ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: TO DICTATE THE PEACE: POWER, STRATEGY AND SUCCESS IN MILITARY OCCUPATIONS

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The dissertation addresses the following question: why do some states win a war only to lose the occupation whereas other states can successfully impose their preferred outcome via the control of foreign territory? For example, compare the United States’ failure in Iraq (2003-2008) to the Allied Powers’ success in France (1815-1818). To explain this variation, I develop and test a principal-agent model in which I incorporate the occupied elite’s costs of compliance and the occupier’s strategies of control. As agents, the occupied elites expect to incur significant domestic and international costs if they consent to the occupier’s demands, and thus have strong incentives to not comply. The occupying state can overcome this hostility through a costly exercise of power to shape the choices and manipulate the incentives of elites to influence their decision-making. Occupying
states that engage in dictating as a strategy of control are compelling the elites to make a costly choice. By constraining the choice set to compliance or non-compliance with its terms, the occupying power can effectively separate strongly adverse elites from moderately or weakly adverse ones, and thereby gain a commitment to its objectives. Although previous work on occupations recognizes the difficulties in achieving success, the costs of compliance to the elite and the occupiers’ strategy of control are largely overlooked in previous scholarship.

To evaluate the theoretical argument, I employ two research methods in the project. First, I built an original dataset to test the effects of the costs of compliance and the strategies of control on the outcomes of 137 military occupations that result from interstate wars between 1815 and 2003. The statistical analyses are paired with two plausibility probes: the Chilean Occupation of Peru (1881-1883) and the Soviet Occupation of North Korea (1945-1948). Second, I examine in-depth the American Occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952. The case study investigates how the costs of compliance – across regime change, economic stabilization, and rearmament – generated resistance among Japanese politicians, and how the Americans exercised their power to dictate that the former comply with the latter’s costly terms during the course of the occupation.
TO DICTATE THE PEACE:
POWER, STRATEGY AND SUCCESS
IN MILITARY OCCUPATIONS

by

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For Katie
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“It is much easier to make war than peace.”

- Georges Clemenceau

Following the War of the Seventh Coalition in July 1815, the Allied Powers imposed a military occupation on Northern France as part of the Second Treaty of Paris. Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom had decided that the victor’s peace would not be left to mere promises and a scrap of paper this time. After capturing Paris, the Allied Powers took their time to restore Louis to the Bourbon throne. Though he was the most likely candidate, the Great Powers did not trust Louis or the French government to carry out their preferred terms absence a strong hand to guide their decision-making. Louis had done relatively little to establish himself among the French population as their new ruler on the throne before the war began. When Napoleon started to amass French support, the restored Bourbon did nothing to challenge him and immediately fled the country. The remainder of the French government had proven to be equally ineffective during its brief time in office. These suspicions caused the Allied Powers great concern over whether the newly re-established regime could bring about stability in the country, and to the region. Furthermore, the Allies realized that with the Second Treaty they had imposed significantly greater costs on the French, and they intended to insure that latter would meet its obligations to insure that peace would emerge on the European Continent. Whereas the First Treaty of Paris (1814) had failed, the Allied Powers decided that they

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would enforce the Second (1815). In response to the foreign military forces controlling French territory, the Duke of Richelieu noted that “Unfortunately for France, her enemies held the power ‘to impose their wills upon us.’” For the next three years, the Allied Powers would pressure the French government to pursue policies and take actions that conformed to their peace. In 1818, the Allied Occupation of France ended in success.

The Allied Occupation of France presents two anomalies for international relations theory regarding why states impose occupations and whether these operations will subsequently succeed. First, why did the Allies impose the occupation? Louis wanted to return to the throne in Paris and reinstate the monarchy as a reputable regime in the international system. Yet, the Allied Powers were not convinced that he would establish himself and an administration suitable to their demands. If foreign imposed regime change and military occupations are supposed to resolve the commitment dilemma, why did the Allied Powers continue to have concerns over whether the French government would comply with their demands in the postwar era?

Second, how did the occupation achieve the Allies’ goals given their concerns over whether the French would comply? Theories concerning success in military occupations have focused on shared threats perceptions as generating incentives for cooperation and the use of coercion to gain compliance as playing prominent roles in

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achieving the occupier’s preferred outcome. However, no external threat challenged the occupation and the Army of Occupation specifically refrained from using coercive strategies. Without either element, why did the French comply with and ultimately adhere to the demands made by the Allied Powers that proved costly for former to implement?

More broadly, the dissertation addresses the following question: why do some states win a war only to lose the occupation whereas other states can successfully impose their preferred outcome via the control of foreign territory? To answer the inquiry, I develop a principal-agent model of international politics that builds on two important, yet overlooked insights concerning the use of military occupations in the modern international system. First, I contend that the occupied elite are the primary targets of influence when a state imposes a military occupation as a result of an interstate war. While I recognize the importance of the occupied population living under foreign control, this dissertation argues that the occupied elite are the ones that must accede to the political demands made by the occupying power. Influencing their decision-making is central to obtaining what I call the victor’s peace. Second, the outcome of the occupation is subsequently influenced by how the occupied elite react to the demands of the occupying power and the latter’s attempts to sway the former into complying with those demands. Following the principal-agent model, the elite are adverse to the costs they will incur in establishing the victor’s peace. Consequently, the occupying power has to engage

Democratization: A Marginal Value Approach to Understanding the Consolidation of Imposed Democratic Regimes” (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2013).

in a costly exercise of power to shape the former’s choice set into making a commitment toward the latter’s preferred outcome.

The chapter is divided into four sections. First, I discuss the importance of studying military occupations as a recent historical phenomenon in international relations when compared to questions of war and peace more generally. This section addresses the relevance of investigating occupations as well as the broader contributions that the project will make to the literature. The next three sections discuss the more specific contributions made to the scholarship on occupations in the context of commitment dilemmas and power politics. Initially, I discuss the importance of the elite in an occupation, illustrating how they constitute a central dilemma to the occupying power. The subsequent section discusses how the occupier has to respond to the occupied elite: power. Previous work on military occupations has framed the debate as a choice between cooperation and coercion without recognizing a third important possibility. Finally, the chapter discusses the organization of the dissertation with an outline of chapters 2 through 6.

**Between War and Peace: Military Occupations in the Modern International System**

The recent failures of the United States in the occupations of Afghanistan (2001-2012) and Iraq (2003-2008) have renewed concerns on how states can take a military victory from war, and translate it into their preferred peace. Furthermore, the importance of understanding military occupations has grown in the preceding months. As I write this introduction, two conflicts pose new concerns for addressing if and when states should take control of foreign territory. As of the end of October 2014, the bombing campaign against the forces of the Islamic State has yet to produce the intended results of driving
their soldiers out of Iraq and back into Syria.\(^6\) While some policymakers contend that the strategy needs more time, the Obama Administration is likely confronted with a difficult choice on whether to commit American ground forces to defeat this new threat. In all likelihood, the option to occupy Iraqi territory is once more on the table. In defeating the Islamic State, the already political unstable regions of Iraq will be vulnerable to continued ethnic strife. American officials must now consider whether the Iraqi central government can effectively stabilize the region after years of infighting, or take control of the region to restore order and prevent further violence. In November 2014, Russian military forces increased the scale of their invasion into eastern Ukraine that could well lead to an occupation of territory.\(^7\) In particular, the economic sanctions currently in place may weaken Russian capabilities to press forward on the military attack. However, the sanctions will likely prove insufficient to dislodge Russia from the territory. Unless the West considers the option for military intervention, the Russian position can consolidate and establish an occupation to pressure the Ukrainian government into compliance with the former’s preferred outcome.

In recognizing the relevance of the subject to the modern world, it is also important to understand that military occupations are a relatively new phenomenon that has emerged as part of the modern state system. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is often invoked by scholars to represent the beginning of the current system of state


\(^7\) “Russian Troops enter Ukraine,” *BBC News* 12 November 2014, Accessed 12 November 2014,  
sovereignty. In the 18th century, the writings of Vattel, Rousseau, and Locke developed the idea that states could control foreign soil as a temporary measure without also claiming ownership. The development of military occupations raised new possibilities for how states could transition between war and peace. Though victorious states had a new option for implementing their terms, questions emerged regarding how states could use military occupations to successfully shape the aftermath of a conflict to conform to the victor’s peace. For example, in 1854, Baron von Moltke lamented the problem of understanding how occupations can succeed when he wrote the following: “Indeed, the military occupation of large towns, without previous agreement, is a problem for the solution of which the history of war offers few precedents.”

Today, we still have relatively few answers regarding the major questions concerning the use of military occupations. As an instrument of foreign policy, occupations are understudied in the scholarly literature though they remain a prominent

8 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 20-21. As Krasner notes, however, the modern notion of sovereignty emerged almost a hundred years after Westphalia. That modern understanding coincides with the writings of authors mentioned in the following sentence.

9 Emmerich de Vattel, The Laws of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law (London: G. G. and J. Robinson, 1758/1797); Also see Elbridge Colby, “Occupation under the Laws of War,” Columbia Law Review 25, no. 7 (1925): 904-922. There is some confusion here, as scholars occasionally assume that the notion of occupying foreign territory is as old as war. For example, Arthur Birnie discusses the Roman occupation of the British Islands and R. F. J. Jones focuses on the Roman occupation in Spain. However, the ancients believed that territory captured as a result of their military victory simultaneously transferred the property rights to the winning government. Hence, the notion of occupying territory, or an occupation, was not necessarily an option that the ancients considered when engaging in war and peace. For the use of the term occupation in reference to Roman conquests, see Arthur Birnie, An Economic History of the British Isles (New York: Routledge, 2005), Chapter 2; and R. F. J. Jones, “The Roman Military Occupation of North-West Spain,” Journal of Roman Studies 66 (1976): 45-66. For a discussion on the ancients notion that military victory equated ownership of conquered territory, see Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1866), 432-442; Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 6-7.

means to achieve a state’s national interests. Volumes have been written about the fighting and politics of war and whether states can remain at peace afterwards. Yet, relatively little systematic and rigorous scholarship has emerged on the use of occupations. The majority of the studies on military occupations have focused on historical analyses of individual cases, or on examining the relevant aspects of international law across a few instances. Those works that have attempted to assess the

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11 In 1961, Garston acknowledges that historians often overlook the postwar era when writing about the modern wars. See, Garston, “Arms of Occupation, I.”


14 See the Case Appendix for a large sample of these works.

utility of military occupations have drawn on limited samples without identifying the broader universe of cases that have occurred in the last two hundred years. One of the primary contributions of this project constitutes a new conceptualization of occupations for recognizing the relevant cases for inclusion in the Military Occupations Dataset.

Furthermore, the literature has not developed a core insight regarding the transition phase from war to peace: winning the war does not imply that the victor on the battlefield can and will successfully establish their peace. As David Lake has noted, the current rationalist approach “assumes that a war is over once a settlement is reached,” and this literature has yet to produce solid explanations for why this failure might occur. That is, the bargaining theories of war have neglected the importance of postwar politics in establishing and enforcing the victor’s peace once the fighting between militaries terminates. Victory on the battlefield is important, but it is the first phase for a state to achieve its political goals. James L. McCamy wrote that, “…[the] end of fighting was in reality to be only the beginning of victory, or rather the struggle not yet ended to gain a


victory from the defeat of the enemy.”¹⁸ There is a strategic component to imposing a military occupation that the literature has yet to sufficiently address in terms of developing theoretical arguments that link the phases of war, peace, and the transitions between each.

In the project, the model focuses on the strategic interaction between the occupier and the occupied elite. In doing so, I consider two related aspects in the theoretical argument: why states selected into military occupations and how the occupier’s beliefs on non-compliance affect its subsequent interactions with the occupied elite. First, the theoretical argument incorporates the idea that states impose military occupations given that they expect the opponent to be non-compliant otherwise. Those states that win wars, but do not impose occupations likely do so if they expect the opponent to adhere to the agreement without further compulsion. The states that do impose occupations likely have concerns over whether the vanquished opponent will adhere to and establish their preferred peace. Second, states that select into occupations demonstrate some variation in their beliefs about the likelihood of compliance, and those beliefs influence how the occupier will choose to interact with the occupied elite. A prime advantage for this project in using strategic interaction to investigate military occupations is that the modeling process requires organizing and specifying one’s ideas about the opposing actors in a systematic manner.¹⁹ In the study of military occupations, a significant actor has often been overlooked: the occupied elite.

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A Central Dilemma for Peace: Occupied Elites and the Costs of Compliance

International relations theory has recognized the problems of defection, cheating exploitation, and misrepresentation when discussing the emergence of cooperation among egotistic states with diverging interests in a system without third-party enforcement. Rationalists and realists have concurred that military occupations following interstate wars are supposed to diminish these concerns over non-compliance and secure the victor’s peace. In doing so, previous work has generally focused on the target of a military occupation has either a unified actor – in particular, the state – lumping the occupied elite and the occupied population into one analytical unit or simply on the population. A central assumption underlying the commitment dilemma is that the opposition always has the motivation for non-compliance; it simply lacks the capabilities

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to act on those incentives. Subsequently, the literature suggests that opportunities for non-compliance emerge with general power shifts, when the state has the capabilities to act on its incentives. This generates two problems. First, these explanations generally lack sufficient foundations as to why the vanquished have incentives to not comply with the agreement. Actors usually have specific reasons for non-compliance, and models of strategic interaction can offer some insight into how the demands of one actor can conflict with the preferences of another. Second, by focusing on the state, previous work has overlooked important variation on the part of the vanquished: across military occupations, the evidence clearly demonstrates some actors have incentives to engage in the opportunistic behaviors, and some actors do not. What explains this variation in the defeated power’s behavior?

In order to identify the origin of the motivation for non-compliance, I argue that the primary theoretical focus should shift from the state to the occupied elite. Recent scholarship has focused on elites in opposing countries as the primary targets of a state’s foreign policy choices, especially the use of more coercive options such as economic sanctions and military force. A similar approach is called for based on how leaders of

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invading countries have historically approached occupations as a means to influence opposing political elites. For example, General John E. Wood noted in the invasion of northern Mexico, “Tomorrow you will…occupy the Territory of our Enemies. We have not come to make war upon the people or peasantry of the country, but to compel the Government of Mexico to render justice to the United States.”

This focus on elites has followed the history of military occupations, through to the recent American Occupation of Iraq. On 12 September 2002, President George W. Bush described the threat that the Iraqi government presented to international peace and security, emphasizing that “The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people.”

Hence, the Bush Administration sought a new regime to govern Iraq, one that would be more amicable to American national interests and security. States target the occupied elite as they are the ones in positions of political power that the occupiers can attempt to influence into accepting and implementing the political elements of the victor’s peace.

The question becomes why do these elite have incentives for non-compliance and when can they act on them to subvert the victor’s peace? The reason for this is simple:

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In the project, I am not arguing that the population residing in the occupied territory is irrelevant to military occupiers. The occupied population can certainly prove difficult to manage, whether through passive or active resistance that can increase the costs of governing territory to the occupying power. Rather, that the occupied population in general are not the individuals in positions of political authority and power that the occupier has to influence into making a commitment to its preferred peace. Those individuals who play a role in making a commitment to the victor’s peace are the actors who have the motivation to not comply with the terms, and they are the ones waiting for an opportunity to emerge that will allow them to escape the agreement. For discussions that focus on the occupied population, see Wimberley, “Pyrrhic Peace.”; Gannon, Military Occupations in the Age of Self-Determination; Collard-Wexler, “Understanding Resistance to Foreign Occupation.”
the occupied elite are politicians interested in maintaining access to office and power with incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviors, relative to the victor’s peace.\textsuperscript{29} Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher succinctly recognize that, “[politicians] want to preserve political power and ensure that [the] peace implementation process either enhances or does not harm their political and economic interests.”\textsuperscript{30} By controlling foreign territory, an occupier is impeding the ability of political actors from pursuing their goals by reducing their autonomy in decision-making and policy implementation. It is this action that brings political elite into conflict with the goals of the occupying power.

Harold Lasswell recognized that in the study of politics the elite are those individuals “who get the most.”\textsuperscript{31} In military occupations, I assert that the occupied elite are the central target for achieving an occupying power’s goals. The aims of the occupation constitute the terms of the contract that the occupied elite are expected to fulfill in order for the occupation to terminate. In effect, the occupation’s aims constitute the price that the occupier is compelling the elite to pay for the postwar peace. The war aims literature has generally viewed the issues at stake as a benefit that each participant seeks to compel from an opponent.\textsuperscript{32} More recent work has suggested that the war aims of one state – especially high ones like territorial conquest and foreign imposed regime

\textsuperscript{29} Anthony Downs, \textit{An Economic Theory of Democracy} (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1957).


\textsuperscript{32} For example, see Allan C. Stam, \textit{Win, Lose or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War} (Ann Arbor: University Michigan Press, 1996); and, D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, “The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985,” \textit{American Political Science Review} 90, no. 2 (June 1996): 239-257.
change – may function as motivation for an opponent to ignore the mounting costs and continue fighting to prevent such a catastrophic loss.\footnote{Hans Speier, “War Aims in Political Warfare,” \textit{Social Research} 12, no. 2 (1945): 159; Suzanne Werner, “Absolute and Limited War: The Possibilities of Foreign Imposed Regime Change,” \textit{International Interactions} 22, no. 1 (1996): 67-88; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, \textit{The Logic of Political Survival} (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003); Sarah E. Croco, “Peace At What Price? Domestic Politics, Settlement Costs and War Termination,” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2008).} Here, I build on this idea that the occupier’s aims affect the decision-making of the occupied elite by altering the conflict of interests between the two. After the fighting, the occupying power enforces its interests as the aims it wants to achieve for its preferred peace.\footnote{Martin Kyre and Joan Kyre, \textit{Military Occupation and National Security} (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968), 23 and 30-31.} I theorize that the aims of the occupying power become the costs of compliance for the elite. These costs represent the losses that the political elite will have to suffer in the postwar era if they comply with the occupying power.

Hence, it is not the governing or relational structure itself, but the political aims of the occupying power that drive the elite to favor non-compliance over compliance.\footnote{Lake contends that variation in governance structure creates incentives for opportunistic behavior. Hence, he would compare military occupations to empires to examine whether politicians will comply. I contend that in military occupations, the incentives for opportunistic behavior vary based on the demands made by the occupying power. See, Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,” 14.} For example, recent efforts to explain variation in the outcomes of foreign imposed regime change have focused on institutional, cultural, and economic factors to explain variation in the outcomes.\footnote{Christopher J. Coyne, \textit{After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, “Forced to be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization,” \textit{International Security} 37, no. 4 (2013): 90-131.} I contend that the occupied elite had incentives to exploit the opportunity of institutional change to their political advantage and to the detriment of the
occupying power’s preferred outcome. In essence, the dissertation reverses Lasswell’s insight in the context of military occupations: the occupied elite are the individuals who can potentially lose the most in the postwar era by complying with the occupying power’s demands. Whether the occupying power can overcome the elite’s adverse intentions to gain a commitment to the former’s postwar interests is the central puzzle to solve for achieving success in military occupations.

**Power Politics and the Establishment of the Victor’s Peace**

By identifying the elites as the primary targets, and recognizing that the goals of the occupation constitute the costs of compliance that these politicians will likely resist, the central concern becomes how an occupying power can influence the elite into accepting by the victor’s peace. In this dissertation, I suggest that the answer lies in power politics. The imposition of a military occupation presents an opportunity to resolve the commitment dilemma that emerges from the concerns over whether the opponent will comply with the victor’s demands. To gain compliance with its preferred peace, the occupying power has to engage in a costly exercise of power during the course of the military occupation to influence the decision-making of the elite. Robert Dahl has provided a definition of such power: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”\(^{37}\) The occupation, then, becomes the opportunity by which A attempts to compel B to favor its preferred peace over the costs it will incur for complying with A’s orders. At the same time, A is attempting to constrain the options available to B, specifically in regards to the options that might work against

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the former’s objectives.\textsuperscript{38} Depending on B’s hostility, he might engage in actions that prove beneficial to him but ultimately would harm or negate the possible benefits to A. Subsequently, A wants to limit the choices for B that would allow him to engage in behaviors that would be harmful to her preferred peace.\textsuperscript{39} That requires A to remove certain options from B’s choice set, and manipulate the incentives regarding the limited range that B has to favor A’s preferred outcome. Specifically, what we need to understand how power works in military occupations is a relational approach between occupied and occupier.\textsuperscript{40}

To understand the relationship between the occupying power and the occupied elite, I draw on the principal-agent model to explain why military occupations succeed in establishing the victor’s peace. In an occupation, the occupied elite are effectively the employees of the occupier and the occupier has concerns over whether the former will comply with their demands. Specifically, there is an asymmetry of information between the occupied elite and the occupying power. The occupied elite are disinclined to favor the peace that the occupying power wants to establish. As previous discussed, elite expect


\textsuperscript{40} Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 74-76; David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979): 163-164. Power limited to capabilities and resources committed to operation is not sufficient to understanding how power politics shapes the decision-making of the elite into accepting the victor’s peace. The resources available to a victorious state may influence its decision-making on whether to fight and impose an occupation. Material power is important then to understanding how long states can remain involved in occupations, yet how states manage their relations with one another frequently focuses on their expectations of the other actor. For perspectives focusing on resources committed to occupations, see James T. Quilivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters (Winter 1995): 59-69; Dobbins, et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: Rand National Security Research Division, 2003).
to incur some costs in altering the status quo to the interests of the occupying power. As
the occupied elites’ expectation of the costs of compliance increases, *ceteris paribus*,
their adversity also increases such that they have incentives to act against the interests of
the occupier, and to engage in opportunistic behaviors. These actions, while potentially
beneficial to the elite, can prove detrimental to the occupying power’s efforts to establish
its preferred peace.

The occupying power will attempt to influence the elites’ decision-making to
fulfill the former’s demands given that it does not know whether the elite intend to abide
by its terms. As previously mentioned, the theory holds that the occupying power shapes
the costly exercise of power through its expectations about whether the opponent will
comply with its demands. Specifically, the approach here builds on the ideas found in
defensive and neoclassical realist thought: the exercise of power is often influenced by
the beliefs of decision-makers.\(^{41}\) As a state’s uncertainty over the elites’ likelihood of
compliance decreases, it subsequently believes that the occupation will demand greater
resources and harsher treatment of the occupied elite to gain compliance. A state’s beliefs
then will influence its selection on which strategy of control to use with the occupied elite
and how the two will interact through the course of the occupation.

**Exercising Power as Control**

Essentially, the occupying power uses the occupied elite to alter the status quo to
a position more favorable to their interests for the postwar era. The occupier
accomplishes this through its exercising power to manage the elite into complying with

the victor’s peace. What I term the strategy of control are the primary means by which the occupying power pressure the occupied elite into making decisions on compliance and non-compliance. These strategies reflect how the occupier assigns authority over the primary demand and what measures it uses to influence the use of that authority by the elite.

Following traditional perspectives, the scholarship has generally found that there are two broadly defined approaches to conducting military occupations: competition/coercion or cooperation/accommodation. Scholars and policy makers have debated the effectiveness of these two approaches in dealing with defeated opponents and achieving a commitment to the victor’s peace. Following the First World War, Lord d’Abernon aptly noted that,

One of two views must be adopted: Either Germany must be regarded as a danger and be held in check by military conventions and by overpowering force, or Germany must be regarded as an ex-enemy whom it is desirable to treat with fairness and generosity in order to strengthen the elements of peace and reconciliation within her borders. It appears difficult if not impossible to frame a policy reconciling these conflicting conceptions.

In a similar vein, Arnold Wolfers notes, “even within the camp that sees a chance of victory there is frequently passionate controversy between those who advocate a punitive peace and those who prefer to settle for a conciliatory peace. The goal of both factions is

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43 Edelstein, “Occupation Hazards,” and Occupation Hazards.

44 Quoted in Frederick Herman, “The Victors and The Vanquished: The Quest for Security as Illustrated by the Three Allied Occupations of Territory of the Defeated Power – France, 1815-1818, Germany, 1919-1929, and Germany 1945” (PhD diss., Tufts University, 1954), 3. Herman labels these two approaches as strategies of moderation or force for the occupying power. See Herman’s comments on page 100.
an “enduring peace,” but the proper road to that goal is not clear.”\textsuperscript{45} Both d’Abernon and Wolfers are describing the two options that have been at the heart of the dispute on how to approach former opponents and gain their compliance to the victor’s peace.

The two perspectives, however, overlook the possibility of a third approach. Napoleon noted it first, stating that “the conduct of a general in a conquered country is full of difficulties. If severe, he irritates and increases the number of his enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to expectations which only render the abuses and vexations inseparable from war the more intolerable. A victorious general must know how to employ severity, justice, and mildness by turns, if he would allay sedition, or prevent it.”\textsuperscript{46} This notion of a third strategy has been suggested in previous works on occupations. As Hardy C. Dillard noted, military occupations are ‘instruments of diplomacy’ that often blur the line in international relations between what has traditionally considered compulsion and persuasion.\textsuperscript{47} Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla have gone further, developing a typology that includes three different types of military occupations with the middle type being a hybrid of the more benign- and the more punishment-orientated approach.\textsuperscript{48} Empirically, a third approach also seems plausible. For example, the Allied Occupation of France does not fit in this dichotomy given that the occupying powers purposively avoided the use of coercion to initially influence the French government and


\textsuperscript{46} Quote from James R. Arnold, \textit{Napoleon Conquers Austria: The 1809 Campaign for Vienna} (Westport: Praeger, 1985), 95.


that no external threat shaped that perceptions of both participations to induce cooperation. The Allied Powers did not pursue a policy that fits into the coercive or cooperative dichotomy that has developed in the literature on military occupations.

I assert that the third approach constitutes ‘dictating’ the peace to the occupied elite. As a strategy, dictating amounts to the occupying power issuing an order to the occupied elite to implement the former’s demands. The occupier has given the elite a choice in compliance and granted them some responsibility in carrying out the occupation. By essentially commanding the vanquished to comply, the occupying power is thereby removing the status quo and other alternatives that deviate from its terms as options from the agent’s choice set. The occupied elite’s decision is thus constrained to compliance, or non-compliance, with the demands of the occupying power. Each response carries with it costs to the elite. The costs of compliance – both domestic and international – can affect the elite’s political standing in the future given that they are the ones fulfilling the occupier’s demands. Yet, non-compliance carries the possibility of enforcement now by the occupying power – such as removing the offending elite from office if necessary. The occupying power makes an effort to manipulate both: it can establish the disincentive for non-compliance, and attaches any incentives for the elite as contingent to their compliance in implementing the victor’s peace.

It is not sufficient to co-opt the elites into the operation to reduce their resistance to the occupation’s goals. The elite still have their own political interests to look out for, and they will not incur the costs of compliance willingly to fulfill the occupier’s agenda. Hence, their opposition to the victor’s peace remains unchanged whether the occupier co-
opts them into the operation. As I argue in the theory chapter, granting the elites authority – albeit limited – might increase their likelihood of engaging in opportunistic behaviors and demonstrate their adversity to the occupier’s demands. The benefit, however, is that the occupying power can effectively learn the intentions of the elite. Hence, the occupying power’s authority when dictating the peace emerges from a costly exercise of power that influences the occupied elite into revealing their preferences for compliance. The occupier can then distinguish among the possible types of elites, removing those who favor non-compliance and compelling the less resistant into accepting the loss that comes with establishing the victor’s peace.

By designating the strategy as dictating, the term immediately becomes associated with dictators, and these types of leaders have gained a negative connotation in the modern world full of democratic institutions. However, I assert that the term aptly describes the strategy of an occupying power when influencing the occupied elite into complying with its demands. Military occupations are essentially a ‘working model of authoritarian


50 The argument offers a sharp contrast to models of hierarchy which propose that the origin of the motivation for compliance with authority comes from legitimacy, rightfulness, or obligation. Lake’s argument is difficult to reconcile with that the fact that obedience does not always stem from obligation, legitimacy, or rightfulness: sometimes opponents comply to survive. As I demonstrate in the dissertation, the elites do not accept the occupier’s demands due to any duty, legitimacy, or rightfulness for the latter’s position. It is the occupier’s exercise of power that influences their compliance. For a discussion on hierarchy and political authority, see, David A. Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics,” International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 50-61; David A. Lake, “Hobbesian Hierarchy: The Political Economy of Political Organization,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 265-266.
governance,’ as John Dower recognizes when discussing the American occupation of Japan.\textsuperscript{51}

**Organizational of the Dissertation**

Chapter 2 establishes the conceptual foundation for identifying military occupations in international politics. First, I discuss a new conceptualization of occupations. The primary distinguishing feature differentiates occupations with a political goal from those limited to military purposes. The conceptualization also accounts for variation in the actors involved and whether the occupation resulted from coercive or cooperative actions. I discuss the components of this conceptualization, providing historical examples to illustrate those cases that will enter the dataset and the types of cases that will not. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the differences between military occupations in relation to interventions and colonies in the context of the distribution of sovereign rights among states. The distribution of sovereign rights builds on the recent literature that argues sovereignty is a bundle of rights, and that states frequently bargain over these rights.\textsuperscript{52} Previously work, though, has focused mainly on the bundle of rights in terms of less coercive interaction, whereas this dissertation is an initial attempt to introduce that idea to the study of international conflict. Finally, the chapter details the procedures for identifying military occupations, and the conditions under which such

\textsuperscript{51} John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 212.

events either enter or exit the dataset. Specifically, I note the population of possible cases following from the Correlates of War Resort to War publication, and the procedures I followed to collect information on the relevant cases.53

In Chapter 3, I develop the principal-agent model for international politics. First, I discuss the four general assumptions underlying the model and proceed to describe the game being played between the occupying power and the occupied elite. The model explains how the adversity of the elite emerges from the demands imposed by the occupying power to comply with its peace. Essentially, these demands will provide the occupied elite with a perverse incentive to work against the interests of the occupier in establishing the victor’s peace. The occupying power moves to counteract the costs it imposes through a strategy of control to influence the elite’s decision-making. Based on its beliefs concerning the likelihood of compliance by the elite, the occupying power will select a strategy that reflects how it will conduct the costly exercise of power and ultimately shape the outcome of the military occupation. Following the logic of the model, I generate the primary hypothesis under investigation for the dissertation, which the following two chapters will evaluate empirically.

In chapter 4, I conduct the statistical analyses on the new dataset of military occupations concerning when occupying powers succeed or fail to establish their preferred peace. The statistical analysis focuses on the primary prediction of the model: how the strategies of control influence the decision-making of the elite, and the

53 Meredith Sarkees and Frank Wayman, Resort to War, 1816-2007 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010). In order to use the COW Interstate War list, I made several modifications to the list of cases following my review of the relevant military and diplomatic histories for the conflicts. In Appendix A, I present the list of wars investigated according to the procedures outlined in Chapter 2 along with the sources for my modifications and additions.
subsequent outcome of the military occupation. To further demonstrate the utility of the dictating strategy, I also present two plausibility probes to augment the interpretation of the statistical findings: the Chilean Occupation of Peru (1881-1883) and the initial phases of the Soviet Occupation of North Korea (1945-1948). Both probes address how the demands of the occupying power influenced the occupied elites’ evaluation of the costs of compliance, and their subsequent resistance to the former’s terms. The first probe addresses how Chile dictated its terms to the leaders of Peru, who in turn attempted a strategy of delay to increase the costs of the operation to the former. The second probe addresses the problem of popular leaders who attempt to leverage their support from the population against the occupier’s demands. Both probes then demonstrate how Chile and the Soviet Union dictated their terms to the elite.

In Chapter 5, I present an in-depth case study on the American Occupation of Japan (1945-1952). Scholars have frequently referred to the success of this occupation, and numerous theoretical competitors have emerged to explain how the Americans achieved their goals. The case study breaks the occupation down into three major observations based on the variation in the American demands of the Japanese elite. Within each observation, I can test the primary hypothesis while evaluating the implications of the principal-agent model concerning how the Americans wielded their power to shape the choices and influence the decision-making of the Japanese elite. I examine the retention of the Imperial Institution and the establishment of the new Constitution, Economic Stabilization and the emerging Cold War, and the Security and Rearmament of Japan. The case study investigates how the American demands generated the costs of compliance for Japanese politicians. The hostility among Japanese politicians
brought them to make numerous attempts at altering, undermining, or denying the occupiers success in achieving their preferred postwar goals. In turn, I examine how the Americans exercised their power to dictate that the former comply with the latter’s costly terms during the course of the occupation.

In chapter 6, I begin with a review of the principal-agent model and the empirical findings as presented in the previous chapters. Then, I present some implications of the arguments addressed here for scholars and policymakers. Finally, I address some future directions for researching military occupations.
Chapter 2: Purgatory in International Politics: the Military Occupations Dataset, 1815 – 2003

“If war is hell, military occupation is a severe form of purgatory.”

- Martin Kyre and Joan Kyre

The primary purpose of this chapter is to address a central question for empirical research in international relations: how to conceptualize instances of military occupation. To answer this inquiry, the chapter is divided into three parts. The first section discusses how the project defines military occupations for the dataset. I present the concept in its simplest form and then describe the components using historical examples to illustrate each one. The second section discusses how this conceptualization of military occupations fits into the broader scheme of the distribution of sovereign rights in the international system. Along these dimensions, I compare and contrast the concept of military occupations to interventions, colonies, and annexations. The third section discusses the population of military occupations in the dataset and the parameters for the identification of the universe of cases.

Conceptualizing Military Occupations

A military occupation constitutes a state (i.e., the occupier or occupying power) using its military forces to coercively capture and assume governing authority over another state’s territory (i.e., the occupied) to compel the latter to fulfill the former’s

goals. To be more explicit, a military occupation involves five criteria. A state must use (1) its military to threaten force and/or defeat an opponent’s military (2) to capture territory from another government, ranging from a small portion to its entire set of territorial possessions. By doing so, the state (3) displaces the ability of another state to act as sovereign, i.e., diminishes its capacity for exercising control via its central institutions and (4) assumes some level of governance to administrate the foreign territory. Finally, the occupying state must (5) demand, or impose, that the occupied territory fulfill a goal, or set of goals, in order for the occupation to terminate. The five criteria establish the requisite components for a military occupation.\textsuperscript{55} The following discussion shall expand on these criteria and draw on historical examples to demonstrate their application for including cases in the dataset.

Military occupations originate from the use of a state’s armed forces to coerce an opponent into submitting its territory to the control of a foreign power.\textsuperscript{56} This use of coercion may occur in one of two ways. First, a state can use its military to invade another state’s territory and through defeating the latter’s armed forces create an


\textsuperscript{56} Roberts, “What is a Military Occupation,” 256.
opportunity for imposing an occupation. In the Lopez War of 1864 to 1869, the militaries of Argentina and Brazil defeated the last of the Paraguayan army in a final confrontation in August 1869. Following the destruction of the Paraguayan military, Argentina and Brazil had captured significant portions of their opponent’s territory, and imposed an occupation on Paraguay.\(^{57}\) Second, a state may threaten further coercive measures against an opponent if it does not surrender territory to an occupation. At the termination of the First World War, the Allied and Associate Powers threatened to continue the fight unless German authorities submitted the Rhineland to an occupation. When confronted with the invasion of their homeland, the German negotiators capitulated to their opponents’ demands.\(^{58}\)

On occasion, a state will consent to a military occupation on its territory without a prior use of coercion. For example, a state may initiate an occupation on allied territory to fighting off invading powers, current occupiers, or insurgencies. In World War I, the Ukrainian government invited the military forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary into their territory to establish an occupation. Though the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of February 1918 recognized the independence of the Ukraine, Soviet military forces continued their efforts to oust the Rada government. Facing certain defeat, the Rada called upon Germany and Austria-Hungary to assist in repelling Soviet forces and to help the government establish order within its borders. Both countries immediately sent military


forces to the Ukraine. By the middle of April 1918, the German and Austrian forces had recaptured the Ukrainian territory lost to the Soviets, and initiated their occupation. The Rada, however, regretted their decision when German authorities installed a new government that was more supportive of their policies. Though the Rada was replaced at the end of April, the occupation of the Ukraine began as a cooperative act between the three governments involved.  

World War II has numerous examples of states consenting to military occupations via civil affairs agreements with the United States, the United Kingdom, and other members of the Allied coalition following the defeat of Axis military forces. The occupations described above did not result from conflicting interests and militarized hostilities between the occupier and the occupied, but from cooperative arrangements previously negotiated by the parties involved. The dataset excludes military occupations that occur as a result of consent among states.

Next, the occupying power must use its military forces to capture and control territory from its opponent. States can occupy any portion of another state’s territory, ranging from coastal cities to the entirety of the country’s formal boundaries. The extent of territory captured by the state’s military forces varies across each of the cases. Following the First Spanish-Moroccan War of 1859-1860, the Spanish government imposed an occupation on the city of Tetuan and its surrounding territories. The occupation may encompass the state’s capital, such as the Chilean Occupation of Peru when

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it captured Lima in January 1881. The occupations of Egypt (1882-1936) and Italy (1943-1947) constitute instances of invading armies occupying their opponent’s entire territory. Furthermore, the territory captured may constitute former colonial possessions of a defeated power, which occurred after the Spanish-American War of 1898. Upon the surrender of Spanish forces, the US military established occupation regimes in three of Spain’s former colonies: Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.

Requirements three and four of the conceptualization are essential for understanding how a military occupation functions. With the third criteria, displacing the authority of an opponent focuses explicitly on the authority held by the central government for a territory and not necessarily provincial or local administrative units. The occupation must limit, or prevent, the institutions of a central government from controlling its territory. Whether regional or city governments remain in place varies across the cases, often depending on the needs and interests of the individual occupying powers. This leads to the fourth condition, that the occupying state must act has a governing authority. I refer to this as “active control,” when the occupant serves as the central authority for the occupied territory.\textsuperscript{61} The military force must take “concrete actions” that one would expect of a government when serving as the public administration for an occupied territory.\textsuperscript{62} Such concrete actions can include settling disputes in local communities, enforcing tax collections, and/or managing the flow of

\textsuperscript{61} International law often refers to this requirement for military occupation as ‘effective’ control, which generates some confusion as to what it necessitates of the occupier. Though what they imply with this concept is that the state actively engages in the governance of the territory under occupation, and not that it do so in an optimal manner. See, for example, Stone, \textit{Legal Controls of International Conflict}; von Glahn, \textit{The Occupation of Enemy Territory}; Ian Brownlie, \textit{Principles of Public International Law} 4\textsuperscript{th} Ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Benvenisti, \textit{The International Law of Occupation}.

\textsuperscript{62} Brownlie, \textit{Principles of Public International Law}, 141.
goods and people. In order to fulfill requirement four, ground troops must be stationed in
the occupied territory regardless if the administration has a military or civilian leader. An occupying power must use its military forces as the primary means to control and
govern the territory. This requirement that occupying powers commit ‘boots on the
ground’ for an occupation removes activities referred to as “air occupations” from the
theoretical and empirical analysis.

Finally, a core notion to the concept of an occupation is that the purpose of using
coercion to take control of foreign territory is to compel an opponent to accept and abide

63 The term ground forces may include any members of a respective country’s army, navy or air force. The
expectation here is that the troops must be deployed on foreign territory as a means of control rather than
jets participating in no-fly zones or battleships preventing ports from functioning. The difference in these
events emerges in the chances that political leaders are willing to take with their country’s armed forces.
The commitment of ground forces to control and administer territory is a risky decision for most political
leaders. One purpose of the project here is to investigate how leaders can manage these risks and achieve
success in establishing the peace by committing ground troops to governing foreign territory. As such, it
serves as a challenge to recent work on grand strategy that has called into the question the practice of
‘putting boots on the ground,’ for any purpose, including occupations. For example, see, Richard
Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1993); Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Colin Dueck,
Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006); Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to
the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

64 This does not exclude the possibility of a civilian administrator for occupation. It merely means that the
occupying power must maintain a military presence as a primary instrument to enforce its authority against
the foreign territory. For a discussion on the use of civilian administrators in occupations, see Kyre and
Kyre, Military Occupation and National Security, 23; Carnes Lord, Proconsuls: Delegated Political-

65 There are two reasons for excluding such cases from the analysis. First, air occupations do not include
much – if any – interaction between the elites and the population living in the territory, and the occupying
power. This is exactly what leaders want with air occupations: to diminish the risks of placing troops in
harm’s way. By limiting the exposure of its military forces, a state decreases the possibility of any hostile
interactions. Military occupations, however, generally increase that risk given the exposure of troops to
potentially unfriendly populations. Second, air occupations do not involve a state governing foreign
territory. The state employing the air occupation does deny a central government the ability to the control
its territory. Yet, that state does not take on the governing authority for that territory. Rather, it allows
regional/local elites to govern the territory without interference from the central government and its armed
forces. Air superiority, then, might prevent the government of the occupied territory from enacting its
authority, but it does not enable a state to become an occupier. For a discussion on the use of air
occupations, see Marc K. Dippold, “Air Occupation: Asking the Right Questions,” (Thesis, Air Command
and Staff College, 1997); Alexander Benard, “Lessons from Iraq and Bosnia on the Theory and Practice of
by the postwar goals of the occupying power. The goal of an occupation should be something that the occupier wants from the occupied as part of the postwar peace, something more than an immediate military advantage in a conflict. These goals represent the reason that leaders imposed occupations upon foreign territory, the political demands that the occupier wants the occupied territory to fulfill in order for the occupation to end. At the most basic level, military occupations are about providing security for the occupying power in the postwar period. Following the end of a conflict, many leaders believe that the defeated may re-initiate hostilities at some point in the future, and occupations are a means to provide security against an immediate resumption of combat. Yet, most occupations represent an opportunity to settle the outstanding issues of the conflict, and to shape the postwar relations between the former opponents. Leaders usually have specific, long-term goals in mind when engaging in the occupation of foreign territory. These aims range from the defeated state paying an indemnity, the disarmament of the opponent’s military forces, or the installation of new domestic institutions. For these ambitions, the occupation of foreign territory is the means by which a state may compel an opponent to concede to its postwar demands.

There is an important reason for including postwar goals as a component in defining military occupations: it allows us to distinguish between instances of occupations that are purely military in nature, and those that have more far reaching political consequences for the opponent after its defeat. In the former category, states establish occupations on foreign soil as a part of their military campaign to convince their opponents to capitulate. The occupation itself fulfills no political goal. In the latter category – what can be called coercive political occupations – the state initiates an
occupation in order to impose its long-term aims to the vanquished. The occupation, then, becomes the opportunity for achieving a peace favorable to the occupant’s ambitions. It is important to note that the concept does not specify the content of these postwar goals. Instead, I contend that military occupations must have political aims that go beyond seeking a military advantage in contests of strength.

Most of these cases – where the state capturing territory has no postwar goal for the occupation – are likely to end in the quick restoration of the defeated state’s capacity to govern. The victorious power may believe that by unilaterally restoring governance to the losing power that such an action would serve as a confidence building measure and signal its intentions to honor the forthcoming peace. For example, in the final battles of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 Russian military forces captured Adrianople and its surrounding territories.\(^\text{66}\) Without question, Russia coercively displaced the authority of the Ottoman Empire and assumed an administrative role over the territory. Yet, in negotiating the Treaty of Adrianople the Russian government placed no demands on the return of city to Ottoman authority. Instead, Russia sought to restore the territory as quickly as possible to the Ottoman Empire once the peace negotiations had concluded.\(^\text{67}\) In such cases, the captured territory might be under an occupation but its purpose was


\(^\text{67}\) One could argue that the capture of Adrianople led the Ottoman Empire to end the hostilities and enter into negotiations with Russia. In all likelihood, that was the Russian goal to force the capitulation of Turkish armed forces and to initiate peace negotiations. However, such instances would be a false positive for evaluating the theoretical argument as the occupation would initiate in success. That is, termination of hostilities would fulfill the goal of the occupation. As discussed, the occupation does not initiate until the fighting stops, and if the occupation initiates on success, why evaluate the period during which troops remain?
purely one of military advantage. I exclude such cases where the occupying power has no political goal for the postwar relations with its opponent.

The conceptualization of military occupations excludes two further types of cases from the analysis. First, I assume that the occupying power is a state, and not an international organization. Some authors do argue that the governing norms and tactics of control for occupying powers in foreign territory are similar to those of international organizations. Consequentially, these scholars want to treat occupations and international administrations as analytically the same. However, when an international organization has taken on administrative responsibilities for territory it often does so in a manner similar to the cooperative occupations described above. For instance, the United Nations (UN) does not ‘threaten or invade’ territory to establish an international administration. Instead, the parties involved consent to such arrangements through diplomatic notes or status of forces agreements. These arrangements establish the framework for the UN’s activities prior to it initiating an administration. Hence, I exclude these instances for lacking the coercion component of the definition. Though, occupations where international organizations later join, or contribute, to the operation are included as long as the primary occupying powers – i.e., those holding the governance rights – remain states.

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Second, the conceptualization excludes occupations that result from an internal conflict, or civil war, between a government and a portion of its population.\(^7\) I eliminate such cases for two reasons. First, it is possible that authors have used the term inappropriately to describe the activities of a state on its internal territory. As Peter Stirk notes, these cases might serve as instances of governments declaring martial law to quell a rebellion or promote stability as opposed to establishing an actual military government that will manage the territory.\(^7\) While the two activities certainly have some similarities, the two terms are not synonymous. Second, the state is not capturing and imposing itself on foreign territory; it is enacting the coercive dimension of its control over its own territory.\(^7\) If states engage in occupations on their own territorial possessions, that act would have no affect on the distribution of sovereign rights among states. In the next section, I will elaborate on this distribution and discuss how military occupations compare with activities such as interventions, annexations, and colonization.

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\(^{71}\) Stirk, The Politics of Military Occupation, 34-36. Furthermore, military government might resemble a military dictatorship in terms of the loci of power in an internal actor governing the population. Again, a foreign power imposes a military occupation. This actor is distinct from military governments and dictatorships that emerge internally to take on the political authority to govern. See Hugh Seton-Watson, “Military Occupations: Some Reflections from Recent and More Distant History,” in Armies of Occupation ed. by Roy Arnold Prete and A. Hamish Ion (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1984), 1-16.

\(^{72}\) Leslie Green discusses how a state might win back its own land through military victory, thus ending a belligerent occupation by a foreign power, and then proceeding to initiate its own occupation on previously possessed territory. See Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 247. In these cases, the victorious state is simply reclaiming territory that it has previously incorporated.
Military Occupations and the Distribution of Sovereign Rights

In a world where states can engage in military interventions, establish far flung colonies, and annex territory, how does one recognize a military occupation in comparison to these other activities? The key to answering this question lies in understanding sovereignty, and the distribution of rights among states. There is significant confusion within the scholarship and among policy makers as to what constitutes sovereignty among states. For instance, many scholars and policymakers do not distinguish between sovereignty as ownership and authority as administration when discussing a territory that is under a military occupation. Instead, both academics and political figures often conflate the terms and use them interchangeably. The difference between the two is essential to understanding what constitutes a military occupation, and how to distinguish it from intervention and annexations in the international system.

At its core, sovereignty is “a bundle of various property rights that correspond to different functional entitlements” that a government possesses over territory. In particular, this project focuses on two of these rights: governance rights and ownership rights. The right to governance encompasses two specific rights that every state uses to

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73 Some scholars might contend that the differences are negligible. For example, see the arguments made in David Lake, *Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Kimberly Zisk Marten, *The Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Such arguments, however, overlook the importance with which states attach to these various distinctions, and the lengths that government officials will go to convince their audiences – domestic as well as international – that these differences matter.


administer territory: authority and control. As Stephen D Krasner notes, “authority involves a mutually recognized right for an actor to engage in specific kinds of activities.”

For states, those ‘specific kinds of activities’ are often the creation of expectations and rules regarding the behavior of the various actors residing within a portion of territory. Control is defined in terms of a government’s capabilities to monitor those individuals under its influence, and sanction those who fail to comply with its directives. Hence, the right to governance includes the authority to make rules – rule creation – and the control necessary to enforce those upon the population – rule enforcement.

The second right – ownership – refers to whether a state has claimed possession over a piece of territory, and incorporated the land into its permanent property. The project here addresses how states redistribute these two rights during the postwar era as a means to identifying occupations in comparison to other foreign policy behaviors.

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**Figure 2.1: Distribution of Sovereign Rights: Governance & Ownership**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incorporating Ownership</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engaging in Governance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>(a) Intervention (b) Autonomous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(c) Occupation (d) Annexation, Colonialism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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77 For a discussion on this analytical distinction between control and authority, see Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research,” *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (1995): 223. Empirically, it is often difficult to untangle the two concepts. That is why I consider them as combined to form the right to governance.
Figure 1 represents the four possible distributions for the rights of governance and ownership when discussing the invasion of military forces into foreign territory. The working assumption here is that the states have previously engaged in some type of armed hostilities and the conflict between them has terminated. The rows denote whether a state in sending its armed forces into foreign territory seized the governance rights from the opposing state. The top line represents whether a state makes a formal claim to incorporate a piece of territory and takes over the ownership rights.

The first cell (a) captures intervention. Scholars have generally conceptualized foreign military interventions as having the following characteristics: (1) the use of militarized force by a challenger (2) within a target’s territory (3) to interfere with some political aspect of the target’s affairs. Examples of foreign military intervention that scholars typically include in datasets are naval bombardment of the target’s territory, air strikes, and deployment of ground troops for combat in addition to some instances of military occupation. Conceptually, foreign military interventions and military occupations share some core components, such as the element of coercion and the interference in another state’s internal affairs. Interventions are infringements upon a state’s right to govern, but not all interventions constitute military occupations. The

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defining difference between intervening in another state’s affairs and occupying its territory rests on whether the military forces assume the rights to governance.\(^80\)

The second cell (b) captures those territories which are incorporated under a state’s ownership, but allowed to maintain governance rights that grant an administration significant authority to rule itself. Such autonomous regions may emerge in one of two ways. A state has made a claim to ownership over the territory, thereby incorporating the land under its sovereignty. Yet, the incorporating state has not taken over the governance rights from the administration and thereby has allowed the region to govern itself. Alternatively, the state with ownership rights has granted the territory governing rights under some conditions that mitigate or diminish its own ability to control the land in question. The dispute between Taiwan and China has a number of elements that meet the description of an autonomous region. Taiwan could be considered part of China, and yet it maintains an independent administration that holds governance rights apart from the mainland regime.\(^81\)

The third cell (c) captures the focus of this investigation: military occupations. In the terms of the distribution of sovereign rights, a state has engaged in an occupation

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\(^80\) How do spheres of influence fit into this discussion on governance and ownership? For the most part, spheres of influence are not immediately relevant to either right. Spheres of influence merely denote regions where a single power has claimed the right to intervene when necessary. For example, Lord Curzon defined a sphere of influence as an area where, “no exterior power but one may reassert itself in the territory so described.” Quoted in Friedrich Kratochwil, “Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System,” World Politics 39, no. 1 (1986): 38. Spheres of influence constitute geographical regions that may include multiple states. Within that region, a single state claims some special right to interfere as it deems necessary with the expectation that competing powers will not hinder its objectives. States that exist within a sphere of influence, then, are not precluded from the possibility of suffering an intervention, an occupation, annexation, or colonization. Instead, spheres of influence simply denote a region where one state in particular is likely to engage in such activities.

when it holds the governance rights over a portion of territory but has not made any formal, public claim to incorporate the land. A core element of interest in studying military occupations is the recognition by the occupant that it is a temporary situation, not a permanent plan, to accomplish its foreign policy goals. As the opening quote to this chapter noted, occupations represent a form a purgatory for foreign territory. Purgatory is a transitional state that will eventually terminate when the occupying power chooses to restore authority to a native government, or decides to incorporate the land under its own sovereignty. As von Glahn notes, “…the occupant …exercises a temporary right of administration on a trustee basis until such time as the final disposition of the occupied territory is determined.”82 Until leaders make the decision to exit purgatory, their military forces remain in an occupation. The governance rights are temporarily assumed by the occupying power, and the ownership rights remain with the occupied state. Hence, the occupation is a temporary redistribution of sovereign rights, a means to an end for the occupying power to accomplish its postwar goals.

When the occupation terminates, the subsequent redistribution of rights will either alter the designation of the troops to an intervening force on foreign soil, or establish the state’s ownership of the territory. In the former case, the occupying powers can restore the right to governance to the inhabitants regardless if their military forces remain in foreign lands. For example, following the end of War of the Roman Republic in July 1849, the French government assumed the right to govern Rome and its immediate territories. While the French military expedition remained for several years, Napoleon III

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ceded the governance rights when the pope returned to the capital in April 1850, thereby transforming the occupation into an intervention. The occupying power might also withdrawal its military forces when terminating an occupation. Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom removed their forces from French soil when the occupation terminated in 1818. A third possibility is that the military forces remain on foreign territory after restoring governance rights, albeit under more cooperative conditions such as basing agreements. For instance, the United States negotiated for extensive basing rights for its armed forces at the conclusion of the occupation of Japan. In these three instances, the occupying power’s decision to restore the governance rights to a domestic government occurred independently of whether its armed forces remained present in the territory. Alternatively, an occupier might end the occupation by claiming the territory as a permanent possession.

The final cell (d) represents the incorporation of territory via a state taking the right to ownership. In this way, the incorporation of territory is what many scholars traditionally refer to as annexations as well as colonies. While most scholars treat annexation and colonization as distinct phenomena, the two processes share an underlying similarity: in both cases, a state makes a formal claim to the long-term

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possession of the ownership rights for a piece of territory. The question then becomes, how do states redistribute ownership rights in order to incorporate territory? Sharon Korman has identified three methods by which states have customarily incorporated territory: state death, negotiated settlement, or acquiescence. As Korman notes, “in the first and third of these cases, the title of conquest is formally complete when the conquering state unilaterally annexes the conquered territory, extending its own civil administration over it and incorporating it into the body of its own state territory.” The second method usually involves a peace treaty whereby the defeated state surrenders its ownership rights to the victor. To incorporate territory, a state must make a formal claim to sovereignty; that is, the government must make a public statement – such as a declaration or a treaty – announcing its possession of the territory’s ownership rights. The emphasis here is that the claim to ownership over the foreign territory must be made explicit to other states in the international system, regardless if those other countries choose to recognize that claim or not. Occupations, then, can terminate with either the relinquishing of governance rights to a native government, or the incorporation of

86 For a discussion of annexation, see the following, Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict; von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory; Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law. For discussions on the concept of colonization, see Juergen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview. Trans. by Shelley Frisch (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997); Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts (New York: Routledge, 2007); Carolyn Gallaher, Carl T. Dahlman, Mary Gilmartin, Alison Mountz, and Peter Shirlow, Key Concepts in Political Geography (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2009). Furthermore, I consider a protectorate as similar to a colony in terms of incorporation of the right to ownership. David Lake, Entangling Relations, 29, defines protectorates as when “…one polity cedes control to another over its foreign affairs, abridging in large part its decision-making authority in this area of policy. Although the terms vary, such grants of control are typically made for extended periods of time and are not revocable.”

87 Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), p. 9. Though, it is important to note that not all state deaths result in incorporation of territory. Tanisha Fazal defines state death simply as “the loss sovereignty to another state” (see 17). Under that conceptualization, the occupation of an entire state’s territory may also count as an instance of state death. For a further discussion on state death, see Tanisha Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
ownership rights into a state’s permanent possession. In both cases, the redistribution of rights focuses on the actions of states with regards to the territory under occupation.

In discussing the conceptualization of military occupations and the redistribution of rights, I do not include a component that distinguishes among the intentions of leaders in regards to the territory and the subsequent outcome of an occupation. For example, David Edelstein has emphasized the intentions of the occupying power as one of the most important aspects for recognizing occupations. Edelstein states that a politician’s goals must reflect a temporary willingness to act as sovereign: “An occupying power must intend at the onset of the occupation to vacate the occupied territory and return control of the territory to an indigenous government.”

The problem is that the intentions of a state – specifically whether leaders want to make a permanent claim to ownership – are better captured as a variable rather than as a distinguishing feature of military occupations. That is, we should treat occupations as a means to accomplish a political goal, and control for the variation in ambitions as to whether states are more, or less, likely to succeed.

We should not deduce the intentions of actors from conceptualizations, nor can we assume motivations from outcomes. The former requires the introduction of unnecessary assumptions that might limit the explanatory power of any theoretical investigation. The latter problem ignores the strategic dimension in leaders’ decision-making. Jeffrey Friedan has noted, “…where actors are strategic, we cannot infer the

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88 Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards*, 3. Edelstein does include further requirements for cases of military occupation to enter his dataset. This particular aspect on intentions, however, does most of the ‘heavy’ analytical work in identifying cases.

89 In the next chapter, I explain how the aims of occupiers are important to understanding the behavior of the occupied elite.

cause of their behavior directly from their behavior."\textsuperscript{91} In other words, we should not assume that the relationship between motivations and outcomes is strictly observable and perfectly correlated. Even in well documented cases, such as the Allied Occupation of the Rhineland following World War I, scholars disagree on how to interpret the intentions of leaders towards the occupied territory.\textsuperscript{92} Rather than rely on the intentions of occupying actors, the project focuses on the behavioral aspect of the redistribution of rights for whether a state establishes a military occupation on foreign soil. The next section discusses the population of military occupations in the dataset and the parameters for identifying instances of military occupations from 1815 to 2003.

**Identifying the Universe of Cases**

Having established a conceptualization of military occupations and the distribution of rights, the project now turns to identifying the possible universe of cases for inclusion in the empirical analysis. I concentrated data collection specifically on military occupations that follow the conclusion of hostilities in interstate wars. The Correlates of War (COW) Project provides an established definition and list of interstate wars for 1815 to 2003 in its most recent publication, *Resort to War*.\textsuperscript{93} There are two benefits in using the list of interstate wars for identifying the possible instances of states imposing military occupations. First, *Resort to War* has the advantage of being a global


\textsuperscript{92} For instance, compare Edelstein (*Occupational Hazards*) with Huth and Allee (*The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict*) regarding the intentions of France during the occupation of the Rhineland.

\textsuperscript{93} Meredith Sarkees and Frank Wayman, *Resort to War, 1816 to 2007* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010).
inventory of interstate conflicts that is not limited to wars in one time period or geographical location. Second, using the COW Resort to War list reduces the potential bias on deciding which cases of occupations should be included in the dataset. By identifying the possible opportunities for states to impose occupations, we can have more confidence in the subsequent empirical results. There is one drawback to using the interstate war list. By limiting the focus to occupations that result from wars, military occupations from lesser levels of interstate violence are excluded from the dataset. Such examples would include the second occupation of Cuba from 1906-1909\textsuperscript{94} as well as the occupations of Haiti from 1915-1924\textsuperscript{95} and the Dominican Republic during 1916-1924.\textsuperscript{96}

As I noted in the introduction, however, identifying military occupations that occur outside of interstate wars can be difficult, and the purpose here is to explain how states enforce their peace following the conclusion of major conflicts.

Beginning with the Neapolitan War of 1815 through the Invasion of Iraq in 2003, I examine each war for evidence of whether a state imposed an occupation on its opponent’s territory. At the end of the chapter, Table 2.1 presents the list of military occupations that result from 90 interstate wars investigated as a part of this project.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{94} Allan Reed Millet, \textit{The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909} (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1968).


\textsuperscript{97} Please see Appendix A for a discussion on which interstate wars I investigated for whether a participant imposed a military occupation. The appendix provides the justification for altering cases as well as the reasons for excluding others.
those 90 interstate wars that occurred between 1815 and 2003, 37 of those wars involved the imposition of a military occupation, bringing the case list to a total of 134 occupations on foreign territory under investigation. I further break down the distribution of the cases across the five regions of the world from 1815 to 2003. In Europe, there have been 77 cases of military occupations, or approximately 56.2 percent of all cases in the dataset. There were 25 occupations in the Middle East, representing 18.25 percent of the cases. The region of Asia has had 20 cases of military occupation, which is approximately 16.06 percent of the observations. The Americas have approximately 9 cases of military occupation, or 6.57 percent of the dataset. Finally, there have been 3 occupations in Africa, accounting for 2.92 percent of the cases. Only 54 of 134 occupations resulted in a success for the victorious state, approximately 41.6 percent of the occupations imposed following a major conflict. The remaining 80 cases constitute a failure for the occupying power to achieve its postwar goals. The average duration of a military occupation has been approximately 85 months, though the mode duration has been significantly lower, at 43 months.

To identify these cases, I focused the investigation for occupations on the war plans made by political and military decision-makers regarding the conflict. This disaggregates the analysis of each conflict to focus on the individual war participants, and their respective plans for waging the war. By focusing on war plans, then, I can identify the theaters of operation as possible opportunities for imposing military occupations. This is important as political leaders often establish the extent of territory that they want to

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98 Actually, the dataset includes 137 military occupations. Three occupations are ongoing as of June 2014. These cases are included in the dataset, but subsequently excluded from the statistical analyses.
capture and occupy prior to the end of a conflict. In some instances, the decision-makers sought to capture all of the territory held by an opponent. In World War II, American, British, and Soviet planners all agreed on the complete defeat of Germany and the total occupation of all its territory. American politicians also sought the total defeat of Afghanistan and Iraq, resulting in the complete occupation of both states following the termination of hostilities. In other cases, political decision-makers only sought to capture specific portions of territory from an opponent, such as in the Anglo-Persian War of 1856-1857. The British government initially planned separate assaults on several portions of Persia, including “…the island of Karrack, Mohammerah at the head of the Gulf, Bushire and Bunder Abbas on the eastern shore.”

By capturing and occupying these territories, the British sought to compel the Persian government to evacuate Herat and to comply with its treaty obligations.

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There are two advantages to examining the war plans of leaders and separating the analysis into the theaters of operations. First, the dataset can be used to evaluate the specific goals and strategies employed in each territory as well as their varying outcomes. For instance, the Mexican-American War resulted in four separate occupations of Mexican territory. Initially, the Americans had planned on occupying the territories of New Mexico and California while the main army captured Northern Mexico. By February 1847, the US Army had firmly established military occupations in all three territories. However, President James Polk realized in September 1846 that occupying Northern Mexico would not be sufficient to compel the Mexican government to accept his postwar goals. Furthermore, the occupying forces were simply too far from Mexico City to march through and capture the territory in between without significant increases in their numbers and significant costs to the American government. Based on this assessment, President Polk ordered General Winfield Scott to invade Central Mexico and establish an occupation on the territory from Vera Cruz to Mexico City.\footnote{Dean B. Mahin, Olive Branch and Sword: The United States and Mexico, 1845-1848 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, 1997), 77-83.} In this case, the occupation of Northern Mexico failed.

Second, I can examine the dyadic nature of conflict between all the opponents involved rather than broadly examining the termination of the war. It is possible that in a war between multiple opponents, say, A, B, and C, that C defeats A early in the conflict and imposes an occupation on part of A’s territory. The war continues between B and C, but the fighting between C and A has stopped. In this instance, the occupation of A initiates when the fighting ends between its military forces and those of C. The War of the Pacific provides an excellent example. Following Resort to War, the war of Peru and
Bolivia against Chile lasted from February 1879 until December 1883. However, Peru and Bolivia did not fight against Chile for the entire duration of the conflict. Bolivia did not participate in any military operations following its defeat at the Battle of Tacna in May 1880. After the capture of Lima in January 1881, the Peruvian government collapsed and its armed forces scattered into the surrounding wilderness. While the two governments did not reach a peace treaty until two years later, the fighting had stopped between the two opponents in January 1881. Thus, the dataset captures the Chilean occupation of Peru as beginning in January 1881.

By focusing on the leaders’ war plans and the end of combat among states’ armed forces, the dataset excludes ‘rolling occupations’ from the theoretical and empirical analysis. During the course of battles, the frontlines between opponents shift. Each shift results in the redistribution of territory from one military to another. As the frontlines move, the right of governance also changes to the state that captures the territory. Identifying which state has the right to govern in these situations is difficult, especially since participants might capture more territory or, more importantly, lose some land in subsequent battles as the fighting amongst soldiers continues. For example, I code the Allied Occupation of Germany following World War Two as beginning in May 1945.


104 Dupuy and Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, 913; Bruce W. Farcau, *The Ten Cents Wars: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific*, 1879-1884 (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 188. Following the capture of Lima, individual commanders retreated from the capital, and used their discretion in deciding whether to continue fighting against the occupying forces. The Peruvian military no longer had a unified command structure. The dataset captures all fighting between these individual units and the Chilean army of occupation as an insurgency (extra-state war). By October 1883, the Peruvian army of occupation had defeated the remaining commanders and restored order to the countryside.

with the capture of Berlin. However, one could argue that the occupation of Germany began in 1944 when the Allied forces captured and governed the city of Aachen while the frontlines pushed deeper into the German homeland.\textsuperscript{106} Rather than attempt to capture such minute changes, the dataset focuses explicitly on territory that a state intends to capture and the termination of combat in that territory as the initiation of the occupation.

Now that I have established the possible opportunities, the next few paragraphs will discuss how the components for conceptualizing occupations interact with identifying whether cases should be included in the dataset. The coercive element of occupations must occur as part of the interstate war, whether as a threat of invasion, or as the actual incursion into enemy territory. Put simply, the coercive element must occur as part of the operations for the larger conflict, not as an incident that is prior to the initiation of hostilities. Furthermore, the use of coercion must come from one of the war participants as established by the \textit{Resort to War} compendium. As an illustration of both requirements, the dataset does not include the Russian, and subsequent Austrian, occupation of the Ottoman territories Moldavia and Wallachia as part of the Crimean War of 1853 to 1856. Russia sent her military forces into the Danubian Principalities in July 1853 to take control of the territory from the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{107} The territories were captured and occupied prior to the initiation of the Crimean War in October of the same year, thereby excluding it from the dataset.\textsuperscript{108} The Austrian occupation of Moldavia

\textsuperscript{106} This example comes from Melissa Willard-Foster, “Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied Occupations of Germany and Japan,” \textit{Journal of Interdisciplinary History} 40, no. 1 (2009): 36.

\textsuperscript{107} Paul Schroeder, \textit{Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 42.

\textsuperscript{108} Sarkees and Wayman, \textit{Resort to War}, 84.
and Wallachia initiated in the middle of August 1854. However, Austria is not included as a war participant in the Crimean War according to Resort to War. Hence, its occupation of the Ottoman territories does not fall into the parameters of the dataset.

The target of a military occupation may constitute another war participant as designated by Resort to War, or a neutral state that did not participate in the hostilities. I include neutral states for two reasons. First, war participants may impose military occupations upon neutral territories in order to preempt any actions by the neutral government. The war participant may suspect that it has conflicting interests with the neutral territory, especially if it expects that another war participant may exploit the neutral territory as part of its military operations. During the opening of World War I, German military planners questioned whether Belgium would remain neutral while the war raged along western front. Many individuals within Belgium assumed that Germany would respect its neutrality, yet German planners firmly believed that the French military would attempt an assault on their homeland via a crossing of Belgian territory. Rather than accept Belgium’s proclamations of neutrality, the German military invaded in August 1914 and occupied the vast majority of the country from October 1914 until withdrawing in November 1918.

Second, neutral territory may constitute the primary battleground between states. Neutral territory already under the control of a foreign army is especially relevant as both the old and new occupying powers may have postwar goals that conflict with each other

109 Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, 207.

110 Sophie de Schaepdrijver, “Belgium,” in *A Companion to World War I* ed. by John Horne (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 386-402; Larry Zuckerman, *The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I* (New York: New York University, 2004). I note that the COW interstate war list does include Belgium as a war participant for World War I. At the initiation of the conflict, however, Belgium did not expect that it would join in the war given the various treaties establishing its neutrality.
as well as the territory’s government. For instance, in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the Chinese government declared its neutrality with respect to the conflict occurring within its territorial borders. By the end of the conflict, the Japanese army had driven the Russia military out of southern Manchuria. As quickly as the Japanese military had forced Russia out, they established their own military occupation upon Chinese territory. While the Japanese government wanted to diminish Russian influence, the former was neither an ally of China nor set on restoring Chinese authority without first extracting certain promises from the government in Beijing. The southern portion of Manchuria remained under Japanese occupation until 1907.\textsuperscript{111}

Finally, if an occupying power makes a formal claim to ownership on said territory within 12 months of terminating hostilities, it is then excluded as an occupation from the dataset. The reason being that states often times can and do move quickly when redistributing the rights over territory at the end of a war. States that intend to incorporate territories immediately under their sovereignty do not refrain from changing institutions, officials, and customs to match with those of their new owners. In these cases, the state capturing the territory takes immediate steps to secure its possession of the territory, often imposing its laws and administration while preparing to take over the ownership rights. For example, the Soviet forces in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania immediately set out to incorporate the territories into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In such cases, it is difficult to discern when the redistribution of rights occurs given the occupying powers immediacy in claiming the territory and asserting its right to ownership.

Alternatively, states often treat territories differently when they wait longer than twelve months to incorporate it. In such instances, states are more likely to engage in occupations as an independent phase in the redistribution of rights among states. For instance, in the American occupations of California and New Mexico, the Polk administration intended to annex the territories after the war ended with Mexico. During the fight, however, Polk and other officials were reluctant to treat the territories as if owned by the United States. They encouraged the commanding officers of the occupations to accept that the territory remained under Mexican sovereignty, much to the chagrin of the American citizens already inhabiting the two areas. As Secretary of War Marcy stated in regard to the trials and convictions of insurgents in the territory:

The foundation of the civil government in New Mexico is not derived directly from the laws and constitution of the United States, but rests upon the rights acquired by conquest …. The territory conquered by our arms does not become, by the mere act of conquest, a permanent part of the United States.112

Hence, the American forces spent almost two years governing these territories under Mexican laws. The two territories remained under military occupation until April 1848 when Mexico formally relinquished ownership to the American government.113 This behavior is similar to Prussia in the occupations of the two duchies following the Second Schleswig-Holstein War of 1864. Though Prussian officials wanted to annex the territories, their arrangements with Austria made them hesitant to take steps towards


incorporating the territory until August 1866.\textsuperscript{114} In these cases, the state capturing the territory – although fully intending to make a formal claim to the ownership rights – explicitly held only the governing rights for at least twelve months through an occupation.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has established three vital components for the project’s theoretical and empirical investigation of military occupations. First, the chapter introduced the conceptualization of military occupations. Second, I discussed how military occupations fit into the redistribution of sovereign rights after international conflicts. Finally, the chapter identified the universe of possible cases for finding and including instances of military occupations in the dataset. The subsequent chapter will discuss the theoretical foundations of the argument, and present the hypotheses for empirical testing.

<table>
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<th>End</th>
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| Occupation of Austria | United Kingdom | France | |
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| Occupation of Hungary | Soviet Union | Austria | 4/1945 | 5/1955 | Success |
| Occupation of the Philippines | United States | Hungary | 4/1945 | 5/1957 | Success |
| Occupation of West Germany | United States | Philippines | 4/1945 | 7/1946 | Success |
| Occupation of East Germany | Soviet Union | West Germany | 5/1945 | 5/1955 | Success |

| Occupation of Poland | United Kingdom | France | |
|----------------------|----------------|-------|-------|-----|---------|
| Occupation of Czechoslovakia | Soviet Union | East Germany | 5/1945 | 3/1954 | Success |
| Occupation of Czechoslovakia | United States | Czechoslovakia | 5/1945 | 12/1945 | Success |
| Occupation of Oder Niesse | Poland | East Germany | 6/1945 | 6/1950 | Success |
| Occupation of the Saarland II | France | Saarland | 7/1945 | 12/1956 | Success |
| Occupation of Berlin | United States | Soviet Union | 7/1945 | 10/1990 | Success |

<p>| Occupation of Berlin | United Kingdom | France | |
|----------------------|----------------|-------|-------|-----|---------|
| Occupation of Japan | United States | Japan | 8/1945 | 4/1952 | Success |</p>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>6/1982</td>
<td>5/2000</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of Nagorno-Karabahk</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>5/1994</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of Badme</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>2/1999</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of Afghanistan</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>12/2000</td>
<td>5/2012</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of Iraq</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5/2003</td>
<td>12/2008</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the Occupier column, when multiple countries are listed the state appearing first in italics constitutes the primary occupying power for the dataset
Chapter 3: Power, Strategy, and Success in Military Occupations

“Power is one thing, the problem of how to administer it is another”

- Douglas MacArthur

In this chapter, I develop a theory on how an occupying power influences the decision-making of the occupied elite towards complying with the victor’s preferred peace, and the outcome of a military occupation. As noted, previous scholars have addressed several dimensions of why occupations succeed or fail, such as the role of prewar planning, the influence of international threats, and the previous economic or political development of the occupied country. The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical argument that addresses the missing dimension of occupation strategies as an essential component for understanding the dynamics of military occupations. The theory focuses on the relationship between the occupying power and the occupied elite as a principal-agent model that incorporates the costly exercise of power as the primary factor for explaining success in achieving the victor’s peace. As this chapter will contend, the crucial means to successfully compel the elite to making a commitment to the occupier’s goals is via its strategy of control. Specifically, states that engage in what I call dictating strategies are more likely to screen the intentions of the occupied agents while simultaneously being in a position to compel and enforce their interests should that elite attempt to undermine the victor’s peace. As a result of employing a dictating strategy,

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occupiers will more likely succeed in gaining a commitment from the occupied elite towards their preferred goals.

Before proceeding, I want to articulate the scope conditions of the theoretical argument presented here. First, the project focuses on the outcomes of military occupations for occupying powers, specifically how they achieve success, and not on the question of why states impose an occupation once the fighting ends. Though the theory endogenizes such arguments, I leave the empirical testing of this assumption for future work. Second, I am concerned primarily with the interaction of an occupying power and the occupied elite via the former’s strategy of control relative to the outcome of the occupation. This work does not address why states select one strategy of control over another when imposing a military occupation on an opponent’s territory. However, the theory does suggest that the occupier’s prior beliefs about the elite’s intentions for compliance will strongly influence which strategy it will select for a particular occupation. Both questions represent interesting and fruitful inquiries for future research, but the project focuses solely on how the strategy for controlling the elite affects the outcomes of military occupations.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section introduces the theoretical argument, starting with the four general assumptions for a principal-agent model of international politics. The following section presents the game being played between the occupying power and the occupied elite, theorizing on why states select into occupations as crucial for understanding their interaction with the elite. The next two sections address how the costly exercise of power in a military occupation is the primary means through which victorious states can overcome the elite’s adverse intentions and effectively
establish the postwar peace. Specifically, I discuss how the strategy of control employed by the occupier influences the elite into accepting and implementing the victor’s peace. The following section presents the three strategies of control, linking up the discussion on autonomy and the means of influence to the occupying power’s expectation on compliance from the elite. The final section addresses how those strategies affect the interaction of the occupier with the elite and subsequently the outcome of the military occupation.

**Clarifying the Vocabulary**

Throughout this chapter, the model focuses on the strategic interaction of two actors as part of a military occupation. I have varied the respective designations of the two actors to keep the vocabulary from becoming too dull or repetitive, though the terms are largely synonymous. For the sake of clarity, here are the terms of reference for the two actors involved. First, the actor engaging in the occupation is always a state, and often referred to as the occupier, occupying power/state, and/or victor. This actor is the principal. Second, the actor being occupied varies depending on occupation. Sometimes the actor is an officially recognized government, other times this actor is not. In either case, this second actor is the one targeted by the first during the course of the occupation.\(^{116}\) I often refer to the second actor as being the occupied, occupied elite, and/or vanquished/defeated, respectively. This actor is the agent for the purposes of the model.

\(^{116}\) Because of the variation in this actor, I explicitly identify who the occupier is targeting in each instance of occupation recorded in the dataset. Please consult the previous chapter and the case appendix for further information.
Enforcement in World Politics: Assumptions of the Model

The theory builds on four general propositions – anarchy, strategic actors, costly nature of power, and uncertainty – to generate a principal-agent theory of international politics. First, the international system is one of anarchy; it lacks a third-party to enforce agreements among states. As a result of the absence of a higher authority, states must be concerned with advancing their own interests and maintaining their foreign policy autonomy. Both goals require states to balance the distribution of their finite resources in relation to the pursuit of the benefits of their interests in matters of foreign policy. As such, states do not value occupying territory for the sake of occupying territory. If states could, they would likely prefer to create commitments without engaging their limited resources in costly enforcement measures to insure their preferred peace. Under anarchy, however, states have no alternative but to enforce their own interests and hence, such costly actions can become necessary.

Second, states are strategic, future-oriented actors in that they make rational calculations based on available information regarding the current and future intentions of

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119 This assumption is similar to the one made through the literature on bargaining and war, though applied to military occupations. For example, see James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49 no. 3 (1995): 379-414; and H. E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
other actors in the system.\textsuperscript{120} States purposefully take actions, weighing out the cost-benefit analysis before making a choice. Their actions should follow in line with their interests; that is no actor will knowingly take an action that will undermine her position given the available information. In terms of the actors in the model, I assume that the occupying power is rational unitary actor. That is, I hold constant the possible domestic implications of their actions. I am not contending that domestic politics is unimportant, but instead the argument developed here focuses on the international aspects of a principal-agent relationship. On the elite side, I assume that the actor has one eye on the international aspects of events and another on her political position at home.

Third, a military occupation remains a fundamental exercise in the power to bring the defeated in line with the preferred postwar agenda of the victor. The occupier has imposed the occupation as a means to limit the elite’s possible responses to the former’s demands. This exercise of power is, however, an act of costly enforcement.\textsuperscript{121} The act is costly to both the occupier in terms of the resources spent to enforce its interests and to the occupied in terms of autonomy as well as resources denied. The occupier has to commit resources – troops, equipment, logistics, etc. – to controlling foreign territory. Constraining the authority and power of another actor requires serious investments and a number of potential risks that could greatly increase the costs of the operation while


simultaneously diminishing any tangible benefits.\textsuperscript{122} The occupier has to be able to incur the costs of occupation, as the elite might not immediately make a commitment or the nature of the commitment is such that it will take time to fully mature. The costs of the operation, then, must remain lower than the costs the occupier is willing to absorb in order to accomplish its goal. The costs incurred by the occupying power must also be lower than the costs to the occupied elite in order to continue the occupation. Otherwise, it loses the advantage of holding the territory as leverage. Furthermore this constraint on the elite likely has diminishing returns for the occupier power given that the costs rise over time and the possible returns from the occupation, while potentially increasing, more than likely remain static and diminish in comparison.

To the occupied elite, the occupation has denied them access to some or all of its territory. More importantly, the occupation has denied it the authority to govern that territory and its resources. That undermines the elite’s ability to pursue its political ambitions given that it lacks some or all of its authority to enact its preferred policies.\textsuperscript{123} For its part, the occupied elite would prefer not to have an army of occupation stationed on its soil, and interfering with its affairs. Instead, the elite would rather pursue its own interests domestically as well as internationally without a foreign presence attempting to pressure them into costly decisions following a military defeat. In effect, the military occupation is a constraint on the elite’s decision-making to limit its autonomy to engage

\textsuperscript{122} The costs of direct rule are generally considered to be high by most scholars in international politics. See, for example, Robert Gilpin, \textit{War and Change in World Politics} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), and David A. Lake, \textit{Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

\textsuperscript{123} Even if the occupation only holds a fraction of territory, it still represents a threat as the occupying power has an established foothold from which to pursue further incursions if necessary. In that way, the occupation becomes a form of signaling via sunk costs. See James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution} 41, no. 1 (1997): 68-90.
in its agenda in order to influence it towards favoring the victor’s peace. Yet, that
c constraint in and of itself does not reveal whether the elite have adverse intentions
towards the occupier’s goals. It is these intentions of the elite that will lead them to select
policies that could undermine the goals of the occupying power.

The final assumption concerns the role of uncertainty in military occupations. I
assume both the occupying power and the occupied elite are uncertain of each other’s
intentions. The occupied elite are uncertain as to whether the occupying power, in a
position of authority and superior capabilities, will take advantage of their weakened
position now to enforce demands that diminish their ability to pursue independent
political agendas in the future. Occupying powers confront the occupied elite as first
and foremost political actors with their own goals and agendas, as noted previously in the
introduction as a central dilemma for establishing the peace. However, the occupier does
not know the type of elite it is dealing with in regards to the latter’s intentions towards
the former’s goals. Whether dealing with an established elite or a newly imposed
leadership, the occupier does not know if the occupied have intentions to seek
alternatives that are advantageous to their agendas but detrimental to the former’s
postwar peace.

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126 Robert W. Rauchhaus, “Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazards, Adverse Selection, and the Commitment Dilemma,” *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 4 (2009): 871-884. Careful selection of the elite a priori is difficult and not always possible in military occupations. This is especially so in cases where new elites emerge, or are imposed, to lead a defeated country.

127 In typical PA Models, the principal is concerned with the agent shirking, which is often defined as the agent doing ‘nothing’ rather than fulfilling their contract terms. I agree with Meier and Hill that the real
opportunities can and will emerge for the elite to use for its own political advantage. For the purposes of the model, I assume that all elites are adverse to the peace, though they vary between weak, moderate, and strong in terms of opposition.

In model, then, uncertainty plays an important role in how the occupying power decides to interact with the elite in order to establish its preferred peace. As Andrew Kydd notes, “Uncertainty is typically represented in game theory by establishing different types of players and giving other players probability estimates over these types.” I contend that the specific form of an occupier’s uncertainty reflects its probability estimate over the type of elite it believes that it is dealing with during an occupation. The particular form of uncertainty represents the occupiers’ prior beliefs about the conditions under which that type of elite will comply with its demands. That prior belief about the likelihood of compliance from the elite will influence its selection for a particular strategy of control. An occupier’s uncertainty can take one of three forms. The first form of uncertainty is fear: that is the elite have unfavorable intentions and will act on them, if not today then possibly tomorrow, to undermine the occupier’s interests. The expectation is that the elite will not comply if given the choice. The second form is

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130 This idea that the source of uncertainty varies comes from Rathbun, who identifies the nature and role of the concept for the leading theories of international relations. See, Brian C. Rathbun, “Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2007): 533-557.
indeterminacy: the elite’s intentions are open to the possibility of change. The occupier expects that the intentions of the elite are malleable, and through a process of reinforcement, can be altered to create a shared interest in the victor’s peace. The final form is ignorance: the occupying power does not know the elite’s intentions towards its preferred peace. The occupier imposes the occupation to enforce its measures and to determine whether the elite will commit to its demands. I will further elaborate on how the sources of uncertainty are reflected in the occupier’s actions when discussing the strategies of control.

**Selection, Costly Compliance, and the Principal-Agent Model in Military Occupations**

War is the bargaining phase of international conflict. As Carl von Clausewitz so aptly noted, states pitch their armies against one another in an effort to continue their politics by other means. Once the fighting stops, states can survey the battlefield to judge their military victories. While the combat between the armies might be over, the states involved can still harbor conflicting interests and divergent expectations regarding the postwar era. The war has not necessarily settled the political issues at stake. Instead, the victor has created an opportunity to enforce its preferred peace against the vanquished. Following hostilities, the victor is the only actor concerned with fulfilling its

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133 Here I note that wars may end in a limited or total outcome, and still result in a military occupation. That is expectations about further fighting might converge between the participants as a result of information revelation or one combatant might pursue total victory due to commitment concerns for the fighting to end. States will still impose a military occupation, regardless of these distinctions. On convergence, see R. Harrison Wagner, “Bargaining and War,” *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 3 (2000): 469-484 and, on absolute outcomes see Dan Reiter, *How Wars End* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
goals, and it must now consider whether its former opponent will commit to its preferred peace. While the defeated power has lost the contest of military strength, its leaders can still resist the winning state’s demands in the postwar era. Even if the opponent agrees to a treaty immediately following the termination of hostilities, a victorious state that has strong doubts over the former’s commitment will not leave the establishment of its peace to ink and parchment alone. Leaders are not likely to assume that all agreements reached following interstate wars will be self-reinforcing, no matter how strong the stipulations or how decisive the victory. The choice, then, is whether to impose an army of occupation on foreign territory to insure the victor’s peace. Successfully enforcing its preferred peace, however, is likely just as difficult if not more so than winning the war.

Figure 1 illustrates the selection process for states deciding to impose military occupations and the subsequent interaction with the occupied elite. At the initial node, a state has to decide whether an occupation is necessary to enforce its demands upon winning the war. The advantages to imposing an occupation can be immense for the victor in achieving its postwar goals. As Frederick Herman noted, “Occupation of all or parts of the defeated power’s territory supplied the means by which the powers could put

134 Winning the war, even an absolute war, does not solve the commitment dilemma for states in a system of anarchy. It does, however, present an opportunity to do so via a military occupation. On the commitment dilemma in international politics, see Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War;”; Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006): 169-203; and Reiter, How Wars End.

[its] policies into effect even if they had been unable to have them written into the peace treaty or agreements.” However, such operations constitute a costly exercise of power further drawing on the finite resources of the state to increase the expenses already incurred by fighting the war. The cost of losing the occupation is the failure to develop the benefits of the postwar peace in line with the occupier’s goals in addition to the squandered resources on the war. Winning the peace, then, should result in a substantial benefit to a state that offsets the price it paid for a military victory in a war and the subsequent occupation when it suspects that the elite will not commit to its goals. Hence, victorious states are only likely to impose military occupations when they are uncertain regarding the elite’s intentions towards fulfilling their demands. Given that the victor is uncertain over the intentions of the defeated, the military occupation presents an opportunity for the victorious state to mitigate its uncertainty and to obtain its preferred peace.  

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The victor (V) moves first by capturing the opponent’s territory and imposing the occupation if it is uncertain regarding the intentions of the elite (E) in committing to its peace.\textsuperscript{138} In doing so, the occupying power offers the occupied elite its terms and adopts a strategy to influence the elite’s behavior towards accepting its peace. The selection of a strategy is how the occupier attempts to achieve its preferred postwar goals. The strategies of control reflect the means as well as the costs that the occupier power is likely to endure to fulfill its goals.\textsuperscript{139} Though military occupations are frequently viewed as instances of might makes right, the extent to which a state achieves right is dependent upon whether the occupied elite comply with its demands. The occupied elite can and

\textsuperscript{138} Otherwise, the victor reaches an agreement with the defeated and enjoys with fruits of victory without imposing an occupation (W).

\textsuperscript{139} In most applications, the principal-agent model assumes that the contract is a voluntary arrangement between the two actors. However, recent work has suggested that this assumption is not entirely necessary. See Daron Acemoglu and Alexander Wolitzky, “The Economics of Labor Coercion,” \textit{Econometrica} 79, no. 2 (2011): 555-600.
will likely take actions that affect the payoff to the occupying power. In order to succeed, the occupying power has to ‘hire’ the occupied elite to assist in accomplishing its postwar goals. In a single shot game, the occupier needs sufficient control to wield it effectively over the occupied while it waits for the credible commitment to its agenda. In multiple iterations of the game, the occupying power might break the desired commitment into several ‘pieces’ that the elite have to fulfill throughout the duration. The occupier would have to maintain sufficient control over the elite to continue to influence them towards accepting the victor’s peace across the each phase. The occupied elite then have to choose between pursuing policies that favor their political intentions and further their political agendas (also referred to as non-compliance), or collaborating with the occupier and complying with its demands for the postwar peace (compliance). If the elite choose to not comply, the occupying power has to decide whether to abandon the project, or enforce its demands depending on the further costs it will incur. In turn, the elite will then have to once again choose between compliance and non-compliance if the occupier selects enforcement.

In the choice over whether to comply with the occupying power, the elite’s intentions play a large role in the decision-making to pursue their own political agendas.

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140 It is possible that across each iteration, each smaller choice accumulates, building on the previous one, thereby making it more difficult and costly for the elite to select non-compliance in future rounds. This might suggest a path dependency element to the commitment. That might further imply that the occupying power can decrease its control over time. For a discussion on path dependency, see Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

141 In the model, I assume that non-compliant behavior can take many different forms, ranging from salami tactics as described by Schelling to outright defection of the elite. See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), on salami tactics.

142 After the elite’s second instance of non-compliance, the occupier would have to decide on whether to abandon the operation or to enforce its interests. I only include two periods of interaction between the occupier and the occupied in the game to simplify its presentation.
The elite’s intentions are influenced by the costs that are likely to be incurred from complying with the occupier’s demands. In addition to the loss of autonomy and policy implementation, all occupations place some demands upon the occupied elite that affects their calculations for choosing between compliance and non-compliance. The benefits that the occupier expects are the costs of compliance that the occupied elite must accept. That is, the commitment to the victor’s peace places the elite in a position to suffer losses that they would not otherwise incur so that its former opponent might reap the rewards. Following Figure 1, when the elite comply with the demands of the victor’s peace they are assenting to pay a price to their political agenda as a result of losing the war.

Though these costs vary across each case in terms of how much the elite will suffer, both the occupier and the occupied recognize that these costs are visible to domestic and international audiences. As Thomas C. Schelling has noted, “It is that the very act of compliance – of doing what is demanded – is more conspicuously compliant, more recognizable as submission under duress, than when an act is merely withheld in the face of a deterrent threat.”¹⁴³ The elite cannot hide their compliance with the demands of an occupying power, and as a result, the costs they anticipate incurring from complying with a foreign state’s demands affect their adverse intentions towards the peace.

The costs of compliance and their interaction with the occupied elite’s intentions are only partially visible to an occupying power during the course of a military occupation. The occupier is of course familiar with its demands upon the occupied elite

¹⁴³ Schelling, Arms and Influence, 82. For a similar point on the public nature of compellent actions, see James D. Davies, Jr., Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 2000), 23.
as these constitute their national interests that they are enforcing through the occupation\textsuperscript{144}, though how the elite will react to these demands remains a source of uncertainty. Alexander L. George notes, “…the strength of the opponent’s motivation not to comply is highly dependent on what is demanded of him.”\textsuperscript{145} The demands made by the occupying power might encourage the elite to favor non-compliance given the possible costs they might incur to their interests, and the possibilities that emerge for opportunistic behaviors.\textsuperscript{146} By complying with the occupier’s demands, the elite might diminish the resources of the state by costing it valuable territory, populations, or industrial resources.\textsuperscript{147} Such demands directly affect the resources available to elites, challenging their capacity to pursue their political agendas now and in the future, thereby increasing their favorability towards non-compliance.\textsuperscript{148} Furthermore, the elite might have incentives to pursue policies that preserve their political power institutionally. If the elite can, they might resist broad domestic institutional changes that would limit their

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access to political office, or twist those changes to fit their political needs which result in detrimental outcomes for the occupying power. The elites might owe their political position to the occupying power, yet that debt does not serve as an obligation to sacrifice their own interests.

There are additional costs of compliance that also influence the decision-making of the elite related to, though separate from the demands by the occupying power. Compliance with the occupier’s demands might affect the occupied elite’s reputation and political standing. Complying with the demands might give the appearance of being ‘puppets’ to domestic and international audiences, thereby reducing the elite in stature. Allies might expect the elite to resist the demands placed before it, and following the occupier’s demands might undermine their security relationship. Adversaries might see compliance as a demonstration of the elite’s vulnerability, thereby increasing the likelihood of future challenges and threats to the occupied territory. Domestically, the elite will likely face charges of ‘collaboration’ with a foreign enemy from friends and foes alike. Though the occupied elite might frame their efforts as ‘shielding’ the nation from further aggression, their supporters and any domestic opposition will see such acts as more self serving to the elite’s political survival.\(^{149}\) The costs paid to end an occupation will likely reflect on the elite’s political record for the remainder of their life, if they survive the fall from office.

The occupying power will attempt to anticipate when its demands will encourage non-compliance from the occupied elite. This strategic anticipation will lead the

\(^{149}\) The statement of the “shield” defense comes from Petain after the German Occupation of France, though he is certainly not the first or last to use it. See, Nicholas Atkin, Petain (New York: Longman, 1998).
occupying power to take steps to influence the costs of compliance. The occupying power recognizes that the elite have their own interests, but the former remains uncertain as to whether the elites have incentives to act on those interests in a way that is detrimental to the victor’s peace. That is why occupying powers adopt a strategy of control to manage the elite’s intentions towards the peace. The strategies represent the efforts of the occupier to use its position to manipulate the elite’s choice between compliance and non-compliance in addition to representing its willingness to enforce its interests when necessary. It is the strategy of control that will influence whether the occupation results in a success, or failure.

*Power, Risk-taking, and the Strategic Nature of Costly Control*

States select into occupations to gain compliance with their postwar demands when they are uncertain of the elite’s intentions towards the peace. Without knowing the elite’s intention, the occupier has to rely on the costly exercise of its power to gain a credible commitment from the former in favor of the latter’s interests. How states gain that compliance is based off the strategy they select for influencing the elite during the occupation. The initial uncertainty that drives states to impose military occupations also influences their strategy selection for engaging with the occupied elite, and therefore how they exercise their power to enforce their aims. States initially select a strategy of control based on what they believe will be the response of the elite in complying with their

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150 Power here does not necessarily refer to the military force involved in the occupation specifically. I conceive of power in terms of the policies adopted by the occupier in relation to the occupied elite in order to influence their behavior into making a credible commitment. The necessary military force, then, varies accordingly to each strategy and the goal intended. For a discussion on how capabilities do not translate into compliance, see Robert Jackman, *Power Without Force: The Political Capacity of Nation-States* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

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demands. These prior beliefs shape whether the occupying power allows the elite some authority over relevant political decisions and the means of influence used to alter their decision-making. Depending on the strategy selected, the occupier can reduce the chances of the elite to unilaterally alter its policy in a way unfavorable to the victor’s interest, or acting in a manner to subvert former’s preferred peace.151

Given its uncertainty over the elite’s compliance, the occupier is attempting to influence them away from acting on their intentions to the detriment of the former’s peace. In essence, the occupier wants to shape the decision-making of the elite to favor compliance while simultaneous discouraging non-compliance. The occupying power wants to structure the choice set of the elite in such a way as to “… [likely] deny B the opportunity to [choose] alternatives that would undermine A’s interests were they to be adopted” while improving the chances of gaining its preferred peace.152 That includes eliminating the status quo from the choice of options, and establishing that set of choices that will constitute compliance with the occupying power’s aims for the postwar era. The victorious state accomplishes this through its strategy of a control. These strategies of control can alter the elite’s calculation for choosing between compliance and its political agenda by demonstrating the costs that the occupier is willing to bear and the measures it will implement to enforce its interests. Most importantly, the strategy selected by the occupying power can determine what choices the elite will have during the course of the occupation in relation to the former’s political objectives. The occupier can

151 These two problems frequently occur among autonomous units. For a discussion on how these two problems lead to costly conflict, see, Kenneth A. Schultz, “The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars,” International Organization 64, no. 2 (2010): 281-312.

constrain the possible options available within the set such that the elite have limits on how they can respond, and that those responses will distinguish between the types of elite that will comply from those that will act on their unfavorable intentions.

In structuring the possible choices for the elite, the occupier will establish that the termination of the occupation is conditional on elite’s behavior in complying with the former’s demands. That is, the occupier sets the end of the occupation upon the decisions taken by the elite in fulfilling the former’s goals, especially in regards to making a commitment to the postwar peace. That structuring of the decision for and conditioning the occupation’s termination on a commitment puts the occupied elite in a unique position. The elite can change the outcome of the occupation for the victorious state given that success of the operation will depend on their decision on whether to comply. As a consequence of being able to influence the outcome of the occupation, the elite are also in a position to influence the costs incurred to the occupier as well as themselves depending on their responses to the latter’s demands. Given the elite’s position to influence the costs and subsequently the outcome of the occupation, they have incentives to act on their adverse intentions that will be damaging to the victor’s peace. Without knowing the elite’s intentions and their interaction with the costs of compliance, the occupying power is undertaking a risk in allowing the former some influence in the establishment of its preferred peace.

The risk here is that the elite might attempt to exploit its position whether through an open defection with the demands of occupying power or a subtle exploitation of the opportunities to further its goals. Two strategies are worth noting here: misrepresentation and delaying tactics. The first strategy employed by the occupied elite focuses on their
attempts to misrepresent their capabilities and interests to the occupying power to diminish the losses incurred as part of the war and occupation. In misrepresenting their capabilities, the elite purposively play on their position as being materially weakened such that they want to ‘intimidate’ the occupier into diminishing any costs imposed by the victor’s peace, or improving their access to potentially available resources. Specifically, the elite are either seeking a reduction in the costs of they will incur through compliance (such as reduction in reparations or reimbursements), or alternatively, an increase in expenditures by the occupying power (such as more aid). The elites will justify these actions to the occupying power based on their ‘weakened’ positions that materially hinder their abilities to meet the demands made by the latter. With intentions, the occupied elite attempt to use a shared perception or interest with the occupying power as a means to gain a better deal than the one currently being pursued by the latter. The elite play on the notion that the shared interests requires a more balanced approach by the occupier, and to convince the latter actor that continuing to pursue its demands can sufficiently harm any benefits that the two could gain from a more equal relationship. This strategy might prove especially attractive to the elite if a third party represents a threat to themselves and the occupier that they can effectively play on as a challenge to the victor’s peace. Both types of misrepresentation are attractive to the elite, especially since they constitute a form of ‘cheap talk’ that can pay high dividends and will likely

153 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War.”


incur low costs if recognized as possibly detrimental to the interests of the occupying power.

The second strategy is also particularly attractive option for the elite: to engage in a costly delay on making a commitment to the occupier’s demands. Delaying the commitment can be costly to the occupying power for two reasons. First, by delaying the termination of the occupation, the elite increases the occupier’s time spent not accessing the spoils of winning the war. Second, a delay in making the commitment increases the costs to the occupying power, and thereby could increase the risk that those costs will exceed what it is willing to endure to achieve its peace.\textsuperscript{156} Increasing the costs to the occupier might cause it to lower the demands, thereby decreasing the costs of compliance to elite, or to simply leave without fulfilling its objectives. However, such a delay will also require that the elite bear further costs to their own political interests as the occupation endures. The effectiveness of such a tactic depends heavily upon the elite generating sufficient costs for the occupier to consider a withdrawal without the latter retaliating with its own measures in response to the former’s non-compliance.

Such risky measures require that the occupier increase the costs of the occupation to itself, and thereby to the elite as well, to insure that the latter cannot undermine its interests. First, the occupier has to maintain sufficient control to enforce its demands against the elite, as failing to do so would undermine its position. The victor’s strategy will likely reflect the costs it is willing to incur and measures it will implement during the occupation to achieve its goals. The strategy, then, can serve as an indicator of the latent coercive power that a victorious state could wield against the elite if necessary to insure

that its demands are met. Second, the occupier has to anticipate that the occupied elite will engage in non-compliance to some extent. Whether via a defection or salami tactics, the occupying power has to expect that the occupied elite will attempt to undermine the former’s preferred goals in favor of pursuing the latter’s interests. The occupier then has to be prepared to enforce its interests. The elite may decide against being compliant, and if that occurs, then occupier has to take action otherwise it risks losing the peace.

The occupier’s strategy also establishes the means of influence that it will use during the operation to manipulate incentives of the occupied elite to make a commitment to the victor’s peace. The occupier has to convince the elite that it will engage in coercion against the latter if and when necessary, ranging from a stern message enforcing that the occupied elite undertake certain measures to threatening and removing the elite from power who are undermining its interests. These acts are not likely to seem ‘benevolent’ to the occupied elite, but the occupying power has to adhere to its position and the costs


158 Some scholars might contend that the convergence of expectations at the war’s termination might be sufficient to convince the elite that their positions are in danger should they resist the occupier’s demands. See, for example, Wagner, “Bargaining and War,”; Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” *The American Political Science Review* 47, no. 4 (2003): 621-632; Robert Powell, “Bargaining and Learning While Fighting,” *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 2 (2004): 344-361. However, this convergence of expectations only affects the outcome of the military contest, and not the outcome of the occupation. The elite might concede the fight, but they still have their unfavorable intentions towards the peace and the anticipated compliance costs that might push them towards non-compliance. Will the elite risk their office to fight these demands? They might, unless the occupier establishes that doing so will risk harm to what they value most. As Schelling notes, “to exploit a capacity for hurting and inflicting damage one needs to know what an adversary treasures and what scares him.” See Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 3-4. As both Stephen Krasner and Duncan Snidal discuss, the act of exclusion can serve as an exercise of power that can have a great influence on the opposing player under the right conditions. See Duncan Snidal, “Coordination versus Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes,” *The American Political Science Review* 79, no. 4 (1985): 923-942; Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” *World Politics* 43, no. 3 (1991): 336-366.
incurred in the occupation can make those threats credible. Alongside the coercive measure, concessions from the occupying power can be useful in offsetting some of the costs of compliance to the elite by making the decision for agreement more palatable though still costly to their interests. Any concessions granted by the occupying power should not place its interests in a precarious position but should grant the elite further incentives to comply with its demands. Mixing the use of both threats and cooperative measures is essential to gaining a commitment to the victor’s preferred peace. As Eric Carlton notes, “Control is usually achieved by a combination of force which induces compliance and persuasion.” Neither incentives nor threats alone will likely be sufficient to compel elites to fulfill the occupier’s demands. The occupying power will likely require the means to encourage compliance as well as discouraging non-compliance. Hence, the combination of these measures is more likely to effectively manipulate the incentives of the elite to favor compliance and increase the chances of success for the achieving the occupier’s goals.

Control, Commitments, and Agents’ Information

For the occupier, then, the advantage in increasing the risks of the occupation is gathering consequentially valuable information on the elite’s intentions to comply with its preferred peace. As Terry Moe has noted, the power of an agent in the principal-agent


160 Eric Carlton, Occupation: The Policies and Practices of Military Conquerors, (Savage: Barnes & Nobles Books, 1992), 1, emphasis mine. Originally, Dillard noted that military occupations often blurred the line between persuasion and force. George (Forceful Persuasion, 10) and Wolfers (Discord and Collaboration, 104) make similar points on the utility of combining persuasion and threats in the context of foreign policy and coercive diplomacy. For the similar argument, see, Hardy C. Dillard, “Power and Persuasion: The Role of Military Government,” The Yale Review 42 (December 1953): 212.
model is the information they possess and their attempt to use that ‘power’ to influence the principal’s decisions. In the context of military occupations, the elite will vary in their hostility towards the peace. In a few instances, the elite’s intentions become known via their open resistance to the demands of the occupying power. In the majority of cases, the occupied elite will likely try to alleviate itself of some or all of the demands made by the occupier, especially when the elite anticipate high compliance costs. That is why the occupying power has to compel the occupied elite into making a choice on complying with their preferred terms. Compliance will result in losses for the occupied elite that they would prefer not to incur if possible. The greater the costs associated with compliance, the more the elite might resist making any commitment to the occupier’s demands. In part, the elite recognize that if they comply with the terms of the occupying power, the losses they incur as a result will be difficult to undo once the occupation is over and hence their compliance will turn into a commitment to the victor’s peace that will be difficult to break. Given their adversity towards incurring these costs, the decision on compliance is an expensive one for the elite to make, and one that they will likely not undertake without the right amount of pressure to forgo their political agenda. In order to succeed, then, the victor wants to use its strategy against the elite to diminish their power by compelling them to decide on whether to comply, as their response would allow the occupying power to gather information and to evaluate their intentions while establishing its peace.

The occupier accomplishes this through its costly exercise of power by shifting the decision for compliance back to the elite. The choice for whether to comply with the

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victor’s demands becomes voluntary on the part of the occupied elite, in that they have to
decide their response to the occupying power’s demands. By allowing the elite some
capacity to make decisions, the occupying power is taking a risk that the elite might
choose against its interests in order to assess the latter’s intentions. However, the benefit
of shifting the decision to the occupied elite is two-fold. First, as James Morrow has
noted, “Giving other actors power is a common way to make a credible commitment to
them. If one actor is worried that another will not honor a commitment, giving the first
some power over the outcome can be sufficient to assure that actor of commitment.”162
That is, allowing the occupied elite some narrow, constrained margin of choice can
effectively serve as a measure of strategic restraint or reassurance that the occupier will
adhere to the commitment if the elite make the choice that coincides with its preferred
peace.163 This act might encourage some elites towards favoring compliance if they
expect that the occupier will not subsequently alter the deal by increasing its demands.
Second, the choice set on the victor’s peace must be sufficiently constrained such that
when the elite decide either in favor of, or against, compliance it will constitute an
informative signal to the occupier about the latter’s type.164 A cheap decision, or a non-
decision, will provide no information regarding the elite’s intentions. An order to act on
the victor’s peace, however, can effectively separate those likely to execute the

162 James D. Morrow, “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in
International Politics,” in Strategic Choice and International Relations, ed. David A. Lake and Robert

163 Davies, Threats and Promises, 12; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint,
and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Glaser,
Rationalist Theory of International Politics; and Schelling, Arms and Influence, 4.

164 Todd S. Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,” International
occupier’s demands from those who are likely to act on their intentions. By the limiting the possible options and compelling the elite to make a choice, the occupier’s strategy should allow it to determine whether elites will commit to its peace.

Those elites with intentions favoring compliance will follow the demands of the occupying power. The less-adverse elite might not like the limited choices presented by the occupying power, but risking their positions is less preferable. The argument does not imply that compliant elites merely accept the demands of the occupier as mere puppets. Rather, these elites will likely select out of riskiest options in terms of resisting the demands of the occupying power, and are likely in favor of more restrained attempts to influence the occupation. The compliant elites might continue to pursue changes in the occupier’s demands that favor their political agendas, and are more likely to attempt small measures to test the occupier’s limits. When confronted, however, this type of elite is also likely to back down and comply with the demands of the occupier rather than suffer any serious consequences. The more-adverse elites will favor non-compliance, and attempt to undermine the victor’s peace when presented with the choice. Though the occupier has likely incurred increasing costs to bear this risk, the occupied elite will act on their hostile intentions for two reasons. First, given that the decision is a costly, such elite would engage in measures to resist making the decision set forth by the occupying power to evade the commitment demanded of them. Second, these elite might anticipate that their non-compliance will be too costly for the occupier to bear, and that their actions will undermine the occupation.

The prime advantage to this costly exercise of power in structuring the choice set and shifting the decision to the elite is that the victor can effectively screen the agents for
any adverse intentions. The screening occurs by compelling the agent to choose between complying with the occupier’s demands, and accepting the losses that come with it. That is, the costly exercise of power to control foreign territory should result in an increase in the amount of information available to the occupying power to evaluate the agent’s intentions towards compliance. The occupier will gather information regarding the behavior of the elite as it likely knows the actions they take. The occupying power still has to evaluate those actions in light of its goals, and attempt to assess the possible intentions of the elite towards accepting their peace. Theorists of strategic interaction have long recognized we cannot simply infer the intentions of an actor from observing her behavior. This is especially true since multiple preferences might lead to the same action, or alternatively, the action observed is part of a larger game in which this single choice is the best option available to reach another goal.\(165\) Hence, behavioral signals can constitute noisy indicators of the elite’s intentions towards the victor’s peace.\(166\) This is especially complicated as many elites have incentives to criticize the actions of the occupying power to play to domestic and international audiences. Though such complaints are likely cheap talk, it complicates the evaluation of the elite’s actions and inferring their intent as well as the consequences in relation to the postwar objectives.\(167\)


\[\text{167} \text{ This former aspect is similar to the problems a state confronts when attempting to estimate the resolve of leaders in international crises. For example, see, James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the}
That is why the occupying power that compels the elite to make a decision on accepting the victor’s peace is usually more successful, as it effectively pursues a separating equilibrium that allows it to distinguish among the possible types of elite. As Andrew Kydd points out, “in separating equilibrium one ends up with beliefs that are, on average, more likely to be correct than the prior beliefs one had before observing the behavior.”

The information is imperfect, but across the duration of the occupation such signals can accumulate and provide the occupying power with sufficient information to confidently evaluate the elite’s intentions towards its preferred peace. An occupier can accomplish this separation through the strategy it uses against the occupied elite.

**Autonomy & Influence: Strategies of Control as Power**

Here, I develop the strategies of control that occupying powers may use during an occupation to gain a credible commitment from the elite. Each strategy varies along two possible dimensions. First, the authority available to elite to make decisions over political affairs that might affect the outcome of the occupation. The second dimension is the means of influence employed by the occupying power to persuade the elite to comply with its demands during the course of the occupation. Across the two dimensions, three possible strategies emerge for an occupying power to select from when dealing with the elite: dominating, accommodating, and dictating. Each of the three strategies

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corresponds to a particular form of uncertainty on the part of the occupying power as discussed in the assumptions of the model section. Here I will explain how the source uncertainty for an occupying power, as its prior belief on compliance, links to a particular strategy, and describe how that strategy works across the two dimensions. In the next section, I discuss how each of the three strategies affects the outcome for the victor’s postwar peace.

For a dominating strategy, the underlying uncertainty for the occupying power is fear: the elite have adverse intentions and will act on them, if not today then possibly tomorrow, to undermine the occupier’s interests. The occupying power likely assumes that the elite will not comply with its goals if given the choice and therefore, the state presents relatively few opportunities for the occupied to make a decision. Operating under such a belief, the occupier minimizes the authority of the elite concerning the outcome of the occupation while acquiring significant control over the occupied territory so that it can act on its own initiative in an almost unilateral manner to accomplish its objectives. If the elite are needed to assist in implementing policies, the occupier likely uses threats or coercion to motivate them into compliance. Additionally, the occupier using dominating strategies will make no attempts to compensate the elite for the costs they incur in complying with the former’s demands. Concessions might seem

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unnecessary or suggest weakness to the elite, thereby encouraging their non-compliance with the victor’s peace. The occupier might offer trivial concessions to the elite, as long these measures have no bearing on the course of the occupation. During the German Occupation of the Crimea, the local Tatars wanted autonomy to manage their affairs. The army officials granted them the ability to form committees, but specifically withheld all authority over political affairs that might interfere with the former’s occupation.\textsuperscript{171} Additionally, in the course of a dominating strategy, the occupying power likely escalates its control, diminishing the capacity of the elite to govern as the occupation endures. For example, in the British Occupation of Egypt, the administration increasingly grew in terms of its responsibilities to reform the country’s institutions. In essence, the dominating strategy attempts to minimize the occupied elite’s ability to interfere with the occupier’s postwar goals.

For the accommodating strategy, the underlying source of uncertainty for an occupier is indeterminacy: the elite’s intentions are open to the possibility of change and through a ‘process of reinforcement’ they will come to favor the victor’s peace.\textsuperscript{172} As David Edelstein notes in regards to accommodation strategies, the occupying powers attempt to ‘co-opt’ elites into the operation.\textsuperscript{173} The occupying power sets out its demands and then offers cooperative assurances or concessions to the occupied elite as incentives


\textsuperscript{172} Rathbun, “Uncertain about Uncertainty,” 550. The accommodation strategy as described here is akin to constructivist theorists such as Wendt, given their arguments on the malleable nature of preferences. For a discussion on constructivism, see Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” \textit{International Organization} 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425.

to fulfill its goals. By offering rewards and incentives for compliance, the occupying power expects that the elite will be induced, or persuaded, into making the commitment that it seeks.\textsuperscript{174} Timothy Crawford has explained this logic behind accommodation as “…making of concessions, or taking steps that compensate or credit the adversary’s interests, for sake of improving relations or sidestepping conflict.”\textsuperscript{175} The occupier also shifts authority back to the elite, likely expecting that they will enforce its interests as necessary.\textsuperscript{176} The occupier might expect that the occupied elite will have fewer incentives to act against the occupation if they are involved in the project. Furthermore, accommodation strategies lack any coercive element that might target the elite to influence their behavior. In 1864, Napoleon III relinquished a significant portion of political authority over to Maximilian upon his ascension to Emperor of Mexico. In doing so, Napoleon expected that Maximilian’s actions would further their shared goal of establishing a new government in Mexico that would be friendly to French interests in the Americas.\textsuperscript{177} An accommodating strategy then places few restraints on the occupied elite while employing cooperative measures to gain their compliance during the course of the military occupation.


\textsuperscript{176} There are no instances of unconditional surrenders of political authority from an occupier to the occupied elite. As discussed in the previous chapter, a defining characteristic for a military occupation is that the occupying power has a political demand it expects the occupied elite to fulfill.

With a dictating strategy, the underlying source of uncertainty for an occupying power is ignorance: it does not know whether or how such individuals will comply with its demands to establish the peace. Given that the occupier does not know the intentions of the elite, it sets out to compel their compliance towards a preferred peace. The occupying power stipulates the terms to the occupied elite, and takes a firm stance that the elite must decide on whether to comply with the former’s demands. Unlike dominating strategies, the elite have some authority to make decisions that can affect the outcome of the military occupation. The elite have a limited autonomy to decide on whether to comply, and on how to fulfill the commands set out by the occupying power during the course of the occupation. Unlike accommodation strategies, though, the occupying power is compelling that decision from the elite. The occupier is essentially issuing orders to the elite to conform to its preferred peace then waiting for the elite to respond to these demands. The occupier then responds to the occupied elite in kind with its means of influence, by granting concessions when compliant, enforcing when needed, or making threats when non-compliant. By establishing that the use of its means of influence is contingent on the elite’s actions, the occupying power attempts to simultaneously manipulate the elite’s incentives towards favoring compliance while diminishing the attractiveness of non-compliance. When the elite comply with its

178 Rathbun, “Uncertain about Uncertainty.” The dictation strategy as described here is akin to rationalist theorists such as Goemans given their arguments on information and learning. See Goemans, War and Punishment; Wagner, “Bargaining and War,”; and Robert Powell, “Bargaining and Learning While Fighting”.

179 In part, the dictating strategy resembles the classic tit-for-tat as developed by Robert Axelrod. Here, I make no specific designation as to the game being played here. I do note that the occupier’s position of power relative to the occupied alters the nature of the incentives to defect or cooperate as well as its ability to threaten to exclude the elite from future interactions if necessary. By bringing power into the analysis, the game here violates rule 3 (agent elimination) and 4 (altering incentives) as set out by Axelrod to explain
orders, the occupier might grant a concession for such actions. Non-compliance, however, will be met increasing levels of coercion, ranging from an occupier further pressuring the elite to comply up to the occupying power threatening to and removing the elite from political office. The Allied Occupation of France described in the introduction is an excellent example. The Allied Powers wanted a politically stable France under a Bourbon king, yet the regime had quickly collapsed when Napoleon returned from exile in 1815. When the allies captured Paris in July, they eventually restored the Bourbon king to the throne, but this time imposed a military occupation across northern France. Rather than accept promises that the regime would consolidate its reign over the country, the Allied Powers sought to enforce it while collecting reparations for their losses in the War of the Seventh Coalition. The Allied Powers wanted a government that the French population would support and would be amicable to their international interests without further fears of revolutionary uprisings. The occupier uses a dictating strategy to compel the elite to a decision on whether to comply with the victor’s peace during the occupation while making contingent use of concessions and threats on manipulate the latter’s behavior.

**Strategies, Costs, and the likelihood of the Victor’s Peace**

Previously, I discussed the strategic interaction of occupying power to successfully compel the elite to accepting the losses associated with the victor’s peace. The above section has set out the three strategies of control that the occupying power can select from when imposing the military occupation on foreign soil. Each of the three

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strategies varies in terms of how the occupying power will use its costly exercise of power to influence the elite, and whether it will result in successfully establishing its preferred peace. Here I address how these exercises of power influence the decision-making of elite between favoring compliance and non-compliance, and the likelihood that the subsequent outcome of the military occupation will favor the victor’s peace.

With a dominating strategy, the occupying power has likely assumed the worst case scenario for the postwar peace – the elite will never comply with the demands. The possibility of changing intentions in the future has driven the occupier to dismissing information that might suggest that the elite would adhere to the former’s postwar goals. Rather than risk including the elite, the occupying power assumes control over the territory and sets about fulfilling its aims. Under a domination strategy, the occupier is not compelling the elite to accomplishing its goals by granting them any type of choice. Instead, the occupier removes that choice when selecting its strategy in order to minimize its uncertainty, and subsequently attempts to unilaterally impose its goals. The occupier assumes that the elite refrain from acting against its demands given the power and threats the former employees towards the latter in the occupation. If the occupier wants to succeed, then, it has to continually bear high costs to maintain its position relative to the elite given its expectation that those individuals will not comply if allowed the choice. The problem is, that the superior advantage is costly to maintain. As Robert Gilpin has noted, “[dominating] …requires the existence of a continuing economic surplus…it becomes more difficult to generate sufficient revenues to cover the protection costs, and

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180 Rathbun, “Uncertain about Uncertainty.”
the protection costs themselves increase over time.”

Elites suffer severe restrictions on their autonomy, especially over any decisions that might affect the goals of occupation. The heavy constraint on the elite reduces their capacity to pursue their political agendas, and to possibly compromise the goals of the occupier. The elite only have incentives to comply as long as the occupier retains a superior position relative to them. During the course of the occupation, this reliance on capabilities to dominate the elite likely results in one of two responses, which result in a similar outcome. First, the weakly and moderately adverse elite comply with the demands of the occupying power for fear of suffering the consequences of non-compliance. For weak and moderately adverse elites, there is no assurance that the occupier might abide any terms imposed. The severity of restrictions on their autonomy likely diminishes these types of elite’s likelihood of compliance with the peace once the occupation ends.

Second, the highly-adverse elite comply since there is no cost commitment to make on their part, but they also take advantage of possible opportunities to undermine the occupier if/when these instances emerge. With both types of elites, the high costs of compliance incurred during the occupation will contribute to their overturning the peace given that the occupier fully imposed these upon them. Unless the occupier can

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181 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 157.

182 This likely occurs regardless of the occupier’s aims for the occupations. As Max Abrahms notes in the credibility paradox, “defenders are apt to infer the extremeness of a challenger’s preferences directly from the extremeness of his tactics notwithstanding the nature of his actual demands.” Even if the occupier had aims that might encourage compliance, the use of such a strategy would likely undermine that incentive. See Max Abrahms, “The Credibility Paradox: Violence as a Double-Edged Sword in International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2013): 661.
unilaterally maintain the costs, it is likely that the occupied elite will opt for other arrangements when the opportunity emerges and abandon the victor’s peace when the operation terminates. Dominating strategies, then, are likely to be self-defeating for an occupying power to manage its relations with the occupied elite, and should increase the chances of failure for establishing a commitment to the victor’s peace.

Accommodation strategies are not much better in achieving the victor’s peace. The occupier’s prior beliefs likely suggest that the elite’s type is potentially receptive towards favoring compliance, and committing to the postwar peace. As intentions of the elite are malleable, they will come to favor and actively support victor’s peace as their shared interest through a process of reinforcement. By granting the elite autonomy over some areas of policy-making, the occupier attempts to signal its benign intentions and assure its commitment to their decisions.\textsuperscript{183} The occupier also attempts to structure the choice set such that the exchange of concessions and cooperative measures increase the elite’s favorability toward compliance and makes a commitment to the victor’s peace an attractive option.\textsuperscript{184} As result, the occupier likely expects to incur fewer costs enforcing its interests upon the elite for two reasons. First, the occupier might not anticipate the elite’s defiance in committing to its terms given that the former expects that the latter will likely share a similar interest in the establishing peace. Second, the occupier might expect that the elite, being persuaded that the peace is in their interests, will contribute their finite resources to insuring a successful outcome for the occupation. Therefore, the

\textsuperscript{183} There are no instances of unconditional surrenders of political authority from an occupier to the occupied elite. As discussed in the previous chapter, a defining characteristic for a military occupation is that the occupying power has a political demand it expects the occupied elite to fulfill.

occupying power expects that it will have to invest fewer resources into the occupation itself in order to succeed, and consequently does so during the operation. This argument is not to suggesting that the occupation will be inexpensive. Rather, that the occupier anticipates that the elite will use their own resources to contribute to furthering the occupation’s goals and subsequently reduce the necessary investment of the former’s resources in order to succeed.

The problem for the occupying power is that such cooperative assurances leave open the possibility of opportunistic behavior on the part of the elite. The incentives might diminish the cost of compliance to the elite, and increase the likelihood of favoring compliance. However, by restoring the elite to almost autonomous status, the occupier has run into the dilemma that they can select and change some policies at their choosing to meet their agendas. The incentives are not enough to guarantee that the elite will accept the occupier’s goals without pursuing their own agendas that can undermine the victor’s peace. Instead, the assurances likely serve as a signal, encouraging the elite to act on their agendas, and to pursue measures that will increase the costs to the occupier. Weakly adverse elites might not share the occupier’s goals initially, but the concessions and cooperative assurances can alter their preferences to favor the victor’s peace. Moderately adverse elite are the dangerous ones. These elites exploit the cooperative measures made by the occupier under the expectation that the latter approves of the former’s actions, or accepts its policies in relation to the occupation’s goals. For instance, leaders can come to depend on the continued support of the army of occupation to maintain and enforce their rule rather than spending their resources on institutionalizing

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their reign.\textsuperscript{186} Strongly adverse elite likely exploit the concessions as well. In either case, the cooperative assurances from the occupier suggest to the elite that there are minimum consequences for engaging in their agendas, thereby furthering incentivizing its behavior. When the elite engage in opportunistic behaviors that have detrimental effects for the occupations, the costs of the operation can quickly escalate beyond the initial expectations of the occupying power. The occupier is then confronted with the choice of either devoting further finite resources to the occupation to establish its preferred peace, or to abandon the project all together at a substantial loss. The unanticipated costs to save the operation dissuade the occupier from remaining, and subsequently accommodating strategies contribute to the failure of occupations.\textsuperscript{187}

With both of the dominating and accommodating strategies, the occupying power has some expectations regarding the behavior of elites and how their actions will ultimately affect the outcome of the occupation. In dominating the elite, the occupier will likely not update its beliefs about the likelihood of compliance. Its strategy does not allow the elite an opportunity to demonstrate compliance. Instead, the costly exercise of power becomes the primary focus for establishing its peace. In accommodating the elite, the occupier can update its beliefs about the likelihood of compliance. However, the updating of beliefs occurs as the costs of the occupation subsequently grow as a result of the elite’s decisions to act on their interests. That learning process is costly, and most


\textsuperscript{187} Alternatively, the potential losses resulting from the accommodating strategy might drive the occupier to expend further resources in a risky gamble to save its preferred peace. Given that the occupier has to invest further resources to establish its peace and now undo the damage from the elite’s decisions, the likelihood of failure remains high. For a discussion on the aversion to losses in foreign policy, see, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, \textit{Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
likely leads the occupier to failure. Neither strategy then allows for a separation of the possible types of elite that the occupying power might be confronting. Without that separation of types, the exercise of power is costly and more likely to fail in achieving the victor’s peace.

An occupying power that uses the dictating strategy against the elite is more likely to succeed in military occupations. Dictating strategies work precisely because the occupying power uses its costly exercise of power to gain demonstrations from the defeated that they will abide by its postwar demands. Rather than holding on to expectations of whether the agent will comply, the occupying power takes a risk in shifting some authority to the elite and attempts to influence their behavior by compelling them to make a choice on the victor’s peace. The dictating strategy accomplishes this through a structuring of the elite’s choice set such that they confront a command from the occupying power to decide on whether to comply with its demands. Compelling that choice via a dictating strategy is important in two respects. First, it gains an acceptance from the occupied elite to the victor’s peace. Second, these decisions reveal information about the elite’s intentions which the occupier can use to infer whether it will comply with the peace after the occupation has terminated. Thus, when an occupying power dictates the peace to its former opponent during an occupation, it consequently uses its costly exercise of power as a separating equilibrium that divides the types of elite based on their adverse intentions. Elites with strong adverse intentions will defect or delay their actions on fulfilling the occupier’s demands, even in the shadow of a foreign power controlling their territory with a clear advantage in capabilities. Elites with weakly or moderately unfavorable intentions will not rejoice at fulfilling the terms demanded by the
occupier. This type of elite will still resist the occupier. Yet, when pressed to follow through, they will comply with the victor’s peace as it allows them to pursue their autonomy in the future while maintaining their political positions now.

The occupier further manipulates the options of the elite through its means of influence during the occupation, to alter the cost-benefit calculation of the latter to favor its preferred peace. The occupying power can make use of concessions, or threats, contingent on behaviors that the elites engage in to fulfill the former’s goals. The costs of compliance can be steep, and yet, the concessions offered by the occupier can alter the incentives for favoring compliance. For weakly and moderately hostile elites, the concessions offered can offset some of the costs of compliance, making the option somewhat less costly to the elite. Such concessions might allow the elite some options in implementing the occupier’s demands, or grant them a measure relative to the primary goal that favors their agendas. The possibility of enforcement actions by the occupier also influences these elites, making non-compliance less favorable given the further costs that they might incur. For the strongly hostile elite, concessions and sanction actions have relatively less affect on their decision-making. Their opposition to the victor’s peace is such that they will favor non-compliance and are willing to demonstrate it.

The dictating strategy does imply that the occupier will have to incur higher costs initially in the occupation to influence the behavior of the elite. In the preliminary phases, the occupier likely has more extensive concerns on whether it can influence the elite’s decision-making, and maintain control over foreign territory. The occupying power has to establish a sufficiently strong position to effectively influence the elite when it risks granting them some authority to make decisions that can affect the outcome of the
occupation. Compelling a choice is difficult and can require an extensive expenditure of power to procure the benefits the occupier seeks for the postwar peace. As the occupation progresses, the occupier can reevaluate its position and the costs it incurs as a result of the operation. A reduction in costs is possible if the elite demonstrate compliance, and have made sufficient commitments to the occupier’s goals. The occupying power might be able to reduce the costs of the occupation to itself and thereby to the elite as a result, under the right conditions. Occupying power should retain sufficient control to insure further compliance with its goals, and not risk sacrificing the operation. That implies the necessity of being able to respond as necessary to the choices of the elites without weakening its position when reducing the costs of the occupation. Hence, reductions in costs should depend on the elite signaling their intentions via the actions to continue complying with the postwar goals to establish the victor’s peace. This leads to the primary hypothesis.

**H1:** Occupying powers pursuing a dictating strategy against the occupied elite increase the chances of gaining a commitment to their preferred peace

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I develop a principal-agent model to explain how occupying powers can influence the decisions of the occupied elite, and ultimately the outcomes of military occupations. My theoretical argument focuses specifically on the strategies that the occupying power uses to gain its preferred peace from occupied elite. I posit that these exercises of power are essential to understanding whether victors can establish their preferred postwar peace. The primary hypothesis is evaluated through statistical analyses in the following chapter on an original data set of military occupations resulting from
interstate wars beginning in 1815 through 2003. In chapter 5, I further evaluate the primary hypothesis concerning the utility of a dictating strategy through a case study of the American Occupation of Japan.
Chapter 4  Testing the Theory

The preceding chapter established a principal-agent theory for international politics that focuses on the costly exercise of power as the primary means for an occupier to successfully compel the elite to adhere to the former’s peace. That costly exercise of power takes the form of a state’s strategy of control. This strategy is a link between the occupying power’s uncertainty over the occupied elite’s intentions towards the peace, and their subsequent interactions during the course of the occupation. The purpose of this chapter then is to evaluate the primary hypothesis through statistical analyses concerning the occupying power’s strategies of control: that dictating should increase the likelihood of successfully achieving the victor’s peace.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the unit of analysis and then operationalize the dependent variable for success and failure in military occupations. Second, the chapter explains the independent variables used in the statistical analysis. Initially, I explain the coding for occupation aims and strategies of control. Then, I proceed to the remaining primary variables of interest that stem directly from military occupations, and introduce the control variables for the equations. In the third section, I test the principal-agent theory of international politics from chapter 3. The statistical analyses strongly support the primary hypothesis of the model: occupying powers that dictate the peace to the occupied elite are more likely to gain the compliance with their preferred peace, and ultimately succeed in the military occupation. I briefly evaluate these arguments further through two plausibility probes: the Chilean Occupation of Peru (1881-1883) and the initial phases of the Soviet Occupation of North Korea (1945-1948).
The remainder of the chapter interprets the associated independent and control variables along aside some historical examples to illustrate the causal effects.

**The Unit of Analysis: Occupying Powers in Military Occupations**

The unit of analysis in the study is the primary occupying power interacting with the occupied elite to make a commitment to the former’s preferred peace. Chapter 2 discussed the criteria for including military occupations in the dataset. When the occupation has a single state holding the authority to govern, I include one observation for that particular occupation in the analysis. Here, I discuss how I identified the primary occupying power when an occupation included more than one state holding the authority to govern foreign territory, and whether the dataset has a single or multiple observations when the occupation has several states involved.

First, I only include states as occupying powers if they held authority to govern the territory, and not if they merely provided some assistance in the operations. For example, the Allied Occupation of France from 1815 to 1818 consisted of several different countries contributing troops to the Army of Occupation, such as Austria, Bavaria, Denmark, Hanover, Prussia, Russia, Saxony, the United Kingdom, and Württemberg. However, the four major powers – Austria, Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom – actually held the authority to govern French territory and made all of the decisions regarding the occupation regime. I do not include states that participated in an occupation regime – whether by contributing troops, money, or logistical support – without acting as a governing authority over the foreign territory. Hence, I do not include

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Bavaria, Denmark, Hanover, Saxony, and Württemberg as being occupying powers in the occupation. Similar examples where I distinguish between occupying powers and participant states would be the occupation of Germany, Japan, and more recently, the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Second, in these cases involving multiple states holding the authority to govern, I then decided on whether to include a single observation for a primary occupier or to include an observation for each occupying power. In some instances I used a single state out of the occupying powers to represent the occupation when the states holding authority to govern were primarily cooperating with one another. In other cases, I did not treat the parties involved as engaged in a single occupation, but disaggregated the occupation according to participants based on the competing nature of parties involved. The main distinguishing characteristic between these cases concerns the level of coordination among the occupying powers involving their goals and strategies for the occupation.¹⁸⁹

The Dependent Variable and the Statistical Model

The primary dependent variable for the statistical analysis is the outcome of the military occupation. The outcome of the occupation captures whether a state succeeded or failed to accomplish its intended political goals upon the termination of its status as an occupying power. This is a dichotomous measure that is equal to a one (1) when the occupying power succeeds, and a zero (0) when it fails to gain its preferred peace. Here, I

¹⁸⁹ As a robustness check on my division of the cases, I ran the analyses excluding the ‘double’ cases. The results remain consistent.
break down the dependent variable into the two primary categories to explain how I evaluated each case and its outcome for the occupying power.\textsuperscript{190}

\textit{Identifying Success}

I define a success as an occupying power achieving a commitment to its primary goals at the termination of the military occupation.\textsuperscript{191} First, identifying success requires comparing the goals of the occupying power as established at the initiation of the operation to its achievements when the occupation terminates. Focusing on the initiation of the occupation allows us to establish the aims without any potential interference that might cause the occupier to alter their goals. For instance, the amount of time that passes between the initiation and termination of an occupation can vary greatly. As described in chapter 2, the shortest occupation is 4 months and the longest runs for 708 months. During that time, the occupying powers may raise, or more likely, lower their demands on the occupied elite. Second, that commitment may come in the form of a formal treaty/an alliance, new domestic institutions, fulfilled payments, or territory incorporated without further immediate military challenges. A successful occupation might combine several of those aspects together depending on how the occupier structures it demands.

\textsuperscript{190} Unfortunately, there are only a few analytical treatments of defining success and failure to follow in the literature. David A. Baldwin has provided the most extensive treatment by developing a five point measure. The typology is rather complicated and lacks several necessary components to operationalize efficiently. Here, I focus primarily on goal obtainment as the main indicator of success and failure. See David A. Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,” \textit{International Security} 24, no. 3 (1999-2000): 80-107; and David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” \textit{Annual Review of Political Science} 3 (2000): 167-182.

and what guarantees it insists on when terminating the operation. In order to be included as a success, then, the commitments made by the occupied elite must meet the demands of the occupying power.\footnote{Some scholars might contend that I need to account for cost when defining success, in order to identify what David A Baldwin has referred to as ‘pyrrhic victories’ in foreign policy outcomes. Unfortunately, evaluating the cost of a military occupation is not that simple, especially in comparison to a political goal (Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,”, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,”). The political goals of an occupying power do not easily translate into monetary figures that we can then compare on a scale to determine whether it found a bargain or a money pit. For this point, see Arnold Wolfers, \textit{Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics} (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 106; David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” \textit{World Politics} 31, no. 2 (1979): 161-194. Only in a rare case can we actually present estimates and final costs to estimate the disparity between projections and expenditures. For example, initial estimates put the cost of the war with Iraq in the $50 billion to $60 billion range. In total, the \textit{Costs of War} project argues that Afghanistan, Iraq, and related long-term economic expenses from these conflicts have cost the United States approximately 3,102 billion dollars from 2001 to 2013. On the initial estimates for Iraq, see, Elisabeth Bumiller, “Threats and Responses: The Cost; White House Cuts Estimate of Cost of War with Iraq,” \textit{The New York Times}, 31 December 2002; and “Summary Costs of War in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan,” \textit{Costs of War}. (2011), Accessed on 21 November 2014, Available from http://costsofwar.org/article/economic-cost-summary.}

The operationalization of the dependent variable here focuses on whether this success is achieved at the termination of the occupation by the primary occupying power. I do not attempt to evaluate whether the goals of the occupation endure past the termination of occupation.\footnote{As an assurance on my coding, I note that all of the cases that I have identified as successes endured for at least one year past the termination of the military occupation. Sullivan uses a similar metric for the outcomes of limited wars. See Patricia Sullivan, “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars,” \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution} 51, no. 3 (2007): 510.} In the successful cases, the occupying state terminates the occupation when it has fulfilled the goals and the occupied elite have made a decision to comply with the postwar peace. At that point in time, following the information available to it, the occupier has succeeded in compelling its preferred terms from the occupied elite. If future events, i.e., activities that occur \textit{after} the occupation, influence a change in commitment that goes against the occupying power’s interests, I do not use that change to
judge the occupation as a failure. To do so, would raise questions regarding how we can account for future activities as causing failure in past outcomes?

As researchers, we can encounter several difficulties such as causality and hindsight bias when attempting to evaluate the outcome of an occupation based on events that occur after its termination. Both of these problems complicate any judgments concerning what the occupying power knew and whether it should have anticipated such actions given the available information at the time. The issue of causality suggests that as time passes between the termination of the occupation and the any future alteration in the commitment the less attenuated the influence of the occupation upon that subsequent change. Hence, one cannot code an alteration in the future as affecting the prior outcome. Too many extraneous factors can account for modifications to the victor’s peace as the amount of time between the end of the occupation and the actual violation increases. For example, one cannot assert that the Allied Occupation of France failed in 1818 because Prussia occupied French territory again in 1871. In a case like the occupation of Cuba in 1898 and again in 1906, we have to address a number of counterfactual questions, such as whether the occupier could have anticipated the events leading to the second occupation, and whether those events resulted from some policy failure from the first occupation. More importantly, would the occupying power have terminated the occupation in 1902 if it foresaw the re-occupation in 1906?

Furthermore, when evaluating the outcome of a military occupation one must always be careful of hindsight bias. We know what happens after the termination of the occupation while the decision-makers involved lack that knowledge for whatever reason. If those decision-makers perceived themselves as succeeding, and the historical evidence
supports their perceptions that the occupation met their primary goals, then we should evaluate that case as a success. Otherwise, we risk reinterpreting history in a way that makes for ‘odd reading,’ as noted by Robert Powell in the context of rationalist models and the termination of wars.\textsuperscript{194} In light of these concerns, I focus on evaluating the occupation at its termination relative to the goals of the occupying power as set out at its initiation.\textsuperscript{195}

\textit{Recognizing Failure}

Two types of failure are relatively easy to identify: unilateral withdrawal and forced exit. In a unilateral withdrawal, the occupying power leaves the territory without gaining any commitment from the occupied elite that provides a guarantee of the former’s interests. The occupying power is not under any immediate coercive pressure to leave, but instead has decided that the costs of staying are too high and exits from the occupied territory. Some might refer to a unilateral withdrawal as an abandonment. An example of a unilateral withdrawal would be the recent exiting of the Israel from the Gaza Strip in September 2005.\textsuperscript{196} In a forced exit, the occupying power leaves the territory when its military can no longer maintain their position due to increasing coercive resistance from either an internal or external armed force. Here, the occupying power is under coercive pressure to leave. In the majority of cases that constitute forced


\textsuperscript{195} That is not to say we cannot evaluate whether the goals of the occupation endure past its termination. Instead, I argue that is a distinct dependent variable from the outcome of a military occupation that requires a separate theoretical and empirical analysis.

\textsuperscript{196} I recognize that there is some debate as to whether Israel actually terminated the occupation of the Gaza Strip in September 2005. I side with the scholars who argue that the occupation has terminated (See some of the sources cited for the case in favor of this argument). I do so because the conceptualization I discussed in chapter 2 also suggests that the occupation terminated in September 2005.
exit, the occupying power has fought and been defeated by an opposing army. Many of the German occupations in both Western and Eastern Europe would constitute examples of a forced exit. In both cases, the occupying power has failed to obtain a commitment to its interests when the occupation terminates.

The more difficult cases to evaluate as failures are those that constitute partial compliance. In a case of partial compliance, the occupying power terminates the occupation with some commitment from the occupied elite in regards to the former’s preferred peace. The occupier has achieved some of its goals but fails to gain the full commitment. In these cases, the occupying power has likely confronted either the problem of increasing costs and marginal returns, or a mismatch in strategy in managing the elite. In either case, the occupier has had to lower its goals for the occupation given that it cannot achieve its original aims without significantly increasing the costs it will incur. In these cases, then, the occupying power has incurred greater costs as a result of the occupation than previously expected. Rather than leave empty handed, the occupier makes due with a more limited commitment that meets some of its goals. For the empirical analysis here, I consider cases of partial compliance to be failures given the costs incurred in fighting the war, and subsequently establishing an occupation on foreign territory.

Since the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of success and failure, I use a probit estimator to test the primary argument between an occupier’s strategy of control and the occupied elite’s decision to comply with the victor’s peace.¹⁹⁷ There remains a concern, however, with the methodological issues that result from a process of

strategic interaction. The fundamental criticism is this: that the outcomes we observe are the result of strategic choice, thereby making the observations censored and complicating any efforts that attempt to directly examine the costs associated with going off the equilibrium path.\textsuperscript{198} The result is that our statistical findings are more than likely wrong given that the estimators used – such as probit – cannot sufficiently account for this process.\textsuperscript{199} The literature presents us with two options for addressing these problems. First, one could adopt an econometric technique to account for censored observations and strategic interaction. A typical estimator for international relations would be a Heckman two-stage equation. However, a number of the independent variables used here – such as the strategies of control, reimbursement, etc. – are endogenous to a military occupation. In the first stage of a Heckman equation, these variables would be either strongly and positively, or even perfectly, correlated with the initiation of a military occupation because these variables only occur when a military occupation is imposed. Without significant variation, the estimator would likely not converge, and any results produced would be highly questionable for theory testing.

In this project, I follow the second approach: I devise a theory that incorporates an occupier’s prior beliefs into the argument, and then derive the hypothesis concerning the outcome of military occupations by assuming the presence of selection bias.\textsuperscript{200} Here, I


concur with Edelstein that the sample of military occupations that result from interstate wars constitutes a set of hard cases.\textsuperscript{201} As I contend, states impose occupations when their beliefs lead them to suspect that the possibility for compliance is low. Given the partially observable nature of the elite’s intentions and the varying effects of the costs of compliance, this approach is particularly well suited for indirectly testing their relationship to the strategies of control and the outcomes of military occupations.\textsuperscript{202} Furthermore, these concerns over strategic interaction and partially observable costs are mitigated when the statistical analyses are paired with the use of plausibility probes and case studies, as I do here and in chapter 5.

**Primary Independent Variables**

Here, I explain the details for coding the primary independent variables to test the primary hypothesis, and also the information collected on additional variables of interest to the study of military occupations. The original independent variables for the analysis are: control strategies, occupation aims, reimbursement, reimbursement sans extraction, extraction, civilian coercion, insurgency, and duration of the occupation. The information to code each of these eight independent variables comes from the source materials listed with each occupation in the case appendix.

*Control Strategy – Dominating, Accommodating, and Dictating*: The previous chapter identified three strategies that occupying powers may adopt in pursuit of gaining


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a commitment from the occupied elite to their preferred peace: dominating, dictating, and accommodating. In dominating, the occupier minimizes the decision-making authority of the elite regarding the primary issue at stake, and likely uses threats when necessary to motivate them to implement its preferred policies. In some cases of dominating, the occupying power will unilaterally make decisions without attempting to motivate the elite to implement any policy. In accommodating, the occupier allows the elite to have or regain significant authority over the issue at stake, and offers concessions, or cooperative measures, to gain the commitment of the elite. To be sure, the elite still have to implement the former’s policies. Yet, the occupier tries using honey to gain that compliance than vinegar. The occupier does not completely sacrifice its position of authority as it likely withholds control over security issues. Otherwise, the occupier allows the occupied elite to manage the settlement of the peace.

In dictating, the occupier allows the elite some authority over the issue at stake, and holds its response with either concessions or threats contingent on the actions of the elites to make its preferred commitment. The occupying power establishes the goal it wants to accomplish, and the presses the elite to make a decision on implementing an action that would fulfill that goal. The elite’s actions will influence how the occupying power responds with either threats or concessions. The key difference from domination is that the occupying power is compelling the elite to take actions that would fulfill its peace. The key difference in comparison to accommodating is that the elite are still significant constrained in their decision-making and no concessions are immediately forthcoming without meeting some criteria as demanded by the occupier.
In order to identify which strategy an occupying power adopted, I examined numerous secondary histories and some primary documents that detailed the plans of the leaders in pursuing military occupations. I looked for two pieces of evidence in order to decide which strategy was adopted by an occupying power: 1) the amount of decision-making the elite would have in the outcome of the occupation, and 2) the means of influence adopted by the occupying power. Of the two criteria, the means of influence is the more difficult to capture. The theoretical model suggests that unless elites are especially resolved, they will likely select into compliant behavior to avoid any possible repercussions when an occupier employs a dictating strategy. That makes it especially important to look at how occupying power structured their demands in terms of whether their use of influence was contingent on actions of the occupied elite. I also examined the evidence for whether the occupier had any suspicions or expectations regarding the behavior of the elite. This information is as not as crucial to coding the strategies, but it can help distinguish one approach from another in the coding decisions.

Then, I examined the interactions of the occupying power and the elites across the course of each military occupation for evidence in favor of one strategy as compared to the others. I coded which strategy an occupying power employed based on this information relative to the initiation of the occupation. In some occupations, states do alter their strategies. However, as the theory stipulates, which strategy an occupier selects at the beginning of the occupation will likely affect subsequent interactions between the occupier and occupied elite during the course of the operation. Following that argument, I established which strategy the occupying power led off its interactions with the occupied elite based on my evaluations of the historical sources and texts available in the case
appendix. Each measure is a dichotomous variable equal to one (1) if a state pursues that particular strategy, and zero for the other two. In the statistical analysis, I included the dictating and accommodating strategies in the model while excluding the dominating strategy as the comparison category.

**Occupation Aims:** In my research, I identified five possible aims for military occupations from 1815 through 2003: reparations, change in policy, foreign imposed regime change, state creation, and territorial gain. Here, I briefly describe each one. 

*Reparations* constitute the collecting of expenses incurred to the occupying power as part of the war as well as any damages inflicted on it as part of the fighting with the defeated state’s army. *Change In Policy* is forcing the occupied elite to renounce certain policy options and choices made prior to the initiation of the occupation. *Foreign Imposed Regime Change* comprises both changes in the leadership of a country and alterations to the domestic institutions of the government. *State Creation* involves creating a new

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203 Initially, I coded all aims sought by an occupying power, and then selected the primary aim from that list. As part of this collection, I also collected information on treaty enforcement and disarmament as occupation aims. Though occupying powers pursued disarmament in twenty-four of the occupations in the dataset, it is rarely the primary goal and more often a secondary or tertiary goal. Hence, I do not include disarmament in the final coding of the occupation aims variable. I collapsed the aim for treaty enforcement into the aim for change in policy as only a handful of cases fit the description of the former. In all of those cases, the occupying power wanted the occupied elite to change their policy to meet the obligations as set forth in a prior agreement.


205 Recent scholarship has sought to further distinguish among the possible types of FIRCS, including installing new leaders, restoring old leaders, and establishing new domestic institutions. In my research, I found it difficult to distinguish among the possible categories. Frequently, the occupying power pursues more than one of these subcategories during a FIRC. For instance, both Austria and France sought to
state with the territory coming from either a former colony/protectorate or an established state to start a new unit in the international system. Finally, *Territorial Gain* consists of an occupying power seeking to incorporate the ownership rights of part or all of the occupied territory. Following the theoretical argument, the final variable is a dichotomous measure equal to one (1) when the highest aims of the occupying power constitute either a foreign imposed regime change, the creation of a new state, or a territorial gain at the initiation of the military occupation.  

*Extraction*: The extraction strategy captures when the occupying power removes resources – such as agricultural products, industrial equipment, produced goods, natural resources, etc. – from the occupied territory without providing any compensation to the population or the elites for what they take. A strategy of extraction is distinct from an indemnity. In the majority of cases, the indemnity is paid to the occupying state through some direct monetary means, i.e., cash, gold, silver. In some cases, a state did pursue the collection of an indemnity as well as a policy of extraction from the occupied territory, such as the Soviet Union in East Germany after World War II. In these incidents, the extracted resources are usually taken as compensation for damages suffered during the course of an invasion and occupation (in this instance, Germany’s multiple occupations on various Soviet territories). Furthermore, an extraction strategy goes above and beyond

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206 Some scholars might contend that paying reparations constitutes a form of exploitation and/or resource drain on the occupied country similar to taking territory or expropriating industrial equipment for a war effort. That is one possible interpretation, but it makes something of false comparison. Money is a fungible asset that the leaders can pay now through a variety of means and replace later in most cases. Loses in territory, raw materials, and industrial equipment are less fungible and extremely costly to replace, especially with regards to the first two. For a discussion on fungible nature of money, see David Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics.”
compensating the military force stationed within the territory for the costs it incurred, and
is pursued separately from reimbursement costs. States pursuing extraction policies are
more likely taking advantage of their position as an occupier to exploit the natural and
industrial resources under their control to further their gains from the war. In the dataset,
this is a dichotomous measure equal to one (1) when the state pursues extraction as a
strategy.

Reimbursement & Reimbursement sans extraction: A state pursues a strategy of
reimbursement when it requires that the occupied pay for the costs incurred in
maintaining troops on foreign territory in addition to any other expenses that might result
from the occupation. For the project, I focus on reimbursement strategies as both a direct
monetary payment by the occupied elite to the occupying power and/or governmental
agencies providing resources and provisions necessary for the troops. I excluded
requisitions where the occupying power pays, or takes, supplies from local merchants and
civilians in the occupied territory. I have included two versions of this variable to
differentiate between two possible uses of reimbursement strategies during the course of
a military occupation. The first instance suggests that reimbursement of occupation costs
should increase the likelihood of compliance from the elite. The second instance,
however, suggests that the use of an extraction strategy along with a reimbursement
strategy might suggest that the occupying power is exploiting its position on occupied
territory. In these cases, the occupying power is likely more concerned about the gains it
can capture during the occupation, and less likely about influencing the elite. Therefore, I
created two versions of this variable for the statistical analysis. Both variables are
dichotomous measures. For the first variable, I code a one (1) when the primary
occupying power employees a reimbursement strategy at the initiation of the occupation on foreign territory. This first measure captures all instances of an occupier imposing the occupation costs on the occupied territory. For the second variable, I code a one (1) when the primary occupying power charges for the occupation costs without pursing an extraction strategy. This second measure captures those instances where the occupier is more likely using the costs to influence the elite, and less likely to be exploiting the territory for material gains.

**Duration:** This variable measures the duration of the occupation from the month it initiated until the month that it terminated.

**Controlling for The Occupied Population**

The primary focus for the dissertation has been on the occupied elite as an essential and understudied element in explaining how victorious states can establish their preferred postwar peace. When discussing military occupations, however, one cannot overlook the occupied population as a separate actor that can also influence the outcome. It is the specter of nationalism among the occupied population that can pose a serious threat to the occupier’s attempts to compel elites. Previous scholarship has identified nationalism as a powerful force that can unify and motivate individuals into making costly sacrifices to defend their homeland from foreign invaders. Unfortunately, there is no direct measure to control for the latent nationalistic tendencies of a population, and to approximate when a conflict will emerge. Here, I contend that the occupied population

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207 I only code as a one (1) if the occupying power charged for the reimbursement of its occupation costs during the actual occupation. If the occupying power sought reimbursement after the termination of the occupation, I did not include that in the coding.

is a relatively neutral actor, one that is neither hostile nor supportive of the occupation of its territory, though they would slightly prefer no occupation to the presence of foreign troops. They might remain a neutral actor during the course of an occupation, and thereby generate no further costs to the occupying power. However, the actions of the occupier can influence the tendencies of the population away from such a neutral position and towards a more hostile evaluation of the foreign presence. The statistical analysis captures this hardening against the occupation in two ways: the use of civilian coercion and whether the occupier has to fight an insurgency. While neither strategy directly affects the elite, these two strategies can indirectly increase their costs of compliance while creating incentives to act on their more opportunistic preferences, thereby decreasing the chances of success.

**Civilian Coercion:** A strategy of civilian coercion consists of a state engaging in violence against the population living in the occupied territory. Civilian coercion may include a number of activities, such as the forced recruitment of men into the occupying power’s armed forces, forcible relocation of certain peoples, compulsory/forced labor, mass arrests, mass hostage-taking, mass rape, and/or indiscriminate, mass killing of

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209 It is important to acknowledge that there is likely some endogeneity between the variables for confronting an insurgency and the use of civilian coercion against the occupied population. That is, the use of civilian coercion by an occupying power can fuel a population’s incentives against the foreign invader by contributing to, or joining an insurgent movement. In addition, when states are fighting an insurgency in occupied territory, the population likely becomes a target for more aggressive actions. Targeting civilians might undermine the native support for an insurgency, thereby eliminating its base for supplies and such to wage a low-cost fight against an occupying power. Hence, the two measures likely influence one another in the model and the likelihood of endogeneity subsequently increases. Theoretically, it is important to control for both in any model investigating the outcomes of military occupations. Furthermore, it is difficult to identify ‘who shot first’ in these cases of civilian coercion and insurgencies in aggregate data analysis. Here, I do not attempt to distinguish whether the occupying power targeted civilians before or after an insurgency commenced. Instead, I contend that both the strategy of civilian coercion and fighting an insurgency during the course of an occupation decrease the likelihood of success. On this difficulty with aggregate datasets see, Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 3 (2009): 331-362.
civilian populations during the course of the occupation. In order to qualify for coding, I place a few rules on the usage of civilian coercion. First, I only include violence directed against noncombatants. Following Alexander Downes, I identify ‘combatants’ as “[consisting] of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible for the conduct of its subordinates.” Those individuals lacking membership in such institutions and who present no threat of harm to the occupier are treated as civilians or noncombatants for coding purposes. Second, the military forces of the occupying power must directly engage in the use of coercion against the civilian population. I exclude instances of the occupying power having local, or native, forces undertake any such measures regardless if they were acting as intermediaries. Third, a strategy of civilian coercion must be a sustained effort by the army of occupation that affects a sizable portion of the occupied population. Random acts of violence that occasionally occur between soldiers and civilians are excluded from the dataset, such as brawling, limited arrests, and dispersing protests against the occupying power (unless followed by mass arrests, killings, etc.). Fourth, a strategy of civilian coercion must have some support – whether openly acknowledged or tacitly communicated – from the

210 For a similar definition on civilian victimization, see, Alexander Downes, “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War,” International Security 30, no. 4 (2006): 156-157. Also see, for example, Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, “Draining the Sea”: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare,” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 375-407, for a definition on mass killing of noncombatants. I do not, however, include as part of the civilian coercion strategy a precise number for what constitutes mass killing. Furthermore, I exclude curfews, limitations on freedom of assembly, speech, and collective fining from the list of coercion as many occupying powers use these strategies during the course of an occupation to control the population. For a defense of these strategies as deterrents to insurgencies, see Melissa Willard-Foster, “Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied Occupations of Germany and Japan,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 40, no. 1 (2009): 33-56.

211 Downes, “Desperate Times, Desperate Measures,” 157. I do exclude violence against prisoners of war, even though their ability to inflict harm may be severely limited.
leaders of the state. In the dataset, this is a dichotomous measure equal to one (1) when the state pursues civilian coercion as a strategy against the population.

**Insurgency:** The second measure to capture the possible dangers of nationalism focuses on whether the occupying power had to fight an insurgency during any portion of the occupation. Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson have established a dataset of counterinsurgency efforts by states from 1808 through 2002, defining insurgencies as:

… a protracted violent struggle by nonstate actors to obtain their political objectives – often independence, greater autonomy, or subversion of existing authorities – against the current political authority (the incumbent). Two rules for defining a case where chosen. First, we imposed a minimum 1,000 battle death inclusion rule, with at least 100 casualties suffered on each side. Second, the nonstate actor must have adopted a guerrilla warfare strategy. Here, guerilla warfare is defined as a strategy of armed resistance that (1) uses small, mobile groups to inflict punishment on the incumbent through hit-and-run strikes while avoiding direct battle when possible and (2) seeks to win the allegiance of at least some portion of the noncombatant population.\(^{212}\)

This is a dichotomous measure equal to one (1) when the state has to fight against an insurgency at any point during the occupation. The data on insurgencies comes from the code book for Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson’s work.\(^{213}\)

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213 Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines,” in particular their code book for the project. I made a few changes to the coding scheme: first I add some insurgencies as detailed from Appendix A on interstate wars. Second, I include the extra-state conflicts in Afghanistan (since 2001) and Iraq (since 2003). Scholars disagree on whether these conflicts constitute civil wars or insurgencies. For example, Peic and Reiter code both as civil wars. *Resort to War* and Valentino et al capture these two conflicts as insurgencies, or extra-state wars. More than likely both conflicts have characteristics meeting the criteria for an insurgency and a civil war. See Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul K. Huth, and Sarah Croco, “Covenants without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War,” *World Politics* 58, no. 3 (2006): 339-377; Goran Peic and Dan Reiter, “Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, State Power, and Civil War Onset, 1920-2004,” *British Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 3 (2011): 453-475; Meredith Sarkees and Frank Wayman, *Resort to War, 1816 to 2007* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010).
Control Variables

_Military Forces_: This variable measures the overall military personnel available to an occupying power. I use the information on military personnel for a state during the last year of the war and the initiation of the occupation. The data for this variable comes from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset. I expect that the greater the military resources available to a state, the more likely it is to succeed in compelling the elite to comply.

_Alliance Partners_: States occasionally engage in military occupations with the help of their wartime allies. Alliance partners can reduce the costs of the occupation by distributing the necessary investment of resources among those involved, thereby freeing up some of each state’s limited resources for other projects. Allies can also increase available manpower and resources in order to enforce the postwar goals during the course of the occupation. Thus, bringing in allies could improve the overall course of the occupation by reducing the costs to the occupying powers while maintaining or even increasing the costs to the occupied elite. The price for including allies in the occupation, however, is not in material costs but rather in the risk of creating substantive disagreements over the pursuit of their interests. When alliance partners share the authority in governing foreign territory, each one involved brings her interests to the table regarding the peace. That creates two problems for succeeding in a military

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215 In the context of a principal-agent model, the inclusion of more than one principal can complicate the contract given that each could have differing interests. Typically, PA models assume that the principal is a
occupation. First, conflicting interests among allies will create internal disagreement over the aims of the occupation and how to enforce their interests, likely resulting in concerns over costly entanglements in ventures that have little to no benefits for the allied powers involved. Second, these disagreements among the occupiers over aims and strategies are often visible, especially to occupied elite. In turn, elites might try to exploit these disagreements to their advantage. For these two reasons, I expect that having alliance partners share in the authority to govern decreases the likelihood of compliance from the elite. To capture this variable, the alliance partners of the primary occupying power must share in the authority to govern the foreign territory, as described previously in the unit of analysis section. The data on alliance membership is from the Alliance Treaty and Obligations Project (ATOP). I code as a one (1) when alliance partners have joined the primary state in managing the occupation.

**Domestic Institutions – Democracy:** Since previous scholarship has found that democracies are more likely to win the wars they fight, the expectation here is the democracies should also be more likely to compel the peace they enforce. Democratic states, then, should be more successful in gaining a credible commitment from occupied elites in military occupations. The literature has several mechanisms for explaining why democracies are more effectively at winning wars, ranging from the influence of

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elections when selecting conflicts\textsuperscript{218}, to the leaders engaging less rent seeking\textsuperscript{219}, and to the ability of democracies to provide material capabilities for war.\textsuperscript{220} The statistical analysis presented here does not focus on the relationship between domestic politics and the outcomes of military occupations. Hence, I do not attempt to parse out which of these three mechanisms explains why democracies might perform better in military occupations as compared to all other types of domestic regimes. I simply accept the basic proposition that if democracies are more likely to win the war, then they might be more likely to win the peace. The data for this variable comes from the Polity IV Project.\textsuperscript{221} In the analysis, I use a dichotomous measure for Democracy. On the Polity scale of -10 to 10, I code all states scoring 6 and above as democracies.

\textbf{Identity:} I created a dichotomous measure to capture whether the occupying power was of a different racial or religious background from the occupied population that it governed. The coding of this variable was based on a comparison of general racial/religious heritage of the state in control of the occupation regime to the racial/religious heritage of the majority of the population residing in the occupied territory. The expectation here is that differences in religious or racial identities may lead to conflicts between the occupying army and the occupied population. In terms of racial


differences, I include the following as possible racial archetypes: African, Asian, and Caucasian. Following previous research, I note that “[major] religions included Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Shintoism, Hinduism, and a number of different major African religious groups.” For coding of this variable, I relied on the secondary historical sources to determine whether the occupied population had a similar race or religion to the occupying state’s military forces.

**Huntington’s Civilizations**: In his work, *Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington suggested that emerging conflicts will occur along the fault lines of various civilizations across the world. Here, I examine whether his argument might offer some insight into why military occupations succeed, or fail when states impose occupations on territory outside of their civilization. Huntington designated eight civilizations in the world: Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese. Based off these civilizations, I created a dichotomous variable that is equal to one (1) when the occupying power and the occupied territory are from separate civilizations.

**Strategic Rival**: If two rivals go to war, then one can assume that the victor of such a conflict has a higher level of uncertainty regarding the opponent’s intentions towards the peace. Rivals might be more likely to impose occupations to insure their preferred outcomes, and they might be more likely to succeed for two reasons. First,

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222 Valentino et al., “Covenants without Swords,” 361.


224 Valentino et al, “Covenants without Swords,” and Downes use a similar measure for examining cultural differences in targeting civilians during war. Also see Alexander B. Downes, “Restraint or Propellant? Democracy and Civilian Fatalities in Interstate Wars,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 6 (2007): 872-904.
rivals imposing military occupations might be more likely to adopt more hard line policies that require reciprocated cooperation from their opponents. Second, as the costs of waging the war increase for the defeated state, the elite’s incentives from their domestic audiences to resist might subsequently decrease and thereby mitigate the likely domestic costs of compliance. The data on strategic rivalries between an occupier and the occupied elite comes Colaresci et al. This is a dichotomous measure equal to one (1) when the occupying power and the occupied territory were engaged in a strategic rivalry prior to the initiation of the military occupation.

**International Threat:** In a system of anarchy, a major concern for states is whether an international threat will emerge and challenge their position in occupied territory. Third party actors could provide a basis for establishing a more cooperative relationship between the occupier and the occupied population if both actors share a similar perception of the threat. An international threat, however, could also provide an opportunity for the elite to engage in opportunistic behaviors against an occupying power. Similar to having allies involved in these operations, the presence of a third party actor interested in the occupation might offer incentives for the elite to favor non-compliance with the occupier’s demands.

Unfortunately, previous scholarship has not established a definitive measure for what constitutes ‘threat,’ especially for quantitative international relations research.

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David M. Edelstein’s work also provides relatively little guidance given that he does not conceptualize or operationalize what constitutes an international threat in his work on military occupations.228 Here, I use the strategic rivalries dataset from Colaresci et al. in combination with secondary historical research to identify whether a third-party constituted a ‘threat’ to the occupation.229 I use the strategic rivalry dataset as it establishes a conceptual identification of rivalries without relying on conflict density measures. Instead, the strategic rivalries dataset uses a more perceptual understanding to identify when states view each other threatening competitors.230 I used the following procedure to identify whether a strategic rival was a potential threat to the occupation. First, I identified the list of possible strategic rivals for the occupying power in a particular occupation. I only included rivals that had the potential to interfere in an occupation, generally based on geographic location. For example, in the American Occupation of the Philippines, I noted that Japan was a potential rival given its proximity. With the American Occupation of Cuba, I found that the United States had a rivalry with the United Kingdom, who still retained territories in the Caribbean. Next, I examined the secondary histories from the case list for whether the occupier recognized that strategic rival as a likely threat to its primary interest in the occupied territory. Following the examples, I found that American officials had concerns regarding the intentions of Japan throughout the occupation, but I did not find similar evidence concerning possible British

228 Edelstein, Occupational Hazards.

229 Colaresi et al, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics.

230 In international relations scholarship, Stephen Walt’s work on alliances provides a thorough conceptualization of the likelihood factors that contribute to identify a threat. The strategic rivalries data meets some of the criteria as established by Walt, which is why I use it instead of enduring rivalry data to identify possible threats to military occupations. See Stephen M. Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
interference in Cuba. The variable is a dichotomous measure that I code as equal to a one (1) when an occupying power perceives a threat from a strategic rival towards its interest in occupied territory.231

The Empirical Results

Now, I turn to evaluating the full statistical model. The results in Table 3.1 provide the full model for the success and failure of military occupations with the coefficients for each model in a column with the robust standard errors in parentheses. In Table 3.2, I present the predicted probabilities for the relevant independent variables based on results from Model 2 in Table 3.1 using the observed value approach to aid in the substantive interpretation of the results.232 I note here that I found no evidence of multicollinearity among the independent variables in these four models, as demonstrated by the auxiliary r² values remaining at or less than 0.41.

231 In Edelstein’s model, he does propose that the occupying power and the occupied population should have a similar perception of a threat. Empirically, it is difficult to establish whether an occupied population shared a similar perception of threat to the occupier power. Historical records as to the perceptions of populations are often difficult to evaluate, especially given the possible distribution of opinions among the various segments. One could focus on the occupied elites to determine whether they shared a similar threat perception as the occupying power. This raises theoretical and methodological concerns with Edelstein’s work in terms of shared threat perceptions when we recognize the difference between the occupied population and the occupied elite. The occupying power is likely to favor elites that share their interests as well as fears. Such elites, then, are more likely to be brought into the operation. These elites are valuable as they can influence the nationalist tendencies of the population. If that holds, then the elites can likely influence the threat perceptions of the population, to a certain extent.

Table 3.1: Probit Analysis for Strategies of Control In Military Occupations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Elites</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dictating</td>
<td>1.42***</td>
<td>1.36***</td>
<td>1.42***</td>
<td>1.32***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.392)</td>
<td>(.403)</td>
<td>(.408)</td>
<td>(.394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodating</td>
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<td>-.381</td>
<td>-.429</td>
<td>-.577</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.463)</td>
<td>(.467)</td>
<td>(.451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation Aims</td>
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<td>-.244</td>
<td>-.229</td>
<td>-.337</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.356)</td>
<td>(.349)</td>
<td>(.378)</td>
<td>(.366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reimbursement</td>
<td>.404</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.345</td>
<td>.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.299)</td>
<td>(.307)</td>
<td>(.301)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reimbursement</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.723**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sans Extraction</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Extraction</td>
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<td>-.050</td>
<td>-.447</td>
<td>-.568</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.495)</td>
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<td>-.002**</td>
<td>-.002**</td>
<td>-.002**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency</td>
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<td>-1.36***</td>
<td>-1.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.481)</td>
<td>(.484)</td>
<td>(.460)</td>
<td>(.481)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Coercion</td>
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<td>-.776*</td>
<td>-.794*</td>
<td>-.775*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.443)</td>
<td>(.462)</td>
<td>(.440)</td>
<td>(.445)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Civilizations</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.418</td>
<td>--</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.274)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
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<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.561*</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(324)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Power</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td>.000**</td>
<td>.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>-.290</td>
<td>-.301</td>
<td>-.323</td>
<td>-.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.308)</td>
<td>(.319)</td>
<td>(.290)</td>
<td>(.296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.642***</td>
<td>.725**</td>
<td>.665**</td>
<td>.766**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.309)</td>
<td>(.345)</td>
<td>(.317)</td>
<td>(.297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Rival</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.260)</td>
<td>(.273)</td>
<td>(.264)</td>
<td>(.277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>-.426</td>
<td>-.454</td>
<td>-.487</td>
<td>-.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.399)</td>
<td>(.397)</td>
<td>(.385)</td>
<td>(.366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.253</td>
<td>-.338</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>.138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.493)</td>
<td>(.520)</td>
<td>(.512)</td>
<td>(.575)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
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<td>-47.67</td>
<td>-47.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>134</td>
<td>134</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.4630</td>
<td>.4742</td>
<td>.4722</td>
<td>.4746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected % Correctly Predicted</td>
<td>77.01</td>
<td>77.38</td>
<td>77.34</td>
<td>77.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered to War and Country
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (one-tailed)
Expected % Correctly Predicted from Herron (1999)
Table 3.2: Predicted Probabilities for Success in a Military Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood of Success</th>
<th>Dictating†</th>
<th>Reimbursement sans extraction††</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Insurgency</th>
<th>Civilian Coercion</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td>25&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; percentile</td>
<td>75&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; percentile</td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>No (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.66</td>
<td>61.08</td>
<td>43.60</td>
<td>39.62</td>
<td>45.40</td>
<td>36.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>+33.41</td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-3.97</td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>+120.78%</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>-9.10%</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No (0)</td>
<td>Yes (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36.60</td>
<td>51.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>+15.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>+41.83%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All variables held at their observed values unless noted otherwise
† Accommodating set to zero
†† Extraction set to zero
For the primary hypothesis under evaluation, there is strong support for the argument that states in a military occupation should approach the occupied elite as agents with adverse intentions towards the postwar peace, and engage in dictating the peace in comparison to the baseline strategy of dominating the former opponent. Occupying powers should anticipate that the elite will likely have incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviors. Therefore, occupiers should employ a strategy that allows them to screen their new agents during the course of the occupation. By engaging in a costly exercise of power via the strategy selected, the occupier can overcome the advantage that the elite have in regards their primary source of influence over the occupation. Specifically, occupying powers engaging in a dictating strategy to control the elite are at an advantage in terms of gathering information to evaluate the elite’s intentions. By compelling a choice, the occupier is engaging the elite in such a way as to reveal their preferences towards the postwar era and allow for an evaluation of whether they will comply with the former’s demands. Furthermore, by maintaining a strong position to influence the elite’s decisions, the occupier can more effectively manipulate the costs of compliance in its favor through the use of concessions or threats as necessary depending on the former’s behavior. In Table 3.1, the statistical result is positive and statistically significant in all four models. In Table 3.2, the predicted probabilities suggest that when the occupying power engages in a dictating strategy against the occupied elite, it increases the chances of successfully gaining its goals by approximately 120 percent as compared to either of the other two strategies.

233 If I run the models with the Dictating strategy as the comparison group, the results for both Dominating and Accommodating are consistently negative and statistically significant across all models.
Costly Delays and Popular Leaders: the Chilean Occupation of Peru (1881-1883) and the Soviet Occupation of North Korea (1945-1948)

To reinforce these findings, I present brief plausibility probes into two cases. First, the Chilean Occupation of Peru as an instance of an occupying power dictating its demands for territorial concessions while pursuing a foreign imposed regime change. Second, I discuss the Soviet Occupation of North Korea as another instance of the dictating strategy, this time against a popular nationalist leader and his followers when creating a new state in the international system. In both cases, the occupying power is pursing demands that increase both the costs of compliance and the possibility for opportunistic behaviors.

The Chilean Occupation of Peru illustrates the utility of dictating the peace, in particular the revelation of information about the adverse intentions of leaders. In January 1881, the Chilean military captured Lima as the Peruvian government collapsed under the weight of its defeat in the War of the Pacific. In order to gain their peace, the Chilean government required that Peru establish a new administration to take over the responsibilities of governing the country and, most importantly, to make the commitment to the former’s demands. The occupation authorities called for an assembly of Peruvian ‘notables’ to convene and to select a new president for the country in February 1881. The assembly elected Francisco Garcia Calderon as the new president of Peru.234 The new commander of the Chilean army of occupation, Patricio Lynch, favored the election of Calderon, and awaited the official formation of the Peruvian government in June to

negotiate the final agreement over the disputed territories of Tarapacá, Tacna, and Arica. Two events occurred, however, that complicated the occupation.

First, the American government admonished the Chilean government that territorial demands were only possible if Peru could not pay an indemnity for the war. To the Peruvians, that statement signaled that they would not have to accept any peace which would require them to relinquish territory to their adversary. Calderon likely decided that this signal, combined with the recent diplomatic recognition of his government by the United States, would allow him to delay in reaching an agreement with the Chileans. Once the façade of compliance from Calderon became increasingly evident, the Chilean occupation adjusted its policy from cooperative measures to more threatening actions. In September 1881, the president of Chile ordered Lynch to dissolve the newly installed government to pressure Calderon into complying with their demands. Calderon continued to withhold his acceptance of the Chilean terms, likely believing that the American government would take some action to support his efforts to not comply. When that measure failed to influence Calderon’s decision, Lynch “…arrested the former provisional president….in the hope that this icy shower of reality would prompt more flexibility in negotiations.” Calderon was eventually removed from power after Lynch had asked the president to resign his office.

Second, the defeated military forces of Peru scattered into the countryside and two of the former generals separately initiated insurgent campaigns against the

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occupier. Lizardo Montero and Andrés Cáceres each gathered troops and supplies to fight the Chilean forces spreading throughout the country. Initially, the Chilean response was rather moderate to the insurgents’ attacks. When Calderon was forced from office, however, Lynch set out to decimate the guerilla forces. In the mean time, the Chileans did not find a new leader for Peru until April 1882 when Miguel Iglesias released papers calling for peace on the terms as set forth by Chile. Iglesias stated that “[Peruvian politicians] speak of a question of honor that impedes a peace agreement that would cede a piece of land. In order not to let it go, something that represents a mere handful of gold…we permit the banner of the enemy [sic] fly over our highest towers.” Though the document demonstrated Iglesias’ strong anti-Chilean rhetoric, Lynch recognized a potential leader who could establish himself as head of Peru and tolerate the costs necessary to commit to Chile’s preferred peace. In December 1882, Iglesias was brought into political power along with some of his supporters. After defeating the main insurgent force in July 1883, the remaining Peruvian holdouts decided to support the Iglesias regime.

Throughout the spring of 1883, the negotiations between Chile and the Iglesias regime took place, reaching an agreement that strongly favored the former’s demands. Chile would permanently receive Tarapacá, and it would control the two disputed provinces for ten years before a plebiscite would decide their final ownership.

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237 This insurgency is not included in the Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines,” dataset. However, I did include an insurgency for the occupation of Peru when coding the variable. See my notes in Appendix A on the War of the Pacific regarding its duration as an interstate war and its subsequent transformation into an extra-state conflict.

238 Farcau, The Ten Cents War, 182.

239 Ibid.
Furthermore, the winner of the plebiscite would pay the loser a substantial indemnity.\textsuperscript{240} In return, Chile recognized Iglesias as the official leader of Peru and agreed to begin the withdrawal of its army of occupation. The remaining insurgents surrendered in October 1883 as the two governments concluded the final agreement.\textsuperscript{241} As the theory suggests, the costs of complying with the victor’s demands were high for Iglesias. Caceres, the former insurgent leader, remained active in politics following the withdrawal. He fervently accused Iglesias of orchestrating the defeat of Peru by accepting the Chilean terms. In November 1885, Caceres won a civil conflict against Iglesias and became president of Peru. Iglesias remained alive and returned to military service. Though Caceres had challenged Iglesias on being compelled to accept Chile’s peace, as president he took no actions to break that commitment.\textsuperscript{242}

One possible contention to the Chilean case is that Calderon lacked strong support from the population. During the occupation, Calderon had to compete with another Peruvian ‘government’ that claimed to be the legitimate ruling entity over the territory in addition to the various insurgent forces that challenged the Chilean occupation. Hence,

\textsuperscript{240} Some might consider the plebiscite a significant concession by Chile. As Sater notes, however, “…the plebiscite was merely a device to gull the Peruvian public while allowing the Chileans to annex the two provinces.” William F. Sater, \textit{Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2007), 330. Chile made no efforts to honor that portion of the agreement, but continued to exploit the two provinces for their natural resources. It was not until 1929 that the two countries resolved the official status of the two territories, thereby granting Chile over 40 years of access to the provinces’ resources and 30 years more than agreed to in the treaty. For a discussion on the history of the dispute following the War of the Pacific, see, Ronald Bruce St. John, “Chile, Peru and the Treaty of 1929: The Final Settlement,” \textit{Boundary and Security Bulletin} 8, no. 1 (2000): 91-100. Furthermore, during this time, the Chilean government generated a significant portion of its revenue – perhaps as much as half - via export taxes on the nitrates from these territories. On this point, see Richard Sicotte, Catalina Vizcarra, and Kirsten Wandschneider, “The Fiscal Impact of the War of the Pacific,” \textit{ Cliometrica} 3, no. 2 (2009): 97-121.

\textsuperscript{241} Farcau, \textit{The Ten Cents War}, 186.

\textsuperscript{242} Farcau, \textit{The Ten Cents War}, 192-193; Sater, \textit{Andean Tragedy}, 343.
some scholars might contend that as a leader, Calderon could not effectively mobilize the population to a single nationalist cause to resist the occupier’s demands. However, the theory would assert that politically valuable leaders do not have an advantage in bargaining – whether via audience costs or reputations – when the occupying power is dictating its conditions. In the Soviet occupation in North Korea, Cho Mansik was considered the most popular political figure in Pyonyang when the occupation initiated in August 1945. His prestige as a Korean nationalist was widely known, and the Soviets hoped to greatly benefit from that image to accomplish their postwar goals on the peninsula. In the autumn of 1945, a number of high-level meetings took place to discuss with Cho the terms of the occupation. Cho, however, refused to cooperate with the Soviets, and had decided to set out his own conditions for the occupation authorities. In order for him to work with the Soviet regime, Cho ardently demanded extensive autonomy in decision-making and policy implementation without Soviet consultation. The Soviets continually refused his demands. Yet, they retained Cho as the official leader of the new government in North Korea.243 In December 1945, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom decided that Korea would remain under a joint administration for five years to receive tutelage on how to govern their country.244 In the following January, the Soviet occupation authorities then demanded that Cho accede to

243 Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Revolution* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 14. Lankov mentions that before January 1946, “Cho tried to use his position to conduct his own policy which often contradicted the plans of Soviet supervisors” (16). Such actions follow in line with the predictions of the model concerning the behavior of the elite. Unfortunately, Lankov provides relatively few details on the precise policies implemented by Cho, and the specific responses of the Soviet authorities in the fall and winter of 1945 to 1946.

244 Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung*, 23. It is not clear who arrested Cho and his supporters. Lankov contends that, most likely, even if the Koreans carried out the action it was done under the explicit orders of the Soviets.
the trusteeship and sign a declaration in support of the proposal. When confronted with the choice, Cho refused. Cho preferred immediate independence for Korea, as he “…was not the least bit interested in exchanging Japanese rulers for new foreign masters under the rubric of ‘trusteeship.’” He then resigned from office. Cho and many of his supporters were arrested. Following this incident, the Soviet authorities promoted Kim Il-Sung to the highest leadership position in the North. At the time, Kim was considered an ardent Korean nationalist, similar to Cho in terms of his preferences for favoring a country immediately free from all foreign influence. However, Kim had to reconcile his political ambitions with the Soviet demands. He now openly stated that Korea was not ready for immediate political independence and he accepted the international trusteeship in return for gaining access to highest political office in the new country.246

**Interpreting the Independent and Control Variables**

Now, I turn to interpreting the remaining primary independent and control variables found in Table 3.1. All four models demonstrate a negative relationship between the aims of the occupying power and the outcome of the military occupation. As the theory indicated, the higher the demands placed upon the occupied elite, the greater the costs of compliance that they will have to incur for fulfilling those terms. Thereby, the likelihood of the occupied elite choosing compliance decreases, and the likely outcome of the occupation shifts towards failure. This finding here corroborates some of the evidence from the FIRC literature regarding the difficulties in successfully imposing

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246 Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader*, 55-56.
new institutions and leaders.\textsuperscript{247} It also suggests that the goals alone for military occupations are not sufficient to demonstrate their utility as a commitment device, against some of the intuitions discussed in the war termination literature.\textsuperscript{248} This finding, however, is not statistically significant for any of the models presented in Table 3.1. The lack of significance results from an interaction with the strategy variables. As the theory predicted the aims of the occupation affect the incentives of the occupied elite to favor non-compliance and ultimately undermine the establishment of the victor’s peace. The occupier adopts its strategy of control as a means to counter the elites’ incentives and to influence their decision-making towards compliance. Hence, the argument expects that the strategy will ‘overcome’ the costs of compliance.

Reimbursement of occupation costs is always positive, but not significant in models 1, 3, and 4. For Model 2, however, reimbursement of occupation costs is positive and significant when I remove those instances where a state is also pursuing an extraction strategy against the occupied territory. As Table 3.2 indicates, when the occupying power pursues a reimbursement strategy there is a 41.83 percentage increase in the likelihood of successful compelling the elite to make a commitment to the victor’s peace. The difference between the two results rests on the possible exploitative nature of extraction policies that some occupying powers might pursue. In these cases where an occupier is extracting industrial and natural resources, the costs of the occupation are likely not used as a means to influence the elite into making a commitment to the occupier’s peace.


\textsuperscript{248} For example, Dan Reiter, \textit{How War Ends} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
Instead, the occupying power is exploiting its position relative to the elite to fuel its own foreign policy projects at the expense of the occupied territory. Though extraction policies – as conceptualized here – focus on the occupying power taking material goods from the occupied territory, the logic behind that action may suggest a more abusive policy that carries over into the pursuit of occupation costs. When an occupier is not pursuing an extraction strategy, the reimbursement of occupation costs is likely an extension of the dictating strategy to influence the behavior of the occupied elite.

For example, the Allies in the occupation of France certainly used the occupation costs to influence the Duke of Richelieu. In 1816, the French government was confronted with an enormous deficit in the coming budget, a shortfall that was largely influenced by the indemnity payments required by the Second Treaty of Paris and the costs of the army of occupation. The Chamber had proved itself uncooperative in numerous matters, with the painful debates on the budget shortages further demonstrating its unwillingness to comply with its imposed financial burdens. Richelieu realized that a reduction in the costs of the army of occupation could improve his ministry’s position vis-à-vis the chamber. Without it, Richelieu understood that he would be out of office by the end of the year. Richelieu approached the Allied Powers with his request for a reduction in forces. He explained that it would decrease the deficit for the government and as a consequence, likely moderate the behavior of the Chamber. The Russia ambassador replied with a demand that the Chamber be dissolved immediately, and that the French hold new elections. The Duke of Wellington recognized that a reduction in forces was possible and likely valuable to Richelieu politically. Wellington, however, advised his government that such a reduction was only possible if there was an improvement in the French
political situation first. The Allies would not grant a reduction in costs as long as the current Chamber remained in power. As Frederick Hermann stated, “Richelieu finally realized he had no choice left and that the Allies had driven him into a corner.” Finding himself in such a difficult political position, Richelieu gave in to the Allies’ demands and dissolved the Chamber in July 1816.249

The duration of the occupation is consistently negative, and statistically significant in all four models presented in Table 3.1. Staying longer on foreign territory reduces the likelihood of gaining a commitment by approximately 9 percent when the duration varies from an occupation that endures for 25 months (25th percentile) to one that lasts for 97 months in total (75th percentile). Effectively, extending the duration of an occupation is not necessarily useful way for the occupying power to influence the behavior of the elite. If anything, remaining in an occupation longer only further undermines the effort. One inefficient aspect of military occupations is that the occupier will likely err on the side of a longer occupation rather than a short one to insure that the elite are not undermining the former’s goals since the occupier does not fully know the intentions of the elite.250 Since the elite might have some incentives to misrepresent their intentions, the occupier likely decides to continue the occupation to keep the pressure on the occupied elite.251 Allowing the occupation to endure, however, can undermine the


250 For the duration of an occupation as a commitment mechanism, see James Dobbins, et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: Rand National Security Research Division, 2003).

251 One question of interest here is whether the elite can engage in delaying strategies to undermine the occupier’s position. By delaying the commitment, the elite could drive up the costs to the occupying power. Delaying strategies would only work if the elite believe that the costs of continuing the occupation are
occupying power’s efforts to compel the elite towards compliance as its costs continue to increase while the benefits remain constant.

Next, I turn to the two primary variables representing how the occupier engages with the occupied population, the possibility of nationalism, and how the use of coercive measures influence the outcomes of military occupations. As the statistical results indicate, the use of civilian coercion undermines the ability of the occupying power to gain a commitment from the occupied elite. The measure is consistently negative and statistically significant across all four models presented in Table 3.1. The use of civilian coercion during the course of a military occupation decreases the likelihood of success by approximately 33 percent. The findings here strongly indicate that using coercion against civilian populations will only diminish the likely of successfully implementing the victor’s peace. I argue that occurs for two reasons. First, the result stems in part from the increasing costs of compliance for the elite thereby decreasing their willingness to comply with the victor’s demands. The occupied elite might confront increasing costs of compliance when the civilian population suffers at the orders of the occupier. If the elite are complicit, then civilian coercion might destabilize any future chance of survival, and likely tie their fate more directly to the occupying power. Second, the occupied population itself now has incentives to not remain neutral during the course of the occupation. When under threat from the foreign power, the population will now confront a choice on whether and how to resist. While most studies recognize the possibility of an insurgency, the occupied population can engage in both active and passive measures to greater to the occupier than the compliance costs incurred to their agendas. Furthermore, the elite would have to assume that the occupier would not interpret a delay on their part as non-compliance, and attempt to sanction them. In part, the plausibility probe into the Chilean Occupation of Peru addressed this concern when Calderon attempted to withhold his agreement to the Chilean terms.
increase the costs that the occupier must bear to achieve its goals. That is, the occupied population has access to multiple paths to effectively resist the occupying power. I contend that using civilian coercion likely increases the use of all forms of resistance, thereby increasing the costs to the occupying power, and subsequently diminishing their chances for success.

For example, in the French Occupation of Cilicia, atrocities committed by legionnaire troops may have ‘cowed’ the population initially in 1918, but their use of these vicious measures resulted in reprisals from the locals shortly thereafter in the occupation.252 The regular troops continued the use of coercion against the population in 1919 in the form of mass arrests and deportations that did relatively little to help the French maintain neutral hearts or minds and only increased the suspicions of the occupied population as to the true intentions of the occupying power.253 Even if civilian coercion can mitigate the potential emergence of an insurgency, it might push the occupied population to adopt more passive measures of resistance as the Germans witnessed in the occupation of Belgium from 1914 to 1918.

One possible criticism of this project’s attempt to measure civilian coercion is the lack of distinction between types of coercive measures. Both Stathis N. Kalyvis and Melissa Willard-Forster have differentiated between the use of sanctions and reprisals, and offer sound logical reasons why that differentiation would potentially affect the incentives of the population towards escalation.254 However, the project here has not


253 Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurus*, 118 and 128.

adopted such differentiation precisely because it does not matter to the occupied population. Here, I suggest that the distinctions – while analytically sound – make little difference to the occupied population as they come to focus more on the violence and less on its intended goals. Similar to the work of Max Abrahms on the credibility paradox with regards to terrorism, I argue that the occupied population will likely infer the preferences of the occupying power from the severity of their treatment while discounting or ignoring the actual goals it wants to accomplish. The occupied population likely sees only the actions of the occupying power, and then infers the latter’s intentions from those actions. Small incidents among civilians are likely not as problematic for occupying powers. Large-scale measures that target the population might diminish the likelihood of an insurgency emerging, but civilian coercion is not likely to be effective for a state to achieve its postwar goals. When witnessing such events, the occupied population is not as likely to infer the intention of deterrence, but more likely to perceive the foreign power as a threat towards their survival and that subsequently diminishes their incentives for remaining neutral. For its part, the occupier cannot expect that its distinctions in the use of violence will effectively communicate its intentions clearly and concisely to the population.

When confronting an insurgency, the occupying power is significantly less likely to gain a commitment to its preferred peace from the occupied elite. In those occupations

a different vocabulary than Willard-Foster to distinguish between what he calls indiscriminate violence and selective violence. For Kalyvas indiscriminate violence targets individuals for belonging to certain groups regardless of their own actions whereas selective focuses on the actions of individuals. Willard-Foster refers to sanctions as a means of population control, such as curfews and forced labor, and reprisals as reserved for only active resistance, such as the destruction of towns to find insurgents.

where a state has to fight an insurgent force, the coefficient is consistently negative and significant for all of the models. Following Table 3.2, when a state confronts an insurgency during an occupation the chances of successfully gaining a commitment to its peace decrease by over 62 percent. The power of an insurgency is not necessarily in driving the occupier from foreign territory. Rather, the effectiveness of an insurgency is in increasing the costs that the occupying power has to incur to maintain the occupation to achieve its postwar goals. Furthermore, it is the counterinsurgency efforts that will likely bring the occupier into conflict with the occupied population, since the insurgents can often hide among locals and occupiers have relatively few means to distinguish friend from foe in these circumstances. Fighting an insurgency, then, is likely to increase the occupier’s use of violence against civilians.

The empirical findings appear to be mixed on whether differences in culture and identity between the occupier and the occupied population affect the outcomes of military occupations. First, in Model 3, the measure for the possible ‘clash of civilizations’ during the course of an occupation is negative as expected, but the result is not statistically significant. The second measure suggests that when the occupying power and the occupied population had differing religious and/or racial backgrounds, the possibility of success diminished. Specifically, the coefficient for this measure is negative and significant for Model 4 in Table 3.1. The results would suggest, then, that identity matters for whether the occupying power can compel compliance from the occupied elite as well as influencing its interactions with the occupied population. However, this finding that different religious and racial backgrounds might undermine the chances of success does not hold when explored further. I re-ran the analyses using Model 4 with a measure for
only religious differences and another model for only racial differences between the occupied and the occupier. The results were consistently negative, but not significant for either variable in these two robustness checks for identity. Upon further investigation, the reason for the significant result in Model 4 is the inclusion of the measure for whether an occupying power was a democracy. By removing that measure, and running the model again, the combined identity variable and the individual measures have negative coefficients but the finding is no longer statistically significant in the analysis. The underlying relationship is likely based on democracies more frequently engaged in occupations on foreign territories that have distinct cultural and religious backgrounds.

The remaining control variables for success and failure in military occupations present a mixed picture regarding their influence on whether such operations succeed. The overall military personnel measure is positive and significant across the four models; however, the coefficient is quite small. Since the measure captures the total military personnel for an occupying power, I cannot draw any direct inferences regarding whether the number of troops committed to an occupation affect the subsequent outcome. Instead, I can only assert that occupying powers with greater numbers of military personnel are more likely to succeed in military occupations. A more precise measure would be the inclusion of actual troops deployed for each occupation, perhaps in addition to the overall strength available to an occupying power. Next, the measure for having allied occupying powers is consistently negative, but does not reach standard levels of significance.

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256 I included the results for these three models in an appendix.

257 For an argument on the commitment of troops as a component for success in military occupations, see, Dobbins et al, America’s Role in Nation-Building. In future work, I intend to complete the collection on ground forces committed to the operation to further test these arguments on whether the numbers of troops involved affect the outcome.
statistical significance in any of the four models presented in Table 3. Occupying a strategic rival is positive across the models, but does not approach standard levels of statistical significance. Finally, the measure for international threat is consistently negative across the four models presented in Table 3.1, in contrast to David Edelstein’s arguments that a threatening international environment should increase the chances of success in a military occupation.258 However, the result is never statistically significant for any model. Thus, I cannot draw any definitively conclusions about whether the international threat environment affects the outcomes of military occupations in this project. The negative coefficient is at least suggestive, and further work could refine the quantitative measure for whether a threatening international threat decreases the likelihood of success.

The final control variable explores whether democracies are more likely to succeed in military occupations. Across all four models, the findings strongly suggest that democracies are more likely to succeed in compelling a commitment from the occupied elite than all other types of regimes. The predicted probabilities in Table 3.2 suggest that a democratic state is approximately 41 percent more likely to succeed in gaining its peace from the occupied elite at the termination of a military occupation. Since I adopted a neutral approach on which mechanism might explain this relationship, I cannot draw any definitely conclusions to explain this empirical finding. This result is quite interesting, however, in that it presents something of a challenge to recent work that suggests democracies have no distinct advantage when attempting to compel their opponents,

258 Edelstein, Occupational Hazards.
particularly in crisis bargaining. The project adopts the perspective that military occupations are most effective when the occupying power compels the occupied elite favor compliance, and accept the victor’s peace. Some aspect of democratic states, then, makes them more effective in compelling a commitment when the autonomy of the opponent is constrained. If democracies are more likely to be successful, however, it raises further questions as to why the United States failed to achieve its primary goals in the recent occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examines the central question of the dissertation: when are occupying powers likely to gain compliance from the occupied elite, and ultimately achieve their postwar goals? To that end, I have empirically evaluated the primary hypothesis derived from the principal-agent model of international politics as developed in the previous chapter. The results have provided strong support for my theoretical argument concerning how occupying powers should engage the occupied elite in order to generate an effective commitment. The statistical results and plausibility probes strongly demonstrate that states engaging the elite via a dictating strategy are more likely to gain their preferred peace. In the next chapter, I will further investigate the primary implication of the theoretical argument against the American Occupation of Japan on how the occupier’s strategies of control affect the responses of the elite, and the outcome of the military occupation.

Chapter 5: Revisiting the American Occupation of Japan, 1945 to 1952

“Forget the utopian notion that a brave new world without power politics will follow the unconditional surrender of wicked nations.”

- Hans Morgenthau

The American Occupation of Japan (1945-1952) has long been heralded as an example on how former rivals and wartime opponents can move from conflict and competition to accommodation and cooperation in the international system. The modus operandi for that change came from the occupation, in which the two countries found their common interests in opposing the spread of communism and establishing mutually beneficial economic relations. The principal-agent model from chapter 3, however, suggests an alternative explanation for the outcome of the American Occupation of Japan that stands at odds with the more conventional thinking that accommodation led to cooperation. In investigating this particular case, the chapter will examine the two primary mechanisms as developed in the chapter 3: the costs of compliance for the occupied elite and the strategy of control employed by the occupying power.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the methodological approach employed in this chapter. Next, I address the three episodes in chronological order, beginning with the regime change starting in October 1945 when Japanese officials first met with Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur. Then, I move to examine how the emerging threat environment led the Americans to alter their goals, and to redirect their

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261 For example, David M. Edelstein, Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
efforts towards the economic stabilization of Japan. The final section presents the Japanese expectations for the post-occupation era, and how the American efforts dictated that they engage in more burden-sharing in the Cold War. With each episode, I establish the following conditions: the Japanese adversity to the demands made by the American officials and the Americans approach to the Japanese, in particular their efforts to dictate to the latter. For each section, I also address Japanese efforts to either resist or act against the occupier’s interests, and American efforts to monitor the behavior of the Japanese politicians and to enforce their orders as necessary. Finally, I discuss that instance and the relevant observations in relation to the theoretical argument. These analytical sections draw out some of the finer points concerning how the empirical evidence relates to the theoretical argument concerning adverse agents and dictating the peace. The conclusion briefly addresses the overall findings of the chapter.

**Research Design and Methodology**

Rather than viewing the American Occupation of Japan as a ‘single’ case study, I contend that the case constitutes a dataset that contains multiple observations for testing the primary prediction of the theoretical argument. Here, I specifically focus on three of these observations that are generated based upon the demands of the American officials, and their subsequent interactions with Japanese politicians. I recognize that the observations here are not independent of one another as they do occur within the same occupation. However, the observations are generated by the variation in the demands made by the United States during the course of the occupation. This approach to large cases with variation in the demands can allow for an alternative approach to the maximizing leverage strategy suggested by King, Keohane and Verba when conducting...
qualitative analysis.\textsuperscript{262} Hence, within each observation – for example, the initial section on regime change – I can subsequently examine multiple discernible implications of the principal-agent model relative to that particular interaction between the occupier and the occupied elite. One advantage to this approach is the strategy of control remains the same across each of the three cases to demonstrate that the Americans consistently dictated their peace and that it had the intended effect on the Japanese politicians.

Following the theoretical argument, each of the demands should generate some adversity among the elite towards fulfilling the conditions as set out by the occupying power. The Japanese politicians involved are resistant, given that they expected to incur the costs for complying with the American terms. Regime change and rearmament, however, differ from economic stabilization in an important way: the Japanese government concurred with the American officials on the end goal of an economically self-sufficient country. Officials from both governments had an interest in altering the status quo from a sluggish to energetic recovery program. However, the two did not necessarily agree on the cause of the poor economic performance, or how to implement the cure. The American officials pressured the Japanese into adopting policies that in the short term generated high compliance costs, and increased the latter’s hostility to the following the former’s prescriptions. With regime change and rearmament, the Japanese officials involved demonstrated their adversity to the end goals. The Shidehara and Yoshida cabinets did not want to remove the Emperor’s political authority. In terminating the occupation, Yoshida did not want assume a defense burden that he believed was unnecessary and potentially harmful to the economic recovery. A second advantage to

examining these demands is that there is almost no disagreement among policymakers and scholars on whether the Americans succeeded in their occupation of Japan following World War II. The outcome of this particular case is not in dispute in the literature or in this dissertation. Instead, my argument is a challenge to previous explanations on how the American occupation resulted in the success that we know today.

An important reason to select the American Occupation of Japan is the availability of materials to demonstrate the fine-grained assumptions of the model and the causal mechanisms at play in how the two interact. The theoretical model assumes that the adversity of the occupied elite emerges from the demands made by the occupying power. The evidence in this chapter should lend itself to supporting that assertion. Though I cannot directly assume preferences from the behavior of strategic actors, the theoretical argument does set out the possible relations between actors’ preferences and their likely behaviors during military occupations. Applying those theories to the available evidence can help us reason out plausible inferences about the preferences of actors for their behaviors through a combination of historical materials and backwards induction. Thus, the abundance of historical material will allow for a thorough investigation of the evidence via process tracing. I can then identify the causal relations

263 A notable exception would be the work of Yoneyuki Sugita, who suggests that the ‘success’ in Japan is negated by increasingly interventionist policies adopted by the United States in regards to Southeast Asia throughout the 1950s and 1960s. While Sugita takes a more pessimistic look at the outcome of the occupation, that evaluation is largely based on events that occur after the occupation. See Yoneyuki Sugita, Pitfall or Panacea: The Irony of US Power in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952 (New York: Routledge, 2003), xi and passim.


posited by the theoretical argument between the resistance of the agents and the strategy of the Americans to explain the outcome of each episode investigated in this chapter.  

Finally, I selected this case as it presents a significant challenge for the principal-agent model. In international environments where the victor and the vanquished share similar threat perceptions of a third party, I contend that such occupations constitute most likely cases for the conventional wisdom on the emergence of cooperation through the use of accommodative strategies to induce compliance. In particular, the threat of communism from the Soviet Union should have pressured the Japanese politicians into accepting the demands made by the Americans. Conversely, the threat of communism should have driven the Americans to make efforts to gain Japanese trust by any means necessary, such as offering concessions and minimizing costs incurred as a result of the former’s preferred peace. In this case, the international environment provided for the possibility of cooperation among the occupier and the occupied elite given that the alternative would certainly lead to an outcome that was sufficiently worse off for both involved. Neither the Americans nor the Japanese wanted to see the Soviet Union involved in Japanese territory. Operating under this dynamic, one would expect that the evidence will demonstrate that the perceived threat from communism pressed both sides to moderate their behaviors during the occupation regardless of the costs incurred to achieve a more cooperative occupation and ultimately achieve a more compromising peace. A threatening international environment favors more accommodative arguments over the principal-agent theory presented in chapter three. This dynamic suggests that the Occupation of Japan will be a least likely case for confronting unfavorable agents and for

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needing dictating strategies to control them given the presence of an international threat that would provide an environment more conducive to moderating behavior and encouraging cooperation. Thus, the American Occupation of Japan initially sets up a tough test to identify the causal mechanisms at play and to explain the outcome of this particular case.267

**Retention of an Emperor and Constitution Reform**

On 4 October 1945, MacArthur issued one of the occupation’s most important directives. This particular American order began the process of liberalizing Japan through the establishment a bill of rights for Japanese citizens. First, the directive granted liberties to all citizens for political, civil, and religious freedoms as while as cancelling out all sentences for political prisoners currently held by the government. In particular, the bill allowed for Japanese citizens to engage in open discussions on the imperial system without threat of punishment. Second, the bill rights abolished the institutions that the Japanese government had created to enforce these restrictions on citizens. These included the elimination of the secret police forces and the Home Ministry in their entirety as well as prohibiting the enforcement of laws contrary to the above freedoms and liberties. The response from the Japanese government was underwhelming at best. Many Japanese officials saw this move as ‘foolish,’ especially since the Americans had allowed the communists to go free as well as other political prisoners. Even this early in the occupation, the threat from communists within Japan was seen as the significant danger to the political system. Yoshida Shigeru, then Foreign Minister, initially complained that

SCAP officials should have consulted with the Japanese government before issuing such orders. Later, he attempted to limit the extent of the order that was issued by the occupation authorities. Yoshida argued that it only applied to individuals with no connections to communism or members of the Japanese Communist Party. His efforts to restrict freedom and preserve some measures to discriminate on the basis of political beliefs failed. As a result of this directive by the occupation authorities and its political consequences, the Higashikuni cabinet resigned on the following day.

On the same day, MacArthur and Prince Konoe Fumimaro met to discuss what the occupier’s were demanding from the Japanese as their terms. Konoe knew that the Emperor was in danger as an individual and as a governing institution, and he attempted to protect them. Konoe intended to explain why the Japanese had fought in the war by shifting the focus away from the Imperial institutions. He tried to place the blame on a number of elements in Japanese society, and excluded the Emperor as one of those individuals who sought war with the United States. Instead, Konoe argued that the nationalists, militarists, and Marxists were responsible for Japan’s involvement in the Pacific theater. After denouncing these groups and their role in bringing about the conflict, Konoe came to the most pressing question he had for MacArthur: following the Potsdam Declaration, what reforms did the United States expect the Japanese to undertake in regards to their domestic institutions. Specifically, he wanted to know if the occupiers had any suggestions to offer on how to reorganize and improve the


government. MacArthur recognized the importance of this question as a central concern, and responded in a commanding military voice to Konoe’s inquiry: “First of all, the Japanese Constitution must be revised. It is essential to introduce into government sufficient liberal elements through constitutional revision.” MacArthur strongly emphasized the necessity of liberalizing the government, and Konoe realized the importance of this statement immediately as a key condition for ending the occupation. When Konoe hesitated, MacArthur compellingly stated: “I hope that a rational way can be found so that essential measures can be devised by the Japanese Government itself. And that must be done as quickly as possible. Otherwise, we ourselves are prepared to see that this shall be done, regardless of the friction that it may cause.”270 The prince moved quickly to organize a Japanese effort to revise the constitution to meet the American orders to redesign the country’s governing institutions and documents.271

On 6 October, George Atcheson Jr., political advisor to MacArthur, met with Konoe and his associates to unofficially offer some advice on how the Japanese government should proceed with altering their domestic institutions. Konoe had fallen from power along with the previous cabinet, yet he wanted to press forward under the Emperor’s authority to initiate the revision of the Meiji Constitution. In the meeting, Atcheson suggested making both legislatures representative of the people through elections, eliminating all extra-governmental institutions, establishing greater protections for individual rights, and placing stringent limitations on the Emperor’s capacity to enact


legislation without the Diet, though imperial authority was not directly questioned at this point.\footnote{272}

On 11 October, MacArthur met with the new Prime Minister, Count Shidehara Kijuro, to instruct him in the process of domestic changes that the Japanese government would undergo in the following months. To that end, MacArthur presented Shidehara with five great reforms: “1) Give women the right to vote; 2) encourage labor unions and correct child-labor practices; 3) institute a more liberal education to make clear that government is “servant rather than the master of people”; 4) eliminate practices “which through secret inquisitions and abuse have held people in constant fear”; 5) promote “a wide distribution of income and ownership of the means of production and trade.”\footnote{273}

Prior to this meeting, SCAP and Japanese officials had met to discuss a different path for constitutional revision. The Japanese officials, already aware of the demand, wanted the Americans to leave it out of the public statements. That would allow for the appearance of the Japanese government independently taking the initiative to revise the Meiji Constitution. Since MacArthur had ordered Konoe to implement the liberalization of the constitution previously, the occupation authorities consented to the request. SCAP announced publicly that the great five reforms would “unquestionably involve a liberalization of the Constitution” yet the occupation refrained from explicitly listing it as one of the five to be carried out by the new cabinet.\footnote{274}

\footnote{272} The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, 10 October 1945, \textit{FRUS}, Vol. VI, 739-740; Koseki \textit{The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution}, 9-10.

\footnote{273} Quoted in Finn, \textit{Winners in Peace}, 40.

After the meeting on 11 October 1945, Shidehara announced publicly that revising the constitution was not necessary, and made similar statements in private among fellow cabinet members. On 25 October, the prime minister and Matsumoto Jōji assembled a group of Japanese scholars and legal professionals to begin addressing the issues in the Meiji Constitution. The ‘Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee’ operated under the aim that the constitution did not require revision, and instead, “its investigation [was] to determine whether any amendment may be necessary, and, if so, what are the points to be amended.” The committee was largely under the direction of Matsumoto. Shidehara had prepared no formal instructions, guidelines, or such to direct the committee in its activities. Furthermore, neither Shidehara nor Matsumoto consulted with SCAP on the measures that they sought to change in the constitution, and how those ideas would mesh with the demands as set forth in the Potsdam Declaration.

From October through February 1946, the Japanese involved in the project did not consult with their occupiers to determine their demands on how the country’s domestic institutions should be reformed. The majority of the members envisioned their project as an ‘investigation’ into the constitution, which might result in adjustments to correct for the previous wrongs. Otherwise, the committee did not take the goal as a serious demand that the Americans would enforce, and assumed that the constitution ‘revision’ was merely a “bee in the American bonnet.” The government also did not consult any of the numerous organizations in Japan that produced a variety of constitutions to replace or revise the old one. Instead, Matsumoto proceed with the constitution committee as if Japan was not under the control of a foreign power, largely acting under the committee’s own initiative. He assigned the committee its guidelines, adopting four guiding principles
for his attempts to ‘revise’ the constitution. On 8 December, when speaking before the House of Representatives, Matsumoto announced these four principles:

1) no change in the fundamental principle that the emperor combined in himself the rights of sovereignty; 2) a broadening of Diet responsibilities and consequent limitation on the emperor’s prerogatives; 3) assumption of responsibility for affairs of state by cabinet ministers who in turn would be responsible to the Diet; and 4) strengthened guarantees of the rights and freedoms of the people, with provision for redress of violations of such rights and freedoms.275

In large part, Matsumoto was merely correcting the constitution to prevent further abuse, and continue along as the country had.

On 11 January 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the final draft of State-War-Navy Co-Ordinating Committee (SWNCC) 228 and transmitted the orders to MacArthur. Officials at SCAP had seen drafts of the document since at least the middle of October 1945, and most knew its contents well in advance of its official adoption as American policy for the occupation. SWNCC 228 called for several basic objectives concerning the political reform of Japan’s domestic institutions, including the expansion of suffrage and civil rights, the adoption of either a directly-elected executive branch or a parliamentary system that was representative of all Japanese citizens, and increased representation at the local level. The policy also confirmed that the imperial institution – in its current form and authority – was not acceptable, and had to be subordinate to the Japanese people. Finally, SWNCC 228 stated that the enactment of these reforms must

275 John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company 1999) 351-353; Koseki *The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution* 50-57; Ward, “The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution,” 985. All quotes from Dower. No evidence indicates that SCAP officials responded to these announcements by Matsumoto in either October or December. This is especially curious given the first of the four principles, that the Emperor would retain some sovereign authority in the new constitution. That statement went directly against the American demands. Also, Dower had noted earlier that Yoshida also supported Matsumoto’s position that the constitution was sufficient, and might need only minor revisions. For this point, see John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 318.
come from within Japan to establish their legitimacy, and to that end, SCAP should refrain from involvement. Whether the constitution was revised, or a new one adopted, that the document must be an expression of the will of the Japanese people. MacArthur met with Shidehara on 24 January to discuss some aspects of the political reforms that the United States expected of Japan. From the meeting, emerged four points on which the two appeared to agree: the adopting of a new constitution, acceptance of the sovereignty of the people, turning the imperial institution into a symbol for Japan, and the idea that Japan would renounce war as a means to settle international disputes. While Shidehara agreed to these positions with MacArthur, the work in the constitution committee did not align with these four points or the basic objectives laid out in SWNCC 228. Shortly after the meeting, MacArthur would learn that Matsumoto had not followed the basic instructions given to him as the necessary conditions for fulfilling the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and SWNCC 228.

Revealed Designs and the American Response

On 1 February 1946, Mainichi Shinbun published a draft of the constitution that it had secretly acquired from the deliberations of the Matsumoto committee. The draft constitution was not well-received by anyone in Japan. The reporting on the draft criticized it for being quite ‘reactionary’ given that it so closely resembled its predecessor, the Meiji Constitution. In SCAP, General Courtney Whitney aptly described the constitutional draft as being “extremely conservative in character,” especially since

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the document made no substantive changes to the Emperor’s position. MacArthur decided that since the Japanese cabinet had not adequately addressed the American demands that SCAP would have to write a draft constitution. MacArthur gave the committee three broad principles on which to write the constitution, including revision of the Emperor’s position, the abolishment of war as a sovereign right, and no further feudal practices in politics. The Emperor would remain, but the position would only retain a symbolic role in the new political system. The draft also established the renunciation of war amendment (to become Article 9), limiting Japan’s use of military forces. The SCAP framers also include a number of civil liberties and human rights in the draft. At the institutional level, the Japanese government would shift to a unicameral legislature. SCAP officials also took care to make amending the constitution a difficult affair, by requiring that the Diet give 2/3 approval to any changes and those changes then had to pass a national referendum with a majority vote in favor. The committee met in secret for seven days, and completed their work before 13 February to present a draft to the members of the Japanese cabinet.

The meeting on 13 February included Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Shirasu Jiro as well as their interpreter. The four officials had come to the meeting with the expectation that they were to receive comments on the draft of the constitution from the Matsumoto committee. Instead, Whitney dismissed the Japanese draft constitution, stating that it was “wholly unacceptable to the Supreme Commander as a document of freedom and democracy.” He further emphasized that the draft had not demonstrated that the Japanese


279 Finn, Winners in Peace, 95-96; McNelly, The Origins of Japan’s Democratic Constitution 4-7.
had learned from their recent history. Whitney then presented the three politicians with the SCAP draft of a new constitution as the acceptable alternative that would address the current situation that confronted Japan. The three officials sat stunned at his announcement.\(^{280}\)

Whitney then proceeded to lay out the decision that would confront these men and their associates concerning the new draft constitution. The occupation authorities expected the Japanese government to give its full attention to adopting the principles in the draft and in any revisions that might occur. He carefully walked them through the costs that their decision could incur, especially if they choose not to accept this draft constitution. The Japanese politicians were informed that the Allies were calling for the Emperor to face charges of war crimes along with the other politicians currently awaiting trial. Yet, MacArthur believed that voting on this constitution would diminish that risk. By accepting the basic principles of a symbolic Emperor and a demilitarization of the country, Japan could demonstrate its ability to function as a responsible member of the international community. The imperial institutions could then remain without further risk of trial. Whitney focused on this point, clearly stating that “acceptance of...this new Constitution would render the Emperor practically unassailable...[and] it would bring much closer the day of your freedom from control by the Allied Powers...”\(^{281}\)

Whitney, however, did not want Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Shirasu to think this was being forced on them. The Japanese politicians were under no ‘compulsion’ to accept this draft or act on its principles in any way. That was entirely their choice to either

\(^{280}\) Finn, Winners in Peace, 97; Dower, Embracing Defeat, 374-375.

accept or reject the SCAP constitution. However, if the cabinet chose the latter option, Whitney explained the consequences. He fully expected that MacArthur would respond by bringing the constitution before the people of Japan in a national referendum and allow them to vote on its acceptance directly. Evidently, MacArthur felt that

this is the last opportunity for the conservative groups, considered by many to be reactionary, to remain in power and that this can only be done by a sharp swing to the left; and that if you accept this Constitution you can be sure that the Supreme Commander will support your position. I cannot emphasize too strongly that the acceptance of the draft constitution is your only hope of survival.

Finally, Whitney raised concerns over what role the domestic politics of the United States could play in the coming decision. MacArthur had serious worries over the strong American opposition to the retention of the Emperor in Japan. If the Japanese did not accept the SCAP draft, Whitney explicitly stated, “GHQ could not answer for whatever might happen to the Emperor.”


283 Quoted in Dower, Embracing Defeat, 375.

284 Quoted in Finn, Winners in Peace, 97. There are two debates relevant to this meeting that I should briefly note. The first debate concerns whether Whitney directly and explicitly threatened the Emperor during the meeting. This interpretation was advanced by Matsumoto in the 1950s to a constitutional commission. The evidence, however, has not supported Matsumoto’s assertion that Whitney made any such threat against the Emperor. Instead, the evidence indicates that the retention of imperial institution and the exemption of the Emperor from the charge of war crimes was an incentive that the Americans were offering to the Japanese. The American officials did not make any menacing statements, but rather explained that both domestic and international actors would have preferred the removal of the Emperor. I do contend, however, that Whitney is likely pressuring, if not threatening, the politicians involved in the meeting when he suggests taking the draft SCAP constitution directly to the Japanese people for a vote.

The second debates concerns whether the American officials imposed the draft SCAP constitution on the Japanese government. I contend that SCAP did dictate the draft constitution to the Japanese government, contrary to the arguments made by Kades and Takayangi, and in agreement with Ward and Koseki. Kades has argued that Ward accepts the Matsumoto interpretation of the meeting when discussing the imposition of the draft constitution. Ward’s argument is not dependent on a threat against the Emperor to demonstrate imposition. When Ward refers to the imposition of the constitution, he contends that SCAP ordered the Japanese officials to accept the draft constitution in place of their own and to submit it to the Diet and the Japanese people for debate. In this paragraph, I did note that Whitney stated that SCAP was not compelling the Japanese to adopt the draft constitution. Whitney’s statement, however, conflicts with the overall evidence in that the American officials did compel the Japanese to make a choice on whether to accept the draft constitution. For a discussion on these debates, see Kenzo Takayangi, “Some
The Japanese politicians were astonished following the revelation of the SCAP draft constitution, and the implications that it held for their country: “Mr Shirasu straightened up as if he had sat on something…Dr. Matsumoto sucked in his breath. Mr. Yoshida’s face was a black cloud.” In rather stark terms, Whitney had laid out their choice, and the costs that non-compliance could bring. Whitney further explained to the Japanese that the draft before them was not the final version that they had to accept. MacArthur was amenable to suggestions and alterations from the Japanese government, as long as any such changes retain the basic principles. At this point in the meeting, Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Shirasu did not raise any concerns over the draft except to ask whether the unicameral legislature was a necessity. The participants decided that this meeting between the SCAP officials and the Japan politicians would remain secret.

Adversity to Demands and Enforcing the Draft Constitution

Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Shirasu did not immediate notify the rest of the cabinet as to the outcome of the 13 February meeting. Instead, the three politicians searched for a way out of accepting the SCAP draft constitution over the course of the next week. Yoshida decided to act through Shirasu, as a means to distance his self from the consequences of being associated with the draft constitution. Initially, Shirasu presented


286 Koseki *The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution*, 101, notes that the participants disagree on which side requested that this meeting on the draft SCAP constitution remain secret. The Americans involved suggested that Yoshida asked for secrecy, and the Japanese records indicate that Whitney had made the request.
Whitney with the “Jeep way letter” on 15 February. Essentially, Shirasu tried to convince the Americans that the two draft constitutions were identical in terms of their principles, and that the only real difference was in the means by which the drafts accomplished those same goals. Shirasu emphasized that while the American draft took a direct route via an airplane, the Japanese draft took a more roundabout path through mountain roads on a jeep. The analogy failed. Whitney was not convinced that the two drafts were in fact similar as Shirasu contended. He simply repeated his warning from 13 February that the SCAP draft constitution was the last, best means by which the Japanese government could save the Emperor and by implication themselves.287

Matsumoto also appealed to SCAP for changes to the document. He countered the draft constitution along two primary lines of attack. First, he was concerned that the draft was written by amateurs, who did not understand the necessity of bicameral legislatures to insure checks and balances within a government. When Matsumoto explained the reasoning for a bicameral legislature, he thought that the Americans were ‘persuaded’ by his arguments. Whitney held that “if the cabinet feels strongly about the desirability of a bicameral legislature, and both houses are elected by popular vote, General MacArthur will interpose no objection.”288 Matsumoto thought he had taught the Americans an important lesson in constitutional design, and gained a significant concession. Instead, he had fallen into the American ploy. The drafters had specifically inserted the unicameral legislature into the constitution expecting the Japanese cabinet to ask for a change to a

287 Koseki The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution, 102-103.
288 Finn, Winners in Peace, 100.
bicameral one. When Matsumoto played into their hand, the SCAP officials appeared to concede the point to the Japanese in an effort to make the constitution acceptable.

In a letter on 18 February, Matsumoto also attempted to explain that his draft of the constitution rested largely on the unique cultural and historical experiences of Japan. His draft of the constitution had taken these important processes in consideration during the committee’s debates, and it was absolutely necessary that the new constitution rest on these foundations so that it might succeed in their country. Similar to Shirasu, Matsumoto argued that the two draft constitutions actually accomplished the same underlying principles, just via different means. For Matsumoto, his draft had incorporated the more relevant measures and adopted a more sensitive approach to the political situation in Japan. Just as Shirasu failed, Matsumoto’s appeals did as well. Whitney responded that the Matsumoto draft required no further evaluation, and he wanted to know whether the cabinet had received the SCAP draft constitution. When Shirasu lied that the Cabinet had received the draft constitution, Whitney demanded that the cabinet members give a response to the draft within forty-eight hours.²⁸⁹

The cabinet finally met on 19 February to discuss the SCAP draft constitution. It was a heated debate among the members as to whether they should accept or reject the draft. Yoshida referred to the draft constitution from SCAP as “revolutionary” and “outrageous” for Japan.²⁹⁰ Matsumoto also did not favor the American revisions to the

²⁸⁹ Koseki *The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution*, 103-104 explains these arguments between Matsumoto and SCAP officials, and McNelly, *The Origins of Japan’s Democratic Constitution* 8, refers to the SCAP insertion of a unicameral legislature into the constitution as a bargaining leverage for later. Interesting, MacArthur actually wanted a unicameral legislature. His staff was not sure why he wanted it, and thought a bicameral one would better suit the country. See Finn, *Winners in Peace*, 98.

²⁹⁰ Dower, *Empire and Aftermath*, 319. Dower explicitly characterizes Yoshida as the least willing member of the cabinet to compromise on the Emperor’s reduction to a political symbol without authority. The evidence in Harries and Harries suggests that Yoshida was on the side that favored adopting the new
constitution. Shidehara and others were also less inclined to favor the draft, and contemplated outright rejection of the document. In one of these meetings, Ashida Hitoshi recognized the consequence of the cabinet rejecting the SCAP draft constitution. He explained that “if at that point the present cabinet refused to accept responsibility and resign, it is certain that others who approve of the American draft would come forward. And the great influence this would have on the outcome of the coming general election is something about which we should be seriously concerned.” Ashida recognized that rejecting the draft constitution from SCAP would not solve their problems. Instead, it would only lead to their fall from office and the emergence of a new government that would likely be less adverse to the American demands. The cabinet finally resolved for Shidehara to meet with MacArthur and to discuss the SCAP draft constitution.

Shidehara met with MacArthur on 21 February, and the two discussed the Emperor’s role in Japan’s domestic institutions as well as the war renunciation clause. MacArthur adhered firmly to these two principles in the constitution, and assured Shidehara that as long as they remained the Diet could make adjustments elsewhere in the draft. On that same day, Yoshida, Matsumoto, and Shirasu met with Whitney, Kades, and other American officials to discuss the possible options for revising the SCAP draft. Matsumoto wanted to know whether any part of the Meiji constitution could be salvaged

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and put in place of some of the less desirable portions of the new constitution. The American response to his request about using any portion of the old constitution was ‘impossible.’ Matsumoto, irritated at the lack of possible alterations, then asked directly, “How many of the articles in the new Constitution do you consider basic and unalterable?” Whitney simply stated that “the whole Constitution as written is basic…Put in general, we regard this document as a unit.” Lieutenant Colonel Milo E. Rowell reaffirmed this position, adding that, “The new Constitution was written as an interwoven unit, one section fitting into another, so there is no one section or chapter that can be can cut out.”293 The Americans made clear their position that the Japanese cabinet would have to accept the draft constitution as a whole.

On 22 February, the cabinet met again to discuss the SCAP draft constitution. As Richard Finn notes, “Some members of the cabinet felt that if the constitutional issue were taken to the people, as Whitney had threatened, the conservatives might lose strength and even be voted out of office.”294 The members recognized that they had to accept the draft, and reluctantly did so with a few ministers still protesting it. The cabinet decided that their struggle was not over yet. They would continue to seek modifications in the draft where they could to achieve the constitution that was most appropriate for Japan. On the same day, Shidehara presented the SCAP draft constitution to the Emperor, and the latter approved of the document.295

293 Quoted in Dower, Embracing Defeat, 378.

294 Finn, Winners in Peace, 99.

295 Finn, Winners in Peace, 99-100.
For next phase in developing the constitution, the Japanese cabinet had to produce a translation of the SCAP draft and present it to the American officials before releasing it to the Japanese public. On 4 March, Matsumoto and Sato Tatsuo presented the Japanese translation to the American officials for inspection. As various officials examined the translated draft, it quickly became evident that the cabinet had not only translated the document but also made major substantive changes throughout. The occupation officials immediately set out to scrutinize the document – line by line – to identify and correct any deviations from the initial draft. Most notably, the current translation had removed a statement from the preamble that held the phrase ‘sovereignty of the people.’ The cabinet members had recognized that the SCAP draft implied that the people held sovereignty greater than the Emperor’s, and the conservative politicians could not abide by such a declaration. Instead of accepting the provision, they altered the formula when translating the draft SCAP constitution from English to Japanese in an attempt to retain the Emperor’s position.

In addition, the members of the Shidehara cabinet made numerous other alternations throughout the document. The translated draft altered the institutional arrangements of the government, making the House of Representatives subordinate to the House of Councilors. Political authority was almost completely centralized as local autonomy was diminished. Almost all of the civil and political rights included various versions of the phrases “do not conflict with public peace and order” or “except as specifically provided by law” that would allow the government to qualify and limit the rights as it deemed necessary. These specific phrases came directly from the Meiji Constitution, which allowed the government great leeway in controlling and limiting the
rights of the Japanese people. Also a number of rights were simply deleted from the draft. Over the course of thirty hours, the American officials pressed the single Japanese negotiator to restore all but a few minor points to the translated draft thus bringing it back into line with the original SCAP draft. Once completed, the American officials stipulated the cabinet accept the newly translated draft the same day. With the Emperor in concurrence, the cabinet members accepted the new draft and prepared to publish it the next day.\textsuperscript{296}

On 6 March, the Japanese government made the revelation of a new draft constitution with both the Emperor and MacArthur issuing statements in support. All of the actors involved wanted to hide the ‘origins’ of the new draft, and thus acted as if the cabinet had presented a new constitution for consideration by the Diet. The Japanese politicians wanted to maintain the appearance that they had acted independently to revise the sacred constitution, and the American officials wanted to maintain that fiction. However, it was difficult to hide the true power behind drafting the new constitution. First, the draft looked nothing like Matsumoto’s from February, which made it suspicious on why the cabinet had shifted from such a reactionary to a fairly progressive position in a relatively short period of time. Second, the Japanese language contained within the document read less like the native script, and more like an oddly done translation. SCAP retained censorship over the press, though the Japanese reporters found interesting ways to refer to the document’s “funny language.” Aside for the evidence indicating foreign involvement, the new draft constitution received a positive reception from almost all groups. The Japanese public responded optimistically to the progressive nature of the

\textsuperscript{296} Dower, \textit{Embracing Defeat}, 380-382. See Koseki \textit{The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution}, 111-122, for a detailed discussion on the changes made to the SCAP draft constitution.
rights contained within. Except for the communists, all other political parties favored the intent of the proposed document.\textsuperscript{297}

The Emperor ‘gifted’ sovereignty to the people on 20 June 1946 when he attended the opening of the Diet’s debate on the draft SCAP constitution. Yoshida – now Prime Minister – argued that in establishing a democratic government the Japanese people were fulfilling the one of the terms of the occupation, and bringing the country that much closer to regaining independence.\textsuperscript{298} The deliberations on the constitution initially involved every member of the Diet, and by 23 July shrank down to a secret committee to discuss changes to the draft. Across all levels of debate, SCAP played an influential and largely secretive role in the development of its draft constitution.

All members of the Diet were free to propose alterations to the constitution, given that such proposals first gained acceptance from the occupation authorities. Even in the secret deliberations, the committee members would call for a halt to note-taking to discuss whether their proposals would meet the demands set forth by SCAP. For its part, the occupation officials did not directly intervene in these Diet meetings. Instead, they operated through members of the cabinet and presented their instructions verbally to hide their participation in drafting the new constitution. SCAP officials even secretly initiated some of their own changes through Japanese members of the Diet when they wanted to see amendments or adjustments to the draft constitution.\textsuperscript{299}

\textsuperscript{297} Ward, “The Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution,” 1003; Dower, Embracing Defeat, 383-387. The Japanese translation was sufficiently confusing that some members of the upper house resorted to using the English translation instead when discussing the new draft constitution.

\textsuperscript{298} McNelly, The Origins of Japan’s Democratic Constitution, 16.

\textsuperscript{299} Dower, Embracing Defeat, 391; McNelly, The Origins of Japan’s Democratic Constitution, 17.
The most pertinent examples of SCAP influence constitute an amendment to the renunciation of war clause, and the debate on the kokutai (the national polity). First, the renouncing of war clause – as known as Article 9 – generated quite the debate among the Diet members as to whether Japan could protect itself. Several politicians interpreted the initial phrasing of the article to suggest that Japan could not possess any armaments. By implication, then, Japan could not act in self defense if the country was threatened or attacked by another. To resolve the debate, Ashida introduced an amendment that allowed the country to maintain a military for self-defense purposes and not for the settlement of international disputes. This same amendment also opened the path for Japan’s eventual rearmament given that the country could maintain a force for self-preservation. This amendment was approved by SCAP officials, knowing full well that the alteration implied the possibility of rearmament for Japan in the future.300

During a discussion on the constitution on 28 June, one member noted that a discrepancy between the English and the Japanese versions. In the former version, sovereignty clearly lay with the people, yet the latter version was ambiguous on the loci in this relationship. This discrepancy led to a debate on kokutai, the concept of the national polity. The concept holds that the Emperor has the divine right to sovereign authority over his subjects. In discussing the Emperor’s new role, many Diet members were concerned how the draft constitution would alter the kokutai in Japan. The SCAP draft constitution had established that the Emperor would no longer hold political authority, and would serve a symbolic function for the government. Sovereignty now rested with the people. Yoshida and Minister of State Kanamori Tokujirō, however,

300 Koseki, The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution, 192-201.
adamantly argued that the constitution made no such alterations. Instead, they contended that the new document would preserve and continue the old relationship between sovereign and subject into the new political system. The two politicians were appealing to certain Diet members that favored the maintenance of the imperial institution by playing on the ambiguity inherent in the Japanese translation.301

These arguments, however, caused concern among the American officials. Colonel Charles L. Kades met with Kanamori on two occasions in July to discuss how these arguments appeared to favor the Emperor as the sovereign authority of Japan. Kanamori tried to explain that his position only reinforced the moral authority of the Emperor. Kades was not convinced. On 23 July, Kades said that the current phrasing in the constitution was open to multiple interpretations. He pushed for a clear statement that ‘sovereignty resides in the people,’ made explicit in the constitution. Kanamori resisted, initially arguing that the current phrasing was acceptable, and then stating if such a change in the draft constitution was necessary he would be compelled to resign his position. Kades, however, was not dissuaded, and repeated his demand. Kanamori replied that the constitution did state that the “people’s will is supreme” before leaving the meeting. In a ruse on 25 July during a secret committee meeting, the Liberal Party in conjunction with the Progressive Party presented an amendment to place sovereignty with the people of Japan. By jointly sponsoring the bill, it relieved both Yoshida’s party and the cabinet from having to introduce the amendment alone under pressure from SCAP.302


302 Koseki, The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution, 173-176. McNelly also notes a second major change regarding the Emperor. Article 4 of the draft constitution now granted the emperor some political authority,
The Diet continued to review the draft SCAP constitution until it was accepted on 3 November 1946. The acceptance of the constitution did not end the political reforms that the Americans demanded, nor did it prevent further attempts to preserve the imperial institution by some politicians. Many of the political reforms required further pressure from SCAP as the Diet attempted to alter the intention of a law, or sometimes the former would force it through when members refused to pass such measures. SCAP would continue to pursue further reforms to the political system in Japan, though many of these were not quite as consequential as altering the role of the emperor and designing a new constitution. Even with the adoption of the constitution, the conservatives did not see the document as having a long life. As Yoshida himself stated, “There was this idea at the back of my mind that, whatever needed to be revised after we regained our independence could be revised then…but once a thing has been decided on, it is not so easy to have it altered.”

On 3 May 1947, the new constitution for Japan went into effect. As the new

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303 The conservative politicians had not given up the fight to preserve the Emperor when the new constitution was adopted, if even in a reduced or less divine role for Japan. If Yoshida and his supporters could not amend the draft constitution to reflect the authority of the Emperor, they could alter subsequent legislation in favor of preserving the importance of the Emperor. The adoption of the SCAP constitution subsequently required changes to the entire Japanese legal system to bring the latter in line with the former. In particular, the criminal code became a source of interest for protecting the imperial institution. Yoshida and Kanamori attempted to retain two crimes against the Emperor: treason (violence and/or the threat of violence) and lese majeste (otherwise known as disrespect). Yoshida tried to persuade SCAP that retaining these two crimes was an absolute necessary based on the ‘sentiments and moral faith’ of the Japanese people. MacArthur personally rejected treason against Emperor as the criminal code already provided punishment for violence against individuals, and then ordered that all crimes against the imperial institution be removed from the law. Interestingly, Yoshida later pleaded with American officials again to restore the lese majeste crime to punish a newspaper for its sarcasm directed towards the Emperor. SCAP refused his request. These two crimes were subsequently removed from the legislation in July 1947. For a discussion on the importance of the imperial institutions and the revisions to the criminal code, see Koseki The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution, 228-233.

304 Quoted in Dower, Embracing Defeat, 400.
legal system emerged, the American occupation began to reevaluate its postwar priorities in Japan.

**Analysis: A Concession to Accommodate or the Power to Enforce**

As the evidence demonstrates, Japanese cabinet members would have preferred not to alter the Meiji Constitution, the imperial institutions, or the *kokutai* in the postwar era. The committee agreed that minor adjustments to the constitution seemed appropriate, but the officials involved decided that the Meiji Constitution was sufficient in its current state and that the individuals in charge of Japan over the last two decades had merely subverted its purpose. Hence, the Japanese politicians had no intention of changing the status quo in Japanese domestic institutions during the occupation. As if they were reviewing the constitution for no particular reason, the politicians involved did not take the American orders to revise the country’s domestic institutions seriously from October 1945 through the exposure of the Matsumoto draft in February 1946. In part, this apparent disregard for constitutional revision resulted from their presumed understanding that the Americans would not enforce their demands. In fact, the lack of consultation by the Japanese politicians such as Matsumoto indicates that the Japanese thought that the Americans would accept whatever solution the former presented as ‘reforms.’ In a way, Matsumoto, Yoshida, Shidehara, and many others simply could not accept that the demands being made by the occupier were serious in terms of revising the imperial institutions and altering the basic structures of the Meiji Constitution. How could they undo the country’s most important political institutions, especially when those same institutions often worked to their benefit in implementing their preferred policy choices.
The serious nature of the American demands became clear in February 1946. Following the theoretical argument, the Americans interpreted the Matsumoto draft constitution as a clear instance of the Japanese politicians failing to follow through on the orders given to them by MacArthur and other officials. The Supreme Commander and others had ordered the revision of the domestic institutions, and granted the occupied elite the authority to do just that. The agents had been given the task of drafting a new constitution that would meet the American demands, and those agents demonstrated their adversity to that outcome by following their political agendas in retaining a political system that they believed was sufficient for their interests. The Americans recognized this behavior as a demonstration of non-compliance with one of the most important goals for establishing their preferred peace. The occupiers could not trust that their agents would draft a suitable replacement given their obvious disregard for altering the imperial institutions. The Americans had dictated their orders while the Japanese had the decision to comply and the latter had chosen to not fulfill the demands of the occupying power. That failure to follow the American demands led directly to SCAP drafting its own constitution for Japan.

By drafting their own constitution, the occupation officials decided that they would enforce their demands in response to the non-compliant behavior from the Japanese cabinet members. If the Americans had accepted the revision of the Meiji Constitution, the Japanese politicians would essentially have retained the status quo given

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305 In this phase of the occupation, SCAP exercised an extensive censorship over the Japanese press. In particular, American officials had to approve everything before it went to press and was published for domestic consumption. That the Mainichi Shinbun somehow published the draft constitution without American consent seems highly unlikely given that strict control by SCAP. However, no evidence indicated that the American side strategically considered the release of the Matsumoto draft constitution to incite domestic or international opposition.
that their position would be the default by which any changes were measured. In doing so, then, the Americans might have confronted difficulties in moving the Japanese away from that point by simply criticizing or responding to the revised Meiji Constitution. Given that any alteration would have to compete with the established point in the revision, the occupiers would have encountered difficulties in following through on their demands to democratize the country. Instead, by creating a new draft constitution, the Americans essentially removed that status quo from the set of available options to the Japanese politicians and subsequently created a new position that strongly favored their interests in the reforms that would be implemented for the country’s governing structures. The Americans allowed for the retention of the imperial institutions as an incentive for Japanese compliance, but the SCAP draft clearly eliminated any political role for the Emperor. The Japanese were not necessarily accommodated here, since the politicians involved wanted an emperor with political authority to remain a part and parcel of their domestic institutions.

When confronted with the demands, the Japanese realized the seriousness of the American orders for revision and recognized the possible consequences for complying with those demands. The Americans had presented their draft constitution which altered every domestic institution and would undermine their formers’ preference for retaining an emperor with political authority. Immediately, the Japanese politicians had two reactions that follow from the theoretical argument concerning the agent’s behavior when confronted with the costs of compliance. First, the politicians demonstrated a concern for complying with the American demands on constitution reform. The secrecy surrounding the initial meeting in February and that carried throughout the remainder of the revision
of the constitution demonstrates their strong concern for incurring the political costs of complying with American demands. The Japanese (and to an extent, the Americans) went to great lengths to cover up the details of the pressure they were now operating under to revise the constitution. Their immediate fear was that the opposition parties and the population would discover the nature of the meeting, the orders that had been issued, and their reluctance to resist the American dictation to reform the domestic political system. The Japanese members hid the meeting in February, and presented the SCAP draft as the new cabinet sponsored constitution, attempting to erase any trace of the influence of SCAP during the hearings. The Japanese politicians especially members of the ruling party and the cabinet were keen to avoid any possible evidence of their compliance with the occupying power’s commands.

Second, the Japanese politicians might have accepted that SCAP held the upper hand, but they continued to demonstrate their hostility to new draft constitution through 1947. Their initial efforts focused on persuading occupation officials that essentially the foundations of the two drafts constitutions were accomplishing the same goals albeit with different means. When persuasion failed, the Japanese made numerous efforts to alter the draft constitution without acknowledging or providing SCAP of any forewarning of these changes. From the initial Japanese translation to the attempt to avoid mentioning the source of sovereignty, the agents pursued several possible avenues to actively undermine the occupation’s efforts to establish the American peace. In light of this evidence, it is difficult to qualify the American Occupation as ‘accommodating’ the Japanese elite. These officials demonstrated their adversity towards the costs they would incur in complying with the orders of the occupation domestically and engaged in opportunistic
actions that would have pursued their interests to the detrimental of the victor’s peace when fulfilling those postwar goals.

The American officials responded to these opportunistic behaviors as the theoretical argument expected, they dictated the terms to the Japanese and enforced those orders as necessary when the latter demonstrated non-compliant behavior. When the Americans confronted the Japanese regarding issues of non-compliance, the latter would often profess an alignment of their interests to downplay non-compliance or simply avoid acknowledging that their actions went against the former’s orders. Occupation officials put pressure on Japanese officials as necessary, and these individuals would then subsequently alter their actions to match up with the orders that had been given. In this case study, none of the politicians involved were removed from political office for not complying with the dictates of the occupying power. Hypothetically, if the Japanese had taken further measures to undermine the American efforts it is possible that the occupation officials would have removed one or more politicians from office. However, such measures were not necessary.

Aid, Economics, and Reviving the Workshop of Asia

By 1947, the United States had begun to rethink its policies of democratization and demilitarization in Japan. This reorientation came in response to the emerging international situation as the Soviet Union crystallized as the most powerful threat to American strategic interests in Europe and Asia. The occupation would no longer pursue policies that enforced political reform in Japan with regards to de-concentration of

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306 At least, thus far my research has found no instance of a politician being removed from office for reasons concerning the SCAP draft constitution and its progression through the Diet.
corporations, purges of nationalist elites involved in the war, and industrial reparations for formerly occupied countries. According to American policymakers, these policies were weakening Japan, undermining the country’s political and economic stability at a time when every member of the free world was necessary to meet the rising challenge of communism. Continuing with this course of action would inhibit a full recovery for Japan, repress productivity of the country’s Asian neighbors, and all the while deplete precious American resources. The resulting economic vulnerability would be ripe for the Soviet Union to exploit against the Japanese.\textsuperscript{307} Hence, political reform would not be sufficient if Japan remained susceptible to economic exploitation. In what became known as the ‘reverse course,’ the United States would pursue a policy of stability in politics and economics towards occupied Japan. As a result, the peace efforts in 1947 ground to a halt as the Truman Administration realized that terminating the occupation would only expose Japan to internal instability and external threats. The Americans now had new plans for their former opponent: Japan would serve as bastion against Soviet Expansion in Asia. In order for the policy of containment to succeed, Japan had to become a bulwark against communism and establish itself as the workshop of Asia to promote international capitalism.\textsuperscript{308}

This new policy to bring Japan to the side of the free world centered on creating a country that was self-sufficient. Following the end of World War II, the Japanese economy had suffered a loss of approximately 25% of its physical wealth while industry


had fallen to less than 20% and agriculture to 60% of the averages experienced between 1934 and 1936. A self-sufficient Japan meant overcoming these obstacles to restore production to reduce the need for American aid to maintain its economy. To carry out this plan, the American officials had to now focus their efforts on engineering a recovery program for Japan that would address both the domestic and international challenges that the occupied country confronted. Such a program could establish a stable Japan by restoring production and initiating economic growth. The issues confronting the Japanese economy were quite formidable.

After World War II, a dollar shortage, or gap, had emerged in the trading relations among of states, such that the value of goods exported from the United States vastly outpaced the dollars that foreign states held to pay for such goods. The primary problem to balancing international trade for many countries was the shortage of dollars they could earn abroad to subsequently spend on purchasing materials from the Americans. For Japan, the dollar gap was especially difficult to redress as the country primary relied on the import of raw materials and export of goods to fuel its economy. Japan could not support itself through exporting in 1947. As Jeremy Cohen notes, “Japan will require about $1,575,000,000 of exports each year…to pay for essential imports of food and raw materials…to maintain a tolerable food ration and standard of living at home. During 1947 imports into Japan were $526,130,000 and exports were $173,568,000.”

Japan could not export more to make up for its trade imbalance for two reasons. First, Japanese goods were not attractive to Western markets at this time. As Ronald


McGlothlen notes, “in 1947, US trade accounted for 92% of Japan’s imports and only 12% of its exports.”311 Without access to Western markets, Japan had to look to Asia for markets to sell its manufactured goods. Second, the goods Japan did produce were high priced because of their reliance on American imports to provide the necessary materials for production. The country was importing most of its raw materials from the United States, who sold these necessary inputs at prices that were significantly greater than companies traditionally had paid when trading with other markets in Asia. Relying on American imports subsequently raised the prices of the goods produced by its manufacturing companies. Unfortunately, most companies were expected to export these goods to non-dollar areas in Southeast Asia. The Asian economies had relatively few dollars to earn, and could not afford large amounts of the high-priced Japanese goods. These high prices meant both that the Asian countries bought less, and that Japanese companies earned relatively smaller profits from these exports. In addition, trade with the other countries in Asian was mostly through non-convertible currencies. Japan was not earning back the dollars it spent on acquiring American raw materials at a time when it desperately needed to earn more dollars to balance its trade deficit with the United States.312

To solve the dollar gap crisis, American officials were pushing for increased trade between Japan and the countries in Southeast Asia. By increasing trade, the Americans would simultaneously reduce the need for further aid to implement the economic


recovery of Japan and in turn, Japan would provide the Asian countries with an opportunity to develop and modernize their industries. In effect, the American policy would tie the recovery of Japan to the economic development of the other Asian economies. If the Japanese could replace American products with materials from the countries of Southeast Asia, it could reduce the current trade imbalance and strengthen international trade within the region. Accomplishing this trading scheme meant that the American officials had to address the primary problem in establishing the Japanese economy as the exporter of international capitalism: rapid, massive inflation. To the Americans, inflation was undercutting Japanese exports to the region given that the prices were rising beyond what the markets in Asia could bear. If the occupation could halt inflation, then the price of manufactured goods would stabilize and become more attractive.

While MacArthur and SCAP were busy reforming the domestic political institutions, the Japanese economy received little attention in terms of a recovery program until 1947. As MacArthur was instructed, “You will not assume responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy. You will make it clear to the Japanese people that…you assume no obligation to maintain…any particular standard of living in Japan.” MacArthur had initially informed the Japanese that they had to maintain strict controls over prices and wages to prevent economic instability and internal unrest. The Japanese government, however,

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took no measures to administer either in 1945. Instead, the Japanese government focused on the problem of reviving its economy following the losses and destruction of the war. Initially, the Japanese government had paid out indemnities to war production companies, in order that these companies could pay on bank loans and these banks would use the incoming currency to reduce their obligations to the Bank of Japan. In February 1946, SCAP had terminated indemnity payments that corporations received for following the orders of the Japanese government during the war for production, investment, or relocation. This termination of indemnities was carried out in opposition to the government’s promise to financially cover the costs incurred as part of the war. Companies then entered into a cycle of liquidation, absorption, and merger that caused instability in production until 1949. The Japanese government responded to this cycle with the creation of the Reconstruction Fund Bank (RFB) in 1947 under the new priority-production system, which sought to increase funds available to under-utilized industries to increase production. In essence, as Nakamura Takafusa notes, the RFB was “a pipeline for government and Bank of Japan funds being channeled into the industrial sector.” RFB would raise money for projects by selling bonds, which the Bank of Japan would purchase. Unfortunately, the RFB was not independent of the government, and politicians often pressured it to engage in less than preferred loans. The unintended outcome of the RFB and its financing measures was to rapidly increase inflation.

315 The priority-production program began with the first Yoshida cabinet in 1946. The government continued to pursue this policy through the Katayama and Ashida cabinets. See Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 342.

On 22 March 1947, MacArthur issued a letter to the Japanese cabinet. In it, he demanded that the government take actions to mitigate the rapidly increasing wages and prices, or else he would terminate any further distribution of aid to the country. The Japanese government initially ignored this letter, but in July 1947 they did create the Emergency Economic Measures to update the pricing structure on necessary goods as a means to stabilize prices at prewar levels. The goal being that that stabilization of prices in conjunction with the priority-production system would work to sufficiently contain inflation. The measures, however, failed to stop significant increases in inflation by June 1948. The government again responded with the restructuring of prices while the RFB provided increased funds via loans to a number of industries involved in the priority program. The measures eventually achieved a limited victory on slowing down inflation, but the subsidies on goods and the money from the bank further contributed to the problem rather than acting as a cure. Inflation continued to rise. According to the

317 Dick K. Nanto, “The Dodge Line: A Reevaluation,” in The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform eds. Lawrence H. Redford (Norfolk: The MacArthur Memorial, 1980), 45. Here, I explain Nanto’s claim that the Japanese ignored MacArthur’s letter in March. Nakamura mentions that law passed in July 1947 concerning this precise issue, which aligns with Nanto’s argument that the Japanese government became concerned about stabilization in the summer of 1947. The likely reason behind this change is the collapse of the first Yoshida cabinet in May 1947, and the formation of the Katayama cabinet in the same month. The change in governments likely accounts for the implementation of the letter at this time. This interpretation is further reinforced by the notion that Ishibashi Tanzan, Yoshida’s finance minister during these years, was purged from government after the elections. SCAP had instructed the government to adopt measures to recoup wartime profits and indemnity payments that Ishibashi opposed. The occupation authorities recognized that his opposition hindered the adoption of their policies, and he was purged after the defeat of the Yoshida cabinet in May 1947 (See Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952 (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1989), 202, and Finn, Winning the Peace, 127-128). There is also disagreement between Nakamura (The Postwar Japanese Economy, pp. 36-37) and Sumiya on whether the law in question also affected wages for workers. For both points, see Mikio Sumiya, A History of Japanese Trade and Industry Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 196-197.

calculations of Herbert B. Schonberger, the prices of goods had risen more than 700 percent from the first full month of the occupation in September 1945 to August 1948.\textsuperscript{319}

Prior to this, the American officials had merely wanted a stable Japanese economy to effectively manage the political changes they were demanding of the government. The aid programs had provided basic necessities while granting the Japanese some credit to buy goods in dollars. American officials had understood that such measures would be a relatively short-term solution while the economy recovered from the war. From September 1945 through June 1948, Japan had received approximately 1 billion in aid, and the demand for further support showed no signs of relenting in the coming years.\textsuperscript{320} While the US wanted Japan as an ally against the emerging communist threat, the country was economically vulnerable. This vulnerability had – in part – resulted from the policies pursued by the various Japanese governments since August 1945. The Cold War had not destabilized the Japanese economy, and it had not directly contributed to the postwar failure of a recovery. Instead, the United States recognized that the economic vulnerability was a direct result of policies adopted and implemented by the Japanese government over the course of the occupation.

With the changing nature of the occupation, the Americans did not see a strong likelihood of success in how the Japanese were essentially spending the victor’s national

\textsuperscript{319} Schonberger, Aftermath of War, 201. Cohen suggests a slightly higher, albeit similar figure for roughly the same time period: “In April 1948 prices were more than eight times the September 1945 levels.” See Cohen, “Japan: Reform vs. Recovery,” 138.

resources. Allowing the Japanese to handle their economic recovery had proved to be too expensive to continue as the postwar recession now hit the US economy. The current Prime Minister, Hitoshi Ashida, and his cabinet likely avoided the problem as stabilizing the Japanese economy would require increasing taxes and large budget cuts that would politically undercut the position of his government. The continuation of economic aid was difficult to justify domestically in the United States since many individuals saw it as failing to achieve its intended goals in Japan and the evidence did not suggest that further aid would improve the country’s economy without American intervention. As the reverse course emerged in 1948, American officials became worried about whether the Japanese government had either the intentions or determination to solve their economic problems.

The American officials realized that now the economic stability of Japan was the issue of upmost prominence for the occupation to address. That would require minimizing the country’s vulnerability internally by directly altering the economic

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321 The aid that Japan received was not given freely. The American expected that the Japanese government would repay some of the funds provided through the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program, and the Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas (EROA) program. For American officials, that repayment scheme was likely dependent on a successful application of the funds during the occupation to initiate the recovery. For a brief discussion on the repayment of GARIOA during the occupation, see Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 230. The negotiations that took place after the termination of the occupation are briefly addressed in Haruhiro Fukui, “Economic Planning in Postwar Japan: A Case Studying in Policy Making,” *Asian Survey* 12, no. 4 (1972): 329, fn. 3; Sayuri Shimizu, *Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan’s Economic Alternatives, 1950-1960* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2001), 183-185; and Robert D. Eldridge, *Secret Talks Between Tokyo and Washington: The Memoirs of Miyazawa Kiichi, 1949-1954* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), 129-131.

322 Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 202. Buckley notes that William Sebald wrote in 1948 that all of the political parties in the Japanese government strongly favored an end to the occupation and to negotiate the final settlement. However, Sebald noted that the parties assumed that “a peace treaty will prove a kind of magic formula by which many of the economic maladjustments now plaguing the nation will be automatically solved.” In effect, the parties wanted to end the occupation to improve the economy but the relationship between the two was never established. Quoted in Roger Buckley, “Joining the Club: The Japanese Question and Anglo-American Peace Diplomacy, 1950-1951,” *Modern Asian Studies* 19, no. 2 (1985): 301, fn. 9.
recovery policies to improve the international trading position of Japan, and thereby establish an ally that could contribute to the maintenance of the free world.

The Japanese had responded quickly to the rising threat of communism, or at least to the emergence of a persistent perception among American policy makers that communism was a potential threat to the occupied country. In March and April 1948, multiple Japanese government officials realized that the threat presented an opportunity for the occupied to exploit its weakened position as a defeated major power. These officials vigorously appealed to the United States for more resources to combat the ever growing threat of communism in East Asia that was imminently prepared to overtake Japan. As Yoneyuki Sugita notes, “The Cold War meant a danger to Asia while it gave an opportunity to Japan to exercise ‘intimidation by the weak’: Japanese officials tried to exploit the American Cold War mentality in order to induce more generous aid to Japan.”323 In essence, the Japanese saw the threat of communism as bargaining leverage that they could use to improve their occupied position, and potentially exhort funding from the American officials towards any number of projects that could benefit the country. For some Japanese officials, however, neither the proximity of the Soviet Union nor the establishment of a communist regime on the Chinese mainland constituted a true danger to country’s interests. To these officials, the actual menace to the recovery of Japanese economy came from Washington, D.C. They recognized that the emerging Cold War and the reverse course would increase the risk that the occupying power would terminate the stream of aid currently propping up the economy unless the government’s

323 Sugita, Pitfall or Panacea, 32.
administration of these resources led to some demonstrable and lasting improvements.\textsuperscript{324} Now that the Americans had decided to make economic stabilization a priority of the occupation, the Japanese worried what new policies the occupying power might demand that they implement.

Following the investigation of the economic conditions in Japan in 1948, the US National Advisory Council realized that it had to take a different approach to managing aid now that the country’s interests demanded stability in the occupied territory. The Council decided that further distribution of economic aid beginning in 1950 to the occupied territory would be conditioned on the policies adopted by the government and whether those efforts contributed to the stabilization of the Japanese economy. In April 1948, the National Advisory Council officially approved of aid contingent on enforcement of a stabilization program. Future contributions by the United States to the economic recovery would then be contingent on the measures that Japanese government took to implement the newly devised nine point stabilization plan.\textsuperscript{325} On 13 June 1948, the National Security Council altered the occupation policy towards Japan, and the economic recovery became “the prime objective of United States policy in Japan for the coming period.”\textsuperscript{326} President Truman approved the Nine-Point Stabilization Plan on 10 December 1948. The ambitious program to revitalize Japan’s economy called for a balanced budget, improvements in tax collection, tighter credit controls, wage


stabilization, expanded price control, expanded foreign exchange control, expanded production, better allocation of materials, and improvements in food allocation.327

MacArthur delivered the nine-points to Yoshida, holding that “the prompt economic stabilization of Japan is a primary objective common to both the Allied Powers and the Japanese people.” The program would entail “…increased austerity in every phase of Japanese life” to achieve its long-term objectives. MacArthur went further, explaining to Yoshida that in the implementation of the program there would be no “place for ideological opposition as the purpose to be served is common to all of the people, and any attempt to delay or frustrate its accomplishment must be curbed as menacing the general welfare.”328 MacArthur made it clear that the Japanese government was now ordered to abide by these policies and that only if they demonstrated compliance with the stabilization program would the American government provide the country with further economic aid.329

Yoshida had only just returned to office as prime minister in October 1948, and in January 1949 his party had captured a majority of seats in the Diet. Enacting the nine-points would fall to his administration then, and American officials were particularly worried about whether his government could achieve success in stabilizing the Japanese economy. Following the discussion with MacArthur, Yoshida likely realized that he would be expected to discipline and align his fellow party members behind the American


328 Sugita, Pitfall or Panacea, 54-55.

329 Dower suggests that SCAP authorities may not have welcomed the return of Yoshida and his cabinet. The first Yoshida government was viewed as “inept and reactionary.” Some SCAP members likely sought to prevent the formation of a second cabinet under Yoshida given the poor performance of the first. See Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 274.
demands, and his cabinet would be responsible for complying with the orders issued. As noted by the State Department in February 1949, “unless economic recovery program gives early promise of success, and does so without patently inequitable distribution of burdens on major economic group [sic], there is no guarantee of continuing political stability under the Democratic-Liberal leadership.” As the report recognized, the potential costs for failure to comply would be the loss of political office by the Democratic and Liberal parties, most likely at the hands of the Japanese citizens who would suffer if the country did not maintain the continuing flow of American aid.

The Dodge Line and the Emerging Political Consequences

The Truman administration had selected Joseph M. Dodge to implement the nine-point stabilization program. Dodge’s objectives in Japan were “(1) to balance the consolidated national budget, (2) to establish the U.S. Aid Counterpart Fund and to terminate lending by the Reconstruction Finance Bank, (3) to establish a foreign-exchange rate, and (4) to decrease the scope of governmental intervention into the private economy, especially with respect to subsidies and price controls.” These objectives became the austerity package commonly referred to as the Dodge Line. The goal of the Dodge Line involved removing the two “stilts holding up the economy”: terminating the need for further American aid to maintain the Japanese economy and to reduce, if not eliminate, domestic subsidies on wages and prices as previously established by the

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330 Sugita, Pitfall or Panacea, 56.

Japanese government.\textsuperscript{332} Knocking down the two stilts would effectively put an end to the priority-production system that the Japanese government had developed, and then consequently allow the Americans to control the debate over which policies the country would implement during its economic recovery. In doing so, the American expectation was that the austerity program would halt any further growth in the rate of inflation, thereby allowing Japan to establish a more competitive export industry and to increase its ability to acquire imports from the United States without having to rely on credit or loans to cover the dollar gap. The intended outcome of the Dodge Line was a self-sufficient Japan.\textsuperscript{333}

The Americans and the Japanese shared the common goal of economic recovery for the war torn country. The Japanese politicians especially did not protest the notion of further American assistance in improving their sluggish economic recovery. What they did oppose was the nature of the policies that the occupying power was ordering them to implement to achieve economic self-sufficiency.\textsuperscript{334} The political consequences of


\textsuperscript{333} The Japanese had also devised an economic reconstruction plan, drafted by the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB) in concert with other public and private actors throughout the country. However, this plan conflicted with the economic stabilization program developed by the United States, and was subsequently dropped under protest by the ESB. See Fukui, “Economic Planning in Postwar Japan,” 329-331.

\textsuperscript{334} Scholars disagree on whether Yoshida and his political party favored the same economic policies that Dodge devised for the country. Dower (\textit{Empire and Aftermath}, 274-275, 342) has suggested that Yoshida and his party did not agree with the economic policies imposed by Dodge beginning in February 1949. They wanted to pursue policies that favored Keynesianism via deficit spending to stimulate the economy. Dodge was staunchly opposed to such arguments. He preferred a more conservative approach to tackle inflation and reign in the budget to achieve more balanced spending habits. Schonberger (\textit{Aftermath of War}, 211) concurs with Dower’s interpretation. Hein (\textit{Fueling Growth}, 156) offers a different interpretation: she argues that the economic policymakers were divided on their support for the Dodge Line. Yoshida, however, was more concerned with using the opportunity to initiate unpopular policies that could improve his political position. Thorsten and Sugita (“Joseph Dodge and the Geometry of Power,”307-310) suggest that the Japanese government concurred with Dodge’s plans, and had actually wanted to implement similar austerity policies to achieve the country’s economic recovery. MacDougall supports this latter
complying with the Dodge Line began to emerge early in the execution of the economic stabilization program. As part of their election campaign in January 1949, Yoshida and his party had promised to reduce income taxes, remove sales taxes, and increase funding to public building projects.\textsuperscript{335} Having won a significant political victory at the ballot box, members of the Liberal Party expected to realize their policy preferences with relative ease. During the initial phases of reviewing the budget with Dodge, Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda intended to secure specific exemptions in favor of these public commitments. He informed Dodge that some small concessions were necessary in designing the new budget to accommodate the promises made by him and his colleagues during the elections. Dodge said no. He refused to grant any concessions to reconcile the stabilization program with the election promises made by Yoshida and his fellow party members. Dodge did not want to set an undo precedent that might influence the course of occupation. As James D. Savage notes, Dodge likely believed that “If [he] did concede on taxes…it would appear that SCAP had succumbed to political pressure and that Japan needed to stop living beyond its means, contract consumption, and beat inflation.”\textsuperscript{336}

\begin{itemize}
  \item I offer a different interpretation following the theoretical argument: the American and Japanese officials likely did disagree on the Dodge Line, though not as a result of preferences for competing economic theories. Instead, I attribute the divergence between the occupier and the occupied on preferred economic policies as a consequence of the costs of compliance that Japanese politicians likely expected to incur by conceding to American demands on how to achieve economic stability. The Japanese government might have accepted the economic premises of the Dodge Line. Regardless of whether they agreed with the Americans on its prescriptions, the Japanese politicians were the ones who would suffer the domestic political costs for complying with the austerity program.
  \item Cohen, \textit{Remaking Japan}, 437; Schonberger, \textit{Aftermath of War}, 209.
  \item James D. Savage, “The Origins of Budgetary Preferences: The Dodge Line and the Balanced Budget Norm in Japan,” \textit{Administration and Society} 34, no. 3 (2002): 275. Dodge did make a recommendation: he informed Ikeda that by increasing the efficacy of tax collection, the government could bring about some of the commitments it made during the election campaign. However, reform of tax collection was outside of Dodge’s preview. Prof. Carl S. Shoup had been charged by the United States to evaluate the Japanese tax
\end{itemize}
the latter point, Dodge firmly believed that the Japanese government had brought about the inflationary crisis, and that they would now have to assume the consequences. As Herbert B. Schonberger notes, Dodge told Ikeda that the Japanese government had to stop “ducking the issues… The history here showed a continued series of concessions made on promises that have not been performed; what we needed was a record of performance.” Dodge would not grant any concessions.

Upon hearing Dodge’s rejection, Ikeda realized that his political position was in danger. He would have to concede the campaign promises made by his political party during the recent elections as the Americans pressed for compliance with their preferred economic policies. In designing the budget, Ikeda adhered to Dodge’s response and did not indulge in any concessions to account for the Liberal Party’s public commitments. Ikeda realized that he could not likely remain in office without gathering a political backlash from his own party, and possibly from opposition parties who would exploit compliance with the occupier’s demands as a sign of political weakness. Ikeda offered to resign from his position as finance minister, to demonstrate the inadequacy of his actions and likely to mitigate any potential costs his political compatriots would subsequently suffer as a result of his actions. Yoshida allowed Ikeda to remain in the cabinet post, even


In June 1950, Dodge did claim that he had “…fully explored the possibility of concessions suitable for some political advantage” for Yoshida and his government. However, no evidence as of yet has indicated that Dodge granted the Japanese government concessions in the budget, beyond the already promised concession of continuing aid should the latter abide by the terms of the economic stabilization program. Quote from Thorsten and Sugita, “Joseph Dodge and the Geometry of Power,” 308.

337 Quoted in Schonberger, Aftermath of War, 209.
though other members of their party sought the finance minister’s immediate removal for sacrificing the campaign pledges and caving into Dodge’s demands.\textsuperscript{338}

The budget became the primary concern in fixing the inflation problem in Japan, and no public spending was spared under Dodge’s scrutiny in February 1949. Yoshida’s government had difficulties embracing the policies that Dodge executed as they as well as other politicians recognized the likely political consequences. First, the Dodge Line severely reduced funding for public works projects such as schools thereby depriving numerous localities of facilities and accompanying resources. Second, the new budget would require the government to terminate hundreds of thousands employees, most likely in a relatively abrupt and quick manner. Third, Dodge wanted to eliminate all rationing programs for items such as gas and alcohol for individuals, and to substantially reduce subsidies to the private sector, if he could not entirely have such items removed from the budget. Fourth, the new budget discontinued RFB’s authority to issue new loans and thereby terminated the priority-production program for those corporations benefiting from its measures. Fifth, Dodge opposed any additions to the budget for unemployment assistance programs for the forthcoming layoffs in the public and private sector that would result from the policies the Americans demanded. Sixth, Dodge implemented policies that would also increase the amount of revenue available to the government. To generate that additional revenue, he required that individuals incur significantly increased fees across a number of basic services, and, as a result of decreasing the rate inflation in the economy these efforts would effectively increase real taxes for individuals. Dodge

\textsuperscript{338} Savage, “The Origins of Budgetary Preferences,” 275-276. This initial rejection did not dissuade Yoshida and the Liberal Party from making further attempts to gain a concession from Dodge to lower taxes. Dodge rejected all of these attempts as well. See Schonberger, \textit{Aftermath of War}, 213.
allocated and pushed debt repayment as a high priority for the government, and he would not allow transfers of money from the general account to cover any special accounts as a measure to prevent further deficit spending. In addition to balancing the budget, Dodge pursued two other major changes that would have serious consequences for the Japanese economy. He created the US Counterpart Fund to manage incoming aid from the United States with the initial goal to repay old RFB debt and once complete, to distribute funds to businesses for various projects, this time under American discretion. Unlike the previous setup with the RFB, the Japanese government was not trusted with significant authority over the allocation of aid, and the counterpart fund was placed directly under SCAP control. Finally, Dodge established a single exchange rate for the yen. This action devalued the yen considerably resulting in an anticipated reduction for the price of Japanese exports and a significant, if not fatal blow to thousands of smaller companies.  

Dodge and Ikeda sent the budget proposal to the Diet in March 1949. The Diet merely had the formality of approving the budget, though it generated significant discontent among many members. Several politicians expressed their concerns that the combined effect of tightening credit and balancing the budget in a weak economy would only increase the risk of pushing the country into a recession, or worse, a depression. “Some members demanded that SCAP directly order them to adopt the budget, so that it would appear they accepted it against their will.” Members of the Diet sought to amend, or revise, portions of the budget, but their efforts failed. SCAP retained the authority to approve the budget proposal, and would only do so if the Japanese government adopted

the bill as it was drafted by Dodge.\textsuperscript{340} The Diet subsequently adopted the budget proposal.

While the budget presented opportunities for the current conservative cabinet to purge Leftists and disrupt the activities of labor organizations in the public and private sectors, the swiftness with which the Dodge Line was implemented disturbed many supporters. The Yoshida government came to oppose these policies and the budget for the political consequences they began to suffer from the massive layoffs across the entire economy, the increased taxes that hit almost every individual and the resulting losses that businesses incurred. The political nature of implementing the Dodge Line became so acute that by the middle of 1949, Yoshida and his cabinet had “adopted a policy of refusing to carry out orders not to its liking without a formal written instruction from GHQ. This [action] relieves Yoshida’s party of the responsibility for unpopular measures [and requires GHQ to] assume an openly greater degree of direct control of Japan’s internal affairs – particularly in connection with the [stabilization plan]. It also places the blame for resulting hardship and difficulties more directly upon the occupation.”\textsuperscript{341} The occupation authorities had to maintain constant pressure on the Japanese government to carry out the stabilization program as the political costs of complying with the policies ordered by the American government continued to rise as the economic situation deteriorated.

\textsuperscript{340} Savage, “The Origins of Budgetary Preferences,” 278.

\textsuperscript{341} Schonberger, \textit{Aftermath of War}, 212. Some evidence suggested that Yoshida and Ikeda went so far as to publically “disavow their support for the Dodge Line.” See Borden, \textit{United States Foreign Economic Policy}, 99.
After passing the budget through the Diet, Dodge began to criticize the Japanese government for shirking on its responsibilities and violating the principles of the stabilization plan. Dodge privately accused Yoshida and his cabinet of manipulating the budget to undermine the recovery program before it could take full effect. For instance, the government targeted individuals employed in statistical offices for layoffs in order to remove those responsible for providing data to monitor implementation of the stabilization program. In addition, the Economic Stabilization Board frequently reported on the negative consequences of the policies, arguing that their analyses had predicted the consequences and that much worse was to come if the government continued to pursue the policies prescribed by the Dodge Line. The most significant violation came from the Bank of Japan. Initially, the Bank of Japan had followed the Dodge Line, restricting access to credit for businesses to reduce inflation. Eventually, it had to act to moderate some of the more stressful aspects of a balanced budget and new tax program. Effectively, the Bank of Japan lightened the impact of these policies by allowing companies to access much needed credit though it was contrary to the stabilization program. The bank encouraged commercial banks to help companies as well, thereby allowing the commercial banking system in Japan to defect from the Dodge Line. The authorities in SCAP and Dodge agreed that measures had to be taken to mandate reserve

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342 Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 275. In June 1950, Dodge would refer to Yoshida and his government as the “best asset” of the American Occupation in Japan. Unlike the accusations made against Yoshida, Dodge does not explain why or how Yoshida had become so valuable in such a relatively short period of time. See the quote from Thorsten and Sugita, “Joseph Dodge and the Geometry of Power,” 308.

levels for commercial banks to prevent over-lending and reign in credit before such actions undermined the efforts of the stabilization program. However, no actions were taken against the commercial banking industry during the implementation of the Dodge Line in either 1949 or throughout 1950. It is likely that Dodge was aware of the acts by the banking industry in Japan. He allowed the banks to act as a safety valve to mitigate the possibility of the more disaster consequences that might emerge from pursuing his line rather than pushing through legislation to alter their policies.344

The Dodge Line had an immediate effect on the Japanese economy. The rapidly rising inflation was ground to a halt in 1949 and for the first time since the early 1930s the government had a large budget surplus.345 These positives, however, were diminished in light of consequences of the implementing stabilization program. By April 1949, all other indicators on the health of the economy had dropped. As a consequence of tightening credit, many small and medium businesses had to declare bankruptcy. The bankruptcies and the reduction in subsidies combined also resulted in massive layoffs in the private sector in addition to the attrition in the public sector. Unemployment had reached a new high as the public and private sector cut over two million jobs between the implementation of the Dodge Line until the middle of 1950.346 As a result of the rising unemployment and the reduction in available jobs, suicide rates also increased across the

344 Borden, United States Foreign Economic Policy, 101; Schonberger, Aftermath of War, 222-225.


346 Hein, Fueling Growth, 155-162. The figures on unemployment in Japan vary across sources. Johnson lists the figure at approximately 2 million, while Hein suggests a somewhat higher figure at 2.4 million unemployed across the public and private sector. See Chalmers Johnson, Conspiracy at Matsukawa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 69, and Hein, Fueling Growth, 155. Dower (Empire and Aftermath, 423) points out that at least 1 million individuals had sought public employment services by March 1950.
country in response to the lack of work. Unexpectedly, durable goods production dropped in Japan, suggesting that the reduction in domestic consumption was not shifting resources over to capital investment.\footnote{Cohen, \textit{Remaking Japan}, 438-439; Dower, \textit{Embracing Defeat}, 541.} In November 1949, William Sebald, Representative of the State Department to SCAP, wrote about the effects of the Dodge Line, stating that “the Nine-Point Stabilization Program is perhaps the most unpopular measure the occupation has imposed on Japan, however much it is for Japan’s ultimately well being.”\footnote{Quoted in Buckley, “Joining the Club,” p. 301, fn. 8.}

More importantly, the American’s expectation that by reducing inflation the prices for exports would fall and Japan would then increase its trade was not working out as planned. International trade initially collapsed, which Dodge had expected, but the subsequent increase in exports did not follow as quickly as some policymakers had hoped. Japan did not experience much change in its trade during 1949, and only a small shift upward in early 1950.\footnote{Cohen, \textit{Remaking Japan}, 438-439; Thorsten and Sugita, “Joseph Dodge and the Geometry of Power,” 310.} The economies of Southeast Asian were not buying up Japanese exports. Japanese goods were cheaper but the American policymakers had assumed that when the prices fell there would be markets for these goods in the world. In 1949 and the first half of 1950, there were not, and the country was developing a massive supply of unsellable goods.\footnote{Fukui, “Economic Planning in Postwar Japan,” 333; Hein, \textit{Fueling Growth}, 185.} At this time, these countries lacked both political stability

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\footnote{Quoted in Buckley, “Joining the Club,” p. 301, fn. 8.}{Quoted in Buckley, “Joining the Club,” p. 301, fn. 8.}
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and wealth to engage in the amount of international trade that Japan needed to revive its economy.  

In March 1950, the Diet began discussions on the budget for 1950. Dodge returned to Japan to enforce the prerogatives of the stabilization program, knowing that many politicians were urgently seeking some type of relief to mitigate the gloomy economic situation. Dodge continued to call for a balanced budget with significant resources spent on further reducing the debt. Dodge also advocated freezing the pay of the civil service in the coming year. Yoshida and his government were unsure of whether the economy could take another year of the austerity program. The members of the Liberal Party were especially concerned about opposition parties exploiting the dismal aspects of the economic stabilization program against them. The Japanese government asked again for concessions from the occupiers to reduce the amount spent on debt retirement and increase investment funds as a means to win some favor among the labor force.  

In May 1950, Yoshida sent Ikeda to Washington, D.C. on a secret trip to ask Dodge for concessions on continuing the economic policies that were devastating Japan. Yoshida had Ikeda issue a subtle threat as part of the request for concessions as to the consequences of refusal. Ikeda informed Dodge that the current economic policies were endangering American interests in Japan. Several opposition parties had recently taken a unified stance against the Yoshida cabinet for allowing the occupation to continue without a peace settlement in the foreseeable future, and attempted a no-confidence

351 Sugita, Pitfall or Panacea, 75; Schonberger, Aftermath of War, 217.

measure to remove it from office. Fortunately, the Liberal Party held a strong majority and stopped the measure in the Lower House. Likely, Ikeda meant to imply that further such challenges would emerge, and could gain more support if the economy did not improve. Ikeda explained that if the Yoshida cabinet lost office, that none of the remaining political parties could obtain a similar majority position. Through this statement, Ikeda was suggesting that the occupation had to accommodate the government’s position; otherwise the United States would risk of losing the only political force in Japan that could meet American interests. Ikeda stated that the Yoshida government needed concessions in the upcoming budget for 1950 to accommodate certain portions of the Japanese population in addition to increased American aid, similar to what other countries were now receiving. Dodge refuted their requests by informing the officials that any changes in the economic stabilization program must be addressed to the authorities at SCAP. The Liberal Party would receive no concessions or any increases in aid. Instead, the Diet had to accept another budget following the prescriptions of the Dodge Line. The Diet adopted the proposal in late May.

Ikeda’s mission had changed nothing in the implementation of the Dodge Line, though it might have signaled the emerging weakness in Yoshida’s position and the costs he was incurring for following the austerity policies. The Americans had already found the current economic trend concerning, as “a secret State Department report of May 1950 outlined how “every major power element in the Japanese body politic considers itself

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354 The Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army (Reid) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Butterworth), 1950 FRUS Vol.VI, 1197; Schonberger, Aftermath of War, 223; and Borden, United States Foreign Economic Policy, 99.
injured and its interests jeopardized” by the enforcement of the stabilization plan.”  

The Dodge Line had brought the economy to at best a draw, and Japanese politicians were searching for the means to overturn its effects. As William S. Borden notes, “Spurred by the end of the American recession, the consequent easing of the world dollar crisis, and the spurt of sterling exports, the indices crept up through June, but Japan’s position was so grave that far more dramatic improvements were necessary to set up the economy on the path of modernization and recovery.” Without redress, the possibility of Japan entering a recession, or a depression, seemed likely in June 1950.

In July 1950, as the politicians were growing restless under the rising costs from complying with the Dodge Line, North Korea invaded the South and initiated the Korean War. The unintended impact of the war on Japan was immense in terms of reviving the economy. Yoshida himself recognized the Korean War as a ‘Gift from God’ in turns of the economic benefits that it showered upon the staggering Japanese economy. The war brought a number of positive benefits that addressed many of the problems confronting the country. The military procurement for the war effort was massive. Goods and services were needed in Korea, and Japan was in the geographic proximity to provide almost everything that the participants needed to fight the North Koreans and then the Chinese. In August 1950, US procurement officers signed contracts for 60 million in goods and services. In 1951, receipts from the proceeds of military procurement had reached almost 1 billion. In addition, once the fighting began to subside, South Korea needed further

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goods and services to rebuild its war-torn country. Again, Japan would benefit enormously from the procurement efforts to refurnish its neighbor. As Tatsurō Uchino noted, from 1950 to 1955 the Japanese economy received orders for procurements in the magnitude of 2.4 billion to 3.6 billion.\textsuperscript{358} The dollar gap had largely dissipated from the military procurements. Furthermore, the war brought a substantial amount of foreign currency to Japan. The American troops passing through Japan to and from the Korean conflict became an excellent source of dollars to further stimulate the economy.\textsuperscript{359} At this point, the Japanese government had relatively few reasons to not implement the Americans preferred economic policies. The exporting of goods had greatly increased while the signs of an emerging depression had disappeared, and was replaced by the new demands for the continuing war effort. These large procurement orders had restored Japan’s trade levels to those of the prewar years of 1934 to 1936 and quickly surpassed that benchmark for economic recovery. Labor also substantially benefited as private corporations sought to increase their hiring efforts while simultaneously offering better compensation to current and new employees.\textsuperscript{360} Japan had at long last achieved a position at which economic self-sufficiency seemed possible.\textsuperscript{361}

\textsuperscript{358} In comparison, the US spent approximately 3 billion on aid from the initiation of the occupation to the month prior of the Korean War. See Tatsurō Uchino, \textit{Japan’s Postwar Economy: An Insider’s View of Its History and Its Future} Trans. by Mark A. Harbison (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1983), 57.


\textsuperscript{360} Uchino, \textit{Japan’s Postwar Economy}, 55-62.

\textsuperscript{361} Cohen, \textit{Remaking Japan}, 440.
As noted in the introduction, this aspect of the occupation focuses on a goal—economic recovery—that both the American and Japanese officials favored as a preferred outcome for the postwar era. All of the cabinets and most members of the Diet wanted to repair the destruction that the country had suffered during the war, and to re-establish the economy as a major contributor and beneficiary of international trade. The United States wanted a bulwark against the rising tide of communism in Asia, a Japan that would serve as a defender of free markets and promoter capitalism in the region. If both countries wanted to accomplish a similar end, why did the victor order the vanquished to implement the economic stabilization program? The importance of recognizing this agreement on goals is that it reinforces the American distrust of the Japanese government to implement the necessary policies to affect an economic recovery. The occupation had provided aid initially as a means to stabilize the economy while pursuing political change in the country. By altering the political institutions, the Americans thought, the economic recovery would subsequently follow. As the international environment shifted, the Americans no longer thought the political reforms would be sufficient to create a stable ally. Many officials believed that the Japanese would not succeed in an economic recovery as their government was responsible for the rapidly rising inflation that brought about economic instability. The Americans would have to pressure the Japanese into accepting costly measures to achieve a goal that both considered beneficial to their postwar interests, but that the latter could not accomplish if left to its own devices. For their part, the Japanese recognized that the American economic policies would have consequences that imposed high political costs for complying with the demands.
As the evidence suggested, many politicians within the government worried about the costs of complying the American economic policies. The Japanese government wanted to restore the country’s economy, but the prescriptions sought in the stabilization program and implemented by Dodge could come back to haunt them. As agents, they became increasingly adverse to the emerging political consequences of the economic policies implemented by the United States to achieve a stable economy. As the consequences of the policies began to affect the population, the politicians involved became increasingly resistant to continuing with the Dodge Line. Eventually, Yoshida and Ikeda went as far as to circumvent MacArthur and SCAP officials to plead secretly with Dodge for some type of relief – not only to mitigate the effects on the population, but to reduce the costs that they anticipated incurring from their supporters for complying with the American demands.

Following the arguments concerning the high costs of compliance, the government officials did take steps to mitigate or contradict American orders. Removing bureaucrats in an attempt to hide information, and potentially encouraging the Bank of Japan to extend credit in opposition to the Dodge Line likely did not alleviate American

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362 In evaluating the theory, some scholars might question whether the Dodge Line was necessary to stabilize the Japanese economy. Some scholars have challenged the notion that the Japanese government required the Economic Stabilization Program to combat inflation in 1949. Dick Nanto argues that the high levels of inflation were already beginning to tamper off in 1948 and 1949 just as the Americans shifted policy and Dodge came to Japan. He contends that had the Americans simply waited, the level of inflation would have decreased and prices would have stabilized. Nakamura supports these conclusions. He argues that the policies implemented in 1947 and 1948 by the Japanese government might have addressed the problem of rising inflation if the measures had been given more time to take effect. Both scholars suggest that the Japanese government had implemented policies to address economic stabilization, and that the program dictated the United States was not entirely necessary. However, the issue as to whether the policy was necessary is not at stake here. The economic stabilization program was the preferred peace of the American officials in response to the changing international environment. Until 1948, the American occupation had yet to see success from the Japanese officials in redressing the economy. To American interests, a recovering Japanese economy was exactly what the free world needed to maintain the balance of power against the Soviet Union. Nanto, “The Dodge Line: A Reevaluation,” passim, and Nakamura, *The Postwar Japanese Economy*, 37.
concerns on whether the Japanese government could achieve economic stability if left to its own devices. Dodge and others knew of these acts, and allowed the Bank of Japan to continue as a means of relieving some of the pressures in complying with the economic program. The Japanese, however, had to be careful not to completely undermine the economic stabilization policies, or they would risk losing the aid that the country desperately needed to maintain its current status. It is possible that the Dodge Line inadvertently increased that reliance on aid – albeit temporarily. This increased reliance would have further pressured politicians to adhere to the American prescriptions as a means to gain the relief that the economy and the population needed to survive the economic downturn in 1949 and 1950. Without the Korean War, it is not clear whether the Japanese economy would have improved as quickly as it did and effectively mitigated the costs of complying with the American economic program.

However, the Korean War was a mixed blessing for the American policies and the Japanese economy, and not quite the gift from god that Yoshida praised. The level of inflation once again started to rise as the procurement orders flowed to the industrial sector, quickly approaching the same rates as during the initial phases of the occupation. The increase in trade led to a subsequently larger demand for shipping exports, making it profitable. Yet, the run on raw material resources as a part of this economic expansion increased the costs of Japanese imports, and reduced overall competitiveness of its

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363 I do not consider this a concession on the part of the American officials, or an accommodating measure for that matter. First, the American officials did not explicitly renounce their position on tightening credit. Instead, Dodge recognized the measure as a safety value that might mitigate some aspects of economic stabilization program. Second, to constitute an accommodating measure, the Americans should have offered the possibility to the Japanese to induce compliance. They did not. For a conceptualization on identifying concessions, see Jonathan N. Brown and Anthony S. Marcum, “Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy,” Security Studies 20, no. 2 (May 2011): 156.
manufactured goods, especially to target markets in Southeast Asia. Japan was not receiving the expected capital investment to account for modernizing or expanding their factories. Instead, the resulting economic boom was increasing the dependency of the economy upon the demands of the United States and its imports rather than on exploring and developing further trade relations with Southeast Asia. Japan was now fully entrenched in the free world and in particular, the economy of the United States. The possibility of playing neutral in the Cold War was effectively eliminated as a result of the war in Korea.  

The Americans had changed their focus from political reform to economic recovery as a result of the shifting international environment. The lack of an effective recovery in Japan was due to the failure of several Japanese governments to adequately address the underlying problems that prevented the emergence of stability. When the economic stabilization program was announced, the occupation officials recognized that their agents were less than enthused about cooperating, especially given the large political costs they expected to reap domestically from the increasing failure of businesses and rising unemployment.


365 For this aspect of the Occupation of Japan, I focused on solely on the domestic costs of compliance that the politicians might incur. There were potentially international costs of complying with the American demands as well. Specifically, the stabilization program sought to increase trade with Southeast Asia. The consequences of increasing exports to Southeast Asia would have likely brought Japan into direct competition with the United Kingdom. After World War II, the British viewed the region as a potential source of restoring their international trade, and though they preferred Japan as a counterweight to China, many still held uncertain views on allowing a defeated opponent to compete for the region’s markets. For an overview of the cooperation and competition between the United Kingdom and Japan in Southeast Asia, see Nicholas J. White, “Britain and the return of Japanese Economic Interests to South East Asia after the Second War World,” *South East Asia Research* 6, no. 3 (1998): 281-307. For example, Dunn discusses how the United Kingdom wanted restrictions on Japanese trade with Asian countries. See Frederick S. Dunn, *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 110. For a
implemented without the Americans ordering the Japanese politicians to comply with the stabilization program to continue receiving aid for their economic recovery. The harsh consequences – rising unemployment, reductions in social programs, and lack of benefits from increased international trade – certainly made the Japanese government question the utility of the program and likely they anticipated significant political costs in coming elections. The Japanese would certainly have undermined the program if they thought it possible. SCAP authorities had to enforce the policies necessary to meet the economic stabilization program and the Japanese, under pressure, complied with what the Americans had dictated to them.

**Peace, Security and Rearmament**

The United States had abandoned a peace conference in 1947 since the unstable financial conditions in Japan would have left the country exposed to the growing communist threat in the region. By May 1949, the State Department issued a report that suggested though the occupation was a success thus far the operation was approaching ‘the point of diminishing returns’ in terms of the goals it could achieve. The Japanese population had not engaged in overt resistance yet, but the report suggested that policy makers should be concerned with a growing restlessness among the occupied.

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The United States government was pursuing its options on how to design the settlement for Japan when the Korean War brought new political concerns to the forefront about the continuing occupation for the victor and the vanquished. John Foster Dulles, the primary negotiator for the peace treaty, believed that the attack on South Korea could become a direct threat to Japan, and thereby the regional interests of United States. Dulles also recognized an opportunity in the new conflict, in that “the Japanese people have been in…a postwar stupor. The Korean attack is awakening them…[the United States can] take advantage of this awakening to bring them an insight into the possibilities of the free world and their responsibility as a member of it.”

The conflict in Korea also served to spark Japanese interest in renewing negotiations, and to bring an end to the occupation as well as settle the remaining disputes from World War II. Prime Minister Yoshida was especially eager to renew negotiations, given his thought that country’s bargaining position had improved vis-à-vis the United States with the recent conflict in Korea in July 1950. Previously, in May, during a visit with Dodge to discuss the economic policies, Financial Minister Ikeda raised a secret offer from the prime minister to entice the Americans into considering the renewal of negotiations over a peace treaty to end the occupation. The offer held that if the US could not raise the issue on retaining military bases in Japan after the occupation ended, then the Japanese government would do so to expedite the settlement. This secret offer for retaining bases was made in the context of a rising domestic threat against the American occupation and its interests in Japan. Yoshida believed that anti-Americanism had grown stronger among the population in recent years as a result of continuing...

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368 Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary, 19 July 1950 FRUS Vol. VI, 1243
American control, and he firmly believed that now was the time to stem the problem before it led to more serious political consequences for the United States and the Japanese government. By initiating negotiations immediately, the Yoshida government was also in a strong position to issue its demands given its majority in the Diet, which indicated that it could deliver a peace on terms acceptable to the Americans if the latter provided certain concessions for the former’s compliance.\footnote{The Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army (Reid) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Butterworth), 1950 \textit{FRUS} Vol. VI, 1195-1196; Dower, \textit{Empire and Aftermath}, 375. Interestingly, Yoshida claimed immediately afterward to a domestic audience that he did not engage in secret diplomacy.}

Following the initial performance of the United Nations forces in the Korean conflict, Yoshida decided that he would publicly rescind the notion that his government would provide bases to the Americans after the occupation.\footnote{Michael M. Yoshitsu, \textit{Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 45.} In late July, Yoshida publicly testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Councilors.\footnote{Yoshida’s secret acceptance of bases was not a new policy for the country. As Foreign Minister, Hitoshi Ashida had written to the American government on 13 September 1947. In the note, Ashida explained the measures that the Katayama Cabinet thought necessary to provide for Japan’s security. This included a ‘security guarantee’ from the United States, which likely implied basing arrangements. See Yoshihisa Hara, “The Significance of the U.S.-Japan Security System to Japan: The Historical Background,” \textit{Peace \\& Change} 12, no. 3-4 (1987): 30-31.} At that meeting, he stated his opposition to providing Japanese territory to any foreign country to use for basing arrangements. He affirmed that the, “Allied powers do not intend to present such a demand, as it is the desire of the Allied powers to keep Japan out of war.” In the following days, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ichiro Ohta explained to William Sebald the unexpected shift in the government’s stance on basing arrangements after the occupation. Ohta informed Sebald that the UN’s performance in protecting
South Korea indicated that the international organization was sufficiently reliable to provide for Japan’s future security needs.\textsuperscript{372}

The prime minister had significant domestic concerns on his mind when publicly renouncing bases, and more generally regarding the future security arrangements for Japan. The Japanese government was persistently pursuing peace with the Americans to end the occupation, though the acceptable terms of any such arrangement were a matter for serious debate. If one thing united the political parties of Japan, it was their resolve to establish a peace that left no infringements on the sovereignty of their country.\textsuperscript{373} The political parties on the Left had formed a coalition called the ‘United Front’ to challenge Yoshida’s government with a vote of no-confidence in April 1950. The following month, Butterworth met with Shirasu to discuss the question of Japan’s future security. Shirasu confided that public support for the prime minister and the Liberal Party was diminishing as a result of the political opposition engaging in an “uncompromising attack on the US base issue.”\textsuperscript{374} In addition, the rearmament of Japan had become a tense debate among the political parties. The Left actively opposed any abrogation of the new pacifist constitution while the Democrats wanted to both revise Article 9 and immediately begin rearming the country. Yoshida himself did not favor the rearmament of Japan at this time, given the possible consequences it would pose for the recovery of the country’s still

\textsuperscript{372} Memorandum by the Office in Charge of Japanese Affairs (Green) 2 August 1950 and The Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State, 9 August 1950, \textit{FRUS} Vol. IV, 1262-1263, and 1270-1271; Yoshitsu, \textit{Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement}, 45-46.


\textsuperscript{374} Eldridge and Kusunoki, “To Base or Not to Base,” 113, and quoted on 117.
The prime minister had strong domestic incentives to state his opposition to any possible basing relationship, and to avoid any entanglements in the rearmament issue.

In private, Yoshida held a different view on the possibility of the Americans retaining bases in Japan. He favored the Americans remaining in Japan, perhaps under an arrangement with the UN or even a bilateral treaty among sovereign equals. He had informed the Sir Alvary Gascoigne, Head of the British Liaison Mission, that the continuing presence of US forces was necessary to maintain the country’s security given the deteriorating situation across East Asia.\textsuperscript{376} For the moment, Yoshida thought Japan had gained an upper hand for the coming negotiations with the US, and hoped for significantly improved terms in the resulting agreements. Specifically, Yoshida thought that “Japan and the United States had to approach the [security treaty] as independent countries on an equal footing.”\textsuperscript{377}

Though still under occupation, Yoshida had expected an increase in his bargaining leverage in the forthcoming negotiations. By virtue of its location Japan had

\textsuperscript{375} Dingman, “Reconsiderations,” 477; MacDougall, “Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Transition,” 62-63. I note that Koseki (The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution, 238) suggests that Yoshida did support the rearmament of Japan, which is likely correct but not a sufficiently precise representation of the prime minister’s motivations. I want to be clear on my interpretation of Yoshida’s intentions: he foresaw that Japan would eventually have to establish a new military force to provide for its own defense and stability. However, his preferred rearmament program would begin after a period of economic growth and the restoration of friendly relations with the other states in East Asia. Both Dingman and MacDougall indicate that Yoshida did not support rearmament in the current period. In further support of this interpretation, see Jennifer M. Miller, “The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in US-Japanese Relations,” Journal of Contemporary History 46, no. 1 (2011): 89.


become indispensible for the Americans to fight the Korean War, especially now with the Chinese intervention. The United States needed Japan to maintain its presence and defend its interest in Asia. As Kenneth Pyle notes, Yoshida “…reasoned that Japan could make minimal concessions of passive cooperation with the Americans in return for an early end to the occupation, a long-term guarantee of its national security, and the opportunity to concentrate on all-out economy recovery.” The prime minister expected that Japan would be exempt from any contributions to collective defense beyond providing the country’s industrial capacity to the free world.

Yoshida also tried to demonstrate that the opposition in Japan had radically different ideas on what was appropriate for a peace treaty. In June 1950, he had Dulles meet with several opposition party leaders, many of whom demanded a full peace including the Soviets and the Chinese, the complete removal of all US military forces from Japanese territory, and no rearmament as per Article 9 of the new constitution. In effect, Yoshida thought the value of Japan had increased significantly, and that only he could deliver an acceptable peace to the Americans. He expected that the US would see no alternative but to pay his price for gaining a peace treaty as well as continued access to Japanese territory. With those advantages in mind, Yoshida looked forward to the negotiations.

On 8 September 1950, President Harry Truman approved NSC 60/1 for the United States to commence the preliminary negotiations with Japan for a peace treaty.


The arrangement called for a number of stipulations, including that the resources of Japan to be denied to the Soviet Union and that the mainland would host no foreign forces that were unacceptable to the United States. The resulting peace treaty would provide rights to the United States to maintain its armed forces in Japan, and to retain strategic control over certain islands. The security arrangement should also establish that the United States could not be forced out of the country, and yet that American officials had the option to exit if new security guarantees emerged. Furthermore, the US military would face no limitations on its ability to act against civil unrest within the country, should the Japanese government request its assistance. Finally, any arrangements between the US and Japan must acknowledge the latter’s right to self-defense, and to possess the necessary capabilities to act on that right.380 On the following day, Dulles held a press conference, during which he made clear that the forthcoming treaty would place no restrictions upon the Japanese government in regards to remilitarization.381

Dulles was prepared to initiate negotiations in November. By the end of that month, however, the tide had turned in the Korean War. The Chinese had intervened and the American forces were retreating deep into South Korea. Under the provisions of NSC 60/1, the negotiations were postponed until January 1951. Truman then decided to reinitiate the peace talks, even though the conflict in Korea had reached something of a stalemate. Dulles had two policy objectives: establish a defensive commitment to protect Japan, and to begin Japanese rearmament immediately.382

380 Memorandum for the President, 8 September 1950, FRUS Vol. VI, 1293.
381 Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan, 108.
382 Truman to Dulles, 10 January 1951, FRUS Vol. VI Part 1, 788-789. Truman issued a third objective for Dulles to pursue: a Pacific collective security part. Umetsu argues that the US believed such an agreement would provide a ‘legitimate’ path for the Japanese government to avoid domestic concerns over Article 9
In January 1951, the Japanese government believed that their bargaining position had further improved following the unexpected downturn in the war and the emerging stalemate. The American negotiators would pursue a quick peace to direct their efforts towards ending the stalemate on the Korean Peninsula. Yoshida had planned on offering the bases to the United States as a concession during the peace talks in 1951. That is, he did not see the bases on the islands, or on the mainland, as a given that the Americans would retain following the termination of the occupation. Instead, Yoshida thought that the basing arrangements were something that had to be purchased from Japan in the course of the negotiations for a peace settlement. His underlying assumption was that the talks would be among equals haggling over an equal partnership for the postwar era. The United States wanted access to Japanese territory to maintain its strategic position in East Asia, and that could be done, for the right price. The prime minister had just such a price in mind when preparing for the upcoming negotiations: in return for access to the bases, Japan would remain unarmed under the protection of United States through a collective defense arrangement under the auspices of the UN. For Yoshida, what mattered most was gaining a commitment from the Americans to defend Japan against any possible threats that might emerge without having to rearm the country and risk endangering the

383 Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement, 47-48. Yoshida had no intentions of rearming Japan in the immediate period while the economy was still recovering. As Yoshitsu further notes, the prime minister likely thought that the possibility of him having to commit to a rearmament program was non-existent. He never asked the treaty planners to prepare a plan on what Japan might offer to the United States as in terms of a rearmament program to capture the eagerly sought-after defense obligation. See Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement, 56-57.
current pace of the economic recovery. Yoshida recognized that the current war presented a window in which the United States could call upon Japan to rearm and possibly then demand that the country’s new military contribute to fighting in Korea. The country would incur significant costs in establishing the military force, placing a drain on its economic resources that would undermine its recovery. Then, Japan would incur further costs in terms of causalities lost in the fight when the United States would call for its assistance through troop contributions to the Korean conflict. During this window, the prime minister would resist any such demands.

_Negotiations among “Equals”_

The peace negotiations began on 29 January 1951. Dulles immediately set in on discussing how Japan intended to provide for its security in the emerging international environment. Yoshida responded that any rearmament of the country must proceed slowly for two reasons. First, Yoshida stressed that the possibility remained for the militarists to reemerge from hiding and overpower the civilian government. The

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384 Indeed, the Japanese government might have considered the alternative much more profitable. During the Korean War, US soldiers were spending a large amount of currency in the country. If Japan began to rearm, it would not only lose that money but also have to expend a sizable portion its own resources on establishing and maintaining a defense force. Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 17 February 1951, _FRUS_ Vol. VI Part 1, 171.

385 Dower, _Empire and Aftermath_, 388-389; Schaller, _The American Occupation of Japan_, 293. It is not clear that the United States wanted Japanese rearmament for this reason. The majority of the evidence presented here holds that American officials who favored rearmament wanted Japan to have the necessary forces to defend itself, and to make a contribution to collective security. Whether the Americans wanted Japanese military forces to contribute specifically to the ongoing conflict on the Korean Peninsula is not immediately evident.

386 Yoshida’s fear was not unfounded. At this point in the occupation, he likely knew the existence of a secret movement to restore certain military officials to power. This movement was led by a former Japanese officer and received assistance for at least a few members of SCAP. See John L. Weste, “Staging a Comeback: Rearmament Planning and kyūgunjin in occupied Japan, 1945-52,” _Japan Forum_ 11, no. 2 (1999): 165-178.
Japanese government would need to take legal steps to avoid these possibilities, such as implementing measures that would insure civilian control while removing the possibility of the military taking over again. Second, the Japanese economy was still weak and recovering from the war. Financially, any attempt at rearmament now would likely undo the progress that had been achieved thus far and undermine future economic growth by redirecting precious resources away from the industrial sector to remilitarizing the country.

Dulles wanted to know whether the prime minister saw these two reasons as preventing Japan from taking action, or simply as hurdles that the latter would have to clear domestically. He reminded Yoshida that the United States and the rest of the free world were contributing to the emerging system of collective security. Dulles further stated that, “no one would expect the Japanese contribution at present to be large but it was felt that Japan should be willing to make at least a token contribution and a commitment to …collective security.” Dulles was not demanding a full and immediate rearmament at the moment. However, he made it clear that the United States expected a demonstrable commitment from Japan to the emerging system of collective security. When confronted with the question, Yoshida responded that of course Japan would make a contribution. The prime minister, however, refrained from offering any specifics on what the country would offer, and that he wanted to avoid a ‘definitively commitment’ for the moment. Yoshida persisted that the discussion on restoring Japan’s sovereignty

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387 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison) 29 January 1951 FRUS Vol. VI Part 1, 829-830.
would come before any considerations on Japan’s contributions to international security.\textsuperscript{388}

On 31 January, Dulles and Yoshida met again to continue the negotiations. Yoshida presented a memorandum that pressed the point that Japan was not in a position to undertake rearmament. The country was confronted with a scarcity of resources to begin such a program, and had to carefully consider where to invest its limited capabilities. The economy certainly was not in a condition to divert valuable materials away from more crucial recovery programs. The document also held that both domestic and international opposition would emerge against any rearmament program. There would be increased domestic unrest towards the government’s policy change, especially since the population had enthusiastically embraced Article 9 of the new constitution. In addition, neighboring countries would likely suspect that rearming Japan would most certainly lead to renewed attempts at aggression by the defeated power. The risks inherent in rearmament were simply too high, contended Yoshida, while protecting the economy remained the more paramount concern for the immediate future. The memorandum also touched on the future basing arrangements and security cooperation that would be included in the peace treaty. Japan wanted to define the duration of the American control for its strategically valuable islands, and establish a shared division of authority between the countries. Turning to the issue of security cooperation, the memorandum held that Japan would manage her internal affairs exclusively. Externally, the document laid out the expectation that the American troops would be stationed in Japan as the primary means for protection from any potential international threats to the

\textsuperscript{388} Yoshitsu, \textit{Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement}, 51.
country’s security. The memo further emphasized that the peace treaty would set out the terms for “providing cooperation for mutual security between Japan and American as equal partners.”

Dulles responded by discussing the issue of Japanese rearmament first. Dulles made his case clear to Yoshida regarding the contribution that the United States expected:

The thing that I worry about in the short term is that Japan will not recreate adequate defense forces. There is no worry in our minds about an unduly large naval or air forces...Americans can envision our troops being indefinitely committed to defending an unarmed Japan: America is not willing to station forces in Japan for very long unless the Japanese do something on their own account. If Japan should be incorporated into the orbit of the Western world...Japan must pull its weight in the boat.

Dulles stressed that a Japanese contribution – via rearmament – was a vital component of the American plan to restore the balance of power in East Asia against further communist expansion. He made explicit that such a contribution should not place an undue burden on the Japanese economy.

However, the United States expected and required that Japan make a demonstration of providing for its defense in return for any type of defensive obligation. Again, Dulles mentioned that the expectation was not that Yoshida sacrifice the economic recovery for the immediate and full rearmament program. Instead, he indicated that Japan would have to bear some costs of rearmament now to demonstrate its commitment to collective security and to receive an American obligation for the island’s

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389 Undated Memorandum by the Prime Minister of Japan, 1951 FRUS Vol. VI Part 1, 833-835. Yoshida also sought arrangements in negotiations to allow the government to begin ‘reforming’ some aspects of the laws. Dulles unequivocally stated that these matters had to be addressed through SCAP, and not in the course of the negotiations. Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearer of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 31 January 1951 FRUS Vol. VI Part 1, 836.

390 Quoted in Umetsu, “Dulles’s Second Visit to Japan,” 67.
defense. The United States had wanted 300,000 to 350,000 men in the Japanese armed forces eventually as the optimal number to protect the islands, but it would accept a smaller figure as a solid commitment to the process of remilitarization. At the moment, Dulles was prepared to accept a lesser contribution from the Japanese government given their economic position but that contribution had to signal that Japan was on its way towards building up its strength to aid in the defense of the free world. Yoshida reaffirmed that Japan could not undertake any type of rearmament program at the moment. He preferred that Japan continue to rely on the United States to supply protection while the Japanese provided its labor and industrial resources as its initial assistance to maintaining the free world. Stationing of the American military on Japanese soil would provide sufficient means to insure the country’s external security.\(^{391}\)

At this point, Dulles was being unequivocal that Japan had to provide for its self defense when Yoshida shifted the conversation to discuss the basing arrangements. Specifically, he wanted to negotiate over the leasing arrangements for the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. Dulles simply stated that this was ‘undesirable’ given the terms of unconditional surrender that Japan had conceded to at the end of World War II.\(^{392}\) Dulles declared that the US would retain control over the islands, and that “the United States…had no reason to consider Japanese wishes regarding the sovereignty of those areas.”\(^{393}\) As Chihiro Hosoya notes, “Dulles…considered the right of the United States to retain her forces in Japan as an obvious pre-condition for any peace settlement, not a

\(^{391}\) Umetsu, “Dulles’s Second Visit to Japan,” 67-68.

\(^{392}\) Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 31 January 1951 FRUS Vol. VI Part 1, 839. Unfortunately, the FRUS series does not contain further reference to these discussions.

\(^{393}\) Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement, 54.
Japanese concession for which the United States should pay a price.”

In essence, Dulles understood the basing rights of the United States as a given demand that it would issue, and was now informing Yoshida that he would comply as part of the peace settlement. As Michael Yoshita further explained, Dulles “defined American security in terms of a Japanese promise to rearm, and assumed a peace settlement would permit the United States to keep bases in Japan and have control over the Ryukyus and Bonins.” That the United States considered these issues resolved was a ‘surprise’ to Yoshida, and a significant decrease in the country’s bargaining power in the negotiations.

The negotiations shifted to staff level meetings rather than continue along this path between Dulles and Yoshida. On 1 February, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Sadao Iguchi and Director of the Treaty Bureau Kumao Nishimura presented Japan’s list of terms for a security treaty. They wanted to negotiate an American guarantee for Japanese security on behalf of the UN. In particular, the United States would act against any external aggression against the country through its maintenance of strategic bases. The United States and Japan would consult one another when threats emerged to their interests to coordinate policy beforehand. Representing the United States, John Allison, Assistant Secretary of State Earl Johnson, General Carter Magruder, and Colonel Stanton Babcock addressed the Japanese draft. The Americans consented to some the points addressed by their Japanese counterparts, but raised serious questions concerning the specific details of several provisions. Without a similar agency to the Department of


395 Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement, 54.

Defense, the Americans were not clear on who they would consult with when threats emerged. They noted that Japan should create a defense agency for the purpose of coordinating responses with American forces. In regards to the UN and the country’s security, the Americans wanted to know explicit details on how the Japanese would contribute to repelling an invasion from its territories. The Americans wanted specific commitments on what actions Japan would take, namely how the government would pursue rearmament to provide for its security when its sovereignty was restored. In shifting the negotiations, the Americans remained fixated on the issue of rearmament while the Japanese officials continued to elude the choice presented to them.

On 2 February, the American side presented its draft arrangement for a security treaty with Japan to discuss the articles concerning the military’s rights and privileges on Japanese soil in the postwar era. Hiroyuki Umetsu has noted that the document “defined Japan’s post-treaty role as an offensive strategic base in the cold war from which to mount aggressive warfare against the Soviet Union and China.” The entirety of Japan’s territory would become a staging area for further conflict in the region, if and when necessary as decided by the United States. The agreement provided broad powers to a commanding officer to determine what the Japanese would need to provide in terms of on the ground resources for the American military. The document also presented the terms for when the United States could use its forces to intervene in the civil affairs of the country when internal threats emerged. Upon reviewing the draft arrangement, Iguchi and Nishimura “realized that the U.S. terms for the continued stationing of American armed forces had been firmly and unilaterally formulated without leaving any room for meeting

397 Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement, 57-59.
Japanese requests.” Protecting the world from the emerging threat of communism was deemed greater than any domestic concerns that the Japanese government might have regarding the terms of the peace that the United States was currently demanding. Furthermore, the terms demonstrated that the American officials did not yet trust Japan to act independently, and that the former wanted some concrete assurances that the latter would remain committed to the free world. The Japanese diplomats now understood that their perceived bargaining strength was not only ineffective, but simply non-existent in the so-called ‘negotiations.’ They realized that the Americans were presenting their terms to compel a commitment for continued compliance after the occupation terminated. Both negotiators emphatically protested these terms, realizing that accepting such an agreement would generate sharp and divisive domestic debates on Japan’s role in future conflicts and its sovereign status as an independent country.

The Japanese officials were extremely worried that the negotiations had gone in the wrong direction, and that the government was in danger of having to accept the terms without gaining any significant concessions. The Americans had made relatively minor indulgences on the terms that they stated in the security treaty, to make it more palatable. Other than that, the negotiators for the United States demanded strict adherence to their draft arrangements as the peace settlement that Japan would have to comply with in the postwar era. For the Japanese negotiators, the defense commitment seemed elusive at this point with the occupying power continuing to press for the initiation of rearmament as the


399 Dingman, “Reconsiderations,” 480-481.

400 Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement, 59.
main priority for any peace settlement that would include such an obligation. Dulles and his fellow negotiators had set the demands and now waited for the Japanese government to decide on how they would comply.

Iguchi and Nishimura met with Yoshida to discuss whether they should now consider rearmament under some limited capacity. Otherwise, the Americans would have the basing rights without any negotiation, and the Japanese government would have gained nothing in return. Yoshida finally relented to his subordinates, and asked them to prepare a draft response, entitled “Initial Steps for Rearmament Program” to meet the demands of the United States. Yoshida agreed to submit to the terms set forth by the Americans, and he sought the smallest possible burden that he thought Japan could bear in terms of rearmament. The program contained two initiatives. First, Japan would establish a 50,000 man defense force separate from existing security forces with superior fire power. Second, the government would create two new organizations: the Peace Preservation Agency and a Defense Planning Office. The former would coordinate with the American military and the latter would function as a general staff headquarters for the new Japanese military.\(^{401}\) Yoshida expected that the US negotiators would now grant the defense obligation that his government wanted.

Upon receiving the plan for rearmament, the Americans presented their final drafts of the peace treaty, security agreement, and the administrative arrangement to the Japanese negotiators, who eagerly reviewed them. The documents contained no reference to any obligation on reparations that the country would have to pay or to any further restrictions on sovereignty once the occupation officially terminated. These constituted

two terms that the Japanese had been anxious about in the lead up to negotiations. The documents, however, did not make the primary concessions sought by Japan in the postwar era: the protection of Japan by the United States from external attack. Specifically, Nishimura and Iguchi realized that the security agreement had “merely ‘implicitly’ incorporated Japan within the American nuclear umbrella” without providing any type of guarantee or obligation to defend the country should the need arise. In response, the negotiators immediately sought any possible mention of an equal cooperative security relationship between the two countries to be inserted into the draft arrangements that would follow the UN Charter. The Americans, however, continued to withhold such an explicit clause in the security agreement. The offer of limited rearmament had been accepted by the Americans, but the proposal was not sufficient to gain the security guarantee.

On 3 February, the Japanese submitted a revision to the draft security arrangement, again calling for the United States to adopt a defensive obligation on behalf

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402 Igarashi, “Peace-Making and Party Politics,” 331. However, the document did proscribe that the Americans and others would receive ‘compensation’ for suffering property damage. See Memorandum Prepared by the Dulles Mission, 3 February 1951, FRUS Vol. VI Part 1, 854. This aspect of the peace agreement has been misinterpreted by a few to mean that the Japanese paid no reparations. The Japanese did not escape reparations. First, as noted above, the Japanese did have to pay out some compensation to the United States as well as other Allied and Associate Powers for damages incurred during the war. Second, the Japanese had to pay a number of countries in Southeast Asia for damages inflicted during the various occupations. As Schaller notes, the Japanese had to incur some industrial reparations during the course of the occupation, up to 1949. (Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 120-137). On the history and decision to terminate the industrial reparations in 1949, see Joseph Z. Reday, “Reparations from Japan,” Far Eastern Survey 18, no. 13 (1949): 145-151. Later reparations payments would come in the form of goods and possibly some cash. For a discussion on Japanese reparations to Southeast Asia, see Saori N. Katada, “Japan’s Foreign Aid after the San Francisco Peace Treaty,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 9, no. 3/4 (2000): 197-220. For a discussion on reparations that Japan would incur to the Philippines, see Roger Dingman, “The Diplomacy of Dependency: The Philippines and Peacemaking with Japan, 1945-52,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 17, no. 2(1986): 307-321.

403 Umetsu, “Dulles’s Second Visit to Japan,” 72.

404 Umetsu, “Dulles’s Second Visit to Japan,” 78.
of Japan’s international security. In addition, the memorandum contained the Japanese response to the three documents, in particular Chapter VII of the security arrangement. The details of this chapter made it explicit that Japan would undertake measures to initiate rearmament and restore its military power. It established the purpose of the Japanese armed forces in terms of protecting the home territories. Chapter VII also specified that, in times of emergencies, the United States would designate a commander to lead a unified American and Japanese military force.\textsuperscript{405} The Japanese officials realized that this aspect of the security arrangement would make it explicit to both international and domestic audiences that the country was now remilitarizing. Public acknowledgement of Japan’s acceptance of the American demand for rearmament was out of the question. The Japanese officials asked that the entire chapter and any further references that indicated or suggested rearmament be removed from all three draft documents. Yoshida would reinforce the necessity of secrecy regarding rearmament to MacArthur on 6 February and Dulles on 7 February, asking that the three documents contain no written references to the pending rearmament of Japan.\textsuperscript{406}

The American officials agreed to remove the clauses in the peace treaty, the security agreement, and the administrative arrangement. The secrecy that Yoshida and the negotiators wanted, however, came at a price. Upon reviewing these new revisions on 5 February, Dulles fully rejected the Japanese appeals for some type of explicit commitment. Under these conditions, Dulles noted that the US would only seek basing


rights and it would not assume any obligations to defend Japan. He clearly stated to his fellow negotiators why the United States could not offer the defensive commitment that the Japanese government was demanding, stating that:

Until Japan is in a position to undertake corresponding obligations of its own the US would want rights rather than obligations. The US cannot press the Japanese to assume military obligations until they have dealt with their Constitutional problem and are in a position formally and publicly to assume such obligations.\footnote{Minutes – Dulles Mission Staff Meeting, 5 February 1951, \textit{FRUS} Vol. VI Part 1, 857}

While the Americans recognized the costs Yoshida could incur from a public acceptance of their demands for rearmament, without that explicit guarantee providing the exact nature of the contributions Japan would make to a collective security arrangement the US would not make one in return. Dulles had decided that the commitment from Yoshida was not a sufficient contribution to collective security. The secrecy required may have led him to further question whether the Japanese government had any intentions to honor its proposal for rearmament.\footnote{Miyasato, “John Foster Dulles and the Peace Settlement with Japan,” 208} More likely, Dulles had simply given Yoshida the choice on how the Japanese government would comply with the American demands, and the subsequent demonstration – while following the demands as set forth – was judged as insufficient to warrant the incentive offered.

Yoshida had hoped to gain an American commitment to defend the islands, to demonstrate that the former opponents were now sovereign equals. He was convinced that the shifting international environment had provided him with an advantage in the negotiations, and yet the Americans had not come to negotiate per se. The prime minister had decided to commit to the American demands, and did so without gaining the prized defense obligation. As Michael Yoshita notes, “The prime minister had assumed that
these facilities [bases] were vital to US interests in the Far East, and concluded that the right to maintain “strategic dispositions” would elicit an unarmed Japan” as compensation. Yoshida had failed to gain a commitment from the United States to defend Japan in the event of an international conflict. Dulles was prepared to make such an arrangement. That commitment, however, was conditioned on Japan agreeing to significantly larger rearmament program. Yoshida had resisted the American demands for 300,000 to 350,000 soldiers immediately as part of a rearmament, and Dulles more ‘moderate’ position on remilitarizing the country presented in the negotiations. Yoshida recognized the costs he would pay for complying with the American demand for such a rearmament program, especially in such a quick and abrupt manner. Now, the prime minister realized the political consequences of not achieving this arrangement during the negotiations: any subsequent agreement would reflect the inequality of the relationship between the two countries even upon the termination of the occupation.

Though the Americans had retained control of the islands, gained their preferred basing arrangements, and established that the Japanese government would contribute to its own security, the last component fell short of its expectations. Yoshida had complied with the demands as presented by Dulles, but he had done so by meeting what he believed was the minimum burden possible to Japan. Dulles, however, had expected a moderate, and public, demonstration by the Japanese government. The United States had won the war and now was moving forward with imposing its peace. On 9 February 1951, the representatives for Japan signed the three draft documents.

409 Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement, 54.
Analysis: Dictating Rearmament over Recovery

The resulting three agreements from the negotiations in 1951 have received dismal evaluations in terms of what Japan gained, and what was dictated to it, from scholars and policymakers alike. As Michael Schaller notes, “the peace treaty served as a sweetener for the less equitable security treaty. The security treaty, in turn, screened criticism of the still more controversial administrative agreement that Yoshida planned to ratify by executive agreement.”\footnote{Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 41.} Secretary of State Christian Herter later remarked on the treaty in 1960, “There were a number of provisions in the 1951-1952 Security Treaty that were pretty extreme from the point of view of an agreement between two sovereign nations.”\footnote{Quote from Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 370. Also see 434-435 for a discussion on the constraints that Japanese elites thought they operated under as a result of these agreements.} By including the secret provision for rearmament, Yoshida incurred several commitments in the three treaties that would be costly to him domestically and Japan internationally after the occupation terminated.

Following the logic of the theory, Yoshida was unfavorable to incurring the costs of complying with American demands for Japanese rearmament. Internationally, the prime minister thought that rearmament might harm Japan’s efforts to make amends for the war atrocities that it had committed. In particular, he worried that neighboring Asian countries would not see a defensive force, but rather a resurgence of an offensive military power in Japan.\footnote{The conclusion of an alliance between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States rested largely on these fears that a resurgent Japan would once again pursue an aggressive, revisionist foreign policy. For a discussion on this fear in relation to why Australia sought the alliance, see Neville Meaney, “Look Back in Fear: Percy Spender, the Japanese Peace Treaty and the ANZUS Pact,” Japan Forum 15, no. 3 (2003): 399-} Yoshida recognized that these countries’ suspicions would undermine...
their current and future trading relations, something Japan desperately needed to continue its economic recovery. Yoshida knew that the Americans wanted the Japanese government to create a force that would eventually measure between 300,000 and 350,000 troops. He worried about what would happen when the Japanese army reached that size: would the Americans press the Japanese government into using that new army in conflicts throughout Asia such as the Korean War?414 Such efforts would only further undermine the country’s pacific reputation internationally, and would certainly rile domestic concerns over the constitution.

Acting as the American representative during the negotiations, Dulles followed the dictating strategy as described in the argument. Dulles presented Yoshida with a choice: engage in rearmament at an appropriate level, publicly declare the intention to the world, and Japan would receive the full protection of the United States. Yoshida resisted, but Dulles and the other American officials established their position and ordered the Japanese government to make a decision on how to comply. Dulles compelled Yoshida to make a choice on how to commitment to rearmament, thereby removing Yoshida’s preferred outcome of not rearming from the table and pressuring him into committing to the American demand for remilitarizing the country.

This choice should have increased Japan’s confidence that the Americans would honor their part of the bargain if the former consented to the latter’s terms. Dulles and the other negotiators granted the Japanese multiple opportunities to comprehend the nature of

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their demands and to understand the importance of compliance as a necessary condition to gain the defensive obligation. The combination of the American officials pressuring the Japanese negotiators combined with the assurance that they would receive the defense obligation pushed them towards agreement. In essence, Dulles and the other American negotiators compelled Yoshida to make a commitment to rearmament. However, the Americans did not follow through given Yoshida’s minimal commitment to rearmament combined with the necessary secrecy of the project. This raises the question as to whether Dulles achieved what the Americans wanted?

John Welfield has noted, that in this regard, “the American refusal to give Japan a clear-cut guarantee of protection was not the result of Japanese capitulation before overwhelming American pressure. … On the contrary, it was a result of the United States having failed to impose its view on Japan in one critical area”\textsuperscript{415} That assertion, however, misses the subtleties of the relationship between the United States and Japan in ‘negotiating’ the peace arrangements. Dulles had stated that the United States now demanded that the Japanese government carry out a rearmament program as the condition for receiving the defensive commitment. He was not bargaining with Yoshida on this point, but ordering the prime minister to decide on how Japan would comply with this term. During the course of the negotiations, the option of pursuing an economic recovery without rearmament became increasingly clear as the American officials continually pressed for a decision. Yoshida would have to incur the costs of sacrificing some resources to the rebuilding of the country’s military. If he wanted the commitment, and the termination of the occupation, he would have to accept the costs of complying with

the American demands. Dulles left the decision on how to pursue rearmament to Yoshida as a means to demonstrate the American commitment to the agent’s following orders. Yoshida’s decision, however, was insufficient to demonstrate compliance. Even though Dulles withdrew the American offer, Yoshida realized the Americans still expected Japan to incur the costs of rearmament.

Did Yoshida avoid compliance with the American demands given his minimum offer on rearmament? In making the commitment to rearmament a secret, Yoshida may have hoped to delay fulfillment of the condition. Specifically, he might have expected MacArthur to support his efforts to slow down or even halt remilitarization after the negotiations with Dulles. MacArthur might have agreed to this, as he was not entirely convinced that Japan should begin rearmament immediately. If that was part of Yoshida’s plan – to play MacArthur off Dulles, and attempt to elude the commitment to rearmament – it failed. In April 1951, MacArthur was removed from his position as the Supreme Commander of SCAP. His replacement, General Matthew Ridgway, did not adhere to MacArthur’s beliefs about a pacifist Japan, and likely supported the restoration of the country’s military power to balance out the communist threat in the region. General Ridgway would eventually present Yoshida with the US plans for the necessary size of the defense force, approximately 300,000 to 350,000 soldiers. This figure was well above the commitment initially made by the prime minister to Dulles in the negotiations. Yoshida opposed these numbers, admitting that providing for the country’s security was important but that the pacing of such programs mattered. The Japanese government had to educate their people on the necessity of remilitarization, with Yoshida arguing that

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416 Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement, 55-56; Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 79.
“the people, understanding the Communist threat, would themselves demand that Japan provide its own protection by rearming.” Otherwise, Yoshida feared that proceeding too quickly would arouse domestic opposition from both sides of the political spectrum.  

Rearmament, however, was already a political problem as Yoshida began incurring the costs for complying with the American demands to end the occupation. As John Dower notes,

Yoshida was accused of selling the country to the United States by bartering true independence for nominal sovereignty, and in Japanese parlance the settlement he gained for Japan became widely characterized as “dependent independence” or “subordinate independence.” The phrase was infuriating to the old patriot, and also effective in undermining his political authority, for its appropriateness was accepted by a wide range of Japanese across the political spectrum from left to right.  

Domestically, Yoshida would confront opposition from both the Left and the Right towards his compliance with the American demands for rearming the country.

The Left in Japan adamantly opposed any kind of rearmament, and even had doubts about a bilateral peace arrangement with the United States, especially one that included the retention of American bases on Japanese soil. The members vocalized their support for a Japan that adopted neutrality as its stance in the ongoing Cold War. The country could not afford to make commitments to either side in the conflict given the associated costs. Various left-wing parties claimed that working with the United States to rearm the country would ultimately undermine the economy and democracy. The economic recovery was far from complete, and every resource taken away from production or consumers was a loss overall. Furthermore, the Japanese people had

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expressed support for the pacifist constitution, and undoing that measure in favor of American demands would diminish their support for government policies. Thus, the Left harshly criticized the Yoshida government for complying with the Americans, who represented the strongest threat to the country economically and democratically. The issue of rearmament caused a divisive split among the conservatives in Japan. Yoshida refrained from discussing the issue, except to make occasional comments concerning the country’s need to ‘increase defensive peace.’ The former leader of the Liberal Party, Hatoyama Ichiro, did not take such a subtle approach. He openly called on the party to support rearmament, and to revise the constitution, especially Article 9. Other conservative parties also favored the establishment of a Japanese military, to end the country’s dependence on American power, and establish an equal partnership between two independent sovereign nations. These pro-rearmament conservatives broke rank with Yoshida and the Liberal Party’s more cautious approach towards the issue. The combined opposition from the Left, and the divisions on the Right weakened Yoshida’s political position.\(^4\)

The elections that followed immediately in 1952 and 1953 did not bode well for Yoshida, the Liberal Party, and the conservatives more generally. The Left effectively packaged its stance on neutrality in the Cold War, a peace among all former war participants, opposition to the continuing presence of American forces, and especially the population’s opposition to the rearmament issue to increase their representation in the Diet. Yoshida and his cabinet did not appeal as successfully to the masses. The

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dissonance between the announcements of the cabinet and the actual emergence of a new military within Japan did not resonate well with a public that was as yet undecided on whether to support or oppose the controversial policy. Furthermore, the divisions within the conservatives’ ranks over rearmament had sufficiently weakened their coordination and led to a declining share of the electorate, subsequently erasing the majority that Yoshida’s party had enjoyed since 1949.420

Even with the costs confronting Yoshida, he would carry out the secret commitment to rearmament by establishing a navy, army, and air force in addition to a defense agency to coordinate their actions. In August 1952, the government created the National Safety Agency and charged it with providing policy for Japan’s defense. In October 1952, the National Police Reserve would almost double in manpower as Yoshida tried to convince the public and the opposition that it only served as a police force. 421 The Maritime force would have its size limits removed in 1952 and shortly thereafter in 1953, the Japanese would gain full control over the emerging naval force. In July 1954, the Japanese government finally created an air force to support the army and navy units already in commission. During this time, the United States also pushed the Japanese to accept armaments for the rising military force. For the Navy, the Americans provided several frigates and landing craft in October 1951 while the army received weapons,


421 As Thomas French explains, the National Police Reserve was not necessarily an army. It was a functioning police force that was later adapted to be the ground units for the Japanese rearmament program. For a discussion on the National Police Reserve, see, Thomas French, “Contested ‘Rearmament’: The National Police Reserve and Japan’s Cold War(s),” Japanese Studies 34, no. 1 (2014): 25-36.
artillery, and tanks.\textsuperscript{422} In addition, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement would deepen the ties between Japan and the United States in the Cold War. The agreement, however, came under strong domestic opposition in the lower house of the Diet for the increased burden that Japan would bear to further its rearmament efforts, though eventually it did pass.\textsuperscript{423} In March 1954, the Diet began debate on two bills to establish the Defense Agency and the creation of the Self Defense Forces. Similar to the Mutual Defense Agreement, the two bills encountered strong debate in both the lower and upper houses before finally passing into law. In July 1954, the National Safety Forces transformed into the Defense Agency along with the establishment of the respective Ground, Air and Maritime Self Defense Forces.\textsuperscript{424} For his part, Yoshida complied with the commitments he made to Dulles in February 1951.

The costs of complying with the American demands caught up with Yoshida shortly after the establishment of the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces. By November 1954, Hatoyama had established a new conservative party that opposed Yoshida and his policies, in particular the slow, cautious rearmament of Japan. As a result of this split within the conservative ranks, Yoshida would lose his position as leader of the Liberal Party shortly thereafter. On 6 December, the opposition parties pushed for a no-confidence vote against Yoshida. It is likely that he sought to resist this latest challenge to his political survival, but the cabinet ministers left their positions in response to the no-confidence measure. The prime minister, now without a government,
wanted to press for new elections, but he found that the fractured Liberal Party would not support his efforts to remain in office. Yoshida resigned on 7 December 1954.425

Once out of office, Yoshida would later contend that he actually had gained the defense obligation when the Americans agreed to keep bases on the islands. By agreeing to maintain the forces on Japanese territory, he effectively gained the protection and security the country needed via the continuing presence of the United State military. Thus, he succeeded in the negotiations.426 That interpretation from the former prime minister, however, overlooks a number of important aspects of the negotiations, including the American refusal to negotiate over the bases and the Japanese commitment to rearmament as a failed attempt to secure the defensive commitment. Yoshida was genuinely surprised that the Americans were not bargaining over the bases, and he adamantly opposed rearmament during the economy recovery. When confronted with the choice on whether to comply, Yoshida was compelled to accept the American demands to gain the defense obligation and to end the occupation. That acceptance, however, did not completely soothe American concerns over Japan’s compliance. As Allison remarked in 1952, “there was an element in risk in trusting the Japanese, but that there was no alternative.”427 Even after almost seven years, the Americans still had doubts about whether the Japanese intended to comply with its preferred peace.

425 Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 491-492.

426 Yoshida, Yoshida Memoirs, 262.

Conclusion

The American Occupation of Japan (1945-1952) offers strong empirical support for the theoretical argument made in the principal-agent model presented in chapter 3. Across each of the three episodes, the Japanese politicians resisted the American demands given the costs they expected to incur for compliance. Japanese politicians recognized that their compliance with American demands risked their political positions whether through changing preferred domestic arrangements, adopting poor economic policies, or diverting resources to rearmament. In each instance, the American officials dictated a choice to the Japanese, pressuring the latter into deciding whether to comply with the former’s terms.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

“...the striving for knowledge and the search for truth are still the strongest motives of scientific discovery.”

- Karl Popper

The project developed here results from a normative desire to understand the most recent occupations by United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. Why did the American efforts in these two operations result in failure? How could a powerful country fail to achieve its goals? That normative drive for understanding, for knowledge, for truth, is the primary reason to undertake a study that follows the scientific method to ask and answer a serious question in an objective manner. One must balance the motivation for truth with rigorous attention to detail and thorough analytical work to reach a solid conclusion that ultimately satisfies the ideas of scientific discovery and simultaneously satiates the normative aspiration. To accomplish that, the dissertation has subsequently grown into a much broader project on the use of military occupations as a tool of foreign policy, and its relation to the larger questions on war and peace in the international system since 1815.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I summarize the primary theoretical and empirical findings of the dissertation. Next, I examine the implications for scholars and policymakers that can be derived from the theoretical argument and empirical findings in this dissertation. Finally, the dissertation closes with some thoughts on future directions for research into military occupations.

Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Discoveries

This dissertation sought to address the following question: How can victorious states transition from war to peace and obtain their objectives via a military occupation? More specifically, why do some states win a war only to lose the occupation whereas other states can successfully impose their preferred outcome via the control of foreign territory? For example, compare the recent failures of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq to the successes the Allied Powers in France (1815-1818), the Allied Occupation of Paraguay, or the American Occupation of Japan. What accounts for that variation in achieving the victor’s peace? Furthermore, the dissertation also indirectly addresses the question concerning why victorious states impose occupations on the vanquished following interstate wars. Given that over half of the military occupations that follow from interstate wars result in failure, why did states decide to engage in these operations initially? Before answering these questions concerning the outcome of military occupations, the project first turns towards understanding what constitutes the subject of this investigation.

In Chapter 2, I sought to establish the foundations for a new conceptualization of military occupations based on the political aspects of the operation. The investigation here focuses on the demands that occupying power made of the occupied elite as the conditions under which the occupation would terminate. I distinguished these cases from those occupations that simply represent a military advantage for one side as part of conducting the war effort. This conceptualization allows me to distinguish coercive political occupations from more cooperative and military efforts that constitute part of the universe of possible occupations that have occurred since 1815. The chapter then
proceeds to place that conceptualization of military occupations into the broader distribution of sovereign rights in the international system. I use the distribution of rights to ground the concept of military occupations into how states engage their military forces and alter political relations with other units in the international system based on who governs and who claims ownership. In doing so, the project recognizes that there are four possible distributions of rights that might occur when states deploy their military forces for operations on foreign soil. T. Clifton Morgan illustrates the value in doing so, stating that, “…only after identifying the full range of values for a variable can we hope to account for a phenomenon by identifying the factors that determine which value of the variable holds.” Conceptually, military occupations are one value for the distribution of sovereign rights in an anarchic international system. A ‘purgatory’ that vanquished opponents may languish in for an indeterminate amount of time as the victor attempts to gain its preferred peace.

Through a rigorous developed conceptualization, a research project can identify the appropriate cases for investigation and offer generalizable findings to understand the phenomena itself as well as its role in the larger context of international politics. The project here limits itself to occupations that result from interstate wars, a limitation that some might find too narrow given the occurrence of such events outside the context of war as acknowledged in Chapter 2. In particular, some might criticize the study for adopting the Correlates of War Resort to War project given its requirement that a ‘war’ constitutes an armed conflict with 1,000 or more battle deaths. While limiting the sample affects the conclusions, it allows for a more systematic and rigorous investigation on how

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states engage in military occupations as a transition period between war and peace. Identifying military occupations requires knowledge on the political relations among units that is sometimes difficult to find and interpret given the incentive to misrepresent by many involved. By focusing on a relatively smaller sub-sample of cases, the project can offer several insights to understanding the use of occupations as part of interstate wars and the establishment of a preferred outcome. Building off this initial project can provide for a stronger foundation for future work to investigate the broader use of occupations that have occurred since 1815 as a result of any type of conflict between states.

Turning to the theoretical argument, the principal-agent model focuses on strategic interaction between the occupier and the occupied elite as a contributing factor in the transition from war to peace. Based on that interaction, the project identifies two components that are significant to understanding military occupations: the costs of compliance for the occupied elite, and the occupying power’s strategy of control to manage the former into complying with their demands. I am not discounting the importance of civilian coercion, insurgencies, etc., by focusing on this interaction explicitly in the theoretical argument. Both the costs of compliance and the strategies of control are important to understanding occupations, yet they are only two in a host of factors that can affect the outcome. Instead, I am offering an explanation for the often overlooked relationship between the occupying power and the occupied elite as a contributing factor to understanding why states can succeed or fail to establish their preferred peace following an interstate war. An inherent limitation in model building is that we have to abstract away from many important and interesting elements to focus on a
few, or a singular, aspect of a phenomena to gain some theoretical and empirical leverage. The argument here presents a probabilistic statement regarding how that relationship – under the specified conditions – can increase the likelihood of success for an occupying power to achieve the victor’s peace.

The dissertation attempts to explain the variation in the responses of the elite to the demands of the occupier when assessing their likelihood of compliance or non-compliance. Theories that simply assume the incentive for non-compliance as a constant leave us with an incomplete explanation. In part, recognizing that the elite’s adversity varies depending on the demands of the occupying power required identifying the appropriate universe of cases to recognize the difference between how the French responded to the Prussian Occupation (1871-1873) and the German reaction to the Allied Occupation of the Rhineland (1918-1930). Theoretically, the difference in the demands establishes when the elite will select compliance over non-compliance during the course of an occupation if left to their own choices. Understanding that the motivation varies across the cases, however, only illuminates part of the picture regarding military occupations. How does the occupying power respond? I argue that the occupier knows that the elite are likely hostile to the former’s peace, but the extent of the adversity remains unknown.

Thus, I introduced the strategies of control: the means by which the occupying power can influence the elite into complying with the victor’s peace. The principal-agent argument indicates that those occupying powers who dictate the peace are more likely to succeed in their efforts to compel the occupied elite into complying with the victor’s peace. The dictating strategy constitutes something of a hybrid between the more
aggressive and conciliatory approaches that have been previously identified in the literature. It draws on the notion of issuing an order, and then attempting to evaluate the intentions of the elite based on their behavior to assess whether they are in compliance. I contend that dictating manipulates the choice set of the elite, altering incentives and disincentives to influence their decision-making into favoring compliance, even though that decision is costly to the elite.

Both chapters 4 and 5 provide the empirical examination of the principal-agent model. In writing a scientific work, I acknowledge that the empirical evidence presented in these two chapters is not sufficiently conclusive proof regarding the principal-agent model from Chapter 3 to accept it as fact. However, I will argue that the combination of the empirical findings from the statistical analyses, the plausibility probes, and the case study of the American Occupation of Japan indicate that there is strong support for the argument. The mixture of these approaches for empirical evaluation increases confidence in the validity of the causal argument presented in chapter 3 as well as several of its implications regarding how the occupied elite and the occupier will act in the establishment of the victor’s peace. The statistical analysis from Chapter 4 presents support for the theories main contention across a variety of cases. The plausibility probes in that chapter and the analysis of the American Occupation of Japan in Chapter 5 provides evaluations of the causal mechanisms that support the primary hypothesis. Both chapters demonstrate strong support for the mechanisms in play and the primary hypothesis from Chapter 3.
Implications for Scholarship and Policymaking

This dissertation offers some recommendations for scholars and policymakers when considering the option of imposing a military occupation. Initially, I believe that a note of caution is in order for individuals looking to interpret the theory as offering simple insights into managing and succeeding in an occupation following an interstate war. The dissertation presents the principal-agent model as a challenge to the understanding how military occupations can result in success, based on the strategic interaction of the occupier and the occupied elite. Even though this project offers an argument for winning the peace, scholars and policymakers should note the first and perhaps more important empirical finding: that occupying foreign territory tends to result in failure more often than not over the last two hundred years. In the dataset, approximately 40% of the cases terminated with the victor achieving its preferred peace. The remainder of the cases – approximately 60% percent of those investigated as part of this dissertation – resulted in failure for the occupying power. There are two implications to this result.

First, the project corroborates previous empirical work that military occupations are more likely to result in lost blood and treasure for a state. Losing an occupation implies a state loses the resources spent to win the war and to control the territory in addition to any benefits it expected to incur from success. Though I disagree with other scholars on the reason why failure occurs, the dissertation confirms the notion that military occupations are difficult and costly ventures for accomplishing a state’s foreign

430 For example, see David M. Edelstein, Occupation Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).
policy goals. Second, the evidence demonstrates that winning on the battlefield does not simply translate into the victor’s peace. In every case, the occupying power had to capture territory which it accomplished through an invasion. That most states fail to achieve their preferred peace suggests a divergence in performance between accomplishing military objectives as part of combat and political objectives as part of the occupation. Leaders – political and military alike – should realize that engaging in military occupations is much more complicated than simply defeating the opponent and imposing one’s preferred outcome.

A military occupation is an effort to compel compliance after an opponent has openly resisted through war. The reason states impose military occupations is that they suspect the opposing power will not comply with the former’s preferred designs for the postwar era. A central contention here is that the occupied elite are adverse to the peace demanded by the occupying power – especially so when the latter aims to impose new domestic institutions, make territorial gains, or establish a new state in the international system. Fulfilling the principal’s demands is costly for the elite as they will have to sacrifice political opportunities, ruin their reputations, or risk their political survival when complying with the victor’s peace. Even in cases of foreign-imposed regime change, the new elites will not have an obligation to establish the victor’s peace when it conflicts with their political ambitions.

This insight is especially important for attempts to impose democratic institutions. Even in emerging democracies, the newly-elected leaders are not somehow made pure through elections and representative institutions. Being elected by the people does not make the leader ‘loyal’ to the occupying power or its postwar goals. Furthermore, these
institutions do not make such agents transparent in terms of their adversity towards the goals of the occupying power. Instead, electoral institutions can allow for the revelation of voter preferences, which may favor less compliance and more opportunistic actions by the occupied elite.\footnote{Kenneth A. Schultz, \textit{Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 237.} Newly-established and emerging democracies under foreign control may be susceptible to voters electing politicians who adopt policy positions that diverge with the occupier’s demands. During the process of institutional change, elites can attempt to play on the suspicions of the population against the occupying power especially as a means to gain political office and to consolidate their position to the detriment of establishing a democracy. Whether an honest divergence, or a vote winning trick, the occupying power has to realize that establishing a democracy has its risks. If anything, imposing democratic regimes can be hazardous to the victor’s peace if left unchecked.

I further suggest that the arguments on the hostility of the elite would also hold when scholars and policymakers consider how to deal with the problem of failed states in the international system. The security concerns associated with failed states – such as training grounds and safe havens for terrorist organizations – have taken on greater importance for policymakers. The scholarly community has responded. Authors have presented new ideas on how to share sovereignty and offered ideas like ‘neotrusteeship’ to focus on multiple actors involved in rehabilitating these deteriorating entities.\footnote{For example, see. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” \textit{International Security} 28, no. 4 (2004): 5-43; Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” \textit{International Security} 29, no. 2 (2004): 85-120.} In addition, nation-building has received significantly more theoretical and empirical
attention in the last decade.\footnote{Gary T. Dempsey, “Fool’s Errands: America’s Recent Encounters with Nation Building,” \textit{Mediterranean Quarterly} 12, no. 1 (2001): 57-80; James Dobbins, et al., \textit{America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq} (Santa Monica: Rand National Security Research Division, 2003); Cynthia Watson, \textit{Nation-Building: A Reference Handbook} (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, Inc., 2004); Katie Jenkins and William Plowden, \textit{Governance and Nationbuilding: The Failure of International Intervention} (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2006); James L. Payne, “Does Nation Building Work?,” \textit{The Independent Review} 10, no. 4 (2006): 599-610; Jason Brownlee, “Can America Nation-Build,” \textit{World Politics} 59, no. 2 (2007): 314-340.} My work suggests that these arrangements are insufficient to address the basic concerns on how to deal with elite. The leaders of failed states likely have political arrangements that benefit them, even in crumbling infrastructures and poorly-performing economies. Removing these leaders will introduce a new set of elites, but pressuring those individuals to carry out international community’s demands might be comparable to a foreign-imposed regime change. The new elites might not want to share power and will certainly engage in opportunistic behaviors that are beneficial to their interests, but perhaps highly detrimental to the goals of the international community. For example, Hamid Karzai has not been a faithful agent to the American attempt and international efforts to develop a democracy in Afghanistan. He has been accused of allowing corruption to run rampant, engaging in nepotism, and expending resources in a manner that has neither improved nor developed the new domestic institutions of the country.\footnote{Ahmed Rashid, “How Obama Lost Karzai: The Road out of Afghanistan runs through two Presidents who just don’t get along,” \textit{Foreign Policy} (22 February 2011).} As a politician, Karzai had his own interests to protect during the course of the occupation, and those interests have conflicted with the American goals of providing political stability to Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the American occupation accommodated Karzai’s regime and the tribal warlords in Afghanistan without stringent commands or directions on implementing the former’s demands. If the international community decides to become more active in failed states, they should understand the potential problems in
dealing with political elites.\textsuperscript{435} Simply engaging in occupation-like operations with multiple actors and attempting to impose good governance on a population is not likely to succeed if such recommendations overlook that elite’s adversity.

Next, the theoretical argument suggests how the occupying power should approach the occupied elite, especially when the latter is not complying with the demands set forth by the former. Unfortunately, some scholars have suggested that the appropriate sanction against the occupied elite would be to threaten a withdrawal as an attempt to compel a change in behavior.\textsuperscript{436} By leaving the territory, as the argument goes, the occupier is threatening that the likelihood of political instability would subsequently increase, thereby decreasing the elites’ chances at survival. That, however, is a hollow threat for two reasons. First, abandoning the occupation might actually increase the political standing of the elite that remained non-compliant in front of the ‘foreign enemy.’ Instead of removing the elite from power, domestic elements might rally to those individuals that successfully defied the foreign presence on their territory. Second, the credibility of the occupier’s threat depends on its willingness to throw away all the blood and treasure spent on the occupation. A sunk costs perspective might support this line of action, suggesting that the resources are already spent and that the occupier should not remain simply because of the costs incurred. Relatively few leaders would be comfortable wasting resources in such a manner to demonstrate their credibility. If the


occupier has to demonstrate the credibility of its threat, withdrawing from the occupation hinders its ability to pursue its interests. The threat is a bluff, and the occupied elite will realize it.

As the theory presented here ‘dictates,’ a more effective sanction would specifically target the elite rather than risk abandoning the entire operation. If a leader fails to comply, the occupying power should then consider options to sanction or remove that individual from political office rather than engage in threats to abandon the operation. The latter threat is something that the occupied elites want to achieve given that the occupation interferes with their ability to freely make policy. Threatening to leave is what the elite would prefer as it might demonstrate their non-compliance with the occupation’s aims. Occupiers should threaten the elite’s ability to remain in office since it is something that the politicians’ value. The victor can then give the occupied an opportunity to respond by either fulfilling its demands or demonstrating further non-compliance.

**Directions for Future Research**

Following this project, there are three general areas where further research can expand on the developments made here and add further support to the theoretical as well as the empirical arguments presented throughout the dissertation. First, I purpose expanding the dataset to including cases of military occupations that involve the intervention of a state into a civil war between a government and some section of its population.\(^{437}\) In some instances, these occupations emerge as assistance to the

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\(^{437}\) For a discussion on these types of cases, see, Meredith Sarkees, and Frank Wayman, *Resort to War, 1816-2007* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010).
government in power, which would not fall into the dataset. In other cases, the occupying power enters the civil war as opposed to the government. For example, the Allied Powers captured and controlled several pieces of territory during their intervention into the Russian Civil War (1917-1922). These incidents in particular constitute coercive political occupations as described in Chapter 2 given that the occupying power is directing its efforts against a government. The theoretical argument developed in Chapter 3 should offer some insight into understanding whether states intervening in civil wars to impose occupations will succeed or fail in their efforts.

A second area for further research would focus on strategy changes by the occupying power in how they deal with the occupied elite. The dissertation has assumed that the strategy of the occupying power remains unchanged during the course of the military occupation. In the vast majority of the cases in the dataset, the occupying power is consistent in its approach to dealing with the elite. However, occupiers can and do sometimes engage in strategy shifts. I believe that there are two questions regarding shifts in strategy that would be of interest. First, explaining why the occupying power shifted its strategy could prove a fruitful inquiry for investigation. Following the theoretical argument, such shifts might follow from a change in beliefs regarding the likelihood of compliance. The possibility of outside interference or in recognizing internal sources of failure might pressure occupying powers to change their approach in an effort to maintain their control of foreign territory. Second, examining how the shifts in strategy affect the outcome of the occupation could lend further support to the arguments presented in Chapter 3. I posit that the initial approach towards the elite is the most influential to gaining a peace, though an occupying power could ‘gamble for resurrection’ and alter its
approach in attempt to achieve the victor’s peace.\textsuperscript{438} This would also offer further confirmation regarding some of the implications from the theoretical arguments on the duration of occupations, and their subsequent outcomes.

Finally, I purpose examining the effects of the costs of compliance on a leader’s political survival. I theorized that the leaders were unfavorable to the victor’s demands given the costs of compliance that they would incur. Empirically, the statistical results combined with the plausibility probes and case study demonstrated that as the aims of the occupation increased the likelihood of success subsequently decreased for establishing the victor’s peace. This adversity during the occupation is found in the costs that a leader expects to incur from complying with the demands of the occupying power. Domestic groups will likely attribute these costs incurred to the individuals who complied with the occupier’s demands. Some leaders – such as Miguel Igelsas and Yoshida Shigeru – ultimately lost office as a result of their following the orders of the occupying power. This assumption raises some interesting questions: after the occupation terminates successfully, how do the occupied elites fare in terms of political survival? What consequences will these leaders confront for complying with the occupier’s demands when the latter withdrawals?\textsuperscript{439} Can the elite adopt strategies to mitigate the costs of compliance incurred? Furthermore, in the project, I theorized that compliance costs affect the leadership’s decision-making regardless of domestic institutions. Future work could


\textsuperscript{439} For example on how war outcomes affect a leader’s fate, see H. E. Goemans, \textit{War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War}. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
expand on the differences between various political arrangements as mitigating or enhancing a leader’s political survival after the occupation ends.  

Looking for direct evidence on compliance costs might be difficult given that such a study could encounter problems similar to those found in the audience costs literature: partial observability and the strategic nature of political leaders. For a discussion on this type of research, see, Kenneth A. Schultz, “Looking Audience Costs,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 1 (2001): 32-60.
Appendix A: Interstate Wars under Investigation for Military Occupations

The Correlates of War Resort to War publication provides a list of interstate wars from 1816 through 2003.\textsuperscript{441} The dataset used here makes some modifications to the list as presented in the Resort to War compendium. First, the COW Interstate War Dataset designates the year 1816 as the initiation of a new international system and contends that the first interstate war in the new system is the Franco-Spanish War of 1823. I argue that the fundamental change in the international system occurred earlier, in 1814 with the first defeat of Napoleon in the War of the Sixth Coalition of 1813 to 1814. Subsequently, a new international system emerged following abdication of Napoleon on 11 April 1814 at the conclusion of the War of the Sixth Coalition, the signing of the first Treaty of Paris on 30 May 1814, and the opening of the Congress of Vienna shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{442} Hence, a new international system emerged in 1815. I include all interstate wars that occur between states that initiate hostilities on or after 1 January 1815. This one year change for the initiation of the modern international system results in the introduction of two new interstate wars into the dataset: the Neapolitan War of 1815 and the War of the Seventh Coalition. Below, I present the list of wars reviewed for military occupations. In addition to the list of wars, I include notes concerning some additional modifications made to certain wars as a result of my research.

\textsuperscript{441} Meredith Sarkees, and Frank Wayman, Resort to War, 1816-2007 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2010).

\textsuperscript{442} R Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present 2\textsuperscript{nd} Revised (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 763.
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<td>Franco-Mexican War of 1862-1867</td>
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<sup>445</sup> I have renamed this war as the ‘Second’ conflict, whereas Resort to War refers to it as ‘The Neapolitan War of 1860-1861.’
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446 The COW Resort to War publication suggests that the Lopez War lasted until 1870. However, the last major confrontation between the opposing armies occurred in August 1869. After that point, the military forces of Argentina and Brazil searched through Paraguay for Lopez, with only minor skirmishes against some irregular troops. I code the conflict as ending and the occupation as beginning in August 1869. See the following sources, Charles J. Kolinski, Independence or Death: The Story of the Paraguayan War (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1965); Chris Leuchars, To the Bitter End: Paraguay and the War of the Triple Alliance (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002); Gilbert Phelps, Tragedy of Paraguay (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975); Harris G. Warren, Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: The Postwar Decade, 1869-1878 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).

447 The COW Resort to War publication suggests that the War of the Pacific lasted until 1883. However, the last major confrontation between the opposing armies occurred in January 1881. No further fighting occurred between the Chilean military forces and a Peruvian military, as the latter disintegrated into competing factions that spread throughout the country and initiated guerilla war campaigns against the occupier. See the following sources, Bruce W. Farcau, The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884 (Westport: Praeger, 2000); William F. Sater, Chile and the War of the Pacific (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986).

448 The Romanian Occupation of Hungary began prior to the initiation of the conflict. The fighting was an enforcement measure by Romania when Hungary refused to comply with its demands.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>War Description</th>
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<th>Extra-State</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>127</td>
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<td>Ifni War of 1957-1958</td>
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<td>War in Assam of 1962</td>
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<td>Six-Day War of 1967</td>
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</table>

449 The Greek Occupation of Smyrna began prior to the initiation of the war. The conflict, however, is between the Greek forces and those of Ataturk, not the official government of Turkey at that time. I include the occupation as an outgrowth of World War I, and the conflict as an extra-state war against the occupying Greek military forces. See the sources listed in the case appendix under the Greek Occupation of Smyrna.

450 The French Occupation of Cilicia began prior to the initiation of the war. The conflict, however, is between the French forces and those of Ataturk, not the official government of Turkey at that time. I include the occupation as an outgrowth of World War I, and the conflict as an extra-state war against the occupying French military forces. See the sources listed in the case appendix under the French Occupation of Cilicia.

451 The status of Taiwan as a state in the international system is questionable here. I excluded the war from the project.


453 See footnote 451.
<table>
<thead>
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<td>175</td>
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<td>Football War of 1969</td>
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<td>176</td>
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<td>War of the Communist Coalition of 1970-1971</td>
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<td>76</td>
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<td>Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988</td>
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<td>Falklands War of 1982</td>
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<td>War over Lebanon of 1982</td>
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<td>War over the Aouzou Strip of 1986-1987</td>
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<td>War of Bosnian Independence of 1992</td>
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<td>Badme Border War of 1998-2000</td>
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<td>221</td>
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<td>War for Kosovo of 1999</td>
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<td>223</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Kargil War of 1999</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Invasion of Afghanistan of 2001</td>
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<td>227</td>
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<td>Invasion of Iraq of 2003</td>
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Appendix B: Auxiliary Analysis for Identity and Democracy

In this appendix, I re-run the analysis from Chapter 4 to further investigate the finding that a difference in identity between the occupying power and the occupied elite contributes to failure in achieving the former’s peace. I accomplish this by disaggregating the identity variable into its two components: race and religion.\textsuperscript{454} In the Table B.1, Model 1 includes a measure for identity that focuses on whether the occupying power and occupied elite have a different religion. Model 2 includes a dichotomous measure for identity that captures whether the occupying power and occupied elite are not of a similar race. Model 3 includes a dichotomous measure for identity that captures whether the occupying power and occupied elite are not of either the same race or religion. Model 3 also excludes the dichotomous measure for whether the occupying power is a democratic state.

The empirical results from disaggregating the identity variable do not support the findings from Chapter 4. In Model 1 with the measure for religion and Model 2 with the measure for race, both coefficients are negative, but neither result is statistically significant. This suggests that the combined identity measure has an unexpected interaction with another variable in the analysis. The culprit here is likely the measure for democratic institutions in the occupying power. I suspect that democratic states are more likely to engage in military occupations on non-contiguous territory, and that subsequently increases their chances of interacting with populations of different religions and races. As Model 3 demonstrates, the coefficient for the combined identity measure

\textsuperscript{454} For a complete description on the coding procedures for the identity variable, please see chapter 4.
remains negative when the measure for democracy is removed. However, the result is no longer statistically significant.
### Table B.1: Probit Analysis of Democracy & Identity

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<td>(.509)</td>
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<td>.078</td>
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Robust Standard Errors in parentheses, clustered to War and Country

*p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 (one-tailed)

Expected % Correctly Predicted from Herron (1999)
Appendix C: Military Occupations Dataset & Case Sources

Appendix C presents the list of sources used to identify and code military occupations that result from interstate wars from 1815 until 2003. The respective footnotes contain the list of relevant sources. I have organized the dataset in chronological order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation Number</th>
<th>Occupation Name</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Dates/Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001</td>
<td>Austrian Occupation of Naples</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Naples</td>
<td>May 1815 to August 1817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>002</td>
<td>Allied Occupation of France</td>
<td>Austria, Prussia, Russia, United Kingdom</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>July 1815 to November 1818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Occupation Number: 003
Occupation Name: Russian Occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia
Occupying State: Russia
Target: Boyars of Moldavia and Wallachia
Dates/Duration: May 1828 to September 1834

Occupation Number: 004
Occupation Name: Russian Occupation of Bulgaria and Roumelia
Occupying State: Russia
Target: Ottoman Empire
Dates/Duration: September 1829 to October 1830

Occupation Number: 005
Occupation Name: Russia Occupation of Silistria
Occupying State: Russia
Target: Ottoman Empire
Dates/Duration: September 1829 to September 1836

Occupation Number: 006
Occupation Name: American Occupation of New Mexico
Participants: United States


Target: New Mexico
Dates/Duration: August 1846 to February 1848\textsuperscript{460}

Occupation Number: 007
Occupation Name: American Occupation of California
Participants: United States
Target: California
Dates/Duration: August 1846 to February 1848\textsuperscript{461}

Occupation Number: 008
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Northern Mexico
Participants: United States
Target: Mexico
Dates/Duration: February 1847 to July 1848\textsuperscript{462}


Occasion Number: 009
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Central Mexico
Participants: United States
Target: Mexico
Dates/Duration: October 1847 to July 1848

Occupation Number: 010
Occupation Name: Austrian Occupation of Novara
Participants: Austria
Target: Piedmont
Dates/Duration: April 1849 to August 1849

Occupation Number: 011
Occupation Name: Austrian Occupation of Tuscany
Participants: Austria


Target: Tuscany
Dates/Duration: May 1849 to May 1855\textsuperscript{465}

Occupation Number: 012
Occupation Name: Austrian Occupation of the Marches, Romagna, and Umbria
Participants: Austria
Target: Papal States
Dates/Duration: June 1849 to June 1857\textsuperscript{466}

Occupation Number: 013
Occupation Name: French Occupation of Rome
Participants: France
Target: Papal States
Dates/Duration: July 1849 to April 1850\textsuperscript{467}

Occupation Number: 014
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Bushire
Participants: United Kingdom
Target: Persia
Dates/Duration: December 1856 to October 1857\textsuperscript{468}


\textsuperscript{468} United Kingdom Foreign Office, \textit{Draft of proposed Political Treaty between Her Majesty the Queen and the Shah of Persia} Confidential Print FO 881/592 (1857); United Kingdom Foreign Office, \textit{Treaty between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Shah of
**Occupation Number:** 015  
**Occupation Name:** Spanish Occupation of Tétouan  
**Participants:** Spain  
**Target:** Morocco  
**Dates/Duration:** March 1860 to May 1862

**Occupation Number:** 016  
**Occupation Name:** French Occupation of Central Mexico  
**Participants:** France  
**Target:** Mexican Emperor  
**Dates/Duration:** May 1863 to February 1867

---

_Persia_ Confidential Print FO 881/634 (1857); United Kingdom Foreign Office, Confidential Print FO 881/675 (1857); Mark S. Bell, _An Account of the British Wars with Persia from the Occupation of Kharaj in 1838 together with a Precis of Contemporaneous Events and Abstracts of Important Correspondence Connected with the War of 1856-57 War Office 106/6275 (Intelligence Branch, Quarter Master General’s Department in India Government Central Press. 1885/1889); Spencer Wadpole, _A History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War in 1815 Vol. VI_ (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1905); Army Head Quarters, _Frontiers and Overseas Expeditions from India Vol. IV: Expeditions Overseas_ (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1911); Barbara English, _John Company’s Last War_ (London: Collins, 1971); Ian Hernon, _Britain’s Forgotten Wars: Colonial Campaigns of the 19th Century_ (Gloucestshire: The History Press, 2008).


Occupation Number: 017
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of the Jutland
Participants: Austria, Prussia
Target: Denmark
Dates/Duration: July 1864 to 30 October 1864

Occupation Number: 018
Occupation Name: Prussian Occupation of Schleswig
Participants: Prussia
Target: Schleswig
Dates/Duration: June 1864 to August 1866

Occupation Number: 019
Occupation Name: Austrian Occupation of Holstein
Participants: Austria
Target: Holstein
Dates/Duration: December 1864 to June 1866

Occupation Number: 020
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Paraguay
Participants: Argentina, Brazil
Target: Paraguay
Dates/Duration: August 1869 to June 1876


473 Malet, The Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation by Prussia; Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire Vol. IV; Brennan, “The Relation of the Schleswig-Holstein Question to the Unification of Germany.”
Occupation Number: 021
Occupation Name: Prussian Occupation of France
Participants: Prussia
Target: France
Dates/Duration: January 1871 to September 1873

Occupation Number: 022
Occupation Name: Russian Occupation of Bulgaria
Participants: Russia
Target: Bulgaria
Dates/Duration: January 1878 to April 1879


**Occupation Number:** 023  
**Occupation Name:** Russia Occupation of Eastern Rumelia  
**Participants:** Russia  
**Target:** Eastern Rumelia  
**Dates/Duration:** January 1878 to April 1879  

**Occupation Number:** 024  
**Occupation Name:** Chilean Occupation of Peru  
**Participants:** Chile  
**Target:** Peru  
**Dates/Duration:** January 1881 to October 1883

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Occupation Number: 025
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Egypt
Participants: United Kingdom
Target: Egypt
Dates/Duration: September 1882 to August 1936\textsuperscript{479}

Occupation Number: 026
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Weihaiwei
Participants: Japan
Target: China
Dates/Duration: February 1895 to May 1898\textsuperscript{480}

Occupation Number: 027
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Cuba
Participants: United States
Target: Cuba
Dates/Duration: August 1898 to May 1902\textsuperscript{481}


Occupation Number: 028
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Puerto Rico
Participants: United States
Target: Puerto Rico
Dates/Duration: August 1898 to April 1900

Occupation Number: 029
Occupation Name: American Occupation of the Philippines I
Participants: United States
Target: Philippines
Dates/Duration: August 1898 to May 1942


Occupation Number: 030
Occupation Name: Occupation of Peking & the Province of Chihli
Participants: Germany, France, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States
Target: China
Dates/Duration: August 1900 to August 1902

Occupation Number: 031
Occupation Name: Occupation of Manchuria


Participants: Russia
Target: China
Dates/Duration: October 1900 to April 1907\textsuperscript{485}

Occupation Number: 032
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Southern Manchuria 1905-1907
Participants: Japan
Target: China
Dates/Duration: March 1905 to April 1907\textsuperscript{486}

Occupation Number: 033
Occupation Name: Greek Occupation of Northern Epirus
Participants: Greece
Target: Albania
Dates/Duration: March 1913 to March 1914\textsuperscript{487}

Occupation Number: 034
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Luxembourg
Participants: Germany
Target: Luxembourg
Dates/Duration: August 1914 to November 1918\textsuperscript{488}


Occupation Number: 035
Occupation Name: Russian Occupation of East Galicia & Bukovina I
Participants: Russia
Target: Austria
Dates/Duration: September 1914 to June 1915

Occupation Number: 036
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Belgium
Participants: Germany
Target: Belgium
Dates/Duration: October 1914 to November 1918

Occupation Number: 037
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Northern France
Participants: Germany
Target: France
Dates/Duration: November 1914 to November 1918

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Occupation Number (occnum): 038
Occupation Name (occname): Japanese Occupation of Shandung Peninsula
Participants (parties): Japan
Target: China
Dates/Duration: November 1914 to December 1922

Occupation Number: 039
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Valona
Participants: Italy
Target: Albania
Dates/Duration: December 1914 to September 1920

Occupation Number: 040
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Lithuania
Participants: Germany
Target: Lithuania
Dates/Duration: March 1915 to October 1918

Occupation Number: 041


Occupation Name: Central Powers Occupation of Poland
Participants: Austria, Germany
Target: Poland
Dates/Duration: August 1915 to November 1918

Occupation Number: 042
Occupation Name: Central Powers Occupation of Serbia
Participants: Austria, Bulgaria
Target: Serbia
Dates/Duration: October 1915 to November 1918

Occupation Number: 043
Occupation Name: Central Powers Occupation of Montenegro
Participants: Austria, Bulgaria
Target: Montenegro
Dates/Duration: January 1916 to November 1918

Occupation Number: 044
Occupation Name: Russian Occupation of East Galicia & Bukovina II
Participants: Russia
Target: Austria
Dates/Duration: June 1916 to July 1917

495 Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship; Davies, God’s Playground; Sukiennicki, East Central Europe During World War I; Jesse Curtis Kaufman, “Sovereignty and the Search for Order in German-Occupied Poland, 1915-1918” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2008); Liulevicius, “German-Occupied Eastern Europe;” Tracey Hayes Norrell, Shattered Communities: Soldiers, Rabbis, and the Ostjuden under German Occupation: 1915-1918 (PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2010).


498 Davies, God’s Playground; Sukiennicki, East Central Europe During World War I; Prusin, Nationalizing a Borderland; Kramer, “Combatants and Noncombatants.”
**Occupation Number:** 045  
**Occupation Name:** French Occupation of Korce  
**Participants:** France  
**Target:** Albania  
**Dates/Duration:** December 1916 to May 1920

**Occupation Number:** 046  
**Occupation Name:** Occupation of Dobrudja & Wallachia  
**Participants:** Austria, Germany  
**Target:** Romania  
**Dates/Duration:** December 1916 to November 1918

**Occupation Number:** 046  
**Occupation Name:** Occupation of Southern Dobrudja  
**Participants:** Bulgaria  
**Target:** Romania  
**Dates/Duration:** December 1916 to May 1918

**Occupation Number:** 048  
**Occupation Name:** Greek Occupation of Northern Epirus II  
**Participants:** Greece  
**Target:** Albania  
**Dates/Duration:** July 1917 to October 1924

**Occupation Number:** 049

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501 See footnote 45 for the relevant sources.

Occupation Name: British Occupation of Palestine
Participants: United Kingdom
Target: Palestine
Dates/Duration: December 1917 to May 1948

Occupation Number: 050
Occupation Name: German Occupation of the United Baltic Duchy
Participants: Germany
Target: Estonia, Latvia
Dates/Duration: February 1918 to November 1918

Occupation Number: 051
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Belorussia
Participants: Germany
Target: Russia
Dates/Duration: February 1918 to November 1918

Occupation Number: 051
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Iraq
Participants: United Kingdom
Target: Iraq
Dates/Duration: October 1918 to October 1932


504 Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship; Rauch, The Baltic States; Sukienicki, East Central Europe During World War I; Tiovo U. Raun, Estonia and the Estonians (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); Parrot, “The Baltic States from 1914 to 1923; Liulevicius, “German-Occupied Eastern Europe.”


Occupation Number: 053
Occupation Name: French Occupation of Syria & Lebanon
Participants: France
Target: Syria & Lebanon
Dates/Duration: October 1918 to August 1946

Occupation Number: 054
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of the Rhineland
Participants: France, Belgium, United Kingdom, and United States
Target: Germany
Dates/Duration: November 1918 to May 1930


Occupation Number: 055
Occupation Name: French Occupation of the Saar
Participants: France
Target: Germany
Dates/Duration: November 1918 to May 1930

Occupation Number: 056
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Istanbul
Participants: France, United Kingdom, Italy
Target: Turkey
Dates/Duration: November 1918 to October 1923

Occupation Number: 057
Occupation Name: Romanian Occupation of Hungary
Participants: Romania
Target: Hungary
Dates/Duration: November 1918 to April 1920


Occupation Number: 058
Occupation Name: French Occupation of Cilicia
Participants: France
Target: Turkey
Dates/Duration: November 1918 to December 1921\textsuperscript{512}

Occupation Number: 059
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Adalia/Antalya
Participants: Italy
Target: Turkey
Dates/Duration: April 1919 to July 1921\textsuperscript{513}

Occupation Number: 060
Occupation Name: Greek Occupation of Smyrna
Participants: Greece
Target: Turkey
Dates/Duration: May 1919 to September 1922\textsuperscript{514}

Occupation Number: 061
Occupation Name: Polish Occupation of Vilnius


Participants: Poland
Target: Lithuania
Dates/Duration: October 1920 to February 1922

Occupation Number: 062
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Manchuria
Participants: Japan
Target: Manchuria
Dates/Duration: March 1933 to August 1945

Occupation Number: 063
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Inner Mongolia
Participants: Japan
Target: Inner Mongolia
Dates/Duration: May 1936 to August 1945

Occupation Number: 064
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Northern & Central China
Participants: Japan


Target: China
Dates/Duration: December 1937 to August 1945

Occupation Number: 065
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Poland
Participants: Germany
Target: Poland
Dates/Duration: September 1939 to January 1945

Occupation Number: 066
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Denmark
Participants: Germany
Target: Denmark
Dates/Duration: April 1940 to May 1945


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation Number</th>
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<th>Participants</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Dates/Duration</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>067</td>
<td>German Occupation of Luxembourg</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>May 1940 to August 1942&lt;sup&gt;521&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>068</td>
<td>German Occupation of Belgium &amp; Northern France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>May 1940 to September 1944&lt;sup&gt;522&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>069</td>
<td>German Occupation of the Netherlands</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>May 1940 to May 1945&lt;sup&gt;523&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>070</td>
<td>German Occupation of France I</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>May 1940 to November 1942&lt;sup&gt;524&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Occupation Number: 071
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Iceland
Participants: United Kingdom, United States
Target: Iceland
Dates/Duration: May 1940 to June 1944

Occupation Number: 072
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Southeastern France
Participants: Italy
Target: France
Dates/Duration: June 1940 to September 1943

Occupation Number: 073
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Norway
Participants: Germany
Target: Norway
Dates/Duration: June 1940 to May 1945


Occupation Number: 074
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Serbia
Participants: Germany
Target: Serbia
Dates/Duration: April 1941 to October 1944

Occupation Number: 075
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Greece
Participants: Germany
Target: Greece
Dates/Duration: April 1941 to November 1944

Occupation Number: 076
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Greece
Participants: Italy
Target: Greece
Dates/Duration: April 1941 to September 1943

Occupation Number: 077
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Montenegro
Participants: Italy
Target: Montenegro
Dates/Duration: April 1941 to September 1943

Occupation Number: 078
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Italian Somaliland
Participants: United Kingdom


530 Spencer, War and Postwar Greece; Rich, Hitler’s War Aims; Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece; Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire; Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece.

531 Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire; Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder.
Target: Italian Somaliland  
Dates/Duration: February 1941 to April 1950

Occupation Number: 079  
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Eritrea  
Participants: United Kingdom  
Target: Eritrea  
Dates/Duration: April 1941 to September 1952

Occupation Number: 080  
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Iraq II  
Participants: United Kingdom  
Dates/Duration: June 1941 to October 1947

Occupation Number: 081  
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Lithuania  
Participants: Germany  
Target: Lithuania

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Dates/Duration: July 1941 to October 1944535

Occupation Number: 082
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Latvia
Participants: Germany
Target: Latvia
Dates/Duration: July 1941 to November 1944536

Occupation Number: 083
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Belarus
Participants: Germany
Target: Belarus
Dates/Duration: July 1941 to August 1944537

Occupation Number: 084
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Ukraine
Participants: Germany
Dates/Duration: July 1941 to May 1944538

Occupation Number: 085
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Estonia
Participants: Germany


Target: Estonia
Dates/Duration: August 1941 to September 1944

Occupation Number: 086
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Croatia
Participants: Germany
Target: Croatia
Dates/Duration: August 1941 to May 1945

Occupation Number: 087
Occupation Name: Italian Occupation of Croatia
Participants: Italy
Target: Croatia
Dates/Duration: August 1941 to May 1943

Occupation Number: 088
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Southern Iran
Participants: United Kingdom, United States
Target: Iran
Dates/Duration: October 1941 to March 1946

Occupation Number: 089

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541 Curtis, ed. Yugoslavia; Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941-1945; Rodogno Fascism’s European Empire; Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder.

Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Northern Iran
Participants: Soviet Union
Target: Iran
Dates/Duration: October 1941 to May 1946

Occupation Number: 090
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of British Borneo
Participants: Japan
Target: British Borneo
Dates/Duration: December 1941 to August 1945

Occupation Number: 091
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of the Philippines
Participants: Japan
Target: Philippines
Dates/Duration: January 1942 to April 1945

Occupation Number: 092
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of British Malaya
Participants: Japan
Target: British Malaya
Dates/Duration: February 1942 to August 1945


Occupation Number: 093
Occupation Name: Japanese Occupation of Dutch East Indies
Participants: Japan
Target: Dutch East Indies
Dates/Duration: March 1942 to August 1945

Occupation Number: 094
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Crimea
Participants: Germany
Target: Crimea
Dates/Duration: July 1942 to May 1944

Occupation Number: 095
Occupation Name: German Occupation of France II
Participants: Germany
Target: France


548 Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945; Rich, Hitler’s War Aims.
Dates/Duration: November 1942 to September 1944

Occupation Number: 096
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Cyrenica
Participants: United Kingdom
Target: Cyrenica
Dates/Duration: January 1943 to December 1951

Occupation Number: 097
Occupation Name: British Occupation of Tripoli
Participants: United Kingdom
Target: Tripoli
Dates/Duration: January 1943 to December 1951

Occupation Number: 098
Occupation Name: French Occupation of Fezzan
Participants: France
Target: Fezzan
Dates/Duration: January 1943 to December 1951

Occupation Number: 099

549 Paxton, Vichy France: Rich, Hitler’s War Aims; Kedward, Occupied France; Atkin, Petain.


Occupation Name: German Occupation of Montenegro
Participants: Germany
Target: Montenegro
Dates/Duration: May 1943 to October 1944

Occupation Number: 100
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Italy
Participants: United Kingdom, United States
Target: Italy
Dates/Duration: September 1943 to January 1947

Occupation Number: 101
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Albania
Participants: Germany
Target: Albania
Dates/Duration: September 1943 to January 1945

Occupation Number: 102
Occupation Name: German Occupation of Hungary
Participants: Germany
Target: Hungary
Dates/Duration: March 1944 to April 1945

553 Rich, Hitler’s War Aims; Mazower, Hitler’s Empire; Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder.


Occupation Number: 103
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Romania
Participants: USSR
Target: Romania
Dates/Duration: August 1944 to August 1958

Occupation Number: 104
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Bulgaria
Participants: USSR
Target: Bulgaria
Dates/Duration: September 1944 to December 1947

Occupation Number: 105
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Poland
Participants: USSR
Target: Poland
Dates/Duration: March 1945 to December 1956

Occupation Number: 106
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Austria
Participants: United States, United Kingdom, France
Target: Austria
Dates/Duration: April 1945 to May 1955


Occupation Number: 107
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Austria
Participants: USSR
Target: Austria
Dates/Duration: April 1945 to May 1955

Occupation Number: 108
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Hungary
Participants: USSR
Target: Hungary
Dates/Duration: April 1945 to May 1957

Occupation Number: 109
Occupation Name: American Occupation of the Philippines II
Participants: United States
Target: Philippines
Dates/Duration: April 1945 to July 1946


Occupation Number: 110
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of West Germany
Participants: United States, United Kingdom, France
Dates/Duration: May 1945 to May 1955\textsuperscript{564}

Occupation Number: 111
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of East Germany
Participants: Soviet Union
Target: East Germany
Dates/Duration: May 1945 to March 1954\textsuperscript{565}


Occupation Number: 112
Occupation Name: Soviet Occupation of Czechoslovakia
Participants: Soviet Union
Target: Czechoslovakia
Dates/Duration: May 1945 to December 1945

Occupation Number: 113
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Czechoslovakia
Participants: United States
Target: Czechoslovakia
Dates/Duration: May 1945 to December 1945

Occupation Number: 114
Occupation Name: Polish Occupation of Oder-Neisse
Participants: Poland
Target: East Germany
Dates/Duration: June 1945 to June 1950

Occupation Number: 115
Occupation Name: French Occupation of the Saarland
Participants: France


Target: Saarland  
Dates/Duration: July 1945 to December 1956  

Occupation Number: 116  
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Berlin  
Participants: France, United Kingdom, United States  
Target: Soviet Union  
Dates/Duration: July 1945 to October 1990

Occupation Number: 117  
Occupation Name: Allied Occupation of Berlin  
Participants: Soviet Union  
Target: France, United Kingdom, United States  
Dates/Duration: July 1945 to October 1990

Occupation Number: 118  
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Japan  
Participants: United States  
Target: Japan  
Dates/Duration: August 1945 to April 1952

Occupation Number: 119  
Occupation Name: American Occupation of Ryukyu Islands  
Participants: United States  
Target: Japan  
Dates/Duration: August 1945 to May 1972


571 Hendry and Wood, The Legal Status of Berlin; Bering, Outpost Berlin.

572 Please see Chapter 5.

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<td>120</td>
<td>Soviet Occupation of Korea</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>August 1945 to September 1948</td>
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<td>121</td>
<td>American Occupation of Korea</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>September 1945 to August 1948</td>
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<td>122</td>
<td>Egyptian Occupation of Gaza I</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>May 1948 to November 1956</td>
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<tr>
<td>123</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Occupation Name:** Israeli Occupation of Gaza  
**Participants:** Israel  
**Target:** Gaza  
**Dates/Duration:** November 1956 to March 1957

**Occupation Number:** 124  
**Occupation Name:** Egyptian Occupation of Gaza II  
**Participants:** Egypt  
**Target:** Gaza  
**Dates/Duration:** March 1957 to June 1967

**Occupation Number:** 125  
**Occupation Name:** Chinese Occupation of Aksai Chin  
**Participants:** China  
**Target:** India  
**Dates/Duration:** November 1962 to Ongoing

**Occupation Number:** 126  
**Occupation Name:** Israeli Occupation of the West Bank  
**Participants:** Israel  
**Target:** Jordan  
**Dates/Duration:** June 1967 to October 1994

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Occupation Number: 127
Occupation Name: Israeli Occupation of Gaza II
Participants: Israel
Target: Palestine
Dates/Duration: June 1967 to September 2005

Occupation Number: 128
Occupation Name: Israeli Occupation of Golan Heights
Participants: Israel
Target: Syria
Dates/Duration: June 1967 to December 1981

Occupation Number: 129
Occupation Name: Israeli Occupation of Sinai II
Participants: Israel
Target: Egypt
Dates/Duration: June 1967 to April 1982


Occupation Number: 130  
Occupation Name: Turkish Occupation of Northern Cyprus  
Participants: Turkey  
Target: Cyprus  
Dates/Duration: August 1974 to December 1983

Occupation Number: 131  
Occupation Name: Vietnamese Occupation of Cambodia  
Participants: Vietnam  
Target: Cambodia  
Dates/Duration: January 1979 to September 1989

Occupation Number: 132  
Occupation Name: Tanzanian Occupation of Uganda  
Participants: Tanzania  
Target: Uganda  
Dates/Duration: April 1979 to June 1981

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Occupation Number: 133
Occupation Name: Israeli Occupation of Lebanon
Participants: Israel
Target: Lebanon
Dates/Duration: June 1982 to May 2000

Occupation Number: 134
Occupation Name: Armenian Occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh
Participants: Armenia
Target: Azerbaijan
Dates/Duration: May 1994 to Ongoing

Occupation Number: 135
Occupation Name: Ethiopian Occupation of Badme
Participants: Ethiopia
Target: Eritrea


**Dates/Duration:** February 1999 to Ongoing

**Occupation Number:** 136
**Occupation Name:** American Occupation of Afghanistan
**Participants:** United States
**Target:** Afghanistan
**Dates/Duration:** December 2000 to May 2012

**Occupation Number:** 137
**Occupation Name:** American Occupation of Iraq
**Participants:** United States
**Target:** Iraq
**Dates/Duration:** May 2003 to December 2008

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