ABSTRACT

Title of thesis: REVIEWING UNITED NATIONS WORLD CONFERENCES ON WOMEN FOR KOREAN WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT

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This thesis explores the historical shifts of the United Nations world conferences on women, considering what is at stake in "thinking globally and acting locally," especially for the Korean women's movement. The following questions are addressed: How have the main issues shifted from the first conference in 1975 to the final one in 2000? What were the linkages between practical issues and epistemic discourses during this process? What kinds of power dynamics have been working in the global arena in terms of transnational feminism? In what context could diverse women's groups succeed in negotiating and producing a consensus? How has the Korean women's movement interacted with the international process? And, in conclusion, what concrete measures might Korean policymakers and women's movement activists undertake as feminists pursuing gender equality?
REVIEWING UNITED NATIONS WORLD CONFERENCES ON WOMEN FOR KOREAN WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT

by

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ACRONYMS

CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CSW: Commission on the Status of Women (of the United Nations [UN])
DAWN: Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era
ECOSOC: Economic and Social Council (of the UN)
ESCAP: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (of the UN)
GA: General Assembly (of the UN)
GAD: Gender and Development
GDI: Gender-Related Development Index (of the UN Development Program [UNDP])
GEM: Gender Empowerment Measure (of the UNDP)
GEPE: Gender Equality Promotion and Education (in Korea)
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GNP: Gross National Product
GO: Government Organization
HDI: Human Development Index (of the UNDP)
INSTRAW: International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (of the UN)
KWDI: Korean Women Development Institute
MHW: Ministry of Health and Welfare
MOGE: Ministry of Gender Equality (in Korea)
MPA II: Ministry of Political Affairs II (in Korea)
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
NSO: National Statistical Office (in Korea)
NFLS: Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCWA: The Presidential Commission on Women's Affairs (in Korea)
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
WID: Women in Development
I. INTRODUCTION

Following the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, the slogan, “think globally, act locally,” became spotlighted all over the world. This slogan appears to represent or symbolize the current epistemological and practical tasks for the women’s movement; however, there seem to be many ways to interpret these words corresponding to each person’s and community’s perspective. “Think global, act local” is not only enigmatic, but also ambiguous and, at the same time, constant; it may also be abstract, and concrete. In this sense, this slogan seems to be “an object” able to travel across borders where it may be understood differently in different places, and at the same time maintain some sort of constant identity (Bowker and Star 1999). Therefore, examining the implication of this slogan can be similar to exploring the current situation of the global women’s movement. Furthermore, this slogan can be considered a pathway for articulating a genealogy of the international women’s movement of the past decades, because it was coined as a result of the progress women’s movements have made through their cooperation at four United Nations (UN) world conferences on women.

Therefore, I will explore the historical shifts of the UN world conferences on women, raising the question as to what is at stake in thinking globally and acting locally. My examination will start from an analysis of the contents and processes of the UN conferences, and then attempt to articulate the implication of thinking globally and acting locally to figure out the current tasks for the transnational women’s movement, and

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1 I will use the term, transnational women’s movement, to point to the tendency beyond the movements based on nation-states. Transnationalism, internationalism, and
especially for the Korean women’s movement. In spite of the importance of these conferences, there are too few reviews of and scholarly responses to the UN conferences on women. In addition, the contents of each conference are usually examined separately, so it is very hard to catch the historical process of the women’s movement within these conferences. Another problem is that practical issues and academic epistemological concerns seem to be separated from each other in exploring these conferences. As a result, there is, on the one hand, a positive evaluation of the conferences and, on the other hand, a disappointment with what the conferences have achieved. Thus, I will attempt to review the conferences with consideration of the historical and epistemological shifts simultaneously, while connecting academic feminist concerns with practical issues— that is, figuring out how and why the main issues of each conference have changed and how academic feminist theory and feminism in practice have interrelated with each other. In this way, I believe we can evaluate the results of the conferences more properly and come to some conclusions about where we have finally arrived after two decades of struggling through four UN women’s conferences, what was accomplished, and what remains to be done both at the level of discourse and practice.

My research will focus on four questions:

1) How have the main issues shifted from the first conference to the final one? Can we figure out the linkage between the practical issues and epistemic discourses during this process?

2) What kinds of power dynamics have been working in the global arena in terms of transnational feminism? In what context could the diverse women’s groups globalization often are used interchangeably, but strictly considered, they have slightly different meanings. According to Amrita Basu’s definition, “transnationalism points to relationships among advocacy groups, networks, and movements within civil society and doesn’t privilege the role of states” (Aidoo, Acosta-Belen, Basu, Conde, Painter, and Saadawi 2000, 4).
succeed in negotiating and producing a consensus? How should we evaluate the consensus and declarations of these conferences? 3) What is at stake in “thinking globally” and what should we do to “act locally”? Does this slogan still represent current objectives of the women’s movement, or does the growth of transnational social movements imply that this is the time to “replace the bumper sticker…or simply to retire the bumper sticker” (Basu 2000, 68)? How should we interpret this implication? 4) How has the Korean women’s movement interacted with this international process? In the Korean context, what should we do to “think globally, act locally” as feminists pursuing equality and, at the same time, concerned to identify concrete measures for the next steps?

There have been many conflicts at these conferences, especially around the significant material issues dividing women between South and North, and East and West, and that are embedded in quite different theoretical perspectives concerning gender and women, difference and solidarity, and women’s human rights. Yet, women have been able to “inhabit the world with others” and “move beyond the opposition between common and uncommon, between friends and strangers, [and] between sameness and difference” (Ahmed 2000, 180). From women to gender, beyond differences to solidarity, against either universalism² or cultural relativism, women in the world have brought about a new consciousness in the name of transnational feminism. They have trained themselves in the international policymaking process as “global agents” and been able to bring a new understanding of egalitarian gender relations to international debates.

² In this case, I use “universalism” to point out the tendency of homogenization. Thus, in my usage, “universality of rights” is a different concept from universalism. The term, “universality,” was one of the hotly debated terms at the Beijing conference and is also deeply related to the discourse on the women’s human rights.
In looking at the Korean women’s agenda for empowerment alongside an examination of the UN conferences on women, I hypothesize that the Korean “local” is closely related to the accomplishments of these UN “global” conferences. This paper therefore concludes with a focus on Korea, with the expectation that the goals of the Korean women’s movement can be more clearly articulated within a study that views the local alongside the global.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD CONFERENCES ON WOMEN

By the time the first UN conference was held in Mexico City in 1975, there was already a tradition of internationalism among women activists. The history of women’s international movements can be traced back to at least the early nineteenth century.

Bonnie S. Anderson, in *Joyous Greetings: The First International Women’s Movement, 1830-1860* (2000), described an 1851 letter, written by two jailed French feminists asking for international support, that encouraged her to research this topic: “The more I investigated, the more international connections I discovered” (1). In *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Movement* (1997), Leila J. Rupp identified women who organized across national borders from the late nineteenth century to the 1950s, formed diverse groups, and shaped new transnational organizations. Following the first international women’s congress that convened in Paris in 1877, national sections for international women’s organizations such as the International Council of Women (founded in 1888), the International Alliance of Women (founded in 1904), and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (founded in 1915) were formed in more than fifty countries all around the world. In 1946, several women who served on UN General Assembly (GA) delegations met privately, drafted and signed an “Open Letter to the Women of the World,” and in 1947 were successful in having a Commission on the Status on Women (CSW) authorized by the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Margaret E. Galey (1995) maintains that the CSW has had a significant influence on UN bodies and that this is due to its connection with international women’s organizations. While all official UN conferences, from the Rio conference in 1992, have
been accompanied by separate UN-authorized Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Forums, women’s conferences, thanks to the enthusiastic participation of international women’s organizations in the work of the CSW, have had an even longer history of an NGO presence.

Women’s tradition of internationalism finally culminated with UN world conferences.³ Four world conferences took place between 1975 and 1995: in Mexico City in 1975, Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985, and Beijing in 1995. In addition to the world conferences on women, there have been several other UN global forums since 1990 that produced separate sections devoted to women in their final documents: the Conference on Environment and Development (1992, Rio de Janeiro), the World Conference on Human Rights (1993, Vienna), the International Conference on Population and Development (1994, Cairo), and the World Summit on Social Development (1995, Copenhagen).⁴ Women’s groups actively participated in these conferences and had a positive effect on the processes, results and resolutions (Charlesworth 1996; Bunch 1995).

Exploring how the key issues and perspectives dealt with in each conference changed can provide us with a valuable chance for reviewing the tasks of the current transnational women’s movement. The theme of all four of the UN conferences on women, “Equality, Development, and Peace,”⁵ first pronounced at the conference in

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³ The call for a UN women’s conference dates back to 1946. In the preparation meeting prior to the establishment of the CSW at the end of April 1946 in New York, seven of nine sub-commission members set four immediate tasks; one of them was “a women’s conference” (Galey 1995).

⁴ The Rio Conference Program for Action contains a whole chapter entitled “Global Action for Women towards Sustainable and Equitable Development.” The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action on Human Rights contain a section on “The Equal Status and Human Rights of Women.” In addition, the Cairo Program of Action is devoted to issues of gender (Charlesworth 1996).

⁵ According to Arvonne S. Fraser (1995), this linkage between equality, development
Mexico City, has been constant, but the key issues and perspectives changed epistemologically and shifted historically. This thesis looks at two key issues: (1) the politics of development and (2) building solidarity across differences.

Epistemologically, I trace the significance of a shift from a “Women in Development” (WID) paradigm, pervasive at the first conference, to a “Gender and Development” (GAD) approach that was called for at the Nairobi conference, and also to “Gender Mainstreaming” and “empowerment” strategies that emerged at the Beijing conference. These practical strategy shifts have always interacted with the academic discourses on “women” and “gender.” I also describe the political conflicts that erupted between South and North, and East and West at the conferences, and describe some of the strategies to resolve them, including the significant role played by Black and Third World feminists in building women’s solidarity around the world. Finally, I relate campaigns for women’s human rights to discourses on universalism and cultural relativism. In examining both practical issues and parallel academic discourses, I show their relationship and clarify the larger significance of both theory and practice.

A. The Politics of Development

1. From “WID” to “GAD”

Poland’s draft, which was selected as the committee’s working document, also linked equality, development, and peace. In 1967, the declaration was adopted in the UN General Assembly, and in 1980 in Copenhagen the declaration finally evolved into the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Regarding the difference between the “declaration” and the “convention,” see Fraser (1995).

6 The Copenhagen conference is remembered as the most conflictive of the four conferences (Jaquette 1995; Cagatay, Grown and Satiago 1986).
In Mexico City, in 1975, one heard the abbreviated term “WID” discussed everywhere. In developing the “Women in Development” or “WID” paradigm, feminists had begun by questioning traditional modernization theory, as it was still understood in the early 1970s, especially the view that the capitalist economic development model would inevitably result in women’s equality (Jaquette 1982). Ester Boserup’s *Women’s Role in Economic Development*, published in 1970, was among the earliest critiques. By studying African farms where new technologies and land ownership systems had been adopted, she argued that “with modernization of agriculture and with migration to the towns, a new sex pattern of productive work must emerge….The obvious danger is, however, that in the course of this transition women will be deprived of their productive functions, and the whole process of growth will thereby be retarded” (5). Therefore, she recommended “new educational and training programmes [for women]…to reduce the productivity gap between male and female labor” (225). The WID paradigm, then, was intended to gain equity for women in the development process by creating compensatory programs that would fully integrate them into the modernizing economy. This principle was written into the World Plan of Action that was produced at the Mexico City conference in the statement that “the full and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the maximum participation of women as well as men in all fields” (paragraph 4), and significantly influenced the design of development projects at both the level of international agencies and individual country initiatives thereafter. Most important were the collection of labor force and education

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7 The term “Women in Development” or “WID” was also adopted by the women’s caucus formed in 1972, of the U.S. professional association, Society for International Development (Tinker 1990), the Association for Women in Development (AWID), and a “desk” of the U.S. State Department’s Agency for International Development.
statistics on women and special training programs to prepare them for newly created job opportunities.

Nonetheless, only ten years later, at the 1985 World Conference on Women in Nairobi, feminists were criticizing the WID approach and calling for its replacement with a “Gender and Development” or “GAD” approach.\(^8\) WID was dubbed a merely “additive approach,” and WID advocates were blamed for ignoring other, possibly even more detrimental, consequences of traditional development practices such as the sexual division of labor (Elson 1990; Fergusen 2000; Moser 1993). As Lucille Mathurin Mair (later, secretary-general of the Copenhagen conference), looking back to 1975, stated: “Women in Development became the Decade’s overnight catchphrase, a seductive one, which for a time, at least, could evade the question of what kind of development women were to be drawn into” (UN 1986 Report, quoted in Tinker 1990).

“GAD” as a term also captured the conceptual shift that a small group of researchers meeting in Bangalore, India, in 1984, were advocating. Drawing on the work of diverse grass-roots organizations in the Third World, this group, calling itself Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), proposed alternative forms of development that would alter power relationships between women and men, rather than the WID approach, which, in the view of DAWN, had sought the integration of women into existing patterns of development without weakening male dominance (Sen and Grown 1987). And then, at the 1985 NGO preparatory forum, according to Helen I. Safa (1985), “The workshop on development, which I [Safa] chaired and which was attended by almost 100 participants, rejected the notion that women have not been

\(^8\) L. Shahanthi, Secretary-General of the Nairobi conference, officially put forward the need to re-examine the meaning of “integration of women in development” at the third plenary meeting (UN 1985, paragraph 64-67).
integrated into the development process while insisting that the form and nature of their participation needs to be changed” (198). The “First World Survey on the Role of Women in Development,” which served as a background report for the Nairobi conference, summarized these criticisms of WID, emphasizing that women have always worked, but that their work was invisible, ignored, and undervalued. The problem was not lack of participation, but the invisibility of women who, “by virtue of an accident of birth, perform two-thirds of the world’s work, receive one tenth of its income and own less than one hundredth of its property” (UN 1984).

These criticisms were repeated in academic texts—including Development, Crises, and Alternative Visions published by DAWN—and buttressed by research that showed the continuing disadvantages women experienced in Third World countries. Diane Elson, in Male Bias in the Development Process (1990), argued that it was inevitable to move on from “WID” to another approach that emphasized gender relations. She asserted, “[WID] facilitates the view that ‘women’s issues can be tackled in isolation from women’s relation to men. It may even give rise to the feeling that the problem is women rather than the disadvantages women face; and that women are unreasonably asking for special treatment” (1). As she points out, in spite of the contribution of “WID” to improvement in some areas, such as employment, health care, and water provision for women, it had basic limitations that overlooked power dynamics; therefore, it would not change women’s subordination.

Other scholars pointed to additional problems and limitations in the WID approach. Barker (2000), for example, wrote, “[T]his early work participated in a discursive construction of Third World women as a passive, kindred, and oppressed
group--the resources for the economic interests of corporate capitalism and the intellectual interests of development experts” (178). Naila Kabeer (1994) identified yet another problem with the WID paradigm, noting that the majority of scholars who developed the WID paradigm lived in the North and had not been able to develop analyses suited to Third World women’s situation. She also pointed out that more accurate data, which the WID strategists insisted on, might assist in improving planning procedures, but would not bring about the radical revisions necessary to transform gender power relations.

As an alternative, the Gender and Development (GAD) approach emphasized a long-term strategy (strategic gender interests) for women’s liberation instead of short-term tactics (practical gender interests) for improving women’s material situation. According to this new perspective, women’s inclusion in a nation’s development was not in and of itself enough to obtain the goal of ultimate gender equality. Rather, what was required was a change in gender norms, principles, and standards in all areas of society. In order to do this, “gender planning” and “gender analysis” were mentioned as important tools for implementation of GAD. Caroline O.N. Moser, in Gender Planning and Development (1993), asserted that gender planning as a new methodology would result in

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9 When analyzing Nicaragua’s socialist revolution, Maxine Molyneux (1985) suggested that “women’s interests” should be replaced with “gender interests,” because the term “women’s interests” suggests a false homogeneity among women whose social situations are completely different and diverse. She then divided “gender interests” into “strategic interests” and “practical interests.” Following her analysis, these terms became very popular among policymakers as well as feminists. However, some scholars such as Wieringa (1994) suggest not dividing practical and strategic interests, arguing that they are not as clearly separable as most of the use of this distinction in the literature implies. But generally, the formulation of this distinction is believed to help people think strategically about “what is required to tackle gender and development issues in a pragmatic way in the context of existing programmes and projects, without losing sight of the fundamental changes required to truly tackle gender inequalities” (Rowlands 1998).
“women’s release from subordination and emancipation” (90) through the tool of identifying gender roles and needs, based on the knowledge of feminist theories and WID/GAD debates. Catherine Overholt, Kathleen Cloud, Mary Anderson and James Austin (1991) proposed that a “gender analysis framework” be included in the entire process of project identification, design, implementation, and evaluation by assessing women’s needs, defining project objectives related to women’s needs, and identifying possible negative effects on women (18-20). The WID approach was based on the underlying rationale that development processes would proceed much better if women were fully incorporated into them, but did not question the values and goals of the development process or the paradigm of liberal economic theory (Sen and Grown 1987). In contrast, the GAD approach maintained that to focus on women in isolation was to ignore the real problem, which remained their subordinate status to men, and argued that to change norms of development processes was more significant (Kabeer 1994; Moser 1993; Barker 2000).

Debates over development process do not appear to have ended at Nairobi, however. At Beijing, criticisms of GAD addressed the difficulty of implementing “gender” theories in practice. For example, Nighat Khan, director of the Applied Socioeconomic Research Organization of Pakistan, argued “gender analysis had become a technocratic discourse, in spite of its roots in socialist feminism, dominated by researchers, policymakers, and consultants, which no longer addressed issues of power central to women’s subordination” (Baden and Goetz 1997, 39). Eudine Barriteau, presenting on a panel for DAWN, described in concrete terms how in Jamaica the shift in discourse from women to gender had resulted in shifting the focus away from women, to
“men at risk” (39). Mary K. Mayer and Elisabeth Prugl, in their introduction to *Gender Politics in Global Governance* (1999), concluded: “This shift from women to gender move[d] attention from women’s subordination to gender constructions, from the politics and choices of agents to gendered structures that passively envelop both women and men” (6).

The shift from “WID” to “GAD” may be viewed as a shift in practice parallel to the shift from “sex” to “gender” in theoretical texts. Feminist scholars first used the term “gender” instead of “sex” to escape biological determinism. Since French feminist Simone de Beauvoir (1947) wrote that women are not “born, but made” in society, feminists in academia have analyzed how societies have constructed different roles for women and men at the micro level as well as at the macro level. Even today, when feminists have come to agree that gender cannot be analyzed outside of racial, ethnic, and class hierarchies, gender remains at the core of their analyses, since the meaning and structural effects of race, ethnicity, and class are always gendered (Ferree et al. 2000).

However, the use of gender by scholars has shifted in different and diverse ways in different fields of study. In 1985, for example, Joan Scott considered a new use of “gender” by adopting a postmodernist approach to this concept. In “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” she asserted that gender is grounded in sex because bodies cannot be represented as entirely social. Thus, she rejected the traditional binary usage of sex and gender, because “gender assumes the prior existence of sexual difference.” In her view, sex is not simply “natural,” but like gender is also a conceptual

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10 “Men at risk” refers to their lower educational degree attainment. As many feminists have argued, however, this has not affected men’s higher social status.
11 Scott’s essay, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” was first presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, December 1985, and was published as a chapter in her *Gender and the Politics of History*, 1988.
Judeith Butler’s theorizing on gender as “performance” continued and extended postmodernist views. As Kath Weston (2002) argued, “according to Butler, gender is not a core identity or essence that precedes expression, but rather a social product created through the practice of relating to other people….Performativity theories work against the reification of gender by attempting to explain how the impression of substantively existing masculinities and feminities emerges from essentially nothing” (64, 40).

2. Feminism and Development Practices

a) “Empowerment”

In Kath Weston’s view, however, “gender theory,” especially as explicated by Butler, becomes ahistorical and nonpolitical. Weston suggests that to explore gender theory properly we should look at practices as well as academic discourse. What do theories of “women” and “gender” look like in actual development practices?

Changes in development practices have evolved incrementally over the past three decades. Starting in the early 1970s, a number of public agencies--of the UN (e.g., the United Nations Development Program, or UNDP) and wealthy countries (like the US’s Agency for International Development, or USAID), international agencies like the World Bank, and local governments--funded projects that showed the influence of feminist critiques of earlier so-called modernization projects. These projects, which most resembled the WID paradigm, usually emphasized girls’ and women’s education programs.  

12 There have been a number of projects from the 1970s to the present, conducted in the name of WID, focusing on girls’ education and women’s training in the Third World.
Criticism of development projects also evolved, as feminist researchers came to view these WID-style projects as too limited in their impact. Although feminists were sometimes successful in influencing public agencies to address women’s needs more broadly, more often they were not. Projects that aimed to transform relationships of power between women and men were more likely to be privately funded. For example, one private agency, the New York-based Population Council, whose programs were intended to encourage family planning, began to funnel money only to those governments who would also include attention to health and other social welfare issues in their projects.\(^{13}\) But more and more frequently, Third World women themselves formed their own NGOs, drew up proposals for development, and obtained funding from either private foundations (like the Ford or the Rockefeller foundations) or progressive governments like Denmark. At the 1995 Beijing conference, these Third World NGOs were discussed using the term “empowerment.”\(^{14}\)

The term “empowerment” does not, however, map well onto the feminist GAD paradigm or even academic gender theory. In so far as “empowerment” is used to describe projects designed by Third World policymakers and researchers, “empowerment” would seem to exemplify the ideals of a group like DAWN that indeed

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See the list and summaries of WID programs at the homepage of UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP): http://www.unescap.org/wid/04widresources/database/.

\(^{13}\) I thank Lynn Bolles for providing me with this example.

\(^{14}\) Empowerment projects have usually been conducted with NGOs’ participation based on diverse funding and donors. See, for examples, “Empowerment Project for Women in the Gaza Strip” (http://www.novartisfoundation.com/social_development/women_empowerment_gza.htm), the “US-Nicaragua Women’s Empowerment Project” (http://www.wccnica.org/women.html) and the “Women’s Empowerment and Socioeconomic Development Project in Tajikistan” (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/B-SPAN/tajikistan_empowerment/tajikistan_slides.ppt).
used “GAD” to characterize their approach. But in many ways, “empowerment” -- encouraging separate women’s enterprisers-- maps most closely onto the politics developed by radical feminists in the late 1970s-1980s. Certainly this was true of the kinds of projects these Third World women began to implement—those that funded poor women themselves in ways that could provide them the tools and means to become self-sustaining (Afshar 1998; Osmani 1998). Marilee Karl (1995) called this “entrepreneurial self-reliance” (108) and pointed to projects such as Grameen Bank as examples. Nazneen Kanji (2003) also added the Self Employment Women’s Association in India as “one of the best examples” (5).

However, “empowerment” does not necessarily belong to a specific perspective; rather different communities of practice use and emphasize this term in the same and different ways. In this respect, “empowerment” is also a “boundary object.” Marilee Karl (1995) identified two “empowerment” approaches: one is “through economic interventions” to increase women’s economic status through employment, income generation and access to credit; the other is “through awareness building, capacity building, and organizing women” (109). Jo Rowlands (1998) points out that this word is used by people representing a wide range of political and philosophical perspectives, from the World Bank to feminists. She asserts that “empowerment” can be used in

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15 Nazneen Kanji (2003) connected the empowerment approach with the voice from the South: “The empowerment approach was influenced by anti-colonial struggles, with theoretical roots in neo-Marxism and dependence theory” (4-5).
16 An excellent example of radical feminist theory that explores women’s empowerment would be Adrienne Rich’s *Of Women Born* (1977).
17 Grameen Bank has provided credits, without requiring any collateral, to the very poorest in rural Bangladesh, and had 2.4 million borrowers in 2002, 95 percent of whom were women (http://www.grameen-info.org/index.html).
18 There is another example of how this term is used: in the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Gender Empowerment
different ways, corresponding to how one understands the concept of power. One example would be a “power-over” view of power, where one person, or group of people, controls the actions or options of another, suggesting that women should fight men in order to attain power, or in order to reject men’s power. However, Hartsock (1983) offered a quite different concept of power, in which power is “energy and competence rather than dominance” (224). According to Hartsock’s approach, the important question is who empowers whom, not who dominates whom. In this respect, the DAWN statement is an example of an “empowerment approach” because it represents Third World women’s perspectives. DAWN also calls for the “empowerment” of individual women by stressing the value of participatory democracy as a process (Sen and Grown 1987, 89).

b) “Gender Mainstreaming”

In feminist development practice, “empowerment” approaches were only one of the strategies feminists came to advocate in their ongoing critique of projects they considered ineffective in practice. They also advocated “gender mainstreaming”—a strategy that would seem to be closer to Scott’s use of “gender,” because this strategy addressed

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19 In *Money, Sex, and Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism*, Hartsock examined three feminist scholars, Hannah Arendt, Dorothy Emmet, and Hanna Pitkin regarding questions of power, identified their commonality, and called it “the feminist theory of power” (224). Arendt linked power with community; as a result, power was viewed as “ability,” “potentiality,” and “empowerment” in community. Emmet argued against the concept of power as domination. Pitkin, relying on Arendt and Emmet, had put forward “power to” by arguing against “power over,” in which power was thought of as a “capacity to do something alone for community.
women’s incorporation into the machinery of the nation-state. Although this strategy still encouraged the setting up of a separate bureaucracy, the purpose of this agency would be to transform gender relations broadly in all aspects of society.\(^{20}\) Anne Marie Goetz (1998) viewed gender mainstreaming as the strategy for “institutionalizing GAD concerns in the state” (42), and particularly noted the importance of mainstreaming an “agenda across other government departments” (62).

The trend towards gender mainstreaming seems to have both positive and negative possibilities at the same time. On the one hand, a gender mainstreaming strategy can contribute to reframing national and international administrative and legislative bodies by forcing them to recognize the importance of gender factors. On the other hand, it assumes that a government unit will actually implement policies aimed at undermining patriarchy—a dubious assumption at best. Thus “gender mainstreaming” could lose its politically radical aspect. Just as Weston warned that “gender” theory is apolitical, similarly, “gender mainstreaming” in practice, with its suggestion of “neutrality,” is potentially a disappointing strategy for those who expect women’s liberation from its implementation.

One should also note that, in practice, “WID” never really disappeared, but rather still continued to be used in the official documents produced by governments and some international institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Tinker (1990) believes this may be because the meanings of WID had proved useful. For example, in order to overcome bureaucratic resistance at a practical level, proponents of the WID approach have successfully argued that

\(^{20}\) The advocates of “gender mainstreaming” tend to prefer “sectoral and technical departments” within other institutions to “small and under-funded women’s units.” See Baden and Goetz (1997).
development projects would be more likely to succeed if women were an integral part of both design and implementation. As Caroline Moser (1993) has noted, the distinction between WID and GAD today is not so clear as once thought.

B. From Difference to Solidarity

1. What Are “Women’s Interests”?

Since women’s economic and social situations are different in every country, women’s points of view are naturally not homogeneous. If so, how can women become “citizen-subjects” for a new global terrain that can unite them with similarly positioned citizen-subjects within and across national borders into a new post-Western-empire alliance (Sandoval 2002)? Is it possible to escape from the pitfall of either universalism or cultural relativism through conferences bringing women from all over the globe together (Ahmed 2000)?

There were a lot of inevitable differences and implicit or explicit conflicts among delegates from different countries and regions at these conferences. For example, generally, the communist countries were said to emphasize women’s role for achieving “peace.” Countries of the Third World tended to pursue “development.” The U.S. and European countries were likely to express their interests by emphasizing the goal of “equality” (Jaquette 1994, 48-49; also see Bunch 2001, 134-135; Moghadam 1996; Chow 1996). Hanna Papanek (1975) tells us a very vivid story by revealing the conflict between Western and Third World delegations at the Mexico City conference:

It was important to learn that the bitter resentment of Latin American women against the United States did not exclude those of us from the United States just because we were women. A woman from the United States stood at the floor mike to ask, “Have I been put down by the men in my country for fifty-two years only to be put down again here by
all of you?” The reply, if there is one, came a little later from a Japanese woman who asked, “What are we women from the industrial countries doing to fulfill our responsibilities to women elsewhere? How many of us are speaking out to our own governments about the things with which we do not agree and which our governments are doing? (217)

The conflict between East and West and between South and North was especially harsh at the second conference in Copenhagen, where the Israeli-Palestinian crisis erupted at the conference with the question of including the equation of Zionism and racism in the final document.21

Conflicts and disagreements seem to have centered on what constituted a “women’s issue.” At both Mexico City and Copenhagen, Western delegations largely viewed women’s low status as a consequence of legal discrimination, while Third World and communist country delegates faulted international economic exploitation and colonialism. Western government delegates were suspicious of the South’s “structural agenda,” which they viewed as diversionary and as “politicizing” the conferences.22 On the other hand, feminists from the South, in addition to a few Western feminists, rejected the view that these “political” issues were not “women’s issues.” They argued that global problems are always interrelated (Jaquette 1995, 48; also see Cagatay, Grown and 21 Ultimately, four countries--the United States, Canada, Australia, and Israel--voted against the Program of Action in which Zionism was defined as racism; other Western delegations abstained. The U.S. press labeled it a diplomatic defeat, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) declared it a “victory.” U.S. official analysis stated that the United States should have been better led and prepared, and that the conference secretariat was not a neutral arbiter in the conflicts between the United States, Israel, and the Western bloc, on the one side, and the developing countries and the Eastern European bloc on the other. Some accounts describe the international women’s movement as “immature,” unable to hold on to its own agenda, and claimed that the conference was “politicized” by men’s interests (Jaquette 1995).

22 “Politics” here refers to international politics among nation-states and not the broader definition of politics as any and all relationships of power more common among today’s feminists.
Ronald D. Branch, in *Black Women at the United Nations*, edited by Hanes Walton Jr. (1995), wrote about the roles of U.S. official delegates whose progressive political views were in conflict with American policies fashioned by the State Department, arguing that “delegates are not expected to act as robots” (13), even though the official delegates have a responsibility, after all, to follow their countries’ instructions and reflect the position of the current administration. Thus, the possibility of “diplomatic protest” always existed (usually based on the grounds that the act or policy in question violates either international law or what is asserted to be universally accepted morality [Walton 1995, D’Amico 1999]). Just as African American delegates were more sensitive to the policies related to African countries’ independence, most female delegates were likely to support women’s issues. At the Copenhagen conference, there were several attempts to practice “diplomatic protest”; for example, when U.S. African American women representing various NGOs held a press conference to present a draft resolution that condemned racism and defined it in more broad terms than apartheid, women of color on the official U.S. delegation immediately supported it, overcoming the State Department’s hesitations, and introduced an anti-racism resolution in the official committee meeting (US Delegation Report 118-19, in Jaquette 1995, 53). In this respect, the 1980 conference at Copenhagen “test[ed] the strength and unity of the international women’s movement and its ability to accommodate differences” (Winslow 1995, 180).

In time, however, feminists from each bloc came to develop a greater understanding of one another, and to learn how to negotiate with one another, and were able to produce a transnational consensus. In order to determine how women situated
themselves to make an alliance in spite of great differences, we need to follow their shift in consciousness. After the Copenhagen conference, some participants were “skeptical about the usefulness of such future world gatherings”⁴³ (Cagatay et al. 1986, 402); but the atmosphere at the next conference held in Nairobi, in 1985, was very different from that of Copenhagen. Cagatay, Grown and Santiago (1986) pointed to the different situations between Copenhagen and Nairobi and hypothesized that the fact that the conference was held in Africa where so many Western feminists could come to understand Third World women’s situations was significant. Also, the world economic crisis and the accompanying ideological movement toward conservatism and religious fundamentalism between 1980 and 1985 may have reinforced the commonality of women’s experience with gender subordination across these blocs. And Moghadam (1996), in tracing the debates at the Beijing conference, noted that by 1995 the significant confrontation ceased to be between feminists from South and North, or East and West, but had shifted instead to that of a feminist and progressive worldview vs. a conservative or religious fundamentalist worldview. The UN CD-Rom, Women Go Global, summarizes the atmosphere at Beijing thus: “The differences once experienced as irreconcilable were bridged as women perceived their common interests across previously ideological divides” (UN 2002).

It is useful to note here the role of Western women of color and Third World women in building a transnational alliance. I have already mentioned what African American women did at the Copenhagen conference in negotiating an acceptable compromise on an antiracism statement. At each of the subsequent UN conferences,

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⁴³ For a skeptical point of view on the Copenhagen conference, see Irene Tinker, “A Feminist View of Copenhagen,” Signs Vol. 6 (Spring 1981): 531-35.
they continued to build networks between South and North, and between governmental and non-governmental organizations, and drafted resolutions to recommend for additions to the official documents. Mallika Dutt (1996), reflecting on the Beijing conference through the lens of a U.S. woman of color, spoke of her recognition that women of color were not exempt from being perceived as Americans. She concluded by criticizing the tendency of women of color to organize solely within their own communities: “Although women of color must focus on their own ethnic communities in order to build strong bases for political action, it is also critical that they begin to provide much-needed national leadership that crosses ethnic and identity lines. [Otherwise] they perpetuate the problem of white women being perceived as national leaders while women of color are seen only as speaking for their own particular ethnicity or concern.” Both Esther Ngan-ling Chow and Amrita Basu pointed out that at Beijing U.S. women of color did in fact take the leadership role Dutt called for: “Forging a unique coalition, they held a series of caucus meetings demonstrating a great sense of camaraderie and validation of each other as equals and a desire to work toward unity and solidarity” (Chow 1996, 189). And from Basu: “One important explanation for the diminution of tension between women’s movements in the North and South [was] the increasingly important influence of women of color in shaping debates about feminism in the United States” (79). Third World women also played a significant role. One example was DAWN, which included development researchers, policymakers, and activists from both North and South but with leadership from southern feminists (Bunch 2001, 135). From a small group coming together for the first time in 1984, this group became the model of transnational activism beyond the division between South and North.
2. Women’s Rights as Human Rights

Successful negotiation among South/North and East/West feminists is perhaps most visible in the “women’s rights are human rights” campaign leading up to, and at, the Beijing conference. The impetus seems to have been feminist transnational networking in preparation for the UN Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna in 1993.

Understanding that this conference would be an occasion for reinterpreting and broadening the scope of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in the United Nations in 1948), feminists were spurred to have women’s interests included. Thus, Women’s Human Rights was a global campaign from the start (Bunch 2001; Dauer 2001). In Vienna, a loose coalition of groups\textsuperscript{24} and individuals were successful in having these words included in the Declaration and Program of Action: “The human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral, and indivisible part of universal human rights” (UN 1993, paragraph 18).

It may not be clear immediately what was new about this statement, since the 1945 United Nations Charter had already recognized “human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion” (my emphasis). But the 1945 definition of “universal” human rights was the narrow view inherited from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophy. Not only were social and economic justice issues excluded, but so too were issues viewed as particular to women, such as violence against women (rape, battery, murder, female genital mutilation, or trafficking). And even though these issues had been on the feminist agenda for more than twenty years, the Vienna conference opened up the possibility of including these issues in an expanded definition of

\textsuperscript{24} The Global Campaign for Women’s Human Rights was organized to prepare and influence the Vienna conference; they organized the Vienna Tribunal for Women’s Human Rights, in which thirty-three women testified about their personal experiences of violence and had their testimonies judged by a distinguished panel (Dauer 2001, 68).
human rights guaranteed by the United Nations. An international coalition of feminists had not only formed to press for this at Vienna, but in circular fashion, these issues then came under the protection of the global community of nations.

The solidarity of feminists was only strengthened by the worldwide resurgence of religious fundamentalism. This was all too evident at the Beijing conference where the significant South/North or East/West divisions separating women gave way to a progressive feminist vs. conservative religious division—both of which were global in reach. The conservatives were a coalition of Muslim and Catholic states, including (and likely the directing force) the Vatican as an observer state. Their common ground was their views on family, motherhood, religion, and women as “bearers of tradition” or “carriers of the cultural purity of their particular group” (Bunch 2001, 134; Desai 2002). Moghadam (1996) summarized the atmosphere of the Beijing conference: “The Muslim-Catholic coalition, and the decision of some Muslim countries not to be part of it, seems to suggest at least two things. One is that notions of a Western-Islamic civilizational clash are exaggerated, for there is considerable consensus among Muslims, Catholics, Protestant fundamentalists, and right-wing nonfundamentalist Americans over religion, family, and sexuality. The real contention globally is between a conservative view (some would call it patriarchal) and a liberal view (some would call it libertarian) on these matters” (80).

The clashes between progressives (and feminists) and conservatives (and religious fundamentalists) came on the debates over the use of the terms gender, sexual orientation, and women’s unremunerated work. Some of these were resolved in the process of negotiation. Feminists failed, however, to have the term “sexual orientation” included.

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25 When failing to prevent the inclusion of the term gender in the final version of the Platform for Action, the Vatican noted in its final statement to the conference that its
under the umbrella of human rights despite lesbian groups’ enthusiastic lobby. Violence against women such as murder (e.g., “honor” or “shame” killing), battery and rape, which had long occurred in both private and public areas without appropriate punishment, gained a new official status as human rights violations. Bunch (2001) pointed out that women’s claims became more indisputable by defining these kinds of violence as human rights violations. There was acclaim from women all around the world celebrating women’s solidarity and praising women’s human rights; the remarks of former first lady of the U.S., Hillary R. Clinton are an example: “We also recognized that women will never gain full dignity until their human rights are respected and protected. Our goals for this conference, to strengthen families and societies by empowering women to take greater control over their own destinies, cannot be fully achieved unless all governments accept their responsibility to protect and promote internationally recognized human rights” (Clinton 1995).

Why did feminists resurrect human rights concepts for their struggles against diverse forms of violence against women? The human rights concept has a long history dating back to the natural law theories of the seventeenth century in Western society, which treat rights as inherent. According to European liberal ideology, the polity is divided into family, civil society, and state, with the family sphere perceived as natural. Because the public and private dichotomy of liberalism assumes that the rights bearer is the head of the family (i.e.,

26. As Palesa Beverley Ditsie (1996), on behalf of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, argued: “the term ‘sexual orientation’ is currently in brackets. If these words are omitted from the relevant paragraphs, the Platform for Action will stand as one more symbol of the discrimination that lesbians face and of the lack of recognition of our very existence” (106).

27. At the Beijing+5 conference in 2000, “honor killing” was renamed “shame killing” by the UN general head, Kofi Anan (UN 2000).
the one who represents the family in civil society and the state), concepts of rights focus on protecting “his” natural rights in the family from “government” as a potential violator, rather than raising “her” rights not to be abused by “him” (Okin 2000). Women, who belong to the family but are excluded from civil society and state, as was the case prior to the twentieth century, do not therefore have protected rights.

Concepts of human rights, however, are not static. Feminists have successfully challenged the perception that family, civil society, and the state are separated and nearly everywhere have legitimated women’s participation in civil society and the state. It is for this reason that feminists have felt emboldened to challenge violations taking place in the name of cultures, religions and national sovereignty, basing their claims on women’s human rights.

In feminist practice, as Bunch and Fried (1996) have pointed out, “[Women’s human rights claims] represent a shift in analysis that moves beyond single-issue politics or identity-based organizing and enhances women’s capacity to build global alliances based on collective political goals and a common agenda.” However, claims based on women’s human rights are not without risk to the larger feminist agenda. Because the claim of women’s human rights seemingly presumes women’s commonality all around the world, some feminists expressed concern that this rights-based politics will lead us to ignore the diverse and different situations between South and North or between developed and developing countries. For example, Inderpal Grewal (1998) points out, “the struggle to keep various kinds of differences alive in the women’s human rights arena is a difficult one” (507). Sunila Abeysekera (2003) also calls for caution concerning the negative effects of rights-based movements; it is her concern, however,
that the women’s human rights movement is likely to focus just on the area of violence against women, while ignoring other issues stemming from unequal social and economic relationships. We need to keep these risks in mind for the concept of women’s human rights to have a positive effect in creating solidarity among women’s movements.
III. Think Globally, Act Locally

A. Transnational Feminism

We are now living in a period when the flows of capital and labor, in addition to
migration, electronic communication, and international finance have led, seemingly
inevitably, to what we call “globalization.” Several feminist researchers in International
Relations and Economics have examined the “gendered effects” 28 of the globalization
process. For Aslanbeigui, Pressman and Summerfield, globalization has had a negative
effect. In the introduction to the book they edited, *Women in the Age of Economic
Transformation* (1994), which presents the results of research conducted in twelve
countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, they write: “Women’s relative losses
have been manifested in different ways, but in every country examined in this volume,
economic transformation has led to fewer gains or greater losses for women” (2). In
spite of the gloomy fact that women are being reconstructed as low-wage workers in the
global economic system, however, there seems to be an opposite facet; the access to
wages and salaries, the “growing feminization of the job supply,” and “the growing
feminization of business opportunities” have brought about an alteration in gender

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28 “Gendered effects” here refers to the phenomenon that economic development,
especially globalization, has different effects on women and men. Gita Sen (1999)
mentions, “Gender-biased or ‘gendered’ labor markets, as we call them, are not only a
problem for women workers. They also trap economies on the so-called low road of
labour-intensive growth, making it difficult to garner the full fruits of growth, or to
ensure its sustainability.” The Official Report of the year 2000 Beijing+5 conference
affirms also, in a “gender impact” section that the globalization process has had a
negative impact on women in developed countries as well as the developing countries
themselves (paragraph 35).

29 Sunwook Kim, in “Globalization and Women’s Policy in Korea (2000)” also comes to
this conclusion in her discussion of Korea and globalization: “[T]he positive affects of
globalization have yet to appear, and the negative influences have been experienced more
greatly” (60).
hierarchies within the family as well as in work places and society (Moghadam 2000; Sassen 1998).

Parallel to globalization, moreover, a cross-cultural consciousness in the name of transnationalism has emerged beyond nation-state and regional boundaries. Saadawi (2000), comparing globalization with transnationalism in a very political way, writes: “The neocolonial capitalist powers try to globalize from above, economically. They try to break the boundaries between countries, so that capital flow and benefit accrues to their property…. [T]ransnationalism, to me, is used by people who struggle against globalization. It’s more or less globalization from below” (15, 14). We should remember, however, that the new global consciousness is not confined only to progressive transnational struggle against the negative effects of economic globalization; religious fundamentalists and cultural conservatives have also developed international coalitions in the name of protecting so-called “family values” from the feminist challenge, as we saw at the Beijing conference.

“Global feminism” or “transnational feminism” has emerged as part of the new consciousness in the name of a transnational women’s movement. However, there seems to be a suspicion that the transnational trend can ignore local needs and impose a new kind of authority on the Third World. For example, Grewal (1998) sets forth this rather harsh critique: “[G]lobal feminism…is the hegemony of First World women’s groups to affect women’s lives and women’s groups worldwide by their interests and their policies” (518). I think this concern is likely to miss how the global and local are interconnected to each other. One of the distinctions of this process of globalization and transnational consciousness is that the boundary between the global and local seems to
have blurred. Transnational consciousness as well as capital flows can be viewed as homogenizing people’s lives, but at the same time, “local” cultural particularities still exist and, in fact, are even sometimes emphasized and reinforced. Thus, as Bunch (2001) suggested, seeing “global” in opposition to the “local” is “one of those false dualisms that we must transcend” (131-132). Basu (2000) identified another problematic dualism, challenging critics who imply that “global” means North and “local” means South. We need to understand “thinking globally, acting locally” as “what happens ‘here’ affects what can be thought and done ‘there,’ and vice versa” (Narayan and Harding 2000, vii). “Global and local’ do not imply different locations; rather, it implies multiplicity of consciousness by emphasizing how “we” (the local) are always interconnected with “them” (the global).

As a result, if transnational movements and organizations are inevitable trends, we should ask how to re-organize women’s tasks under this circumstance. What is at stake in order to “think globally” and what we should do to “act locally”? How should we evaluate the processes and results of these global conferences on women? International UN conferences not only have contributed to building this new cross-cultural consciousness, but transnational feminism also has had a positive effect on the international conferences. In Nairobi, a “great diversity of views generated a wealth of information on ways in which women’s struggles are carried out within different contexts” (Cagatay et al. 1985), and in Beijing, women gained “a great degree of unity in diversity among women from the South and the North as they articulate[d] their common

30 This slogan came from the environmental movement. The phrase was originated by Rene Dubos, an advisor to the UN Conference on Human Environment, in 1972. He intended to convey his conviction that all environmental problems had global aspects, but different local situations should also be considered (Eblen and Eblen 1994, 702).
concern” (Chow 1996) through their campaign for “women’s human rights,” and their confrontation with a new conservative coalition.

The expansion of the number and extension of the role of NGOs is one of the phenomena resulting from transnationalism. The CSW has held international forums of NGOs parallel with the governmental conferences since the first conference. The purpose of an NGO Forum was not confined only to influencing individual governments, but also to participating in the international norm-making process as an active agent. However, there seems to be the potential for harm from this transnational NGO trend: “In some respects, the growth of transnational women’s movements has clearly exacerbated divisions within the women’s movement. Although global networks are often formed across North-South lines, they are quite good at facilitating links between those groups that have the resources and ability to attend international conferences, to join international networks, and to hook into new forms of technology…. And in the process, of course, this exacerbates class divisions between the global [sic] middle classes and the poor. Transnational social movements come to rely more heavily on elites who possess globally marketable skills” (Basu 2003). Regarding this concern, however, Moghadam (2000) expressed a relatively positive perspective: “Many feminist organizations are middle-class and often elite, but class lines are increasingly blurred as women professionals and women proletarians find common cause around personal, economic, and social issues…” (153). Therefore, we need to find a balance between two different perspectives: how to accelerate NGOs’ activities in connecting grassroots movements with global concerns, and how to overcome the potential danger of NGOs’ new class division, if we are to successfully build global movements on behalf of all women.
B. The Korean Government Responds

Korean participation in the UN world conferences, along with the globalization of capital and labor and the parallel transnational shift of consciousness, has had a significant impact on Korean society. On the one hand, a number of positive changes, such as the establishment of national machineries and new laws and regulations for women have appeared during this period. Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and almost all resolutions on women passed in the UN General Assembly were ratified. On the other hand, Korean women’s lives and status do not seem to have improved very much. According to the Gender Equality Measure (GEM) of the UNDP, Korean women’s gender status, compared with other countries, still looks problematic, and women’s labor force participation has not advanced to the level of other developed countries. Thus, this appears to be an urgent moment for the Korean women’s movement to examine its current situation and reconsider its tasks for the future.

The most noticeable result of Korea’s participation in the UN conferences was the establishment of national machineries on women’s affairs. The Plan for Action in 1975 suggested establishing “interdisciplinary and multisetoral machinery within government such as national commissions, women’s bureaus and other bodies…for accelerating the achievement of equal opportunity for women and their full integration in

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Even before national machinery on women was established, Women’s Studies lectures were offered at Ewha Womans’ University (1977). This is said to be one of the impacts of the Mexico City conference (Mi-kyung Lee 1999).
national life” (paragraph 34). This suggestion was detailed in the Copenhagen conference Program of Action:

Where it does not exist, national machinery should be established and should systematically review its objectives and methodology in the light of the experience acquired…. (Paragraph 42)

And again:

Effective institutional links between national machinery and national planning units as well as national women’s organizations, should be established…. (Paragraph 43)

Following these recommendations, women’s groups called for the establishment of Korean national machinery to develop women's policies. The government complied by establishing two units in the same year, 1983: The Korean Women's Development Institute (KWDI) and the National Committee on Women’s Policies (Yeoseong Jeongchaek Simui Wiweonhoe) under the Office of the Prime Minister. In addition, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination on Women (CEDAW) was ratified the next year.  

This process could be viewed as implementing a WID approach, since before establishing KWDI, and the National Committee on Women’s Policies, women’s affairs had been dealt with in the department of the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) as a part of national welfare policy, where it was invisible. Only after the Copenhagen conference, when KWDI and the Committee were established, did promoting the status of women became national policy (Hyun Ja Kim, 1985; Byun 1998; Sun-uk Kim and Deuk-Kyoung Yoon 1996). However, KWDI was a research institute rather than an

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32 At the Copenhagen conference in 1980, sixty countries signed the CEDAW. In Korea, Hyun Ja Kim, a female legislator, raised a question about the government’s official stance on ratifying CEDAW at the foreign policy session of Gukhoe (the Korean national legislative body) in 1982. Following this debate, CEDAW was ratified in 1984 (Shin 1994; Yeong-jeong Kim 1994).
administrative body in the government system, limited to collecting data and advising the
government on how women could be integrated into the national development process;
and the National Committee on Women’s Policies was really only a series of meetings
and also not a government unit. After the Nairobi conference, however, national
machinery was established in the Ministry of Political Affairs II (MPA II). This was in
1988, one year after the June Democratic Revolution toppling the almost-threethree-decade-
long military dictatorship, which also enhanced the possibilities for a national policy
towards greater gender equality.

The difference that this made was greater than may seem at first glance. In the
policies of MHW, women had been viewed as passive recipients of financial assistance,
because MHW’s policies were focused on supporting so-called alienated women such as
poor single mothers and prostitutes who needed social welfare assistance (Hae-suk Lee
2003; Min 2003). In contrast, MPA II adopted a gender perspective intended to
empower women in all aspects of politics and society. According to the new
Government Organization Principle, MPA II gathered together all the information related
to women produced in other ministries and then reviewed them in order to implement its
own women’s policy. And even though MPA II lacked the power to interfere directly
with other ministries’ policies, it could, and did, mediate and coordinate other ministries’
policies regarding women’s affairs through the interministerial committee.

Also following the re-instatement of democracy, many women-related laws were
revised in line with proposals issuing from the Nairobi conference. A women’s section
was included in “The National Long-Term Development Plan toward the Year 2000” in
1986; “The Mother and Child Health Act” was revised in the same year; and “Guidelines
to Eliminate Gender Discrimination” were provided in 1987. Furthermore, in 1987, an article on gender equality in marriage and family life was inserted into the constitutional revision and an “Equal Employment Opportunity Act” was passed. After the Beijing conference, progress further accelerated: in 1995, the “Framework Act on Women’s Development” was established, which acts as the basic and inclusive law on Korean women’s rights. Article One is explicit in stating its purpose:

To promote the equality between men and women in all the areas of politics, economy, society and culture by stipulating fundamental rules with regard to the obligation, etc, of the State and local governments for realization of equality between men and women under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea.

In 1997, the Act to Prevent Sexual Violence was revised, and the Act to Prevent Family Violence was passed. Most recently, in 2000, the Prevention of Gender Discrimination and Sexual Harassment Law, intended to provide women with better working conditions, was passed. Such a series of events shows clearly the impact of the UN conferences on improving policies concerning women in Korea. Especially after the Beijing conference, in 1995, the Committee to Pursue Globalization formulated the “Ten Tasks for Women's Social Participation,” opening up the possibility of affirmative action when screening government officials and for government committees.

In 1998, the MPA II was replaced with the Presidential Commission on Women’s Affairs (PCWA) in keeping with the new president Kim Dae Jung’s campaign pledge. Within the ongoing and heated debates on a proper government organization for women’s empowerment, PCWI was a new option; instead of an independent ministry, PCWI,

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33 This was not a quota system, but only an “additional point system.” Regarding this, Eun-hee Chi (1996) complains, “The idea of a quota system is based on gender equality while that of additional points is based on providing advantage to an inferior gender.” The affirmative action suggested in “Ten Tasks for Women’s Social Participation” triggered a debate on the need for special measures to improve women’s status.
under the immediate direction of the president, was authorized to coordinate other ministries’ administrative measures. Alongside PCWA, women’s branches were established in six ministries (Justice, Administration, Education, Health and Welfare, Labor, and Agriculture and Forestry). Thus, the PCWA was able to intervene in other ministries more efficiently. But this did not satisfy feminists’ demands. Although the PCWA is believed to have launched women’s policy on a full scale (Kyung-Hee Kim 2003), women’s groups continued to insist on the establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs instead of PCWA (Chi 1996; Sun-uk Kim and Deuk-Kyoung Yoon 1996), the main difference being that a ministry can compile its own budget and propose bills. (The PCWA, as a commission, could not.) In 2001, the PCWA was finally replaced with the Ministry of Gender Equality (MOGE). MOGE further expanded the scope of women’s policy by addressing violence against women, child-bearing and caring, and women’s job-training programs. Additionally, in 2003, MOGE established the Korean Institute for Gender Equality Promotion and Education (GEPE) to provide “the models for gender equality education and gender sensitivity policy analysis training…focusing on public office holders” (GEPE 2003).

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34 This is the name used in English. A word-for-word translation of the Korean name is Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Both names are official. In my personal memory, there were serious debates about choosing between “women” and “gender” when naming the ministry that would replace the PCWA. Some argued that internationally the term “gender” was more appropriate than “women,” but others worried that women would once again be marginalized if the term “gender” was used. So finally, the Ministry of Gender Equality came to have two names; “gender” for use internationally and “women” for Korean use.
C. Korean Women Today

Sixteen years after the establishment of the first national machinery, can we evaluate the results? What is women’s status in Korea today? Clearly, the Korean government has achieved some important and impressive progress in the area of women’s rights. As we considered above, women’s national machineries, as well as the expansion of focal points including women’s branches in other ministries, have been developed and a number of laws and regulations aimed at women’s empowerment have been established or revised.\(^\text{35}\) Affirmative action for female applicants for government positions has been in place since 1995; sexual segregation or prohibition against women in some areas such as the military academies and police recruitment have been abolished.\(^\text{36}\) Alongside these kinds of governmental measures, diverse social indicators also show rapid change and improvement in Korean women’s lives during this period: the ratio of girls’ entrance to college and university changed dramatically from 25.3 percent in 1970 to 72.1 percent in 2002—a figure that is almost the same as boys’ (75.1 percent); the average life expectancy of women rose from 66.7 years to 80.0; and the percentage of female employees to total female workers (i.e. not including family-owned farm women, shop keepers, etc.) from 28.6 to 63.5 during the same period (National Statistical Office 2003).

At the same time, Korea is setting a new world record in its declining reproduction

\(^{35}\) The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women evaluated highly the establishment of Korea’s national machinery and the new laws mentioned above at the third and fourth deliberative council in 1998 (PCWA 1998). This Committee has authority to review each country’s national report submitted every four years based on the eighteenth paragraph of CEDAW.

\(^{36}\) Male and female separate recruiting of police and firefighters was abolished in 1989, and as a result, the female ratio was improved in that area. Military academies had prohibited female students from entering until 1997. Interestingly, in spite of conservative people’s concerns, the ice-breaking entering students’ scholastic attainments were excellent and one of them graduated as a first-honored grade.
rate and increasing divorce rate. In 2002, the Korean reproduction rate was 1.16, the very lowest in the world; the divorce rate was 3.0 (3 cases among 1,000 people), ranking second highest in the world. Whether these rates are to be considered positive or negative, there can be no doubt that they signal the collapse of Korea’s “traditional” family structure. Some national policymakers have connected this situation with women’s increasing labor participation rate: from 37.0 percent in 1963, 39.3 percent in 1970, 42.8 percent in 1980, to 49.8 percent in 1997. However, in 1997, the Korean female labor market participation rate stopped increasing, and in 1998 and 1999, even declined to 47.1 percent and 47.6 percent, before rising again to 49.7 percent in 2002. The decline in 1998 and 1999 may have been due to the Korean monetary crisis and subsequent economic “structural adjustment” policies required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF); male participation rates also dropped in these years and the overall unemployment rate was higher than for other years: 7.0 percent in 1998, 6.3 percent in 1999, compared to 3.1 percent in 2002 (NSO 2003-a, b).

Although the increase in women’s labor force participation rates is impressive, these figures still lag considerably behind the rates for men: 74.8 percent versus 49.7 percent (2002). According to a 2003 Opinion Survey, 38.3 percent named “the burden of child care” the primary obstruction to female employment; 22.8 percent named “social prejudice”; 12.4 percent named “unequal working conditions”; 8.9 percent named

37 Correctly speaking, this rank is among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, but can be interpreted as “in the world,” because OECD countries generally have the highest divorce rates in the world. According to Korean National Statistical Office’s 2002 report, the U.S. is ranked first at 4.0, with Britain and Australia following Korea at 2.6. (National Statistical Office [NSO] 2003-c).
38 It is a typically conservative point of view to connect women’s participation in the paid workforce with a so-called family crisis; one example would be the debate over whether women’s paid work results in “children’s behavior problems” (Cooksey et al. 1997).
“burden of housework”; 6.3 percent named “lack of responsibility”; 2.3 percent named “lack of ability” (NSO 2003-d).

The change in family structure should not be explained simply as the result of the increasing number of women in the paid labor force. In fact, according to the Engelhardt and Prskawelz's demographic analysis of OECD member countries for a 30-year period (2002), reproductive rates and female labor participation (FLP) rates do not necessarily correlate as might be expected (i.e., an increasing FLP along with declining fertility). Their example is the comparison between Sweden, the country with the highest FLP rate and Italy, the lowest among the OECD countries. As shown in figure 1, although Italy's female labor participation rate is low, Italy's reproduction rate is also low (47 percent FLP and 1.2 per 1,000 total fertility rate [TFR] in 1995); in contrast, in Sweden, where the FLP rate is high, the reproduction rate is significantly higher than Italy's (78 percent FLP rate and 1.75 TFR in 1995). The correlation for other countries is similar. The correlation for other countries is similar. Moreover, according to the 2002

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Figure 1: Total fertility rate (TFR) and female labor force participation (FLP) rate in Italy and Sweden, in 1965 and 1995 (Engelhardt and Prskawelz 2002, 3).
Human Development Report of UNDP, Korea ranks sixty-first in the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) among a total sixty-six countries. GEM consists of four factors: the percentage of women in parliament; the percentage of female administrators and managers; the percentage of women among professors and technical workers; and women’s relative Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The most important reason for Korean women’s poor showing in GEM ranks seems to have resulted from the low number of women legislators. According to 2003 political statistics, women legislators at both national and regional levels is just 5.5 percent. The percentage of professional workers among female employees is 15.2 percent; high-level female government officials are just 2.7 percent, although women represent 32.9 percent of total government employees.

When compared to the Human Development Index (HDI), in which Korea ranks twenty-seventh, the GEM ranking must be viewed as very disappointing. Even though Bardhan and Klasen (1999) raised some criticisms of UNDP’s gender related indices, claiming that the GEM focuses too heavily on representation at the national political level and on the formal economy, this result can be roughly interpreted to say that Korea lags in terms of gender equality, or women’s empowerment, especially when compared to its relative progress in the human development arena (Jo 2002). In considering an agenda for the Korean women’s movement, it will be important to keep in mind the continuing lag in Korean women’s relative status in spite of the many programs established by the Korean government.

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40 HDI consists of educational degree, life expectation, Gross National Product (GNP).
D. An Agenda for Korean Women’s Empowerment

1. Gender Mainstreaming and Institutionalization

“Gender mainstreaming” is one of the most emphasized catchphrases heard from MOGE officials. It is this strategy that has extended gender concerns into the very institutions of the state. This process of gender mainstreaming or “gender institutionalization” has resulted in a new discourse concerning women and the state. Two quite different feminist perspectives have emerged. One considers the patriarchal nature of the state (Staudt 1997); the other views the state as a neutral body that can provide proper measures to improve women’s status (Hae-suk Lee 2003). While the former perspective is found in British and U.S studies, the latter, according to Kyung-hee Kim, is the perspective held by feminists in northern European welfare states. Kyung-hee Kim (2003) identifies as one of the most important characteristics of the Korean women’s movement that many women’s activists and feminist researchers have served in government and/or political parties. As a result, the relationships between academics, government policy makers, and feminist activists are quite close and many Korean feminists have adopted the northern European perspective (Kyung-hee Kim 2003; Hae-suk Lee 2003).

To date, Korean national machinery has been most effective in employment related legislation and expanding education opportunities for girls and women, but less successful in increasing women’s political power.41 Sunwook Kim (2000) recognizes

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41 Seung-kyung Kim, in “Gender Policy and the New Status of Women in South Korea” (2003) pointed out: “The South Korean government’s gender policy has focused on three areas: Equality between women and men; expansion of women’s participation in society;
this, writing: “There is no means by which a gender egalitarianism can enter policy
design and decision making processes at the governmental level without the participation
of women in both politics and those policy process” (68). Several countries (e.g. France,
Uganda) have overcome the obstacles to women’s electability by instituting quotas or set
aside seats in municipal regional, and national legislative branches. I suggest that
MOGE undertake a study of the feasibility of a similar policy in Korea.42

2. The Role of NGOs and Grassroots Pressure

McBride Stetson and Amy Mazur (1995), on the basis of fourteen case studies of
women’s policy machinery in the developed world, warn that the usefulness of so-called
state feminism requires a balance between lobbying from moderate feminist groups and
grassroots pressure from radical feminists outside the state; societies that favor strong
state intervention; and an agency structure that promotes or requires interministerial
cooperation. We would be well-advised to consider whether these conditions exist in
Korea before placing our hopes for women’s empowerment in state feminism.

In the Korean context, the inclusion of activists and feminist researchers in the
state can be expected to contribute to progressive legislative measures and policies for
women, but only if “lobbying from moderate feminist groups and grassroots pressure
from radical feminists outside the state” is heightened. If not, the results could be the
“ghettoization of feminism” (Nam 2000). In short, becoming a “part” of the “system”

and improvement of women’s welfare. In addition to overall policy changes, women’s
legal status has been subject to gradual transformation. Related to these three areas of
focus, the government has enacted and revised various laws relevant to women” (216).

42 In “Current Issues of the MOGE (2003)” the possibility of this study has been
recognized: “the Ministry [of Gender Equality] has suggested that the Government take
affirmative actions. Specially, the government will regulate a minimum ratio of women
in several sectors: women member of Parliament (10%)…” (7).
can result in losing the capacity to stay critical of the system. Similarly, Abeysekera (2003), referring to the experiences of “women who worked closely with leftwing political parties, groups and trade unions in the 1970s,” pointed to the dilemmas of “becoming a part,” especially with regard to maintaining a gender-specific analysis of issues and even claiming equal space and opportunities within the group.

To solve this dilemma, Korean feminists need to keep in mind society as a whole, and not focus solely on governmental bodies. The successes that the Korean women’s movement has had in the area of legislation and building national machineries are impressive; but there remains the reality of a still low female labor participation rate, job segregation and stereotypes that deprecate women’s roles and confine women within the family. Oakla Cho, in a paper presented at the Modernity/Globalization and Women in East Asia Conference in 2000, emphasized that legal reforms have not been sufficient for women’s equality and called for “more vigorous cultural reform” (30, 33). National machinery can be helpful in this area, for example by examining school textbooks for their representation of negative female stereotypes. But to challenge patriarchy in culture and society, the role of women’s groups is especially important. One area that should be addressed is the lack of awareness among women themselves of the rights to, and benefits of, increased equality in the workplace and the family (See Oakla Cho, 30). Women’s groups should increase their activities to raise awareness of women’s oppression. For example, discussion of family and sexual equality would be best addressed by women’s groups. Grassroots pressure on mass media (magazines, newspapers, film, and especially television) to represent women as active in public life and in all kinds of employment could also lead to cultural reform challenging patriarchal
ideology.

In short, gender mainstreaming and institutionalization can be one of the strategies for advancing women’s status, but must be pursued along with grassroots activism and independent research if offices on women’s affairs within government agencies are to provide more than “token” victories. Reviewing the opinion survey about the obstructions of women’s paid work participation, women need realistic supports to lighten their child care burden and cultural reforms that would cast away social prejudice. To do this, we have to consider both “becoming part” and “staying outside,” if we are to empower ourselves.

3. Increasing the Role of Korean Feminists in the International Arena
From 1975, when the Korean delegation to the first UN World Conference on Women consisted of five people without including any government official, the size and official status of the Korean delegation improved rapidly. Whereas at the first conference the Korean delegation consisted of three professors, one activist, and one researcher, at the second conference, a government official, the director of the Women and Children Department in the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW), was included, although the delegation still included mostly professors (6) plus one activist (MHW 1982). But beginning with the Nairobi conference, the head of the Korean delegation has been a government official. At the Nairobi conference, the head of the Korean delegation was Hyun-Jeong Kim, the president of KWDI. After this, the ministers of MPA II, PCWA, or MOGE have been appointed heads of delegations.
In 1993, Korea became a member of United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, and in 1996, Young-jung Kim, ex-minister of the MPA II, and ex-president of the KWDI, was elected a member of the United Nations Committee to Eliminate Discrimination against Women.\(^{43}\) In the 2000 Beijing+5 Conference, the Korean delegation started to participate in JUSCANZ\(^{44}\) and then played an important role in negotiations between JUSCANZ and the G77.\(^{45}\)

In the Korean official report of its participation in the Beijing+5 conference, the debate on the family was mentioned as the main area where Korean delegates contributed to the negotiation between the two groups (PCWA 2000). This role should be continued in future international meetings. In 1995 and 2000, the core of the debate on the “family” focused on sexual orientation, because this was related to whether society accepts diverse family structures, including gay and lesbian couples’ marriages. Korean delegates can expand this debate into other areas, for example, how to provide single mothers with support, and how to value women’s invisible labor in the family.

Korean participation in NGO forums also expanded over the course of the UN conferences. In 1995, for the Beijing conference, more than seven hundred women and men participated in the Korean NGO Committee. And women’s NGOs are now participating in other international networks. The East Asian Women’s Forum is an

\(^{43}\) Based on the seventeenth paragraph of the CEDAW, it is composed of 23 experts, coming from member countries. The duration of committee service is four years. Experts screen and evaluate national reports which are about the implementation of the CEDAW, submitted by member countries every four years.

\(^{44}\) The JUSCANZ group consists of Pacific Rim countries, Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This group has close economic relationships with each other, and common interests such as the environment, immigration policy, etc.

\(^{45}\) G77 is the group of developing countries from the South and Middle East, formed at the first conference in Mexico City. It consists of 123 countries.
example. This Forum was developed at the Asia-Pacific Regional Conference in 1993 in preparation for the Beijing conference, but still continues to monitor the region’s common concerns. The East Asian Women’s Forum consists of seven countries: China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan. Bong-Scuk Sohn (1996) explains that the women from East Asia, who gathered at the Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, felt that they are largely neglected in UN conferences. She asserts that one of the main reasons for this is the language barrier. Hyun Ja Kim (1996) adds that this group share a common cultural background and similar concerns, identifying the dynamic economic progress of their countries, a tradition of Confucianism, and a common tradition of high regard for scholarship and education.

Women’s NGOs are also key players in efforts to promote Korean unification. Although there has been no war between South and North since 1953, tension and conflicts between the two are always present. Women’s participation in peace groups has been an important focus of Korean NGOs, paralleling the peace actions supported at Nairobi and Beijing and addressed in the Beijing Platform for Action in the stipulation that governments "increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels." The Platform for Action urges governments, as well as international and regional institutions, to integrate gender perspectives in the resolution of armed or other conflicts and foreign occupation. Therefore, in the Korean situation, women’s peacemaking movements should be emphasized.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Beijing Conference Report announced, “The organized women’s movement initiated in the nineteenth century has become a global force” (UN 1995, paragraph 66). In spite of the major drawback that the UN system has no mechanism to enforce its agreements, women have achieved several “declarations” that have functioned as an important ground for making claims on their governments. They also gained significant experience as global agents. Through these four conferences, the women’s movement achieved solidarity across differences, and at the same time opened up the possibility that the transnational/global feminist movement could transcend the pitfalls of both cultural relativism and universalism. The women’s movement evolved in practice as well as in the area of epistemology. At the Beijing conference, there even emerged a strategy to overcome the structural constraints placed on UN declarations. Each country attending the conference would present specific national commitments to be achieved by the year 2000. This meant that the Beijing conference went beyond the limitation of “soft law” (Hopkins 1996), and convinced each country to implement a set of actions for women’s empowerment.

The effects of these commitments have been different in each country. The Korean government seems to have been particularly responsive in following the evolving international consensus. Not insignificant in the government’s positive response, was the pressure women’s groups put on the government, both by participating in the state machinery and by monitoring government commitments. National machineries of women’s policy were established and gender mainstreaming and institutionalization
emerged as a new strategy to implement women’s policy.

There is now an important debate among Korean feminists over gender institutionalization. Some think of this trend as the most efficient way to achieve gender equality in Korea, but others are concerned whether this will result in weakening NGOs’ power in relation to the state. Looking at the contradiction between rapid economic development in Korea and women’s relatively stagnant overall status, I would like to suggest that pursuing gender mainstreaming and institutionalization should run parallel with women’s empowerment by and for themselves. Without women’s self empowerment, gender institutionalization may result in mere “tokenism,” with some women advancing in public life, but with most women left behind.

My research has been confined to a focus on the relationship between the UN conferences and the Korean government’s response. Many other factors, such as the intrinsic power of the Korean women’s movement, and the historical background of Korean women would figure in a more complete investigation into women’s progress. But these UN conferences were certainly crucial, especially for providing the government with useful strategies and connecting Korean feminists to a global movement where common interests can be discussed and differences can be understood.

This approach, viewing practical issues along with theoretical background, can help us design policies with greater insight into their implications. At the same time, the chance to review how theoretical debates have influenced practices makes feminist discourse more concrete, and reminds us that we must keep foremost in our minds that the purpose of our scholarship is to improve the conditions of women’s lives.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Forum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Mexico City, Mexico</td>
<td>131 Member States</td>
<td>World Plan of Action</td>
<td>NGO Tribune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6/19 - 7/2</td>
<td>2,230 delegates</td>
<td>Declaration of Mexico</td>
<td>5,000 Participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Xilonen-newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Copenhagen, Denmark</td>
<td>137 Member States</td>
<td>Program of Action</td>
<td>The Alternative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7/14 - 7/30</td>
<td>2,300 delegates</td>
<td>48 Resolutions</td>
<td>Women’s Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,580 participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>157 Member States</td>
<td>Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies (NFLS)</td>
<td>Forum ’85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7/15 - 7/26</td>
<td>1,900 delegates</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000 ~ 15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Forum ’85-newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Beijing, China</td>
<td>189 Member States</td>
<td>Platform for Action</td>
<td>NGO Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/4 - 9/15</td>
<td>6,000 delegates</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000 participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>New York, U.S.</td>
<td>180 Member States</td>
<td>Further Action and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action</td>
<td>Beijing + 5 Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6/5 – 6/10</td>
<td>(23rd UN General Assembly Special Session)</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000 participants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table 1] UN World Conferences on Women
## Table 2
The Korean National Machinery and Laws on Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>National Machinery/Public Institutions</th>
<th>Significant Legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975 Mexico City</td>
<td>5 delegates</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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