Has the authority of the sovereign state system undergone a fundamental transformation in recent decades? This dissertation seeks to: 1) offer a critical examination of claims regarding the perceived fracture and erosion of sovereign state authority; 2) contribute to the task of building a theoretical framework to study the power and authority of the sovereign state system and its changes over time; 3) find evidence of patterns in how the nature of that power and authority changes over time and across different political organizations in the context of war. Theoretically, the characterization of the threat non-state combatants pose to the authority of the state system neglects relations of power between those who hold privilege within that system and those who are excluded from its benefits. Empirically, there has been an absence of systematic study of potential authoritative transformations that is both historically and geographically broad. This dissertation analyzes the language of justification for war – as expressions of political authority - used by political and military leaders from 1618-2008, employing a combination of fuzzy-sets qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) with interpretive case analysis to determine the constellations of conditions which drive the use of
justification for war. Findings indicate that non-state actors are not challenging the authoritative logic underlying the sovereign state system; rather, the use of sovereign rights logics of justification in asymmetrical conflicts indicates a desire to access the benefits and privileges of that system. When interpreted through a post-colonial and critical race lens, these claims appear as a challenge to exclusion that is largely rooted in a legacy of racialized colonial subjugation. Relations of power, embedded in a state system that developed through imperial conquest and colonial domination, drive the use of justification frames. Thus, low power actors may in fact threaten the stability of the sovereign state system, but not in the manner characterized by the fracture narrative. The threat is not to the authoritative logic of the system, but rather to the uneven distribution of the powers and privileges of that system that stems from a legacy of colonizatio

which produced lasting divisions in power.
THE MORE THINGS STAY THE SAME:
COLONIZATION, RESISTANCE, AND THE FRACTURED SOVEREIGN STATE

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy 2014

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# Table of Contents

List of Tables iv

List of Figures v

Chapter 1: The Ever-Transforming State 1
  Introduction 2
  Context 4
  Plan of Research

Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundations 8
  Sovereignty: the Idea and Structure of Political Authority 8
  The Fracture Narrative and the Erosion of Sovereign State Authority 10
  Institutionalist Theories of the State 19
  The Historical Transformations of State Sovereignty 30
  Framing War: Logics and Discourses of Justification 35
  Argument and Hypotheses 46

Chapter 3: Methods 56
  Interpretive Document Analysis: Close-Acquaintance and QCA Approaches 56
  Case Selection 61
  Document Collection and Coding 66
  Variables 71
  Analysis Procedures 83

Chapter 4: fsQCA Results 88
  Interpreting fsQCA Results 88
  Sovereign Rights Logic of Justification Frames 89
  Humanitarian Justice Logic of Justification Frames 101
  Themes for Further Exploration 109

Chapter 5: Interest-centric to human-centric? Examining the impact of historical era on discourses of justification 113
  The Seven Years’ War, 1756 115
  The Second World War, 1939 121
  The Falklands/Malvinas War, 1982 128
  Conclusion 133

Chapter 6: Group Preservation Frame 138
  The Holy Roman Empire in the Thirty Years’ War, 1618 138
  Transylvania in the Thirty Years’ War, 1644 140
  Italy in the Italian-Ethiopian (Abyssinian) War, 1935 142
  Conclusion 146
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 7: Fighting for Dignity</th>
<th>149</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algerian Revolution, 1954</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Intifada, 2000</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 2003</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 8: Conclusion</th>
<th>164</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Appendix                       | 174 |

| References                     | 184 |
List of Tables

Table 2.1 Justification Frameworks ........................................ 42
Table 3.1 War Type Definitions .......................................... 64
Table 3.2 Combatant case summary statistics ......................... 66
Table 3.3 Typologies of Discourses of Justification with Examples .................................................. 68
Table 3.4 Typologies of Logics of Justification with Examples .................................................. 69
Table 3.5 Historical era Fuzzy-set Calibration .......................... 78
Table 3.6 State Integration Variables ................................... 81
Table 3.7 Colonial Experience Variables ................................. 83
Table 6.1 Summary Characteristics of Combatant Actors Employing Group Preservation Frame .................. 147
Table 7.1. Dignity Case Study Characteristics ......................... 154
Appendix Table 1. Case Selection ....................................... 174
Appendix Table 2. Coding Schemes by Round of Coding ............ 178
List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Conceptual Model: Factors Influencing Justifications for War 50

Figure 3.1 Historical Eras of Prevailing Conceptions of Political Authority 76

Figure 5.1 Discourses of Justification Used by High Power Actors in Symmetrical Conflicts, before and after 1945 135

Figure 5.2 Discourses of Justification Used by all Actors in all Conflicts, before and after 1945 136

Figure 7.1. Average Dignity Claims by Level of State Integration 150

Figure 7.2. Average Dignity Claims by Dyad Symmetry 151

Figure 7.3. Average Dignity Claims by Colonial Subject History 151

Figure 7.4. Average Dignity Claims by Colonial Dyad Status 152
Chapter 1 The Ever Transforming State

Introduction

The sovereign state system, its origins, power, and influence have been dominant themes in comparative and historical scholarship for decades. Since the 1990s, much of this scholarship has turned its attention to the perceived decline of the sovereign state system, the erosion of its power, and the undermining of its authority by myriad forces. Transformations in the dynamics of warfare have been central to this scholarship, in particular the perceived rising influence of transnational combatant forces operating across and beyond national boundaries. Much attention has been given to the globalizing factors that allow war to take on a character distinct from the state-centered boundaries that have defined it for much of the modern era, and the danger that such a transformation may hold for global security. However, systematic analysis of the extent to which such a fundamental transformation has actually occurred has remained underdeveloped.

Has the authority of the sovereign state system in fact undergone a fundamental transformation since the end of the Cold War? This dissertation is situated within this overarching question, and seeks to achieve three major objectives: first, to offer a critical examination of claims regarding the perceived fracture and erosion of sovereign state authority; second, to contribute to the task of building a theoretical framework to study the power and authority of the sovereign state system and its changes over time; third, to find evidence of patterns in how the nature of that power and authority changes over time and across different political organizations in the context of war.
To achieve these objectives, I focus my analysis on justifications for war-making among political and military leaders throughout the history of the modern sovereign state system, from 1618-2008. The study of war-making has been central to many analyses of the state system within comparative, historical, and political scholarship, exemplified by Tilly’s famous adage that “war makes states, and vice versa” (1992). Beyond the centrality of war, broadly speaking, within this field of scholarship, justifications for war in particular are an extremely useful object of analysis to examine the political authority and its transformations over time. War requires widespread coordination of wills and resources; that is, in order to obtain the material and moral support necessary to wage war, leaders need to publicly articulate to their constituent population why war is appropriate and actionable in a manner that they expect to resonate with the public’s perceptions of legitimate authority. Justifications for war, therefore, provide the historical documentation necessary to track how political authority is conceived of in particular historical and social contexts.

Context

Scholarship on the sovereign state in the post-Cold war era has focused extensively on the perceived fracturing and erosion of boundaries: territorial boundaries between nations, ideological boundaries between politics and religion, and temporal boundaries between war and peace. This fracture narrative has typically depicted the consequences of this boundary erosion as chaotic and destructive: without the protective blanket of sovereign state authority that has dominated the political organization of war for the past 500 years, millions of lives and the future security of the world hangs on a
precarious thread. While such claims abound, two major implications of this assertion have remained largely unexamined.

The first of these relates to an issue of historical perspective. Many of the inquiries into the erosion of state sovereign authority have focused solely on the challenges posed by non-state actors in the post-Cold War era; there has not been sufficient attention to the development and transformation in the conceptual strength of sovereign state authority over the historical course of the sovereign state system. As a result, scholarship embedded within the fracture narrative carries an implicit presentist fallacy whereby the sovereign authority of past centuries appears stable and secure, while its current status appears much more precarious. What is needed, therefore, is a broader historical analysis that more critically engages with the ways in which the authority of the sovereign state system has been contested and incomplete throughout its history.

The second implication relates to an implicit Eurocentrism. While much attention is paid to non-state combatant actors and they threat they pose to the stability of the modern state system, there has been very little critical examination of the geographic, historic, and racial meanings packed within the term “non-state actor,” who are likely to include groups who have been colonized by Western powers, racially marginalized, and distanced or excluded from the state system. It is therefore important to situate the violent actions, military struggles, and political organization of such non-state actors in the context of a history of European-driven colonial domination and marginalization from systems of power. Scholarship embedded within the fracture narrative, I argue, are missing a key part of the story: for most of the world, the sovereign state system and its authority was imposed through colonization and a power hierarchy of exclusion, it did
not necessarily “win out” over competing forms of political authority as Spruyt (1994) has described in the context of European history. I argue that this makes a fundamental difference in how we assess the history, current status, and future prospects of the sovereign state, particularly in terms of how scholars conceive of the threat posed by non-state actors to the authority of the state system.

Guided by a postcolonial, critical race perspective, I argue that a more historically rigorous analysis of conceptions of legitimate authority among combatant actors at various levels of integration within the state system will result in a very different vision of the current status and future prospects of the international system of sovereign states. Rather than the authority of states fracturing under the weight of challenges from non-state actors who have been empowered by globalizing forces in recent decades, we can understand the sovereign state system as a site of constant political struggle throughout its history, its authority constructed in continuous interaction with challenges to that authority in a historical context of imperial expansion, racial formation, colonial domination, and post-colonial resistance. The challenges to state authority witnessed in recent decades are therefore not a new threat, but one small part of a much larger story of change, struggle, and continuity. In other words, the more things have changed in the state system, the more they have stayed the same.

Plan of Research

It is necessary, therefore, to examine the story of the sovereign state system and its authority from two lenses simultaneously: as a story of temporal transformation as well as a story of structural integration. Starting from the premise that justifications for
war-making reflect conceptions of legitimate political authority in particular historical and social contexts, this dissertation will address two central research questions:

1. To what extent do justifications for war-making in the post-Cold War era reflect a fundamental transformation in the way the authority of the sovereign state system is conceived?

2. What constellations of conditions, particularly those related to the political organization and state system integration of combatant groups, lead to the use of particular logical and discursive frames to justify war-making?

Justifications for war-making provide a unique window through which we can examine patterns in conceptions of legitimate political authority across different types of political organizations and over time. By uncovering these patterns, I intend to contribute theoretically to the conversation on state sovereignty in current sociological and political scholarship by offering an analysis of this system which accounts for the historical intersections between imperial expansion, colonial domination, racial formation, and post-colonial resistance. War initiation provides a historical rupture in which political authority needs to be publicly articulated in order to gain the material and moral support necessary to wage it. I therefore analyze only justifications for the initiation of war, and not arguments related to brokering peace. Although an analysis of settlement negotiations and peace treaties could likewise provide valuable information on conceptions of political authority, including an analysis on the ends of wars would introduce a set of considerations that are beyond the scope of the current study. Likewise, while I focus on
justifications for war-making as evidence of widely held conceptions of legitimate political authority, this analysis can not speak to the resonance of particular arguments for or against going to war. Rather, I group these particular arguments into frameworks of justification, and employ these frames as evidence of broadly held conceptions of legitimate political authority that political and military leaders invoke with the understanding that they will be (or should be) considered in alignment with prevailing conceptions of legitimate authority.

In the following section, I detail the theoretical foundations on which the current analysis rests. I begin by describing what I refer to as the fracture narrative: a dominant theme in post-Cold War scholarship on the state system which is focused on the declining power of the international system of sovereign states and the dangers entailed in the erosion of the authority of that system in the face of non-state challengers. My critique of this narrative, which highlights the need for a historically and geographically broad analysis that accounts for experiences of colonial domination and subjugation as well as state system integration and exclusion, leads to the theoretical framework that guides my research approach, namely, an integration of historical and cultural institutionalist theories of the state with critical race and post-colonial perspectives. This theoretical framework guides my methodological approach; a fuzzy-sets qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) that is used to reveal the causal configurations associated with particular justification frames. A small-n interpretive analysis is also used to highlight interesting patterns and explore questions raised by the fuzzy-sets analysis.

Taken together, these analyses reveal a very different story of the state system and transformations in its authority than the one told by the fracture narrative. Rather than a
dangerous erosion of boundaries and fracturing of the state’s authority, we are able to conceive of transformations in political authority as ongoing processes that grow out of the interactions between the weak and the powerful.
Chapter 2 Theoretical Foundations

Sovereignty: the idea and structure of political authority

Sovereignty, in its broadest definition, is the principle of supreme and overarching authority within a geographic space (Phillpott 2001). As such it is both abstract and concrete: it is an idea about the legitimacy of authority as well as a concrete manifestation of political organization. As a concept, sovereignty as understood within international relations scholarship and political philosophy first emerged during the European Middle Ages, and has since taken on a variety of ideational and institutional forms. In both idea and structure, sovereignty is a social construct rooted in time and place (Biersteker & Weber 1996). As a social construct, it is pervasive, stubborn, and fluid. It is constructed in specific social contexts, and its normative power in turn shapes social reality, creating a sense of what legitimate authority means and who has it, as well as contributing to the institutional structures through which its power is manifest.

Since the 17th century, political sovereignty has ideationally and organizationally manifested as state sovereignty. The sovereign state is typically identified as the form of political organization that emerged within the Westphalian transformation in the latter half of the 17th century (Axtmann 1996). It is at this point that the concept of the “state” as a political and governing body became intimately connected with territorial continuity and clear geographic boundaries. Territorial consolidation, mutual recognition, internal centralization and external autonomy provided the foundations of sovereign authority
(Axtmann 2004, Parekh 2002). Prior to the Westphalian transformation, political authority in Europe was conceived in an overlapping web of allegiances to local nobility, guilds, and the Church, to name but a few, as well as the ever-changing web of alliances between any and all of these loci of authority. Although sovereignty is broadly understood as authority within a geographic space, it is the mutual exclusivity of that authoritative space that made the modern sovereign state distinct from the political organizations of medieval Europe that came before. The sovereign state emerged as a system of political organization rooted in mutual exclusivity and physical differentiation (Brubaker 1992). These qualities, as well as the ideational and institutional definitions of sovereignty, are crucial to understanding how the modern system of sovereign political authority has transformed over time. Although state sovereignty has been the dominant form of political authority in the modern era, how this authority has been conceptualized and institutionally manifest has not been consistent or universal. Because state sovereignty is a social construct, it is important to disentangle the historical and social contexts in which it emerged, proliferated, and came to dominate global political organization.

The current chapter lays out the theoretical foundations on which I construct my analysis of transformations in the political authority of the sovereign state system. I begin by briefly outlining the major parameters of what I refer to as the fracture narrative: a body of scholarship within international relations security studies in conjunction with the new war perspective that portrays a fundamental transformation in the nature of warfare since the end of the Cold War, signaling the erosion of the authority and stability of the international system of sovereign states. Critiques of this perspective problematize the
Eurocentric and ahistorical viewpoint embedded within the fracture narrative and call for a study of the state system and organized violence from a post-colonial perspective in which state authority is constructed within interactions between the weak and the powerful in the context of imperial domination and resistance. I argue that the theoretical tools necessary to accomplish such an analysis are available within sociological comparative historical analysis. By integrating historical and cultural institutionalist theories of the role of warfare in state formation and proliferation with post-colonial and critical race perspectives, an approach I call historical intersectionality, it is possible to construct an analysis of the transformations in the political authority that envisions the state system as constructed through continuous interactions between weak and strong and which attends to the role of colonization and racial formation, exclusion and resistance, in the construction of sovereign state authority and its transformations.

The Fracture Narrative and the Erosion of Sovereign State Authority

Arguments regarding the eroding authority of state sovereignty take somewhat different forms across disciplinary boundaries, but scholars from sociology, political science, and international relations have shared a growing concern over the apparent fracturing of national sovereign authority in the post-Cold War era. Taken together, this body of literature suggests that a variety of local and global trends have coalesced to undermine the foundational power of the international system of states which had prevailed over the previous five centuries. Stephen Krasner (1999) has suggested that the conventional notion of state sovereignty has been frequently violated in practice
throughout the history of this system, but only in recent decades have the governing rules of this system been challenged in principle. It is the nature and source of this challenge to the underlying principles of the system of state sovereignty that has been the focus of much post-Cold War political scholarship.

The relationship between globalization and shifting cultural boundaries has been a central focus in explaining the erosion of sovereign authority; globalizing trends have diminished the territorial boundaries that have defined state sovereignty in the Westphalian era (Sassen 1996, Brown 2010) while the post-Cold War political climate has witnessed claims to ethnic identity trumping allegiances to the state (Gurr 1994). Roland Axtmann (1996) argues that the notions of the ideal nation state – one that is territorially consolidated, homogenous, and sovereign – have been problematized by growing multiculturalism within national boundaries, growing societal heterogeneity and disillusionment with Enlightenment philosophy in combination with the restructuring of the global economy in increasingly interconnected ways. Axtmann suggests that the state will continue to retain several important institutional functions but that the locus of authority will shift from state sovereignty to more dispersed and differentiated sources of authority emanating from multiple sources. Wendy Brown likewise suggests that the state and sovereignty are becoming detached from each other with key characteristics of sovereignty “migrating from the nation-state to the unrelieved domination of capital and God-sanctioned political violence” (2010: 23). While it is typically the end of the Cold War that is pointed to as the fracture point signaling the end of the old order of state-controlled violence, recent work has also focused on the events of September 11, 2001
and the subsequent Global War on Terror as further evidence of the threat that non-state combatants pose to the sovereign state system (Bauman 2007, Snow 2007).

The fracturing authority of the state and the military challenges posed by non-state actors are directly connected in many accounts, particularly within the new war perspective. Mary Kaldor (1999) coined the term ‘new war’ to describe a fundamental shift in the dynamics of war from state-centered conflicts controlled by governments with clear political objectives towards war that is pervasive in time and space, fought by criminals and bandits, controlled by warlords who benefit from its continuation, fought for abstract ideological goals, and waged with no clear distinction between belligerents and victims, beginning and end. Martin van Creveld (1991) had earlier argued that a ‘transformation of war’ was underway in late 1980s and early 1990s, characterized by a growing climate of low-intensity conflicts in which state governments were increasingly incapable of effectively wage war against much smaller and weaker non-state combatants. Van Creveld anticipated that this pattern would ultimately lead to the loss of the state’s ability to fulfill one of its central roles: to protect its dependent population.

The reasons for and implications of the challenges of these non-state combatants to the system of sovereign state authority has exhibited substantial divergence. For some, these trends are indicative of one aspect of larger patterns of globalization in which state sovereignty has become de-centered and conflicts have become transnational (Kaldor 1999, Bauman 2007). In a globalized context, dynamics of urbanization and global networks of overlapping and territorially diverse economic and political interconnections has led to an international environment of “fragmented sovereignty” with the potential to undermine national state-based sovereignties, particularly in the developing world (Davis
For others, changing patterns of warfare indicate a shift in motivations for war from the political to the ideological, resulting in non-state actors gaining greater influence in war-making and decreasing the ability of state organized militaries to quell violence (Van Creveld 1991, Keegan 1993). Still others view these trends as more old than new, that is, that war is exhibiting a regression to pre-modern modes of fighting including the dispersion of the control of violence among a variety of groups not organized within a state (Mueller 2004, Münkler 2005). While many argue that such patterns pose a serious danger to global political stability and human life, not all are convinced that trends of dispersing sovereign authority warrant such pessimism. Cosmopolitans, for example, have emphasized the ways in which the erosion of state sovereign authority offers hope of a new kind of global political system that values universal human rights over the power of states (Held 2005, Pogge 2002, Parekh 2002). What these perspectives share is a vision of the post-Cold War political climate in which the authority of the state is undergoing a fundamental transformation.

Although there are a multitude of elements that can be examined as evidence of the nature of this perceived transformation, one set of scholarship has focused on the manner in which political and military leaders justify going to war. The “justness” of war has been a common consideration for war scholars, from the writings of Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas in the late Roman era, to Hugo Grotius and the Catholic legal scholars of the Middle Ages and early Renaissance, to Michael Walzer in the post-Vietnam era. In the just war tradition, debates on both the just cause \textit{(jus ad bellum)} and just conduct \textit{(jus en bello)} within war have dominated legal and ethical scholarship on
Some recent scholarship has pointed to an apparent transformation in claims of just cause, in which justifications for war are increasingly invoking notions of humanitarian justice and protection of the innocent that were once characteristic of early modern warfare, rather than invoking the claims of the sovereign rights of states and protection of national economic and security interests that had been characteristic of war since the Westphalian transformation.

Richard Falk has argued that the reemergence of a just war discourse after the Cold War is explained by the inability of international law to address the changes in technology, organization of conflict, and the emergence of powerful ‘non-territorial’ actors that occurred during, and particularly after, the Cold War. Because international laws of war were based on the regulation of violence between territorial states, the just war discourse provided a “more flexible notion of permissible use of force” for states that found themselves confronted by violence waged by non-state actors (2004: 43). Peter Lawler suggests a similar argument that the unconventional nature of many conflicts in the post-Cold War era has spurred a reformulation of justifications for engaging in war. Because conventional justifications were situated within the framework of wars between sovereign states, the increasing prevalence of attacks waged by non-state actors has forced state leaders to develop new justifications to fit these new conflicts. As a consequence, the moral frameworks surrounding post-Cold War conflicts (particularly in Western foreign policy) have come to be characterized by a discourse of the ‘good war’ which can take the form of the ‘war-waging’ narrative or a ‘criminality’ narrative. Lawler suggests that the ‘war waging’ narrative reinforces the established state-centric system of

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1 Rengger (2002) provides an excellent and concise summary of the just war tradition.
war while the ‘criminality’ narrative poses a challenge to these conventions and “anticipates the ultimate transcendence of the war system as a corollary of a larger logic of global transformation” (2002: 154). In other words, the discourses and logics of justification for war-making invoked by political and military leaders provide a concrete manifestation of broader processes of stability and transformation within global political organization.

The fracture narrative presents an image of global political organization that has been fundamentally altered in recent decades as globalizing trends diminish the salience of national boundaries and provide new avenues, such as technologically facilitated transnational networks, through which non-state combatants can challenge the authority of the state system. However there are reasons to be critical of the assumption that the challenges to sovereign authority presented by non-state combatant groups is indicative of a fundamental shift in the nature of global political organization.

Although the new war approach has received substantial attention and carried credibility in many scholarly circles, it has also been met with considerable critique. These critiques have largely centered on issues of measurement and definition. One set of critiques argues that empirical analyses of recent wars reveal that the surge in non-state and non-territorially bound combatants may have been overstated and that the sovereign state has been and continues to be the dominant player in contemporary conflicts (Fearon & Laitin 2003, Chojnacki 2003). A second critique suggests that new wars are largely a matter of perception, and that greater attention to the historical variety in both current and past conflicts (Newman 2004) as well as critical engagement with how conceptual
categories are employed (Kalyvas 2001), reveals that the "newness" of wars is often exaggerated and does not stand up to scrutiny.

Embedded within the problem of conceptual clarity is an issue of Eurocentrism which pervades most political scholarship. In the new war approach, this Eurocentrism manifests as a fallacy of asymmetric comparisons: all conflicts today are compared to only a tiny minority of wars that took place on the European continent in a span of two and a half centuries, from the end of the Thirty Year's War until the World Wars of the mid-20th century. When such a comparison is made, it is easy to support the claim of substantial change in patterns of war making; all wars today look almost nothing like the wars that took place in Europe from 1700-1950. Neither do the vast majority all of the other wars that took place in the world from 1700-1950.

The conflation between conceptual shifts and empirical shifts result in a vision of current wars that appears to fundamentally challenge the authority and security of the sovereign state system. Kaldor, for example, uses the term "new war" in order "to distinguish such wars from prevailing perceptions of war drawn from an earlier era" (2007: 1-2, my emphasis). She goes on to argue that what we "tend to perceive as war, what policy-makers and military leaders define as war, is, in fact, a specific phenomenon which took shape in Europe somewhere between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries" (2007: 15). Despite Kaldor’s acknowledgement that the supposed historical shift from old to new wars is exclusively a matter of definition and perception, she goes on to argue that wars in the post-Cold War era are in fact new. The major distinction between old and new wars that she offers is that old wars were hierarchical and centralized within states, whereas new wars are characterized by a more vertical and decentralized organization,
waged by a diverse set of actors which include not only states and regular armies, but also warlords, criminal gangs, police forces, and mercenary groups (2009: 9). But she also argues that the notion of hierarchical and centralized state based war is largely a myth based on a perception of war that emerged from the experience of intra-European conflict in the modern era that excluded the experiences of warfare in this same period of time outside of the continental boundaries of Europe.

This is not to say that new war proponents are uniquely guilty of a Eurocentric vision; rather this vision is embedded within the foundations of the study of the state, political authority, and international relations itself. Arguably, it is embedded within all fields of scholarship because the academe itself emerged from Western society in a historical moment of Western imperial expansion and therefore envisions the world from the West out. This is the perspective put forth by post-colonialists such as Franz Fanon and Edward Said, third world intellectuals who sought to problematize the origins of modern scholarship as constructed within a system of Western privilege and intimately connected with projects of colonial expansion and racial subjugation. With its emphasis on culture, knowledge, and representation, the postcolonial perspective has been well integrated into the humanities, but has met an uneven reception within the social sciences. In sociology, much of the response to the postcolonial challenge has been to shift focus from studying Western nations to those in the global East and South, rather than focusing on the interactions between them (Go 2013). A postcolonial sociology must not simply give greater attention to the colonized and post-colonized peoples of the world, but rather must fundamentally alter the ontology with which scholarship is approached away from one that sees units of analysis as beings in and of themselves and
move towards a relational ontology that studies the “intertwined histories” of these units (Said 2003, quoted in Go 2013: 41). A similar argument is made for a postcolonial approach to international relations which approaches the study of global security through a lens of “the mutually constitutive nature of world politics, the numerous and diverse ways in which the weak and the strong are bound up together” (Barkawi & Laffey 2006). Wimmer (2013) has also emphasized the need to add relations of power and exclusion from systems of power to the analysis of war and the state; he argues that political violence is more likely to occur the larger the population that is excluded from state networks. While Wimmer’s study focuses largely on internal conflicts, I argue that a similar focus on power and exclusion can be useful to understand international political violence.

A relational ontology is necessary to effectively evaluate the extent to which political authoritative structures have transformed in the post-Cold War era because challenges to political authority are constructed within dynamic global systems of power and exclusion that dictate the relationships between the strong, the weak, and everyone in between. A study of the transformations in political authority must therefore be historically broad, conceptually critical, and globally intersectional. It must move beyond Eurocentric conceptions of state formation and proliferation and seek to understand how the authority of the sovereign state system is constructed in continuous interaction with challenges to that authority in a historical context of imperial expansion, racial formation, colonial domination, and postcolonial resistance.

The tools to conduct such an analysis are already available within comparative historical sociology when integrated with postcolonial and critical race perspectives. In
the following section, I argue for the integration of historical and cultural institutionalist approaches to the state, which I refer to as historical intersectionality, as the most fruitful way to understand historical transformations in state sovereignty. Applying this lens to the emergence and proliferation of state sovereignty reveals several interrelated themes that are essential to understanding historical transformations in state sovereignty. First, sovereignty is a culturally embedded system of political authority and as such it is fundamentally a relation of power. Second, as a system of physical demarcation, processes of state formation and proliferation are intimately bound to racial formation. Third, the proliferation of the state and the standardization of state sovereignty as the dominant form of global political organization occurred within a process of colonial exploitation. Finally, the modern state is defined in terms of its ability to monopolize the legitimate use of violence within mutually exclusive territorial boundaries; the use of force is therefore central to understanding what state sovereignty and challenges to it mean.

**Institutionalist Theories of the State**

Theories of the state – its formation and proliferation – in comparative historical analysis typically fall into one of three broad institutionalist theoretical approaches: historical (HI), cultural (CI), and rational choice institutionalism (RCI). Because RCI accounts of state formation tend to be functionalist, voluntarist, intentionalist, and often to treat culture as exogenous to action, I find this approach ill-suited to understand historical transformations of state sovereignty where sovereignty is conceived of as both
an ideational and structural social construct. Such explanations often discount the asymmetries of power involved in processes such as state formation and growth in which domination, resistance, and struggle are integral to the story. Rather, I argue that an integration of historical and cultural approaches is well-equipped to deal with the question of how state sovereignty as a culturally embedded system of political authority has transformed over time, and what these transformations mean for current understandings of political authority and the supremacy of state sovereignty.

HI emphasizes the role of structure in bringing about social change, particularly the way in which institutional structures mold and disseminate worldviews and shape power relations (Hall & Taylor 1996). The focus on historical context results in HI theories of the state that can link process to outcome, effectively explain particular cases, and explain variations in outcome among similar cases. Thus, Ertman (1997) is able to distinguish four types of states that emerged during European state formation based upon the characteristics of state infrastructure and political regime. Building on Tilly’s “war makes states” formulation, Ertman suggests that what war makes is the specific type of political and administrative infrastructure and this infrastructure is dependent on the timing of the onset of conflict. Spruyt (1994) likewise offers an account of state formation that is able to move beyond rational choice assumptions of efficiency and

2 Attempts to deal with some of these problematic assumptions, such as Lachmann’s (2002) account of state formation, emphasize the role of both individual agency and unintentional consequences. Although Lachmann’s account avoids the fallacy of intentional action, this account of state formation still treats macro level outcomes as the aggregation of individual action and fails to account for the ways in which individual action exists within and is mutually constitutive of historically embedded cultural systems that both inform individual action as well as exist autonomously from it. Lachmann’s treatment of culture as a “toolkit” that simply informs rational (albeit not necessarily intentionalist) action is exemplary of many rational choice accounts of culture in general, an understanding of culture as distinct from instrumentality that are ultimately incapable of providing a fully robust account of macro level processes that are embedded within cultural systems.
instrumental action. Rather, he argues that the sovereign state did not simply emerge through unilinear stages of increasing efficiency, it won out over competing forms of organization due to both top down and bottom up selection processes.

HI approaches often employ bellicist models of state formation, exemplified by Tilly’s “war makes states” argument (1992), in which sustained geopolitical competition created the need for standing armies which in turn required large-scale bureaucratic administrations capable of extracting and managing the resources necessary to maintain a large force over a relatively long period of time. Centralized state bureaucracies developed to implement and enforce the taxation of the population necessary to maintain these armed forces, which in turn required a social system capable of defining and accounting for the taxable population. The social system spurred by this process was citizenship, which redefined the relationship of people to the state in terms of mutual obligations: the people owed resources - in the form of taxes and later in the form of military service as well - and in turn, the state was obligated to protect the lives and well-being of the people who lived within the territorial boundaries claimed by the state (Tilly 1992). The creation of citizenship ultimately led to the development of nationalism; as people became incorporated into the state through both taxation and military conscription, they became capable of conceiving of the state as “theirs.” In the context of Enlightenment philosophy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, popular sovereignty emerged as a dominant ideological frame in which national identity legitimated political organization. This entry of ordinary people into war-making through citizen-based conscription is central to understanding the organization of state and society, as
Kestnbaum (2004) suggests, because through the processes of war-making state and society engage in an "invisible dialogue" in which the state is reproduced.

Historical institutionalist accounts of state formation highlight a largely top-down and structural account of the emergence of the state and its effect the people. Exogenous shock transformed structural organization altering the relationship between the people and political organization such that the structure became a state and the people became citizens who identified with “their” state through nationalism. As Benedict Anderson (1983) argues, citizens were able to imagine themselves as part of a national community in the historical context of Enlightenment and Revolutionary philosophy that destroyed the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm and replaced it with the popular sovereignty of the modern state.

While historical institutionalist accounts often emphasize the role of structure, these accounts do not preclude the incorporation of individual agency and issues of power and resistance. What historical institutionalists can offer is a vision of history that “is malleable and partly the creature of power. Traditions are invented, but never completely. Nationalism, much like culture, is situationally grounded” (Centeno 1997: 169). Nevertheless, conceiving of state formation as a series of events in which structural transformations shape social relations leads to a somewhat linear understanding of state proliferation which neglects the continuous level of interaction between strong and weak polities in which the state is continuously produced and reproduced in contexts of power, exclusion and resistance. The advantage of such an approach, however, is that the HI account identifies a starting point in the event of state formation in which these relationships can be understood.
In contrast to the eventful characterization of state formation and proliferation, CI approaches conceive of state formation as an ongoing subjective and objective process in which multiple forms of power are crystallized within a territorially bound, coercive apparatus that is conceived of and simultaneously exerts itself materially and mentally. Culturalists are critical of a top down structural approach to state formation, suggesting that such an approach treats the power relationships spurred by state formation as natural or inevitable, thus failing to critically engage issues of power and resistance that should be made central.

Drawing from Foucault, culturalist approaches conceive of state power as widely dispersed, rather than localized in the state apparatus and argue that traditional state theory underestimates the decentralized and molecular nature of state power. Drawing from systems theory and networks theory, the state is understood as one of many systems of power, and CI often focuses on the state as a web of shifting ties among changing sets of actors, rather than a monolithic unified entity. The goal in such a cultural turn, as Steinmetz argues, is not to put the state on a theoretical pedestal, but rather to highlight how the state is not autonomous from cultural forces, but "shot through with circuits of meaning that cut across the state-society frontier" (1999: 12). CI approaches therefore tend to explicitly engage in the deconstruction of knowledge, advocating a deconstruction of theories about the state that are rooted in a modern naturalistic ontology, leading us to “discover” particular questions and problems at the expense of others (Somers 1996). It becomes useless, then, to theorize the state unless engaging in a rigorous historical epistemology that questions and deconstructs the knowledge culture in which our questions and answers are embedded.
Bourdieu (1999) likewise argues in favor of a deconstruction of the state, namely, to question our own understandings of the state as culturally embedded in our thoughts regarding it. Matters of culture, and the social divisions and hierarchies associated with them, often appear and are treated by the analyst as natural precisely because they have been constituted and institutionalized by the state "both in things and in minds" in order to be experienced as natural. The state "thinks itself through those who attempt to think it" (1999: 55), and so to successfully analyze the state, the analyst must submit to "radical questioning" of his own thoughts and assumptions about reality. The state as we know it is constantly formed through processes of culture; that is, the state unifies linguistic and juridical codes and homogenizes communication, classification systems (e.g. age and sex), bureaucratic procedures, educational structures and social rituals. Thus, "the state molds mental structures and imposes common principles of vision and division...And it thereby contributes to the construction of what is commonly designated as national identity" (1999: 61, emphasis in original). The radical questioning necessary to study the state can be accomplished by reconstructing a model of its emergence, thus deconstructing the seeming naturalness of the state and raising the question of discarded possibilities: something else could have been and could still be possible.

The role of warfare in state formation is characterized by cultural institutionalists as interdependent with processes of social and cultural systems of symbolic power. This process is best characterized by Bourdieu who defines the state as “the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital” (1999: 57, emphasis in original), stressing
that these different dimensions are interdependent and co-constitutive. In Bourdieu’s formulation, war makes states, but not simply as a result of a consolidation of administrative power through taxation and subsequent bureaucratization. Rather, this centralization of power is interdependent with the development of systems of social and cultural signification.

Given this greater focus on multiple systems of power and exclusion, CI approaches have focused more extensively than others on the role of race within these relationships, emphasizing how state policies not only reflect power relations among unequally situated citizens, but also constructs them within an international context. Anthony Marx (1999) and Aiwha Ong (2004) have outlined the processes by which both race and nation are “made” through exclusionary citizenship policies. The broader implication of this for the processes of nation-state building through inclusion and exclusion indicates that institutional rules not only consolidate existing social cleavages but these cleavages can also be manipulated by the state to shape how dominant institutions and loyalty to them are built. Thus, selective exclusion - and the conditions under which it is selected and occurs - is central to understanding how political power is established and maintained. Omi and Winant's racial formation perspective is especially useful in understanding how racial projects, as processes which link structure and representation, are constantly transformed in the context of political struggle (1994: 55-56). A racial formation perspective thus focuses our attention on how racial meanings become rearticulated within this ever transforming project and the necessity of deconstructing "code words" that bear racial signification but are not always recognized as such. Thus it becomes possible to see that the classification of "non-state actor" in
post-Cold War analyses typically refers to people whose experiences and identities have been shaped by resistance to a particular form of state domination, namely, Western colonialism.

Situating state sovereignty within the modernizing project likewise raises questions regarding the presumed homogenizing force of the state. Parekh (2002) suggests that in the face of globalizing challenges that bring with it the forces of heterogeneity, the modern state and its inherent drive towards homogeneity must be reconstituted. The traditional functions of the state, Parekh argues, have become either irrelevant or ineffectual due to the recent advent of globally articulated politics that have come to either overshadow or replace the familiar territorially based or state centric politics, thus weakening the emotional hold of the territorial boundary. Because the modern state is defined in terms of individual identity subordinated to territoriality, the changes wrought by globalization mean that the state must be reconstituted in a way that can cope with coordinated sovereignty and porous territorial boundaries. Goldberg (2000), however, challenges prevailing conceptions of racial heterogeneity in the post WWII era as a product of increasing global integration and the end of colonialism. Rather, he suggests that racial heterogeneity is produced within and constructive of the racist modern state. Like Goldeberg, Parekh defines the modern state in terms of its homogenizing tendencies, but unlike Goldberg, Parekh sees the modern state as an ideal form of political organization that is beneficial in granting liberties and equality to its citizens. It only runs into trouble when it encounters the heterogeneous forces spurred by globalization. Where Parekh sees this heterogeneity as a new challenge to the otherwise
homogenizing modern state, Goldberg sees heterogeneity as productive of the modern state and its oppressive features.

Just as it is impossible to understand sovereignty distinct from modernity, so it is also impossible to separate both of these processes from race. Fanon makes clear that colonization is fundamentally a racial project that creates a "compartmentalized world...Looking at the immediacies of the colonial context, it is clear that what divides this world is first and foremost what species, what race one belongs to" (2004[1963]: 5). Colonization was not simply a division of the West and the rest, but a process of racialization which divides whites from people of color. Goldberg (1993) likewise asserts that race is not simply an outcome of historical and cultural circumstances and social process, but rather is an ever transforming process that structures social processes themselves. James C. Scott similarly draws attention to the ways in which the state is constructed in the context of resistance to it, with one important result of this process being the imposition of ethnic and racial categories defined in terms of degrees of inclusion and exclusion in relationship to the state. Scott describes racialization and ethnicization as “state effects” produced in a context whereby

“those who had reason to flee state power- to escape taxes, conscription, disease, poverty, or prison, or to trade or raid – were, in a sense, tribalizing themselves. Ethnicity, once again, began where sovereignty and taxes ended. The ethnic zone was feared and stigmatized precisely because it was beyond sovereignty and therefore a magnet for those who, for whatever reason, wanted to elude the state” (2009: 122).
Scott’s analysis, employing the example of the expanding Chinese Han state at various historical moments, is especially useful in pointing to the necessity of understanding how state formation and expansion is productive of racial and ethnic identity. Racial and ethnic identities are formed in the context of resistance to the state which then in turn reproduces state boundaries and structures.

The CI perspective thus leads to a characterization of state formation and proliferation as one in which the state constructs and is constructed by systems of identity imbued with power and exclusion. CI approaches draw our attention to the manner in which the state operates as a mechanism of both inclusion and exclusion, constructing multiple systems of power and resistance. In contrast, HI approaches conceive of the state as an autonomous structure, determining the relationship between states within a system governed by a (relatively) clear set of rules. There are several benefits to such an approach. First, it emphasizes the ways in which structural transformations from above extensively impact social relations on the ground, thus forcing us to attend to the ways in which macro level processes impact lived experiences. It likewise forces us to confront issues of macro level change, suggesting that unexpected exogenous shocks and large scale social transformations will inevitably transform the ways in which people relate to each other and to the institutions in which they are embedded. The drawback of such an approach, however, is an inherent danger of perceiving of the consequences of macro-structural transformation as natural or inevitable, undermining the role of individual agency, inequalities of power, and possibilities for resistance. CI approaches specifically addresses this drawback, focusing our attention on the relationship between citizenship and nationalism and the role of processes of state formation in this relationship in such a
way that requires the analyst to conceive of the state, the citizen, and the nation in mutually constructive terms with a focus on unequal relations of power. What CI approaches lack, however, is a place to start. While HI approaches tend to conceive of power far too narrowly and underemphasize the central role that power, coercion, and resistance play in the relationships between polities, CI approaches focus more exclusively on the mutually constructed nature of these relationships, not accounting for the ways in which unexpected exogenous shock affect structural transformations in the first place. While culturalists are correct in bringing relations of power, coercion, and resistance to the center of the analysis, they often do so at the expense of a clear understanding of how the specific ways in which structural transformation occurs in the first place affects how these relations of power play out.

Integration between cultural and historical approaches focuses our attention on the mutual construction of the state as an institution, the nation as a cultural and ideological structure, and the individual as agent. The traditional institutional approaches tend to focus on one of these fields and then explicate its effects on the other two. A more useful approach, and the one I advocate here, instead envisions these fields in a trinitarian relationship in which conceptions of legitimate political authority lie at the intersection of these three interdependent relationships, transforming in the context of the changing contours of the mutually constituting relationships between the state, nation, and citizen. This historical intersectional approach allows us to see how individuals’ lives and actions are shaped in terms of the degree to which they are included or excluded from the state as an institution and the nation as an ideological construct. Clearly specifying the
intersections between these fields and the resulting contours that they form is therefore vital to understanding historical transformations in political authority.

The Historical Transformations of State Sovereignty

The above discussion of theoretical approaches to understanding state formation and proliferation highlight several interrelated themes which are essential to understanding historical transformations of state sovereignty: sovereignty as a cultural system, state formation as a process of physical demarcation and racial formation, state proliferation as a project of colonial exploitation, and an understanding of the state as a monopolist of the legitimate use of violence. Philpott (2001) argues that two revolutions in the idea of sovereignty have fundamentally shaped the current system of international states: first, the Westphalian transformation in 1648 and second the colonial independence movements after the Second World War. I argue that we should consider two additional events that occurred between these revolutions: the advent of popular sovereignty surrounding the American and French revolutions at the end of the 18th century and role of nationalist identity formation in the 1848 “springtime of the nations.” Understanding how each of these transformations built upon, expanded, and rebuilt ideas about the political authority of state sovereignty leads us to a fuller understanding of the state of sovereignty in the current global context.

The emergence of the foundational principles of state sovereignty (territorial consolidation, mutual recognition, internal centralization, and external autonomy) after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established the bedrock on which the modern
international system of states was built. This process set the standard of mutually exclusive physical boundary making that set into a motion a cultural system of political authority rooted in processes of othering. In doing so, the Westphalian state introduced into the conception of political authority a boundary between those who were subject to the authority of the state and those who were not.

This transformation of political authority from overlapping and uneven within a territorial space to mutually exclusive, uniform, and bounded spaces of authority drew an explicit connection between the physical boundaries of an authoritative space and the people around whom the boundary is drawn. Thus, the embodiment of legitimate political authority transferred from the monarch to the people under the government’s rule. In order to be legitimate, authority had to operate by the consent of the governed. This transformation was notably articulated in the French and American revolutions in the late 18th century, most explicitly in the “We the People” frame in which the 1776 United State Declaration of Independence was conceived.

In conjunction with the principles of rule by consent of the governed that came to fruition at the end of the 18th century, the advent of the bounded state also led to the solidification of identity in the context of state boundaries. By the mid-19th century, the idea of popular sovereignty had incorporated an understanding of the people that was defined in terms of national identity. This transformation was marked by broad popular revolutions in Europe and Latin America in the 1840s, specifically the 1848 “springtime of the nations.”
While popular and national sovereignty gained an authoritative foothold in Europe, North America, and increasingly in Latin America, the colonial and imperial holdings of the Western powers experienced political authority as subjects to the civilizing mission of the colonizing powers. Throughout this era of colonial expansion, resistance to such colonial authority both drew upon and challenged European ideals of popular national sovereignty, emphasizing universal human rights and the right to self-determination as a vital component of national sovereign authority. This transforming conception of sovereign authority was notably articulated by the official end of British colonial rule in India and the establishment of the independent states of India and Pakistan in 1947, events which became a source of inspiration for a number of independence movements in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. In this context of political authority becoming increasingly rooted in universal human rights, global political dynamics in the post-war era became centered around the bi-polar superpower system in which the states within the international system were defined in terms of their alignment to the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union, or their exclusion from that system as part of the non-aligned third world. Political authority in this era thus came to be largely understood in terms of supranational sovereignty, in which some aspects of national sovereignty were subordinated to the collective authority of a broader group of similarly aligned countries and under the auspices of the aligning superpower. The idea formed here was that there was an authority that existed beyond the state and that to protect values of human rights and self-determination, states should subordinate some aspects of national sovereignty to supranational authoritative structures. The Berlin wall served as a highly visible symbol of this global polarization between the
eastern and western supranational alignments and its destruction in 1989, precipitating
the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union two years later, signaled an important
reorganization of that system.

Each phase of transformation in the authority state system has successively
become more strongly oriented towards the obligations of governing polities to value
human rights and well-being over material and territorial interests. These transformative
processes occurred in direct conjunction with war-making; as Kestnbaum (2004) argues,
states and society engage in an “invisible dialogue” during armed conflict in which state
power is reproduced through citizen participation in war-making. The formation of the
state system within the Westphalian transformation created mutually obligatory
relationships between state and citizen, as increasingly larger standing armies were
required to defend territorial states, the integration of ordinary people into war-making
allowed citizens to increasingly view the state as “theirs”; mass mobilization
subsequently led to the nationalization of war between states further reifying the
definition of the state in terms of its obligations toward its citizens (Kestnbaum 2002,
2004). Since the end of the Cold War, and increasingly since the start of the Global War
on Terror in 2001, political scholarship has engaged with another transformation in
political authority: that of a fragmentation in state sovereignty. The challenge posed by
non-state actors to the authority of the state system is, as characterized by the fracture
narrative, a challenge to the relationship between territorial states and their citizens, and
the sovereign rights of states to act on behalf of their populations at the expense of other
populations.
It is these questions of how the political authority of the sovereign state has transformed over time and the extent to which sovereignty has undergone another transformation in the post-Cold War era that this dissertation seeks to answer. Although there appears to be a temporal pattern since the advent of the Westphalian system to the post-Cold War era of political authority moving away from notions of the collective interests of territorial entities and towards a stronger notion of universal human rights, it is important to recognize that this transformation is not experienced by all political entities in a uniform way. Conceptions of legitimate political authority transform over time, but they do so in social contexts of power, exclusion, and resistance. Placing this transformation into these varying contexts can help us understand how justifications for war come to be framed in different ways, and what these framings tell us about political authority in particular social and historical contexts.

To answer these questions, I examine justifications for war-making across the history of the sovereign state’s growth and proliferation. Throughout this history, war-making has been central to the transformation of ideas on political authority. I have highlighted the ways in which theories of state formation have identified war-making as central to this process, and revolutions in ideas about state sovereignty have often been accompanied by revolutions of a violent nature. Beyond this, war generally, and the ways in which the initiation of wars are constructed in particular, offer a unique window to understand how political authority is constructed and how these constructions transform over time and in different social contexts.
Framing War: Logics and Discourses of Justification

Justifications for war provide a useful site to examine political authority and its transformations because political authority is discursively constituted. In analyzing how authority was constructed in the French Revolution, Baker argued that political authority is a matter of linguistic authority, “first, in the sense that political functions are defined and allocated within the framework of a given political discourse; and second, in the sense that their exercise takes the form of upholding authoritative definitions of the terms within that discourse” (1990: 4). In addition, approaching political authority from a linguistic interpretation of justification frames is also a means to illuminate the connections between human agency and historical context. Human agents “find their being within language; they are, to that extent, constrained by it. Yet they are constantly working with it and on it, playing at its margins, exploiting its possibilities, and extending the play of its potential meanings, as they pursue their purposes and projects” (Baker 1990: 4-6). Thus, the language invoked to express political authority can tell us something about the historical and structural context in which it was employed. To be authoritative, expressions of political authority must work within the boundaries of what is already accepted as legitimate, but can simultaneously reify boundaries while pushing them in a new direction.

A similar understanding of linguistic frameworks is present in the works of Erving Goffman (1986) whose theory of frame analysis conceives of primary frameworks as discursive expressions which render meaningful aspects that would otherwise be meaningless. Frame analysis has typically been employed in the study of social movements and the identification of processes by which frames align to produce
resonance among participating individuals (Benford & Snow 1988 provide a useful review of this literature). The goal of the current project is not to determine the resonance or effectiveness of these justifications per say, but rather to ground them in their broader social contexts. That is, the degree to which the populace accepts or rejects these justifications is not an object of analysis; that leaders employ those logics that they perceive to hold power within their own particular contexts is a significant indicator of how authority is conceived. In this regard, Goffman’s concept of social frameworks provides a useful set of tools to conceive of justifications for war-making as frames that are situated in specific historical contexts. As mentioned above, the just war tradition has long focused on just cause for war, or *jus ad bellum*, as a matter of philosophical and moral significance. While there is certainly overlap between the just cause of a war and the justification frames employed by political and military leaders, I propose to move past the just war focus on the moral relevance of these frames, and instead deal with justification frames as they are. That is, the larger philosophical and moral question of whether and under what conditions a war can be considered just is not at issue here. Rather, the specific frames that leaders use to justify war, whether political and legal philosophers consider them truly just or not, are incredibly useful sites of knowledge ripe for study. These justification frames reveal important information about what leaders in a specific moment in time and political context consider appropriate and legitimate authority; they are windows into the widespread and normative conceptions regarding legitimate political authority in specific historical and political contexts. As such, when collected globally and over large swaths of time, these justifications are data which can be used to better understand long term trends in political transformation.
Operating within this understanding of social frameworks, I define a justification frame as one type of social framework that is invoked by political and military leaders to substantiate to the public the reasons why engaging in armed conflict is both necessary and authoritatively sound. As such, justification frames are comprised of two components: a *logic of justification* which specifies the authority by which the right to wage war is drawn, and a *discourse of justification* which defines the object for which war is needed to benefit and/or protect. The two central logics of justification that have been employed historically are a *sovereign rights logic* and a *humanitarian justice logic*. A sovereign rights logic refers to the right to wage war because the authoritative structure in question is widely acknowledged as the highest level at which authority operates. In other words it is an authority that is readily identifiable at a concrete temporal and physical level: authority is located in a specific person or governing apparatus. A humanitarian justice logic refers to the right to wage war because of a sense of moral righteousness drawn from the nature of humanity itself; it is an authority that exists beyond any concrete, physically identifiable form. Although a humanitarian justice logic often does correspond with a particular religious institution, it is not the institution itself that is identified as the source of authority but rather a higher, divine power. Such a logic could take the form of “God-sanctioned violence” but need not be associated with belief in the divine; this logic also encompasses a humanist perspective which envisions authority located in an innate human morality. In contrast to logics of justification, discourses of justification encompass the *need* for waging war. A discourse of justification can be *human-centric* – referring to the obligation to protect people from
undue harm – or *interest-centric* – referring to the need to protect material and status interests.

This distinction between logics and discourses of justification here may help to explain why some scholars have perceived of a shift in the nature of justifications for war since the end of the Cold War. Just war revival claims assert that justifications rooted in moral authority, rather than the authority of governments, have resurfaced in recent decades after a centuries-long dormancy in which the authority of states dominated the language of war. This shift, it is argued, is indicative of a broader global transformation in which the power and authority of the international system of states is waning. These just war revival claims in particular draw attention to the use of human-centric language employed by leaders to justify waging war (see for example, Lawler 2002 and Falk 2004). What these accounts fail to specify is whether this perceived transformation is authoritative in nature, from sovereign to humanitarian justice logics, or rather is discursive in nature, from interest-centric to human-centric within the same logical framework. A sovereign logic of justification can, and often does, link with human-centric discourses. States, for example, may claim the need to wage war to protect their citizens; however, this discourse is linked with a sovereign rights justification: they need to protect their citizens because that is a central role of the state and their authority to do so is based on their status as a sovereign state. Claiming to protect people is not necessarily indicative of a transformation in legitimate political authority, unless it is accompanied by a logical framework which locates the authority to do so as existing beyond the power of states.
When invoked in various combinations, these discourses and logics comprise the set of frameworks that leaders use to justify war (see table 2.1). A justification frame that employs a logic of sovereign rights and a human-centric discourse is referred to as a *protection obligation* frame. Here, justifications for war-making center on the responsibility of the state apparatus to protect and defend the people under its rule. This justification is based on one of the traditional defining features of the state system—that of the state holding a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Because the state (largely) denies its citizens the right to use force for their own protection, the state has a responsibility to provide protection for those citizens against any perceived threat to their safety. The protection obligation frame is often used in the context of a state protecting its own citizens, but this is not always the case. The protection obligation frame may also be used by a state to justify fighting for the protection of the citizens of another state, arguing that if a state is not fulfilling its obligation to protect its citizenry then it becomes the responsibility of another state to step in and fill that role. Similarly, an absence-of-state argument may be used by a group within a state by claiming that because the state is not fulfilling its obligation to protect its citizenry, another polity must take on this responsibility until the state proves capable of doing so. The key component that distinguishes the *protection obligation* frame from humanitarian justifications that call for the protection of innocents, which will be discussed in more detail below, is that the identity of those who are due protection is defined in terms of a geographic location; that is, they largely occupy a distinct location that can be territorially identified and is (or is supposed to be) under the rule of a territorially delineated government. It is their physical location within specific geographic boundaries that warrants their protection.
A justification frame which employs a sovereign rights logic and an interest-centric discourse is referred to as a state power-interests frame. This frame justifies war-making in terms of the power and authority possessed by the state to protect and defend its interests, namely, material and status interests. Material interests refer primarily to territory and natural resources, while status interests refers to the need to establish or maintain beneficial relations to other (typically similarly organized) polities and the need to defend against threats to the status quo. In other words, the state power-interests frame is primarily concerned with the prevention of a disruption to the established system of polity organization, in this case, the international system of states. Similar to the protection obligation frame, the state power-interests frame can invoke an absence-of-state claim, but here the absence-of-state claim is used to argue that war-making is necessary to protect the material and/or status interests of a citizen body because the state that is imbued with the authority to do so is unwilling or unable to act.

A justification frame which employs a humanitarian justice logic and a human-centric discourse is referred to as a suffering of innocents frame. This frame justifies war-making in the broad context of human rights and typically invokes the idea of the prevention of suffering of innocent people as a basis for action. Recall the distinction made above between the protection obligation frame and humanitarian justifications in terms of how the identity characteristics of the group that warrants protection; namely, their association with territorially defined political organization. Human rights claims within the suffering of innocents frames are likewise distinct in the manner in which the claim invokes a fundamental right to basic security, independent from association with any territorial political organization.
A justification frame which employs a humanitarian justice logic and an interest-centric discourse is referred to as a *group preservation* frame. This frame justifies war-making for the protection of the interests of a group (again, based on an identity that is independent from territorial political organizations). These interest claims can be in terms of the protection of a belief system that is fundamental to the group’s identity (in particular, religion), a broader claim of threat to the group’s basic security and survival, the prevention of the spread of violence or security threat to other group members, or as a claim of unprovoked aggression. It is important to note that a claim of unprovoked aggression in the context of a humanitarian justice logic refers to the concept of a fundamental right to security that is independent from territorial political organization. Claims of unprovoked aggression may be present within a sovereign rights logic, but these claims are in terms of national security interests within a *power-interests* frame. The essence of the unprovoked aggression claim within the *group preservation* frame is that the group has done nothing to deserve violence against it, but because of the aggressive actions of others, the group’s fundamental right to existence is threatened, necessitating the use of force.

The major advantage to these employing frameworks in this manner is the plasticity they offer in interpreting transformations in political authority. The broadness of these frames allows them to encompass the wide variety of specific claims that may be historically or geographically contextual. The boundaries of these frames are malleable, leaving room for interpretation on the part of the researcher to situate claims in very different contexts into the same framework. At the same time, however, these frames offer clear boundaries around which broad classes of frames can be distinguished from
each other, allowing for analysis and generalization across a wide variety of cases, and
avoiding the tendency for contextual specificity that is inherent in historical research.
These categorical boundaries are important because in order to understand how political
authority transforms over time and in different contexts, it is essential to clearly
demarcate and identify both the logic and discourse of justifications that are being
employed within a particular frame. I have previously approached the question of a just
war revival in the post-Cold War era by analyzing the logics and discourses of
justification employed by political and military leaders in nine conflicts initiated from
1990-2008 (Clever 2012). The findings of this study do not support the claim that states
are eschewing conventional state-interest arguments in favor of the greater flexibility of
humanitarian arguments, or that non-state actors are more likely to use humanitarian
justice logics because the established state sovereignty frames are not open to them.
Rather, the data indicates that power-interest frames are the predominant frame employed
by both state and non-state actors, and that state actors are more likely than non-state
actors to intertwine sovereign rights and humanitarian rights logics.

Table 2.1 Justification Frameworks

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<td></td>
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<td>Sovereign rights</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group preservation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These preliminary findings also indicate several fronts where further research
should be targeted. First, the small number of cases examined limits the extent to which
these findings can be generalized to all conflicts. It is one thing to claim that non-state actors pose a challenge to the conceptual authority of state sovereignty; it is quite another to claim that this challenge is somehow different or more serious after 1990 than during preceding centuries. It is necessary then to expand the historical scope and number of cases in order to establish more generalizable conclusions. Second, the results of the analysis indicate important differences between the types of justification frames employed in different types of war. State combatants, for example, were more likely to use sovereign rights logics of justification in asymmetrical wars against non-state actors than in symmetrical inter-state wars. This highlights the need for a relational ontology; how strong and weak actors interact with each other, and the social and historical context that informs this interaction, is essential to understanding what particular claims to authority mean and how these claims vary in different contexts.

Finally, these findings indicate that although state actors were more likely than non-state actors to employ sovereign rights logics of justification, non-state actors still employed a sovereign rights logic more than 40 percent of the time, with the vast majority of these frames employing an interest-centric discourse. Understanding why non-state actors employ sovereign rights justification is necessary to understand what these authoritative claims indicate about transformations in the power of the state system. If they employ these logics because they perceive it as the only way to reasonably compete and be recognized by other polities, then this is indicative of the continuing strength and dominance of the sovereign state system. However, it is also possible that the use of seemingly old frames is indicative of a shift towards new ways of thinking.
Cecilia Ridgeway has used the concept of cultural frames to understand the persistence of structural gender inequality, arguing that because cultural frames serve as the basis for social coordination, forms of inequality are able to persist for two reasons: lag time, and the reapplication of old cultural frames on new organizational forms (2011, 2012). When social change creates “sites of innovation,” she suggests, increased uncertainty leads to an increased likelihood that individuals will unconsciously fall back on familiar cultural frames. When those familiar frames contain expressions of inequality, that inequality becomes reapplied to the new organizational form that emerges from the site of innovation. This process occurs simultaneously with a cultural “lag time” in which new ideas exist in advance of the application of those ideas to new organizational forms. That is, an idea has to be widely held in society before it can be applied to new organizational forms. Even when an idea is widely held, there will be a lag before it can be effectively applied to a new organizational form because sites of innovation create uncertainty, causing people to fall back on older and more familiar cultural frames as the basis for coordination. This means that new ideas will be applied to new organizational forms in a piecemeal pattern, with one step back for every two steps forward.

Ridgeway applied these concepts of lag time and familiar frame reapplication to the study of gender inequality, however, the focus on cultural frames as the basis for coordination readily applies itself to the study of war. Because war requires massive coordination both of ideas and action, cultural frames, in the form of justification frames, are necessary. If a new organizational form of political power is in fact emerging, Ridgeway’s theory would predict that the uncertainty created by such a site of innovation
would cause leaders to fall back on the familiar cultural frame of state sovereignty, in order to enhance their basis for coordination with other leaders and existing organizations. In addition, we should expect to observe a lag between when an idea first emerges (global governance over state sovereignty, for example) and its application to a new organizational form, and we should expect that the application to occur in a piecemeal fashion. Thus, while the end of the Cold War and rising relevance of non-state combatants in war spurred the notion that sovereign state authority mattered less than in the past, the uncertainty created by such a situation and the lag between the emergence of a new idea and its full application to a new organizational form can be expected to lead to the persistence of sovereign rights frames in justifications for war long after such a frame is deemed irrelevant by scholars. If these processes of lag time and reapplication of familiar cultural frames on new organizations are actually at work, we should be able to observe evidence of these patterns over the longer term. That is, during periods of ideational and organizational change – such as that surrounding the transition to national governments in the late 18th and early 19th century revolutions – it should be possible to observe a pattern whereby the emergence of new ideas is accompanied by a fall back to older justification frames, followed by a lag in which new ideas are slowly adapted to new organizational forms while carrying older frames along with it.

While Ridgeway’s concepts of familiar frame reapplication and lag time can help us to understand how old frames may persist in the face of new ideas, it is also important to keep in mind the interactional context that informs the use of these frames among actors at varying levels of integration within organizational structures such as the international system of states. Those categorized as non-state combatants are comprised
of groups who have been historically and systematically excluded from the international system of states, as well as the privilege and benefits that accompany inclusion within this system. The term ‘terrorism’ is often used by Western powers to legitimate state power and delegitimize the violent actions of these actors with little thought given to the historical experiences of exclusion that inform the motives behind such forms of violent resistance (Barkawi & Laffey 2006). For those identified by Western powers as terrorists, the link between this history and current violent acts are often made explicit. Osama bin Laden, for example, has stated that “the West’s occupation of our countries is old, but takes new forms. The struggle between us and them began centuries ago, and will continue” (quoted in Barkawi & Laffey 2006: 330). Within such a historical context, claims to the authoritative power of the state system by those who have been historically excluded from this system may be indicative of a desire to access the benefits and privileges of that system, as well as the continuing authoritative relevance of that system.

An analysis of justification frames in the context of war can uncover patterns of continuity and change in systems of authority when approached from a relational ontology that includes historically and globally broad cases.

**Argument and Hypotheses**

My argument is driven by two assumptions drawn from theories of the interiorization of state power (Goldberg 2002, Bourdieu 1999, Scott 1990). First, that modern state sovereignty is a system of political power. Second, that within systems of power which are globally, culturally and socially pervasive (as is the modern state
system), those who are most excluded will tend to more strongly assert the ways in which they are or desire to be integrated into that system, while those who are well integrated and advantaged by such a system of power have greater flexibility in the ways in which they claim belonging and have the privilege to assert, deny, or remain ambivalent about their relationship to that system. In the words of Scott “the greater the disparity in power between the dominant and the subordinate and the more arbitrarily it is exercised, the more the public transcripts of the subordinates will take on a stereotyped ritualistic cast” (1990: 3). This relationship, operating within particular historical contexts, shapes the justification frames that are employed by combatant actors in war. I argue that which justification frame is employed in a given conflict is shaped by the tension between the prevailing conceptions of the specific nature of the political authority of the state and the extent to which a combatant actor in a given conflict is excluded from the state system.

Central to the story of the transformations in the political authority of the sovereign state are the processes of modernity, colonization, and race. Modernity is a social condition of differentiation, characterized by the establishment and exclusivity of boundaries. State sovereignty as a system of political authority is rooted in the territorial delimitation and mutual exclusivity of state power defined by its physical boundaries. Racialization is a product of the same modern social condition that produced the state, a condition of differentiation and physical delimitation between people. Colonization, by the same token, is a product and an extension of state power which creates a “compartmentalized world” divided first and foremost by racial distinction (Fanon 2004); it is a state project that is marked and ordered by race (Goldberg 2002). Colonization and race are two sides of the same coin and intimately linked with the proliferation of the
state. That these processes emerged simultaneously and in the context of early modern Western Europe is no coincidence. Colonization, race, and the sovereign state are interrelated products of the same modern social condition.

How each of these components is employed in my dissertation is modeled in figure 2.1. Justifications for war-making (as expressions of conceptions of legitimate political authority) are shaped by three factors: the colonial experiences of the combatants (as a colonial power, a colonial subject, and a colonial relationship between the combatant dyad), the prevailing understanding of the nature of the state’s authority within the historical era in which the war is taking place, and the symmetry of the combatant dyad in terms of their relationship to the international system of states. It is also important to note the link between colonial history and combatant symmetry; those actors with histories as colonial powers will be more likely to be strongly integrated into the state system, while those with histories as colonial subjects will be less integrated. Therefore, conflicts between colonial power actors and colonial subject actors as well as conflicts between a combatant dyad with a colonial history with each other will be more likely to be asymmetrical than conflicts between two colonial powers, two colonial subjects, or non-colonial relationship dyads.

Racial formation is an important component to include in this model, but in and of itself is not a variable I will measure in terms of its impact on the use of justification frames. Rather, what matters about race here is that it is an inextricable part of the colonial experience and the divisions produced by the colonial project. It is essential to keep race in the picture for the sake of understanding and explaining the perceived threat of non-state combatants to the political authority of the state system. Including three
different aspects of the colonial experience allows me to capture the range of ways in which a history of colonialism can impact how combatant actors experience integration or exclusion from the state system. Those who have had recent or ongoing experiences as a colonial subject have experienced exclusion and disadvantage within the state system, while those who have had recent or ongoing experiences as a colonial power have experienced inclusion and advantage within the state system. Greater inclusion means greater privilege of flexibility in how legitimate authority is expressed, while greater exclusion leads to greater assertion of claims in line with the authority of that system from which one is excluded. Connected to this colonial experience is the level of symmetry of the combatants, highly symmetrical conflicts will tend to be those between combatants that are both highly integrated into the state system, and therefore the language used will be less likely to rigidly adhere to sovereignist logics of justification because such highly integrated combatants have the privilege of greater flexibility in drawing on prevailing conceptions of political authority. Highly asymmetrical conflicts will be those among dyads in which one combatant is relatively more integrated into the state system than the other. Such conflicts will be more likely to draw on sovereignist logics of justification because the position of one of the combatants as relatively excluded from the state system.

3 Conflicts between combatants of which neither are highly integrated into the state system (non-state conflicts) would also be considered highly symmetric, but such conflicts are rare in modern history and are unlikely to enter into the historical record, and are therefore not included in the analysis.
The conditions under consideration are state system integration, colonial experience, and historical era of political authority. The definitions of these variables will be discussed in more detail in the methods chapter, but for current purposes, I define state system integration conditions as including the status of the combatant as a state or non-state actor, and the symmetry or asymmetry of the combatant dyad. Colonial experience conditions include the recent history or ongoing status of the combatant actor as a colonial power or colonial subject, and whether the combatant is engaged in conflict with another combatant with whom it has shared a colonial relationship. The historical eras in political authority described above – the Westphalian transformation, the era of popular sovereignty, the springtime of the nations, the era of supra-national authority, and the era of fragmented sovereignty after 1989 – each exhibit successively greater weight given to
the authority of universal human rights over the collective interests of territorial polities. I expect that the constellations of state system integration and colonial experience conditions as combined within particular historical eras of political authority produce particular outcomes in how justifications for war are framed. While it is possible, and even likely, that more than one frame will be present in a given case, I focus on which frame emerges as most prominent, or is given the most authoritative weight in each case. The technique used to establish which frame is most prominent is detailed in the methods chapter.

The following chapter also details the techniques used to determine which constellations of conditions combine to produce particular justification frame outcomes. Based upon the theoretical perspective outlined in the above chapter, there are a few patterns in particular that I expect to observe.

The fracture narrative and just war revival arguments would predict that the greater the divergence in power status between the two combatants, the more invocations of authority and cause for war will be rooted in a humanitarian justice logic and a human-centric discourse for war. In other words, both low and high power actors in power divergent and/or asymmetric conflicts will employ the suffering of innocents frame because such conflicts require an authoritative context that exists outside of the conventional boundaries of the sovereign state system. Further, this pattern would become more apparent over time as states encounter ever more opponents who are outside the system.
My theoretical approach, employing a relational ontology, however, challenges this prediction. I predict that high power and low power actors employ different justifications frames depending on the combatant structural and historical context that surrounds the conflicts. I expect that in conflicts in which the relations of power between the main combatant actors are highly divergent and/or highly asymmetrical, high power actors will employ a humanitarian logic of justification while low power actors will employ a sovereign rights logic of justification. I expect this pattern to occur because the sovereign state system is a system of political power which confers privilege on those who are highly integrated into its structure, and disadvantages to those who are excluded from it. Those who are excluded seek to invoke the rules of that system in order to stake claim to its privileges, while those who benefit from the system shift focus toward justifications that lay outside the rules of the system, as if to refuse to allow those who threaten that privileged status to play by the set of rules that grants them that privilege. However, if both combatants hold privileged status within the system of states, sovereignist logics will be most prevalent among both actors, since both seek to assert their privilege most strongly. While this balance fluctuates between humanitarian and sovereignist logics dependent upon the divergence in power-integration, discourses of justification will show an increasing trend in prevalence towards human-centric justifications over the course of time, because each era in the transformation of political authority has become successively more oriented toward the obligation of government to the people under its rule.

The theoretical framework outlined here therefore leads to the following sets of hypotheses:
H1: A sovereign rights logic of justification will be employed as a primary justication by high power actors in symmetrical and/or non-power divergent conflicts and by low power actors in asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts. Among all actors, interest-centric discourses will be associated with earlier eras of the state system, while human-centric discourses will be associated with later eras of the state system, with middle eras exhibiting both discursive types. Thus,

H1a: The power interests frame will be associated with high power actors in symmetrical and/or non-power divergent conflicts in the early and middle eras of the state system.

H1b: The power interests frame will be associated with low power actors in asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts in the early and middle eras of the state system.

H1c: The protection obligation frame will be associated with high power actors in symmetrical and/or non-power divergent conflicts in the middle eras and later eras of the state system.

H1d: The protection obligation frame will be associated with low power actors in asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts in the middle and later eras of the state system.

H2: A humanitarian rights logic of justification will be used as a primary justication by high power actors in power asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts. Low power actors, however, will not employ a humanitarian right logic as
a primary justification when in conflict with high power actors. Among all actors, interest-centric discourses will be associated with earlier eras of the state system, while human-centric discourses will be associated with later eras of the state system, with middle eras exhibiting both discursive types. Thus,

H2a: The group preservation frame will be associated with high power actors in power asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts in the early and middle eras of the state system.

H2b: The suffering of innocents frame will be associated with high power actors in power asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts in the middle and later eras of the state system.

If these hypotheses are supported, my analysis will offer evidence against the fracture narrative and just war revival arguments that see state authority declining as low power, non-state actors increasingly come into conflict with high power state actors. Rather than the authority of the sovereign state system waning in the face of such challenges, the invocation of a sovereign rights logic of justification by low power actors against high power actors indicates that the authority of the state system remains strong; that is, the challenge to the state system is not a challenge to the nature of its authority, but rather, a challenge to include previously excluded actors into the benefits of that system. By remaining attentive to the discourses used within each of these logics of justification, the current analysis offers a level of nuance that has not been provided by

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4 Because symmetrical low power conflicts (that is, non-state wars) are relatively rare in the historical record and are not included in the present data set, the current analysis cannot speculate on the frames associated with symmetrical and non-power divergent conflicts between low power actors.
the fracture narrative and just war revival arguments. That is, while it is possible that recent conflicts are exhibiting different justification frames from those that were common in past centuries, I predict that this shift reflects the ever transforming orientation of the obligations of the state system, not a transformation in the authoritative foundations of the state system itself.

In the following chapter, I detail the variable definitions and methodological techniques used to test the above hypotheses.
Chapter 3 Methods

*Interpretive Document Analysis: close acquaintance and QCA approaches*

This dissertation has two primary objectives. First, to determine the extent to which conceptions of the authority of the sovereign state system in the post-Cold War era has transformed from earlier eras. Second, to uncover the constellation of conditions, particularly those related to the political organization and state system integration of combatant groups, which lead to the use of particular frames to justify war-making. To achieve these objectives, I employ an interpretive analysis through two complementary approaches: a small-n interpretive case study and a medium-n fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA).

Justifications for war provide the documentary window through which we are able to observe how conceptions of political authority are conceived of in particular social and historical contexts. It is therefore fitting to employ an interpretive approach that treats these justifications as “repositories of meaning,” to borrow Sewell’s terminology, in order to “reconstruct the codes…that the text or text analogues instantiate and upon which their authors can be presumed to have drawn on in carrying out their actions” (2005: 332). As discussed in the previous chapter, my focus on constructions and transformations of political authority make an interpretive approach especially appropriate. Baker (1990) describes political authority as a matter of linguistic authority that must work within the boundaries of prevailing notions of legitimate authority while simultaneously pushing those boundaries in new directions. Goffman’s (1986) theory of
primary frameworks likewise provides a set of tools through which linguistic expressions of authority can be interpreted to uncover their underlying social meanings.

An interpretive approach, in addition to being an appropriate fit for questions of political authority, also has several advantages for historically oriented research. Skocpol (1984) has advocated the narrative style of interpretive works as offering a compelling means to reach audiences beyond academia. The single or limited comparative case studies used in interpretive approaches attend to the rich complexity of historical events while avoiding the high levels of abstraction inherent in causal modeling that may seem arbitrary or alienated from context. Arguments proceed through the telling of stories that draw on contemporary sensibilities and deliberately stress the relevance of past events to current worldviews. I use a case-study interpretive approach to tell a story about how political authority has transformed, and how it has stayed the same, over the course of the history of the sovereign state system. Skocpol also emphasizes, however, that compelling storytelling does not equate with validity, and single or small-n interpretive studies are painfully limited in their ability to speak to broader patterns beyond the individual case.

In an effort to balance rich historical context with generalizable empirical assessment, I employ a second complementary approach that bridges qualitative and quantitative assessment. The techniques of interpretive case studies necessarily limit the number of cases with which a single researcher can feasibly engage in a reasonable amount of time, but that does not mean that it is impossible to examine a broader set of historically and geographically representative cases for the purposes of revealing more general patterns. Ragin (1987, 2000, 2008) has developed a set of strategies for engaging in medium-n analysis that is especially appropriate for the project at hand. Qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA) is particularly suited to historical case-based research in which a given outcome can be the result of multiple trajectories, or pathways, expressed as different configurations of conditions.

In addition to providing strategies for analyzing outcomes that have multiple sources of causation, Ragin challenges both traditional quantitative and qualitative approaches to social science as violating basic assumptions about how the social world operates. Namely, both approaches neglect the importance of set-relations in social research, instead preferring to convert theoretic statements into statements of correlation. In conventional qualitative approaches, this means transforming sets into typologies to be deconstructed, whereas quantitative approaches transform these sets into dummy variables that can be plugged into linear models. The problem with both approaches, according to Ragin, is that set-relations should be analyzed on their own terms as they “reflect integral social or causal connections and are not merely definitional in nature, they require explication – that is, they are theory and knowledge dependent” (2008: 14). For example, consider the following claim: “one indication of the declining authority of the state is the resurgence of humanitarian rather than sovereignist claims as the basis of justifying war in the post-Cold War era, particularly as evidenced in conflicts between state and non-state actors.” This statement identifies humanitarian and sovereignist justifications as subsets of all justifications for war-making and state and non-state actors as subsets of all types of combatant actors. A traditional correlational approach would seek to link the instances of each type of justification with the type of actor employing them. The analyst could then make statements about the proportion of instances, in terms of a defined set of wars and/or actors, in which each kind of justification was used. The
analyst could then make claims about the prevalence of particular types of justifications under particular conditions and offer theoretically informed speculations on what these correlations indicate about how political authority has changed over time.

Although such an approach may offer some useful insights, these correlations neglect important aspects of the meaning and degree of belonging of these variables within their respective analyst-imposed categories. For example, a combatant actor can be understood as being state or non-state, but variations in the extent to which an actor belongs to these categories is meaningful. A non-state actor can include groups that operate entirely independently of any support from a state, but also those who operate within a state that offers material and moral support, operate within a state that tolerates their presence but does not offer any support, or operate within a state that is hostile to them while receiving support from other external actors. Similarly the justifications employed by actors can have meaningful differences in belonging to categories of humanitarian or sovereignist. To claim, for example, that humanitarian logics are more likely to be employed when states fight non-state actors glosses over the meaningful distinction between statements that exclusively use one type of logic, those that intertwine different logics of justification, and the degree of weight given to one type of justification over another when they are intertwined.

To address these complexities, I use a particular form of QCA: fuzzy sets qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). In fsQCA, each variable is calibrated in terms of the degree to which it belongs to a set, informed by theory and knowledge of each case. Where a ‘crisp’ set would define a variable in terms of either satisfying the conditions for membership or non-membership, a fuzzy-set approach allows for more
precise quantitative membership, ranging from full membership (1.0) to full non-membership (0.0), with a range of values in between to satisfy conditions of partial membership. Collective social science knowledge as well as the researcher’s own accumulated knowledge informs the criteria for calibration, setting ‘qualitative anchors’ where the researcher can distinguish between relevant and irrelevant variation. A fsQCA approach thus forms a bridge between quantitative and qualitative approaches: a fuzzy-set is both case oriented and variable oriented, full membership or non-membership is a qualitative state defined by the analyst’s knowledge, while the allowance for varying degrees of membership leads to greater quantitative precision (Ragin 2008: 81-83).

These two interpretive approaches, a close-acquaintance study and fsQCA, complement each other and their use together enhances the overall quality of the study. Using these approaches together allows me to examine the question of transformation in political authority with rich historical context in a small subset of cases as well as draw out broader patterns and trends from a larger set of globally and historically representative cases. Although fsQCA addresses some of the generalizability shortcomings of a close-acquaintance study, this approach cannot provide a fully representative and broadly generalizable analysis. It can, however provide an analysis of limited generalizability which more appropriately accounts for the set-theoretic nature of the variables of interest. These two approaches can also be used to inform one another, with the trends revealed in the fuzzy-set analysis highlighting important illustrative cases, and the in-depth narratives of individual cases allowing for theoretical insights that can give greater clarity to the conditions under which particular justification frames are employed.
Case Selection

Following the case selection guidelines for QCA outlined in Rihoux and Ragin (2009) and Ragin (1987), I selected cases of war-making with attention to issues of the relationship between the outcome of interest and case definition, as well as the balance between case diversity and practicalities of sample size.

The universe of cases for this analysis was wars since the beginning of the 17th century. This historical scope was selected in order to include cases of war immediately prior to, during, and after the Westphalian transformation out of which the modern state system was born. I define war as a specific form of violence that is explicitly organized for the purpose of obtaining a political objective. Accordingly, I do not believe it is appropriate to define war in terms of threshold of combat related fatalities, as has been the standard practice of most currently available data sets.\(^5\) What makes war distinct from other forms of violence is not the number of people killed, but rather the fact that people organize with the express purpose of enacting violence in order to achieve a political objective. This emphasis on the organization of political violence is particularly relevant given the outcome of interest: justifications for war-making. Because war is violence organized for political objectives, engaging in it requires the extraction of substantial manpower and material resources. This extraction, in turn, requires the war-waging leadership to publicly and explicitly justify why such an action is appropriate and necessary. For the purposes of case selection, the scale of conflict matters only to the

\(^5\) See for examples the Correlates of War project (www.correlatesofwar.org) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Research Program at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/)
extent that a conflict requires widespread public articulation of the reasons for conflict; that is, its organization must have been sufficiently large enough in scale to have entered into the historical record.

Because QCA requires a sufficient level of intimacy with each case in the sample in order to make theoretically informed decisions about variable specification, the number of cases that can be included is necessarily restricted. In addition, sample size must be balanced with condition selection. The range of conditions included should be guided by careful examination of all relevant competing theories, but too great a focus on including the full range of possible conditions can lead to a problem of ‘limited diversity’ where the logical combinations of conditions is greater than the number of cases (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Limited diversity can result in an analysis where each individual case has an individual explanation, rather than revealing general explanations for groups of similar cases. It is necessary then to remain cognizant of the balance between sample size and the number of conditions, an issue which I will explicate in more depth in the variable descriptions below.

Case selection must also ensure that the variation across cases sufficiently captures the diversity of cases within the universe. Particularly in QCA, where analyst knowledge of cases is paramount, it is important for case selection to obtain “a maximum of heterogeneity over a minimum number of cases (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009: 21). Because this dissertation addresses conceptions of legitimate political authority in the context of the historical development of the international system of states, it is necessary to select cases of war that capture geographic and temporal diversity, as well as reflect the different ways in which authority is employed or challenged within war. With this
variation in mind, I select cases of war purposively to include external wars, wars of
rebellion, and civil, or internal wars (see table 3.1). These categorization of war types
exhibits some divergences between conventional categorizations such as inter-state and
civil wars and reflects the focus of this dissertation on authoritative meanings.
Particularly for internal conflicts, categorizing wars as either rebellions or conflicts can
obscure the authoritative meanings embedded in them more than they help to distinguish
between them. For example, at what point does an insurgency become a civil war? What
is the difference between a civil war and a rebellion? Often these categorizations reflect
the legitimacy ascribed to the conflict by external parties rather than reflecting real
differences in the dynamics of conflict. Because this dissertation is concerned with
expressions of political authority, I draw the lines of distinction between different types
of internal conflicts around whether the conflicting groups are fighting for total
dominance of one territorial locus of authority, or whether one group is seeking to
separate its political authority from another and create a distinct locus of authority in
addition to and on par with its rival. The distinction here is between seeking to overtake
an existing authority or create a parallel authority. In addition to including variation
across different types of authoritative conflicts, I also make an effort to include as much
geographic diversity as possible, including wars from Europe, Asia (including the Middle
East), Africa, and the Americas (including the Caribbean). Ideally, a case selection that
exhibited the fullest possible variation would include one war of each type for each
geographic area and each century.
Table 3.1 War Type Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War Type</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>Conflict between parties with territorially distinct and independent centers of power at the start of conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal for central control</td>
<td>Internal for control of political authority. Conflict between parties with wholly or partially overlapping centers of power at the start of conflict contesting the legitimate rule in a singular territorial space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal separatist</td>
<td>Internal for separation of political authority. Conflict between parties with wholly or partially overlapping centers of power at the start of conflict where one of the parties seeks political concessions from the reigning political authority, or a partial or total separation of political authority.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With attention to these issues, I purposively selected 63 cases of conflict involving a total of 126 combatants. After an initial round of data collection, 16 cases involving 37 combatant actors were excluded from analysis because of insufficient documentation available. For each of the dropped cases, the lack of primary documentation was a result of original materials having been destroyed or only reported in a second-hand manner that was unreliable. For some cases, such as the Taiping Rebellion (1850) and the Egyptian-Ethiopian War (1870), sufficient documentation was available for one combatant but not another. In these cases, only the information on the combatant for which documentation could be collected was included in the final analysis. The final case selection included data from 89 combatants across 47 conflicts initiated from 1618-2008 (see Appendix Table 1). While I made a concerted effort to achieve maximum variation in geographic location, war type, and period of time, the facts of history do not always cooperate. For example, there are very few external wars with adequate documentation in Africa and the Americas before the early 19th century resulting in a sample of wars that exhibits greater variation after the mid-19th century that in the period between the early 17th and mid-19th centuries. Table 3.2 provides basic
summary information on the war type, time period, and geographic location for the combatant cases.

The choice to select cases purposively on these measures was done with the aim of ensuring variation on the variables, rather than variation on the population as would be accomplished with a random sampling from an existing data source. This approach to case selection follows from the objectives of this dissertation; that is, to seek to understand how different temporal and geopolitical contexts impact conceptions of legitimate authority within the state system. As reflected in table 3.2, the limitations of documentation availability mean that the current sample of conflicts analyzed are more heavily skewed towards external conflicts and conflicts occurring in Europe and the Americas than is represented in other widely used data sets such as COW and UCDP/PRIO. Some of this skewing is a result of documentation availability, however, much of it can also be attributed to a combination of differences in the time frame encompassing the data and the death threshold use to define war. Differences in these parameters ensure that every data set of war will have different representations on these major variables. Because of the manner in which the current analysis is conducted, particularly in its use of fsQCA as will be described in more detail below, the scale of representation on each of these variables is not influential on the outcome of the analysis. It is the existence of variation in the geopolitical contexts surrounding conflicts rather than the quantity of representation of each of these variations that influences the analysis outcome.
Table 3.2 Combatant case summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Current Sample 1618-2008</th>
<th>COW (v. 4) 1816-2007</th>
<th>UCDP/PRIO (ACD v. 4) 1946-2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War Type</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>48 54%</td>
<td>212 32%</td>
<td>67 27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal for central control</td>
<td>21 24%</td>
<td>249 38%</td>
<td>177 73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal separatist</td>
<td>20 22%</td>
<td>191 29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War Initiation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th century</td>
<td>14 16%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th century</td>
<td>10 11%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th century</td>
<td>21 24%</td>
<td>228 35%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th century</td>
<td>38 43%</td>
<td>397 61%</td>
<td>226 93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st century</td>
<td>6 7%</td>
<td>27 4%</td>
<td>18 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographic Location</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>15 17%</td>
<td>151 23%</td>
<td>79 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>20 22%</td>
<td>102 16%</td>
<td>26 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Middle East</td>
<td>19 21%</td>
<td>273 42%</td>
<td>102 42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>35 39%</td>
<td>125 19%</td>
<td>34 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>89 100%</td>
<td>651 100%</td>
<td>241 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Document Collection and Coding*

All documents were transcribed and imported into Atlas.ti coding software. An initial round of open coding was conducted using a grounded theory approach (Glaser &

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6 For COW and UCDP/PRIO data, external wars include all wars fought across borders, including interstate conflicts, extra-state conflicts, and wars of colonial and imperial conquest.

7 UCDP/PRIO data does not distinguish between internal separatist wars and internal wars for central control.
This initial coding scheme was consolidated and revised through three further rounds of coding, until a saturation point was reached and coding was not revealing any new information. This coding procedure ultimately produced 13 distinct discourses and 12 distinct logics of justification (see Appendix table 2). These logics and discourses were then organized into typologies where discourses were identified as being either human-centric or interest-centric, and logics were identified as being rooted in either sovereign rights or humanitarian justice (see tables 3.3 and 3.4). Three codes did not fit into this typology. First was a discourse of fighting for the common good or general peace and order with no accompanying specification of for whom or what this common good would benefit. Second was a logic of unspecified self-defense, usually framed in terms of an enemy’s aggressive acts or amassing of force when unconnected to any other authority. Many claims of self-defense were connected to a specific authority, for example claiming a “God-given right to self-defense” or citing a specific UN charter or treaty stipulation that grants the right to self-defense, and such claims would be coded as a divine/natural authority or treaty/legal authority, respectively. Unspecified claims of self-defense, however, were highly prevalent across all cases. Another highly prevalent logic of justification was a claim that recourse to war was legitimate because all peaceful means of resolution had been exhausted. These unspecified claims: a common good discourse, a general self-defense logic, and an exhaustion of peaceful means logic, I classified as universal codes because of their high prevalence across cases. These universal codes were therefore not integrated into the justification frame typologies detailed below.
Table 3.3 Typologies of Discourses of Justification with Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human-Centric</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Protect people (extra-territorial identity)                              | “...this we owe to [our Indian allies], as free Men and true Christians, to promote their Happiness, and make them Partakers of our happy Constitution, and extending it thro' the Continent, by endeavouring to civilize and incorporate with them...”  
- Governor Dobbs of North Carolina, 1756, French & Indian War |
| Protect people (government obligation to subjects/citizens/ruler/homeland) | “First, the Falkland Islanders are British citizens. British citizens have been invaded. If they can't look to their own country to protect them, to go and try to get the invader off, what future is there for anyone in this world? So they have a right to look to us for their defence. We have a right to defend our own territory.”  
- Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, May 17th 1982, Falklands/Malvinas War |
| Dignity/humiliation of populace                                          | “More and more Africans everywhere in Zimbabwe will embrace armed struggle. So it must proceed inexorably to its end of inevitable victory of justice against injustice and fascism, human dignity against humiliation and degradation, freedom against oppression, and progress against exploitation and racial greed.”  
- ZANU Proclamation, April 1973, Chimurenga War |
| Promote racial equality                                                   | “… racialism in any form or guise has no room whatsoever in Zimbabwe. Our objective, among other things, is to rid the country of this detrimental system of prejudice...”  
- James Chikerema, May 1966, Chimurenga War |
| Protect or promote representative government                               | “…such conduct was indispensable to show to the whole world that the Mexican people are fit for democracy, that they are thirsty for liberty, and that their present rulers do not measure up to their aspirations.”  
- The Plan of San Louis San Potosi, November 20th 1910, Mexican Revolution |
| **Interest-Centric**                                                      |                                                                         |
| Allies                                                                    | “If Germany is not to be false to her word and permit her ally to suffer annihilation at the hands of Russian superiority, she, too, must mobilize.”  
- Memorandum of Helmuth Von Moltke, July 29th 1914, World War I |
| Protect law/treaty/constitution                                           | “The barbarian merchants of your country, if they wish to do business for a prolonged period, are required to obey our statues respectfully...They must by no means try to test the effectiveness of the law with their lives. May you, O King, check your wicked and sift your wicked people before...”  
- Memorandum of Helmuth Von Moltke, July 29th 1914, World War I |
they come to China, in order to guarantee the peace of your nation.”
-Emperor Lin Tse-Hsu's Letter of Advice to Queen Victoria, 1839, First Opium War

| National/regional security interests | “We will withdraw from Iranian territory - where defence lines and army security necessitate our presence - as soon as Iran recognizes our sovereignty over our land and respects our vital interest.”
-Iraqi Commentary on Military Action, September 23rd 1980, First Persian Gulf War |

| Territorial/economic interests | “By the occupation of the coast, the Egyptians have completely isolated Abyssinia from the rest of the world, preventing trade with Europe by the heavy taxes they impose on both exports and imports.”
-King Yohannis of Ethiopia, May 13th 1873, Egyptian-Abyssinian War |

| Religious institution | “Alas, since the Tartar slaves invaded China, they have taught people to worship their false idols, to renounce the true faith and to betray God by shaking the people's beliefs. The Manchu demons are different from men. They affront High Heaven, tyrannize our black-haired multitudes, and destroy our people's lives.”
-Proclamation of the Taiping Rebels, 1854, Taiping Rebellion |

Table 3.4 Typologies of Logics of Justification with Examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic</th>
<th>By what authority is the right to wage war drawn?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Justice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Divine/natural authority | “We will be left no choice, but to take the necessary measure to maintain our authority with the help of the Almighty by whose grace we are your rightful king and master.”
-Emperor Matthias' Open Letter to the Bohemians, 1619, Thirty Years' War |
| Personal vengeance | “The Ming killed the father and grandfather of Nurhaci for no reason.”
-Nurhaci's Seven Grievances, 1618, Manchu Conquest of China |
| Virtue/might makes right | “By means of an army of veteran soldiers well trained in warfare, they seized on our treasures, our lands, and the government of our country, thereby proving that the only thing requisite for the usurping empire is the fact of being the strongest. There is, therefore, no difference between ourselves, who lay contributions on the villages we take, and the agents sent from Peking to collect taxes.
-Manifesto on the Right to the Throne, Taiping Rebellion, 1854 |
| Historical precedent                                                                 | “As a matter of history, successive British Governments have felt obliged to resist attempts by a single Power to dominate Europe at the expense of others, and the imposition of one country’s will by force of arms.”
|                                                                                     | -British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, August 24th 1939, Second World War |
| Sovereign Rights                                                                    |
| Monarchical sovereignty                                                              | “The whole world knows that it was essential to the French monarchy...that the king of France should be legislator; that he should have the full and entire disposal of the army; that he should cause justice to be administered to his subjects; that he should have the right of making peace and war; and, in a word, that plenitude of power which belongs to sovereignty.”
|                                                                                     | -Manifesto issued by the allied monarchs of Europe, August 4th 1792, European Wars of the French Revolution |
| Popular/ national sovereignty (consent of governed)                                  | “…this scandalous proceeding attacks the principle of popular sovereignty, which all the Republics of South America recognise as the basis of their institutions.”
|                                                                                     | -Argentine declaration of war against Bolivia, May 9th 1837, War of the Confederation |
| State sovereignty                                                                    | “Thus were established the two great principles asserted by the Colonies, namely: the right of a State to govern itself; and the right of a people to abolish a Government when it becomes destructive of the ends for which it was instituted. And concurrent with the establishment of these principles, was the fact, that each Colony became and was recognized by the mother Country a FREE, SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE.”
|                                                                                     | -South Carolina Declaration of the Causes of Secession, December 24th 1860, U.S. Civil War |
| Territorial or economic violation                                                    | “The Palestinians have achieved something but not what they wanted and need. They have been granted autonomy. But what does autonomy mean? We are living here but we do not own the country. The owner controls everything...continues to be under Israeli control. We have no sovereignty over our land and our water.”
|                                                                                     | -Ahmed Yasin, October 4th 2000, Second Intifada |
| Treaty, legal, or constitutional authority                                          | “We are in the right and the treaties support this claim; diplomacy ratifies this; and the international community recognizes it.”
|                                                                                     | -Peruvian Foreign Minister, February 6th 1995, Alto Cenepa War |
| Illegitimate foreign interference                                                    | “These bands occasionally adorn themselves with the title of National Liberation Army. In terms of liberation, the bring only oppression and terror. They call themselves national, and drawing their directives from abroad, they slay their brothers in religion. They make their way through fires, looting, and crime.”
|                                                                                     | -Jaques Soustelle, May 20th 1955, Algerian Revolution |
Variables

Dependent variables: justification frames

The above discourses and logics of justification are organized into the justification frameworks outlined in chapter 2 in order to form the dependent variables for fuzzy sets analysis. For each combatant case, I established the proportion of discourses employed that were interest-centric or human-centric, and the proportion of logics that were sovereignist or humanitarian. As a first step, I evaluated the proportions of discourses and logics for each case and set qualitative markers of being “fully in,” “more in than out,” “more out than in,” and “fully out” for each justification frame. For example, if 100% of the discourse codes employed in a particular case were interest-centric, while the 70% of the logics sovereign rights codes and 30% were humanitarian justice code, I would code this case as being more in than out of the power interests frame, more out than in the group preservation frame, and fully out of the suffering of innocents and protection obligation frames. After qualitatively assessing each case, I then averaged the proportions of each logic and discourse for each case using the following formulas:

Protection obligation frame = \( \% \)human-centric discourse + \( \% \)sovereign rights logic/2

Power-interests frame = \( \% \)interest-centric discourse + \( \% \)sovereign rights logic/2

Suffering of innocents frame = \( \% \)human-centric discourse + \( \% \)humanitarian justice logic/2
Group preservation frame = %interest-centric discourse + humanitarian justice 
\[ \log c/2 \]

Applying these formulas produces a value ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 that is indicative of the extent to which a case belongs within the set of each particular frame. Values closer to 0.0 indicate that the case is more out of the set, while values closer to 1.0 indicate that the case is more in the set, thus forming a continuous-value fuzzy set (Ragin 2008: 31). These values matched my qualitative assessment markers in over 95% of the cases.

**Independent variables**

These justification frameworks comprise the outcome variables of interest. What constellations of conditions are associated with the use of each of these frames? As detailed in chapter 2, a historical intersectional perspective leads me to reject the just war revival claims, which assert a resurgence of humanitarian justice authoritative claims in a post-Cold War era of diminishing sovereign state system authority. Rather, informed by critical race and post-colonial perspectives, I expect that the type of justification frame employed in a particular war is related to patterns of inclusion or exclusion from systems of global power within broader a broader historical transformation in conceptions of political authority.

As emphasized above, it is important to achieve a balance between the number of cases and the number of conditions to avoid the problem of limited diversity. While it may be possible to identify innumerable conditions that impact how political leaders
justify war, my review of the existing theoretical approaches to understanding the evolution of legitimate political authority in the modern era leads me to identify three central conditions that warrant focused attention in the context of my study: (1) when the conflict occurred in terms of its temporal proximity to key moments in the development of the concept of state sovereignty, (2) whether and the extent to which the combatant has been a colonial subject or a colonial power, and (3) whether and the extent to which the combatant is integrated into the state system and the state system integration of its opponent. Applying a fuzzy-sets logic to the construction of state system integration, colonial history, and historical era variables provides a useful way to integrate meaningful variation within these categories into the analysis. I discuss the operationalization of each of these conditions in turn.

**Historical Era**

The historical era in which a conflict took place is determined by its proximity to certain key events and trends in the historical development of the sovereign state system. As has been discussed in chapter 2, five key events stand out in the course of the ideational development of political authority in the international system of sovereign states: (1) the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which set foundational principles of state sovereignty; (2) the revolutions France and the United States in the late 18th century which marked a transformation in conceptions of the embodiment of sovereign authority from the monarch to the people under the government’s rule; (3) the national demarcation of popular sovereignty marked by the popular revolutions in Europe and Latin America.
in the 1848 “springtime of the nations”; (4) the incorporation of and challenges to European ideals of national popular sovereignty in colonial resistance movements marked by the 1947 Indian and Pakistani independence and subsequent 1960s African colonial independence movements, resulting in the emergence of a human rights based supranational authority, and (5) the fragmentation of this supranational authority after the demise of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw pact allies after 1989.

Throughout its history, how political authority was conceived of within the international system of states underwent substantial transformation and can be usefully conceived of in five eras, marked by important events in the years 1648, 1776, 1848, 1947, and 1989. Although these dates provide important markers for key developments in transforming conceptions of political authority in the development of the state system, it is important to emphasize that these events do not mark the emergence of a new idea about political authority, but rather are key events that can be pointed to as moments when an idea became eventfully articulated. For example, the U.S. Declaration of Independence was perhaps the earliest prominent example of popular national sovereignty (i.e. “We the People...”) becoming articulated as the institutional foundation of a government, but it is important to remember that the concept of popular sovereignty had to already exist in the imagination of its authors in order for it to be articulated in the document and carry the conceptual authority and legitimacy necessary to become the basis of a system of government that individuals would be willing to risk their lives to defend.

One option for measuring the effect of historical era on the justification frame employed in conflict is to dichotomously code each conflict in terms of its belonging as
either “in” or “out” of a defined period of time. For example, we could define the era of Westphalian sovereignty as occurring during the period of time between the start of the Thirty Years war and the start of the Seven Years war, i.e. from 1618 to 1756, and then coding conflicts as having been initiated either within or outside of this period of time. However, artificially imposing such temporal boundaries, even if theoretically well-informed, obscures how ideas about political authority actually emerge, gain acceptance, transform, and inform subsequent ideas. For example, if we define the era of Westphalian sovereignty as occurring from 1618-1756, and the era of popular sovereignty as occurring from 1757-1830, how could we account for the impact of historical era on the justification frame employed for a conflict occurring in 1750? Is it “fully” in the era of Westphalian sovereignty, and therefore shaped by the notions of political authority that dominated at this time? Or, because of its proximity to the events of 1776 and the likelihood that ideas about political authority at this time helped to inform the development and proliferation of ideas about popular sovereignty would it be more appropriate to include this conflict in the era of popular sovereignty? The answer, of course, is that ideas about political authority in such a conflict would be shaped by notions of Westphalian sovereignty that came before, as well as exhibiting aspects of and contributing to the formation of ideas about popular sovereignty that were developing but had not yet been eventfully articulated. These eras are not mutually exclusive then, and in fact overlap. In addition, the strength of different conceptions about political authority within each era are not even, that is, a particular conception of political authority will have greater strength in the period of time immediately surrounding the moment when that idea has first been eventfully articulated. Therefore it does not make sense to
conceive of conflicts as events that took place either inside or outside of these eras, but rather to conceive of eventful articulations as central moments within the overlapping and uneven development of ideas. Defining historical eras in this way allows me to account for how justifications for war-making can be shaped by multiple ideas in the overlapping eras. Figure 3.1 provides a visual model of these overlapping and uneven historical eras of ideas about political authority.

I treat each of these eras as five-value fuzzy sets in which the justifications within each conflict case will be coded in terms of its temporal distance from each eventful articulation. Those occurring within a set period of time close to the eventful articulation are coded as being fully-in the historical era it marks (1.0), while those occurring further away are respectively coded as being more in than out (0.75), neither in nor out (0.5), more out than in (0.25) or fully out (0.0). The overall length, extent of overlap, and specific calibration of each set is determined by my own knowledge of the emergence and development of ideas about political authority throughout this period of time (see section on the history of political ideas in chapter 2).

Figure 3.1 Historical Eras of Prevailing Conceptions of Political Authority
Table 3.5 outlines the fuzzy-set calibration of this timeline. To some extent, these calibrations may seem arbitrary. While there may be reasonable disagreement about precisely where the lines should be drawn, the calibration was informed both theoretically and by my own understanding of the historical processes in which ideas on political authority develop. For example, rather than treating each era as a uniform block of time (say, 100 years surrounding each eventful articulation) I allow each era to be a different length, informed by the historical context surrounding the emergence and transformation of each prevailing idea of political authority. In addition, the bubbles representing each historical era are oval, rather than circular, with the divisions between each calibration closer together at the front end of each era and more spread out towards the end of each era. This is to reflect the differing paces at which ideas emerge, gain acceptance, and fade. Although this is certainly not a perfect representation of historical eras of ideas about political authority, I believe it is a substantial improvement on a more rigid understanding of historical eras that treats eras as mutually exclusive and the impact of ideas within these eras as having equivalent influence on events no matter where it occurs within an era.
### Table 3.4 Historical Era Fuzzy-set Calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical Era</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Calibration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Westphalian (1618-1756)</td>
<td>Prior to 1618, after 1756</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1618-1624, 1721-1757</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1625-1630, 1701-1720</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1631-1638, 1671-1700</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1639-1670</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular (1740-1835)</td>
<td>Prior to 1740, after 1835</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1740-1749, 1820-1835</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1750-1756, 1801-1819</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1757-1766, 1783-1800</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1767-1782</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National (1816-1939)</td>
<td>Prior to 1816, after 1939</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1816-1824, 1918-1939</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1825-1834, 1895-1917</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1835-1841, 1871-1894</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1842-1870</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supranational (1915-2008)</td>
<td>Prior to 1915, after 2008</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1915-1924, 1995-2008</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1925-1934, 1980-1994</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1935-1942, 1957-1979</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1943-1956</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented (1968-present)</td>
<td>Prior to 1968</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1968-1972</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973-1981</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982-1988, 2001-2010</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989-2000</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*State System Integration*

Two variables are employed to indicate state system integration: degree of membership into the state system and the symmetry of the conflict dyad in terms of whether the central combatants have differing degrees of membership within the state system.

Full membership into the international system of states is determined by employing the Correlates of War Project State System Membership List (v.2008.1, hereafter SSML). This list covers the period from 1816 to 2008 and includes dates of tenure, that is, it
allows polities to drop in and out of state membership throughout this period as political and historical context warrants. State membership of each combatant actor is defined as being a member of the international system of states according to SSML guidelines in the year the conflict began. The guidelines for inclusion in the SSML are:  

1. Prior to 1920, the entity must have had a population greater than 500,000 and have had diplomatic missions at or above the rank of charge d’affaires with Britain and France.

2. After 1920, the entity must be a member of the League of Nations or the United Nations, or have a population greater than 500,000 and receive diplomatic missions from two major powers.

For conflicts occurring before 1816, I will classify entities as a state system member if they have a population greater than 500,000 and are a signatory to the treaty of Westphalia or have diplomatic relations with a signatory to the treaty of Westphalia.

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8 The criteria for inclusion in the international system of states are derived from several publications (Russett, Singer & Small 1968, Singer & Small 1972, Small & Singer 1982, full details available in the SSML codebook). Setting population size as a primary criterion was meant to indicate that in order to be a member of the state system, an entity had to possess enough national power to be moderately active in world politics, “to be a player more than a pawn” (Singer & Small 1972). The population threshold of 500,000 was determined by its high correlation with other measures of national power, such as territory, unity, self-sufficiency, and armed might. The second primary criterion, its widespread recognition of the entity by other members of the system, was meant to determine whether the entity was “sufficiently unencumbered by legal, military, economic, or political constraints to exercise a fair degree of sovereignty and independence” (Small & Singer 1982). This criterion can be operationalized in terms of the granting or withholding of diplomatic recognition. This decision, particularly before WWI, was based not on whether a state approved or disapproved of a particular government, but rather was determined by whether they believed a given entity could effectively fulfill its international obligations. Prior to the Versailles Conference after WWI, the diplomatic recognition of Britain and France serve as an effective proxy, as the system up until this time was dominated by European powers and “as went Britain and France, so went the majority” (Singer & Small 1982). In the post-Versailles era, however, the supremacy of Britain and France was less secure and there were no two powers within the system who could effectively replace Britain and France as proxy legitimizers. Therefore, after 1920, state membership criteria were changed to classify as a state any entity that was a member of the League of Nations or the United Nations at any time during its existence or met the 500,000 population and was recognized by as a state by at least two major powers within the system.
While the SSML is extremely useful for determining those who were clear and full members of the state system, membership into the category of states is not best understood as a crisp-set between “state” or “non-state.” Rather, variation in the belongingness to these categories is meaningful. The degree to which a non-state combatant group is tolerated or not tolerated by the host country in which they operate and the extent to which they receive support from their host country or external actors reveals important information about the extent to which a non-state group has been incorporated into the state system, how they perceive themselves and how other groups perceive them as having a stake in that system. Therefore, while the COW SSML can be used to determine those who are full state system members, further work is needed to determine the level of belongingness of other combatant actors whose degree of membership is more fuzzy. I treat state system membership as a four-value fuzzy set; table 3.6 outlines the criteria for each value.9

Determining whether an entity is tolerated or supported by a host country and the extent to which they receive meaningful support was determined by close investigation of individual cases.10 After determining the extent to which each actor is incorporated into the state system, I then take the difference of these scores to obtain a dyad symmetry score, where a score of 1.0 indicates that the dyad is fully symmetrical, meaning they

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9 See Ragin (2008) chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on fuzzy set calibration. I initially coded state integration variables as a six-value fuzzy set, however found that there was not enough case diversity to make a six-value set analytically useful. A four-value fuzzy set was the maximum amount of variation possible in which there were enough cases within each value set to make the results of the analysis meaningful.

10 In most instances, the association between country and combatant actor is fairly clear, as the combatant actors explicitly represent the ruling government of a country or operate exclusively within a country and claim to represent that country. In some cases the association is less clear. For groups such as Al Qaeda which operate across country boundaries, I will use the country in which the group originated and/or the origins of its founding members to establish colonial history.
share a similar level of incorporation into the state system. The closer the dyad symmetry score is to 0.0, the less symmetrical the dyad (see table 3.7).

Colonial Experience

Three aspects of colonial experience are relevant for this project: 1) did either of the primary combatants have a history as a colonizer empire or a colonized subject country? 2) does the combatant dyad in question have a colonial history with each other? and 3) of those combatants with a colonial history of any sort, was the relevant colonial experience in the recent or distant past, or is it ongoing at the start of the war?

Table 3.5 State Integration Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>State Membership</th>
<th>Dyad Symmetry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Fully in</td>
<td>Fully symmetrical, difference in state membership scores between combatant dyad equals 0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>More in than out</td>
<td>Mostly symmetrical, difference in state system membership scores equals 0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>More out than in</td>
<td>Mostly non-state; actor is not member of state system and operates within a hostile host state while receiving meaningful support from another state. Mostly asymmetrical, difference in state system membership scores between combatant dyad equals 0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>Fully out</td>
<td>Fully non-state; actor operates without any meaningful support from any state system member; OR operates within a non-state political unit. Fully asymmetrical, difference in state membership scores between combatant dyad equals 1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A fuzzy-sets approach is useful for addressing these questions. A crisp set coding of whether a combatant actor had a colonial experience or not, or was part of a colonizer or colonized country, obscures important degrees of variation in these categories. For example, a combatant dyad whose colonial relationship ended over a century before the conflict should not be treated as analytically identical to a dyad whose colonial relationship ended in the previous decade, as the rhetoric surrounding conflict justifications in these two cases would draw upon the colonial experience in very different ways. Differences between the colonial experiences - for example, if the colonial experience was part of a national historical narrative or part of the recent lived experiences of these populations - could also impact the kind of language that a leader would choose to use as appealing to the populace.

Because there is no available data source which clearly demarcates the colonial power and colonial subject status of each polity, I used careful historical investigation of each case to determine the colonial history experiences of each case. In its broadest definition colonization can be voluntary, however, for the purposes of the current research, I define colonization as the forceful exercise of political sovereignty of one polity, defined as the metropole, over a previously independent polity, defined as the colony, in which the metropole seeks to extract resources from the colony in order to benefit the political and economic power of the metropole.

Three variables are used to capture the complexities of colonial history and analyze its impact on the use of justification frames: colonial power, colonial subject, and colonial dyad are used to indicate if each combatant case has a history as a colonial power, has a history as a colonial subject, and if the combatant is engaged in conflict with
an opponent with whom it has had a colonial relationship. A three-value fuzzy set is used for each of these variables to classify these colonial history factors as having never occurred, having occurred in the past century, or being present at the onset of conflict.\textsuperscript{11}

The calibrations for these variables are summarized in table 3.6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Colonial Power</th>
<th>Colonial Subject</th>
<th>Colonial Dyad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Fully in</td>
<td>Combatant is a colonial power at onset of conflict</td>
<td>Combatant is a colonial subject at onset of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>Neither fully in nor fully out</td>
<td>Combatant has been a colonial power in past century</td>
<td>Combatant has been a colonial subject in past century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>Fully out</td>
<td>Combatant has never been a colonial power (within past century)</td>
<td>Combatant has never been a colonial subject (within past century)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Analysis Procedures}

In the previous chapter, I specified the set of relationships I expect to observe based upon a historical intersectional perspective. To reiterate, I expect that in cases where the power-integration characteristics of the primary combatants are highly

\textsuperscript{11} The 100-year cut off, while somewhat arbitrary, is based on the notion of a colonial living memory among the population, that is, if the colonial experience ended more than a century prior to the onset of conflict, there no living memory of that colonial experience among the population. A more nuanced five-value fuzzy set calibration was initially used to distinguish between ongoing, recent, intermediate, and distant colonial experiences, however the limited numbers of cases that fit into each of these categorizations severely diminished the utility of the analysis. A three-value fuzzy set proved the most nuanced possible to allow for meaningful interpretation of results.
divergent, a humanitarian justice logic will be most prevalent among those with high power-integration within the system, but that further excluded from the system a combatant is, the more they will invoke sovereignist claims. Those who are excluded seek to invoke the rules of that system in order to stake claim to its privileges, while those who benefit from the system shift focus toward justifications that lay outside the rules of the system, as if to refuse to allow those who threaten that privileged status to play by the set of rules that grants them that privilege. However, if both combatants hold privileged status within the system of states, sovereignist logics will be most prevalent among both actors, since both seek to assert their privilege most strongly. While this balance fluctuates between humanitarian and sovereignist logics dependent upon the divergence in power-integration, discourses of justification will show an increasing trend in prevalence towards human-centric justifications over the course of time, because each era in the transformation of political authority has become successively more oriented toward the obligation of government to the people under its rule. This progression will not be steady however, but will show increased intensity surrounding moments in which these ideational transformations are eventfully articulated. To test these expectations, I administered the following procedures.

After each variable was calibrated according to the definitions provided in tables 3.4-3.6, the full dataset was imported into the fsQCA software package designed by Ragin (2006) for analysis. The fsQCA software uses a truth table algorithm to assess the likelihood that a given outcome is a consistent subset of the set of conditions specified in the causal recipe, as well as the extent of coverage offered by a particular causal recipe. Consistency gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of
conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question, where coverage gauges the
degree to which a causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome (Ragin
2008:44). These measures are useful in establishing the causes or causal combinations
that can be considered necessary or sufficient.

Because of the problem of limited diversity, or “too many variables and not enough
cases,” Ragin’s guidelines (2008: 142-144) recommend restricting the number of
variables introduced into the model to between three and eight. One suggestion for
mitigating the problem of too many variables is to create macrovariables by merging
related variables with a logical OR operator. Thus, I consolidate all of the variables
discussed above into seven macrovariables, where (~) signifies the negation of the
variable:

- High power-integration = state system member OR colonial power
- Low power-integration = ~state system member OR colonial subject
- Power divergence = ~dyad symmetry OR colonial dyad
- Power symmetry = dyad symmetry OR ~colonial dyad
- Early state system = Westphalian
- Mid-state system = Popular Sovereignty OR National Sovereignty
- Later state system = Supra-national Sovereignty OR Fragmented Sovereignty

Four causal combination truth table algorithms were produced, one for each of the four
justification frame outcomes. The truth table algorithm outputs $2^k$ rows where k is the
number of causal conditions, representing all possible corners of the vector space. In this
case, each truth table produces $2^7$, or 128 rows in each of the four tables. Each row
reports the number of cases with greater than 0.5 membership in the vector space corner. Each row also reports a consistency measure which assesses the degree to which membership in each corner is a subset of membership in the outcome for all cases. These rows are reduced to only those solutions which meet pre-determined threshold criteria.

Following fsQCA procedural guidelines (Ragin 2008: 142-144), I conducted two parallel analyses to include low threshold and high threshold criteria. The low threshold criteria used a consistency threshold of 0.80 and a frequency threshold of \( n=1 \). The high threshold criteria analysis used a consistency threshold of 0.90 and a frequency threshold of \( n=2 \). The consistency threshold indicates the proportion of cases in which the causal combination in question consistently produced the observed outcome, while the frequency threshold indicates the number of cases in the dataset in which the causal combination and outcome in question can be observed. Solutions that do not meet these threshold criteria are referred to as “remainders.” Remainder solutions are those without strong instances or with very few strong instances, that is, they represent potential counterfactual combinations. The truth table analysis produces three solutions that can be thought of as points on a continuum: a complex, a parsimonious, and an intermediate solution. The parsimonious solution incorporates into the causal combinations that meet the threshold criteria all remainder solutions that yield a simpler solution. In other words, when all counterfactual solutions are considered, the parsimonious solution points to the causal condition that is the most decisive factor in determining the outcome. At the other end of the spectrum, the complex solution excludes all remainder combinations and therefore provides no simplifying assumptions regarding combinations of conditions that do not exist in the dataset. Between these two extremes are the intermediate solutions,
which are made up of a subset of the most parsimonious solution and a superset of the most complex solution and are informed by the investigator’s theoretical and empirical knowledge (each row in the truth table is individually coded by the researcher as belonging to the set of possible solutions). In other words, in the intermediate solution any causal combination that uses at least some of the causal conditions specified in the complex solution is a valid solution of the truth table as long as it contains the causal conditions specified in the parsimonious solution.\footnote{See Ragin (2008) chapters 7-9 for a detailed description of this truth table procedure and the resulting solutions.} The results of this analysis are discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 4 fsQCA Results

Interpreting fsQCA Results

The current chapter details the results of the fsQCA analysis. As outlined in chapter 3, fsQCA holds important advantages over conventional quantitative analyses and is especially suited to historical case-based research in which the central variables exhibit varying degrees of belongingness, and a given outcome can be the result of multiple conditional configurations. Certainly, however, there are limitations to this approach. Fuzzy-sets analysis is dependent on the careful construction and calibration of each variable in a theoretically informed and well-reasoned manner. Reasonable disagreements between researchers over the definitions of categories or the setting of calibration markers may result in very different analytical output and interpretation. It is essential, then, that the variable construction and calibration process be carefully detailed and that the interpretation of fsQCA results be carefully wedded to the construction of the variables themselves.

The three solutions produced by the truth table algorithm – complex, parsimonious, and intermediate – represent the continuum of possible causal combinations producing the observed outcome. The complex solution comprises only those combinations that are observed in the data, while the parsimonious solution incorporates the observed causal combinations with all possible counterfactuals to produce the most simplified solution. The intermediate solution provides a midpoint on this continuum in which the complex solution is integrated with a limited array of counterfactual remainders that are determined by the researcher’s theoretical and
empirical knowledge. This intermediate solution is therefore preferred as the most interpretable solution, however, any representation of truth table results must include the parsimonious solution because this solution consists of those causal ingredients which are the most decisively associated with the outcome.

The current chapter therefore details the intermediate and parsimonious solutions associated with each of the four justification frames detailed in chapter 2: the protection obligation frame, the power-interests frame, the suffering of innocents frame, and the group preservation frame.

*Sovereign Rights Logic of Justification Frames*

In chapter 2, I argued that sovereign rights logics of justification will be employed in different contexts by combatant actors depending on the extent to which they are integrated into the power structure of the state system. High power actors will be more likely to invoke sovereign rights frames when engaged in conflict with other high power actors because in this context, both actors are beneficiaries of the state system and so will seek to invoke the rules of the system for their benefit. Conversely, low power actors will invoke the sovereign rights logic of justification when in conflict with high power actors. Because of their relative exclusion from the state system, low power actors will seek to stake claim to the benefits of the system within which their opponents are privileged. In addition to the different combatant-structural contexts that I predict will be associated with the logic of justification, I also predicted that historical context will shape the discourses of justification employed. The authority of the state system has over time
become increasingly oriented toward the obligation of government toward the people under its rule. While the authority of the state system has been conventionally oriented toward the protection of and obligation to the material and status interests of the state, this orientation has gone through successive phases of transformation in which the protection of and obligation to the people which compose the state has become ever more central to the defining features of the state’s role and authority. I therefore expect that in the early eras of the state system that sovereign rights logics of justification will be linked with an interest-centric discourse, producing a power-interests frame. In later eras of the state system, this logic will be more strongly linked with a human-centric logic of justification producing a protection obligation frame. The middle eras of the state system will exhibit a mix between these two frames, highlighting this transformation.

I therefore hypothesize that the power-interests frame will be produced by these four contexts:

1. **High power** actors in **early era** conflicts characterized by **power symmetry** and/or **power convergence** (non-power divergence).
2. **High power** actors in **middle era** conflicts characterized by **power symmetry** and/or **power convergence** (non-power divergence).
3. **Low power** actors in **early era** conflicts characterized by **power asymmetry** and/or **power divergence**.
4. **Low power actors** in **middle era** conflicts characterized by **power asymmetry** and/or **power divergence**.
Because I expect that the structural combatant conditions drive the use of the logic of justification, while the historical era drives the use of discourses of justification, I hypothesize that the protection obligation frame will be associated with the following four contexts:

1. **High power** actors in **middle era** conflicts characterized by **power symmetry** and/or **non-power divergence**.

2. **High power** actors in **late era** conflicts characterized by **power symmetry** and/or **non-power divergence**.

3. **Low power** actors in **middle era** conflicts characterized by **power asymmetry** and/or **power divergence**.

4. **Low power actors** in **later era** conflicts characterized by **power asymmetry** and/or **power divergence**.

**Power-Interests Frame**

The power-interests frame employs a sovereign rights logic of justification combined with an interest-centric discourse of justification. This frame justifies war-making in terms of the power and authority possessed by the state to protect and defend its interests, namely, material and status interests. Material interests refer primarily to territory and natural resources, while status interests refers to the need to establish or maintain beneficial relations to other (typically similarly organized) polities and the need to defend against threats to the status quo. In other words, the state power-interests frame is primarily concerned with the prevention of a disruption to the established system of
polity organization, in this case, the international system of states. Similar to the protection obligation frame, the state power-interests frame can invoke an absence-of-state claim, but here the absence-of-state claim is used to argue that war-making is necessary to protect the material and/or status interests of a political unit because the state that is imbued with the authority to do so is unwilling or unable to act. Forty-seven percent of cases were calibrated as being more in than out or fully in the set of power-interests cases.

The intermediate solution of the fuzzy sets truth table procedure using high threshold criteria (a consistency score of at least 0.90 and a frequency threshold of n=2) revealed three causal combinations associated with the use of a power-interests frame:

1. late*~mid*~early*~powerdiv*~lopower*hipower
2. ~late*~early*powersym*~powerdiv*~lopower*hipower
3. late*~mid*~early*~powersym*~powerdiv*lopower*~hipower

These causal combinations support the expectations regarding the different contexts in which high power and low power actors will employ a power interests frame, but do not support the expectation that later era conflicts will reflect a discursive shift from interest-centric to human-centric justifications.

In the first two combinations, high power actors employ the power interests frame in non-power divergent or symmetrical conflicts; in other words, in conflicts in which they are fighting other high power actors. The third solution further supports my expectation that low power actors employ a sovereign rights logic of justification in different contexts than high power actors. Much like the protection obligation frame, the
power interests frame is used by low power actors in later era conflicts that do not belong to the set of power symmetrical conflicts or power divergent conflicts. Given the manner in which these macro-variables were constructed, a conflict can be neither symmetrical nor power divergent in two circumstances: when a state system member with a recent colonial history engages in conflict with another state system member with which it shares a past colonial relationship, or when a non-state system member engages in conflict with a member of the state system with whom it does not share a past colonial relationship. In both instances, the low power actor is invoking a sovereign rights logic of justification in contexts in which it holds a lower level of power and integration within the state system relative to its opponent.

Although these solutions support the expectations that the power-interests frame is employed by high-power actors in non-power divergent or symmetrical conflicts and by low power actors in power divergent or asymmetrical conflicts, they contradict the expectation that the power interests frame would be more strongly associated with earlier eras of conflict, giving way to human-centric justifications in later eras. Indeed, the parsimonious solution indicates that not belonging to the set of early or middle era conflicts, or being a power symmetrical conflict not occurring in the early era of the state system are the factors that most decisively determine the use of the power-interests frame:

4. ~early*~mid

5. powersym*~early
To better understand why the power interests frame does not appear to be associated with earlier eras of conflict, we can lower the analysis threshold to open up more potential solutions. The intermediate solution of a lower threshold analysis (n=1 and consistency >0.80) reveals two possible contexts in the early era of the state system associated with the use of a power interests frame:

6. ~late*~mid*early*~powersym*powerdiv*lopower*hipower
7. ~late*~mid*early*~powersym*powerdiv*lopower*~hipower

In solution 6, high power actors in the early era of the state system employ the power interests frame in non-power divergent conflicts, that is, in conflicts in which the combatant dyad share similarly high levels of power in the state system. In solution 7, low power actors in the early era of the state system employ the power interests frame in asymmetrical, power divergent conflicts. These solutions provide further support for the hypotheses that high power actors will use a sovereign rights logic in conflicts with other high power actors, while low power actors use a sovereign rights logic in conflicts that are asymmetrical and power divergent. These conditions occurring in the context of early era conflicts are not wholly different from the conditions that were associated with both low and high power actors employing the power interests frame in middle and later era conflicts. However, the lower threshold of analysis indicates that these causal combinations are not strongly consistent, and so must be interpreted with caution.

Although the lower threshold analysis indicated that the conditions surrounding the use of this frame in the early era of the state system is not different from later eras, these solutions raise doubts about the prediction of a discursive shift from interest-centric to human-centric discourses over the course of the state system. To understand the nature of
this shift – or lack thereof - it is necessary to explore in greater depth cases that share conflict structural characteristics but occur in different eras of the state system.

*Protection Obligation Frame*

The protection obligation frame is composed of a sovereign rights logic of justification and a human-centric discourse. Here, justifications for war-making center on the responsibility of the governing apparatus to protect and defend the people under its rule. This justification is most strongly connected with one of the traditional defining features of the state system—that of the state holding a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Because the state (largely) denies its citizens the right to use force for their own protection, the state has a responsibility to provide protection for those citizens against any perceived threat to their safety. The protection obligation frame is often used in the context of a state protecting its own citizens, but this is not always the case. The protection obligation frame may also be used by a state to justify fighting for the protection of the citizens of another state, arguing that if a state is not fulfilling its obligation to protect its citizenry then it becomes the responsibility of another state to step in and fill that role. Similarly, an absence-of-state argument may be used by a group within a state by claiming that because the state is not fulfilling its obligation to protect its citizenry, another polity must take on this responsibility until the state proves capable of doing so. The key component that distinguishes the protection obligation frame from humanitarian justifications that call for the protection of innocents is that the identity of those who are due protection is defined in terms of a geographic location; that is, they
largely occupy a distinct location that can be territorially identified and is (or is supposed to be) under the rule of a territorially delineated government. It is their physical location within specific geographic boundaries that warrants their protection. Fifty-three percent of cases were calibrated as being more in than out or fully in the set of protection obligation cases.

The intermediate solution of the fuzzy sets truth table procedure using high threshold criteria (a consistency score of at least 0.90 and a frequency threshold of n=2) revealed three causal combinations associated with the use of a protection obligation frame:

1. late*~mid*~early*~powerdiv*~lopower*hipower
2. ~late*mid*~early*~powerdiv*~lopower*hipower
3. late*~mid*~early*~powersym*~powerdiv*lopower*~hipower

The parsimonious solution, indicating the most central conditions contributing to the use of a protection frame, was:

4. late
5. ~lopower*mid
6. hipower*mid

The intermediate solution largely supports the hypotheses detailed above. The first two solutions indicate that the power obligation frame is used in non-power divergent conflicts among high power actors in both the middle and later eras of the state system. In the third solution, low power actors employ the protection obligation frame in
the later era of the state system in conflicts that are neither symmetrical nor power divergent. Given how these variables were constructed in chapter 3, there are only two logically possible contexts in which a conflict could be asymmetrical but not power divergent. One is a conflict in which an actor is classified as low power because they are not a member of the state system, and is engaged in conflict with a state system member with which there is no shared colonial history. Another possible context is a conflict in which an actor is classified as low power because it has been a recent colonial subject, is currently integrated into the state system, and is in conflict with a high power actor with which there is a shared colonial history.

The parsimonious solution further supports the prediction that the protection obligation has become more prevalent over time as discourses of justification have shifted more strongly toward human-centric rather than interest-centric discourses. However, power divergence or dyadic symmetry are not implicated in the parsimonious solution as being a driving factor in the use of the protection obligation frame. Rather, conflicts occurring in the middle and later eras of the state system and belonging to the set of high power, and not low power, actors are implicated as the driving factors in the use of the protection obligation frame.

Taken together, these causal combinations support two major findings. First, high power and low power actors use the same justification frame in very different contexts. Although the high power status of the combatant and middle or later eras of the state system were the conditions that were most decisively associated with the protection obligation frame in the parsimonious solution, the intermediate solution indicated that the state system integration and dyadic power characteristics between the central combatant
actors have a differing impact on high power and low power actors. For high power actors, the power obligation frame is employed in contexts in which both central combatants have a similar level of integration within the state system and/or have been a colonial power.\textsuperscript{13} In other words, since the advent of popular sovereignty in the late 18\textsuperscript{th} to early 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, when members of the state system have fought other members of the state system in conflicts occurring they have increasingly come to employ a protection obligation justification frame. Low power actors, in contrast, tend to employ the protection obligation frame in one of two possible contexts: when a state system member with a recent colonial history engages in conflict with another state system member with which it shares a past colonial relationship, or when a non-state system member engages in conflict with a member of the state system with whom it does not share a past colonial relationship. In both instances, the low power actor is invoking a sovereign rights logic of justification in contexts in which it holds a lower level of power and integration within the state system compared with its opponent.

Second, the protection obligation frame seems to have become more prevalent over time, with conflicts occurring in the later era being one of the strongest determining factors in the use of this frame, particularly among high power actors. This finding supports the expectation that human-centric discourses have become more prevalent over the course of the state system, and provides some support for my critique of the just war revival arguments and fracture narrative. These arguments suggested that states have had to revert to early modern models of justification because the traditional sovereignist

\textsuperscript{13} High power actors are, without any exception that I have been able to locate, strongly integrated into the state system. While some high power actors have been colonial powers and some have not, I cannot find an example of an actor which has been a (relatively recent) colonial power but is not well integrated into the state system.
models of authority have been undermined by the non-conventional nature of recent conflicts. The results of this analysis, however, suggest that the uses of human-centric discourses in recent justifications for war are not a response to sovereignist models of justification. Rather, sovereignist logics of justification, such as within the protection obligation frame, remain prevalent even among high power actors. The discursive frames attached to these sovereignist logics, however, have become increasingly human-centric over time, reflecting how political authority has become successively more oriented with each historical era toward the obligation of government toward the people under its rule.

However, the findings from the power-interests frame analysis, which also indicated that this frame was associated with the later era of the state system, sheds some doubt on the conclusion that human-centric discourses have become more prevalent over the course of the state system. Both frames appear to be strongly associated with the later era of the state system. By lowering the analysis threshold (n=1, consistency > 0.80), two further combinations associated with the protection obligation frame that indicate its usage in early and middle eras are revealed:

7. lopower*powerdiv*~early*mid*late
8. hipower*~lopower*~powerdiv*powersym*early*mid*~late

In solution 7, low power actors employ the protection obligation frame in power divergent contexts in the middle or later eras of the state system, but not the early era. This solution is consistent with the expectations outlined above. However, solution 8 indicates that high power actors employ the protection obligation frame in non-power
divergent, symmetric conflicts in the early or middle era of the state system, but not the later era.

The fsQCA results for both the power-interests frame and protection obligation frame support the hypotheses that high power and low power actors employ a sovereign rights justification in different combatant-structural contexts. High power actors invoked sovereign rights frames when engaged in conflict with other high power actors, while low power actors invoked sovereign rights frames when in conflict with high power actors. These findings offer some evidence against the fracture narrative arguments that see state authority declining as low power, non-state actors increasingly come into conflict with high power state actors. Rather than the authority of the sovereign state system waning in the face of such challenges, the invocation of a sovereign rights logic of justification by low power actors against high power actors indicates that the authority of the state system remains strong; that is, the challenge to the state system is not a challenge to the nature of its authority, but rather, a challenge to include previously excluded actors into the benefits of that system.

Although the combatant-structural contexts that I predicted would be associated with the sovereign rights logic of justification was supported by the fsQCA results, my prediction of a discursive shift from interest-centric to human-centric discourses over the course of the state system was not supported by these results. Rather, the conditions surrounding the use of both the protection obligation and power-interests frame were largely identical, and both frames were strongly associated with the later, and to a smaller extent, the middle eras of the state system. To better understand the extent to which the discourses of justification have (or have not) shifted from interest-centric to human-
centric over the course of the state, it is necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of those cases which are identical on all power integration and conflict structural characteristics but differ on the historical era in which the conflict occurred.

*Humanitarian Justice Logic of Justification Frames*

In chapter 2, I argued that humanitarian justice logics of justification will be employed by high power actors engaged in power divergent and/or asymmetrical conflicts. In these contexts, actors who hold a privileged position within the state system will seek to deny the benefits of that system from those have been wholly or partially excluded from it. By invoking a humanitarian logic of justification in power divergent and/or asymmetrical conflicts while invoking a sovereign rights logic of justification in non-power divergent and/or symmetrical conflicts, these high power actors are exerting the privilege of their flexibility within a system that is designed to benefit their status. If low power actors seek to challenge the authoritative logic of the system itself, they will invoke humanitarian justice logics in order to assert that that their right to wage war lays outside this system; however, I expect that low power actors are not likely to invoke these humanitarian justice claims because they in fact seek to be part of that system. By invoking sovereign rights logics of justification instead, low power actors are seeking to claim a stake in the benefits of a system from which they have largely been excluded. In addition, I expect that as the authority of the state system has become successively more oriented towards the obligations of government to the people under its rule over time,
there will be an observable shift from the group preservation frame to the suffering of innocents frame.

I therefore hypothesize that the group preservation frame will be used in the following two contexts:

1. **High power** actors in **early era** conflicts characterized by **power divergence** and/or **power asymmetry**.
2. **High power** actors in **middle era** conflicts characterized by **power divergence** and/or **power asymmetry**.

The suffering of innocents frame, therefore, will be associated with the following two contexts:

1. **High power** actors in **middle era** conflicts characterized by **power divergence** and/or **power asymmetry**.
2. **High power** actors in **later era** conflicts characterized by **power divergence** and/or **power asymmetry**.

*Group Preservation Frame*

A group preservation justification frame employs a humanitarian justice logic and an interest-centric discourse. This frame justifies war-making for the protection of the interests of a group (again, based on an identity that is independent from territorial political organizations). These interest claims can be in terms of the protection of a belief
system that is fundamental to the group’s identity (in particular, religion), a broader claim of threat to the group’s basic security and survival, the prevention of the spread of violence or security threat to other group members, or as a claim of unprovoked aggression. It is important to note that a claim of unprovoked aggression in the context of a humanitarian justice logic refers to the concept of a fundamental right to security that is independent from territorial political organization. Claims of unprovoked aggression may be present within a sovereign rights logic, but these claims are in terms of national security interests within a power-interests frame. The essence of the unprovoked aggression claim within the group preservation frame is that the group has done nothing to deserve violence against it, but because of the aggressive actions of others, the group’s fundamental right to existence is threatened, necessitating the use of force. This frame was the least commonly invoked frame across the data set; only four percent of cases were calibrated as being more in than out or fully in the set of group preservation cases.

The truth table procedure produced no causal configurations, at either a low or high criteria threshold, that were associated with the use of a group preservation justification frame. Lowering the consistency threshold to 70%, however, reveals one intermediate solution that is worthy of further exploration:

1. ~late*~mid*~early*powersym*~powerdiv*~lopower*hipower

The parsimonious solution at this lower consistency threshold indicates that the most central factors in determining the use of a group preservation frame are:

2. powersym

3. hipower*~powerdiv
4. ~powerdiv*~early*~middle

These solutions indicate that the group preservation frame is most likely to be associated with high power actors in symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts. This finding is entirely contradictory to my hypothesis that humanitarian justifications are employed by high power actors in asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts. In addition, this solution indicates that this frame is associated with conflicts that are not part of the set of early, middle, or later era conflicts. There are two possibilities that can explain this solution: first, that this solution is logically inconsistent and should be disregarded (Ragin 2008), or that this solution is associated with not belonging to the set of any of these eras, but is prevalent in conflicts that occur in between eras, that is, in the historical spaces relatively long after one eventual articulation of political authority but relatively long before the next eventful articulation. In addition, because the consistency threshold is so low among these solutions (73%), it is difficult to assert with any confidence the factors that drive the use of the group preservation frame using this analysis. It is necessary, therefore to explore those few cases that employed a group preservation frame in greater depth.

*Suffering of Innocents Frame*

The suffering of innocents frame employs a humanitarian justice logic and a human-centric discourse. This frame justifies war-making in the broad context of human rights and typically invokes the idea of the prevention of suffering of innocent people as a basis for action. Human rights claims within the suffering of innocents frames are distinct
from human-centric discourse claims within the protection obligation frame in the manner in which the claim invokes a fundamental right to basic security, independent from association with any territorial political organization. Much like the group preservation frame, the suffering of innocents frame was commonly invoked across cases, but comprised a driving justification frame in only a few instances. Only seven percent of cases were calibrated as being more in than out or fully in the set of suffering of innocents cases.

The high threshold truth table analysis (n=2, consistency > 0.90) did not reveal any causal combinations associated with the suffering of innocents frame. Lowering the analysis threshold (n=1, consistency > 0.80) reveals one causal combination in the intermediate solution associated with the suffering of innocents frame:

1. Late*~mid*~early*~powerdiv*~powersym*~lopower*~hipower

This solution provides partial support for the above hypotheses, indicating that the suffering of innocents frame is associated with the later, but not early or middle eras of the state system. However, this solution does not support the hypothesis that high power actors are more likely to employ the suffering of innocents frame in this later era conflicts. Rather, it is actors who do not belong to the set of high power or to the set of low power actors who are associated with the use of this frame. In other words, the use of the suffering of innocents frame appears to be associated with middle power actors, those who have some level of power and status within the state system, but are not fully integrated. In addition, this solution indicates that this frame is associated with conflicts that are neither symmetrical nor power divergent. If it is the case that this frame is
associated with middle power actors, then a conflict that is both asymmetrical and not
power divergent becomes possible in similar contexts to those described above for low
power actors in asymmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts. That is, a conflict in which
the middle power actor is not strongly integrated into the state system and is in conflict
with a state system member with whom there is no shared colonial history, or a conflict
in which a middle power actor has been a recent colonial subject, is currently integrated
into the state system, and is in conflict with a high power actors with which it shares a
colonial history. The former instance would include, for example, non-state actors with
some external state support in conflict with a high power member of the state system,
while the latter would include former colonies that have recently become state system
members in conflict with their recent colonial masters.

The most decisive factors in driving the use of the suffering of innocents frame,
however, appears to be not the colonial relationships between the combatants, but the
status of the combatant as not belonging to the set of either high or low power actors and
conflicts occurring in the late, but not the early or middle eras of the state system, as
indicated by the parsimonious solution:

2. ~hipower*~lopower*late

3. ~hipower*~lopower*~early*~mid

Taken together, these solutions indicate several fronts on which the above hypotheses
should be reevaluated. First, my hypothesis that the interest-centric discourse of the group
preservation frame should be more prevalent in earlier eras of conflict and the human-
centric discourse of the suffering of innocents frame should be more prevalent in later
eras of conflict was not supported. Although the suffering of innocents frame was associated with later era, and not early or middle era conflicts, the group preservation frame was not associated with any era of conflict. The low consistency threshold of the group preservation results, however, makes it impossible to draw any conclusions about a temporal shift over time.

Second, my hypotheses predicted that high power actors in asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts would employ humanitarian logics of justification. The solutions associated with the group preservation frame largely supported this hypothesis, however, the solutions associated with the suffering of innocents frame did not. Instead, the suffering of innocents frame was associated with those actors who are not part of the set of either high or low power actors, indicating that it is most likely to be invoked by middle power actors, those who are partially integrated into the state system and/or have not experienced colonial subjugation. This surprising and interesting finding raises questions about both my own theoretical expectations as well as those of the fracture narrative.

The fracture narrative argues that justification frames have transformed in recent decades, as low power actors challenge the authoritative structure of the sovereign state system, and high power actors have had to adjust they language they use to justify war in a political environment where the old rules of the game no longer apply. According to this reasoning, all actors, regardless of their power status characteristics, employ similar justification frames. Therefore, middle power actors should exhibit the same justification frameworks and the same shift if frameworks in recent decades as all other actors. I challenged this fracture narrative however, arguing instead that low and high power
actors employ justification frames in different historical and structural contexts. The tendency of the fracture narrative to conclude that the authoritative logic of the state system is under threat, I argued, results from a failure to disentangle how power, exclusion, and historical change interact to produce these frameworks. Rather than the authoritative logic of the state system fracturing under the weight of non-state challengers, I argued that the authority of the state system remains strong, predicting that the further excluded an actor is from this system of power, the more likely they will be to invoke sovereign rights logics of justification. The more integrated the actor, in contrast, the more likely they will be to invoke humanitarian justice logics of justification; not because the old rules of the system no longer apply, but rather because these high power actors are attempted to secure and maintain the exclusivity of their privileged position within that system. According to this line of reasoning, therefore, middle power actors should still invoke sovereign rights justifications when in conflict with high power actors, but may exhibit more of a mixture between sovereign rights and humanitarian logics of justification. If the authoritative power of the state system remains strong, and actors who are excluded from its power seek to access its benefits, then their status as partially, but not fully excluded, from the system of power should lead these middle power actors to assert their sovereign rights to wage war. However, their status as partially, but not fully integrated, from the system of power may also lead them to employ the same humanitarian logics of justification as high power actors.

Despite the fsQCA results indicating that the suffering of innocents frame is associated with actors who are not part of the set of high power or low power actors, and associated with later era conflicts, an examination of cases that fit these criteria do not
support these configurations. The most recent case which was mostly or fully in the set of suffering of innocents was Italy in the 1935 Italian-Ethiopian War. Each of the 29 “later era” cases (conflicts occurring after 1945), are either neither in nor out or mostly out of the set of suffering of innocents cases. This indicates that the solution produced by the low consistency threshold fsQCA algorithm is logically inconsistent and should be disregarded.

**Themes for Further Exploration**

The results of the fsQCA analysis supported several of the hypotheses outlined above, and raised areas where further analysis is needed. The results for the power-interest and protection obligation frame supported my hypotheses that sovereign rights logics of justification are used by high power and low power actors in very different contexts. High power actors employ sovereign rights logics of justification in symmetrical and non-power divergent conflicts, while low power actors employ sovereign rights logics of justification in asymmetrical and power divergent conflicts. Both of these relationships held true for later era conflicts. These findings indicate that the authoritative logic underpinning the sovereign state system is not under threat in the manner described by the fracture narrative. Those actors who are excluded from the power of the state system employ sovereign rights logics when in conflict with high power actors, and those who are highly integrated into this power structure employ sovereign logics of justification when in conflict with other high power actors. This pattern indicates that those who are excluded from the sovereign state system are seeking
to access its benefits, not challenge its authority. Because these associations were present at a high analytical threshold (n=2 and consistency > 0.90), I have confidence in concluding that this portion of my hypotheses was supported.

Although fsQCA proved useful for understanding the power and combatant symmetry contexts that drive the use of the two types of sovereign rights logic of justification, this analysis was less fruitful in revealing evidence for the use of frames employing a humanitarian justice logic of justification. The solutions provided by the fuzzy sets analysis indicated that the group preservation frame was employed in a very different context than my theory predicted: by high power actors in symmetrical conflicts, rather than by high power actors in asymmetrical or power divergent conflicts. However, the low consistency threshold associated with this solution raises doubts about any interpretation that can be drawn from these findings. Another possible explanation for this lack of evidence in the fsQCA results is that these frames were simply not used with enough prevalence across the cases in the data set to allow decisive causal combinations to emerge. This would indicate that these frames, while commonly used, have been and continue to be secondary frames among both high power and low power actors.

Although the fsQCA results could not give insight into the conditional configurations that contribute to the use of the group preservation or suffering of innocents frames, this lack of a finding does provide useful information to contribute to this dissertation’s critique of the just war revival and fracture narrative. Very few cases exhibited a strongly humanitarian logic of justification; the fracture narrative claims are premised on the notion that the reemergence of this just war language, the language that
was characteristic of early modern Europe before the Westphalian transformation. The evidence provided here indicates that the humanitarian justice logic of justification is employed consistently as a secondary frame throughout the history of the state system, but only emerges as a dominant frame in a very small number of cases, mostly occurring at the very early stages of the state system. There is no evidence that these frames have made a resurgence in recent decades.

For all the frames employed above, it was difficult to pinpoint a concrete historical pattern. It does not appear that interest-centric discourses have given way to more human-centric discourses over the course of the state system. To better understand how transformations in political authority over time have impacted the discourses of justification employed, it is necessary to examine how these discourses are employed in different historical contexts among actors and conflicts with identical conflict structural characteristics.

The remainder of this dissertation therefore proceeds as follows. In chapter 5, I examine three cases of conflict with identical power and conflict structural characteristics that occur at three different points in the history of the state system. By keeping all variables constant except for historical era, I am better equipped to understand how this variable influences the use of justification discourses.

The low consistency scores associated with the causal combinations produced by the truth table algorithm for the group preservation and suffering of innocents frames do not allow me to draw any conclusions about the causal factors associated with these frames. Only three conflicts within the dataset were calibrated as being mostly or fully in
the set of cases characterized by the group preservation frame. In chapter 6, I examine these three cases in depth to help uncover the conditions that are associated with the use of this frame.

In chapter 7, I explore one particular justification discourse that exhibited a noteworthy pattern. Early in the coding process, I noticed a particularly interesting pattern among combatants with relatively low levels of power and status integration within the state system. These low power actors appeared far more likely than high power actors to invoke the dignity and perceived humiliation as a discourse of justification for waging war. The need to protect the dignity of the polity that the combatant group represented and avenge or prevent its humiliation emerged as a common driving factor for the justification of war. To understand what meaning might lay behind this apparent pattern, I explore this one code in greater depth.
Chapter 5 Interest-Centric to Human-Centric? Examining the impact of historical era on discourses of justification

The findings of the fsQCA truth table algorithm indicated strong support for the hypothesis that high and low power actors employ sovereign rights logics of justification in different contexts. However, there was less support for the hypothesis that the discourses of justification within this sovereign rights logic have shifted over time from an interest-centric to a human-centric justification. This chapter uses a small-n comparative case analysis to examine the extent to which a discursive shift can, or can not, be observed.

To understand this possible shift, I examine three cases of a high power actor involved in highly symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts at three points in time over the course of the state system. I choose these types of cases for several reasons. First, to understand the impact of historical era on discourses of justification, it is necessary to keep all conditions other than historical era constant. Second, choosing three cases of high power, symmetrical, and non-power divergent conflict holds a number of advantages over, for example, low power, asymmetrical, power divergent conflicts. Fully state actors are the most common type of actor appearing in the data set, which allows for greater historical range in selecting cases. Because of the variety of levels at which an actor can be integrated into the state system, it is much more difficult to find three conflicts at different points in time that have equivalently matched characteristics in terms of power integration and dyad symmetry. Finally, looking closely at high power actors in particular is useful for examining a particular claim of the just war revival: that
it is high power actors who have had to adjust their justification language over time as the authoritative power of the state system has waned. I argued that the tendency to observe a shift in the language used by high power actors over time was not a result of the challenged posed by non-state actors to the authority of the state system, but rather a discursive shift within a sovereign rights logic of justification from interest-centric to human-centric discourses as the authority of the state system became increasingly oriented towards the obligations of the state to the people under its rule. The fsQCA results in the previous chapter provided support for my hypothesis that sovereign rights logics of justification remain a dominant frame among high power actors, but did not provide support for a discursive shift over time.

Great Britain provides a useful case to examine a possible discursive shift in the use of a sovereign rights logic of justification. Because Great Britain appears with high frequency in the data set, appears in each historical era, and is highly integrated into the state system across the historical range of this data set, it is a useful country case to examine the extent to which high power actors have exhibited a discursive shift within the sovereign rights logic of justification over the past four centuries. Great Britain appears in the data set as a combatant 11 times in 10 distinct conflicts (in the 1642 English Civil War it appears as a combatant twice in the same conflict). Three of these conflicts were fully symmetrical: the Seven Years’ War beginning in 1756, the Second World War beginning in 1940, and the Falklands/Malvinas War beginning in 1982.

The results of the fuzzy-sets analysis indicated that causal conditions associated with the use of a sovereign rights logic of justification are high power actors engaged in highly symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts. That is, actors who are well
integrated into the state system and have a history of being a colonial power or do not have a history of being a colonial subject in conflict with other actors with similar levels of state system integration and colonial history. By examining each of these symmetrical conflicts that Great Britain engaged in in different historical eras, we are able to hold constant those conditions that are associated with logic of justification use and observe the effect of historical era on discourses of justification.

*The Seven Years’ War, 1756*

The outbreak of hostilities between France and Great Britain on the North American continent was a spillover of tensions leftover from the previous decade’s war of Austrian Succession. After the treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle that had ended the war between Austria and Prussia in 1750, both Maria Theresa of Austria and Frederick II of Prussia sought European allies in an effort to counter each other’s growing power: France backed Austria’s Hapsburg dynasty while Britain allied itself with Prussia’s Hohenzollern dynasty. Britain and France already had competing interests in North America, and saw in these alliances to the opposing great dynasties of Europe a growing threat to each other’s colonial expansions.

The Seven Years’ War on the North American continent occurred at a historical moment of transition between the Westphalian transformation that began in 1648 and the emergence of popular sovereignty that would come to characterize the American and French revolutions two decades later. Occurring at this moment when Westphalian discourses of material and status interests remained prevalent but at a time when
discourses surrounding the obligations of the government to be responsive to the will of the people under its rule where beginning to take hold, we should expect to observe the need to wage war in this conflict to be articulated primarily in terms of power-interests with protection obligation emerging as a secondary justification. Indeed, we find this to be the case. Of the 32 discourse codes applied to these documents, 44 percent were interest-centric, 38 percent were human-centric, and 19 percent were universal codes.

Two lengthy primary documents give insight into how the British colonial authority in North America conceived of articulated their cause of war against the French colonial presence. The first is the Plan of Union, given by Arthur Dobbs, the governor of North Carolina, before the North Carolina colonial general assembly in December, 1754 (Dobbs 1754). The second is the declaration of war issued by the British Crown against the King of France in 1756 (King George II 1756).

In the summer of 1754, delegates from seven colonial assemblies met in Albany, New York to draft and vote on a plan of union between the colonies in an effort to strengthen British imperial administration over the area, regulate colonial-Indian relations, and resolve territorial disputes between the colonies. The plan, originally proposed by Benjamin Franklin, was ultimately voted down, as many colonial governors were reluctant to subordinate their administrative power to a single colonial authority. However, the efforts to strengthen common colonial defense did not end in Albany. In December, Governor Arthur Dobbs of North Carolina continued to advocate a plan of union to his own colonial assembly, specifically contextualizing the need for a colonial union for the defense against the coming, and necessary, hostilities against France.
Dobbs’ speech begins by framing the need and authority for fighting France in terms of the universal codes. First, by specifying that the “ever active and ambitious France, under the insatiable and rapacious House of Bourbon” pose an ever growing threat to the “Liberties of Europe,” Dobbs frames the cause for war in broad terms of the amassing threat that France’s actions pose to the common good of the peoples of Europe. Dobbs then proceeds by citing specific risks to the economic and status interests of Britain, claiming that France’s expansion in North America,

“…by securing the Fisheries, and Naval Stores of America, they would increase their Marina, and ruin the Commerce, and with it the Naval Power of Britain; and then they wou’d divide America with the Spaniards, and the whole wou’d center in the House of Bourbon, for then, by the Assistance of France, Portugal must fall an early Prey to the Power of Spain, and the French wou’d stipulate to have the Brazil, Africa, and India, yielded to them as the elder Branch of the House of Bourbon, and then the Wealth and Power of Britain, being reduced, all the Powers of Europe, tho’ united, could not withstand the united Power and Wealth of the House of Bourbon, it being demonstrable, that those who have the Wealth, Power, and Commerce of America, Africa, and the Indies, must be Masters of the Liberties of Europe.”

Here, Dobbs invokes the regional security interests of Europe and the national security interests of Britain, as well as both the present and future the economic interests of Europe as the primary factors in need of protection through armed conflict. Similar interest-centric discourses are used throughout the document. In addition to these security
and economic interests, the need to protect the interests of Britain’s allies and dependents likewise form a central justification in Dobbs’ account:

“Are they not gaining all the Indian Nations, intercepting and depriving us of our Indian Allies, and daily instigating their Allies to scalp, massacre, and destroy our Settlers: These are all Facts too notorious and recent to be denied; and must naturally discover to us the whole Plan and Scheme laid by the French to confine, conquer, and enslave all our Colonies….then they propose proceeding further, and to seize and secure all the Passes on the Mountains, and head the Indians against all our colonies, and force us to become a tributary, or to submit to the arbitrary Government of France, and become their Slaves….”

These statements of justification contextualize the need to protect and defend Britain’s Indian allies on the continent, both as an interest-centric argument regarding the protection of territorial and economic interests in the colonies, as well as a human-centric argument regarding the obligation of the British government to protect the lives and safety of its colonial settler subjects. Human-centric discourses comprise much of the middle portion of Dobbs’ speech, along with the need to protect the religious traditions of the British against the “Popish Schemes” of the Catholic French: “If we then give the French Time to execute the Scheme they have begun, the Liberties, Properties, and Protestant Religion in these Colonies will be unavoidably lost.”
Dobbs concludes by again citing the obligation of the British colonial government to protect the British interests, support their Indian allies, and protect the Protestant religion:

“Let us then cheerfully give what is reasonable and proper for us…as well knowing that a moderate Sum now granted, will go farther in securing our Rights and Properties, than Ten Times as much if longer delayed: Let us then inspire the other Colonies with an equal Fire to maintain their Religion and Liberties, and to preserve the Friendship, and defend the rights of our Indian Allies, this, as grateful Men, we owe to them...this will shew the Gallic Monarch, and his insatiable Ministry, that we are not to be intimidated or bullied out of our Rights, and that if he should insist upon his romantic Scheme of surrounding, confining and enslaving us, that we will jointly and unanimously support our valuable Religion, Liberties, and Properties, with our Lives and Fortunes….”

The discursive claims put forth by Dobbs in his speech to the North Carolina assembly in December of 1754 reappear – in much more concise fashion – in the official declaration of war issued by the British crown in May of 1756. This declaration begins by firmly establish the authority to wage war in a sovereign rights logic of justification, citing the “Usurpations and Encroachments made by [the French] upon Our Territories” as well as the violations of the “solemn Treaties and Engagements… [that] has been evaded under the most frivolous Pretences….” The declaration then proceeds by specifying three factors in need of protection for which the war must be fought. The first discursive claim argues that:
“notwithstanding this Act of Hostility, which could not be but looked upon as a Commencement of War, yet, from Our earnest Desire of Peace, and in Hopes the Court of France would disavow this Violence and Injustice, We contented Ourselves with fending such a Force to America, as was indispensably necessary for the Defense and Protection of Our Subjects against fresh Attacks and Insults.”

Here, the British crown invokes a protection obligation frame, arguing that despite its hopes for a peaceful settlement with France, it was essential to dispatch an armed force against France in order to protect British subjects from French aggression. In addition to this human-centric discourse, the British declaration of war invokes an interest-centric discourse:

“In these Circumstances We could not but think it incumbent upon Us, to endeavor to prevent the Success of so dangerous a Design, and to oppose the Landing of the French Troops in America; and, in consequence of the just and necessary Measures We had taken for that Purpose…great Bodies of Troops marched down to the Coast; and Our Kingdoms were threatened with an invasion. In order to prevent the Execution of these Designs, and to provide for the Security of Our Kingdoms, which were thus threatened, We could no longer forbear giving Orders for the seizing at Sea the Ships of the French King….”
In response to the perceived aggressive intentions of the French, the British crown responds by asserting the necessity of using force to protect the national security interests and territorial integrity of the British Kingdom.

The British justifications for waging war against France in the mid-18th century exhibit characteristics consistent with expectations regarding the discursive frames that my theory would be predict should be employed in this high power, symmetrical, and non-power divergent conflict at the end of the Westphalian age and the dawn of the age of popular sovereignty. Interest-centric discourses were dominant in both accounts, with human-centric discourses emerging as a prominent, but secondary justification. If human-centric discourses indeed become more prevalent as the authority of the state system becomes successively more oriented toward the obligation of government to the will and well-being of its constituent population, then later conflicts should exhibit this shift with human-centric discourses surpassing interest-centric discourses as the primary need for waging war.

*The Second World War, 1939*

The causes of the Second World War were global and complex, including Japanese imperialism in the east, the rise of communism in Russia, and unsettled tensions in the European balance of power. Here I focus on the conflict between Germany and Great Britain that emerged in the summer of 1939 and that ultimately led to the outbreak of violence across Western Europe. In the years after the First World War, German bitterness over their military loss and the harsh economic punishments enacted by the
Treaty of Versailles allowed for the rise of a fascist regime under Adolf Hitler. Hitler’s promises of territorial expansion and a renewal of the former glory of the empire appealed to German nationalistic sentiments. In 1938, Hitler set his sights on Poland, claiming that the large German ethnic population in the city of Danzig needed protection and should be under German control. When Poland refused to turn Danzig over to the Germans, Hitler threatened invasion. Great Britain, supported by their French ally, promised retaliation if the Germans encroached on Polish territory. After a tense summer of speeches and communications between Germany and Britain, the German military commenced its invasion of Poland, sparking six years of war that would be the deadliest in European history.

Britain’s involvement in the Second World War occurred in a historical context in which the authority of the state was transitioning between national and supra-national authority. In the era of national sovereignty that dominated from the mid to late 19th century, political authority was largely contextualized in terms of the rights of self-determination. For Europeans and the former European colonies in Latin America, this expression of national self-determination was notably articulated in the “springtime of the nations” popular revolutions beginning in 1848. While notions of national sovereignty and self-determination were gaining an authoritative foothold in Europe and the former European colonies of the Americas, much of the rest of the world was continuing to experience the political authority of the state system as subjects of the European (and by the end of the 19th century, American) colonial powers. Throughout this era of colonial expansion at the turn of the 20th century, resistance to colonial authority both drew upon and challenged European ideals of popular national sovereignty, emphasizing universal
human rights and the right to self-determination for all people as a vital component of the authority of the state system. The events of the Second World War serve as a notable historic marker in another transformation in the authority of the state system. At the end of this war, the resistance to colonial rule among those people, particularly in south Asia, who had fought and died in support of imperial powers of France and Great Britain during the wars, found that their status within the imperial system was still subjugated. At the same time, the World War had weakened the administrative capacity of the great imperial powers over their colonial holdings. The transforming nature of political authority at this time was most notably articulated by the official end of British colonial rule in India and the establishment of the independent states of India and Pakistan in 1947, events which became a source of inspiration for a number of colonial independence movements in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. The idea formed at this time was that there was a political authority that existed beyond the state and that to protect values of human rights and self-determination, states should subordinate some aspects of national sovereignty to supranational authoritative structures. In this context, I therefore expect justification discourses to be predominantly human-centric, particularly focusing on the right to self-determination and the need to defend the authority of supranational structures, such as the United Nations. Interest-centric discourses may still be prevalent as secondary frames, but should exhibit evidence of being less powerful than human-centric discourses.

Six primary documents were collected declaring the Britain’s justification for war against Germany in the weeks leading up to armed conflict, from June 10th to September 4th, 1939: two speeches of the Prime Minister before Parliament, one speech of the
Secretary of State before Parliament, two letters of official correspondence between the British to the German head of state, and a radio broadcast from the Prime Minister to the German people of Danzig on the eve of attack (Great Britain 1939). Within these documents, 21 discourses of justification are invoked; 81 percent of the discourses are interest-centric, while no explicitly human-centric discourses are invoked. Nineteen percent of the discursive claims are universal discourses of justification, all of which invoke the need to protect the common good and general peace of humanity. This pattern directly contradicts the hypothesis that human-centric discourses should be invoked more prominently in this 20th century conflict relative to the predominantly interest-centric discourses of the late Westphalian to early popular sovereignty eras.

Two types of interest-centric discourses were invoked in these documents: the most common (48 percent of the discursive claims) was for the protection of allies. One-third of the discursive claims invoked the need to protect the national security interests of Britain as well as the regional security interests of Europe. The protection of allies claim is exhibited in a speech given by Prime Minister Chamberlain to the House of Commons on July 10, 1939:

“the issue could not be considered as purely local matter involving the rights and liberties of the Danzigers, which incidentally are in no way threatened, but would at once raise graver issues affecting Polish national existence and independence. We have guaranteed to give our assistance to Poland in the case of a clear threat to her independence, which considers it vital to resist with her national forces, and we are firmly resolved to carry out this undertaking.”
Here we see evidence of the political authority of national sovereignty, with Poland’s national independence made central to the need for war; however, rather than arguing for this need in terms of the right of the Polish people to national independence, Chamberlain argues for this need in terms of the obligations of alliance between nations. This sentiment is further expressed in the official reply of His Majesty’s Government to a letter from the German Chancellor on August 28th:

“The German Government will be aware that His Majesty’s Government have obligations to Poland by which they are bound and which they intend to honour. They could not, for any advantage offered to Great Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which put in jeopardy the independence of a State to whom they have given their guarantee.”

In an official letter two days later, His Majesty’s Government again asserts the interest-centric argument of the need to protect its allies:

“His Majesty’s Government repeat that they reciprocate the German Government’s desire for improved relations, but it will be recognized that they could not sacrifice the interests of other friends in order to obtain that improvement.”

The Secretary of State, Viscount Halifax, employed this same argument in a speech to Parliament on August 24th, stating “…we do not think of asking Germany to sacrifice her national interests, but we do insist that the interests of other States should be respected.”
When hostilities commenced on September 4, 1939, Chamberlain gave a radio broadcast directly to the German people, putting the protection of Britain’s Polish allies in terms of its own status interests:

“Your country and mine are now at war. Your Government has bombed and invaded the free and independent State of Poland, which this country is honour bound to defend….You may ask why Great Britain is concerned. We are concerned because we gave our word of honour to defend Poland against aggression.”

While the majority of Britain’s discursive claims were put in terms of the protection of its Polish ally, broader national and regional security interests accounted for approximately one-third of all the discursive claims. Secretary of State Viscount Halifax argued in a speech to Parliament on August 24th that

“As a matter of history, successive British Governments have felt obliged to resist attempts by a single Power to dominate Europe at the expense of others, and the imposition of one country’s will by force of arms. This country has stood for the maintenance of the independence of those States who both valued their liberties and were ready to defend them….Our object is, and has been, to build an international order based on mutual understanding and mutual confidence, but that order can only rest on the basis of certain moral principles which are widely recognized to be essential to the peaceful and the orderly life of nations, and among those principles I place high the renunciation of forcible solutions and the
respect for the pledged word in international relationships. And, fundamentally, it is those principles which are to-day as we see it in danger, and it is those principles which we consider it vital to try and protect.”

This supranational authority is again evident in an official letter from His Majesty’s Government to the German Government on August 28th, where the British suggest that any discussions to negotiate peace must be centered on “the safeguarding of Poland’s essential interests and the securing of the settlement by an international guarantee.”

The evidence provided in these documents from the British government at the start of the Second World War do not support the hypothesis of a transition from interest-centric to human-centric discourses as the state system became increasingly oriented toward the human rights, self-determination, and supranational authority. Rather, the British government articulated its need to go to war in terms of its obligation to allies, its status interests, and the regional security interests of Europe. These discursive claims were made in the context of an emerging notion of supranational authority, with emphasis on the need to strengthen international relationships and to use international guarantees the basis to secure peaceful settlement of disputes. In this context, it is entirely reasonable to imagine the British government invoking a human-centric discourse in its obligation to fulfill its promises to Poland by invoking the need to protect the Polish people as citizens of state that the British had guaranteed to protect. Instead, they assert that armed force is necessary for the existence of the Polish state as a governing entity. Even when citing specific attacks by the Germans against Polish towns, the British government does not invoke the need to protect the Polish people, or innocent women and children, but rather
to protect the independence and security of the Polish state. When speaking directly to the German people, Chamberlain could have invoked the humanitarian cost of German’s aggression; instead, he emphasizes Poland’s right to sovereign independence as a free state.

The Falklands/Malvinas War, 1982

The conflict that erupted in 1982 between Britain and Argentina over the tiny south Atlantic Islands (known to the British as the Falklands, South Georgia, and South Sandwich islands and to the Argentinians as the Malvinas) came as a surprise to the international community. The islands, a few hundred miles from Argentina’s southeastern coast, had been British possessions since 1833. Though Argentina had requested on several occasions that the islands be turned over into their possession, Britain retained control, arguing that the vast majority of the islands’ several thousand inhabitants identified as British subjects. In the 1980s, as Argentine society was in the midst of economic, political and social upheaval, the government of Argentine president Galtieri saw the disputed islands as an opportunity to whip up patriotic unity and distract from the country’s troubles. An Argentine force invaded the islands on April 2, 1982, and quickly compelled the Falkland’s minimally staffed defense force into surrender. The British, caught off guard by the surprise invasion, quickly assembled a task force to regain control of the islands. For nearly two months, the two countries fought over control of the tiny islands, whose main economic activities were fishing and sheep herding. Nearly
1,000 people were killed on both sides before the British retook the islands and forced an Argentine surrender in June.

The Falklands/Malvinas War occurred at a moment of transition between the eras of supranational authority and the era of fragmented authority that would come to characterize the post-Cold War political context. At this late stage in the Cold War era, the bipolar superpower system that characterized the supranational state system was already strained by a weakening Soviet Union and a growing challenge of non-state combatants to the stability of the state system. In this context, my theory would predict that a high power actor in a symmetrical conflict would invoke predominantly human-centric frames within a sovereign rights logic of justification, that is, predominantly a protection obligation frame, with minimal invocation of interest-centric claims. Indeed, this appears to be case.

In the two months that surrounded this brief conflict, seven primary documents explicitly outlining Britain’s justification for the use of force against Argentina were collected.\(^4\) Two of these documents were speeches given by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher before the House of Commons, two were interviews given by Thatcher on television and radio, one was a speech given by Thatcher at a public event, one was a speech given by British representative to the UN, Sir Anthony Parsons, and one was an official appeal submitted to the UN by the British government. Within these documents, 31 discursive claims are invoked, the vast majority of these (68 percent) being human-

\(^{14}\) All documents cited here were taken from The Margaret Thatcher Foundation online archive, available at www.margaretthatcher.org
centric claims. Nineteen percent were interest-centric claims, and 16 percent were universal claims to protect the common good.

Interest-centric frames comprised a minority of the discursive claims invoked by Britain to justify the use of force against Argentina, and these interest-centric claims were exclusively oriented toward the territorial sovereignty of the British state. In fact, this is the very first claim invoked by Thatcher upon calling an emergency session of Parliament following the news of the Argentine invasion on April 3. Thatcher opens her remarks to Parliament by saying “The House meets this Saturday to respond to a situation of great gravity. We are here because, for the first time in many years, British sovereign territory has been invaded by a foreign power.” In an interview two days later, Thatcher again asserts “We have to recover what is our sovereign territory…. If this [invasion] succeeds there will be other examples of it elsewhere. Therefore we have a duty to our territory, to our people, but also a duty to see that these aggressive moves do not succeed.” Here Thatcher intertwines interest- and human-centric discursive claims by invoking the government’s obligation to both its territory and its people.

The vast majority of these human-centric claims called for the protection of British citizens to whom the government was legally and morally obligated to defend. In a speech to Parliament on April 3, 1982, Prime Minister Thatcher argued for the need to use force to expel the Argentine invasion of the islands by claiming that

“The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an island race…. They are few in number, but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine
their own allegiance. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her Majesty’s Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right.”

As was the case in World War II, the right to self-determination forms the central authoritative logic by which the British claim the right to wage war. However, unlike in the case of WWII, the need to wage war is articulated using human-centric language, both in terms of the obligation to protect to those who give their allegiance to the British government, as well as the need to carry out the wishes of the British people to uphold the Falklanders right to self-determination. Thatcher again expresses this discourse in an April 3 interview, in which she asserts, “we have to recover [the Falkland islands] for the people on them are British and British stock and they still owe allegiance to the crown and want to be British. We have to what is necessary to recover those islands.” In a speech on April 30, Thatcher further emphasizes that the obligation of a government to its citizens holds regardless of how far away these citizens are to homeland. Speaking about the nationalistic reaction to the Argentine incursion, Thatcher comments that the crisis “awoke in Britain an fantastic pride of country” with the realization that “this country was a free country and we weren’t going to have other people walking all over British citizens even though they were 8,000 miles away.” Thatcher further asserts the obligations to the Falkland British citizens in a May 17 interview:

“…the Falkland Islanders are British citizens. British citizens have ben invaded. If they can’t look to their own country to protect them, to go and try to get the invader off, what future is there for anyone in this world? ...And don’t forget…you’re dealing with a country that hasn’t exactly got
a good record on human rights. Are you going to leave our people to be under the heel of that kind of junta?”

Here Thatcher invokes a human rights argument for using force, but does so within the context of a protection obligation frame. It is not simply because the human rights of the Falklanders are under threat that warrants action, but because those people are British citizens that the government must act. In addition, this claim is firmly embedded in the authoritative structure of the state system; Thatcher asserts a dangerous future for all people if they cannot expect the protection of their government against foreign invasion.

The authoritative context of the supranational era is likewise evident in language invoked by Britain’s ambassador to the UN, Sir Anthony Parsons. In a speech before the UN Security Council on April 3, Parsons argues that whether the Falklanders number “1,800 or 18,000 or 18 million, they are still entitled to the protection of international law and they are entitled to have their freely expressed wishes respected.” In a formal appeal to the UN on 21 May, the British government further asserts that Argentina’s “unlawful use of force in unprovoked aggression threatened not only to destroy the democratic way of life freely chosen by the Falkland Islanders but also the basis on which international order rests.” Within the context of supranational authority, the British claim for the need to use force against Argentina is premised both on the right of self-determination of its citizens as well as an obligation to protect the international system which is premised on that right.

The evidence provided by Britain’s claims surrounding the initiation of the Falklands/Malvinas War indicates that human-centric language was more dominant in
this conflict than the two earlier examples of conflict provided. The British government articulated its need to go to war predominantly in terms of its obligation to protect its citizens, and secondarily, in terms of obligations to protect territorial sovereignty. These discursive claims were made in the context of a supranational authority that was at the beginnings of a transformation, with emphasis on the need to safeguard the rules of the dominant international system. In this context, it is entirely reasonable to imagine the British government invoking interest-centric discourses in a more dominant manner, by emphasizing its territorial rights under international law. Instead, territorial claims comprised a minority of the discursive claims, with the arguments for the use of force framed predominantly in terms of citizen rights and the obligations of government to protect its citizens regardless of their territorial location. These claims highlight the overarching supranational authority that dominated the political context at this historical moment, in which the protection of citizen rights and the right to self-determination are conceived of as legitimate causes for war.

**Conclusion**

My hypothesis regarding the shift from interest-centric to human-centric discourses over the course of the state system was rooted in an effort to explain why the fracture narrative suggested that recent conflicts have exhibited justifications framed more in terms of the need to protect people rather than the need to protect interests. I argued that the tendency to perceive of this transformation was rooted in a discursive, rather than a logical shift in the nature of war justifications over time. I argued that because successive phases in the development of the international system of sovereign
states became increasingly oriented towards the obligation of governments to their constituent populations, that those embedded within the fracture narrative were picking up on a discursive, but not a logical shift.

Fuzzy-sets analysis did not support this expectation, and this chapter’s examination of the Seven Years’ War, the Second World War, and the Falklands/Malvinas War provided somewhat mixed results. Instead of human-centric discourses becoming more steadily more prevalent, the pattern that emerged was that Great Britain, as a high power actor in highly symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts, employed mostly interest-centric and some human-centric discourses in the Seven Years’ War, exclusively interest-centric frames in the Second World War and predominantly human-centric frames in the Falklands/Malvinas War.

One possible explanation for this pattern is that the creation of supranational organizations, such as the United Nations, after WWII made human-centric discourses more necessary. As is evident in the Falkland/Malvinas war, appeals to the United Nations by both countries were strongly situated in a context of human rights and self-determination. If it was the creation of the United Nations that necessitated this discursive shift, then we should see evidence of this shift before and after 1945. However, examining the proportion of interest-centric vs. human-centric discourses employed by all high power actors in symmetrical conflicts before and after 1945 (figure 5.1), there appears to be no discernable temporal trend indicating periods of time in which human-centric or interest-centric trends are more prevalent. Similarly, figure 5.2 demonstrates no discernable temporal trend among all conflicts in the data set.
Because there is no discernable temporal trend, the factors that influence the use of human- or interest-centric discourses must be structural or contextual in nature. The fsQCA results did not point to power integration, dyad symmetry, colonial power/subject history, or colonial relationships factors influencing the use of discourses of justification. Therefore, the conditions that drive the use of human- or interest-centric discourses must be outside of the score of variables considered by this study. This suggests that future research should examine a broader range of factors than those considered in the current study.

Figure 5.1 Discourses of Justification Used by High Power Actors in Symmetrical Conflicts, before and after 1945
Although my original hypotheses were not fully supported, the findings of this chapter do support the skepticism of the fracture narrative claims on which this dissertation is based. This narrative argues that high power actors have shifted their justifications in recent decades as the authoritative logic of the state system gradually disintegrated. I argued that the authoritative logic of the state system remained strong, but that the tendency to see a transformation was in fact evidence of a discursive, rather than a logical, shift that was part of a long term trend of the state’s power becoming increasingly oriented toward its obligation to the people under its rule. The cases examined here did not provide evidence of such a temporal trend. Rather, the evidence indicates that another structural or contextual factor is at play, but this factor was not accounted for in the current analysis. While this analysis did identify state system integration and colonial history variables, particularly in dyadic relational terms, as being central driving features of the use of logics of justification, it was not able to identify the conditions that drive the discourses of justification. Future research should focus on
uncovering these factors to create a fuller theoretical explanation for the use of interest-
or human-centric discourses.
Chapter 6 Group Preservation Frames

The low consistency scores associated with the causal combinations produced by the truth table algorithm for the group preservation frame does not allow me to draw any conclusions about the causal factors associated with these frames. Only three conflicts within the dataset were calibrated as being mostly or fully in the set of cases characterized by the group preservation frame. The current chapter examines these three cases in depth to help uncover the conditions that are associated with the use of this frame.

The Holy Roman Empire in the Thirty Years’ War, 1618

Conflicts between Catholic and Protestant factions had been ongoing across Europe for a full century by the time Protestant Bohemian Lords tossed the Catholic representatives of Holy Roman Emperor Matthias out the window of the Bohemian Chancellery on May 23, 1618. The Bohemian Revolt against the expansion of Catholic rights and perceived imposition of Catholic rule over the largely Protestant principality reignited the Catholic-Protestant wars of religion that had been previously settled by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. The Holy Roman Empire justified its use of force against the Protestant League that arose to support the Bohemian rebels predominantly in terms of the need to protect the practice of Catholicism across Europe, citing the divine authority of God to maintain peace and order within its kingdoms. Using an exclusively humanitarian justice logic and split between human-centric and interest-centric
discourses, this case was fully in the set of group preservation frame cases, fully out of
the power-interests frame set, and neither in nor out of the suffering of innocents and
protection obligation frames. This case also represents a highly symmetrical, non-power
divergent conflict between high power actors. The force that backed the Bohemian rebels
was a coalition of German States, the Protestant Union, which formed in 1608 to counter
the power of the Catholic League headed by the Holy Roman Empire.

In the first phase of this long conflict, the Bohemian phase, two documents
articulate the justifications of the Holy Roman Empire in taking up arms against the
Bohemian rebels. In an open letter to the Bohemians issued shortly after the
Defenestration of Prague in May 1618, Holy Roman Emperor Matthias warns the
Bohemians:

“If our gracious and paternal warnings and our just orders and instructions
are ignored and the soldiers and militia are not immediately disbanded in
the kingdom of Bohemia, we will be obliged to accept that order and
justice are being disregarded. We will be left no choice, but to take the
necessary measure to maintain our authority with the help of the Almighty
by whose grace we are your rightful king and master.”

Here, Emperor Matthias makes an interest-centric arguing – claiming the need to protect
the order and justice of the realm – embedded within a humanitarian justice logic, that is,
invoking the divine authority of God as the basis of the right to use force.

In the following year, the Holy Roman Empire consolidates its forces against the
Protestant Union by calling on the Duke of Bavaria to raise a force on behalf of the
Catholic League. In the Treaty of Munich, the Duke of Bavaria justifies his use of force against the Protestant Union in order “to protect the Catholic religion and all the Estates of the Empire loyal to it.” The call for protection invoked here is for a population that is non-territorial in nature, that is, the need to protect the Catholic population exists beyond the boundaries of any one state.

Although limited primary documentation is available for this early conflict, the documentation that is available indicates that the group preservation frame as it was used at the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War was used in the context of divine authority to fight for the preservation of a religious group.

_Transylvania in the Thirty Years’ War, 1644_

The Principality of Transylvania had been involved on both sides of the Thirty Years’ War, first as an ally to the Protestant Union in 1620, then switching sides later that year in exchange for Hungarian lands from the Holy Roman Emperor. The Transylvanian prince largely stayed out of the conflict for the next 20 years, but tensions grew between the prince and the empire as the Hapsburgs attempted to re-Catholicize that had been acceded to Transylvania in the 1620 deal. By the 1640s, the Protestants and Catholics were in a tenuous stalemate, and the entrance of Transylvania into the conflict on either side could tip the balance. When Prince Racokzkie issued a manifesto declaring his intentions reenter the war on the side of the Protestant Swedes in 1644, the pamphlet was published and distributed across Europe.
Much like the Holy Roman Empire at the beginning of the conflict in 1618, the entrance of the Transylvanians into the war represents a high power, highly symmetric, and non-power divergent conflict. The Transylvanian manifesto does, however, provide evidence of the shifting conceptions of political authority that would come to characterize the state system that would be established in the Westphalian Peace four years later. Religious justifications enter prominently into Rocokzkie’s manifesto, but he also cites issues related to the power and right to political control of independent states that was largely absent from justifications at the beginning of the war. Thus, the Transylvanian manifesto exhibits justifications that are mostly in the group preservation set, neither in nor out of the power-interests and suffering of innocents sets, and mostly out of the protection obligation set.

Thus, Rocokzkie argues that taking up arms is necessary, not only for the “liberty of our souls,” speaking in terms of the freedom of religious practice he seeks to reestablish, but also for “temporall liberty,” drawing repeated reference to the right of Nations to establish “the Statutes and Laws of the Kingdome” as they see fit. The authority to establish national political control is still firmly rooted in divine authority, however, because “to Domineere and Rule over Consciences doth not belong to men, but to God alone.” Rocokzkie’s manifesto, however, also exhibits a blending of divine and national political authority that was absent from earlier justifications:

“Our conscience, as also our duty to the glory and service of God, and the love and zeale to the Libertie of Our native Country and Nation required Us, yea by some of the Protestant States and Peeres also, and not lesse by some of the Roman Catholiques, We have beene exhorted upon Our soules
salvation, and in a manner beene forced, that for defence of their Liberties
We would rule.”

The justification frames invoked by Prince Racokzkie near the end of the Thirty Years’
War provide some evidence of the conceptual shifts in political authority that surrounding
the Westphalian transformation. The group preservation frame that dominated the
beginning of the Thirty Years’ is still a prominent frame near its conclusion, but shows
evidence of being integrated with notions of state sovereignty that would characterize the
political world of Europe after the 1648 Westphalian Peace.

_Italy in the Italian-Ethiopian (Abyssinian) War, 1935_

The group preservation frame doesn’t appear as a driving frame again until the
1935 Italian-Ethiopian (Abyssinian) War. The Italians had been a late-comer to African
colonization, and by the 1930s Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini was eager to seize any
opportunity to gain a foothold on the continent and demonstrate Italy’s rising power. Italy
had fought the Ethiopians before: after seizing control of Somaliland in the 1880s, they
attempted to establish a protectorate over the Ethiopian empire in 1895 and were
decisively defeated. Four decades later, Mussolini was determined to make Italy a
colonial power in Africa through Ethiopia. Branching out from their base in Somaliland,
the Italians began encroaching on Ethiopian territory, building a fort at the Wal Wal oasis
well inside Ethiopian territory, leading to a skirmish that led to the deaths of 150
Ethiopians in December 1934. The Wal Wal incident, and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia
that followed in the spring of 1935 proved the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations.
Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie appealed emphatically and repeatedly to the League to enforce the regulations, particularly Article X regarding aid to member states to defend against external aggression. The League’s response was weak, imposing sanctions on Italy in November of 1935 only to lift them by the following July. By the spring of 1936, the Ethiopian military was defeated and Selassie was driven into exile in England. The Italians won control of the Ethiopian kingdom, but their colonial control of the region would be relatively short-lived. Mussolini entered WWII on the side of the Axis powers in 1940 and Selassie returned to Ethiopia in 1941 to lead the resistance against the Axis powers in Africa, who were forced to surrender their positions in North Africa in 1943. Haile Selassie returned to power as the emperor of Ethiopia. When Italy formally surrendered to the Allied powers in 1947, they were compelled to sign a treaty of peace which included a formal recognition of Ethiopia’s independence and a promise to pay reparations of $25 million.

Like the two earlier conflicts detailed above, Italy in the Italian-Ethiopian War represents a high power actor in a symmetrical conflict. This conflict occurred at a historical moment of transition between the era of national sovereignty that had dominated global politics since the middle of the 19th century and the emerging notions of supranational authority that would become prevalent after the end of the Second World War.

Italy in the war against Ethiopia represents in an interesting case for a number of reasons. Although Ethiopia, as a member of the League of Nations, is coded as a full member of the state system without a colonial history at the start of the conflict, it ends the conflict as a colonial subject of Italy that is not integrated into the state system.
Indeed, the political power of the League of Nations disintegrates in large part because it fails in its mission to protect member states from invasion. Thus, although this conflict is coded in the data set as a high power, high symmetry, non-power divergent and non-colonial conflict, this characterization could be reasonably disputed. How well integrated into the state system should Ethiopia be considered, if that system failed to come to its aid when called upon? Should a conflict be considered colonial if colonial domination was a driving motivation in Italy’s aggression, even if Ethiopia had not experienced colonial subjugation at the start of the war? In these features, the Italian-Ethiopian War is a unique case in this dataset.

Mussolini’s justifications for war are evident in five documents from the summer and fall of 1935; two of these documents are transcripts of speeches given before the League of Nations, one speech given to the Italian legislative assembly, one speech broadcast to the Italian public, and one publicly issued policy statement. In these documents, Mussolini justifies Italian force against the Ethiopian (or Abyssinian) empire exclusively in terms of a humanitarian justice logic of justification, with near equal invocation of interest-centric and human-centric discourses. Thus, these justifications are coded as being mostly in the group preservation set, mostly in the suffering of innocents set, and mostly out of the protection obligation and power-interests sets.

Although Mussolini draws exclusively on humanitarian justice logic of justification, this logic looks entirely different from the divine authority arguments present in the earlier 17th century conflicts. Rather, Mussolini claims the authority to attack based on a natural and geographic authority. In a policy statement issued in August 1935, Mussolini argues that Italy’s unique position in the Mediterranean imposes upon it
both the right and obligation to “civilize Africa.” Mussolini frequently cites Ethiopia’s failure to eradicate slavery as evidence of its barbarism and the need for the European “civilizing mission” to spread through Africa. However, he also claims that

“it is not for [slavery] that Italy is preparing herself for action. The abolition of slavery will be only a consequence of the Italian policy…. Not even civilization is the object that Italy has in view. Civilization, too, will be only a consequence of the Italian policy. The essential arguments, absolutely unanswerable, are two: the vital needs of the Italian people and their security in East Africa.”

Italy’s civilizing mission, Mussolini asserts, is not for “territorial conquests” but rather is rooted in a “natural expansion which ought to lead to a collaboration between Italy and the peoples of Africa, between Italy and the nations of the Near and Middle East.” In announcing the war to the Italian people in October, Mussolini again invokes a natural right to expansion by claiming that action offers a redress for the Italian people “against whom the blackest of all injustices has been committed – that of denying them a place in the sun.”

Mussolini’s justifications for the 1935 invasion of Ethiopia largely invoke a group preservation frame, namely the need to spread the Western civilizing mission to Africa within an authoritative framework of Italy’s natural right and geographic position. However, this frame was intertwined with a number of other justifications, including interest-centric discourses regarding Italian security and economic interests, the protection obligation Italy owed to its citizens, the suffering of innocent Africans trapped
in illegal slavery, and the sovereign right of Italy as “the only judge of her security in East Africa.” Thus, although the group preservation frame figures prominently into Mussolini’s justifications, this frame is blended with a number of other justifications. This complex blending of justifications may reflect the unique status of the case of the Italian-Ethiopian War which does not seem to fit neatly into analytical categories.

**Conclusion**

The fsQCA results detailed in chapter 4 indicated that the group preservation may be associated with high power actors in symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts. However, the low consistency of the solutions produced by the fuzzy sets analysis did not allow me to draw confident conclusions regarding the conditions associated with the use of this frame.

The findings of the case studies in the current chapter support the fsQCA results that the group preservation frame is associated with high power actors in symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts. Table 6.1 summarizes the characteristics of these conflicts. With the exception of the Italian-Ethiopian War of 1935, this frame appears to only be used as a dominant frame in the early era of the state system. Closer examination of these cases also reveal that the type of group preservation claims made by Italy in 1935 are vastly different from the divine-authority invoked in the group preservation frames used in the Bohemian and Swedish phases of the Thirty Years’ War. Thus, although the fsQCA results did not give a clear indication of how historical era may contribute to the use of the group preservation frame, these case studies can allow for some speculation.
The group preservation appears more strongly associated with the early era of the state system than any subsequent eras. The use of this frame in the 1935 Italian-Ethiopian War is associated with the same structural conditions as the earlier wars, namely high power, symmetrical, and non-power divergence, however, the type of humanitarian justice logic invoked was very different. That is, while the earlier conflicts invoked specific divine authority, the logic employed in the 1935 war invoked a more general authority of “natural right.”

Table 6.1 Summary Characteristics of Combatant Actors the Employing Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant</th>
<th>Holy Roman Empire (1618)</th>
<th>Transylvania (1644)</th>
<th>Italy (1935)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Era</td>
<td>Early Westphalian</td>
<td>Westphalian</td>
<td>Late national into early supranational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Integration</td>
<td>High power</td>
<td>High power</td>
<td>High power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyad Characteristics</td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Dyad</td>
<td>Non-divergent</td>
<td>Non-divergent</td>
<td>Non-divergent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial Characteristics</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None, but aspiring colonial power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Preservation</td>
<td>Fully in</td>
<td>Mostly in</td>
<td>Mostly in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffering of Innocents</td>
<td>Neither in nor out</td>
<td>Neither in nor out</td>
<td>Mostly in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection Obligation</td>
<td>Neither in nor out</td>
<td>Neither in nor out</td>
<td>Mostly out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-Interests</td>
<td>Fully out</td>
<td>Mostly out</td>
<td>Mostly out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings are entirely contradictory to my hypothesis that humanitarian justice logics of justification would be employed by high power actors in asymmetrical
and/or power divergent conflicts. Given the limited number of cases in which the group preservation figures prominently, the fsQCA results and the cases examined here do not provide strong evidence of the conditions that drive the use of the group preservation frame. However, these results do provide evidence against the just war revival arguments that were detailed in chapter 2.

These findings support the critique offered by this study of just war revival claim. These arguments suggest that those justifications characteristic of the early modern period have reemerged in recent decades as a result of the fracturing authority of the sovereign state system in the face of non-state challengers. The group preservation frame, rooted in a humanitarian justice logic and a human-centric discourse, is definitive of those early modern, pre-Westphalian justifications described by the just war revival arguments. Brown (2010), for example, argues that political authority is currently in the process of “migrating from the nation-state to the unrelieved domination of capital and God-sanctioned political violence.”

The findings of both the fsQCA and case study analysis do not support this notion of sovereignty shifting from national to divine authority; rather, the group preservation frame in which this divine authority is contained appears predominantly in the Westphalian era of the state system. Even when invoked in the 1935 Italian-Ethiopian War, the logic invoked is not one of “God-sanctioned political violence” but rather of a more abstract and general sense of a natural right to determine the justness of war, as well as an argument related to geographic convenience.
Chapter 7 Fighting for Dignity

Early in the coding process, I took note of an apparent association between low power actors and the use of discourses related to the dignity and humiliation of the population represented by the combatant group that was not present among high power actors. A fuzzy sets analysis of the conditions that contribute to the use of this discourse yielded a parsimonious solution of:

1. colonized
2. colonial dyad

These solutions indicated that being a colonial subject and being in conflict with another actor with whom the combatant shares a colonial relationship are the driving factors contributing to the use of dignity as a justification discourse. However, the consistency scores of these solutions are far too low (<0.60) to draw conclusions with any confidence.

To explore how state system integration and colonial history characteristics may contribute to the use of dignity claims in justifications for war, I calculated the average number of dignity claims made among each of the combatants within the variable categories. That is, the number of dignity codes within the total number of discursive codes for each type of combatant.

Fully non-state actors were more likely to employ dignity claims in justifying war than fully state actors (figure 7.1). Actors that were fully integrated into the state system employed dignity claims on an average of 1.4 times per combatant case, while fully non-
state actors employed actors on average 2.3 times per case. However, dignity claims were most likely to appear among mostly or partially non-state actors (4.5 times per case) and least likely to appear among mostly or partially state actors (less than one claim per case on average).

The difference in use of dignity claims within symmetrical and asymmetrical conflicts is far less pronounced (figure 7.2). Combatants within fully asymmetrical conflicts were 1.6 times more likely to employ dignity claims than combatants within fully symmetrical conflicts. There was little difference between the use of dignity claims among mostly or partially asymmetrical and mostly or partially symmetrical conflicts.

The most striking patterns, however, when examining the use of dignity claims by colonial history of the combatants. Figure 7.3 demonstrates a steady increase in the average use of dignity claims by colonial subject status as well as the time between the end of that colonial subjugation and the start of the conflict. Combatants who have never been colonial subjects or whose colonial experience ended more than a century prior to the start of the conflict employ dignity justifications on average less than once (0.8) per
case. These claims rise to an average of 2.0 per case when the combatant was a colonial subject between 51 and 100 years prior to the start of the conflict, 2.3 times per case when the combatant was a colonial subject within 50 years prior to the start of the conflict, and 3.8 times per case when the combatant was a colonial subject at the start of the conflict.
Because those who are colonial subjects at the start of a conflict are likely to be in anti-colonial struggles against their colonial masters, whereas those who have a recent or distant history of colonial subjugation may be in conflict with any other type of actor, it is important to look at the impact of the colonial relationship between the conflict dyad. Figure 7.4 displays the average number of dignity claims by the colonial status of the conflict dyad. Dignity claims were 1.5 times more likely to be invoked in conflicts involving combatants who were in a colonial relationship at the start of the conflict than in those conflicts in which the combatant dyad had no colonial relationship or those whose relationship ended more than a century prior to the start of the conflict. Interestingly however, dignity claims were least likely to be employed in conflicts in which there was a colonial relationship between the dyad within the past century.\(^\text{15}\)

\[\text{Figure 7.4. Average Dignity Claims by Colonial Dyad Status}\]

Taken together, counts of the average use of justifications for war related to the dignity and perceived humiliation reveal interesting associations with the state integration and colonial history of the central combatants. Those who have experienced exclusion

\(^{15}\) Because of the low frequency of conflicts in which the central combatants shared a past colonial history (n=4), the categories for recent and distant colonial relationships were collapsed.
from the state system appear far more likely to employ dignity claims than those who are well integrated into the state system. In particular, dignity claims are most likely to be employed by those who have a low level of integration within the state system but are not entirely excluded from it, for example, those who receive meaningful support from another member of the state system. In addition, the power dynamics between the central combatants also appear to play a role in influencing the use of dignity as a justification for war. Dignity claims were more common among fully asymmetrical conflicts than among symmetrical conflicts, and more common within conflicts in which the combatant dyad is in a colonial relationship at the start of conflict than in conflicts in which a colonial relationship existed between the dyad in the past or never existed.

To further explore how state system integration and colonial history dynamics impact the use of dignity as a justification frame, I explore three cases in which this frame was most prevalent: The Algerian Revolution of 1954, the Second Intifada of 2000, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq of 2003. These three cases are among the five cases in the dataset with the highest prevalence of dignity claims. Examining these three cases in depth allows us to explore how state system integration characteristics and colonial history impact the use of dignity as a justification for war. As outlined in table 7.4, these cases vary in terms of state system membership and dyad symmetry, and exhibit different patterns of colonial relationships. Two other cases that had similarly high prevalence of dignity claims that are not examined in depth here were Iran in the 1980 Iran-Iraq War and ZANU in the 1964 Zimbabwean/Rhodesian Bush War. The case of Iran in the 1980 Iran-Iraq war exhibits state system and colonial history characteristics (in terms of their definitions here) that are identical to the 2003 U.S. Iraq War (both state members,
symmetrical conflict, with no dyadic colonial relationship, with Iraq having a past history as a colonial subject), while ZANU in the 1964 Zimbabwean/Rhodesian Bush War exhibits identical characteristics to Hamas in the Second Intifada (mostly non-state, mostly asymmetrical, with no dyadic colonial history but a history as a colonial subject).  

Table 7.1. Dignity Case Study Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combatant</th>
<th>State System Membership</th>
<th>Dyad Symmetry</th>
<th>Colonial Subject History</th>
<th>Dyad Colonial Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algerian FLN</td>
<td>Fully non-state</td>
<td>Fully asymmetrical</td>
<td>Colonial subject at start of conflict</td>
<td>Colonial relationship at start of conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Mostly non-state</td>
<td>Mostly asymmetrical</td>
<td>Past colonial subject (contested)</td>
<td>No colonial relationship (contested)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Fully state</td>
<td>Fully symmetrical</td>
<td>Past colonial subject</td>
<td>No colonial relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Algerian Revolution, 1954*

Algeria had been occupied as a French colonial possession since the 1830s; however, since 1848 it held a unique status as “an integral part of France.” Many Algerians fought for France during both the First and Second World Wars, and these experiences contributed to a growing sense of nationalism and a desire for independent

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16 The Zimbabwean/Rhodesian Bush War presents an interesting case because although the Zimbabweans were not directly colonized by the Rhodesian government at the time of the start of the conflict, both sides considered themselves to have been past colonial subjects to the British government. While the white Rhodesians saw themselves as resisting the influence of their former British imperial masters, the black Zimbabweans viewed the white Rhodesians as the “settler government” that was imposing a racist, imperial inspired regime upon the native Zimbabweans. This is a rather unique dynamic within the dataset, and one that I hope to explore further in future research.
national sovereignty among many Algerian intellectuals. After WWII, France extended citizenship to all Algerians, further contributing to the sense among some Algerian nationalists that an independent Algerian identity would be increasingly difficult to distinguish from that of France. Uprisings and protests against the French colonial authority had occurred sporadically throughout the 1920s and 1930s, but it was with the 1954 foundation of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and its armed wing, the National Liberation Army, that the movement exploded into a full-scale civil war. On November 1, 1954, the FLN issued a proclamation calling for the restoration of Algerian sovereignty and democracy within an Islamic framework and launched a series of attacks across Algeria, many against civilian targets.

In the FLN’s primary publication, *El Moudjahid*, the group cites the profaning of religious values, the economic and political exploitation of France’s colonial government, and the violation of its cultural dignity as a central motivation for the conflict:

“It just so happens that Islam was in Algeria the last refuge of these values hounded and profaned by an outrageous colonialism. Is there any reason then to be surprised that, in recovering a national consciousness, it contributes to the victory of a just cause?.... That said, we must add that a war can never be holy enough against a colonial regime which after a cowardly aggression in 1830 has, for the past 125 years, tried to exterminate the Algerian people and, not being able to do so, has worked to despoil it and exploit it to the extreme, to maintain it in fetters, in an iron collar of political domination, to systematically violate its language, its religion, its traditions.”
The language of the indignities of slavery, such as the “fetters” and the “iron collar of political domination” imposed by the colonial power, are common across these justifications. It was not only native Algerians who cited the indignities of colonial subjugation; Henri Mailloit, a French Algerian military commander, famously deserted his unit in April, 1956, to join the FLN, taking a truck load of weapons and ammunition with him. In an open letter published shortly thereafter, Mailloit justified his actions by saying,

“I consider Algeria to be my homeland. I feel that I should have the same obligations towards it as all of its children. At a moment when the Algerian people has risen up to free its soil from the colonialist yoke, my place is at the side of those who have taken up the fight for liberation….The Algerian people, so long scorned and humiliated, has taken its place in the great historic movement for the liberation of colonial peoples which has set Africa and Asia ablaze.”

The FLN further appealed to European Algerians in October, 1957, arguing that the responsibility for “this cruel war” lies with

“those who, after having conquered a land that didn’t belong to them, have spent 127 years enslaving its people, degrading them, ridiculing them, refusing them any kind of dignity, sabotaging the few laws grudgingly granted by Paris, shamefully falsifying elections, refusing the most rudimentary instruction to the majority of Algerian children, denying all
official rights to the Arabic language, and keeping the majority of Algerians in the most atrocious poverty.”

The justifications employed by the Algerian revolutionaries against the French colonial government make clear that the nature of colonialism, its economic exploitation, its violation of cultural and religious values, and its imposition of oppressive laws against the Algerian people, are a central motivation and justification for waging violence. The dynamics of colonialism are repeatedly presented in terms of the humiliation it imposes upon colonized people, and a fundamental right to human dignity is presented as a just cause of war.

Second Intifada, 2000

The long-standing tensions between Palestinian and Israeli leaders flared up once again into full-scale violence in the fall of 2000. Tensions in the region were already high as a result of the failed Camp David summit negotiations in July, and these tensions were further inflamed when Ariel Sharon, then a candidate for Israel’s prime minister, entered the Temple Mount on September 28 with 1,000 guards. The Temple Mount, an area sacred to Jews, is located on the site of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, an area sacred to Muslims. Palestinian protestors interpreted Sharon’s speech at the Temple Mount as an act of provocation surrounded the area and clashed with Israeli police. The militant group Hamas called for an Intifada, or armed uprising, against Israeli occupation of the region.
The area known as Palestine came under British administration in 1920, carved out of an Ottoman administered region in the aftermath of World War I. After the Second World War, the British administration, in conjunction with American and European allies, worked to implement the creation of an Israeli state. Designating a colonial subject and colonial history status for Palestine is rather complicated. From the perspective of Muslim Palestinians, the area has been and remains a colonial subject of Israeli Zionist imperialism. From the perspective of Israel and its American and British allies, however, Palestine at the time of the Intifada had full civil autonomy while remaining under Israeli military control. Hamas emerged as a militant resistance movement in 1987, claiming to represent the Palestinian people and their fight for full independence.

Claims to be acting in defense of Palestinian dignity and to counter the humiliation of occupation were repeatedly cited by Hamas’ frequent proclamations. In all of the Hamas proclamations, some statement of Sharon’s visit to Al-Aqsa as being a “declaration of war against our nation and its religion and dignity” is made. In a statement issued October 1, 2000, Hamas claims,

“O our steadfast Palestinian people: The intifadah of the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque will continue and persist and escalate to prove to the whole world that our people have not become tired or weakened and will not surrender to humiliation, oppression and occupation. This intifadah will also prove that our people have been and will continue to be able to offer resistance and sacrifices, confront the barbarism of the Jewish occupiers and their covetous ambitions and oppression, and defend Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque.”
In a statement issued a week later, Hamas expresses resistance to negotiating a peaceful settlement as a humiliation:

“We urge the anticipated Arab summit to be a summit for Al-Aqsa, jihad, resistance, and building a real Arab strategy to repulse the occupiers and save Al-Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, and Palestine from them, rather than issuing statements of condemnation and giving new chances for the humiliating peace process.”

Much like the case of the FLN in Algeria, the Hamas militant organization of Palestine justifies their violent actions in terms of the past humiliations of occupation and in terms of the necessity of protecting the dignity of their people.

*The U.S. Invasion of Iraq, 2003*

Just over a year after attacking the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, American president George W. Bush began arguing for the need to remove Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power to in an effort combat anti-American terrorism around the world. The negotiations that ended the war between the U.S. and Iraq in 1991 had set up a U.N. backed system for preventing Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction. Armed with evidence that Iraq was developing banned weapons the Bush administration petitioned the U.N. to authorize the use of force to remove Hussein from power. The U.N. refused to authorize the American-led war, but Bush presented Hussein with an ultimatum and assembled a
coalition of 46 countries (although Britain, Australia, and Poland sent the vast majority of manpower) to take part in the invasion. The invasion of Iraq commenced on March 19, 2003.

Although Iraq was a full member of the state system at the start of the invasion, and its history as a British colonial subject had ended 71 years prior to the 2003 invasion, Iraq’s status as a former colonial subject informed its justifications for responding to the U.S. ultimatum with a call for war, rather than submitting to U.S. demands for full weapons inspections. In an interview with a British journalist six weeks before the commencement of the joint U.S.-British invasion, Hussein responded to a question about how he would respond to those who wished for peace:

“Tell the British people if the Iraqis are subjected to aggression or humiliation they would fight bravely. Just as the British people did in the Second World War and we will defend our country as they defended their country each in its own way. The Iraqis don’t wish war but if war is imposed upon them – if they are attacked and insulted – they will defend themselves.” In an interview with Dan Rather three weeks later, Hussein further emphasized that “we must defend ourselves, and defend our right to dignity, and to live in peace and to live in dignity and freedom.”

Hussein further cited dignity in a televised address to the Iraqi people as the invasion commenced on March 24:
“O brothers, you know that our country’s policy is to avoid evil. But when evil comes, armed with deceit and destruction, we must face them with faith and holy struggle in a manner which dignifies us and satisfies God.”

Despite the relatively long historical distance between the end of the colonial period in Iraq, and despite Iraq’s full integration into the state system, dignity and the perceived humiliation being brought against Iraq by the U.S.-led coalition formed a central theme in Hussein’s justifications for fighting back.

Conclusion

The three cases presented above indicate that while power divergence in terms of state system integration between the combatants may influence the use of dignity as a justification frame, it appears as if having a history of being a colonial subject is a driving condition in influencing the use of dignity as a justification frame.

This finding calls into question the nature, or perhaps very existence of, the perceived threat to the authority of the state system. As outlined above, political scholarship in the post-Cold War, and particularly in the post-9/11, eras have been dominated by fears that the sovereign state system is under threat by non-state challengers who seek to dismantle its authority. The language used to justify war has been cited as evidence of this dangerous transformation, suggesting that states have had to reformulate their language for waging war as non-state challengers have rendered previous formulations obsolete (Falk 2002, Lawler 2004). The relational ontology
employed by this study challenges this vision, however. The sovereign state system has been experienced as a system of protection and security for much of the world for hundreds of years, and the erosion of its authority would pose danger to millions. However, it is also essential to realize that the safety and security offered by this system is not experienced equally. For the majority of the world’s population, the power and authority of the state system has been experienced through colonial exploitation. By employing language related to dignity and humiliation, formerly colonized groups are not necessarily challenging or rejecting the authority of the state system. Rather, they seek to claim the dignity and privilege that being integrated into and a beneficiary of such a system confers.

In addition to the theoretical implications of these findings, this study offers insight into potential avenues for conflict resolution among actors with different levels of power and integration within the state system. The justifications highlighted above give us insight into the emotional context that surrounds many current conflicts. While those who have high levels of power and integration within the state system see the non-state challenge as a threat to global security and the protection offered by the state system, those who have low levels of power integration and who have histories as colonial subjects see that same system as a source of exploitation and humiliation. This disconnect creates a significant barrier in negotiating peace. This barrier becomes further entrenched when non-state combatants are labeled as terrorist organizations with which opponents within the state system refuse to negotiate. Refusal to acknowledge the position of these actors as advocating for the needs of the people they perceive themselves as representing further entrenches this hatred. Understanding the link between colonial history and the
emotional language used to justify war carries implications for conflict resolution between high and low power actors. These implications are further discussed in the following concluding chapter.
Chapter 8 Conclusion

This dissertation sought to answer two questions. First, drawing from a body of scholarship in recent decades which has problematized the threat of non-state combatants to the continuing dominance of state sovereignty as the prevailing form of legitimate political authority, I asked to what extent do justifications for war-making in the post-Cold War reflect a fundamental transformation in conceptions of political authority? Second, drawing from post-colonial and critical race critiques of the study of the state, I asked which constellations of conditions related to the power status and state system integration of combatant actors were associated with the use of particular logical and discursive frameworks to justify war-making?

Employing post-colonial and critical race perspectives, I critiqued the fracture narrative, arguing that the tendency to see a recent transformation in the language of war was due to both theoretical and empirical misconceptions. Theoretically, the characterization of the threat of non-state combatants to the authority of the state system within the fracture narrative neglects the impact of power relations between those who hold privilege within the state system and those who are excluded from accessing its benefits. Empirically, there has been an absence of systematic study of the language used to justify war in way that is both historically and geographically broad. It is one thing to argue that non-state combatants pose a challenge to the authority of the state system, it is quite another to suggest that this challenge is somehow fundamentally different or more serious now than in the past. Drawing from a previously developed scheme of justification frameworks (Clever 2012), I argued that one likely explanation for the
tendency to see a transformation in the language of war was due to a shift from interest-centric to human-centric language over the course of the state system, as political authority became increasingly oriented toward human rights. Because human-centric discourses can be made within a sovereign rights logic of justification, I argued that improving the conceptual clarity with which justifications for war are analyzed can give insight into the extent to which the apparent transformations of the state system can be characterized as logical in nature, that is, a transformation in the fundamental political authority of the system, or rather is discursive in nature, that is, a transformation in the orientation of that authority.

My theoretical approach, employing a relational ontology challenges the fracture narrative. I predicted that high power and low power actors would employ different justifications frames depending on the combatant structural and historical context that surrounds the conflicts. I expected that in conflicts in which the relations of power between the main combatant actors were highly divergent and/or highly asymmetrical, high power actors would employ a humanitarian logic of justification while low power actors will employ a sovereign rights logic of justification. I expected this pattern to occur because the sovereign state system is a system of political power which confers privilege on those who are highly integrated into its structure, and disadvantages to those who are excluded from it. Those who are excluded seek to invoke the rules of that system in order to stake claim to its privileges, while those who benefit from the system shift focus toward justifications that lay outside the rules of the system, as if to refuse to allow those who threaten that privileged status to play by the set of rules that grants them that privilege. However, if both combatants hold privileged status within the system of states,
sovereign logics will be most prevalent among both actors, since both seek to assert their privilege most strongly. While this balance fluctuates between humanitarian and sovereignist logics dependent upon the divergence in power-integration, I expected that discourses of justification would show an increasing trend in prevalence towards human-centric justifications over the course of time, because each era in the transformation of political authority has become successively more oriented toward human rights.

Fuzzy-sets qualitative comparative analysis was used to determine the constellations of conditions that drive the use of particular justification frames. This analysis largely supported my hypotheses regarding sovereign rights logics of justification, but provided limited evidence regarding humanitarian justice logics of justification. I hypothesized that a sovereign rights logic of justification would be employed as a primary logic of justification by high power actors in symmetrical and/or non-power divergent conflicts and by low power actors in asymmetrical and/or power divergent conflicts. This hypothesis was supported by the fsQCA results with a high frequency and consistency threshold; both the power-interests and protection obligation frames were used by high power actors in symmetrical/non-power divergent conflicts and used by low power actors in asymmetrical/power divergent conflicts.

I also hypothesized that a humanitarian justice logic of justification would be employed as a primary justification by high power actors in asymmetrical/power divergent conflicts while low power actors would not employ this logic as a primary justification. The fsQCA results were inconclusive in specifying the conditions that contribute to the use of these frames. The solutions produced by the fuzzy sets analysis indicated that the group preservation frame was employed in a very different context than
my theory predicted: by high power actors in symmetrical conflicts. However, the low consistency threshold associated with this solution makes it impossible to draw conclusions with any confidence. The suffering of innocents frame did not reveal any logically consistent solutions to indicate the conditions that drive the use of this frame. Because of the rarity with which these frames emerge as dominant, including more cases in the dataset may help to provide insight into the conditions that drive their use.

Although the fsQCA results could not give insight into the conditional configurations that contribute to the use of the group preservation or suffering of innocents frames, this lack of a finding does provide useful information to contribute to this dissertation’s critique of the just war revival and fracture narrative. Very few cases exhibited a strongly humanitarian logic of justification; however, fracture narrative claims are premised on the notion that the reemergence of this just war language, the language that was characteristic of early modern Europe before the Westphalian transformation. The evidence provided here indicates that the humanitarian justice logic of justification is employed consistently as a secondary frame throughout the history of the state system, but only emerges as a dominant frame in a very small number of cases, mostly occurring at the very early stages of the state system. There is no evidence that these frames have made a resurgence in recent decades.

Finally, I hypothesized that within both types of justification logics, human-centric discourses within a sovereign rights logic of justification would become increasingly more prevalent over time. This hypothesis was not supported. By examining three cases of high power, symmetrical, non-power divergent conflicts at three points in time in chapter 5, I sought to understand the extent to which a discursive transformation
may have, or have not, occurred. These case studies revealed no discernable temporal trend, suggesting that the factors that influence the use of human- or interest-centric discourses must be structural or contextual in nature. The fsQCA results did not point to power integration, dyad symmetry, colonial power/subject history, or colonial relationships factors influencing the use of discourses of justification. Therefore, the conditions that drive the use of human- or interest-centric discourses must be outside of the score of variables considered by this study. This suggests that future research should examine a broader range of factors than those considered in the current study.

Although several of my hypotheses were not supported, the finding that low power actors invoke sovereign rights logics of justification when in conflict with high power actors provides support for the theoretical expectation that relations of power between combatant actors, defined in terms of state system integration and colonial history, influence the language these actors use to justify war. Because these justifications are reflections of conceptions of legitimate political authority, this finding also provides evidence against the claims of the fracture narrative. Rather than non-state actors challenging the authoritative logic underlying the sovereign state system, their use of sovereign rights logics of justification in asymmetrical/power divergent conflicts indicates a desire to access the benefits and privileges of that system. When interpreted through a post-colonial and critical race lens, we can understand these claims as challenging their exclusion from the system, an exclusion that for much of the world was rooted in a legacy of racialized colonial subjugation. Just war revival claims have argued that states have had to alter the language of justification in response to the challenge of non-state actors; these findings provide limited support for that assertion. High power
actors were shown to use sovereign rights logics of justification in symmetrical/non-power divergent conflicts, however, the fsQCA results provided no evidence of the frames that are employed by high power actors in asymmetrical/power divergent conflicts.

Thus, it may be the case that high power actors have altered the language they use in wars against low power actors because of the challenge posed by non-state actors, however, I argue that the reasons for this shift in language is not occurring because the old rules of the system no longer apply, as asserted by the just war revival claims. Rather, in the context of the finding that low power actors invoke sovereign rights logics of justification in asymmetrical/power divergent conflicts, the absence of sovereign rights logics among high power actors in these conflicts would indicate that high power actors are reacting to the challenge of exclusion posed by low power actors. By not using sovereign rights logics of justification in these conflicts, high power actors are refusing to allow those who threaten their privileged status play by the same set of rules that grants them that privilege.

Theoretically, these findings provide support for the relational ontology advocated by Go (2013) and other recent post-colonial theorists, and calls into question the nature, or perhaps the very existence of, the perceived threat to the authority of the state system. The fracture narrative, which has dominated political scholarship in the post-Cold War, and particularly in the post-9/11, eras have been dominated by fears that the sovereign state system is under threat by non-state challengers who seek to dismantle its authority. The language used to justify war has been cited as evidence of this dangerous transformation, suggesting that states have had to reformulate their language of waging
war as non-state challengers have rendered previous formulations obsolete (Falk 2002, Lawler 2004). The relational ontology employed by this study challenges this vision, however. The findings highlighted here support the preliminary findings of Clever (2012) that states are not eschewing sovereignist frameworks in the face of non-state challengers because the authoritative logic of the sovereign rights system is fracturing. Rather, this study uncovered evidence that it is relations of power, embedded in a state system that developed through imperial conquest and colonial domination, which drive the use of justification frames. The evidence indicates that low power actors may in fact threaten the stability of the sovereign state system, but not in the manner characterized by the fracture narrative. The threat is not to the authoritative logic of the system, but rather to the uneven distribution of the powers and privileges of that system that stems from a legacy of colonization, which produced lasting divisions in power.

The sovereign state system has been experienced as a system of protection and security for much of the world for hundreds of years, and the erosion of its authority would pose danger to millions. However, it is also essential to realize that the safety and security offered by this system is not experienced equally. For the majority of the world’s population, the power and authority of the state system has been experienced through violence and colonial exploitation. The impact of the colonial legacy was further explored in chapter 7, in which I examined the factors that contributed to one specific justification discourse: dignity. By employing language related to dignity and humiliation, formerly colonized groups are not necessarily challenging or rejecting the authority of the state system. Rather, they seek to claim the dignity and privilege that being integrated into and a beneficiary of such a system confers.
These findings carry implications for conflict resolution. Because divisions in power between actors produce different understandings of when war is appropriate and actionable, diplomatic efforts can focus on bridging these gaps in understanding by acknowledging the benefits that being integrated into the state system offers high power actors, and by acknowledging the resentment that exclusion from that system creates among low power actors. This was the strategy employed by Greek Foreign Minister (and later Prime Minister) George Papandreou in mediating long-standing tensions between Greece and Turkey in the late 1990s. Disagreements over sovereignty and natural resources between the two countries, along with a long history of distrust deeply embedded within both cultures, brought the two countries to the brink of armed conflict in 1999. Tensions began to dissolve, however, when foreign minister Papandreou went to Turkey and offered to support Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Union, and began to publicly talk about the benefits of a shared future between Greece and Turkey (Vedantam 2013).

Understanding how exclusions from systems of power in general, and the legacy of colonialism in particular, as having a lasting impact on the emotional language used to justify war supports the restorative justice approach to conflict resolution. Restorative justice programs as applied to civil and international violence have been typically used with the objective of resolving ethnic, inter-communal, and cultural hatreds that stem from protracted conflict and human rights violations (Avruch & Vejarano 2001). Typically these programs are implemented by governments or international organizations, such as the United Nations, in countries experiencing a tenuous post-conflict transition, for example in South Africa, Guatemala, and East Timor. Employing a
reconciliation framework, restorative justice programs seek to bridge community divides created by the conflict by allowing the perpetrators and victims of violence to openly discuss and confront the emotional legacy of the conflict. Although meeting with varying degrees of success (Hayner 1994), such programs have been shown to be largely effective in dissolving tensions and promoting lasting peace among both civil and international conflicts when reconciliation events lead to the redefinition of identities and partial justice to address wrong-doings; that is “reconciliation occurs when shame and anger that often lead to aggression or a desire for revenge are superceded by a different emotive and cognitive path—empathy and desire for affiliation” (Long & Brecke 2003: 28). Long and Brecke (2003) argue that by integrating emotion into the conflict resolution process, previously antagonistic groups are able to redefine their identities away from “us-them” and toward a super-ordinate national or international identity within which all parties are included and all parties have a stake in maintaining.

Building effective strategies for negotiating and maintaining lasting peace in conflicts involving non-state combatants will require addressing the legacy of colonial subjugation and the ongoing exclusion from the state system that is experienced by these groups. Diplomatic efforts can focus on bridging these gaps in understanding by acknowledging the benefits that being integrated into the state system offers high power actors, the privileges that former colonial powers continue to enjoy because of colonial exploitation, and by acknowledging the resentment that exclusion from that this system has created among those who have experienced colonial subjugation or otherwise have been excluded from the state system.
For those who operate from the vantage of being the beneficiaries of a system of power, it can be difficult to understand how exclusion from such a system can be experienced as both hatred and envy, a desire to destroy the system while simultaneously desiring to be part of it. The complex results of this study highlight the Janus-faced nature of this relationship and emphasize the importance of putting the dynamics of power and exclusion in conversation with one another to better understand the nature of conflict and political authority.
Appendix

Appendix Table 1. Case Selection

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<tr>
<th>Combatant Name</th>
<th>War Name</th>
<th>Year Initiated</th>
<th>War Type</th>
<th>Geographic Area</th>
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<td>1618</td>
<td>External</td>
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<td>Shimabara Revolt</td>
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<td>Internal separatist</td>
<td>Asia</td>
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<td>English Civil War</td>
<td>1642</td>
<td>Internal for central control</td>
<td>Europe</td>
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## Appendix Table 2. Coding Schemes by Round of Coding

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<td><em>Consistency check of second round coding, minor consolidation of similar codes</em></td>
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<td>Disc: obligation to homeland</td>
<td>Disc: people extra-territorial identity (national/ethnic/religious community)</td>
<td>Disc: people extra-territorial identity (national/ethnic/religious community)</td>
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<td>Disc: people (general innocents)</td>
<td>Disc: people government obligation (subjects/citizens/ruler/homeland)</td>
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<td>government obligation to subjects/citizens</td>
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<td>Violation of human rights</td>
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<td>Violation of international law</td>
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<td>Violation of law/treaty/constitution</td>
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<td>Violation of national sovereignty</td>
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<td>Violation of religion</td>
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<td>Violation of state sovereignty</td>
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<td>Welfare/abuse of population</td>
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References


King George II. 1756. *His Majesty’s Declaration of War against the French King*. London: Printed by Thomas Baskett, printer of the King.


