation of “spheres of influence” in China, Williams adapted the concept of “the Open Door” as an all-encompassing metaphor for American foreign relations (and U.S. history)—i.e. the influence of capitalist economic expansion on the development of the United States and specifically U.S. foreign policy. Williams’s Open Door thesis indicted the actions and ideology of American business and policy-making elites for their cynical devotion to developing and maintaining access to new markets for American capitalism, whatever the cost. For Williams, the continued reliance on (territorial and economic) expansionism was entirely unsustainable over the long term and drew attention away from pressing problems at home. At the same time, it exposed the fallacy of exceptionalist claims concerning the special course and purpose of American history, which conceived the United States as a beacon of liberty and democracy. As Williams famously concluded, “[t]he tragedy of American diplomacy is not that it is evil, but that it denies and subverts American ideas and ideals.”

came “in the loss of our vitality as citizens,” leading to the decline of strong and healthy communities, the eclipse of civil society, and the erosion of democracy.49

While Williams tended to focus on the origins and domestic consequences of “empire as a way of life,” his students continued to flesh out the details of his thesis while remaining true to its central arguments about the importance of economic expansion to American history. In the context of U.S.-Latin American relations since the 1930s, most recent attempts to analyze the Roosevelt administration’s “Good Neighbor Policy” echo the conclusions of Williams and his student Lloyd C. Gardner. Arguing against the grain of scholars such as Samuel F. Bemis, who saw the Good Neighbor policy as a corrective to earlier imperialistic policies in Latin America, Gardner concluded that Roosevelt’s foreign policy existed comfortably within in the “mainstream” of American foreign

49 William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life: an Essay on the Causes and Character of America’s Present Predicament, Along with a Few Thoughts about an Alternative (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980), 13. The legacy of various domestic reforms fared little better in Williams’s analysis, following a familiar pattern of profit-driven manipulation and squandered opportunities. In the case of turn-of-the-century progressivism, for example, Williams concluded simply that “[r]eform at home justified empire abroad.” Ibid, 119. Williams’s analysis of the New Deal was more nuanced, but nevertheless resulted in similar conclusions. On the one hand, he observed that a profound change had occurred with the inauguration of the New Deal in the 1930s. Whereas nineteenth-century liberalism associated individual liberty with limited government and expansion across the continent, after the New Deal the expansion of liberty came increasingly to rely “upon the imperial police power of the ever more awesome state.” Ibid, 114. The key moment in the formation of this “new” empire had come with the Spanish-American War, which initiated the globalization of U.S.-American aspirations. Nevertheless, it was the New Deal that consummated the new situation, saving capitalism with a dose of statism. While the New Deal and the Second World War resulted in the formation of the American welfare state, Williams observed that the New Deal legacy of expanded social services was imaginable only as the continuation of well worn expansionist policies. Ibid, 157. entering the great historiographic debate surrounding historians’ attempts to come to grips with the nature of the New Deal, Williams concluded that it was “revolutionary” to the extent that it redefined American liberalism and legitimated a new role for the state as an instrument of “reform,” but that it did so under the restrictive conditions of a highly developed, global capitalist political economy.
relations. Following the trail blazed by his mentor, for Gardner the Good Neighbor Policy was primarily concerned with expanding U.S. markets and creating new outlets for American business. “New Deal foreign policy was not unique,” he wrote, it “did not magically or morally climb from isolation to world leadership, and does not give us a guide to the future.” At the same time, he noted that, “from 1938 to 1941 the United States was developing a way to give Latin America a meaningful share,” in the form of “aid for the establishment of basic industries, programs to absorb agricultural surpluses, and the ‘delousing of South America to rid it of Axis pets.’”

However, Gardner maintains, with the exception of the war years, the overriding emphasis was on promoting stability in the face of revolution, resulting in coercive economic policies that crippled the independence and economic development of many Latin American states.

Similarly, R.A. Humphreys’s two-volume treatment of the region during World War II argues that the goodwill of the war years was squandered when the United States

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failed to provide Latin America with its own Marshall Plan.\textsuperscript{51} U.S. agencies such as the Institute for Inter-American Affairs did continue to operate in the region until the announcement of Point Four, but such activities paled in comparison to the levels of aid provided to war torn Europe. In the same way, despite the pronouncements of American presidents and other U.S. officials to the contrary, for Samuel Bailey, U.S. policy in Latin America acted as a major obstacle to “modernization” and “development,” and “has frequently distorted, frustrated, and undermined the South Americans’ efforts to overcome their poverty.”\textsuperscript{52} In this way, attitudes about development in Latin American in


the United States have been characterized by a belief in the superiority of the U.S. system, a failure to recognize or admit the negative consequences of U.S. policy for the region, and a perspective that sees development as “essentially an economic or technological matter.”

Building upon the insights of this literature, I nevertheless believe that U.S. activities in Latin America should be understood within the wider context of an international social politics that came to define the period during and after World War II. While previous studies have focused on U.S. foreign policy and bilateral aid, the role of international institutions and networks has received less attention. Under the postwar order inaugurated with the end of World War II, the U.S. increasingly relied upon a newly created network of international institutions—including the United Nations and specialized organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the International Labor Organization—to maintain the stability of the international system. In this new “world system,” American capitalism was ascendant, but the mechanisms for organizing order and stability and for exercising power became enmeshed in a matrix of international organizations, institutions, and laws. Thus, I would contend, both the U.S. and ILO programs were part of an evolving local, regional, and international “development apparatus.” In order to understand the circumstances and

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53 Bailey, United States, 14.
forces that gave rise to the age of development we need to rethink the standard periodization of U.S. and international development which tends to treat the period before the late 1950s and 1960s as a mere prologue to the Cold War. In contrast, I argue throughout this dissertation that World War II was the primary catalyst or engine for the developmentalist turn that followed. It formed the basis for a network of institutions, ideas, and responsible personnel that made projects such as the Andean Indian Program possible.

*International Social Politics and the Age of Development*

Although this dissertation certainly is relevant to the study of U.S. foreign relations and foreign policy, it does not fit neatly into either of these historiographic traditions. Indeed, because I am interested in the ways in which power circulated through a global network of institutions devoted to the shifting and amorphous concept of “development,” my project necessarily complicates finite distinctions between United States history, the history of other peoples, and of international institutions such as the ILO. In this way, my dissertation addresses problems and themes located at the intersection of two broad areas of analysis: social politics or what is sometimes referred to a political economy and international history. Constituted as an expanding matrix of bilateral and multilateral strategies and practices, I conceive “development” as a “complex, contradictory phenomenon, one reflective of the best of human aspirations and yet, exactly because great ideas form the basis of power, subject to the most intense manipulation and liable to be used for purposes that reverse its original ideal intent.” In

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54 Richard Peet with Elaine Hartwick, *Theories of Development* (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 1999), 2. Peet and Hartwick argue for a critical modernism that incorporates the insights of postmodernism, but reject its tendency to define development as simply imperialism by other means. From this perspective, “development has
this section, after outlining the dominant theoretical perspectives that have defined postwar development discourse, I then situate the current project within the established literature and suggest ways in which it adds to our understanding of “development” as both a discourse and a system of social relations.

After the Second World War, modernization theory represented perhaps the most important effort to formally define “development” in the non-Western world, achieving its greatest influence in the late 1950s and 1960s. For its chief proponents, however, it also represented much more. Drawing upon the insights of Darwinian biology and Weberian sociology, modernization theorists in the United States and elsewhere sought to systematize the study of human societies under the rubric of a single, universal model of social and economic development. From this basis, assumptions and conclusions about what constituted “progress” or “development” rested upon distinctions between “traditional” and “modern” societies. 55 Eschewing the explicit biological and racial determinism that underwrote an earlier age of empire and colonialism, from the perspective of modernization theory democracy, western technology, and liberal capitalism were the criteria for modernity. As one of modernization theory’s chief unrealized potential, and radical analysis should be dedicated to extracting those notions of modern developmentalism that can be used to further the interests of peasants and workers, rather than dismissing the entire venture.” Ibid, 161.

architects explained, in the “traditional” society the efficiencies of production derived from “modern science and technology were either not available or not regularly applied.”56 Furthermore, such societies devoted “a very high proportion of their resources to agriculture,” possessed a hierarchal social structure defined by familial or clan loyalties, and had a value system oriented toward “a long-run fatalism.”57 Lacking the high levels of production and efficiency found in the West, the “traditional” society rested upon more “primitive” means of production and social organization, which explained its “backwardness.” In stark contrast, what were termed the “high mass consumption” societies of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan were urban and highly industrialized. As a sign of their modernity, these societies of abundance increasingly allocated resources to “social welfare and security,” “to the production of consumers’ durables,” and “to the diffusion of services on a mass basis.”58 Modernization theory understood economic and social “development” as a by-product of “the penetration of technology, capital, trade, democratic political institutions, and attitudes from the ‘developed’ into the ‘developing’ countries of the world.”59 In this way, as non-western societies moved through a series of historical stages on the road to modernity, the West in general and the United States in particular represented a timeless, universal

58 Ibid, 11.
model in which progress equaled westernization. Development became a process of
economic and technological diffusion.

Despite its widespread influence, as a description of reality modernization theory
was justly criticized for its teleological pretensions, for its flattening of historical
contingency into evolutionary certainty, and for its obfuscation of powerful coercive
forces such as western colonialism and imperialism. Indeed, emerging largely in response
to the pretensions of modernization theory, dependency and world systems theorists
attack modernization theory on the basis that it distorts and conceals the true dynamics of
the world economy. For the proponents of dependency and world systems theory, rather
than benefiting the non-western world, the economic growth of the “center” (or
developed western “core”) depends upon the active destruction and conquest of the
“periphery.” As the radical dependency theorist Andre Gunder Frank explained in the
1960s, “underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the
existence of capital shortage in regions that have remained isolated from the stream of
world history.” Rather, “underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same
historical process which also generated economic development: the development of
capitalism itself.” For Frank, the unfolding of this historical process resulted in the
“development of underdevelopment,” what western modernizers labeled the
“backwardness” of “traditional” society was in fact the predictable byproduct of market
capitalism. According to this view, modernization theory was (at worst) a crude defense
of western expansionism and exploitation, and (at best) a farcical distortion of reality.

60 Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York,
Although both theories are highly critical of modernization, there are also important differences between the perspectives of *dependencia* and world systems theory. On the one hand, because they perceive underdevelopment as a consequence of the infiltration of global capitalism, for dependency theorists the solution is for countries in the periphery to revolt against the economic system controlled by the West, replacing dependence on foreign imports with local production. After the Second World War, many Latin American countries adopted “import-substitution” as the foundation of an economic model that internalized and nationalized their economies. In contrast, for world system analysts such as Immanuel Wallerstein, the capacity of societies in the “periphery” and “semiperiphery” to create independent and self-sustaining economies—to resist the dominance of the core countries—is significantly diminished. Social movements that revolt against the world system have a limited capacity to alter or even challenge the status quo. Indeed, countries in the periphery and semi-periphery are better off participating in the world system rather than backing away from it.

Since the late 1980s, critics influenced by the insights of postcolonialism, postmodernism, and poststructuralism have challenged modernization, dependency, and world systems models on the grounds that these theories ignore the ways in which development operates as a discourse.61 According to postmodern critics of development,

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61 The insights of Edward Said were especially influential in this regard. Said’s analysis of “Orientalism” as a “a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles” examined the ways in which the East was quite literally imagined and constructed by western colonialism. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 2. See also, Said, “Representing the Colonized: Anthropology’s Interlocutors,” *Critical Inquiry* 15 (1989): 205-225. Also important was the body of literature associated with the Subaltern Studies Group, which began as an attempt to recapture the voices of subordinate classes of rural peasants. See for example, Ranjit Guha, *Elementary Aspects*
even the radical critiques of modernization (represented by dependency and the world systems perspective) share its uncritical acceptance of the notion that all societies move along a more or less universal, linear path toward “modernity.” Dependency and world systems theorists merely substitute one totalizing explanatory mechanism (capitalism) for another (modernization), charging it with an omnipotent power as the motor of economic and social development. From this perspective, if modernization theory views isolation from the global system as the source of “underdevelopment,” then dependency and world systems theory relocate the causes of “underdevelopment” externally. In contrast, critics such as anthropologist Arturo Escobar conceive development as a “historically produced discourse,” an apparatus of knowledge and power that constructs “the poor and underdeveloped as universal, preconstituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers.” Escobar demonstrates that, as a discourse, development “form[s] systematically the objects of which it [speaks], to group them and arrange them in certain ways, and to give them a unity of their own,” producing knowledge about the “Third World” that is deployed as a means of exercising power over it. In this sense, 


“[e]verything [is] subjected to the eye of the new [development] experts: the poor dwellings of the rural masses, the vast agricultural fields, cities, households, factories, hospitals, schools, public offices, towns and regions, and, in the last instance, the world as a whole.”64 Rather than a way of describing the path to a universally experienced modernity, Escobar and others see development as a modern system(s) of surveillance, power, and domination.

The emphasis on “development” as discourse makes possible a critical appraisal of the knowledge-power nexus that has enabled the West to historically construct the “Third World” as a “backward” outlier of modernity. But, taken to its logical extreme, the postmodern turn also represents a cynical rejection of modernity in its entirety, not to mention the very capacity to improve the conditions of human existence more generally. Describing “development” as a socio-cultural version of the AIDS virus, for example, former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations and editor of The Post-Development Reader Majid Rahnema argues that development not only serves to conceal the true intentions of the West, “giving a human face to an even more pernicious form of colonialism,” but as it works its way through the host society, “[it] aims at colonizing from within.” It sets “out to change every vernacular person into an economic agent, able

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64 Escobar, Encounter Development, 42.
to produce and make more money.”\textsuperscript{65} Just as AIDS turns the body’s defenses against itself, development “aspires to make its target populations ‘freely participate’ in their mutation.” Perceived in this way, as a virus that lays waste to the social body, “development” becomes little more than a “deceitful mirage,” an imperialist plague.\textsuperscript{66}

Adapting the notion of development as discourse, while hesitating to dismiss outright the modernist goal of social and economic improvement, some historians and social scientists have taken the further step of historicizing “development,” and in the process have brought into focus the pivotal actions of particular individuals, institutions, and states.\textsuperscript{67} In this way, Timothy Mitchell’s study of British colonialism in nineteenth-century Egypt describes the ways in which the imperial machinery of representation constructed Egypt as a terrific spectacle or exhibition to be ordered via institutions such as the Egyptian army, national schooling, and other “civilizing innovations.” In the colonial context, the principal purpose of this conception of the “world as exhibition,” was to make the unfamiliar world of nineteenth-century Egypt “legible” to colonial

\textsuperscript{66} Rahnema, “Development,” 119.
officials and to British society. Similarly, anthropologist James C. Scott emphasizes the ways in which the technocratic “high modernism” practiced by states in the twentieth century has failed to achieve its utopian goals and frequently ended in tragedy. According to Scott, the architects of such ventures ignored the importance of local or “improvised knowledge” in favor of the “generalized knowledge” of experts, which supposedly facilitated the integration of previously marginalized regions and groups. Although Scott is certainly skeptical of the developmentalism practiced by modern regimes, he restricts his critique to “certain kinds of states, driven by utopian plans and an authoritarian disregard for the values, desires, and objections of their subjects,” stopping short of a total condemnation of modernist planning in its entirety.

A few scholars have undertaken a similar analysis of the United States during the Cold War. In his analysis of modernization theory, Nils Gilman argues that the construction of a universal model of social and economic development by social scientists in the 1950s had just as much to do with their attempts to define America as it did their attempts to understand the postcolonial world. According to Gilman, above all else, modernization theory represented a scholarly consensus about the way societies “evolve.” Thus, he describes the ideas and relationships that connected Harvard sociologists, members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, MIT economists, and even so called consensus historians in the United States and shows how (after the Korean War) they gradually came to exercise direct influence over government policy. For Gilman, modernization theory itself also reflected wider cultural and intellectual trends common to the 1950s and 1960s: a paradoxical

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68 Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt*, 175.
combination of unfettered “confidence” in the American model of development and nagging anxiety about the uncertainties of a larger conflict with the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. Frustrated by the obstacles to reform at home, Gilman argues, the promotion of modernization “in countries emerging from colonialism allowed American liberals to retain their self-image as progressive reformers, even as they acquiesced to a conservative domestic agenda.” In this way, modernization theory was a “manifestation of American postwar liberalism,” and “its history cannot be understood apart from the fate of that liberalism.”

The Cold War context explored by Gilman is critical to our understanding of how and why modernization theory appealed to some researchers and policymakers in the 1950s and 1960s. But Gilman’s study is less useful as a means of understanding the global nature of postwar development discourse. This is because Gilman, while privileging the texts of modernization theory, pays less attention to the ways in which the concept of development and modernization possessed much deeper roots not only in American liberalism but also in the economic and social upheavals of the 1930s and 1940s. I would argue that the proliferation of ideas about development owe as much to the Second World War as to the Cold War. What needs to be better understood is the

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71 Ibid, 4. Gilman’s analysis illustrates the ways in which the discourse of development (in this case the formation of a particular theory of development at a singular moment in the history of the United States during the twentieth century) was tied to a system of social relations that connected researchers and academics in the United States. In a similar fashion, Michael Latham’s recent study of modernization and development during the Kennedy administration demonstrates that it represented more than just “propaganda employed to legitimate and rationalize genuine intentions.” According to Latham, it also constituted “a broader worldview, a constellation of mutually reinforcing ideas that often framed policy goals through a definition of the nation’s ideals, history, and mission.” Latham, *Modernization as Ideology*, 12. See also, David Engerman (ed.), *Staging Growth*. 47
difference that the Cold War made in terms of shifting and/or redirecting the focus of international development. To account for the international proliferation of ideas about economic and social development before the formal emergence of modernization theory at the height of the Cold War, we must also look beyond the United States. Building on existing efforts to historicize postwar development strategies and practices, I want to examine the power of development discourse as a global phenomenon by drawing attention to international networks of experts, policymakers, and institutions. From this perspective the United States was still an important producer and distributor of development strategies and practices, but possessed no monopoly on outcomes. Hence, the thrust of the present study is not to question the status of development as a discourse of power, but to recognize and understand the ways in which it “may be transformed and appropriated in ways that were unintended.” As anthropologist James Ferguson concludes in his path breaking study of the southern African nation of Lesotho, “[w]hen we deal with planned interventions by powerful parties, it is tempting to see in the discourse and intentions of such parties the logic that defines the train of events.” The problem emerges when such a view “inevitably misrepresents the complexities of the involvement of intentionality with events.” Drawing on this insight, I share Ferguson’s conclusion that “[i]ntentions, even of the most powerful actors or interests, are only the visible part of a much larger mechanism through which structures are actually produced, reproduced, and transformed.” As important as the articulated goals and purposes of specific development projects may be for assessing the intentions of its participants and

73 Ferguson, *The anti-politics machine*, 276.
for fitting them into a larger historical context, I am just as interested in the potentially unintended consequences of “development” for the people of the Andes, the region, and for the states and international institutions affected by its proliferation.
Chapter 2: The Second World War and the Formation of International Technocracy

After the Second World War, the activities of organizations involved in the field of economic and social “development” were guided by an increasingly global network of civil servants and technical experts—what I term the International Technocracy (ITC). As already suggested in the introduction, many recent studies of postwar “development” focus attention on the circulation of “development discourse,” especially its deployment by countries in the West as a technique of power and domination. Yet, by conjuring up a monolithic “discourse of development” that systematically removes every obstacle and assimilates all resistance, the individuals who actually managed and executed such projects are largely ignored. Human action dissolves into a play of signs and significations. The orientation of this chapter is different. It begins to fill a gap in the historiography of postwar development studies by examining the forces and circumstances that contributed to the emergence of the ITC, especially those individuals responsible for the technical assistance and community development operations of the ILO’s Andean Indian Program (AIP). This chapter examines the roots of the ITC in the Second World War, with special emphasis on how those individuals that would go on to influence and direct the ILO’s postwar development activities were shaped by the war and its aftermath in ways that made the Andean Indian Program possible. The chapter begins with a discussion of the ITC’s formation and the ways in which the experience of the Second World War resulted in a set of guiding principles that would structure its activities. A comprehensive explanation and defense of the ITCs existence is beyond the scope of this analysis. Instead, I emphasize the experience of several men who would go
on to drive the ILO’s postwar transformation, as represented by the Andean Indian Program. Of the individuals discussed below, the American David Morse did more perhaps than any other to define and direct the ILO’s postwar path. Using the origins of the ITC and the Andean Indian Program as a lens, the goal is to build the foundation for an epistemologically more intricate, less preordained, history of “encounters,” which refocuses attention on the individual subjects who moved within and sometimes struggled against the parameters of established discourses about social and economic change. In the case of the AIP, a hierarchy of relations defined the spaces in which the ITC functioned. From officials at the United Nations and the ILO who superintended and administered the program to the mission experts deployed to run its day-to-day operations, this chapter considers some of the ways in which World War II and the Cold War engaged the talents of, created a niche for, and made the ITC into a force for international reform and regulation.

Of course, singling out a particular group for its historical significance is a very different thing from providing a proof of its existence. The question remains: who or what is meant by the phrase “International Technocracy”? Since the 1960s, technocracy has been conceptualized in three distinct ways, which are relevant to this question and to my analysis of the ITC. First, there are those scholars who define technocracy as a consequence of modernization. Authors who identify technocracy in this way treat it primarily as a mechanism evolved to facilitate the expansion of the modern state, i.e. to manage the enlarged powers and authority of growing state bureaucracies.\footnote{See for example Jean Meynaud, \textit{Technocracy}, trans. Paul Barnes (New York, NY: Free Press, 1969); Frank Fisher, \textit{Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise} (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990); Robert D. Putnam, “Elite Transformation in Advanced}
comprehensive description of technocracy this explanation is too narrowly construed and ultimately unsatisfying. While it is certainly true that technocratic groups often do emerge during periods of rapid social, economic, or political change, it does not necessarily follow that such groups are a mere by-product of “modernization.” In fact, if technocracy serves merely as a stand-in for an inevitable process of modernization—if, like the modernization theory that dominated development discourse throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, technocracy functions simply as a conceptual analogue to social and economic change—it ceases to be a useful analytical tool. Put simply, the technocracy-as-modernization argument ignores or subsumes other forces that can support or prevent the rise of technocratic groups and institutions, such as political corruption, ideology, civil strife or war, and class, ethnic, and racial conflict.

Second, technocracy is sometimes understood more precisely as accompanying a process of post-industrial de-politicization, a result of the decline of political ideologies, or even as the consolidation of powerful forces within government hostile to the democratic political process.\(^2\) Sharing many of the assumptions and weakness of studies in the first category, authors who adopt this perspective nevertheless add greater emphasis to the evolution of an elite “expert” class, which comes to fill the space

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formally occupied by what the scholar Jürgen Habermas has described as the bourgeois public sphere. As the process of modernization moves irresistibly forward, these authors contend, new specialized groups emerge to manage the complexities of modern life. The scientific certainty provided by the “rule of experts” replaces less predictable but free and open public debate, disputation, and discussion. Once set upon this course, politics and political life, indeed history itself, ceases to have meaning. Like the authors who emphasize technocracy as the handmaiden of modernization, analysis in this vein becomes more an indictment of the present or a prediction of the future than an analysis of a contingent past.

A third and final perspective introduces a different set of concerns to the study of technocracy as a historically determined, but by no means inevitable, subject of analysis. The more recent work by historian Patricio Silva and others specializing in the study of Latin America attends more to the historical forces “facilitating the rise of technocratic groups,” such as the balance of political forces within a country at a given moment in its history. In contrast to the first two approaches outlined above, this third approach deems the emergence of technocratic groups (i.e. classes of experts whose authority becomes, in some way, integrated with the structures of power that govern a society) less as an evolutionary process and more as a political or an historical one. The concerns of this

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chapter share a common methodology and set of interests with this final body of scholarship. The contingency favored by Silva and others to analyze the configuration of technocratic groups is, frankly, more useful and appropriate for a historical examination of International Technocracy. At the same time, I also draw insights from all three approaches to the study of technocracy. In sum, this chapter and the dissertation as a whole synthesizes aspects of all three approaches to explore the formation of the ITC, its relationship to different types of governmental power, and its use of social-scientific discourse to produce normative international social policy standards.

As a group, the ITC facilitated the practices of technical assistance and community development, which (in turn) generated a particular status and type of authority. Expertise was the International Technocracy’s greatest political asset and the source of its collective identity. With knowledge in fields such as labor law and industrial relations, agriculture, economics, medicine, and anthropology, the faith of the ITC in the capacity of science and technology (or “know-how,” as it was often described) to radically transform society for the better was a source of group cohesion, as well as individual and collective identity. Individual members of the ITC, no doubt, rarely thought of themselves as being engaged in a struggle with other “classes.” The very idea went against everything that they purported to believe about themselves, the organizations they represented, and the work to which they dedicated their professional lives. Nevertheless, the “ITC” remains a useful category for describing and analyzing the existence and the mechanics of an international network of people, policies, and institutions defined by their relationship to a particular form of political rationality and

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mode of capitalist expansion. For, together with its indefatigable faith in the capacity of
technology to remake the world, the ITC’s defense of political and economic liberalism
represented a potent fact of postwar international relations. It is in this sense that my use
of the concept “technocracy” differs dramatically from scholars, such James Scott, who
have tended to decouple the technocratic enterprise from political ideology. In the case of
the ITC, international liberalism was essential to the expert’s sense of self.

As suggested above, the emergence of the ITC was a complicated process that
involved the interaction of multiple events and larger historical forces. Yet, no event
proved more important to the emergence of the ITC than the Second World War. The
destruction, death, and hope unleashed by that terrible conflict is the starting point for any
attempt to come to grips with the ITC and its significance. Besides leading directly to the
creation of the United Nations and its system of specialized organizations, the war
spurred interest in and encouraged a demand for technical assistance and economic
development projects as never before. Nowhere was this more evident than in the effect
that the war had on the foreign aid and technical assistance programs of the U.S.
government, which expanded exponentially from 1939 onward. Moreover, the intensity
and success of its own wartime mobilization and contributions to the collective Allied
victory granted the United States a powerful voice and assumed moral authority with
which it attempted to shape postwar development and technical assistance priorities. The
United Nations and its specialized agencies would become important nodes for the
delivery of development assistance, but the basic tenor and focus of many subsequent UN
projects (including the Andean Indian Program) can be detected in some of the wartime programs initiated by the United States government.\(^5\)

In a calibrated campaign to mobilize resources and defeat its enemies, the U.S. government deployed soldier and civilian experts to supervise reconstruction in occupied territories and to assist its allies. It was as an American soldier, for example, that future ILO Director-General David Morse first confronted the problem of social and economic development, a subject that would garner unprecedented attention from the ILO during his tenure. As an Army Captain stationed in the European theater, Morse was one of the first experts on the ground charged with the task of reconstituting Italian labor unions after the collapse of Mussolini’s fascist regime. Similarly, to support and gain the cooperation of its Latin America neighbors, the United States government provided military support and organized technical assistance projects up and down the South American continent. Conducted primarily under the auspices of the Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), these early “development” projects accompanied an extensive propaganda campaign that sought to secure the Western Hemisphere against Nazi Fifth Column activities, ensure access to valuable war resources

\(^5\) It is perhaps ironic that the best known (and certainly one of the most thoroughly researched) examples of postwar aid and assistance is the European Recovery Plan (ERP), launched by the United States government in 1947 to help rebuild the economies of Western Europe. Although historians still debate the economic and symbolic significance of the ERP or “Marshall Plan” for rebuilding Western Europe, there is no disputing the fact that, by the 1950s, supporters of bilateral and multilateral foreign aid and technical assistance in the United States faced increasingly staunch opposition from Congress and the American public against such programs. The enactment of multiple “Marshall Plans,” for different regions of the world did not materialize. The ERP’s importance as a symbol of a new postwar order is more certain, especially its demonstration of the ways in which international aid and technical assistance would become another critical front in the Cold War. Still, the efforts to plan for and manage the postwar reconstruction discussed in this chapter provide a more detailed picture of what technical assistance during the Cold War would actually look like.
such as rubber and tin, as well as continue the reset of U.S.-Latin American relations begun under the Good Neighbor diplomacy of the 1930s. Indeed, it was as a Special Advisor to OCIAA Director Nelson Rockefeller that the first Regional Director of the ILO’s Andean Indian Program, Enrique Sanchez de Lozada first argued for a new approach to economic development in Latin American by the United States and the rest of the international community. For Morse, de Lozada, and other contributors to the ILO’s expanded field operations, the war focused personal and collective energies in new directions, introduced an anti-totalitarian rhetoric and moral perspective that continued to be useful when fighting ceased, and provided stark evidence of the need for an unprecedented expansion of international technical assistance. The example offered by the experience of these men suggests the important ways in which the war channeled reformist energies in new ways and in new directions and is critical to understanding the ultimate goals and aspirations of the both the ILO and the Andean Indian Program.

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6 American intervention in Latin America encompasses a long and frequently tragic history dating back to the 19th century. Nevertheless, the advent of the Good Neighbor Policy and the exigencies of the Second World War marked a new chapter, characterized by a temporary move away from the direct military interventions of the past in favor of a new multilateral approach. The various Pan-American conferences that occurred during the 1930s and a new willingness on the part of the U.S. government to become directly involved in economic development through such agencies as the Export-Import Bank, which provided the initial capital outlays for Brazil’s Volta Redonda steel mill project and other endeavors, signaled this change. Enrique de Lozada captured this notion of a new Pan-Americanism supported by the Good Neighbor Policy, as having “injected the human element into the policies the United States.” Enrique de Lozada, “On World Regionalism,” 1942, Folder 52, Box 6, CIAA Sub-Series, Washington File Series, Record Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family Collection, Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York.
From 1948 until 1970, David A. Morse served as the ILO’s Director-General and guided it into a new era of its history. During that time, Morse oversaw the implementation of a new manpower utilization and migration program in the late 1940s, the tumultuous reentry of the Soviet Union into the ILO in 1954, the opening of the organization’s Turin industrial training center in 1964, and the launching of the organization’s World Employment Program in 1969. Despite the challenges that surrounded each of these initiatives, all of which occurred in the shadow of the Cold War, Morse was reelected to the Director-Generalship six consecutive times. He capped an already full career by accepting the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the ILO and its international staff, as the ILO celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 1969. In his acceptance speech to the Nobel Committee, Morse acknowledged that in the wake of World War II the ILO had encountered many “significant new challenges.” Chief among them was the necessity of paring “rapid economic and social development with a system of distribution . . . [that would] result in improvement of the standard of living of all the people in the countries concerned, and particularly the most disadvantaged.” According to Morse, this objective was “what the development effort [was] all about.”7 By any standard, when his final term as the ILO’s Director-General expired the following year, Morse left the organization with an impressive list of accomplishments.

It is safe to say that no other figure did more to reshape the ILO during the Cold War than David Morse. Indeed, his Nobel speech addressed an important, but often

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neglected aspect of his tenure at the ILO: the ways in which he sought to merge the organization’s burgeoning postwar technical assistance programs with its broader mission of social justice. Beginning in the late 1940s, Morse had called for the ILO to expand its field operations into new areas around the globe and to become an active contributor to postwar discourses of social and economic development. His public championing of what he called “the gospel of production” provided strong encouragement and justification for the ILO’s experiments in rural and community development, particularly the Andean Indian Program. Yet, his embrace of a pro-production, pro-consumption, pro-development agenda did not occur all at once. Over a period of many years and through the accretion of his experiences first as an official of the United States government and then as an officer in the U.S. military, Morse came to embrace what was then a still emerging international consensus about the relationship between social and economic development and international peace and stability. His wartime experiences in particular emphasized the need for a more robust American presence on the international stage.

Morse attended Columbia University, successfully completed his degree, and matriculated at Harvard Law School, from which he graduated in 1932. At Harvard, he was a student and protégé of Felix Frankfurter, the law school professor and future Supreme Court Justice who guided many of his students to Washington, D.C. and Wall Street. After graduation, Morse clerked briefly at a private New Jersey law firm before he was recruited in 1933 to work at the Interior Department, first on the staff of the department’s solicitor and then as a Special Assistant to the United States Attorney General to investigate violations of the petroleum code established under the National
Recovery Act. Things began to happen quickly after his move to Washington. As Morse recalled some years later, the Interior Department job opened up a “whole new world . . . of important people.” It was there, for example, that he first encountered some of the most influential persons atop the U.S. labor movement, including United Mine Workers president John Lewis and the leader of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, Sidney Hillman. Both Lewis and Hillman were instrumental in harnessing the grassroots energy of U.S. industrial workers to form of the Congress of Industrial Occupations or CIO. Morse was an eager and energetic addition to the legal staff of the Interior Department. After he took it upon himself to answer hundreds of letters from workers who had lost their jobs, he attracted the attention of the Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes. Ickes was then staffing the newly created Petroleum Labor Policy Board (PLPB). Although Morse confessed not to “know the difference between a collective agreement and a sack of potatoes,” he became Ickes’s choice to serve as General Counsel to the PLPB.

At the PLPB, Morse gained valuable first-hand experience mediating labor disputes, negotiating collective bargaining agreements, and enforcing the labor provisions of the National Recovery Act. William Leiserson, a Professor from Antioch College in Yellow Springs, Ohio, was selected to become the chairman of the PLPB. The first case Leiserson assigned to Morse involved the Champlin Oil Refining Company in Enid,

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9 Ibid., 93-94.
10 Ibid., 90.
11 Ibid.
Oklahoma. The company refused to negotiate with the workers’ union representatives and the refinery’s workers went on strike. As Morse later remembered the case, “[i]n the Enid strike, there was a question of hours and wages, but . . . [t]he real issue at that time was recognition of the [Oil Field, Gas Well, and Refinery Workers’] Union as the representative of the workers in the refinery.” Morse met with representatives from the company and the union for weeks, but confessed to feeling out of his depth and frustrated by the lack of progress. Overcoming the feeling that he was “getting no place fast” and with his boss’s encouragement to stay the course, he eventually mediated a compromise between the two parties.

The agreement brokered by Morse between the union and the oil company created a closed shop at the Champlin refinery, brought an end to the strike, and helped establish his reputation as a skilled and resourceful negotiator. Even more importantly, the Enid case brought Morse to the attention of officials charged with implementing the provisions of the recently passed Wagner Act, especially his former law school professor Calvert Magruder. On leave from teaching duties at Harvard, Magruder served a brief tenure as the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) General Counsel, responsible for heading up the Legal Division. The NLRB was created in 1933 to go after violators of Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which guaranteed employees’ right to organize and bargain collectively. With the passage of the National Labor Relations Act

12 Ibid., 91.
14 Louchheim, Making of the New Deal, 91.
15 Ibid.
(or Wagner Act) two years later, the NLRB moved to the center of New Deal industrial relations policy. In 1936, Morse became a Regional Attorney for the NLRB.

After the Second World War, the NLRB would come to represent the triumph of the philosophy of “industrial pluralism,” championed most notably by the labor economist John R. Commons. Commons famously denied that relations between capital and labor necessarily entail an irrevocable class struggle, as in both Marxism and classical orthodox economics. Besides Commons’ efforts to do so himself, many of his students carried on his legacy as an economist, labor historian, and social reformer.

Driving the narrative of Commons’ protégé Selig Perlman’s *A History of Trade Unionism in the United States*, for example, was his perception that American labor lacked the kind of radical, socialist inspired working class movements found in Europe.¹⁶ For Perlman, one had only to look at the history of American labor relations to see the truth of Commons’ argument. When combined with other indigenous factors (such as a decentralized form of government, ethnic and religious differences, and the prominence of liberal ideology) the nature of the capitalist marketplace produced an American working class devoid of class-consciousness, rich in job consciousness, and consumed with the bread and butter economic issues. Perlman’s work made him an important defender of industrial pluralism, and left a deep impression on the analysis of American labor relations that lasted for decades.

Instead of an inevitable struggle between workers and their employers, the industrial pluralist school championed by Commons and Perlman insisted that capital and labor could resolve their differences orderly and peaceably. Commons and his followers

emphasized the capacity of business and labor to settle their differences through negotiated settlements, otherwise known as collective bargaining. Indeed, because they remained suspicious of too much government interference, the industrial pluralist school defined the most important job of the NLRB as the creation of formal spaces and procedures for mediating and arbitrating disputes between workers and their employers. Through collective bargaining agreements, the supporters of industrial pluralism argued, the representatives of labor and capital could resolve their differences without violence or costly strikes—although critics point out that the emphasis on collective bargaining as the sole or primary means of resolving industrial labor disputes inevitably locked labor unions into a narrow field of action, while promoting industrial harmony at the cost of workers’ rights. Although his experiences during the Second World War would ultimately lead David Morse to outgrow industrial pluralism’s limited views on the role of government, it was important to Morse’s early development as a prosecutor and labor relations expert and would continue to inform his views about business and labor relations into the future.

As of 1936, the NLRB was still a young, largely untested legal enforcement mechanism. Fresh off the Roosevelt administration’s confrontation with the Supreme Court over the legality of the National Recovery Act and the ensuing court packing scandal, the high court’s ruling on the NLRB’s constitutionality hung in the balance. Congress had granted powers to the NLRB that extended well beyond the promotion of collective bargaining, but the devil was in the details of the Wagner Act’s enforcement. Most importantly, although the law gave the Board authority to prosecute employers for unfair labor practices, it was by no means certain that the NLRB would aggressively go
after violators. Given the untested potential of the Wagner Act and the Board itself, interpretation of the law’s key enforcement provisions had significant consequences for big business and labor unions. Following a pragmatic middle path, throughout the late 1930s the board’s administrators would construe the Wagner Act in terms that were more or less advantageous to the unions, but which stressed the ideal of cooperation.17

During his tenure at the NLRB, Morse found the Board’s emphasis on bolstering business-labor cooperation with aggressive government regulation well suited to his own emerging pragmatic, progressive style. In his public attempts to defend the Board he spoke strongly of the need for workers and employers to continue to talk to each other, but defined the NLRB role assertively. In a 1938 speech he noted that, although NLRB policy sought first to encourage constructive dialogue between workers and their employers, the Board had a larger mandate before it. 18 “When it is not a question of misunderstandings which can be straightened out, nor hasty judgments which can be corrected by friendly counsel, but rather, deliberate, systematic, and ruthless disregard of the law by attempts to discourage [the] organization of labor,” Morse concluded that the NLRB had the authority and will to act. He insisted that, “the Board unquestionably will and must pursue the method most calculated to end such tactics with all the firmness at its command.”19 This usually meant at least the threat of prosecution.

18 See for example David Morse, “Speech, Unity Club, 1938,” Folder 2, Box 86, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
Besides helping the new regional administrator, his friend Eleanor Herrick, establish the New York office of the NLRB, Morse worked to find a model case to test the Board’s constitutionality and publicly defended it against accusations that it was “un-American.” Although compromise between labor and business would always be preferred, he understood the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act to be that of “correct[ing] great wrongs and grave injustices.” New laws created at both the state and federal level would, Morse conjectured, “democratize industry and give to workers opportunities for living which they have hoped for but never before realized.” \(^{20}\) Like many defenders of the Administration’s policies at the time, Morse’s argument in favor of strong coordinated government action rested not simply on a preference for union over business interests but upon an expanded definition of the public interest. Because the labor movement “still has a long way to go to provide for the industrial workers even a minimum of security and decency,” the inadequacy of the current level of protection provided to workers “stands as a challenge to the leadership of both industry and labor and effects the public interest in such a way that the hand of government [across different] agencies … must be clasped.” \(^{21}\) With the state as an honest broker, Morse conjectured, there was no reason why business and labor could not find common ground that promoted not only their own collective interests, but also those of society as a whole.

At the NLRB, Morse worked on the celebrated Associated Press cases, which concluded with the Supreme Court upholding the federal government’s power to regulate

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\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
industrial relations via the Constitution’s interstate commerce clause.\textsuperscript{22} As the politically and constitutionally important AP cases illustrated, during Morse’s tenure at the Board, the defense of workers’ right to organize often went hand in hand with defending the NLRB from critics of the New Deal. In 1937, Morse left the National Labor Relations Board and government service for private law practice in his home state of New Jersey. In the years that followed his departure, the landscape of New Deal labor law and the function of the NLRB changed quickly. If, under the New Deal, the government sought to enforce a level playing field between capital and labor, then during and after World War II, orderly industrial relations, high productivity, and economic stability often superseded the goal of social justice. Increasingly, the Board and its wartime manifestation as the National War Labor Board (NWLB) emphasized collective bargaining less as a means of promoting industrial democracy and more as a tool for avoiding costly work stoppages and strikes. It is not clear what Morse thought about the direction the NLRB took in subsequent decades, but, given his own record, there is reason to suppose that he shared the view that future progress in the economic and social realms rested on greater cooperation between workers and business management.

If the New Deal provided Morse with the credentials of an experienced negotiator and labor law expert, it was World War II that educated Morse about the international scope of issues he had previously confronted only as domestic labor problems. Like many of his fellow citizens, after Pearl Harbor he volunteered for and served in the United States military. He was stationed in Europe, appointed Chief of the Labor Division of the

\textsuperscript{22} The key court decision was in Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). David A. Morse, interview by James R. Fuchs, July 25, 1977, transcript, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.
Allied Military Government, and made responsible for establishing labor policy in the occupied territories of Italy and Germany. The official American presence in postwar Europe, including both the military government and the civilian officials later installed under the Marshall Plan, reflected a diverse assortment of representatives from American labor unions, business, and government.\textsuperscript{23} In addition to Morse, much of the staff of the U.S. Office of Military Government’s Labor Division in particular was drawn from the American labor movement and various New Deal agencies. The first Labor Relations director, Mortimer Wolf, was, like Morse, a former attorney for the NLRB. As director he supported organizing German workers at the grassroots level. A former Chicago electrician, Joe Keenan was an advisor on labor affairs to the U.S. military governor, General Lucius Clay. Keenan had worked his way up the union hierarchy to become an assistant to the American labor leader Sidney Hillman and then served as an official at the War Production Board, where Clay had singled him out. Joseph Gould came from the CIO office workers union, Edward Fruchtman had worked in the Wages and Hours Administration, George Wheeler was with the NLRB and the United Federal Workers (CIO), Clarence Bolds was a member of the UAW, and Franz Loreiaux represented the Oil Workers International. Other officials with union ties included Henry Rutz (AFL),

\textsuperscript{23} So much so, that historian Michael Hogan has concluded that the ERP should be viewed as an “international projection of the corporative political economy that had evolved in the United States” in the 1920s and 1930s. In other words, U.S. policy sought to remake Europe in the image of the United States, stressing multilateral trade, free markets, and Keynesian fiscal and monetary management. Michael Hogan, \textit{The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe} (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), xii.
Newman Jeffery (CIO), Andrew Joseph Dunn (AFL), Paul Porter (AFL and CIO), Harold Francis Mullaney (AFL), and Murray Gross (AFL).  

If Morse (and others) brought their own experiences to bear on the problems that confronted European labor at the end of the war, his exposure to the European context also marked him in important ways. His military service forced him to confront firsthand the challenges to social and economic development that existed in societies devastated by years of war, misrule, and fascist tyranny. It was in Italy that the question of reconstruction and “development” first arose for Morse. Concerning the important issue of what to do about the lingering influence of fascist institutions, Morse came down firmly on the side of “wiping the slate clean” of fascist syndicalism.  

On at least one occasion, this approach brought him into conflict with military superiors who believed that retaining the syndicalist framework would accelerate the process of reconstruction. Along with an independent union movement, Morse urged the cultivation of American style collective bargaining, both of which were anathema to the authoritarianism of the existing Italian labor system.

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26 Ibid.
As he surveyed circumstances on the ground, Morse noted that the promotion of free and independent labor unions would require outside aid and assistance, perhaps for some time into the future. He advocated “leaving the door open for self organization along the lines desired by the people,” yet he insisted that, “[i]t [was] not enough to say to a people, ‘You now have the right to organize,’ and then leave them to flounder with a principle which can well become meaningless.” Identifying the need for a worker exchange and technical assistance program to provide the necessary expertise, Morse doubted Italian labor’s capacity to succeed on its own. The answer to the “underdevelopment” of Italian labor relations, he concluded, was “aid by those experienced with life under such democratic principles.” Not surprisingly, he believed “this experience should be drawn from the United States and the United Kingdom.” As we shall see, Morse’s take on the Italian labor situation foreshadowed the approach that the ILO would adopt to expand its own technical assistance and community development programs in the 1950s, deploying teams of experts to fill the knowledge gap and promote a model for future development.

When Morse returned home after the war, to accept a senior post with the Department of Labor, he arrived with a new appreciation for labor’s importance as an international issue, as well as a renewed sense of American exceptionalism.

27 David A. Morse, Journal, 1943-1945, Folder 6, Box 67, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
28 David A. Morse, “Some Comments on Labor Relations in Italy from 26 Nov. 43 to date,” Morse to Director, Labor Sub-Commission, ACC, March 1, 1944, Folder 1, Box 68, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
29 In the Labor Department, Morse continued to engage in work that required his attention to international conditions, serving as Deputy Chairman of the International Social Policy Committee and head of the newly created Bureau of International Labor
worries of another postwar recession like the one that followed the First World War, the impact of strikes and work stoppages on productivity and employment were a chief concern among many policy makers in the United States. Morse was no exception. Like the industrial conflicts that confronted Morse as a young NLRB lawyer, the feud between America’s two largest unions, the AFL and CIO, threatened to stand in the way of steady economic growth after the war. Thus, after joining the Labor Department as an Assistant Secretary, he created a Trade Union Advisory Committee, which met “regularly to discuss problems together with the CIO and the AF of L.”  

The committee served as a venue for working out differences between the two powerful unions and for selling U.S. policies such as the Marshall Plan to their leaders. But Morse also believed that more was required. From his vantage point on the frontlines of the European reconstruction effort, he had concluded that “it would be necessary and helpful, really vital, for the United States to have someone in the U.S. Government authorized to be responsible for monitoring the labor developments in Europe and elsewhere in the world and if possible to influence those developments.” He was among the first officials to recognize that labor relations had important social and political implications for “the development of democracy” around the globe. He noted that, “[b]ecause the economies of the various countries of the world are becoming increasingly more integrated and interdependent and

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31 Ibid. At a secret meeting of the committee attended by then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Morse recalled that both unions were persuaded to provide their support to the Marshall Plan.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
because of closer communication between nations, foreign policy is today also a matter of economic and social policy.”34 The age of “development” had arrived.

Morse was in contact with other U.S. government officials who shared his concerns and his ideas. Walter H. C. Laves, for example, was an Administrative Consultant on International Affairs with the Bureau of the Budget until 1947, when he left for a post with UNESCO. Laves was an outspoken proponent of expanding U.S. foreign relations into the economic and social realms.35 In their correspondence, Morse and Laves revealed themselves as kindred spirits: both men supported the doctrine, as Laves described it, which “recognizes that the State Department does not hold a monopoly of interest in the field of foreign policy.”36 With the emergence of the National Security State, described by historians such as Michael Hogan, statements like Laves’s would indeed rise to the level of an official heresy in a few short years. But for Laves and, I would argue for Morse as well, it was simply a statement of practical reality, a description of the new world emerging from the ashes of the old. It was perhaps no coincidence that both Morse and Laves gravitated toward the international orbit of the United Nations. Morse’s discussions with Walter Laves and other officials represent a serious, if ultimately unsuccessful, effort to recast the labor question as a critical facet of U.S. national security interest. More directly, they led to Morse’s appointment as the first Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs.

34 David A. Morse, “Labor and American Foreign Policy,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, October 1947, Folder 3, Box 87, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.  
35 Ibid.  
36 “Organizing the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Relations,” (Based on Memorandum from the Director to the President, January 1, 1945), Folder 3, Box 87, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
Morse’s embrace of internationalism over unilateralism was characteristic of a generation of American public servants, nurtured by the experimental pragmatism of New Deal liberalism and the bitter fruit of failed international cooperation and economic autarchy in the 1930s. Yet, as suggested in the introduction, his commitment to internationalism did not free Morse from the exceptionalist’s faith in America’s special mission. “It must be,” he suggested to an audience of utility workers in 1947, “that God has willed that [the American] formula shall be the eventual formula for the world at large – at the time when we on earth shall have finally recognized His will.”37 Although he invoked a less teleological tone, while speaking to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco in 1948 his message was much the same. On the cusp of his election as the ILO’s new Director-General, he warned that the outcome of World War II and the “outstanding position of the American economy, of American industry and of American labor” had brought the United States “to a place where we must assume a role of leadership.”38 The need for American assertiveness on the international field was, Morse said, not just a factor of the country’s military might or economic preeminence. The “fundamental basis of American prestige abroad,” he concluded, “is moral in character.”39

It was in answer to the problem of how the United States could best use its supposed mantel of moral leadership that Morse located the importance of coordinated

37 David A. Morse, “Address before the Utility Workers Union of America, CIO” by Under Secretary of Labor David A. Morse, (Buffalo, New York, October 24, 1947), 371-381, Folder 5, Box 81, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
39 Ibid, 4.
international action, through organizations such as the United Nations or the ILO. He noted that, “good international relations are founded on accomplishments at home,” but feared complacency or an American retreat into isolationism. Drawing on his experiences during the war, he felt that the means by which the United States could best fulfill its long list of postwar obligations was the diffusion of American technical knowledge: “the techniques and ‘know-how’ of industrial hygiene, industrial safety, industrial efficiency and management—the shortcuts and savings we have contrived in the fields of distribution and of transportation; the programs we have devised for vocational guidance and the training and retraining of persons within industry; the economic and scientific research which is going forward daily in our factories, our universities and public laboratories.” At the same time, via its membership in the ILO, the U.S. was already “a part of the economic and social machinery for world collaboration in the development of labor standards and the promotion of justice.” Armed with this vision of a postwar order in which the spread of technology and “know-how” was essential to the achievement of peace, stability, and social justice, he viewed the ILO as an important mechanism for the transmission of a progressive American influence “throughout the world.”

As suggested above, the collapse of the international economy during the 1930s was linked in importance, for Morse, as for many of his generation, to the failures of international cooperation that had contributed to the Second World War. The frosting of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, no doubt, altered the way in which

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40 Ibid, 6.
41 Ibid, 8.
42 Ibid, 10.
43 Ibid, 8.
Morse talked and perhaps thought about the United State’s international commitments. With the dire consequences of another, potentially greater conflagration in mind—this time between the supporters of western-style democracy and Soviet communism—Morse set about nurturing the ILO’s capacities as a promoter of international social and economic “development.” As Morse himself put it, “[t]he world-wide depression of the [19]30s assisted in the rise of fascism,” but “[a]nother depression would assist in the rise of communism.”\textsuperscript{44} Echoing the conclusions of economists and sociologists then and now, Morse noted that “[p]overty has been a fertile breeding ground for both fascism and communism,” and that the greatest contribution the ILO could make was “in the removal of those conditions which lead to war.”\textsuperscript{45} As a member of what I have described earlier in this chapter as the International Technocracy, Morse conceived the ILO as an entity that could, through its global membership and tripartite structure, assist in the repair of international relations and promote the improved living and working conditions of all. Indeed, it was the belief in the capacity of technical expertise over traditional diplomacy to remake the world that makes Morse an illustrative case for demonstrating the underlying characteristics that motivated the ITC. Morse’s elevation to the position of Director-General of the ILO provided a unique platform for action; to test the ideas that he had developed during the war, to promote more vigorous international coordination, and to spread the “gospel of production.” Once elected, he focused on acquiring the tools that the ILO would need to accomplish this new mission.

\textsuperscript{44} David Morse, “America’s Stake in the International Labor Organization [Statement before Industrial Relations Conference, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., New York City, March 11, 1948],” Folder 5, Box 81, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
As the ILO’s Director-General, David Morse promoted and oversaw the implementation and expansion of the organization’s technical assistance programs, but he did not and could not act alone. Considered together, the career trajectories of several officials directly involved with the ILO’s administration of the Andean Indian Program further illustrate how World War II helped forge an identity and a purpose for the International Technocracy. The Belgian born Jef Rens, for one, served as the ILO’s Deputy Director in charge of operations throughout much of Morse’s tenure. He came to the ILO through his participation in the Belgian labor movement and began his career working in the Belgian automobile and diamond industries. Unlike Morse, Rens did not serve in the military during World War II. However, as an advisor to the Belgian government in exile he became a valuable operative and information source for agents of the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor agency to the CIA.

Throughout the 1930s Rens worked for the Belgium Broadcasting System and then as the editor of the Belgian General Confederation of Labor or CGTB newspaper. The economic turmoil of that period, together with the rise of fascism across Europe, left an indelible impression on Rens. As a doctoral student, he was particularly concerned with the conditions that had allowed fascism to flourish and contributed to the disintegration of international cooperation. He wrote his thesis on “The Social Foundations of National Socialism in Germany.” It is safe to say that during these years Rens developed a deep, abiding interest in the social and economic problems that confronted international capitalism between the two World Wars. It was this interest that made the ILO a logical, if not inevitable, next stop for Rens. In 1938, Rens was elected Deputy General Secretary of the CGTB and attended his first ILO conference as an
advisor. He worked under three different administrations of the Belgium government, including (as mentioned above) during the war as an advisor to the Prime Minister of the Belgian government in exile and as General Secretary of the Belgium Planning Committee on Post-war Problems, a position he resigned to become an ILO Assistant Director. In 1941, Rens attended the ILO’s annual conference as a workers’ delegate and was elected a member of the Governing Body of the ILO three years later.46

It was early in the fall of 1942 that Arthur Goldburg, George Pratt, and other agents of the American OSS stationed in London sought Rens’ assistance. Pratt and Goldburg were part of a team of officers assigned to gather intelligence in preparation for a long anticipated land invasion of the continent. As Pratt explained in a letter to Rens dated June 1943, reliable information on Belgian trade unionist living in London and Belgium was necessary, “in order to have available an organization which will enable an army occupation to possess accurate information for the prevention of sabotage, the detection of spies and saboteurs, and the re-constitution of civilian authority and organization in the shortest possible time.”47 As far as he was concerned, Pratt explained, the trade unionists were “our natural allies,” but he needed specific information “to sell the idea to the military forces.”48 Rens eagerly responded to these requests for assistance by providing information about the Belgian resistance and an index of individuals from the Belgium trade union movement who might prove useful for Pratt’s plans. Rens’ index

46 Appendix of “Questions Concerning the Organisation and Structure of the Office,” Jef Rens, Dossier de l’Office du Personnel, International Labor Organization Archive, Geneva, Switzerland. The ILO’s Geneva Archives are cited hereafter as ILOA.
47 George C. Pratt to Jef Rens, 22 June 1943, Box 32, Entry 115, London Field Station Files, RG 226 Records of the Office of Strategic Services, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
48 Ibid.
included a description of the trade unionists’ technical abilities and expertise, current location, and an evaluation of their reliability or loyalty to the Allied cause.

Besides an obvious desire to see Belgium and the rest of Europe freed from the Nazi yoke, Rens’ work for the Belgian government and the OSS powerfully demonstrated that the conditions necessary for a vibrant trade unionism were fragile and did not exist everywhere. To simulate those conditions on a global scale would require not just the defeat of National Socialism, but also a herculean effort of social and economic organization on an unprecedented scale. For Rens, the ILO might have seemed a natural outlet for such a project. In any case, it was in 1944 that he received an appointment as one of the organization’s Assistant Directors, a position in which he remained until 1951. In that year, he was promoted to Deputy-Director General, second in command at the ILO under David Morse. Along with the Director-General himself, Jef Rens became a driving force behind the postwar expansion of the ILO’s field operations, and especially the establishment of the Andean Indian Program.

Summarizing the intent of the ILO’s Andean mission, Rens concluded that, “the Andean program amounts to a gigantic campaign of education and enlightenment among the Indian population designed to point the way to a better life.”49 For Rens, in practice this meant building a new class of workers that would contribute to economic growth, through both their increased productivity and rising levels of consumption. “The Indian population,” he wrote, “formed a reserve of manpower which would prove indispensable

in the economic development of the country.”50 In a somewhat different vein, he instructed the AIP’s Regional Director that, “[t]he important thing is to create a class of farmers having sufficient land so as to be able to live under conditions of ease.” By providing land to farmers instructed in the techniques of modern agricultural production, he concluded that the governments of the Andean countries would not only be performing “a great service to the economy of [their] countr[ies], but will also ensure a new policy for the future.”51 In short, Rens pressed for the implementation of policies that emphasized the participation of indigenous peoples as both producers and consumers of the region’s prospective wealth, with the promise of future benefits to national, regional, international economies.52 In doing so, it does not require too much imagination to suggest that Rens’s own trade unionist background—including his experience as a government advisor and informant during the recent war—played no small part in his diagnosis. Rens’s analysis of National Socialism seemed to demonstrate free labor as an essential ingredient of a peaceful international order.

The experience of Enrique Sanchez de Lozada, the AIP’s first Regional Director, is

50 “Mr. Rens’ Mission Notes, Andean Indian Project (Spring 1958),” Z 1/1/1/16 (J. 6), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
also illustrative of how the war helped create networks of expertise that provided a niche
for and stimulated the growth of the International Technocracy. De Lozada was a
Bolivian diplomat who fled the country for exile in the United States in the 1930s. He
had served as a member of the Bolivian Diplomatic Corps in London from 1923 to 1926
and then returned to Bolivia to serve as a professor of international law at the University
of La Paz. From 1931 to 1936, de Lozada served as secretary of the Bolivian legation to
Washington. As a prominent Bolivian ex-patriot, he became an outspoken proponent of
the Roosevelt administration’s Good Neighbor Policy and a close friend and associate of
Nelson Rockefeller. A professor of international law who taught at the University of La
Paz in his native Bolivia, as well as at Williams College and Harvard University in the
United States, de Lozada became a Special Assistant to Rockefeller in 1941.\footnote{“Enrique Sanchez de Lozada,” 18 February 1965, Folder 64, Box 9, Countries File
Series, Record Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family Collection, Rockefeller Archives
Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York.} As for
Rockefeller himself, a scion of one of the world’s wealthiest families with his own
personal political ambitions, his Republican credentials and his family’s business and
philanthropic ties to Latin American made him a shrewd choice to fill the role of Director
of the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), a new agency created by U.S.
President Roosevelt to strengthen relationship with the Latin American allies. De
Lozada’s story, like that of Morse and Rens, suggests some of the ways in which World
War II and the expansion of international institutions to which it contributed helped
define the problem of “underdevelopment” and the disparate strategies adopted to address
it.
When de Lozada joined Rockefeller’s staff at the OCIAA he was already a vocal advocate of a new approach to diplomacy on the part of the United States in Latin America, one that would help forge “the good will of the masses” and counteract Nazi efforts to infiltrate the region. Born into privilege and possessing all the advantages of education and social connection that it implied, he was convinced of the need for significant social and economic changes in his native Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America. In order to address long-standing class, ethnic, and racial conflicts, he predicted the growing influence of an incipient middle class in many Latin American countries that would wrest control from the ruling oligarchies. Essential to the recipe of reforms he proscribed were (public and private) investments from the United States in sanitation and public works, or “the kind of practical work you do in your own country,” as he told a U.S. audience in November 1940.\(^{54}\) As a means of gradually improving the level of common understanding that existed between the United States and its southern neighbors, he advocated an exchange program that prefigured the design of the U.S. Peace Corps created in the 1960s. Both of these measures were seen by Lozada as ways of “crystallizing” the identity of interest between the new middle class in Latin America and the United States.\(^{55}\)

Lozada’s ideas paralleled the rhetoric of the Roosevelt administration’s Good\(^{54}\) Enrique de Lozada, *Latin America: United States’ Achilles Heel* (Chicago, IL: Lecture Reporting Service, 1940), 10.\(^{55}\) Enrique de Lozada, “Pan-Americanism at the Crossroads,” June 1942, Folder 52, Box 6, CIAA Sub-Series, Washington File Series, Record Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family Collection, Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York. The document is a typed manuscript copy of an article published in the June 1942 issue of the journal *Free World*. 80
Neighbor Policy, which he claimed “injected the human element into the policies of the United States” for the first time. During the war, he completed special reports for Nelson Rockefeller and the OCIAA on Pan-Americanism, rural education, and other subjects pertaining to Latin America. He also worked on training and literacy films contracted out by the OCIAA to Walt Disney Films. In his reports to and conversations with Nelson Rockefeller, Lozada advocated what he called “regional internationalism,” which he suggested could be achieved “by endeavoring to influence, through example, other sections of the world in the ways of peaceful international living” and “by actively eradicating totalitarian theories within the [Western] Hemisphere itself.” According to Lozada, regional internationalism was part of a “dynamic conception of the world of tomorrow...which will be universal in scope but which will tend to solve the problems of everyday life.”56 Indeed, it was the absence of a “regional unifying policy” that led Lozada to advocate changes in the way the U.S. State Department dealt with the region, and which looked to the OCIAA as a model.57

The OCIAA itself was created in 1939 by President Franklin Roosevelt as part of a U.S. government led effort to combat Nazi influence in South and Central America. It aimed to accomplish this goal through a variety of measures, including the application of diplomatic pressure directed by the State Department, a propaganda campaign operated through the OCIAA cultural information program, and the strategic commitment of

57 Eleanor F. Clark to Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, “Memorandum from Enrique de Lozada,” 11 August 1945, Folder 53, Box 7, CIAA Sub-Series, Washington File Series, Record Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family Collection, Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York.
American financial and technical assistance. During the war, the OCIAA performed a number of functions in support of the Allied war effort, but was primarily an organ of U.S. government propaganda, which utilized press releases and radio broadcasts, as well as more substantive technical and financial aid projects. Toward the end of the war, the OCIAA’s focus shifted toward regional cooperation and collective security. For example, a special labor service feature printed by the OCIAA championed the benefits of labor-management cooperation focused on raising production levels, which it claimed would produce a higher standard of living and full employment for all after the war. This perspective was hardly unique to the OCIAA. Indeed, it was consistent with an emerging international consensus, discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter, which found expression in the work of economists, the actions of individual governments, and the arrangement of various international institutions.

Much like the American mobilization of weapons and war materials, the Administration’s Latin American campaign involved considerable public-private cooperation. Many Spanish language film and newsreel projects issued by the OCIAA, for example, were translations of educational and industrial films created by the likes of the TVA and the American Steel industry. Similarly, the OCIAA commissioned new films on subjects ranging from public sanitation to personal hygiene with the help of Walt Disney Studios.\(^{58}\) The OCIAA created the Inter-American Educational Foundation to facilitate cooperative education programs between North and South America, and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA), which focused specifically on joint American

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and Latin-American development projects. The IIAA also elaborated on the activities of a pre-existing Inter-departmental Committee on Cultural and Scientific Cooperation with the American Republics, focusing its efforts initially on the development of health and sanitation services.

American aid activities in Latin American during and after the war surely built upon the earlier efforts of private philanthropic entities as well, and especially the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Yet despite such antecedents, the practice of providing technical assistance in the form of advisors from the public and private sectors intensified in the 1930s and 1940s. Such missions typically consisted of commissions of experts from the United States sent to observe conditions on the ground and provide (and sometimes implement) recommendations for reform. A number of agricultural and industrial development programs were implemented during this period, which established a fairly consistent pattern of action: the U.S. government and/or private U.S. firms supplied technical assistance and

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60 In 1934, for example, at the request of Cuban President Carlos Mendieta, Raymond L. Buell led a committee sponsored by the Foreign Policy Association to provide a survey of possible economic, social, and political reforms. The Commission on Cuban Affairs produced a 1934 report (*Problems of the New Cuba*), which drew on American approaches to similar problems. Among the members of the commission were Frank W. Fetter, a finance specialist who also worked for the Export-Import Bank and served as a technical advisor to the Central Bank of Ecuador. Although still employed by the federal government, Fetter and an undetermined number of other American officials and government experts were able to work as advisors to Latin American governments via Public Law 63, which authorized the American government to “lend” federal officials to South American governments. Fetter, Frank W. 1974. Interview with Richard D. McKinzie. transcript. Hanover, New Hampshire, July, 22. Truman Presidential Library and Museum. www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/fetterfw.htm, (accessed July12, 2013).
equipment, while the “Latin American nation would agree to furnish the land, buildings, labor, associate technicians, and funds for operation.”61 This relationship, later formalized via the IIAA’s “servicio system,” became an important foundation of future technical assistance operations managed by both the U.S. government and international institutions.

In some ways, observing the array of wartime activities that fell under the purview of the OCIAA is like looking into a crystal ball, as it reveals the future of international technical assistance. Many OCIAA programs reflected the same emphasis on “self-help” and the application of technical “know-how” as would the development programs conducted by the ILO and other international bodies during the Cold War. This was particularly true of the Institute for Inter-American Affairs, which began as a branch of the OCIAA focused on rural development and technical assistance projects, but which outlived the OCIAA itself to become an early pillar of the U.S. government’s foreign assistance program. Moreover, individuals who worked for the OCIAA went on to careers in the international civil service and/or worked for projects such as the Andean Indian Program. In this way, and despite its relatively short lived existence, the OCIAA also served as a training ground for the technocrats that constructed the postwar “development” programs of the ILO and other international organizations. Finally, the OCIAA and IIAA were early precursors to U.S. President Harry Truman’s announcement of the U.S. government’s Point Four program, as well as the United Nations own initiation of the Expanded Program for Technical Assistance or EPTA in 1949.

61 Guerrant, Good Neighbor Policy, 132. Most of the agricultural missions were managed directly by the Department of Agriculture, and Peru, Nicaragua, Ecuador, El Salvador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Brazil, and Cuba all completed agreements for agricultural technical assistance during this period.
As suggested above, the OCIAA was a formative experiment proto-
developmentalism for individuals such as de Lozada and a foreshadowing of things to
come. Indeed, of more lasting significance than any influence de Lozada may have had as
an advisor and occasional speechwriter during the war, was the impression that Lozada’s
service in the OCIAA left on him. De Lozada came to see the agency’s work as a
prototype for how to bring less economically developed regions of the world into the
international fold, to fight the spread of totalitarian ideologies and to promote global
economic growth. In an August 1945 memo, for example, he wrote that all hope of
influencing the masses and middle classes of the American republics “for constructive
international purposes” must be abandoned “unless there is simultaneous action to uplift
their present living conditions.”62 According to Lozada, the OCIAA was a “small but
very significant” precedent for “this type of policy,” whether in the form of bilateral aid
programs operated by the U.S. government or multilateral technical assistance projects
conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) and other international
bodies.63

In the early 1950s, Lozada used the experience, skills, and contacts he acquired at
the OCIAA to gain a position with the UN that led to his work on the ILO’s Andean
Indian Program. With the help of several letters of introduction written by Nelson
Rockefeller on his behalf, Lozada joined the staff of the United Nations Technical
Assistance Program in 1951. The following year he was selected to serve on the survey

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62 Eleanor F. Clark to Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, “Memorandum from Enrique de Lozada,”
11 August 1945, Folder 53, Box 7, CIAA Sub-Series, Washington File Series, Record
Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family Collection, Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy
Hollow, New York.
63 Ibid.
mission, which examined the need for and outlined the basic framework of what became
the Andean Indian Program. In 1954, Lozada became the first regional director of the
AIP. Shortly after his appointment, he wrote that he believed the ILO had an interest in
the issue of indigenous integration “from [a] purely technological point of view,” as well
as a matter of “human relations.”64 Consistent with the new focus of the ILO on
promoting economic growth, this meant that the success of the program would be
measured by its contribution to steadily increasing productivity, especially improvements
in agricultural yields. Increasing production (which could be quantified with relative
ease) became a gauge of progress in the area of indigenous “integration” (which was
much more difficult to translate into easily quantifiable terms).

The Argentine economist David Efron, who would join the staff of the
International Labor Organization in 1944, offers yet another example of the kind
of networks upon which the International Technocracy relied. Efron had earned a
doctorate at the National University of Buenos Aires, a Ph.D. in Social Science
from Columbia University, and completed post-doctoral work at the Sorbonne
and the College de France in Paris and the Friedrich Wilhelm Universistität in
Berlin. When World War II began, he went to work promoting the Allied cause in
Latin America as an author and analyst for the National Planning Association
(NPA) and the OCIAA in Washington, D.C. To an astonishing degree, a book
Efron co-authored for the NPA and published in 1945 provided a blueprint for the
work the ILO would do after the war. The key to future peace and prosperity in
Latin America, the book suggested, was the development of the region’s

64 Enrique de Lozada to David Morse, 22 October 1953, TAP AND 2 (1953), ILOA,
Geneva, Switzerland.
productive capacity. “If employment grows from decade to decade, if production
evinces a long-term trend to increase, and if new opportunities continue to be
opened,” Efron and his co-authors concluded, “[then] other difficulties [will]
become more manageable.” Economic productivity was the foundation, if not a
prerequisite, of social transformation. The book also called upon international
authorities to assist in creating the necessary administrative institutions to execute
comprehensive national planning and noted that the ILO in particular would “gain
effectiveness by being closely integrated with dynamic authorities which would
provide the economic basis for advancing standards, instead of having to rely as
in the past on purely legislative action in each country.”

Throughout his career at the ILO, Efron worked in the office of the Workers’ Relations Service, the
Conditions of Work Division, and the Rural and Indigenous Workers Division. As
we shall see in the next chapter, together with David Morse and Jef Rens, Efron
advocated for the ILO to take action on the subject of indigenous “integration” as
vociferously as anyone. He was also a key figure in the production of the ILO’s
landmark 1952 study, _Indigenous Peoples_.

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66 Ibid, 328. Working for the NPA eventually brought Efron into contact with Nelson Rockefeller’s Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, for whom he
completed two extended studies on Latin American resource development. During the
war he contributed numerous pamphlets, articles, and speeches on the topics of Pan-
Americanism, Latin American democracy, and the fascist threat in South America.
“Curriculum Vitae,” David Efron, Dossier de l’Office du Personnel, ILOA, Geneva,
Switzerland.
The ITC and Postwar Liberalism

The examples of David Morse, Jef Rens, Enrique de Lozada, and David Efron illustrate that there were many pathways into the International Technocracy. But the ITC represented more than just a complex of inter-governmental bodies, as the necessities of war and postwar reconstruction drew individuals with the right combination of expertise, political connections, and progressive instincts to the subject of “under-development.” From the late 1940s onward, the spectrum of projects that fell under the rubric of international “development” continued to grow and so too did the influence of non-government organizations (NGOs) that sought to influence official policy at the UN, the ILO, and other inter-governmental bodies. Increasingly during the Cold War it was NGOs such as the Society for International Development (SID), which actively organized to solidify “development” as an engine of social change and a strategy for international economic growth.

At its creation, SID was the brainchild of a small group of Americans who saw the need for a professional organization of those “employed or interested in the field of international economic development and technical cooperation.” As the Society for International Development described its membership in the first issue of the organization’s journal *International Development Review*, “these workers in international development may be thought of as the army—the land, sea, and air forces—the officers, the doughboys sloshing through the mud—who

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have volunteered for service in the real twentieth century war, a war to build, not
annihilate civilization; expand, not extinguish life; engender, not repudiate
love.”69 Appropriately channeling the wartime origins of the ITC and the broader
developmentalist project with this martial theme, SID counted among its members
hundreds of individuals who worked on international development projects at the
UN and its specialized agencies, as well as through the bilateral programs of
individual governments.70 Through its publications, numerous international
conferences, and the organization of its numerous international chapters SID was
part of a public-private development “industry” that grew in the United States and
elsewhere after the Second World War. It was also one of many methods through
which the International Technocracy organized itself and sought to shape the
trajectory of “development” as a discipline and a technique for bringing about
social and economic change.

If the ITC possessed a coherent, solidifying ideology other than its valorization of
expertise and its capacity for social change, then it was as part of a new synthesis
regarding the link between economic rationalization and social integration. The key to
this new synthesis combined aspects of the approach to industrial innovation associated
with Henry Ford and commonly revered to as Fordism, and the ideas of economist John
Maynard Keynes. Fordism is defined here as a technique and an ideology, as both a
system of practices characterized by continuous innovation in the production process and
as a powerful hegemonic idea that reached the height of its influence in the decades

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immediately following the Second World War. As geographer David Harvey suggests, Fordism rose to prominence as postwar planners sought to develop “the proper configuration and deployment of state powers,” capable of “stabiliz[ing] capitalism, while avoiding the evident repression and irrationalities . . . that national socialist
When combined with Keynesian ideas about the need for governmental institutions to balance production and consumption through monetary and fiscal policy, Fordism suggested a compelling alternative to decades of war and economic autarky. On the one hand, the Fordist-Keynesian fix prescribed an intensive and on-going rationalization of production—of the sort proven to be so powerful in the United States during the war—in order to maximize productivity and create conditions approaching full employment. On the other, it necessitated a new “mode of regulation,” an organizing narrative that promised to bring stability to the global economy.

The technocrats that managed the field operations of the ILO were self-assured of their capacity to serve as instruments of reform. The experience of World War II had convinced the ILO’s leadership in Geneva that projects such as the Andean Indian Program would highlight the organization’s relevance to the emerging postwar world. Yet, this is only part of the story. In addition to supreme confidence, the ILO’s development agenda was symptomatic of the same uncertainties and anxieties that plagued postwar liberalism everywhere. How, for example, to balance an individual and collective faith in the superiority of liberal economic and political models with the still resonant memory of globe economic collapse, the ensuing anti-Fascist struggle, and the uncertainty of an ongoing conflict with the Soviet Union? The practices of technical assistance and

community development that informed the Andean Indian Program were, at least in part, an attempt to answer to such questions.

As the ITC emerged to confront the profound uncertainties that plagued postwar liberalism, its work had especially profound implications for the structure and function of international institutions such as the ILO. In his 1956 study *Swords and Plowshares*, the political scientist Inis Claude captured an important aspect of the change. “If the liberalism which inspired the League [of Nations] was essentially a nineteenth-century phenomenon, the doctrinal foundation of the night-watchman state,” Claude interposed, “[then] the liberalism which underlay the new [international] system was the twentieth-century version, the theoretical support of the welfare state.”74 Perhaps most importantly, the shift from the schema of the “night-watchman state” to that of the “welfare state” implied a greater emphasis on the “security” of whole populations, i.e. the standard of living, quality of life, degree of liberty, etc. that could be found in a society. With the effort to, as one ILO official put it, extend “the concept of the Welfare State to cover all the economically significant portions of the earth’s surface,”75 populations on the margins of an expanding system of global trade and geopolitical maneuvering became the targets of international reform. “Development” was quickly becoming part of the altered framework of postwar liberalism and the foundation of a new form of government rationality that would seek to assert itself in a newly global and globalizing context.

75 David Blelloch, “Technical Assistance: Programmes and Policies,” *International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (January, 1952), 50. Blelloch was an ILO representative on the initial survey mission approved by the UNTAB and which led to the establishment of the AIP.
Chapter 3: The ILO in the Age of Development

As suggested in the last chapter, expertise was the International Technocracy’s greatest political asset and the source of its collective identity. But in addition to expertise, several other elements also proved decisive to the organization and goals of the Andean Indian Program. As the Bolivian case will illustrate, in response to the concerns of regional governments, the AIP offered a theory and a methodology of social and economic change. The politico-economic solution posed by the ITC through programs such as the AIP positioned “technical assistance” and “community development” as techniques by which states could individually and/or in partnership with international governmental and non-governmental organizations achieve economic growth and social integration. In the spaces of the Andean Program, these disparate elements transformed the ILO from an organization focused on research and standard setting to one concerned with “integration,” population security, and economic rationalization.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the ILO’s interest in indigenous peoples and the decision to make them a test case and target of international development. While the ILO’s concern for the situation that confronted indigenous peoples across Latin America dated to very early in the organization’s history, the move toward a program of economic development and social integration began in earnest only after the Second World War. To understand the nature and timing of the ILO’s efforts during the immediate postwar period, this chapter briefly delves into the geographic and historical context that necessarily informed the ILO’s activities in Bolivia and influenced the scope and priorities of the AIP. A brief introduction to
some of the most important aspects of Bolivia’s geography and history is followed by a discussion of the circumstances and broader international currents which helped drive the ILO’s focus on indigenous peoples. Building on the concept of a Fordist-Keynesian synthesis introduced at the end of the last chapter, I then examine the ways in which the strategy of economic rationalization and social integration generated by this synthesis was enacted by the ILO: first in the adoption of its 1944 Philadelphia Charter, which articulated the way forward for the ILO as organization after the Second World War, and then in the Andean Indian Program. Before the Second World War, the ILO’s preferred method of action was through the passage of resolutions dedicating member states (at least in theory) to an evolving international system of labor standards. However, with the adoption of the Philadelphia Declaration and the ILO’s subsequent inclusion into the UN system, this began to change. Accepted by the International Labor Organization’s General Conference in 1944, the Philadelphia Declaration committed the ILO to “full employment and the raising of standards of living,” while promising that the organization would work with other international bodies to “expand production and consumption” so as to “promote the economic and social advancement of the less developed regions of the world.” In the coming years and decades, the new economic orthodoxy of full employment emphasizing expanded production and consumption, together with the determination of the ILO’s new Director-General (David Morse) to raise the organization’s international profile, encouraged a new emphasis on expanding the organization’s field operations. The chapter ends with a detailed discussion of the

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1 General Conference of the International Labor Organization, “Declaration
goals and purposes articulated for the AIP by the ILO, as well as the various and problematical discourses that informed the ILO’s “integral” method for promoting indigenous social integration.

*Bolivia, the ILO, and the Origins of the AIP*

To understand the specific circumstances reflected in the ILO’s focus on indigenous peoples and why Bolivia in particular drew repeated (if intermittent) attention from the international community, some basic background about the country and its history is essential. With an area of roughly 423,163 square miles, Bolivia is the fifth largest country in South America. Census records from the 1950s and 1960s suggest a rural population of approximately 66 percent, but the actual percentage of rural inhabitants may have been much higher, as evidenced by the Bolivian National Planning Council’s estimated of 71% in the 1970s and other estimates of closer to 90% during the same period. While around three-fourths of the population worked in agriculture, agricultural production accounted for only one-third of the gross national product in 1964 and agricultural production was persistently below the standard required to feed the people. Bolivia’s chronic difficulty in producing enough food to feed its citizens is further demonstrated by the fact that over 40 percent of Bolivian imports throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s were constituted by foodstuffs. At the same time, the gap between the labor effort expended to produce food and the

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Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labor Organization (Declaration of Philadelphia),” Twenty-Six Session, Philadelphia, 1944.


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.
country’s ability to feed itself was not a result of exportation, because almost 95 percent of exports during the same period were minerals such as tin, which were historically controlled by a small group of wealthy elites.\textsuperscript{5}

Bolivia’s population historically consisted of several different groups. National Planning Council estimates from the 1960s suggested that the population was approximately 53 percent indigenous peoples, 32 percent \textit{cholo} or \textit{mestizo}, and 15 percent white.\textsuperscript{6} More recent figures suggest a similar distribution with an indigenous population that is 30 percent Quechua and 25 percent Aymara, a mestizo population of mixed white and Amerindian ancestry constituting 25 percent, and 15 percent white. Quechua and Aymara are the two predominant indigenous cultural and linguistic groups found in Bolivia, although 36 distinct indigenous languages in addition to Spanish are officially recognized by the state of Bolivia.\textsuperscript{7}

As much or perhaps more so than any other country in the region, Bolivia’s history has been profoundly shaped by its geography, which frequently served as a barrier to communication and a critical factor in determining the distribution of its population. The climate of Bolivia is highly variable depending on elevation, but consists of three primary zones possessing different ecological characteristics, i.e. the high plateau, valleys, and lowlands. The high plateau or Altiplano region constitutes approximately 12 percent of the country’s landmass and has historically been home to

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.
the majority of the country’s population. While never easy given the condition of local roads, travel overland through the Altiplano was aided by the relatively flat and dry conditions. Although rail transport came to this region of Bolivia relatively early, as the ILO ramped up the first AIP projects in the 1950s the railroad still only serviced a few cities and was designed primarily to support mineral extraction rather than as a principle means of overland travel. Mountains making up the Cordillera Occidental to the east and the Cordillera Real in the west run north and south through the country, surrounding the Altiplano. The *cordillera* were historically the primary source of Bolivia’s mineral resources—for example, the tin found there was highly sought after before and during the Second World War, but declined significantly as a source of national wealth thereafter as cheaper, higher quality tin could be harvested elsewhere. While the mountains flanking the region rise to 23,000 feet, elevations in the Altiplano vary from 12,000 to 13,000 feet above sea level. The climate is arid and cool with scant trees and frequent, piercing winds. Annual rainfall amounts decrease as one moves further south toward Bolivia’s border with Argentina. La Paz, Bolivia’s capital, is located near the northern tip of the high plateau region and approximately 100 miles from Lake Titicaca on the border with nearby Peru.

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The eastern Cordillera contains a series of habitable valleys that bridge the divide between the Altiplano region in the west and the isolated lowlands farther east. The valleys found in this region can be quite narrow, but extend in some cases for miles in the direction of the eastern lowlands. Undulating between jagged peaks and vales, elevations alternate rapidly from 16,000 feet vertically to sweeping valley floors that descend to 2,000 feet above sea level.\textsuperscript{12} The highly variable terrain contributes to significant travel and communication barriers, by rail or by air. Roads throughout the region are highly susceptible to erosion. In total, Bolivia’s valleys make up about 15 percent of total land and historically supported approximately twenty percent of the population.\textsuperscript{13} The upper valleys are characterized by cloudy, humid, wet conditions of the semitropical Yungas region, and the drier, mild temperatures of the more sheltered valleys of the Cordillera Oriental. Farther east, as one approaches the eastern lowlands the climate is able to support foodstuffs such as coffee, bananas, citrus, and coca.\textsuperscript{14}

The large flatland region that stretches from the foot of the eastern Cordillera to the Brazilian border is the Llanos del Oriente, which makes up over two thirds of the total area of the country. The lowlands have been historically the most isolated of Bolivia’s three primary ecological areas, with travel throughout the region largely conducted by foot, horseback, or small boat. With elevations between 300 and 1,500 feet, the northern portion of the Oriente is especially hot and wet.\textsuperscript{15} Heavy seasonal

\textsuperscript{12} McEwen, \textit{Changing Rural Society}, 16.
\textsuperscript{13} Vera, “Bolivia,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} McEwen, \textit{Changing Rural Society}, 17. See also Vera, “Bolivia”, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
rains that begin in October and last until April create lush vegetation and characterize the tropical environment alternating with forest and grasslands throughout the region. The band surrounding the central lowlands is somewhat hillier and drier than in the north and is the location of what is today Bolivia’s largest city, Santa Cruz. Further south is the Chaco region that continues across the border with neighboring Paraguay. The Chaco receives almost no rainfall for most of the year, followed by heavy, swamp-inducing rains for three months. Despite high moisture, the population of the Oriente has historically represented a small percentage of Bolivia’s total, roughly 15 per cent through the late twentieth century. Development since the 1980s, including the growth of urban centers such as the city of Santa Cruz, expansion of commercial crops such as soybeans, and the discovery of oil and natural gas reserves has contributed to increased population growth in recent years.

In addition to Bolivia’s complex geography, the racial, ethnic, and cultural consequences of the Spanish conquest have imposed a legacy on Bolivia’s historical development that confronted the AIP and its teams of international experts. During the colonial era, almost all of the indigenous peoples of what is present day Bolivia were brought under Spanish administrative control, largely through the use of forced labor and special grants, known as repartimiento and encomienda respectively.17

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These and other provisions under colonial law provided Spanish whites with legal sanction and enforcement by the Spanish crown to exact tribute and labor from indigenous peoples under their control. The historical legacy of repartimiento and encomienda are beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, these and other practices that originated during the colonial period clearly helped to define the conditions under which the AIP operated. Perhaps most significantly, the subsequent development of encomienda and the hacienda or latifundia labor system evolved in response to the Spanish crown’s attempts to reign in repartimiento and landholders’ attempts to secure large, private landholdings in perpetuity and without interference from the crown. As an illustration of the historical impact of these practices, by 1950 less than 4 percent of privately held land made up over 81 percent of all arable property in Bolivia.18 As discussed further in subsequent chapters, the agrarian reforms introduced after the 1952 Bolivian Revolution by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) took direct aim at the semi-feudal hacienda system and the legacy of national economic stagnation, failed state administration, and accelerating popular discontent that was a legacy of Bolivia’s difficult colonial and postcolonial past.

A variety of historical, environmental, political, and economic circumstances contributed to the conditions that were ultimately targeted by the ILO’s Andean program. It remains to be seen how Bolivia and the Andes region more widely were selected for the ILO’s first significant experiment in social and economic

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18 McEwen, Changing Rural Society, 22.
development. From early in its history, the ILO laid a claim to the problems of “indigenous workers” that seemed to foreshadow its involvement with the Andean Indian Program during the new era of colonial expansion that encompassed the early 20th Century. As the legal scholar and historian Luis Rodríguez-Piñero suggests, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, ILO interest in matters affecting “indigenous workers” was reflected in what he describes as the organization’s “Colonial Code.”

The ILO’s implementation of this code “consolidated the organization’s formal competence in ‘indigenous’ affairs, at a historical moment when the difference between the status of colonial peoples and indigenous groups living in independent countries was irrelevant in international law.” Drawing on notions of colonial trusteeship, the ILO drew up “a different set of international labor standards specifically aimed at disciplining the conditions of exploitation of ‘indigenous peoples’.”

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19 Luis Rodríguez-Piñero, *Indigenous Peoples, Postcolonialism, and International Law: The ILO Regime (1919-1989)*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), 12. As with much of the existing literature that examines the work of the ILO in the area of indigenous affairs, Rodríguez-Piñero’s interest in the AIP and the ILO stems from its relationship to evolving international legal standards concerning the rights of indigenous peoples. Indeed, to the extent that ILO Convention No. 107 (passed in 1957) and Convention No. 169 (passed in 1989) informed international efforts to promote and protect the rights of indigenous populations, the ILO played a pioneering role. See also S. James Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples in International Law* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004); Ronald Niezen, *The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003); and Chris Tennant, “Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions and the International Legal Literature from 1945-1993,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 16, no. 1 (1994): 1-57. Setting aside the relative importance of the ILO conventions, my interest in the Andean Indian Program lay in the matrices of relations it contained. The AIP was (at least nominally) meant to address the material conditions/standards increasingly defined as necessary for the enjoyment of rights that indigenous peoples *already* possessed as citizens of a sovereign state. It was not concerned, per se, with the creation of new rights.

20 Rodríguez-Piñero, *Indigenous Peoples*, 12.
workers.” While these early efforts did not directly lead to Andean Indian Program, the organization’s attentions to the conditions affecting “indigenous workers” prior to the Second World War made subsequent declarations of a special area of interest all the more appropriate and convincing.

Even as the organization sought to regulate the exploitation of indigenous labor, the ILO’s interest in the Andes region percolated through a broader web of international conferences and meetings. In 1936, for example, delegates to the first regional conference of ILO members from the American States first discussed the need to study the situation of indigenous peoples that resided in several Latin American nations. In 1943, the ILO, together with the Bolivian and United States governments, conducted a study of Bolivia’s economy and social structure. Neither the conference nor the study resulted in a concrete plan. However, the authors of the joint investigation recommended that the ILO organize a “far-reaching program in the Labor field” to address the integration of Bolivia’s indigenous population. Perhaps such a program would have materialized earlier had not the Second World War

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21 Ibid., 18. As Rodríguez-Piñero notes, largely as a result of decolonization, the modern definition of “indigenous” has since taken on a different meaning, referring to “culturally distinct groups living within the borders of independent states that are the descendants of the peoples that inhabited the region prior to colonization.” Ibid., 40.

22 Through the conferences, “the growing saliency of the organization’s colonial policy during [the 1920s and 1930s] interacted with the American states’ official discourse on the ‘Indian problem’ to create a specific policy within the ILO’s regional policy without questioning the organization’s competence—either in formal or technical terms.” Ibid., 333. The importance of Indigenist discourse to the formation of the AIP is discussed below.

intervened, but ultimately it would be another decade before the AIP was
implemented. By that time, the nature of the program and the ILO’s interest in
promoting development had taken on increased international importance in the
context of the Cold War and in the ensuing wake of the 1952 Bolivian Revolution.

As already suggested, despite sporadic interest in the Andes region and its
people by the ILO, serious planning for a permanent program did not occur until
1949. In that year, a conference resolution on the “conditions of life and work of
indigenous populations” (at the Fourth Conference of ILO American States Members)
again addressed prospects for an ILO sponsored program. This time the resources of
the newly created United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program
(UNETAP) were cited as the basis for action. The UNETAP proposal received further
impetus three years later, when the ILO’s Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labor
(meeting in La Paz, Bolivia) urged the creation of a “joint field working party” to
assess conditions on the ground for a permanent Andean mission. 24 The geography,
make-up of its population, and history of Bolivia were considerations with which the
international planners of the Andean Program were forced to grapple. The leader of
the initial survey mission that led to the AIP’s establishment, Ernest Beaglehole,
described it as “a region of violent contrasts.” In the high plateau region, he
suggested, “the Indian inhabitant struggle to gain a precarious livelihood by
agriculture and animal husbandry.” Meanwhile, in the valleys of the eastern

24 “Collaboration of the United Nations with the International Labour Organisation on
Resolution VII of the Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labour in accordance with
the recommendation of the Social Commission on the Andean Indians,” 6 July 1951,
TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. See also Rodríguez-Piñero,
Indigenous Peoples, 78-82.
Cordillera, “life is superficially pleasanter but still hard because of increasing population pressure on an already overpopulated land.” Writing shortly after the survey team finished its work in 1952, Beaglehole summarized the need for and purpose of the AIP by pointing to the indigenous populations lack of social and economic integration:

The problem placed before the Andean Indian Mission was [...] deceptively simple: to plan action programmes [sic] with the tripartite co-operation of Governments, Indians and international organisations [sic] that would accelerate the integration of Indians into the national political, social and economic life of the three Andean countries; such integration to be orientated towards a democratically-phrased integration/in place of the present prevailing master-subordinate integration; such integration finally to be regional in scope, integral in approach, organic in growth, based upon consent rather than upon coercion, and to be achieved without destroying for the Indian his present satisfying community organisation [sic] and valued way of life.

From the outset, overcoming the challenges that geography and history imposed on Bolivian development was a primary aim of the AIP. For this reason and as illustrated in Figure 2, the ILO targeted communities in all three of Bolivia’s primary geographic and climatic regions, represented by the base of operations established at Playa Verde, Pillapi, Otavi, and Cotaca. These four centers were, in turn, designed to serve as a model for like communities elsewhere in the region and around the world, wherever the problem of “underdevelopment” existed.

26 Ibid, 523.
The ILO’s historic interest in the problems affecting indigenous peoples forms a backdrop to the Andean Program, but ultimately it does not address the question of why an organization which had made establishing international labor standards the focus of its existence before the Second World War suddenly entered the field of international development nor, when it chose to do so, why it concentrated those efforts on the plight of indigenous peasants. As discussed in the last chapter, the historic emergence and consolidation of an International Technocracy is posed here as part of the answer to the question of why the ILO pursued the Andean Indian Program. Members of the ITC became important promoters and distributors of international developmentalism, as well as the “shocktroops” of development projects.
around the world. It is also true that, by the early 1950s, a new sense of urgency seemed to be pushing some sort of Andean program to the top of the ILO’s agenda. David Efron, the Argentine economist discussed in the previous chapter who joined the staff of the International Labor Organization in 1944, was chief among those experts who insisted that “now is the time for the [International Labor] Office to take the initiative” and intensify its work on indigenous populations.27 From Efron’s perspective, hesitation on the part of the ILO risked the creation of a situation in which other organizations or governments would take the initiative ahead of the ILO. Given the organization’s previous efforts to subject the conditions of “indigenous workers” to critical international scrutiny, Efron feared that inaction would be taken as a sign of the ILO’s increasing irrelevance. To send the opposite message, he counseled that the programs of other organizations “should not be permitted to develop without immediate appropriate coordination [with] the ILO.”28

Reinforcing David Efron’s passionate appeals for action, the failure of previous efforts in the region also suggested an opportunity to reshape the ILO’s international profile and portfolio. Throughout the 1940s, the governments of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador had rejected a number of United Nations (UN) proposals, including a series of seminars on child and community welfare sponsored by the UN Department of Social Affairs, on the grounds that they were “piecemeal, provincial,

28 Memo from David Efron to Mr. Fano and Mr. Alvarado, 22 August 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
over-simple, unscientific and impractical.”

Intensification of the Cold War and the priority it gave to aiding social and economic development in the “Third World” urged a different strategy. In contrast to earlier proposals, the multilateral program envisioned by the ILO and presented to the UN Technical Assistance Board (UNTAB) in the early 1950s would be “integrated, organic, regional, scientific and practical.” The mission would “develop every approach and technique which seem[ed] practically useful in breaking down obstacles to integration.” Thus, the notion that half-measures had limited past efforts in the Andes region was an important backdrop for ILO action and made the AIP into much more than a project in “the Labor-field.”

Indeed, the problem of indigenous “integration” was an extension of the more broadly conceived mandate that drove the ILO’s postwar turn toward developmentalism. As discussed in the last chapter, the priorities that rose to prominence at the ILO in the 1940s and 1950s addressed several areas critical to sustaining the Fordist-Keynesian model, including improvements in labor productivity, technological efficiency, and administrative organization. Moreover, the


30 “Technical Assistance to Latin American Countries on the Problems of Indigenous Populations,” 1 December 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. In 1952, UNTAB authorized a survey mission to the Andes region, which became the basis for the Andean Program. Although the ILO successfully fought to lead the Andean mission, and was responsible for planning and directing the AIP’s day-to-day operations, the project would also rely upon expertise from the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.), the United Nation’s Education, Science, and Culture Organization (U.N.E.S.C.O.), and the World Health Organization (W.H.O). Over time, UNESCO would become the epicenter of UN community development programs, but as of the early 1950s institutional pathways were more fluid.
ILO’s 1944 “Philadelphia Declaration,” a general statement of the organization’s postwar aims and purposes adopted by the ILO General Assembly in the same year, articulated the organization’s commitment to acting on these goals. The Declaration echoed the ILO’s social democratic heritage, stressing a commitment to labor regulation and the extension of workers’ protections, but it also heralded ambitious new priorities. It addressed the need “to expand production and consumption, to avoid severe economic fluctuations, to promote the economic and social advancement of the less developed regions of the world, to assure greater stability in world prices of primary products, and to promote a high and steady volume of international trade.” The call to address this expanded program of economic and social concerns both built on and went well beyond the organization’s earlier focus on labor regulation. The Declaration’s call for the ILO to promote consumption and social advancement implied and was interpreted to require a level of technical and administrative responsibility that went well beyond the organization’s traditional standard setting activities; it summoned new organizational capacities into being.

31 Under the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, the ILO was formally recognized as the “permanent machinery” for executing the “General Principles” embodied by Article 427 of the treaty, which insisted that “there are methods and principles for regulating labor conditions which all industrial communities should endeavor to apply.” Among the nine principles specifically identified were the belief that labor is not “a commodity or article of commerce,” the right of free association by workers and employers, the payment of a living wage, support for the eight hour day and forty-eight hour week, the abolition of child labor, and equal pay for equal work between men and women. The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, “The Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919,” http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/partxiii.htm (accessed October 30, 2013).
At the same stroke of a pen, the Philadelphia Declaration also repositioned the organization’s historic commitment to social justice around the centerpiece of an abstract humanism. The document’s sole human rights provision affirmed that “all human beings . . . have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.” While the Declaration’s defense of human rights represented an important departure from Fordism’s focus on productivity and efficiency, discussed in the previous chapter, it also served as the basis for a new, expanded program of action, which included commitments to achieving “full employment and the raising of standards of living,” the promotion of “the right of collective bargaining,” “the continuous improvement of productive efficiency,” and “the collaboration of workers and employers” to facilitate economic and social development. Reflective of an emerging international consensus (at least within the non-communist bloc of countries that included the United States and its allies), the Declaration looked to a future in which economic growth and efficiency, along with the promise of full employment, would neutralize social and economic conflicts. High productivity

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combined with mass consumption would be a rising tide that lifted all boats. At the same time, the ability to neutralize social strife was a strategic goal of developmentalism in the Cold War, i.e. an intervention designed to disrupt conditions that led to political and economic instability and/or provided an opening to leftist forces that served as proxies for the Soviet Union.

While the Philadelphia Declaration constituted a vision that had yet to be implemented, the “primary purpose” of the technical assistance program adopted by the International Labor Conference in 1949 was to help fuel “increase[s] in production and in opportunities for employment in the less developed countries of the world.”36 Along with improvements in production, the ILO’s new program defined as “vital” the need “to raise steadily and progressively the level of consumption” in the developing world.37 In this way, expansion of the organization’s field operations was deemed “essential to the raising of living standards in [developing countries],” while


helping “at the same time to raise standards of living in the world as a whole.”

The ILO would continue to rely on “research and standard setting.” But, as one official put it, “now there [is] a new spirit in the development of practical operational programmes.” Through its publications and expanded field operations, and drawing on the Philadelphia Declaration as a blueprint, the ILO would preach what David Morse called “the gospel of increasing productivity.”

Tactics of “Integration”: The AIP as Social Reform

As an initial thrust of the ILO’s strategy to extend its field operations, the Andean Indian Program gave a privileged place to the technique of economic rationalization through increasing productivity and consumption. This can be observed in, among other places, the three phases of the AIP. The program’s first, “experimental,” stage constituted “an effort to determine the best methods of

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39 “Report on the Technical Working Group on Migration,” 23 and 24 March 1949, Z 6/1/7, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. The comment was that of the ILO representative to the meeting, R. A. Metall. Metall was describing the preparedness of the ILO to carry out “inquiries and projects for economic development,” in cooperation with other international organizations. The meeting discussed the results of an Economic Commission for Latin America report on migration to the region. See also Memo to D-G and Eric Hutchison, “Observations concerning the Memorandum of Mr. [Wendell] Hayes.,” unknown date, Z 6/1/7, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILO Archives, Geneva. The unknown author of the memo wrote that, “From now on, the I.L.O., without diminishing its legislative activities, should however consider it to be of the same (if not greater) importance to have for each matter within its competence a general programme [sic] of technical assistance to governments. This is an entirely different application of the activities of the I.L.O. but through it the I.L.O. should be in a better position to fulfill its objectives.”

40 David Morse, “Broadcast over WCFM, 26 September 1952,” Folder 2, Box 82, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
achieving [the AIP’s] objectives.\textsuperscript{41} In this initial stage, as in those that followed, the “action base” became the focal point of activity. It was to be a dynamic space, comprising multiple operations: it was an experimental agricultural station, a vocational training center, a rural school for fundamental education, a medical clinic, and a research site for generating new knowledge about the region and its people. The basic administrative unit of the ILO’s Andean program was a series of “action bases” located in the areas targeted for reform. The action base served as the forward operating center for the AIP’s personnel deployed to villages across the region. A technical lead was assigned to each base by officials who managed the program from the ILO’s regional headquarters with frequent input and instruction received directly from the Director-General’s office in Geneva. The staff located at these operational sites across Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador constituted the core of technical expertise for the program, living and working among the indigenous peoples and communities that were the targets of the Andean Program. The first of these bases was located at the village of Pillapi. In the characterization of the ILO’s Deputy-Director Jef Rens, the action bases were the “linchpins of the whole Andean program,”\textsuperscript{42} the take-off point for the AIP’s broader objectives.

A tactical variation on this model was the AIP’s colonization or “community resettlement” projects, designed to bring indigenous groups into regions where labor was relatively scarce, especially for agricultural production. For some ILO officials, colonization or “the transfer of a great percentage of [the indigenous] population to

\textsuperscript{41} “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.

areas that [would] ensure them better living conditions” constituted the “true solution
to the problem of the Andean populations.” At the AIP’s first colony, located at
Cotoca, Bolivia, land titles were promised to individuals, but the focus was on
developing cooperative systems of agricultural production. As Jef Rens explained,
Cotoca utilized “a combination of private ownership to supply individual stimulus to
the Indians and large-scale exploitation [of land] to meet the economic needs of the
community as a whole.” Similarly, a memo on the use of cooperatives concluded
that, “[t]he basic idea [was] to take advantage of the traditional communal
organization and mutual aid system of the Indians and attempt to change it into
modern market-oriented cooperatives.” The cooperatives were meant to boost
production and serve as an alternative method of rural economic organization and
administration to the hacienda system, which was a target of the MNR led
government in Bolivia after the revolution.

The deployment of this model will be discussed further in later chapters, but
the AIP’s colonization program had the practical objective of combining traditional
forms of communal organization with an emphasis on “self-help” and a market-based
approach to introducing new seed varieties, irrigation systems, and cultivation
methods. In this way, indigenous labor would be incorporated into the national labor
market to overcome a traditional reliance on subsistence agriculture. Indeed, from the

43 Enrique de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 12 April 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J.3), ILOA,
Geneva, Switzerland.
44 Jef Rens, “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with UNESCO, Paris, 26
November 1955,” Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
45 Memo, “Special Comment on Cooperative Farming,” 13 March 1959, TAP-A 1-1-
0 (J.2), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. The memo was a list of recommendations
generated by specialists at the Food and Agriculture Organization to be added to an
AIP Special Fund proposal for Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador.
perspective of some Bolivian government officials, the implementation of the cooperatives made it possible for the state to prioritize agricultural production “destined for consumption in the markets of the cities.” This was a necessary step, argued one state minister, given “the present tendency of the farmer to return to a self-sufficient agrarian economy.” From the moment the first AIP expert set foot in the country, the Bolivian government was desperate to break the system of subsistence agriculture that kept production low and forced the country to rely on imports to feed its population. The appropriation of indigenous labor to raise production levels was the point at which “integration” and the AIP’s goal of long term economic rationalization intersected.

During the Andean Indian Program’s second phase, “the work of the action bases was extended over an increasing number of surrounding communities and emphasis was placed on training at the community level through the organization and follow-up of courses for indigenous social promoters and auxiliary workers.” This phase also sought the “development of material facilities in the indigenous communities (irrigation, roads, school buildings, improved housing, etc.),” as well as the construction of new action bases and the “strengthening of those already in existence.” The shift in focus represented by phase two of the program came in 1956, as administrators in Geneva determined, “that the initial and experimental stage

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46 Nuflo Chavez Ortiz, Ministro de Asuntos Campesinos to Alejandro Oropeza Castillo, Representante en Bolivia de la Junta de Asistencia Técnica de Naciones Unidas,” 7 February 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J.3), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
47 “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
48 “Tentative Suggestions Relating to a Possible Expansion of the Andean Indian Programme,” AIP/M.2/2, Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
should now come to an end and that it is high time for our programme [sic] to enter its consolidated and expanding phase.”\(^{49}\) With an emphasis on increasing the influence of the program by deepening connections with local communities, stage two represented the ILO’s effort to secure the AIP’s institutional presence and importance in the regions where it operated.

The third phase of the program represented a move toward “gradual ‘nationalisation’ [sic] of projects.” As an aspect of the larger goal of economic rationalization, the principal objective of phase three was to “link more effectively all the projects with national economic development plans,”\(^ {50}\) so that they would “gradually be integrated into the national programmes [sic] and become the responsibility of national administrative machinery, depending as little as possible on external assistance.”\(^ {51}\) To do so, even on paper, was no easy task and required “coordinated action” between “the different [ministerial] departments, in all the regions inhabited by the indigenous populations.”\(^ {52}\) Nationalization would mark a culmination: the successful integration of AIP practices into civil society and the apparatus of the Bolivian state.

ILO officials such as the program’s first regional director, Enrique Sanchez de Lozada, saw this threefold process as a rational plan of action. However, there was always the potential for misunderstanding and tension between the AIP’s technocratic

\(^{49}\) Abbas Ammar to Enrique de Lozada, 10 October 1956, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.

\(^{50}\) “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.

\(^{51}\) Abbas Ammar to Enrique de Lozada, 10 October 1956, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.

\(^{52}\) Jef Rens to Carlos d’Ugard, 18 July 1958, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
operators and the population targeted by the program. In 1956, for example, a group of settlers at the AIP’s Cotoca colony discovered the distance that existed between their conception of the project and the priorities of the program’s international experts and administrators. On March 29, 1956 the Chief of Mission for Cotoca hurriedly informed the AIP’s Regional Director that, “a meeting of the colonists had been held without his permission and that he had discovered it by chance.”

Though non-violent, their actions set off alarm bells among the settlement’s group of international experts. According to the only know record of the incident, the colonists themselves claimed that they had formed the ad hoc committee to air grievances and to negotiate the terms of the cooperative with the AIP’s Regional Director, Enrique de Lozada.

Responding to the pleas for assistance from Cotoca Mission Chief, Lozada met with the colonists to share his vision of the settlement’s overarching purpose. “[T]he Cotoca Project,” he asserted, “was a shared endeavor between the Andean Mission and the colonists that had not been designed for their benefit only[,] but also was to help to define, in an experimental way, the aspects that it was advisable to multiply, in the future, to the usefulness of a great number of campesinos.” Thus, he continued, “[t]hey were ‘pioneers’ who, in common with the mission, were to create

53 Enrique de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 29 March 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J.3), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. Cotoca was the AIP’s premiere “community resettlement” project, in which volunteers were selected to relocate from the Andean highlands to build a new community cooperative in the eastern department of Santa Cruz, Bolivia. In addition to the organization of an agricultural cooperative, the bargain the settlers struck with the AIP and the Bolivian government involved the issuance of individual land titles. When these titles failed to materialize as promised, some of the settlers began to take matters into their own hands.

54 Ibid.
the prototype of a form of colonization likely to multiply.”

Representatives from the committee organized by the colonos replied that, “it was precisely because of [its wider significance] that they believed they had the right to express their opinions with the administration and to ask for explanations of all the problems encountered by the Project.”

Indeed, in a moment of absolute candor the Cotoca Mission Chief confessed that the anger and frustration “of the colonists [was] perfectly justified since their reclamations [of the mission lands] were founded on the promises which had been made to them,” to receive titles for their own land and to participate in organizing the cooperative. The colonists had done their part to turn Cotoca into a place where they could live with their families, but the government and the mission had not fulfilled its obligations. For his part, de Lozada believed that the program could succeed “only insofar as the members of the colony [took] an active part in [its] achievements.” Thus, on this occasion he “did not find it convenient to contradict” the views expressed by the colonists, for fear that, if he “attack[ed] the interest that [they] expressed in the project,” the settlement would collapse from within.

As the Cotoca example suggests, the AIP’s design targeted the Bolivian state and nation as a whole, providing social services to rural populations while attempting to catalyze the levers of national economic growth. The international technocrats who administered the Andean Indian Program could point to any number of factors that prevented the “integration” of indigenous peoples, including racial and ethnic prejudice, the legacy of centuries-old legal servitude and discrimination, illiteracy,

55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid.
difficulties of geography and climate, lack of economic diversity, among others. However, at its core, the AIP was an experiment in institution and nation building, which emphasized the spread of scientific and technical “know-how” through the deployment of its action bases and colonies. “The underlying problem,” which the AIP was meant to address, was defined as “an administrative one.”\(^59\) This premise disciplined the practices of the AIP from its inception.

After World War II, the ability of international organizations and communities of experts to deliver knowledge and administrative resources to the periphery of international capitalism was an important measure of their success. At the ILO, this meant dramatically expanding the organization’s field operations, which in turn placed a high value on the capacity of experts to, as one observer put it, reform “the social world through economic growth and administrative rationalization.”\(^60\) As the organization’s Director-General, David Morse, explained in 1949, “nothing could more gravely jeopardize the usefulness of an organization like the International Labor Organization than the failure to take account of historical trends and where necessary to adapt quickly its methods and procedures to changing circumstances.” Indeed, the ILO’s Fourth Conference of American State Members in Montevideo, where Morse announced his intentions with regard to technical assistance, was a watershed for articulation of his vision as Director-General, for the direction of the ILO, and for the prospects of the Andean Indian Program. With “new States in being and on the


horizon,” Morse predicted that there would be demand “for industrialization, for increasing production, for a quickening in the pace of improving standards of living.” 61 “The ILO must legislate,” advised Morse, “but [it] must also act!” 62 Morse’s words, much like those of David Efron and others discussed above, did not mark a wholesale departure from the ILO’s roots. Nevertheless, the emphasis on actively promoting “development” urged the ILO into a new era in which the organization’s standard setting mission was increasing overshadowed by a new focus on production, under-consumption, social integration, and nation building.

Adding to the urgency of the moment, the link between technical assistance, community development, and execution of the ILO’s international reform goals came just as much of the world’s attention shifted toward a struggle for “hearts and minds” in “developing countries.” Indeed, a few months into his first term as Director-General, Morse confessed to a friend that, “I see now where the efforts which I am making in the field of technical assistance . . . in under-developed countries, especially in Asia and Latin America, is an indispensable part of the total effort to insure that democracies survive.” The ideological fight with the Soviets and their allies would be, Morse wrote, “extremely difficult,” largely because the agents of communism “have such absolute control” over their people. In the West, he concluded, “[o]ur greatest card is our productive capacity; our freedoms, but above

62 Ibid.
all, the need to maintain a healthy social and economic system.” He and others hoped that projects such as the Andean Indian Program would enable the ILO to navigate successfully between the aspirations of its “Philadelphia Declaration” and the uncertainties imposed by the Cold War.

*Indigenism, Integration, and the Problem of Expertise*

Earlier sections of this chapter have examined the ILO’s interest in indigenous peoples and the contours of a broader shift in focus toward field programs that promoted economic development with the application of technical expertise, or what David Morse termed the “gospel of production.” This section explores more particular aspects of literature, politics, and the social sciences that specifically informed AIP development discourse in Bolivia. As the primary expression of the ILO’s turn toward programmatic efforts in support of economic development, social integration, and nation building, the AIP and its endorsement by the Bolivian government benefited from the intersection of two separate streams of thought within the social sciences. The first of these influences was an “Indigenist” movement promoted by organizations such as the Inter-American Indian Institute (III), which was formed in 1940 out of the first Inter-American Indigenist Congress in Pátzcuaro, Mexico and became a component of the Organization of American States in 1953, but also related to an older *indigenista* literary tradition. As a method of studying and categorizing indigenous peoples and cultures, Indigenism or *Indigenismo* had its origins before the turn of the century. Influenced by late nineteenth century European

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63 David Morse to Elinore Herrick, January 31, 1949, Folder 141, Box 53, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
positivism, a diverse group of Latin American authors helped make what they called the “indigenous problem” into a defining element of a new nationalism. The synthesis of “Indigenism” with the indigenista tradition structured and informed the discourse of social integration and development pursued by the ILO and the new revolutionary regime that ruled Bolivian politics between 1952 and 1964.

The Bolivian diplomat, author, and social critic Alcides Arguedas (1879-1046) was among the earliest authors who tied Bolivia’s ongoing social and economic problems to its unfortunate geography and, most controversially, to a historical process of miscegenation. In response to the country’s humiliating defeat in the Pacific War (1879-1884) with Chile, Arguedas voiced the anxieties of a traditional white ruling elite, even as he criticized the country’s existing social system for exacerbating the situation of “the Indian.” Influenced by the race theories of the French psychologist Gustave Le Bon, Arguedas openly mourned the declining “purity” of caste in Bolivian society and asserted that, “the white race [had been] invaded by the blood of the Indian.” In his scathing social commentary Pueblo enfermo (1909), he blamed the rise and triumph of “Creole” politicians and the “entry into power of a lower class mestizo” for many of the country’s social and economic problems.64 Perhaps most significantly, Arguedas’s Social Darwinian critique of Bolivian society sparked a renewed discussion among the country’s intellectual classes about the place of Bolivia’s indigenous population in the life of the nation.

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Writing at the same time as Arguedas, the journalist Franz Tamayo also viewed Bolivia’s history and the struggles of its people in racial terms, but his conclusions differed significantly from his more politically conservative countryman. In direct contrast to Arguedas, Tamayo’s *Creación de una pedagogía nacional* (1910) argued that in seeking to modernize and unify Bolivian society, the country’s political leaders would do well to look closely at Bolivia’s own autochthonous culture and traditions, rather than blindly attempting to copy European models.65 Also countering Arguedas’s bleaker analysis, Tamayo concluded that the vitality of the country’s indigenous population could be harnessed with a new focus on the education of “the Indigenous race.” Only after “the Indian” had been “civilized,” Tamayo argued, could he contribute to the regeneration of Bolivian society and the formation of a new Bolivian nationalism.66 Tamayo’s writing was still heavily influenced by the racial theories of the time, but he was at the forefront of a group of writers who emphasized the need to combine Bolivia’s indigenous heritage with what could be usefully borrowed from the West.

The socialist writer-diplomat Tristán Marof represented a third option when it came to assessing Bolivia’s difficult past and uncertain future. In contrast to both Arguedas and Tamayo, Marof emphasized the need to strengthen the power of the state to take on the traditional mining and landowning oligarchy. In his *La justicia del inca*, published in 1926, Marof proposed a new economic orientation that emphasized


raising the material standard of living of indigenous peoples as part of a broader effort of “development” and modernization. Marof stressed the need to capture the power of the state from the oligarchs, nationalize the country’s mineral wealth, and redistribute land. In 1934, he attempted practical steps in this direction by helping to organize a new radical political party, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario or POR.

From the early 1900s to the late 1930s, the viewpoints represented by Arguedas, Tamayo, and Marof constituted the three main perspectives from which Bolivian intellectuals attempted to connect the “indigenous problem”—recall that the indigenous population constituted over 50 percent of Bolivia’s total population and was completely disenfranchised, exploited for its labor, and experienced extremely high rates of poverty and illiteracy—to a broader, popular discussion of Bolivian nationalism. In the 1940s, the elite discourse of Indigenism intersected with a grassroots uprising that gave rise to a new political coalition and paved the way to Bolivia’s 1952 revolution. The National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) had first appeared during the Second World War as a political party tinged with fascist sympathies. However, as the old ruling oligarchy attempted to reassert its weakening grip on power after the war, the MNR was reborn under the leadership of economist Paz Estenssoro. It emerged as a left of center political party supported by middle class intellectuals, mine workers, and student radicals. Over time, the MNR’s commitment to universal suffrage and economic reform also helped it win favor among the

country’s large, primarily indigenous class of rural peasants. As historian James Kohl notes, as early as 1942 MNR “recognized the need for a study of the land tenure problem [in Bolivia] and the necessity of incorporating the peasantry into the national life and restructuring the agricultural economy.”69 After coming to power in 1952, MNR demonstrated its willingness to work for change (and to court political support in rural areas) by passing the Agrarian Reform Law (1953) and creating a Ministry of Peasant and Indian Affairs. The ministry had the authority to address a range of issues related to the “broad tasks of incorporating the Indian masses into the national culture.”70 Under the leadership of its first minister, Ñuflo Chávez, the ministry made plans to overturn the old feudal system of latifundios, substituting a new system based upon wage labor.71 In the face of chronic economic stagnation, the MNR platform echoed the call of Marof and others to use the power of the state to support economic “development” and made it a willing, if somewhat unpredictable, ally in the ILO’s implementation of the Andean Indian Program.

As a grassroots mobilization against centuries of exploitation slowly brought dramatic change to Bolivian politics, interest in the living conditions of indigenous peoples also expanded across Latin America. Beginning in 1940, a series of regional conferences led to the creation of the Inter-American Indigenist Institute (Instituto

70 Kohl, “Peasant and Revolution,” 246.
71 Ibid, 247.
*Indigenista Interamericano* or III), based in Mexico City and which became an important arena for the discussion and study of indigenous peoples throughout the Americas. Significantly, the Pátzcuaro Congress that resulted in the formation of the III in 1940 was not a meeting of indigenous groups, rather it was a conference of academics, politicians and public officials from across the Americas. This pattern of participation and membership held for subsequent congresses, which periodically occurred up through the 1990s, when the Institute was closed and ceased to act as a specialized organization of the Organization of American States. The Pátzcuaro Congress itself is often credited with raising the level of public awareness about the need to address Indigenous issues.\(^{72}\)

The III itself emphasized a process of ethnic, cultural, and political acculturation suited to individual national conditions and provided resources and expertise in support of state sponsored “integration” programs. Under the auspices of the III, the practitioners of Indigenism merged the concerns of their discipline with a broader discussion about the nature of social and economic “development.” As Alejandro Marroquín, a former chief of the III’s Anthropological Section, described the link between Indigenism and integration: “the objective of Indigenism is the integration of the indigenous population of the nation, meaning by nation, the prevailing socio-economic system in a given country, with its own expanding cultural center that seeks to ideologically unify the entire society.”\(^{73}\) Through the III’s efforts in this direction, the organization did more than perhaps any other to promote


\(^{73}\) Marroquín, *Balance del indigenismo*, 18.
Indigenism and to secure government support for “integration” policies.

The III’s promotion of cultural and political “integration” served as a useful discursive frame for Latin American political elites eager to execute their own state-building and national unification projects. Yet, if the III advanced the cause of indigenous “integration” in the region, new work in the fields of sociology, anthropology and ethno-psychology provided a less direct, but no less powerful, theoretical justification for the implementation of state policies encouraging “integration.” A growing body of work in the field of sociology (and often associated with Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons) elaborated new theories about the process of “social integration” that informed the ILO’s Andean Program. As perhaps the most eminent and influential sociologist of the postwar era, Parsons published several seminal works during the 1940s and 1950s, including *The Structure of Social Action* (1949), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (1951), and *Economy and Society* (1956). The increasing popularity of his work and its influence occurred just as the ILO embarked on a new era of expansion and experimentation.

Throughout his lifetime, much of Parson’s oeuvre was devoted to the development of a single, grand theory for the study of all social systems. Many of his writings from 1949 onward tackled, either directly or indirectly, what he considered to be the fundamental problem of all social systems: the structural weaknesses produced by the process of social and cultural “differentiation.” For Parsons, all

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74 Rodríguez-Piñero, *Indigenous Peoples*, 58.
75 Ibid., 176.
social systems were “differentiated and segmented into relatively independent units.”
On the one hand, “differentiation” within a society was extremely beneficial, as it facilitated adaptation to new conditions and circumstances and made change or “progress” possible. While differentiation was inherent and necessary to the structure of every social system, Parsons concluded it also posed a threat that had to be addressed through a process of “integration.” “The functional problem of integration,” he concluded, “concerns the mutual adjustments [of individual] ‘units’ or sub-systems from the point of view of their ‘contributions’ to the effective functioning of the system as a whole.”

In Parsonian theory, “integration” was the systemic remedy for a “disintegrating” social fabric, particularly where the root cause of the system’s weakness or collapse was tied to the presence of unassimilated cultural or ethnic groups.

Parsons noted that “integration” could entail an array of social processes, but he emphasized the “institutionalization of normative culture” as the most important stabilizing force. Internalized norms (e.g. common values) together with “explicit prescriptive or prohibitory role-expectations” (e.g. laws), he argued, constituted the principal institutions that offset the imbalances created by differentiation. As a theoretician, Parsons did distinguish between his models and the “concrete” world, and he insisted upon the “imperfect integration of all actual social systems.”

Generally speaking, he remained aloof from the concerns of policymakers who might wish to use his work for their own purposes. Even so, his contention that the

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78 Ibid., 126.
79 Ibid., 128.
acceptance of collective norms by individuals and groups within a social system not only facilitated “integration” but also made economic differentiation (i.e. “development”) possible, became an important component of modernization theory and postwar development discourse in general. The work of Parsons and his students suggested a strong relationship between the processes of “integration” and economic “development” that were central to the discourse that structured the ILO’s “Andean Program.”

As Indigenism and the structural functionalist sociology championed by Parsons rapidly gained influence after the Second World War, each contributed to the integration discourse that informed the policies of the AIP. Indeed, the association of “integration” with Indigenism and modernization theory has led many scholars to define the term almost synonymously with “acculturation.” The social scientist Luis Rodríguez-Piñero, for example, has argued that the “crux” of Indigenist “integration” rested upon “the underlying assumption of the need to foster cultural change in cultural groups as a necessary precondition for the successful introduction of economic, technological, social, and political changes in indigenous societies.” As the Bolivian context outlined above illustrates, this was not simply a “neutral goal,” of purely scientific interest. Rather, “[it] was ultimately grounded on the political model of the nation-state and its ideal of homogeneity of the social fabric.” As Rodríguez-Piñero suggests, “integration” was also a prominent justification for

80 Rodríguez-Piñero, Indigenous Peoples, 176.
81 Ibid., 178.
82 Ibid., 178.
international intervention on the part of the ILO and other organizations that participated in the Andean Program.

From the beginning, the administration of the AIP program rested on the temperament, organization, and management skills of international experts. Until the AIP’s initiatives could be turned over to national authorities and because of the relative isolation and difficulty of transportation to and communication with the AIP’s Bolivian action bases, success and failure depended on the judgment of the experts in charge. The orientation toward integration and technocratic expertise that came to define the AIP at multiple institutional levels can be traced back to the initial survey mission that led to the establishment of the AIP. That mission was organized in 1952 and led by the New Zealand social scientist Ernest Beaglehole. Because of Beaglehole’s influence on the establishment of the AIP, it is worth pausing to understand how his own interests intersected with and contributed new elements to the discourse of social integration.

Beaglehole’s experience and reputation was based on his work as an anthropologist and consultant to the government of New Zealand regarding the indigenous Maori. During the 1930s, he had worked in a similar capacity as a consultant to the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the United States, but it was his New Zealand experience that made him the ILO’s pick to oversee the mission and to draft recommendations for the Andean Program. An ethno-psychologist and anthropologist by training, Beaglehole brought a diagnosis of Bolivia’s current situation that reflected his own wide-ranging interests. While his doctoral work had examined the psychological basis of property, Beaglehole’s work with the Maori led him to focus
on acculturation and the disappearance of traditional native practices. He published his findings in 1946 as *Some Modern Maoris* followed by *Social Change in the South Pacific* in 1957. *Some Modern Maoris* was particularly notable for what Beaglehole (channeling Freud) described as the “character-structure” of Maori society, past and present. Beaglehole had developed his methodology in an earlier article published in the multidisciplinary journal *Psychiatry*. In the article, titled “Character Structure: Its Role in the Analysis of Interpersonal Relations”, Beaglehole articulates a theory of integration in which “every culture orders the interpersonal relations of its carriers on the basis of a set of universals and alternatives.” It remains for the individual “to understand and to control this system[,] mak[ing] it possible for him to order both his formal and his more informal or intimate social and private relations with other people.” He goes on to distinguish between the “primary” or original character structure and “secondary” character structures, which an individual may develop to enable “a person to react dynamically and adaptively to a new set of major directives.”83 The need to wrestle with new cultural, political, economic directives was especially problematic for indigenous groups confronted with a Faustian choice between acculturation and cultural separatism. The article itself is a fascinating example of Beaglehole’s roving and imaginative intellect, which (much like Talcott Parsons) he applied across disciplines in search of a grand theory of social integration.

While Beaglehole was perfectly willing to appropriate the concept of “character structures” from psychoanalysis, the primary focus of his work was not the

“internal drives” that preoccupied most Freudians. As already stated, Beaglehole’s concern was the issue of social integration and adaptation. Yet, his analysis dictated that any attempt to address the issue of underdevelopment or to improve the way of life by introducing new economic techniques would be slow without first changing “the action and thought patterns of human beings who have been accustomed to a given way of life, a culture as the anthropologist terms it, for many generations.”84

Put somewhat differently, but still in terms Beaglehole himself recognized, “[c]ultural integration without economic integration can never be successful; conversely economic integration may fail because of the blockages and resistances human beings place in the way of an economic integration that may do violence to their cherished values.”85 The ILO deployed Beaglehole as the chief of mission for the 1952 expedition to map out the possibilities for a permanent program in Bolivia and, in 1954, he became the head of the ILO’s Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labour. The choice of Beaglehole to lead the Andean Indian survey mission and the subsequent enactment of the plan Beaglehole prescribed illustrates the fact that the AIP necessitated the creation of “new techniques of administration and policy making in the field of technical assistance.”86 The need to pair economic development with a thorough plan of social integration was essential to the integral method that would come to define the ILO’s approach to development in the Post-World War II era.

84 Beaglehole emphasized that many different types of experts were needed for such an effort to be successful. Beaglehole, “A Technical Assistance Mission in the Andes,” 416.
85 Ibid., 417.
86 Ibid., 553.
The need for a new approach was of paramount concern to Beaglehole and to the officials at the ILO who were committed to making the AIP into a demonstration of a new and improved ILO. Beaglehole himself summarized the issue neatly in an article published shortly after the competition of his mission, as fundamentally a question of expertise. According to Beaglehole, an “integral” approach necessitated the establishment of a team made up of “experts in different fields—health, education, labour [sic], agriculture and so on—so that it would be possible to evaluate solutions already suggested while at the same time keeping in view the necessity for a integral solution and not a piecemeal nibbling at the problem.”87 Requisite expertise for the survey mission and the subsequent field operations of the AIP were provided by the ILO and its UN sister agencies (e.g. UNESCO, UN, FAO, WHO, etc.). Once on the ground, the survey team met with officials from the Bolivian government to develop a schedule for completing the mission survey of key regions, establish contact with the indigenous communities, and plan the new ways in which administrative action would be organized “when [AIP] action programmes [sic] were commenced.”88 The recommendations of Beaglehole and his team led directly to the organization of the AIP and made the case for a pilot program that would be used to encourage migration from the Andes to the lowland areas in and around the province of Santa Cruz.

The technocrats who managed the technical assistance operations of the ILO were confident in their ability to act as change agents, and the experience of World War II convinced the ILO’s leadership in Geneva that projects such as the Andean

87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., 529.
Program were needed to make the organization relevant for the new postwar world. When AIP officials and experts deployed the term “integration,” they generally referred to a process of social and economic transformation that was, at least initially, under the direction of international technocrats. Backed by numerous social scientific studies, “integration” elevated state sponsored cultural assimilation to the level of evolutionary certainty. The ILO asserted, for example, that the Andean Program would “integrate” the indigenous peoples of Bolivia in a “peaceful process of evolution,” such that, “two ethnic groups may fuse into one national economic and social life.” The “two ethnic groups” of this binary consisted of indigenous peoples, on the one hand, and Bolivia’s politically and culturally dominant mestizo population, on the other.

The ILO’s division of Bolivian society into two groups dramatically underestimated or intentionally downplayed the actual ethnic diversity of Bolivia, as well as other Andean countries. Besides differences in language (between Aymara and Quechua for example), indigenous peoples who lived on the Altiplano possessed

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89 As the technical assistance programs administered directly by the U.S. Point IV program, the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and other entities, threatened to overlap and/or supercede ILO initiatives, officials urged in internal discussions that “now is the time for the [International Labor] Office to take the initiative in order to prevent the crystallization of an undesirable situation.” In the scramble to stay ahead of the pack and establish a foothold in the new era of “development,” part of the explanation for the timing of the Andean Program must include doubts about the ILO’s continued relevance in a new era. In the case of the Andean Program, at least one official counseled that the programs of other organizations “should not be permitted to develop without immediate appropriate coordination [with] the ILO.” Such council urged the organization to take decisive action or be left behind by history. Memo from David Efron to Mr. Fano and Mr. Alvarado, 22 August 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.

90 “Technical Assistance to Latin American Countries on the Problems of Indigenous Populations,” 1 December 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
different interests from the so-called “ex-comunarios” who had previously relocated to urban areas. While the farmers and mine workers that lived in the Andean highlands made up the vast majority of Bolivia’s indigenous population, the country’s indigenous peoples were hardly a monolithic constituency. Similarly, the country’s non-indigenous population divided along economic, political, and racial fault lines. Echoing Bolivia’s own indigenista literary discourse and the social scientific theories of Indigenism, the assumptions that lay behind the ILO’s use of the term “integration” reified a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society into categories of “developed” and “underdeveloped” citizens. In a strategy leveraged repeatedly by western governments and international experts to promote development and stabilize politically weak allies during the Cold War, the Andean Program embodied the ILO’s goal of shaping Bolivia into a homogenous state that could effectively control and contain ethnic and social conflicts within its own borders.

To the technocrats and experts who shaped the policy discourse of the AIP, indigenous “integration” was a grand experiment designed to test “the skills in social engineering of the United Nations and the Specialised [sic] Agencies.”91 This technocratic conceit is found in the earliest internal discussions of the AIP. In its initial proposals to the United Nations Technical Assistance Board (UNTAB), for example, the ILO deemed previous efforts to bring about the “integration” of indigenous peoples as “piecemeal, provincial, over-simple, unscientific and

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impractical.” In contrast, the multilateral program envisioned by the ILO would be “integrated, organic, regional, scientific and practical.”

As a method of intervention and control, the AIP could be disbursed and adapted to suit local needs and conditions. At the same time, ILO officials took great interest in cataloguing the “collective” ethnic and racial identity of indigenous peoples. The identification of certain shared characteristics that defined “indigenous experience” was paramount to the developmentalist goals of AIP technocrats. They believed that “effective international help [could only] be made available to governments” if a firm grasp of the “common denominators” was achieved. At the same time, the belief that indigenous peoples shared basic characteristics of history, culture, and circumstance, which needed to be identified, catalogued, and assessed,

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92 “Collaboration of the United Nations with the International Labour Organisation on Resolution VII of the Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labour in accordance with the recommendation of the Social Commission on the Andean Indians,” 6 July 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. The governments of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador had rejected previous efforts on precisely these same grounds dating back to the mid-1940s, as the UN Department of Social Affairs promoted a series of seminars on child and community welfare. Even as officials stressed the novelty of the new program, in an effort to legitimate the Andean Program they cited numerous precedents. In addition to various UN mandates, the resolution on the “conditions of life and work of indigenous populations” passed at the Fourth Conference of American States Members of the International Labor Organization (Montevideo, 1949) had recommended a program involving the resources of the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program. Similarly, the ILO’s Committee of Experts on Indigenous Labor recommended the creation of a “joint field working party” at its meeting in La Paz, Bolivia three years later. The UNTAB was the administrative entity created at the UN to oversee its Expanded Technical Assistance Program, which provided both the funding and administrative oversight of the Andean Program.
helped buttress official emphasis on the comprehensive nature the program. AIP officials carefully charted the existence of “national characteristics and differences,” while simultaneously viewing the program as a regional “development” project.95

In fact, the preoccupation with the “common denominators” of indigenous experience shaped a range of policy decisions and enabled the AIP’s technocratic managers to draw parallels to and from experiences in other parts of the world. The influence of Ernest Beaglehole’s views on character structure and integration (discussed above) were clearly visible in the way the ILO would continue to define the AIP project. Thus, even as officials discussed the “special difficulties” faced by a group of Quechua-speaking participants in the ILO’s colonization project at Santa Cruz, Bolivia, they defined the basic problem confronting the colonists as that of “adaptation to a new environment and mode of life.” As a result, when ILO officials chose international personnel for the project, they deemed knowledge of the Quechua language “not quite as important” as other qualifications, yet considered “tropical experience” an “essential” asset.96 Indeed, one example of the sort of personnel choices made by the international administrators at the UN and ILO was the selection of Beaglehole himself to lead the 1952 survey mission that outlined recommendations

96 “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with UNESCO concerning staffing and equipment questions,” Paris, 28 November 1955, Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
for the Andean Program to the UN Technical Assistance Board.

The concept of integration and its method of implementation also merged with the theme of “self-help.” In the case of the AIP, the term “self-help” referred to both the contributions of national governments as well as to the participation of indigenous peoples themselves. It became both a necessary requirement to secure funding and an operating principle that shaped the nature of international technical assistance programs during 1950s and subsequent periods. Even before the initiation of the ILO programs, “self-help” was one of the foundational principals behind U.S. bilateral assistance programs, dating back to the Office of Inter-American Affairs and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs during the Second World War and continuing with the Truman Administration’s Point IV program and the Kennedy sponsored Alliance for Progress. 97 Not surprisingly, throughout the life of the Andean Program the most intense source of pressure to emphasize “self-help” as a prerequisite for international action came from the United States and particularly from the U.S. Congress. In 1952, for example, congress was eager to cut money designated for UN multilateral assistance programs from the federal budget. Had not the U.S. President (Harry Truman) intervened, congressional action would have halved the budget for multilateral assistance programs from 26 to 13 million dollars. For many

congressional members, technical assistance programs were worthy of consideration only if administrators could demonstrate a substantive contribution by local or national governments. Since the United States was by far the largest source of funding for the UN Expanded Technical Assistance Program, the constant threat of budget cuts had a dramatic impact on the final shape of technical assistance policy.

The U.S. Congress was not the only source of pressure with regard to the emphasis on self-help, however. Integration discourse, and the technocrats who promoted its influence, contributed to an international climate in which “self-help” distinguished “development” from philanthropy. In 1955, for example, ILO administrators met with representatives of UNESCO (United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), and WHO (World Health Organization) to discuss the Andean Program. At the meeting, UNESCO officials stated their view that, “it should not be over-looked that the ultimate objective [of the Andean Program] must be the preparation of the members of the indigenous communities themselves for responsibility in what one might call ‘local government.’” Lacking this component, they concluded, no integration program was likely to succeed. Generally speaking, the UNESCO representatives insisted that, “members of indigenous communities should be provided with opportunities for the development of their own initiative and leadership,” especially in light of “the unhappy results of certain paternalistic experiments.” UNESCO officials rooted the basis for this belief in the “[m]odern

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98 Memo, Thatcher Winslow (Director of ILO Washington Office) to David A. Morse, July 20, 1953, Z 11/10/6, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
theory and practice concerning integration,” which “indicate[d] that outside assistance should act primarily as a sparking plug,” or a catalyst designed “to help the indigenous group to become aware of and develop its own potential resources.” The emphasis on “self-help” was meant to be prescriptive, a pedagogical rubric for nation building. To be effective, the UNESCO officials advised that technical assistance “should provide a minimum of material aid and services without which change could not be initiated,” but, “be given in such a way that it will stimulate the Indian’s own sense of responsibility.”99 At least in theory, the principle of self-help extended to relations with the national governments that participated in the program, but also to the participation of indigenous peoples themselves.

Highlighting the active participation of aid recipients, the architects of the Andean Program attempted to head-off accusations of “paternalism” or neo-imperialism, especially from critics located in or allied with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the ILO had to defend the program to outside observers and to other UN officials against the charge of unprofessional, unscientific philanthropy.100 As a mandated component of many “development” programs that began in the 1950s, the emphasis on “self-help” acted as an institutional sieve, constraining and limiting the

100 In early August of 1959, for example, the ILO was in the process of negotiating additional resources for the Andean Program through the UN Special Fund. One of the biggest obstacles in their quest was the skepticism of many UN officials, principally M. A. Lewis, the Managing Director of the fund. The ILO representative at the talks celebrated his success at convincing Lewis that the AIP “is not a philanthropic type of work but has a definite economic impact.” “Results of Discussions with Mr. W. A. Lewis on the Andean Indian Submissions to the Special Fund, 30 July-5 August 1959,” Z 11-10-18-1 (J.1), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
manner of projects granted international funding and support. At the same time, the link between “integration” and “self-help” also had important implications on the ground, for those programs that did receive the imprimatur of international support. As discussed in the next chapter, the AIP contained a number of different operational components designed to address the issue of integration as a universal model of economic and social development. The ILO’s universalist model, what it called its “integral approach,” was determined by the intersection of a field of forces that collectively constituted AIP development discourse.
In 1958, on the eve of the organization’s 40th anniversary, International Labor Organization (ILO) Deputy Director-General Jef Rens addressed a Trade Union House in Caracas, Venezuela. The official purpose of his visit was a months-long review of the organization’s programs across the region, but Rens used the occasion to “[retrace] the history of the relations between the Latin American countries and the I.L.O.”1 In summarizing the last forty years, he reserved the highest praise for the Andean Indian Program (AIP). Six years after its launch in 1952, Rens noted, the enterprise was training “millions of efficient producers in agriculture, handicrafts and industry, who will form a market of some 8 million people with a far higher purchasing power.”2 He immodestly likened the AIP to “a new life … being born,” formed around the idea that, “the campesinos, by their own labour [sic], can improve their own lot.”3 According to Rens, the AIP demonstrated to indigenous peoples how they could increase their output and profit more from their own labor, while raising their standard of living and contributing to the economic development of the region as a whole. “We try to point the way towards civilisation [sic],” he reflected, “and the

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3 “Mr. Rens’ Mission Notes,” Z 1/1/1/16 (J.6), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
Andean Indians have shown themselves eager to follow."4 Rens believed that the AIP had the potential to redefine life on the Altiplano.

This chapter grapples with a more complicated and ambiguous history: one in which different social and political interests frequently collided. It examines encounters between national and international experts, pro- and anti-government forces, and indigenous peoples that fed into a larger debate about “development” and modernization in Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America during the first decades of the Cold War. The ILO promoted the spread of the AIP’s “action bases” and “colonies” as a way to grow an indigenous middle class, to increase agricultural production, and to establish the foundations for future economic growth and political stability. As the following analysis demonstrates, however, those who came into contact with the AIP freely assigned their own meanings to the project. Confrontations over the establishment of agricultural cooperatives, the issuance of property titles, and the failure to provide promised services all could and did serve as sources of discord and mistrust. Colonization and resettlement were especially controversial aspects of the AIP scheme, attacked for the expense relative to other projects and for the difficulties encountered establishing permanent settlements. Focusing on the interplay of these and other elements of the AIP’s day-to-day operation complicates the legacy of the ILO’s activities in Latin America and compels us to ask new questions about the nature of its postwar turn toward social and economic development.

The ILO conceived the AIP as an experiment to “develop every approach and technique which seems practically useful in breaking down obstacles to [social and economic] integration.” This included various “instrumentalities,” from the expanded use of existing community centers and the application of new land utilization techniques to more “experimental” programs in fundamental education, market cooperatives, and “community migration” or resettlement. In the AIP’s earlier planning stages, ILO officials had warned that some of these actions would be disruptive to daily life. Indeed, the recommendation made by Ernest Beaglehole and others (discussed in the last chapter) to utilize anthropologists to “circumvent or dissolve” the “cultural blockages and resistances […] encountered during the operation of the program” anticipated, and perhaps encouraged, this as a virtual certainty. The organization insisted, however, that, “the programmes [sic] of development will be initiated in such manner that they can become normal and integral parts of the national life of the countries concerned.” The result was something of a methodological conundrum, which the ILO’s postwar leadership committed the organization to solving. Disruption of the traditional patterns of daily life appeared to be an unavoidable cost of building a more integrated society in

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5 “Technical Assistance,” 1 December 1951, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. See also “Mr. Rens’ Mission Notes, Andean Indian Project (Spring 1958),” Z 1/1/1/1 (J.6), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
Bolivia and across the region, but the AIP would adopt an “integral approach” in a
attempt to avoid the miscues and mistakes of earlier modernization schemes.9

For those charged with managing the AIP’s daily operations, it was indeed the
project’s underlying methodology that set it apart: what the ILO described as its
“integral method” or “integral approach.” While surveying the program’s various
operations during his 1958 trip, for example, Jef Rens insisted that, “[the Andean]
Programme [was] a method rather than anything else,” as it “attempt[ed] to arouse
the interest of the Indians in activities covering all aspects of life on the Altiplano.”10

The AIP “trie[d] to teach the Indians how to improve their agriculture and to obtain
from the soil higher production[,] both in quality and in quantity.”11 With the
overarching goal of increasing production, the AIP’s focus included “experiments
with seeds and new plants, as well as with natural and artificial fertilizers,” various
construction projects, and the distribution of modern farming equipment.12 It
encompassed “demonstrations on the care of animals and their diseases[;] medical
and hygiene services; the increase of rural schools and the improvement of education;
the organisation [sic] of vocation training in order to provide, for the Indian villages

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9 One example that was cited as a cautionary tale was the initial “failure” of the
UNESCO fundamental education project in the Marbial Valley, Haiti. Jean Guiton, a
UNESCO education expert, noted that in the case of the Marbial Valley project
“responsibility . . . was shared with the Government of Haiti, but in the eyes of
everyone it was UNESCO’s responsibility.” However, “UNESCO had met with
financial and practical difficulties, and its prestige had very heavily suffered as a
result.” According to Guiton, the project began to succeed only after “UNESCO had
relinquished any responsibility for it.” “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with
UNESCO, Paris,” 22 November 1955, Z 10/11/8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA,
Geneva, Switzerland.
10 “Mr. Rens’ Mission Notes,” Z 1/1/1/16 (J.6), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA,
Geneva, Switzerland.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
and communities, the skilled workmen who are lacking.” Rens noted that “[t]he ‘integral’ method of the Andean Programme also provid[ed] literacy courses for adults, social assistances who work among women, to teach them how to make their homes more comfortable, to care for their children, to vary their diet, etc.” Finally, the need to move indigenous peoples from their traditional homes was also an important tool of the integral approach, which attempted to address every aspect that could support the success of the AIP experiment. As the AIP’s Regional Director reported in April of 1956: “We knew, certainly, the unfavorable conditions of the Altiplano, but the rank dryness which has just befallen these areas must convince us that the true solution to the problem of the Andean populations is the transfer of a great percentage of this population to areas that will ensure them of better living conditions.” It was for this reason that, “our Cotoca Project is of such cardinal importance as the first test of establishing the peasants of the Altiplano in the lowlands.” In short, virtually any area of daily life that could be legitimately tied to improvements in living standards fell within the purview of the AIP.

In practice, all this activity occurred throughout a network of “action bases” located in the rural areas targeted for reform. The bases formed the “linchpins” of the program’s ground operations, the scaffolding of the AIP’s institutional and administrative framework. To unpack the actual work that was done at these action bases one needs to consider the location of individual bases and the problems that the

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 12 April 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J.3), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
missions were meant to address. In Bolivia, the first of several bases was established at Pillapi, located in the Andean highlands near the country’s border with Peru. The location of the other Bolivian bases included Playa Verde in the southwest, Otavi in the south, and a resettlement colony at Cotaca in the Santa Cruz region to the east. In addition to providing social services and technical training to the local population, the purpose of Pillapi and the other bases was to create a permanent presence for the AIP, and hence for the Bolivian state, in regions where the government’s reach was limited or non-existent. As Rens suggested in a 1957 letter to his ILO colleagues, “the project sites […] were never [intended to be] pilot projects” in the most limited sense. Rather, they were considered “bases from which action could be launched for the conquest of the Altiplano by progress and civilization.” Use of the term “conquest” to delineate the activities of the ILO’s field operations, particularly in a region where the tragic legacy of earlier imperial conquests were still quite visible and keenly felt, suggests the contradictions and solipsism of the ILO’s “integral” method. Even as it offered a critique of past imperialisms and emphasized the need to preserve indigenous culture, its practitioners relied on an updated discourse of “conquest.”

Located in relatively remote villages, high in the Andes Mountains, the action bases were outposts of reform activity that extended the reach of international experts and government officials into the countryside. The fact that the “administrative authority [of the Bolivian government] does not go beyond a radius of one hundred

17 “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
18 Jef Rens to Albert Guigui and David Efron, 28 January 1957, Jacket 4, Box 9, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
kilometers from the large towns” was a prime consideration, which made the action base model an attractive solution to crusading international experts and government officials alike. Indeed, the very label “action base” implied the kind of dynamic changes sought by both groups, particularly the synthesis of socio-cultural “integration” and economic development. AIP planners had argued from the very beginning of the program that indigenous peoples “represent[ed] a great economic potential which has so far been barely tapped, or, if tapped, ineffectively.” As suggested in previous chapters, it was the view of ILO technocrats and many Bolivian government officials that, “[i]ntegration will be made easier to the extent that economic development can open up new types and sources of production and new means of communication, result in closer co-ordination between production and markets and, in general, raise the standard of living of the population.” For both groups, the AIP’s bases and colonies were bridges to a brighter, more prosperous future for Bolivia and its neighbors.

Although the organization of the bases themselves was to serve as a universal model for future integration and development projects, other elements of the program were more directly adapted to national and local circumstance. In Bolivia, for example, passage of the revolutionary government’s new Agrarian Reform Law in 1953, opened a doorway to the possibility of more fundamental societal changes.

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20 Ibid.
21 “Andean Indian Programme: Project Submission to Special Fund,” Corrected Draft, 1959, Z 11-10-18-1 (J.1), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
Under a new revolutionary government with a broad reform agenda, the wholesale transformation of Bolivia’s old latifundia system dominated by a few oligarchic families seemed a real possibility. After Bolivia’s 1952 Revolution, the newly ascendant Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) regime embraced the use of agricultural cooperatives to industrialize the planting, cultivation, and harvest of rice, peanuts, quinoa, potatoes, and other commodities. Indeed, ILO officials believed that the new MNR-led government was “keenly interested in cooperating with the ILO” as part of its broad mandate to enact the promises of the revolution, including the redistribution of individual land titles to indigenous farmers and the need to make better use of indigenous labor. This was a space that at least some Bolivian government officials believed could be filled by the AIP. Bolivia’s new Minister of Indigenous Affairs, for example, emphasized that the government had an interest in ensuring that land granted under its Land Reform Decrees would be put to productive use. The ILO did not see this as a fact limited to Bolivia, as “[a]ll the projects in the Andean Indian Programme in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador have some

22 “Extract from letter from M. Papdakos to M. Rens,” 28 October 1954, Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
23 “G. Koulischer to Jef Rens,” 31 May 1952, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. Koulischer was Assistant Director of the ILO’s Latin American Field Office and wrote to Rens to report on effort to negotiate with the Bolivian government regarding the AIP survey recommendations and field missions. The initial focus of the MNR’s agrarian reform plan was “only the intensification of educative action among the ‘comunarios’ (indigenous collective land-owners) combined with technical help to the same people” Although, “no action towards parcellation [sic] of big land-holdings [was] envisaged,” the political climate in the countryside soon altered this plan. Xavier Caballero Tamayo, “Mission to Bolivia May 5th-27th, 1952,” 29 May 1952, TAP 6-01-2 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
connection with the land problems of the indigenous populations.”

Although, for the reasons documented earlier regarding the control of land resources, the problem was especially pronounced there and the AIP’s market cooperatives in particular suggested a means of supporting the transition toward improved cultivation, including the introduction of modern, mechanized agriculture. Because “[t]he new owners would lack the economic resources to quickly improve methods and tools of cultivation,” Bolivia’s Minister of Indigenous Affairs reasoned, the market cooperatives enacted by the AIP offered a compelling alternative to distributing land to individuals or individual families. With the assistance of the AIP, the cooperatives “benefit more quickly from the [introduction of] technical aid and modern tools.”

For this reason, the Ministry recommended that the “operational range” of the Andean Mission cooperatives be expanded to become “a mechanism for the supplying of the cities.”

As a solution to the chronic shortfalls in national food production that led to a reliance on imports, agricultural cooperatives in which a small portion of earth could be distributed in the form of individual land titles while a larger share remained for collective production were an important component of the ILO and the Bolivian government’s “integration” and development programs. Yet, the ILO tread cautiously, lest it be accused of benefiting from the government land seizures. In the

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26 Ibid.
fall of 1953, the ILO’s Director-General David Morse issued orders to the effect that, “it should be made clear that the Andean Project could not be associated with the expropriation programme [sic] of the Bolivian government.” Morse concluded that, “the ILO does not wish to take a position in respect of this policy,” but “it nonetheless would be wrong for an international institution to profit by such a policy.”

Considering the tripartite nature of the ILO, Morse’s reasons for enacting this policy are not difficult to surmise. In the event that such deals were made public, as they surely would be, he plainly feared a backlash from some of the ILO’s members. Yet, he also insisted that, “there was no question of abandoning the project.” Morse instead sought to avoid any public endorsement or criticism of the Bolivian government’s land reform policies by the ILO.

Despite David Morse’s efforts to navigate around the politically delicate issue of land reform, the ILO’s partnership with the Bolivian government produced many opportunities for misunderstanding. For example, as Colonel Epifanio Rios Zambrana, of the Bolivian army, completed a report on the suitability of land near the city of Santa Cruz for use by the Andean Indian Program’s Cotoca settlement, he also reported on his confrontations with the small landowners who currently occupied the land. As numerous documents in the ILO’s central archive reveal, the Cotoca colony was envisioned as a kind of weigh station for “all Indians coming down from the highlands with a view to resettling in the Santa Cruz area whether on a spontaneous

27 “Memorandum on discussion on land for the Andean Project,” 5 November 1953, Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. However, as the evidence below suggests, this was not the last word on the subject of land expropriation and the AIP.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
or assisted basis.” Confronted with inquiries from the current occupants about the security of their existing land claims, Zambrana replied that “[t]he Government [has] recognized that the individual farmer’s efforts did not contribute in any way to the regional economy,” and it had “decided to organise [sic] agricultural co-operatives” with the assistance of the Andean Program. These farmers were not members of the landowning oligarchy that had dominated Bolivian agriculture for centuries. By Zambrana’s own admission, most were subsistence farmers who had themselves received the land in the form of a government grant. Yet, “[i]f a man who calls himself a stockbreeder only breeds 30 or 40 animals on a given area of land that would suffice for five or six hundred,” Zambrana sardonically reflected, “the practical result, whatever he may say or whatever strange ideas of prosperity he may have, is that he is a parasite living on the proceeds of his selfish little herd.” Given Bolivia’s chronic dependence on agricultural imports, Zambrana insisted the government’s plans would “not be jeopardized by the private interests of a handful of landowners,” whose current use of the land for the purposes of “small-scale farming” presented “a pathetic picture of inertia, quite incomprehensible in the modern world.”

An AIP survey conducted at about the same time, though more measured, seemed to echo Zambrana’s own conclusions about the government’s priorities. The results of the study “led to the recognition that there were three types of farmer and

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30 “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” 20 June 1960, Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
two types of [agricultural] exploitation” in Bolivia. The first type included “large landowners or ‘haciendos’[sic], small landowners, and peons.” The second consisted of “haciendas and family farms.” The AIP report noted that, “[a]lmost without exception, the haciendas were prosperous because they had sufficient capital in various forms, and workers,” while “the family farms were economically deficient and at times poverty-stricken.” On this basis, “the conclusion was reached that the AIP project should follow the ‘hacienda’ system and not family exploitation, thus the system advocated was that of agricultural cooperation, in which it would be possible to assemble [the] capital and human effort needed for a large undertaking without hacendados [sic].” But the observations of other AIP officials suggested that the similarities to the old hacienda system were not just limited to the scale of the farms or the resources at their disposal. In 1957, the Chief of the AIP’s Cotoca mission noted in a letter to superiors that because “[r]elations between [the Indians] are highly personalized,” the problem confronting the AIP was “not a matter of colonizing large groups of Indians, but rather [of] efforts to help them with their own personal problems.” He concluded that, “this aid is symbolized by the Director of the project, a reflection of the old patron system.” If the goal was simply to increase agricultural production yields as quickly as possible, both the government and AIP assessments

34 “Cotoca,” Jacket 2, Box 12, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Olen Leonard to Abbas Ammar, 2 October 1957, TAP-A 7-3/PS 5-1-6 (E), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
39 Ibid.
agreed, then the creation of cooperatives based upon the model of the large haciendas was surely the quickest path to success.

The AIP study largely agreed with the conclusions of the government survey, but at least some AIP officials took seriously the need to reassure local farmers who feared they would be adversely affected by the expansion of the cooperatives. Enrique Sanchez de Lozada (the AIP’s first Regional Director) attempted to allay the concerns of the displaced farmers by explaining that it was not the intent of the program “to harm the small holders established on the grounds given by the Government to the colony, but quite the contrary to try and help them.” Lozada assured the farmers that, “if the colony, as it was the case, needed their land to establish the village, we would make efforts to choose land elsewhere[,] provided that this does not harm the colony as a whole.”

Indeed, partly through Lozada’s own efforts, the landowners were induced to accept an arrangement in which the project used a portion of their lands to avoid a complete forfeiture of their property.

Local landowners were not the only individuals who questioned whether the Cotoca lowland resettlement colony represented the best use of the available land and resources. At a meeting in Paris in 1955, officials with the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization doubted that the project was justified given that, “the needs of the populations which have moved and are moving from the Highlands unaided and those who remain in the Highlands are so great.”

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40 Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 5 April 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J.3), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
41 Ibid.
42 “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with UNESCO,” 26 November 1955, Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. The ILO would
by Jean Guiton, an UNESCO Education Expert, had precipitated the meeting. Guiton had voiced concerns that, “if the [Cotoca] Santa Cruz experiment results in harming one single ‘transplanted’ person [. . .], or brings about the death of a single Indian, [the international] organizations . . . bear the responsibility.” The nub of the problem, for Guiton, was that, “our actions would sometimes seem to suggest [. . .] we believe that our status as international officials shelters us from such risks.” 43 Guiton’s letter to Rens explained his intentions in raising the alarm to his UNESCO colleagues and represented a serious attempt to raise difficult questions about a project that suffered much ambiguity of purpose. The original memo indicates that Guiton’s concerns stemmed from a conversation he had with two French social scientists who “expressed their misgivings (I should say their anger) at the [Andean Indian] project continue to battle doubts and skepticism of the Cotoca project in the future. The Director of the Peruvian indigenous institute, Dr. Carlos Monge Medrano, for example, allegedly sponsored a press campaign in 1957 that decried the “displacement of the populations of the ‘Altiplano’ into the low areas” as “pure and simple genocide.” When confronted, Monge denied his involvement. Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Jef Rens, 9 September 1957, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. Lozada later reported, the opposition of such a prominent expert threatened to jeopardize the whole Peruvian program: “Our visit with the Minister was thus very profitable because, being already familiar with our action, he posed precise questions to us about Cotoca and admitted that we had restored his confidence, which had been somewhat shaken a few days before by the statements of a distinguished doctor who caused him a great concern by ensuring him that the roads of penetration towards the low valleys would not have any economic value [and that] it was illusory and even dangerous to consider the migrations of the natives of Altiplano towards the plains of Tambopata.” Enrique Sanchez de Lozada and Carolos d’Ugard to Jef Rens, 30 January 1957, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.

43 Guiton continued, “[t]he responsibility of international officials seems to me, in such a case, to be much graver than that of national officials; the latter are exposed in the course of their duties to risks which we do not run.” Jean Guiton to Jef Rens, 17 November 1955, TAP-A 13-2, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
itself and the way in which it is conducted." The main ILO representative at the talks, Deputy Director Jef Rens, responded directly to the fears raised by Guiton and insisted that new resources were being allocated to the Highlands. However, Rens also asserted that, “the demographic pressure [in support of migration] was inescapable, and it was impossible to improve quickly enough the agrarian economy of the Highlands to ensure the survival of the entire population of the Altiplano.”

Overcoming the initial resistance of his colleagues, Rens explained that the solution was to create a more sustainable system of agriculture in the lowlands, which relied upon “a combination of private ownership to supply individual stimulus to the Indians and large-scale exploitation to meet the economic needs of the community as a whole.” In other words, use of the AIPs cooperatives and the colonies themselves, which involved a combination of land redistribution and reorganization of local agricultural markets, were deemed essential to the deployment of the ILO’s integral method in Bolivia. They were deemed worth the risk, despite the objections raised by officials such as Guiton.

The Cotoca site, located some 20 kilometers east of the city of Santa Cruz, represented one aspect of the two-pronged approach eluded to by Rens: first, to improve conditions on the Altiplano and, second, to ease the way for “natural” or “assisted” migration into under populated regions. This was, in fact, a “government policy” that the ILO was asked to help facilitate. Yet, officials from the Corporación

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45 “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with UNESCO,” 26 November 1955, Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
*Boliviana de Fomento* (CBF), the government agency paired with the AIP to support the Cotoca settlement, criticized the Cotoca project for its “extremely high cost and poor administration.”48 International experts stationed at the AIP’s Otavi base screened and handpicked the settlers using a range of criteria, including health, family situation, age, and other factors.49 And several classes of experts were stationed at the Cotoca site itself: including construction and carpentry, public health, fundamental education, agriculture, manpower, and social work. However, at best, indigenous participation in the program was extremely modest. By August of 1957, “some 180 colonists had been transferred to the project[,] about 80 of whom had moved away after varied periods of residence.”50 This result barely scratched the surface of the problem the Bolivian government sought to address through colonization, namely increased production and more efficient use of indigenous labor. It also, of course, was a rather modest result for a program that sought to bring “civilization” to the Andes.

Several circumstances contributed to the slow rate of progress and the attrition of the *colonos*. The Cotoca mission chief, American Olen Leonard complained that there was a lack of equipment and other necessities at the Cotoca settlement and that the Playa Verde and Otavi action bases both were better equipped than Cotoca despite the fact that it employed 4 to 5 times more personnel. He specifically cited the failed

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48 Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 30 March 1956, TAP-A 13 1-1 (J.3), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. One CBF representative requested that the organization be freed from “any responsibility concerning the project.” Ibid.

49 “Otavi,” Jacket 2, Box 12, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. The document was undated, but the other materials in this box were created between March 1954 and November 1955.

50 “Cotoca Center-Inducement to Colonization of the Eastern Lowlands of Bolivia,” 3 February 1957, Jacket 6, Box 9, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
delivery of two trucks to Cotoca when they were re-routed to the other bases, lack of adequate funds, and the need for additional power generators and better pay for the experts. The challenges of transportation to and from the village contributed to these and other complaints and criticism by internal and external stakeholders.

In addition to the challenges faced by the experts, the colonos themselves faced the greatest difficulties and hardship. As they attempted to establish roots in their new home, the settlers struggled to repay money advanced by the Bolivian government for housing construction. Several years into the project, there were still not enough houses for all those who had come. The failure to distribute individual land titles in a timely fashion was also a major source of frustration, but which was largely outside the control of the international experts. The inability of the government to complete a timely survey of the colony slowed distribution of the land to individual settlers, and the small size of the land titles that were distributed (10 hectares or not quite 2.5 acres) “force[d] the colonists to dedicate a major portion of their time to cooperative projects frequently against their will.” Finally, the effort to transform Cotoca into a regional breadbasket was severely hampered by the fact that there was no “decent road” linking Cotoca with the nearest city of Santa Cruz. Eventually better roads were constructed and important rail connections were established in Santa Cruz that literally paved the way for the desired economic growth.

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51 Olen Leonard to Abbas Ammar, 20 May 1957, Jacket 4, Box 9, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
52 “Cotoca Center Inducement,” 3 February 1957, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
ILO Deputy Director, Jef Rens had a different view of the underlying problem that plagued the colony at Cotoca, suggesting that it had much to do the “quality” of the settlers themselves. Rens believed that changes in the way settlers were selected would improve the situation. “Many of our settlers have already reached a certain age and have experience of life.” In other words, “[t]hey are not only miners and seasonal workers used to going to Argentina for the harvest, but also ex-soldiers from the Chaco War.” Whether Rens meant their age or overall life experience is not clear, but this evidently was the wrong sort of settler. “The Altiplano, however, is full of young and poor campesinos who have nothing to lose.” It was among this group, Rens suggested, “that the best settlers can be found.” 53

Despite the difficulty the AIP experienced in recruiting and retaining settlers for the Cotoca settlement, ILO and AIP officials continued to stress the importance of the project as an experiment in social change. “The Cotoca experience, at least in part, has been unique in the annals of planned migrations,” concluded one memo. Admittedly, the project “has operated under conditions many experts have long considered as suicidal, i.e. have considered the transfer of people from high to low altitudes as a means for certain death.” But rather than question the efficacy of the project, this suggested, “a major contribution to the existant [sic] knowledge of the field,” which “will be lost within a few years and many of the pains of the project will be experienced all over again at some other time and some other similar place” unless pains were taken to learn from the Cotoca experience. 54

53 Jef Rens, “Mr. Rens’ Mission Notes, Andean Indian Project (Spring 1958),” 14 May 1958, Z 1/1/1/16, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
54 “Cotoca Center Inducement,” 3 February 1957, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
as an experiment in social change illustrates the ways in which every component of
the program was constructed with an eye toward broader changes elsewhere. The ILO
sought to refine the administration and practice of the “action base” and the “colony”
in fulfillment of its technocratic vision. Under this paradigm, local circumstances,
needs, and constraints could very easily be subsumed by the program’s larger
“civilizing” mission.

The politics of land reform and a failure to understand the complexities of
local conditions and concerns compounded the difficulty of promoting the AIP’s
agricultural cooperatives and experimental colony at Cotoca. This difficulty was also
visible in the conditions that resulted from enactment of the Bolivian Agrarian
Reform Law. As suggested above, the Reform Law itself was a delicate subject for
the ILO’s leadership, which complicated the ILO’s attempts to depoliticize the
Andean Indian Program. This was especially the case with the so-called “ex-
comunarios.” As indigenous migrants who had left the countryside for the city some
years before, under the new law the ex-comunarios were able “to reclaim the land that
belonged to their family.”55 Yet, the interests of the ex-comunarios were not
necessarily aligned with those of their rural relatives and former neighbors. In
January of 1955, the AIP’s Regional Director Enrique de Lozada first warned that,
“the natives of the [Pillapi] region [had become] very easy victims of this new enemy
which, in addition to his indigenous origin […] was a member of the [ruling] Party
[and] the trade unions, and had real political influence.”56 The danger, Lozada

55 Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Jef Rens, 4 January 1955, Jacket 1, Box 12,
Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
56 Ibid.
explained, was that the *ex-comunarios* laid “claim to being [land] owners without working the land themselves, [and] involving the indigenous [people] in conditions less favorable than that which existed under [their] former bosses.”57 The potential existed for a “new system of exploitation” that, he concluded, the ILO and the AIP “could in no way accept.”58 Indeed, by October of 1955, the AIP Chief of Mission at Pillapi related that the situation had reached a critical stage, as the program’s agronomy expert who attempted to intervene in a land dispute had received threats against his life. “[T]hings got so bad last Friday, 7 October,” the Pillapi Mission Chief reported, “that our tractors had to work under the eye of armed guards.”59 The use of armed guards provided an ad hoc, temporary solution, but the legal questions opened up by land reform were left unresolved for years to come. Despite the confusion that sometimes resulted, the Agrarian Land Reform Law would remain an important aspect of the AIP and the Bolivian government’s campaign to bolster Bolivia’s agricultural self-sufficiency until the early 1960s. There is little doubt that it was one of the important legacies of the 1952 revolution, whatever its limitations.

The example of the Pillapi mission illustrates how quickly events could spiral out of control at any of the AIP’s action bases. Tensions between the international experts and the national personnel stationed at the site had been a problem since at least January of 1955. By May of the same year, the situation had gone from bad to worse. The former Chief of the Mission, an American named William Dillingham, had left the project under a cloud of accusation and suspicion. The facts are far from

57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 “Extract from letter from Mr. L.D. Schweng to Mr. Rens,” 9 October 1955, Jacket 1, Box 12, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
clear in the historical record. However, as an exasperated Jef Rens later put it, he had allegedly “abandoned his post to go sprawl in the arms of his mistress in La Paz.”\textsuperscript{60} In February 1955, Rens wrote that he had made up his mind about what to do about Dillingham. “The Director-General, whom I update regularly […] strongly insists that we get rid of Dillingham.”\textsuperscript{61} This was not the first incident involving Dillingham and evidently Morse “had a precise memory of the previous incidents and thinks that we will always have difficulties with him.” Dillingham’s abrupt departure was followed by various intrigues, including “a cabal” that pitted portions of the local indigenous population, the Bolivian teachers at the base, and a nebulous collection of outside interests against the international experts. The situation finally came to a head when a young man named Mariano Huanco claimed that “on Monday 39 May, around 11 h. in the evening, he had seen a large truck near the Pillapi workshops unload 250 rifles[,] several machine-guns and some quantity of ammunition.”\textsuperscript{62} Huanco alleged that individuals associated with the AIP base were arming themselves for an assault on local representatives of the government. Huanco specifically implicated Pacifico Vasquez, a teacher at the base, in the alleged plot. Vasquez was arrested and a government investigation ensued, which eventually cleared him of all charges. The risk of counter revolutionary forces or violence stoked by local

\textsuperscript{60} Jef Rens to Enrique Sanchez de Lozada, 8 June 1955, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
\textsuperscript{61} Rens to de Lozada, 16 February 1955. TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. Despite Dillingham’s shortfalls, he was still considered for a new post on the project in Puno, Peru. Rens granted that, “[i]t is true that Dillingham did good work in Lima in connection with the organization of the employment service.” However, “[t]he Puno project, on the other hand, will pose problems similar to those of Pillapi [and] is a task whose complexity and political and human aspects exceed, in my opinion, Dillingham’s capacities.”
\textsuperscript{62} De Lozada to Rens, 8 June 1955. TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
vendettas was a real concern. Subsequent events suggested that the witness was associated with a group that stood to benefit from the confusion such incidences could unleash, either as part of a dispute of land or as part of a plot by enemies of the government. The AIP’s Regional Director deemed Vasquez’s accuser to be “nothing but a tool of the _ex-comunarios_ and communist agents.”

Whatever the reasons behind Huanco’s accusations, the damage was done and the ILO’s trust in the national personnel assigned to the project was completely undermined. Instead, it was determined that the entire national staff at the base would have to be purged. As Jef Rens rhetorically asked after the sordid affair, how can a project “with the goal of integrating the Indians into the national community [of Bolivia]” fulfill its mission “with people who do not believe in it?” To succeed “with a population which was plunged for centuries in a sleep of inactivity,” Rens reflected, “[o]ne needs faith.”

Indeed, where the ILO lacked the wherewithal to control events on the ground, as was the case in Pillapi, the “faith” of Rens and a few others was one of the AIP’s greatest assets.

On the other side of the AIP’s economic equation from the issue of land reform and the utilization of indigenous labor to raise agricultural production was the promotion of rural consumption, especially by encouraging the creation of a region-wide middle class made up of skilled industrial laborers and independent farmers. Building a new middle class was the message that Jef Rens brought to the Andes during his 1958 tour and review of the Andean Indian Program. To the government officials he met with from Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador (all participants in the Andean

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63 De Lozada to Rens, 9 June 1955. TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
64 Rens to de Lozada, 13 June 1955. TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
Indian Program), Rens emphasized the need to engender the “middle-class,” by providing “increased wellbeing” and “land” to the “Indians.”65 In this way, he insisted, “a class would thus be created which, because of its comfortable circumstances would represent a factor of social and political stability in the life of the country.”66 Of course, this also meant finding ways to inculcate the values and standards of western, middle-class households. According to the diary he kept of his activities, Rens was never more impressed during the 1958 trip than when, upon arriving in a small village, he was met by “the whole community […] with the children lined up in two rows, waiting for us outside the school.”67 The school itself had been built with AIP assistance, but his attention was drawn more to the appearance of the people. To his surprise and pleasure, the children “were spotlessly clean, all wearing their best clothes,” and “smell[ing] of soap.” Rens concluded that, “from the point of view of cleanliness and clothing, they compare favourably [sic] with the schoolchildren of my own country.”68 The AIP school and the “spotlessly clean” children “smelling of soap” were no doubt outward signs of what Rens and the ILO hoped to achieve: a normative standard (of order, respectability, cleanliness, etc.) that synthesized the goals of social and cultural “integration” with economic development.

No single group of individuals better epitomized the ILO’s efforts to encourage an indigenous middle class than the indigenous “social promoter,” who

65 “Mr. Rens’ Mission Notes,” Z 1/1/16 (J.6), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
served as “agents or intermediaries in the introduction of modern practices of economic organization.”69 As indigenous agents of modernization, the job of the social promoter was to mobilize “the material and human resources” of their community.70 The specific application of social promoters differed from country to country, but ILO administrators considered them essential to the AIP’s central aims. In most cases, they were provided with a certain level of scientific and/or technical training: for example, some received instruction in providing basic health services such as how to clean and dress a wound, while others learned industrial skills such as gasoline engine repair. As the social promoters applied what they had learned in their own communities, it was reasoned, they would help overcome the resistance of indigenous peoples to the use of outsiders’ methods. As one AIP official concluded, “[i]n every one of our projects the paramount objective will be to help each country in one way or another to integrate the indigenous populations.”71 In Bolivia, “this [was] achieved through short periods of training to gain a certain degree of ‘know-how’, after which the trainee [was] sent back to his own community to practice and propagate his newly acquired skill.”72 Those individuals selected to be social promoters were evaluated on their progress, while “[t]hose who succeed best in this propagation [were] brought back again for further training.”73 International experts

69 “Andean Indian Programme—Project Submission to Special Projects Fund,” Z 11-10-18-1 (J.1), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
70 Ibid.
71 Enrique de Lozada to Albert Guigui-Théral, 30 October 1953, TAP-AND 2 (1953), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid. See also “Andean Indian Programme, Negotiations with UNESCO, Paris, 26 November 1955,” Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
organized and provided the training, but their impact would be amplified through the use of social promoters.

The ultimate goal of the social promoters program was to institutionalize a set of practices deemed essential for integration and economic development. Put somewhat differently, as semi-permanent institutions that could be absorbed into the apparatus of the Bolivian government, the AIP’s “action bases” and “colonies” represented one metric of progress toward this goal. But another way that the AIP’s international experts defined success was through the cultivation of indigenous surrogates for themselves. Inevitably the social promoters worked more closely with the AIP’s international staff than did other members of their community, complicating the role they played in the program’s field operations. When social promoters rendered basic services to the community, it was hoped they “[would also] gain the confidence of the people” and “eventually… [be] recognized as community leaders.” If such individuals did emerge as leaders and/or civil administrators their role was more complex than that of an enabler. By virtue of their special position vis-à-vis the international experts and as a result of their knowledge of and close contact with their communities, they could function as brokers or *bricoleurs* between the AIP’s mission experts and indigenous communities. Social promoters could act as agitators who questioned and even disrupted the plans of ILO administrators.

Whatever difficulties were encountered by their use, the goal remained the same. As the AIP’s regional director Enrique de Lozada wrote in 1953, “the most desirable outcome would be for [the indigenous auxiliaries and social promoters] . . . to become

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74 “Andean Indian Programme Plan for Consolidation and Transfer,” 1960, Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
Government employees,” creating “for the first time” a group of “Indian administrators.” In this way, Lozada concluded, “a great degree of integration [would be] reached.” Thus, the social promoters were a key element of the ILO’s integral approach to development and as such encompassed many of the contradictions of that approach as it was put in practice.

Although the ILO supported the view of Bolivian state officials who wanted to connect increasing production and consumption to indigenous “integration,” there were sometimes tensions between the AIP’s focus on the gradual process of “integration” and the desire of many government officials for more immediate signs of progress in agricultural or industrial production. The ILO integration policy projected the gaze of the Andean Indian Program years, sometimes decades into the future, beyond “immediate circumstances, such as the current industrial situation.” In Bolivia, ILO policy sought to address “the possible economic development of the country” at a “moment when the reorganization of agriculture and the exploitation of other natural resources such as oil, would give rise to a demand for qualified labor.” In contrast, officials from the Bolivian government often sought more immediate gains. For example, as the MNR government sought to boost its oil production, particularly in the area near Santa Cruz and stretching north to Cochabamba, the government sought to boost domestic consumption of oil products. Bolivian President Paz Estenssoro expressed his view to AIP Director Enrique de Lozada that, “it would

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75 Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Albert Guigui-Théral, 30 October 1953, TAP-AND 2 (1953), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
76 Ibid.
77 Carlos d’Ugard to Abbas Ammar, 29 November 1958, TAP-A 1.1.0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
78 Ibid.
be necessary […] to introduce the use of oil products among the Indian population,” in order to both improve the standard of living and to boost domestic consumption. The use of oil based products and the use of oil stoves constructed out of scrap metal would, Estenssoro suggested, “have a very great effect upon the agriculture of the highlands, since, from time immemorial the Indians have been using natural fertilizers for fuel purposes, thus depriving the soil of its only natural fertilizer.”

The stoves could be produced using the AIP’s machine shops, the Bolivian President suggested, at relatively low cost.

While the long view espoused by the ILO was frequently repeated back to Bolivian government officials impatient with the Andean Program’s rate of progress, the ILO also could not afford to simply ignore the AIP’s critics. Attempts were made to address the gulf between the AIP’s ambitious goals and its much more modest results, particularly the suggestion that the programs colonization schemes distracted from the goal of raising industrial output, which was heard from Bolivian and non-Bolivian critics alike. The economic strategy of import substitution embraced by many Latin American governments during the 1950s and 1960s called for more emphasis on rapidly building up national industrial capacities. By the end of the 1950s, as plans to expand the AIP using resources from the United Nations Special Fund for Economic Development and the Inter-American Development Bank, somewhat greater emphasis was directed toward creating “conditions necessary for encouraging capital investment” and for “a greatly expanded demand for the products

79 Enrique de Lozada to Jef Rens, 5 November 1954, TAP-A 1-1 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
of industry.”80 ILO officials had always said that, “higher production and the raising of living standards of the Indians would enormously contribute to the national income and would increase internal markets.” This conclusion was based on the fact that, “[t]he Indians constitute the main potential source of manpower for new industries and for the colonization of new lands.”81 But industrial development was a distant goal of the AIP’s rural development strategy, a fact that increasingly brought it and the ILO into conflict with the nearer term aspirations of the Bolivian government. By the 1960s, if not before, the pendulum had shifted. The government was impatient for a new strategy.

The goal of the Andean Indian Program was to formulate a synthesis between the social and cultural objectives of integration and rural economic development. Indeed, an ILO calendar printed in the late 1950s and featuring the AIP’s purported achievements suggested the anticipated results of this synthesis. The calendar described the indigenous participants in the program as “peons of today, men of tomorrow.”82 On the one hand, the ILO had premised the AIP on the notion that “integration” required dramatic changes in the culture of indigenous peoples, and even the mass relocation and removal of entire communities from the Altiplano.83 To

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80 “Andean Indian Programme: Project Submission to Special Fund,” Corrected Draft, 1959, Z 11-10-18-1 (J.1), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
81 The memo trumpeted the AIP’s achievements over the last decade for the benefit of the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, who was then on a diplomatic tour of the region. “Memorandum for Adlai Stevenson,” 16 June 1961, Z 11-10-8, David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
82 “Mr. Rens’ Mission Notes, Andean Indian Project (Spring 1958),” Correspondence between the D-G and Mr. Jef Rens. Jan. 1957-December 1958, Z 1/1/1/16 (J. 6), David Morse Cabinet Files, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
83 As discussed above, relocation was the a key recommendation of the Beaglehole mission and a prerequisite of the AIP’s Cotoca, Bolivia settlement and a favored
build the “men of tomorrow,” the AIP promoted indigenous “integration” and non-coercive assimilation as essential to raising living standards and increasing economic productivity. This represented a challenge to (if not an outright assault upon) traditional ways of life in the Andes, and it subsumed the protection of indigenous individual and/or collective rights under the broader goal of improvements in “living conditions.” In the calculation of many AIP and Bolivian government officials, this was the price of progress.

The calendar and the events that followed its publication suggest the immense uncertainty that defined the Bolivian political landscape and the slipperiness of the ILO and the AIP’s own development discourse. During his 1958 mission to the region described in the introduction to this chapter, Jef Rens used the calendar’s transformational message as an illustration of what he predicted to be the future of Bolivia and the region as a whole. In one respect, his prediction proved almost prescient. The AIP’s emphasis on building-up the middle-class did, in fact, anticipate some of the thinking that would inform the United States’ sponsored Alliance for Progress in the 1960s. In 1961, the historian and then special assistant to U.S. President John F. Kennedy Arthur Schlesinger Jr. urged that U.S. policy be directed toward “carry[ing] the new urban middle class into power and produce, along with it, such necessities of modern technical society as constitutional government, honest public administration, a responsible party system, a rational land system, an efficient system of taxation, mass education, social mobility, etc.” Schlesinger made his

solution by several of the program’s international experts and administrators. See for example Enrique Sanchez de Lozada to Abbas Ammar, 12 April 1956, TAP-A 1-1 (J.3), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
recommendations days before President Kennedy announced “a vast new 10-year plan for the Americas.” But the situation on the ground was never the ILO’s to direct and control. By 1965, as part of the Alliance for Progress initiative, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) had launched a new community development program in Bolivia, the introduction of which coincided with the 1964 military coup that overthrew Bolivian President Victor Paz Estenssoro in favor of a junta led by the Vice President, René Barrientos. In many ways, the USAID program mirrored and indeed eventually absorbed the activities of the AIP. But it also (no doubt) better complimented the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s anti-communist operations in the Bolivian countryside, especially in pursuit of the Argentine revolutionary Ché Guevara. The AIP was, then, finally absorbed into the fabric of Bolivian politics and society, but hardly in the way its cadre of international experts had intended. The opening for applying the ILO’s integral method to execute its unique but flawed version of “development” was rapidly closing.

85 See “Bolivia – National Integration Plan,” Jacket 2, Box 12, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. This document was undated but the source folder contains material from March 1954 to November 1955. On the capture of Ché Guevara see “Briefing Background Material: Bolivia,” Spring 1969, Folder 1216, Box 150, Series O: Washington, D.C., Record Group 4 NAR, Rockefeller Family Collection, Rockefeller Archives Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York. See also, for example, Kenneth D. Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 153-157; Klein, Bolivia, 225. Unfortunately, the USAID records pertaining to this period of activity in Bolivia remain classified and off limits to researchers at the National Archives and Records Administration.
Chapter 5: The AIP and the “Integral Method” as Regional Development

This chapter continues the analysis of the ILO’s efforts to develop a new model of social integration and economic development in the Andes region throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. Whereas the last chapter focused on the development politics that engulfed the ILO’s Andean Mission in Bolivia, chapter five looks more closely at the regional character and impact of the program. The Bolivian project was, throughout the history of the ILO’s involvement in the region, the conceptual and technical center of the AIP— the fortunes of the program tended to rise and fall on the success and failure of the Bolivian experiment. Bolivia possessed the largest population of indigenous peoples in the region and it was the original impetus behind the establishment of the program. Yet, as suggested in previous chapters, the AIP had always been conceived in broader terms. As Deputy Director Rens reflected in his to a colleague, “[o]ne of the main aims to be achieved [was] to get the national administrations of the Andean countries in such a shape that they [could] handle Indian affairs in the same manner as matters of concern to all other categories of citizens.”¹ The ILO defined the goals of the AIP not just in terms of “integrating” indigenous peoples, but also specific practices and techniques of governance. It did so as a part of a comprehensive approach to regional development.

Regarding the goal of transferring the AIP projects intact to the national governments, the ILO sought “guarantees that with our help[,] the ministerial departments will organise [sic] themselves so as to be able to cope in a routine...

¹ Jef Rens to Abbas Ammar, 11 March 1957, Jacket 4, Box 9, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
manner with Indian affairs.” To this end, as early as 1957 the governments of the Andean nations that participated in the program were encouraged to “begin to think about taking over responsibility for [AIP] projects.” The establishment of societal and governmental structures that would make the “handl[ing] of Indian affairs” as routine, as unexceptional as any other service provided by the state or state institutions—this was the overarching regional goal of the AIP. Perhaps unavoidably, this effort to make indigenous affairs an unremarkable aspect of the social, political and economic landscape of Bolivia and its neighbors conflicted with the desire of indigenous peoples for cultural and economic autonomy and was at odds with the particular historical factors and circumstances that defined the societies where the AIP operated.

The ILO’s integral method was conceived as a transnational, cross-cultural method that could be suited to meet the needs of a particular national situation while remaining widely applicable as a mode of translation between the so-called “developed” and “developing” worlds. As discussed in Chapter 3, the purported universal applicability of the ILO program was also rooted intellectually in the perspectives of Indigenism, structuralist sociology and the ethno-psychological theories promoted by Ernest Beaglehole and others. Looking to Bolivia’s neighbors in Ecuador, Peru and Colombia, this chapter explores how the AIP attempted to organize local villagers and migrant settlers into new communities throughout the Andes region. In doing so, it addresses the degree to which the Bolivian case was representative of the AIP’s efforts throughout the region during the period 1952-1965

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
and describes some of the ways in which the AIP confronted local or national circumstances in the deployment of a regional development strategy. It demonstrates that at the regional level the AIP was applied as an antidote to many of the national “exceptionalisms” that both its experts and development discourse in general identified as the chief impediments to economic growth and social integration. While a detailed project-by-project comparison of the AIP’s operations across the region would be a useful exercise for the purpose of teasing out specific differences between the affected countries, such an exercise is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Emphasizing the “common denominators” and circumstances affecting indigenous peoples throughout the Andes, regardless of national borders, the AIP’s experts conceived their work in terms of its regional impact. Lessons learned in one country were to be applied universally. In this regard, the Bolivian case is proven to be representative of the AIP’s primary goals and operations in other countries and an important case study of the ILO’s integral approach to development under the leadership of its Director General, David Morse. The following sections on Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia illustrate this fact while at the same time suggesting some of the challenges that accompanied this construction of the AIP as a regional program.

**The Ecuadorian Case**

In the fall of 1962 an “uprising” occurred in the village of Cuenca, Ecuador, in the province of Azuey. The event led to several deaths, including two AIP officials.

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4 The substance of my account comes from a report from the Ecuadorian chief of mission, as well as the report from a meeting involving several ILO administrators and the Catholic Bishop from the region in which the event occurred. The observations of the Bishop of Riobamba, Leonidas Proaño, were particularly...
who were visiting the village, Dr. Jorge Merchán (Chief of the Azuay “sub-centre”) and a social worker named Hernán Vinueza. Two other members of the team, a nurse and a driver, suffered injuries. On the morning of October 2nd, the four-member team disembarked for Cuenca amid reports that there were plans to attack members of the AIP in the region, which according to subsequent testimony they disregarded. When the team arrived at the village square, a group of “probably 100 hostile men and women with sticks, machetes and stones” confronted them and “forced [Dr. Mechan, Mr. Vinueza, the nurse and their driver] out of [their] vehicle.”

Failing to dissuade their attackers, the AIP team made their way to the village church and sought assistance from the local parish priest. The account found in the ILO archives suggests that the priest offered no assistance, refused to address the mob and retired to his house in the village. The AIP representatives “followed him, being attacked all the time by the hostile crowd and then tried to take refuge in the priest’s house.” The crowd then continued to attack the team. “Cut with a blow from a machete,” the nurse fainted and “was then poked in the cheek with a knife and left for dead.” Regaining consciousness somewhat later, both the nurse and chauffeur managed to escape by important in attempting to reconstruct the event. Proaño served as Bishop of Riobamba for over three decades and was known as one of the most outspoken promoters of Catholic liberation theology in Ecuador. There is no indication that an investigation beyond the initial report provided by the Chief of Mission and the administrators’ meeting ever occurred or attempted regarding the incident. See Memo, David Efrón, “Note on the Cuenca Tragedy,” 7 October 1962, Director-General’s Cabinet Files, Z 11-10-8, ILO Archives, Geneva, Switzerland; “Report from Chief,” Andean Programme, Ecuador, 9th October, 1962, Director-General’s Cabinet Files, Z 11-10-8, ILOA; and Abbas Ammar to David Morse and David Efron, 30 October 1962, Director-General’s Cabinet Files, Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.

5 Efrón, “Note on the Cuenca Tragedy,” ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
stealth from the scene. Meanwhile, the doctor and the social worker absorbed the mob’s fury, “put[ting] up what resistance they could.” Mr. Vinueza, “who was young and fit, received many blows before he collapsed.”8 According to the report, “[t]he crowd was so violent that both the bodies of the doctor and the social worker were stripped naked,” and “the social worker’s eye was poked out and his whole body was covered with cuts.”9 A local teacher who had attempted to assist them “was attacked in a similar fashion, knocked unconscious and left for dead while the crowd set […] to cover the other two bodies with dried leaves and set fire to them.” When local authorities later arrived to recover the bodies, the village was empty.10

The violence of the above account is arresting, but just as striking are the conclusions offered in explanation of the bloody episode. Noting that there had been similar occurrences in the region before, although none involving AIP experts, the ILO officials who examined the attacks and the aftermath concluded that the uprisings were instigated, “by certain elements who were anxious to maintain the status quo and saw in the work of ‘Mision Andina’ a danger to their vested interests.”11 Among those groups were political parties, the local Chimborazo Provincial Council, the Riobamba municipality, big landowners, and the liquor merchants, who were described as “[t]he greatest enemies of the Programme [sic] who do not hesitate to spread gossip and lies in order to create confusion and hostility among their Indian victims.”12 News reports from the Ecuadorian newspaper *El*
Comercio (Quito) on October 3, 1962 suggested that the Indians associated the AIP with the Agricultural Census (carried out by the Ecuadorean government). The papers also suggested that members of the AIP were “smeared as having communistic affiliations,” while the standard account of the incident found in the Director-General’s files also emphasized the fact the AIP officials were mistaken for “communists.” Indeed, one of the indictments made against the parish priest in the aftermath of the attacks was that he had not attempted to persuade the crowd that the AIP experts were not, in fact, communists.

ILO and AIP officials had always approached relations with Catholic Church and its representatives with respect and caution. In 1957, for example, the AIP had discussed a partnership with the Catholic Bishop of Riobamba who was interested in getting some assistance from the AIP “for the more efficient utilization of Church estates [that lay] within the area of the Andean Indian project in Ecuador.” The assistance provided involved some soil surveys, “farm management advice,” and some assistance from a “co-operative expert.” From the perspective of project leaders, collaboration with the church represented an opportunity to develop certain elements of the program. But it did not come without risk. As D.L.W. Anker (the AIP expert who handled the negotiations) noted, “[b]earing in mind the prominent position of the Church in Ecuador I consider that a successful effort by the Bishop would do much to foster ‘colonisation’ work in Ecuador.” Anker suggested that,

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14 Ibid.
15 D.L.W. Anker to Abbas Ammar, 7 October 1957, Jacket 5, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
“[t]he Government having set up a Colonisation [sic] authority recently[,] there would seem to be every reason for encouraging the success of the first efforts” but with an eye toward ensuring that the project was guaranteed to succeed. Therefore, Anker concluded, “the Bishop should not be encouraged to proceed unless he can be assured of adequate technical advice until the project can stand on its own feet.” ¹⁶ The AIP welcomed collaboration with the Church, under the right circumstances, but proceeded with caution lest the risk of failure might jeopardize the wider efforts of the Andean Program.

Stronger and more generalized reservations about close cooperation with the Church or its representatives can be found elsewhere. Jen Rens cautioned about the appointment of a Father Froman to one of the Ecuadorian AIP sites on the grounds that it could establish an undesirable precedent. “Without wanting to exclude priests from our T.A. Programme,” Rens wrote, “I do not think it is wise to put them on the education posts.” Rens pointed out that “there is some fear among certain Indian quarters towards our Programme on account of the use of the word ‘Mission’[and], [s]o as to overcome this fear, we are planning to abandon the use of the [term]” It would seem highly inconsistent, Rens continued, “now to recruit a priest.” ¹⁷ While the church was highly influential in and across the region, the ILO sought to steer the AIP clear of the complicated legacy that informed the Church’s relations with indigenous peoples.

¹⁶ Ibid.
¹⁷ Memo, Rens to Ammar, 21 March 1956, Jacket 3, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland. See also Rens to Ammar, 17 July 1957, Jacket 4, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
Despite the tragedy that befell Dr. Merchán and his team at Cuenca, the AIP’s Chief of Mission in Ecuador (an American by the name of David Luscombe) believed that the Andean Program was on much firmer footing in the rest of the country, in part “because the methods adopted are closely in line with the original experimental project in Chimborazo and depend on secure bases in the communities which we have been influencing from the very beginning.”\(^{18}\) However, he added that, in addition to the Azuey where the attack on Dr. Merchán had occurred “[t]here are some exceptions to this in Tungurahua Province,” and that financial problems were mostly to blame: the Mission had not “been able to carry out many of the useful physical projects of the type which attract attention and we have not apparently, as a result, had the degree of support from the mass of the villagers which was essential to maintain or activities against the counter-interests,” i.e. the politicians, landowners, and liquor merchants cited above.\(^{19}\) The motives of the project’s enemies could be financial and political, linked as they were to the administration of government authority and government programs for rural development. In the narrative constructed around the Cuenca tragedy, which Luscombe highlighted as a struggle between the forces of “reaction and progress,” the villagers who allegedly perpetrated the violence are portrayed as the victims of outside forces, incapable of generating grievances of their own or of acting for their own purposes.\(^{20}\) This depiction of “indigenous peoples” as innocent savages erases the complicated field of forces that contributed to the incident.

\(^{18}\) “Report from Chief,” Andean Programme, Ecuador, 9\(^{th}\) October, 1962, Director-General’s Cabinet Files, Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.
It is not unlikely that many of the participants in this tragedy, from the villagers to local interests who opposed the AIP’s efforts in the region, from ILO officials in Geneva to church officials in the region largely viewed the incident through the lens of the Cold War and the Cuban Revolution in particular. Ecuador’s political landscape was deeply affected by the Cuban Revolution, which gave rise to a series of anti-communist regimes largely controlled by the military. President José María Velasco Ibarra had been elected with widespread popular support in 1960, but his refusal to purge his government of alleged communists and to break off relations with Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba fell afoul of U.S. policy in the region and ran counter to the interests of traditional ruling elites. Terrorist attacks, some of which were later found to have been orchestrated by rightwing paramilitary groups against the Catholic Church and other village institutions, were blamed on communist insurgents and slowly drove much of Ecuador’s indigenous population away from liberal politicians such as Velasco and his Vice President and immediate successor Carlos Julio Arosemana. Arosemana’s time in office ended abruptly with a military coup in 1963.21

The Cold War context notwithstanding, the villagers also confronted a series of changes, which coincided with or were brought about directly by the AIP. One such project was the construction of a 40-kilometer long road built by the Ecuadorian army, with American support and the help of local, indigenous voluntary labor. Construction of the road was to support the migration of indigenous groups, which in some locales was already occurring naturally. Yet, even though AIP experts and ILO

21 Ibid.
officials generally looked upon such migration as a key element of any scheme to improve the quality of life for indigenous groups in the region, Ecuador exemplified the contradictions that accompanied a large scale migration program. Vocational training provided by the AIP made it possible for local villagers to seek work elsewhere, which from the perspective of some national government officials undermined efforts to develop rural areas. Likewise, in the Peruvian context, two AIP experts went so far as to suggest that demonstration project set up to teach basic mechanical skills be reconsidered because, “the training would be wasted since, instead of returning to their communities, the Indians would try to get Government jobs.”

In Cuenca, the negotiations for the road into the region were being conducted David Luscombe. As mentioned above, Luscome was an American and the AIP’s Mission Chief in Ecuador. Luscombe hoped that the road would improve “access to Indian areas in the Province and in beginning to set up the basic services necessary” to support the AIP’s and the government’s activities in the region. Indeed, to explain the tragedy that occurred at Cuenca, Luscombe pointed to the region’s relative lack of contact with the outside world and noted that, “the Province has always been a difficult one to work in because the pure Indian communities are very isolated and in areas where roads have not yet been constructed and […] have very special and difficult problems not found to the same degree in other parts of the

22 “Memorandum sobre la Asistencia Técnica a las Poblaciones Andinas (Más especialmente Muquíyauyo),” 5 August 1954. Jacket 2, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
23 “Report from Chief,” Andean Programme, Ecuador, 9th October, 1962, Director-General’s Cabinet Files, Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
country.” 24 Not to be discouraged, he concluded that the Cuenca incident “has resulted in us receiving a great deal of sympathy and, above all, in the stark nature of the clash between reaction and progress being forced into the forefront of the situation of the entire country,” referring specifically to the coverage in the national daily *El Comercio.* 25

The AIP program in Ecuador began along similar lines as those conceived for the program in Bolivia. A document included as an annex to the 1956 “Report on the Nation” (Informe de la Nacion, 1955-1956) by the Ecuadorian Minister of Social and Labor Affairs noted that in Ecuador as in Bolivia, “the task of incorporating the Indian into national life is a task which should be integral, covering all aspects of the life of the indigenous populations.” 26 As in Bolivia, the ILO and its partners conceived this to mean that the program “should be augment the productivity of the campesino and the indigenous artisan, making him a more efficient producer, and aiding him to commercialize his products, converting him into a more useful consumer.” 27 The way in which this goal was pursued by the program was also consistent with the AIP’s actions in Bolivia, which emphasized providing indigenous men with “instruction and a trade which would enable him adequately to earn his living when he had to leave his habitual occupation or social medium, improving his house, food and conditions of health and hygiene, giving him elemental knowledge which will serve him as a

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
foundation for accepting new techniques and adapting himself to modern progress in social life”

In Ecuador, the AIP did place more emphasis on promoting the development of local handicrafts for a commercial market. Attempts to promote the idea led to an exhibition of Ecuadorian rugs at UN headquarters in Geneva, which included “some of the Indian workers on [the] project.” Yet the similarities between the Bolivian and Ecuadorian projects were stronger than their differences. The use of social promoters and the training of national experts to eventually take over the work of the AIP was also a core focus of the Ecuadorian program, as it was in Bolivia. It was necessary for the local populations to “participate actively from the beginning in their own emancipation so that they can take advantage of and use to the full the means given to them, to improve their present situation.” This meant cooperation with local village leaders as well as Provencal Councils and national government ministries. In a letter to David Luscombe in March of 1958, ILO Assistant Director-General Abbas Ammar reminded the Chief of the Ecuadorian project of the importance of developing that national expertise. “I do not need to emphasize the importance of this matter,” Ammar wrote, “as I am sure you will agree that it is a basic factor in our programme and that no useful purpose will be served by our

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28 Ibid.
29 Abbas Ammar to Andrew W. Cordier (Exec. Assistant to Secretary-General, UN), 17 March 1956, Jacket 3, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
30 “Visit by Mr. Abbas Ammar, Assistant Director-General of the International Labour Organisation, to Ecuador Friday, 10 May to Friday, 17 May 1957,” Jacket 4, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
He nevertheless felt the need to make the point that, “[e]ducation is the essence of our programme: the sole reason for our presence in Ecuador is the training of national personnel in order that they may gradually become capable of working alone along the lines we jointly lay down and may eventually take over full responsibility for the project.”

In Ecuador as in Bolivia, the use of Indigenous social promoters was intended to eventually replace the international experts with national counterparts, thus institutionalizing the changes enacted by the AIP, and advancing the AIP’s regional focus on “the social rehabilitation and real integration of the Indians in their national society.”

The Peruvian Case

Although transportation and communication were of constant concern to the officials in charge of managing the Andean Indian Program in all of the countries where it operated, nowhere did the construction of a single road so govern the program’s fate as it did in the Tambopata Valley of Peru. Although the Peruvian government and the AIP sought to promote Indian migration and settlement of the valley, the Tambopata region near the town of Sandia was rapidly becoming a destination for migrants who traveled from the Late Titicaca Region as well as the Yungas region of central Bolivia as a result of a number of factors unrelated to the plans of the government or international organizations. Perhaps the most important single factor was several years of prolonged drought in the 1950s, which squeezed...
families and created more difficult living conditions than normal throughout the region. In addition, the Bolivian Revolution in 1952 had the effect of repatriating many indigenous migrants who had originated from across the border in Peru but had served as the primary labor force of the Yungas in Bolivia. As the AIP experts dispatched to review the situation concluded, “these newcomers were fulfilling a very important function, since they were well-acquainted with tropical agriculture, particularly in coffee growing, and were helping in the adaptation of those who had come from the highland regions.”  

ILO officials, including Deputy Director Rens, saw enormous potential for development in Peru along with many challenges. Besides the AIP, American and German investment was involved in the mining and agricultural sectors. The American businessman Robert Le Tourneau, for example, was engaged in a scheme to clear nearly 100,000 acres of tropical forest for settlement and agricultural development. Le Tourneau was best known for the design and production of engineering equipment, a field in which his company was an innovator and market leader. Using his large earth moving equipment, Le Tourneau planned to sell the cleared land in Peru to German immigrants. Rens, for one, suggested the project might be worth a closer look by the ILO, “as it may well be that we can do some business in the field of migration.”

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34 “Excerpts from Progress Reports on Andean Indian Programme Dealing with Negotiations with Peruvian Government,” Jacket 2, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
35 Jef Rens to the Director-General, 5 August 1954, Jacket 2, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
Despite the potential for large scale agricultural production in the valley, the hopes to establish a program to support the natural migration that was already occurring hinged on the construction of the road. Jef Rens remarked that, “the main condition for success…is the construction of this damn road about which everybody speaks and nobody seems to do anything about.”36 “Without roads,” another official who reviewed the situation reported, “it will be difficult to undertake the resettlement of surplus populations from the highlands.”37 The role of the AIP in the region was not to construct the necessary roads, but to support resettlement with the establishment of health services and training centers that would assist the migrants with the transition to their new homes and provide the know-how necessary to accelerate agricultural production. The Peruvian government was faced with limited resources and sought partnerships not only with the ILO, but also with the U.S. aid program then known as Point Four. While the ILO wished to complete additional studies before committing to action, Peruvian government officials were impatient to show results. A frank discussion with the Peruvian Minister of Indigenous Affairs in April 0f 1954 led Enrique de Lozada, the AIP’s regional director to conclude that, “what is happening means that we cannot proceed in the usual [slow and cautious] manner of international organizations [sic].”38 His conversation with the Minister suggested that the Peruvian government would “not wait for several months until the health and agricultural experts have gone and made their studies, as was the original

36 Ibid.
37 “Excerpts from Progress Reports on Andean Indian Programme Dealing with Negotiations with Peruvian Government,” Jacket 2, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
38 Enrique de Lozada to Luis Alvarado, 7 April 1954, Jacket 2, Box 9, Documents of the Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
As discussed in previous chapters, this was one of the principal reasons that the ILO had embarked on the AIP in the first place, i.e. to remake itself as more than a regulatory organization and to take a bold new step in expanding its field operations. According to Rens, embarking on a program of technical assistance that produced rapid results was, “the only way in which we will satisfy the [Peruvian] Government in the long run.” It was simply fact, Rens continued, that “[t]echnical assistance becomes more and more meaningless and uninteresting to the receiving countries, unless they see, from the outset, practical results and not [m]ere written reports, no matter how good these may be.” To achieve the ambitious goals of the program (integration, community development, increased economic production and consumption) and to satisfy the Peruvian government, the ILO had to show results. In the end, Lozada’s lobbying effort along with the support of several government offices resulted in promises to provide the funds for construction of the road. Unfortunately, there was still by no means unanimous agreement within the Peruvian government as to the need for the venture, which continued to delay completion of the project.

The ILO confronted challenges with the implementation of the AIP in Peru in other ways as well. The Peruvian Institute for Indigenous Affairs and its President, Dr. Carlos Monge, was considered an obstacle to the success of the program because of his doubts about the efficacy of resettlement programs such as those promoted by the AIP in Tambopata. Monge was a prominent physician and founder of Peru’s National Institute of Andean Biology. He had focused much of his career on the

39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
biology of “Andean man,” which combined aspects of evolutionary biology with the Indigenist discourse discussed in previous chapters. According to Monge, the Andean man constituted a “distinct climatological variety of the human race” and in the way in which he had adapted to the unique ecosystem of the Andean highlands. On this basis, he warned that efforts directed at relocation or colonization—such as the AIP’s Cotoca settlement in Bolivia and its site in Puno, Peru—were a mistake. He opposed resettlement on the grounds that climatic adaptations that had made life in the mountains easier for indigenous peoples would lead to illness and death in lower elevations. Indeed, Monge had opposed the resettlement projects advocated by the original Beaglehole mission and Jef Rens and others suspected that he meant to stop the program in its tracks if he could. As Lozada recalled his previous encounters with the man as part of the Beaglehole mission, he noted that, “the theories of Dr. Monge would oblige us to give up one of the most effective branches of our activities: the displacement of the populations of the “Altiplano” into the low areas.” Monge supported more focused efforts to develop the highland regions, however suspect his biological theories may appear today. His dispute with the AIP, however, illustrates the way in which the program’s main tenets and chosen methods of implementation were applied across the region to affect the condition of indigenous peoples.

The Colombian Case

Colombia was the last of the countries to which the projects of the AIP were extended under its regional framework. The AIP was deployed in a limited fashion to

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42 Enrique de Lozada to Jef Rens, 9 September 1957, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
Colombia as part of the transition in funding sources away from the Expanded Program for Technical Assistance and to the UN Special Fund. Colombia was attempting to emerge from a 20 year civil war (often referred to in Spanish as la Violencia), the bloodiest conflict in the Western Hemisphere during that period. Despite the violence and bloodshed that plague the country from 1946 to 1966, the Colombian government engaged a number of international resources during this period for the purposes of promoting economic development. Perhaps the most well-known of these was the so-called Lebret Report, named after the French Dominican economist Father Louis Lebret. In the 1950s, Lebret was commissioned by the government of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to complete a report on Colombian society that included recommendations for how to promote development. In the late 1950s, the ILO expanded the Andean Program to the Cuaca region in Colombia, at the request first of the Roja regime and subsequently the National Front, a centrist political coalition. Before and after the end of the Rojas regime in 1957, the details of the Lebret Report had begun to be enacted with the deployment of teams of experts across the country. It was within this context that the ILO dispatched Grégoire Koulischer between September and December 1958 to devise a plan for the proposed expansion of the AIP. An emergency credit issued by the U.N. Technical Assistance Board funded the Koulischer mission. The dispatch of Koulischer, an ILO official who had completed a similar mission to Ecuador in 1955-1956 and who would go on to direct the ILO’s programs in Africa, followed a formal request by the Colombian

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government for international assistance. While Koulischer’s report focused specifically on indigenous groups living in the Cuaca Valley, it drew heavily from and supported many of the conclusion found in the Lebret Report.44

Cauca, where the ILO study was focused, was one of the five Colombian provinces most seriously affected by the violent political and social crisis which had ravaged the country since 1946. Within Cuaca, municipalities with a large Indian population had suffered the most, yet according to Koulischer, the Province contained one of “the greatest concentrations of Indians who, though not yet integrated, are considered capable of being integrated immediately.”45 Critical to the impact of the civil war on the indigenous population in Colombia was the resguardos, a system of communal property that dated to the colonial period, and Cuaca contained 54 of the 84 resguardos in the country. Each resguardo was governed by a cabildo or community council.46 Along with their communal system of governance, Koulischer noted, one other significant aspect of the resguardos was their relative lack of agricultural productivity. Due to “the peculiar conditions of the Indian communities,” Koulischer concluded that the territories of the resguardo are “badly farmed and much of it left fallow.”47 He found that the inhabitants of the resguardos “have no knowledge of the use of fertilisers [sic.], crop rotation or irrigation […] and they lack the machinery to improve or repair [their] primitive equipment.”48 The lack of production largely explained why the Colombian government and the AIP attempted

44 “The Indian Problem in Colombia,” 9 January 1959, Z 11/10/8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
to work together in Cuaca, but the *resguardo* system often did not function in practice as it was supposed to in law. Somewhat differently than the struggles that resulted from the Bolivian Land Reform law discussed in previous chapters, small groups within the Indian communities had come to dominate the *cabildo* and communal lands were sold-off despite legal limitations prohibiting such sales. The result, Koulischer concluded, was “social and moral degradation” of *resguardos* and the communities they served. He had no doubt that this constituted “an obstacle which must be overcome both in the interest of the Indian population and with a view to implementing plans of economic development for the whole province.” As to how to approach the problem, Koulischer suggested that the situation of the *resguardos* would change “only by increasing the Indians’ output, which requires in its turn the application of an over-all programme (general and technical education, supervised credit, extension and organization of markets, etc.) adapted to the peculiar characteristics of the *resguardo* population.” His report went on to stress the changed circumstances of these communities in the modern world. The affected communities were being forced to confront new modes of regulation, which included the intrusion of a monetary economy. “Unprepared for the need to buy and sell, unfamiliar with technical progress and wage labour,” Koulischer concluded, “they require technical assistance.”

For its part, the Colombian government sought not to abolish the *resguardo* system, but rather to reform and reorganize it—chiefly by relocating people from

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49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid.
areas with little cultivable land to territories with more arable land. In Colombia, as with the colonies established by the AIP in Cotoca, Bolivia and Puno Peru, the purpose of such relocation programs was to make the resguardos “into units capable of administering themselves” through the “progressive development of co-operative methods, de facto if not de jure, in all matters concerning sales, purchases and credit,” and adjustments in the nutritional habits of the population.52 Despite efforts to address the problem in Colombia, the program had been largely ineffectual. The key to unlocking the economic potential of the resguardos was, in addition to administrative reforms, new roads and other infrastructure improvements, the training of “Indians who will be capable of promoting the rehabilitation and integration programmes [sic] in their respective communities.”53 Drawing on the AIP experiments in Bolivia, Koulischer recommended, “these Indian promoters [would obtain] the technical knowledge required to enable them to help the resguardos in adjusting to modern forms of economic and social organization.”54 Quoting the Lebret Report and echoing the diagnosis of the Beaglehole Report from the AIP’s original survey mission, Koulischer argued that, “what must be done is study all the positive aspects of their ancient customs in order to help those Indians to evolve towards more productive types of work and a higher standard of living.”55 In short, Colombia needed the organic, holistic approach to integration that the ILO and the AIP had already prescribed for Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador.

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
Unintended Consequences

The Andean Program promoted indigenous “integration” and non-coercive assimilation as essential to raising living standards and increasing economic productivity. This chapter has specifically addressed some of the ways in which the AIP was applied across the Andes region to support social integration through the application of international expertise. As suggested above, unique circumstances affected the AIP’s efforts in each country, but the focus and primary goals of the program varied rather little as a result of the ILO’s contemplation of specific national differences. Ecuador, Peru, and the planned expansion into Colombia by the ILO and its fellow U.N. agency partners shared many of the same characteristics and basic assumptions as the program deployed to Bolivia discussed in previous chapters. Across the region, because the AIP largely defined integration in terms of, firstly, acculturating indigenous peoples to an a priori concept of modernity and, secondly, increasing the production and consumption of national economies across the region, it tended to subsume the protection of indigenous individual and/or collective rights under the broader goal of economic and social development. Ironically, the true regional significance of the AIP may have been that the ILO’s involvement with the program helped to push the organization toward ratification of a special category of rights for indigenous peoples. That resolution was the ILO’s Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, passed in 1957 and commonly known as Convention 107.

The AIP was conceived as a means of launching the ILO on a bold new path that target social integration and development; the AIP it did not give a prominent place to the protection of indigenous social and political citizenship rights.
Nevertheless, it was through the ILO’s orchestration and administration of the AIP that Convention 107 was made possible. The ILO’s management of the AIP allowed the organization to claim some direct knowledge and expertise in attempting to address the problems that affected indigenous peoples. Moreover, the lack of any provision for social and political rights within the framework of the AIP exposed the gaps in the ILO’s own “integral” approach, leading at least indirectly to eventual passage of Convention 107. For its part, Convention 107 provided an opening for the subsequent recognition of the individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples by international law.\(^{56}\) It did so by recognizing, for the first time, “[t]he right of [land] ownership, collective or individual” by indigenous peoples and by providing specific protections for traditional indigenous “customs and institutions.” Convention 107 shared the integrationist perspective of the Andean Program by defining these special protections and other measures as transitory and unnecessary after the process of social integration was complete.\(^{57}\) It did not, as has been subsequently noted by scholars such as S. James Anaya, “envisage a place in the long term for robust, politically significant cultural and associational patterns of indigenous groups.”\(^{58}\) Convention 107, nevertheless invoked the Philadelphia Declaration’s affirmation of the right of “all human beings . . . to pursue both their material well-being and their


\(^{58}\) Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples*, 55.
spiritual development.” For all its historic and historical limitations, and as James Anaya concludes, “through the conceptual and institutional medium of human rights,” Convention 107 “established a foothold” for the subject of indigenous peoples within the international system. This “foothold” became an important precedent for subsequent struggles by indigenous groups across Latin America, Africa, Australia, and elsewhere. Convention 107, combined with the subsequent efforts of indigenous peoples themselves to challenge the integrationist narrative, eventually led to a version of indigenous identity within international law that articulated autonomous rights for indigenous peoples regarding land, work, social and cultural institutions.

60 Anaya, Indigenous Peoples, 56.
Conclusion

The origins of the Andean Indian Program cannot be reduced to a single moment or isolated historical event. Nevertheless, the ubiquitous expansion of technical assistance and “developmentalism” since the 1950s—not to mention the millions of lives affected by such programs—underscores the importance of understanding the triggers that compelled the ILO’s postwar turn. My dissertation has argued that initiation of the AIP depended on the establishment of new transnational networks and institutions, which spurred the formation of a new internationalism at the ILO. I have argued that this internationalism reflected the will of a technocracy possessing both a shared experience and a common belief in the capacity of international institutions to meet postwar challenges and the efficacy of American models of economic and social development for the world. Officials at the ILO sought to make the ILO relevant after World War II, and the AIP compelled a significant reorientation of the ILO’s traditional methods of operation. To affect international social policy norms, the ILO previously had focused its efforts on the passage of international labor standards. With the inauguration of the AIP, this focus began to be matched, if not entirely superseded, by direct programs of technical assistance. Several aspects of this new approach first found expression in the Andean Indian Program. Perhaps most importantly, the AIP explicitly linked technical expertise to specific techniques for social and economic development. These techniques included the establishment of “action bases” and colonies that brought local communities under the AIP’s sphere of influence. Resettlement projects such as Cotoca were designed to reverse or reorient centuries old patterns of migration, settlement, and work in Ayamara and Quechua-speaking communities across the Andes. The AIP included the use of
economic cooperatives that more closely tied local agricultural production to demand for products in national and regional markets. Rural education and infrastructure development were also important components, which required the collaboration of Bolivian state officials and the use of indigenous social promoters. Together, the various elements of the ILO’s strategy contained a putatively universal model of development that was heavily determined by United States hegemony. This strategy supported the goals of modernizing Latin American states, increasing production and consumption, growing the region’s middle class, and integrating historically excluded populations. This approach, what the ILO increasingly defined as its “integral” approach, was a departure from the past: for the first time, and as a compliment to the organization’s traditional standard setting activities, the ILO attempted to enact international social policy norms directly from the field.

The application of technical expertise at precise geographic points on the globe—i.e. the social-political vectors that appeared most at risk and prone to failure—was the essence of the new internationalism that David Morse and others brought to the ILO. Morse’s friend and confidant Snowden Herrick summarized this new internationalism succinctly in a letter to Morse in 1953, although Morse himself and others quoted throughout this dissertation expressed almost identical sentiments. Several key themes discussed throughout this dissertation resonate in Herrick’s letter. The idea of “putting people in the field,” Herrick wrote, would overcome the perception that the ILO “spends most of its time looking for occasion [to pass] new Conventions and Recommendations, or [to revise] old ones,” because this is the only thing “a large percentage of the staff’
knows how to do.”¹ This impulse toward legislation, these “sterile preoccupations” as Herrick referred to them, was a “hangover from the days before technical assistance.”² To compel the necessary changes at the ILO and beyond, Herrick suggested, was a herculean task that required deliberate action and resources. If the ILO was to become an effective and meaningful force in world affairs, he concluded, then the United States was “key to the situation,” as “the dynamic country,” as the source of ideas, money and resources to act on shared ideals.³ Thus, besides the familiar call to action and reform, Herrick’s letter captures another important theme of my dissertation, namely that faith in technical know-how, in the expert’s capacity to bring about a “perceptible decrease in human misery,” in a technocracy of expertise, was a version of American exceptionalism vigorously exported in the decades immediately following the Second World War.⁴

As if continuing the conversation with Snowden Herrick decades later, Morse’s 1969 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech connected the themes of “peace-building” and the need to develop “social cohesion and stability” as the primary justification for the ILO’s technical assistance efforts over the last decades: “To provide these countries with the resources, the technical and managerial know-how, and the institutional and administrative framework which are essential for viable nationhood in the modern

¹ Snowden Herrick to David Morse, 8 May 1952, Folder 41, Box 53, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid. Morse wrote back to Herrick several days later on May 19th that, “I think you are correct in practically all the points you make (perhaps because they happen to coincide with points that I have been making and reiterating in Geneva ever since I took over).” David Morse to Snowden Herrick, 19 May 1952, Folder 41, Box 53, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
world,” it was “for this reason that the ILO gives top priority in its work today to the strengthening of developing nations.”

In addition to the emphasis on building up this “social infrastructure,” as Morse described it, my analysis of the ILO’s efforts to promote development and social integration through the auspices of the AIP also suggests the need to pay close attention to specific encounters. In the communities targeted by the Andean Indian Program, confrontations over the formation of market-oriented cooperatives, the distribution of property titles, the use of the natural environment, and the failure to provide social services defined the contours of resistance and participation by indigenous peoples. These types of encounters, some of which have been discussed throughout this study, illustrate the need to widen the lens through which international institutions have been viewed historically. Thus, a third theme is the need to understand such institutions as arenas in which ideas about the “nation,” “region,” “expert” or “populations” are construed, constructed, and contested. My work on the AIP contributes to our understanding of the transnational nature of these encounters as seen through the lens of the international technocracy.

The need to demonstrate the ILO’s capacity and commitment to the active deployment of expertise in support of social justice made the Andean Indian Program an important, if risky, venture for the ILO. The degree of cooperation and coordination required, involving numerous state and non-state actors, had rarely if ever been attempted before the launch of the AIP in 1952. In addition to the unprecedented nature of the AIP, other circumstances may have reduced the ILO’s willingness or ability to sustain the

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program, without diminishing its importance as a model for future initiatives. First, there is some evidence that David Morse’s relationship with his Deputy, Jef Rens, had begun to disintegrate by the early 1960s. Obviously, the AIP figured larger in the ILO’s postwar plans than the vision of just one man, but, as previously suggested, Rens had been a champion and defender of the AIP since its inception. By 1962, Morse had served as the ILO Director-General for thirteen years and contemplated retirement, which he announced in the fall of 1961. Although he had made enemies during his first 10 years at the helm of the ILO, he still retained many strong personal and professional relationships with colleagues in the United States government. Indeed, Arthur Goldberg, then U.S. Secretary of Labor, personally “recruited” and persuaded Morse to reverse his decision and seek another term as Director General. When the votes were finally counted, among the member states, only Russia, who had rejoined the ILO in 1954, and Romania opposed his reelection. Morse was unanimously supported by the Workers Group of the ILO’s Governing Body.

Despite widespread support from the ILO’s membership for his reelection, Morse’s decision to pursue another term did not please the leader of the largest and most powerful labor union in the United States, AFL-CIO President George Meany. Upon learning of Morse’s retirement plans in the fall of 1961, Meany backed Jef Rens as

6 “Memorandum: For the Files,” 5 January 1962, Folder 8, Box 53, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
7 “Memorandum: For the Files,” 5 January 1962, Folder 8, Box 53, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
8 David Morse to Arthur Goldberg, 19 March 1962, Folder 8, Box 53, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
Morse’s successor. In the spring of 1962, after Morse had reversed course and announced his decision to seek another term, Meany unleashed a bitter public tirade against the ILO. Articles quoting Meany were published in the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *AFL-CIO News*, entitled respectively “Meany Sees ILO Slipping From West” and “Free Nations Warned of Red Drive in ILO.” Morse’s friends in the U.S. Labor Department wrote to warn him that Meany and Rens were “in cahoots” and that Rens had been encouraged to “stick around and expect to succeed you—before your term is up!” When Morse finally spoke face-to-face with Rens, it was determined that he would remain in place as Morse’s Deputy, but only on the condition that Rens be “prepared to go back to [their] original footing of collaboration without reservation.” Although difficult to confirm the long term impact of this episode, if Rens’s relationship with the Director-General deteriorated over time, it is reasonable to suppose that this may have had some impact on his ability to influence events at the ILO. Whatever the exact nature of the disagreement involving Morse, Rens, and Meany, it may have been at the cost of diminishing one of the AIP’s most consistent and outspoken advocates.

It is not clear what, if any, impact Rens’s relationship with Morse may have had on the ILO’s handling of the AIP throughout the 1960s. However, there were definite gaps in ILO’s ability to sustain its commitment to the AIP. Following the

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9 David Morse to Cass Millard, 18 July 1962, Folder 7, Box 49, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
10 Ibid.
11 Cass Millard to David Morse, 11 August 1962, Folder 7, Box 49, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
12 “Memorandum: For the Files,” 5 January 1962, Folder 8, Box 53, David A. Morse Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
recommendations of the initial Beaglehole mission, indigenous social and cultural<br>“integration” was most frequently described as a prerequisite to economic development.<br>By the late 1950s, ILO leadership in Geneva privately expressed doubts that “the ILO<br>could carry on indefinitely such a multi-lateral and multi-agency Programme [sic].”¹³<br>Integration was proving to be a slow process on a national and regional scale, difficult to<br>measure or show progress in meaningful terms. “Integration will be made easier,” the<br>ILO concluded, “to the extent that economic development can open up new types and<br>sources of production and new means of communication, result in closer co-ordination<br>between production and markets and, in general, raise the standard of living of the<br>population.”¹⁴ Within the ILO, disagreement about the efficacy of its chosen methods<br>also mattered. Some officials, such as then director of the ILO Conditions of Work<br>Division, David Efron, believed that not enough emphasis had been placed in the past on<br>the economic sources of “underdevelopment” in the Andes. Efron criticized the<br>integration model originally emphasized by Beaglehole and argued that, “[the AIP]<br>cannot continue indefinitely to apply a socio-anthropological approach to problems which<br>have important economic development aspects.”¹⁵ At the same time, Bolivian state<br>officials urged the ILO to expand the program and accelerate its progress, while<br>indigenous groups were increasingly frustrated by the slow transfer of land titles and top<br>down control that characterized the program. These sources of pressure led Rens to<br>conclude that the ILO, “must obtain the means of expanding the base of our operation, or

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¹³ “Director-General’s Meeting to discuss the Andean-Indian Programme, 4 November,<br>1957,” Cabinet Files of David Morse, Z 11-10-8, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.<br>¹⁴ “Andean Indian Programme: Project Submission to Special Fund,” Corrected Draft,<br>1959, Z 11-10-18-1 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.<br>¹⁵ “Minute No 38,” David Efron to Regional Director of Andean Indian Programme, 1<br>April 1963, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.3), ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
else, or else [the program] risks cracking under the current framework.”16 With the need
to show accelerated progress and answer critics, the ILO pressed Bolivia and the other
AIP countries to seek additional assistance for the program from the newly inauguration
United Nations Special Fund (established in 1959) and other sources such as the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB).17 Unlike the AIP, which married social
“integration” with economic development, the Special Fund and the IADB more
exclusively and explicitly targeted economic development initiatives.

Another source of difficulties for the program occurred in 1964, at precisely the
moment that the first Special Fund and IADB resources were made available. The return
to power of Victor Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia resulted in a series of shake-ups within the
Bolivian government that would frustrate the AIP’s goals of economic growth and
stability. As discussed above, Estenssoro had led the MNR at the time of the revolution
and served as Bolivia’s first president (1952-1956) after the revolution. In the years since

16 Jef Rens to Enrique de Lozada, 16 July 1958, TAP-A 1-1-0 (J.1), ILOA, Geneva,
Switzerland.
17 The AIP was initially funded through the UN’s Expanded Technical Assistance
Program, but when the Special Fund was created in 1959, the ILO urged Bolivia and its
neighbors to apply for additional funding to expand the program. The concept of the
IADB in particular dated back to the 19th century, but its creation was not successfully
negotiated by the Organization of American States until 1959. With the establishment of
the bank, new funds became available to regional governments, provided they met the
banks criteria. An IADB loan for Bolivia was agreed to in 1964, via the Social Progress
Trust Fund, “for the purpose of consolidating and expanding the National Rural Develop
Plan on the basis of the project drawn up by the Government with the collaboration of the
AIP Advisory Group.” The Advisory Group had just been created to provide a
institutional body made up of international experts from the ILO and the other UN
agencies (FAO, WHO, etc.) that contributed to the program. The loan to the Bolivian
government was in keeping with the bank’s support of programs in the region that
involved settlement of populations in tropical areas and totaled $15.6 million. Jef Rens to
Alejandro Quesada, 26 February 1958, Jacket 7, Box 10, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA,
Geneva, Switzerland. See also “Bolivia – National Integration Plan,” Jacket 2, Box 12,
Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA, Geneva, Switzerland.
the revolution, a power struggle emerged within the MNR that increasingly pitted a left-wing faction headed by Juan Lechin against a more conservative faction led by Walter Guevara. By the early 1960s, Paz Estenssoro remained a popular if diminished figure with Bolivian voters, who had grown disenchanted by some of the failed promises of the revolution and, perhaps more importantly, the intra-party fights between the supporters of Guevara and Lechin. Lechin in particular had the solid support of the well-armed miners and workers, which had been critical to the success of the revolution in 1952. To launch his third presidential campaign and gain the support of the important miner-workers block, Estenssoro chose Lechin as his running mate. However, the alliance was short lived, and Lechin was forced into exile. With his bid for a third term requiring an amendment to the Bolivian constitution and with dwindling support on the political left in Bolivia after the split with Lechin, Estenssoro became increasingly dependent on the military to retain his position. In 1964, he was forced into exile by a military coup. A reorganization of many government offices and agencies followed the successful coup. The bases and colonies created by the AIP came under the control of the Community Development and Agricultural Extension Service (Servicio de Desarrollo de la Comunidad y Extension Rural or SEDEX), which operated as a joint USAID-Bolivian government run agency. By the time General Alfredo Ovando seized power of the Bolivian state in 1969, the AIP had all but ceased to exist. A skeleton staff persisted as a reminder of the program’s former ambitions until 1972, with the ILO’s presence in the country reduced to one expert in vocational training and one expert in rural cooperatives.\textsuperscript{18} Despite its slow unraveling at the end of David Morse’s term atop the

\textsuperscript{18} “Bolivia – National Integration Plan,” Jacket 2, Box 12, Documents of Jef Rens, ILOA,
ILO, the AIP interests as a subject of historical analysis issues from its status as an extended episode in the history of postwar “developmentalism” and the construction of the postwar international system. Understood as an apparatus of reform, the AIP has at least a dual significance: as part of a strategy of self-preservation for the ILO itself and as a technique for the circulation of new forms and discourses of rationality.
Figure 3: David A. Morse, longest serving Director General of the International Labor Organization, 1948-1970. United State Department of Labor photo.
Figure 4: On the left, long time Deputy Director General of the ILO, Jef Rens, pictured circa 1944. ILOA photo.

Figure 5: At right, ILO official David Efron, circa 1944. Efron filled a number of different positions during his career at the ILO, but remained involved in the AIP into the 1960s. ILOA photo.
Photos from a workshop conducted by the ILO in 1955 and sent back to ILO headquarters in Geneva. Figure 6: On the left, the caption found in the report reads, “The work of the expert is being studied.” ILOA photo.

Figure 7: At right, a laborer and unionist are demonstrating an assembly line process. He is watched and timed by two engineers from the Bolivian Ministry of Economy. ILOA photo.
Figure 8: Photographs from a pamphlet produced by the ILO and the Ecuadorian government entitled, “La Vivienda Campesina: Mision Andina de Reconstruccion Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda.” The pamphlet describes the housing program implemented as part of the AIP. It was produced in 1961 and contains a series of photographs illustrating the phases of housing construction of a typical dwelling. ILOA photo.
Figure 9: Additional photographs from “La Vivienda Campesina” showing the final phases of construction for a house designed and built by the AIP. ILOA photo.
Figure 10: A photograph printed in the La Paz based newspaper, La Nacion, on 25 October 1954 announcing the launch of the AIP action base at Pillapi. William Dillingham, Pillapi Mission Chief is pictured two from the right as he addressed the gathered crowd. The Bolivian President, Paz Estenssoro, also attended the ceremony and appears seventh from the right in the photograph.
Figure 11: A map depicting the Cotoca settlement of the AIP. Although the project was known by the name Cotoca, the mission itself actually consisted of two small settlements constructed for and by the colonists near the small village of Cotoca.
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